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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40665 ***
+
+Transcriber's note:
+
+      1. Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
+
+      2. In the mathematical expressions in this text the carat
+         character represents 'raised to the power' (example:
+         1+3=2^2).
+
+      3. The original text includes Greek characters. For this
+         text file version these letters have been replaced with
+         their transliterations, with the exception of Greek
+         letter 'pi' which is represented as [pi].
+
+
+
+
+
+STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY
+
+by
+
+JOHN DEWEY
+
+Professor of Philosophy
+
+With the Co-Operation of Members and Fellows of the
+Department of Philosophy
+
+The Decennial Publications
+Second Series Volume Xi
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Chicago
+The University of Chicago Press
+1903
+
+Copyright, 1903
+By the University of Chicago
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+This volume presents some results of the work done in the matter of
+logical theory in the Department of Philosophy of the University of
+Chicago in the first decade of its existence. The eleven Studies are the
+work of eight different hands, all, with the exception of the editor,
+having at some period held Fellowships in this University, Dr. Heidel in
+Greek, the others in Philosophy. Their names and present pursuits are
+indicated in the Table of Contents. The editor has occasionally, though
+rarely, added a footnote or phrase which might serve to connect one
+Study more closely with another. The pages in the discussion of
+Hypothesis, on Mill and Whewell, are by him. With these exceptions, each
+writer is individually and completely responsible for his own Study.
+
+The various Studies present, the editor believes, about the relative
+amount of agreement and disagreement that is natural in view of the
+conditions of their origin. The various writers have been in contact
+with one another in Seminars and lecture courses in pursuit of the same
+topics, and have had to do with shaping one another's views. There are
+several others, not represented in this volume, who have also
+participated in the evolution of the point of view herein set forth, and
+to whom the writers acknowledge their indebtedness. The disagreements
+proceed from the diversity of interests with which the different writers
+approach the logical topic; and from the fact that the point of view in
+question is still (happily) developing and showing no signs of becoming
+a closed system.
+
+If the Studies themselves do not give a fair notion of the nature and
+degree of the harmony in the different writers' methods, a preface is
+not likely to succeed in so doing. A few words may be in place, however,
+about a matter repeatedly touched upon, but nowhere consecutively
+elaborated--the more ultimate philosophical bearing of what is set
+forth. All agree, the editor takes the liberty of saying, that judgment
+is the central function of knowing, and hence affords the central
+problem of logic; that since the act of knowing is intimately and
+indissolubly connected with the like yet diverse functions of affection,
+appreciation, and practice, it only distorts results reached to treat
+knowing as a self-inclosed and self-explanatory whole--hence the
+intimate connections of logical theory with functional psychology; that
+since knowledge appears as a function within experience, and yet passes
+judgment upon both the processes and contents of other functions, its
+work and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or transformatory;
+that since Reality must be defined in terms of experience, judgment
+appears accordingly as the medium through which the consciously effected
+evolution of Reality goes on; that there is no reasonable standard of
+truth (or of success of the knowing function) in general, except upon
+the postulate that Reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving, and, in
+particular, except through reference to the specific offices which
+knowing is called upon to perform in readjusting and expanding the means
+and ends of life. And all agree that this conception gives the only
+promising basis upon which the working methods of science, and the
+proper demands of the moral life, may co-operate. All this, doubtless,
+does not take us very far on the road to detailed conclusions, but it is
+better, perhaps, to get started in the right direction than to be so
+definite as to erect a dead-wall in the way of farther movement of
+thought.
+
+In general, the obligations in logical matters of the writers are
+roughly commensurate with the direction of their criticisms. Upon the
+whole, most is due to those whose views are most sharply opposed. To
+Mill, Lotze, Bosanquet, and Bradley the writers then owe special
+indebtedness. The editor acknowledges personal indebtedness to his
+present colleagues, particularly to Mr. George H. Mead, in the Faculty
+of Philosophy, and to a former colleague, Dr. Alfred H. Lloyd, of the
+University of Michigan. For both inspiration and the forging of the
+tools with which the writers have worked there is a pre-eminent
+obligation on the part of all of us to William James, of Harvard
+University, who, we hope, will accept this acknowledgment and this book
+as unworthy tokens of a regard and an admiration that are coequal.
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+
+
+  I. Thought and its Subject-Matter                                  1
+
+          By JOHN DEWEY
+
+  II. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Antecedents of Thought    23
+
+          By JOHN DEWEY
+
+  III. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Datum of Thinking        49
+
+          By JOHN DEWEY
+
+  IV. Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Content and
+      Object of Thought                                             65
+
+          By JOHN DEWEY
+
+  V. Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment                                 86
+
+          By HELEN BRADFORD THOMPSON, Ph.D., Director of the
+          Psychological Laboratory of Mount Holyoke College
+
+  VI. Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment                127
+
+          By SIMON FRASER MCLENNAN, Ph.D., Professor of
+          Philosophy in Oberlin College
+
+  VII. The Nature of Hypothesis                                    142
+
+          By MYRON LUCIUS ASHLEY, Ph.D., Instructor,
+          American Correspondence School
+
+  VIII. Image and Idea in Logic                                    183
+
+          By WILLARD CLARK GORE, Ph.D., Assistant Professor
+          of Psychology in the University of Chicago
+
+  IX. The Logic of the Pre-Socratic Philosophy                     203
+
+          By WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL, Ph.D., Professor of
+          Latin in Iowa College
+
+  X. Valuation as a Logical Process                                227
+
+          By HENRY WALDGRAVE STUART, Ph.D., Instructor in
+          Philosophy in the State University of Iowa
+
+  XI. Some Logical Aspects of Purpose                              341
+
+          By ADDISON WEBSTER MOORE, Ph.D., Assistant Professor
+          of Philosophy in the University of Chicago
+
+
+
+
+I
+
+THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF LOGICAL THEORY
+
+
+No one doubts that thought, at least reflective, as distinct from what
+is sometimes called constitutive, thought, is derivative and secondary.
+It comes after something and out of something, and for the sake of
+something. No one doubts that the thinking of everyday practical life
+and of science is of this reflective type. We think about; we reflect
+over. If we ask what it is which is primary and radical to thought; if
+we ask what is the final objective for the sake of which thought
+intervenes; if we ask in what sense we are to understand thought as a
+derived procedure, we are plunging ourselves into the very heart of the
+logical problem: the relation of thought to its empirical antecedents
+and to its consequent, truth, and the relation of truth to reality.
+
+Yet from the naïve point of view no difficulty attaches to these
+questions. The antecedents of thought are our universe of life and love;
+of appreciation and struggle. We think about anything and everything:
+snow on the ground; the alternating clanks and thuds that rise from
+below; the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the embroglio in
+Venezuela; the relation of art to industry; the poetic quality of a
+painting by Botticelli; the battle of Marathon; the economic
+interpretation of history; the proper definition of cause; the best
+method of reducing expenses; whether and how to renew the ties of a
+broken friendship; the interpretation of an equation in hydrodynamics;
+etc.
+
+Through the madness of this miscellaneous citation there appears so much
+of method: anything--event, act, value, ideal, person, or place--may be
+an object of thought. Reflection busies itself alike with physical
+nature, the record of social achievement, and the endeavors of social
+aspiration. It is with reference to _such_ affairs that thought is
+derivative; it is with reference to them that it intervenes or mediates.
+Taking some part of the universe of action, of affection, of social
+construction, under its special charge, and having busied itself
+therewith sufficiently to meet the special difficulty presented, thought
+releases that topic and enters upon further more direct experience.
+
+Sticking for a moment to this naïve standpoint, we recognize a certain
+rhythm of direct practice and derived theory; of primary construction
+and of secondary criticism; of living appreciation and of abstract
+description; of active endeavor and of pale reflection. We find that
+every more direct primary attitude passes upon occasion into its
+secondary deliberative and discursive counterpart. We find that when the
+latter has done its work it passes away and passes on. From the naïve
+standpoint such rhythm is taken as a matter of course. There is no
+attempt to state either the nature of the occasion which demands the
+thinking attitude, nor to formulate a theory of the standard by which is
+judged its success. No general theory is propounded as to the exact
+relationship between thinking and what antecedes and succeeds it. Much
+less do we ask how empirical circumstances can generate rationality of
+thought; nor how it is possible for reflection to lay claim to power of
+determining truth and thereby of constructing further reality.
+
+If we were to ask the thinking of naïve life to present, with a minimum
+of theoretical elaboration, its conception of its own practice, we
+should get an answer running not unlike this: Thinking is a kind of
+activity which we perform at specific need, just as at other need we
+engage in other sorts of activity: as converse with a friend; draw a
+plan for a house; take a walk; eat a dinner; purchase a suit of
+clothes; etc., etc. In general, its material is anything in the wide
+universe which seems to be relevant to this need--anything which may
+serve as a resource in defining the difficulty or in suggesting modes of
+dealing effectively with it. The measure of its success, the standard of
+its validity, is precisely the degree in which the thinking actually
+disposes of the difficulty and allows us to proceed with more direct
+modes of experiencing, that are forthwith possessed of more assured and
+deepened value.
+
+If we inquire why the naïve attitude does not go on to elaborate these
+implications of its own practice into a systematic theory, the answer,
+on its own basis, is obvious. Thought arises in response to its own
+occasion. And this occasion is so exacting that there is time, as there
+is need, only to do the thinking which is needed in that occasion--not
+to reflect upon the thinking itself. Reflection follows so naturally
+upon its appropriate cue, its issue is so obvious, so practical, the
+entire relationship is so organic, that once grant the position that
+thought arises in reaction to specific demand, and there is not the
+particular type of thinking called logical theory because there is not
+the practical demand for reflection of that sort. Our attention is taken
+up with particular questions and specific answers. What we have to
+reckon with is not the problem of, How can I think _überhaupt_? but, How
+shall I think right _here and now_? Not what is the test of thought at
+large, but what validates and confirms _this_ thought?
+
+In conformity with this view, it follows that a generic account of our
+thinking behavior, the generic account termed logical theory, arises at
+historic periods in which the situation has lost the organic character
+above described. The general theory of reflection, as over against its
+concrete exercise, appears when occasions for reflection are so
+overwhelming and so mutually conflicting that specific adequate
+response in thought is blocked. Again, it shows itself when practical
+affairs are so multifarious, complicated, and remote from control that
+thinking is held off from successful passage into them.
+
+Anyhow (sticking to the naïve standpoint), it is true that the stimulus
+to that particular form of reflective thinking termed logical theory is
+found when circumstances require the act of thinking and nevertheless
+impede clear and coherent thinking in detail; or when they occasion
+thought and then prevent the results of thinking from exercising
+directive influence upon the immediate concerns of life. Under these
+conditions we get such questions as the following: What is the relation
+of rational thought to crude or unreflective experience? What is the
+relation of thought to reality? What is the barrier which prevents
+reason from complete penetration into the world of truth? What is it
+that makes us live alternately in a concrete world of experience in
+which thought as such finds not satisfaction, and in a world of ordered
+thought which is yet only abstract and ideal?
+
+It is not my intention here to pursue the line of historical inquiry
+thus suggested. Indeed, the point would not be mentioned did it not
+serve to fix attention upon the nature of the logical problem.
+
+It is in dealing with this latter type of questions that logical theory
+has taken a turn which separates it widely from the theoretical
+implications of practical deliberation and of scientific research. The
+two latter, however much they differ from each other in detail, agree in
+a fundamental principle. They both assume that every reflective problem
+and operation arises with reference to some _specific_ situation, and
+has to subserve a _specific_ purpose dependent upon its own occasion.
+They assume and observe distinct limits--limits from which and to which.
+There is the limit of origin in the needs of the particular situation
+which evokes reflection. There is the limit of terminus in successful
+dealing with the particular problem presented--or in retiring, baffled,
+to take up some other question. The query that at once faces us
+regarding the nature of logical theory is whether reflection upon
+reflection shall recognize these limits, endeavoring to formulate them
+more exactly and to define their relationships to each other more
+adequately; or shall it abolish limits, do away with the matter of
+specific conditions and specific aims of thought, and discuss thought
+and its relation to empirical antecedents and rational consequents
+(truth) at large?
+
+At first blush, it might seem as if the very nature of logical theory as
+generalization of the reflective process must of necessity disregard the
+matter of particular conditions and particular results as irrelevant.
+How, the implication runs, could reflection become generalized save by
+elimination of details as irrelevant? Such a conception in fixing the
+central problem of logic fixes once for all its future career and
+material. The essential business of logic is henceforth to discuss the
+relation of thought as such to reality as such. It may, indeed, involve
+much psychological material, particularly in the discussion of the
+processes which antecede thinking and which call it out. It may involve
+much discussion of the concrete methods of investigation and
+verification employed in the various sciences. It may busily concern
+itself with the differentiation of various types and forms of
+thought--different modes of conceiving, various conformations of
+judgment, various types of inferential reasoning. But it concerns itself
+with any and all of these three fields, not on their own account or as
+ultimate, but as subsidiary to the main problem: the relation of thought
+as such, or at large, to reality as such, or at large. Some of the
+detailed considerations referred to may throw light upon the terms under
+which thought transacts its business with reality; upon, say, certain
+peculiar limitations it has to submit to as best it may. Other
+considerations throw light upon the ways in which thought gets at
+reality. Still other considerations throw light upon the forms which
+thought assumes in attacking and apprehending reality. But in the end
+all this is incidental. In the end the one problem holds: How do the
+specifications of thought as such hold good of reality as such? In fine,
+logic is supposed to grow out of the epistemological inquiry and to lead
+up to its solution.
+
+From this point of view various aspects of logical theory are well
+stated by an author whom later on we shall consider in some detail.
+Lotze[1] refers to "universal forms and principles of thought which hold
+good everywhere both in judging of reality and in weighing possibility,
+_irrespective of any difference in the objects_." This defines the
+business of _pure_ logic. This is clearly the question of thought as
+such--of thought at large or in general. Then we have the question "of
+how far the most complete structure of thought ... can claim to be an
+adequate account of that which we seem compelled to assume as the object
+and occasion of our ideas." This is clearly the question of the relation
+of thought at large to reality at large. It is epistemology. Then comes
+"applied logic," having to do with the actual employment of concrete
+forms of thought with reference to investigation of specific topics and
+subjects. This "applied" logic would, if the standpoint of practical
+deliberation and of scientific research were adopted, be the sole
+genuine logic. But the existence of thought _in itself_ having been
+agreed upon, we have in this "applied" logic only an incidental inquiry
+of how the particular resistances and oppositions which "pure" thought
+meets from particular matters may best be discounted. It is concerned
+with methods of investigation which obviate defects in the relationship
+of thought at large to reality at large, as these present themselves
+under the limitations of human experience. It deals merely with
+hindrances, and with devices for overcoming them; it is directed by
+considerations of utility. When we reflect that this field includes the
+entire procedure of practical deliberation and of concrete scientific
+research, we begin to realize something of the significance of the
+theory of logic which regards the limitations of specific origination
+and specific outcome as irrelevant to its main problem, which assumes an
+activity of thought "pure" or "in itself," that is, "irrespective of any
+difference in its objects."
+
+This suggests, by contrast, the opposite mode of stating the problem of
+logical theory. Generalization of the nature of the reflective process
+certainly involves elimination of much of the specific material and
+contents of the thought-situations of daily life and of critical
+science. Quite compatible with this, however, is the notion that it
+seizes upon _certain_ specific conditions and factors, and aims to bring
+them to clear consciousness--not to abolish them. While eliminating the
+particular material of particular practical and scientific pursuits,
+(1) it may strive to hit upon the common denominator in the various
+situations which are antecedent or primary to thought and which evoke
+it; (2) it may attempt to show how typical features in the specific
+antecedents of thought call out to diverse typical modes of
+thought-reaction; (3) it may attempt to state the nature of the specific
+consequences in which thought fulfils its career.
+
+(1) It does not eliminate dependence upon specific occasions as
+provocative of thought; but endeavors to define _what_ in the various
+situations constitutes them thought-provoking. The specific occasion is
+not eliminated, but insisted upon and brought into the foreground.
+Consequently psychological considerations are not subsidiary incidents,
+but of essential importance so far as they enable us to trace the
+generation of the thought-situation. (2) So from this point of view the
+various types and modes of conceiving, judging, and inference are
+treated, not as qualifications of thought per se or at large, but of
+thought engaged in its specific, most economic, effective response to
+its own particular occasion; they are adaptations for control of
+stimuli. The distinctions and classifications that have been accumulated
+in "formal" logic are relevant data; but they demand interpretation from
+the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment to material antecedents
+and stimuli. (3) Finally the question of validity, or ultimate objective
+of thought, is relevant; but is such as a matter of the specific issue
+of the specific career of a thought-function. All the typical
+investigatory and verificatory procedures of the various sciences are
+inherently concerned as indicating the ways in which thought actually
+brings itself to its own successful fulfilment in dealing with various
+types of problems.
+
+While the epistemological type of logic may, as we have seen, leave
+(under the name of applied logic), a subsidiary place open for the
+instrumental type, the type which deals with thinking as a specific
+procedure relative to a specific antecedent occasion and to a subsequent
+specific fulfilment, is not able to reciprocate the favor. From its
+point of view, an attempt to discuss the antecedents, data, forms, and
+objective of thought, apart from reference to particular position
+occupied, and particular part played in the growth of experience is to
+reach results which are not so much either true or false as they are
+radically meaningless--because they are considered apart from limits.
+Its results are not only abstractions (for all theorizing ends in
+abstractions), but abstractions without possible reference or bearing.
+From this point of view, the taking of something, whether that something
+be thinking activity, its empirical condition, or its objective goal,
+apart from the limits of a historic or developing situation, is the
+essence of _metaphysical_ procedure--in the sense of metaphysics which
+makes a gulf between it and science.
+
+As the reader has doubtless anticipated, it is the object of this
+chapter to present the problem and industry of reflective thought from
+this latter point of view. I recur again to the standpoint of naïve
+experience, using the term in a sense wide enough to cover both
+practical procedure and concrete scientific research. I resume by saying
+that this point of view knows no fixed distinction between the empirical
+values of unreflective life and the most abstract process of rational
+thought. It knows no fixed gulf between the highest flight of theory and
+control of the details of practical construction and behavior. It
+passes, according to the occasion and opportunity of the moment, from
+the attitude of loving and struggling and doing to that of thinking and
+the reverse. Its contents or material shift their values back and forth
+from technological or utilitarian to æsthetic, ethic, or affectional. It
+utilizes data of perception or of discursive ideation as need calls,
+just as an inventor now utilizes heat, now mechanical strain, now
+electricity, according to the demands set by his aim. From this point of
+view, more definite logical import is attached to our earlier statements
+(p. 2) regarding the possibility of taking anything in the universe of
+experience as subject-matter of thought. Anything from past experience
+may be taken which appears to be an element in either the statement or
+the solution of the present problem. Thus we understand the coexistence
+without contradiction of an indeterminate possible field and a limited
+actual field. The undefined set of means becomes specific through
+reference to an end.
+
+In all this, there is no difference of kind between the methods of
+science and those of the plain man. The difference is the greater
+control in science of the statement of the problem, and of the
+selection and use of relevant material, both sensible or ideational. The
+two are related to each other just as the hit-or-miss, trial-and-error
+inventions of uncivilized man stand to the deliberate and consecutively
+persistent efforts of a modern inventor to produce a certain complicated
+device for doing a comprehensive piece of work. Neither the plain man
+nor the scientific inquirer is aware, as he engages in his reflective
+activity, of any transition from one sphere of existence to another. He
+knows no two fixed worlds--reality on one side and mere subjective ideas
+on the other; he is aware of no gulf to cross. He assumes uninterrupted,
+free, and fluid passage from ordinary experience to abstract thinking,
+from thought to fact, from things to theories and back again.
+Observation passes into development of hypothesis; deductive methods
+pass to use in description of the particular; inference passes into
+action with no sense of difficulty save those found in the particular
+task in question. The fundamental assumption is _continuity_ in and of
+experience.
+
+This does not mean that fact is confused with idea, or observed datum
+with voluntary hypothesis, theory with doing, any more than a traveler
+confuses land and water when he journeys from one to the other. It
+simply means that each is placed and used with reference to service
+rendered the other, and with reference to future use of the other.
+
+Only the epistemological spectator is aware of the fact that the
+everyday man and the scientific man in this free and easy intercourse
+are rashly assuming the right to glide over a cleft in the very
+structure of reality. This fact raises a query not favorable to the
+epistemologist. Why is it that the scientific man, who is constantly
+plying his venturous traffic of exchange of facts for ideas, of theories
+for laws, of real things for hypotheses, should be so wholly unaware of
+the radical and generic (as distinct from specific) difficulty of the
+undertakings in which he is engaged? We thus come afresh to our inquiry:
+Does not the epistemological logician unwittingly transfer the specific
+difficulty which always faces the scientific man--the difficulty in
+detail of correct and adequate translation back and forth of _this_ set
+of facts and _this_ group of ideas--into a totally different problem of
+the wholesale relation of thought at large with reality in general? If
+such be the case, it is clear that the very way in which the
+epistemological type of logic states the problem of thinking, in
+relation both to empirical antecedents and to objective truth, makes
+that problem insoluble. Working terms, terms which as working are
+flexible and historic, relative, are transformed into absolute, fixed,
+and predetermined forms of being.
+
+We come a little closer to the problem when we recognize that every
+scientific inquiry passes historically through at least four stages.
+(_a_) The first of these stages is, if I may be allowed the bull, that
+in which scientific inquiry does not take place at all, because no
+problem or difficulty in the quality of the experience has presented
+itself to provoke reflection. We have only to cast our eye back from the
+existing status of any science, or back from the status of any
+particular topic in any science, to discover a time when no reflective
+or critical thinking busied itself with the matter--when the facts and
+relations were taken for granted and thus were lost and absorbed in the
+value which accrued from the experience. (_b_) After the dawning of the
+problem, there comes a period of occupation with relatively crude and
+unorganized facts--the hunting for, locating, and collecting of raw
+material. This is the empiric stage, which no existing science, however
+proud in its attained rationality, can disavow as its own progenitor.
+(_c_) Then there is also a speculative stage: a period of guessing, of
+making hypotheses, of framing ideas which later on are labeled and
+condemned as only ideas. There is a period of distinction and
+classification-making which later on is regarded as only
+mentally-gymnastic in character. And no science, however proud in its
+present security of experimental assurance, can disavow a scholastic
+ancestor. (_d_) Finally, there comes a period of fruitful interaction
+between the mere ideas and the mere facts: a period when observation is
+determined by experimental conditions depending upon the use of certain
+guiding conceptions; when reflection is directed and checked at every
+point by the use of experimental data, and by the necessity of finding
+such form for itself as will enable it to serve as premise in a
+deduction leading to evolution of new meanings, and ultimately to
+experimental inquiry, which brings to light new facts. In the emerging
+of a more orderly and significant region of fact, and of a more coherent
+and self-luminous system of meaning, we have the natural limit of
+evolution of the logic of a given science.
+
+But consider what has happened in this historic record. Unanalyzed
+experience has broken up into distinctions of facts and ideas; the
+factual side has been developed by indefinite and almost miscellaneous
+descriptions and cumulative listings; the conceptual side has been
+developed by unchecked and speculative elaboration of definitions,
+classifications, etc. There has been a relegation of accepted meanings
+to the limbo of mere ideas; there has been a passage of some of the
+accepted facts into the region of mere hypothesis and opinion.
+Conversely, there has been a continued issuing of ideas from the region
+of hypotheses and theories into that of facts, of accepted objective and
+meaningful contents. Out of a world of only _seeming_ facts, and of only
+_doubtful_ ideas, there emerges a universe continually growing in
+definiteness, order, and luminosity.
+
+This progress, verified in every record of science, is an absolute
+monstrosity from the standpoint of the epistemology which assumes a
+thought in general, on one side, and a reality in general, on the other.
+The reason that it does not present itself as such a monster and miracle
+to those actually concerned with it is because there is a certain
+_homogeneity_ or _continuity_ of reference and of use which controls all
+diversities in both the modes of existence specified and the grades of
+value assigned. The distinction of thought and fact is treated in the
+growth of a science, or of any particular scientific problem, as an
+_induced_ and _intentional_ practical division of labor; as relative
+assignments of position with reference to performance of a task; as
+deliberate distribution of forces at command for their more economic
+use. The interaction of bald fact and hypothetical idea into the outcome
+of a single world of scientific apprehension and comprehension is but
+the successful achieving of the aim on account of which the distinctions
+in question were instituted.
+
+Thus we come back to the problem of logical theory. To take the
+distinctions of thought and fact, etc., as ontological, as inherently
+fixed in the make-up of the structure of being, is to treat the actual
+development of scientific inquiry and scientific control as a mere
+subsidiary topic ultimately of only utilitarian worth. It is also to
+state the terms upon which thought and being transact business in a way
+so totally alien to the use made of these distinctions in concrete
+experience as to create a problem which can be discussed only in terms
+of itself--not in terms of the conduct of life--metaphysics again in the
+bad sense of that term. As against this, the problem of a logic which
+aligns itself with the origin and employ of reflective thought in
+everyday life and in critical science, is to follow the natural history
+of thinking as a life-process having its own generating antecedents and
+stimuli, its own states and career, and its own specific objective or
+limit.
+
+This point of view makes it possible for logical theory to come to terms
+with psychology.[2] When logic is considered as having to do with the
+wholesale activity of thought per se, the question of the historic
+process by which this or that particular thought came to be, of how its
+object happens to present itself as sensation, or perception, or
+conception, is quite irrelevant. These things are mere temporal
+accidents. The psychologist (not lifting his gaze from the realm of the
+changeable) may find in them matters of interest. His whole industry is
+just with natural history--to trace series of psychical events as they
+mutually excite and inhibit one another. But the logician, we are told,
+has a deeper problem and an outlook of more unbounded horizon. He deals
+with the question of the eternal nature of thought and its eternal
+validity in relation to an eternal reality. He is concerned, not with
+genesis, but with value, not with a historic cycle, but with absolute
+distinctions and relations.
+
+Still the query haunts us: Is this so in truth? Or has the logician of a
+certain type arbitrarily made it thus by taking his terms apart from
+reference to the specific occasions in which they arise and situations
+in which they function? If the latter, then the very denial of historic
+relationship and of the significance of historic method, is indicative
+only of the unreal character of his own abstraction. It means in effect
+that the affairs under consideration have been isolated from the
+conditions in which alone they have determinable meaning and assignable
+worth. It is astonishing that, in the face of the advance of the
+evolutionary method in natural science, any logician can persist in the
+assertion of a rigid difference between the problem of origin and of
+nature; between genesis and analysis; between history and validity. Such
+assertion simply reiterates as final a distinction which grew up and
+had meaning in pre-evolutionary science. It asserts against the most
+marked advance which scientific method has yet made a survival of a
+crude period of logical scientific procedure. We have no choice save
+either to conceive of thinking as a response to a specific stimulus, or
+else to regard it as something "in itself," having just in and of itself
+certain traits, elements, and laws. If we give up the last view, we must
+take the former.
+
+The entire significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social
+history is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every
+grouping of cells or elements, has to be treated as an instrument of
+adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation. Its
+meaning, its character, its value, is known when, and only when, it is
+considered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in some
+specific situation. This analysis of value is carried out in detail by
+tracing successive stages of development--by endeavoring to locate the
+particular situation in which each structure has its origin, and by
+tracing the successive modifications through which, in response to
+changing media, it has reached its present conformation.[3] To persist
+in condemning natural history from the standpoint of what natural
+history meant before it identified itself with an evolutionary process
+is not so much to exclude the natural-history standpoint from
+philosophic consideration as it is to evince ignorance of what it
+signifies.
+
+Psychology as the natural history of the various attitudes and
+structures through which experiencing passes, as an account of the
+conditions under which this or that state emerges, and of the way in
+which it influences, by stimulation or inhibition, production of other
+states or conformations of consciousness, is indispensable to logical
+evaluation, the moment we treat logical theory as an account of
+thinking as a mode of adaptation to its own generating conditions, and
+judge its validity by reference to its efficiency in meeting its
+problems. The historical point of view describes the sequence; the
+normative follows the sequence to its conclusion, and then turns back
+and judges each historical step by viewing it in reference to its own
+outcome.[4]
+
+In the course of changing experience we keep our balance as we move from
+situations of an affectional quality to those which are practical or
+appreciative or reflective, because we bear constantly in mind the
+context in which any particular distinction presents itself. As we
+submit each characteristic function and situation of experience to our
+gaze, we find it has a dual aspect. Wherever there is striving there are
+obstacles; wherever there is affection there are persons who are
+attached; wherever there is doing there is accomplishment; wherever
+there is appreciation there is value; wherever there is thinking there
+is material-in-question. We keep our footing as we move from one
+attitude to another, from one characteristic quality to another, because
+we know the position occupied in the whole growth by the particular
+function in which we are engaged, and the position within the function
+of the particular element that engages us.
+
+The distinction _between_ each attitude and function and its predecessor
+and successor is serial, dynamic, operative. The distinctions _within_
+any given operation or function are structural, contemporaneous, and
+distributive. Thinking follows, we will say, striving, and doing follows
+thinking. Each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls
+out its successor. But coincident, simultaneous, and correspondent
+_within_ doing, is the distinction of doer and of deed; _within_ the
+function of thought, of thinking and material thought upon; within the
+function of striving, of obstacle of aim, of means and end. We keep our
+paths straight because we do not confuse the sequential, efficient, and
+functional relationship of types of experience with the contemporaneous,
+correlative, and structural distinctions of elements within a given
+function. In the seeming maze of endless confusion and unlimited
+shiftings, we find our way by the means of the stimulations and checks
+occurring within the process we are actually engaged with. We do not
+contrast or confuse a condition or state which is an element in the
+formation of one operation with the status or element which is one of
+the distributive terms of another function. If we do, we have at once an
+insoluble, because meaningless, problem upon our hands.
+
+Now the epistemological logician deliberately shuts himself off from
+those cues and checks upon which the plain man instinctively relies, and
+which the scientific man deliberately searches for and adopts as
+constituting his technique. Consequently he is likely to set the sort of
+object or material which has place and significance only in one of the
+serial functional situations of experience, over against the active
+attitude which describes part of the structural constitution of another
+situation; or with equal lack of justification to assimilate terms
+characteristic of different stages to one another. He sets the agent, as
+he is found in the intimacy of love or appreciation, over against the
+externality of the fact, as that is defined within the reflective
+process. He takes the material which thought selects as its own basis
+for further procedure to be identical with the significant content which
+it secures for itself in the successful pursuit of its aim; and this in
+turn he regards as the material which was presented at the outset, and
+whose peculiarities were the express means of awakening thought. He
+identifies the final deposit of the thought-function with its own
+generating antecedent, and then disposes of the resulting surd by
+reference to some metaphysical consideration, which remains when logical
+inquiry, when science (as interpreted by him), has done its work. He
+does this, not because he prefers confusion to order, or error to truth,
+but simply because, when the chain of historic sequence is cut, the
+vessel of thought is afloat to veer upon a sea without soundings or
+moorings. There are but two alternatives: either there is an object "in
+itself" of thought "in itself," or else there are a series of values
+which vary with the varying functions to which they belong. If the
+latter, the only way these values can be defined is by discriminating
+the functions to which they belong. It is only conditions relative to a
+specific period or epoch of development in a cycle of experience
+which-enables one to tell what to do next, or to estimate the value and
+meaning of what is already done. And the epistemological logician, in
+choosing to take his question as one of thought which has its own form
+just as "thought," apart from the limits of the special work it has to
+do, has deprived himself of these supports and stays.
+
+The problem of logic has a more general and a more specific phase. In
+its generic form, it deals with this question: How does one type of
+functional situation and attitude in experience pass out of and into
+another; for example, the technological or utilitarian into the
+æsthetic, the æsthetic into the religious, the religious into the
+scientific, and this into the socio-ethical and so on? The more specific
+question is: How does the particular functional situation termed the
+reflective behave? How shall we describe it? What in detail are its
+diverse contemporaneous distinctions, or divisions of labor, its
+correspondent _statuses_; in what specific ways do these operate with
+reference to each other so as to effect the specific aim which is
+proposed by the needs of the affair?
+
+This chapter may be brought to conclusion by reference to the more
+alternate value of the logic of experience, of logic taken in its wider
+sense; that is, as an account of the sequence of the various typical
+functions or situations of experience in their determining relations to
+one another. Philosophy, defined as such a logic, makes no pretense to
+be an account of a closed and finished universe. Its business is not to
+secure or guarantee any particular reality or value. _Per contra_, it
+gets the significance of a method. The right relationship and adjustment
+of the various typical phases of experience to one another is a problem
+felt in every department of life. Intellectual rectification and control
+of these adjustments cannot fail to reflect itself in an added clearness
+and security on the practical side. It may be that general logic can not
+become an instrument in the immediate direction of the activities of
+science or art or industry; but it is of value in criticising and in
+organizing the tools of immediate research in these lines. It also has
+direct significance in the valuation for social or life-purposes of
+results achieved in particular branches. Much of the immediate business
+of life is badly done because we do not know in relation to its
+congeners the organic genesis and outcome of the work that occupies us.
+The manner and degree of appropriation of the values achieved in various
+departments of social interest and vocation are partial and faulty
+because we are not clear as to the due rights and responsibilities of
+one function of experience in reference to others.
+
+The value of research for social progress; the bearing of psychology
+upon educational procedure; the mutual relations of fine and industrial
+art; the question of the extent and nature of specialization in science
+in comparison with the claims of applied science; the adjustment of
+religious aspirations to scientific statements; the justification of a
+refined culture for a few in face of economic insufficiency for the
+mass--such are a few of the many social questions whose _final_ answer
+depends upon the possession and use of a general logic of experience as
+a method of inquiry and interpretation. I do not say that headway cannot
+be made in such questions apart from the method indicated: a logic of
+genetic experience. But unless we have a critical and assured view of
+the juncture in which and with reference to which a given attitude or
+interest arises, unless we know the service it is thereby called upon to
+perform and hence the organs or methods by which it best functions in
+that service, our progress is impeded and irregular. We take a part for
+a whole, a means for an end, or attack wholesale some other interest
+because it interferes with the deified sway of the one we have selected
+as ultimate. A clear and comprehensive consensus of social conviction,
+and a consequent concentrated and economical direction of effort, are
+assured only as there is some way of locating the position and rôle of
+each typical interest and occupation in experience. The domain of
+opinion is one of conflict; its rule is arbitrary and costly. Only
+intellectual method affords a substitute for opinion. The general logic
+of experience can alone do for the region of social values and aims what
+the natural sciences after centuries of struggle are doing for activity
+in the physical realm.
+
+This does not mean that systems of philosophy which have attempted to
+state the nature either of thought and of reality at large, apart from
+limits of particular crises in the growth of experience, have been
+worthless--though it does mean that their industry has been somewhat
+misapplied. The unfolding of metaphysical theory has made large
+contributions to positive evaluations of the typical situations and
+relationships of experience--even when its conscious intention has been
+quite otherwise. Every system of philosophy is itself a mode of
+reflection; consequently (if our main contention be true), it too has
+been evoked out of specific social antecedents, and has had its use as
+a response to them. It has effected something in modifying the situation
+within which it found its origin. It may not have solved the problem
+which it consciously put itself; in many cases we may freely admit that
+the question put has afterward been found to be so wrongly put as to be
+insoluble. Yet exactly the same thing is true, in precisely the same
+sense, in the history of science. For this reason, if for no other, it
+is impossible for the scientific man to cast the first stone at the
+philosopher.
+
+The progress of science in any branch continually brings with it a
+realization that problems in their previous form of statement are
+insoluble because put in terms of unreal conditions; because the real
+conditions have been mixed up with mental artifacts or misconstructions.
+Every science is continually learning that its supposed solutions are
+only apparent, because the "solution" solves, not the actual problem,
+but one which has been made up. But the very putting of the question,
+the very giving of the wrong answer, induces modification of existing
+intellectual habits, standpoints, and aims. Wrestling with the problem,
+there is evolution of new forms of technique to control its treatment,
+there is search for new facts, institution of new types of
+experimentation; there is gain in the methodic control of experience.
+And all this is progress. It is only the worn-out cynic, the devitalized
+sensualist, and the fanatical dogmatist who interpret the continuous
+change of science as proving that, since each successive statement is
+wrong, the whole record is error and folly; and that the present truth
+is only the error not yet found out. Such draw the moral of caring
+naught for all these things, or of flying to some external authority
+which will deliver once for all the fixed and unchangeable truth. But
+historic philosophy even in its aberrant forms has proved a factor in
+the valuation of experience; it has brought problems to light, it has
+provoked intellectual conflicts without which values are only nominal;
+even through its would-be absolutistic isolations, it has secured
+recognition of mutual dependencies and reciprocal reinforcements. Yet if
+it can define its work more clearly, it can concentrate its energy upon
+its own characteristic problem: the genesis and functioning in
+experience of various typical interests and occupations with reference
+to one another.
+
+
+
+
+II
+
+THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS AND CUES OF
+THE THOUGHT-FUNCTION
+
+
+We have discriminated logic in its wider sense, concerned with the
+sequence of characteristic functions and attitudes in experience, from
+logic in its stricter meaning, concerned in particular with description
+and interpretation of the function of reflective thought. We must avoid
+yielding to the temptation of identifying logic with either of these to
+the exclusion of the other; or of supposing that it is possible to
+isolate one finally from the other. The more detailed treatment of the
+organs and methods of reflection cannot be carried on with security save
+as we have a correct idea of the historic position of reflection in the
+evolving of experience. Yet it is impossible to determine this larger
+placing, save as we have a defined and analytic, as distinct from a
+merely vague and gross, view of what we mean by reflection--what is its
+actual constitution. It is necessary to work back and forth between the
+larger and the narrower fields, transforming every increment upon one
+side into a method of work upon the other, and thereby testing it. The
+apparent confusion of existing logical theory, its uncertainty as to its
+own bounds and limits, its tendency to oscillate from larger questions
+of the inherent worth of judgment and validity of inference over to
+details of scientific technique, and to translation of distinctions of
+formal logic into terms of an investigatory or verificatory process, are
+indications of the need of this double movement.
+
+In the next three chapters it is proposed to take up some of the
+considerations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the
+narrower conceptions of logical theory. I shall discuss the _locus_ of
+the function of thought, so far as such _locus_ enables us to select and
+characterize some of the most fundamental distinctions, or divisions of
+labor, within the reflective process. In taking up the problem of the
+subject-matter of thought, I shall try to make clear that it assumes
+three quite distinct forms according to the epochal moment reached in
+transformation of experience; and that continual confusion and
+inconsistency are introduced when these respective meanings are not
+identified and described according to their respective geneses and
+places. I shall attempt to show that we must consider subject-matter
+from the standpoint, first, of the _antecedents_ or conditions that
+evoke thought; second, of the _datum_ or _immediate material_ presented
+to thought; and, third, of the _proper content_ of thought. Of these
+three distinctions the first, that of antecedent and stimulus, clearly
+refers to the situation that is immediately prior to the
+thought-function as such. The second, that of datum or immediately given
+matter, refers to a distinction which is made within the thought-process
+as a part of and for the sake of its own _modus operandi_. It is a
+status in the scheme of thinking. The third, that of content or object,
+refers to the progress actually made in any thought-function; the
+material which is organized into the thought-situation, so far as this
+has fulfilled its purpose. It goes without saying that these are to be
+discriminated as stages of a life-process in the natural history of
+experience, not as ready-made or ontological; it is contended that, save
+as they are differentiated in connection with well-defined historical
+stages, they are either lumped off as equivalents, or else treated as
+absolute divisions--or as each by turns, according to the exigencies of
+the particular argument. In fact, this chapter will get at the matter of
+preliminary conditions of thought indirectly rather than directly, by
+indicating the contradictory positions into which one of the most
+vigorous and acute of modern logicians, Lotze, has been forced through
+failing to define logical distinctions in terms of the history of
+readjustment of experience, and therefore endeavoring to interpret
+certain notions as absolute instead of as periodic and methodological.
+
+Before passing directly to the exposition and criticism of Lotze, it
+will be well, however, to take the matter in a somewhat freer way. We
+cannot approach logical inquiry in a wholly direct and uncompromised
+manner. Of necessity we bring to it certain distinctions--distinctions
+partly the outcome of concrete experience; partly due to the logical
+theory which has got embodied in ordinary language and in current
+intellectual habits; partly results of deliberate scientific and
+philosophic inquiry. These more or less ready-made results are
+resources; they are the only weapons with which we can attack the new
+problem. Yet they are full of unexamined assumptions; they commit us to
+all sorts of logically predetermined conclusions. In one sense our study
+of the new subject-matter, let us say logical theory, is in truth only a
+review, a re-testing and criticising of the intellectual standpoints and
+methods which we bring with us to the study.
+
+Everyone comes with certain distinctions already made between the
+subjective and the objective, between the physical and the psychical,
+between the intellectual and the factual. (1) We have learned to regard
+the region of emotional disturbance, of uncertainty and aspiration, as
+belonging somehow peculiarly to ourselves; we have learned to set over
+against this a world of observation and of valid thought as something
+unaffected by our moods, hopes, fears, and opinions. (2) We have also
+come to distinguish between what is immediately present in our
+experience and the past and the future; we contrast the realms of memory
+and anticipation of sense-perception; the given with the ideal. (3) We
+are confirmed in a habit of distinguishing between what we call actual
+fact and our mental attitude toward that fact--the attitude of surmise
+or wonder or reflective investigation. While one of the aims of logical
+theory is precisely to make us critically conscious of the significance
+and bearing of these various distinctions, to change them from
+ready-made assumptions into controlled constructs, our mental habits are
+so set that they tend to have their own way with us; and we read into
+logical theory conceptions that were formed before we had even dreamed
+of the logical undertaking which after all has for its business to
+assign to the terms in question their proper meaning.
+
+We find in Lotze an unusually explicit inventory of these various
+preliminary distinctions; and an unusually serious effort to deal with
+the problems which arise from introducing them into the structure of
+logical theory. (1) He expressly separates the matter of logical worth
+from that of psychological genesis. He consequently abstracts the
+subject-matter of logic as such wholly from the question of historic
+_locus_ and _situs_. (2) He agrees with common-sense in holding that
+logical thought is reflective and thus presupposes a given material. He
+occupies himself with the nature of the antecedent conditions. (3) He
+wrestles with the problem of how a material formed prior to thought and
+irrespective of it can yet afford it stuff upon which to exercise
+itself. (4) He expressly raises the question of how thought working
+independently and from without upon a foreign material can shape the
+latter into results which are valid--that is, objective.
+
+If his discussion is successful; if Lotze can provide the intermediaries
+which span the gulf between an independent thought-material and an
+independent thought-activity; if he can show that the question of the
+origin of thought-material and of thought-activity is irrelevant to the
+question of its worth, we shall have to surrender the position already
+taken. But if we find that Lotze's elaborations only elaborate the same
+fundamental difficulty, presenting it now in this light and now in that,
+but never effecting more than presenting the problem as if it were its
+own solution, we shall be confirmed in our idea of the need of
+considering logical questions from a different point of view. If we find
+that, whatever his formal treatment, he always, as matter of fact, falls
+back upon some organized situation or function as the source of both the
+specific thought-material and the specific thought-activity in
+correspondence with each other, we shall have in so far an elucidation
+and even a corroboration of our theory.
+
+1. We begin with the question of the material antecedents of
+thought--antecedents which condition reflection, and which call it out
+as reaction or response, by giving it its cue. Lotze differs from many
+logicians of the same type in affording us an explicit account of these
+antecedents. The ultimate material antecedents of thought are found in
+impressions, which are due to external objects as stimuli. Taken in
+themselves, these impressions are mere psychical states or events. They
+exist in us side by side, or one after the other, according as the
+objects which excite them operate simultaneously or successively. The
+occurrence of these various psychical states is not, however, entirely
+dependent upon the presence of the exciting thing. After a state has
+once been excited, it gets the power of reawakening other states which
+have accompanied it or followed it. The associative mechanism of revival
+plays a part. If we had a complete knowledge of both the stimulating
+object and its effects, and of the details of the associative mechanism,
+we should be able from given data to predict the whole course of any
+given train or current of ideas (for the impressions as conjoined
+simultaneously or successively become ideas and a current of ideas).
+
+Taken in itself, a sensation or impression is nothing but a "state of
+our consciousness, a mood of ourselves." Any given current of ideas is a
+necessary sequence of existences (just as necessary as any succession of
+material events), happening in some particular sensitive soul or
+organism. "Just because, under their respective conditions, every such
+series of ideas hangs together by the same necessity and law as every
+other, there would be no ground for making any such distinction of value
+as that between truth and untruth, thus placing one group in opposition
+to all the others."[5]
+
+2. Thus far, as the last quotation clearly indicates, there is no
+question of reflective thought, and hence no question of logical theory.
+But further examination reveals a peculiar property of the current of
+ideas. Some ideas are merely coincident, while others may be termed
+coherent. That is to say, the exciting causes of some of our
+simultaneous and successive ideas really belong together; while in other
+cases they simply happen to act at the same time, without there being a
+real connection between them. By the associative mechanism, however,
+both the coherent and the merely coincident combinations recur. The
+first type of recurrence supplies positive material for knowledge; the
+second gives occasion for error.
+
+3. It is a peculiar mixture of the coincident and the coherent which
+sets the peculiar problem of reflective thought. The business of thought
+is to recover and confirm the coherent, the really connected, adding to
+its reinstatement an accessory justifying notion of the real ground of
+coherence, while it eliminates the coincident as such. While the mere
+current of ideas is something which just happens within us, the process
+of elimination and of confirmation by means of statement of real ground
+and basis of connection is an activity which mind as such exercises. It
+is this distinction which marks off thought as activity from any
+psychical event and from the associative mechanism as receptive
+happenings. One is concerned with mere _de facto_ coexistences and
+sequences; the other with the _worth_ of these combinations.[6]
+
+Consideration of the peculiar work of thought in going over, sorting
+out, and determining various ideas according to a standard of value will
+occupy us in our next chapter. Here we are concerned with the material
+antecedents of thought as they are described by Lotze. At first glance,
+he seems to propound a satisfactory theory. He avoids the extravagancies
+of transcendental logic, which assumes that all the matter of experience
+is determined from the very start by rational thought; and he also
+avoids the pitfall of purely empirical logic, which makes no distinction
+between the mere occurrence and association of ideas and the real worth
+and validity of the various conjunctions thus produced. He allows
+unreflective experience, defined in terms of sensations and their
+combinations, to provide material conditions for thinking, while he
+reserves for thought a distinctive work and dignity of its own.
+Sense-experience furnishes the antecedents; thought has to introduce and
+develop systematic connection--rationality.
+
+A further analysis of Lotze's treatment may, however, lead us to believe
+that his statement is riddled through and through with inconsistencies
+and self-contradictions; that, indeed, any one part of it can be
+maintained only by the denial of some other portion.
+
+1. The impression is the ultimate antecedent in its purest or crudest
+form (according to the angle from which one views it). It is that which
+has never felt, for good or for bad, the influence of thought. Combined
+into ideas, these impressions stimulate or arouse the activities of
+thought, which are forthwith directed upon them. As the recipient of the
+activity which they have excited and brought to bear upon themselves,
+they furnish also the material content of thought--its actual stuff. As
+Lotze says over and over again: "It is the relations themselves already
+subsisting between impressions, when we become conscious of them, by
+which the action of thought which is never anything but reaction, is
+attracted; and this action consists merely in interpreting relations
+which we find existing between our passive impressions into aspects of
+the matter of impressions."[7] And again:[8] "Thought can make no
+difference where it finds none already in the matter of the
+impressions." And again:[9] "The possibility and the success of
+thought's procedure depends upon this original constitution and
+organization of the whole world of ideas, a constitution which, though
+not necessary in thought, is all the more necessary to make thinking
+possible."
+
+The impressions and ideas play a versatile rôle; they now assume the
+part of ultimate antecedents and provocative conditions; of crude
+material; and somehow, when arranged, of content for thought. This very
+versatility awakens suspicion.
+
+While the impression is merely subjective and a bare state of our own
+consciousness, yet it is determined, both as to its existence and as to
+its relation to other similar existences, by external objects as
+stimuli, if not as causes. It is also determined by a psychical
+mechanism so thoroughly objective or regular in its workings as to give
+the same necessary character to the current of ideas that is possessed
+by any physical sequence. Thus that which is "nothing but a state of our
+consciousness" turns out straightway to be a specifically determined
+objective fact in a system of facts.
+
+That this absolute transformation is a contradiction is no clearer than
+that just such a contradiction is indispensable to Lotze. If the
+impressions were nothing but states of consciousness, moods of
+ourselves, bare psychical existences, it is sure enough that we should
+never even know them to be such, to say nothing of conserving them as
+adequate conditions and material for thought. It is only by treating
+them as real facts in a real world, and only by carrying over into them,
+in some assumed and unexplained way, the capacity of representing the
+cosmic facts which arouse them, that impressions or ideas come in any
+sense within the scope of thought. But if the antecedents are really
+impressions-in-their-objective-setting, then Lotze's whole way of
+distinguishing thought-worth from _mere_ existence or event without
+objective significance must be radically modified.
+
+The implication that impressions have actually a matter or quality or
+meaning of their own becomes explicit when we refer to Lotze's theory
+that the immediate antecedent of thought is found in the _matter_ of
+ideas. When thought is said to "take cognizance of _relations_ which its
+own activity does not originate, but which have been prepared for it by
+the unconscious mechanism of the psychic states,"[10] the attribution of
+objective content, of reference and meaning to ideas, is unambiguous.
+The idea forms a most convenient half-way house for Lotze. On one hand,
+as absolutely prior to thought, as material antecedent condition, it is
+merely psychical, a bald subjective event. But as subject-matter for
+thought, as antecedent which affords stuff for thought's exercise, it is
+_meaning_, characteristic quality of content.
+
+Although we have been told that the impression is a mere receptive
+irritation without participation of mental activity, we are not
+surprised, in view of this capacity of ideas, to learn that the mind
+actually has a determining share in both the reception of stimuli and in
+their further associative combinations. The subject always enters into
+the presentation of any mental object, even the sensational, to say
+nothing of the perceptional and the imaged. The perception of a given
+state of things is possible only on the assumption that "the perceiving
+subject is at once enabled and compelled by its own nature to combine
+the excitations which reach it from objects into those forms which it is
+to perceive in the objects, and which it supposes itself simply to
+_receive_ from them."[11]
+
+It is only by continual transition from impression and ideas as mental
+states and events to ideas as cognitive (or logical) _objects or
+contents_, that Lotze bridges the gulf from bare exciting antecedent to
+concrete material conditions of thought. This contradiction, again, is
+necessary to Lotze's standpoint. To set out frankly with "meanings" as
+antecedents would demand reconsideration of the whole view-point, which
+supposes that the difference between the logical and its antecedent is a
+matter of the difference between _worth_ and mere _existence_ or
+_occurrence_. It would indicate that since meaning or value is already
+there, the task of thought must be that of the transformation or
+_reconstruction of worth_ through an intermediary process of valuation.
+On the other hand, to stick by the standpoint of _mere_ existence is not
+to get anything which can be called even antecedent of thought.
+
+2. Why is there a task of transformation? Consideration of the material
+in its function of evoking thought, giving it its cue, will serve to
+complete the picture of the contradiction and of the real facts. It is
+the conflict between ideas as merely coincident and ideas as coherent
+that constitutes the need which provokes the response of thought. Here
+Lotze vibrates (_a_) between considering coincidence and coherence as
+both affairs of existence of psychical events; (_b_) considering
+coincidence as purely psychical and coherence as at least quasi-logical,
+and (_c_) the inherent logic which makes them both determinations within
+the sphere of reflective thought. In strict accordance with his own
+premises, coincidence and coherence both ought to be mere peculiarities
+of the current of ideas as events within ourselves. But so taken the
+distinction becomes absolutely meaningless. Events do not cohere; at the
+most certain sets of them happen more or less frequently than other
+sets; the only intelligible difference is one of repetition of
+coincidence. And even this attributes to an event the supernatural trait
+of reappearing after it has disappeared. Even coincidence has to be
+defined in terms of relation of the _objects_ which are supposed to
+excite the psychical events that happen together.
+
+As recent psychological discussion has made clear enough, it is the
+matter, meaning, or content, of ideas that is associated, not the ideas
+as states or existences. Take such an idea as sun-revolving-about-earth.
+We may say it means the conjunction of various sense-impressions, but it
+is conjunction, or mutual reference, of _attributes_ that we have in
+mind in the assertion. It is absolutely certain that our psychical image
+of the sun is not psychically engaged in revolving about our psychical
+image of the earth. It would be amusing if such were the case; theaters
+and all dramatic representations would be at a discount. In truth,
+sun-revolving-about-earth is a single meaning or idea; it is a unified
+subject-matter within which certain distinctions of reference appear. It
+is concerned with what we intend when we think earth and sun, and think
+them in their relation to each other. It is really a specification or
+direction of how to think when we have occasion to think a certain
+subject-matter. To treat the origin of this mutual reference as if it
+were simply a case of conjunction of ideas produced by conditions of
+original psycho-physical irritation and association is a profound case
+of the psychological fallacy. We may, indeed, analyze an experience and
+find that it had its origin in certain conditions of the sensitive
+organism, in certain peculiarities of perception and of association,
+and hence conclude that the belief involved in it was not justified
+by the facts themselves. But the significance of the belief in
+sun-revolving-about-earth as an item of the experience of those who
+meant it, consisted precisely in the fact that it was taken not as a
+mere association of feelings, but as a definite portion of the whole
+structure of objective experience, guaranteed by other parts of the
+fabric, and lending its support and giving its tone to them. It was to
+them part of the experience-frame of things--of the real universe.
+
+Put the other way, if such an instance meant a mere conjunction of
+psychical states, there would be in it absolutely nothing to evoke
+thought. Each idea as event, as Lotze himself points out (Vol. I, p. 2),
+may be regarded as adequately and necessarily determined to the place it
+occupies. There is absolutely no question on the side of events of mere
+coincidence _versus_ genuine connection. As event, it is there and it
+belongs there. We cannot treat something as at once bare fact of
+existence and as problematic subject-matter of logical inquiry. To take
+the reflective point of view is to consider the matter in a totally new
+light; as Lotze says, it is to raise the question of rightful claims to
+a position or relation.
+
+The point becomes clearer when we contrast coincidence with connection.
+To consider coincidence as simply psychical, and coherence as at least
+quasi-logical, is to put the two on such different bases that no
+question of contrasting them can arise. The coincidence which precedes a
+valid or grounded coherence (the conjunction which as coexistence of
+objects and sequence of acts is perfectly adequate) never is, as
+antecedent, the coincidence which is set over against coherence. The
+side-by-sideness of books on my bookshelf, the succession of noises that
+rise through my window, do not as such trouble me logically. They do not
+appear as errors or even as problems. One coexistence is just as good as
+any other until some new point of view, or new end, presents itself. If
+it is a question of the convenience of arrangement of books, then the
+value of their present collocation becomes a problem. Then I may
+contrast their present bare conjunction with a scheme of possible
+coherence. If I regard the sequence of noises as a case of articulate
+speech, their order becomes important--it is a problem to be determined.
+The inquiry whether a given combination means only apparent or real
+connection, shows that reflective inquiry is already going on. Does this
+phase of the moon really mean rain, or does it just happen that the
+rain-storm comes when the moon has reached this phase? To ask such
+questions shows that a certain portion of the universe of experience is
+subjected to critical analysis for purposes of definitive restatement.
+The tendency to regard one combination as bare conjunction or mere
+coincidence is absolutely a _part_ of the movement of mind in its search
+for the real connection.
+
+If coexistence as such is to be set over against coherence as such, as
+the non-logical against the logical, then, since our whole spatial
+universe is one of collocation, and since thought in this universe can
+never get farther than substituting one collocation for another, the
+whole realm of space-experience is condemned off-hand and in perpetuity
+to anti-rationality. But, in truth, coincidence as over against
+coherence, conjunction as over against connection, is just _suspected_
+coherence, one which is under the fire of active inquiry. The
+distinction is one which arises only within the grasp of the logical or
+reflective function.
+
+3. This brings us explicitly to the fact that there is no such thing as
+either coincidence or coherence in terms of the elements or meanings
+contained in any couple or pair of ideas taken by itself. It is only
+when they are co-factors in a situation or function which includes more
+than either the "coincident" or the "coherent" and more than the
+arithmetical sum of the two, that thought's activity can be evoked.
+Lotze is continually in this dilemma: Thought either shapes its own
+material or else just accepts it. In the first case (since Lotze cannot
+rid himself of the presumption that thought must have a fixed ready-made
+antecedent) its activity can only alter this stuff and thus lead the
+mind farther away from reality. But if thought just accepts its
+material, how can there be any distinctive aim or activity of thought at
+all? As we have seen, Lotze endeavors to escape this dilemma by
+supposing that, while thought receives its material, it yet checks it
+up: it eliminates certain portions of it and reinstates others, plus the
+stamp and seal of its own validity.
+
+Lotze objects most strenuously to the notion that thought awaits its
+subject-matter with certain ready-made modes of apprehension. This
+notion would raise the insoluble question of how thought contrives to
+bring the matter of each impression under that particular form which is
+appropriate to it (Vol. I, p. 24). But he has not really avoided the
+difficulty. How does thought know which of the combinations are merely
+coincident and which are merely coherent? How does it know which to
+eliminate as irrelevant and which to confirm as grounded? Either this
+evaluation is an imposition of its own, or else gets its cue and clue
+from the subject-matter. Now, if the coincident and the coherent taken
+in and of themselves are competent to give this direction, they are
+already practically labeled. The further work of thought is one of
+supererogation. It has at most barely to note and seal the material
+combinations that are already there. Such a view clearly renders
+thought's work as unnecessary in form as it is futile in force.
+
+But there is no alternative in this dilemma except to recognize that an
+entire situation of experience, within which are both that afterward
+found to be mere coincidence and that found to be real connection,
+actually provokes thought. It is only as an experience previously
+accepted comes up in its wholeness against another one equally integral;
+and only as some larger experience dawns which requires each as a part
+of itself and yet within which the required factors show themselves
+mutually incompatible, that thought arises. It is not bare coincidence,
+or bare connection, or bare addition of one to the other, that excites
+thought. It is a situation which is organized or constituted as a whole,
+and which yet is falling to pieces in its parts--a situation which is in
+conflict within itself--that arouses the search to find what really goes
+together and a correspondent effort to shut out what only seemingly
+belongs together. And real coherence means precisely capacity to exist
+within the comprehending whole. It is a case of the psychologist's
+fallacy to read back into the preliminary situation those distinctions
+of mere conjunction of material and of valid relationship which get
+existence, to say nothing of fixation, only within the thought-process.
+
+We must not leave this phase of the discussion, however, until it is
+quite clear that our objection is not to Lotze's position that
+reflective thought arises from an antecedent which is not reflectional
+in character; nor yet to his idea that this antecedent has a certain
+structure and content of its own setting the peculiar problem which
+evokes thought and gives the cue to its specific activities. On the
+contrary, it is this latter point upon which we would insist; and, by
+insisting, point out, negatively, that this view is absolutely
+inconsistent with Lotze's theory that psychical impressions and ideas
+are the true antecedents of thought; and, positively, that it is the
+_situation as a whole_, and not any one isolated part of it, or
+distinction within it, that calls forth and directs thinking. We must
+beware the fallacy of assuming that some one element in the prior
+situation in isolation or detachment induces the thought which in
+reality comes forth only from the whole disturbed situation. On the
+negative side, characterizations of impression and idea (whether as
+mental contents or as psychical existences) are distinctions which arise
+only within reflection upon the situation which is the genuine
+antecedent of thought; while the distinction of psychical existences
+from external existences arises only within a highly elaborate technical
+reflection--that of the psychologist as such.[12] Positively, it is the
+whole dynamic experience with its qualitative and pervasive identity of
+value, and its inner distraction, its elements at odds with each other,
+in tension against each other, contending each for its proper placing
+and relationship, that generates the thought-situation.
+
+From this point of view, at this period of development, the distinctions
+of objective and subjective have a characteristic meaning. The
+antecedent, to repeat, is a situation in which the various factors are
+actively incompatible with each other, and which yet in and through the
+striving tend to a re-formation of the whole and to a restatement of the
+parts. This situation as such is clearly objective. It is there; it is
+there as a whole; the various parts are there; and their active
+incompatibility with one another is there. Nothing is conveyed at this
+point by asserting that any particular part of the situation is illusory
+or subjective, or mere appearance; or that any other is truly real. It
+is the further work of _thought_ to exclude some of the contending
+factors from membership in experience, and thus to relegate them to the
+sphere of the merely subjective. But just at this epoch the experience
+exists as one of vital and active confusion and conflict. The conflict
+is not only objective in a _de facto_ sense (that is, really existent),
+but is objective in a logical sense as well; it is just this conflict
+which effects the transition into the thought-situation--this, in turn,
+being only a constant movement toward a defined equilibrium. The
+conflict has objective logical value because it is the antecedent
+condition and cue of thought.
+
+Every reflective attitude and function, whether of naïve life,
+deliberate invention, or controlled scientific research, has risen
+through the medium of some such total objective situation. The abstract
+logician may tell us that sensations or impressions, or associated
+ideas, or bare physical things, or conventional symbols, are antecedent
+conditions. But such statements cannot be verified by reference to a
+single instance of thought in connection with actual practice or actual
+scientific research. Of course, by extreme mediation symbols may become
+conditions of evoking thought. They get to be objects in an active
+experience. But they are stimuli only in case their manipulation to form
+a new whole occasions resistance, and thus reciprocal tension. Symbols
+and their definitions develop to a point where dealing with them becomes
+itself an experience, having its own identity; just as the handling of
+commercial commodities, or arrangement of parts of an invention, is an
+individual experience. There is always as antecedent to thought an
+experience of some subject-matter of the physical or social world, or
+organized intellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with each
+other--so much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire experience,
+which accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate
+re-definition and re-relation of its tensional parts. This is the
+reconstructive process termed thinking: the reconstructive situation,
+with its parts in tension and in such movement toward each other as
+tends to a unified experience, is the thought-situation.
+
+This at once suggests the subjective phase. The situation, the
+experience as such, is objective. There is an experience of the confused
+and conflicting tendencies. But just _what in particular_ is objective,
+just _what_ form the situation shall take as an organized harmonious
+whole, is unknown; that is the problem. It is the uncertainty as to the
+_what_ of the experience together with the certainty _that_ there is
+such an experience, that evokes the thought-function. Viewed from this
+standpoint of uncertainty, the situation as a whole is subjective. No
+particular content or reference can be asserted off-hand. Definite
+assertion is expressly reserved--it is to be the outcome of the
+procedure of reflective inquiry now undertaken. This holding off of
+contents from definitely asserted position, this viewing them as
+candidates for reform, is what we mean at this stage of the natural
+history of thought by the subjective.
+
+We have followed Lotze through his tortuous course of inconsistencies.
+It is better, perhaps, to run the risk of vain repetition, than that of
+leaving the impression that these are _mere_ self-contradictions. It is
+an idle task to expose contradictions save we realize them in relation
+to the fundamental assumption which breeds them. Lotze is bound to
+differentiate thought from its antecedents. He is intent to do this,
+however, through a preconception that marks off the thought-situation
+radically from its predecessor, through a difference that is complete,
+fixed, and absolute, or at large. It is a total contrast of thought as
+such to something else as such that he requires, not a contrast within
+experience of one phase of a process, one period of a rhythm, from
+others.
+
+This complete and rigid difference Lotze finds in the difference between
+an experience which is _mere existence_ or occurrence, and one which has
+to do with worth, truth, right relationship. Now things, objects, have
+already, implicitly at least, determinations of worth, of truth,
+reality, etc. The same is true of deeds, affections, etc., etc. Only
+states of feelings, bare impressions, etc., seem to fulfil the
+prerequisite of being given as existence, and yet without qualification
+as to worth, etc. Then the current of ideas offers itself, a ready-made
+stream of events, of existences, which can be characterized as wholly
+innocent of reflective determination, and as the natural predecessor of
+thought.
+
+But this stream of existences is no sooner there than its total
+incapacity to officiate as material condition and cue of thought
+appears. It is about as relevant as are changes that may be happening on
+the other side of the moon. So, one by one, the whole series of
+determinations of value or worth already traced are introduced _into_
+the very make-up, the inner structure, of what was to be _mere_
+existence: viz., (1) value as determined by things of whose spatial and
+temporal relations the things are somehow _representative_; (2) hence,
+value in the shape of _meaning_--the idea as significant, possessed of
+quality, and not a mere event; (3) distinguished values of coincidence
+and coherence within the stream. All these kinds of value are explicitly
+asserted, as we have seen; underlying and running through them all is
+the recognition of the supreme value of a situation which is organized
+as a whole, yet conflicting in its inner constitution.
+
+These contradictions all arise in the attempt to put thought's work, as
+concerned with value or validity over against experience as a mere
+antecedent happening, or occurrence. Since this contrast arises because
+of the deeper attempt to consider thought as an independent somewhat in
+general which yet, in _our_ experience, is specifically dependent, the
+sole radical avoiding of the contradictions can be found in the endeavor
+to characterize thought as a specific mode of valuation in the evolution
+of significant experience, having its own specific occasion or demand,
+and its own specific place.
+
+The nature of the organization and value that the antecedent conditions
+of the thought-function possess is too large a question here to enter
+upon in detail. Lotze himself suggests the answer. He speaks of the
+current of ideas, just as a current, supplying us with the "mass of
+well-grounded information which _regulates_ daily life" (Vol. I, p. 4).
+It gives rise to "_useful combinations_," "_correct expectations_,"
+"_seasonable reactions_" (Vol. I, p. 7). He speaks of it, indeed, as if
+it were just the ordinary world of naïve experience, the so-called
+empirical world, as distinct from the world as critically revised and
+rationalized in scientific and philosophic inquiry. The contradiction
+between this interpretation and that of a mere stream of psychical
+impressions is only another instance of the difficulty already
+discussed. But the phraseology suggests the type of value possessed by
+it. The unreflective world is a world of practical values; of ends and
+means, of their effective adaptations; of control and regulation of
+conduct in view of results. Even the most purely utilitarian of values
+are nevertheless values; not _mere_ existences. But the world of
+uncritical experience is saved from reduction to just material uses and
+worths; for it is a world of social aims and means, involving at every
+turn the values of affection and attachment, of competition and
+co-operation. It has incorporate also in its own being the surprise of
+æsthetic values--the sudden joy of light, the gracious wonder of tone
+and form.
+
+I do not mean that this holds in gross of the unreflective world of
+experience over against the critical thought-situation--such a contrast
+implies the very wholesale, at large, consideration of thought which I
+am striving to avoid. Doubtless many and many an act of thought has
+intervened in effecting the organization of our commonest
+practical-affectional-æsthetic region of values. I only mean to indicate
+that thought does take place in such a world; not _after_ a world of
+bare existences lacking value-specifications; and that the more
+systematic reflection we call organized science, may, in some fair
+sense, be said to come _after_, but to come after affectional, artistic,
+and technological interests which have found realization and expression
+in building up a world of values.
+
+Having entered so far upon a suggestion which cannot be followed out, I
+venture one other digression. The notion that value or significance as
+distinct from mere existentiality is the product of thought or reason,
+and that the source of Lotze's contradictions lies in the effort to find
+_any_ situation prior or antecedent to thought, is a familiar one--it is
+even possible that my criticisms of Lotze have been interpreted by some
+readers in this sense.[13] This is the position frequently called
+neo-Hegelian (though, I think, with questionable accuracy), and has been
+developed by many writers in criticising Kant. This position and that
+taken in this chapter do indeed agree in certain general regards. They
+are at one in denial of the factuality and the possibility of
+developing fruitful reflection out of antecedent bare existence or mere
+events. They unite in denying that there is or can be any such thing as
+mere existence--phenomenon unqualified as respects meaning, whether such
+phenomenon be psychic or cosmic. They agree that reflective thought
+grows organically out of an experience which is already organized, and
+that it functions within such an organism. But they part company when a
+fundamental question is raised: Is all organized meaning the work of
+thought? Does it therefore follow that the organization out of which
+reflective thought grows is the work of thought of some other type--of
+Pure Thought, Creative or Constitutive Thought, Intuitive Reason, etc.?
+I shall indicate briefly the reasons for divergence at this point.
+
+To cover all the practical-social-æsthetic values involved, the term
+"thought" has to be so stretched that the situation might as well be
+called by any other name that describes a typical value of experience.
+More specifically, when the difference is minimized between the
+organized and arranged scheme of values out of which reflective inquiry
+proceeds, and reflective inquiry itself (and there can be no other
+reason for insisting that the antecedent of reflective thought is itself
+somehow thought), exactly the same type of problem recurs that presents
+itself when the distinction is exaggerated into one between bare
+unvalued existences and rational coherent meanings.
+
+For the more one insists that the antecedent situation is constituted by
+thought, the more one has to wonder why another type of thought is
+required; what need arouses it, and how it is possible for it to improve
+upon the work of previous constitutive thought. This difficulty at once
+forces us from a logic of experience as it is concretely experienced
+into a metaphysic of a purely hypothetical experience. Constitutive
+thought precedes _our_ conscious thought-operations; hence it must be
+the working of some absolute universal thought which, unconsciously to
+our reflection, builds up an organized world. But this recourse only
+deepens the difficulty. How does it happen that the absolute
+constitutive and intuitive Thought does such a poor and bungling job
+that it requires a finite discursive activity to patch up its products?
+Here more metaphysic is called for: The Absolute Reason is now supposed
+to work under limiting conditions of finitude, of a sensitive and
+temporal organism. The antecedents of reflective thought are not,
+therefore, determinations of thought pure and undefiled, but of what
+thought can do when it stoops to assume the yoke of change and of
+feeling. I pass by the metaphysical problem left unsolved by this flight
+into metaphysic: Why and how should a perfect, absolute, complete,
+finished thought find it necessary to submit to alien, disturbing, and
+corrupting conditions in order, in the end, to recover through
+reflective thought in a partial, piecemeal, wholly inadequate way what
+it possessed at the outset in a much more satisfactory way?
+
+I confine myself to the logical difficulty. How can thought relate
+itself to the fragmentary sensations, impressions, feelings, which, in
+their contrast with and disparity from the workings of constitutive
+thought, mark it off from the latter; and which in their connection with
+its products give the cue to reflective thinking? _Here we have again
+exactly the problem with which Lotze has been wrestling_: we have the
+same insoluble question of the reference of thought-activity to a wholly
+indeterminate unrationalized, independent, prior existence. The absolute
+rationalist who takes up the problem at this point will find himself
+forced into the same continuous seesaw, the same scheme of alternate
+rude robbery and gratuitous gift, that Lotze engaged in. The simple fact
+is that here _is_ just where Lotze himself began; he saw that previous
+transcendental logicians had left untouched the specific question of
+relation of _our_ supposedly finite, reflective thought to its own
+antecedents, and he set out to make good the defect. If reflective
+thought is required because constitutive thought works under externally
+limiting conditions of sense, then we have some elements which are,
+after all, mere existences, events, etc. Or, if they have organization
+from some other source, and induce reflective thought not as bare
+impressions, etc., but through their place in some whole, then we have
+admitted the possibility of organic unity in experience, apart from
+Reason, and the ground for assuming Pure Constitutive Thought is
+abandoned.
+
+The contradiction appears equally when viewed from the side of
+thought-activity and its characteristic forms. All our knowledge, after
+all, of thought as constitutive is gained by consideration of the
+operations of reflective thought. The perfect system of thought is so
+perfect that it is a luminous, harmonious whole, without definite parts
+or distinctions--or, if there are such, it is only reflection that
+brings them out. The categories and methods of constitutive thought
+itself must therefore be characterized in terms of the _modus operandi_
+of reflective thought. Yet the latter takes place just because of the
+peculiar problem of the peculiar conditions under which it arises. Its
+work is progressive, reformatory, reconstructive, synthetic, in the
+terminology made familiar by Kant. We are not only _not_ justified,
+accordingly, in transferring its determinations over to constitutive
+thought, but we are absolutely prohibited from attempting any such
+transfer. To identify logical processes, states, devices, results that
+are conditioned upon the primary fact of resistance to thought as
+constitutive with the structure of such thought is as complete an
+instance of the fallacy of recourse from one genus to another as could
+well be found. Constitutive and reflective thought are, first, defined
+in terms of their dissimilarity and even opposition, and then without
+more ado the forms of the description of the latter are carried over
+bodily to the former![14]
+
+This is not meant for a merely controversial criticism. It is meant to
+point positively toward the fundamental thesis of these chapters: All
+the distinctions of the thought-function, of conception as over against
+sense-perception, of judgment in its various modes and forms, of
+inference in its vast diversity of operation--all these distinctions
+come within the thought-situation as growing out of a characteristic
+antecedent typical formation of experience; and have for their purpose
+the solution of the peculiar problem with respect to which the
+thought-function is generated or evolved: the restoration of a
+deliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict into which
+it has fallen.
+
+The failure of transcendental logic has the same origin as the failure
+of the empiristic (whether taken pure or in the mixed form in which
+Lotze presents it). It makes absolute and fixed certain distinctions of
+existence and meaning, and of one kind of meaning and another kind,
+which are wholly historic and relative in their origin and their
+significance. It views thought as attempting to represent or state
+reality once for all, instead of trying to determine some phases or
+contents of it with reference to their more effective and significant
+reciprocal employ--instead of as reconstructive. The rock against which
+every such logic splits is that either reality already has the statement
+which thought is endeavoring to give it, or else it has not. In the
+former case, thought is futilely reiterative; in the latter, it is
+falsificatory.
+
+The significance of Lotze for critical purposes is that his peculiar
+effort to combine a transcendental view of thought (_i. e._, of Thought
+as active in forms of its own, pure in and of themselves) with certain
+obvious facts of the dependence of our thought upon specific empirical
+antecedents, brings to light fundamental defects in both the empiristic
+and the transcendental logics. We discover a common failure in both: the
+failure to view logical terms and distinctions with respect to their
+necessary function in the redintegration of experience.
+
+
+
+
+III
+
+THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE DATUM OF THINKING
+
+
+We have now reached a second epochal stage in the evolution of the
+thought-situation, a crisis which forces upon us the problem of the
+distinction and mutual reference of the datum or presentation, and the
+ideas or "thoughts." It will economize and perhaps clarify discussion if
+we start from the relatively positive and constructive result just
+reached, and review Lotze's treatment from that point of regard.
+
+We have reached the point of conflict in the matters or contents of an
+experience. It is _in_ this conflict and because of it that the matters
+or contents, or significant quales, stand out as such. As long as the
+sun revolves about earth without tension or question, this "content," or
+fact, is not in any way abstracted _as_ content or object. Its very
+distinction as content from the form or mode of experience as such is
+the result of post-reflection. The same conflict makes other experiences
+assume conscious objectification; they, too, cease to be ways of living,
+and become distinct objects of observation and consideration. The
+movements of planets, eclipses, etc., are cases in point.[15] The
+maintenance of a unified experience has become a problem, an end. It is
+no longer secure. But this involves such restatement of the conflicting
+elements as will enable them to take a place somewhere in the new
+experience; they must be disposed of somehow, and they can be disposed
+of finally only as they are provided for. That is, they cannot be
+simply denied or excluded or eliminated; they must be taken into the
+fold of the new experience; such introduction, on the other hand,
+clearly demands more or less modification or transformation on their
+part. The thought-situation is the conscious maintenance of the unity of
+experience, with a critical consideration of the claims of the various
+conflicting contents to a place within itself, and a deliberate final
+assignment of position.
+
+The conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or dichotomizes itself.
+There is somewhat which is untouched in the contention of incompatibles.
+There is something which remains secure, unquestioned. On the other
+hand, there are elements which are rendered doubtful and precarious.
+This gives the framework of the general distribution of the field into
+"facts," the given, the presented, the Datum; and ideas, the ideal, the
+conceived, the Thought. For there is always something unquestioned in
+any problematic situation at any stage of its process,[16] even if it be
+only the fact of conflict or tension. For this is never _mere_ tension
+at large. It is thoroughly qualified, or characteristically toned and
+colored, by the particular elements which are in strife. Hence it is
+_this_ conflict, unique and irreplaceable. That it comes now means
+precisely that it has never come before; that it is now passed in review
+and some sort of a settlement reached, means that just _this_ conflict
+will never recur. In a word, the conflict as such is immediately
+expressed, or felt, as of just this and no other sort, and this
+immediately apprehended quality is an irreducible datum. _It_ is fact,
+even if all else be _doubtful_. As it is subjected to examination, it
+loses vagueness and assumes more definite form.
+
+Only in very extreme cases, however, does the assured, unquestioned
+element reduce to as low terms as we have here imagined. Certain things
+come to stand forth as facts, no matter what else may be doubted. There
+are certain _apparent_ diurnal changes of the sun; there is a certain
+annual course or track. There are certain nocturnal changes in the
+planets, and certain seasonal rhythmic paths. The significance of these
+may be doubted: Do they _mean_ real change in the sun or in the earth?
+But change, and change of a certain definite and numerically determinate
+character is there. It is clear that such out-standing facts
+(ex-istences) constitute the data, the given or presented, of the
+thought-function.
+
+It is obvious that this is only one correspondent, or status, in the
+total situation. With the consciousness of _this_ as certain, as given
+to be reckoned with, goes the consciousness of uncertainty as to _what
+it means_--of how it is to be understood or interpreted. The facts _qua_
+presentation or existences are sure; _qua_ meaning (position and
+relationship in an experience yet to be secured) they are doubtful.
+Yet doubt does not preclude memory or anticipation. Indeed, it is
+possible only through them. The memory of past experience makes
+sun-revolving-about-earth an object of attentive regard. The
+recollection of certain other experiences suggests the idea of
+earth-rotating-daily-on-axis and revolving-annually-about-sun. These
+contents are as much present as is the observation of change, but as
+respects worth, they are only possibilities. Accordingly, they are
+categorized or disposed of as just ideas, meanings, thoughts, ways of
+conceiving, comprehending, interpreting facts.
+
+Correspondence of reference here is as obvious as correlation of
+existence. In the logical process, the datum is not just real existence,
+and the idea mere psychical unreality. Both are modes of existence--one
+of _given_ existence, the other of _mental_ existence. And if the
+mental existence is in such cases regarded, from the standpoint of the
+unified experience aimed at, as having only _possible_ value, the datum
+also is regarded, from the value standpoint, as incomplete and
+unassured. The very existence of the idea or meaning as separate _is_
+the partial, broken up, and hence objectively unreal (from the validity
+standpoint) character of the datum. Or, as we commonly put it, while the
+ideas are impressions, suggestions, guesses, theories, estimates, etc.,
+the facts are crude, raw, unorganized, brute. They lack relationship,
+that is, assured place in the universe; they are deficient as to
+continuity. Mere change of apparent position of sun, which is absolutely
+unquestioned as datum, is a sheer abstraction from the standpoint either
+of the organized experience left behind, or of the reorganized
+experience which is the end--the objective. It is impossible as a
+persistent object in experience or reality. In other words, datum and
+ideatum are divisions of labor, co-operative instrumentalities, for
+economical dealing with the problem of the maintenance of the integrity
+of experience.
+
+Once more, and briefly, both datum and ideatum may (and positively,
+veritably, do) break up, each for itself, into physical and psychical.
+In so far as the conviction gains ground that the earth revolves about
+the sun, the old fact is broken up into a new cosmic existence, and a
+new psychological condition--the recognition of a mental process in
+virtue of which movements of smaller bodies in relation to very remote
+larger bodies are interpreted in a reverse sense. We do not just
+eliminate as false the source of error in the old content. We
+reinterpret it as valid in its own place, viz., a case of the psychology
+of apperception, although invalid as a matter of cosmic structure. In
+other words, with increasing accuracy of determination of the given,
+there comes a distinction, for methodological purposes, between the
+_quality_ or matter of the sense-experience and its _form_--the
+sense-perceiving, as itself a psychological fact, having its own place
+and laws or relations. Moreover, the old experience, that of
+sun-revolving, abides. But it is regarded as belonging to "me"--to this
+experiencing individual, rather than to the cosmic world. It is
+_psychic_.
+
+Here, then, _within_ the growth of the thought-situation and as a part
+of the process of determining _specific_ truth under _specific_
+conditions, we get for the first time the clue to that distinction with
+which, as ready-made and prior to all thinking, Lotze started out,
+namely, the separation of the matter of impression from impression as
+psychical event. The separation which, taken at large, engenders an
+insoluble problem, appears within a particular reflective inquiry, as an
+inevitable differentiation of a scheme of values.
