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diff --git a/40665.txt b/40665.txt deleted file mode 100644 index fd948b9..0000000 --- a/40665.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14126 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, Studies in Logical Theory, by John Dewey - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - - - - -Title: Studies in Logical Theory - - -Author: John Dewey - - - -Release Date: September 5, 2012 [eBook #40665] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY*** - - -E-text prepared by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) - - - -Transcriber's note: - - 1. Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). - - 2. In the mathematical expressions in this text the carat - character represents 'raised to the power' (example: - 1+3=2^2). - - 3. The original text includes Greek characters. For this - text file version these letters have been replaced with - their transliterations, with the exception of Greek - letter 'pi' which is represented as [pi]. - - - - - -STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY - -by - -JOHN DEWEY - -Professor of Philosophy - -With the Co-Operation of Members and Fellows of the -Department of Philosophy - -The Decennial Publications -Second Series Volume Xi - - - - - - - -Chicago -The University of Chicago Press -1903 - -Copyright, 1903 -By the University of Chicago - - - - -PREFACE - - -This volume presents some results of the work done in the matter of -logical theory in the Department of Philosophy of the University of -Chicago in the first decade of its existence. The eleven Studies are the -work of eight different hands, all, with the exception of the editor, -having at some period held Fellowships in this University, Dr. Heidel in -Greek, the others in Philosophy. Their names and present pursuits are -indicated in the Table of Contents. The editor has occasionally, though -rarely, added a footnote or phrase which might serve to connect one -Study more closely with another. The pages in the discussion of -Hypothesis, on Mill and Whewell, are by him. With these exceptions, each -writer is individually and completely responsible for his own Study. - -The various Studies present, the editor believes, about the relative -amount of agreement and disagreement that is natural in view of the -conditions of their origin. The various writers have been in contact -with one another in Seminars and lecture courses in pursuit of the same -topics, and have had to do with shaping one another's views. There are -several others, not represented in this volume, who have also -participated in the evolution of the point of view herein set forth, and -to whom the writers acknowledge their indebtedness. The disagreements -proceed from the diversity of interests with which the different writers -approach the logical topic; and from the fact that the point of view in -question is still (happily) developing and showing no signs of becoming -a closed system. - -If the Studies themselves do not give a fair notion of the nature and -degree of the harmony in the different writers' methods, a preface is -not likely to succeed in so doing. A few words may be in place, however, -about a matter repeatedly touched upon, but nowhere consecutively -elaborated--the more ultimate philosophical bearing of what is set -forth. All agree, the editor takes the liberty of saying, that judgment -is the central function of knowing, and hence affords the central -problem of logic; that since the act of knowing is intimately and -indissolubly connected with the like yet diverse functions of affection, -appreciation, and practice, it only distorts results reached to treat -knowing as a self-inclosed and self-explanatory whole--hence the -intimate connections of logical theory with functional psychology; that -since knowledge appears as a function within experience, and yet passes -judgment upon both the processes and contents of other functions, its -work and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or transformatory; -that since Reality must be defined in terms of experience, judgment -appears accordingly as the medium through which the consciously effected -evolution of Reality goes on; that there is no reasonable standard of -truth (or of success of the knowing function) in general, except upon -the postulate that Reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving, and, in -particular, except through reference to the specific offices which -knowing is called upon to perform in readjusting and expanding the means -and ends of life. And all agree that this conception gives the only -promising basis upon which the working methods of science, and the -proper demands of the moral life, may co-operate. All this, doubtless, -does not take us very far on the road to detailed conclusions, but it is -better, perhaps, to get started in the right direction than to be so -definite as to erect a dead-wall in the way of farther movement of -thought. - -In general, the obligations in logical matters of the writers are -roughly commensurate with the direction of their criticisms. Upon the -whole, most is due to those whose views are most sharply opposed. To -Mill, Lotze, Bosanquet, and Bradley the writers then owe special -indebtedness. The editor acknowledges personal indebtedness to his -present colleagues, particularly to Mr. George H. Mead, in the Faculty -of Philosophy, and to a former colleague, Dr. Alfred H. Lloyd, of the -University of Michigan. For both inspiration and the forging of the -tools with which the writers have worked there is a pre-eminent -obligation on the part of all of us to William James, of Harvard -University, who, we hope, will accept this acknowledgment and this book -as unworthy tokens of a regard and an admiration that are coequal. - - - - -TABLE OF CONTENTS - - - I. Thought and its Subject-Matter 1 - - By JOHN DEWEY - - II. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Antecedents of Thought 23 - - By JOHN DEWEY - - III. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Datum of Thinking 49 - - By JOHN DEWEY - - IV. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Content and - Object of Thought 65 - - By JOHN DEWEY - - V. Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment 86 - - By HELEN BRADFORD THOMPSON, Ph.D., Director of the - Psychological Laboratory of Mount Holyoke College - - VI. Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment 127 - - By SIMON FRASER MCLENNAN, Ph.D., Professor of - Philosophy in Oberlin College - - VII. The Nature of Hypothesis 142 - - By MYRON LUCIUS ASHLEY, Ph.D., Instructor, - American Correspondence School - - VIII. Image and Idea in Logic 183 - - By WILLARD CLARK GORE, Ph.D., Assistant Professor - of Psychology in the University of Chicago - - IX. The Logic of the Pre-Socratic Philosophy 203 - - By WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL, Ph.D., Professor of - Latin in Iowa College - - X. Valuation as a Logical Process 227 - - By HENRY WALDGRAVE STUART, Ph.D., Instructor in - Philosophy in the State University of Iowa - - XI. Some Logical Aspects of Purpose 341 - - By ADDISON WEBSTER MOORE, Ph.D., Assistant Professor - of Philosophy in the University of Chicago - - - - -I - -THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF LOGICAL THEORY - - -No one doubts that thought, at least reflective, as distinct from what -is sometimes called constitutive, thought, is derivative and secondary. -It comes after something and out of something, and for the sake of -something. No one doubts that the thinking of everyday practical life -and of science is of this reflective type. We think about; we reflect -over. If we ask what it is which is primary and radical to thought; if -we ask what is the final objective for the sake of which thought -intervenes; if we ask in what sense we are to understand thought as a -derived procedure, we are plunging ourselves into the very heart of the -logical problem: the relation of thought to its empirical antecedents -and to its consequent, truth, and the relation of truth to reality. - -Yet from the naive point of view no difficulty attaches to these -questions. The antecedents of thought are our universe of life and love; -of appreciation and struggle. We think about anything and everything: -snow on the ground; the alternating clanks and thuds that rise from -below; the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the embroglio in -Venezuela; the relation of art to industry; the poetic quality of a -painting by Botticelli; the battle of Marathon; the economic -interpretation of history; the proper definition of cause; the best -method of reducing expenses; whether and how to renew the ties of a -broken friendship; the interpretation of an equation in hydrodynamics; -etc. - -Through the madness of this miscellaneous citation there appears so much -of method: anything--event, act, value, ideal, person, or place--may be -an object of thought. Reflection busies itself alike with physical -nature, the record of social achievement, and the endeavors of social -aspiration. It is with reference to _such_ affairs that thought is -derivative; it is with reference to them that it intervenes or mediates. -Taking some part of the universe of action, of affection, of social -construction, under its special charge, and having busied itself -therewith sufficiently to meet the special difficulty presented, thought -releases that topic and enters upon further more direct experience. - -Sticking for a moment to this naive standpoint, we recognize a certain -rhythm of direct practice and derived theory; of primary construction -and of secondary criticism; of living appreciation and of abstract -description; of active endeavor and of pale reflection. We find that -every more direct primary attitude passes upon occasion into its -secondary deliberative and discursive counterpart. We find that when the -latter has done its work it passes away and passes on. From the naive -standpoint such rhythm is taken as a matter of course. There is no -attempt to state either the nature of the occasion which demands the -thinking attitude, nor to formulate a theory of the standard by which is -judged its success. No general theory is propounded as to the exact -relationship between thinking and what antecedes and succeeds it. Much -less do we ask how empirical circumstances can generate rationality of -thought; nor how it is possible for reflection to lay claim to power of -determining truth and thereby of constructing further reality. - -If we were to ask the thinking of naive life to present, with a minimum -of theoretical elaboration, its conception of its own practice, we -should get an answer running not unlike this: Thinking is a kind of -activity which we perform at specific need, just as at other need we -engage in other sorts of activity: as converse with a friend; draw a -plan for a house; take a walk; eat a dinner; purchase a suit of -clothes; etc., etc. In general, its material is anything in the wide -universe which seems to be relevant to this need--anything which may -serve as a resource in defining the difficulty or in suggesting modes of -dealing effectively with it. The measure of its success, the standard of -its validity, is precisely the degree in which the thinking actually -disposes of the difficulty and allows us to proceed with more direct -modes of experiencing, that are forthwith possessed of more assured and -deepened value. - -If we inquire why the naive attitude does not go on to elaborate these -implications of its own practice into a systematic theory, the answer, -on its own basis, is obvious. Thought arises in response to its own -occasion. And this occasion is so exacting that there is time, as there -is need, only to do the thinking which is needed in that occasion--not -to reflect upon the thinking itself. Reflection follows so naturally -upon its appropriate cue, its issue is so obvious, so practical, the -entire relationship is so organic, that once grant the position that -thought arises in reaction to specific demand, and there is not the -particular type of thinking called logical theory because there is not -the practical demand for reflection of that sort. Our attention is taken -up with particular questions and specific answers. What we have to -reckon with is not the problem of, How can I think _ueberhaupt_? but, How -shall I think right _here and now_? Not what is the test of thought at -large, but what validates and confirms _this_ thought? - -In conformity with this view, it follows that a generic account of our -thinking behavior, the generic account termed logical theory, arises at -historic periods in which the situation has lost the organic character -above described. The general theory of reflection, as over against its -concrete exercise, appears when occasions for reflection are so -overwhelming and so mutually conflicting that specific adequate -response in thought is blocked. Again, it shows itself when practical -affairs are so multifarious, complicated, and remote from control that -thinking is held off from successful passage into them. - -Anyhow (sticking to the naive standpoint), it is true that the stimulus -to that particular form of reflective thinking termed logical theory is -found when circumstances require the act of thinking and nevertheless -impede clear and coherent thinking in detail; or when they occasion -thought and then prevent the results of thinking from exercising -directive influence upon the immediate concerns of life. Under these -conditions we get such questions as the following: What is the relation -of rational thought to crude or unreflective experience? What is the -relation of thought to reality? What is the barrier which prevents -reason from complete penetration into the world of truth? What is it -that makes us live alternately in a concrete world of experience in -which thought as such finds not satisfaction, and in a world of ordered -thought which is yet only abstract and ideal? - -It is not my intention here to pursue the line of historical inquiry -thus suggested. Indeed, the point would not be mentioned did it not -serve to fix attention upon the nature of the logical problem. - -It is in dealing with this latter type of questions that logical theory -has taken a turn which separates it widely from the theoretical -implications of practical deliberation and of scientific research. The -two latter, however much they differ from each other in detail, agree in -a fundamental principle. They both assume that every reflective problem -and operation arises with reference to some _specific_ situation, and -has to subserve a _specific_ purpose dependent upon its own occasion. -They assume and observe distinct limits--limits from which and to which. -There is the limit of origin in the needs of the particular situation -which evokes reflection. There is the limit of terminus in successful -dealing with the particular problem presented--or in retiring, baffled, -to take up some other question. The query that at once faces us -regarding the nature of logical theory is whether reflection upon -reflection shall recognize these limits, endeavoring to formulate them -more exactly and to define their relationships to each other more -adequately; or shall it abolish limits, do away with the matter of -specific conditions and specific aims of thought, and discuss thought -and its relation to empirical antecedents and rational consequents -(truth) at large? - -At first blush, it might seem as if the very nature of logical theory as -generalization of the reflective process must of necessity disregard the -matter of particular conditions and particular results as irrelevant. -How, the implication runs, could reflection become generalized save by -elimination of details as irrelevant? Such a conception in fixing the -central problem of logic fixes once for all its future career and -material. The essential business of logic is henceforth to discuss the -relation of thought as such to reality as such. It may, indeed, involve -much psychological material, particularly in the discussion of the -processes which antecede thinking and which call it out. It may involve -much discussion of the concrete methods of investigation and -verification employed in the various sciences. It may busily concern -itself with the differentiation of various types and forms of -thought--different modes of conceiving, various conformations of -judgment, various types of inferential reasoning. But it concerns itself -with any and all of these three fields, not on their own account or as -ultimate, but as subsidiary to the main problem: the relation of thought -as such, or at large, to reality as such, or at large. Some of the -detailed considerations referred to may throw light upon the terms under -which thought transacts its business with reality; upon, say, certain -peculiar limitations it has to submit to as best it may. Other -considerations throw light upon the ways in which thought gets at -reality. Still other considerations throw light upon the forms which -thought assumes in attacking and apprehending reality. But in the end -all this is incidental. In the end the one problem holds: How do the -specifications of thought as such hold good of reality as such? In fine, -logic is supposed to grow out of the epistemological inquiry and to lead -up to its solution. - -From this point of view various aspects of logical theory are well -stated by an author whom later on we shall consider in some detail. -Lotze[1] refers to "universal forms and principles of thought which hold -good everywhere both in judging of reality and in weighing possibility, -_irrespective of any difference in the objects_." This defines the -business of _pure_ logic. This is clearly the question of thought as -such--of thought at large or in general. Then we have the question "of -how far the most complete structure of thought ... can claim to be an -adequate account of that which we seem compelled to assume as the object -and occasion of our ideas." This is clearly the question of the relation -of thought at large to reality at large. It is epistemology. Then comes -"applied logic," having to do with the actual employment of concrete -forms of thought with reference to investigation of specific topics and -subjects. This "applied" logic would, if the standpoint of practical -deliberation and of scientific research were adopted, be the sole -genuine logic. But the existence of thought _in itself_ having been -agreed upon, we have in this "applied" logic only an incidental inquiry -of how the particular resistances and oppositions which "pure" thought -meets from particular matters may best be discounted. It is concerned -with methods of investigation which obviate defects in the relationship -of thought at large to reality at large, as these present themselves -under the limitations of human experience. It deals merely with -hindrances, and with devices for overcoming them; it is directed by -considerations of utility. When we reflect that this field includes the -entire procedure of practical deliberation and of concrete scientific -research, we begin to realize something of the significance of the -theory of logic which regards the limitations of specific origination -and specific outcome as irrelevant to its main problem, which assumes an -activity of thought "pure" or "in itself," that is, "irrespective of any -difference in its objects." - -This suggests, by contrast, the opposite mode of stating the problem of -logical theory. Generalization of the nature of the reflective process -certainly involves elimination of much of the specific material and -contents of the thought-situations of daily life and of critical -science. Quite compatible with this, however, is the notion that it -seizes upon _certain_ specific conditions and factors, and aims to bring -them to clear consciousness--not to abolish them. While eliminating the -particular material of particular practical and scientific pursuits, -(1) it may strive to hit upon the common denominator in the various -situations which are antecedent or primary to thought and which evoke -it; (2) it may attempt to show how typical features in the specific -antecedents of thought call out to diverse typical modes of -thought-reaction; (3) it may attempt to state the nature of the specific -consequences in which thought fulfils its career. - -(1) It does not eliminate dependence upon specific occasions as -provocative of thought; but endeavors to define _what_ in the various -situations constitutes them thought-provoking. The specific occasion is -not eliminated, but insisted upon and brought into the foreground. -Consequently psychological considerations are not subsidiary incidents, -but of essential importance so far as they enable us to trace the -generation of the thought-situation. (2) So from this point of view the -various types and modes of conceiving, judging, and inference are -treated, not as qualifications of thought per se or at large, but of -thought engaged in its specific, most economic, effective response to -its own particular occasion; they are adaptations for control of -stimuli. The distinctions and classifications that have been accumulated -in "formal" logic are relevant data; but they demand interpretation from -the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment to material antecedents -and stimuli. (3) Finally the question of validity, or ultimate objective -of thought, is relevant; but is such as a matter of the specific issue -of the specific career of a thought-function. All the typical -investigatory and verificatory procedures of the various sciences are -inherently concerned as indicating the ways in which thought actually -brings itself to its own successful fulfilment in dealing with various -types of problems. - -While the epistemological type of logic may, as we have seen, leave -(under the name of applied logic), a subsidiary place open for the -instrumental type, the type which deals with thinking as a specific -procedure relative to a specific antecedent occasion and to a subsequent -specific fulfilment, is not able to reciprocate the favor. From its -point of view, an attempt to discuss the antecedents, data, forms, and -objective of thought, apart from reference to particular position -occupied, and particular part played in the growth of experience is to -reach results which are not so much either true or false as they are -radically meaningless--because they are considered apart from limits. -Its results are not only abstractions (for all theorizing ends in -abstractions), but abstractions without possible reference or bearing. -From this point of view, the taking of something, whether that something -be thinking activity, its empirical condition, or its objective goal, -apart from the limits of a historic or developing situation, is the -essence of _metaphysical_ procedure--in the sense of metaphysics which -makes a gulf between it and science. - -As the reader has doubtless anticipated, it is the object of this -chapter to present the problem and industry of reflective thought from -this latter point of view. I recur again to the standpoint of naive -experience, using the term in a sense wide enough to cover both -practical procedure and concrete scientific research. I resume by saying -that this point of view knows no fixed distinction between the empirical -values of unreflective life and the most abstract process of rational -thought. It knows no fixed gulf between the highest flight of theory and -control of the details of practical construction and behavior. It -passes, according to the occasion and opportunity of the moment, from -the attitude of loving and struggling and doing to that of thinking and -the reverse. Its contents or material shift their values back and forth -from technological or utilitarian to aesthetic, ethic, or affectional. It -utilizes data of perception or of discursive ideation as need calls, -just as an inventor now utilizes heat, now mechanical strain, now -electricity, according to the demands set by his aim. From this point of -view, more definite logical import is attached to our earlier statements -(p. 2) regarding the possibility of taking anything in the universe of -experience as subject-matter of thought. Anything from past experience -may be taken which appears to be an element in either the statement or -the solution of the present problem. Thus we understand the coexistence -without contradiction of an indeterminate possible field and a limited -actual field. The undefined set of means becomes specific through -reference to an end. - -In all this, there is no difference of kind between the methods of -science and those of the plain man. The difference is the greater -control in science of the statement of the problem, and of the -selection and use of relevant material, both sensible or ideational. The -two are related to each other just as the hit-or-miss, trial-and-error -inventions of uncivilized man stand to the deliberate and consecutively -persistent efforts of a modern inventor to produce a certain complicated -device for doing a comprehensive piece of work. Neither the plain man -nor the scientific inquirer is aware, as he engages in his reflective -activity, of any transition from one sphere of existence to another. He -knows no two fixed worlds--reality on one side and mere subjective ideas -on the other; he is aware of no gulf to cross. He assumes uninterrupted, -free, and fluid passage from ordinary experience to abstract thinking, -from thought to fact, from things to theories and back again. -Observation passes into development of hypothesis; deductive methods -pass to use in description of the particular; inference passes into -action with no sense of difficulty save those found in the particular -task in question. The fundamental assumption is _continuity_ in and of -experience. - -This does not mean that fact is confused with idea, or observed datum -with voluntary hypothesis, theory with doing, any more than a traveler -confuses land and water when he journeys from one to the other. It -simply means that each is placed and used with reference to service -rendered the other, and with reference to future use of the other. - -Only the epistemological spectator is aware of the fact that the -everyday man and the scientific man in this free and easy intercourse -are rashly assuming the right to glide over a cleft in the very -structure of reality. This fact raises a query not favorable to the -epistemologist. Why is it that the scientific man, who is constantly -plying his venturous traffic of exchange of facts for ideas, of theories -for laws, of real things for hypotheses, should be so wholly unaware of -the radical and generic (as distinct from specific) difficulty of the -undertakings in which he is engaged? We thus come afresh to our inquiry: -Does not the epistemological logician unwittingly transfer the specific -difficulty which always faces the scientific man--the difficulty in -detail of correct and adequate translation back and forth of _this_ set -of facts and _this_ group of ideas--into a totally different problem of -the wholesale relation of thought at large with reality in general? If -such be the case, it is clear that the very way in which the -epistemological type of logic states the problem of thinking, in -relation both to empirical antecedents and to objective truth, makes -that problem insoluble. Working terms, terms which as working are -flexible and historic, relative, are transformed into absolute, fixed, -and predetermined forms of being. - -We come a little closer to the problem when we recognize that every -scientific inquiry passes historically through at least four stages. -(_a_) The first of these stages is, if I may be allowed the bull, that -in which scientific inquiry does not take place at all, because no -problem or difficulty in the quality of the experience has presented -itself to provoke reflection. We have only to cast our eye back from the -existing status of any science, or back from the status of any -particular topic in any science, to discover a time when no reflective -or critical thinking busied itself with the matter--when the facts and -relations were taken for granted and thus were lost and absorbed in the -value which accrued from the experience. (_b_) After the dawning of the -problem, there comes a period of occupation with relatively crude and -unorganized facts--the hunting for, locating, and collecting of raw -material. This is the empiric stage, which no existing science, however -proud in its attained rationality, can disavow as its own progenitor. -(_c_) Then there is also a speculative stage: a period of guessing, of -making hypotheses, of framing ideas which later on are labeled and -condemned as only ideas. There is a period of distinction and -classification-making which later on is regarded as only -mentally-gymnastic in character. And no science, however proud in its -present security of experimental assurance, can disavow a scholastic -ancestor. (_d_) Finally, there comes a period of fruitful interaction -between the mere ideas and the mere facts: a period when observation is -determined by experimental conditions depending upon the use of certain -guiding conceptions; when reflection is directed and checked at every -point by the use of experimental data, and by the necessity of finding -such form for itself as will enable it to serve as premise in a -deduction leading to evolution of new meanings, and ultimately to -experimental inquiry, which brings to light new facts. In the emerging -of a more orderly and significant region of fact, and of a more coherent -and self-luminous system of meaning, we have the natural limit of -evolution of the logic of a given science. - -But consider what has happened in this historic record. Unanalyzed -experience has broken up into distinctions of facts and ideas; the -factual side has been developed by indefinite and almost miscellaneous -descriptions and cumulative listings; the conceptual side has been -developed by unchecked and speculative elaboration of definitions, -classifications, etc. There has been a relegation of accepted meanings -to the limbo of mere ideas; there has been a passage of some of the -accepted facts into the region of mere hypothesis and opinion. -Conversely, there has been a continued issuing of ideas from the region -of hypotheses and theories into that of facts, of accepted objective and -meaningful contents. Out of a world of only _seeming_ facts, and of only -_doubtful_ ideas, there emerges a universe continually growing in -definiteness, order, and luminosity. - -This progress, verified in every record of science, is an absolute -monstrosity from the standpoint of the epistemology which assumes a -thought in general, on one side, and a reality in general, on the other. -The reason that it does not present itself as such a monster and miracle -to those actually concerned with it is because there is a certain -_homogeneity_ or _continuity_ of reference and of use which controls all -diversities in both the modes of existence specified and the grades of -value assigned. The distinction of thought and fact is treated in the -growth of a science, or of any particular scientific problem, as an -_induced_ and _intentional_ practical division of labor; as relative -assignments of position with reference to performance of a task; as -deliberate distribution of forces at command for their more economic -use. The interaction of bald fact and hypothetical idea into the outcome -of a single world of scientific apprehension and comprehension is but -the successful achieving of the aim on account of which the distinctions -in question were instituted. - -Thus we come back to the problem of logical theory. To take the -distinctions of thought and fact, etc., as ontological, as inherently -fixed in the make-up of the structure of being, is to treat the actual -development of scientific inquiry and scientific control as a mere -subsidiary topic ultimately of only utilitarian worth. It is also to -state the terms upon which thought and being transact business in a way -so totally alien to the use made of these distinctions in concrete -experience as to create a problem which can be discussed only in terms -of itself--not in terms of the conduct of life--metaphysics again in the -bad sense of that term. As against this, the problem of a logic which -aligns itself with the origin and employ of reflective thought in -everyday life and in critical science, is to follow the natural history -of thinking as a life-process having its own generating antecedents and -stimuli, its own states and career, and its own specific objective or -limit. - -This point of view makes it possible for logical theory to come to terms -with psychology.[2] When logic is considered as having to do with the -wholesale activity of thought per se, the question of the historic -process by which this or that particular thought came to be, of how its -object happens to present itself as sensation, or perception, or -conception, is quite irrelevant. These things are mere temporal -accidents. The psychologist (not lifting his gaze from the realm of the -changeable) may find in them matters of interest. His whole industry is -just with natural history--to trace series of psychical events as they -mutually excite and inhibit one another. But the logician, we are told, -has a deeper problem and an outlook of more unbounded horizon. He deals -with the question of the eternal nature of thought and its eternal -validity in relation to an eternal reality. He is concerned, not with -genesis, but with value, not with a historic cycle, but with absolute -distinctions and relations. - -Still the query haunts us: Is this so in truth? Or has the logician of a -certain type arbitrarily made it thus by taking his terms apart from -reference to the specific occasions in which they arise and situations -in which they function? If the latter, then the very denial of historic -relationship and of the significance of historic method, is indicative -only of the unreal character of his own abstraction. It means in effect -that the affairs under consideration have been isolated from the -conditions in which alone they have determinable meaning and assignable -worth. It is astonishing that, in the face of the advance of the -evolutionary method in natural science, any logician can persist in the -assertion of a rigid difference between the problem of origin and of -nature; between genesis and analysis; between history and validity. Such -assertion simply reiterates as final a distinction which grew up and -had meaning in pre-evolutionary science. It asserts against the most -marked advance which scientific method has yet made a survival of a -crude period of logical scientific procedure. We have no choice save -either to conceive of thinking as a response to a specific stimulus, or -else to regard it as something "in itself," having just in and of itself -certain traits, elements, and laws. If we give up the last view, we must -take the former. - -The entire significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social -history is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every -grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument of -adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation. Its -meaning, its character, its value, is known when, and only when, it is -considered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in some -specific situation. This analysis of value is carried out in detail by -tracing successive stages of development--by endeavoring to locate the -particular situation in which each structure has its origin, and by -tracing the successive modifications through which, in response to -changing media, it has reached its present conformation.[3] To persist -in condemning natural history from the standpoint of what natural -history meant before it identified itself with an evolutionary process -is not so much to exclude the natural-history standpoint from -philosophic consideration as it is to evince ignorance of what it -signifies. - -Psychology as the natural history of the various attitudes and -structures through which experiencing passes, as an account of the -conditions under which this or that state emerges, and of the way in -which it influences, by stimulation or inhibition, production of other -states or conformations of consciousness, is indispensable to logical -evaluation, the moment we treat logical theory as an account of -thinking as a mode of adaptation to its own generating conditions, and -judge its validity by reference to its efficiency in meeting its -problems. The historical point of view describes the sequence; the -normative follows the sequence to its conclusion, and then turns back -and judges each historical step by viewing it in reference to its own -outcome.[4] - -In the course of changing experience we keep our balance as we move from -situations of an affectional quality to those which are practical or -appreciative or reflective, because we bear constantly in mind the -context in which any particular distinction presents itself. As we -submit each characteristic function and situation of experience to our -gaze, we find it has a dual aspect. Wherever there is striving there are -obstacles; wherever there is affection there are persons who are -attached; wherever there is doing there is accomplishment; wherever -there is appreciation there is value; wherever there is thinking there -is material-in-question. We keep our footing as we move from one -attitude to another, from one characteristic quality to another, because -we know the position occupied in the whole growth by the particular -function in which we are engaged, and the position within the function -of the particular element that engages us. - -The distinction _between_ each attitude and function and its predecessor -and successor is serial, dynamic, operative. The distinctions _within_ -any given operation or function are structural, contemporaneous, and -distributive. Thinking follows, we will say, striving, and doing follows -thinking. Each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls -out its successor. But coincident, simultaneous, and correspondent -_within_ doing, is the distinction of doer and of deed; _within_ the -function of thought, of thinking and material thought upon; within the -function of striving, of obstacle of aim, of means and end. We keep our -paths straight because we do not confuse the sequential, efficient, and -functional relationship of types of experience with the contemporaneous, -correlative, and structural distinctions of elements within a given -function. In the seeming maze of endless confusion and unlimited -shiftings, we find our way by the means of the stimulations and checks -occurring within the process we are actually engaged with. We do not -contrast or confuse a condition or state which is an element in the -formation of one operation with the status or element which is one of -the distributive terms of another function. If we do, we have at once an -insoluble, because meaningless, problem upon our hands. - -Now the epistemological logician deliberately shuts himself off from -those cues and checks upon which the plain man instinctively relies, and -which the scientific man deliberately searches for and adopts as -constituting his technique. Consequently he is likely to set the sort of -object or material which has place and significance only in one of the -serial functional situations of experience, over against the active -attitude which describes part of the structural constitution of another -situation; or with equal lack of justification to assimilate terms -characteristic of different stages to one another. He sets the agent, as -he is found in the intimacy of love or appreciation, over against the -externality of the fact, as that is defined within the reflective -process. He takes the material which thought selects as its own basis -for further procedure to be identical with the significant content which -it secures for itself in the successful pursuit of its aim; and this in -turn he regards as the material which was presented at the outset, and -whose peculiarities were the express means of awakening thought. He -identifies the final deposit of the thought-function with its own -generating antecedent, and then disposes of the resulting surd by -reference to some metaphysical consideration, which remains when logical -inquiry, when science (as interpreted by him), has done its work. He -does this, not because he prefers confusion to order, or error to truth, -but simply because, when the chain of historic sequence is cut, the -vessel of thought is afloat to veer upon a sea without soundings or -moorings. There are but two alternatives: either there is an object "in -itself" of thought "in itself," or else there are a series of values -which vary with the varying functions to which they belong. If the -latter, the only way these values can be defined is by discriminating -the functions to which they belong. It is only conditions relative to a -specific period or epoch of development in a cycle of experience -which-enables one to tell what to do next, or to estimate the value and -meaning of what is already done. And the epistemological logician, in -choosing to take his question as one of thought which has its own form -just as "thought," apart from the limits of the special work it has to -do, has deprived himself of these supports and stays. - -The problem of logic has a more general and a more specific phase. In -its generic form, it deals with this question: How does one type of -functional situation and attitude in experience pass out of and into -another; for example, the technological or utilitarian into the -aesthetic, the aesthetic into the religious, the religious into the -scientific, and this into the socio-ethical and so on? The more specific -question is: How does the particular functional situation termed the -reflective behave? How shall we describe it? What in detail are its -diverse contemporaneous distinctions, or divisions of labor, its -correspondent _statuses_; in what specific ways do these operate with -reference to each other so as to effect the specific aim which is -proposed by the needs of the affair? - -This chapter may be brought to conclusion by reference to the more -alternate value of the logic of experience, of logic taken in its wider -sense; that is, as an account of the sequence of the various typical -functions or situations of experience in their determining relations to -one another. Philosophy, defined as such a logic, makes no pretense to -be an account of a closed and finished universe. Its business is not to -secure or guarantee any particular reality or value. _Per contra_, it -gets the significance of a method. The right relationship and adjustment -of the various typical phases of experience to one another is a problem -felt in every department of life. Intellectual rectification and control -of these adjustments cannot fail to reflect itself in an added clearness -and security on the practical side. It may be that general logic can not -become an instrument in the immediate direction of the activities of -science or art or industry; but it is of value in criticising and in -organizing the tools of immediate research in these lines. It also has -direct significance in the valuation for social or life-purposes of -results achieved in particular branches. Much of the immediate business -of life is badly done because we do not know in relation to its -congeners the organic genesis and outcome of the work that occupies us. -The manner and degree of appropriation of the values achieved in various -departments of social interest and vocation are partial and faulty -because we are not clear as to the due rights and responsibilities of -one function of experience in reference to others. - -The value of research for social progress; the bearing of psychology -upon educational procedure; the mutual relations of fine and industrial -art; the question of the extent and nature of specialization in science -in comparison with the claims of applied science; the adjustment of -religious aspirations to scientific statements; the justification of a -refined culture for a few in face of economic insufficiency for the -mass--such are a few of the many social questions whose _final_ answer -depends upon the possession and use of a general logic of experience as -a method of inquiry and interpretation. I do not say that headway cannot -be made in such questions apart from the method indicated: a logic of -genetic experience. But unless we have a critical and assured view of -the juncture in which and with reference to which a given attitude or -interest arises, unless we know the service it is thereby called upon to -perform and hence the organs or methods by which it best functions in -that service, our progress is impeded and irregular. We take a part for -a whole, a means for an end, or attack wholesale some other interest -because it interferes with the deified sway of the one we have selected -as ultimate. A clear and comprehensive consensus of social conviction, -and a consequent concentrated and economical direction of effort, are -assured only as there is some way of locating the position and role of -each typical interest and occupation in experience. The domain of -opinion is one of conflict; its rule is arbitrary and costly. Only -intellectual method affords a substitute for opinion. The general logic -of experience can alone do for the region of social values and aims what -the natural sciences after centuries of struggle are doing for activity -in the physical realm. - -This does not mean that systems of philosophy which have attempted to -state the nature either of thought and of reality at large, apart from -limits of particular crises in the growth of experience, have been -worthless--though it does mean that their industry has been somewhat -misapplied. The unfolding of metaphysical theory has made large -contributions to positive evaluations of the typical situations and -relationships of experience--even when its conscious intention has been -quite otherwise. Every system of philosophy is itself a mode of -reflection; consequently (if our main contention be true), it too has -been evoked out of specific social antecedents, and has had its use as -a response to them. It has effected something in modifying the situation -within which it found its origin. It may not have solved the problem -which it consciously put itself; in many cases we may freely admit that -the question put has afterward been found to be so wrongly put as to be -insoluble. Yet exactly the same thing is true, in precisely the same -sense, in the history of science. For this reason, if for no other, it -is impossible for the scientific man to cast the first stone at the -philosopher. - -The progress of science in any branch continually brings with it a -realization that problems in their previous form of statement are -insoluble because put in terms of unreal conditions; because the real -conditions have been mixed up with mental artifacts or misconstructions. -Every science is continually learning that its supposed solutions are -only apparent, because the "solution" solves, not the actual problem, -but one which has been made up. But the very putting of the question, -the very giving of the wrong answer, induces modification of existing -intellectual habits, standpoints, and aims. Wrestling with the problem, -there is evolution of new forms of technique to control its treatment, -there is search for new facts, institution of new types of -experimentation; there is gain in the methodic control of experience. -And all this is progress. It is only the worn-out cynic, the devitalized -sensualist, and the fanatical dogmatist who interpret the continuous -change of science as proving that, since each successive statement is -wrong, the whole record is error and folly; and that the present truth -is only the error not yet found out. Such draw the moral of caring -naught for all these things, or of flying to some external authority -which will deliver once for all the fixed and unchangeable truth. But -historic philosophy even in its aberrant forms has proved a factor in -the valuation of experience; it has brought problems to light, it has -provoked intellectual conflicts without which values are only nominal; -even through its would-be absolutistic isolations, it has secured -recognition of mutual dependencies and reciprocal reinforcements. Yet if -it can define its work more clearly, it can concentrate its energy upon -its own characteristic problem: the genesis and functioning in -experience of various typical interests and occupations with reference -to one another. - - - - -II - -THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS AND CUES OF -THE THOUGHT-FUNCTION - - -We have discriminated logic in its wider sense, concerned with the -sequence of characteristic functions and attitudes in experience, from -logic in its stricter meaning, concerned in particular with description -and interpretation of the function of reflective thought. We must avoid -yielding to the temptation of identifying logic with either of these to -the exclusion of the other; or of supposing that it is possible to -isolate one finally from the other. The more detailed treatment of the -organs and methods of reflection cannot be carried on with security save -as we have a correct idea of the historic position of reflection in the -evolving of experience. Yet it is impossible to determine this larger -placing, save as we have a defined and analytic, as distinct from a -merely vague and gross, view of what we mean by reflection--what is its -actual constitution. It is necessary to work back and forth between the -larger and the narrower fields, transforming every increment upon one -side into a method of work upon the other, and thereby testing it. The -apparent confusion of existing logical theory, its uncertainty as to its -own bounds and limits, its tendency to oscillate from larger questions -of the inherent worth of judgment and validity of inference over to -details of scientific technique, and to translation of distinctions of -formal logic into terms of an investigatory or verificatory process, are -indications of the need of this double movement. - -In the next three chapters it is proposed to take up some of the -considerations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the -narrower conceptions of logical theory. I shall discuss the _locus_ of -the function of thought, so far as such _locus_ enables us to select and -characterize some of the most fundamental distinctions, or divisions of -labor, within the reflective process. In taking up the problem of the -subject-matter of thought, I shall try to make clear that it assumes -three quite distinct forms according to the epochal moment reached in -transformation of experience; and that continual confusion and -inconsistency are introduced when these respective meanings are not -identified and described according to their respective geneses and -places. I shall attempt to show that we must consider subject-matter -from the standpoint, first, of the _antecedents_ or conditions that -evoke thought; second, of the _datum_ or _immediate material_ presented -to thought; and, third, of the _proper content_ of thought. Of these -three distinctions the first, that of antecedent and stimulus, clearly -refers to the situation that is immediately prior to the -thought-function as such. The second, that of datum or immediately given -matter, refers to a distinction which is made within the thought-process -as a part of and for the sake of its own _modus operandi_. It is a -status in the scheme of thinking. The third, that of content or object, -refers to the progress actually made in any thought-function; the -material which is organized into the thought-situation, so far as this -has fulfilled its purpose. It goes without saying that these are to be -discriminated as stages of a life-process in the natural history of -experience, not as ready-made or ontological; it is contended that, save -as they are differentiated in connection with well-defined historical -stages, they are either lumped off as equivalents, or else treated as -absolute divisions--or as each by turns, according to the exigencies of -the particular argument. In fact, this chapter will get at the matter of -preliminary conditions of thought indirectly rather than directly, by -indicating the contradictory positions into which one of the most -vigorous and acute of modern logicians, Lotze, has been forced through -failing to define logical distinctions in terms of the history of -readjustment of experience, and therefore endeavoring to interpret -certain notions as absolute instead of as periodic and methodological. - -Before passing directly to the exposition and criticism of Lotze, it -will be well, however, to take the matter in a somewhat freer way. We -cannot approach logical inquiry in a wholly direct and uncompromised -manner. Of necessity we bring to it certain distinctions--distinctions -partly the outcome of concrete experience; partly due to the logical -theory which has got embodied in ordinary language and in current -intellectual habits; partly results of deliberate scientific and -philosophic inquiry. These more or less ready-made results are -resources; they are the only weapons with which we can attack the new -problem. Yet they are full of unexamined assumptions; they commit us to -all sorts of logically predetermined conclusions. In one sense our study -of the new subject-matter, let us say logical theory, is in truth only a -review, a re-testing and criticising of the intellectual standpoints and -methods which we bring with us to the study. - -Everyone comes with certain distinctions already made between the -subjective and the objective, between the physical and the psychical, -between the intellectual and the factual. (1) We have learned to regard -the region of emotional disturbance, of uncertainty and aspiration, as -belonging somehow peculiarly to ourselves; we have learned to set over -against this a world of observation and of valid thought as something -unaffected by our moods, hopes, fears, and opinions. (2) We have also -come to distinguish between what is immediately present in our -experience and the past and the future; we contrast the realms of memory -and anticipation of sense-perception; the given with the ideal. (3) We -are confirmed in a habit of distinguishing between what we call actual -fact and our mental attitude toward that fact--the attitude of surmise -or wonder or reflective investigation. While one of the aims of logical -theory is precisely to make us critically conscious of the significance -and bearing of these various distinctions, to change them from -ready-made assumptions into controlled constructs, our mental habits are -so set that they tend to have their own way with us; and we read into -logical theory conceptions that were formed before we had even dreamed -of the logical undertaking which after all has for its business to -assign to the terms in question their proper meaning. - -We find in Lotze an unusually explicit inventory of these various -preliminary distinctions; and an unusually serious effort to deal with -the problems which arise from introducing them into the structure of -logical theory. (1) He expressly separates the matter of logical worth -from that of psychological genesis. He consequently abstracts the -subject-matter of logic as such wholly from the question of historic -_locus_ and _situs_. (2) He agrees with common-sense in holding that -logical thought is reflective and thus presupposes a given material. He -occupies himself with the nature of the antecedent conditions. (3) He -wrestles with the problem of how a material formed prior to thought and -irrespective of it can yet afford it stuff upon which to exercise -itself. (4) He expressly raises the question of how thought working -independently and from without upon a foreign material can shape the -latter into results which are valid--that is, objective. - -If his discussion is successful; if Lotze can provide the intermediaries -which span the gulf between an independent thought-material and an -independent thought-activity; if he can show that the question of the -origin of thought-material and of thought-activity is irrelevant to the -question of its worth, we shall have to surrender the position already -taken. But if we find that Lotze's elaborations only elaborate the same -fundamental difficulty, presenting it now in this light and now in that, -but never effecting more than presenting the problem as if it were its -own solution, we shall be confirmed in our idea of the need of -considering logical questions from a different point of view. If we find -that, whatever his formal treatment, he always, as matter of fact, falls -back upon some organized situation or function as the source of both the -specific thought-material and the specific thought-activity in -correspondence with each other, we shall have in so far an elucidation -and even a corroboration of our theory. - -1. We begin with the question of the material antecedents of -thought--antecedents which condition reflection, and which call it out -as reaction or response, by giving it its cue. Lotze differs from many -logicians of the same type in affording us an explicit account of these -antecedents. The ultimate material antecedents of thought are found in -impressions, which are due to external objects as stimuli. Taken in -themselves, these impressions are mere psychical states or events. They -exist in us side by side, or one after the other, according as the -objects which excite them operate simultaneously or successively. The -occurrence of these various psychical states is not, however, entirely -dependent upon the presence of the exciting thing. After a state has -once been excited, it gets the power of reawakening other states which -have accompanied it or followed it. The associative mechanism of revival -plays a part. If we had a complete knowledge of both the stimulating -object and its effects, and of the details of the associative mechanism, -we should be able from given data to predict the whole course of any -given train or current of ideas (for the impressions as conjoined -simultaneously or successively become ideas and a current of ideas). - -Taken in itself, a sensation or impression is nothing but a "state of -our consciousness, a mood of ourselves." Any given current of ideas is a -necessary sequence of existences (just as necessary as any succession of -material events), happening in some particular sensitive soul or -organism. "Just because, under their respective conditions, every such -series of ideas hangs together by the same necessity and law as every -other, there would be no ground for making any such distinction of value -as that between truth and untruth, thus placing one group in opposition -to all the others."[5] - -2. Thus far, as the last quotation clearly indicates, there is no -question of reflective thought, and hence no question of logical theory. -But further examination reveals a peculiar property of the current of -ideas. Some ideas are merely coincident, while others may be termed -coherent. That is to say, the exciting causes of some of our -simultaneous and successive ideas really belong together; while in other -cases they simply happen to act at the same time, without there being a -real connection between them. By the associative mechanism, however, -both the coherent and the merely coincident combinations recur. The -first type of recurrence supplies positive material for knowledge; the -second gives occasion for error. - -3. It is a peculiar mixture of the coincident and the coherent which -sets the peculiar problem of reflective thought. The business of thought -is to recover and confirm the coherent, the really connected, adding to -its reinstatement an accessory justifying notion of the real ground of -coherence, while it eliminates the coincident as such. While the mere -current of ideas is something which just happens within us, the process -of elimination and of confirmation by means of statement of real ground -and basis of connection is an activity which mind as such exercises. It -is this distinction which marks off thought as activity from any -psychical event and from the associative mechanism as receptive -happenings. One is concerned with mere _de facto_ coexistences and -sequences; the other with the _worth_ of these combinations.[6] - -Consideration of the peculiar work of thought in going over, sorting -out, and determining various ideas according to a standard of value will -occupy us in our next chapter. Here we are concerned with the material -antecedents of thought as they are described by Lotze. At first glance, -he seems to propound a satisfactory theory. He avoids the extravagancies -of transcendental logic, which assumes that all the matter of experience -is determined from the very start by rational thought; and he also -avoids the pitfall of purely empirical logic, which makes no distinction -between the mere occurrence and association of ideas and the real worth -and validity of the various conjunctions thus produced. He allows -unreflective experience, defined in terms of sensations and their -combinations, to provide material conditions for thinking, while he -reserves for thought a distinctive work and dignity of its own. -Sense-experience furnishes the antecedents; thought has to introduce and -develop systematic connection--rationality. - -A further analysis of Lotze's treatment may, however, lead us to believe -that his statement is riddled through and through with inconsistencies -and self-contradictions; that, indeed, any one part of it can be -maintained only by the denial of some other portion. - -1. The impression is the ultimate antecedent in its purest or crudest -form (according to the angle from which one views it). It is that which -has never felt, for good or for bad, the influence of thought. Combined -into ideas, these impressions stimulate or arouse the activities of -thought, which are forthwith directed upon them. As the recipient of the -activity which they have excited and brought to bear upon themselves, -they furnish also the material content of thought--its actual stuff. As -Lotze says over and over again: "It is the relations themselves already -subsisting between impressions, when we become conscious of them, by -which the action of thought which is never anything but reaction, is -attracted; and this action consists merely in interpreting relations -which we find existing between our passive impressions into aspects of -the matter of impressions."[7] And again:[8] "Thought can make no -difference where it finds none already in the matter of the -impressions." And again:[9] "The possibility and the success of -thought's procedure depends upon this original constitution and -organization of the whole world of ideas, a constitution which, though -not necessary in thought, is all the more necessary to make thinking -possible." - -The impressions and ideas play a versatile role; they now assume the -part of ultimate antecedents and provocative conditions; of crude -material; and somehow, when arranged, of content for thought. This very -versatility awakens suspicion. - -While the impression is merely subjective and a bare state of our own -consciousness, yet it is determined, both as to its existence and as to -its relation to other similar existences, by external objects as -stimuli, if not as causes. It is also determined by a psychical -mechanism so thoroughly objective or regular in its workings as to give -the same necessary character to the current of ideas that is possessed -by any physical sequence. Thus that which is "nothing but a state of our -consciousness" turns out straightway to be a specifically determined -objective fact in a system of facts. - -That this absolute transformation is a contradiction is no clearer than -that just such a contradiction is indispensable to Lotze. If the -impressions were nothing but states of consciousness, moods of -ourselves, bare psychical existences, it is sure enough that we should -never even know them to be such, to say nothing of conserving them as -adequate conditions and material for thought. It is only by treating -them as real facts in a real world, and only by carrying over into them, -in some assumed and unexplained way, the capacity of representing the -cosmic facts which arouse them, that impressions or ideas come in any -sense within the scope of thought. But if the antecedents are really -impressions-in-their-objective-setting, then Lotze's whole way of -distinguishing thought-worth from _mere_ existence or event without -objective significance must be radically modified. - -The implication that impressions have actually a matter or quality or -meaning of their own becomes explicit when we refer to Lotze's theory -that the immediate antecedent of thought is found in the _matter_ of -ideas. When thought is said to "take cognizance of _relations_ which its -own activity does not originate, but which have been prepared for it by -the unconscious mechanism of the psychic states,"[10] the attribution of -objective content, of reference and meaning to ideas, is unambiguous. -The idea forms a most convenient half-way house for Lotze. On one hand, -as absolutely prior to thought, as material antecedent condition, it is -merely psychical, a bald subjective event. But as subject-matter for -thought, as antecedent which affords stuff for thought's exercise, it is -_meaning_, characteristic quality of content. - -Although we have been told that the impression is a mere receptive -irritation without participation of mental activity, we are not -surprised, in view of this capacity of ideas, to learn that the mind -actually has a determining share in both the reception of stimuli and in -their further associative combinations. The subject always enters into -the presentation of any mental object, even the sensational, to say -nothing of the perceptional and the imaged. The perception of a given -state of things is possible only on the assumption that "the perceiving -subject is at once enabled and compelled by its own nature to combine -the excitations which reach it from objects into those forms which it is -to perceive in the objects, and which it supposes itself simply to -_receive_ from them."[11] - -It is only by continual transition from impression and ideas as mental -states and events to ideas as cognitive (or logical) _objects or -contents_, that Lotze bridges the gulf from bare exciting antecedent to -concrete material conditions of thought. This contradiction, again, is -necessary to Lotze's standpoint. To set out frankly with "meanings" as -antecedents would demand reconsideration of the whole view-point, which -supposes that the difference between the logical and its antecedent is a -matter of the difference between _worth_ and mere _existence_ or -_occurrence_. It would indicate that since meaning or value is already -there, the task of thought must be that of the transformation or -_reconstruction of worth_ through an intermediary process of valuation. -On the other hand, to stick by the standpoint of _mere_ existence is not -to get anything which can be called even antecedent of thought. - -2. Why is there a task of transformation? Consideration of the material -in its function of evoking thought, giving it its cue, will serve to -complete the picture of the contradiction and of the real facts. It is -the conflict between ideas as merely coincident and ideas as coherent -that constitutes the need which provokes the response of thought. Here -Lotze vibrates (_a_) between considering coincidence and coherence as -both affairs of existence of psychical events; (_b_) considering -coincidence as purely psychical and coherence as at least quasi-logical, -and (_c_) the inherent logic which makes them both determinations within -the sphere of reflective thought. In strict accordance with his own -premises, coincidence and coherence both ought to be mere peculiarities -of the current of ideas as events within ourselves. But so taken the -distinction becomes absolutely meaningless. Events do not cohere; at the -most certain sets of them happen more or less frequently than other -sets; the only intelligible difference is one of repetition of -coincidence. And even this attributes to an event the supernatural trait -of reappearing after it has disappeared. Even coincidence has to be -defined in terms of relation of the _objects_ which are supposed to -excite the psychical events that happen together. - -As recent psychological discussion has made clear enough, it is the -matter, meaning, or content, of ideas that is associated, not the ideas -as states or existences. Take such an idea as sun-revolving-about-earth. -We may say it means the conjunction of various sense-impressions, but it -is conjunction, or mutual reference, of _attributes_ that we have in -mind in the assertion. It is absolutely certain that our psychical image -of the sun is not psychically engaged in revolving about our psychical -image of the earth. It would be amusing if such were the case; theaters -and all dramatic representations would be at a discount. In truth, -sun-revolving-about-earth is a single meaning or idea; it is a unified -subject-matter within which certain distinctions of reference appear. It -is concerned with what we intend when we think earth and sun, and think -them in their relation to each other. It is really a specification or -direction of how to think when we have occasion to think a certain -subject-matter. To treat the origin of this mutual reference as if it -were simply a case of conjunction of ideas produced by conditions of -original psycho-physical irritation and association is a profound case -of the psychological fallacy. We may, indeed, analyze an experience and -find that it had its origin in certain conditions of the sensitive -organism, in certain peculiarities of perception and of association, -and hence conclude that the belief involved in it was not justified -by the facts themselves. But the significance of the belief in -sun-revolving-about-earth as an item of the experience of those who -meant it, consisted precisely in the fact that it was taken not as a -mere association of feelings, but as a definite portion of the whole -structure of objective experience, guaranteed by other parts of the -fabric, and lending its support and giving its tone to them. It was to -them part of the experience-frame of things--of the real universe. - -Put the other way, if such an instance meant a mere conjunction of -psychical states, there would be in it absolutely nothing to evoke -thought. Each idea as event, as Lotze himself points out (Vol. I, p. 2), -may be regarded as adequately and necessarily determined to the place it -occupies. There is absolutely no question on the side of events of mere -coincidence _versus_ genuine connection. As event, it is there and it -belongs there. We cannot treat something as at once bare fact of -existence and as problematic subject-matter of logical inquiry. To take -the reflective point of view is to consider the matter in a totally new -light; as Lotze says, it is to raise the question of rightful claims to -a position or relation. - -The point becomes clearer when we contrast coincidence with connection. -To consider coincidence as simply psychical, and coherence as at least -quasi-logical, is to put the two on such different bases that no -question of contrasting them can arise. The coincidence which precedes a -valid or grounded coherence (the conjunction which as coexistence of -objects and sequence of acts is perfectly adequate) never is, as -antecedent, the coincidence which is set over against coherence. The -side-by-sideness of books on my bookshelf, the succession of noises that -rise through my window, do not as such trouble me logically. They do not -appear as errors or even as problems. One coexistence is just as good as -any other until some new point of view, or new end, presents itself. If -it is a question of the convenience of arrangement of books, then the -value of their present collocation becomes a problem. Then I may -contrast their present bare conjunction with a scheme of possible -coherence. If I regard the sequence of noises as a case of articulate -speech, their order becomes important--it is a problem to be determined. -The inquiry whether a given combination means only apparent or real -connection, shows that reflective inquiry is already going on. Does this -phase of the moon really mean rain, or does it just happen that the -rain-storm comes when the moon has reached this phase? To ask such -questions shows that a certain portion of the universe of experience is -subjected to critical analysis for purposes of definitive restatement. -The tendency to regard one combination as bare conjunction or mere -coincidence is absolutely a _part_ of the movement of mind in its search -for the real connection. - -If coexistence as such is to be set over against coherence as such, as -the non-logical against the logical, then, since our whole spatial -universe is one of collocation, and since thought in this universe can -never get farther than substituting one collocation for another, the -whole realm of space-experience is condemned off-hand and in perpetuity -to anti-rationality. But, in truth, coincidence as over against -coherence, conjunction as over against connection, is just _suspected_ -coherence, one which is under the fire of active inquiry. The -distinction is one which arises only within the grasp of the logical or -reflective function. - -3. This brings us explicitly to the fact that there is no such thing as -either coincidence or coherence in terms of the elements or meanings -contained in any couple or pair of ideas taken by itself. It is only -when they are co-factors in a situation or function which includes more -than either the "coincident" or the "coherent" and more than the -arithmetical sum of the two, that thought's activity can be evoked. -Lotze is continually in this dilemma: Thought either shapes its own -material or else just accepts it. In the first case (since Lotze cannot -rid himself of the presumption that thought must have a fixed ready-made -antecedent) its activity can only alter this stuff and thus lead the -mind farther away from reality. But if thought just accepts its -material, how can there be any distinctive aim or activity of thought at -all? As we have seen, Lotze endeavors to escape this dilemma by -supposing that, while thought receives its material, it yet checks it -up: it eliminates certain portions of it and reinstates others, plus the -stamp and seal of its own validity. - -Lotze objects most strenuously to the notion that thought awaits its -subject-matter with certain ready-made modes of apprehension. This -notion would raise the insoluble question of how thought contrives to -bring the matter of each impression under that particular form which is -appropriate to it (Vol. I, p. 24). But he has not really avoided the -difficulty. How does thought know which of the combinations are merely -coincident and which are merely coherent? How does it know which to -eliminate as irrelevant and which to confirm as grounded? Either this -evaluation is an imposition of its own, or else gets its cue and clue -from the subject-matter. Now, if the coincident and the coherent taken -in and of themselves are competent to give this direction, they are -already practically labeled. The further work of thought is one of -supererogation. It has at most barely to note and seal the material -combinations that are already there. Such a view clearly renders -thought's work as unnecessary in form as it is futile in force. - -But there is no alternative in this dilemma except to recognize that an -entire situation of experience, within which are both that afterward -found to be mere coincidence and that found to be real connection, -actually provokes thought. It is only as an experience previously -accepted comes up in its wholeness against another one equally integral; -and only as some larger experience dawns which requires each as a part -of itself and yet within which the required factors show themselves -mutually incompatible, that thought arises. It is not bare coincidence, -or bare connection, or bare addition of one to the other, that excites -thought. It is a situation which is organized or constituted as a whole, -and which yet is falling to pieces in its parts--a situation which is in -conflict within itself--that arouses the search to find what really goes -together and a correspondent effort to shut out what only seemingly -belongs together. And real coherence means precisely capacity to exist -within the comprehending whole. It is a case of the psychologist's -fallacy to read back into the preliminary situation those distinctions -of mere conjunction of material and of valid relationship which get -existence, to say nothing of fixation, only within the thought-process. - -We must not leave this phase of the discussion, however, until it is -quite clear that our objection is not to Lotze's position that -reflective thought arises from an antecedent which is not reflectional -in character; nor yet to his idea that this antecedent has a certain -structure and content of its own setting the peculiar problem which -evokes thought and gives the cue to its specific activities. On the -contrary, it is this latter point upon which we would insist; and, by -insisting, point out, negatively, that this view is absolutely -inconsistent with Lotze's theory that psychical impressions and ideas -are the true antecedents of thought; and, positively, that it is the -_situation as a whole_, and not any one isolated part of it, or -distinction within it, that calls forth and directs thinking. We must -beware the fallacy of assuming that some one element in the prior -situation in isolation or detachment induces the thought which in -reality comes forth only from the whole disturbed situation. On the -negative side, characterizations of impression and idea (whether as -mental contents or as psychical existences) are distinctions which arise -only within reflection upon the situation which is the genuine -antecedent of thought; while the distinction of psychical existences -from external existences arises only within a highly elaborate technical -reflection--that of the psychologist as such.[12] Positively, it is the -whole dynamic experience with its qualitative and pervasive identity of -value, and its inner distraction, its elements at odds with each other, -in tension against each other, contending each for its proper placing -and relationship, that generates the thought-situation. - -From this point of view, at this period of development, the distinctions -of objective and subjective have a characteristic meaning. The -antecedent, to repeat, is a situation in which the various factors are -actively incompatible with each other, and which yet in and through the -striving tend to a re-formation of the whole and to a restatement of the -parts. This situation as such is clearly objective. It is there; it is -there as a whole; the various parts are there; and their active -incompatibility with one another is there. Nothing is conveyed at this -point by asserting that any particular part of the situation is illusory -or subjective, or mere appearance; or that any other is truly real. It -is the further work of _thought_ to exclude some of the contending -factors from membership in experience, and thus to relegate them to the -sphere of the merely subjective. But just at this epoch the experience -exists as one of vital and active confusion and conflict. The conflict -is not only objective in a _de facto_ sense (that is, really existent), -but is objective in a logical sense as well; it is just this conflict -which effects the transition into the thought-situation--this, in turn, -being only a constant movement toward a defined equilibrium. The -conflict has objective logical value because it is the antecedent -condition and cue of thought. - -Every reflective attitude and function, whether of naive life, -deliberate invention, or controlled scientific research, has risen -through the medium of some such total objective situation. The abstract -logician may tell us that sensations or impressions, or associated -ideas, or bare physical things, or conventional symbols, are antecedent -conditions. But such statements cannot be verified by reference to a -single instance of thought in connection with actual practice or actual -scientific research. Of course, by extreme mediation symbols may become -conditions of evoking thought. They get to be objects in an active -experience. But they are stimuli only in case their manipulation to form -a new whole occasions resistance, and thus reciprocal tension. Symbols -and their definitions develop to a point where dealing with them becomes -itself an experience, having its own identity; just as the handling of -commercial commodities, or arrangement of parts of an invention, is an -individual experience. There is always as antecedent to thought an -experience of some subject-matter of the physical or social world, or -organized intellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with each -other--so much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire experience, -which accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate -re-definition and re-relation of its tensional parts. This is the -reconstructive process termed thinking: the reconstructive situation, -with its parts in tension and in such movement toward each other as -tends to a unified experience, is the thought-situation. - -This at once suggests the subjective phase. The situation, the -experience as such, is objective. There is an experience of the confused -and conflicting tendencies. But just _what in particular_ is objective, -just _what_ form the situation shall take as an organized harmonious -whole, is unknown; that is the problem. It is the uncertainty as to the -_what_ of the experience together with the certainty _that_ there is -such an experience, that evokes the thought-function. Viewed from this -standpoint of uncertainty, the situation as a whole is subjective. No -particular content or reference can be asserted off-hand. Definite -assertion is expressly reserved--it is to be the outcome of the -procedure of reflective inquiry now undertaken. This holding off of -contents from definitely asserted position, this viewing them as -candidates for reform, is what we mean at this stage of the natural -history of thought by the subjective. - -We have followed Lotze through his tortuous course of inconsistencies. -It is better, perhaps, to run the risk of vain repetition, than that of -leaving the impression that these are _mere_ self-contradictions. It is -an idle task to expose contradictions save we realize them in relation -to the fundamental assumption which breeds them. Lotze is bound to -differentiate thought from its antecedents. He is intent to do this, -however, through a preconception that marks off the thought-situation -radically from its predecessor, through a difference that is complete, -fixed, and absolute, or at large. It is a total contrast of thought as -such to something else as such that he requires, not a contrast within -experience of one phase of a process, one period of a rhythm, from -others. - -This complete and rigid difference Lotze finds in the difference between -an experience which is _mere existence_ or occurrence, and one which has -to do with worth, truth, right relationship. Now things, objects, have -already, implicitly at least, determinations of worth, of truth, -reality, etc. The same is true of deeds, affections, etc., etc. Only -states of feelings, bare impressions, etc., seem to fulfil the -prerequisite of being given as existence, and yet without qualification -as to worth, etc. Then the current of ideas offers itself, a ready-made -stream of events, of existences, which can be characterized as wholly -innocent of reflective determination, and as the natural predecessor of -thought. - -But this stream of existences is no sooner there than its total -incapacity to officiate as material condition and cue of thought -appears. It is about as relevant as are changes that may be happening on -the other side of the moon. So, one by one, the whole series of -determinations of value or worth already traced are introduced _into_ -the very make-up, the inner structure, of what was to be _mere_ -existence: viz., (1) value as determined by things of whose spatial and -temporal relations the things are somehow _representative_; (2) hence, -value in the shape of _meaning_--the idea as significant, possessed of -quality, and not a mere event; (3) distinguished values of coincidence -and coherence within the stream. All these kinds of value are explicitly -asserted, as we have seen; underlying and running through them all is -the recognition of the supreme value of a situation which is organized -as a whole, yet conflicting in its inner constitution. - -These contradictions all arise in the attempt to put thought's work, as -concerned with value or validity over against experience as a mere -antecedent happening, or occurrence. Since this contrast arises because -of the deeper attempt to consider thought as an independent somewhat in -general which yet, in _our_ experience, is specifically dependent, the -sole radical avoiding of the contradictions can be found in the endeavor -to characterize thought as a specific mode of valuation in the evolution -of significant experience, having its own specific occasion or demand, -and its own specific place. - -The nature of the organization and value that the antecedent conditions -of the thought-function possess is too large a question here to enter -upon in detail. Lotze himself suggests the answer. He speaks of the -current of ideas, just as a current, supplying us with the "mass of -well-grounded information which _regulates_ daily life" (Vol. I, p. 4). -It gives rise to "_useful combinations_," "_correct expectations_," -"_seasonable reactions_" (Vol. I, p. 7). He speaks of it, indeed, as if -it were just the ordinary world of naive experience, the so-called -empirical world, as distinct from the world as critically revised and -rationalized in scientific and philosophic inquiry. The contradiction -between this interpretation and that of a mere stream of psychical -impressions is only another instance of the difficulty already -discussed. But the phraseology suggests the type of value possessed by -it. The unreflective world is a world of practical values; of ends and -means, of their effective adaptations; of control and regulation of -conduct in view of results. Even the most purely utilitarian of values -are nevertheless values; not _mere_ existences. But the world of -uncritical experience is saved from reduction to just material uses and -worths; for it is a world of social aims and means, involving at every -turn the values of affection and attachment, of competition and -co-operation. It has incorporate also in its own being the surprise of -aesthetic values--the sudden joy of light, the gracious wonder of tone -and form. - -I do not mean that this holds in gross of the unreflective world of -experience over against the critical thought-situation--such a contrast -implies the very wholesale, at large, consideration of thought which I -am striving to avoid. Doubtless many and many an act of thought has -intervened in effecting the organization of our commonest -practical-affectional-aesthetic region of values. I only mean to indicate -that thought does take place in such a world; not _after_ a world of -bare existences lacking value-specifications; and that the more -systematic reflection we call organized science, may, in some fair -sense, be said to come _after_, but to come after affectional, artistic, -and technological interests which have found realization and expression -in building up a world of values. - -Having entered so far upon a suggestion which cannot be followed out, I -venture one other digression. The notion that value or significance as -distinct from mere existentiality is the product of thought or reason, -and that the source of Lotze's contradictions lies in the effort to find -_any_ situation prior or antecedent to thought, is a familiar one--it is -even possible that my criticisms of Lotze have been interpreted by some -readers in this sense.[13] This is the position frequently called -neo-Hegelian (though, I think, with questionable accuracy), and has been -developed by many writers in criticising Kant. This position and that -taken in this chapter do indeed agree in certain general regards. They -are at one in denial of the factuality and the possibility of -developing fruitful reflection out of antecedent bare existence or mere -events. They unite in denying that there is or can be any such thing as -mere existence--phenomenon unqualified as respects meaning, whether such -phenomenon be psychic or cosmic. They agree that reflective thought -grows organically out of an experience which is already organized, and -that it functions within such an organism. But they part company when a -fundamental question is raised: Is all organized meaning the work of -thought? Does it therefore follow that the organization out of which -reflective thought grows is the work of thought of some other type--of -Pure Thought, Creative or Constitutive Thought, Intuitive Reason, etc.? -I shall indicate briefly the reasons for divergence at this point. - -To cover all the practical-social-aesthetic values involved, the term -"thought" has to be so stretched that the situation might as well be -called by any other name that describes a typical value of experience. -More specifically, when the difference is minimized between the -organized and arranged scheme of values out of which reflective inquiry -proceeds, and reflective inquiry itself (and there can be no other -reason for insisting that the antecedent of reflective thought is itself -somehow thought), exactly the same type of problem recurs that presents -itself when the distinction is exaggerated into one between bare -unvalued existences and rational coherent meanings. - -For the more one insists that the antecedent situation is constituted by -thought, the more one has to wonder why another type of thought is -required; what need arouses it, and how it is possible for it to improve -upon the work of previous constitutive thought. This difficulty at once -forces us from a logic of experience as it is concretely experienced -into a metaphysic of a purely hypothetical experience. Constitutive -thought precedes _our_ conscious thought-operations; hence it must be -the working of some absolute universal thought which, unconsciously to -our reflection, builds up an organized world. But this recourse only -deepens the difficulty. How does it happen that the absolute -constitutive and intuitive Thought does such a poor and bungling job -that it requires a finite discursive activity to patch up its products? -Here more metaphysic is called for: The Absolute Reason is now supposed -to work under limiting conditions of finitude, of a sensitive and -temporal organism. The antecedents of reflective thought are not, -therefore, determinations of thought pure and undefiled, but of what -thought can do when it stoops to assume the yoke of change and of -feeling. I pass by the metaphysical problem left unsolved by this flight -into metaphysic: Why and how should a perfect, absolute, complete, -finished thought find it necessary to submit to alien, disturbing, and -corrupting conditions in order, in the end, to recover through -reflective thought in a partial, piecemeal, wholly inadequate way what -it possessed at the outset in a much more satisfactory way? - -I confine myself to the logical difficulty. How can thought relate -itself to the fragmentary sensations, impressions, feelings, which, in -their contrast with and disparity from the workings of constitutive -thought, mark it off from the latter; and which in their connection with -its products give the cue to reflective thinking? _Here we have again -exactly the problem with which Lotze has been wrestling_: we have the -same insoluble question of the reference of thought-activity to a wholly -indeterminate unrationalized, independent, prior existence. The absolute -rationalist who takes up the problem at this point will find himself -forced into the same continuous seesaw, the same scheme of alternate -rude robbery and gratuitous gift, that Lotze engaged in. The simple fact -is that here _is_ just where Lotze himself began; he saw that previous -transcendental logicians had left untouched the specific question of -relation of _our_ supposedly finite, reflective thought to its own -antecedents, and he set out to make good the defect. If reflective -thought is required because constitutive thought works under externally -limiting conditions of sense, then we have some elements which are, -after all, mere existences, events, etc. Or, if they have organization -from some other source, and induce reflective thought not as bare -impressions, etc., but through their place in some whole, then we have -admitted the possibility of organic unity in experience, apart from -Reason, and the ground for assuming Pure Constitutive Thought is -abandoned. - -The contradiction appears equally when viewed from the side of -thought-activity and its characteristic forms. All our knowledge, after -all, of thought as constitutive is gained by consideration of the -operations of reflective thought. The perfect system of thought is so -perfect that it is a luminous, harmonious whole, without definite parts -or distinctions--or, if there are such, it is only reflection that -brings them out. The categories and methods of constitutive thought -itself must therefore be characterized in terms of the _modus operandi_ -of reflective thought. Yet the latter takes place just because of the -peculiar problem of the peculiar conditions under which it arises. Its -work is progressive, reformatory, reconstructive, synthetic, in the -terminology made familiar by Kant. We are not only _not_ justified, -accordingly, in transferring its determinations over to constitutive -thought, but we are absolutely prohibited from attempting any such -transfer. To identify logical processes, states, devices, results that -are conditioned upon the primary fact of resistance to thought as -constitutive with the structure of such thought is as complete an -instance of the fallacy of recourse from one genus to another as could -well be found. Constitutive and reflective thought are, first, defined -in terms of their dissimilarity and even opposition, and then without -more ado the forms of the description of the latter are carried over -bodily to the former![14] - -This is not meant for a merely controversial criticism. It is meant to -point positively toward the fundamental thesis of these chapters: All -the distinctions of the thought-function, of conception as over against -sense-perception, of judgment in its various modes and forms, of -inference in its vast diversity of operation--all these distinctions -come within the thought-situation as growing out of a characteristic -antecedent typical formation of experience; and have for their purpose -the solution of the peculiar problem with respect to which the -thought-function is generated or evolved: the restoration of a -deliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict into which -it has fallen. - -The failure of transcendental logic has the same origin as the failure -of the empiristic (whether taken pure or in the mixed form in which -Lotze presents it). It makes absolute and fixed certain distinctions of -existence and meaning, and of one kind of meaning and another kind, -which are wholly historic and relative in their origin and their -significance. It views thought as attempting to represent or state -reality once for all, instead of trying to determine some phases or -contents of it with reference to their more effective and significant -reciprocal employ--instead of as reconstructive. The rock against which -every such logic splits is that either reality already has the statement -which thought is endeavoring to give it, or else it has not. In the -former case, thought is futilely reiterative; in the latter, it is -falsificatory. - -The significance of Lotze for critical purposes is that his peculiar -effort to combine a transcendental view of thought (_i. e._, of Thought -as active in forms of its own, pure in and of themselves) with certain -obvious facts of the dependence of our thought upon specific empirical -antecedents, brings to light fundamental defects in both the empiristic -and the transcendental logics. We discover a common failure in both: the -failure to view logical terms and distinctions with respect to their -necessary function in the redintegration of experience. - - - - -III - -THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE DATUM OF THINKING - - -We have now reached a second epochal stage in the evolution of the -thought-situation, a crisis which forces upon us the problem of the -distinction and mutual reference of the datum or presentation, and the -ideas or "thoughts." It will economize and perhaps clarify discussion if -we start from the relatively positive and constructive result just -reached, and review Lotze's treatment from that point of regard. - -We have reached the point of conflict in the matters or contents of an -experience. It is _in_ this conflict and because of it that the matters -or contents, or significant quales, stand out as such. As long as the -sun revolves about earth without tension or question, this "content," or -fact, is not in any way abstracted _as_ content or object. Its very -distinction as content from the form or mode of experience as such is -the result of post-reflection. The same conflict makes other experiences -assume conscious objectification; they, too, cease to be ways of living, -and become distinct objects of observation and consideration. The -movements of planets, eclipses, etc., are cases in point.