diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/40436.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/40436.txt | 23794 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 23794 deletions
diff --git a/old/40436.txt b/old/40436.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 35e9396..0000000 --- a/old/40436.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23794 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, -3rd ed. Volume II (of 4), by George Grote - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume II (of 4) - -Author: George Grote - -Release Date: August 7, 2012 [EBook #40436] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO, COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, VOL II *** - - - - -Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project - - - - - - - - -PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. - - - - -PLATO, - -AND THE - -OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. - - - -BY - -GEORGE GROTE, - -AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'. - - - -_A NEW EDITION._ - -IN FOUR VOLUMES. - -VOL. II. - - - -LONDON: - -JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. - -1888. - -_The right of Translation is reserved._ - - - - -CONTENTS. - -CHAPTER XII. - -ALKIBIADES I. AND II. - - -Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons--Sokrates and -Alkibiades 1 - -Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades 2 - -Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in -his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he -intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he -know? _ib._ - -Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of -war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those -whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer? To -just and unjust 3 - -How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or -distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he -always knew it, even as a boy 4 - -Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as -he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach just and -unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. -Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not -know himself 5 - -Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally -debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every -one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with -just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He -asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but -question 6 - -Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the respondent -makes the discoveries for himself _ib._ - -Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is -good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both -does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal -reasoning of Sokrates 7 - -Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are -equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is -to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic -description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make -himself as good as possible 8 - -But good--for what end, and under what circumstances? -Abundant illustrative examples 9 - -Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his -ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to -make such discovery in youth 10 - -Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated -effect--applicable to the season of youth 11 - -Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent importance--What -is myself? My mind is myself _ib._ - -I cannot know myself, except by looking into another -mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the -conditions both of happiness and of freedom 11 - -Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares -that he will never quit Sokrates 12 - -Second Alkibiades--situation supposed _ib._ - -Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which -may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic -word: madmen, a particular variety under it _ib._ - -Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms -comprehended under it, was not then familiar 13 - -Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, -and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies -that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance 14 - -Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must -discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is always -mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always _ib._ - -Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we -call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or -accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions -and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used 15 - -Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good -or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial 16 - -It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice, -until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the -Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel -of Sokrates _ib._ - -Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues 17 - -Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against the -Second than against the First 18 - -The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only -marks of inferiority _ib._ - -The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's earlier -compositions 20 - -Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic -Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men 21 - -Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for -idealising this feature in Sokrates _ib._ - -Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates. -Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates 22 - -The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is -followed out in Alkibiades I. Warfare against the false persuasion of -knowledge 24 - -Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing -Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance 25 - -Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. -He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are acknowledged -Incognita 26 - -Prolixity of Alkibiades I.--Extreme multiplication of -illustrative examples--How explained _ib._ - -Alkibiades II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined 27 - -Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for -favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular -agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory warnings 28 - -Comparison of Alkibiades II. with the Xenophontic -Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus. -Sokrates not always consistent with himself 29 - -Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiades II.--that knowledge is -not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable: -without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than -beneficial _ib._ - -Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined, in many -of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles 31 - -The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we to know -it? Plato leaves this undetermined _ib._ - - -CHAPTER XIII. - -HIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR. - -Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the -dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias 33 - -Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in -the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate 34 - -Opening of the Hippias Major**--Hippias describes the -successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown -as well as the gain acquired by his lectures 35 - -Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans -did not admit his instructions--their law forbids _ib._ - -Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the -Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they -fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is -also unlawful 36 - -Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with -that of the Xenophontic Sokrates 37 - -The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is -the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not -always adhere 38 - -Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or -astronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are -beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth? 39 - -Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the -background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the -Beautiful? _ib._ - -Hippias thinks the question easy to answer 40 - -Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is -Beauty, or the Beautiful? _ib._ - -Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by -indicating one particularly beautiful object _ib._ - -Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also are -beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under -some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes -not beautiful 41 - -Second answer of Hippias--_ Gold_, is that by the -presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to -the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies _ib._ - -Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof given -that it fails of universal application 42 - -Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1. The -Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected 43 - -2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold 44 - -3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that -which is received through the eye and the ear 45 - -Objections to this last--What property is there common to -both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two -senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful? _ib._ - -Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common, -the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this -ground they are called beautiful 46 - -This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good, -and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is -the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has -been already declared inadmissible _ib._ - -Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations ascribed to -Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates -are attempts to assign some general concept 47 - -Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to -Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the -Memorabilia 49 - -Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates 51 - -Rhetoric against Dialectic 52 - -Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the -speculative and analytical philosophers _ib._ - -Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical Aggregates. -Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician 53 - -Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into -debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty 54 - -Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed 55 - -Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols -Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and straightforward -hero better than the mendacious and crafty 56 - -This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the -mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer -truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses, -_i. e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of -doing either the one or the other 57 - -Analogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who -can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses - _ib._ - -View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He -thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains -that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent -purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose 58 - -Issue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who hurt, -or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like -unwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his -questions _ib._ - -Questions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special -arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, -whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well -when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses 59 - -It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his -mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends -to hit 60 - -Dissent and repugnance of Hippias _ib._ - -Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil -wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist -the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses -his perplexity 61 - -Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted, -the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the -sophistry and corruption of the Sophists 62 - -Polemical purpose of the dialogue--Hippias humiliated by -Sokrates 63 - -Philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of the -Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by -Plato _ib._ - -The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory--Sokrates -sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it -up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias--Error in the Greater 64 - -The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed -by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia 66 - -Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it 67 - -Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively -on the intellectual conditions of human conduct _ib._ - -They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts--they -take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of -praise and blame 68 - -Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be -suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of -the question under review 69 - -Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic 70 - - -CHAPTER XIV. - -HIPPARCHUS--MINOS. - -Hipparchus--Question--What is the definition of Lover of -Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth -nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man -expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: -in this sense, no man is a lover of gain 71 - -Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are -lovers of gain 72 - -Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of -trying to deceive him--accusation is retorted upon Sokrates 73 - -Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the -Peisistratid--never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by -Sokrates _ib._ - -Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers. -The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil 74 - -Questions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as much as -good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are -called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a -smaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be -evil--embarrassment confessed _ib._ - -It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be -greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay. -The valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good. -Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good 75 - -Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, -and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no man -ought to be reproached for being so the companion is compelled to -admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded _ib._ - -Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is -Law, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law: what is -the common constituent attribute? 76 - -Answer--Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2. -The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion _ib._ - -Cross-examination by Sokrates--just and lawfully-behaving -men are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the -absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is -ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad social -opinion--cannot be law 77 - -Suggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_ opinion of -the city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of -reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of -reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so 77 - -Objection taken by the Companion--That there is great -discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several cases -of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity, -and requests him to confine himself to question or answer 78 - -Farther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and light, just and -unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are accounted -so everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever -fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful _ib._ - -There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few -physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by -them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared -by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the -laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who -know how to rule 79 - -That which is right is the regal law, the only true and -real law--that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be -law in the eyes of the ignorant 80 - -Minos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and excellent, -and have remained unchanged from time immemorial _ib._ - -Question about the character of Minos--Homer and Hesiod -declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him -as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens 81 - -That Minos was really admirable--and that he has found out truth and -reality respecting the administration of the city--we may be sure -from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered _ib._ - -The question is made more determinate--What is it that the -good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the -mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body? -Sokrates cannot tell. Close 81 - -The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and -both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished 82 - -Hipparchus--double meaning of [Greek: philokerde\s] and -[Greek: ke/rdos] _ib._ - -State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent -inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found 83 - -Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, -what is the meaning of the word _gain_**? None is found _ib._ - -Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the -confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for -clearing it up 84 - -Historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue -respecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to -be spurious _ib._ - -Minos. Question--What is the characteristic property -connoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law? 86 - -This question was discussed by the historical Sokrates, -Memorabilia of Xenophon _ib._ - -Definitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law includes, -as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c. -Bad decrees are not laws 86 - -Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it is the declared -judgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which it -refers--it is truth and reality, found out and certified by him 87 - -Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but -Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato--he -acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to -_be_ Law 88 - -Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work of -systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man 89 - -Different applications of this general Platonic view, in -the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_ Rectitude of -Law, Government, Names, &c _ib._ - -Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine -type or natural rectitude 90 - -The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a -Trilogy along with the Leges 91 - -Explanations of the word Law--confusion in its meaning _ib._ - - -CHAPTER XV. - -THEAGES. - -Theages--has been declared spurious by some modern -critics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient 98 - -Persons of the dialogue--Sokrates, with Demodokus and -Theages, father and son. Theages (the son), eager to acquire -knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist 99 - -Sokrates questions Theages, inviting him to specify what he -wants _ib._ - -Theages desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can -govern freemen with their own consent 100 - -Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else. -Theages requests that Sokrates will himself teach him _ib._ - -Sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach--that -he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theages maintains that -many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation -of Sokrates 101 - -Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he -recites his experience of the divine sign or Daemon _ib._ - -The Daemon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others. -Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by -the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from -Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him 102 - -Theages expresses his anxiety to be received as the -companion of Sokrates 103 - -Remarks on the Theages--analogy with the Laches 104 - -Chief peculiarity of the Theages--stress laid upon the -divine sign or Daemon _ib._ - -Plato employs this divine sign here to render some -explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of -his unequal influence upon different companions _ib._ - -Sokrates, while continually finding fault with other -teachers, refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an excuse -for his refusal. The Theages furnishes an excuse 106 - -Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to -the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working -essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person _ib._ - - -CHAPTER XVI. - -ERASTAE OR ANTERASTAE--RIVALES. - - -Erastae--subject and persons of the dialogue--dramatic -introduction--interesting youths in the palaestra 111 - -Two rival Erastae--one of them literary, devoted to -philosophy--the other gymnastic, hating philosophy _ib._ - -Question put by Sokrates--What is philosophy? It is the -perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum -total 112 - -In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise -which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind -also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity -which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure? _ib._ - -No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the -literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the -greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as will enable him to -talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise 113 - -The philosopher is one who is second-best in several -different arts--a Pentathlus--who talks well upon each _ib._ - -On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There -are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the -second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner 114 - -Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned -acquirements _ib._ - -Sokrates changes his course of examination--questions put -to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of -administering and discriminating the bad from the good 115 - -In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best, -competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, -competent to act _ib._ - -Close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary Erastes 116 - -Remarks--animated manner of the dialogue _ib._ - -Definition of philosophy--here sought for the first -time--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered 117 - -View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as -compared with the special proficient and practitioner 118 - -Plato's view--that the philosopher has a province special -to himself, distinct from other specialties--dimly indicated--regal -or political art 119 - -Philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other artists 120 - - -CHAPTER XVII. - -ION. - -Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among -modern critics as to its genuineness 124 - -Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at -the festivals. Ion has been triumphant 124 - -Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation--exposition of the -poets--arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent 125 - -The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from -their recitation--powerful effect which they produced _ib._ - -Ion both reciter and expositor--Homer was considered more -as an instructor than as a poet 126 - -Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional -working _ib._ - -Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of -Sokrates to him--How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon -other poets? The poetic art is one 127 - -Explanation given by Sokrates--both the Rhapsode and the -Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration--fine -poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from -some God _ib._ - -Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction -successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then -act through him and through Ion upon the auditors 128 - -This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an -expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology 129 - -Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished -from unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness -inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad 129 - -Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in -Grecian life--privileged communications from the Gods to -Sokrates--his firm belief in them 130 - -Condition of the inspired person--his reason is for the -time withdrawn 131 - -Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind 132 - -Homer talks upon all subjects--Is Ion competent to explain -what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its -province? _ib._ - -The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the -craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the -business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having -learnt it from Homer 133 - -Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of -what he says, but by divine inspiration 134 - -The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional -experience--Homer and the poets were talked of as the great -teachers--Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know -everything, but really knowing nothing _ib._ - -Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge 136 - -Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the uselessness -of written geometrical treatises _ib._ - - -CHAPTER XVIII. - -LACHES. - -Laches. Subject and persons of the dialogue--whether it is -useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of -arms. Nikias and Laches differ in opinion 138 - -Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion--he replies that the point -cannot be decided without a competent professional judge 139 - -Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their -competence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence 140 - -Nikias and Laches submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates 141 - -Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their -feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the question -shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education 141 - -Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man--this -man is never seen or identified 142 - -We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on -education--virtue, as a whole, is too large a question--we will -enquire about one branch of virtue--courage _ib._ - -Question--what is courage? Laches answers by citing -one particularly manifest case of courage--mistake of not giving a -general explanation 143 - -Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the -mind--Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and -incorrect--endurance is not always courage: even intelligent -endurance is not always courage _ib._ - -Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort -of Intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not -terrible. Objections of Laches 144 - -Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events, -not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future -events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present 145 - -Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil -generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and -we declared that courage was only a part thereof--it will not hold -therefore as a definition of courage 146 - -Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion -of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about -courage without knowing what it is _ib._ - -No solution given by Plato--apparent tendency of his mind, -in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be understood without -reference to some object or end 147 - -Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence--of -things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not -possessed by professional artists 148 - -Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly -indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the -undiscovered Science of Ends _ib._ - -Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one -sufficient condition of virtue 149 - -Dramatic contrast between Laches and Sokrates, as cross-examiners 150 - - -CHAPTER XIX. - -CHARMIDES. - -Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded palaestra. -Emotions of Sokrates 153 - -Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate -Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness 154 - -But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness -is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary. -Temperance cannot be slowness _ib._ - -Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of -shame. Refuted by Sokrates _ib._ - -Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's own -business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and -refutes it. Distinction between making and doing 155 - -Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge. _ib._ - -Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does -self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this case? -Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge -itself 156 - -Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a -given _cognitum_ as its object. Analogies to prove that -knowledge of knowledge is impossible 156 - -All knowledge must be relative to some object 157 - -All properties are relative--every thing in nature has its -characteristic property with reference to something else _ib._ - -Even if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of -non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but -he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the fact _that_ -he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he -does not know 158 - -Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of -little or no value 159 - -But even granting the possibility of that which has just -been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that -all separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we -should not attain our end--Happiness _ib._ - -Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to -well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and evil 160 - -Without the science of good and evil, the other special -science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not the -science of good and evil, and is of little service 161 - -Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He -cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have -been made which cannot be justified _ib._ - -Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides -cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what temperance is -remains unknown 162 - -Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and -devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament -throughout _ib._ - -The Charmides is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of -Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately -disallowed 163 - -Trial and Error, the natural process of the human mind. -Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of -the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of -conscious ignorance 164 - -Familiar words--constantly used, with much earnest -feeling, but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in -human society 165 - -Different ethical points of view in different Platonic -dialogues 167 - -Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible _ib._ - -In other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be -essential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have -presented to him dissentient points of view _ib._ - -Courage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning, -except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil 168 - -Distinction made between the special sciences and the -science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are -of no use _ib._ - -Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate -or divination of a Science of Teleology 169 - -Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by -Aristotle. Comparison between the two 170 - - -CHAPTER XX. - -LYSIS. - -Analogy between Lysis and Charmides. Richness of dramatic -incident in both. Youthful beauty 172 - -Scenery and personages of the Lysis _ib._ - -Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example -of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit 173 - -Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis _ib._ - -Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothales 177 - -Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to -Menexenus _ib._ - -Value of the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, -as an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner 177 - -Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship. -Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue 178 - -Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the -poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected _ib._ - -Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion; -unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons _pro_ and _con_. -Rejected 179 - -Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent -(neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good 180 - -Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the -Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from -which it is anxious to escape 180 - -Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate -condition--not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance 181 - -Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The -Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us, _per se_: by -relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear _ib._ - -The cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin -to us or our own 182 - -Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one. -Inconsistency with what has been previously laid down 183 - -Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue 184 - -Remarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar -words--to expose the false persuasion of knowledge _ib._ - -Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner -of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing reasons -why each is defective 185 - -The process of trial and error is better illustrated by a -search without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue -for self-working minds 186 - -Subject of friendship, handled both by the Xenophontic -Sokrates, and by Aristotle _ib._ - -Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real. -Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the -real Sokrates would have found reason for challenging 188 - -Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates. -Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial -tinge of evil, and desiring good to escape from it 189 - -This general theory illustrated by the case of the -philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance -the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato -upon this attribute 190 - -Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or -original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved -through association with this. The object is Good 191 - -Statement by Plato of the general law of mental association _ib._ - -Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, -with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic -communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler -analogical communion 192 - -Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia -of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not -member of a generic family 194 - -The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment _ib._ - - -CHAPTER XXI. - -EUTHYDEMUS. - -Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydemus. Judgments -of various critics 195 - -Scenery and personages _ib._ - -The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: manner in -which they are here presented 196 - -Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates, -next by the two Sophists _ib._ - -Contrast between the two different modes of interrogation 197 - -Wherein this contrast does not consist 198 - -Wherein it does consist 199 - -Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists--their bidding for the -applause of the by-standers _ibid._ - -Comparison of the Euthydemus with the Parmenides 200 - -Necessity of settling accounts with the negative, before -we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the -process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and -ludicrous 201 - -Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the -Euthydemus, that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus represent the way in -which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors 202 - -That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic -than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous -speech or lecture _ib._ - -Sokrates in the Euthydemus is drawn suitably to the -purpose of that dialogue 203 - -The two Sophists in the Euthydemus are not to be taken as -real persons, or representatives of real persons 204 - -Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias--possession of good things is -useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them _ib._ - -But intelligence--of what? It must be such intelligence, -or such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and -the right use of it when made 205 - -Where is such an art to be found? The regal or political -art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be -found. Ends in puzzle 206 - -Review of the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates. -It is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look for 207 - -Comparison with other dialogues--Republic, Philebus, Protagoras. -The only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras 208 - -The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired -while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real -admiration, but the contrary _ib._ - -Mistaken representations about the Sophists--Aristotle's -definition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist -and the Dialectician 210 - -Philosophical purpose of the Euthydemus--exposure of -fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of -particular examples 211 - -Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of -fallacies: Plato enumerates them without classification 212 - -Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists -in the Euthydemus _ib._ - -Fallacies--_a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum -simpliciter_--in the Euthydemus 213 - -Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their -replies--determination not to contradict themselves 214 - -Farther verbal equivocations _ib._ - -Fallacies involving deeper logical principles--contradiction -is impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible 215 - -Plato's Euthydemus is the earliest known attempt to set -out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies is to -exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion -proved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd 216 - -Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and -propagated by Athenian Sophists--they are inherent inadvertencies and -liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal -debate affords the best means of correcting them 217 - -Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by -one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon, -&c.,--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill 218 - -Value of formal debate as a means for testing and -confuting fallacies 221 - -Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have -composed his Euthydemus, nor Aristotle the treatise De Sophisticis -Elenchis _ib._ - -Probable popularity of the Euthydemus at Athens--welcomed -by all the enemies of Dialectic 222 - -Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this -inference by opponents--Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton 223 - -Altered tone in speaking of Euthydemus--Disparagement of -persons half-philosophers, half-politicians 224 - -Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his -sons--Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him to search for -himself 225 - -Euthydemus is here cited as representative of Dialectic -and philosophy 226 - -Who is the person here intended by Plato, -half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates? 227 - -Variable feeling at different times, between Plato and -Isokrates 228 - - -CHAPTER XXII. - -MENON. - -Persons of the Dialogue 232 - -Question put by Menon--Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that -he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon _ib._ - -Sokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity -entailed by it 233 - -Answer of Menon--plurality of virtues, one belonging to -each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the -property common to all of them _ib._ - -Analogous cases cited--definitions of figure and colour 235 - -Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view, -logical subordination and distinctions--Neither logic nor grammar had -then been cast into system _ib._ - -Definition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls it to pieces 236 - -Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds -him like an electric shock--Sokrates replies that he is himself in -the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of -search by both 237 - -But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man -searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know, -it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it _ib._ - -Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates--anterior immortality -of the soul--what is called teaching is the revival and recognition -of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten _ib._ - -Illustration of this theory--knowledge may be revived by -skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates -questions the slave of Menon 238 - -Enquiry taken up--Whether virtue is teachable? without -determining what virtue is 239 - -Virtue is knowledge--no possessions, no attributes, either -of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of -knowledge _ib._ - -Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there -are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No -teachers of it can be found 239 - -Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the -Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can -teach virtue 240 - -Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring -virtue is shown _ib._ - -Sokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not the only thing -which guides to good results--right opinion will do the same _ib._ - -Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, -and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others--good -practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the -Gods 241 - -All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by -special inspiration from the Gods 242 - -But what virtue itself is, remains unknown _ib._ - -Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the -different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates _ib._ - -Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when -the fundamental notions and word are unsettled _ib._ - -Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon--desire of good alleged -to be universally felt--in what sense this is true 243 - -Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of -virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what? 244 - -Subject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras--diversity -of handling--Plato is not anxious to settle a question and -get rid of it 245 - -Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of -research 246 - -Great question discussed among the Grecian -philosophers--criterion of truth--Wherein consists the process -of verification? _ib._ - -None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer -here made by Plato--that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal -experience 247 - -Plato's view of the immortality of the soul--difference -between the Menon, Phaedrus, and Phaedon 249 - -Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful -examination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct? _ib._ - -Plato's doctrine about _a priori_ reasonings--different -from the modern doctrine 251 - -Plato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took no -pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience 252 - -Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic -Ideas or Forms 253 - -What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning--his distinction -between knowledge and right opinion _ib._ - -This distinction compared with modern philosophical views 254 - -Manifestation of Anytus--intense antipathy to the Sophists -and to philosophy generally 255 - -The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the -sophists--practical statesmen 256 - -The Menon brings forward the point of analogy between -Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the -practical statesmen 257 - - -CHAPTER XXIII. - -PROTAGORAS. - -Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue 259 - -Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to -become acquainted with Protagoras 260 - -Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and -expectations from Protagoras _ib._ - -Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist -without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach 262 - -Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge -brought to light 263 - -Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias. -Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras 264 - -Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter, -declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own -openness in avowing himself a sophist _ib._ - -Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled -company 266 - -Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as -virtuous citizens _ib._ - -Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for -such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not. _ib._ - -Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe 267 - -Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and -Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It -is partly amended by Prometheus 267 - -Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of -individual wants, but could not give them the social art--Mankind are -on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions -essential for society 268 - -Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and -the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed -by all citizens and taught by all to all 269 - -Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment 270 - -Why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent 271 - -Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws, -dikastery, &c. _ib._ - -All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a -learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own -individual aptitude 272 - -Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher -thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others 273 - -The sons of great artists do not themselves become great -artists 274 - -Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the -manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates -and perpetuates itself 274 - -Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is -to be assimilated to a special art 275 - -Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of -Protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of -the fundamental assumptions 276 - -One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous -discourse with short cross-examining question and answer 277 - -Questions by Sokrates--Whether virtue is one and -indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are -homogeneous or heterogeneous? _ib._ - -Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far -justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, "If -you please" 278 - -Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they -have the same contrary 279 - -Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to -distinguish different meanings of the same term _ib._ - -Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated 280 - -Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to -test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry -prolixity _ib._ - -Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as -inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates -rises to depart 281 - -Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. -Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought -to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue 282 - -Claim of a special _locus standi_ and professorship -for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric _ib._ - -Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites -Protagoras to question him _ib._ - -Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of -the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. -Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song 283 - -Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the -song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed -sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech 283 - -Character of this speech--its connection with the -dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in -continuous speech 284 - -Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. -Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from -themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the -task of answering 285 - -Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really -feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this -purpose 287 - -The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that -courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue 288 - -Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in -knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates -changes his attack _ib._ - -Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful -with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate 289 - -Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the -mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or -pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant 290 - -Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. -We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a -preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures 291 - -Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No man does -evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures -present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain 292 - -Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing -pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it 293 - -To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase -for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance 294 - -Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which -conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable 295 - -Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of -things terrible and not terrible _ib._ - -Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of -the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in -confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. -Amicable reply of Protagoras 297 - -Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least -allusion to Hippokrates 298 - -Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one -under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates 299 - -Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates _ib._ - -Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from -this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without -enquiry 300 - -Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to -established public sentiments with which he is in harmony 301 - -Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem -which Protagoras had left out _ib._ - -Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the -analytical cross-examiner 303 - -Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though -he is described as brought to a contradiction _ib._ - -Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by -Plato himself elsewhere _ib._ - -The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are -not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the -common consciousness 304 - -Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the -song of Simonides 305 - -Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at length -clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of -pleasures and pains of the agent _ib._ - -Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory 306 - -Reasoning of Sokrates 307 - -Application of that reasoning to the case of courage _ib._ - -The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and -specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues 308 - -Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is -too narrow, and exclusively prudential 309 - -Comparison with the Republic 310 - -The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part -of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates 311 - -The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of -Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of -other persons besides the agent himself 312 - -Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or -satisfactory, especially about courage 313 - -Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. -That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato -as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists 314 - -Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency 315 - -Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close -of the dialogue 316 - - -CHAPTER XXIV. - -GORGIAS. - -Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the -historical Gorgias 317 - -Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and -Kallikles 318 - -Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good -definition _ib._ - -Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the -artisan of persuasion 319 - -The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what -matters is he competent to advise? 319 - -The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even -against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among -the ignorant 320 - -Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes -up the debate with Sokrates 321 - -Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he -gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical -knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to -cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery _ib._ - -Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of -the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the -same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure 322 - -Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have -any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish 323 - -All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and -Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for -them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and -therefore have no real power 324 - -Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia--Polus -affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks -so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless -denies it 325 - -Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil to do -wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is -better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished 326 - -Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and -Turpe--Proof of the first point 327 - -Proof of the second point _ib._ - -The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which -though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure -for him. To be punished is best for him 328 - -Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend -has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought -to keep him unpunished 329 - -Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed by -Kallikles whether he means it seriously 330 - -Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one acts with -a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery _ib._ - -Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness 331 - -Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the -Platonic meaning _ib._ - -Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency -between the general answer of Polus and his previous -declarations--Law and Nature 332 - -The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, -will not hold 334 - -Worse or better--for whom? The argument of Sokrates does -not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, -the definition would be inadmissible _ib._ - -Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and -misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus -is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it 335 - -If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in -which punishment is considered would be reversed 336 - -Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper -and bodily distemper--Material difference between the two--Distemper -must be felt by the distempered persons 337 - -Kallikles begins to argue against Sokrates--he takes a -distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of -Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly -understood 338 - -What Kallikles says is not to be taken as a sample of the -teachings of Athenian sophists. Kallikles--rhetor and politician 339 - -Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may -be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kallikles is -made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it 340 - -Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is -requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kallikles defends -the negative 343 - -Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, -provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties -of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are -identical? 344 - -Kallikles maintains that pleasurable and good are -identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. -A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them 345 - -Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and -Sokrates in the Protagoras _ib._ - -Views of critics about this contradiction 346 - -Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates -in both dialogues _ib._ - -Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and -evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed -in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias 347 - -Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense--not -recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues 348 - -In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is -self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the -pleasures and pains of other persons, so far as affected by -the agent 349 - -Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in -substance the same, but differing in classification _ib._ - -Kallikles, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains -a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the -Protagoras 350 - -The refutation of Kallikles by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is -unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts -unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras 351 - -Permanent elements--and transient elements--of human -agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues 353 - -In the Protagoras _ib._ - -In the Gorgias 354 - -Character of the Gorgias generally--discrediting all the -actualities of life 355 - -Argument of Sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of -flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure 357 - -The Rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even the -best past Rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the four great -Rhetors by Kallikles 357 - -Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This is the -condition of virtue and happiness 358 - -Impossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be -thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force 359 - -Danger of one who dissents from the public, either for -better or for worse _ib._ - -Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself--to -study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction 360 - -Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens, -who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this 361 - -Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased -persons therein, according to their merits during life--the -philosopher who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be -rewarded _ib._ - -Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates--Rhetorical or -dogmatical character of the Gorgias 362 - -He merges politics in Ethics--he conceives the rulers as -spiritual teachers and trainers of the community _id._ - -_Ideal_ of Plato--a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer, -on scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to -certain types of his own 363 - -Platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily -health--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference _ib._ - -Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a -community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter, -on important points, should acquire any public influence 364 - -Sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He -is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic 365 - -Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric _ib._ - -Position of one who dissents, upon material points, from -the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen 366 - -Probable feelings of Plato on this subject--Claim put -forward in the Gorgias of an independent _locus standi_ for -philosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination -pursued by Sokrates 367 - -Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion. -Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance 368 - -Issue between philosophy and rhetoric--not satisfactorily -handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in which -it is presented by Polus and Kallikles 369 - -Perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as -Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias 370 - -The Athenian people recognise a distinction between the -pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato -conceived 371 - -Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the -various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences -raised by the Kallikles of Plato 373 - -The Platonic Ideal exacts, as good, some order, system, -discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good. -Divergent ideas about virtue 374 - -How to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato -does not advise us 375 - -The Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the -dissenting philosopher _ib._ - - -CHAPTER XXV. - -PHAEDON. - -The Phaedon is affirmative and expository 377 - -Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phaedon. Pathetic -interest which they inspire _ib._ - -Simmias and Kebes, the two collocutors with Sokrates. Their -feelings and those of Sokrates 378 - -Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, active -exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each reasoner 379 - -Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on their -guard against being influenced by his authority--that they shall -follow only the convictions of their own reason 380 - -Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned -truth and the liberty of individual dissent 381 - -Phaedon and Symposion--points of analogy and contrast 382 - -Phaedon--compared with Republic and Timaeus. No recognition -of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and body 383 - -Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all -the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone 385 - -The life and character of a philosopher is a constant -struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone enables -him to do this completely 386 - -Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after -death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher alone is -relieved from all communion with body 387 - -Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phaedon -apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers 388 - -Simmias and Kebes do not admit readily the immortality of -the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof. -Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate 390 - -Simmias and Kebes believe fully in the pre-existence of -the soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine--That the soul is a -sort of harmony--refuted by Sokrates _ib._ - -Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings -through which his mind had passed 391 - -First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he -rejected it _ib._ - -Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of -Anaxagoras 393 - -Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the -optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes -efficient and causes co-efficient 394 - -Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle -for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and -embraced a third doctrine about cause 395 - -He now assumes the separate existence of ideas. These -ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain -attributes 396 - -Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He -insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the -discussion of its consequences 397 - -Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. Remarks -upon it 398 - -The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned upon -different views as to a true cause _ib._. - -Problems and difficulties of which Sokrates first sought -solution 399 - -Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the treatise of -Anaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between causes and -co-efficients 400 - -Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting -physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same which -Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates 401 - -The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out, -either by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates turns to general -words, and adopts the theory of ideas 403 - -Vague and dissentient meanings attached to the word Cause. -That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to his -inquisitive feelings 404 - -Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What is a -cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates--no intuition to guide him -407 - -Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation, -causes regular and irregular. Inductive theory of causation, -elaborated in modern times _ib._ - -Last transition of the mind of Sokrates from things to -words--to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great multitude of -ideas assumed, each fitting a certain number of particulars 410 - -Ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality 411 - -Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests -upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this 412 - -The soul always brings life, and is essentially living. It -cannot receive death: in other words, it is immortal 413 - -The proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as -post-existence--animals as well as man--also the metempsychosis or -translation of the soul from one body to another 414 - -After finishing his proof that the soul is immortal, -Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it after the -death of the body. He describes a [Greek: Nekui/a] 415 - -Sokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of -the blest. Reply to Kriton about burying his body 416 - -Preparations for administering the hemlock. Sympathy of -the gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates _ib._ - -Sokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with the gaoler 417 - -Ungovernable sorrow of the friends present. Self-command -of Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death _ib._ - -Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these -personal details 419 - -Contrast between the Platonic Apology and the Phaedon _ib._. - -Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the Phaedon -compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the -Apology 421 - -Total renunciation and discredit of the body in the Phaedon. -Different feeling about the body in other Platonic dialogues 422 - -Plato's argument does not prove the immortality of the -soul. Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence and -the mode of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite undetermined 423 - -The philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul -unattached to any body 425 - -Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul did -not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The question -remained debated and problematical 426 - - - - -PLATO. - -CHAPTER XII - -ALKIBIADES I. AND II. - -ALKIBIADES I.--ON THE NATURE OF MAN. - - -[Side-note: Situation supposed in the dialogue. -Persons--Sokrates and Alkibiades.] - -This dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Alkibiades. It -introduces Alkibiades as about twenty years of age, having just -passed through the period of youth, and about to enter on the -privileges and duties of a citizen. The real dispositions and -circumstances of the historical Alkibiades (magnificent personal -beauty, stature, and strength, high family and connections, great -wealth already possessed, since his father had died when he was a -child,--a full measure of education and accomplishments--together -with exorbitant ambition and insolence, derived from such accumulated -advantages) are brought to view in the opening address of Sokrates. -Alkibiades, during the years of youth which he had just passed, had -been surrounded by admirers who tried to render themselves acceptable -to him, but whom he repelled with indifference, and even with scorn. -Sokrates had been among them, constantly present and near to -Alkibiades, but without ever addressing a word to him. The youthful -beauty being now exchanged for manhood, all these admirers had -retired, and Sokrates alone remains. His attachment is to Alkibiades -himself: to promise of mind rather than to attractions of person. -Sokrates has been always hitherto restrained, by his divine sign -or Daemon, from speaking to Alkibiades. But this prohibition has now -been removed; and he accosts him for the first time, in the full -belief that he shall be able to give improving counsel, essential to -the success of that political career upon which the youth is about to -enter.[1] - -[Footnote 1: Plato, Alkib. i. 103, 104, 105. Perikles is supposed to -be still alive and political leader of Athens--104 B. - -I have briefly sketched the imaginary situation to which this -dialogue is made to apply. The circumstances of it belong to Athenian -manners of the Platonic age. - -Some of the critics, considering that the relation supposed between -Sokrates and Alkibiades is absurd and unnatural, allege this among -their reasons for denying the authenticity of the dialogue. But if -any one reads the concluding part of the Symposion--the authenticity -of which has never yet been denied by any critic--he will find -something a great deal more abnormal in what is there recounted about -Sokrates and Alkibiades. - -In a dialogue composed by AEschines Socraticus (cited by the rhetor -Aristeides--[Greek: Peri\ R(etorike=s], Or. xlv. p. 23-24), -expressions of intense love for Alkibiades are put into the mouth of -Sokrates. AEschines was [Greek: gne/sios e(tai=ros Sokra/tous], not -less than Plato. The different companions of Sokrates thus agreed in -their picture of the relation between him and Alkibiades.] - -[Side-note: Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of -Alkibiades.] - -You are about to enter on public life (says Sokrates to Alkibiades) -with the most inordinate aspirations for glory and aggrandisement. -You not only thirst for the acquisition of ascendancy such as -Perikles possesses at Athens, but your ambition will not be satisfied -unless you fill Asia with your renown, and put yourself upon a level -with Cyrus and Xerxes. Now such aspirations cannot be gratified -except through my assistance. I do not deal in long discourses such -as you have been accustomed to hear from others: I shall put to you -only some short interrogatories, requiring nothing more than answers -to my questions.[2] - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Alkib. i. 106 B. [Greek: A)=ra e)rotta=|s ei)/ -tina e)/cho ei)pei=n lo/gon makro/n, oi(/ous de\ a)kou/ein -ei)/thisai? ou) ga/r e)sti toiou=ton to\ e)mo/n.] I give here, as -elsewhere, not an exact translation, but an abstract.] - -[Side-note: Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to -Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What -does he intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does -he know?] - -_Sokr._--You are about to step forward as adviser of the public -assembly. Upon what points do you intend to advise them? Upon points -which you know better than they? _Alk._--Of course. -_Sokr._--All that you know, has been either learnt from others -or found out by yourself. _Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--But -you would neither have learnt any thing, nor found out any thing, -without the desire to learn or find out: and you would have felt no -such desire, in respect to that which you believed yourself to know -already. That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when -you believed yourself not to know? _Alk._--Necessarily so. -_Sokr._--Now all that you have learnt, as I am well aware, -consists of three things--letters, the harp, gymnastics. Do you -intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters, -or about harp-playing, or about gymnastics? _Alk._--Neither of -the three. _Sokr._--Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to -give advice? Surely, not when the Athenians are debating about -architecture, or prophetic warnings, or the public health: for to -deliver opinions on each of these matters, belongs not to you but to -professional men--architects, prophets, physicians; whether they be -poor or rich, high-born or low-born? If not _then_, upon what -other occasions will you tender your counsel? _Alk._--When they -are debating about affairs of their own. - -[Side-note: Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on -questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must -fight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better -refer? To just and unjust.] - -_Sokr._--But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs -of shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing. _Alk._--When they -are discussing war and peace, or any other business concerning the -city. _Sokr._--You mean when they are discussing the question -with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? But it is -certain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight--also -_when_ it is best--and _as long as_ it is best. -_Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Now, if the Athenians wished -to know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how long it was -best which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or -the professional trainer? _Alk._--The trainer, undoubtedly. -_Sokr._--So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when -you talk about _better_, in wrestling or singing, what standard -do you refer to? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art? -_Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--Answer me in like manner about war or -peace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen, -whom, and at what periods, it is _better_ to fight, and -_better_ not to fight? What in this last case do you mean by -_better_? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?[3] -_Alk._--I cannot say. _Sokr._--But is it not a disgrace, -since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom -it is better for them to war,--not to be able to say to what end your -_better_ refers? Do not you know what are the usual grounds and -complaints urged when war is undertaken? _Alk._--Yes: -complaints of having been cheated, or robbed, or injured. -_Sokr._--Under what circumstances? _Alk._--You mean, -whether justly or unjustly? That makes all the difference. -_Sokr._--Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who -behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? _Alk._--The -question is monstrous. Certainly not those who behave justly. It -would be neither lawful nor honourable. _Sokr._--Then when you -spoke about _better_, in reference to war or peace, what you -meant was _juster_--you had in view justice and injustice? -_Alk._--It seems so. - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Alkib. i. 108 E--109 A. -[Greek: i)/thi de/, kai\ to\ en to=| polemei=n be/ltion kai\ to\ en -to=| ei)re/nen a)/gein, tou=to to\ be/ltion ti/ o)noma/zeis? o(/sper -e)kei= e)ph' e)ka/sto| e)/leges to\ a)/meinon, o(/ti mousiko/teron, -kai\ e)pi\ to=| e(tero|, o(/ti gumnastiko/teron; peiro= de\ kai\ -e)ntau=tha le/gein to\ be/ltion . . . . . pro\s ti/ teinei to\ e)n -to=| ei)re/nen te a)/gein a)/meinon kai\ to\ e)n to=| polemei=n oi(=s -dei=?] _Alkib._ [Greek: A)lla\ skopo=n ou) du/namai -e)nnoe=sai.]] - -[Side-note: How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern -or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he -always knew it, even as a boy.] - -_Sokr._--How is this? How do you know, or where have you learnt, -to distinguish just from unjust? Have you frequented some master, -without my knowledge, to teach you this? If you have, pray introduce -me to him, that I also may learn it from him. _Alk._--You are -jesting. _Sokr._--Not at all: I love you too well to jest. -_Alk._--But what if I had no master? Cannot I know about justice -and injustice, without a master? _Sokr._--Certainly: you might -find out for yourself, if you made search and investigated. But this -you would not do, unless you were under the persuasion that you did -not already know. _Alk._--Was there not a time when I really -believed myself not to know it? _Sokr._--Perhaps there may have -been: tell me _when_ that time was. Was it last year? -_Alk._--No: last year I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--Well, -then two years, three years, &c., ago? _Alk._--No: the case -was the same then, also, I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--But -before that, you were a mere boy; and during your boyhood you -certainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust; for I -well recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys, -for acting unjustly towards you. _Alk._--Certainly: I was not -then ignorant on the point: I knew distinctly that they were acting -unjustly towards me. _Sokr._--You knew, then, even in your -boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? _Alk._--Certainly: I -knew even then. _Sokr._--At what moment did you first find it -out? Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time -was there when you did not believe yourself to know? -_Alk._--Upon my word, I cannot say. - -[Side-note: Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the -multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach -just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. -Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not -know himself.] - -_Sokr._--Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for -yourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or -injustice at all, or from what quarter? _Alk._--I was mistaken -in saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from -the multitude.[4] _Sokr._--Your teachers are none of the best: -no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at -draughts: much less, what is just and unjust. _Alk._--I learnt -it from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had -any special teacher. _Sokr._--Of that the multitude are -competent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree -or a stone,--a horse or a man,--you get the same answer from every -one. But when you ask not simply which are _horses_, but also -which horses are fit to run well in a race--when you ask not merely -about which are _men_, but which men are healthy or unhealthy--are -the multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer? -_Alk._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--When you see the multitude -differing among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not -competent to teach others. _Alk._--It is so. _Sokr._--Now, -about the question, What is just and unjust--are the multitude all of -one mind, or do they differ among themselves? _Alk._--They -differ prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy -each other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about -health and sickness.[5] _Sokr._ How, then, can we say that the -multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely -dispute about it among themselves? _Alk._--I now perceive that -we cannot say so. _Sokr._--How can we say, therefore, that -they are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who -have learnt from no other teachers? _Alk._--From what you say, -it is impossible. - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Alkib. i. 110 D-E. [Greek: e)/mathon, oi)=mai, -kai\ e)go\ o(/sper kai\ oi( a)/lloi . . . . para\ to=n pollo=n.]] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Alkib. i. 112 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de\ -de\? nu=n peri\ to=n dikai/on kai\ a)di/kon a)nthro/pon kai\ -pragma/ton, oi( polloi\ dokou=si/ soi o(mologei=n au)toi\ e(autoi=s -e)\ a)lle/lois?] _Alkib._ [Greek: E(/kista, ne\ Di/', o)= -So/krates.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de/? ma/lista peri\ au)to=n -diaphe/resthai?] _Alkib._ [Greek: polu/ ge.]] - -_Sokr._--No: not from what _I_ say, but from what -_you_ say yourself. I merely ask questions: it is you who give -all the answers.[6] And what you have said amounts to this--that -Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes -himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he -does not know himself? - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Alkib. i. 112-113.] - -[Side-note: Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not -generally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to -every one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not -coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the -expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do -nothing but question.] - -_Alk._--But, Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about -what is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident; they -debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice -and expediency do not do not always coincide. Many persons commit -great crimes, and are great gainers by doing so: others again behave -justly, and suffer from it.[7] _Sokr_--Do you then profess to -know what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt--or -when did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of -questions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner. -But we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and -expediency are not coincident. Persuade _me_ of this, by -interrogating me as I interrogated you. _Alk._--That is beyond -my power. _Sokr._--But when you rise to address the assembly, -you will have to persuade _them_. If you can persuade them, you -can persuade me. Assume _me_ to be the assembly, and practise -upon me.[8] _Alk._--You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is -for you to speak and prove the point. _Sokr_--No: I can only -question: you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the -point is determined by your own answers.[9] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Alkib. i. 113 D. [Greek: Oi)=mai me\n o)liga/kis -A)thenai/ous bouleu/esthai po/tera dikaio/tera e)\ a)dikotera; ta\ -me\n ga\r toiau=ta e(gou=ntai de=la ei)=nai], &c.] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 B-C. This same argument is -addressed by Sokrates to Glaukon, in Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, 14-15.] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 E. -[Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) le/geis o(/ti tau=th' ou(/tos e)/chei, ma/list' -a)\n ei)/es pepeisme/nos?]] - -[Side-note: Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the -respondent makes the discoveries for himself.] - -Such is the commencing portion (abbreviated or abstracted) of -Plato's First Alkibiades. It exhibits a very characteristic specimen -of the Sokratico-Platonic method: both in its negative and positive -aspect. By the negative, false persuasion of knowledge is exposed. -Alkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and -unjust, which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated -for himself--which he has picked up from the multitude, and supposes -to be clear to every one, but about which nevertheless there is so -much difference of appreciation among the multitude, that fierce and -perpetual quarrels are going on. On the positive side, Sokrates -restricts himself to the function of questioning: he neither affirms -nor denies any thing. It is Alkibiades who affirms or denies every -thing, and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own -mind, instigated indeed, but not taught, by the questions of his -companion. - -[Side-note: Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is -just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts -honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness -thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates.] - -By a farther series of questions, Sokrates next brings Alkibiades to -the admission that what is just, is also honourable, good, -expedient--what is unjust, is dishonourable, evil, inexpedient: and -that whoever acts justly, and honourably, thereby acquires happiness. -Admitting, first, that an act which is good, honourable, just, -expedient, &c., considered in one aspect or in reference to some -of its conditions--may be at the same time bad, dishonourable, -unjust, considered in another aspect or in reference to other -conditions; Sokrates nevertheless brings his respondent to admit, -that every act, _in so far as it is just and honourable_, is -also good and expedient.[10] And he contends farther, that whoever -acts honourably, does well: now every man who does well, becomes -happy, or secures good things thereby: therefore the just, the -honourable, and the good or expedient, coincide.[11] The argument, -whereby this conclusion is here established, is pointed out by -Heindorf, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, as not merely inconclusive, but -as mere verbal equivocation and sophistry--the like of which, -however, we find elsewhere in Plato.[12] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Alkib. i. 115 B--116 A. -[Greek: Ou)kou=n te\n toiau/ten boethei/an kale\n me\n le/geis kata\ -te\n e)pichei/resin tou= so=sai ou(=s e)/dei; tou=to d' e)sti\n -a)ndri/a; . . . . kake\n de/ ge kata\ tou\s thana/tous te kai\ ta\ -e(/lke. . . . - -Ou)kou=n o(=de di/kaion prosagoreu/ein e(ka/sten to=n pra/xeon; -ei)/per e)=| kako\n a)perga/zetai kake\n kalei=s, kai\ e)=| a)gatho\n -a)gathe\n klete/on. - -A)r' ou)=n kai\ e)=| a)gatho\n kalo/n,--e)=| de\ kako\n ai)schro/n? -Nai/.] - -Compare Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, where he maintains that in every -particular case, what is just, honourable, virtuous, &c., is also -unjust, dishonourable, vicious, &c. Nothing remains unchanged, -nor excludes the contrary, except the pure, self-existent, Idea or -general Concept.--[Greek: au)to\-dikaiosu/ne], &c.] - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Alkib. i. 116 E.] - -[Footnote 12: The words [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein--eu)pragi/a] have a -double sense, like our "doing well". Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 175; -Steinhart, Einl. p. 149. - -We have, p. 116 B, the equivocation between [Greek: kalo=s pra/ttein] -and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein], also with [Greek: kako=s pra/ttein], p. -134 A, 135 A; compare Heindorf ad Platon. Charmid. p. 172 A, p. 174 -B; also Platon. Gorgias, p. 507 C, where similar equivocal meanings -occur.] - -[Side-note: Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen -are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades -is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. -Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must -make himself as good as possible.] - -Alkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment, -and stands convicted, by his own contradictions and confession, of -ignorance in its worst form: that is, of being ignorant, and yet -believing himself to know.[13] But other Athenian statesmen are no -wiser. Even Perikles is proved to be equally deficient--by the fact -that he has never been able to teach or improve any one else, not -even his own sons and those whom he loved best.[14] "At any rate" -(contends Alkibiades) "I am as good as my competitors, and can hold -my ground against them." But Sokrates reminds him that the real -competitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners, -liable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he -pretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of -unusual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia -are of nobler breed, as well as more highly and carefully trained, -than the Athenian statesmen.[15] Alkibiades must be rescued from his -present ignorance, and exalted, so as to be capable of competing with -these kings: which object cannot be attained except through the -auxiliary interposition of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to -be himself already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no -farther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain -it for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his -interrogatories.[16] - - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118.] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-119.] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 120-124.] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124.] - -[Side-note: But good--for what end, and under what -circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples.] - -The dialogue then continues. _Sokr._--We wish to become as good -as possible. But in what sort of virtue? _Alk._--In that virtue -which belongs to good men. _Sokr._--Yes, but _good_, in -what matters? _Alk._--Evidently, to men who are good in -transacting business. _Sokr._--Ay, but what kind of business? -business relating to horses, or to navigation? If that be meant, we -must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners? _Alk._--No, I -mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in -Athens. _Sokr._--You mean the intelligent men. Every man is -good, in reference to that which he understands: every man is bad, in -reference to that which he does not understand. _Alk._--Of -course. _Sokr._--The cobbler understands shoemaking, and is -therefore good at _that_: he does not understand weaving, and is -therefore bad at that. The same man thus, in your view, will be both -good and bad?[17] _Alk._--No: that cannot be. _Sokr._--Whom -then do you mean, when you talk of _the good_? _Alk._--I mean -those who are competent to command in the city. _Sokr._--But -to command whom or what--horses or men? _Alk._--To command -men. _Sokr._--But what men, and under what circumstances? sick -men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in -what occupations? _Alk._--I mean, men living in social and -commercial relation with each other, as we live here; men who live in -common possession of the same laws and government. _Sokr._--When -men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we -name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend? -_Alk._--It is the art of the pilot; and the purpose towards which -it tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea. -_Sokr._--When men are in social and political communion, to what -purpose does the art of commanding them tend? _Alk._--Towards -the better preservation and administration of the city.[18] -_Sokr._--But what do you mean by _better_? What is that, -the presence or absence of which makes _better_ or _worse_? -If in regard to the management of the body, you put to me the -same question, I should reply, that it is the presence of health, and -the absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the -city? _Alk._--I should say, when friendship and unanimity among -the citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent. -_Sokr._--This unanimity, of what nature is it? Respecting what -subject? What is the art or science for realising it? If I ask you -what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will -say the arithmetical and the metretic art. _Alk._--I mean that -friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives, -father and son, husband and wife. _Sokr._--But how can there be -unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of -them knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning -and weaving, which the husband does not know, or about military -duties, which the wife does not know, how can there be unanimity -between the two? _Alk._--No: there cannot be. _Sokr._--Nor -friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together? -_Alk._--Apparently there cannot. _Sokr._--Then when men and women -each perform their own special duties, there can be no friendship -between them. Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen -performs his own special duties? or (which is the same thing) when -each citizen acts justly? _Alk._--Not so: I think there may be -friendship, when each person performs his or her own business. -_Sokr._--Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship -or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become -good men? - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 125 B. - -[Greek: O( au)to\s a)/ra tou/to| ge to=| lo/go| kako/s te kai\ -a)gatho/s.] - -Plato slides unconsciously here, as in other parts of his reasonings, -_a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_.] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 126 A. [Greek: ti/ de/? e)\n su\ -kalei=s eu)bouli/an, ei)s ti/ e)stin?] _Alk._ [Greek: Ei)s to\ -a)/meinon te\n po/lin dioikei=n kai\ so/zesthai.] _Sokr._ -[Greek: A)meinon de\ dioikei=tai kai\ so/zetai ti/nos paragignome/nou -e)\ a)pogignomenou?]] - -[Side-note: Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his -ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to -make such discovery in youth.] - -_Alk._--In truth, I am puzzled myself to say. I find myself in a -state of disgraceful ignorance, of which I had no previous suspicion. -_Sokr._--Do not be discouraged. If you had made this discovery -when you were fifty years old, it would have been too late for taking -care of yourself and applying a remedy: but at your age, it is the -right time for making the discovery. _Alk._--What am I to do, -now that I have made it? _Sokr._--You must answer my questions. -If my auguries are just, we shall soon be both of us better for the -process.[19] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Alkib. i. 127 D-E. _Alk._ [Greek: A)lla\ -ma\ tou\s theou/s, ou)d' au)to\s oi)=da o(/ ti le/go, kinduneu/o de\ -kai\ pa/lai lelethe/nai e)mauto\n ai)/schist' e)/chon.] - -_Sokr._ [Greek: A)lla\ chre\ thar)r(ei=n; ei) me\n ga\r au)to\ -e)=|sthou pepontho\s pentekontae/tes, chalepo\n a)\n e)=n soi -e)pimelethe=nai sautou=; nu=n de\ e)\n e)/cheis e(liki/an, au)/te -e)sti/n, e)n e(=| dei= au)to\ ai)sthe/sthai.] - -_Alk._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n to\n ai(stho/menon chre\ poiei=n?] - -_Sokr._ [Greek: _A)pokri/nesthai ta\ e)roto/mena_, kai\ -e)a\n tou=to poie=|s, a)\n theo\s e)the/le|, ei)/ ti dei= kai\ te=| -e)me=| mantei/a| pisteu/ein, su/ te ka)go\ beltio/nos sche/somen.]] - -[Side-note: Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its -anticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth.] - -Here we have again, brought into prominent relief, the dialectic -method of Plato, under two distinct aspects: 1. Its actual effects, -in exposing the false supposition of knowledge, in forcing upon the -respondent the humiliating conviction, that he does not know familiar -topics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others. -2. Its anticipated effects, if continued, in remedying such defect: -and in generating out of the mind of the respondent, real and living -knowledge. Lastly, it is plainly intimated that this shock of -humiliation and mistrust, painful but inevitable, must be undergone -in youth. - -[Side-note: Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent -importance--What is myself? My mind is myself.] - -The dialogue continues, in short questions and answers, of which the -following is an abstract. _Sokr._--What is meant by a man -_taking care of himself_? Before I can take care of myself, I -must know what myself is: I must _know myself_, according to the -Delphian motto. I cannot make myself better, without knowing what -_myself_ is.[20] That which belongs to me is not _myself_: -my body is not myself, but an instrument governed by myself.[21] My -mind or soul only, is myself. To take care of myself is, to take care -of my mind. At any rate, if this be not strictly true,[22] my mind is -the most important and dominant element within me. The physician who -knows his own body, does not for that reason know himself: much less -do the husbandman or the tradesman, who know their own properties or -crafts, know themselves, or perform what is truly their own business. - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Alkib. i. 129 B. [Greek: ti/n' a)\n tro/pon -eu(rethei/e _au)to\ to\ au)to/_?]] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Alkib. i. 128-130. All this is greatly expanded -in the dialogue--p. 128 D: [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra o)/tan to=n sautou= -e)pimele=|, sautou= e)pime/lei?] This same antithesis is employed by -Isokrates, De Permutatione, sect. 309, p. 492, Bekker. He recommends -[Greek: au)tou= pro/teron e)\ to=n au)tou= poiei=sthai te\n -e)pime/leian].] - -[Footnote 22: Plato considers this point to be not clearly made out. -Alkib. i. 130.] - -[Side-note: I cannot know myself, except by looking into -another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice -are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom.] - -Since temperance consists in self-knowledge, neither of these -professional men, as such, is temperate: their professions are of a -vulgar cast, and do not belong to the virtuous life.[23] How are -we to know our own minds? We know it by looking into another mind, -and into the most rational and divine portion thereof: just as the -eye can only know itself by looking into another eye, and seeing -itself therein reflected.[24] It is only in this way that we can come -to know ourselves, or become temperate: and if we do not know -ourselves, we cannot even know what belongs to ourselves, or what -belongs to others: all these are branches of one and the same -cognition. We can have no knowledge of affairs, either public or -private: we shall go wrong, and shall be unable to secure happiness -either for ourselves or for others. It is not wealth or power which -are the conditions of happiness, but justice and temperance. Both for -ourselves individually, and for the public collectively, we ought to -aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth and power. The evil and -unjust man ought to have no power, but to be the slave of those who -are better than himself.[25] He is fit for nothing but to be a slave: -none deserve freedom except the virtuous. - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Alkib. i. 131 B.] - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. i. 133.] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Alkib. i. 134-135 B-C. - -[Greek: Pri\n de/ ge a)rete\n e)/chein, to\ a)/rchesthai a)/meinon -u(po\ tou= belti/onos e)\ to\ a)/rchein a)ndri\, ou) mo/non paidi/ -. . . . Pre/pei a)/ra to=| kako=| douleu/ein; a)/meinon ga/r.]] - -[Side-note: Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and -declares that he will never quit Sokrates.] - -_Sokr._--How do you feel your own condition now, Alkibiades. Are -you worthy of freedom? _Alk._--I feel but too keenly that I am -not. I cannot emerge from this degradation except by your society and -help. From this time forward I shall never leave you.