+
+The same sort of thing occurs on the side of thought, or meaning. The
+meaning or idea which is growing in acceptance, which is gaining ground
+as meaning-of-datum, gets logical or intellectual or objective force;
+that which is losing standing, which is increasingly doubtful, gets
+qualified as just a notion, a fancy, a pre-judice, mis-conception--or
+finally just an error, a mental slip.
+
+Evaluated as fanciful in validity it becomes mere image--subjective;[17]
+and finally a psychical existence. It is not eliminated, but receives a
+new reference or meaning. Thus the distinction between subjectivity and
+objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such. It is
+a specification that emerges, correspondently, in _both_ datum and
+ideatum, as affairs of the direction of logical movement. That which is
+left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as
+real, but only in a psychical sense; that which is moved toward is
+regarded as real in an objective, cosmic sense.[18]
+
+The implication of the psychic and the logical within both the given
+presentation and the thought about it, appears in the continual shift to
+which logicians of Lotze's type are put. When the psychical is regarded
+as existence over against meaning as just ideal, reality seems to reside
+in the psychical; it is _there_ anyhow, and meaning is just a curious
+attachment--curious because as _mere meaning_ it is non-existent as
+event or state--and there seems to be nothing by which it can be even
+tied to the psychical state as its bearer or representative. But when
+the emphasis falls on thought as _content_, as significance, then the
+psychic event, the idea as image[19] (as distinct from idea as meaning)
+appears as an accidental but necessary evil, the unfortunate irrelevant
+medium through which _our_ thinking has to go on.[20]
+
+1. _The data of thought._--When we turn to Lotze, we find that he makes
+a clear distinction between the presented material of thought, its
+datum, and the typical characteristic modes of thinking in virtue of
+which the datum gets organization or system. It is interesting to note
+also that he states the datum in terms different from those in which the
+antecedents of thought are defined. From the point of view of the
+material upon which ideas exercise themselves, it is not coincidence,
+collocation, or succession that counts; but gradation of degrees in a
+scale. It is not things in spatial or temporal grouping that are
+emphasized, but qualities as mutually distinguished, yet classed--as
+differences of a common somewhat. There is no inherent inconceivability
+in the idea that every impression should be as incomparably different
+from every other as sweet is from warm. But by a remarkable circumstance
+such is not the case. We have series, and networks of series. We have
+diversity of a common--diverse colors, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. In
+other words, the datum is sense-qualities which, fortunately for
+thought, are given arranged, as shades, degrees, variations, or
+qualities of somewhat that is identical.[21]
+
+All this is given, presented, to our ideational activities. Even the
+universal, the common-color which runs through the various qualities of
+blue, green, white, etc., is not a product of thought, but something
+which thought finds already in existence. It conditions comparison and
+reciprocal distinction. Particularly all mathematical determinations,
+whether of counting (number), degree (more or less), and quantity
+(greatness and smallness), come back to this peculiarity of the datum of
+thought. Here Lotze dwells at considerable length upon the fact that the
+very possibility, as well as the success, of thought is due to this
+peculiar universalization or _prima facie_ ordering with which its
+material is given to it. Such pre-established fitness in the meeting of
+two things that have nothing to do with each other is certainly cause
+enough for wonder and congratulation.
+
+It should not be difficult to see why Lotze uses different categories in
+describing the given material of thought from those employed in
+describing its antecedent conditions, even though, according to him, the
+two are absolutely the same.[22] He has different _functions_ in mind.
+In one case, the material must be characterized as evoking, as
+incentive, as stimulus--from this point of view the peculiar combination
+of coincidence and coherence is emphasized. But in the other case the
+material must be characterized as affording stuff, actual
+subject-matter. Data are not only what is given _to_ thought, but they
+are also the food, the raw material, _of_ thought. They must be
+described as, on the one hand, wholly outside of thought. This clearly
+puts them into the region of sense-perception. They are matter of
+_sensation_ given free from all inferring, judging, relating influence.
+Sensation is just what is _not_ called up in memory or in anticipated
+projection--it is the immediate, the irreducible. On the other hand,
+sensory-_matter_ is qualitative, and quales are made up on a common
+basis. They are degrees or grades of a common quality. Thus they have a
+certain ready-made setting of mutual distinction and reference which is
+already almost, if not quite, the effect of comparing, of relating, and
+these are the express traits of thinking.
+
+It is easy to interpret this miraculous gift of grace in the light of
+what has been said. The data are in truth precisely that which is
+selected and set aside _as_ present, as immediate. Thus they are _given_
+to _further_ thought. But the selection has occurred in view of the need
+for thought; it is a listing of the capital in the way of the
+undisturbed, the undiscussed, which thought can count upon in this
+particular problem. Hence it is not strange that it has a peculiar
+fitness of adaptation for thought's further work. Having been selected
+with precisely that end in view, the wonder would be if it were not so
+fitted. A man may coin counterfeit money for use upon others, but hardly
+with the intent of passing it off upon himself.
+
+Our only difficulty here is that the mind flies away from the logical
+interpretation of sense-datum to a ready-made notion of it brought over
+from abstract psychological inquiry. The belief in sensory quales as
+somehow forced upon us, and forced upon us at large, and thus
+conditioning thought wholly _ab extra_, instead of determining it as
+instrumentalities or elements in its own scheme, is too fixed. Such
+qualities _are_ forced upon us, but _not_ at large. The sensory data of
+experience, as distinct from the psychologists' constructs, always come
+_in a context_; they always appear as variations in a continuum of
+values. Even the thunder which breaks in upon me (to take the extreme of
+apparent discontinuity and irrelevancy) disturbs me because it is taken
+as a part of the same space-world as that in which my chair and room and
+house are located; and it is taken as an influence which interrupts and
+disturbs, _because_ it is part of my common world of causes and effects.
+The solution of continuity is itself practical or teleological, and thus
+presupposes and affects continuity of purpose, occupations, and means in
+a life-process. It is not metaphysics, it is biology which enforces the
+idea that actual sensation is not only determined as an event in a world
+of events,[23] but is an occurrence occurring at a certain period in the
+evolution of experience, marking a certain point in its cycle, and,
+consequently--having always its own conscious context and bearings--is a
+characteristic function of reconstruction in experience.[24]
+
+2. _Forms of thinking data._--As sensory datum is material set for the
+work of thought, so the ideational forms with which thought does its
+work are apt and prompt to meet the needs of the material. The
+"accessory"[25] notion of ground of coherence turns out, in truth, not
+to be a formal, or external, addition to the data, but a requalification
+of them. Thought is accessory as accomplice, not as addendum. "Thought"
+is to eliminate mere coincidence, and to assert grounded coherence.
+Lotze makes it absolutely clear that he does not at bottom conceive of
+"thought" as an activity "in itself" imposing a form of coherence; but
+that the organizing work of "thought" is only the progressive
+realization of an inherent unity, or system, in the material experience.
+The specific modes in which thought brings its "accessory" power to
+bear--names, conception, judgment, and inference--are successive stages
+in the adequate organization of the matter which comes to us first as
+datum; they are successive stages of the effort to overcome the
+original defects of the datum. Conception starts from the given
+universal (the common element) of sense. Yet (and this is the
+significant point) it does not simply abstract this common element, and
+consciously generalize it as over against its own differences. Such a
+"universal" is _not_ coherence, just because it does not _include_ and
+dominate the temporal and local heterogeneity. The _true_ concept (see
+Vol. I, p. 38) is a system of attributes, held together on the basis of
+some ground, or determining, dominating principle--a ground which so
+controls all its own instances as to make them into an inwardly
+connected whole, and so specifies its own limits as to be exclusive of
+all else. If we abstract color as the common element of various colors,
+the result is not a scientific idea or concept. Discovery of a process
+of light-waves whose various rates constitute the various colors of the
+spectrum gives the concept. And when we get such a concept, the former
+mere temporal abruptness of color experiences gives way to organic parts
+of a color system. The logical product--the concept, in other words--is
+not a formal seal or stamp; it is a thoroughgoing transformation of data
+in a given sense.
+
+The form or mode of thought which marks the continued transformation of
+the data and the idea in reference to each other is judgment. Judgment
+makes explicit the assumption of a principle which determines connection
+within an individualized whole. It definitely states red as _this_ case
+or instance of the law or process of color, and thus overcomes further
+the defect in _subject-matter_ or data still left by conception.[26] Now
+judgment logically terminates in disjunction. It gives a universal
+which may determine any one of a number of alternative defined
+particulars, but which is arbitrary as to _what_ one is selected.
+Systematic _inference_ brings to light the material conditions under
+which the law, or dominating universal, applies to this, rather than
+that alternative particular, and so completes the ideal organization of
+the subject-matter. If this act were complete, we should finally have
+present to us a whole on which we should know the determining and
+effective or authorizing elements, and the order of development or
+hierarchy of dependence, in which others follow from them.[27]
+
+In this account by Lotze of the operations of the forms of thought,
+there is clearly put before us the picture of a continuous correlative
+determination of datum on one side and of idea or meaning on the other,
+till experience is again integral, data thoroughly defined and
+corrected, and ideas completely incarnate as the relevant meaning of
+subject-matter. That we have here in outline a description of what
+actually occurs there can be no doubt. But there is as little doubt that
+it is thoroughly inconsistent with Lotze's supposition that the material
+or data of thought is precisely the same as the antecedents of thought;
+or that ideas, conceptions, are purely mental somewhats brought to bear,
+as the sole essential characteristics of thought, extraneously upon a
+material provided ready-made. It means but one thing: The maintenance of
+unity and wholeness in experience through conflicting contents occurs by
+means of a strictly correspondent setting apart of fact to be accurately
+described and properly related, and meaning to be adequately construed
+and properly referred. The datum is given _in_ the thought-situation,
+and _to_ further qualification of ideas or meanings. But even in this
+aspect it presents a problem. To find out _what is_ given is an inquiry
+which taxes reflection to the uttermost. Every important advance in
+scientific method means better agencies, more skilled technique for
+simply detaching and describing what is barely there, or given. To be
+able to find out what can safely be taken as _there_, as given in any
+particular inquiry, and hence be taken as material for orderly and
+verifiable thinking, for fruitful hypothesis-making, for entertaining of
+explanatory and interpretative ideas, is one phase of the effort of
+systematic scientific inquiry. It marks its inductive phase. To take
+what is given _in_ the thought-situation, for the sake of accomplishing
+the aim of thought (along with a correlative discrimination of ideas or
+meanings), as if it were given absolutely, or apart from a particular
+historic situs and context, is the fallacy of empiricism as a logical
+theory. To regard the thought-forms of conception, judgment, and
+inference as qualifications of "pure thought, apart from any difference
+in objects," instead of as successive dispositions in the progressive
+organization of the material (or objects) is the fallacy of rationalism.
+Lotze attempts to combine the two, thinking thereby to correct each by
+the other.
+
+Lotze recognizes the futility of thought if the sense-data are final, if
+they alone are real, the truly existent, self-justificatory and valid.
+He sees that, if the empiricist were right in his assumption as to the
+real worth of the given data, thinking would be a ridiculous pretender,
+either toilfully and poorly doing over again what needs no doing, or
+making a wilful departure from truth. He realizes that thought really is
+evoked because it is needed, and that it has a work to do which is not
+merely formal, but which effects a modification of the subject-matter of
+experience. Consequently he assumes a thought-in-itself, with certain
+forms and modes of action of its own, a realm of meaning possessed of a
+directive and normative worth of its own--the root-fallacy of
+rationalism. His attempted compromise between the two turns out to be
+based on the assumption of the indefensible ideas of both--the notion of
+an independent matter of thought, on one side, and of an independent
+worth or value of thought-forms, on the other.
+
+This pointing out of inconsistencies becomes stale and unprofitable save
+as we bring them back into connection with their root-origin--the
+erection of distinctions that are genetic and historic, and working or
+instrumental divisions of labor, into rigid and ready-made differences
+of structural reality. Lotze clearly recognizes that thought's nature is
+dependent upon its aim, its aim upon its problem, and this upon the
+situation in which it finds its incentive and excuse. Its work is cut
+out for it. It does not what it would, but what it must. As Lotze puts
+it, "Logic has to do with thought, not as it would be under
+hypothetical conditions, but as it is" (Vol. I, p. 33), and this
+statement is made in explicit combination with statements to the effect
+that the peculiarity of the material of thought conditions its activity.
+Similarly he says in a passage already referred to: "The possibility and
+the success of thought's production in general depends upon this
+original constitution and organization of the whole world of ideas, a
+constitution which, though not necessary in thought, is all the more
+necessary to make thought possible."[28]
+
+As we have seen, the essential nature of conception, judgment, and
+inference is dependent upon peculiarities of the propounded material,
+they being forms dependent for their significance upon the stage of
+organization in which they begin.
+
+From this only one conclusion is suggested. If thought's nature is
+dependent upon its actual conditions and circumstances, the primary
+logical problem is to study thought-in-its-conditioning; it is to detect
+the crisis within which thought and its subject-matter present
+themselves in their mutual distinction and cross-reference. But Lotze is
+so thoroughly committed to a ready-made antecedent of some sort, that
+this genetic consideration is of no account to him. The historic method
+is a mere matter of psychology, and has no logical worth (Vol. I, p. 2).
+We must presuppose a psychological mechanism and psychological material,
+but logic is concerned not with origin or history, but with authority,
+worth, value (Vol. I, p. 10). Again: "Logic is not concerned with the
+manner in which the elements utilized by thought come into existence,
+but their value _after_ they have somehow come into existence, for the
+carrying out of intellectual operations" (Vol. I, p. 34). And finally:
+"I have maintained throughout my work that logic cannot derive any
+serious advantage from a discussion of _the conditions under which
+thought as a psychological process comes about_. The significance of
+logical forms ... is to be found in the utterances of thought, the laws
+which it imposes, after or during the act of thinking, not in the
+conditions which lie back of and which produce thought."[29]
+
+Lotze, in truth, represents a halting-stage in the evolution of logical
+theory. He is too far along to be contented with the reiteration of the
+purely formal distinctions of a merely formal thought-by-itself. He
+recognizes that thought as formal is the form of some matter, and has
+its worth only as organizing that matter to meet the ideal demands of
+reason; and that "reason" is in truth only an ideal systematization of
+the matter or content. Consequently he has to open the door to admit
+"psychical processes" which furnish this material. Having let in the
+material, he is bound to shut the door again in the face of the
+processes from which the material proceeded--to dismiss them as
+impertinent intruders. If thought gets its data in such a surreptitious
+manner, there is no occasion for wonder that the legitimacy of its
+dealings with the material remains an open question. Logical theory,
+like every branch of the philosophic disciplines, waits upon a surrender
+of the obstinate conviction that, while the work and aim of thought is
+conditioned by the material supplied to it, yet the _worth_ of its
+performances is something to be passed upon in complete abstraction from
+conditions of origin and development.
+
+
+
+
+IV
+
+THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE CONTENT AND OBJECT OF THOUGHT
+
+
+In the foregoing discussion, particularly in the last chapter, we were
+led repeatedly to recognize that thought has its own content. At times
+Lotze gives way to the tendency to define thought entirely in terms of
+modes and forms of activity which are exercised by it upon a strictly
+foreign material. But two motives continually push him in the other
+direction. (1) Thought has a distinctive work to do, one which involves
+a qualitative transformation of (at least) the _relationships_ of the
+presented matter; as fast as it accomplishes this work, the
+subject-matter becomes somehow thought's own. As we have just seen, the
+data are progressively organized to meet thought's ideal of a complete
+whole, with its members interconnected according to a determining
+principle. Such progressive organization throws backward doubt upon the
+assumption of the original total irrelevancy of the data and
+thought-form to each other. (2) A like motive operates from the side of
+the subject-matter. As merely foreign and external, it is too
+heterogeneous to lend itself to thought's exercise and influence. The
+idea, as we saw in the first chapter, is the convenient medium through
+which Lotze passes from the purely heterogeneous psychical impression or
+event, which is totally irrelevant to thought's purpose and working,
+over to a state of affairs which can reward thought. Idea as meaning
+forms the bridge from the brute factuality of the psychical impression
+over to the coherent value of thought's own content.
+
+We have, in this chapter, to consider the question of the idea or
+content of thought from two points of view: first, the _possibility_ of
+such a content--its consistency with Lotze's fundamental premises;
+secondly, its _objective_ character--its validity and test.
+
+I. The question of the possibility of a specific content of thought is
+the question of the nature of the idea as meaning. Meaning is the
+characteristic content of thought as such. We have thus far left
+unquestioned Lotze's continual assumption of meaning as a sort of
+thought-unit; the building-stone of thought's construction. In his
+treatment of meaning, Lotze's contradictions regarding the antecedents,
+data, and content of thought reach their full conclusion. He expressly
+makes meaning to be the product of thought's activity and also the
+unreflective material out of which thought's operations grow.
+
+This contradiction has been worked out in accurate and complete detail
+by Professor Jones.[30] He summarizes it as follows (p. 99): "No other
+way was left to him [Lotze] excepting this of first attributing all to
+sense and afterwards attributing all to thought, and, finally of
+attributing it to thought only because it was already in its material.
+This _seesaw_ is essential to his theory; the elements of knowledge as
+he describes them can subsist only by the alternate robbery of each
+other." We have already seen how strenuously Lotze insists upon the fact
+that the given subject-matter of thought is to be regarded wholly as the
+work of a physical mechanism, "without any action of thought."[31] But
+Lotze also states that if the products of the psychical mechanism "are
+to admit of combination in the definite form of a _thought_, they each
+require some previous shaping to make them into logical building-stones
+and to convert them from _impressions_ into _ideas_. Nothing is really
+more familiar to us than this first operation of thought; the only
+reason why we usually overlook it is that in the language which we
+inherit, it is already carried out, and it seems, therefore, to belong
+to the self-evident presuppositions of thought, _not to its own specific
+work_."[32] And again (Vol. I, p. 23) judgments "can consist of nothing
+but combinations of ideas which are no longer mere impressions: every
+such idea must have undergone at least the simple formation mentioned
+above." Such ideas are, Lotze goes on to urge, already rudimentary
+concepts--that is to say, logical determinations.
+
+The obviousness of the logical contradiction of attributing to a
+preliminary specific work of thought exactly the condition of affairs
+which is elsewhere explicitly attributed to a psychical mechanism prior
+to any thought-activity, should not blind us to its meaning and relative
+necessity. The impression, it will be recalled, is a mere state of our
+own consciousness--a mood of ourselves. As such it has simply _de facto_
+relations as an event to other similar events. But reflective thought is
+concerned with the relationship of a content or matter to other
+contents. Hence the impression must have a matter before it can come at
+all within the sphere of thought's exercise. How shall it secure this?
+Why, by a preliminary activity of thought which objectifies the
+impression. Blue as a mere sensuous irritation or feeling is given a
+quality, the meaning "blue"--blueness; the sense-impression is
+objectified; it is presented "no longer as a condition which we undergo,
+but as a something which has its being and its meaning in itself, and
+which continues to be what it is, and to mean what it means whether we
+are conscious of it or not. It is easy to see here the _necessary
+beginning of that activity which we above appropriated to thought as
+such_: it has not yet got so far as converting coexistence into
+coherence. It has first to perform the previous task of investing each
+single impression with an independent validity, without which the later
+opposition of their real coherence to mere coexistence could not be made
+in any intelligible sense."[33]
+
+This objectification, which converts a sensitive state into a sensible
+matter to which the sensitive state is referred, also gives this matter
+"position," a certain typical character. It is not objectified in a
+merely general way, but is given a specific sort of objectivity. Of
+these kinds of objectivity there are three mentioned: that of a
+substantive content; that of an attached dependent content; that of an
+active relationship connecting the various contents with each other. In
+short, we have the types of meaning embodied in language in the form of
+nouns, adjectives, and verbs. It is through this preliminary formative
+activity of thought that reflective or _logical_ thought has presented
+to it a world of meanings ranged in an order of relative independence
+and dependence, and ranged as elements in a complex of meanings whose
+various constituent parts mutually influence each other's meanings.[34]
+
+As usual, Lotze mediates the contradiction between material constituted
+_by_ thought and the same material just presented _to_ thought, by a
+further position so disparate to each that, taken in connection with
+each in a pair, and by turns, it seems to bridge the gulf. After
+describing the prior constitutive work of thought as above, he goes on
+to discuss a _second_ phase of thought which is intermediary between
+this and the third phase, viz., reflective thought proper. This second
+activity is that of arranging experienced quales in series and groups,
+thus ascribing a sort of universal or common somewhat to various
+instances (as already described; see p. 55). On one hand, it is clearly
+stated that this second phase of thought's activity is in reality the
+_same_ as the first phase: since all objectification involves positing,
+since positing involves distinction of one matter from others, and since
+this involves placing it in a series or group in which each is
+measurably marked off, as to the degree and nature of its diversity,
+from every other. We are told that we are only considering "a really
+inseparable operation" of thought from two different sides: first, as to
+the effect which objectifying thought has upon the matter as set over
+against the feeling _subject_, secondly, the effect which this
+objectification has upon the matter in relation to _other matters_.[35]
+Afterward, however, these two operations are declared to be radically
+different in type and nature. The first is determinant and formative; it
+gives ideas "the shape without which the logical spirit could not accept
+them." In a way it dictates "its own laws to its object-matter."[36] The
+second activity of thought is rather passive and receptive. It simply
+recognizes what is already there. "Thought can make no difference where
+it finds none already in the matter of impressions."[37] "The first
+universal, as we saw, can only be experienced in immediate sensation. It
+is no product of thought, but something that thought finds already in
+existence."[38]
+
+The obviousness of this further contradiction is paralleled only by its
+inevitableness. Thought is in the air, is arbitrary and wild in dealing
+with meanings, unless it gets its start and cue from actual experience.
+Hence the necessity of insisting upon thought's activity as just
+recognizing the contents already given. But, on the other hand, prior to
+the work of thought there is to Lotze no content or meaning. It requires
+a work of thought to detach anything from the flux of sense-irritations
+and invest it with a meaning of its own. This dilemma is inevitable to
+any writer who declines to consider as correlative the nature of
+thought-activity and thought-content from the standpoint of their
+generating conditions in the movement of experience. Viewed from such a
+standpoint the principle of solution is clear enough. As we have already
+seen (p. 53), the internal dissension of an experience leads to
+detaching certain values previously absorptively integrated into the
+concrete experience as part of its own qualitative coloring; and to
+relegating them, for the time being, (pending integration into further
+immediate values of a reconstituted experience) into a world of bare
+meanings, a sphere qualified as ideal throughout. These meanings then
+become the tools of thought in interpreting the data, just as the
+sense-qualities which define the presented situation are the immediate
+object to thought. The two _as mutually referred_ are content. That is,
+the datum and the thought-mode or idea as connected are the object of
+thought.
+
+To reach this unification is thought's objective or goal. Exactly the
+same value is idea, as either tool or content, according as it is taken
+as instrumental or as accomplishment. Every successive cross-section of
+the thought-situation presents what may be taken for granted as the
+outcome of previous thinking, and consequently as the determinant of
+further reflective procedure. Taken as defining the point reached in the
+thought-function and serving as constituent unit of further thought, it
+is content. Lotze's instinct is sure in identifying and setting over
+against each other the material given to thought and the content which
+is thought's own "building-stone." His contradictions arise simply from
+the fact that his absolute, non-historic method does not permit him to
+interpret this joint identity and distinction in a working, and hence
+relative, sense.
+
+II. The question of how the possibility of meanings, or
+thought-contents, is to be understood merges imperceptibly into the
+question of the real objectivity or validity of such contents. The
+difficulty for Lotze is the now familiar one: So far as his logic
+compels him to insist that these meanings are the possession and product
+of thought (since thought is an independent activity), the ideas are
+merely ideas; there is no test of objectivity beyond the thoroughly
+unsatisfactory and formal one of their own mutual consistency. In
+reaction from this Lotze is thrown back upon the idea of these contents
+as the original matter given in the impressions themselves. Here there
+seems to be an objective or external test by which the reality of
+thought's operations may be tried; a given idea is verified or found
+false according to its measure of correspondence with the matter of
+experience as such. But now we are no better off. The original
+independence and heterogeneity of impressions and of thought is so great
+that there is no way to compare the results of the latter with the
+former. We cannot compare or contrast distinctions of worth with bare
+differences of factual existence (Vol. I, p. 2). The standard or test of
+objectivity is so thoroughly external that by original definition it is
+wholly outside the realm of thought. How can thought compare its own
+contents with that which is wholly outside itself?
+
+Or again, the given material of experience apart from thought is
+precisely the relatively chaotic and unorganized; it even reduces itself
+to a mere sequence of psychical events. What rational meaning is there
+in directing us to compare the highest results of scientific inquiry
+with the bare sequence of our own states of feeling; or even with the
+original data whose fragmentary and uncertain character was the exact
+motive for entering upon scientific inquiry? How can the former in any
+sense give a check or test of the value of the latter? This is
+professedly to test the validity of a system of meanings by comparison
+with that whose defects and errors call forth the construction of the
+system of meanings by which to rectify and replace themselves. Our
+subsequent inquiry simply consists in tracing some of the phases of the
+characteristic seesaw from one to the other of the two horns of the now
+familiar dilemma: either thought is separate from the matter of
+experience, and then its validity is wholly its own private business; or
+else the objective results of thought are already in the antecedent
+material, and then thought is either unnecessary, or else has no way of
+checking its own performances.
+
+1. Lotze assumes, as we have seen, a certain independent validity in
+each meaning or qualified content, taken in and of itself. "Blue" has a
+certain validity, or meaning, in and of itself; it is an object for
+consciousness as such. After the original sense-irritation through which
+it was mediated has entirely disappeared, it persists as a valid idea,
+as a meaning. Moreover, it is an object or content of thought for others
+as well. Thus it has a double mark of validity: in the comparison of one
+part of my own experience with another, and in the comparison of my
+experience as a whole with that of others. Here we have a sort of
+validity which does not raise at all the question of _metaphysical_
+reality (Vol. I, pp. 14, 15). Lotze thus seems to have escaped from the
+necessity of employing as check or test for the validity of ideas any
+reference to a real outside the sphere of thought itself. Such terms as
+"conjunction," "franchise," "constitution," "algebraic zero," etc.,
+etc., claim to possess objective validity. Yet none of these professes
+to refer to a reality beyond thought. Generalizing this point of view,
+validity or objectivity of meaning means simply that which is "identical
+for all consciousness" (Vol. I, p. 3); "it is quite indifferent whether
+certain parts of the world of thought indicate something which has
+beside an independent reality outside of thinking minds, or whether all
+that it contains exists only in the thoughts of those who think it, but
+with equal validity for them all" (Vol. I, p. 16).
+
+So far it seems clear sailing. Difficulties, however, show themselves,
+the moment we inquire what is meant by a self-identical content for all
+thought. Is this to be taken in a static or in a dynamic way? That is to
+say: Does it express the fact that a given content or meaning is _de
+facto_ presented to the consciousness of all alike? Does this coequal
+presence guarantee an objectivity? Or does validity attach to a given
+meaning or content in so far as it directs and controls the further
+exercise of thinking, and thus the formation of further _new_ contents
+of consciousness?
+
+The former interpretation is alone consistent with Lotze's notion that
+the independent idea as such is invested with a certain validity or
+objectivity. It alone is consistent with his assertion that concepts
+precede judgments. It alone, that is to say, is consistent with the
+notion that reflective thinking has a sphere of ideas or meanings
+supplied to it at the outset. But it is impossible to entertain this
+belief. The stimulus which, according to Lotze, goads thought on from
+ideas or concepts to judgments and inferences, is in truth simply the
+lack of validity, of objectivity in its original independent meanings or
+contents. A meaning as independent is precisely that which is not
+invested with validity, but which is a mere idea, a "notion," a fancy,
+at best a surmise which may turn out to be valid (and of course this
+indicates possible reference); a standpoint to have its value determined
+by its further active use. "Blue" as a mere detached floating meaning,
+an idea at large, would not gain in validity simply by being entertained
+continuously in a given consciousness; or by being made at one and the
+same time the persistent object of attentive regard by all human
+consciousnesses. If this were all that were required, the chimera, the
+centaur, or any other subjective construction, could easily gain
+validity. "Christian Science" has made just this notion the basis of its
+philosophy.
+
+The simple fact is that in such illustrations as "blue," "franchise,"
+"conjunction," Lotze instinctively takes cases which are not mere
+independent and detached meanings, but which involve reference to a
+region of cosmic experience, or to a region of mutually determining
+social activities. The conception that reference to a _social_ activity
+does not involve the same sort of reference of thought beyond itself
+that is involved in physical matters, and hence may be taken quite
+innocent and free of the metaphysical problem of reference to reality
+beyond meaning, is one of the strangest that has ever found lodgment in
+human thinking. Either both physical and social reference or neither, is
+metaphysical; if neither, then it is because the meaning functions, as
+it originates, in a specific situation which carries with it its own
+tests (see p. 17). Lotze's conception is made possible only by
+unconsciously substituting the idea of object as content of thought for
+a large number of persons (or a _de facto_ somewhat for every
+consciousness), for the genuine definition of object as a determinant in
+a scheme of experience. The former is consistent with Lotze's conception
+of thought, but wholly indeterminate as to validity or intent. The
+latter is the test used experimentally in all concrete thinking, but
+involves a radical transformation of all Lotze's assumptions. A given
+idea of the conjunction of the franchise, or of blue, is valid, not
+because everybody happens to entertain it, but because it expresses the
+factor of control or direction in a given movement of experience. The
+test of validity of idea[39] is its functional or instrumental use in
+effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a
+relatively integrated one. If Lotze's view were correct, "blue" valid
+once would be valid always--even when red or green were actually called
+for to fulfil specific conditions. This is to say validity always refers
+to rightfulness or adequacy of performance in an asserting of
+connection--not to the meaning as detached and contemplated.
+
+If we refer again to the fact that the genuine antecedent of thought is
+a situation which is tensional as regards its existing status, or
+disorganized in its structural elements, yet organized as emerging out
+of the unified experience of the past and as striving as a whole, or
+equally in all its phases, to reinstate an experience harmonized in
+make-up, we can easily understand how certain contents may be detached
+and held apart as meanings or references, actual or possible (according
+as they are viewed with reference to the past or to the future). We can
+understand how such detached contents may be of use in effecting a
+review of the entire experience, and as affording standpoints and
+methods of a reconstruction which will maintain the integrity of
+experience. We can understand how validity of meaning is measured by
+reference to something which is not mere meaning; by reference to
+something which lies beyond the idea as such--viz., the reconstitution
+of an experience into which thought enters as mediator. That paradox of
+ordinary experience and of scientific inquiry by which objectivity is
+given alike to matter of perception and to conceived relations--to
+facts and to laws--affords no peculiar difficulty, because we see that
+the test of objectivity is everywhere the same: anything is objective in
+so far as, through the medium of conflict, it controls the movement of
+experience in its reconstructive transition from one unified form to
+another. There is not first an object, whether of sense-perception or of
+conception, which afterward somehow exercises this controlling
+influence; but the objective is such in virtue of the exercise of
+function of control. It may only control the act of inquiry; it may only
+set on foot doubt, but this is direction of subsequent experience, and,
+in so far, is a token of objectivity.
+
+So much for the thought-content or meaning as having a validity of its
+own. It does not have it as isolated or given or static; it has it in
+its dynamic reference, its use in determining further movement of
+experience. In other words, the "meaning" or idea as such, having been
+selected and made-up with reference to performing a certain office in
+the evolution of a unified experience, can be tested in no other way
+than by discovering whether it does what it was intended to do and what
+it purports to do.[40]
+
+2. Lotze has to wrestle with this question of validity in a further
+aspect: What constitutes the objectivity of thinking as a total
+attitude, activity, or function? According to his own statement, the
+meanings or valid ideas are after all only building-stones for logical
+thought. Validity is thus not a question of them in their independent
+existences, but of their mutual reference to each other. Thinking is the
+process of instituting these mutual references; of building up the
+various scattered and independent building-stones into the coherent
+system of thought. What is the validity of the various forms of thinking
+which find expression in the various types of judgment and in the
+various forms of inference? Categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive
+judgment; inference by induction, by analogy, by mathematical equation;
+classification, theory of explanation--all these are processes of
+reflection by which mutual connection in an individualized whole is
+given to the fragmentary meanings or ideas with which thought as it sets
+out is supplied. What shall we say of the validity of such processes?
+
+On one point Lotze is quite clear. These various logical acts do not
+really enter into the constitution of the valid world. The logical forms
+as such are maintained _only_ in the process of thinking. The world of
+valid truth does not undergo a series of contortions and evolutions,
+paralleling in any way the successive steps and missteps, the succession
+of tentative trials, withdrawals, and retracings, which mark the course
+of our own thinking.[41]
+
+Lotze is explicit upon the point that it is only the thought-content in
+which the process of thinking issues that has objective validity; the
+act of thinking is "purely and simply an inner movement of our own
+minds, made necessary to us by reason of the constitution of our nature
+and of our place in the world" (Vol. II, p. 279).
+
+Here the problem of validity presents itself as the problem of the
+relation of the act of thinking to its own product. In his solution
+Lotze uses two metaphors: one derived from building operations, the
+other from traveling. The construction of a building requires of
+necessity certain tools and extraneous constructions, stagings,
+scaffoldings, etc., which are necessary to effect the final
+construction, but yet which do not enter into the building as such. The
+activity has an instrumental, though not a constitutive, value as
+regards its product. Similarly, in order to get a view from the top of a
+mountain--this view being the objective--the traveler has to go through
+preliminary movements along devious courses. These again are antecedent
+prerequisites, but do not constitute a portion of the attained view.
+
+The problem of thought as activity, as distinct from thought as content,
+opens up altogether too large a question to receive complete
+consideration at this point. Fortunately, however, the previous
+discussion enables us to narrow the point which is in issue just here.
+It is once more the question whether the activity of thought is to be
+regarded as an independent function supervening entirely from without
+upon antecedents, and directed from without upon data; or whether it
+marks merely a phase of the transformation which the course of
+experience (whether practical, or artistic, or socially affectional or
+whatever) undergoes in entering into a tensional status where the
+maintenance of its harmony of content is problematic and hence an aim.
+If it be the latter, a thoroughly intelligent sense can be given to the
+proposition that the activity of thinking is instrumental, and that its
+worth is found, not in its own successive states as such, but in the
+result in which it comes to conclusion. But the conception of thinking
+as an independent activity somehow occurring after an independent
+antecedent, playing upon an independent subject-matter, and finally
+effecting an independent result, presents us with just one miracle the
+more.
+
+I do not question the strictly instrumental character of thinking. The
+problem lies not here, but in the interpretation of the nature of the
+organ and instrument. The difficulty with Lotze's position is that it
+forces us into the assumption of a means and an end which are simply and
+only external to each other, and yet necessarily dependent upon each
+other--a position which, whenever found, is so thoroughly
+self-contradictory as to necessitate critical reconsideration of the
+premises which lead to it. Lotze vibrates between the notion of thought
+as a tool in the external sense, a mere scaffolding to a finished
+building in which it has no part nor lot, and the notion of thought as
+an immanent tool, as a scaffolding which is an integral part of the very
+operation of building, and set up for the sake of the building-activity
+which is carried on effectively only with and through a scaffolding.
+Only in the former case can the scaffolding be considered as a _mere_
+tool. In the latter case the external scaffolding is not itself the
+instrumentality; the actual tool is the _action_ of erecting the
+building, and this action involves the scaffolding as a constituent part
+of itself. The work of erecting is not set over against the completed
+building as mere means to an end; it _is_ the end taken in process or
+historically, longitudinally viewed. The scaffolding, moreover, is not
+an external means to the process of erecting, but an organic member of
+it. It is no mere accident of language that "building" has a double
+sense--meaning at once the process and the finished product. The outcome
+of thought is the thinking activity carried on to its own completion;
+the activity, on the other hand, _is_ the outcome taken anywhere short
+of its own realization, and thereby still going on.
+
+The only consideration which prevents easy and immediate acceptance of
+this view is the notion of thinking as something purely formal. It is
+strange that the empiricist does not see that his insistence upon a
+matter extraneously given to thought only strengthens the hands of the
+rationalist with his claim of thinking as an independent activity,
+separate from the actual make-up of the affairs of experience. Thinking
+as a merely formal activity exercised upon certain sensations or images
+or objects sets forth an absolutely meaningless proposition. The
+psychological identification of thinking with the process of association
+is much nearer the truth. It is, indeed, on the way to the truth. We
+need only to recognize that association is of contents or matters or
+meanings, not of ideas as bare existences or events; and that the type
+of association we call thinking differs from the associations of casual
+fancy and revery in an element of control by reference to an end which
+determines the fitness and thus the selection of the associates, to
+apprehend how completely thinking is a reconstructive movement of actual
+contents of experience in relation to each other, and for the sake of a
+redintegration of a conflicting experience.
+
+There is no miracle in the fact that tool and material are adapted to
+each other in the process of reaching a valid conclusion. Were they
+external in origin to each other and to the result, the whole affair
+would, indeed, present an insoluble problem--so insoluble that, if this
+were the true condition of affairs, we never should even know that there
+was a problem. But, in truth, both material and tool have been secured
+and determined with reference to economy and efficiency in effecting the
+end desired--the maintenance of a harmonious experience. The builder has
+discovered that his building means building tools, and also building
+material. Each has been slowly evolved with reference to its fit employ
+in the entire function; and this evolution has been checked at every
+point by reference to its own correspondent. The carpenter has not
+thought at large on his building and then constructed tools at large,
+but has thought of his building in terms of the material which enters
+into it, and through that medium has come to the consideration of the
+tools which are helpful. Life proposes to maintain at all hazards the
+unity of its own process. Experience insists on being itself, on
+securing integrity even through and by means of conflict.
+
+This is not a formal question, but one of the placing and relations of
+the matters or values actually entering into experience. And this in
+turn determines the taking up of just those mental attitudes, and the
+employing of just those intellectual operations, which most effectively
+handle and organize the material. Thinking is adaptation _to_ an end
+_through_ the adjustment of particular objective contents.
+
+The thinker, like the carpenter, is at once stimulated and checked in
+every stage of his procedure by the particular situation which confronts
+him. A person is at the stage of wanting a new house: well then, his
+materials are available resources, the price of labor, the cost of
+building, the state and needs of his family, profession, etc.; his tools
+are paper and pencil and compass, or possibly the bank as a credit
+instrumentality, etc. Again, the work is beginning. The foundations are
+laid. This in turn determines its own specific materials and tools.
+Again, the building is almost ready for occupancy. The concrete process
+is that of taking away the scaffolding, clearing up the grounds,
+furnishing and decorating rooms, etc. This specific operation again
+determines its own fit or relevant materials and tools. It defines the
+time and mode and manner of beginning and ceasing to use them. Logical
+theory will get along as well as does reflective practice, when it
+sticks close by and observes the directions and checks inherent in each
+successive phase of the evolution of the cycle of experiencing. The
+problem in general of validity of the thinking process as distinct from
+the validity of this or that process arises only when thinking is
+isolated from its historic position and its material context.
+
+3. But Lotze is not yet done with the problem of validity, even from his
+own standpoint. The ground shifts again under his feet. It is no longer
+a question of the validity of the idea or meaning with which thought is
+supposed to set out; it is no longer a question of the validity of the
+process of thinking in reference to its own product; it is the question
+of the validity of the product. Supposing, after all, that the final
+meaning, or logical idea, is thoroughly coherent and organized;
+supposing it is an object for all consciousness as such. Once more
+arises the question: What is the validity of even the most coherent and
+complete idea?--a question which rises and will not down. We may
+reconstruct our notion of the chimera until it ceases to be an
+independent idea and becomes a part of the system of Greek mythology.
+Has it gained in validity in ceasing to be an independent myth, in
+becoming an element in systematized myth? Myth it was and myth it
+remains. Mythology does not get validity by growing bigger. How do we
+know the same is not the case with the ideas which are the product of
+our most deliberate and extended scientific inquiry? The reference again
+to the content as the self-identical object of all consciousness proves
+nothing; the matter of a hallucination does not gain worth in proportion
+to its social contagiousness. Or the reference proves that we have not
+as yet reached any conclusion, but are entertaining a hypothesis--since
+social validity is not a matter of mere common content, but of securing
+participation in a commonly adjudged social experience through action
+directed thereto and directed by consensus of judgment.
+
+According to Lotze, the final product is, after all, still thought. Now,
+Lotze is committed once for all to the notion that thought, in any form,
+is directed by and at an outside reality. The ghost haunts him to the
+last. How, after all, does even the ideally perfect valid thought apply
+or refer to reality? Its genuine subject is still beyond itself. At the
+last Lotze can dispose of this question only by regarding it as a
+metaphysical, not a logical, problem (Vol. II, pp. 281, 282). In other
+words, _logically_ speaking, we are at the end just exactly where we
+were at the beginning--in the sphere of ideas, and of ideas only, plus a
+consciousness of the necessity of referring these ideas to a reality
+which is beyond them, which is utterly inaccessible to them, which is
+out of reach of any influence which they may exercise, and which
+transcends any possible comparison with their results. "It is vain,"
+says Lotze, "to shrink from acknowledging the circle here involved ...
+all we know of the external world depends upon the ideas of it which are
+within us" (Vol. II, p. 185). "It is then this varied world of ideas
+within us which forms the sole material directly given to us" (Vol. II,
+p. 186). As it is the only material given to us, so it is the only
+material with which thought can end. To talk about knowing the external
+world through ideas which are merely within us is to talk of an inherent
+self-contradiction. There is no common ground in which the external
+world and our ideas can meet. In other words, the original implication
+of a separation between an independent thought-material and an
+independent thought-function and purpose lands us inevitably in the
+metaphysics of subjective idealism, plus a belief in an unknown reality
+beyond, which unknowable is yet taken as the ultimate test of the value
+of our ideas as just subjective. The subjectivity of the psychical
+event infects at the last the meaning or ideal object. Because it has
+been taken to be something "in itself," thought is also something "in
+itself," and at the end, after all our maneuvering we are where we
+began:--with two separate disparates, one of meaning, but no existence,
+the other of existence, but no meaning.
+
+The other aspect of Lotze's contradiction which completes the circle is
+clear when we refer to his original propositions, and recall that at the
+outset he was compelled to regard the origination and conjunctions of
+the impressions, the elements of ideas, as themselves the effects
+exercised by a world of things already in existence (see p. 31). He sets
+up an independent world of thought, and yet has to confess that both at
+its origin and termination it points with absolute necessity to a world
+beyond itself. Only the stubborn refusal to take this initial and
+terminal reference of thought beyond itself as having a historic
+meaning, indicating a particular place of generation and a particular
+point of fulfilment in the drama of evolving experience, compels Lotze
+to give such bifold objective reference a purely metaphysical turn.
+
+When Lotze goes on to say (Vol. II, p. 191) that the measure of truth of
+particular parts of experience is found in asking whether, when judged
+by thought, they are in harmony with other parts of experience; when he
+goes on to say that there is no sense in trying to compare the entire
+world of ideas with a reality which is non-existent, excepting as it
+itself should become an idea, Lotze lands where he might better have
+frankly commenced.[43] He saves himself from utter skepticism only by
+claiming that the explicit assumption of skepticism, the need of
+agreement of a ready-made idea as such, with an extraneous independent
+material as such, is meaningless. He defines correctly the work of
+thought as consisting in harmonizing the various portions of experience
+with each other: a definition which has meaning only in connection with
+the fact that experience is continually integrating itself into a
+wholeness of coherent meaning deepened in significance by passing
+through an inner distraction in which by means of conflict certain
+contents are rendered partial and hence objectively conscious. In this
+case the test of thought is the harmony or unity of experience actually
+effected. In that sense the test of reality is beyond thought, as
+thought, just as at the other limit thought originates out of a
+situation which is not reflectional in character. Interpret this before
+and beyond in a historic sense, as an affair of the place occupied and
+rôle played by thinking as a function in experience in relation to other
+functions, and the intermediate and instrumental character of thought,
+its dependence upon unreflective antecedents for its existence, and upon
+a consequent experience for its test of final validity, becomes
+significant and necessary. Taken at large, it plunges us in the depths
+of a hopelessly complicated and self-revolving metaphysic.
+
+
+
+
+V
+
+A CRITICAL STUDY OF BOSANQUET'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT[44]
+
+
+Bosanquet's theory of the judgment, in common with all such theories of
+the judgment, necessarily involves the metaphysical problem of the
+nature of reality and of the relation of thought to reality. That the
+judgment is the function by which knowledge is attained is a proposition
+which would meet with universal acceptance. But knowledge is itself a
+relation of some sort between thought and reality. The view which any
+logician adopts as to the nature of the knowledge-process is accordingly
+conditioned by his metaphysical presuppositions as to the nature of
+reality. It is equally true that the theory of the judgment developed
+from any metaphysical standpoint serves as a test of the validity of
+that standpoint. We shall attempt in the present paper to show how
+Bosanquet's theory of the judgment develops from his view of the nature
+of reality, and to inquire whether the theory succeeds in giving such an
+account of the knowledge-process as to corroborate the presupposition
+underlying it.
+
+Bosanquet defines judgment as "the intellectual function which defines
+reality by significant ideas and in so doing affirms the reality of
+those ideas" (p. 104).[45] The form of the definition suggests the
+nature of his fundamental problem. There is, on the one hand, a world
+of reality which must be regarded as having existence outside of and
+independently of the thoughts or ideas we are now applying to it; and
+there is, on the other hand, a world of ideas whose value is measured by
+the possibility of applying them to reality, of qualifying reality by
+them. The judgment is the function which makes the connection between
+these two worlds. If judgment merely brought one set of ideas into
+relation with another set, then it could never give us anything more
+than purely hypothetical knowledge whose application to the real world
+would remain forever problematic. It would mean that knowledge is
+impossible, a result which seems to be contradicted by the existence of
+knowledge. The logician must, therefore, as Bosanquet tells us, regard
+it as an essential of the act of judgment that it always refers to a
+reality which goes beyond and is independent of the act itself (p. 104).
+His central problem thus becomes that of understanding what the nature
+of reality is which permits of being defined by ideas, and what the
+nature of an idea is that it can ever be affirmed to be real. How does
+the real world get representation in experience, and what is the
+guarantee that the representation, when obtained, is correct?
+
+The defining of the problem suggests the view of the nature of reality
+out of which Bosanquet's theory of the judgment grows. The real world is
+to him a world which has its existence quite independently of the
+process by which it is known. The real world is there to be known, and
+is in no wise modified by the knowledge which we obtain of it. The work
+of thought is to build up a world of ideas which shall represent, or
+correspond to, the world of reality. The more complete and perfect the
+correspondence, the greater our store of knowledge.
+
+Translated into terms of the judgment, this representational view means
+that the subject of the judgment must always be reality, while the
+predicate is an idea. But when we examine the content of any universal
+judgment, or even of an ordinary judgment of perception, the subject
+which appears in the judgment is evidently not reality at all, if by
+reality we mean something which is in no sense constituted by the
+thought-process. When I say, "The tree is green," the subject, tree,
+cannot be regarded as a bit of reality which is given ready-made to the
+thought-process. The ability to perceive a tree, to distinguish it from
+other objects and single it out for the application of an idea,
+evidently implies a long series of previous judgments. The content
+"tree" is itself ideal. As Bosanquet forcibly states it: "If a sensation
+or elementary perception is in consciousness (and if not we have nothing
+to do with it in logic), it already bears the form of thinking" (p. 33).
+How, then, can it serve as the subject of a judgment? Bosanquet's
+solution of the problem is to say that the real subject of a judgment is
+not the grammatical subject which appears in a proposition, but reality
+itself. In the more complex forms of judgment the reference to reality
+is disguised by the introduction of explicit ideas to designate the
+portion of reality to which reference is made (pp. 78, 79). In the
+simplest type of judgment known, however, the qualitative judgment of
+perception, the reference to reality appears within the judgment itself.
+The relations of thought to reality and of the elements of the judgment
+to one another can, accordingly, most readily be seen in the
+consideration of this rudimentary form of judgment in which the various
+parts lie bare before us.
+
+Bosanquet describes it as follows:
+
+    If I say, pointing to a particular house, "That is my home," it is
+    clear that in this act of judgment the reference conveyed by the
+    demonstrative is indispensable. The significant idea "my home" is
+    affirmed, not of any other general significant idea in my mind,
+    but of something which is rendered unique by being present to me
+    in perception. In making the judgment, "That is my home," I extend
+    the present sense-perception of a house in a certain landscape by
+    attaching to it the ideal content or meaning of "home;" and
+    moreover, in doing this, I pronounce the ideal content to be, so
+    to speak, of one and the same tissue with what I have before me in
+    my actual perception. That is to say, I affirm the meaning of the
+    idea, or the idea considered as a meaning, to be a real quality of
+    that which I perceive in my perception.
+
+    The same account holds good of every perceptive judgment; when I
+    see a white substance on a plate and judge that "it is bread" I
+    affirm the reference, or general meaning which constitutes the
+    symbolic idea "bread" in my mind, to be a real quality of the spot
+    or point in present perception which I attempt to designate by the
+    demonstrative "this." The act defines the given but indefinite
+    real by affirmation of a quality, and affirms reality of the
+    definite quality by attaching it to the previously undefined real.
+    Reality is given for me _in_ present sensuous perception, and _in_
+    the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with
+    it. (Pp. 76, 77.)
+
+Again, he says that the general features of the judgment of perception
+are as follows:
+
+    There is a presence of a something in contact with our sensitive
+    self, which, as being so in contact, has the character of reality;
+    and there is the qualification of this reality by the reference to
+    it of some meaning _such as can_ be symbolized by a name (p. 77).
+
+Our point of contact with reality, the place where reality gets into the
+thought-process, is, according to this view, to be found in the
+simplest, most indefinite type of judgment of perception. We meet with
+reality in the mere undefined "this" of primitive experience. But each
+such elementary judgment about an undefined "this" is an isolated bit of
+experience. Each "this" could give us only a detached bit of reality at
+best, and the further problem now confronts us of how we ever succeed in
+piecing our detached bits of reality together to form a real world.
+Bosanquet's explanation is, in his words, this:
+
+    The real world, as a definite organized system, is _for me_ an
+    extension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of
+    judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain
+    such an extension (p. 77).
+
+Again he says:
+
+    The subject in every judgment of Perception is some given spot or
+    point in sensuous contact with the percipient self. But, as all
+    reality is continuous, the subject is not _merely_ this given spot
+    or point. It is impossible to confine the real world within this
+    or that presentation. Every definition or qualification of a point
+    in present perception is affirmed of the real world which is
+    continuous with present perception. The ultimate subject of the
+    perceptive judgment is the real world as a whole, and it is of
+    this that, in judging, we affirm the qualities or characteristics.
+    (P. 78.)
+
+The problem is the same as that with which Bradley struggles in his
+treatment of the subject of the judgment, and the solution is also the
+same. Bradley's treatment of the point is perhaps somewhat more
+explicit. Like Bosanquet, he starts with the proposition that the
+subject of the judgment must be reality itself and not an idea, because,
+if it were the latter, judgment could never give us anything but a union
+of ideas, and a union of ideas remains forever universal and
+hypothetical. It can never acquire the uniqueness, the singularity,
+which is necessary to make it refer to the real. Uniqueness can be found
+only in our contact with the real. But just where does our contact with
+the real occur? Bradley recognizes the fact that it cannot be the
+_content_--even in the case of a simple sensation--which gives us
+reality. The content of a sensation is a thing which is in my
+consciousness, and which has the form which it presents because it is in
+my consciousness. Reality is precisely something which is not itself
+sensation, and cannot be in my consciousness. If I say, "This is white,"
+the "this" has a content which is a sensation of whiteness. But the
+sensation of whiteness is not reality. The experience brings with it an
+assurance of reality, not because its content is the real, but because
+it is "my direct encounter in sensible presentation with the real
+world."[46] To make the matter clearer, Bradley draws a distinction
+between the _this_ and the _thisness_. In every experience, however
+simple, there is a content--a "thisness"--which is not itself unique.
+Considered merely as content, it is applicable to an indefinite number
+of existences; in other words, it is an idea. But there is also in every
+experience a "this" which is unique, but which is not a content. It is a
+mere sign of existence which gives the experience uniqueness, but
+nothing else. The "thisness" falls on the side of the content, and the
+"this" on the side of existence. It is exactly the distinction which
+Bosanquet has in mind in the passages quoted in which he tells us that
+"reality is given for me _in_ present sensuous perception, and _in_ the
+immediate feeling of my own sentient existence which goes with it;" and
+again when he says: "There is a presence of a something in contact with
+our sensitive self, which, as being so in contact, has the character of
+reality." The same point is made somewhat more explicitly in his
+introduction when he says that the individual's present perception is
+not, indeed, reality as such, but is his present point of contact with
+reality as such (p. 3).
+
+But has this distinction between the content of an experience and its
+existence solved the problem of how we _know_ reality? When Bosanquet
+talks of knowing reality, he means possessing ideas which are an
+accurate reproduction of reality. It is still far from clear how,
+according to his own account, we could ever have any assurance that our
+ideas do represent reality accurately, if we can nowhere find a point
+at which the content of an experience can be held to give us reality.
+The case is still worse when we go beyond the problem of how any
+particular bit of reality can be known, and ask ourselves how reality as
+a whole can be known. The explanation offered by both Bradley and
+Bosanquet is that by means of judgment we extend the bit of reality of
+whose existence we get a glimpse through a peep-hole in the curtain of
+sensuous perception, and thus build up the organized system of reality.
+In a passage previously quoted, Bosanquet tells us that all reality is
+continuous, and therefore the real subject of a judgment cannot be the
+mere spot or point which is given in sensuous perception, but must be
+the real world as a whole. But how does he know that reality is
+continuous, and that the real world is an organized system? Our only
+knowledge of reality comes through judgment, and judgment brings us into
+contact with reality only at isolated points. When he tells us that
+reality is a continuous whole, he does so on the basis of a metaphysical
+presupposition which is not justifiable by his theory of the judgment.
+The only statement about reality which could be maintained on the basis
+of his theory is that some sort of a reality exists, but the theory
+furnishes equal justification for the assurance that this reality is of
+such a nature that we can never know anything more about it than the
+bare fact of its existence. Moreover, the bare fact of the existence of
+reality comes to us merely in the form of a feeling of our own sentient
+existence which goes with sense-perception. But the mere assurance that
+somewhere behind the curtain of sensuous perception reality exists (even
+if this could go unchallenged), accompanied by the certainty that we can
+never by any possibility know anything more about it, is practically
+equivalent to the denial of the possibility of knowledge.[47]
+
+Although the denial of the possibility of knowledge seems to be the
+logical outcome of the premises, it is not the conclusion reached by
+Bosanquet. At the outset of his treatise, Bosanquet propounds the
+fundamental question we have been considering in these words: "How does
+the analysis of knowledge as a systematic function, or system of
+functions, explain that relationship in which truth appears to consist,
+between the human intelligence on the one hand, and fact or reality on
+the other?" His answer is: "To this difficulty there is only one reply.
+If the object-matter of reality lay genuinely outside the system of
+thought, not only our analysis, but thought itself, would be unable to
+lay hold of reality." (Pp. 2, 3.) The statement is an explicit
+recognition of the impossibility of bridging the chasm between a reality
+outside the content of knowledge and a known real world. It brings
+before us the dilemma contained in Bosanquet's treatment of the subject
+of the judgment. On the one hand the subject of the judgment must be
+outside the realm of my thoughts. If it were not, judgment would merely
+establish a relation between my ideas and would give me no knowledge of
+the real world. On the other hand, the subject of the judgment must be
+within the realm of my thoughts. If it were not, I could never assert
+anything of it; could never judge, or know it. The stress he lays on the
+first horn of the dilemma has been shown. It remains to show his
+recognition of the second horn, and to find out whether or not he
+discovers any real reconciliation between the two.
+
+Bosanquet sums up the section of the introduction on knowledge and its
+content, truth, with the following paragraph:
+
+    The real world for every individual is thus emphatically _his_
+    world; an extension and determination of his present perception,
+    which perception is to him not indeed reality as such, but his
+    point of contact with reality as such. Thus in the enquiry which
+    will have to be undertaken as to the logical subject of the
+    judgment, we shall find that the subject, however it may shift,
+    contract, and expand, is always in the last resort some greater or
+    smaller element of this determinate reality, which the individual
+    has constructed by identifying significant ideas with that world
+    of which he has assurance through his own perceptive experience.
+    In analyzing common judgment it is ultimately one to say that _I
+    judge_ and that _the real world for me, my real world, extends
+    itself_, or maintains its organized extension. This is the
+    ultimate connection by which the distinction of subject and
+    predication is involved in the act of affirmation or enunciation
+    which is the differentia of judgment. (Pp. 3, 4).
+
+Here the subject of the judgment appears as an element of a reality
+_which the individual has constructed_ by identifying significant ideas
+with that world of which he has assurance through his own perceptive
+experience. But the very point with reference to the subject of the
+judgment previously emphasized is that it is not and cannot be something
+which the individual has constructed. The subject of the judgment must
+be reality, and reality does not consist of ideas, even if it be
+determined by them. It does not mend matters to explain that the
+individual has constructed his real world by identifying significant
+ideas with that world of which he has assurance through his own
+perceptive experiences, because, as we have seen, "the individual's
+perceptive experiences" either turn out to be merely similar mental
+constructions made at a prior time, so that nothing is gained by
+attaching to them, or else they mean once more the mere shock of contact
+which is supposed to give assurance that some sort of reality exists,
+but which gives no assurance of what it is. That and what, this and
+thisness still remain detached. When he talks of _the real world for any
+individual_ we are left entirely in the dark as to what the relation
+between _the real world as it is for any individual_ and _the real
+world as it is for itself_ may be, or how the individual is to gain any
+assurance that _the real world as it is for him_ represents _the real
+world as it is for itself_.
+
+Another attempt at a reconciliation of these opposing views leaves us no
+better satisfied. The passage is as follows:
+
+    The real world, as a definite organized system, is _for me_ an
+    extension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of
+    judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain
+    such an extension. It makes no essential difference whether the
+    ideas whose content is pronounced to be an attribute of reality
+    appear to fall within what is given in perception, or not. We
+    shall find hereafter that it is vain to attempt to lay down
+    boundaries between the given and its extension. The moment we try
+    to do this we are on the wrong track. The given and its extension
+    differ not absolutely but relatively; they are continuous with
+    each other, and the metaphor by which we speak of an extension
+    conceals from us that the so-called "given" is no less artificial
+    than that by which it is extended. It is the character and quality
+    of being directly in contact with sense-perception, not any fixed
+    datum of content, that forms the constantly shifting center of the
+    individual's real world, and spreads from that center over every
+    extension which the system of reality receives from judgment. (P.
+    77.)
+
+In this passage by the "given" he evidently means the content of sensory
+experience, the thisness, the what. It is, as he says, of the same stuff
+as that by which it is extended. Both the given and that by which it is
+extended are artificial in the sense of not being _real_ according to
+Bosanquet's interpretation of reality; they are ideas. But if all this
+is admitted, what becomes of the possibility of knowledge? Bosanquet
+undertakes to rescue it by assuring us again that it is the character
+and quality of being directly in contact with sense-perception, not any
+fixed datum of content, that forms the center of the individual's real
+world and gives the stamp of reality to his otherwise ideal extension of
+this center. Here again we find ourselves with no evidence that the
+_content_ of our knowledge bears any relation to reality. We have merely
+the feeling of vividness attached to sensory experience which seems to
+bring us the certainty that there is some sort of a reality behind it,
+but this is not to give assurance that our ideal content even belongs
+rightfully to that against which we have bumped, much less of _how_ it
+belongs--and only this deserves the title "knowledge."
+
+In the chapter on "Quality and Comparison," in which he takes up the
+more detailed treatment of the simplest types of judgment of perception,
+he comes back to the same contradiction, and again attempts to explain
+how both horns of his dilemma must be true. The passage is this:
+
+    The Reality to which we ascribe the predicate is undoubtedly
+    self-existent; it is not _merely_ in my mind or in my act of
+    judgment; if it were, the judgment would only be a game with my
+    ideas. It is well to make this clear in the case before us, for in
+    the later forms of the judgment it will be much disguised. Still
+    the reality which attracts my concentrated attention is also
+    within my act of judgment; it is not even the whole reality
+    present to my perception; still less of course the whole
+    self-existent Reality which I dimly presuppose. The immediate
+    subject of the judgment is a mere aspect, too indefinite to be
+    described by explicit ideas except in as far as the qualitative
+    predication imposes a first specification upon it. _This_ Reality
+    _is_ in my judgment; it is the point at which the actual world
+    impinges upon my consciousness as real, and it is only by judging
+    with reference to this point that I can refer the ideal content
+    before my mind to the whole of reality which I at once believe to
+    exist, and am attempting to construct. The Subject is both in and
+    out of the Judgment, as Reality is both in and out of my
+    consciousness. (Pp. 113, 114.)
+
+The conclusion he reaches is a mere restatement of the difficulty. The
+problem he is trying to solve is how the subject _can_ be both in and
+out of the judgment, and how the subject without is related to the
+subject within. The mere assertion that it is so does not help us to
+understand it. His procedure seems like taking advantage of two
+meanings of sense-perception, its conscious quality and its brute abrupt
+immediacy, and then utilizing this ambiguity to solve a problem which
+grows out of the conception of judgment as a reference of idea to
+reality.
+
+Turning from his treatment of the world of fact to his discussion of the
+world of idea, from the subject to the predicate, as it appears in his
+theory of the judgment we find again a paradox which must be recognized
+and cannot be obviated. An idea is essentially a meaning. It is not a
+particular existence whose essence is uniqueness as is the case with the
+subject of the judgment, but is a meaning whose importance is that it
+may apply to an indefinite number of unique existences. Its
+characteristic is universality. And yet an idea regarded as a psychical
+existence, an idea as a content in my mind, is just as particular and
+unique as any other existence. How, then, does it obtain its
+characteristic of universality? Bosanquet's answer is that it must be
+universal by means of a reference to something other than itself. Its
+meaning resides, not in its existence as a psychical image, but in its
+reference to something beyond itself. Now, any idea that is affirmed is
+referred to reality, but do ideas exist which are not being affirmed? If
+so, their reference cannot be to reality. Bosanquet discusses the
+question in the second section of his introduction as follows:
+
+    It is not easy to deny that there is a world of ideas or of
+    meanings, which simply consists in that identical reference of
+    symbols by which mutual understanding between rational beings is
+    made possible. A _mere_ suggestion, a _mere_ question, a _mere_
+    negation, seem all of them to imply that we sometimes _entertain_
+    ideas without affirming them of reality, and therefore without
+    affirming their reference to be a reference to something real or
+    their meaning to be fact. We may be puzzled indeed to say what an
+    idea can mean, or to what it can refer, if it does not mean or
+    refer to something real--to some element in the fabric
+    continuously sustained by the judgment which is our consciousness.
+    On the other hand, it would be shirking a difficulty to neglect
+    the consideration that an idea, while denied of reality, may
+    nevertheless, or even must, possess an identical and so
+    intelligible reference--a symbolic value--for the rational beings
+    who deny it. A reference, it may be argued, must be a reference to
+    something. But it seems as if in this case the something were the
+    fact of reference itself, the rational convention between
+    intelligent beings, or rather the world which has existence,
+    whether for one rational being or for many, merely as contained in
+    and sustained by such intellectual reference.
+
+    I only adduce these considerations in order to explain that
+    transitional conception of an objective world or world of
+    meanings, distinct from the real world or world of facts, with
+    which it is impossible wholly to dispense in an account of thought
+    starting from the individual subject. The paradox is that the real
+    world or world of fact thus seems for us to fall within and be
+    included in the objective world or world of meanings, as if all
+    that is fact were meaning, but not every meaning were fact. This
+    results in the contradiction that something is objective, which is
+    not real. (Pp. 4, 5.)
+
+In the seventh section of the introduction Bosanquet explains his
+meaning further by what the reader is privileged to regard as a flight
+of the imagination--a mere simile--which he thinks may, nevertheless,
+make the matter clearer.
+
+    We might try to think that the world, _as known to each of us_, is
+    constructed and sustained by his individual consciousness; and
+    that every other individual also frames for himself, and sustains
+    by the action of his intelligence, the world in which he in
+    particular lives and moves. Of course such a construction is to be
+    taken as a reconstruction, a construction by way of knowledge
+    only; but for our present purpose this is indifferent. Thus we
+    might think of the ideas and objects of our private world rather
+    as corresponding to than as from the beginning identical with
+    those which our fellow-men are occupied in constructing each
+    within his own sphere of consciousness. And the same would be true
+    even of the objects and contents within our own world, in as far
+    as an act or effort would be required to maintain them, of the
+    same kind with that which was originally required to construct
+    them.... Thus the paradox of reference would become clearer. We
+    should understand that we refer to a correspondence by means of a
+    content. We should soften down the contradiction of saying that a
+    name to meet which we have and can get nothing but an idea,
+    nevertheless does not stand for that idea but for something else.
+    We should be able to say that the name stands for those elements
+    in the idea which correspond in all our separate worlds, and in
+    our own world of yesterday and of today, considered as so
+    corresponding. (Pp. 45, 46.)
+
+According to this view, the idea obtains the universality which
+constitutes it an idea by a sort of process of elimination. It is like a
+composite photograph. It selects only the common elements in a large
+number of particular existences, and thus succeeds in representing, or
+referring to, all the particular existences which have gone to make it
+up. But when we come to consider the bearing which this view of
+universality, or generalized significance, has on our estimate of the
+knowledge-process, we feel that it has not solved the problem for us. In
+the first place, the idea _in its existence_ is just as particular when
+regarded as made up of the common elements of many ideas as is any of
+the ideas whose elements are taken. A composite photograph is just as
+much a single photograph as any one of the photographs which are taken
+to compose it. The chasm between the particularity of the psychical
+image and the universality of its meaning is not bridged by regarding
+the content of the image as made up by eliminating unlike elements in a
+number of images. The stuff with which thought has to work is still
+nothing more than a particular psychical image, and the problem of what
+gives it its logical value as a general significance is still unsolved.
+Nor does it seem possible to find anything in the _existence_ of the
+image which could account for its reference to something outside of
+itself. The _fact_ of reference itself becomes an ultimate mystery.[48]
+
+But even waiving this difficulty, the judgment must still
+appear truncated, if it really totally disregard a part of its
+content--_i. e._, the particular existence of the image as part of the
+judging consciousness. The theory holds that the particular existence of
+the image has no logical value. It is only its meaning, or general
+reference, which has logical value. But the image _qua_ image is just as
+real as that to which it is supposed to refer. If the judgment really
+does ignore its existence, then it ignores a portion of the reality it
+attempts to represent, and stands self-confessed as a failure.[49] At
+still another point, ideas, as Bosanquet represents them, prove to be
+unsatisfactory tools to use in the work of building up reality. In
+Bosanquet's words: "The meaning tyrannizes over the psychical image in
+another respect. Besides crushing out of sight its particular and
+exclusive existence, it also crushes out part of its content" (p. 74).
+The idea, as we use it, is not, as to content, a complete or accurate
+representation of anything real. To take Bosanquet's illustration:
+
+    Some one speaks to me of the Ægean sea, which I have never seen.
+    He tells me that it is a deep blue sea under a cloudless sky,
+    studded with rocky islands. The meanings of these words are a
+    problem set to my thought. I have to meet him in the world of
+    objective references, which as intelligent beings we have in
+    common. How I do this is my own affair, and the precise images at
+    my command will vary from day to day, and from minute to minute.
+    It sounds simple to say that I combine my recollections of sea and
+    sky at Torbay with those of the island-studded waters of Orkney
+    or the Hebrides. Even so, there is much to adjust and to neglect;
+    the red cliffs of Torbay, and the cloudy skies of the north. But
+    then again, my recollections are already themselves symbolic
+    ideas; the reference to Torbay or the Hebrides is itself a problem
+    set to thought, and puts me upon the selection of index-elements
+    in fugitive images that are never twice the same. I have _first_
+    to symbolize the color of Torbay, using for the purpose any blue
+    that I can call to mind, and fixing, correcting, subtracting from,
+    the color so recalled, till I reduce it to a mere index quality;
+    and _then_ I have to deal in the same way with the meaning or
+    significant idea so obtained, clipping and adjusting the qualities
+    of Torbay till it seems to serve as a symbol of the Ægean. (Pp.
+    74, 75.)
+
+And by the time all this is performed what sort of a representation of
+reality is the idea? Evidently a very poor and meager and fragmentary
+one.
+
+It is so poor and fragmentary, that it cannot itself be that which is
+affirmed of reality. It must be some other fuller existence to be found
+in the world of meanings which is affirmed. And yet how the meager
+content of the idea succeeds in referring to the world of meanings, and
+acting as the instrument for referring a meaning to reality, is not at
+all clear. It seems impossible to explain reference intelligibly by the
+concept of a _correspondence_ of contents.
+
+The fundamental difficulty in the interpretation of the predicate is the
+same one that we encountered in the interpretation of the subject. If
+the predicate is to be affirmed of reality (and if it be not, it has no
+logical value), then it must, when affirmed, be in some sense an
+accurate representation of reality. But the predicate is an idea, and,
+moreover, an idea which is, both in its existence and in its meaning
+palpably the outcome of transformations wrought upon given sensory
+contents by the individual consciousness. Since the one point of contact
+with reality is in sensory experience, the more simple sensory
+experiences are reacted upon and worked over, the farther they recede
+from reality. The idea seems, therefore, in its very essence, a thing
+which never can be affirmed of reality. As image it is itself a reality,
+but not affirmed; as meaning it is that reality (the image) manipulated
+for individual ends. Why suppose that by distorting reality we get it in
+shape to affirm _of_ reality? Moreover, the farther an idea is removed
+from immediate sensory experience--in other words, the more abstract it
+becomes--the less is the possibility of affirming it of reality. The
+final outcome of this point of view, if we adhere rigorously to its
+logic is that the more thinking we do, the less we know about the real
+world. Bosanquet avoids this conclusion by a pure act of faith. If
+knowledge is to be rescued, we must believe that the work done by
+consciousness upon the bits of reality given in sensory experience
+really does succeed in building up a knowledge of reality for us. As
+Bosanquet puts it: "The presentation of Reality, qualified by an ideal
+content, is one aspect of Subject and Predication; and my individual
+percipient consciousness determining itself by a symbolic idea is the
+other. That the latter is identified with the former follows from the
+claim of conscious thought that its nature is to know."[50] (P. 83.)
+
+To sum up the situation, Bosanquet starts out with the assumption that
+by knowledge we must mean knowledge of a world entirely independent of
+our ideas. If we fail to make this assumption, knowledge becomes merely
+a relation between ideas. But its whole importance seems to us to rest
+on the conviction that it does give us knowledge of a world which is
+what it is quite independently of our ideas about it, and cannot in any
+sense be modified by what we think about it. What knowledge does is to
+give us a copy or representation of the real world, whose value depends
+on the accuracy of the representation. And yet when we examine any
+individual knowing consciousness, the subject which appears within the
+judgment is never some portion of the world which exists outside of the
+knowing consciousness, but always some portion of the world which exists
+within the knowing consciousness, and which is constituted by the
+knowledge process. The predicate which is affirmed of reality is
+constantly found to derive its meaning, its generalized significance,
+not from its correspondence with, or reference to, the real world
+outside of the knowing consciousness, but from reference to a world of
+meanings, which consists in a sort of convention among rational
+beings--a world whose existence is distinctly within the knowing
+consciousness and not outside of it.[51] Between the real world, as
+Bosanquet conceives it, and the world of knowledge, we find inserted on
+the side of the subject, the world _as known to each of us_, and on the
+side of the predicate, the _objective world of meanings_. Neither of
+these is the real world. Both of them are ideal, _i. e._, are
+constructions of the individual consciousness. We nowhere find any
+satisfactory explanation of how these ideal worlds are related to the
+real world. There is merely the assertion that we must believe that they
+represent the real world in order that we may believe that knowledge
+exists. But the fact remains that whenever we try to analyze and explain
+any particular judgment, what we find ourselves dealing with is always
+the world as it exists to us as subject, and the objective world of
+meanings as predicate. If we stop here, then knowledge turns out to be
+just what Bosanquet asserted at the outset that it was _not, i. e._, a
+relation between ideas. When we demand a justification for going farther
+than this, we find none except the claim of conscious thought that its
+nature is to know--a claim whose justice we have no possible means of
+testing, and which would not, even if admitted, be of the slightest
+value in deciding which _particular_ judgment is true and which false.
+
+Bosanquet's development of his subject has proved to be throughout the
+necessary logical outcome of the presuppositions with reference to
+reality from which he starts. The fundamental difficulty of erecting a
+theory of the knowledge-process upon such a basis is recognized by him
+at the start in a passage already quoted: "If the object-matter of
+reality lay genuinely outside the system of thought, not only our
+analysis, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold of reality"
+(p. 2). But, in spite of this assertion, his fundamental conception of
+reality remains that of a system which does lie outside the
+thought-process. His theory is an attempt to reconcile the essentially
+irreconcilable views that reality is outside of the thought-process, and
+that it is inside of the thought-process, and he succeeds only by
+calling upon our faith that so it is.
+
+If it be true, as it seems to him to be, that we are compelled to adhere
+to both of these views of reality, then surely there is no other
+outcome. It means, however, that we finally resign all hope of _knowing_
+reality. We may _have faith_ in its existence, but we have no way of
+deciding what particular judgment has reality in it as it should have
+it, and what as it should not. All stand (and fall) on the same basis.
+But does not Bosanquet himself point out a pathway which, if followed
+farther, would reach a more satisfactory view of the realm of knowledge?
+He has shown us that the only sort of reality _we know_, or can know, is
+the reality which appears within our judgment-process--the reality as
+known to us. Would it not be possible to drop the presupposed reality
+outside of the judgment-process (with which judgment is endeavoring to
+make connections) and content ourselves with the sort of reality which
+appears within the judgment-process? In other words, may there not be a
+satisfactory view of reality which frankly recognizes its organic
+relation to the knowledge-process, without at the same time destroying
+its value as reality? Is it possible to admit that reality is in a sense
+constituted in the judgment without making it at the same time the
+figment of the individual imagination--"a game with ideas"?
+
+Let us assume for the moment that the real difficulty with Mr.
+Bosanquet's conception, the error that keeps him traveling in his
+hopeless circles, is the notion that truth is a matter of reference of
+ideas as such to reality as such, leading us to oscillate between the
+alternatives that either all ideas have such reference, and so are true,
+constitute knowledge; or else none have such reference, and so are
+false; or else are mere ideas to which neither truth nor falsity can be
+attributed. Let us ask if truth is not rather some _specific_ relation
+within experience, something which characterizes one idea rather than
+another, so that our problem is not how an idea can refer to a reality
+beyond itself, but what are the marks by which we discriminate a true
+reference from a false one. Then let us ask for the criterion used in
+daily life and in science by which to test reality.
+
+If we ask the philosophically unsophisticated individual why he believes
+that his house still exists when he is away from it and has no immediate
+evidence of the fact, he will tell you it is because he has found that
+he can go back to it time and again and see it and walk into it. It
+never fails him when he acts upon the assumption that it is there. He
+would never tell you that he believed in its existence when he was not
+experiencing it because his mental picture of his house stood for and
+represented accurately an object in the real world which was
+nevertheless of a different order of existence from his mental picture.
+When you ask the physicist why he believes that the laws of motion are
+true, he will tell you that it is because he finds that bodies always
+do behave according to them. He can predict just what a body will do
+under given circumstances. He is never disappointed however long he
+takes it for granted that the laws of motion are true and that bodies
+behave according to them. The only thing that could make him question
+their truth would be to find some body which did not prove to behave in
+accordance with them. The criterion is the same in both cases. It is the
+practical criterion of what as a matter of fact will work. That which
+can safely be taken for granted as a basis for further action is
+regarded as real and true. It remains real so long, and only so long, as
+it continues to fulfil this condition. As soon as it ceases to do so, it
+ceases to be regarded as real. When a man finds that he can no longer
+obtain the accustomed experience of seeing and entering his house, he
+ceases to regard it as real. It has burned down, or been pulled down.
+When a physicist finds that a body does not, as a matter of fact, behave
+as a given law leads him to expect it would behave, he ceases to regard
+the law as _true_.
+
+The contrast between the naïve view of the criterion of reality and the
+one we have just been discussing may be brought out by considering how
+we should have to interpret from each standpoint the constant succession
+of facts in the history of science which have ceased to be facts. For
+illustration take the former fact that the earth is flat. It ceased to
+be a fact, says the theory we have been reviewing, because further
+thought-constructions of the real world convinced us that there is no
+reality which the idea "flat-world" represents. The idea "round-world"
+alone reproduces reality. It ceased to be a fact, says the naïve view,
+because it ceased to be a safe guide for action. Men found they could
+sail around the world. Correspondence in one case is pictorial, and its
+existence or non-existence can, as we have seen, never be ascertained.
+In the other, correspondence is response, adjustment, the co-meeting of
+specific conditions in further constituting of experience.
+
+In actual life, therefore, the criterion of reality which we use is a
+practical one. The test of reality does not consist in ascertaining the
+relationship between an idea and an _x_ which is not idea, but in
+ascertaining what experience can be taken for granted as a safe basis
+for securing other experiences. The evident advantage of the latter
+view, leaving aside for the moment the question of its adequacy in other
+respects, is that it avoids the fundamental skepticism at once suggested
+by the former. How can we ever be sure that the fact which we have
+discovered will stand the test of further thought-constructions? Perhaps
+it comes no nearer to reality than the discarded one. Obviously we never
+_can_ be sure that any particular content of thought represents reality
+so accurately and perfectly that it will never be subject to revision.
+If, however, the test of reality is the _adequacy_ of a given content of
+consciousness as a stimulus to action, as a mode of control, we have an
+applicable standard. A given content of consciousness is real--is a
+fact--so long as the act resulting from it is adequate in adaptation to
+other contents. It ceases to be real as soon as the act it stimulates
+proves to be inadequate.
+
+The view which places the ultimate test of facts, not in any
+relationship of contents or existences, but in the practical outcome of
+thought, is the one which seems to follow necessarily from a
+thoroughgoing conception of the judgment as a function--an act. Our
+fundamental biological conception of the activities of living organisms
+is that acts exist for the sake of their results. Acts are always
+stimulated by some definite set of conditions, and their value is always
+tested by the adequacy with which they meet this set of conditions. The
+judgment is no exception to the rule. It is always an act stimulated by
+some set of conditions which needs readjusting. Its outcome is a
+readjustment whose value is and can be tested only by its adequacy. It
+is accordingly entirely in line with our reigning biological conceptions
+to expect to find the ultimate criterion of truth and reality in the
+practical outcome of thought, and to seek for an understanding of the
+nature of the "real" and of the "ideal" within the total activity of
+judgment.
+
+One difficulty besets us at the outset of such an investigation--that of
+being sure that we have a genuine judgment under examination. A large
+portion of the so-called judgments considered by logicians, even by
+those who emphasize the truth that a judgment is an _act_, are really
+not judgments at all, but contents of thought which are the outcome of
+judgments--what might be called dead judgments, instead of live
+judgments. When we analyze a real act of judgment, as it occurs in a
+living process of thought, we find given elements which are always
+present. There is always a certain situation which demands a reaction.
+The situation is always in part determined and taken for granted, and in
+part questioned. It is determined in so far as it is a definite
+situation of some sort; it is undetermined in so far as it furnishes an
+inadequate basis for further action and therefore comes to consciousness
+as a problem. For example, take one of the judgments Bosanquet uses.
+"This is bread." We have first to inquire when such a judgment actually
+occurs in the living process of thought. A man does not make such a
+judgment in the course of his thinking unless there is some instigation
+to do so. Perhaps he is in doubt as to whether the white object he
+perceives is bread or cake. He wants some bread, but does not want cake.
+A closer inspection convinces him that it is bread, and the finished
+judgment is formulated in the proposition: "This is bread." What is the
+test of the reality of the bread, and the truth of the judgment?
+Evidently the act based on it. He eats the bread. If it tastes like
+bread and affects him like bread, then the bread was real and the
+judgment true. If, on the other hand, it does not taste like bread, or
+if it makes him violently ill, then the "bread" was not real and the
+judgment was false. In either case, the "this"--the experience to be
+interpreted--is unquestioned. The man does not question the fact that he
+has a perception of a white object. So much is taken for granted and is
+unquestioned within that judgment. But there is another part of the
+experience which is questioned, and which remains tentative up to the
+conclusion of the act of judgment; that is the doubt as to whether the
+perceived white object is bread or something else. Every live judgment,
+every judgment as it normally occurs in the vital process of thought,
+must have these phases. It is only when a judgment is taken out of its
+context and reduced to a mere memorandum of past judgments that it fails
+to reveal such parts. The man may, of course, go farther back. He may
+wonder whether this is really white or not. But he falls back then on
+something else which he takes unquestioningly--a "this" experience of
+some sort or other.