[15] The -maintenance of a unified experience has become a problem, an end. It is -no longer secure. But this involves such restatement of the conflicting -elements as will enable them to take a place somewhere in the new -experience; they must be disposed of somehow, and they can be disposed -of finally only as they are provided for. That is, they cannot be -simply denied or excluded or eliminated; they must be taken into the -fold of the new experience; such introduction, on the other hand, -clearly demands more or less modification or transformation on their -part. The thought-situation is the conscious maintenance of the unity of -experience, with a critical consideration of the claims of the various -conflicting contents to a place within itself, and a deliberate final -assignment of position. - -The conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or dichotomizes itself. -There is somewhat which is untouched in the contention of incompatibles. -There is something which remains secure, unquestioned. On the other -hand, there are elements which are rendered doubtful and precarious. -This gives the framework of the general distribution of the field into -"facts," the given, the presented, the Datum; and ideas, the ideal, the -conceived, the Thought. For there is always something unquestioned in -any problematic situation at any stage of its process,[16] even if it be -only the fact of conflict or tension. For this is never _mere_ tension -at large. It is thoroughly qualified, or characteristically toned and -colored, by the particular elements which are in strife. Hence it is -_this_ conflict, unique and irreplaceable. That it comes now means -precisely that it has never come before; that it is now passed in review -and some sort of a settlement reached, means that just _this_ conflict -will never recur. In a word, the conflict as such is immediately -expressed, or felt, as of just this and no other sort, and this -immediately apprehended quality is an irreducible datum. _It_ is fact, -even if all else be _doubtful_. As it is subjected to examination, it -loses vagueness and assumes more definite form. - -Only in very extreme cases, however, does the assured, unquestioned -element reduce to as low terms as we have here imagined. Certain things -come to stand forth as facts, no matter what else may be doubted. There -are certain _apparent_ diurnal changes of the sun; there is a certain -annual course or track. There are certain nocturnal changes in the -planets, and certain seasonal rhythmic paths. The significance of these -may be doubted: Do they _mean_ real change in the sun or in the earth? -But change, and change of a certain definite and numerically determinate -character is there. It is clear that such out-standing facts -(ex-istences) constitute the data, the given or presented, of the -thought-function. - -It is obvious that this is only one correspondent, or status, in the -total situation. With the consciousness of _this_ as certain, as given -to be reckoned with, goes the consciousness of uncertainty as to _what -it means_--of how it is to be understood or interpreted. The facts _qua_ -presentation or existences are sure; _qua_ meaning (position and -relationship in an experience yet to be secured) they are doubtful. -Yet doubt does not preclude memory or anticipation. Indeed, it is -possible only through them. The memory of past experience makes -sun-revolving-about-earth an object of attentive regard. The -recollection of certain other experiences suggests the idea of -earth-rotating-daily-on-axis and revolving-annually-about-sun. These -contents are as much present as is the observation of change, but as -respects worth, they are only possibilities. Accordingly, they are -categorized or disposed of as just ideas, meanings, thoughts, ways of -conceiving, comprehending, interpreting facts. - -Correspondence of reference here is as obvious as correlation of -existence. In the logical process, the datum is not just real existence, -and the idea mere psychical unreality. Both are modes of existence--one -of _given_ existence, the other of _mental_ existence. And if the -mental existence is in such cases regarded, from the standpoint of the -unified experience aimed at, as having only _possible_ value, the datum -also is regarded, from the value standpoint, as incomplete and -unassured. The very existence of the idea or meaning as separate _is_ -the partial, broken up, and hence objectively unreal (from the validity -standpoint) character of the datum. Or, as we commonly put it, while the -ideas are impressions, suggestions, guesses, theories, estimates, etc., -the facts are crude, raw, unorganized, brute. They lack relationship, -that is, assured place in the universe; they are deficient as to -continuity. Mere change of apparent position of sun, which is absolutely -unquestioned as datum, is a sheer abstraction from the standpoint either -of the organized experience left behind, or of the reorganized -experience which is the end--the objective. It is impossible as a -persistent object in experience or reality. In other words, datum and -ideatum are divisions of labor, co-operative instrumentalities, for -economical dealing with the problem of the maintenance of the integrity -of experience. - -Once more, and briefly, both datum and ideatum may (and positively, -veritably, do) break up, each for itself, into physical and psychical. -In so far as the conviction gains ground that the earth revolves about -the sun, the old fact is broken up into a new cosmic existence, and a -new psychological condition--the recognition of a mental process in -virtue of which movements of smaller bodies in relation to very remote -larger bodies are interpreted in a reverse sense. We do not just -eliminate as false the source of error in the old content. We -reinterpret it as valid in its own place, viz., a case of the psychology -of apperception, although invalid as a matter of cosmic structure. In -other words, with increasing accuracy of determination of the given, -there comes a distinction, for methodological purposes, between the -_quality_ or matter of the sense-experience and its _form_--the -sense-perceiving, as itself a psychological fact, having its own place -and laws or relations. Moreover, the old experience, that of -sun-revolving, abides. But it is regarded as belonging to "me"--to this -experiencing individual, rather than to the cosmic world. It is -_psychic_. - -Here, then, _within_ the growth of the thought-situation and as a part -of the process of determining _specific_ truth under _specific_ -conditions, we get for the first time the clue to that distinction with -which, as ready-made and prior to all thinking, Lotze started out, -namely, the separation of the matter of impression from impression as -psychical event. The separation which, taken at large, engenders an -insoluble problem, appears within a particular reflective inquiry, as an -inevitable differentiation of a scheme of values. - -The same sort of thing occurs on the side of thought, or meaning. The -meaning or idea which is growing in acceptance, which is gaining ground -as meaning-of-datum, gets logical or intellectual or objective force; -that which is losing standing, which is increasingly doubtful, gets -qualified as just a notion, a fancy, a pre-judice, mis-conception--or -finally just an error, a mental slip. - -Evaluated as fanciful in validity it becomes mere image--subjective;[17] -and finally a psychical existence. It is not eliminated, but receives a -new reference or meaning. Thus the distinction between subjectivity and -objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such. It is -a specification that emerges, correspondently, in _both_ datum and -ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement. That which is -left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as -real, but only in a psychical sense; that which is moved toward is -regarded as real in an objective, cosmic sense.[18] - -The implication of the psychic and the logical within both the given -presentation and the thought about it, appears in the continual shift to -which logicians of Lotze's type are put. When the psychical is regarded -as existence over against meaning as just ideal, reality seems to reside -in the psychical; it is _there_ anyhow, and meaning is just a curious -attachment--curious because as _mere meaning_ it is non-existent as -event or state--and there seems to be nothing by which it can be even -tied to the psychical state as its bearer or representative. But when -the emphasis falls on thought as _content_, as significance, then the -psychic event, the idea as image[19] (as distinct from idea as meaning) -appears as an accidental but necessary evil, the unfortunate irrelevant -medium through which _our_ thinking has to go on.[20] - -1. _The data of thought._--When we turn to Lotze, we find that he makes -a clear distinction between the presented material of thought, its -datum, and the typical characteristic modes of thinking in virtue of -which the datum gets organization or system. It is interesting to note -also that he states the datum in terms different from those in which the -antecedents of thought are defined. From the point of view of the -material upon which ideas exercise themselves, it is not coincidence, -collocation, or succession that counts; but gradation of degrees in a -scale. It is not things in spatial or temporal grouping that are -emphasized, but qualities as mutually distinguished, yet classed--as -differences of a common somewhat. There is no inherent inconceivability -in the idea that every impression should be as incomparably different -from every other as sweet is from warm. But by a remarkable circumstance -such is not the case. We have series, and networks of series. We have -diversity of a common--diverse colors, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. In -other words, the datum is sense-qualities which, fortunately for -thought, are given arranged, as shades, degrees, variations, or -qualities of somewhat that is identical.[21] - -All this is given, presented, to our ideational activities. Even the -universal, the common-color which runs through the various qualities of -blue, green, white, etc., is not a product of thought, but something -which thought finds already in existence. It conditions comparison and -reciprocal distinction. Particularly all mathematical determinations, -whether of counting (number), degree (more or less), and quantity -(greatness and smallness), come back to this peculiarity of the datum of -thought. Here Lotze dwells at considerable length upon the fact that the -very possibility, as well as the success, of thought is due to this -peculiar universalization or _prima facie_ ordering with which its -material is given to it. Such pre-established fitness in the meeting of -two things that have nothing to do with each other is certainly cause -enough for wonder and congratulation. - -It should not be difficult to see why Lotze uses different categories in -describing the given material of thought from those employed in -describing its antecedent conditions, even though, according to him, the -two are absolutely the same.[22] He has different _functions_ in mind. -In one case, the material must be characterized as evoking, as -incentive, as stimulus--from this point of view the peculiar combination -of coincidence and coherence is emphasized. But in the other case the -material must be characterized as affording stuff, actual -subject-matter. Data are not only what is given _to_ thought, but they -are also the food, the raw material, _of_ thought. They must be -described as, on the one hand, wholly outside of thought. This clearly -puts them into the region of sense-perception. They are matter of -_sensation_ given free from all inferring, judging, relating influence. -Sensation is just what is _not_ called up in memory or in anticipated -projection--it is the immediate, the irreducible. On the other hand, -sensory-_matter_ is qualitative, and quales are made up on a common -basis. They are degrees or grades of a common quality. Thus they have a -certain ready-made setting of mutual distinction and reference which is -already almost, if not quite, the effect of comparing, of relating, and -these are the express traits of thinking. - -It is easy to interpret this miraculous gift of grace in the light of -what has been said. The data are in truth precisely that which is -selected and set aside _as_ present, as immediate. Thus they are _given_ -to _further_ thought. But the selection has occurred in view of the need -for thought; it is a listing of the capital in the way of the -undisturbed, the undiscussed, which thought can count upon in this -particular problem. Hence it is not strange that it has a peculiar -fitness of adaptation for thought's further work. Having been selected -with precisely that end in view, the wonder would be if it were not so -fitted. A man may coin counterfeit money for use upon others, but hardly -with the intent of passing it off upon himself. - -Our only difficulty here is that the mind flies away from the logical -interpretation of sense-datum to a ready-made notion of it brought over -from abstract psychological inquiry. The belief in sensory quales as -somehow forced upon us, and forced upon us at large, and thus -conditioning thought wholly _ab extra_, instead of determining it as -instrumentalities or elements in its own scheme, is too fixed. Such -qualities _are_ forced upon us, but _not_ at large. The sensory data of -experience, as distinct from the psychologists' constructs, always come -_in a context_; they always appear as variations in a continuum of -values. Even the thunder which breaks in upon me (to take the extreme of -apparent discontinuity and irrelevancy) disturbs me because it is taken -as a part of the same space-world as that in which my chair and room and -house are located; and it is taken as an influence which interrupts and -disturbs, _because_ it is part of my common world of causes and effects. -The solution of continuity is itself practical or teleological, and thus -presupposes and affects continuity of purpose, occupations, and means in -a life-process. It is not metaphysics, it is biology which enforces the -idea that actual sensation is not only determined as an event in a world -of events,[23] but is an occurrence occurring at a certain period in the -evolution of experience, marking a certain point in its cycle, and, -consequently--having always its own conscious context and bearings--is a -characteristic function of reconstruction in experience.[24] - -2. _Forms of thinking data._--As sensory datum is material set for the -work of thought, so the ideational forms with which thought does its -work are apt and prompt to meet the needs of the material. The -"accessory"[25] notion of ground of coherence turns out, in truth, not -to be a formal, or external, addition to the data, but a requalification -of them. Thought is accessory as accomplice, not as addendum. "Thought" -is to eliminate mere coincidence, and to assert grounded coherence. -Lotze makes it absolutely clear that he does not at bottom conceive of -"thought" as an activity "in itself" imposing a form of coherence; but -that the organizing work of "thought" is only the progressive -realization of an inherent unity, or system, in the material experience. -The specific modes in which thought brings its "accessory" power to -bear--names, conception, judgment, and inference--are successive stages -in the adequate organization of the matter which comes to us first as -datum; they are successive stages of the effort to overcome the -original defects of the datum. Conception starts from the given -universal (the common element) of sense. Yet (and this is the -significant point) it does not simply abstract this common element, and -consciously generalize it as over against its own differences. Such a -"universal" is _not_ coherence, just because it does not _include_ and -dominate the temporal and local heterogeneity. The _true_ concept (see -Vol. I, p. 38) is a system of attributes, held together on the basis of -some ground, or determining, dominating principle--a ground which so -controls all its own instances as to make them into an inwardly -connected whole, and so specifies its own limits as to be exclusive of -all else. If we abstract color as the common element of various colors, -the result is not a scientific idea or concept. Discovery of a process -of light-waves whose various rates constitute the various colors of the -spectrum gives the concept. And when we get such a concept, the former -mere temporal abruptness of color experiences gives way to organic parts -of a color system. The logical product--the concept, in other words--is -not a formal seal or stamp; it is a thoroughgoing transformation of data -in a given sense. - -The form or mode of thought which marks the continued transformation of -the data and the idea in reference to each other is judgment. Judgment -makes explicit the assumption of a principle which determines connection -within an individualized whole. It definitely states red as _this_ case -or instance of the law or process of color, and thus overcomes further -the defect in _subject-matter_ or data still left by conception.[26] Now -judgment logically terminates in disjunction. It gives a universal -which may determine any one of a number of alternative defined -particulars, but which is arbitrary as to _what_ one is selected. -Systematic _inference_ brings to light the material conditions under -which the law, or dominating universal, applies to this, rather than -that alternative particular, and so completes the ideal organization of -the subject-matter. If this act were complete, we should finally have -present to us a whole on which we should know the determining and -effective or authorizing elements, and the order of development or -hierarchy of dependence, in which others follow from them.[27] - -In this account by Lotze of the operations of the forms of thought, -there is clearly put before us the picture of a continuous correlative -determination of datum on one side and of idea or meaning on the other, -till experience is again integral, data thoroughly defined and -corrected, and ideas completely incarnate as the relevant meaning of -subject-matter. That we have here in outline a description of what -actually occurs there can be no doubt. But there is as little doubt that -it is thoroughly inconsistent with Lotze's supposition that the material -or data of thought is precisely the same as the antecedents of thought; -or that ideas, conceptions, are purely mental somewhats brought to bear, -as the sole essential characteristics of thought, extraneously upon a -material provided ready-made. It means but one thing: The maintenance of -unity and wholeness in experience through conflicting contents occurs by -means of a strictly correspondent setting apart of fact to be accurately -described and properly related, and meaning to be adequately construed -and properly referred. The datum is given _in_ the thought-situation, -and _to_ further qualification of ideas or meanings. But even in this -aspect it presents a problem. To find out _what is_ given is an inquiry -which taxes reflection to the uttermost. Every important advance in -scientific method means better agencies, more skilled technique for -simply detaching and describing what is barely there, or given. To be -able to find out what can safely be taken as _there_, as given in any -particular inquiry, and hence be taken as material for orderly and -verifiable thinking, for fruitful hypothesis-making, for entertaining of -explanatory and interpretative ideas, is one phase of the effort of -systematic scientific inquiry. It marks its inductive phase. To take -what is given _in_ the thought-situation, for the sake of accomplishing -the aim of thought (along with a correlative discrimination of ideas or -meanings), as if it were given absolutely, or apart from a particular -historic situs and context, is the fallacy of empiricism as a logical -theory. To regard the thought-forms of conception, judgment, and -inference as qualifications of "pure thought, apart from any difference -in objects," instead of as successive dispositions in the progressive -organization of the material (or objects) is the fallacy of rationalism. -Lotze attempts to combine the two, thinking thereby to correct each by -the other. - -Lotze recognizes the futility of thought if the sense-data are final, if -they alone are real, the truly existent, self-justificatory and valid. -He sees that, if the empiricist were right in his assumption as to the -real worth of the given data, thinking would be a ridiculous pretender, -either toilfully and poorly doing over again what needs no doing, or -making a wilful departure from truth. He realizes that thought really is -evoked because it is needed, and that it has a work to do which is not -merely formal, but which effects a modification of the subject-matter of -experience. Consequently he assumes a thought-in-itself, with certain -forms and modes of action of its own, a realm of meaning possessed of a -directive and normative worth of its own--the root-fallacy of -rationalism. His attempted compromise between the two turns out to be -based on the assumption of the indefensible ideas of both--the notion of -an independent matter of thought, on one side, and of an independent -worth or value of thought-forms, on the other. - -This pointing out of inconsistencies becomes stale and unprofitable save -as we bring them back into connection with their root-origin--the -erection of distinctions that are genetic and historic, and working or -instrumental divisions of labor, into rigid and ready-made differences -of structural reality. Lotze clearly recognizes that thought's nature is -dependent upon its aim, its aim upon its problem, and this upon the -situation in which it finds its incentive and excuse. Its work is cut -out for it. It does not what it would, but what it must. As Lotze puts -it, "Logic has to do with thought, not as it would be under -hypothetical conditions, but as it is" (Vol. I, p. 33), and this -statement is made in explicit combination with statements to the effect -that the peculiarity of the material of thought conditions its activity. -Similarly he says in a passage already referred to: "The possibility and -the success of thought's production in general depends upon this -original constitution and organization of the whole world of ideas, a -constitution which, though not necessary in thought, is all the more -necessary to make thought possible."[28] - -As we have seen, the essential nature of conception, judgment, and -inference is dependent upon peculiarities of the propounded material, -they being forms dependent for their significance upon the stage of -organization in which they begin. - -From this only one conclusion is suggested. If thought's nature is -dependent upon its actual conditions and circumstances, the primary -logical problem is to study thought-in-its-conditioning; it is to detect -the crisis within which thought and its subject-matter present -themselves in their mutual distinction and cross-reference. But Lotze is -so thoroughly committed to a ready-made antecedent of some sort, that -this genetic consideration is of no account to him. The historic method -is a mere matter of psychology, and has no logical worth (Vol. I, p. 2). -We must presuppose a psychological mechanism and psychological material, -but logic is concerned not with origin or history, but with authority, -worth, value (Vol. I, p. 10). Again: "Logic is not concerned with the -manner in which the elements utilized by thought come into existence, -but their value _after_ they have somehow come into existence, for the -carrying out of intellectual operations" (Vol. I, p. 34). And finally: -"I have maintained throughout my work that logic cannot derive any -serious advantage from a discussion of _the conditions under which -thought as a psychological process comes about_. The significance of -logical forms ... is to be found in the utterances of thought, the laws -which it imposes, after or during the act of thinking, not in the -conditions which lie back of and which produce thought."[29] - -Lotze, in truth, represents a halting-stage in the evolution of logical -theory. He is too far along to be contented with the reiteration of the -purely formal distinctions of a merely formal thought-by-itself. He -recognizes that thought as formal is the form of some matter, and has -its worth only as organizing that matter to meet the ideal demands of -reason; and that "reason" is in truth only an ideal systematization of -the matter or content. Consequently he has to open the door to admit -"psychical processes" which furnish this material. Having let in the -material, he is bound to shut the door again in the face of the -processes from which the material proceeded--to dismiss them as -impertinent intruders. If thought gets its data in such a surreptitious -manner, there is no occasion for wonder that the legitimacy of its -dealings with the material remains an open question. Logical theory, -like every branch of the philosophic disciplines, waits upon a surrender -of the obstinate conviction that, while the work and aim of thought is -conditioned by the material supplied to it, yet the _worth_ of its -performances is something to be passed upon in complete abstraction from -conditions of origin and development. - - - - -IV - -THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE CONTENT AND OBJECT OF THOUGHT - - -In the foregoing discussion, particularly in the last chapter, we were -led repeatedly to recognize that thought has its own content. At times -Lotze gives way to the tendency to define thought entirely in terms of -modes and forms of activity which are exercised by it upon a strictly -foreign material. But two motives continually push him in the other -direction. (1) Thought has a distinctive work to do, one which involves -a qualitative transformation of (at least) the _relationships_ of the -presented matter; as fast as it accomplishes this work, the -subject-matter becomes somehow thought's own. As we have just seen, the -data are progressively organized to meet thought's ideal of a complete -whole, with its members interconnected according to a determining -principle. Such progressive organization throws backward doubt upon the -assumption of the original total irrelevancy of the data and -thought-form to each other. (2) A like motive operates from the side of -the subject-matter. As merely foreign and external, it is too -heterogeneous to lend itself to thought's exercise and influence. The -idea, as we saw in the first chapter, is the convenient medium through -which Lotze passes from the purely heterogeneous psychical impression or -event, which is totally irrelevant to thought's purpose and working, -over to a state of affairs which can reward thought. Idea as meaning -forms the bridge from the brute factuality of the psychical impression -over to the coherent value of thought's own content. - -We have, in this chapter, to consider the question of the idea or -content of thought from two points of view: first, the _possibility_ of -such a content--its consistency with Lotze's fundamental premises; -secondly, its _objective_ character--its validity and test. - -I. The question of the possibility of a specific content of thought is -the question of the nature of the idea as meaning. Meaning is the -characteristic content of thought as such. We have thus far left -unquestioned Lotze's continual assumption of meaning as a sort of -thought-unit; the building-stone of thought's construction. In his -treatment of meaning, Lotze's contradictions regarding the antecedents, -data, and content of thought reach their full conclusion. He expressly -makes meaning to be the product of thought's activity and also the -unreflective material out of which thought's operations grow. - -This contradiction has been worked out in accurate and complete detail -by Professor Jones.[30] He summarizes it as follows (p. 99): "No other -way was left to him [Lotze] excepting this of first attributing all to -sense and afterwards attributing all to thought, and, finally of -attributing it to thought only because it was already in its material. -This _seesaw_ is essential to his theory; the elements of knowledge as -he describes them can subsist only by the alternate robbery of each -other." We have already seen how strenuously Lotze insists upon the fact -that the given subject-matter of thought is to be regarded wholly as the -work of a physical mechanism, "without any action of thought."[31] But -Lotze also states that if the products of the psychical mechanism "are -to admit of combination in the definite form of a _thought_, they each -require some previous shaping to make them into logical building-stones -and to convert them from _impressions_ into _ideas_. Nothing is really -more familiar to us than this first operation of thought; the only -reason why we usually overlook it is that in the language which we -inherit, it is already carried out, and it seems, therefore, to belong -to the self-evident presuppositions of thought, _not to its own specific -work_."[32] And again (Vol. I, p. 23) judgments "can consist of nothing -but combinations of ideas which are no longer mere impressions: every -such idea must have undergone at least the simple formation mentioned -above." Such ideas are, Lotze goes on to urge, already rudimentary -concepts--that is to say, logical determinations. - -The obviousness of the logical contradiction of attributing to a -preliminary specific work of thought exactly the condition of affairs -which is elsewhere explicitly attributed to a psychical mechanism prior -to any thought-activity, should not blind us to its meaning and relative -necessity. The impression, it will be recalled, is a mere state of our -own consciousness--a mood of ourselves. As such it has simply _de facto_ -relations as an event to other similar events. But reflective thought is -concerned with the relationship of a content or matter to other -contents. Hence the impression must have a matter before it can come at -all within the sphere of thought's exercise. How shall it secure this? -Why, by a preliminary activity of thought which objectifies the -impression. Blue as a mere sensuous irritation or feeling is given a -quality, the meaning "blue"--blueness; the sense-impression is -objectified; it is presented "no longer as a condition which we undergo, -but as a something which has its being and its meaning in itself, and -which continues to be what it is, and to mean what it means whether we -are conscious of it or not. It is easy to see here the _necessary -beginning of that activity which we above appropriated to thought as -such_: it has not yet got so far as converting coexistence into -coherence. It has first to perform the previous task of investing each -single impression with an independent validity, without which the later -opposition of their real coherence to mere coexistence could not be made -in any intelligible sense."[33] - -This objectification, which converts a sensitive state into a sensible -matter to which the sensitive state is referred, also gives this matter -"position," a certain typical character. It is not objectified in a -merely general way, but is given a specific sort of objectivity. Of -these kinds of objectivity there are three mentioned: that of a -substantive content; that of an attached dependent content; that of an -active relationship connecting the various contents with each other. In -short, we have the types of meaning embodied in language in the form of -nouns, adjectives, and verbs. It is through this preliminary formative -activity of thought that reflective or _logical_ thought has presented -to it a world of meanings ranged in an order of relative independence -and dependence, and ranged as elements in a complex of meanings whose -various constituent parts mutually influence each other's meanings.[34] - -As usual, Lotze mediates the contradiction between material constituted -_by_ thought and the same material just presented _to_ thought, by a -further position so disparate to each that, taken in connection with -each in a pair, and by turns, it seems to bridge the gulf. After -describing the prior constitutive work of thought as above, he goes on -to discuss a _second_ phase of thought which is intermediary between -this and the third phase, viz., reflective thought proper. This second -activity is that of arranging experienced quales in series and groups, -thus ascribing a sort of universal or common somewhat to various -instances (as already described; see p. 55). On one hand, it is clearly -stated that this second phase of thought's activity is in reality the -_same_ as the first phase: since all objectification involves positing, -since positing involves distinction of one matter from others, and since -this involves placing it in a series or group in which each is -measurably marked off, as to the degree and nature of its diversity, -from every other. We are told that we are only considering "a really -inseparable operation" of thought from two different sides: first, as to -the effect which objectifying thought has upon the matter as set over -against the feeling _subject_, secondly, the effect which this -objectification has upon the matter in relation to _other matters_.[35] -Afterward, however, these two operations are declared to be radically -different in type and nature. The first is determinant and formative; it -gives ideas "the shape without which the logical spirit could not accept -them." In a way it dictates "its own laws to its object-matter."[36] The -second activity of thought is rather passive and receptive. It simply -recognizes what is already there. "Thought can make no difference where -it finds none already in the matter of impressions."[37] "The first -universal, as we saw, can only be experienced in immediate sensation. It -is no product of thought, but something that thought finds already in -existence."[38] - -The obviousness of this further contradiction is paralleled only by its -inevitableness. Thought is in the air, is arbitrary and wild in dealing -with meanings, unless it gets its start and cue from actual experience. -Hence the necessity of insisting upon thought's activity as just -recognizing the contents already given. But, on the other hand, prior to -the work of thought there is to Lotze no content or meaning. It requires -a work of thought to detach anything from the flux of sense-irritations -and invest it with a meaning of its own. This dilemma is inevitable to -any writer who declines to consider as correlative the nature of -thought-activity and thought-content from the standpoint of their -generating conditions in the movement of experience. Viewed from such a -standpoint the principle of solution is clear enough. As we have already -seen (p. 53), the internal dissension of an experience leads to -detaching certain values previously absorptively integrated into the -concrete experience as part of its own qualitative coloring; and to -relegating them, for the time being, (pending integration into further -immediate values of a reconstituted experience) into a world of bare -meanings, a sphere qualified as ideal throughout. These meanings then -become the tools of thought in interpreting the data, just as the -sense-qualities which define the presented situation are the immediate -object to thought. The two _as mutually referred_ are content. That is, -the datum and the thought-mode or idea as connected are the object of -thought. - -To reach this unification is thought's objective or goal. Exactly the -same value is idea, as either tool or content, according as it is taken -as instrumental or as accomplishment. Every successive cross-section of -the thought-situation presents what may be taken for granted as the -outcome of previous thinking, and consequently as the determinant of -further reflective procedure. Taken as defining the point reached in the -thought-function and serving as constituent unit of further thought, it -is content. Lotze's instinct is sure in identifying and setting over -against each other the material given to thought and the content which -is thought's own "building-stone." His contradictions arise simply from -the fact that his absolute, non-historic method does not permit him to -interpret this joint identity and distinction in a working, and hence -relative, sense. - -II. The question of how the possibility of meanings, or -thought-contents, is to be understood merges imperceptibly into the -question of the real objectivity or validity of such contents. The -difficulty for Lotze is the now familiar one: So far as his logic -compels him to insist that these meanings are the possession and product -of thought (since thought is an independent activity), the ideas are -merely ideas; there is no test of objectivity beyond the thoroughly -unsatisfactory and formal one of their own mutual consistency. In -reaction from this Lotze is thrown back upon the idea of these contents -as the original matter given in the impressions themselves. Here there -seems to be an objective or external test by which the reality of -thought's operations may be tried; a given idea is verified or found -false according to its measure of correspondence with the matter of -experience as such. But now we are no better off. The original -independence and heterogeneity of impressions and of thought is so great -that there is no way to compare the results of the latter with the -former. We cannot compare or contrast distinctions of worth with bare -differences of factual existence (Vol. I, p. 2). The standard or test of -objectivity is so thoroughly external that by original definition it is -wholly outside the realm of thought. How can thought compare its own -contents with that which is wholly outside itself? - -Or again, the given material of experience apart from thought is -precisely the relatively chaotic and unorganized; it even reduces itself -to a mere sequence of psychical events. What rational meaning is there -in directing us to compare the highest results of scientific inquiry -with the bare sequence of our own states of feeling; or even with the -original data whose fragmentary and uncertain character was the exact -motive for entering upon scientific inquiry? How can the former in any -sense give a check or test of the value of the latter? This is -professedly to test the validity of a system of meanings by comparison -with that whose defects and errors call forth the construction of the -system of meanings by which to rectify and replace themselves. Our -subsequent inquiry simply consists in tracing some of the phases of the -characteristic seesaw from one to the other of the two horns of the now -familiar dilemma: either thought is separate from the matter of -experience, and then its validity is wholly its own private business; or -else the objective results of thought are already in the antecedent -material, and then thought is either unnecessary, or else has no way of -checking its own performances. - -1. Lotze assumes, as we have seen, a certain independent validity in -each meaning or qualified content, taken in and of itself. "Blue" has a -certain validity, or meaning, in and of itself; it is an object for -consciousness as such. After the original sense-irritation through which -it was mediated has entirely disappeared, it persists as a valid idea, -as a meaning. Moreover, it is an object or content of thought for others -as well. Thus it has a double mark of validity: in the comparison of one -part of my own experience with another, and in the comparison of my -experience as a whole with that of others. Here we have a sort of -validity which does not raise at all the question of _metaphysical_ -reality (Vol. I, pp. 14, 15). Lotze thus seems to have escaped from the -necessity of employing as check or test for the validity of ideas any -reference to a real outside the sphere of thought itself. Such terms as -"conjunction," "franchise," "constitution," "algebraic zero," etc., -etc., claim to possess objective validity. Yet none of these professes -to refer to a reality beyond thought. Generalizing this point of view, -validity or objectivity of meaning means simply that which is "identical -for all consciousness" (Vol. I, p. 3); "it is quite indifferent whether -certain parts of the world of thought indicate something which has -beside an independent reality outside of thinking minds, or whether all -that it contains exists only in the thoughts of those who think it, but -with equal validity for them all" (Vol. I, p. 16). - -So far it seems clear sailing. Difficulties, however, show themselves, -the moment we inquire what is meant by a self-identical content for all -thought. Is this to be taken in a static or in a dynamic way? That is to -say: Does it express the fact that a given content or meaning is _de -facto_ presented to the consciousness of all alike? Does this coequal -presence guarantee an objectivity? Or does validity attach to a given -meaning or content in so far as it directs and controls the further -exercise of thinking, and thus the formation of further _new_ contents -of consciousness? - -The former interpretation is alone consistent with Lotze's notion that -the independent idea as such is invested with a certain validity or -objectivity. It alone is consistent with his assertion that concepts -precede judgments. It alone, that is to say, is consistent with the -notion that reflective thinking has a sphere of ideas or meanings -supplied to it at the outset. But it is impossible to entertain this -belief. The stimulus which, according to Lotze, goads thought on from -ideas or concepts to judgments and inferences, is in truth simply the -lack of validity, of objectivity in its original independent meanings or -contents. A meaning as independent is precisely that which is not -invested with validity, but which is a mere idea, a "notion," a fancy, -at best a surmise which may turn out to be valid (and of course this -indicates possible reference); a standpoint to have its value determined -by its further active use. "Blue" as a mere detached floating meaning, -an idea at large, would not gain in validity simply by being entertained -continuously in a given consciousness; or by being made at one and the -same time the persistent object of attentive regard by all human -consciousnesses. If this were all that were required, the chimera, the -centaur, or any other subjective construction, could easily gain -validity. "Christian Science" has made just this notion the basis of its -philosophy. - -The simple fact is that in such illustrations as "blue," "franchise," -"conjunction," Lotze instinctively takes cases which are not mere -independent and detached meanings, but which involve reference to a -region of cosmic experience, or to a region of mutually determining -social activities. The conception that reference to a _social_ activity -does not involve the same sort of reference of thought beyond itself -that is involved in physical matters, and hence may be taken quite -innocent and free of the metaphysical problem of reference to reality -beyond meaning, is one of the strangest that has ever found lodgment in -human thinking. Either both physical and social reference or neither, is -metaphysical; if neither, then it is because the meaning functions, as -it originates, in a specific situation which carries with it its own -tests (see p. 17). Lotze's conception is made possible only by -unconsciously substituting the idea of object as content of thought for -a large number of persons (or a _de facto_ somewhat for every -consciousness), for the genuine definition of object as a determinant in -a scheme of experience. The former is consistent with Lotze's conception -of thought, but wholly indeterminate as to validity or intent. The -latter is the test used experimentally in all concrete thinking, but -involves a radical transformation of all Lotze's assumptions. A given -idea of the conjunction of the franchise, or of blue, is valid, not -because everybody happens to entertain it, but because it expresses the -factor of control or direction in a given movement of experience. The -test of validity of idea[39] is its functional or instrumental use in -effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a -relatively integrated one. If Lotze's view were correct, "blue" valid -once would be valid always--even when red or green were actually called -for to fulfil specific conditions. This is to say validity always refers -to rightfulness or adequacy of performance in an asserting of -connection--not to the meaning as detached and contemplated. - -If we refer again to the fact that the genuine antecedent of thought is -a situation which is tensional as regards its existing status, or -disorganized in its structural elements, yet organized as emerging out -of the unified experience of the past and as striving as a whole, or -equally in all its phases, to reinstate an experience harmonized in -make-up, we can easily understand how certain contents may be detached -and held apart as meanings or references, actual or possible (according -as they are viewed with reference to the past or to the future). We can -understand how such detached contents may be of use in effecting a -review of the entire experience, and as affording standpoints and -methods of a reconstruction which will maintain the integrity of -experience. We can understand how validity of meaning is measured by -reference to something which is not mere meaning; by reference to -something which lies beyond the idea as such--viz., the reconstitution -of an experience into which thought enters as mediator. That paradox of -ordinary experience and of scientific inquiry by which objectivity is -given alike to matter of perception and to conceived relations--to -facts and to laws--affords no peculiar difficulty, because we see that -the test of objectivity is everywhere the same: anything is objective in -so far as, through the medium of conflict, it controls the movement of -experience in its reconstructive transition from one unified form to -another. There is not first an object, whether of sense-perception or of -conception, which afterward somehow exercises this controlling -influence; but the objective is such in virtue of the exercise of -function of control. It may only control the act of inquiry; it may only -set on foot doubt, but this is direction of subsequent experience, and, -in so far, is a token of objectivity. - -So much for the thought-content or meaning as having a validity of its -own. It does not have it as isolated or given or static; it has it in -its dynamic reference, its use in determining further movement of -experience. In other words, the "meaning" or idea as such, having been -selected and made-up with reference to performing a certain office in -the evolution of a unified experience, can be tested in no other way -than by discovering whether it does what it was intended to do and what -it purports to do.[40] - -2. Lotze has to wrestle with this question of validity in a further -aspect: What constitutes the objectivity of thinking as a total -attitude, activity, or function? According to his own statement, the -meanings or valid ideas are after all only building-stones for logical -thought. Validity is thus not a question of them in their independent -existences, but of their mutual reference to each other. Thinking is the -process of instituting these mutual references; of building up the -various scattered and independent building-stones into the coherent -system of thought. What is the validity of the various forms of thinking -which find expression in the various types of judgment and in the -various forms of inference? Categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive -judgment; inference by induction, by analogy, by mathematical equation; -classification, theory of explanation--all these are processes of -reflection by which mutual connection in an individualized whole is -given to the fragmentary meanings or ideas with which thought as it sets -out is supplied. What shall we say of the validity of such processes? - -On one point Lotze is quite clear. These various logical acts do not -really enter into the constitution of the valid world. The logical forms -as such are maintained _only_ in the process of thinking. The world of -valid truth does not undergo a series of contortions and evolutions, -paralleling in any way the successive steps and missteps, the succession -of tentative trials, withdrawals, and retracings, which mark the course -of our own thinking.[41] - -Lotze is explicit upon the point that it is only the thought-content in -which the process of thinking issues that has objective validity; the -act of thinking is "purely and simply an inner movement of our own -minds, made necessary to us by reason of the constitution of our nature -and of our place in the world" (Vol. II, p. 279). - -Here the problem of validity presents itself as the problem of the -relation of the act of thinking to its own product. In his solution -Lotze uses two metaphors: one derived from building operations, the -other from traveling. The construction of a building requires of -necessity certain tools and extraneous constructions, stagings, -scaffoldings, etc., which are necessary to effect the final -construction, but yet which do not enter into the building as such. The -activity has an instrumental, though not a constitutive, value as -regards its product. Similarly, in order to get a view from the top of a -mountain--this view being the objective--the traveler has to go through -preliminary movements along devious courses. These again are antecedent -prerequisites, but do not constitute a portion of the attained view. - -The problem of thought as activity, as distinct from thought as content, -opens up altogether too large a question to receive complete -consideration at this point. Fortunately, however, the previous -discussion enables us to narrow the point which is in issue just here. -It is once more the question whether the activity of thought is to be -regarded as an independent function supervening entirely from without -upon antecedents, and directed from without upon data; or whether it -marks merely a phase of the transformation which the course of -experience (whether practical, or artistic, or socially affectional or -whatever) undergoes in entering into a tensional status where the -maintenance of its harmony of content is problematic and hence an aim. -If it be the latter, a thoroughly intelligent sense can be given to the -proposition that the activity of thinking is instrumental, and that its -worth is found, not in its own successive states as such, but in the -result in which it comes to conclusion. But the conception of thinking -as an independent activity somehow occurring after an independent -antecedent, playing upon an independent subject-matter, and finally -effecting an independent result, presents us with just one miracle the -more. - -I do not question the strictly instrumental character of thinking. The -problem lies not here, but in the interpretation of the nature of the -organ and instrument. The difficulty with Lotze's position is that it -forces us into the assumption of a means and an end which are simply and -only external to each other, and yet necessarily dependent upon each -other--a position which, whenever found, is so thoroughly -self-contradictory as to necessitate critical reconsideration of the -premises which lead to it. Lotze vibrates between the notion of thought -as a tool in the external sense, a mere scaffolding to a finished -building in which it has no part nor lot, and the notion of thought as -an immanent tool, as a scaffolding which is an integral part of the very -operation of building, and set up for the sake of the building-activity -which is carried on effectively only with and through a scaffolding. -Only in the former case can the scaffolding be considered as a _mere_ -tool. In the latter case the external scaffolding is not itself the -instrumentality; the actual tool is the _action_ of erecting the -building, and this action involves the scaffolding as a constituent part -of itself. The work of erecting is not set over against the completed -building as mere means to an end; it _is_ the end taken in process or -historically, longitudinally viewed. The scaffolding, moreover, is not -an external means to the process of erecting, but an organic member of -it. It is no mere accident of language that "building" has a double -sense--meaning at once the process and the finished product. The outcome -of thought is the thinking activity carried on to its own completion; -the activity, on the other hand, _is_ the outcome taken anywhere short -of its own realization, and thereby still going on. - -The only consideration which prevents easy and immediate acceptance of -this view is the notion of thinking as something purely formal. It is -strange that the empiricist does not see that his insistence upon a -matter extraneously given to thought only strengthens the hands of the -rationalist with his claim of thinking as an independent activity, -separate from the actual make-up of the affairs of experience. Thinking -as a merely formal activity exercised upon certain sensations or images -or objects sets forth an absolutely meaningless proposition. The -psychological identification of thinking with the process of association -is much nearer the truth. It is, indeed, on the way to the truth. We -need only to recognize that association is of contents or matters or -meanings, not of ideas as bare existences or events; and that the type -of association we call thinking differs from the associations of casual -fancy and revery in an element of control by reference to an end which -determines the fitness and thus the selection of the associates, to -apprehend how completely thinking is a reconstructive movement of actual -contents of experience in relation to each other, and for the sake of a -redintegration of a conflicting experience. - -There is no miracle in the fact that tool and material are adapted to -each other in the process of reaching a valid conclusion. Were they -external in origin to each other and to the result, the whole affair -would, indeed, present an insoluble problem--so insoluble that, if this -were the true condition of affairs, we never should even know that there -was a problem. But, in truth, both material and tool have been secured -and determined with reference to economy and efficiency in effecting the -end desired--the maintenance of a harmonious experience. The builder has -discovered that his building means building tools, and also building -material. Each has been slowly evolved with reference to its fit employ -in the entire function; and this evolution has been checked at every -point by reference to its own correspondent. The carpenter has not -thought at large on his building and then constructed tools at large, -but has thought of his building in terms of the material which enters -into it, and through that medium has come to the consideration of the -tools which are helpful. Life proposes to maintain at all hazards the -unity of its own process. Experience insists on being itself, on -securing integrity even through and by means of conflict. - -This is not a formal question, but one of the placing and relations of -the matters or values actually entering into experience. And this in -turn determines the taking up of just those mental attitudes, and the -employing of just those intellectual operations, which most effectively -handle and organize the material. Thinking is adaptation _to_ an end -_through_ the adjustment of particular objective contents. - -The thinker, like the carpenter, is at once stimulated and checked in -every stage of his procedure by the particular situation which confronts -him. A person is at the stage of wanting a new house: well then, his -materials are available resources, the price of labor, the cost of -building, the state and needs of his family, profession, etc.; his tools -are paper and pencil and compass, or possibly the bank as a credit -instrumentality, etc. Again, the work is beginning. The foundations are -laid. This in turn determines its own specific materials and tools. -Again, the building is almost ready for occupancy. The concrete process -is that of taking away the scaffolding, clearing up the grounds, -furnishing and decorating rooms, etc. This specific operation again -determines its own fit or relevant materials and tools. It defines the -time and mode and manner of beginning and ceasing to use them. Logical -theory will get along as well as does reflective practice, when it -sticks close by and observes the directions and checks inherent in each -successive phase of the evolution of the cycle of experiencing. The -problem in general of validity of the thinking process as distinct from -the validity of this or that process arises only when thinking is -isolated from its historic position and its material context. - -3. But Lotze is not yet done with the problem of validity, even from his -own standpoint. The ground shifts again under his feet. It is no longer -a question of the validity of the idea or meaning with which thought is -supposed to set out; it is no longer a question of the validity of the -process of thinking in reference to its own product; it is the question -of the validity of the product. Supposing, after all, that the final -meaning, or logical idea, is thoroughly coherent and organized; -supposing it is an object for all consciousness as such. Once more -arises the question: What is the validity of even the most coherent and -complete idea?--a question which rises and will not down. We may -reconstruct our notion of the chimera until it ceases to be an -independent idea and becomes a part of the system of Greek mythology. -Has it gained in validity in ceasing to be an independent myth, in -becoming an element in systematized myth? Myth it was and myth it -remains. Mythology does not get validity by growing bigger. How do we -know the same is not the case with the ideas which are the product of -our most deliberate and extended scientific inquiry? The reference again -to the content as the self-identical object of all consciousness proves -nothing; the matter of a hallucination does not gain worth in proportion -to its social contagiousness. Or the reference proves that we have not -as yet reached any conclusion, but are entertaining a hypothesis--since -social validity is not a matter of mere common content, but of securing -participation in a commonly adjudged social experience through action -directed thereto and directed by consensus of judgment. - -According to Lotze, the final product is, after all, still thought. Now, -Lotze is committed once for all to the notion that thought, in any form, -is directed by and at an outside reality. The ghost haunts him to the -last. How, after all, does even the ideally perfect valid thought apply -or refer to reality? Its genuine subject is still beyond itself. At the -last Lotze can dispose of this question only by regarding it as a -metaphysical, not a logical, problem (Vol. II, pp. 281, 282). In other -words, _logically_ speaking, we are at the end just exactly where we -were at the beginning--in the sphere of ideas, and of ideas only, plus a -consciousness of the necessity of referring these ideas to a reality -which is beyond them, which is utterly inaccessible to them, which is -out of reach of any influence which they may exercise, and which -transcends any possible comparison with their results. "It is vain," -says Lotze, "to shrink from acknowledging the circle here involved ... -all we know of the external world depends upon the ideas of it which are -within us" (Vol. II, p. 185). "It is then this varied world of ideas -within us which forms the sole material directly given to us" (Vol. II, -p. 186). As it is the only material given to us, so it is the only -material with which thought can end. To talk about knowing the external -world through ideas which are merely within us is to talk of an inherent -self-contradiction. There is no common ground in which the external -world and our ideas can meet. In other words, the original implication -of a separation between an independent thought-material and an -independent thought-function and purpose lands us inevitably in the -metaphysics of subjective idealism, plus a belief in an unknown reality -beyond, which unknowable is yet taken as the ultimate test of the value -of our ideas as just subjective. The subjectivity of the psychical -event infects at the last the meaning or ideal object. Because it has -been taken to be something "in itself," thought is also something "in -itself," and at the end, after all our maneuvering we are where we -began:--with two separate disparates, one of meaning, but no existence, -the other of existence, but no meaning. - -The other aspect of Lotze's contradiction which completes the circle is -clear when we refer to his original propositions, and recall that at the -outset he was compelled to regard the origination and conjunctions of -the impressions, the elements of ideas, as themselves the effects -exercised by a world of things already in existence (see p. 31). He sets -up an independent world of thought, and yet has to confess that both at -its origin and termination it points with absolute necessity to a world -beyond itself. Only the stubborn refusal to take this initial and -terminal reference of thought beyond itself as having a historic -meaning, indicating a particular place of generation and a particular -point of fulfilment in the drama of evolving experience, compels Lotze -to give such bifold objective reference a purely metaphysical turn. - -When Lotze goes on to say (Vol. II, p. 191) that the measure of truth of -particular parts of experience is found in asking whether, when judged -by thought, they are in harmony with other parts of experience; when he -goes on to say that there is no sense in trying to compare the entire -world of ideas with a reality which is non-existent, excepting as it -itself should become an idea, Lotze lands where he might better have -frankly commenced.[43] He saves himself from utter skepticism only by -claiming that the explicit assumption of skepticism, the need of -agreement of a ready-made idea as such, with an extraneous independent -material as such, is meaningless. He defines correctly the work of -thought as consisting in harmonizing the various portions of experience -with each other: a definition which has meaning only in connection with -the fact that experience is continually integrating itself into a -wholeness of coherent meaning deepened in significance by passing -through an inner distraction in which by means of conflict certain -contents are rendered partial and hence objectively conscious. In this -case the test of thought is the harmony or unity of experience actually -effected. In that sense the test of reality is beyond thought, as -thought, just as at the other limit thought originates out of a -situation which is not reflectional in character. Interpret this before -and beyond in a historic sense, as an affair of the place occupied and -role played by thinking as a function in experience in relation to other -functions, and the intermediate and instrumental character of thought, -its dependence upon unreflective antecedents for its existence, and upon -a consequent experience for its test of final validity, becomes -significant and necessary. Taken at large, it plunges us in the depths -of a hopelessly complicated and self-revolving metaphysic. - - - - -V - -A CRITICAL STUDY OF BOSANQUET'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT[44] - - -Bosanquet's theory of the judgment, in common with all such theories of -the judgment, necessarily involves the metaphysical problem of the -nature of reality and of the relation of thought to reality. That the -judgment is the function by which knowledge is attained is a proposition -which would meet with universal acceptance. But knowledge is itself a -relation of some sort between thought and reality. The view which any -logician adopts as to the nature of the knowledge-process is accordingly -conditioned by his metaphysical presuppositions as to the nature of -reality. It is equally true that the theory of the judgment developed -from any metaphysical standpoint serves as a test of the validity of -that standpoint. We shall attempt in the present paper to show how -Bosanquet's theory of the judgment develops from his view of the nature -of reality, and to inquire whether the theory succeeds in giving such an -account of the knowledge-process as to corroborate the presupposition -underlying it. - -Bosanquet defines judgment as "the intellectual function which defines -reality by significant ideas and in so doing affirms the reality of -those ideas" (p. 104).[45] The form of the definition suggests the -nature of his fundamental problem. There is, on the one hand, a world -of reality which must be regarded as having existence outside of and -independently of the thoughts or ideas we are now applying to it; and -there is, on the other hand, a world of ideas whose value is measured by -the possibility of applying them to reality, of qualifying reality by -them. The judgment is the function which makes the connection between -these two worlds. If judgment merely brought one set of ideas into -relation with another set, then it could never give us anything more -than purely hypothetical knowledge whose application to the real world -would remain forever problematic. It would mean that knowledge is -impossible, a result which seems to be contradicted by the existence of -knowledge. The logician must, therefore, as Bosanquet tells us, regard -it as an essential of the act of judgment that it always refers to a -reality which goes beyond and is independent of the act itself (p. 104). -His central problem thus becomes that of understanding what the nature -of reality is which permits of being defined by ideas, and what the -nature of an idea is that it can ever be affirmed to be real. How does -the real world get representation in experience, and what is the -guarantee that the representation, when obtained, is correct? - -The defining of the problem suggests the view of the nature of reality -out of which Bosanquet's theory of the judgment grows. The real world is -to him a world which has its existence quite independently of the -process by which it is known. The real world is there to be known, and -is in no wise modified by the knowledge which we obtain of it. The work -of thought is to build up a world of ideas which shall represent, or -correspond to, the world of reality. The more complete and perfect the -correspondence, the greater our store of knowledge. - -Translated into terms of the judgment, this representational view means -that the subject of the judgment must always be reality, while the -predicate is an idea. But when we examine the content of any universal -judgment, or even of an ordinary judgment of perception, the subject -which appears in the judgment is evidently not reality at all, if by -reality we mean something which is in no sense constituted by the -thought-process. When I say, "The tree is green," the subject, tree, -cannot be regarded as a bit of reality which is given ready-made to the -thought-process. The ability to perceive a tree, to distinguish it from -other objects and single it out for the application of an idea, -evidently implies a long series of previous judgments. The content -"tree" is itself ideal. As Bosanquet forcibly states it: "If a sensation -or elementary perception is in consciousness (and if not we have nothing -to do with it in logic), it already bears the form of thinking" (p. 33). -How, then, can it serve as the subject of a judgment? Bosanquet's -solution of the problem is to say that the real subject of a judgment is -not the grammatical subject which appears in a proposition, but reality -itself. In the more complex forms of judgment the reference to reality -is disguised by the introduction of explicit ideas to designate the -portion of reality to which reference is made (pp. 78, 79). In the -simplest type of judgment known, however, the qualitative judgment of -perception, the reference to reality appears within the judgment itself. -The relations of thought to reality and of the elements of the judgment -to one another can, accordingly, most readily be seen in the -consideration of this rudimentary form of judgment in which the various -parts lie bare before us. - -Bosanquet describes it as follows: - - If I say, pointing to a particular house, "That is my home," it is - clear that in this act of judgment the reference conveyed by the - demonstrative is indispensable. The significant idea "my home" is - affirmed, not of any other general significant idea in my mind, - but of something which is rendered unique by being present to me - in perception. In making the judgment, "That is my home," I extend - the present sense-perception of a house in a certain landscape by - attaching to it the ideal content or meaning of "home;" and - moreover, in doing this, I pronounce the ideal content to be, so - to speak, of one and the same tissue with what I have before me in - my actual perception. That is to say, I affirm the meaning of the - idea, or the idea considered as a meaning, to be a real quality of - that which I perceive in my perception. - - The same account holds good of every perceptive judgment; when I - see a white substance on a plate and judge that "it is bread" I - affirm the reference, or general meaning which constitutes the - symbolic idea "bread" in my mind, to be a real quality of the spot - or point in present perception which I attempt to designate by the - demonstrative "this." The act defines the given but indefinite - real by affirmation of a quality, and affirms reality of the - definite quality by attaching it to the previously undefined real. - Reality is given for me _in_ present sensuous perception, and _in_ - the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with - it. (Pp. 76, 77.) - -Again, he says that the general features of the judgment of perception -are as follows: - - There is a presence of a something in contact with our sensitive - self, which, as being so in contact, has the character of reality; - and there is the qualification of this reality by the reference to - it of some meaning _such as can_ be symbolized by a name (p. 77). - -Our point of contact with reality, the place where reality gets into the -thought-process, is, according to this view, to be found in the -simplest, most indefinite type of judgment of perception. We meet with -reality in the mere undefined "this" of primitive experience. But each -such elementary judgment about an undefined "this" is an isolated bit of -experience. Each "this" could give us only a detached bit of reality at -best, and the further problem now confronts us of how we ever succeed in -piecing our detached bits of reality together to form a real world. -Bosanquet's explanation is, in his words, this: - - The real world, as a definite organized system, is _for me_ an - extension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of - judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain - such an extension (p. 77). - -Again he says: - - The subject in every judgment of Perception is some given spot or - point in sensuous contact with the percipient self. But, as all - reality is continuous, the subject is not _merely_ this given spot - or point. It is impossible to confine the real world within this - or that presentation. Every definition or qualification of a point - in present perception is affirmed of the real world which is - continuous with present perception. The ultimate subject of the - perceptive judgment is the real world as a whole, and it is of - this that, in judging, we affirm the qualities or characteristics. - (P. 78.) - -The problem is the same as that with which Bradley struggles in his -treatment of the subject of the judgment, and the solution is also the -same. Bradley's treatment of the point is perhaps somewhat more -explicit. Like Bosanquet, he starts with the proposition that the -subject of the judgment must be reality itself and not an idea, because, -if it were the latter, judgment could never give us anything but a union -of ideas, and a union of ideas remains forever universal and -hypothetical. It can never acquire the uniqueness, the singularity, -which is necessary to make it refer to the real. Uniqueness can be found -only in our contact with the real. But just where does our contact with -the real occur? Bradley recognizes the fact that it cannot be the -_content_--even in the case of a simple sensation--which gives us -reality. The content of a sensation is a thing which is in my -consciousness, and which has the form which it presents because it is in -my consciousness. Reality is precisely something which is not itself -sensation, and cannot be in my consciousness. If I say, "This is white," -the "this" has a content which is a sensation of whiteness. But the -sensation of whiteness is not reality. The experience brings with it an -assurance of reality, not because its content is the real, but because -it is "my direct encounter in sensible presentation with the real -world."[46] To make the matter clearer, Bradley draws a distinction -between the _this_ and the _thisness_. In every experience, however -simple, there is a content--a "thisness"--which is not itself unique. -Considered merely as content, it is applicable to an indefinite number -of existences; in other words, it is an idea. But there is also in every -experience a "this" which is unique, but which is not a content. It is a -mere sign of existence which gives the experience uniqueness, but -nothing else. The "thisness" falls on the side of the content, and the -"this" on the side of existence. It is exactly the distinction which -Bosanquet has in mind in the passages quoted in which he tells us that -"reality is given for me _in_ present sensuous perception, and _in_ the -immediate feeling of my own sentient existence which goes with it;" and -again when he says: "There is a presence of a something in contact with -our sensitive self, which, as being so in contact, has the character of -reality." The same point is made somewhat more explicitly in his -introduction when he says that the individual's present perception is -not, indeed, reality as such, but is his present point of contact with -reality as such (p. 3). - -But has this distinction between the content of an experience and its -existence solved the problem of how we _know_ reality? When Bosanquet -talks of knowing reality, he means possessing ideas which are an -accurate reproduction of reality. It is still far from clear how, -according to his own account, we could ever have any assurance that our -ideas do represent reality accurately, if we can nowhere find a point -at which the content of an experience can be held to give us reality. -The case is still worse when we go beyond the problem of how any -particular bit of reality can be known, and ask ourselves how reality as -a whole can be known. The explanation offered by both Bradley and -Bosanquet is that by means of judgment we extend the bit of reality of -whose existence we get a glimpse through a peep-hole in the curtain of -sensuous perception, and thus build up the organized system of reality. -In a passage previously quoted, Bosanquet tells us that all reality is -continuous, and therefore the real subject of a judgment cannot be the -mere spot or point which is given in sensuous perception, but must be -the real world as a whole. But how does he know that reality is -continuous, and that the real world is an organized system? Our only -knowledge of reality comes through judgment, and judgment brings us into -contact with reality only at isolated points. When he tells us that -reality is a continuous whole, he does so on the basis of a metaphysical -presupposition which is not justifiable by his theory of the judgment. -The only statement about reality which could be maintained on the basis -of his theory is that some sort of a reality exists, but the theory -furnishes equal justification for the assurance that this reality is of -such a nature that we can never know anything more about it than the -bare fact of its existence. Moreover, the bare fact of the existence of -reality comes to us merely in the form of a feeling of our own sentient -existence which goes with sense-perception. But the mere assurance that -somewhere behind the curtain of sensuous perception reality exists (even -if this could go unchallenged), accompanied by the certainty that we can -never by any possibility know anything more about it, is practically -equivalent to the denial of the possibility of knowledge.[47] - -Although the denial of the possibility of knowledge seems to be the -logical outcome of the premises, it is not the conclusion reached by -Bosanquet. At the outset of his treatise, Bosanquet propounds the -fundamental question we have been considering in these words: "How does -the analysis of knowledge as a systematic function, or system of -functions, explain that relationship in which truth appears to consist, -between the human intelligence on the one hand, and fact or reality on -the other?" His answer is: "To this difficulty there is only one reply. -If the object-matter of reality lay genuinely outside the system of -thought, not only our analysis, but thought itself, would be unable to -lay hold of reality." (Pp. 2, 3.) The statement is an explicit -recognition of the impossibility of bridging the chasm between a reality -outside the content of knowledge and a known real world. It brings -before us the dilemma contained in Bosanquet's treatment of the subject -of the judgment. On the one hand the subject of the judgment must be -outside the realm of my thoughts. If it were not, judgment would merely -establish a relation between my ideas and would give me no knowledge of -the real world. On the other hand, the subject of the judgment must be -within the realm of my thoughts. If it were not, I could never assert -anything of it; could never judge, or know it. The stress he lays on the -first horn of the dilemma has been shown. It remains to show his -recognition of the second horn, and to find out whether or not he -discovers any real reconciliation between the two. - -Bosanquet sums up the section of the introduction on knowledge and its -content, truth, with the following paragraph: - - The real world for every individual is thus emphatically _his_ - world; an extension and determination of his present perception, - which perception is to him not indeed reality as such, but his - point of contact with reality as such. Thus in the enquiry which - will have to be undertaken as to the logical subject of the - judgment, we shall find that the subject, however it may shift, - contract, and expand, is always in the last resort some greater or - smaller element of this determinate reality, which the individual - has constructed by identifying significant ideas with that world - of which he has assurance through his own perceptive experience. - In analyzing common judgment it is ultimately one to say that _I - judge_ and that _the real world for me, my real world, extends - itself_, or maintains its organized extension. This is the - ultimate connection by which the distinction of subject and - predication is involved in the act of affirmation or enunciation - which is the differentia of judgment. (Pp. 3, 4). - -Here the subject of the judgment appears as an element of a reality -_which the individual has constructed_ by identifying significant ideas -with that world of which he has assurance through his own perceptive -experience. But the very point with reference to the subject of the -judgment previously emphasized is that it is not and cannot be something -which the individual has constructed. The subject of the judgment must -be reality, and reality does not consist of ideas, even if it be -determined by them. It does not mend matters to explain that the -individual has constructed his real world by identifying significant -ideas with that world of which he has assurance through his own -perceptive experiences, because, as we have seen, "the individual's -perceptive experiences" either turn out to be merely similar mental -constructions made at a prior time, so that nothing is gained by -attaching to them, or else they mean once more the mere shock of contact -which is supposed to give assurance that some sort of reality exists, -but which gives no assurance of what it is. That and what, this and -thisness still remain detached. When he talks of _the real world for any -individual_ we are left entirely in the dark as to what the relation -between _the real world as it is for any individual_ and _the real -world as it is for itself_ may be, or how the individual is to gain any -assurance that _the real world as it is for him_ represents _the real -world as it is for itself_. - -Another attempt at a reconciliation of these opposing views leaves us no -better satisfied. The passage is as follows: - - The real world, as a definite organized system, is _for me_ an - extension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of - judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain - such an extension. It makes no essential difference whether the - ideas whose content is pronounced to be an attribute of reality - appear to fall within what is given in perception, or not. We - shall find hereafter that it is vain to attempt to lay down - boundaries between the given and its extension. The moment we try - to do this we are on the wrong track. The given and its extension - differ not absolutely but relatively; they are continuous with - each other, and the metaphor by which we speak of an extension - conceals from us that the so-called "given" is no less artificial - than that by which it is extended. It is the character and quality - of being directly in contact with sense-perception, not any fixed - datum of content, that forms the constantly shifting center of the - individual's real world, and spreads from that center over every - extension which the system of reality receives from judgment. (P. - 77.) - -In this passage by the "given" he evidently means the content of sensory -experience, the thisness, the what. It is, as he says, of the same stuff -as that by which it is extended. Both the given and that by which it is -extended are artificial in the sense of not being _real_ according to -Bosanquet's interpretation of reality; they are ideas. But if all this -is admitted, what becomes of the possibility of knowledge? Bosanquet -undertakes to rescue it by assuring us again that it is the character -and quality of being directly in contact with sense-perception, not any -fixed datum of content, that forms the center of the individual's real -world and gives the stamp of reality to his otherwise ideal extension of -this center. Here again we find ourselves with no evidence that the -_content_ of our knowledge bears any relation to reality. We have merely -the feeling of vividness attached to sensory experience which seems to -bring us the certainty that there is some sort of a reality behind it, -but this is not to give assurance that our ideal content even belongs -rightfully to that against which we have bumped, much less of _how_ it -belongs--and only this deserves the title "knowledge." - -In the chapter on "Quality and Comparison," in which he takes up the -more detailed treatment of the simplest types of judgment of perception, -he comes back to the same contradiction, and again attempts to explain -how both horns of his dilemma must be true. The passage is this: - - The Reality to which we ascribe the predicate is undoubtedly - self-existent; it is not _merely_ in my mind or in my act of - judgment; if it were, the judgment would only be a game with my - ideas. It is well to make this clear in the case before us, for in - the later forms of the judgment it will be much disguised. Still - the reality which attracts my concentrated attention is also - within my act of judgment; it is not even the whole reality - present to my perception; still less of course the whole - self-existent Reality which I dimly presuppose. The immediate - subject of the judgment is a mere aspect, too indefinite to be - described by explicit ideas except in as far as the qualitative - predication imposes a first specification upon it. _This_ Reality - _is_ in my judgment; it is the point at which the actual world - impinges upon my consciousness as real, and it is only by judging - with reference to this point that I can refer the ideal content - before my mind to the whole of reality which I at once believe to - exist, and am attempting to construct. The Subject is both in and - out of the Judgment, as Reality is both in and out of my - consciousness. (Pp. 113, 114.) - -The conclusion he reaches is a mere restatement of the difficulty. The -problem he is trying to solve is how the subject _can_ be both in and -out of the judgment, and how the subject without is related to the -subject within. The mere assertion that it is so does not help us to -understand it. His procedure seems like taking advantage of two -meanings of sense-perception, its conscious quality and its brute abrupt -immediacy, and then utilizing this ambiguity to solve a problem which -grows out of the conception of judgment as a reference of idea to -reality. - -Turning from his treatment of the world of fact to his discussion of the -world of idea, from the subject to the predicate, as it appears in his -theory of the judgment we find again a paradox which must be recognized -and cannot be obviated. An idea is essentially a meaning. It is not a -particular existence whose essence is uniqueness as is the case with the -subject of the judgment, but is a meaning whose importance is that it -may apply to an indefinite number of unique existences. Its -characteristic is universality. And yet an idea regarded as a psychical -existence, an idea as a content in my mind, is just as particular and -unique as any other existence. How, then, does it obtain its -characteristic of universality? Bosanquet's answer is that it must be -universal by means of a reference to something other than itself. Its -meaning resides, not in its existence as a psychical image, but in its -reference to something beyond itself. Now, any idea that is affirmed is -referred to reality, but do ideas exist which are not being affirmed? If -so, their reference cannot be to reality. Bosanquet discusses the -question in the second section of his introduction as follows: - - It is not easy to deny that there is a world of ideas or of - meanings, which simply consists in that identical reference of - symbols by which mutual understanding between rational beings is - made possible. A _mere_ suggestion, a _mere_ question, a _mere_ - negation, seem all of them to imply that we sometimes _entertain_ - ideas without affirming them of reality, and therefore without - affirming their reference to be a reference to something real or - their meaning to be fact. We may be puzzled indeed to say what an - idea can mean, or to what it can refer, if it does not mean or - refer to something real--to some element in the fabric - continuously sustained by the judgment which is our consciousness. - On the other hand, it would be shirking a difficulty to neglect - the consideration that an idea, while denied of reality, may - nevertheless, or even must, possess an identical and so - intelligible reference--a symbolic value--for the rational beings - who deny it. A reference, it may be argued, must be a reference to - something. But it seems as if in this case the something were the - fact of reference itself, the rational convention between - intelligent beings, or rather the world which has existence, - whether for one rational being or for many, merely as contained in - and sustained by such intellectual reference. - - I only adduce these considerations in order to explain that - transitional conception of an objective world or world of - meanings, distinct from the real world or world of facts, with - which it is impossible wholly to dispense in an account of thought - starting from the individual subject. The paradox is that the real - world or world of fact thus seems for us to fall within and be - included in the objective world or world of meanings, as if all - that is fact were meaning, but not every meaning were fact. This - results in the contradiction that something is objective, which is - not real. (Pp. 4, 5.) - -In the seventh section of the introduction Bosanquet explains his -meaning further by what the reader is privileged to regard as a flight -of the imagination--a mere simile--which he thinks may, nevertheless, -make the matter clearer. - - We might try to think that the world, _as known to each of us_, is - constructed and sustained by his individual consciousness; and - that every other individual also frames for himself, and sustains - by the action of his intelligence, the world in which he in - particular lives and moves. Of course such a construction is to be - taken as a reconstruction, a construction by way of knowledge - only; but for our present purpose this is indifferent. Thus we - might think of the ideas and objects of our private world rather - as corresponding to than as from the beginning identical with - those which our fellow-men are occupied in constructing each - within his own sphere of consciousness. And the same would be true - even of the objects and contents within our own world, in as far - as an act or effort would be required to maintain them, of the - same kind with that which was originally required to construct - them.... Thus the paradox of reference would become clearer. We - should understand that we refer to a correspondence by means of a - content. We should soften down the contradiction of saying that a - name to meet which we have and can get nothing but an idea, - nevertheless does not stand for that idea but for something else. - We should be able to say that the name stands for those elements - in the idea which correspond in all our separate worlds, and in - our own world of yesterday and of today, considered as so - corresponding. (Pp. 45, 46.) - -According to this view, the idea obtains the universality which -constitutes it an idea by a sort of process of elimination. It is like a -composite photograph. It selects only the common elements in a large -number of particular existences, and thus succeeds in representing, or -referring to, all the particular existences which have gone to make it -up. But when we come to consider the bearing which this view of -universality, or generalized significance, has on our estimate of the -knowledge-process, we feel that it has not solved the problem for us. In -the first place, the idea _in its existence_ is just as particular when -regarded as made up of the common elements of many ideas as is any of -the ideas whose elements are taken. A composite photograph is just as -much a single photograph as any one of the photographs which are taken -to compose it. The chasm between the particularity of the psychical -image and the universality of its meaning is not bridged by regarding -the content of the image as made up by eliminating unlike elements in a -number of images. The stuff with which thought has to work is still -nothing more than a particular psychical image, and the problem of what -gives it its logical value as a general significance is still unsolved. -Nor does it seem possible to find anything in the _existence_ of the -image which could account for its reference to something outside of -itself. The _fact_ of reference itself becomes an ultimate mystery.[48] - -But even waiving this difficulty, the judgment must still -appear truncated, if it really totally disregard a part of its -content--_i. e._, the particular existence of the image as part of the -judging consciousness. The theory holds that the particular existence of -the image has no logical value. It is only its meaning, or general -reference, which has logical value. But the image _qua_ image is just as -real as that to which it is supposed to refer. If the judgment really -does ignore its existence, then it ignores a portion of the reality it -attempts to represent, and stands self-confessed as a failure.[49] At -still another point, ideas, as Bosanquet represents them, prove to be -unsatisfactory tools to use in the work of building up reality. In -Bosanquet's words: "The meaning tyrannizes over the psychical image in -another respect. Besides crushing out of sight its particular and -exclusive existence, it also crushes out part of its content" (p. 74). -The idea, as we use it, is not, as to content, a complete or accurate -representation of anything real. To take Bosanquet's illustration: - - Some one speaks to me of the Aegean sea, which I have never seen. - He tells me that it is a deep blue sea under a cloudless sky, - studded with rocky islands. The meanings of these words are a - problem set to my thought. I have to meet him in the world of - objective references, which as intelligent beings we have in - common. How I do this is my own affair, and the precise images at - my command will vary from day to day, and from minute to minute. - It sounds simple to say that I combine my recollections of sea and - sky at Torbay with those of the island-studded waters of Orkney - or the Hebrides. Even so, there is much to adjust and to neglect; - the red cliffs of Torbay, and the cloudy skies of the north. But - then again, my recollections are already themselves symbolic - ideas; the reference to Torbay or the Hebrides is itself a problem - set to thought, and puts me upon the selection of index-elements - in fugitive images that are never twice the same. I have _first_ - to symbolize the color of Torbay, using for the purpose any blue - that I can call to mind, and fixing, correcting, subtracting from, - the color so recalled, till I reduce it to a mere index quality; - and _then_ I have to deal in the same way with the meaning or - significant idea so obtained, clipping and adjusting the qualities - of Torbay till it seems to serve as a symbol of the Aegean. (Pp. - 74, 75.) - -And by the time all this is performed what sort of a representation of -reality is the idea? Evidently a very poor and meager and fragmentary -one. - -It is so poor and fragmentary, that it cannot itself be that which is -affirmed of reality. It must be some other fuller existence to be found -in the world of meanings which is affirmed. And yet how the meager -content of the idea succeeds in referring to the world of meanings, and -acting as the instrument for referring a meaning to reality, is not at -all clear. It seems impossible to explain reference intelligibly by the -concept of a _correspondence_ of contents. - -The fundamental difficulty in the interpretation of the predicate is the -same one that we encountered in the interpretation of the subject. If -the predicate is to be affirmed of reality (and if it be not, it has no -logical value), then it must, when affirmed, be in some sense an -accurate representation of reality. But the predicate is an idea, and, -moreover, an idea which is, both in its existence and in its meaning -palpably the outcome of transformations wrought upon given sensory -contents by the individual consciousness. Since the one point of contact -with reality is in sensory experience, the more simple sensory -experiences are reacted upon and worked over, the farther they recede -from reality. The idea seems, therefore, in its very essence, a thing -which never can be affirmed of reality. As image it is itself a reality, -but not affirmed; as meaning it is that reality (the image) manipulated -for individual ends. Why suppose that by distorting reality we get it in -shape to affirm _of_ reality? Moreover, the farther an idea is removed -from immediate sensory experience--in other words, the more abstract it -becomes--the less is the possibility of affirming it of reality. The -final outcome of this point of view, if we adhere rigorously to its -logic is that the more thinking we do, the less we know about the real -world. Bosanquet avoids this conclusion by a pure act of faith. If -knowledge is to be rescued, we must believe that the work done by -consciousness upon the bits of reality given in sensory experience -really does succeed in building up a knowledge of reality for us. As -Bosanquet puts it: "The presentation of Reality, qualified by an ideal -content, is one aspect of Subject and Predication; and my individual -percipient consciousness determining itself by a symbolic idea is the -other. That the latter is identified with the former follows from the -claim of conscious thought that its nature is to know."[50] (P. 83.) - -To sum up the situation, Bosanquet starts out with the assumption that -by knowledge we must mean knowledge of a world entirely independent of -our ideas. If we fail to make this assumption, knowledge becomes merely -a relation between ideas. But its whole importance seems to us to rest -on the conviction that it does give us knowledge of a world which is -what it is quite independently of our ideas about it, and cannot in any -sense be modified by what we think about it. What knowledge does is to -give us a copy or representation of the real world, whose value depends -on the accuracy of the representation. And yet when we examine any -individual knowing consciousness, the subject which appears within the -judgment is never some portion of the world which exists outside of the -knowing consciousness, but always some portion of the world which exists -within the knowing consciousness, and which is constituted by the -knowledge process. The predicate which is affirmed of reality is -constantly found to derive its meaning, its generalized significance, -not from its correspondence with, or reference to, the real world -outside of the knowing consciousness, but from reference to a world of -meanings, which consists in a sort of convention among rational -beings--a world whose existence is distinctly within the knowing -consciousness and not outside of it.