[26] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. i. 135.] - - -ALKIBIADES II. - - -[Side-note: Second Alkibiades--situation supposed.] - -The other Platonic dialogue, termed the Second Alkibiades, introduces -Alkibiades as about to offer prayer and sacrifice to the Gods. - -[Side-note: Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts -which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the -generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it.] - -_Sokr._--You seem absorbed in thought, Alkibiades, and not -unreasonably. In supplicating the Gods, caution is required not to -pray for gifts which are really mischievous. The Gods sometimes grant -men's prayers, even when ruinously destructive; as they granted -the prayers of Oedipus, to the destruction of his own sons. -_Alk._--Oedipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up -such a prayer? _Sokr._--You think that madness is the opposite -of good sense or wisdom. You recognise men wise and unwise: and you -farther admit that every man must be one or other of the two,--just -as every man must be either healthy or sick: there is no third -alternative possible? _Alk._--I think so. _Sokr._--But each -thing can have but one opposite:[27] to be unwise, and to be mad, are -therefore identical? _Alk._--They are. _Sokr._--Wise men -are only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you -really think them mad? How could any of us live safely in the society -of so many mad-men? _Alk._--No: it cannot be so: I was mistaken. -_Sokr._--Here is the illustration of your mistake. All men who -have gout, or fever, or ophthalmia are sick; but all sick men have -not gout, or fever, or ophthalmia. So, too, all carpenters, or -shoemakers, or sculptors, are craftsmen; but all craftsmen are not -carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors. In like manner, all mad men -are unwise; but all unwise men are not mad. _Unwise_ comprises -many varieties and gradations of which the extreme is, being mad: but -these varieties are different among themselves, as one disease -differs from another, though all agree in being disease and one art -differs from another, though all agree in being art.[28] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139 B. - -[Greek: Kai\ me\n du/o ge u(penanti/a e(ni\ pra/gmati po=s a)\n -ei)/e?] - -That each thing has one opposite, and no more, is asserted in the -Protagoras also, p. 192-193.] - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139-140 A-B. - -[Greek: Kai\ ga\r oi( pure/ttontes pa/ntes nosou=sin, ou) me/nntoioi( -nosou=ntes pa/ntes pure/ttousin ou)de\ podagro=sin ou)de/ ge -o)phthalmio=sin; a)lla\ no/sos me\n pa=n to\ toiou=to/n e)sti, -diaphe/rein de/ phasin ou(\s de\ kalou=men i)atros te\n a)pergasi/an -au)to=n; ou) ga\r pa=sai ou)/te o(/moiai ou)/te o(moi/os -diapra/ttontai, a)lla\ kata\ te\n au)te=s du/namin e(ka/ste.]] - -[Side-note: Relation between a generic term, and the specific -terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar.] - -(We may remark that Plato here, as in the Euthyphron, brings under -especial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal -logic--that between a generic between a term and the various specific -terms comprehended under it. Possessing as yet no technical language -for characterising this distinction, he makes it understood by an -induction of several separate but analogous cases. Because the -distinction is familiar now to instructed men, we must not suppose -that it was familiar then.) - -[Side-note: Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed -benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every -one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of -ignorance.] - -_Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man, -he who knows what it is proper to say and do--and the unwise man, he -who does not know? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--The unwise man -will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or -done? Though not mad like Oedipus, he will nevertheless pray to the -Gods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for -example, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you -should become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece. -_Alk._--Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I -do. _Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life, -or to damage yourself by the employment of it? _Alk._--Not on -those conditions.[29] _Sokr._--But you are aware that many -ambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the -man who just now killed the Macedonian King Archelaus, and usurped -his throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be -envied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to -ruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that -they may become fathers; but discover presently that their children -are the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves -again childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually -happening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed -benefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see -that it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered -to you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.[30] _Alk._--I -see now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks -himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but -ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head. - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141.] - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141-142.] - -[Side-note: Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. -We must discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is -always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.] - -_Sokr._--You ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified -manner. You must distinguish and specify. Ignorance of what? and -under what modifications of persons and circumstances? _Alk._--How? -Are there _any_ matters or circumstances in which it is -better for a man to be ignorant, than to know? _Sokr._--You will -see that there are such. Ignorance of good, or ignorance of what is -best, is always mischievous: moreover, assuming that a man knows what -is best, then all other knowledge will be profitable to him. In his -special case, ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than -hurtful. But if a man be ignorant things of good, or of what is best, -in his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful -than profitable. To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question, -"What is good?" as to resolve to kill his mother, it would be a real -benefit, if for the time he did not know his mother. Ignorance on -that point, in his state of mind, would be better for him than -knowledge.[31] _Alk._--It appears so. - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 144.] - -[Side-note: Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground -do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special -arts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what -occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought -to be used.] - -_Sokr._--Follow the argument farther. When we come forward to -say or do any thing, we either know what we are about to say and do, -or at least believe ourselves to know it. Every statesman who gives -counsel to the public, does so in the faith of such knowledge. Most -citizens are unwise, and ignorant of good as well as of other things. -The wise are but few, and by their advice the city is conducted. Now -upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public -counsellors? If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it -is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best--should we call -him wise? If he knows how to kill men, or dispossess them, or drive -them into exile,--but does not know upon whom, or on what occasions, -it is good to inflict this treatment--is he a useful counsellor? If -he can ride, or shoot, or wrestle, well,--we give him an epithet -derived from this special accomplishment: we do not call him wise. -What would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen, -horsemen, wrestlers, rhetors, &c., accomplished and excellent -each in his own particular craft, yet none of them knowing what is -good, nor when, nor on what occasions, it is good to employ their -craft? When each man pushes forward his own art and speciality, -without any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for -himself or for the city, will not affairs thus conducted be reckless -and disastrous?[32] _Alk._--They will be very bad indeed. - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145.] - -[Side-note: Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of -the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial.] - -_Sokr._--If, then, a man has no knowledge of good or of the -better--if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy without -reason--the possession of knowledge upon special subjects will be -oftener hurtful than profitable to him; because it will make him more -forward in action, without any good result. Possessing many arts and -accomplishments, and prosecuting one after another, but without the -knowledge of good,--he will only fall into greater trouble, like a -ship sailing without a pilot. Knowledge of good is, in other words, -knowledge of what is useful and profitable. In conjunction with this, -all other knowledge is valuable, and goes to increase a man's -competence as a counsellor: apart from this, all other knowledge will -not render a man competent as a counsellor, but will be more -frequently hurtful than beneficial.[33] Towards right living, what we -need is, the knowledge of good: just as the sick stand in need of a -physician, and the ship's crew of a pilot. _Alk._--I admit your -reasoning. My opinion is changed. I no longer believe myself -competent to determine what I ought to accept from the Gods, or what -I ought to pray for. I incur serious danger of erring, and of asking -for mischiefs, under the belief that they are benefits. - -[Footnote 33: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145 C: - -[Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti to=n toiou/ton oi)=den, e)a\n me\n -pare/petai au)to=| e( _tou= belti/stou e)piste/me--au(/te d' e)=n -e( au)te\ de/pou e(/per kai\ e( tou= o)pheli/mou_--phro/nimo/n ge -au)to\n phe/somen kai\ a)pochro=nta xu/mboulou kai\ te=| po/lei kai\ -au)to\n au(to=|; to\n de\ me\ toiou=ton, ta)nanti/a tou/ton.] -([Greek: Touou=ton] is Schneider's emendation for [Greek: -poiou=nta].) Ibid. 146 C: [Greek: Ou)kou=n phame\n pa/lin tou\s -pollou\s diemarteke/nai tou= belti/stou, o(s ta\ polla/ ge, oi)=mai, -a)/neu nou= do/xe| pepisteuko/tas?] Ibid. 146 E: [Greek: O(ra=|s -ou)=n, o(/te g' e)/phen kinduneu/ein to/ ge to=n a)/llon e)pistemo=n -kte=ma, e)a/n tis a)/neu te=s tou= belti/stou e)piste/mes kekteme/nos -e)=|, o)liga/kis me\n o)phelei=n bla/ptein de\ ta\ plei/o ton -e)/chont' au)to/.] Ibid. 147 A: [Greek: O( de\ de\ te\n kaloume/nen -poluma/theia/n te kai\ polutechni/an kekteme/nos, o)rphano\s de\ o)\n -tau/tes te=s e)piste/mes, a)go/menos de\ u(po\ mia=s e(ka/stes to=n -a)/llon, a)=r' ou)chi\ to=| o)/nti dikai/os pollo=| cheimo=ni -chre/setai, a(/t', oi)=mai, a)/neu kuberne/tou diatelo=n e)n -pela/gei], &c.] - -[Side-note: It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his -sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address -to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the -counsel of Sokrates.] - -_Sokr._--The Lacedaemonians, when they offer sacrifice, pray -simply that they may obtain what is honourable and good, without -farther specification. This language is acceptable to the Gods, -more acceptable than the costly festivals of Athens. It has procured -for the Spartans more continued prosperity than the Athenians have -enjoyed.[34] The Gods honour wise and just men, that is, men who know -what they ought to say and do both towards Gods and towards men--more -than numerous and splendid offerings.[35] You see, therefore, that it -is not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice, until you have -learnt what is the proper language to be used, and what are the -really good gifts to be prayed for. Otherwise your sacrifice will not -prove acceptable, and you may even bring upon yourself positive -mischief.[36] _Alk._--When shall I be able to learn this, and -who is there to teach me? I shall be delighted to meet him. -_Sokr._--There is a person at hand most anxious for your -improvement. What he must do is, first to disperse the darkness from -your mind, next, to impart that which will teach you to discriminate -evil from good, which at present you are unable to do. _Alk._--I -shall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object. Until then, I -postpone my intended sacrifice: and I tender my sacrificial wreath to -you, in gratitude for your counsel.[37] _Sokr._--I accept the -wreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation -between us, to help us out of the present embarrassment. - -[Footnote 34: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 148.] - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.] - -[Footnote 36: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.] - -[Footnote 37: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 151.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Different critical opinions respecting these two -dialogues.] - -The two dialogues, called First and Second Alkibiades, of which I -have just given some account, resemble each other more than most of -the Platonic dialogues, not merely in the personages introduced, but -in general spirit, in subject, and even in illustrations. The First -Alkibiades was recognised as authentic by all critics without -exception, until the days of Schleiermacher. Nay, it was not only -recognised, but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of -all the Platonic compositions; proper to be studied first, as a key -to all the rest. Such was the view of Jamblichus and Proklus, -transmitted to modern times; until it received a harsh contradiction -from Schleiermacher, who declared the dialogue to be both worthless -and spurious. The Second Alkibiades was also admitted both by -Thrasyllus, and by the general body of critics in ancient times: but -there were some persons (as we learn from Athenaeus)[38] who -considered it to be a work of Xenophon; perceiving probably (what is -the fact) that it bears much analogy to several conversations which -Xenophon has set down. But those who held this opinion are not to be -considered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a -forgery or imitation of Plato. Compositions emanating from Xenophon -are just as much Sokratic, probably even more Sokratic, than the most -unquestioned Platonic dialogues, besides that they must of necessity -be contemporary also. Schleiermacher has gone much farther: declaring -the Second as well as the First to be an unworthy imitation of -Plato.[39] - -[Footnote 38: Athenaeus, xi. p. 506.] - -[Footnote 39: See the Einleitung of Schleiermacher to Alkib. i. part -ii. vol. iii. p. 293 seq. Einleitung to Alkib. ii. part i. vol. ii. -p. 365 seq. His notes on the two dialogues contain various additional -reasons, besides what is urged in his Introduction.] - -[Side-note: Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against -the Second than against the First.] - -Here Ast agrees with Schleiermacher fully, including both the First -and Second Alkibiades in his large list of the spurious. Most of the -subsequent critics go with Schleiermacher only half-way: Socher, -Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, recognise the First -Alkibiades, but disallow the Second.[40] In my judgment, -Schleiermacher and Ast are more consistently right, or more -consistently wrong, in rejecting both, than the other critics who -find or make so capital a distinction between the two. The similarity -of tone and topics between the two is obvious, and is indeed admitted -by all. Moreover, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should say -that the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the -Second than against the First; and that Schleiermacher, reasoning -upon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against -the Second, would have no difficulty in showing that his own -objections against the First were still more forcible. The long -speech assigned in the First Alkibiades to Sokrates, about the -privileges of the Spartan and Persian kings,[41] including the -mention of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes, and the Magian religion, -appears to me more unusual with Plato than anything which I find in -the Second Alkibiades. It is more Xenophontic[42] than Platonic. - -[Footnote 40: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 112. Stallbaum, -Prolegg. to Alkib. i. and ii. vol. v. pp. 171-304. K. F. Hermann, -Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 420-439. Steinhart, -Einleitungen to Alkib. i. and ii. in Hieronymus Mueller's Uebersetzung -des Platon's Werke, vol. i. pp. 135-509.] - -[Footnote 41: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 121-124. - -Whoever reads the objections in Steinhart's Einleitung (p. 148-150) -against the First Alkibiades, will see that they are quite as -forcible as what he urges against the Second; only, that in the case -of the First, he gives these objections their legitimate bearing, -allowing them to tell against the merit of the dialogue, but not -against its authenticity.] - -[Footnote 42: See Xenoph. Oekonom. c. 4; Cyropaed. vii. 5, 58-64, -viii. 1, 5-8-45; Laced. Repub. c. 15.] - -[Side-note: The supposed grounds for disallowance are in -reality only marks of inferiority.] - -But I must here repeat, that because I find, in this or any other -dialogue, some peculiarities not usual with Plato, I do not feel -warranted thereby in declaring the dialogue spurious. In my judgment, -we must look for a large measure of diversity in the various -dialogues; and I think it an injudicious novelty, introduced by -Schleiermacher, to set up a canonical type of Platonism, all -deviations from which are to be rejected as forgeries. Both the First -and the Second Alkibiades appear to me genuine, even upon the showing -of those very critics who disallow them. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, -and Steinhart, all admit that there is in both the dialogues a -considerable proportion of Sokratic and Platonic ideas: but they -maintain that there are also other ideas which are not Sokratic or -Platonic, and that the texture, style, and prolixity of the Second -Alkibiades (Schleiermacher maintains this about the First also) are -unworthy of Plato. But if we grant these premisses, the reasonable -inference would be, not to disallow it altogether, but to admit it as -a work by Plato, of inferior merit; perhaps of earlier days, before -his powers of composition had attained their maturity. To presume -that because Plato composed many excellent dialogues, therefore all -that he composed must have been excellent, is a pretension formally -disclaimed by many critics, and asserted by none.[42] Steinhart -himself allows that the Second Alkibiades, though not composed by -Plato, is the work of some other author contemporary, an untrained -Sokratic disciple attempting to imitate Plato.[44] But we do not know -that there were any contemporaries who tried to imitate Plato: -though Theopompus accused him of imitating others, and called most of -his dialogues useless as well as false: while Plato himself, in his -inferior works, will naturally appear like an imitator of his better -self. - -[Footnote 43: Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 186) makes this -general statement very justly, but he as well as other critics are -apt to forget it in particular cases.] - -[Footnote 44: Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 516-519. Stallbaum and Boeckh -indeed assign the dialogue to a later period. Heindorf (ad Lysin, p. -211) thinks it the work "antiqui auctoris, sed non Platonis". - -Steinhart and others who disallow the authenticity of the Second -Alkibiades insist much (p. 518) upon the enormity of the -chronological blunder, whereby Sokrates and Alkibiades are introduced -as talking about the death of Archelaus king of Macedonia, who was -killed in 399 B.C., in the same year as Sokrates, and four -years after Alkibiades. Such an anachronism (Steinhart urges) Plato -could never allow himself to commit. But when we read the Symposion, -we find Aristophanes in a company of which Sokrates, Alkibiades, and -Agathon form a part, alluding to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of -Mantineia, which took place in 386 B.C. No one has ever made -this glaring anachronism a ground for disallowing the Symposion. -Steinhart says that the style of the Second Alkibiades copies Plato -too closely (die aengstlich platonisirende Sprache des Dialogs, p. -515), yet he agrees with Stallbaum that in several places it departs -too widely from Plato.] - -[Side-note: The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's -earlier compositions.] - -I agree with Schleiermacher and the other recent critics in -considering the First and Second Alkibiades to be inferior in merit -to Plato's best dialogues; and I contend that their own premisses -justify no more. They may probably be among his earlier productions, -though I do not believe that the First Alkibiades was composed during -the lifetime of Sokrates, as Socher, Steinhart, and Stallbaum -endeavour to show.[45] I have already given my reasons, in a -previous chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at -all during the lifetime of Sokrates; still less in that of -Alkibiades, who died four years earlier. There is certainly nothing -in either Alkibiades I. or II. to shake this belief. - -[Footnote 45: Stallbaum refers the composition of Alkib. i. to a time -not long before the accusation of Sokrates, when the enemies of -Sokrates were calumniating him in consequence of his past intimacy -with Alkibiades (who had before that time been killed in 404 -B.C.) and when Plato was anxious to defend his master -(Prolegg. p. 186). Socher and Steinhart (p. 210) remark that such -writings would do little good to Sokrates under his accusation. They -place the composition of the dialogue earlier, in 406 B.C. -(Steinhart, p. 151-152), and they consider it the first exercise of -Plato in the strict dialectic method. Both Steinhart and Hermann -(Gesch. Plat. Phil. p. 440) think that the dialogue has not only a -speculative but a political purpose; to warn and amend Alkibiades, -and to prevent him from surrendering himself blindly to the -democracy. - -I cannot admit the hypothesis that the dialogue was written in 406 -B.C. (when Plato was twenty-one years of age, at most -twenty-two), nor that it had any intended bearing upon the real -historical Alkibiades, who left Athens in 415 B.C. at the -head of the armament against Syracuse, was banished three months -afterwards, and never came back to Athens until May 407 B.C. -(Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 13; i. 5, 17). He then enjoyed four months of -great ascendancy at Athens, left it at the head of the fleet to Asia -in Oct. 407 B.C., remained in command of the fleet for about -three months or so, then fell into disgrace and retired to -Chersonese, never revisiting Athens. In 406 B.C. Alkibiades -was again in banishment, out of the reach of all such warnings as -Hermann and Steinhart suppose that Plato intended to address to him -in Alkib. i. - -Steinhart says (p. 152), "In dieser Zeit also, _wenige Jahre nach -seiner triumphirenden Rueckkehr_, wo Alkibiades," &c. Now -Alkibiades left the Athenian service, irrevocably, within less -_than one year_ after his triumphant return. - -Steinhart has not realised in his mind the historical and -chronological conditions of the period.] - -[Side-note: Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic -Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men.] - -If we compare various colloquies of Sokrates in the Xenophontic -Memorabilia, we shall find Alkibiades I. and II. very analogous to -them both in purpose and spirit. In Alkibiades I. the situation -conceived is the same as that of Sokrates and Glaukon, in the third -book of the Memorabilia. Xenophon recounts how the presumptuous -Glaukon, hardly twenty years of age, fancied himself already fit to -play a conspicuous part in public affairs, and tried to force -himself, in spite of rebuffs and humiliations, upon the notice of the -assembly.[46] No remonstrances of friends could deter him, nor could -anything, except the ingenious dialectic of Sokrates, convince him of -his own impertinent forwardness and exaggerated self-estimation. -Probably Plato (Glaukon's elder brother) had heard of this -conversation, but whether the fact be so or not, we see the same -situation idealised by him in Alkibiades I., and worked out in a way -of his own. Again, we find in the Xenophontic Memorabilia another -colloquy, wherein Sokrates cross-questions, perplexes, and -humiliates, the studious youth Euthydemus,[47] whom he regards as -over-confident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with -himself. It was among the specialties of Sokrates to humiliate -confident young men, with a view to their future improvement. He made -his conversation "an instrument of chastisement," in the language of -Xenophon: or (to use a phrase of Plato himself in the Lysis) he -conceived. "that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love, -was, not to exalt and puff them up, but to subdue and humiliate -them".[48] - -[Footnote 46: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6.] - -[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2.] - -[Footnote 48: Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, 1. [Greek: skepsa/menoi me\ mo/non -a(\ e)kei=nos] (Sokrates) [Greek: _kolasteri/ou e(/neka _tou/s -pa/nt' oi)ome/nous ei)de/nai e)roto=n e)/legchen, a)lla\ kai\ a(\ -le/gon suneme/reue toi=s sundiatri/bousin], &c. So in the -Platonic Lysis, the youthful Lysis says to Sokrates "Talk to -Menexenus, [Greek: i(/n' au)to\n kola/se|s]" (Plat. Lysis, 211 B). -And Sokrates himself says, a few lines before (210 E), [Greek: Ou(/to -chre\ toi=s paidikoi=s diale/gesthai, tapeinou=nta kai\ suste/llonta, -kai\ me\ o(/sper su\ chaunou=nta kai\ diathru/ptonta.]] - -[Side-note: Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for -idealising this feature in Sokrates.] - -If Plato wished to idealise this feature in the character of -Sokrates, no name could be more suitable to his purpose than that of -Alkibiades: who, having possessed as a youth the greatest personal -beauty (to which Sokrates was exquisitely sensible) had become in his -mature life distinguished not less for unprincipled ambition and -insolence, than for energy and ability. We know the real Alkibiades -both from Thucydides and Xenophon, and we also know that Alkibiades -had in his youth so far frequented the society of Sokrates as to -catch some of that dialectic ingenuity, which the latter was expected -and believed to impart.[49] The contrast, as well as the -companionship, between Sokrates and Alkibiades was eminently -suggestive to the writers of Sokratic dialogues, and nearly all of -them made use of it, composing dialogues in which Alkibiades was the -principal name and figure.[50] It would be surprising indeed if Plato -had never done the same: which is what we must suppose, if we adopt -Schleiermacher's view, that both Alkibiades I. and II. are spurious. -In the Protagoras as well as in the Symposion, Alkibiades figures; -but in neither of them is he the principal person, or titular hero, -of the piece. In Alkibiades I. and II., he is introduced as the -solitary respondent to the questions of Sokrates--[Greek: kolasteri/ou -e(/neka]: to receive from Sokrates a lesson of humiliation such as -the Xenophontic Sokrates administers to Glaukon and Euthydemus, -taking care to address the latter when alone.[51] - -[Footnote 49: The sensibility of Sokrates to youthful beauty is as -strongly declared in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (i. 3, 8-14), as in -the Platonic Lysis, Charmides, or Symposion. - -The conversation reported by Xenophon between Alkibiades, when not -yet twenty years of age, and his guardian Perikles, the first man in -Athens--wherein Alkibiades puzzles Perikles by a Sokratic -cross-examination--is likely enough to be real, and was probably the -fruit of his sustained society with Sokrates (Xen. Memor. i. 2, 40).] - -[Footnote 50: Stallbaum observes (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 215, 2nd -ed.), "Ceterum etiam AEschines, Euclides, Phaedon, et Antisthenes, -dialogos _Alcibiadis_ nomine inscriptos composuisse narrantur". - -Respecting the dialogues composed by AEschines, see the first note to -this chapter.] - -[Footnote 51: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 8.] - -[Side-note: Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of -Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of -Sokrates.] - -I conceive Alkibiades I. and II. as composed by Plato among his -earlier writings (perhaps between 399-390 B.C.)[52] giving -an imaginary picture of the way in which "Sokrates handled every -respondent just as he chose" (to use the literal phrase of -Xenophon[53]): taming even that most overbearing youth, whom -Aristophanes characterises as the lion's whelp.[54] In selecting -Alkibiades as the sufferer under such a chastising process, Plato -rebuts in his own ideal style that charge which Xenophon answers with -prosaic directness--the charge made against Sokrates by his enemies, -that he taught political craft without teaching ethical sobriety; and -that he had encouraged by his training the lawless propensities of -Alkibiades.[55] When Schleiermacher, and others who disallow the -dialogue, argue that the inordinate insolence ascribed to Alkibiades, -and the submissive deference towards Sokrates also ascribed to him, -are incongruous and incompatible attributes,--I reply that such a -conjunction is very improbable in any real character. But this does -not hinder Plato from combining them in one and the same ideal -character, as we shall farther see when we come to the manifestation -of Alkibiades in the Symposion: in which dialogue we find a -combination of the same elements, still more extravagant and -high-coloured. Both here and there we are made to see that Sokrates, -far from encouraging Alkibiades, is the only person who ever succeeded -in humbling him. Plato attributes to the personality and conversation -of Sokrates an influence magical and almost superhuman: which Cicero -and Plutarch, proceeding probably upon the evidence of the Platonic -dialogues, describe as if it were historical fact. They represent -Alkibiades as shedding tears of sorrow and shame, and entreating -Sokrates to rescue him from a sense of degradation insupportably -painful.[56] Now Xenophon mentions Euthydemus and other young men as -having really experienced these profound and distressing -emotions.[56] But he does not at all certify the same about -Alkibiades, whose historical career is altogether adverse to the -hypothesis. The Platonic picture is an _ideal_, drawn from what -may have been actually true about other interlocutors of Sokrates, -and calculated to reply to Meletus and his allies. - -[Footnote 52: The date which I here suppose for the composition of -Alkib. i. (_i.e._ after the death of Sokrates, but early in the -literary career of Plato), is farther sustained (against those -critics who place it in 406 B.C. or 402 B.C. before -the death of Sokrates) by the long discourse (p. 121-124) of Sokrates -about the Persian and Spartan kings. In reference to the Persian -monarchy Sokrates says (p. 123 B), [Greek: e)pei/ pot' e)go\ e(/kousa -a)ndro\s a)xiopi/stou to=n a)nabebeko/ton para\ basile/a, o(\s e)/phe -parelthei=n cho/ran pa/nu polle\n kai\ a)gathe/n--e(\n kalei=n tou\s -e)pichori/ous zo/nen te=s basile/os gunaiko/s], &c. Olympiodorus -and the Scholiast both suppose that Plato here refers to Xenophon and -the Anabasis, in which a statement very like this is found (i. 4, 9). -It is plain, therefore, that _they_ did not consider the -dialogue to have been composed before the death of Sokrates. I think -it very probable that Plato had in his mind Xenophon (either his -Anabasis, or personal communications with him); but at any rate -visits of Greeks to the Persian court became very numerous between -399-390 B.C., whereas Plato can hardly have seen any such -visitors at Athens in 406 B.C. (before the close of the -war), nor probably in 402 B.C., when Athens, though relieved -from the oligarchy, was still in a state of great public prostration. -Between 399 B.C. and the peace of Antalkidas (387 -B.C.), visitors from Greece to the interior of Persia became -more and more frequent, the Persian kings interfering very actively -in Grecian politics. Plato may easily have seen during these years -intelligent Greeks who had been up to the Persian court on military -or political business. Both the Persian kings and the Spartan kings -were then in the maximum of power and ascendancy--it is no wonder -therefore that Sokrates should here be made to dwell upon their -prodigious dignity in his discourse with Alkibiades. Steinhart (Einl. -p. 150) feels the difficulty of reconciling this part of the dialogue -with his hypothesis that it was composed in 406 B.C.: yet he -and Stallbaum both insist that it must have been composed before the -death of Sokrates, for which they really produce no grounds at all.] - -[Footnote 53: Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14. [Greek: toi=s de\ dialegome/nois -au)to=| pa=si chro/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/pos bou/loito.]] - -[Footnote 54: Aristoph. Ran. 1431. [Greek: ou) chre\ le/ontos -sku/mnon e)n po/lei tre/phein.] Thucyd. vi. 15. [Greek: phobethe/ntes -ga\r au)tou=] (Alkib.) [Greek: oi( polloi\ to\ me/gethos te=s te -kata\ to\ e(autou= so=ma paranomi/as e)s te\n di/aitan, kai\ te=s -dianoi/as o(=n kath' e(\n e(/kaston, e)n o(/to| gi/gnoito, -e)/prassen, o(s turanni/dos e)pithumou=nti pole/mioi kathe/stasan], -&c.] - -[Footnote 55: Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 17.] - -[Footnote 56: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iii. 32, 77; Plutarch, Alkib. c. -4-6. Compare Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 D, 135 C; Symposion, p. 215-216.] - -[Footnote 57: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 39-40.] - -[Side-note: The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology -is followed out in Alkib. I. Warfare against the false persuasion of -knowledge.] - -Looking at Alkibiades I. and II. in this point of view, we shall find -them perfectly Sokratic both in topics proclaimed and in -manner--whatever may be said about unnecessary prolixity and common-place -here and there. The leading ideas of Alkibiades I. may be found, -nearly all, in the Platonic Apology. That warfare, which Sokrates -proclaims in the Apology as having been the mission of his life, -against the false persuasion of knowledge, or against beliefs ethical -and aesthetical, firmly entertained without having been preceded by -conscious study or subjected to serious examination--is exemplified -in Alkibiades I. and II. as emphatically as in any Platonic -composition. In both these dialogues, indeed (especially in the -first), we find an excessive repetition of specialising -illustrations, often needless and sometimes tiresome: a defect easily -intelligible if we assume them to have been written when Plato was -still a novice in the art of dialogic composition. But both dialogues -are fully impregnated with the spirit of the Sokratic process, -exposing, though with exuberant prolixity, the firm and universal -belief, held and affirmed by every one even at the age of boyhood, -without any assignable grounds or modes of acquisition, and amidst -angry discordance between the affirmation of one man and another. The -emphasis too with which Sokrates insists upon his own single function -of merely questioning, and upon the fact that Alkibiades gives all -the answers and pronounces all the self-condemnation with his own -mouth[58]--is remarkable in this dialogue: as well as the confidence -with which he proclaims the dialogue as affording the only, but -effective, cure.[59] The ignorance of which Alkibiades stands -unexpectedly convicted, is expressly declared to be common to him -with the other Athenian politicians: an exception being half allowed -to pass in favour of the semi-philosophical Perikles, whom Plato -judges here with less severity than elsewhere[60]--and a decided -superiority being claimed for the Spartan and Persian kings, who are -extolled as systematically trained from childhood. - -[Footnote 58: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 112-113.] - -[Footnote 59: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 E.] - -[Footnote 60: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-120.] - -[Side-note: Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of -bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance.] - -The main purpose of Sokrates is to drive Alkibiades into -self-contradictions, and to force upon him a painful consciousness of -ignorance and mental defect, upon grave and important subjects, while -he is yet young enough to amend it. Towards this purpose he is made -to lay claim to a divine mission similar to that which the real -Sokrates announces in the Apology[61] A number of perplexing -questions and difficulties are accumulated: it is not meant that -these difficulties are insoluble, but that they cannot be solved by -one who has never seriously reflected on them--by one who (as the -Xenophontic Sokrates says to Euthydemus),[62] is so confident of -knowing the subject that he has never meditated upon it at all. The -disheartened Alkibiades feels the necessity of improving himself and -supplicates the assistance of Sokrates:[63] who reminds him that he -must first determine what "Himself" is. Here again we find ourselves -upon the track of Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, and under the -influence of the memorable inscription at Delphi--_Nosce -teipsum_. Your mind is yourself; your body is a mere instrument of -your mind: your wealth and power are simple appurtenances or -adjuncts. To know yourself, which is genuine Sophrosyne or -temperance, is to know your mind: but this can only be done by -looking into another mind, and into its most intelligent compartment: -just as the eye can only see itself by looking into the centre of -vision of another eye.[64] - -[Footnote 61: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124 C-127 E.] - -[Footnote 62: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 36. [Greek: A)lla\ tau=ta me/n, -e)/phe o( Sokra/tes, i)/sos, dia\ to\ spho/dra posteu/ein ei)de/nai, -ou)d' e)/skepsai.]] - -[Footnote 63: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 128-132 A.] - -[Footnote 64: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 133. - -A Platonic metaphor, illustrating the necessity for two separate -minds co-operating in dialectic colloquy.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these -difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are -acknowledged Incognita.] - -At the same time, when, after having convicted Alkibiades of -deplorable ignorance, Sokrates is called upon to prescribe -remedies--all distinctness of indication disappears. It is exacted only -when the purpose is to bring difficulties and contradictions to view: -it is dispensed with, when the purpose is to solve them. The conclusion -is, that assuming happiness as the acknowledged ultimate end,[65] -Alkibiades cannot secure this either for himself or for his city, by -striving for wealth and power, private or public: he can only secure -it by acquiring for himself, and implanting in his country-men, -justice, temperance, and virtue. This is perfectly Sokratic, and -conformable to what is said by the real Sokrates in the Platonic -Apology. But coming at the close of Alkibiades I., it presents no -meaning and imparts no instruction: because Sokrates had shown in the -earlier part of the dialogue, that neither he himself, nor -Alkibiades, nor the general public, knew what justice and virtue -were. The positive solution which Sokrates professes to give, is -therefore illusory. He throws us back upon those old, familiar, -emotional, associations, unconscious products and unexamined -transmissions from mind to mind--which he had already shown to -represent the fancy of knowledge without the reality--deep-seated -belief without any assignable intellectual basis, or outward standard -of rectitude. - -[Footnote 65: Plat. Alkibiad. i. p. 134.] - -[Side-note: Prolixity of Alkibiades I.--Extreme multiplication -of illustrative examples--How explained.] - -Throughout the various Platonic dialogues, we find alternately two -distinct and opposite methods of handling--the generalising of the -special, and the specialising of the general. In Alkibiades I, the -specialising of the general preponderates--as it does in most of the -conversations of the Xenophontic Memorabilia: the number of -exemplifying particulars is unusually great. Sokrates does not accept -as an answer a general term, without illustrating it by several of -the specific terms comprehended under it: and this several times on -occasions when an instructed reader thinks it superfluous and -tiresome: hence, partly, the inclination of some modern critics to -disallow the dialogue. But we must recollect that though a modern -reader practised in the use of general terms may seize the meaning at -once, an Athenian youth of the Platonic age would not be sure of -doing the same. No conscious analysis had yet been applied to general -terms: no grammar or logic then entered into education. Confident -affirmation, without fully knowing the meaning of what is affirmed, -is the besetting sin against which Plato here makes war: and his -precautions for exposing it are pushed to extreme minuteness. So, -too, in the Sophistes and Politikus, when he wishes to illustrate the -process of logical division and subdivision, he applies it to cases -so trifling and so multiplied, that Socher is revolted and rejects -the dialogues altogether. But Plato himself foresees and replies to -the objection; declaring expressly that his main purpose is, not to -expound the particular subject chosen, but to make manifest and -familiar the steps and conditions of the general classifying -process--and that prolixity cannot be avoided.[66] We must reckon upon -a similar purpose in Alkibiades I. The dialogue is a specimen of that -which Aristotle calls Inductive Dialectic, as distinguished from -Syllogistic: the Inductive he considers to be plainer and easier, -suitable when you have an ordinary collocutor--the Syllogistic is the -more cogent, when you are dealing with a practised disputant.[67] - -[Footnote 66: Plato, Politikus, 285-286.] - -[Footnote 67: Aristotel. Topic. i. 104, a. 16. [Greek: Po/sa to=n -lo/gon ei)/de to=n dialektiko=n--e)/sti de\ to\ me\n e)pagoge/, to\ -de\ sullogismo/s . . . . e)/sti d' e( me\n e)pagoge\ pithano/teron -kai\ saphe/steron kai\ kata\ te\n ai)/sthesin gnorimo/teron kai\ -toi=s polloi=s koino/n; o( de\ sullogismo\s biastiko/teron kai\ pro\s -tou\s a)ntilogikou\s e)nerge/steron.]] - -[Side-note: Alkibiades II. leaves its problem avowedly -undetermined.] - -It has been seen that Alkibiades I, though professing to give -something like a solution, gives what is really no solution at all. -Alkibiades II., similar in many respects, is here different, inasmuch -as it does not even profess to solve the difficulty which had been -raised. The general mental defect--false persuasion of knowledge -without the reality--is presented in its application to a particular -case. Alkibiades is obliged to admit that he does not know what he -ought to pray to the Gods for: neither what is _good_, to be -granted, nor what is _evil_, to be averted. He relies upon -Sokrates for dispelling this mist from his mind: which Sokrates -promises to do, but adjourns for another occasion. - -[Side-note: Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the -Gods for favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular, -semi-irregular agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory -warnings.] - -Sokrates here ascribes to the Spartans, and to various philosophers, -the practice of putting up prayers in undefined language, for good -and honourable things generally. He commends that practice. Xenophon -tells us that the historical Sokrates observed it:[68] but he tells -us also that the historical Sokrates, though not praying for any -special presents from the Gods, yet prayed for and believed himself -to receive special irregular revelations and advice as to what was -good to be done or avoided in particular cases. He held that these -special revelations were essential to any tolerable life: that the -dispensations of the Gods, though administered upon regular -principles on certain subjects and up to a certain point, were kept -by them designedly inscrutable beyond that point: but that the Gods -would, if properly solicited, afford premonitory warnings to any -favoured person, such as would enable him to keep out of the way of -evil, and put himself in the way of good. He declared that to consult -and obey oracles and prophets was not less a maxim of prudence than a -duty of piety: for himself, he was farther privileged through his -divine sign or monitor, which he implicitly followed.[69] Such -premonitory warnings were the only special favour which he thought it -suitable to pray for--besides good things generally. For special -presents he did not pray, because he professed not to know whether -any of the ordinary objects of desire were good or bad. He proves in -his conversation with Euthydemus, that all those acquisitions which -are usually accounted means of happiness--beauty, strength, wealth, -reputation, nay, even good health and wisdom--are sometimes good -or causes of happiness, sometimes evil or causes of misery; and -therefore cannot be considered either as absolutely the one or -absolutely the other.[70] - -[Footnote 68: Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 2; Plat. Alk. ii. p. 143-148.] - -[Footnote 69: These opinions of Sokrates are announced in various -passages of the Xenophontic Memorabilia, i. 1, 1-10--[Greek: e)/phe -de\ dei=n, a(\ me\n matho/ntas poiei=n e)/dokan oi( theoi/, -mantha/nein; a(\ de\ me\ de=la toi=s a)nthro/pois e)sti/, peira=sthai -dia\ mantike=s para\ to=n theo=n puntha/nesthai; tou\s theou\s ga/r, -oi(=s a)\n o)=sin i(/leo|, semai/nein]--i. 3, 4; i. 4, 2-15; iv. 3, -12; iv. 7, 10; iv. 8, 5-11.] - -[Footnote 70: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 31-32-36.[Greek: Tau=ta ou)=n -pote\ me\n o)phelou=nta pote\ de\ bla/ptonta, ti/ ma=llon a)gatha\ -e)\ kaka/ e)stin?]] - -[Side-note: Comparison of Alkibiades II. with the Xenophontic -Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus. -Sokrates not always consistent with himself.] - -This impossibility of determining what is good and what is evil, in -consequence of the uncertainty in the dispensations of the Gods and -in human affairs--is a doctrine forcibly insisted on by the -Xenophontic Sokrates in his discourse with Euthydemus, and much akin -to the Platonic Alkibiades II., being applied to the special case of -prayer. But we must not suppose that Sokrates adheres to this -doctrine throughout all the colloquies of the Xenophontic -Memorabilia: on the contrary, we find him, in other places, reasoning -upon such matters, as health, strength, and wisdom, as if they were -decidedly good.[71] The fact is, that the arguments of Sokrates, in -the Xenophontic Memorabilia, vary materially according to the -occasion and the person with whom he is discoursing: and the case is -similar with the Platonic dialogues: illustrating farther the -questionable evidence on which Schleiermacher and other critics -proceed, when they declare one dialogue to be spurious, because it -contains reasoning inconsistent with another. - -[Footnote 71: For example, Xen. Mem. iv. 5, 6--[Greek: sophi/an to\ -me/giston a)gatho/n], &c.] - -We find in Alkibiades II. another doctrine which is also proclaimed -by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: that the Gods are not -moved by costly sacrifice more than by humble sacrifice, according to -the circumstances of the offerer:[72] they attend only to the mind of -the offerer, whether he be just and wise: that is, "whether he knows -what ought to be done both towards Gods and towards men".[73] - -[Footnote 72: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149-150; Xen. Mem. i. 3. Compare -Plato, Legg. x. p. 885; Isokrat. ad Nikok.] - -[Footnote 73: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149 E, 150 B.] - -[Side-note: Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiades II.--that -knowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is -indispensable: without that, the knowledge of other things is more -hurtful than beneficial.] - -But we find also in Alkibiades II. another doctrine, more remarkable. -Sokrates will not proclaim absolutely that knowledge is good, and -that ignorance is evil. In some cases, he contends, ignorance is -good; and he discriminates which the cases are. That which we -are principally interested in knowing, is _Good_, or The -_Best_--The _Profitable_:[74] phrases used as equivalent. -The knowledge of this is good, and the ignorance of it mischievous, -under all supposable circumstances. And if a man knows good, the more -he knows of everything else, the better; since he will sure to make a -good use of his knowledge. But if he does not know good, the -knowledge of other things will be hurtful rather than beneficial to -him. To be skilful in particular arts and accomplishments, under the -capital mental deficiency supposed, will render him an instrument of -evil and not of good. The more he knows--and the more he believes -himself to know--the more forward will he be in acting, and therefore -the greater amount of harm will he do. It is better that he should -act as little as possible. Such a man is not fit to direct his own -conduct, like a freeman: he must be directed and controlled by -others, like a slave. The greater number of mankind are fools of this -description--ignorant of good: the wise men who know good, and are -fit to direct, are very few. The wise man alone, knowing good, -follows reason: the rest trust to opinion, without reason.[75] He -alone is competent to direct both his own conduct and that of the -society. - -[Footnote 74: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145 C. [Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti -to=n toiou/ton oi)=den, e)a\n me\n pare/petai au)to=| e( tou= -belti/stou e)piste/me--au)te\ d' e)=n e( au)te\ de/pou e(per kai\ e( -tou= o)pheli/mou]--also 146 B.] - -[Footnote 75: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 146 A-D. [Greek: a)/neu nou= -do/xe| pepisteuko/tas.]] - -The stress which is laid here upon the knowledge of good, as -distinguished from all other varieties of knowledge--the -identification of the good with the profitable, and of the knowledge -of good with reason ([Greek: nou=s]), while other varieties of -knowledge are ranked with opinion ([Greek: do/xa])--these are points -which, under one phraseology or another, pervade many of the Platonic -dialogues. The old phrase of Herakleitus--[Greek: Polumathi/e no/on -ou) dida/skei]--"much learning does not teach reason"--seems to have -been present to the mind of Plato in composing this dialogue. The man -of much learning and art, without the knowledge of good, and -surrendering himself to the guidance of one or other among his -accomplishments, is like a vessel tossed about at sea without a -pilot.[76] - -[Footnote 76: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 147 A. [Greek: o( de\ de\ te\n -kaloume/nen poluma/theia/n te kai\ polutechni/an kekteme/nos, -o)rphano\s de\ o)\n tau/tes te=s e)piste/mes, a)go/menos de\ u(po\ -mia=s e(ka/stes to=n a)/llon], &c.] - -[Side-note: Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined, -in many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles.] - -What Plato here calls the knowledge of Good, or Reason--the just -discrimination and comparative appreciation of Ends and -Means--appears in the Politikus and Euthydemus, under the title of the -Regal or Political Art, of employing or directing[77] the results of all -other arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the Protagoras, -under the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the -Philebus, as measure and proportion: in the Phaedrus (in regard to -rhetoric) as the art of turning to account, for the main purpose of -persuasion, all the special processes, stratagems, decorations, -&c., imparted by professional masters. In the Republic, it is -personified in the few venerable Elders who constitute the Reason of -the society, and whose directions all the rest (Guardians and -Producers) are bound implicitly to follow: the virtue of the -subordinates consisting in this implicit obedience. In the Leges, it -is defined as the complete subjection in the mind, of pleasures and -pains to right Reason,[78] without which, no special aptitudes are -worth having. In the Xenophontic Memorabilia, it stands as a Sokratic -authority under the title of Sophrosyne or Temperance:[79] and the -Profitable is declared identical with the Good, as the directing and -limiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings.[80] - -[Footnote 77: Plato, Politikus, 292 B, 304 B, 305 A; Euthydemus, 291 -B, 292 B. Compare Xenophon, Oekonomicus, i. 8, 13.] - -[Footnote 78: Leges, iii. 689 A-D, 691 A.] - -[Footnote 79: Xenoph. Memor. i. 2. 17; iv. 3. 1.] - -[Footnote 80: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 6, 8; iv. 7, 7.] - -[Side-note: The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we -to know it? Plato leaves this undetermined.] - -But what are we to understand by the _Good_, about which there -are so many disputes, according to the acknowledgment of Plato as -well as of Sokrates? And what are we to understand by the Profitable? -In what relation does it stand to the Pleasurable and the Painful? - -These are points which Plato here leaves undetermined. We shall find -him again touching them, and trying different ways of determining -them, in the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Republic, and -elsewhere. We have here the title and the postulate, but nothing -more, of a comprehensive Teleology, or right comparative estimate of -ends and means one against another, so as to decide when, how far, -under what circumstances, &c., each ought to be pursued. We shall -see what Plato does in other dialogues to connect this title and -postulate with a more definite meaning. - - - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - -HIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR. - - -[Side-note: Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the -dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias.] - -Both these two dialogues are carried on between Sokrates and the -Eleian Sophist Hippias. The general conception of Hippias--described -as accomplished, eloquent, and successful, yet made to say vain and -silly things--is the same in both dialogues: in both also the -polemics of Sokrates against him are conducted in a like spirit, of -affected deference mingled with insulting sarcasm. Indeed the figure -assigned to Hippias is so contemptible, that even an admiring critic -like Stallbaum cannot avoid noticing the "petulans pene et proterva -in Hippiam oratio," and intimating that Plato has handled Hippias -more coarsely than any one else. Such petulance Stallbaum attempts to -excuse by saying that the dialogue is a youthful composition of -Plato:[1] while Schleiermacher numbers it among the reasons for -suspecting the dialogue, and Ast, among the reasons for declaring -positively that Plato is not the author.[2] This last conclusion I do -not at all accept: nor even the hypothesis of Stallbaum, if it be -tendered as an excuse for improprieties of tone: for I believe that -the earliest of Plato's dialogues was composed after he was -twenty-eight years of age--that is, after the death of Sokrates. It is -however noway improbable, that both the Greater and Lesser Hippias -may have been among Plato's earlier compositions. We see by the -Memorabilia of Xenophon that there was repeated and acrimonious -controversy between Sokrates and Hippias: so that we may probably -suppose feelings of special dislike, determining Plato to compose two -distinct dialogues, in which an imaginary Hippias is mocked and -scourged by an imaginary Sokrates. - -[Footnote 1: Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Hipp. Maj. p. 149-150; also -Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 42-43), who says, after an outpouring of -his usual invective against the Sophist: "Nevertheless the coarse -jesting of the dialogue seems almost to exceed the admissible limit -of comic effect," &c. Again, p. 50, Steinhart talks of the banter -which Sokrates carries on with Hippias, in a way not less cruel -(grausam) than purposeless, tormenting him with a string of -successive new propositions about the definition of the Beautiful, -which propositions, as fast as Hippias catches at them, he again -withdraws of his own accord, and thus at last dismisses him (as he -had dismissed Ion) uninstructed and unimproved, without even leaving -behind in him the sting of anger, &c. - -It requires a powerful hatred against the persons called Sophists, to -make a critic take pleasure in a comedy wherein silly and ridiculous -speeches are fastened upon the name of one of them, in his own day -not merely honoured but acknowledged as deserving honour by -remarkable and varied accomplishments--and to make the critic -describe the historical Hippias (whom we only know from Plato and -Xenophon--see Steinhart, note 7, p. 89; Socher, p. 221) as if he had -really delivered these speeches, or something equally absurd. - -How this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of -individual taste. For my part, I agree with Ast in thinking it -misplaced and unbecoming: and I am not surprised that he wishes to -remove the dialogue from the Platonic canon, though I do not concur -either in this inference, or in the general principle on which it -proceeds, viz., that all objections against the composition of a -dialogue are to be held as being also objections against its -genuineness as a work of Plato. The Nubes of Aristophanes, greatly -superior as a comedy to the Hippias of Plato, is turned to an abusive -purpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the -character of the real Sokrates. - -K. F. Hermann, in my judgment, takes a more rational view of the -Hippias Major (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 487-647). Instead -of expatiating on the glory of Plato in deriding an accomplished -contemporary, he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which -the dialogue brings to view; and he reminds us justly of the -intellectual condition of the age, when even elementary distinctions -in logic and grammar had been scarcely attended to. - -Both K. F. Hermann and Socher consider the Hippias to be not a -juvenile production of Plato, but to belong to his middle age.] - -[Footnote 2: Schleierm. Einleitung. p. 401; Ast, Platon's Leben und -Schriften, p. 457-459.] - -[Side-note: Real debate between the historical Sokrates and -Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate.] - -One considerable point in the Hippias Major appears to have a bearing -on the debate between Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic -Memorabilia: in which debate, Hippias taunts Sokrates with always -combating and deriding the opinions of others, while evading to give -opinions of his own. It appears that some antecedent debates between -the two had turned upon the definition of the Just, and that on these -occasions Hippias had been the respondent, Sokrates the objector. -Hippias professes to have reflected upon these debates, and to be now -prepared with a definition which neither Sokrates nor any one else -can successfully assail, but he will not say what the definition is, -until Sokrates has laid down one of his own. In reply to this -challenge, Sokrates declares the Just to be equivalent to the Lawful -or Customary: he defends this against various objections of -Hippias, who concludes by admitting it.[3] Probably this debate, as -reported by Xenophon, or something very like it, really took place. -If so, we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of -Hippias, in a case where Sokrates, if he had been the objector, would -have found such strong ones--and the feeble replies given by -Sokrates, whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties, -not in solving them.[4] Among the remarks which Sokrates makes in -illustration to Hippias, one is--that Lykurgus had ensured -superiority to Sparta by creating in the Spartans a habit of implicit -obedience to the laws.[5] Such is the character of the Xenophontic -debate. - -[Footnote 3: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 12-25.] - -[Footnote 4: Compare the puzzling questions which Alkibiades when a -youth is reported to have addressed to Perikles, and which he must -unquestionably have heard from Sokrates himself, respecting the -meaning of the word [Greek: No/mos] (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 42). All the -difficulties in determining the definition of [Greek: No/mos], occur -also in determining that of [Greek: No/mimon], which includes both -Jus Scriptum and Jus Moribus Receptum.] - -[Footnote 5: Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 15.] - -[Side-note: Opening of the Hippias Major--Hippias describes the -successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown -as well as the gain acquired by his lectures.] - -Here, in the beginning of the Hippias Major, the Platonic Sokrates -remarks that Hippias has been long absent from Athens: which absence, -the latter explains, by saying that he has visited many cities in -Greece, giving lectures with great success, and receiving high pay: -and that especially he has often visited Sparta, partly to give -lectures, but partly also to transact diplomatic business for his -countrymen the Eleians, who trusted him more than any one else for -such duties. His lectures (he says) were eminently instructive and -valuable for the training of youth: moreover they were so generally -approved, that even from a small Sicilian town called Inykus, he -obtained a considerable sum in fees. - -[Side-note: Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the -Spartans did not admit his instructions--their law forbids.] - -Upon this Sokrates asks--In which of the cities were your gains the -largest: probably at Sparta? _Hip._--No; I received nothing at -all at Sparta. _Sokr._--How? You amaze me! Were not your -lectures calculated to improve the Spartan youth? or did not the -Spartans desire to have their youth improved? or had they no money? -_Hip._--Neither one nor the other. The Spartans, like others, -desire the improvement of their youth: they also have plenty of -money: moreover my lectures were very beneficial to them as well -as to the rest.[6] _Sokr._--How could it happen then, that at -Sparta, a city great and eminent for its good laws, your valuable -instructions were left unrewarded; while you received so much at the -inconsiderable town of Inykus? _Hip._--It is not the custom of -the country, Sokrates, for the Spartans to change their laws, or to -educate their sons in a way different from their ordinary routine. -_Sokr._--How say you? It is not the custom of the country for -the Spartans to do right, but to do wrong? _Hip._--I shall not -say that, Sokrates. _Sokr._--But surely they would do right, in -educating their children better and not worse? _Hip._--Yes, they -would do right: but it is not lawful for them to admit a foreign mode -of education. If any one could have obtained payment there for -education, I should have obtained a great deal; for they listen to me -with delight and applaud me: but, as I told you, their law forbids. - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 283-284.] - -[Side-note: Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at -the Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they -fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is -also unlawful.] - -_Sokr._--Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city? -_Hip._--Law is enacted with a view to benefit: but it sometimes -hurts if it be badly enacted.[7] _Sokr._--But what? Do not the -enactors enact it as the maximum of good, without which the citizens -cannot live a regulated life? _Hip._--Certainly: they do so. -_Sokr._--Therefore, when those who try to enact laws miss the -attainment of good, they also miss the lawful and law itself. How say -you? _Hip._--They do so, if you speak with strict propriety: but -such is not the language which men commonly use. _Sokr._--What -men? the knowing? or the ignorant? _Hip._--The Many. -_Sokr._--The Many; is it _they_ who know what truth is? -_Hip._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--But surely those who do -know, account the profitable to be in truth more lawful than the -unprofitable, to all men. Don't you admit this? _Hip._--Yes, I -admit they account it so in truth. _Sokr._--Well, and it is so, -too: the truth is as the knowing men account it. _Hip._--Most -certainly. _Sokr._--Now you affirm, that it is more profitable -to the Spartans to be educated according to your scheme, foreign as -it is, than according to their own native scheme. _Hip._--I -affirm it, and with truth too. _Sokr._--You affirm besides, -that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful? -_Hip._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your reasoning, -then, it is more lawful for the Spartan children to be educated by -Hippias, and more unlawful for them to be educated by their fathers-- -if in reality they will be more benefited by you? _Hip._--But -they will be more benefited by me. _Sokr._--The Spartans -therefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to -confide to you their sons? _Hip._--I admit that they do: indeed -your reasoning seems to make in my favour, so that I am noway called -upon to resist it. _Sokr._--We find then, after all, that the -Spartans are enemies of law, and that too in the most important -matters--though they are esteemed the most exemplary followers of -law.[8] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 284 C-B.] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 285.] - - -* * * * * - -[Side-note: Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates -with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates.] - -Perhaps Plato intended the above argument as a derisory taunt against -the Sophist Hippias, for being vain enough to think his own tuition -better than that of the Spartan community. If such was his intention, -the argument might have been retorted against Plato himself, for his -propositions in the Republic and Leges: and we know that the enemies -of Plato did taunt him with his inability to get these schemes -adopted in any actual community. But the argument becomes interesting -when we compare it with the debate before referred to in the -Xenophontic Memorabilia, where Sokrates maintains against Hippias -that the Just is equivalent to the Lawful. In that Xenophontic -dialogue, all the difficulties which embarrass this explanation are -kept out of sight, and Sokrates is represented as gaining an easy -victory over Hippias. In this Platonic dialogue, the equivocal use of -the word [Greek: no/mimon] is expressly adverted to, and Sokrates -reduces Hippias to a supposed absurdity, by making him pronounce the -Spartans to be enemies of law: [Greek: paranomou/s] bearing a double -sense, and the proposition being true in one sense, false in the -other. In the argument of the Platonic Sokrates, a law which does not -attain its intended purpose of benefiting the community, is no -law at all,--not lawful:[9] so that we are driven back again upon the -objections of Alkibiades against Perikles (in the Xenophontic -Memorabilia) in regard to what constitutes a law. In the argument of -the Xenophontic Sokrates, law means a law actually established, by -official authority or custom--and the Spartans are produced as -eminent examples of a lawfully minded community. As far as we can -assign positive opinion to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias -Major, he declares that the profitable or useful (being that which -men always aim at in making law) is The Lawful, whether actually -established or not: and that the unprofitable or hurtful (being that -which men always intend to escape) is The Unlawful, whether -prescribed by any living authority or not. This (he says) is the -opinion of the wise men who know: though the ignorant vulgar hold the -contrary opinion. The explanation of [Greek: to\ di/kaion] given by -the Xenophontic Sokrates ([Greek: to\ di/kaion = to\ no/mimon]), -would be equivalent, if we construe [Greek: to\ no/mimon] in the -sense of the Platonic Sokrates (in Hippias Major) as an affirmation -that The Just was the generally useful--[Greek: To\ di/kaion = to\ -koine=| su/mphoron]. - -[Footnote 9: Compare a similar argument of Sokrates against -Thrasymachus--Republic, i. 339.] - -[Side-note: The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. -This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he -does not always adhere.] - -There exists however in all this, a prevalent confusion between Law -(or the Lawful) as actually established, and Law (or the Lawful) as -it ought to be established, in the judgment of the critic, or of -those whom he follows: that is (to use the phrase of Mr. Austin in -his 'Province of Jurisprudence') Law as it would be, if it conformed -to its assumed measure or test. In the first of these senses, [Greek: -to\ no/mimon] is not one and the same, but variable according to -place and time--one thing at Sparta, another thing elsewhere: -accordingly it would not satisfy the demand of Plato's mind, when he -asks for an explanation of [Greek: to\ di/kaion]. It is an -explanation in the second of the two senses which Plato seeks--a -common measure or test applicable universally, at all times and -places. In so far as he ever finds one, it is that which I have -mentioned above as delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in this -dialogue: viz., the Just or Good, that which ought to be the measure -or test of Law and Positive Morality, is, the beneficial or -profitable. This (I repeat) is the only approach to a solution which -we ever find in Plato. But this is seldom clearly enunciated, never -systematically followed out, and sometimes, in appearance, even -denied. - -* * * * * - -[Side-note: Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or -astronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are -beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth.] - -I resume the thread of the Hippias Major. Sokrates asks Hippias what -sort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at -Sparta? The Spartans (Hippias replies) knew nothing and cared nothing -about letters, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy: but they took delight -in hearing tales about heroes, early ancestors, foundation-legends of -cities, &c., which his mnemonic artifice enabled him to -deliver.[10] The Spartans delight in you (observes Sokrates) as -children delight in old women's tales. Yes (replies Hippias), but -that is not all: I discoursed to them also, recently, about fine and -honourable pursuits, much to their admiration: I supposed a -conversation between Nestor and Neoptolemus, after the capture of -Troy, in which the veteran, answering a question put by his youthful -companion, enlarged upon those pursuits which it was fine, -honourable, beautiful for a young man to engage in. My discourse is -excellent, and obtained from the Spartans great applause. I am going -to deliver it again here at Athens, in the school-room of -Pheidostratus, and I invite you, Sokrates, to come and hear it, with -as many friends as you can bring.[11] - -[Footnote 10: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285 E.] - -[Footnote 11: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 A-B.] - -[Side-note: Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in -the background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the -Beautiful?] - -I shall come willingly (replied Sokrates). But first answer me one -small question, which will rescue me from a present embarrassment. -Just now, I was shamefully puzzled in conversation with a friend, to -whom I had been praising some things as honourable and -beautiful,--blaming other things as mean and ugly. He surprised me by -the interrogation--How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful, -and what are ugly? Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful? -I, in my stupidity, was altogether puzzled, and could not answer the -question. But after I had parted from him, I became mortified and -angry with myself; and I vowed that the next time I met any wise man, -like you, I would put the question to him, and learn how to answer -it; so that I might be able to renew the conversation with my friend. -Your coming here is most opportune. I entreat you to answer and -explain to me clearly what the Beautiful is; in order that I may not -again incur the like mortification. You can easily answer: it is a -small matter for you, with your numerous attainments. - -[Side-note: Hippias thinks the question easy to answer.] - -Oh--yes--a small matter (replies Hippias); the question is easy to -answer. I could teach you to answer many questions harder than that: -so that no man shall be able to convict you in dialogue.[12] - -[Footnote 12: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 C-D.] - -Sokrates then proceeds to interrogate Hippias, in the name of the -absentee, starting one difficulty after another as if suggested by -this unknown prompter, and pretending to be himself under awe of so -impracticable a disputant. - -[Side-note: Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. -What is Beauty, or the Beautiful?] - -All persons are just, through Justice--wise, through Wisdom--good, -through Goodness or the Good--beautiful, through Beauty or the -Beautiful. Now Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty or the Beautiful, -must each be _something_. Tell me what the Beautiful is? - -[Side-note: Hippias does not understand the question. He -answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object.] - -Hippias does not conceive the question. Does the man want to know -what is a beautiful thing? _Sokr._--No; he wants to know what is -_The Beautiful_. _Hip._--I do not see the difference. I -answer that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing. No one can deny -that.[13] - -[Footnote 13: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 287 A.] - -_Sokr._--My disputatious friend will not accept your answer. He -wants you to tell him, What is the Self-Beautiful?--that Something -through which all beautiful things become beautiful. Am I to tell -him, it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing? He will -say--Is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing also? and a beautiful -lyre as well? _Hip._--Yes;--both of them are so. _Sokr._--Ay, -and a beautiful pot, my friend will add, well moulded and rounded -by a skilful potter, is a beautiful thing too. _Hip._--How, -Sokrates? Who can your disputatious friend be? Some ill-taught -man, surely; since he introduces such trivial names into a dignified -debate. _Sokr._--Yes; that is his character: not polite, but -vulgar, anxious for nothing else but the truth. _Hip._--A pot, -if it be beautifully made, must certainly be called beautiful; yet -still, all such objects are unworthy to be counted as beautiful, if -compared with a maiden, a mare, or a lyre. - -[Side-note: Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also -are beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or -under some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful, -sometimes not beautiful.] - -_Sokr._--I understand. You follow the analogy suggested by -Herakleitus in his dictum--That the most beautiful ape is ugly, if -compared with the human race. So you say, the most beautiful pot is -ugly, when compared with the race of maidens. _Hip_--Yes. That -is my meaning. _Sokr._--Then my friend will ask you in return, -whether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of -Gods, as the pot to the maiden? whether the most beautiful maiden -will not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess? whether the wisest -of men will not appear an ape, when compared to the Gods, either in -beauty or in wisdom.[14] _Hip._--No one can dispute it. -_Sokr._--My friend will smile and say--You forget what was the -question put. I asked you, What is the Beautiful?--the -Self-Beautiful: and your answer gives me, as the Self-Beautiful, -something which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than -ugly? If I had asked you, from the first, what it was that was both -beautiful and ugly, your answer would have been pertinent to the -question. Can you still think that the Self-Beautiful,--that -Something, by the presence of which all other things become -beautiful,--is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre? - -[Footnote 14: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 289.] - -[Side-note: Second answer of Hippias--_Gold_, is that by -the presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied -to the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies.] - -_Hip._--I have another answer to which your friend can take no -exception. That, by the presence of which all things become -beautiful, is Gold. What was before ugly, will (we all know), when -ornamented with gold, appear beautiful. _Sokr._--You little know -what sort of man my friend is. He will laugh at your answer, and ask -you--Do you think, then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as -a sculptor? How came he not to make the statue of Athene all -gold, instead of making (as he has done) the face, hands, and feet of -ivory, and the pupils of the eyes of a particular stone? Is not ivory -also beautiful, and particular kinds of stone? _Hip._--Yes, each -is beautiful, where it is becoming. _Sokr._--And ugly, where it -is not becoming.[15] _Hip._--Doubtless. I admit that what is -becoming or suitable, makes that to which it is applied appear -beautiful: that which is not becoming or suitable, makes it appear -ugly. _Sokr._--My friend will next ask you, when you are boiling -the beautiful pot of which we spoke just now, full of beautiful soup, -what sort of ladle will be suitable and becoming--one made of gold, -or of fig-tree wood? Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and -the wooden ladle turn it out good? Is not the wooden ladle, -therefore, better than the golden? _Hip._--By Herakles, -Sokrates! what a coarse and stupid fellow your friend is! I cannot -continue to converse with a man who talks of such matters. -_Sokr._--I am not surprised that you, with your fine attire and -lofty reputation, are offended with these low allusions. But I have -nothing to spoil by intercourse with this man; and I entreat you to -persevere, as a favour to me. He will ask you whether a wooden -soup-ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold,--since it is more -suitable and becoming? So that though you said--The Self-Beautiful is -Gold--you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more -beautiful than fig-tree wood? - -[Footnote 15: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 290.] - -[Side-note: Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof -given that it fails of universal application.] - -_Hip._--I acknowledge that it is so. But I have another answer -ready which will silence your friend. I presume you wish me to -indicate as The Beautiful, something which will never appear ugly to -any one, at any time, or at any place.[16] _Sokr._--That is -exactly what I desire. _Hip._--Well, I affirm, then, that to -every man, always, and everywhere, the following is most beautiful. A -man being healthy, rich, honoured by the Greeks, having come to old -age and buried his own parents well, to be himself buried by his own -sons well and magnificently. _Sokr._--Your answer sounds -imposing; but my friend will laugh it to scorn, and will remind me -again, that his question pointed to the Beautiful -_itself_[17]--something which, being present as attribute in any -subject, will make that subject (whether stone, wood, man, God, -action, study, &c.) beautiful. Now that which you have asserted -to be beautiful to every one everywhere, was not beautiful to -Achilles, who accepted by preference the lot of dying before his -father--nor is it so to the heroes, or to the sons of Gods, who do -not survive or bury their fathers. To some, therefore, what you -specify is beautiful--to others it is not beautiful but ugly: that -is, it is both beautiful and ugly, like the maiden, the lyre, the -pot, on which we have already remarked. _Hip._--I did not speak -about the Gods or Heroes. Your friend is intolerable, for touching on -such profanities.[18] _Sokr._--However, you cannot deny that -what you have indicated is beautiful only for the sons of men, and -not for the sons of Gods. My friend will thus make good his reproach -against your answer. He will tell me, that all the answers, which we -have as yet given, are too absurd. And he may perhaps at the same -time himself suggest another, as he sometimes does in pity for my -embarrassment. - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 C-D.] - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 292 D.] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 B.] - -[Side-note: Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1. -The Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected.] - -Sokrates then mentions, as coming from hints of the absent friend, -three or four different explanations of the Self-Beautiful: each of -which, when first introduced, he approves, and Hippias approves also: -but each of which he proceeds successively to test and condemn. It is -to be remarked that all of them are general explanations: not -consisting in conspicuous particular instances, like those which had -come from Hippias. His explanations are the following:-- - -1. The suitable or becoming (which had before been glanced at). It is -the suitable or becoming which constitutes the Beautiful.[19] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E.] - -To this Sokrates objects: The suitable, or becoming, is what causes -objects to _appear_ beautiful--not what causes them to _be -really_ beautiful. Now the latter is that which we are seeking. -The two conditions do not always go together. Those objects, -institutions, and pursuits which _are really_ beautiful (fine, -honourable) very often do not appear so, either to individuals or to -cities collectively; so that there is perpetual dispute and -fighting on the subject. The suitable or becoming, therefore, as it -is certainly what makes objects appear beautiful, so it cannot be -what makes them really beautiful.[20] - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 B-E.] - -[Side-note: 2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will -not hold.] - -2. The useful or profitable.--We call objects beautiful, looking to -the purpose which they are calculated or intended to serve: the human -body, with a view to running, wrestling, and other exercises--a -horse, an ox, a cock, looking to the service required from -them--implements, vehicles on land and ships at sea, instruments for -music and other arts all upon the same principle, looking to the end -which they accomplish or help to accomplish. Laws and pursuits are -characterised in the same way. In each of these, we give the name -Beautiful to the useful, in so far as it is useful, when it is -useful, and for the purpose to which it is useful. To that which is -useless or hurtful, in the same manner, we give the name Ugly.[21] - -[Footnote 21: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 C-D.] - -Now that which is capable of accomplishing each end, is useful for -such end: that which is incapable, is useless. It is therefore -capacity, or power, which is beautiful: incapacity, or impotence, is -ugly.[22] - -[Footnote 22: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\ dunato\n -e(/kaston a)perga/zesthai, ei)s o(/per dunato/n, ei)s tou=to kai\ -chre/simon; to\ de\ a)du/naton a)/chreston? . . . . Du/namis me\n -a)/ra kalo/n--a)dunami/a de\ ai)schro/n?]] - -Most certainly (replies Hippias): this is especially true in our -cities and communities, wherein political power is the finest thing -possible, political impotence, the meanest. - -Yet, on closer inspection (continues Sokrates), such a theory will -not hold. Power is employed by all men, though unwillingly, for bad -purposes: and each man, through such employment of his power, does -much more harm than good, beginning with his childhood. Now power, -which is useful for the doing of evil, can never be called -beautiful.[23] - -[Footnote 23: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 296 C-D.] - -You cannot therefore say that Power, taken absolutely, is beautiful. -You must add the qualification--Power used for the production of some -good, is beautiful. This, then, would be the profitable--the cause or -generator of good.[24] But the cause is different from its effect: -the generator or father is different from the generated or son. -The beautiful would, upon this view, be the cause of the good. But -then the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good -different from the beautiful? Who can admit this? It is obviously -wrong: it is the most ridiculous theory which we have yet hit -upon.[25] - -[Footnote 24: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 B.] - -[Footnote 25: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 D-E. [Greek: ei) oi(=o/n t' -e)sti/n, e(kei/non ei)=nai (kinduneu/ei) geloio/teros to=n -pro/ton.]] - -[Side-note: 3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that -which is received through the eye and the ear.] - -3. The Beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or -pleasurable: that which characterises those things which cause -pleasure to us through sight and hearing. Thus the men, the -ornaments, the works of painting or sculpture, upon which we look -with admiration,[26] are called beautiful: also songs, music, poetry, -fable, discourse, in like manner; nay even laws, customs, pursuits, -which we consider beautiful, might be brought under the same -head.[27] - -[Footnote 26: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 A-B.] - -[Footnote 27: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 D. - -Professor Bain observes:--"The eye and the ear are the great avenues -to the mind for the aesthetic class of influences; the other senses -are more or less in the monopolist interest. The blue sky, the green -woods, and all the beauties of the landscape, can fill the vision of -a countless throng of admirers. So with the pleasing sounds, &c." -'The Emotions and the Will.' ch. xiv. (The AEsthetic Emotions), sect. -2, p. 226, 3rd ed.] - -[Side-note: Objections to this last--What property is there -common to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of -these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful?] - -The objector, however, must now be dealt with. He will ask us--Upon -what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures -of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? Do you deny that these -others (those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really -pleasures? No, surely (we shall reply); we admit them to be -pleasures,--but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful: -especially the pleasures of sex, which as pleasures are the greatest -of all, but which are ugly and disgraceful to behold. He will -answer--I understand you: you are ashamed to call these pleasures -beautiful, because they do not seem so to the multitude: but I did not -ask you, what _seems_ beautiful to the multitude--I asked you, what -_is_ beautiful.[28] You mean to affirm, that all pleasures which -do not belong to sight and hearing, are not beautiful: Do you mean, -all which do not belong to both? or all which do not belong to -one or the other? We shall reply--To either one of the two--or to -both the two. Well! but, why (he will ask) do you single out these -pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? What is -there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction? -All pleasures are alike, so far forth as pleasures, differing only in -the more or less. Next, the pleasures of sight cannot be considered -as beautiful by reason of their coming through sight--for that reason -would not apply to the pleasures of hearing: nor again can the -pleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their -coming through hearing.[29] We must find something possessed as well -by sight as by hearing, common to both, and peculiar to them,--which -confers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each. Any attribute -of one, which does not also belong to the other, will not be -sufficient for our purpose.[30] Beauty must depend upon some -essential characteristic which both have in common.[31] We must -therefore look out for some such characteristic, which belongs to -both as well as to each separately. - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A. - -[Greek: Mantha/no, a)\n i)/sos phai/e, kai\ e)go/, o(/ti pa/lai -ai)schu/nesthe tau/tas ta\s e(dona\s pha/nai kala\s ei)=nai, o(/ti -ou) dokei= toi=s a)nthro/pois; a)ll' e)go\ ou) tou=to e)ro/ton, -_o(\ dokei= toi=s polloi=s kalo\n ei)=nai_, a)ll' o(\, _ti -e)/stin_.]] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E.] - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 300 B. A separate argument between -Sokrates and Hippias is here as it were interpolated; Hippias affirms -that he does not see how any predicate can be true of both which is -not true of either separately. Sokrates points out that two men are -Both, even in number, while each is One, an odd number. You cannot -say of the two that they are one, nor can you say of either that he -is Both. There are two classes of predicates; some which are true of -either but not true of the two together, or _vice versa_; some -again which are true of the two and true also of each one--such as -just, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-303 B.] - -[Footnote 31: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 302 C. [Greek: te=| ou)si/a| te=| e)p' -a)mpho/tera e(pome/ne| o)=|men, ei)/per a)mpho/tera/ e)sti kala/, -tau/te| dei=n au)ta\ kala\ ei)=nai, te=| de\ kata\ ta\ e(/tera -a)poleipome/ne| me/. kai\ e(/ti nu=n oi)=omai.]] - -[Side-note: Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in -common, the property of being innocuous and profitable -pleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful.] - -Now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve. The -pleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, are distinguished from -other pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best.[32] It is -for this reason that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, is -profitable pleasure--or pleasure producing good--for the profitable -is, that which produces good.[33] - -[Footnote 32: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: o(/ti a)sine/statai -au(=tai to=n e(dono=n ei)si kai\ be/ltistai, kai\ a)mpho/terai kai\ -e(kate/ra.]] - -[Footnote 33: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: le/gete de\ to\ kalo\n -ei)=nai, _e(done\n o)phe/limon_.]] - -[Side-note: This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of -Good, and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful -is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this -has been already declared inadmissible.] - -Nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this. He -will tell us--You declare the Beautiful to be Pleasure producing -good. But we before agreed, that the producing agent or cause is -different from what is produced or the effect. Accordingly, the -Beautiful is different from the good: or, in other words, the -Beautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful--if each of them is -a different thing.[34] Now these propositions we have already -pronounced to be inadmissible, so that your present explanation will -not stand better than the preceding. - -[Footnote 34: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E--304 A. [Greek: Ou)/koun -o)phe/limon, phe/sei, to\ poiou=n ta)gatho/n, to\ de\ poiou=n kai\ -to\ poiou/menon, e(/teron nu=n de\ e)pha/ne, kai\ ei)s to\n pro/teron -lo/gon e(/kei u(mi=n o( lo/gos? _ou)/te ga\r to\ a)gatho\n a)\n -ei)/e kalo\n ou)/te to\ kalo\n a)gatho/n, ei)/per a)/llo au)to=n -e(ka/tero/n e)stin_.] - -These last words deserve attention, because they coincide with the -doctrine ascribed to Antisthenes, which has caused so many hard words -to be applied to him (as well as to Stilpon) by critics, from Kolotes -downwards. The general principle here laid down by Plato is--A is -something different from B, therefore A is not B and B is not A. In -other words, A cannot be predicated of B nor B of A. Antisthenes said -in like manner--[Greek: A)/nthropos] and [Greek: A)gatho\s] are -different from each other, therefore you cannot say [Greek: -A)/nthropos e)stin a)gatho/s]. You can only say [Greek: A)/nthropos -e)stin A)/nthropos]--A)gatho/s e)stin a)gatho/s]. - -I have touched farther upon this point in my chapter upon Antisthenes -and the other Viri Sokratici.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations -ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed -to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept.] - -Thus finish the three distinct explanations of [Greek: To\ kalo\n], -which Plato in this dialogue causes to be first suggested by -Sokrates, successively accepted by Hippias, and successively refuted -by Sokrates. In comparing them with the three explanations which he -puts into the mouth of Hippias, we note this distinction: That the -explanations proposed by Hippias are conspicuous particular -exemplifications of the Beautiful, substituted in place of the -general concept: as we remarked, in the Dialogue Euthyphron, that the -explanations of the Holy given by Euthyphron in reply to Sokrates, -were of the same exemplifying character. On the contrary, those -suggested by Sokrates keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to -discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a -derivative or a modification, so as to render a definition of it -practicable. To illustrate this difference by the language of Dr. -Whewell respecting many of the classifications in Natural History, we -may say--That according to the views here represented by Hippias, -the group of objects called beautiful is given by Type, not by -Definition:[35] while Sokrates proceeds like one convinced that some -common characteristic attribute may be found, on which to rest a -Definition. To search for Definitions of general words, was (as -Aristotle remarks) a novelty, and a valuable novelty, introduced by -Sokrates. His contemporaries, the Sophists among them, were not -accustomed to it: and here the Sophist Hippias (according to Plato's -frequent manner) is derided as talking nonsense,[36] because, when -asked for an explanation of The Self-Beautiful, he answers by citing -special instances of beautiful objects. But we must remember, first, -that Sokrates, who is introduced as trying several general -explanations of the Self-Beautiful, does not find one which will -stand: next, that even if one such could be found, particular -instances can never be dispensed with, in the way of illustration; -lastly, that there are many general terms (the Beautiful being one of -them) of which no definitions can be provided, and which can only be -imperfectly explained, by enumerating a variety of objects to which -the term in question is applied.[37] Plato thought himself -entitled to objectivise every general term, or to assume a -substantive Ens, called a Form or Idea, corresponding to it. This was -a logical mistake quite as serious as any which we know to have been -committed by Hippias or any other Sophist. The assumption that -wherever there is a general term, there must also be a generic -attribute corresponding to it--is one which Aristotle takes much -pains to negative: he recognises terms of transitional analogy, as -well as terms equivocal: while he also especially numbers the -Beautiful among equivocal terms.[38] - -[Footnote 35: See Dr. Whewell's 'History of the Inductive Sciences,' -ii. 120 seq.; and Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' iv. 8, 3. - -I shall illustrate this subject farther when I come to the dialogue -called Lysis.] - -[Footnote 36: Stallbaum, in his notes, bursts into exclamations of -wonder at the incredible stupidity of Hippias--"En hominis stuporem -prorsus admirabilem," p. 289 E.] - -[Footnote 37: Mr. John Stuart Mill observes in his System of Logic, -i. 1, 5: "One of the chief sources of lax habits of thought is the -custom of using connotative terms without a distinctly ascertained -connotation, and with no more precise notion of their meaning than -can be loosely collected from observing what objects they are used to -denote. It is in this manner that we all acquire, and inevitably so, -our first knowledge of our vernacular language. A child learns the -meaning of Man, White, &c., by hearing them applied to a number -of individual objects, and finding out, by a process of -generalisation of which he is but imperfectly conscious, what those -different objects have in common. In many cases objects bear a -general resemblance to each other, which leads to their being -familiarly classed together under a common name, while it is not -immediately apparent what are the particular attributes upon the -possession of which in common by them all their general resemblance -depends. In this manner names creep on from subject to subject until -all traces of a common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word -comes to denote a number of things not only independently of any -common attribute, but which have actually no attribute in common, or -none but what is shared by other things to which the name is -capriciously refused. It would be well if this degeneracy of language -took place only in the hands of the untaught vulgar; but some of the -most remarkable instances are to be found in terms of art, and among -technically educated persons, such as English lawyers. _Felony_, -_e.g._, is a law-term with the sound of which all are familiar: -_but there is no lawyer who would undertake to tell what a felony -is, otherwise than by enumerating the various offences so called._ -Originally the word _felony_ had a meaning; it denoted all -offences, the penalty of which included forfeiture of lands or goods, -but subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared various offences to -be felonies without enjoining that penalty, and have taken away that -penalty from others which continue nevertheless to be called -felonies, insomuch that the acts so called have now no property -whatever in common save that of being unlawful and punishable."] - -[Footnote 38: Aristot. Topic, i. 106, a. 21. [Greek: Ta\ pollacho=s -lego/mena--ta\ pleonacho=s lego/mena]--are perpetually noted and -distinguished by Aristotle.] - -[Side-note: Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to -Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the -Memorabilia.] - -We read in the Xenophontic Memorabilia a dialogue between Sokrates -and Aristippus, on this same subject--What is the Beautiful, which -affords a sort of contrast between the Dialogues of Search and those -of Exposition. In the Hippias Major, we have the problem approached -on several different sides, various suggestions being proposed, and -each successively disallowed, on reasons shown, as failures: while in -the Xenophontic dialogue, Sokrates declares an affirmative doctrine, -and stands to it--but no pains are taken to bring out the objections -against it and rebut them. The doctrine is, that the Beautiful is -coincident with the Good, and that both of them are resolvable into -the Useful: thus all beautiful objects, unlike as they may be to the -eye or touch, bear that name because they have in common the -attribute of conducing to one and the same purpose--the security, -advantage, or gratification, of man, in some form or other. This is -one of the three explanations broached by the Platonic Sokrates, and -afterwards refuted by him, in the Hippias: while his declaration -(which Hippias puts aside as unseemly)--that a pot and a wooden -soup-ladle conveniently made are beautiful is perfectly in harmony -with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates, that a basket for carrying dung -is beautiful, if it performs its work well.[39] We must moreover -remark, that the objections whereby the Platonic Sokrates, after -proposing the doctrine and saying much in its favour, finds himself -compelled at last to disallow it--these objections are not produced -and refuted, but passed over without notice, in the Xenophontic -dialogue, wherein Sokrates affirms it decidedly.