+
+So far we have considered the practical criterion of reality merely as
+the one which is actually operative in everyday life, and as the one
+suggested by our biological theory of the functions of living organisms.
+It also offers a suggestion for the modified view of the nature of
+reality for which we are in search. Our previous discussion brought out
+incidentally a contradiction in the traditional theory of the nature of
+reality which it will be worth while to consider further. In dealing
+with the subject of the judgment, reality seemed to be made synonymous
+with fact. In this sense fact, or the real, was set off against the
+ideal. Knowledge was viewed as the correspondence between real and
+ideal. When we came to deal with the ideal itself--with the predicate
+of the judgment--there appeared in it an element of fact or reality
+which proved a serious stumbling-block for the theory. As image in my
+mind, the idea is just as real as the so-called facts; but this sort of
+reality according to the theory in question is neither the reality about
+which we are judging nor a real quality of it. Both Bradley and
+Bosanquet are forced to admit that the judgment ignores it, and is in so
+far by nature inadequate to its appointed task of knowing reality.
+
+The suggestion which the situation offers for a new theory is that the
+view of reality has been too narrow. Reality must evidently be a broad
+enough term to cover both fact and idea. If so, the reality must be
+nothing more nor less than the total process of experience with its
+continual opposition of fact and idea, and their continual resolution
+through activity. That which previous theory has been calling the real
+is not the total reality, but merely one aspect of it. The problem of
+relation of fact and idea is thus the problem of the relation of one
+form of reality to another, and so a determinate soluble one, not a
+_merely_ metaphysical or general one. Granting this, does it still
+remain true that reality in the narrower sense, reality as fact, can be
+regarded as a different order of existence from the ideal, and set over
+against the thought-process? Evidently not. Fact and idea become merely
+two aspects of a total reality. The way in which fact and idea are
+distinguished has already been suggested by the practical and biological
+criterion of fact, or reality in the narrower sense. From this point of
+view, fact is not a different order of existence from idea, but is
+merely a part of the total process of experience which functions in a
+given way. It is merely that part of experience which is taken as given,
+and which serves as a stimulus to action. Thus the essential nature of
+fact, or reality in the popular sense, falls not at all on the side of
+its content, but on the side of its function. Similarly the ideal is
+merely that part of the total experience which is taken as tentative.
+There is no problem as to how either of them is related to reality. In
+this relationship they _are_ reality. That which previous theories had
+been calling the whole of reality now appears as merely one aspect of
+it--the fact aspect--artificially isolated from the rest.
+
+When we translate this view of the nature of reality into terms of a
+theory of the judgment, we find that we can agree with Bosanquet in his
+definition of a judgment. It is an act, and an act which refers an ideal
+content to reality. The judgment must be an act, because it is
+essentially an adaptation--a reaction toward a given situation. The
+subject of the judgment is that part of the content of experience which
+represents the situation to be reacted to. It is that which is taken for
+granted as given in each case. Now this is, as we have seen, reality--in
+the narrower sense of that term. What Bosanquet has been calling reality
+now appears merely as the subject of the judgment taken out of its
+normal function and considered as an isolated thing. It is an artificial
+abstraction. It is accordingly true, as Bosanquet insists, that the
+subject of the judgment must always be reality--both in his sense of the
+term and in ours. This reality is not real, however, by virtue of its
+independence from the judgment, but by virtue of its function within the
+judgment. His fundamental problem with reference to the subject of the
+judgment is disposed of from this point of view. The subject is wholly
+within the judgment, not in any sense outside of it; but it is at the
+same time true that the subject of the judgment is reality. The fact
+that the subjects of all judgments--even those of the most elementary
+type--bear evident marks of the work done by thought upon them, ceases
+to be a problem. The subject is essentially a thing constituted by the
+doubt-inquiry process, and functioning within it. The necessity for an
+intermediate _real world as it is to me_ between the real world and the
+knowing process disappears, because the _real world as it is to me_ is
+the only real world of which the judgment can take account. There is no
+longer any divorce between the content of the subject and its existence.
+Reality in his sense of the term--reality as fact--does not fall on the
+side of _existence_ in distinction from content, but on the side of
+_function_ in distinction from content.
+
+The predicate of the judgment is that part of the total experience which
+is taken as doubtful, or tentative. As we have seen, every act of
+adaptation involves a definite situation to be reacted to (subject) and
+an indefinite or tentative material with which to react (predicate). We
+have pointed out that a situation which demands a judgment never appears
+in consciousness as mere questioned or questionable situation.[52] There
+is always present, as soon as the doubt arises, some sort of tentative
+solution. This is the predicate or idea. Just as the fact, or real in
+the narrower sense, is that which is taken as given in the situation, so
+the ideal is that which is taken as tentative. Its ideality does not
+consist in its reference to another order of existence, the objective
+world of meanings, but in its function within the judgment, the estimate
+of the whole situation as leading up to the adequate act. Just as we no
+longer have any need for the mediation of the _real world as known to
+me_ between subject and reality, so we no longer need _the objective
+world of meanings_ to bridge the chasm between the predicate and
+reality. The difficulty of understanding how ideas can be used to build
+up facts disappears when we regard fact and idea, not as different
+orders of existence, but as contents marking different phases of a total
+function.
+
+Ideas, as Bosanquet represented them, proved to be extremely
+unsatisfactory tools to use in building up a knowledge of reality. In
+the first place, their value as instruments of thought depends upon
+their universality. We have already reviewed Bosanquet's difficulties in
+attempting to explain the universality of ideas. The universality of an
+idea cannot reside in its mere existence as image. Its existence is
+purely particular. Its universality must reside in its reference to
+something outside of itself. But no explanation of how the particular
+existence--image--could refer to another and fuller content of a
+different order of existence could be discovered. The fact of reference
+remained an ultimate mystery. From the new point of view the image gains
+its universality through its organizing function. It represents an
+organized habit which may be brought to bear upon the present situation,
+and which serves, by directing action, to organize and unify experience
+as a whole. It is only as function that the concept of reference can be
+made intelligible.
+
+Of course, considered as content, the idea is just as particular from
+this point of view as from any other. We still have to discuss the
+question as to whether or not the particularity of the idea has a
+logical value. The fact that it had none in Bosanquet's theory sets a
+limit to the validity of thought. But if the real test of the validity
+of a judgment is the act in which it issues, then the existential aspect
+of the idea must have logical value. The existential aspect of the idea
+is the "my" side of it. It is as my personal experience that it exists.
+But it is only as my idea that it has any impulsive power, or can issue
+in action. Far from being ignored, therefore, the existential aspect is
+essential to the logical, the determinative, value of an idea.
+
+Ideas, according to the representational theory of knowledge, proved to
+be a poor medium for knowing reality in still another respect. They are
+in their very nature contents that have been reduced from the fulness
+of experience to mere index-signs. Even though their reference to a
+fuller content in the objective world of meanings presented no problem,
+still this objective world of meanings is far removed from reality. And
+yet, in order to know, we must be able to affirm ideas of reality. On
+the functional theory of ideas, their value does not rest at all upon
+their representational nature. They are not taken either in their
+existence or in their meaning as representations of any other content.
+They are taken as contents which mark a given function, and their value
+is determined entirely by the adequacy of the function of which they are
+the conscious expression. Their content may be as meager as you please.
+It may have been obtained by a long process of reducing and transforming
+sensory experience, but if it serve to enable its possessor to meet the
+situation which called it up with the appropriate act, then it has truth
+and value in the fullest sense. The reduction of the idea to a mere
+index-sign presents no problem when we realize that it is the tool of a
+given function, not the sign for a different and fuller content. The
+idea thus becomes a commendable economy in the thought-process, rather
+than a reprehensible departure from reality.
+
+We have already upon general considerations criticised the point of view
+which holds that ideality consists in reference to another content. In
+arguing that this reference cannot be primarily to reality itself, but
+rather to an intermediate world of meanings, Bosanquet cites the
+question and the negative judgment. In the question ideas are not
+affirmed of reality, and in negation they are definitely denied of
+reality, hence their reference cannot be to reality. It must therefore
+be to an objective world of meanings. It may be worth while to point out
+in passing that, from the functional point of view, the part played by
+ideas in the question and in negative judgment is the same that it is in
+affirmation.
+
+We have brought out the fact that all judgment arises in a doubt. The
+earliest stage of judgment is accordingly a question. Whether the
+process stops at that point, or is carried on to an affirmation or
+negation, depends upon the particular conditions. The ideas which appear
+in questions present no other problem than those of affirmation. They
+are ideas, not by virtue of their reference to another content in the
+world of meanings, but by virtue of their function, _i. e._, that of
+constituting that part of the total experience which is taken as
+doubtful, and hence as in process.
+
+In order to make this point clear with reference to negative judgments,
+it will be necessary to consider the relation of negative and positive
+judgments somewhat more in detail. All judgment is in its earliest
+stages a question, but a question is never _mere_ question. There are
+always present some suggestions of an answer, which make the process
+really a disjunctive judgment. A question might be defined as a
+disjunctive judgment in which one member of the disjunction is expressed
+and the others implied. If the process goes on to take the form of
+affirmation or negation, one of the suggested answers is selected. To
+follow out the illustration of the bread used above, the judgment arises
+in a doubt as to the nature of the white object perceived, but the doubt
+never takes the form of a blank question. It at once suggests certain
+possible solutions drawn from the mass of organized experience at the
+command of the person judging. At this stage the judgment is
+disjunctive. In the illustration it would probably take the form: "This
+is either bread or cake." The further course of the judgment rejects the
+cake alternative, and selects the bread, and the final outcome of the
+judgment is formulated in the proposition: "This is bread." But how did
+it happen that it did not take the form: "This is not cake"? That
+proposition is also involved in the outcome, and implied in the judgment
+made. The answer is that the form taken by the final outcome depends
+entirely on the direction of interest of the person making the judgment.
+If his interest happened to lie in obtaining bread, then the outcome
+would naturally take the form: "This is bread," and his act would
+consist in eating it. If he happened to want cake, the natural form
+would be, "This is not cake," and his act would consist in refraining
+from eating. In other words, the question as to whether a judgment turns
+out to be negative or positive is a question of whether the stress of
+interest happens to fall on the selected or on the rejected portions of
+the original disjunction. Every determination of a subject through a
+predicate includes both. The selection of one or the other according to
+interest affects the final formulation of the process, but does not
+change the relations of its various phases. An idea in a negative
+judgment is just what it is in a positive judgment. In neither case is
+it constituted an idea by reference to some other content.
+
+So far we have outlined Bosanquet's theory of the judgment; have noted
+the apparently insoluble problems inherent in his system, and have
+sketched a radically different theory which offered a possible solution
+for his difficulties. It now remains to develop the implications of the
+new theory further by comparing its application to some of the more
+important problems of logic with that of Bosanquet. In closing we shall
+have to inquire to what extent the new theory of the judgment with its
+metaphysical implications has proved more satisfactory than that of
+Bosanquet.
+
+The special problems to be considered are (1) the relation of judgment
+to inference; (2) the parts of the judgment and their relationship; (3)
+the time element in the judgment; and (4) the way in which one judgment
+can be separated from another.
+
+1. The discussion of the relation between judgment and inference comes
+up incidentally in Bosanquet's treatment of the distinction between a
+judgment and a proposition (p. 79). The proposition, he says, is merely
+the enunciative sentence which represents the act of thought called
+judgment. With this distinction we should agree. In his discussion of
+the point, however, he criticises Hegel's doctrine that a judgment is
+distinguished from a proposition in that a judgment maintains itself
+against a doubt, while a proposition is a mere temporal affirmation, not
+implying the presence of a doubt. The ground of his criticism is that
+judgment must be regarded as operative before the existence of a
+conscious doubt, and that, while it is true, as Hegel suggests, that
+judgment and inference begin together, they both begin farther back than
+the point at which conscious doubt arises. Doubt marks the point at
+which inference becomes conscious of its ground. Now, it is undoubted
+that inferences in which the ground is implicit exist at an earlier
+stage of experience than those in which it is explicit. The former we
+usually call simple apprehension, and the latter judgment. What
+Bosanquet wishes to do is to make the term "judgment" cover both the
+implicit and the explicit activities. The question at once arises
+whether such a use of terms is accurate. There is certainly a wide
+difference between an inference which is conscious of its ground, and
+one which is not. It is conceivably a distinction of philosophic
+importance. To slur the difference by applying one name to both
+accomplishes nothing. It will be remembered that the presence of a
+conscious doubt is the criterion of judgment adopted in the standpoint
+from which we have been criticising Bosanquet's theory. We should
+accordingly make the term "inference" a wider one than the term
+"judgment." A judgment is an inference which is conscious of its ground.
+Since fact and idea have been represented as constituted in and through
+judgment, the question which at once suggests itself is: What, from such
+a standpoint, is the criterion of fact and idea in the stage of
+experience previous to the appearance of judgment? The answer is that
+the question involves the psychological fallacy. There is no such
+distinction as fact and idea in experience previous to the appearance of
+judgment. The distinction between fact and idea arises only at the
+higher level of experience at which inference becomes conscious of its
+grounds. To ask what they were previous to that is to ask _what_ they
+were before they _were_--a question which, of course, cannot be
+answered.
+
+Our reason for not adopting Hegel's distinction between a judgment and a
+proposition would accordingly not be the same as Bosanquet's. The
+question has already been touched upon in the distinction between dead
+and live judgments. What Hegel calls a proposition is really nothing but
+a dead judgment. His illustration of a temporal affirmation is the
+sentence: "A carriage is passing the house." That sentence would be a
+judgment, he says, only in case there were some doubt as to whether or
+not a carriage was passing. But the question to be answered first is:
+When would such a "statement" occur in the course of our experience? It
+is impossible to conceive of any circumstances in which it would
+naturally occur, unless there were some doubt to be solved either of our
+own or of another. Perhaps one is expecting a friend, and does not know
+at first whether it is a carriage or a cart which is passing. Perhaps
+some one has been startled, and asks: "What is this noise?" What Hegel
+wishes to call a proposition is, accordingly, nothing but a judgment
+taken out of its setting.
+
+2. In dealing with the traditional three parts of the judgment--subject,
+predicate, and copula--Bosanquet disposes of the copula at once, by
+dividing the judgment into subject and predication. But the two terms
+"subject" and "predication" are not co-ordinate. Subject, as he uses it,
+is a static term indicating a _content_. Predication is a dynamic term
+indicating the act of predicating. It implies something which is
+predicated of something else, _i. e._, two contents and the act of
+bringing them into relation. Now, if what we understand by the copula is
+the _act_ of predicating abstracted from the content which is predicated
+of another content, then it does not dispose of the copula as a separate
+factor in judgment to include thing predicated and act of predicating
+under the single term "predication." The term "predication" might just
+as reasonably be made to absorb the subject as well, and would then
+appear--as it really is--synonymous with the term "judgment."
+
+But Bosanquet's difficulties with the parts of the judgment are not
+disposed of even by the reduction to subject and predication. He goes on
+to say:
+
+    It is plain that the judgment, however complex, is a single idea.
+    The relations within it are not relations between ideas, but are
+    themselves a part of the idea which is predicated. In other words,
+    the subject must be outside the judgment in order that the content
+    of the judgment may be predicated of it. If not, we fall back into
+    "my idea of the earth goes round my idea of the sun," and this, as
+    we have seen, is never the meaning of "The earth goes round the
+    sun." What we want is, "The real world has in it as a fact what I
+    mean by earth-going-round-sun." (P. 81.)
+
+We have already pointed out the difficulties into which Bosanquet's
+presupposition as to the nature of reality plunges him. This is but
+another technical statement of the same problem. If the subject is
+really outside of judgment, then the entire _content_ of the judgment
+must fall on the side of predicate, or idea. In the paragraphs that
+follow, Bosanquet brings out the point that the judgment must
+nevertheless contain the distinction of subject and predicate, since it
+is impossible to affirm without introducing a distinction into the
+_content_ of the affirmation. Yet he considers this distinction to be
+_merely_ a difference within an identity. It serves to mark off the
+grammatical subject and predicate, but cannot be the essential
+distinction of subject and predicate. His solution of the puzzle is
+really the one for which we have been contending, _i. e._, that "the
+real world is primarily and emphatically my world," but he still cannot
+be satisfied with that kind of a real world as ultimate. Behind the
+subject which presents my world he postulates a real world which is not
+my world, but which my world represents. It is the relation between this
+real world and the total content of a judgment which he considers the
+essential relation of judgment. This leaves him--as we have pointed
+out--as far as ever from a theory of the relation of thought to reality,
+and, moreover, with no criterion for the distinction of subject and
+predicate within the judgment. To say that it is a difference within an
+identity does not explain how, on a mere basis of content, such a
+difference is distinguished within an identity or how it assumes the
+importance it actually has. He vibrates between taking the whole
+intellectual content as predicate, the reality to be represented as
+subject (in which case the copula would be the "contact of
+sense-perception") and a distinction appearing without reasonable ground
+or bearing _within_ the intellectual content. When subject and predicate
+are regarded as the contents in which phases of a function appear, this
+difficulty no longer exists.
+
+3. In discussing the time relations within judgment (p. 85) Bosanquet
+first disposes of the view which holds that the subject is prior to the
+predicate in time, and is distinguished from the predicate by its
+priority. He emphasizes the fact that no content of consciousness can
+have the significance of a subject, except with reference to something
+already referred to it as predicate. But while it cannot be true that
+the parts of the judgment fall outside of one another in time, it is yet
+evident that in one sense at least the judgment is in time. To make this
+clear, Bosanquet draws a provisional distinction between the process of
+arriving at a judgment and the completed judgment. The process of
+arriving at a judgment is a process of passing from a subject with an
+indefinite provisional predicate--a sort of disjunctive judgment--to a
+subject with a defined predicate. This process is evidently in time, but
+it is as evidently not a transition from subject to predicate. It is, as
+he says, a modification, _pari passu_, of both subject and predicate.
+The same distinction, he thinks, must hold of the judgment when
+completed. But this throws us into a dilemma with reference to the
+time-factor in judgment. Time either is or is not an essential factor in
+judgment. If it is not essential, then how explain the evident fact that
+the judgment as an intellectual process does have duration? If it is
+essential, then how explain the fact that its parts do not fall outside
+one another in time? Bosanquet evidently regards the former problem as
+the easier of the two. His solution is that, while the judgment is an
+intellectual process in time, still this is a purely external aspect.
+The essential relation between subject and predicate is not in time,
+since they are coexistent; therefore time is not an essential element in
+judgment.
+
+The first point at which we take issue with this treatment of time in
+relation to judgment is in the distinction between the process of
+arriving at the judgment and the completed judgment. Bosanquet himself
+defines judgment as an intellectual act by which an ideal content is
+referred to reality. Now, at what point does this act begin? Certainly
+at the point where an ideal content is first applying to reality, and
+this, as he points out, is at the beginning of the process which he
+describes as the process of arriving at a judgment. It is nothing to the
+point that at this stage the predicate is tentative, while later it
+becomes defined. His process of arriving at the judgment is exactly the
+process we have been describing as the early stages of any and every
+judgment. When he talks about the judgment as completed, he has
+apparently shifted from the dynamic view of judgment implied in his
+definition to a static view. All he could mean by a completed
+judgment--in distinction to the total activity of arriving at a
+judgment--is the new content of which we find ourselves possessed when
+the total process of predication is complete. But this content is not a
+judgment at all. It is a new construction of reality which may serve
+either as subject or as predicate in future judgments.
+
+Now, if we regard the judgment as the total activity by which an ideal
+content is referred to reality, then must we not regard time as an
+essential element? Bosanquet answers this question in the negative,
+because he believes that if time is an essential element, then the parts
+of the judgment must necessarily fall outside one another in time. But
+is this necessary? If the essence of judgment is the very modification,
+_pari passu_, of subject and predicate, then time must be an essential
+element in it, but it is not at all necessary that its elements should
+fall outside of one another in time. In other words, the dilemma which
+Bosanquet points out on p. 87 is not a genuine one. There is no
+difficulty involved in admitting that the judgment is a transition in
+time, and still holding that its _parts_ do not fall outside _one
+another_ in time. His own solution of the problem--_i. e._, that,
+although judgment is an intellectual process in time, still time is not
+an essential feature of it, because subject and predicate are coexistent
+and judgment is a relation between them--involves a desertion of his
+dynamic view of judgment. He defines judgment, not as a relation between
+subject and predicate, but as an intellectual _act_.[53]
+
+4. The discussion of the time-element in judgment leads up to the next
+puzzle--that as to the way in which one judgment can be marked off from
+another in the total activity of thought. Bosanquet has pointed out that
+subject and predicate are both of them present at every stage of the
+judging process, and are undergoing progressive modification. If,
+therefore, we take a cross-section of the process at any point, we find
+both subject and predicate present; but a cross-section at one point
+would not reveal quite the same subject and predicate as the
+cross-section at another point. He comes to the conclusion that judgment
+breaks up into judgments as rhomboidal spar into rhomboids (p. 88). It
+is, accordingly, quite arbitrary to mark out any limits for a single
+judgment. The illustration he gives of the point is as follows:
+
+    Take such an every-day judgment of mixed perception and inference
+    as, "He is coming down stairs and going into the street." It is
+    the merest chance whether I break up the process thus, into two
+    judgments as united by a mere conjunction, or, knowing the man's
+    habits, say, when I hear him half way down stairs, "He is going
+    out." In the latter case I summarize a more various set of
+    observations and inferences in a single judgment; but the judgment
+    is as truly single as each of the two which were before separated
+    by a conjunction; for each of them was also a summary of a set of
+    perceptions, which might, had I chosen, have been subdivided into
+    distinct propositions expressing separate judgments; _e. g._, "He
+    has opened his door, and is going toward the staircase, and is
+    half way down, and is in the passage," etc. If I simply say, "He
+    is going out," I am not a whit the less conscious that I judge all
+    these different relations, but I then include them all in a single
+    systematic content "going out." (P. 89.)
+
+But is it a question of merest chance which of these various
+possibilities is actualized? Is Bosanquet really looking--as he
+thinks--at the actual life of thought, or is he considering, not what as
+a matter of fact does take place under a concrete set of circumstances,
+but what might take place under slightly differing sets of
+circumstances? If it is true that judgment is a crisis developing
+through adequate interaction of stimulus and response into a definite
+situation, beginning with doubt and ending with a solution of the doubt,
+then it is not true that its limits are purely arbitrary. It begins with
+the appearance of the problem and its tentative solutions, and ends with
+the solution of a final response. It does, of course, depend upon
+momentary interest, but this does not make its limits arbitrary, for the
+interest is inherent, not external. In the case of Bosanquet's
+illustration, the question of whether one judgment or half a dozen is
+made is not a question of merest chance. It depends upon where the
+interest of the person making the judgment is centered--in other words,
+upon what is the particular doubt to be solved. If the real doubt is as
+to whether the man will stay in his room or go out, then when he is
+heard leaving his room the solution comes in the form: "He is going
+out." But if the doubt is as to whether he will stay in his room, go
+out, or go into some other room, then the succession of judgments
+occurs, each of which solves a problem. "He has opened his door"--then
+he is not going to stay in his room; "He is going toward the
+staircase"--then he is not going into a room in the opposite direction,
+etc. It is impossible to conceive of such a series of judgments as
+actually being made, unless each one represents a problematic situation
+and its determination. The only time that a man would, as a matter of
+fact, choose to break up the judgment, "He is going out," into such a
+series, would be the time when each member of the series had its own
+special interest as representing a specific uncertain aim or problem.
+Nor is it altogether true that in making the judgment, "He is going
+out," one is not a whit the less conscious that he judges all these
+different relations. He judges only such relations as are necessary to
+the solution of the problem in hand. If hearing the man open his door is
+a sufficient basis for the solution, then that is the only one which
+consciously enters into the formation of the judgment.
+
+We have attempted to bring out in the preceding pages what seem to be
+the contradictions and insoluble problems involved in Bosanquet's theory
+of the judgment, and to exhibit them as the logical outcome of his
+metaphysical presuppositions. We have also tried to develop another
+theory of the judgment involving a different view of the nature of
+reality, and to show that the new theory is able to avoid the
+difficulties inherent in Bosanquet's system. The change in view-point
+briefly is this: Instead of regarding the real world as self-existent,
+independently of the judgments we make about it, we viewed it as the
+totality of experience which is assured, _i. e._, determined as to
+certainty or specific availability, through the instrumentality of
+judgment. We thus avoided the essentially insoluble problem of how a
+real world whose content is self-existent quite outside of knowledge can
+ever be correctly represented by ideas. The difficulty in understanding
+the relation of the subject and the predicate of judgment to reality
+disappears when we cease to regard reality as self-existent outside of
+knowledge. Subject and predicate become instrumentalities in the process
+of building up reality. Thought no longer seems to carry us farther and
+farther from reality as ideas become abstract and recede from the
+immediate sensory experience in which contact with the real occurs. On
+the contrary, thought carries us constantly toward reality. Finally, we
+avoid the fundamental skepticism about the possibility of knowledge
+which, from the other standpoint, is forced upon us by the long
+succession of facts which have faded into the realm of false opinions,
+and the lack of any guarantee that our present so-called knowledge of
+reality shall not meet the same fate. From that point of view, reality
+seems to be not only unknown, but unknowable.
+
+The criticism sure to be passed upon the alternative view developed is
+that the solution of Bosanquet's problems which it affords is not a real
+solution, but rather the abandonment of an attempt at a solution. It
+represents reality as a thing which is itself in process of development.
+It would force us to admit that the reality of a hundred years ago, or
+even of yesterday, was not in content the reality of today. A growing,
+developing reality is, it will be said, an imperfect reality, while we
+must conceive of reality as complete and perfect in itself. The only
+answer which can be made is to insist again that we have no right to
+assume that reality is such an already completed existence, unless such
+an assumption enables us to understand experience and organize it into a
+consistent whole. The attempt of this paper has been to show that such a
+conception of reality really makes it inherently impossible to give an
+intelligible account of experience as a whole, while the view which
+regards reality as developing in and through judgment does enable us to
+build up a consistent and understandable view of the world. This
+suggests that the "perfect" may not after all be that which is finished
+and ended, but that whose reality is so abundant and vital as to issue
+in continuous self-modification. The Reality that evolves and moves may
+be more perfect, less finite, than that which has exhausted itself.
+Moreover, only the view that Reality is developmental in quality, and
+that the instrument of its development is judgment involving the
+psychical in its determination of subject and predicate gives the
+psychical as such any significant place in knowledge or in reality.
+According to the view of knowledge as representation of an eternal
+content, the psychical is a mere logical surd.
+
+
+
+
+VI
+
+TYPICAL STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT
+
+
+Logic aims at investigating the general function of knowing. But
+knowing, it is commonly asserted, is constituted as judgment.
+Furthermore, there is reason to believe that judgment undergoes
+well-marked changes in its development. Consequently, an understanding
+of the judgment-function and of its epochs in development is of prime
+importance. In carrying through the investigation we shall endeavor,
+first, to state and to defend a certain presupposition with reference to
+the character of the judgment-function; second, to exhibit the
+application of this presupposition in the typical stages of judgment.
+
+
+I
+
+Judgment is essentially _instrumental_. This is the presupposition which
+we must explain and make good. And we shall accomplish this by way of an
+analysis of judgment as meaning.
+
+It cannot be denied that what we call knowledge is concerned with the
+discrimination of valid meaning. To know is to appreciate the _meaning_
+of things and the meaning _of things_ is the same with valid meaning.
+Judging determines knowledge, and in the same act develops meaning. To
+put it otherwise, knowledge is a matter of _content_; _content_ is
+_meaning_, and we have knowledge when we have meaning satisfactorily
+determined. It is evident, therefore, that if we would understand the
+judging-function, we must first make clear to ourselves the nature and
+rôle of _meaning_.
+
+Meaning is universally embodied in _ideas_. To know, to understand the
+meaning, to get ideas, are the same. Now, in ideas two factors may be
+distinguished. First, every idea has as its base an image or emphasized
+portion of experience. In some forms of ideation we are more immediately
+aware of the presence of images than in others, but no idea--even the
+most abstract--can exist apart from an ultimate base. Second, every idea
+is equally a function of _reference_ and _control_. As _reference_, the
+idea projects in the mind's view an anticipation of experiences and of
+the conditions upon which these experiences depend for their
+realization; as _control_, ideas are agencies in turning anticipations
+into realizations.[54]
+
+To be more specific on both points: Since the days of Galton it has been
+almost a commonplace in psychology that ideas are embodied in forms of
+imagery which vary for and in different individuals. It has been
+maintained, it is true, that in abstract forms of thought, imagery
+disappears. This objection is met in two ways. For one, words--the
+vehicle of many abstract ideas--involve imagery of a most pronounced
+type: for another, every idea, when examined closely, discloses an
+image, no matter how much for the time being this has been driven into
+obscurity by the characteristics of reference and control. Furthermore,
+when we examine the anticipatory aspect of ideas, the presence of
+imagery both with reference to outcome and to conditions is so evident
+that its presence will scarcely be denied.
+
+The second point may be illustrated in several ways. In everyday life
+anticipation and realization are inseparable from the nature and use of
+ideas. "Hat" means anticipation of protection to the head and the
+tendency toward setting in motion the conditions appropriate to the
+realization of this anticipation. The same factors are evident in the
+boy's definition of a knife as "something to whittle with." Again it is
+maintained that intelligence is an essential factor in human
+self-consciousness. By this is meant that human beings are universally
+aware in some degree of what they are about. And this awareness consists
+in understanding the meaning of their actions, of forecasting the
+outcome of various kinds of activity, of apprehending beforehand the
+conditions connected with determinate results. Within this sphere we
+speak of certain men as being pre-eminently intelligent, meaning that
+for such men outcomes are previewed and connected with their appropriate
+conditions far beyond the range of ordinary foresight. Finally,
+scientific intelligence is essentially of this kind. It aims at
+understanding the varying types of process which operate in nature and
+thus at possessing itself of information with reference to results to be
+expected under determinate conditions. For example, the knowledge
+acquired in his researches by Louis Pasteur enabled him to predict the
+life or death of animals inoculated with charbon virus according as they
+had or had not been vaccinated previously. His information, in other
+words, became an instrument for the control and eradication of the
+disease. And what is true of this case is true of all science. To the
+scientist ideas are "working hypotheses" and have their value only as
+they enable him to predict, and to control. And while it is true that
+the scientist usually overlooks the so-called _practical_ value of his
+discoveries, it is none the less true that in due time the inventor
+follows the investigator. The investigator is content to construct and
+show the truth of his idea. The inventor assumes the truth of the
+investigator's work and carries his idea as a constructive principle
+into the complications of life. To both men "knowledge is power,"
+although the "power" may be realized in connection with different
+interests. But if this be true, ideas can no longer be regarded as
+copies in individual experience of some pre-existing reality. They are
+rather instruments for transforming and directing experience, by way of
+constructing anticipations and the conditions appropriate to their
+realization. Herein also consists their truth or falsity. The true idea
+is reliable, carrying us from anticipation to realization; the false
+idea is unreliable, and fails in bringing the promised result.
+
+Now, in the development of instruments generally, we may distinguish a
+rule-of-thumb or more or less unreflective stage of construction, and
+one entirely reflective. As to use there is the distinction of inexpert
+and expert control. This leads us to expect that in the thought-function
+also certain typical stages of construction and of control may be found.
+To the investigation of this point we shall next direct attention.
+
+
+II
+
+In its development from crude to expert forms judgment exhibits three
+typical stages--_the impersonal_, _the reflective_, and _the intuitive_.
+These we shall consider in order of development. But first it is to be
+noticed that these stages of judgment are not to be regarded as hard and
+fast distinctions of the kind that no indications of the higher are to
+be found in the lower types, but rather as working distinctions within a
+process of continuous development.
+
+1. _The impersonal judgment._--Ever since the days of the Greek
+grammarians the impersonal judgment has been considered an anomaly in
+logic. And the reason is not far to seek. From the time of Aristotle it
+has been customary to maintain that judgments, when analyzed, disclose a
+subject and a predicate. Logically considered, these appear to be
+entirely correlative, for, as Erdmann puts it,[55] "an event without a
+substrate, a quality without a subject, is altogether unpresentable."
+But there is in all languages a class of judgments, such as, "It rains,"
+"It snows," "Fire!" in which no directly asserted subject is
+discoverable. To these the name impersonal and subjectless has been
+given. Here then is the difficulty. If we admit that the impersonal
+expression involves predication, we must, in all consistency, search for
+a subject, while at the same time the subject refuses to disclose
+itself. In ancient days the orthodox logician confined his search to
+language and to the spoken or written proposition. The unorthodox critic
+maintained, in opposition to this, that a subject was provided only by
+warping and twisting the natural sense of the impersonal expression. And
+thus the matter stood until the development of modern comparative
+philology. It was then demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt that
+the "it" (or its equivalent) of the impersonal is a purely contentless
+form word. Language provides no subject whatsoever. So strong, however,
+is the hold of tradition that the search has been renewed. Attention has
+been turned upon the mental processes involved, and this time with more
+apparent result. Although there has been no general agreement with
+reference to the subject, a classification of the different views may
+still be made. (_a_) The subject is universal and undetermined; (_b_) it
+is individual and more or less determined; (_c_) between these extremes
+lies almost every intermediate degree conceivable.
+
+Ueberweg maintains that the subject of the impersonal is the actual
+totality of present experience. When we ask, "What rains?" we must
+understand a reference to our general environment, in which no special
+element is singled out. Sigwart, on the other hand, maintains that the
+subject can be construed only as the actual sense-impression. This
+diversity of opinion might seem to indicate that, were it not for the
+constraining power of theory, a subject would scarcely be thought of
+for the impersonal. Still it must be admitted that when we examine the
+impersonal expression closely we can discover a sense-impression,
+whether definite or indefinite, combined with an idea. This would seem
+to give the case to the orthodox logician, for he will at once claim the
+sense-impression as the subject and the idea as the predicate of the
+judgment. But we must have a care. Predication is usually held to
+consist in a _reference_ of predicate _to_ subject. The factors of the
+judgment are, as it were, held apart. In the impersonal no such thing as
+this can be discovered. The meaning is so close a unity that impression
+and idea are entirely fused. We may analyze the expression and find them
+there, but by so doing we destroy the immediacy which is an essential
+characteristic of the impersonal. In other words, the impersonal does
+not analyze itself. It is entirely unconscious of its make-up. And yet
+it is definite and applies itself with precision: If I am in a
+lecture-hall and hear the fire-alarm, the thought "Fire!" which enters
+my mind leads to an immediate change in my conduct. I arise, move
+quietly out, and prepare for duty. If, on the other hand, I open the
+street door and the rain strikes my face, I ejaculate "Raining!" turn,
+reach for my umbrella, and pass out protected. In both cases I act
+_knowingly_ and with _meaning_, but I do not analyze the movement either
+of thought or of action. A correlate to the unreflective impersonal
+judgment is found in early custom. Custom embodies social ideas and is
+an instrument for the determination and control of action. Individuals
+moved by custom know what they are about and act with precision
+according as custom may demand. But it is notorious that custom is
+direct and unreflective. It represents social instruments of control
+which have grown up without method and which represent the slow
+accretion of rule-of-thumb activities through many ages. So in the
+impersonal judgment we have a type of intellectual instrument which has
+been brought to a high degree of precision in use, but which still
+retains the simplicity and certainty of an unquestioned instrument of
+action. For this reason, whatever complexity of elements the impersonal
+may present to a reflective view, it does not contain to itself.
+Consequently it may be best to say that to the impersonal there is
+neither subject, predicate, nor reference of the one to the other. These
+are distinctions which arise only when the instrument of action has been
+questioned and the mind turns back upon the meaning which it has
+unhesitatingly used, analyzing, investigating, constructing, laying bare
+the method and function of its tools. Thus arises a new and distinctive
+type of judgment, viz., the reflective.
+
+2. _The reflective judgment._--By the reflective judgment is to be
+understood that form of meaning whose structure and function have become
+a problem to itself. The days of naïve trust and spontaneous action have
+gone by. Inquiry, criticism, aloofness, stay the tendency to immediate
+action. Meaning has grown worldly wise and demands that each situation
+shall explain itself and that the general principles and concrete
+applications of its own instruments shall be made manifest. Hence in the
+various forms of reflective thought we find the progressive steps in
+which meaning comes to full consciousness of its function in experience.
+
+The demonstrative judgment (the simplest of the reflective type) carries
+doubt, criticism, construction, and assertion written on the face of it.
+For example, in the expression, "That is hot," we do not find the
+directness and immediacy of response characteristic of the simpler
+impersonal "hot." Instead, we note a clash of tendencies, a suspension
+of the proposed action, a demand for and a carrying out of a
+reconsideration of the course of action, the emergence of a new meaning,
+and the consequent redirection of activities. An iron lies upon the
+hearth; I stretch out my hand to return it to its place; I stop
+suddenly, having become conscious of signs of warmth; the thought arises
+in my mind, "That is hot;" I experiment and find my judgment correct; I
+search for a cloth, and thus protected carry out my first intention.
+Again, a hunter notes a movement in the thicket, quickly raises his gun,
+and is about to fire. Something in the movement of the object arrests
+him. He stops, thinking, "That is a man, perhaps." What has caught the
+eye has arrested his action, has become a demand, and not until the
+situation has become clear can the hunter determine what to do. In other
+words, he must reflectively assure himself what the object is before he
+can satisfy himself as to how he should act. Subject and predicate have
+arisen and have consciously played their parts in the passage from doubt
+to decision.
+
+Under the heading "individual judgments" are classed such expressions
+as, "That ship is a man-o'-war," "Russia opposes the policy of the open
+door in China." In both these cases it is evident that an advance in
+definiteness of conception and of complexity of meaning has been made,
+while at the same time we recognize that the instrumental
+characteristics of the thought-movement remain the same. In considering
+the subject of the judgment we note that the stimulus presents itself
+partly as a determinate factor and partly as a problem--an insistent
+demand. The expression, "That ship is a man-o'-war," might be written,
+"That is a ship and of the kind man-o'-war," and it thus constitutes
+what Sigwart calls a "double synthesis." As used in actual judgment,
+however, the two are held together and constitute the statement of a
+single stimulus of which a certain portion is evident and a certain
+portion is in doubt. The working out of the difficulty is given in the
+predicate "is a man-o'-war," in which we at once detect the instrumental
+characteristics fundamental to all judgment. To illustrate: At the
+close of the battle of Santiago, in the Spanish-American war, smoke
+appeared upon the horizon revealing the presence of a strange ship.
+Instantly attention was directed to it, and it became a problem for
+action--a demand for instrumental information. Soon it was identified as
+a man-o'-war, and the American ships were cleared for action. Closer
+approach raised a further question with reference to its nationality.
+After some debate this also was resolved, and hostile demonstrations
+were abandoned.
+
+The universal judgment is sometimes said to exhibit two distinct forms.
+Investigation, however, has proved this statement to be incorrect.
+Instances taken in themselves and apart from their character are of no
+logical significance. Advance is made by weighing instances and not by
+counting them. In short, the true universal is the hypothetical
+judgment, and the reason for this may be readily shown. The hypothetical
+judgment is essentially double-ended. On the one hand, it is a statement
+of the problem of action in terms of the conditions which will turn the
+problem into a solution. On the other hand, it is an assertion that once
+the conditions of action have been determined the result desired may be
+attained. Here we note that the judgment has come to clear consciousness
+of itself and of the part which it plays in experience. It has now
+obtained an insight into the criterion of its legitimate employment,
+_i. e._, of its truth and falsity. And this insight makes the
+justification of its claim almost self-evident. For, inasmuch as the
+hypothetical judgment says, "If such and such conditions be realized,
+such and such a result will be obtained," the test of the claim is made
+by putting the conditions into effect and watching whether the promised
+experience is given. And further, since it has been found that the
+judgment formulated as a hypothesis actually accomplishes what it
+promises, we must admit that the hypothetical judgment is also
+categorical. These two factors cannot be separated from each other. It
+is true that the hypothetical judgment reduces every valid meaning to
+the form, "_If_ certain conditions be realized," but it as plainly and
+positively asserts, "such and such results _will_ be obtained." When we
+grasp the absolute correlativity of the hypothetical and categorical
+aspects of judgment, we realize at once the essentially instrumental
+character of judgment, when it comes to consciousness of its structure
+and function. It arises in the self-conscious realization of a problem.
+This it reflects upon and sizes up. When the difficulty has been
+apprehended, the judgment emerges as the consciousness of the conditions
+which will attain the desired end of action freed and unimpeded. This
+may be illustrated by reference to the work of Pasteur cited above. His
+investigations began in a problem set for him by agricultural conditions
+in France. A certain disease had made the profitable rearing of sheep
+and cattle almost an impossibility. After long and careful examination
+he discovered the beneficial effects of vaccination. To him the
+conditions which governed the presence of the disease became apparent,
+and this knowledge furnished him with an instrument by means of which
+one difficulty was removed from the path of the stock-raiser. In this
+illustration we have an epitome of the work accomplished everywhere by
+the scientist. It is his task to develop and to reduce to exact terms
+instruments of control for the varied activities of life. In its parts
+and as a whole each instrument is intelligently constructed and tested
+so that its make-up and function are exactly known. Because of this,
+reasoned belief now takes the place of unreflective trust as that was
+experienced in the impersonal stage of judgment. What at first hand
+might appear to be a loss was in reality a gain; the breakdown of the
+impersonal was the first step in the development of an instrument of
+action conscious of its reason for being, its methods and conditions of
+action. These latter constitute the distinctive subject and predicate of
+the reflective judgment.
+
+This brings us to the connection between the hypothetical character of
+this form of judgment and its universality. And this perhaps will now be
+quite apparent. The reflective judgment lays bare an objective
+connection between the conditions and outcomes of actions. It proves its
+point by actually constructing the event. Such being the case,
+universality is no more than a statement of identical results being
+predictable wherever like conditions are realized. If it be true that
+"man is mortal," then it is an identical statement to insist that,
+"Wherever we find men there we shall also find mortality."
+
+And this point brings us naturally to the treatment of the disjunctive
+judgment: "A is either B or C or D." In the disjunctive judgment the
+demand is not for the construction of a reliable instrument of action,
+but for the resolution of a doubt as to which instrument is precisely
+fitted to the circumstances. In fact, the disjunctive judgment involves
+the identification of the practical problem. When we say of a man, "He
+is either very simple or very deep," we have no doubt as to our proper
+course of action in either case. If he is simple, then we shall do so
+and so; if he is deep, then another course of action follows. We can lay
+out alternative courses beforehand, but the point of difficulty lies
+here: "But just which is he?" In short, the disjunctive judgment is the
+demand for and the attempt at a precise diagnosis of a concrete problem.
+To illustrate: A patient afflicted with aphasia is brought to a
+physician. The fact that the trouble is aphasia may be quite evident.
+But what precisely is the form and seat of the aphasia? To the mind of
+the educated physician the problem will take on the disjunctive form:
+"This is either subcortical or cortical aphasia. If subcortical,
+intelligence will not be impaired; if cortical, the sensor and motor
+tracts will be in good condition." Appropriate tests are made and the
+subcortical possibilities are shut out. The disjunction disappears and
+the judgment emerges: "This is a case of cortical aphasia." But now a
+new disjunction arises. It is either the sensory or motor form of
+cortical aphasia, and, whichever one of these, it is again one of
+several possibilities. As the alternatives arise, the means for
+discriminating them arise also; determinate symptoms are observed, and
+in due time the physician arrives at the final conclusion: "This is
+sensory cortical aphasia of the visual type." Having determined this,
+his method of action is assured, and he proceeds to the appropriate
+operation. Thus, finally, we are brought to a form of judgment aware not
+only of its motive, method, and justification, but also to one aware of
+its specific application to individual cases. Thus it would seem as
+though judgment had returned upon itself and had completed the
+determination of its sphere of action. And in one sense this is true. In
+the disjunctive judgment, as inclusive of the motives of the
+hypothetical and categorical forms, the reflective judgment would appear
+to have come to its limit of development. One thing, however, remains to
+be considered, viz., the development from crude to expert uses of
+intellectual instruments.
+
+3. _The intuitive judgment._--As stated above, the intuitive type of
+judgment depends upon efficiency in the use of judgment. In this regard
+there is a great similarity between the impersonal and the intuitive
+judgments. Both are immediate and precise. But there is a radical and
+essential difference. The impersonal judgment knows nothing of the
+strict analysis, insight, and constructive power of the reflective
+judgment. The intuitive judgment, on the other hand, includes the
+results of reflection and brings them to their highest power.
+Paradoxically put, in the intuitive judgment there is so much reflection
+that there is no need for it at all. To the intuitive judgment there is
+no hesitation, no aloofness. Action is direct, but entirely
+self-conscious. That such a type of judgment as the intuitive exists
+there can be no doubt. There is all the difference in the world between
+the quality of consciousness of a mere layman and that of an expert, no
+matter what the line. The layman must size up a situation. It is a
+process whose parts are successive, whether much or little difficulty be
+experienced. For the expert situations are taken in at a glance, parts
+and whole are simultaneous and immediate. Yet the meaning is entirely
+exact. The expert judgment is self-conscious to the last degree. While
+other individuals are thinking out what to do, the expert has it, sees
+the advantage, adjusts, and moves. Demand and solution jump together.
+How otherwise can we explain, for example, the action of an expert
+ball-player? Witness his rapid reactions, his instantaneous adjustments.
+Mistakes of opponents which would never be noticed by the average player
+are recognized and seized upon. On the instant the new opening is seen,
+the adjustment is evident, the movement made. Illustrations to the same
+effect could be drawn from other modes of life, _e. g._, music, the
+military life, etc. That intuitive judgments are not more common is a
+proof in itself of their distinctive character and value. Only in so far
+as we become experts in our special fields of experience and have
+reduced our instruments of action to precise control, can we expect the
+presence of intuitive judgments. They remain, therefore, as the final
+outcome of the judgment-function made perfect in its technique and use.
+
+In conclusion we shall make a brief summary of our investigation and a
+criticism of certain current theories of judgment.
+
+Judgment is essentially instrumental. Its function is to construct,
+justify, and refine experience into exact instruments for the direction
+and control of future experience through action. It exhibits itself
+first in the form of instruments developed unsystematically in response
+to the hard necessities of life. In a higher stage of development the
+instrumental process itself is taken into account, and systematically
+developed until in the methodical procedure of science the general
+principles of knowledge are laid bare and efficient instruments of
+action constructed. Finally, constant, intelligent use results in
+complete control, so that within certain spheres doubt and hesitancy
+would seem to disappear as to the character of the tools used, and
+remain only as a moment in determining their wisest or most appropriate
+employ.
+
+The criticism indicated is based upon the instrumental character of
+judgment and is directed against all theories which contend that
+knowledge is a "copying" or "reproducing" of reality. In whatever form
+this "copy" theory be stated, the question inevitably arises how we can
+compare our ideas with reality and thus know their truth. On this
+theory, what we possess is ever the copy; the reality is beyond. In
+other words, such a theory logically carried out leads to the breakdown
+of knowledge. Only a theory which contains and constructs its criterion
+within its own specific movement can verify its constructions. Such a
+theory is the instrumental. Judgment constructs a situation in
+consciousness. The values assigned in this situation have a determining
+influence upon values further appreciated. The construction arrived at
+concerns future weal and woe. Thus gradually a sense of truth and
+falsity attaches to the construing of situations. One sees that he
+_must_ look beyond _this_ situation, because the way he estimates _this_
+situation is fraught with meaning beyond itself. Hence the critically
+reflective judgment in which hesitancy and doubt direct themselves at
+the attitude, elements, and tools involved in defining and identifying
+the situation, instead of at the situation itself _in toto_. Instead of
+developing a complex of experience through assigning qualities and
+meanings to the _situation_ as such, some one of the quales is selected,
+to have _its_ significance determined. It becomes, _pro tempore_, the
+situation judged. Or the same thing takes place as regards some "idea"
+or value hitherto immediately fastened upon and employed. In either case
+we get the reflective judgment, the judgment of pure relationship as
+distinct from the constructive judgment. But the judgment of relation,
+employing the copula to refer a specified predicate to a specified
+object, is after all only for the sake of controlling some immediate
+judgment of constructive experience. It realizes itself in forming the
+confident habit of prompt and precise mental adjustment to
+individualized situations.
+
+
+
+
+VII
+
+THE NATURE OF HYPOTHESIS
+
+
+In the various discussions of the hypothesis which have appeared in
+works on inductive logic and in writings on scientific method, its
+structure and function have received considerable attention, while its
+origin has been comparatively neglected. The hypothesis has generally
+been treated as that part of scientific procedure which marks the stage
+where a definite plan or method is proposed for dealing with new or
+unexplained facts. It is regarded as an invention for the purpose of
+explaining the given, as a definite conjecture which is to be tested by
+an appeal to experience to see whether deductions made in accordance
+with it will be found true in fact. The function of the hypothesis is to
+unify, to furnish a method of dealing with things, and its structure
+must be suitable to this end. It must be so formed that it will be
+likely to prove valid, and writers have formulated various rules to be
+followed in the formation of hypotheses. These rules state the main
+requirements of a good hypothesis, and are intended to aid in a general
+way by pointing out certain limits within which it must fall.
+
+In respect to the origin of the hypothesis, writers have usually
+contented themselves with pointing out the kind of situations in which
+hypotheses are likely to appear. But after this has been done, after
+favorable external conditions have been given, the rest must be left to
+"genius," for hypotheses arise as "happy guesses," for which no rule or
+law can be given. In fact, the genius differs from the ordinary plodding
+mortal in just this ability to form fruitful hypotheses in the midst of
+the same facts which to other less gifted individuals remain only so
+many disconnected experiences.
+
+This unequal stress which has been laid on the structure and function of
+the hypothesis in comparison with its origin may be attributed to three
+reasons: (1) The facts, or data, which constitute the working material
+of hypotheses are regarded as given to all alike, and all alike are more
+or less interested in systematizing and unifying experience. The purpose
+of the hypothesis and the opportunity for forming it are thus
+practically the same for all, and hence certain definite rules can be
+laid down which will apply to all cases where hypotheses are to be
+employed. (2) But beyond this there seems to be no clue that can be
+formulated. There is apparently a more or less open acceptance of the
+final answer of the boy Zerah Colburn, who, when pressed to give an
+explanation of his method of instantaneous calculation, exclaimed in
+despair: "God put it into my head, and I can't put it into yours."[56]
+(3) And, furthermore, there is very often a strong tendency to disregard
+investigation into the origin of that which is taken as given, for,
+since it is already present, its origin, whatever it may have been, can
+have nothing to do with what it is now. The facts, the data, are _here_,
+and must be dealt with as they _are_. Their past, their history or
+development, is entirely irrelevant. So, even if we could trace the
+hypothesis farther back on the psychological side, the investigation
+would be useless, for the rules to which a good hypothesis must conform
+would remain the same.
+
+Whether or not it can be shown that Zerah Colburn's ultimate explanation
+is needed in logic as little as Laplace asserted a similar one to be
+required in his celestial mechanics, it may at least be possible to
+defer it to some extent by means of a further psychological inquiry. It
+will be found that psychological inquiry into the origin of the
+hypothesis is not irrelevant in respect to an understanding of its
+structure and function; for origin and function cannot be understood
+apart from each other, and, since structure must be adapted to function,
+it cannot be independent of origin. In fact, origin, structure, and
+function are organically connected, and each loses its meaning when
+absolutely separated from each other. It will be found, moreover, that
+the data which are commonly taken as the given material are not
+something to which the hypothesis is subsequently applied, but that,
+instead of this external relation between data and hypothesis, the
+hypothesis exercises a directive function in determining what are the
+data. In a word, the main object of this discussion will be to contend
+against making a merely convenient and special way of regarding the
+hypothesis a full and adequate one. Though we speak of facts and of
+hypotheses that may be applied to them, it must not be forgotten that
+there are no facts which remain the same whatever hypothesis be applied
+to them; and that there are no hypotheses which are hypotheses at all
+except in reference to their function in dealing with our subject-matter
+in such a way as to facilitate its factual apprehension. Data are
+selected in order to be determined, and hypotheses are the ways in which
+this determination is carried on. If, as we shall attempt to show, the
+relation between data and hypothesis is not external, but strictly
+correlative, it is evident that this fact must be taken into account in
+questions concerning deduction and induction, analytic and synthetic
+judgments, and the criterion of truth. Its bearing must be recognized in
+the investigation of metaphysical problems as well, for reality cannot
+be independent of the knowing process. In a word, the purpose of this
+discussion of the hypothesis is to determine its nature a little more
+precisely through an investigation of its rather obscure origin, and to
+call attention to certain features of its function which have not
+generally been accorded their due significance.
+
+
+I
+
+_The hypothesis as predicate._--It is generally admitted that the
+function of the hypothesis is to provide a way of dealing with the data
+or subject-matter which we need to organize. In this use of the
+hypothesis it appears in the rôle of predicate in a judgment of which
+the data, or facts, to be construed constitute the subject.
+
+In his attempts to reduce the movements of the planets about the sun to
+some general formula, Kepler finally hit upon the law since known as
+Kepler's law, viz., that the squares of the periodic times of the
+several planets are proportional to the cubes of their mean distances
+from the sun. This law was first tentatively advanced as a hypothesis.
+Kepler was not certain of its truth till it had proved its claim to
+acceptance. Neither did Newton have at first any great degree of
+assurance in regard to his law of gravitation, and was ready to give it
+up when he failed in his first attempt to test it by observation of the
+moon. And the same thing may be said about the caution of Darwin and
+other investigators in regard to accepting hypotheses. The only reason
+for their extreme care in not accepting at once their tentative
+formulations or suggestions was the fear that some other explanation
+might be the correct one. This rejection of other possibilities is the
+negative side of the matter. We become confident that our hypothesis is
+the right one as we lose confidence in other possible explanations; and
+it might be added, without falling into a circle, that we lose
+confidence in the other possibilities as we become more convinced of our
+hypothesis.
+
+It appears that such may be the relation of the positive and negative
+sides in case of such elaborate hypotheses as those of Kepler and
+Newton; but is it true where our hypotheses are more simple? It is not
+easy to understand why the fact that the hypothesis is more simple, and
+the time required for its formulation and test a good deal shorter,
+should materially change the state of affairs. The question remains:
+Why, if there is no opposition, should there be any uncertainty? In all
+instances, then, the hypothesis appears as one among other possible
+predicates which may be applied to our data taken as subject-matter of a
+judgment.
+
+_The predicate as hypothesis._--Suppose, then, the hypothesis is a
+predicate; is the predicate necessarily a hypothesis? This is the next
+question we are called upon to answer, and, since the predicate cannot
+very well be taken aside from the judgment, our question involves the
+nature of the judgment.
+
+While it will not be necessary to give a very complete account of the
+various definitions of the judgment that might be adduced, still the
+mention of a few of the more prominent ones may serve to indicate that
+something further is needed. In definitions of the judgment sometimes
+the subjective side is emphasized, sometimes the objective side, and in
+other instances there are attempts to combine the two. For instance,
+Lotze regards the judgment as the idea of a unity or relation between
+two concepts, with the further implication that this connection holds
+true of the object referred to. J. S. Mill says that every proposition
+either affirms or denies existence, coexistence, sequence, causation, or
+resemblance. Trendelenburg regards the judgment as a form of thought
+which corresponds to the real connection of things, while Ueberweg
+states the case a little differently, and says that the essence of
+judgment consists in recognizing the objective validity of a subjective
+connection of ideas. Royce points to a process of imitation and holds
+that in the judgment we try to portray by means of the ideas that enter
+into it. Ideas are imitative in their nature. Sigwart's view of the
+judgment is that in it we say something about something. With him the
+judgment is a synthetic process, while Wundt considers its nature
+analytic and holds that, instead of uniting, or combining, concepts into
+a whole, it separates them out of a total idea or presentation. Instead
+of blending parts into a whole, it separates the whole into its
+constituent parts. Bradley and Bosanquet both hold that in the judgment
+an ideal content comes into relation with reality. Bradley says that in
+every judgment reality is qualified by an idea, which is symbolic. The
+ideal content is recognized as such, and is referred to a reality beyond
+the act. This is the essence of judgment. Bosanquet seems to perceive a
+closer relation between idea and reality, for although he says that
+judgment is the "intellectual function which defines reality by
+significant ideas," he also tells us that "the subject is both in and
+out of the judgment, as Reality is both in and out of my consciousness."
+
+In all these definitions of judgment the predicate appears as ideal. An
+ideal content is predicated of something, whether we regard this
+something as an idea or as reality beyond, or as reality partly within
+and partly without the act of judging; and it is ideal whether we
+consider it as one of the three parts into which judgments are usually
+divided, or whether we say, with Bosanquet and Bradley, that subject,
+predicate, and copula all taken together form a single ideal content,
+which is somehow applied to reality. Moreover, we not only judge about
+reality, but it seems to be quite immaterial to reality whether we judge
+concerning it or not.
+
+Many of our judgments prove false. Not only do we err in our judgments,
+but we often hesitate in making them for fear of being wrong; we feel
+there are other possibilities, and our predication becomes tentative.
+Here we have something very like the hypothesis, for our ideal content
+shows itself to be a tentative attempt in the presence of alternatives
+to qualify and systematize reality. It appears, then, on the basis of
+the views of the judgment that have been mentioned, that not only do we
+find the hypothesis taking its place as the predicate of a judgment, but
+the predicate is itself essentially of the nature of a hypothesis.
+
+In the views of the judgment so far brought out, reality, with which it
+is generally admitted that the judgment attempts to deal in some way,
+appears to lie outside the act of judging. Now, everyone would say that
+we make some advance in judging, and that we have a better grasp of
+things after than before. But how is this possible if reality lies
+without or beyond our act of judging? Is the reality we now have the
+same that we had to begin with? If so, then we have made no advance as
+far as the real itself is concerned. If merely our conception of it has
+changed, then it is not clear why we may not be even worse off than
+before. If reality does lie beyond our judgment, then how, in the nature
+of the case, can we ever know whether we have approached it or have gone
+still farther away? To make any claim of approximation implies that we
+do reach reality in some measure, at least, and, if so, it is difficult
+to understand how it lies beyond, and is independent of, the act of
+judging.
+
+_Further analysis of judgment._--It remains to be seen whether a further
+investigation of the judgment will still show the predicate to be a
+hypothesis. It is evident that in some cases the judgment appears at the
+end of a more or less pronounced reflective process, during which other
+possible judgments have suggested themselves, but have been rejected.
+The history of scientific discovery is filled with cases which
+illustrate the nature of the process by which a new theory is developed.
+For instance, in Darwin's _Formation of Vegetable Mould through the
+Action of Earth Worms_, we find the record of successive steps in the
+development of his hypothesis. Darwin suspected from his observations
+that vegetable mold was due to some agency which was not yet determined.
+He reasoned that if vegetable mold is the result of the life-habits of
+earthworms, _i. e._, if earth is brought up by them from beneath the
+surface and afterward spread out by wind and rain, then small objects
+lying on the surface of the ground would tend to disappear gradually
+below the surface. Facts seemed to support his theory, for layers of red
+sand, pieces of chalk, and stones were found to have disappeared below
+the surface in a greater or less degree. A common explanation had been
+that heavy objects tend to sink in soft soil through their own weight,
+but the earthworm hypothesis led to a more careful examination of the
+data. It was found that the weight of the object and the softness of the
+ground made no marked difference, for sand and light objects sank, and
+the ground was not always soft. In general, it was shown that where
+earthworms were found vegetable mold was also present, and _vice versa_.
+
+In this investigation of Darwin's the conflicting explanations of
+sinking stones appear within the main question of the formation of
+vegetable mold by earthworms. The facts that disagreed with the old
+theory about sinking stones were approached through this new one. But
+the theories had something in common, viz., the disappearance of the
+stones or other objects: they differed in their further determination of
+this disappearance. In this case it may seem as if the facts which were
+opposed to the current theory of sinking stones were seen to be
+discrepant only after the earthworm hypothesis had been advanced; the
+conflict between the new facts and the old theory appears to have
+arisen through the influence of the new theory.
+
+There are cases, however, where the facts seem clearly to contradict the
+old theory and thus give rise to a new one. For example, we find in
+Darwin's introduction to his _Origin of Species_ the following: "In
+considering the origin of species it is quite conceivable that a
+naturalist reflecting on the mental affinities of organic beings, on
+their embryological relations, their geographical distribution,
+geological succession, and other such facts, might come to the
+conclusion that species had not been independently created but had
+descended, like varieties, from other species." It would seem from this
+statement that certain data were found for which the older theory of
+independent creation did not offer an adequate explanation. And yet the
+naturalist would hardly "reflect" on all these topics in a comparative
+way unless some other mode of interpretation were already dawning upon
+him, which led him to review the accepted reflections or views.
+
+As a more simple illustration, we may cite the common experience of a
+person who is uncertain concerning the identity of an approaching
+object, say, another person. At first he may not be sure it is a person
+at all. He then sees that it is someone, and as the person approaches he
+is inclined to believe him to be an acquaintance. As the supposed
+acquaintance continues to approach, the observer may distinguish certain
+features that cause him to doubt, and then relinquish his supposition
+that it is an acquaintance. Or, he may conclude at once that the
+approaching person is another individual he knows, and the transition
+may be so readily made from one to the other that it would be difficult
+to determine whether the discordant features are discordant before the
+new supposition arises, or whether they are not recognized as
+conflicting till this second person is in mind. Or, again, the
+identification of the new individual and the discovery of the features
+that are in conflict with the first supposition may appear to go on
+together.
+
+Now, marked lines of likeness appear between this relatively simple
+judgment and the far more involved ones of scientific research. In the
+more extended scientific process we find data contradicting an old
+theory and a new hypothesis arising to account for them. The hypothesis
+is tested, and along with its verification we have the rejection, or
+rather the modification, of the old theory. Similarly, in case of the
+approaching stranger all these features are present, though in less
+pronounced degree. In scientific investigation there is an interval of
+testing by means of more careful consideration of the data and even
+actual experimentation. Before an explanation is accepted subject to
+test, a number of others may have been suggested and rejected. They may
+not have received even explicit recognition. In case of the
+identification of the stranger this feature is also present. Between two
+fairly definite attempts to identify the mind does not remain a mere
+blank or stationary, but other possible identifications may be suggested
+which do not have sufficient plausibility to command serious attention;
+they are only comparatively brief suggestions or tendencies.
+
+It is to be noted that in all these instances the first supposition was
+not _entirely_ abandoned, but was modified and more exactly determined.
+(Why it could not be wholly false and the new one wholly new, will be
+considered later in connection with discussion of the persistence and
+re-formation of habit.) There was such a modification of the old theory
+as would meet the requirements of the new data, and the new explanations
+thus contained both old and new features.
+
+We have seen that the predicate of the scientific judgment is a
+hypothesis which is consciously applied to certain data. If the
+similarity between the scientific judgment and the more immediate and
+simple judgment is to be maintained, it is clear that the predicate of
+the simple judgment must be of like nature. The structure of the two
+varieties of judgment differs only in the degree of explicitness which
+the hypothesis acquires. That is, the predicate of a judgment, as such,
+is ideal; it is meaning, significant quality. If conditions are such as
+to make the one judging hesitant or doubtful the mind wavers; the
+predicate is not applied at once to the determination or qualification
+of data, and hence comes to more distinct consciousness on its own
+account. From being "ideal," it becomes _an_ idea. Yet its sole purpose
+and value remains in its possible use to interpret data. Let the idea
+remain detached, and let the query whether it be a true predicate
+(_i. e_., really fit to be employed in determining the present data)
+become more critical, and the idea becomes clearly a hypothesis.[57] In
+other words, the hypothesis is just the predicate-function of judgment
+definitely apprehended and regarded with reference to its nature and
+adequacy.
+
+_Psychological analysis of judgment._--This hypothetical nature of the
+predicate will be even more apparent after a further psychological
+analysis, which, while applying more directly to the simpler and more
+immediate judgments, may be extended to the more involved ones as well.
+
+In psychological terms, we may say, in explanation of the judging
+process, that some stimulus to action has failed to function properly as
+a stimulus, and that the activity which was going on has thus been
+interrupted. Response in the accustomed way has failed. In such a case
+there arises a division in experience into sensation content as subject
+and ideal content as predicate. In other words, an activity has been
+going on in accordance with established habits, but upon failure of the
+accustomed stimulus to be longer an adequate stimulus this particular
+activity ceases, and is resumed in an integral form only when a new
+habit is set up to which the new or altered stimulus is adequate. It is
+in this process of reconstruction that subject and predicate appear.
+Sensory quality marks the point of stress, or seeming arrest, while the
+ideal or imaged aspect defines the continuing activity as projected, and
+hence that with which start is to be made in coping with the obstacle.
+It serves as standpoint of regard and mode of indicated behavior. The
+sensation stands for the interrupted habit, while the image stands for
+the new habit, that is, the new way of dealing with the
+subject-matter.[58]
+
+It appears, then, that the purpose of the judgment is to obtain an
+adequate stimulus in that, when stimulus and response are adjusted to
+each other, activity will be resumed. But if this reconstruction and
+response were to follow at once, would there be any clearly defined act
+of judging at all? In such a case there would be no judgment, properly
+speaking, and no occasion for it. There would be simply a ready
+transition from one line of activity to another; we should have changed
+our method of reaction easily and readily to meet the new requirements.
+On the one hand, our subject-matter would not have become a clearly
+recognized datum with which we must deal; on the other hand, there would
+be no ideal method of construing it.[59] Activity would have changed
+without interruption, and neither subject nor predicate would have
+arisen.
+
+In order that judgment may take place there must be interruption and
+suspense. Under what conditions, then, is this suspense and uncertainty
+possible? Our reply must be that we hesitate because of more or less
+sharply defined alternatives; we are not sure which predicate, which
+method of reaction, is the right one. The clearness with which these
+alternatives come to mind depends upon the degree of explicitness of the
+judgment, or, more exactly, the explicitness of the judgment depends
+upon the sharpness of these alternatives. Alternatives may be carefully
+weighed one against the other, as in deliberative judgments; or they may
+be scarcely recognized as alternatives, as in the case in the greater
+portion of our more simple judgments of daily conduct.
+
+_The predicate is essentially hypothetical._--If we review in a brief
+résumé the types of judgment we have considered, we find in the explicit
+scientific judgment a fairly well-defined subject-matter which we seek
+further to determine. Different suggestions present themselves with
+varying degrees of plausibility. Some are passed by as soon as they
+arise. Others gain a temporary recognition. Some are explicitly tested
+with resulting acceptance or rejection. The acceptance of any one
+explanation involves the rejection of some other explanation. During the
+process of verification or test the newly advanced supposition is
+recognized to be more or less doubtful. Besides the hypothesis which is
+tentatively applied there is recognized the possibility of others. In
+the disjunctive judgment these possible reactions are thought to be
+limited to certain clearly defined alternatives, while in the less
+explicit judgments they are not so clearly brought out. Throughout the
+various forms of judgment, from the most complex and deliberate down to
+the most simple and immediate, we found that a process could be traced
+which was like in kind and varied only in degree. And, finally, in the
+most immediate judgments where some of these features seem to disappear,
+the same account not only appears to be the most reasonable one, but
+there is the additional consideration, from the psychological side, that
+were not the judgment of this doubtful, tentative character, it would be
+difficult to understand how there could be judgment as distinct from a
+reflex. It appears, then, that throughout, the predicate is essentially
+of the nature of a hypothesis for dealing with the subject-matter. And,
+however simple and immediate, or however involved and prolonged, the
+judgment may be, it is to be regarded as essentially a process of
+reconstruction which aims at the resumption of an interrupted
+experience; and when experience has become itself a consciously
+intellectual affair, at the restoration of a unified objective
+situation.
+
+
+II
+
+_Criticism of certain views concerning the hypothesis._--The explanation
+we have given of the hypothesis will enable us to criticise the
+treatment it has received from the empirical and the rationalistic
+schools. We shall endeavor to point out that these schools have, in
+spite of their opposed views, an assumption in common--something given
+in a fixed, or non-instrumental way; and that consequently the
+hypothesis is either impossible or else futile.
+
+Bacon is commonly recognized as a leader in the reactionary inductive
+movement, which arose with the decline of scholasticism, and will serve
+as a good example of the extreme empirical position. In place of
+authority and the deductive method, Bacon advocated a return to nature
+and induction from data given through observation. The new method which
+he advanced has both a positive and a negative side. Before any
+positive steps can be taken, the mind must be cleared of the various
+false opinions and prejudices that have been acquired. This preliminary
+task of freeing the mind from "phantoms," or "eidola," which Bacon
+likened to the cleansing of the threshing-floor, having been
+accomplished, nature should be carefully interrogated. There must be no
+hasty generalization, for the true method "collects axioms from sense
+and particulars, ascending continuously and by degrees, so that in the
+end it arrives at the most general axioms." These axioms of Bacon's are
+generalizations based on observation, and are to be applied deductively,
+but the distinguishing feature of Bacon's induction is its carefully
+graduated steps. Others, too, had proceeded with caution (for instance
+Galileo), but Bacon laid more stress than they on the subordination of
+steps.
+
+It is evident that Bacon left very little room for hypotheses, and this
+is in keeping with his aversion to anticipation of nature by means of
+"phantoms" of any sort; he even said explicitly that "our method of
+discovery in science is of such a nature that there is not much left to
+acuteness and strength of genius, but all degrees of genius and
+intellect are brought nearly to the same level."[60] Bacon gave no
+explanation of the function of the hypothesis; in his opinion it had no
+lawful place in scientific procedure and must be banished as a
+disturbing element. Instead of the reciprocal relation between
+hypothesis and data, in which hypothesis is not only tested in
+experience, but at the same time controls in a measure the very
+experience which tests it, Bacon would have a gradual extraction of
+general laws from nature through direct observation. He is so afraid of
+the distorting influence of conception that he will have nothing to do
+with conception upon any terms. So fearful is he of the influence of
+pre-judgment, of prejudice, that he will have no judging which depends
+upon ideas, since the idea involves anticipation of the fact.
+Particulars are somehow to arrange and classify themselves, and to
+record or register, in a mind free from conception, certain
+generalizations. Ideas are to be registered derivatives of the given
+particulars. This view is the essence of empiricism as a logical theory.
+If the views regarding the logic of thought before set forth are
+correct, it goes without saying that such empiricism is condemned to
+self-contradiction. It endeavors to construct judgment in terms of its
+subject alone; and the subject, as we have seen, is always a
+co-respondent to a predicate--an idea or mental attitude or tendency of
+intellectual determination. Thus the subject of judgment can be
+determined only with reference to a corresponding determination of the
+predicate. Subject and predicate, fact and idea, are contemporaneous,
+not serial in their relations (see pp. 110-12).
+
+Less technically the failure of Bacon's denial of the worth of
+hypothesis--which is in such exact accord with empiricism in
+logic--shows itself in his attitude toward experimentation and toward
+observation. Bacon's neglect of experimentation is not an accidental
+oversight, but is bound up with his view regarding the worthlessness of
+conception or anticipation. To experiment means to set out from an idea
+as well as from facts, and to try to construe, or even to discover,
+facts in accordance with the idea. Experimentation not only anticipates,
+but strives to make good an anticipation. Of course, this struggle is
+checked at every point by success or failure, and thus the hypothesis is
+continuously undergoing in varying ratios both confirmation and
+transformation. But this is not to make the hypothesis secondary to the
+fact. It is simply to remain true to the proposition that the
+distinction and the relationship of the two is a thoroughly
+contemporaneous one. But it is impossible to draw any fixed line between
+experimentation and scientific observations. To insist upon the need of
+systematic observation and collection of particulars is to set up a
+principle which is as distinct from the casual accumulation of
+impressions as it is from nebulous speculation. If there is to be
+observation of a directed sort, it must be with reference to some
+problem, some doubt, and this, as we have seen, is a stimulus which
+throws the mind into a certain attitude of response. Controlled
+observation is inquiry, it is search; consequently it must be search for
+something. Nature cannot answer interrogations excepting as such
+interrogations are put; and the putting of a question involves
+anticipation. The observer does not inquire about anything or look for
+anything excepting as he is after something. This search implies at once
+the incompleteness of the particular given facts, and the
+possibility--that is ideal--of their completion.
+
+It was not long until the development of natural science compelled a
+better understanding of its actual procedure than Bacon possessed.
+Empiricism changed to experimentalism. With experimentalism inevitably
+came the recognition of hypotheses in observing, collecting, and
+comparing facts. It is clear, for instance, that Newton's fruitful
+investigations are not conducted in accordance with the Baconian notion.
+It is quite clear that his celebrated four rules for philosophizing[61]
+are in truth statements of certain principles which are to be observed
+in forming hypotheses. They imply that scientific technique had advanced
+to a point where hypotheses were such regular and indispensable factors
+that certain uniform conditions might be laid down for their use. The
+fourth rule in particular is a statement of the relative validity of
+hypothesis as such until there is ground for entertaining a contrary
+hypothesis.
+
+The subsequent history of logical theory in England is conditioned upon
+its attempt to combine into one system the theories of empiristic logic
+with recognition of the procedure of experimental science. This attempt
+finds its culmination in the logic of John Stuart Mill. Of his interest
+in and fidelity to the actual procedure of experimental science, as he
+saw it, there can be no doubt. Of his good faith in concluding his
+_Introduction_ with the words following there can be no doubt: "I can
+conscientiously affirm that no one proposition laid down in this work
+has been adopted for the sake of establishing, or with any reference for
+its fitness in being employed in establishing, preconceived opinions in
+any department of knowledge or of inquiry on which the speculative world
+is still undecided." Yet Mill was equally attached to the belief that
+ultimate reality, as it is for the human mind, is given in sensations,
+independent of ideas; and that all valid ideas are combinations and
+convenient ways of using such given material. Mill's very sincerity made
+it impossible that this belief should not determine, at every point, his
+treatment of the thinking process and of its various instrumentalities.
+
+In Book III, chap. 14, Mill discusses the logic of explanation, and in
+discussing this topic naturally finds it necessary to consider the
+matter of the proper use of scientific hypotheses. This is conducted
+from the standpoint of their use as that is reflected in the technique
+of scientific discovery. In Book IV, chap. 2, he discusses "Abstraction
+or the Formation of Conceptions"--a topic which obviously involves the
+forming of hypotheses. In this chapter, his consideration is conducted
+in terms, not of scientific procedure, but of general philosophical
+theory, and this point of view is emphasized by the fact that he is
+opposing a certain view of Dr. Whewell.
+
+The contradiction between the statements in the two chapters will serve
+to bring out the two points already made, viz., the correspondent
+character of datum and hypothesis, and the origin of the latter in a
+problematic situation and its consequent use as an instrument of
+unification and solution. Mill first points out that hypotheses are
+invented to enable the deductive method to be applied earlier to
+phenomena; that it does this by suppressing the first of the three
+steps, induction, ratiocination, and verification. He states that:
+
+    The process of tracing regularity in any complicated, and at first
+    sight confused, set of appearances is necessarily tentative; we
+    begin by making any supposition, even a false one, to see what
+    consequences will follow from it; and by observing how these
+    differ from the real phenomena, we learn what corrections to make
+    in our assumption.... _Neither induction nor deduction would
+    enable us to understand even the simplest phenomena_, if we did
+    not often commence by anticipating the results; by making a
+    provisional supposition, at first essentially conjectural, as to
+    some of the very notions which constitute the final object of the
+    inquiry.[62]
+
+If in addition we recognize that, according to Mill, our direct
+experience of nature always presents us with a complicated and confused
+set of appearances, we shall be in no doubt as to the importance of
+ideas as anticipations of a possible experience not yet had. Thus he
+says:
+
+    The order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents at
+    every instant a chaos followed by another chaos. We must decompose
+    each chaos into single facts. We must learn to see in the chaotic
+    antecedent a multitude of distinct antecedents, in the chaotic
+    consequent a multitude of distinct consequents.[63]
+
+In the next section of the same chapter he goes on to state that, having
+discriminated the various antecedents and consequents, we then "are to
+inquire which is connected with which." This requires a still further
+resolution of the complex and of the confused. To effect this we must
+vary the circumstances; we must modify the experience as given with
+reference to accomplishing our purpose. To accomplish this purpose we
+have recourse either to observation or to experiment: "We may either
+_find_ an instance in nature _suited to our purposes_, or, by an
+artificial arrangement of circumstances, _make_ one" (the italics in
+"suited to our purpose" are mine; the others are Mill's). He then goes
+on to say that there is no real logical distinction between observation
+and experimentation. The four methods of experimental inquiry are
+expressly discussed by Mill in terms of their worth in singling out and
+connecting the antecedents and consequents which actually belong
+together, from the chaos and confusion of direct experience.
+
+We have only to take these statements in their logical connection with
+each other (and this connection runs through the entire treatment by
+Mill of scientific inquiry), to recognize the absolute necessity of
+hypothesis to undertaking any directed inquiry or scientific operation.
+Consequently we are not surprised at finding him saying that "the
+function of hypotheses is one which must be reckoned absolutely
+indispensable in science;" and again that "the hypothesis by suggesting
+observations and experiments puts us on the road to independent
+evidence."[64]
+
+Since Mill's virtual retraction, from the theoretical point of view, of
+what is here said from the standpoint of scientific procedure, regarding
+the necessity of ideas is an accompaniment of his criticism of Whewell,
+it will put the discussion in better perspective if we turn first to
+Whewell's views.[65] The latter began by stating a distinction which
+easily might have been developed into a theory of the relation of fact
+and idea which is in line with that advanced in this chapter, and indeed
+in this volume as a whole. He questions (chap. 2) the fixity of the
+distinction between theory and practice. He points out that what we term
+facts are in effect simply accepted inferences; and that what we call
+theories are describable as facts, in proportion as they become
+thoroughly established. A true theory is a fact. "All the great theories
+which have successively been established in the world are now thought of
+as facts." "The most recondite theories when firmly established are
+accepted as facts; the simplest facts seem to involve something of the
+nature of theory."
+
+The conclusion is that the distinction is a historic one, depending upon
+the state of knowledge at the time, and upon the attitude of the
+individual. What is theory for one epoch, or for one inquirer in a given
+epoch, is fact for some other epoch, or even for some other more
+advanced inquirer in the same epoch. It is theory when the element of
+inference involved in judging any fact is consciously brought out; it is
+fact when the conditions are such that we have never been led to
+question the inference involved, or else, having questioned it, have so
+thoroughly examined into the inferential process that there is no need
+of holding it further before the mind, and it relapses into
+unconsciousness again. "If this greater or less consciousness of our own
+internal act be all that distinguishes fact from theory, we must allow
+that the distinction is still untenable" (untenable, that is to say, as
+a fixed separation). Again, "fact and theory have no essential
+difference except in the degree of their _certainty and familiarity_.
+Theory, when it becomes firmly established and steadily lodged in the
+mind becomes fact." (P. 45; italics mine.) And, of course, it is equally
+true that as fast as facts are suspected or doubted, certain aspects of
+them are transferred into the class of theories and even of mere
+opinions.
+
+I say this conception might have been developed in a way entirely
+congruous with the position of this chapter. This would have happened if
+the final distinction between fact and idea had been formulated upon the
+basis simply of the points, "relative certainty and familiarity." From
+this point of view the distinction between fact and idea is one purely
+relative to the doubt-inquiry function. It has to do with the evolution
+of an experience as regards its conscious surety. It has its origin in
+problematic situations. Whatever appears to us as a problem appears as
+contrasted with a possible solution. Whatever objects of thought refer
+particularly to the problematic side are theories, ideas, hypotheses;
+whatever relates to the solution side is surety, unquestioned
+familiarity, fact. This point of view makes the distinctions entirely
+relative to the exigencies of the process of reflective transformation
+of experience.
+
+Whewell, however, had no sooner started in this train of thought than he
+turns his back upon it. In chap. 3 he transforms what he had proclaimed
+to be a relative, historic, and working distinction into a fixed and
+absolute one. He distinguishes between sensations and ideas, not upon a
+genetic basis with reference to establishing the conditions of further
+operation; but with reference to a fundamentally fixed line of
+demarkation between what is passively _given_ to the mind and the
+_activity_ put forth by the mind. Thus he reinstates in its most
+generalized and fixed, and therefore most vicious, form the separation
+which he has just rejected. Sensations are a brute unchangeable element
+of fact which exists and persists independent of ideas; an idea is a
+mode of mental operation which occurs and recurs in an independent
+individuality of its own. If he had carried out the line of thought with
+which he began, sensation as fact would have been that residuum of
+familiarity and certainty which cannot be eliminated, however much else
+of an experience is dissolved in the inner conflict. Idea as hypothesis
+or theory would have been the corresponding element in experience which
+is necessary to redintegrate this residuum into a coherent and
+significant experience.