[51] Between the real world, as -Bosanquet conceives it, and the world of knowledge, we find inserted on -the side of the subject, the world _as known to each of us_, and on the -side of the predicate, the _objective world of meanings_. Neither of -these is the real world. Both of them are ideal, _i. e._, are -constructions of the individual consciousness. We nowhere find any -satisfactory explanation of how these ideal worlds are related to the -real world. There is merely the assertion that we must believe that they -represent the real world in order that we may believe that knowledge -exists. But the fact remains that whenever we try to analyze and explain -any particular judgment, what we find ourselves dealing with is always -the world as it exists to us as subject, and the objective world of -meanings as predicate. If we stop here, then knowledge turns out to be -just what Bosanquet asserted at the outset that it was _not, i. e._, a -relation between ideas. When we demand a justification for going farther -than this, we find none except the claim of conscious thought that its -nature is to know--a claim whose justice we have no possible means of -testing, and which would not, even if admitted, be of the slightest -value in deciding which _particular_ judgment is true and which false. - -Bosanquet's development of his subject has proved to be throughout the -necessary logical outcome of the presuppositions with reference to -reality from which he starts. The fundamental difficulty of erecting a -theory of the knowledge-process upon such a basis is recognized by him -at the start in a passage already quoted: "If the object-matter of -reality lay genuinely outside the system of thought, not only our -analysis, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold of reality" -(p. 2). But, in spite of this assertion, his fundamental conception of -reality remains that of a system which does lie outside the -thought-process. His theory is an attempt to reconcile the essentially -irreconcilable views that reality is outside of the thought-process, and -that it is inside of the thought-process, and he succeeds only by -calling upon our faith that so it is. - -If it be true, as it seems to him to be, that we are compelled to adhere -to both of these views of reality, then surely there is no other -outcome. It means, however, that we finally resign all hope of _knowing_ -reality. We may _have faith_ in its existence, but we have no way of -deciding what particular judgment has reality in it as it should have -it, and what as it should not. All stand (and fall) on the same basis. -But does not Bosanquet himself point out a pathway which, if followed -farther, would reach a more satisfactory view of the realm of knowledge? -He has shown us that the only sort of reality _we know_, or can know, is -the reality which appears within our judgment-process--the reality as -known to us. Would it not be possible to drop the presupposed reality -outside of the judgment-process (with which judgment is endeavoring to -make connections) and content ourselves with the sort of reality which -appears within the judgment-process? In other words, may there not be a -satisfactory view of reality which frankly recognizes its organic -relation to the knowledge-process, without at the same time destroying -its value as reality? Is it possible to admit that reality is in a sense -constituted in the judgment without making it at the same time the -figment of the individual imagination--"a game with ideas"? - -Let us assume for the moment that the real difficulty with Mr. -Bosanquet's conception, the error that keeps him traveling in his -hopeless circles, is the notion that truth is a matter of reference of -ideas as such to reality as such, leading us to oscillate between the -alternatives that either all ideas have such reference, and so are true, -constitute knowledge; or else none have such reference, and so are -false; or else are mere ideas to which neither truth nor falsity can be -attributed. Let us ask if truth is not rather some _specific_ relation -within experience, something which characterizes one idea rather than -another, so that our problem is not how an idea can refer to a reality -beyond itself, but what are the marks by which we discriminate a true -reference from a false one. Then let us ask for the criterion used in -daily life and in science by which to test reality. - -If we ask the philosophically unsophisticated individual why he believes -that his house still exists when he is away from it and has no immediate -evidence of the fact, he will tell you it is because he has found that -he can go back to it time and again and see it and walk into it. It -never fails him when he acts upon the assumption that it is there. He -would never tell you that he believed in its existence when he was not -experiencing it because his mental picture of his house stood for and -represented accurately an object in the real world which was -nevertheless of a different order of existence from his mental picture. -When you ask the physicist why he believes that the laws of motion are -true, he will tell you that it is because he finds that bodies always -do behave according to them. He can predict just what a body will do -under given circumstances. He is never disappointed however long he -takes it for granted that the laws of motion are true and that bodies -behave according to them. The only thing that could make him question -their truth would be to find some body which did not prove to behave in -accordance with them. The criterion is the same in both cases. It is the -practical criterion of what as a matter of fact will work. That which -can safely be taken for granted as a basis for further action is -regarded as real and true. It remains real so long, and only so long, as -it continues to fulfil this condition. As soon as it ceases to do so, it -ceases to be regarded as real. When a man finds that he can no longer -obtain the accustomed experience of seeing and entering his house, he -ceases to regard it as real. It has burned down, or been pulled down. -When a physicist finds that a body does not, as a matter of fact, behave -as a given law leads him to expect it would behave, he ceases to regard -the law as _true_. - -The contrast between the naive view of the criterion of reality and the -one we have just been discussing may be brought out by considering how -we should have to interpret from each standpoint the constant succession -of facts in the history of science which have ceased to be facts. For -illustration take the former fact that the earth is flat. It ceased to -be a fact, says the theory we have been reviewing, because further -thought-constructions of the real world convinced us that there is no -reality which the idea "flat-world" represents. The idea "round-world" -alone reproduces reality. It ceased to be a fact, says the naive view, -because it ceased to be a safe guide for action. Men found they could -sail around the world. Correspondence in one case is pictorial, and its -existence or non-existence can, as we have seen, never be ascertained. -In the other, correspondence is response, adjustment, the co-meeting of -specific conditions in further constituting of experience. - -In actual life, therefore, the criterion of reality which we use is a -practical one. The test of reality does not consist in ascertaining the -relationship between an idea and an _x_ which is not idea, but in -ascertaining what experience can be taken for granted as a safe basis -for securing other experiences. The evident advantage of the latter -view, leaving aside for the moment the question of its adequacy in other -respects, is that it avoids the fundamental skepticism at once suggested -by the former. How can we ever be sure that the fact which we have -discovered will stand the test of further thought-constructions? Perhaps -it comes no nearer to reality than the discarded one. Obviously we never -_can_ be sure that any particular content of thought represents reality -so accurately and perfectly that it will never be subject to revision. -If, however, the test of reality is the _adequacy_ of a given content of -consciousness as a stimulus to action, as a mode of control, we have an -applicable standard. A given content of consciousness is real--is a -fact--so long as the act resulting from it is adequate in adaptation to -other contents. It ceases to be real as soon as the act it stimulates -proves to be inadequate. - -The view which places the ultimate test of facts, not in any -relationship of contents or existences, but in the practical outcome of -thought, is the one which seems to follow necessarily from a -thoroughgoing conception of the judgment as a function--an act. Our -fundamental biological conception of the activities of living organisms -is that acts exist for the sake of their results. Acts are always -stimulated by some definite set of conditions, and their value is always -tested by the adequacy with which they meet this set of conditions. The -judgment is no exception to the rule. It is always an act stimulated by -some set of conditions which needs readjusting. Its outcome is a -readjustment whose value is and can be tested only by its adequacy. It -is accordingly entirely in line with our reigning biological conceptions -to expect to find the ultimate criterion of truth and reality in the -practical outcome of thought, and to seek for an understanding of the -nature of the "real" and of the "ideal" within the total activity of -judgment. - -One difficulty besets us at the outset of such an investigation--that of -being sure that we have a genuine judgment under examination. A large -portion of the so-called judgments considered by logicians, even by -those who emphasize the truth that a judgment is an _act_, are really -not judgments at all, but contents of thought which are the outcome of -judgments--what might be called dead judgments, instead of live -judgments. When we analyze a real act of judgment, as it occurs in a -living process of thought, we find given elements which are always -present. There is always a certain situation which demands a reaction. -The situation is always in part determined and taken for granted, and in -part questioned. It is determined in so far as it is a definite -situation of some sort; it is undetermined in so far as it furnishes an -inadequate basis for further action and therefore comes to consciousness -as a problem. For example, take one of the judgments Bosanquet uses. -"This is bread." We have first to inquire when such a judgment actually -occurs in the living process of thought. A man does not make such a -judgment in the course of his thinking unless there is some instigation -to do so. Perhaps he is in doubt as to whether the white object he -perceives is bread or cake. He wants some bread, but does not want cake. -A closer inspection convinces him that it is bread, and the finished -judgment is formulated in the proposition: "This is bread." What is the -test of the reality of the bread, and the truth of the judgment? -Evidently the act based on it. He eats the bread. If it tastes like -bread and affects him like bread, then the bread was real and the -judgment true. If, on the other hand, it does not taste like bread, or -if it makes him violently ill, then the "bread" was not real and the -judgment was false. In either case, the "this"--the experience to be -interpreted--is unquestioned. The man does not question the fact that he -has a perception of a white object. So much is taken for granted and is -unquestioned within that judgment. But there is another part of the -experience which is questioned, and which remains tentative up to the -conclusion of the act of judgment; that is the doubt as to whether the -perceived white object is bread or something else. Every live judgment, -every judgment as it normally occurs in the vital process of thought, -must have these phases. It is only when a judgment is taken out of its -context and reduced to a mere memorandum of past judgments that it fails -to reveal such parts. The man may, of course, go farther back. He may -wonder whether this is really white or not. But he falls back then on -something else which he takes unquestioningly--a "this" experience of -some sort or other. - -So far we have considered the practical criterion of reality merely as -the one which is actually operative in everyday life, and as the one -suggested by our biological theory of the functions of living organisms. -It also offers a suggestion for the modified view of the nature of -reality for which we are in search. Our previous discussion brought out -incidentally a contradiction in the traditional theory of the nature of -reality which it will be worth while to consider further. In dealing -with the subject of the judgment, reality seemed to be made synonymous -with fact. In this sense fact, or the real, was set off against the -ideal. Knowledge was viewed as the correspondence between real and -ideal. When we came to deal with the ideal itself--with the predicate -of the judgment--there appeared in it an element of fact or reality -which proved a serious stumbling-block for the theory. As image in my -mind, the idea is just as real as the so-called facts; but this sort of -reality according to the theory in question is neither the reality about -which we are judging nor a real quality of it. Both Bradley and -Bosanquet are forced to admit that the judgment ignores it, and is in so -far by nature inadequate to its appointed task of knowing reality. - -The suggestion which the situation offers for a new theory is that the -view of reality has been too narrow. Reality must evidently be a broad -enough term to cover both fact and idea. If so, the reality must be -nothing more nor less than the total process of experience with its -continual opposition of fact and idea, and their continual resolution -through activity. That which previous theory has been calling the real -is not the total reality, but merely one aspect of it. The problem of -relation of fact and idea is thus the problem of the relation of one -form of reality to another, and so a determinate soluble one, not a -_merely_ metaphysical or general one. Granting this, does it still -remain true that reality in the narrower sense, reality as fact, can be -regarded as a different order of existence from the ideal, and set over -against the thought-process? Evidently not. Fact and idea become merely -two aspects of a total reality. The way in which fact and idea are -distinguished has already been suggested by the practical and biological -criterion of fact, or reality in the narrower sense. From this point of -view, fact is not a different order of existence from idea, but is -merely a part of the total process of experience which functions in a -given way. It is merely that part of experience which is taken as given, -and which serves as a stimulus to action. Thus the essential nature of -fact, or reality in the popular sense, falls not at all on the side of -its content, but on the side of its function. Similarly the ideal is -merely that part of the total experience which is taken as tentative. -There is no problem as to how either of them is related to reality. In -this relationship they _are_ reality. That which previous theories had -been calling the whole of reality now appears as merely one aspect of -it--the fact aspect--artificially isolated from the rest. - -When we translate this view of the nature of reality into terms of a -theory of the judgment, we find that we can agree with Bosanquet in his -definition of a judgment. It is an act, and an act which refers an ideal -content to reality. The judgment must be an act, because it is -essentially an adaptation--a reaction toward a given situation. The -subject of the judgment is that part of the content of experience which -represents the situation to be reacted to. It is that which is taken for -granted as given in each case. Now this is, as we have seen, reality--in -the narrower sense of that term. What Bosanquet has been calling reality -now appears merely as the subject of the judgment taken out of its -normal function and considered as an isolated thing. It is an artificial -abstraction. It is accordingly true, as Bosanquet insists, that the -subject of the judgment must always be reality--both in his sense of the -term and in ours. This reality is not real, however, by virtue of its -independence from the judgment, but by virtue of its function within the -judgment. His fundamental problem with reference to the subject of the -judgment is disposed of from this point of view. The subject is wholly -within the judgment, not in any sense outside of it; but it is at the -same time true that the subject of the judgment is reality. The fact -that the subjects of all judgments--even those of the most elementary -type--bear evident marks of the work done by thought upon them, ceases -to be a problem. The subject is essentially a thing constituted by the -doubt-inquiry process, and functioning within it. The necessity for an -intermediate _real world as it is to me_ between the real world and the -knowing process disappears, because the _real world as it is to me_ is -the only real world of which the judgment can take account. There is no -longer any divorce between the content of the subject and its existence. -Reality in his sense of the term--reality as fact--does not fall on the -side of _existence_ in distinction from content, but on the side of -_function_ in distinction from content. - -The predicate of the judgment is that part of the total experience which -is taken as doubtful, or tentative. As we have seen, every act of -adaptation involves a definite situation to be reacted to (subject) and -an indefinite or tentative material with which to react (predicate). We -have pointed out that a situation which demands a judgment never appears -in consciousness as mere questioned or questionable situation.[52] There -is always present, as soon as the doubt arises, some sort of tentative -solution. This is the predicate or idea. Just as the fact, or real in -the narrower sense, is that which is taken as given in the situation, so -the ideal is that which is taken as tentative. Its ideality does not -consist in its reference to another order of existence, the objective -world of meanings, but in its function within the judgment, the estimate -of the whole situation as leading up to the adequate act. Just as we no -longer have any need for the mediation of the _real world as known to -me_ between subject and reality, so we no longer need _the objective -world of meanings_ to bridge the chasm between the predicate and -reality. The difficulty of understanding how ideas can be used to build -up facts disappears when we regard fact and idea, not as different -orders of existence, but as contents marking different phases of a total -function. - -Ideas, as Bosanquet represented them, proved to be extremely -unsatisfactory tools to use in building up a knowledge of reality. In -the first place, their value as instruments of thought depends upon -their universality. We have already reviewed Bosanquet's difficulties in -attempting to explain the universality of ideas. The universality of an -idea cannot reside in its mere existence as image. Its existence is -purely particular. Its universality must reside in its reference to -something outside of itself. But no explanation of how the particular -existence--image--could refer to another and fuller content of a -different order of existence could be discovered. The fact of reference -remained an ultimate mystery. From the new point of view the image gains -its universality through its organizing function. It represents an -organized habit which may be brought to bear upon the present situation, -and which serves, by directing action, to organize and unify experience -as a whole. It is only as function that the concept of reference can be -made intelligible. - -Of course, considered as content, the idea is just as particular from -this point of view as from any other. We still have to discuss the -question as to whether or not the particularity of the idea has a -logical value. The fact that it had none in Bosanquet's theory sets a -limit to the validity of thought. But if the real test of the validity -of a judgment is the act in which it issues, then the existential aspect -of the idea must have logical value. The existential aspect of the idea -is the "my" side of it. It is as my personal experience that it exists. -But it is only as my idea that it has any impulsive power, or can issue -in action. Far from being ignored, therefore, the existential aspect is -essential to the logical, the determinative, value of an idea. - -Ideas, according to the representational theory of knowledge, proved to -be a poor medium for knowing reality in still another respect. They are -in their very nature contents that have been reduced from the fulness -of experience to mere index-signs. Even though their reference to a -fuller content in the objective world of meanings presented no problem, -still this objective world of meanings is far removed from reality. And -yet, in order to know, we must be able to affirm ideas of reality. On -the functional theory of ideas, their value does not rest at all upon -their representational nature. They are not taken either in their -existence or in their meaning as representations of any other content. -They are taken as contents which mark a given function, and their value -is determined entirely by the adequacy of the function of which they are -the conscious expression. Their content may be as meager as you please. -It may have been obtained by a long process of reducing and transforming -sensory experience, but if it serve to enable its possessor to meet the -situation which called it up with the appropriate act, then it has truth -and value in the fullest sense. The reduction of the idea to a mere -index-sign presents no problem when we realize that it is the tool of a -given function, not the sign for a different and fuller content. The -idea thus becomes a commendable economy in the thought-process, rather -than a reprehensible departure from reality. - -We have already upon general considerations criticised the point of view -which holds that ideality consists in reference to another content. In -arguing that this reference cannot be primarily to reality itself, but -rather to an intermediate world of meanings, Bosanquet cites the -question and the negative judgment. In the question ideas are not -affirmed of reality, and in negation they are definitely denied of -reality, hence their reference cannot be to reality. It must therefore -be to an objective world of meanings. It may be worth while to point out -in passing that, from the functional point of view, the part played by -ideas in the question and in negative judgment is the same that it is in -affirmation. - -We have brought out the fact that all judgment arises in a doubt. The -earliest stage of judgment is accordingly a question. Whether the -process stops at that point, or is carried on to an affirmation or -negation, depends upon the particular conditions. The ideas which appear -in questions present no other problem than those of affirmation. They -are ideas, not by virtue of their reference to another content in the -world of meanings, but by virtue of their function, _i. e._, that of -constituting that part of the total experience which is taken as -doubtful, and hence as in process. - -In order to make this point clear with reference to negative judgments, -it will be necessary to consider the relation of negative and positive -judgments somewhat more in detail. All judgment is in its earliest -stages a question, but a question is never _mere_ question. There are -always present some suggestions of an answer, which make the process -really a disjunctive judgment. A question might be defined as a -disjunctive judgment in which one member of the disjunction is expressed -and the others implied. If the process goes on to take the form of -affirmation or negation, one of the suggested answers is selected. To -follow out the illustration of the bread used above, the judgment arises -in a doubt as to the nature of the white object perceived, but the doubt -never takes the form of a blank question. It at once suggests certain -possible solutions drawn from the mass of organized experience at the -command of the person judging. At this stage the judgment is -disjunctive. In the illustration it would probably take the form: "This -is either bread or cake." The further course of the judgment rejects the -cake alternative, and selects the bread, and the final outcome of the -judgment is formulated in the proposition: "This is bread." But how did -it happen that it did not take the form: "This is not cake"? That -proposition is also involved in the outcome, and implied in the judgment -made. The answer is that the form taken by the final outcome depends -entirely on the direction of interest of the person making the judgment. -If his interest happened to lie in obtaining bread, then the outcome -would naturally take the form: "This is bread," and his act would -consist in eating it. If he happened to want cake, the natural form -would be, "This is not cake," and his act would consist in refraining -from eating. In other words, the question as to whether a judgment turns -out to be negative or positive is a question of whether the stress of -interest happens to fall on the selected or on the rejected portions of -the original disjunction. Every determination of a subject through a -predicate includes both. The selection of one or the other according to -interest affects the final formulation of the process, but does not -change the relations of its various phases. An idea in a negative -judgment is just what it is in a positive judgment. In neither case is -it constituted an idea by reference to some other content. - -So far we have outlined Bosanquet's theory of the judgment; have noted -the apparently insoluble problems inherent in his system, and have -sketched a radically different theory which offered a possible solution -for his difficulties. It now remains to develop the implications of the -new theory further by comparing its application to some of the more -important problems of logic with that of Bosanquet. In closing we shall -have to inquire to what extent the new theory of the judgment with its -metaphysical implications has proved more satisfactory than that of -Bosanquet. - -The special problems to be considered are (1) the relation of judgment -to inference; (2) the parts of the judgment and their relationship; (3) -the time element in the judgment; and (4) the way in which one judgment -can be separated from another. - -1. The discussion of the relation between judgment and inference comes -up incidentally in Bosanquet's treatment of the distinction between a -judgment and a proposition (p. 79). The proposition, he says, is merely -the enunciative sentence which represents the act of thought called -judgment. With this distinction we should agree. In his discussion of -the point, however, he criticises Hegel's doctrine that a judgment is -distinguished from a proposition in that a judgment maintains itself -against a doubt, while a proposition is a mere temporal affirmation, not -implying the presence of a doubt. The ground of his criticism is that -judgment must be regarded as operative before the existence of a -conscious doubt, and that, while it is true, as Hegel suggests, that -judgment and inference begin together, they both begin farther back than -the point at which conscious doubt arises. Doubt marks the point at -which inference becomes conscious of its ground. Now, it is undoubted -that inferences in which the ground is implicit exist at an earlier -stage of experience than those in which it is explicit. The former we -usually call simple apprehension, and the latter judgment. What -Bosanquet wishes to do is to make the term "judgment" cover both the -implicit and the explicit activities. The question at once arises -whether such a use of terms is accurate. There is certainly a wide -difference between an inference which is conscious of its ground, and -one which is not. It is conceivably a distinction of philosophic -importance. To slur the difference by applying one name to both -accomplishes nothing. It will be remembered that the presence of a -conscious doubt is the criterion of judgment adopted in the standpoint -from which we have been criticising Bosanquet's theory. We should -accordingly make the term "inference" a wider one than the term -"judgment." A judgment is an inference which is conscious of its ground. -Since fact and idea have been represented as constituted in and through -judgment, the question which at once suggests itself is: What, from such -a standpoint, is the criterion of fact and idea in the stage of -experience previous to the appearance of judgment? The answer is that -the question involves the psychological fallacy. There is no such -distinction as fact and idea in experience previous to the appearance of -judgment. The distinction between fact and idea arises only at the -higher level of experience at which inference becomes conscious of its -grounds. To ask what they were previous to that is to ask _what_ they -were before they _were_--a question which, of course, cannot be -answered. - -Our reason for not adopting Hegel's distinction between a judgment and a -proposition would accordingly not be the same as Bosanquet's. The -question has already been touched upon in the distinction between dead -and live judgments. What Hegel calls a proposition is really nothing but -a dead judgment. His illustration of a temporal affirmation is the -sentence: "A carriage is passing the house." That sentence would be a -judgment, he says, only in case there were some doubt as to whether or -not a carriage was passing. But the question to be answered first is: -When would such a "statement" occur in the course of our experience? It -is impossible to conceive of any circumstances in which it would -naturally occur, unless there were some doubt to be solved either of our -own or of another. Perhaps one is expecting a friend, and does not know -at first whether it is a carriage or a cart which is passing. Perhaps -some one has been startled, and asks: "What is this noise?" What Hegel -wishes to call a proposition is, accordingly, nothing but a judgment -taken out of its setting. - -2. In dealing with the traditional three parts of the judgment--subject, -predicate, and copula--Bosanquet disposes of the copula at once, by -dividing the judgment into subject and predication. But the two terms -"subject" and "predication" are not co-ordinate. Subject, as he uses it, -is a static term indicating a _content_. Predication is a dynamic term -indicating the act of predicating. It implies something which is -predicated of something else, _i. e._, two contents and the act of -bringing them into relation. Now, if what we understand by the copula is -the _act_ of predicating abstracted from the content which is predicated -of another content, then it does not dispose of the copula as a separate -factor in judgment to include thing predicated and act of predicating -under the single term "predication." The term "predication" might just -as reasonably be made to absorb the subject as well, and would then -appear--as it really is--synonymous with the term "judgment." - -But Bosanquet's difficulties with the parts of the judgment are not -disposed of even by the reduction to subject and predication. He goes on -to say: - - It is plain that the judgment, however complex, is a single idea. - The relations within it are not relations between ideas, but are - themselves a part of the idea which is predicated. In other words, - the subject must be outside the judgment in order that the content - of the judgment may be predicated of it. If not, we fall back into - "my idea of the earth goes round my idea of the sun," and this, as - we have seen, is never the meaning of "The earth goes round the - sun." What we want is, "The real world has in it as a fact what I - mean by earth-going-round-sun." (P. 81.) - -We have already pointed out the difficulties into which Bosanquet's -presupposition as to the nature of reality plunges him. This is but -another technical statement of the same problem. If the subject is -really outside of judgment, then the entire _content_ of the judgment -must fall on the side of predicate, or idea. In the paragraphs that -follow, Bosanquet brings out the point that the judgment must -nevertheless contain the distinction of subject and predicate, since it -is impossible to affirm without introducing a distinction into the -_content_ of the affirmation. Yet he considers this distinction to be -_merely_ a difference within an identity. It serves to mark off the -grammatical subject and predicate, but cannot be the essential -distinction of subject and predicate. His solution of the puzzle is -really the one for which we have been contending, _i. e._, that "the -real world is primarily and emphatically my world," but he still cannot -be satisfied with that kind of a real world as ultimate. Behind the -subject which presents my world he postulates a real world which is not -my world, but which my world represents. It is the relation between this -real world and the total content of a judgment which he considers the -essential relation of judgment. This leaves him--as we have pointed -out--as far as ever from a theory of the relation of thought to reality, -and, moreover, with no criterion for the distinction of subject and -predicate within the judgment. To say that it is a difference within an -identity does not explain how, on a mere basis of content, such a -difference is distinguished within an identity or how it assumes the -importance it actually has. He vibrates between taking the whole -intellectual content as predicate, the reality to be represented as -subject (in which case the copula would be the "contact of -sense-perception") and a distinction appearing without reasonable ground -or bearing _within_ the intellectual content. When subject and predicate -are regarded as the contents in which phases of a function appear, this -difficulty no longer exists. - -3. In discussing the time relations within judgment (p. 85) Bosanquet -first disposes of the view which holds that the subject is prior to the -predicate in time, and is distinguished from the predicate by its -priority. He emphasizes the fact that no content of consciousness can -have the significance of a subject, except with reference to something -already referred to it as predicate. But while it cannot be true that -the parts of the judgment fall outside of one another in time, it is yet -evident that in one sense at least the judgment is in time. To make this -clear, Bosanquet draws a provisional distinction between the process of -arriving at a judgment and the completed judgment. The process of -arriving at a judgment is a process of passing from a subject with an -indefinite provisional predicate--a sort of disjunctive judgment--to a -subject with a defined predicate. This process is evidently in time, but -it is as evidently not a transition from subject to predicate. It is, as -he says, a modification, _pari passu_, of both subject and predicate. -The same distinction, he thinks, must hold of the judgment when -completed. But this throws us into a dilemma with reference to the -time-factor in judgment. Time either is or is not an essential factor in -judgment. If it is not essential, then how explain the evident fact that -the judgment as an intellectual process does have duration? If it is -essential, then how explain the fact that its parts do not fall outside -one another in time? Bosanquet evidently regards the former problem as -the easier of the two. His solution is that, while the judgment is an -intellectual process in time, still this is a purely external aspect. -The essential relation between subject and predicate is not in time, -since they are coexistent; therefore time is not an essential element in -judgment. - -The first point at which we take issue with this treatment of time in -relation to judgment is in the distinction between the process of -arriving at the judgment and the completed judgment. Bosanquet himself -defines judgment as an intellectual act by which an ideal content is -referred to reality. Now, at what point does this act begin? Certainly -at the point where an ideal content is first applying to reality, and -this, as he points out, is at the beginning of the process which he -describes as the process of arriving at a judgment. It is nothing to the -point that at this stage the predicate is tentative, while later it -becomes defined. His process of arriving at the judgment is exactly the -process we have been describing as the early stages of any and every -judgment. When he talks about the judgment as completed, he has -apparently shifted from the dynamic view of judgment implied in his -definition to a static view. All he could mean by a completed -judgment--in distinction to the total activity of arriving at a -judgment--is the new content of which we find ourselves possessed when -the total process of predication is complete. But this content is not a -judgment at all. It is a new construction of reality which may serve -either as subject or as predicate in future judgments. - -Now, if we regard the judgment as the total activity by which an ideal -content is referred to reality, then must we not regard time as an -essential element? Bosanquet answers this question in the negative, -because he believes that if time is an essential element, then the parts -of the judgment must necessarily fall outside one another in time. But -is this necessary? If the essence of judgment is the very modification, -_pari passu_, of subject and predicate, then time must be an essential -element in it, but it is not at all necessary that its elements should -fall outside of one another in time. In other words, the dilemma which -Bosanquet points out on p. 87 is not a genuine one. There is no -difficulty involved in admitting that the judgment is a transition in -time, and still holding that its _parts_ do not fall outside _one -another_ in time. His own solution of the problem--_i. e._, that, -although judgment is an intellectual process in time, still time is not -an essential feature of it, because subject and predicate are coexistent -and judgment is a relation between them--involves a desertion of his -dynamic view of judgment. He defines judgment, not as a relation between -subject and predicate, but as an intellectual _act_.[53] - -4. The discussion of the time-element in judgment leads up to the next -puzzle--that as to the way in which one judgment can be marked off from -another in the total activity of thought. Bosanquet has pointed out that -subject and predicate are both of them present at every stage of the -judging process, and are undergoing progressive modification. If, -therefore, we take a cross-section of the process at any point, we find -both subject and predicate present; but a cross-section at one point -would not reveal quite the same subject and predicate as the -cross-section at another point. He comes to the conclusion that judgment -breaks up into judgments as rhomboidal spar into rhomboids (p. 88). It -is, accordingly, quite arbitrary to mark out any limits for a single -judgment. The illustration he gives of the point is as follows: - - Take such an every-day judgment of mixed perception and inference - as, "He is coming down stairs and going into the street." It is - the merest chance whether I break up the process thus, into two - judgments as united by a mere conjunction, or, knowing the man's - habits, say, when I hear him half way down stairs, "He is going - out." In the latter case I summarize a more various set of - observations and inferences in a single judgment; but the judgment - is as truly single as each of the two which were before separated - by a conjunction; for each of them was also a summary of a set of - perceptions, which might, had I chosen, have been subdivided into - distinct propositions expressing separate judgments; _e. g._, "He - has opened his door, and is going toward the staircase, and is - half way down, and is in the passage," etc. If I simply say, "He - is going out," I am not a whit the less conscious that I judge all - these different relations, but I then include them all in a single - systematic content "going out." (P. 89.) - -But is it a question of merest chance which of these various -possibilities is actualized? Is Bosanquet really looking--as he -thinks--at the actual life of thought, or is he considering, not what as -a matter of fact does take place under a concrete set of circumstances, -but what might take place under slightly differing sets of -circumstances? If it is true that judgment is a crisis developing -through adequate interaction of stimulus and response into a definite -situation, beginning with doubt and ending with a solution of the doubt, -then it is not true that its limits are purely arbitrary. It begins with -the appearance of the problem and its tentative solutions, and ends with -the solution of a final response. It does, of course, depend upon -momentary interest, but this does not make its limits arbitrary, for the -interest is inherent, not external. In the case of Bosanquet's -illustration, the question of whether one judgment or half a dozen is -made is not a question of merest chance. It depends upon where the -interest of the person making the judgment is centered--in other words, -upon what is the particular doubt to be solved. If the real doubt is as -to whether the man will stay in his room or go out, then when he is -heard leaving his room the solution comes in the form: "He is going -out." But if the doubt is as to whether he will stay in his room, go -out, or go into some other room, then the succession of judgments -occurs, each of which solves a problem. "He has opened his door"--then -he is not going to stay in his room; "He is going toward the -staircase"--then he is not going into a room in the opposite direction, -etc. It is impossible to conceive of such a series of judgments as -actually being made, unless each one represents a problematic situation -and its determination. The only time that a man would, as a matter of -fact, choose to break up the judgment, "He is going out," into such a -series, would be the time when each member of the series had its own -special interest as representing a specific uncertain aim or problem. -Nor is it altogether true that in making the judgment, "He is going -out," one is not a whit the less conscious that he judges all these -different relations. He judges only such relations as are necessary to -the solution of the problem in hand. If hearing the man open his door is -a sufficient basis for the solution, then that is the only one which -consciously enters into the formation of the judgment. - -We have attempted to bring out in the preceding pages what seem to be -the contradictions and insoluble problems involved in Bosanquet's theory -of the judgment, and to exhibit them as the logical outcome of his -metaphysical presuppositions. We have also tried to develop another -theory of the judgment involving a different view of the nature of -reality, and to show that the new theory is able to avoid the -difficulties inherent in Bosanquet's system. The change in view-point -briefly is this: Instead of regarding the real world as self-existent, -independently of the judgments we make about it, we viewed it as the -totality of experience which is assured, _i. e._, determined as to -certainty or specific availability, through the instrumentality of -judgment. We thus avoided the essentially insoluble problem of how a -real world whose content is self-existent quite outside of knowledge can -ever be correctly represented by ideas. The difficulty in understanding -the relation of the subject and the predicate of judgment to reality -disappears when we cease to regard reality as self-existent outside of -knowledge. Subject and predicate become instrumentalities in the process -of building up reality. Thought no longer seems to carry us farther and -farther from reality as ideas become abstract and recede from the -immediate sensory experience in which contact with the real occurs. On -the contrary, thought carries us constantly toward reality. Finally, we -avoid the fundamental skepticism about the possibility of knowledge -which, from the other standpoint, is forced upon us by the long -succession of facts which have faded into the realm of false opinions, -and the lack of any guarantee that our present so-called knowledge of -reality shall not meet the same fate. From that point of view, reality -seems to be not only unknown, but unknowable. - -The criticism sure to be passed upon the alternative view developed is -that the solution of Bosanquet's problems which it affords is not a real -solution, but rather the abandonment of an attempt at a solution. It -represents reality as a thing which is itself in process of development. -It would force us to admit that the reality of a hundred years ago, or -even of yesterday, was not in content the reality of today. A growing, -developing reality is, it will be said, an imperfect reality, while we -must conceive of reality as complete and perfect in itself. The only -answer which can be made is to insist again that we have no right to -assume that reality is such an already completed existence, unless such -an assumption enables us to understand experience and organize it into a -consistent whole. The attempt of this paper has been to show that such a -conception of reality really makes it inherently impossible to give an -intelligible account of experience as a whole, while the view which -regards reality as developing in and through judgment does enable us to -build up a consistent and understandable view of the world. This -suggests that the "perfect" may not after all be that which is finished -and ended, but that whose reality is so abundant and vital as to issue -in continuous self-modification. The Reality that evolves and moves may -be more perfect, less finite, than that which has exhausted itself. -Moreover, only the view that Reality is developmental in quality, and -that the instrument of its development is judgment involving the -psychical in its determination of subject and predicate gives the -psychical as such any significant place in knowledge or in reality. -According to the view of knowledge as representation of an eternal -content, the psychical is a mere logical surd. - - - - -VI - -TYPICAL STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT - - -Logic aims at investigating the general function of knowing. But -knowing, it is commonly asserted, is constituted as judgment. -Furthermore, there is reason to believe that judgment undergoes -well-marked changes in its development. Consequently, an understanding -of the judgment-function and of its epochs in development is of prime -importance. In carrying through the investigation we shall endeavor, -first, to state and to defend a certain presupposition with reference to -the character of the judgment-function; second, to exhibit the -application of this presupposition in the typical stages of judgment. - - -I - -Judgment is essentially _instrumental_. This is the presupposition which -we must explain and make good. And we shall accomplish this by way of an -analysis of judgment as meaning. - -It cannot be denied that what we call knowledge is concerned with the -discrimination of valid meaning. To know is to appreciate the _meaning_ -of things and the meaning _of things_ is the same with valid meaning. -Judging determines knowledge, and in the same act develops meaning. To -put it otherwise, knowledge is a matter of _content_; _content_ is -_meaning_, and we have knowledge when we have meaning satisfactorily -determined. It is evident, therefore, that if we would understand the -judging-function, we must first make clear to ourselves the nature and -role of _meaning_. - -Meaning is universally embodied in _ideas_. To know, to understand the -meaning, to get ideas, are the same. Now, in ideas two factors may be -distinguished. First, every idea has as its base an image or emphasized -portion of experience. In some forms of ideation we are more immediately -aware of the presence of images than in others, but no idea--even the -most abstract--can exist apart from an ultimate base. Second, every idea -is equally a function of _reference_ and _control_. As _reference_, the -idea projects in the mind's view an anticipation of experiences and of -the conditions upon which these experiences depend for their -realization; as _control_, ideas are agencies in turning anticipations -into realizations.[54] - -To be more specific on both points: Since the days of Galton it has been -almost a commonplace in psychology that ideas are embodied in forms of -imagery which vary for and in different individuals. It has been -maintained, it is true, that in abstract forms of thought, imagery -disappears. This objection is met in two ways. For one, words--the -vehicle of many abstract ideas--involve imagery of a most pronounced -type: for another, every idea, when examined closely, discloses an -image, no matter how much for the time being this has been driven into -obscurity by the characteristics of reference and control. Furthermore, -when we examine the anticipatory aspect of ideas, the presence of -imagery both with reference to outcome and to conditions is so evident -that its presence will scarcely be denied. - -The second point may be illustrated in several ways. In everyday life -anticipation and realization are inseparable from the nature and use of -ideas. "Hat" means anticipation of protection to the head and the -tendency toward setting in motion the conditions appropriate to the -realization of this anticipation. The same factors are evident in the -boy's definition of a knife as "something to whittle with." Again it is -maintained that intelligence is an essential factor in human -self-consciousness. By this is meant that human beings are universally -aware in some degree of what they are about. And this awareness consists -in understanding the meaning of their actions, of forecasting the -outcome of various kinds of activity, of apprehending beforehand the -conditions connected with determinate results. Within this sphere we -speak of certain men as being pre-eminently intelligent, meaning that -for such men outcomes are previewed and connected with their appropriate -conditions far beyond the range of ordinary foresight. Finally, -scientific intelligence is essentially of this kind. It aims at -understanding the varying types of process which operate in nature and -thus at possessing itself of information with reference to results to be -expected under determinate conditions. For example, the knowledge -acquired in his researches by Louis Pasteur enabled him to predict the -life or death of animals inoculated with charbon virus according as they -had or had not been vaccinated previously. His information, in other -words, became an instrument for the control and eradication of the -disease. And what is true of this case is true of all science. To the -scientist ideas are "working hypotheses" and have their value only as -they enable him to predict, and to control. And while it is true that -the scientist usually overlooks the so-called _practical_ value of his -discoveries, it is none the less true that in due time the inventor -follows the investigator. The investigator is content to construct and -show the truth of his idea. The inventor assumes the truth of the -investigator's work and carries his idea as a constructive principle -into the complications of life. To both men "knowledge is power," -although the "power" may be realized in connection with different -interests. But if this be true, ideas can no longer be regarded as -copies in individual experience of some pre-existing reality. They are -rather instruments for transforming and directing experience, by way of -constructing anticipations and the conditions appropriate to their -realization. Herein also consists their truth or falsity. The true idea -is reliable, carrying us from anticipation to realization; the false -idea is unreliable, and fails in bringing the promised result. - -Now, in the development of instruments generally, we may distinguish a -rule-of-thumb or more or less unreflective stage of construction, and -one entirely reflective. As to use there is the distinction of inexpert -and expert control. This leads us to expect that in the thought-function -also certain typical stages of construction and of control may be found. -To the investigation of this point we shall next direct attention. - - -II - -In its development from crude to expert forms judgment exhibits three -typical stages--_the impersonal_, _the reflective_, and _the intuitive_. -These we shall consider in order of development. But first it is to be -noticed that these stages of judgment are not to be regarded as hard and -fast distinctions of the kind that no indications of the higher are to -be found in the lower types, but rather as working distinctions within a -process of continuous development. - -1. _The impersonal judgment._--Ever since the days of the Greek -grammarians the impersonal judgment has been considered an anomaly in -logic. And the reason is not far to seek. From the time of Aristotle it -has been customary to maintain that judgments, when analyzed, disclose a -subject and a predicate. Logically considered, these appear to be -entirely correlative, for, as Erdmann puts it,[55] "an event without a -substrate, a quality without a subject, is altogether unpresentable." -But there is in all languages a class of judgments, such as, "It rains," -"It snows," "Fire!" in which no directly asserted subject is -discoverable. To these the name impersonal and subjectless has been -given. Here then is the difficulty. If we admit that the impersonal -expression involves predication, we must, in all consistency, search for -a subject, while at the same time the subject refuses to disclose -itself. In ancient days the orthodox logician confined his search to -language and to the spoken or written proposition. The unorthodox critic -maintained, in opposition to this, that a subject was provided only by -warping and twisting the natural sense of the impersonal expression. And -thus the matter stood until the development of modern comparative -philology. It was then demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt that -the "it" (or its equivalent) of the impersonal is a purely contentless -form word. Language provides no subject whatsoever. So strong, however, -is the hold of tradition that the search has been renewed. Attention has -been turned upon the mental processes involved, and this time with more -apparent result. Although there has been no general agreement with -reference to the subject, a classification of the different views may -still be made. (_a_) The subject is universal and undetermined; (_b_) it -is individual and more or less determined; (_c_) between these extremes -lies almost every intermediate degree conceivable. - -Ueberweg maintains that the subject of the impersonal is the actual -totality of present experience. When we ask, "What rains?" we must -understand a reference to our general environment, in which no special -element is singled out. Sigwart, on the other hand, maintains that the -subject can be construed only as the actual sense-impression. This -diversity of opinion might seem to indicate that, were it not for the -constraining power of theory, a subject would scarcely be thought of -for the impersonal. Still it must be admitted that when we examine the -impersonal expression closely we can discover a sense-impression, -whether definite or indefinite, combined with an idea. This would seem -to give the case to the orthodox logician, for he will at once claim the -sense-impression as the subject and the idea as the predicate of the -judgment. But we must have a care. Predication is usually held to -consist in a _reference_ of predicate _to_ subject. The factors of the -judgment are, as it were, held apart. In the impersonal no such thing as -this can be discovered. The meaning is so close a unity that impression -and idea are entirely fused. We may analyze the expression and find them -there, but by so doing we destroy the immediacy which is an essential -characteristic of the impersonal. In other words, the impersonal does -not analyze itself. It is entirely unconscious of its make-up. And yet -it is definite and applies itself with precision: If I am in a -lecture-hall and hear the fire-alarm, the thought "Fire!" which enters -my mind leads to an immediate change in my conduct. I arise, move -quietly out, and prepare for duty. If, on the other hand, I open the -street door and the rain strikes my face, I ejaculate "Raining!" turn, -reach for my umbrella, and pass out protected. In both cases I act -_knowingly_ and with _meaning_, but I do not analyze the movement either -of thought or of action. A correlate to the unreflective impersonal -judgment is found in early custom. Custom embodies social ideas and is -an instrument for the determination and control of action. Individuals -moved by custom know what they are about and act with precision -according as custom may demand. But it is notorious that custom is -direct and unreflective. It represents social instruments of control -which have grown up without method and which represent the slow -accretion of rule-of-thumb activities through many ages. So in the -impersonal judgment we have a type of intellectual instrument which has -been brought to a high degree of precision in use, but which still -retains the simplicity and certainty of an unquestioned instrument of -action. For this reason, whatever complexity of elements the impersonal -may present to a reflective view, it does not contain to itself. -Consequently it may be best to say that to the impersonal there is -neither subject, predicate, nor reference of the one to the other. These -are distinctions which arise only when the instrument of action has been -questioned and the mind turns back upon the meaning which it has -unhesitatingly used, analyzing, investigating, constructing, laying bare -the method and function of its tools. Thus arises a new and distinctive -type of judgment, viz., the reflective. - -2. _The reflective judgment._--By the reflective judgment is to be -understood that form of meaning whose structure and function have become -a problem to itself. The days of naive trust and spontaneous action have -gone by. Inquiry, criticism, aloofness, stay the tendency to immediate -action. Meaning has grown worldly wise and demands that each situation -shall explain itself and that the general principles and concrete -applications of its own instruments shall be made manifest. Hence in the -various forms of reflective thought we find the progressive steps in -which meaning comes to full consciousness of its function in experience. - -The demonstrative judgment (the simplest of the reflective type) carries -doubt, criticism, construction, and assertion written on the face of it. -For example, in the expression, "That is hot," we do not find the -directness and immediacy of response characteristic of the simpler -impersonal "hot." Instead, we note a clash of tendencies, a suspension -of the proposed action, a demand for and a carrying out of a -reconsideration of the course of action, the emergence of a new meaning, -and the consequent redirection of activities. An iron lies upon the -hearth; I stretch out my hand to return it to its place; I stop -suddenly, having become conscious of signs of warmth; the thought arises -in my mind, "That is hot;" I experiment and find my judgment correct; I -search for a cloth, and thus protected carry out my first intention. -Again, a hunter notes a movement in the thicket, quickly raises his gun, -and is about to fire. Something in the movement of the object arrests -him. He stops, thinking, "That is a man, perhaps." What has caught the -eye has arrested his action, has become a demand, and not until the -situation has become clear can the hunter determine what to do. In other -words, he must reflectively assure himself what the object is before he -can satisfy himself as to how he should act. Subject and predicate have -arisen and have consciously played their parts in the passage from doubt -to decision. - -Under the heading "individual judgments" are classed such expressions -as, "That ship is a man-o'-war," "Russia opposes the policy of the open -door in China." In both these cases it is evident that an advance in -definiteness of conception and of complexity of meaning has been made, -while at the same time we recognize that the instrumental -characteristics of the thought-movement remain the same. In considering -the subject of the judgment we note that the stimulus presents itself -partly as a determinate factor and partly as a problem--an insistent -demand. The expression, "That ship is a man-o'-war," might be written, -"That is a ship and of the kind man-o'-war," and it thus constitutes -what Sigwart calls a "double synthesis." As used in actual judgment, -however, the two are held together and constitute the statement of a -single stimulus of which a certain portion is evident and a certain -portion is in doubt. The working out of the difficulty is given in the -predicate "is a man-o'-war," in which we at once detect the instrumental -characteristics fundamental to all judgment. To illustrate: At the -close of the battle of Santiago, in the Spanish-American war, smoke -appeared upon the horizon revealing the presence of a strange ship. -Instantly attention was directed to it, and it became a problem for -action--a demand for instrumental information. Soon it was identified as -a man-o'-war, and the American ships were cleared for action. Closer -approach raised a further question with reference to its nationality. -After some debate this also was resolved, and hostile demonstrations -were abandoned. - -The universal judgment is sometimes said to exhibit two distinct forms. -Investigation, however, has proved this statement to be incorrect. -Instances taken in themselves and apart from their character are of no -logical significance. Advance is made by weighing instances and not by -counting them. In short, the true universal is the hypothetical -judgment, and the reason for this may be readily shown. The hypothetical -judgment is essentially double-ended. On the one hand, it is a statement -of the problem of action in terms of the conditions which will turn the -problem into a solution. On the other hand, it is an assertion that once -the conditions of action have been determined the result desired may be -attained. Here we note that the judgment has come to clear consciousness -of itself and of the part which it plays in experience. It has now -obtained an insight into the criterion of its legitimate employment, -_i. e._, of its truth and falsity. And this insight makes the -justification of its claim almost self-evident. For, inasmuch as the -hypothetical judgment says, "If such and such conditions be realized, -such and such a result will be obtained," the test of the claim is made -by putting the conditions into effect and watching whether the promised -experience is given. And further, since it has been found that the -judgment formulated as a hypothesis actually accomplishes what it -promises, we must admit that the hypothetical judgment is also -categorical. These two factors cannot be separated from each other. It -is true that the hypothetical judgment reduces every valid meaning to -the form, "_If_ certain conditions be realized," but it as plainly and -positively asserts, "such and such results _will_ be obtained." When we -grasp the absolute correlativity of the hypothetical and categorical -aspects of judgment, we realize at once the essentially instrumental -character of judgment, when it comes to consciousness of its structure -and function. It arises in the self-conscious realization of a problem. -This it reflects upon and sizes up. When the difficulty has been -apprehended, the judgment emerges as the consciousness of the conditions -which will attain the desired end of action freed and unimpeded. This -may be illustrated by reference to the work of Pasteur cited above. His -investigations began in a problem set for him by agricultural conditions -in France. A certain disease had made the profitable rearing of sheep -and cattle almost an impossibility. After long and careful examination -he discovered the beneficial effects of vaccination. To him the -conditions which governed the presence of the disease became apparent, -and this knowledge furnished him with an instrument by means of which -one difficulty was removed from the path of the stock-raiser. In this -illustration we have an epitome of the work accomplished everywhere by -the scientist. It is his task to develop and to reduce to exact terms -instruments of control for the varied activities of life. In its parts -and as a whole each instrument is intelligently constructed and tested -so that its make-up and function are exactly known. Because of this, -reasoned belief now takes the place of unreflective trust as that was -experienced in the impersonal stage of judgment. What at first hand -might appear to be a loss was in reality a gain; the breakdown of the -impersonal was the first step in the development of an instrument of -action conscious of its reason for being, its methods and conditions of -action. These latter constitute the distinctive subject and predicate of -the reflective judgment. - -This brings us to the connection between the hypothetical character of -this form of judgment and its universality. And this perhaps will now be -quite apparent. The reflective judgment lays bare an objective -connection between the conditions and outcomes of actions. It proves its -point by actually constructing the event. Such being the case, -universality is no more than a statement of identical results being -predictable wherever like conditions are realized. If it be true that -"man is mortal," then it is an identical statement to insist that, -"Wherever we find men there we shall also find mortality." - -And this point brings us naturally to the treatment of the disjunctive -judgment: "A is either B or C or D." In the disjunctive judgment the -demand is not for the construction of a reliable instrument of action, -but for the resolution of a doubt as to which instrument is precisely -fitted to the circumstances. In fact, the disjunctive judgment involves -the identification of the practical problem. When we say of a man, "He -is either very simple or very deep," we have no doubt as to our proper -course of action in either case. If he is simple, then we shall do so -and so; if he is deep, then another course of action follows. We can lay -out alternative courses beforehand, but the point of difficulty lies -here: "But just which is he?" In short, the disjunctive judgment is the -demand for and the attempt at a precise diagnosis of a concrete problem. -To illustrate: A patient afflicted with aphasia is brought to a -physician. The fact that the trouble is aphasia may be quite evident. -But what precisely is the form and seat of the aphasia? To the mind of -the educated physician the problem will take on the disjunctive form: -"This is either subcortical or cortical aphasia. If subcortical, -intelligence will not be impaired; if cortical, the sensor and motor -tracts will be in good condition." Appropriate tests are made and the -subcortical possibilities are shut out. The disjunction disappears and -the judgment emerges: "This is a case of cortical aphasia." But now a -new disjunction arises. It is either the sensory or motor form of -cortical aphasia, and, whichever one of these, it is again one of -several possibilities. As the alternatives arise, the means for -discriminating them arise also; determinate symptoms are observed, and -in due time the physician arrives at the final conclusion: "This is -sensory cortical aphasia of the visual type." Having determined this, -his method of action is assured, and he proceeds to the appropriate -operation. Thus, finally, we are brought to a form of judgment aware not -only of its motive, method, and justification, but also to one aware of -its specific application to individual cases. Thus it would seem as -though judgment had returned upon itself and had completed the -determination of its sphere of action. And in one sense this is true. In -the disjunctive judgment, as inclusive of the motives of the -hypothetical and categorical forms, the reflective judgment would appear -to have come to its limit of development. One thing, however, remains to -be considered, viz., the development from crude to expert uses of -intellectual instruments. - -3. _The intuitive judgment._--As stated above, the intuitive type of -judgment depends upon efficiency in the use of judgment. In this regard -there is a great similarity between the impersonal and the intuitive -judgments. Both are immediate and precise. But there is a radical and -essential difference. The impersonal judgment knows nothing of the -strict analysis, insight, and constructive power of the reflective -judgment. The intuitive judgment, on the other hand, includes the -results of reflection and brings them to their highest power. -Paradoxically put, in the intuitive judgment there is so much reflection -that there is no need for it at all. To the intuitive judgment there is -no hesitation, no aloofness. Action is direct, but entirely -self-conscious. That such a type of judgment as the intuitive exists -there can be no doubt. There is all the difference in the world between -the quality of consciousness of a mere layman and that of an expert, no -matter what the line. The layman must size up a situation. It is a -process whose parts are successive, whether much or little difficulty be -experienced. For the expert situations are taken in at a glance, parts -and whole are simultaneous and immediate. Yet the meaning is entirely -exact. The expert judgment is self-conscious to the last degree. While -other individuals are thinking out what to do, the expert has it, sees -the advantage, adjusts, and moves. Demand and solution jump together. -How otherwise can we explain, for example, the action of an expert -ball-player? Witness his rapid reactions, his instantaneous adjustments. -Mistakes of opponents which would never be noticed by the average player -are recognized and seized upon. On the instant the new opening is seen, -the adjustment is evident, the movement made. Illustrations to the same -effect could be drawn from other modes of life, _e. g._, music, the -military life, etc. That intuitive judgments are not more common is a -proof in itself of their distinctive character and value. Only in so far -as we become experts in our special fields of experience and have -reduced our instruments of action to precise control, can we expect the -presence of intuitive judgments. They remain, therefore, as the final -outcome of the judgment-function made perfect in its technique and use. - -In conclusion we shall make a brief summary of our investigation and a -criticism of certain current theories of judgment. - -Judgment is essentially instrumental. Its function is to construct, -justify, and refine experience into exact instruments for the direction -and control of future experience through action. It exhibits itself -first in the form of instruments developed unsystematically in response -to the hard necessities of life. In a higher stage of development the -instrumental process itself is taken into account, and systematically -developed until in the methodical procedure of science the general -principles of knowledge are laid bare and efficient instruments of -action constructed. Finally, constant, intelligent use results in -complete control, so that within certain spheres doubt and hesitancy -would seem to disappear as to the character of the tools used, and -remain only as a moment in determining their wisest or most appropriate -employ. - -The criticism indicated is based upon the instrumental character of -judgment and is directed against all theories which contend that -knowledge is a "copying" or "reproducing" of reality. In whatever form -this "copy" theory be stated, the question inevitably arises how we can -compare our ideas with reality and thus know their truth. On this -theory, what we possess is ever the copy; the reality is beyond. In -other words, such a theory logically carried out leads to the breakdown -of knowledge. Only a theory which contains and constructs its criterion -within its own specific movement can verify its constructions. Such a -theory is the instrumental. Judgment constructs a situation in -consciousness. The values assigned in this situation have a determining -influence upon values further appreciated. The construction arrived at -concerns future weal and woe. Thus gradually a sense of truth and -falsity attaches to the construing of situations. One sees that he -_must_ look beyond _this_ situation, because the way he estimates _this_ -situation is fraught with meaning beyond itself. Hence the critically -reflective judgment in which hesitancy and doubt direct themselves at -the attitude, elements, and tools involved in defining and identifying -the situation, instead of at the situation itself _in toto_. Instead of -developing a complex of experience through assigning qualities and -meanings to the _situation_ as such, some one of the quales is selected, -to have _its_ significance determined. It becomes, _pro tempore_, the -situation judged. Or the same thing takes place as regards some "idea" -or value hitherto immediately fastened upon and employed. In either case -we get the reflective judgment, the judgment of pure relationship as -distinct from the constructive judgment. But the judgment of relation, -employing the copula to refer a specified predicate to a specified -object, is after all only for the sake of controlling some immediate -judgment of constructive experience. It realizes itself in forming the -confident habit of prompt and precise mental adjustment to -individualized situations. - - - - -VII - -THE NATURE OF HYPOTHESIS - - -In the various discussions of the hypothesis which have appeared in -works on inductive logic and in writings on scientific method, its -structure and function have received considerable attention, while its -origin has been comparatively neglected. The hypothesis has generally -been treated as that part of scientific procedure which marks the stage -where a definite plan or method is proposed for dealing with new or -unexplained facts. It is regarded as an invention for the purpose of -explaining the given, as a definite conjecture which is to be tested by -an appeal to experience to see whether deductions made in accordance -with it will be found true in fact. The function of the hypothesis is to -unify, to furnish a method of dealing with things, and its structure -must be suitable to this end. It must be so formed that it will be -likely to prove valid, and writers have formulated various rules to be -followed in the formation of hypotheses. These rules state the main -requirements of a good hypothesis, and are intended to aid in a general -way by pointing out certain limits within which it must fall. - -In respect to the origin of the hypothesis, writers have usually -contented themselves with pointing out the kind of situations in which -hypotheses are likely to appear. But after this has been done, after -favorable external conditions have been given, the rest must be left to -"genius," for hypotheses arise as "happy guesses," for which no rule or -law can be given. In fact, the genius differs from the ordinary plodding -mortal in just this ability to form fruitful hypotheses in the midst of -the same facts which to other less gifted individuals remain only so -many disconnected experiences. - -This unequal stress which has been laid on the structure and function of -the hypothesis in comparison with its origin may be attributed to three -reasons: (1) The facts, or data, which constitute the working material -of hypotheses are regarded as given to all alike, and all alike are more -or less interested in systematizing and unifying experience. The purpose -of the hypothesis and the opportunity for forming it are thus -practically the same for all, and hence certain definite rules can be -laid down which will apply to all cases where hypotheses are to be -employed. (2) But beyond this there seems to be no clue that can be -formulated. There is apparently a more or less open acceptance of the -final answer of the boy Zerah Colburn, who, when pressed to give an -explanation of his method of instantaneous calculation, exclaimed in -despair: "God put it into my head, and I can't put it into yours."[56] -(3) And, furthermore, there is very often a strong tendency to disregard -investigation into the origin of that which is taken as given, for, -since it is already present, its origin, whatever it may have been, can -have nothing to do with what it is now. The facts, the data, are _here_, -and must be dealt with as they _are_. Their past, their history or -development, is entirely irrelevant. So, even if we could trace the -hypothesis farther back on the psychological side, the investigation -would be useless, for the rules to which a good hypothesis must conform -would remain the same. - -Whether or not it can be shown that Zerah Colburn's ultimate explanation -is needed in logic as little as Laplace asserted a similar one to be -required in his celestial mechanics, it may at least be possible to -defer it to some extent by means of a further psychological inquiry. It -will be found that psychological inquiry into the origin of the -hypothesis is not irrelevant in respect to an understanding of its -structure and function; for origin and function cannot be understood -apart from each other, and, since structure must be adapted to function, -it cannot be independent of origin. In fact, origin, structure, and -function are organically connected, and each loses its meaning when -absolutely separated from each other. It will be found, moreover, that -the data which are commonly taken as the given material are not -something to which the hypothesis is subsequently applied, but that, -instead of this external relation between data and hypothesis, the -hypothesis exercises a directive function in determining what are the -data. In a word, the main object of this discussion will be to contend -against making a merely convenient and special way of regarding the -hypothesis a full and adequate one. Though we speak of facts and of -hypotheses that may be applied to them, it must not be forgotten that -there are no facts which remain the same whatever hypothesis be applied -to them; and that there are no hypotheses which are hypotheses at all -except in reference to their function in dealing with our subject-matter -in such a way as to facilitate its factual apprehension. Data are -selected in order to be determined, and hypotheses are the ways in which -this determination is carried on. If, as we shall attempt to show, the -relation between data and hypothesis is not external, but strictly -correlative, it is evident that this fact must be taken into account in -questions concerning deduction and induction, analytic and synthetic -judgments, and the criterion of truth. Its bearing must be recognized in -the investigation of metaphysical problems as well, for reality cannot -be independent of the knowing process. In a word, the purpose of this -discussion of the hypothesis is to determine its nature a little more -precisely through an investigation of its rather obscure origin, and to -call attention to certain features of its function which have not -generally been accorded their due significance. - - -I - -_The hypothesis as predicate._--It is generally admitted that the -function of the hypothesis is to provide a way of dealing with the data -or subject-matter which we need to organize. In this use of the -hypothesis it appears in the role of predicate in a judgment of which -the data, or facts, to be construed constitute the subject. - -In his attempts to reduce the movements of the planets about the sun to -some general formula, Kepler finally hit upon the law since known as -Kepler's law, viz., that the squares of the periodic times of the -several planets are proportional to the cubes of their mean distances -from the sun. This law was first tentatively advanced as a hypothesis. -Kepler was not certain of its truth till it had proved its claim to -acceptance. Neither did Newton have at first any great degree of -assurance in regard to his law of gravitation, and was ready to give it -up when he failed in his first attempt to test it by observation of the -moon. And the same thing may be said about the caution of Darwin and -other investigators in regard to accepting hypotheses. The only reason -for their extreme care in not accepting at once their tentative -formulations or suggestions was the fear that some other explanation -might be the correct one. This rejection of other possibilities is the -negative side of the matter. We become confident that our hypothesis is -the right one as we lose confidence in other possible explanations; and -it might be added, without falling into a circle, that we lose -confidence in the other possibilities as we become more convinced of our -hypothesis. - -It appears that such may be the relation of the positive and negative -sides in case of such elaborate hypotheses as those of Kepler and -Newton; but is it true where our hypotheses are more simple? It is not -easy to understand why the fact that the hypothesis is more simple, and -the time required for its formulation and test a good deal shorter, -should materially change the state of affairs. The question remains: -Why, if there is no opposition, should there be any uncertainty? In all -instances, then, the hypothesis appears as one among other possible -predicates which may be applied to our data taken as subject-matter of a -judgment. - -_The predicate as hypothesis._--Suppose, then, the hypothesis is a -predicate; is the predicate necessarily a hypothesis? This is the next -question we are called upon to answer, and, since the predicate cannot -very well be taken aside from the judgment, our question involves the -nature of the judgment. - -While it will not be necessary to give a very complete account of the -various definitions of the judgment that might be adduced, still the -mention of a few of the more prominent ones may serve to indicate that -something further is needed. In definitions of the judgment sometimes -the subjective side is emphasized, sometimes the objective side, and in -other instances there are attempts to combine the two. For instance, -Lotze regards the judgment as the idea of a unity or relation between -two concepts, with the further implication that this connection holds -true of the object referred to. J. S. Mill says that every proposition -either affirms or denies existence, coexistence, sequence, causation, or -resemblance. Trendelenburg regards the judgment as a form of thought -which corresponds to the real connection of things, while Ueberweg -states the case a little differently, and says that the essence of -judgment consists in recognizing the objective validity of a subjective -connection of ideas. Royce points to a process of imitation and holds -that in the judgment we try to portray by means of the ideas that enter -into it. Ideas are imitative in their nature. Sigwart's view of the -judgment is that in it we say something about something. With him the -judgment is a synthetic process, while Wundt considers its nature -analytic and holds that, instead of uniting, or combining, concepts into -a whole, it separates them out of a total idea or presentation. Instead -of blending parts into a whole, it separates the whole into its -constituent parts. Bradley and Bosanquet both hold that in the judgment -an ideal content comes into relation with reality. Bradley says that in -every judgment reality is qualified by an idea, which is symbolic. The -ideal content is recognized as such, and is referred to a reality beyond -the act. This is the essence of judgment. Bosanquet seems to perceive a -closer relation between idea and reality, for although he says that -judgment is the "intellectual function which defines reality by -significant ideas," he also tells us that "the subject is both in and -out of the judgment, as Reality is both in and out of my consciousness." - -In all these definitions of judgment the predicate appears as ideal. An -ideal content is predicated of something, whether we regard this -something as an idea or as reality beyond, or as reality partly within -and partly without the act of judging; and it is ideal whether we -consider it as one of the three parts into which judgments are usually -divided, or whether we say, with Bosanquet and Bradley, that subject, -predicate, and copula all taken together form a single ideal content, -which is somehow applied to reality. Moreover, we not only judge about -reality, but it seems to be quite immaterial to reality whether we judge -concerning it or not. - -Many of our judgments prove false. Not only do we err in our judgments, -but we often hesitate in making them for fear of being wrong; we feel -there are other possibilities, and our predication becomes tentative. -Here we have something very like the hypothesis, for our ideal content -shows itself to be a tentative attempt in the presence of alternatives -to qualify and systematize reality. It appears, then, on the basis of -the views of the judgment that have been mentioned, that not only do we -find the hypothesis taking its place as the predicate of a judgment, but -the predicate is itself essentially of the nature of a hypothesis. - -In the views of the judgment so far brought out, reality, with which it -is generally admitted that the judgment attempts to deal in some way, -appears to lie outside the act of judging. Now, everyone would say that -we make some advance in judging, and that we have a better grasp of -things after than before. But how is this possible if reality lies -without or beyond our act of judging? Is the reality we now have the -same that we had to begin with? If so, then we have made no advance as -far as the real itself is concerned. If merely our conception of it has -changed, then it is not clear why we may not be even worse off than -before. If reality does lie beyond our judgment, then how, in the nature -of the case, can we ever know whether we have approached it or have gone -still farther away? To make any claim of approximation implies that we -do reach reality in some measure, at least, and, if so, it is difficult -to understand how it lies beyond, and is independent of, the act of -judging. - -_Further analysis of judgment._--It remains to be seen whether a further -investigation of the judgment will still show the predicate to be a -hypothesis. It is evident that in some cases the judgment appears at the -end of a more or less pronounced reflective process, during which other -possible judgments have suggested themselves, but have been rejected. -The history of scientific discovery is filled with cases which -illustrate the nature of the process by which a new theory is developed. -For instance, in Darwin's _Formation of Vegetable Mould through the -Action of Earth Worms_, we find the record of successive steps in the -development of his hypothesis. Darwin suspected from his observations -that vegetable mold was due to some agency which was not yet determined. -He reasoned that if vegetable mold is the result of the life-habits of -earthworms, _i. e._, if earth is brought up by them from beneath the -surface and afterward spread out by wind and rain, then small objects -lying on the surface of the ground would tend to disappear gradually -below the surface. Facts seemed to support his theory, for layers of red -sand, pieces of chalk, and stones were found to have disappeared below -the surface in a greater or less degree. A common explanation had been -that heavy objects tend to sink in soft soil through their own weight, -but the earthworm hypothesis led to a more careful examination of the -data. It was found that the weight of the object and the softness of the -ground made no marked difference, for sand and light objects sank, and -the ground was not always soft. In general, it was shown that where -earthworms were found vegetable mold was also present, and _vice versa_. - -In this investigation of Darwin's the conflicting explanations of -sinking stones appear within the main question of the formation of -vegetable mold by earthworms. The facts that disagreed with the old -theory about sinking stones were approached through this new one. But -the theories had something in common, viz., the disappearance of the -stones or other objects: they differed in their further determination of -this disappearance. In this case it may seem as if the facts which were -opposed to the current theory of sinking stones were seen to be -discrepant only after the earthworm hypothesis had been advanced; the -conflict between the new facts and the old theory appears to have -arisen through the influence of the new theory. - -There are cases, however, where the facts seem clearly to contradict the -old theory and thus give rise to a new one. For example, we find in -Darwin's introduction to his _Origin of Species_ the following: "In -considering the origin of species it is quite conceivable that a -naturalist reflecting on the mental affinities of organic beings, on -their embryological relations, their geographical distribution, -geological succession, and other such facts, might come to the -conclusion that species had not been independently created but had -descended, like varieties, from other species." It would seem from this -statement that certain data were found for which the older theory of -independent creation did not offer an adequate explanation. And yet the -naturalist would hardly "reflect" on all these topics in a comparative -way unless some other mode of interpretation were already dawning upon -him, which led him to review the accepted reflections or views. - -As a more simple illustration, we may cite the common experience of a -person who is uncertain concerning the identity of an approaching -object, say, another person. At first he may not be sure it is a person -at all. He then sees that it is someone, and as the person approaches he -is inclined to believe him to be an acquaintance. As the supposed -acquaintance continues to approach, the observer may distinguish certain -features that cause him to doubt, and then relinquish his supposition -that it is an acquaintance. Or, he may conclude at once that the -approaching person is another individual he knows, and the transition -may be so readily made from one to the other that it would be difficult -to determine whether the discordant features are discordant before the -new supposition arises, or whether they are not recognized as -conflicting till this second person is in mind. Or, again, the -identification of the new individual and the discovery of the features -that are in conflict with the first supposition may appear to go on -together. - -Now, marked lines of likeness appear between this relatively simple -judgment and the far more involved ones of scientific research. In the -more extended scientific process we find data contradicting an old -theory and a new hypothesis arising to account for them. The hypothesis -is tested, and along with its verification we have the rejection, or -rather the modification, of the old theory. Similarly, in case of the -approaching stranger all these features are present, though in less -pronounced degree. In scientific investigation there is an interval of -testing by means of more careful consideration of the data and even -actual experimentation. Before an explanation is accepted subject to -test, a number of others may have been suggested and rejected. They may -not have received even explicit recognition. In case of the -identification of the stranger this feature is also present. Between two -fairly definite attempts to identify the mind does not remain a mere -blank or stationary, but other possible identifications may be suggested -which do not have sufficient plausibility to command serious attention; -they are only comparatively brief suggestions or tendencies. - -It is to be noted that in all these instances the first supposition was -not _entirely_ abandoned, but was modified and more exactly determined. -(Why it could not be wholly false and the new one wholly new, will be -considered later in connection with discussion of the persistence and -re-formation of habit.) There was such a modification of the old theory -as would meet the requirements of the new data, and the new explanations -thus contained both old and new features. - -We have seen that the predicate of the scientific judgment is a -hypothesis which is consciously applied to certain data. If the -similarity between the scientific judgment and the more immediate and -simple judgment is to be maintained, it is clear that the predicate of -the simple judgment must be of like nature. The structure of the two -varieties of judgment differs only in the degree of explicitness which -the hypothesis acquires. That is, the predicate of a judgment, as such, -is ideal; it is meaning, significant quality. If conditions are such as -to make the one judging hesitant or doubtful the mind wavers; the -predicate is not applied at once to the determination or qualification -of data, and hence comes to more distinct consciousness on its own -account. From being "ideal," it becomes _an_ idea. Yet its sole purpose -and value remains in its possible use to interpret data. Let the idea -remain detached, and let the query whether it be a true predicate -(_i. e_., really fit to be employed in determining the present data) -become more critical, and the idea becomes clearly a hypothesis.[57] In -other words, the hypothesis is just the predicate-function of judgment -definitely apprehended and regarded with reference to its nature and -adequacy. - -_Psychological analysis of judgment._--This hypothetical nature of the -predicate will be even more apparent after a further psychological -analysis, which, while applying more directly to the simpler and more -immediate judgments, may be extended to the more involved ones as well. - -In psychological terms, we may say, in explanation of the judging -process, that some stimulus to action has failed to function properly as -a stimulus, and that the activity which was going on has thus been -interrupted. Response in the accustomed way has failed. In such a case -there arises a division in experience into sensation content as subject -and ideal content as predicate. In other words, an activity has been -going on in accordance with established habits, but upon failure of the -accustomed stimulus to be longer an adequate stimulus this particular -activity ceases, and is resumed in an integral form only when a new -habit is set up to which the new or altered stimulus is adequate. It is -in this process of reconstruction that subject and predicate appear. -Sensory quality marks the point of stress, or seeming arrest, while the -ideal or imaged aspect defines the continuing activity as projected, and -hence that with which start is to be made in coping with the obstacle. -It serves as standpoint of regard and mode of indicated behavior. The -sensation stands for the interrupted habit, while the image stands for -the new habit, that is, the new way of dealing with the -subject-matter.[58] - -It appears, then, that the purpose of the judgment is to obtain an -adequate stimulus in that, when stimulus and response are adjusted to -each other, activity will be resumed. But if this reconstruction and -response were to follow at once, would there be any clearly defined act -of judging at all? In such a case there would be no judgment, properly -speaking, and no occasion for it. There would be simply a ready -transition from one line of activity to another; we should have changed -our method of reaction easily and readily to meet the new requirements. -On the one hand, our subject-matter would not have become a clearly -recognized datum with which we must deal; on the other hand, there would -be no ideal method of construing it.[59] Activity would have changed -without interruption, and neither subject nor predicate would have -arisen. - -In order that judgment may take place there must be interruption and -suspense. Under what conditions, then, is this suspense and uncertainty -possible? Our reply must be that we hesitate because of more or less -sharply defined alternatives; we are not sure which predicate, which -method of reaction, is the right one. The clearness with which these -alternatives come to mind depends upon the degree of explicitness of the -judgment, or, more exactly, the explicitness of the judgment depends -upon the sharpness of these alternatives. Alternatives may be carefully -weighed one against the other, as in deliberative judgments; or they may -be scarcely recognized as alternatives, as in the case in the greater -portion of our more simple judgments of daily conduct. - -_The predicate is essentially hypothetical._--If we review in a brief -resume the types of judgment we have considered, we find in the explicit -scientific judgment a fairly well-defined subject-matter which we seek -further to determine. Different suggestions present themselves with -varying degrees of plausibility. Some are passed by as soon as they -arise. Others gain a temporary recognition. Some are explicitly tested -with resulting acceptance or rejection. The acceptance of any one -explanation involves the rejection of some other explanation. During the -process of verification or test the newly advanced supposition is -recognized to be more or less doubtful. Besides the hypothesis which is -tentatively applied there is recognized the possibility of others. In -the disjunctive judgment these possible reactions are thought to be -limited to certain clearly defined alternatives, while in the less -explicit judgments they are not so clearly brought out. Throughout the -various forms of judgment, from the most complex and deliberate down to -the most simple and immediate, we found that a process could be traced -which was like in kind and varied only in degree. And, finally, in the -most immediate judgments where some of these features seem to disappear, -the same account not only appears to be the most reasonable one, but -there is the additional consideration, from the psychological side, that -were not the judgment of this doubtful, tentative character, it would be -difficult to understand how there could be judgment as distinct from a -reflex. It appears, then, that throughout, the predicate is essentially -of the nature of a hypothesis for dealing with the subject-matter. And, -however simple and immediate, or however involved and prolonged, the -judgment may be, it is to be regarded as essentially a process of -reconstruction which aims at the resumption of an interrupted -experience; and when experience has become itself a consciously -intellectual affair, at the restoration of a unified objective -situation. - - -II - -_Criticism of certain views concerning the hypothesis._--The explanation -we have given of the hypothesis will enable us to criticise the -treatment it has received from the empirical and the rationalistic -schools. We shall endeavor to point out that these schools have, in -spite of their opposed views, an assumption in common--something given -in a fixed, or non-instrumental way; and that consequently the -hypothesis is either impossible or else futile. - -Bacon is commonly recognized as a leader in the reactionary inductive -movement, which arose with the decline of scholasticism, and will serve -as a good example of the extreme empirical position. In place of -authority and the deductive method, Bacon advocated a return to nature -and induction from data given through observation. The new method which -he advanced has both a positive and a negative side. Before any -positive steps can be taken, the mind must be cleared of the various -false opinions and prejudices that have been acquired. This preliminary -task of freeing the mind from "phantoms," or "eidola," which Bacon -likened to the cleansing of the threshing-floor, having been -accomplished, nature should be carefully interrogated. There must be no -hasty generalization, for the true method "collects axioms from sense -and particulars, ascending continuously and by degrees, so that in the -end it arrives at the most general axioms." These axioms of Bacon's are -generalizations based on observation, and are to be applied deductively, -but the distinguishing feature of Bacon's induction is its carefully -graduated steps. Others, too, had proceeded with caution (for instance -Galileo), but Bacon laid more stress than they on the subordination of -steps. - -It is evident that Bacon left very little room for hypotheses, and this -is in keeping with his aversion to anticipation of nature by means of -"phantoms" of any sort; he even said explicitly that "our method of -discovery in science is of such a nature that there is not much left to -acuteness and strength of genius, but all degrees of genius and -intellect are brought nearly to the same level."[60] Bacon gave no -explanation of the function of the hypothesis; in his opinion it had no -lawful place in scientific procedure and must be banished as a -disturbing element. Instead of the reciprocal relation between -hypothesis and data, in which hypothesis is not only tested in -experience, but at the same time controls in a measure the very -experience which tests it, Bacon would have a gradual extraction of -general laws from nature through direct observation. He is so afraid of -the distorting influence of conception that he will have nothing to do -with conception upon any terms. So fearful is he of the influence of -pre-judgment, of prejudice, that he will have no judging which depends -upon ideas, since the idea involves anticipation of the fact. -Particulars are somehow to arrange and classify themselves, and to -record or register, in a mind free from conception, certain -generalizations. Ideas are to be registered derivatives of the given -particulars. This view is the essence of empiricism as a logical theory. -If the views regarding the logic of thought before set forth are -correct, it goes without saying that such empiricism is condemned to -self-contradiction. It endeavors to construct judgment in terms of its -subject alone; and the subject, as we have seen, is always a -co-respondent to a predicate--an idea or mental attitude or tendency of -intellectual determination. Thus the subject of judgment can be -determined only with reference to a corresponding determination of the -predicate. Subject and predicate, fact and idea, are contemporaneous, -not serial in their relations (see pp. 110-12). - -Less technically the failure of Bacon's denial of the worth of -hypothesis--which is in such exact accord with empiricism in -logic--shows itself in his attitude toward experimentation and toward -observation. Bacon's neglect of experimentation is not an accidental -oversight, but is bound up with his view regarding the worthlessness of -conception or anticipation. To experiment means to set out from an idea -as well as from facts, and to try to construe, or even to discover, -facts in accordance with the idea. Experimentation not only anticipates, -but strives to make good an anticipation. Of course, this struggle is -checked at every point by success or failure, and thus the hypothesis is -continuously undergoing in varying ratios both confirmation and -transformation. But this is not to make the hypothesis secondary to the -fact. It is simply to remain true to the proposition that the -distinction and the relationship of the two is a thoroughly -contemporaneous one. But it is impossible to draw any fixed line between -experimentation and scientific observations. To insist upon the need of -systematic observation and collection of particulars is to set up a -principle which is as distinct from the casual accumulation of -impressions as it is from nebulous speculation. If there is to be -observation of a directed sort, it must be with reference to some -problem, some doubt, and this, as we have seen, is a stimulus which -throws the mind into a certain attitude of response. Controlled -observation is inquiry, it is search; consequently it must be search for -something. Nature cannot answer interrogations excepting as such -interrogations are put; and the putting of a question involves -anticipation. The observer does not inquire about anything or look for -anything excepting as he is after something. This search implies at once -the incompleteness of the particular given facts, and the -possibility--that is ideal--of their completion. - -It was not long until the development of natural science compelled a -better understanding of its actual procedure than Bacon possessed. -Empiricism changed to experimentalism. With experimentalism inevitably -came the recognition of hypotheses in observing, collecting, and -comparing facts. It is clear, for instance, that Newton's fruitful -investigations are not conducted in accordance with the Baconian notion. -It is quite clear that his celebrated four rules for philosophizing[61] -are in truth statements of certain principles which are to be observed -in forming hypotheses. They imply that scientific technique had advanced -to a point where hypotheses were such regular and indispensable factors -that certain uniform conditions might be laid down for their use. The -fourth rule in particular is a statement of the relative validity of -hypothesis as such until there is ground for entertaining a contrary -hypothesis. - -The subsequent history of logical theory in England is conditioned upon -its attempt to combine into one system the theories of empiristic logic -with recognition of the procedure of experimental science. This attempt -finds its culmination in the logic of John Stuart Mill. Of his interest -in and fidelity to the actual procedure of experimental science, as he -saw it, there can be no doubt. Of his good faith in concluding his -_Introduction_ with the words following there can be no doubt: "I can -conscientiously affirm that no one proposition laid down in this work -has been adopted for the sake of establishing, or with any reference for -its fitness in being employed in establishing, preconceived opinions in -any department of knowledge or of inquiry on which the speculative world -is still undecided." Yet Mill was equally attached to the belief that -ultimate reality, as it is for the human mind, is given in sensations, -independent of ideas; and that all valid ideas are combinations and -convenient ways of using such given material. Mill's very sincerity made -it impossible that this belief should not determine, at every point, his -treatment of the thinking process and of its various instrumentalities. - -In Book III, chap. 14, Mill discusses the logic of explanation, and in -discussing this topic naturally finds it necessary to consider the -matter of the proper use of scientific hypotheses. This is conducted -from the standpoint of their use as that is reflected in the technique -of scientific discovery. In Book IV, chap. 2, he discusses "Abstraction -or the Formation of Conceptions"--a topic which obviously involves the -forming of hypotheses. In this chapter, his consideration is conducted -in terms, not of scientific procedure, but of general philosophical -theory, and this point of view is emphasized by the fact that he is -opposing a certain view of Dr. Whewell. - -The contradiction between the statements in the two chapters will serve -to bring out the two points already made, viz., the correspondent -character of datum and hypothesis, and the origin of the latter in a -problematic situation and its consequent use as an instrument of -unification and solution. Mill first points out that hypotheses are -invented to enable the deductive method to be applied earlier to -phenomena; that it does this by suppressing the first of the three -steps, induction, ratiocination, and verification. He states that: - - The process of tracing regularity in any complicated, and at first - sight confused, set of appearances is necessarily tentative; we - begin by making any supposition, even a false one, to see what - consequences will follow from it; and by observing how these - differ from the real phenomena, we learn what corrections to make - in our assumption.... _Neither induction nor deduction would - enable us to understand even the simplest phenomena_, if we did - not often commence by anticipating the results; by making a - provisional supposition, at first essentially conjectural, as to - some of the very notions which constitute the final object of the - inquiry.