[40] The -affirming Sokrates, and the objecting Sokrates, are not on the -stage at once. - -[Footnote 39: Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 2, 7; iv. 6, 8. - -Plato, Hipp. Maj. 288 D, 290 D. - -I am obliged to translate the words [Greek: to\ Kalo/n] by the -Beautiful or beauty, to avoid a tiresome periphrasis. But in reality -the Greek words include more besides: they mean also the _fine_, -the _honourable or that which is worthy of honour_, the -_exalted_, &c. If we have difficulty in finding any common -property connoted by the English word, the difficulty in the case of -the Greek word is still greater.] - -[Footnote 40: In regard to the question, Wherein consists [Greek: To\ -Kalo/n]? and objections against the theory of the Xenophontic -Sokrates, it is worth while to compare the views of modern -philosophers. Dugald Stewart says (on the Beautiful, 'Philosophical -Essays,' p. 214 seq.), "It has long been a favourite problem with -philosophers to ascertain the common quality or qualities which -entitle a thing to the denomination of Beautiful. But the success of -their speculations has been so inconsiderable, that little can be -inferred from them except the impossibility of the problem to which -they have been directed. The speculations which have given occasion -to these remarks have evidently originated in a prejudice which has -descended to modern times from the scholastic ages. That when a word -admits of a variety of significations, these different significations -must all be species of the same genus, and must consequently include -some essential idea common to every individual to which the generic -term can be applied. Of this principle, which has been an abundant -source of obscurity and mystery in the different sciences, it would -be easy to expose the unsoundness and futility. Socrates, whose plain -good sense appears, on this as on other occasions, to have fortified -his understanding to a wonderful degree against the metaphysical -subtleties which misled his successors, was evidently apprised fully -of the justice of the foregoing remarks, if any reliance can be -placed on the account given by Xenophon of his conversation with -Aristippus about the Good and the Beautiful," &c. - -Stewart then proceeds to translate a portion of the Xenophontic -dialogue (Memorab. iii. 8). But unfortunately he does not translate -the whole of it. If he had he would have seen that he has -misconceived the opinion of Sokrates, who maintains the very doctrine -here disallowed by Stewart, viz., That there is an essential idea -common to all beautiful objects, the fact of being conducive to human -security, comfort, or enjoyment. This is unquestionably an important -common property, though the multifarious objects which possess it may -be unlike in all other respects. - -As to the general theory I think that Stewart is right: it is his -compliment to Sokrates, on this occasion, which I consider misplaced. -He certainly would not have agreed with Sokrates (nor should I agree -with him) in calling by the epithet _beautiful_ a basket for -carrying dung when well made for its own purpose, or a convenient -boiling-pot, or a soup-ladle made of fig-tree wood, as the Platonic -Sokrates affirms in the Hippias (288 D, 290 D). The Beautiful and the -Useful sometimes coincide; more often or at least very often, they do -not. Hippias is made to protest, in this dialogue, against the mention -of such vulgar objects as the pot and the ladle; and this is -apparently intended by Plato as a defective point in his character, -denoting silly affectation and conceit, like his fine apparel. But -Dugald Stewart would have agreed in the sentiment ascribed to -Hippias--that vulgar and mean objects have no place in an inquiry -into the Beautiful; and that they belong, when well-formed for their -respective purposes, to the category of the Useful. - -The Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia is mistaken in -confounding the Beautiful with the Good and the Useful. But his -remarks are valuable in another point of view, as they insist most -forcibly on the essential relativity both of the Beautiful and the -Good. - -The doctrine of Dugald Stewart is supported by Mr. John Stuart Mill -('System of Logic,' iv. 4, 5, p. 220 seq.);** and Professor Bain -has expounded the whole subject still more fully in a chapter (xiv. -p. 225 seq., on the AEsthetic Emotions) of his work on the Emotions -and the Will.] - -The concluding observations of this dialogue, interchanged between -Hippias and Sokrates, are interesting as bringing out the antithesis -between rhetoric and dialectic--between the concrete and -exemplifying, as contrasted with the abstract and analytical. -Immediately after Sokrates has brought his own third suggestion to an -inextricable embarrassment, Hippias remarks-- - -[Side-note: Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and -Sokrates.] - -"Well, Sokrates, what do you think now of all these reasonings of -yours? They are what I declared them to be just now,--scrapings and -parings of discourse, divided into minute fragments. But the really -beautiful and precious acquirement is, to be able to set out well and -finely a regular discourse before the Dikastery or the public -assembly, to persuade your auditors, and to depart carrying with you -not the least but the greatest of all prizes--safety for yourself, -your property, and your friends. These are the real objects to strive -for. Leave off your petty cavils, that you may not look like an -extreme simpleton, handling silly trifles as you do at present."[41] - -"My dear Hippias," (replies Sokrates) "you are a happy man, since you -know what pursuits a man ought to follow, and have yourself followed -them, as you say, with good success. But I, as it seems, am under the -grasp of an unaccountable fortune: for I am always fluctuating and -puzzling myself, and when I lay my puzzle before you wise men, I am -requited by you with hard words. I am told just what you have now -been telling me, that I busy myself about matters silly, petty, and -worthless. When on the contrary, overborne by your authority, I -declare as you do, that it is the finest thing possible to be able to -set out well and beautifully a regular discourse before the public -assembly, and bring it to successful conclusion--then there are other -men at hand who heap upon me bitter reproaches: especially that one -man, my nearest kinsman and inmate, who never omits to convict me. -When on my return home he hears me repeat what you have told me, he -asks, if I am not ashamed of my impudence in talking about beautiful -(honourable) pursuits, when I am so manifestly convicted upon -this subject, of not even knowing what the Beautiful (Honourable) is. -How can you (he says), being ignorant what the Beautiful is, know -_who_ has set out a discourse beautifully and _who_ has -not--_who_ has performed a beautiful exploit and _who_ has -not? Since you are in a condition so disgraceful, can you think life -better for you than death? Such then is my fate--to hear -disparagement and reproaches from you on the one side, and from him -on the other. Necessity however perhaps requires that I should endure -all these discomforts: for it will be nothing strange if I profit by -them. Indeed I think that I have already profited both by your -society, Hippias, and by his: for I now think that I know what the -proverb means--Beautiful (Honourable) things are difficult."[42] - -[Footnote 41: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 A.] - -[Footnote 42: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 D-E.] - -[Side-note: Rhetoric against Dialectic.] - -Here is a suitable termination for one of the Dialogues of Search: -"My mind has been embarrassed by contradictions as yet unreconciled, -but this is a stage indispensable to future improvement". We have -moreover an interesting passage of arms between Rhetoric and -Dialectic: two contemporaneous and contending agencies, among the -stirring minds of Athens, in the time of Plato and Isokrates. The -Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of -reality--of breaking up the integrity of those concretes, which occur -in nature each as continuous and indivisible wholes. Each of the -analogous particular cases forms a continuum or concrete by itself, -which may be compared with the others, but cannot be taken to pieces, -and studied in separate fragments.[43] The Dialectician on his side -treats the Abstract ([Greek: to\ kalo\n]) as the real Integer, and -the highest abstraction as the first of all integers, containing in -itself and capable of evolving all the subordinate integers: the -various accompaniments, which go along with each Abstract to make up -a concrete, he disregards as shadowy and transient disguises. - -[Footnote 43: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 301 B. [Greek: A)lla\ ga\r de\ su/, -o)= So/krates, ta\ me\n o(/la to=n pragma/ton ou) skopei=s, ou)d' -e)kei=noi, oi(=s su\ ei)/othas diale/gesthai, krou/ete de\ -a)polamba/nontes to\ kalo\n kai\ e(/kaston to=n o)/nton e)n toi=s -lo/gois katate/mnontes; dia\ tau=ta ou(/to mega/la u(ma=s lantha/nei -kai\ _dianeke= so/mata te=s ou)si/as pephuko/ta_.] Compare 301 -E. - -The words [Greek: dianeke= so/mata te=s ou)si/as pephuko/ta] -correspond as nearly as can be to the logical term _Concrete_, -opposed to _Abstract_. Nature furnishes only Concreta, not -Abstracta.] - -[Side-note: Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the -speculative and analytical philosophers.] - -Hippias accuses Sokrates of never taking into his view Wholes, -and of confining his attention to separate parts and fragments, -obtained by logical analysis and subdivision. Aristophanes, when he -attacks the Dialectic of Sokrates, takes the same ground, employing -numerous comic metaphors to illustrate the small and impalpable -fragments handled, and the subtle transpositions which they underwent -in the reasoning. Isokrates again deprecates the over-subtlety of -dialectic debate, contrasting it with discussions (in his opinion) -more useful; wherein entire situations, each with its full clothing -and assemblage of circumstances, were reviewed and estimated.[44] -All these are protests, by persons accustomed to deal with real life, -and to talk to auditors both numerous and commonplace, against that -conscious analysis and close attention to general and abstract terms, -which Sokrates first insisted on and transmitted to his disciples. On -the other side, we have the emphatic declaration made by the Platonic -Sokrates (and made still earlier by the Xenophontic[45] or historical -Sokrates)--That a man was not fit to talk about beautiful things in -the concrete--that he had no right to affirm or deny that attribute, -with respect to any given subject--that he was not** even fit to live -unless he could explain what was meant by The Beautiful, or Beauty -in the abstract. Here are two distinct and conflicting intellectual -habits, the antithesis between which, indicated in this dialogue, -is described at large and forcibly in the Theaetetus.[46] - -[Footnote 44: Aristophan. Nubes, 130. [Greek: lo/gon a)kribo=n -schindala/mous--paipa/le.] Nub. 261, Aves, 430. [Greek: leptota/ton -le/ron i(ereu=], Nub. 359. [Greek: gno/mais leptais], Nub. 1404. -[Greek: skariphismoi=si le/ron], Ran. 1497. [Greek: smileu/mata]--id. -819. Isokrates, [Greek: Pro\s Nikokle/a], s. 69, antithesis of the -[Greek: lo/goi politikoi\] and [Greek: lo/goi e)ristikoi/--ma/lista -me\n kai\ a)po\ ton kairo=n theorei=n sumbouleu/ontas, ei) de\ me\, -_kath' o(/lon to=n pragma/ton_ le/gontas]--which is almost -exactly the phrase ascribed to Hippias by Plato in this Hippias -Major. Also Isokrates, Contra Sophistas, s. 24-25, where he contrasts -the useless [Greek: logi/dia], debated by the contentious -dialecticians (Sokrates and Plato being probably included in this -designation), with his own [Greek: lo/goi politikoi/]. Compare also -Isokrates, Or. xv. De Permutatione, s. 211-213-285-287.] - -[Footnote 45: Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16.] - -[Footnote 46: Plato, Theaetet. pp. 173-174-175.] - -[Side-note: Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical -Aggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the -Dialectician.] - -When Hippias accuses Sokrates of neglecting to notice Wholes or -Aggregates, this is true in the sense of Concrete Wholes--the -phenomenal sequences and co-existences, perceived by sense or -imagined. But the Universal (as Aristotle says)[47] is one kind of -Whole: a Logical Whole, having logical parts. In the minds of -Sokrates and Plato, the Logical Whole separable into its logical -parts and into them only, were preponderant. - -[Footnote 47: Aristot. Physic. i. 1. [Greek: to\ ga\r o(/lon kata\ -te\n ai)/sthesin gnorimo/teron, _to\ de\ katho/lou o(/lon ti e)sti; -polla\ ga\r perilamba/nei o(s me/re to\ katho/lou_.] Compare -Simplikius, Schol. Brandis ad loc. p. 324, a. 10-26.] - -[Side-note: Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought -into debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty.] - -One other point deserves peculiar notice, in the dialogue under our -review. The problem started is, What is the Beautiful--the -Self-Beautiful, or Beauty _per se_: and it is assumed that this must -be Something,[48] that from the accession of which, each particular -beautiful thing becomes beautiful. But Sokrates presently comes to -make a distinction between that which is really beautiful and that -which appears to be beautiful. Some things (he says) appear -beautiful, but are not so in reality: some are beautiful, but do not -appear so. The problem, as he states it, is, to find, not what that -is which makes objects appear beautiful, but what it is that makes -them really beautiful. This distinction, as we find it in the -language of Hippias, is one of degree only:[49] that _is_ -beautiful which appears so to every one and at all times. But in the -language of Sokrates, the distinction is radical: to _be_ -beautiful is one thing, to _appear_ beautiful is another; -whatever makes a thing appear beautiful without being so in reality, -is a mere engine of deceit, and not what Sokrates is enquiring -for.[50] The Self-Beautiful or real Beauty is so, whether any one -perceives it to be beautiful or not: it is an Absolute, which exists -_per se_, having no relation to any sentient or percipient -subject.[51] At any rate, such is the manner in which Plato -conceives it, when he starts here as a problem to enquire, What -it is. - -[Footnote 48: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 286 K. [Greek: au)to\ to\ kalo\n o(/, -ti e)/stin.] Also 287 D, 289 D.] - -[Footnote 49: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 D, 292 E.] - -[Footnote 50: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 A-B, 299 A.] - -[Footnote 51: Dr. Hutcheson, in his inquiry into the Original of our -Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, observes (sect. i. and ii. p. 14-16):-- - -"Beauty is either original or comparative, or, if any like the terms -better, absolute or relative; only let it be observed, that by -_absolute_ or _original_, is not understood any quality -supposed to be in the object, which should of itself be beautiful, -without relation to any mind which perceives it. For Beauty, like -other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes the perception of -some mind. . . . . Our inquiry is only about the qualities which are -beautiful to men, or about the foundation of their sense of beauty, -for (as above hinted) Beauty has always relation to the sense of some -mind; and when we afterwards show how generally the objects that -occur to us are beautiful, we mean that such objects are agreeable to -the sense of men, &c." - -The same is repeated, sect. iv. p. 40; sect. vi. p. 72.] - -Herein we note one of the material points of disagreement between -Plato and his master: for Sokrates (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) -affirms distinctly that Beauty is altogether relative to human wants -and appreciations. The Real and Absolute, on the one hand, wherein -alone resides truth and beauty--as against the phenomenal and -relative, on the other hand, the world of illusion and meanness--this -is an antithesis which we shall find often reproduced in Plato. I -shall take it up more at large, when I come to discuss his argument -against Protagoras in the Theaetetus. - -* * * * * - -[Side-note: Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed.] - -I now come to the Lesser Hippias: in which (as we have already seen -in the Greater) that Sophist is described by epithets, affirming -varied and extensive accomplishments, as master of arithmetic, -geometry, astronomy, poetry (especially that of Homer), legendary -lore, music, metrical and rhythmical diversities, &c. His memory -was prodigious, and he had even invented for himself a technical -scheme for assisting memory. He had composed poems, epic, lyric, and -tragic, as well as many works in prose: he was, besides, a splendid -lecturer on ethical and political subjects, and professed to answer -any question which might be asked. Furthermore, he was skilful in -many kinds of manual dexterity: having woven his own garments, -plaited his own girdle, made his own shoes, engraved his own -seal-ring, and fabricated for himself a curry-comb and oil-flask.[52] -Lastly, he is described as wearing fine and showy apparel. What he is -made to say is rather in harmony with this last point of character, -than with the preceding. He talks with silliness and presumption, so -as to invite and excuse the derisory sting of Sokrates, There is a -third interlocutor, Eudikus: but he says very little, and other -auditors are alluded to generally, who say nothing.[53] - -[Footnote 52: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 368.] - -[Footnote 53: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 369 D, 373 B. - -Ast rejects both the dialogues called by the name of Hippias, as not -composed by Plato. Schleiermacher doubts about both, and rejects the -Hippias Minor (which he considers as perhaps worked up by a Platonic -scholar from a genuine sketch by Plato himself) but will not pass the -same sentence upon the Hippias Major (Schleierm. Einleit. vol. ii. -pp. 293-296; vol. v. 399-403. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. -457-464). - -Stallbaum defends both the dialogues as genuine works of Plato, and -in my judgment with good reason (Prolegg. ad Hipp. Maj. vol. iv. pp. -145-150; ad Hipp. Minor, pp. 227-235). Steinhart (Einleit. p. 99) and -Socher (Ueber Platon, p. 144 seq., 215 seq.) maintain the same -opinion on these dialogues as Stallbaum. It is to be remarked that -Schleiermacher states the reasons both for and against the -genuineness of the dialogues; and I think that even in his own -statement the reasons _for_ preponderate. The reasons which both -Schleiermacher and Ast produce as proving the spuriousness, are in my -view quite insufficient to sustain their conclusion. There is bad -taste, sophistry, an overdose of banter and derision (they say very -truly), in the part assigned to Sokrates: there are also differences -of view, as compared with Sokrates in other dialogues; various other -affirmations (they tell us) are _not_ Platonic. I admit much of -this, but I still do not accept their conclusion. These critics -cannot bear to admit any Platonic work as genuine unless it affords -to them ground for superlative admiration and glorification of the -author. This postulate I altogether contest; and I think that -differences of view, as between Sokrates in one dialogue and Sokrates -in another, are both naturally to be expected and actually manifested -(witness the Protagoras and Gorgias). Moreover Ast designates (p. -404) a doctrine as "durchaus unsokratisch" which Stallbaum justly -remarks (p. 233) to have been actually affirmed by Sokrates in the -Xenophontic Memorabilia. Stallbaum thinks that both the two dialogues -(Socher, that the Hippias Minor only) were composed by Plato among -his earlier works, and this may probably be true. The citation and -refutation of the Hippias Minor by Aristotle (Metaphys. [Greek: D]. -1025, a. 6) counts with me as a strong corroborative proof that the -dialogue is Plato's work. Schleiermacher and Ast set this evidence -aside because Aristotle does not name Plato as the author. But if the -dialogue had been composed by any one less celebrated than Plato, -Aristotle would have named the author. Mention by Aristotle, though -without Plato's name, is of greater value to support the genuineness -than the purely internal grounds stated by Ast and Schleiermacher -against it.] - -[Side-note: Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which -he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and -straightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty.] - -In the Hippias Minor, that Sophist appears as having just concluded a -lecture upon Homer, in which he had extolled Achilles as better than -Odysseus: Achilles being depicted as veracious and straightforward, -Odysseus as mendacious and full of tricks. Sokrates, who had been -among the auditors, cross-examines Hippias upon the subject of this -affirmation. - -Homer (says Hippias) considers veracious men, and mendacious men, to -be not merely different, but opposite: and I agree with him. Permit -me (Sokrates remarks) to ask some questions about the meaning of this -from you, since I cannot ask any from Homer himself. You will answer -both for yourself and him.[54] - -[Footnote 54: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 365 C-D. - -The remark here made by Sokrates--"The poet is not here to answer for -himself, so that you cannot put any questions to him" is a point of -view familiar to Plato: insisted upon forcibly in the Protagoras (347 -E), and farther generalised in the Phaedrus, so as to apply to all -written matter compared with personal converse (Phaedrus, p. 275 D). - -This ought to count, so far as it goes, as a fragment of proof that -the Hippias Minor is a genuine work of Plato, instead of which -Schleiermacher treats it (p. 295) as evincing a poor copy, made by -some imitator of Plato, from the Protagoras.] - -Mendacious men (answers Hippias, to a string of questions, -somewhat prolix) are capable, intelligent, wise: they are not -incapable or ignorant. If a man be incapable of speaking falsely, or -ignorant, he is not mendacious. Now the capable man is one who can -make sure of doing what he wishes to do, at the time and occasion -when he does wish it, without let or hindrance.[55] - -[Footnote 55: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 366 B-C.] - -[Side-note: This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man -and the mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can -answer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he -chooses, _i.e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make -sure of doing either the one or the other.] - -You, Hippias (says Sokrates), are expert on matters of arithmetic: -you can make sure of answering truly any question put to you on the -subject. You are _better_ on the subject than the ignorant man, -who cannot make sure of doing the same. But as you can make sure of -answering truly, so likewise you can make sure of answering falsely, -whenever you choose to do so. Now the ignorant man cannot make sure -of answering falsely. He may, by reason of his ignorance, when he -wishes to answer falsely, answer truly without intending it. You, -therefore, the intelligent man and the good in arithmetic, are better -than the ignorant and the bad for both purposes--for speaking -falsely, and for speaking truly.[56] - -[Footnote 56: Plato, Hippias Minor, 366 E. [Greek: Po/teron su\ a)\n -ma/lista pseu/doio kai\ a)ei\ kata\ tau)ta\ pseude= le/gois peri\ -tou/ton, boulo/menos pseu/desthai kai\ mede/pote a)lethe= -a)pokri/nesthai? e)/ o( a)mathe\s ei)s logismou\s du/nait' a)\n sou= -ma=llon pseu/desthai boulome/nou? e)\ o( me\n a)mathe\s polla/kis -a)\n boulo/menos pseude= le/gein ta)lethe= a)\n ei)/poi a)/kon, ei) -tu/choi, dia\ to\ me\ ei)de/nai--su\ de\ o( sopho/s, ei)/per bou/loio -pseu/desthai, a)ei\ a)\n kata\ ta\ au)ta\ pseu/doio?]] - -[Side-note: Analogy of special arts--it is only the -arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when -he chooses.] - -What is true about arithmetic, is true in other departments also. The -only man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses is the man who can -speak truly whenever he chooses. Now, the mendacious man, as we -agreed, is the man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses. -Accordingly, the mendacious man, and the veracious man, are the same. -They are not different, still less opposite: nay, the two epithets -belong only to one and the same person. The veracious man is not -better than the mendacious--seeing that he is one and the same.[57] - -[Footnote 57: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 367 C, 368 E, 369 A-B.] - -You see, therefore, Hippias, that the distinction, which you drew -and which you said that Homer drew, between Achilles and Odysseus, -will not hold. You called Achilles veracious, and Odysseus, -mendacious: but if one of the two epithets belongs to either of them, -the other must belong to him also.[58] - -[Footnote 58: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 360 B.] - -[Side-note: View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. -He thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains -that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent -purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose.] - -Sokrates then tries to make out that Achilles speaks falsehood in the -Iliad, and speaks it very cleverly, because he does so in a way to -escape detection from Odysseus himself. To this Hippias replies, that -if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, he does it innocently, without any -purpose of cheating or injuring any one; whereas the falsehoods of -Odysseus are delivered with fraudulent and wicked intent.[59] It is -impossible (he contends) that men who deceive and do wrong wilfully -and intentionally, should be better than those who do so unwillingly -and without design. The laws deal much more severely with the former -than with the latter.[60] - -[Footnote 59: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 370 E.] - -[Footnote 60: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 372 A.] - -[Side-note: Issue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who -hurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the -like unwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his -questions.] - -Upon this point, Hippias (says Sokrates), I dissent from you -entirely. I am, unhappily, a stupid person, who cannot find out the -reality of things: and this appears plainly enough when I come to -talk with wise men like you, for I always find myself differing from -you. My only salvation consists in my earnest anxiety to put -questions and learn from you, and in my gratitude for your answers -and teaching. I think that those who hurt mankind, or cheat, or lie, -or do wrong, _wilfully_--are better than those who do the same -_unwillingly_. Sometimes, indeed, from my stupidity, the -opposite view presents itself to me, and I become confused: but now, -after talking with you, the fit of confidence has come round upon me -again, to pronounce and characterise the persons who do wrong -_unwillingly_, as worse than those who do wrong _wilfully_. -I entreat you to heal this disorder of my mind. You will do me -much more good than if you cured my body of a distemper. But it will -be useless for you to give me one of your long discourses: for I warn -you that I cannot follow it. The only way to confer upon me real -service, will be to answer my questions again, as you have hitherto -done. Assist me, Eudikus, in persuading Hippias to do so. - -Assistance from me (says Eudikus) will hardly be needed, for Hippias -professed himself ready to answer any man's questions. - -Yes--I did so (replies Hippias)--but Sokrates always brings trouble -into the debate, and proceeds like one disposed to do mischief. - -Eudikus repeats his request, and Hippias, in deference to him, -consents to resume the task of answering.[61] - -[Footnote 61: Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 B.] - -[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the -special arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings -badly, whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can -sing well when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses.] - -Sokrates then produces a string of questions, with a view to show -that those who do wrong wilfully, are better than those who do wrong -unwillingly. He appeals to various analogies. In running, the good -runner is he who runs quickly, the bad runner is he who runs slowly. -What is evil and base in running is, to run slowly. It is the good -runner who does this evil wilfully: it is the bad runner who does it -unwillingly.[62] The like is true about wrestling and other bodily -exercises. He that is good in the body, can work either strongly or -feebly,--can do either what is honourable or what is base; so that -when he does what is base, he does it wilfully. But he that is bad -in the body does what is base unwillingly, not being able to help -it.[63] - -[Footnote 62: Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 D-E.] - -[Footnote 63: Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 B.] - -What is true about the bodily movements depending upon strength, is -not less true about those depending on grace and elegance. To be -wilfully ungraceful, belongs only to the well-constituted body: none -but the badly-constituted body is ungraceful without wishing it. The -same, also, about the feet, voice, eyes, ears, nose: of these organs, -those which act badly through will and intention, are preferable to -those which act badly without will or intention. Lameness of feet is -a misfortune and disgrace: feet which go lame only by intention -are much to be preferred.[64] - -[Footnote 64: Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 C-D.] - -Again, in the instruments which we use, a rudder or a bow,--or the -animals about us, horses or dogs,--those are better with which we -work badly when we choose; those are worse, with which we work badly -without design, and contrary to our own wishes. - -[Side-note: It is better to have the mind of a bowman who -misses his mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when -he intends to hit.] - -It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark by -design, than that of one who misses when he tries to hit. The like -about all other arts--the physician, the harper, the flute-player. In -each of these artists, _that_ mind is better, which goes wrong -only wilfully--_that_ mind is worse, which goes wrong -unwillingly, while wishing to go right. In regard to the minds of our -slaves, we should all prefer those which go wrong only when they -choose, to those which go wrong without their own choice.[65] - -[Footnote 65: Plat. Hipp. Min. 376 B-D.] - -Having carried his examination through this string of analogous -particulars, and having obtained from Hippias successive -answers--"Yes--true in that particular case," Sokrates proceeds to -sum up the result:-- - -_Sokr._--Well! should we not wish to have our own minds as good -as possible? _Hip._--Yes. _Sokr._--We have seen that they -will be better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully, than if -they do so unwillingly? _Hip._--But it will be dreadful, -Sokrates, if the willing wrong-doers are to pass for better men than -the unwilling. - -[Side-note: Dissent and repugnance of Hippias.] - -_Sokr._--Nevertheless--it seems so: from what we have said. -_Hip._--It does not seem so to me. _Sokr._--I thought that -it would have seemed so to you, as it does to me. However, answer me -once more--Is not justice either a certain mental capacity? or else -knowledge? or both together?[66] _Hip._--Yes! it is. -_Sokr._--If justice be a capacity of the mind, the more capable -mind will also be the juster: and we have already seen that the more -capable soul is the better. _Hip._--We have. _Sokr._--If it -be knowledge, the more knowing or wiser mind will of course be -the juster: if it be a combination of both capacity and knowledge, -that mind which is more capable as well as more knowing,--will be the -juster that which is less capable and less knowing, will be the more -unjust. _Hip._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Now we have shown -that the more capable and knowing mind is at once the better mind, -and more competent to exert itself both ways--to do what is -honourable as well as what is base--in every employment. -_Hip._--Yes. _Sokr._--When, therefore, such a mind does what is base, -it does so wilfully, through its capacity or intelligence, which we -have seen to be of the nature of justice? _Hip._--It seems so. -_Sokr._--Doing base things, is acting unjustly: doing honourable -things, is acting justly. Accordingly, when this more capable and -better mind acts unjustly, it will do so wilfully; while the less -capable and worse mind will do so without willing it? -_Hip._--Apparently. - -[Footnote 66: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 D. [Greek: e( dikaiosu/ne ou)chi -e)\ du/nami/s ti/s e)stin, e)\ e)piste/me, e)\ a)mpho/tera?]] - -[Side-note: Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil -wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist -the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses -his perplexity.] - -_Sokr._--Now the good man is he that has the good mind: the bad -man is he that has the bad mind. It belongs therefore to the good man -to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man, to do wrong without wishing -it--that is, if the good man be he that has the good mind? _Hip._--But -that is unquestionable--that he has it. _Sokr._--Accordingly, -he that goes wrong and does base and unjust things -wilfully, if there be any such character--can be no other than the -good man. _Hip._--I do not know how to concede _that_ to -you, Sokrates.[67] _Sokr._--Nor I, how to concede it to myself, -Hippias: yet so it must appear to us, now at least, from the past -debate. As I told you long ago, I waver hither and thither upon this -matter; my conclusions never remain the same. No wonder indeed that I -and other vulgar men waver; but if you wise men waver also, that -becomes a fearful mischief even to us, since we cannot even by coming -to you escape from our embarrassment.[68] - -[Footnote 67: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 E, 376 B.] - -[Footnote 68: Plato, Hipp. Min. 376 C.] - -* * * * * - -I will here again remind the reader, that in this, as in the other -dialogues, the real speaker is Plato throughout: and that it is -he alone who prefixes the different names to words determined by -himself. - -[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been -inverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen -of the sophistry and corruption of the Sophists.] - -Now, if the dialogue just concluded had come down to us with the -parts inverted, and with the reasoning of Sokrates assigned to -Hippias, most critics would probably have produced it as a tissue of -sophistry justifying the harsh epithets which they bestow upon the -Athenian Sophists--as persons who considered truth and falsehood to -be on a par--subverters of morality--and corruptors of the youth of -Athens.[69] But as we read it, all that, which in the mouth of -Hippias would have passed for sophistry, is here put forward by -Sokrates; while Hippias not only resists his conclusions, and adheres -to the received ethical sentiment tenaciously, even when he is unable -to defend it, but hates the propositions forced upon him, protests -against the perverse captiousness of Sokrates, and requires much -pressing to induce him to continue the debate. Upon the views adopted -by the critics, Hippias ought to receive credit for this conduct, as -a friend of virtue and morality. To me, such reluctance to debate -appears a defect rather than a merit; but I cite the dialogue as -illustrating what I have already said in another place--that -Sokrates and Plato threw out more startling novelties in ethical -doctrine, than either Hippias or Protagoras, or any of the other -persons denounced as Sophists. - -[Footnote 69: Accordingly one of the Platonic critics, Schwalbe -(Oeuvres de Platon, p. 116), explains Plato's purpose in the -Hippias Minor by saying, that Sokrates here serves out to the -Sophists a specimen of their own procedure, and gives them an example -of sophistical dialectic, by defending a sophistical thesis in a -sophistical manner: That he chooses and demonstrates at length the -thesis--the liar is not different from the truth-teller--as an -exposure of the sophistical art of proving the contrary of any given -proposition, and for the purpose of deriding and unmasking the false -morality of Hippias, who in this dialogue talks reasonably enough. - -Schwalbe, while he affirms that this is the purpose of Plato, admits -that the part here assigned to Sokrates is unworthy of him; and -Steinhart maintains that Plato never could have had any such purpose, -"however frequently" (Steinhart says), "sophistical artifices may -occur in this conversation of Sokrates, which artifices Sokrates no -more disdained to employ than any other philosopher or rhetorician of -that day" ("so haeufig auch in seinen Eroerterungen sophistische -Kunstgriffe vorkommen moegen, die Sokrates eben so wenig verschmaht -hat, als irgend ein Philosoph oder Redekuenstler dieser Zeit"). -Steinhart, Einleitung zum Hipp. Minor, p. 109. - -I do not admit the purpose here ascribed to Plato by Schwalbe, but I -refer to the passage as illustrating what Platonic critics think of -the reasoning assigned to Sokrates in the Hippias Minor, and the -hypotheses which they introduce to colour it. - -The passage cited from Steinhart also--that Sokrates no more -disdained to employ sophistical artifices than any other philosopher -or rhetorician of the age--is worthy of note, as coming from one who -is so very bitter in his invectives against the sophistry of the -persons called Sophists, of which we have no specimens left.] - -[Side-note: Polemical purpose of the dialogue--Hippias -humiliated by Sokrates.] - -That Plato intended to represent this accomplished Sophist as -humiliated by Sokrates, is evident enough: and the words put into his -mouth are suited to this purpose. The eloquent lecturer, so soon as -his admiring crowd of auditors has retired, proves unable to parry -the questions of a single expert dialectician who remains behind, -upon a matter which appears to him almost self-evident, and upon -which every one (from Homer downward) agrees with him. Besides this, -however, Plato is not satisfied without making him say very simple -and absurd things. All this is the personal, polemical, comic scope -of the dialogue. It lends (whether well-placed or not) a certain -animation and variety, which the author naturally looked out for, in -an aggregate of dialogues all handling analogous matters about man -and society. - -But though the polemical purpose of the dialogue is thus plain, its -philosophical purpose perplexes the critics considerably. They do not -like to see Sokrates employing sophistry against the Sophists: that -is, as they think, casting out devils by the help of Beelzebub. And -certainly, upon the theory which they adopt, respecting the relation -between Plato and Sokrates on one side, and the Sophists on the -other, I think this dialogue is very difficult to explain. But I do -not think it is difficult, upon a true theory of the Platonic -writings. - -[Side-note: Philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of -the Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by -Plato.] - -In a former chapter, I tried to elucidate the general character and -purpose of those Dialogues of Search, which occupy more than half the -Thrasyllean Canon, and of which we have already reviewed two or three -specimens--Euthyphron, Alkibiades, &c. We have seen that they are -distinguished by the absence of any affirmative conclusion: that they -prove nothing, but only, at the most, disprove one or more supposable -solutions: that they are not processes in which one man who knows -communicates his knowledge to ignorant hearers, but in which all are -alike ignorant, and all are employed, either in groping, or guessing, -or testing the guesses of the rest. We have farther seen that the -value of these Dialogues depends upon the Platonic theory about -knowledge; that Plato did not consider any one to know, who could not -explain to others all that he knew, reply to the cross-examination of -a Sokratic Elenchus, and cross-examine others to test their -knowledge: that knowledge in this sense could not be attained by -hearing, or reading, or committing to memory a theorem, together with -the steps of reasoning which directly conducted to it:--but that -there was required, besides, an acquaintance with many -counter-theorems, each having more or less appearance of truth; as -well as with various embarrassing aspects and plausible delusions -on the subject, which an expert cross-examiner would not fail to urge. -Unless you are practised in meeting all the difficulties which he can -devise, you cannot be said _to know_. Moreover, it is in this -last portion of the conditions of knowledge, that most aspirants are -found wanting. - -[Side-note: The Hippias is an exemplification of this -theory--Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability -to clear it up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias--Error in the -Greater.] - -Now the Greater and Lesser Hippias are peculiar specimens of these -Dialogues of Search, and each serves the purpose above indicated. The -Greater Hippias enumerates a string of tentatives, each one of which -ends in acknowledged failure: the Lesser Hippias enunciates a thesis, -which Sokrates proceeds to demonstrate, by plausible arguments such -as Hippias is forced to admit. But though Hippias admits each -successive step, he still mistrusts the conclusion, and suspects that -he has been misled--a feeling which Plato[70] describes elsewhere as -being frequent among the respondents of Sokrates. Nay, Sokrates -himself shares in the mistrust--presents himself as an unwilling -propounder of arguments which force themselves upon him,[71] and -complains of his own mental embarrassment. Now you may call this -sophistry, if you please; and you may silence its propounders by -calling them hard names. But such ethical prudery--hiding all the -uncomfortable logical puzzles which start up when you begin to -analyse an established sentiment, and treating them as non-existent -because you refuse to look at them--is not the way, to attain what -Plato calls knowledge. If there be any argument, the process of which -seems indisputable, while yet its conclusion contradicts, or seems to -contradict, what is known, upon other evidence--the full and patient -analysis of that argument is indispensable, before you can become -master of the truth and able to defend it. Until you have gone -through such analysis, your mind must remain in that state of -confusion which is indicated by Sokrates at the end of the Lesser -Hippias. As it is a part of the process of Search, to travel in the -path of the Greater Hippias--that is, to go through a string of -erroneous solutions, each of which can be proved, by reasons shown, -to _be_ erroneous: so it is an equally important part of the -same process, to travel in the path of the Lesser Hippias--that is, -to acquaint ourselves with all those arguments, bearing on the case, -in which two contrary conclusions appear to be both of them plausibly -demonstrated, and in which therefore we cannot as yet determine which -of them is erroneous--or whether both are not erroneous. The Greater -Hippias exhibits errors,--the Lesser Hippias puts before us -confusion. With both these enemies the Searcher for truth must -contend: and Bacon tells us, that confusion is the worst enemy of the -two--"Citius emergit veritas ex errore, quam ex confusione". Plato, -in the Lesser Hippias, having in hand a genuine Sokratic thesis, does -not disdain to invest Sokrates with the task (sophistical, as some -call it, yet not the less useful and instructive) of setting forth at -large this case of confusion, and avowing his inability to clear it -up. It is enough for Sokrates that he brings home the painful sense -of confusion to the feelings of his hearer as well as to his own. In -that painful sentiment lies the stimulus provocative of farther -intellectual effort.[72] The dialogue ends but the process of search, -far from ending along with it, is emphatically declared to be -unfinished, and, to be in a condition not merely unsatisfactory -but intolerable, not to be relieved except by farther investigation, -which thus becomes a necessary sequel. - -[Footnote 70: Plato, Republ. vi. 487 B. - -[Greek: Kai\ o( A)dei/mantos, O)= So/krates, e)/phe, pro\s me\n -tau=ta/ soi ou)dei\s a)\n oi(=os t' ei)/e a)nteipei=n; a)lla\ ga\r -toio/nde ti pa/schousin oi( a)kou/ontes e)ka/stote a)\ nu=n le/geis; -e(gou=ntai di' a)peiri/an tou= e)rota=|n kai\ a)pokri/nesthai u(po\ -tou= lo/gou par' e(/kaston to\ e)ro/tema smikro\n parago/menoi, -a)throisthe/nton to=n smikro=n e)pi\ teleute=s to=n lo/gon, me/ga to\ -spha/lma kai\ e)nanti/on toi=s pro/tois a)naphai/nesthai . . . e)pei -to/ ge a)lethe\s ou)de/n ti ma=llon tau/te| e)/chein.] - -This passage, attesting the effect of the Sokratic examination upon -the minds of auditors, ought to be laid to heart by those Platonic -critics who denounce the Sophists for generating scepticism and -uncertainty.] - -[Footnote 71: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 373 B; also the last sentence of -the dialogue.] - -[Footnote 72: See the passage in Republic, vii. 523-524, where the -[Greek: to\ parakletiko\n kai\ e)gertiko\n te=s noe/seos] is declared -to arise from the pain of a felt contradiction.] - -There are two circumstances which lend particular interest to this -dialogue--Hippias Minor. 1. That the thesis out of which the -confusion arises, is one which we know to have been laid down by the -historical Sokrates himself. 2. That Aristotle expressly notices this -thesis, as well as the dialogue in which it is contained, and combats -it. - -[Side-note: The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also -affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.] - -Sokrates in his conversation with the youthful Euthydemus (in the -Xenophontic Memorabilia) maintains, that of two persons, each of whom -deceives his friends in a manner to produce mischief, the one who -does so wilfully is not so unjust as the one who does so -unwillingly.[73] Euthydemus (like Hippias in this dialogue) maintains -the opposite, but is refuted by Sokrates; who argues that justice is -a matter to be learnt and known like letters; that the lettered man, -who has learnt and knows letters, can write wrongly when he chooses, -but never writes wrongly unless he chooses--while it is only the -unlettered man who writes wrongly unwillingly and without intending -it: that in like manner the just man, he that has learnt and knows -justice, never commits injustice unless when he intends it--while the -unjust man, who has not learnt and does not know justice, commits -injustice whether he will or not. It is the just man therefore, and -none but the just man (Sokrates maintains), who commits injustice -knowingly and wilfully: it is the unjust man who commits injustice -without wishing or intending it.[74] - -[Footnote 73: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19. [Greek: to=n de\ de\ tou\s -phi/lous e)xapato/nton e)pi\ blabe=| (i(/na mede\ tou=to -paralei/pomen a)/skepton) po/teros a)diko/tero/s e)stin, o( e(ko\n -e)\ o( a)/kon?] - -The natural meaning of [Greek: e)pi\ blabe=|] would be, "for the -purpose of mischief"; and Schneider, in his Index, gives "nocendi -causa". But in that meaning the question would involve an -impossibility, for the words [Greek: o( a)/kon] exclude any such -purpose.] - -[Footnote 74: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19-22.] - -This is the same view which is worked out by the Platonic Sokrates in -the Hippias Minor: beginning with the antithesis between the -veracious and mendacious man (as Sokrates begins in Xenophon); and -concluding with the general result--that it belongs to the good -man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly. - -[Side-note: Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against -it.] - -Aristotle,[75] in commenting upon this doctrine of the Hippias Minor, -remarks justly, that Plato understands the epithets _veracious_ -and _mendacious_ in a sense different from that which they -usually bear. Plato understands the words as designating one who -_can_ tell the truth if he chooses--one who _can_ speak -falsely if he chooses: and in this sense he argues plausibly that the -two epithets go together, and that no man can be mendacious unless he -be also veracious. Aristotle points out that the epithets in their -received meaning are applied, not to the power itself, but to the -habitual and intentional use of that power. The power itself is -doubtless presupposed or implied as one condition to the -applicability of the epithets, and is one common condition to the -applicability of both epithets: but the distinction, which they are -intended to draw, regards the intentions and dispositions with which -the power is employed. So also Aristotle observes that Plato's -conclusion--"He that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that -does wrong unwillingly," is falsely collected from induction or -analogy. The analogy of the special arts and accomplishments, upon -which the argument is built, is not applicable. _Better_ has -reference, not to the amount of intelligence but to the dispositions -and habitual intentions; though it presupposes a certain state and -amount of intelligence as indispensable. - -[Footnote 75: Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 8; compare -Ethic. Nikomach. iv. p. 1127, b. 16.] - -[Side-note: Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too -exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct.] - -Both Sokrates and Plato (in many of his dialogues) commit the error -of which the above is one particular manifestation--that of dwelling -exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct,[76] and -omitting to give proper attention to the emotional and volitional, as -essentially co-operating or preponderating in the complex meaning of -ethical attributes. The reasoning ascribed to the Platonic Sokrates -in the Hippias Minor exemplifies this one-sided view. What he -says is true, but it is only a part of the truth. When he speaks of a -person "who does wrong unwillingly," he seems to have in view one who -does wrong without knowing that he does so: one whose intelligence is -so defective that he does not know when he speaks truth and when he -speaks falsehood. Now a person thus unhappily circumstanced must be -regarded as half-witted or imbecile, coming under the head which the -Xenophontic Sokrates called _madness_:[77] unfit to perform any -part in society, and requiring to be placed under tutelage. Compared -with such a person, the opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be -defended--that the mendacious person, who _can_ tell truth when -he chooses, is the better of the two in the sense of less mischievous -or dangerous. But he is the object of a very different sentiment; -moreover, this is not the comparison present to our minds when we -call one man veracious, another man mendacious. We always assume, in -every one, a measure of intelligence equal or superior to the -admissible minimum; under such assumption, we compare two persons, -one of whom speaks to the best of his knowledge and belief, the -other, contrary to his knowledge and belief. We approve the former -and disapprove the latter, according to the different intention and -purpose of each (as Aristotle observes); that is, looking at them -under the point of view of emotion and volition--which is logically -distinguishable from the intelligence, though always acting in -conjunction with it. - -[Footnote 76: Aristotle has very just observations on these views of -Sokrates, and on the incompleteness of his views when he resolved all -virtue into knowledge, all vice into ignorance. See, among other -passages, Aristot. Ethica Magna, i. 1182, a. 16; 1183, b. 9; 1190, b. -28; Ethic. Eudem. i. 1216, b, 4. The remarks of Aristotle upon -Sokrates and Plato evince a real progress in ethical theory.] - -[Footnote 77: Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 7. [Greek: tou\s diemarteko/tas, o(=n -oi( polloi\ gigno/skousi, mainome/nous kalei=n], &c.] - -[Side-note: They rely too much on the analogy of the special -arts--They take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the -epithets of praise and blame.] - -Again, the analogy of the special arts, upon which the Platonic -Sokrates dwells in the Hippias Minor, fails in sustaining his -inference. By a good runner, wrestler, harper, singer, speaker, -&c., we undoubtedly mean one who can, if he pleases, perform some -one of these operations well; although he can also, if he pleases, -perform them badly. But the epithets _good_ or _bad_, in -this case, consider exclusively that element which was left out, and -leave out that element which was exclusively considered, in the -former case. The good singer is declared to stand distinguished from -the bad singer, or from the [Greek: i)dio/tes], who, if he sings -at all, will certainly sing badly, by an attribute belonging to his -intelligence and vocal organs. To sing well is a special -accomplishment, which is possessed only by a few, and which no man is -blamed for not possessing. The distinction between such special -accomplishments, and justice or rectitude of behaviour, is well -brought out in the speech which Plato puts into the mouth of the -Sophist Protagoras.[78] "The special artists (he says) are few in -number: one of them is sufficient for many private citizens. But -every citizen, without exception, must possess justice and a sense of -shame: if he does not, he must be put away as a nuisance--otherwise, -society could not be maintained." The special artist is a citizen -also; and as such, must be subject to the obligations binding on all -citizens universally. In predicating of him that he is _good_ or -_bad_ as a citizen, we merely assume him to possess the average -intelligence, of the community; and the epithet declares whether his -emotional and volitional attributes exceed, or fall short of, the -minimum required in the application of that intelligence to his -social obligations. It is thus that the words _good_ or -_bad_ when applied to him as a citizen, have a totally different -bearing from that which the same words have when applied to him in -his character of special artist. - -[Footnote 78: Plato, Protagoras, 322.] - -[Side-note: Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be -suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of -the question under review.] - -The value of these debates in the Platonic dialogues consists in -their raising questions like the preceding, for the reflection of the -reader--whether the Platonic Sokrates may or may not be represented -as taking what we think the right view of the question. For a -Dialogue of Search, the great merit is, that it should be suggestive; -that it should bring before our attention the conditions requisite -for a right and proper use of these common ethical epithets, and the -state of circumstances which is tacitly implied whenever any one uses -them. No man ever learns to reflect upon the meaning of such familiar -epithets, which he has been using all his life--unless the process be -forced upon his attention by some special conversation which brings -home to him an uncomfortable sentiment of perplexity and -contradiction. If a man intends to acquire any grasp of ethical -or political theory, he must render himself master, not only of the -sound arguments and the guiding analogies but also of the unsound -arguments and the misleading analogies, which bear upon each portion -of it. - -[Side-note: Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic.] - -There is one other point of similitude deserving notice, between the -Greater and Lesser Hippias. In both of them, Hippias makes special -complaint of Sokrates, for breaking the question in pieces and -picking out the minute puzzling fragments--instead of keeping it -together as a whole, and applying to it the predicates which it -merits when so considered.[79] Here is the standing antithesis -between Rhetoric and Dialectic: between those unconsciously acquired -mental combinations which are poured out in eloquent, impressive, -unconditional, and undistinguishing generalities--and the logical -analysis which resolves the generality into its specialities, -bringing to view inconsistencies, contradictions, limits, -qualifications, &c. I have already touched upon this at the close -of the Greater Hippias. - -[Footnote 79: Plato, Hipp. Min. 369 B-C. [Greek: O)= So/krates, a)ei\ -su/ tinas toiou/tous ple/keis lo/gous, kai\ a)polamba/non o(/ a)\n -e)=| duschere/staton tou= lo/gou, tou/tou e)/chei kata\ smikro\n -e)phapto/menos, kai\ ou)ch o(/lo a)goni/zei to=| pra/gmati, peri\ -o(/tou a)\n o( lo/gos e)=|], &c. - -A remark of Aristotle (Topica, viii. 164, b. 2) illustrates this -dissecting function of the Dialectician. - -[Greek: e)/sti ga/r, o(s a(plo=s ei)pei=n, dialektiko\s o( -protatiko\s kai\ e)nstatiko/s; e)/sti de\ to\ me\n protei/nesthai, -e(\n poiei=n ta\ plei/o (dei= ga\r e(\n o(/lo| lephthe=nai pro\s o(\ -o( lo/gos), to\ d' e)ni/stasthai, to\ e(n polla/; e)\ ga\r diairei=, -e)\ a)nairei=, to\ me\n didou/s, to\ de\ ou)/, to=n -proteinome/non.]] - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - -HIPPARCHUS--MINOS. - - -In these two dialogues, Plato sets before us two farther specimens of -that error and confusion which beset the enquirer during his search -after "reasoned truth". Sokrates forces upon the attention of a -companion two of the most familiar words of the market-place, to see -whether a clear explanation of their meaning can be obtained. - -[Side-note: Hipparchus--Question--What is the definition of -Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things -worth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man -expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in -this sense, no man is a lover of gain.] - -In the dialogue called Hipparchus, the debate turns on the definition -of [Greek: to\ philokerde\s] or [Greek: o( philokerde/s]--the love of -gain or the lover of gain. Sokrates asks his Companion to define the -word. The Companion replies--He is one who thinks it right to gain -from things worth nothing.[1] Does he do this (asks Sokrates) knowing -that the things are worth nothing? or not knowing? If the latter, he -is simply ignorant. He knows it perfectly well (is the reply). He is -cunning and wicked; and it is because he cannot resist the temptation -of gain, that he has the impudence to make profit by such things, -though well aware that they are worth nothing. _Sokr._--Suppose -a husbandman, knowing that the plant which he is tending is -worthless--and yet thinking that he ought to gain by it: does not -that correspond to your description of the lover of gain? -_Comp._--The lover of gain, Sokrates, thinks that he ought to -gain from every thing. _Sokr._--Do not answer in that reckless -manner,[2] as if you had been wronged by any one; but answer with -attention. You agree that the lover of gain knows the value of -that from which he intends to derive profit; and that the husbandman -is the person cognizant of the value of plants. _Comp._--Yes: I -agree. _Sokr._--Do not therefore attempt, you are so young, to -deceive an old man like me, by giving answers not in conformity with -your own admissions; but tell me plainly, Do you believe that the -experienced husbandman, when he knows that he is planting a tree -worth nothing, thinks that he shall gain by it? _Comp._--No, -certainly: I do not believe it. - -[Footnote 1: Plato, Hipparch. 225 A. [Greek: oi(\ a)\n kerdai/nein -a)xio=sin a)po\ to=n medeno\s a)xi/on.]] - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Hipparch. 225 C.] - -Sokrates then proceeds to multiply illustrations to the same general -point. The good horseman does not expect to gain by worthless food -given to his horse: the good pilot, by worthless tackle put into his -ship: the good commander, by worthless arms delivered to his -soldiers: the good fifer, harper, bowman, by employing worthless -instruments of their respective arts, if they know them to be -worthless. - -[Side-note: Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all -men are lovers of gain.] - -None of these persons (concludes Sokrates) correspond to your -description of the lover of gain. Where then can you find a lover of -gain? On your explanation, no man is so.[3] _Comp._--I mean, -Sokrates, that the lovers of gain are those, who, through greediness, -long eagerly for things altogether petty and worthless; and thus -display a love of gain.[4] _Sokr._--Not surely knowing them to -be worthless--for this we have shown to be impossible--but ignorant -that they are worthless, and believing them to be valuable. -_Comp._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Now gain is the opposite -of loss: and loss is evil and hurt to every one: therefore gain (as -the opposite of loss) is good. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--It -appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers -of gain? _Comp._--Yes: it appears so. _Sokr._--Do not you -yourself love good--all good things? _Comp._--Certainly. -_Sokr._--And I too, and every one else. All men love good -things, and hate evil. Now we agreed that gain was a good: so that by -this reasoning, it appears that all men are lovers of gain while by -the former reasoning, we made out that none were so.[5] Which of the -two shall we adopt, to avoid error. _Comp._--We shall commit -no error, Sokrates, if we rightly conceive the lover of gain. He is -one who busies himself upon, and seeks to gain from, things from -which good men do not venture to gain. - -[Footnote 3: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D.] - -[Footnote 4: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D. [Greek: A)ll' e)go\, o)= -So/krates, bou/lomai le/gein tou/tous philokerdei=s ei)=nai, oi(\ -e(ka/stote u(po\ a)plesti/as kai\ panu\ smikra\ kai\ o)li/gou a)/xia -kai\ ou)deno\s gli/chontai u(perphuo=s kai\ philokerdou=sin.]] - -[Footnote 5: Plat. Hipparch. 227 C.] - -[Side-note: Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the -companion of trying to deceive him. Accusation is retorted upon -Sokrates.] - -_Sokr._--But, my friend, we agreed just now, that gain was a -good, and that all men always love good. It follows therefore, that -good men as well as others love all gains, if gains are good things. -_Comp._--Not, certainly, those gains by which they will -afterwards be hurt. _Sokr._--Be hurt: you mean, by which they -will become losers. _Comp._--I mean that and nothing else. -_Sokr._--Do they become losers by gain, or by loss? -_Comp._--By both: by loss, and by evil gain. _Sokr._--Does -it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil? -_Comp._--No. _Sokr._--Well! we agreed just now that gain -was the opposite of loss, which was evil; and that, being the -opposite of evil, gain was good. _Comp._--That was what we -agreed. _Sokr._--You see how it is: you are trying to deceive -me: you purposely contradict what we just now agreed upon. -_Comp._--Not at all, by Zeus: on the contrary, it is you, -Sokrates, who deceive me, wriggling up and down in your talk, I -cannot tell how.[6] _Sokr._--Be careful what you say: I should -be very culpable, if I disobeyed a good and wise monitor. -_Comp._--Whom do you mean: and what do you mean? -_Sokr._--Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus. - -[Footnote 6: Plat. Hipparch. 228 A. _Sokr._--[Greek: O(ra=|s -ou)=n? e)picheirei=s me e)xapata=|n, e)pi/tedes e)nanti/a le/gon -oi(=s a)/rti o(mologe/samen.] _Comp._ [Greek: Ou) ma\ Di/', o)= -So/krates; a)lla\ tou)nanti/on su\ e)me\ e)xapata=|s, kai\ ou)k -oi)=da o(pe=| e)n toi=s lo/gois a)/no kai\ ka/to stre/pheis.]] - -[Side-note: Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the -Peisistratid--"Never deceive a friend". Eulogy of Hipparchus by -Sokrates.] - -Sokrates then describes at some length the excellent character of -Hipparchus: his beneficent rule, his wisdom, his anxiety for the -moral improvement of the Athenians: the causes, different from what -was commonly believed, which led to his death; and the wholesome -precepts which he during his life had caused to be inscribed on -various busts of Hermes throughout Attica. One of these busts or -Hermae bore the words--Do not deceive a friend.[7] - -[Footnote 7: Plat. Hipparch. 228 B-229 D. - -The picture here given of Hipparchus deserves notice. We are informed -that he was older than his brother Hippias, which was the general -belief at Athens, as Thucydides (i. 20, vi. 58) affirms, though -himself contradicting it, and affirming that Hippias was the elder -brother. Plato however agrees with Thucydides in this point, that the -three years after the assassination of Hipparchus, during which -Hippias ruled alone, were years of oppression and tyranny; and that -the hateful recollection of the Peisistratidae, which always survived -in the minds of the Athenians, was derived from these three last -years. - -The picture which Plato here gives of Hipparchus is such as we might -expect from a philosopher. He dwells upon the pains which Hipparchus -took to have the recitation of the Homeric poems made frequent and -complete: also upon his intimacy with the poets Anakreon and -Simonides. The colouring which Plato gives to the intimacy between -Aristogeiton and Harmodius is also peculiar. The [Greek: e)raste\s] -is represented by Plato as eager for the education and improvement of -the [Greek: e)ro/menos]; and the jealousy felt towards Hipparchus is -described as arising from the distinguished knowledge and abilities -of Hipparchus, which rendered him so much superior and more effective -as an educator.] - -The Companion resumes: Apparently, Sokrates, either you do not -account me your friend, or you do not obey Hipparchus: for you are -certainly deceiving me in some unaccountable way in your talk. You -cannot persuade me to the contrary. - -[Side-note: Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of -his answers. The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain -is evil.] - -_Sokr._--Well then! in order that you may not think yourself -deceived, you may take back any move that you choose, as if we were -playing at draughts. Which of your admissions do you wish to -retract--That all men desire good things? That loss (to be a loser) -is evil? That gain is the opposite of loss: that to gain is the -opposite of to lose? That to gain, as being the opposite of evil -is a good thing? _Comp._--No. I do not retract any one of these. -_Sokr._--You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other -gain evil? _Comp._--Yes, that is what I do think.[8] _Sokr._--Well, I -give you back that move: let it stand as you say. Some gain is good: -other gain is bad. But surely the good gain is no more _gain_, -than the bad gain: both are _gain_, alike and equally. -_Comp._--How do you mean? - -[Footnote 8: Plat. Hipparch. 229 E, 230 A.] - -[Side-note: Questions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as -much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which -both are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with -a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be -evil--embarrassment confessed.] - -Sokrates then illustrates his question by two or three analogies. Bad -food is just as much _food_, as good food: bad drink, as much -_drink_ as good drink: a good man is no more _man_ than a -bad man.[9] - -[Footnote 9: Plat. Hipparch. 230 C.] - -_Sokr._--In like manner, bad gain, and good gain, are (both of -them) _gain_ alike--neither of them more or less than the other. -Such being the case, what is that common quality possessed by both, -which induces you to call them by the same name _Gain_?[10] -Would you call _Gain_ any acquisition which one makes either -with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all?[11] -_Comp._--Yes. I should call that gain. _Sokr._--For example, if after -being at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an -excellent dinner, you acquire an illness? _Comp._--Not at all: -that is no gain. _Sokr._--But if from the banquet you acquire -health, would that be gain or loss? _Comp._--It would be gain. -_Sokr._--Not every acquisition therefore is gain, but only such -acquisitions as are good and not evil: if the acquisition be evil, it -is loss. _Comp._--Exactly so. _Sokr._--Well, now, you see, -you are come round again to the very same point: Gain is good. Loss -is evil. _Comp._--I am puzzled what to say.[12] -_Sokr._--You have good reason to be puzzled. - -[Footnote 10: Plat. Hipparch. 230 E. [Greek: dia\ ti/ pote -a)mpho/tera au)ta\ ke/rdos kalei=s? ti/ tau)to\n e)n a)mphote/rois -o(ro=n?]] - -[Footnote 11: Plat. Hipparch. 231 A.] - -[Footnote 12: Plat. Hipparch. 231 C. _Sokr._ [Greek: O(ra=|s -ou)=n, o(s pa/lin au)= peritre/cheis ei)s to\ au)to\--to\ me\n -ke/rdos a)gatho\n phai/netai, e( de\ zemi/a kako/n?] _Comp._ -[Greek: A)poro= e)/goge o(\, ti ei)/po.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)k -a)di/kos ge su\ a)poro=n.]] - -[Side-note: It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made -shall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the -outlay. The valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good. -Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good.] - -But tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much, -that is gain? _Comp._--Yes: but not if it be evil: it is gain, -if it be good, like gold or silver. _Sokr._--I will ask you -about gold and silver. Suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold -acquires two pounds of silver, is it gain or loss? _Comp._--It -is loss, decidedly, Sokrates: gold is twelve times the value of -silver. _Sokr._--Nevertheless he has acquired more: double is -more than half. _Comp._--Not in value: double silver is not more -than half gold. _Sokr._--It appears then that we must include -value as essential to gain, not merely quantity. The valuable is -gain: the valueless is no gain. The valuable is that which is -valuable to possess: is that the profitable, or the unprofitable? -_Comp._--It is the profitable. _Sokr._--But the profitable -is good? _Comp._--Yes: it is. _Sokr._--Why then, here, the -same conclusion comes back to us as agreed, for the third or fourth -time. The gainful is good. _Comp._--It appears so.[13] - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Hipparch. 231 D-E, 232 A.] - -[Side-note: Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain -is good, and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no -man ought to be reproached for being so. The companion is compelled -to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded.] - - _Sokr._--Let me remind you of what has passed. You contended - that good men did not wish to acquire all sorts of gain, but -only such as were good, and not such as were evil. But now, the -debate has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains are good, -whether small or great. _Comp._--As for me, Sokrates, the debate -has compelled me rather than persuaded me.[14] -_Sokr._--Presently, perhaps, it may even persuade you. But now, -whether you have been persuaded or not, you at least concur with -me in affirming that all gains, whether small or great, are good. -That all good men wish for all good things. _Comp._--I do concur. -_Sokr._--But you yourself stated that evil men love all gains, -small and great? _Comp._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your -doctrine then, all men are lovers of gain, the good men as well as -the evil? _Comp._--Apparently so. _Sokr._--It is therefore -wrong to reproach any man as a lover of gain: for the person who -reproaches is himself a lover of gain, just as much. - -[Footnote 14: Plat. Hipparch. 232 A-B. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n -nu=n pa/nta ta\ ke/rde o( lo/gos e(ma=s e)na/gkake kai\ smikra\ kai\ -mega/la o(mologei=n a)gatha\ ei)=nai?] _Comp._ [Greek: -E)na/gkake ga/r, o)= So/krates, ma=llon e)me/ ge e)\ pe/peiken.] -_Sokr._ [Greek: A)ll' i)/sos meta\ tou=to kai\ pei/seien -a)\n.]] - -[Side-note: Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. -What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law: -what is the common constituent attribute?] - -The Minos, like the Hipparchus, is a dialogue carried on between -Sokrates and a companion not named. It relates to Law, or The Law-- - -_Sokr._--What is Law (asks Sokrates)? _Comp._--Respecting -what sort of Law do you enquire (replies the Companion)? -_Sokr._--What! is there any difference between one law and -another law, as to that identical circumstance, of being Law? Gold -does not differ from gold, so far as the being gold is concerned--nor -stone from stone, so far as being stone is concerned. In like manner, -one law does not differ from another, all are the same, in so far as -each is Law alike:--not, one of them more, and another less. It is -about this as a whole that I ask you--What is Law? - -[Side-note: Answer--Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding -customs. 2. The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion.] - -_Comp._--What should Law be, Sokrates, other than the various -assemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs?[15] -_Sokr._--Do you think, then, that discourse is, the things -spoken: that sight is, the things seen? that hearing is, the things -heard? Or are they not distinct, in each of the three cases--and is -not Law also one thing, the various customs and beliefs another? -_Comp._--Yes! I now think that they are distinct.[16] -_Sokr._--Law is that whereby these binding customs become -binding. What is it? _Comp._--Law can be nothing else than the -public resolutions and decrees promulgated among us. Law is the -decree of the city.[17] _Sokr._--You mean, that Law is social -opinion. _Comp._--Yes I do. - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Minos, 313 B. [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n a)/llo no/mos -ei)/e a)\n a)ll' e)\ ta\ nomizo/mena?]] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Minos, 313 B-C. - -I pass over here an analogy started by Sokrates in his next question; -as [Greek: o)/psis] to [Greek: ta\ o(ro/mena], so [Greek: no/mos] to -[Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena], &c.] - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Minos, 814 A. [Greek: e)peide\ no/mo| ta\ -nomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti to=| no/mo| nomi/zetai?]] - -[Side-note: Cross-examination by Sokrates--just and -lawfully-behaving men are so through law; unjust and lawless men -are so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: -lawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad -social opinion--cannot be law.] - -_Sokr._--Perhaps you are right: but let us examine. You call -some persons wise:--they are wise through wisdom. You call some -just:--they are just through justice. In like manner, the -lawfully-behaving men are so through law: the lawless men are so -through lawlessness. Now the lawfully-behaving men are just: the -lawless men are unjust. _Comp._--It is so. _Sokr._--Justice and Law, -are highly honourable: injustice and lawlessness, highly -dishonourable: the former preserves cities, the latter ruins them. -_Comp._--Yes--it does. _Sokr._--Well, then! we must -consider law as something honourable; and seek after it, under the -assumption that it is a good thing. You defined law to be the decree -of the city: Are not some decrees good, others evil? -_Comp._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--But we have already said that law -is not evil. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--It is incorrect -therefore to answer, as you did broadly, that law is the decree of -the city. An evil decree cannot be law. _Comp._--I see that it -is incorrect.[18] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Minos, 314 B-C-D.] - -[Side-note: Suggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_ -opinion of the city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding -out of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of -reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so.] - -_Sokr._--Still--I think, myself, that law is opinion of some -sort; and since it is not evil opinion, it must be good opinion. Now -good opinion is true opinion: and true opinion is, the finding out of -reality. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--Law therefore wishes -or tends to be, the finding out of reality.[19] _Comp._--But, -Sokrates, if law is the finding out of reality--if we have -therein already found out realities--how comes it that all -communities of men do not use the same laws respecting the same -matters? _Sokr._--The law does not the less wish or tend to find -out realities; but it is unable to do so. That is, if the fact be -true as you state--that we change our laws, and do not all of us use -the same. _Comp._--Surely, the fact as a fact is obvious -enough.[20] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Minos, 315 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n e( a)lethe\s -do/xa tou= o)/ntos e)stin e)xeu/resis? . . . o( no/mos a)/ra bou/letai -tou= o)/ntos ei)=nai e)xeu/resis?]] - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Minos, 315 A-B.] - -[Side-note: Objection taken by the Companion--That there is -great discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several -cases of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his -prolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or -answer.] - -(The Companion here enumerates some remarkable local rites, -venerable in one place, abhorrent in another, such as the human -sacrifices at Carthage, &c., thus lengthening his answer much -beyond what it had been before. Sokrates then continues): - -_Sokr._--Perhaps you are right, and these matters have escaped -me. But if you and I go on making long speeches each for ourselves, -we shall never come to an agreement. If we are to carry on our -research together, we must do so by question and answer. Question me, -if you prefer:--if not, answer me. _Comp._--I am quite ready, -Sokrates, to answer whatever you ask. - -[Side-note: Farther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and -light, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are -so, and are accounted so everywhere. Real things are always accounted -real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the -lawful.] - -_Sokr._--Well, then! do you think that just things are just and -unjust things are unjust? _Comp._--I think they are. -_Sokr._--Do not all men in all communities, among the Persians -as well as here, now as well as formerly, think so too? -_Comp._--Unquestionably they do. _Sokr._--Are not things which weigh -more, accounted heavier; and things which weigh less, accounted -lighter, here, at Carthage, and everywhere else?[21] -_Comp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--It seems, then, that honourable things -are accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable things -dishonourable? not the reverse. _Comp._--Yes, it is so. -_Sokr._--Then, speaking universally, existent things or -realities (not non-existents) are accounted existent and real, among -us as well as among all other men? _Comp._--I think they are. -_Sokr._--Whoever therefore fails in attaining the real fails in -attaining the lawful.[22] _Comp._--As you now put it, Sokrates, -it would seem that the same things are accounted lawful both by us at -all times, and by all the rest of mankind besides. But when I reflect -that we are perpetually changing our laws, I cannot persuade myself -of what you affirm. - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Minos, 316 A. [Greek: Po/teron de\ ta\ plei=on -e)/lkonta baru/tera nomi/zetai e)ntha/de, ta\ de\ e)/latton, -koupho/tera, e)\ tou)nanti/on?] - -The verb [Greek: nomi/zetai] deserves attention here, being the same -word as has been employed in regard to law, and derived from [Greek: -no/mos].] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: ou)kou=n, o(s kata\ -pa/nton ei)pei=n, ta\ o)/nta nomi/zetai ei)=nai, ou) ta\ me\ o)/nta, -kai\ par' e(mi=n kai\ para\ toi=s a)/llois a(/pasin.] -_Comp._ [Greek: E)/moige dokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: O(\s a)\n -a)/ra tou= o)/ntos a(marta/ne|, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]] - -[Side-note: There are laws of health and of cure, composed by -the few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared -by them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, -declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like -manner, the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise -men who know how to rule.] - -_Sokr._--Perhaps you do not reflect that pieces on the draught-board, -when their position is changed, still remain the same. You -know medical treatises: you know that physicians are the really -knowing about matters of health: and that they agree with each other -in writing about them. _Comp._--Yes--I know that. _Sokr._--The -case is the same whether they be Greeks or not Greeks: Those who -know, must of necessity hold the same opinion with each other, on -matters which they know: always and everywhere. _Comp._--Yes--always -and everywhere. _Sokr._--Physicians write respecting -matters of health what they account to be true, and these writings of -theirs are the medical laws? _Comp._--Certainly they are. -_Sokr._--The like is true respecting the laws of farming--the -laws of gardening--the laws of cookery. All these are the writings of -persons, knowing in each of the respective pursuits? _Comp._--Yes.[23] -_Sokr._--In like manner, what are the laws respecting -the government of a city? Are they not the writings of those who know -how to govern--kings, statesmen, and men of superior excellence? -_Comp._--Truly so. _Sokr._--Knowing men like these will not -write differently from each other about the same things, nor change -what they have once written. If, then, we see some doing this, -are we to declare them knowing or ignorant? -_Comp._--Ignorant--undoubtedly. - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Minos, 316 D-E.] - -[Side-note: That which is right is the regal law, the only -true and real law--that which is not right, is not law, but only -seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant.] - -_Sokr._--Whatever is right, therefore, we may pronounce to be -lawful; in medicine, gardening, or cookery: whatever is not right, -not to be lawful but lawless. And the like in treatises respecting -just and unjust, prescribing how the city is to be administered: That -which is right, is the regal law--that which is not right, is not so, -but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant--being in truth -lawless. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--We were correct therefore -in declaring Law to be the finding out of reality. _Comp._--It -appears so.[24] _Sokr._--It is the skilful husbandman who gives -right laws on the sowing of land: the skilful musician on the -touching of instruments: the skilful trainer, respecting exercise of -the body: the skilful king or governor, respecting the minds of the -citizens. _Comp._--Yes--it is.[25] - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Minos, 317 C. [Greek: to\ me\n o)rtho\n no/mos -e)sti\ basiliko/s; to\ de\ me\ o)rtho/n ou)/, o(\ dokei= no/mos -ei)=nai toi=s ei)do/sin; e)/sti ga\r a)/nomon.]] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Minos, 318 A.] - -[Side-note: Minos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and -excellent, and have remained unchanged from time immemorial.] - -_Sokr._--Can you tell me which of the ancient kings has the -glory of having been a good lawgiver, so that his laws still remain -in force as divine institutions? _Comp._--I cannot tell. -_Sokr._--But can you not say which among the Greeks have the -most ancient laws? _Comp._--Perhaps you mean the Lacedaemonians -and Lykurgus? _Sokr._--Why, the Lacedaemonian laws are hardly -more than three hundred years old: besides, whence is it that the -best of them come? _Comp._--From Krete, they say. _Sokr._--Then -it is the Kretans who have the most ancient laws in Greece? -_Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--Do you know those good kings of -Krete, from whom these laws are derived--Minos and Rhadamanthus, sons -of Zeus and Europa? _Comp._--Rhadamanthus certainly is said to -have been a just man, Sokrates; but Minos quite the reverse--savage, -ill-tempered, unjust. _Sokr._--What you affirm, my friend, is a -fiction of the Attic tragedians. It is not stated either by Homer or -Hesiod, who are far more worthy of credit than all the tragedians put -together. _Comp._--What is it that Homer and Hesiod say -about Minos?[26] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Minos, 318 E.] - -[Side-note: Question about the character of Minos--Homer and -Hesiod declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians -defame him as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens.] - -Sokrates replies by citing, and commenting upon, the statements of -Homer and Hesiod respecting Minos, as the cherished son, companion, -and pupil, of Zeus; who bestowed upon him an admirable training, -teaching him wisdom and justice, and thus rendering him consummate as -a lawgiver and ruler of men. It was through these laws, divine as -emanating from the teaching of Zeus, that Krete (and Sparta as the -imitator of Krete) had been for so long a period happy and virtuous. -As ruler of Krete, Minos had made war upon Athens, and compelled the -Athenians to pay tribute. Hence he had become odious to the -Athenians, and especially odious to the tragic poets who were the -great teachers and charmers of the crowd. These poets, whom every one -ought to be cautious of offending, had calumniated Minos as the old -enemy of Athens.[27] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Minos, 319-320.] - -[Side-note: That Minos was really admirable--and that he has -found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the -city--we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so -long unaltered.] - -But that these tales are mere calumny (continues Sokrates), and that -Minos was truly a good lawgiver, and a good shepherd ([Greek: nomeu\s -a)gatho/s]) of his people--we have proof through the fact, that his -laws still remain unchanged: which shows that he has really found out -truth and reality respecting the administration of a city.[28] -_Comp._--Your view seems plausible, Sokrates. _Sokr._--If I -am right, then, you think that the Kretans have more ancient laws -than any other Greeks? and that Minos and Rhadamanthus are the best -of all ancient lawgivers, rulers, and shepherds of mankind? -_Comp._--I think they are. - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Minos, 321 B. [Greek: tou=to me/giston semei=on, -o(/ti a)ki/netoi au)tou= oi( no/moi ei)si/n, a)/te tou= o)/ntos peri\ -po/leos oi)ke/seos e)xeuro/ntos eu)= te\n a)le/theian.]] - -[Side-note: The question is made more determinate--What is it -that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of -the mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the -body? Sokrates cannot tell. Close.] - -_Sokr._--Now take the case of the good lawgiver and good -shepherd for the body--If we were asked, what it is that he -prescribes for the body, so as to render it better? we should answer, -at once, briefly, and well, by saying--food and labour: the former to -sustain the body, the latter to exercise and consolidate it. -_Comp._--Quite correct. _Sokr._--And if after that we -were asked, What are those things which the good lawgiver prescribes -for the mind to make it better, what should we say, so as to avoid -discrediting ourselves? _Comp._--I really cannot tell. -_Sokr._--But surely it is discreditable enough both for your -mind and mine--to confess, that we do not know upon what it is that -good and evil for our minds depends, while we can define upon what it -is that the good or evil of our bodies depends?[29] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Minos, 321 C-B.] - -* * * * * - -[Side-note: The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each -other, and both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished.] - -I have put together the two dialogues Hipparchus and Minos, partly -because of the analogy which really exists between them, partly -because that analogy is much insisted on by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, -Stallbaum, and other recent critics; who not only strike them both -out of the list of Platonic works, but speak of them with contempt as -compositions. On the first point, I dissent from them altogether: on -the second, I agree with them thus far--that I consider the two -dialogues inferior works of Plato:--much inferior to his greatest and -best compositions,--certainly displaying both less genius and less -careful elaboration--probably among his early performances--perhaps -even unfinished projects, destined for a farther elaboration, which -they never received, and not published until after his decease. Yet -in Hipparchus as well as in Minos, the subjects debated are important -as regards ethical theory. Several questions are raised and partially -canvassed: no conclusion is finally attained. These characteristics -they have in common with several of the best Platonic dialogues. - -[Side-note: Hipparchus--Double meaning of [Greek: -philokerde\s] and [Greek: ke/rdos].] - -In Hipparchus, the question put by Sokrates is, about the definition -of [Greek: o( philokerde\s] (the lover of gain), and of [Greek: -ke/rdos] itself--gain. The first of these two words (like many in -Greek as well as in English) is used in two senses. In its plain, -etymological sense, it means an attribute belonging to all men: all -men love gain, hate loss. But since this is predicable of all, -there is seldom any necessity for predicating it of any one man or -knot of men in particular. Accordingly, when you employ the epithet -as a predicate of A or B, what you generally mean is, to assert -something more than its strict etymological meaning: to declare that -he has the attribute in unusual measure; or that he has shown -himself, on various occasions, wanting in other attributes, which on -those occasions ought, in your judgment, to have countervailed it. -The epithet thus comes to connote a sentiment of blame or reproach, -in the mind of the speaker.[30] - -[Footnote 30: Aristotle adverts to this class of ethical epithets, -connoting both an attribute in the person designated and an -unfavourable sentiment in the speaker (Ethic. Nikom. ii. 6, p. 1107, -a. 9). [Greek: Ou) pa=sa d' e)pide/chetai pra=xis, ou)de\ pa=n -pa/thos, te\n meso/teta; e)/nia ga\r eu)thu\s o)no/mastai -suneilemme/na meta\ te=s phaulo/tetos, oi)=on], &c.] - -[Side-note: State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, -frequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found.] - -The Companion or Collocutor, being called upon by Sokrates to explain -[Greek: to\ philokerde\s], defines it in this last sense, as -conveying or connoting a reproach. He gives three different -explanations of it (always in this sense), each of which Sokrates -shows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases are compared, and -the question is put (so constantly recurring in Plato's writings), -what is the state of the agent's mind as to knowledge? The -cross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to -know,--then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a -[Greek: philokerde/s]: if the agent be supposed not to know--then, -on the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The -Companion is persuaded that there is such a thing as "love of -gain" in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable -definition, to discriminate it from "love of gain" in the -ordinary or innocent sense. - -[Side-note: Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good -gain, what is the meaning of the word _gain_? None is found.] - -The same question comes back in another form, after Sokrates has -given the liberty of retractation. The Collocutor maintains that -there is bad _gain_, as well as good _gain_. But what is -that common, generic, quality, designated well as good by the word -_gain_, apart from these two distinctive epithets? He cannot -find it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which -is torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of _gain_, that -which a man acquires must be good; and it must surpass, in value as -well as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order -to acquire it. But when thus understood, all gains are good. There is -no meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains: all men are -lovers of gain. - -[Side-note: Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the -confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for -clearing it up.] - -With this confusion, the dialogue closes. The Sokratic notion of -_good_, as what every one loves--_evil_ as what every one -hates--also of evil-doing, as performed by every evil-doer only -through ignorance or mistake is brought out and applied to test the -ethical phraseology of a common-place respondent. But it only serves -to lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity, without clearing up -any thing. Herein, so far as I can see, lies Plato's purpose in the -dialogue. The respondent is made aware of the confusion, which he did -not know before; and this, in Plato's view, is a progress. The -respondent cannot avoid giving contradictory answers, under an acute -cross-examination: but he does not adopt any new belief. He says to -Sokrates at the close--"The debate has constrained rather than -persuaded me".[31] This is a simple but instructive declaration of -the force put by Sokrates upon his collocutors; and of the -reactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds, with a view -to extricate themselves from a painful sense of contradiction. If -such effort be provoked, Plato's purpose is attained. - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Hipparch. 232 B. [Greek: e)na/gkake ga\r (o( -lo/gos) ma=llon e)me/ ge e)\ pe/peiken.]] - -One peculiarity there is, analogous to what we have already seen in -the Hippias Major. It is not merely the Collocutor who charges -Sokrates, but also Sokrates who accuses the Collocutor--each charging -the other with attempts to deceive a friend.[32] This seems intended -by Plato to create an occasion for introducing what he had to say -about Hipparchus--_apropos_ of the motto on the Hipparchean -Hermes--[Greek: me\ phi/lon e)xapa/ta]. - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Hipparch. 225 E, 228 A.] - -[Side-note: Historical narrative and comments given in the -dialogue respecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the -dialogue to be spurious.] - -The modern critics, who proclaim the Hipparchus not to be the work of -Plato, allege as one of the proofs of spuriousness, the occurrence of -this long narrative and comment upon the historical Hipparchus and -his behaviour; which narrative (the critics maintain) Plato would -never have introduced, seeing that it contributes nothing to the -settlement of the question debated. But to this we may reply, first, -That there are other dialogues[33] (not to mention the Minos) in -which Plato introduces recitals of considerable length, historical or -quasi-historical recitals; bearing remotely, or hardly bearing at -all, upon the precise question under discussion; next,--That even if -no such analogies could be cited, and if the case stood single, no -modern critic could fairly pretend to be so thoroughly acquainted -with Plato's views and the surrounding circumstances, as to put a -limit on the means which Plato might choose to take, for rendering -his dialogues acceptable and interesting. Plato's political views -made him disinclined to popular government generally, and to the -democracy of Athens in particular. Conformably with such sentiment, -he is disposed to surround the rule of the Peisistratidae with an -ethical and philosophical colouring: to depict Hipparchus as a wise -man busied in instructing and elevating the citizens; and to -discredit the renown of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, by affirming them -to have been envious of Hipparchus, as a philosopher who surpassed -themselves by his own mental worth. All this lay perfectly in the -vein of Plato's sentiment; and we may say the same about the -narrative in the Minos, respecting the divine parentage and teaching -of Minos, giving rise to his superhuman efficacy as a lawgiver and -ruler. It is surely very conceivable, that Plato, as a composer of -ethical dialogues or dramas, might think that such recitals lent a -charm or interest to some of them. Moreover, something like variety, -or distinctive features as between one dialogue and another, was a -point of no inconsiderable moment. I am of opinion that Plato did so -conceive these narratives. But at any rate, what I here contend is, -that no modern critics have a right to assume as certain that he did -not. - -[Footnote 33: See Alkibiad. ii. pp. 142-149-150; Alkibiad. i. pp. -121-122: Protagoras, 342-344; Politikus, 268 D., [Greek: schedo\n -paidia\n e)gkerasame/nous] and the two or three pages which follow. - -F. A. Wolf, and various critics after him, contend that the -genuineness of the Hipparchus was doubted in antiquity, on the -authority of AElian, V. H. viii. 2. But I maintain that this is not -the meaning of the passage, unless upon the supposition that the word -[Greek: mathete\s] is struck out of the text conjecturally. The -passage may be perfectly well construed, leaving [Greek: mathete\s] -in the text: we must undoubtedly suppose the author to have made an -assertion historically erroneous: but this is nowise impossible in -the case of AElian. If you construe the passage as it stands, without -such conjectural alteration, it does not justify Wolf's inference.] - -[Side-note: Minos. Question--What is the characteristic -property connoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law?] - -I now come to the Minos. The subject of this dialogue is, the -explanation or definition of Law. Sokrates says to his Companion or -Collocutor,--Tell me what is the generic constituent of Law: All Laws -are alike _quatenus_ Law. Take no note of the difference between -one law and another, but explain to me what characteristic property -it is, which is common to all Law, and is implied in or connoted by -the name Law. - -This question is logically the same as that which Sokrates asks in -the Hipparchus with reference to [Greek: ke/rdos] or gain. - -[Side-note: This question was discussed by the historical -Sokrates, Memorabilia of Xenophon.] - -That the definition of [Greek: No/mos] or Law was discussed by -Sokrates, we know, not only from the general description of his -debates given in Xenophon, but also from the interesting description -(in that author) of the conversation between the youthful Alkibiades -and Perikles.[34] The interrogations employed by Alkibiades on that -occasion are Sokratic, and must have been derived, directly or -indirectly, from Sokrates. They are partially analogous to the -questions of Sokrates in the dialogue Minos, and they end by driving -Perikles into a confusion, left unexplained, between Law and -Lawlessness. - -[Footnote 34: Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16; i. 2, 42-46.] - -[Side-note: Definitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law -includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, -&c. Bad decrees are not laws.] - -Definitions of [Greek: No/mos] are here given by the Companion, who -undergoes a cross-examination upon them. First, he says, that [Greek: -No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena]. But this is rejected by Sokrates, who -intimates that Law is not the aggregate of laws enacted or of customs -held binding: but that which lies behind these laws and customs, -imparting to them their binding force.[35] We are to enquire what -this is. The Companion declares that it is the public decree of the -city: political or social opinion. But this again Sokrates contests: -putting questions to show that Law includes, as a portion of its -meaning, justice, goodness, beauty, and preservation of the city with -its possessions; while lawlessness includes injustice, evil, -ugliness, and destruction. There can be no such thing as bad or -wicked law.[36] But among decrees of the city, some are bad, some -are good. Therefore to define Law as a decree of the city, thus -generally, is incorrect. It is only the good decree, not the bad -decree, which is Law. Now the good decree or opinion, is the true -opinion: that is, it is the finding out of reality. Law therefore -wishes or aims to be the finding out of reality: and if there are -differences between different nations, this is because the power to -find out does not always accompany the wish to find out. - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Minos, 314 A. [Greek: e)peide\ no/mo| ta\ -nomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti to=| no/mo| nomi/zetai?]] - -[Footnote 36: Plato, Minos, 314 E. [Greek: kai\ me\n no/mos ge ou)k -e)=n ponero/s.]] - -[Side-note: Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it -is the declared judgment and command of the Wise man upon the -subject to which it refers--it is truth and reality, found out and -certified by him.] - -As to the assertion--that Law is one thing here, another thing there, -one thing at one time, another thing at another--Sokrates contests -it. Just things are just (he says) everywhere and at all times; -unjust things are unjust also. Heavy things are heavy, light things -light, at one time, as well as at another. So also honourable things -are everywhere honourable, base things everywhere base. In general -phrase, existent things are everywhere existent,[37] non-existent -things are not existent. Whoever therefore fails to attain the -existent and real, fails to attain the lawful and just. It is only -the man of art and knowledge, in this or that department, who attains -the existent, the real, the right, true, lawful, just. Thus the -authoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine, are those -laid down by practitioners who know that subject, all of whom agree -in what they lay down: the laws of cookery, the laws of agriculture -and of gardening--are rescripts delivered by artists who know -respectively each of those subjects. So also about Just and Unjust, -about the political and social arrangements of the city--the -authoritative rescripts or laws are, those laid down by the artists -or men of knowledge in that department, all of whom agree in laying -down the same: that is, all the men of art called kings or lawgivers. -It is only the right, the true, the real--that which these artists -attain--which is properly a law and is entitled to be so called. That -which is not right is not a law,--ought not to be so called--and is -only supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men.[38] - -[Footnote 37: M. Boeckh remarks justly in his note on this -passage--"neque enim illud demonstratum est, eadem omnibus legitima -esse--sed tantum, _notionem_" (rather the sentiment or emotion) -"_legitimi_ omnibus eandem esse. Sed omnia scriptor hic -confundit."] - -[Footnote 38: Plato, Minos, 317 C.] - -[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, -but Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of -Plato--he acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought -to _be_ Law.] - -That the reasoning of Sokrates in this dialogue is confused and -unsound (as M. Boeckh and other critics have remarked), I perfectly -agree. But it is not the less completely Platonic; resting upon views -and doctrines much cherished and often reproduced by Plato. The -dialogue Minos presents, in a rude and awkward manner, without -explanation or amplification, that worship of the Abstract and the -Ideal, which Plato, in other and longer dialogues, seeks to diversify -as well as to elaborate. The definitions of Law here combated and -given by Sokrates, illustrate this. The good, the true, the right, -the beautiful, the real--all coalesce in the mind of Plato. There is -nothing (in his view) real, except _The_ Good, _The_ Just, &c. -([Greek: to\ au)to-a)gatho\n]; [Greek: au)to-di/kaion]--Absolute -Goodness and Justice): particular good and just things have -no reality, they are no more good and just than bad and unjust--they -are one or the other, according to circumstances--they are ever -variable, floating midway between the real and unreal.[39] The real -alone is knowable, correlating with knowledge or with the knowing -Intelligence [Greek: Nou=s]. As Sokrates distinguishes elsewhere -[Greek: to\ di/kaion] or [Greek: au)to-di/kaion] from [Greek: ta\ -di/kaia]--so here he distinguishes ([Greek: no/mos] from [Greek: ta\ -nomizo/mena]) _Law_, from the assemblage of actual commands or -customs received as _laws_ among mankind. These latter are -variable according to time and place; but Law is always one and the -same. Plato will acknowledge nothing to _be_ Law, except that -which (he thinks) _ought to be_ Law: that which emanates from a -lawgiver of consummate knowledge, who aims at the accomplishment of -the good and the real, and knows how to discover and realise that -end. So far as "the decree of the city" coincides with what would -have been enacted by this lawgiver (_i. e._ so far as it is good -and right), Sokrates admits it as a valid explanation of Law; but no -farther. He considers the phrase _bad law_ to express a logical -impossibility, involving a contradiction _in adjecto_.