+
+But since Whewell did not follow out his own line of thought, choosing
+rather to fall back on the Kantian antithesis of sense and thought, he
+had no sooner separated his fact and idea, his given datum and his
+mental relation, than he is compelled to get them together again. The
+idea becomes "a general relation which is imposed upon perception by an
+act of the mind, and which is different from anything which our senses
+directly offer to us" (p. 26). Such conceptions are necessary to connect
+the facts which we learn from our senses into truths. "The ideal
+conception which the mind itself supplies is superinduced upon the facts
+as they are originally presented to observation. Before the inductive
+truth is detected, the facts are there, but they are many and
+unconnected. The conception which the discoverer applies to them gives
+them connection and unity." (P. 42.) All induction, according to
+Whewell, thus depends upon superinduction--imposition upon sensory data
+of certain ideas or general relations existing independently in the
+mind.[66]
+
+We do not need to present again the objections already offered to this
+view: the impossibility of any orderly stimulation of ideas by facts,
+and the impossibility of any check in the imposition of idea upon fact.
+"Facts" and conception are so thoroughly separate and independent that
+any sensory datum is indifferently and equally related to any
+conceivable idea. There is no basis for "superinducing" one idea or
+hypothesis, rather than any other, upon any particular set of data.
+
+In the chapter already referred to upon abstraction, or the formation of
+conceptions, Mill seizes upon this difficulty. Yet he and Whewell have
+one point in common: they both agree in the existence of a certain
+subject-matter which is given for logical purposes quite outside of the
+logical process itself. Mill agrees with Whewell in postulating a raw
+material of pure sensational data. In criticising Whewell's theory of
+superinduction of idea upon fact, he is therefore led to the opposite
+assertion of the complete dependence of ideas as such upon the given
+facts as such--in other words, he is led to a reiteration of the
+fundamental Baconian empiricism; and thus to a virtual retraction of
+what he had asserted regarding the necessity of ideas to fruitful
+scientific inquiry, whether in the way of observation or
+experimentation. The following quotation gives a fair notion of the
+extent of Mill's retraction:
+
+    The conceptions then which we employ for the colligation and
+    methodization of facts, do not develop themselves from within,
+    _but are impressed upon the mind from without_; they are never
+    obtained otherwise than by way of comparison and abstraction, and,
+    in the most important and most numerous cases, are evolved by
+    abstraction _from the very phenomena which it is their office to
+    colligate_.[67]
+
+Even here Mill's sense for the positive side of scientific inquiry
+suffices to reveal to him that the "facts" are somehow inadequate and
+defective, and are in need of assistance from ideas--and yet the ideas
+which are to help out the facts are to be the impress of the unsure
+facts! The contradiction comes out very clearly when Mill says: "The
+really difficult cases are those in which the conception destined to
+create light and order out of darkness and confusion has to be sought
+for among the very phenomena which it afterward serves to arrange."[68]
+
+Of course, there is a sense in which Mill's view is very much nearer the
+truth than is Whewell's. Mill at least sees that "idea" must be relevant
+to the facts or data which it is to arrange, which are to have "light
+and order" introduced into them by means of the idea. He sees clearly
+enough that this is impossible save as the idea develops _within_ the
+same experience in which the "dark and confused" facts are presented. He
+goes on to show correctly enough how conflicting data lead the mind to a
+"confused feeling of an analogy" between the data of the confused
+experience and of some other experience which is orderly (or already
+colligated and methodized); and how this vague feeling, through
+processes of further exploration and comparison of experiences, gets a
+clearer and more adequate form until we finally accept it. He shows how
+in this process we continually judge of the worth of the idea which is
+in process of formation, by reference to its appropriateness to _our
+purpose_. He goes so far as to say: "The question of appropriateness is
+relative to the _particular object we have in view_."[69] He sums up his
+discussion by stating: "We cannot frame good general conceptions
+beforehand. That the conception we have obtained is the one we want can
+only be known when we have _done the work for the sake of which we
+wanted it_."[70]
+
+This all describes the actual state of the case, but it is consistent
+only with a logical theory which makes the distinction between fact and
+hypothesis instrumental in the transformation of experience from a
+confused into an organized form; not with Mill's notion that sensations
+are somehow finally and completely given as ultimate facts, and that
+ideas are mere re-registrations of such facts. It is perfectly just to
+say that the hypothesis is impressed upon the mind (in the sense that
+any notion which occurs to the mind is impressed) _in the course_ of an
+experience. It is well enough, if one define what he means, to say that
+the hypothesis is impressed (that is to say, occurs or is suggested)
+through the medium of given facts, or even of sensations. But it is
+equally true that the _facts_ are presented and that _sensations_ occur
+within the course of an experience which is larger than the bare facts,
+because involving the conflicts among them and the corresponding
+intention to treat them in some fashion which will secure a unified
+experience. Facts get power to suggest ideas to the mind--to
+"impress"--only through their position in an entire experience which is
+in process of disintegration and of reconstruction--their "fringe" or
+feeling of tendency is quite as factual as they are. The fact that "the
+conception we have obtained is the one we want can be known only when we
+have done the work for the sake of which we wanted it," is enough to
+show that it is not bare facts, but facts in relation to want and
+purpose and purpose in relation to facts, which originate the
+hypothesis.
+
+It would be interesting to follow the history of discussion of the
+hypothesis since the time of Whewell and of Mill, particularly in the
+writings of Jevons, Venn, and Bosanquet. This history would refine the
+terms of our discussion by introducing more complex distinctions and
+relations. But it would be found, I think, only to refine, not to
+introduce any fundamentally new principles. In each case, we find the
+writer struggling with the necessity of distinguishing between fact and
+idea; of giving the fact a certain primacy with respect to testing of
+idea and of giving the idea a primacy with respect to the significance
+and orderliness of the fact; and of holding throughout to a relationship
+of idea with fact so intimate that the idea develops only by being
+"compared" with facts (that is, used in construing them), and facts get
+to be known only as they are "connected" through the idea--and we find
+that what is a maze of paradoxes and inconsistencies from an absolute,
+from a non-historic standpoint, is a matter of course the moment
+it is looked at from the standpoint of experience engaged in
+self-transformation of meaning through conflict and reconstitution.
+
+But we can only note one or two points. Jevons's "infinite ballot-box"
+of nature which is absolutely neutral as to any particular conception or
+idea, and which accordingly requires as its correlate the formation of
+every possible hypothesis (all standing in themselves upon the same
+level of probability) is an interesting example of the logical
+consequences of feeling the need of both fact and hypothesis for
+scientific procedure and yet regarding them as somehow arising
+independently of each other. It is an attempt to combine extreme
+empiricism and extreme rationalism. The process of forming hypotheses
+and of deducing their rational consequences goes on at random, because
+the disconnectedness of facts as given is so ultimate that the facts
+suggest one hypothesis no more readily than another. Mathematics, in its
+two forms of measurements as applied to the facts, and of calculation as
+applied in deduction, furnishes Jevons the bridge by which he finally
+covers the gulf which he has first himself created. Venn's theory
+requires little or no restatement to bring it into line with the
+position taken in the text. He holds to the origin of hypothesis in the
+original practical needs of mankind, and to its gradual development into
+present scientific form.[71] He states expressly:
+
+    The _distinction between what is known and what is not known is
+    essential to Logic_, and peculiarly characteristic of it in a
+    degree not to be found in any other science. Inference is the
+    process of passing from one to the other; from facts which we had
+    accepted as premises, to those which we have not yet accepted,
+    _but are in the act of doing so by the very process in question_.
+    No scrutiny of the facts themselves, regarded as objective, can
+    ever detect these characteristics of their greater or less
+    familiarity to our minds. We must introduce also the subjective
+    element if we wish to give any adequate explanation of them.[72]
+
+Venn, however, does not attempt a thoroughgoing statement of logical
+distinctions, relations, and operations, as parts "of the act of passing
+from the unknown to the known." He recognizes the relation of reflection
+to a historic process, which we have here termed "reconstruction," and
+the origin and worth of hypothesis as a tool in the movement, but does
+not carry his analysis to a systematic form.
+
+
+III
+
+_Origin of the hypothesis._--In our analysis of the process of judgment,
+we attempted to show that the predicate arises in case of failure of
+some line of activity going on in terms of an established habit. When
+the old habit is checked through failure to deal with new conditions
+(_i. e._, when the situation is such as to stimulate two habits with
+distinct aims) the problem is to find a new method of response--that is,
+to co-ordinate the conflicting tendencies by building up a single aim
+which will function the existing situation. As we saw that, in case of
+judgment, habit when checked became ideal, an idea, so the new habit is
+first formalized as an ideal type of reaction and is the hypothesis by
+which we attempt to construe new data. In our inquiry as to how this
+formulation is effected, _i. e._, how the hypothesis is developed, it
+will be convenient to take some of the currently accepted statements as
+to their origin, and show how these statements stand in reference to the
+analysis proposed.
+
+_Enumerative induction and allied processes._--It is pointed out by
+Welton[73] that the various ways in which hypotheses are suggested may
+be reduced to three classes, viz., enumerative induction, conversion of
+propositions, and analogy. Under the head of "enumeration" he reminds us
+that "every observed regularity of connection between phenomena suggests
+a question as to whether it is universal." There are numerous instances
+of this in mathematics. For example, it is noticed that 1+3=2^2,
+1+3+5=3^2, 1+3+5+7=4^2, etc.; and one is led to ask whether there is any
+general principle involved, so that the sum of the first _n_ odd numbers
+will be _n_^2, where _n_ is any number, however great. In this early
+form of inductive inference there are two divergent tendencies. One is
+the tendency to complete enumeration. This _tendency_ is clearly
+ideal--it transcends the facts as given. To look for all the cases is
+thus itself an experimental inquiry, based upon a hypothesis which it
+endeavors to test. But in most cases enumeration can be only incomplete,
+and we are able to reach nothing better than probability. Hence the
+other tendency in the direction of an analysis of content in search for
+a principle of connection in the elements in any _one_ case. For if a
+characteristic belonging to a number of individuals suggests a class
+where it belongs to all individuals, it must be that it is found in
+every individual as such. The hypothesis of complete class involves a
+hypothesis as to the character of each individual in the class. Thus a
+hypothesis as to extension transforms itself into one as to intension.
+
+But it is analogy which Welton considers "the chief source from which
+new hypotheses are drawn." In the second tendency mentioned under
+enumerative induction, that is, the tendency to analysis of content or
+intension, we are naturally led to analogy, for in our search for the
+characteristic feature which determines classification among the
+concrete particulars our first step will be an inference by analogy. In
+analogy attention is turned from the number of observed instances to
+their character, and, because particulars have some feature in common,
+they are supposed to be the same in still other respects. While the best
+we can reach in analogy is probability, the arguments may be such as to
+result in a high degree of certainty. The form of the argument is
+valuable in so far as we are able to distinguish between essential and
+nonessential characteristics on which to base our analogy. What is
+essential and what nonessential depends upon the particular end we have
+in view.
+
+In addition to enumerative induction, which Welton has mentioned, it is
+to be noted that there are a number of other processes which are very
+similar to it in that a number of particulars appear to furnish a basis
+for a general principle or method. Such instances are common in
+induction, in instruction, and in methods of proof.
+
+If one is to be instructed in some new kind of labor, he is supposed to
+acquire a grasp of the method after having been shown in a few instances
+how this particular work is to be done; and, if he performs the
+manipulations himself, so much the better. It is not asked why the
+experience of a few cases should be of any assistance, for it seems
+self-evident that an experienced man, a man who has acquired the skill,
+or knack, of doing things, should deal better with all other cases of
+similar nature.
+
+There is something very similar in inductive proofs, as they are called.
+The inductive proof is common in algebra. Suppose we are concerned in
+proving the law of expansion of the binomial theorem. We show by actual
+calculation that, if the law holds good for the _n_th power, it is true
+for the _n_+first power. That is, if it holds for any power, it holds
+for the next also. But we can easily show that it does hold for, say,
+the second power. Then it must be true for the third, and hence for the
+fourth, and so on. Whether this law, though discovered by inductive
+processes, depends on deduction for the conclusiveness of its proof, as
+Jevons holds;[74] whether, as Erdmann[75] contends, the proof is
+thoroughly deductive; or whether Wundt[76] is right in maintaining that
+it is based on an exact analogy, while the fundamental axioms of
+mathematics are inductive, it is clear that in such proofs a few
+instances are employed to give the learner a start in the right
+direction. Something suggests itself, and is found true in this case, in
+the next, and again in the next, and so on. It may be questioned whether
+there is usually a very clear notion of what is involved in the "so on."
+To many it appears to mark the point where, after having been taken a
+few steps, the learner is carried on by the acquired momentum somewhat
+after the fashion of one of Newton's laws of motion. Whether the few
+successive steps are an integral part of the proof or merely serve as
+illustration, they are very generally resorted to. In fact, they are
+often employed where there is no attempt to introduce a general term
+such as _n_, or _k_, or _l_, but the few individual instances are deemed
+quite sufficient. Such, for instance, is the custom in arithmetical
+processes. We call attention to these facts in order to show that
+successive cases are utilized in the course of explanation as an aid in
+establishing the generality of a law.
+
+In geometry we find a class of proofs in which the successive steps seem
+to have great significance. A common proof of the area of the circle
+will serve as a fair example. A regular polygon is circumscribed about
+the circle. Then as the number of its sides are increased its area will
+approach that of the circle, as its perimeter approaches the
+circumference of the circle. The area of the circle is thus inferred to
+be [pi]_R_^2, since the area of the polygon is always (1/2)_R_×
+perimeter, and in case of the circle the circumference = 2[pi]_R_.
+Here again we get under such headway by means of the polygon that we
+arrive at the circle with but little difficulty. Had we attempted the
+transition at once, say, from a circumscribed square, we should
+doubtless have experienced some uncertainty and might have recoiled from
+what would seem a rash attempt; but as the number of the sides of our
+polygon approach infinity--that mysterious realm where many paradoxical
+things become possible--the transition becomes so easy that our polygon
+is often said to have truly become a circle.
+
+Similarly, some statements of the infinitesimal calculus rest on the
+assumption that slight degrees of difference may be neglected. Though
+the more modern theory of limits has largely displaced this attitude in
+calculus and has also changed the method of proof in such geometrical
+problems as the area of the circle, the underlying motive seems to have
+been to make transitions easy, and thus to make possible a continued
+application of some particular method or way of dealing with things.
+
+But granted that this is all true, what has it to do with the origin of
+the hypothesis? It seems likely that the hypothesis may be suggested by
+a few successive instances; but are these to be classed with the
+successive steps in proof to which we have referred? In the first place,
+we attempt to prove our hypothesis because we are not sure it is true;
+we are not satisfied that there are no other tenable hypotheses. But if
+we do test it, is not such test enough? It depends upon how thorough a
+grasp we have of the situation; but, in general, each test case adds to
+its probability. The value of tests lies in the fact that they
+strengthen and tend to confirm our hypothesis by checking the force of
+alternatives. One instance is not sufficient because there are other
+possible incipient hypotheses, or more properly tendencies, and the
+enumeration serves to bring one of these tendencies into prominence in
+that it diminishes other vague and perhaps subconscious tendencies and
+strengthens the one which suddenly appears as the mysterious product of
+genius.
+
+The question might arise why the mere repetition of conflicting
+tendencies would lead to a predominance of one of them. Why would they
+not all remain in conflict and continue to check any positive result? It
+is probably because there never is any absolute equilibrium. The
+successive instances tend to intensify and bring into prominence some
+tendency which is already taking a lead, so to speak. And it may be said
+further in this connection that only as seen from the outside, only as a
+mechanical view is taken, does there appear to be an excluding of
+definitely made out alternatives.
+
+In explanation of the part played by analogy in the origin of
+hypotheses, Welton points out that a mere number of instances do not
+take us very far, and that there must be some "_specification_ of the
+instances as well as numbering of them," and goes on to show that the
+argument by enumerative induction passes readily into one from analogy,
+as soon as attention is turned from the number of the observed instances
+to their character. It is not necessary, however, to pass to analogy
+through enumerative induction. "When the instances presented to
+observation offer immediately the characteristic marks on which we base
+the inference to the connection of S and P, we can proceed at once to an
+inference from analogy, without any preliminary enumeration of the
+instances."[77]
+
+Welton, and logicians generally, regard analogy as an inference on the
+basis of partial identity. Because of certain common features we are led
+to infer a still greater likeness.
+
+Both enumerative induction and analogy are explicable in terms of habit.
+We saw in our examination of enumerative induction that a form of
+reaction gains strength through a series of successful applications.
+Analogy marks the presence of an identical element together with the
+tendency to extend this "partial identity" (as it is commonly called)
+still farther. In other words, in analogy it is suggested that a type of
+reaction which is the same in certain respects may be made similar in a
+greater degree. In enumerative induction we lay stress on the number of
+instances in which the habit is applied. In analogy we emphasize the
+content side and take note of the partial identity. In fact, the
+relation between enumerative induction and analogy is of the same sort
+as that existing between association by contiguity and association by
+similarity. In association by contiguity we think of the things
+associated as merely standing in certain temporal or spatial relations,
+and disregard the fact that they were elements in a larger experience.
+In case of association by similarity we regard the like feature in the
+things associated as a basis for further correction.
+
+In conversion of propositions we try to reverse the direction of the
+reaction, so to speak, and thereby to free the habit, to get a mode of
+response so generalized as to act with a minimum cue. For instance, we
+can deal with A in a way called B, or, in other words, in the same way
+that we did with other things called B. If we say, "Man is an animal,"
+then to a certain extent the term "animal" signifies the way in which we
+regard "man." But the question arises whether we can regard all animals
+as we do man. Evidently not, for the reaction which is fitting in case
+of animals would be only partially applicable to man. With the animals
+that are also men we have the beginning of a habit which, if unchecked,
+would lead to a similar reaction toward all animals, _i. e._, we would
+say: "All animals are men." Man may be said to be the richer concept, in
+that only a part of the reaction which determines an object to be a man
+is required to designate it as an animal. On the other hand, if we start
+with animal, then (except in case of the animals which are men) there is
+lacking the subject-matter which would permit the fuller concept to be
+applied. By supplying the conditions under which animal=man we get a
+reversible habit. The equation of technical science has just this
+character. It represents the maximum freeing or abstraction of a
+predicate _qua_ predicate, and thereby multiplies the possible
+applications of it to subjects of future judgments, and lessens the
+amount of shearing away of irrelevancies and of re-adaptation necessary
+when so used in any particular case.
+
+_Formation and test of the hypothesis._--The formation of the hypothesis
+is commonly regarded as essentially different from the process of
+testing, which it subsequently undergoes. We are said to observe facts,
+invent hypotheses, and _then_ test them. The hypothesis is not required
+for our preliminary observations; and some writers, regarding the
+hypothesis as a formulation which requires a difficult and elaborate
+test, decline to admit as hypotheses those more simple suppositions,
+which are readily confirmed or rejected. A very good illustration of
+this point of view is met with in Wundt's discussion of the hypothesis,
+by an examination of which we hope to show that such distinctions are
+rather artificial than real.
+
+The subject-matter of science, says Wundt,[78] is constituted by that
+which is actually given and that which is actually to be expected. The
+whole content is not limited to this, however, for these facts must be
+supplemented by certain presuppositions, which are not given in a
+factual sense. Such presuppositions are called hypotheses and are
+justified by our fundamental demand for unity. However valuable the
+hypothesis may be when rightly used, there is constant danger of
+illegitimately extending it by additions that spring from mere
+inclinations of fancy. Furthermore, the hypothesis in this proper
+scientific sense must be carefully distinguished from the various
+inaccurate uses, which are prevalent. For instance, hypotheses must not
+be confused with expectations of fact. As cases in point Wundt mentions
+Galileo's suppositions that small vibrations of the pendulum are
+isochronous, and that the space traversed by a falling body is
+proportional to the square of the time it has been falling. It is true
+that such anticipations play an important part in science, but so long
+as they relate to the facts themselves or to their connections, and can
+be confirmed or rejected any moment through observation, they should not
+be classed with those added presuppositions which are used to
+co-ordinate facts. Hence not all suppositions are hypotheses. On the
+other hand, not every hypothesis can be actually experienced. For
+example, one employs in physics the hypothesis of electric fluid, but
+does not expect actually to meet with it. In many cases, however, the
+hypothesis becomes proved as an experienced fact. Such was the course of
+the Copernican theory, which was at first only a hypothesis, but was
+transformed into fact through the evidence afforded by subsequent
+astronomical observation.
+
+Wundt defines a theory as a hypothesis taken together with the facts for
+whose elucidation it was invented. In thus establishing a connection
+between the facts which the hypothesis merely suggested, the theory
+furnishes at the same time partly the foundation (_Begründung_) and
+partly the confirmation (_Bestätigung_) of the hypothesis.[79] These
+aspects, Wundt insists, must be sharply distinguished. Every hypothesis
+must have its _Begründung_, but there can be _Bestätigung_ only in so
+far as the hypothesis contains elements which are accessible to actual
+processes of verification. In most cases verification is attainable in
+only certain elements of the hypothesis. For example, Newton was obliged
+to limit himself to one instance in the verification of his theory of
+gravitation, viz., the movements of the moon. The other heavenly bodies
+afforded nothing better than a foundation in that the supposition that
+gravity decreases as the square of the distance increases enabled him to
+deduce the movements of the planets. The main object of his theory,
+however, lay in the deduction of these movements and not in the proof of
+universal gravity. With the Darwinian theory, on the contrary, the main
+interest is in seeking its verification through examination of actual
+cases of development. Thus, while the Newtonian and the greater part of
+the other physical theories lead to a deduction of the facts from the
+hypotheses, which can be verified only in individual instances, the
+Darwinian theory is concerned in evolving as far as possible the
+hypothesis out of the facts.
+
+Let us look more closely at Wundt's position. We will ask, first,
+whether the distinction between hypotheses and expectations is as
+pronounced as he maintains; and, second, whether the relation between
+_Begründung_ and _Bestätigung_ may not be closer than Wundt would have
+us believe.
+
+As examples of the hypothesis Wundt mentions the Copernican hypothesis,
+Newton's hypothesis of gravitation, and the predictions of the
+astronomers which led to the discovery of Neptune. As examples of mere
+expectations we are referred to Galileo's experiments with falling
+bodies and pendulums. In case of Newton's hypothesis there was the
+assumption of a general law, which was verified after much labor and
+delay. The heliocentric hypothesis of Copernicus, which was invented for
+the purpose of bringing system and unity into the movements of the
+planets, has also been fairly well substantiated. In the discovery of
+Neptune we have, apparently, not the proof of a general law or the
+discovery of further peculiarities of previously known data, but rather
+the discovery of a new object or agent by means of its observed effects.
+In each of these instances we admit that the hypothesis was not readily
+suggested or easily and directly tested.
+
+If we turn to Galileo's pendulum and falling bodies, it is clear first
+of all that he did not have in mind the discovery of some object, as was
+the case in the discovery of Neptune. Did he, then, either contribute to
+the proof of a general law or discover further characteristics of things
+already known in a more general way? Wundt tells us that Galileo only
+determined a little more exactly what he already knew, and that he did
+this with but little labor or delay.
+
+What, then, is the real difference between hypothesis and expectation?
+If we compare Galileo's determination of the law of falling bodies with
+Newton's test of his hypothesis of gravitation, we see that both
+expectation and hypothesis were founded on observation and took the form
+of mathematical formulæ. Each tended to confirm the general law
+expressed in its formula, though there was, of course, much difference
+in the time and labor required. If we compare the Copernican hypothesis
+with Galileo's supposition concerning the pendulum, we find again that
+they agree in regard to general purpose and method, and differ in the
+difficulty of verification. If the experiment with the pendulum only
+substituted exactness for inexactness, did the Copernican theory do
+anything different in _kind_? It is true that the more exact statement
+of the swing of the pendulum was expressed in quantitative form, but
+quantitative statement is no criterion of either the presence or the
+absence of the hypothesis.
+
+Again, we may compare the pendulum with Kepler's laws. What was Kepler's
+hypothesis, that the square of the periodic times of the several planets
+are proportional to the cubes of their mean distances from the sun,
+except a more exact formulation of facts which were already known in a
+more general way? Wundt's position seems to be this: whenever a
+supposition or suggestion can be tested readily, it should not be
+classed as a hypothesis. This would make the distinction one of degree
+rather than kind, and it does not appear how much labor we must expend,
+or how long our supposition must evade our efforts to test it, before it
+can win the title of hypothesis.
+
+In the second place, we have seen that Wundt draws a sharp line between
+_Begründung_ and _Bestätigung_. It is doubtless true that every
+hypothesis requires a certain justification, for unless other facts can
+be found which agree with deductions made in accordance with it, its
+only support would be the data from which it is drawn. Such support as
+this would be obtained through a process too clearly circular to be
+seriously entertained. The distinction which Wundt draws between
+_Begründung_ and _Bestätigung_ is evidently due to the presence of the
+experimental element in the latter. For descriptive purposes this
+distinction is useful, but is misleading if it is understood to mean
+that there is mere experience in one case and mere inference in the
+other. The difference is rather due to the relative parts played by
+inference and by accepted experience in each. In _Begründung_ the
+inferential feature is the more prominent, while in _Bestätigung_ the
+main emphasis is on the experiential aspect. It must not be supposed,
+however, that either of these aspects can be wholly absent. It is
+difficult to understand how any hypothesis can be entertained at all
+unless it meets in some measure the demand with reference to which it
+was invented, viz., a unification of conflicts in experience. And, _in
+so far_, it is confirmed. The motive which casts doubt upon its adequacy
+is the same that leads to its re-forming as a hypothesis, as a mental
+concept.
+
+The difficulties in Wundt's position are thus due to a failure to take
+account of the reconstructive nature of the judgment. The predicate,
+supposition, or hypothesis, whatever we may choose to call it, is formed
+because of the check of a former habit. The judgment is an ideal
+application of a new habit, and its test is the attempt to act in
+accordance with this ideal reconstruction. It must not be thought,
+however, that our supposition is first fully developed and then tried
+and accepted or rejected without modification. On the contrary, its
+growth is the result of successive minor tests and corresponding minor
+modifications in its form. Formation and test are merely convenient
+distinctions in a larger process in which forming, testing, and
+_re_-forming go on together. The activity of experimental verification
+is not only a testing, a confirming or weakening of the validity of a
+hypothesis, but it is equally well an evolution of the _meaning_ of the
+hypothesis through bringing it into closer relations with specific data
+not previously included in defining its import. _Per contra_, a purely
+reflective and deductive consideration which develops the idea as
+hypothesis, _in so far_ as it introduces the determinateness of
+previously accepted facts within the scope, comprehension, or intension
+of the idea, is in so far forth, a verification.
+
+If the view which we have maintained is correct, the hypothesis is not
+to be limited to those elaborate formulations of the scientist which he
+seeks to confirm by crucial tests. The hypothesis of the investigator
+differs from the comparatively rough conjecture of the plain man only in
+its greater precision. Indeed, as we have attempted to show, the
+hypothesis is not a method which we may employ or not as we choose; on
+the contrary, as predicate of the judgment it is present in a more or
+less explicit form if we judge at all. Whether the time and labor
+required for its confirmation or rejection is a matter of a lifetime or
+a moment, its nature remains the same. Its function is identical with
+that of the predicate. In short, the hypothesis is the predicate so
+brought to consciousness and defined that those features which are not
+noticed in the ordinary judgment are brought into prominence. We then
+recognize the hypothesis to be what in fact the predicate always is,
+viz., a method of organization and control.
+
+
+
+
+VIII
+
+IMAGE AND IDEA IN LOGIC
+
+
+The logic of sense-impressions and of ideas as copies of
+sense-impressions has had its day. It engaged in a conflict with
+dogmatism, and scored a decisive victory. It overthrew the dynasty of
+prescribed formulæ and innate ideas, of ideas derived ready-made from
+custom and social usage, ancient enough to be lost in the remote
+obscurity of divine sources; and enthroned in their place ideas derived
+from, and representative of, the sense-experiences of a very real and
+present world. It marked a reaction from dogma back to the original
+meaning of dogma, back to the seeming, the appearance, of things. So
+thoroughly did Bacon and Hobbes, Locke and Hume, to mention only these
+four, do their work, that many of the problems growing out of the
+conflict itself, to say nothing of the scholastic traditions that were
+combated, have come to have merely a historical rather than a logical
+interest. Logic no longer concerns itself very eagerly with the content
+or sensuous qualities of ideas, with their derivation from
+sense-impressions, or with questions as to the relation of copy to
+original, of representative to that which is presented. It is concerned
+rather with the constructive operations of thought, with meaning,
+reference to reality, inference--with intellectual processes. Perhaps in
+no respect is this shifting of logical standpoint indicated more clearly
+than in the unregretful way with which the old logical interest in the
+sense-qualities of ideas is now made over to psychology. States of
+consciousness as such, we are told, are the proper study of psychology;
+whereas logic concerns itself with the relation of thought to its
+object. True, these states of consciousness include thought-states, as
+well as sense-impressions; ideas and concepts, as well as feelings and
+fancies; and the business of psychology is to observe, compare and
+classify, describe and chronicle, these states and whatever else is
+carried along in the stream of consciousness. But logic is concerned,
+not with these states of consciousness _per se_, least of all with the
+flotsam and jetsam of the stream, but with its reference to reality; not
+with the true, but with truth; not even with what consciousness does,
+but with how consciousness is to outdo itself, transcend itself, in a
+rational and universal whole. Even an empirical logic has to arrange
+somehow the way to get from one sense-impression to another.
+
+In drawing this distinction between logic and psychology--a distinction
+which virtually amounts to a separation--two things are overlooked:
+first, that the distinction itself is a logical distinction, and may
+properly constitute a problem falling under the province of logical
+inquiry and theory; and, second, that the rather arbitrary and official
+setting apart of psychology to look after the task of studying states of
+consciousness does not carry with it the guarantee that psychology will
+confine itself exclusively to that task. This last point in particular
+must be my excuse for discussing the question of image and idea from the
+psychological rather than from the logical standpoint. The logic of
+ideas derived from sense-impressions has had its day. But even the very
+leavings of the past may have been gathered up and reconstructed by
+psychology in such a way as to anticipate some of the newer developments
+of logical theory and meet some of its difficulties. One can hardly hope
+to justify in advance a discussion based on such a sheer possibility.
+Let us begin, rather, by noting down from the standpoint of logic some
+of the distinctions between image and idea, and the estimate of the
+logical function and value of mental imagery, and see in what direction
+they take us and whether they suggest a resort to an analysis from the
+standpoint of psychology.
+
+Proceeding from the standpoint of logic to inquire into the logical
+function of mental imagery and into the distinction between image and
+idea, we shall come upon two opposed but characteristic answers. If the
+inquiry be directed to a member of the empirical school of logic, he
+would be bound to answer in the affirmative, so far as the question
+regarding the function of mental imagery is concerned. He would be
+likely to say, if he were loyal to the traditions of his school, that
+mental imagery is the counterpart of sense-perception, and is thus the
+representative of the data with which empirical logic is concerned.
+Mental imagery, he would continue, is a representative in a literal
+sense, a copy, a reflection, of what comes to us through the avenues of
+sensation. True, it is not the perfect twin of sense-experience; else we
+could not tell them apart; indeed, there are times when the copy becomes
+so much like the original that we are deceived by it, as in dreams or in
+hallucinations. Ordinarily, however, we are able to distinguish one from
+the other. Two criteria are usually present; (1) imagery is fainter,
+more fleeting, than the corresponding sense-experience; and (2), save in
+the case of accurate memory-images, it is subject to a more or less
+arbitrary rearrangement of its parts, as when, for example, we make over
+the images of scenes we have actually experienced, to furnish forth the
+setting of some remote historical event.
+
+Barring, or controlling and rectifying, its tendencies toward both
+arbitrary and constructive variations from the original, mental imagery
+is on the same level as sense-experience, and serves the same logical
+purpose. That is to say, it contributes to the data which constitute the
+foundations of empirical logic. It furnishes materials for the
+operations of observing, comparing, abstracting and generalizing.
+Mental imagery helps to piece out the fragments that may be presented to
+sense-experience. It supplies the entire anatomy when only a single
+bone, say, is actually given. Yet, however useful as a servant of truth,
+it has to be carefully watched, lest its spontaneous tendency to vary
+the actual order and coexistence of data lead the investigator astray.
+The copy it presents is, after all, a temporary makeshift, until it can
+be shown to correspond point for point to the now absent reality. Mental
+imagery furnishes one with an illustrated edition of the book of nature,
+but the illustrations await the confirmation of comparison with the
+originals.
+
+Mental imagery functions logically when it extends the area of data
+beyond the range of the immediate sense-perceptions of any given time,
+and thus makes possible a more comprehensive application of the
+empirical methods of observation, comparison, abstraction, and
+generalization. It functions logically when it acts as a feeder of
+logical machinery, though it is not indispensable to this machinery and
+does not modify its principles. The logical mill could grind up in the
+same way the pure grain of sense-perceptions, unmixed with mental
+images, but it would have to grind more slowly for lack of material. In
+other words, empirical logic could carry on its operations of observing,
+comparing, abstracting, and generalizing, solely on the basis of objects
+or data present to the senses, and with no extension of this basis in
+terms of imagery, or copies of objects not immediately present; but it
+would take more time for it to apply and carry through its operations.
+The logical machinery is the same in each case. The materials fed and
+the product issuing are the same in each case. Imagery simply fulfils
+the function of providing a more copious grist.
+
+The empiricist's answer to our question regarding the logical function
+of mental imagery leaves that function in an uncertain and parlous
+state. Imagery lacks the security of sense-perception on the one hand,
+and it has no part in the operation of thought on the other. It is a
+sort of hod-carrier, whose function it is to convey the raw materials of
+sense-perception to a more exalted position where someone else does all
+the work. I suppose this could be called a functional interpretation of
+a logical element. The question, then, would be whether an element so
+functioning is in any sense logical. As an element lying outside of the
+thought-process it owes no responsibility to logic; it is not amenable
+to its regulations. Thought simply finds it expedient to operate with an
+agent over which it has no intrinsic control. The case might be allowed
+to rest here. Yet were this extra-logical element of imagery to abandon
+thought, all conscious thinking as opposed to sense-perception would
+cease. A false alarm, perhaps. Imagery may be so constituted that it is
+inseparably subordinated to thought and can never abandon it. Thought
+may simply exude imagery. But imagery somehow has to represent
+sense-perception, also. It can hardly be a secretion of thought and a
+copy of sense-perceptions at one and the same time, unless the
+empiricist is willing to turn absolute idealist! Before taking such a
+desperate plunge as this, it might be desirable to see whether there is
+any other recourse.
+
+There is another and a very different answer to the question regarding
+the logical function of mental imagery. To distinguish this answer from
+that of the associationist or empiricist, I will call it the answer of
+the conceptualist. I am not at all positive that this label would stick
+even to those to whom it might be applied with considerable
+justification. The terms "rationalistic" and "transcendental" might be
+preferred in opposition to the term "empirical." And we have the term
+"apperceptionist" in opposition to the term "associationist." If the
+term "conceptualist" is admissible, it should be brought down to date,
+perhaps, by making it "neo-conceptualist." The present difficulties
+regarding terminology would be eased considerably if we only had a
+convenient set of derivatives made from the word "meaning." Since we
+have not, I will use derivatives made from the word "concept" to denote
+views opposite to those held by the empirical school.
+
+The conceptualist could be depended upon to answer our question in the
+negative. Logical functions begin where the image leaves off. They begin
+with the _idea_, with meaning. The conceptualist distinguishes sharply
+between the image as a psychical existence and the idea, or concept, as
+logical meaning. On the one hand, you have the "image," not only as a
+mere psychical existence, but a mocking existence at that, fleeting,
+inconstant, shifting, never perhaps twice alike; yet, mind you, an
+_existence_, a _fact_--that must be admitted. On the other hand, you
+have the "idea," with "a fixed content or logical meaning,"[80] which is
+referred by an act of judgment to a reality beyond the act.[81]
+
+The "idea," the logical meaning, begins where the "image" leaves off.
+Does this mean that the "idea" is wholly independent of the "image"? Yes
+and no. The "idea" is independent of that which is ordinarily regarded
+as the special characteristic of an "image," namely, its quality, its
+sense-content. That is to say, the "idea" is independent of any
+particular "image," any special embodiment of sense-content. Any image
+will do. As Mr. Bosanquet remarks in comparing the psychical images that
+pass through our minds to a store of signal flags:
+
+    Not only is it indifferent whether your signal flag of today is
+    the same bit of cloth that you hoisted yesterday, but also, no one
+    knows or cares whether it is clean or dirty, thick or thin, frayed
+    or smooth, as long as it is distinctly legible as an element of
+    the signal code. Part of its content, of its attributes and
+    relations, is a fixed index which carries a distinct reference;
+    all the rest is nothing to us, and, except in a moment of idle
+    curiosity, we are unaware that it exists.[82]
+
+On the other hand, the "idea" could not operate as an idea, could not be
+in consciousness, save as it involves some imagery, however old, dirty,
+thin, and frayed. Take the statement, "The angles of a triangle are
+equal to two right angles." If the statement means anything to a given
+individual, if it conveys an idea, it must necessarily involve some form
+of imagery, some qualitative or conscious content. But so far as the
+_meaning_ is concerned, it is a matter of complete indifference as to
+_what_ qualities are involved. These qualities may be in terms of
+visual, auditory, tactual, kinæsthetic, or verbal imagery. The
+individual may visualize a blackboard drawing of a triangle with its
+sides produced, or he may imagine himself to be generating a triangle
+while revolving through an angle of 180°. Any imagery anyone pleases may
+be employed, so long as there goes with it somehow the _idea_ of the
+relation of equality between the angles of a triangle and two right
+angles. But the conceptualist does not stop here. The act of judgment
+comes in to affirm that the "idea" is no mere idea, but is a quality of
+the real. "The act [of judgment] attaches the floating adjective [the
+idea, the logical meaning] to the nature of the world, and, at the same
+time, tells one it was there already."[83] The "idea," the logical
+meaning, begins where the "image" leaves off. Yet, somehow, the "idea"
+could not begin, unless there were an "image" to leave off.
+
+An "image" is not an "idea," says the conceptualist. An "idea" is not an
+"image." (1) An "image" is not an "idea," because an "image" is a
+particular, individual fragment of consciousness. It is so bound up
+with its own existence that it cannot reach out to the existence of an
+"idea," or to anything beyond itself. Chemically speaking, it is an
+_avalent_ atom of consciousness, if such a thing is thinkable. Mr.
+Bosanquet raises the question:
+
+    Are there at all ideas which are not symbolic?... The answer is
+    that _(a)_ in judgment itself the idea can be distinguished _qua_
+    particular in time or psychical fact, and _so far_ is not
+    symbolic; and _(b)_ in all those human experiences from which we
+    draw our conjectures as to the animal intelligence, when in
+    languor or in ignorance image succeeds image without conscious
+    judgment, we feel what it is to have ideas as facts and not as
+    symbols.[84]
+
+(2) An "idea" is not an "image," because an idea _is_ meaning, which
+consists in a part of the content of the image, cut off, and considered
+apart from the _existence_ of the content or sign itself.[85] This
+meaning, this fragment of psychical existence, lays down all claim to
+existence on its own account, that it may refer through an act of
+judgment to a reality beyond itself and beyond the act also. An "image"
+is not an "idea" and an "idea" is not an "image," because an "image"
+exists only as a quality, a sense-content, whereas an "idea" exists only
+as a relation, a reference to reality beyond. "On the one hand," to
+recall Bradley's antinomy, "no possible idea [as a psychical image] can
+be that which it means.... On the other hand, no idea [as logical
+signification] is anything but just what it means."
+
+There is a significant point of agreement between the conceptualist and
+the empiricist. Both regard imagery as on the level with
+sense-perception. For the empiricist, as we have seen, the fact that
+imagery may be compelled to serve as a yoke-fellow of sense-experience
+constitutes its logical value. For the conceptualist, however, the
+association of imagery with sense-experience is of no logical
+consequence whatsoever, save as it may help to intensify the distinction
+between imagery and meaning. To quote again from Bradley:
+
+    For logical purposes the psychological distinction of idea and
+    sensation may be said to be irrelevant, while the distinction of
+    idea and fact is vital. The image, or psychological idea, is for
+    logic nothing but a sensible reality. It is on a level with the
+    mere sensations of the senses. For both are facts and neither are
+    meanings. Neither are cut from a mutilated presentation and fixed
+    as a connection. Neither are indifferent to their place in the
+    stream of psychical events, their time and their relations to the
+    presented congeries. Neither are adjectives to be referred from
+    their existence, to live on strange soils, under other skies, and
+    through changing seasons. The lives of both are so entangled with
+    their environment, so one with their setting of sensuous
+    particulars, that their character is destroyed if but one thread
+    is broken.[86]
+
+This point of agreement between conceptualism and empiricism, this
+placing of imagery and sense-experience on a common level, serves to
+bring into relief fundamental differences between the two schools of
+thought; fundamental, because they have to do with the nature of reality
+itself. The conceptualist in his zealous endeavor to distinguish between
+imagery and logical meaning has come perilously near driving imagery
+into the arms of reality. It is the opportunity of empiricism to make
+them one. How can conceptualism prevent the union? Has it not disarmed
+itself? The act of judgment, which includes within itself logical
+meaning as predicate, refers to a reality beyond the act. Both imagery
+and reality, then, lie outside of the act of judgment! What alliance, or
+_mésalliance_, may they not form, one with the other?
+
+The difficulties we have noted thus far in the discussion are due to a
+large extent, I believe, to incomplete psychological analysis of
+logical machinery. The empiricist has not carried the psychology of
+logic as far as the conceptualist, although the latter might be the
+loudest to disclaim the honor. I will not try to prove this statement,
+but simply give it as a reason why, in the interest of brevity, I shall
+pass with little comment over the psychological shortcomings and
+contributions of empirical logic, and devote what space remains to the
+psychology implicitly worked out by conceptual logic, and to its
+possible development, with special reference, of course, to the problem
+of the logical function of imagery.
+
+The logical distinction, which practically amounts to a separation
+between imagery and meaning, is the counterpart of the psychological
+distinction between stimulus and response, between the two poles of
+sensori-motor activity, where the stimulus is defined in consciousness
+in the form of imagery, in the form of sense-qualities centrally
+excited, and where the response is directed and controlled _via_ this
+imagery, so as to function in bringing some end, project, purpose, or
+ideal, nearer to realization, some problem nearer to solution.
+
+Psychologically, there is no break between image and response, between
+thought and action. The stimulus is a condition of action, in both
+senses of the ambiguity of the word "condition." (1) It _is_ action; it
+is a state or condition of action. (2) It is also an initiation of
+action. _If_ the appropriate stimulus, then the desired action. The
+response to an image is the meaning of the image. Or, the response to
+any stimulus _via_ an image--mediated, controlled or directed by an
+image--is the meaning of that image. The less imagery involved in any
+response, the greater the presumption in favor of the belief that the
+response is either an instinctive impulse or else has become a habit of
+mind, an adequate idea. The reduction and loss of sense-content which an
+image may undergo--the wearing away of an image, it is sometimes
+called--is not a sign that this sense-content has no logical function;
+but rather that it has fulfilled a logical function so well that it has
+made part of itself useless. The husk, to recall one of Mr. Bradley's
+comparisons, that useless husk, tends to fall away, to lapse from
+consciousness, after it has served the purpose of helping to bring the
+kernel of truth to fruition.
+
+This raises again the original question as to whether the sense-content,
+the quality, the existential quality, of an image has a logical
+function. I will ask first whether it has a function from the standpoint
+of psychology. We will agree with the empiricist that the content of an
+image is representative, that it is a return, a revival, of a
+sense-content previously experienced through the activity of
+sense-organs stimulated from the periphery. What is the function, then,
+of the representative image? Sensation, quality, as we have implied
+above, is the stimulus come to consciousness. To explain how a stimulus
+can "come" to consciousness is a problem I will not attempt to go into
+here. I assume as a fact that there are times when we know what we are
+about; when we are conscious of the stimuli, or conditions of action,
+which are tending in this direction or in that, and when through this
+consciousness we exercise a controlling influence over action by
+selecting and reinforcing certain stimuli and suppressing or inhibiting
+others. It is true that we do not always realize to how great an extent
+our actions are controlled by stimuli which do not come to
+consciousness, by reflexes, instincts, and habits which do not rise
+above the threshold of imagery. And when this vast complex of hidden
+machinery is partly revealed to us, it may either cause the beholder to
+take a materialistic, mechanical, or fatalistic view of existence, to
+say that we are the victims of our own machinery, or else it may induce
+the other extreme of more or less mystic pronouncements regarding the
+province of the subconscious, of the subliminal self; thus out of
+partial views, out of half-truths, metaphysical problems arise and arm
+for mutual conflict. Nevertheless, there is a presumption, amounting in
+most minds to a conviction, that we do at times consciously control some
+of our actions. And it is only making this conviction a little more
+explicit to say that we consciously control our actions through becoming
+aware of the stimuli, or conditions of action, and through selecting and
+reinforcing them.
+
+Is it begging the question to speak of consciousness as exercising a
+selective function with reference to stimuli? From the standpoint of
+psychology, I cannot see that it is. No characteristic of consciousness
+has been more clearly made out, both reflectively and experimentally,
+than its selective function, than its ability to pick out and intensify
+within certain limits the stimuli or conditions of action.
+
+The representational image is a stimulus come to consciousness in the
+same way that a sensation is a stimulus come to consciousness. It is
+both a direct and an indirect stimulus. The terms "direct" and
+"indirect" are used as relative solely to the demands of the particular
+situation out of which they arise. By direct stimulus I mean a stimulus
+which initiates with almost no appreciable delay the response or
+attitude appropriate to the demands of a given situation, bridging the
+difficulties, removing the obstacles, or solving the problem with the
+minimum of conscious reflection. As an image becomes more and more of a
+working symbol, an idea, it tends to become simply a direct stimulus.
+
+By an "indirect stimulus" is meant a stimulus initiating a response
+which, if not inhibited, would be irrelevant to the situation, yet which
+may represent stimuli which are not found in the immediate field of
+sense-perception, and which are essential to the carrying on of the
+activity. The situation is a problematic one. Acquired habits or mental
+adjustments break down at some point or fail to operate smoothly, either
+owing to the absence of customary stimuli or to the presence of new and
+untried conditions of action. Part of the stress of meeting such a
+situation as this falls on the side of discovering appropriate stimuli
+and part on the side of developing out of habits already acquired new
+methods of response.
+
+In such a situation as this, imagery may function on the side of
+_stimulus_ when, taking its cue from the stimuli which are actually
+present, and which grow out of the strain and friction, it represents
+the missing conditions of action sufficiently to direct a search for
+them. It projects a map, so to speak, in which the fragmentary
+conditions immediately present to sense-perception may find their
+bearings, or in which in some way the missing members may be discovered.
+A familiar instance of this would be the experience one sometimes has in
+trying to recall the forgotten name of an acquaintance. The images of
+scenes associated with the acquaintance, of various letters and sounds
+of words associated with his name, which may be called to mind, do not
+function so much as direct stimuli as they do as intermediate or
+indirect stimuli. It is a case of casting about for the image that will
+function as a direct stimulus in bringing an acquired but temporarily
+lost adjustment into play.
+
+Image functions on the side of _response_, on the side of developing new
+habits, new forms of adjustment, in so far as the conditions of action
+which it represents, or projects, are not the actual conditions of
+action, either because they are so inaccessible as to demand development
+of new habits for purposes of attaining them, or else because, though
+actually present, they stimulate relatively uncontrolled æsthetic or
+emotional responses, whose very expression, however, may be translated
+into a demand for more adequate, intelligent, controlled habits or
+adjustments. The conscious projection of the unattained, even of the
+unattainable, not only marks a certain degree of attainment, but is the
+initiation of further development. Here we see again that a stimulus is
+a condition of action in both senses of the ambiguity of the word
+"condition." It is both a state or condition of activity, and an
+initiation or condition of further activity.
+
+As an indirect stimulus growing out of a problematic situation imagery
+necessarily brings in more or less irrelevant material. If I may be
+permitted the paradox, imagery would not be relevant if it did not bring
+in the irrelevant. The novelty of the situation makes it impossible to
+say in advance what will be relevant. Hence the demand for range and
+play of imagery. It is only the successful adjustment finally hit upon
+and worked out that is the test of the relevancy of the imagery which
+anticipated it. Even this test may be unfair, since it is likely to
+discount the value of imagery which is now ruled out, but which may have
+been indispensable in turning up the proper cues in the course of the
+process of reflection and experiment.
+
+To restate the point in regard to the psychological function of imagery.
+Imagery functions in representing control as ideal, not as fact. It
+represents a possible process of reconstructing adjustments and habits;
+it is not an actual and complete readjustment. It arises normally in a
+stress, in the presence of fresh demands and new problems. It looks
+forward in every possible direction, because it is important and
+difficult to foresee consequences. But suppose the new adjustment to be
+made with reasonable success--reasonable, note. Suppose the ideal to be
+realized. With practice the adjustment becomes less problematic, more
+under control--that is, it comes to require less conscious attention to
+bring it about. The image loses some of its sensuous content. It becomes
+worn away, more remote, until at last it becomes respectably vague and
+abstract enough to be classed as a concept. Imagery is the stimulus of
+the reconstructive process between habit and habit, concept and concept,
+idea and idea.
+
+We now return to the original question regarding the logical function of
+imagery. There is only one condition, I believe, on which we can accept
+the assumption of both empiricist and conceptualist that imagery is on
+the same level with sense-perception, and that is the assumption that
+meaning, logical meaning, is on the same level with habit, habit naming
+the more obvious, overt forms of response to stimuli, logical meaning
+naming the more internal forms of response or reference. Psychical
+response and logical reference thus become equivalent terms.
+
+We have seen that imagery may exercise two functions with reference to
+habit, as direct and as indirect stimulus; so also with reference to
+logical meaning, imagery may be the stimulus to a direct reference of
+the idea to reality, or it may present, or mirror, conditions with
+regard to which some new meaning is to be worked out. The quality, the
+sense-content, of imagery may _per se_ suffice directly to arouse a
+habitual attitude, to call forth an immediate reference to reality. It
+may cause one to "tumble" to what is taking place, to "catch on," to
+apprehend (pardon these expressions for the sake of their description of
+the motor aspect of meaning), as when we say, for example: "It came over
+me like a flash what I was to do, and I did it." Our more abstract and
+complicated forms of judgment and reasoning, in which the imagery
+involved is reduced to the minimum of conscious, qualitative content,
+are of the same order, though at the other extreme, so far as immediate
+overt expression is concerned. We are working along lines of habitual
+activity so familiar that we can work almost in the dark. We need no
+elaborate imagery. Guided only by the waving of a signal flag or by the
+shifting gleam of a semaphore, we thread our way swiftly through the
+maze of tracks worn smooth by use and habit. But suppose a new line of
+habit is to be constructed. No signal flags or semaphores will suffice.
+A detailed survey of the proposed route must be had, and here is where
+imagery with a rich and varied yet flexible sensuous content, growing
+out of previous surveys, may function in projecting and anticipating the
+new set of conditions, and thus become the stimulus of a new line of
+habit, of a new and more far-reaching meaning. As this new line of
+habit, of meaning, gets into working order with the rest of the system,
+imagery tends normally to decline again to the rôle of signal flags and
+semaphores.
+
+The distinction in logical theory between "image" and "idea" which we
+have been considering is only a half-truth from the point of view of
+psychology. It virtually limits the "idea" to a fixed, unalterable
+reference of a fragment of a desiccated image to a reality beyond. It
+indifferently loses the play and richness of imagery to the floating
+remnants of sense-content, or to an external reality. It limits itself
+to an examination of a final stage in thinking, a stage in which the
+image acts as a direct stimulus, a stage in which the sense-content of
+the image has little or no function _per se_, because this content now
+initiates directly a habitual adjustment, a worked-out and established
+adaptation of means to end. It overlooks the process of conscious
+reflection which logically precedes every such adjustment not purely
+instinctive or accidental, a process in which imagery as
+representational functions indirectly in bringing the resources of past
+experience, the fund of acquired habits, to bear upon the fragmentary
+and problematic elements of sense-experience actually present, thus
+maintaining the flow and continuity of experience. It fails to recognize
+that in the inseparable association of meaning with quality, of "idea"
+with "image," there goes the possibility of working out and applying
+new meanings from old, of developing deeper meanings, of testing and
+affirming more inclusive and universal meaning.
+
+We are confronted with this alternative. Either the image has a logical
+function in virtue of its sense-content, or else the image functions
+logically merely as a symbol, the sense-content of which is a matter of
+complete logical indifference. According to the empiricist, the former
+is the case, according to the conceptualist, the latter. The empiricist
+would say that he needs the image to piece out the data upon which
+logical processes operate. Having met this need, the image is retired
+from active service. For the empiricist the processes of thought,
+observing, comparing, generalizing, etc., are as independent of the data
+they use as, for the conceptualist, logical meaning, reference, and
+"idea" are independent of the sense-content of the "image." In reality
+he agrees with the conceptualist in excluding the sense-content of the
+image from the processes of thought, and hence from the domain of logic.
+
+From the standpoint of psychological theory the conceptualist is an
+improvement over the empiricist. He has gone a step farther in the
+analysis of thought-processes by showing that they are bound up with
+some kind of imagery, however irrelevant, inconsequential, and worn down
+the sense-quality of that imagery may be. His statement of ideas as
+references to reality lends itself readily, as we have seen, to the
+unitary conception in psychology of ideo-motor, or sensori-motor,
+activity. But is this where logical theory is to stop, while psychology
+as a study of "states of consciousness" takes up the unfinished tale and
+carries it forward? It seems hardly possible, unless logic is willing to
+give over its task of thinking about thinking.
+
+Reduce the image to a mere symbol. Let its sense-quality be a matter of
+complete indifference. What have you, then, but an elementary and
+primitive type of reflex action? It is of no particular consequence even
+from what sense-organ it appears to proceed, or whether it appears to be
+peripherally or centrally excited. It is simply a case of feel and act;
+touch and go. Is this thinking? It may be regarded as either the germ or
+the finality of thinking, but what most of us are inclined to believe is
+the true subject-matter of logic is not to be limited to a simple
+reflex, or even to a chain of reflexes. It is something more complex,
+even if nothing more than an intricate tangle of chains of reflexes.
+
+The complexity of the process called thinking does not reside alone in
+the instinctive or habitual reflexes involved. The more instinctive and
+habitual any adjustment may be, the less is it a matter of thought, as
+everyone knows, although its biological complexity is none the less
+patent to one who looks at it from the outside. The complexity of the
+thinking process resides in consciousness also; it resides in the
+imagery, the stimuli, the mere symbols, if you like, that have "come" to
+consciousness. As soon as the complexity begins to be _felt_, as soon as
+any discrimination whatsoever begins to be introduced or appreciated, at
+that instant the sense-content, the quale, of imagery begins to have a
+logical function. Conscious discrimination, however vague and
+evanescent, and the logical function of the quale of imagery are born
+together, unless one chooses to regard the more obvious and deliberate
+forms of conscious discrimination as more characteristic of a logical
+process. It is only as the sense-contents of various images are
+discriminated and compared that anything like thinking can be conceived
+to go on. The particular sense-content of an image, instead of being a
+matter of logical indifference, is the condition, the possibility, of
+thinking.
+
+The conceptualist has contributed to the data of descriptive psychology
+by calling attention, by implication at least, to the remote and
+reduced character of the imagery which may characterize thinking. But it
+by no means follows that the more remote and reduced the sense-content
+of an image becomes, the less important is that sense-content for
+thinking, the less demand for discrimination. On the contrary, the
+sense-content that remains may be of supreme logical importance. It may
+be the quintessence of meaning. It may be the conscious factor which,
+when discriminated from another almost equally sublimated conscious
+factor, may determine a whole course of action. The delicacy and
+rapidity with which these reduced forms of imagery as they hover about
+the margin of consciousness or flit across its focus are discriminated
+and caught, are points in the technique of that long art of
+thinking, begun in early childhood. The fact that questionnaire
+investigations--like that of Galton's, for example--have in many
+instances failed to discover in the minds of scientists and advanced
+thinkers a rich and varied furniture of imagery does not argue the
+poverty of imagery in such minds; it argues, rather, a highly developed
+technique, a species of virtuosity, with reference to the sense-content
+of the types of imagery actually in use.
+
+To push a step farther the alternative we have already stated in a
+preliminary way: Either the "idea," or "logical meaning," lies outside
+of the process of thinking, as a mere impulse or reflex; or else, in
+virtue of the sense-content of its "image," it enters into that
+conscious process of discrimination, comparison, and selection, of light
+and shade, of doubt and inquiry, which constitutes the evolution of a
+judgment, which makes the life-history of a movement of thought.
+
+
+
+
+IX
+
+THE LOGIC OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY[87]
+
+
+It is not the purpose of this study to show that the Pre-Socratics
+possessed a system of logic which is now for the first time brought to
+the notice of the modern world. Indeed, there is nothing to indicate
+that they had reflected on mental processes in such a way as to call for
+an organized body of canons regulating the forms of concepts and
+conclusions. Aristotle attributed the discovery of the art of dialectic
+to Zeno the Eleatic, and we shall see in the sequel that there was much
+to justify the opinion. But logic, in the technical sense, is
+inconceivable without concepts, and from the days of Aristotle it has
+been universally believed that proper definitions owe their origin to
+Socrates. A few crude attempts at definition, if such they may be
+rightly called, are referred to Empedocles and Democritus. But in so far
+as they were conceived in the spirit of science, they essayed to define
+things materially by giving, so to speak, the chemical formula for their
+production. Significant as this very fact is, it shows that even the
+rudiments of the canons of thought were not the subjects of reflection.
+
+In his _Organon_ Aristotle makes it evident that the demand for a
+regulative art of scientific discourse was created by the eristic
+logic-chopping of those who were most deeply influenced by the Eleatic
+philosophy. Indeed, the case is quite parallel to the rise of the art of
+rhetoric. Aristotle regarded Empedocles as the originator of that art,
+as he referred the beginnings of dialectic to Zeno. But the formulation
+of both arts in well-rounded systems came much later. As men conducted
+lawsuits before the days of Tisias and Corax, so also were the essential
+principles of logic operative and effective in practice before Aristotle
+gave them their abstract formulation.
+
+While it is true, therefore, that the Pre-Socratics had no formal logic,
+it is equally true, and far more significant, that they either received
+from their predecessors or themselves developed the conceptions and the
+presuppositions on which the Aristotelian logic is founded. One of the
+objects of this study is to institute a search for some of these basic
+conceptions of Greek thought, almost all of which existed before the
+days of Socrates, and to consider their origin as well as their logical
+significance. The other aim here kept in view is to trace the course of
+thought in which the logical principles, latent in all attempts to
+construct and verify theories, came into play.
+
+It is impossible, no doubt, to discover a body of thought which does not
+ground itself upon presuppositions. They are the warp into which the
+woof of the system, itself too often consisting of frayed ends of other
+fabrics, is woven with the delight of a supposed creator. Rarely is the
+thinker so conscious of his own mental processes that he is aware of
+what he takes for granted. Ordinarily this retirement to an interior
+line takes place only when one has been driven back from the advanced
+position which could no longer be maintained. Emerson has somewhere
+said: "The foregoing generations beheld God and Nature face to face; we
+through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to
+the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight
+and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us and not the
+history of theirs?" The difficulty lies precisely in our faith in
+immediate insight and revelation, which are themselves only short-cuts
+of induction, psychological short circuits, conducted by media we have
+disregarded. Only a fundamentally critical philosophy pushes its doubt
+to the limit of demanding the credentials of those conceptions which
+have come to be regarded as axiomatic.
+
+The need of going back of Aristotle in our quest for the truth is well
+shown by his attitude toward the first principles of the several
+sciences. To him they are immediately given--[Greek: amesoi
+protaseis]--and hence are ultimate _a priori_. The historical
+significance of this fact is already apparent. It means that in his day
+these first principles, which sum up the outcome of previous inductive
+movements of thought, were regarded as so conclusively established that
+the steps by which they had been inferred were allowed to lapse from
+memory.
+
+No account of the history of thought can hope to satisfy the demands of
+reason that does not _explain_ the origin of the convictions thus
+embodied in principles. The only acceptable explanation would be in
+terms of will and interest. To give such an account would, however,
+require the knowledge of secular pursuits and ambitions no longer
+obtainable. It might be fruitful of results if we could discover even
+the theoretical interests of the age before Thales; but we know that in
+modern times the direction of interest characteristic of the purely
+practical pursuits manifests its reformative influences in speculation a
+century or more after it has begun to shape the course of common life.
+Hence we might misinterpret the historical data if they were obtainable.
+But general considerations, which we need not now rehearse, as well as
+indications contained in the later history of thought, hereinafter
+sketched, point to the primacy of the practical as yielding the
+direction of interest that determines the course it shall take.
+
+It was said above that the principles of science are the result of an
+inductive movement, and that the inductive movement is directed by an
+interest. Hence the principles are contained in, or rather are the
+express definition of, the interest that gave them birth. In other
+words, there is implied in all induction a process of deduction. Every
+stream of thought embraces not only the main current, but also an eddy,
+which here and there re-enters it. And this is one way of explaining the
+phenomenon which has long engaged the thought of philosophers, namely,
+the fact of successful anticipations of the discoveries of science or,
+more generally still, the possibility of synthetic judgments _a priori_.
+The solution of the problem is ultimately contained in its
+statement.[88]
+
+To arrive at a stage of mentality not based on assumptions one would
+have, no doubt, to go back to its beginnings. Greek thought, even in the
+time of Thales, was well furnished with them. We cannot pause to
+catalogue them, but it may further our project if we consider a few of
+the more important. The precondition of thought as of life is that
+nature be uniform, or ultimately that the world be rational. This is not
+even, as it becomes later, a conscious demand; it is the primary ethical
+postulate which expresses itself in the confidence that it is so. Viewed
+from a certain angle it may be called the principle of sufficient
+reason. Closely associated with it is the universal belief of the early
+philosophers of Greece that everything that comes into being is bound up
+inseparably with that which has been before; more precisely, that there
+is no absolute, but only relative, Becoming. Corollaries of this axiom
+soon appeared in the postulates of the conservation of matter or mass,
+and the conservation of energy, or more properly for the ancients, of
+motion. Logically these principles appear to signify that the subject,
+while under definition, shall remain just what it is; and that, in the
+system constituted of subject, predicate, and copula, the terms shall
+"stay put" while the adjustment of verification is in progress. It is a
+matter of course that the constants in the great problem should become
+permanent landmarks.
+
+Other corollaries derive from this same principle of uniformity. Seeing
+that all that comes to be in some sense already is, there appears the
+postulate of the unity of the world; and this unity manifests itself not
+only in the integrity and homogeneity of the world-ground, but also in
+the more ideal conception of a universal law to which all special modes
+of procedure in nature are ancillary. In these we recognize the
+insistent demand for the organization of predicate and copula. Side by
+side with these formulæ stands the other, which requires an ordered
+process of becoming and a graduated scale of existences, such as can
+mediate between the extremes of polarity. Such series meet us on every
+hand in early Greek thought. The process of rarefaction and condensation
+in Anaximenes, the [Greek: hodos anô katô] of Heraclitus, the regular
+succession of the four Empedoclean elements in almost all later
+systems--these and other examples spontaneously occur to the mind. The
+significance of this conception, as the representative of an effective
+copula, will presently be seen. More subtle, perhaps, than any of these
+principles, though not allowed to go so long unchallenged, is the
+assumption of a [Greek: physis], that is, the assumption that all nature
+is instinct with life. The logical interpretation of this postulate
+would seem to be that the concrete system of things--subject, predicate,
+copula--constitutes a totality complete in itself and needing no jog
+from without.
+
+In this survey of the preconceptions of the early Greek philosophers I
+have employed the terms of the judgment without apology. The
+justification for this course must come ultimately, as for any
+assumption, from the success of its application to the facts. But if
+"logic" merely formulates in a schematic way that which in life is the
+manipulation of concrete experience, with a view to attaining practical
+ends, then its forms must apply here as well as anywhere. Logical
+terminology may therefore be assumed to be welcome to this field where
+judgments are formed, induction is made from certain facts to defined
+conceptions, and deductions are derived from principles or premises
+assumed. Speaking then in these terms we may say that the Pre-Socratics
+had three logical problems set for them: First, there was a demand for a
+predicate, or, in other words, for a theory of the world. Secondly,
+there was the need of ascertaining just what should be regarded as the
+subject, or, otherwise stated, just what it was that required
+explanation. Thirdly, there arose the necessity of discovering ways and
+means by which the theory could be predicated of the world and by which,
+in turn, the hypothesis erected could be made to account for the
+concrete experience of life: in terms of logic this problem is that of
+maintaining an efficient copula. It is not assumed that the sequence
+thus stated was historically observed without crossing and overlapping;
+but a survey of the history of the period will show that, in a general
+way, the logical requirements asserted themselves in this order.
+
+1. Greek philosophy began its career with induction. We have already
+stated that the preconceptions with which it approached its task were
+the result of previous inductions, and indeed the epic and theogonic
+poetry of the Greeks abounds in thoughts indicative of the consciousness
+of all of these problems. Thus Homer is familiar with the notion that
+all things proceed from water,[89] and that, when the human body decays,
+it resolves itself into earth and water.[90] Other opinions might be
+enumerated, but they would add nothing to the purpose. When men began,
+in the spirit of philosophy, to theorize about the world, they assumed
+that it--the subject--was sufficiently known. Its existence was taken
+for granted, and that which engaged their attention was the problem of
+its meaning. What predicate--so we may formulate their question--should
+be given to the subject? It is noticeable that their induction was quite
+perfunctory. But such is always the case until there are rival theories
+competing for acceptance, and even then the impulse to gather up
+evidence derived from a wide field and assured by resort to experiment
+comes rather with the desire to test a hypothesis than to form it. It is
+the effort to _verify_ that brings out details and also the negative
+instances. Hence we are not to blame Thales for rashness in making his
+generalization that all is Water. We do not know what indications led to
+this conclusion. Aristotle ventured a guess, but the motives assumed for
+Thales agree too well with those which weighed with Hippo to admit of
+ready acceptance.
+
+Anaximander, feeling the need of deduction as a sequel to induction,
+found his predicate in the Infinite. We cannot now delay to inquire just
+what he meant by the term; but it is not unlikely that its very
+vagueness recommended it to a man of genius who caught enthusiastically
+at the skirts of knowledge. Anaximenes, having pushed verification
+somewhat farther and eliciting some negative instances, rejected water
+and the Infinite and inferred that all was air. His [Greek: archê] must
+have the quality of infinity, but, a copula having been found in the
+process of rarefaction and condensation, it must occupy a determinate
+place in the series of typical forms of existence. The logical
+significance of this thought will engage our attention later.
+
+Meanwhile it may be well to note that thus far only _one_ predicate has
+been offered by each philosopher. This is doubtless due to the
+preconception of the unity and homogeneity of the world, of which we
+have already made mention. Although at the beginning its significance
+was little realized, the conception was destined to play a prominent
+part in Greek thought. It may be regarded from different points of view
+not necessarily antagonistic. One may say, as indeed has oftentimes been
+said, that it was due to ignorance. Men did not know the complexity of
+the world, and hence declared its substance to be simple. Again, it may
+be affirmed that the assumption was merely the naïve reflex of the
+ethical postulate that we shall unify our experience and organize it for
+the realization of our ideals. While increased knowledge has multiplied
+the so-called chemical elements, physics knows nothing of their
+differences, and chemistry itself demands their reduction.
+
+The extension and enlarged scope of homogeneity came in two ways: First,
+it presented itself by way of abstraction from the particular predicates
+that may be given to things. This was due to the operation of the
+fundamental assumption that the world must be intelligible. Thus, even
+in Anaximander, the world-ground takes no account of the diversity of
+things except in the negative way of providing that the contrariety of
+experience shall arise from it. We are therefore referred for our
+predicate to a somewhat behind concrete experience. The Pythagoreans fix
+upon a single aspect of things as the essential, and find the meaning of
+the world in mathematical relations. The Eleatics press the conception
+of homogeneity until it is reduced to identity. Identity means the
+absence of difference; hence, spatially considered, it requires the
+negation of a void and the indivisibility of the world; viewed
+temporally, it precludes the succession of different states and hence
+the possibility of change.
+
+We thus reach the acute stage of the problem of the One and the Many.
+The One is here the predicate, the subject is the Many. The solution of
+the difficulty is the task of the copula, and we shall recur to the
+theme in due time. It may be well, however, at this point to draw
+attention to the fact that the One is not always identical with the
+predicate, nor the Many with the subject. In the rhythmic movement of
+erecting and verifying hypotheses the interest shifts and what was but
+now the predicate, by taking the place of the premises, comes to be
+regarded as the given from which the particular is to be derived or
+deduced. There is thus likewise a shift in the positions of existence
+and meaning. The subject, or the world, was first assumed as the given
+means with which to construct the predicate, its meaning; once the
+hypothesis has been erected, the direction of interest shifts back to
+the beginning, and in the process of verification or deduction the
+quondam predicate, now the premises, becomes the given, and the task set
+for thought is the derivation of fact. For the moment, or until the
+return to the world is accomplished, the One is the only real, the
+Manifold remains mere appearance.
+
+The second form in which the sense of the homogeneity of the world
+embodies itself is not, like the first, static, but is altogether
+dynamic. That which makes the whole world kin is neither the presence
+nor the absence of a quality, but a principle. The law thus revealed is,
+therefore, not a matter of the predicate, but is the copula itself.
+Hence we must defer a fuller consideration of it for the present.
+
+2. As has already been said, the inductive movement implies the
+deductive, and not only as something preceding or accompanying it, but
+as its inner meaning and ultimate purpose. So too it was with the
+earliest Greek thinkers. Their object in setting up a predicate was the
+derivation of the subject from it. In other words their ambition was to
+discover the [Greek: archê] from which the genesis of the world
+proceeds. But deduction is really a much more serious task than would
+at first appear to one who is familiar with the Aristotelian machinery
+of premises and middle terms. The business of deduction is to reveal the
+subject, and ordinarily the subject quite vanishes from view. Induction
+is rapid, but deduction lags far behind. It may require but a momentary
+flash of "insight" on the part of the physical philosopher to discover a
+principle; if it is really significant, inventors will be engaged for
+centuries in deducing from it applications to the needs of life by means
+of contrivances. Thus after ages we come to know more of the subject,
+which is thereby enriched. The contrivances are the representatives of
+the copula in practical affairs; in quasi-theoretical spheres they are
+the apparatus for experimentation. It has just been remarked that by the
+application of the principles to life it is enriched; in other words, it
+receives new meaning, and new meaning signifies a new predicate. Theory
+is at times painfully aware of the multitude of new predicates proposed;
+rarely does it realize that there has been created a new heaven and a
+new earth. Without the latter, the former would be absurd.
+
+Men take very much for granted and regard almost every achievement as a
+matter of course. Hence they do not become aware of their changed
+position except as it reflects itself in new schemes and in a larger
+outlook. The subject receives only a summary glance to discover what new
+predicate shall be evolved. Hence, while there is in Greek philosophy a
+strongly marked deductive movement, the theoretical results to the
+subject are insignificant. Thales seems, indeed, to have had no means to
+offer for the derivation of the world, but he evidently had no doubt
+that it was possible. With him and with others the assumption, however
+vaguely understood, seems to have been that the subject, like the
+predicate, was simple. Thus the essential unity of the world, considered
+as existence no less than as meaning, is a foregone conclusion. The
+sense of a division in the subject seems to arise with Empedocles when,
+reaping the harvest of the Eleatic definition of substance, he parted
+the world, as subject and as predicate, into four elements.
+
+We may, perhaps, pause a moment to consider the significance of the
+assumption of four elements which plays so large a part in subsequent
+philosophies. There is no need of enlarging on the importance of the
+association of multiple elements with the postulate that nothing is
+absolutely created and nothing absolutely passes away. These are indeed
+the pillars that support chemical science, and they further imply the
+existence of qualities of different rank; but that implication, as we
+shall see, lay even in the process of rarefaction and condensation
+introduced by Anaximenes. The four elements concern us here chiefly as
+testifying to the fact that certain practical interests had summed up
+the essential characteristics of nature in forms sufficiently
+significant to have maintained themselves even to our day. In regard to
+fire, air, and water this is not greatly to be wondered at; it is a
+somewhat different case with earth. If metallurgy and other pursuits
+which deal with that which is roughly classed as earth had been highly
+enough developed to have reacted upon the popular mind, this element
+could not possibly have been assumed to be so homogeneous. The
+conception clearly reflects the predominantly agricultural interest of
+the Greeks in their relation to the earth. This further illustrates the
+slow progress which deduction makes in the reconstitution of the
+subject.
+
+It is different, however, with Anaxagoras and the Atomists. Apparently
+the movement begun by Empedocles soon ran its extreme course. Instead of
+four elements there is now an infinite number of substances, each
+differentiated from the other. The meaning of this wide swing of the
+pendulum is not altogether clear; but it is evident from the system of
+Anaxagoras that the metals, for example, possessed a significance which
+they can not have had for Empedocles.
+
+The opposite swing of the pendulum is seen in the later course of the
+Eleatics. Given a predicate as fixed and unified as they assumed, the
+subject cannot possibly be conceived in terms of it and hence it is
+denied outright. In the dialectic of Zeno and Melissus, dealing with the
+problems of the One and the Many, there is much that suggests the
+solution offered by the Atomists; but it is probably impossible now to
+ascertain whether these passages criticise a doctrine already propounded
+or pointed the way for successors. While the Eleatics asserted the sole
+reality of the One, Anaxagoras and the Atomists postulated a
+multiplicity without essential unity. But the human mind seems to be
+incapable of resting in that decision; it demands that the world shall
+have not meanings, but a meaning. This demand calls not only for a
+unified predicate, but also for an effective copula.
+
+3. We have already remarked that the steps by which the predicate was
+inferred are for the most part unknown. Certain suggestions are
+contained in the reports of Aristotle, but it is safe to say that they
+are generally guesses well or ill founded. The summary inductive
+mediation has left few traces; and the process of verification, in the
+course of which hypotheses were rejected and modified, can be followed
+only here and there in the records. Almost our only source of
+information is the dialectic of systems. Fortunately for our present
+purpose we do not need to know the precise form which a question assumed
+to the minds of the several philosophers; the efforts which they made to
+meet the imperious demands of logic here speak for themselves.
+
+At first there was no scheme for the mediation of the predicate back to
+the subject. Indeed there seems not to have existed in the mind of
+Thales a sense of its need. Anaximander raised the question, but the
+process of segregation or separation ([Greek: ekkrinesthai]) which he
+propounded was so vaguely conceived that it has created more problems
+than it solved. Anaximenes first proposed a scheme that has borne
+fruits. He said that things are produced from air by rarefaction and
+condensation. This process offers not only a principle of difference,
+but also a regulative conception, the evaluation of which engaged the
+thought of almost all the later Pre-Socratics. It implies that extension
+and mass constitute the essential characters of substance, and, fully
+apprehended, contains in germ the whole materialistic philosophy from
+Parmenides at one extreme to Democritus and Anaxagoras at the other. The
+difficulties inherent in the view were unknown to Anaximenes; for,
+having a unitary predicate, he assumed also a homogeneous subject.
+
+The logical position of Heraclitus is similar to that of Anaximenes. He
+likewise posits a simple predicate and further signalizes its functional
+character by naming it Fire. Without venturing upon debatable ground we
+may say that it was the restless activity of the element that caused him
+to single it out as best expressing the meaning of things. Its rhythmic
+libration typified to him the principle of change in existence and of
+existence in change. It is the "ever-living" copula, devouring subject
+and predicate alike and re-creating them functionally as co-ordinate
+expressions of itself. That which alone _is_, the abiding, is not the
+physical composition of a thing, but the law of reciprocity by which it
+maintains a balance. This he calls variously by the names of Harmony,
+Logos, Necessity, Justice. In this system of functional co-ordinates
+nothing escapes the accounting on 'Change;[91] all things are in
+continuous flux, only the nodes of the rhythm remaining constant. It is
+not surprising therefore that Heraclitus has been the subject of so much
+speculation and comment in modern times; for the functional character of
+all distinctions in his system marks the affinity of his doctrines for
+those of modern psychology and logic.[92]
+
+The Pythagoreans, having by abstraction obtained a predicate,
+acknowledged the existence of the subject, but did not feel the need of
+a copula in the theoretical sphere, except as it concerned the inner
+relation of the predicate. To them the world was number, but number
+itself was pluralistic, or let us rather say dualistic. The odd and the
+even, the generic constituents of number, had somehow to be brought
+together. The bond was found in Unity, or, again, in Harmony. When they
+inquired how numbers constituted the world, their answer was in general
+only a nugatory exercise of an unbridled fancy.[93] Such and such a
+number was Justice, such another, Man. It was only in the wholly
+practical sphere of experiment that they reached a conclusion worth
+recording. Its significance they themselves did not perceive. Here, by
+the application of mathematical measurements to sounds, they discovered
+how to produce tones of a given pitch, and thus successfully
+demonstrated the efficiency of their copula.
+
+The Eleatics followed the same general course of abstraction; but with
+them the sense of the unity of the world effaced its rich diversity.
+Xenophanes does not appear to have pressed the conception so far as to
+deny all change within the world. Parmenides, however, bated no jot of
+the legitimate consequences of his logical position, interpreting, as he
+did, the predicate, originally conceived as meaning, in terms of
+existence. That which is simply _is_. Thus there is left only a one-time
+predicate, now converted into a subject of which only itself, as a brute
+fact, can be predicated. Stated logically, Parmenides is capable only of
+uttering identical propositions: A=A. The fallacious character of the
+report of the senses and the impossibility of Becoming followed as a
+matter of course. Where the logical copula is a mere sign of equation
+there can be neither induction nor deduction. We are caught in a
+theoretical _cul-de-sac_.
+
+We are not now concerned to know in what light the demand for a treatise
+on the world of Opinion may have appeared to Parmenides himself. The
+avenues by which men reach conclusions which are capable of
+simplification and syllogistic statement are too various to admit of
+plausible conjecture in the absence of specific evidence. But it is
+clear that his resort to the expedient reflected a consciousness of the
+state of deadlock. In that part of his philosophical poem he dealt with
+many questions of detail in a rather more practical spirit. Following
+the lead of Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans he was more successful here
+than in the field of metaphysics. Thus we see once more that the wounds
+of theory are healed by practice. But, as usual, even though the
+metaphysician does receive the answer to his doubts by falling into a
+severely practical pit and extricating himself by steps which he
+fashions with his hands, his mental habit is not thereby reconstructed.
+The fixed predicate of the Eleatics was bequeathed to the
+Platonic-Aristotelian formal logic, and induction and deduction remained
+for centuries in theory a race between the hedgehog and the hare.[94]
+The true significance of the destructive criticism brought to bear by
+Zeno and Melissus on the concepts of unity, plurality, continuity,
+extension, time, and motion is simply this: that when by a shift of the
+attention a predicate becomes subject or meaning fossilizes as
+existence, the terms of the logical process lose their functional
+reference and grow to be unmeaning and self-contradictory.
+
+We have already remarked that Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists
+sought to solve the problem of the One and the Many, of the subject and
+the predicate, by shattering the unitary predicate and thus leaving the
+field to plurality in both spheres. But obviously they were merely
+postponing the real question. Thought, as well as action, demands a
+unity somewhere. Hence the absorbing task of these philosophers is to
+disclose or contrive such a bond of unity. The form which their quest
+assumed was the search for a basis for physical interaction.[95]
+
+Empedocles clearly believed that he was solving the difficulty in one
+form when he instituted the rhythmic libration between unity under the
+sway of Love and multiplicity under the domination of Hate. But even he
+was not satisfied with that. While Love brought all the elements
+together into a sphere and thus produced a unity, it was a unity
+constituted of a mixture of elements possessing inalienable characters
+not only different but actually antagonistic. On the other hand, Hate
+did indeed separate the confused particles, but it effected a sort of
+unity in that, by segregating the particles of the several elements from
+the others, it brought like and like together. In so far Aristotle was
+clearly right in attributing to Love the power to separate as well as to
+unite. Moreover, it would seem that there never was a moment in which
+both agencies were not conceived to be operative, to however small an
+extent.