[62] - -If in addition we recognize that, according to Mill, our direct -experience of nature always presents us with a complicated and confused -set of appearances, we shall be in no doubt as to the importance of -ideas as anticipations of a possible experience not yet had. Thus he -says: - - The order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents at - every instant a chaos followed by another chaos. We must decompose - each chaos into single facts. We must learn to see in the chaotic - antecedent a multitude of distinct antecedents, in the chaotic - consequent a multitude of distinct consequents.[63] - -In the next section of the same chapter he goes on to state that, having -discriminated the various antecedents and consequents, we then "are to -inquire which is connected with which." This requires a still further -resolution of the complex and of the confused. To effect this we must -vary the circumstances; we must modify the experience as given with -reference to accomplishing our purpose. To accomplish this purpose we -have recourse either to observation or to experiment: "We may either -_find_ an instance in nature _suited to our purposes_, or, by an -artificial arrangement of circumstances, _make_ one" (the italics in -"suited to our purpose" are mine; the others are Mill's). He then goes -on to say that there is no real logical distinction between observation -and experimentation. The four methods of experimental inquiry are -expressly discussed by Mill in terms of their worth in singling out and -connecting the antecedents and consequents which actually belong -together, from the chaos and confusion of direct experience. - -We have only to take these statements in their logical connection with -each other (and this connection runs through the entire treatment by -Mill of scientific inquiry), to recognize the absolute necessity of -hypothesis to undertaking any directed inquiry or scientific operation. -Consequently we are not surprised at finding him saying that "the -function of hypotheses is one which must be reckoned absolutely -indispensable in science;" and again that "the hypothesis by suggesting -observations and experiments puts us on the road to independent -evidence."[64] - -Since Mill's virtual retraction, from the theoretical point of view, of -what is here said from the standpoint of scientific procedure, regarding -the necessity of ideas is an accompaniment of his criticism of Whewell, -it will put the discussion in better perspective if we turn first to -Whewell's views.[65] The latter began by stating a distinction which -easily might have been developed into a theory of the relation of fact -and idea which is in line with that advanced in this chapter, and indeed -in this volume as a whole. He questions (chap. 2) the fixity of the -distinction between theory and practice. He points out that what we term -facts are in effect simply accepted inferences; and that what we call -theories are describable as facts, in proportion as they become -thoroughly established. A true theory is a fact. "All the great theories -which have successively been established in the world are now thought of -as facts." "The most recondite theories when firmly established are -accepted as facts; the simplest facts seem to involve something of the -nature of theory." - -The conclusion is that the distinction is a historic one, depending upon -the state of knowledge at the time, and upon the attitude of the -individual. What is theory for one epoch, or for one inquirer in a given -epoch, is fact for some other epoch, or even for some other more -advanced inquirer in the same epoch. It is theory when the element of -inference involved in judging any fact is consciously brought out; it is -fact when the conditions are such that we have never been led to -question the inference involved, or else, having questioned it, have so -thoroughly examined into the inferential process that there is no need -of holding it further before the mind, and it relapses into -unconsciousness again. "If this greater or less consciousness of our own -internal act be all that distinguishes fact from theory, we must allow -that the distinction is still untenable" (untenable, that is to say, as -a fixed separation). Again, "fact and theory have no essential -difference except in the degree of their _certainty and familiarity_. -Theory, when it becomes firmly established and steadily lodged in the -mind becomes fact." (P. 45; italics mine.) And, of course, it is equally -true that as fast as facts are suspected or doubted, certain aspects of -them are transferred into the class of theories and even of mere -opinions. - -I say this conception might have been developed in a way entirely -congruous with the position of this chapter. This would have happened if -the final distinction between fact and idea had been formulated upon the -basis simply of the points, "relative certainty and familiarity." From -this point of view the distinction between fact and idea is one purely -relative to the doubt-inquiry function. It has to do with the evolution -of an experience as regards its conscious surety. It has its origin in -problematic situations. Whatever appears to us as a problem appears as -contrasted with a possible solution. Whatever objects of thought refer -particularly to the problematic side are theories, ideas, hypotheses; -whatever relates to the solution side is surety, unquestioned -familiarity, fact. This point of view makes the distinctions entirely -relative to the exigencies of the process of reflective transformation -of experience. - -Whewell, however, had no sooner started in this train of thought than he -turns his back upon it. In chap. 3 he transforms what he had proclaimed -to be a relative, historic, and working distinction into a fixed and -absolute one. He distinguishes between sensations and ideas, not upon a -genetic basis with reference to establishing the conditions of further -operation; but with reference to a fundamentally fixed line of -demarkation between what is passively _given_ to the mind and the -_activity_ put forth by the mind. Thus he reinstates in its most -generalized and fixed, and therefore most vicious, form the separation -which he has just rejected. Sensations are a brute unchangeable element -of fact which exists and persists independent of ideas; an idea is a -mode of mental operation which occurs and recurs in an independent -individuality of its own. If he had carried out the line of thought with -which he began, sensation as fact would have been that residuum of -familiarity and certainty which cannot be eliminated, however much else -of an experience is dissolved in the inner conflict. Idea as hypothesis -or theory would have been the corresponding element in experience which -is necessary to redintegrate this residuum into a coherent and -significant experience. - -But since Whewell did not follow out his own line of thought, choosing -rather to fall back on the Kantian antithesis of sense and thought, he -had no sooner separated his fact and idea, his given datum and his -mental relation, than he is compelled to get them together again. The -idea becomes "a general relation which is imposed upon perception by an -act of the mind, and which is different from anything which our senses -directly offer to us" (p. 26). Such conceptions are necessary to connect -the facts which we learn from our senses into truths. "The ideal -conception which the mind itself supplies is superinduced upon the facts -as they are originally presented to observation. Before the inductive -truth is detected, the facts are there, but they are many and -unconnected. The conception which the discoverer applies to them gives -them connection and unity." (P. 42.) All induction, according to -Whewell, thus depends upon superinduction--imposition upon sensory data -of certain ideas or general relations existing independently in the -mind.[66] - -We do not need to present again the objections already offered to this -view: the impossibility of any orderly stimulation of ideas by facts, -and the impossibility of any check in the imposition of idea upon fact. -"Facts" and conception are so thoroughly separate and independent that -any sensory datum is indifferently and equally related to any -conceivable idea. There is no basis for "superinducing" one idea or -hypothesis, rather than any other, upon any particular set of data. - -In the chapter already referred to upon abstraction, or the formation of -conceptions, Mill seizes upon this difficulty. Yet he and Whewell have -one point in common: they both agree in the existence of a certain -subject-matter which is given for logical purposes quite outside of the -logical process itself. Mill agrees with Whewell in postulating a raw -material of pure sensational data. In criticising Whewell's theory of -superinduction of idea upon fact, he is therefore led to the opposite -assertion of the complete dependence of ideas as such upon the given -facts as such--in other words, he is led to a reiteration of the -fundamental Baconian empiricism; and thus to a virtual retraction of -what he had asserted regarding the necessity of ideas to fruitful -scientific inquiry, whether in the way of observation or -experimentation. The following quotation gives a fair notion of the -extent of Mill's retraction: - - The conceptions then which we employ for the colligation and - methodization of facts, do not develop themselves from within, - _but are impressed upon the mind from without_; they are never - obtained otherwise than by way of comparison and abstraction, and, - in the most important and most numerous cases, are evolved by - abstraction _from the very phenomena which it is their office to - colligate_.[67] - -Even here Mill's sense for the positive side of scientific inquiry -suffices to reveal to him that the "facts" are somehow inadequate and -defective, and are in need of assistance from ideas--and yet the ideas -which are to help out the facts are to be the impress of the unsure -facts! The contradiction comes out very clearly when Mill says: "The -really difficult cases are those in which the conception destined to -create light and order out of darkness and confusion has to be sought -for among the very phenomena which it afterward serves to arrange."[68] - -Of course, there is a sense in which Mill's view is very much nearer the -truth than is Whewell's. Mill at least sees that "idea" must be relevant -to the facts or data which it is to arrange, which are to have "light -and order" introduced into them by means of the idea. He sees clearly -enough that this is impossible save as the idea develops _within_ the -same experience in which the "dark and confused" facts are presented. He -goes on to show correctly enough how conflicting data lead the mind to a -"confused feeling of an analogy" between the data of the confused -experience and of some other experience which is orderly (or already -colligated and methodized); and how this vague feeling, through -processes of further exploration and comparison of experiences, gets a -clearer and more adequate form until we finally accept it. He shows how -in this process we continually judge of the worth of the idea which is -in process of formation, by reference to its appropriateness to _our -purpose_. He goes so far as to say: "The question of appropriateness is -relative to the _particular object we have in view_."[69] He sums up his -discussion by stating: "We cannot frame good general conceptions -beforehand. That the conception we have obtained is the one we want can -only be known when we have _done the work for the sake of which we -wanted it_."[70] - -This all describes the actual state of the case, but it is consistent -only with a logical theory which makes the distinction between fact and -hypothesis instrumental in the transformation of experience from a -confused into an organized form; not with Mill's notion that sensations -are somehow finally and completely given as ultimate facts, and that -ideas are mere re-registrations of such facts. It is perfectly just to -say that the hypothesis is impressed upon the mind (in the sense that -any notion which occurs to the mind is impressed) _in the course_ of an -experience. It is well enough, if one define what he means, to say that -the hypothesis is impressed (that is to say, occurs or is suggested) -through the medium of given facts, or even of sensations. But it is -equally true that the _facts_ are presented and that _sensations_ occur -within the course of an experience which is larger than the bare facts, -because involving the conflicts among them and the corresponding -intention to treat them in some fashion which will secure a unified -experience. Facts get power to suggest ideas to the mind--to -"impress"--only through their position in an entire experience which is -in process of disintegration and of reconstruction--their "fringe" or -feeling of tendency is quite as factual as they are. The fact that "the -conception we have obtained is the one we want can be known only when we -have done the work for the sake of which we wanted it," is enough to -show that it is not bare facts, but facts in relation to want and -purpose and purpose in relation to facts, which originate the -hypothesis. - -It would be interesting to follow the history of discussion of the -hypothesis since the time of Whewell and of Mill, particularly in the -writings of Jevons, Venn, and Bosanquet. This history would refine the -terms of our discussion by introducing more complex distinctions and -relations. But it would be found, I think, only to refine, not to -introduce any fundamentally new principles. In each case, we find the -writer struggling with the necessity of distinguishing between fact and -idea; of giving the fact a certain primacy with respect to testing of -idea and of giving the idea a primacy with respect to the significance -and orderliness of the fact; and of holding throughout to a relationship -of idea with fact so intimate that the idea develops only by being -"compared" with facts (that is, used in construing them), and facts get -to be known only as they are "connected" through the idea--and we find -that what is a maze of paradoxes and inconsistencies from an absolute, -from a non-historic standpoint, is a matter of course the moment -it is looked at from the standpoint of experience engaged in -self-transformation of meaning through conflict and reconstitution. - -But we can only note one or two points. Jevons's "infinite ballot-box" -of nature which is absolutely neutral as to any particular conception or -idea, and which accordingly requires as its correlate the formation of -every possible hypothesis (all standing in themselves upon the same -level of probability) is an interesting example of the logical -consequences of feeling the need of both fact and hypothesis for -scientific procedure and yet regarding them as somehow arising -independently of each other. It is an attempt to combine extreme -empiricism and extreme rationalism. The process of forming hypotheses -and of deducing their rational consequences goes on at random, because -the disconnectedness of facts as given is so ultimate that the facts -suggest one hypothesis no more readily than another. Mathematics, in its -two forms of measurements as applied to the facts, and of calculation as -applied in deduction, furnishes Jevons the bridge by which he finally -covers the gulf which he has first himself created. Venn's theory -requires little or no restatement to bring it into line with the -position taken in the text. He holds to the origin of hypothesis in the -original practical needs of mankind, and to its gradual development into -present scientific form.[71] He states expressly: - - The _distinction between what is known and what is not known is - essential to Logic_, and peculiarly characteristic of it in a - degree not to be found in any other science. Inference is the - process of passing from one to the other; from facts which we had - accepted as premises, to those which we have not yet accepted, - _but are in the act of doing so by the very process in question_. - No scrutiny of the facts themselves, regarded as objective, can - ever detect these characteristics of their greater or less - familiarity to our minds. We must introduce also the subjective - element if we wish to give any adequate explanation of them.[72] - -Venn, however, does not attempt a thoroughgoing statement of logical -distinctions, relations, and operations, as parts "of the act of passing -from the unknown to the known." He recognizes the relation of reflection -to a historic process, which we have here termed "reconstruction," and -the origin and worth of hypothesis as a tool in the movement, but does -not carry his analysis to a systematic form. - - -III - -_Origin of the hypothesis._--In our analysis of the process of judgment, -we attempted to show that the predicate arises in case of failure of -some line of activity going on in terms of an established habit. When -the old habit is checked through failure to deal with new conditions -(_i. e._, when the situation is such as to stimulate two habits with -distinct aims) the problem is to find a new method of response--that is, -to co-ordinate the conflicting tendencies by building up a single aim -which will function the existing situation. As we saw that, in case of -judgment, habit when checked became ideal, an idea, so the new habit is -first formalized as an ideal type of reaction and is the hypothesis by -which we attempt to construe new data. In our inquiry as to how this -formulation is effected, _i. e._, how the hypothesis is developed, it -will be convenient to take some of the currently accepted statements as -to their origin, and show how these statements stand in reference to the -analysis proposed. - -_Enumerative induction and allied processes._--It is pointed out by -Welton[73] that the various ways in which hypotheses are suggested may -be reduced to three classes, viz., enumerative induction, conversion of -propositions, and analogy. Under the head of "enumeration" he reminds us -that "every observed regularity of connection between phenomena suggests -a question as to whether it is universal." There are numerous instances -of this in mathematics. For example, it is noticed that 1+3=2^2, -1+3+5=3^2, 1+3+5+7=4^2, etc.; and one is led to ask whether there is any -general principle involved, so that the sum of the first _n_ odd numbers -will be _n_^2, where _n_ is any number, however great. In this early -form of inductive inference there are two divergent tendencies. One is -the tendency to complete enumeration. This _tendency_ is clearly -ideal--it transcends the facts as given. To look for all the cases is -thus itself an experimental inquiry, based upon a hypothesis which it -endeavors to test. But in most cases enumeration can be only incomplete, -and we are able to reach nothing better than probability. Hence the -other tendency in the direction of an analysis of content in search for -a principle of connection in the elements in any _one_ case. For if a -characteristic belonging to a number of individuals suggests a class -where it belongs to all individuals, it must be that it is found in -every individual as such. The hypothesis of complete class involves a -hypothesis as to the character of each individual in the class. Thus a -hypothesis as to extension transforms itself into one as to intension. - -But it is analogy which Welton considers "the chief source from which -new hypotheses are drawn." In the second tendency mentioned under -enumerative induction, that is, the tendency to analysis of content or -intension, we are naturally led to analogy, for in our search for the -characteristic feature which determines classification among the -concrete particulars our first step will be an inference by analogy. In -analogy attention is turned from the number of observed instances to -their character, and, because particulars have some feature in common, -they are supposed to be the same in still other respects. While the best -we can reach in analogy is probability, the arguments may be such as to -result in a high degree of certainty. The form of the argument is -valuable in so far as we are able to distinguish between essential and -nonessential characteristics on which to base our analogy. What is -essential and what nonessential depends upon the particular end we have -in view. - -In addition to enumerative induction, which Welton has mentioned, it is -to be noted that there are a number of other processes which are very -similar to it in that a number of particulars appear to furnish a basis -for a general principle or method. Such instances are common in -induction, in instruction, and in methods of proof. - -If one is to be instructed in some new kind of labor, he is supposed to -acquire a grasp of the method after having been shown in a few instances -how this particular work is to be done; and, if he performs the -manipulations himself, so much the better. It is not asked why the -experience of a few cases should be of any assistance, for it seems -self-evident that an experienced man, a man who has acquired the skill, -or knack, of doing things, should deal better with all other cases of -similar nature. - -There is something very similar in inductive proofs, as they are called. -The inductive proof is common in algebra. Suppose we are concerned in -proving the law of expansion of the binomial theorem. We show by actual -calculation that, if the law holds good for the _n_th power, it is true -for the _n_+first power. That is, if it holds for any power, it holds -for the next also. But we can easily show that it does hold for, say, -the second power. Then it must be true for the third, and hence for the -fourth, and so on. Whether this law, though discovered by inductive -processes, depends on deduction for the conclusiveness of its proof, as -Jevons holds;[74] whether, as Erdmann[75] contends, the proof is -thoroughly deductive; or whether Wundt[76] is right in maintaining that -it is based on an exact analogy, while the fundamental axioms of -mathematics are inductive, it is clear that in such proofs a few -instances are employed to give the learner a start in the right -direction. Something suggests itself, and is found true in this case, in -the next, and again in the next, and so on. It may be questioned whether -there is usually a very clear notion of what is involved in the "so on." -To many it appears to mark the point where, after having been taken a -few steps, the learner is carried on by the acquired momentum somewhat -after the fashion of one of Newton's laws of motion. Whether the few -successive steps are an integral part of the proof or merely serve as -illustration, they are very generally resorted to. In fact, they are -often employed where there is no attempt to introduce a general term -such as _n_, or _k_, or _l_, but the few individual instances are deemed -quite sufficient. Such, for instance, is the custom in arithmetical -processes. We call attention to these facts in order to show that -successive cases are utilized in the course of explanation as an aid in -establishing the generality of a law. - -In geometry we find a class of proofs in which the successive steps seem -to have great significance. A common proof of the area of the circle -will serve as a fair example. A regular polygon is circumscribed about -the circle. Then as the number of its sides are increased its area will -approach that of the circle, as its perimeter approaches the -circumference of the circle. The area of the circle is thus inferred to -be [pi]_R_^2, since the area of the polygon is always (1/2)_R_x -perimeter, and in case of the circle the circumference = 2[pi]_R_. -Here again we get under such headway by means of the polygon that we -arrive at the circle with but little difficulty. Had we attempted the -transition at once, say, from a circumscribed square, we should -doubtless have experienced some uncertainty and might have recoiled from -what would seem a rash attempt; but as the number of the sides of our -polygon approach infinity--that mysterious realm where many paradoxical -things become possible--the transition becomes so easy that our polygon -is often said to have truly become a circle. - -Similarly, some statements of the infinitesimal calculus rest on the -assumption that slight degrees of difference may be neglected. Though -the more modern theory of limits has largely displaced this attitude in -calculus and has also changed the method of proof in such geometrical -problems as the area of the circle, the underlying motive seems to have -been to make transitions easy, and thus to make possible a continued -application of some particular method or way of dealing with things. - -But granted that this is all true, what has it to do with the origin of -the hypothesis? It seems likely that the hypothesis may be suggested by -a few successive instances; but are these to be classed with the -successive steps in proof to which we have referred? In the first place, -we attempt to prove our hypothesis because we are not sure it is true; -we are not satisfied that there are no other tenable hypotheses. But if -we do test it, is not such test enough? It depends upon how thorough a -grasp we have of the situation; but, in general, each test case adds to -its probability. The value of tests lies in the fact that they -strengthen and tend to confirm our hypothesis by checking the force of -alternatives. One instance is not sufficient because there are other -possible incipient hypotheses, or more properly tendencies, and the -enumeration serves to bring one of these tendencies into prominence in -that it diminishes other vague and perhaps subconscious tendencies and -strengthens the one which suddenly appears as the mysterious product of -genius. - -The question might arise why the mere repetition of conflicting -tendencies would lead to a predominance of one of them. Why would they -not all remain in conflict and continue to check any positive result? It -is probably because there never is any absolute equilibrium. The -successive instances tend to intensify and bring into prominence some -tendency which is already taking a lead, so to speak. And it may be said -further in this connection that only as seen from the outside, only as a -mechanical view is taken, does there appear to be an excluding of -definitely made out alternatives. - -In explanation of the part played by analogy in the origin of -hypotheses, Welton points out that a mere number of instances do not -take us very far, and that there must be some "_specification_ of the -instances as well as numbering of them," and goes on to show that the -argument by enumerative induction passes readily into one from analogy, -as soon as attention is turned from the number of the observed instances -to their character. It is not necessary, however, to pass to analogy -through enumerative induction. "When the instances presented to -observation offer immediately the characteristic marks on which we base -the inference to the connection of S and P, we can proceed at once to an -inference from analogy, without any preliminary enumeration of the -instances."[77] - -Welton, and logicians generally, regard analogy as an inference on the -basis of partial identity. Because of certain common features we are led -to infer a still greater likeness. - -Both enumerative induction and analogy are explicable in terms of habit. -We saw in our examination of enumerative induction that a form of -reaction gains strength through a series of successful applications. -Analogy marks the presence of an identical element together with the -tendency to extend this "partial identity" (as it is commonly called) -still farther. In other words, in analogy it is suggested that a type of -reaction which is the same in certain respects may be made similar in a -greater degree. In enumerative induction we lay stress on the number of -instances in which the habit is applied. In analogy we emphasize the -content side and take note of the partial identity. In fact, the -relation between enumerative induction and analogy is of the same sort -as that existing between association by contiguity and association by -similarity. In association by contiguity we think of the things -associated as merely standing in certain temporal or spatial relations, -and disregard the fact that they were elements in a larger experience. -In case of association by similarity we regard the like feature in the -things associated as a basis for further correction. - -In conversion of propositions we try to reverse the direction of the -reaction, so to speak, and thereby to free the habit, to get a mode of -response so generalized as to act with a minimum cue. For instance, we -can deal with A in a way called B, or, in other words, in the same way -that we did with other things called B. If we say, "Man is an animal," -then to a certain extent the term "animal" signifies the way in which we -regard "man." But the question arises whether we can regard all animals -as we do man. Evidently not, for the reaction which is fitting in case -of animals would be only partially applicable to man. With the animals -that are also men we have the beginning of a habit which, if unchecked, -would lead to a similar reaction toward all animals, _i. e._, we would -say: "All animals are men." Man may be said to be the richer concept, in -that only a part of the reaction which determines an object to be a man -is required to designate it as an animal. On the other hand, if we start -with animal, then (except in case of the animals which are men) there is -lacking the subject-matter which would permit the fuller concept to be -applied. By supplying the conditions under which animal=man we get a -reversible habit. The equation of technical science has just this -character. It represents the maximum freeing or abstraction of a -predicate _qua_ predicate, and thereby multiplies the possible -applications of it to subjects of future judgments, and lessens the -amount of shearing away of irrelevancies and of re-adaptation necessary -when so used in any particular case. - -_Formation and test of the hypothesis._--The formation of the hypothesis -is commonly regarded as essentially different from the process of -testing, which it subsequently undergoes. We are said to observe facts, -invent hypotheses, and _then_ test them. The hypothesis is not required -for our preliminary observations; and some writers, regarding the -hypothesis as a formulation which requires a difficult and elaborate -test, decline to admit as hypotheses those more simple suppositions, -which are readily confirmed or rejected. A very good illustration of -this point of view is met with in Wundt's discussion of the hypothesis, -by an examination of which we hope to show that such distinctions are -rather artificial than real. - -The subject-matter of science, says Wundt,[78] is constituted by that -which is actually given and that which is actually to be expected. The -whole content is not limited to this, however, for these facts must be -supplemented by certain presuppositions, which are not given in a -factual sense. Such presuppositions are called hypotheses and are -justified by our fundamental demand for unity. However valuable the -hypothesis may be when rightly used, there is constant danger of -illegitimately extending it by additions that spring from mere -inclinations of fancy. Furthermore, the hypothesis in this proper -scientific sense must be carefully distinguished from the various -inaccurate uses, which are prevalent. For instance, hypotheses must not -be confused with expectations of fact. As cases in point Wundt mentions -Galileo's suppositions that small vibrations of the pendulum are -isochronous, and that the space traversed by a falling body is -proportional to the square of the time it has been falling. It is true -that such anticipations play an important part in science, but so long -as they relate to the facts themselves or to their connections, and can -be confirmed or rejected any moment through observation, they should not -be classed with those added presuppositions which are used to -co-ordinate facts. Hence not all suppositions are hypotheses. On the -other hand, not every hypothesis can be actually experienced. For -example, one employs in physics the hypothesis of electric fluid, but -does not expect actually to meet with it. In many cases, however, the -hypothesis becomes proved as an experienced fact. Such was the course of -the Copernican theory, which was at first only a hypothesis, but was -transformed into fact through the evidence afforded by subsequent -astronomical observation. - -Wundt defines a theory as a hypothesis taken together with the facts for -whose elucidation it was invented. In thus establishing a connection -between the facts which the hypothesis merely suggested, the theory -furnishes at the same time partly the foundation (_Begruendung_) and -partly the confirmation (_Bestaetigung_) of the hypothesis.[79] These -aspects, Wundt insists, must be sharply distinguished. Every hypothesis -must have its _Begruendung_, but there can be _Bestaetigung_ only in so -far as the hypothesis contains elements which are accessible to actual -processes of verification. In most cases verification is attainable in -only certain elements of the hypothesis. For example, Newton was obliged -to limit himself to one instance in the verification of his theory of -gravitation, viz., the movements of the moon. The other heavenly bodies -afforded nothing better than a foundation in that the supposition that -gravity decreases as the square of the distance increases enabled him to -deduce the movements of the planets. The main object of his theory, -however, lay in the deduction of these movements and not in the proof of -universal gravity. With the Darwinian theory, on the contrary, the main -interest is in seeking its verification through examination of actual -cases of development. Thus, while the Newtonian and the greater part of -the other physical theories lead to a deduction of the facts from the -hypotheses, which can be verified only in individual instances, the -Darwinian theory is concerned in evolving as far as possible the -hypothesis out of the facts. - -Let us look more closely at Wundt's position. We will ask, first, -whether the distinction between hypotheses and expectations is as -pronounced as he maintains; and, second, whether the relation between -_Begruendung_ and _Bestaetigung_ may not be closer than Wundt would have -us believe. - -As examples of the hypothesis Wundt mentions the Copernican hypothesis, -Newton's hypothesis of gravitation, and the predictions of the -astronomers which led to the discovery of Neptune. As examples of mere -expectations we are referred to Galileo's experiments with falling -bodies and pendulums. In case of Newton's hypothesis there was the -assumption of a general law, which was verified after much labor and -delay. The heliocentric hypothesis of Copernicus, which was invented for -the purpose of bringing system and unity into the movements of the -planets, has also been fairly well substantiated. In the discovery of -Neptune we have, apparently, not the proof of a general law or the -discovery of further peculiarities of previously known data, but rather -the discovery of a new object or agent by means of its observed effects. -In each of these instances we admit that the hypothesis was not readily -suggested or easily and directly tested. - -If we turn to Galileo's pendulum and falling bodies, it is clear first -of all that he did not have in mind the discovery of some object, as was -the case in the discovery of Neptune. Did he, then, either contribute to -the proof of a general law or discover further characteristics of things -already known in a more general way? Wundt tells us that Galileo only -determined a little more exactly what he already knew, and that he did -this with but little labor or delay. - -What, then, is the real difference between hypothesis and expectation? -If we compare Galileo's determination of the law of falling bodies with -Newton's test of his hypothesis of gravitation, we see that both -expectation and hypothesis were founded on observation and took the form -of mathematical formulae. Each tended to confirm the general law -expressed in its formula, though there was, of course, much difference -in the time and labor required. If we compare the Copernican hypothesis -with Galileo's supposition concerning the pendulum, we find again that -they agree in regard to general purpose and method, and differ in the -difficulty of verification. If the experiment with the pendulum only -substituted exactness for inexactness, did the Copernican theory do -anything different in _kind_? It is true that the more exact statement -of the swing of the pendulum was expressed in quantitative form, but -quantitative statement is no criterion of either the presence or the -absence of the hypothesis. - -Again, we may compare the pendulum with Kepler's laws. What was Kepler's -hypothesis, that the square of the periodic times of the several planets -are proportional to the cubes of their mean distances from the sun, -except a more exact formulation of facts which were already known in a -more general way? Wundt's position seems to be this: whenever a -supposition or suggestion can be tested readily, it should not be -classed as a hypothesis. This would make the distinction one of degree -rather than kind, and it does not appear how much labor we must expend, -or how long our supposition must evade our efforts to test it, before it -can win the title of hypothesis. - -In the second place, we have seen that Wundt draws a sharp line between -_Begruendung_ and _Bestaetigung_. It is doubtless true that every -hypothesis requires a certain justification, for unless other facts can -be found which agree with deductions made in accordance with it, its -only support would be the data from which it is drawn. Such support as -this would be obtained through a process too clearly circular to be -seriously entertained. The distinction which Wundt draws between -_Begruendung_ and _Bestaetigung_ is evidently due to the presence of the -experimental element in the latter. For descriptive purposes this -distinction is useful, but is misleading if it is understood to mean -that there is mere experience in one case and mere inference in the -other. The difference is rather due to the relative parts played by -inference and by accepted experience in each. In _Begruendung_ the -inferential feature is the more prominent, while in _Bestaetigung_ the -main emphasis is on the experiential aspect. It must not be supposed, -however, that either of these aspects can be wholly absent. It is -difficult to understand how any hypothesis can be entertained at all -unless it meets in some measure the demand with reference to which it -was invented, viz., a unification of conflicts in experience. And, _in -so far_, it is confirmed. The motive which casts doubt upon its adequacy -is the same that leads to its re-forming as a hypothesis, as a mental -concept. - -The difficulties in Wundt's position are thus due to a failure to take -account of the reconstructive nature of the judgment. The predicate, -supposition, or hypothesis, whatever we may choose to call it, is formed -because of the check of a former habit. The judgment is an ideal -application of a new habit, and its test is the attempt to act in -accordance with this ideal reconstruction. It must not be thought, -however, that our supposition is first fully developed and then tried -and accepted or rejected without modification. On the contrary, its -growth is the result of successive minor tests and corresponding minor -modifications in its form. Formation and test are merely convenient -distinctions in a larger process in which forming, testing, and -_re_-forming go on together. The activity of experimental verification -is not only a testing, a confirming or weakening of the validity of a -hypothesis, but it is equally well an evolution of the _meaning_ of the -hypothesis through bringing it into closer relations with specific data -not previously included in defining its import. _Per contra_, a purely -reflective and deductive consideration which develops the idea as -hypothesis, _in so far_ as it introduces the determinateness of -previously accepted facts within the scope, comprehension, or intension -of the idea, is in so far forth, a verification. - -If the view which we have maintained is correct, the hypothesis is not -to be limited to those elaborate formulations of the scientist which he -seeks to confirm by crucial tests. The hypothesis of the investigator -differs from the comparatively rough conjecture of the plain man only in -its greater precision. Indeed, as we have attempted to show, the -hypothesis is not a method which we may employ or not as we choose; on -the contrary, as predicate of the judgment it is present in a more or -less explicit form if we judge at all. Whether the time and labor -required for its confirmation or rejection is a matter of a lifetime or -a moment, its nature remains the same. Its function is identical with -that of the predicate. In short, the hypothesis is the predicate so -brought to consciousness and defined that those features which are not -noticed in the ordinary judgment are brought into prominence. We then -recognize the hypothesis to be what in fact the predicate always is, -viz., a method of organization and control. - - - - -VIII - -IMAGE AND IDEA IN LOGIC - - -The logic of sense-impressions and of ideas as copies of -sense-impressions has had its day. It engaged in a conflict with -dogmatism, and scored a decisive victory. It overthrew the dynasty of -prescribed formulae and innate ideas, of ideas derived ready-made from -custom and social usage, ancient enough to be lost in the remote -obscurity of divine sources; and enthroned in their place ideas derived -from, and representative of, the sense-experiences of a very real and -present world. It marked a reaction from dogma back to the original -meaning of dogma, back to the seeming, the appearance, of things. So -thoroughly did Bacon and Hobbes, Locke and Hume, to mention only these -four, do their work, that many of the problems growing out of the -conflict itself, to say nothing of the scholastic traditions that were -combated, have come to have merely a historical rather than a logical -interest. Logic no longer concerns itself very eagerly with the content -or sensuous qualities of ideas, with their derivation from -sense-impressions, or with questions as to the relation of copy to -original, of representative to that which is presented. It is concerned -rather with the constructive operations of thought, with meaning, -reference to reality, inference--with intellectual processes. Perhaps in -no respect is this shifting of logical standpoint indicated more clearly -than in the unregretful way with which the old logical interest in the -sense-qualities of ideas is now made over to psychology. States of -consciousness as such, we are told, are the proper study of psychology; -whereas logic concerns itself with the relation of thought to its -object. True, these states of consciousness include thought-states, as -well as sense-impressions; ideas and concepts, as well as feelings and -fancies; and the business of psychology is to observe, compare and -classify, describe and chronicle, these states and whatever else is -carried along in the stream of consciousness. But logic is concerned, -not with these states of consciousness _per se_, least of all with the -flotsam and jetsam of the stream, but with its reference to reality; not -with the true, but with truth; not even with what consciousness does, -but with how consciousness is to outdo itself, transcend itself, in a -rational and universal whole. Even an empirical logic has to arrange -somehow the way to get from one sense-impression to another. - -In drawing this distinction between logic and psychology--a distinction -which virtually amounts to a separation--two things are overlooked: -first, that the distinction itself is a logical distinction, and may -properly constitute a problem falling under the province of logical -inquiry and theory; and, second, that the rather arbitrary and official -setting apart of psychology to look after the task of studying states of -consciousness does not carry with it the guarantee that psychology will -confine itself exclusively to that task. This last point in particular -must be my excuse for discussing the question of image and idea from the -psychological rather than from the logical standpoint. The logic of -ideas derived from sense-impressions has had its day. But even the very -leavings of the past may have been gathered up and reconstructed by -psychology in such a way as to anticipate some of the newer developments -of logical theory and meet some of its difficulties. One can hardly hope -to justify in advance a discussion based on such a sheer possibility. -Let us begin, rather, by noting down from the standpoint of logic some -of the distinctions between image and idea, and the estimate of the -logical function and value of mental imagery, and see in what direction -they take us and whether they suggest a resort to an analysis from the -standpoint of psychology. - -Proceeding from the standpoint of logic to inquire into the logical -function of mental imagery and into the distinction between image and -idea, we shall come upon two opposed but characteristic answers. If the -inquiry be directed to a member of the empirical school of logic, he -would be bound to answer in the affirmative, so far as the question -regarding the function of mental imagery is concerned. He would be -likely to say, if he were loyal to the traditions of his school, that -mental imagery is the counterpart of sense-perception, and is thus the -representative of the data with which empirical logic is concerned. -Mental imagery, he would continue, is a representative in a literal -sense, a copy, a reflection, of what comes to us through the avenues of -sensation. True, it is not the perfect twin of sense-experience; else we -could not tell them apart; indeed, there are times when the copy becomes -so much like the original that we are deceived by it, as in dreams or in -hallucinations. Ordinarily, however, we are able to distinguish one from -the other. Two criteria are usually present; (1) imagery is fainter, -more fleeting, than the corresponding sense-experience; and (2), save in -the case of accurate memory-images, it is subject to a more or less -arbitrary rearrangement of its parts, as when, for example, we make over -the images of scenes we have actually experienced, to furnish forth the -setting of some remote historical event. - -Barring, or controlling and rectifying, its tendencies toward both -arbitrary and constructive variations from the original, mental imagery -is on the same level as sense-experience, and serves the same logical -purpose. That is to say, it contributes to the data which constitute the -foundations of empirical logic. It furnishes materials for the -operations of observing, comparing, abstracting and generalizing. -Mental imagery helps to piece out the fragments that may be presented to -sense-experience. It supplies the entire anatomy when only a single -bone, say, is actually given. Yet, however useful as a servant of truth, -it has to be carefully watched, lest its spontaneous tendency to vary -the actual order and coexistence of data lead the investigator astray. -The copy it presents is, after all, a temporary makeshift, until it can -be shown to correspond point for point to the now absent reality. Mental -imagery furnishes one with an illustrated edition of the book of nature, -but the illustrations await the confirmation of comparison with the -originals. - -Mental imagery functions logically when it extends the area of data -beyond the range of the immediate sense-perceptions of any given time, -and thus makes possible a more comprehensive application of the -empirical methods of observation, comparison, abstraction, and -generalization. It functions logically when it acts as a feeder of -logical machinery, though it is not indispensable to this machinery and -does not modify its principles. The logical mill could grind up in the -same way the pure grain of sense-perceptions, unmixed with mental -images, but it would have to grind more slowly for lack of material. In -other words, empirical logic could carry on its operations of observing, -comparing, abstracting, and generalizing, solely on the basis of objects -or data present to the senses, and with no extension of this basis in -terms of imagery, or copies of objects not immediately present; but it -would take more time for it to apply and carry through its operations. -The logical machinery is the same in each case. The materials fed and -the product issuing are the same in each case. Imagery simply fulfils -the function of providing a more copious grist. - -The empiricist's answer to our question regarding the logical function -of mental imagery leaves that function in an uncertain and parlous -state. Imagery lacks the security of sense-perception on the one hand, -and it has no part in the operation of thought on the other. It is a -sort of hod-carrier, whose function it is to convey the raw materials of -sense-perception to a more exalted position where someone else does all -the work. I suppose this could be called a functional interpretation of -a logical element. The question, then, would be whether an element so -functioning is in any sense logical. As an element lying outside of the -thought-process it owes no responsibility to logic; it is not amenable -to its regulations. Thought simply finds it expedient to operate with an -agent over which it has no intrinsic control. The case might be allowed -to rest here. Yet were this extra-logical element of imagery to abandon -thought, all conscious thinking as opposed to sense-perception would -cease. A false alarm, perhaps. Imagery may be so constituted that it is -inseparably subordinated to thought and can never abandon it. Thought -may simply exude imagery. But imagery somehow has to represent -sense-perception, also. It can hardly be a secretion of thought and a -copy of sense-perceptions at one and the same time, unless the -empiricist is willing to turn absolute idealist! Before taking such a -desperate plunge as this, it might be desirable to see whether there is -any other recourse. - -There is another and a very different answer to the question regarding -the logical function of mental imagery. To distinguish this answer from -that of the associationist or empiricist, I will call it the answer of -the conceptualist. I am not at all positive that this label would stick -even to those to whom it might be applied with considerable -justification. The terms "rationalistic" and "transcendental" might be -preferred in opposition to the term "empirical." And we have the term -"apperceptionist" in opposition to the term "associationist." If the -term "conceptualist" is admissible, it should be brought down to date, -perhaps, by making it "neo-conceptualist." The present difficulties -regarding terminology would be eased considerably if we only had a -convenient set of derivatives made from the word "meaning." Since we -have not, I will use derivatives made from the word "concept" to denote -views opposite to those held by the empirical school. - -The conceptualist could be depended upon to answer our question in the -negative. Logical functions begin where the image leaves off. They begin -with the _idea_, with meaning. The conceptualist distinguishes sharply -between the image as a psychical existence and the idea, or concept, as -logical meaning. On the one hand, you have the "image," not only as a -mere psychical existence, but a mocking existence at that, fleeting, -inconstant, shifting, never perhaps twice alike; yet, mind you, an -_existence_, a _fact_--that must be admitted. On the other hand, you -have the "idea," with "a fixed content or logical meaning,"[80] which is -referred by an act of judgment to a reality beyond the act.[81] - -The "idea," the logical meaning, begins where the "image" leaves off. -Does this mean that the "idea" is wholly independent of the "image"? Yes -and no. The "idea" is independent of that which is ordinarily regarded -as the special characteristic of an "image," namely, its quality, its -sense-content. That is to say, the "idea" is independent of any -particular "image," any special embodiment of sense-content. Any image -will do. As Mr. Bosanquet remarks in comparing the psychical images that -pass through our minds to a store of signal flags: - - Not only is it indifferent whether your signal flag of today is - the same bit of cloth that you hoisted yesterday, but also, no one - knows or cares whether it is clean or dirty, thick or thin, frayed - or smooth, as long as it is distinctly legible as an element of - the signal code. Part of its content, of its attributes and - relations, is a fixed index which carries a distinct reference; - all the rest is nothing to us, and, except in a moment of idle - curiosity, we are unaware that it exists.[82] - -On the other hand, the "idea" could not operate as an idea, could not be -in consciousness, save as it involves some imagery, however old, dirty, -thin, and frayed. Take the statement, "The angles of a triangle are -equal to two right angles." If the statement means anything to a given -individual, if it conveys an idea, it must necessarily involve some form -of imagery, some qualitative or conscious content. But so far as the -_meaning_ is concerned, it is a matter of complete indifference as to -_what_ qualities are involved. These qualities may be in terms of -visual, auditory, tactual, kinaesthetic, or verbal imagery. The -individual may visualize a blackboard drawing of a triangle with its -sides produced, or he may imagine himself to be generating a triangle -while revolving through an angle of 180 deg. Any imagery anyone pleases -may be employed, so long as there goes with it somehow the _idea_ of -the relation of equality between the angles of a triangle and two right -angles. But the conceptualist does not stop here. The act of judgment -comes in to affirm that the "idea" is no mere idea, but is a quality of -the real. "The act [of judgment] attaches the floating adjective [the -idea, the logical meaning] to the nature of the world, and, at the same -time, tells one it was there already."[83] The "idea," the logical -meaning, begins where the "image" leaves off. Yet, somehow, the "idea" -could not begin, unless there were an "image" to leave off. - -An "image" is not an "idea," says the conceptualist. An "idea" is not an -"image." (1) An "image" is not an "idea," because an "image" is a -particular, individual fragment of consciousness. It is so bound up -with its own existence that it cannot reach out to the existence of an -"idea," or to anything beyond itself. Chemically speaking, it is an -_avalent_ atom of consciousness, if such a thing is thinkable. Mr. -Bosanquet raises the question: - - Are there at all ideas which are not symbolic?... The answer is - that _(a)_ in judgment itself the idea can be distinguished _qua_ - particular in time or psychical fact, and _so far_ is not - symbolic; and _(b)_ in all those human experiences from which we - draw our conjectures as to the animal intelligence, when in - languor or in ignorance image succeeds image without conscious - judgment, we feel what it is to have ideas as facts and not as - symbols.[84] - -(2) An "idea" is not an "image," because an idea _is_ meaning, which -consists in a part of the content of the image, cut off, and considered -apart from the _existence_ of the content or sign itself.[85] This -meaning, this fragment of psychical existence, lays down all claim to -existence on its own account, that it may refer through an act of -judgment to a reality beyond itself and beyond the act also. An "image" -is not an "idea" and an "idea" is not an "image," because an "image" -exists only as a quality, a sense-content, whereas an "idea" exists only -as a relation, a reference to reality beyond. "On the one hand," to -recall Bradley's antinomy, "no possible idea [as a psychical image] can -be that which it means.... On the other hand, no idea [as logical -signification] is anything but just what it means." - -There is a significant point of agreement between the conceptualist and -the empiricist. Both regard imagery as on the level with -sense-perception. For the empiricist, as we have seen, the fact that -imagery may be compelled to serve as a yoke-fellow of sense-experience -constitutes its logical value. For the conceptualist, however, the -association of imagery with sense-experience is of no logical -consequence whatsoever, save as it may help to intensify the distinction -between imagery and meaning. To quote again from Bradley: - - For logical purposes the psychological distinction of idea and - sensation may be said to be irrelevant, while the distinction of - idea and fact is vital. The image, or psychological idea, is for - logic nothing but a sensible reality. It is on a level with the - mere sensations of the senses. For both are facts and neither are - meanings. Neither are cut from a mutilated presentation and fixed - as a connection. Neither are indifferent to their place in the - stream of psychical events, their time and their relations to the - presented congeries. Neither are adjectives to be referred from - their existence, to live on strange soils, under other skies, and - through changing seasons. The lives of both are so entangled with - their environment, so one with their setting of sensuous - particulars, that their character is destroyed if but one thread - is broken.[86] - -This point of agreement between conceptualism and empiricism, this -placing of imagery and sense-experience on a common level, serves to -bring into relief fundamental differences between the two schools of -thought; fundamental, because they have to do with the nature of reality -itself. The conceptualist in his zealous endeavor to distinguish between -imagery and logical meaning has come perilously near driving imagery -into the arms of reality. It is the opportunity of empiricism to make -them one. How can conceptualism prevent the union? Has it not disarmed -itself? The act of judgment, which includes within itself logical -meaning as predicate, refers to a reality beyond the act. Both imagery -and reality, then, lie outside of the act of judgment! What alliance, or -_mesalliance_, may they not form, one with the other? - -The difficulties we have noted thus far in the discussion are due to a -large extent, I believe, to incomplete psychological analysis of -logical machinery. The empiricist has not carried the psychology of -logic as far as the conceptualist, although the latter might be the -loudest to disclaim the honor. I will not try to prove this statement, -but simply give it as a reason why, in the interest of brevity, I shall -pass with little comment over the psychological shortcomings and -contributions of empirical logic, and devote what space remains to the -psychology implicitly worked out by conceptual logic, and to its -possible development, with special reference, of course, to the problem -of the logical function of imagery. - -The logical distinction, which practically amounts to a separation -between imagery and meaning, is the counterpart of the psychological -distinction between stimulus and response, between the two poles of -sensori-motor activity, where the stimulus is defined in consciousness -in the form of imagery, in the form of sense-qualities centrally -excited, and where the response is directed and controlled _via_ this -imagery, so as to function in bringing some end, project, purpose, or -ideal, nearer to realization, some problem nearer to solution. - -Psychologically, there is no break between image and response, between -thought and action. The stimulus is a condition of action, in both -senses of the ambiguity of the word "condition." (1) It _is_ action; it -is a state or condition of action. (2) It is also an initiation of -action. _If_ the appropriate stimulus, then the desired action. The -response to an image is the meaning of the image. Or, the response to -any stimulus _via_ an image--mediated, controlled or directed by an -image--is the meaning of that image. The less imagery involved in any -response, the greater the presumption in favor of the belief that the -response is either an instinctive impulse or else has become a habit of -mind, an adequate idea. The reduction and loss of sense-content which an -image may undergo--the wearing away of an image, it is sometimes -called--is not a sign that this sense-content has no logical function; -but rather that it has fulfilled a logical function so well that it has -made part of itself useless. The husk, to recall one of Mr. Bradley's -comparisons, that useless husk, tends to fall away, to lapse from -consciousness, after it has served the purpose of helping to bring the -kernel of truth to fruition. - -This raises again the original question as to whether the sense-content, -the quality, the existential quality, of an image has a logical -function. I will ask first whether it has a function from the standpoint -of psychology. We will agree with the empiricist that the content of an -image is representative, that it is a return, a revival, of a -sense-content previously experienced through the activity of -sense-organs stimulated from the periphery. What is the function, then, -of the representative image? Sensation, quality, as we have implied -above, is the stimulus come to consciousness. To explain how a stimulus -can "come" to consciousness is a problem I will not attempt to go into -here. I assume as a fact that there are times when we know what we are -about; when we are conscious of the stimuli, or conditions of action, -which are tending in this direction or in that, and when through this -consciousness we exercise a controlling influence over action by -selecting and reinforcing certain stimuli and suppressing or inhibiting -others. It is true that we do not always realize to how great an extent -our actions are controlled by stimuli which do not come to -consciousness, by reflexes, instincts, and habits which do not rise -above the threshold of imagery. And when this vast complex of hidden -machinery is partly revealed to us, it may either cause the beholder to -take a materialistic, mechanical, or fatalistic view of existence, to -say that we are the victims of our own machinery, or else it may induce -the other extreme of more or less mystic pronouncements regarding the -province of the subconscious, of the subliminal self; thus out of -partial views, out of half-truths, metaphysical problems arise and arm -for mutual conflict. Nevertheless, there is a presumption, amounting in -most minds to a conviction, that we do at times consciously control some -of our actions. And it is only making this conviction a little more -explicit to say that we consciously control our actions through becoming -aware of the stimuli, or conditions of action, and through selecting and -reinforcing them. - -Is it begging the question to speak of consciousness as exercising a -selective function with reference to stimuli? From the standpoint of -psychology, I cannot see that it is. No characteristic of consciousness -has been more clearly made out, both reflectively and experimentally, -than its selective function, than its ability to pick out and intensify -within certain limits the stimuli or conditions of action. - -The representational image is a stimulus come to consciousness in the -same way that a sensation is a stimulus come to consciousness. It is -both a direct and an indirect stimulus. The terms "direct" and -"indirect" are used as relative solely to the demands of the particular -situation out of which they arise. By direct stimulus I mean a stimulus -which initiates with almost no appreciable delay the response or -attitude appropriate to the demands of a given situation, bridging the -difficulties, removing the obstacles, or solving the problem with the -minimum of conscious reflection. As an image becomes more and more of a -working symbol, an idea, it tends to become simply a direct stimulus. - -By an "indirect stimulus" is meant a stimulus initiating a response -which, if not inhibited, would be irrelevant to the situation, yet which -may represent stimuli which are not found in the immediate field of -sense-perception, and which are essential to the carrying on of the -activity. The situation is a problematic one. Acquired habits or mental -adjustments break down at some point or fail to operate smoothly, either -owing to the absence of customary stimuli or to the presence of new and -untried conditions of action. Part of the stress of meeting such a -situation as this falls on the side of discovering appropriate stimuli -and part on the side of developing out of habits already acquired new -methods of response. - -In such a situation as this, imagery may function on the side of -_stimulus_ when, taking its cue from the stimuli which are actually -present, and which grow out of the strain and friction, it represents -the missing conditions of action sufficiently to direct a search for -them. It projects a map, so to speak, in which the fragmentary -conditions immediately present to sense-perception may find their -bearings, or in which in some way the missing members may be discovered. -A familiar instance of this would be the experience one sometimes has in -trying to recall the forgotten name of an acquaintance. The images of -scenes associated with the acquaintance, of various letters and sounds -of words associated with his name, which may be called to mind, do not -function so much as direct stimuli as they do as intermediate or -indirect stimuli. It is a case of casting about for the image that will -function as a direct stimulus in bringing an acquired but temporarily -lost adjustment into play. - -Image functions on the side of _response_, on the side of developing new -habits, new forms of adjustment, in so far as the conditions of action -which it represents, or projects, are not the actual conditions of -action, either because they are so inaccessible as to demand development -of new habits for purposes of attaining them, or else because, though -actually present, they stimulate relatively uncontrolled aesthetic or -emotional responses, whose very expression, however, may be translated -into a demand for more adequate, intelligent, controlled habits or -adjustments. The conscious projection of the unattained, even of the -unattainable, not only marks a certain degree of attainment, but is the -initiation of further development. Here we see again that a stimulus is -a condition of action in both senses of the ambiguity of the word -"condition." It is both a state or condition of activity, and an -initiation or condition of further activity. - -As an indirect stimulus growing out of a problematic situation imagery -necessarily brings in more or less irrelevant material. If I may be -permitted the paradox, imagery would not be relevant if it did not bring -in the irrelevant. The novelty of the situation makes it impossible to -say in advance what will be relevant. Hence the demand for range and -play of imagery. It is only the successful adjustment finally hit upon -and worked out that is the test of the relevancy of the imagery which -anticipated it. Even this test may be unfair, since it is likely to -discount the value of imagery which is now ruled out, but which may have -been indispensable in turning up the proper cues in the course of the -process of reflection and experiment. - -To restate the point in regard to the psychological function of imagery. -Imagery functions in representing control as ideal, not as fact. It -represents a possible process of reconstructing adjustments and habits; -it is not an actual and complete readjustment. It arises normally in a -stress, in the presence of fresh demands and new problems. It looks -forward in every possible direction, because it is important and -difficult to foresee consequences. But suppose the new adjustment to be -made with reasonable success--reasonable, note. Suppose the ideal to be -realized. With practice the adjustment becomes less problematic, more -under control--that is, it comes to require less conscious attention to -bring it about. The image loses some of its sensuous content. It becomes -worn away, more remote, until at last it becomes respectably vague and -abstract enough to be classed as a concept. Imagery is the stimulus of -the reconstructive process between habit and habit, concept and concept, -idea and idea. - -We now return to the original question regarding the logical function of -imagery. There is only one condition, I believe, on which we can accept -the assumption of both empiricist and conceptualist that imagery is on -the same level with sense-perception, and that is the assumption that -meaning, logical meaning, is on the same level with habit, habit naming -the more obvious, overt forms of response to stimuli, logical meaning -naming the more internal forms of response or reference. Psychical -response and logical reference thus become equivalent terms. - -We have seen that imagery may exercise two functions with reference to -habit, as direct and as indirect stimulus; so also with reference to -logical meaning, imagery may be the stimulus to a direct reference of -the idea to reality, or it may present, or mirror, conditions with -regard to which some new meaning is to be worked out. The quality, the -sense-content, of imagery may _per se_ suffice directly to arouse a -habitual attitude, to call forth an immediate reference to reality. It -may cause one to "tumble" to what is taking place, to "catch on," to -apprehend (pardon these expressions for the sake of their description of -the motor aspect of meaning), as when we say, for example: "It came over -me like a flash what I was to do, and I did it." Our more abstract and -complicated forms of judgment and reasoning, in which the imagery -involved is reduced to the minimum of conscious, qualitative content, -are of the same order, though at the other extreme, so far as immediate -overt expression is concerned. We are working along lines of habitual -activity so familiar that we can work almost in the dark. We need no -elaborate imagery. Guided only by the waving of a signal flag or by the -shifting gleam of a semaphore, we thread our way swiftly through the -maze of tracks worn smooth by use and habit. But suppose a new line of -habit is to be constructed. No signal flags or semaphores will suffice. -A detailed survey of the proposed route must be had, and here is where -imagery with a rich and varied yet flexible sensuous content, growing -out of previous surveys, may function in projecting and anticipating the -new set of conditions, and thus become the stimulus of a new line of -habit, of a new and more far-reaching meaning. As this new line of -habit, of meaning, gets into working order with the rest of the system, -imagery tends normally to decline again to the role of signal flags and -semaphores. - -The distinction in logical theory between "image" and "idea" which we -have been considering is only a half-truth from the point of view of -psychology. It virtually limits the "idea" to a fixed, unalterable -reference of a fragment of a desiccated image to a reality beyond. It -indifferently loses the play and richness of imagery to the floating -remnants of sense-content, or to an external reality. It limits itself -to an examination of a final stage in thinking, a stage in which the -image acts as a direct stimulus, a stage in which the sense-content of -the image has little or no function _per se_, because this content now -initiates directly a habitual adjustment, a worked-out and established -adaptation of means to end. It overlooks the process of conscious -reflection which logically precedes every such adjustment not purely -instinctive or accidental, a process in which imagery as -representational functions indirectly in bringing the resources of past -experience, the fund of acquired habits, to bear upon the fragmentary -and problematic elements of sense-experience actually present, thus -maintaining the flow and continuity of experience. It fails to recognize -that in the inseparable association of meaning with quality, of "idea" -with "image," there goes the possibility of working out and applying -new meanings from old, of developing deeper meanings, of testing and -affirming more inclusive and universal meaning. - -We are confronted with this alternative. Either the image has a logical -function in virtue of its sense-content, or else the image functions -logically merely as a symbol, the sense-content of which is a matter of -complete logical indifference. According to the empiricist, the former -is the case, according to the conceptualist, the latter. The empiricist -would say that he needs the image to piece out the data upon which -logical processes operate. Having met this need, the image is retired -from active service. For the empiricist the processes of thought, -observing, comparing, generalizing, etc., are as independent of the data -they use as, for the conceptualist, logical meaning, reference, and -"idea" are independent of the sense-content of the "image." In reality -he agrees with the conceptualist in excluding the sense-content of the -image from the processes of thought, and hence from the domain of logic. - -From the standpoint of psychological theory the conceptualist is an -improvement over the empiricist. He has gone a step farther in the -analysis of thought-processes by showing that they are bound up with -some kind of imagery, however irrelevant, inconsequential, and worn down -the sense-quality of that imagery may be. His statement of ideas as -references to reality lends itself readily, as we have seen, to the -unitary conception in psychology of ideo-motor, or sensori-motor, -activity. But is this where logical theory is to stop, while psychology -as a study of "states of consciousness" takes up the unfinished tale and -carries it forward? It seems hardly possible, unless logic is willing to -give over its task of thinking about thinking. - -Reduce the image to a mere symbol. Let its sense-quality be a matter of -complete indifference. What have you, then, but an elementary and -primitive type of reflex action? It is of no particular consequence even -from what sense-organ it appears to proceed, or whether it appears to be -peripherally or centrally excited. It is simply a case of feel and act; -touch and go. Is this thinking? It may be regarded as either the germ or -the finality of thinking, but what most of us are inclined to believe is -the true subject-matter of logic is not to be limited to a simple -reflex, or even to a chain of reflexes. It is something more complex, -even if nothing more than an intricate tangle of chains of reflexes. - -The complexity of the process called thinking does not reside alone in -the instinctive or habitual reflexes involved. The more instinctive and -habitual any adjustment may be, the less is it a matter of thought, as -everyone knows, although its biological complexity is none the less -patent to one who looks at it from the outside. The complexity of the -thinking process resides in consciousness also; it resides in the -imagery, the stimuli, the mere symbols, if you like, that have "come" to -consciousness. As soon as the complexity begins to be _felt_, as soon as -any discrimination whatsoever begins to be introduced or appreciated, at -that instant the sense-content, the quale, of imagery begins to have a -logical function. Conscious discrimination, however vague and -evanescent, and the logical function of the quale of imagery are born -together, unless one chooses to regard the more obvious and deliberate -forms of conscious discrimination as more characteristic of a logical -process. It is only as the sense-contents of various images are -discriminated and compared that anything like thinking can be conceived -to go on. The particular sense-content of an image, instead of being a -matter of logical indifference, is the condition, the possibility, of -thinking. - -The conceptualist has contributed to the data of descriptive psychology -by calling attention, by implication at least, to the remote and -reduced character of the imagery which may characterize thinking. But it -by no means follows that the more remote and reduced the sense-content -of an image becomes, the less important is that sense-content for -thinking, the less demand for discrimination. On the contrary, the -sense-content that remains may be of supreme logical importance. It may -be the quintessence of meaning. It may be the conscious factor which, -when discriminated from another almost equally sublimated conscious -factor, may determine a whole course of action. The delicacy and -rapidity with which these reduced forms of imagery as they hover about -the margin of consciousness or flit across its focus are discriminated -and caught, are points in the technique of that long art of -thinking, begun in early childhood. The fact that questionnaire -investigations--like that of Galton's, for example--have in many -instances failed to discover in the minds of scientists and advanced -thinkers a rich and varied furniture of imagery does not argue the -poverty of imagery in such minds; it argues, rather, a highly developed -technique, a species of virtuosity, with reference to the sense-content -of the types of imagery actually in use. - -To push a step farther the alternative we have already stated in a -preliminary way: Either the "idea," or "logical meaning," lies outside -of the process of thinking, as a mere impulse or reflex; or else, in -virtue of the sense-content of its "image," it enters into that -conscious process of discrimination, comparison, and selection, of light -and shade, of doubt and inquiry, which constitutes the evolution of a -judgment, which makes the life-history of a movement of thought. - - - - -IX - -THE LOGIC OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY[87] - - -It is not the purpose of this study to show that the Pre-Socratics -possessed a system of logic which is now for the first time brought to -the notice of the modern world. Indeed, there is nothing to indicate -that they had reflected on mental processes in such a way as to call for -an organized body of canons regulating the forms of concepts and -conclusions. Aristotle attributed the discovery of the art of dialectic -to Zeno the Eleatic, and we shall see in the sequel that there was much -to justify the opinion. But logic, in the technical sense, is -inconceivable without concepts, and from the days of Aristotle it has -been universally believed that proper definitions owe their origin to -Socrates. A few crude attempts at definition, if such they may be -rightly called, are referred to Empedocles and Democritus. But in so far -as they were conceived in the spirit of science, they essayed to define -things materially by giving, so to speak, the chemical formula for their -production. Significant as this very fact is, it shows that even the -rudiments of the canons of thought were not the subjects of reflection. - -In his _Organon_ Aristotle makes it evident that the demand for a -regulative art of scientific discourse was created by the eristic -logic-chopping of those who were most deeply influenced by the Eleatic -philosophy. Indeed, the case is quite parallel to the rise of the art of -rhetoric. Aristotle regarded Empedocles as the originator of that art, -as he referred the beginnings of dialectic to Zeno. But the formulation -of both arts in well-rounded systems came much later. As men conducted -lawsuits before the days of Tisias and Corax, so also were the essential -principles of logic operative and effective in practice before Aristotle -gave them their abstract formulation. - -While it is true, therefore, that the Pre-Socratics had no formal logic, -it is equally true, and far more significant, that they either received -from their predecessors or themselves developed the conceptions and the -presuppositions on which the Aristotelian logic is founded. One of the -objects of this study is to institute a search for some of these basic -conceptions of Greek thought, almost all of which existed before the -days of Socrates, and to consider their origin as well as their logical -significance. The other aim here kept in view is to trace the course of -thought in which the logical principles, latent in all attempts to -construct and verify theories, came into play. - -It is impossible, no doubt, to discover a body of thought which does not -ground itself upon presuppositions. They are the warp into which the -woof of the system, itself too often consisting of frayed ends of other -fabrics, is woven with the delight of a supposed creator. Rarely is the -thinker so conscious of his own mental processes that he is aware of -what he takes for granted. Ordinarily this retirement to an interior -line takes place only when one has been driven back from the advanced -position which could no longer be maintained. Emerson has somewhere -said: "The foregoing generations beheld God and Nature face to face; we -through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to -the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight -and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us and not the -history of theirs?" The difficulty lies precisely in our faith in -immediate insight and revelation, which are themselves only short-cuts -of induction, psychological short circuits, conducted by media we have -disregarded. Only a fundamentally critical philosophy pushes its doubt -to the limit of demanding the credentials of those conceptions which -have come to be regarded as axiomatic. - -The need of going back of Aristotle in our quest for the truth is well -shown by his attitude toward the first principles of the several -sciences. To him they are immediately given--[Greek: amesoi -protaseis]--and hence are ultimate _a priori_. The historical -significance of this fact is already apparent. It means that in his day -these first principles, which sum up the outcome of previous inductive -movements of thought, were regarded as so conclusively established that -the steps by which they had been inferred were allowed to lapse from -memory. - -No account of the history of thought can hope to satisfy the demands of -reason that does not _explain_ the origin of the convictions thus -embodied in principles. The only acceptable explanation would be in -terms of will and interest. To give such an account would, however, -require the knowledge of secular pursuits and ambitions no longer -obtainable. It might be fruitful of results if we could discover even -the theoretical interests of the age before Thales; but we know that in -modern times the direction of interest characteristic of the purely -practical pursuits manifests its reformative influences in speculation a -century or more after it has begun to shape the course of common life. -Hence we might misinterpret the historical data if they were obtainable. -But general considerations, which we need not now rehearse, as well as -indications contained in the later history of thought, hereinafter -sketched, point to the primacy of the practical as yielding the -direction of interest that determines the course it shall take. - -It was said above that the principles of science are the result of an -inductive movement, and that the inductive movement is directed by an -interest. Hence the principles are contained in, or rather are the -express definition of, the interest that gave them birth. In other -words, there is implied in all induction a process of deduction. Every -stream of thought embraces not only the main current, but also an eddy, -which here and there re-enters it. And this is one way of explaining the -phenomenon which has long engaged the thought of philosophers, namely, -the fact of successful anticipations of the discoveries of science or, -more generally still, the possibility of synthetic judgments _a priori_. -The solution of the problem is ultimately contained in its -statement.[88] - -To arrive at a stage of mentality not based on assumptions one would -have, no doubt, to go back to its beginnings. Greek thought, even in the -time of Thales, was well furnished with them. We cannot pause to -catalogue them, but it may further our project if we consider a few of -the more important. The precondition of thought as of life is that -nature be uniform, or ultimately that the world be rational. This is not -even, as it becomes later, a conscious demand; it is the primary ethical -postulate which expresses itself in the confidence that it is so. Viewed -from a certain angle it may be called the principle of sufficient -reason. Closely associated with it is the universal belief of the early -philosophers of Greece that everything that comes into being is bound up -inseparably with that which has been before; more precisely, that there -is no absolute, but only relative, Becoming. Corollaries of this axiom -soon appeared in the postulates of the conservation of matter or mass, -and the conservation of energy, or more properly for the ancients, of -motion. Logically these principles appear to signify that the subject, -while under definition, shall remain just what it is; and that, in the -system constituted of subject, predicate, and copula, the terms shall -"stay put" while the adjustment of verification is in progress. It is a -matter of course that the constants in the great problem should become -permanent landmarks. - -Other corollaries derive from this same principle of uniformity. Seeing -that all that comes to be in some sense already is, there appears the -postulate of the unity of the world; and this unity manifests itself not -only in the integrity and homogeneity of the world-ground, but also in -the more ideal conception of a universal law to which all special modes -of procedure in nature are ancillary. In these we recognize the -insistent demand for the organization of predicate and copula. Side by -side with these formulae stands the other, which requires an ordered -process of becoming and a graduated scale of existences, such as can -mediate between the extremes of polarity. Such series meet us on every -hand in early Greek thought. The process of rarefaction and condensation -in Anaximenes, the [Greek: hodos ano kato] of Heraclitus, the regular -succession of the four Empedoclean elements in almost all later -systems--these and other examples spontaneously occur to the mind. The -significance of this conception, as the representative of an effective -copula, will presently be seen. More subtle, perhaps, than any of these -principles, though not allowed to go so long unchallenged, is the -assumption of a [Greek: physis], that is, the assumption that all nature -is instinct with life. The logical interpretation of this postulate -would seem to be that the concrete system of things--subject, predicate, -copula--constitutes a totality complete in itself and needing no jog -from without. - -In this survey of the preconceptions of the early Greek philosophers I -have employed the terms of the judgment without apology. The -justification for this course must come ultimately, as for any -assumption, from the success of its application to the facts. But if -"logic" merely formulates in a schematic way that which in life is the -manipulation of concrete experience, with a view to attaining practical -ends, then its forms must apply here as well as anywhere. Logical -terminology may therefore be assumed to be welcome to this field where -judgments are formed, induction is made from certain facts to defined -conceptions, and deductions are derived from principles or premises -assumed. Speaking then in these terms we may say that the Pre-Socratics -had three logical problems set for them: First, there was a demand for a -predicate, or, in other words, for a theory of the world. Secondly, -there was the need of ascertaining just what should be regarded as the -subject, or, otherwise stated, just what it was that required -explanation. Thirdly, there arose the necessity of discovering ways and -means by which the theory could be predicated of the world and by which, -in turn, the hypothesis erected could be made to account for the -concrete experience of life: in terms of logic this problem is that of -maintaining an efficient copula. It is not assumed that the sequence -thus stated was historically observed without crossing and overlapping; -but a survey of the history of the period will show that, in a general -way, the logical requirements asserted themselves in this order. - -1. Greek philosophy began its career with induction. We have already -stated that the preconceptions with which it approached its task were -the result of previous inductions, and indeed the epic and theogonic -poetry of the Greeks abounds in thoughts indicative of the consciousness -of all of these problems. Thus Homer is familiar with the notion that -all things proceed from water,[89] and that, when the human body decays, -it resolves itself into earth and water.[90] Other opinions might be -enumerated, but they would add nothing to the purpose. When men began, -in the spirit of philosophy, to theorize about the world, they assumed -that it--the subject--was sufficiently known. Its existence was taken -for granted, and that which engaged their attention was the problem of -its meaning. What predicate--so we may formulate their question--should -be given to the subject? It is noticeable that their induction was quite -perfunctory. But such is always the case until there are rival theories -competing for acceptance, and even then the impulse to gather up -evidence derived from a wide field and assured by resort to experiment -comes rather with the desire to test a hypothesis than to form it. It is -the effort to _verify_ that brings out details and also the negative -instances. Hence we are not to blame Thales for rashness in making his -generalization that all is Water. We do not know what indications led to -this conclusion. Aristotle ventured a guess, but the motives assumed for -Thales agree too well with those which weighed with Hippo to admit of -ready acceptance. - -Anaximander, feeling the need of deduction as a sequel to induction, -found his predicate in the Infinite. We cannot now delay to inquire just -what he meant by the term; but it is not unlikely that its very -vagueness recommended it to a man of genius who caught enthusiastically -at the skirts of knowledge. Anaximenes, having pushed verification -somewhat farther and eliciting some negative instances, rejected water -and the Infinite and inferred that all was air. His [Greek: arche] must -have the quality of infinity, but, a copula having been found in the -process of rarefaction and condensation, it must occupy a determinate -place in the series of typical forms of existence. The logical -significance of this thought will engage our attention later. - -Meanwhile it may be well to note that thus far only _one_ predicate has -been offered by each philosopher. This is doubtless due to the -preconception of the unity and homogeneity of the world, of which we -have already made mention. Although at the beginning its significance -was little realized, the conception was destined to play a prominent -part in Greek thought. It may be regarded from different points of view -not necessarily antagonistic. One may say, as indeed has oftentimes been -said, that it was due to ignorance. Men did not know the complexity of -the world, and hence declared its substance to be simple. Again, it may -be affirmed that the assumption was merely the naive reflex of the -ethical postulate that we shall unify our experience and organize it for -the realization of our ideals. While increased knowledge has multiplied -the so-called chemical elements, physics knows nothing of their -differences, and chemistry itself demands their reduction. - -The extension and enlarged scope of homogeneity came in two ways: First, -it presented itself by way of abstraction from the particular predicates -that may be given to things. This was due to the operation of the -fundamental assumption that the world must be intelligible. Thus, even -in Anaximander, the world-ground takes no account of the diversity of -things except in the negative way of providing that the contrariety of -experience shall arise from it. We are therefore referred for our -predicate to a somewhat behind concrete experience. The Pythagoreans fix -upon a single aspect of things as the essential, and find the meaning of -the world in mathematical relations. The Eleatics press the conception -of homogeneity until it is reduced to identity. Identity means the -absence of difference; hence, spatially considered, it requires the -negation of a void and the indivisibility of the world; viewed -temporally, it precludes the succession of different states and hence -the possibility of change. - -We thus reach the acute stage of the problem of the One and the Many. -The One is here the predicate, the subject is the Many. The solution of -the difficulty is the task of the copula, and we shall recur to the -theme in due time. It may be well, however, at this point to draw -attention to the fact that the One is not always identical with the -predicate, nor the Many with the subject. In the rhythmic movement of -erecting and verifying hypotheses the interest shifts and what was but -now the predicate, by taking the place of the premises, comes to be -regarded as the given from which the particular is to be derived or -deduced. There is thus likewise a shift in the positions of existence -and meaning. The subject, or the world, was first assumed as the given -means with which to construct the predicate, its meaning; once the -hypothesis has been erected, the direction of interest shifts back to -the beginning, and in the process of verification or deduction the -quondam predicate, now the premises, becomes the given, and the task set -for thought is the derivation of fact. For the moment, or until the -return to the world is accomplished, the One is the only real, the -Manifold remains mere appearance. - -The second form in which the sense of the homogeneity of the world -embodies itself is not, like the first, static, but is altogether -dynamic. That which makes the whole world kin is neither the presence -nor the absence of a quality, but a principle. The law thus revealed is, -therefore, not a matter of the predicate, but is the copula itself. -Hence we must defer a fuller consideration of it for the present. - -2. As has already been said, the inductive movement implies the -deductive, and not only as something preceding or accompanying it, but -as its inner meaning and ultimate purpose. So too it was with the -earliest Greek thinkers. Their object in setting up a predicate was the -derivation of the subject from it. In other words their ambition was to -discover the [Greek: arche] from which the genesis of the world -proceeds. But deduction is really a much more serious task than would -at first appear to one who is familiar with the Aristotelian machinery -of premises and middle terms. The business of deduction is to reveal the -subject, and ordinarily the subject quite vanishes from view. Induction -is rapid, but deduction lags far behind. It may require but a momentary -flash of "insight" on the part of the physical philosopher to discover a -principle; if it is really significant, inventors will be engaged for -centuries in deducing from it applications to the needs of life by means -of contrivances. Thus after ages we come to know more of the subject, -which is thereby enriched. The contrivances are the representatives of -the copula in practical affairs; in quasi-theoretical spheres they are -the apparatus for experimentation. It has just been remarked that by the -application of the principles to life it is enriched; in other words, it -receives new meaning, and new meaning signifies a new predicate. Theory -is at times painfully aware of the multitude of new predicates proposed; -rarely does it realize that there has been created a new heaven and a -new earth. Without the latter, the former would be absurd. - -Men take very much for granted and regard almost every achievement as a -matter of course. Hence they do not become aware of their changed -position except as it reflects itself in new schemes and in a larger -outlook. The subject receives only a summary glance to discover what new -predicate shall be evolved. Hence, while there is in Greek philosophy a -strongly marked deductive movement, the theoretical results to the -subject are insignificant. Thales seems, indeed, to have had no means to -offer for the derivation of the world, but he evidently had no doubt -that it was possible. With him and with others the assumption, however -vaguely understood, seems to have been that the subject, like the -predicate, was simple. Thus the essential unity of the world, considered -as existence no less than as meaning, is a foregone conclusion. The -sense of a division in the subject seems to arise with Empedocles when, -reaping the harvest of the Eleatic definition of substance, he parted -the world, as subject and as predicate, into four elements. - -We may, perhaps, pause a moment to consider the significance of the -assumption of four elements which plays so large a part in subsequent -philosophies. There is no need of enlarging on the importance of the -association of multiple elements with the postulate that nothing is -absolutely created and nothing absolutely passes away. These are indeed -the pillars that support chemical science, and they further imply the -existence of qualities of different rank; but that implication, as we -shall see, lay even in the process of rarefaction and condensation -introduced by Anaximenes. The four elements concern us here chiefly as -testifying to the fact that certain practical interests had summed up -the essential characteristics of nature in forms sufficiently -significant to have maintained themselves even to our day. In regard to -fire, air, and water this is not greatly to be wondered at; it is a -somewhat different case with earth. If metallurgy and other pursuits -which deal with that which is roughly classed as earth had been highly -enough developed to have reacted upon the popular mind, this element -could not possibly have been assumed to be so homogeneous. The -conception clearly reflects the predominantly agricultural interest of -the Greeks in their relation to the earth. This further illustrates the -slow progress which deduction makes in the reconstitution of the -subject. - -It is different, however, with Anaxagoras and the Atomists. Apparently -the movement begun by Empedocles soon ran its extreme course. Instead of -four elements there is now an infinite number of substances, each -differentiated from the other. The meaning of this wide swing of the -pendulum is not altogether clear; but it is evident from the system of -Anaxagoras that the metals, for example, possessed a significance which -they can not have had for Empedocles. - -The opposite swing of the pendulum is seen in the later course of the -Eleatics. Given a predicate as fixed and unified as they assumed, the -subject cannot possibly be conceived in terms of it and hence it is -denied outright. In the dialectic of Zeno and Melissus, dealing with the -problems of the One and the Many, there is much that suggests the -solution offered by the Atomists; but it is probably impossible now to -ascertain whether these passages criticise a doctrine already propounded -or pointed the way for successors. While the Eleatics asserted the sole -reality of the One, Anaxagoras and the Atomists postulated a -multiplicity without essential unity. But the human mind seems to be -incapable of resting in that decision; it demands that the world shall -have not meanings, but a meaning. This demand calls not only for a -unified predicate, but also for an effective copula. - -3. We have already remarked that the steps by which the predicate was -inferred are for the most part unknown. Certain suggestions are -contained in the reports of Aristotle, but it is safe to say that they -are generally guesses well or ill founded. The summary inductive -mediation has left few traces; and the process of verification, in the -course of which hypotheses were rejected and modified, can be followed -only here and there in the records. Almost our only source of -information is the dialectic of systems. Fortunately for our present -purpose we do not need to know the precise form which a question assumed -to the minds of the several philosophers; the efforts which they made to -meet the imperious demands of logic here speak for themselves. - -At first there was no scheme for the mediation of the predicate back to -the subject. Indeed there seems not to have existed in the mind of -Thales a sense of its need. Anaximander raised the question, but the -process of segregation or separation ([Greek: ekkrinesthai]) which he -propounded was so vaguely conceived that it has created more problems -than it solved. Anaximenes first proposed a scheme that has borne -fruits. He said that things are produced from air by rarefaction and -condensation. This process offers not only a principle of difference, -but also a regulative conception, the evaluation of which engaged the -thought of almost all the later Pre-Socratics. It implies that extension -and mass constitute the essential characters of substance, and, fully -apprehended, contains in germ the whole materialistic philosophy from -Parmenides at one extreme to Democritus and Anaxagoras at the other. The -difficulties inherent in the view were unknown to Anaximenes; for, -having a unitary predicate, he assumed also a homogeneous subject. - -The logical position of Heraclitus is similar to that of Anaximenes. He -likewise posits a simple predicate and further signalizes its functional -character by naming it Fire. Without venturing upon debatable ground we -may say that it was the restless activity of the element that caused him -to single it out as best expressing the meaning of things. Its rhythmic -libration typified to him the principle of change in existence and of -existence in change. It is the "ever-living" copula, devouring subject -and predicate alike and re-creating them functionally as co-ordinate -expressions of itself. That which alone _is_, the abiding, is not the -physical composition of a thing, but the law of reciprocity by which it -maintains a balance. This he calls variously by the names of Harmony, -Logos, Necessity, Justice. In this system of functional co-ordinates -nothing escapes the accounting on 'Change;[91] all things are in -continuous flux, only the nodes of the rhythm remaining constant. It is -not surprising therefore that Heraclitus has been the subject of so much -speculation and comment in modern times; for the functional character of -all distinctions in his system marks the affinity of his doctrines for -those of modern psychology and logic.