[40] What -others call a bad law, he regards as being no real law, but only -a fallacious image, mistaken for such by the ignorant. He does not -consider such ignorant persons as qualified to judge: he recognises -only the judgment of the knowing one or few, among whom he affirms -that there can be no difference of opinion. Every one admits just -things to be just,--unjust things to be unjust,--heavy things to be -heavy,--the existent and the real, to be the existent and the real. -If then the lawgiver in any of his laws fails to attain this reality, -he fails in the very purpose essential to the conception of law:[41] -_i. e._ his pretended law is no law at all. - -[Footnote 39: See the remarkable passage in the fifth book of the -Republic, pp. 479-480; compare vii. 538 E.] - -[Footnote 40: Plato, Minos, 314 D. - -The same argument is brought to bear by the Platonic Sokrates against -Hippias in the Hippias Major, 284-285. If the laws are not really -profitable, which is the only real purpose for which they were -established, they are no laws at all. The Spartans are [Greek: -para/nomoi]. Some of the answers assigned to Hippias (284 D) are -pertinent enough; but he is overborne.] - -[Footnote 41: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: O(\s a)\n a)/ra tou= -o)/ntos a(marta/ne, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]] - -[Side-note: Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work -of systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man.] - -By _Law_ then, Plato means--not the assemblage of actual -positive rules, nor any general property common to and characteristic -of them, nor the free determination of an assembled Demos as -distinguished from the mandates of a despot--but the Type of Law as -it ought to be, and as it would be, if prescribed by a perfectly wise -ruler, aiming at good and knowing how to realise it. This, which is -the ideal of his own mind, Plato worships and reasons upon as if it -were the only reality; as Law by nature, or natural Law, -distinguished from actual positive laws: which last have either been -set by some ill-qualified historical ruler, or have grown up -insensibly. Knowledge, art, philosophy, systematic and constructive, -applied by some one or few exalted individuals, is (in his view) the -only cause capable of producing that typical result which is true, -good, real, permanent, and worthy of the generic name. - -[Side-note: Different applications of this general Platonic -view, in the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_ -Rectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c.] - -In the Minos, this general Platonic view is applied to Law: in the -Politikus, to government and social administration: in the Kratylus, -to naming or language. In the Politikus, we find the received -classification of governments (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) -discarded as improper; and the assertion advanced, That there is only -one government right, true, genuine, really existing--government by -the uncontrolled authority and superintendence of the man of exalted -intelligence: he who is master in the art of governing, whether -such man do in fact hold power anywhere or not. All other governments -are degenerate substitutes for this type, some receding from it less, -some more.[42] Again, in the Kratylus, where names and name-giving -are discussed, Sokrates[43] maintains that things can only be named -according to their true and real nature--that there is, belonging to -each thing, one special and appropriate Name-Form, discernible only -by the sagacity of the intelligent Lawgiver: who alone is competent -to bestow upon each thing its right, true, genuine, real name, -possessing rectitude by nature ([Greek: o)rtho/tes phu/sei]).[44] -This Name-Form (according to Sokrates) is the same in all languages -in so far as they are constructed by different intelligent Lawgivers, -although the letters and syllables in which they may clothe the Form -are very different.[45] If names be not thus apportioned by the -systematic purpose of an intelligent Lawgiver, but raised up by -insensible and unsystematic growth--they will be unworthy substitutes -for the genuine type, though they are the best which actual societies -possess; according to the opinion announced by Kratylus in that same -dialogue, they will not be names at all.[46] - -[Footnote 42: Plato, Politikus, 293 C-E. [Greek: tau/ten o)rthe\n -diaphero/ntos ei)=nai kai\ mo/nen politei/an, e)n e(=| tis a)\n -eu(/riskoi tou\s a)/rchontas a)letho=s e)piste/monas kai\ ou) -dokou=ntas mo/non . . . to/te kai\ kata\ tou\s toiou/tous o(/rous -e(mi=n mo/nen o)rthe\n politei/an ei)=nai r(ete/on. o(/sas de\ -a)/llas le/gomen, _ou) gnesi/as ou)d' o)/ntos ou)/sas lekte/on_, -a)lla\ memimeme/nas tau/ten, a(/s me\n eu)no/mous le/gomen, e)pi\ ta\ -kalli/o, ta\s de\ a)/llas e)pi\ ta\ ai)schi/ona memime=sthai.] - -The historical (Xenophontic) Sokrates asserts this same position in -Xenophon's Memorabilia (iii. 9, 10). "Sokrates said that Kings and -Rulers were those who knew how to command, not those who held the -sceptre or were chosen by election or lot, or had acquired power by -force or fraud," &c. - -The Kings of Sparta and Macedonia, the [Greek: Boule\] and [Greek: -De=mos] of Athens, the Despot of Syracuse or Pherae are here declared -to be not real rulers at all.] - -[Footnote 43: Plato, Kratylus, 387 D.] - -[Footnote 44: Plato, Kratyl. 388 A-E.] - -[Footnote 45: Plato, Kratyl. 389 E, 390 A, 432 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n -ou)/tos a)xio/seis kai\ to\n nomothe/ten to/n te e)ntha/de kai\ to\n -e)n toi=s barba/rois, e(/os a)\n to\ tou= o)no/matos ei)=dos -a)podido=| to\ prose=kon e(ka/sto| e)n o(poiaisou=n sullabai=s, -ou)de\n chei/ro nomothe/ten ei)=nai to\n e)ntha/de e)\ to\n o(pouou=n -a)/llothi?] Compare this with the Minos, 315 E, 316 D, where Sokrates -evades, by an hypothesis very similar, the objection made by the -collocutor, that the laws in one country are very different from -those in another--[Greek: i)/sos ga\r ou)k e)nnoei=s tau=ta -metapetteuo/mena o(/ti tau)ta/ e)stin.]] - -[Footnote 46: Plato, Kratyl. 430 A, 432 A, 433 D, 435 C. - -Kratylus says that a name badly given is no name at all; just as -Sokrates says in the Minos that a bad law is no law at all.] - -[Side-note: Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on -this divine type or natural rectitude.] - -The Kretan Minos (we here find it affirmed), son, companion, and -pupil of Zeus, has learnt to establish laws of this divine type or -natural rectitude: the proof of which is, that the ancient Kretan -laws have for immemorial ages remained, and still do remain,[47] -unchanged. But when Sokrates tries to determine, Wherein consists -this Law-Type? What is it that the wise Lawgiver prescribes for the -minds of the citizens--as the wise gymnastic trainer prescribes -proper measure of nourishment and exercise for their bodies?--the -question is left unanswered. Sokrates confesses with shame that he -cannot answer it: and the dialogue ends in a blank. The -reader--according to Plato's manner--is to be piqued and shamed -into the effort of meditating the question for himself. - -[Footnote 47: Plato, Minos, 319 B, 321 A.] - -[Side-note: The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in -a Trilogy along with the Leges.] - -An attempt to answer this question will be found in Plato's Treatise -De Legibus--in the projected Kretan colony, of which he there -sketches the fundamental laws. Aristophanes of Byzantium very -naturally placed this treatise as sequel to the Minos; second in the -Trilogy of which the Minos was first.[48] - -[Footnote 48: I reserve for an Appendix some further remarks upon the -genuineness of Hipparchus and Minos.] - -[Side-note: Explanations of the word Law--confusion in its -meaning.] - -Whoever has followed the abstract of the Minos, which I have just -given, will remark the different explanations of the word Law--both -those which are disallowed, and that which is preferred, though left -incomplete, by Sokrates. On this same subject, there are in many -writers, modern as well an ancient, two distinct modes of confusion -traceable--pointed out by eminent recent jurists, such as Mr. -Bentham, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Maine. 1. Between Law as it is, and Law -as it ought to be. 2. Between Laws Imperative, set by intelligent -rulers, and enforced by penal sanction--and Laws signifying -uniformities of fact expressed in general terms, such as the Law of -Gravitation, Crystallisation, &c.--We can hardly say that in the -dialogue Minos, Plato falls into the first of these two modes of -confusion: for he expressly says that he only recognises the Ideal of -Law, or Law as it ought to be (actual Laws everywhere being -disallowed, except in so far as they conform thereunto). But he does -fall into the second, when he identifies the Lawful with the Real or -Existent. His Ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact. - -There is also much confusion, if we compare the Minos with other -dialogues; wherein Plato frequently talks of Laws as the laws and -customs actually existing or imperative in any given state--Athens, -Sparta, or elsewhere ([Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena], according to -the first words in the Minos). For example, in the harangue which he -supposes to be addressed to Sokrates in the Kriton, and which he -invests with so impressive a character--the Laws of Athens are -introduced as speakers: but according to the principles laid down in -the Minos, three-fourths of the Laws of Athens could not be regarded -as laws at all. If therefore we take Plato's writings throughout, we -shall not find that he is constant to one uniform sense of the word -Law, or that he escapes the frequent confusion between Law as it -actually exists and Law as it ought to be.[49] - -[Footnote 49: The first explanation of [Greek: No/mos] advanced by -the Companion in reply to Sokrates (viz. [Greek: No/mos = ta\ -nomizo/mena], coincides substantially with the meaning of [Greek: -No/mos basileu\s] in Pindar and Herodotus (see above, chap. viii.), -who is an imaginary ruler, occupying a given region, and enforcing -[Greek: ta\ nomizo/mena]. It coincides also with the precept [Greek: -No/mo| po/leos], as prescribed by the Pythian priestess to applicants -who asked advice about the proper forms of religious worship (Xen. -Mem. i. 3, 1); though this precept, when Cicero comes to report it -(Legg. ii. 16, 40), appears divested of its simplicity, and -over-clouded with the very confusion touched upon in my text. Aristotle -does not keep clear of the confusion (compare Ethic. Nikom. i. 1, -1094, b. 16, and v. 5, 1130, b. 24). I shall revert again to the -distinction between [Greek: no/mos] and [Greek: phu/sis], in touching -on other Platonic dialogues. Cicero expressly declares (Legg. ii. 5, -11), conformably to what is said by the Platonic Sokrates in the -Minos, that a bad law, however passed in regular form, is no law at -all; and this might be well if he adhered consistently to the same -phraseology, but he perpetually uses, in other places, the words -_Lex_ and _Leges_ to signify laws actually in force at -Rome, good or bad. - -Mr. Bentham gives an explanation of Law or The Law, which coincides -with [Greek: No/mos = ta\ nomizo/mena]. He says (Principles of Morals -and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. 17, p. 257, ed. 1823), "Now Law, or The -Law, taken indefinitely, is an abstract and collective term, which, -when it means anything, can mean neither more nor less than the sum -total of a number of individual laws taken together". - -Mr. Austin in his Lectures, 'The Province of Jurisprudence -Determined', has explained more clearly and copiously than any -antecedent author, the confused meanings of the word Law adverted to -in my text. See especially his first lecture and his fifth, pp. 88 -seq. and 171 seq., 4th ed.] - -* * * * * - - -APPENDIX. - -In continuing to recognise Hipparchus and Minos as Platonic works, -contrary to the opinion of many modern critics, I have to remind the -reader, not only that both are included in the Canon of Thrasyllus, -but that the Minos was expressly acknowledged by Aristophanes of -Byzantium, and included by him among the Trilogies: showing that it -existed then (220 B.C.) in the Alexandrine Museum as a -Platonic work. The similarity between the Hipparchus and Minos is -recognised by all the Platonic critics, most of whom declare that -both of them are spurious. Schleiermacher affirms and vindicates this -opinion in his Einleitung and notes: but it will be convenient to -take the arguments advanced to prove the spuriousness, as they are -set forth by M. Boeckh, in his "Comment. in Platonis qui vulgo fertur -Minoem": in which treatise, though among his early works, the case is -argued with all that copious learning and critical ability, which -usually adorn his many admirable contributions to the improvement of -philology. - -M. Boeckh not only rejects the pretensions of Hipparchus and Minos to -be considered as works of Plato, but advances an affirmative -hypothesis to show what they are. He considers these two dialogues, -together with those De Justo, and De Virtute (two short dialogues in -the pseudo-Platonic list, not recognised by Thrasyllus) as among the -dialogues published by Simon; an Athenian citizen and a shoemaker by -trade, in whose shop Sokrates is said to have held many of his -conversations. Simon is reported to have made many notes of these -conversations, and to have composed and published, from them, a -volume of thirty-three dialogues (Diog. L. ii. 122), among the titles -of which there are two--[Greek: Peri\ Philkerdou=s] and [Greek: Peri\ -No/mou]. Simon was, of course, contemporary with Plato; but somewhat -older in years. With this part of M. Boeckh's treatise, respecting -the supposed authorship of Simon, I have nothing to do. I only notice -the arguments by which he proposes to show that Hipparchus and Minos -are not works of Plato. - -In the first place, I notice that M. Boeckh explicitly recognises -them as works of an author contemporary with Plato, not later -than 380 B.C. (p. 46). Hereby many of the tests, whereby we -usually detect spurious works, become inapplicable. - -In the second place, he admits that the dialogues are composed in -good Attic Greek, suitable to the Platonic age both in character and -manners--"At veteris esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui -mores, totus denique character, spondeat," p. 32. - -The reasons urged by M. Boeckh to prove the spuriousness of the -Minos, are first, that it is unlike Plato--next, that it is too much -like Plato. "Dupliciter dialogus a Platonis ingenio discrepat: partim -quod parum, partim quod nimium, similis ceteris ejusdem scriptis sit. -Parum similis est in rebus permultis. Nam cum Plato adhuc vivos ac -videntes aut nuper defunctos notosque homines, ut scenicus poeta -actores, moribus ingeniisque accurate descriptis, nominatim producat -in medium--in isto opusculo cum Socrate colloquens persona plane -incerta est ac nomine carens: quippe cum imperitus scriptor esset -artis illius colloquiis suis _dulcissimas veneres_ illas -inferendi, quae ex peculiaribus personarum moribus pingendis -redundant, atque a Platone ut flores per amplos dialogorum hortos -sunt disseminatae" (pp. 7-8): again, p. 9, it is complained that there -is an "infinitus secundarius collocutor" in the Hipparchus. - -Now the sentence, just transcribed from M. Boeckh, shows that he had -in his mind as standard of comparison, a certain number of the -Platonic works, but that he did not take account of all of them. The -Platonic Protagoras begins with a dialogue between Sokrates and an -unknown, nameless person; to whom Sokrates, after a page of -conversation with him, recounts what has just passed between himself, -Protagoras, and others. Next, if we turn to the Sophistes and -Politikus, we find that in both of them, not simply the secundarius -collocutor, but even the principal speaker, is an unknown and -nameless person, described only as a Stranger from Elea, and never -before seen by Sokrates. Again, in the Leges, the principal speaker -is only an [Greek: A)thenai=os xe/nos], without a name. In the face -of such analogies, it is unsafe to lay down a peremptory rule, that -no dialogue can be the work of Plato, which acknowledges as -_collocutor_ an unnamed person. - -Then again--when M. Boeckh complains that the Hipparchus and Minos -are destitute of those "_flores et dulcissimae Veneres_" which -Plato is accustomed to spread through his dialogues--I ask, Where are -the "dulcissimae Veneres" in the Parmenides, Sophistes, Politikus, -Leges, Timaeus, Kritias? I find none. The presence of "dulcissimae -Veneres" is not a condition _sine qua non_, in every -composition which pretends to Plato as its author: nor can the -absence of them be admitted as a reason for disallowing Hipparchus -and Minos. - -The analogy of the Sophistes and Politikus (besides Symposium, -Republic, and Leges) farther shows, that there is nothing wonderful -in finding the titles of Hipparchus and Minos derived from the -subjects ([Greek: Peri\ Philkerdou=s] and [Greek: Peri\ No/mou]), not -from the name of one of the collocutors:--whether we suppose the -titles to have been bestowed by Plato himself, or by some subsequent -editor (Boeckh, p. 10). - -To illustrate his first ground of objection--Dissimilarity between -the Minos and the true Platonic writings--M. Boeckh enumerates (pp. -12-23) several passages of the dialogue which he considers -unplatonic. Moreover, he includes among them (p. 12) examples of -confused and illogical reasoning. I confess that to me this evidence -is noway sufficient to prove that Plato is not the author. That -certain passages may be picked out which are obscure, confused, -inelegant--is certainly no sufficient evidence. If I thought so, I -should go along with Ast in rejecting the Euthydemus, Menon, Laches, -Charmides, Lysis, &c., against all which Ast argues as spurious, -upon evidence of the same kind. It is not too much to say, that -against almost every one of the dialogues, taken severally, a case of -the same kind, more or less plausible, might be made out. You might -in each of them find passages peculiar, careless, awkwardly -expressed. The expression [Greek: te\n a)nthropei/an a)ge/len tou= -so/matos], which M. Boeckh insists upon so much as improper, would -probably have been considered as a mere case of faulty text, if it -had occurred in any other dialogue: and so it may fairly be -considered in the Minos. - -Moreover as to faults of logic and consistency in the reasoning, most -certainly these cannot be held as proving the Minos not to be Plato's -work. I would engage to produce, from most of his dialogues, defects -of reasoning quite as grave as any which the Minos exhibits. On the -principle assumed by M. Boeckh, every one who agreed with Panaetius in -considering the elaborate proof given in the Phaedon, of the -immortality of the soul, as illogical and delusive--would also agree -with Panaetius in declaring that the Phaedon was not the work of Plato. -It is one question, whether the reasoning in any dialogue be good or -bad: it is another question, whether the dialogue be written by Plato -or not. Unfortunately, the Platonic critics often treat the first -question as if it determined the second. - -M. Boeckh himself considers that the evidence arising from -dissimilarity (upon which I have just dwelt) is not the strongest -part of his case. He relies more upon the evidence arising from -_too much similarity_, as proving still more clearly the -spuriousness of the Minos. "Jam pergamus ad alteram partem nostrae -argumentationis, _eamque etiam firmiorem_, de _nimia -similitudine_ Platonicorum aliquot locorum, quae imitationem doceat -subesse. Nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, -Platonem se ipsum haud posse imitari: nisi si quis dubitet de sana -ejus mente" (p. 23). Again, p. 26, "Jam vero in nostro colloquio -Symposium, Politicum, Euthyphronem, Protagoram, Gorgiam, Cratylum, -Philebum, dialogos expressos ac tantum non compilatos reperies". And -M. Boeckh goes on to specify various passages of the Minos, which he -considers to have been imitated, and badly imitated, from one or -other of these dialogues. - -I cannot agree with M. Boeckh in regarding this _nimia -similitudo_ as the strongest part of his case. On the contrary, I -consider it as the weakest: because his own premisses (in my -judgment) not only do not prove his conclusion, but go far to prove -the opposite. When we find him insisting, in such strong language, -upon the great analogy which subsists between the Minos and seven of -the incontestable Platonic dialogues, this is surely a fair proof -that its author is the same as their author. To me it appears as -conclusive as internal evidence ever can be; unless there be some -disproof _aliunde_ to overthrow it. But M. Boeckh produces no -such disproof. He converts these analogies into testimony in his own -favour, simply by bestowing upon them the name _imitatio,--stulta -imitatio_ (p. 27). This word involves an hypothesis, whereby the -point to be proved is assumed--viz.: difference of authorship. "Plato -cannot have imitated himself" (M. Boeckh observes). I cannot admit -such impossibility, even if you describe the fact in that phrase: but -if you say "Plato in one dialogue thought and wrote like Plato in -another"--you describe the same fact in a different phrase, and it -then appears not merely possible but natural and probable. Those very -real analogies, to which M. Boeckh points in the word -_imitatio_, are in my judgment cases of the Platonic thought in -one dialogue being like the Platonic thought in another. The -_similitudo_, between Minos and these other dialogues, can -hardly be called _nimia_, for M. Boeckh himself points out that -it is accompanied with much difference. It is a similitude, such as -we should expect between one Platonic dialogue and another: with this -difference, that whereas, in the Minos, Plato gives the same general -views in a manner more brief, crude, abrupt--in the other dialogues -he works them out with greater fulness of explanation and -illustration, and some degree of change not unimportant. That there -should be this amount of difference between one dialogue of Plato and -another appears to me perfectly natural. On the other hand--that -there should have been a contemporary _falsarius_ (scriptor -miser, insulsus, vilissimus, to use phrases of M. Boeckh), who -studied and pillaged the best dialogues of Plato, for the purpose of -putting together a short and perverted abbreviation of them--and who -contrived to get his miserable abbreviation recognised by the -Byzantine Aristophanes among the genuine dialogues notwithstanding -the existence of the Platonic school--this, I think highly -improbable. - -I cannot therefore agree with M. Boeckh in thinking, that "ubique se -prodens Platonis imitatio" (p. 31) is an irresistible proof of -spuriousness: nor can I think that his hypothesis shows itself to -advantage, when he says, p. 10--"Ipse autem dialogus (Minos) quum -post Politicum compositus sit, quod quaedam in eo dicta rebus ibi -expositis manifeste nitantur, ut paullo post ostendemus--quis est qui -artificiosissimum philosophum, postquam ibi (in Politico) accuratius -de natura legis egisset, de ea iterum putet negligenter egisse?"--I -do not think it so impossible as it appears to M. Boeckh, that a -philosopher, after having _written_ upon a given subject -_accuratius_, should subsequently write upon it -_negligenter_. But if I granted this ever so fully, I should -still contend that there remains another alternative. The negligent -workmanship may have preceded the accurate: an alternative which I -think is probably the truth, and which has nothing to exclude it -except M. Boeckh's pure hypothesis, that the Minos must have been -copied from the Politikus. - -While I admit then that the Hipparchus and Minos are among the -inferior and earlier compositions of Plato, I still contend that -there is no ground for excluding them from the list of his works. -Though the Platonic critics of this century are for the most part of -an adverse opinion, I have with me the general authority of the -critics anterior to this century--from Aristophanes of Byzantium down -to Bentley and Ruhnken--see Boeckh, pp. 7-32. - -Yxem defends the genuineness of the Hipparchus--(Ueber Platon's -Kleitophon, p. 8. Berlin, 1846). - - - - - -CHAPTER XV. - -THEAGES. - - -[Side-note: Theages--has been declared spurious by some modern -critics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient.] - -This is among the dialogues declared by Schleiermacher, Ast, -Stallbaum, and various other modern critics, to be spurious and -unworthy of Plato: the production of one who was not merely an -imitator, but a bad and silly imitator.[1] Socher on the other hand -defends the dialogue against them, reckoning it as a juvenile -production of Plato.[2] The arguments which are adduced to prove its -spuriousness appear to me altogether insufficient. It has some -features of dissimilarity with that which we read in other -dialogues--these the above-mentioned critics call un-Platonic: it has -other features of similarity--these they call bad imitation by a -_falsarius_: lastly, it is inferior, as a performance, to the -best of the Platonic dialogues. But I am prepared to expect (and have -even the authority of Schleiermacher for expecting) that some -dialogues will be inferior to others. I also reckon with certainty, -that between two dialogues, both genuine, there will be points of -similarity as well as points of dissimilarity. Lastly, the critics -find marks of a bad, recent, un-Platonic style: but Dionysius of -Halikarnassus--a judge at least equally competent upon such a -matter--found no such marks. He expressly cites the dialogue as the -work of Plato,[3] and explains the peculiar phraseology assigned to -Demodokus by remarking, that the latter is presented as a person of -rural habits and occupations. - -[Footnote 1: Stallbaum, Proleg. pp. 220-225, "ineptus tenebrio," -&c. Schleiermacher, Einleitung, part ii. v. iii. pp. 247-252. -Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 495-497. - -Ast speaks with respect (differing in this respect from the other -two) of the Theages as a composition, though he does not believe it -to be the work of Plato. Schleiermacher also admits (see the end of -his Einleitung) that the style in general has a good Platonic -colouring, though he considers some particular phrases as -un-Platonic.] - -[Footnote 2: Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 92-102. M. Cobet also speaks -of it as a work of Plato (Novae Lectiones, &c., p. 624. Lugd. Bat. -1858).] - -[Footnote 3: Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor. p. 405, Reiske. Compare -Theages, 121 D. [Greek: ei)s to\ a)/stu katabai/nontes]. - -In general, in discussions on the genuineness of any of the Platonic -dialogues, I can do nothing but reply to the arguments of those -critics who consider them spurious. But in the case of the Theages -there is one argument which tends to mark Plato positively as the -author. - -In the Theages, p. 125, the senarius [Greek: sophoi\ tu/rannoi to=n -sopho=n sunousi/a|] is cited as a verse of _Euripides_. Now it -appears that this is an error of memory, and that the verse really -belongs to _Sophokles_, [Greek: e)n Ai)/anti Lokro=|]. If the -error had only appeared in this dialogue, Stallbaum would probably -have cited it as one more instance of stupidity on the part of the -_ineptus tenebrio_ whom he supposes to have written the -dialogue. But unfortunately the error does not belong to the Theages -alone. It is found also in the Republic (viii. 568 B), the most -unquestionable of all the Platonic compositions. Accordingly, -Schleiermacher tells us in his note that the _falsarius_ of the -Theages has copied this error out of the above-named passage of the -Republic of Plato (notes, p. 500). - -This last supposition of Schleiermacher appears to me highly -improbable. Since we know that the mistake is one made by Plato -himself, surely we ought rather to believe that he made it in two -distinct compositions. In other words, the occurrence of the same -exact mistake in the Republic and the Theages affords strong -presumption that both are by the same author--Plato.] - -[Side-note: Persons of the dialogue--Sokrates, with Demodokus -and Theages, father and son. Theages (the son), eager to acquire -knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist.] - -Demodokus, an elderly man (of rank and landed property), and his -youthful son Theages, have come from their Deme to Athens, and enter -into conversation with Sokrates: to whom the father explains, that -Theages has contracted, from the conversation of youthful companions, -an extraordinary ardour for the acquisition of wisdom. The son has -importuned his father to put him under the tuition of one of the -Sophists, who profess to teach wisdom. The father, though not -unwilling to comply with the request, is deterred by the difficulty -of finding a good teacher and avoiding a bad one. He entreats the -advice of Sokrates, who invites the young man to explain what it is -that he wants, over and above the usual education of an Athenian -youth of good family (letters, the harp, wrestling, &c.), which -he has already gone through.[4] - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Theages, 122.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates questions Theages, inviting him to specify -what he wants.] - -_Sokr._--You desire wisdom: but what kind of wisdom? That by -which men manage chariots? or govern horses? or pilot ships? -_Theag._--No: that by which men are governed. _Sokr._--But -what men? those in a state of sickness--or those who are singing in a -chorus--or those who are under gymnastic training? Each of these -classes has its own governor, who bears a special title, and belongs -to a special art by itself--the medical, musical, gymnastic, &c. -_Theag._--No: I mean that wisdom by which we govern, not these -classes alone, but all the other residents in the city along with -them--professional as well as private--men as well as women.[5] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Theages, 124 A-B. Schleiermacher (Einleit. p. -250) censures the prolixity of the inductive process in this -dialogue, and the multitude of examples here accumulated to prove a -general proposition obvious enough without proof. Let us grant this -to be true; we cannot infer from it that the dialogue is not the work -of Plato. By very similar arguments Socher endeavours to show that -the Sophistes and the Politikus are not works of Plato, because in -both these dialogues logical division and differentiation is -accumulated with tiresome prolixity, and applied to most trivial -subjects. But Plato himself (in Politikus, pp. 285-286) explains why -he does so, and tells us that he wishes to familiarise his readers -with logical subdivision and classification as a process. In like -manner I maintain that prolixity in the [Greek: lo/goi e)paktikoi/] -is not to be held as proof of spurious authorship, any more than -prolixity in the process of logical subdivision and classification. - -I noticed the same objection in the case of the First Alkibiades.] - -[Side-note: Theages desires to acquire that wisdom by which he -can govern freemen with their own consent.] - -Sokrates now proves to Theages, that this function and power which he -is desirous of obtaining, is, the function and power of a despot: and -that no one can aid him in so culpable a project. I might yearn (says -Theages) for such despotic power over all: so probably would you and -every other man. But it is not _that_ to which I now aspire. I -aspire to govern freemen, with their own consent; as was done by -Themistokles, Perikles, Kimon, and other illustrious statesmen,[6] -who have been accomplished in the political art. - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Theages, 126 A.] - -_Sokr._--Well, if you wished to become accomplished in the art -of horsemanship, you would put yourself under able horsemen: if in -the art of darting the javelin, under able darters. By parity of -reasoning, since you seek to learn the art of statesmanship, you must -frequent able statesmen.[7] - - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Theages, 126 C.] - -[Side-note: Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to -teach any one else. Theages requests that Sokrates will himself teach -him.] - -_Theag._--No, Sokrates. I have heard of the language which you -are in the habit of using to others. You pointed out to them that -these eminent statesmen cannot train their own sons to be at all -better than curriers: of course therefore they cannot do _me_ -any good.[8] _Sokr._--But what can your father do for you -better than this, Theages? What ground have you for complaining of -him? He is prepared to place you under any one of the best and most -excellent men of Athens, whichever of them you prefer. -_Theag._--Why will not you take me yourself, Sokrates? I look -upon you as one of these men, and I desire nothing better.[9] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Theages, 126 D. Here again Stallbaum (p. 222) -urges, among his reasons for believing the dialogue to be -spurious--How absurd to represent the youthful Theages as knowing -what arguments Sokrates had addressed to others! But the youthful -Theaetetus is also represented as having heard from others the -cross-examinations made by Sokrates (Theaetet. 148 E). So likewise the -youthful sons of Lysimachus--(Laches, 181 A); compare also Lysis, 211 -A.] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Theages, 127 A.] - -Demodokus joins his entreaties with those of Theages to prevail upon -Sokrates to undertake this function. But Sokrates in reply says that -he is less fit for it than Demodokus himself, who has exercised high -political duties, with the esteem of every one; and that if practical -statesmen are considered unfit, there are the professional Sophists, -Prodikus, Gorgias, Polus, who teach many pupils, and earn not merely -good pay, but also the admiration and gratitude of every one--of the -pupils as well as their senior relatives.[10] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Theages, 127 D-E, 128 A.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates declares that he is not competent to -teach--that he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theages -maintains that many of his young friends have profited largely by the -conversation of Sokrates.] - -_Sokr._--I know nothing of the fine things which these Sophists -teach: I wish I did know. I declare everywhere, that I know nothing -whatever except one small matter--what belongs to love. In that, I -surpass every one else, past as well as present.[11] -_Theag._--Sokrates is only mocking us. I know youths (of my own age and -somewhat older), who were altogether worthless and inferior to every -one, before they went to him; but who, after they had frequented his -society, became in a short time superior to all their former rivals. -The like will happen with me, if he will only consent to receive -me.[12] - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Theages, 128 B. [Greek: a)lla\ kai\ le/go de/pou -a)ei/, o(/ti e)go\ tugcha/no, o(s e)/pos ei)pei=n, ou)de\n -e)pista/menos ple/n ge smikrou= tino\s mathe/matos, to=n e)rotiko=n, -tou=to me/ntoi to\ ma/thema par' o(ntinou=n poiou=mai deino\s -ei)=nai, kai\ to=n progegono/ton a)nthro/pon kai\ to=n nu=n.]] - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Theages, 128 C.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he -recites his experience of the divine sign or Daemon.] - -_Sokr._--You do not know how this happens; I will explain it to -you. From my childhood, I have had a peculiar superhuman something -attached to me by divine appointment: a voice, which, whenever it -occurs, warns me to abstain from that which I am about to do, -but never impels me.[13] Moreover, when any one of my friends -mentions to me what he is about to do, if the voice shall then occur -to me it is a warning for him to abstain. The examples of Charmides -and Timarchus (here detailed by Sokrates) prove what I say: and many -persons will tell you how truly I forewarned them of the ruin of the -Athenian armament at Syracuse.[14] My young friend Sannion is now -absent, serving on the expedition under Thrasyllus to Ionia: on his -departure, the divine sign manifested itself to me, and I am -persuaded that some grave calamity will befall him. - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Theages, 128 D. [Greek: e)sti ga/r ti thei/a| -moi/ra| parepo/menon e)moi\ e)k paido\s a)rxa/menon daimo/nion; -e)/sti de\ tou=to phone/, e)\ o(/tan ge/netai, a)ei/ moi semai/nei, -o(\ a)\n me/llo pra/ttein, tou/tou a)potrope/n, protre/pei de\ -ou)de/pote.]] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Theag. 129.] - -[Side-note: The Daemon is favourable to some persons, adverse to -others. Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion -profits by the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt -anything from Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him.] - -These facts I mention to you (Sokrates continues) because it is that -same divine power which exercises paramount influence over my -intercourse with companions.[15] Towards many, it is positively -adverse; so that I cannot even enter into companionship with them. -Towards others, it does not forbid, yet neither does it co-operate: -so that they derive no benefit from me. There are others again in -whose case it co-operates; these are the persons to whom you allude, -who make rapid progress.[16] With some, such improvement is lasting: -others, though they improve wonderfully while in my society, yet -relapse into commonplace men when they leave me. Aristeides, for -example (grandson of Aristeides the Just), was one of those who made -rapid progress while he was with me. But he was forced to absent -himself on military service; and on returning, he found as my -companion Thucydides (son of Melesias), who however had quarrelled -with me for some debate of the day before. I understand (said -Aristeides to me) that Thucydides has taken offence and gives himself -airs; he forgets what a poor creature he was, before he came to -you.[17] I myself, too, have fallen into a despicable condition. -When I left you, I was competent to discuss with any one and make a -good figure, so that I courted debate with the most accomplished men. -Now, on the contrary, I avoid them altogether--so thoroughly am I -ashamed of my own incapacity. Did the capacity (I, _Sokrates_, -asked Aristeides) forsake you all at once, or little by little? -Little by little, he replied. And when you possessed it (I asked), -did you get it by learning from me? or in what other way? I will tell -you, Sokrates (he answered), what seems incredible, yet is -nevertheless true.[18] I never learnt from you any thing at all. You -yourself well know this. But I always made progress, whenever I was -along with you, even if I were only in the same house without being -in the same room; but I made greater progress, if I was in the same -room--greater still, if I looked in your face, instead of turning my -eyes elsewhere--and the greatest of all, by far, if I sat close and -touching you. But now (continued Aristeides) all that I then acquired -has dribbled out of me.[19] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Theages, 129 E. [Greek: tau=ta de\ pa/nta -ei)/reka/ soi, o(/ti e( du/namis au(/te tou= daimoni/ou tou/tou kai\ -ei)s ta\s sunousi/as to=n met' e)mou= sundiatribo/nton to\ a(/pan -du/natai. polloi=s me\n ga\r e)nantiou=tai, kai\ ou)k e)/sti tou/tois -o)phelethenai met' e)mou= diatri/bousin.]] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Theag. 129 E. [Greek: oi(=s d' a)\n sulla/betai -te=s sunousi/as e( tou= daimo/niou du/namis, ou(=toi ei)sin o(=n kai\ -su\ e)/|sthesai; tachu\ ga\r parachre=ma e)pidido/asin.]] - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Theag. 130 A-B. [Greek: Ti/ dai/? ou)k oi)=den, -e)/phe, pri\n soi\ suggene/sthai, oi(=on e)=n to\ a)ndra/podon?]] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Theag. 130 D. [Greek: E(ni/ka de/ soi -parege/neto (e( du/namis), po/teron matho/nti par' e)mou= ti -parege/neto, e)/ tini a)/llo| tro/po|? E)go/ soi, e)/phe, e)ro=, o)= -So/krates, a)/piston me\n ne\ tou\s theou/s, a)lethe\s de/. e)go\ -ga\r e)/mathon me\n para\ sou= ou)de\n po/pote, o(s au)to\s oi)=stha; -e)pedi/doun de\ o(pote soi sunei/en, ka)\n ei) e)n te=| au)te=| -mo/non oi)ki/a| ei)/en, me\ e)n to=| au)to=| de\ oi)ke/mati], -&c.] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Theag. 130 E. [Greek: polu\ de\ ma/lista kai\ -plei=ston e)pedi/doun, o(po/te par' au)to/n se kathoi/men -e)cho/meno/s sou kai\ a(pto/menos. nu=n de/, e)= d' o(/s, pa=sa -e)kei/ne e(\ e(/xis e)xer)r(u/eken.]] - -[Side-note: Theages expresses his anxiety to be received as the -companion of Sokrates.] - -_Sokr._--I have now explained to you, Theages, what it is to -become my companion. If it be the pleasure of the God, you will make -great and rapid progress: if not, not. Consider, therefore, whether -it is not safer for you to seek instruction from some of those who -are themselves masters of the benefits which they impart, rather than -to take your chance of the result with me.[20] _Theag._--I shall -be glad, Sokrates, to become your companion, and to make trial of -this divine coadjutor. If he shows himself propitious, that will be -the best of all: if not, we can then take counsel, whether I shall -try to propitiate him by prayer, sacrifice, or any other means which -the prophets may recommend or whether I shall go to some other -teacher.[21] - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Theag. 130 E. [Greek: o(/ra ou)=n me/ soi -a)sphale/steron e)=| par' e)kei/non tini\ paideu/esthai, oi(\ -e)gkratei=s au)toi/ ei)si te=s o)phelei/as, e)\n o)phelou=si tou\s -a)nthro/pous, ma=llon e)\ par' e)mou= o(/, ti a)\n tu/che|, tou=to -pra=xai.]] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Theag. 131 A.] - -* * * * * - -[Side-note: Remarks on the Theages--analogy with the -Laches.] - -The Theages figured in the list of Thrasyllus as first in the fifth -Tetralogy: the other three members of the same Tetralogy being -Charmides, Laches, Lysis. Some persons considered it suitable to read -as first dialogue of all.[22] There are several points of analogy -between the Theages and the Laches, though with a different turn -given to them. Aristeides and Thucydides are mentioned in both of -them: Sokrates also is solicited to undertake the duty of teacher. -The ardour of the young Theages to acquire wisdom reminds us of -Hippokrates at the beginning of the Protagoras. The string of -questions put by Sokrates to Theages, requiring that what is called -wisdom shall be clearly defined and specialised, has its parallel in -many of the Platonic dialogues. Moreover the declaration of Sokrates, -that he knows nothing except about matters of love, but that in them -he is a consummate master--is the same as what he explicitly declares -both in the Symposion and other dialogues.[23] - -[Footnote 22: Diog. L. iii. 59-61.] - -[Footnote 23: Symposion, 177 E. [Greek: ou)/te ga\r a)/n pou e)go\ -a)pophe/saimi, o(\s ou)de/n phemi a)/llo e)pi/stasthai e)\ ta\ -e)rotika/.] Compare the same dialogue, p. 212 B, 216 C. Phaedrus, 227 -E, 257 A; Lysis, 204 B. Compare also Xenoph. Memor. ii. 6, 28; -Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 27. - -It is not reasonable to treat this declaration of Sokrates, in the -Theages, as an evidence that the dialogue is the work of a -_falsarius_, when a declaration quite similar is ascribed to -Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues.] - -[Side-note: Chief peculiarity of the Theages--stress laid upon -the divine sign or Daemon.] - -But the chief peculiarity of the Theages consists in the stress which -is laid upon the Daemon, the divine voice, the inspiration of -Sokrates. This divine auxiliary is here described, not only as giving -a timely check or warning to Sokrates, when either he or his friends -contemplated any inauspicious project--but also as intervening, in -the case of those youthful companions with whom he conversed, to -promote the improvement of one, to obstruct that of others; so that -whether Sokrates will produce any effect or not in improving any one, -depends neither upon his own efforts nor upon those of the recipient, -but upon the unpredictable concurrence of a divine agency.[24] - -[Footnote 24: See some remarks on this point in Appendix.] - -[Side-note: Plato employs this divine sign here to render some -explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of -his unequal influence upon different companions.] - -Plato employs the Sokratic Daemon, in the Theages, for a philosophical -purpose, which, I think, admits of reasonable explanation. During the -eight (perhaps ten) years of his personal communion with Sokrates, -he had had large experience of the variable and unaccountable -effect produced by the Sokratic conversation upon different hearers: -a fact which is also attested by the Xenophontic Memorabilia. This -difference of effect was in no way commensurate to the unequal -intelligence of the hearers. Chaerephon, Apollodorus, Kriton, seem to -have been ordinary men:--[25] while Kritias and Alkibiades, who -brought so much discredit both upon Sokrates and his teaching, -profited little by him, though they were among the ablest pupils that -he ever addressed: moreover Antisthenes, and Aristippus, probably did -not appear to Plato (since he greatly dissented from their -philosophical views) to have profited much by the common -companionship with Sokrates. Other companions there must have been -also personally known to Plato, though not to us: for we must -remember that Sokrates passed his whole day in talking with all -listeners. Now when Plato in after life came to cast the ministry of -Sokrates into dramatic scenes, and to make each scene subservient to -the illustration of some philosophical point of view, at least a -negative--he was naturally led to advert to the Daemon or divine -inspiration, which formed so marked a feature in the character of his -master. The concurrence or prohibition of this divine auxiliary -served to explain why it was that the seed, sown broadcast by -Sokrates, sometimes fructified, and sometimes did not fructify, or -speedily perished afterwards--when no sufficient explanatory -peculiarity could be pointed out in the ground on which it fell. It -gave an apparent reason for the perfect singularity of the course -pursued by Sokrates: for his preternatural acuteness in one -direction, and his avowed incapacity in another: for his mastery of -the Elenchus, convicting men of ignorance, and his inability to -supply them with knowledge: for his refusal to undertake the duties -of a teacher. All these are mysterious features of the Sokratic -character. The intervention of the Daemon appears to afford an -explanation, by converting them into religious mysteries: which, -though it be no explanation at all, yet is equally efficacious by -stopping the mouth of the questioner, and by making him believe that -it is guilt and impiety to ask for explanation--as Sokrates -himself declared in regard to astronomical phenomena, and as -Herodotus feels, when his narrative is crossed by strange religious -legends.[26] - -[Footnote 25: Xenophon, Apol. Sokr. 28. -[Greek: A)pollo/doros--e)pithume/tes me\n i)schuro=s au)tou=, -a)/llos d' eu)e/thes.]--Plat. Phaedon, 117 D.] - -[Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. iv. 7, 5-6; Herodot. ii. 3, 45-46.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates, while continually finding fault with -other teachers, refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an -excuse for his refusal. The Theages furnishes an excuse.] - -In this manner, the Theages is made by Plato to exhibit one way of -parrying the difficulty frequently addressed to Sokrates by various -hearers: "You tell us that the leading citizens cannot even teach -their own sons, and that the Sophists teach nothing worth having: you -perpetually call upon us to seek for better teachers, without telling -us where such are to be found. We entreat you to teach us yourself, -conformably to your own views." - -If a leader of political opposition, after years employed in -denouncing successive administrators as ignorant and iniquitous, -refuses, when invited, to take upon himself the business of -administration--an intelligent admirer must find some decent pretence -to colour the refusal. Such a pretence is found for Sokrates in the -Theages: "I am not my own master on this point. I am the instrument -of a divine ally, without whose active working I can accomplish -nothing: who forbids altogether my teaching of one man--tolerates, -without assisting, my unavailing lessons to another--assists -efficaciously in my teaching of a third, in which case alone the -pupil receives any real benefit. The assistance of this divine ally -is given or withheld according to motives of his own, which I cannot -even foretell, much less influence. I should deceive you therefore if -I undertook to teach, when I cannot tell whether I shall do good or -harm." - -The reply of Theages meets this scruple. He asks permission to make -the experiment, and promises to propitiate the divine auxiliary by -prayer and sacrifice; under which reserve Sokrates gives consent. - -[Side-note: Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, -allude to the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working -essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person.] - -It is in this way that the Daemon or divine auxiliary serves the -purpose of reconciling what would otherwise be an inconsistency in -the proceedings of Sokrates. I mean, that such is the purpose served -in _this_ dialogue: I know perfectly that Plato deals with the -case differently elsewhere: but I am not bound (as I have said -more than once) to force upon all the dialogues one and the same -point of view. That the agency of the Gods was often and in the most -important cases, essentially undiscoverable and unpredictable, and -that in such cases they might sometimes be prevailed on to give -special warnings to favoured persons--were doctrines which the -historical Sokrates in Xenophon asserts with emphasis.[27] The Daemon -of Sokrates was believed, both by himself and his friends, to be a -special privilege and an extreme case of divine favour and -communication to him.[28] It was perfectly applicable to the scope of -the Theages, though Plato might not choose always to make the same -employment of it. It is used in the same general way in the -Theaetetus;[29] doubtless with less expansion, and blended with -another analogy (that of the mid-wife) which introduces a -considerable difference.[30] - -[Footnote 27: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 8-9-19. - -Euripid. Hecub. 944. - -[Greek: phu/rousi d' au)ta\ theoi\ pa/lin te kai\ pro/so, -taragmo\n e)ntithe/ntes, o(s a)gnosi/a| -se/bomen au)tou/s.]] - -[Footnote 28: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 3, 12.] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Theaetet. 150 D-E.] - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. 33 C. [Greek: e)moi\ de\ tou=to, -o(s e)go/ phemi, proste/taktai u(po\ toou= theou= pra/ttein kai\ e)k -manteio=n kai\ e)x e)nupni/on kai\ panti\ tro/po|, o(=|pe/r ti/s pote -kai\ a)/lle thei/a moio/ra a)nthro/po| kai\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe -pra/ttein.] 40 A. [Greek: e( ga\r ei)othui=a/ moi mantike\ e( tou= -daimoni/ou e)n me\n to=| pro/sthen _chro/no| panti\ pa/nu pukne\ -a)ei\ e)=n kai\ pa/nu e)pi\ smikroi=s e)nantioume/ne_, ei)/ ti -me/lloimi me\ o)rtho=s pra/xein.] Compare Xenophon, Memor. iv. 8, 5; -Apol. Sokr. c. 13.] - - - - -APPENDIX. - -[Greek: To\ daimo/nion semei=on.] - - -Here is one of the points most insisted on by Schleiermacher and -Stallbaum, as proving that the Theages is not the work of Plato. -These critics affirm (to use the language of Stallbaum, Proleg. p. -220) "Quam Plato alias de Socratis daemonio prodidit sententiam, ea -longissime recedit ab illa ratione, quae in hoc sermone exposita est". -He says that the representation of the Daemon of Sokrates, given in -the Theages, has been copied from a passage in the Theaetetus, by an -imitator who has not understood the passage, p. 150, D, E. But Socher -(p. 97) appears to me to have shown satisfactorily, that there is no -such material difference as these critics affirm between this passage -of the Theaetetus and the Theages. In the Theaetetus, Sokrates -declares, that none of his companions learnt any thing from him, but -that all of them [Greek: oi(=sper a)\n o( theo\s parei/ke|] (the very -same term is used at the close of the Theages--131 A, [Greek: e)a\n -me\n parei/ke| e(mi=n--to\ daimo/nion]) made astonishing progress and -improvement in his company. Stallbaum says, "Itaque [Greek: o( -theo\s], qui ibi memoratur, non est Socratis daemonium, sed potius -deus _i.e._ sors divina. Quod non perspiciens _noster -tenebrio_ protenus illud daemonium, quod Socrates sibi semper -adesse dictitabat, ad eum dignitatis et potentiae gradum evexit, ut, -&c." I agree with Socher in thinking that the phrase [Greek: o( -theo\s] in the Theaetetus has substantially the same meaning as -[Greek: to\ daimo/nion] in the Theages. Both Schleiermacher (Notes on -the Apology, p. 432) and Ast (p. 482), have notes on the phrase -[Greek: to\ daimo/nion]--and I think the note of Ast is the more -instructive of the two. In Plato and Xenophon, the words [Greek: to\ -daimo/nion], [Greek: to\ thei=on], are in many cases -undistinguishable in meaning from [Greek: o( dai/mon], [Greek: o( -theo/s]. Compare the Phaedrus, 242 E, about [Greek: theo\s] and -[Greek: thei=o/n ti]. Sokrates, in his argument against Meletus in -the Apology (p. 27) emphatically argues that no man could believe in -any thing [Greek: daimo/nion], without also believing in [Greek: -daimo/nes]. The special [Greek: thei=o/n ti kai\ daimo/nion -(Apol. p. 31 C), which presented itself in regard to him and his -proceedings, was only one of the many modes in which (as he believed) -[Greek: o( theo/s] commanded and stimulated him to work upon the -minds of the Athenians:--[Greek: e)moi\ de\ tou=to, o(s e)go/ phemi, -proste/taktai u(po\ tou= theou= pra/ttein kai\ e)k manteio=n kai\ e)x -e)nupni/on kai\ panti\ tro/po|, o(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\ a)/lle thei/a -moi=ra a)nthro/po| kai\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein] (Apol. p. 33 -C). So again in Apol. p. 40 A, B, [Greek: e( ei)othui=a/ moi mantike\ -e( tou= daimoni/ou]--and four lines afterwards we read the very same -fact intimated in the words, [Greek: to\ tou= theou= semei=on], where -Sokratis daemonium--and Deus--are identified: thus refuting the -argument above cited from Stallbaum. There is therefore no such -discrepancy, in reference to [Greek: to\ daimo/nion], as Stallbaum -and Schleiermacher contend for. We perceive indeed this difference -between them--that in the Theaetetus, the simile of the obstetric art -is largely employed, while it is not noticed in the Theages. But we -should impose an unwarrantable restriction upon Plato's fancy, if we -hindered him from working out his variety and exuberance of -metaphors, and from accommodating each dialogue to the metaphor -predominant with him at the time. - -Moreover, in respect to what is called the Daemon of Sokrates, we -ought hardly to expect that either Plato or Xenophon would always be -consistent even with themselves. It is unsafe for a modern critic to -determine beforehand, by reason or feelings of his own, in what -manner either of them would speak upon this mysterious subject. The -belief and feeling of a divine intervention was very real on the part -of both, but their manner of conceiving it might naturally fluctuate: -and there was, throughout all the proceedings of Sokrates, a mixture -of the serious and the playful, of the sublime and the eccentric, of -ratiocinative acuteness with impulsive superstition--which it is -difficult to bring into harmonious interpretation. Such heterogeneous -mixture is forcibly described in the Platonic Symposium, pp. 215-222. -When we consider how undefined, and undefinable, the idea of this -[Greek: daimo/nion] was, we cannot wonder if Plato ascribes to it -different workings and manifestations at different times. Stallbaum -affirms that it is made ridiculous in the Theages: and Kuehner -declares that Plutarch makes it ridiculous, in his treatise De Genio -Sokratia (Comm. ad. Xenoph. Memor. p. 23). But this is because its -agency is described more in detail. You can easily present it in a -ridiculous aspect, by introducing it as intervening on petty and -insignificant matters. Now it is remarkable, that in the Apology, we -are expressly told that it actually did intervene on the most -trifling occasions--[Greek: pa/nu e)pi\ smikroi=s -e)nantioume/ne]. The business of an historian of philosophy is, to -describe it as it was really felt and believed by Sokrates and -Plato--whether a modern critic may consider the description -ridiculous or not. - -When Schleiermacher says (Einleitung, p. 248), respecting the -_falsarius_ whom he supposes to have written the Theages--"Damit -ist ihm begegnet, auf eine hoechst verkehrte Art wunderbar -zusammenzuruehren diese goettliche Schickung, und jenes persoenliche -Vorgefuehl welches dem Sokrates zur goettlichen Stimme ward".--I -contend that the mistake is chargeable to Schleiermacher himself, for -bisecting into two phenomena that which appears in the Apology as the -same phenomenon under two different names--[Greek: to\ -daimo/nion]--[Greek: to\ tou= theou= semei=on]. Besides, to treat the -Daemon as a mere "personal presentiment" of Sokrates, may be a true -view:--but it is the view of one who does not inhale the same religious -atmosphere as Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon. It cannot therefore be -properly applied in explaining their sayings or doings. Kuehner, who treats -the Theages as not composed by Plato, grounds this belief partly on the -assertion, that the [Greek: daimo/nion] of Sokrates is described -therein as something peculiar to Sokrates; which, according to -Kuehner, was the fiction of a subsequent time. By Sokrates and his -contemporaries (Kuehner says) it was considered "non sibi soli tanquam -proprium quoddam beneficium a Diis tributum, sed commune sibi esse -cum caeteris hominibus" (pp. 20-21). I dissent entirely from this -view, which is contradicted by most of the passages noticed even by -Kuehner himself. It is at variance with the Platonic Apology, as well -as with the Theaetetus (150 D), and Republic (vi. 496 C). Xenophon -does indeed try, in the first Chapter of the Memorabilia, as the -defender of Sokrates, to soften the _invidia_ against Sokrates, -by intimating that other persons had communications from the Gods as -well as he. But we see plainly, even from other passages of the -Memorabilia, that this was not the persuasion of Sokrates himself, -nor of his friends, nor of his enemies. They all considered it (as it -is depicted in the Theages also) to be a special privilege and -revelation. - - - - - - -CHAPTER XVI. - -ERASTAE OR ANTERASTAE--RIVALES. - - -The main subject of this short dialogue is--What is philosophy? -[Greek: e( philosophi/a--to\ philosophei=n]. How are we to explain or -define it? What is its province and purport? - -[Side-note: Erastae--subject and persons of the -dialogue--dramatic introduction--interesting youths in the palaestra.] - -Instead of the simple, naked, self-introducing, conversation, which -we read in the Menon, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Sokrates recounts a -scene and colloquy, which occurred when he went into the house of -Dionysius the grammatist or school-master,[1] frequented by many -elegant and high-born youths as pupils. Two of these youths were -engaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical -problem, in the presence of various spectators; and especially of two -young men, rivals for the affection of one of them. Of these rivals, -the one is a person devoted to music, letters, discourse, -philosophy:--the other hates and despises these pursuits, devoting -himself to gymnastic exercise, and bent on acquiring the maximum of -athletic force.[2] It is much the same contrast as that between the -brothers Amphion and Zethus in the Antiope of Euripides--which is -beautifully employed as an illustration by Plato in the Gorgias.[3] - -[Footnote 1: Plato, Erastae, 132. [Greek: ei)s Dionusi/ou tou= -grammatistou= ei)se=lthon, kai\ ei)=don au)to/thi to=n te ne/on tou\s -e)pieikesta/tous dokou=ntas ei)=nai te\n i)de/an kai\ pate/ron -eu)doki/mon kai\ tou/ton e)rasta/s.]] - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Erast. 132 E.] - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Gorgias, 485-486. Compare Cicero De Oratore, ii. -37, 156.] - -[Side-note: Two rival Erastae--one of them literary, devoted to -philosophy--the other gymnastic, hating philosophy.] - -As soon as Sokrates begins his interrogatories, the two youths -relinquish[4] their geometrical talk, and turn to him as attentive -listeners. Their approach affects his emotions hardly less than those -of the Erastes. He first enquires from the athletic Erastes, -What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon? It -must surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which -they display? How do you mean _fine_ (replies the athlete)? They -are only prosing about astronomical matters--talking -nonsense--philosophising! The literary rival, on the contrary, treats this -athlete as unworthy of attention, speaks with enthusiastic admiration -of philosophy, and declares that all those to whom it is repugnant -are degraded specimens of humanity. - -[Footnote 4: The powerful sentiment of admiration ascribed to -Sokrates in the presence of these beautiful youths deserves notice as -a point in his character. Compare the beginning of the Charmides and -the Lysis.] - -[Side-note: Question put by Sokrates--What is philosophy? It is -the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest -sum total.] - -_Sokr._--You think philosophy a fine thing? But you cannot tell -whether it is fine or not, unless you know what it is.[5] Pray -explain to me what philosophy is. _Erast._--I will do so -readily. Philosophy consists in the perpetual growth of a man's -knowledge--in his going on perpetually acquiring something new, both -in youth and in old age, so that he may learn as much as possible -during life. Philosophy is polymathy.[6] _Sokr._--You think -philosophy not only a fine thing, but good? _Erast._--Yes--very -good. _Sokr._--But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic? -Is a man's bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or -as much nourishment, as possible? Is such very great quantity good -for the body?[7] - -[Footnote 5: Plat. Erast. 133 A-B.] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Erast. 133 D. [Greek: te\n -philosophi/an--poluma/theian.]] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Erast. 133 E.] - -[Side-note: In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of -exercise which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the -mind also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured -quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?] - -It appears after some debate (in which the other or athletic Erastes -sides with Sokrates[8]) that in regard to exercise and food it is not -the great quantity or the small quantity, which is good for the body--but -the moderate or measured quantity.[9] For the mind, the case is -admitted to be similar. Not the _much_, nor the _little_, -of learning is good for it but the right or measured amount. -_Sokr._--And who is the competent judge, how much of either -is right measure for the body? _Erast._--The physician and the -gymnastic trainer. _Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, how much -seed is right measure for sowing a field? _Erast._--The farmer. -_Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, in reference to the sowing -and planting of knowledge in the mind, which varieties are good, and -how much of each is right measure? - -[Footnote 8: Plat. Erast. 134 B-C. The literary Erastes says to -Sokrates, "To _you_, I have no objection to concede this point, -and to admit that my previous answer must be modified. But if I were -to debate the point only with _him_ (the athletic rival), I -could perfectly well have defended my answer, and even worse answer -still, for _he_ is quite worthless ([Greek: ou)de\n ga/r -e)sti])." - -This is a curious passage, illustrating the dialectic habits of the -day, and the pride felt in maintaining an answer once given.] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Erastae, 134 B-D. [Greek: ta\ me/tria ma/lista -o)phelei=n, a)lla\ me\ ta\ polla\ mede\ ta\ o)li/ga.]] - -[Side-note: No answer given. What is the best conjecture? -Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will -yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as -will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to -practise.] - -The question is one which none of the persons present can answer.[10] -None of them can tell who is the special referee, about training of -mind; corresponding to the physician or the farmer in the analogous -cases. Sokrates then puts a question somewhat different: -_Sokr._--Since we have agreed, that the man who prosecutes -philosophy ought not to learn many things, still less all -things--what is the best conjecture that we can make, respecting the -matters which he ought to learn? _Erast._--The finest and most suitable -acquirements for him to aim at, are those which will yield to him the -greatest reputation as a philosopher. He ought to appear accomplished -in every variety of science, or at least in all the more important; -and with that view, to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to -know:--that is, what belongs to the intelligent critic, as -distinguished from the manual operative: to the planning and -superintending architect, as distinguished from the working -carpenter.[11] _Sokr._--But you cannot learn even two different -arts to this extent--much less several considerable arts. -_Erast._--I do not of course mean that the philosopher can be -supposed to know each of them accurately, like the artist himself--but -only as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated -citizen. That is, he shall be able to appreciate, better than other -hearers, the observations made by the artist: and farther to deliver -a reasonable opinion of his own, so as to be accounted, by all the -hearers, more accomplished in the affairs of the art than -themselves.[12] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Erast. 134 E, 135 A.] - -[Footnote 11: Plat. Erast. 135 B. [Greek: o(/sa xune/seos e)/chetai, -me\ o(/sa cheirourgi/as.]] - -[Footnote 12: Plat. Erast. 135 D.] - -[Side-note: The philosopher is one who is second-best in -several different arts--a Pentathlus--who talks well upon each.] - -_Sokr._--You mean that the philosopher is to be second-best in -several distinct pursuits: like the Pentathlus, who is not -expected to equal either the runner or the wrestler in their own -separate departments, but only to surpass competitors in the five -matches taken together.[13] _Erast._--Yes--I mean what you say. -He is one who does not enslave himself to any one matter, nor works -out any one with such strictness as to neglect all others: he attends -to all of them in reasonable measure.[14] - -[Footnote 13: Plat. Erast. 135 E, 136 A. [Greek: kai\ ou(/tos -gi/gnesthai peri\ pa/nta u(/pakro/n tina a)/ndra to\n -pephilosopheko/ta.] The five matches were leaping, running, throwing -the quoit and the javelin, wrestling.] - -[Footnote 14: Plat. Erast. 136 B. [Greek: a)lla\ pa/nton metri/os -e)phe=phthai.]] - -[Side-note: On what occasions can such second-best men be -useful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one -will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular -practitioner.] - -Upon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross-examine: _Sokr._--Do -you think that good men are useful, bad men useless? _Erast._--Yes -I do. _Sokr._--You think that philosophers, as you describe -them, are useful? _Erast._--Certainly: extremely useful. -_Sokr._--But tell me on what occasions such second-best men are -useful: for obviously they are inferior to each separate artist. If -you fall sick will you send for one of _them_, or for a -professional physician? _Erast._--I should send for both. -_Sokr._--That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you -will send for first and by preference? _Erast._--No doubt I -shall send for the professional physician. _Sokr._--The like -also, if you are in danger on shipboard, you will entrust your life -to the pilot rather than to the philosopher: and so as to all other -matters, as long as a professional man is to be found, the -philosopher is of no use? _Erast._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Our -philosopher then is one of the useless persons: for we assuredly -have professional men at hand. Now we agreed before, that good men -were useful, bad men useless.[15] _Erast._--Yes; that was -agreed. - -[Footnote 15: Plat. Erast. 136 C-D.] - -[Side-note: Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of -learned acquirements.] - -_Sokr._--If then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be -one who has a second-rate knowledge on many subjects, he is useless -so long as there exist professional artists on each subject. Your -definition cannot therefore be correct. Philosophy must be something -quite apart from this multifarious and busy meddling with -different professional subjects, or this multiplication of -learned acquirements. Indeed I fancied, that to be absorbed in -professional subjects and in variety of studies, was vulgar and -discreditable rather than otherwise.[16] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Erast. 137 B.] - -Let us now, however (continues Sokrates), take up the matter in -another way. In regard to horses and dogs, those who punish rightly -are also those who know how to make them better, and to discriminate -with most exactness the good from the bad? _Erast._--Yes: such -is the fact. - -[Side-note: Sokrates changes his course of -examination--questions put to show that there is one special art, regal -and political, of administering and discriminating the bad from the -good.] - -_Sokr._--Is not the case similar with men? Is it not the same -art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best -distinguishes the good from the bad? whether applied to one, few, or -many? _Erast._--It is so.[17] _Sokr._--The art or science, -whereby men punish evil-doers rightly, is the judicial or justice: -and it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad, -either one or many. If any man be a stranger to this art, so as not -to know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself, -whether he be a good or a bad man? _Erast._--Yes: he is. -_Sokr._--To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in -sobriety or temperance; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate. -But this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly--or -justice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same: and the -Delphian rescript, _Know thyself_, does in fact enjoin the -practice both of justice and of sobriety.[18] _Erast._--So it -appears. _Sokr._--Now it is by this same art, when practised by -a king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed; -it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master, -that the house is well-governed: so that this art, justice or -sobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical; and the -just and sober man is at once the true king, statesman, -house-master.[19] _Erast._--I admit it. - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Erast. 137 C-D.] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Erast. 138 A.] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Erast. 138 C.] - -[Side-note: In this art the philosopher must not only be -second-best, competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified -practitioner, competent to act.] - -_Sokr._--Now let me ask you. You said that it was discreditable -for the philosopher, when in company with a physician or any other -craftsman talking about matters of his own craft, not to be able to -follow what he said and comment upon it. Would it not also be -discreditable to the philosopher, when listening to any king, judge, -or house-master, about professional affairs, not to be able to -understand and comment? _Erast._--Assuredly it would be most -discreditable upon matters of such grave moment. _Sokr._--Shall -we say then, that upon these matters also, as well as all others, the -philosopher ought to be a Pentathlus or second-rate performer, -useless so long as the special craftsman is at hand? or shall we not -rather affirm, that he must not confide his own house to any one -else, nor be the second-best within it, but must himself judge and -punish rightly, if his house is to be well administered? -_Erast._--That too I admit.[20] _Sokr._--Farther, if his -friends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes,--if -the city shall command him to act as Dikast or to settle any -difficulty,--in those cases also it will be disgraceful for him to -stand second or third, and not to be first-rate? _Erast._--I -think it will be. _Sokr._--You see then, my friend, philosophy -is something very different from much learning and acquaintance with -multifarious arts or sciences.[21] - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Erast. 138 E. [Greek: Po/teron ou)=n kai\ peri\ -tau=ta le/gomen, pe/ntathlon au)to\n dei=n ei)=nai kai\ u(/pakron, -ta\ deuterei=a e)/chonta pa/nton, to\n philo/sophon, kai\ a)chrei=on -ei)=nai, e(/os a)\n tou/ton tis e)=|? e)\ pro=ton me\n te\n au(tou= -oi)ki/an ou)k a)llo| e)pitrepte/on ou)de ta\ deuterei=a e)n tou/to| -e(kte/on, a)ll' au)to\n kolaste/on dika/zonta o)rtho=s, ei) me/llei -eu)= oi)kei=sthai au)tou= e( oi)ki/a?]] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Erast. 139 A. [Greek: Pollou= a)/ra dei= e(mi=n, -o)= be/ltiste, to\ philosophei=n poluma/theia/ te ei)=nai kai\ e( -peri\ ta\s te/chnas pragmatei/a.]] - -[Side-note: Close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary -Erastes.] - -Upon my saying this (so Sokrates concludes his recital of the -conversation) the literary one of the two rivals was ashamed and held -his peace; while the gymnastic rival declared that I was in the -right, and the other hearers also commended what I had said. - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Remarks--animated manner of the dialogue.] - -The antithesis between the philo-gymnast, hater of philosophy,--and -the enthusiastic admirer of philosophy, who nevertheless cannot -explain what it is--gives much point and vivacity to this short -dialogue. This last person is exhibited as somewhat presumptuous and -confident; thus affording a sort of excuse for the humiliating -cross-examination put upon him by Sokrates to the satisfaction -of his stupid rival. Moreover, the dramatic introduction is full of -animation, like that of the Charmides and Lysis. - -Besides the animated style of the dialogue, the points raised for -discussion in it are of much interest. The word philosophy has at all -times been vague and ambiguous. Certainly no one before -Sokrates--probably no one before Plato--ever sought a definition of it. -In no other Platonic dialogue than this, is the definition of it made a -special topic of research. - -[Side-note: Definition of philosophy--here sought for the -first time--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered.] - -It is here handled in Plato's negative, elenchtic, tentative, manner. -By some of his contemporaries, philosophy was really considered as -equivalent to polymathy, or to much and varied knowledge: so at least -Plato represents it as being considered by Hippias the Sophist, -contrary to the opinion of Protagoras.[22] The exception taken by -Sokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity, without any -standard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be -measured, introduces that governing idea of [Greek: to\ me/trion] -(the moderate, that which conforms to a standard measure) upon which -Plato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues. The -conception of a measure, of a standard of measurement--and of -conformity thereunto, as the main constituent of what is good and -desirable--stands prominent in his mind,[23] though it is not always -handled in the same way. We have seen it, in the Second Alkibiades, -indicated under another name as knowledge of Good or of the Best: -without which, knowledge on special matters was declared to be -hurtful rather than useful.[24] Plato considers that this Measure is -neither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained -intelligence. In the Erastae as elsewhere, such an intelligence is -called for in general terms: but when it is asked, Where is the -person possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental -training--neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To -suggest a question, and direct attention to it, yet still to -leave it unanswered--is a practice familiar with Plato. In this -respect the Erastae is like other dialogues. The answer, if any, -intended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence -is the philosopher himself. - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Protag. 318 E. Compare too, the Platonic -dialogues, Hippias Major and Minor.] - -[Footnote 23: See about [Greek: e( tou= metri/ou phu/sis] as [Greek: -ou)si/a]--as [Greek: o)/ntos gigno/menon].--Plato, Politikus, -283-284. Compare also the Philebus, p. 64 D, and the Protagoras, pp. -356-357, where [Greek: e( metretike\ te/chne] is declared to be the -principal saviour of life and happiness.] - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, ch. xii. p. 16.] - -[Side-note: View taken of the second-best critical talking -man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner.] - -The second explanation of philosophy here given--that the philosopher -is one who is second-best in many departments, and a good talker upon -all, but inferior to the special master in each--was supposed by -Thrasyllus in ancient times to be pointed at Demokritus. By many -Platonic critics, it is referred to those persons whom they single -out to be called Sophists. I conceive it to be applicable (whether -intended or not) to the literary men generally of that age, the -persons called Sophists included. That which Perikles expressed by -the word, when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty -as characteristic features of the Athenian citizen--referred chiefly -to the free and abundant discussion, the necessity felt by every one -for talking over every thing before it was done, yet accompanied with -full energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act.[25] -Speech, ready and pertinent, free conflict of opinion on many -different topics--was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge -acquired. Sokrates passed his life in talking, with every one -indiscriminately, and upon each man's particular subject; often -perplexing the artist himself. Xenophon recounts conversations with -various professional men--a painter, a sculptor, an armourer--and -informs us that it was instructive to all of them, though Sokrates -was no practitioner in any craft.[26] It was not merely Demokritus, -but Plato and Aristotle also, who talked or wrote upon almost every -subject included in contemporary observation. The voluminous works of -Aristotle,--the Timaeus, Republic, and Leges, of Plato,--embrace a -large variety of subjects, on each of which, severally taken, these -two great men were second-best or inferior to some special -proficient. Yet both of them had judgments to give, which it was -important to hear, upon all subjects:[27] and both of them could -probably talk better upon each than the special proficient himself. -Aristotle, for example, would write better upon rhetoric than -Demosthenes--upon tragedy, than Sophokles. Undoubtedly, if an oration -or a tragedy were to be composed--if resolution or action were -required on any real state of particular circumstances--the special -proficient would be called upon to act: but it would be a mistake to -infer from hence, as the Platonic Sokrates intimates in the Erastae, -that the second-best, or theorizing reasoner, was a useless man. The -theoretical and critical point of view, with the command of language -apt for explaining and defending it, has a value of its own; distinct -from, yet ultimately modifying and improving, the practical. And such -comprehensive survey and comparison of numerous objects, without -having the attention exclusively fastened or enslaved to any one of -them, deserves to rank high as a variety of intelligence whether it -be adopted as the definition of a philosopher, or not. - -[Footnote 25: Thucyd. ii. 39 fin.--40. [Greek: kai\ e)/n te tou/tois -te\n po/lin a)xi/an ei)=nai thauma/zesthai, kai\ e)/ti e)n a)/llois. -philokalou=men ga\r met' eu)telei/as kai\ philosophou=men a)/neu -malaki/as], &c., and the remarkable sequel of the same chapter -about the intimate conjunction of abundant speech with energetic -action in the Athenian character.] - -[Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. iii. 10; iii. 11; iii. 12.] - -[Footnote 27: The [Greek: pe/ntathlos] or [Greek: u(/pakros] whom -Plato criticises in this dialogue, coincides with what Aristotle -calls "the man of universal education or culture".--Ethic. Nikom. I. -i. 1095, a. 1. [Greek: e(/kastos de\ kri/nei kalo=s a(\ gigno/skei, -kai\ tou/ton e)sti\n a)gatho\s krite/s; kath' e(/kaston a)/ra, o( -pepaideume/nos; a(plo=s de/, o( peri\ pa=n pepaideume/nos.]] - -[Side-note: Plato's view--that the philosopher has a province -special to himself, distinct from other specialties--dimly -indicated--regal or political art.] - -Plato undoubtedly did not conceive the definition of the philosopher -in the same way as Sokrates. The close of the Erastae is employed in -opening a distant and dim view of the Platonic conception. We are -given to understand, that the philosopher has a province of his own, -wherein he is not second-best, but a first-rate actor and adviser. To -indicate, in many different ways, that there is or must be such a -peculiar, appertaining to philosophy--distinct from, though analogous -to, the peculiar of each several art--is one leading purpose in many -Platonic dialogues. But what is the peculiar of the philosopher? -Here, as elsewhere, it is marked out in a sort of misty outline, not -as by one who already knows and is familiar with it, but as one who -is trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded. Here, -we have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil, -governing, and applying penal sanctions rightly. This is the supreme -art or science, of which the philosopher is the professor; and -in which, far from requiring advice from others, he is the only -person competent both to advise and to act: the art which exercises -control over all other special arts, directing how far, and on what -occasions, each of them comes into appliance. It is philosophy, -looked at in one of its two aspects: not as a body of speculative -truth, to be debated, proved, and discriminated from what cannot be -proved or can be disproved--but as a critical judgment bearing on -actual life, prescribing rules or giving directions in particular -cases, with a view to the attainment of foreknown ends, recognised as -_expetenda_.[28] This is what Plato understands by the measuring -or calculating art, the regal or political art, according as we use -the language of the Protagoras, Politikus, Euthydemus, Republic. Both -justice and sobriety are branches of this art; and the distinction -between the two loses its importance when the art is considered as a -whole--as we find both in the Erastae and in the Republic.[29] - -[Footnote 28: The difference between the second explanation of -philosophy and the third explanation, suggested in the Erastae, will -be found to coincide pretty nearly with the distinction which -Aristotle takes much pains to draw between [Greek: sophi/a] and -[Greek: phro/nesis].--Ethic. Nikomach. vi. 5, pp. 1140-1141; also -Ethic. Magn. i. pp. 1197-1198.] - -[Footnote 29: See Republic, iv. 433 A; Gorgias, 526 C; Charmides 164 -B; and Heindorf's note on the passage in the Charmides.] - -[Side-note: Philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other -artists.] - -Here, in the Erastae, this conception of the philosopher as the -supreme artist controlling all other artists, is darkly indicated and -crudely sketched. We shall find the same conception more elaborately -illustrated in other dialogues; yet never passing out of that state. - - -* * * * * - - -APPENDIX. - -This is one of the dialogues declared to be spurious by -Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, and Stallbaum, all of them critics of -the present century. In my judgment, their grounds for such -declaration are altogether inconclusive. They think the dialogue an -inferior composition, unworthy of Plato; and they accordingly find -reasons, more or less ingenious, for relieving Plato from the -discredit of it. I do not think so meanly of the dialogue as they do; -but even if I did, I should not pronounce it to be spurious, without -some evidence bearing upon that special question. No such evidence, -of any value, is produced. - -It is indeed contended, on the authority of a passage in Diogenes -(ix. 37), that Thrasyllus himself doubted of the authenticity of the -Erastae. The passage is as follows, in his life of Demokritus--[Greek: -ei)/per oi( A)nterastai\ Pla/tono/s ei)si, phesi\ Thra/sullos, -ou(=tos a)\n ei)/e o( parageno/menos a)no/numos, to=n peri\ -Oi)nopi/den kai\ A)naxago/ran e(/teros, e)n te=| pro\s Sokra/ten -o(mili/a| dialego/menos peri\ philosophi/as; o(=|, phesi/n, o(s -penta/thlo| e)/oiken o( philo/sophos; kai\ e)=n o(s a)letho=s e)n -philosophi/a| pe/ntathlos] (Demokritus). - -Now in the first place, Schleiermacher and Stallbaum both declare -that Thrasyllus can never have said that which Diogenes here makes -him say (Schleierm. p. 510; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad. Erast. p. 266, -and not. p. 273). - -Next, it is certain that Thrasyllus did consider it the undoubted -work of Plato, for he enrolled it in his classification, as the third -dialogue in the fourth tetralogy (Diog. L. iii. 59). - -Yxem, who defends the genuineness of the Erastae (Ueber Platon's -Kleitophon, pp. 6-7, Berlin, 1846), insists very properly on this -point; not merely as an important fact in itself, but as determining -the sense of the words [Greek: ei)/per oi( A)nterastai\ Pla/tono/s -ei)si], and as showing that the words rather affirm, than deny, the -authenticity of the dialogue. "If the Anterastae are the work of -Plato, _as they are universally admitted to be_." You must -supply the parenthesis in this way, in order to make Thrasyllus -consistent with himself. Yxem cites a passage from Galen, in -which [Greek: ei)/per] is used, and in which the parenthesis must be -supplied in the way indicated: no doubt at all being meant to be -hinted. And I will produce another passage out of Diogenes himself, -where [Greek: ei)/per] is used in the same way; not as intended to -convey the smallest doubt, but merely introducing the premiss for a -conclusion immediately following. Diogenes says, respecting the -Platonic Ideas, [Greek: ei)/per e)sti\ mne/me, ta\s i)de/as e)n toi=s -ou)=sin u(pa/rchein] (iii. 15). He does not intend to suggest any -doubt whether there be such a fact as memory. [Greek: Ei)/per] is -sometimes the equivalent of [Greek: e)peide/per]: as we learn from -Hermann ad Viger. VIII. 6, p. 512. - -There is therefore no fair ground for supposing that Thrasyllus -doubted the genuineness of the Erastae. And when I read what modern -critics say in support of their verdict of condemnation, I feel the -more authorised in dissenting from it. I will cite a passage or two -from Stallbaum. - -Stallbaum begins his Prolegomena as follows, pp. 205-206: "Quanquam -hic libellus genus dicendi habet purum, castum, elegans, nihil ut -inveniri queat quod a Platonis aut Xenophontis elegantia, -abhorreat--tamen quin a Boeckhio, Schleiermachero, Astio, Sochero, -Knebelio, aliis jure meritoque pro suppositicio habitus sit, haudquaquam -dubitamus. Est enim materia operis adeo non ad Platonis mentem -rationemque elaborata, ut potius cuivis alii Socraticorum quam huic -recte adscribi posse videatur." - -After stating that the Erastae may be divided into two principal -sections, Stallbaum proceeds:--"Neutra harum partium ita tractata -est, ut nihil desideretur, quod ad justam argumenti explicationem -merito requiras--nihil inculcatum reperiatur, quod vel alio modo -illustratum vel omnino omissum esse cupias". - -I call attention to this sentence as a fair specimen of the grounds -upon which the Platonic critics proceed when they strike dialogues -out of the Platonic Canon. If there be anything wanting in it which -is required for what they consider a proper setting forth of the -argument--if there be anything which they would desire to see omitted -or otherwise illustrated--this is with them a reason for deciding -that it is not Plato's work. That is, if there be any defects in it -of any kind, it cannot be admitted as Plato's work;--_his genuine -works have no defects_. I protest altogether against this _ratio -decidendi_. If I acknowledged it and applied it consistently I -should strike out every dialogue in the Canon. Certainly, the -presumption in favour of the Catalogue of Thrasyllus must be counted -as _nil_, if it will not outweigh such feeble counter-arguments -as these. - -One reason given by Stallbaum for considering the Erastae as -spurious is, that the Sophists are not derided in it. "Quis est -igitur, qui Platonem sibi persuadeat illos non fuisse castigaturum, -et omnino non significaturum, quinam illi essent, adversus quos hanc -disputationem instituisset?" It is strange to be called on by learned -men to strike out all dialogues from the Canon in which there is no -derision of the Sophists. Such derision exists already in excess: we -hear until we are tired how mean it is to receive money for -lecturing. Again, Stallbaum says that the persons whose opinions are -here attacked are not specified by name. But who are the [Greek: -ei)do=n phi/loi], attacked in the Sophistes? They are not specified -by name, and critics differ as to the persons intended. - - - - - -CHAPTER XVII. - -ION. - - -[Side-note: Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion -among modern critics as to its genuineness.] - -The dialogue called Ion is carried on between Sokrates and the -Ephesian rhapsode Ion. It is among those disallowed by Ast, first -faintly defended, afterwards disallowed, by Schleiermacher,[1] and -treated contemptuously by both. Subsequent critics, Hermann,[2] -Stallbaum, Steinhart, consider it as genuine, yet as an inferior -production, of little worth, and belonging to Plato's earliest years. - -[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Ion, p. 261-266; Ast, Leben -und Schriften des Platon, p. 406.] - -[Footnote 2: K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. pp. -437-438; Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 15.] - -[Side-note: Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for -prizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant.] - -I hold it to be genuine, and it may be comparatively early; but I see -no ground for the disparaging criticism which has often been applied -to it. The personage whom it introduces to us as subjected to the -cross-examination of Sokrates is a rhapsode of celebrity; one among a -class of artists at that time both useful and esteemed. They recited -or sang,[3] with appropriate accent and gesture, the compositions of -Homer and of other epic poets: thus serving to the Grecian epic, the -same purpose as the actors served to the dramatic, and the -harp-singers ([Greek: kitharo|doi\]) to the lyric. There were various -solemn festivals such as that of AEsculapius at Epidaurus, and (most -especially) the Panathenaea at Athens, where prizes were awarded for -the competition of the rhapsodes. Ion is described as having competed -triumphantly in the festival at Epidaurus, and carried off the first -prize. He appeared there in a splendid costume, crowned with a -golden wreath, amidst a crowd which is described as containing more -than 20,000 persons.[4] - -[Footnote 3: The word [Greek: a)/|dein] is in this very dialogue (532 -D, 535 A) applied to the rhapsoding of Ion.] - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Ion, 535 D.] - -[Side-note: Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation--Exposition -of the poets. Arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent.] - -Much of the acquaintance of cultivated Greeks with Homer and the -other epic poets was both acquired and maintained through such -rhapsodes; the best of whom contended at the festivals, while others, -less highly gifted as to vocal power and gesticulation, gave separate -declamations and lectures of their own, and even private lessons to -individuals.[5] Euthydemus, in one of the Xenophontic conversations -with Sokrates, and Antisthenes in the Xenophontic Symposion, are made -to declare that the rhapsodes as a class were extremely silly. This, -if true at all, can apply only to the expositions and comments with -which they accompanied their recital of Homer and other poets. -Moreover we cannot reasonably set it down (though some modern critics -do so) as so much incontestable truth: we must consider it as an -opinion delivered by one of the speakers in the conversation, but not -necessarily well founded.[6] Unquestionably, the comments made upon -Homer (both in that age and afterwards) were often fanciful and -misleading. Metrodorus, Anaxagoras, and others, resolved the Homeric -narrative into various allegories, physical, ethical, and -theological: and most men who had an opinion to defend, rejoiced to -be able to support or enforce it by some passages of Homer, well or -ill-explained--just as texts of the Bible are quoted in modern times. -In this manner, Homer was pressed into the service of every -disputant; and the Homeric poems were presented as containing, or at -least as implying, doctrines quite foreign to the age in which they -were composed.[7] - -[Footnote 5: Xen. Sympos. iii. 6. Nikeratus says that he heard the -rhapsodes nearly every day. He professes to be able to repeat both -the Iliad and the Odyssey from memory.] - -[Footnote 6: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 10; Sympos. iii. 6; Plato, Ion, 530 E. - -Steinhart cites this judgment about the rhapsodes as if it had been -pronounced by the Xenophontic Sokrates himself, which is not the fact -(Steinhart, Einleitung p. 3).] - -[Footnote 7: Diogenes Laert. ii. 11; Nitzsch, Die Heldensage des -Griechen, pp. 74-78; Lobeck, Agloaphamus, p. 157. - -Seneca, Epistol. 88: "modo Stoicum Homerum faciunt--modo Epicureum -. . . modo Peripateticum, tria genera bonorum inducentem: modo -Academicum, incerta omnia dicentem. Apparet nihil horum esse in illo, -cui omnia insunt: ista enim inter se dissident."] - -[Side-note: The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived -from their recitation. Powerful effect which they produced.] - -The Rhapsodes, in so far as they interpreted Homer, were -probably not less disposed than others to discover in him their -own fancies. But the character in which they acquired most -popularity, was, not as expositors, but as reciters, of the poems. -The powerful emotion which, in the process of reciting, they both -felt themselves and communicated to their auditors, is declared in -this dialogue: "When that which I recite is pathetic (says Ion), my -eyes are filled with tears: when it is awful or terrible, my hair -stands on end, and my heart leaps. Moreover I see the spectators also -weeping, sympathising with my emotions, and looking aghast at what -they hear."[8] This assertion of the vehement emotional effect -produced by the words of the poet as declaimed or sung by the -rhapsode, deserves all the more credit--because Plato himself, far -from looking upon it favourably, either derides or disapproves it. -Accepting it as a matter of fact, we see that the influence of -rhapsodes, among auditors generally, must have been derived more from -their efficacy as actors than from their ability as expositors. - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Ion, 535 C-E. - -The description here given is the more interesting because it is the -only intimation remaining of the strong effect produced by these -rhapsodic representations.] - -[Side-note: Ion both reciter and expositor--Homer was -considered more as an instructor than as a poet.] - -Ion however is described in this dialogue as combining the two -functions of reciter and expositor: a partnership like that of -Garrick and Johnson, in regard to Shakspeare. It is in the last of -the two functions, that Sokrates here examines him: considering -Homer, not as a poet appealing to the emotions of hearers, but as a -teacher administering lessons and imparting instruction. Such was the -view of Homer entertained by a large proportion of the Hellenic -world. In that capacity, his poems served as a theme for rhapsodes, -as well as for various philosophers and Sophists who were not -rhapsodes, nor accomplished reciters. - -[Side-note: Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or -emotional working.] - -The reader must keep in mind, in following the questions put by -Sokrates, that this paedagogic and edifying view of Homer is the only -one present to the men of the Sokratic school--and especially to -Plato. Of the genuine functions of the gifted poet, who touches the -chords of strong and diversified emotion--"qui pectus inaniter -angit, Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet" (Horat. Epist. II. -1, 212)--Plato takes no account: or rather, he declares open war -against them, either as childish delusions[9], or as mischievous -stimulants, tending to exalt the unruly elements of the mind, and to -overthrow the sovereign authority of reason. We shall find farther -manifestations on this point in the Republic and Leges. - -[Footnote 9: The question of Sokrates (Ion, 535 D), about the emotion -produced in the hearers by the recital of Homer's poetry, bears out -what is here asserted.] - -[Side-note: Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions -of Sokrates to him--How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon -other poets? The poetic art is one.] - -Ion professes to have devoted himself to the study of Homer -exclusively, neglecting other poets: so that he can interpret the -thoughts, and furnish reflections upon them, better than any other -expositor.[10] How does it happen (asked Sokrates) that you have so -much to say about Homer, and nothing at all about other poets? Homer -may be the best of all poets: but he is still only one of those who -exercise the poetic art, and he must necessarily talk about the same -subjects as other poets. Now the art of poetry is _One_ -altogether--like that of painting, sculpture, playing on the flute, -playing on the harp, rhapsodizing, &c.[11] Whoever is competent -to judge and explain one artist,--what he has done well and what he -has done ill,--is competent also to judge any other artist in the -same profession. - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Ion, 536 E.] - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Ion, 531 A, 532 C-D. [Greek: poietike\ pou/ -e)sti to\ o(/lon. . . Ou)kou=n e)peida\n la/be| tis kai\ a)/llen -te/chnen e(ntinou=n o(/len, o( au)to\s tro/pos te=s ske/pseo/s e)sti -peri\ a(paso=n to=n techno=n?] 533 A.] - -I cannot explain to you how it happens (replies Ion): I only know the -fact incontestably--that when I talk about Homer, my thoughts flow -abundantly, and every one tells me that my discourse is excellent. -Quite the reverse, when I talk of any other poet.[12] - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Ion, 533 C.] - -[Side-note: Explanation given by Sokrates. Both the Rhapsode -and the Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration. -Fine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration -from some God.] - -_I_ can explain it (says Sokrates). Your talent in expounding -Homer is not an art, acquired by system and method--otherwise it -would have been applicable to other poets besides. It is a special -gift, imparted to you by divine power and inspiration. The like is -true of the poet whom you expound. His genius does not spring from -art, system, or method: it is a special gift emanating from the -inspiration of the Muses.[13] A poet is a light, airy, holy, person, -who cannot compose verses at all so long as his reason remains within -him.[14] The Muses take away his reason, substituting in place of it -their own divine inspiration and special impulse, either towards -epic, dithyramb, encomiastic hymns, hyporchemata, &c., one or -other of these. Each poet receives one of these special gifts, but is -incompetent for any of the others: whereas, if their ability had been -methodical or artistic, it would have displayed itself in all of them -alike. Like prophets, and deliverers of oracles, these poets have -their reason taken away, and become servants of the Gods.[15] It is -not _they_ who, bereft of their reason, speak in such sublime -strains: it is the God who speaks to us, and speaks through them. You -may see this by Tynnichus of Chalkis; who composed his Paean, the -finest of all Paeans, which is in every one's mouth, telling us -himself, that it was the invention of the Muses--but who never -composed anything else worth hearing. It is through this worthless -poet that the God has sung the most sublime hymn:[16] for the express -purpose of showing us that these fine compositions are not human -performances at all, but divine: and that the poet is only an -interpreter of the Gods, possessed by one or other of them, as the -case may be. - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Ion, 533 E--534 A. [Greek: pa/ntes ga\r oi(/ te -to=n e)po=n poietai\ oi( a)gathoi\ ou)k e)k te/chnes a)ll' e)/ntheoi -o)/ntes kai\ katecho/menoi pa/nta tau=ta ta\ kala\ le/gousi -poie/mata, kai\ oi( melopoioi\ oi( a)gathoi\ o(sau/tos; o(/sper oi( -korubantintio=tes ou)k e)/mphrones o)/ntes o)rchou=ntai, ou(/to kai\ -oi(] melopoioi\ ou)k e)/mphrones o)/ntes ta\ kala\ me/le tau=ta -poiou=sin], &c.]] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Ion, 534 B. [Greek: kou=phon ga\r chre=ma -poiete/s e)sti kai\ pteno\n kai\ i(ero/n, kai\ ou) pro/teron oi(=o/s -te poiei=n pri\n a)\n e)/ntheo/s te ge/netai kai\ e)/kphron kai\ o( -nou=s meke/ti e)n au)to=| e)ne=|; e(/os d' a)\n touti\ e)/che| to\ -kte=ma, a)du/natos pa=s poiei=n e)stin a)/nthropos kai\ -chresmo|dei=n.]] - -[Footnote 15: Plato. Ion, 534 C-D. [Greek: dia\ tau=ta de\ o( theo\s -e)xairou/menos tou/ton to\n nou=n tou/tois chre=tai u(pere/tais kai\ -toi=s chresmo|doi=s kai\ toi=s ma/ntesi toi=s thei/ois, i(/na e(mei=s -oi( a)kou/ontes ei)do=men, o(/ti ou)ch ou(=toi/ ei)sin oi( tau=ta -le/gontes ou(/to pollou= a)/xia, a)ll' o( theo\s au)to/s e)stin o( -le/gon, dia\ tou/ton de\ phthe/ggetai pro\s e(ma=s.]] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Ion. 534 E. [Greek: tau=ta e)ndeiknu/menos o( -theo\s e)xepi/tedes dia\ tou= phaulota/tou poietou= to\ ka/lliston -me/los e)=|sen.]] - -[Side-note: Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction -successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then -act through him and through Ion upon the auditors.] - -Homer is thus (continues Sokrates) not a man of art or reason, but -the interpreter of the Gods; deprived of his reason, but possessed, -inspired, by them. You, Ion, are the interpreter of Homer: and the -divine inspiration, carrying away your reason, is exercised over you -through him. It is in this way that the influence of the Magnet -is shown, attracting and holding up successive stages of iron -rings.[17] The first ring is in contact with the Magnet itself: the -second is suspended to the first, the third to the second, and so on. -The attractive influence of the Magnet is thus transmitted through a -succession of different rings, so as to keep suspended several which -are a good way removed from itself. So the influence of the Gods is -exerted directly and immediately upon Homer: through him, it passes -by a second stage to you: through him and you, it passes by a third -stage to those auditors whom you so powerfully affect and delight, -becoming however comparatively enfeebled at each stage of transition. - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Ion, 533 D-E.] - -[Side-note: This comparison forms the central point of the -dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in -the Apology.] - -The passage and comparison here given by Sokrates--remarkable as an -early description of the working of the Magnet--forms the central -point or kernel of the dialogue called Ion. It is an expansion of a -judgment delivered by Sokrates himself in his Apology to the Dikasts, -and it is repeated in more than one place by Plato.[18] Sokrates -declares in his Apology that he had applied his testing -cross-examination to several excellent poets; and that finding them -unable to give any rational account of their own compositions, he -concluded that they composed without any wisdom of their own, under -the same inspiration as prophets and declarers of oracles. In the -dialogue before us, this thought is strikingly illustrated and -amplified. - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 22 D; Plato, Menon, p. 99 D.] - -[Side-note: Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure -distinguished from unsystematic: which latter was either blind -routine, or madness inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good -and bad.] - -The contrast between systematic, professional, procedure, -deliberately taught and consciously acquired, capable of being -defended at every step by appeal to intelligible rules founded upon -scientific theory, and enabling the person so qualified to impart his -qualification to others--and a different procedure purely impulsive -and unthinking, whereby the agent, having in his mind a conception of -the end aimed at, proceeds from one intermediate step to another, -without knowing why he does so or how he has come to do so, and -without being able to explain his practice if questioned or to -impart it to others--this contrast is a favourite one with Plato. The -last-mentioned procedure--the unphilosophical or irrational--he -conceives under different aspects: sometimes as a blind routine or -insensibly acquired habit,[19] sometimes as a stimulus applied from -without by some God, superseding the reason of the individual. Such a -condition Plato calls _madness_, and he considers those under it -as persons out of their senses. But he recognises different varieties -of madness, according to the God from whom it came: the bad madness -was a disastrous visitation and distemper--the good madness was a -privilege and blessing, an inspiration superior to human reason. -Among these privileged madmen he reckoned prophets and poets; another -variety under the same genus, is, that mental love, between a -well-trained adult, and a beautiful, intelligent, youth, which he -regards as the most exalted of all human emotions.[20] In the Ion, -this idea of a privileged madness--inspiration from the Gods superseding -reason--is applied not only to the poet, but also to the rhapsode who -recites the poem, and even to the auditors whom he addresses. The -poet receives the inspiration directly from the Gods: he inoculates -the rhapsode with it, who again inoculates the auditors--the fervour -is, at each successive communication, diminished. The auditor -represents the last of the rings; held in suspension, through the -intermediate agency of other rings, by the inherent force of the -magnet.[21] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Phaedon, 82 A; Gorgias, 463 A, 486 A.] - -[Footnote 20: This doctrine is set forth at length by Sokrates in the -Platonic Phaedrus, in the second discourse of Sokrates about Eros, pp. -244-245-249 D.] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Ion, 535 E. [Greek: ou(=to/s e)stin o( theate\s -to=n daktuli/on o( e)/schatos . . . . o( de\ me/sos su\ o( r(apso|do\s -kai\ u(pokrite\s, o( de\ pro=tos, au)to\s o( poiete/s.]] - -[Side-note: Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar -fact in Grecian life. Privileged communications from the Gods to -Sokrates--his firm belief in them.] - -We must remember, that privileged communications from the Gods to -men, and special persons recipient thereof, were acknowledged and -witnessed everywhere as a constant phenomenon of Grecian life. There -were not only numerous oracular temples, which every one could visit -to ask questions in matters of doubt--but also favoured persons who -had received from the Gods the gift of predicting the future, of -interpreting omens, of determining the good or bad indications -furnished by animals sacrificed.[22] In every town or village--or -wherever any body of men were assembled--there were always persons -who prophesied or delivered oracles, and to whom special revelations -were believed to be vouchsafed, during periods of anxiety. No one was -more familiar with this fact than the Sokratic disciples: for -Sokrates himself had perhaps a greater number of special -communications from the Gods than any man of his age: his divine sign -having begun when he was a child, and continuing to move him -frequently, even upon small matters, until his death: though the -revelations were for the most part negative, not affirmative--telling -him often what was not to be done--seldom what was to be -done--resembling in this respect his own dialogues with other persons. -Moreover Sokrates inculcated upon his friends emphatically, that they -ought to have constant recourse to prophecy: that none but impious -men neglected to do so: that the benevolence of the Gods was nowhere -more conspicuous than in their furnishing such special revelations -and warnings, to persons whom they favoured: that the Gods -administered the affairs of the world partly upon principles of -regular sequence, so that men by diligent study might learn what they -were to expect,--but partly also, and by design, in a manner -irregular and undecypherable, such that it could not be fathomed by -any human study, and could not be understood except through direct -and special revelation from themselves.[23] - -[Footnote 22: Not only the [Greek: chresmolo/goi, ma/nteis] oracular -temples, &c., are often mentioned in Herodotus, Thucydides, -Xenophon, &c., but Aristotle also recognises [Greek: oi( -numpho/leptoi kai\ theo/leptoi to=n a)nthro/pon, e)pipnoi/a| -daimoni/ou tino\s o(/sper e)nthousia/zontes], as a real and known -class of persons. See Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1214, a. 23; Ethic. Magna, -ii. p. 1207, b. 8. - -The [Greek: ma/ntis] is a recognised profession, the gift of Apollo, -not merely according to Homer, but according to Solon (Frag. xi. 52, -Schn.): - -[Greek: A)/llon ma/ntin e)/theken a)/nax e(ka/ergos A)po/llon, -e)/gno d' a)ndri\ kako\n telo/then e)rcho/menon], &c.] - -[Footnote 23: These views of Sokrates are declared in the Memorabilia -of Xenophon, i. 1, 6-10; i. 4, 2-18; iv. 3, 12. - -It is plain from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1, 3) that many persons were -offended with Sokrates because they believed,--or at least because he -affirmed--that he received more numerous and special revelations from -the Gods than any one else.] - -[Side-note: Condition of the inspired person--his reason is -for the time withdrawn.] - -Here, as well as elsewhere, Plato places inspiration, both of the -prophet and the poet, in marked contrast with reason and -intelligence. Reason is supposed to be for the time withdrawn or -abolished, and inspiration is introduced by the Gods into its -place. "When Monarch Reason sleeps, this mimic wakes." The person -inspired (prophet or poet) becomes for the time the organ of an -extraneous agency, speaking what he neither originates nor -understands. The genuine gift of prophecy[24] (Plato says) attaches -only to a disabled, enfeebled, distempered, condition of the -intelligence; the gift of poetry is conferred by the Gods upon the -most inferior men, as we see by the case of Tynnichus--whose sublime -paean shows us, that it is the Gods alone who utter fine poetry -through the organs of a person himself thoroughly incompetent. - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Timaeus, 71 E. [Greek: i(kano\n de\ semei=on o(s -mantike\n a)phrosu/ne| theo\s a)nthropi/ne| de/doken; ou)dei\s ga\r -e)/nnous e)pha/ptetai mantike=s e)nthe/ou kai\ a)lethou=s, a)ll' e)\ -kath' u(/pnon te\n te=s phrone/seos pedethei\s du/namin, e)\ dia\ -no/son e)/ tina e)nthousiasmo\n paralla/xas.] - -Compare Plato, Menon, pp. 99-100. [Greek: oi( chresmo|doi/ te kai\ -oi( theoma/nteis . . . . le/gousi me\n a)lethe= kai\ polla\ i)/sasi de\ -ou)de\n o(=n le/gousi.] Compare Plato, Legg. iv. 719.] - -[Side-note: Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out -of his mind.] - -It is thus that Plato, setting before himself a process of -systematised reason,--originating in a superior intellect, laying -down universal principles and deducing consequences from -them--capable of being consistently applied, designedly taught, and -defended against objections--enumerates the various mental conditions -opposed to it, and ranks inspiration as one of them. In this -dialogue, Sokrates seeks to prove that the success of Ion as a -rhapsode depends upon his being out of his mind or inspired. But Ion -does not accept the compliment: _Ion._--You speak well, -Sokrates; but I should be surprised if you spoke well enough to -create in me the new conviction, that I am possessed and mad when I -eulogize Homer. I do not think that you would even yourself say so, -if you heard me discourse on the subject.[25] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Ion, 536 E.] - -[Side-note: Homer talks upon all subjects--Is Ion competent to -explain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its -province?] - -_Sokr._--But Homer talks upon all subjects. Upon which of them -can you discourse? _Ion._--Upon all. _Sokr._--Not surely on -such as belong to special arts, professions. Each portion of the -matter of knowledge is included under some special art, and is known -through that art by those who possess it. Thus, you and I, both of -us, know the number of our fingers; we know it through the same art, -which both of us possess--the arithmetical. But Homer talks of -matters belonging to many different arts or occupations, that of -the physician, the charioteer, the fisherman, &c. You cannot know -these; since you do not belong to any of these professions, but are a -rhapsode. Describe to me what are the matters included in the -rhapsodic art. The rhapsodic art is one art by itself, distinct from -the medical and others: it cannot know every thing; tell me what -matters come under its special province.[26] _Ion._--The -rhapsodic art does not know what belongs to any one of the other -special arts: but that of which it takes cognizance, and that which I -know, is, what is becoming and suitable to each variety of character -described by Homer: to a man or woman--to a freeman or slave--to the -commander who gives orders or to the subordinate who obeys them, -&c. This is what belongs to the peculiar province of the rhapsode -to appreciate and understand.[27] _Sokr._--Will the rhapsode -know what is suitable for the commander of a ship to say to his -seamen, during a dangerous storm, better than the pilot? Will the -rhapsode know what is suitable for one who gives directions about the -treatment of a sick man, better than the physician? Will the rhapsode -know what is suitable to be said by the herdsman when the cattle are -savage and distracted, or to the female slaves when busy in spinning? -_Ion._--No: the rhapsode will not know these things so well as -the pilot, the physician, the grazier, the mistress, &c.[28] -_Sokr._--Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the -military commander to say, when he is exhorting his soldiers? -_Ion._--Yes: the rhapsode will know this well: at least I know -it well. - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Ion, 538-539.] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Ion, 540 A. [Greek: a)\ to=| r(apso|do=| -prose/kei kai\ skopei=sthai kai\ diakri/nein para\ tou\s a)/llous -a)nthro/pous], 539 E.] - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Ion, 540 B-C.] - -[Side-note: The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such -as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows -the business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, -having learnt it from Homer.] - -_Sokr._--Perhaps, Ion, you are not merely a rhapsode, but -possess also the competence for being a general. If you know matters -belonging to military command, do you know them in your capacity of -general, or in your capacity of rhapsode? _Ion._--I think there -is no difference. _Sokr._--How say you? Do you affirm that the -rhapsodic art, and the strategic art, are one? _Ion._--I think -they are one. _Sokr._--Then whosoever is a good rhapsode, is -also a good general? _Ion._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--And -of course, whoever is a good general, is also a good rhapsode? -_Ion._--No: I do not think that. _Sokr._--But you do -maintain, that whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? -_Ion._--Decidedly. _Sokr._--You are yourself the best -rhapsode in Greece? _Ion._--By far. _Sokr._--Are you then -also the best general in Greece? _Ion._--Certainly I am, -Sokrates: and that too, by having learnt it from Homer.[29] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Ion, 540 D--541 B.] - -After putting a question or two, not very forcible, to ask how it -happens that Ion, being an excellent general, does not obtain a -military appointment from Athens, Sparta, or some other city, -Sokrates winds up the dialogue as follows:-- - -[Side-note: Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any -knowledge of what he says, but by divine inspiration.] - -Well, Ion, if it be really true that you possess a rational and -intelligent competence to illustrate the beauties of Homer, you wrong -and deceive me, because after promising to deliver to me a fine -discourse about Homer, you will not even comply with my preliminary -entreaty--that you will first tell me what those matters are, on -which your superiority bears. You twist every way like Proteus, until -at last you slip through my fingers and appear as a general. If your -powers of expounding Homer depend on art and intelligence, you are a -wrong-doer and deceiver, for not fulfilling** your promise to me. But -you are not chargeable with wrong, if the fact be as I say; that is, -if you know nothing about Homer, but are only able to discourse upon -him finely and abundantly, through a divine inspiration with which -you are possessed by him. Choose whether you wish me to regard you as -a promise-breaker, or as a divine man. _Ion._--I choose the -last: it is much better to be regarded as a divine man.[30] - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Ion, 541 E--542 A. [Greek: ei) me\n a)lethe/ -le/geis, o(s te/chne| kai\ e)piste/me| oi(=o/s te ei)= O(/merou -e)painei=n, a)dikei=s . . . ei) de\ me\ techniko\s ei)=, a)lla\ -thei/a| moi/ra| katecho/menos e)x O(me/rou mede\n ei)do\s polla\ kai\ -kala\ le/geis peri\ tou= poietou=, o(/sper e)go\ ei)=pon peri\ sou=, -ou)de\n a)dikei=s; e(lou= ou)=n, po/tera bou/lei nomi/zesthai u(ph' -e(mo=n a)/dikos a)ne\r ei)=nai e)\ thei=os.]] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: The generals in Greece usually possessed no -professional experience--Homer and the poets were talked of as the -great teachers--Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know -everything, but really knowing nothing.] - -It seems strange to read such language put into Ion's mouth (we are -not warranted in regarding it as what any rhapsode ever did say), as -the affirmation--that every good rhapsode was also a good general, -and that he had become the best of generals simply through -complete acquaintance with Homer. But this is only a caricature of a -sentiment largely prevalent at Athens, according to which the works -of the poets, especially the Homeric poems, were supposed to be a -mine of varied instruction, and were taught as such to youth.[31] In -Greece, the general was not often required (except at Sparta, and not -always even there) to possess professional experience.[32] Sokrates, -in one of the Xenophontic conversations, tries to persuade -Nikomachides, a practised soldier (who had failed in getting himself -elected general, because a successful Choregus had been preferred to -him), how much the qualities of an effective Choregus coincided with -those of an effective general.[33] The poet Sophokles was named by -the Athenians one of the generals of the very important armament for -reconquering Samos: though Perikles, one of his colleagues, as well -as his contemporary declared that he was an excellent poet, but knew -nothing of generalship.[34] Plato frequently seeks to make it evident -how little the qualities required for governing numbers, either civil -or military, were made matter of professional study or special -teaching. The picture of Homer conveyed in the tenth book of the -Platonic Republic is, that of a man who pretends to know -everything, but really knows nothing: an imitative artist, -removed by two stages from truth and reality,--who gives the shadows -of shadows, resembling only enough to satisfy an ignorant crowd. This -is the picture there presented of poets generally, and of Homer as -the best among them. The rhapsode Ion is here brought under the same -category as the poet Homer, whom he has by heart and recites. The -whole field of knowledge is assumed to be distributed among various -specialties, not one of which either of the two can claim. -Accordingly, both of them under the mask of universal knowledge, -conceal the reality of universal ignorance. - -[Footnote 31: Aristophan. Ranae, 1032. - - [Greek: O)rpheu\s me\n ga\r teleta/s th' e(mi=n kate/deixe pho/non -t' a)pe/chesthai -Mousai=os d' e)xake/seis te no/son kai\ chresmou/s, E(si/odos de\ -Ge=s e)rgasi/as, karpo=n o(/ras, a)ro/tous; o( de\ thei=os O(/meros -A)po\ tou= time\n kai\ kle/os e)/schein, ple\n tou=d', o(/ti chre/st' -e)di/daxe. -Ta/xeis, a)reta/s, o(pli/seis a)ndro=n? . . . . -A)ll' a)/llous toi pollou\s a)gathou\s (e)di/daxen), o(=n e)=n kai\ -La/machos e(/ros.] - -See these views combated by Plato, Republ. x. 599-600-606 E. - -The exaggerated pretension here ascribed to Ion makes him look -contemptible--like the sentiment ascribed to him, 535 E, "If I make -the auditors weep, I myself shall laugh and pocket money," &c.] - -[Footnote 32: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 5, 21, in the conversation between -the younger Perikles and Sokrates--[Greek: to=n de\ stratego=n oi( -plei=stoi au)toschedia/zousin.] Also iii. 5, 24. - -Compare, respecting the generals, the striking lines of Euripides, -Androm. 698, and the encomium of Cicero (Academ. Prior. 2, 1) -respecting the quickness and facility with which Lucullus made -himself an excellent general.] - -[Footnote 33: Xen. Mem. iii. 4, especially iii. 4, 6, where -Nikomachides asks with surprise, [Greek: le/geis su/, o)= So/krates, -o(s tou= au)tou= a)ndro/s e)sti choregei=n te kalo=s kai\ -strategei=n?]] - -[Footnote 34: See the very curious extract from the contemporary Ion -of Chios, in Athenaeus, xiii. 604. Aristophanes of Byzantium says that -the appointment of Sophokles to this military function arose from the -extra-ordinary popularity of his tragedy Antigone, exhibited a little -time before. See Boeckh's valuable 'Dissertation on the Antigone,' -appended to his edition thereof, pp. 121-124.] - -[Side-note: Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without -knowledge.] - -Ion is willing enough (as he promises) to exhibit before Sokrates one -of his eloquent discourses upon Homer. But Sokrates never permits him -to arrive at it: arresting him always by preliminary questions, and -requiring him to furnish an intelligible description of the matter -which his discourse is intended to embrace, and thus to distinguish -it from other matters left untouched. A man who cannot comply with -this requisition,--who cannot (to repeat what I said in a previous -chapter) stand a Sokratic cross-examination on the subject--possesses -no rational intelligence of his own proceedings: no art, science, -knowledge, system, or method. If as a practitioner he executes well -what he promises (which is often the case), and attains success--he -does so either by blind imitation of some master, or else under the -stimulus and guidance of some agency foreign to himself--of the Gods -or Fortune. - -This is the Platonic point of view; developed in several different -ways and different dialogues, but hardly anywhere more conspicuously -than in the Ion. - -[Side-note: Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the -uselessness of written geometrical treatises.] - -I have observed that in this dialogue, Ion is anxious to embark on -his eloquent expository discourse, but Sokrates will not allow him to -begin: requiring as a preliminary stage that certain preliminary -difficulties shall first be cleared up. Here we have an illustration -of Plato's doctrine, to which I adverted in a former chapter,[35]--that -no written geometrical treatise could impart a knowledge of -geometry to one ignorant thereof. The geometrical writer begins by -laying down a string of definitions and axioms; and then strikes out -boldly in demonstrating his theorems. But Plato would refuse him the -liberty of striking out, until he should have cleared up the -preliminary difficulties about the definitions and axioms themselves. -This the geometrical treatise does not even attempt.[36] - -[Footnote 35: Chap. viii. p. 353.] - -[Footnote 36: Compare Plato, Republic, vi. 510 C; vii. 538 C-D.] - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII. - -LACHES. - - -The main substance of this dialogue consists of a discussion, carried -on by Sokrates with Nikias and Laches, respecting Courage. Each of -the two latter proposes an explanation of Courage: Sokrates -criticises both of them, and reduces each to a confessed -contradiction. - -[Side-note: Laches. Subject and persons of the dialogue, -Whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a -master of arms. Nikias and Laches differ in opinion.] - -The discussion is invited, or at least dramatically introduced, by -two elderly men--Lysimachus, son of Aristeides the Just,--and -Melesias, son of Thucydides the rival of Perikles. Lysimachus and -Melesias, confessing with shame that they are inferior to their -fathers, because their education has been neglected, wish to guard -against the same misfortune in the case of their own sons: respecting -the education of whom, they ask the advice of Nikias and Laches. The -question turns especially upon the propriety of causing their sons to -receive lessons from a master of arms just then in vogue. Nikias and -Laches, both of them not merely distinguished citizens but also -commanders of Athenian armies, are assumed to be well qualified to -give advice. Accordingly they deliver their opinions: Nikias -approving such lessons as beneficial, in exalting the courage of a -young man, and rendering him effective on the field of battle: while -Laches takes an opposite view, disparages the masters of arms as -being no soldiers, and adds that they are despised by the -Lacedaemonians, to whose authority on military matters general -deference was paid in Greece.[1] Sokrates,--commended greatly by -Nikias for his acuteness and sagacity, by Laches for his courage -in the battle of Delium,--is invited to take part in the -consultation. Being younger than both, he waits till they have -delivered their opinions, and is then called upon to declare with -which of the two his own judgment will concur.[2] - -[Footnote 1: Plato, Laches, 182-183.] - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Laches, 184 D. - -Nikias is made to say that Sokrates has recently recommended to him -Damon, as a teacher of [Greek: mousike\] to his sons, and that Damon -had proved an admirable teacher as well as companion (180 D). Damon -is mentioned by Plato generally with much eulogy.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion. He -replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent -professional judge.] - -_Sokr._--The question must not be determined by a plurality of -votes, but by superiority of knowledge.[3] If we were debating about -the proper gymnastic discipline for these young men, we should -consult a known artist or professional trainer, or at least some one -who had gone through a course of teaching and practice under the -trainer. The first thing to be enquired therefore is, whether, in -reference to the point now under discussion, there be any one of us -professionally or technically competent, who has studied under good -masters, and has proved his own competence as a master by producing -well-trained pupils. The next thing is, to understand clearly what it -is, with reference to which such competence is required.[4] -_Nikias._--Surely the point before us is, whether it be wise to -put these young men under the lessons of the master of arms? That is -what we want to know. _Sokr._--Doubtless it is: but that is only -one particular branch of a wider and more comprehensive enquiry. When -you are considering whether a particular ointment is good for your -eyes, it is your eyes, and their general benefit, which form the -subject of investigation--not the ointment simply. The person to -assist you will be, he who understands professionally the general -treatment of the eyes. So in this case, you are enquiring whether -lessons in arms will be improving for the minds and character of your -sons. Look out therefore for some one who is professionally -competent, from having studied under good masters, in regard to the -general treatment of the mind.[5] _Laches._--But there are -various persons who, without ever having studied under masters, -possess greater technical competence than others who have so -studied. _Sokr._--There are such persons: but you will never -believe it upon their own assurance, unless they can show you some -good special work actually performed by themselves. - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Laches, 184 E. [Greek: e)piste/me| dei= -kri/nesthai a)ll' ou) ple/thei to\ me/llon kalo=s krithe/sesthai.]] - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Laches, 185 C.] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Laches, 185 E. [Greek: ei)/ tis e(mo=n techniko\s -peri\ psuche=s therapei/an, kai\ oi(=o/s te kalo=s tou=to -therapeu=sai, kai\ o(/to| dida/skaloi a)gathoi\ gego/nasi, tou=to -skepte/on.]] - -[Side-note: Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving -their competence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence.] - -_Sokr._--Now then, Lysimachus, since you have invited Laches and -Nikias, as well as me, to advise you on the means of most effectively -improving the mind of your son, it is for us to show you that we -possess competent professional skill respecting the treatment of the -youthful mind. We must declare to you who are the masters from whom -we have learnt, and we must prove their qualifications. Or if we have -had no masters, we must demonstrate to you our own competence by -citing cases of individuals, whom we have successfully trained, and -who have become incontestably good under our care. If we can fulfil -neither of these two conditions, we ought to confess our incompetence -and decline advising you. We must not begin to try our hands upon so -precious a subject as the son of a friend, at the hazard of doing him -more harm than good.[6] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Laches, 186 B.] - -As to myself, I frankly confess that I have neither had any master to -impart to me such competence, nor have I been able to acquire it by -my own efforts. I am not rich enough to pay the Sophists, who profess -to teach it. But as to Nikias and Laches, they are both older and -richer than I am: so that they may well have learnt it from others, -or acquired it for themselves. They must be thoroughly satisfied of -their own knowledge on the work of education; otherwise they would -hardly have given such confident opinions, pronouncing what pursuits -are good or bad for youth. For my part, I trust them implicitly: the -only thing which surprises me, is, that they dissent from each -other.[7] It is for you therefore, Lysimachus, to ask Nikias and -Laches,--Who have been their masters? Who have been their -fellow-pupils? If they have been their own masters, what proof can they -produce of previous success in teaching, and what examples can they -cite of pupils whom they have converted from bad to good?[8] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Laches, 186 C-D. [Greek: dokou=si de/ moi -dunatoi\ ei)=nai paideu=sai a)/nthropon; ou) ga\r a)\n pote a)deo=s -a)pephai/nonto peri\ e)pitedeuma/ton ne/o| chresto=n te kai\ -ponero=n, ei) me\ au)toi=s e)pi/steuon i(kano=s ei)de/nai. ta\ me\n -ou)=n a)/lla, e)/goge tou/tois pisteu/o, o(/ti de\ diaphe/resthon -a)lle/loin, e)thau/masa.]] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Laches, 186-187.] - -[Side-note: Nikias and Laches submit to be cross-examined -by Sokrates.] - -_Nikias._--I knew from the beginning that we should both of us -fall under the cross-examination of Sokrates, and be compelled to -give account of our past lives. For my part, I have already gone -through this scrutiny before, and am not averse to undergo it again. -_Laches._--And I, though I have never experienced it before, -shall willingly submit to learn from Sokrates, whom I know to be a -man thoroughly courageous and honest in his actions. I hate men whose -lives are inconsistent with their talk.[9]--Thus speak both of them. - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Laches, 188. - -"Ego odi homines ignava opera et philosophia sententia," is a line -cited by Cicero out of one of the Latin comic writers.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Both of them give opinions offhand, according to -their feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the -question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of -education.] - -This portion of the dialogue, which forms a sort of preamble to the -main discussion, brings out forcibly some of the Platonic points of -view. We have seen it laid down in the Kriton--That in questions -about right and wrong, good and evil, &c., we ought not to trust -the decision of the Many, but only that of the One Wise Man. Here we -learn something about the criteria by which this One man may be -known. He must be one who has gone through a regular training under -some master approved in ethical or educational teaching: or, if he -cannot produce such a certificate, he must at least cite sufficient -examples of men whom he has taught well himself. This is the Sokratic -comparison, assimilating the general art of living well to the -requirements of a special profession, which a man must learn through -express teaching, from a master who has proved his ability, and -through conscious application of his own. Nikias and Laches give -their opinions offhand and confidently, upon the question whether -lessons from the master of arms be profitable to youth or not. Plato, -on the contrary, speaking through Sokrates, points out that this is -only one branch of the more comprehensive question as to education -generally--"What are the qualities and habits proper to be imparted -to youth by training? What is the proper treatment of the mind? No -one is competent to decide the special question, except he who -has professionally studied the treatment of the mind." To deal with -the special question, without such preliminary general preparation, -involves rash and unverified assumptions, which render any opinion so -given dangerous to act upon. Such is the judgment of the Platonic -Sokrates, insisting on the necessity of taking up ethical questions -in their most comprehensive aspect. - -[Side-note: Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise -Man--this man is never seen or identified.] - -Consequent upon this preamble, we should expect that Laches and -Nikias would be made to cite the names of those who had been their -masters; or to produce some examples of persons effectively taught by -themselves. This would bring us a step nearer to that One Wise -Man--often darkly indicated, but nowhere named or brought into -daylight--from whom alone we can receive a trustworthy judgment. But -here, as in the Kriton and so many other Platonic dialogues, we get -only a Pisgah view of our promised adviser--nothing more. The discussion -takes a different turn. - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: We must know what virtue is, before we give an -opinion on education. Virtue, as a whole, is too large a question. We -will enquire about one branch of virtue--courage.] - -_Sokr._--"We will pursue a line of enquiry which conducts to the -same result; and which starts even more decidedly from the -beginning.[10] We are called upon to advise by what means virtue can -be imparted to these youths, so as to make them better men. Of -course, this implies that we know what virtue is: otherwise how can -we give advice as to the means of acquiring it? _Laches._--We -could give no advice at all. _Sokr._--We affirm ourselves -therefore to know what virtue is? _Laches._--We do. -_Sokr._--Since therefore we know, we can farther declare what it -is.[11] _Laches._--Of course we can. _Sokr._--Still, we -will not at once enquire as to the whole of virtue, which might be an -arduous task, but as to a part of it--Courage: that part to which the -lessons of the master of arms are supposed to tend. We will -first enquire what courage is: after that has been determined, -we will then consider how it can best be imparted to these youths." - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Laches, 189 E. [Greek: kai\ e( toia/de ske/psis -ei)s tau)to\n phe/rei, schedo\n de/ ti kai\ ma=llon e)x a)rche=s -ei)/e a)\n.]] - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Laches, 190 C. [Greek: phame\n a)/ra, o)= -La/ches, ei)de/nai au)to\ (te\n a)rete\n) o(/, ti e)/sti. Phame\n -me/ntoi. Ou)kou=n o(/ ge i)/smen, ka)\n ei)/poimen de/pou, ti/ -e)/sti. Po=s ga\r ou)/?]] - -"Try then if you can tell me, Laches, what courage is. -_Laches._--There is no difficulty in telling you that. Whoever -keeps his place in the rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away, -is a courageous man."[12] - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Laches, 190 D-E.] - -[Side-note: Question--what is courage? Laches answers by citing -one particularly manifest case of courage. Mistake of not giving a -general explanation.] - -Here is the same error in replying, as was committed by Euthyphron -when asked, What is the Holy? and by Hippias, about the Beautiful. -One particular case of courageous behaviour, among many, is -indicated, as if it were an explanation of the whole: but the general -feature common to all acts of courage is not declared. Sokrates -points out that men are courageous, not merely among hoplites who -keep their rank and fight, but also among the Scythian horsemen who -fight while running away; others also are courageous against disease, -poverty, political adversity, pain and fear of every sort; others -moreover, against desires and pleasures. What is the common attribute -which in all these cases constitutes Courage? If you asked me what is -_quickness_--common to all those cases when a man runs, speaks, -plays, learns, &c., quickly--I should tell you that it was that -which accomplished much in a little time. Tell me in like manner, -what is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage? - -Laches at first does not understand the question:[13] and Sokrates -elucidates it by giving the parallel explanation of quickness. Here, -as elsewhere, Plato takes great pains to impress the conception in -its full generality, and he seems to have found difficulty in making -others follow him. - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Laches, 191-192. - -[Greek: pa/lin ou)=n peiro= ei)pei=n a)ndrei/an pro=ton, ti/ o)\n e)n -pa=si tou/tois tau)to/n e)stin. e)\ ou)/po katamantha/neis o(\ -le/go?] _Laches._ [Greek: Ou) pa/nu ti. . . .] _Sokr._ -[Greek: peiro= de\ te\n a)ndrei/an ou(/tos ei)pein, ti/s ou)=sa -du/namis e( au)te\ e)n e(done=| kai\ e)n lu/pe| kai\ e)n a(/pasin -oi(=s nu=n de\ e)le/gomen au)te\n ei)=nai, e)/peit' a)ndrei/a -ke/kletai.]] - -[Side-note: Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of -the mind. Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect. -Endurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not -always courage.] - -Laches then gives a general definition of courage. It is a sort of -endurance of the mind.[14] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Laches, 192 B. [Greek: karteri/a tis te=s -psuche=s.]] - -Surely not _all_ endurance (rejoins Sokrates)? You admit that -courage is a fine and honourable thing. But endurance without -intelligence is hurtful and dishonourable: it cannot therefore be -courage. Only intelligent endurance, therefore, can be courage. And -then what is meant by _intelligent_? Intelligent--of what--or to -what end? A man, who endures the loss of money, understanding well -that he will thereby gain a larger sum, is he courageous? No. He who -endures fighting, knowing that he has superior skill, numbers, -and all other advantages on his side, manifests more of -intelligent endurance, than his adversary who knows that he has all -these advantages against him, yet who nevertheless endures fighting. -Nevertheless this latter is the most courageous of the two.[15] -Unintelligent endurance is in this case courage: but unintelligent -endurance was acknowledged to be bad and hurtful, and courage to be a -fine thing. We have entangled ourselves in a contradiction. We must -at least show our own courage, by enduring until we can get right. -For my part (replies Laches) I am quite prepared for such endurance. -I am piqued and angry that I cannot express what I conceive. I seem -to have in my mind clearly what courage is: but it escapes me somehow -or other, when I try to put it in words.[16] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Laches, 192 D-E. [Greek: e( phro/nimos karteri/a -. . . i)/domen de/, _e( ei)s ti/_ phro/nimos; e)\ e( ei)s a(/panta -kai\ ta\ mega/la kai\ ta\ smikra/?]] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Laches, 193 C, 194 B.] - -Sokrates now asks aid from Nikias. _Nikias._--My explanation of -courage is, that it is a sort of knowledge or intelligence. -_Sokr._--But what sort of intelligence? Not certainly -intelligence of piping or playing the harp. Intelligence of what? - -[Side-note: Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is -a sort of intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not -terrible. Objections of Laches.] - -_Nikias._--Courage is intelligence of things terrible, and -things not terrible, both in war and in all other conjunctures. -_Laches._--What nonsense! Courage is a thing totally apart from -knowledge or intelligence.[17] The intelligent physician knows best -what is terrible, and what is not terrible, in reference to disease: -the husbandman, in reference to agriculture. But they are not for -that reason courageous. _Nikias._--They are not; but neither do -they know what is terrible, or what is not terrible. Physicians can -predict the result of a patient's case: they can tell what may -cure him, or what will kill him. But whether it be better for him to -die or to recover--_that_ they do not know, and cannot tell him. -To some persons, death is a less evil than life:--defeat, than -victory:--loss of wealth, than gain. None except the person who can -discriminate these cases, knows what is really terrible and what is -not so. He alone is really courageous.[18] _Laches._--Where is -there any such man? It can be only some God. Nikias feels himself in -a puzzle, and instead of confessing it frankly as I have done, he is -trying to help himself out by evasions more fit for a pleader before -the Dikastery.[19] - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Laches, 195 A. [Greek: te\n to=n deinon kai\ -thar)r(ale/on e)piste/men kai\ e)n pole/mo| kai\ e)n toi=s a)/llois -a(/pasin.] _Laches._--[Greek: O(s a)/topa le/gei!--chori\s de/ -pou sophi/a e)sti\n a)ndrei/as.] - -It appears from two other passages (195 E, and 198 B) that [Greek: -thar)r(a/leos] here is simply the negation of [Greek: deino\s] and -cannot be translated by any affirmative word.] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Laches, 195-196.] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Laches, 196 B.] - -[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future -events, not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of -future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present.] - -_Sokr._--You do not admit, then, Nikias, that lions, tigers, -boars, &c., and such animals, are courageous? _Nikias._--No: -they are without fear--simply from not knowing the danger--like -children: but they are not courageous, though most people call them -so. I may call them bold, but I reserve the epithet courageous for -the intelligent. _Laches._--See how Nikias strips those, whom -every one admits to be courageous, of this honourable appellation! -_Nikias._--Not altogether, Laches: I admit you, and Lamachus, -and many other Athenians, to be courageous, and of course therefore -intelligent. _Laches._--I feel the compliment: but such subtle -distinctions befit a Sophist rather than a general in high -command.[20] _Sokr._--The highest measure of intelligence befits -one in the highest command. What you have said, Nikias, deserves -careful examination. You remember that in taking up the investigation -of courage, we reckoned it only as a portion of virtue: you are aware -that there are other portions of virtue, such as justice, temperance, -and the like. Now you define courage to be, intelligence of what is -terrible or not terrible: of that which causes fear, or does not -cause fear. But nothing causes fear, except future or apprehended -evils: present or past evils cause no fear. Hence courage, as you -define it, is intelligence respecting future evils, and future events -not evil. But how can there be intelligence respecting the future, -except in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and -the past? In every special department, such as medicine, military -proceedings, agriculture, &c., does not the same man, who knows -the phenomena of the future, know also the phenomena of present and -past? Are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same -intelligent mind?[21] - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Laches, 197. [Greek: Kai\ ga\r pre/pei, o)= -So/krates, sophiste=| ta\ toiau=ta ma=llon kompseu/esthai e)\ a)ndri\ -o(\n e( po/lis a)xioi= au(te=s proi+sta/nai.] - -Assuredly the distinctions which here Plato puts into the mouth of -Nikias are nowise more subtle than those which he is perpetually -putting into the mouth of Sokrates. He cannot here mean to -distinguish the Sophists from Sokrates, but to distinguish the -dialectic talkers, including both one and the other, from the active -political leaders.] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Laches, 198 D. [Greek: peri\ o(/son e)sti\n -e)piste/me, ou)k a)/lle me\n ei)=nai peri\ gegono/tos, ei)de/nai -o(/pe| ge/gonen, a)/lle de\ peri\ gignome/non, o(/pe| gi/gnetai, -a)/lle de\ o(/pe| a)\n ka/llista ge/noito kai\ gene/setai to\ me/po -gegono/s--a)ll' e( au)te/. oi(=on peri\ to\ u(gieino\n ei)s a(/pantas -tou\s chro/nous ou)k a)/lle tis e)\ e( i)atrike/, mi/a ou)=sa, -e)phora=| kai\ gigno/mena kai\ gegono/ta kai\ geneso/mena, o(/pe| -gene/setai.] - -199 B. [Greek: e( de/ g' au)te\ e)piste/me to=n au)to=n kai\ -mello/nton kai\ pa/ntos e)cho/nton ei)=nai [o(molo/getai].] - -[Side-note: Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and -evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of -virtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof. It will -not hold therefore as a definition of courage.] - -Since therefore courage, according to your definition, is the -knowledge of futurities evil and not evil, or future evil and good--and -since such knowledge cannot exist without the knowledge of good -and evil generally--it follows that courage is the knowledge of good -and evil generally.[22] But a man who knows thus much, cannot be -destitute of any part of virtue. He must possess temperance and -justice as well as courage. Courage, therefore, according to your -definition, is not only a part of virtue, it is the whole. Now we -began the enquiry by stating that it was only a part of virtue, and -that there were other parts of virtue which it did not comprise. It -is plain therefore that your definition of courage is not precise, -and cannot be sustained. We have not yet discovered what courage -is.[23] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Laches, 199 C. [Greek: kata\ to\n so\n lo/gon -ou) mo/non deino=n te kai\ thar)r(ale/on e( e)piste/me a)ndrei/a -e)sti/n, a)lla\ schedo/n ti e( peri\ pa/nton a)gatho=n te kai\ kako=n -kai\ pa/ntos e)cho/nton], &c.] - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Laches, 199 E. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra eu)re/kamen, -a)ndrei/a o(/, ti e)/stin.]] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false -persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently -about courage without knowing what it is.] - -Here ends the dialogue called Laches, without any positive result. -Nothing is proved except the ignorance of two brave and eminent -generals respecting the moral attribute known by the name -_Courage_: which nevertheless they are known to possess, -and have the full sentiment and persuasion of knowing perfectly; so -that they give confident advice as to the means of imparting it. "I -am unaccustomed to debates like these" (says Laches): "but I am -piqued and mortified--because I feel that I know well what Courage -is, yet somehow or other I cannot state my own thoughts in words." -Here is a description[24] of the intellectual deficiency which -Sokrates seeks to render conspicuous to the consciousness, instead of -suffering it to remain latent and unknown, as it is in the ordinary -mind. Here, as elsewhere, he impugns the false persuasion of -knowledge, and the unconscious presumption of estimable men in -delivering opinions upon ethical and social subjects, which have -become familiar and interwoven with deeply rooted associations, but -have never been studied under a master, nor carefully analysed and -discussed, nor looked at in their full generality. This is a mental -defect which he pronounces to be universal: belonging not less to men -of action like Nikias and Laches, than to Sophists and Rhetors like -Protagoras and Gorgias. - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Laches, 194. [Greek: Kai/toi a)e/thes g' ei)mi\] -(Laches) [Greek: to=n toiou/ton lo/gon; a)lla/ ti/s me kai\ -philoneiki/a ei)/lephe pro\s ta\ ei)reme/na, kai\ o(s a)letho=s -a)ganakto=, ei) ou(tosi\ a)\ noo= me\ oi(=o/s t' ei)mi\ ei)pei=n; -noei=n me\n ga\r e)/moige doko= peri\ a)ndrei/as o(/, ti e)/stin, -ou)k oi)=da d' o(/pe| me a)/rti die/phugen, o(/ste me\ xullabei=n -to=| lo/go| au)te\n kai\ ei)pei=n o(/, ti e)/stin.] - -Compare the Charmides p. 159 A, 160 D, where Sokrates professes to -tell Charmides, If temperance is really in you, you can of course -inform us what it is.] - -[Side-note: No solution given by Plato. Apparent tendency of -his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be -understood without reference to some object or end.] - -Here, as elsewhere, Plato (or the Platonic Sokrates) exposes the -faulty solutions of others, but proposes no better solution of his -own, and even disclaims all ability to do so. We may nevertheless -trace, in the refutation which he gives of the two unsatisfactory -explanations, hints guiding the mind into that direction in which -Plato looks to supply the deficiency. Thus when Laches, after having -given as his first answer (to the question, What is Courage?) a -definition not even formally sufficient, is put by Sokrates upon -giving his second answer,--That Courage is intelligent endurance: -Sokrates asks him[25]--"Yes, _intelligent_: but intelligent to -_what end_? Do you mean, to all things alike, great as well -as little?" We are here reminded that _intelligence_, simply -taken, is altogether undefined; that intelligence must relate to -_something_--and when human conduct is in question, must relate -to some end; and that the Something, and the End, to which it -relates, must be set forth, before the proposition can be clearly -understood. - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Laches, 192 D. - -[Greek: e( phro/nimos karteri/a . . . i)/domen de/, e( ei)s ti -phro/nimos; e)\ e( ei)s a(/panta kai\ ta\ mega/la kai\ ta\ -smikra/?]] - -[Side-note: Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias. -Intelligence--of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence -is not possessed by professional artists.] - -Coming to the answer given by Nikias, we perceive that this -deficiency is in a certain manner supplied. Courage is said to -consist in knowledge: in knowledge of things terrible, and things not -terrible. When Laches applies his cross-examination to the answer, -the manner in which Nikias defends it puts us upon a distinction -often brought to view, though not always adhered to, in the Platonic -writings. There can be no doubt that death, distemper, loss of -wealth, defeat, &c. are terrible things (_i.e._ the prospect -of them inspires fear) in the estimation of mankind generally. -Correct foresight of such contingencies, and of the antecedents -tending to produce or avert them, is possessed by the physician and -other professional persons: who would therefore, it should seem, -possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible. But Nikias -denies this. He does not admit that the contingencies here enumerated -are, always or necessarily, proper objects of fear. In some cases, he -contends, they are the least of two evils. Before you can be said to -possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible, you must -be able to take correct measure not only of the intervening -antecedents or means, but also of the end itself as compared with -other alternative ends: whether, in each particular case, it be the -end most to be feared, or the real evil under the given -circumstances. The professional man can do the former, but he cannot -do the latter. He advises as to means, and executes: but he assumes -his own one end as an indisputable datum. The physician seeks to cure -his patient, without ever enquiring whether it may not be a less evil -for such patient to die than to survive. - -[Side-note: Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, -dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the -undiscovered Science of Ends.] - -The ulterior, yet not less important, estimate of the comparative -worth of different ends, is reserved for that unknown master whom -Nikias himself does not farther specify, and whom Laches sets -aside as nowhere to be found, under the peculiar phrase of "some -God". Subjectively considered, this is an appeal to the judgment of -that One Wise Man, often alluded to by Plato as an absent Expert who -might be called into court--yet never to be found at the exact -moment, nor produced in visible presence: Objectively considered, it -is a postulate or divination of some yet undiscovered Teleology or -Science of Ends: that Science of the Good, which (as we have already -noticed in Alkibiades II.) Plato pronounces to be the crowning and -capital science of all--and without which he there declared, that -knowledge on all other topics was useless and even worse than -useless.[26] The One Wise Man--the _Science of Good_--are the -Subject and Object corresponding to each other, and postulated by -Plato. None but the One Wise Man can measure things terrible and not -terrible: none else can estimate the good or evil, or the comparative -value of two alternative evils, in each individual case. The items -here directed to be taken into the calculation, correspond with what -is laid down by Sokrates in the Protagoras, not with that laid down -in the Gorgias: we find here none of that marked antithesis between -pleasure and good--between pain and evil--upon which Sokrates -expatiates in the Gorgias. - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. ii. 146-147. See above, ch. xii. p. 16.] - -[Side-note: Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one -sufficient condition of virtue.] - -This appears still farther when the cross-examination is taken up by -Sokrates instead of by Laches. We are then made to perceive, that the -knowledge of things terrible and not terrible is a part, but an -inseparable part, of the knowledge of good and evil generally: the -lesser cannot be had without the greater--and the greater carries -with it not merely courage, but all the other virtues besides. None -can know good or evil generally except the perfectly Wise Man. The -perfect condition of the Intelligence, is the sole and all-sufficient -condition of virtue. None can possess one mode of virtue separately. - -This is the doctrine to which the conclusion of the Laches points, -though the question debated is confessedly left without solution. It -is a doctrine which seems to have been really maintained by the -historical Sokrates, and is often implied in the reasonings of the -Platonic Sokrates, but not always nor consistently. - -[Side-note: Dramatic contrast between Laches and Sokrates, as -cross-examiners.] - -In reference to this dialogue, the dramatic contrast is very -forcible, between the cross-examination carried on by Laches, and -that carried on by Sokrates. The former is pettish and impatient, -bringing out no result, and accusing the respondent of cavil and -disingenuousness: the latter takes up the same answer patiently, -expands it into the full generality wrapped up in it, and renders -palpable its inconsistency with previous admissions. - - -APPENDIX. - - -Ast is the only critic who declares the Laches not to be Plato's work -(Platon's Leben und Schr. pp. 451-456). He indeed even finds it -difficult to imagine how Schleiermacher can accept it as genuine (p. -454). He justifies this opinion by numerous reasons--pointing out -what he thinks glaring defects, absurdity, and bad taste, both in the -ratiocination and in the dramatic handling, also _dicta_ alleged -to be _un-Platonic_. Compare Schleiermacher's Einleitung zum -Laches, p. 324 seq. - -I do not concur with Ast in the estimation of those passages which -serve as premisses to his conclusion. But even if I admitted his -premisses, I still should not admit his conclusion. I should conclude -that the dialogue was an inferior work of Plato, but I should -conclude nothing beyond. Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Lachet. p. 29-30, 2nd -ed.) and Socher discover "adolescentiae vestigia" in it, which are not -apparent to me. - -Socher, Stallbaum, and K. F. Hermann pass lightly over the objections -of Ast; and Steinhart (Einleit. p. 355) declares them to be unworthy -of a serious answer. For my part, I draw from these dissensions among -the Platonic critics a conviction of the uncertain evidence upon -which all of them proceed. Each has his own belief as to what Plato -_must_ say, _ought to_ say, and _could not_ have said; -and each adjudicates thereupon with a degree of confidence which -surprises me. The grounds upon which Ast rejects Laches, Charmides, -and Lysis, though inconclusive, appear to me not more inconclusive -than those on which he and other critics reject the Erastae, Theages. -Hippias Major, Alkibiades II., &c. - -The dates which Stallbaum, Schleiermacher, Socher, and Steinhart -assign to the Laches (about 406-404 B.C.) are in my judgment -erroneous. I have already shown my reasons for believing that not one -of the Platonic dialogues was composed until after the death of -Sokrates. The hypotheses also of Steinhart (p. 357) as to the special -purposes of Plato in composing the dialogue are unsupported by any -evidence; and are all imagined so as to fit his supposition as -to the date. So also Schleiermacher tells us that a portion of the -Laches is intended by Plato as a defence of himself against -accusations which had been brought against him, a young man, for -impertinence in having attacked Lysias in the Phaedrus, and Protagoras -in the Protagoras, both of them much older than Plato. But Steinhart -justly remarks that this explanation can only be valid if we admit -Schleiermacher's theory that the Phaedrus and the Protagoras are -earlier compositions than the Laches, which theory Steinhart and most -of the others deny. Steinhart himself adapts his hypotheses to his -own idea of the date of the Laches: and he is open to the same remark -as he himself makes upon Schleiermacher. - - - - - -CHAPTER XIX. - -CHARMIDES. - - -As in Laches, we have pursued an enquiry into the nature of Courage--so -in Charmides, we find an examination of Temperance, Sobriety, -Moderation.[1] Both dialogues conclude without providing any tenable -explanation. In both there is an abundant introduction--in Charmides, -there is even the bustle of a crowded palaestra, with much dramatic -incident--preluding to the substantive discussion. I omit the notice -of this dramatic incident, though it is highly interesting to read. - -[Footnote 1: I translate [Greek: sophrosu/ne] Temperance, though it -is very inadequate, but I know no single English word better -suited.] - -[Side-note: Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded -palaestra. Emotions of Sokrates.] - -The two persons with whom Sokrates here carries on the discussion, -are Charmides and Kritias; both of whom, as historical persons, were -active movers in the oligarchical government of the Thirty, with its -numerous enormities. In this dialogue, Charmides appears as a youth -just rising into manhood, strikingly beautiful both in face and -stature: Kritias his cousin is an accomplished literary man of mature -age. The powerful emotion which Sokrates describes himself as -experiencing,[2] from the sight and close neighbourhood of the -beautiful Charmides, is remarkable, as a manifestation of Hellenic -sentiment. The same exaltation of the feelings and imagination, which -is now produced only by beautiful women, was then excited chiefly by -fine youths. Charmides is described by Kritias as exhibiting -dispositions at once philosophical and poetical:[3] illustrating -the affinity of these two intellectual veins, as Plato conceived -them. He is also described as eminently temperate and modest:[4] from -whence the questions of Sokrates take their departure. - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Charm. 154 C. Ficinus, in his Argumentum to this -dialogue (p. 767), considers it as mainly allegorical, especially the -warm expressions of erotic sentiment contained therein, which he -compares to the Song of Solomon. "Etsi omnia in hoc dialogo mirificam -habeant allegoriam, amatoria maxime, non aliter quam Cantica -Salomonis--mutavi tamen nonnihil--nonnihil etiam praetermisi. Quae enim -consonabant castigatissimis auribus Atticorum, rudioribus forte -auribus minime consonarent."] - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Charm. 155 A.] - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Charm. 157 D. About the diffidence of Charmides -in his younger years, see Xen. Mem. iii. 7, 1.] - -[Side-note: Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates -to the temperate Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or -slowness.] - -You are said to be temperate, Charmides (says Sokrates). If so, your -temperance will surely manifest itself within you in some way, so as -to enable you to form and deliver an opinion, What Temperance is. -Tell us in plain language what you conceive it to be. Temperance, -replies Charmides (after some hesitation),[5] consists in doing every -thing in an orderly and sedate manner, when we walk in the highway, -or talk, or perform other matters in the presence of others. It is, -in short, a kind of sedateness or slowness. - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Charm. 159 B. [Greek: to\ kosmi/os pa/nta -pra/ttein kai\ e(suche=|, e)/n te tai=s o)doi=s badi/zein kai\ -diale/gesthai . . . sulle/bden e(suchio/tes tis.]] - -[Side-note: But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and -slowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the -contrary. Temperance cannot be slowness.] - -Sokrates begins his cross-examination upon this answer, in the same -manner as he had begun it with Laches in respect to courage. -_Sokr._--Is not temperance a fine and honourable thing? Does it -not partake of the essence and come under the definition, of what is -fine or and honourable?[6] _Char._--Undoubtedly it does. -_Sokr._--But if we specify in detail our various operations, -either of body or mind--such as writing, reading, playing on the -harp, boxing, running, jumping, learning, teaching, recollecting, -comprehending, deliberating, determining, &c.--we shall find that -to do them quickly is more fine and honourable than to do them -slowly. Slowness does not, except by accident, belong to the fine and -honourable: therefore temperance, which does so belong to it, cannot -be a kind of slowness.[7] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Charm. 159 C--160 D. [Greek: ou) to=n kalo=n -me/ntoi e( sophrosu/ne e)sti/n? . . . e)peide\ _e)n to=| lo/go|_ to=n -kalo=n ti e(mi=n e( sophrosu/ne u(pete/the.]] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Charm. 160 C.] - -[Side-note: Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the -feeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates.] - -Charmides next declares Temperance to be a variety of the feeling of -shame or modesty. But this (observes Sokrates) will not hold more -than the former explanation: since Homer has pronounced shame not to -be good, for certain persons and under certain circumstances.[8] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Charm. 161 A.] - -[Side-note: Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's -own business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, -and refutes it. Distinction between making and doing.] - -"Temperance consists in doing one's own business." Here we have a -third explanation, proposed by Charmides and presently espoused by -Kritias. Sokrates professes not to understand it, and pronounces it -to be like a riddle.[9] Every tradesman or artisan does the business -of others as well as his own. Are we to say for that reason that he -is not temperate? I distinguish (says Kritias) between _making_ -and _doing_: the artisan _makes_ for others, but he does -not _do_ for others, and often cannot be said to _do_ at -all. _To do_, implies honourable, profitable, good, occupation: -this alone is a man's own business, and this I call temperance. When -a man acts so as to harm himself, he does not do his own -business.[10] The doing of good things, is temperance.[11] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Charm. 161 C--162 B. [Greek: sophrosu/ne--to\ ta\ -au(tou= pra/ttein . . . ai)ni/gmati/ tini e)/oiken.] - -There is here a good deal of playful vivacity in the dialogue: -Charmides gives this last answer, which he has heard from Kritias, -who is at first not forward to defend it, until Charmides forces him -to come forward, by hints and side-insinuations. This is the dramatic -art and variety of Plato, charming to read, but not bearing upon him -as a philosopher.] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Charm. 163 C-D. [Greek: ta\ kalo=s kai\ -o)pheli/mos poiou/mena . . . oi)kei=a mo/na ta\ toiau=ta e(gei=sthai, -ta\ de\ blabera\ pa/nta a)llo/tria . . . o(/ti ta\ oi)kei=a te kai\ -ta\ au(tou= a)gatha\ kaloi/es, kai\ ta\s to=n a)gatho=n poie/seis -pra/xeis.]] - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Charm. 163 E. [Greek: te\n to=n a)gatho=n pra=xin -sophrosu/nen ei)=nai sapho=s soi diori/zomai.]] - -[Side-note: Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in -self-knowledge.] - -_Sokr._--Perhaps it is. But does the well-doer always and -certainly know that he is doing well? Does the temperate man know his -own temperance? _Krit._--He certainly must. Indeed I think that -the essence of temperance is, _Self-knowledge_. _Know -thyself_ is the precept of the Delphian God, who means thereby the -same as if he had said--Be temperate. I now put aside all that I have -said before, and take up this new position, That temperance consists -in a man's knowing himself. If you do not admit it, I challenge your -cross-examination.[12] - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Charm. 164-165.] - -[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does -self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this -case? Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the -knowledge itself.] - -_Sokr._--I cannot tell you whether I admit it or not, until I -have investigated. You address me as if I professed to know the -subject: but it is because I do not know, that I examine, in -conjunction with you, each successive answer.[13] If temperance -consists in knowing, it must be a knowledge of something. -_Krit._--It is so: it is knowledge of a man's self. -_Sokr._--What good does this knowledge procure for us? as -medical knowledge procures for us health--architectural knowledge, -buildings, &c.? _Krit._--It has no object positive result of -analogous character: but neither have arithmetic nor geometry. -_Sokr._--True, but in arithmetic and geometry, we can at least -indicate a something known, distinct from the knowledge. Number and -proportion are distinct from arithmetic, the science which takes -cognizance of them. Now what is that, of which temperance is the -knowledge,--distinct from temperance itself? _Krit._--It is on -this very point that temperance differs from all the other -cognitions. Each of the others is knowledge of something different -from itself, but not knowledge of itself: while temperance is -knowledge of all the other sciences and of itself also.[14] -_Sokr._--If this be so, it will of course be a knowledge of -ignorance, as well as a knowledge of knowledge? -_Krit._--Certainly. - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Charm. 165 C.] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Charm. 166 C. [Greek: ai( me\n a)/llai pa=sai -a)/llou ei)si\n e)piste=mai, e(auto=n d' ou)/; e( de\ mo/ne to=n te -a)/llon e)pistemo=n e)piste/me e)sti\ kai\ au)te\ e(aute=s.] So -also 166 E.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, -without a given _cognitum_ as its object. Analogies to prove -that knowledge of knowledge is impossible.] - -_Sokr._--According to your explanation, then, it is only the -temperate man who knows himself. He alone is able to examine himself, -and thus to find out what he really knows and does not know: he alone -is able to examine others, and thus to find out what each man knows, -or what each man only believes himself to know without really -knowing. Temperance, or self-knowledge, is the knowledge what a man -knows, and what he does not know.[15] Now two questions arise upon -this: First, is it possible for a man to know, that he knows what he -does know, and that he does not know what he does not know? Next, -granting it to be possible, in what way do we gain by it? The first -of these two questions involves much difficulty. How can there be any -cognition, which is not cognition of a given _cognitum_, but -cognition merely of other cognitions and non-cognitions? There is no -vision except of some colour, no audition except of some sound: there -can be no vision of visions, or audition of auditions. So -likewise, all desire is desire of some pleasure; there is no desire -of desires. All volition is volition of some good; there is no -volition of volitions: all love applies to something beautiful--there -is no love of other loves. The like is true of fear, opinion, &c. -It would be singular therefore, if contrary to all these analogies, -there were any cognition not of some _cognitum_, but of itself -and other cognitions.[16] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Charm. 167 A.] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Charm. 167-168.] - -[Side-note: All knowledge must be relative to some object.] - -It is of the essence of cognition to be cognition of something, and -to have its characteristic property with reference to some -correlate.[17] What is greater, has its property of being greater in -relation to something else, which is less--not in relation to itself. -It cannot be greater than itself, for then it would also be less than -itself. It cannot include in itself the characteristic property of -the _correlatum_ as well as that of the _relatum_. So too -about what is older, younger, heavier, lighter: there is always a -something distinct, to which reference is made. Vision does not -include in itself both the property of seeing, and that of being -seen: the _videns_ is distinct from the _visum_. A movement -implies something else to be moved: a heater something else to be -heated. - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Charm. 168 B. [Greek: e)/sti me\n au(te\ e( -e)piste/me tino\s e)piste/me, kai\ e)/chei tina toiau/ten du/namin -o(/ste tino\s ei)=nai.]] - -[Side-note: All properties are relative--every thing in nature -has its characteristic property with reference to something else.] - -In all these cases (concludes Sokrates) the characteristic property -is essentially relative, implying something distinguishable from, yet -correlating with, itself. May we generalise the proposition, and -affirm, That all properties are relative, and that every thing in -nature has its characteristic property with reference, not to itself, -but to something else? Or is this true only of some things and not of -all--so that cognition may be something in the latter category? - -This is an embarrassing question, which I do not feel qualified to -decide: neither the general question, whether there be any cases of -characteristic properties having no reference to any thing beyond -themselves, and therefore not relative, but absolute--nor the -particular question, whether cognition be one of those cases, -implying no separate _cognitum_, but being itself both -_relatum_ and _correlatum_--cognition of cognition.[18] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Charm. 168-169. 169 A: [Greek: mega/lou de/ tinos -a)ndro\s dei=, o(/stis tou=to kata\ pa/nton i(kano=s diaire/setai, -po/teron ou)de\n to=n o)/nton te\n au(tou= du/namin au)to\ pro\s e(auto\ -pe/phuken e)/chein, a)lla\ pro\s a)llo\--e)\ ta\ me\n, ta\ d' ou)/; -kai\ ei) e)/stin au(= a(/tina au)ta\ pro\s e(auta\ e)/chei, a)=r' e)n -tou/tois e)sti\n e)piste/me, e(\n de\ e(mei=s sophrosu/nen phame\n -ei)=nai. e)go\ me\n ou) pisteu/o e)mauto=| i(kano\s ei)=nai tau=ta -diele/sthtai.]] - -But even if cognition of cognition be possible, I shall not -admit it as an explanation of what temperance is, until I have -satisfied myself that it is beneficial. For I have a presentiment -that temperance must be something beneficial and good.[19] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Charm. 169 B. [Greek: o)phelimo/n ti ka)gatho\n -manteu/omai ei)=nai.]] - -[Side-note: Even if cognition of cognition were possible, -cognition of non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what -he knows, but he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the -fact _that_ he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, -and how much he does not know.] - -Let us concede for the present discussion (continues Sokrates) that -cognition of cognition is possible. Still how does this prove that -there can be cognition of non-cognition? that a man can know both -what he knows and what he does not know? For this is what we declared -self-knowledge and temperance to be.[20] To have cognition of -cognition is one thing: to have cognition of non-cognition is a -different thing, not necessarily connected with it. If you have -cognition of cognition, you will be enabled to distinguish that which -is cognition from that which is not--but no more. Now the knowledge -or ignorance of the matter of health is known by medical science: -that of justice known by political science. The knowledge of -knowledge simply--cognition of cognition--is different from both. The -person who possesses this last only, without knowing either medicine -or politics, will become aware that he knows something and possesses -some sort of knowledge, and will be able to verify so much with -regard to others. But _what_ it is that he himself knows, or -that others know, he will not thereby be enabled to find out: he will -not distinguish whether that which is known belong to physiology or -to politics; to do this, special acquirements are needed. You, a -temperate man therefore, as such, do not know _what_ you know -and _what_ you do not know; you know the bare fact, _that_ -you know and _that_ you do not know. You will not be competent -to cross-examine any one who professes to know medicine or any other -particular subject, so as to ascertain whether the man really -possesses what he pretends to possess. There will be no point in -common between you and him. You, as a temperate man, possess -cognition of cognition, but you do not know any special -_cognitum_: the special man knows his own special -_cognitum_ but is a stranger to cognition generally. You cannot -question him, nor criticise what he says or performs, in his own -specialty--for of that you are ignorant:--no one can do it except -some fellow _expert_. You can ascertain that he possesses some -knowledge: but whether he possesses that particular knowledge to -which he lays claim, or whether he falsely pretends to it, you cannot -ascertain:--since, as a temperate man, you know only cognition and -non-cognition generally. To ascertain this point, you must be not -only a temperate man, but a man of special cognition besides.[21] You -can question and test no one, except another temperate man like -yourself. - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Charm. 169 D. [Greek: nu=n me\n tou=to -xugchore/somen, dunato\n ei)=nai gene/sthai e)piste/men e)piste/mes--i)/thi -de\ ou)=n, ei) o(/, ti ma/lista dunato\n tou=to, ti/ ma=llon oi(=o/n -te/ e)stin ei)de/nai a(/ te/ tis oi)=de kai\ a(\ me/? tou=to ga\r -de/pou e)/phamen ei)=nai to\ gigno/skein au(to\n kai\ sophronei=n.]] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Charm. 170-171. 171 C: [Greek: Panto\s a)/ra -ma=llon, ei) e( sophrosu/ne e)piste/mes e)pise/me mo/non e)sti\ kai\ -a)nepistemosu/nes, ou)/te i)atro\n diakri=nai oi(/a te e)/stai -e)pista/menon ta\ te=s te/chnes, e)\ me\ e)pista/menon prospoiou/menon -de\ e)\ oi)o/menon, ou)/te a)//lon ou)de/na to=n e)pistame/non -kai\ o(tiou=n, ple/n ge to\n au(tou= o(mo/technon, o(/sper oi( -a)/lloi demiourgoi/.]] - -[Side-note: Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be -of little or no value.] - -But if this be all that temperance can do, of what use is it to us -(continues Sokrates)? It is indeed a great benefit to know how much -we know, and how much we do not know: it is also a great benefit to -know respecting others, how much _they_ know, and how much they -do not know. If thus instructed, we should make fewer mistakes: we -should do by ourselves only what we knew how to do,--we should commit -to others that which they knew how to do, and which we did not know. -But temperance (meaning thereby cognition of cognition and of -non-cognition generally) does not confer such instruction, nor have -we found any science which does.[22] How temperance benefits us, does -not yet appear. - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Charm. 172 A. [Greek: o(ra=|s, o(/ti ou)damou= -e)piste/me ou)demi/a toiau/te ou)=sa pe/phantai.]] - -[Side-note: But even granting the possibility of that which -has just been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. -Suppose that all separate work were well performed, by special -practitioners, we should not attain our end--Happiness.] - -But let us even concede--what has been just shown to be impossible--that -through temperance we become aware of what we do know and what -we do not know. Even upon this hypothesis, it will be of little -service to us. We have been too hasty in conceding that it would be a -great benefit if each of us did only what he knew, committing to -others to do only what they knew. I have an awkward suspicion -(continues Sokrates) that after all, this would be no great -benefit.[23] It is true that upon this hypothesis, all operations in -society would be conducted scientifically and skilfully. We should -have none but competent pilots, physicians, generals, &c., acting -for us, each of them doing the work for which he was fit. The -supervision exercised by temperance (in the sense above defined) -would guard us against all pretenders. Let us even admit that as to -prediction of the future, we should have none but competent and -genuine prophets to advise us; charlatans being kept aloof by this -same supervision. We should thus have every thing done scientifically -and in a workmanlike manner. But should we for that reason do well -and be happy? Can that be made out, Kritias?[24] - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Charm. 172-173.] - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Charm. 173 C-D. [Greek: kateskeuasme/non de\ -ou(/to to\ a)nthro/pinon ge/nos o(/ti me\n e)pistemo/nos a)\n pra/ttoi -kai\ zo=|e, e(/pomai--o(/ti d' e)pistemo/nos a)\n pra/ttontes eu)= a)\n -pra/ttoimen kai\ eu)daimonoi=men, tou=to de\ ou(/po duna/metha -mathei=n, o)= phi/le Kriti/a.]] - -[Side-note: Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes -most to well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and -evil.] - -_Krit._--You will hardly find the end of well-doing anywhere -else, if you deny that it follows on doing scientifically or -according to knowledge.[25] _Sokr._--But according to knowledge, -of _what_? Of leather-cutting, brazen work, wool, wood, &c.? -_ Krit._--No, none of these. _Sokr._--Well then, you see, -we do not follow out consistently your doctrine--That the happy man -is he who lives scientifically, or according to knowledge. For all -these men live according to knowledge, and still you do not admit -them to be happy. Your definition of happiness applies only to some -portion of those who live according to knowledge, but not to all. How -are we to distinguish which of them? Suppose a man to know every -thing past, present, and future; which among the fractions of such -omniscience would contribute most to make him happy? Would they all -contribute equally? _Krit._--By no means. _Sokr._--Which of -them then would contribute most? Would it be that by which he knew -the art of gaming? _Krit._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--Or that -by which he knew the art of computing? _Krit._--No. -_Sokr._--Or that by which he knew the conditions of health? -_Krit._--That will suit better. _Sokr._--But which of them -most of all? _Krit._--That by which he knew good and evil.[26] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Charm. 173 D. [Greek: A)lla\ me/ntoi, e)= d' o(/s, -ou) r(a|di/os eu(re/seis a)/llo ti te/los tou= eu)= pra/ttein -e)a\n to\ e)pistemo/nos a)tima/ses.]] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Charm. 174.] - -[Side-note: Without the science of good and evil, the other -special science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not -the science of good and evil, and is of little service.] - -_Sokr._--Here then, you have been long dragging me round in a -circle, keeping back the fact, that well-doing and happiness does not -arise from living according to science generally, not of all other -matters taken together--but from living according to the science of -this one single matter, good and evil. If you exclude this last, and -leave only the other sciences, each of these others will work as -before: the medical man will heal, the weaver will prepare clothes, -the pilot will navigate his vessel, the general will conduct his -army--each of them scientifically. Nevertheless, that each of these -things shall conduce to our well-being and profit, will be an -impossibility, if the science of good and evil be wanting.[27] Now -this science of good and evil, the special purpose of which is to -benefit us,[28] is altogether different from temperance; which you -have defined as the science of cognition and non-cognition, and which -appears not to benefit us at all. _Krit._--Surely it does -benefit us: for it presides over and regulates all the other -sciences, and of course regulates this very science, of good and -evil, among the rest. _Sokr._--In what way can it benefit us? It -does not procure for us any special service, such as good health: -_that_ is the province of medicine: in like manner, each -separate result arises from its own producing art. To confer benefit -is, as we have just laid down, the special province of the science of -good and evil.[29] Temperance, as the science of cognition and -non-cognition, cannot work any benefit at all. - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Charm. 174 C-D. [Greek: e)pei\ ei) the/leis -e)xelei=n tau/ten te\n e)piste/men] (of good and evil) [Greek: e)k -to=n a)/llon e)pistemo=n, e(=tto/n ti e( me\n i)atrike\ u(giai/nein -poie/sei, e( de\ skutike\ u(podede/sthai, e( de\ u(phantike\ -e(mphie/sthai, e( de\ kubbernetike\ kolu/sei e)n te=| thala/tte| -a)pothne/skein kai\ e( strategike\ e)n pole/mo|? Ou)de\n e(=tton, e)/phe. -A)lla\ to\ eu)= te tou/ton e(/kasta gi/gnesthai kai\ o)pheli/mos -a)poleloipo\s e(ma=s e)/stai tau/tes a)pou/ses.]] - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Charm. 174 D. [Greek: e(=s e)/rgon e)sti\ to\ -o)phelei=n e(ma=s], &c.] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Charm. 175 A. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/as e)/stai -demiourgo/s (e( sophrosu/ne). Ou) de=ta. A)/lles ga\r e)=n te/chnes -u(giei/a, e)\ ou)/? A)/lles. Ou)d' a)/ra o)phelei/as, o)= e(/taire; -a)/lle| ga\r au)= a)pe/domen tou=to to\ e)/rgon te/chne| nu=n de/; -e)= ga/r? Pa/nu ge. Po=s ou)=n o)phe/limos e)/stai e( sophrosu/ne, -ou)demia=s o)phelei/as ou)=sa demiourgo/s? Ou)damo=s, o)= So/krates, -e)/oike/ ge.]] - -[Side-note: Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his -research. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several -concessions have been made which cannot be justified.] - -Thus then, concludes Sokrates, we are baffled in every way: we -cannot find out what temperance is, nor what that name has been -intended to designate. All our tentatives have failed; although, in -our anxiety to secure some result, we have accepted more than one -inadmissible hypothesis. Thus we have admitted that there might exist -cognition of cognition, though our discussion tended to negative such -a possibility. We have farther granted, that this cognition of -cognition, or science of science, might know all the operations of -each separate and special science: so that the temperate man -(_i.e._ he who possesses cognition of cognition) might know both -what he knows and what he does not know: might know, namely, that he -knows the former and that he does not know the latter. We have -granted this, though it is really an absurdity to say, that what a -man does not know at all, he nevertheless does know after a certain -fashion.[30] Yet after these multiplied concessions against strict -truth, we have still been unable to establish our definition of -temperance: for temperance as we defined it has, after all, turned -out to be thoroughly unprofitable. - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Charm. 175 B. [Greek: kai\ ga\r e)piste/men -e)piste/mes ei)=nai xunechore/samen, ou)k e)o=ntos tou= lo/gou ou)de\ -pha/skontos ei)=nai; kai\ tau/te| au)= te=| e)piste/me| kai\ ta\ to=n -a)/llon e)pistemo=n e)/rga gigno/skein xunechore/samen, ou)de\ tou=t' -e)o=ntos tou= lo/gou, i(/na de\ e(mi=n ge/noito o( so/phron -e)piste/mon o(=n te oi)=den, o(/ti oi)=de, kai\ o(=n me\ oi)=den, o(/ti -ou)k oi)=de. tou=to me\n de\ kai\ panta/pasi megaloprepo=s -xunechore/samen, ou)d' e)piskepsa/menoi to\ a)du/naton ei)=nai -a(/ tis me\ oi)=de medamo=s, tau=ta ei)de/nai a(mo=s ge/ pos; o(/ti -ga\r ou)k oi)=de, phesi\n au)ta\ ei)de/nai e( e(mete/ra o(mologi/a. -kai/toi, o(s e)go=mai, ou)deno\s o(/tou ou)chi\ a)logo/teron tou=t' -a)\n phanei/e.] This would not appear an absurdity to Aristotle. -See Analyt. Priora, ii. p. 67, a. 21; Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 28.] - -[Side-note: Temperance is and must be a good thing: but -Charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what -temperance is remains unknown.] - -It is plain that we have taken the wrong road, and that I (Sokrates) -do not know how to conduct the enquiry. For temperance, whatever it -may consist in, must assuredly be a great benefit: and you, -Charmides, are happy if you possess it. How can I tell (rejoins -Charmides) whether I possess it or not: since even men like you and -Kritias cannot discover what it is?[31] - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Charm. 176 A.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of -praise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. -Dramatic ornament throughout.] - -Here ends the dialogue called Charmides[32] after the interchange of -a few concluding compliments, forming part of the great dramatic -richness which characterises this dialogue from the beginning. I make -no attempt to reproduce this latter attribute; though it is one of -the peculiar merits of Plato in reference to ethical enquiry, -imparting to the subject a charm which does not naturally belong to -it. I confine myself to the philosophical bearing of the dialogue. -According to the express declaration of Sokrates, it ends in nothing -but disappointment. No positive result is attained. The problem--What -is Temperance?--remains unsolved, after four or five different -solutions have been successively tested and repudiated. - -[Footnote 32: See Appendix at end of chapter.] - -[Side-note: The Charmides is an excellent specimen of -Dialogues of Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all -ultimately disallowed.] - -The Charmides (like the Laches) is a good illustrative specimen of -those Dialogues of Search, the general character and purpose of which -I have explained in my eighth** chapter. It proves nothing: it -disproves several hypotheses: but it exhibits (and therein consists -its value) the anticipating, guessing, tentative, and eliminating -process, without which no defensible conclusions can be -obtained--without which, even if such be found, no advocate can be -formed capable of defending them against an acute cross-examiner. In most -cases, this tentative process is forgotten or ignored: even when -recognised as a reality, it is set aside with indifference, often -with ridicule. A writer who believes himself to have solved any -problem, publishes his solution together with the proofs; and -acquires deserved credit for it, if those proofs give satisfaction. -But he does not care to preserve, nor do the public care to know, the -steps by which such solution has been reached. Nevertheless in most -cases, and in all cases involving much difficulty, there has been a -process, more or less tedious, of tentative and groping--of guesses -at first hailed as promising, then followed out to a certain extent, -lastly discovered to be untenable. The history of science,[33] -astronomical, physical, chemical, physiological, &c., -wherever it has been at all recorded, attests this constant -antecedence of a period of ignorance, confusion, and dispute, even in -cases where ultimately a solution has been found commanding the -nearly unanimous adhesion of the scientific world. But on subjects -connected with man and society, this period of dispute and confusion -continues to the present moment. No unanimity has ever been -approached, among nations at once active in intellect and enjoying -tolerable liberty of dissent. Moreover--apart from the condition of -different sciences among mature men--we must remember that the -transitive process, above described, represents the successive stages -by which every adult mind has been gradually built up from infancy. -Trial and error--alternate guess and rejection, generation and -destruction of sentiments and beliefs--is among the most widespread -facts of human intelligence.[34] Even those ordinary minds, which in -mature life harden with the most exemplary fidelity into the locally -prevalent type of orthodoxy,--have all in their earlier years gone -through that semi-fluid and indeterminate period, in which the type -to come is yet a matter of doubt--in which the head might have been -permanently lengthened or permanently flattened, according to the -direction in which pressure was applied. - -[Footnote 33: It is not often that historians of science take much -pains to preserve and bring together the mistaken guesses and -tentatives which have preceded great physical discoveries. One -instance in which this has been ably and carefully done is in the -'Biography of Cavendish,' the chemist and natural philosopher, by Dr. -Geo. Wilson. - -The great chemical discovery of the composition of water, -accomplished during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, has -been claimed as the privilege of three eminent scientific -men--Cavendish, Watt, and Lavoisier. The controversy on the subject, -voluminous and bitter, has been the means of recording each -successive scientific phase and point of view. It will be found -admirably expounded in this biography. Wilson sets forth the -misconceptions, confusion of ideas, approximations to truth seen but -not followed out, &c., which prevailed upon the scientific men of -that day, especially under the misleading influence of the -"phlogiston theory," then universally received. - -To Plato such a period of mental confusion would have been in itself -an interesting object for contemplation and description. He might -have dramatised it under the names of various disputants, with the -cross-examining Elenchus, personified in Sokrates, introduced to stir -up the debate, either by first advocating, then refuting, a string of -successive guesses and dreams (Charmides, 173 A) of his own, or by -exposing similar suggestions emanating from others; especially in -regard to the definition of _phlogiston_, an entity which then -overspread and darkened all chemical speculation, but which every -theorist thought himself obliged to define. The dialogues would have -ended (as the Protagoras, Lysis, Charmides, &c., now end) by -Sokrates deriding the ill success which had attended them in the -search for an explanation, and by his pointing out that while all the -theorists talked familiarly about _phlogiston_ as a powerful -agent, none of them could agree what it was. - -See Dr. Wilson's 'Biography of Cavendish,' pp. 36-198-320-325, and -elsewhere.] - -[Footnote 34: It is strikingly described by Plato in one of the most -remarkable passages of the speech of Diotima in the Symposion, pp. -207-208.] - -[Side-note: Trial and Error, the natural process of the human -mind. Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this -part of the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the -condition of conscious ignorance.] - -We shall follow Plato towards the close of his career (Treatise De -Legibus), into an imperative and stationary orthodoxy of his -own: but in the dialogues which I have already reviewed, as well as -in several others which I shall presently notice, no mention is made -of any given affirmative doctrine as indispensable to arrive at -ultimately. Plato here concentrates his attention upon the -indeterminate period of the mind: looking upon the mind not as an -empty vessel, requiring to be filled by ready-made matter from -without--nor as a blank sheet, awaiting a foreign hand to write -characters upon it--but as an assemblage of latent capacities, which -must be called into action by stimulus and example, but which can -only attain improvement through multiplied trials and multiplied -failures. Whereas in most cases these failures are forgotten, the -peculiarity of Plato consists in his bringing them to view with full -detail, explaining the reasons of each. He illustrates abundantly, -and dramatises with the greatest vivacity, the intellectual process -whereby opinions are broached, at first adopted, then mistrusted, -unmade, and re-made--or perhaps not re-made at all, but exchanged for -a state of conscious ignorance. The great hero and operator in this -process is the Platonic Sokrates, who accepts for himself this -condition of conscious ignorance, and even makes it a matter of -comparative pride, that he stands nearly alone in such -confession.[35] His colloquial influence, working powerfully and -almost preternaturally,[36] not only serves both to spur and to -direct the activity of hearers still youthful and undecided, but also -exposes those who have already made up their minds and confidently -believe themselves to know. Sokrates brings back these latter from -the false persuasion of knowledge to the state of conscious -ignorance, and to the prior indeterminate condition of mind, in which -their opinions have again to be put together by the tentative and -guessing process. This tentative process, prosecuted under the drill -of Sokrates, is in itself full of charm and interest for Plato, -whether it ends by finding a good solution or only by discarding a -bad one. - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. pp. 21-22-23.] - -[Footnote 36: Plato, Symposion, 213 E, 215-216; Menon, 80 A-B.] - -[Side-note: Familiar words--constantly used, with much earnest -feeling, but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in -human society.] - -The Charmides is one of the many Platonic dialogues wherein such -intellectual experimentation appears depicted without any positive -result: except as it adds fresh matter to illustrate that wide-spread -mental fact,--(which has already come before the reader, in -Euthyphron, Alkibiades, Hippias, Erastae, Laches, &c., as to -holiness, beauty, philosophy, courage, &c., and is now brought to -view in the case of _temperance_ also; all of them words in -every one's mouth, and tacitly assumed by every one as known -quantities) the perpetual and confident judgments which mankind are -in the habit of delivering--their apportionment of praise and blame, -as well as of reward and punishment consequent on praise and -blame--without any better basis than that of strong emotion imbibed -they know not how, and without being able to render any rational -explanation even of the familiar words round which such emotions are -grouped. No philosopher has done so much as Plato to depict in detail -this important fact--the habitual condition of human society, modern -as well as ancient, and for that very reason generally unnoticed.[37] -The emotional or subjective value of temperance is all that Sokrates -determines, and which indeed he makes his point of departure. -Temperance is essentially among the fine, beautiful, honourable, -things:[38] but its rational or objective value (_i.e._, what is -the common object characterising all temperate acts or persons), he -cannot determine. Here indeed Plato is not always consistent with -himself: for we shall come to other dialogues wherein he professes -himself incompetent to say whether a thing be beautiful or not, until -it be determined what the thing is:[39] and we have already found -Sokrates declaring (in the Hippias Major), that we cannot -determine whether any particular object is beautiful or not, until we -have first determined, What is Beauty in the Absolute, or the -Self-Beautiful? a problem nowhere solved by Plato. - -[Footnote 37: "Whoever has reflected on the generation of ideas in -his own mind, or has investigated the causes of misunderstandings -among mankind, will be obliged to proclaim as a fact deeply seated in -human nature--That most of the misunderstandings and contradictions -among men, most of the controversies and errors both in science and -in society, arise usually from our assuming (consciously or -unconsciously) fundamental maxims and fundamental facts as if they -were self-evident, and as if they must be assumed by every one else -besides. Accordingly we never think of closely examining them, until -at length experience has taught us that these _self-evident_ -matters are exactly what stand most in need of proof, and what form -the special root of divergent opinions."--(L. O. Broecker--Untersuchungen -ueber die Glaubwuerdigkeit der alt-Roemischen Geschichte, p. 490.)] - -[Footnote 38: Plato, Charm. 159 B, 160 D. [Greek: e( sophrosu/ne--to=n -kalo=n ti--e)n to=| lo/go=| to=n kalo=n ti]. So also Sokrates -in the Laches (192 C), assumes that courage is [Greek: to=n pa/nu kalo=n -pragma/ton], though he professes not to know nor to be able to discover -what courage is.] - -[Footnote 39: See Gorgias, 462 B, 448 E; Menon, 70 B.] - -[Side-note: Different ethical points of view in different -Platonic dialogues.] - -Among the various unsuccessful definitions of temperance propounded, -there is more than one which affords farther example to show how -differently Plato deals with the same subject in different dialogues. -Here we have the phrase--"to do one's own business"--treated as an -unmeaning puzzle, and exhibited as if it were analogous to various -other phrases, with which the analogy is more verbal than real. But -in the Republic, Plato admits this phrase as well understood, and -sets it forth as the constituent element of justice; in the Gorgias, -as the leading mark of philosophical life.[40] - -[Footnote 40: Plato, Republ. iv. 433, vi. 496 C, viii. 550 A; -Gorgias, 526 C. Compare also Timaeus, 72 A, Xen, Mem. ii. 9, 1.] - -[Side-note: Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible.] - -Again, another definition given by Kritias is, That temperance -consists in knowing yourself, or in self-knowledge. In commenting -upon this definition, Sokrates makes out--first, that self-knowledge -is impossible: next, that if possible, it would be useless. You -cannot know yourself, he argues: you cannot know what you know, and -what you do not know: to say that you know what you know, is either -tautological or untrue--to say that you know what you do not know, is -a contradiction. All cognition must be cognition of something -distinct from yourself: it is a relative term which must have some -correlate, and cannot be its own correlate: you cannot have cognition -of cognition, still less cognition of non-cognition. - -[Side-note: In other dialogues, Sokrates declares -self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable. Necessity for -the student to have presented to him dissentient points of view.] - -This is an important point of view, which I shall discuss more at -length when I come to the Platonic Theaetetus. I bring it to view here -only as contrasting with different language held by the Platonic -Sokrates in other dialogues; where he insists on the great value and -indispensable necessity of self-knowledge, as a preliminary to all -other knowledge--upon the duty of eradicating from men's minds that -false persuasion of their own knowledge which they universally -cherished--and upon the importance of forcing them to know their -own ignorance as well as their own knowledge. In the face of this -last purpose, so frequently avowed by the Platonic Sokrates -(indirectly even in this very dialogue),[41] we remark a material -discrepancy, when he here proclaims self-knowledge to be impossible. -We must judge every dialogue by itself, illustrating it when -practicable by comparison with others, but not assuming consistence -between them as a postulate _a priori_. It is a part of Plato's -dramatic and tentative mode of philosophising to work out different -ethical points of view, and to have present to his mind one or other -of them, with peculiar force in each different dialogue. The subject -is thus brought before us on all its sides, and the reader is -familiarised with what a dialectician might say, whether capable of -being refuted or not. Inconsistency between one dialogue and another -is not a fault in the Platonic dialogues of Search; but is, on the -contrary, a part of the training process, for any student who is -destined to acquire that full mastery of question and answer which -Plato regards as the characteristic test of knowledge. It is a puzzle -and provocative to the internal meditation of the student. - -[Footnote 41: Plato, Charm. 166 D.] - -[Side-note: Courage and Temperance are shown to have no -distinct meaning, except as founded on the general cognizance of good -and evil.] - -In analyzing the Laches, we observed that the definition of courage -given by Nikias was shown by Sokrates to have no meaning, except in -so far as it coincided with the general knowledge or cognition of -good and evil. Here, too, in the Charmides, we are brought in the -last result to the same terminus--the general cognition of good and -evil. But Temperance, as previously good and defined, is not -comprehended under that cognition, and is therefore pronounced to be -unprofitable. - -[Side-note: Distinction made between the special sciences and -the science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences -are of no use.] - -This cognition of good and evil--the science of the profitable--is -here (in the Charmides) proclaimed by Sokrates to have a place of its -own among the other sciences; and even to be first among them, -essentially necessary to supervise and direct them, as it had been -declared in Alkibiades II. Now the same supervising place and -directorship had been claimed by Kritias for Temperance as he -defines it--that is, self-knowledge, or the cognition of our -cognitions and non-cognitions. But Sokrates doubts even the reality -of such self-knowledge: and granting for argument's sake that it -exists, he still does not see how it can be profitable. For the -utmost which its supervision can ensure would be, that each -description of work shall be scientifically done, by the skilful man, -and not by the unskilful. But it is not true, absolutely speaking (he -argues), that acting scientifically or with knowledge is sufficient -for well doing or for happiness: for the question must next be -asked--Knowledge--of what? Not knowledge of leather-cutting, carpenter's -or brazier's work, arithmetic, or even medicine: these, and many others, -a man may possess, and may act according to them; but still he will -not attain the end of being happy. All cognitions contribute in -greater or less proportion towards that end: but what contributes -most, and most essentially, is the cognition of good and evil, -without which all the rest are insufficient. Of this last-mentioned -cognition or science, it is the special object to ensure profit or -benefit:[42] to take care that everything done by the other sciences -shall be done well or in a manner conducing towards the end -Happiness. After this, there is no province left for -temperance--_i.e._, self-knowledge, or the knowledge of cognitions and -non-cognitions: no assignable way in which it can yield any benefit.