+
+Empedocles asserted, however, that a world could arise only in the
+intervals between the extremes of victory in the contest between Love
+and Hate, when, so to speak, the battle was drawn and there was a
+general _mêlée_ of the combatants. It may be questioned, perhaps,
+whether he distinctly stated that in our world everything possessed its
+portion of each of the elements; but so indispensable did he consider
+this _mixture_ that its function of providing a physical unity is
+unmistakable. A further evidence of his insistent demand for unity--the
+copula--is found in his doctrine that only like can act on like; and the
+scheme of pores and effluvia which he contrived bears eloquent testimony
+to the earnest consideration he gave to this matter. For he conceived
+that all interaction took place by means of them.
+
+Empedocles, then, may be said to have annulled the decree of divorce he
+had issued for the elements at the beginning. But the solution here too
+is found, not in the theoretical, but in the practical, sphere; for he
+never retracts his assertion that the elements are distinct and
+antagonistic. But even so his problem is defined rather than solved; for
+after the elements have been brought within microscopic distance of each
+other in the mixture, since like can act only on like, the narrow space
+that separates them is still an impassable gulf.[96]
+
+Anaxagoras endowed his infinitely numerous substances with the same
+characters of fixity and contrariety that mark the four elements of
+Empedocles. For him, therefore, the difficulty of securing unity and
+co-operation in an effective copula is, if that be possible, further
+aggravated. His grasp of the problem, if we may judge from the
+relatively small body of documentary evidence, was not so sure as that
+of Empedocles, though he employed in general the same means for its
+solution. He too postulates a mixture of all substances, more
+consciously and definitely indeed than his predecessor. Believing that
+only like can act on like,[97] he is led to assume not only an infinite
+multiplicity of substances, but also their complete mixture, so that
+everything, however small, contains a portion of every other. Food, for
+example, however seeming-simple, nourishes the most diverse tissues of
+the body. Thus we discover in the universal mixture of substances the
+basis for co-operation and interaction.
+
+Anaxagoras, therefore, like Empedocles, feels the need of bridging the
+chasm which he has assumed to exist between his distinct substances.
+Their failure is alike great, and is due to the presuppositions they
+inherited from the Eleatic conception of a severe homogeneity which
+implies an absolute difference from everything else. The embarrassment
+of Anaxagoras increases with the introduction of the [Greek: Nous]. This
+agency was conceived with a view to explaining the formation of the
+world; that is, with a view to mediating between the myriad substances
+in their essential aloofness and effecting the harmonious concord of
+concrete things. While, even on the basis of a universal mixture, the
+function of the [Greek: Nous] was foredoomed to failure, its task was
+made more difficult still by the definition given to its nature.
+According to Anaxagoras it was the sole exception to the composite
+character of things; it is absolutely pure and simple in nature.[98] By
+its definition, then, it is prevented from accomplishing the work it was
+contrived to do; and hence we cannot be surprised at the lamentations
+raised by Plato and Aristotle about the failure of Anaxagoras to employ
+the agency he had introduced. To be sure, the [Greek: Nous] is no more
+a _deus ex machina_ than were the ideas of Plato or the God of
+Aristotle. They all labored under the same restrictions.
+
+The Atomists followed with the same recognition of the Many, in the
+infinitely various kinds of atoms; but it was tempered by the assumption
+of an essential homogeneity. One atom is distinguished from another by
+characteristics due to its spatial relations. Mass and weight are
+proportional to size. Aristotle reports that, though things and atoms
+have differences, it is not in virtue of their differences, but in
+virtue of their essential identity, that they interact.[99] There is
+thus introduced a distinction which runs nearly, but not quite, parallel
+to that between primary and secondary qualities.[100] Primary qualities
+are those of size, shape, and perhaps[101] position; all others are
+secondary. On the other hand, that which is common to all atoms is their
+corporeity, which does indeed define itself with reference to the
+primary (spatial) qualities, but not alike in all. The atoms of which
+the world is constituted are alike in essential nature, but they differ
+most widely in position.
+
+It is the void that breaks up the unity of the world--atomizes it, if we
+may use the expression. It is the basis of all discontinuity. Atoms and
+void are thus polar extremes reciprocally exclusive. The atoms in their
+utter isolation in space are incapable of producing a world. In order to
+bridge the chasm between atom and atom, recourse is had to motion
+eternal, omnipresent, and necessary. This it is that annihilates
+distances. In the course of their motion atoms collide, and in their
+impact one upon the other the Atomists find the precise mode of
+co-operation by which the world is formed.[102] To this agency are due
+what Lucretius happily called "generating motions."
+
+The problem, however, so insistently pursued the philosophers of this
+time that the Atomists did not content themselves with this solution,
+satisfactory as modern science has pretended to consider it. They
+followed the lead of Empedocles and Anaxagoras in postulating a
+widespread, if not absolutely universal, _mixture_. Having on principle
+excluded "essential" differences among the atoms, the impossibility of
+finally distinguishing essential and non-essential had its revenge.
+Important as the device of mixture was to Empedocles and Anaxagoras,
+just so unmeaning ought it to have been in the Atomic philosophy,
+provided that the hypothesis could accomplish what was claimed for it.
+It is not necessary to reassert that the assumption of "individua,"
+utterly alienated one from the other by a void, rendered the problem of
+the copula insoluble for the Atomists.
+
+Diogenes of Apollonia is commonly treated contemptuously as a mere
+reactionary who harked back to Anaximenes and had no significance of his
+own. The best that can be said of such an attitude is that it regards
+philosophical theories as accidental utterances of individuals,
+naturally well or ill endowed, who happen to express conclusions with
+which men in after times agree or disagree. A philosophical tenet is an
+atom, set somewhere in a vacuum, utterly out of relation to everything
+else. But it is impossible to see how, on this theory, any system of
+thought should possess any significance for anybody, or how there should
+be any progress even, or retardation.
+
+Viewed entirely from without, the doctrine of Diogenes would seem to be
+substantially a recrudescence of that of Anaximenes. Air is once more
+the element or [Greek: archê] out of which all proceeds and into which
+all returns. Again the process of transformation is seen in rarefaction
+and condensation; and the attributes of substance are those which were
+common to the early hylozoists. But there is present a keen sense of a
+problem unknown to Anaximenes. What the early philosopher asserted in
+the innocence of the youth of thought, the later physiologist reiterates
+with emphasis because he believes that the words are words of life.
+
+The motive for recurring to the earlier system is supplied by the
+imperious demand for a copula which had so much distressed Empedocles,
+Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. And here we are not left to conjecture,
+but are able to refer to the _ipsissima verba_ of our philosopher. After
+a brief prologue, in which he stated that one's starting-point must be
+beyond dispute, he immediately[103] turned to his theme in these
+words:[104] "In my opinion, to put the whole matter in a nutshell, all
+things are derived by alteration from the same substance, and indeed all
+are one and the same. And this is altogether evident. For if the things
+that now exist in the world--earth and water and air and fire and
+whatsoever else appears to exist in this world--if, I say, any one of
+these were different from the other, different that is to say in its
+proper peculiar nature, and did not rather, being one and the same,
+change and alter in many ways, then in no-wise would things be able to
+mix with one another, nor would help or harm come to one from the other,
+nor would any plant spring from the earth, nor any other living thing
+come into being, if things were not so constituted as to be one and the
+same."
+
+These words contain a singularly interesting expression of the need of
+restoring the integrity of the process which had been lost in the effort
+to solve the problem of the One and the Many without abandoning the
+point of view won by the Eleatics. Aristotle and Theophrastus paraphrase
+and sum up the passage above quoted by saying[105] that interaction is
+impossible except on the assumption that all the world is one and the
+same. Hence it is manifest, as was said above, that the return of
+Diogenes to the monistic system of Anaximenes had for its conscious
+motive the avoidance of the dualism that had sprung up in the interval
+and had rendered futile the multiplied efforts to secure an effective
+copula.
+
+We should note, however, that in the attempt thus made to undo the work
+of several generations Diogenes retained the principle which had wrought
+the mischief. We have before remarked that the germ of the Atomic
+philosophy was contained in the process of rarefaction and condensation.
+Hence, in accepting it along with the remainder of Anaximenes's theory,
+the fatal assumption was reinstated. It is the story of human systems in
+epitome. The superstructure is overthrown, and with the débris a new
+edifice is built upon the old foundations.
+
+In the entire course of philosophical thought from Thales onward the
+suggestion of an opposition between the subject and the predicate had
+appeared. It has often been said that it was expressed by the search for
+a [Greek: physis], or a _true nature_, in contrast with the world as
+practically accepted. There is a certain truth in this view; for the
+effort to attain a predicate which does not merely repeat the subject
+does imply that there is an opposition. But the efforts made to return
+from the predicate to the subject, in a deductive movement, shows that
+the difference was not believed to be absolute. This is true, however,
+only of those fields of speculation that lie next to the highways of
+practical life, which lead equally in both directions, or, let us
+rather say, which unite while they mark separation. In the sphere of
+abstract ideas the sense of embarrassment was deep and constantly
+growing deeper. The reconstruction, accomplished on lower levels, did
+not attain unto those heights. Men doubted conclusions, but did not
+think to demand the credentials of their common presuppositions.
+
+Side by side with the later philosophers whom we have mentioned there
+walked men whom we are wont to call the Sophists. They were the
+journalists and pamphleteers of those days, men who, without dealing
+profoundly with any special problem, familiarized themselves with the
+generalizations of workers in special fields and combined these ideas
+for the entertainment of the public. They were neither philosophers nor
+physicists, but, like some men whom we might cite from our own times,
+endeavored to popularize the teachings of both. Naturally they seized
+upon the most sweeping generalizations and the preconceptions which
+disclosed themselves in manifold forms. Just as naturally they had no
+eyes with which to detect the significance of the besetting problems at
+which, in matters more concrete, the masters were toiling. Hence the
+contradictions, revealed in the analysis we have just given of the
+philosophy of the age, stood out in utter nakedness.
+
+The result was inevitable. The inability to discover a unitary
+predicate, more still, the failure to attain a working copula, led
+directly to the denial of the possibility of predication. There was no
+truth. Granted that it existed, it could not be known. Even if known, it
+could not be communicated. In these incisive words of Gorgias the
+conclusion of the ineffectual effort to establish a logic of science is
+clearly stated. But the statement is happily only the half-truth, which
+is almost a complete falsehood. It takes no account of the indications,
+everywhere present, of a needed reconstruction. Least of all does it
+catch the meaning of such a demand.
+
+The Sophists did not, however, merely repeat in abstract from the
+teachings of the philosophers. It matters not whether they originated
+the movement or not; at all events they were pioneers in the field of
+moral philosophy. Here it was that they chiefly drew the inferences from
+the distinction between [Greek: physei] and [Greek: nomô]. Nothing could
+have been more effective in disengaging the firmly rooted moral
+pre-possessions and rendering them amenable to philosophy. Just here, at
+last, we catch a hint of the significance of the logical process. In a
+striking passage in Plato's _Protagoras_,[106] which one is fain to
+regard as an essentially true reproduction of a discourse by that great
+man, Justice and Reverence are accorded true validity. On inquiring to
+what characteristic this honorable distinction is due, we find that it
+does not reside in themselves; it is due to _the assumption that a state
+must exist_.
+
+Here, then, in a word, is the upshot of the logical movement. Logical
+predicates are essentially hypothetical, deriving their validity from
+the interest that moves men to affirm them. When they lose this
+hypothetical character, as terms within a volitional system, and set up
+as entities at large, they cease to function and forfeit their right to
+exist.
+
+
+
+
+X
+
+VALUATION AS A LOGICAL PROCESS
+
+
+The purpose of this discussion is to supply the main outlines of a
+theory of value based upon analysis of the valuation-process from the
+logical point of view. The general principle which we shall seek to
+establish is that judgments of value, whether passed upon things or upon
+modes of conduct, are essentially objective in import, and that they are
+reached through a process of valuation which is essentially of the same
+logical character as the judgment-process whereby conclusions of
+physical fact are established--in a word, that the valuation-process,
+issuing in the finished judgment of value expressive of the judging
+person's definitive attitude toward the thing in question, is
+constructive of an order of reality in the same sense as, in current
+theories of knowledge, is the judgment of sense-perception and science.
+Our method of procedure to this end will be that of assuming, and
+adhering to as consistently as possible, the standpoint of the
+individual in the process of deliberating upon an ethical or economic
+problem (for, as we shall hold, all values properly so called are either
+ethical or economic), and of ascertaining, as accurately as may be, the
+meaning of the deliberative or evaluating process and of the various
+factors in it as these are presented in the individual's apprehension.
+It is in this sense that our procedure will be logical rather than
+psychological. We shall be concerned to determine the _meaning_ of the
+object of valuation as object, of the standard of value as standard, and
+of the valued object as valued, in terms of the individual's own
+apprehension of these, rather than to ascertain the nature and
+conditions of his apprehensions of these considered as psychical
+events. Our attention will throughout be directed to these factors or
+phases of the valuation-process in their functional aspect of
+determinants of the valuing agent's practical attitude, and never,
+excepting for purposes of incidental illustration and in a very general
+and tentative way, as events in consciousness mediated by more
+"elementary" psychical processes. The results which we shall gain by
+adhering to this method will enable us to see not merely that our
+judgments of value are in function and meaning objective, but also that
+our judgments of sense-perception and science are, as such, capable of
+satisfactory interpretation only as being incidental to the attainment
+and progressive reconstruction of judgments of value.
+
+The first three main divisions will be given over to establishing the
+objectivity of content and function of judgments of value. The fourth
+division will present a detailed analysis of the two types of judgment
+of value, the ethical and economic, defining them and relating them to
+each other, and correlating them in the manner just suggested with
+judgment of the physical type. After considering, in the fifth part,
+certain general objections to the positions thus stated, we shall
+proceed in the sixth and concluding division to define the function of
+the consciousness of value in the economy of life.[107]
+
+
+I
+
+The system of judgments which defines what one calls the objective order
+of things is inevitably unique for each particular individual. No two
+men can view the world from the standpoint of the same theoretical and
+practical interests, nor can any two proceed in the work of gaining for
+themselves knowledge of the world with precisely equal degrees of skill
+and accuracy. Each must be prompted and guided, in the construction of
+his knowledge of single things and of the system in which they have
+their being, by his own particular interests and aims; and even when one
+person in a measure shares in the interests and aims of another, the
+rate and manner of procedure will not be the same for both, nor will the
+knowledge gained be for both equally systematic in arrangement or in
+interrelation of its parts. Each man lives in a world of his own--a
+world, indeed, identical in certain fundamental respects with the worlds
+which his fellow-men have constructed for themselves, but one
+nevertheless necessarily unique through and through because each man is
+a unique individual. There is, doubtless, a "social currency" of objects
+which implies a certain identity of meaning in objects as experienced by
+different individuals. The existence of society presupposes, and its
+evolution in turn develops and extends, a system of generally accepted
+objects and relations. Nevertheless, the "socially current object" is,
+as such, an abstraction just as the uniform social individual is
+likewise an abstraction. The only concrete object ever actually known or
+in any wise experienced by any person is the object as constructed by
+that person in accordance with his own aims and purposes, and in which
+there is, therefore, a large and important share of meaning which is
+significant to no one else.
+
+It is needless in this discussion to dwell at length upon the general
+principle of recent "functional" psychology, that practical ends are the
+controlling factors in the acquisition of our knowledge of objective
+things. We shall take for granted the truth of the general proposition
+that cognition, in whatever sphere of science or of practical life, is
+essentially teleological in the sense of being incidental always, more
+or less directly, to the attainment of ends. Cognition, as the
+apperceptive or attentive process, is essentially the process of
+scrutinizing a situation (whether theoretical or practical) with a view
+to determining the availability for one's intended purpose of such
+objects and conditions as the situation may present. The objects and
+conditions thus determined will be made use of or ignored, counted upon
+as advantageous or guarded against as unfavorable--in a word, responded
+to--in ways suggested by their character as ascertained through
+reference to the interest in question. In this sense, then, objective
+things as known by individual persons are essentially complex stimuli
+whose proper function and reason for being it is to elicit useful
+responses in the way of conduct--responses conducive to the realization
+of ends.
+
+From this point of view, then, the difference between one person's
+knowledge of a particular object and another's signifies (1) a
+difference between these persons' original purposes in setting out to
+gain knowledge of the object, and (2) consequently a difference between
+their present ways of acting with reference to the object. The bare
+object as socially current is, at best, for each individual simply a
+ground upon which subsequent construction may be made; and the
+subsequent construction which each individual is prompted by his
+circumstances and is able to work out in judgment first makes the
+object, for this individual, real and for his purposes complete.
+
+Now, it is our primary intention to show that objects are, in cases of a
+certain important class, not yet ready to serve the person who knows
+them in their proper character of stimuli, when they have been, even
+exhaustively, defined in merely physical terms. It is very often not
+enough that the dimensions of an object and its physical properties,
+even the more recondite ones as well as those more commonly
+understood--it is often not enough for the purposes of an agent that
+these characters should make up the whole sum of his knowledge of the
+object in question. A measure of knowledge in terms of physical
+categories is often only a beginning--the result of a preliminary stage
+of the entire process of teleological determination, which must be
+carried through before the object of attention can be satisfactorily
+known. In the present study of the logic of valuation we shall be
+occupied exclusively with the discussion of cases of this kind. In our
+judgments of sense-perception and physical science we have presented to
+us material objects in their physical aspect. When these latter are
+inadequate to suggest or warrant overt conduct, our knowledge of them
+must be supplemented and reconstructed in ways presently to be
+specified. It is in the outcome of judgment-processes in which this work
+of supplementing and reconstructing is carried through that the
+consciousness of value, in the proper sense, arises, and these
+processes, then, are those which we shall here consider under the name
+of "processes of valuation." They will therefore best be approached
+through specification of the ways in which our physical judgments may be
+inadequate.
+
+Let us, then, assume, as has been indicated, that the process of
+acquiring knowledge--that is to say, the process of judgment or
+attention--is in every case of its occurrence incidental to the
+attainment of an end. We must make this assumption without attempting
+formally to justify it--though in the course of our discussion it will
+be abundantly illustrated. Let us, in accordance with this view, think
+of the typical judgment-process as proceeding, in the main, as follows:
+First of all must come a sense of need or deficiency, which may, on
+occasion, be preceded by a more or less violent and sudden shock to the
+senses, forcibly turning one's attention to the need of immediate
+action. By degrees this sense of need will grow more definite and come
+to express itself in a more or less "clear and distinct" image of an
+end, toward which end the agent is drawn by desire and to which he looks
+with much or little of emotion. The emergence of the end into
+consciousness immediately makes possible and occasions definite analysis
+of the situation in which the end must be worked out. Salient features
+of the situation forthwith are noticed--whether useful things or
+favoring conditions, or, on the other hand, the absence of any such.
+Thus predicates and then subjects for many subsidiary judgments in the
+comprehensive judgment-process emerge together in action and interaction
+upon each other. The predicates, developed out of the general end toward
+which the agent strives, afford successive points of view for
+fresh analyses of the situation. The logical subjects thus
+discovered--_objects_ of attention and knowledge--require, on
+the other hand, as they are scrutinized and judged, modification and
+re-examination of the end. The end grows clearer and fuller of detail
+as the predicates or implied ("constituent") ideas which are developed
+out of it are distinguished from each other and used in making one's
+inventory of the objective situation. Conversely, the situation loses
+its first aspect of confusion and takes on more and more the aspect of
+an orderly assemblage of objects and conditions, useful, indifferent,
+and adverse, by means of which the end may in greater or less measure be
+attained or must, in however greatly modified a form, be defeated. Now,
+in this development of the judgment-process, it must be observed, the
+end must be more or less clearly and consistently conceived throughout
+as an _activity_, if the objective means of action which have been
+determined in the process are not to be, at the last, separate and
+unrelated data still requiring co-ordination. If the end has been so
+conceived, the means will inevitably be known as members of a mechanical
+_system_, since the predicates by which they have been determined have
+at every point involved this factor of amenability to co-ordination.
+The judgment-process, if properly conducted and brought to a conclusion,
+must issue at the end in the functional unity of a finished plan of
+conduct with a perfected mechanical co-ordination of the available
+means.
+
+We have now to see that much more may be involved in such a process as
+this than has been explicitly stated in our brief analysis. For the end
+itself may be a matter of deliberation, just as must be the physical
+means of accomplishing it; and, again, the means may call for scrutiny
+and determination from other points of view than the physical and
+mechanical. The final action taken at the end may express the outcome of
+deliberate ethical and economic judgment as well as of judgments in the
+sphere of sense-perception and physical science. Let us consider, for
+example, that one's end is the construction of a house upon a certain
+plot of ground. This end expresses the felt need of a more comfortable
+or more reputable abode, and has so much of general presumption in its
+favor. There may, however, be many reasons for hesitation. The cost in
+time or money or materials on hand may tax one's resources and
+injuriously curtail one's activities along other lines. And there may be
+ethical reasons why the plan should not be carried out. The house may
+shut off a pleasing prospect from the view of the entire neighborhood
+and serve no better end than the gratification of its owner's selfish
+vanity. It will cost a sum of money which might be used in paying just,
+though outlawed, debts.
+
+Now, from the standpoint of such problems as these the fullest possible
+preliminary knowledge of the physical and mechanical fitness of our
+means must still be very abstract and general. It would be of use in any
+undertaking like the one we have supposed, but it is not sufficient in
+so far as the problem is one's own problem, concrete, particular, and
+so unique. One may, of course, proceed to the stage of physical
+judgment without having settled the ethical problems which may have
+presented themselves at the outset. The end may be entertained
+tentatively as a hypothesis until certain mechanical problems have been
+dealt with. But manifestly this is only postponement of the issue. The
+agent is still quite unprepared, even after the means have been so far
+determined, to take the first step in the execution of the plan; indeed,
+his uncertainty is probably only the more harassing than before.
+Moreover, the economic problems in the case are now more sharply
+defined, and these for the time being still further darken counsel.
+Manifestly the need for deliberation is at this point quite as urgent as
+the need for physical determination can ever be, and the need is
+evidenced in the same way by the actual arrest and postponement of overt
+conduct. The agent, despite his physical knowledge, is not yet free to
+embrace the end and, having done so, use thereto the means at his
+disposal. It is plainly impossible to use the physical means until one
+knows in terms of Substance and Attribute or Cause and Effect, or
+whatever other physical categories one may please, what manner of
+behavior may be expected of them. So likewise is it as truly impossible,
+for one intellectually and morally capable of appreciating problems of a
+more advanced and complex sort, to exploit the physical properties thus
+discovered until ethical determination of the end and economic
+determination of the means have been completed.[108]
+
+There are, then, we conclude, cases in which physical determination of
+the means is by itself not a sufficient preparation for conduct--in
+which there are ethical and economic problems which delay the
+application of the physical means to the end to which they may be
+physically adapted. Indeed, so much as this may well appear as
+sufficiently obvious without extended illustration. Everyone knows that
+it is nearly always necessary, in undertaking any work in which material
+things are used as means, to count the cost; and everyone knows likewise
+that not every end that is in any way attractive and within one's reach
+may without more ado be taken as an object of settled desire and effort.
+It is indeed needless to elaborate these commonplaces in the sense in
+which they are commonly understood. However, such is not our present
+purpose. Our purpose is the more specific one of showing that the
+meaning of Objectivity must be widened so as to include (1) the
+"universe" of ends in their ethical aspect and (2) the economic aspect
+of the means of action, as well as (3) the physical aspect to which the
+character of Objectivity is commonly restricted. We shall maintain that
+these are parts or phases of a complete conception of Reality, and that
+of them, consequently, Objectivity must be predicated for every
+essential reason connoted by such characterization of the world of
+things "external" to the senses. It has been with this conclusion in
+mind, then, that we have sought to emphasize the frequent serious
+inadequacy, for practical purposes, of the merely physical determination
+of the means in one's environment.
+
+The principle thus suggested would imply that the ethical and economic
+stages in the one inclusive process of reflective attention should be
+regarded as involving, when they occur, the same logical function of
+judgment as is operative in the sphere of sense-perception and the
+sciences generally. Ethical and economic factors must on occasion be
+present at the final choice and shaping of one's course of conduct,
+along with the physical determinations of environing means and
+conditions which one has made in sense-perception. There is, then, it
+would appear, at least a fair presumption, though not indeed an _a
+priori_ certainty, that these ethical and economic factors or conditions
+have, like the physical, taken form in a _judgment-process_ which will
+admit of profitable analysis in accordance with whatever general theory
+of judgment one may hold as valid elsewhere in the field of knowledge.
+This presumption we shall seek to verify. Now, our interest in thus
+determining, first of all, the logical character of these processes will
+readily be understood from this, that, in the present view, these are
+the processes, and the only ones in our experience, which are properly
+to be regarded as processes of Valuation. We shall hold that Valuation,
+and so all consciousness of Value, properly so called, must be either
+ethical or economic; that the only conscious processes in which Values
+can come to definition are these processes of ethical and economic
+judgment. The present theory of Value is, then, essentially a logical
+one, in the sense of holding that Values are determined in and by a
+logical--that is, a judgmental--valuation-process and in its details is
+closely dependent upon the general conception of judgment of which the
+outlines have been sketched above. Accordingly, the exposition must
+proceed in the following general order: Assuming the conception of
+judgment which has been presented (which our discussion will in several
+ways further illustrate and so tend to confirm), we shall seek to show
+that the determinations made in ethical and economic judgment are in the
+proper sense objective. This will involve, first of all, a statement of
+the conditions under which the ethical and economic judgments
+respectively arise--which statement will serve to distinguish the two
+types of judgment from each other. We shall then proceed to the special
+analysis of the ethical and economic forms from the standpoint of our
+general theory of judgment, thereby establishing in detail the
+judgmental character of these parts of the reflective process. This
+analysis will serve to introduce our interpretation of the consciousness
+of Value as a factor in the conduct and economy of life.
+
+
+II
+
+Let us then define the problem of the objective reference of the
+valuational judgments by stating, as distinctly as may be, the
+conditions by which ethical and economic deliberation, respectively, are
+prompted. A study of these conditions will make it easier to see in what
+way the judgments reached in dealing with them can be objective.
+
+When will an end, presenting itself in consciousness in the manner
+indicated in our brief analysis of the judgment-process, become the
+center of attention, thereby checking the advance, through investigation
+of the possible means, to final overt action? This is the general
+statement of the problem of the typical ethical situation. Manifestly
+there will be no ethical deliberation if the imaged end at once turns
+the attention toward the environment of possible means, instead of first
+of all itself becoming the object instead of the director of attention;
+there will be no suspension of progress toward final action, excepting
+such as may later come through difficulty in the discovery and
+co-ordination of the means. However, there are cases in which the
+emergence of the end forthwith is followed by a check to the reflective
+process, and the agent shrinks from the end presented in imagination as
+being, let us say, one forbidden by authority or one repugnant to his
+own established standards. The end may in such a case disappear at once;
+very often it will insistently remain. On this latter supposition, the
+simplest possibility will be the development of a mere mechanical
+tension, a "pull and haul" between the end, or properly the impulses
+which it represents, and the agent's habit of suppressing impulses of
+the class to which the present one is, perhaps intuitively, recognized
+as belonging. The case is the common one of "temptation" on the one side
+and "principle" or "conscience" on the other, and so long as the two
+forces remain thus in hard-and-fast opposition to each other there can
+be no ethical deliberation or judgment in a proper sense. The standard
+or habit may gain the day by sheer mechanical excess of power, or the
+new impulse, the temptation, may prevail because its onset can break
+down the mechanical resistance.
+
+Out of such a situation as this, however, genuine ethical deliberation
+may arise on condition that standard and "temptation" can lose something
+of their abstractness and their hard-and-fast opposition, and develop
+into terms of concrete meaning. The agent may come to see that the end
+is in some definite way of really vital interest and too important to be
+put aside without consideration. He may, of course, in this fall into
+gross self-sophistication, like the drunkard in the classical instance
+who takes another glass to test his self-control and thereby gain
+assurance, or he may act with wisdom and with full sincerity, like
+Dorothea Casaubon when she renounced the impossible task imposed by her
+departed husband. In the moral life one can ask or hope for complete
+exemption from the risk of self-deception with as little reason as in
+scientific research. But however this may be, our present interest is in
+the method, not in particular results of ethical reflection. Whether
+properly so in a particular case or not, the imaged end may come to
+seem at least plausibly defensible on grounds of principle which serve
+to sanction certain other modes of conduct to which a place is given in
+the accepted scheme of life; or the end may simply press for a
+relatively independent recognition on the very general ground that its
+emergence represents an enlargement and new development of the
+personality.[109] The end may thus cease to stand in the character of
+blind self-assertive impulse, and press its claim as a positive means of
+future moral growth, as bringing freedom from repressive and enfeebling
+restraints and as tending to the reinforcement of other already valued
+modes of conduct. On the other hand, the standard will cease to stand as
+mere resistance and negation, and may discover something of its hidden
+meaning as a product of long experience and slow growth, and as perhaps
+a vital part of the organization of one's present life, not to be
+touched without grave risk.
+
+Now, on whichever side the development may first commence, a like
+development must soon follow on the other, and it is the action and
+reaction of standard and prospective or problematic end upon each other
+that constitutes the process of ethical deliberation or judgment. Just
+as in the typical judgment-process, as sketched above, so also here
+predicate and subject _develop each other_, when once they have given
+over their first antagonism and come to the attitude of reasoning
+together. The predicate explains itself that the subject or new end may
+be searchingly and fairly tested; and under this scrutiny the subject
+develops its full meaning as a course of conduct, thereby prompting
+further analysis and reinterpretation of the standard. But this is not
+the place for detailed analysis of the process;[110] here we are
+concerned only to define the type of situation, and this we may now do
+in the following terms: The indispensable condition of ethical judgment
+is the presence in the agent's mind of at least two rival interesting
+ends or systems of such ends. In the foregoing, the subject of the
+judgment is the new end that has arisen; the predicate or "standard" is
+the symbol for the old ends or values which in the tension of the
+judgment-process must be brought to more or less explicit
+enumeration--and, we must add, reconstruction also. Indeed, it is
+important, even at this stage of our discussion, to observe that
+Predicate and Standard are not equivalent in meaning. The predicate, or
+predicative side, of judgment is the imagery of control in the process,
+which, as we have seen, develops with the subject side; while the term
+"Standard" connotes the rigid fixity which belongs to the inhibiting
+concept or ideal in the stage before the judgment-process proper can
+begin. The ethical judgment-process is, in a word, just the process of
+reconstructing standards--as in its other and corresponding aspect it is
+the process of interpreting new ends. Those who oppose measures of
+social reform or new modes of conduct or belief on alleged grounds of
+"immorality" instinctively feel in doing so that the change may make its
+way more easily against a resistance that will candidly explain itself;
+and, on the other side of the social judgment-process, the more
+fanatical know how to turn to good advantage for their propaganda the
+bitterness or contempt of those who represent the established order. On
+both sides there are those who trust more in mechanical "pull and haul"
+than in the intrinsic merits of their cause.
+
+Thus it is by encountering some rival end or entire system of ends, as
+symbolized by an ideal, that a new end emerging out of impulse comes to
+stand for an agent, as the center of a problem of conduct, and so to
+occupy the center of attention. And it thereby becomes an Object, as we
+shall hold, which must be more fully defined in order that it may be
+_valued_, and accordingly be held to warrant a determinate attitude
+toward itself on the agent's part. We have now to define in the same
+general terms the typical economic situation.
+
+In economic theory as in common thought it is not the contemplated act
+of applying certain means to the attainment of an end regarded as
+desirable that functions as the logical subject of valuation. The thing
+or object valued in the economic situation is one's present wealth,
+whether material or immaterial, one's services or labor--whatever one
+gives in exchange or otherwise sets apart for the attainment of a
+desired end or, proximately, to secure possession of the necessary and
+sufficient means to the attainment of a desired end. The object of
+attention in the valuing process is here not itself an end of action. In
+this respect the economic type of judgment is like the physical, for in
+both the object to be valued is a certain means which one is seeking to
+adapt to some more or less definitely imaged purpose; or a condition of
+which one wishes, likewise for some special purpose, to take advantage.
+The ultimate goal of all judgment is the determination of a course of
+conduct looking toward an end, and our present problem may accordingly
+be stated in the following terms: Under what circumstances in the
+judgment-process does it become necessary to the definition and
+attainment of an end as yet vague and indeterminate that the requisite
+means, as in part already physically determined, should be further
+scrutinized in attention and determined from the economic point of view?
+Or, in a word: What is the "jurisdiction" of the economic point of view?
+
+For ordinary judgements of sense-perception the presence in
+consciousness of a single unquestioned end is the adequate occasion, as
+our analysis (assuming its validity) has shown. For ethical judgment we
+have seen that the presence of conflicting ends is necessary; and we
+shall now hold that this condition is necessary, though not, without a
+certain qualification, adequate, for the economic type as well. If an
+imaged end can hold its place in consciousness without a rival, and the
+physical means of attaining it have been found and co-ordinated, then
+the use or consumption of the means must inevitably follow, without
+either ethical or economic judgement; for, to paraphrase the saying of
+Professor James, nothing but an end can displace or inhibit effort
+toward another end. The economic situation differs, then, from the
+ethical in this, that the end or system of ends entering into
+competition with the one for the time being of chief and primary
+interest has been brought to consciousness through reference to those
+"physical" means which already have been determined as necessary to this
+latter end. The conflict of ends in the economic situation, that is to
+say, is not due to a direct and intrinsic incompatibility between them.
+Where there manifestly is such incompatibility, judgment will be of the
+ethical type--as when building the house involves the foreclosure of a
+mortgage, and so, in working an injury to the holder of the site, may do
+violence to one's ideal of friendship or of more special obligation; or
+when an impulse to intemperate self-indulgence is met by one's ideal of
+social usefulness. In cases such as these one clearly sees, or can on
+reflection come to see, in what way an evil result to personal character
+will follow upon the imminent misdeed, and in what way suppression of
+the momentary impulse will conserve the entire approved and established
+way of life. Very often, however, the conflicting ends are related in no
+such mutually exclusive way. Each may be in itself permissible and
+compatible with the other, and, so far as any possible ethical
+discrimination can determine, there is no ground for choice between
+them. Thus it is only through the fact that both ends are dependent
+upon a limited supply of means that one would, for example, ever bring
+together and deliberately oppose in judgment the purpose of making
+additions to his library and the necessity of providing a store of fuel
+for the winter. Both ends in such a case are in themselves indeed
+permissible in a general way, but they may very well not both of them be
+economically possible, and hence, for the person in question and in the
+presence of the economic conditions which confront him, not, in the last
+analysis, both ethically possible. When there is a conflict between two
+ends that stand in close organic relation in the sense explained above,
+the problem is an ethical one; when the conflict is, in the sense
+explained, one of competition between ends ethically permissible--not at
+variance, either one, that is, with other ends _directly_--for the whole
+or for a share of one's supply of means, the problem is of the economic
+type.[111]
+
+There are three typical cases in which economic judgment or valuation of
+the means is necessary, and the enumeration of these will make clear the
+relation between the ethical and the economic types of judgment: (1)
+First may be mentioned the case in which ethical deliberation has
+apparently reached its end in the formation of a plan of action which,
+so far as one can see, on ethical grounds is unobjectionable. A definite
+"temptation" may have been overcome, or out of a more complex situation
+a satisfactory ethical compromise or readjustment may have been
+developed with much difficulty. Now, there are very often cases in which
+such a course of action still may not be entered on without further
+hesitation; for, if the plan be one requiring for its working out the
+use of material means, the fact of an existing limitation of one's
+supply of means must bring hitherto unthought of ends into conflict with
+it. There are doubtless many situations in which one's moral choice may
+be carried into practice without consideration of ways and means, as
+when one forgives an injury or holds his instinctive nature under
+discipline in the effort to attain an ascetic or a genuinely social
+ideal of character. But more often than the moral rigorist cares to see,
+questions of an economic nature must be raised after the ethical
+"evidence is all in"--questions which are probably more trying to a
+sensitive moral nature than those more dramatic situations in which the
+real perils of self-sophistication are vastly less, and the simpler,
+sharper definition of the issue makes possible a less difficult, though
+a more decisive and edifying, victory. (2) In the second place are those
+cases in which the end that has emerged is without conspicuous moral
+quality, because, although it may represent some worthy impulse, it has
+not been obliged to make its way to acceptance against the resistance of
+desires less worthy than itself. This is the ideal case of economic
+theory in which "moral distinctions are irrelevant," and the economic
+man is free, according to the myth, to perform his hedonistic
+calculations without thought of moral scruple. The end ethically
+acceptable in itself, like the enriching of one's library, must, when
+the means are limited, divert a portion of the means from other uses,
+and will thus, _through reference to the indispensable means_, engage in
+conflict with other ends quite remotely, if in the agent's knowledge at
+all, related with itself. (3) Finally we reach the limit of apparent
+freedom from ethical considerations in the operations of business
+institutions, and perhaps especially in those of large business
+corporations. Apart from the routine operations of a business which
+involve no present exercise of the valuing judgment, there are
+constantly in such institutions new projects which must be considered,
+and which commonly must involve revaluation of the means. In this
+revaluation the principle of greatest revenue is supposed to be the sole
+criterion, regardless of other personal or social points of view from
+which confessedly the measure might be considered. But such a
+supposition, however true to the facts of current business practice it
+may be, we must hold to be an abstraction when viewed from the
+standpoint of the social life at large, and hence no real exception to
+our general principle. The economic and the ethical situations differ,
+as types, only in the closeness of relation between the ends that are in
+conflict and in the manner in which the ends are first brought into
+conflict--not in respect of the intrinsic nature of the ends which are
+involved in them.[112] It is this difference which, as we shall see,
+explains why ethical valuation must be of ends, and economic valuation,
+on the other hand, of means.
+
+We have yet to see _in what way_ valuation of the means of action can
+serve to resolve a difficulty of the type which has thus been designated
+as Economic. The question must be deferred until a more detailed
+analysis of the economic judgment-process can be undertaken. It is
+enough for our present purpose to note that the subject of valuation in
+this process _is_ the means, and to see that under the typical
+conditions which have been described some further determination of the
+means than the merely physical one of their factual availability for the
+competing ends is needed.[113] Physically and mechanically the means are
+available for each one of the ends or groups of ends in question; the
+pressing problem is to determine for which one of the ends, if any, or
+to what compromise or readjustment of certain of the ends or all of
+them, the means at hand are in an economic sense most properly
+available.[114]
+
+From this preliminary discussion of the ethical and economic situations
+we must now pass to discuss the objectivity of the judgments by which
+the agent meets the difficulties which such situations as these present.
+We shall seek to show that these judgments are constructive of an
+objective order of reality. It will be necessary in the first place to
+determine the psychological conditions of the more commonly recognized
+experience of Objectivity in the restricted sphere of sense-perception.
+There might otherwise remain a certain antecedent presumption against
+the thesis which we wish to establish even after the direct argument had
+been presented.[115]
+
+
+III
+
+Common-sense and natural science certainly tend to identify the
+objectively real with the existent in space and time. The physical
+universe is held to be palpably real in a way in which nothing not
+presented in sensuous terms can be. To most minds doubtless it is
+difficult to understand why Plato should have ascribed to the Ideas a
+higher degree of reality than that possessed by the particular objects
+of sense-perception, and still more difficult to understand his
+ascription of real existence to such Ideas as those of Beauty, Justice,
+and the Good. There is a certain apparent stability in a universe
+presented in "immediate" sense-perception--a universe with which we are
+in constant bodily intercourse--that seems not to belong to a mere
+order of relations which, if known in any sense, is not known to us
+through the senses. Moreover, knowledge of the physical world is felt to
+possess a higher degree of certainty than does any knowledge we can have
+of supposed economic or moral truth, or of economic or moral standards.
+Of such knowledge one is disposed to say, as Mr. Spencer does of
+metaphysics, that at the best it presupposes a long and elaborate
+inferential process which, as long, is likely to be faulty; whereas
+physical truth is immediate or else, when inference is involved in it,
+easy to be tested by appeal to immediate facts. Physical reality is a
+reality that can be seen and handled and felt as offering resistance,
+and this is evidence of objectivity of a sort not to be found in other
+spheres of knowledge for which the like claim is made.
+
+The force of these impressions (and it would not be difficult to find
+stronger statements in the history of scientific and ethical nominalism)
+diminishes if one tries to determine in what consists that objectivity
+which they uncritically assume as given in sense-perception. For one
+must recognize that not all our possible modes of sense-experience are
+equally concerned in the presentation of this perceived objective world.
+Certain sensory "quales" are immediately referred to outward objects as
+belonging to them. Certain others are, in a way, "inward," either not
+more definitely localized at all or merely localized in the sense-organ
+which mediates them. Now, the reason for this difference cannot lie in
+the content of the various sense-qualities abstractly taken. A visual
+sensation, apart from the setting in which it occurs in common
+experience, can be no more objective in its reference--indeed, can have
+no more reference of any kind--than the least definite and instructive
+organic sensation. For the degree of distinctness with which one
+discriminates sense-qualities depends upon the number and importance of
+the interpretative associations which it is important from time to time
+to "connect" with them; or, conversely, the sense-qualities are not
+_self_-discriminating in virtue of an intrinsic objective reference or
+meaning which each possesses and which drives it apart from all the
+rest. Indeed, an intrinsic meaning, if a sensation could possess one,
+would not only be superfluous in the development of knowledge, but, as
+likely to be mistaken for the acquired or functional meaning, even
+seriously confusing.[116]
+
+Now, it must be granted that, if the "simple idea of sensation" is
+without objective reference, no association with it of similarly
+abstract sensations can supply the lack. A "movement" sensation, or a
+tactual, having in itself no such meaning, cannot merely by being
+"associated" with a similarly meaningless visual sensation endow this
+latter with reference to an object. Objective reference is, in fact, not
+a sensuous thing; it is not a conscious "element," nor does it arise
+from any combination or fusion of such. It is neither _in_ the
+association of ideas as a constituent member, nor does it belong to the
+association considered as a sequence of psychical states. Instead, in
+our present view, it belongs to or arises out of the activity through
+which and with reference to which associations are first of all
+established. It is an aspect or kind of reference or category under
+which any sense-quality or datum is apperceived when it is held apart
+from the stream of consciousness in order that it may receive new
+meaning as a stimulus; and a sensation functioning in such a "state of
+consciousness"[117] is a psychical phenomenon very different from the
+conscious element of "analytical" psychology. The extent to which it is
+true that the objective world of sense-perception is pre-eminently
+visual and tactual is then merely an evidence of the extent to which the
+exigencies of the life-process have required finer sense-discrimination
+for the sake of more refined reaction within these spheres as compared
+with others. Our conclusion, then, must be that the consciousness of
+objectivity is not as such sensuous, even as given in our perception of
+the material world. The world, as viewed from the standpoint of a
+particular, practical emergency, is an objective world, not in virtue of
+its having a "sensuous" or a "material" aspect as something existent
+_per se_, but because it is a world of stimuli in course of definition
+for the guidance of activity.[118]
+
+It will be well to give further positive exposition of the meaning of
+the view thus stated. To return once more to our fundamental
+psychological conception, knowledge is essentially relevant to the
+solution of particular problems of more or less urgency and of various
+kinds and figures in the solution of such problems as the assemblage of
+consciously recognized symbols or stimuli by which various actions are
+suggested. The object as known is therefore not the same as the object
+as apprehended in other possible modes of being conscious of it. The
+workman who is actually using his tool in shaping his material, or the
+warrior who is actually using his weapon in the thick of combat, is, if
+conscious of these objects at all (and doubtless he may be conscious of
+them at such times), not conscious of them _as objects_--as the one
+might be, for example, in adjusting the tool for a particular kind of
+use, and the other in giving a keen edge to his blade. Under these
+latter circumstances the tool or weapon is an _object_, and its observed
+condition, viewed in the light of a purpose of using the object in a
+certain way, is regarded as properly suggesting certain changes or
+improvements. And likewise will the tool or the weapon have an objective
+character in the agent's apprehension in the moment of identifying and
+selecting it from among a number of others, or even in the act of
+reaching for it, especially if it is inconveniently placed. But in the
+act of freely using one's objective means the category of the objective
+plays no part in consciousness, because at such times there is no
+judgment respecting the means--because there is no sufficient occasion
+for the isolation of certain conscious elements from the rest of the
+stream of conscious experience to be defined as stimuli to certain
+needed responses. Such isolation will not normally take place so long as
+the reactions suggested by the conscious contents involved in the
+experience are fully adequate to the situation. Objects are not normally
+held apart as such from the stream of consciousness in which they are
+presented and recognized as possessing qualities warranting certain
+modes of conduct, excepting as it has become necessary to the attainment
+of the agent's purposes to modify or reconstruct his activity.[119]
+
+Are things, then, apprehended as objective in virtue of the agent's
+attitude toward them, or is the agent's attitude in a typical case
+grounded upon an antecedent determination of the objectivity of the
+things in question? We must answer, in the first place, that there can
+be no such antecedent determination. We may, it is true, speak of
+believing, on the evidence of sight or touch, that a certain object is
+really present before us. But neither sight nor touch possesses in
+itself, as a particular sense-quality, any objective meaning. If touch
+is _par excellence_ the sense of the objective and the appeal to touch
+the test of objectivity, this can only be because touch is the sense
+most closely and intimately connected in our experience with action.
+After any interval of hesitation and judgment, action begins with
+contact with and manipulation of the physical means which have been
+under investigation. Not only is touch the proximate stimulus and guide
+to manipulation, but all relevant knowledge which has been gained in any
+judgment-process, through the other senses, and especially through
+sight, must ultimately be reducible to terms of touch or other contact
+sense. The alleged tactual evidence of objectivity is, then, rather a
+confirmation than a difficulty for our present view. In short, we must
+dismiss as impossible the hypothesis that there can be a consciousness
+of objectivity which is not dependent upon and an expression of primary
+antecedent tendencies toward motor response to the presented stimulus.
+It is our attitude toward the prospective stimulus that mediates the
+consciousness of an object standing over against us.
+
+So far, indeed, is it from being true that objectivity is a matter for
+special determination antecedently to action that by common testimony
+the conviction of objectivity comes to us quite irresistibly. The object
+forces itself upon us, as we say, and "whether we will or no" we must
+recognize its presence there before us and its independence of any
+choice of ours or of our knowledge. In the cautious manipulation of an
+instrument, in the laborious shaping of some refractory material, in the
+performance of any delicate or difficult task, one's sense of the
+objectivity of the thing with which one works is as obtrusive as remorse
+or grief, and as little to be shaken off. We shall revert to this
+suggested analogy at a later stage in our discussion.
+
+We are now in a position to define more precisely the nature of the
+conditions in which the sense of objectivity emerges, and this will
+bring us to the point at which the objective import of our economic and
+ethical judgments can profitably be discussed. We have said that the
+world of the physical is objective, not in virtue of the sensuous terms
+in which it is presented, but because it is a world of stimuli for the
+guidance of human conduct. Under what circumstances, then, are we
+conscious of stimuli in their capacity of guides or incentives or
+grounds of conduct? And the answer must be that stimuli are interpreted
+as such, and so take on the character of objectivity, when their precise
+character as stimuli is still in doubt, and they must therefore receive
+further definition.
+
+For example, a man pursued by a wild beast must find some means of
+escape or defense, and, seeing a tree which he may climb or a stone
+which he may hurl, will inspect these as well as may be with reference
+to their fitness for the intended purpose. It is at just such moments as
+these, then, that physical things become things for knowledge and take
+on their stubbornly objective character--that is to say, when they are
+essentially problematic. Now, in order that any physical thing may be
+thus problematic and so possess objective character for knowledge, it
+must (1) be in part understood, and so prompt certain more or less
+indiscriminate responses; and (2) be in part as yet not understood--in
+such wise that, while there are certain indefinite or unmeasured
+tendencies on the agent's part to respond to the object--climb the tree
+or hurl the stone--there is also a certain failure of complete unity in
+the co-ordination of these activities, a certain contradiction between
+different suggestions of conduct which different observed qualities of
+the tree or stone may give, and so hesitation and arrest of final
+action. The pursued man views the tree suspiciously before trusting
+himself to its doubtful strength, or weighs well the stone and tests its
+rough edges before pausing to throw it. Thus, to state the matter
+negatively, there are two possible situations in which the sense of
+objectivity, if it emerge into consciousness at all, cannot long
+continue. An object---as, for example, some strange shrub or
+flower--which, in the case we are supposing, may attract the pursued
+wayfarer's notice, may awaken no responses relevant to the emergency in
+which the agent finds himself; and it will therefore forthwith lapse
+from consciousness. Or, on the other hand, the object, as the tree or
+stone, may rightly or wrongly seem to the agent so completely
+satisfactory, or, rather, in effect may _be_ so, as instantly to prompt
+the action which otherwise would come, if at all, only after a period of
+more or less prolonged attention. In neither of these cases, then, is
+there a problematic object. In the one the thing in question is wholly
+apart from any present interest, and therefore lapses. In the other case
+the thing seen is comprehended on the instant with reference to its
+general use and merges immediately into the main stream of the agent's
+consciousness without having been an object of express attention. In
+neither case, therefore, is there hesitation with reference to the
+thing in question--any conflict between inconsiderate positive responses
+prompted by certain features of the object and inhibitions due to
+recognition of its shortcomings. In a word, in neither case is there any
+judgment or possibility of judgment, and hence no sense of objectivity.
+We can have consciousness of an object, in the strict sense of the term,
+only when some part or general aspect of the total situation confronting
+an agent excites or seems to warrant responses which must be held in
+check for further determination. In terms of consciousness, an object is
+always an object of attention--that is, an object which is under process
+of development and reconstruction with reference to an end.
+
+An inhibited impulse to react in a more or less definite way to a
+stimulus is, then, the adequate condition of the emergence in
+consciousness of the sense of objectivity. So long as an activity is
+proceeding without check or interruption, and no conflict develops
+between motor responses prompted by different parts or aspects of the
+situation, the agent's consciousness will not present the distinction of
+Objective and Subjective. The mode of being conscious which accompanies
+free and harmonious activity of this sort may be exemplified by such
+experiences as æsthetic appreciation, sensuous enjoyment, acquiescent
+absorption in pleasurable emotion, or even intellectual processes of the
+mechanical sort, such as easy computation or the solution of simple
+algebraic problems--processes in which no more serious difficulty is
+encountered than suffices to stimulate a moderate degree of interest.
+If, however, reverting to the illustration, our present need for a stone
+calls for some property which the stone we have seized appears to lack,
+consciousness must pass over into the reflective or attentive phase. The
+stone will now figure as an _object_ possessing certain qualities which
+render it in a general way relevant to the emergency before us. A
+needed quality is missing, and this defect must hold in check all the
+imminent responses until discovery of the missing quality can set them
+free. In a word, the stone as known to us has assumed the station of
+subject in a judgment-process, and our effort is, if possible, to assign
+to it a new predicate relevant to our present situation. Psychologically
+speaking, the stone is an object, a stimulus to which we are endeavoring
+to find warrant for responding in some new or reconstructed way.
+
+In this process we must assume, then, first of all, an interest on the
+agent's part in the situation as a whole, which in the first place, in
+terms of the illustration, makes the pursued one note the tree or
+stone--which might otherwise have escaped his notice as completely as
+any passing cloud or falling leaf--and suggests what particular
+qualities or adaptabilities should be looked for in it. Given this
+interest in "making something" out of the total situation as explaining
+the recognition of the stone and the impulse to seize and hurl it, we
+find the sense of the stone's objectivity emerging just in the arrest of
+the undiscriminating impulse. The stone must have a certain meaning as a
+stimulus first of all, but it must be a meaning not yet quite defined
+and certain of acceptance. The stone will be an _object_ only if, and so
+long as, the undiscriminating impulses suggested by these elements of
+meaning are held in check in order that they may be ordered,
+supplemented, or made more definite. It is, then, the essence of the
+present contention that physical things are _objective_ in our
+experience in virtue of their recognized inadequacy as means or
+incentives of action--an inadequacy which, in turn, is felt as such in
+so far as we are seeking to use them as means or grounds of conduct, or
+to avail ourselves of them as conditions, in coping with the general
+situation from which our attention has abstracted them.
+
+From this analysis of the conditions of the consciousness of objectivity
+we must now proceed to inquire whether in the typical ethical and
+economic situations, as they have been described, essentially these same
+conditions are present.
+
+In the ethical situation, according to our statement, the subject of the
+judgment (the object of attention) is the new end which has just been
+presented in imagination, and we have now to see that the agent's
+attitude toward this end is for our present purpose essentially the same
+as toward a physical object which is under scrutiny. For just as the
+physical object is such for consciousness because it is partly relevant
+(whether in the way of furthering or of hindering) to the agent's
+purpose, but as yet partly not understood from this point of view, so
+the imaged end may likewise be ambiguous. The agent's moral purpose may
+be the (very likely mythical) primitive one of which we read in
+"associational" discussions of the moral consciousness--that of avoiding
+punishment. It may be that of "imitative," sympathetic obedience to
+authority--a sentiment whose fundamental importance for ethical
+psychology has long remained without due recognition.[120] It may be
+loyalty to an ideal of conscience, or yet again a purpose of enlargement
+and development of personality. But on either supposition the
+compatibility of the end with the prevailing standard or principle of
+decision may be a matter of doubt and so call for judgment. The problem
+will, of course, be a problem in the full logical sense as involving
+judgment of the type described in our discussion of the ethical
+situation only when the attitudes of obedience to authority and to fixed
+ideals have been outgrown; but, on the other hand, as might be shown, it
+is just the inevitable increasing use of judgment with reference to
+these formulations of the moral life which gradually undermines them
+and, by a kind of "internal dialectic" of the moral consciousness,
+brings the agent to recognition as well as to more perfect practice of a
+logical or deliberative method.
+
+The end, then, is, in the typical ethical situation, an _object_ which
+one must determine by analysis and reconstruction as a means or
+condition of moral "integrity" and progress. It is, accordingly, in the
+second place, an object upon whose determination a definite activity of
+the agent is regarded by him as depending. Just as in the physical
+judgment-process the object is set off over against the self and
+regarded as a given thing which, when once completely defined, will
+prompt certain movements of the body, so here the contemplated act is an
+object which, when fully defined in all its relevant psychological and
+sociological bearings, will prompt a definite act of rejection or
+acceptance by the self. Now, it might be shown, as we believe, that the
+complete psychological and sociological definition of the course of
+conduct _is_ in truth the full explanation of the choice; there is no
+_separate_ reaction of the moral self to which the course of conduct is,
+as defined, an external stimulus. So also in the sphere of physical
+judgment complete definition passes over into action--or the
+appreciative mode of consciousness which accompanies action--without
+breach of continuity. But within the judgment-process in all its forms
+there is in the agent's apprehension this characteristic feature of
+apparent separation between the subject as an objective thing presently
+to be known and used or responded to, and the predicate as a response
+yet to be perfected in details, but at the right time, when one has
+proper warrant, to be set free. It is not our purpose here to speak of
+metaphysical interpretations or misinterpretations of this functional
+distinction; but only to argue from the presence of the distinction in
+the ethical type of judgment as in the physical as genuine an
+objectivity for the ethical type as can be ascribed to the other. The
+ethical judgment is objective in the sense that in it an object--an
+imaged mode of conduct taken as such--is presented for development to a
+degree of adequacy at which one can accept it or reject it as a mode of
+conduct. The ethical predicates Right and Wrong, Good and Bad, each pair
+representing a particular standpoint, as we shall later see, signify
+this accepting or rejecting movement of the self, this "act of will," of
+which, as an act in due time to be performed, the agent is more or less
+acutely conscious in the course of moral judgment.
+
+In the economic situation also, as above described, there is present the
+requisite condition of the consciousness of objectivity. Here, as in the
+ethical situation, an object is presented which one must redetermine,
+and toward which one must presently act in a way likewise to be
+determined in detail in judgment. We shall defer until a later stage
+discussion of the reason why this subject of the economic judgment is
+the _means_ in the activity that is in progress. We are not yet ready to
+show that the means _must_ be the center of attention under the
+conditions which have been specified. Here we need only note the fact of
+common experience that economic judgment does center upon the means, and
+show that in this fact is given the objective status of the means in the
+judgment-process; for the economic problem is essentially that of
+withdrawing a portion, a "marginal increment," of the means from some
+use or set of uses to which they are at present set apart, and applying
+it to the new end that has come to seem, on ethical grounds at least,
+desirable; and we may regard this diversion as the essentially economic
+act which, in the agent's apprehension during judgment, is contingent
+upon the determination of the means. The object as economic is
+accordingly the means, or a marginal portion of the means, which is to
+be thus diverted (or, so to speak, exposed to the likelihood of such
+diversion), and its determination must be of such a nature as to show
+the economic urgency, or at least the permissibility, of this diversion.
+Into this determination, manifestly, the results of much auxiliary
+inquiry into physical properties of the means must enter--such
+properties, for example, as have to do with its technological fitness
+for its present use as compared with possible substitutes, and its
+adaptability for the new use proposed. Taking the word in the broad
+sense of _object of thought_, it is always an object in space and time
+to which the economic judgment assigns an economic value; and it is true
+here (just the same is true, _mutatis mutandis_, of the psychological
+and sociological determinations necessary to the fixation of ethical
+value) that the _economically motivated_ physical determination of the
+objective means from the standpoint of the emergency in hand is the full
+"causal" explanation of the economic act. It must, however, be carefully
+observed that this physical determination is in the typical case
+altogether incidental, from the agent's standpoint, to the assignment of
+an economic character or value to the means--a value which will at the
+close of the judgment come to conscious recognition. As we shall see,
+the process is directed throughout by reference to economic principles
+and standards, and what shall be an adequate determination in the case
+depends upon the precision with which these are formulated and the
+strenuousness with which they are applied. In a word, the economic
+judgment assigns to the physical object, as known at the outset, a new
+non-physical character. Throughout the judgment-process this character
+is gaining in distinctness, and at the end it is accepted as the Value
+of the means, as warrant for the diversion of them to the new use which
+has been decided on.[121]
+
+We have now to consider whether in the actual ethical and economic
+experience of men there is any direct evidence confirming the
+conclusions which our logical analysis of the respective situations
+would appear to require. Can any phases of the total experience of
+working out a satisfactory course of conduct in these typical
+emergencies be appealed to as actually showing at least some tacit
+recognition that these types of judgment present each one an order of
+reality or an aspect of the one reality?
+
+In the first place, then, one must recognize that in the agent's own
+apprehension a judgment of value has something more than a purely
+subjective meaning. It is never offered, by one who has taken the
+trouble to work it out more or less laboriously and then to express it
+in terms which are certainly objective, as a mere announcement of _de
+facto_ determination or a registration of arbitrary whim and caprice.
+One no more means to announce a groundless choice or a choice based upon
+pleasure felt in contemplation of the imaged end than in his judgments
+concerning the physical universe he means to affirm coexistences and
+sequences, agreements and disagreements, of "ideas" as psychical
+happenings. That there is an ethical or economic truth to which one can
+appeal in doubtful cases is, indeed, the tacit assumption in all
+criticism of another's deliberate conduct; the contrary assumption, that
+criticism is merely the opposition of one's own private prejudice or
+desire to the equally private prejudice or desire of another, would
+render all criticism and mutual discussion of ethical problems
+meaningless and futile in the plain man's apprehension as in the
+philosopher's. For the plain man has a spontaneous confidence in his
+knowledge of the material world which makes him look askance at any
+alleged analysis of his sense-perceptions and scientific judgments into
+"associations of ideas," and the same confidence, or something very like
+it, attaches to judgments of these other types. It may perhaps be
+easier (though the concession is a very doubtful one) to destroy a naïve
+confidence in the objectivity of moral truth than a like confidence in
+scientific knowledge, but it must be remembered that the plain man's
+sense of the urgency, at least of ethical problems, if not of economic,
+is commonly less acute than for the physical. In the plain man's
+experience serious moral problems are infrequent--problems of the true
+type, that is, which cannot be disposed of as mere cases of temptation;
+one must have attained a considerable capacity for sympathy and a
+considerable knowledge of social relations before either the recognition
+of such problems or proper understanding of their significance is
+possible. Moral and economic crises are not vividly presented in
+sensuous imagery excepting in minds of developed intelligence,
+experience, and imaginative power; and the judgments reached in coping
+with them do not, as a rule, obviously call for nicely measured,
+calculated, and adjusted bodily movements. The immediate act of
+executing an important economic judgment may be a very commonplace
+performance, like the dictation of a letter, and an ethical decision
+may, however great its importance for future overt conduct, be expressed
+by no immediate visible movements of the body. But this possible
+difference of impressiveness between physical and other types of
+judgments is from our present standpoint unessential; and indeed, after
+all, it cannot be denied that there are persons whose sense of moral
+obligation is quite as distinct and influential, and even sensuously
+vivid, as their conviction of the real existence of an external world.
+To the average man it certainly is clear that, as Dr. Martineau
+declares, "it is an inversion of moral truth to say ... that honour is
+higher than appetite _because_ we feel it so; we feel it so because it
+_is_ so. This '_is_' we know to be not contingent on our apprehension,
+not to arise from our constitution of faculty, but to be a reality
+irrespective of us in adaptation to which our nature is constituted, and
+for the recognition of which the faculty is given."[122] And the
+impressiveness, to most minds, of likening the sublimity of the moral
+law to the visible splendor of the starry heavens would seem to suggest
+that the apprehension of moral truth is a mode of consciousness, in form
+at least, so far akin to sense-perception as to be capable of
+illustration and even reinforcement from that type of experience.
+
+At this point we must revert to a suggestion which presented itself
+above in another connection, but which at the time could not be further
+developed. This was, in a word, that there is often a feeling of
+_obtrusiveness_ in our appreciation of the objectivity of the things
+before us in ordinary sense-perception (or physical judgment) which is
+not unlike the felt insistence of remorse and grief.[123] This feeling
+is so conspicuous a feature of the state of consciousness in physical
+judgment as frequently to serve the plain man as his last and
+irrefragable evidence of the metaphysical independence of the material
+world, and it is indeed a feature whose explanation does throw much
+light upon the meaning of the consciousness of objectivity as a factor
+within experience. Now, there is another common feeling--or, as we do
+not scruple to call it, another emotion--which is perhaps quite as often
+appealed to in this way; though, as we believe, never in quite the same
+connection in any argument in which the two experiences are called upon
+to do service to the same end. Material objects, we are told, are
+_reliable_ and _stable_ as distinguished from the fleeting illusive
+images of a dream--they have a "solidity" in virtue of which one can
+"depend upon them," are "hard and fast" remaining faithfully where one
+deposits them for future use or, if they change and disappear, doing so
+in accordance with fixed laws which make the changes calculable in
+advance. The material realm is the realm of "solid fact" in which one
+can work with assurance that causes will infallibly produce their right
+and proper effects, and to which one willingly returns from the
+dream-world in which his adversary, the "idealist," would hold him
+spellbound. We propose now briefly to consider these two modes of
+apprehension of external physical reality in the light of the general
+analysis of judgment given above--from which it will appear that they
+are, psychologically, emotional expressions of what have been set forth
+as the essential features of the judgment-situation, whether in its
+physical, ethical, or economic forms. From this we shall argue that
+there should actually be in the ethical and economic spheres similar, or
+essentially identical, "emotions of reality," and we shall then proceed
+to verify the hypothesis by pointing to those ethical and economic
+experiences which answer the description.
+
+We have seen that the center of attention or subject in the
+judgment-process is as such problematic--in the sense that there are
+certain of its observed and recognized attributes which make it in some
+sense relevant and useful to the purpose in hand, while yet other of its
+attributes (or absences of certain attributes) suggest conflicting
+activities. The object which one sees is certainly a stone and of
+convenient size for hurling at the pursuing animal. The situation has
+been analyzed and found to demand a missile, and this demand has led to
+search for and recognition of a stone. The stone, however, may be of a
+color suggesting a soft and crumbling texture, or its form may appear
+from a distance to be such as to make it practically certain to miss the
+mark, however carefully it may be aimed and thrown. Until these points
+of difficulty have been ascertained, the stone is wanting still in
+certain essential determinations. So far as it has been certainly
+determined, it prompts to the response directly suggested by one's
+general end of defense and escape, but there are these other indications
+which hold this response in check and which, if verified, will cause the
+stone to be let lie unused. Now, we have, in this situation of conflict
+or tension between opposed incitements given by the various
+discriminated characters of the object, the explanation of the aspect of
+obtrusiveness, of arbitrary resistance to and independence of one's
+will, which for the time being seems the unmistakable mark or
+coefficient of the thing's objectivity. For it is not the object as a
+whole that is obtrusive; indeed, clearly, there could be no
+obtrusiveness on the part of an "object as a whole," and in such a case
+there could also be no judgment. The obtrusion in the case before us is
+not a sense of the energy of a recalcitrant metaphysical object put
+forth upon a coerced and helpless human will, but simply a conscious
+interpretation of the inhibition of certain of the agent's motor
+tendencies by certain others prompted by the object's "suspicious" and
+as yet undetermined appearances or possible attributes. The object as
+amenable to use--those of its qualities which taken by themselves are
+unquestionable and clearly conducive to the agent's purpose--needs no
+attention for the moment, let us say. The attention is rather upon the
+dubious and to all appearance unfavorable qualities, and these for the
+time being make up the sum and content of the agent's knowledge of the
+object. On the other hand, the agent as an active self is identified
+with the end and with those modes of response to the object which
+promise to contribute directly to its realization. It is in this
+direction that his interest is set and he strains with all his powers of
+mind to move, and it is upon the self as identified with, and for the
+time being expressed in, the "effort of the agent's will" that the
+object as resistant, refusing to be misconstrued, obtrudes. One _must_
+see the object and _must_ acknowledge its apparent, or in the end its
+ascertained, unfitness. One is "coerced." The situation is one of
+conflict, and it is out of the conflict that the essentially emotional
+experience of "resistance" emerges.[124] The more special emotions of
+impatience, anger, or discouragement may in a given case not be present
+or may be suppressed, but the emotion of objectivity will still
+remain.[125]
+
+On the same general principles the other of our two coefficients of
+reality may be explained. Let us assume that the stone in our
+illustration has at last been cleared of all ambiguity in its
+suggestion, having been taken as a missile, and that the man in flight
+now holds it ready awaiting the most favorable moment for hurling it at
+his pursuer. It will hardly be maintained that under these conditions
+the coefficient of the stone's reality as an object consists in its
+obtrusiveness, in its resistance to or coercion of the self. The stone
+is now regarded as a fixed and determinate feature of the situation--a
+condition which can be counted on, whatever else may fail. Over against
+other still uncertain aspects of the situation (which are now in _their_
+turn real because resistant, coercive, and obtrusive) stands the stone
+as a reassuring fact upon and about which the agent can build up the
+whole plan of conduct which may, if all goes well, bring him safely out
+of his predicament. The stone has, so to speak, passed over to the "end"
+side of the situation, and although it may have to be rejected for some
+other means of defense, as the definition of the situation proceeds and
+the plan of action accordingly changes (as in some degree it probably
+must), nevertheless for the time being the imaged activities as stimulus
+to which the stone is now accepted are a fixed part of the plan and
+guide in further judgment of the means still undefined. The agent can
+hardly recur to the stone, when, after attending for a time to the
+bewildering perplexities of the situation, he pauses once more to take
+an inventory of his certain resources, without something of an emotional
+thrill of assurance and encouragement. In this emotional appreciation of
+the "solidity" and "dependability" of the object the second of our
+coefficients of reality consists. This might be termed the Recognition,
+the other the Perception, coefficient. Classifying them as emotions,
+because both are phenomena of tension in activity, we should group the
+Perception coefficient with emotions of the Contraction type, like grief
+and anger, and the Recognition coefficient with the Expansion emotions,
+like joy and triumph.
+
+Now, in the foregoing interpretation no reference has been made to any
+conditions peculiar to the physical type of judgment-situation. The
+ground of explanation has been the feature of arrest of activity for the
+sake of reconstruction, and this, if our analyses have been correct, is
+the essence of the ethical and economic situations as well as of the
+physical. Can there then be found in these two spheres experiences of
+the same nature and emerging under the same general conditions as our
+Perception and Recognition coefficients of reality? If so, then our case
+for the objective significance and value of ethical and economic
+judgment is in so far strengthened. (1) In the first place, then, the
+object in its economic character is problematic, assuming a desire on
+the agent's part to apply it, as means, to some new or freshly
+interesting end, because it has already been, and accordingly now is,
+set apart for other uses and cannot thoughtlessly be withdrawn from
+them. Extended illustration is not needed to remind one that these
+established and hitherto unquestioned uses will haunt the economic
+conscience as obtrusively and inhibit the desired course of economic
+conduct with as much energy of resistance as in the other case will any
+of the contrary promptings of a physical object. Moreover, the
+Recognition coefficient may as easily be identified in this connection.
+If one's scruples gain the day, in such a case one has at least a sense
+of comforting assurance in the conservatism of his choice and its
+accordance with the facts, however unreconciled in another way one may
+be to the deprivation that has thus seemed to be necessary. If, however,
+the new end in a measure makes good its case and the modes of
+expenditure which the "scruples" represented have been readjusted in
+accordance with it, then the means, no less than before the new
+interpretation had been placed upon them, will enjoy the status of
+Reality in the economic sense. They will be real now, however, not in
+the obtrusive way, as presenting aspects which inhibit the leading
+tendency in the judgment-process, but, instead, as means having a fixed
+and certain character in one's economic life, which, after the
+hesitation and doubt just now superseded, one may safely count upon and
+will do well to keep in view henceforth. (2) In the second place, mere
+mention of the corresponding ethical experiences must suffice, since
+only extended illustration from literature and life would be fully
+adequate: on the one hand, the "still small voice" of Conscience or the
+authoritativeness of Duty, "stern daughter of the voice of God;" and, on
+the other, the restful assurance with which, from the vantage-ground of
+a satisfying decision, one may look back in wonder at the possibility of
+so serious a temptation or in rejoicing over the new-won freedom from a
+burdensome and repressive prejudice.
+
+This must for the present serve as positive exposition of our view as
+to the objective significance of the valuational types of judgment.
+There are certain essential points which have as yet not been touched
+upon, and there are certain objections to the general view the
+consideration of which will serve further to explain it; but the
+discussion of these various matters will more conveniently follow the
+special analysis of the valuational judgments, to which we shall now
+proceed.
+
+
+IV
+
+In the last analysis the ultimate motive of all reflective thought is
+the progressive determination of the ends of conduct. Physical judgment,
+or, in psychological terms, reflective attention to objects in the
+physical world, is at every turn directed and controlled by reference to
+a gradually developing purpose, so that the process may also be
+described as one of bringing to fulness of definition an at first
+vaguely conceived purpose through ascertainment and determination of the
+means at hand. The problematic situation in which reflection takes its
+rise inevitably develops in this two-sided way into consciousness of a
+definite end on the one side, and of the means or conditions of
+attaining it on the other.
+
+It has been shown that there _may_ be involved in any finally
+satisfactory determination of a situation an explicit reflection upon
+and definition of the controlling end which is present and gives point
+and direction to the physical determination. But very often such is not
+the case. When a child sees a bright object at a distance and makes
+toward it, availing himself more or less skilfully of such assistance as
+intervening articles of furniture may afford, there is of course no
+consciousness on his part of any definite purpose as such, and this is
+to say that the child does not subject his conduct to criticism from the
+standpoint of the value or its ends. There is simply strong desire for
+the distant red ball, controlling all the child's movements for the
+time being and prompting a more or less critical inspection of the
+intervening territory with reference to the easiest way of crossing it.
+The purpose is implicitly accepted, not explicitly determined, as a
+preliminary to physical determination of the situation. If one may speak
+of a development of the purpose in such a case as this, one must say
+that the development into details comes through judgment of the
+environing conditions. To change the illustration in order not to commit
+ourselves to the ascription of too developed a faculty of judgment to
+the child, this is true likewise of any process of reflective attention
+in the mind of an adult in which a general purpose is accepted at the
+outset and is carried through to execution without reflection upon its
+ethical or economic character as a purpose. The specific purpose as
+executed is certainly not the same as the general purpose with which the
+reflective process took its rise. It is filled out with details, or may
+perhaps even be quite different in its general outlines. There has
+necessarily been development and perhaps even transformation, but our
+contention is that all this has been effected in and through a process
+of judgment in which the conditions of action, and not the purpose
+itself, have been the immediate objects of determination. Upon these the
+attention has been centered, though of course the attention was directed
+to them by the purpose. To state the case in logical terms, it has been
+only through selection and determination of the means and conditions of
+action from the standpoint of predicates suggested by the general
+purpose accepted at the outset that this purpose itself had been
+rendered definite and practical and possible of execution. Probably such
+cases are seldom to be found in the adult experience. As a rule, the
+course of physical or technological judgment will almost always bring to
+light implications involved in the accepted purpose which must
+inevitably raise ethical and economic questions; and the resolution of
+these latter will in turn afford new points of view for further physical
+determination of the situation. In such processes the logical points of
+the problem of ethical and economic valuation come clearly into view.
+
+In our earlier account of the matter it was more convenient to use
+language which implied that ethical and economic judgment must be
+preceded by implicit or explicit acceptance of a definite situation
+presented in sense-perception, and that these evaluating judgments could
+be carried through to their goal only upon the basis of such an
+inventory of fixed conditions. Thus the ultimate ethical quality of the
+general purpose of building a house would seem to depend upon the
+precise form which this purpose comes to assume after the actual
+presence and the quality of the means of building have been ascertained
+and the economic bearings of the proposed expenditure have been
+considered. Surely it is a waste of effort to debate with oneself upon
+the ethical rightness of a project which is physically impossible or
+else out of the question from the economic point of view. We are,
+however, now in a position to see that this way of looking at the matter
+is both inaccurate and self-contradictory. In the actual development of
+our purposes there is no such orderly and inflexible arrangement of
+stages; and if it is a waste of effort to deliberate upon a purpose that
+is physically impossible, it may, with still greater force, be argued
+that we cannot find, and judge the fitness of, the necessary physical
+means until we know what, precisely, it is that we wish to do. The truth
+is that there is constant interplay and interaction between the various
+phases of the inclusive judgment-process, or rather, more than this,
+that there is a complete and thoroughgoing mutual implication. It is
+indeed true that our ethical purposes cannot take form in a vacuum apart
+from consideration of their physical and economic possibility, but it
+is also true that our physical and economic problems are ultimately
+meaningless and impossible, whether of statement or of solution, except
+as they are interpreted as arising in the course of ethical conflict.
+
+We have, then, to do, in the present division, with situations in which,
+whether at the outset or from time to time during the course of the
+reflective process, there is explicit conflict between ends of conduct.
+These situations are the special province of the judgment of valuation.
+Our line of argument may be briefly indicated in advance as follows:
+
+1. The judgment of valuation, whether expressed in terms of the
+individual experience or in terms of social evolution, is essentially
+the process of the explicit and deliberate resolution of conflict
+between ends. As an incidental, though nearly always indispensable, step
+to the final resolution of such conflict, physical judgment, or, in
+general, the judgment of fact or existence, plays its part, this part
+being to define the situation in terms of the means necessary for the
+execution of the end that is gradually taking form. The two modes of
+judgment mutually incite and control each other, and neither could
+continue to any useful purpose without this incitement and control of
+the other. Both modes of judgment are objective in content and
+significance. At the end of the reflective process and immediately upon
+the verge of execution of the end or purpose which has taken form the
+result may be stated or apprehended in either of two ways: (1) directly,
+in terms of the end, and (2) indirectly, in terms of the ordered system
+of existent means which have been discovered, determined, and arranged.
+If such final survey of the result be taken by way of preparation for
+action, or for whatever reason, the end will be apprehended as
+possessing ethical value and the means, under conditions later to be
+specified, as possessing economic value.
+
+2. What then is the nature and source of this apprehension of end or
+means as valuable? The consciousness of end or means as valuable is an
+emotional consciousness expressive of the agent's practical attitude as
+determined in the just completed judgment of ethical or economic
+valuation and arising in consequence of the inhibition placed upon the
+activities which constitute the attitude by the effort of apprehending
+or imaging the valued object. Ethical and economic value are thus
+strictly correlative; psychologically they are emotional incidents of
+apprehending in the two respective ways just indicated the same total
+result of the inclusive complex judgment-process. Finally, as the moment
+of action comes on, the consciousness of the ethically valued end lapses
+first; then the consciousness of economic value is lost in a purely
+"physical," _i. e._, technological, consciousness of the means and their
+properties and interrelations in the ordered system which has been
+arranged; and this finally merges into the immediate and
+undifferentiated consciousness of activity as use of the means becomes
+sure and unhesitating.
+
+When we say that the ends which oppose each other in an ethical
+situation (that is, a situation for the time being seen in an ethical
+aspect) are related, and the ends in an economic situation are not, we
+by no means wish to imply that in the one case we have in this fact of
+relatedness a satisfactory solution at hand which is wanting in the
+other. To feel, for example, that there is a direct and inherent
+relationship between a cherished purpose of self-culture and an ideal of
+social service which seems now to require the abandonment of the purpose
+does not mean that one yet knows just _how_ the two ends should be
+related in his life henceforth; and again, to say that one can see no
+inherent relation between a desire for books and pictures and the need
+of food, excepting in so far as both ends depend for their realization
+upon a limited supply of means, is not to say that the issue of the
+conflict is not of ethical significance. Such a view as we here reject
+would amount to a denial of the possibility of genuinely problematic
+ethical situations[126] and would accord with the opinion that economic
+judgment as such lies apart from the sphere of ethics and is at most
+subject only to occasional revision and control in the light of ethical
+considerations.
+
+By the relatedness of the ends in a situation we mean the fact, more or
+less explicitly recognized by the agent, that the new, and as yet
+undefined, purpose which has arisen belongs in the same system with the
+end, or group of ends, which the standard inhibiting immediate action
+represents. The standard inhibits action in obedience to the impulse
+that has come to consciousness, and the image of the new end is, on its
+part, definite and impressive enough to inhibit action in obedience to
+the standard. The relatedness of the two factors is shown in a practical
+way by the fact that, in the first instance at least, they are tacitly
+expected to work out their own adjustment. By the process already
+described in outline, subject and predicate begin to develop and thereby
+to approach each other, and a provisional or partial solution of the
+problem may thus be reached without resort to any other method than that
+of direct comparison and adjustment of the ends involved on either side.
+The standard which has been called in question has enough of congruence
+with the new imaged purpose to admit of at least some progress toward a
+solution through this method.
+
+We can best come to an understanding of this recognition of the
+relatedness of the ends in ethical valuation by pausing to examine
+somewhat carefully into the conditions involved in the acceptance or
+reflective acknowledgment of a defined end of conduct as being one's
+own. Any new end in coming to consciousness encounters some more or
+less firmly established habit represented in consciousness by a sign or
+symbolic image of some sort, the habit being itself the outcome of past
+judgment-process. Our present problem is the significance of the agent's
+recognition of a relatedness between his new impulsive end and the end
+which represents the habit, and we shall best approach its solution by
+considering the various factors and conditions involved in the agent's
+conscious recognition of the established end as being such.
+
+
+In any determinate end there is inevitably implied a number of groups of
+factual judgments in which are presented the objective conditions under
+which execution of the end or purpose must take place. There is in the
+first place a general view of environing conditions, physical and
+social, presented in a group of judgments (1) descriptive of the means
+at hand, of the topography of the region in which the purpose is to be
+carried out, of climatic conditions, and the like, and (2) descriptive
+of the habits of thought and feeling of the people with whom one is to
+deal, their prejudices, their tastes, and their institutions. The
+project decided on may, let us say, be an individual or a national
+enterprise, whether philanthropic or commercial, which is to be launched
+in a distant country peopled by partly civilized races. In addition to
+these groups of judgments upon the physical and sociological conditions
+under which the work must proceed, there will also be a more or less
+adequate and impartial knowledge of one's own physical and mental
+fitness for the enterprise, since the work as projected may promise to
+tax one's physical powers severely and to require, for its successful
+conduct, large measure of industry, devotion, patience, and wisdom.
+Indeed any determinate purpose whatever inevitably implies a more or
+less varied and comprehensive inventory of conditions. Further
+illustration is not necessary for our present purpose. We may say that
+in a general way the conditions relevant to a practical purpose will
+group themselves naturally under four heads of classification, as
+physical, sociological, physiological, and psychological. All four
+classes are objective, though the last two embrace conditions peculiar
+to the agent as an individual over against the environment to which for
+purposes of his present activity he stands in a sense opposed.
+
+Now our present interest is not so much in the enumeration and
+classification of possible relevant conditions in a typical situation as
+in the significance of these relevant conditions in the agent's
+apprehension of them. Perhaps this significance cannot better be
+described than by saying that essentially and impressively the
+conditions are apprehended as, taken together, _warranting_ the purpose
+that has been determined. We appeal, in support of this account of the
+matter, to an impartial introspection of the way in which the means and
+conditions of action stand related to the formed purpose in the moment
+of survey of a situation. The various details presented in the survey of
+a situation are apprehended, not as bare facts such as one might find
+set down in a scientist's notebook, but as warranting--as closely,
+uniquely, and vitally relevant to--the action that is about to be taken.