[92] - -The Pythagoreans, having by abstraction obtained a predicate, -acknowledged the existence of the subject, but did not feel the need of -a copula in the theoretical sphere, except as it concerned the inner -relation of the predicate. To them the world was number, but number -itself was pluralistic, or let us rather say dualistic. The odd and the -even, the generic constituents of number, had somehow to be brought -together. The bond was found in Unity, or, again, in Harmony. When they -inquired how numbers constituted the world, their answer was in general -only a nugatory exercise of an unbridled fancy.[93] Such and such a -number was Justice, such another, Man. It was only in the wholly -practical sphere of experiment that they reached a conclusion worth -recording. Its significance they themselves did not perceive. Here, by -the application of mathematical measurements to sounds, they discovered -how to produce tones of a given pitch, and thus successfully -demonstrated the efficiency of their copula. - -The Eleatics followed the same general course of abstraction; but with -them the sense of the unity of the world effaced its rich diversity. -Xenophanes does not appear to have pressed the conception so far as to -deny all change within the world. Parmenides, however, bated no jot of -the legitimate consequences of his logical position, interpreting, as he -did, the predicate, originally conceived as meaning, in terms of -existence. That which is simply _is_. Thus there is left only a one-time -predicate, now converted into a subject of which only itself, as a brute -fact, can be predicated. Stated logically, Parmenides is capable only of -uttering identical propositions: A=A. The fallacious character of the -report of the senses and the impossibility of Becoming followed as a -matter of course. Where the logical copula is a mere sign of equation -there can be neither induction nor deduction. We are caught in a -theoretical _cul-de-sac_. - -We are not now concerned to know in what light the demand for a treatise -on the world of Opinion may have appeared to Parmenides himself. The -avenues by which men reach conclusions which are capable of -simplification and syllogistic statement are too various to admit of -plausible conjecture in the absence of specific evidence. But it is -clear that his resort to the expedient reflected a consciousness of the -state of deadlock. In that part of his philosophical poem he dealt with -many questions of detail in a rather more practical spirit. Following -the lead of Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans he was more successful here -than in the field of metaphysics. Thus we see once more that the wounds -of theory are healed by practice. But, as usual, even though the -metaphysician does receive the answer to his doubts by falling into a -severely practical pit and extricating himself by steps which he -fashions with his hands, his mental habit is not thereby reconstructed. -The fixed predicate of the Eleatics was bequeathed to the -Platonic-Aristotelian formal logic, and induction and deduction remained -for centuries in theory a race between the hedgehog and the hare.[94] -The true significance of the destructive criticism brought to bear by -Zeno and Melissus on the concepts of unity, plurality, continuity, -extension, time, and motion is simply this: that when by a shift of the -attention a predicate becomes subject or meaning fossilizes as -existence, the terms of the logical process lose their functional -reference and grow to be unmeaning and self-contradictory. - -We have already remarked that Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists -sought to solve the problem of the One and the Many, of the subject and -the predicate, by shattering the unitary predicate and thus leaving the -field to plurality in both spheres. But obviously they were merely -postponing the real question. Thought, as well as action, demands a -unity somewhere. Hence the absorbing task of these philosophers is to -disclose or contrive such a bond of unity. The form which their quest -assumed was the search for a basis for physical interaction.[95] - -Empedocles clearly believed that he was solving the difficulty in one -form when he instituted the rhythmic libration between unity under the -sway of Love and multiplicity under the domination of Hate. But even he -was not satisfied with that. While Love brought all the elements -together into a sphere and thus produced a unity, it was a unity -constituted of a mixture of elements possessing inalienable characters -not only different but actually antagonistic. On the other hand, Hate -did indeed separate the confused particles, but it effected a sort of -unity in that, by segregating the particles of the several elements from -the others, it brought like and like together. In so far Aristotle was -clearly right in attributing to Love the power to separate as well as to -unite. Moreover, it would seem that there never was a moment in which -both agencies were not conceived to be operative, to however small an -extent. - -Empedocles asserted, however, that a world could arise only in the -intervals between the extremes of victory in the contest between Love -and Hate, when, so to speak, the battle was drawn and there was a -general _melee_ of the combatants. It may be questioned, perhaps, -whether he distinctly stated that in our world everything possessed its -portion of each of the elements; but so indispensable did he consider -this _mixture_ that its function of providing a physical unity is -unmistakable. A further evidence of his insistent demand for unity--the -copula--is found in his doctrine that only like can act on like; and the -scheme of pores and effluvia which he contrived bears eloquent testimony -to the earnest consideration he gave to this matter. For he conceived -that all interaction took place by means of them. - -Empedocles, then, may be said to have annulled the decree of divorce he -had issued for the elements at the beginning. But the solution here too -is found, not in the theoretical, but in the practical, sphere; for he -never retracts his assertion that the elements are distinct and -antagonistic. But even so his problem is defined rather than solved; for -after the elements have been brought within microscopic distance of each -other in the mixture, since like can act only on like, the narrow space -that separates them is still an impassable gulf.[96] - -Anaxagoras endowed his infinitely numerous substances with the same -characters of fixity and contrariety that mark the four elements of -Empedocles. For him, therefore, the difficulty of securing unity and -co-operation in an effective copula is, if that be possible, further -aggravated. His grasp of the problem, if we may judge from the -relatively small body of documentary evidence, was not so sure as that -of Empedocles, though he employed in general the same means for its -solution. He too postulates a mixture of all substances, more -consciously and definitely indeed than his predecessor. Believing that -only like can act on like,[97] he is led to assume not only an infinite -multiplicity of substances, but also their complete mixture, so that -everything, however small, contains a portion of every other. Food, for -example, however seeming-simple, nourishes the most diverse tissues of -the body. Thus we discover in the universal mixture of substances the -basis for co-operation and interaction. - -Anaxagoras, therefore, like Empedocles, feels the need of bridging the -chasm which he has assumed to exist between his distinct substances. -Their failure is alike great, and is due to the presuppositions they -inherited from the Eleatic conception of a severe homogeneity which -implies an absolute difference from everything else. The embarrassment -of Anaxagoras increases with the introduction of the [Greek: Nous]. This -agency was conceived with a view to explaining the formation of the -world; that is, with a view to mediating between the myriad substances -in their essential aloofness and effecting the harmonious concord of -concrete things. While, even on the basis of a universal mixture, the -function of the [Greek: Nous] was foredoomed to failure, its task was -made more difficult still by the definition given to its nature. -According to Anaxagoras it was the sole exception to the composite -character of things; it is absolutely pure and simple in nature.[98] By -its definition, then, it is prevented from accomplishing the work it was -contrived to do; and hence we cannot be surprised at the lamentations -raised by Plato and Aristotle about the failure of Anaxagoras to employ -the agency he had introduced. To be sure, the [Greek: Nous] is no more -a _deus ex machina_ than were the ideas of Plato or the God of -Aristotle. They all labored under the same restrictions. - -The Atomists followed with the same recognition of the Many, in the -infinitely various kinds of atoms; but it was tempered by the assumption -of an essential homogeneity. One atom is distinguished from another by -characteristics due to its spatial relations. Mass and weight are -proportional to size. Aristotle reports that, though things and atoms -have differences, it is not in virtue of their differences, but in -virtue of their essential identity, that they interact.[99] There is -thus introduced a distinction which runs nearly, but not quite, parallel -to that between primary and secondary qualities.[100] Primary qualities -are those of size, shape, and perhaps[101] position; all others are -secondary. On the other hand, that which is common to all atoms is their -corporeity, which does indeed define itself with reference to the -primary (spatial) qualities, but not alike in all. The atoms of which -the world is constituted are alike in essential nature, but they differ -most widely in position. - -It is the void that breaks up the unity of the world--atomizes it, if we -may use the expression. It is the basis of all discontinuity. Atoms and -void are thus polar extremes reciprocally exclusive. The atoms in their -utter isolation in space are incapable of producing a world. In order to -bridge the chasm between atom and atom, recourse is had to motion -eternal, omnipresent, and necessary. This it is that annihilates -distances. In the course of their motion atoms collide, and in their -impact one upon the other the Atomists find the precise mode of -co-operation by which the world is formed.[102] To this agency are due -what Lucretius happily called "generating motions." - -The problem, however, so insistently pursued the philosophers of this -time that the Atomists did not content themselves with this solution, -satisfactory as modern science has pretended to consider it. They -followed the lead of Empedocles and Anaxagoras in postulating a -widespread, if not absolutely universal, _mixture_. Having on principle -excluded "essential" differences among the atoms, the impossibility of -finally distinguishing essential and non-essential had its revenge. -Important as the device of mixture was to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, -just so unmeaning ought it to have been in the Atomic philosophy, -provided that the hypothesis could accomplish what was claimed for it. -It is not necessary to reassert that the assumption of "individua," -utterly alienated one from the other by a void, rendered the problem of -the copula insoluble for the Atomists. - -Diogenes of Apollonia is commonly treated contemptuously as a mere -reactionary who harked back to Anaximenes and had no significance of his -own. The best that can be said of such an attitude is that it regards -philosophical theories as accidental utterances of individuals, -naturally well or ill endowed, who happen to express conclusions with -which men in after times agree or disagree. A philosophical tenet is an -atom, set somewhere in a vacuum, utterly out of relation to everything -else. But it is impossible to see how, on this theory, any system of -thought should possess any significance for anybody, or how there should -be any progress even, or retardation. - -Viewed entirely from without, the doctrine of Diogenes would seem to be -substantially a recrudescence of that of Anaximenes. Air is once more -the element or [Greek: arche] out of which all proceeds and into which -all returns. Again the process of transformation is seen in rarefaction -and condensation; and the attributes of substance are those which were -common to the early hylozoists. But there is present a keen sense of a -problem unknown to Anaximenes. What the early philosopher asserted in -the innocence of the youth of thought, the later physiologist reiterates -with emphasis because he believes that the words are words of life. - -The motive for recurring to the earlier system is supplied by the -imperious demand for a copula which had so much distressed Empedocles, -Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. And here we are not left to conjecture, -but are able to refer to the _ipsissima verba_ of our philosopher. After -a brief prologue, in which he stated that one's starting-point must be -beyond dispute, he immediately[103] turned to his theme in these -words:[104] "In my opinion, to put the whole matter in a nutshell, all -things are derived by alteration from the same substance, and indeed all -are one and the same. And this is altogether evident. For if the things -that now exist in the world--earth and water and air and fire and -whatsoever else appears to exist in this world--if, I say, any one of -these were different from the other, different that is to say in its -proper peculiar nature, and did not rather, being one and the same, -change and alter in many ways, then in no-wise would things be able to -mix with one another, nor would help or harm come to one from the other, -nor would any plant spring from the earth, nor any other living thing -come into being, if things were not so constituted as to be one and the -same." - -These words contain a singularly interesting expression of the need of -restoring the integrity of the process which had been lost in the effort -to solve the problem of the One and the Many without abandoning the -point of view won by the Eleatics. Aristotle and Theophrastus paraphrase -and sum up the passage above quoted by saying[105] that interaction is -impossible except on the assumption that all the world is one and the -same. Hence it is manifest, as was said above, that the return of -Diogenes to the monistic system of Anaximenes had for its conscious -motive the avoidance of the dualism that had sprung up in the interval -and had rendered futile the multiplied efforts to secure an effective -copula. - -We should note, however, that in the attempt thus made to undo the work -of several generations Diogenes retained the principle which had wrought -the mischief. We have before remarked that the germ of the Atomic -philosophy was contained in the process of rarefaction and condensation. -Hence, in accepting it along with the remainder of Anaximenes's theory, -the fatal assumption was reinstated. It is the story of human systems in -epitome. The superstructure is overthrown, and with the debris a new -edifice is built upon the old foundations. - -In the entire course of philosophical thought from Thales onward the -suggestion of an opposition between the subject and the predicate had -appeared. It has often been said that it was expressed by the search for -a [Greek: physis], or a _true nature_, in contrast with the world as -practically accepted. There is a certain truth in this view; for the -effort to attain a predicate which does not merely repeat the subject -does imply that there is an opposition. But the efforts made to return -from the predicate to the subject, in a deductive movement, shows that -the difference was not believed to be absolute. This is true, however, -only of those fields of speculation that lie next to the highways of -practical life, which lead equally in both directions, or, let us -rather say, which unite while they mark separation. In the sphere of -abstract ideas the sense of embarrassment was deep and constantly -growing deeper. The reconstruction, accomplished on lower levels, did -not attain unto those heights. Men doubted conclusions, but did not -think to demand the credentials of their common presuppositions. - -Side by side with the later philosophers whom we have mentioned there -walked men whom we are wont to call the Sophists. They were the -journalists and pamphleteers of those days, men who, without dealing -profoundly with any special problem, familiarized themselves with the -generalizations of workers in special fields and combined these ideas -for the entertainment of the public. They were neither philosophers nor -physicists, but, like some men whom we might cite from our own times, -endeavored to popularize the teachings of both. Naturally they seized -upon the most sweeping generalizations and the preconceptions which -disclosed themselves in manifold forms. Just as naturally they had no -eyes with which to detect the significance of the besetting problems at -which, in matters more concrete, the masters were toiling. Hence the -contradictions, revealed in the analysis we have just given of the -philosophy of the age, stood out in utter nakedness. - -The result was inevitable. The inability to discover a unitary -predicate, more still, the failure to attain a working copula, led -directly to the denial of the possibility of predication. There was no -truth. Granted that it existed, it could not be known. Even if known, it -could not be communicated. In these incisive words of Gorgias the -conclusion of the ineffectual effort to establish a logic of science is -clearly stated. But the statement is happily only the half-truth, which -is almost a complete falsehood. It takes no account of the indications, -everywhere present, of a needed reconstruction. Least of all does it -catch the meaning of such a demand. - -The Sophists did not, however, merely repeat in abstract from the -teachings of the philosophers. It matters not whether they originated -the movement or not; at all events they were pioneers in the field of -moral philosophy. Here it was that they chiefly drew the inferences from -the distinction between [Greek: physei] and [Greek: nomo]. Nothing could -have been more effective in disengaging the firmly rooted moral -pre-possessions and rendering them amenable to philosophy. Just here, at -last, we catch a hint of the significance of the logical process. In a -striking passage in Plato's _Protagoras_,[106] which one is fain to -regard as an essentially true reproduction of a discourse by that great -man, Justice and Reverence are accorded true validity. On inquiring to -what characteristic this honorable distinction is due, we find that it -does not reside in themselves; it is due to _the assumption that a state -must exist_. - -Here, then, in a word, is the upshot of the logical movement. Logical -predicates are essentially hypothetical, deriving their validity from -the interest that moves men to affirm them. When they lose this -hypothetical character, as terms within a volitional system, and set up -as entities at large, they cease to function and forfeit their right to -exist. - - - - -X - -VALUATION AS A LOGICAL PROCESS - - -The purpose of this discussion is to supply the main outlines of a -theory of value based upon analysis of the valuation-process from the -logical point of view. The general principle which we shall seek to -establish is that judgments of value, whether passed upon things or upon -modes of conduct, are essentially objective in import, and that they are -reached through a process of valuation which is essentially of the same -logical character as the judgment-process whereby conclusions of -physical fact are established--in a word, that the valuation-process, -issuing in the finished judgment of value expressive of the judging -person's definitive attitude toward the thing in question, is -constructive of an order of reality in the same sense as, in current -theories of knowledge, is the judgment of sense-perception and science. -Our method of procedure to this end will be that of assuming, and -adhering to as consistently as possible, the standpoint of the -individual in the process of deliberating upon an ethical or economic -problem (for, as we shall hold, all values properly so called are either -ethical or economic), and of ascertaining, as accurately as may be, the -meaning of the deliberative or evaluating process and of the various -factors in it as these are presented in the individual's apprehension. -It is in this sense that our procedure will be logical rather than -psychological. We shall be concerned to determine the _meaning_ of the -object of valuation as object, of the standard of value as standard, and -of the valued object as valued, in terms of the individual's own -apprehension of these, rather than to ascertain the nature and -conditions of his apprehensions of these considered as psychical -events. Our attention will throughout be directed to these factors or -phases of the valuation-process in their functional aspect of -determinants of the valuing agent's practical attitude, and never, -excepting for purposes of incidental illustration and in a very general -and tentative way, as events in consciousness mediated by more -"elementary" psychical processes. The results which we shall gain by -adhering to this method will enable us to see not merely that our -judgments of value are in function and meaning objective, but also that -our judgments of sense-perception and science are, as such, capable of -satisfactory interpretation only as being incidental to the attainment -and progressive reconstruction of judgments of value. - -The first three main divisions will be given over to establishing the -objectivity of content and function of judgments of value. The fourth -division will present a detailed analysis of the two types of judgment -of value, the ethical and economic, defining them and relating them to -each other, and correlating them in the manner just suggested with -judgment of the physical type. After considering, in the fifth part, -certain general objections to the positions thus stated, we shall -proceed in the sixth and concluding division to define the function of -the consciousness of value in the economy of life.[107] - - -I - -The system of judgments which defines what one calls the objective order -of things is inevitably unique for each particular individual. No two -men can view the world from the standpoint of the same theoretical and -practical interests, nor can any two proceed in the work of gaining for -themselves knowledge of the world with precisely equal degrees of skill -and accuracy. Each must be prompted and guided, in the construction of -his knowledge of single things and of the system in which they have -their being, by his own particular interests and aims; and even when one -person in a measure shares in the interests and aims of another, the -rate and manner of procedure will not be the same for both, nor will the -knowledge gained be for both equally systematic in arrangement or in -interrelation of its parts. Each man lives in a world of his own--a -world, indeed, identical in certain fundamental respects with the worlds -which his fellow-men have constructed for themselves, but one -nevertheless necessarily unique through and through because each man is -a unique individual. There is, doubtless, a "social currency" of objects -which implies a certain identity of meaning in objects as experienced by -different individuals. The existence of society presupposes, and its -evolution in turn develops and extends, a system of generally accepted -objects and relations. Nevertheless, the "socially current object" is, -as such, an abstraction just as the uniform social individual is -likewise an abstraction. The only concrete object ever actually known or -in any wise experienced by any person is the object as constructed by -that person in accordance with his own aims and purposes, and in which -there is, therefore, a large and important share of meaning which is -significant to no one else. - -It is needless in this discussion to dwell at length upon the general -principle of recent "functional" psychology, that practical ends are the -controlling factors in the acquisition of our knowledge of objective -things. We shall take for granted the truth of the general proposition -that cognition, in whatever sphere of science or of practical life, is -essentially teleological in the sense of being incidental always, more -or less directly, to the attainment of ends. Cognition, as the -apperceptive or attentive process, is essentially the process of -scrutinizing a situation (whether theoretical or practical) with a view -to determining the availability for one's intended purpose of such -objects and conditions as the situation may present. The objects and -conditions thus determined will be made use of or ignored, counted upon -as advantageous or guarded against as unfavorable--in a word, responded -to--in ways suggested by their character as ascertained through -reference to the interest in question. In this sense, then, objective -things as known by individual persons are essentially complex stimuli -whose proper function and reason for being it is to elicit useful -responses in the way of conduct--responses conducive to the realization -of ends. - -From this point of view, then, the difference between one person's -knowledge of a particular object and another's signifies (1) a -difference between these persons' original purposes in setting out to -gain knowledge of the object, and (2) consequently a difference between -their present ways of acting with reference to the object. The bare -object as socially current is, at best, for each individual simply a -ground upon which subsequent construction may be made; and the -subsequent construction which each individual is prompted by his -circumstances and is able to work out in judgment first makes the -object, for this individual, real and for his purposes complete. - -Now, it is our primary intention to show that objects are, in cases of a -certain important class, not yet ready to serve the person who knows -them in their proper character of stimuli, when they have been, even -exhaustively, defined in merely physical terms. It is very often not -enough that the dimensions of an object and its physical properties, -even the more recondite ones as well as those more commonly -understood--it is often not enough for the purposes of an agent that -these characters should make up the whole sum of his knowledge of the -object in question. A measure of knowledge in terms of physical -categories is often only a beginning--the result of a preliminary stage -of the entire process of teleological determination, which must be -carried through before the object of attention can be satisfactorily -known. In the present study of the logic of valuation we shall be -occupied exclusively with the discussion of cases of this kind. In our -judgments of sense-perception and physical science we have presented to -us material objects in their physical aspect. When these latter are -inadequate to suggest or warrant overt conduct, our knowledge of them -must be supplemented and reconstructed in ways presently to be -specified. It is in the outcome of judgment-processes in which this work -of supplementing and reconstructing is carried through that the -consciousness of value, in the proper sense, arises, and these -processes, then, are those which we shall here consider under the name -of "processes of valuation." They will therefore best be approached -through specification of the ways in which our physical judgments may be -inadequate. - -Let us, then, assume, as has been indicated, that the process of -acquiring knowledge--that is to say, the process of judgment or -attention--is in every case of its occurrence incidental to the -attainment of an end. We must make this assumption without attempting -formally to justify it--though in the course of our discussion it will -be abundantly illustrated. Let us, in accordance with this view, think -of the typical judgment-process as proceeding, in the main, as follows: -First of all must come a sense of need or deficiency, which may, on -occasion, be preceded by a more or less violent and sudden shock to the -senses, forcibly turning one's attention to the need of immediate -action. By degrees this sense of need will grow more definite and come -to express itself in a more or less "clear and distinct" image of an -end, toward which end the agent is drawn by desire and to which he looks -with much or little of emotion. The emergence of the end into -consciousness immediately makes possible and occasions definite analysis -of the situation in which the end must be worked out. Salient features -of the situation forthwith are noticed--whether useful things or -favoring conditions, or, on the other hand, the absence of any such. -Thus predicates and then subjects for many subsidiary judgments in the -comprehensive judgment-process emerge together in action and interaction -upon each other. The predicates, developed out of the general end toward -which the agent strives, afford successive points of view for -fresh analyses of the situation. The logical subjects thus -discovered--_objects_ of attention and knowledge--require, on -the other hand, as they are scrutinized and judged, modification and -re-examination of the end. The end grows clearer and fuller of detail -as the predicates or implied ("constituent") ideas which are developed -out of it are distinguished from each other and used in making one's -inventory of the objective situation. Conversely, the situation loses -its first aspect of confusion and takes on more and more the aspect of -an orderly assemblage of objects and conditions, useful, indifferent, -and adverse, by means of which the end may in greater or less measure be -attained or must, in however greatly modified a form, be defeated. Now, -in this development of the judgment-process, it must be observed, the -end must be more or less clearly and consistently conceived throughout -as an _activity_, if the objective means of action which have been -determined in the process are not to be, at the last, separate and -unrelated data still requiring co-ordination. If the end has been so -conceived, the means will inevitably be known as members of a mechanical -_system_, since the predicates by which they have been determined have -at every point involved this factor of amenability to co-ordination. -The judgment-process, if properly conducted and brought to a conclusion, -must issue at the end in the functional unity of a finished plan of -conduct with a perfected mechanical co-ordination of the available -means. - -We have now to see that much more may be involved in such a process as -this than has been explicitly stated in our brief analysis. For the end -itself may be a matter of deliberation, just as must be the physical -means of accomplishing it; and, again, the means may call for scrutiny -and determination from other points of view than the physical and -mechanical. The final action taken at the end may express the outcome of -deliberate ethical and economic judgment as well as of judgments in the -sphere of sense-perception and physical science. Let us consider, for -example, that one's end is the construction of a house upon a certain -plot of ground. This end expresses the felt need of a more comfortable -or more reputable abode, and has so much of general presumption in its -favor. There may, however, be many reasons for hesitation. The cost in -time or money or materials on hand may tax one's resources and -injuriously curtail one's activities along other lines. And there may be -ethical reasons why the plan should not be carried out. The house may -shut off a pleasing prospect from the view of the entire neighborhood -and serve no better end than the gratification of its owner's selfish -vanity. It will cost a sum of money which might be used in paying just, -though outlawed, debts. - -Now, from the standpoint of such problems as these the fullest possible -preliminary knowledge of the physical and mechanical fitness of our -means must still be very abstract and general. It would be of use in any -undertaking like the one we have supposed, but it is not sufficient in -so far as the problem is one's own problem, concrete, particular, and -so unique. One may, of course, proceed to the stage of physical -judgment without having settled the ethical problems which may have -presented themselves at the outset. The end may be entertained -tentatively as a hypothesis until certain mechanical problems have been -dealt with. But manifestly this is only postponement of the issue. The -agent is still quite unprepared, even after the means have been so far -determined, to take the first step in the execution of the plan; indeed, -his uncertainty is probably only the more harassing than before. -Moreover, the economic problems in the case are now more sharply -defined, and these for the time being still further darken counsel. -Manifestly the need for deliberation is at this point quite as urgent as -the need for physical determination can ever be, and the need is -evidenced in the same way by the actual arrest and postponement of overt -conduct. The agent, despite his physical knowledge, is not yet free to -embrace the end and, having done so, use thereto the means at his -disposal. It is plainly impossible to use the physical means until one -knows in terms of Substance and Attribute or Cause and Effect, or -whatever other physical categories one may please, what manner of -behavior may be expected of them. So likewise is it as truly impossible, -for one intellectually and morally capable of appreciating problems of a -more advanced and complex sort, to exploit the physical properties thus -discovered until ethical determination of the end and economic -determination of the means have been completed.[108] - -There are, then, we conclude, cases in which physical determination of -the means is by itself not a sufficient preparation for conduct--in -which there are ethical and economic problems which delay the -application of the physical means to the end to which they may be -physically adapted. Indeed, so much as this may well appear as -sufficiently obvious without extended illustration. Everyone knows that -it is nearly always necessary, in undertaking any work in which material -things are used as means, to count the cost; and everyone knows likewise -that not every end that is in any way attractive and within one's reach -may without more ado be taken as an object of settled desire and effort. -It is indeed needless to elaborate these commonplaces in the sense in -which they are commonly understood. However, such is not our present -purpose. Our purpose is the more specific one of showing that the -meaning of Objectivity must be widened so as to include (1) the -"universe" of ends in their ethical aspect and (2) the economic aspect -of the means of action, as well as (3) the physical aspect to which the -character of Objectivity is commonly restricted. We shall maintain that -these are parts or phases of a complete conception of Reality, and that -of them, consequently, Objectivity must be predicated for every -essential reason connoted by such characterization of the world of -things "external" to the senses. It has been with this conclusion in -mind, then, that we have sought to emphasize the frequent serious -inadequacy, for practical purposes, of the merely physical determination -of the means in one's environment. - -The principle thus suggested would imply that the ethical and economic -stages in the one inclusive process of reflective attention should be -regarded as involving, when they occur, the same logical function of -judgment as is operative in the sphere of sense-perception and the -sciences generally. Ethical and economic factors must on occasion be -present at the final choice and shaping of one's course of conduct, -along with the physical determinations of environing means and -conditions which one has made in sense-perception. There is, then, it -would appear, at least a fair presumption, though not indeed an _a -priori_ certainty, that these ethical and economic factors or conditions -have, like the physical, taken form in a _judgment-process_ which will -admit of profitable analysis in accordance with whatever general theory -of judgment one may hold as valid elsewhere in the field of knowledge. -This presumption we shall seek to verify. Now, our interest in thus -determining, first of all, the logical character of these processes will -readily be understood from this, that, in the present view, these are -the processes, and the only ones in our experience, which are properly -to be regarded as processes of Valuation. We shall hold that Valuation, -and so all consciousness of Value, properly so called, must be either -ethical or economic; that the only conscious processes in which Values -can come to definition are these processes of ethical and economic -judgment. The present theory of Value is, then, essentially a logical -one, in the sense of holding that Values are determined in and by a -logical--that is, a judgmental--valuation-process and in its details is -closely dependent upon the general conception of judgment of which the -outlines have been sketched above. Accordingly, the exposition must -proceed in the following general order: Assuming the conception of -judgment which has been presented (which our discussion will in several -ways further illustrate and so tend to confirm), we shall seek to show -that the determinations made in ethical and economic judgment are in the -proper sense objective. This will involve, first of all, a statement of -the conditions under which the ethical and economic judgments -respectively arise--which statement will serve to distinguish the two -types of judgment from each other. We shall then proceed to the special -analysis of the ethical and economic forms from the standpoint of our -general theory of judgment, thereby establishing in detail the -judgmental character of these parts of the reflective process. This -analysis will serve to introduce our interpretation of the consciousness -of Value as a factor in the conduct and economy of life. - - -II - -Let us then define the problem of the objective reference of the -valuational judgments by stating, as distinctly as may be, the -conditions by which ethical and economic deliberation, respectively, are -prompted. A study of these conditions will make it easier to see in what -way the judgments reached in dealing with them can be objective. - -When will an end, presenting itself in consciousness in the manner -indicated in our brief analysis of the judgment-process, become the -center of attention, thereby checking the advance, through investigation -of the possible means, to final overt action? This is the general -statement of the problem of the typical ethical situation. Manifestly -there will be no ethical deliberation if the imaged end at once turns -the attention toward the environment of possible means, instead of first -of all itself becoming the object instead of the director of attention; -there will be no suspension of progress toward final action, excepting -such as may later come through difficulty in the discovery and -co-ordination of the means. However, there are cases in which the -emergence of the end forthwith is followed by a check to the reflective -process, and the agent shrinks from the end presented in imagination as -being, let us say, one forbidden by authority or one repugnant to his -own established standards. The end may in such a case disappear at once; -very often it will insistently remain. On this latter supposition, the -simplest possibility will be the development of a mere mechanical -tension, a "pull and haul" between the end, or properly the impulses -which it represents, and the agent's habit of suppressing impulses of -the class to which the present one is, perhaps intuitively, recognized -as belonging. The case is the common one of "temptation" on the one side -and "principle" or "conscience" on the other, and so long as the two -forces remain thus in hard-and-fast opposition to each other there can -be no ethical deliberation or judgment in a proper sense. The standard -or habit may gain the day by sheer mechanical excess of power, or the -new impulse, the temptation, may prevail because its onset can break -down the mechanical resistance. - -Out of such a situation as this, however, genuine ethical deliberation -may arise on condition that standard and "temptation" can lose something -of their abstractness and their hard-and-fast opposition, and develop -into terms of concrete meaning. The agent may come to see that the end -is in some definite way of really vital interest and too important to be -put aside without consideration. He may, of course, in this fall into -gross self-sophistication, like the drunkard in the classical instance -who takes another glass to test his self-control and thereby gain -assurance, or he may act with wisdom and with full sincerity, like -Dorothea Casaubon when she renounced the impossible task imposed by her -departed husband. In the moral life one can ask or hope for complete -exemption from the risk of self-deception with as little reason as in -scientific research. But however this may be, our present interest is in -the method, not in particular results of ethical reflection. Whether -properly so in a particular case or not, the imaged end may come to -seem at least plausibly defensible on grounds of principle which serve -to sanction certain other modes of conduct to which a place is given in -the accepted scheme of life; or the end may simply press for a -relatively independent recognition on the very general ground that its -emergence represents an enlargement and new development of the -personality.[109] The end may thus cease to stand in the character of -blind self-assertive impulse, and press its claim as a positive means of -future moral growth, as bringing freedom from repressive and enfeebling -restraints and as tending to the reinforcement of other already valued -modes of conduct. On the other hand, the standard will cease to stand as -mere resistance and negation, and may discover something of its hidden -meaning as a product of long experience and slow growth, and as perhaps -a vital part of the organization of one's present life, not to be -touched without grave risk. - -Now, on whichever side the development may first commence, a like -development must soon follow on the other, and it is the action and -reaction of standard and prospective or problematic end upon each other -that constitutes the process of ethical deliberation or judgment. Just -as in the typical judgment-process, as sketched above, so also here -predicate and subject _develop each other_, when once they have given -over their first antagonism and come to the attitude of reasoning -together. The predicate explains itself that the subject or new end may -be searchingly and fairly tested; and under this scrutiny the subject -develops its full meaning as a course of conduct, thereby prompting -further analysis and reinterpretation of the standard. But this is not -the place for detailed analysis of the process;[110] here we are -concerned only to define the type of situation, and this we may now do -in the following terms: The indispensable condition of ethical judgment -is the presence in the agent's mind of at least two rival interesting -ends or systems of such ends. In the foregoing, the subject of the -judgment is the new end that has arisen; the predicate or "standard" is -the symbol for the old ends or values which in the tension of the -judgment-process must be brought to more or less explicit -enumeration--and, we must add, reconstruction also. Indeed, it is -important, even at this stage of our discussion, to observe that -Predicate and Standard are not equivalent in meaning. The predicate, or -predicative side, of judgment is the imagery of control in the process, -which, as we have seen, develops with the subject side; while the term -"Standard" connotes the rigid fixity which belongs to the inhibiting -concept or ideal in the stage before the judgment-process proper can -begin. The ethical judgment-process is, in a word, just the process of -reconstructing standards--as in its other and corresponding aspect it is -the process of interpreting new ends. Those who oppose measures of -social reform or new modes of conduct or belief on alleged grounds of -"immorality" instinctively feel in doing so that the change may make its -way more easily against a resistance that will candidly explain itself; -and, on the other side of the social judgment-process, the more -fanatical know how to turn to good advantage for their propaganda the -bitterness or contempt of those who represent the established order. On -both sides there are those who trust more in mechanical "pull and haul" -than in the intrinsic merits of their cause. - -Thus it is by encountering some rival end or entire system of ends, as -symbolized by an ideal, that a new end emerging out of impulse comes to -stand for an agent, as the center of a problem of conduct, and so to -occupy the center of attention. And it thereby becomes an Object, as we -shall hold, which must be more fully defined in order that it may be -_valued_, and accordingly be held to warrant a determinate attitude -toward itself on the agent's part. We have now to define in the same -general terms the typical economic situation. - -In economic theory as in common thought it is not the contemplated act -of applying certain means to the attainment of an end regarded as -desirable that functions as the logical subject of valuation. The thing -or object valued in the economic situation is one's present wealth, -whether material or immaterial, one's services or labor--whatever one -gives in exchange or otherwise sets apart for the attainment of a -desired end or, proximately, to secure possession of the necessary and -sufficient means to the attainment of a desired end. The object of -attention in the valuing process is here not itself an end of action. In -this respect the economic type of judgment is like the physical, for in -both the object to be valued is a certain means which one is seeking to -adapt to some more or less definitely imaged purpose; or a condition of -which one wishes, likewise for some special purpose, to take advantage. -The ultimate goal of all judgment is the determination of a course of -conduct looking toward an end, and our present problem may accordingly -be stated in the following terms: Under what circumstances in the -judgment-process does it become necessary to the definition and -attainment of an end as yet vague and indeterminate that the requisite -means, as in part already physically determined, should be further -scrutinized in attention and determined from the economic point of view? -Or, in a word: What is the "jurisdiction" of the economic point of view? - -For ordinary judgements of sense-perception the presence in -consciousness of a single unquestioned end is the adequate occasion, as -our analysis (assuming its validity) has shown. For ethical judgment we -have seen that the presence of conflicting ends is necessary; and we -shall now hold that this condition is necessary, though not, without a -certain qualification, adequate, for the economic type as well. If an -imaged end can hold its place in consciousness without a rival, and the -physical means of attaining it have been found and co-ordinated, then -the use or consumption of the means must inevitably follow, without -either ethical or economic judgement; for, to paraphrase the saying of -Professor James, nothing but an end can displace or inhibit effort -toward another end. The economic situation differs, then, from the -ethical in this, that the end or system of ends entering into -competition with the one for the time being of chief and primary -interest has been brought to consciousness through reference to those -"physical" means which already have been determined as necessary to this -latter end. The conflict of ends in the economic situation, that is to -say, is not due to a direct and intrinsic incompatibility between them. -Where there manifestly is such incompatibility, judgment will be of the -ethical type--as when building the house involves the foreclosure of a -mortgage, and so, in working an injury to the holder of the site, may do -violence to one's ideal of friendship or of more special obligation; or -when an impulse to intemperate self-indulgence is met by one's ideal of -social usefulness. In cases such as these one clearly sees, or can on -reflection come to see, in what way an evil result to personal character -will follow upon the imminent misdeed, and in what way suppression of -the momentary impulse will conserve the entire approved and established -way of life. Very often, however, the conflicting ends are related in no -such mutually exclusive way. Each may be in itself permissible and -compatible with the other, and, so far as any possible ethical -discrimination can determine, there is no ground for choice between -them. Thus it is only through the fact that both ends are dependent -upon a limited supply of means that one would, for example, ever bring -together and deliberately oppose in judgment the purpose of making -additions to his library and the necessity of providing a store of fuel -for the winter. Both ends in such a case are in themselves indeed -permissible in a general way, but they may very well not both of them be -economically possible, and hence, for the person in question and in the -presence of the economic conditions which confront him, not, in the last -analysis, both ethically possible. When there is a conflict between two -ends that stand in close organic relation in the sense explained above, -the problem is an ethical one; when the conflict is, in the sense -explained, one of competition between ends ethically permissible--not at -variance, either one, that is, with other ends _directly_--for the whole -or for a share of one's supply of means, the problem is of the economic -type.[111] - -There are three typical cases in which economic judgment or valuation of -the means is necessary, and the enumeration of these will make clear the -relation between the ethical and the economic types of judgment: (1) -First may be mentioned the case in which ethical deliberation has -apparently reached its end in the formation of a plan of action which, -so far as one can see, on ethical grounds is unobjectionable. A definite -"temptation" may have been overcome, or out of a more complex situation -a satisfactory ethical compromise or readjustment may have been -developed with much difficulty. Now, there are very often cases in which -such a course of action still may not be entered on without further -hesitation; for, if the plan be one requiring for its working out the -use of material means, the fact of an existing limitation of one's -supply of means must bring hitherto unthought of ends into conflict with -it. There are doubtless many situations in which one's moral choice may -be carried into practice without consideration of ways and means, as -when one forgives an injury or holds his instinctive nature under -discipline in the effort to attain an ascetic or a genuinely social -ideal of character. But more often than the moral rigorist cares to see, -questions of an economic nature must be raised after the ethical -"evidence is all in"--questions which are probably more trying to a -sensitive moral nature than those more dramatic situations in which the -real perils of self-sophistication are vastly less, and the simpler, -sharper definition of the issue makes possible a less difficult, though -a more decisive and edifying, victory. (2) In the second place are those -cases in which the end that has emerged is without conspicuous moral -quality, because, although it may represent some worthy impulse, it has -not been obliged to make its way to acceptance against the resistance of -desires less worthy than itself. This is the ideal case of economic -theory in which "moral distinctions are irrelevant," and the economic -man is free, according to the myth, to perform his hedonistic -calculations without thought of moral scruple. The end ethically -acceptable in itself, like the enriching of one's library, must, when -the means are limited, divert a portion of the means from other uses, -and will thus, _through reference to the indispensable means_, engage in -conflict with other ends quite remotely, if in the agent's knowledge at -all, related with itself. (3) Finally we reach the limit of apparent -freedom from ethical considerations in the operations of business -institutions, and perhaps especially in those of large business -corporations. Apart from the routine operations of a business which -involve no present exercise of the valuing judgment, there are -constantly in such institutions new projects which must be considered, -and which commonly must involve revaluation of the means. In this -revaluation the principle of greatest revenue is supposed to be the sole -criterion, regardless of other personal or social points of view from -which confessedly the measure might be considered. But such a -supposition, however true to the facts of current business practice it -may be, we must hold to be an abstraction when viewed from the -standpoint of the social life at large, and hence no real exception to -our general principle. The economic and the ethical situations differ, -as types, only in the closeness of relation between the ends that are in -conflict and in the manner in which the ends are first brought into -conflict--not in respect of the intrinsic nature of the ends which are -involved in them.[112] It is this difference which, as we shall see, -explains why ethical valuation must be of ends, and economic valuation, -on the other hand, of means. - -We have yet to see _in what way_ valuation of the means of action can -serve to resolve a difficulty of the type which has thus been designated -as Economic. The question must be deferred until a more detailed -analysis of the economic judgment-process can be undertaken. It is -enough for our present purpose to note that the subject of valuation in -this process _is_ the means, and to see that under the typical -conditions which have been described some further determination of the -means than the merely physical one of their factual availability for the -competing ends is needed.[113] Physically and mechanically the means are -available for each one of the ends or groups of ends in question; the -pressing problem is to determine for which one of the ends, if any, or -to what compromise or readjustment of certain of the ends or all of -them, the means at hand are in an economic sense most properly -available.[114] - -From this preliminary discussion of the ethical and economic situations -we must now pass to discuss the objectivity of the judgments by which -the agent meets the difficulties which such situations as these present. -We shall seek to show that these judgments are constructive of an -objective order of reality. It will be necessary in the first place to -determine the psychological conditions of the more commonly recognized -experience of Objectivity in the restricted sphere of sense-perception. -There might otherwise remain a certain antecedent presumption against -the thesis which we wish to establish even after the direct argument had -been presented.[115] - - -III - -Common-sense and natural science certainly tend to identify the -objectively real with the existent in space and time. The physical -universe is held to be palpably real in a way in which nothing not -presented in sensuous terms can be. To most minds doubtless it is -difficult to understand why Plato should have ascribed to the Ideas a -higher degree of reality than that possessed by the particular objects -of sense-perception, and still more difficult to understand his -ascription of real existence to such Ideas as those of Beauty, Justice, -and the Good. There is a certain apparent stability in a universe -presented in "immediate" sense-perception--a universe with which we are -in constant bodily intercourse--that seems not to belong to a mere -order of relations which, if known in any sense, is not known to us -through the senses. Moreover, knowledge of the physical world is felt to -possess a higher degree of certainty than does any knowledge we can have -of supposed economic or moral truth, or of economic or moral standards. -Of such knowledge one is disposed to say, as Mr. Spencer does of -metaphysics, that at the best it presupposes a long and elaborate -inferential process which, as long, is likely to be faulty; whereas -physical truth is immediate or else, when inference is involved in it, -easy to be tested by appeal to immediate facts. Physical reality is a -reality that can be seen and handled and felt as offering resistance, -and this is evidence of objectivity of a sort not to be found in other -spheres of knowledge for which the like claim is made. - -The force of these impressions (and it would not be difficult to find -stronger statements in the history of scientific and ethical nominalism) -diminishes if one tries to determine in what consists that objectivity -which they uncritically assume as given in sense-perception. For one -must recognize that not all our possible modes of sense-experience are -equally concerned in the presentation of this perceived objective world. -Certain sensory "quales" are immediately referred to outward objects as -belonging to them. Certain others are, in a way, "inward," either not -more definitely localized at all or merely localized in the sense-organ -which mediates them. Now, the reason for this difference cannot lie in -the content of the various sense-qualities abstractly taken. A visual -sensation, apart from the setting in which it occurs in common -experience, can be no more objective in its reference--indeed, can have -no more reference of any kind--than the least definite and instructive -organic sensation. For the degree of distinctness with which one -discriminates sense-qualities depends upon the number and importance of -the interpretative associations which it is important from time to time -to "connect" with them; or, conversely, the sense-qualities are not -_self_-discriminating in virtue of an intrinsic objective reference or -meaning which each possesses and which drives it apart from all the -rest. Indeed, an intrinsic meaning, if a sensation could possess one, -would not only be superfluous in the development of knowledge, but, as -likely to be mistaken for the acquired or functional meaning, even -seriously confusing.[116] - -Now, it must be granted that, if the "simple idea of sensation" is -without objective reference, no association with it of similarly -abstract sensations can supply the lack. A "movement" sensation, or a -tactual, having in itself no such meaning, cannot merely by being -"associated" with a similarly meaningless visual sensation endow this -latter with reference to an object. Objective reference is, in fact, not -a sensuous thing; it is not a conscious "element," nor does it arise -from any combination or fusion of such. It is neither _in_ the -association of ideas as a constituent member, nor does it belong to the -association considered as a sequence of psychical states. Instead, in -our present view, it belongs to or arises out of the activity through -which and with reference to which associations are first of all -established. It is an aspect or kind of reference or category under -which any sense-quality or datum is apperceived when it is held apart -from the stream of consciousness in order that it may receive new -meaning as a stimulus; and a sensation functioning in such a "state of -consciousness"[117] is a psychical phenomenon very different from the -conscious element of "analytical" psychology. The extent to which it is -true that the objective world of sense-perception is pre-eminently -visual and tactual is then merely an evidence of the extent to which the -exigencies of the life-process have required finer sense-discrimination -for the sake of more refined reaction within these spheres as compared -with others. Our conclusion, then, must be that the consciousness of -objectivity is not as such sensuous, even as given in our perception of -the material world. The world, as viewed from the standpoint of a -particular, practical emergency, is an objective world, not in virtue of -its having a "sensuous" or a "material" aspect as something existent -_per se_, but because it is a world of stimuli in course of definition -for the guidance of activity.[118] - -It will be well to give further positive exposition of the meaning of -the view thus stated. To return once more to our fundamental -psychological conception, knowledge is essentially relevant to the -solution of particular problems of more or less urgency and of various -kinds and figures in the solution of such problems as the assemblage of -consciously recognized symbols or stimuli by which various actions are -suggested. The object as known is therefore not the same as the object -as apprehended in other possible modes of being conscious of it. The -workman who is actually using his tool in shaping his material, or the -warrior who is actually using his weapon in the thick of combat, is, if -conscious of these objects at all (and doubtless he may be conscious of -them at such times), not conscious of them _as objects_--as the one -might be, for example, in adjusting the tool for a particular kind of -use, and the other in giving a keen edge to his blade. Under these -latter circumstances the tool or weapon is an _object_, and its observed -condition, viewed in the light of a purpose of using the object in a -certain way, is regarded as properly suggesting certain changes or -improvements. And likewise will the tool or the weapon have an objective -character in the agent's apprehension in the moment of identifying and -selecting it from among a number of others, or even in the act of -reaching for it, especially if it is inconveniently placed. But in the -act of freely using one's objective means the category of the objective -plays no part in consciousness, because at such times there is no -judgment respecting the means--because there is no sufficient occasion -for the isolation of certain conscious elements from the rest of the -stream of conscious experience to be defined as stimuli to certain -needed responses. Such isolation will not normally take place so long as -the reactions suggested by the conscious contents involved in the -experience are fully adequate to the situation. Objects are not normally -held apart as such from the stream of consciousness in which they are -presented and recognized as possessing qualities warranting certain -modes of conduct, excepting as it has become necessary to the attainment -of the agent's purposes to modify or reconstruct his activity.[119] - -Are things, then, apprehended as objective in virtue of the agent's -attitude toward them, or is the agent's attitude in a typical case -grounded upon an antecedent determination of the objectivity of the -things in question? We must answer, in the first place, that there can -be no such antecedent determination. We may, it is true, speak of -believing, on the evidence of sight or touch, that a certain object is -really present before us. But neither sight nor touch possesses in -itself, as a particular sense-quality, any objective meaning. If touch -is _par excellence_ the sense of the objective and the appeal to touch -the test of objectivity, this can only be because touch is the sense -most closely and intimately connected in our experience with action. -After any interval of hesitation and judgment, action begins with -contact with and manipulation of the physical means which have been -under investigation. Not only is touch the proximate stimulus and guide -to manipulation, but all relevant knowledge which has been gained in any -judgment-process, through the other senses, and especially through -sight, must ultimately be reducible to terms of touch or other contact -sense. The alleged tactual evidence of objectivity is, then, rather a -confirmation than a difficulty for our present view. In short, we must -dismiss as impossible the hypothesis that there can be a consciousness -of objectivity which is not dependent upon and an expression of primary -antecedent tendencies toward motor response to the presented stimulus. -It is our attitude toward the prospective stimulus that mediates the -consciousness of an object standing over against us. - -So far, indeed, is it from being true that objectivity is a matter for -special determination antecedently to action that by common testimony -the conviction of objectivity comes to us quite irresistibly. The object -forces itself upon us, as we say, and "whether we will or no" we must -recognize its presence there before us and its independence of any -choice of ours or of our knowledge. In the cautious manipulation of an -instrument, in the laborious shaping of some refractory material, in the -performance of any delicate or difficult task, one's sense of the -objectivity of the thing with which one works is as obtrusive as remorse -or grief, and as little to be shaken off. We shall revert to this -suggested analogy at a later stage in our discussion. - -We are now in a position to define more precisely the nature of the -conditions in which the sense of objectivity emerges, and this will -bring us to the point at which the objective import of our economic and -ethical judgments can profitably be discussed. We have said that the -world of the physical is objective, not in virtue of the sensuous terms -in which it is presented, but because it is a world of stimuli for the -guidance of human conduct. Under what circumstances, then, are we -conscious of stimuli in their capacity of guides or incentives or -grounds of conduct? And the answer must be that stimuli are interpreted -as such, and so take on the character of objectivity, when their precise -character as stimuli is still in doubt, and they must therefore receive -further definition. - -For example, a man pursued by a wild beast must find some means of -escape or defense, and, seeing a tree which he may climb or a stone -which he may hurl, will inspect these as well as may be with reference -to their fitness for the intended purpose. It is at just such moments as -these, then, that physical things become things for knowledge and take -on their stubbornly objective character--that is to say, when they are -essentially problematic. Now, in order that any physical thing may be -thus problematic and so possess objective character for knowledge, it -must (1) be in part understood, and so prompt certain more or less -indiscriminate responses; and (2) be in part as yet not understood--in -such wise that, while there are certain indefinite or unmeasured -tendencies on the agent's part to respond to the object--climb the tree -or hurl the stone--there is also a certain failure of complete unity in -the co-ordination of these activities, a certain contradiction between -different suggestions of conduct which different observed qualities of -the tree or stone may give, and so hesitation and arrest of final -action. The pursued man views the tree suspiciously before trusting -himself to its doubtful strength, or weighs well the stone and tests its -rough edges before pausing to throw it. Thus, to state the matter -negatively, there are two possible situations in which the sense of -objectivity, if it emerge into consciousness at all, cannot long -continue. An object---as, for example, some strange shrub or -flower--which, in the case we are supposing, may attract the pursued -wayfarer's notice, may awaken no responses relevant to the emergency in -which the agent finds himself; and it will therefore forthwith lapse -from consciousness. Or, on the other hand, the object, as the tree or -stone, may rightly or wrongly seem to the agent so completely -satisfactory, or, rather, in effect may _be_ so, as instantly to prompt -the action which otherwise would come, if at all, only after a period of -more or less prolonged attention. In neither of these cases, then, is -there a problematic object. In the one the thing in question is wholly -apart from any present interest, and therefore lapses. In the other case -the thing seen is comprehended on the instant with reference to its -general use and merges immediately into the main stream of the agent's -consciousness without having been an object of express attention. In -neither case, therefore, is there hesitation with reference to the -thing in question--any conflict between inconsiderate positive responses -prompted by certain features of the object and inhibitions due to -recognition of its shortcomings. In a word, in neither case is there any -judgment or possibility of judgment, and hence no sense of objectivity. -We can have consciousness of an object, in the strict sense of the term, -only when some part or general aspect of the total situation confronting -an agent excites or seems to warrant responses which must be held in -check for further determination. In terms of consciousness, an object is -always an object of attention--that is, an object which is under process -of development and reconstruction with reference to an end. - -An inhibited impulse to react in a more or less definite way to a -stimulus is, then, the adequate condition of the emergence in -consciousness of the sense of objectivity. So long as an activity is -proceeding without check or interruption, and no conflict develops -between motor responses prompted by different parts or aspects of the -situation, the agent's consciousness will not present the distinction of -Objective and Subjective. The mode of being conscious which accompanies -free and harmonious activity of this sort may be exemplified by such -experiences as aesthetic appreciation, sensuous enjoyment, acquiescent -absorption in pleasurable emotion, or even intellectual processes of the -mechanical sort, such as easy computation or the solution of simple -algebraic problems--processes in which no more serious difficulty is -encountered than suffices to stimulate a moderate degree of interest. -If, however, reverting to the illustration, our present need for a stone -calls for some property which the stone we have seized appears to lack, -consciousness must pass over into the reflective or attentive phase. The -stone will now figure as an _object_ possessing certain qualities which -render it in a general way relevant to the emergency before us. A -needed quality is missing, and this defect must hold in check all the -imminent responses until discovery of the missing quality can set them -free. In a word, the stone as known to us has assumed the station of -subject in a judgment-process, and our effort is, if possible, to assign -to it a new predicate relevant to our present situation. Psychologically -speaking, the stone is an object, a stimulus to which we are endeavoring -to find warrant for responding in some new or reconstructed way. - -In this process we must assume, then, first of all, an interest on the -agent's part in the situation as a whole, which in the first place, in -terms of the illustration, makes the pursued one note the tree or -stone--which might otherwise have escaped his notice as completely as -any passing cloud or falling leaf--and suggests what particular -qualities or adaptabilities should be looked for in it. Given this -interest in "making something" out of the total situation as explaining -the recognition of the stone and the impulse to seize and hurl it, we -find the sense of the stone's objectivity emerging just in the arrest of -the undiscriminating impulse. The stone must have a certain meaning as a -stimulus first of all, but it must be a meaning not yet quite defined -and certain of acceptance. The stone will be an _object_ only if, and so -long as, the undiscriminating impulses suggested by these elements of -meaning are held in check in order that they may be ordered, -supplemented, or made more definite. It is, then, the essence of the -present contention that physical things are _objective_ in our -experience in virtue of their recognized inadequacy as means or -incentives of action--an inadequacy which, in turn, is felt as such in -so far as we are seeking to use them as means or grounds of conduct, or -to avail ourselves of them as conditions, in coping with the general -situation from which our attention has abstracted them. - -From this analysis of the conditions of the consciousness of objectivity -we must now proceed to inquire whether in the typical ethical and -economic situations, as they have been described, essentially these same -conditions are present. - -In the ethical situation, according to our statement, the subject of the -judgment (the object of attention) is the new end which has just been -presented in imagination, and we have now to see that the agent's -attitude toward this end is for our present purpose essentially the same -as toward a physical object which is under scrutiny. For just as the -physical object is such for consciousness because it is partly relevant -(whether in the way of furthering or of hindering) to the agent's -purpose, but as yet partly not understood from this point of view, so -the imaged end may likewise be ambiguous. The agent's moral purpose may -be the (very likely mythical) primitive one of which we read in -"associational" discussions of the moral consciousness--that of avoiding -punishment. It may be that of "imitative," sympathetic obedience to -authority--a sentiment whose fundamental importance for ethical -psychology has long remained without due recognition.[120] It may be -loyalty to an ideal of conscience, or yet again a purpose of enlargement -and development of personality. But on either supposition the -compatibility of the end with the prevailing standard or principle of -decision may be a matter of doubt and so call for judgment. The problem -will, of course, be a problem in the full logical sense as involving -judgment of the type described in our discussion of the ethical -situation only when the attitudes of obedience to authority and to fixed -ideals have been outgrown; but, on the other hand, as might be shown, it -is just the inevitable increasing use of judgment with reference to -these formulations of the moral life which gradually undermines them -and, by a kind of "internal dialectic" of the moral consciousness, -brings the agent to recognition as well as to more perfect practice of a -logical or deliberative method. - -The end, then, is, in the typical ethical situation, an _object_ which -one must determine by analysis and reconstruction as a means or -condition of moral "integrity" and progress. It is, accordingly, in the -second place, an object upon whose determination a definite activity of -the agent is regarded by him as depending. Just as in the physical -judgment-process the object is set off over against the self and -regarded as a given thing which, when once completely defined, will -prompt certain movements of the body, so here the contemplated act is an -object which, when fully defined in all its relevant psychological and -sociological bearings, will prompt a definite act of rejection or -acceptance by the self. Now, it might be shown, as we believe, that the -complete psychological and sociological definition of the course of -conduct _is_ in truth the full explanation of the choice; there is no -_separate_ reaction of the moral self to which the course of conduct is, -as defined, an external stimulus. So also in the sphere of physical -judgment complete definition passes over into action--or the -appreciative mode of consciousness which accompanies action--without -breach of continuity. But within the judgment-process in all its forms -there is in the agent's apprehension this characteristic feature of -apparent separation between the subject as an objective thing presently -to be known and used or responded to, and the predicate as a response -yet to be perfected in details, but at the right time, when one has -proper warrant, to be set free. It is not our purpose here to speak of -metaphysical interpretations or misinterpretations of this functional -distinction; but only to argue from the presence of the distinction in -the ethical type of judgment as in the physical as genuine an -objectivity for the ethical type as can be ascribed to the other. The -ethical judgment is objective in the sense that in it an object--an -imaged mode of conduct taken as such--is presented for development to a -degree of adequacy at which one can accept it or reject it as a mode of -conduct. The ethical predicates Right and Wrong, Good and Bad, each pair -representing a particular standpoint, as we shall later see, signify -this accepting or rejecting movement of the self, this "act of will," of -which, as an act in due time to be performed, the agent is more or less -acutely conscious in the course of moral judgment. - -In the economic situation also, as above described, there is present the -requisite condition of the consciousness of objectivity. Here, as in the -ethical situation, an object is presented which one must redetermine, -and toward which one must presently act in a way likewise to be -determined in detail in judgment. We shall defer until a later stage -discussion of the reason why this subject of the economic judgment is -the _means_ in the activity that is in progress. We are not yet ready to -show that the means _must_ be the center of attention under the -conditions which have been specified. Here we need only note the fact of -common experience that economic judgment does center upon the means, and -show that in this fact is given the objective status of the means in the -judgment-process; for the economic problem is essentially that of -withdrawing a portion, a "marginal increment," of the means from some -use or set of uses to which they are at present set apart, and applying -it to the new end that has come to seem, on ethical grounds at least, -desirable; and we may regard this diversion as the essentially economic -act which, in the agent's apprehension during judgment, is contingent -upon the determination of the means. The object as economic is -accordingly the means, or a marginal portion of the means, which is to -be thus diverted (or, so to speak, exposed to the likelihood of such -diversion), and its determination must be of such a nature as to show -the economic urgency, or at least the permissibility, of this diversion. -Into this determination, manifestly, the results of much auxiliary -inquiry into physical properties of the means must enter--such -properties, for example, as have to do with its technological fitness -for its present use as compared with possible substitutes, and its -adaptability for the new use proposed. Taking the word in the broad -sense of _object of thought_, it is always an object in space and time -to which the economic judgment assigns an economic value; and it is true -here (just the same is true, _mutatis mutandis_, of the psychological -and sociological determinations necessary to the fixation of ethical -value) that the _economically motivated_ physical determination of the -objective means from the standpoint of the emergency in hand is the full -"causal" explanation of the economic act. It must, however, be carefully -observed that this physical determination is in the typical case -altogether incidental, from the agent's standpoint, to the assignment of -an economic character or value to the means--a value which will at the -close of the judgment come to conscious recognition. As we shall see, -the process is directed throughout by reference to economic principles -and standards, and what shall be an adequate determination in the case -depends upon the precision with which these are formulated and the -strenuousness with which they are applied. In a word, the economic -judgment assigns to the physical object, as known at the outset, a new -non-physical character. Throughout the judgment-process this character -is gaining in distinctness, and at the end it is accepted as the Value -of the means, as warrant for the diversion of them to the new use which -has been decided on.[121] - -We have now to consider whether in the actual ethical and economic -experience of men there is any direct evidence confirming the -conclusions which our logical analysis of the respective situations -would appear to require. Can any phases of the total experience of -working out a satisfactory course of conduct in these typical -emergencies be appealed to as actually showing at least some tacit -recognition that these types of judgment present each one an order of -reality or an aspect of the one reality? - -In the first place, then, one must recognize that in the agent's own -apprehension a judgment of value has something more than a purely -subjective meaning. It is never offered, by one who has taken the -trouble to work it out more or less laboriously and then to express it -in terms which are certainly objective, as a mere announcement of _de -facto_ determination or a registration of arbitrary whim and caprice. -One no more means to announce a groundless choice or a choice based upon -pleasure felt in contemplation of the imaged end than in his judgments -concerning the physical universe he means to affirm coexistences and -sequences, agreements and disagreements, of "ideas" as psychical -happenings. That there is an ethical or economic truth to which one can -appeal in doubtful cases is, indeed, the tacit assumption in all -criticism of another's deliberate conduct; the contrary assumption, that -criticism is merely the opposition of one's own private prejudice or -desire to the equally private prejudice or desire of another, would -render all criticism and mutual discussion of ethical problems -meaningless and futile in the plain man's apprehension as in the -philosopher's. For the plain man has a spontaneous confidence in his -knowledge of the material world which makes him look askance at any -alleged analysis of his sense-perceptions and scientific judgments into -"associations of ideas," and the same confidence, or something very like -it, attaches to judgments of these other types. It may perhaps be -easier (though the concession is a very doubtful one) to destroy a naive -confidence in the objectivity of moral truth than a like confidence in -scientific knowledge, but it must be remembered that the plain man's -sense of the urgency, at least of ethical problems, if not of economic, -is commonly less acute than for the physical. In the plain man's -experience serious moral problems are infrequent--problems of the true -type, that is, which cannot be disposed of as mere cases of temptation; -one must have attained a considerable capacity for sympathy and a -considerable knowledge of social relations before either the recognition -of such problems or proper understanding of their significance is -possible. Moral and economic crises are not vividly presented in -sensuous imagery excepting in minds of developed intelligence, -experience, and imaginative power; and the judgments reached in coping -with them do not, as a rule, obviously call for nicely measured, -calculated, and adjusted bodily movements. The immediate act of -executing an important economic judgment may be a very commonplace -performance, like the dictation of a letter, and an ethical decision -may, however great its importance for future overt conduct, be expressed -by no immediate visible movements of the body. But this possible -difference of impressiveness between physical and other types of -judgments is from our present standpoint unessential; and indeed, after -all, it cannot be denied that there are persons whose sense of moral -obligation is quite as distinct and influential, and even sensuously -vivid, as their conviction of the real existence of an external world. -To the average man it certainly is clear that, as Dr. Martineau -declares, "it is an inversion of moral truth to say ... that honour is -higher than appetite _because_ we feel it so; we feel it so because it -_is_ so. This '_is_' we know to be not contingent on our apprehension, -not to arise from our constitution of faculty, but to be a reality -irrespective of us in adaptation to which our nature is constituted, and -for the recognition of which the faculty is given."[122] And the -impressiveness, to most minds, of likening the sublimity of the moral -law to the visible splendor of the starry heavens would seem to suggest -that the apprehension of moral truth is a mode of consciousness, in form -at least, so far akin to sense-perception as to be capable of -illustration and even reinforcement from that type of experience. - -At this point we must revert to a suggestion which presented itself -above in another connection, but which at the time could not be further -developed. This was, in a word, that there is often a feeling of -_obtrusiveness_ in our appreciation of the objectivity of the things -before us in ordinary sense-perception (or physical judgment) which is -not unlike the felt insistence of remorse and grief.[123] This feeling -is so conspicuous a feature of the state of consciousness in physical -judgment as frequently to serve the plain man as his last and -irrefragable evidence of the metaphysical independence of the material -world, and it is indeed a feature whose explanation does throw much -light upon the meaning of the consciousness of objectivity as a factor -within experience. Now, there is another common feeling--or, as we do -not scruple to call it, another emotion--which is perhaps quite as often -appealed to in this way; though, as we believe, never in quite the same -connection in any argument in which the two experiences are called upon -to do service to the same end. Material objects, we are told, are -_reliable_ and _stable_ as distinguished from the fleeting illusive -images of a dream--they have a "solidity" in virtue of which one can -"depend upon them," are "hard and fast" remaining faithfully where one -deposits them for future use or, if they change and disappear, doing so -in accordance with fixed laws which make the changes calculable in -advance. The material realm is the realm of "solid fact" in which one -can work with assurance that causes will infallibly produce their right -and proper effects, and to which one willingly returns from the -dream-world in which his adversary, the "idealist," would hold him -spellbound. We propose now briefly to consider these two modes of -apprehension of external physical reality in the light of the general -analysis of judgment given above--from which it will appear that they -are, psychologically, emotional expressions of what have been set forth -as the essential features of the judgment-situation, whether in its -physical, ethical, or economic forms. From this we shall argue that -there should actually be in the ethical and economic spheres similar, or -essentially identical, "emotions of reality," and we shall then proceed -to verify the hypothesis by pointing to those ethical and economic -experiences which answer the description. - -We have seen that the center of attention or subject in the -judgment-process is as such problematic--in the sense that there are -certain of its observed and recognized attributes which make it in some -sense relevant and useful to the purpose in hand, while yet other of its -attributes (or absences of certain attributes) suggest conflicting -activities. The object which one sees is certainly a stone and of -convenient size for hurling at the pursuing animal. The situation has -been analyzed and found to demand a missile, and this demand has led to -search for and recognition of a stone. The stone, however, may be of a -color suggesting a soft and crumbling texture, or its form may appear -from a distance to be such as to make it practically certain to miss the -mark, however carefully it may be aimed and thrown. Until these points -of difficulty have been ascertained, the stone is wanting still in -certain essential determinations. So far as it has been certainly -determined, it prompts to the response directly suggested by one's -general end of defense and escape, but there are these other indications -which hold this response in check and which, if verified, will cause the -stone to be let lie unused. Now, we have, in this situation of conflict -or tension between opposed incitements given by the various -discriminated characters of the object, the explanation of the aspect of -obtrusiveness, of arbitrary resistance to and independence of one's -will, which for the time being seems the unmistakable mark or -coefficient of the thing's objectivity. For it is not the object as a -whole that is obtrusive; indeed, clearly, there could be no -obtrusiveness on the part of an "object as a whole," and in such a case -there could also be no judgment. The obtrusion in the case before us is -not a sense of the energy of a recalcitrant metaphysical object put -forth upon a coerced and helpless human will, but simply a conscious -interpretation of the inhibition of certain of the agent's motor -tendencies by certain others prompted by the object's "suspicious" and -as yet undetermined appearances or possible attributes. The object as -amenable to use--those of its qualities which taken by themselves are -unquestionable and clearly conducive to the agent's purpose--needs no -attention for the moment, let us say. The attention is rather upon the -dubious and to all appearance unfavorable qualities, and these for the -time being make up the sum and content of the agent's knowledge of the -object. On the other hand, the agent as an active self is identified -with the end and with those modes of response to the object which -promise to contribute directly to its realization. It is in this -direction that his interest is set and he strains with all his powers of -mind to move, and it is upon the self as identified with, and for the -time being expressed in, the "effort of the agent's will" that the -object as resistant, refusing to be misconstrued, obtrudes. One _must_ -see the object and _must_ acknowledge its apparent, or in the end its -ascertained, unfitness. One is "coerced." The situation is one of -conflict, and it is out of the conflict that the essentially emotional -experience of "resistance" emerges.[124] The more special emotions of -impatience, anger, or discouragement may in a given case not be present -or may be suppressed, but the emotion of objectivity will still -remain.