[43] - -[Footnote 42: Plato, Charm. 174 D. [Greek: Ou)ch au(/te| de/ ge, o(s -e)/oiken, e)sti\n e( sophrosu/ne, a)ll' e(=s e)/rgon e)sti\ to\ -o)phelei=n e(ma=s. Ou) ga\r e)pistemo=n ge kai\ a)nepistemosuno=n -e( e)piste/me e)sti/n, a)lla\ a)gathou= te kai\ kakou=.]] - -[Footnote 43: Plato, Charm. 174 E. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/as e)/stai -demiourgo/s? Ou) de=ta. A)/lles ga\r e)=n te/chnes u(gi/eia? e)\ ou)/? -A)/lles; Ou)d' a)/ra o)phelei/as, o)= e(tai=re; a)/lle| ga\r au)= -a)pe/domen tou=to to\ e)/rgon te/chne| nu=n de/; e)= ga\r? Pa/nu ge. -Po=s ou)=n o)phe/limos e)/stai e(sophrosu/ne, ou)demia=s o)phelei/as -ou)=sa demiourgo/s? Ou)damo=s, o)= So/krates, e)/oike/ ge.]] - -[Side-note: Knowledge, always relative to some object known. -Postulate or divination of a Science of Teleology.] - -Two points are here to be noted, as contained and debated in the -handling of this dialogue. 1. Knowledge absolutely, is a word without -meaning: all knowledge is relative, and has a definite object or -_cognitum_: there can be no _scientia scientiarum_. 2. -Among the various objects of knowledge (_cognita_ or -_cognoscenda_), one is, _good and evil_. There is a science -of good and evil, the function of which is, to watch over and compare -the results of the other sciences, in order to promote results of -happiness, and to prevent results of misery: without the supervision -of this latter science, the other sciences might be all exactly -followed out, but no rational comparison could be had between -them.[44] In other words, there is a science of Ends, estimating the -comparative worth of each End in relation to other Ends (Teleology): -distinct from those other more special sciences, which study the -means each towards a separate End of its own. Here we fall into the -same track as we have already indicated in Laches and Alkibiades II. - -[Footnote 44: Compare what has been said upon the same subject in my -remarks on Alkib. i. and ii. p. 31.**] - -[Side-note: Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and -by Aristotle. Comparison between the two.] - -These matters I shall revert to in other dialogues, where we shall -find them turned over and canvassed in many different ways. One -farther observation remains to be made on the Laches and Charmides, -discussing as they do Courage (which is also again discussed in the -Protagoras) and Temperance. An interesting comparison may be made -between them and the third book of the Nikomachean Ethics of -Aristotle,[45] where the same two subjects are handled in the -Aristotelian manner. The direct, didactic, systematising, brevity of -Aristotle contrasts remarkably with the indirect and circuitous -prolixity, the multiplied suggestive comparisons, the shifting points -of view, which we find in Plato. Each has its advantages: and both -together will be found not more than sufficient, for any one who is -seriously bent on acquiring what Plato calls knowledge, with the -cross-examining power included in it. Aristotle is greatly superior -to Plato in one important attribute of a philosopher: in the care -which he takes to discriminate the different significations of the -same word: the univocal and the equivocal, the generically identical -from the remotely analogical, the proper from the improper, the -literal from the metaphorical. Of such precautions we discover little -or no trace in Plato, who sometimes seems not merely to neglect, but -even to deride them. Yet Aristotle, assisted as he was by all Plato's -speculations before us, is not to be understood as having superseded -the necessity for that negative Elenchus which animates the Platonic -dialogues of Search: nor would his affirmative doctrines have held -their grounds before a cross-examining Sokrates. - -[Footnote 45: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. iii. p. 1115, 1119; also Ethic. -Eudem. iii. 1229-1231. - -The comments of Aristotle upon the doctrine of Sokrates respecting -Courage seem to relate rather to the Protagoras than to the Laches of -Plato. See Eth. Nik. 1116, 6, 4; Eth. Eud. 1229, a. 15.] - - -APPENDIX. - - -The dialogue Charmides is declared to be spurious, not only by Ast, -but also by Socher (Ast, Platon's Leb. pp. 419-428; Socher, Ueber -Platon, pp. 130-137). Steinhart maintains the genuineness of the -dialogue against them; declaring (as in regard to the Laches) that he -can hardly conceive how critics can mistake the truly Platonic -character of it, though here too, as in the Laches, he detects -"adolescentiae vestigia" (Steinhart, Einleit. zum Charmides, -pp. 290-293). - -Schleiermacher considers Charmides as well as Laches to be appendixes -to the Protagoras, which opinion both Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Charm, p. -121; Proleg. ad Lachet. p. 30, 2nd ed.) and Steinhart controvert. - -The views of Stallbaum respecting the Charmides are declared by -Steinhart (p. 290) to be "recht aeusserlich und oberflaechlich". To me -they appear much nearer the truth than the profound and recondite -meanings, the far-sighted indirect hints, which Steinhart himself -perceives or supposes in the words of Plato. - -These critics consider the dialogue as composed during the government -of the Thirty at Athens, in which opinion I do not concur. - - - - -CHAPTER XX. - -LYSIS. - - -[Side-note: Analogy between Lysis and Charmides. Richness of -dramatic incident in both. Youthful beauty.] - -The Lysis, as well as the Charmides, is a dialogue recounted by -Sokrates himself, describing both incidents and a conversation in a -crowded Palaestra; wherein not merely bodily exercises were habitually -practised, but debate was carried on and intellectual instruction -given by a Sophist named Mikkus, companion and admirer of Sokrates. -There is a lively dramatic commencement, introducing Sokrates into -the Palaestra, and detailing the preparation and scenic arrangements, -before the real discussion opens. It is the day of the Hermaea, or -festival of Hermes, celebrated by sacrifice and its accompanying -banquets among the frequenters of gymnasia. - -[Side-note: Scenery and personages of the Lysis.] - -Lysis, like Charmides, is an Athenian youth, of conspicuous beauty, -modesty, and promise. His father Demokrates represents an ancient -family of the AExonian Deme in Attica, and is said to be descended -from Zeus and the daughter of the Archegetes or Heroic Founder of -that Deme. The family moreover are so wealthy, that they have gained -many victories at the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games, both with -horses and with chariots and four. Menexenus, companion of Lysis, is -somewhat older, and is his affectionate friend. The persons who -invite Sokrates into the palaestra, and give occasion to the debate, -are Ktesippus and Hippothales: both of them adults, yet in the vigour -of age. Hippothales is the Erastes of Lysis, passionately attached to -him. He is ridiculed by Ktesippus for perpetually talking about -Lysis, as well as for addressing to him compositions both in prose -and verse, full of praise and flattery; extolling not only his -personal beauty, but also his splendid ancestry and position.[1] - -[Footnote 1: Plato, Lysis, 203-205.] - -[Side-note: Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to -give an example of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his -benefit.] - -In reference to these addresses, Sokrates remonstrates with -Hippothales on the imprudence and mischief of addressing to a youth -flatteries calculated to turn his head. He is himself then invited by -Hippothales to exhibit a specimen of the proper mode of talking to -youth; such as shall be at once acceptable to the person addressed, -and unobjectionable. Sokrates agrees to do so, if an opportunity be -afforded him of conversing with Lysis.[2] Accordingly after some -well-imagined incidents, interesting as marks of Greek manners--Sokrates -and Ktesippus with others seat themselves in the palaestra, -amidst a crowd of listeners.[3] Lysis, too modest at first to -approach, is emboldened to sit down by seeing Menexenus seated by the -side of Sokrates: while Hippothales, not daring to put himself where -Lysis can see him, listens, but conceals himself behind some of the -crowd. Sokrates begins the conversation with Menexenus and Lysis -jointly: but presently Menexenus is called away for a moment, and he -talks with Lysis singly. - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Lysis, 206.] - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Lysis, 206-207.] - -[Side-note: Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis.] - -_Sokr._--Well--Lysis--your father and mother love you extremely. -_Lysis._--Assuredly they do. _Sokr._--They would wish you -therefore to be as happy as possible. _Lysis._--Undoubtedly. -_Sokr._--Do you think any man happy, who is a slave, and who is -not allowed to do any thing that he desires? _Lysis._--I do not -think him happy at all. _Sokr._--Since therefore your father and -mother are so anxious that you should be happy, they of course allow -you to do the things which you desire, and never reprove nor forbid -you. _Lysis._--Not at all, by Zeus, Sokrates: there are a great -many things that they forbid me. _Sokr._--How say you! they wish -you to be happy--and they hinder you from doing what you wish! Tell -me, for example, when one of your father's chariots is going to run a -race, if you wished to mount and take the reins, would not they allow -you to do so? _Lysis._--No--certainly: they would not allow me. -_Sokr._--But whom do they allow, then? _Lysis._--My father -employs a paid charioteer. _Sokr._--What! do they permit a -hireling, in preference to _you_, to do what he wishes with the -horses? and do they give him pay besides for doing so? -_Lysis._--Why--to be sure. _Sokr._--But doubtless, I imagine, they -trust the team of mules to your direction; and if you chose to take -the whip and flog, they would allow you? _Lysis._--Allow me? not at -all. _Sokr._--What! is no one allowed to flog them? -_Lysis._--Yes--certainly--the mule-groom. _Sokr._--Is he a -slave or free? _Lysis._--A slave. _Sokr._--Then, it seems, -they esteem a slave higher than you their son; trusting their -property to him rather than to you, letting _him_ do what he -pleases, while they forbid you. But tell me farther: do they allow -you to direct yourself--or do not they even trust you so far as that? -_Lysis._--How can you imagine that they trust me? _Sokr._--But -does any one else direct you? _Lysis._--Yes--this tutor -here. _Sokr._--Is he a slave? _Lysis._--To be sure: -belonging to our family. _Sokr._--That is shocking: one of free -birth to be under the direction of a slave! But what is it that he -does, as your director? _Lysis._--He conducts me to my teacher's -house. _Sokr._--What! do _they_ govern you also, these -teachers? _Lysis._--Undoubtedly they do. _Sokr._--Then your -father certainly is bent on putting over you plenty of directors and -governors. But surely, when you come home to your mother, she at -least, anxious that you should be happy as far as she is concerned, -lets you do what you please about the wool or the web, when she is -weaving: she does not forbid you to meddle with the bodkin or any of -the other instruments of her work? _Lysis._--Ridiculous! not -only does she forbid me, but I should be beaten if I did meddle. -_Sokr._--How is this, by Herakles? Have you done any wrong to -your father and mother? _Lysis._--Never at all, by Zeus. -_Sokr._--From what provocation is it, then, that they prevent -you in this terrible way, from being happy and doing what you wish? -keeping you the whole day in servitude to some one, and never your -own master? so that you derive no benefit either from the great -wealth of the family, which is managed by every one else rather than -by you--or from your own body, noble as it is. Even _that_ is -consigned to the watch and direction of another: while you, Lysis, -are master of nothing, nor can do any one thing of what you desire. -_Lysis._--The reason is, Sokrates, that I am not yet old enough. -_Sokr._--That can hardly be the reason; for to a certain extent -your father and mother do trust you, without waiting for you to -grow older. If they want any thing to be written or read for them, -they employ you for that purpose in preference to any one in the -house: and you are then allowed to write or read first, whichever of -the letters you think proper. Again, when you take up the lyre, -neither father nor mother hinder you from tightening or relaxing the -strings, or striking them either with your finger or with the -plectrum. _Lysis._--They do not. _Sokr._--Why is it, then, -that they do not hinder you in this last case, as they did in the -cases before mentioned? _Lysis._--I suppose it is because I know -this last, but did not know the others. _Sokr._--Well, my good -friend, you see that it is not your increase of years that your -father waits for; but on the very day that he becomes convinced that -you know better than he, he will entrust both himself and his -property to your management. _Lysis._--I suppose that he will. -_Sokr._--Ay--and your neighbour too will judge in the same way -as your father. As soon as he is satisfied that you understand -house-management better than he does, which do you think he will -rather do--confide his house to you, or continue to manage it -himself? _Lysis._--I think he will confide it to me. _Sokr._--The -Athenians too: do not you think that they also will put their affairs -into your management, as soon as they perceive that you have -intelligence adequate to the task? _Lysis._--Yes: I do. -_Sokr._--What do you say about the Great King also, by Zeus! -When his meat is being boiled, would he permit his eldest son who is -to succeed to the rule of Asia, to throw in any thing that he pleases -into the sauce, rather than us, if we come and prove to him that we -know better than his son the way of preparing sauce? -_Lysis._--Clearly, he will rather permit us. _Sokr._--The Great King -will not let his son throw in even a pinch of salt: while we, if we -chose to take up an entire handful, should be allowed to throw it in. -_Lysis._--No doubt. _Sokr._--What if his son has a -complaint in his eyes; would the Great King, knowing him to be -ignorant of medicine, allow him even to touch his own eyes or would -he forbid him? _Lysis._--He would forbid him. _Sokr._--As -to us, on the contrary, if he accounted us good physicians, and if we -desired even to open the eyes and drop a powder into them, he would -not hinder us, in the conviction that we understood what we were -doing. _Lysis._--You speak truly. _Sokr._--All other -matters, in short, on which he believed us to be wiser than himself -or his son, he would entrust to us rather than to himself or his son? -_Lysis._--Necessarily so, Sokrates. _Sokr._--This is the -state of the case, then, my dear Lysis: On those matters on which we -shall have become intelligent, all persons will put trust in us--Greeks -as well as barbarians, men as well as women. We shall do -whatever we please respecting them: no one will be at all inclined to -interfere with us on such matters; not only we shall be ourselves -free, but we shall have command over others besides. These matters -will be really ours, because we shall derive real good from them.[4] -As to those subjects, on the contrary, on which we shall not have -acquired intelligence, no one will trust us to do what we think -right: every one,--not merely strangers, but father and mother and -nearer relatives if there were any,--will obstruct us as much as they -can: we shall be in servitude so far as these subjects are concerned; -and they will be really alien to us, for we shall derive no real good -from them. Do you admit that this is the case?[5] _Lysis._--I do -admit it. _Sokr._--Shall we then be friends to any one, or will -any one love us, on those matters on which we are unprofitable -_Lysis._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--You see that neither does -your father love you, nor does any man love another, in so far as he -is useless? _Lysis._--Apparently not. _Sokr._--If then you -become intelligent, my boy, all persons will be your friends and all -persons will be your kinsmen: for you will be useful and good: if you -do not, no one will be your friend,--not even your father nor your -mother nor your other relatives. - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Lysis, 210 B. [Greek: kai\ ou)dei\s e(ma=s e(ko\n -ei)=nai e)mpodiei=, a)ll' au)toi/ te e)leu/theroi e)so/metha e)n -au)toi=s kai\ a)/llon a)/rchontes, e(me/tera/ te tau=ta e)/stai; -o)neso/metha ga\r a)p' au)to=n.]] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Lysis, 210 C. [Greek: au)toi/ te e)n au)toi=s -e)so/metha a)/llon u(pekooi, kai\ e(mi=n e)/stai a)llo/tria; ou)de\n -ga\r a)p' au)to=n o)neso/metha. Sugchorei=s ou(/tos e)/chein? -Sugchoro=.]] - -Is it possible then, Lysis, for a man to think highly of himself on -those matters on which he does not yet think aright? _Lysis._--How -can it be possible? _Sokr._--If you stand in need of a -teacher, you do not yet think aright? _Lysis._--True. -_Sokr._--Accordingly, you are not presumptuous on the score of -intelligence, since you are still without intelligence. -_Lysis._--By Zeus, Sokrates, I think not.[6] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Lysis, 210 D. [Greek: Oi(=o/n te ou)=n e)pi\ -tou/tois, o)= Lu/si, me/ga phronei=n, e)n oi(=s tis me/po phronei=? -Kai\ po=s a)\n? e)/phe. Ei) d' a)/ra su\ didaska/lou de/ei, ou)/po -phronei=s. A)lethe=. - -Ou)d' a)/ra megalo/phron ei)=, ei)/per a)/phron e)/ti. Ma\ Di/', -e)/phe, o)= So/krates, ou)/ moi dokei=.] - -There is here a double sense of [Greek: me/ga phronei=n, -megalo/phron], which cannot easily be made to pass into any other -language.] - -[Side-note: Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothales.] - -When I heard Lysis speak thus (continues Sokrates, who is here the -narrator), I looked towards Hippothales and I was on the point of -committing a blunder: for it occurred to me to say, That is the way, -Hippothales, to address a youth whom you love: you ought to check and -humble him, not puff him up and spoil him, as you have hitherto done. -But when I saw him agitated and distressed by what had been said, I -called to mind that, though standing close by, he wished not to be -seen by Lysis. Accordingly, I restrained myself and said nothing of -the kind.[7] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Lysis, 210 E.] - -[Side-note: Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain -to Menexenus.] - -Lysis accepts this as a friendly lesson, inculcating humility: and -seeing Menexenus just then coming back, he says aside to Sokrates, -Talk to Menexenus, as you have been talking to me. You can tell him -yourself (replies Sokrates) what you have heard from me: you listened -very attentively. Most certainly I shall tell him (says Lysis): but -meanwhile pray address to him yourself some other questions, for me -to hear. You must engage to help me if I require it (answers -Sokrates): for Menexenus is a formidable disputant, scholar of our -friend Ktesippus, who is here ready to assist him. I know he is -(rejoined Lysis), and it is for that very reason that I want you to -talk to him--that you may chasten and punish him.[8] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Lysis, 211 B-C. [Greek: a)ll' o(/ra o(/pos -e)pikoure/seis moi, e)a/n me e)le/gchein e)picheire=| o( Mene/xenos. -e)\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti e)ristiko/s e)sti? Nai\ ma\ Di/a, e)/phe, -spho/dra ge. dia\ tau=ta/ toi kai\ bou/lomai/ se au)to=| -diale/gesthai--i(/n' au)to\n kola/se|s.] - -Compare Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 1, where he speaks of the chastising -purpose often contemplated by Sokrates in his conversation--[Greek: -a)\ e)kei=nos kolasteri/ou e(/neka tou\s pa/nt' oi)ome/nous ei)de/nai -e)roto=n e)/legchen.]] - -[Side-note: Value of the first conversation between Sokrates -and Lysis, as an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner.] - -I have given at length, and almost literally (with some few -abbreviations), this first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, -because it is a very characteristic passage, exhibiting conspicuously -several peculiar features of the Platonico-Sokratic interrogation. -Facts common and familiar are placed in a novel point of view, -ingeniously contrasted, and introduced as stepping-stones to a very -wide generality. Wisdom or knowledge is exalted into the ruling force -with liberty of action not admissible except under its guidance: -the questions are put in an inverted half-ironical tone (not uncommon -with the historical Sokrates[9]), as if an affirmative answer were -expected as a matter of course, while in truth the answer is sure to -be negative: lastly, the purpose of checking undue self-esteem is -proclaimed. The rest of the dialogue, which contains the main -substantive question investigated, I can report only in brief -abridgment, with a few remarks following. - -[Footnote 9: See the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon in -Xenophon, Memor. iii. 6; also the conversation with Perikles, iii. 5, -23-24.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting -friendship. Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue.] - -Sokrates begins, as Lysis requests, to interrogate Menexenus--first -premising--Different men have different tastes: some love horses and -dogs, others wealth or honours. For my part, I care little about all -such acquisitions: but I ardently desire to possess friends, and I -would rather have a good friend than all the treasures of Persia. You -two, Menexenus and Lysis, are much to be envied, because at your -early age, each of you has made an attached friend of the other. But -I am so far from any such good fortune, that I do not even know how -any man becomes the friend of another. This is what I want to ask -from you, Menexenus, as one who must know,[10] having acquired such a -friend already. - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Lysis, 211-212.] - -When one man loves another, which becomes the friend of which? Does -he who loves, become the friend of him whom he loves, whether the -latter returns the affection or not? Or is the person loved, whatever -be his own dispositions, the friend of the person who loves him? Or -is reciprocity of affection necessary, in order that either shall be -the friend of the other? - -The speakers cannot satisfy themselves that the title of -_friend_ fits either of the three cases;[11] so that this line -of interrogating comes to a dead lock. Menexenus avows his -embarrassment, while Lysis expresses himself more hopefully. - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Lysis, 212-213. 213 C:--[Greek: ei) me/te oi( -philou=ntes (1) phi/loi e)/sontai, me/th' oi( philou/menoi (2), -me/th' oi( philou=nte/s te kai\ philou/menoi] (3), &c. Sokrates -here professes to have shown grounds for rejecting all these three -suppositions. But if we follow the preceding argument, we shall see -that he has shown grounds only against the first two, not against the -third.] - -[Side-note: Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims -of the poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected.] - -Sokrates now takes up a different aspect of the question, and -turns to Lysis, inviting him to consider what has been laid down -by the poets, "our fathers and guides in respect of wisdom".[12] -Homer says that the Gods originate friendship, by bringing the like -man to his like: Empedokles and other physical philosophers have also -asserted, that like must always and of necessity be the friend of -like. These wise teachers cannot mean (continues Sokrates) that bad -men are friends of each other. The bad man can be no one's friend. He -is not even like himself, but ever wayward and insane:--much less can -he be like to any one else, even to another bad man. They mean that -the good alone are like to each other, and friends to each other.[13] -But is this true? What good, or what harm, can like do to like, which -it does not also do to itself? How can there be reciprocal love -between parties who render to each other no reciprocal aid? Is not -the good man, so far forth as good, sufficient to himself,--standing -in need of no one--and therefore loving no one? How can good men care -much for each other, seeing that they thus neither regret each other -when absent, nor have need of each other when present?[14] - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Lysis, 213 E: [Greek: skopou=nta kata\ tou\s -poieta/s; ou(=toi ga\r e(mi=n o(/sper pate/res te=s sophi/as ei)si\ -kai\ e(gemo/nes.]] - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Lysis, 214.] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Lysis 215 B: [Greek: O( de\ me/ tou deo/menos, -ou)de/ ti a)gapo/| a)\n. . . . O(\ de\ me\ a)gapo/|e, ou)d' a)\n -philoi=. . . . Po=s ou)=n oi( a)gathoi\ toi=s a)gathoi=s e(mi=n phi/loi -e)/sontai te\n a)rche/n, oi(\ me/te a(po/ntes potheinoi\ -a)lle/lois--i(kanoi\ ga\r e(autoi=s kai\ chori\s o)/ntes--me/te paro/ntes -chrei/an au)to=n e)/chousi? tou\s de\ toiou/tous ti/s mechane\ peri\ -pollou= poiei=sthai a)llelous?]] - -[Side-note: Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of -aversion; unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons _pro_ and -_con_. Rejected.] - -It appears, therefore, Lysis (continues Sokrates), that we are -travelling in the wrong road, and must try another direction. I now -remember to have recently heard some one affirming--contrary to what -we have just said--that likeness is a cause of aversion, and** -unlikeness a cause of friendship. He too produced evidence from the -poets: for Hesiod tells us, that "potter is jealous of potter, and -bard of bard". Things most alike are most full of envy, jealousy and -hatred to each other: things most unlike, are most full of -friendship. Thus the poor man is of necessity a friend to the rich, -the weak man to the strong, for the sake of protection: the sick man, -for similar reason, to the physician. In general, every ignorant man -loves, and is a friend to, the man of knowledge. Nay, there are -also physical philosophers, who assert that this principle -pervades all nature; that dry is the friend of moist, cold of hot, -and so forth: that all contraries serve as nourishment to their -contraries. These are ingenious teachers: but if we follow them, we -shall have the cleverest disputants attacking us immediately, and -asking--What! is the opposite essentially a friend to its opposite? -Do you mean that unjust is essentially the friend of just--temperate -of intemperate--good of evil? Impossible: the doctrine cannot be -maintained.[15] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Lysis, 215-216.] - -[Side-note: Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the -Indifferent (neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good.] - -My head turns (continues Sokrates) with this confusion and puzzle--since -neither like is the friend of like, nor contrary of contrary. -But I will now hazard a different guess of my own.[16] There are -three genera in all: the good--the evil--and that which is neither -good nor evil, the indifferent. Now we have found that good is not a -friend to good--nor evil to evil--nor good to evil--nor evil to good. -If therefore there exist any friendship at all, it must be the -indifferent that is friend, either to its like, or to the good: for -nothing whatever can be a friend to evil. But if the indifferent be a -friend at all, it cannot be a friend to its own like; since we have -already shown that like generally is not friend to like. It remains -therefore, that the indifferent, in itself neither good nor evil, is -friend to the good.[17] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Lysis, 216 C-D: [Greek: to=| o)/nti au)to\s -i)liggio= u(po\ te=s tou= lo/gou a)pori/as--Le/go toi/nun -a)pomanteuo/menos], &c.] - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Lysis, 216 D.] - -[Side-note: Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend -to the Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt -evil, from which it is anxious to escape.] - -Yet hold! Are we on the right scent? What reason is there to -determine, on the part of the indifferent, attachment to the good? It -will only have such attachment under certain given circumstances: -when, though neither good nor evil in itself, it has nevertheless -evil associated with it, of which it desires to be rid. Thus the body -in itself is neither good nor evil: but when diseased, it has evil -clinging to it, and becomes in consequence of this evil, friendly to -the medical art as a remedy. But this is true only so long as the -evil is only apparent, and not real: so long as it is a mere -superficial appendage, and has not become incorporated with the -essential nature of the body. When evil has become engrained, -the body ceases to be indifferent (_i.e._, neither good nor -evil), and loses all its attachment to good. Thus that which -determines the indifferent to become friend of the good, is, the -contact and pressure of accessory evil not in harmony with its own -nature, accompanied by a desire for the cure of such evil.[18] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Lysis, 217 E: [Greek: To\ me/te kako\n a)/ra -me/t' a)gatho\n e)ni/ote kakou= paro/ntos ou)/po kako/n e)stin, -e)/sti d' o(/te e)/de to\ toiou=ton ge/gonen. Pa/nu ge. Ou)kou=n -o(/tan me/po lalo\n e(=| kakou= paro/ntos, au)te\ me\n e( parousi/a -a)gathou= au)to\ poiei= e)pithumei=n, e( de\ kako\n poiou=sa -a)posterei= au)to\ te=s t' e)pithumi/as a)/ma kai\ te=s phili/as -ta)gathou=. Ou) ga\r e)/ti e)sti\n ou)/te kako\n ou)/t' a)gatho/n, -a)lla\ kako/n; phi/lon de\ a)gatho=| kako\n ou)k e)=n.]] - -[Side-note: Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His -intermediate condition--not wise, yet painfully feeling his own -ignorance.] - -Under this head comes the explanation of the philosopher--the friend -or lover of wisdom. The man already wise is not a lover of wisdom: -nor the man thoroughly bad and stupid, with whose nature ignorance is -engrained. Like does not love like, nor does contrary love contrary. -The philosopher is intermediate between the two: he is not wise, but -neither has he yet become radically stupid and unteachable. He has -ignorance cleaving to him as an evil, but he knows his own ignorance, -and yearns for wisdom as a cure for it.[19] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Lysis, 218 A. [Greek: dia\ tau=ta de\ phai=men -a)\n kai\ tou\s e)/de sophou\s meke/ti philosophei=n, ei)/te theoi\ -ei)/te a)/nthropoi/ ei)sin ou(=toi; ou)d' au)= e)kei/nous -philosophei=n tou\s ou(/tos a)/gnoian e)/chontas o(/ste kakou\s -ei)=nai; kako\n ga\r kai\ a)mathe= ou)de/na philosophei=n. lei/pontai -de\ oi( e)/chontes me\n to\ kako\n tou=to, te\n a)/gnoian, me/po de\ -u(p' au)tou= o)/ntes a)gno/mones med' a)mathei=s, a)ll' e)/ti -e(gou/menoi me\ ei)de/nai a(\ me\ i)/sasin. dio\ de\ philosophou=sin -oi( ou)/te a)gathoi\ ou)/te kakoi/ po o)/ntes. o(/soi de\ kakoi\, ou) -philosophou=sin, ou)de\ oi( a)gathoi/.] - -Compare Plato, Symposion, 204.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new -suggestion. The Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us, -_per se_: by relation or resemblance to which other objects -become dear.] - -The two young collocutors with Sokrates welcome this explanation -heartily, and Sokrates himself appears for the moment satisfied with -it. But he presently bethinks himself, and exclaims, Ah! Lysis and -Menexenus, our wealth is all a dream! we have been yielding again to -delusions! Let us once more examine. You will admit that all -friendship is on account of something and for the sake of something: -it is relative both to some producing cause, and to some prospective -end. Thus the body, which is in itself neither good nor evil, becomes -when sick a friend to the medical art: on account of sickness, which -is an evil--and for the sake of health, which is a good. The medical -art is dear to us, because health is dear: but is there any thing -behind, for the sake of which health also is dear? It is plain -that we cannot push the series of references onward for ever, and -that we must come ultimately to something which is dear _per -se_, not from reference to any ulterior _aliud_. We must come -to some _primum amabile_, dear by its own nature, to which all -other dear things refer, and from which they are derivatives.[20] It -is this _primum amabile_ which is the primitive, essential, and -constant, object of our affections: we love other things only from -their being associated with it. Thus suppose a father tenderly -attached to his son, and that the son has drunk hemlock, for which -wine is an antidote; the father will come by association to prize -highly, not merely the wine which saves his son's life, but even the -cup in which the wine is contained. Yet it would be wrong to say that -he prizes the wine or the cup as much as his son: for the truth is, -that all his solicitude is really on behalf of his son, and extends -only in a derivative and secondary way to the wine and the cup. So -about gold and silver: we talk of prizing highly gold and silver--but -this is incorrect, for what we really prize is not gold, but the -ulterior something, whatever it be, for the attainment of which gold -and other instrumental means are accumulated. In general terms--when -we say that B is dear on account of A, we are really speaking of A -under the name of B. What is really dear, is that primitive object of -love, _primum amabile_, towards which all the affections which -we bear to other things, refer and tend.[21] - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Lysis, 219 C-D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n ou)k -a)na/gke a)peipei=n e(ma=s ou(/tos i)o/ntas, kai\ a)phike/sthai e)pi/ -tina a)rche\n, e)\ ou)ke/t' e)panoi/sei e)p' a)/llo phi/lon, a)ll' -e(/xei e)p' e)kei=no o(/ e)sti _pro=ton phi/lon_, ou(= e(/neka -kai\ ta)/lla phame\n pa/nta phi/la ei)=nai?]] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Lysis, c. 37, p. 220 B. [Greek: O(/sa ga/r -phamen phi/la ei)=nai e(mi=n e(/neka phi/lou tino/s, e(te/ro| -r(e/mati phaino/metha le/gontes _au)to/_; phi/lon de\ _to=| -o)/nti_ kinduneu/ei _e)kei=no au)to\_, ei)s o(\ pa=sai -au(=tai ai( lego/menai phili/ai teleuto=sin.]] - -[Side-note: The cause of love is desire. We desire that which -is akin to us or our own.] - -Is it then true (continues Sokrates) that good is our _primum -amabile_, and dear to us in itself? If so, is it dear to us on -account of evil? that is, only as a remedy for evil; so that if evil -were totally banished, good would cease to be prized? Is it true that -evil is the cause why any thing is dear to us?[22] This cannot be: -because even if all evil were banished, the appetites and -desires, such of them as were neither good nor evil, would still -remain: and the things which gratify those appetites will be dear to -us. It is not therefore true that evil is the cause of things being -dear to us. We have just found out another cause for loving and being -loved--desire. He who desires, loves what he desires and as long as -he desires: he desires moreover that of which he is in want, and he -is in want of that which has been taken away from him--of his -own.[23] It is therefore this _own_ which is the appropriate -object of desire, friendship, and love. If you two, Lysis and -Menexenus, love each other, it is because you are somehow of kindred -nature with each other. The lover would not become a lover, unless -there were, between him and his beloved, a certain kinship or -affinity in mind, disposition, tastes, or form. We love, by necessary -law, that which has a natural affinity to us; so that the real and -genuine lover may be certain of a return of affection from his -beloved.[24] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Lysis, 220 D. We may see that in this chapter -Plato runs into a confusion between [Greek: to\ dia/ ti] and [Greek: -to\ e(/neka/ tou], which two he began by carefully distinguishing. -Thus in 218 D he says, [Greek: o( phi/los e)sti\ to| phi/los--e(/neka/ -tou kai\ dia/ ti.] Again 219 A, he says--[Greek: to\ so=ma -te=s i)atrike=s phi/lon e)sti/n, _dia\ te\n no/son, e(/neka te=s -u(giei/as_.] This is a very clear and important distinction. - -It is continued in 220 D--[Greek: o(/ti _dia\ to\ kako\n_ -ta)gatho\n e)gapo=men kai\ e)philou=men, o(s pha/rmakon o)\n tou= -kakou= to\ a)gatho/n, to\ de\ kako/n no/sma.] But in 220 E--[Greek: -to\ de\ to=| o)/nti phi/lon pa=n tou)nanti/on tou/tou phai/netai -pephuko/s; _phi/lon ga\r e(mi=n a)nepha/ne o(\n e(chthrou= -e(/neka_.] To make the reasoning consistent with what had gone -before, these two last words ought to be exchanged for [Greek: dia\ -to\ e)chthro/n]. Plato had laid down the doctrine that good is -loved--[Greek: dia\ to\ kako/n], not [Greek: e(/neka tou= kakou=]. Good -is loved on _account of evil_, but for _the sake of obtaining_ -a remedy to or cessation of the evil. - -Steinhart (in his note on Hieron. Mueller's translation of Plato, p. -268) calls this a "sophistisches Raethselspiel"; and he notes other -portions of the dialogue which "remind us of the deceptive tricks of -the Sophists" (die Trugspiele der Sophisten, see p. 222-224-227-230). -He praises Plato here for his "fine pleasantry on the deceptive arts -of the Sophists". Admitting that Plato puts forward sophistical -quibbles with the word [Greek: phi/los], he tells us that this is -suitable for the purpose of puzzling the contentious young man -Menexenus. The confusion between [Greek: e(/neka/ tou] and [Greek: -dia/ ti] (noticed above) appears to be numbered by Steinhart among -the fine jests against Protagoras, Prodikus, or some of the Sophists. -I can see nothing in it except an unconscious inaccuracy in Plato's -reasoning.] - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Lysis, 221 E. [Greek: To\ e)pithumou=n ou(= a)\n -e)ndee\s e)=|, tou/tou e)pithumei=--e)ndee\s de\ gi/gnetai ou(= a)/n -tis a)phaire=tai--tou= oi)kei/ou de/, o(s e)/oiken, o(/ te e)/ros -kai\ e( phili/a kai\ e( e)pithumi/a tugcha/nei ou)=sa.] This is the -same doctrine as that which we read, expanded and cast into a myth -with comic turn, in the speech of Aristophanes in the Symposion, pp. -191-192-193. [Greek: e(/kastos ou)=n e(mo=n e)/stin a)nthro/pou -su/mbolon, a)/te tetmeme/nos o(/sper ai( pse=ttai e)x e(no\s du/o. -zetei= de\ a)ei\ to\ au)tou= e(/kastos xu/mbolon] (191 D)--[Greek: -dikai/os a)\n u(mnoi=men E)/rota, o(\s e)/n te to=| paro/nti plei=sta -e(ma=s o)ni/nesin ei)s to\ oi)kei=on a)/gon], &c. (193 D).] - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Lysis, 221-222.] - -[Side-note: Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is -alien to every one. Inconsistency with what has been previously laid -down.] - -But is there any real difference between what is akin and what is -like? We must assume that there is: for we showed before, that like -was useless to like, and therefore not dear to like. Shall we say -that good is of a nature akin to every one, and evil of a nature -foreign to every one? If so, then there can be no friendship except -between one good man and another good man. But this too has been -proved to be impossible. All our tentatives have been alike -unsuccessful. - -[Side-note: Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue.] - -In this dilemma (continues Sokrates, the narrator) I was about to ask -assistance from some of the older men around. But the tutors of -Menexenus and Lysis came up to us and insisted on conveying their -pupils home--the hour being late. As the youths were departing I said -to them--Well, we must close our dialogue with the confession, that -we have all three made a ridiculous figure in it: I, an old man, as -well as you two youths. Our hearers will go away declaring, that we -fancy ourselves to be friends each to the other two; but that we have -not yet been able to find out what a friend is.[25] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Lysis, 223 B. [Greek: Nu=n me\n katage/lastoi -gego/namen e)go/ te, gero\n a)ne/r, kai\ u(mei=s], &c.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Remarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in -analysing the familiar words--to expose the false persuasion of -knowledge.] - -Thus ends the main discussion of the Lysis: not only without any -positive result, but with speakers and hearers more puzzled than they -were at the beginning: having been made to feel a great many -difficulties which they never felt before. Nor can I perceive any -general purpose running through the dialogue, except that truly -Sokratic and Platonic purpose--To show, by cross-examination on the -commonest words that what every one appears to know, and talks about -most confidently, no one really knows or can distinctly explain.[26] -This is the meaning of the final declaration put into the mouth -of Sokrates. "We believe ourselves to be each other's friends, yet we -none of us know what a friend is." The question is one, which no one -had ever troubled himself to investigate, or thought it requisite to -ask from others. Every one supposed himself to know, and every one -had in his memory an aggregate of conceptions and beliefs which he -accounted tantamount to knowledge: an aggregate generated by the -unconscious addition of a thousand facts and associations, each -separately unimportant and often inconsistent with the remainder: -while no rational analysis had ever been applied to verify the -consistency of this spontaneous product, or to define the familiar -words in which it is expressed. The reader is here involved in a -cloud of confusion respecting Friendship. No way out of it is shown, -and how is he to find one? He must take the matter into his own -active and studious meditation: which he has never yet done, though -the word is always in his mouth, and though the topic is among the -most common and familiar, upon which "the swain treads daily with his -clouted shoon". - -[Footnote 26: Among the many points of analogy between the Lysis and -the Charmides, one is, That both of them are declared to be spurious -and unworthy of Plato, by Socher as well as by Ast (Ast, Platon's -Leben, pp. 429-434; Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 137-144). - -Schleiermacher ranks the Lysis as second in his Platonic series of -dialogues, an appendix to the Phaedrus (Einl. p. 174 seq.); K. F. -Hermann, Stallbaum, and nearly all the other critics dissent from -this view: they place the Lysis as an early dialogue, along with -Charmides and Laches, anterior to the Protagoras (K. F. Hermann, -Gesch. und Syst. Plat. Phil. pp. 447-448; Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Lys. -p. 90 (110 2nd ed.); Steinhart, Einl. p. 221) near to or during the -government of the Thirty. All of them profess to discover in the -Lysis "adolescentiae vestigia". - -Ast and Socher characterise the dialogue as a tissue of subtle -sophistry and eristic contradiction, such as (in their opinion) Plato -cannot have composed. Stallbaum concedes the sophistry, but contends -that it is put by Plato intentionally, for the purpose of deriding, -exposing, disgracing, the Sophists and their dialectical tricks: -"ludibrii causa" (p. 88); "ut illustri aliquo exemplo demonstretur -dialecticam istam, quam adolescentes magno quodam studio sectabantur, -nihil esse aliud, nisi inanem quandam argutiarum captatricem," -&c. (p. 87). Nevertheless he contends that along with this -derisory matter there is intermingled serious reasoning which may be -easily distinguished (p. 87), but which certainly he does not clearly -point out. (Compare pp. 108-9-14-15, 2nd ed.) Schleiermacher and -Steinhart also (pp. 222-224-227) admit the sophistry in which -Sokrates is here made to indulge. But Steinhart maintains that there -is an assignable philosophical purpose in the dialogue, which Plato -purposely wrapped up in enigmatical language, but of which he -(Steinhart) professes to give the solution (p. 228).] - -[Side-note: Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. -Manner of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing -reasons why each is defective.] - -This was a proper subject for a dialogue of Search. In the dialogue -Lysis, Plato describes Sokrates as engaged in one of these searches, -handling, testing, and dropping, one point of view after another, -respecting the idea and foundation of friendship. He speaks, -professedly, as a diviner or guesser; following out obscure -promptings which he does not yet understand himself.[27] In this -character, he suggests several different explanations, not only -distinct but inconsistent with each other; each of them true to a -certain extent, under certain conditions and circumstances: but each -of them untrue, when we travel beyond those limits: other -contradictory considerations then interfering. To multiply defective -explanations, and to indicate why each is defective, is the whole -business of the dialogue. - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Lysis, 216 D. [Greek: le/go toi/nun -a)pomanteuo/menos], &c.] - -[Side-note: The process of trial and error is better -illustrated by a search without result than with result. Usefulness -of the dialogue for self-working minds.] - -Schleiermacher discovers in this dialogue indications of a positive -result not plainly enunciated: but he admits that Aristotle did not -discover them--nor can I believe them to have been intended by the -author.[28] But most critics speak slightingly of it, as alike -sceptical and sophistical: and some even deny its authenticity on -these grounds. Plato might have replied by saying that he intended it -as a specimen illustrating the process of search for an unknown -_quaesitum_; and as an exposition of what can be said for, as -well as against, many different points of view. The process of trial -and error, the most general fact of human intelligence, is even -better illustrated when the search is unsuccessful: because when a -result is once obtained, most persons care for nothing else and -forget the antecedent blunders. To those indeed, who ask only to hear -the result as soon as it is found, and who wait for others to look -for it--such a dialogue as the Lysis will appear of little value. But -to any one who intends to search for it himself, or to study the same -problem for himself, the report thus presented of a previous -unsuccessful search, is useful both as guidance and warning. Every -one of the tentative solutions indicated in the Lysis has something -in its favour, yet is nevertheless inadmissible. To learn the grounds -which ultimately compel us to reject what at first appears -admissible, is instruction not to be despised; at the very least, it -helps to preserve us from mistake, and to state the problem in the -manner most suitable for obtaining a solution. - -[Footnote 28: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Lysis, i. p. 177.] - -[Side-note: Subject of friendship, handled both by the -Xenophontic Sokrates, and by Aristotle.] - -In truth, no one general solution is attainable, such as Plato here -professes to search for.[29] In one of the three Xenophontic -dialogues wherein the subject of friendship is discussed we find -the real Sokrates presenting it with a juster view of its real -complications.[30] The same remark may be made upon Aristotle's -manner of handling friendship in the Ethics. He seems plainly to -allude to the Lysis (though not mentioning it by name); and to profit -by it at least in what he puts out of consideration, if not in what -he brings forward.[31] He discards the physical and cosmical -analogies, which Plato borrows from Empedokles and Herakleitus, as -too remote and inapplicable: he considers that the question must be -determined by facts and principles relating to human dispositions and -conduct. In other ways, he circumscribes the problem, by setting -aside (what Plato includes) all objects of attachment which are not -capable of reciprocating attachment.[32] The problem, as set forth -here by Plato, is conceived in great generality. In what manner does -one man become the friend of another?[33] How does a man become the -object of friendship or love from another? What is that object -towards which our love or friendship is determined? These terms are -so large, that they include everything belonging to the Tender -Emotion generally.[34] - -[Footnote 29: Turgot has some excellent remarks on the hopelessness -of such problems as that which Plato propounds, here well as in other -dialogues, to find definitions of common and vague terms. - -We read in his article Etymologie, in the Encyclopedie (vol. iii. pp. -70-72 of his Oeuvres Complets): - -"Qu'on se represente la foule des acceptions du mot _esprit_, -depuis son sens primitif _spiritus, haleine_, jusqu'a ceux -qu'on lui donne dans la chimie, dans la litterature, dans la -jurisprudence, _esprit acide_, esprit de Montaigne, _esprit -des loix_, &c.--qu'on essaie d'extraire de toutes ces -acceptions une idee qui soit commune a toutes--on verra s'evanouir -tous les caracteres qui distinguent _l'esprit_ de toute autre -chose, dans quelque sens qu'on le prenne. . . . La multitude et -l'incompatibilite des acceptions du mot _esprit_, sont telles, -que personne n'a ete tente de les comprendre toutes dans une seule -_definition_, et de definir l'esprit en general. Mais le vice de -cette methode n'est pas moins reel lorsqu'il n'est pas assez sensible -pour empecher qu'on ne la suive. - -"A mesure que le nombre et la diversite des acceptions diminue, -l'absurdite s'affoiblit: et quand elle disparoit, il reste encore -l'erreur. J'ose dire, que presque toutes les _definitions_ ou -l'on annonce qu'on va definir les choses _dans le sens le plus -general_, ont ce defaut, et ne definissent veritablement rien: -parceque leurs auteurs, en voulant renfermer toutes les acceptions -d'un mot, ont entrepris une chose impossible: je veux dire, de -rassembler sous une seule idee generale des idees tres differentes -entre elles, et qu'un meme nom n'a jamais pu designer que -successivement, en cessant en quelque sorte d'etre le meme mot." - -See also the remarks of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the same subject. -System of Logic, Book IV. chap. 4, s. 5.] - -[Footnote 30: See Xenophon, Memor. ii. 4-5-6. In the last of these -three conversations (s. 21-22), Sokrates says to Kritobulus [Greek: -A)ll' e)/chei me\n poiki/los pos tau=ta, o)= Krito/boule; phu/sei -ga\r e)/chousin oi( a)/nthropoi ta\ me\n philika/; de/ontai te ga\r -a)lle/lon, kai\ e)leou=si, kai\ sunergou=ntes o)phelou=si, kai\ -tou=to sunie/ntes cha/rin e)/chousin a)lle/lois, ta\ de\ polemika/; -ta/ te ga\r au)ta\ kala\ kai\ e(de/a nomi/zontes u(pe\r tou/ton -ma/chontai, kai\ dichognomonou=ntes e)nantiou=ntai; polemiko\n de\ -kai\ e)/ris kai\ o)rge/; kai\ dusmene\s me\n o( tou= pleonektei=n -e)/ros, miseto\n de\ o( phtho/nos.] - -This observation of Sokrates is very true and valuable--that the -causes of friendship and the causes of enmity are both of them -equally natural, _i.e._ equally interwoven with the constant -conditions of individual and social life. This is very different from -the vague, partial, and encomiastic predicates with which [Greek: to\ -phu/sei] is often decorated elsewhere by Sokrates himself, as well as -by Plato and Aristotle.] - -[Footnote 31: Aristot. Eth. Nikom. viii. 1, p. 1155 b. Compare Plato, -Lysis, 214 A--215 E.] - -[Footnote 32: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. viii. 2, p. 1155, b. 28; Plato, -Lysis, 212 D.] - -[Footnote 33: Plato, Lysis, 212 A: [Greek: o(/ntina tro/pon gi/gnetai -phi/los e(/teros e(te/rou.] 223 ad fin.: [Greek: o(/, ti e)sti\n o( -phi/los.]] - -[Footnote 34: See the chapter on Tender Emotion in Mr. Bain's -elaborate classification and description of the Emotions. 'The -Emotions and the Will,' ch. vii. p. 94 seq. (3rd ed., p. 124). - -In the Lysis, 216 C-D, we read, among the suppositions thrown out by -Sokrates, about [Greek: to\ phi/lon--kinduneu/ei kata\ te\n -a)rchai/an paroimi/an to\ kalo\n phi/lon ei)=nai. e)/oike gou=n -malako=| tini kai\lei/o| kai\ liparo=|; dio\ kai\ i)/sos r(a|di/os -diolisthai/nei kai\ diadu/etai e(ma=s, a(/te toiou=ton o)/n; le/go -ga\r ta)gatho\n kalo\n ei)=nai.] This allusion to the soft and the -smooth is not very clear; a passage in Mr. Bain's chapter serves to -illustrate it. - -"Among the sensations of the senses we find some that have the power -of awakening tender emotion. The sensations that incline to -tenderness are, in the first place, the effects of very gentle or -soft stimulants, such as soft touches, gentle sounds, slow movements, -temperate warmth, mild sunshine. These sensations must be felt in -order to produce the effect, which is mental and not simply organic. -We have seen that an acute sensation raises a vigorous muscular -expression, as in wonder; a contrast to this is exhibited by gentle -pressure or mild radiance. Hence tenderness is passive emotion by -pre-eminence: we see it flourishing best in the quiescence of the -moving members. Remotely there may be a large amount of action -stimulated by it, but the proper outgoing accompaniment of it is -organic not muscular." - -That the sensations of the soft and the smooth dispose to the Tender -Emotion is here pointed out as a fact in human nature, agreeably to -the comparison of Plato. Mr. Bain's treatise has the rare merit of -describing fully the physical as well as the mental characteristics -of each separate emotion.] - -[Side-note: Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real. -Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the -real Sokrates would have found reason for challenging.] - -The debate in the Lysis is partly verbal: _i.e._, respecting the -word [Greek: phi/los], whether it means the person loving, or the -person loved, or whether it shall be confined to those cases in which -the love is reciprocal, and then applied to both. Herein the question -is about the meaning of words--a word and nothing more. The following -portions of the dialogue enter upon questions not verbal but -real--"Whether we are disposed to love what is like to ourselves, or -what is unlike or opposite to ourselves?" Though both these are -occasionally true, it is shown that as general explanations neither -of them will hold. But this is shown by means of the following -assumptions, which not only those whom Plato here calls the "very -clever Disputants,"[35] but Sokrates himself at other times, would -have called in question, viz.: "That bad men cannot be friends to -each other--that men like to each other (therefore good men as -well as bad) can be of no use to each other, and therefore there can -be no basis of friendship between them--that the good man is -self-sufficing, stands in need of no one, and therefore will not love -any one."[36] All these assumptions Sokrates would have found sufficient -reason for challenging, if they had been advanced by Protagoras or -any other opponents. They stand here as affirmed by him; but here, as -elsewhere in Plato, the reader must apply his own critical intellect, -and test what he reads for himself. - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Lysis, 216 A.: [Greek: oi( pa/nsophoi a)/ndres -oi( a)ntilogikoi/], &c. Yet Plato, in the Phaedrus and Symposion, -indicates colloquial debate as the great generating cause of the most -intense and durable friendship. Aristeides the Rhetor says, Orat. -xlvii. ([Greek: Pro\s Kapi/tona]), p. 418, Dindorf, [Greek: e)pei\ -kai\ Pla/ton to\ a)lethe\s a(pantachou= tima=|, kai\ ta\s e)n toi=s -lo/gois sunousi/as a)phorme\n phili/as a)lethine=s u(polamba/nei.]] - -[Footnote 36: Plato, Lysis, 214-215. The discourse of Cicero, De -Amicitia, is composed in a style of pleasing rhetoric; suitable to -Laelius, an ancient Roman senator and active politician, who expressly -renounces the accurate subtlety of Grecian philosophers (v. 18). -There is little in it which we can compare with the Platonic Lysis; -but I observe that he too, giving expression to his own feelings, -maintains that there can be no friendship except between the good and -virtuous: a position which is refuted by the "nefaria vox," cited by -himself as spoken by C. Blossius, xi. 37.] - -[Side-note: Peculiar theory about friendship broached by -Sokrates. Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a -superficial tinge of evil, and desiring good to escape from it.] - -It is thus shown, or supposed to be shown, that the persons who love -are neither the Good, nor the Bad: and that the objects loved, are -neither things or persons similar, nor opposite, to the persons -loving. Sokrates now adverts to the existence of a third -category--Persons who are neither good, nor bad, but intermediate between -the two--Objects which are intermediate between likeness and opposition. -He announces as his own conjecture,[37] that the Subject of friendly -or loving feeling, is, that which is neither good nor evil: the -Object of the feeling, Good: and the cause of the feeling, the -superficial presence of evil, which the subject desires to see -removed.[38] The evil must be present in a superficial and removable -manner--like whiteness in the hair caused by white paint, not by the -grey colour of old age. Sokrates applies this to the state of mind of -the philosopher, or lover of knowledge: who is not yet either -thoroughly good or thoroughly bad,--either thoroughly wise or -thoroughly unwise--but in a state intermediate between the two: -ignorant, yet conscious of his own ignorance, and feeling it as a -misfortune which he was anxious to shake off.[39] - -[Footnote 37: Plato, Lysis, 216 D. [Greek: le/go toi/nun -a)pomanteuo/menos], &c.] - -[Footnote 38: Plato, Lysis, 216-217.] - -[Footnote 39: Plato, Lysis, 218 C. [Greek: lei/pontai de\ oi( -e)/chontes me\n to\ kako\ tou=to, te\n a)/gnoian, me/po de\ u(p' -au)tou= o)/ntes a)gno/mones med' a)mathei=s, a)ll' e)/ti e(gou/menoi -me\ ei)de/nai a)\ me\ i)/sasi; dio\ de\ philosophou=sin oi( ou)/te -a)gathoi\ ou)/te kakoi/ po o)/ntes; o(/soi de\ kakoi/, ou) -philosophou=sin, ou)de\ oi( a)gathoi/.] Compare the phrase of Seneca, -Epist. 59, p. 211, Gronov.: "Elui difficile est: non enim inquinati -sumus, sed infecti".] - -[Side-note: This general theory illustrated by the case -of the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of -ignorance the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and -Plato upon this attribute.] - -This meaning of philosophy, though it is not always and consistently -maintained throughout the Platonic writings, is important as -expanding and bringing into system the position laid down by Sokrates -in the Apology. He there disclaimed all pretensions to wisdom, but he -announced himself as a philosopher, in the above literal sense: that -is, as ignorant, yet as painfully conscious of his own ignorance, and -anxiously searching for wisdom as a corrective to it: while most men -were equally ignorant, but were unconscious of their own ignorance, -believed themselves to be already wise, and delivered confident -opinions without ever having analysed the matters on which they -spoke. The conversation of Sokrates (as I have before remarked) was -intended, not to teach wisdom, but to raise men out of this false -persuasion of wisdom, which he believed to be the natural state of -the human mind, into that mental condition which he called -philosophy. His Elenchus made them conscious of their ignorance, -anxious to escape from it, and prepared for mental efforts in search -of knowledge: in which search Sokrates assisted them, but without -declaring, and even professing inability to declare, where that truth -lay in which the search was to end. He considered that this change -was in itself a great and serious improvement, converting what was -evil, radical, and engrained--into evil superficial and removable; -which was a preliminary condition to any positive acquirement. The -first thing to be done was to create searchers after truth, men who -would look at the subject for themselves with earnest attention, and -make up their own individual convictions. Even if nothing ulterior -were achieved, that alone would be a great deal. Such was the scope -of the Sokratic conversation; and such the conception of philosophy -(the capital peculiarity which Plato borrowed from Sokrates), which -is briefly noted in this passage of the Lysis, and developed in other -Platonic dialogues, especially in the Symposion,[40] which we shall -reach presently. - -[Footnote 40: Plato, Sympos. 202-203-204. Phaedrus, 278 D.] - -[Side-note: Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or -original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved -through association with this. The object is, Good.] - -Still, however, Sokrates is not fully satisfied with this -hypothesis, but passes on to another. If we love anything, we -must love it (he says) for the sake of something. This implies that -there must exist, in the background, a something which is the -primitive and real object of affection. The various things which we -actually love, are not loved for their own sake, but for the sake of -this _primum amabile_, and as shadows projected by it: just as a -man who loves his son, comes to love by association what is salutary -or comforting to his son--or as he loves money for the sake of what -money will purchase. The _primum amabile_, in the view of -Sokrates, is _Good_; particular things loved, are loved as -shadows of good. - -[Side-note: Statement by Plato of the general law of mental -association.] - -This is a doctrine which we shall find reproduced in other dialogues. -We note with interest here, that it appears illustrated, by a -statement of the general law of mental association--the calling up of -one idea by other ideas or by sensations, and the transference of -affections from one object to others which have been apprehended in -conjunction with it, either as antecedents or consequents. Plato -states this law clearly in the Phaedon and elsewhere:[41] but he here -conceives it imperfectly: for he seems to believe that, if an -affection be transferred by association from a primitive object A, to -other objects, B, C, D, &c., A always continues to be the only -real object of affection, while B, C, D, &c., operate upon the -mind merely by carrying it back to A. The affection towards B, C, D, -&c., therefore is, in the view of Plato, only the affection for A -under other denominations and disguises.[42] Now this is doubtless -often the case; but often also, perhaps even more generally, it is -not the case. After a certain length of repetition and habit, all -conscious reference to the primitive object of affection will -commonly be left out, and the affection towards the secondary object -will become a feeling both substantive and immediate. What was -originally loved as means, for the sake of an ulterior end, will in -time come to be loved as an end for itself; and to constitute a -new centre of force, from whence derivatives may branch out. It may -even come to be loved more vehemently than any primitive object of -affection, if it chance to accumulate in itself derivative influences -from many of those objects.[43] This remark naturally presents -itself, when we meet here for the first time, distinctly stated by -Plato, the important psychological doctrine of the transference of -affections by association from one object to others. - -[Footnote 41: Plato, Phaedon, 73-74. - -It is declared differently, and more clearly, by Aristotle in the -treatise [Greek: Peri\ Mne/mes kai\ A)namne/seos], pp. 451-452.] - -[Footnote 42: Plato, Lysis, 220 B. [Greek: o(/sa ga/r phamen phi/la -ei)=nai e(mi=n e(/neka phi/lou tino/s, e(te/ro| r(e/mati phaino/metha -le/gontes au)to/; phi/lon de\ to=| o)/nti kinduneu/ei e)kei=no au)to\ -ei)=nai, ei)s o(\ pa=sai au(=tai ai( lego/menai phili/ai -teleuto=sin.]] - -[Footnote 43: There is no stronger illustration of this than the love -of money, which is the very example that Plato himself here cites. - -The important point to which I here call attention, in respect to the -law of Mental Association, is forcibly illustrated by Mr. James Mill -in his 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' chapters xxi. and xxii., and by -Professor Bain in his works on the Senses and the -Intellect,--Intellect, chap. i. sect. 47-48, p. 404 seq. ed. 3; and on -the Emotions and the Will, chap. iv. sect. 4-5, p. 428 seq. (3rd ed. p. -363 seq.).] - -[Side-note: Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by -Sokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. -Generic communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler -analogical communion.] - -The _primum amabile_, here introduced by Sokrates, is described -in restricted terms, as valuable merely to correct evil, and as -having no value _per se_, if evil were assumed not to exist. In -consequence chiefly of this restriction, Sokrates discards it as -unsatisfactory. Such restriction, however, is noway essential to the -doctrine: which approaches to, but is not coincident with, the Ideal -Good or Idea of Good, described in other dialogues as what every one -yearns after and aspires to, though without ever attaining it and -without even knowing what it is.[44] The Platonic Idea was conceived -as a substantive, intelligible, Ens, distinct in its nature from all -the particulars bearing the same name, and separated from them all by -a gulf which admitted no gradations of nearer and farther--yet -communicating itself to, or partaken by, all of them, in some -inexplicable way. Aristotle combated this doctrine, denying the -separate reality of the Idea, and admitting only a common generic -essence, dwelling in and pervading the particulars, but pervading -them all equally. The general word connoting this generic unity was -said by Aristotle (retaining the Platonic phraseology) to be [Greek: -lego/menon kata\ mi/an i)de/an] or [Greek: kath' e(/n]. - -[Footnote 44: Plato, Republ. vi. pp. 505-506.] - -But apart from and beyond such generic unity, which implied a common -essence belonging to all, Aristotle recognised a looser, more -imperfect, yet more extensive, communion, founded upon common -relationship towards some [Greek: A)rche\]--First Principle or First -Object. Such relationship was not always the same in kind: it might -be either resemblance, concomitance, antecedence or consequence, -&c.: it might also be different in degree, closer or more remote, -direct or indirect. Here, then, there was room for graduation, or -ordination of objects as former and latter, first, second, third, -&c., according as, when compared with each other, they were more -or less related to the common root. This imperfect communion was -designated by Aristotle under the title [Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an], as -contrasted with [Greek: kata\ ge/nos]: the predicate which affirmed -it was said to be applied, not [Greek: kata\ mi/an i)de/an] or -[Greek: kath' e(/n], but [Greek: pro\s mi/an phu/sin] or [Greek: -pro\s e(/n]:[45] it was affirmed neither entirely [Greek: sunonu/mos] -(which would imply generic communion), nor entirely [Greek: -o(monu/mos] (which would be casual and imply no communion at all), -but midway between the two, so as to admit of a graduated communion, -and an arrangement as former and later, first cousin, or second, -third cousin. Members of the same Genus were considered to be -brothers, all on a par: but wherever there was this graduated -cousinship or communion (signified by the words Former and Later, -more or less in degree of relationship), Aristotle did not admit a -common Genus, nor did Plato admit a Substantive Idea.[46] - -[Footnote 45: Arist. Metaphys. A. 1072, a. 26-29; Bonitz, Comm. p. -497 id. [Greek: Pro=ton o)rekto/n--Pro=ton voeto/n (pro=ton -o)rekto\n]--"quod _per se_ appetibile est et concupiscitur"). -"Quod autem primum est in aliqua serie, id praecipue etiam habet -qualitatem, quae in reliqua cernitur serie, c. a. 993, b. 24: ergo -prima illa substantia est [Greek: to\ a)/riston]"--also [Greek: G] -1004, a. 25-26, 1005, a. 7, about the [Greek: pro=ton e(/n--pro=ton -o)/n]. These were [Greek: ta\ pollacho=s lego/mena--ta\ pleonacho=s -lego/mena]--which were something less than [Greek: suno/numa] and -more than [Greek: o(mo/numa]; intermediate between the two, having no -common [Greek: lo/gos] or generical unity, and yet not entirely -equivocal, but designating a [Greek: koino\n kat' a)nalogi/an]: not -[Greek: kata\ mi/an i)de/an lego/mena], but [Greek: pro\s e(\n] or -[Greek: pro\s mi/an phu/sin]; having a certain relation to one common -[Greek: phu/sis] called [Greek: to\ pro=ton]. See the Metaphys. -[Greek: G]. 1003, a. 33--[Greek: to/ de\ o)/n le/getai me\n -pollacho=s, a)lla\ pro\s e(/n kai\ mi/an tina\ phu/sin, kai\ ou)ch -o(monu/mos, a)ll' o(/sper to\ u(gieino\n a(/pan pro\s u(giei/an, to\ -me\n to=| phula/ttein, to\ de\ to=| poiei=n, to\ de\ te| semei=on -ei)=nai te=s u(giei/as, to\ d' o(/ti dektiko\n au)te=s--kai\ to\ -i)atriko\n pro\s i)atrike/n], &c. The Scholion of Alexander upon -this passage is instructive (p. 638, a. Brandis); and a very copious -explanation of the whole doctrine is given by M. Brentano, in his -valuable treatise, 'Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung _des -Seienden_ nach Aristoteles,' Freiburg, 1862, pp. 85-108-147. -Compare Aristotel. Politic. III. i. 9, p. 1275, a. 35. - -The distinction drawn by Aristotle between [Greek: to\ koino\n kat' -i)de/an] and [Greek: to\ koino\n kat' a)nalogi/an]--between [Greek: -ta\ kata\ mi/an i)de/an lego/mena], and [Greek: ta\ pro\s e(\n] or -[Greek: pro\s mi/an phu/sin lego/mena]--this distinction corresponds -in part to that which is drawn by Dr. Whewell between classes which -are given by Definition, and natural groups which are given by Type. -"Such a natural group" (says Dr. Whewell) "is steadily fixed, though -not precisely limited; it is given, though not circumscribed; it is -determined, not by a boundary but by a central point within, &c." -The coincidence between this doctrine and the Aristotelian is real, -though only partial: [Greek: to\ pro=ton phi/lon, to\ pro=ton -o(rekto/n], may be considered as types of _objects loveable, -objects desirable_, &c., but [Greek: e( u(giei/a] cannot be -considered as a type of [Greek: ta\ u(gieina\] nor [Greek: e( -i)atrike\] as a type of [Greek: ta\ i)atrika/], though it is "the -central point" to which all things so called are referred. See Dr. -Whewell's doctrine stated in the Philosophy of the Inductive -Sciences, i. 476-477; and the comments of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the -doctrine--'System of Logic,' Book iv. ch. 7. I have adverted to this -same doctrine in remarking on the Hippias Major, supra, p. 47; also -on the Philebus, infra, chap. 32, vol. III.] - -[Footnote 46: This is attested by Aristotle, Eth. Nik. i. 64, p. -1096, a. 16. [Greek: Oi( de\ komi/santes te\n do/xan tau/ten, ou)k -e)poi/oun i)de/as e)n oi(=s to\ pro/teron kai\ to\ u(/steron -e)/legon; dio/per ou)de\ to=n a)rithmo=n i)de/an kateskeu/azon]: -compare Ethic. Eudem. i. 8, 1218, a. 2. He goes on to object that -Plato, having laid this down as a general principle, departed from it -in recognizing an [Greek: i)de/an a)gathou=], because [Greek: -ta)gatho\n] was predicated in all the categories, in that of [Greek: -ou)si/a] as well as in that of [Greek: pro/s ti--to\ de\ kath' au(to\ -kai\ e( ou)si/a pro/teron te=| phu/sei tou= pro/s ti--o(/ste ou)k -a)\n ei)/e koine/ tis e)pi\ tou/ton i)de/a.]] - -[Side-note: Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima -Amicitia of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical -aggregate, not member of a generic family.] - -Now the [Greek: Pro=ton phi/lon] or Primum Amabile which we find in -the Lysis, is described as the principium or initial root of one of -these imperfectly united aggregates; ramifying into many branches -more or less distant, in obedience to one or other of the different -laws of association. Aristotle expresses the same idea in another -form of words: instead of a Primum Amabile, he gives us a Prima -Amicitia--affirming that the diversities of friendship are not -species comprehended under the same genus, but gradations or -degeneracies departing in one direction or other from the First or -pure Friendship. The Primum Amabile, in Plato's view, appears to be -the Good, though he does not explicitly declare it: the Prima -Amicitia, with Aristotle, is friendship subsisting between two good -persons, who have had sufficient experience to know, esteem, and -trust, each other.[47] - -[Footnote 47: Aristotel. Eth. Nikom. viii. 2, 1155, b. 12, viii. 5, -1157, a. 30, viii. 4; Eth. Eudem. vii. 2, 1236, a. 15. The statement -is more full in the Eudemian Ethics than in the Nikomachean; he -begins the seventh book by saying that [Greek: phili/a] is not said -[Greek: monacho=s] but [Greek: pleonacho=s]; and in p. 1236 he says -[Greek: A)na/gke a)/ra tri/a phili/as ei)/de ei)=nai, kai\ _mete -kath' e(\n a(pa/sas_ meth' o(s _ei)/de e(no\s ge/nous_, me/te -pa/mpan le/gesthai o(monu/mos; pro\s _mi/an ga/r tina le/gontai -kai\ pro/ten, o(/sper to\ i)atriko/n_], &c. The whole passage -is instructive, but is too long to cite. - -Bonitz gives some good explanations of these passages. Observationes -Criticae in Aristotelis quae feruntur _Magna Moralia_ et -_Eudemia_, pp. 55-57.] - -[Side-note: The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of -attachment.] - -In regard to the Platonic Lysis, I have already observed that no -positive result can be found in it, and that all the hypotheses -broached are successively negatived. What is kept before the reader's -mind, however, more than anything else, though not embodied in any -distinct formula, is--The Good and the Beautiful considered as -objects of love or attachment. - - - - - -CHAPTER XXI. - -EUTHYDEMUS. - - -[Side-note: Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydemus. -Judgments of various critics.] - -Dramatic vivacity, and comic force, holding up various persons to -ridicule or contempt, are attributes which Plato manifests often and -abundantly. But the dialogue in which these qualities reach their -maximum, is, the Euthydemus. Some portions of it approach to the -Nubes of Aristophanes: so that Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other -admiring critics have some difficulty in explaining, to their own -satisfaction,[1] how Plato, the sublime moralist and lawgiver, can -here have admitted so much trifling and buffoonery. Ast even rejects -the dialogue as spurious; declaring it to be unworthy of Plato and -insisting on various peculiarities, defects, and even absurdities, -which offend his critical taste. His conclusion in this case has -found no favour: yet I think it is based on reasons quite as forcible -as those upon which other dialogues have been condemned:[2] upon -reasons, which, even if admitted, might prove that the dialogue was -an inferior performance, but would not prove that Plato was not the -author. - -[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Euthydemos, vol. iii. pp. -400-403-407; Stallbaum. Proleg. in Euthydem. p. 14.] - -[Footnote 2: Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 408-418.] - -[Side-note: Scenery and personages.] - -Sokrates recounts (to Kriton) a conversation in which he has just -been engaged with two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, in the -undressing-room belonging to the gymnasium of the Lykeium. There were -present, besides, Kleinias, a youth of remarkable beauty and -intelligence, cousin of the great Alkibiades--Ktesippus, an adult -man, yet still young, friend of Sokrates and devotedly attached to -Kleinias--and a crowd of unnamed persons, partly friends of -Kleinias, partly admirers and supporters of the two Sophists. - -[Side-note: The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: -manner in which they are here presented.] - -This couple are described and treated throughout by Sokrates, with -the utmost admiration and respect: that is, in terms designating such -feelings, but intended as the extreme of irony or caricature. They -are masters of the art of Contention, in its three varieties[3]--1. -Arms, and the command of soldiers. 2. Judicial and political -rhetoric, fighting an opponent before the assembled Dikasts or -people. 3. Contentious Dialectic--they can reduce every respondent to -a contradiction, if he will only continue to answer their -questions--whether what he says be true or false.[4] All or each of these -accomplishments they are prepared to teach to any pupil who will pay -the required fee: the standing sarcasm of Plato against the paid -teacher, occurring here as in so many other places. Lastly, they are -brothers, old and almost toothless--natives of Chios, colonists from -thence to Thurii, and exiles from Thurii and resident at Athens, yet -visiting other cities for the purpose of giving lessons.[5] Their -dialectic skill is described as a recent acquisition,--made during -their old age, only in the preceding year,--and completing their -excellence as professors of the tripartite Eristic. But they now -devote themselves to it more than to the other two parts. Moreover -they advertise themselves as teachers of virtue. - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Euthyd. pp. 271-272.] - -[Footnote 4: Plat. Euthyd. p. 272 B. [Greek: e)xele/gchein to\ a)ei\ -lego/menon, o(moi/os e)a/n te pseu=dos e)a/n t' a)lethe\s e)=|]: p. -275 C. [Greek: ou)de\n diaphe/rei, e)a\n mo/non e)the/le| -a)pokri/nesthai o( neani/skos.]] - -[Footnote 5: Plat. Euthyd. p. 273 B-C. "quamvis essent aetate -grandiores et _edentuli_" says Stallbaum in his Proleg. p. 10. -He seems to infer this from page 294 C; the inference, though not -very certain, is plausible. - -Steinhart, in his Einleitung zum Euthydemos (vol. ii. p. 2 of -Hieronym. Mueller's translation of Plato) repeats these antecedents of -Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, as recited in the dialogue before us, as -if they were matter of real history, exemplifications of the -character of the class called Sophists. He might just as well produce -what is said by the comic poets Eupolis and Aristophanes--the -proceedings as recounted by the Sokratic disciple in the [Greek: -phrontiste/rion] (Nubes)--as evidence about the character of -Sokrates.] - -[Side-note: Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by -Sokrates, next by the two Sophists.] - -The two Sophists, having announced themselves as competent to teach -virtue and stimulate pupils to a virtuous life, are entreated by -Sokrates to exercise their beneficent influence upon the youth -Kleinias, in whose improvement he as well as Ktesippus feels the -warmest interest. Sokrates gives a specimen of what he wishes by -putting a series of questions himself. Euthydemus follows, and begins -questioning Kleinias; who, after answering three or four -successive questions, is forced to contradict himself. Dionysodorus -then takes up the last answer of Kleinias, puts him through another -series of interrogations, and makes him contradict himself again. In -this manner the two Sophists toss the youthful respondent backwards -and forwards to each other, each contriving to entangle him in some -puzzle and contradiction. They even apply the same process to -Sokrates, who cannot avoid being entangled in the net; and to -Ktesippus, who becomes exasperated, and retorts upon them with -contemptuous asperity. The alternate interference of the two Sophists -is described with great smartness and animation; which is promoted by -the use of the dual number, peculiar to the Greek language, employed -by Plato in speaking of them. - -[Side-note: Contrast between the two different modes of -interrogation.] - -This mode of dialectic, conducted by the two Sophists, is interrupted -on two several occasions by a counter-exhibition of dialectic on the -part of Sokrates: who, under colour of again showing to the couple a -specimen of that which he wishes them to do, puts two successive -batches of questions to Kleinias in his own manner.[6] The contrast -between Sokrates and the two Sophists, in the same work, carried on -respectively by him and by them, of interrogating Kleinias, is -evidently meant as one of the special matters to arrest attention in -the dialogue. The questions put by the couple are made to turn -chiefly on verbal quibbles and ambiguities: they are purposely -designed to make the respondent contradict himself, and are -proclaimed to be certain of bringing about this result, provided the -respondent will conform to the laws of dialectic--by confining his -answer to the special point of the question, without adding any -qualification of his own, or asking for farther explanation from the -questioner, or reverting to any antecedent answer lying apart from -the actual question of the moment.[7] Sokrates, on the contrary, -addresses interrogations, each of which has a clear and substantive -meaning, and most of which Kleinias is able to answer without -embarrassment: he professes no other design except that of -encouraging Kleinias to virtue, and assisting him to determine -in what virtue consists: he resorts to no known quibbles or words of -equivocal import. The effect of the interrogations is represented as -being, not to confound and silence the youth, but to quicken and -stimulate his mind and to call forth an unexpected amount of latent -knowledge: insomuch that he makes one or two answers very much beyond -his years, exciting the greatest astonishment and admiration, in -Sokrates as well as in Kriton.[8] In this respect, the youth Kleinias -serves the same illustrative purpose as the youthful slave in the -Menon:[9] each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of -Sokrates, into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected, nor -traceable to any teaching. But in the Menon, this magical evocation -of knowledge from an untaught youth is explained by the theory of -reminiscence, pre-existence, and omniscience, of the soul: while in -the Euthydemus, no allusion is made to any such theory, nor to any -other cause except the stimulus of the Sokratic cross-questioning. - -[Footnote 6: Plat. Euthydem. pp. 279-288.] - -[Footnote 7: Plat. Euthyd. pp. 275 E--276 E. [Greek: Pa/nta toiau=ta -e(mei=s e)roto=men a)/phukta], pp. 287 B--295 B--296 A, &c.] - -[Footnote 8: Plat. Euthydem. pp. 290-291. The unexpected wisdom, -exhibited by the youth Kleinias in his concluding answer, can be -understood only as illustrating the obstetric efficacy of Sokratic -interrogations. See Winckelmann, Proleg. ad Euthyd. pp. xxxiii. -xxxiv. The words [Greek: to=n kreitto/non] must have the usual -signification, as recognised by Routh and Heindorf, though -Schleiermacher treats it as absurd, p. 552, notes.] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Menon, pp. 82-85.] - -[Side-note: Wherein this contrast does not consist.] - -In the dialogue _Euthydemus_, then, one main purpose of Plato is -to exhibit in contrast two distinct modes of questioning: one -practised by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; the other, by Sokrates. Of -these two, it is the first which is shown up in the most copious and -elaborate manner: the second is made subordinate, serving mainly as a -standard of comparison with the first. We must take care however to -understand in what the contrast between the two consists, and in what -it does not consist. - -The contrast does not consist in this--that Sokrates so contrives his -string of questions as to bring out some established and positive -conclusion, while Euthydemus and his brother leave everything in -perplexity. Such is not the fact. Sokrates ends without any result, -and with a confession of his inability to find any. Professing -earnest anxiety to stimulate Kleinias in the path of virtue, he is at -the same time unable to define what the capital condition of -virtue is.[10] On this point, then, there is no contrast between -Sokrates and his competitors: if they land their pupil in -embarrassment, so does he. Nor, again, does Sokrates stand -distinguished from them by affirming (or rather implying in his -questions) nothing but what is true and indisputable.[11] - -[Footnote 10: Plat. Euthydem. pp. 291 A--293 A; Plat. Kleitophon, pp. -409-410.] - -[Footnote 11: See Plat. Euthydem. p. 281 C-D, where undoubtedly the -positions laid down by Sokrates would not have passed without -contradiction by an opponent.] - -[Side-note: Wherein it does consist.] - -The real contrast between the competitors, consists, first in the -pretensions--next in the method. The two Sophists are described as -persons of exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue,[12] and -claiming a fee as if they did teach it: Sokrates disdains the fee, -doubts whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to -encourage or help forward on the road a willing pupil. The pupil in -this case is a given subject, Kleinias, a modest and intelligent -youth: and the whole scene passes in public before an indiscriminate -audience. To such a pupil, what is needed is, encouragement and -guidance. Both of these are really administered by the questions of -Sokrates, which are all suggestive and pertinent to the matter in -hand, though failing to reach a satisfactory result: moreover, -Sokrates attends only to Kleinias, and is indifferent to the effect -on the audience around. The two Sophists, on the contrary, do not say -a word pertinent to the object desired. Far from seeking (as they -promised) to encourage Kleinias,[13] they confuse and humiliate him -from the beginning: all their implements for teaching consist only of -logical puzzles; lastly, their main purpose is to elicit applause -from the by-standers, by reducing both the modest Kleinias and every -other respondent to contradiction and stand-still. - -[Footnote 12: Plat. Euthydem. pp. 273 D, 275 A, 304 B.] - -[Footnote 13: Plat. Euthyd. p. 278 C. [Greek: e)pha/ten ga\r -e)pidei/xasthai te\n protreptike\n sophi/an.]] - -[Side-note: Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists--their bidding -for the applause of the by-standers.] - -Such is the real contrast between Sokrates and the two Sophists, and -such is the real scene which we read in the dialogue. The presence, -as well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd in the -Lykeium, are essential features of the drama.[14] The point of -view which Plato is working out, is, the abusive employment, the -excess, and the misplacement, of logical puzzles: which he brings -before us as administered for the humiliation of a youth who requires -opposite treatment, in the prosecution of an object which they do not -really promote and before undiscerning auditors, for whose applause -the two Sophists are bidding.[15] The whole debate upon these -fallacies is rendered ridiculous; and when conducted with Ktesippus, -degenerates into wrangling and ribaldry. - -[Footnote 14: The [Greek: o)/chlos] (surrounding multitude) is -especially insisted on in the first sentence of the dialogue, and is -perpetually adverted to throughout all the recital of Sokrates to -Kriton, pp. 276 B-D, 303 B.] - -[Footnote 15: Plat. Euthydem. p. 303 B.] - -[Side-note: Comparison of the Euthydemus with the Parmenides.] - -The bearing of the Euthydemus, as I here state it, will be better -understood if we contrast it with the Parmenides. In this -last-mentioned dialogue, the amount of negative dialectic and -contradiction is greater and more serious than that which we read in -the Euthydemus. One single case of it is elaborately built up in the -long Antinomies at the close of the Parmenides (which occupy as much -space, and contain nearly as much sophistry, as the speeches assigned -to the two Sophists in Euthydemus), while we are given to understand -that many more remain behind.[16] These perplexing Antinomies -(addressed by the veteran Parmenides to Sokrates as his junior), -after a variety of other objections against the Platonic theory of -Ideas, which theory Sokrates has been introduced as affirming,--are -drawn up for the avowed purpose of checking premature affirmation, -and of illustrating the difficult exercises and problems which must -be solved, before affirmation can become justifiable. This task, -though long and laborious, cannot be evaded (we are here told) by -aspirants in philosophy. But it is a task which ought only to be -undertaken in conjunction with a few select companions. "Before any -large audience, it would be unseemly and inadmissible: for the public -are not aware that without such roundabout and devious journey in all -directions, no man can hit upon truth or acquire intelligence."[17] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. I shall revert to this point -when I notice the Parmenides.] - -[Footnote 17: Plat. Parmen. pp. 135-136. [Greek: e(/lkuson de\ -sauto\n kai\ gu/mnasai ma=llon dia\ te=s dokou/ses a)chre/stou -ei)=nai kai\ kaloume/nes u(po\ to=n pollo=n a)doleschi/as, e(/os -e(/ti ne/os ei)=--ei) me\n ou)=n plei/ous e(=men, ou)k a)\n a)/xion -e)=n dei=sthai], (to request Parmenides to give a specimen of -dialectic) [Greek: a)prepe= ga\r ta\ toiau=ta pollo=n e)nanti/on -le/gein, a)/llos te kai\ telikou/to|; a)gnoou=si ga\r oi( polloi\ -o(/ti a)/neu tau/tes te=s dia\ pa/nton diexo/dou te kai\ pla/nes, -a)du/naton e)ntucho/nta to=| a)lethei= nou=n schei=n.]] - -[Side-note: Necessity of settling accounts with the -negative, before we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: -in the one the process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is -vulgarised and ludicrous.] - -This important proposition--That before a man can be entitled to lay -down with confidence any affirmative theory, in the domain of -philosophy or "reasoned truth," he must have had before him the -various knots tied by negative dialectic, and must find out the way -of untying them--is a postulate which lies at the bottom of Plato's -Dialogues of Search, as I have remarked in the eighth chapter of this -work. But there is much difference in the time, manner, and -circumstances, under which such knots are brought before the student -for solution. In the Parmenides the process is presented as one both -serious and indispensable, yet requiring some precautions: the public -must be excluded, for they do not understand the purpose: and the -student under examination must be one who is competent or more than -competent to bear the heavy burthen put upon him, as Sokrates is -represented to be in the Parmenides.[18] In the Euthydemus, on the -contrary, the process is intended to be made ridiculous; accordingly -these precautions are disregarded. The crowd of indiscriminate -auditors are not only present, but are the persons whose feelings the -two Sophists address--and who either admire what is said as dexterous -legerdemain, or laugh at the interchange of thrusts, as the duel -becomes warmer: in fact, the debate ends with general mirth, in which -the couple themselves are among the loudest.[19] Lastly, Kleinias, -the youth under interrogation, is a modest novice; not represented, -like Lysis in the dialogue just reviewed, as in danger of corruption -from the exorbitant flatteries of an Erastes, nor as requiring a -lowering medicine to be administered by a judicious friend. When the -Xenophontic (historical) Sokrates cross-examines and humiliates -Euthydemus (a youth, but nevertheless more advanced than Kleinias in -the Platonic Euthydemus is represented to be), we shall see that he -not only lays a train for the process by antecedent suggestions, but -takes especial care to attack Euthydemus when alone.[20] The -cross-examination pursued by Sokrates inflicts upon this accomplished -young man the severest distress and humiliation, and would have been -utterly intolerable, if there had been by-standers clapping their -hands (as we read in the Platonic Euthydemus) whenever the respondent -was driven into a corner. We see that it was hardly tolerable even -when the respondent was alone with Sokrates; for though Euthydemus -bore up against the temporary suffering, cultivated the society of -Sokrates, and was handled by him more gently afterwards; yet there -were many other youths whom Sokrates cross-examined in the same way, -and who suffered so much humiliation from the first solitary -colloquy, that they never again came near him (so Xenophon expressly -tells us)[21] for a second. This is quite enough to show us how -important is the injunction delivered in the Platonic Parmenides--to -carry on these testing colloquies apart from indiscriminate auditors, -in the presence, at most, of a few select companions. - -[Footnote 18: See the compliments to Sokrates, on his strenuous -ardour and vocation for philosophy, addressed by Parmenides, p. 135 -D.] - -[Footnote 19: Plat. Euthyd. p. 303 B. [Greek: E)ntau=tha me/ntoi, o)= -phi/le Kri/ton, ou)deis o(/stis ou) to=n paro/nton u(perepe/nese to\n -lo/gon, kai\ to\ a)/ndre] (Euthydemus and Dionysodorus) [Greek: -gelo=nte kai\ krotou=nte kai\ chai/ronte o)li/gou pareta/thesan.]] - -[Footnote 20: Xenophon. Memor. iv. 2, 5-8. [Greek: o(s d' e)/|stheto] -(Sokrates) [Greek: au)to\n e)toimo/teron u(pome/nonta, o(/te -diale/goito, kai\ prothumo/teron a)kou/onta, _mo/nos e)=lthen_ -ei)s to\ e(niopoiei=on; parakathezome/non d' au)to=| tou= -Eu)thude/mou, Ei)=pe/ moi, e)/phe], &c.] - -[Footnote 21: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 39-40. Compare the remarks of Sokrates -in Plato, Theaetetus, p. 151 C.] - -[Side-note: Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the -Euthydemus, that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus represent the way in -which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors.] - -Stallbaum, Steinhart, and other commentators denounce in severe terms -the Eristics or controversial Sophists of Athens, as disciples of -Protagoras and Gorgias, infected with the mania of questioning and -disputing every thing, and thereby corrupting the minds of youth. -They tell us that Sokrates was the constant enemy of this school, but -that nevertheless he was unjustly confounded with them by the comic -poets, and others; from which confusion alone his unpopularity with -the Athenian people arose.[22] In the Platonic dialogue of Euthydemus -the two Sophists (according to these commentators) represent the way -in which Protagoras and Gorgias with their disciples reasoned: and -the purpose of the dialogue is to contrast this with the way in which -Sokrates reasoned. - -[Footnote 22: Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Euthydem. pp. 9-11-13; -Winckelmann, Proleg. ad eundem, pp. xxxiii.-xxxiv.] - -[Side-note: That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more -Eristic than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by -continuous speech or lecture.] - -Now, in this opinion, I think that there is much of unfounded -assumption, as well as a misconception of the real contrast intended -in the Platonic Euthydemus. Comparing Protagoras with Sokrates, -I maintain that Sokrates was decidedly the more Eristic of the two, -and left behind him a greater number of active disciples. In so far -as we can trust the picture given by Plato in the dialogue called -Protagoras, we learn that the Sophist of that name chiefly manifested -himself in long continuous speeches or rhetoric; and though he also -professed, if required, to enter into dialectic colloquy, in this art -he was no match for Sokrates.[23] Moreover, we know by the evidence -of Sokrates himself, that _he_ was an Eristic not only by taste, -but on principle, and by a sense of duty. He tells us, in the -Platonic Apology, that he felt himself under a divine mission to go -about convicting men of ignorance, and that he had prosecuted this -vocation throughout many years of a long life. Every one of these -convictions must have been brought about by one or more disputes of -his own seeking: every such dispute, with occasional exceptions, made -him unpopular, in the outset at least, with the person convicted: the -rather, as his ability in the process is known, upon the testimony of -Xenophon[24] as well as of Plato, to have been consummate. It is -therefore a mistake to decry Protagoras and the Protagoreans (if -there were any) as the special Eristics, and to represent Sokrates as -a tutelary genius, the opponent of such habits. If the commentators -are right (which I do not think they are) in declaring the Athenian -mind to have been perverted by Eristic, Sokrates is much more -chargeable with the mischief than Protagoras. And the comic poets, -when they treated Sokrates as a specimen and teacher of Eristic, -proceeded very naturally upon what they actually saw or heard of -him.[25] - -[Footnote 23: See Plat. Protag., especially pp. 329 and 336. About -the eristic disposition of Sokrates, see the striking passage in -Plato, Theaetet. 169 B-C; also Laches, 187, 188.] - -[Footnote 24: Xen. Mem. i. 2.] - -[Footnote 25: Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydem. pp. 50-51. "Sed -hoc utcunque se habet, illud quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ex -ipso Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem non tantum ab orationum -scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis, in vanissimorum sophistaram loco -habitum fuisse."] - -[Side-note: Sokrates in the Euthydemus is drawn suitably to -the purpose of that dialogue.] - -The fact is, that the Platonic Sokrates when he talks with the two -Sophists in the dialogue Euthydemus, is a character drawn by Plato -for the purpose of that dialogue, and is very different from the real -historical Sokrates, whom the public of Athens saw and heard in -the market-place or gymnasia. He is depicted as a gentle, soothing, -encouraging talker, with his claws drawn in, and affecting inability -even to hold his own against the two Sophists: such indeed as he -sometimes may have been in conversing with particular persons (so -Xenophon[26] takes pains to remind his readers in the Memorabilia), -but with entire elimination of that characteristic aggressive -Elenchus for which he himself (in the Platonic Apology) takes credit, -and which the auditors usually heard him exhibit. - -[Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. i. 4, 1; iv. 2, 40.] - -[Side-note: The two Sophists in the Euthydemus are not to be -taken as real persons, or representatives of real persons.] - -This picture, accurate or not, suited the dramatic scheme of the -Euthydemus. Such, in my judgment, is the value and meaning of the -Euthydemus, as far as regards personal contrasts. One style of -reasoning is represented by Sokrates, the other by the two Sophists: -both are the creatures of Plato, having the same dramatic reality as -Sokrates and Strepsiades, or the [Greek: Di/kaios Lo/gos] and [Greek: -A)/dikos Lo/gos], of Aristophanes, but no more. That they correspond -to any actual persons at Athens, is neither proved nor probable. The -comic poets introduce Sokrates as talking what was either -nonsensical, or offensive to the feelings of the Athenians: and -Sokrates (in the Platonic Apology) complains that the Dikasts judged -him, not according to what he had really said or done, but according -to the impression made on them by this dramatic picture. The Athenian -Sophists would have equal right to complain of those critics, who not -only speak of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus with a degree of acrimony -applicable only to historical persons, but also describe them as -representative types of Protagoras, Gorgias, and their disciples.[27] - -[Footnote 27: The language of Schleiermacher is more moderate than -that of Stallbaum, Steinhart, and others. He thinks moreover, that -the polemical purpose of this dialogue is directed not against -Protagoras or Gorgias, but against the Megarics and against -Antisthenes, who (so Schleiermacher supposes) had brought the attack -upon themselves by attacking Plato first (Einleitung zum Euthyd. p. -404 seq.). Schleiermacher cannot make out who the two Sophists were -personally, but he conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no -notice. - -This is a conjecture which admits of no proof; but if any real victim -is here intended by Plato, we may just as reasonably suppose -Antisthenes as Protagoras.] - -[Side-note: Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias--possession of -good things is useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use -them.] - -The conversation of Sokrates with the youth Kleinias is -remarkable for its plainness and simplicity. His purpose is to -implant or inflame in the youth the aspiration and effort towards -wisdom or knowledge ([Greek: philosophi/a], in its etymological -sense). "You, like every one else, wish to do well or to be happy. -The way to be happy is, to have many good things. Every one knows -this: every one knows too, that among these good things, wealth is an -indisputable item:[28] likewise health, beauty, bodily activity, good -birth, power over others, honour in our city, temperance, justice, -courage, wisdom, &c. Good fortune does not count as a distinct -item, because it resolves itself into wisdom.[29]--But it is not -enough to have all these good things: we must not only have them but -use them: moreover, we must use them not wrongly, but rightly. If we -use them wrongly, they will not produce their appropriate -consequences. They will even make us more miserable than if we had -them not, because the possession of them will prompt us to be active -and meddlesome: whereas, if we have them not, we shall keep in the -back-ground and do little.[30] But to use these good things rightly, -depends upon wisdom, knowledge, intelligence. It thus appears that -the enumerated items are not really good, except on the assumption -that they are under the guidance of intelligence: if they are under -the guidance of ignorance, they are not good; nay, they even produce -more harm than good, since they are active instruments in the service -of a foolish master.[31] - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Euthydem. p. 279 A. [Greek: a)gatha\ de\ poi=a -a)/ra to=n o)/nton tugcha/nei e(mi=n o)/nta? e)\ ou) chalepo\n ou)de\ -semnou= a)ndro\s pa/nu ti ou)de\ tou=to e)/oiken ei)=nai eu(rei=n? -pa=s ga\r a)\n e(mi=n ei)/poi o(/ti to\ ploutei=n a)gatho/n?]] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Euthydem. pp. 279-280.] - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Euthydem. p. 281 C. [Greek: e(=tton de\ kako=s -pra/tton, a)/thlios e(=tton a)\n ei)/e.]] - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Euthyd. p. 282 E. If we compare this with p. 279 -C-D we shall see that the argument of Sokrates is open to the -exception which he himself takes in the case of [Greek: eu)tuchi/a--di\s -tau)ta\ le/gein]. Wisdom is counted twice over.] - -[Side-note: But intelligence--of what? It must be such -intelligence, or such an art, as will include both the making of what -we want, and the right use of it when made.] - -"But what intelligence do we want for the purpose? Is it _all_ -intelligence? Or is there any one single variety of intelligence, by -the possession of which we shall become good and happy?