+This, as we believe, is a fair account of the situation in even the
+commoner and simpler emergencies that confront the ordinary man. Quite
+conspicuously is it true of cases in which the purpose is a purely
+technological one that has been worked out with considerable difficulty
+and is therefore not executed until after a somewhat careful survey of
+conditions has been taken. It is often true likewise in cases of express
+ethical judgment; if the ethical phases of the reflective process have
+not been excessively long and difficult, our definite sense of the
+ethical value of the act we are about to do lapses quite easily, and the
+factual aspects and features of the situation as given in one or more of
+the four classes which we have distinguished take on an access of
+significance in their character of warranting, confirming, or even
+compelling the act determined upon. Of our ordinary sense-perception in
+the moments of its actual functioning no less than of conscience in its
+aspect of a moral perceptive faculty are the words of Bishop Butler
+sensibly true that "to preside and govern, from the very economy and
+constitution of man, belongs to it."[127] I Even in cases of more
+serious moral difficulty this sanctioning aspect of the means and
+conditions of action is not overshadowed. If the situation is one in
+which by reason of their complexity these play a conspicuous rôle and
+must be surveyed, by way of preparation on the agents' part, for
+performance of the act, they inevitably assume, for the agent, their
+proper functional character. In general, the conditions presented in the
+system of factual judgments have a certain "rightful authority" which
+they seem to lend to the purpose or end with reference to which they
+were worked out to their present degree of factual detail. The
+conditions can thus seem to sanction the end because conditions and end
+have been worked out together. Gradual development on the one side
+prompts analytical inquiry upon the other and is in turn directed and
+advanced by the results of this inquiry. In the end the result may be
+read off either in terms of end or in terms of conditions and
+means.[128] The two readings must be in accord and the agent's
+apprehension of the conditions as warrant for the end is expression in
+consciousness of this "agreement."[129]
+
+Now in this mode of apprehension of factual conditions there is a highly
+important logical implication--an implication which inevitably comes
+more and more clearly into view with the continued exercise of judgment,
+even though the agent's habit of interest in the scrutiny of perplexing
+situations may still remain, by reason of the want of trained capacity
+for a broader view, limited in its range quite strictly to the physical
+sphere. This implication is, we shall declare at once, that of an
+endeavoring, striving, active principle or self which can be helped or
+hindered in its unfolding by particular purposes and sets of
+corresponding conditions--can lose or gain, through devotion to
+particular purposes, in the breadth, fulness, and energy of its life.
+The agent's apprehension of and reference to this active principle of
+course varies in all degrees of explicitness, according to
+circumstances, from the vague awareness that is present in a simple case
+of physical judgment to the clear recognition and endeavor at definition
+that are characteristic of serious ethical crises.
+
+That the situation should develop and bring to light this factor is what
+should be expected on general grounds of logic--for to say that a set of
+conditions warrants or sanctions or confirms a given purpose implies
+that our purposes can stand in need of warrant, and this would seem to
+be impossible apart from reference to a process whose maintenance and
+development in and through our purposes are assumed as being as a matter
+of course desirable. It is of the essence of our contention that the
+apprehension of the conditions of action as _warranting the end_ is a
+primordial and necessary feature of the situation--indeed, its
+constitutive feature. If our concern were with the psychological
+development of self-consciousness as a phase of reflective experience,
+we should endeavor to show that this development is mediated in the
+first instance by the "subjective" phenomena of feeling, emotion, and
+desire which find their place _in the course_ of the judgment-process.
+We should then hold that, with the _conclusion_ of the judgment-process
+and the accompanying sense of the known conditions as reassuring and
+confirmatory of the end, comes the earliest possibility of a
+discriminative recognition of the self as having been all along a
+necessary factor in the process. We should hold that outside of the
+_process_ of reflective attention there can be no psychical or
+"elementary" _beginnings_ of self-consciousness, and then that, except
+as a development out of the experience to which we have referred as
+marking the _conclusion_ of the attentive process, there can be no
+recognized specific and in any degree definable consciousness of self.
+All this, however, lies rather beside our present purpose. We wish
+simply to insist that it is out of the apprehension of conditions as
+reassuring and confirmatory, out of this "primordial germ," that the
+agent's definite recognition of himself as a center of development and
+expenditure of energy takes its rise. Here are the beginnings of the
+possibility of self-conscious ethical and economic valuation.
+
+This apprehension of the means as _warranting_ is, we have held, a fact
+even when the means surveyed are wholly of the physical sort, and we
+have thereby implied that consciousness of the self as "energetic" may
+take its rise in situations of this type or during the physical stage in
+the development of a more complex total situation. It would be an
+interesting speculation to consider to what extent and in what way the
+development of the sciences of sociology and physiology may have been
+essentially facilitated by the emergence of this form of
+self-consciousness. But however the case may stand with these sciences
+or with the rise of real interest in them in the mind of a given
+individual, interest in the objective psychological conditions of a
+contemplated act is certainly very closely dependent upon interest in
+that subjective self which one has learned to know through the past
+exercise of judgment in definition and contemplation of conditions of
+the three other kinds. The more diversified and complex the array of
+physical and social conditions with reference to which one is to act,
+the more important becomes not simply a clearly articulated knowledge of
+these, but also a knowledge of oneself. The self that is warranted in
+its purpose by the surveyed conditions must hold itself in a steady and
+consistent attitude during the performance on pain of "falling short of
+its opportunity" and thereby rendering nugatory the reflective process
+in which the purpose was worked out. Experience abundantly shows how
+easily the assurance that comes with the survey of conditions may come
+to grief, though there may have been on the side of the conditions, so
+far as defined, no visible change; and in so far as self-consciousness
+has already emerged as a distinguishable factor in such situations,
+failures of the sort we here refer to are the more easily identified and
+interpreted. Some sudden impulse may have broken in upon the execution
+of the chosen purpose; there may have been an unexpected shift of
+interest away from that general phase of life which the purpose
+represented; or in any one of a number of other ways may have come about
+a wavering and a slackening in the resolution which marked the
+commencement of action. The "energetic" self forthwith (if we may so
+express it) recognizes that the sanction which the conditions so far as
+then known gave to its purpose was a misleading because an incomplete
+one, and it proceeds to develop within itself a new range of objective
+fact in which may be worked out the explanation, and thereby a method of
+control, of these new disturbing phenomena. The qualities of patience
+under disappointment, courage in encountering resistance, steadiness and
+self-control in sustained and difficult effort--these qualities and
+others of like nature come to be discriminated from each other by
+introspective analysis and may be as accurately measured, and in general
+as objectively studied, as any of the conditions to a saving knowledge
+and respect of which one may already have attained, and these newly
+determined psychological conditions will henceforth play the same part
+in affording sanction to one's purposes as do the rest. An ordered
+system of psychological categories or points of view comes to be
+developed, and an accurate statement of conditions of personal
+disposition and capacity relevant to each emergency as it arises will
+hereafter be worked out--over against and in tension with one's
+gradually forming purposes in like manner as are statements of all the
+other relevant objective aspects of the situation.[130]
+
+In the "energetic" self, we shall now seek to show, we have the common
+and essential principle of both ethical and economic valuation which
+marks these off from other and subordinate types of judgment. Let us
+determine as definitely as possible the nature and function of this
+principle.
+
+
+The recognition of the chosen purpose as one favorable or otherwise to
+the self, and so the recognition of the self as capable of furtherance
+or retardation by its chosen purposes, is not always a feature of the
+state of mind which may ensue upon completed judgment. In the commoner
+situations of the everyday life of normal persons, as practically always
+in the lives of persons of relatively undeveloped reflective powers, it
+is quite wanting as a separate distinguished phase of the experience. In
+such cases it is present, if present at all, merely as the vaguely felt
+implicit meaning of the recognition that the known conditions sanction
+and confirm the purpose. Such situations yield easily to attack and
+threaten none of those dangers, none of those possible occasions for
+regret or remorse, of which complex situations make the person of
+developed reflective capacity and long experience so keenly
+apprehensive. They are disposed of with comparatively little of
+conscious reconstruction on either the subject or the predicate side,
+and when a conclusion has been reached the agent's recognition of the
+conditions carries with it the comfortable though too often delusive
+assurance of the complete and perfect eligibility of the purpose. If the
+question of eligibility is raised at all, the answer is given on the
+tacit principle that "whatever purpose is, is right." To the "plain
+man," and to all of us on certain sides of our lives, every purpose for
+which the requisite means and factual conditions are found to be at hand
+is, just as our purpose, therefore right.
+
+The same experience of failure and disappointment which proves our
+purpose to have been, from the standpoint of enlargement and enrichment
+of the self, a mistaken one brings a clearer consciousness of the logic
+implicit in our first confident belief in the purpose, and at the same
+time emphasizes the need of making this logic explicit. The purpose, as
+warranted to us by the conditions and assembled means that lay before
+us, was our own, and _as our own_ was implicitly a purpose of
+furtherance of the self. The disappointment that has come brings this
+implication more clearly into view, and likewise the need of methodical
+procedure, not as before in the determination of _conditions_, but in
+the determination of purposes as such; for the essence of the situation
+is that the _execution_ of the purpose has brought to light some
+unforeseen consequence now recognized as having been all the while in
+the nature of things involved in the purpose. This consequence or group
+of consequences consists (in general terms) in the abatement or arrest
+of desirable modes of activity which find their motivation elsewhere in
+the agent's system of accepted ends, and it is registered in
+consciousness in that sense of restriction or repression from without
+which is a notable phase of all emotional experience, particularly in
+its early stages. The consequences are as undesirable as they are
+unexpected, and the reaction against them, at first emotional, presently
+passes over into the form of a reflective interpretation of the
+situation to the effect that the self has suffered a loss by reason of
+its thoughtless haste in identifying itself with so unsafe a
+purpose.[131]
+
+It is the essential logical function of the consciousness of self to
+stimulate the valuation processes which take their rise in the stage of
+reflective thought thus attained. The consciousness of self is a
+peculiarly baffling theme for discussion from whatever point of view,
+because one finds its meaning shifting constantly between the two
+extremes of a subjectivity to which "all objects of all thought" are
+external and an objective thing or system of energies which is known
+just as other things are--known in a sense by itself, to be sure, but
+_known_ nevertheless, and thought of as an object standing in possible
+relations to other objects. Now, it is of the subjective self that we
+are speaking when we say that its essential function is the stimulation
+or incitement of the valuation processes, but manifestly in order to
+serve thus it must nevertheless be presented in some sort of sensuous
+imagery. The subjective self may, in fact, be thought of in many
+ways--presented in many different sorts of imagery--but in all its forms
+it must be distinguished carefully from that objective self which, as
+described in psychology, is the assemblage of conditions under which the
+subjective or "energetic" self works out its purposes. It may be the
+pale, attenuated double of the body, or a personal being standing in
+need of deliverance from sin, or an atom of soul-substance, or, in our
+present terminology, a center of developing and unfolding energy. The
+significant fact is that, however different in content and in motive
+these various presentations of the subjective self may be, they are, one
+and all, as presentations and as in so far objective, stimuli to some
+definite response. The savage warrior deposits his double in a tree or
+stone for safety while he goes into battle; the self that is to be saved
+from sin is a self that prompts certain acceptable acts in satisfaction
+of the quasi-legal obligations that the fact of sin has laid upon the
+agent. The presented self, whatever the form it may assume as
+presentation, has its function, and this function is in general that of
+stimulus to the conservation and increase, in some sense, of the self
+that is not presented, but for whom the presentation is. Now our own
+present description of the self as "energetic," as a center or source of
+developing and unfolding energy is in its way a presentation. It
+consists of sensuous imagery and suggests a mechanical process, or the
+growth of a plant perhaps, which if properly safeguarded will go on
+satisfactorily--a process which one must not allow to be perturbed or
+hindered by external resistance or internal friction or to run down. To
+many persons doubtless such an account would seem arbitrary and
+fantastic in the extreme, but no great importance need be attached to
+its details. The kind and number and sensuous vividness of the details
+in which this essential content of presentation may be clothed must of
+course depend, for each person, upon his psychical idiosyncrasy.
+
+Indeed, as the habit of reflection upon purposes comes to be more
+firmly fixed, and the procedure of valuation to be consciously
+methodical and orderly, the sensuous content of the presented self must
+grow constantly more and more attenuated until it has declined into a
+mere unexpressed principle or maxim or tacit presumption, prescribing
+the free and impartial application of the method of valuation to
+particular practical emergencies as these arise. For a self, consisting
+of presented content of whatever sort, which one seeks to further
+through attentive deliberation upon concrete purposes, must, just in so
+far as it has _content_, determine the outcome of ethical judgment in
+definite ways. Thus the soul that must be saved from sin (if this be the
+content of the presented self) is one that has transgressed the law in
+certain ways and the right relations that should subsist between
+creature and Creator, and has thereby incurred a more or less
+technically definable guilt. This guilt can only be removed and the self
+rehabilitated in its normal relations to the law by an appropriate
+response to the situation--by a choice on the agent's part, first, of a
+certain technical procedure of repentance, and then of a settled purpose
+of living as the law prescribes.[132] So also our own image of the self
+as "energetic" after the manner of a growing organism may well seem, if
+taken too seriously as to its presentational details, to foster a bias
+in favor of over-conservative adherence to the established and the
+accredited as such.[133]
+
+The argument of the last few paragraphs may be restated in the
+following way in terms of the evolution of the individual's moral
+attitude or technique of self-control:
+
+1. In the stage of moral evolution in which custom and authority are the
+controlling principles of conduct, moral judgment in the proper sense of
+self-conscious, critical, and reconstructive valuation of purposes is
+wanting. Such judgment as finds here a place is at best of the merely
+casuistical type, looking to a determination of particular cases as
+falling within the scope of fixed and definite concepts. There is no
+self-consciousness except such as may be mediated by the sentiment of
+willing obedience. It is, at this stage, not the _particular sort_ of
+conduct which the law prescribes that in the agent's apprehension
+enlarges and develops the self; so far as any thought of enlargement and
+development of the self plays a part in influencing conduct, these
+effects are such as, in the agent's trusting faith, will come from an
+entire and willing acceptance of the law as such. "If any man will do
+His will, he shall know of the doctrine." Moreover, the stage of custom
+and authority goes along with, in social evolution, either very simple
+social conditions or else conditions which, though very complex, are
+stable, so that in either case the conditions of conduct are in general
+in harmony with the conduct which custom and authority prescribe. The
+law, therefore, can be absolute and takes no account of possible
+inability to obey. The divine justice punishes infraction of the law
+simply as objective infraction; not as sin, in proportion to the
+sinner's responsibility.
+
+2. But inevitably custom and authority come to be inadequate. As social
+conditions change, custom becomes antiquated and authority blunders,
+wavers, contradicts itself in the endeavor to prescribe suitable modes
+of individual conduct. Obedience no longer is the way to light. The self
+becomes self-conscious through feeling more and more the repression and
+the misdirection of its energies that obedience now involves. This is
+the stage of subjective morality or conscience; and the rise of
+conscience, the attitude of appeal to conscience, means the beginning of
+endeavor at _methodical solution_ of those new problematic situations in
+the attempt to deal with which authority as such has palpably collapsed.
+We say, however, that conscience is the _beginning_ of this endeavor;
+for conscience is, in fact, an ambiguous and essentially transitional
+phenomenon. On the one hand conscience is the inner nature of a man
+speaking within him, and so the self furthers its own growth in
+listening to this expression of itself. In this aspect conscience is
+methodological. But on the other hand conscience _speaks_, and,
+speaking, must say something determinate, however general this something
+may be. In this aspect conscience is a _résumé_ of the _generic_ values
+realized under the system of custom and authority, but to the present
+continued attainment of which the _particular prescriptions_ of custom
+and authority are no longer adequate guides. Conscience is thus at once
+an inward prompting to the application of logical method to the case in
+hand and a body of general or specific rules under some one of which the
+case can be subsumed. In ethical theory we accordingly find no unanimity
+as to the nature of conscience. At the one extreme it is the voice of
+God speaking in us or through us, in detailed and specific terms--and
+so, virtually, custom and authority in disguise. At the other it is an
+empty abstract intuition that the right is binding upon us--and, so,
+simply the hypostasis of demand for a logical procedure. The history of
+ethics presents us with all possible intermediate conceptions in which
+these extreme motives are more or less skilfully interwoven or combined
+in varying proportions. The truth is that conscience is essentially a
+transitional conception, and so necessarily looks before and after. In
+one of its aspects it is a self which has come to miss (and therefore to
+image for itself) the values and, it may be, a certain dawning sense of
+vitality and growth which obedience to authority once afforded.[134] In
+its other aspect it is a self that is looking forward in a self-reliant
+way to the determination on its own account of its purposes and values.
+And finally, as for the environing world of means and conditions,
+clearly this is not necessarily harmonious with and amenable to
+conscience; indeed, in the nature of things it can be only partially so.
+The morality of conscience is, therefore, either mystical, a morality
+that seeks to escape the world in the very moment of its affirmation
+that the world is unreal (because worthless), or else it takes refuge in
+a virtual distinction between "absolute" and "relative" morality (to
+borrow a terminology from a system in which properly it should have no
+place), perhaps setting up as an intermediary between heaven and earth a
+machinery of special dispensation.[135]
+
+3. Conscience professes in general, that is, to be autonomous, and the
+profession is, strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. Moreover,
+apart from considerations of the logic of the situation, theories of
+conscience have, as a matter of fact, always lent themselves kindly to
+theological purposes just as the theory of self-realization in its
+classic modern statement rests upon a metaphysical doctrine of the
+Absolute.[136] Inevitably the movement concealed within this essentially
+unstable conception must have its legitimate outcome (1) in a clearing
+of the presented self of its fixed elements of content, thus setting it
+free in its character of a non-presentational principle of valuation,
+and (2) a setting apart of these elements of content from the principle
+of valuation as standards for reference and consultation rather than as
+law to be obeyed.
+
+We have thus correlated our account of the logic whereby the "energetic"
+self comes to explicit recognition as stimulus to the valuation-process
+with the three main stages in the moral evolution of the individual and
+the race. We were brought to this first-mentioned part of our discussion
+by our endeavor to find out the factors involved in the first acceptance
+of a conscious purpose (or, indifferently, the subsequent recognition of
+it as a standard)--an endeavor prompted by the need of distinguishing,
+with a view to their special analysis, the two types of
+valuation-process. We now return to this problem.
+
+
+The following illustration will serve our present undertaking: A lawyer
+or man of business is struck by the great need of honest men in public
+office, or has had his attention in some impressive way called to the
+fact of great inequality in the present distribution of wealth, and to
+the diverse evils resulting therefrom. These facts hold his attention,
+perhaps against his will, and at last suggest the thought of his making
+some personal endeavor toward improvement of conditions, political or
+social, as the case may be. On the other hand, however, the man has
+before him the promise of a successful or even brilliant career in his
+chosen occupation, and is already in the enjoyment of a substantial
+income, which is rapidly increasing. Moreover, he has a family growing
+up about him, and he is not simply strongly interested in the early
+training and development of his children, and desirous of having himself
+some share in conducting it, but he sees that the suitable higher
+education of his children will in a few years make heavy demands upon
+his pecuniary means. Here, then, we have a situation the analysis of
+which will enable us to distinguish and define the provinces of ethical
+and economic judgment.
+
+It is easy to see that we have here a conflict between ends. On the one
+side is the thought of public service in some important office or, let
+us say, the thought of bettering society in a more fundamental way by
+joining the propaganda of some proposed social reform. This end rests
+upon certain social impulses in the man's nature and appeals to him as
+strongly, we may fairly assume, as would any purpose of immediate
+self-interest or self-indulgence, so that it stands before him and urges
+him with an insistent pertinacity that at first even puts him on his
+guard against it as a temptation. Over against this concrete end or
+subject of moral valuation stand other ends comprehended or symbolized
+in the ideals of regular and steady industry, of material provision for
+family, of paternal duty toward children, of scholarly achievement as
+lawyer or judge, and the like--ideals which are indeed practical and
+personal, but which, as they now function, are general or universal in
+character, are lacking in the concreteness and emotional quality which
+belong to the new purpose which has just come to imagination and has
+brought these ideals into action on the predicate side. Will this life
+of social agitation really be quite "respectable," and befitting the
+character of a sober and industrious man? Will it enable me to support
+and educate my family? Will it permit me to devote sufficient attention
+to their present care and training? And will it not so warp my nature,
+so narrow and concentrate my interests, as in a measure to disqualify me
+for the right exercise of paternal authority over them in years to come?
+Moreover, will not a life of agitation, of constant intercourse with
+minds and natures in many ways inferior to my own and those of my
+present professional associates, lower my intellectual and moral
+standards, and so make of me in the end a less useful member of society
+than I am at present? These and other questions like them present the
+issue in its earlier aspect. Presently, however, the tentative purpose
+puts in its defense, appealing to yet other recognized ideals or
+standards of self-sacrifice, benevolence, or social justice as witnesses
+in its favor. The conflict thus takes on the subject-predicate form, as
+has already been explained. On the one hand we have the undefined but
+strongly insistent concrete purpose; on the other hand we have a number
+of symbolic concepts or universals standing for accepted and accredited
+habitual modes of conduct. The problem is that of working the two sides
+of the situation together into a unified and harmonious plan of conduct
+which shall be at once concrete and particular, as a plan chosen by way
+of solution of a given present emergency, and universal, as having due
+regard for past modes of conduct, and as itself worthy of consideration
+in coping with future emergencies.
+
+Now, how shall we discriminate the ethical and the economic aspects of
+the situation which we have described? We shall most satisfactorily do
+this through a consideration of the various sorts of conditions and
+means of which account must be taken in working the situation through to
+a solution, or (to express it more accurately) the various sorts of
+conditions and means which need to be defined over against the purpose
+as the purpose gradually develops into detailed form.
+
+We may say, first of all, that there are _psychological_ conditions
+which must be taken into consideration in the case before us. Our thesis
+is that in so far as a situation gives rise to the determination of
+psychological conditions and is advanced along the way toward final
+solution through determination of these, the situation is an ethical
+one. In other words, we hold that the ends at issue in the situation are
+"related" in so far as they depend upon the same set of psychological
+conditions. In so far as these statements are not true of the situation
+there must be a resort to economic judgment.
+
+By the general questions suggested above as presenting themselves to
+the agent we have indicated in what way the course of action taken must
+have regard to certain psychological considerations. Entering upon the
+new way of life will inevitably lessen the agent's interest in his
+present professional pursuits and so make difficult, and in the end even
+irksome, any attempt at continuing in them either as a partial means of
+livelihood or as a recreation. The new work will be absorbing--as indeed
+it must be if it is to be worth while. In the same way the man must
+recognize that his nature is not one of the rare ones so richly endowed
+in capacity for sympathy that constant familiarity with general
+conditions of misery and suffering does not dull their fineness of
+sensibility to the special concerns and interests of particular
+individuals. If he takes his suffering fellow-men at large for his
+children, his own children will probably suffer just in so far the loss
+of a father's special sympathy and understanding care. And likewise he
+must be drawn away and isolated from his friends, for it will be hard
+for him, he must foresee, to hold free and intimate converse with men
+whose ways of thinking lie apart from his own controlling interest and
+for whose insensibility to the things that move him so profoundly he
+must come more and more to feel a certain impatience if not contempt.
+Not to enlarge upon these possibilities and others of like nature, we
+must see that reflection upon the situation must presently bring to
+consciousness these various consequences of the kind of action which is
+proposed and a recognition that the ground of relation between them and
+the action proposed lies in certain qualities and limitations of his own
+nature. These latter are for him the general psychological conditions of
+action, his "empirical self," the general nature of which he has
+doubtless already come to be familiar with in many former situations
+perhaps wholly different in superficial aspect from from the present
+one.
+
+Now, just in so far as there is this relation of mutual exclusiveness
+between the end proposed and certain of the standard ends or modes of
+conduct which are involved, judgment will be by the direct or ethical
+method of adjustment presently to be described. Let us assume
+accordingly that a tentative solution of the problem has been reached to
+the effect that a portion of the lawyer's time shall be given to his
+profession and to his family life, and that the remainder shall be given
+to a moderate participation in the social propaganda. Over against this
+tentative ethical solution, as its warrant in the sense explained above,
+will stand in the survey of the situation that may now be taken a
+certain fairly definite disposition or _Anlage_ of the capacities and
+functions of the empirical self.[137] Now on the basis of the ethical
+solution thus reached there will be further study of the situation,
+perhaps as a result of failure in the attempt to carry the solution into
+practice, but more probably as a further preparation for overt action.
+Forthwith it develops that the compromise proposed will be impossible.
+Participation in the social agitation will excite hostility on the part
+of the classes from which possible clients would come and will cause
+distrust and a suspicion of inattention to details of business among the
+lawyer's present clientage. There are, in a word, a whole assemblage of
+"external" sociological conditions (and we need not stop to speak of
+physical conditions which co-operate with these and contribute to their
+effect) which effectually veto the plan proposed. In general these
+external conditions are such as to deprive the agent of the means of
+living in the manner which the ethical determination of the end
+proposes. In the present case, unless some other more feasible
+compromise can be devised, either the one extreme or the other must be
+chosen--either continuance in the profession and the corresponding
+general scheme of life or the social propaganda and reliance upon such
+scant and precarious income as it may incidentally afford.
+
+We can now define the economic aspect of a situation in terms of our
+present illustration. The end which the lawyer had in view in a vague
+and tentative way was, as we saw, defined with reference to his ethical
+standards--that is to say, a certain measure of participation in the new
+work was determined as satisfactory at once to his ideals of devotion to
+the cause of social justice and to his sense of obligation to himself
+and to his family. In this sense, logically speaking, a subject was
+defined to which a system of predicates, comprehended perhaps under the
+general predicate of right or good, applies. Now, however, it appears,
+from the inspection of the material and social environment, that the
+execution of this purpose, perfectly in accord though it may be with the
+spiritual capacities and powers of the agent, is possible only on pain
+of certain other consequences, certain other sacrifices, which have not
+hitherto been considered. That a half-hearted interest in his profession
+would still not prevent his earning a moderate income from it was never
+questioned in the ethical "first approximation" to a final decision, but
+now the issue is fairly presented, and, as we must see, in a very
+difficult and distressing way; for the essence of the situation is that
+the ends now in conflict, that of earning a living and caring for his
+family and that of laboring for the social good, are not intrinsically
+(that is, from the standpoint of the empirical self) incompatible. On
+the contrary, these two ends are psychologically quite compatible, as
+the outcome of the ethical judgment shows; only the "external"
+conditions oppose them to each other. The difficulty of the case lies,
+then, just in the fact that the conflicting ends, both standing, as they
+do, for strong personal interests of the self, nevertheless cannot be
+brought to an adjustment by the direct method of an apportionment
+between them of the "spiritual resources" or "energies" of the self.
+Instead, the case is one calling for an apportionment of the external
+means, and so, proximately, not for immediate determination of the final
+end, but for economic determination of the means.
+
+
+We come now to the task of describing, so far as this may be possible,
+the judgment or valuation-processes which correspond to the types of
+situation thus distinguished. We are able now to see that these must be
+constructive processes, in the sense that in and through them courses of
+conduct adapted to unique situations are shaped by the concourse of
+established standards with a new end which has arisen and put in its
+claim for recognition. We can see, moreover, that these
+valuation-processes effect a construction of a different order from that
+given in factual judgment. Factual judgment determines external objects
+as means or conditions of action from standpoints suggested by the
+analysis and development of ends. Judgments of valuation determine
+concrete purposes from standpoints given in recognized general purposes
+of the self--purposes which are general in virtue of their having been
+taken by abstraction from concrete cases, in which they have received
+particular formulation as purposes, and set apart as typical modes of
+conduct in general serviceable to the "energetic" self.[138] Logically
+factual judgment is at all times subordinate to valuational; when
+valuational judgment has become consciously deliberate, this logical
+subordination becomes explicit and factual judgment appears in its true
+character. Its essential function is that of presenting the conditions
+which sanction and stimulate our ethically and economically determined
+purposes.[139] Finally, in the construction of purposes and
+reconstruction of standards in valuation the ideal of the expansion and
+development of the "energetic" self controls--not as a "presented" or
+contentual self prescribing particular modes of conduct, but as a
+principle prescribing the greatest possible openness to suggestion and
+an impartial application of the method of valuation to the case in hand.
+As we have said, in whatever sensuous image we figure the "energetic"
+self, its essential character lies in its function of stimulating
+methodical valuation. In place of the two-faced and ambiguous
+"presented" self, which is characteristic of the stage of conscience, we
+now have in the stage of valuation the "energetic" self on the one hand
+and standards on the other.[140]
+
+We have now to consider the actual procedure of valuation, and first the
+ethical form as above defined. Bearing in mind that we are not concerned
+with cases of obedience to authority or deference to conscience, let us
+take a case of genuine moral conflict such as we were considering some
+time since. Suppose that one has the impulse to indulge in some form of
+amusement which he has been in the habit of considering frivolous or
+absolutely wrong. The end, as soon as imaged, or rather as the condition
+of its being imaged, encounters past habits of conduct symbolized by
+standards--standards which may be presented under a variety of forms, a
+maxim learned in early childhood, the ideal of a Stoic sage or Christian
+saint, the example of some friend, or a precept put in abstract terms,
+but which, however presented, are essentially symbolic of established
+habits of thought or action.[141] Solution of such a problem proceeds,
+in general, along two closely interwoven lines: (1) collation and
+comparison of cases recognized as conforming to the standard, with a
+view to determining the standard type of conduct in a less ambiguous
+way, and (2) definition of the relations between this type of conduct
+and other recognized types in the catalogue of virtues.
+
+Now, these two movements are in fact inseparable, for, without reference
+to the entire system of virtues of which the one now asserting itself is
+a member, the comparison of cases with a view to definition of the
+virtue would be blind and hopeless of any outcome. The agent in the case
+before us desires to be temperate in amusement and to make profitable
+use of leisure time, but after all he may wonder whether these ideals
+really require the austerities of certain mediæval saints or the Stoic
+_ataraxy_. The saint's feats of spiritual athletics may have served a
+useful purpose, in ruder times, as evidence of human power to lead a
+virtuous and thoughtful life, but can such self-denial now be required
+of the moral man? It is apparent, in short, that the superficially
+conceived ideal must be analyzed. We must consider the "spirit" of our
+saint or hero, not the letter of his conduct, as we say, and in
+interpreting it make due allowance for the conditions of the time in
+which he lived and the grade of general intelligence of those he sought
+to edify. Whether our standard is a person or a parable or an abstractly
+formulated precept, the logic of the situation is the same in every case
+of judgment. The analysis of a standard cannot proceed without the
+"synthesis" or co-ordination of the type of conduct thereby defined with
+other distinguishable recognized types of conduct into a comprehensive
+ideal of life as a whole. In the last resort the implicit relations of
+all the virtues will be made explicit in the process of defining
+accurately any one of them.
+
+In the last resort, then, the predicate of the ethical judgment is the
+whole system of the recognized habits of the agent, and each
+judgment-process is in its outcome a readjustment of the system to
+accommodate the new habit that has been seeking admission. Both the old
+habits and the new impulse have been modified in the process just as the
+intension of a class term and the particular "subsumed" under the class
+are reciprocally modified in the ordinary judgment of sense-perception.
+We are once more able to see that the process of ethical judgment or
+valuation is not a process of subsumption or classification, of
+_ascertaining_ the value of particular modes of conduct, but on the
+contrary a process of determining or _assigning_ value. Each judgment
+process means a new and more or less thoroughgoing redetermination of
+the self and hence a fixation of the ethical value of the conduct whose
+emergence as a purpose gave rise to the process. The moral experience is
+not essentially and in its typical emergencies a _recognition_ of values
+with a view to shaping one's course accordingly, but rather a
+determining or a _fixation_ of values which shall serve for the time
+being, but be subject at all times to re-appraisal.
+
+If the present discussion were primarily intended as a contribution to
+general ethical theory, it would be a part of our purpose to show in
+detail that any formulation of an ethical ideal in contentual "material"
+terms must always be inadequate for practical purposes and hence
+theoretically indefensible. This, as we believe, could be shown true of
+the popularly current ideal of self-realization as well as of hedonism
+in its various forms and the older systems of conscience or the moral
+sense. These all are essentially fixed ideals admitting of more or less
+complete specification in point of content and regarded as tests or
+canons by appeal to which the moral quality of any concrete act can be
+deductively ascertained. They are the ethical analogues of such
+metaphysical principles as the Cartesian God or the Substance of
+Spinoza, and the logic implied in regarding them as adequate standards
+for the valuation of conduct is the logic whereby the Rationalist
+sought to deduce from concepts the world of particular things. The
+present desideratum in ethical theory would appear to be, not further
+attempts at definition of a moral ideal of any sort, but the development
+of a logical method for the valuation of ideals and ends in which the
+results of more modern researches in the theory of knowledge should be
+made use of--in which the concept of self should play the part, not of
+the concept of Substance in a rationalistic metaphysics,[142] but of
+such a principle as that of the conservation of energy, for example, in
+scientific inference.[143]
+
+We have, then, in each readjustment of the activities of the self a
+reconstruction in knowledge of ethical reality--a reconstruction which
+at the same time involves the assignment of a definite value to the new
+mode of conduct which has been worked out in the readjustment. We
+conclude, then, that the ethical experience is one of continuous
+construction and reconstruction of an order of objective reality, within
+which the world of sense-perception is comprised as the world of more or
+less refractory means to the attainment of ethical purposes. In this
+process of construction of ethical reality current moral standards play
+the same part as concepts already defined--that is to say, the agent's
+present habits--do in the typical judgment of sense-perception. They
+play the part of symbols suggestive of recognized and heretofore
+habitual modes of action with reference to conduct of the type of the
+particular instance that is under consideration, serving thus to bring
+to bear upon the subject of the judgment sooner or later the entire
+moral self. The outcome is a new self, and so for the future a new
+standard, in which the past self as represented by the former standard
+and the new impulse have been brought to mutual adjustment. Our position
+is that this adjustment is essentially experimental and that in it the
+_general principle_ of the unity and expansion of the self must be
+presupposed, as in inductive inference general principles of teleology,
+of the conservation of energy, and of organic interconnection of parts
+in living things are presupposed. The unity and increase of the self is
+not a test or canon, but a principle of moral experimentation.[144]
+
+Finally, we must note one further parallel between ethical judgment and
+the judgment of sense-perception and science. However the man of science
+may, as a nominalist, regard the laws of nature as mere observed
+uniformities of fact and particulars as the true realities, these same
+laws will nevertheless on occasion have a distinctly objective character
+in his actual apprehension of them. The stubbornness with which a
+certain material may refuse to lend itself to a desired purpose will
+commonly be reinforced, as a matter of apprehension, by one's
+recognition of the "scientific necessity" of the phenomenon. As offering
+resistance the thing itself, as we have seen, becomes objective; so also
+does the law of which this case may be recognized as only a particular
+example--and the other type of objectivity experience we need not here
+do more than mention as likewise possible in one's apprehension of the
+law as well as of the "facts" of nature. Both types of objectivity
+attach to the moral law as well. The standard that restrains is one
+"above" us or "beyond" us. Even Kant, as the similitude of the starry
+heavens would suggest, was not incapable of a faint "emotion of the
+heteronomous," and authority in one form or another is a moral force
+whose objective validity as moral, both in its inhibiting and in its
+sanctioning aspects, human nature is prone to acknowledge. The
+apprehension of objectivity is everywhere, as we have held, emotional.
+One type of situation in which the moral law takes on this character is
+found in the interposition of the law to check a forward tendency; the
+other is found in the instant of transition from doubt to the new
+adjustment that has been reached. In the one case the law is
+"inexorable" in its demands. In the other case there are two
+possibilities: If the adjustment has been essentially a rejection of the
+new "temptation," the law which one obeys is one no longer inexorable,
+but sustaining, as a rock of salvation. If the adjustment is a
+distinctly new attitude, the sense of the objectivity of the principle
+embodied in it will commonly be less strong, if not for the time being
+almost wholly wanting; but in the moment of overt action it will in some
+degree wear the character of a firm truth upon which one has taken his
+stand.
+
+This general view of the logical constitution of the moral experience
+may suggest a comparison with the fundamental doctrine of the British
+Intellectualist school. The Intellectualist writers were very largely
+guided in their expositions by the desire of refuting on the one hand
+Hobbes and on the other Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Against Hobbes they
+wished to establish the obligatory character of the moral law entirely
+apart from sanction or enactment by political authority. Against the
+Sentimentalists they wished to vindicate its objectivity and permanence.
+This twofold purpose they accomplished by holding that the morality of
+conduct lies in its conformity to the "objective nature of things," the
+knowledge of which, in its moral aspects, is logically deducible from
+certain moral axioms, self-evident like those of mathematics. Now this
+mathematical analogy is the key to the whole position of the
+Intellectualist writers. By so conceiving the nature of knowledge these
+men seriously weakened their strong general position. Mathematics is
+just that species of knowledge which is most remote from and apparently
+independent of any reference to conduct, and the Intellectualists, by
+choosing it as their ideal, were thereby rendered incapable of
+explaining the obligatoriness of the moral law. An adequate psychology
+of knowledge would have obviated this difficulty in their system.
+
+
+The occasion for economic judgment is given, as we have seen, in a
+conflict between ends not incompatible, in view of any ascertainable
+conditions of the agent's nature as an empirical self, but inhibitory of
+each other in view of what we have described as conditions external to
+the agent. Thus the lawyer in our illustration found his plan of
+compromise thwarted by the existence of such sociological conditions as
+would make the practice of his profession, in the manner intended,
+impossible, and so cut off his income. Similarly the peasant in a
+European country finds that (for reasons which, more probably, he does
+not understand) he can no longer earn a living in the accustomed way,
+and emigrates to a country in which his capital and his physical
+energies may be more profitably employed. So also in the everyday lives
+of all of us ends and interests quite disparate, so far as any relation
+to each other through our psychical capacities is concerned, stand very
+frequently in opposition, nevertheless, and calling for adjustment. We
+must make a choice between amusement or intellectual pursuits or the
+means of æsthetic culture, on the one hand, and the common necessaries
+of life on the other, and the difficulty of the situation lies just in
+absence of any sort of "spiritual affinity" between these ends. There is
+no necessary ratio between the satisfaction of the common needs of life
+and the cultivation of the higher faculties--no ratio for which the
+individual can ever find a sanction in the constitution of his empirical
+self through the direct method of ethical valuation. The common needs
+must have their measure of recognition, but no attempted ethical
+valuation of them can ever come to a result convincingly warranted to
+the "energetic" self by psychological conditions. The economic situation
+as such is in this sense (that is, from the standpoint of any recognized
+ethical standards) unintelligible. It is this ethical unintelligibility
+that often lends a genuine element of tragedy to situations which press
+urgently and in which the ends at issue are of great ethical moment. It
+is no small matter to the emigrant, for example, that he must cut the
+very roots by which he has grown to the sort of man he finds himself to
+be. His whole nature protests against this violence, and questions its
+necessity, though the necessity is unmistakable and it would be quite
+impossible for him not to act accordingly. Nevertheless, tragic as such
+a conflict may well be, it does not differ in any logically essential
+way, does not differ in its degree of strictly logical difficulty, from
+the ethically much less serious economic problems of our everyday life.
+
+Now, we have already defined the economic act for which economic
+judgment is preparatory as being, in general terms, the diversion of
+certain means from a present use to which they have been devoted to a
+new use which has come to seem in a general way desirable.[145] Thus, in
+the cases just mentioned, the lawyer contemplates the virtual purchase
+of his new career by the income which his profession might in years to
+come afford him, the emigrant seeks a better market for his labor, and
+the pleasure-seeker and the ambitious student and the buyer of a
+commodity in the market propose to themselves, each one, the diversion
+from some hitherto intended use of a sum of money. Manifestly it is
+immaterial from our logical point of view whether the means in question
+which one proposes to apply in some new way are in the nature of
+physical and mental strength, or materials and implements of manufacture
+ready to be used, or means of purchase of some sort wherewith the
+desired service or commodity may be obtained at once. The economic
+problem, to state it technically, is the problem of the _reapplicability
+of the means_, interpreting the category of means quite broadly.
+
+In a word, then, the method of procedure adapted to the economic type of
+situation is that of valuation of the means, not that of direct
+valuation of the ends. This method is one of valuation since, like the
+ethical method, it is determinative of a purpose, but it accomplishes
+this result in its own distinctive way. The problem of our present
+analysis will accordingly be how this method of valuation of the means
+is able to help toward an adjustment of disparate or unrelated ends
+which the ethical method is inadequate to effect.
+
+Let us assume that a vague purpose of foreign travel, for example, has
+presented itself in imagination, and that the preliminary stage of
+ethical judgment has been passed through, with the result that the
+purpose, in a more definite form than it could have at first, is now
+ready for economic consideration. In the first place the cost of the
+journey must be determined, and this step, in terms of our present point
+of view, is simply a methodological device whereby certain ends which
+the standards involved in the stage of ethical judgment could not
+suggest or could not effectually take into co-operation with themselves
+in their determination of the end are brought into play. Ascertaining
+the means suggests these disparate ends, these established modes of use
+of the means, with the result that the agent's "forward tendency" is
+checked. Shall the necessary sums be spent in foreign travel or shall
+they be spent in the present ways--in providing various physical
+necessities and comforts, or for various forms of amusement, or in
+increasing investments in business enterprises? These modes of use do
+not admit of ethical comparison with the plan of foreign travel, and the
+agent's interest must therefore now be centered on the means.
+
+It is in this check to the agent's forward tendency that the logical
+status of the means is evinced. As merely so much money the means could
+only serve to further the execution of the purpose that is forming,
+since under the circumstances it could only prompt immediate
+expenditure. Like the subject in factual judgment, the means in economic
+judgment have their problematic aspect which as effectually hinders the
+desired use of them as could any palpable physical defect. This
+problematic aspect consists in the fact of the present established mode
+of use which the now-forming purpose threatens to disturb, and it is the
+agent's interest in this mode of use that turns his attention to the
+valuation of the means.
+
+It need hardly be pointed out that in the economic life we find
+situations exactly corresponding to those of "conscience and temptation"
+and mechanical "pull and haul" which were discriminated in the ethical
+sphere and marked off from judgment properly so called. Indeed it seems
+reasonable to think, on general grounds of introspection, that these
+methods of decision (if they deserve the name) are, relatively speaking,
+more frequently relied upon in the economic than in the moral life. The
+economic method of true judgment is roundabout and more complex and more
+difficult than ethical, and involves a more express recourse to those
+abstract conceptions which for the most part are only implicitly
+involved in valuation of the other type. The economic type of valuation,
+in fact, differs from the ethical, not in an absolute or essential way,
+but rather in the explicitness with which it brings to light and lays
+bare the vital elements in valuation as such. In general, then, the
+economic process would seem necessarily to embrace three stages, which
+will first of all be enumerated and then very briefly explained and
+discussed. These are: (1) a preliminary consideration of the means
+necessary to attain the end--which must be vague and tentative, of
+course, for the reason that the end as imagined is so, as compared with
+the fulness of detail which must belong to it before it can be finally
+accepted; (2) a consideration of the means, as thus provisionally taken,
+in the light of their present devotion to other purposes, this present
+devotion of them being the outcome, in some degree at least, of past
+valuation; (3) final definition of the means with reference to the
+proposed use through an adjustment effected between this and the factors
+involved in the past valuation.
+
+1. In the first stage as throughout, it must be carefully noted, the
+means are under consideration not primarily in their physical aspect,
+but simply as _subject to a possible redisposition_. Thus it is not
+money as lawful currency receivable at the steamship office for an ocean
+passage, nor tools and materials and labor-power technically suitable
+for the production of a desired object, that is the subject of the
+economic judgment. The problem of redisposition would of course not be
+raised were the means not technically adaptable to the purpose, nor on
+the other hand can the means in the course of economic judgment, as a
+rule, escape some measure of further (factual) inquiry into their
+technical properties; but the standpoints are nevertheless distinct.
+Again, it must be noted that the means in this first stage will be only
+roughly measured. The length of one's stay abroad, the size of the
+house one wishes to build, the purpose whatever it may be, is still
+undefined--these are in fact the very matters which the process must
+determine--and in the first instance it is "money in general" or "a
+large sum of money" with reference to which we raise the economic
+problem. The category of quantity is in fact essentially an economic
+one; it is essentially a standpoint for determining the means of action
+in such a way as to facilitate their economic valuation. The reader
+familiar with the writings of the Austrian school of economists will
+easily recall how uniformly in their discussions of the principle of
+marginal utility these writers assume outright in the first place the
+division of the stock of goods into definite units, and then raise the
+question of how the value of a unit is measured. The stock contains
+already a hundred bushels of wheat or ten loaves of bread--apparently as
+a matter of metaphysical necessity--whereas in fact the essential
+economic problem is this very one of how "wheat at large" comes to be
+put in sacks of a certain size and "bread in general" to be baked in
+twelve-ounce loaves. The subdivision of the stock and the valuation of
+the unit are not successive stages, but inseparably correlative phases
+of the valuation-process as a whole. The outcome may be stated either
+way, in accordance with one's interest in the situation.
+
+2. But the unmeasured means as redisposable in an as yet undetermined
+way bring to consciousness established measured uses to which the means
+have been heretofore assigned in definite amounts. In this way the
+process of determining a definite quantum as redisposable (which is to
+say, of attaining to a definite acceptable plan of conduct) can begin.
+How, then, does this fact of past assignment to uses still recognized as
+desirable figure in the situation? In the first place the past
+assignment may have been (1) an outcome of past economic valuation, (2)
+an unhesitating or non-economic act executive of an ethical decision,
+or (3) an act of more or less conscious obedience to "conscience" or
+"authority." In either case it now stands as a course of conduct which
+at the time was, in the way explained above, _sanctioned_ to the
+agent, to the "energetic" self, by the means and conditions recognized
+as bearing upon it. In this sense, then, we have, in this recognition
+of the past adjustment and of the economic character which the
+means now have in virtue of it, what we may term a judgment of
+"energy-equivalence" between the means and their established uses. For
+to the agent it was the essential meaning of the sense of sanction felt
+when the means were assigned to these uses that the "energetic" self
+would on the whole be furthered thereby--and this in view of all the
+sacrifices that this use would entail, or in view of the sacrifices
+required for the production of the means, if the case were one in which
+the means were not at hand and could only be secured by a more or less
+extended production process.
+
+In the illustration we have been considering, it will be observed, there
+is an extensive schedule of present uses which the new project calls in
+question and from which the means must be diverted. This is in fact the
+commoner case. A new use of money will affect, as a rule, not simply a
+single present mode of expenditure, but will very probably involve a
+readjustment throughout the whole schedule of expenditure which our
+separate past valuations of money have in effect co-operated in
+establishing. So likewise if we wish to use part of a store of building
+materials or of food, or of any other subdivisible commodity, we
+encounter an ordered system of consumption rather than a single
+predetermined use which we have not yet enjoyed. Where this is the case
+the whole process of valuation is greatly facilitated, but this is not
+essential. The means in cases of true economic valuation may be capable
+of but a single use, like a railroad ticket or a perishable piece of
+fruit, or of a virtually endless series of uses, like a painting or a
+literary masterpiece. Whether the means figure as representing but a
+single use or stand for the conservation of an extensive system, their
+economic significance is the same. They are the "energy-equivalent" of
+this use or system of uses considered as an act or system of acts of
+consumption in furtherance of the self. Their past assignment meant then
+and means now simply this, that the "energetic" self would thereby gain
+more than it would lose through the inevitable sacrifices. This is the
+economic significance of the means in virtue of which they are now
+problematic to the extent of checking, for a time at least, forward
+tendency toward the desired end.[146]
+
+3. The judgment of energy-equivalence, then, defines the inhibiting
+economic aspect of the means, and moreover defines it for the means as
+subdivided and set apart for a schedule of uses if this was the form of
+the past adjustments to which reference is made. The problem of the
+third stage of the process is that of "bringing subject and predicate
+together," as we have elsewhere expressed it--that is, of determining,
+in the light of the economic character of the means as just ascertained,
+what measure of satisfaction, if any, may be accorded to the new and as
+yet undefined desire. The new disposition of the means, if one is to be
+made, must bring to the "energetic" self a degree of furtherance and
+development which shall be sensibly as great as would come from the
+established method of consumption. The means, as economic, are means to
+the conservation of the old adjustment, and any new disposal of them or
+of any portion of them for a full or partial execution of the new
+purpose must make out at least as good a case. It must appear that the
+new disposition is not only physically possible, but also economically
+necessary in the light of the same principle of expansion of the self as
+sanctioned the disposition now in force. It must make the self in some
+way more efficient--whether more strong and symmetrical in body, more
+skilled in work, more clear of brain, or more efficient in whatever
+other concrete way may be desired.
+
+Psychologically the sanction of any course of action which is taken as
+evidence of conformity to the general rule thus inadequately stated is
+the more or less strong sense of "relaxation" of attentive strain which
+comes with the shift of attention, in the final survey, from means to
+end. We may accordingly, for the sake of greater definiteness, restate
+in the following terms the process which has just been sketched: The
+ends in conflict at the outset are ends which do not sensibly bear upon
+each other through their dependence upon a common fund of psychical
+capacities or energies. They are related in the agent's experience
+solely through their dependence upon a common stock of physical means,
+and they do not therefore admit of adjustment through the ethical type
+of process. The economic process consists essentially of a revival in
+imagination of the experiences accompanying the former disposition of
+the means and a re-enforcement by these of the means in their adherence
+to that former and still recognized disposition. If an adapted form of
+the new end can be imagined which will mediate a like experience of
+relaxation when the attention shifts from the means, thus emotionally
+re-enforced in their economic status, to the end as thus conceived, the
+means will be recognized as economically redisposable. Thus the method
+of valuation of the means makes possible, through appeal to the
+sensibly invariable experience of relaxation or assurance in the outcome
+of judgment, a co-ordination of disparate ends which the ethical method
+of direct adjustment could not effect.[147]
+
+The economic process thus presents on analysis the same factors as does
+the ethical. On the subject side we have the means--which as economic
+are problematic as to their reapplicability. On the predicate side we
+have the suggested mode of reapplication in tension against conservative
+ideals of application to established purposes. Just as it may be held
+that the general ethical predicate is that of Right or Good--that is,
+deserving of adoption into the system of one's ends--so the economic
+predicate applied to the means as these come in the end to be defined is
+the general concept Reappliable. And in general the distinction of the
+types is not an ultimate one, for the more deliberately and rigorously
+the method of economic valuation is pursued--in such a case, for
+example, as that of the prospective emigrant--the stronger will be the
+agent's sense of a genuinely ethical sanction as belonging to the
+decision which is in the end worked out. The more certain and sincere,
+therefore, will be the agent's judgment that the means must be
+reapplied, for on the sense of sanction of which we speak rests the
+explicit judgment that the purpose formed is expansive of the self.
+
+From the analysis thus presented it must appear, therefore, that the
+economic type of judgment is in our sense a constructive process. Its
+function is to determine a particular commodity or portion of a stock of
+some commodity in its economic character as _disposable_, and in
+performing this function it presents a definite reality in the economic
+order. Moreover, in thus defining the particular, recourse is had to
+more or less distinctively namable economic standards which are in the
+last resort symbols representing established habits of consumption in
+the light of which the means, _prima facie_, seem not to be available
+for any other purposes. These economic standards, like ethical standards
+and the class concepts of science and our ordinary perceptual
+experience, are, with all due respect to nominalism, constitutive of a
+real world--a world which is real because it lends form and significance
+to our knowledge of particulars as stimuli to conduct.
+
+
+We have now before us sufficient reason for our thesis that the
+valuation-process in both its forms is constructive of an order of
+reality, and we have sufficiently explained the relation which the
+economic order bears to the inclusive and logically prior order of
+ethical objects and relations. We are now in a position to see that in
+being thus constructive of reality (taking the conception in its proper
+functional meaning) they are at the same time constructive of the self,
+since the reality which they construct is in its functional aspect the
+assemblage of means and conditions, of stimuli, in short, for the
+development and expansion of the self. We shall bring this main division
+of our study to a close with a series of remarks in explanation and
+illustration of this view.
+
+Let us consider once more the factors present in the agent's final
+survey of the situation after the completion of the judgment-process and
+on the verge of action. These factors are, as we have seen, (1)
+recognition of conditions sanctioning the purpose formed, (2)
+recognition of the purpose as, in view of this sanction, warranted to
+the "energetic" self as an eligible method of expansion and development,
+and (3) recognition of the "energetic" self, conversely, as in
+possession, in virtue of the favorable conditions given in factual
+judgment, of this new method of furtherance. These three factors are
+manifestly not so much factors co-operating in the situation as
+inseparable aspects of it distinguishable from each other and admitting
+of discriminative emphasis in accordance with the degree of reflective
+power which the individual may possess or choose to exercise. Strictly
+speaking these three aspects are present in every conscious recognition
+of a purpose as one's own and as presently to be carried into effect,
+but they are not always present in equal conspicuousness, and never with
+equal logical importance for the individual. In fact this enumeration of
+aspects coincides with our enumeration of the three stages in the
+evolution of the individual's conscious moral attitude toward new
+purposes given in impulse--in the third of which the last named of these
+aspects comes to the fore with the others in logical or functional
+subordination to it.
+
+Now it will be apparent on grounds of logic, as on the evidence of
+simple introspection, that in this third type of attitude--in the
+attitude of true valuation, that is to say--the energetic self cannot be
+identified with the chosen purpose. The purpose is a determinate
+specified act to be performed subject to recognized conditions, and with
+the use of the co-ordinated means; the self, on the other hand, is a
+process to which this particular purpose is, indeed, from the standpoint
+of the self's conservation and increase, indispensable, but which is
+nevertheless apart from the purpose in the sense that without the
+purpose it would still be a self, though perhaps a narrower and less
+developed one. Our standpoint here as elsewhere, the reader must
+remember, is the logical. It is the standpoint of the agent's own
+interpretation of his experience of judgment during the judgment-process
+and at its close, and not the standpoint of the psychological mediation
+of this experience as a series of occurrences. Thus we are here far from
+wishing to deny the general proposition that a man's purposes are an
+expression of his nature, as the psychologist might describe it, or the
+proposition that a man's conduct and his character are one and the same
+thing viewed from different points of view. We wish merely to insist
+upon the fact that these psychological propositions are not a true
+account of the agent's own experience of himself and of his purposes
+_while these latter are in the making or are on the verge of execution_.
+There is indeed no conflict between this "inside view" of the
+judgment-process and of the final survey and the psychological
+propositions just mentioned. The identity of conduct and character means
+not simply that as the man is so does he act, but quite as much, and in
+a more important way, that as he acts so is he and so does he become. It
+is, then, the essence of the agent's own view of the situation that his
+character is in the making and that the purpose is the method to be
+taken. To the agent the self is not, indeed, independent of the purpose,
+for plainly it is recognized that upon just this purpose the self is, in
+the sense explained, in a vital way dependent. Nevertheless the self is
+in the agent's apprehension essentially beyond the purpose, and larger
+than the purpose, and even, we may say, metaphysically apart from it.
+Now the conclusion which we wish to draw from this examination of the
+agent's attitude in judgment is that no formulation of an ideal self can
+ever be adequate to his purposes, not simply because any such
+formulation must, as Green allows, inevitably be incomplete and
+inconsistent, but because the self as a process is in the agent's own
+apprehension of it inherently incapable of formulation. Any formulation
+that might be attempted must be in terms of particular purposes (since
+in a modern ethical theory the self must be a "concrete" and not an
+abstract universal), and it is easy to see that any such would be, to
+the agent in the attitude of true ethical judgment, worse than useless.
+It could as contentual and concrete only be a composite of existing
+standards, more or less coherently put together, offered to the agent as
+a substitute for the new standard which he is trying to work out. If
+there were not need of a new standard there would be no
+judgment-process; the agent must be, to say the least, embarrassed, even
+if the unwitting imposture does not deceive him, when such a composite,
+useful and indeed indispensable in its proper place as a standard of
+reference and a source of suggestion, is urged upon him as suitable for
+a purpose which in the very nature of the case it is logically incapable
+of serving.[148]
+
+To the agent, then, the "energetic" self can never be represented as an
+ideal--can never be expressed in terms of purpose--since it is in its
+very nature logically incongruous with any possible particular purpose
+or generalization of such purposes. It is commonly imaged by the agent
+in some manner of sensuous terms, but it is imaged, in so far as the
+case is one of judgment in a proper sense, for use as a stimulus to the
+methodical process of valuation--not as a standard, which if really
+adequate would make valuation unnecessary. The agent's consciousness of
+himself as "energetic" cannot be an ideal; it comes to consciousness
+only through the endeavor, first to follow, and then, in a later stage
+of moral development, to use ideals, and has for its function, as a
+presentation, the incitement of the process of methodical use of
+standards in the control of the agent's impulsive ends. It is not an
+anticipatory vision of the final goal of life, but the agent's coming to
+consciousness of the general impulse and movement of the life that is.
+
+It is an inevitable consequence of acceptance of a contentual view of
+the "energetic" self as one's ideal that reflective morality should tend
+to degenerate into an introspective conscientiousness constantly in
+unstable equilibrium between a pharisaical selfishness on the one hand
+and a morally scarcely more dangerous hypocrisy on the other. There is
+certainly much justice in the stinging characterization of "Neo-Hegelian
+Egoism" which Mr. Taylor somewhere in his unsearchable book applies to
+the currently prevailing conventionalized type of idealistic ethics. If
+the self of the valuation-process is an ultimate goal of effort, then
+there must certainly be an irreconcilable contrast to the disadvantage
+of the latter between the plain man's objective desire for right
+conduct, as such, and for the welfare of his fellow-beings, and the
+moralist's anxious questionings of the rectitude of the motives by which
+his conformity to the fixed moral standard are prompted.[149] Into the
+value and significance of the attitude of conscientious examination of
+one's moral motives we are not here concerned to inquire, but need only
+insist, in accordance with our present view, that its value must be
+distinctly subordinate and incidental to the general course and outcome
+of the valuation-process. In the valuation-process, consciousness of
+self is not an object of solicitude, but simply, we repeat, a pure
+presentation of stimulus, having for its office the incitement, and if
+need be the reincitement, of the attitude of deference to the
+suggestions of old standards and openness to the petitions of new
+impulse, and of methodically bringing these to bear upon each other.
+
+The outcome of such a process, of course, cannot be predicted--and for
+the same reasons as make unpredictable the scientist's factual
+hypothesis. Just as the scientist's data are incomplete and ill-assorted
+and unorganized, for the reason that they have, of necessity, been
+collected, and must at the outset be interpreted, in the light of
+present concepts, whose inadequacy the very existence of the problem at
+issue demonstrates, so the final moral purpose that shall be developed
+is not to be deduced from any possible inventory of the situation as it
+stands. The process in both cases is one of reconstruction, and the test
+of the validity of the reconstruction must in both cases be of the same
+essentially practical character. In both cases the process is
+constructive of reality, in the functional signification of the term. In
+both, the judgment process is constructive also of the self, in the
+sense that upon the determination of the agent's future attitude the
+cumulative outcome of his past attitudes is methodically brought to
+bear.[150]
+
+
+V
+
+Judgments of value are, then, objective in their import in the same
+sense as are the factual judgments in which the conditions of action are
+presented. The ideal problematic situation is, in the last resort,
+ethical, in the sense of requiring for its solution determination of the
+new end that has arisen with reference to existing standards. In
+structure and in function the judgment in which the outcome of this
+process is presented is knowledge, and objective in the only valid
+acceptation of the term.
+
+But, after all, it may be urged, is it not the essential mark of the
+objective that it should be accessible to all men, and not in the nature
+of the case valid for only a single individual? At best the objectivity
+of content which has been made out for the judgment of value is purely
+functional, and not such as can be verified by appeal to the consensus
+of other persons. The agent's _assurance_ of the reality of the economic
+or ethical subject-matter which he is endeavoring to determine, and his
+sense of the objectivity of the results which he reaches, need not be
+denied. These may well enough be illusions of personal prejudice or
+passion, or even normal illusions of the reflective faculty, like that
+of interpreting the secondary qualities of bodies as objective in the
+same sense as are the "bulk, figure, extension, number, and motion of
+their solid parts."[151] Any man can see the physical object to which I
+point, and verify with his own eyes the qualities which I ascribe to it,
+but no man can either understand or verify my judgment that the purpose
+I have formed is in accord with rational ideals of industry and
+self-denial, or that this portion of my winter's fuel may be given to a
+neighbor who has none.
+
+But this line of objection proves too much, for, made consistent with
+itself, it really amounts to a denial that the very judgment of
+sense-perception, to which it appeals so confidently as a criterion, has
+objective import. The first division of this study was intended to show
+that every object in the experience of each individual is for the
+individual a unique construction of his own, determined in form and in
+details by individual interests and purposes, and therefore different
+from that object in the experience of any other individual which in
+social intercourse passes current as the same. The real object is for me
+the object which functions in my experience, presenting problematic
+aspects for solution, and lending itself more or less serviceably to my
+purposes; and this object is, we hold, not the object as socially
+current, but the complete object which, as complete in its determination
+with reference to my unique purposes, cannot possibly have social
+currency. The objection as stated cuts away the very ground on which it
+rests, since the shortcoming which it finds in the judgment of ethical
+or economic value is present in the particular judgment of
+sense-perception also. The object about which I can assure myself by an
+immediate appeal to other persons is the object in its bare "conceptual"
+aspects--the object as a dictionary might define it, the commodity as it
+might be described in a trade catalogue, or the ethical act as defined
+by the criminal code or in the treatise of a moral philosopher. It is an
+object consisting of a central core or fixed deposit of meaning, which
+renders it significant in a certain general way to a number of persons,
+or even to all men, but which is not yet adequately known by me from the
+standpoint of my present forming purpose. In virtue of these conceptual
+characters it is adaptable to my purpose, which is as yet general and
+indeterminate; but in the nature of the case it cannot yet be known to
+me as applicable to my prospective concrete purpose, as this shall come
+to be through judgment.
+
+Thus, if the test of objectivity of import is to be that the judgment
+shall present an object or a fact which, as presented, is socially
+current among men and not shut away in the individual intelligence
+apart from the possibility of social verification, then the apparent
+nominalism of the objection we are considering turns out to be the
+uttermost extreme of realism. Such a test amounts to a virtual
+affirmation that the sole objective reality is the conceptual, and that
+the "accidents" of one's particular object of sense-perception are the
+arbitrary play of private preference or fancy. At this point, however,
+the objection may shift its ground and take refuge in some such position
+as the following: The real object is indeed the object which the
+individual knows in relation to his particular purpose, and it is indeed
+impossible that the individual's judgment should be limited in its
+content to coincidence with the conceptual elements of meaning which are
+socially current. The building-stone which one has judged precisely fit
+for a special purpose, the specimen which the mineralogist or the
+botanist examines under his microscope, the tool whose peculiarity of
+working one has learned to make allowance for in use--these all are, of
+course, highly individual objects, possessing for the person in question
+an indefinite number of objective aspects of which no other person can
+possibly be conscious at the time. And, more than this, even though the
+individual may, in his scrutiny of the object, have discovered no
+conspicuous new qualities in it which were not present in the socially
+current meaning, the object will still possess an individuality making
+it genuinely unique merely through its co-ordination with other objects
+in the mechanical process of working out the purpose in hand. It is at
+least an object standing here at just this time, a tool cutting this
+particular piece of stone and striking at this instant with this
+particular ringing sound, and these perhaps wholly nonessential facts
+will nevertheless serve to individualize the object (if one chances to
+think of them) in the sense of making it such a one as no other person
+knows. All this may be granted, the objection may allow, and yet the
+vital point remains; for this is not what it was intended, even in the
+first place, to deny. The vital point at issue is not whether the object
+which I know _is_ known as I know it by any other person, but whether,
+in the nature of things, it is one that _can_ be so known.
+
+Herein, then, lies the difference between judgments of fact and
+judgments of value. The mineralogist can train his pupil to see
+precisely what he himself sees; and so likewise in any case of
+sense-perception, the object, however recondite may be the qualities or
+features which one may see in it, _can_ nevertheless be seen by any
+other person in precisely the same way on the single, more often not
+insuperably difficult, condition that the discoverer shall point these
+out or otherwise prepare the other for seeing them. But with the ton of
+coal which one may judge economically disposable for a charitable
+purpose the case stands differently, since it is not in its visible or
+other physical aspects that the ton of coal is here the subject of the
+judgment. It is as having been set apart _by oneself exclusively_ for
+other uses that the ton of coal now functions as an object and now
+possesses the character which the economic judgment has given it; and
+the case stands similarly with a contemplated act, of telling the truth
+in a trying situation. The valuation placed upon the commodity or upon
+the moral act depends essentially upon psychological conditions of
+temperament, disposition, mood, or whim into which it would be
+impossible for another person to enter, and these depend upon conditions
+of past training and native endowment which can never occur or be
+combined in future in precisely the same way for any other individual.
+In short, the physical object is _describable_ and _can_ be made
+socially current, though doubtless with more or less of difficulty, if
+other persons will attend to it and learn to see it as I see it; but the
+value of an economic object or a moral act depends upon my desires and
+feelings, and therefore must remain a matter of my private appreciation.
+
+In answering this amended form of the objection it is entirely
+unnecessary to discuss the issue of fact which it has raised as to
+whether or not complete description of a physical object or event is a
+practical or theoretical possibility. It need only be pointed out that
+at best such complete description can only be successful in its purpose
+on condition that the individual upon whom the experiment is tried be
+willing to attend and have the requisite "apperceptive background." The
+accuracy with which another person's knowledge shall copy the knowledge
+which I endeavor to impart to him must manifestly depend upon these two
+leading conditions, not to mention also the measure of my own
+pedagogical and literary skill. Any consideration of such a purely
+psychological problem as is here suggested would be entirely out of
+place in a discussion the purpose of which is not that of analyzing the
+process of judgment, but that of interpreting its meaning aspects. Let
+us grant the entire psychological possibility of making socially current
+in the manner here suggested the most highly individual and concrete
+cognition of an object one may please, and let us grant, moreover, that
+this possibility has been actually realized. This concurrent testimony
+of the witness will doubtless confirm one's impression of the accuracy
+of the process of observation and inference whereby the knowledge which
+has been imparted was first gained, but we must deny that it can do more
+than this. For indeed, apart from some independent self-reliant
+conviction of the objective validity of the knowledge in question, how
+should another's assent be taken as _confirmation_ and not rather as
+evidence of one's own mere skill in suggestion and of the other's
+susceptibility thereto? We must deny that even in the improved form the
+criterion of social currency is a valid one. In a word, the social
+currency of knowledge to the extent to which it can exist requires as
+its condition, and is evidence of, the equal social currency of certain
+interests, purposes, or points of view for predication; and if it be
+possible to make socially current an item of concrete knowledge, with
+all its concrete fulness of detail, then _a fortiori_ it must be
+possible to make socially current the concrete individual purpose with
+reference to which this item of knowledge first of all took form.
+Whether such a thing be psychologically possible at all the reader may
+decide; but if it be possible in the sphere of knowledge of fact, then
+it must be possible in the sphere of valuation. In short, judgment in
+either field, in definition of a certain object or commodity or moral
+act as, for the agent, an objective fact possessing certain characters,
+involves the tacit assumption of social verifiability as a matter of
+course; but it does not rest upon this assumption, nor is this
+assumption the essence of its meaning. To say that my judgment is
+socially verifiable, that my concrete object of perception or of
+valuation would be seen as I see it by any person in precisely my place,
+is merely a tautological way of formally announcing that _I have made
+the judgment_ and have now a definite object which to me has a certain
+definite functional meaning.
+
+Thus, instead of drawing a distinction between the realms of fact and
+value, as between what is or can be common to all intelligent beings and
+what must be unique for each individual one, we must hold that the two
+realms are coextensive. The socially current object answers to a certain
+general type of conscious purpose or interest active in the individual
+and so to a general habit of valuation, and the concrete object to a
+special determination of this type of purpose with reference to others
+in the recognized working system of life. The agent's final attitude, on
+the conclusion of the judgment-process, may be expressed in either sort
+of judgment--in a judgment of the value of commodity or moral purpose,
+or in a judgment of concrete fact setting forth the "external"
+conditions which warrant the purpose to the "energetic" self. Throughout
+the judgment-process there is a correlation between the movement whereby
+the socially current object develops into the adapted means and that
+whereby the socially current type of conduct develops into the defined
+and valued purpose.[152]
+
+At this point, however, a second general objection presents itself.
+However individual the content of my knowledge of physical fact may be,
+and however irrelevant, from the logical point of view, to my confidence
+in its objective validity may be the possibility of sharing it with
+other persons, nevertheless it refers to an object which is in some
+sense permanent, and therein differs from my valuations. In economic
+valuation I reach a definition of a certain commodity and am confirmed
+in it by all the conditions that enter into my final survey of the
+situation. But my desire for the new sort of consumption may fail, and
+so expose my valuation to easy attack from any new desire that may
+arise; or my supply of the commodity in question may be suddenly
+increased or diminished, and my valuation of the unit quantity thereby
+changed. Likewise my ethical valuation may have to be reversed (as Mr.
+Taylor has insisted) by reason of a change of disposition or particular
+desire which makes impossible, except in obedience to some other and
+inclusive valuation, further adherence to it. And these changes take
+place without any accompanying sense of their doing violence to
+objective fact or, on the other hand, any judgment of their being in
+the nature of corrections of previous errors in valuation, and so more
+closely in accordance with the truth. Moreover, a new valuation, taking
+the place of an old, does not supplement its predecessor as one set of
+judgments about a physical object may supplement another, made from a
+different point of view, but does literally take its place, and this
+without necessarily condemning it as having been erroneous.
+
+This general objection rests upon a number of fairly obvious
+misconceptions, and its strength is apparent only. In the first place,
+the question of the objectivity of any type of judgment must in the end,
+as we have seen, reduce itself to a question of the judgment's import to
+the agent. However the agent's valuations may shift from time to time,
+each several one will be sanctioned to the agent by the changed
+conditions exhibited in the inventory which the agent takes at the close
+of judgment which has formed it. The conditions have changed, and the
+valuation of the earlier purpose has likewise changed; but the new
+purpose is sanctioned by the new conditions, and the test of the
+presumed validity of the new valuation can only be in the manner already
+discussed[153] the test of actual execution of the purpose. In the
+change, as the agent interprets the situation, there is no violation of
+the former purpose nor a nearer approach to truth. Each valuation is
+true for the situation to which it corresponds. We are obviously not
+here considering the case of error. An error in valuation is evidenced
+to the agent, not by the need of a new valuation answering to changed
+conditions, but by the failure of a given valuation to make good its
+promise, although to all appearance conditions have remained unchanged.
+If the conditions have changed, then the purpose and the conditions
+_must_ be redetermined, if the expansion of the "energetic" self is to
+continue; but the former valuation does not thereby become untrue.
+
+These brief remarks should suffice by way of answer, but it will serve
+advantageously to illustrate our general position if we pursue the
+objection somewhat farther. The physical object is, nevertheless,
+_permanent_, it will be said, and this surely distinguishes it from the
+object (now freely acknowledged as such) of the value-judgment. To one
+man gold may be soluble in _aqua regia_ and to another worth so many
+pence an ounce, but different and individual as are these judgments and
+the standpoints they respectively imply, the gold is _one_, impartially
+admitting at the same time of both characterizations. On the other hand,
+one cannot judge an act good and bad at once. The purpose of deception
+that may be good is one controlled and shaped by ideals quite different
+from those which permit deception of the evil sort--is, in truth, taken
+as a total act, altogether different from the purpose of deception which
+one condemns, and not, like the "parcel of matter" in the two judgments
+about gold, the subject of both valuations.
+
+A brief consideration of the meaning of this "parcel of matter" will
+easily expose the weakness of the plea. In the last analysis the "parcel
+of matter" must for the agent reduce itself, let us say, to certain
+controllable energies centering about certain closely contiguous points
+in space and capable, in their exercise, of setting free or checking
+other energies in the system of nature. Thus, put in _aqua regia_ the
+gold will dissolve, but in the atmosphere it retains its brilliant
+color, and in the photographer's solution its energies have still a
+different mode of manifestation. And thus it would appear that the
+various predicates which are applied to "gold" imply, each one, a unique
+set of conditions. Gold is soluble in _aqua regia_, but not if it is to
+retain its yellow luster; which predicate is to be true of it depends
+upon the conditions under which the energies "resident in the gold" are
+to be set free, just as the moral character of an act depends upon the
+social conditions obtaining at the time of its performance--that is,
+upon the ideals with reference to which it has been shaped in judgment.
+How can one maintain that in a literal and concrete physical sense gold
+in process of solution is the "same" as gold entering into chemical
+combination? Surely the energy conditions which constitute the "gold" in
+the two processes are not the same--and can one nowadays hope to find
+sameness in unchangeable atoms?[154]
+
+In a word, the permanent substance or "real essence" that admits of
+various mutually supplementary determinations corresponding to diverse
+points of view is, strictly speaking, a convenient abstraction, and not
+an existent fact in time--and we shall maintain that the same species of
+abstraction has its proper place, and in fact occurs, in the sphere of
+moral judgment. The type of moral conduct that in every actual case of
+its occurrence in the moral order is determined in some unique and
+special way by relation to other standards is precisely analogous to the
+"substance" that is now dissolved in _aqua regia_ and now made to pass
+in the form of current coin, but cannot be treated in both ways at once.
+Both are abstractions. The "gold" is a name for the general possibility
+of attaining any one of a certain set of particular ends by
+appropriately co-ordinating certain energies, resident elsewhere in the
+physical system, with those at present stored in this particular "parcel
+of matter;" the result to be attained depends not alone upon the "parcel
+of matter," but also upon the particular energies brought to bear upon
+it from without. Now let us take a type of conduct which is sometimes
+judged good and sometimes bad. Deception, for example, is such a
+type--and as a type it simply stands for the general possibility of
+furtherance or detriment to the "energetic" self according as it is
+determined in the concrete instance by ideals of social well-being or by
+considerations of immediate personal advantage.
+
+For the type-form of conduct--when considered, not as a type of mere
+physical performance, but as conduct in the technical sense of a
+possible purpose of the self--is, in the sense we have explained, a
+symbol for the general possibility of access or dissipation of spiritual
+energy--energy which must be set free by the bringing to bear of other
+energies upon it, and which furthers or works counter to the enlargement
+and development of the self according to the mode of its co-ordination
+with other energies which the self has already turned to its
+purposes.[155] But actual conduct is concrete always and never typical;
+and so likewise, we have sought to show, actual "substance," the
+objective thing referred to in the factual judgment, is always concrete
+and never an essence. It is not a fixed thing admitting of a
+simultaneous variety of conflicting determinations and practical uses,
+but absolutely unique and already determined to its unique character by
+the whole assemblage of physical conditions which affect it at the time
+and which it in turn reacts upon. In the moral as in the physical sphere
+the fundamental category would, on our present account, appear to be
+that of energy. The particular physical object given in judgment is a
+concrete realization, in the form of a particular means or instrument,
+of that general possibility of attaining ends which the concept of a
+fixed fund of energy, interpreted as a logical postulate or principle of
+inference, expresses. The particular moral or economic act is a
+particular way in which the energy of the self may be increased or
+diminished. In both spheres the reality presented in the finished
+judgment is objective as being a stimulus to the setting free of the
+energies for which it stands. Once more, then, our answer to the
+objection we have been considering must be that the object as the
+permanent substrate is merely an abstract symbol standing for the
+indeterminate means in general set over against the self. Corresponding
+to it we have, on the other side, the concept of the "energetic"
+self--the self that is purposive in general, expansive somehow or other.
+
+
+The function of completed factual judgment in the development of
+experience is, we have held, that of warranting to the agent the
+completed purpose which his judgment of value expresses. This view calls
+for some further comment and illustration in closing the present
+division. In the first place the statement implies that the conditions
+which factual judgment presents in the "final survey" as sanctioning the
+purpose have not _determined_ the purpose, since prior to the
+determination of the purpose the conditions were not, and could not be,
+so presented. The question, therefore, naturally arises whether our
+meaning is that in the formation of our purposes in valuation the
+recognition of existing conditions plays no part. Our answer can be
+indicated only in the barest outline as follows:
+
+The agent must, of course, in an economic judgment-process, recognize
+and take account of such facts as the technical adaptability of the
+means he is proposing to use to the new purpose that is forming, as also
+of environing conditions which may affect the success which he may meet
+with in applying them. He must consider also his own physical strength
+and qualities of mind with a view to this same technical problem. And
+similarly in ethical valuation, as we have seen, the psychology of the
+"empirical ego" must play its part. But the conditions thus recognized
+are, as we might seek to show more in detail, explainable as the outcome
+of past factual judgment-processes, and on the occasion of their
+original definition in the form in which they now are known played the
+sanctioning part of which we have so often spoken. They therefore
+correspond to the agent's accepted practical ideals, so that the control
+which his past experience exercises over his present conduct may be
+stated equally well in either sort of terms--in terms of his prevailing
+recognized standards, or in terms of his present knowledge of the
+conditions which his new purpose must respect. Thus, in general, the
+concept of a physical order conditioning the conduct of all men and
+presented in a definite body of socially current knowledge is the
+logical correlate of the moral law conceived as a categorical imperative
+prescribing certain types of conduct.
+
+Thus the error of regarding the agent's conduct in a present emergency
+as an outcome of existing determining conditions is logically identical
+with the corresponding error of the ethical theory of self-realization.
+The latter holds the logical possibility of a determinate descriptive
+ideal (already realized in the unchanging Absolute Self) which is
+adequate to the solution of all possible ethical problems. The former
+holds that all conduct must be subject to the determining force of
+external conditions which, if not at present completely known, are at
+least in theory knowable. The physical universe in its original nebulous
+state contained the "promise and potency" of all that has been in the
+way of human conduct and of all that is to be. Into the fixed mechanical
+system no new energy can enter and from it none of the original fund of
+energy can be lost. This mechanical theory of conduct is the essential
+basis of the hedonistic theory of ethics; and it would not be difficult
+to show that Green's criticism of this latter and his own affirmative
+theory of the moral ideal (as also the current conventional criticism of
+hedonism in the same tenor by the school of Green) are in a logical
+sense identical with it. For the assumption that conduct is determined
+by existing objective conditions is precisely the logical correlate of
+the concept of a contentual and "realizable" ideal moral self.[156]
+
+We may now interpret, in the light of our general view of the function
+of factual judgment, the concept of the "empirical self" referred to in
+our discussion of the various types of sanctioning condition which may
+enter into the "final survey." The "empirical self" of psychological
+science is a construction gradually put together by psychologist or
+introspective layman as an interpretation of the way in which accepted
+concrete modes of conduct, in the determination of which standards have
+been operative, have worked out in practice to the furtherance or
+impoverishment of the "energetic" self. We have seen that the ambiguous
+presented self which functions in the moral attitude of obedience to
+authority or to conscience gives place in the attitude of conscious
+valuation to apprehension of the "energetic" self, on the one hand, and
+descriptive concepts of particular types of conduct, on the other. The
+"empirical self" at the same time makes its appearance as a constantly
+expanding inventory of the "spiritual resources" which the "energetic"
+self has at its disposal. These are the functions of the soul which a
+functional psychology shows us in operation--powers of attention,
+strength of memory, fertility in associative recall, and the like--and
+these are the resources wherewith the "energetic" self may execute, and
+so exploit to its own furtherance, the purposes which, in particular
+emergencies, new end and recognized standards may work out in
+co-operation.[157]
+
+
+VI
+
+In the foregoing pages we have consistently used the expressions
+"ethical and economic judgment" and "judgment of valuation" as
+synonymous. This may have seemed to the reader something very like a
+begging of the question from the outset, as taking for granted that very
+judgmental character of our valuational experience which it was the
+professed object of our discussion to establish. We are thus called upon
+very briefly to consider, first of all, the relations which subsist
+between the consciousness of value and the process which we have
+described as that of valuation. This will enable us, in the second
+place, to determine the logical function which belongs to the
+consciousness of value in the general economy of life. The consciousness
+of value is a perfectly definite and distinctive psychical fact mediated
+by a doubtless highly complex set of psychical or ultimately
+physiological conditions. As such it admits of descriptive analysis, and
+in a complete theory of value such descriptive analysis should certainly
+find a place. It would doubtless throw much light upon the origin of
+valuation as a process, and of valuing as an attitude, and admirably
+illustrate the view of the function of the consciousness of value to
+which a logical study of valuation as a process seems to lead us. This
+problem in analysis belongs, however, to psychology, and therefore lies
+apart from our present purpose; nor is it necessary to the establishment
+of our present view to undertake it. It is necessary for our purpose
+only to suggest, for purposes of identification, a brief description of
+the value-consciousness, and to indicate its place in the process of
+reflective thought.