[125] - -On the same general principles the other of our two coefficients of -reality may be explained. Let us assume that the stone in our -illustration has at last been cleared of all ambiguity in its -suggestion, having been taken as a missile, and that the man in flight -now holds it ready awaiting the most favorable moment for hurling it at -his pursuer. It will hardly be maintained that under these conditions -the coefficient of the stone's reality as an object consists in its -obtrusiveness, in its resistance to or coercion of the self. The stone -is now regarded as a fixed and determinate feature of the situation--a -condition which can be counted on, whatever else may fail. Over against -other still uncertain aspects of the situation (which are now in _their_ -turn real because resistant, coercive, and obtrusive) stands the stone -as a reassuring fact upon and about which the agent can build up the -whole plan of conduct which may, if all goes well, bring him safely out -of his predicament. The stone has, so to speak, passed over to the "end" -side of the situation, and although it may have to be rejected for some -other means of defense, as the definition of the situation proceeds and -the plan of action accordingly changes (as in some degree it probably -must), nevertheless for the time being the imaged activities as stimulus -to which the stone is now accepted are a fixed part of the plan and -guide in further judgment of the means still undefined. The agent can -hardly recur to the stone, when, after attending for a time to the -bewildering perplexities of the situation, he pauses once more to take -an inventory of his certain resources, without something of an emotional -thrill of assurance and encouragement. In this emotional appreciation of -the "solidity" and "dependability" of the object the second of our -coefficients of reality consists. This might be termed the Recognition, -the other the Perception, coefficient. Classifying them as emotions, -because both are phenomena of tension in activity, we should group the -Perception coefficient with emotions of the Contraction type, like grief -and anger, and the Recognition coefficient with the Expansion emotions, -like joy and triumph. - -Now, in the foregoing interpretation no reference has been made to any -conditions peculiar to the physical type of judgment-situation. The -ground of explanation has been the feature of arrest of activity for the -sake of reconstruction, and this, if our analyses have been correct, is -the essence of the ethical and economic situations as well as of the -physical. Can there then be found in these two spheres experiences of -the same nature and emerging under the same general conditions as our -Perception and Recognition coefficients of reality? If so, then our case -for the objective significance and value of ethical and economic -judgment is in so far strengthened. (1) In the first place, then, the -object in its economic character is problematic, assuming a desire on -the agent's part to apply it, as means, to some new or freshly -interesting end, because it has already been, and accordingly now is, -set apart for other uses and cannot thoughtlessly be withdrawn from -them. Extended illustration is not needed to remind one that these -established and hitherto unquestioned uses will haunt the economic -conscience as obtrusively and inhibit the desired course of economic -conduct with as much energy of resistance as in the other case will any -of the contrary promptings of a physical object. Moreover, the -Recognition coefficient may as easily be identified in this connection. -If one's scruples gain the day, in such a case one has at least a sense -of comforting assurance in the conservatism of his choice and its -accordance with the facts, however unreconciled in another way one may -be to the deprivation that has thus seemed to be necessary. If, however, -the new end in a measure makes good its case and the modes of -expenditure which the "scruples" represented have been readjusted in -accordance with it, then the means, no less than before the new -interpretation had been placed upon them, will enjoy the status of -Reality in the economic sense. They will be real now, however, not in -the obtrusive way, as presenting aspects which inhibit the leading -tendency in the judgment-process, but, instead, as means having a fixed -and certain character in one's economic life, which, after the -hesitation and doubt just now superseded, one may safely count upon and -will do well to keep in view henceforth. (2) In the second place, mere -mention of the corresponding ethical experiences must suffice, since -only extended illustration from literature and life would be fully -adequate: on the one hand, the "still small voice" of Conscience or the -authoritativeness of Duty, "stern daughter of the voice of God;" and, on -the other, the restful assurance with which, from the vantage-ground of -a satisfying decision, one may look back in wonder at the possibility of -so serious a temptation or in rejoicing over the new-won freedom from a -burdensome and repressive prejudice. - -This must for the present serve as positive exposition of our view as -to the objective significance of the valuational types of judgment. -There are certain essential points which have as yet not been touched -upon, and there are certain objections to the general view the -consideration of which will serve further to explain it; but the -discussion of these various matters will more conveniently follow the -special analysis of the valuational judgments, to which we shall now -proceed. - - -IV - -In the last analysis the ultimate motive of all reflective thought is -the progressive determination of the ends of conduct. Physical judgment, -or, in psychological terms, reflective attention to objects in the -physical world, is at every turn directed and controlled by reference to -a gradually developing purpose, so that the process may also be -described as one of bringing to fulness of definition an at first -vaguely conceived purpose through ascertainment and determination of the -means at hand. The problematic situation in which reflection takes its -rise inevitably develops in this two-sided way into consciousness of a -definite end on the one side, and of the means or conditions of -attaining it on the other. - -It has been shown that there _may_ be involved in any finally -satisfactory determination of a situation an explicit reflection upon -and definition of the controlling end which is present and gives point -and direction to the physical determination. But very often such is not -the case. When a child sees a bright object at a distance and makes -toward it, availing himself more or less skilfully of such assistance as -intervening articles of furniture may afford, there is of course no -consciousness on his part of any definite purpose as such, and this is -to say that the child does not subject his conduct to criticism from the -standpoint of the value or its ends. There is simply strong desire for -the distant red ball, controlling all the child's movements for the -time being and prompting a more or less critical inspection of the -intervening territory with reference to the easiest way of crossing it. -The purpose is implicitly accepted, not explicitly determined, as a -preliminary to physical determination of the situation. If one may speak -of a development of the purpose in such a case as this, one must say -that the development into details comes through judgment of the -environing conditions. To change the illustration in order not to commit -ourselves to the ascription of too developed a faculty of judgment to -the child, this is true likewise of any process of reflective attention -in the mind of an adult in which a general purpose is accepted at the -outset and is carried through to execution without reflection upon its -ethical or economic character as a purpose. The specific purpose as -executed is certainly not the same as the general purpose with which the -reflective process took its rise. It is filled out with details, or may -perhaps even be quite different in its general outlines. There has -necessarily been development and perhaps even transformation, but our -contention is that all this has been effected in and through a process -of judgment in which the conditions of action, and not the purpose -itself, have been the immediate objects of determination. Upon these the -attention has been centered, though of course the attention was directed -to them by the purpose. To state the case in logical terms, it has been -only through selection and determination of the means and conditions of -action from the standpoint of predicates suggested by the general -purpose accepted at the outset that this purpose itself had been -rendered definite and practical and possible of execution. Probably such -cases are seldom to be found in the adult experience. As a rule, the -course of physical or technological judgment will almost always bring to -light implications involved in the accepted purpose which must -inevitably raise ethical and economic questions; and the resolution of -these latter will in turn afford new points of view for further physical -determination of the situation. In such processes the logical points of -the problem of ethical and economic valuation come clearly into view. - -In our earlier account of the matter it was more convenient to use -language which implied that ethical and economic judgment must be -preceded by implicit or explicit acceptance of a definite situation -presented in sense-perception, and that these evaluating judgments could -be carried through to their goal only upon the basis of such an -inventory of fixed conditions. Thus the ultimate ethical quality of the -general purpose of building a house would seem to depend upon the -precise form which this purpose comes to assume after the actual -presence and the quality of the means of building have been ascertained -and the economic bearings of the proposed expenditure have been -considered. Surely it is a waste of effort to debate with oneself upon -the ethical rightness of a project which is physically impossible or -else out of the question from the economic point of view. We are, -however, now in a position to see that this way of looking at the matter -is both inaccurate and self-contradictory. In the actual development of -our purposes there is no such orderly and inflexible arrangement of -stages; and if it is a waste of effort to deliberate upon a purpose that -is physically impossible, it may, with still greater force, be argued -that we cannot find, and judge the fitness of, the necessary physical -means until we know what, precisely, it is that we wish to do. The truth -is that there is constant interplay and interaction between the various -phases of the inclusive judgment-process, or rather, more than this, -that there is a complete and thoroughgoing mutual implication. It is -indeed true that our ethical purposes cannot take form in a vacuum apart -from consideration of their physical and economic possibility, but it -is also true that our physical and economic problems are ultimately -meaningless and impossible, whether of statement or of solution, except -as they are interpreted as arising in the course of ethical conflict. - -We have, then, to do, in the present division, with situations in which, -whether at the outset or from time to time during the course of the -reflective process, there is explicit conflict between ends of conduct. -These situations are the special province of the judgment of valuation. -Our line of argument may be briefly indicated in advance as follows: - -1. The judgment of valuation, whether expressed in terms of the -individual experience or in terms of social evolution, is essentially -the process of the explicit and deliberate resolution of conflict -between ends. As an incidental, though nearly always indispensable, step -to the final resolution of such conflict, physical judgment, or, in -general, the judgment of fact or existence, plays its part, this part -being to define the situation in terms of the means necessary for the -execution of the end that is gradually taking form. The two modes of -judgment mutually incite and control each other, and neither could -continue to any useful purpose without this incitement and control of -the other. Both modes of judgment are objective in content and -significance. At the end of the reflective process and immediately upon -the verge of execution of the end or purpose which has taken form the -result may be stated or apprehended in either of two ways: (1) directly, -in terms of the end, and (2) indirectly, in terms of the ordered system -of existent means which have been discovered, determined, and arranged. -If such final survey of the result be taken by way of preparation for -action, or for whatever reason, the end will be apprehended as -possessing ethical value and the means, under conditions later to be -specified, as possessing economic value. - -2. What then is the nature and source of this apprehension of end or -means as valuable? The consciousness of end or means as valuable is an -emotional consciousness expressive of the agent's practical attitude as -determined in the just completed judgment of ethical or economic -valuation and arising in consequence of the inhibition placed upon the -activities which constitute the attitude by the effort of apprehending -or imaging the valued object. Ethical and economic value are thus -strictly correlative; psychologically they are emotional incidents of -apprehending in the two respective ways just indicated the same total -result of the inclusive complex judgment-process. Finally, as the moment -of action comes on, the consciousness of the ethically valued end lapses -first; then the consciousness of economic value is lost in a purely -"physical," _i. e._, technological, consciousness of the means and their -properties and interrelations in the ordered system which has been -arranged; and this finally merges into the immediate and -undifferentiated consciousness of activity as use of the means becomes -sure and unhesitating. - -When we say that the ends which oppose each other in an ethical -situation (that is, a situation for the time being seen in an ethical -aspect) are related, and the ends in an economic situation are not, we -by no means wish to imply that in the one case we have in this fact of -relatedness a satisfactory solution at hand which is wanting in the -other. To feel, for example, that there is a direct and inherent -relationship between a cherished purpose of self-culture and an ideal of -social service which seems now to require the abandonment of the purpose -does not mean that one yet knows just _how_ the two ends should be -related in his life henceforth; and again, to say that one can see no -inherent relation between a desire for books and pictures and the need -of food, excepting in so far as both ends depend for their realization -upon a limited supply of means, is not to say that the issue of the -conflict is not of ethical significance. Such a view as we here reject -would amount to a denial of the possibility of genuinely problematic -ethical situations[126] and would accord with the opinion that economic -judgment as such lies apart from the sphere of ethics and is at most -subject only to occasional revision and control in the light of ethical -considerations. - -By the relatedness of the ends in a situation we mean the fact, more or -less explicitly recognized by the agent, that the new, and as yet -undefined, purpose which has arisen belongs in the same system with the -end, or group of ends, which the standard inhibiting immediate action -represents. The standard inhibits action in obedience to the impulse -that has come to consciousness, and the image of the new end is, on its -part, definite and impressive enough to inhibit action in obedience to -the standard. The relatedness of the two factors is shown in a practical -way by the fact that, in the first instance at least, they are tacitly -expected to work out their own adjustment. By the process already -described in outline, subject and predicate begin to develop and thereby -to approach each other, and a provisional or partial solution of the -problem may thus be reached without resort to any other method than that -of direct comparison and adjustment of the ends involved on either side. -The standard which has been called in question has enough of congruence -with the new imaged purpose to admit of at least some progress toward a -solution through this method. - -We can best come to an understanding of this recognition of the -relatedness of the ends in ethical valuation by pausing to examine -somewhat carefully into the conditions involved in the acceptance or -reflective acknowledgment of a defined end of conduct as being one's -own. Any new end in coming to consciousness encounters some more or -less firmly established habit represented in consciousness by a sign or -symbolic image of some sort, the habit being itself the outcome of past -judgment-process. Our present problem is the significance of the agent's -recognition of a relatedness between his new impulsive end and the end -which represents the habit, and we shall best approach its solution by -considering the various factors and conditions involved in the agent's -conscious recognition of the established end as being such. - - -In any determinate end there is inevitably implied a number of groups of -factual judgments in which are presented the objective conditions under -which execution of the end or purpose must take place. There is in the -first place a general view of environing conditions, physical and -social, presented in a group of judgments (1) descriptive of the means -at hand, of the topography of the region in which the purpose is to be -carried out, of climatic conditions, and the like, and (2) descriptive -of the habits of thought and feeling of the people with whom one is to -deal, their prejudices, their tastes, and their institutions. The -project decided on may, let us say, be an individual or a national -enterprise, whether philanthropic or commercial, which is to be launched -in a distant country peopled by partly civilized races. In addition to -these groups of judgments upon the physical and sociological conditions -under which the work must proceed, there will also be a more or less -adequate and impartial knowledge of one's own physical and mental -fitness for the enterprise, since the work as projected may promise to -tax one's physical powers severely and to require, for its successful -conduct, large measure of industry, devotion, patience, and wisdom. -Indeed any determinate purpose whatever inevitably implies a more or -less varied and comprehensive inventory of conditions. Further -illustration is not necessary for our present purpose. We may say that -in a general way the conditions relevant to a practical purpose will -group themselves naturally under four heads of classification, as -physical, sociological, physiological, and psychological. All four -classes are objective, though the last two embrace conditions peculiar -to the agent as an individual over against the environment to which for -purposes of his present activity he stands in a sense opposed. - -Now our present interest is not so much in the enumeration and -classification of possible relevant conditions in a typical situation as -in the significance of these relevant conditions in the agent's -apprehension of them. Perhaps this significance cannot better be -described than by saying that essentially and impressively the -conditions are apprehended as, taken together, _warranting_ the purpose -that has been determined. We appeal, in support of this account of the -matter, to an impartial introspection of the way in which the means and -conditions of action stand related to the formed purpose in the moment -of survey of a situation. The various details presented in the survey of -a situation are apprehended, not as bare facts such as one might find -set down in a scientist's notebook, but as warranting--as closely, -uniquely, and vitally relevant to--the action that is about to be taken. -This, as we believe, is a fair account of the situation in even the -commoner and simpler emergencies that confront the ordinary man. Quite -conspicuously is it true of cases in which the purpose is a purely -technological one that has been worked out with considerable difficulty -and is therefore not executed until after a somewhat careful survey of -conditions has been taken. It is often true likewise in cases of express -ethical judgment; if the ethical phases of the reflective process have -not been excessively long and difficult, our definite sense of the -ethical value of the act we are about to do lapses quite easily, and the -factual aspects and features of the situation as given in one or more of -the four classes which we have distinguished take on an access of -significance in their character of warranting, confirming, or even -compelling the act determined upon. Of our ordinary sense-perception in -the moments of its actual functioning no less than of conscience in its -aspect of a moral perceptive faculty are the words of Bishop Butler -sensibly true that "to preside and govern, from the very economy and -constitution of man, belongs to it."[127] I Even in cases of more -serious moral difficulty this sanctioning aspect of the means and -conditions of action is not overshadowed. If the situation is one in -which by reason of their complexity these play a conspicuous role and -must be surveyed, by way of preparation on the agents' part, for -performance of the act, they inevitably assume, for the agent, their -proper functional character. In general, the conditions presented in the -system of factual judgments have a certain "rightful authority" which -they seem to lend to the purpose or end with reference to which they -were worked out to their present degree of factual detail. The -conditions can thus seem to sanction the end because conditions and end -have been worked out together. Gradual development on the one side -prompts analytical inquiry upon the other and is in turn directed and -advanced by the results of this inquiry. In the end the result may be -read off either in terms of end or in terms of conditions and -means.[128] The two readings must be in accord and the agent's -apprehension of the conditions as warrant for the end is expression in -consciousness of this "agreement."[129] - -Now in this mode of apprehension of factual conditions there is a highly -important logical implication--an implication which inevitably comes -more and more clearly into view with the continued exercise of judgment, -even though the agent's habit of interest in the scrutiny of perplexing -situations may still remain, by reason of the want of trained capacity -for a broader view, limited in its range quite strictly to the physical -sphere. This implication is, we shall declare at once, that of an -endeavoring, striving, active principle or self which can be helped or -hindered in its unfolding by particular purposes and sets of -corresponding conditions--can lose or gain, through devotion to -particular purposes, in the breadth, fulness, and energy of its life. -The agent's apprehension of and reference to this active principle of -course varies in all degrees of explicitness, according to -circumstances, from the vague awareness that is present in a simple case -of physical judgment to the clear recognition and endeavor at definition -that are characteristic of serious ethical crises. - -That the situation should develop and bring to light this factor is what -should be expected on general grounds of logic--for to say that a set of -conditions warrants or sanctions or confirms a given purpose implies -that our purposes can stand in need of warrant, and this would seem to -be impossible apart from reference to a process whose maintenance and -development in and through our purposes are assumed as being as a matter -of course desirable. It is of the essence of our contention that the -apprehension of the conditions of action as _warranting the end_ is a -primordial and necessary feature of the situation--indeed, its -constitutive feature. If our concern were with the psychological -development of self-consciousness as a phase of reflective experience, -we should endeavor to show that this development is mediated in the -first instance by the "subjective" phenomena of feeling, emotion, and -desire which find their place _in the course_ of the judgment-process. -We should then hold that, with the _conclusion_ of the judgment-process -and the accompanying sense of the known conditions as reassuring and -confirmatory of the end, comes the earliest possibility of a -discriminative recognition of the self as having been all along a -necessary factor in the process. We should hold that outside of the -_process_ of reflective attention there can be no psychical or -"elementary" _beginnings_ of self-consciousness, and then that, except -as a development out of the experience to which we have referred as -marking the _conclusion_ of the attentive process, there can be no -recognized specific and in any degree definable consciousness of self. -All this, however, lies rather beside our present purpose. We wish -simply to insist that it is out of the apprehension of conditions as -reassuring and confirmatory, out of this "primordial germ," that the -agent's definite recognition of himself as a center of development and -expenditure of energy takes its rise. Here are the beginnings of the -possibility of self-conscious ethical and economic valuation. - -This apprehension of the means as _warranting_ is, we have held, a fact -even when the means surveyed are wholly of the physical sort, and we -have thereby implied that consciousness of the self as "energetic" may -take its rise in situations of this type or during the physical stage in -the development of a more complex total situation. It would be an -interesting speculation to consider to what extent and in what way the -development of the sciences of sociology and physiology may have been -essentially facilitated by the emergence of this form of -self-consciousness. But however the case may stand with these sciences -or with the rise of real interest in them in the mind of a given -individual, interest in the objective psychological conditions of a -contemplated act is certainly very closely dependent upon interest in -that subjective self which one has learned to know through the past -exercise of judgment in definition and contemplation of conditions of -the three other kinds. The more diversified and complex the array of -physical and social conditions with reference to which one is to act, -the more important becomes not simply a clearly articulated knowledge of -these, but also a knowledge of oneself. The self that is warranted in -its purpose by the surveyed conditions must hold itself in a steady and -consistent attitude during the performance on pain of "falling short of -its opportunity" and thereby rendering nugatory the reflective process -in which the purpose was worked out. Experience abundantly shows how -easily the assurance that comes with the survey of conditions may come -to grief, though there may have been on the side of the conditions, so -far as defined, no visible change; and in so far as self-consciousness -has already emerged as a distinguishable factor in such situations, -failures of the sort we here refer to are the more easily identified and -interpreted. Some sudden impulse may have broken in upon the execution -of the chosen purpose; there may have been an unexpected shift of -interest away from that general phase of life which the purpose -represented; or in any one of a number of other ways may have come about -a wavering and a slackening in the resolution which marked the -commencement of action. The "energetic" self forthwith (if we may so -express it) recognizes that the sanction which the conditions so far as -then known gave to its purpose was a misleading because an incomplete -one, and it proceeds to develop within itself a new range of objective -fact in which may be worked out the explanation, and thereby a method of -control, of these new disturbing phenomena. The qualities of patience -under disappointment, courage in encountering resistance, steadiness and -self-control in sustained and difficult effort--these qualities and -others of like nature come to be discriminated from each other by -introspective analysis and may be as accurately measured, and in general -as objectively studied, as any of the conditions to a saving knowledge -and respect of which one may already have attained, and these newly -determined psychological conditions will henceforth play the same part -in affording sanction to one's purposes as do the rest. An ordered -system of psychological categories or points of view comes to be -developed, and an accurate statement of conditions of personal -disposition and capacity relevant to each emergency as it arises will -hereafter be worked out--over against and in tension with one's -gradually forming purposes in like manner as are statements of all the -other relevant objective aspects of the situation.[130] - -In the "energetic" self, we shall now seek to show, we have the common -and essential principle of both ethical and economic valuation which -marks these off from other and subordinate types of judgment. Let us -determine as definitely as possible the nature and function of this -principle. - - -The recognition of the chosen purpose as one favorable or otherwise to -the self, and so the recognition of the self as capable of furtherance -or retardation by its chosen purposes, is not always a feature of the -state of mind which may ensue upon completed judgment. In the commoner -situations of the everyday life of normal persons, as practically always -in the lives of persons of relatively undeveloped reflective powers, it -is quite wanting as a separate distinguished phase of the experience. In -such cases it is present, if present at all, merely as the vaguely felt -implicit meaning of the recognition that the known conditions sanction -and confirm the purpose. Such situations yield easily to attack and -threaten none of those dangers, none of those possible occasions for -regret or remorse, of which complex situations make the person of -developed reflective capacity and long experience so keenly -apprehensive. They are disposed of with comparatively little of -conscious reconstruction on either the subject or the predicate side, -and when a conclusion has been reached the agent's recognition of the -conditions carries with it the comfortable though too often delusive -assurance of the complete and perfect eligibility of the purpose. If the -question of eligibility is raised at all, the answer is given on the -tacit principle that "whatever purpose is, is right." To the "plain -man," and to all of us on certain sides of our lives, every purpose for -which the requisite means and factual conditions are found to be at hand -is, just as our purpose, therefore right. - -The same experience of failure and disappointment which proves our -purpose to have been, from the standpoint of enlargement and enrichment -of the self, a mistaken one brings a clearer consciousness of the logic -implicit in our first confident belief in the purpose, and at the same -time emphasizes the need of making this logic explicit. The purpose, as -warranted to us by the conditions and assembled means that lay before -us, was our own, and _as our own_ was implicitly a purpose of -furtherance of the self. The disappointment that has come brings this -implication more clearly into view, and likewise the need of methodical -procedure, not as before in the determination of _conditions_, but in -the determination of purposes as such; for the essence of the situation -is that the _execution_ of the purpose has brought to light some -unforeseen consequence now recognized as having been all the while in -the nature of things involved in the purpose. This consequence or group -of consequences consists (in general terms) in the abatement or arrest -of desirable modes of activity which find their motivation elsewhere in -the agent's system of accepted ends, and it is registered in -consciousness in that sense of restriction or repression from without -which is a notable phase of all emotional experience, particularly in -its early stages. The consequences are as undesirable as they are -unexpected, and the reaction against them, at first emotional, presently -passes over into the form of a reflective interpretation of the -situation to the effect that the self has suffered a loss by reason of -its thoughtless haste in identifying itself with so unsafe a -purpose.[131] - -It is the essential logical function of the consciousness of self to -stimulate the valuation processes which take their rise in the stage of -reflective thought thus attained. The consciousness of self is a -peculiarly baffling theme for discussion from whatever point of view, -because one finds its meaning shifting constantly between the two -extremes of a subjectivity to which "all objects of all thought" are -external and an objective thing or system of energies which is known -just as other things are--known in a sense by itself, to be sure, but -_known_ nevertheless, and thought of as an object standing in possible -relations to other objects. Now, it is of the subjective self that we -are speaking when we say that its essential function is the stimulation -or incitement of the valuation processes, but manifestly in order to -serve thus it must nevertheless be presented in some sort of sensuous -imagery. The subjective self may, in fact, be thought of in many -ways--presented in many different sorts of imagery--but in all its forms -it must be distinguished carefully from that objective self which, as -described in psychology, is the assemblage of conditions under which the -subjective or "energetic" self works out its purposes. It may be the -pale, attenuated double of the body, or a personal being standing in -need of deliverance from sin, or an atom of soul-substance, or, in our -present terminology, a center of developing and unfolding energy. The -significant fact is that, however different in content and in motive -these various presentations of the subjective self may be, they are, one -and all, as presentations and as in so far objective, stimuli to some -definite response. The savage warrior deposits his double in a tree or -stone for safety while he goes into battle; the self that is to be saved -from sin is a self that prompts certain acceptable acts in satisfaction -of the quasi-legal obligations that the fact of sin has laid upon the -agent. The presented self, whatever the form it may assume as -presentation, has its function, and this function is in general that of -stimulus to the conservation and increase, in some sense, of the self -that is not presented, but for whom the presentation is. Now our own -present description of the self as "energetic," as a center or source of -developing and unfolding energy is in its way a presentation. It -consists of sensuous imagery and suggests a mechanical process, or the -growth of a plant perhaps, which if properly safeguarded will go on -satisfactorily--a process which one must not allow to be perturbed or -hindered by external resistance or internal friction or to run down. To -many persons doubtless such an account would seem arbitrary and -fantastic in the extreme, but no great importance need be attached to -its details. The kind and number and sensuous vividness of the details -in which this essential content of presentation may be clothed must of -course depend, for each person, upon his psychical idiosyncrasy. - -Indeed, as the habit of reflection upon purposes comes to be more -firmly fixed, and the procedure of valuation to be consciously -methodical and orderly, the sensuous content of the presented self must -grow constantly more and more attenuated until it has declined into a -mere unexpressed principle or maxim or tacit presumption, prescribing -the free and impartial application of the method of valuation to -particular practical emergencies as these arise. For a self, consisting -of presented content of whatever sort, which one seeks to further -through attentive deliberation upon concrete purposes, must, just in so -far as it has _content_, determine the outcome of ethical judgment in -definite ways. Thus the soul that must be saved from sin (if this be the -content of the presented self) is one that has transgressed the law in -certain ways and the right relations that should subsist between -creature and Creator, and has thereby incurred a more or less -technically definable guilt. This guilt can only be removed and the self -rehabilitated in its normal relations to the law by an appropriate -response to the situation--by a choice on the agent's part, first, of a -certain technical procedure of repentance, and then of a settled purpose -of living as the law prescribes.[132] So also our own image of the self -as "energetic" after the manner of a growing organism may well seem, if -taken too seriously as to its presentational details, to foster a bias -in favor of over-conservative adherence to the established and the -accredited as such.[133] - -The argument of the last few paragraphs may be restated in the -following way in terms of the evolution of the individual's moral -attitude or technique of self-control: - -1. In the stage of moral evolution in which custom and authority are the -controlling principles of conduct, moral judgment in the proper sense of -self-conscious, critical, and reconstructive valuation of purposes is -wanting. Such judgment as finds here a place is at best of the merely -casuistical type, looking to a determination of particular cases as -falling within the scope of fixed and definite concepts. There is no -self-consciousness except such as may be mediated by the sentiment of -willing obedience. It is, at this stage, not the _particular sort_ of -conduct which the law prescribes that in the agent's apprehension -enlarges and develops the self; so far as any thought of enlargement and -development of the self plays a part in influencing conduct, these -effects are such as, in the agent's trusting faith, will come from an -entire and willing acceptance of the law as such. "If any man will do -His will, he shall know of the doctrine." Moreover, the stage of custom -and authority goes along with, in social evolution, either very simple -social conditions or else conditions which, though very complex, are -stable, so that in either case the conditions of conduct are in general -in harmony with the conduct which custom and authority prescribe. The -law, therefore, can be absolute and takes no account of possible -inability to obey. The divine justice punishes infraction of the law -simply as objective infraction; not as sin, in proportion to the -sinner's responsibility. - -2. But inevitably custom and authority come to be inadequate. As social -conditions change, custom becomes antiquated and authority blunders, -wavers, contradicts itself in the endeavor to prescribe suitable modes -of individual conduct. Obedience no longer is the way to light. The self -becomes self-conscious through feeling more and more the repression and -the misdirection of its energies that obedience now involves. This is -the stage of subjective morality or conscience; and the rise of -conscience, the attitude of appeal to conscience, means the beginning of -endeavor at _methodical solution_ of those new problematic situations in -the attempt to deal with which authority as such has palpably collapsed. -We say, however, that conscience is the _beginning_ of this endeavor; -for conscience is, in fact, an ambiguous and essentially transitional -phenomenon. On the one hand conscience is the inner nature of a man -speaking within him, and so the self furthers its own growth in -listening to this expression of itself. In this aspect conscience is -methodological. But on the other hand conscience _speaks_, and, -speaking, must say something determinate, however general this something -may be. In this aspect conscience is a _resume_ of the _generic_ values -realized under the system of custom and authority, but to the present -continued attainment of which the _particular prescriptions_ of custom -and authority are no longer adequate guides. Conscience is thus at once -an inward prompting to the application of logical method to the case in -hand and a body of general or specific rules under some one of which the -case can be subsumed. In ethical theory we accordingly find no unanimity -as to the nature of conscience. At the one extreme it is the voice of -God speaking in us or through us, in detailed and specific terms--and -so, virtually, custom and authority in disguise. At the other it is an -empty abstract intuition that the right is binding upon us--and, so, -simply the hypostasis of demand for a logical procedure. The history of -ethics presents us with all possible intermediate conceptions in which -these extreme motives are more or less skilfully interwoven or combined -in varying proportions. The truth is that conscience is essentially a -transitional conception, and so necessarily looks before and after. In -one of its aspects it is a self which has come to miss (and therefore to -image for itself) the values and, it may be, a certain dawning sense of -vitality and growth which obedience to authority once afforded.[134] In -its other aspect it is a self that is looking forward in a self-reliant -way to the determination on its own account of its purposes and values. -And finally, as for the environing world of means and conditions, -clearly this is not necessarily harmonious with and amenable to -conscience; indeed, in the nature of things it can be only partially so. -The morality of conscience is, therefore, either mystical, a morality -that seeks to escape the world in the very moment of its affirmation -that the world is unreal (because worthless), or else it takes refuge in -a virtual distinction between "absolute" and "relative" morality (to -borrow a terminology from a system in which properly it should have no -place), perhaps setting up as an intermediary between heaven and earth a -machinery of special dispensation.[135] - -3. Conscience professes in general, that is, to be autonomous, and the -profession is, strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. Moreover, -apart from considerations of the logic of the situation, theories of -conscience have, as a matter of fact, always lent themselves kindly to -theological purposes just as the theory of self-realization in its -classic modern statement rests upon a metaphysical doctrine of the -Absolute.[136] Inevitably the movement concealed within this essentially -unstable conception must have its legitimate outcome (1) in a clearing -of the presented self of its fixed elements of content, thus setting it -free in its character of a non-presentational principle of valuation, -and (2) a setting apart of these elements of content from the principle -of valuation as standards for reference and consultation rather than as -law to be obeyed. - -We have thus correlated our account of the logic whereby the "energetic" -self comes to explicit recognition as stimulus to the valuation-process -with the three main stages in the moral evolution of the individual and -the race. We were brought to this first-mentioned part of our discussion -by our endeavor to find out the factors involved in the first acceptance -of a conscious purpose (or, indifferently, the subsequent recognition of -it as a standard)--an endeavor prompted by the need of distinguishing, -with a view to their special analysis, the two types of -valuation-process. We now return to this problem. - - -The following illustration will serve our present undertaking: A lawyer -or man of business is struck by the great need of honest men in public -office, or has had his attention in some impressive way called to the -fact of great inequality in the present distribution of wealth, and to -the diverse evils resulting therefrom. These facts hold his attention, -perhaps against his will, and at last suggest the thought of his making -some personal endeavor toward improvement of conditions, political or -social, as the case may be. On the other hand, however, the man has -before him the promise of a successful or even brilliant career in his -chosen occupation, and is already in the enjoyment of a substantial -income, which is rapidly increasing. Moreover, he has a family growing -up about him, and he is not simply strongly interested in the early -training and development of his children, and desirous of having himself -some share in conducting it, but he sees that the suitable higher -education of his children will in a few years make heavy demands upon -his pecuniary means. Here, then, we have a situation the analysis of -which will enable us to distinguish and define the provinces of ethical -and economic judgment. - -It is easy to see that we have here a conflict between ends. On the one -side is the thought of public service in some important office or, let -us say, the thought of bettering society in a more fundamental way by -joining the propaganda of some proposed social reform. This end rests -upon certain social impulses in the man's nature and appeals to him as -strongly, we may fairly assume, as would any purpose of immediate -self-interest or self-indulgence, so that it stands before him and urges -him with an insistent pertinacity that at first even puts him on his -guard against it as a temptation. Over against this concrete end or -subject of moral valuation stand other ends comprehended or symbolized -in the ideals of regular and steady industry, of material provision for -family, of paternal duty toward children, of scholarly achievement as -lawyer or judge, and the like--ideals which are indeed practical and -personal, but which, as they now function, are general or universal in -character, are lacking in the concreteness and emotional quality which -belong to the new purpose which has just come to imagination and has -brought these ideals into action on the predicate side. Will this life -of social agitation really be quite "respectable," and befitting the -character of a sober and industrious man? Will it enable me to support -and educate my family? Will it permit me to devote sufficient attention -to their present care and training? And will it not so warp my nature, -so narrow and concentrate my interests, as in a measure to disqualify me -for the right exercise of paternal authority over them in years to come? -Moreover, will not a life of agitation, of constant intercourse with -minds and natures in many ways inferior to my own and those of my -present professional associates, lower my intellectual and moral -standards, and so make of me in the end a less useful member of society -than I am at present? These and other questions like them present the -issue in its earlier aspect. Presently, however, the tentative purpose -puts in its defense, appealing to yet other recognized ideals or -standards of self-sacrifice, benevolence, or social justice as witnesses -in its favor. The conflict thus takes on the subject-predicate form, as -has already been explained. On the one hand we have the undefined but -strongly insistent concrete purpose; on the other hand we have a number -of symbolic concepts or universals standing for accepted and accredited -habitual modes of conduct. The problem is that of working the two sides -of the situation together into a unified and harmonious plan of conduct -which shall be at once concrete and particular, as a plan chosen by way -of solution of a given present emergency, and universal, as having due -regard for past modes of conduct, and as itself worthy of consideration -in coping with future emergencies. - -Now, how shall we discriminate the ethical and the economic aspects of -the situation which we have described? We shall most satisfactorily do -this through a consideration of the various sorts of conditions and -means of which account must be taken in working the situation through to -a solution, or (to express it more accurately) the various sorts of -conditions and means which need to be defined over against the purpose -as the purpose gradually develops into detailed form. - -We may say, first of all, that there are _psychological_ conditions -which must be taken into consideration in the case before us. Our thesis -is that in so far as a situation gives rise to the determination of -psychological conditions and is advanced along the way toward final -solution through determination of these, the situation is an ethical -one. In other words, we hold that the ends at issue in the situation are -"related" in so far as they depend upon the same set of psychological -conditions. In so far as these statements are not true of the situation -there must be a resort to economic judgment. - -By the general questions suggested above as presenting themselves to -the agent we have indicated in what way the course of action taken must -have regard to certain psychological considerations. Entering upon the -new way of life will inevitably lessen the agent's interest in his -present professional pursuits and so make difficult, and in the end even -irksome, any attempt at continuing in them either as a partial means of -livelihood or as a recreation. The new work will be absorbing--as indeed -it must be if it is to be worth while. In the same way the man must -recognize that his nature is not one of the rare ones so richly endowed -in capacity for sympathy that constant familiarity with general -conditions of misery and suffering does not dull their fineness of -sensibility to the special concerns and interests of particular -individuals. If he takes his suffering fellow-men at large for his -children, his own children will probably suffer just in so far the loss -of a father's special sympathy and understanding care. And likewise he -must be drawn away and isolated from his friends, for it will be hard -for him, he must foresee, to hold free and intimate converse with men -whose ways of thinking lie apart from his own controlling interest and -for whose insensibility to the things that move him so profoundly he -must come more and more to feel a certain impatience if not contempt. -Not to enlarge upon these possibilities and others of like nature, we -must see that reflection upon the situation must presently bring to -consciousness these various consequences of the kind of action which is -proposed and a recognition that the ground of relation between them and -the action proposed lies in certain qualities and limitations of his own -nature. These latter are for him the general psychological conditions of -action, his "empirical self," the general nature of which he has -doubtless already come to be familiar with in many former situations -perhaps wholly different in superficial aspect from from the present -one. - -Now, just in so far as there is this relation of mutual exclusiveness -between the end proposed and certain of the standard ends or modes of -conduct which are involved, judgment will be by the direct or ethical -method of adjustment presently to be described. Let us assume -accordingly that a tentative solution of the problem has been reached to -the effect that a portion of the lawyer's time shall be given to his -profession and to his family life, and that the remainder shall be given -to a moderate participation in the social propaganda. Over against this -tentative ethical solution, as its warrant in the sense explained above, -will stand in the survey of the situation that may now be taken a -certain fairly definite disposition or _Anlage_ of the capacities and -functions of the empirical self.[137] Now on the basis of the ethical -solution thus reached there will be further study of the situation, -perhaps as a result of failure in the attempt to carry the solution into -practice, but more probably as a further preparation for overt action. -Forthwith it develops that the compromise proposed will be impossible. -Participation in the social agitation will excite hostility on the part -of the classes from which possible clients would come and will cause -distrust and a suspicion of inattention to details of business among the -lawyer's present clientage. There are, in a word, a whole assemblage of -"external" sociological conditions (and we need not stop to speak of -physical conditions which co-operate with these and contribute to their -effect) which effectually veto the plan proposed. In general these -external conditions are such as to deprive the agent of the means of -living in the manner which the ethical determination of the end -proposes. In the present case, unless some other more feasible -compromise can be devised, either the one extreme or the other must be -chosen--either continuance in the profession and the corresponding -general scheme of life or the social propaganda and reliance upon such -scant and precarious income as it may incidentally afford. - -We can now define the economic aspect of a situation in terms of our -present illustration. The end which the lawyer had in view in a vague -and tentative way was, as we saw, defined with reference to his ethical -standards--that is to say, a certain measure of participation in the new -work was determined as satisfactory at once to his ideals of devotion to -the cause of social justice and to his sense of obligation to himself -and to his family. In this sense, logically speaking, a subject was -defined to which a system of predicates, comprehended perhaps under the -general predicate of right or good, applies. Now, however, it appears, -from the inspection of the material and social environment, that the -execution of this purpose, perfectly in accord though it may be with the -spiritual capacities and powers of the agent, is possible only on pain -of certain other consequences, certain other sacrifices, which have not -hitherto been considered. That a half-hearted interest in his profession -would still not prevent his earning a moderate income from it was never -questioned in the ethical "first approximation" to a final decision, but -now the issue is fairly presented, and, as we must see, in a very -difficult and distressing way; for the essence of the situation is that -the ends now in conflict, that of earning a living and caring for his -family and that of laboring for the social good, are not intrinsically -(that is, from the standpoint of the empirical self) incompatible. On -the contrary, these two ends are psychologically quite compatible, as -the outcome of the ethical judgment shows; only the "external" -conditions oppose them to each other. The difficulty of the case lies, -then, just in the fact that the conflicting ends, both standing, as they -do, for strong personal interests of the self, nevertheless cannot be -brought to an adjustment by the direct method of an apportionment -between them of the "spiritual resources" or "energies" of the self. -Instead, the case is one calling for an apportionment of the external -means, and so, proximately, not for immediate determination of the final -end, but for economic determination of the means. - - -We come now to the task of describing, so far as this may be possible, -the judgment or valuation-processes which correspond to the types of -situation thus distinguished. We are able now to see that these must be -constructive processes, in the sense that in and through them courses of -conduct adapted to unique situations are shaped by the concourse of -established standards with a new end which has arisen and put in its -claim for recognition. We can see, moreover, that these -valuation-processes effect a construction of a different order from that -given in factual judgment. Factual judgment determines external objects -as means or conditions of action from standpoints suggested by the -analysis and development of ends. Judgments of valuation determine -concrete purposes from standpoints given in recognized general purposes -of the self--purposes which are general in virtue of their having been -taken by abstraction from concrete cases, in which they have received -particular formulation as purposes, and set apart as typical modes of -conduct in general serviceable to the "energetic" self.[138] Logically -factual judgment is at all times subordinate to valuational; when -valuational judgment has become consciously deliberate, this logical -subordination becomes explicit and factual judgment appears in its true -character. Its essential function is that of presenting the conditions -which sanction and stimulate our ethically and economically determined -purposes.[139] Finally, in the construction of purposes and -reconstruction of standards in valuation the ideal of the expansion and -development of the "energetic" self controls--not as a "presented" or -contentual self prescribing particular modes of conduct, but as a -principle prescribing the greatest possible openness to suggestion and -an impartial application of the method of valuation to the case in hand. -As we have said, in whatever sensuous image we figure the "energetic" -self, its essential character lies in its function of stimulating -methodical valuation. In place of the two-faced and ambiguous -"presented" self, which is characteristic of the stage of conscience, we -now have in the stage of valuation the "energetic" self on the one hand -and standards on the other.[140] - -We have now to consider the actual procedure of valuation, and first the -ethical form as above defined. Bearing in mind that we are not concerned -with cases of obedience to authority or deference to conscience, let us -take a case of genuine moral conflict such as we were considering some -time since. Suppose that one has the impulse to indulge in some form of -amusement which he has been in the habit of considering frivolous or -absolutely wrong. The end, as soon as imaged, or rather as the condition -of its being imaged, encounters past habits of conduct symbolized by -standards--standards which may be presented under a variety of forms, a -maxim learned in early childhood, the ideal of a Stoic sage or Christian -saint, the example of some friend, or a precept put in abstract terms, -but which, however presented, are essentially symbolic of established -habits of thought or action.[141] Solution of such a problem proceeds, -in general, along two closely interwoven lines: (1) collation and -comparison of cases recognized as conforming to the standard, with a -view to determining the standard type of conduct in a less ambiguous -way, and (2) definition of the relations between this type of conduct -and other recognized types in the catalogue of virtues. - -Now, these two movements are in fact inseparable, for, without reference -to the entire system of virtues of which the one now asserting itself is -a member, the comparison of cases with a view to definition of the -virtue would be blind and hopeless of any outcome. The agent in the case -before us desires to be temperate in amusement and to make profitable -use of leisure time, but after all he may wonder whether these ideals -really require the austerities of certain mediaeval saints or the Stoic -_ataraxy_. The saint's feats of spiritual athletics may have served a -useful purpose, in ruder times, as evidence of human power to lead a -virtuous and thoughtful life, but can such self-denial now be required -of the moral man? It is apparent, in short, that the superficially -conceived ideal must be analyzed. We must consider the "spirit" of our -saint or hero, not the letter of his conduct, as we say, and in -interpreting it make due allowance for the conditions of the time in -which he lived and the grade of general intelligence of those he sought -to edify. Whether our standard is a person or a parable or an abstractly -formulated precept, the logic of the situation is the same in every case -of judgment. The analysis of a standard cannot proceed without the -"synthesis" or co-ordination of the type of conduct thereby defined with -other distinguishable recognized types of conduct into a comprehensive -ideal of life as a whole. In the last resort the implicit relations of -all the virtues will be made explicit in the process of defining -accurately any one of them. - -In the last resort, then, the predicate of the ethical judgment is the -whole system of the recognized habits of the agent, and each -judgment-process is in its outcome a readjustment of the system to -accommodate the new habit that has been seeking admission. Both the old -habits and the new impulse have been modified in the process just as the -intension of a class term and the particular "subsumed" under the class -are reciprocally modified in the ordinary judgment of sense-perception. -We are once more able to see that the process of ethical judgment or -valuation is not a process of subsumption or classification, of -_ascertaining_ the value of particular modes of conduct, but on the -contrary a process of determining or _assigning_ value. Each judgment -process means a new and more or less thoroughgoing redetermination of -the self and hence a fixation of the ethical value of the conduct whose -emergence as a purpose gave rise to the process. The moral experience is -not essentially and in its typical emergencies a _recognition_ of values -with a view to shaping one's course accordingly, but rather a -determining or a _fixation_ of values which shall serve for the time -being, but be subject at all times to re-appraisal. - -If the present discussion were primarily intended as a contribution to -general ethical theory, it would be a part of our purpose to show in -detail that any formulation of an ethical ideal in contentual "material" -terms must always be inadequate for practical purposes and hence -theoretically indefensible. This, as we believe, could be shown true of -the popularly current ideal of self-realization as well as of hedonism -in its various forms and the older systems of conscience or the moral -sense. These all are essentially fixed ideals admitting of more or less -complete specification in point of content and regarded as tests or -canons by appeal to which the moral quality of any concrete act can be -deductively ascertained. They are the ethical analogues of such -metaphysical principles as the Cartesian God or the Substance of -Spinoza, and the logic implied in regarding them as adequate standards -for the valuation of conduct is the logic whereby the Rationalist -sought to deduce from concepts the world of particular things. The -present desideratum in ethical theory would appear to be, not further -attempts at definition of a moral ideal of any sort, but the development -of a logical method for the valuation of ideals and ends in which the -results of more modern researches in the theory of knowledge should be -made use of--in which the concept of self should play the part, not of -the concept of Substance in a rationalistic metaphysics,[142] but of -such a principle as that of the conservation of energy, for example, in -scientific inference.[143] - -We have, then, in each readjustment of the activities of the self a -reconstruction in knowledge of ethical reality--a reconstruction which -at the same time involves the assignment of a definite value to the new -mode of conduct which has been worked out in the readjustment. We -conclude, then, that the ethical experience is one of continuous -construction and reconstruction of an order of objective reality, within -which the world of sense-perception is comprised as the world of more or -less refractory means to the attainment of ethical purposes. In this -process of construction of ethical reality current moral standards play -the same part as concepts already defined--that is to say, the agent's -present habits--do in the typical judgment of sense-perception. They -play the part of symbols suggestive of recognized and heretofore -habitual modes of action with reference to conduct of the type of the -particular instance that is under consideration, serving thus to bring -to bear upon the subject of the judgment sooner or later the entire -moral self. The outcome is a new self, and so for the future a new -standard, in which the past self as represented by the former standard -and the new impulse have been brought to mutual adjustment. Our position -is that this adjustment is essentially experimental and that in it the -_general principle_ of the unity and expansion of the self must be -presupposed, as in inductive inference general principles of teleology, -of the conservation of energy, and of organic interconnection of parts -in living things are presupposed. The unity and increase of the self is -not a test or canon, but a principle of moral experimentation.[144] - -Finally, we must note one further parallel between ethical judgment and -the judgment of sense-perception and science. However the man of science -may, as a nominalist, regard the laws of nature as mere observed -uniformities of fact and particulars as the true realities, these same -laws will nevertheless on occasion have a distinctly objective character -in his actual apprehension of them. The stubbornness with which a -certain material may refuse to lend itself to a desired purpose will -commonly be reinforced, as a matter of apprehension, by one's -recognition of the "scientific necessity" of the phenomenon. As offering -resistance the thing itself, as we have seen, becomes objective; so also -does the law of which this case may be recognized as only a particular -example--and the other type of objectivity experience we need not here -do more than mention as likewise possible in one's apprehension of the -law as well as of the "facts" of nature. Both types of objectivity -attach to the moral law as well. The standard that restrains is one -"above" us or "beyond" us. Even Kant, as the similitude of the starry -heavens would suggest, was not incapable of a faint "emotion of the -heteronomous," and authority in one form or another is a moral force -whose objective validity as moral, both in its inhibiting and in its -sanctioning aspects, human nature is prone to acknowledge. The -apprehension of objectivity is everywhere, as we have held, emotional. -One type of situation in which the moral law takes on this character is -found in the interposition of the law to check a forward tendency; the -other is found in the instant of transition from doubt to the new -adjustment that has been reached. In the one case the law is -"inexorable" in its demands. In the other case there are two -possibilities: If the adjustment has been essentially a rejection of the -new "temptation," the law which one obeys is one no longer inexorable, -but sustaining, as a rock of salvation. If the adjustment is a -distinctly new attitude, the sense of the objectivity of the principle -embodied in it will commonly be less strong, if not for the time being -almost wholly wanting; but in the moment of overt action it will in some -degree wear the character of a firm truth upon which one has taken his -stand. - -This general view of the logical constitution of the moral experience -may suggest a comparison with the fundamental doctrine of the British -Intellectualist school. The Intellectualist writers were very largely -guided in their expositions by the desire of refuting on the one hand -Hobbes and on the other Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Against Hobbes they -wished to establish the obligatory character of the moral law entirely -apart from sanction or enactment by political authority. Against the -Sentimentalists they wished to vindicate its objectivity and permanence. -This twofold purpose they accomplished by holding that the morality of -conduct lies in its conformity to the "objective nature of things," the -knowledge of which, in its moral aspects, is logically deducible from -certain moral axioms, self-evident like those of mathematics. Now this -mathematical analogy is the key to the whole position of the -Intellectualist writers. By so conceiving the nature of knowledge these -men seriously weakened their strong general position. Mathematics is -just that species of knowledge which is most remote from and apparently -independent of any reference to conduct, and the Intellectualists, by -choosing it as their ideal, were thereby rendered incapable of -explaining the obligatoriness of the moral law. An adequate psychology -of knowledge would have obviated this difficulty in their system. - - -The occasion for economic judgment is given, as we have seen, in a -conflict between ends not incompatible, in view of any ascertainable -conditions of the agent's nature as an empirical self, but inhibitory of -each other in view of what we have described as conditions external to -the agent. Thus the lawyer in our illustration found his plan of -compromise thwarted by the existence of such sociological conditions as -would make the practice of his profession, in the manner intended, -impossible, and so cut off his income. Similarly the peasant in a -European country finds that (for reasons which, more probably, he does -not understand) he can no longer earn a living in the accustomed way, -and emigrates to a country in which his capital and his physical -energies may be more profitably employed. So also in the everyday lives -of all of us ends and interests quite disparate, so far as any relation -to each other through our psychical capacities is concerned, stand very -frequently in opposition, nevertheless, and calling for adjustment. We -must make a choice between amusement or intellectual pursuits or the -means of aesthetic culture, on the one hand, and the common necessaries -of life on the other, and the difficulty of the situation lies just in -absence of any sort of "spiritual affinity" between these ends. There is -no necessary ratio between the satisfaction of the common needs of life -and the cultivation of the higher faculties--no ratio for which the -individual can ever find a sanction in the constitution of his empirical -self through the direct method of ethical valuation. The common needs -must have their measure of recognition, but no attempted ethical -valuation of them can ever come to a result convincingly warranted to -the "energetic" self by psychological conditions. The economic situation -as such is in this sense (that is, from the standpoint of any recognized -ethical standards) unintelligible. It is this ethical unintelligibility -that often lends a genuine element of tragedy to situations which press -urgently and in which the ends at issue are of great ethical moment. It -is no small matter to the emigrant, for example, that he must cut the -very roots by which he has grown to the sort of man he finds himself to -be. His whole nature protests against this violence, and questions its -necessity, though the necessity is unmistakable and it would be quite -impossible for him not to act accordingly. Nevertheless, tragic as such -a conflict may well be, it does not differ in any logically essential -way, does not differ in its degree of strictly logical difficulty, from -the ethically much less serious economic problems of our everyday life. - -Now, we have already defined the economic act for which economic -judgment is preparatory as being, in general terms, the diversion of -certain means from a present use to which they have been devoted to a -new use which has come to seem in a general way desirable.[145] Thus, in -the cases just mentioned, the lawyer contemplates the virtual purchase -of his new career by the income which his profession might in years to -come afford him, the emigrant seeks a better market for his labor, and -the pleasure-seeker and the ambitious student and the buyer of a -commodity in the market propose to themselves, each one, the diversion -from some hitherto intended use of a sum of money. Manifestly it is -immaterial from our logical point of view whether the means in question -which one proposes to apply in some new way are in the nature of -physical and mental strength, or materials and implements of manufacture -ready to be used, or means of purchase of some sort wherewith the -desired service or commodity may be obtained at once. The economic -problem, to state it technically, is the problem of the _reapplicability -of the means_, interpreting the category of means quite broadly. - -In a word, then, the method of procedure adapted to the economic type of -situation is that of valuation of the means, not that of direct -valuation of the ends. This method is one of valuation since, like the -ethical method, it is determinative of a purpose, but it accomplishes -this result in its own distinctive way. The problem of our present -analysis will accordingly be how this method of valuation of the means -is able to help toward an adjustment of disparate or unrelated ends -which the ethical method is inadequate to effect. - -Let us assume that a vague purpose of foreign travel, for example, has -presented itself in imagination, and that the preliminary stage of -ethical judgment has been passed through, with the result that the -purpose, in a more definite form than it could have at first, is now -ready for economic consideration. In the first place the cost of the -journey must be determined, and this step, in terms of our present point -of view, is simply a methodological device whereby certain ends which -the standards involved in the stage of ethical judgment could not -suggest or could not effectually take into co-operation with themselves -in their determination of the end are brought into play. Ascertaining -the means suggests these disparate ends, these established modes of use -of the means, with the result that the agent's "forward tendency" is -checked. Shall the necessary sums be spent in foreign travel or shall -they be spent in the present ways--in providing various physical -necessities and comforts, or for various forms of amusement, or in -increasing investments in business enterprises? These modes of use do -not admit of ethical comparison with the plan of foreign travel, and the -agent's interest must therefore now be centered on the means. - -It is in this check to the agent's forward tendency that the logical -status of the means is evinced. As merely so much money the means could -only serve to further the execution of the purpose that is forming, -since under the circumstances it could only prompt immediate -expenditure. Like the subject in factual judgment, the means in economic -judgment have their problematic aspect which as effectually hinders the -desired use of them as could any palpable physical defect. This -problematic aspect consists in the fact of the present established mode -of use which the now-forming purpose threatens to disturb, and it is the -agent's interest in this mode of use that turns his attention to the -valuation of the means. - -It need hardly be pointed out that in the economic life we find -situations exactly corresponding to those of "conscience and temptation" -and mechanical "pull and haul" which were discriminated in the ethical -sphere and marked off from judgment properly so called. Indeed it seems -reasonable to think, on general grounds of introspection, that these -methods of decision (if they deserve the name) are, relatively speaking, -more frequently relied upon in the economic than in the moral life. The -economic method of true judgment is roundabout and more complex and more -difficult than ethical, and involves a more express recourse to those -abstract conceptions which for the most part are only implicitly -involved in valuation of the other type. The economic type of valuation, -in fact, differs from the ethical, not in an absolute or essential way, -but rather in the explicitness with which it brings to light and lays -bare the vital elements in valuation as such. In general, then, the -economic process would seem necessarily to embrace three stages, which -will first of all be enumerated and then very briefly explained and -discussed. These are: (1) a preliminary consideration of the means -necessary to attain the end--which must be vague and tentative, of -course, for the reason that the end as imagined is so, as compared with -the fulness of detail which must belong to it before it can be finally -accepted; (2) a consideration of the means, as thus provisionally taken, -in the light of their present devotion to other purposes, this present -devotion of them being the outcome, in some degree at least, of past -valuation; (3) final definition of the means with reference to the -proposed use through an adjustment effected between this and the factors -involved in the past valuation. - -1. In the first stage as throughout, it must be carefully noted, the -means are under consideration not primarily in their physical aspect, -but simply as _subject to a possible redisposition_. Thus it is not -money as lawful currency receivable at the steamship office for an ocean -passage, nor tools and materials and labor-power technically suitable -for the production of a desired object, that is the subject of the -economic judgment. The problem of redisposition would of course not be -raised were the means not technically adaptable to the purpose, nor on -the other hand can the means in the course of economic judgment, as a -rule, escape some measure of further (factual) inquiry into their -technical properties; but the standpoints are nevertheless distinct. -Again, it must be noted that the means in this first stage will be only -roughly measured. The length of one's stay abroad, the size of the -house one wishes to build, the purpose whatever it may be, is still -undefined--these are in fact the very matters which the process must -determine--and in the first instance it is "money in general" or "a -large sum of money" with reference to which we raise the economic -problem. The category of quantity is in fact essentially an economic -one; it is essentially a standpoint for determining the means of action -in such a way as to facilitate their economic valuation. The reader -familiar with the writings of the Austrian school of economists will -easily recall how uniformly in their discussions of the principle of -marginal utility these writers assume outright in the first place the -division of the stock of goods into definite units, and then raise the -question of how the value of a unit is measured. The stock contains -already a hundred bushels of wheat or ten loaves of bread--apparently as -a matter of metaphysical necessity--whereas in fact the essential -economic problem is this very one of how "wheat at large" comes to be -put in sacks of a certain size and "bread in general" to be baked in -twelve-ounce loaves. The subdivision of the stock and the valuation of -the unit are not successive stages, but inseparably correlative phases -of the valuation-process as a whole. The outcome may be stated either -way, in accordance with one's interest in the situation. - -2. But the unmeasured means as redisposable in an as yet undetermined -way bring to consciousness established measured uses to which the means -have been heretofore assigned in definite amounts. In this way the -process of determining a definite quantum as redisposable (which is to -say, of attaining to a definite acceptable plan of conduct) can begin. -How, then, does this fact of past assignment to uses still recognized as -desirable figure in the situation? In the first place the past -assignment may have been (1) an outcome of past economic valuation, (2) -an unhesitating or non-economic act executive of an ethical decision, -or (3) an act of more or less conscious obedience to "conscience" or -"authority." In either case it now stands as a course of conduct which -at the time was, in the way explained above, _sanctioned_ to the -agent, to the "energetic" self, by the means and conditions recognized -as bearing upon it. In this sense, then, we have, in this recognition -of the past adjustment and of the economic character which the -means now have in virtue of it, what we may term a judgment of -"energy-equivalence" between the means and their established uses. For -to the agent it was the essential meaning of the sense of sanction felt -when the means were assigned to these uses that the "energetic" self -would on the whole be furthered thereby--and this in view of all the -sacrifices that this use would entail, or in view of the sacrifices -required for the production of the means, if the case were one in which -the means were not at hand and could only be secured by a more or less -extended production process. - -In the illustration we have been considering, it will be observed, there -is an extensive schedule of present uses which the new project calls in -question and from which the means must be diverted. This is in fact the -commoner case. A new use of money will affect, as a rule, not simply a -single present mode of expenditure, but will very probably involve a -readjustment throughout the whole schedule of expenditure which our -separate past valuations of money have in effect co-operated in -establishing. So likewise if we wish to use part of a store of building -materials or of food, or of any other subdivisible commodity, we -encounter an ordered system of consumption rather than a single -predetermined use which we have not yet enjoyed. Where this is the case -the whole process of valuation is greatly facilitated, but this is not -essential. The means in cases of true economic valuation may be capable -of but a single use, like a railroad ticket or a perishable piece of -fruit, or of a virtually endless series of uses, like a painting or a -literary masterpiece. Whether the means figure as representing but a -single use or stand for the conservation of an extensive system, their -economic significance is the same. They are the "energy-equivalent" of -this use or system of uses considered as an act or system of acts of -consumption in furtherance of the self. Their past assignment meant then -and means now simply this, that the "energetic" self would thereby gain -more than it would lose through the inevitable sacrifices. This is the -economic significance of the means in virtue of which they are now -problematic to the extent of checking, for a time at least, forward -tendency toward the desired end.[146] - -3. The judgment of energy-equivalence, then, defines the inhibiting -economic aspect of the means, and moreover defines it for the means as -subdivided and set apart for a schedule of uses if this was the form of -the past adjustments to which reference is made. The problem of the -third stage of the process is that of "bringing subject and predicate -together," as we have elsewhere expressed it--that is, of determining, -in the light of the economic character of the means as just ascertained, -what measure of satisfaction, if any, may be accorded to the new and as -yet undefined desire. The new disposition of the means, if one is to be -made, must bring to the "energetic" self a degree of furtherance and -development which shall be sensibly as great as would come from the -established method of consumption. The means, as economic, are means to -the conservation of the old adjustment, and any new disposal of them or -of any portion of them for a full or partial execution of the new -purpose must make out at least as good a case. It must appear that the -new disposition is not only physically possible, but also economically -necessary in the light of the same principle of expansion of the self as -sanctioned the disposition now in force. It must make the self in some -way more efficient--whether more strong and symmetrical in body, more -skilled in work, more clear of brain, or more efficient in whatever -other concrete way may be desired. - -Psychologically the sanction of any course of action which is taken as -evidence of conformity to the general rule thus inadequately stated is -the more or less strong sense of "relaxation" of attentive strain which -comes with the shift of attention, in the final survey, from means to -end. We may accordingly, for the sake of greater definiteness, restate -in the following terms the process which has just been sketched: The -ends in conflict at the outset are ends which do not sensibly bear upon -each other through their dependence upon a common fund of psychical -capacities or energies. They are related in the agent's experience -solely through their dependence upon a common stock of physical means, -and they do not therefore admit of adjustment through the ethical type -of process. The economic process consists essentially of a revival in -imagination of the experiences accompanying the former disposition of -the means and a re-enforcement by these of the means in their adherence -to that former and still recognized disposition. If an adapted form of -the new end can be imagined which will mediate a like experience of -relaxation when the attention shifts from the means, thus emotionally -re-enforced in their economic status, to the end as thus conceived, the -means will be recognized as economically redisposable. Thus the method -of valuation of the means makes possible, through appeal to the -sensibly invariable experience of relaxation or assurance in the outcome -of judgment, a co-ordination of disparate ends which the ethical method -of direct adjustment could not effect.[147] - -The economic process thus presents on analysis the same factors as does -the ethical. On the subject side we have the means--which as economic -are problematic as to their reapplicability. On the predicate side we -have the suggested mode of reapplication in tension against conservative -ideals of application to established purposes. Just as it may be held -that the general ethical predicate is that of Right or Good--that is, -deserving of adoption into the system of one's ends--so the economic -predicate applied to the means as these come in the end to be defined is -the general concept Reappliable. And in general the distinction of the -types is not an ultimate one, for the more deliberately and rigorously -the method of economic valuation is pursued--in such a case, for -example, as that of the prospective emigrant--the stronger will be the -agent's sense of a genuinely ethical sanction as belonging to the -decision which is in the end worked out. The more certain and sincere, -therefore, will be the agent's judgment that the means must be -reapplied, for on the sense of sanction of which we speak rests the -explicit judgment that the purpose formed is expansive of the self. - -From the analysis thus presented it must appear, therefore, that the -economic type of judgment is in our sense a constructive process. Its -function is to determine a particular commodity or portion of a stock of -some commodity in its economic character as _disposable_, and in -performing this function it presents a definite reality in the economic -order. Moreover, in thus defining the particular, recourse is had to -more or less distinctively namable economic standards which are in the -last resort symbols representing established habits of consumption in -the light of which the means, _prima facie_, seem not to be available -for any other purposes. These economic standards, like ethical standards -and the class concepts of science and our ordinary perceptual -experience, are, with all due respect to nominalism, constitutive of a -real world--a world which is real because it lends form and significance -to our knowledge of particulars as stimuli to conduct. - - -We have now before us sufficient reason for our thesis that the -valuation-process in both its forms is constructive of an order of -reality, and we have sufficiently explained the relation which the -economic order bears to the inclusive and logically prior order of -ethical objects and relations. We are now in a position to see that in -being thus constructive of reality (taking the conception in its proper -functional meaning) they are at the same time constructive of the self, -since the reality which they construct is in its functional aspect the -assemblage of means and conditions, of stimuli, in short, for the -development and expansion of the self. We shall bring this main division -of our study to a close with a series of remarks in explanation and -illustration of this view. - -Let us consider once more the factors present in the agent's final -survey of the situation after the completion of the judgment-process and -on the verge of action. These factors are, as we have seen, (1) -recognition of conditions sanctioning the purpose formed, (2) -recognition of the purpose as, in view of this sanction, warranted to -the "energetic" self as an eligible method of expansion and development, -and (3) recognition of the "energetic" self, conversely, as in -possession, in virtue of the favorable conditions given in factual -judgment, of this new method of furtherance. These three factors are -manifestly not so much factors co-operating in the situation as -inseparable aspects of it distinguishable from each other and admitting -of discriminative emphasis in accordance with the degree of reflective -power which the individual may possess or choose to exercise. Strictly -speaking these three aspects are present in every conscious recognition -of a purpose as one's own and as presently to be carried into effect, -but they are not always present in equal conspicuousness, and never with -equal logical importance for the individual. In fact this enumeration of -aspects coincides with our enumeration of the three stages in the -evolution of the individual's conscious moral attitude toward new -purposes given in impulse--in the third of which the last named of these -aspects comes to the fore with the others in logical or functional -subordination to it. - -Now it will be apparent on grounds of logic, as on the evidence of -simple introspection, that in this third type of attitude--in the -attitude of true valuation, that is to say--the energetic self cannot be -identified with the chosen purpose. The purpose is a determinate -specified act to be performed subject to recognized conditions, and with -the use of the co-ordinated means; the self, on the other hand, is a -process to which this particular purpose is, indeed, from the standpoint -of the self's conservation and increase, indispensable, but which is -nevertheless apart from the purpose in the sense that without the -purpose it would still be a self, though perhaps a narrower and less -developed one. Our standpoint here as elsewhere, the reader must -remember, is the logical. It is the standpoint of the agent's own -interpretation of his experience of judgment during the judgment-process -and at its close, and not the standpoint of the psychological mediation -of this experience as a series of occurrences. Thus we are here far from -wishing to deny the general proposition that a man's purposes are an -expression of his nature, as the psychologist might describe it, or the -proposition that a man's conduct and his character are one and the same -thing viewed from different points of view. We wish merely to insist -upon the fact that these psychological propositions are not a true -account of the agent's own experience of himself and of his purposes -_while these latter are in the making or are on the verge of execution_. -There is indeed no conflict between this "inside view" of the -judgment-process and of the final survey and the psychological -propositions just mentioned. The identity of conduct and character means -not simply that as the man is so does he act, but quite as much, and in -a more important way, that as he acts so is he and so does he become. It -is, then, the essence of the agent's own view of the situation that his -character is in the making and that the purpose is the method to be -taken. To the agent the self is not, indeed, independent of the purpose, -for plainly it is recognized that upon just this purpose the self is, in -the sense explained, in a vital way dependent. Nevertheless the self is -in the agent's apprehension essentially beyond the purpose, and larger -than the purpose, and even, we may say, metaphysically apart from it. -Now the conclusion which we wish to draw from this examination of the -agent's attitude in judgment is that no formulation of an ideal self can -ever be adequate to his purposes, not simply because any such -formulation must, as Green allows, inevitably be incomplete and -inconsistent, but because the self as a process is in the agent's own -apprehension of it inherently incapable of formulation. Any formulation -that might be attempted must be in terms of particular purposes (since -in a modern ethical theory the self must be a "concrete" and not an -abstract universal), and it is easy to see that any such would be, to -the agent in the attitude of true ethical judgment, worse than useless. -It could as contentual and concrete only be a composite of existing -standards, more or less coherently put together, offered to the agent as -a substitute for the new standard which he is trying to work out. If -there were not need of a new standard there would be no -judgment-process; the agent must be, to say the least, embarrassed, even -if the unwitting imposture does not deceive him, when such a composite, -useful and indeed indispensable in its proper place as a standard of -reference and a source of suggestion, is urged upon him as suitable for -a purpose which in the very nature of the case it is logically incapable -of serving.[148] - -To the agent, then, the "energetic" self can never be represented as an -ideal--can never be expressed in terms of purpose--since it is in its -very nature logically incongruous with any possible particular purpose -or generalization of such purposes. It is commonly imaged by the agent -in some manner of sensuous terms, but it is imaged, in so far as the -case is one of judgment in a proper sense, for use as a stimulus to the -methodical process of valuation--not as a standard, which if really -adequate would make valuation unnecessary. The agent's consciousness of -himself as "energetic" cannot be an ideal; it comes to consciousness -only through the endeavor, first to follow, and then, in a later stage -of moral development, to use ideals, and has for its function, as a -presentation, the incitement of the process of methodical use of -standards in the control of the agent's impulsive ends. It is not an -anticipatory vision of the final goal of life, but the agent's coming to -consciousness of the general impulse and movement of the life that is. - -It is an inevitable consequence of acceptance of a contentual view of -the "energetic" self as one's ideal that reflective morality should tend -to degenerate into an introspective conscientiousness constantly in -unstable equilibrium between a pharisaical selfishness on the one hand -and a morally scarcely more dangerous hypocrisy on the other. There is -certainly much justice in the stinging characterization of "Neo-Hegelian -Egoism" which Mr. Taylor somewhere in his unsearchable book applies to -the currently prevailing conventionalized type of idealistic ethics. If -the self of the valuation-process is an ultimate goal of effort, then -there must certainly be an irreconcilable contrast to the disadvantage -of the latter between the plain man's objective desire for right -conduct, as such, and for the welfare of his fellow-beings, and the -moralist's anxious questionings of the rectitude of the motives by which -his conformity to the fixed moral standard are prompted.[149] Into the -value and significance of the attitude of conscientious examination of -one's moral motives we are not here concerned to inquire, but need only -insist, in accordance with our present view, that its value must be -distinctly subordinate and incidental to the general course and outcome -of the valuation-process. In the valuation-process, consciousness of -self is not an object of solicitude, but simply, we repeat, a pure -presentation of stimulus, having for its office the incitement, and if -need be the reincitement, of the attitude of deference to the -suggestions of old standards and openness to the petitions of new -impulse, and of methodically bringing these to bear upon each other. - -The outcome of such a process, of course, cannot be predicted--and for -the same reasons as make unpredictable the scientist's factual -hypothesis. Just as the scientist's data are incomplete and ill-assorted -and unorganized, for the reason that they have, of necessity, been -collected, and must at the outset be interpreted, in the light of -present concepts, whose inadequacy the very existence of the problem at -issue demonstrates, so the final moral purpose that shall be developed -is not to be deduced from any possible inventory of the situation as it -stands. The process in both cases is one of reconstruction, and the test -of the validity of the reconstruction must in both cases be of the same -essentially practical character. In both cases the process is -constructive of reality, in the functional signification of the term. In -both, the judgment process is constructive also of the self, in the -sense that upon the determination of the agent's future attitude the -cumulative outcome of his past attitudes is methodically brought to -bear.[150] - - -V - -Judgments of value are, then, objective in their import in the same -sense as are the factual judgments in which the conditions of action are -presented. The ideal problematic situation is, in the last resort, -ethical, in the sense of requiring for its solution determination of the -new end that has arisen with reference to existing standards. In -structure and in function the judgment in which the outcome of this -process is presented is knowledge, and objective in the only valid -acceptation of the term. - -But, after all, it may be urged, is it not the essential mark of the -objective that it should be accessible to all men, and not in the nature -of the case valid for only a single individual? At best the objectivity -of content which has been made out for the judgment of value is purely -functional, and not such as can be verified by appeal to the consensus -of other persons. The agent's _assurance_ of the reality of the economic -or ethical subject-matter which he is endeavoring to determine, and his -sense of the objectivity of the results which he reaches, need not be -denied. These may well enough be illusions of personal prejudice or -passion, or even normal illusions of the reflective faculty, like that -of interpreting the secondary qualities of bodies as objective in the -same sense as are the "bulk, figure, extension, number, and motion of -their solid parts."[151] Any man can see the physical object to which I -point, and verify with his own eyes the qualities which I ascribe to it, -but no man can either understand or verify my judgment that the purpose -I have formed is in accord with rational ideals of industry and -self-denial, or that this portion of my winter's fuel may be given to a -neighbor who has none. - -But this line of objection proves too much, for, made consistent with -itself, it really amounts to a denial that the very judgment of -sense-perception, to which it appeals so confidently as a criterion, has -objective import. The first division of this study was intended to show -that every object in the experience of each individual is for the -individual a unique construction of his own, determined in form and in -details by individual interests and purposes, and therefore different -from that object in the experience of any other individual which in -social intercourse passes current as the same. The real object is for me -the object which functions in my experience, presenting problematic -aspects for solution, and lending itself more or less serviceably to my -purposes; and this object is, we hold, not the object as socially -current, but the complete object which, as complete in its determination -with reference to my unique purposes, cannot possibly have social -currency. The objection as stated cuts away the very ground on which it -rests, since the shortcoming which it finds in the judgment of ethical -or economic value is present in the particular judgment of -sense-perception also. The object about which I can assure myself by an -immediate appeal to other persons is the object in its bare "conceptual" -aspects--the object as a dictionary might define it, the commodity as it -might be described in a trade catalogue, or the ethical act as defined -by the criminal code or in the treatise of a moral philosopher. It is an -object consisting of a central core or fixed deposit of meaning, which -renders it significant in a certain general way to a number of persons, -or even to all men, but which is not yet adequately known by me from the -standpoint of my present forming purpose. In virtue of these conceptual -characters it is adaptable to my purpose, which is as yet general and -indeterminate; but in the nature of the case it cannot yet be known to -me as applicable to my prospective concrete purpose, as this shall come -to be through judgment. - -Thus, if the test of objectivity of import is to be that the judgment -shall present an object or a fact which, as presented, is socially -current among men and not shut away in the individual intelligence -apart from the possibility of social verification, then the apparent -nominalism of the objection we are considering turns out to be the -uttermost extreme of realism. Such a test amounts to a virtual -affirmation that the sole objective reality is the conceptual, and that -the "accidents" of one's particular object of sense-perception are the -arbitrary play of private preference or fancy. At this point, however, -the objection may shift its ground and take refuge in some such position -as the following: The real object is indeed the object which the -individual knows in relation to his particular purpose, and it is indeed -impossible that the individual's judgment should be limited in its -content to coincidence with the conceptual elements of meaning which are -socially current. The building-stone which one has judged precisely fit -for a special purpose, the specimen which the mineralogist or the -botanist examines under his microscope, the tool whose peculiarity of -working one has learned to make allowance for in use--these all are, of -course, highly individual objects, possessing for the person in question -an indefinite number of objective aspects of which no other person can -possibly be conscious at the time. And, more than this, even though the -individual may, in his scrutiny of the object, have discovered no -conspicuous new qualities in it which were not present in the socially -current meaning, the object will still possess an individuality making -it genuinely unique merely through its co-ordination with other objects -in the mechanical process of working out the purpose in hand. It is at -least an object standing here at just this time, a tool cutting this -particular piece of stone and striking at this instant with this -particular ringing sound, and these perhaps wholly nonessential facts -will nevertheless serve to individualize the object (if one chances to -think of them) in the sense of making it such a one as no other person -knows. All this may be granted, the objection may allow, and yet the -vital point remains; for this is not what it was intended, even in the -first place, to deny. The vital point at issue is not whether the object -which I know _is_ known as I know it by any other person, but whether, -in the nature of things, it is one that _can_ be so known. - -Herein, then, lies the difference between judgments of fact and -judgments of value. The mineralogist can train his pupil to see -precisely what he himself sees; and so likewise in any case of -sense-perception, the object, however recondite may be the qualities or -features which one may see in it, _can_ nevertheless be seen by any -other person in precisely the same way on the single, more often not -insuperably difficult, condition that the discoverer shall point these -out or otherwise prepare the other for seeing them. But with the ton of -coal which one may judge economically disposable for a charitable -purpose the case stands differently, since it is not in its visible or -other physical aspects that the ton of coal is here the subject of the -judgment. It is as having been set apart _by oneself exclusively_ for -other uses that the ton of coal now functions as an object and now -possesses the character which the economic judgment has given it; and -the case stands similarly with a contemplated act, of telling the truth -in a trying situation. The valuation placed upon the commodity or upon -the moral act depends essentially upon psychological conditions of -temperament, disposition, mood, or whim into which it would be -impossible for another person to enter, and these depend upon conditions -of past training and native endowment which can never occur or be -combined in future in precisely the same way for any other individual. -In short, the physical object is _describable_ and _can_ be made -socially current, though doubtless with more or less of difficulty, if -other persons will attend to it and learn to see it as I see it; but the -value of an economic object or a moral act depends upon my desires and -feelings, and therefore must remain a matter of my private appreciation. - -In answering this amended form of the objection it is entirely -unnecessary to discuss the issue of fact which it has raised as to -whether or not complete description of a physical object or event is a -practical or theoretical possibility. It need only be pointed out that -at best such complete description can only be successful in its purpose -on condition that the individual upon whom the experiment is tried be -willing to attend and have the requisite "apperceptive background." The -accuracy with which another person's knowledge shall copy the knowledge -which I endeavor to impart to him must manifestly depend upon these two -leading conditions, not to mention also the measure of my own -pedagogical and literary skill. Any consideration of such a purely -psychological problem as is here suggested would be entirely out of -place in a discussion the purpose of which is not that of analyzing the -process of judgment, but that of interpreting its meaning aspects. Let -us grant the entire psychological possibility of making socially current -in the manner here suggested the most highly individual and concrete -cognition of an object one may please, and let us grant, moreover, that -this possibility has been actually realized. This concurrent testimony -of the witness will doubtless confirm one's impression of the accuracy -of the process of observation and inference whereby the knowledge which -has been imparted was first gained, but we must deny that it can do more -than this. For indeed, apart from some independent self-reliant -conviction of the objective validity of the knowledge in question, how -should another's assent be taken as _confirmation_ and not rather as -evidence of one's own mere skill in suggestion and of the other's -susceptibility thereto? We must deny that even in the improved form the -criterion of social currency is a valid one. In a word, the social -currency of knowledge to the extent to which it can exist requires as -its condition, and is evidence of, the equal social currency of certain -interests, purposes, or points of view for predication; and if it be -possible to make socially current an item of concrete knowledge, with -all its concrete fulness of detail, then _a fortiori_ it must be -possible to make socially current the concrete individual purpose with -reference to which this item of knowledge first of all took form. -Whether such a thing be psychologically possible at all the reader may -decide; but if it be possible in the sphere of knowledge of fact, then -it must be possible in the sphere of valuation. In short, judgment in -either field, in definition of a certain object or commodity or moral -act as, for the agent, an objective fact possessing certain characters, -involves the tacit assumption of social verifiability as a matter of -course; but it does not rest upon this assumption, nor is this -assumption the essence of its meaning. To say that my judgment is -socially verifiable, that my concrete object of perception or of -valuation would be seen as I see it by any person in precisely my place, -is merely a tautological way of formally announcing that _I have made -the judgment_ and have now a definite object which to me has a certain -definite functional meaning. - -Thus, instead of drawing a distinction between the realms of fact and -value, as between what is or can be common to all intelligent beings and -what must be unique for each individual one, we must hold that the two -realms are coextensive. The socially current object answers to a certain -general type of conscious purpose or interest active in the individual -and so to a general habit of valuation, and the concrete object to a -special determination of this type of purpose with reference to others -in the recognized working system of life. The agent's final attitude, on -the conclusion of the judgment-process, may be expressed in either sort -of judgment--in a judgment of the value of commodity or moral purpose, -or in a judgment of concrete fact setting forth the "external" -conditions which warrant the purpose to the "energetic" self. Throughout -the judgment-process there is a correlation between the movement whereby -the socially current object develops into the adapted means and that -whereby the socially current type of conduct develops into the defined -and valued purpose.