[32] -Obviously, it must be must be such as will be profitable to us.[33] -We have seen that there is no good in possessing wealth--that we -should gain nothing by knowing how to acquire wealth or even to turn -stones into gold, unless we at the same time knew how to use it -rightly. Nor should we gain any thing by knowing how to make -ourselves healthy, or even immortal, unless we knew how to employ -rightly our health or immortality. We want knowledge or intelligence, -of such a nature, as to include both acting, making, or construction -and rightly using what we have done, made, or constructed.[34] The -makers of lyres and flutes may be men of skill, but they cannot play -upon the instruments which they have made: the logographers compose -fine discourses, but hand them over for others to deliver. Even -masters in the most distinguished arts--such as military commanders, -geometers, arithmeticians, astronomers, &c., do not come up to -our requirement. They are all of them varieties under the general -class _hunters_: they find and seize, but hand over what they -have seized for others to use. The hunter, when he has caught or -killed game, hands it over to the cook; the general, when he has -taken a town, delivers it to the political leader or minister: the -geometer makes over his theorems to be employed by the dialectician -or comprehensive philosopher.[35] - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Euthydem. p. 282 E. Sokrates here breaks off the -string of questions to Kleinias, but resumes them, p. 288 D.] - -[Footnote 33: Plato, Euthydem. p. 288 D. [Greek: ti/na pot' ou)=n -a)\n ktesa/menoi e)piste/men o)rtho=s ktesai/metha? a)=r' ou) tou=to -me\n a(plou=n, o(/ti tau/ten e(/tis e(ma=s o)ne/sei?]] - -[Footnote 34: Plato, Euthyd. p. 289 B. [Greek: toiau/tes tino\s a)/r' -e(mi=n e)piste/mes dei=, e)n e(=| sumpe/ptoken a(/ma to/ te poiei=n -kai\ to\ e)pi/stasthai chre=sthai o(=| a)\n poie=|.]] - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Euthyd. p.290 C-D.] - -[Side-note: Where is such an art to be found? The regal or -political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No -answer can be found. Ends in puzzle.] - -"Where then can we find such an art--such a variety of knowledge or -intelligence--as we are seeking? The regal or political art looks -like it: that art which regulates and enforces all the arrangements -of the city. But what is the work which this art performs? What -product does it yield, as the medical art supplies good health, and -the farmer's art, provision? What good does it effect? You may say -that it makes the citizens wealthy, free, harmonious in their -intercourse. But we have already seen that these acquisitions are not -good, unless they be under the guidance of intelligence: that nothing -is really good, except some variety of intelligence.[36] Does the -regal art then confer knowledge? If so, does it confer every -variety of knowledge--that of the carpenter, currier, &c., as -well as others? Not certainly any of these, for we have already -settled that they are in themselves neither good nor bad. The regal -art can thus impart no knowledge except itself; and what is -_itself_? how are we to use it? If we say, that we shall render -other men _good_--the question again recurs, _Good_--in -what respect? _useful_--for what purpose?[37] - -[Footnote 36: Plato, Euthyd. p. 292 B. [Greek: A)gatho\n de/ ge/ pou -o(mologe/samen a)lle/lois--ou)de\n ei)=nai a)/llo e)\ e)piste/men -tina/.]] - -[Footnote 37: Plat. Euthydem. p. 292 D. [Greek: A)lla\ ti/na de\ -e)piste/men? e(=| ti/ chreso/metha? to=n me\n ga\r e)/rgon ou)deno\s -dei= au)te\n demiourgo\n ei)=nai to=n me/te kako=n me/te a)gatho=n, -e)piste/men de\ paradido/nai medemi/an a)/llen e)\ au)te\n e(aute/n; -le/gomen de\ ou)=n, ti/s pote e)/stin au(te\ e(=| ti/ -chreso/metha?]] - -"Here then" (concludes Sokrates), "we come to a dead lock: we can -find no issue.[38] We cannot discover what the regal art does for us -or gives us: yet this is the art which is to make us happy." In this -difficulty, Sokrates turns to the two Sophists, and implores their -help. The contrast between him and them is thus brought out. - -[Footnote 38: Plat. Euthyd. p. 292 E.] - -[Side-note: Review of the cross-examination just pursued by -Sokrates. It is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look -for.] - -The argument of Sokrates, which I have thus abridged from the -Euthydemus, arrives at no solution: but it is nevertheless eminently -suggestive, and puts the question in a way to receive solution. What -is the regal or political art which directs or regulates all others? -A man has many different impulses, dispositions, qualities, -aptitudes, advantages, possessions, &c., which we describe by -saying that he is an artist, a general, a tradesman, clever, just, -temperate, brave, strong, rich, powerful, &c. But in the course -of life, each particular situation has its different exigencies, -while the prospective future has its exigencies also. The whole man -is one, with all these distinct and sometimes conflicting attributes: -in following one impulse, he must resist others--in turning his -aptitudes to one object, he must turn them away from others--he must, -as Plato says, distinguish the right use of his force from the wrong, -by virtue of knowledge, intelligence, reason. Such discriminating -intelligence, which in this dialogue is called the Regal or political -art,--what is the object of it? It is intelligence or knowledge,--But -_of what_? Not certainly of the way how each particular act is -to be performed--how each particular end is to be attained. Each -of these separately is the object of some special knowledge. But the -whole of a man's life is passed in a series of such particular acts, -each of which is the object of some special knowledge: what then -remains as the object of Regal or political intelligence, upon which -our happiness is said to depend? Or how can it have any object at -all? - -[Side-note: Comparison with other dialogues--Republic, -Philebus, Protagoras. The only distinct answer is found in the -Protagoras.] - -The question here raised is present to Plato's mind in other -dialogues, and occurs under other words, as for example, What is -good? Good is the object of the Regal or political intelligence; but -what is Good? In the Republic he raises this question, but declines -to answer it, confessing that he could not make it intelligible to -his hearers:[39] in the Gorgias, he takes pains to tell us what it -_is not_: in the Philebus, he does indeed tell us what it is, -but in terms which need explanation quite as much as the term which -they are brought to explain. There is only one dialogue in which the -question is answered affirmatively, in clear and unmistakable -language, and with considerable development--and that is, the -Protagoras: where Sokrates asserts and proves at length, that Good is -at the bottom identical with pleasure, and Evil with pain: that the -measuring or calculating intelligence is the truly regal art of life, -upon which the attainment of Good depends: and that the object of -that intelligence--the items which we are to measure, calculate, and -compare--is pleasures and pains, so as to secure to ourselves as much -as possible of the former, and escape as much as possible of the -latter. - -[Footnote 39: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 505-506.] - -In my remarks on the Protagoras, I shall state the view which I take -of the doctrine laid down in that dialogue by Sokrates. Persons may -think the answer insufficient: most of the Platonic critics declare -it to be absolutely wrong. But at any rate it is the only distinct -answer which Plato ever gives, to the question raised by Sokrates in -the Euthydemus and elsewhere. - -[Side-note: The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically -admired while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real -admiration, but the contrary.] - -From the abstract just given of the argument of Sokrates in the -Euthydemus, it will be seen to be serious and pertinent, though -ending with a confession of failure. The observations placed in -contrast with it and ascribed to the two Sophists, are -distinguished by being neither serious nor pertinent; but parodies of -debate for the most part, put together for the express purpose of -appearing obviously silly to the reader. Plato keeps up the dramatic -or ironical appearance, that they are admired and welcomed not only -by the hearers, but even by Sokrates himself. Nevertheless, it is -made clear at the end that all this is nothing but irony, and that -the talk which Plato ascribes to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus -produced, according to his own showing, no sentiment of esteem for -their abilities among the by-standers, but quite the reverse. Whether -there were individual Sophists at Athens who talked in that style, we -can neither affirm nor deny: but that there were an established class -of persons who did so, and made both money and reputation by it, we -can securely deny. It is the more surprising that the Platonic -commentators should desire us to regard Euthydemus and Dionysodorus -as representative samples of a special class named Sophists, since -one of the most eminent of those commentators (Stallbaum),[40] both -admits that Sokrates himself was generally numbered in the class and -called by the name and affirms also (incorrectly, in my opinion) that -the interrogations of Sokrates, which in this dialogue stand -contrasted with those of the two Sophists, do not enunciate the -opinions either of Sokrates or of Plato himself, but the opinions of -these very Sophists, which Plato adopts and utters for the -occasion.[41] - -[Footnote 40: Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydem. p. 50. "Illud -quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ipso Platone evidenter apparet, -Socratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis in -vanissimorum sophistarum numero habitum fuisse." Ib. p. 49 (cited in -a previous note). "Videtur pervulgata fuisse hominum opinio, qua -Socratem inter vanos sophistas numerandum esse existimabant." Again -p. 44, where Stallbaum tells us that Sokrates was considered by many -to belong "misellorum Sophistarum gregi".] - -[Footnote 41: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Euthydem. p. 30. "Cavendum -est magnopere, ne quae hic a Socrate disputantur, pro ipsius decretis -habeamus: _sunt enim omnia ad mentem Sophistarum disputata_, -quos ille, reprehensis eorum opinionibus, sperat eo adductum iri, ut -gravem prudentemque earum defensionem suscipiant." Compare p. 66. -Stallbaum says that Plato often reasons, adopting for the occasion -the doctrine of the Sophists. See his Prolegg. to the Laches and -Charmides, and still more his Proleg. to the Protagoras, where he -tells us that Plato introduces his spokesman Sokrates not only as -arguing _ex mente Sophistarum_, but also as employing captious -and delusive artifice, such as in this dialogue is ascribed to -Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.--pp. 23-24. "Itaque Socrates, missa -hujus rei disputatione, repente ad alia progreditur, scilicet -_similibus loqueis_ hominem denuo irretiturus. Nemini facile -obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco Protagoram _argutis conclusiunculis -deludi_" (_i.e._ by Sokrates) "atque _callide eo -permoveri,_" &c. "Quanquam nemo erit, quin videat, _callide -deludi Protagoram_, ubi ex eo, quod qui injuste faciat, is -neutiquam agat [Greek: sophro/nos], protinus colligitur justitiam et -[Greek: sophrosu/ne] unum idemque esse."--p. 25. "Disputat enim -Socrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagorae."--p. 30. -"Platonem ipsum haec non probasse, sed e vulgi opinione et mente -explicasse, vel illud non obscure significat," &c.--p. 33.] - -[Side-note: Mistaken representations about the Sophists--Aristotle's -definition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between -the Sophist and the Dialectician.] - -The received supposition that there were at Athens a class of men -called Sophists who made money and reputation by obvious fallacies -employed to bring about contradictions in dialogue--appears to me to -pervert the representations given of ancient philosophy. Aristotle -defines a Sophist to be "one who seeks to make money by apparent -wisdom which is not real wisdom":--the Sophist (he says) is an -Eristic who, besides money-making, seeks for nothing but victory in -debate and humiliation of his opponent:--Distinguishing the -Dialectician from the Sophist (he says), the Dialectician impugns or -defends, by probable arguments, probable tenets--that is, tenets -which are believed by a numerous public or by a few wise and eminent -individuals:--while the Sophist deals with tenets which are probable -only in appearance and not in reality--that is to say, tenets which -almost every one by the slightest attention recognises as false.[42] -This definition is founded, partly on the personal character and -purpose ascribed to the Sophist: partly upon the distinction between -apparent and real wisdom, assumed to be known and permanent. Now such -pseudo-wisdom was declared by Sokrates to be the natural state of all -mankind, even the most eminent, which it was his mission to expose: -moreover, the determination, what is to be comprised in this -description, must depend upon the judges to whom it is -submitted, since much of the works of Aristotle and Plato would come -under the category, in the judgment of modern readers both vulgar and -instructed. But apart from this relative and variable character of -the definition, when applied to philosophy generally--we may -confidently assert, that there never was any real class of -intellectual men, in a given time or place, to whom it could possibly -apply. Of individuals, the varieties are innumerable: but no -professional body of men ever acquired gain or celebrity by -maintaining theses, and employing arguments, which every one could -easily detect as false. Every man employs sophisms more or less; -every man does so inadvertently, some do it by design also; moreover, -almost every reasoner does it largely, in the estimation of his -opponents. No distinct line can be drawn between the Sophist and the -Dialectician: the definition given by Aristotle applies to an ideal -in his own mind, but to no reality without: Protagoras and Prodikus -no more correspond to it than Sokrates and Plato. Aristotle observes, -with great truth, that all men are dialecticians and testers of -reasoning, up to a certain point: he might have added that they are -all Sophists also, up to a certain point.[43] Moreover, when he -attempts to found a scientific classification of intellectual -processes upon a difference in the purposes of different -practitioners--whether they employ the same process for money or -display, or beneficence, or mental satisfaction to themselves--this -is altogether unphilosophical. The medical art is the same, whether -employed to advise gratis, or in exchange for a fee.[44] - -[Footnote 42: Aristotel. Topic, i. 1, p. 100, b. 21. [Greek: e)/ndoxa -de\ ta\ dokou=nta pa=sin e)\ toi=s plei/stois e)\ toi=s sophoi=s, -kai\ tou/tois e)\ pa=sin e)\ toi=s plei/stois e)\ toi=s ma/lista -gnori/mois kai\ e)ndo/xois. E)ristiko\s de\ e)/sti sullogismo\s o( -e)k phainome/non e)ndo/xon, me\ o)/nton de\--kai\ o( e)x e)ndo/xon -e)\ phainome/non e)ndo/xon phaino/menos. Ou)the\n ga\r to=n -legome/non e)ndo/xon e)pipolai/on e)/chei pantelo=s te\n phantasi/an, -katha/per peri\ ta\s to=n e)ristiko=n lo/gon a)rcha\s sumbe/beken -e)/chein. Parachre=ma ga\r kai\ o(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ toi=s kai\ mikra\ -sunora=|n duname/nois, kata/delos e)n au)toi=s e( tou= pseu/dous -e)/sti phu/sis.] - -De Sophisticis Elenchis, i. p. 165, a. 21. [Greek: e)/sti ga\r e( -sophistike\ phainome/ne sophi/a, ou)=sa d' ou)/; kai\ o( sophiste\s -chrematiste\s a)po\ phainome/nes sophi/as, a)ll' ou)k ou)/ses], p. -165, b. 10, p. 171, b. 8-27. [Greek: Oi( phile/rides, e)ristikoi\, -a)gonistikoi\], are persons who break the rules of dialectic ([Greek: -a)dikomachi/a]) for the purpose of gaining victory; [Greek: oi( -sophistai\] are those who do the same thing for the purpose of -getting money. See also Metaphys. iii. 1004, b. 17.] - -[Footnote 43: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 172, a. 30.] - -[Footnote 44: Aristot. Rhetor, i. 1, 1355, b. 18. He here admits that -the only difference between the Dialectician and the Sophist lies in -their purposes--that the mental activity employed by both is the -same. [Greek: o( ga\r sophistiko\s ou)k e)n te=| duna/mei a)ll' e)n -te=| proaire/sei; ple\n e)ntau=tha me\n] (in Rhetoric) [Greek: -e)/stai o( me\n kata\ te\n e)piste/men o( de\ kata\ te\n proai/resin, -r(e/tor, e)kei= de\] (in Dialectic) [Greek: sophiste\s me\n kata\ -te\n proai/resin, dialektiko\s de\ ou) kata\ te\n proai/resin, a)lla\ -kata\ te\n du/namin.]] - -[Side-note: Philosophical purpose of the Euthydemus--exposure -of fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of -particular examples.] - -Though I maintain that no class of professional Sophists (in the -meaning given to that term by the Platonic critics after Plato and -Aristotle) ever existed--and though the distinction between the paid -and the gratuitous discourser is altogether unworthy to enter into -the history of philosophy--yet I am not the less persuaded that the -Platonic dialogue Euthydemus, and the treatise of Aristotle De -Sophisticis Elenchis, are very striking and useful compositions. This -last-mentioned treatise was composed by Aristotle very much -under the stimulus of the Platonic dialogue Euthydemus, to which it -refers several times--and for the purpose of distributing the variety -of possible fallacies under a limited number of general heads, each -described by its appropriate characteristic, and represented by its -illustrative type. Such attempt at arrangement--one of the many -valuable contributions of Aristotle to the theory of reasoning--is -expressly claimed by him as his own. He takes a just pride in having -been the first to introduce system where none had introduced it -before.[45] No such system was known to Plato, who (in the -Euthydemus) enumerates a string of fallacies one after another -without any project of classifying them, and who presents them as it -were in concrete, as applied by certain disputants in an imaginary -dialogue. The purpose is, to make these fallacies appear -conspicuously in their character of fallacies: a purpose which is -assisted by presenting the propounders of them as ridiculous and -contemptible. The lively fancy of Plato attaches suitable accessories -to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. They are old men, who have been all -their lives engaged in teaching rhetoric and tactics, but have -recently taken to dialectic, and acquired perfect mastery thereof -without any trouble--who make extravagant promises--and who as -talkers play into each other's hands, making a shuttlecock of the -respondent, a modest novice every way unsuitable for such treatment. - -[Footnote 45: See the last chapter of the treatise De Sophisticis -Elenchis.] - -[Side-note: Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a -classification of fallacies: Plato enumerates them without -classification.] - -Thus different is the Platonic manner, from the Aristotelian manner, -of exposing fallacies. But those exhibited in the former appear as -members of one or more among the classes framed by the latter. The -fallacies which we read in the Euthydemus are chiefly verbal: but -some are verbal, and something beyond. - -[Side-note: Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two -Sophists in the Euthydemus.] - -Thus, for example, if we take the first sophism introduced by the two -exhibitors, upon which they bring the youth Kleinias, by suitable -questions, to declare successively both sides of the -alternative--"Which of the two is it that learns, the wise or the -ignorant?"--Sokrates himself elucidates it by pointing out that the terms -used are equivocal:[46] You might answer it by using the language ascribed -to Dionysodorus in another part of this dialogue--"Neither and -Both".[47] The like may be said about the fallacy in page 284 D--"Are -there persons who speak of things as they are? Good men speak of -things as they are: they speak of good men well, of bad men badly: -therefore, of course, they speak of stout men stoutly, and of hot men -hotly. Ay! rejoins the respondent Ktesippus, angrily--they speak of -cold men coldly, and say that they talk coldly."[48] These are -fallacies of double meaning of words--or double construction of -phrases: as we read also in page 287 D, where the same Greek verb -([Greek: noei=n]) may be construed either to _think_ or to -_mean_: so that when Sokrates talks about what a predication -_means_--the Sophists ask him--"Does anything _think_, -except things having a soul? Did you ever know any predication that -had a soul?" - -[Footnote 46: Plato, Euthydem. pp. 275 D--278 D. Aristotle also -adverts to this fallacy, but without naming the Euthydemus. See Soph. -El. 4, 165, b. 30.] - -[Footnote 47: Plato, Euthydem. p. 300 D. [Greek: Ou)de/tera kai\ -a)mpho/tera]] - -[Footnote 48: Plato, Euthydem. p. 284 E. [Greek: tou\s gou=n -psuchrou\s psuchro=s le/gousi/ te kai\ phasi\ diale/gesthai.] The -metaphorical sense of [Greek: psuchro\s] is _pointless_, -_stupid_, _out of taste_, _out of place_, -_&c._] - -[Side-note: Fallacies--_a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum -simpliciter_--in the Euthydemus.] - -Again, the two Sophists undertake to prove that Sokrates, as well as -the youth Kleinias and indeed every one else, knows everything. "Can -any existing thing _be_ that which it is, and at the same time -_not be_ that which it is?--No.--You know some things?--Yes.--Then -if you know, _you are knowing_?--Certainly. I am knowing of -those particular things.--That makes no difference: if you are -knowing, you necessarily know everything.--Oh! no: for there are many -things which I do not know.--Then if there be anything which you do -not know, _you are not knowing_?--Yes, doubtless--of that -particular thing.--Still you are _not knowing_: and just now you -said that you were _knowing_: and thus, at one and the same -time, you are what you are, and you are not what you are.[49] - -[Footnote 49: Plato, Euthydem. p. 293 C. Aristotle considers -_know_ to be an equivocal word; he admits that in certain senses -you may both _know_ and _not know_ the same thing. Anal. -Prior. ii. 67, b. 8. Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 25.] - -"But _you_ also" (retorts Sokrates upon the couple), "do not -you also know some things, not know others?--By no means.--What! -do you know nothing?--Far from it.--Then you know all -things?--Certainly we do,--and you too: if you know one thing, you know -all things.--What! do you know the art of the carpenter, the currier, the -cobbler--the number of stars in the heaven, and of grains of sand in -the desert, &c.?--Yes: we know all these things." - -[Side-note: Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their -replies--determination not to contradict themselves.] - -The two Sophists maintain their consistency by making reply in the -affirmative to each of these successive questions: though Ktesippus -pushes them hard by enquiries as to a string of mean and diverse -specialties.[50] This is one of the purposes of the dialogue: to -represent the two Sophists as willing to answer any thing, however -obviously wrong and false, for the purpose of avoiding defeat in the -dispute--as using their best efforts to preserve themselves in the -position of questioners, and to evade the position of respondents--and -as exacting a categorical answer--Yes or No--to every question -which they put without any qualifying words, and without any -assurance that the meaning of the question was understood.[51] - -[Footnote 50: Plato, Euthydem. pp. 293-294.] - -[Footnote 51: Plato, Euthydem. pp. 295-296.] - -The base of these fallacious inferences is, That respecting the same -subject, you cannot both affirm and deny the same predicate: you -cannot say, A is knowing--A is not knowing ([Greek: e)piste/mon]). -This is a fallacy more than verbal: it is recognised by Aristotle -(and by all subsequent logicians) under the name--_a dicto secundum -quid, ad dictum simpliciter_. - -It is very certain that this fallacy is often inadvertently committed -by very competent reasoners, including both Plato and Aristotle. - -[Side-note: Farther verbal equivocations.] - -Again--Sophroniskus was my father--Chaeredemus was the father of -Patrokles.--Then Sophroniskus was different from a father: therefore -he was not a father. You are different from a stone, therefore you -are not a stone: you are different from gold, therefore you are not -gold. By parity of reasoning, Sophroniskus is different from a -father--therefore he is not a father. Accordingly, you, Sokrates, -have no father.[52] - -[Footnote 52: Plato, Euthydem. pp. 297-298.] - -But (retorts Ktesippus upon the couple) your father is different -from my father.--Not at all.--How can that be?--What! is your father, -then, the father of all men and of all animals?--Certainly he is. A -man cannot be at the same time a father, and not a father. He cannot -be at the same time a man, and not a man--gold, and not gold.[53] - -[Footnote 53: Plato, Euthydem. p. 298. Some of the fallacies in the -dialogue ([Greek: Po/teron o(ro=sin oi( a)/nthropoi ta\ dunata\ -o(ra=|n e)\ ta\ a)du/nata? . . . E)= ou)ch oi(=o/n te sigo=nta -le/gein?] p. 300 A) are hardly translatable into English, since they -depend upon equivocal constructions peculiar to the Greek language. -Aristotle refers them to the general head [Greek: par' -a)mphiboli/an]. The same about [Greek: prose/kei to\n ma/geiron -katako/ptein], p. 301 D.] - -You have got a dog (Euthydemus says to Ktesippus).--Yes.--The dog is -the father of puppies?--Yes.--The dog, being a father, is -yours?--Certainly.--Then your father is a dog, and you are brother -of the puppies. - -You beat your dog sometimes? Then you beat your father.[54] - -[Footnote 54: Plat. Euthyd. p. 298.] - -Those animals, and those alone are _yours_ (sheep, oxen, -&c.), which you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. -But Zeus, Apollo, and Athene are _your_ Gods. The Gods have a -soul and are animals. Therefore your Gods are your animals. Now you -told us that those alone were your animals, which you could give -away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. Therefore you can give away, -or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure, Zeus, Apollo, and Athene.[55] - -[Footnote 55: Plat. Euthydem. p. 302. This same fallacy, in -substance, is given by Aristotle, De Sophist. El. 17, 176 a. 3, 179, -a. 5, but with different exemplifying names and persons.] - -This fallacy depends upon the double and equivocal meaning of -_yours_--one of its different explanations being treated as if -it were the only one. - -[Side-note: Fallacies involving deeper logical -principles--contradiction is impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible.] - -Other puzzles cited in this dialogue go deeper:--Contradiction is -impossible--To speak falsely is impossible.[56] These paradoxes were -maintained by Antisthenes and others, and appear to have been matters -of dialectic debate throughout the fourth and third centuries. I -shall say more of them when I speak about the Megarics and -Antisthenes. Here I only note, that in this dialogue, Ktesippus is -represented as put to silence by them, and Sokrates as making an -answer which is no answer at all.[57] We see how much trouble these -paradoxes gave to Plato, when we read the Sophistes, in which he -handles the last of the two in a manner elaborate, but (to my -judgment) unsatisfactory. - -[Footnote 56: Plato, Euthydem. pp. 285-286.] - -[Footnote 57: Plato, Euthydem. pp. 286 B--287 A.] - -[Side-note: Plato's Euthydemus is the earliest known attempt -to set out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies -is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the -conclusion proved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd.] - -The Euthydemus of Plato is memorable in the history of philosophy as -the earliest known attempt to set out, and exhibit to attention, a -string of fallacious modes of reasoning. Plato makes them all absurd -and ridiculous. He gives a caricature of a dialectic debate, not -unworthy of his namesake Plato Comicus--or of Aristophanes, Swift, or -Voltaire. The sophisms appear for the most part so silly, as he puts -them, that the reader asks himself how any one could have been ever -imposed upon by such a palpable delusion? Yet such confidence is by -no means justified. A sophism, perfectly analogous in character to -those which Plato here exposes to ridicule, may, in another case, -easily escape detection from the hearer, and even from the reasoner -himself. People are constantly misled by fallacies arising from the -same word bearing two senses, from double construction of the same -phrase, from unconscious application of a _dictum secundum -quid_, as if it were a _dictum simpliciter_; from Petitio -Principii, &c., Ignoratio Elenchi, &c. Neither Plato himself, -nor Aristotle, can boast of escaping them.[58] If these fallacies -appear, in the examples chosen by Plato for the Euthydemus, so -obviously inconclusive that they can deceive no one--the reason lies -not in the premisses themselves, but in the particular conclusions to -which they lead: which conclusions are known on other grounds to be -false, and never to be seriously maintainable by any person. Such -conclusions as--"Sokrates had no father: Sophroniskus, if father of -Sokrates, was father of all men and all animals: In beating your dog, -you beat your father: If you know one thing, you know everything," -&c., being known _aliunde_ to be false, prove that there has -been some fallacy in the premisses whereby they have been -established. Such cases serve as a _reductio ad absurdum_ of the -antecedent process. They make us aware of one mode of liability -to error, and put us on our guard against it in analogous cases. This -is a valuable service, and all the more valuable, because the -liability to error is real and widespread, even from fallacies -perfectly analogous to those which seem so silly under the particular -exemplifications which Plato selects and exposes. Many of the -illustrations of the Platonic Euthydemus are reproduced by Aristotle -in the Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis, together with other -fallacies, discriminated with a certain method and system.[59] - -[Footnote 58: See a passage in Plato's Charmides, where Heindorf -remarks with propriety upon his equivocal use of the words [Greek: -eu)= ze=|n] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein]--also the Gorgias, p. 507 D, -with the notes of Routh and Heindorf. I have noticed both passages in -discussing these two dialogues.] - -[Footnote 59: Aristotle, De Sophist. Elench.; also Arist. Rhet. ii. -p. 1401, a-b.] - -[Side-note: Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been -invented and propagated by Athenian Sophists--they are inherent -inadvertencies and liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of -thinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them.] - -The true character of these fallacies is very generally overlooked by -the Platonic critics, in their appreciation of the Euthydemus; when -they point our attention to the supposed tricks and frauds of the -persons whom they called Sophists, as well as to mischievous -corruptions alleged to arise from Eristic or formal contentious -debate. These critics speak as if they thought that such fallacies -were the special inventions of Athenian Sophists for the purposes of -Athenian Eristic: as if such causes of error were inoperative on -persons of ordinary honesty or intelligence, who never consulted or -heard the Sophists. It has been the practice of writers on logic, -from Aristotle down to Whately, to represent logical fallacies as -frauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners, whose art -Whately assimilates to that of jugglers. - -This view of the case appears to me incomplete and misleading. It -substitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and -essential. The various sophisms, of which Plato in the Euthydemus -gives the _reductio ad absurdum_, are not the inventions of -Sophists. They are erroneous tendencies of the reasoning process, -frequently incident to human thought and speech: specimens of those -ever-renewed "inadvertencies of ordinary thinking" (to recur to a -phrase cited in my preface), which it is the peculiar mission of -philosophy or "reasoned truth" to rectify. Moreover the practice of -formal debate, which is usually denounced with so much asperity--if -it affords on some occasions opportunity to produce such fallacies, -presents not merely equal opportunity, but the only effective means, -for exposing and confuting them. Whately in his Logic,[60] like -Plato in the Euthydemus, when bringing these fallacies into open -daylight in order that every one may detect them, may enliven the -theme by presenting them as the deliberate tricks of a Sophist. -Doubtless they are so by accident: yet their essential character is -that of infirmities incident to the _intellectus sibi -permissus_: operative at Athens before Athenian Sophists existed, -and in other regions also, where these persons never penetrated.] - -[Footnote 60: Whately's Logic, ch. v. sect. 5. Though Whately, like -other logicians, keeps the Sophists in the foreground, as the -fraudulent enemy who sow tares among that which would otherwise come -up as a clean crop of wheat--yet he intimates also incidentally how -widespread and frequent such fallacies are, quite apart from -dishonest design. He says--"It seems by most persons to be taken for -granted, that a Fallacy is to be dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned -and wielded by a skilful Sophist: or, if they allow that a man may -with honest intentions slide into one, unconsciously, in the heat of -_argument_--still they seem to suppose, that where there is no -_dispute_, there is no cause to dread Fallacy. Whereas there is -much danger, even in what may be called _solitary reasoning_, of -sliding unawares into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far -deceived as even to act upon the conclusion so obtained. By -_solitary reasoning_, is meant the case in which we are not -seeking for arguments to prove a given question, but labouring to -elicit from our previous stock of knowledge some useful inference." - -"To speak of all the Fallacies that have ever been enumerated, as too -glaring and obvious to need even being mentioned--because the simple -instances given in books, and there stated in the plainest and -consequently most easily detected form, are such as (in that form) -would deceive no one--this, surely, shows either extreme weakness or -extreme unfairness."--Aristotle himself makes the same remark as -Whately--That the man who is easily taken in by a Fallacy advanced by -another, will be easily misled by the like Fallacy in his own -solitary reasoning. Sophist. Elench. 16, 175, a. 10.] - -[Side-note: Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, -misguided by one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, -Plato, Bacon, &c.,--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by -Mill.] - -The wide diffusion and constant prevalence of such infirmities is -attested not less by Sokrates in his last speech, wherein he declares -real want of knowledge and false persuasion of knowledge, to be -universal, the mission of his life being to expose them, though he -could not correct them--than by Bacon in his reformatory projects, -where he enumerates the various Idola worshipped by the human -intellect, and the false tendencies acquired "_in prima digestione -mentis_". The psychological analysis of the sentiment of belief -with its different sources, given in Mr. Alexander Bain's work on the -Emotions and the Will, shows how this takes place; and exhibits true -or sound belief, in so far as it ever is acquired, as an acquisition -only attained after expulsion of earlier antecedent error.[61] Of -such error, and of the different ways in which apparent evidence -is mistaken for real evidence, a comprehensive philosophical -exposition is farther given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the fifth -book of his System of Logic, devoted to the subject of Fallacies. -Every variety of erroneous procedure is referable to some one or more -of the general heads of Fallacy there enumerated. It is the Fallacies -of Ratiocination, of which the two Sophists, in the Platonic -Euthydemus, are made to exhibit specimens: and when we regard such -Fallacies, as one branch among several in a complete logical scheme, -we shall see at once that they are not inventions of the Athenian -Sophists--still less inventions for the purpose of Eristic or formal -debate. For every one of these Fallacies is of a nature to ensnare -men, and even to ensnare them more easily, in the common, informal, -conversation of life--or in their separate thoughts. Besides mistakes -on matters of fact, the two main causes which promote the -success and encourage the multiplication of Fallacies generally, are -first, the emotional bias towards particular conclusions, which -disposes persons to accept any apparent evidence, favourable to such -conclusion, as if it, were real evidence: next, the careless and -elliptical character of common speech, in which some parts of the -evidence are merely insinuated, and other parts altogether left out. -It is this last circumstance which gives occasion to the very -extensive class of Fallacies called by Mr. Mill Fallacies of -Confusion: a class so large, that the greater number of Fallacies -might plausibly be brought under it.[62] - -[Footnote 61: See the instructive and original chapter on the -generation, sources, and growth of Belief, in Mr. Bain's work, -'Emotions and Will,' p. 568 seq. After laying down the fundamental -characteristic of Belief, as referable altogether to intended action, -either certain to come, or contingent under supposed circumstances, -and after enumerating the different Sources of Belief.--1. Intuitive -or Instinctive. 2. Experience. 3. The Influence of the Emotions -(sect. x. p. 579)--Mr. Bain says: "Having in our constitution -primordial fountains of activity in the spontaneous and voluntary -impulses, we follow the first clue that experience gives us, and -accept the indication with the whole force of these natural -promptings. Being under the strongest impulses to act somehow, an -animal accepts any lead that is presented, and if successful, abides -by that lead with unshaken confidence. This is that instinct of -credulity so commonly attributed to the infant mind. It is not the -single instance, or the repetition of two or three, that makes up the -strong tone of confidence; it is the mind's own active determination, -finding some definite vent in the gratification of its ends, and -abiding by the discovery with the whole energy of the character, -until the occurrence of some check, failure, or contradiction. The -force of belief, therefore, is not one rising from zero to a full -development by slow degrees, according to the length of the -experience. We must treat it rather as a strong primitive -manifestation, derived from the natural activity of the system, and -taking its direction and rectification from experience (p. 583). The -anticipation of nature, so strenuously repudiated by Bacon, is the -offspring of this characteristic of the mental system. With the -active tendency at its maximum, and the exercise of intelligence and -acquired knowledge at the minimum, there can issue nothing but a -quantity of rash enterprises. The respectable name -_generalisation_, implying the best products of enlightened -scientific research, has also a different meaning, expressing one of -the most erroneous impulses and crudest determinations of untutored -human nature. To extend some familiar and narrow experience, so as to -comprehend cases the most distant, is a piece of mere reckless -instinct, demanding severe discipline for its correction. I have -mentioned the case of our supposing all other minds constituted like -our own. The veriest infant has got this length in the career of -fallacy. Sound belief, instead of being a pacific and gentle growth, -is in reality the battering of a series of strongholds, the -conquering of a country in hostile occupation. This is a fact common -both to the individual and to the race. Observation is unanimous on -the point. It will probably be long ere the last of the delusions -attributable to this method of believing first and proving afterwards -can be eradicated from humanity." [3rd ed., p. 505 seq.]] - -[Footnote 62: Mill, 'System of Logic,' Book V., to which is prefixed -the following citation from Hobbes's 'Logica'. "Errare non modo -affirmando et negando, sed etiam in sentiendo, et in tacita hominum -cogitatione, contingit." - -Mr. Mill points out forcibly both the operation of moral or emotional -bias in perverting the intellect, and causing sophisms or fallacies -to produce conviction; and the increased chance afforded for the -success of a sophism by the suppression of part of the premisses, -which is unavoidable in informal discussions. - -"Bias is not a direct source of wrong conclusions (v. 1-3). We cannot -believe a proposition only by wishing, or only by dreading, to -believe it. Bias acts indirectly by placing the intellectual grounds -of belief in an incomplete or distorted shape before a man's eyes. It -makes him shrink from the irksome labour of a rigorous induction. It -operates too by making him look out eagerly for reasons, or apparent -reasons, to support opinions which are conformable, or resist those -which are repugnant, to his interests or feelings; and when the -interests or feelings are common to great numbers of persons, reasons -are accepted or pass current which would not for a moment be listened -to in that character, if the conclusion had nothing more powerful -than its reasons to speak in its behalf. The natural or acquired -prejudices of mankind are perpetually throwing up philosophical -theories, the sole recommendation of which consists in the premisses -which they afford for proving cherished doctrines, or justifying -favourite feelings; and when any one of these theories has become so -thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose, another is -always ready to take its place."--"Though the opinions of the -generality of mankind, when not dependent upon mere habit and -inculcation, have their root much more in the inclinations than in -the intellect, it is a necessary condition to the triumph of the -moral bias that it should first pervert the understanding." - -Again in v. 2, 3. "It is not in the nature of bad reasoning to -express itself unambiguously. When a sophist, whether he is imposing -upon himself or attempting to impose upon others, can be constrained -to throw his argument into so distinct a form, it needs, in a large -number of cases, no farther exposure. In all arguments, everywhere -but in the schools, some of the links are suppressed: _a -fortiori_, when the arguer either intends to deceive, or is a lame -and inexpert thinker, little accustomed to bring his reasoning -processes to any test; and it is in those steps of the reasoning -which are made in this tacit and half-conscious, or even wholly -unconscious, manner, that the error oftenest lurks. In order to -detect the fallacy the proposition thus silently assumed must be -supplied, but the reasoner, most likely, has never really asked -himself what he was assuming; his confuter, unless permitted to -extort it from him by the Socratic mode of interrogation, must -himself judge what the suppressed premiss ought to be, in order to -support the conclusion." Mr. Mill proceeds to illustrate this -confusion by an excellent passage cited from Whately's 'Logic'. I may -add, that Aristotle himself makes a remark substantially the same--That -the same fallacy may be referred to one general head or to -another, according to circumstances. Sophist. Elench. 33, 182, b. 10.] - -[Side-note: Value of formal debate as a means for testing -and confuting fallacies.] - -We thus see not only that the fallacious agencies are self-operative, -generating their own weeds in the common soil of human thought and -speech, without being planted by Athenian Sophists or watered by -Eristic--but that this very Eristic affords the best means of -restraining their diffusion. It is only in formal debate that the -disputant can be forced to make clear to himself and declare -explicitly to others, without reserve or omission, all the premisses -upon which his conclusion rests--that every part of these premisses -becomes liable to immediate challenge by an opponent--that the -question comes distinctly under consideration, what is or is not -sufficient evidence--that the premisses of one argument can be -compared with the premisses of another, so that if in the former you -are tempted to acquiesce in them as sufficient because you have a -bias favourable to the conclusion, in the latter you may be made to -feel that they are _insufficient_, because the conclusion which -they prove is one which you know to be untrue (_reductio ad -absurdum_). The habit of formal debate (called by those who do not -like it, Eristic[63]) is thus an indispensable condition both for the -exposure and confutation of fallacies, which exist quite independent -of that habit--owing their rise and prevalence to deep-seated -psychological causes. - -[Footnote 63: The Platonic critics talk about the Eristics (as they -do about the Sophists) as if that name designated a known and -definite class of persons. This is altogether misleading. The term is -vituperative, and was applied by different persons according to their -own tastes. - -Ueberweg remarks with great justice, that Isokrates called all -speculators on philosophy by the name of Eristics. "Als ob jener -Rhetor nicht (wie ja doch Spengel selbst gut nachgewiesen hat) alle -und jede Spekulation mit dem Nahmen der Eristik bezeichnete." -(Untersuchungen ueber die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schriften, p. 257.) In -reference to the distinction which Aristotle attempts to draw between -Dialectic and Eristic--the former legitimate, the latter -illegitimate--we must remark that even in the legitimate Dialectic -the purpose prominent in his mind is that of victory over an -opponent. He enjoins that you are not only to guard against your -opponent, lest he should out-manoeuvre you, but you are to conceal -and disguise the sequence of your questions so as to out-manoeuvre -him. [Greek: Chre\ d' o(/per phula/ttesthai paragge/llomen -a)pokrinome/nous, au)tou\s e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein.] -Anal. Prior. ii. 66, a. 32. Compare Topic. 108, a. 25, 156, a. 23, -164, b. 35.] - -[Side-note: Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could -not have composed his Euthydemus, nor Aristotle the treatise De -Sophisticis Elenchis.] - -Without the experience acquired by this habit of dialectic debate at -Athens, Plato could not have composed his Euthydemus, exhibiting a -_reductio ad absurdum_ of several verbal fallacies--nor could we -have had the logical theories of Aristotle, embodied in the -Analytica and Topica with its annexed treatise De Sophisticis -Elenchis, in which various fallacies are discriminated and -classified. These theories, and the corollaries connected with them, -do infinite honour to the comprehensive intellect of Aristotle: but -he could not have conceived them without previous study of the -ratiocinative process. He, as the first theorizer, must have had -before him abundant arguments explicitly laid out, and contested, or -open to be contested, at every step by an opponent.[64] Towards such -habit of formal argumentation, a strong repugnance was felt by many -of the Athenian public, as there is among modern readers generally: -but those who felt thus, had probably little interest in the -speculations either of Plato or of Aristotle. That the Platonic -critics should themselves feel this same repugnance, seems to me not -consistent with their admiration for the great dialectician and -logician of antiquity: nor can I at all subscribe to their view, when -they present to us the inherent infirmities of the human intellect as -factitious distempers generated by the habit of formal debate, and by -the rapacity of Protagoras, Prodikus, and others. - -[Footnote 64: Mill, 'System of Logic.' Book VI. 1, 1. "Principles of -Evidence and Theories of Method, are not to be constructed _a -priori_. The laws of our rational faculty, like those of every -other natural agency, are only got by seeing the agent at work."] - -[Side-note: Probable popularity of the Euthydemus at -Athens--welcomed by all the enemies of Dialectic.] - -I think it probable that the dialogue of Euthydemus, as far as the -point to which I have brought it (_i.e._, where Sokrates -finishes his recital to Kriton of the conversation which he had had -with the two Sophists), was among the most popular of all the -Platonic dialogues: not merely because of its dramatic vivacity and -charm of expression, but because it would be heartily welcomed by the -numerous enemies of Dialectic at Athens. We must remember that in the -estimation of most persons at Athens, Dialectic included Sokrates and -all the _viri Sokratici_ (Plato among them), just as much as the -persons called Sophists. The discreditable picture here given of -Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, would be considered as telling against -Dialectic and the Sokratic Elenchus generally: while the rhetors, and -others who dealt in long continuous discourse, would treat it as a -blow inflicted upon the rival art of dialogue, by the professor -of the dialogue himself. In Plato's view, the dialogue was the -special and appropriate manifestation of philosophy. - -[Side-note: Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to -obviate this inference by opponents--Conversation between Sokrates -and Kriton.] - -That the natural effect of the picture here drawn by Plato, was, to -justify the antipathy of those who hated philosophy--we may see by -the epilogue which Plato has thought fit to annex: an epilogue so -little in harmony with what has preceded, that we might almost -imagine it to be an afterthought--yet obviously intended to protect -philosophy against imputations. Sokrates having concluded the -recital, in his ironical way, by saying that he intended to become a -pupil under the two Sophists, and by inviting Kriton to be a pupil -along with him--Kriton replies by saying that he is anxious to obtain -instruction from any one who can give it, but that he has no sympathy -with Euthydemus, and would rather be refuted by him, than learn from -him to refute in such a manner. Kriton proceeds to report to Sokrates -the remarks of a by-stander (an able writer of discourses for the -Dikastery) who had heard all that passed; and who expressed his -surprise that Sokrates could have remained so long listening to such -nonsense, and manifesting so much deference for a couple of foolish -men. Nevertheless (continued the by-stander) this couple are among -the most powerful talkers of the day upon philosophy. This shows you -how worthless a thing philosophy is: prodigious fuss, with -contemptible result--men careless what they say, and carping at every -word that they hear.[65] - -[Footnote 65: Plat. Euthyd. pp. 304-305.] - -Now, Sokrates (concludes Kriton), this man is wrong for depreciating -philosophy, and all others who depreciate it are wrong also. But he -was right in blaming you, for disputing with such a couple before a -large crowd. - -_Sokr._--What kind of person is this censor of philosophy? Is he -a powerful speaker himself in the Dikastery? Or is he only a composer -of discourses to be spoken by others? _Krit._--The latter. I do -not think that he has ever spoken in court: but every one says that -he knows judicial practice well, and that he composes admirable -speeches.[66] - -[Footnote 66: Plat. Euthyd. p. 305.] - -[Side-note: Altered tone in speaking of -Euthydemus--Disparagement of persons half-philosophers, -half-politicians.] - -_Sokr._--I understand the man. He belongs to that class whom -Prodikus describes as the border-men between philosophy and politics. -Persons of this class account themselves the wisest of mankind, and -think farther that besides being such in reality, they are also -admired as such by many: insomuch that the admiration for them would -be universal, if it were not for the professors of philosophy. -Accordingly they fancy, that if they could once discredit these -philosophers, the prize of glory would be awarded to themselves, -without controversy, by every one: they being in truth the wisest men -in society, though liable, if ever they are caught in dialectic -debate, to be overpowered and humbled by men like Euthydemus.[67] -They have very plausible grounds for believing in their own wisdom, -since they pursue both philosophy and politics to a moderate extent, -as far as propriety enjoins; and thus pluck the fruit of wisdom -without encountering either dangers or contests. _Krit._--What -do you say to their reasoning, Sokrates? It seems to me specious. -_Sokr._--Yes, it is specious, but not well founded. You cannot -easily persuade them, though nevertheless it is true, that men who -take a line mid-way between two pursuits, are _better_ than -either, if both pursuits be bad--_worse_ than either, if both -pursuits be good, but tending to different ends--_better_ than -one and _worse_ than the other, if one of the pursuits be bad -and the other good--_better_ than both, if both be bad, but -tending to different ends. Such being the case, if the pursuit of -philosophy and that of active politics be both of them good, but -tending to different objects, these men are inferior to the pursuers -of one as well as of the other: if one be good, the other bad, they -are worse than the pursuers of the former, better than the pursuers -of the latter: if both be bad, they are better than either. Now I am -sure that these men themselves account both philosophy and politics -to be good. Accordingly, they are inferior both to philosophers and -politicians:[68] they occupy only the third rank, though they pretend -to be in the first. While we pardon such a pretension, and -refrain from judging these men severely, we must nevertheless -recognise them for such as they really are. We must be content with -every one, who announces any scheme of life, whatever it be, coming -within the limits of intelligence, and who pursues his work with -persevering resolution.[69] - -[Footnote 67: Plat. Euthyd. p. 305 D. [Greek: ei)=nai me\n ga\r te=| -a)lethei/a| spha=s sophota/tous, e)n de\ toi=s i)di/ois lo/gois -o(/tan a)polephtho=sin, u(po\ to=n a)mphi\ Eu)thu/demon -kolou/esthai.] - -[Greek: Oi( a)mphi\ Eu)thu/demon] may mean Euthydemus himself and -alone; yet I incline to think that it here means Euthydemus and his -like.] - -[Footnote 68: Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 B.] - -[Footnote 69: Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 C. [Greek: suggigno/skein me\n -ou)=n au)toi=s chre\ te=s e)pithumi/as kai\ me\ chalepai/nein, -e(gei=sthai me/ntoi toiou/tous ei)=nai oi(=oi/ ei)si; pa/nta ga\r -a)/ndra chre\ a)gapa=|n, o(/stis kai\ o(tiou=n le/gei e)cho/menon -phrone/seos pra=gma, kai\ a)ndrei/os diaponei=tai.]] - -[Side-note: Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the -education of his sons--Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him -to search for himself.] - -_Krit._ I am always telling you, Sokrates, that I too am embarrassed -where to seek instructors for my sons. Conversation with you has -satisfied me, that it is madness to bestow so much care upon the -fortune and position of sons, and so little upon their instruction. -Yet when I turn my eyes to the men who make profession of -instructing, I am really astonished. To tell you the truth, every one -of them appears to me extravagantly absurd,[70] so that I know not -how to help forward my son towards philosophy. _Sokr._--Don't -you know, Kriton, that in every different pursuit, most of the -professors are foolish and worthless, and that a few only are -excellent and above price? Is not this the case with gymnastic, -commercial business, rhetoric, military command? Are not most of -those who undertake these pursuits ridiculously silly?[71] -_Krit._--Unquestionably: nothing can be more true. _Sokr._--Do - you think _that_ a sufficient reason for avoiding all these -pursuits yourself, and keeping your son out of them also? _Krit._ No: -it would be wrong to do so. _Sokr._--Well then, don't do so. -Take no heed about the professors of philosophy, whether they are -good or bad; but test philosophy itself, well and carefully. If it -shall appear to you worthless, dissuade not merely your sons, but -every one else also, from following it.[72] But if it shall appear to -you as valuable as I consider it to be, then take courage to pursue -and practise it, you and your children both, according to the -proverb.-- - -[Footnote 70: Plato, Euthyd. p. 306 E. [Greek: kai/ moi dokei= ei)=s -e(/kastos au)to=n skopou=nti pa/nu a)llo/kotos ei)=nai], &c.] - -[Footnote 71: Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. [Greek: e)n e(ka/ste| tou/ton -tou\s pollou\s pro\s e(/kaston to\ e)/rgon ou) katagela/stous -o(ra=|s?]] - -[Footnote 72: Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. [Greek: e)a/sas chai/rein -tou\s e)pitedeu/ontas philosophi/an, ei)/te chrestoi/ ei)sin ei)/te -poneroi/, au)to\ to\ pra=gma basani/sas kalo=s te kai\ eu)=, e)a\n -me/n soi phai/netai phaulo\n o)/n], &c.] - -[Side-note: Euthydemus is here cited as representative of -Dialectic and philosophy.] - -The first part of this epilogue, which I have here given in -abridgment, has a bearing very different from the rest of the -dialogue, and different also from most of the other Platonic -dialogues. In the epilogue, Euthydemus is cited as the representative -of true dialectic and philosophy: the opponents of philosophy are -represented as afraid of being put down by Euthydemus: whereas, -previously, he had been depicted as contemptible,--as a man whose -manner of refuting opponents was more discreditable to himself than -to the opponent refuted; and who had no chance of success except -among hearers like himself. We are not here told that Euthydemus was -a bad specimen of philosophers, and that there were others better, by -the standard of whom philosophy ought to be judged. On the contrary, -we find him here announced by Sokrates as among those dreaded by men -adverse to philosophy,--and as not undeserving of that epithet which -the semi-philosopher cited by Kriton applies to "one of the most -powerful champions of the day". - -Plato, therefore, after having applied his great dramatic talent to -make dialectic debate ridiculous, and thus said much to gratify its -enemies--changes his battery, and says something against these -enemies, without reflecting whether it is consistent or no with what -had preceded. Before the close, however, he comes again into -consistency with the tone of the earlier part, in the observation -which he assigns to Kriton, that most of the professors of philosophy -are worthless; to which Sokrates rejoins that this is not less true -of all other professions. The concluding inference is, that -philosophy is to be judged, not by its professors but by itself; and -that Kriton must examine it for himself, and either pursue it or -leave it alone, according as his own convictions dictated. - -This is a valuable admonition, and worthy of Sokrates, laying full -stress as it does upon the conscientious conviction which the person -examining may form for himself. But it is no answer to the question -of Kriton; who says that he had already heard from Sokrates, and was -himself convinced, that philosophy was of first-rate importance--and -that he only desired to learn where he could find teachers to forward -the progress of his son in it. As in so many other dialogues, Plato -leaves the problem started, but unsolved. The impulse towards -philosophy being assured, those who feel it ask Plato in what -direction they are to move towards it. He gives no answer. He can -neither perform the service himself, nor recommend any one else, as -competent. We shall find such silence made matter of pointed -animadversion, in the fragment called Kleitophon. - -[Side-note: Who is the person here intended by Plato, -half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates?] - -The person, whom Kriton here brings forward as the censor of Sokrates -and the enemy of philosophy, is peculiarly marked. In general, the -persons whom Plato ranks as enemies of philosophy are the rhetors and -politicians: but the example here chosen is not comprised in either -of these classes: it is a semi-philosopher, yet a writer of -discourses for others. Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Spengel, suppose -that Isokrates is the person intended: Winckelmann thinks it is -Thrasymachus: others refer it to Lysias, or Theodorus of -Byzantium:[73] Socher and Stallbaum doubt whether any special person -is intended, or any thing beyond some supposed representative of a -class described by attributes. I rather agree with those who refer -the passage to Isokrates. He might naturally be described as one -steering a middle course between philosophy and rhetoric: which in -fact he himself proclaims in the Oration De Permutatione, and which -agrees with the language of Plato in the dialogue Phaedrus, where -Isokrates is mentioned by name along with Lysias. In the Phaedrus, -moreover, Plato speaks of Isokrates with unusual esteem, especially -as a favourable contrast with Lysias, and as a person who, though not -yet a philosopher, may be expected to improve, so as in no long time -to deserve that appellation.[74] We must remember that Plato in -the Phaedrus attacks by name, and with considerable asperity, first -Lysias, next Theodorus and Thrasymachus the rhetors--all three -persons living and of note. Being sure to offend all these, Plato -might well feel disposed to avoid making an enemy of Isokrates at the -same time, and to except him honourably by name from the vulgar -professors of rhetoric. In the Euthydemus (where the satire is -directed not against the rhetors, but against their competitors the -dialecticians or pseudo-dialecticians) he had no similar motive to -address compliments to Isokrates: respecting whom he speaks in a -manner probably more conformable to his real sentiments, as the -unnamed representative of a certain type of character--a -semi-philosopher, fancying himself among the first men in Athens, and -assuming unwarrantable superiority over the genuine philosopher; but -entitled to nothing more than a decent measure of esteem, such as -belonged to sincere mediocrity of intelligence. - -[Footnote 73: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyd. p. 47; Winckelmann. -Proleg. p. xxxv. - -Heindorf, in endeavouring to explain the difference between Plato's -language in the Phaedrus and in the Euthydemus respecting Isokrates, -assumes as a matter beyond question the theory of Schleiermacher, -that the Phaedrus was composed during Plato's early years. I have -already intimated my may dissent from this theory.] - -[Footnote 74: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 278 E. - -I have already observed that I do not agree with Schleiermacher and -the other critics who rank the Phaedrus as the earliest or even among -the earliest compositions of Plato. That it is of much later -composition I am persuaded, but of what particular date can only be -conjectured. The opinion of K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, -that it was composed about the time when Plato began his school at -Athens (387-386 B.C.) is sufficiently probable. - -The Euthydemus may be earlier or may be later than the Phaedrus. I -incline to think it later. The opinion of Stallbaum (resting upon the -mention of Alkibiades, p. 275 A), that it was composed in or before -404 B.C., appears to me untenable (Stallbaum, Proleg. p. -64). Plato would not be likely to introduce Sokrates speaking of -Alkibiades as a deceased person, whatever time the dialogue was -composed. Nor can I agree with Steinhart, who refers it to 402 -B.C. (Einleitung, p. 26). Ueberweg (Untersuch. ueber die -Zeitfolge der Plat. Schr. pp. 265-267) considers the Euthydemus later -(but not much later) than the Phaedrus, subsequent to the -establishment of the Platonic school at Athens (387-386 -B.C.) This seems to me more probable than the contrary. - -Schleiermacher, in arranging the Platonic dialogues, ranks the -Euthydemus as an immediate sequel to the Menon, and as presupposing -both Gorgias and Theaetetus (Einl. pp. 400-401). Socher agrees in this -opinion, but Steinhart rejects it (Einleit. p. 26), placing the -Euthydemus immediately after the Protagoras, and immediately before -the Menon and the Gorgias; according to him, Euthydemus, Menon, and -Gorgias, form a well marked Trilogy. - -Neither of these arrangements rests upon any sufficient reasons. The -chronological order cannot be determined.] - -[Side-note: Variable feeling at different times, between Plato -and Isokrates.] - -That there prevailed at different times different sentiments, more or -less of reciprocal esteem or reciprocal jealousy, between Plato and -Isokrates, ought not to be matter of surprise. Both of them were -celebrated teachers of Athens, each in his own manner, during the -last forty years of Plato's life: both of them enjoyed the favour of -foreign princes, and received pupils from outlying, sometimes -distant, cities--from Bosphorus and Cyprus in the East, and from -Sicily in the West. We know moreover that during the years -immediately preceding Plato's death (347 B.C.), his pupil -Aristotle, then rising into importance as a teacher of rhetoric, was -engaged in acrimonious literary warfare, seemingly of his own -seeking, with Isokrates (then advanced in years) and some of the -Isokratean pupils. The little which we learn concerning the literary -and philosophical world of Athens, represents it as much distracted -by feuds and jealousies. Isokrates on his part has in his -compositions various passages which appear to allude (no name being -mentioned) to Plato among others, in a tone of depreciation.[75] - -[Footnote 75: Isokrates, ad Philipp. Or. v. s. 14, p. 84; contra -Sophistas, Or. xiii.; Or. xiii. s. 2-24, pp. 291-295; Encom. Helenae, -Or. x. init.; Panathenaic. Or. xii. s. 126, p. 257; Or. xv. De -Permutatione, s. 90, p. 440, Bekk.] - -Isokrates seems, as far as we can make out, to have been in early -life, like Lysias, a composer of speeches to be spoken by clients in -the Dikastery. This lucrative profession was tempting, since his -family had been nearly ruined during the misfortunes of Athens at the -close of the Peloponnesian war. Having gained reputation by such -means, Isokrates became in his mature age a teacher of Rhetoric, and -a composer of discourses, not for private use by clients, but for the -general reader, on political or educational topics. In this -character, he corresponded to the description given by Plato in the -Euthydemus: being partly a public adviser, partly a philosopher. But -the general principle under which Plato here attacks him, though -conforming to the doctrine of the Platonic Republic, is contrary to -that of Plato in other dialogues, "You must devote yourself either -wholly to philosophy, or wholly to politics: a mixture of the two is -worse than either"--this agrees with the Republic, wherein Plato -enjoins upon each man one special and exclusive pursuit, as well as -with the doctrine maintained against Kallikles in the Gorgias--but it -differs from the Phaedrus, where he ascribes the excellence of -Perikles as a statesmen and rhetor, to the fact of his having -acquired a large tincture of philosophy.[76] Cicero quotes this last -passage as applicable to his own distinguished career, a combination -of philosophy with politics.[77] He dissented altogether from the -doctrine here laid down by Plato in the Euthydemus, and many other -eminent men would have dissented from it also. - -[Footnote 76: See the facts about Isokrates in a good Dissertation by -H. P. Schroeder, Utrecht, 1859, Quaestiones Isocrateae, p. 51, seq. - -Plato, Phaedrus, p. 270; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 23; Plato, Republic, -iii. p. 397.] - -[Footnote 77: Cicero, De Orator. iii. 34, 138; Orator. iv. 14; -Brutus, 11, 44.] - -As a doctrine of universal application, in fact, it cannot be -defended. The opposite scheme of life (which is maintained by -Isokrates in De Permutatione and by Kallikles in the Platonic -Gorgias)[78]--that philosophy is to be attentively studied in the -earlier years of life as an intellectual training, to arm the mind -with knowledge and capacities which may afterwards be applied to the -active duties of life--is at least equally defensible, and suits -better for other minds of a very high order. Not only Xenophon and -other distinguished Greeks, but also most of the best Roman citizens, -held the opinion which Plato in the Gorgias ascribes to Kallikles and -reprobates through the organ of Sokrates--That philosophical study, -if prolonged beyond what was necessary for this purpose of adequate -intellectual training, and if made the permanent occupation of life, -was more hurtful than beneficial.[79] Certainly, a man may often fail -in the attempt to combine philosophy with active politics. No one -failed in such a career more lamentably than Dion, the friend of -Plato--and Plato himself, when he visited Sicily to second Dion. -Moreover Alkibiades and Kritias were cited by Anytus and the other -accusers of Sokrates as examples of the like mischievous conjunction. -But on the other hand, Archytas at Tarentum (another friend of Plato -and philosopher) administered his native city with success, as long -(seemingly) as Perikles administered Athens. Such men as these two -are nowise inferior either to the special philosopher or to the -special politician. Plato has laid down an untenable generality, in -this passage of the Euthydemus, in order to suit a particular point -which he wished to make against Isokrates, or against the -semi-philosopher indicated, whoever else he may have been. - -[Footnote 78: Isokrates, De Permutatione, Or. xv. sect. 278-288, pp. -485-480, Bekk.; Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-485.] - -[Footnote 79: The half-philosophers and half-politicians to whom -Sokrates here alludes, are characterised by one of the Platonic -critics as "jene oberflaechlichen und schwaechlichen Naturen die sich -zwischen beiden Richtungen stellen, und zur Erreichung -selbstsuechtiger und beschraenkter Zwecke von beiden aufnehmen was sie -verstehen und was ihnen gefaellt" (Steinhart, Einleit. p. 25). On the -other hand we find in Tacitus a striking passage respecting the -studies of Agricola in his youth at Massilia. "Memoria teneo, solitum -ipsum narrare, se in prima juventa studium philosophiae acrius, ultra -quam concessum Romano ac senatori, hausisse--ni prudentia matris -incensum ac flagrantem animum exercuisset: Scilicet sublime et -erectum ingenium, pulchritudinem ac speciem excelsae magnaeque gloriae -vehementius quam laute appetebat: retinuitque, quod est -difficillimum, ex sapientia modum" (Vit. Agr. c. 4). - -Tacitus expresses himself in the same manner about the purpose with -which Helvidius Priscus applied himself to philosophy (Hist. iv. 6): -"non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo -constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret". - -Compare also the memorable passage in the Funeral Oration pronounced -by Perikles (Thuc. ii. 40)--[Greek: philosophou=men a)/neu -malaki/as], &c., which exhibits the like views. - -Aulus Gellius (x. 22), who cites the doctrine which Plato ascribes to -Kallikles in the Gorgias (about the propriety of confining philosophy -to the function of training and preparation for active pursuits), -tries to make out that this was Plato's own opinion.] - - - - - -CHAPTER XXII. - -MENON. - - -[Side-note: Persons of the Dialogue.] - -This dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Menon, a man of -noble family, wealth, and political influence, in the Thessalian city -of Larissa. He is supposed to have previously frequented, in his -native city, the lectures and society of the rhetor Gorgias.[1] The -name and general features of Menon are probably borrowed from the -Thessalian military officer, who commanded a division of the Ten -Thousand Greeks, and whose character Xenophon depicts in the -Anabasis: but there is nothing in the Platonic dialogue to mark that -meanness and perfidy which the Xenophontic picture indicates. The -conversation between Sokrates and Menon is interrupted by two -episodes: in the first of these, Sokrates questions an unlettered -youth, the slave of Menon: in the second, he is brought into conflict -with Anytus, the historical accuser of the historical Sokrates. - -[Footnote 1: Cicero notices Isokrates as having heard Gorgias in -Thessaly (Orator. 53, 176).] - -The dialogue is begun by Menon, in a manner quite as abrupt as the -Hipparchus and Minos: - -[Side-note: Question put by Menon--Is virtue teachable? -Sokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of -Menon.] - -_Menon._--Can you tell me, Sokrates, whether virtue is -teachable--or acquirable by exercise--or whether it comes by nature--or -in what other manner it comes? _Sokr._--I cannot answer your -question. I am ashamed to say that I do not even know what virtue is: -and when I do not know what a thing is, how can I know any thing -about its attributes or accessories? A man who does not know, Menon, -cannot tell whether he is handsome, rich, &c., or the contrary. -_Menon._--Certainly not. But is it really true, Sokrates, -that you do not know what virtue is? Am I to proclaim this respecting -you, when I go home?[2] _Sokr._--Yes--undoubtedly: and proclaim -besides that I have never yet met with any one who _did_ know. -_Menon._--What! have you not seen Gorgias at Athens, and did not -he appear to you to know? _Sokr._--I have met him, but I do not -quite recollect what he said. We need not consider what he said, -since he is not here to answer for himself.[3] But you doubtless -recollect, and can tell me, both from yourself, and from him, what -virtue is? _Menon._--There is _no difficulty_ in telling -you.[4] - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Menon, p. 71 B-C. [Greek: A)lla\ su/, o)= -So/krates, ou)d' o(/ ti a)rete/ e)stin oi)=stha, a)lla\ tau=ta peri\ -sou= kai\ oi)/kade a)pagge/llomen?]] - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Menon, p. 71 D. [Greek: a)kei=non me/ntoi nu=n -e)o=men, e)peide\ kai\ a)/pestin.] Sokrates sets little value upon -opinions unless where the person giving them is present to explain -and defend: compare what he says about the uselessness of citation -from poets, from whom you can ask no questions, Plato, Protagor. p. -347 E.] - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Menon, p. 71 E. [Greek: A)ll' ou) chalepo/n, o)= -So/krates, ei)pei=n], &c.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates stands alone in this confession. -Unpopularity entailed by it.] - -Many commentators here speak as if such disclaimer on the part of -Sokrates had reference merely to certain impudent pretensions to -universal knowledge on the part of the Sophists. But this (as I have -before remarked) is a misconception of the Sokratic or Platonic point -of view. The matter which Sokrates proclaims that _he_ does not -know, is, what, not Sophists alone, but every one else also, -professes to know well. Sokrates stands alone in avowing that he does -not know it, and that he can find no one else who knows. Menon treats -the question as one of no difficulty--one on which confessed -ignorance was discreditable. "What!" says Menon, "am I really to -state respecting you, that you do not know what virtue is?" The man -who makes such a confession will be looked upon by his neighbours -with surprise and displeasure--not to speak of probable consequences -yet worse. He is one whom the multifarious agencies employed by King -Nomos (which we shall find described more at length in the -Protagoras) have failed to mould into perfect and uninquiring -conformity, and he is still in process of examination to form a -judgment for himself. - -[Side-note: Answer of Menon--plurality of virtues, one -belonging to each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires -for the property common to all of them.] - -Menon proceeds to answer that there are many virtues: the virtue of a -man--competence to transact the business of the city, and in such -business to benefit his friends and injure his enemies: the -virtue of a woman--to administer the house well, preserving every -thing within it and obeying her husband: the virtue of a child, of an -old man, a slave, &c. There is in short a virtue--and its -contrary, a vice--belonging to each of us in every work, profession, -and age.[5] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Menon, p. 72 A. [Greek: kath' e(ka/sten ga\r to=n -pra/xeon kai\ to=n e(liko=n pro\s e(/kaston e)/rgon e(ka/sto| e(mo=n -e( a)rete/ e)stin. o(sau/tos de\ kai\ e( kaki/a.] - -Though Sokrates disapproves this method of answering--[Greek: to\ -e)xarithmei=n ta\s a)reta/s] (to use the expression of Aristotle)--yet -Aristotle seems to think it better than searching for one general -definition. See Politica, i. 13, p. 1260, a. 15-30, where he has the -Platonic Menon in his mind.] - -But (replies Sokrates) are they not all the same, _quatenus_ -virtue? Health, _quatenus_ Health, is the same in a man or a -woman: is not the case similar with virtue? _Menon._--Not -exactly similar. _Sokr._--How so? Though there are many diverse -virtues, have not all of them one and the same form in common, -through the communion of which they _are_ virtues? In answer to -my question, you ought to declare what this common form is. Thus, -both the man who administers the city, and the woman who administers -the house, must act both of them with justice and moderation. Through -the same qualities, both the one and the other are good. There is -thus some common constituent: tell me what it is, according to you -and Gorgias? _Menon._--It is to be competent to exercise command -over men.[6] _Sokr._--But that will not suit for the virtue of a -child or a slave. Moreover, must we not superadd the condition, to -command justly, and not unjustly? _Menon._--I think so: justice -is virtue. _Sokr._--Is it virtue--or is it one particular -variety of virtue?[7] _Menon._--How do you mean? _Sokr._--Just -as if I were to say about roundness, that it is not figure, but -a particular variety of figure: because there are other figures -besides roundness. _Menon._--Very true: I say too, that there -are other virtues besides justice--namely, courage, moderation, -wisdom, magnanimity, and several others also. _Sokr._--We are -thus still in the same predicament. In looking for one virtue, we -have found many; but we cannot find that one form which runs through -them all. _Menon._--I cannot at present tell what that one -is.[8] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Menon, p. 73 D.] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Menon, p. 73 E. [Greek: Po/teron a)rete/, o)= -Me/non, e)\ a)rete/ tis?]] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Menon, p. 74 A. [Greek: ou) ga\r du/namai/ po, -o)= So/krates, o(s su\ zetei=s, mi/an a)rete\n labei=n kata\ -pa/nton.]] - -[Side-note: Analogous cases cited--definitions of figure -and colour.] - -Sokrates proceeds to illustrate his meaning by the analogies of -figure and colour. You call _round_ a figure, and _square_ -a figure: you call _white_ and _black_ both colour, the one -as much as the other, though they are unlike and even opposite.[9] -Tell me, What is this same common figure and property in both, which -makes you call both of them figure--both of them colour? Take this as -a preliminary exercise, in order to help you in answering my enquiry -about virtue.[10] Menon cannot answer, and Sokrates answers his own -question. He gives a general definition, first of figure, next of -colour. He first defines figure in a way which implies colour to be -known. This is pointed out; and he then admits that in a good -definition, suitable to genuine dialectical investigation, nothing -should be implied as known, except what the respondent admits himself -to know. Figure and colour are both defined suitably to this -condition.[11] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Menon, p. 74 D.] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Menon, c. 7, pp. 74-75. [Greek: Peiro= ei)pei=n, -i(/na kai\ ge/netai/ soi mele/te pro\s te\n peri\ te=s a)rete=s -a)po/krisin] (75 A). - -The purpose of practising the respondent is here distinctly -announced.] - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Menon, p. 75 C-E.] - -[Side-note: Importance at that time of bringing into conscious -view, logical subordination and distinctions--Neither logic nor -grammar had then been cast into system.] - -All this preliminary matter seems to be intended for the purpose of -getting the question clearly conceived as a general question--of -exhibiting and eliminating the narrow and partial conceptions which -unconsciously substitute themselves in the mind, in place of that -which ought to be conceived as a generic whole--and of clearing up -what is required in a good definition. A generic whole, including -various specific portions distinguishable from each other, was at -that time little understood by any one. There existed no grammar, nor -any rules of logic founded on analysis of the intellectual processes. -To predicate of the genus what was true only of the species--to -predicate as distinctively characterizing the species, what is true -of the whole genus in which it is contained--to lose the integrity of -the genus in its separate parcels or fragments[12]--these were errors -which men had never yet been expressly taught to avoid. To assign the -one common meaning, constituent of or connoted by a generic term, -had never yet been put before them as a problem. Such -preliminary clearing of the ground is instructive even now, when -formal and systematic logic has become more or less familiar: but in -the time of Plato, it must have been indispensably required, to -arrive at a full conception of any general question.[13] - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Menon, p. 79 A. [Greek: e)mou= deethe/ntos sou -me\ katagnu/mai mede\ kermati/zein te\n a)reten], &c. 79 B: -[Greek: e)mou= deethe/ntos o(/len ei)pei=n te\n a)rete/n], &c.] - -[Footnote 13: These examples of trial, error, and exposure, have -great value and reflect high credit on Plato, when we regard them as -an intellectual or propaedeutic discipline, forcing upon hearers an -attention to useful logical distinctions at a time when there existed -no systematic grammar or logic. But surely they must appear degraded, -as they are presented in the Prolegomena of Stallbaum, and by some -other critics. We are there told that Plato's main purpose in this -dialogue was to mock and jeer the Sophists and their pupil, and that -for this purpose Sokrates is made to employ not his own arguments but -arguments borrowed from the Sophists themselves--"ut callide suam -ipsius rationem occultare existimandus sit, quo magis illudat -Sophistarum alumnum" (p. 15). "Quae quidem argumentatio" (that of -Sokrates) "admodum cavendum est ne pro Socratica vel Platonica -accipiatur. Est enim prorsus ad mentem Sophistarum aliorumque id -genus hominum comparata," &c. (p. 16). Compare pp. 12-13 seq. - -The Sophists undoubtedly had no distinct consciousness, any more than -other persons, of these logical distinctions, which were then for the -first pressed forcibly upon attention.] - -[Side-note: Definition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls -it to pieces.] - -Menon having been thus made to understand the formal requisites for a -definition, gives as his definition of virtue the phrase of some -lyric poet--"To delight in, or desire, things beautiful, fine, -honourable--and to have the power of getting them". But Sokrates -remarks that honourable things are good things, and that every one -without exception desires good. No one desires evil except when he -mistakes it for good. On this point all men are alike; the -distinctive feature of virtue must then consist in the second half of -the definition--in the power of acquiring good things, such as -health, wealth, money, power, dignities, &c.[14] But the -acquisition of these things is not virtuous, unless it be made -consistently with justice and moderation: moreover the man who acts -justly is virtuous, even though he does not acquire them. It appears -then that every agent who acts with justice and moderation is -virtuous. But this is nugatory as a definition of virtue: for justice -and moderation are only known as parts of virtue, and require to be -themselves defined. No man can know what a part of virtue is, unless -he knows what virtue itself is.[15] Menon must look for a better -definition, including nothing but what is already known or admitted. - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Menon, p. 77 B. [Greek: dokei= toi/nun moi -a)rete\ ei)=nai, katha/per o( poiete\s le/gei, chai/rein te kaloi=si -kai\ du/nasthai. Kai\ e)go\ tou=to le/go a)rete\n e)pithumou=nta to=n -kalo=n dunato\n ei)=nai pori/zesthai.] - -Whoever this lyric poet was, his real meaning is somewhat twisted by -Sokrates in order to furnish a basis for ethical criticism, as the -song of Simonides is in the Protagoras. A person having power, and -taking delight in honourable or beautiful things--is a very -intelligible Hellenic ideal, as an object of envy and admiration. -Compare Protagoras, p. 351 C: [Greek: ei)/per toi=s kaloi=s zo/|e -e(do/menos.] A poor man may be [Greek: philo/kalos] as well as a rich -man: [Greek: philokalou=men met' eu)telei/as], is the boast of -Perikles in the name of the Athenians, Thucyd. ii. 40. - -Plato, Menon, p. 78 C. _Sokr._ [Greek: A)gatha\ de\ kalei=s -ou)chi oi(=on u(gi/eia/n te kai\ plou=ton? kai\ chrusi/on le/go kai\ -a)rgu/rion kta=sthai kai\ tima\s e)n po/lei kai\ a)rcha/s? me\ a)/ll' -a)/tta le/geis ta)gatha\ e)\ ta\ toiau=ta?] _Menon._ [Greek: -Ou)k; a)lla\ pa/nta le/go ta\ toiau=ta.]] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Menon, p. 79.] - -[Side-note: Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates -confounds him like an electric shock--Sokrates replies that he is -himself in the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges -continuance of search by both.] - -_Menon._--Your conversation, Sokrates, produces the effect of -the shock of the torpedo: you stun and confound me: you throw me into -inextricable perplexity, so that I can make no answer. I have often -discoursed copiously--and, as I thought, effectively--upon virtue; -but now you have shown that I do not even know what virtue is. -_Sokr._--If I throw you into perplexity, it is only because I am -myself in the like perplexity and ignorance. I do not know what -virtue is, any more than you: and I shall be glad to continue the -search for finding it, if you will assist me. - -[Side-note: But how is the process of search available to any -purpose? No man searches for what he already knows: and for what he -does not know, it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he -has found it.] - -_Menon._--But how are you to search for that of which you are -altogether ignorant? Even if you do find it, how can you ever know -that you have found it? _Sokr._--You are now introducing a -troublesome doctrine, laid down by those who are averse to the labour -of thought. They tell us that a man cannot search either for what he -knows, or for what he does not know. For the former, research is -superfluous: for the latter it is unprofitable and purposeless, since -the searcher does not know what he is looking for. - -[Side-note: Theory of reminiscence propounded by -Sokrates--anterior immortality of the soul--what is called teaching is -the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but -forgotten.] - -I do not believe this doctrine (continues Sokrates). Priests, -priestesses, and poets (Pindar among them) tell us, that the mind of -man is immortal and has existed throughout all past time, in -conjunction with successive bodies; alternately abandoning one body, -or dying--and taking up new life or reviving in another body. In this -perpetual succession of existences, it has seen every thing,--both -here and in Hades and everywhere else--and has learnt every thing. -But though thus omniscient, it has forgotten the larger portion of -its knowledge. Yet what has been thus forgotten may again be -revived. What we call learning, is such revival. It is reminiscence -of something which the mind had seen in a former state of existence, -and knew, but had forgotten. Since then all the parts of nature are -analogous, or cognate--and since the mind has gone through and learnt -them all--we cannot wonder that the revival of any one part should -put it upon the track of recovering for itself all the rest, both -about virtue and about every thing else, if a man will only persevere -in intent meditation. All research and all learning is thus nothing -but reminiscence. In our researches, we are not looking for what we -do not know: we are looking for what we do know, but have forgotten. -There is therefore ample motive, and ample remuneration, for -prosecuting enquiries: and your doctrine which pronounces them to be -unprofitable, is incorrect.[16] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Menon, pp. 81 C-D. [Greek: A(=te ou)=n e( -psuche\ a)tha/nato/s te ou)=sa kai\ polla/kis gegonui=a, kai\ -e(orakui=a kai\ ta\ e)ntha/de kai\ ta\ e)n Ai)/dou kai\ pa/nta -chre/mata, ou)k e)/stin o(/ ti ou) mema/theken; o(/ste ou)de\n -thaumasto\n kai\ peri\ a)rete=s kai\ peri\ a)/llon oi(=o/n te ei)=nai -au)te\n a)namnesthe=nai a(/ ge kai\ pro/teron e)pi/stato. A(=te ga\r -te=s phu/seos a(pa/ses suggenou=s ou)/ses kai\ memathekui/as te=s -psuche=s a(/panta, ou)de\n kolu/ei e(\n mo/non a)namnesthe/nta, o(\ -de\ ma/thesin kalou=sin a)/nthropoi, ta)/lla pa/nta au)to\n -a)neurei=n, e)a/n tis a)ndrei=os e)=| kai\ me\ a)poka/mne| zeto=n. -To\ ga\r zetei=n a)/ra kai\ to\ mantha/nein a)na/mnesis o(/lon -e)sti/n.]] - -[Side-note: Illustration of this theory--knowledge may be -revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly -untaught. Sokrates questions the slave of Menon.] - -Sokrates proceeds to illustrate the position, just laid down, by -cross-examining Menon's youthful slave, who, though wholly untaught -and having never heard any mention of geometry, is brought by a -proper series of questions to give answers out of his own mind, -furnishing the solution of a geometrical problem. The first part of -the examination brings him to a perception of the difficulty, and -makes him feel a painful perplexity, from which he desires to obtain -relief:[17] the second part guides his mind in the efforts necessary -for fishing up a solution out of its own pre-existing, but forgotten, -stores. True opinions, which he had long had within him without -knowing it, are awakened by interrogation, and become cognitions. -From the fact that the mind thus possesses the truth of things -which it has not acquired in this life, Sokrates infers that it must -have gone through a pre-existence of indefinite duration, or must be -immortal.[18] - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Menon, p. 84 C. [Greek: Oi)/ei ou)=n a)\n -au)to\n pro/teron e)picheire=sai zetei=n e)\ mantha/nein tou=to o(\ -o)=|eto ei)de/nai ou)k ei)do/s, pri\n ei)s a)pori/an kate/pesen -e(gesa/menos me\ ei)de/nai, kai\ e)po/these to\ ei)de/nai? Ou)/ moi -dokei=. O)/neto a)/ra narke/sas?]] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Menon, p. 86. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) a)ei\ e( -a)le/theia e(mi=n to=n o)/nton e)sti\n e)n te=| psuche=|, a)tha/natos -a)\n e( psuche\ ei)/e?]] - -[Side-note: Enquiry taken up--Whether virtue is teachable? -without determining what virtue is.] - -The former topic of enquiry is now resumed: but at the instance of -Menon, the question taken up, is not--"What is virtue?" but--"Is -virtue teachable or not?" Sokrates, after renewing his objection -against the inversion of philosophical order by discussing the second -question without having determined the first, enters upon the -discussion hypothetically, assuming as a postulate, that nothing can -be taught except knowledge. The question then stands thus--"Is virtue -knowledge?" If it be, it can be taught: if not, it cannot be -taught.[19] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Menon, p. 87.] - -[Side-note: Virtue is knowledge--no possessions, no -attributes, either of mind or body, are good or profitable, except -under the guidance of knowledge.] - -Sokrates proceeds to prove that virtue is knowledge, or a mode of -knowledge. Virtue is good: all good things are profitable. But none -of the things accounted good are profitable, unless they be rightly -employed; that is, employed with knowledge or intelligence. This is -true not only of health, wealth, beauty, strength, power, &c., -but also of the mental attributes justice, moderation, courage, quick -apprehension, &c. All of these are profitable, and therefore -good, if brought into action under knowledge or right intelligence; -none of them are profitable or good, without this condition--which is -therefore the distinctive constituent of virtue.[20] - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Menon, p. 89.] - -Virtue, therefore, being knowledge or a mode of knowledge, cannot -come by nature, but must be teachable. - -[Side-note: Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet -there are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No -teachers of it can be found.] - -Yet again there are other contrary reasons (he proceeds) which prove -that it cannot be teachable. For if it were so, there would be -distinct and assignable teachers and learners of it, and the times -and places could be pointed out where it is taught and learnt. We see -that this is the case with all arts and professions. But in regard to -virtue, there are neither recognised teachers, nor learners, nor -years of learning. The Sophists pretend to be teachers of it, but are -not:[21] the leading and esteemed citizens of the community do -not pretend to be teachers of it, and are indeed incompetent to teach -it even to their own sons--as the character of those sons -sufficiently proves.[22] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Menon, p. 92.] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Menon, p. 97. Isokrates (adv. Sophistas, s. 25, -p. 401) expressly declares that he does not believe [Greek: o(/s -e)sti dikaiosu/ne didakto/n]. There is no [Greek: te/chne] which can -teach it, if a man be [Greek: kako=s pephuko/s]. But if a man be -well-disposed, then education in [Greek: lo/goi politikoi/] will -serve [Greek: sumparakeleu/sasthai/ ge kai\ sunaske=sai]. - -For a man to announce himself as a teacher of justice or virtue, was -an unpopular and invidious pretension. Isokrates is anxious to guard -himself against such unpopularity.] - -[Side-note: Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests -the Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can -teach virtue.] - -Here, a new speaker is introduced into the dialogue--Anytus, one of -the accusers of Sokrates before the Dikastery. The conversation is -carried on for some time between Sokrates and him. Anytus denies -altogether that the Sophists are teachers of virtue, and even -denounces them with bitter contempt and wrath. But he maintains that -the leading and esteemed citizens of the state do really teach it. -Anytus however presently breaks off in a tone of displeasure and -menace towards Sokrates himself.[23] The conversation is then renewed -with Menon, and it is shown that the leading politicians cannot be -considered as teachers of virtue, any more than the Sophists. There -exist no teachers of it; and therefore we must conclude that it is -not teachable. - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Menon, p. 94 E.] - -[Side-note: Confused state of the discussion. No way of -acquiring virtue is shown.] - -The state of the discussion as it stands now, is represented by two -hypothetical syllogisms, as follows: -1. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable: -But virtue is knowledge: -Therefore virtue is teachable. -2. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable: -But virtue is not teachable: -Therefore virtue is not knowledge. -The premisses of each of these two syllogisms contradict the -conclusion of the other. Both cannot be true. If virtue is not -acquired by teaching and does not come by nature, how are there any -virtuous men? - -[Side-note: Sokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not -the only thing which guides to good results--right opinion will do -the same.] - -Sokrates continues his argument: The second premiss of the first -syllogism--that virtue is knowledge--is true, but not the whole -truth. In proving it we assumed that there was nothing except -knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences. But -this assumption will not hold. There is something else besides -knowledge, which also guides us to the same useful results. That -something is _right opinion_, which is quite different from -knowledge. The man who holds right opinions is just as profitable to -us, and guides us quite as well to right actions, as if he knew. -Right opinions, so long as they stay in the mind, are as good as -knowledge, for the purpose of guidance in practice. But the -difference is, that they are evanescent and will not stay in the -mind: while knowledge is permanent and ineffaceable. They are exalted -into knowledge, when bound in the mind by a chain of causal -reasoning:[24] that is, by the process of reminiscence, before -described. - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Menon, pp. 97 E--98 A. [Greek: kai\ ga\r ai( -do/xai ai( a)lethei=s, o(/son me\n a)\n chro/non parame/nosin, kalo/n -ti chre=ma kai\ pa/nta ta)gatha\ e)rga/zontai; polu\n de\ chro/non -ou)k e)the/lousi parame/nein, a)lla\ drapeteu/ousin e)k te=s psuche=s -tou= a)nthro/pou. o(/ste ou) pollou= a)/xiai/ ei)sin, _e(/os a)\n -tis au)ta\s de/se| ai)ti/as logismo=|_; tou=to d' e)sti\n -_a)na/mnesis_, o(s e)n toi=s pro/sthen e(mi=n o(molo/getai.]] - -[Side-note: Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in -the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach -others--good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration -from the Gods.] - -Virtue then (continues Sokrates)--that which constitutes the virtuous -character and the permanent, trustworthy, useful guide--consists in -knowledge. But there is also right opinion, a sort of -_quasi-knowledge_, which produces in practice effects as good as -knowledge, only that it is not deeply or permanently fixed in the -mind.[25] It is this right opinion, or _quasi-knowledge_, which -esteemed and distinguished citizens possess, and by means of which -they render useful service to the city. That they do not possess -knowledge, is certain; for if they did, they would be able to teach -it to others, and especially to their own sons: and this it has been -shown that they cannot do.[26] They deliver true opinions and -predictions, and excellent advice, like prophets and oracular -ministers, by divine inspiration and possession, without knowledge or -wisdom of their own. They are divine and inspired persons, but not -wise or knowing.[27] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Menon, p. 99 A. [Greek: o(=| de\ a)/nthropos -e(gemo/n e)stin e)pi\ to\ o)rtho/n, du/o tau=ta, do/xa a)lethe\s kai\ -e)piste/me.]] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Menon, p. 99 B. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra sophi/a tini\ -ou)de\ sophoi\ o)/ntes oi( toiou=toi a)/ndres e(gou=nto tai=s -po/lesin, oi( a)mphi\ Themistokle/a. . . . dio\ kai\ ou)ch oi(=oi/ te -a)/llous poiei=n toiou/tous oi(=oi au)toi/ ei)sin, a(/te ou) di' -e)piste/men o)/ntes toiou=toi.]] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Menon, p. 99 D. [Greek: kai\ tou\s politikou\s -ou)ch e(/kista tou/ton phai=men, a)\n thei/ous te ei)=nai kai\ -e)nthousia/zein, e)pi/pnous o)/ntas kai\ katechome/nous e)k tou= -theou=, o(/tan katortho=si le/gontes polla\ kai\ mega/la pra/gmata, -mede\n ei)do/tes o(=n le/gousin.]] - -[Side-note: All the real virtue that there is, is -communicated by special inspiration from the Gods.] - -And thus (concludes Sokrates) the answer to the question originally -started by Menon--"Whether virtue is teachable?"--is as follows. -Virtue in its highest sense, in which it is equivalent to or -coincident with knowledge, is teachable: but no such virtue exists. -That which exists in the most distinguished citizens under the name -of virtue,--or at least producing the results of virtue in practice--is -not teachable. Nor does it come by nature, but by special -inspiration from the Gods. The best statesmen now existing cannot -make any other person like themselves: if any one of them could do -this, he would be, in comparison with the rest, like a real thing -compared with a shadow.[28] - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Menon, p. 100.] - -[Side-note: But what virtue itself is, remains unknown.] - -Nevertheless the question which we have just discussed--"How virtue -arises or is generated?"--must be regarded as secondary and -dependent, not capable of being clearly understood until the primary -and principal question--"What is virtue?"--has been investigated and -brought to a solution.[29] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Menon, p. 100 B.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for -examining the different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates.] - -This last observation is repeated by Sokrates at the end--as it had -been stated at the beginning, and in more than one place during the -continuance--of the dialogue. In fact, Sokrates seems at first -resolved to enforce the natural and necessary priority of the latter -question: but is induced by the solicitation of Menon to invert the -order.[30] - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Menon, p. 86.] - -[Side-note: Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary -questions when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled.] - -The propriety of the order marked out, but not pursued, by Sokrates -is indisputable. Before you can enquire how virtue is generated or -communicated, you must be satisfied that you know what virtue is. You -must know the essence of the subject--or those predicates which the -word connotes ( = the meaning of the term) before you investigate its -accidents and antecedents.