+
+The consciousness of value may best be described, by way of first
+approximation, in the language of the Austrian economists as a sense of
+the "importance" to oneself of a commodity or defined moral purpose. It
+belongs to the agent's attitude of survey or recapitulation which ensues
+upon the completion of the judgment-process and is mediated by attention
+to the ethical or economic object in its newly defined character of
+specific conduciveness to the well-being of the self. The commodity, in
+virtue of its ascertained physical properties, is adapted to certain
+modes of use or consumption which, through valuation of the commodity,
+have come to be accepted as desirable. The moral act likewise has been
+approved by virtue of its having certain definite sociological
+tendencies, or being conducive to the welfare and happiness of a friend.
+Thus commodity or moral act, as the case may be, has a determinate
+complexity of meaning which has been judged as, in one sense, expansive
+of the self, and the value-consciousness we may identify as that sense
+of the valued object's importance which is mediated by recognition of it
+as the bearer of this complexity of concrete meaning. The meaning is, as
+we may say, "condensed" or "compacted" into the object as given in
+sense-perception, and because the meaning stands for expansion of the
+self, the object in taking it up into itself receives the character of
+importance as a valued object.
+
+The sense of importance thus is expressive of an attitude upon the
+agent's part. The concrete meanings which make up the content of the
+object's importance would inevitably, if left to themselves, prompt
+overt action. The commodity would forthwith be applied to its new use or
+the moral act would be performed. The self would, as we may express it,
+possess itself of the spiritual energies resident in the chosen purpose.
+The attitude of survey, however, inhibits this action of the self and
+the sense of importance is the resulting emotional apprehension of the
+value of the object hereby brought to recognition. Now, it should be
+carefully observed that the particular concrete emotions appropriate to
+the details of the valued purpose are not what we here intend. The
+purpose may spring from some impulse of self-interest, hatred,
+patriotism, or love, and the psychical material of its presentation
+during the agent's survey will be the varied complex of qualitative
+emotion that comes from inhibition of the detailed activities which make
+up the purpose as a whole. So also the apprehension of the physical
+object of economic valuation is largely, if not altogether, emotional in
+its psychical constitution. Psychologically these emotions are the
+purpose--they are the "stuff" of which the purpose as a psychical fact
+occurring in time is made. But we must bear in mind that it is not the
+purpose as a psychical fact that is the object of the agent's
+valuing--any more than is the tool with which one cuts perceived as a
+molecular mass or as an aggregation of centers of ether-stress. As a
+cognized object of value the purpose is, in our schematic terminology, a
+source of energy for the increase of the self, and thus the
+consciousness of value is the perfectly specific emotion arising from
+restraint put upon the self in its movement of appropriation of this
+energy. In contrast with the concrete emotions which are the substance
+of the purpose as presented, the consciousness of value may be called a
+"formal" emotion or the emotion of a typical reflective attitude.
+
+The valuing attitude we may then describe as that of "resolution" on the
+part of the self to adhere to the finished purpose which it now surveys,
+with a view to exploitation of the purpose. The connection between the
+valuation-process and the consciousness of value may be stated thus: The
+valuation-process works out (and necessarily in cognitive, objective
+terms) the purpose which is valued in the agent's survey. But this
+development of the purpose is at the same time determination of the
+"energetic" self to acceptance of the purpose that shall be worked out.
+Thus the valuation-process is the source of the consciousness of value
+in the twofold way (1) of defining the object valued, and (2) of
+determining the self to the attitude of resolution to adhere to it and
+exploit it.[158] The consciousness of value is the apprehension of an
+object in its complete functional character as a factor in experience.
+
+The function of the consciousness of value must now be very briefly
+considered. The phenomenon is a striking one, and apparently, as the
+economists especially have insisted, of much practical importance in the
+conduct of life.[159] And yet on our account of the phenomenon, as it
+may appear, the problem of assigning to it a function must be, to say
+the least, difficult. For the consciousness of value is, we have held,
+emotional, and, on the conception of emotion in general which we have
+taken for granted throughout our present discussion, this mode of being
+conscious is merely a reflex of a state of tension in activity. As such
+it merely reports in consciousness a process of motor co-ordination
+already going on and in the nature of the case can contribute nothing to
+the outcome.
+
+Now if it were in a direct way as immediately felt emotion that the
+consciousness of value must be functional if functional at all, then the
+problem might well be given up; but it would be a serious blunder to
+conceive the problem in this strictly psychological way. A logical
+statement of the problem would raise a different issue--not the question
+of whether emotion as emotion can in any sense be functional in
+experience, but whether the consciousness of value and emotion in
+general may not receive reflective interpretation and thereby, becoming
+objective, play a part as a factor in subsequent valuation-processes.
+Indeed, the psychological statement of the problem misses the entire
+point at issue and leads directly to the wholly irrelevant general
+problem of whether any mode of consciousness whatever can, _as
+consciousness_, put forth energy and be a factor in controlling conduct.
+The present problem is properly a logical one. What is the agent's
+apprehension of the matter? In his subsequent reflective processes of
+valuation does the consciousness of value, which was a feature of the
+survey on a past occasion, receive recognition in any way and so play a
+part? This is simply a question of fact and clearly, as a question
+relating to the logical content of the agent's reflective process, has
+no connection with or interest in the problem of a possible dynamic
+efficacy of consciousness as such. The question properly is logical, not
+psychological or metaphysical.
+
+Thus stated, then, the problem seems to admit of answer--and along the
+line already suggested in our account of economic valuation.[160]
+Recognition of the fact that the consciousness of value was experienced
+in the survey of a certain purpose on an earlier occasion confirms this
+purpose, holding the means, in an economic situation, to their appointed
+use and strengthening adherence to the standard in the ethical case.
+This recognition serves as stimulus to a reproduction, in memory, of the
+cognitive details of the earlier survey, and so in the ideal case to a
+more or less complete and recognizably adequate reinstatement of the
+earlier valuing attitude, and so to a reinstatement of the consciousness
+of value itself. The result is a strengthening of the established
+valuation, a more efficacious control of the new end claiming
+recognition, and an assured measure of continuity of ethical development
+from the old valuation to the new. The function thus assigned to the
+consciousness of value finds abundant illustration elsewhere in the
+field of emotion. The stated festivals of antiquity commemorative of
+regularly recurrent phases of agricultural and pastoral life, as also
+the festivals in observance of signal events in the private and
+political life of the individual, would appear to find, more or less
+distinctly, here their explanation. These festivals must have been
+prompted by a more or less conscious recognition of the social value
+inherent in the important functions making up the life of the community,
+and of the individual citizen as a member of the community and as an
+individual. They secured the end of a sustained and enhanced interest in
+these normal functions by effecting, through a symbolic reproduction of
+these, an intensified and glorified experience of the emotional meaning
+normally and inherently belonging to them.[161] In the same way the
+rites of the religious cults of Greece, not to mention kindred phenomena
+so abundantly to be found in lower civilizations as well as in our own,
+served to fortify the individual in a certain consistent and salutary
+course of institutional and private life.[162]
+
+It has been taken for granted throughout that there are but two forms of
+valuation-process, the ethical and the economic. The reason for this
+limitation may already be sufficiently apparent, but it will further
+illustrate our general conception of the valuation-process briefly to
+indicate it in detail. What shall be said, for example, of the common
+use of the term "value" in such expressions as the "value of life," the
+"emotional value" of an object or a moral act, the "natural value" of a
+type of impulsive activity? In these uses of the word the reference is
+apparently to one's own incommunicable inner experience of living, of
+perception of the object, or of the impulse, which cannot be suggested
+to any other person who has not himself had the experience. My pleasure,
+my color-sensation in its affective aspect, my emotion, are inner and
+subjective, and I distinguish them by such expressions as the above from
+the visible, tangible object to which I ascribe them as constituting its
+immediate or natural value to me. This broader use of the term "value"
+has not found recognition in the foregoing pages, and it requires here a
+word of comment. So long as these phases of the experience of the object
+are not recognized as separable in thought from the object viewed as an
+external condition or means, they would apparently be better
+characterized in some other way. If, however, they are so recognized,
+and are thereby taken as determinative of the agent's practical attitude
+toward the thing, we have merely our typical situation of ethical
+valuation of some implied purpose as conducive to the self and economic
+valuation of the means as requisites for execution of the purpose. Our
+general criterion for the propriety of terming any mode of consciousness
+the _value_ of an object must be that it shall perform a logical
+function and not simply be referred to in its aspect of psychical fact.
+The feeling or emotion, or whatever the mode of consciousness in
+question may be, must play the recognized part, in the agent's survey of
+the situation, of prompting and supporting a definite practical attitude
+with reference to the object. If, in short, the experience in question
+enters in any way into a conscious purpose of the agent, it may properly
+be termed a value.[163]
+
+Æsthetic value also has not been recognized, and for the opposite
+reason. The sense of beauty would appear to be a correlate of relatively
+perfect attained adjustment between the agent and his natural
+environment or the conditions suggested more or less impressively by the
+work of art. There must, indeed, be present in the æsthetic experience
+an element of unsatisfied curiosity sufficient to stimulate an interest
+in the changing or diverse aspects of the beautiful object, but this
+must not be sufficient to prompt reflective judgment of the details
+presented. On the whole, the æsthetic experience would appear to be
+essentially post-judgmental and appreciative. It comes on the particular
+occasion, not as the result of a judgment-process of the valuational
+type, but as an immediate appreciation. As an immediate appreciation it
+has no logical function and on our principles must be denied the name of
+value. Our standpoint must be that of the experiencing individual. The
+æsthetic experience as a type may well be a development out of the
+artistic and so find its ultimate explanation in the psychology of
+man's primitive technological occupations in the ordinary course of
+life. It is, as we have said, of the post-judgmental type, and so may
+very probably be but the cumulative outcome of closer and closer
+approximations along certain lines to a perfected adjustment with the
+conditions of life. It may thus have its origin in past processes of the
+reflective valuational type. Nevertheless, viewed in the light of its
+actual present character and status in experience, the æsthetic must be
+excluded from the sphere of values.
+
+
+Thus the realms of fact and value are both real, but that of value is
+logically prior and so the "more real." The realm of fact is that of
+conditions warranting the purposes of the self; as a separate order,
+complete and absolute in itself, it is an abstraction that has forgotten
+the reason for which it was made. Reality in the logical sense is that
+which furthers the development of the self. The purpose that falls short
+of its promise in this regard is unreal--not, indeed, in the
+psychological sense that it never existed in imagination, but in the
+logical sense that it is no longer valued. Within the inclusive realm of
+reality the realm of fact is that of the means which serve the concrete
+purposes which the self accepts. The completed purpose, however, is not
+_means_, since still behind and beyond it there can be no other concrete
+valued purpose which it can serve. Nor is it an ultimate _end_, since in
+its character of accepted and valued end the self adheres _to_ it, and
+it therefore cannot express the _whole_ purpose of the self to whose
+unspecifiable fulness and increase of activity it is but a temporary
+probational contributor. It is rather in the nature of a formula or
+method of behavior to which the self ascribes reality by recognizing and
+accepting it as its own.
+
+
+
+
+XI
+
+SOME LOGICAL ASPECTS OF PURPOSE
+
+INTRODUCTORY
+
+
+Whenever and wherever it was discovered that the content of experience
+as given in immediate perception could be reconstructed through ideas,
+then and there began to emerge such questions as these: What is the
+significance of this reconstructive power? What is the relation between
+it and the immediate experience? What is the relative value of each in
+experience as a whole? What is their relation to truth and error? If
+thinking leads to truth, and thought must yet get its material from
+perception, how then shall the product of thought escape infection from
+the material? On the other hand, if truth is to be found in the
+immediate experience, can it here be preserved from the blighting
+effects of thought? For so insistent and pervasive is this activity of
+thought that it appears to penetrate into the sanctum of perception
+itself. Turning to a third possibility, if it should be found that truth
+and error are concerned with both--that they are products of the
+combined activity of perception and reflection--then just what does each
+do? And what in their operations marks the difference between truth and
+error? Or still again, if truth and error cannot be found in the
+operations of perception and reflection as such, then they must be
+located in the relation of these processes to something else. If so,
+what is this something else? Out of such questions as these is logic
+born.
+
+There may be those who will object to some of these questions as
+"logical" problems--those who would limit logic to a description of the
+forms and processes of reconstruction, relegating the question of the
+criterion of truth and error to "epistemology." This objection we must
+here dismiss summarily by saying that, by whatever name it is called, a
+treatment of the forms and processes of thought must deal with the
+criterion of truth and error, since these different "forms" are just
+those which thought assumes in attempting to reach truth under different
+conditions.
+
+Certainly in the beginning the Greeks regarded their newly discovered
+power of thought as anything but formal. Indeed, it soon became so
+"substantial" that it was regarded as simply a new world of fact, of
+existence alongside of, or rather above, the world of perception. But
+Socrates hailed ideas as deliverers from the contradictions and
+paradoxes into which experience interpreted in terms of immediate
+sense-perception had fallen. In the concept Socrates found a solution
+for the then pressing problems of social life. The Socratic universal is
+not a mere empty form which thought imposes upon the world. It is
+something which thought creates in order that a life of social
+interaction and reciprocity may go on. This need not mean that the
+Greeks were reflectively conscious of this, but that this was the way
+the concept was actually used and developed by Socrates.
+
+In attempting to formulate the relation between this new world of ideas
+and immediate sense-experience, Plato constructed his scheme of
+substantiation and participation. The Platonic doctrine of
+substantiation and participation is an expression of the conviction that
+anything so valuable as Socrates had shown ideas to be could not be
+merely formal or unreal. Up to the discovery of these ideas reality lay
+in the "substances" of perception. Hence in order to have that reality
+to which their worth, their value in life, entitled them, the ideas must
+be substantiated.
+
+This introduction of the newly discovered ideas into the world of
+substances and reality wrought, of course, a change in the conception
+of the latter--a change which has well-nigh dominated the entire
+philosophic development ever since. Let us recall that the aim of
+Socrates was to find something that would prevent society from going to
+pieces under the influence of the disintegrating conception of
+experience as a mere flux of given immediate content. Now, in the
+concepts Socrates discovered the basis for just this much-needed
+wholeness and stability. Moreover, the fact that unity and stability
+were the actual social needs of the hour led not only to the concepts
+which furnished them being conceived as substantial and real, but to
+their being regarded as a higher type of reality, as "more real" than
+the given, immediate experiences of perception. They were higher and
+more real because, just then, they answered the pressing social need.
+
+The ideas supplied this unity because they furnished ends, purposes, to
+the given material of perception. The given is now given for something;
+for something more, too, than mere contemplation. Socrates also showed,
+by the most acute analysis, that the content of these ends, these
+purposes, was social through and through.
+
+From the ethical standpoint this teleological character of the idea is
+clearly recognized. But as "real," the ideas must be stated in the
+metaphysical terms of substance and attribute. Here the social need is
+abstracted from and lost to sight. The fundamental attributes of the
+ideas are now a metaphysical unity and stability. Hence unity and
+stability, wholeness and completeness, are the very essence of reality,
+while multiplicity and change constitute the nature of appearance. Thus
+does Plato's reality become, as Windelband says, "an immaterial
+eleaticism which seeks true being in the ideas without troubling itself
+about the world of generation and occurrence which it leaves to
+perception and opinion."[164]
+
+Now it is the momentum of this conception of reality as a stable and
+complete system of absolute ideas, the development of which we have just
+roughly sketched, that is so important historically. Why this conception
+of reality, which apparently grew out of a particular historical
+situation, should have dominated philosophic theory for over two
+thousand years appears at first somewhat puzzling. Those who still hold
+and defend it will of course say that this survival is evidence of its
+validity. But, after all, our human world may be yet very young. It may
+be that "a thousand years are but as yesterday." At any rate philosophy
+has never been in a hurry to reconstruct conceptions which served their
+day and generation with such distinction as did the Platonic conception
+of reality. And this is true to the evolutionary instinct that
+experience has only its own products as material for further
+construction. On the other hand, the principle of evolution with equal
+force demands that only as _material_, not as final forms of experience,
+shall these products continue. It may be that philosophy has not yet
+taken the conception of evolution quite seriously. At all events it is
+certain that long after it has been found that, instead of being eternal
+and complete, the concept undergoes change, that it has simply the
+stability and wholeness demanded by a particular and concrete situation;
+after it has been discovered, in other words, that the stability and
+wholeness, instead of attaching to the content of an idea, are simply
+the functions of any content used as a purpose--after all this has been
+accepted in psychology, the conception of truth and reality which arose
+under an entirely different conception of the nature of thought still
+survives.
+
+This change in the conception of the character of the ideas, with no
+corresponding change in the conception of reality, marks the divorce of
+thought and reality and the rise of the epistemological problem. Let us
+recall that in Plato the relation between the higher and ultimate
+reality, as constituted by the complete and "Eternal Ideas," and the
+lower reality of perception, is that of archetype and ectype.
+Perceptions attempt to imitate and copy the ideas. Now, when the ideas
+are found to be changing, and when further the interpenetration of
+perception and conception is discovered, reality as fixed and complete
+must be located elsewhere. And just as in the old system it was the
+business of perception to imitate the "Eternal Ideas," so here it is
+still assumed that thought is to imitate the reality wherever now it is
+to be located. And as regards the matter of location, the old conception
+is not abandoned. The elder Plato is mighty yet. Reality must still be a
+completed system of fixed and eternal "things in themselves,"
+"relations," or "noumena" of some sort which _our_ ideas, now
+constituted by both perception and conceptional processes, are still to
+"imitate," "copy," "reflect," "represent," or at least "symbolize" in
+some fashion.
+
+From this point on, then, thought has two functions: one, to help
+experience meet and reorganize into itself the results of its own past
+activity; the other, to reflect or represent in some sense the absolute
+system of reality. For a very long time the latter has continued to
+constitute the logical problem, the former being relegated to the realm
+of psychology.
+
+But this discovery of the reconstructive function of the idea and its
+assignment to the jurisdiction of psychology did not leave logic where
+it was before, nor did it lighten its task. Logic could not shut its
+eyes to this "psychological" character of the idea.[165] Indeed, logic
+had to take the idea as psychology described it, then do the best it
+could with it for its purpose.
+
+The embarrassment of logic by this reconstructive character of the idea
+even Aristotle discovered to some extent in the relation of the Platonic
+perceptions to the eternal ideas. He found great difficulty in getting a
+flowing stream of consciousness to imitate or even symbolize an
+eternally fixed and completed reality. And since we have discovered, in
+addition, that the idea is so palpably a reconstructive activity, the
+difficulties have not diminished.
+
+In such a situation it could only be a question of time until solutions
+of the problem should be sought by attempting to bring together these
+two functions of the idea. Perhaps after all the representation of
+objects in an absolute system is involved in the reconstruction of our
+experience. Or perhaps what appears as reconstructions of our
+experience--as desiring, struggling, deliberating, choosing, willing, as
+sorrows and joys, failures and triumphs--are but the machinery by which
+the absolute system is represented. At any rate, these two functions
+surely cannot be regarded as belonging to the idea as color and form
+belong to a stone. We should never be satisfied with such a brute
+dualism as this.
+
+Without any further historical sketch of attempts at this synthesis, I
+desire to pass at once to a consideration of what I am sure everyone
+will agree must stand as one of the most brilliant and in every way
+notable efforts in this direction--Mr. Royce's Aberdeen lectures on "The
+World and the Individual." It is the purpose here to examine that part
+of these lectures, and it is the heart of the whole matter, in which the
+key to the solution of the problem of the relation between ideas and
+reality is sought precisely in the purposive character of the idea. This
+will be found especially in the "Introduction" and in the chapter on
+"Internal and External Meaning of Ideas."[166]
+
+
+I. THE PURPOSIVE CHARACTER OF IDEAS
+
+With his unerring sense for fundamentals, Mr. Royce begins by telling us
+that the first thing called for by the problem of the relation of ideas
+to reality is a discussion of the nature of ideas. Here Mr. Royce says
+he shall "be guided by certain psychological analyses of the mere
+contents of our consciousness, which have become prominent in recent
+discussion."[167]
+
+    Your intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere imagery of
+    the thing, but always involve a consciousness of how you propose
+    to act toward the thing of which you have ideas.... Complex
+    scientific ideas viewed as to their conscious significance are, as
+    Professor Stout has well said, plans of action, ways of
+    constructing the object of your scientific consciousness.... By
+    the word idea, then, as we shall use it, when, after having
+    criticised opposing theory, we come to state in these lectures our
+    own thesis, I shall mean in the end any state of consciousness,
+    whether simple or complex, which when present is then and there
+    viewed as at least a partial expression, or embodiment of a single
+    conscious purpose.... In brief, an idea in my present definition
+    may, and in fact always does, if you please, appear to be
+    representative of a fact existent beyond itself. But the _primary_
+    character which makes it an idea is _not its representative
+    character_, is not its vicarious assumption of the responsibility
+    of standing for a being beyond itself, but is its inner character
+    as _relatively fulfilling the purpose_, that is as presenting the
+    partial fulfilment of the purpose which is in the consciousness of
+    the moment wherein the idea takes place.[168]... Now this purpose,
+    just in so far as it gets a present conscious embodiment in the
+    contents, and in the form of the complex state called the idea,
+    constitutes what I shall hereafter call the internal meaning of
+    the idea.[169]... But ideas often seem to have a meaning; yes, as
+    one must add, finite ideas always undertake or appear to have a
+    meaning that is not exhausted by this conscious internal meaning
+    presented and relatively fulfilled at the moment when the idea is
+    there for our finite view. The melody sung, the artists' idea, the
+    thought of your absent friend, a thought on which you love to
+    dwell, all these not merely have their obvious internal meaning
+    as meeting a conscious purpose by their very presence, but also
+    they at least appear to have that other sort of meaning, that
+    reference beyond themselves to objects, that cognitive relation to
+    outer facts, that attempted correspondence with outer facts, which
+    many accounts of our ideas regard as their primary inexplicable
+    and ultimate character. I call this second, and for me still
+    problematic, and derived aspect of the nature of ideas, their
+    apparently external meaning.[170]
+
+From all this it is quite evident that Mr. Royce accepts and welcomes
+the results of the work of modern psychology on the nature of the idea.
+The difficulty will come in making the connection between these accepted
+results and the Platonic conception of ultimate reality as stated in the
+following:
+
+    To be means simply to express, to embody the complete internal
+    meaning of _a certain absolute system of ideas_. A system,
+    moreover, which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning
+    or purpose of every finite idea, however fragmentary.[171]
+
+It may be well to note here in passing that, notwithstanding the avowed
+subordination here of the representative to the reconstructive character
+of the ideas, the former becomes very important in the chapter on the
+relation of internal to external meaning, where the problem of truth and
+error is considered.
+
+In this account of the two meanings of the idea, which I have tried to
+state as nearly as possible in the author's own words, there appear some
+conceptions of idea, of purpose, and of their relation to each other,
+that play an important part in the further treatment and in determining
+the final outcome. In the description of the internal meaning there
+appear to be two quite different conceptions of the relation of idea to
+purpose. One regards the idea as itself constituting the purpose or plan
+of action; the other describes the idea as "the partial fulfilment" of
+the purpose. (1) "Complex scientific ideas, viewed as to their
+conscious significance, are, as Professor Stout has well said, _plans of
+action_." (2) "You sing to yourself a melody; you are then and there
+conscious that the melody, as you hear yourself singing it, _partially
+fulfils_ and embodies a purpose."[172] When we come to the problem of
+the relation between the internal and external meaning, we shall find
+that the idea as internal meaning comes into a third relation to
+purpose, viz., that of _having_ the further purpose to agree or
+correspond to the external meaning. "Is the correspondence reached
+between idea and object the precise correspondence that the idea itself
+intended? If it is, the idea is true.... Thus it is not mere agreement,
+but intended agreement, that constitutes truth."[173] Thus the idea is
+(1) the purpose, (2) the partial fulfilment of the purpose, and (3) has
+a further purpose--to correspond to an object in the "absolute system of
+ideas."
+
+The first statement of the internal meaning as constituting the plan or
+purpose is, I take it, the conception of the internal meaning as an
+ideal construction which gives a working form, a definition to the
+"indefinite sort of restlessness" and blind feeling of dissatisfaction
+out of which the need of and demand for thought arises.[174] This
+accords with the scientific conception of the idea as a working
+hypothesis. If this interpretation of idea were steadily followed
+throughout, it is difficult to see how it could fail to lead to a
+conception of reality quite different from that described as "a certain
+absolute system of ideas."
+
+The second definition of internal meaning is the one in which it is
+stated as the "partial expression," "embodiment," and "fulfilment" of a
+single conscious purpose, and in which subsequently and consequently the
+idea is identified with "any conscious act," for example, singing. The
+first part of the statement appears to say that the idea of a melody is
+in "partial fulfilment" of the idea regarded as the purpose to sing the
+melody. But, as the first statement of internal meaning implies, how can
+one have a purpose to sing the melody except in and through the idea? It
+is precisely the construction of an idea that transforms the vague
+"indefinite restlessness" and dissatisfaction into a purpose. The idea
+is the defining, the sharpening of the blind activity of mere sensation,
+mere want, into a plan of action.
+
+However, Mr. Royce meets this difficulty at once by the statement that
+the term "idea" here not only covers the activity involved in forming
+the idea, _e. g._, the idea of singing, but includes the action of
+singing, which fulfils this purpose. "In the same sense _any conscious
+act_ at the moment when you perform it not merely expresses, but is, in
+my present sense, an idea."[175]
+
+But this sort of an adjustment between the idea as the purpose and as
+the fulfilment of the purpose raises a new question. What here becomes
+of the distinction between immediate and mediating experience? Surely
+there is a pretty discernible difference between experience as a
+purposive idea and the experience which fulfils this purpose. To call
+them both "ideas" is at least confusing, and indeed it appears that it
+is just this confusion that obscures the fundamental difficulty in
+dealing, later on, with the problem of truth and error. To be sure, the
+very formation of the idea as the purpose, the "plan of action," is the
+beginning of the relief from the "indefinite restlessness." On the other
+hand, it defines and sharpens the dissatisfaction. When this vague
+unrest takes the form of a purpose to attain food or shelter, or to sing
+in tune, it is of course the first step toward solution. But this very
+definition of the dissatisfaction intensifies it. The idea as purpose,
+then, instead of being the fulfilment, appears to be the plan, the
+method of fulfilment. The fulfilling experience is the further
+experience to which the idea points and leads.
+
+To follow a little farther this relation between the purposive and
+fulfilling aspects of experience, it is of course apparent that the idea
+as the purpose, the "plan of action," must as a function go over into
+the fulfilling experience. My purpose to sing the melody must remain, in
+so far as the action is a conscious one, until the melody is sung. I say
+"as a function," for the specific content of this purpose is
+continuously changing. The purpose is certainly not the same in content
+after half the melody has been sung as it is at the beginning. This
+means that the purpose is being progressively fulfilled; and as part of
+the purpose is fulfilled each moment, so a part of the original content
+of the idea drops out; and when the fulfilling process of this
+particular purpose is complete, or is suspended--for, in Mr. Royce's
+view, it never is complete in human experience--that purpose then gives
+way to some other, perhaps one growing out of it, but still one regarded
+as another. A purpose realized, fulfilled, cannot persist as a purpose.
+We may desire to repeat the experience in memory; _i. e._, instead of
+singing aloud, simply, as Mr. Royce says, "silently recall and listen to
+its imagined presence." But here we must remember that the memory
+experience, as such, is not an idea in the logical sense at all. It is
+an immediate experience that is fulfilling the idea of the song which
+constitutes the purpose to recall it, just as truly as the singing aloud
+fulfils the idea of singing aloud. Shouting, whistling, or "listening in
+memory to the silent notes" may all be equally immediate, fulfilling
+experiences. Doubtless the idea as purpose involves memory, as Mr. Royce
+says.[176] But it is a memory used as a purpose, and it is just this use
+of the memory material as a purpose that makes it a logical idea. In
+its content the purposive idea is just as immediate and as mechanical as
+any other part of experience. "Psychology explains the presence and the
+partial present efficacy of this purpose by the laws of motor processes,
+of habit, or of what is often called association."[177] Here "idea,"
+however, simply means, as Mr. Royce takes it in his second statement,
+conscious content of any sort. But this is not the meaning of "idea" in
+the logical sense. The logical idea is a conscious content used as an
+organizer, as "a plan of action," to get other contents. If, for
+example, in the course of writing a paper one wishes to recall an
+abstract distinction, as the distinction dawns in consciousness, it is
+not an idea in the logical sense. It is just as truly an immediate
+fulfilling experience as is a good golf stroke. So in the
+mathematician's most abstruse processes, which Mr. Royce so admirably
+portrays, the results for which he watches "as empirically as the
+astronomer alone with his star" are not ideas in the logical sense; they
+are immediate, fulfilling experiences.[178] The distinction between the
+idea as the mediating experience--that is, the logical idea--and the
+immediate fulfilling experience is therefore not one of content, but of
+use.
+
+There is a sense, however, in which the idea as a purpose can be taken
+as the partial fulfilment of another purpose; in the sense that any
+purpose is the outgrowth of activity involving previous purposes. This
+becomes evident when we inquire into the "indefinite restlessness" and
+dissatisfaction out of which the idea as purpose springs.
+Dissatisfaction presupposes some activity already going on in attempted
+fulfilment of some previous purpose. If one is dissatisfied with his
+singing, or with not singing, it is because one has already purposed to
+participate in the performance of a company of people which now he finds
+singing a certain melody, or one has rashly contracted to entertain a
+strenuous infant who is vociferously demanding his favorite ditty. This
+is only saying that any given dissatisfaction and the purpose to which
+it gives rise grow out of activity involving previous purposing. But
+this does not do away with the distinction between the idea as a purpose
+and the immediate fulfilling experience.
+
+If the discussion appears at this point to be growing somewhat captious,
+let us pass to a consideration of the relation between internal and
+external meanings, where the problem of truth and error appears, and
+where the vital import of these distinctions becomes more obvious.
+
+
+II. PURPOSE AND THE JUDGMENT
+
+Mr. Royce begins with the traditional definition of truth, which he then
+proceeds to reinterpret:
+
+    Truth is very frequently defined in terms of external meaning as
+    _that about which we judge_.... In the second place, truth has
+    been defined as the _correspondence between our ideas and their
+    objects_[179].... When we undertake to express the objective
+    validity of any truth, we use judgment. These judgments, if
+    subjectively regarded, that is, if viewed merely as processes of
+    our own present thinking, whose objects are external to
+    themselves, involve in all their more complex forms, combinations
+    of ideas, devices whereby we weave already present ideas into more
+    manifold structure, thereby enriching our internal meaning; but
+    the act of judgment has always its other, its objective aspect.
+    The ideas when we judge are also to possess external meaning....
+    It is true, as Mr. Bradley has well said, that the intended
+    subject of every judgment is reality itself. The ideas that we
+    combine when we judge about external meanings are to have value
+    for us as truth only in so far as they not only possess internal
+    meaning, but also imitate, by their structure, what is at once
+    other than themselves, and, in significance, something above
+    themselves. That, at least, is the natural view of our
+    consciousness, just in so far as, in judging, we conceive our
+    thought as essentially other than its external object, and as
+    destined merely to correspond thereto. Now we have by this time
+    come to feel how hard it is to define the Reality to which our
+    ideas are thus to conform, and about which our judgments are said
+    to be made, so long as we thus sunder external and internal
+    meanings.[180]
+
+_The universal judgment._--The problem is, then, to discover just the
+nature and ground of this relation between the internal and external
+meaning, between the idea and its object. This relation is established
+in the act of judgment. Taking first _the universal judgment_, we find
+here that the internal meaning has at best only a negative relation to
+the external meaning.
+
+    To say that all A is B is in fact merely to assert that the real
+    world contains no objects that are A, but that fail to be of the
+    class B. To say that no A is B is to assert that the real world
+    contains no objects that are at once A and B.[181]
+
+The universal judgments then "tell us indirectly what is in the realm of
+external meaning; but only by first telling us what is not."[182]
+
+However, these universal judgments have after all a positive value in
+the realm of internal meaning; that is, as mere thought.
+
+    This negative character of the universal judgments holds true of
+    them, as we have just said, just in so far as you sunder the
+    external and internal meaning, and just in so far as you view the
+    real as the beyond, and as the merely beyond. If you turn your
+    attention once more to the realm of ideas, viewed as internal
+    meaning, you see, indeed, that they are constantly becoming
+    enriched in their inner life by all this process. To know by inner
+    demonstration that 2+2=4 and that this is necessarily so, is not
+    yet to know that the external world, taken merely as the Beyond,
+    contains any true or finally valid variety of objects at all, any
+    two or four objects that can be counted.... On the other hand, so
+    far as your internal meaning goes, to have experienced within that
+    which makes you call this judgment necessary, is indeed to have
+    observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems to
+    you very positive.[183]
+
+This passage deserves especial attention. In the light of Kant, and in
+view of Mr. Royce's general definition of the judgment as the reference
+of internal to external meanings, one is puzzled to find that for the
+mathematician the positive value of the judgment "two and two are four"
+is confined to the realm of internal meaning. To be sure, Mr. Royce says
+that this limitation of the positive value of the universal judgment to
+the world of internal meaning occurs only when the external and internal
+meaning are sundered. But the point is: Does the mathematician or anyone
+else ever so sunder as to regard the judgment "two and two are four" as
+of positive value only as internal meaning? Indeed, in another
+connection Mr. Royce himself shows most clearly that mathematical
+results are as objective and as empirical as the astronomer's star.[184]
+Nor would it appear competent for anyone to say here: "Of course, they
+are not internal meanings _after_ we come to see, through the kind
+offices of the epistemologist, that the internal meanings are valid of
+the external world." We are insisting that they are never taken by the
+mathematician and scientists at first as merely internal meaning whose
+external meaning is then to be established. Surely the mathematical
+judgment, or any other, does not require an epistemological midwife to
+effect the passage from internal to external meaning. The external
+meaning is there all the while in the form of the diagrams and motor
+tensions and images with which the mathematician works. The difficulty
+here again seems to be that the distinction above discussed between the
+idea in the logical sense, as purpose, and the immediate fulfilling
+experience is lost sight of. The relation between two and four is not
+first discovered as a merely internal meaning. It is discovered in the
+process of fulfilling some purpose involving the working out of this
+relation. So the sum of the angles of a triangle is not discovered as a
+mere internal meaning whose external meaning is then to be found. It is
+found _in working with_ the triangle. It is discovered _in_ the
+triangle. And, once more, it matters not if the triangle here is a mere
+memory image. In relation to the purpose, to the logical idea, it is as
+truly external and objective as pine sticks or chalk marks. The streams
+of motor, etc., images that flow spontaneously under the stimulus of the
+purpose are just as immediate fulfilling experiences as the manipulation
+of sticks or chalk lines.
+
+The difficulty in keeping the universal judgment, as a judgment, in
+terms of merely internal meaning may be seen from the following:
+
+    As to these two types of judgments, the universal and the
+    particular, they both, as we have seen, make use of experience.
+    The universal judgments arise in the realm where experience and
+    idea have already fused into one whole; and this is precisely the
+    realm of internal meanings. Here one constructs and observes the
+    consequences of one's construction. But the construction is at
+    once an experience _of fact and an idea_.... Upon the basis of
+    such ideal constructions one makes universal judgments. These in a
+    fashion still to us, at this stage, mysterious, undertake to be
+    valid of that other world--the world of external meaning.[185]
+
+One is somewhat puzzled to know just what is meant by the fusion "of
+experience and idea." We must infer that it means the fusion of some
+aspect of experience which can be set over against idea, and this has
+always meant the external meaning, and this interpretation seems
+further warranted by the statement immediately following which describes
+the fusion as one "of _fact_ and idea." The situation then seems to be
+this: An internal and an external meaning, a fact and an idea, "fuse
+into one whole" and thus constitute that which is yet "precisely the
+realm of internal meanings," which aims to be valid of still another
+world of external meanings. And this waives the question of how
+experience fused into one whole can be an internal meaning, since as
+such it must be in opposition and reference to an external meaning; or
+conversely, how experience can be at once fact _and_ idea and still be
+"fused into one whole."
+
+Nor does the difficulty disappear when we turn to the aspects of
+universality and necessity. What is the significance and basis of
+universality and necessity as confined merely to the realm of internal
+meaning?
+
+    So far as your internal meaning goes, _to have experienced within
+    that which makes you call this judgment necessary_ is, indeed, to
+    have observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems
+    to you very positive.[186]
+
+But what is it that we "experience within" which makes us call this
+judgment necessary? In the discussion of the relation of the universal
+judgment to the disjunctive judgment, through which the former is shown
+to get even its negative force, there is an interesting statement:
+
+    One who inquires into a matter upon which he believes himself able
+    to decide in universal terms, _e. g._, in mathematics, has present
+    to his mind, at the outset, questions such as admit of alternative
+    answers. "A," he declares, "in case it exists at all, is either B
+    or C." Further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is
+    B.
+
+The last sentence is the statement referred to. What is meant by
+"further research shows universally, perhaps, that No A is B"? What kind
+of "research," internal or external, can show this? In short, there
+appears to be as much difficulty with universality and necessity in the
+realm of internal meaning as in the reference of internal to external
+meaning.[187]
+
+Instead, however, of discussing this point, Mr. Royce pursues the
+problem of the relation of the external and internal meaning, and finds
+that regarded as sundered there is no basis so far for even the negative
+universality and necessity in the reference of the internal meaning to
+the external.
+
+    For at this point arises the ancient question, How can you know at
+    all that your judgment is universally valid, even in this ideal
+    and negative way, about that external realm of validity, in so far
+    as it is external, and is merely your Other,--the Beyond? Must you
+    not just dogmatically say that that world must agree with your
+    negations? This judgment is indeed positive. But how do you prove
+    it? The only answer has to be in terms which already suggest how
+    vain is the very sundering in question. If you can predetermine,
+    even if but thus negatively, what cannot exist in the object, the
+    object then cannot be merely foreign to you. It must be somewhat
+    predetermined by your Meaning.[188]
+
+But in the universal judgment this determination, as referred to the
+external meaning, is only negative.
+
+_The particular judgment._--It is then through the particular judgment
+that the universal judgment is to get any positive value in its
+reference to the external meaning.
+
+    As has been repeatedly pointed out in the discussions on recent
+    Logic, the particular judgments--whose form is Some A is B, or
+    Some A is not B--are the typical judgments that positively assert
+    Being in the object viewed as external. This fact constitutes
+    their essential contrast with the universal judgments. They
+    undertake to cross the chasm that is said to sunder internal and
+    external meanings; and the means by which they do so is always
+    what is called "external experience."
+
+It is now high time to ask why the internal meaning seeks this external
+meaning. Why does it seek an object? Why does it want to cross the
+chasm? In other words, what is the significance of the demand for the
+particular judgment? In the introduction we have been told, as a matter
+of description, that the internal meanings do seek the external meaning,
+but why do they? We have also been told that universal judgments
+"develop and enrich the realm of internal meaning." Why, then, should
+there be a demand for the external meaning, for a further object? The
+answer is:
+
+    We have our internal meanings. We develop them in inner
+    experience. There they get presented as something of universal
+    value, _but always in fragments_. They, therefore, so far
+    dissatisfy. We conceive of the Other wherein these meanings shall
+    get some sort of final fulfilment.[189]
+
+It is, then, the incomplete and fragmentary character of the internal
+meaning that demands the particular judgment. The particular judgment is
+to further complete and determine the incomplete and indeterminate
+internal meaning. And yet no sooner is this particular judgment made
+than we are told that "it is a form at once positive, and very
+unsatisfactorily indeterminate." Again:[190]
+
+    The judgments of experience, the particular judgments, express a
+    positive but still imperfect determination of internal meaning
+    through external experience. The limit or goal of this process
+    would be an individual judgment wherein the will expressed its own
+    final determination.[191]
+
+Apparently, then, the particular judgment to which the internal meaning
+appeals for completion and determination only succeeds in increasing the
+fragmentary and indeterminate character.
+
+This brings us to another "previous question." Just what are we to
+understand by this "fragmentary" and "indeterminate" character of the
+internal meaning? In what sense, with reference to what, is it
+incomplete and fragmentary? Later we shall be told that it is with
+reference to "its own final and completely individual expression." This
+is to be reached in the individual judgment. And if we ask what is meant
+by this final, complete, and individual expression--which, by the way,
+no human being can experience--we read, wondering all the while how it
+can be known, that it is simply "the expression that seeks no other,"
+that "is satisfied," that "is conclusive of the search for
+perfection."[192] Waiving for the present questions concerning the basis
+of this satisfaction and perfection, all this leaves unanswered our
+query concerning the other end of the matter, viz., the meaning and
+criterion of the fragmentary and indeterminate character of these
+internal meanings.
+
+If we here return to the first definition of internal meaning of the
+idea as a purpose in the sense of "a plan of action," such as "singing
+in tune," or getting the properties of a geometrical figure, it does not
+seem difficult to find a basis and meaning for this fragmentary and
+indeterminate character. First we may note in a general way that it is
+of the very essence of a plan or purpose to lead on to a fulfilling
+experience such as singing in tune, or reaching a mathematical equation.
+But here this fulfilling experience to which the plan points is not a
+mere working out of detail inside the plan itself, although, indeed,
+this does take place. If this were all the fulfilling experience meant,
+it is difficult to see how we should escape subjective idealism.[193] We
+start with a relatively indeterminate idea and end with a more
+determinate _idea_, though, indeed, there is yet no criterion for this
+increased determination. To be sure, the idea as a plan of action, as
+has already been stated, does undergo change and does become, if you
+please, more definite and complete as a plan; but this does not
+constitute its fulfilment. Its fulfilment surely is to be found in the
+immediate experiences of singing, etc., to which the idea points and
+leads.
+
+The fragmentary and incomplete character of the internal meaning as a
+plan of action does not, then, after all, so much describe the plan
+itself as it does the general condition of experience out of which the
+idea arises. Experience takes on the form of a plan, of an idea,
+precisely because it has fallen apart, has become "fragmentary." It is
+just the business of the internal meaning, as Mr. Royce so well shows,
+to form a plan, an ideal, an hypothetical synthesis that shall stimulate
+an activity, which shall satisfactorily heal the breach. "Fragmentary"
+is a quality, then, that belongs, not to the idea in itself considered,
+but to the general condition of experience, of which the idea as a plan
+is an expression.
+
+If, now, the fragmentary character of the internal meaning is determined
+simply with relation to the fulfilling experiences, such as singing in
+tune, adjustments of geometrical figures, etc., to which it points and
+leads, it seems as if the completion of the internal meaning must be
+defined in the same terms. And this would appear to open a pretty
+straight path to the redefinition of truth and error.
+
+
+III. THE CRITERION OF TRUTH AND ERROR
+
+At the outset, truth was defined as the "correspondence" or "agreement"
+of an idea with its object. But we have seen that correspondence or
+agreement with an object means the completion and determination of the
+idea itself, and since the idea is here a specific "plan of action," it
+would seem that the "true" idea would be the one that can complete
+itself by stimulating a satisfying activity. The false idea would be
+one that cannot complete itself in a satisfying activity, such as
+singing in tune, constructing a mathematical equation, etc., and just
+this solution is very clearly expounded by our author. In the case of
+mathematical inquiry,
+
+    In just so far as we _pause satisfied_ we observe that there "is
+    no other" mathematical fact to be sought _in the direction of the
+    particular inquiry in hand_. Satisfaction of purpose by means of
+    _presented fact_ and such determinate satisfaction as sends us to
+    no other experience for further light and fulfillment, precisely
+    this outcome is itself the Other that is sought when we begin our
+    inquiry.[194]
+
+So "when other facts of experience are sought," if I watch for stars or
+for a chemical precipitate, or for a turn in the stock market, or in the
+sickness of a friend, my ideas are true when they are satisfied with
+"the presented facts." Again,
+
+    It follows that the finally determinate form of the object of any
+    finite idea is that form which the idea itself would assume
+    whenever it became individuated, or in other words, became a
+    completely determined idea, an idea or will fulfilled by a wholly
+    adequate empirical content, for which no other content need be
+    substituted or from the point of view of the satisfied idea, could
+    be substituted.[195]
+
+In such passages as these it seems clear that the test of the truth of
+an idea is its power to bring us to the point where we "pause
+satisfied," where "no other content need be substituted," etc. Nor in
+such passages does there seem to be any doubt of reaching satisfaction
+in particular cases. Here, it appears, we _may_ sing in tune, we _may_
+get the desired precipitate, and possibly even interpret the stock
+market correctly. Of course, the discord, the hunger, the loss, will
+come again; but so will new ideas, new truths. "Man thinks in order to
+get control of his world and thereby of himself."[196] Then the control
+actually gained must measure the value, the truth of his thought. Do you
+wish to sing in tune, "then your musical ideas are false if they lead
+you to strike what are then called false notes."[197]
+
+It should also be noticed that here this desired determination does not
+consist in a further determination of the mere idea as such. It is found
+in "the presented fact," in the immediate activity of singing, of
+getting precipitates, etc. As has already been pointed out, it is only
+by using the term "idea" for both the purpose and the fulfilling act of
+singing that this "pause of satisfaction" can be ascribed to the further
+determination of the idea. As such, as also before remarked, the sort of
+determination that the idea here gets means its termination, its
+disappearance in the immediate experiences of singing, etc., to which it
+leads. The "indefinite restlessness" of hunger and cold would scarcely
+be satisfied by getting more determinate and specific _ideas_ only of
+food and shelter. The satisfaction comes when the ideas are "realized,"
+when the "plans" are swallowed up in fulfilment.
+
+But in all this nothing has been said about "the certain absolute system
+of ideas," nor does there appear to be here any demand for it. To be
+sure, in the passages just considered, experience has been found to
+become "fragmentary," but it has also been found capable of healing, of
+wholing itself, not of course into any "final whole," but into the unity
+of "satisfaction" as regards "the particular inquiry in hand." There is
+of course failure as well, but this also is not final. It means simply
+that we must look farther for the "pause of satisfaction," that we must
+construct another idea, another "plan of action."
+
+But, after having shown that the idea as a plan of action may lead to
+satisfaction in the particular case, and that its success or failure so
+to do is one measure of its truth or falsity, we are now suddenly
+aroused to the fact that after all thought does not lead us to the
+completed "absolute system of ideas," to a final stage of eternal
+unbroken satisfaction.
+
+    But never in our human process of experience do we reach that
+    determination. It is for us the object of love and of hope, of
+    desire and of will, of faith and of work, but never of present
+    finding.[198]
+
+If at this point one asks: Whence this absolute system of ideas? Why
+have we to reckon with it at all? there appears to be little that is
+satisfying. Indeed, it seems difficult to get rid of the impression that
+this "certain absolute system of ideas" is on our hands as a
+philosophical heirloom from the time of Plato, so hallowed by time and
+so established by centuries of acceptance that we have ceased to ask for
+its credentials. To ground it in the "essentially fragmentary character
+of human experience" appears to be a _petitio_, for experience does not
+appear "essentially fragmentary" in this sense until after the absolute
+system has been posited.
+
+And this brings to notice that at this point both the fragmentary and
+unitary characters of experience take on new meaning. So far this
+fragmentary character has been defined with reference to "the particular
+inquiry in hand." Now, since the distinction between absolute and human
+experience has emerged, the fragmentary character becomes an absolute
+quality of the latter in contrast with the former. So, _mutatis
+mutandis_, of unity. Up to this point unity, wholeness, has been
+possible within human experience in the case of particular problems,
+such as singing in tune, etc. But with the appearance of the absolute
+system of ideas, wholeness is now the exclusive quality of the latter,
+as incompleteness is of human experience, though of course the _working_
+unity, the unity resulting in "pauses of satisfaction," must still
+remain in the latter.
+
+The problem now is to somehow work the absolute system of ideas into
+connection with the conception of the idea as a purpose, as a concrete
+plan of action. Here is where the third conception of the relation
+between idea and purpose, described at the beginning, comes into
+play--the conception in which the idea, instead of being the purpose, or
+the fulfilment of a purpose, _has_ the purpose to correspond with, or
+represent "its own final and completely individual expression,"
+contained in the absolute system. From the previous standpoint the
+idea's "own final and completely individual expression" has been found
+in the fulfilling experiences of singing in tune, getting mathematical
+equations, chemical precipitates, etc. Here this complete individual
+experience can never be found in finite, human experience, but must be
+sought in the absolute system--and this can be only "the object of love
+and hope, of desire and will, never of present finding."
+
+Notwithstanding the many previous protestations that the purposive
+function of the idea is its "primary" and "most essential" character, we
+are here forced to fall back upon correspondence--representation as the
+primary, the essential, and indeed, it appears at times, as the sole
+function. For in the attempt to bring these two functions together the
+purposive function is swallowed up in the representative. The idea still
+is, or has a purpose, a "plan of action," but this purpose, this plan,
+is now nothing but to represent and correspond with its own final and
+completed form in the absolute system. By this simple _coup_ is the
+purposive function of the idea reduced at once to the representative.
+Nor is it pertinent to urge at this point that every purpose involves
+representation, that the plan must be some sort of an image or scheme
+which symbolizes and stimulates the thing to be done. This no one would
+question, but now the sole "thing to be done" apparently is to perfect
+this representation of the complete and individual form in the absolute
+system.[199]
+
+Once more, an array of passages could be marshaled from almost every
+page refuting any such interpretation as this, but they would be
+passages expounding the part played by the idea in such concrete
+experiences as singing, measuring, etc., not in representing an absolute
+system of ideas. Even as regards the latter one might urge that, by
+insisting on the active character of the idea, we could after all regard
+this absolute system as a life of will after the fashion of our own,
+were it not at once described as "the complete embodiment," "the final
+fulfilment," of finite ideas. A life consisting of mere fulfilment seems
+a baffling paradox. And its timeless character only adds to the
+difficulty. Moreover, if we regard the system as constituted by such
+concrete activities as measuring and singing, etc., while we have saved
+will, we shall now have to fallback upon our first conception of truth
+as found in the idea which unifies the fragmentary condition of
+experience as related to specific problems, not fragmentary as related
+to an absolute system.
+
+This brings us to the final and crucial point of the discussion, the
+part which purpose plays in the determination of _truth_ and _error_
+from the standpoint of "the absolute system of ideas." When is this
+purpose of the idea to correspond with its absolute, final, and
+completed form fulfilled, or partially fulfilled? And here at the very
+outset is a difficulty. We have read repeatedly that the idea is itself
+"the partial fulfilment of a purpose." It is now to seek an object which
+shall increase this degree of fulfilment, but still this fulfilment
+shall be incomplete. And when we come to consider error, it too will be
+found to consist in a partial fulfilment. So it appears that there are
+three stages of "partial fulfilment" to be discriminated, one belonging
+to the idea itself, another to finite truth, and still another to error.
+
+Returning to the problem, from this point on we find the two
+standpoints, that of the specific situation and that of the absolute
+system, so closely interwoven and entangled that they are followed with
+great difficulty. We have already seen that the idea seeks
+correspondence with its object, because it is "fragmentary,"
+"incomplete," "indetermined." And there we found that this indeterminate
+and fragmentary character belonged to the idea as a purpose, a plan of
+seeking relief from some sort of "restlessness" and "dissatisfaction,"
+such as singing out of tune, etc. Here it is the incompleteness of an
+imperfect representation of its object in the absolute system that is
+the _motif_, and how it is to effect an improvement in its imperfect
+condition is now the problem. Here again the appeal is to purpose.
+Whatever may constitute the absolute system, one thing is assured:
+nothing in it can be an object except as the finite idea "intends it,"
+purposes it, to be its object. Again must we ask: On what basis is this
+object in the absolute system selected at all? In general the answer is:
+On the basis of a need of "further determination;" but when we further
+analyze this, we find it means on the basis of a specific want or need,
+such as food, shelter, measuring, singing, etc. The basis of the
+selection, then, is entirely on the side of the concrete, finite
+situation.
+
+Here, too, we might ask: Whence the confidence that there will be found
+something in the absolute system that will fulfil the purpose generated
+on the side of the finite? Must we not here fall back on something like
+a pre-established harmony? To this our author would say: "Yea, verily.
+The fact that the absolute system responds to the finite needs does
+precisely show that the finite and the absolute cannot be sundered." But
+when we try to state _how_ the purpose generated on the side of the
+finite can be met by the absolute system, the account again seems to run
+so much in terms of the finite experience that to call it a system of
+"final," "completed," and "fulfilled" ideas does not seem accurate. We
+must note here, too, the shifting in the sense of "purpose." The idea
+selects its object on the basis of the material needed to relieve the
+unrest and dissatisfaction of singing out of tune, etc. But now it is to
+be satisfied by increasing the extent of its representation of its
+object in the absolute system.
+
+And now, finally, what shall mark the attainment of this purpose of the
+idea to correspond and represent "its own completed form"? When is the
+correspondence and representation true? Simply at the point where "we
+pause satisfied," where "no other content need be substituted, or from
+the point of view of the satisfied idea could be substituted." That is
+all; there is no other answer. There are other statements, but they all
+come to the same thing. For instance:
+
+    It is true--this instant's idea--if, in its own measure, and on
+    its own plan, it corresponds, even in its vagueness, to its own
+    final and completely individual expression.[200]
+
+But the moment we ask what this "final and individual expression" is,
+and what is meant by "in its own measure," and "on its own plan," we
+are thrown back at once upon the preceding statement. The next sentence
+following the passage just quoted does indeed define this "individual
+expression." "Its expression would be the very life of fulfilment of
+purpose which this present idea already fragmentarily begins, as it
+were, to express." But how can we know that the expression is
+"fragmentary" unless we have some experience of wholeness?
+
+And here perhaps is the place to say, what has been implied all along,
+that this absolutely "fragmentary" character of human experience is an
+abstraction of the relatively disintegrated condition into which
+experience temporarily falls, which abstraction is then reinstated as a
+fixed quality, overlooking the fact that experience becomes fragmentary
+only that it may again become whole. The absolute system, the final
+fulfilment, is in the same case. It too is but the hypostatized
+abstraction of the function of becoming whole, of wholing and
+fulfilling, which manifests itself in the "pauses of satisfaction."
+
+"But," Mr. Royce would say, "the wholeness of the particular instance is
+after all not a true and perfect wholeness, because we can always think
+of the fulfilling experience as possibly different, as having a possibly
+different embodiment." But this implies also a different purpose.
+Moreover, it abstracts the purpose from the specific conditions under
+which the purpose develops. Thus in singing in tune one doubtless could
+easily imagine himself singing another tune, on another occasion, in
+another key, in a clear tenor instead of a cracked bass, etc. But if on
+_this_ occasion, in _this_ song, and with _this_ cracked bass voice one,
+accepting all these conditions, does, with malice aforethought, purpose
+to strike the tune, and happily succeeds, why, for that purpose formed
+under the known and accepted conditions, is not the accomplishment final
+and absolute? Nor is the case any different, so far as I can see, in
+mathematical experience. To quote again:
+
+    You think of numbers, and accordingly count one, two, three. Your
+    idea of these numbers is abstract, a mere generality. Why? Because
+    there could be other cases of counting, and other numbers counted
+    than the present counting process shows you, and why so? Because
+    your purpose in counting is not wholly fulfilled by the numbers
+    now counted.[201]
+
+I confess I cannot see here in what respect the purpose is not
+fulfilled. Doubtless there could be "other cases of counting," and
+"other numbers," but these may not be included in my present purpose,
+which is simply to count here and now. In this passage the purpose is
+not very fully defined. One's counting is usually for something, if for
+nothing more than merely to illustrate the process. In this latter case
+one's purpose would be completely fulfilled by just the numbers used
+when he should "pause satisfied" with the illustration. Or, if I wish to
+show the properties of numbers, then the discovery that there can always
+be more of them fulfils my purpose, since this endless progression is
+one of the properties. Or yet again, if one should suddenly become
+enamored of the process of counting, and forthwith should purpose to
+devote the rest of his days to it, it would still be fortunate that
+there were always other numbers to be counted. In other words, the idea
+as a purpose is formed with reference to, and out of, specific
+conditions. In the last analysis the problem always is: What is to be
+done here and now with the actual material at hand, under the present
+conditions? As the purpose is determined by these specific conditions,
+so is the fulfilment. To say that the fulfilment might be different is
+virtually to say that the purpose might have been different, or indeed
+that the universe might have been different.
+
+This necessity of falling back upon the character of the idea as a
+purpose in the sense of the specific "plan of action" comes into still
+bolder relief in the consideration of error from the standpoint of "the
+absolute system of ideas." As already mentioned, the initial and
+persistent problem here is to distinguish at all between truth and error
+in our experience from this standpoint. All our efforts at representing
+the absolute system must fall short. What can we mean, then, by calling
+some of our ideas true and others false? The definition of error is as
+follows:
+
+    An error is an error about a specific object, only in case the
+    purpose, imperfectly defined by the vague idea at the instant when
+    the error is made, is better defined, is in fact, better fulfilled
+    by an object whose determinate character in some wise, although
+    never absolutely, opposes the fragmentary efforts first made to
+    define them.[202]
+
+But in relation to the absolute system the later part of this statement
+holds of all our ideas. There always is the absolute object which would
+"better define" and "better fulfil" our purposes. Hence it is only in
+reference to the "specific" instances of singing, measuring, etc., that
+a basis for the distinction can be found. Here our plan is not true so
+long as its mission of relieving the specific unrest and
+dissatisfaction, the specific discord or hunger, is unfulfilled.
+
+The only criterion, then, which we have been able to find for the
+fulfilment of the purpose, for the truth of the idea as representing an
+object in the absolute system, is the sense of wholeness, the "pause of
+satisfaction," which we experience in realizing such specific purposes
+as "singing in tune." And if it be said again: "Precisely so; this only
+shows how intimate is the relation between our experience and the
+absolute system of ideas;" then must it also be said once more, either
+that the absolute system can be nothing more than an abstraction of the
+element of wholeness or wholing in our experience, or that thus far the
+relation appears to rest upon sheer assumption.
+
+Again, it may be insisted, as suggested at the outset of this
+discussion, that the idea can well have two purposes: one to help
+constitute and solve the specific problems of daily life; the other to
+represent the absolute system. Very well, we must then make out a case
+for the latter. If the purposes are to be different, the purpose to
+represent the Absolute should have a criterion of its own. This we have
+not been able to find. On the contrary, whenever pushed to the point of
+stating a criterion for the representation of the absolute system, we
+have had to appeal, in every case, to the fulfilment of a specific
+finite purpose. And even if this purpose to represent the absolute
+system had some apparent standard of its own, we should not be content
+to leave the matter so. We should scarcely be satisfied to observe as a
+mere matter of fact that the idea has a reconstructive function, and
+_also_ a representative function. Such a brute dualism would be
+intolerable.
+
+
+IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
+
+In the end, the outcome of the endeavor to establish a connection
+between the relation of the idea to human experience and its relation to
+the absolute system does not appear satisfying. The idea is left either
+with two independent purposes--one to reconstruct finite experience, the
+other to represent and symbolize the absolute system--or one of these
+purposes is merged in the other. When the attempt is made from the
+standpoint of the absolute system, the reconstructive purpose is
+swallowed up in the representative. When, on the other hand, the need
+for a basis of distinction between truth and error "here on this bank
+and shoal of time" is felt, the representative disappears in the
+reconstructive function. Nowhere are we able to discover a true
+unification. To be sure, we have been told again and again that the
+representation of the absolute object, if only we could accomplish it,
+would be "the final fulfilment," "completion," and "realization" of the
+human, finite purpose. But besides a confessed impotency at the very
+start, this involves, as we have seen, either a sudden transformation of
+the specific purpose of singing in tune, etc., into that of representing
+the absolute system, or a sheer assumption that the representation of
+the absolute object does somehow help in the realization of the specific
+finite purpose. Nowhere is there any account of _how_ this help would be
+given.
+
+And this suggests that if the analysis of the idea as purpose, given at
+the outset of Mr. Royce's lecture, had been developed further, if the
+conditions and origin of purpose had been examined, it is difficult to
+see how this discrepancy could have escaped disclosure. Mr. Royce starts
+his account by simply accepting from psychology a general description of
+the purposive character of the idea. Even in the more detailed passages
+on purpose we have nothing but descriptions of purpose after it is
+formed. Nothing is said of the origin of this purposiveness. The
+purposive character of experience is of course very manifest, but what
+is the significance of this purposing in experience as a whole? What is
+the source and the material of the purposes?
+
+It is this uncritical acceptance of the purposive quality of the idea
+that obscures the irrelevancy of its relation to the absolute system. If
+the idea must merely be or have a purpose, then it may as well be that
+of representing the absolute system as any other. Of course, there are
+troublesome questions as to how our finite ideas ever got such a
+purpose; but, after all, if it is simply a matter of having any sort of
+a purpose, representing the absolute system may answer as well as
+anything. But when now we come to deal with the problem of fulfilment,
+with the question of truth and error, we have to reckon with this
+neglect of the source of this purposiveness.
+
+It is this unanalyzed ground of the purpose that makes the matter of
+fulfilment so ambiguous. Such an analysis, we believe, would have shown
+that the conditions out of which the idea as a purpose arises determine
+also the sort of fulfilment possible. There are, indeed, one or two very
+general, but very significant, statements in this direction, if they
+were only followed up. For instance:
+
+    In doing what we often call "making up our minds" we pass from a
+    vague to a definite state of will and of resolution. In such cases
+    we begin with perhaps a very indefinite sort of restlessness which
+    arouses the question: "What is it that I want, what do I desire,
+    what is my real purpose?"
+
+In other words, what does this restlessness mean? What is the matter?
+What is to be done?
+
+Purpose is born, then, out of restlessness and dissatisfaction. But
+whence comes this restlessness and dissatisfaction? Surely we cannot at
+this point charge it to a discrepancy between our finite idea and the
+absolute object, since it is just this restlessness that is giving birth
+to the purposive idea. One thing, at any rate, appears pretty certain:
+this "indefinite restlessness" presupposes some sort of activity already
+going on. The restlessness is not generated in a vacuum. But why should
+this activity get into a condition to be described as "indefinite
+restlessness" and dissatisfaction?
+
+Repugnant as it will be to many to have psycho-physical, to say nothing
+of biological, doctrines introduced into a logical discussion, I confess
+that, at this point facing the issue squarely, I see no other way. And
+it appears to me that just at this point it is the fear of
+phenomenalistic giants that has kept logic wandering so many years in
+the wilderness.
+
+What, then, in this action already going on is responsible for this
+restlessness? First let us note that "indefinite restlessness" and
+"dissatisfaction" are terms descriptive of what Mr. James calls "the
+first thing in the way of consciousness." This assumes consciousness as
+a factor in activity. So that our question now becomes: What is the
+significance of this factor of restless, dissatisfied consciousness in
+activity? Now, there appears no way of getting at the part which
+consciousness plays different from that of discovering the function of
+anything else. And this way is simply that of observing, as best we may,
+the conditions under which consciousness operates, and what it does.
+Here the biologist and psychologist with one voice inform us that this
+indefinite restlessness which marks the point of the operation of
+consciousness arises where, in a co-ordinated system of activities,
+there develop out of the continuation of the activity itself new
+conditions calling for a readjustment and reconstruction of the
+activity, if it is to go on. Consciousness then appears to be the
+function which makes possible the reorganization of the results of a
+process back into the process itself, thus constituting and preserving
+the continuity of activity. So interpreted, consciousness appears to be
+an essential element in the conception of a self-sustaining activity.
+This "indefinite restlessness," in which consciousness begins, marks,
+then, the operation of the function of reconstruction without which
+activity would utterly break down.
+
+Precisely because, then, the idea "as a plan" is projected and
+constructed in response to this restlessness must its fulfilment be
+relevant to it. It is when the idea as a purpose, a plan, born out of
+this matrix of restlessness, begins to aspire to the absolute system,
+and attempts to ignore or repudiate its lowly antecedents, that the
+difficulties concerning fulfilment begin. They are the difficulties that
+beset every ambition which aspires to things foreign to its inherited
+powers and equipment.
+
+A detailed account at this point of the construction and fulfilment of
+the idea as "a plan of action" would contain a consecutive
+reinterpretation of Mr. Royce's principal rubrics. Such an account the
+limits of this paper forbid. We shall have to be content with pointing
+out in a general way a few instances by way of illustration.
+
+In the first place, it is in this matrix of indefinite restlessness out
+of which the idea is born that the "fragmentary character of
+experience," of which Mr. Royce is so keenly conscious, appears. But,
+once more, this fragmentary character is discernible only by contrast
+with the wholeness on both sides of the fragments; the wholeness that
+precedes the restlessness, and the new "pause of satisfaction" toward
+which it points. Nor must we forget that the habit matrix, out of the
+disintegration of which the restlessness is immediately born, does not
+exist as some metaphysical ultimate out of which thought as such has
+evolved. Back of it is some previous purpose in whose service habit was
+enlisted. On the other hand, this disintegration means that the old
+purpose, the old plan, must be reconstructed; that it, along with the
+disintegrated habit, becomes the material for a new plan, a new wholing
+of experience.
+
+In the next place, the construction of this new plan of action does
+involve "re-presentation." The first step in the transition from the
+condition of "indefinite restlessness" toward a "plan" is the diagnosis,
+the definition of the restlessness. This involves the re-presentation in
+consciousness of the activities, out of which the restlessness has
+arisen. This re-presentation is also the beginning of the
+reconstruction. The diagnosis of the singing activity as being "out of
+tune" is the negative side of beginning to sing in tune. It is now a
+commonplace of psychology that all representation is reconstruction. And
+this is where Mr. Royce's emphasis of the symbolic, the algebraic, as
+against the copy type of representation, has its application. All we
+want here is some sort of an image--visual, auditory, motor, it matters
+not--that shall serve to focus attention upon the singing activities
+until they are reconstructed sufficiently to bring us to the "pause of
+satisfaction."[203] But nowhere in all this is there any reference to
+the idea's object in the absolute system. Nor does there appear to be
+any call or place for such reference. The representation here is a part
+of the very process of forming the plan of further reconstruction out of
+the materials of the specific situation. Representation is not the
+plan's own end and aim. This is to stimulate a new set of activities
+that shall lead out of the present state of unrest and dissatisfaction.
+
+It is also true, as already mentioned, that in the process of fulfilling
+the plan, of realizing the idea, further determination and specification
+is produced in the plan itself. The idea as a plan is certainly not
+formed all at once. Nor does it reach and maintain a fixed content. No
+purpose is ever realized in its original content. But this does not mean
+that its realization is, therefore, "partial," "incomplete," or
+"fragmentary." It is a part of its business to change. The purpose is
+not there for its own sake. The purpose is there as a _means_ to the
+reorganization and reconstruction of experience. It exists, as Mr. Royce
+says, as an instrument, "as a tool" for "introducing control into
+experience." And as, in the process of use, a tool always undergoes
+modification, so here, as an instrument for reconstructing habit, the
+plan, too, undergoes reconstruction. Indeed, as regards its content, it
+is itself, as Mr. Royce says, as much a habit, as much "the product of
+association," as any part of experience. The purposing function, the
+purposing activity, remains; its content is constantly shifting.
+
+Here, too, is where "the submission of the idea to the object" takes
+place. Only, here, it is not a submission to an object already
+constituted as it is in Mr. Royce's conception of the absolute system.
+The idea as an hypothetical plan of action, as a trial construction,
+must be tested by the activities it is attempting to reconstruct. That
+is to say, at this point the question is: Does the plan apply to the
+activities actually involved in the unrest? Has it diagnosed the case
+properly, and is it therefore one in and through which these activities
+can operate and come to unity again? The "submission" here is the
+submission of the purpose, the end, to the material out of which it is
+formed, and with which it must work. But again this material to which
+the idea submits itself is anything but finally fixed and "complete" in
+form. On the contrary, as we have seen, it is just the fragmentary and
+incomplete condition of this material that calls for the idea. Yet the
+idea as a plan must be true to its mission, and to this material, and in
+this sense must submit itself to whatever modifications and
+reconstruction the material "dictates" as necessary in order that it may
+function in and through the plan.[204]
+
+On the other hand--and this is the point to which Mr. Royce gives most
+emphasis--it is equally apparent that "the idea must determine its
+object." On this all philosophy, from Plato down, which approaches
+reality "from the side of ideas" is at stake. And this does not appear
+impossible if, again, the object is not already and eternally fixed and
+complete. If the object is one constructed out of the very mass of habit
+material which the idea is reconstructing, and if "determination" means
+not copying, but construction, then, indeed, must the idea "determine
+its object." Just for that does it have its being. That is its sole
+mission. Here the determination of the object by the idea is not a mere
+abstract postulate; it is not based upon a general consideration of the
+disastrous consequences to our logical and ethical assumptions, if it
+were not so determined. Here not only the general necessity for it, but
+the _modus operandi_ of this determination, is apparent. But, at the
+risk of tedious iteration, must it again be said that for the
+determination of the completed and perfected object in the absolute
+system not only is there nowhere any _modus_ to be found, but, even if
+there were, it is difficult to see what it would have to do with the
+kind of determination demanded by such a specific sort of unrest as
+"singing out of tune," etc. The process of submission is thus a
+reciprocal one. Neither in the object nor in the idea is there a fixed
+scheme or order _to_ which the other must submit and conform. And this
+is simply the logical commonplace that submission cannot be a one-sided
+affair, that determination must be reciprocal.
+
+This brings us to what might as well have been our introductory as our
+concluding observation. It has just been said that the determination of
+the object by the idea is a vital matter in any philosophy which
+approaches reality "from the side of ideas." Such a way of approach must
+assert "the primacy of the world of ideas over the world as a
+fact."[205] Mr. Royce thus further states the case:
+
+    I am one of those who hold that when you ask what is an idea, and
+    how can ideas stand in any true relation to reality, you attack
+    the world knot in the way that promises most for the untying of
+    its meshes. This way is of course very ancient. It is the way of
+    Plato.... It is in a different sense the way of Kant. If you view
+    philosophy in this fashion, you subordinate the study of the world
+    as fact to a reflection upon the world as idea. Begin by accepting
+    upon faith and tradition the mere brute reality of the world as
+    fact, and there you are sunk deep in an ocean of mystery.... The
+    world of fact surprises you with all sorts of strange
+    contrasts.... It baffles you with caprices like a charming and yet
+    hopelessly wayward child, or like a bad fairy. The world of fact
+    daily announces itself to you as a defiant mystery.[206]
+
+Here we have concisely stated at the outset of the lectures the position
+which we have seen to be fraught with so many difficulties: the
+position, namely, which accepts to start with the opposition of the
+world as idea and the world as fact, as something given, instead of
+something to be accounted for; and which assumes that this opposition
+stands in the way of reaching reality, whereas it possibly may be of the
+very essence of reality. To be sure, the above statement of this
+opposition between the world as fact and as idea is but the expository
+starting-point. And it is true that the rest of the argument is occupied
+in the attempt to close this breach. But, as we have seen, except where
+the idea is expounded as a specific purpose, arising out of a specific
+experience of unrest, such as singing out of tune, etc.--except in this
+case, the breach is taken as found and the attempt to heal it is made by
+working forward from the opposition as given instead of back to its
+source. This opposition, of course, has its forward goal, but the
+difficulty is to find it without an exploration of its source. It is
+back in that matrix out of which the opposition has arisen that the line
+of direction to the goal is to be found.
+
+Moreover, in starting from this opposition of fact and idea as given,
+the only method of quelling it seems to be either that of reducing one
+side to terms of the other, or of appealing to some new, and therefore
+external unifying, agency. But if the factors in the opposition are
+found, not one in submission _to_ the other, nor having the "primacy"
+_over_ the other, but as co-ordinate and mutually determining functions,
+developed from a common matrix and co-operating in the work of
+reconstructing experience, some of the difficulties involved in the
+alternative methods just mentioned appear to drop out.[207]
+
+The point may be clearer if we recur to the passage and ask just what is
+meant by "the defiantly mysterious," "baffling," and "capricious"
+character of the world as fact--as "brute reality." First, if by the
+world as "fact;" as "brute reality," we mean experience so brute that it
+is not yet "lighted up with ideas," it is difficult to see how it could
+be mysterious or capricious, since mystery and caprice appear only when
+experience ceases to be taken merely as it comes and an inquiry for
+connections and meanings has begun. That is to say, there can be neither
+mystery nor caprice except in relation to some sort of order. And order
+is always a matter of ideas. But it is sufficient to submit Mr. Royce's
+own statement on this point:
+
+    We all of us from moment to moment have experience. This
+    experience comes to us in part as brute fact; light and shade,
+    sound and silence, pain and grief and joy.... These given facts
+    flow by; and were they all, our world would be too much of a blind
+    problem for us even to be puzzled by its meaningless
+    presence.[208]
+
+If next we take the world of fact as in contrast and co-ordinate with
+the world of ideas, mystery and caprice here, certainly, are not all on
+the side of the fact. Here, again, must they be functions of the
+relation between fact and idea. We have seen that without thought there
+is neither mystery nor caprice. The idea then cannot take part in the
+production of mystery and caprice, and forthwith deny its parenthood. Of
+course, mystery and caprice are not the final fruits of this co-ordinate
+opposition of fact and idea. They are but the _first_ fruits--the
+relatively unorganized embryonic mass which through the further
+activities of the parent functions shall develop into the symmetry of
+truth and law.
+
+There appears then no ultimate "primacy" of either idea or fact over the
+other. Nor does either appear as a better way of approach _to_ reality
+than the other. It is only when we say: "Lo! here in the idea," _or_
+"Lo! there in the fact is reality," that we find it "imperfect,"
+"incomplete," and "fragmentary," and must straightway "look for
+another." But surely not in "a certain absolute system of ideas," which
+is "the object of love and hope, of desire and will, of faith and work,
+but never of present finding," shall we seek it. Rather precisely in the
+loving and hoping, desiring and willing, believing and working, shall we
+find that reality in which and for which both the "World as fact" and
+the "World as idea" have their being.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+  ABSOLUTE:
+    as constituting reality, 348;
+    as related to truth and error, 363 ff.;
+    as a hypostatized abstraction, 369.
+
+  ABSOLUTE SELF, 330.
+
+  ACCESSORY:
+    thought as, 58 ff.
+
+  ACTIVITY:
+    as social, 74;
+    thought as, 78;
+    interrupted, and judgment, 154;
+    and hypothesis, 170;
+    as sensori-motor, 193, 200;
+    (see Function, Reconstruction).
+
+  ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE:
+    appreciative rather than reflective, 255;
+    not a form of valuation, 339, 340.
+
+  ALTERNATIVES: in judgment, 155;
+    (see Disjunction).
+
+  ANALOGY, 171, 172, 175;
+    in relation to habit, 176.
+
+  ANAXAGORAS:
+    in relation to the One and the Many, 219;
+    his [Greek: nous], 220, 221.
+
+  ANAXIMANDER:
+    and the infinite, 209;
+    his process of segregation, 214, 215.
+
+  ANAXIMENES:
+    his [Greek: archê], 209;
+    his scheme of rarefaction and condensation, 209, 213, 215, 224.
+
+  ANGELL, J. R., 14 note, 345 note.
+
+  ANIMISM, 49 note.
+
+  ANTECEDENTS OF THOUGHT (see Stimulus).
+
+  APPLIED LOGIC: Lotze's definition, 6.
+
+  APPRECIATION:
+    distinguished from reflection, 255, 339;
+    not to be identified with valuation, 320-24, 338.
+
+  [Greek: Archê]:
+    meaning of search for, 211 ff.
+
+  ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS:
+    refers to meanings, 33, 34;
+    connection with thought, 80;
+    doctrine of: analogous to subjectivism in ethics, 261;
+    presupposes a mechanical metaphysics, 330, 331 note.
+
+  ATOMISTS:
+    treatment of the One and the Many, 221.
+
+  AUSTRIAN ECONOMISTS, 307, 333.
+
+  AUTHORITY AND CUSTOM:
+    logic of attitude of obedience to, 286;
+    social conditions compatible with dominance of, 286;
+    failure of, as moral control, 286.
+
+
+  BACON:
+    extreme empirical position, 156 ff.;
+    view of induction, 157, 158.
+
+  "BAD":
+    practical significance of, as moral predicate, 259;
+    relation to "wrong," 335.
+
+  BALDWIN, J. M., 257 note, 378 note.
+
+  Becoming: as relative, 206.
+
+  "BEGRÜNDUNG" AND "BESTÄTIGUNG":
+    Wundt's distinction of, 179;
+    criticised, 181, 182.
+
+  BIOLOGY:
+    view of sensation, 58;
+    use of, in logic, 374, 375.
+
+  BOSANQUET, B., 59 note, 147, 189, 190, 191, 300;
+    (see Study V).
+
+  BRADLEY, F. H., 47 note, 54 note, 90 ff., 147, 189, 190, 191, 192,
+          194, 299 note 2, 331 note, 332 note, 353.
+
+  BRENTANO, 250 note.
+
+  BUTLER, J., 277.
+
+
+  CERTAIN, THE:
+    relation to tension, 50, 51;
+    as datum, 57.
+
+  COEFFICIENTS OF REALITY, PERCEPTION, AND RECOGNITION:
+    defined, 263-7;
+    present in economic and ethical experience, 267-9.
+
+  COEXISTENCE, COINCIDENCE, AND COHERENCE, 28, 29, 33-6, 58, 59, 68.
+
+  CONCEPTIONS:
+    Lotze's view of, 59;
+    Bacon's attitude toward, 157;
+    relation to fact, 168;
+    function in Greek philosophy, 342;
+    (see Idea, Image, Hypothesis).
+
+  CONCEPTUAL LOGIC:
+    as related to idea and image, 188-92.
+
+  CONSCIENCE:
+    evolution of, 286, 287;
+    ambiguous and transitional character of, 287;
+    metaphysical implications of, as moral standard, 288;
+    not autonomous, 288.
+
+  CONSCIENTIOUSNESS:
+    dangers of, consequent upon ideal of self-realization, 316;
+    Green's defense of, referred to, 316 note.
+
+  CONSERVATION:
+    of energy and mass, 206;
+    (see Energy).
+
+  CONTENT OF KNOWLEDGE:
+    and logical object, originates in tension, 49;
+    thought's own, 65;
+    and datum, 69;
+    as truth, 79 ff.;
+    as static and dynamic, 73, 93 ff., 110 ff.;
+    (see Study IV; Objectivity, Validity).
+
+  CONTINUITY, 10, 13, 55.
+
+  CONTROL:
+    idea and, 75, 129.
+
+  CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS, 171;
+    in relation to habit, 176.
+
+  COPERNICUS:
+    his theory, 178;
+    compared with Galileo's supposition, 179-81.
+
+  COPULA, 118 ff.;
+    scheme of mediation between subject and predicate, 208, 214 ff.
+
+  CORRESPONDENCE:
+    of datum and idea, 51;
+    of thought-content and thought-activity, 70;
+    as criterion of truth, 82 ff., 353 ff.
+
+
+  DARWIN, CHARLES, 146, 150, 179.
+
+  DATUM OF THOUGHT, 7, 8, 24;
+    as fact, 26, 50, 52;
+    Lotze's theory of, stated, 55;
+    criticised, 56 ff.;
+    relation to induction, 61;
+    and content, 60, 70;
+    (see Study III; Content, Fact, Stimulus).
+
+  DEDUCTION, 211, 212.
+
+  DEFINITION:
+    invented by Socrates, 203.
+
+  DEMOCRITUS:
+    attempts at definition, 203.
+
+  DEMONSTRATIVE JUDGMENT, 134.
+
+  DETERMINATION:
+    as criterion of truth, 362 ff.;
+    impossibility of complete, in finite experience, 364.
+
+  DEWEY, JOHN, 58 note, 86 note, 266 note 2, 316 note, 381 note.
+
+  DIALECTIC:
+    Zeno as originator of, 203.
+
+  DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA, 222 ff.
+
+  DISJUNCTION:
+    in judgment, 115, 138.
+
+  DYNAMIC:
+    ideas as, and as static, 73, 76;
+    reality as, 126.
+
+
+  EARTH:
+    as an element, 213.
+
+  ECONOMIC JUDGMENT:
+    involves same type of process as physical, 235;
+    a process of valuation, 236;
+    type of situation evoking, 241-6, 293-5, 302, 303;
+    distinguished from ethical, 243 note, 246 note, 271, 302, 303;
+    relation to physical, 246 note 3;
+    subject of, the means of action, 259, 304;
+    analysis of process of, 304-12;
+    distinguished from "pull and haul," 237, 238;
+    psychological account of, 310, 311;
+    a reconstructive process, 311, 312.