[152] - -At this point, however, a second general objection presents itself. -However individual the content of my knowledge of physical fact may be, -and however irrelevant, from the logical point of view, to my confidence -in its objective validity may be the possibility of sharing it with -other persons, nevertheless it refers to an object which is in some -sense permanent, and therein differs from my valuations. In economic -valuation I reach a definition of a certain commodity and am confirmed -in it by all the conditions that enter into my final survey of the -situation. But my desire for the new sort of consumption may fail, and -so expose my valuation to easy attack from any new desire that may -arise; or my supply of the commodity in question may be suddenly -increased or diminished, and my valuation of the unit quantity thereby -changed. Likewise my ethical valuation may have to be reversed (as Mr. -Taylor has insisted) by reason of a change of disposition or particular -desire which makes impossible, except in obedience to some other and -inclusive valuation, further adherence to it. And these changes take -place without any accompanying sense of their doing violence to -objective fact or, on the other hand, any judgment of their being in -the nature of corrections of previous errors in valuation, and so more -closely in accordance with the truth. Moreover, a new valuation, taking -the place of an old, does not supplement its predecessor as one set of -judgments about a physical object may supplement another, made from a -different point of view, but does literally take its place, and this -without necessarily condemning it as having been erroneous. - -This general objection rests upon a number of fairly obvious -misconceptions, and its strength is apparent only. In the first place, -the question of the objectivity of any type of judgment must in the end, -as we have seen, reduce itself to a question of the judgment's import to -the agent. However the agent's valuations may shift from time to time, -each several one will be sanctioned to the agent by the changed -conditions exhibited in the inventory which the agent takes at the close -of judgment which has formed it. The conditions have changed, and the -valuation of the earlier purpose has likewise changed; but the new -purpose is sanctioned by the new conditions, and the test of the -presumed validity of the new valuation can only be in the manner already -discussed[153] the test of actual execution of the purpose. In the -change, as the agent interprets the situation, there is no violation of -the former purpose nor a nearer approach to truth. Each valuation is -true for the situation to which it corresponds. We are obviously not -here considering the case of error. An error in valuation is evidenced -to the agent, not by the need of a new valuation answering to changed -conditions, but by the failure of a given valuation to make good its -promise, although to all appearance conditions have remained unchanged. -If the conditions have changed, then the purpose and the conditions -_must_ be redetermined, if the expansion of the "energetic" self is to -continue; but the former valuation does not thereby become untrue. - -These brief remarks should suffice by way of answer, but it will serve -advantageously to illustrate our general position if we pursue the -objection somewhat farther. The physical object is, nevertheless, -_permanent_, it will be said, and this surely distinguishes it from the -object (now freely acknowledged as such) of the value-judgment. To one -man gold may be soluble in _aqua regia_ and to another worth so many -pence an ounce, but different and individual as are these judgments and -the standpoints they respectively imply, the gold is _one_, impartially -admitting at the same time of both characterizations. On the other hand, -one cannot judge an act good and bad at once. The purpose of deception -that may be good is one controlled and shaped by ideals quite different -from those which permit deception of the evil sort--is, in truth, taken -as a total act, altogether different from the purpose of deception which -one condemns, and not, like the "parcel of matter" in the two judgments -about gold, the subject of both valuations. - -A brief consideration of the meaning of this "parcel of matter" will -easily expose the weakness of the plea. In the last analysis the "parcel -of matter" must for the agent reduce itself, let us say, to certain -controllable energies centering about certain closely contiguous points -in space and capable, in their exercise, of setting free or checking -other energies in the system of nature. Thus, put in _aqua regia_ the -gold will dissolve, but in the atmosphere it retains its brilliant -color, and in the photographer's solution its energies have still a -different mode of manifestation. And thus it would appear that the -various predicates which are applied to "gold" imply, each one, a unique -set of conditions. Gold is soluble in _aqua regia_, but not if it is to -retain its yellow luster; which predicate is to be true of it depends -upon the conditions under which the energies "resident in the gold" are -to be set free, just as the moral character of an act depends upon the -social conditions obtaining at the time of its performance--that is, -upon the ideals with reference to which it has been shaped in judgment. -How can one maintain that in a literal and concrete physical sense gold -in process of solution is the "same" as gold entering into chemical -combination? Surely the energy conditions which constitute the "gold" in -the two processes are not the same--and can one nowadays hope to find -sameness in unchangeable atoms?[154] - -In a word, the permanent substance or "real essence" that admits of -various mutually supplementary determinations corresponding to diverse -points of view is, strictly speaking, a convenient abstraction, and not -an existent fact in time--and we shall maintain that the same species of -abstraction has its proper place, and in fact occurs, in the sphere of -moral judgment. The type of moral conduct that in every actual case of -its occurrence in the moral order is determined in some unique and -special way by relation to other standards is precisely analogous to the -"substance" that is now dissolved in _aqua regia_ and now made to pass -in the form of current coin, but cannot be treated in both ways at once. -Both are abstractions. The "gold" is a name for the general possibility -of attaining any one of a certain set of particular ends by -appropriately co-ordinating certain energies, resident elsewhere in the -physical system, with those at present stored in this particular "parcel -of matter;" the result to be attained depends not alone upon the "parcel -of matter," but also upon the particular energies brought to bear upon -it from without. Now let us take a type of conduct which is sometimes -judged good and sometimes bad. Deception, for example, is such a -type--and as a type it simply stands for the general possibility of -furtherance or detriment to the "energetic" self according as it is -determined in the concrete instance by ideals of social well-being or by -considerations of immediate personal advantage. - -For the type-form of conduct--when considered, not as a type of mere -physical performance, but as conduct in the technical sense of a -possible purpose of the self--is, in the sense we have explained, a -symbol for the general possibility of access or dissipation of spiritual -energy--energy which must be set free by the bringing to bear of other -energies upon it, and which furthers or works counter to the enlargement -and development of the self according to the mode of its co-ordination -with other energies which the self has already turned to its -purposes.[155] But actual conduct is concrete always and never typical; -and so likewise, we have sought to show, actual "substance," the -objective thing referred to in the factual judgment, is always concrete -and never an essence. It is not a fixed thing admitting of a -simultaneous variety of conflicting determinations and practical uses, -but absolutely unique and already determined to its unique character by -the whole assemblage of physical conditions which affect it at the time -and which it in turn reacts upon. In the moral as in the physical sphere -the fundamental category would, on our present account, appear to be -that of energy. The particular physical object given in judgment is a -concrete realization, in the form of a particular means or instrument, -of that general possibility of attaining ends which the concept of a -fixed fund of energy, interpreted as a logical postulate or principle of -inference, expresses. The particular moral or economic act is a -particular way in which the energy of the self may be increased or -diminished. In both spheres the reality presented in the finished -judgment is objective as being a stimulus to the setting free of the -energies for which it stands. Once more, then, our answer to the -objection we have been considering must be that the object as the -permanent substrate is merely an abstract symbol standing for the -indeterminate means in general set over against the self. Corresponding -to it we have, on the other side, the concept of the "energetic" -self--the self that is purposive in general, expansive somehow or other. - - -The function of completed factual judgment in the development of -experience is, we have held, that of warranting to the agent the -completed purpose which his judgment of value expresses. This view calls -for some further comment and illustration in closing the present -division. In the first place the statement implies that the conditions -which factual judgment presents in the "final survey" as sanctioning the -purpose have not _determined_ the purpose, since prior to the -determination of the purpose the conditions were not, and could not be, -so presented. The question, therefore, naturally arises whether our -meaning is that in the formation of our purposes in valuation the -recognition of existing conditions plays no part. Our answer can be -indicated only in the barest outline as follows: - -The agent must, of course, in an economic judgment-process, recognize -and take account of such facts as the technical adaptability of the -means he is proposing to use to the new purpose that is forming, as also -of environing conditions which may affect the success which he may meet -with in applying them. He must consider also his own physical strength -and qualities of mind with a view to this same technical problem. And -similarly in ethical valuation, as we have seen, the psychology of the -"empirical ego" must play its part. But the conditions thus recognized -are, as we might seek to show more in detail, explainable as the outcome -of past factual judgment-processes, and on the occasion of their -original definition in the form in which they now are known played the -sanctioning part of which we have so often spoken. They therefore -correspond to the agent's accepted practical ideals, so that the control -which his past experience exercises over his present conduct may be -stated equally well in either sort of terms--in terms of his prevailing -recognized standards, or in terms of his present knowledge of the -conditions which his new purpose must respect. Thus, in general, the -concept of a physical order conditioning the conduct of all men and -presented in a definite body of socially current knowledge is the -logical correlate of the moral law conceived as a categorical imperative -prescribing certain types of conduct. - -Thus the error of regarding the agent's conduct in a present emergency -as an outcome of existing determining conditions is logically identical -with the corresponding error of the ethical theory of self-realization. -The latter holds the logical possibility of a determinate descriptive -ideal (already realized in the unchanging Absolute Self) which is -adequate to the solution of all possible ethical problems. The former -holds that all conduct must be subject to the determining force of -external conditions which, if not at present completely known, are at -least in theory knowable. The physical universe in its original nebulous -state contained the "promise and potency" of all that has been in the -way of human conduct and of all that is to be. Into the fixed mechanical -system no new energy can enter and from it none of the original fund of -energy can be lost. This mechanical theory of conduct is the essential -basis of the hedonistic theory of ethics; and it would not be difficult -to show that Green's criticism of this latter and his own affirmative -theory of the moral ideal (as also the current conventional criticism of -hedonism in the same tenor by the school of Green) are in a logical -sense identical with it. For the assumption that conduct is determined -by existing objective conditions is precisely the logical correlate of -the concept of a contentual and "realizable" ideal moral self.[156] - -We may now interpret, in the light of our general view of the function -of factual judgment, the concept of the "empirical self" referred to in -our discussion of the various types of sanctioning condition which may -enter into the "final survey." The "empirical self" of psychological -science is a construction gradually put together by psychologist or -introspective layman as an interpretation of the way in which accepted -concrete modes of conduct, in the determination of which standards have -been operative, have worked out in practice to the furtherance or -impoverishment of the "energetic" self. We have seen that the ambiguous -presented self which functions in the moral attitude of obedience to -authority or to conscience gives place in the attitude of conscious -valuation to apprehension of the "energetic" self, on the one hand, and -descriptive concepts of particular types of conduct, on the other. The -"empirical self" at the same time makes its appearance as a constantly -expanding inventory of the "spiritual resources" which the "energetic" -self has at its disposal. These are the functions of the soul which a -functional psychology shows us in operation--powers of attention, -strength of memory, fertility in associative recall, and the like--and -these are the resources wherewith the "energetic" self may execute, and -so exploit to its own furtherance, the purposes which, in particular -emergencies, new end and recognized standards may work out in -co-operation.[157] - - -VI - -In the foregoing pages we have consistently used the expressions -"ethical and economic judgment" and "judgment of valuation" as -synonymous. This may have seemed to the reader something very like a -begging of the question from the outset, as taking for granted that very -judgmental character of our valuational experience which it was the -professed object of our discussion to establish. We are thus called upon -very briefly to consider, first of all, the relations which subsist -between the consciousness of value and the process which we have -described as that of valuation. This will enable us, in the second -place, to determine the logical function which belongs to the -consciousness of value in the general economy of life. The consciousness -of value is a perfectly definite and distinctive psychical fact mediated -by a doubtless highly complex set of psychical or ultimately -physiological conditions. As such it admits of descriptive analysis, and -in a complete theory of value such descriptive analysis should certainly -find a place. It would doubtless throw much light upon the origin of -valuation as a process, and of valuing as an attitude, and admirably -illustrate the view of the function of the consciousness of value to -which a logical study of valuation as a process seems to lead us. This -problem in analysis belongs, however, to psychology, and therefore lies -apart from our present purpose; nor is it necessary to the establishment -of our present view to undertake it. It is necessary for our purpose -only to suggest, for purposes of identification, a brief description of -the value-consciousness, and to indicate its place in the process of -reflective thought. - -The consciousness of value may best be described, by way of first -approximation, in the language of the Austrian economists as a sense of -the "importance" to oneself of a commodity or defined moral purpose. It -belongs to the agent's attitude of survey or recapitulation which ensues -upon the completion of the judgment-process and is mediated by attention -to the ethical or economic object in its newly defined character of -specific conduciveness to the well-being of the self. The commodity, in -virtue of its ascertained physical properties, is adapted to certain -modes of use or consumption which, through valuation of the commodity, -have come to be accepted as desirable. The moral act likewise has been -approved by virtue of its having certain definite sociological -tendencies, or being conducive to the welfare and happiness of a friend. -Thus commodity or moral act, as the case may be, has a determinate -complexity of meaning which has been judged as, in one sense, expansive -of the self, and the value-consciousness we may identify as that sense -of the valued object's importance which is mediated by recognition of it -as the bearer of this complexity of concrete meaning. The meaning is, as -we may say, "condensed" or "compacted" into the object as given in -sense-perception, and because the meaning stands for expansion of the -self, the object in taking it up into itself receives the character of -importance as a valued object. - -The sense of importance thus is expressive of an attitude upon the -agent's part. The concrete meanings which make up the content of the -object's importance would inevitably, if left to themselves, prompt -overt action. The commodity would forthwith be applied to its new use or -the moral act would be performed. The self would, as we may express it, -possess itself of the spiritual energies resident in the chosen purpose. -The attitude of survey, however, inhibits this action of the self and -the sense of importance is the resulting emotional apprehension of the -value of the object hereby brought to recognition. Now, it should be -carefully observed that the particular concrete emotions appropriate to -the details of the valued purpose are not what we here intend. The -purpose may spring from some impulse of self-interest, hatred, -patriotism, or love, and the psychical material of its presentation -during the agent's survey will be the varied complex of qualitative -emotion that comes from inhibition of the detailed activities which make -up the purpose as a whole. So also the apprehension of the physical -object of economic valuation is largely, if not altogether, emotional in -its psychical constitution. Psychologically these emotions are the -purpose--they are the "stuff" of which the purpose as a psychical fact -occurring in time is made. But we must bear in mind that it is not the -purpose as a psychical fact that is the object of the agent's -valuing--any more than is the tool with which one cuts perceived as a -molecular mass or as an aggregation of centers of ether-stress. As a -cognized object of value the purpose is, in our schematic terminology, a -source of energy for the increase of the self, and thus the -consciousness of value is the perfectly specific emotion arising from -restraint put upon the self in its movement of appropriation of this -energy. In contrast with the concrete emotions which are the substance -of the purpose as presented, the consciousness of value may be called a -"formal" emotion or the emotion of a typical reflective attitude. - -The valuing attitude we may then describe as that of "resolution" on the -part of the self to adhere to the finished purpose which it now surveys, -with a view to exploitation of the purpose. The connection between the -valuation-process and the consciousness of value may be stated thus: The -valuation-process works out (and necessarily in cognitive, objective -terms) the purpose which is valued in the agent's survey. But this -development of the purpose is at the same time determination of the -"energetic" self to acceptance of the purpose that shall be worked out. -Thus the valuation-process is the source of the consciousness of value -in the twofold way (1) of defining the object valued, and (2) of -determining the self to the attitude of resolution to adhere to it and -exploit it.[158] The consciousness of value is the apprehension of an -object in its complete functional character as a factor in experience. - -The function of the consciousness of value must now be very briefly -considered. The phenomenon is a striking one, and apparently, as the -economists especially have insisted, of much practical importance in the -conduct of life.[159] And yet on our account of the phenomenon, as it -may appear, the problem of assigning to it a function must be, to say -the least, difficult. For the consciousness of value is, we have held, -emotional, and, on the conception of emotion in general which we have -taken for granted throughout our present discussion, this mode of being -conscious is merely a reflex of a state of tension in activity. As such -it merely reports in consciousness a process of motor co-ordination -already going on and in the nature of the case can contribute nothing to -the outcome. - -Now if it were in a direct way as immediately felt emotion that the -consciousness of value must be functional if functional at all, then the -problem might well be given up; but it would be a serious blunder to -conceive the problem in this strictly psychological way. A logical -statement of the problem would raise a different issue--not the question -of whether emotion as emotion can in any sense be functional in -experience, but whether the consciousness of value and emotion in -general may not receive reflective interpretation and thereby, becoming -objective, play a part as a factor in subsequent valuation-processes. -Indeed, the psychological statement of the problem misses the entire -point at issue and leads directly to the wholly irrelevant general -problem of whether any mode of consciousness whatever can, _as -consciousness_, put forth energy and be a factor in controlling conduct. -The present problem is properly a logical one. What is the agent's -apprehension of the matter? In his subsequent reflective processes of -valuation does the consciousness of value, which was a feature of the -survey on a past occasion, receive recognition in any way and so play a -part? This is simply a question of fact and clearly, as a question -relating to the logical content of the agent's reflective process, has -no connection with or interest in the problem of a possible dynamic -efficacy of consciousness as such. The question properly is logical, not -psychological or metaphysical. - -Thus stated, then, the problem seems to admit of answer--and along the -line already suggested in our account of economic valuation.[160] -Recognition of the fact that the consciousness of value was experienced -in the survey of a certain purpose on an earlier occasion confirms this -purpose, holding the means, in an economic situation, to their appointed -use and strengthening adherence to the standard in the ethical case. -This recognition serves as stimulus to a reproduction, in memory, of the -cognitive details of the earlier survey, and so in the ideal case to a -more or less complete and recognizably adequate reinstatement of the -earlier valuing attitude, and so to a reinstatement of the consciousness -of value itself. The result is a strengthening of the established -valuation, a more efficacious control of the new end claiming -recognition, and an assured measure of continuity of ethical development -from the old valuation to the new. The function thus assigned to the -consciousness of value finds abundant illustration elsewhere in the -field of emotion. The stated festivals of antiquity commemorative of -regularly recurrent phases of agricultural and pastoral life, as also -the festivals in observance of signal events in the private and -political life of the individual, would appear to find, more or less -distinctly, here their explanation. These festivals must have been -prompted by a more or less conscious recognition of the social value -inherent in the important functions making up the life of the community, -and of the individual citizen as a member of the community and as an -individual. They secured the end of a sustained and enhanced interest in -these normal functions by effecting, through a symbolic reproduction of -these, an intensified and glorified experience of the emotional meaning -normally and inherently belonging to them.[161] In the same way the -rites of the religious cults of Greece, not to mention kindred phenomena -so abundantly to be found in lower civilizations as well as in our own, -served to fortify the individual in a certain consistent and salutary -course of institutional and private life.[162] - -It has been taken for granted throughout that there are but two forms of -valuation-process, the ethical and the economic. The reason for this -limitation may already be sufficiently apparent, but it will further -illustrate our general conception of the valuation-process briefly to -indicate it in detail. What shall be said, for example, of the common -use of the term "value" in such expressions as the "value of life," the -"emotional value" of an object or a moral act, the "natural value" of a -type of impulsive activity? In these uses of the word the reference is -apparently to one's own incommunicable inner experience of living, of -perception of the object, or of the impulse, which cannot be suggested -to any other person who has not himself had the experience. My pleasure, -my color-sensation in its affective aspect, my emotion, are inner and -subjective, and I distinguish them by such expressions as the above from -the visible, tangible object to which I ascribe them as constituting its -immediate or natural value to me. This broader use of the term "value" -has not found recognition in the foregoing pages, and it requires here a -word of comment. So long as these phases of the experience of the object -are not recognized as separable in thought from the object viewed as an -external condition or means, they would apparently be better -characterized in some other way. If, however, they are so recognized, -and are thereby taken as determinative of the agent's practical attitude -toward the thing, we have merely our typical situation of ethical -valuation of some implied purpose as conducive to the self and economic -valuation of the means as requisites for execution of the purpose. Our -general criterion for the propriety of terming any mode of consciousness -the _value_ of an object must be that it shall perform a logical -function and not simply be referred to in its aspect of psychical fact. -The feeling or emotion, or whatever the mode of consciousness in -question may be, must play the recognized part, in the agent's survey of -the situation, of prompting and supporting a definite practical attitude -with reference to the object. If, in short, the experience in question -enters in any way into a conscious purpose of the agent, it may properly -be termed a value.[163] - -Aesthetic value also has not been recognized, and for the opposite -reason. The sense of beauty would appear to be a correlate of relatively -perfect attained adjustment between the agent and his natural -environment or the conditions suggested more or less impressively by the -work of art. There must, indeed, be present in the aesthetic experience -an element of unsatisfied curiosity sufficient to stimulate an interest -in the changing or diverse aspects of the beautiful object, but this -must not be sufficient to prompt reflective judgment of the details -presented. On the whole, the aesthetic experience would appear to be -essentially post-judgmental and appreciative. It comes on the particular -occasion, not as the result of a judgment-process of the valuational -type, but as an immediate appreciation. As an immediate appreciation it -has no logical function and on our principles must be denied the name of -value. Our standpoint must be that of the experiencing individual. The -aesthetic experience as a type may well be a development out of the -artistic and so find its ultimate explanation in the psychology of -man's primitive technological occupations in the ordinary course of -life. It is, as we have said, of the post-judgmental type, and so may -very probably be but the cumulative outcome of closer and closer -approximations along certain lines to a perfected adjustment with the -conditions of life. It may thus have its origin in past processes of the -reflective valuational type. Nevertheless, viewed in the light of its -actual present character and status in experience, the aesthetic must be -excluded from the sphere of values. - - -Thus the realms of fact and value are both real, but that of value is -logically prior and so the "more real." The realm of fact is that of -conditions warranting the purposes of the self; as a separate order, -complete and absolute in itself, it is an abstraction that has forgotten -the reason for which it was made. Reality in the logical sense is that -which furthers the development of the self. The purpose that falls short -of its promise in this regard is unreal--not, indeed, in the -psychological sense that it never existed in imagination, but in the -logical sense that it is no longer valued. Within the inclusive realm of -reality the realm of fact is that of the means which serve the concrete -purposes which the self accepts. The completed purpose, however, is not -_means_, since still behind and beyond it there can be no other concrete -valued purpose which it can serve. Nor is it an ultimate _end_, since in -its character of accepted and valued end the self adheres _to_ it, and -it therefore cannot express the _whole_ purpose of the self to whose -unspecifiable fulness and increase of activity it is but a temporary -probational contributor. It is rather in the nature of a formula or -method of behavior to which the self ascribes reality by recognizing and -accepting it as its own. - - - - -XI - -SOME LOGICAL ASPECTS OF PURPOSE - -INTRODUCTORY - - -Whenever and wherever it was discovered that the content of experience -as given in immediate perception could be reconstructed through ideas, -then and there began to emerge such questions as these: What is the -significance of this reconstructive power? What is the relation between -it and the immediate experience? What is the relative value of each in -experience as a whole? What is their relation to truth and error? If -thinking leads to truth, and thought must yet get its material from -perception, how then shall the product of thought escape infection from -the material? On the other hand, if truth is to be found in the -immediate experience, can it here be preserved from the blighting -effects of thought? For so insistent and pervasive is this activity of -thought that it appears to penetrate into the sanctum of perception -itself. Turning to a third possibility, if it should be found that truth -and error are concerned with both--that they are products of the -combined activity of perception and reflection--then just what does each -do? And what in their operations marks the difference between truth and -error? Or still again, if truth and error cannot be found in the -operations of perception and reflection as such, then they must be -located in the relation of these processes to something else. If so, -what is this something else? Out of such questions as these is logic -born. - -There may be those who will object to some of these questions as -"logical" problems--those who would limit logic to a description of the -forms and processes of reconstruction, relegating the question of the -criterion of truth and error to "epistemology." This objection we must -here dismiss summarily by saying that, by whatever name it is called, a -treatment of the forms and processes of thought must deal with the -criterion of truth and error, since these different "forms" are just -those which thought assumes in attempting to reach truth under different -conditions. - -Certainly in the beginning the Greeks regarded their newly discovered -power of thought as anything but formal. Indeed, it soon became so -"substantial" that it was regarded as simply a new world of fact, of -existence alongside of, or rather above, the world of perception. But -Socrates hailed ideas as deliverers from the contradictions and -paradoxes into which experience interpreted in terms of immediate -sense-perception had fallen. In the concept Socrates found a solution -for the then pressing problems of social life. The Socratic universal is -not a mere empty form which thought imposes upon the world. It is -something which thought creates in order that a life of social -interaction and reciprocity may go on. This need not mean that the -Greeks were reflectively conscious of this, but that this was the way -the concept was actually used and developed by Socrates. - -In attempting to formulate the relation between this new world of ideas -and immediate sense-experience, Plato constructed his scheme of -substantiation and participation. The Platonic doctrine of -substantiation and participation is an expression of the conviction that -anything so valuable as Socrates had shown ideas to be could not be -merely formal or unreal. Up to the discovery of these ideas reality lay -in the "substances" of perception. Hence in order to have that reality -to which their worth, their value in life, entitled them, the ideas must -be substantiated. - -This introduction of the newly discovered ideas into the world of -substances and reality wrought, of course, a change in the conception -of the latter--a change which has well-nigh dominated the entire -philosophic development ever since. Let us recall that the aim of -Socrates was to find something that would prevent society from going to -pieces under the influence of the disintegrating conception of -experience as a mere flux of given immediate content. Now, in the -concepts Socrates discovered the basis for just this much-needed -wholeness and stability. Moreover, the fact that unity and stability -were the actual social needs of the hour led not only to the concepts -which furnished them being conceived as substantial and real, but to -their being regarded as a higher type of reality, as "more real" than -the given, immediate experiences of perception. They were higher and -more real because, just then, they answered the pressing social need. - -The ideas supplied this unity because they furnished ends, purposes, to -the given material of perception. The given is now given for something; -for something more, too, than mere contemplation. Socrates also showed, -by the most acute analysis, that the content of these ends, these -purposes, was social through and through. - -From the ethical standpoint this teleological character of the idea is -clearly recognized. But as "real," the ideas must be stated in the -metaphysical terms of substance and attribute. Here the social need is -abstracted from and lost to sight. The fundamental attributes of the -ideas are now a metaphysical unity and stability. Hence unity and -stability, wholeness and completeness, are the very essence of reality, -while multiplicity and change constitute the nature of appearance. Thus -does Plato's reality become, as Windelband says, "an immaterial -eleaticism which seeks true being in the ideas without troubling itself -about the world of generation and occurrence which it leaves to -perception and opinion."[164] - -Now it is the momentum of this conception of reality as a stable and -complete system of absolute ideas, the development of which we have just -roughly sketched, that is so important historically. Why this conception -of reality, which apparently grew out of a particular historical -situation, should have dominated philosophic theory for over two -thousand years appears at first somewhat puzzling. Those who still hold -and defend it will of course say that this survival is evidence of its -validity. But, after all, our human world may be yet very young. It may -be that "a thousand years are but as yesterday." At any rate philosophy -has never been in a hurry to reconstruct conceptions which served their -day and generation with such distinction as did the Platonic conception -of reality. And this is true to the evolutionary instinct that -experience has only its own products as material for further -construction. On the other hand, the principle of evolution with equal -force demands that only as _material_, not as final forms of experience, -shall these products continue. It may be that philosophy has not yet -taken the conception of evolution quite seriously. At all events it is -certain that long after it has been found that, instead of being eternal -and complete, the concept undergoes change, that it has simply the -stability and wholeness demanded by a particular and concrete situation; -after it has been discovered, in other words, that the stability and -wholeness, instead of attaching to the content of an idea, are simply -the functions of any content used as a purpose--after all this has been -accepted in psychology, the conception of truth and reality which arose -under an entirely different conception of the nature of thought still -survives. - -This change in the conception of the character of the ideas, with no -corresponding change in the conception of reality, marks the divorce of -thought and reality and the rise of the epistemological problem. Let us -recall that in Plato the relation between the higher and ultimate -reality, as constituted by the complete and "Eternal Ideas," and the -lower reality of perception, is that of archetype and ectype. -Perceptions attempt to imitate and copy the ideas. Now, when the ideas -are found to be changing, and when further the interpenetration of -perception and conception is discovered, reality as fixed and complete -must be located elsewhere. And just as in the old system it was the -business of perception to imitate the "Eternal Ideas," so here it is -still assumed that thought is to imitate the reality wherever now it is -to be located. And as regards the matter of location, the old conception -is not abandoned. The elder Plato is mighty yet. Reality must still be a -completed system of fixed and eternal "things in themselves," -"relations," or "noumena" of some sort which _our_ ideas, now -constituted by both perception and conceptional processes, are still to -"imitate," "copy," "reflect," "represent," or at least "symbolize" in -some fashion. - -From this point on, then, thought has two functions: one, to help -experience meet and reorganize into itself the results of its own past -activity; the other, to reflect or represent in some sense the absolute -system of reality. For a very long time the latter has continued to -constitute the logical problem, the former being relegated to the realm -of psychology. - -But this discovery of the reconstructive function of the idea and its -assignment to the jurisdiction of psychology did not leave logic where -it was before, nor did it lighten its task. Logic could not shut its -eyes to this "psychological" character of the idea.[165] Indeed, logic -had to take the idea as psychology described it, then do the best it -could with it for its purpose. - -The embarrassment of logic by this reconstructive character of the idea -even Aristotle discovered to some extent in the relation of the Platonic -perceptions to the eternal ideas. He found great difficulty in getting a -flowing stream of consciousness to imitate or even symbolize an -eternally fixed and completed reality. And since we have discovered, in -addition, that the idea is so palpably a reconstructive activity, the -difficulties have not diminished. - -In such a situation it could only be a question of time until solutions -of the problem should be sought by attempting to bring together these -two functions of the idea. Perhaps after all the representation of -objects in an absolute system is involved in the reconstruction of our -experience. Or perhaps what appears as reconstructions of our -experience--as desiring, struggling, deliberating, choosing, willing, as -sorrows and joys, failures and triumphs--are but the machinery by which -the absolute system is represented. At any rate, these two functions -surely cannot be regarded as belonging to the idea as color and form -belong to a stone. We should never be satisfied with such a brute -dualism as this. - -Without any further historical sketch of attempts at this synthesis, I -desire to pass at once to a consideration of what I am sure everyone -will agree must stand as one of the most brilliant and in every way -notable efforts in this direction--Mr. Royce's Aberdeen lectures on "The -World and the Individual." It is the purpose here to examine that part -of these lectures, and it is the heart of the whole matter, in which the -key to the solution of the problem of the relation between ideas and -reality is sought precisely in the purposive character of the idea. This -will be found especially in the "Introduction" and in the chapter on -"Internal and External Meaning of Ideas."[166] - - -I. THE PURPOSIVE CHARACTER OF IDEAS - -With his unerring sense for fundamentals, Mr. Royce begins by telling us -that the first thing called for by the problem of the relation of ideas -to reality is a discussion of the nature of ideas. Here Mr. Royce says -he shall "be guided by certain psychological analyses of the mere -contents of our consciousness, which have become prominent in recent -discussion."[167] - - Your intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere imagery of - the thing, but always involve a consciousness of how you propose - to act toward the thing of which you have ideas.... Complex - scientific ideas viewed as to their conscious significance are, as - Professor Stout has well said, plans of action, ways of - constructing the object of your scientific consciousness.... By - the word idea, then, as we shall use it, when, after having - criticised opposing theory, we come to state in these lectures our - own thesis, I shall mean in the end any state of consciousness, - whether simple or complex, which when present is then and there - viewed as at least a partial expression, or embodiment of a single - conscious purpose.... In brief, an idea in my present definition - may, and in fact always does, if you please, appear to be - representative of a fact existent beyond itself. But the _primary_ - character which makes it an idea is _not its representative - character_, is not its vicarious assumption of the responsibility - of standing for a being beyond itself, but is its inner character - as _relatively fulfilling the purpose_, that is as presenting the - partial fulfilment of the purpose which is in the consciousness of - the moment wherein the idea takes place.[168]... Now this purpose, - just in so far as it gets a present conscious embodiment in the - contents, and in the form of the complex state called the idea, - constitutes what I shall hereafter call the internal meaning of - the idea.[169]... But ideas often seem to have a meaning; yes, as - one must add, finite ideas always undertake or appear to have a - meaning that is not exhausted by this conscious internal meaning - presented and relatively fulfilled at the moment when the idea is - there for our finite view. The melody sung, the artists' idea, the - thought of your absent friend, a thought on which you love to - dwell, all these not merely have their obvious internal meaning - as meeting a conscious purpose by their very presence, but also - they at least appear to have that other sort of meaning, that - reference beyond themselves to objects, that cognitive relation to - outer facts, that attempted correspondence with outer facts, which - many accounts of our ideas regard as their primary inexplicable - and ultimate character. I call this second, and for me still - problematic, and derived aspect of the nature of ideas, their - apparently external meaning.[170] - -From all this it is quite evident that Mr. Royce accepts and welcomes -the results of the work of modern psychology on the nature of the idea. -The difficulty will come in making the connection between these accepted -results and the Platonic conception of ultimate reality as stated in the -following: - - To be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal - meaning of _a certain absolute system of ideas_. A system, - moreover, which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning - or purpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary.[171] - -It may be well to note here in passing that, notwithstanding the avowed -subordination here of the representative to the reconstructive character -of the ideas, the former becomes very important in the chapter on the -relation of internal to external meaning, where the problem of truth and -error is considered. - -In this account of the two meanings of the idea, which I have tried to -state as nearly as possible in the author's own words, there appear some -conceptions of idea, of purpose, and of their relation to each other, -that play an important part in the further treatment and in determining -the final outcome. In the description of the internal meaning there -appear to be two quite different conceptions of the relation of idea to -purpose. One regards the idea as itself constituting the purpose or plan -of action; the other describes the idea as "the partial fulfilment" of -the purpose. (1) "Complex scientific ideas, viewed as to their -conscious significance, are, as Professor Stout has well said, _plans of -action_." (2) "You sing to yourself a melody; you are then and there -conscious that the melody, as you hear yourself singing it, _partially -fulfils_ and embodies a purpose."[172] When we come to the problem of -the relation between the internal and external meaning, we shall find -that the idea as internal meaning comes into a third relation to -purpose, viz., that of _having_ the further purpose to agree or -correspond to the external meaning. "Is the correspondence reached -between idea and object the precise correspondence that the idea itself -intended? If it is, the idea is true.... Thus it is not mere agreement, -but intended agreement, that constitutes truth."[173] Thus the idea is -(1) the purpose, (2) the partial fulfilment of the purpose, and (3) has -a further purpose--to correspond to an object in the "absolute system of -ideas." - -The first statement of the internal meaning as constituting the plan or -purpose is, I take it, the conception of the internal meaning as an -ideal construction which gives a working form, a definition to the -"indefinite sort of restlessness" and blind feeling of dissatisfaction -out of which the need of and demand for thought arises.[174] This -accords with the scientific conception of the idea as a working -hypothesis. If this interpretation of idea were steadily followed -throughout, it is difficult to see how it could fail to lead to a -conception of reality quite different from that described as "a certain -absolute system of ideas." - -The second definition of internal meaning is the one in which it is -stated as the "partial expression," "embodiment," and "fulfilment" of a -single conscious purpose, and in which subsequently and consequently the -idea is identified with "any conscious act," for example, singing. The -first part of the statement appears to say that the idea of a melody is -in "partial fulfilment" of the idea regarded as the purpose to sing the -melody. But, as the first statement of internal meaning implies, how can -one have a purpose to sing the melody except in and through the idea? It -is precisely the construction of an idea that transforms the vague -"indefinite restlessness" and dissatisfaction into a purpose. The idea -is the defining, the sharpening of the blind activity of mere sensation, -mere want, into a plan of action. - -However, Mr. Royce meets this difficulty at once by the statement that -the term "idea" here not only covers the activity involved in forming -the idea, _e. g._, the idea of singing, but includes the action of -singing, which fulfils this purpose. "In the same sense _any conscious -act_ at the moment when you perform it not merely expresses, but is, in -my present sense, an idea."[175] - -But this sort of an adjustment between the idea as the purpose and as -the fulfilment of the purpose raises a new question. What here becomes -of the distinction between immediate and mediating experience? Surely -there is a pretty discernible difference between experience as a -purposive idea and the experience which fulfils this purpose. To call -them both "ideas" is at least confusing, and indeed it appears that it -is just this confusion that obscures the fundamental difficulty in -dealing, later on, with the problem of truth and error. To be sure, the -very formation of the idea as the purpose, the "plan of action," is the -beginning of the relief from the "indefinite restlessness." On the other -hand, it defines and sharpens the dissatisfaction. When this vague -unrest takes the form of a purpose to attain food or shelter, or to sing -in tune, it is of course the first step toward solution. But this very -definition of the dissatisfaction intensifies it. The idea as purpose, -then, instead of being the fulfilment, appears to be the plan, the -method of fulfilment. The fulfilling experience is the further -experience to which the idea points and leads. - -To follow a little farther this relation between the purposive and -fulfilling aspects of experience, it is of course apparent that the idea -as the purpose, the "plan of action," must as a function go over into -the fulfilling experience. My purpose to sing the melody must remain, in -so far as the action is a conscious one, until the melody is sung. I say -"as a function," for the specific content of this purpose is -continuously changing. The purpose is certainly not the same in content -after half the melody has been sung as it is at the beginning. This -means that the purpose is being progressively fulfilled; and as part of -the purpose is fulfilled each moment, so a part of the original content -of the idea drops out; and when the fulfilling process of this -particular purpose is complete, or is suspended--for, in Mr. Royce's -view, it never is complete in human experience--that purpose then gives -way to some other, perhaps one growing out of it, but still one regarded -as another. A purpose realized, fulfilled, cannot persist as a purpose. -We may desire to repeat the experience in memory; _i. e._, instead of -singing aloud, simply, as Mr. Royce says, "silently recall and listen to -its imagined presence." But here we must remember that the memory -experience, as such, is not an idea in the logical sense at all. It is -an immediate experience that is fulfilling the idea of the song which -constitutes the purpose to recall it, just as truly as the singing aloud -fulfils the idea of singing aloud. Shouting, whistling, or "listening in -memory to the silent notes" may all be equally immediate, fulfilling -experiences. Doubtless the idea as purpose involves memory, as Mr. Royce -says.[176] But it is a memory used as a purpose, and it is just this use -of the memory material as a purpose that makes it a logical idea. In -its content the purposive idea is just as immediate and as mechanical as -any other part of experience. "Psychology explains the presence and the -partial present efficacy of this purpose by the laws of motor processes, -of habit, or of what is often called association."[177] Here "idea," -however, simply means, as Mr. Royce takes it in his second statement, -conscious content of any sort. But this is not the meaning of "idea" in -the logical sense. The logical idea is a conscious content used as an -organizer, as "a plan of action," to get other contents. If, for -example, in the course of writing a paper one wishes to recall an -abstract distinction, as the distinction dawns in consciousness, it is -not an idea in the logical sense. It is just as truly an immediate -fulfilling experience as is a good golf stroke. So in the -mathematician's most abstruse processes, which Mr. Royce so admirably -portrays, the results for which he watches "as empirically as the -astronomer alone with his star" are not ideas in the logical sense; they -are immediate, fulfilling experiences.[178] The distinction between the -idea as the mediating experience--that is, the logical idea--and the -immediate fulfilling experience is therefore not one of content, but of -use. - -There is a sense, however, in which the idea as a purpose can be taken -as the partial fulfilment of another purpose; in the sense that any -purpose is the outgrowth of activity involving previous purposes. This -becomes evident when we inquire into the "indefinite restlessness" and -dissatisfaction out of which the idea as purpose springs. -Dissatisfaction presupposes some activity already going on in attempted -fulfilment of some previous purpose. If one is dissatisfied with his -singing, or with not singing, it is because one has already purposed to -participate in the performance of a company of people which now he finds -singing a certain melody, or one has rashly contracted to entertain a -strenuous infant who is vociferously demanding his favorite ditty. This -is only saying that any given dissatisfaction and the purpose to which -it gives rise grow out of activity involving previous purposing. But -this does not do away with the distinction between the idea as a purpose -and the immediate fulfilling experience. - -If the discussion appears at this point to be growing somewhat captious, -let us pass to a consideration of the relation between internal and -external meanings, where the problem of truth and error appears, and -where the vital import of these distinctions becomes more obvious. - - -II. PURPOSE AND THE JUDGMENT - -Mr. Royce begins with the traditional definition of truth, which he then -proceeds to reinterpret: - - Truth is very frequently defined in terms of external meaning as - _that about which we judge_.... In the second place, truth has - been defined as the _correspondence between our ideas and their - objects_[179].... When we undertake to express the objective - validity of any truth, we use judgment. These judgments, if - subjectively regarded, that is, if viewed merely as processes of - our own present thinking, whose objects are external to - themselves, involve in all their more complex forms, combinations - of ideas, devices whereby we weave already present ideas into more - manifold structure, thereby enriching our internal meaning; but - the act of judgment has always its other, its objective aspect. - The ideas when we judge are also to possess external meaning.... - It is true, as Mr. Bradley has well said, that the intended - subject of every judgment is reality itself. The ideas that we - combine when we judge about external meanings are to have value - for us as truth only in so far as they not only possess internal - meaning, but also imitate, by their structure, what is at once - other than themselves, and, in significance, something above - themselves. That, at least, is the natural view of our - consciousness, just in so far as, in judging, we conceive our - thought as essentially other than its external object, and as - destined merely to correspond thereto. Now we have by this time - come to feel how hard it is to define the Reality to which our - ideas are thus to conform, and about which our judgments are said - to be made, so long as we thus sunder external and internal - meanings.[180] - -_The universal judgment._--The problem is, then, to discover just the -nature and ground of this relation between the internal and external -meaning, between the idea and its object. This relation is established -in the act of judgment. Taking first _the universal judgment_, we find -here that the internal meaning has at best only a negative relation to -the external meaning. - - To say that all A is B is in fact merely to assert that the real - world contains no objects that are A, but that fail to be of the - class B. To say that no A is B is to assert that the real world - contains no objects that are at once A and B.[181] - -The universal judgments then "tell us indirectly what is in the realm of -external meaning; but only by first telling us what is not."[182] - -However, these universal judgments have after all a positive value in -the realm of internal meaning; that is, as mere thought. - - This negative character of the universal judgments holds true of - them, as we have just said, just in so far as you sunder the - external and internal meaning, and just in so far as you view the - real as the beyond, and as the merely beyond. If you turn your - attention once more to the realm of ideas, viewed as internal - meaning, you see, indeed, that they are constantly becoming - enriched in their inner life by all this process. To know by inner - demonstration that 2+2=4 and that this is necessarily so, is not - yet to know that the external world, taken merely as the Beyond, - contains any true or finally valid variety of objects at all, any - two or four objects that can be counted.... On the other hand, so - far as your internal meaning goes, to have experienced within that - which makes you call this judgment necessary, is indeed to have - observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems to - you very positive.[183] - -This passage deserves especial attention. In the light of Kant, and in -view of Mr. Royce's general definition of the judgment as the reference -of internal to external meanings, one is puzzled to find that for the -mathematician the positive value of the judgment "two and two are four" -is confined to the realm of internal meaning. To be sure, Mr. Royce says -that this limitation of the positive value of the universal judgment to -the world of internal meaning occurs only when the external and internal -meaning are sundered. But the point is: Does the mathematician or anyone -else ever so sunder as to regard the judgment "two and two are four" as -of positive value only as internal meaning? Indeed, in another -connection Mr. Royce himself shows most clearly that mathematical -results are as objective and as empirical as the astronomer's star.[184] -Nor would it appear competent for anyone to say here: "Of course, they -are not internal meanings _after_ we come to see, through the kind -offices of the epistemologist, that the internal meanings are valid of -the external world." We are insisting that they are never taken by the -mathematician and scientists at first as merely internal meaning whose -external meaning is then to be established. Surely the mathematical -judgment, or any other, does not require an epistemological midwife to -effect the passage from internal to external meaning. The external -meaning is there all the while in the form of the diagrams and motor -tensions and images with which the mathematician works. The difficulty -here again seems to be that the distinction above discussed between the -idea in the logical sense, as purpose, and the immediate fulfilling -experience is lost sight of. The relation between two and four is not -first discovered as a merely internal meaning. It is discovered in the -process of fulfilling some purpose involving the working out of this -relation. So the sum of the angles of a triangle is not discovered as a -mere internal meaning whose external meaning is then to be found. It is -found _in working with_ the triangle. It is discovered _in_ the -triangle. And, once more, it matters not if the triangle here is a mere -memory image. In relation to the purpose, to the logical idea, it is as -truly external and objective as pine sticks or chalk marks. The streams -of motor, etc., images that flow spontaneously under the stimulus of the -purpose are just as immediate fulfilling experiences as the manipulation -of sticks or chalk lines. - -The difficulty in keeping the universal judgment, as a judgment, in -terms of merely internal meaning may be seen from the following: - - As to these two types of judgments, the universal and the - particular, they both, as we have seen, make use of experience. - The universal judgments arise in the realm where experience and - idea have already fused into one whole; and this is precisely the - realm of internal meanings. Here one constructs and observes the - consequences of one's construction. But the construction is at - once an experience _of fact and an idea_.... Upon the basis of - such ideal constructions one makes universal judgments. These in a - fashion still to us, at this stage, mysterious, undertake to be - valid of that other world--the world of external meaning.[185] - -One is somewhat puzzled to know just what is meant by the fusion "of -experience and idea." We must infer that it means the fusion of some -aspect of experience which can be set over against idea, and this has -always meant the external meaning, and this interpretation seems -further warranted by the statement immediately following which describes -the fusion as one "of _fact_ and idea." The situation then seems to be -this: An internal and an external meaning, a fact and an idea, "fuse -into one whole" and thus constitute that which is yet "precisely the -realm of internal meanings," which aims to be valid of still another -world of external meanings. And this waives the question of how -experience fused into one whole can be an internal meaning, since as -such it must be in opposition and reference to an external meaning; or -conversely, how experience can be at once fact _and_ idea and still be -"fused into one whole." - -Nor does the difficulty disappear when we turn to the aspects of -universality and necessity. What is the significance and basis of -universality and necessity as confined merely to the realm of internal -meaning? - - So far as your internal meaning goes, _to have experienced within - that which makes you call this judgment necessary_ is, indeed, to - have observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems - to you very positive.[186] - -But what is it that we "experience within" which makes us call this -judgment necessary? In the discussion of the relation of the universal -judgment to the disjunctive judgment, through which the former is shown -to get even its negative force, there is an interesting statement: - - One who inquires into a matter upon which he believes himself able - to decide in universal terms, _e. g._, in mathematics, has present - to his mind, at the outset, questions such as admit of alternative - answers. "A," he declares, "in case it exists at all, is either B - or C." Further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is - B. - -The last sentence is the statement referred to. What is meant by -"further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is B"? What kind -of "research," internal or external, can show this? In short, there -appears to be as much difficulty with universality and necessity in the -realm of internal meaning as in the reference of internal to external -meaning.[187] - -Instead, however, of discussing this point, Mr. Royce pursues the -problem of the relation of the external and internal meaning, and finds -that regarded as sundered there is no basis so far for even the negative -universality and necessity in the reference of the internal meaning to -the external. - - For at this point arises the ancient question, How can you know at - all that your judgment is universally valid, even in this ideal - and negative way, about that external realm of validity, in so far - as it is external, and is merely your Other,--the Beyond? Must you - not just dogmatically say that that world must agree with your - negations? This judgment is indeed positive. But how do you prove - it? The only answer has to be in terms which already suggest how - vain is the very sundering in question. If you can predetermine, - even if but thus negatively, what cannot exist in the object, the - object then cannot be merely foreign to you. It must be somewhat - predetermined by your Meaning.[188] - -But in the universal judgment this determination, as referred to the -external meaning, is only negative. - -_The particular judgment._--It is then through the particular judgment -that the universal judgment is to get any positive value in its -reference to the external meaning. - - As has been repeatedly pointed out in the discussions on recent - Logic, the particular judgments--whose form is Some A is B, or - Some A is not B--are the typical judgments that positively assert - Being in the object viewed as external. This fact constitutes - their essential contrast with the universal judgments. They - undertake to cross the chasm that is said to sunder internal and - external meanings; and the means by which they do so is always - what is called "external experience." - -It is now high time to ask why the internal meaning seeks this external -meaning. Why does it seek an object? Why does it want to cross the -chasm? In other words, what is the significance of the demand for the -particular judgment? In the introduction we have been told, as a matter -of description, that the internal meanings do seek the external meaning, -but why do they? We have also been told that universal judgments -"develop and enrich the realm of internal meaning." Why, then, should -there be a demand for the external meaning, for a further object? The -answer is: - - We have our internal meanings. We develop them in inner - experience. There they get presented as something of universal - value, _but always in fragments_. They, therefore, so far - dissatisfy. We conceive of the Other wherein these meanings shall - get some sort of final fulfilment.[189] - -It is, then, the incomplete and fragmentary character of the internal -meaning that demands the particular judgment. The particular judgment is -to further complete and determine the incomplete and indeterminate -internal meaning. And yet no sooner is this particular judgment made -than we are told that "it is a form at once positive, and very -unsatisfactorily indeterminate." Again:[190] - - The judgments of experience, the particular judgments, express a - positive but still imperfect determination of internal meaning - through external experience. The limit or goal of this process - would be an individual judgment wherein the will expressed its own - final determination.[191] - -Apparently, then, the particular judgment to which the internal meaning -appeals for completion and determination only succeeds in increasing the -fragmentary and indeterminate character. - -This brings us to another "previous question." Just what are we to -understand by this "fragmentary" and "indeterminate" character of the -internal meaning? In what sense, with reference to what, is it -incomplete and fragmentary? Later we shall be told that it is with -reference to "its own final and completely individual expression." This -is to be reached in the individual judgment. And if we ask what is meant -by this final, complete, and individual expression--which, by the way, -no human being can experience--we read, wondering all the while how it -can be known, that it is simply "the expression that seeks no other," -that "is satisfied," that "is conclusive of the search for -perfection."[192] Waiving for the present questions concerning the basis -of this satisfaction and perfection, all this leaves unanswered our -query concerning the other end of the matter, viz., the meaning and -criterion of the fragmentary and indeterminate character of these -internal meanings. - -If we here return to the first definition of internal meaning of the -idea as a purpose in the sense of "a plan of action," such as "singing -in tune," or getting the properties of a geometrical figure, it does not -seem difficult to find a basis and meaning for this fragmentary and -indeterminate character. First we may note in a general way that it is -of the very essence of a plan or purpose to lead on to a fulfilling -experience such as singing in tune, or reaching a mathematical equation. -But here this fulfilling experience to which the plan points is not a -mere working out of detail inside the plan itself, although, indeed, -this does take place. If this were all the fulfilling experience meant, -it is difficult to see how we should escape subjective idealism.[193] We -start with a relatively indeterminate idea and end with a more -determinate _idea_, though, indeed, there is yet no criterion for this -increased determination. To be sure, the idea as a plan of action, as -has already been stated, does undergo change and does become, if you -please, more definite and complete as a plan; but this does not -constitute its fulfilment. Its fulfilment surely is to be found in the -immediate experiences of singing, etc., to which the idea points and -leads. - -The fragmentary and incomplete character of the internal meaning as a -plan of action does not, then, after all, so much describe the plan -itself as it does the general condition of experience out of which the -idea arises. Experience takes on the form of a plan, of an idea, -precisely because it has fallen apart, has become "fragmentary." It is -just the business of the internal meaning, as Mr. Royce so well shows, -to form a plan, an ideal, an hypothetical synthesis that shall stimulate -an activity, which shall satisfactorily heal the breach. "Fragmentary" -is a quality, then, that belongs, not to the idea in itself considered, -but to the general condition of experience, of which the idea as a plan -is an expression. - -If, now, the fragmentary character of the internal meaning is determined -simply with relation to the fulfilling experiences, such as singing in -tune, adjustments of geometrical figures, etc., to which it points and -leads, it seems as if the completion of the internal meaning must be -defined in the same terms. And this would appear to open a pretty -straight path to the redefinition of truth and error. - - -III. THE CRITERION OF TRUTH AND ERROR - -At the outset, truth was defined as the "correspondence" or "agreement" -of an idea with its object. But we have seen that correspondence or -agreement with an object means the completion and determination of the -idea itself, and since the idea is here a specific "plan of action," it -would seem that the "true" idea would be the one that can complete -itself by stimulating a satisfying activity. The false idea would be -one that cannot complete itself in a satisfying activity, such as -singing in tune, constructing a mathematical equation, etc., and just -this solution is very clearly expounded by our author. In the case of -mathematical inquiry, - - In just so far as we _pause satisfied_ we observe that there "is - no other" mathematical fact to be sought _in the direction of the - particular inquiry in hand_. Satisfaction of purpose by means of - _presented fact_ and such determinate satisfaction as sends us to - no other experience for further light and fulfillment, precisely - this outcome is itself the Other that is sought when we begin our - inquiry.[194] - -So "when other facts of experience are sought," if I watch for stars or -for a chemical precipitate, or for a turn in the stock market, or in the -sickness of a friend, my ideas are true when they are satisfied with -"the presented facts." Again, - - It follows that the finally determinate form of the object of any - finite idea is that form which the idea itself would assume - whenever it became individuated, or in other words, became a - completely determined idea, an idea or will fulfilled by a wholly - adequate empirical content, for which no other content need be - substituted or from the point of view of the satisfied idea, could - be substituted.[195] - -In such passages as these it seems clear that the test of the truth of -an idea is its power to bring us to the point where we "pause -satisfied," where "no other content need be substituted," etc. Nor in -such passages does there seem to be any doubt of reaching satisfaction -in particular cases. Here, it appears, we _may_ sing in tune, we _may_ -get the desired precipitate, and possibly even interpret the stock -market correctly. Of course, the discord, the hunger, the loss, will -come again; but so will new ideas, new truths. "Man thinks in order to -get control of his world and thereby of himself."[196] Then the control -actually gained must measure the value, the truth of his thought. Do you -wish to sing in tune, "then your musical ideas are false if they lead -you to strike what are then called false notes."[197] - -It should also be noticed that here this desired determination does not -consist in a further determination of the mere idea as such. It is found -in "the presented fact," in the immediate activity of singing, of -getting precipitates, etc. As has already been pointed out, it is only -by using the term "idea" for both the purpose and the fulfilling act of -singing that this "pause of satisfaction" can be ascribed to the further -determination of the idea. As such, as also before remarked, the sort of -determination that the idea here gets means its termination, its -disappearance in the immediate experiences of singing, etc., to which it -leads. The "indefinite restlessness" of hunger and cold would scarcely -be satisfied by getting more determinate and specific _ideas_ only of -food and shelter. The satisfaction comes when the ideas are "realized," -when the "plans" are swallowed up in fulfilment. - -But in all this nothing has been said about "the certain absolute system -of ideas," nor does there appear to be here any demand for it. To be -sure, in the passages just considered, experience has been found to -become "fragmentary," but it has also been found capable of healing, of -wholing itself, not of course into any "final whole," but into the unity -of "satisfaction" as regards "the particular inquiry in hand." There is -of course failure as well, but this also is not final. It means simply -that we must look farther for the "pause of satisfaction," that we must -construct another idea, another "plan of action." - -But, after having shown that the idea as a plan of action may lead to -satisfaction in the particular case, and that its success or failure so -to do is one measure of its truth or falsity, we are now suddenly -aroused to the fact that after all thought does not lead us to the -completed "absolute system of ideas," to a final stage of eternal -unbroken satisfaction. - - But never in our human process of experience do we reach that - determination. It is for us the object of love and of hope, of - desire and of will, of faith and of work, but never of present - finding.[198] - -If at this point one asks: Whence this absolute system of ideas? Why -have we to reckon with it at all? there appears to be little that is -satisfying. Indeed, it seems difficult to get rid of the impression that -this "certain absolute system of ideas" is on our hands as a -philosophical heirloom from the time of Plato, so hallowed by time and -so established by centuries of acceptance that we have ceased to ask for -its credentials. To ground it in the "essentially fragmentary character -of human experience" appears to be a _petitio_, for experience does not -appear "essentially fragmentary" in this sense until after the absolute -system has been posited. - -And this brings to notice that at this point both the fragmentary and -unitary characters of experience take on new meaning. So far this -fragmentary character has been defined with reference to "the particular -inquiry in hand." Now, since the distinction between absolute and human -experience has emerged, the fragmentary character becomes an absolute -quality of the latter in contrast with the former. So, _mutatis -mutandis_, of unity. Up to this point unity, wholeness, has been -possible within human experience in the case of particular problems, -such as singing in tune, etc. But with the appearance of the absolute -system of ideas, wholeness is now the exclusive quality of the latter, -as incompleteness is of human experience, though of course the _working_ -unity, the unity resulting in "pauses of satisfaction," must still -remain in the latter. - -The problem now is to somehow work the absolute system of ideas into -connection with the conception of the idea as a purpose, as a concrete -plan of action. Here is where the third conception of the relation -between idea and purpose, described at the beginning, comes into -play--the conception in which the idea, instead of being the purpose, or -the fulfilment of a purpose, _has_ the purpose to correspond with, or -represent "its own final and completely individual expression," -contained in the absolute system. From the previous standpoint the -idea's "own final and completely individual expression" has been found -in the fulfilling experiences of singing in tune, getting mathematical -equations, chemical precipitates, etc. Here this complete individual -experience can never be found in finite, human experience, but must be -sought in the absolute system--and this can be only "the object of love -and hope, of desire and will, never of present finding." - -Notwithstanding the many previous protestations that the purposive -function of the idea is its "primary" and "most essential" character, we -are here forced to fall back upon correspondence--representation as the -primary, the essential, and indeed, it appears at times, as the sole -function. For in the attempt to bring these two functions together the -purposive function is swallowed up in the representative. The idea still -is, or has a purpose, a "plan of action," but this purpose, this plan, -is now nothing but to represent and correspond with its own final and -completed form in the absolute system. By this simple _coup_ is the -purposive function of the idea reduced at once to the representative. -Nor is it pertinent to urge at this point that every purpose involves -representation, that the plan must be some sort of an image or scheme -which symbolizes and stimulates the thing to be done. This no one would -question, but now the sole "thing to be done" apparently is to perfect -this representation of the complete and individual form in the absolute -system.[199] - -Once more, an array of passages could be marshaled from almost every -page refuting any such interpretation as this, but they would be -passages expounding the part played by the idea in such concrete -experiences as singing, measuring, etc., not in representing an absolute -system of ideas. Even as regards the latter one might urge that, by -insisting on the active character of the idea, we could after all regard -this absolute system as a life of will after the fashion of our own, -were it not at once described as "the complete embodiment," "the final -fulfilment," of finite ideas. A life consisting of mere fulfilment seems -a baffling paradox. And its timeless character only adds to the -difficulty. Moreover, if we regard the system as constituted by such -concrete activities as measuring and singing, etc., while we have saved -will, we shall now have to fallback upon our first conception of truth -as found in the idea which unifies the fragmentary condition of -experience as related to specific problems, not fragmentary as related -to an absolute system. - -This brings us to the final and crucial point of the discussion, the -part which purpose plays in the determination of _truth_ and _error_ -from the standpoint of "the absolute system of ideas." When is this -purpose of the idea to correspond with its absolute, final, and -completed form fulfilled, or partially fulfilled? And here at the very -outset is a difficulty. We have read repeatedly that the idea is itself -"the partial fulfilment of a purpose." It is now to seek an object which -shall increase this degree of fulfilment, but still this fulfilment -shall be incomplete. And when we come to consider error, it too will be -found to consist in a partial fulfilment. So it appears that there are -three stages of "partial fulfilment" to be discriminated, one belonging -to the idea itself, another to finite truth, and still another to error. - -Returning to the problem, from this point on we find the two -standpoints, that of the specific situation and that of the absolute -system, so closely interwoven and entangled that they are followed with -great difficulty. We have already seen that the idea seeks -correspondence with its object, because it is "fragmentary," -"incomplete," "indetermined." And there we found that this indeterminate -and fragmentary character belonged to the idea as a purpose, a plan of -seeking relief from some sort of "restlessness" and "dissatisfaction," -such as singing out of tune, etc. Here it is the incompleteness of an -imperfect representation of its object in the absolute system that is -the _motif_, and how it is to effect an improvement in its imperfect -condition is now the problem. Here again the appeal is to purpose. -Whatever may constitute the absolute system, one thing is assured: -nothing in it can be an object except as the finite idea "intends it," -purposes it, to be its object. Again must we ask: On what basis is this -object in the absolute system selected at all? In general the answer is: -On the basis of a need of "further determination;" but when we further -analyze this, we find it means on the basis of a specific want or need, -such as food, shelter, measuring, singing, etc. The basis of the -selection, then, is entirely on the side of the concrete, finite -situation. - -Here, too, we might ask: Whence the confidence that there will be found -something in the absolute system that will fulfil the purpose generated -on the side of the finite? Must we not here fall back on something like -a pre-established harmony? To this our author would say: "Yea, verily. -The fact that the absolute system responds to the finite needs does -precisely show that the finite and the absolute cannot be sundered." But -when we try to state _how_ the purpose generated on the side of the -finite can be met by the absolute system, the account again seems to run -so much in terms of the finite experience that to call it a system of -"final," "completed," and "fulfilled" ideas does not seem accurate. We -must note here, too, the shifting in the sense of "purpose." The idea -selects its object on the basis of the material needed to relieve the -unrest and dissatisfaction of singing out of tune, etc. But now it is to -be satisfied by increasing the extent of its representation of its -object in the absolute system. - -And now, finally, what shall mark the attainment of this purpose of the -idea to correspond and represent "its own completed form"? When is the -correspondence and representation true? Simply at the point where "we -pause satisfied," where "no other content need be substituted, or from -the point of view of the satisfied idea could be substituted." That is -all; there is no other answer. There are other statements, but they all -come to the same thing. For instance: - - It is true--this instant's idea--if, in its own measure, and on - its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own - final and completely individual expression.[200] - -But the moment we ask what this "final and individual expression" is, -and what is meant by "in its own measure," and "on its own plan," we -are thrown back at once upon the preceding statement. The next sentence -following the passage just quoted does indeed define this "individual -expression." "Its expression would be the very life of fulfilment of -purpose which this present idea already fragmentarily begins, as it -were, to express." But how can we know that the expression is -"fragmentary" unless we have some experience of wholeness? - -And here perhaps is the place to say, what has been implied all along, -that this absolutely "fragmentary" character of human experience is an -abstraction of the relatively disintegrated condition into which -experience temporarily falls, which abstraction is then reinstated as a -fixed quality, overlooking the fact that experience becomes fragmentary -only that it may again become whole. The absolute system, the final -fulfilment, is in the same case. It too is but the hypostatized -abstraction of the function of becoming whole, of wholing and -fulfilling, which manifests itself in the "pauses of satisfaction." - -"But," Mr. Royce would say, "the wholeness of the particular instance is -after all not a true and perfect wholeness, because we can always think -of the fulfilling experience as possibly different, as having a possibly -different embodiment." But this implies also a different purpose. -Moreover, it abstracts the purpose from the specific conditions under -which the purpose develops. Thus in singing in tune one doubtless could -easily imagine himself singing another tune, on another occasion, in -another key, in a clear tenor instead of a cracked bass, etc. But if on -_this_ occasion, in _this_ song, and with _this_ cracked bass voice one, -accepting all these conditions, does, with malice aforethought, purpose -to strike the tune, and happily succeeds, why, for that purpose formed -under the known and accepted conditions, is not the accomplishment final -and absolute? Nor is the case any different, so far as I can see, in -mathematical experience. To quote again: - - You think of numbers, and accordingly count one, two, three. Your - idea of these numbers is abstract, a mere generality. Why? Because - there could be other cases of counting, and other numbers counted - than the present counting process shows you, and why so? Because - your purpose in counting is not wholly fulfilled by the numbers - now counted.[201] - -I confess I cannot see here in what respect the purpose is not -fulfilled. Doubtless there could be "other cases of counting," and -"other numbers," but these may not be included in my present purpose, -which is simply to count here and now. In this passage the purpose is -not very fully defined. One's counting is usually for something, if for -nothing more than merely to illustrate the process. In this latter case -one's purpose would be completely fulfilled by just the numbers used -when he should "pause satisfied" with the illustration. Or, if I wish to -show the properties of numbers, then the discovery that there can always -be more of them fulfils my purpose, since this endless progression is -one of the properties. Or yet again, if one should suddenly become -enamored of the process of counting, and forthwith should purpose to -devote the rest of his days to it, it would still be fortunate that -there were always other numbers to be counted. In other words, the idea -as a purpose is formed with reference to, and out of, specific -conditions. In the last analysis the problem always is: What is to be -done here and now with the actual material at hand, under the present -conditions? As the purpose is determined by these specific conditions, -so is the fulfilment. To say that the fulfilment might be different is -virtually to say that the purpose might have been different, or indeed -that the universe might have been different. - -This necessity of falling back upon the character of the idea as a -purpose in the sense of the specific "plan of action" comes into still -bolder relief in the consideration of error from the standpoint of "the -absolute system of ideas." As already mentioned, the initial and -persistent problem here is to distinguish at all between truth and error -in our experience from this standpoint. All our efforts at representing -the absolute system must fall short. What can we mean, then, by calling -some of our ideas true and others false? The definition of error is as -follows: - - An error is an error about a specific object, only in case the - purpose, imperfectly defined by the vague idea at the instant when - the error is made, is better defined, is in fact, better fulfilled - by an object whose determinate character in some wise, although - never absolutely, opposes the fragmentary efforts first made to - define them.[202] - -But in relation to the absolute system the later part of this statement -holds of all our ideas. There always is the absolute object which would -"better define" and "better fulfil" our purposes. Hence it is only in -reference to the "specific" instances of singing, measuring, etc., that -a basis for the distinction can be found. Here our plan is not true so -long as its mission of relieving the specific unrest and -dissatisfaction, the specific discord or hunger, is unfulfilled. - -The only criterion, then, which we have been able to find for the -fulfilment of the purpose, for the truth of the idea as representing an -object in the absolute system, is the sense of wholeness, the "pause of -satisfaction," which we experience in realizing such specific purposes -as "singing in tune." And if it be said again: "Precisely so; this only -shows how intimate is the relation between our experience and the -absolute system of ideas;" then must it also be said once more, either -that the absolute system can be nothing more than an abstraction of the -element of wholeness or wholing in our experience, or that thus far the -relation appears to rest upon sheer assumption. - -Again, it may be insisted, as suggested at the outset of this -discussion, that the idea can well have two purposes: one to help -constitute and solve the specific problems of daily life; the other to -represent the absolute system. Very well, we must then make out a case -for the latter. If the purposes are to be different, the purpose to -represent the Absolute should have a criterion of its own. This we have -not been able to find. On the contrary, whenever pushed to the point of -stating a criterion for the representation of the absolute system, we -have had to appeal, in every case, to the fulfilment of a specific -finite purpose. And even if this purpose to represent the absolute -system had some apparent standard of its own, we should not be content -to leave the matter so. We should scarcely be satisfied to observe as a -mere matter of fact that the idea has a reconstructive function, and -_also_ a representative function. Such a brute dualism would be -intolerable. - - -IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS - -In the end, the outcome of the endeavor to establish a connection -between the relation of the idea to human experience and its relation to -the absolute system does not appear satisfying. The idea is left either -with two independent purposes--one to reconstruct finite experience, the -other to represent and symbolize the absolute system--or one of these -purposes is merged in the other. When the attempt is made from the -standpoint of the absolute system, the reconstructive purpose is -swallowed up in the representative. When, on the other hand, the need -for a basis of distinction between truth and error "here on this bank -and shoal of time" is felt, the representative disappears in the -reconstructive function. Nowhere are we able to discover a true -unification. To be sure, we have been told again and again that the -representation of the absolute object, if only we could accomplish it, -would be "the final fulfilment," "completion," and "realization" of the -human, finite purpose. But besides a confessed impotency at the very -start, this involves, as we have seen, either a sudden transformation of -the specific purpose of singing in tune, etc., into that of representing -the absolute system, or a sheer assumption that the representation of -the absolute object does somehow help in the realization of the specific -finite purpose. Nowhere is there any account of _how_ this help would be -given. - -And this suggests that if the analysis of the idea as purpose, given at -the outset of Mr. Royce's lecture, had been developed further, if the -conditions and origin of purpose had been examined, it is difficult to -see how this discrepancy could have escaped disclosure. Mr. Royce starts -his account by simply accepting from psychology a general description of -the purposive character of the idea. Even in the more detailed passages -on purpose we have nothing but descriptions of purpose after it is -formed. Nothing is said of the origin of this purposiveness. The -purposive character of experience is of course very manifest, but what -is the significance of this purposing in experience as a whole? What is -the source and the material of the purposes? - -It is this uncritical acceptance of the purposive quality of the idea -that obscures the irrelevancy of its relation to the absolute system. If -the idea must merely be or have a purpose, then it may as well be that -of representing the absolute system as any other. Of course, there are -troublesome questions as to how our finite ideas ever got such a -purpose; but, after all, if it is simply a matter of having any sort of -a purpose, representing the absolute system may answer as well as -anything. But when now we come to deal with the problem of fulfilment, -with the question of truth and error, we have to reckon with this -neglect of the source of this purposiveness. - -It is this unanalyzed ground of the purpose that makes the matter of -fulfilment so ambiguous. Such an analysis, we believe, would have shown -that the conditions out of which the idea as a purpose arises determine -also the sort of fulfilment possible. There are, indeed, one or two very -general, but very significant, statements in this direction, if they -were only followed up. For instance: - - In doing what we often call "making up our minds" we pass from a - vague to a definite state of will and of resolution. In such cases - we begin with perhaps a very indefinite sort of restlessness which - arouses the question: "What is it that I want, what do I desire, - what is my real purpose?" - -In other words, what does this restlessness mean? What is the matter? -What is to be done? - -Purpose is born, then, out of restlessness and dissatisfaction. But -whence comes this restlessness and dissatisfaction? Surely we cannot at -this point charge it to a discrepancy between our finite idea and the -absolute object, since it is just this restlessness that is giving birth -to the purposive idea. One thing, at any rate, appears pretty certain: -this "indefinite restlessness" presupposes some sort of activity already -going on. The restlessness is not generated in a vacuum. But why should -this activity get into a condition to be described as "indefinite -restlessness" and dissatisfaction? - -Repugnant as it will be to many to have psycho-physical, to say nothing -of biological, doctrines introduced into a logical discussion, I confess -that, at this point facing the issue squarely, I see no other way. And -it appears to me that just at this point it is the fear of -phenomenalistic giants that has kept logic wandering so many years in -the wilderness. - -What, then, in this action already going on is responsible for this -restlessness? First let us note that "indefinite restlessness" and -"dissatisfaction" are terms descriptive of what Mr. James calls "the -first thing in the way of consciousness." This assumes consciousness as -a factor in activity. So that our question now becomes: What is the -significance of this factor of restless, dissatisfied consciousness in -activity? Now, there appears no way of getting at the part which -consciousness plays different from that of discovering the function of -anything else. And this way is simply that of observing, as best we may, -the conditions under which consciousness operates, and what it does. -Here the biologist and psychologist with one voice inform us that this -indefinite restlessness which marks the point of the operation of -consciousness arises where, in a co-ordinated system of activities, -there develop out of the continuation of the activity itself new -conditions calling for a readjustment and reconstruction of the -activity, if it is to go on. Consciousness then appears to be the -function which makes possible the reorganization of the results of a -process back into the process itself, thus constituting and preserving -the continuity of activity. So interpreted, consciousness appears to be -an essential element in the conception of a self-sustaining activity. -This "indefinite restlessness," in which consciousness begins, marks, -then, the operation of the function of reconstruction without which -activity would utterly break down. - -Precisely because, then, the idea "as a plan" is projected and -constructed in response to this restlessness must its fulfilment be -relevant to it. It is when the idea as a purpose, a plan, born out of -this matrix of restlessness, begins to aspire to the absolute system, -and attempts to ignore or repudiate its lowly antecedents, that the -difficulties concerning fulfilment begin. They are the difficulties that -beset every ambition which aspires to things foreign to its inherited -powers and equipment. - -A detailed account at this point of the construction and fulfilment of -the idea as "a plan of action" would contain a consecutive -reinterpretation of Mr. Royce's principal rubrics. Such an account the -limits of this paper forbid. We shall have to be content with pointing -out in a general way a few instances by way of illustration. - -In the first place, it is in this matrix of indefinite restlessness out -of which the idea is born that the "fragmentary character of -experience," of which Mr. Royce is so keenly conscious, appears. But, -once more, this fragmentary character is discernible only by contrast -with the wholeness on both sides of the fragments; the wholeness that -precedes the restlessness, and the new "pause of satisfaction" toward -which it points. Nor must we forget that the habit matrix, out of the -disintegration of which the restlessness is immediately born, does not -exist as some metaphysical ultimate out of which thought as such has -evolved. Back of it is some previous purpose in whose service habit was -enlisted. On the other hand, this disintegration means that the old -purpose, the old plan, must be reconstructed; that it, along with the -disintegrated habit, becomes the material for a new plan, a new wholing -of experience. - -In the next place, the construction of this new plan of action does -involve "re-presentation." The first step in the transition from the -condition of "indefinite restlessness" toward a "plan" is the diagnosis, -the definition of the restlessness. This involves the re-presentation in -consciousness of the activities, out of which the restlessness has -arisen. This re-presentation is also the beginning of the -reconstruction. The diagnosis of the singing activity as being "out of -tune" is the negative side of beginning to sing in tune. It is now a -commonplace of psychology that all representation is reconstruction. And -this is where Mr. Royce's emphasis of the symbolic, the algebraic, as -against the copy type of representation, has its application. All we -want here is some sort of an image--visual, auditory, motor, it matters -not--that shall serve to focus attention upon the singing activities -until they are reconstructed sufficiently to bring us to the "pause of -satisfaction."[203] But nowhere in all this is there any reference to -the idea's object in the absolute system. Nor does there appear to be -any call or place for such reference. The representation here is a part -of the very process of forming the plan of further reconstruction out of -the materials of the specific situation. Representation is not the -plan's own end and aim. This is to stimulate a new set of activities -that shall lead out of the present state of unrest and dissatisfaction. - -It is also true, as already mentioned, that in the process of fulfilling -the plan, of realizing the idea, further determination and specification -is produced in the plan itself. The idea as a plan is certainly not -formed all at once. Nor does it reach and maintain a fixed content. No -purpose is ever realized in its original content. But this does not mean -that its realization is, therefore, "partial," "incomplete," or -"fragmentary." It is a part of its business to change. The purpose is -not there for its own sake. The purpose is there as a _means_ to the -reorganization and reconstruction of experience. It exists, as Mr. Royce -says, as an instrument, "as a tool" for "introducing control into -experience." And as, in the process of use, a tool always undergoes -modification, so here, as an instrument for reconstructing habit, the -plan, too, undergoes reconstruction. Indeed, as regards its content, it -is itself, as Mr. Royce says, as much a habit, as much "the product of -association," as any part of experience. The purposing function, the -purposing activity, remains; its content is constantly shifting. - -Here, too, is where "the submission of the idea to the object" takes -place. Only, here, it is not a submission to an object already -constituted as it is in Mr. Royce's conception of the absolute system. -The idea as an hypothetical plan of action, as a trial construction, -must be tested by the activities it is attempting to reconstruct. That -is to say, at this point the question is: Does the plan apply to the -activities actually involved in the unrest? Has it diagnosed the case -properly, and is it therefore one in and through which these activities -can operate and come to unity again? The "submission" here is the -submission of the purpose, the end, to the material out of which it is -formed, and with which it must work. But again this material to which -the idea submits itself is anything but finally fixed and "complete" in -form. On the contrary, as we have seen, it is just the fragmentary and -incomplete condition of this material that calls for the idea. Yet the -idea as a plan must be true to its mission, and to this material, and in -this sense must submit itself to whatever modifications and -reconstruction the material "dictates" as necessary in order that it may -function in and through the plan.[204] - -On the other hand--and this is the point to which Mr. Royce gives most -emphasis--it is equally apparent that "the idea must determine its -object." On this all philosophy, from Plato down, which approaches -reality "from the side of ideas" is at stake. And this does not appear -impossible if, again, the object is not already and eternally fixed and -complete. If the object is one constructed out of the very mass of habit -material which the idea is reconstructing, and if "determination" means -not copying, but construction, then, indeed, must the idea "determine -its object." Just for that does it have its being. That is its sole -mission. Here the determination of the object by the idea is not a mere -abstract postulate; it is not based upon a general consideration of the -disastrous consequences to our logical and ethical assumptions, if it -were not so determined. Here not only the general necessity for it, but -the _modus operandi_ of this determination, is apparent. But, at the -risk of tedious iteration, must it again be said that for the -determination of the completed and perfected object in the absolute -system not only is there nowhere any _modus_ to be found, but, even if -there were, it is difficult to see what it would have to do with the -kind of determination demanded by such a specific sort of unrest as -"singing out of tune," etc. The process of submission is thus a -reciprocal one. Neither in the object nor in the idea is there a fixed -scheme or order _to_ which the other must submit and conform. And this -is simply the logical commonplace that submission cannot be a one-sided -affair, that determination must be reciprocal. - -This brings us to what might as well have been our introductory as our -concluding observation. It has just been said that the determination of -the object by the idea is a vital matter in any philosophy which -approaches reality "from the side of ideas." Such a way of approach must -assert "the primacy of the world of ideas over the world as a -fact."[205] Mr. Royce thus further states the case: - - I am one of those who hold that when you ask what is an idea, and - how can ideas stand in any true relation to reality, you attack - the world knot in the way that promises most for the untying of - its meshes. This way is of course very ancient. It is the way of - Plato.... It is in a different sense the way of Kant. If you view - philosophy in this fashion, you subordinate the study of the world - as fact to a reflection upon the world as idea. Begin by accepting - upon faith and tradition the mere brute reality of the world as - fact, and there you are sunk deep in an ocean of mystery.... The - world of fact surprises you with all sorts of strange - contrasts.... It baffles you with caprices like a charming and yet - hopelessly wayward child, or like a bad fairy. The world of fact - daily announces itself to you as a defiant mystery.[206] - -Here we have concisely stated at the outset of the lectures the position -which we have seen to be fraught with so many difficulties: the -position, namely, which accepts to start with the opposition of the -world as idea and the world as fact, as something given, instead of -something to be accounted for; and which assumes that this opposition -stands in the way of reaching reality, whereas it possibly may be of the -very essence of reality. To be sure, the above statement of this -opposition between the world as fact and as idea is but the expository -starting-point. And it is true that the rest of the argument is occupied -in the attempt to close this breach. But, as we have seen, except where -the idea is expounded as a specific purpose, arising out of a specific -experience of unrest, such as singing out of tune, etc.--except in this -case, the breach is taken as found and the attempt to heal it is made by -working forward from the opposition as given instead of back to its -source. This opposition, of course, has its forward goal, but the -difficulty is to find it without an exploration of its source. It is -back in that matrix out of which the opposition has arisen that the line -of direction to the goal is to be found. - -Moreover, in starting from this opposition of fact and idea as given, -the only method of quelling it seems to be either that of reducing one -side to terms of the other, or of appealing to some new, and therefore -external unifying, agency. But if the factors in the opposition are -found, not one in submission _to_ the other, nor having the "primacy" -_over_ the other, but as co-ordinate and mutually determining functions, -developed from a common matrix and co-operating in the work of -reconstructing experience, some of the difficulties involved in the -alternative methods just mentioned appear to drop out.[207] - -The point may be clearer if we recur to the passage and ask just what is -meant by "the defiantly mysterious," "baffling," and "capricious" -character of the world as fact--as "brute reality." First, if by the -world as "fact;" as "brute reality," we mean experience so brute that it -is not yet "lighted up with ideas," it is difficult to see how it could -be mysterious or capricious, since mystery and caprice appear only when -experience ceases to be taken merely as it comes and an inquiry for -connections and meanings has begun. That is to say, there can be neither -mystery nor caprice except in relation to some sort of order. And order -is always a matter of ideas. But it is sufficient to submit Mr. Royce's -own statement on this point: - - We all of us from moment to moment have experience. This - experience comes to us in part as brute fact; light and shade, - sound and silence, pain and grief and joy.... These given facts - flow by; and were they all, our world would be too much of a blind - problem for us even to be puzzled by its meaningless - presence.[208] - -If next we take the world of fact as in contrast and co-ordinate with -the world of ideas, mystery and caprice here, certainly, are not all on -the side of the fact. Here, again, must they be functions of the -relation between fact and idea. We have seen that without thought there -is neither mystery nor caprice. The idea then cannot take part in the -production of mystery and caprice, and forthwith deny its parenthood. Of -course, mystery and caprice are not the final fruits of this co-ordinate -opposition of fact and idea. They are but the _first_ fruits--the -relatively unorganized embryonic mass which through the further -activities of the parent functions shall develop into the symmetry of -truth and law. - -There appears then no ultimate "primacy" of either idea or fact over the -other. Nor does either appear as a better way of approach _to_ reality -than the other. It is only when we say: "Lo! here in the idea," _or_ -"Lo! there in the fact is reality," that we find it "imperfect," -"incomplete," and "fragmentary," and must straightway "look for -another." But surely not in "a certain absolute system of ideas," which -is "the object of love and hope, of desire and will, of faith and work, -but never of present finding," shall we seek it. Rather precisely in the -loving and hoping, desiring and willing, believing and working, shall we -find that reality in which and for which both the "World as fact" and -the "World as idea" have their being. - - - - -INDEX - - - ABSOLUTE: - as constituting reality, 348; - as related to truth and error, 363 ff.; - as a hypostatized abstraction, 369. - - ABSOLUTE SELF, 330. - - ACCESSORY: - thought as, 58 ff. - - ACTIVITY: - as social, 74; - thought as, 78; - interrupted, and judgment, 154; - and hypothesis, 170; - as sensori-motor, 193, 200; - (see Function, Reconstruction). - - AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: - appreciative rather than reflective, 255; - not a form of valuation, 339, 340. - - ALTERNATIVES: in judgment, 155; - (see Disjunction). - - ANALOGY, 171, 172, 175; - in relation to habit, 176. - - ANAXAGORAS: - in relation to the One and the Many, 219; - his [Greek: nous], 220, 221. - - ANAXIMANDER: - and the infinite, 209; - his process of segregation, 214, 215. - - ANAXIMENES: - his [Greek: arche], 209; - his scheme of rarefaction and condensation, 209, 213, 215, 224. - - ANGELL, J. R., 14 note, 345 note. - - ANIMISM, 49 note. - - ANTECEDENTS OF THOUGHT (see Stimulus). - - APPLIED LOGIC: Lotze's definition, 6. - - APPRECIATION: - distinguished from reflection, 255, 339; - not to be identified with valuation, 320-24, 338. - - [Greek: Arche]: - meaning of search for, 211 ff. - - ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS: - refers to meanings, 33, 34; - connection with thought, 80; - doctrine of: analogous to subjectivism in ethics, 261; - presupposes a mechanical metaphysics, 330, 331 note. - - ATOMISTS: - treatment of the One and the Many, 221. - - AUSTRIAN ECONOMISTS, 307, 333. - - AUTHORITY AND CUSTOM: - logic of attitude of obedience to, 286; - social conditions compatible with dominance of, 286; - failure of, as moral control, 286. - - - BACON: - extreme empirical position, 156 ff.; - view of induction, 157, 158. - - "BAD": - practical significance of, as moral predicate, 259; - relation to "wrong," 335. - - BALDWIN, J. M., 257 note, 378 note. - - Becoming: as relative, 206. - - "BEGRUENDUNG" AND "BESTAETIGUNG": - Wundt's distinction of, 179; - criticised, 181, 182. - - BIOLOGY: - view of sensation, 58; - use of, in logic, 374, 375. - - BOSANQUET, B., 59 note, 147, 189, 190, 191, 300; - (see Study V). - - BRADLEY, F. H., 47 note, 54 note, 90 ff., 147, 189, 190, 191, 192, - 194, 299 note 2, 331 note, 332 note, 353. - - BRENTANO, 250 note. - - BUTLER, J., 277. - - - CERTAIN, THE: - relation to tension, 50, 51; - as datum, 57. - - COEFFICIENTS OF REALITY, PERCEPTION, AND RECOGNITION: - defined, 263-7; - present in economic and ethical experience, 267-9. - - COEXISTENCE, COINCIDENCE, AND COHERENCE, 28, 29, 33-6, 58, 59, 68. - - CONCEPTIONS: - Lotze's view of, 59; - Bacon's attitude toward, 157; - relation to fact, 168; - function in Greek philosophy, 342; - (see Idea, Image, Hypothesis). - - CONCEPTUAL LOGIC: - as related to idea and image, 188-92. - - CONSCIENCE: - evolution of, 286, 287; - ambiguous and transitional character of, 287; - metaphysical implications of, as moral standard, 288; - not autonomous, 288. - - CONSCIENTIOUSNESS: - dangers of, consequent upon ideal of self-realization, 316; - Green's defense of, referred to, 316 note. - - CONSERVATION: - of energy and mass, 206; - (see Energy). - - CONTENT OF KNOWLEDGE: - and logical object, originates in tension, 49; - thought's own, 65; - and datum, 69; - as truth, 79 ff.; - as static and dynamic, 73, 93 ff., 110 ff.; - (see Study IV; Objectivity, Validity). - - CONTINUITY, 10, 13, 55. - - CONTROL: - idea and, 75, 129. - - CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS, 171; - in relation to habit, 176. - - COPERNICUS: - his theory, 178; - compared with Galileo's supposition, 179-81. - - COPULA, 118 ff.; - scheme of mediation between subject and predicate, 208, 214 ff. - - CORRESPONDENCE: - of datum and idea, 51; - of thought-content and thought-activity, 70; - as criterion of truth, 82 ff., 353 ff. - - - DARWIN, CHARLES, 146, 150, 179. - - DATUM OF THOUGHT, 7, 8, 24; - as fact, 26, 50, 52; - Lotze's theory of, stated, 55; - criticised, 56 ff.; - relation to induction, 61; - and content, 60, 70; - (see Study III; Content, Fact, Stimulus). - - DEDUCTION, 211, 212. - - DEFINITION: - invented by Socrates, 203. - - DEMOCRITUS: - attempts at definition, 203. - - DEMONSTRATIVE JUDGMENT, 134. - - DETERMINATION: - as criterion of truth, 362 ff.; - impossibility of complete, in finite experience, 364. - - DEWEY, JOHN, 58 note, 86 note, 266 note 2, 316 note, 381 note. - - DIALECTIC: - Zeno as originator of, 203. - - DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA, 222 ff. - - DISJUNCTION: - in judgment, 115, 138. - - DYNAMIC: - ideas as, and as static, 73, 76; - reality as, 126. - - - EARTH: - as an element, 213. - - ECONOMIC JUDGMENT: - involves same type of process as physical, 235; - a process of valuation, 236; - type of situation evoking, 241-6, 293-5, 302, 303; - distinguished from ethical, 243 note, 246 note, 271, 302, 303; - relation to physical, 246 note 3; - subject of, the means of action, 259, 304; - analysis of process of, 304-12; - distinguished from "pull and haul," 237, 238; - psychological account of, 310, 311; - a reconstructive process, 311, 312. - - "EGOISM, NEO-HEGELIAN," 316. - - EHRENFELS, C. VON, 318 note. - - EIDOLA: - Bacon's view of, 157. - - ELEATICS: - their logical position, 216 ff. - - ELEMENTS: - as four, 213; - as infinite, 213 ff. - - EMERSON, R. W., 204, 246 note. - - EMPEDOCLES: - attempts at definition, 203; - treatment of the One and the Many, 218 ff. - - EMPIRICISM, 11, 29, 47, 48, 61 ff.; - and rationalism, 80; - criticised, 156; - Jevons, 169; - treatment of imagery, 186-8. - - ENDS: - controlling factors in acquisition of knowledge, 229; - may themselves be objects of attention and judgment, 233; - judgment of, inseparable from factual judgment, 234; - conflict of, related, the occasion for ethical judgment, 238-41; - indirect conflict of unrelated, the occasion for economic judgment, - 241-3; - the subject-matter of ethical judgment, 258, 259; - definition of, the goal of all judgment, 264, 272; - not always explicit in judgment-process, 269, 270; - nature of relation between, in ethical judgment, 273, 274, 291, 292; - types of factual condition implied in acceptance of, 275, 276; - warranted by factual judgment, 276; - nature of, unrelatedness of, in economic judgment, 293-5, 302, 303; - (see Purpose). - - ENERGY: - principle of conservation of, 206, 299, 300; - not valid in sphere of valuation, 328. - - "ENERGY-EQUIVALENCE": - principle of, in economic judgment, 308, 309; - meaning of, 309 note. - - EPISTEMOLOGY, 5-7, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 47, 73, 341; - origin of problem of, 344, 345. - - ERDMANN, BENNO: - concerning induction, 173. - - ERROR: - criterion of, 371. - - ETHICAL JUDGMENT: - involves same type of process as physical, 235; - a process of valuation, 236, 332; - type of situation evoking, 237-41, 291-4; - distinguished from mechanical "pull and haul" between ends, 237, - 238; - distinguished from economic judgment, 243 note, 246 note, 271, 302, - 303; - subject of, an end of action, 258; - analysis of process of, 295-302; - a reconstructive process, 295, 299. - - EXISTENCE: - _versus_ meaning, 216, 217. - - EXPERIENCE: - duality of, 16; - logic of, 19-21; - how organized, 42; - relation of thought to organization of, 43-8; - as disorganized, 75; - (see Absolute, Functions). - - EXPERIMENT: - as form of deduction, 212. - - - FACT: - as equivalent to datum, 26, 50 ff.; - criteria for determining, 106 ff.; - as reality, 110; - in relation to both idea and reality, 380 ff.; - and theory, conflict between, 150, 151; - mutual dependence of, 168; - Whewell's view of, 163; - (see Datum, Idea, Reality, Truth). - - FACTUAL JUDGMENT: - inadequate to complete mediation of conduct, 230-34; - controlled by ends, 269; - incidental to judgments of valuation, 272, 295; - types of, implied in acceptance of an end, 275, 276; - presents warrant for acceptance of ends, 277. - - FITE, W., 331 note. - - FRAGMENTARY, 72; - as quality of internal meaning, 360, 361; - as an attribute of finite experience, 364, 376; - (see Stimulus, Tension). - - FUNCTIONS: OF EXPERIENCE, 16; - logic of, 18, 23; - distinguished from status, 16; - of thought, 23, 24, 78, 85; - total, as stimulus to thought, 36-8, 80; - different, and logical distinctions, 42; - different, confused by Lotze, 56; - sensations as, 58. - - - GENETIC: - method, significance of, 14, 15, 187; - distinctions, importance of, 24, 53, 62, 71, 85; - effect of ignoring, 53, 62, 71; - (see Psychology). - - "GOOD": - practical significance of, as moral predicate, 259; - relation to "right," 335. - - GORE, W. C., 377 note. - - GORGIAS, 225. - - GREEK VIEW OF THOUGHT AND REALITY, 342 ff. - - GREEN, T. H., 274 note, 288 note 3, 315 note, 316 note, 330, 331. - - - HABIT: - relation of judgment to, interruption and resumption of, 154; - and hypothesis, 170; - and analogy, 176; - and simple enumeration, 176; - and conversion, 176; - and logical meaning, 198; - logical function of, 375, 376. - - HERACLITUS: - his position, 215 ff. - - HIPPO, 209. - - HOBBES, THOMAS, 301. - - HOMOGENEITY: - of the world-ground, 207; - of the world, 209, 210. - - HUTCHESON, F., 301. - - HYPOTHESIS: - nature of, VII, 143-83; - unequal stress commonly laid on its origin, structure, and function, - 143-5; - relation of data and hypothesis strictly correlative, 145, 152, 168; - as predicate, 146, 183; - negative and positive sides of, 146, 155; - came to be recognized with rise of experimentalism, 159; - and test, 174, 175, 177 ff.; - origin of, 170, 171 ff.; - supposition and, 178; - interdependence of formation and test of, 182. - - - IDEA: - continuous with fact, 9, 10, 12; - distinction from fact, 13, 110; - Lotze's confusion regarding, 31, 32, 41, 65; - association of, 33; - contrast with datum, 52-4; - functional conception of, 70, 112 ff.; - objective validity of, 72-5; - as entire content of judgment, 119; - existential aspect of, 97, 99 ff., 113; - in relation to reference, 97 ff., 103, 129; - representational theory of, 100 ff., 113 ff., 141, 347 ff., 372 ff.; - universality of, 97 ff., 113 ff.; - as not referred to reality, 97 ff.; - as forms of control, 129; - function in judgment, 153, 154; - distinguished from image, 183-93; - distinction criticised, 199-202; - problems accompanying discovery of, 341; - in Greek thought, 342; - instrumental and representative functions of, 346 ff., 372 ff.; - purposive character of, 347 ff.; - external and internal meaning of, 347 ff.; - Royce's absolute system of, 348; - triple relation to purpose in Royce's account, 349 ff.; - logical _versus_ memorial, 351; - in relation to fact and reality, 379 ff.; - (see Hypothesis, Image, Predicate). - - IDEAS: - Platonic, 247. - - IMAGE: - as merely fanciful, 53; - in relation to meaning, 54; - place of, in judgment, 154; - distinction from idea, 189-93; - distinction criticised, 199-202; - as direct and indirect stimulus, 195-7. - - IMAGERY: - empirical criteria of, 186; - function of, 187; - as representative, 186-8, 194; - psychological function of, 193-7; - logical function of, 198, 199. - - IMMEDIATE: - as related to mediation, 342, 350 ff. - - IMPRESSION: - Lotze's definition of, 27, 28, 29, 32; - objective determination of, 30, 31; - objective quality of, 31, 68; - as psychic, 53; - as transformed by thought into meanings or ideas, 67 ff.; - (see Idea, Meaning, Sensation). - - INDETERMINATE: - as quality of finite experience, 364. - - INDUCTION: - Bacon's view of, 157; - by enumeration and allied processes, 171; - and habit, 176; - _versus_ deduction, 211, 212. - - INFERENCE: - Lotze's view of, 60; - in relation to judgment, 117. - - INSTRUMENTAL: - as character of thought, 78-82, 128, 140, 346 ff., 372 ff.; - (see Purpose). - - INTERACTION: - physical, 218 ff. - - INTEREST: - direction of, 205. - - INVENTION: - form of deduction, 212. - - - JAMES, WILLIAM, 81 note, 352 note, 375. - - JEVONS, W. STANLEY, 169, 173. - - JONES, HENRY, 43 note, 59 note, 66. - - JUDGMENT: - Lotze's definition of, 59 and note; - relation of, to ideas, 60; - structure of, 75 note; - Bosanquet's theory of, 86 ff.; - as a function, 107 ff.; - dead and live, 108; - definition of, 86, 111; - relation to inference, 116 ff.; - limits of single, 123 ff.; - negative, 114 ff.; - of perception, 88 ff., 96; - parts of, 118 ff., 207, 208; - time relations of, 120 ff.; - as individual, 136; - as instrumental, 128, 140; - as categorical and hypothetical, 136; - as impersonal, 131; - as intuitive, 139; - various definitions of, 147 ff.; - analysis of, 149 ff.; - disjunctive, 155; - psychology of, 153; - purpose of, 154; - and interrupted activity, 154; - unique system of, 224-30; - general analysis of, 230-32; - purposive character of, 353 ff.; - universal, 354; - particular, 358; - individual, 359, 360; - mathematical, 354 ff., 370; - (see Economic, Ethical, Factual judgments, Copula, Predicate, - Reflection, Subject). - - - KANT, I., 43, 46, 60 note, 163, 263, 301. - - KEPLER, 146, 181. - - KNOWLEDGE: - in relation to reality, 102 ff.; - meaning and, 128; - "copy" and "instrumental" theories of, 129, 140, 141; - (see Judgment, Truth). - - KUELPE, O., 250 note. - - - LOGIC: - origin of, 4; - types of, 5-22; - as generic and specific, 18, 23; - relations to psychology, 14, 15, 63, 64, 184, 185, 192 ff.; - effect of modern psychology upon, 345; - relation to genetic method, 15-18; - problems illustrated, 19, 20; - social significance of, 20; - eristic the source of formal, 203; - pre-Socratic, 203; - and epistemology, 341, 342; - (see Epistemology, Psychology). - - LOTZE: - criticised, Studies II, III, IV; - applied logic, 6; - thought as accessory, 56; - view of judgment, 147; - similarity between him and Whewell, 165 note; - quoted, 6, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42, 56 note, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, - 68, 69, 73, 77, 83, 84. - - - MANY: - the, and the One, 210 ff., 218 ff. - - MARGINAL UTILITY: - principle of, 307, 337 note. - - Martineau, J., 262. - - MATHEMATICS: - certain forms of proof in, 172 ff.; - judgments of, 354 ff., 370. - - MCGILVARY, E. B., 257 note. - - MEAD, G. H., 38 note, 337 note. - - MEANING: - and logical idea, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 97; - as content of thought, 66 ff.; - three types of, 68; - as property of independent idea, 73-5; - and association of ideas, 33, 80; - and reference, 97; - world of, 98, 103, 112; - and knowledge, 89, 128, 190; - equivalent to response, 198; - _versus_ existence, 216-18; - inner and outer, 347 ff.; - (see Content, Idea, Reference). - - MEANS: - as external and constitutive, 78; - reapplication of, the problem of economic valuation, 242, 243, 246, - 259, 260, 303, 304; - objective in so far as not known adequately for one's purpose, 256; - definition of, incidental to all judgment, 272; - factual determination of, sometimes determinative of ends also, 270. - - MEDIATION: - in relation to the immediate, 350 ff. - - MELISSUS: - his dialectic, 214. - - METAPHYSICS, 8, 9, 13, 18, 85; - and logic of experience, 13; - as natural history, 13-18; - worth, 19-22; - logical and, 72, 74; - (see Epistemology, Logic). - - MILL, J. STUART, 147, 160 ff., 162, 166. - - MIXTURE: - logical meaning of idea of, 219, 220, 222. - - MONISM, 224. - - MOORE, A. W., 76 note, 346 note. - - MOTION: - conservation of, 206. - - - NEGATION, 97, 114 ff. - - NEO-HEGELIAN, 43, 316. - - NEWTON, I., 146, 159, 179; - his notes for philosophizing, 159 note. - - [Greek: Nomo] _versus_ [Greek: physei], 226. - - NORMATIVE AND GENETIC, 16; - (see End, Purpose, Validity, Value). - - - OBEDIENCE: - a factor in genesis of morality, 257 - (see also Authority and Custom). - - OBJECT: - how defined, 38, 39, 74, 76; - socially current, 230; - real, individual in significance, 230; - nature of the ethical, 240, 328; - of the economic, 259, 260, 328; - (see Substance). - - OBJECTIVITY: - Lotze's view of, 68 (see Study IV); - types of, 68; - Lotze's distinction of logical and ontological, 72, 73; - distinction denied, 341, 342; - scope of conception of, 235; - commonly denied to other than factual judgments, 247, 248; - not a property of sense-elements as such, 248, 249; - a category of "apperception," 250; - a mark of the problematic as such, 250, 251, 255; - not ascertainable by any specific method, 252; - "obtrusiveness" as evidence of, 253; - "reliability" as evidence of, 263; - conditions of experience of, 253-6; - conditions of, present in the ethical and economic situations, - 257-60; - a real characteristic of ethical and economic judgment, 261-3; - not dependent on social currency, 318-20; - nor on possibility of social currency, 320-24; - nor on permanence, 324-9; - (see Reality, Validity). - - ONE: - the, and the Many, 210 ff., 218 ff. - - - PARMENIDES: - his logical position, 216 ff.; - influence on Platonic-Aristotelian logic, 217. - - PARTICIPATION: - significance of, in Plato, 342 ff. - - PARTICULARITY: - of an idea, 99, 113; - of a judgment, 358. - - PERCEPTION: - judgments of, 88 ff., 96. - - PERFECT, THE, 126. - - PHYSICAL JUDGMENT (see Factual judgment). - - [Greek: Physei] _versus_ [Greek: nomo], 226. - - [Greek: Physis], 207, 224. - - PLATO, 53 note; - on ideas and reality, 342 ff., 378, 379. - - PLURALISM, 81 note. - - POSITING: - thought as, 68. - - PREDICATE: - how constituted, 75 note; - in relation to reality, 101, 103; - as hypothesis, 147, 153, 155, 156, 183, 186; - develops out of imaged end, 232; - interaction with subject, 232; - in ethical judgment, 258, 291-6; - in economic, 259, 260, 309-11; - (see Copula, Judgment, Hypothesis, Idea, Image). - - PREDICATION, 118 ff. - - PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY: - in Royce's philosophy, 368. - - PRESUPPOSITIONS, 204, 206. - - PROBLEMATIC (see Tension). - - PROOF: - inductive, 172, 173; - of hypothesis, 174, 175; - relation of, to origin of hypothesis, 179-82; - Wundt's view of, 177, 178. - - PROPOSITION: - and judgment, 118. - - PROTAGORAS, 226. - - PRUDENCE: - ethical status of, as a virtue, 246. - - PYTHAGOREANS, THE: - their logical position, 216; - use of experiment, 216. - - PSYCHICAL: - distinguished from physical, 25; - Lotze's view of impression as barely, 27, 28, 30; - view criticised, 31-4, 41, 42; - two meanings of, 38 note; - psychical mechanism, 31; - idea as, 53; - problem of logical and, 54 and note, 64; - activity of thought also made, by Lotze, 77 and note; - subjective result, 84; - (see Impression). - - PSYCHOLOGY: - and logic, 14-16, 26, 63, 64, 153, 154, 184, 185, 192 ff., 345, 348; - principle of, functional, 229, 230; - genesis of, 280, 281; - logical value of functional, 293. - - PSYCHOLOGISTS' FALLACY, 37. - - PURPOSE: - logical importance of, 4, 9, 10, 13, 15, 20, 35, 58, 76, 80, 154; - logical aspects of, Study XI; - in an idea, 347 ff.; - in judgment, 353 ff.; - in criterion of truth and error, 361 ff.; - origin of, as idea, 373 ff.; - as method, 377; - (see End, Reconstruction). - - - QUALES: - of sensation, 55, 56, 60 note. - - QUALITIES: - primary and secondary, 221. - - QUESTION: - and judgment, 97, 114 ff. - - - RATIONALISM: - criticised, 156 ff., 188 ff., 298 ff. - - RATIONALITY: - of world, 206. - - REALITY: - as constructed by thought, 94 ff., 104; - as developing, 126; - as including fact and idea, 108, 110, 125, 382; - as independent of thought, 85, 87 ff., 104; - as subject of subject, 88 ff.; - popular criterion of, 105 ff.; - possibility of knowledge of, 91 ff., 102 ff., 125; - for the individual, 94 ff., 103, 112, 224 ff.; - as relative to judging, 149; - as given in sensation, 160; - "perception" and "recognition" coefficients of, 263-7, 277; - these present in ethical and economical experience, 267-9; - apprehension of, emotional, 263; - scope of complete conception of, 235, 340; - degrees of, 340; - Platonic conception of, 343 ff.; - Royce's conception of, 348; - as related to fact and idea, 379 ff.; - (see Fact, Truth, Validity). - - REASON, SUFFICIENT: - principle of, 206. - - RECONSTRUCTION: - the function of thinking, 38, 40, 46, 75, 76, 85; - effect of denying this, 47, 71, 72; - data and, 49 ff.; - in judgment, 154, 291, 295, 299, 311, 312, 346, 347; - (see Habit, Stimulus, Tension). - - REFERENCE: - as social, 74; - problem of reference of ideas, 82 ff.; - as meaning, 97 ff.; - functional conception of, 113; - paradox of, 99; - idea as, 129. - - REFLECTION: - as derived, 1-12; - naive, 3, 9; - subject-matter of, 7, 8; - logic and, 3, 18, 23; - _versus_ constitutive thought, 43-8; - distinguished, 255; - general nature of, 269; - end not always explicit in, 270; - outcome of, statable in terms of end or means, 272; - (see Judgment, Thought). - - REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT, 134. - - REPRESENTATION: - as one of the two functions of an idea, 345, 347 ff., 372; - significance of, in ideal reconstruction, 376. - - RESPONSE: - failure of, and origin of judgment, 154. - - RESTLESSNESS: - as source of reflection and purpose, 374 ff.; - (see Tension). - - RHETORIC: - origin of, 203, 204. - - "RIGHT" (see "Good"). - - ROYCE, JOSIAH: - referred to, 76 note, 147; - theory of ideas discussed, 346-82; - quoted, 347, 348, 349, 350, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, - 362, 364, 366 note, 368, 370, 371, 374, 379, 380, 381. - - - SATISFACTION: - pause of, as marking attainment of truth, 362 ff. - - SCHILLER, F. C. S., 327 note, 345 note. - - SCIENCE: - relation to naive experience, 10, 11; - its historic stages, 11, 12; - distinction of logical procedure from epistemology, 13; - same history as philosophy, 21, 22. - - SELF, EMPIRICAL: - genesis and content of concept of, 290, 292, 331, 332 note 1. - - SELF, "ENERGETIC": - implied in experience of "warrant," 277, 278; - stimulus to development of concept of empirical self, 279-81; - essential principle in all valuation, 281-5; - evolution of moral attitude of reference to, 285-9; - logical function of, in valuation, 296; - important place in economic valuation, 308, 309; - not capable of being described in terms of purpose or ideal, 313-16; - Bradley's misinterpretation of, 332 note. - - SELF-REALIZATION (see also Green, T. H.): - theory of, as moral ideal futile, 298; - logically congruous with determinism and hedonism, 330, 331. - - SENSATIONS: - logical import of, 57; - as functions of experience, 58; - as point of contact with reality, 90; - place in judgment, 154; - and ideas, 164 ff.; - (see Impressions, Psychical). - - SENSORI-MOTOR ACTIVITY, 193, 200. - - SHAFTESBURY, 301. - - SIGWART, C.: - view of judgment, 147. - - SKEPTICISM, 50 note, 85. - - "SOCIAL CURRENCY": - implies an identity of aspect of an object to different persons, - 229; - object having, an abstraction like social individual, 229; - not a test of objectivity, 318-29. - - SOCRATES: - function of concept, 342. - - SOPHISTS, THE, 225. - - SPENCER, H., 248, 250 note 1, 315 note. - - STANDARD (see also Predicate): - identified with predicate in ethical judgment, 238-40; - function of, in ethical judgment, 274, 299, 300; - morphology and mode of reconstruction of, 296, 297; - an ultimate ethical, impossible, 299; - objectivity of, 300, 301. - - STIMULUS: - of thought, 7, 8, 17, 24, 37-40, 47, 81; - Lotze's view of, 27, 29, 30; - view criticised, 30-36; - confusion of datum with, 61; - defined, 75; - and judgment, 153-4; - as condition of thinking, 193 ff.; - as direct and indirect, 195-7; - of ethical judgment, 238-41, 291; - of economic, judgment, 241-6, 302; - (see Content, Datum). - - STOUT, G. F.: - referred to, 349. - - STRATTON, G. M., 318 note. - - STRUCTURE, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 75; - (see Function). - - SUBJECT: - of judgment, how constituted, 75 note; - as constructed by thought, 94 ff., 103; - as a part of judgment, 118 ff.; - as reality, 88 ff.; - as inside and outside of judgment, 93, 96; - functional theory of, 111, 125; - as that requiring explanation, 208, 211 ff.; - as modified by deduction, 212; - given by analysis of situation, 232; - interacts with predicate in judgment, 232; - of ethical judgment, 258, 296-8; - of economic judgment, 259, 260, 304, 309-11; - (see Copula, Datum, Judgment, Predicate). - - SUBJECTIVE: - distinguished from objective, 25; - Lotze's view of impressions as purely, 27, 28; - view criticised, 31; - definition of, 39; - developed only within reflection, 52, 53; - (see Psychical). - - SUBJECTIVISM: - in Lotze, 83, 84; - in Royce, 360. - - SUBJECT-MATTER OF THOUGHT: - distinguished as stimulus, datum, and content, 7, 8, 24; - confusion of these (genetic) distinctions, 17, 18; - as antecedent, Study II; - as datum, Study III; - as content, Study IV. - - SUBSTANCE: - ethical theories based on logic involved in rationalistic conception - of, 298, 299; - meaning of concept of, 326, 327; - type-form of conduct analogous to concept of a particular kind of, - 327, 328. - - SUBSTANTIATION: - significance of Plato's, of ideas, 342 ff. - - SUPPOSITION AND HYPOTHESIS, 178-81. - - SWEET, HENRY: quoted, 153 note. - - SYNTHETIC (see Reconstruction). - - - TAYLOR, A. E., 299 note 2, 315 note, 316, 324. - - TELEOLOGY (see End, Purpose). - - TEMPTATION: - ethical, 238, 301; - economic, 305. - - TENSION: - as stimulus to thought, 37, 38, 49, 50, 53, 70, 85; - in relation to constitution of sensory datum, 53, 58, 59, 70; - constitution of meaning as distinct from fact, 75, 85, 154, 237-46, - 250, 251, 255, 291-5, 374 ff.; - (see Purpose, Reconstruction). - - THALES: - his [Greek: arche], water, 209; - in relation to deduction, 212, 214. - - THOUGHT: - forms of, 58 ff.; - as modes of organizing data, 63; - three kinds according to Lotze, 68, 69; - as positing and distinguishing, 69; - validity of its function, 76-82; - of its products, 82-5; - instrumental character, 78-82; - as discriminating sensory qualities, 200-202; - (see Judgment, Reflection). - - TIME: - as involved in judgment, 120 ff. - - TRANSCENDENTALISM, 29, 43-8. - - TRENDELENBURG, A.: - view of judgment, 147. - - TRUTH: criterion of, 84; - Bosanquet's conception of, 105; - popular criterion of, 105 ff.; - and purpose, Study XI; - representational _versus_ teleological view of, 341 ff.; - criterion of, 361 ff.; - (see Objectivity, Validity). - - - UEBERWEG: - view of judgment, 147. - - UNIFORMITY: - of nature, 206. - - UNITY: - of the world, 207. - - UNIVERSAL: - first and second according to Lotze, 56, 59, 69; - ideas as, 97 ff., 113; - judgment as, 136; - Mr. Royce's treatment of, 354 ff.; - necessity and, 357. - - - VALIDITY: - of thought, 7, 8; - relation to genesis, 14, 15; - test, 17, 18; - defines content of thought, 24; - problem of, Study IV; - Lotze's dilemma regarding, 71-85; - of bare object of thought, 72-6; - of activity of thought, 76-82; - of product of thought, 82-5; - (see Objectivity, Reality, Truth). - - VALUE: - Lotze's distinction of, from existence, 28, 29; - view criticised, 31, 41, 45; - organized, of experience, 42-8; - determined in and by a logical process, 233; - nature of consciousness of, 273, 333-5; - function of consciousness of, 335-7; - properly mediate and functional in character, 338-40. - - VALUATION (see also Ethical judgment, Economic judgment): - includes only ethical and economic types of judgment, 227, 236, - 338-40; - general account of process of, 272, 295; - reconstructive of self as well as of reality, 312. - - VENN, JOHN: - origin of hypothesis, 169. - - - "WARRANT": - consciousness of, accompanies purely factual as well as valuational - judgment processes, 276, 277; - the constitutive feature of survey of factual conditions, 278, 279. - - WELTON, J.: - origin of hypothesis, 171. - - WHEWELL, WILLIAM, 163; - view of sensations and ideas, 164, 165; - of induction, 165; - a certain agreement between him and Mill, 166. - - WIESER, F. VON, 335 note 2. - - WILL: - as related to thought, 366 note; - (see Activity, End, Purpose). - - WUNDT, W.: - view of judgment, 147; - view of mathematical induction, 173; - formation and proof of hypothesis, 177 ff.; - distinction between supposition and hypothesis, 178 ff. - - "WRONG" (see "Bad"). - - - XENOPHANES: - his logical position, 216. - - - ZENO: - his dialectic, 214. - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, pp. 10, 11. Italics -mine. - -[2] See ANGELL, "The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology -to Philosophy," _The Decennial Publications of the University of -Chicago_, Vol. III (1903), Part II, pp. 61-6, 70-72. - -[3] See _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, pp. 117-20. - -[4] See statements regarding the psychological and the logical in _The -Child and the Curriculum_, pp. 28, 29. - -[5] LOTZE, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 2. For the -preceding exposition see Vol. I, pp. 1, 2, 13, 14, 37, 38; also -_Microkosmus_, Book V, chap. 4. - -[6] LOTZE, _Logic_, Vol. I, pp. 6, 7. - -[7] LOTZE, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 25. - -[8] _Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 36. - -[9] _Ibid._ - -[10] _Microkosmus_, Book V, chap. 4. - -[11] _Logic_, Vol. II, p. 235; see the whole discussion, Secs. 325 -through 327. - -[12] The emphasis here is upon the term "existences," and in its plural -form. Doubtless the distinction of some experiences as belonging to me, -as mine in a peculiarly intimate way, from others as chiefly concerning -other persons, or as having to do with things, is an early one. But this -is a distinction of _concern_, of value. The distinction referred to -above is that of making an _object_, or presentation, out of this felt -type of value, and thereby breaking it up into distinct "events," etc., -with their own laws of inner connection. This is the work of -psychological analysis. Upon the whole matter of the psychical I am glad -to refer to PROFESSOR GEORGE H. MEAD'S article entitled "The Definition -of the Psychical," Vol. III, Part II, of _The Decennial Publications of -the University of Chicago_. - -[13] We have a most acute and valuable criticism of Lotze from this -point of view in PROFESSOR HENRY JONES, _Philosophy of Lotze_, 1895. My -specific criticisms agree in the main with his, and I am glad to -acknowledge my indebtedness. But I cannot agree in the belief that the -business of thought is to qualify reality as such; its occupation -appears to me to be determining the reconstruction of some aspect or -portion of reality, and to fall within the course of reality itself; -being, indeed, the characteristic medium of its activity. And I cannot -agree that reality as such, with increasing fulness of knowledge, -presents itself as a thought-system, though, as just indicated, I have -no doubt that reality appears as thought-specifications or values, just -as it does as affectional and aesthetic and the rest of them. - -[14] Bradley's criticisms of rationalistic idealism should have made the -force of this point reasonably familiar. - -[15] The common statement that primitive man projects his own volitions, -emotions, etc., into objects is but a back-handed way of expressing the -truth that "objects," etc., have only gradually emerged from their -life-matrix. Looking back, it is almost impossible to avoid the fallacy -of supposing that somehow such objects were there first and were -afterward emotionally appreciated. - -[16] Of course, this very element may be the precarious, the ideal, and -possibly fanciful of some other situation. But it is to change the -historic into the absolute to conclude that therefore everything is -uncertain, all at once, or as such. This gives metaphysical skepticism -as distinct from the working skepticism which is an inherent factor in -all reflection and scientific inquiry. - -[17] But this is a slow progress within reflection. Plato, who was -influential in bringing this general distinction to consciousness, still -thought and wrote as if "image" were itself a queer sort of objective -existence; it was only gradually that it was disposed of as psychical, -or a phase of immediate experience. - -[18] Of course, this means that what is excluded and so left behind in -the problem of determination of _this_ objective content is regarded as -psychical. With reference to other problems and aims this same psychic -existence is initial, not survival. Released from its prior absorption -in some unanalyzed experience it gains standing and momentum on its own -account; _e. g._, the "personal equation" represents what is eliminated -from a given astronomic time-determination as being purely subjective, -or "source-of-error." But it is initiatory in reference to new modes of -technique, re-readings of previous data--new considerations in -psychology, even new socio-ethical judgments. Moreover, it remains a -fact, and even a worthful fact, as a part of one's own "inner" -experience, as an immediate _psychical reality_. That is to say, there -is a region of _personal_ experience (mainly emotive or affectional) -already recognized as a sphere of value. The "source of error" is -disposed of by making it a _fact_ of this region. The recognition of -falsity does not _originate_ the psychic (p. 38, note). - -[19] Of course, this is a further reflective distinction. The plain man -and the student do not determine the extraneous, irrelevant, and -misleading matter as image in a _psychological_ sense, but only as -_fanciful_ or fantastic. Only to the psychologist and for _his_ purpose -does it break up into image and meaning. - -[20] Bradley, more than any other writer, has seized upon this double -antithesis, and used it first to condemn the logical as such, and then -turned it around as the impartial condemnation of the psychical also. -See _Appearance and Reality_. In chap. 15 he metes out condemnation to -"thought" because it can never take in the psychical existence or -reality which is present; in chap. 19, he passes similar judgment upon -the "psychical" because it is brutally fragmentary. Other -epistemological logicians have wrestled--or writhed--with this problem, -but I believe Bradley's position is impregnable--from the standpoint of -ready-made differences. When the antithesis is treated as part and lot -of the process of defining the truth of a particular subject-matter, and -thus as historic and relative, the case is quite otherwise. - -[21] Vol. I, pp. 28-34. - -[22] It is interesting to see how explicitly Lotze is compelled finally -to differentiate two aspects in the antecedents of thoughts, one of -which is necessary in order that there may be anything to call out -thought (a lack, or problem); the other in order that when thought is -evoked it may find data at hand--that is, material in shape to receive -and respond to its exercise. "The manifold matter of ideas is brought -before us, not only in the _systematic order of its qualitative -relationships_, but in the rich _variety of local and temporal -combinations_.... The _combinations of heterogeneous ideas_ ... forms -the _problems_, in connection with which the efforts of thought to -reduce coexistence to coherence will _subsequently_ be made. The -_homogeneous or similar_ ideas, on the other hand, give occasion to -separate, to connect, and to count their repetitions." (Vol. I, pp. 33, -34; italics mine.) Without the heterogeneous variety of the local and -temporal juxtapositions there would be nothing to excite thought. -Without the systematic arrangement of quality there would be nothing to -meet thought and reward it for its efforts. The homogeneity of -qualitative relationships, _in the pre-thought material_, gives the -tools or instruments by which thought is enabled successfully to tackle -the heterogeneity of collocations and conjunctions also found in the -same material! One would suppose that when Lotze reached this point he -might have been led to suspect that in this remarkable adjustment of -thought-stimuli, thought-material, and thought-tools to one another, he -must after all be dealing, not with something prior to the -thought-function, but with the necessary elements in and of the -thought-situation. - -[23] _Supra_, p. 30. - -[24] For the identity of sensory experience with the point of greatest -strain and stress in conflicting or tensional experience, see "The -Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," _Psychological Review_, Vol. III, p. -57. - -[25] For the "accessory" character of thought, see LOTZE, Vol. I, pp. 7, -25-7, 61, etc. - -[26] BOSANQUET, _Logic_ (Vol. I, pp. 30-34), and Jones (_Philosophy of -Lotze_, 1895, chap. 4) have called attention to a curious inconsistency -in Lotzes's treatment of judgment. On one hand, the statement is as -given above. Judgment grows out of conception in making explicit the -determining relation of universal to its own particular, implied in -conception. But, on the other hand, judgment grows not out of conception -at all, but out of the question of determining connection in change. -Lotze's nominal reason for this latter view is that the conceptual world -is purely static; since the actual world is one of change, we need to -pass upon what really goes together (is causal) in the change as -distinct from such as are merely coincident. But, as Jones clearly -shows, it is also connected with the fact that, while Lotze nominally -asserts that judgment grows out of conception, he treats conception as -the result of judgment since the first view makes judgment a mere -explication of the content of an idea, and hence merely expository or -analytic (in the Kantian sense) and so of more than doubtful -applicability to reality. The affair is too large to discuss here, and I -will content myself with referring to the oscillation between -conflicting contents, and gradation of sensory qualities already -discussed (p. 56, note). It is judgment which grows out of the former, -because judgment is the whole situation as such; conception is referable -to the latter because it _is_ one abstraction within the whole (the -solution of possible meanings of the data) just as the datum is another. -In truth, since the sensory datum is not absolute, but comes in a -historical context, the qualities apprehended as constituting the datum -simply define the locus of conflict in the entire situation. They are -attributives of the contents-in-tension of the colliding things, not -calm untroubled ultimates. On pp. 33 and 34 of Vol. I, Lotze recognizes -(as we have just seen) that, as matter of fact, it is both sensory -qualities in their systematic grading, or quantitative determinations -(see Vol. I, p. 43, for the recognition of the necessary place of the -quantitative in the true concept), _and_ the "rich variety of local and -temporal combinations," that provoke thought and supply it with -material. But, as usual, he treats this simply as a historical accident, -not as furnishing the key to the whole matter. In fine, while the -heterogeneous collocations and successions constitute the problematic -element that stimulates thought, quantitative determination of the -sensory quality furnishes one of the two chief means through which -thought deals with the problem. It is a reduction of the original -colliding contents to a form in which the effort at redintegration gets -maximum efficiency. The concept, as ideal meaning, is of course the -other partner to the transaction. It is getting the various possible -meanings-of-the-data into such shape as to make them most useful in -construing the data. The bearing of this upon the subject and predicate -of judgment cannot be discussed here. - -[27] See Vol. I, pp. 38, 59, 61, 105, 129, 197, for Lotze's treatment of -these distinctions. - -[28] Vol. I, p. 36; see also Vol. II, pp. 290, 291. - -[29] Vol. II, p. 246; the same is reiterated in Vol. II, p. 250, where -the question of origin is referred to as a corruption in logic. Certain -psychical acts are necessary as "conditions and occasions" of logical -operations, but the "deep gulf between psychical mechanism and thought -remains unfilled." - -[30] _Philosophy of Lotze_, chap. 3, "Thought and the Preliminary -Process of Experience." - -[31] Vol. I, p. 38. - -[32] Vol. I, p. 13; last italics mine. - -[33] Vol. I, p. 14; italics mine. - -[34] See Vol. I, pp. 16-20. On p. 22 this work is declared to be not -only the first, but the most indispensable of all thought's operations. - -[35] Vol. I, p. 26. - -[36] Vol. I, p. 35. - -[37] Vol. I, p. 36; see the strong statements already quoted, p. 30. -What if this canon were applied in the first act of thought referred to -above: the original objectification which transforms the mere state into -an abiding quality or meaning? Suppose, that is, it were said that the -first objectifying act cannot make a substantial (or attached) quale out -of a mere state of feeling; it must _find_ the distinction it makes -there already! It is clear we should at once get a _regressus ad -infinitum_. We here find Lotze face to face with this fundamental -dilemma: thought either arbitrarily forces in its own distinctions, or -else just repeats what is already there--is either falsifying or futile. -This same contradiction, so far as it affects the impression, has -already been discussed. See p. 31. - -[38] Vol. I, p. 31. - -[39] As we have already seen, the concept, the meaning as such, is -always a factor or status in a reflective situation; it is always a -predicate of judgment, in use in interpreting and developing the logical -subject, or datum of perception. See Study VII, on the Hypothesis. - -[40] ROYCE, in his _World and Individual_, Vol. I, chaps. 6 and 7, has -criticised the conception of meaning as valid, but in a way which -implies that there is a difference between validity and reality, in the -sense that the meaning or content of the valid idea becomes real only -when it is experienced in direct feeling. The above implies, of course, -a difference between validity and reality, but finds the test of -validity in exercise of the function of direction or control to which -the idea makes pretension or claim. The same point of view would -profoundly modify Royce's interpretation of what he terms "inner" and -"outer" meaning. See MOORE, _The University of Chicago Decennial -Publications_, Vol. III, on "Existence, Meaning, and Reality." - -[41] Vol. II, pp. 257, 265 and in general Book III, chap. 4. It is -significant that thought itself, appearing as an act of thinking over -against its own content, is here treated as psychical. Even this -explicit placing of thinking in the psychical sphere, along with -sensations and the associative mechanism, does not, however, lead Lotze -to reconsider his statement that the psychological problem is totally -irrelevant and even corrupting as regards the logical. Consequently, as -we see in the text, it only gives him one more difficulty to wrestle -with: how a process which is _ex officio_ purely psychical and -subjective can yet yield results which are valid, in a logical, to say -nothing of an ontological, sense. - -[42] Professor James's satisfaction in the -contemplation of bare pluralism, of disconnection, of radical -having-nothing-to-do-with-one-another, is a case in point. The -satisfaction points to an aesthetic attitude in which the brute diversity -becomes itself one interesting object; and thus unity asserts itself in -its own denial. When discords are hard and stubborn, and intellectual -and practical unification are far to seek, nothing is commoner than the -device of securing the needed unity by recourse to an emotion which -feeds on the very brute variety. Religion and art and romantic affection -are full of examples. - -[43] Lotze even goes so far in this connection as to say that the -antithesis between our ideas and the objects to which they are directed -is itself a part of the world of ideas (Vol. II, p. 192). Barring the -phrase "world of _ideas_" (as against world of continuous experiencing) -he need only have commenced at this point to have traveled straight and -arrived somewhere. But it is absolutely impossible to hold both this -view and that of the original independent existence of something given -to and in thought and an independent existence of a thought-activity, -thought-forms, and thought-contents. - -[44] The criticism of Bosanquet's theory of the judgment offered in this -paper is from the standpoint of the theory of the judgment developed by -Professor John Dewey, in his lectures on "The Theory of Logic." While -the chief interest of the paper, as the title implies, is critical, it -has been necessary to devote a portion of it to the exposition of the -point of view from which the criticism is made.--H. B. T. - -[45] The references throughout this paper are to the pages of Vol. I of -BERNARD BOSANQUET, _Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge_, Oxford, 1888. - -[46] F. H. BRADLEY, _Principles of Logic_, p. 64. - -[47] The difficulty, of course, is not a merely formal one, much less a -verbal one. Instinctively we grant to Bosanquet his statement that -reality is a continuous whole; we feel it almost captious to question -his right to it. But why? Because the _content of judgment_ is -continuous; judgment is always engaged with the determination of a -related totality. But if all content is ideal, and judgment is just the -application of this content to reality in virtue of an isolated contact, -surely it begs the entire question to say that reality apart from the -content applied is continuous, and then to use this assertion to justify -the objective validity of the judgment--its element of permanent truth. - -[48] There is good reason for believing that Mr. Bosanquet escapes, in -his own mind, the difficulty by the term "correspondence." "The name -stands for these elements in the idea which _correspond_ in the separate -worlds;" we may even be accused of injustice in confusing this -correspondence with bare identity of existence. But if one idea -corresponds to another in the sense of referring to it, what is this but -the fact to be explained--how an existence can refer beyond itself? - -[49] This conclusion is clearly recognized by BRADLEY, _Appearance and -Reality_, chap. 4. - -[50] It would be suggestive to inquire in what sense conscious thought -claims to know. Is it a general claim which thought _qua_ thought puts -forth, or is it the claim of the content of some particular thought? The -former, of course, is a mere pious aspiration having no reference to -specific validity or truth; the latter is precisely the problem under -consideration. - -[51] Bosanquet would seem to have followed Lotze in this insertion of a -world of "meanings" intermediate between the individual idea as such and -the real object as such. See the criticism already passed, pp. 93-5. - -[52] Or, the situation as questioned is itself a fact, and a perfectly -determinate (though not determined) one. See pp. 38, 50. - -[53] Of course, the distinction between the process of arriving as -temporal, and the essential relation of subject and predicate as -eternal, harks back to the notion of judgment as the process by which -"we" reproduce, or make real for ourselves, a reality already real -within itself. And it involves just the same difficulties. The relation -of subject and predicate--this simultaneous distinction and mutual -reference--has meaning only in an act of adjustment, of attempt to -control, within which we distribute our conditions. When the act is -completed, the relation of subject and predicate, as subject and -predicate, quite disappears. An eternal relation of the two is -meaningless; we might as well talk of an eternal reaching for the same -distant object by the same hand. In such conceptions, we have only -grasped a momentary phase of a situation, isolated it, and set it up as -an entity. Significant results would be reached by considering the -"synthetic" character (in the Kantian sense) of judgment from this point -of view. All modern logicians agree that judgment must be ampliative, -must extend knowledge; that a "trifling proposition" is no judgment at -all. What does this mean save that judgment is developmental, -transitive, in effect and purport? And yet these same writers conceive -of Reality as a _finished system of content in a complete and -unchangeable single Judgment_! It is impossible to evade the -contradiction save by recognizing that since it is the business of -judgment to transform, its test (or Truth) is successful performance of -the particular transformation it has set itself, and that transformation -is temporal. - -[54] It is worth considering whether this may not be the reality of -Royce's distinction between outer and inner meaning. An anticipation of -experience is the working prerequisite of the control which will realize -the idea, _i. e._, the experience anticipated. One is no more "inner" or -"outer" than the other. - -[55] _Logik_, p. 304. - -[56] DE MORGAN, _Budget of Paradoxes_, pp. 55, 56; quoted by WELTON, -_Logic_, Vol. II, p. 60. - -[57] Advanced grammarians treat this matter in a way which should be -instructive to logicians. The hypothesis, says SWEET (Sec. 295 of _A New -English Grammar, Logical and Historical_, Oxford, 1892), suggests an -affirmation or negation "as objects of thought." "In fact, we often say -_supposing_ (that is, 'thinking') _it is true_, instead of _if it is -true_." In a word, the hypothetical judgment as such puts explicitly -before us the content of thought, of the predicate or hypothesis; and in -so far is a moment in judgment rather than adequate judgment itself. - -[58] This carries with it, of course, the notion that "sensation" and -"image" are not distinct psychical existences in themselves, but are -distinguished logical forces. - -[59] Concerning the strict correlativity of subject and predicate, data -and hypothesis, see p. 34. - -[60] _Novum Organum_, Vol. I, p. 61. - -[61] Newton's "Rules for Philosophizing" (_Principia_, Book III) are as -follows: - -Rule I. "No more causes of natural things are to be admitted than such -as are both true, and sufficient to explain the phenomena of those -things." - -Rule II. "Natural effects of the same kind are to be referred as far as -possible to the same causes." - -Rule III. "Those qualities of bodies that can neither be increased nor -diminished in intensity, and which are found to belong to all bodies -within reach of our experiments are to be regarded as qualities of all -bodies whatever." - -Rule IV. "In experimental philosophy propositions collected by induction -from phenomena are to be regarded either as accurately true or very -nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis, till other -phenomena occur, by which they are made more accurate or are rendered -subject to exceptions." - -[62] Book III, chap. 2, sec. 5; italics mine. The latter part of the -passage, beginning with the words "If we did not often commence," etc., -is quoted by Mill from Comte. The words "neither induction nor deduction -would enable us to understand even the simplest phenomena" are his own. - -[63] Book III, chap. 7, sec. 1. - -[64] Book III, chap. 14, secs. 4 and 5. - -[65] WILLIAM WHEWELL, _The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_, -London, 1840. - -[66] The essential similarity between Whewell's view and that of Lotze, -already discussed (see chap. 3) is of course explainable on the basis of -their common relationship to Kant. - -[67] _Logic_, Book IV, chap. 2, sec. 2; italics mine. - -[68] _Ibid._ - -[69] _Ibid._, sec. 4; in sec. 6 he states even more expressly that any -conception is appropriate in the degree in which it "helps us toward -what we wish to understand." - -[70] _Ibid._, sec. 6; italics mine. - -[71] VENN, _Empirical Logic_, p. 383. - -[72] VENN, _Empirical Logic_, p. 25; italics mine. - -[73] WELTON, _Manual of Logic_, Vol. II, chap. 3. - -[74] W. S. JEVONS, _Principles of Science_, pp. 231, 232. - -[75] B. ERDMANN, "Zur Theorie des Syllogismus und der Induktion," -_Philosophische Abhandlungen_, Vol. VI, p. 230. - -[76] WUNDT, _Logik_, 2d ed., Vol. II, p. 131. - -[77] WELTON, _Manual of Logic_, Vol. II, p. 72. - -[78] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 452 ff. - -[79] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 454-461. - -[80] BOSANQUET, _Logic_, Vol. I, p. 46. - -[81] BRADLEY, _Principles of Logic_, p. 10. - -[82] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 74. - -[83] BRADLEY, _Principles of Logic_, p. 11. - -[84] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 75, 76. - -[85] BRADLEY, _op. cit._, pp. 4-6. - -[86] _Op. cit._, pp. 7, 8. - -[87] This study may be regarded as in some sense a development of pp. -7-10 of _The Necessary and the Contingent in the Aristotelian System_, -published in 1896 by The University of Chicago Press. While quite -independent in treatment, the two papers supplement each other. - -[88] The best special illustration of this truth with which I am -acquainted is presented for the science of chemistry in an article by F. -WALD, "Die Genesis der stoechiometrischen Grundgesetze," in _Zeitschrift -fuer physikalische Chemie_, Vol. XVIII (1895), pp. 337 ff. - -[89] [Greek: Xi] 201, 246. - -[90] H 99. - -[91] In allusion to fr. 90 (DIELS). DIELS finds in fr. 108 (fr. 18, -BYWATER), [Greek: oti sophon esti panton kechorismenon] the thought that -God is the Absolute, comparing the [Greek: Nous] of Anaxagoras and the -[Greek: choriste idea] of Plato and the [Greek: ousia choriste] of -Aristotle. He assumes that [Greek: sophon]=[Greek: logos] and concedes -great significance to the fragment. But this interpretation is utterly -incompatible with everything else that we know of Heraclitus, and should -be admitted only if it were the only one admissible. ZELLER discusses -the fragment at length, Vol. I, p. 629, 1. If Diels's interpretation be -accepted, the exposition above given of Heraclitus's logical position -must be abandoned. - -[92] It has been, and in some quarters is still, the fashion to say that -Heraclitus is the originator of the doctrine of relativity; but Zeller -is quite right in denying the charge. No doubt his teachings lent -themselves readily to such a development, but he did not so express -himself. According to him the _contrarieties coexist in the process_. - -[93] _Cf._ RITTER-PRELLER, Sec. 65_c_. - -[94] This, in a word, is the burden of my study of _The Necessary and -the Contingent in the Aristotelian System_. - -[95] I have in preparation a study of the problem of physical -interaction in Pre-Socratic philosophy which deals with this question in -all its phases. - -[96] This statement is, of course, figurative, since Empedocles denied -the existence of a void. - -[97] I cannot now undertake a defense of this statement, which runs -counter to certain ancient reports, but must reserve a full discussion -for my account of physical interaction. - -[98] The motive for making this assumption was clearly the desire to -make of the [Greek: Nous] the prime mover in the world while exempting -it from reaction on the part of the world, which would have been -unavoidable if its nature had contained parts of other things. It is the -same problem of "touching without being touched in return" that led -Aristotle to a similar definition of God and of the rational soul. The -same difficulty besets the absolutely "simple" soul of Plato's _Phaedo_ -and the causality of the Ideas. - -[99] ARISTOTLE, _De Generatione et Corruptione_, 323^b 10 f. - -[100] We have seen that this distinction was latent in Anaximenes's -process of rarefaction and condensation. For other matters see CHAIGNET, -_Histoire de la Psychologie_, Vol. I, p. 114, whose account, however, -needs to be corrected in some particulars. - -[101] I say "perhaps" because ancient reports differ as to the precise -relation of position and arrangement to the distinction between -qualities, primary and secondary. - -[102] This is only another instance of what MR. VENN (_Empirical Logic_, -p. 56) has wittily alluded to as "screwing up the cause and the effect -into close juxtaposition." - -[103] Simplicius says [Greek: euthys meta to prooimion]; see DIELS, _Die -Fragmente der Vorsokratiker_ (Berlin, 1903), p. 347, l. 18. - -[104] Fr. 2, DIELS. - -[105] See DIELS, _Fragmente der Vorsokratiker_, p. 343, l. 2; p. 344, l. -27. - -[106] 320 C f. - -[107] Considerations of space as well as circumstances attending the -immediate preparation of this discussion for the press have precluded -any but the most general and casual reference to the recent literature -of the subject. Much of this literature only imperfectly distinguishes -the logical and psychological points of view, so that critical reference -to it, unaccompanied by detailed restatement and analysis of the -positions criticised, would be useless. - -[108] In order to avoid complicating the problems, we have here employed -the common notion that the physical world, physical object, and property -may be taken for granted as possible adequate contents of judgment, and -that the problem is only as to the objectivity of economic and ethical -contents. Of course we may, in the end, come to believe that the -"physical" object is itself an economic construct, in the large sense of -"economic;" that is, an instrument of an effective or successful -experience. Thus in terms of the illustration used above, in the -attitude of entertaining in a general way the plan of building a house -_of some sort or other_, one may have before him various building -materials the ascertained qualities of which are, it may be, socially -recognized as in a general way fitting them for such a use. There is -doubtless so much of real foundation for the common notion here referred -to. But along with the _definition_ of the plan in ethical and economic -judgment, along with the determination actually to build a house, and a -house of a certain specific kind, must go _further_ determination of the -means in their physical aspects, a determination which all the while -reacts into the process of determination of the end. See below, p. 246, -note 3. - -[109] In the moral life, as elsewhere, the distinction of deduction and -induction is one of degree. There is but one _type_ or _method_ of -inference, though some inferences may approach more closely than do -others the limit of pure "subsumption." - -[110] See III below. - -[111] It is no part of the present view that the ends which enter into -economic conflict are incapable of becoming organic and intrinsically -interrelated members of the provisional system of life. On the contrary, -the very essence of our contention is that adjustment established -between two such conflicting ends in economic judgment is in itself -ethical and a member of the provisional system of the individual's ends -of life, and will stand as such, subject to modification through changes -elsewhere in the system, so long as the economic conditions in view of -which it was determined remained unchanged. The "mutual exclusiveness" -of the ends in ethical deliberation is simply the correlate of a -relative fixity in certain of the conditions of life. A man's command -over the means of obtaining such things as books and fuel varies much -and often suddenly in a society like ours from time to time; but, on the -other hand, his physical condition, his intelligence, his powers of -sympathy, and his spiritual capacity for social service commonly do not. -Hence there can be and is a certain more or less definite and permanent -comprehensive scheme of conduct morally obligatory upon him so far as -the exercise of these latter faculties is concerned, but so far as his -conduct depends upon the variable conditions mentioned, it cannot be -prescribed in general terms, nor will any provisional ideal of moral -selfhood admit any such prescriptions as integral elements into itself. -The moral self is an ideal construct based upon these fixed conditions -of life--conditions so fixed that the spiritual furtherance or -deterioration likely to result from certain modes of conduct involving -and affecting them can be estimated directly and with relative ease by -the "ethical" method of judgment. Implied in such a construct is, of -course, a reference to certain relatively permanent social and also -physical conditions. In so far as society and physical nature, and for -that matter the individual's own nature, are _variable_, these are the -subjects of "scientific" or "factual" judgments incidental to the -determination of problems by the "economic" method--problems, that is, -for which no _general_ answer, through reference to a more or less -definite and stable working concept of the self, can be given. Thus our -knowledge of the physical universe is largely, if not chiefly, -incidental to and conditioned by our economic experience. Again, our -economic judgments are in every case determinative of the self in -situations in which, as presented by (perhaps even momentarily) variable -conditions, physical, social, or personal, the ethical method is -inapplicable. In a socialistic state, in which economic conditions might -be more stable than in our present one, many problems in consumption -which now are economic in one sense would be ethical because admitting -of solution by reference to the type of self presupposed in the -established state program of production and distribution. Even now it is -not easy to specify an economic situation the solution of which is -absolutely indifferent ethically. There is a possibility of intemperance -even in so "aesthetic" an indulgence as Turkish rugs. - -[112] Accordingly there can be no distinction of ends, some as ethical, -others as economic, but from an ethical standpoint indifferent, and yet -others as amenable neither to ethical nor to economic judgment. The type -of situation and the corresponding mode of judgment employed determines -whether an end shall be for the time being ethical, economic, or of -neither sort conspicuously. - -[113] The right of Prudence to rank among the virtues cannot, on our -present view, be questioned. Economic judgment, though it must be -valuation of means, is essentially choice of ends--and, as would appear, -choice of a sort peculiarly difficult by reason of the usually slight -intrinsic relation between the ends involved and also by reason of the -absence of effective points of view for comparison. Culture, as Emerson -remarks, "sees prudence not to be a several faculty, but a name for -wisdom and virtue conversing with the body and its wants." And again, -"The spurious prudence, making the senses final, is the god of sots and -cowards, and is the subject of all comedy.... [The true prudence] takes -the laws of the world whereby man's being is conditioned, as they are, -and keeps these laws that it may enjoy their proper good" (Essay on -_Prudence_). - -[114] Here again we purposely use inaccurate language. Strictly, the -ends here spoken of as competing are such, we must say, only because -they are as yet in a measure indeterminate, wanting in "clearness," and -are not yet understood in their true economic character; likewise the -means are wanting in that final shade or degree of physical and -mechanical determinateness which they are presently to possess as means -to a finally determinate economic end. Thus economic judgment, by which -is to be understood determination of an end of action by the economic -method and in accordance with economic principles, involves in general -physical re-determination of the means. The means which at the outset of -the present economic judgment-process appear as physically available -indifferently for either of the tentative ends under consideration are -only in a general way the same means for knowledge as they will be when -the economic problem has been solved. They are, so far as now -determinate, the outcome of former physical judgment-processes -incidental to the definition of economic ends in former situations like -the present. - -[115] In our discussion of this preliminary question there is no attempt -to furnish what might be called an _analysis_ of the consciousness of -objectivity. This has been undertaken by various psychologists in recent -well-known contributions to the subject. For our purpose it is necessary -only to specify the intellectual and practical attitude out of which the -consciousness of objectivity arises; not the sensory "elements" or -factors involved in its production as an experience. - -[116] So, on the other hand, our vague organic sensations are possibly -more instructive as they are, _for their own purpose_, than they would -be if more sharply discriminated and complexly referred. - -For convenience we here meet the view under consideration with its own -terminology; we by no means wish to be understood as indorsing this -terminology as psychologically correct. The sense-quality of which we -read in "structural psychology" is, we hold, not a structural unit at -all, but in fact a highly abstract development out of that unorganized -whole of sensory experience in which reflective attention begins. There -is, for example, no such thing as the simple unanalyzable sense-quality -"red" in consciousness until judgment has proceeded far enough to have -constructed a definite and measured experience which may be symbolized -as "object-before-me-possessing-the-attribute-red." In place of the -original sensory total-experience we now have a more or less developed -perceptual (_i. e._, judgmental) total-experience. It is an instance of -the "psychological fallacy" to interpret what are really elements of -_meaning_ in a perceived object constructed in judgment (for this is the -true nature of the "simple idea of sensation" or "sense-element") as so -many bits of psychical material which were isolated from each other at -the outset, and have been externally joined together in their present -combination. - -[117] The phrase is Kuelpe's and is used in his sense of consciousness -taken as a whole, as, for example, attentive, apperceptive, volitional, -rather than in the sense made familiar by Spencer and others. - -[118] The foregoing discussion is in many ways similar to Brentano's -upon the same subject. In discussing his first class of modes of -consciousness, the _Vorstellungen_, he says: "We find no contrasts -between presentations excepting those of the objects to which the -presentations refer. Only in so far as warm and cold, light and dark, a -high note and a low, form contrasts can we speak of the corresponding -presentations as contrasted; and, in general, there is in any other -sense than this no contrast within the entire range of these conscious -processes" (_Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte_, Bd. I, p. 29). -This may stand as against any attempt to find contrast between abstract -sense-qualities taken apart from their objective reference. What is, -however, the ground of distinction between the presented objects? -Apparently this must be answered in the last resort as above. In this -sense we should need finally to interpret "sensuous" and "material" in -terms of objectivity as above defined, rather than the reverse. They are -cases in or specifications of the determination of adequate stimuli. - -[119] In this connection reference may be made to the well-known -disturbing effect of the forced introduction of attention to details -into established sensori-motor co-ordinations, such as "typewriting," -playing upon the piano, and the like. - -[120] _Cf._ PROFESSOR BALDWIN'S _Social and Ethical Interpretations_, -and PROFESSOR MCGILVARY'S recent paper on "Moral Obligation," -_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, especially pp. 349 f. - -[121] Manifestly, as indicated just above, this accepted value of the -object implies fuller physical knowledge of the object than was -possessed at the outset of the economic judgment. See above, p. 234, -note; p. 246, note 3; and p. 271, below. - -[122] _Types of Ethical Theory_, Vol. II, p. 5. - -[123] See p. 253 above. - -[124] It is not so much the case that the object, on the one side, -excites in the agent's consciousness, on the other, the "sensations of -resistance" which have played such a part in recent controversy on the -subject, as that (1) the object in certain of its promptings is -"resisting" certain other of its promptings, or that (2) certain -"positive" activities of the agent are being inhibited by certain -"negative" activities, thereby giving rise to the "emotion of -resistance." That "positive" and "negative" are here used in a -teleological way will be apparent. It is surely misleading to speak of -"_sensations_ of resistance" even in deprecatory quotation marks, except -as "sensation" is used in its everyday meaning, viz., experience of -strongly sensory quality. - -[125] The general theory of emotion which is here presupposed, and -indeed is fundamental to the entire discussion, may be found in -PROFESSOR DEWEY'S papers on "The Theory of Emotion," _Psychological -Review_, Vol. I, p. 553; Vol. II, p. 13. - -[126] Such is, in fact, the teaching of the various forms of ethical -intuitionism, and we find it not merely implied, but explicitly -affirmed, in a work in many respects so remote from intuitionism in its -standpoint as GREEN'S _Prolegomena to Ethics_. See pp. 178-81, and -especially pp. 355-9. - -[127] Sermon II. - -[128] Not to imply of course that psychologically or logically the -distinction of conditions and means is other than a convenient -superficial one. - -[129] Manifestly we have here been approaching from a new direction the -"Recognition coefficient" of reality described above. See p. 266. - -[130] This, if it were intended as an account of the genesis of -psychology as a science and of the psychological interest on the part of -the individual, would doubtless be most inadequate. We have, for one -thing, made no mention of the part which error and resulting practical -failure play in stimulating an interest in the _judgmental_ processes of -observation and the like, and in technique of the control of these. -Here, as well as in the processes of _execution_ of our purposes, must -be found many of the roots of psychology as a science. Moreover, no -explanation has been offered above for the appropriation by the -"energetic" self of these phenomena of interruption and retardation of -its energy as being, in fact, its own, or within itself. The problem -would appear to be psychological, and so without our province, and we -gladly pass it by. - -[131] We can, of course, undertake no minute analysis of the -psychological mechanism or concatenation of the process here sketched in -barest outline. Our present purpose is wholly that of description. -Slight as our account of the process of transition is, we give it space -only because it seems necessary to do so in order to make intelligible -the accounts yet to be given of the conscious valuation processes for -which the movement here described prepares the way. - -It will be observed that we assume above that the purpose is _successful -as planned_ and _by succeeding_ brings about the undesirable results. -Failure in execution of the purpose as such could only, in the manner -already outlined, prompt a more adequate investigation of the _factual -conditions_. - -[132] The case is not essentially altered in logical character if for -the Levitical law be substituted the general principles of the new -dispensation read off details by an authoritative church or by "private -judgment." - -[133] A remark may be added here by way of caution. The presented self, -we have said, attenuates to a mere maxim or tacit presumption in favor -of a certain type of logical procedure in dealing with the situation. It -must be remembered that the presented self, like all other presentation, -is and comes to be for the sake of its function in experience, and so is -practical from the start. The process sketched above is therefore not -from bare presented content as such to a methodological presumption, -which, as methodological and not contentual, is qualitatively different -from what preceded it. - -[134] _Recognized_ authority is, of course, not the same thing by any -means as authority unrecognized because absolutely dominant. - -[135] We may be pardoned for supplying from the history of ethics no -illustrations of this slight sketch. - -[136] In fact, as suggested above, the _Prolegomena to Ethics_ is in -many respects essentially intuitional in spirit, though its intuitionism -is of a modern discreetly attenuated sort. - -[137] This would appear to be the logical value of functional psychology -as a science of mental process. - -[138] We have already given a slight sketch of the historical process -here characterized in the barest logical terms. - -[139] Further consideration of the problem of factual judgment must be -deferred to Part V. - -[140] The relation of the empirical self to the "energetic" and to -standards will come in for statement in Part V in the connection just -referred to. - -[141] It might be possible to construct a "logic" of these various types -of working moral standard in such a way as to show that in each type -there is implied the one next higher morphologically, and ultimately the -highest--that is, some sort of concept of the "energetic" self. - -[142] It matters not at all whether, in ethics or metaphysics, our -universal be abstract or on the other hand "concrete," like Green's -conception of the self, or a "Hegelian" Absolute. Its logical use in the -determination of particulars must be essentially the same in either -case. - -[143] In this connection reference may be made to MR. TAYLOR'S recent -work, _The Problem of Conduct_. Mr. Taylor reduces the moral life to -terms of an ultimate conflict between the ideals of egoism and social -justice, holding that the conflict is in theory irreconcilable. With -this negative attitude toward current standards in ethical theory one -may well be in accord without accepting Mr. Taylor's further contention -that a theory of ethics is therefore impossible. Because the "ethics of -subsumption" is demonstrably futile it by no means follows that a method -of ethics cannot be developed along the lines of modern scientific logic -which shall be as valid as the procedure of the investigator in the -sciences. Mr. Taylor's _logic_ is virtually the same as that of the -ethical theories which he criticises; because an ethical _ideal_ is -impossible, a theory of ethics is impossible also. One is reminded of -MR. BRADLEY'S criticism of knowledge in the closing chapters of the -_Logic_ as an interesting parallel. - -[144] MR. BOSANQUET'S discussion of the place of the principle of -teleology in analogical inference will be found suggestive in this -connection (_Logic_, Vol. II, chap. iii). - -[145] See above, p. 243 and p. 259 _ad fin._ - -[146] We use the expression "energy-_equivalent_" because the "excess" -gained by the self through the past adjustment is not of importance at -just this point. The essential significance of the means now is not that -they "cost" less than they promised to bring in in energy, but that -_because they required sacrifice the self will now lose unless they are -allowed to fulfil the promise_. They are the logical equivalent of the -established modes of consumption from the standpoint of conservation of -the energies of the self, not the mathematical equivalent. - -It would be desirable, if there were space, to present a brief account -of the psychological basis of the concepts of energy and -energy-equivalence which here come into play, but this must be omitted. - -[147] Putting it negatively, the renunciation of the new end involves a -"greater" sacrifice than all the sacrifices which adherence to the -present system of consumption can compensate. - -[148] Green, as is well known, allows that any formulation of the ideal -self must be incomplete, but holds that it is not for this reason -useless. But this is to assume that development in the ideal is never to -be radically reconstructive, that the ideal is to expand and fill out -along established and unchangeable lines of growth so that all increase -shall be in the nature of accretion. The self as a system is fixed and -all individual moral growth is in the nature of approximation to this -absolute ideal. This would appear to be essentially identical in a -logical sense with Mr. Spencer's hypothesis of social evolution as a -process of gradual approach to a condition of perfect adaptation of -society and the individual to each other in an environment to which -society is perfectly adapted--a condition in which "perfectly evolved" -individuals shall live in a state of blessedness in conformity to the -requirements of "absolute ethics." For a criticism of this latter type -of view see MR. TAYLOR'S above-mentioned work (chap. v, _passim_). - -[149] For GREEN'S cautious defense of conscientiousness as a moral -attitude see the _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Book IV, chap. i; and for a -statement of the present point of view as bearing upon Green's -difficulty, see DEWEY, _The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus_, p. 37 _ad -fin._, and _Philosophical Review_, Vol. II, pp. 661, 662. - -[150] Along the line thus inadequately suggested might be found an -answer to certain criticisms of the attempt to dispense with a -metaphysical idea of the self. Such criticisms usually urge that without -reference to a metaphysical ideal no meaning attaches to such -conceptions as "adjustment," "expansion," "furtherance," and the like as -predicated of the moral acts of an agent in their effect upon the -"energetic" self. Anything that one may do, it is said, is expansive of -the self, if it be something new, except as we judge it by a -metaphysical ideal of a rightly expanded self. For an excellent -statement of this general line of criticism see STRATTON, "A -Psychological Test of Virtue," _International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. -XI, p. 200. - -[151] The polemic of certain recent writers (as, for example, EHRENFELS -in his _System der Werttheorie_) against the objectivity of judgments of -value appears to rest upon an uncritical acceptance of the time-honored -distinction between "primary" and "secondary" qualities as equivalent to -the logical distinction of subjective and objective. Thus EHRENFELS -confutes "das Vorurteil von der objectiven Bedeutung des Wertbegriffes" -by explaining it as due to a misleading usage of speech expressive of -"an impulse, deep-rooted in the human understanding, to objectify its -presentations" and then goes on to say "We do not desire things because -we recognize the presence in them of a mysterious impalpable essence of -Value but we ascribe value to them because we desire them." (_Op. cit._, -Bd. I, p. 2.) This may serve to illustrate the easy possibility of -confusing the logical and psychological points of view, as likewise does -EHRENFELS's formal definition of value. (Bd. I., p. 65.) - -[152] The essential dependence of factual judgment upon the rise of -economic and ethical conflict is implied in the widely current doctrine -of the teleological character of knowledge. It is indeed nowadays -something like a commonplace to say in one sense or another that -knowledge is relative to ends, but it is not always recognized by those -who hold this view that an end never appears as such in consciousness -alone. The end that guides in the construction of factual knowledge is -an end in ethical or economic conflict with some other likewise -indeterminate end in the manner above discussed. - -[153] See above, pp. 282, 283. - -[154] _Cf._ SCHILLER, _Riddles of the Sphinx_, chap. vii, Secs. 10-14. - -[155] It would appear that the principle of the conservation of energy -is valid only in the physical sphere; but the logical significance of -this limitation cannot be here discussed. - -[156] That the assumption mentioned is the essential basis of the twin -theories of associationism in psychology and hedonism in ethics is shown -by DR. WARNER FITE in his article, "The Associational Conception of -Experience," _Philosophical Review_, Vol. IX, pp. 283 ff. _Cf._ MR. -BRADLEY's remarks on the logic of hedonism in his _Principles of Logic_, -pp. 244-9. - -[157] The "energetic" self is apparently MR. BRADLEY'S fourth "meaning -of self," the self as monad--"something moving parallel with the life of -a man, or, rather, something not moving, but literally _standing_ in -relation to his successive variety" (_Appearance and Reality_ [1st ed.] -p. 86, in chap. ix, "The Meanings of the Self"). Mr. Bradley's -difficulty appears to come from his desiring a psychological content for -what is essentially a logical conception--a confusion (if we may be -permitted the remark) which runs through the entire chapter to which we -refer and is responsible for the undeniable and hopeless incoherency of -the various meanings of the self, as Mr. Bradley therein expounds them. -"If the monad stands aloof," says Mr. Bradley, "either with no character -at all or a private character apart, then it may be a fine thing in -itself, but it is a mere mockery to call it the self of a man" (p. 87). -Surely this is to misconstrue and then find fault with that very -character of essential _logical_ apartness from any possibility of -determination in point of descriptive psychological content which -constitutes the whole value of the "energetic" self as a logical -conception stimulative of the valuation-process and so inevitably of -factual judgment. See pp. 258, 259, above. The reader may find for -himself in Mr. Bradley's enumeration of meanings our concept of the -empirical self. But surely the "energetic" and empirical selves would -appear on our showing to have no necessary conflict with each other. - -[158] In the first of these inseparable aspects valuation is -determinative of Rightness and Wrongness; in the second it presents the -object as Good or Bad. See p. 259, above. - -[159] See, for example, WIESER, _Natural Value_ (Eng. trans.), p. 17. - -[160] See pp. 307-12 above. - -[161] The illustration, as also the general principle which it here is -used to illustrate, was suggested some years since by Professor G. H. -Mead in a lecture course on the "History of Psychology," which the -writer had the advantage of attending. - -[162] The conservative function of valuation may be further illustrated -by reference to the well-known principle of marginal utility of which we -have already made mention (p. 307 above), and which has played so great -a part in modern economic theory. The value of the unit quantity of a -stock of any commodity is, according to this principle, measured by the -least important single use in the schedule of uses to which the stock as -a whole is to be applied. Manifestly, then, adherence to this valuation -placed upon the unit quantity is in so far conservative of the whole -schedule and the marginal value is a "short-hand" symbol expressive of -the value of the whole complex purpose presented in the schedule. -Moreover, the increase of marginal value concurrently with diminution of -the stock through consumption, loss, or reapplication is not indicative -so much of a change of purpose as of determination to adhere to so much -of the original program of consumption as may still be possible of -attainment with the depleted supply of the commodity. - -[163] Thus except on this condition we should deny the propriety of -speaking of the value of a friend or of a memento or sacred relic. The -purpose of accurate definition of the function of such objects as these -in the attainment of one's ends is foreign to the proper attitude of -loving, prizing, or venerating them. We may ethically value the _act_ of -sacrifice for a friend or of solicitous care of the memento, but the -object of our sacrifice or solicitude has simply the direct or immediate -"qualitative" emotional character appropriate to the kinds of activity -to which it is the adequate stimulus. - -[164] _History of Philosophy_ (TUFT's translation), p. 117. - -[165] _Cf._ PROFESSOR J. R. ANGELL's article, "Relations of Structural -and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," _Decennial Publications of the -University of Chicago_, Vol. III, pp. 10-12; also _Philosophical -Review_, Vol. XII, No. 3. _Cf._ also MR. SCHILLER's essay on "Axioms as -Postulates" in _Personal Idealism_. - -[166] From this point on this paper is an expansion of some paragraphs, -pp. 11-13, in an article on "Existence, Meaning, and Reality," printed -from Vol. III of the First Series of the _Decennial Publications of the -University of Chicago_. - -[167] P. 22. - -[168] Pp. 22, 23; italics mine. - -[169] P. 25. - -[170] P. 26. - -[171] p. 36; italics mine. - -[172] Pp. 22, 23; italics mine. - -[173] P. 307. - -[174] P. 327. - -[175] P. 23; italics mine. - -[176] _Cf._ p. 34; also p. 22. - -[177] P. 35. - -[178] This warns us that in the phrase, "a plan of action," the term -"action" must be more inclusive than it is in much current discussion. -It must not be limited to gymnastic performance. It must apply to any -sort of activity planned for, and which, when it arrives, fulfils the -plan. This, I take it, is the import of the paragraph at the top of p. 7 -of PROFESSOR JAMES's _Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results_. - -[179] P. 270. - -[180] Pp. 270, 271. - -[181] P. 276. - -[182] P. 277. - -[183] Pp. 280, 281. - -[184] See p. 256. - -[185] P. 289; italics mine. - -[186] P. 281; italics mine. - -[187] It is worth noting in passing that here the universal appears to -be located in finite experience, while the ground of the particular is -in the absolute. - -[188] P. 282. - -[189] P. 284; italics mine. - -[190] P. 283. - -[191] P. 332. - -[192] P. 339. - -[193] This ghost of subjectivism haunts the entire part of the essay in -which the final fulfilment of finite ideas is found in "a certain -absolute system of ideas." - -[194] P. 330; italics mine. - -[195] P. 337. - -[196] P. 286. - -[197] P. 307. - -[198] P. 297. - -[199] This reduction of the purposive to the representative function -carries with it an interesting implication concerning the whole -character and relationship of thought and will. From beginning to end, -on almost every page, Mr. Royce insists upon the idea as an expression -of will. At the outset we read: "When we try to define the idea in -itself, as a conscious fact, our best means is to lay stress upon the -sort of will or active meaning which any idea involves for the mind that -forms the idea" (p. 22). Again: "The idea is a will seeking its own -determination. It is nothing else" (p. 332)--and so on throughout the -lectures. And we have already seen how consistently this is worked out -in the analysis of concrete acts, such as singing, etc. But now, as -related to the absolute system, the will, as embodied in the idea, is to -find its final determination in approximating the certain absolute -system of ideas. This would seem to make will but little more than the -mere form of representation itself. The idea is a will, but in its -relation to truth its will is "to correspond even in its vagueness to -its own final and completely individual expression." - -[200] P. 339. - -[201] P. 338. - -[202] P. 335. - -[203] _Cf._ MR. GORE'S paper, above. - -[204] _Cf._ BALDWIN'S _Development and Evolution_, pp. 250, 251, on the -necessity of the submission of the "new experience" to the test of its -ability to utilize habit. Interpreted broadly, habit might here mean the -whole mechanical side, including organism _and_ environment, and so -include Mr. Baldwin's second or "extra-organic" test. - -[205] P. 19. - -[206] Pp. 17, 18. - -[207] See, above, PROFESSOR DEWEY'S Study III, pp. 49 ff. - -[208] P. 55. - - - - - * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - -1. Footnotes have been renumbered and moved from the middle of a -chapter to the end of the main text. - -2. 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