+
+  "EGOISM, NEO-HEGELIAN," 316.
+
+  EHRENFELS, C. VON, 318 note.
+
+  EIDOLA:
+    Bacon's view of, 157.
+
+  ELEATICS:
+    their logical position, 216 ff.
+
+  ELEMENTS:
+    as four, 213;
+    as infinite, 213 ff.
+
+  EMERSON, R. W., 204, 246 note.
+
+  EMPEDOCLES:
+    attempts at definition, 203;
+    treatment of the One and the Many, 218 ff.
+
+  EMPIRICISM, 11, 29, 47, 48, 61 ff.;
+    and rationalism, 80;
+    criticised, 156;
+    Jevons, 169;
+    treatment of imagery, 186-8.
+
+  ENDS:
+    controlling factors in acquisition of knowledge, 229;
+    may themselves be objects of attention and judgment, 233;
+    judgment of, inseparable from factual judgment, 234;
+    conflict of, related, the occasion for ethical judgment, 238-41;
+    indirect conflict of unrelated, the occasion for economic judgment,
+          241-3;
+    the subject-matter of ethical judgment, 258, 259;
+    definition of, the goal of all judgment, 264, 272;
+    not always explicit in judgment-process, 269, 270;
+    nature of relation between, in ethical judgment, 273, 274, 291, 292;
+    types of factual condition implied in acceptance of, 275, 276;
+    warranted by factual judgment, 276;
+    nature of, unrelatedness of, in economic judgment, 293-5, 302, 303;
+    (see Purpose).
+
+  ENERGY:
+    principle of conservation of, 206, 299, 300;
+    not valid in sphere of valuation, 328.
+
+  "ENERGY-EQUIVALENCE":
+    principle of, in economic judgment, 308, 309;
+    meaning of, 309 note.
+
+  EPISTEMOLOGY, 5-7, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 47, 73, 341;
+    origin of problem of, 344, 345.
+
+  ERDMANN, BENNO:
+    concerning induction, 173.
+
+  ERROR:
+    criterion of, 371.
+
+  ETHICAL JUDGMENT:
+    involves same type of process as physical, 235;
+    a process of valuation, 236, 332;
+    type of situation evoking, 237-41, 291-4;
+    distinguished from mechanical "pull and haul" between ends, 237,
+          238;
+    distinguished from economic judgment, 243 note, 246 note, 271, 302,
+          303;
+    subject of, an end of action, 258;
+    analysis of process of, 295-302;
+    a reconstructive process, 295, 299.
+
+  EXISTENCE:
+    _versus_ meaning, 216, 217.
+
+  EXPERIENCE:
+    duality of, 16;
+    logic of, 19-21;
+    how organized, 42;
+    relation of thought to organization of, 43-8;
+    as disorganized, 75;
+    (see Absolute, Functions).
+
+  EXPERIMENT:
+    as form of deduction, 212.
+
+
+  FACT:
+    as equivalent to datum, 26, 50 ff.;
+    criteria for determining, 106 ff.;
+    as reality, 110;
+    in relation to both idea and reality, 380 ff.;
+    and theory, conflict between, 150, 151;
+    mutual dependence of, 168;
+    Whewell's view of, 163;
+    (see Datum, Idea, Reality, Truth).
+
+  FACTUAL JUDGMENT:
+    inadequate to complete mediation of conduct, 230-34;
+    controlled by ends, 269;
+    incidental to judgments of valuation, 272, 295;
+    types of, implied in acceptance of an end, 275, 276;
+    presents warrant for acceptance of ends, 277.
+
+  FITE, W., 331 note.
+
+  FRAGMENTARY, 72;
+    as quality of internal meaning, 360, 361;
+    as an attribute of finite experience, 364, 376;
+    (see Stimulus, Tension).
+
+  FUNCTIONS: OF EXPERIENCE, 16;
+    logic of, 18, 23;
+    distinguished from status, 16;
+    of thought, 23, 24, 78, 85;
+    total, as stimulus to thought, 36-8, 80;
+    different, and logical distinctions, 42;
+    different, confused by Lotze, 56;
+    sensations as, 58.
+
+
+  GENETIC:
+    method, significance of, 14, 15, 187;
+    distinctions, importance of, 24, 53, 62, 71, 85;
+    effect of ignoring, 53, 62, 71;
+    (see Psychology).
+
+  "GOOD":
+    practical significance of, as moral predicate, 259;
+    relation to "right," 335.
+
+  GORE, W. C., 377 note.
+
+  GORGIAS, 225.
+
+  GREEK VIEW OF THOUGHT AND REALITY, 342 ff.
+
+  GREEN, T. H., 274 note, 288 note 3, 315 note, 316 note, 330, 331.
+
+
+  HABIT:
+    relation of judgment to, interruption and resumption of, 154;
+    and hypothesis, 170;
+    and analogy, 176;
+    and simple enumeration, 176;
+    and conversion, 176;
+    and logical meaning, 198;
+    logical function of, 375, 376.
+
+  HERACLITUS:
+    his position, 215 ff.
+
+  HIPPO, 209.
+
+  HOBBES, THOMAS, 301.
+
+  HOMOGENEITY:
+    of the world-ground, 207;
+    of the world, 209, 210.
+
+  HUTCHESON, F., 301.
+
+  HYPOTHESIS:
+    nature of, VII, 143-83;
+    unequal stress commonly laid on its origin, structure, and function,
+          143-5;
+    relation of data and hypothesis strictly correlative, 145, 152, 168;
+    as predicate, 146, 183;
+    negative and positive sides of, 146, 155;
+    came to be recognized with rise of experimentalism, 159;
+    and test, 174, 175, 177 ff.;
+    origin of, 170, 171 ff.;
+    supposition and, 178;
+    interdependence of formation and test of, 182.
+
+
+  IDEA:
+    continuous with fact, 9, 10, 12;
+    distinction from fact, 13, 110;
+    Lotze's confusion regarding, 31, 32, 41, 65;
+    association of, 33;
+    contrast with datum, 52-4;
+    functional conception of, 70, 112 ff.;
+    objective validity of, 72-5;
+    as entire content of judgment, 119;
+    existential aspect of, 97, 99 ff., 113;
+    in relation to reference, 97 ff., 103, 129;
+    representational theory of, 100 ff., 113 ff., 141, 347 ff., 372 ff.;
+    universality of, 97 ff., 113 ff.;
+    as not referred to reality, 97 ff.;
+    as forms of control, 129;
+    function in judgment, 153, 154;
+    distinguished from image, 183-93;
+    distinction criticised, 199-202;
+    problems accompanying discovery of, 341;
+    in Greek thought, 342;
+    instrumental and representative functions of, 346 ff., 372 ff.;
+    purposive character of, 347 ff.;
+    external and internal meaning of, 347 ff.;
+    Royce's absolute system of, 348;
+    triple relation to purpose in Royce's account, 349 ff.;
+    logical _versus_ memorial, 351;
+    in relation to fact and reality, 379 ff.;
+    (see Hypothesis, Image, Predicate).
+
+  IDEAS:
+    Platonic, 247.
+
+  IMAGE:
+    as merely fanciful, 53;
+    in relation to meaning, 54;
+    place of, in judgment, 154;
+    distinction from idea, 189-93;
+    distinction criticised, 199-202;
+    as direct and indirect stimulus, 195-7.
+
+  IMAGERY:
+    empirical criteria of, 186;
+    function of, 187;
+    as representative, 186-8, 194;
+    psychological function of, 193-7;
+    logical function of, 198, 199.
+
+  IMMEDIATE:
+    as related to mediation, 342, 350 ff.
+
+  IMPRESSION:
+    Lotze's definition of, 27, 28, 29, 32;
+    objective determination of, 30, 31;
+    objective quality of, 31, 68;
+     as psychic, 53;
+    as transformed by thought into meanings or ideas, 67 ff.;
+    (see Idea, Meaning, Sensation).
+
+  INDETERMINATE:
+    as quality of finite experience, 364.
+
+  INDUCTION:
+    Bacon's view of, 157;
+    by enumeration and allied processes, 171;
+    and habit, 176;
+    _versus_ deduction, 211, 212.
+
+  INFERENCE:
+    Lotze's view of, 60;
+    in relation to judgment, 117.
+
+  INSTRUMENTAL:
+    as character of thought, 78-82, 128, 140, 346 ff., 372 ff.;
+    (see Purpose).
+
+  INTERACTION:
+    physical, 218 ff.
+
+  INTEREST:
+    direction of, 205.
+
+  INVENTION:
+    form of deduction, 212.
+
+
+  JAMES, WILLIAM, 81 note, 352 note, 375.
+
+  JEVONS, W. STANLEY, 169, 173.
+
+  JONES, HENRY, 43 note, 59 note, 66.
+
+  JUDGMENT:
+    Lotze's definition of, 59 and note;
+    relation of, to ideas, 60;
+    structure of, 75 note;
+    Bosanquet's theory of, 86 ff.;
+    as a function, 107 ff.;
+    dead and live, 108;
+    definition of, 86, 111;
+    relation to inference, 116 ff.;
+    limits of single, 123 ff.;
+    negative, 114 ff.;
+    of perception, 88 ff., 96;
+    parts of, 118 ff., 207, 208;
+    time relations of, 120 ff.;
+    as individual, 136;
+    as instrumental, 128, 140;
+    as categorical and hypothetical, 136;
+    as impersonal, 131;
+    as intuitive, 139;
+    various definitions of, 147 ff.;
+    analysis of, 149 ff.;
+    disjunctive, 155;
+    psychology of, 153;
+    purpose of, 154;
+    and interrupted activity, 154;
+    unique system of, 224-30;
+    general analysis of, 230-32;
+    purposive character of, 353 ff.;
+    universal, 354;
+    particular, 358;
+    individual, 359, 360;
+    mathematical, 354 ff., 370;
+    (see Economic, Ethical, Factual judgments, Copula, Predicate,
+          Reflection, Subject).
+
+
+  KANT, I., 43, 46, 60 note, 163, 263, 301.
+
+  KEPLER, 146, 181.
+
+  KNOWLEDGE:
+    in relation to reality, 102 ff.;
+    meaning and, 128;
+    "copy" and "instrumental" theories of, 129, 140, 141;
+    (see Judgment, Truth).
+
+  KÜLPE, O., 250 note.
+
+
+  LOGIC:
+     origin of, 4;
+    types of, 5-22;
+    as generic and specific, 18, 23;
+    relations to psychology, 14, 15, 63, 64, 184, 185, 192 ff.;
+    effect of modern psychology upon, 345;
+    relation to genetic method, 15-18;
+    problems illustrated, 19, 20;
+    social significance of, 20;
+    eristic the source of formal, 203;
+    pre-Socratic, 203;
+    and epistemology, 341, 342;
+    (see Epistemology, Psychology).
+
+  LOTZE:
+    criticised, Studies II, III, IV;
+    applied logic, 6;
+    thought as accessory, 56;
+    view of judgment, 147;
+    similarity between him and Whewell, 165 note;
+    quoted, 6, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 42, 56 note, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67,
+          68, 69, 73, 77, 83, 84.
+
+
+  MANY:
+    the, and the One, 210 ff., 218 ff.
+
+  MARGINAL UTILITY:
+    principle of, 307, 337 note.
+
+  Martineau, J., 262.
+
+  MATHEMATICS:
+    certain forms of proof in, 172 ff.;
+    judgments of, 354 ff., 370.
+
+  MCGILVARY, E. B., 257 note.
+
+  MEAD, G. H., 38 note, 337 note.
+
+  MEANING:
+    and logical idea, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 97;
+    as content of thought, 66 ff.;
+    three types of, 68;
+    as property of independent idea, 73-5;
+    and association of ideas, 33, 80;
+    and reference, 97;
+    world of, 98, 103, 112;
+    and knowledge, 89, 128, 190;
+    equivalent to response, 198;
+    _versus_ existence, 216-18;
+    inner and outer, 347 ff.;
+    (see Content, Idea, Reference).
+
+  MEANS:
+    as external and constitutive, 78;
+    reapplication of, the problem of economic valuation, 242, 243, 246,
+          259, 260, 303, 304;
+    objective in so far as not known adequately for one's purpose, 256;
+    definition of, incidental to all judgment, 272;
+    factual determination of, sometimes determinative of ends also, 270.
+
+  MEDIATION:
+    in relation to the immediate, 350 ff.
+
+  MELISSUS:
+    his dialectic, 214.
+
+  METAPHYSICS, 8, 9, 13, 18, 85;
+    and logic of experience, 13;
+    as natural history, 13-18;
+    worth, 19-22;
+    logical and, 72, 74;
+    (see Epistemology, Logic).
+
+  MILL, J. STUART, 147, 160 ff., 162, 166.
+
+  MIXTURE:
+    logical meaning of idea of, 219, 220, 222.
+
+  MONISM, 224.
+
+  MOORE, A. W., 76 note, 346 note.
+
+  MOTION:
+    conservation of, 206.
+
+
+  NEGATION, 97, 114 ff.
+
+  NEO-HEGELIAN, 43, 316.
+
+  NEWTON, I., 146, 159, 179;
+    his notes for philosophizing, 159 note.
+
+  [Greek: Nomô] _versus_ [Greek: physei], 226.
+
+  NORMATIVE AND GENETIC, 16;
+    (see End, Purpose, Validity, Value).
+
+
+  OBEDIENCE:
+    a factor in genesis of morality, 257
+    (see also Authority and Custom).
+
+  OBJECT:
+    how defined, 38, 39, 74, 76;
+    socially current, 230;
+    real, individual in significance, 230;
+    nature of the ethical, 240, 328;
+    of the economic, 259, 260, 328;
+    (see Substance).
+
+  OBJECTIVITY:
+    Lotze's view of, 68 (see Study IV);
+    types of, 68;
+    Lotze's distinction of logical and ontological, 72, 73;
+    distinction denied, 341, 342;
+    scope of conception of, 235;
+    commonly denied to other than factual judgments, 247, 248;
+    not a property of sense-elements as such, 248, 249;
+    a category of "apperception," 250;
+    a mark of the problematic as such, 250, 251, 255;
+    not ascertainable by any specific method, 252;
+    "obtrusiveness" as evidence of, 253;
+    "reliability" as evidence of, 263;
+    conditions of experience of, 253-6;
+    conditions of, present in the ethical and economic situations,
+          257-60;
+    a real characteristic of ethical and economic judgment, 261-3;
+    not dependent on social currency, 318-20;
+    nor on possibility of social currency, 320-24;
+    nor on permanence, 324-9;
+    (see Reality, Validity).
+
+  ONE:
+    the, and the Many, 210 ff., 218 ff.
+
+
+  PARMENIDES:
+    his logical position, 216 ff.;
+    influence on Platonic-Aristotelian logic, 217.
+
+  PARTICIPATION:
+    significance of, in Plato, 342 ff.
+
+  PARTICULARITY:
+    of an idea, 99, 113;
+    of a judgment, 358.
+
+  PERCEPTION:
+    judgments of, 88 ff., 96.
+
+  PERFECT, THE, 126.
+
+  PHYSICAL JUDGMENT (see Factual judgment).
+
+  [Greek: Physei] _versus_ [Greek: nomô], 226.
+
+  [Greek: Physis], 207, 224.
+
+  PLATO, 53 note;
+    on ideas and reality, 342 ff., 378, 379.
+
+  PLURALISM, 81 note.
+
+  POSITING:
+    thought as, 68.
+
+  PREDICATE:
+    how constituted, 75 note;
+    in relation to reality, 101, 103;
+    as hypothesis, 147, 153, 155, 156, 183, 186;
+    develops out of imaged end, 232;
+    interaction with subject, 232;
+    in ethical judgment, 258, 291-6;
+    in economic, 259, 260, 309-11;
+    (see Copula, Judgment, Hypothesis, Idea, Image).
+
+  PREDICATION, 118 ff.
+
+  PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY:
+    in Royce's philosophy, 368.
+
+  PRESUPPOSITIONS, 204, 206.
+
+  PROBLEMATIC (see Tension).
+
+  PROOF:
+    inductive, 172, 173;
+    of hypothesis, 174, 175;
+    relation of, to origin of hypothesis, 179-82;
+    Wundt's view of, 177, 178.
+
+  PROPOSITION:
+    and judgment, 118.
+
+  PROTAGORAS, 226.
+
+  PRUDENCE:
+    ethical status of, as a virtue, 246.
+
+  PYTHAGOREANS, THE:
+    their logical position, 216;
+    use of experiment, 216.
+
+  PSYCHICAL:
+    distinguished from physical, 25;
+    Lotze's view of impression as barely, 27, 28, 30;
+    view criticised, 31-4, 41, 42;
+    two meanings of, 38 note;
+    psychical mechanism, 31;
+    idea as, 53;
+    problem of logical and, 54 and note, 64;
+    activity of thought also made, by Lotze, 77 and note;
+    subjective result, 84;
+    (see Impression).
+
+  PSYCHOLOGY:
+    and logic, 14-16, 26, 63, 64, 153, 154, 184, 185, 192 ff., 345, 348;
+    principle of, functional, 229, 230;
+    genesis of, 280, 281;
+    logical value of functional, 293.
+
+  PSYCHOLOGISTS' FALLACY, 37.
+
+  PURPOSE:
+    logical importance of, 4, 9, 10, 13, 15, 20, 35, 58, 76, 80, 154;
+    logical aspects of, Study XI;
+    in an idea, 347 ff.;
+    in judgment, 353 ff.;
+    in criterion of truth and error, 361 ff.;
+    origin of, as idea, 373 ff.;
+    as method, 377;
+    (see End, Reconstruction).
+
+
+  QUALES:
+    of sensation, 55, 56, 60 note.
+
+  QUALITIES:
+    primary and secondary, 221.
+
+  QUESTION:
+    and judgment, 97, 114 ff.
+
+
+  RATIONALISM:
+    criticised, 156 ff., 188 ff., 298 ff.
+
+  RATIONALITY:
+    of world, 206.
+
+  REALITY:
+    as constructed by thought, 94 ff., 104;
+    as developing, 126;
+    as including fact and idea, 108, 110, 125, 382;
+    as independent of thought, 85, 87 ff., 104;
+    as subject of subject, 88 ff.;
+    popular criterion of, 105 ff.;
+    possibility of knowledge of, 91 ff., 102 ff., 125;
+    for the individual, 94 ff., 103, 112, 224 ff.;
+    as relative to judging, 149;
+    as given in sensation, 160;
+    "perception" and "recognition" coefficients of, 263-7, 277;
+    these present in ethical and economical experience, 267-9;
+    apprehension of, emotional, 263;
+    scope of complete conception of, 235, 340;
+    degrees of, 340;
+    Platonic conception of, 343 ff.;
+    Royce's conception of, 348;
+    as related to fact and idea, 379 ff.;
+    (see Fact, Truth, Validity).
+
+  REASON, SUFFICIENT:
+    principle of, 206.
+
+  RECONSTRUCTION:
+    the function of thinking, 38, 40, 46, 75, 76, 85;
+    effect of denying this, 47, 71, 72;
+    data and, 49 ff.;
+    in judgment, 154, 291, 295, 299, 311, 312, 346, 347;
+    (see Habit, Stimulus, Tension).
+
+  REFERENCE:
+    as social, 74;
+    problem of reference of ideas, 82 ff.;
+    as meaning, 97 ff.;
+    functional conception of, 113;
+    paradox of, 99;
+    idea as, 129.
+
+  REFLECTION:
+    as derived, 1-12;
+    naïve, 3, 9;
+    subject-matter of, 7, 8;
+    logic and, 3, 18, 23;
+    _versus_ constitutive thought, 43-8;
+    distinguished, 255;
+    general nature of, 269;
+    end not always explicit in, 270;
+    outcome of, statable in terms of end or means, 272;
+    (see Judgment, Thought).
+
+  REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT, 134.
+
+  REPRESENTATION:
+    as one of the two functions of an idea, 345, 347 ff., 372;
+    significance of, in ideal reconstruction, 376.
+
+  RESPONSE:
+    failure of, and origin of judgment, 154.
+
+  RESTLESSNESS:
+    as source of reflection and purpose, 374 ff.;
+    (see Tension).
+
+  RHETORIC:
+    origin of, 203, 204.
+
+  "RIGHT" (see "Good").
+
+  ROYCE, JOSIAH:
+    referred to, 76 note, 147;
+    theory of ideas discussed, 346-82;
+    quoted, 347, 348, 349, 350, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359,
+          362, 364, 366 note, 368, 370, 371, 374, 379, 380, 381.
+
+
+  SATISFACTION:
+    pause of, as marking attainment of truth, 362 ff.
+
+  SCHILLER, F. C. S., 327 note, 345 note.
+
+  SCIENCE:
+    relation to naïve experience, 10, 11;
+    its historic stages, 11, 12;
+    distinction of logical procedure from epistemology, 13;
+    same history as philosophy, 21, 22.
+
+  SELF, EMPIRICAL:
+    genesis and content of concept of, 290, 292, 331, 332 note 1.
+
+  SELF, "ENERGETIC":
+    implied in experience of "warrant," 277, 278;
+    stimulus to development of concept of empirical self, 279-81;
+    essential principle in all valuation, 281-5;
+    evolution of moral attitude of reference to, 285-9;
+    logical function of, in valuation, 296;
+    important place in economic valuation, 308, 309;
+    not capable of being described in terms of purpose or ideal, 313-16;
+    Bradley's misinterpretation of, 332 note.
+
+  SELF-REALIZATION (see also Green, T. H.):
+    theory of, as moral ideal futile, 298;
+    logically congruous with determinism and hedonism, 330, 331.
+
+  SENSATIONS:
+    logical import of, 57;
+    as functions of experience, 58;
+    as point of contact with reality, 90;
+    place in judgment, 154;
+    and ideas, 164 ff.;
+    (see Impressions, Psychical).
+
+  SENSORI-MOTOR ACTIVITY, 193, 200.
+
+  SHAFTESBURY, 301.
+
+  SIGWART, C.:
+    view of judgment, 147.
+
+  SKEPTICISM, 50 note, 85.
+
+  "SOCIAL CURRENCY":
+    implies an identity of aspect of an object to different persons,
+          229;
+    object having, an abstraction like social individual, 229;
+    not a test of objectivity, 318-29.
+
+  SOCRATES:
+    function of concept, 342.
+
+  SOPHISTS, THE, 225.
+
+  SPENCER, H., 248, 250 note 1, 315 note.
+
+  STANDARD (see also Predicate):
+    identified with predicate in ethical judgment, 238-40;
+    function of, in ethical judgment, 274, 299, 300;
+    morphology and mode of reconstruction of, 296, 297;
+    an ultimate ethical, impossible, 299;
+    objectivity of, 300, 301.
+
+  STIMULUS:
+    of thought, 7, 8, 17, 24, 37-40, 47, 81;
+    Lotze's view of, 27, 29, 30;
+    view criticised, 30-36;
+    confusion of datum with, 61;
+    defined, 75;
+    and judgment, 153-4;
+    as condition of thinking, 193 ff.;
+    as direct and indirect, 195-7;
+    of ethical judgment, 238-41, 291;
+    of economic, judgment, 241-6, 302;
+    (see Content, Datum).
+
+  STOUT, G. F.:
+    referred to, 349.
+
+  STRATTON, G. M., 318 note.
+
+  STRUCTURE, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 75;
+    (see Function).
+
+  SUBJECT:
+    of judgment, how constituted, 75 note;
+    as constructed by thought, 94 ff., 103;
+    as a part of judgment, 118 ff.;
+    as reality, 88 ff.;
+    as inside and outside of judgment, 93, 96;
+    functional theory of, 111, 125;
+    as that requiring explanation, 208, 211 ff.;
+    as modified by deduction, 212;
+    given by analysis of situation, 232;
+    interacts with predicate in judgment, 232;
+    of ethical judgment, 258, 296-8;
+    of economic judgment, 259, 260, 304, 309-11;
+    (see Copula, Datum, Judgment, Predicate).
+
+  SUBJECTIVE:
+    distinguished from objective, 25;
+    Lotze's view of impressions as purely, 27, 28;
+    view criticised, 31;
+    definition of, 39;
+    developed only within reflection, 52, 53;
+    (see Psychical).
+
+  SUBJECTIVISM:
+    in Lotze, 83, 84;
+    in Royce, 360.
+
+  SUBJECT-MATTER OF THOUGHT:
+    distinguished as stimulus, datum, and content, 7, 8, 24;
+    confusion of these (genetic) distinctions, 17, 18;
+    as antecedent, Study II;
+    as datum, Study III;
+    as content, Study IV.
+
+  SUBSTANCE:
+    ethical theories based on logic involved in rationalistic conception
+          of, 298, 299;
+    meaning of concept of, 326, 327;
+    type-form of conduct analogous to concept of a particular kind of,
+          327, 328.
+
+  SUBSTANTIATION:
+    significance of Plato's, of ideas, 342 ff.
+
+  SUPPOSITION AND HYPOTHESIS, 178-81.
+
+  SWEET, HENRY: quoted, 153 note.
+
+  SYNTHETIC (see Reconstruction).
+
+
+  TAYLOR, A. E., 299 note 2, 315 note, 316, 324.
+
+  TELEOLOGY (see End, Purpose).
+
+  TEMPTATION:
+    ethical, 238, 301;
+    economic, 305.
+
+  TENSION:
+    as stimulus to thought, 37, 38, 49, 50, 53, 70, 85;
+    in relation to constitution of sensory datum, 53, 58, 59, 70;
+    constitution of meaning as distinct from fact, 75, 85, 154, 237-46,
+          250, 251, 255, 291-5, 374 ff.;
+    (see Purpose, Reconstruction).
+
+  THALES:
+    his [Greek: archê], water, 209;
+    in relation to deduction, 212, 214.
+
+  THOUGHT:
+    forms of, 58 ff.;
+    as modes of organizing data, 63;
+    three kinds according to Lotze, 68, 69;
+    as positing and distinguishing, 69;
+    validity of its function, 76-82;
+    of its products, 82-5;
+    instrumental character, 78-82;
+    as discriminating sensory qualities, 200-202;
+    (see Judgment, Reflection).
+
+  TIME:
+    as involved in judgment, 120 ff.
+
+  TRANSCENDENTALISM, 29, 43-8.
+
+  TRENDELENBURG, A.:
+    view of judgment, 147.
+
+  TRUTH: criterion of, 84;
+    Bosanquet's conception of, 105;
+    popular criterion of, 105 ff.;
+    and purpose, Study XI;
+    representational _versus_ teleological view of, 341 ff.;
+    criterion of, 361 ff.;
+    (see Objectivity, Validity).
+
+
+  UEBERWEG:
+    view of judgment, 147.
+
+  UNIFORMITY:
+    of nature, 206.
+
+  UNITY:
+    of the world, 207.
+
+  UNIVERSAL:
+    first and second according to Lotze, 56, 59, 69;
+    ideas as, 97 ff., 113;
+    judgment as, 136;
+    Mr. Royce's treatment of, 354 ff.;
+    necessity and, 357.
+
+
+  VALIDITY:
+    of thought, 7, 8;
+    relation to genesis, 14, 15;
+    test, 17, 18;
+    defines content of thought, 24;
+    problem of, Study IV;
+    Lotze's dilemma regarding, 71-85;
+    of bare object of thought, 72-6;
+    of activity of thought, 76-82;
+    of product of thought, 82-5;
+    (see Objectivity, Reality, Truth).
+
+  VALUE:
+    Lotze's distinction of, from existence, 28, 29;
+    view criticised, 31, 41, 45;
+    organized, of experience, 42-8;
+    determined in and by a logical process, 233;
+    nature of consciousness of, 273, 333-5;
+    function of consciousness of, 335-7;
+    properly mediate and functional in character, 338-40.
+
+  VALUATION (see also Ethical judgment, Economic judgment):
+    includes only ethical and economic types of judgment, 227, 236,
+          338-40;
+    general account of process of, 272, 295;
+    reconstructive of self as well as of reality, 312.
+
+  VENN, JOHN:
+    origin of hypothesis, 169.
+
+
+  "WARRANT":
+    consciousness of, accompanies purely factual as well as valuational
+          judgment processes, 276, 277;
+    the constitutive feature of survey of factual conditions, 278, 279.
+
+  WELTON, J.:
+    origin of hypothesis, 171.
+
+  WHEWELL, WILLIAM, 163;
+    view of sensations and ideas, 164, 165;
+    of induction, 165;
+    a certain agreement between him and Mill, 166.
+
+  WIESER, F. VON, 335 note 2.
+
+  WILL:
+    as related to thought, 366 note;
+    (see Activity, End, Purpose).
+
+  WUNDT, W.:
+    view of judgment, 147;
+    view of mathematical induction, 173;
+    formation and proof of hypothesis, 177 ff.;
+    distinction between supposition and hypothesis, 178 ff.
+
+  "WRONG" (see "Bad").
+
+
+  XENOPHANES:
+    his logical position, 216.
+
+
+  ZENO:
+    his dialectic, 214.
+
+
+
+
+FOOTNOTES
+
+
+[1] _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, pp. 10, 11. Italics
+mine.
+
+[2] See ANGELL, "The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology
+to Philosophy," _The Decennial Publications of the University of
+Chicago_, Vol. III (1903), Part II, pp. 61-6, 70-72.
+
+[3] See _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, pp. 117-20.
+
+[4] See statements regarding the psychological and the logical in _The
+Child and the Curriculum_, pp. 28, 29.
+
+[5] LOTZE, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 2. For the
+preceding exposition see Vol. I, pp. 1, 2, 13, 14, 37, 38; also
+_Microkosmus_, Book V, chap. 4.
+
+[6] LOTZE, _Logic_, Vol. I, pp. 6, 7.
+
+[7] LOTZE, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), Vol. I, p. 25.
+
+[8] _Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 36.
+
+[9] _Ibid._
+
+[10] _Microkosmus_, Book V, chap. 4.
+
+[11] _Logic_, Vol. II, p. 235; see the whole discussion, §§ 325 through
+327.
+
+[12] The emphasis here is upon the term "existences," and in its plural
+form. Doubtless the distinction of some experiences as belonging to me,
+as mine in a peculiarly intimate way, from others as chiefly concerning
+other persons, or as having to do with things, is an early one. But this
+is a distinction of _concern_, of value. The distinction referred to
+above is that of making an _object_, or presentation, out of this felt
+type of value, and thereby breaking it up into distinct "events," etc.,
+with their own laws of inner connection. This is the work of
+psychological analysis. Upon the whole matter of the psychical I am glad
+to refer to PROFESSOR GEORGE H. MEAD'S article entitled "The Definition
+of the Psychical," Vol. III, Part II, of _The Decennial Publications of
+the University of Chicago_.
+
+[13] We have a most acute and valuable criticism of Lotze from this
+point of view in PROFESSOR HENRY JONES, _Philosophy of Lotze_, 1895. My
+specific criticisms agree in the main with his, and I am glad to
+acknowledge my indebtedness. But I cannot agree in the belief that the
+business of thought is to qualify reality as such; its occupation
+appears to me to be determining the reconstruction of some aspect or
+portion of reality, and to fall within the course of reality itself;
+being, indeed, the characteristic medium of its activity. And I cannot
+agree that reality as such, with increasing fulness of knowledge,
+presents itself as a thought-system, though, as just indicated, I have
+no doubt that reality appears as thought-specifications or values, just
+as it does as affectional and æsthetic and the rest of them.
+
+[14] Bradley's criticisms of rationalistic idealism should have made the
+force of this point reasonably familiar.
+
+[15] The common statement that primitive man projects his own volitions,
+emotions, etc., into objects is but a back-handed way of expressing the
+truth that "objects," etc., have only gradually emerged from their
+life-matrix. Looking back, it is almost impossible to avoid the fallacy
+of supposing that somehow such objects were there first and were
+afterward emotionally appreciated.
+
+[16] Of course, this very element may be the precarious, the ideal, and
+possibly fanciful of some other situation. But it is to change the
+historic into the absolute to conclude that therefore everything is
+uncertain, all at once, or as such. This gives metaphysical skepticism
+as distinct from the working skepticism which is an inherent factor in
+all reflection and scientific inquiry.
+
+[17] But this is a slow progress within reflection. Plato, who was
+influential in bringing this general distinction to consciousness, still
+thought and wrote as if "image" were itself a queer sort of objective
+existence; it was only gradually that it was disposed of as psychical,
+or a phase of immediate experience.
+
+[18] Of course, this means that what is excluded and so left behind in
+the problem of determination of _this_ objective content is regarded as
+psychical. With reference to other problems and aims this same psychic
+existence is initial, not survival. Released from its prior absorption
+in some unanalyzed experience it gains standing and momentum on its own
+account; _e. g._, the "personal equation" represents what is eliminated
+from a given astronomic time-determination as being purely subjective,
+or "source-of-error." But it is initiatory in reference to new modes of
+technique, re-readings of previous data--new considerations in
+psychology, even new socio-ethical judgments. Moreover, it remains a
+fact, and even a worthful fact, as a part of one's own "inner"
+experience, as an immediate _psychical reality_. That is to say, there
+is a region of _personal_ experience (mainly emotive or affectional)
+already recognized as a sphere of value. The "source of error" is
+disposed of by making it a _fact_ of this region. The recognition of
+falsity does not _originate_ the psychic (p. 38, note).
+
+[19] Of course, this is a further reflective distinction. The plain man
+and the student do not determine the extraneous, irrelevant, and
+misleading matter as image in a _psychological_ sense, but only as
+_fanciful_ or fantastic. Only to the psychologist and for _his_ purpose
+does it break up into image and meaning.
+
+[20] Bradley, more than any other writer, has seized upon this double
+antithesis, and used it first to condemn the logical as such, and then
+turned it around as the impartial condemnation of the psychical also.
+See _Appearance and Reality_. In chap. 15 he metes out condemnation to
+"thought" because it can never take in the psychical existence or
+reality which is present; in chap. 19, he passes similar judgment upon
+the "psychical" because it is brutally fragmentary. Other
+epistemological logicians have wrestled--or writhed--with this problem,
+but I believe Bradley's position is impregnable--from the standpoint of
+ready-made differences. When the antithesis is treated as part and lot
+of the process of defining the truth of a particular subject-matter, and
+thus as historic and relative, the case is quite otherwise.
+
+[21] Vol. I, pp. 28-34.
+
+[22] It is interesting to see how explicitly Lotze is compelled finally
+to differentiate two aspects in the antecedents of thoughts, one of
+which is necessary in order that there may be anything to call out
+thought (a lack, or problem); the other in order that when thought is
+evoked it may find data at hand--that is, material in shape to receive
+and respond to its exercise. "The manifold matter of ideas is brought
+before us, not only in the _systematic order of its qualitative
+relationships_, but in the rich _variety of local and temporal
+combinations_.... The _combinations of heterogeneous ideas_ ... forms
+the _problems_, in connection with which the efforts of thought to
+reduce coexistence to coherence will _subsequently_ be made. The
+_homogeneous or similar_ ideas, on the other hand, give occasion to
+separate, to connect, and to count their repetitions." (Vol. I, pp. 33,
+34; italics mine.) Without the heterogeneous variety of the local and
+temporal juxtapositions there would be nothing to excite thought.
+Without the systematic arrangement of quality there would be nothing to
+meet thought and reward it for its efforts. The homogeneity of
+qualitative relationships, _in the pre-thought material_, gives the
+tools or instruments by which thought is enabled successfully to tackle
+the heterogeneity of collocations and conjunctions also found in the
+same material! One would suppose that when Lotze reached this point he
+might have been led to suspect that in this remarkable adjustment of
+thought-stimuli, thought-material, and thought-tools to one another, he
+must after all be dealing, not with something prior to the
+thought-function, but with the necessary elements in and of the
+thought-situation.
+
+[23] _Supra_, p. 30.
+
+[24] For the identity of sensory experience with the point of greatest
+strain and stress in conflicting or tensional experience, see "The
+Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," _Psychological Review_, Vol. III, p.
+57.
+
+[25] For the "accessory" character of thought, see LOTZE, Vol. I, pp. 7,
+25-7, 61, etc.
+
+[26] BOSANQUET, _Logic_ (Vol. I, pp. 30-34), and Jones (_Philosophy of
+Lotze_, 1895, chap. 4) have called attention to a curious inconsistency
+in Lotzes's treatment of judgment. On one hand, the statement is as
+given above. Judgment grows out of conception in making explicit the
+determining relation of universal to its own particular, implied in
+conception. But, on the other hand, judgment grows not out of conception
+at all, but out of the question of determining connection in change.
+Lotze's nominal reason for this latter view is that the conceptual world
+is purely static; since the actual world is one of change, we need to
+pass upon what really goes together (is causal) in the change as
+distinct from such as are merely coincident. But, as Jones clearly
+shows, it is also connected with the fact that, while Lotze nominally
+asserts that judgment grows out of conception, he treats conception as
+the result of judgment since the first view makes judgment a mere
+explication of the content of an idea, and hence merely expository or
+analytic (in the Kantian sense) and so of more than doubtful
+applicability to reality. The affair is too large to discuss here, and I
+will content myself with referring to the oscillation between
+conflicting contents, and gradation of sensory qualities already
+discussed (p. 56, note). It is judgment which grows out of the former,
+because judgment is the whole situation as such; conception is referable
+to the latter because it _is_ one abstraction within the whole (the
+solution of possible meanings of the data) just as the datum is another.
+In truth, since the sensory datum is not absolute, but comes in a
+historical context, the qualities apprehended as constituting the datum
+simply define the locus of conflict in the entire situation. They are
+attributives of the contents-in-tension of the colliding things, not
+calm untroubled ultimates. On pp. 33 and 34 of Vol. I, Lotze recognizes
+(as we have just seen) that, as matter of fact, it is both sensory
+qualities in their systematic grading, or quantitative determinations
+(see Vol. I, p. 43, for the recognition of the necessary place of the
+quantitative in the true concept), _and_ the "rich variety of local and
+temporal combinations," that provoke thought and supply it with
+material. But, as usual, he treats this simply as a historical accident,
+not as furnishing the key to the whole matter. In fine, while the
+heterogeneous collocations and successions constitute the problematic
+element that stimulates thought, quantitative determination of the
+sensory quality furnishes one of the two chief means through which
+thought deals with the problem. It is a reduction of the original
+colliding contents to a form in which the effort at redintegration gets
+maximum efficiency. The concept, as ideal meaning, is of course the
+other partner to the transaction. It is getting the various possible
+meanings-of-the-data into such shape as to make them most useful in
+construing the data. The bearing of this upon the subject and predicate
+of judgment cannot be discussed here.
+
+[27] See Vol. I, pp. 38, 59, 61, 105, 129, 197, for Lotze's treatment of
+these distinctions.
+
+[28] Vol. I, p. 36; see also Vol. II, pp. 290, 291.
+
+[29] Vol. II, p. 246; the same is reiterated in Vol. II, p. 250, where
+the question of origin is referred to as a corruption in logic. Certain
+psychical acts are necessary as "conditions and occasions" of logical
+operations, but the "deep gulf between psychical mechanism and thought
+remains unfilled."
+
+[30] _Philosophy of Lotze_, chap. 3, "Thought and the Preliminary
+Process of Experience."
+
+[31] Vol. I, p. 38.
+
+[32] Vol. I, p. 13; last italics mine.
+
+[33] Vol. I, p. 14; italics mine.
+
+[34] See Vol. I, pp. 16-20. On p. 22 this work is declared to be not
+only the first, but the most indispensable of all thought's operations.
+
+[35] Vol. I, p. 26.
+
+[36] Vol. I, p. 35.
+
+[37] Vol. I, p. 36; see the strong statements already quoted, p. 30.
+What if this canon were applied in the first act of thought referred to
+above: the original objectification which transforms the mere state into
+an abiding quality or meaning? Suppose, that is, it were said that the
+first objectifying act cannot make a substantial (or attached) quale out
+of a mere state of feeling; it must _find_ the distinction it makes
+there already! It is clear we should at once get a _regressus ad
+infinitum_. We here find Lotze face to face with this fundamental
+dilemma: thought either arbitrarily forces in its own distinctions, or
+else just repeats what is already there--is either falsifying or futile.
+This same contradiction, so far as it affects the impression, has
+already been discussed. See p. 31.
+
+[38] Vol. I, p. 31.
+
+[39] As we have already seen, the concept, the meaning as such, is
+always a factor or status in a reflective situation; it is always a
+predicate of judgment, in use in interpreting and developing the logical
+subject, or datum of perception. See Study VII, on the Hypothesis.
+
+[40] ROYCE, in his _World and Individual_, Vol. I, chaps. 6 and 7, has
+criticised the conception of meaning as valid, but in a way which
+implies that there is a difference between validity and reality, in the
+sense that the meaning or content of the valid idea becomes real only
+when it is experienced in direct feeling. The above implies, of course,
+a difference between validity and reality, but finds the test of
+validity in exercise of the function of direction or control to which
+the idea makes pretension or claim. The same point of view would
+profoundly modify Royce's interpretation of what he terms "inner" and
+"outer" meaning. See MOORE, _The University of Chicago Decennial
+Publications_, Vol. III, on "Existence, Meaning, and Reality."
+
+[41] Vol. II, pp. 257, 265 and in general Book III, chap. 4. It is
+significant that thought itself, appearing as an act of thinking over
+against its own content, is here treated as psychical. Even this
+explicit placing of thinking in the psychical sphere, along with
+sensations and the associative mechanism, does not, however, lead Lotze
+to reconsider his statement that the psychological problem is totally
+irrelevant and even corrupting as regards the logical. Consequently, as
+we see in the text, it only gives him one more difficulty to wrestle
+with: how a process which is _ex officio_ purely psychical and
+subjective can yet yield results which are valid, in a logical, to say
+nothing of an ontological, sense.
+
+[42] Professor James's satisfaction in the
+contemplation of bare pluralism, of disconnection, of radical
+having-nothing-to-do-with-one-another, is a case in point. The
+satisfaction points to an æsthetic attitude in which the brute diversity
+becomes itself one interesting object; and thus unity asserts itself in
+its own denial. When discords are hard and stubborn, and intellectual
+and practical unification are far to seek, nothing is commoner than the
+device of securing the needed unity by recourse to an emotion which
+feeds on the very brute variety. Religion and art and romantic affection
+are full of examples.
+
+[43] Lotze even goes so far in this connection as to say that the
+antithesis between our ideas and the objects to which they are directed
+is itself a part of the world of ideas (Vol. II, p. 192). Barring the
+phrase "world of _ideas_" (as against world of continuous experiencing)
+he need only have commenced at this point to have traveled straight and
+arrived somewhere. But it is absolutely impossible to hold both this
+view and that of the original independent existence of something given
+to and in thought and an independent existence of a thought-activity,
+thought-forms, and thought-contents.
+
+[44] The criticism of Bosanquet's theory of the judgment offered in this
+paper is from the standpoint of the theory of the judgment developed by
+Professor John Dewey, in his lectures on "The Theory of Logic." While
+the chief interest of the paper, as the title implies, is critical, it
+has been necessary to devote a portion of it to the exposition of the
+point of view from which the criticism is made.--H. B. T.
+
+[45] The references throughout this paper are to the pages of Vol. I of
+BERNARD BOSANQUET, _Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge_, Oxford, 1888.
+
+[46] F. H. BRADLEY, _Principles of Logic_, p. 64.
+
+[47] The difficulty, of course, is not a merely formal one, much less a
+verbal one. Instinctively we grant to Bosanquet his statement that
+reality is a continuous whole; we feel it almost captious to question
+his right to it. But why? Because the _content of judgment_ is
+continuous; judgment is always engaged with the determination of a
+related totality. But if all content is ideal, and judgment is just the
+application of this content to reality in virtue of an isolated contact,
+surely it begs the entire question to say that reality apart from the
+content applied is continuous, and then to use this assertion to justify
+the objective validity of the judgment--its element of permanent truth.
+
+[48] There is good reason for believing that Mr. Bosanquet escapes, in
+his own mind, the difficulty by the term "correspondence." "The name
+stands for these elements in the idea which _correspond_ in the separate
+worlds;" we may even be accused of injustice in confusing this
+correspondence with bare identity of existence. But if one idea
+corresponds to another in the sense of referring to it, what is this but
+the fact to be explained--how an existence can refer beyond itself?
+
+[49] This conclusion is clearly recognized by BRADLEY, _Appearance and
+Reality_, chap. 4.
+
+[50] It would be suggestive to inquire in what sense conscious thought
+claims to know. Is it a general claim which thought _qua_ thought puts
+forth, or is it the claim of the content of some particular thought? The
+former, of course, is a mere pious aspiration having no reference to
+specific validity or truth; the latter is precisely the problem under
+consideration.
+
+[51] Bosanquet would seem to have followed Lotze in this insertion of a
+world of "meanings" intermediate between the individual idea as such and
+the real object as such. See the criticism already passed, pp. 93-5.
+
+[52] Or, the situation as questioned is itself a fact, and a perfectly
+determinate (though not determined) one. See pp. 38, 50.
+
+[53] Of course, the distinction between the process of arriving as
+temporal, and the essential relation of subject and predicate as
+eternal, harks back to the notion of judgment as the process by which
+"we" reproduce, or make real for ourselves, a reality already real
+within itself. And it involves just the same difficulties. The relation
+of subject and predicate--this simultaneous distinction and mutual
+reference--has meaning only in an act of adjustment, of attempt to
+control, within which we distribute our conditions. When the act is
+completed, the relation of subject and predicate, as subject and
+predicate, quite disappears. An eternal relation of the two is
+meaningless; we might as well talk of an eternal reaching for the same
+distant object by the same hand. In such conceptions, we have only
+grasped a momentary phase of a situation, isolated it, and set it up as
+an entity. Significant results would be reached by considering the
+"synthetic" character (in the Kantian sense) of judgment from this point
+of view. All modern logicians agree that judgment must be ampliative,
+must extend knowledge; that a "trifling proposition" is no judgment at
+all. What does this mean save that judgment is developmental,
+transitive, in effect and purport? And yet these same writers conceive
+of Reality as a _finished system of content in a complete and
+unchangeable single Judgment_! It is impossible to evade the
+contradiction save by recognizing that since it is the business of
+judgment to transform, its test (or Truth) is successful performance of
+the particular transformation it has set itself, and that transformation
+is temporal.
+
+[54] It is worth considering whether this may not be the reality of
+Royce's distinction between outer and inner meaning. An anticipation of
+experience is the working prerequisite of the control which will realize
+the idea, _i. e._, the experience anticipated. One is no more "inner" or
+"outer" than the other.
+
+[55] _Logik_, p. 304.
+
+[56] DE MORGAN, _Budget of Paradoxes_, pp. 55, 56; quoted by WELTON,
+_Logic_, Vol. II, p. 60.
+
+[57] Advanced grammarians treat this matter in a way which should be
+instructive to logicians. The hypothesis, says SWEET (§ 295 of _A New
+English Grammar, Logical and Historical_, Oxford, 1892), suggests an
+affirmation or negation "as objects of thought." "In fact, we often say
+_supposing_ (that is, 'thinking') _it is true_, instead of _if it is
+true_." In a word, the hypothetical judgment as such puts explicitly
+before us the content of thought, of the predicate or hypothesis; and in
+so far is a moment in judgment rather than adequate judgment itself.
+
+[58] This carries with it, of course, the notion that "sensation" and
+"image" are not distinct psychical existences in themselves, but are
+distinguished logical forces.
+
+[59] Concerning the strict correlativity of subject and predicate, data
+and hypothesis, see p. 34.
+
+[60] _Novum Organum_, Vol. I, p. 61.
+
+[61] Newton's "Rules for Philosophizing" (_Principia_, Book III) are as
+follows:
+
+Rule I. "No more causes of natural things are to be admitted than such
+as are both true, and sufficient to explain the phenomena of those
+things."
+
+Rule II. "Natural effects of the same kind are to be referred as far as
+possible to the same causes."
+
+Rule III. "Those qualities of bodies that can neither be increased nor
+diminished in intensity, and which are found to belong to all bodies
+within reach of our experiments are to be regarded as qualities of all
+bodies whatever."
+
+Rule IV. "In experimental philosophy propositions collected by induction
+from phenomena are to be regarded either as accurately true or very
+nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis, till other
+phenomena occur, by which they are made more accurate or are rendered
+subject to exceptions."
+
+[62] Book III, chap. 2, sec. 5; italics mine. The latter part of the
+passage, beginning with the words "If we did not often commence," etc.,
+is quoted by Mill from Comte. The words "neither induction nor deduction
+would enable us to understand even the simplest phenomena" are his own.
+
+[63] Book III, chap. 7, sec. 1.
+
+[64] Book III, chap. 14, secs. 4 and 5.
+
+[65] WILLIAM WHEWELL, _The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_,
+London, 1840.
+
+[66] The essential similarity between Whewell's view and that of Lotze,
+already discussed (see chap. 3) is of course explainable on the basis of
+their common relationship to Kant.
+
+[67] _Logic_, Book IV, chap. 2, sec. 2; italics mine.
+
+[68] _Ibid._
+
+[69] _Ibid._, sec. 4; in sec. 6 he states even more expressly that any
+conception is appropriate in the degree in which it "helps us toward
+what we wish to understand."
+
+[70] _Ibid._, sec. 6; italics mine.
+
+[71] VENN, _Empirical Logic_, p. 383.
+
+[72] VENN, _Empirical Logic_, p. 25; italics mine.
+
+[73] WELTON, _Manual of Logic_, Vol. II, chap. 3.
+
+[74] W. S. JEVONS, _Principles of Science_, pp. 231, 232.
+
+[75] B. ERDMANN, "Zur Theorie des Syllogismus und der Induktion,"
+_Philosophische Abhandlungen_, Vol. VI, p. 230.
+
+[76] WUNDT, _Logik_, 2d ed., Vol. II, p. 131.
+
+[77] WELTON, _Manual of Logic_, Vol. II, p. 72.
+
+[78] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 452 ff.
+
+[79] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 454-461.
+
+[80] BOSANQUET, _Logic_, Vol. I, p. 46.
+
+[81] BRADLEY, _Principles of Logic_, p. 10.
+
+[82] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 74.
+
+[83] BRADLEY, _Principles of Logic_, p. 11.
+
+[84] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 75, 76.
+
+[85] BRADLEY, _op. cit._, pp. 4-6.
+
+[86] _Op. cit._, pp. 7, 8.
+
+[87] This study may be regarded as in some sense a development of pp.
+7-10 of _The Necessary and the Contingent in the Aristotelian System_,
+published in 1896 by The University of Chicago Press. While quite
+independent in treatment, the two papers supplement each other.
+
+[88] The best special illustration of this truth with which I am
+acquainted is presented for the science of chemistry in an article by F.
+WALD, "Die Genesis der stöchiometrischen Grundgesetze," in _Zeitschrift
+für physikalische Chemie_, Vol. XVIII (1895), pp. 337 ff.
+
+[89] [Greek: Xi] 201, 246.
+
+[90] H 99.
+
+[91] In allusion to fr. 90 (DIELS). DIELS finds in fr. 108 (fr. 18,
+BYWATER), [Greek: oti sophon esti pantôn kechôrismenon] the thought that
+God is the Absolute, comparing the [Greek: Nous] of Anaxagoras and the
+[Greek: chôristê idea] of Plato and the [Greek: ousia chôristê] of
+Aristotle. He assumes that [Greek: sophon]=[Greek: logos] and concedes
+great significance to the fragment. But this interpretation is utterly
+incompatible with everything else that we know of Heraclitus, and should
+be admitted only if it were the only one admissible. ZELLER discusses
+the fragment at length, Vol. I, p. 629, 1. If Diels's interpretation be
+accepted, the exposition above given of Heraclitus's logical position
+must be abandoned.
+
+[92] It has been, and in some quarters is still, the fashion to say that
+Heraclitus is the originator of the doctrine of relativity; but Zeller
+is quite right in denying the charge. No doubt his teachings lent
+themselves readily to such a development, but he did not so express
+himself. According to him the _contrarieties coexist in the process_.
+
+[93] _Cf._ RITTER-PRELLER, § 65_c_.
+
+[94] This, in a word, is the burden of my study of _The Necessary and
+the Contingent in the Aristotelian System_.
+
+[95] I have in preparation a study of the problem of physical
+interaction in Pre-Socratic philosophy which deals with this question in
+all its phases.
+
+[96] This statement is, of course, figurative, since Empedocles denied
+the existence of a void.
+
+[97] I cannot now undertake a defense of this statement, which runs
+counter to certain ancient reports, but must reserve a full discussion
+for my account of physical interaction.
+
+[98] The motive for making this assumption was clearly the desire to
+make of the [Greek: Nous] the prime mover in the world while exempting
+it from reaction on the part of the world, which would have been
+unavoidable if its nature had contained parts of other things. It is the
+same problem of "touching without being touched in return" that led
+Aristotle to a similar definition of God and of the rational soul. The
+same difficulty besets the absolutely "simple" soul of Plato's _Phaedo_
+and the causality of the Ideas.
+
+[99] ARISTOTLE, _De Generatione et Corruptione_, 323^b 10 f.
+
+[100] We have seen that this distinction was latent in Anaximenes's
+process of rarefaction and condensation. For other matters see CHAIGNET,
+_Histoire de la Psychologie_, Vol. I, p. 114, whose account, however,
+needs to be corrected in some particulars.
+
+[101] I say "perhaps" because ancient reports differ as to the precise
+relation of position and arrangement to the distinction between
+qualities, primary and secondary.
+
+[102] This is only another instance of what MR. VENN (_Empirical Logic_,
+p. 56) has wittily alluded to as "screwing up the cause and the effect
+into close juxtaposition."
+
+[103] Simplicius says [Greek: euthys meta to prooimion]; see DIELS, _Die
+Fragmente der Vorsokratiker_ (Berlin, 1903), p. 347, l. 18.
+
+[104] Fr. 2, DIELS.
+
+[105] See DIELS, _Fragmente der Vorsokratiker_, p. 343, l. 2; p. 344, l.
+27.
+
+[106] 320 C f.
+
+[107] Considerations of space as well as circumstances attending the
+immediate preparation of this discussion for the press have precluded
+any but the most general and casual reference to the recent literature
+of the subject. Much of this literature only imperfectly distinguishes
+the logical and psychological points of view, so that critical reference
+to it, unaccompanied by detailed restatement and analysis of the
+positions criticised, would be useless.
+
+[108] In order to avoid complicating the problems, we have here employed
+the common notion that the physical world, physical object, and property
+may be taken for granted as possible adequate contents of judgment, and
+that the problem is only as to the objectivity of economic and ethical
+contents. Of course we may, in the end, come to believe that the
+"physical" object is itself an economic construct, in the large sense of
+"economic;" that is, an instrument of an effective or successful
+experience. Thus in terms of the illustration used above, in the
+attitude of entertaining in a general way the plan of building a house
+_of some sort or other_, one may have before him various building
+materials the ascertained qualities of which are, it may be, socially
+recognized as in a general way fitting them for such a use. There is
+doubtless so much of real foundation for the common notion here referred
+to. But along with the _definition_ of the plan in ethical and economic
+judgment, along with the determination actually to build a house, and a
+house of a certain specific kind, must go _further_ determination of the
+means in their physical aspects, a determination which all the while
+reacts into the process of determination of the end. See below, p. 246,
+note 3.
+
+[109] In the moral life, as elsewhere, the distinction of deduction and
+induction is one of degree. There is but one _type_ or _method_ of
+inference, though some inferences may approach more closely than do
+others the limit of pure "subsumption."
+
+[110] See III below.
+
+[111] It is no part of the present view that the ends which enter into
+economic conflict are incapable of becoming organic and intrinsically
+interrelated members of the provisional system of life. On the contrary,
+the very essence of our contention is that adjustment established
+between two such conflicting ends in economic judgment is in itself
+ethical and a member of the provisional system of the individual's ends
+of life, and will stand as such, subject to modification through changes
+elsewhere in the system, so long as the economic conditions in view of
+which it was determined remained unchanged. The "mutual exclusiveness"
+of the ends in ethical deliberation is simply the correlate of a
+relative fixity in certain of the conditions of life. A man's command
+over the means of obtaining such things as books and fuel varies much
+and often suddenly in a society like ours from time to time; but, on the
+other hand, his physical condition, his intelligence, his powers of
+sympathy, and his spiritual capacity for social service commonly do not.
+Hence there can be and is a certain more or less definite and permanent
+comprehensive scheme of conduct morally obligatory upon him so far as
+the exercise of these latter faculties is concerned, but so far as his
+conduct depends upon the variable conditions mentioned, it cannot be
+prescribed in general terms, nor will any provisional ideal of moral
+selfhood admit any such prescriptions as integral elements into itself.
+The moral self is an ideal construct based upon these fixed conditions
+of life--conditions so fixed that the spiritual furtherance or
+deterioration likely to result from certain modes of conduct involving
+and affecting them can be estimated directly and with relative ease by
+the "ethical" method of judgment. Implied in such a construct is, of
+course, a reference to certain relatively permanent social and also
+physical conditions. In so far as society and physical nature, and for
+that matter the individual's own nature, are _variable_, these are the
+subjects of "scientific" or "factual" judgments incidental to the
+determination of problems by the "economic" method--problems, that is,
+for which no _general_ answer, through reference to a more or less
+definite and stable working concept of the self, can be given. Thus our
+knowledge of the physical universe is largely, if not chiefly,
+incidental to and conditioned by our economic experience. Again, our
+economic judgments are in every case determinative of the self in
+situations in which, as presented by (perhaps even momentarily) variable
+conditions, physical, social, or personal, the ethical method is
+inapplicable. In a socialistic state, in which economic conditions might
+be more stable than in our present one, many problems in consumption
+which now are economic in one sense would be ethical because admitting
+of solution by reference to the type of self presupposed in the
+established state program of production and distribution. Even now it is
+not easy to specify an economic situation the solution of which is
+absolutely indifferent ethically. There is a possibility of intemperance
+even in so "æsthetic" an indulgence as Turkish rugs.
+
+[112] Accordingly there can be no distinction of ends, some as ethical,
+others as economic, but from an ethical standpoint indifferent, and yet
+others as amenable neither to ethical nor to economic judgment. The type
+of situation and the corresponding mode of judgment employed determines
+whether an end shall be for the time being ethical, economic, or of
+neither sort conspicuously.
+
+[113] The right of Prudence to rank among the virtues cannot, on our
+present view, be questioned. Economic judgment, though it must be
+valuation of means, is essentially choice of ends--and, as would appear,
+choice of a sort peculiarly difficult by reason of the usually slight
+intrinsic relation between the ends involved and also by reason of the
+absence of effective points of view for comparison. Culture, as Emerson
+remarks, "sees prudence not to be a several faculty, but a name for
+wisdom and virtue conversing with the body and its wants." And again,
+"The spurious prudence, making the senses final, is the god of sots and
+cowards, and is the subject of all comedy.... [The true prudence] takes
+the laws of the world whereby man's being is conditioned, as they are,
+and keeps these laws that it may enjoy their proper good" (Essay on
+_Prudence_).
+
+[114] Here again we purposely use inaccurate language. Strictly, the
+ends here spoken of as competing are such, we must say, only because
+they are as yet in a measure indeterminate, wanting in "clearness," and
+are not yet understood in their true economic character; likewise the
+means are wanting in that final shade or degree of physical and
+mechanical determinateness which they are presently to possess as means
+to a finally determinate economic end. Thus economic judgment, by which
+is to be understood determination of an end of action by the economic
+method and in accordance with economic principles, involves in general
+physical re-determination of the means. The means which at the outset of
+the present economic judgment-process appear as physically available
+indifferently for either of the tentative ends under consideration are
+only in a general way the same means for knowledge as they will be when
+the economic problem has been solved. They are, so far as now
+determinate, the outcome of former physical judgment-processes
+incidental to the definition of economic ends in former situations like
+the present.
+
+[115] In our discussion of this preliminary question there is no attempt
+to furnish what might be called an _analysis_ of the consciousness of
+objectivity. This has been undertaken by various psychologists in recent
+well-known contributions to the subject. For our purpose it is necessary
+only to specify the intellectual and practical attitude out of which the
+consciousness of objectivity arises; not the sensory "elements" or
+factors involved in its production as an experience.
+
+[116] So, on the other hand, our vague organic sensations are possibly
+more instructive as they are, _for their own purpose_, than they would
+be if more sharply discriminated and complexly referred.
+
+For convenience we here meet the view under consideration with its own
+terminology; we by no means wish to be understood as indorsing this
+terminology as psychologically correct. The sense-quality of which we
+read in "structural psychology" is, we hold, not a structural unit at
+all, but in fact a highly abstract development out of that unorganized
+whole of sensory experience in which reflective attention begins. There
+is, for example, no such thing as the simple unanalyzable sense-quality
+"red" in consciousness until judgment has proceeded far enough to have
+constructed a definite and measured experience which may be symbolized
+as "object-before-me-possessing-the-attribute-red." In place of the
+original sensory total-experience we now have a more or less developed
+perceptual (_i. e._, judgmental) total-experience. It is an instance of
+the "psychological fallacy" to interpret what are really elements of
+_meaning_ in a perceived object constructed in judgment (for this is the
+true nature of the "simple idea of sensation" or "sense-element") as so
+many bits of psychical material which were isolated from each other at
+the outset, and have been externally joined together in their present
+combination.
+
+[117] The phrase is Külpe's and is used in his sense of consciousness
+taken as a whole, as, for example, attentive, apperceptive, volitional,
+rather than in the sense made familiar by Spencer and others.
+
+[118] The foregoing discussion is in many ways similar to Brentano's
+upon the same subject. In discussing his first class of modes of
+consciousness, the _Vorstellungen_, he says: "We find no contrasts
+between presentations excepting those of the objects to which the
+presentations refer. Only in so far as warm and cold, light and dark, a
+high note and a low, form contrasts can we speak of the corresponding
+presentations as contrasted; and, in general, there is in any other
+sense than this no contrast within the entire range of these conscious
+processes" (_Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte_, Bd. I, p. 29).
+This may stand as against any attempt to find contrast between abstract
+sense-qualities taken apart from their objective reference. What is,
+however, the ground of distinction between the presented objects?
+Apparently this must be answered in the last resort as above. In this
+sense we should need finally to interpret "sensuous" and "material" in
+terms of objectivity as above defined, rather than the reverse. They are
+cases in or specifications of the determination of adequate stimuli.
+
+[119] In this connection reference may be made to the well-known
+disturbing effect of the forced introduction of attention to details
+into established sensori-motor co-ordinations, such as "typewriting,"
+playing upon the piano, and the like.
+
+[120] _Cf._ PROFESSOR BALDWIN'S _Social and Ethical Interpretations_,
+and PROFESSOR MCGILVARY'S recent paper on "Moral Obligation,"
+_Philosophical Review_, Vol. XI, especially pp. 349 f.
+
+[121] Manifestly, as indicated just above, this accepted value of the
+object implies fuller physical knowledge of the object than was
+possessed at the outset of the economic judgment. See above, p. 234,
+note; p. 246, note 3; and p. 271, below.
+
+[122] _Types of Ethical Theory_, Vol. II, p. 5.
+
+[123] See p. 253 above.
+
+[124] It is not so much the case that the object, on the one side,
+excites in the agent's consciousness, on the other, the "sensations of
+resistance" which have played such a part in recent controversy on the
+subject, as that (1) the object in certain of its promptings is
+"resisting" certain other of its promptings, or that (2) certain
+"positive" activities of the agent are being inhibited by certain
+"negative" activities, thereby giving rise to the "emotion of
+resistance." That "positive" and "negative" are here used in a
+teleological way will be apparent. It is surely misleading to speak of
+"_sensations_ of resistance" even in deprecatory quotation marks, except
+as "sensation" is used in its everyday meaning, viz., experience of
+strongly sensory quality.
+
+[125] The general theory of emotion which is here presupposed, and
+indeed is fundamental to the entire discussion, may be found in
+PROFESSOR DEWEY'S papers on "The Theory of Emotion," _Psychological
+Review_, Vol. I, p. 553; Vol. II, p. 13.
+
+[126] Such is, in fact, the teaching of the various forms of ethical
+intuitionism, and we find it not merely implied, but explicitly
+affirmed, in a work in many respects so remote from intuitionism in its
+standpoint as GREEN'S _Prolegomena to Ethics_. See pp. 178-81, and
+especially pp. 355-9.
+
+[127] Sermon II.
+
+[128] Not to imply of course that psychologically or logically the
+distinction of conditions and means is other than a convenient
+superficial one.
+
+[129] Manifestly we have here been approaching from a new direction the
+"Recognition coefficient" of reality described above. See p. 266.
+
+[130] This, if it were intended as an account of the genesis of
+psychology as a science and of the psychological interest on the part of
+the individual, would doubtless be most inadequate. We have, for one
+thing, made no mention of the part which error and resulting practical
+failure play in stimulating an interest in the _judgmental_ processes of
+observation and the like, and in technique of the control of these.
+Here, as well as in the processes of _execution_ of our purposes, must
+be found many of the roots of psychology as a science. Moreover, no
+explanation has been offered above for the appropriation by the
+"energetic" self of these phenomena of interruption and retardation of
+its energy as being, in fact, its own, or within itself. The problem
+would appear to be psychological, and so without our province, and we
+gladly pass it by.
+
+[131] We can, of course, undertake no minute analysis of the
+psychological mechanism or concatenation of the process here sketched in
+barest outline. Our present purpose is wholly that of description.
+Slight as our account of the process of transition is, we give it space
+only because it seems necessary to do so in order to make intelligible
+the accounts yet to be given of the conscious valuation processes for
+which the movement here described prepares the way.
+
+It will be observed that we assume above that the purpose is _successful
+as planned_ and _by succeeding_ brings about the undesirable results.
+Failure in execution of the purpose as such could only, in the manner
+already outlined, prompt a more adequate investigation of the _factual
+conditions_.
+
+[132] The case is not essentially altered in logical character if for
+the Levitical law be substituted the general principles of the new
+dispensation read off details by an authoritative church or by "private
+judgment."
+
+[133] A remark may be added here by way of caution. The presented self,
+we have said, attenuates to a mere maxim or tacit presumption in favor
+of a certain type of logical procedure in dealing with the situation. It
+must be remembered that the presented self, like all other presentation,
+is and comes to be for the sake of its function in experience, and so is
+practical from the start. The process sketched above is therefore not
+from bare presented content as such to a methodological presumption,
+which, as methodological and not contentual, is qualitatively different
+from what preceded it.
+
+[134] _Recognized_ authority is, of course, not the same thing by any
+means as authority unrecognized because absolutely dominant.
+
+[135] We may be pardoned for supplying from the history of ethics no
+illustrations of this slight sketch.
+
+[136] In fact, as suggested above, the _Prolegomena to Ethics_ is in
+many respects essentially intuitional in spirit, though its intuitionism
+is of a modern discreetly attenuated sort.
+
+[137] This would appear to be the logical value of functional psychology
+as a science of mental process.
+
+[138] We have already given a slight sketch of the historical process
+here characterized in the barest logical terms.
+
+[139] Further consideration of the problem of factual judgment must be
+deferred to Part V.
+
+[140] The relation of the empirical self to the "energetic" and to
+standards will come in for statement in Part V in the connection just
+referred to.
+
+[141] It might be possible to construct a "logic" of these various types
+of working moral standard in such a way as to show that in each type
+there is implied the one next higher morphologically, and ultimately the
+highest--that is, some sort of concept of the "energetic" self.
+
+[142] It matters not at all whether, in ethics or metaphysics, our
+universal be abstract or on the other hand "concrete," like Green's
+conception of the self, or a "Hegelian" Absolute. Its logical use in the
+determination of particulars must be essentially the same in either
+case.
+
+[143] In this connection reference may be made to MR. TAYLOR'S recent
+work, _The Problem of Conduct_. Mr. Taylor reduces the moral life to
+terms of an ultimate conflict between the ideals of egoism and social
+justice, holding that the conflict is in theory irreconcilable. With
+this negative attitude toward current standards in ethical theory one
+may well be in accord without accepting Mr. Taylor's further contention
+that a theory of ethics is therefore impossible. Because the "ethics of
+subsumption" is demonstrably futile it by no means follows that a method
+of ethics cannot be developed along the lines of modern scientific logic
+which shall be as valid as the procedure of the investigator in the
+sciences. Mr. Taylor's _logic_ is virtually the same as that of the
+ethical theories which he criticises; because an ethical _ideal_ is
+impossible, a theory of ethics is impossible also. One is reminded of
+MR. BRADLEY'S criticism of knowledge in the closing chapters of the
+_Logic_ as an interesting parallel.
+
+[144] MR. BOSANQUET'S discussion of the place of the principle of
+teleology in analogical inference will be found suggestive in this
+connection (_Logic_, Vol. II, chap. iii).
+
+[145] See above, p. 243 and p. 259 _ad fin._
+
+[146] We use the expression "energy-_equivalent_" because the "excess"
+gained by the self through the past adjustment is not of importance at
+just this point. The essential significance of the means now is not that
+they "cost" less than they promised to bring in in energy, but that
+_because they required sacrifice the self will now lose unless they are
+allowed to fulfil the promise_. They are the logical equivalent of the
+established modes of consumption from the standpoint of conservation of
+the energies of the self, not the mathematical equivalent.
+
+It would be desirable, if there were space, to present a brief account
+of the psychological basis of the concepts of energy and
+energy-equivalence which here come into play, but this must be omitted.
+
+[147] Putting it negatively, the renunciation of the new end involves a
+"greater" sacrifice than all the sacrifices which adherence to the
+present system of consumption can compensate.
+
+[148] Green, as is well known, allows that any formulation of the ideal
+self must be incomplete, but holds that it is not for this reason
+useless. But this is to assume that development in the ideal is never to
+be radically reconstructive, that the ideal is to expand and fill out
+along established and unchangeable lines of growth so that all increase
+shall be in the nature of accretion. The self as a system is fixed and
+all individual moral growth is in the nature of approximation to this
+absolute ideal. This would appear to be essentially identical in a
+logical sense with Mr. Spencer's hypothesis of social evolution as a
+process of gradual approach to a condition of perfect adaptation of
+society and the individual to each other in an environment to which
+society is perfectly adapted--a condition in which "perfectly evolved"
+individuals shall live in a state of blessedness in conformity to the
+requirements of "absolute ethics." For a criticism of this latter type
+of view see MR. TAYLOR'S above-mentioned work (chap. v, _passim_).
+
+[149] For GREEN'S cautious defense of conscientiousness as a moral
+attitude see the _Prolegomena to Ethics_, Book IV, chap. i; and for a
+statement of the present point of view as bearing upon Green's
+difficulty, see DEWEY, _The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus_, p. 37 _ad
+fin._, and _Philosophical Review_, Vol. II, pp. 661, 662.
+
+[150] Along the line thus inadequately suggested might be found an
+answer to certain criticisms of the attempt to dispense with a
+metaphysical idea of the self. Such criticisms usually urge that without
+reference to a metaphysical ideal no meaning attaches to such
+conceptions as "adjustment," "expansion," "furtherance," and the like as
+predicated of the moral acts of an agent in their effect upon the
+"energetic" self. Anything that one may do, it is said, is expansive of
+the self, if it be something new, except as we judge it by a
+metaphysical ideal of a rightly expanded self. For an excellent
+statement of this general line of criticism see STRATTON, "A
+Psychological Test of Virtue," _International Journal of Ethics_, Vol.
+XI, p. 200.
+
+[151] The polemic of certain recent writers (as, for example, EHRENFELS
+in his _System der Werttheorie_) against the objectivity of judgments of
+value appears to rest upon an uncritical acceptance of the time-honored
+distinction between "primary" and "secondary" qualities as equivalent to
+the logical distinction of subjective and objective. Thus EHRENFELS
+confutes "das Vorurteil von der objectiven Bedeutung des Wertbegriffes"
+by explaining it as due to a misleading usage of speech expressive of
+"an impulse, deep-rooted in the human understanding, to objectify its
+presentations" and then goes on to say "We do not desire things because
+we recognize the presence in them of a mysterious impalpable essence of
+Value but we ascribe value to them because we desire them." (_Op. cit._,
+Bd. I, p. 2.) This may serve to illustrate the easy possibility of
+confusing the logical and psychological points of view, as likewise does
+EHRENFELS's formal definition of value. (Bd. I., p. 65.)
+
+[152] The essential dependence of factual judgment upon the rise of
+economic and ethical conflict is implied in the widely current doctrine
+of the teleological character of knowledge. It is indeed nowadays
+something like a commonplace to say in one sense or another that
+knowledge is relative to ends, but it is not always recognized by those
+who hold this view that an end never appears as such in consciousness
+alone. The end that guides in the construction of factual knowledge is
+an end in ethical or economic conflict with some other likewise
+indeterminate end in the manner above discussed.
+
+[153] See above, pp. 282, 283.
+
+[154] _Cf._ SCHILLER, _Riddles of the Sphinx_, chap. vii, §§ 10-14.
+
+[155] It would appear that the principle of the conservation of energy
+is valid only in the physical sphere; but the logical significance of
+this limitation cannot be here discussed.
+
+[156] That the assumption mentioned is the essential basis of the twin
+theories of associationism in psychology and hedonism in ethics is shown
+by DR. WARNER FITE in his article, "The Associational Conception of
+Experience," _Philosophical Review_, Vol. IX, pp. 283 ff. _Cf._ MR.
+BRADLEY's remarks on the logic of hedonism in his _Principles of Logic_,
+pp. 244-9.
+
+[157] The "energetic" self is apparently MR. BRADLEY'S fourth "meaning
+of self," the self as monad--"something moving parallel with the life of
+a man, or, rather, something not moving, but literally _standing_ in
+relation to his successive variety" (_Appearance and Reality_ [1st ed.]
+p. 86, in chap. ix, "The Meanings of the Self"). Mr. Bradley's
+difficulty appears to come from his desiring a psychological content for
+what is essentially a logical conception--a confusion (if we may be
+permitted the remark) which runs through the entire chapter to which we
+refer and is responsible for the undeniable and hopeless incoherency of
+the various meanings of the self, as Mr. Bradley therein expounds them.
+"If the monad stands aloof," says Mr. Bradley, "either with no character
+at all or a private character apart, then it may be a fine thing in
+itself, but it is a mere mockery to call it the self of a man" (p. 87).
+Surely this is to misconstrue and then find fault with that very
+character of essential _logical_ apartness from any possibility of
+determination in point of descriptive psychological content which
+constitutes the whole value of the "energetic" self as a logical
+conception stimulative of the valuation-process and so inevitably of
+factual judgment. See pp. 258, 259, above. The reader may find for
+himself in Mr. Bradley's enumeration of meanings our concept of the
+empirical self. But surely the "energetic" and empirical selves would
+appear on our showing to have no necessary conflict with each other.
+
+[158] In the first of these inseparable aspects valuation is
+determinative of Rightness and Wrongness; in the second it presents the
+object as Good or Bad. See p. 259, above.
+
+[159] See, for example, WIESER, _Natural Value_ (Eng. trans.), p. 17.
+
+[160] See pp. 307-12 above.
+
+[161] The illustration, as also the general principle which it here is
+used to illustrate, was suggested some years since by Professor G. H.
+Mead in a lecture course on the "History of Psychology," which the
+writer had the advantage of attending.
+
+[162] The conservative function of valuation may be further illustrated
+by reference to the well-known principle of marginal utility of which we
+have already made mention (p. 307 above), and which has played so great
+a part in modern economic theory. The value of the unit quantity of a
+stock of any commodity is, according to this principle, measured by the
+least important single use in the schedule of uses to which the stock as
+a whole is to be applied. Manifestly, then, adherence to this valuation
+placed upon the unit quantity is in so far conservative of the whole
+schedule and the marginal value is a "short-hand" symbol expressive of
+the value of the whole complex purpose presented in the schedule.
+Moreover, the increase of marginal value concurrently with diminution of
+the stock through consumption, loss, or reapplication is not indicative
+so much of a change of purpose as of determination to adhere to so much
+of the original program of consumption as may still be possible of
+attainment with the depleted supply of the commodity.
+
+[163] Thus except on this condition we should deny the propriety of
+speaking of the value of a friend or of a memento or sacred relic. The
+purpose of accurate definition of the function of such objects as these
+in the attainment of one's ends is foreign to the proper attitude of
+loving, prizing, or venerating them. We may ethically value the _act_ of
+sacrifice for a friend or of solicitous care of the memento, but the
+object of our sacrifice or solicitude has simply the direct or immediate
+"qualitative" emotional character appropriate to the kinds of activity
+to which it is the adequate stimulus.
+
+[164] _History of Philosophy_ (TUFT's translation), p. 117.
+
+[165] _Cf._ PROFESSOR J. R. ANGELL's article, "Relations of Structural
+and Functional Psychology to Philosophy," _Decennial Publications of the
+University of Chicago_, Vol. III, pp. 10-12; also _Philosophical
+Review_, Vol. XII, No. 3. _Cf._ also MR. SCHILLER's essay on "Axioms as
+Postulates" in _Personal Idealism_.
+
+[166] From this point on this paper is an expansion of some paragraphs,
+pp. 11-13, in an article on "Existence, Meaning, and Reality," printed
+from Vol. III of the First Series of the _Decennial Publications of the
+University of Chicago_.
+
+[167] P. 22.
+
+[168] Pp. 22, 23; italics mine.
+
+[169] P. 25.
+
+[170] P. 26.
+
+[171] p. 36; italics mine.
+
+[172] Pp. 22, 23; italics mine.
+
+[173] P. 307.
+
+[174] P. 327.
+
+[175] P. 23; italics mine.
+
+[176] _Cf._ p. 34; also p. 22.
+
+[177] P. 35.
+
+[178] This warns us that in the phrase, "a plan of action," the term
+"action" must be more inclusive than it is in much current discussion.
+It must not be limited to gymnastic performance. It must apply to any
+sort of activity planned for, and which, when it arrives, fulfils the
+plan. This, I take it, is the import of the paragraph at the top of p. 7
+of PROFESSOR JAMES's _Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results_.
+
+[179] P. 270.
+
+[180] Pp. 270, 271.
+
+[181] P. 276.
+
+[182] P. 277.
+
+[183] Pp. 280, 281.
+
+[184] See p. 256.
+
+[185] P. 289; italics mine.
+
+[186] P. 281; italics mine.
+
+[187] It is worth noting in passing that here the universal appears to
+be located in finite experience, while the ground of the particular is
+in the absolute.
+
+[188] P. 282.
+
+[189] P. 284; italics mine.
+
+[190] P. 283.
+
+[191] P. 332.
+
+[192] P. 339.
+
+[193] This ghost of subjectivism haunts the entire part of the essay in
+which the final fulfilment of finite ideas is found in "a certain
+absolute system of ideas."
+
+[194] P. 330; italics mine.
+
+[195] P. 337.
+
+[196] P. 286.
+
+[197] P. 307.
+
+[198] P. 297.
+
+[199] This reduction of the purposive to the representative function
+carries with it an interesting implication concerning the whole
+character and relationship of thought and will. From beginning to end,
+on almost every page, Mr. Royce insists upon the idea as an expression
+of will. At the outset we read: "When we try to define the idea in
+itself, as a conscious fact, our best means is to lay stress upon the
+sort of will or active meaning which any idea involves for the mind that
+forms the idea" (p. 22). Again: "The idea is a will seeking its own
+determination. It is nothing else" (p. 332)--and so on throughout the
+lectures. And we have already seen how consistently this is worked out
+in the analysis of concrete acts, such as singing, etc. But now, as
+related to the absolute system, the will, as embodied in the idea, is to
+find its final determination in approximating the certain absolute
+system of ideas. This would seem to make will but little more than the
+mere form of representation itself. The idea is a will, but in its
+relation to truth its will is "to correspond even in its vagueness to
+its own final and completely individual expression."
+
+[200] P. 339.
+
+[201] P. 338.
+
+[202] P. 335.
+
+[203] _Cf._ MR. GORE'S paper, above.
+
+[204] _Cf._ BALDWIN'S _Development and Evolution_, pp. 250, 251, on the
+necessity of the submission of the "new experience" to the test of its
+ability to utilize habit. Interpreted broadly, habit might here mean the
+whole mechanical side, including organism _and_ environment, and so
+include Mr. Baldwin's second or "extra-organic" test.
+
+[205] P. 19.
+
+[206] Pp. 17, 18.
+
+[207] See, above, PROFESSOR DEWEY'S Study III, pp. 49 ff.
+
+[208] P. 55.
+
+
+
+
+      *      *      *      *      *
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note:
+
+1. Footnotes have been renumbered and moved from the middle of a
+chapter to the end of the main text.
+
+2. Other than that, printer's inconsistencies in spelling,
+punctuation, hyphenation, and ligature usage have been retained.
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40665 ***