[31] Menon begins by being satisfied that -he knows what virtue is: so satisfied, that he accounts it -discreditable for a man not to know: although he is made to answer -like one who has never thought upon the subject, and does not even -understand the question. Sokrates, on the other hand, not only -confesses that he does not himself know, but asserts that he never -yet met with a man who did know. One of the most important lessons in -this, as in so many other Platonic dialogues, is the mischief of -proceeding to debate ulterior and secondary questions, without having -settled the fundamental words and notions: the false persuasion of -knowledge, common to almost every one, respecting these familiar -ethical and social ideas. Menon represents the common state of mind. -He begins with the false persuasion that he as well as every one else -knows what virtue is: and even when he is proved to be ignorant, he -still feels no interest in the fundamental enquiry, but turns aside -to his original object of curiosity--"Whether virtue is teachable". -Nothing can be more repugnant to an ordinary mind than the thorough -sifting of deep-seated, long familiarised, notions--[Greek: to\ ga\r -o)rthou=sthai gno/man, o)duna=|]. - -[Footnote 31: To use the phrase of Plato himself in the Euthyphron, -p. 11 A, the [Greek: ou)si/a] must be known before the [Greek: -pa/the] are sought--[Greek: kinduneu/eis, o)= Eu)thu/phron, -e)roto/menos to\ o(/sion, o(/, ti/ pot' e)sti, _te\n me\n -ou)si/an_ moi au)tou= ou) bou/lesthai delo=sai, _pa/thos de/ ti -peri\ au)tou=_ le/gein, o(/, ti pe/ponthe tou=to to\ o(/sion, -philei=sthai u(po\ pa/nton theo=n; _o(/ ti de\ o)/n, ou)/po -ei)=pes_.] - -Compare Laches, p. 190 B and Gorgias, pp. 448 E, 462 C.] - -[Side-note: Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon--desire of good -alleged to be universally felt--in what sense this is true.] - -The confession of Sokrates that neither he nor any other person in -his experience knows what virtue is--that it must be made a subject -of special and deliberate investigation--and that no man can know -what justice, or any other part of virtue is, unless he first knows -what virtue as a whole is[32]--are matters to be kept in mind also, -as contrasting with other portions of the Platonic dialogues, wherein -virtue, justice, &c., are tacitly assumed (according to the -received habit) as matters known and understood. The contributions -which we obtain from the Menon towards finding out the Platonic -notion of virtue, are negative rather than positive. The comments of -Sokrates upon Menon's first definition include the doctrine often -announced in Plato--That no man by nature desires suffering or evil; -every man desires good: if he seeks or pursues suffering or -evil, he does so merely from error or ignorance, mistaking it for -good.[33] This is true, undoubtedly, if we mean what is good or evil -for himself: and if by good or evil we mean (according to the -doctrine enforced by Sokrates in the Protagoras) the result of items -of pleasure and pain, rightly estimated and compared by the Measuring -Reason. Every man naturally desires pleasure, and the means of -acquiring pleasure, for himself: every man naturally shrinks from -pain, or the causes of pain, to himself: every one compares and -measures the items of each with more or less wisdom and impartiality. -But the proposition is not true, if we mean what is good or evil for -others: and if by good we mean (as Sokrates is made to declare in the -Gorgias) something apart from pleasure, and by evil something apart -from pain (understanding pleasure and pain in their largest sense). A -man sometimes desires what is good for others, sometimes what is evil -for others, as the case may be. Plato's observation therefore cannot -be admitted--That as to the wish or desire, all men are alike: one -man is no better than another.[34] - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Menon, p. 79 B-C. [Greek: te\n ga\r dikaiosu/nen -mo/rion phe\| a)rete=s ei)=nai kai\ e(/kasta tou/ton. . . . oi)/ei tina -ei)de/nai mo/rion a)rete=s o(/ ti e)/stin, au)te\n me\ ei)do/ta? Ou)k -e)/moige dokei=.]] - -[Footnote 33: Plato, Menon, p. 77.] - -[Footnote 34: Plato, Menon, p. 78 B. [Greek: to\ me\n bou/lesthai -pa=sin u(pa/rchei, kai\ tau/te| ge ou)de\n o( e(/teros tou= e(te/rou -belti/on.]] - -[Side-note: Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal -condition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what?] - -The second portion of Plato's theory, advanced to explain what virtue -is, presents nothing more satisfactory. Virtue is useful or -profitable: but neither health, strength, beauty, wealth, power, -&c., are profitable, unless rightly used: nor are justice, -moderation, courage, quick apprehension, good memory, &c., -profitable, unless they are accompanied and guided by knowledge or -prudence.[35] Now if by _profitable_ we have reference not to -the individual agent alone, but to other persons concerned also, the -proposition is true, but not instructive or distinct. For what is -meant by _right use_? To what ends are the gifts here enumerated -to be turned, in order to constitute right use? What again is meant -by _knowledge_? knowledge of what?[36] This is a question put by -Sokrates in many other dialogues, and necessary to be put here also. -Moreover, knowledge is a term which requires to be determined, not -merely to some assignable object, but also in its general import, -no less than virtue. We shall come presently to an elaborate -dialogue (Theaetetus) in which Plato makes many attempts to determine -knowledge generally, but ends in a confessed failure. Knowledge must -be knowledge _possessed by some one_, and must be knowledge of -_something_. What is it, that a man must know, in order that his -justice or courage may become profitable? Is it pleasures and pains, -with their causes, and the comparative magnitude of each (as Sokrates -declares in the Protagoras), in order that he may contribute to -diminish the sum of pains, increase that of pleasures, to himself or -to the society? If this be what he is required to know, Plato should -have said so--or if not, what else--in order that the requirement of -knowledge might be made an intelligible condition. - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Menon, pp. 87-88.] - -[Footnote 36: See Republic, vi. p. 505 B, where this question is put, -but not answered, respecting [Greek: phro/nesis].] - -[Side-note: Subject of Menon; same as that of the -Protagoras--diversity of handling--Plato is not anxious to settle a -question and get rid of it.] - -Though the subject of direct debate in the Menon is the same as that -in the Protagoras (whether virtue be teachable?) yet the manner of -treating this subject is very different in the two. One point of -difference between the two has been just noticed. Another difference -is, that whereas in Menon the teachability of virtue is assumed to be -disproved, because there are no recognised teachers or learners of -it--in the Protagoras this argument is produced by Sokrates, but is -combated at length (as we shall presently see) by a counter-argument -on the part of the Sophists, without any rejoinder from Sokrates. Of -this counter-argument no notice is taken in the Menon: although, if -it be well-founded, it would have served Anytus no less than -Protagoras, as a solution of the difficulties raised by Sokrates. -Such diversity of handling and argumentative fertility, are -characteristic of the Platonic procedure. I have already remarked, -that the establishment of positive conclusions, capable of being -severed from their premisses, registered in the memory, and used as -principles for deduction--is foreign to the spirit of these Dialogues -of Search. To settle a question and finish with it--to get rid of the -debate, as if it were a troublesome temporary necessity--is not what -Plato desires. His purpose is, to provoke the spirit of enquiry--to -stimulate responsive efforts of the mind by a painful shock of -exposed ignorance--and to open before it a multiplicity of new roads -with varied points of view. - -[Side-note: Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the -spirit of research.] - -Nowhere in the Platonic writings is this provocative shock more -vividly illustrated than in the Menon, by the simile of the -electrical fish: a simile as striking as that of the magnet in -Ion.[37] Nowhere, again, is the true character of the Sokratic -intellect more clearly enunciated. "You complain, Menon, that I -plunge your mind into nothing but doubt, and puzzle, and conscious -ignorance. If I do this, it is only because my own mind is already in -that same condition.[38] The only way out of it is, through joint -dialectical colloquy and search; in which I invite you to accompany -me, though I do not know when or where it will end." And then, for -the purpose of justifying as well as encouraging such prolonged -search, Sokrates proceeds to unfold his remarkable -hypothesis--eternal pre-existence, boundless past experience, and -omniscience, of the mind--identity of cognition with recognition, -dependent on reminiscence. "Research or enquiry (said some) is fruitless. -You must search either for that which you know, or for that which you do -not know. The first is superfluous--the second impossible: for if you do -not know what a thing is, how are you to be satisfied that the answer -which you find is that which you are looking for? How can you -distinguish a true solution from another which is untrue, but -plausible?" - -[Footnote 37: Plato, Menon, p. 80 A. [Greek: na/rke thalassi/a]. -Compare what I have said above about the Ion, ch. XVII., p. 128.] - -[Footnote 38: Plato, Menon, p. 80 D.] - -[Side-note: Great question discussed among the Grecian -philosophers--criterion of truth--Wherein consists the process of -verification?] - -Here we find explicitly raised, for the first time, that difficulty -which embarrassed the different philosophical schools in Greece for -the subsequent three centuries--What is the criterion of truth? -Wherein consists the process called verification and proof, of that -which is first presented as an hypothesis? This was one of the great -problems debated between the Academics, the Stoics, and the Sceptics, -until the extinction of the schools of philosophy.[39] - -[Footnote 39: Sokrates here calls this problem an [Greek: e)ristiko\s -lo/gos]. Stallbaum (in his Prolegom. to the Menon, p. 14) describes -it as a "quaestiunculam, haud dubie e sophistarum disciplina -arreptam". If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I -think that by doing so they rendered service to the interests of -philosophy. The question is among the first which ought to be -thoroughly debated and sifted, if we are to have a body of "reasoned -truth" called philosophy. - -I dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum (p. 20), though it is adopted -both by Socher (Ueber Platon, p. 185) and by Steinhart (Einleitung -zum Menon, p. 123), that the Menon was composed by Plato during the -lifetime of Sokrates. Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 22; -Einleitung zum Menon, pp. 329-330), Ueberweg (Aechth. Plat. Schr. p. -226), and K. F. Hermann, on the other hand, regard the Menon as -composed after the death of Sokrates, and on this point I agree with -them, though whether it was composed not long after that event (as K. -F. Hermann thinks) or thirteen years after it (as Schleiermacher -thinks), I see no sufficient grounds for deciding. I incline to the -belief that its composition is considerably later than Hermann -supposes; the mention of the Theban Ismenias is one among the reasons -rendering such later origin probable. Plato probably borrowed from -the Xenophontic Anabasis the name, country, and social position of -Menon, who may have received teaching from Gorgias, as we know that -Proxenus did, Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16. The reader can compare the -Einleitung of Schleiermacher (in which he professes to prove that the -Menon is a corollary to the Theaetetus and Gorgias, and an immediate -antecedent to the Euthydemus,--that it solves the riddle of the -Protagoras--and that it presupposes and refers back to the Phaedrus) -with the Einleitung of Steinhart (p. 120 seq.), who contests all -these propositions, saying that the Menon is decidedly later than the -Euthydemus, and decidedly earlier than the Theaetetus, Gorgias, and -Phaedrus; with the opinions of Stallbaum and Hermann, who recognise an -order different from that either of Steinhart or Schleiermacher; and -with that of Ast, who rejects the Menon altogether as unworthy of -Plato. Every one of these dissentient critics has _something_ to -say for his opinion, while none of them (in my judgment) can make out -anything like a conclusive case. The mistake consists in assuming -that there must have been a peremptory order and intentional -interdependence among the Platonic Dialogues, and next in trying to -show by internal evidence what that order was.] - -[Side-note: None of the philosophers were satisfied with -the answer here made by Plato--that verification consists in appeal -to pre-natal experience.] - -Not one of these schools was satisfied with the very peculiar answer -which the Platonic Sokrates here gives to the question. When truth is -presented to us (he intimates), we recognise it as an old friend -after a long absence. We know it by reason of its conformity to our -antecedent, pre-natal, experience (in the Phaedon, such pre-natal -experience is restricted to commerce with the substantial, -intelligible, Ideas, which are not mentioned in the Menon): the soul -or mind is immortal, has gone through an indefinite succession of -temporary lives prior to the present, and will go through an -indefinite succession of temporary lives posterior to the -present--"longae, canitis si cognita, vitae Mors media est". The mind has -thus become omniscient, having seen, heard, and learnt every thing, both -on earth and in Hades: but such knowledge exists as a confused and -unavailable mass, having been buried and forgotten on the -commencement of its actual life. - -Since all nature is in universal kindred, communion, or -interdependence, that which we hear or see here, recalls to the -memory, by association, portions of our prior forgotten -omniscience.[40] It is in this recall or reminiscence that -search, learning, acquisition of knowledge, consists. Teaching and -learning are words without meaning: the only process really -instructive is that of dialectic debate, which, if indefatigably -prosecuted, will dig out the omniscience buried within.[41] So vast -is the theory generated in Plato's mind, by his worship of dialectic, -respecting that process of search to which more than half of his -dialogues are devoted. - -[Footnote 40: The doctrine of communion or interdependence pervading -all Nature, with one continuous cosmical soul penetrating everywhere, -will be found set forth in the kosmology of the Timaeus, pp. 37-42-43. -It was held, with various modifications, both by the Pythagoreans and -the Stoics. Compare Cicero, Divinat. ii. 14-15; Virgil, AEneid vi. 715 -seqq.; Georgic. iv. 220; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. ix. 127; -Ekphantus Pythagoreus ap. Stobaeum, Tit. 48, vol. ii. p. 320, -Gaisford. - -The view here taken by Plato, that all nature is cognate and -interdependent--[Greek: a(/te ga\r te=s phu/seos a(pa/ses suggenou=s -ou)/ses]--is very similar to the theory of Leibnitz:--"Ubique per -materiam disseminata statuo principia vitalia seu percipientia. Omnia -in natura sunt analogica" (Leibnitz, Epist. ad Wagnerum, p. 466; -Leibn. Opp. Erdmann). Farther, that the human mind by virtue of its -interdependence or kindred with all nature, includes a confused -omniscience, is also a Leibnitzian view. "Car comme tout est plein -(ce qui rend toute la matiere liee) et comme dans le plein tout -mouvement fait quelqu' effet sur les corps distans a mesure de la -distance, de sorte que chaque corps est affecte non seulement par -ceux qui le touchent, et se ressent en quelque facon de tout ce qui -leur arrive--mais aussi par leur moyen se ressent de ceux qui -touchent les premiers dont il est touche immediatement. Il s'ensuit -que cette communication va a quelque distance que ce soit. Et par -consequent tout corps se ressent de tout ce qui se fait dans -l'Univers: tellement que celui, qui voit tout, pourroit lire dans -chacun ce qui se fait partout et meme ce qui s'est fait et se fera, -en remarquant dans le present ce qui est eloigne tant selon les temps -que selon les lieux: [Greek: su/mpnoia pa/nta], disoit Hippocrate. -Mais une ame ne peut lire en elle meme que ce qui y est represente -distinctement: elle ne sauroit developper tout d'un coup ses regles, -car elles vont a l'infini. Ainsi quoique chaque monade creee -represente tout l'Univers, elle represente plus distinctement le -corps qui lui est particulierement affecte, et dont elle fait -l'Entelechie. Et comme ce corps exprime tout l'Univers par la -connexion de toute la matiere dans le plein, l'ame represente aussi -tout l'Univers en representant ce corps qui lui appartient d'une -maniere particuliere" (Leibnitz, Monadologie, sect. 61-62, No. 88, p. -710; Opp. Leibn. ed. Erdmann). - -Again, Leibnitz, in another Dissertation: "Comme a cause de la -plenitude du monde tout est lie, et chaque corps agit sur chaque -autre corps, plus ou moins, selon la distance, et en est affecte par -la reaction--il s'ensuit que chaque monade est un miroir vivant, ou -doue d'action interne, representatif de l'Univers, suivant son point -de vue, et aussi regle que l'Univers meme" (Principes de la Nature et -de la Grace, p. 714, ed. Erdmann; also Systeme Nouveau, p. 128, a. -36). - -Leibnitz expresses more than once how much his own metaphysical views -agreed with those of Plato. Lettre a M. Bourguet, pp. 723-725. He -expresses his belief in the pre-existence of the soul: "Tout ce que -je crois pouvoir assurer, est, que l'ame de tout animal a preexiste, -et a ete dans un corps organique: qui enfin, par beaucoup de -changemens, involutions, et evolutions, est devenu l'animal present" -(Lettre a M. Bourguet, p. 731). And in the Platonic doctrine of -reminiscence to a certain point: "II y a quelque chose de solide dans -ce que dit Platon de la reminiscence" (p. 137, b. 10). Also -Leibnitz's Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, p. 196, b. 28; -and Epistol. ad Hanschium, p. 446, a. 12. - -See the elaborate account of the philosophy of Leibnitz by Dr. Kuno -Fischer--Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 226-232.] - -[Footnote 41: Plato, Menon, p. 81 D. [Greek: e)a/n tis a)ndrei=os -e)=|, kai\ me\ a)poka/mne| zeto=n.] Compare also p. 86 B.] - -[Side-note: Plato's view of the immortality of the -soul--difference between the Menon, Phaedrus, and Phaedon.] - -In various other dialogues of Plato, the same hypothesis is found -repeated. His conception of the immortality of the soul or mind, -includes pre-existence as well as post-existence: a perpetual -succession of temporary lives, each in a distinct body, each -terminated by death, and each followed by renewed life for a time in -another body. In fact, the pre-existence of the mind formed the most -important part of Plato's theory about immortality: for he employed -it as the means of explaining how the mind became possessed of -general notions. As the doctrine is stated in the Menon, it is made -applicable to all minds (instead of being confined, as in Phaedrus, -Phaedon, and elsewhere, to a few highly gifted minds, and to commerce -with the intelligible substances called Ideas). This appears from the -person chosen to illustrate the alleged possibility of stimulating -artificial reminiscence: that person is an unlettered youth, taken at -hazard from among the numerous slaves of Menon.[42] - -[Footnote 42: Plato, Menon, pp. 82 A, 85 E. [Greek: proska/leson to=n -pollo=n a)kolou/thon toutoni\ to=n sautou= e(/na, o(/ntina bou/lei, -i(/na e)n tou/to| soi e)pidei/xomai.] Stallbaum says that this -allusion to the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to -illustrate conspicuously the wealth and nobility of Menon. In my -judgment, it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure -accident--the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked -upon--"one among many, which you please".] - -[Side-note: Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited -by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct?] - -It is true, indeed (as Schleiermacher observes), that the questions -put by Sokrates to this youth are in great proportion leading -questions, suggesting their own answers. They would not have served -their purpose unless they had been such. The illustration here -furnished, of the Sokratic interrogatory process, is highly -interesting, and his theory is in a great degree true.[43] Not all -learning, but an important part of learning, consists in -reminiscence--not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent -life, but of past experience and judgments in this life. Of such -experience and judgments every one has travelled through a large -course; which has disappeared from his memory, yet not irrevocably. -Portions of it may be revived, if new matter be presented to the -mind, fitted to excite the recollection of them by the laws of -association. By suitable interrogations, a teacher may thus recall to -the memory of his pupils many facts and judgments which have been -hitherto forgotten: he may bring into juxtaposition those which have -never before been put together in the mind: and he may thus make them -elicit instructive comparisons and inferences. He may provoke the -pupils to strike out new results for themselves, or to follow, by -means of their own stock of knowledge, in the path suggested by the -questions. He may farther lead them to perceive the fallacy of -erroneous analogies which at first presented themselves as plausible; -and to become painfully sensible of embarrassment and perplexing -ignorance, before he puts those questions which indicate the way of -escape from it. Upon the necessity of producing such painful -consciousness of ignorance Plato insists emphatically, as is his -custom.[44] - -[Footnote 43: Plutarch (Fragment. [Greek: Peri\ psuche=s]). Ei) a)ph' -e(te/rou e(/teron e)nnoou=men? ou)k a)/n, ei) me\ proe/gnosto. To\ -e)pichei/rema Platoniko/n. Ei) prosti/themen to\ e)/lleipon toi=s -ai)sthetoi=s?--kai\ au)to\ Platoniko/n.] - -Plutarch, in the same fragment, indicates some of the objections made -by Bion and Straton against the doctrine of [Greek: a)na/mnesis]. How -(they asked) does it happen that this reminiscence brings up often -what is false or absurd? (asked Bion). If such reminiscence exists -(asked Straton) how comes it that we require demonstrations to -conduct us to knowledge? and how is it that no man can play on the -flute or the harp without practice? - -[Greek: O(/ti Bi/on e)po/rei peri\ tou= pseu/dous, ei) kai\ au)to\ -kat' a)na/mnesin, o(s to\ e)nanti/on ge, e)\ ou)/? kai\ ti/ e( -a)logi/a? O(/ti Stra/ton e)po/rei, ei) e)/stin a)namnesis, po=s -a)/neu a)podei/xeon ou) gigno/metha e)piste/mones? po=s de\ ou)dei\s -au)lete\s e)\ kithariste\s ge/gonen a)/neu mele/tes?]] - -[Footnote 44: Plato, Menon, p. 84. The sixteenth Dissertation of -Maximus Tyrius presents a rhetorical amplification of this -doctrine--[Greek: pa=sa ma/thesis, a)na/mnesis]--in which he enters fully -into the spirit of the Menon and the Phaedon--[Greek: au)todi/dakto/n ti -chre=ma e( psuche/--e( psuche=s eu(/resis, au)togene/s tis ou)=sa, -kai\ au)tophue\s, kai\ xu/mphutos, ti/ a)/llo e)/stin e)\ do/xai -a)lethei=s e)geiro/menai, o(=n te=| e)pege/rsei te kai\ xunta/xei -e)piste/me o)/noma?] (c. 6). Compare also Cicero, Tusc. D. i. 24. -The doctrine has furnished a theme for very elegant poetry: both in -the Consolatio Philosophiae of Boethius--the piece which ends with - -"Ac si Platonis Musa personat verum, -Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur"-- - -and in Wordsworth--"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting," -&c. - -On the other hand Aristotle alludes also to the same doctrine and -criticises it; but he does not seem (so far as I can understand this -brief allusion) to seize exactly Plato's meaning. This is the remark -of the Scholiast on Aristotle: and I think it just. It is curious to -compare the way in which [Greek: a)na/mnesis] is handled by Plato in -the Menon and Phaedon, and by Aristotle in the valuable little -tract--[Greek: Peri\ mne/nes kai\ a)namne/seos] (p. 451, b.). Aristotle -has his own way of replying to the difficulty raised in the question of -Menon, and tries to show that sometimes we _know_ in one sense -and _do not know_ in another. See Aristotel. Anal. Prior., ii. -p. 67, a. 22; Anal. Poster. i. p. 71, a. 27; and the Scholia on the -former passage, p. 193, b. 21, ed. Brandis. - -Sir William Hamilton, in one of the Appendixes to his edition of -Reid's Works (Append. D. p. 890 seq.), has given a learned and -valuable translation and illustration of the treatise of Aristotle -[Greek: Peri\ A)namne/seos]. I note, however, with some surprise, -that while collecting many interesting comments from writers who -lived _after_ Aristotle, he has not adverted to what was said -upon this same subject by Plato, _before_ Aristotle. It was the -more to be expected that he would do this, since he insists so -emphatically upon the complete originality of Aristotle.] - -[Side-note: Plato's doctrine about _a priori_ -reasonings--Different from the modern doctrine.] - -Plato does not intend here to distinguish (as many modern writers -distinguish) geometry from other sciences, as if geometry were known -_a priori_, and other sciences known _a posteriori_ or from -experience. He does not suppose that geometrical truths are such that -no man can possibly believe the contrary of them; or that they are -different in this respect from the truths of any other science. He -here maintains that all the sciences lie equally in the untaught -mind,[45] but buried, forgotten, and confused: so as to require the -skill of the questioner not merely to recall them into consciousness, -but to disentangle truth from error. Far from supposing that the -untaught mind has a natural tendency to answer correctly geometrical -questions, he treats erroneous answers as springing up more naturally -than true answers, and as requiring a process of painful exposure -before the mind can be put upon the right track. The questioner, -without possessing any knowledge himself, (so Plato thinks,) can -nevertheless exercise an influence at once stimulating, corrective, -and directive. He stimulates the action of the associative process, -to call up facts, comparisons, and analogies, bearing on the -question: he arrests the respondent on a wrong answer, creating -within him a painful sense of ignorance and embarrassment: he directs -him by his subsequent questions into the path of right answers. His -obstetric aid (to use the simile in Plato's Theaetetus), though -presupposing the pregnancy of the respondent mind, is indispensable -both to forward the childbirth, and to throw away any offspring which -may happen to be deformed. In the Theaetetus, the main stress is laid -on that part of the dialogue which is performed by the questioner: in -the Menon, upon the latent competence and large dead stock of an -untaught respondent. - -[Footnote 45: Plato, Menon, p. 85 E. [Greek: ou(=tos ga\r] (the -untaught slave) [Greek: poie/sei peri\ pa/ses geometri/as tau)ta\ -tau=ta, kai\ to=n a)/llon mathema/ton a(pa/nton.]] - -The mind of the slave questioned by Sokrates is discovered to be -pregnant. Though he has received no teaching from any professed -geometer, he is nevertheless found competent, when subjected to a -skilful interrogatory, to arrive at last, through a series of -mistakes, at correct answers, determining certain simple -problems of geometry. He knows nothing about geometry: -nevertheless there exist in his mind true opinions respecting that -which he does not know. These opinions are "called up like a dream" -by the interrogatories: which, if repeated and diversified, convert -the opinions into knowledge, taken up by the respondent out of -himself.[46] The opinions are inherited from an antecedent life and -born with him, since they have never been taught to him during this -life. - -[Footnote 46: Plato, Menon, p. 85. [Greek: to=| ou)k eido/ti a)/ra -peri\ o(=n a)\n me\ ei)de=| e)/neisin a)lethei=s do/xai. . . . kai\ -nu=n me/n ge _au)to=| o(/sper o)/nar_ a)/rti a)nakeki/nentai ai( -do/xai au(=tai; ei) de\ au)to/n tis a)nere/setai polla/kis ta\ au)ta\ -tau=ta kai\ pollache=, oi)=sth' o(/ti teleuto=n ou)deno\s e(=tton -a)kribo=s e)piste/setai peri\ au)ton. . . . Ou)kou=n ou)deno\s -dida/xantos a)ll' e)rote/santos e)piste/setai, a)nalabo\n au)to\s e)x -au)tou= te\n e)piste/men?]] - -[Side-note: Plato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took -no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal -experience.] - -It is thus that Plato applies to philosophical theory the doctrine -(borrowed from the Pythagoreans) of pre-natal experience and -cognitions: which he considers, not as inherent appurtenances of the -mind, but as acquisitions made by the mind during various antecedent -lives. These ideas (Plato argues) cannot have been acquired during -the present life, because the youth has received no special teaching -in geometry. But Plato here takes no account of the multiplicity and -diversity of experiences gone through, comparisons made, and -acquirements lodged, in the mind of a youthful adult however -unlettered. He recognises no acquisition of knowledge except through -special teaching. So, too, in the Protagoras, we shall find him -putting into the mouth of Sokrates the doctrine--That virtue is not -taught and cannot be taught, because there were no special masters or -times of teaching. But in that dialogue we shall also see Plato -furnishing an elaborate reply to this doctrine in the speech of -Protagoras; who indicates the multifarious and powerful influences -which are perpetually operative, even without special professors, in -creating and enforcing ethical sentiment. If Plato had taken pains to -study the early life of the untaught slave, with its stock of facts, -judgments, comparisons, and inferences suggested by analogy, &c., -he might easily have found enough to explain the competence of the -slave to answer the questions appearing in the dialogue. And even if -enough could not have been found, to afford a direct and specific -explanation--we must remember that only a very small proportion -of the long series of mental phenomena realised in the infant, the -child, the youth, ever comes to be remembered or recorded. To assume -that the large unknown remainder would be insufficient, if known, to -afford the explanation sought, is neither philosophical nor -reasonable. This is assumed in every form of the doctrine of innate -ideas: and assumed by Plato here without even trying any explanation -to dispense with the hypothesis: simply because the youth -interrogated had never received any special instruction in geometry. - -[Side-note: Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the -Platonic Ideas or Forms.] - -I have already observed, that though great stress is laid in this -dialogue upon the doctrine of opinions and knowledge inherited from -an antecedent life--upon the distinction between true opinion and -knowledge--and upon the identity of the process of learning with -reminiscence--yet nothing is said about universal Ideas or Forms, so -much dwelt upon in other dialogues. In the Phaedrus and Phaedon, it is -with these universal Ideas that the mind is affirmed to have had -communion during its prior existence, as contrasted with the -particulars of sense apprehended during the present life: while in -the Menon, the difference pointed out between true opinions and -knowledge is something much less marked and decisive. Both the one -and the other are said to be, not acquired during this life, but -inherited from antecedent life: to be innate, yet -unperceived--revived by way of reminiscence and interrogation. True -opinions are affirmed to render as much service as knowledge, in -reference to practice. There is only this distinction between them--that -true opinions are transient, and will not remain in the mind until they -are bound in it by causal reasoning, or become knowledge. - -[Side-note: What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning--his -distinction between knowledge and right opinion.] - -What Plato meant by this "causal reasoning, or computation of cause," -is not clearly explained. But he affirms very unequivocally, first, -that the distinction between true opinion and knowledge is one of the -few things of which he feels assured[47]--next, with somewhat less -confidence, that the distinction consists only in the greater -security which knowledge affords for permanent in-dwelling in the -mind. This appears substantially the same distinction as what is laid -down in other words towards the close of the dialogue--That those, -who have only true opinions and not knowledge, judge rightly without -knowing how or why; by an aptitude not their own but supplied to them -from without for the occasion, in the nature of inspiration or -prophetic _oestrus_. Hence they are unable to teach others, or -to transfer this occasional inspiration to any one else. They cannot -give account of what they affect to know, nor answer scrutinizing -questions to test it. This power of answering and administering -cross-examination, is Plato's characteristic test of real knowledge--as -I have already observed in my eighth** chapter. - -[Footnote 47: Plato, Menon, p. 98 B. [Greek: o(/ti de/ e)sti/ ti -a)lloi=on o)rthe\ do/xa kai\ e)piste/me, ou) pa/nu moi doko= tou=to -ei)ka/zein; a)ll' ei)/per ti a)/llo phai/en a)\n ei)de/nai, -_o)li/ga d' a)\n phai/en, e(\n d' ou)=n kai\ tou=to e)kei/non -thei/en a)\n o(=n oi)=da_.]] - -[Side-note: This distinction compared with modern -philosophical views.] - -To translate the views of Plato into analogous views of a modern -philosopher, we may say--That right opinion, as contrasted with -knowledge, is a discriminating and acute empirical judgment: -inferring only from old particulars to new particulars (without the -intermediate help and guarantee of general propositions distinctly -enunciated and interpreted), but selecting for every new case the -appropriate analogies out of the past, with which it ought to be -compared. Many persons judge in this manner fairly well, and some -with extreme success. But let them be ever so successful in practice, -they proceed without any conscious method; they are unable to -communicate the grounds of their inferences to others: and when they -are right, it is only by haphazard--that is (to use Plato's -language), through special inspiration vouchsafed to them by the -Gods. But when they ascend to knowledge, and come to judge -scientifically, they then distribute these particular facts into -classes--note the constant sequences as distinguished from the -occasional--and draw their inferences in every new case according to -such general laws or uniformities of antecedent and consequent. Such -uniform and unconditional antecedents are the only causes of which we -have cognizance. They admit of being described in the language which -Plato here uses ([Greek: ai)ti/as logismo=|]), and they also serve as -reasons for justifying or explaining our inferences to others.[48] - -[Footnote 48: We have seen that in the Menon Plato denies all [Greek: -didache/], and recognises nothing but [Greek: a)na/mnesis]. The -doctrine of the Timaeus (p. 51 D-E) is very different. He there lays -especial stress on the distinction between [Greek: didache\] and -[Greek: peitho/]--the first belonging to [Greek: e)piste/me], the -second to [Greek: do/xa]. Also in Gorgias, 454, and in Republic, v. -pp. 477-479, about [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek: e)piste/me]. In those -dialogues the distinction between the two is presented as marked and -fundamental, as if [Greek: do/xa] alone was fallible and [Greek: -e)piste/me] infallible. In the Menon the distinction appears as -important, but not fundamental; the Platonic Ideas or Universals -being _not_ recognised as constituting a substantive world by -themselves. In this respect the Menon is nearer to the truth in -describing the difference between [Greek: o)rthe\ do/xa] and [Greek: -e)piste/me]. Mr. John Stuart Mill (in the chapter of his System of -Logic wherein the true theory of the Syllogism is for the first time -expounded) has clearly explained what that difference amounts to. All -our inferences are _from_ particulars, sometimes _to_ new -particulars directly and at once ([Greek: do/xa]), sometimes -_to_ generals in the first instance, and through them _to_ -new particulars; which latter, or scientific process, is highly -valuable as a security for correctness ([Greek: e)piste/me]). "Not -only" (says Mr. Mill) "_may_ we reason from particulars to -particulars without passing through generals, but we perpetually -_do_ so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature. -From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences, but years -elapse before we learn the use of general language. We are constantly -reasoning from ourselves to other people, or from one person to -another, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect our -observations into general maxims of human or external nature. If we -have an extensive experience and retain its impressions strongly, we -may acquire in this manner a very considerable power of accurate -judgment, which we may be utterly incapable of justifying or of -communicating to others. Among the higher order of practical -intellects, there have been many of whom it was remarked how -admirably they suited their means to their ends, without being able -to give any sufficient account of what they did; and applied, or -seemed to apply, recondite principles which they were wholly unable -to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored with -appropriate particulars, and having been accustomed to reason at once -from these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of -stating to one's self or others the corresponding general -propositions. The cases of men of talent performing wonderful things -they know not how, are examples of the rudest and most spontaneous -forms of the operations of superior minds. It is a defect in them, -and often a source of errors, not to have generalised as they went -on; but generalisation, though a help, the most important indeed of -all helps, is not an essential" (Mill, Syst. of Logic, Book II. ch. -iii.). Compare the first chapter of the Metaphysica of Aristotle, p. -980, a. 15, b. 7.] - -[Side-note: Manifestation of Anytus--intense antipathy to -the Sophists and to philosophy generally.] - -The manner in which Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates before the -Dikastery, is introduced into this dialogue, deserves notice. The -questions are put to him by Sokrates--"Is virtue teachable? How is -Menon to learn virtue, and from whom? Ought he not to do as he would -do if he wished to learn medicine or music: to put himself under some -paid professional man as teacher?" Anytus answers these questions in -the affirmative: but asks, where such professional teachers of virtue -are to be found. "There are the Sophists," replies Sokrates. Upon -this Anytus breaks out into a burst of angry invective against the -Sophists; denouncing them as corruptors of youth, whom none but a -madman would consult, and who ought to be banished by public -authority. - -Why are you so bitter against the Sophists? asks Sokrates. Have -any of them ever injured you? _Anyt._--No; never: I have never -been in the company of any one of them, nor would I ever suffer any -of my family to be so. _Sokr._--Then you have no experience -whatever about the Sophists? _Anyt._--None: and I hope that I -never may have. _Sokr._--How then can you know about this -matter, how far it is good or bad, if you have no experience whatever -about it? _Anyt._--Easily. I know what sort of men the Sophists -are, whether I have experience of them or not. _Sokr._--Perhaps -you are a prophet, Anytus: for how else you can know about them, I do -not understand, even on your own statement.[49] - -[Footnote 49: Plato, Menon, p. 92.] - -Anytus then declares, that the persons from whom Menon ought to learn -virtue are the leading practical politicians; and that any one of -them can teach it. But Sokrates puts a series of questions, showing -that the leading Athenian politicians, Themistokles, Perikles, -&c., have not been able to teach virtue even to their own sons: -_a fortiori_, therefore, they cannot teach it to any one else. -Anytus treats this series of questions as disparaging and calumnious -towards the great men of Athens. He breaks off the conversation -abruptly, with an angry warning to Sokrates to be cautious about his -language, and to take care of his own safety. - -The dialogue is then prosecuted and finished between Sokrates and -Menon: and at the close of it, Sokrates says--"Talk to Anytus, and -communicate to him that persuasion which you have yourself -contracted,[50] in order that he may be more mildly disposed: for, if -you persuade him, you will do some good to the Athenians as well as -to himself." - -[Footnote 50: Plato, Menon, ad fin. [Greek: su\ de\ tau=ta a(/per -au)to\s pe/peisai, pei=the kai\ to\n xe/non to/nde A)/nuton, i(/na -pra|o/teros e)=|; o(s e)a\n pei/se|s tou=ton, e)/stin o(/, ti kai\ -A)thenai/ous o)ne/seis.]] - -[Side-note: The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the -sophists--Practical statesmen.] - -The enemy and accuser of Sokrates is here depicted as the bitter -enemy of the Sophists also. And Plato takes pains to exhibit the -enmity of Anytus to the Sophists as founded on no facts or -experience. Without having seen or ascertained anything about them, -Anytus hates them as violently as if he had sustained from them some -personal injury; a sentiment which many Platonic critics and -many historians of philosophy have inherited from him.[51] Whether -the corruption which these Sophists were accused of bringing about in -the minds of youth, was intentional or not intentional on their -part--how such corruption could have been perpetually continued, while at -the same time the eminent Sophists enjoyed long and unabated esteem -from the youth themselves and from their relatives--are difficulties -which Anytus does not attempt to explain, though they are started -here by Sokrates. Indeed we find the same topics employed by Sokrates -himself, in his defence before the Dikasts against the same -charge.[52] Anytus has confidence in no one except the practical -statesmen: and when a question is raised about _their_ power to -impart their own excellence to others, he presently takes offence -against Sokrates also. The same causes which have determined his -furious antipathy against the Sophists, make him ready to transfer -the like antipathy to Sokrates. He is a man of plain sense, practical -habits, and conservative patriotism--who worships what he finds -accredited as virtue, and dislikes the talkers and theorisers about -virtue in general: whether they debated in subtle interrogation and -dialectics, like Sokrates--or lectured in eloquent continuous -discourse, like Protagoras. He accuses the Sophists, in this -dialogue, of corrupting the youth; just as he and Meletus, before the -Dikastery, accused Sokrates of the same offence. He understands the -use of words, to discuss actual business before the assembly or -dikastery; but he hates discourse on the generalities of ethics or -philosophy. He is essentially [Greek: miso/logos]. The point which he -condemns in the Sophists, is that which they have in common with -Sokrates. - -[Footnote 51: Upon the bitter antipathy here expressed by Anytus -against the Sophists, whom nevertheless he admits that he does not at -all know, Steinhart remarks as follows:--"Gerade so haben zu allen -Zeiten Orthodoxe und Fanatiker aller Arten ueber ihre Gegner -abgeurtheilt, ohne sie zu kennen oder auch nur kennen lernen zu -wollen" (Einleit. zum Menon, not. 15, p. 173). - -Certainly orthodox and fanatical persons often do what is here -imputed to them. But Steinhart might have found a still closer -parallel with Anytus, in his own criticisms, and in those of many -other Platonic critics on the Sophists; the same expressions of -bitterness and severity, with the same slender knowledge of the -persons upon whom they bear.] - -[Footnote 52: Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 26 A, 33 D, 34 B.] - -[Side-note: The Menon brings forward the point of analogy -between Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the -practical statesmen.] - -In many of the Platonic dialogues we have the antithesis between -Sokrates and the Sophists brought out, as to the different point of -view from which the one and the other approached ethical -questions. But in this portion of the Menon, we find exhibited the -feature of analogy between them, in which both one and the other -stood upon ground obnoxious to the merely practical politicians. Far -from regarding hatred against the Sophists as a mark of virtue in -Anytus, Sokrates deprecates it as unwarranted and as menacing to -philosophy in all her manifestations. The last declaration ascribed -to Anytus, coupled with the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue, -show us that Plato conceives the anti-Sophistic antipathy as being -anti-Sokratic also, in its natural consequences. That Sokrates was in -common parlance a Sophist, disliked by a large portion of the general -public, and ridiculed by Aristophanes, on the same grounds as those -whom Plato calls Sophists--is a point which I have noticed elsewhere. - - - - - -CHAPTER XXIII. - -PROTAGORAS. - - -[Side-note: Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue.] - -The dialogue called Protagoras presents a larger assemblage of varied -and celebrated characters, with more of dramatic winding, and more -frequent breaks and resumptions in the conversation, than any -dialogue of Plato--not excepting even Symposion and Republic. It -exhibits Sokrates in controversy with the celebrated Sophist -Protagoras, in the presence of a distinguished society, most of whom -take occasional part in the dialogue. This controversy is preceded by -a striking conversation between Sokrates and Hippokrates--a youth of -distinguished family, eager to profit by the instructions of -Protagoras. The two Sophists Prodikus and Hippias, together with -Kallias, Kritias, Alkibiades, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, Pausanias, -Agathon, the two sons of Perikles (Paralus and Xanthippus), -Charmides, son of Glaukon, Antimoerus of Mende, a promising pupil -of Protagoras, who is in training for the profession of a -Sophist--these and others are all present at the meeting, which is held -in the house of Kallias.[1] Sokrates himself recounts the whole--both his -conversation with Hippokrates and that with Protagoras--to a nameless -friend. - -[Footnote 1: Plato, Protag. p. 315.] - -This dialogue enters upon a larger and more comprehensive ethical -theory than anything in the others hitherto noticed. But it contains -also a great deal in which we hardly recognise, or at least cannot -verify, any distinct purpose, either of search or exposition. Much of -it seems to be composed with a literary or poetical view, to enhance -the charm or interest of the composition. The personal -characteristics of each speaker--the intellectual peculiarities -of Prodikus and Hippias--the ardent partisanship of Alkibiades--are -brought out as in a real drama. But the great and marked antithesis -is that between the Sophist Protagoras and Sokrates--the Hektor and -Ajax of the piece: who stand forward in single combat, exchange some -serious blows, yet ultimately part as friends. - -[Side-note: Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates -to become acquainted with Protagoras.] - -An introduction of some length impresses upon us forcibly the -celebrity of the Great Sophist, and the earnest interest excited by -his visit to Athens. Hippokrates, a young man of noble family and -eager aspirations for improvement, having just learnt the arrival of -Protagoras, comes to the house of Sokrates and awakens him before -daylight, entreating that Sokrates will introduce him to the -new-comer. He is ready to give all that he possesses in order that he -may become wise like Protagoras.[2] While they are awaiting a suitable -hour for such introduction, Sokrates puts a series of questions to -test the force of Hippokrates.[3] - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Protag. pp. 310-311 A.] - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Protag. p. 311 B. [Greek: kai\ e)go\ -popeiro/menos tou= I(ppokra/tous te=s r(o/mes diesko/poun au)to\n -kai\ e)ro/ton], &c.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose -and expectations from Protagoras.] - -_Sokr._--You are now intending to visit Protagoras, and to pay -him for something to be done for you--tell me what manner of man it -is that you are going to visit--and what manner of man do you wish to -become? If you were going in like manner to pay a fee for instruction -to your namesake Hippokrates of Kos, you would tell me that you were -going to him as to a physician--and that you wished to qualify -yourself for becoming a physician. If you were addressing yourself -with the like view to Pheidias or Polykleitus, you would go to them -as to sculptors, and for the purpose of becoming yourself a sculptor. -Now then that we are to go in all this hurry to Protagoras, tell me -who he is and what title he bears, as we called Pheidias a sculptor? -_Hipp._--They call him a Sophist.[4] _Sokr._--We are going -to pay him then as a Sophist? _Hipp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--And -what are you to become by going to him? _Hipp._--Why, -judging from the preceding analogies, I am to become a Sophist. -_Sokr._--But would not you be ashamed of presenting yourself to -the Grecian public as a Sophist? _Hipp._--Yes: if I am to -tell you my real opinion.[5] _Sokr._--Perhaps however you only -propose to visit Protagoras, as you visited your schoolmaster and -your musical or gymnastical teacher: not for the purpose of entering -that career as a professional man, but to acquire such instruction as -is suitable for a private citizen and a freeman? _Hipp._--That -is more the instruction which I seek from Protagoras. _Sokr._--Do -you know then what you are going to do? You are consigning your -mind to be treated by one whom you call a Sophist: but I shall be -surprised if you know what a Sophist is[6]--and if you do not know, -neither do you know what it is--good or evil--to which you are -consigning your mind. _Hipp._--I think I _do_ know. The -Sophist is, as the name implies, one cognizant of matters wise and -able.[7] _Sokr._--That may be said also of painters and -carpenters. If we were asked in what special department are painters -cognizant of matters wise and able, we should specify that it was in -the workmanship of portraits. Answer me the same question about the -Sophist. What sort of workmanship does he direct? _Hipp._--That -of forming able speakers.[8] _Sokr._--Your answer may be -correct, but it is not specific enough: for we must still ask, About -_what_ is it that the Sophist forms able speakers? just as the -harp-master makes a man an able speaker about harping, at the same -time that he teaches him harping. About _what_ is it that the -Sophist forms able speakers: of course about that which he -himself knows?[9] _Hipp._--Probably. _Sokr._--What then is -that, about which the Sophist is himself cognizant, and makes his -pupil cognizant? _Hipp._--By Zeus, I cannot give you any farther -answer.[10] - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Protagoras, p. 311.] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Protag. p. 312 A. [Greek: su\ de/, e)=n d' e)go/, -pro\s theo=n, ou)k a)\n ai)schu/noio ei)s tou\s E(/llenas sauto\n -sophiste\n pare/chon? Ne\ to\n Di/', o)= So/krates, ei)/per ge a)\ -dianoou=mai chre\ le/gein.] Ast (Platon's Leben, p. 78) and other -Platonic critics treat this _Sophistomanie_ (as they call it) of -an Athenian youth as something ludicrous and contemptible: all the -more ludicrous because (they say) none of them goes to qualify -himself for becoming a Sophist, but would even be ashamed of the -title. Yet if we suppose the same question addressed to a young -Englishman of rank and fortune (as Hippokrates was at Athens), "Why -do you put yourself under the teaching of Dr. ---- at Eton or -Professor ---- at Oxford? Do you intend to qualify yourself for -becoming a schoolmaster or a professor?" He will laugh at you for the -question; if he answers it seriously, he will probably answer as -Hippokrates does. But there is nothing at all in the question to -imply that the schoolmaster or the professor is a worthless -pretender--or the youth foolish, for being anxious to obtain -instruction from him; which is the inference that Ast and other -Platonic critics desire us to draw about the Athenian Sophists.] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. [Greek: o(/, ti de/ pote o( -sophiste/s e)sti, thauma/zoim' a)\n ei) oi)=stha], &c.] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. [Greek: o(/s per tou)/noma -le/gei, to\n to=n sopho=n e)piste/mona.] (Quasi sophistes -sit--[Greek: o( to=n sopho=n i)/stes], Heindorf.) If this supposition -of Heindorf be just, we may see in it an illustration of the -etymological views of Plato, which I shall notice when I come to the -Kratylus.] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Protag. p. 312 D. [Greek: poi/as e)rgasi/as -e)pista/tes? e)pista/ten tou= poie=sai deino\n le/gein.]] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Protag. p. 312 D-E. [Greek: e)rote/seos ga\r -e)/ti e( a)po/krisis e(mi=n dei=tai, peri\ o(/tou o( sophiste\s -deino\n poiei= le/gein; o(/sper o( kithariste\s deino\n de/pou poiei= -le/gein peri\ ou(=per kai\ e)piste/mona, peri\ kithari/seos.]] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Protag. p. 312 E.] - -[Side-note: Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a -Sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach.] - -_Sokr._--Do you see then to what danger you are going to submit -your mind? If the question were about going to trusting your body to -any one, with the risk whether it should become sound or unsound, you -would have thought long, and taken much advice, before you decided. -But now, when it is about your mind, which you value more than your -body, and upon the good or evil of which all your affairs turn[11]--you -are hastening without reflection and without advice, you are -ready to pay all the money that you possess or can obtain, with a -firm resolution already taken to put yourself at all hazard under -Protagoras: whom you do not know--with whom you have never once -talked--whom you call a Sophist, without knowing what a Sophist is? -_Hipp._--I must admit the case to be as you say.[12] -_Sokr._--Perhaps the Sophist is a man who brings for sale those -transportable commodities, instruction or doctrine, which form the -nourishment of the mind. Now the traders in food for the body praise -indiscriminately all that they have to sell, though neither they nor -their purchasers know whether it is good for the body; unless by -chance any one of them be a gymnastic trainer or a physician.[13] So, -too, these Sophists, who carry about food for the mind, praise all -that they have to sell: but perhaps some of them are ignorant, and -assuredly their purchasers are ignorant, whether it be good or bad -for the mind: unless by accident any one possess medical knowledge -about the mind. Now if you, Hippokrates, happen to possess such -knowledge of what is good or bad for the mind, you may safely -purchase doctrine from Protagoras or from any one else:[14] but if -not, you are hazarding and putting at stake your dearest -interests. The purchase of doctrines is far more dangerous than that -of eatables or drinkables. As to these latter, you may carry them -away with you in separate vessels, and before you take them into your -body you may invoke the _Expert_, to tell you what you may -safely eat and drink, and when, and how much. But this cannot be done -with doctrines. You cannot carry away _them_ in a separate -vessel to be tested; you learn them and take them into the mind -itself; so that you go away, after having paid your money, actually -damaged or actually benefited, as the case may be.[15] We will -consider these matters in conjunction with our elders. But first let -us go and talk with Protagoras--we can consult the others afterwards. - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Protag. p. 313 A. [Greek: o(\ de\ peri\ -plei/onos tou= so/matos e(gei=, te\n psuche\n, kai\ e)n o)=| pa/nt' -e)sti\ ta\ sa\ e)\ eu)= e)\ kalo=s pra/ttein, chrestou= e)\ ponerou= -au)tou= genome/nou], &c.] - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Protag. p. 313 C.] - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Protag. p. 313 D.] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Protag. p. 313 E. [Greek: e)a\n me/ tis tu/che| -peri\ te\n psuche\n au)= i)atriko\s o)/n. ei) me\n ou)=n su\ -tugcha/neis e)piste/mon tou/ton ti/ chresto\n kai\ ponero/n, -a)sphale/s soi o)nei=sthai mathe/mata kai\ para\ Protago/rou kai\ -par' a)/llou o(tounou=n; ei) de\ me/, o(/ra, o)= phi/ltate, me\ peri\ -toi=s philta/tois kubeu/e|s te kai\ kinduneu/e|s.]] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Protag. p. 314 A. [Greek: siti/a me\n ga\r kai\ -pota\ pria/menon e)/xestin e)n a)/llois a)ggei/ois a)pophe/rein, kai\ -pri\n de/xasthai au)ta\ e)s to\ so=ma pio/nta e)\ phago/nta, -katathe/menon oi)/kade e)/xesti sumbouleu/sasthai parakale/santa to\n -e)pai+/onta, o(/, ti te e)deste/on e)\ pote/on kai\ o(/, ti me/, kai\ -o(po/son, kai\ o(po/te; . . . . mathe/mata de\ ou)k e)/stin e)n a)/llo| -a)ggei/o| a)penegkei=n, a)ll' a)na/gke katathe/nta te\n time\n to\ -ma/thema e)n au)te=| te=| psuche=| labo/nta kai\ matho/nta a)pie/nai -e)\ beblamme/non e)\ o)pheleme/non.]] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of -knowledge brought to light.] - -Such is the preliminary conversation of Sokrates with Hippokrates, -before the interview with Protagoras. I have given it (like the -introduction to the Lysis) at considerable length, because it is a -very characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic point of view. -It brings to light that false persuasion of knowledge, under which -men unconsciously act, especially in what concerns the mind and its -treatment. Common fame and celebrity suffice to determine the most -vehement aspirations towards a lecturer, in one who has never stopped -to reflect or enquire what the lecturer does. The pressure applied by -Sokrates in his successive questions, to get beyond vague -generalities into definite particulars--the insufficiency, thereby -exposed, of the conceptions with which men usually rest -satisfied--exhibit the working of his Elenchus in one of its most -instructive ways. The parallel drawn between the body and the mind--the -constant precaution taken in the case of the former to consult the -professional man and to follow his advice in respect both to -discipline and nourishment--are in the same vein of sentiment -which we have already followed in other dialogues. Here too, as -elsewhere, some similar _Expert_, in reference to the ethical -and intellectual training of mind, is desiderated, as still more -imperatively necessary. Yet where is he to be found? How is the -business of mental training to be brought to a beneficial issue -without him? Or is Protagoras the man to supply such a demand? We -shall presently see. - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of -Kallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras.] - -Sokrates and Hippokrates proceed to the house of Kallias, and find -him walking about in the fore-court with Protagoras, and some of the -other company; all of whom are described as treating the Sophist with -almost ostentatious respect. Prodikus and Hippias have each their -separate hearers, in or adjoining to the court. Sokrates addresses -Protagoras. - -[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the -latter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and -his own openness in avowing himself a sophist.] - -_Sokr._--Protagoras, I and Hippokrates here are come to talk to -you about something. _Prot._--Do you wish to ta]k to me alone, -or in presence of the rest? _Sokr._--To us it is indifferent: -but I will tell you what we come about, and you may then determine -for yourself. This Hippokrates is a young man of noble family, and -fully equal to his contemporaries in capacity. He wishes to become -distinguished in the city; and he thinks he shall best attain that -object through your society. Consider whether you would like better -to talk with him alone, or in presence of the rest.[16] _Prot._--Your -consideration on my behalf, Sokrates, is reasonable. A person -of my profession must be cautious in his proceedings. I, a foreigner, -visit large cities, persuading the youth of best family to frequent -my society in preference to that of their kinsmen and all others; in -the conviction that I shall do them good. I thus inevitably become -exposed to much jealousy and even to hostile conspiracies.[17] -The sophistical art is an old one;[18] but its older professors, -being afraid of enmity if they proclaimed what they really were, have -always disguised themselves under other titles. Some, like Homer, -Hesiod, and Simonides, called themselves poets: others, Orpheus, -Musaeus, &c., professed to prescribe religious rites and -mysteries: others announced themselves as gymnastic trainers or -teachers of music. But I have departed altogether from this policy; -which indeed did not succeed in really deceiving any leading -men--whom alone it was intended to deceive--and which, when found out, -entailed upon its authors the additional disgrace of being considered -deceivers. The true caution consists in open dealing; and this is -what I have always adopted. I avow myself a Sophist, educating men. I -am now advanced in years, old enough to be the father of any of you, -and have grown old in the profession: yet during all these years, -thank God, I have suffered no harm either from my practice or my -title.[19] If therefore you desire to converse with me, it will be -far more agreeable to me to converse in presence of all who are now -in the house.[20] - -[Footnote 16: Plat. Prot. p. 316. - -The motive assigned by Hippokrates, for putting himself under the -teaching of Protagoras, is just the same as that which Xenophon -assigns to his friend Proxenus for taking lessons and paying fees to -the Leontine Gorgias (Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16).] - -[Footnote 17: The jealousy felt by fathers, mothers, and relatives -against a teacher or converser who acquired great influence over -their youthful relatives, is alluded to by Sokrates in the Platonic -Apology (p. 37 E), and is illustrated by a tragical incident in the -Cyropaedia of Xenophon, iii. 1. 14-38. Compare also Xenophon, Memorab. -i. 2, 52.] - -[Footnote 18: Plat. Prot. p. 316 D. [Greek: e)go\ de\ te\n -sophistike\n te/chnen phemi\ me\n ei)=nai palaia/n.]] - -[Footnote 19: Plat. Prot. p. 317 C. [Greek: o(/ste su\n theo=| -ei)pei=n mede\n deino\n pa/schein dia\ to\ o(mologei=n sophiste\s -ei)=nai.]] - -[Footnote 20: Plat. Prot. p. 317 D. In the Menon, the Platonic -Sokrates is made to say that Protagoras died at the age of seventy; -that he had practised forty years as a Sophist; and that during all -that long time he had enjoyed the highest esteem and reputation, even -after his death, "down to the present day" (Menon, p. 91 E). - -It must be remembered that the speech, of which I have just given an -abstract, is delivered not by the historical, real, Protagoras, but -by the character named _Protagoras_, depicted by Plato in this -dialogue: _i.e._ the speech is composed by Plato himself. I -read, therefore, with much surprise, a note of Heindorf (ad p. 316 -D), wherein he says about Protagoras: "Callide in postremis reticet, -quod addere poterat, [Greek: chre/mata dido/ntas]." "Protagoras -cunningly keeps back, what he might have here added, that people gave -him money for his teaching." Heindorf must surely have supposed that -he was commenting upon a real speech, delivered by the historical -person called Protagoras. Otherwise what can be meant by this charge -of "cunning reticence or keeping back?" Protagoras here speaks what -Plato puts into his mouth; neither more nor less. What makes the -remark of Heindorf the more preposterous is, that in page 328 B the -very fact, which Protagoras is here said "cunningly to keep back," -appears mentioned by Protagoras; and mentioned in the same spirit of -honourable frankness and fair-dealing as that which pervades the -discourse which I have just (freely) translated. Indeed nothing can -be more marked than the way in which Plato makes Protagoras dwell -with emphasis on the frankness and openness of his dealing: nothing -can be more at variance with the character which critics give us of -the Sophists, as "cheats, who defrauded pupils of their money while -teaching them nothing at all, or what they themselves knew to be -false".] - -[Side-note: Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of -the assembled company.] - -On hearing this, Sokrates--under the suspicion (he tells us) that -Protagoras wanted to show off in the presence of Prodikus and -Hippias--proposes to convene all the dispersed guests, and to talk in -their hearing. This is accordingly done, and the conversation -recommences--Sokrates repeating the introductory request which he had -preferred on behalf of Hippokrates. - -[Side-note: Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young -men as virtuous citizens.] - -_Sokr._--Hippokrates is anxious to distinguish himself in the -city, and thinks that he shall best attain this end by placing -himself under your instruction. He would gladly learn, Protagoras, -what will happen to him, if he comes into intercourse with you. -_Prot._--Young man, if you come to me, on the day of your first -visit, you will go home better than you came, and on the next day the -like: each successive day you will make progress for the better.[21] -_Sokr._--Of course he will; there is nothing surprising in that: -but towards _what_, and about _what_, will he make -progress? _Prot._--Your question is a reasonable one, and I am -glad to reply to it. I shall not throw him back--as other Sophists -do, with mischievous effect--into the special sciences, geometry, -arithmetic, astronomy, music, &c., just after he has completed -his course in them. I shall teach him what he really comes to learn: -wisdom and good counsel, both respecting his domestic affairs, that -he may manage his own family well--and respecting the affairs of the -city, that he may address himself to them most efficaciously, both in -speech and act. _Sokr._--You speak of political or social -science. You engage to make men good citizens. _Prot._--Exactly -so.[22] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Protag. p. 318 A. "Qui ad philosophorum scholas -venit, quotidie secum aliquid boni ferat: aut sanior domum redeat, -aut sanabilior." Seneca, Epistol. 108, p. 530.] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Protag. pp. 318-319. - -The declaration made by Protagoras--that he will not throw back his -pupils into the special arts--is represented by Plato as intended to -be an indirect censure on Hippias, then sitting by.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. -Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is -or not.] - -_Sokr._--That is a fine talent indeed, which you possess, if you -_do_ possess it; for (to speak frankly) I thought that the thing -had not been teachable, nor intentionally communicable, by man to -man.[23] I will tell you why I think so. The Athenians are -universally recognised as intelligent men. Now when our public -assembly is convened, if the subject of debate be fortification, -ship-building, or any other specialty which they regard as learnable -and teachable, they will listen to no one except a professional -artist or craftsman.[24] If any non-professional man presumes to -advise them on the subject, they refuse to hear him, however rich and -well-born he may be. It is thus that they act in matters of any -special art;[25] but when the debate turns upon the general -administration of the city, they hear every man alike--the -brass-worker, leather-cutter, merchant, navigator, rich, poor, -well-born, low-born, &c. Against none of them is any exception taken, -as in the former case--that he comes to give advice on that which he has -not learnt, and on which he has had no master.[26] It is plain that -the public generally think it not teachable. Moreover our best and -wisest citizens, those who possess civic virtue in the highest -measure, cannot communicate to their own children this same virtue, -though they cause them to be taught all those accomplishments which -paid masters can impart. Perikles and others, excellent citizens -themselves, have never been able to make any one else excellent, -either in or out of their own family. These reasons make me conclude -that social or political virtue is not teachable. I shall be glad if -you can show me that it is so.[27] - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Protag. p. 319 B. [Greek: ou) didakto\n ei)=nai, -med' u(p' a)nthro/pon paraskeuasto\n a)nthro/pois.]] - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Protag. p. 319 C. [Greek: kai\ ta)/lla pa/nta -ou(/tos, o(/sa e(gou=ntai matheta/ te kai\ didakta\ ei)=nai. e)a/n -de/ tis a)/llos e)picheire=| au)toi=s sumbouleu/ein o(\n e)kei=noi -me\ oi)/ontai demiourgo\n ei)=nai], &c.] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. [Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n o(=n -_oi)/ontai e)n te/chne| ei)=nai_, ou(/to diapra/ttontai.]] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. [Greek: kai\ tou/tois ou)dei\s -tou=to e)piple/ssei o(sper toi=s pro/teron, o(/ti ou)damo/then -matho/n, ou)de\ o)/ntos didaska/lou ou)deno\s au)to=|, e)/peita -sumbouleu/ein e)picheirei=; de=lon ga\r o(/ti ou)ch e(gou=ntai -didakto\n ei)=nai.]] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Protag. pp. 319-320.] - -[Side-note: Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a -mythe.] - -_Prot._--I will readily show you. But shall I, like an old man -addressing his juniors, recount to you an illustrative mythe?[28] or -shall I go through an expository discourse? The mythe perhaps will be -the more acceptable of the two. - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Protag. p. 320 C. [Greek: po/teron u(mi=n, o(s -presbu/teros neote/rois, mu=thon le/gon e)pidei/xo, e)\ lo/go| -diexeltho/n?] - -It is probable that the Sophists often delivered illustrative mythes -or fables as a more interesting way of handling social matters before -an audience. Such was the memorable fable called the choice of -Herakles by Prodikus.] - -[Side-note: Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. -Prometheus and Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by -the latter. It is partly amended by Prometheus.] - -There was once a time when Gods existed, but neither men nor -animals had yet come into existence. At the epoch prescribed by -Fate, the Gods fabricated men and animals in the interior of the -earth, out of earth, fire, and other ingredients: directing the -brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus to fit them out with suitable -endowments. Epimetheus, having been allowed by his brother to -undertake the task of distributing these endowments, did his work -very improvidently, wasted all his gifts upon the inferior animals, -and left nothing for man. When Prometheus came to inspect what had -been done, he found that other animals were adequately equipped, but -that man had no natural provision for clothing, shoeing, bedding, or -defence. The only way whereby Prometheus could supply the defect was, -by breaking into the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, and -stealing from thence their artistic skill, together with fire.[29] -Both of these he presented to man, who was thus enabled to construct -for himself, by art, all that other animals received from nature and -more besides. - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322. [Greek: a)pori/a| ou)=n -e)cho/menos o( Prometheu\s e(/ntina soteri/an to=| a)nthro/po| -eu(/roi, kle/ptei E(phai/stou kai\ A)thena=s te\n e(/ntechnon -sophi/an su\n puri/. . . . Te\n me\n ou)=n peri\ to\n bi/on sophi/an -a)/nthropos tau/te| e)/sche, te\n de\ politike\n ou)k ei)=chen; e)=n -ga\r para\ to=| Di/i+], &c. - -If the reader will compare this with the doctrine delivered in the -Platonic Timaeus--that the inferior animals spring from degenerate -men--he will perceive the entire variance between the two (Timaeus, -pp. 91-92).] - -[Side-note: Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of -individual wants, but could not give them the social art. Mankind are -on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions -essential for society.] - -Still however, mankind did not possess the political or social art; -which Zeus kept in his own custody, where Prometheus could not reach -it. Accordingly, though mankind could provide for themselves as -individuals, yet when they attempted to form themselves into -communities, they wronged each other so much, from being destitute of -the political or social art, that they were presently forced again -into dispersion.[30] The art of war, too, being a part of the -political art, which mankind did not possess--they could not get up a -common defence against hostile animals: so that the human race would -have been presently destroyed, had not Zeus interposed to avert such -a consummation. He sent Hermes to mankind, bearing with him -Justice and the sense of Shame (or Moderation), as the bonds and -ornaments of civic society, coupling men in friendship.[31] Hermes -asked Zeus--Upon what principle shall I distribute these gifts among -mankind? Shall I distribute them in the same way as artistic skill is -distributed, only to a small number--a few accomplished physicians, -navigators, &c., being adequate to supply the wants of the entire -community? Or are they to be apportioned in a certain dose to every -man? Undoubtedly, to every man (was the command of Zeus). All without -exception must be partakers in them. If they are confined exclusively -to a few, like artistic or professional skill, no community can -exist.[32] Ordain, by my authority, that every man, who cannot take a -share of his own in justice and the sense of shame, shall be slain, -as a nuisance to the community. - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Protag. p. 322 B. [Greek: e)ze/toun de\ -a)throi/zesthai kai\ so/zesthai kti/zontes po/leis; o(/t' ou)=n -a)throisthei=en, e)di/koun a)lle/lous, a(/te ou)k e)/chontes te\n -politike\n te/chnen, o(/ste pa/lin skedannu/menoi diephthei/ronto.] - -Compare Plato, Republic, i. p. 351 C, p. 352 B, where Sokrates sets -forth a similar argument.] - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Protagor. p. 322 C. [Greek: E(rme=n pe/mpei -a)/gonta ei)s a)nthro/pous ai)do= te kai\ di/ken, i(/n' ei)=en -po/leon ko/smoi te kai\ desmoi\ phili/as sunagogoi/.]] - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Protag. p. 322 C-D. [Greek: ei)=s e)/chon -i)atrike\n polloi=s i(kano\s i)dio/tais, kai\ oi( a)/lloi -demiourgoi/. kai\ di/ken de\ kai\ ai)do= ou(/to tho= e)n toi=s -a)nthro/pois, e)\ e)pi\ pa/ntas nei/mo? E)pi\ pa/ntas, e)/phe o( -Zeu/s, kai\ pa/ntes metecho/nton; ou) ga\r a)\n ge/nointo po/leis, -ei) o)li/goi au)to=n mete/choien o(/sper a)/llon techno=n. kai\ -no/mon ge the\s par' e)mou=, to\n me\ duna/menon ai)doou=s kai\ -di/kes mete/chein, ktei/nein o(s no/son po/leos.] - -We see by p. 323 A that [Greek: sophrosu/ne] is employed as -substitute or equivalent for [Greek: ai)do/s]: yet still [Greek: -ai)do\s] is the proper word to express Plato's meaning, as it denotes -a distinct and positive regard to the feelings of others--a feeling -of pain in each man's mind, when he discovers or believes that he is -disapproved by his comrades. Hom. Il. O. 561--[Greek: ai)do= -the/sth' e)ni\ thumo=| A)lle/lous t' ai)dei=sthe kata\ kratera\s -u(smi/nas.]] - -[Side-note: Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. -Justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but -are possessed by all citizens and taught by all to all.] - -This fable will show you, therefore, Sokrates (continues Protagoras), -that the Athenians have good reason for making the distinction to -which you advert. When they are discussing matters of special art, -they will hear only the few to whom such matters are known. But when -they are taking counsel about social or political virtue, which -consists altogether in justice and moderation, they naturally hear -every one; since every one is presumed, as a condition of the -existence of the commonwealth, to be a partaker therein.[33] -Moreover, even though they know a man not to have these virtues in -reality, they treat him as insane if he does not proclaim himself to -have them, and make profession of virtue: whereas, in the case of the -special arts, if a man makes proclamation of his own skill as a -physician or musician, they censure or ridicule him.[34] - -[Footnote 33: Plat. Prot. pp. 322-323.] - -[Footnote 34: Plato, Protag. p. 323 C.] - -[Side-note: Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of -punishment.] - -Nevertheless, though they account this political or social virtue an -universal endowment, they are far from thinking that it comes -spontaneously or by nature. They conceive it to be generated by care -and teaching. For in respect of all those qualities which come by -nature or by accident, no one is ever angry with another or blames -another for being found wanting. An ugly, dwarfish, or sickly man is -looked upon simply with pity, because his defects are such as he -cannot help. But when any one manifests injustice or other qualities -the opposite of political virtue, then all his neighbours visit him -with indignation, censure, and perhaps punishment: implying clearly -their belief that this virtue is an acquirement obtained by care and -learning.[35] Indeed the whole institution of punishment has no other -meaning. It is in itself a proof that men think social virtue to be -acquirable and acquired. For no rational man ever punishes -malefactors because they _have_ done wrong, or simply with a -view to the past:--since what is already done cannot be undone. He -punishes with a view to the future, in order that neither the same -man, nor others who see him punished, may be again guilty of similar -wrong. This opinion plainly implies the belief, that virtue is -producible by training, since men punish for the purpose of -prevention.[36] - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Protag. pp. 323-324.] - -[Footnote 36: Plato, Protag. p. 324 A-B. [Greek: ou)dei\s ga\r -kola/zei tou\s a)dikou=ntas pro\s tou/to| to\n nou=n e)/chon kai\ -tou/tou e(/neka o(/ti e)di/kesen, o(/stis me\ o(/sper theri/on -a)logi/stos timorei=tai; o( de\ meta\ lo/gou e)picheiro=n kola/zein -ou) tou= parelelutho/tos e(/neka a)dike/matos timorei=tai--ou) ga\r -a)\n to/ ge prachthe\n a)ge/neton thei/e--a)lla\ tou= me/llontos -cha/rin, i(/na me\ au)=this a)dike/se| me/te au)to\s ou(=tos me/te -a)/llos o( tou=ton i)do\n kolasthe/nta. kai\ toiau/ten ei)=nai -a)rete/n; _a)potrope=s gou=n e(/neka kola/zei_.] - -This clear and striking exposition of the theory of punishment is one -of the most memorable passages in Plato, or in any ancient author. -And if we are to believe the words which immediately follow, it was -the theory universally accepted at that time--[Greek: tau/ten ou)=n -te\n do/xan pa/ntes e)/chousin, o(/soi per timorou=ntai kai\ i)di/a| -kai\ demosi/a|.] Compare Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933, where the same -doctrine is announced: Seneca, De Ira, i. 16. "Nam, ut Plato ait, -nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Revocari enim -praeterita non possunt: futura prohibentur." Steinhart (Einleit. zum -Protag. p. 423) pronounces a just encomium upon this theory of -punishment, which, as he truly observes, combines together the -purposes declared in the two modern theories--Reforming and -Deterring. He says further, however, that the same theory of -punishment reappears in the Gorgias, which I do not think exact. The -purpose of punishment, as given in the Gorgias, is simply to cure a -distempered patient of a terrible distemper, and thus to confer great -benefit on him--but without any allusion to tutelary results as -regards society.] - -[Side-note: Why eminent men cannot make their sons -eminent.] - -I come now to your remaining argument, Sokrates. You urge that -citizens of eminent civil virtue cannot communicate that virtue to -their own sons, to whom nevertheless they secure all the -accomplishments which masters can teach. Now I have already shown you -that civil virtue is the one accomplishment needful,[37] which every -man without exception must possess, on pain of punishment or final -expulsion, if he be without it. I have shown you, moreover that every -one believes it to be communicable by teaching and attention. How can -you believe then that these excellent fathers teach their sons other -things, but do not teach them this, the want of which entails such -terrible penalties? - -[Footnote 37: Plato, Protag. p. 324 E. [Greek: Po/teron e)/sti ti -e(/n, e)\ ou)k e)/stin, ou)= a)nagkai=on pa/ntas tou\s poli/tas -mete/chein, ei)/per me/llei po/lis ei)=nai? e)n tou/to| ga\r au(/te -lu/etai e( a)pori/a e(\n su\ a)porei=s.]] - -[Side-note: Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws, -dikastery, &c.] - -The fact is, they _do_ teach it: and that too with great -pains.[38] They begin to admonish and lecture their children, from -the earliest years. Father, mother, tutor, nurse, all vie with each -other to make the child as good as possible: by constantly telling -him on every occasion which arises, This is right--That is -wrong--This is honourable--That is mean--This is holy--That is unholy--Do -these things, abstain from those.[39] If the child obeys them, it is -well: if he do not, they straighten or rectify him, like a crooked -piece of wood, by reproof and flogging. Next, they send him to a -schoolmaster, who teaches him letters and the harp; but who is -enjoined to take still greater pains in watching over his orderly -behaviour. Here the youth is put to read, learn by heart, and recite, -the compositions of able poets; full of exhortations to excellence -and of stirring examples from the good men of past times.[40] On the -harp also, he learns the best songs, his conduct is strictly watched, -and his emotions are disciplined by the influence of rhythmical and -regular measure. While his mind is thus trained to good, he is sent -besides to the gymnastic trainer, to render his body a suitable -instrument for it,[41] and to guard against failure of energy -under the obligations of military service. If he be the son of a -wealthy man, he is sent to such training sooner, and remains in it -longer. As soon as he is released from his masters, the city publicly -takes him in hand, compelling him to learn the laws prescribed by old -and good lawgivers,[42] to live according to their prescriptions, and -to learn both command and obedience, on pain of being punished. Such -then being the care bestowed, both publicly and privately, to foster -virtue, can you really doubt, Sokrates, whether it be teachable? You -might much rather wonder if it were not so.[43] - -[Footnote 38: Plato, Protag. p. 325 B.] - -[Footnote 39: Plato, Protag. p. 325 D. [Greek: par' e(/kaston kai\ -e)/rgon kai\ lo/gon dida/skontes kai\ e)ndeiknu/menoi o(/ti to\ me\n -di/kaion, to\ de\ a)/dikon, kai\ to/de me\n kalo/n, to/de de\ -ai)schro/n], &c.] - -[Footnote 40: Plato, Protag. p. 325 E--326 A. [Greek: paratithe/asin -au)toi=s e)pi\ to=n ba/thron a)nagino/skein poieto=n a)gatho=n -poie/mata kai\ e)kmantha/nein a)nagka/zousin, e)n oi(=s pollai\ me\n -nouthete/seis e)/neisi, pollai\ de\ die/xodoi kai\ e)/painoi kai\ -e)gko/mia palaio=n a)ndro=n a)gatho=n, i(/na o( pai=s zelo=n mime=tai -kai\ o)re/getai toiou=tos gene/sthai.]] - -[Footnote 41: Plato, Protag. p. 326 B. [Greek: i(/na ta\ so/mata -belti/o e)/chontes u(pereto=si te=| dianoi/a| chreste=| ou)/se|], -&c.] - -[Footnote 42: Plato, Protag. p. 326 D. [Greek: no/mous u(pogra/psasa, -a)gatho=n kai\ palaio=n nomotheto=n eu(re/mata], &c.] - -[Footnote 43: Plato, Protag. p. 326 E.] - -[Side-note: All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. -Whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his -own individual aptitude.] - -How does it happen, then, you ask, that excellent men so frequently -have worthless sons, to whom, even with all virtue from these -precautions, they cannot teach their own virtue? This is not -surprising, when you recollect what I have just said--That in regard -to social virtue, every man must be a craftsman and producer; there -must be no non-professional consumers.[44] All of us are interested -in rendering our neighbours just and virtuous, as well as in keeping -them so. Accordingly, every one, instead of being jealous, like a -professional artist, of seeing his own accomplishments diffused, -stands forward zealously in teaching justice and virtue to every one -else, and in reproving all short-comers.[45] Every man is a teacher -of virtue to others: every man learns his virtue from such general -teaching, public and private. The sons of the best men learn it in -this way, as well as others. The instruction of their fathers counts -for comparatively little, amidst such universal and paramount -extraneous influence; so that it depends upon the aptitude and -predispositions of the sons themselves, whether they turn out better -or worse than others. The son of a superior man will often turn out -ill; while the son of a worthless man will prove meritorious. So -the case would be, if playing on the flute were the one thing needful -for all citizens; if every one taught and enforced flute-playing upon -all others, and every one learnt it from the teaching of all -others.[46] You would find that the sons of good or bad flute-players -would turn out good or bad, not in proportion to the skill of their -fathers, but according to their own natural aptitudes. You would find -however also, that all of them, even the most unskilful, would be -accomplished flute-players, if compared with men absolutely untaught, -who had gone through no such social training. So too, in regard to -justice and virtue.[47] The very worst man brought up in your society -and its public and private training, would appear to you a craftsman -in these endowments, if you compared him with men who had been -brought up without education, without laws, without dikasteries, -without any general social pressure bearing on them, to enforce -virtue: such men as the savages exhibited last year in the comedy of -Pherekrates at the Lenaean festival. If you were thrown among such -men, you, like the chorus of misanthropes in that play, would look -back with regret even upon the worst criminals of the society which -you had left, such as Eurybatus and Phrynondas.[48] - -[Footnote 44: Plato, Protag. p. 326 E. [Greek: o(/ti tou/tou tou= -pra/gmatos, te=s a)rete=s, ei) me/llei po/lis ei)=nai, ou)de/na dei= -_i)dioteu/ein_.] - -It is to be regretted that there is no precise word to translate -exactly the useful antithesis between [Greek: i)dio/tes] and [Greek: -techni/tes] or [Greek: demiourgo/s].] - -[Footnote 45: Plato, Protag. p. 327 A. [Greek: ei) kai\ tou=to kai\ -i)di/a| kai\ demosi/a| pa=s pa/nta kai\ e)di/daske kai\ e)pe/plette -to\n me\ kalo=s au)lou=nta, kai\ me\ e)phtho/nei tou/tou, o(/sper -nu=n to=n dikai/on kai\ to=n nomi/mon ou)dei\s phthonei= ou)d' -a)pokru/ptetai, o(/sper to=n a)/llon technema/ton--lusitelei= ga\r, -oi)=mai, e(mi=n e( a)lle/lon dikaiosu/ne kai\ a)rete\; dia\ tau=ta -pa=s panti\ prothu/mos le/gei kai\ dida/skei kai\ ta\ di/kaia kai\ -ta\ no/mima.]] - -[Footnote 46: Plato, Protag. p. 327 C.] - -[Footnote 47: Plato, Protag. p. 327 C-D. [Greek: O(/stis soi -a)diko/tatos phai/netai a)/nthropos to=n e)n no/mois kai\ -a)nthro/pois tethramme/non, di/kaion au)to\n ei)=nai kai\ -_demiourgo\n tou/tou tou= pra/gmatos_, ei) de/oi au)to\n -kri/nesthai pro\s a)nthro/pous, oi(=s me/te paidei/a e)sti\ me/te -dikaste/ria me/te no/moi me/te a)na/gke medemi/a dia\ panto\s -a)nagka/zoousa a)rete=s e)pimelei=sthai.]] - -[Footnote 48: Plato, Protag. p. 327 D.] - -[Side-note: Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special -teacher thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than -others.] - -But now, Sokrates, you are over-nice, because all of us are teachers -of virtue, to the best of every man's power; while no particular -individual appears to teach it specially and _ex professo_[49] -By the same analogy, if you asked who was the teacher for speaking -our vernacular Greek, no one special person could be pointed out:[50] -nor would you find out who was the finishing teacher for those sons -of craftsmen who learnt the rudiments of their art from their own -fathers--while if the son of any non-professional person learns a -craft, it is easy to assign the person by whom he was taught.[51] -So it is in respect to virtue. All of us teach and enforce -virtue to the best of our power; and we ought to be satisfied if -there be any one of us ever so little superior to the rest, in the -power of teaching it. Of such men I believe myself to be one.[52] I -can train a man into an excellent citizen, better than others, and in -a manner worthy not only of the fee which I ask, but even of a still -greater remuneration, in the judgment of the pupil himself. This is -the stipulation which I make with him: when he has completed his -course, he is either to pay me the fee which I shall demand--or if he -prefers, he may go into a temple, make oath as to his own estimate of -the instruction imparted to him, and pay me according to that -estimate.[53] - -[Footnote 49: Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. [Greek: nu=n de\ trupha=|s, -o)= So/krates, dio/ti pa/ntes dida/skaloi/ ei)sin a)rete=s, kath' -o(/son du/natai e(/kastos, kai\ ou)dei/s soi phai/netai.]] - -[Footnote 50: Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. [Greek: ei)=th' o(/s per a)\n -ei) zetoi=s ti/s dida/skalos tou= e(lleni/zein, ou)d' a)\n ei(=s -phanei/e.]] - -[Footnote 51: Plato, Protag. p. 328 A.] - -[Footnote 52: Plato, Protag. p. 328 B. [Greek: A)lla\ ka)\n ei) -o)li/gon e)/sti tis o(/stis diaphe/rei e(mo=n probiba/sai ei)s -a)rete/n, a)gapeto/n. O(=n de\ e)go\ oi)=mai ei(=s ei)=nai], -&c.] - -[Footnote 53: Plato, Protag. p. 328 B.] - -[Side-note: The sons of great artists do not themselves become -great artists.] - -I have thus proved to you, Sokrates--That virtue is teachable--That -the Athenians account it to be teachable--That there is nothing -wonderful in finding the sons of good men worthless, and the sons of -worthless men good. Indeed this is true no less about the special -professions, than about the common accomplishment, virtue. The sons -of Polykletus the statuary, and of many other artists, are nothing as -compared with their fathers.[54] - -[Footnote 54: Plato, Protag. p. 328 C.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain -the manner in which the established sentiment of a community -propagates and perpetuates itself.] - -Such is the discourse composed by Plato and attributed to the -Platonic Protagoras--showing that virtue is teachable, and intended -to remove the difficulties proposed by Sokrates. It is an exposition -of some length: and because it is put into the mouth of a Sophist, -many commentators presume, as a matter of course, that it must be a -manifestation of some worthless quality:[55] that it is either empty -verbiage, or ostentatious self-praise, or low-minded immorality. I am -unable to perceive in the discourse any of these demerits. I think it -one of the best parts of the Platonic writings, as an exposition -of the growth and propagation of common sense--the common, -established, ethical and social sentiment, among a community: -sentiment neither dictated in the beginning, by any scientific or -artistic lawgiver, nor personified in any special guild of craftsmen -apart from the remaining community--nor inculcated by any formal -professional teachers--nor tested by analysis--nor verified by -comparison with any objective standard: but self-sown and -self-asserting, stamped, multiplied, and kept in circulation, by the -unpremeditated conspiracy of the general[56] public--the omnipresent -agency of King Nomos and his numerous volunteers. - -[Footnote 55: So Serranus (ad 326 E), who has been followed by many -later critics. "Quaestio est, Virtusne doceri possit? Quod instituit -demonstrare Sophista, sed ineptissimis argumentis et quae contra -seipsum faciant." - -To me this appears the reverse of the truth. But even if it were -true, no blame could fall on Protagoras. We should only be warranted -in concluding that it suited the scheme of Plato here to make him -talk nonsense.] - -[Footnote 56: This is what the Platonic Sokrates alludes to in the -Phaedon and elsewhere. [Greek: oi( te\n demotike\n te kai\ politike\n -a)rete\n e)pitetedeuko/tes, e(\n de\ kalou=si sophrosu/nen te kai\ -dikaiosu/nev, e)x e)/thous te kai\ mele/tes gegonui=an, a)/neu -philosophi/as te kai\ nou=.] Phaedon, p. 82 B; compare the same -dialogue, p. 68 C; also Republic, x. p. 619 C--[Greek: e)/thei a)/neu -philosophi/as a)rete=s meteilepho/ta].] - -The account given by Mr. James Mill (Fragment on Mackintosh, p. -259-260) of the manner in which the established morality of a society -is transmitted and perpetuated, coincides completely with the discourse -of the Platonic Protagoras. The passage is too long to be cited: I -give here only the concluding words, which describe the [Greek: -demotike\ a)rete\ a)/neu philosophi/as]-- - -"In this manner it is that men, in the social state, acquire the -habits of moral acting, and certain affections connected with it, -before they are capable of reflecting upon the grounds which -recommend the acts either to praise or blame. Nearly at this point -the greater part of them remain: continuing to perform moral acts and -to abstain from the contrary, chiefly from the habits which they have -acquired, and the authority upon which they originally acted: though -it is not possible that any man should come to the years and blessing -of reason, without perceiving at least in an indistinct and general -way, the advantage which mankind derive from their acting towards one -another in one way rather than another."] - -[Side-note: Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether -virtue is to be assimilated to a special art.] - -In many of the Platonic dialogues, Sokrates is made to dwell upon the -fact that there are no recognised professional teachers of virtue; -and to ground upon this fact a doubt, whether virtue be really -teachable. But the present dialogue is the only one in which the fact -is accounted for, and the doubt formally answered. There are neither -special teachers, nor professed pupils, nor determinate periods of -study, nor definite lessons or stadia, for the acquirement of virtue, -as there are for a particular art or craft: the reason being, that in -that department every man must of necessity be a practitioner, more -or less perfectly: every man has an interest in communicating it to -his neighbour: hence every man is constantly both teacher and -learner. Herein consists one main and real distinction between virtue -and the special arts; an answer to the view most frequently -espoused by the Platonic Sokrates, assimilating virtue to a -professional craft, which ought to have special teachers, and a -special season of apprenticeship, if it is to be acquired at all. - -The speech is censured by some critics as prolix. But to me it seems -full of matter and argument, exceedingly free from superfluous -rhetoric. The fable with which it opens presents of course the -poetical ornament which belongs to that manner of handling. It is -however fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm--in my -judgment, it is even superior to any other fable in Plato. - -[Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse -of Protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some -of the fundamental assumptions.] - -When the harangue, lecture, or sermon, of Protagoras is concluded, -Sokrates both expresses his profound admiration of it, and admits the -conclusion--That virtue is teachable--to be made out, as well as it -can be made out by any continuous exposition.[57] In fact, the -speaker has done all that could be done by Perikles or the best -orator of the assembly. He has given a long series of reasonings in -support of his own case, without stopping to hear the doubts of -opponents. He has sailed along triumphantly upon the stream of public -sentiment, accepting all the established beliefs--appealing to his -hearers with all those familiar phrases, round which the most -powerful associations are grouped--and taking for granted that -justice, virtue, good, evil, &c., are known, indisputable, -determinate data, fully understood, and unanimously interpreted. He -has shown that the community take great pains, both publicly and -privately, to inculcate and enforce virtue: that is, what _they_ -believe in and esteem as virtue. But is their belief well founded? Is -that which they esteem, really virtue? Do they and their elegant -spokesman Protagoras, know what virtue is? If so, _how_ do they -know it, and can they explain it? - -[Footnote 57: Plato, Protag. pp. 328-329. - -Very different indeed is the sentiment of the principal Platonic -commentators. Schleiermacher will not allow the mythus of Protagoras -to be counted among the Platonic mythes: he says that it is composed -in the style of Protagoras, and perhaps copied from some real -composition of that Sophist. He finds in it nothing but a -"grobmaterialistiche Denkungsart, die ueber die sinnliche Erfahrung -nicht hinaus philosophirt" (Einleitung zum Protagoras, vol. i. pp. -233-234). - -To the like purpose Ast (Plat. Leb. p. 71)--who tells us that what is -expressed in the mythus is, "the vulgar and mean sentiment and manner -of thought of the Sophist: for it deduces every thing, both arts and -the social union itself, from human wants and necessity". Apparently -these critics, when they treat this as a proof of meanness and -vulgarity, have forgotten that the Platonic Sokrates himself does -exactly the same thing in the Republic--deriving the entire social -union from human necessities (Republ. ii. 369 C). - -K. F. Hermann is hardly less severe upon the Protagorean discourse -(Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 460). - -For my part, I take a view altogether opposed to these learned -persons. I think the discourse one of the most striking and -instructive portions of the Platonic writings: and if I could believe -that it was the composition of Protagoras himself, my estimation of -him would be considerably raised. - -Steinhart pronounces a much more rational and equitable judgment than -Ast and Schleiermacher, upon the discourse of Protagoras (Einleitung -zum Prot. pp. 422-423).] - -[Side-note: One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast -continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer.] - -This is the point upon which Sokrates now brings his Elenchus to -bear: his method of short question and answer. We have seen what long -continuous speaking can do: we have now to see what short -cross-questioning can do. The antithesis between the two is at least -one main purpose of Plato--if it be not even _the_ purpose (as -Schleiermacher supposes it to be) in this memorable dialogue. - -[Side-note: Questions by Sokrates--Whether virtue is one and -indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are -homogeneous or heterogeneous?] - -After your copious exposition, Protagoras (says Sokrates), I have -only one little doubt remaining, which you will easily explain.[58] -You have several times spoken of justice, moderation, holiness, -&c., as if they all, taken collectively, made up virtue. Do you -mean that virtue is a Whole, and that these three names denote -distinct parts of it? Or are the three names all equivalent to -virtue, different names for one and are the same thing? - _Prot._--They are names signifying distinct parts of virtue. -_Sokr._--Are these parts like the parts of the face,--eyes, nose, -mouth, ears--each part not only distinct from the rest, but having -its own peculiar properties? Or are they like the parts of gold, -homogeneous with each other and with the whole, differing only in -magnitude? _Prot._--The former. _Sokr._--Then some men may possess one -part, some another. Or is it necessary that he who possesses one -part, should possess all? _Prot._--By no means necessary. Some -men are courageous, but unjust: others are just, but not intelligent. -_Sokr._--Wisdom and courage then, both of them, are parts of -virtue? _Prot._--They are so. Wisdom is the greatest of the -parts: but no one of the parts is the exact likeness of another: each -of them has its own peculiar property.[59] - -[Footnote 58: Plato, Protag. pp. 328 E--329 B. [Greek: ple\n smikro/n -ti/ moi e)mpodo/n, o(\ de=lon o(/ti Protago/ras r(a|di/os -e)pekdida/xei. . . . smikrou= tinos e)ndee/s ei)mi pa/nt' e)/chein], -&c.] - -[Footnote 59: Plato, Protag, pp. 329-330.] - -[Side-note: Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? -How far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an -answer, "If you please".] - -_Sokr._--Now let us examine what sort of thing each of these -parts is. Tell me--is justice some thing, or no thing? I think it is -some thing: are you of the same opinion?[60] _Prot._--Yes. -_Sokr._--Now this thing which you call _justice_: is it -itself just or unjust? I should say that it was just: what do you -say?[61] _Prot._--I think so too. _Sokr._--Holiness also is -some thing: is the thing called _holiness_, itself holy or -unholy? As for me, if any one were to ask me the question, I should -reply--Of course it is: nothing else can well be holy, if holiness -itself be not holy. Would you say the same? -_Prot._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--Justice being admitted to be just, -and holiness to be holy--do not you think that justice also is holy, -and that holiness is just? If so, how can you reconcile that with your -former declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any -other part? _Prot._--I do not altogether admit that justice is -holy, and that holiness is just. But the matter is of little moment: -if you please, let both of them stand as admitted. _Sokr._--Not -so:[62] I do not want the debate to turn upon an "If you please": You -and I are the debaters, and we shall determine the debate best -without "Ifs". _Prot._--I say then that justice and holiness are -indeed, in a certain way, like each other; so also there is a point -of analogy between white and black,[63] hard and soft, and between -many other things which no one would pronounce to be like generally. -_Sokr._--Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a -small point of analogy between them? _Prot._--Not exactly so: -but I do not concur with you when you declare that one is like the -other. _Sokr._--Well then! since you seem to follow with -some repugnance this line of argument, let us enter upon another.[64] - -[Footnote 60: Plato, Protag. p. 330 B. [Greek: koine=| skepso/metha -_poi=o/n ti au)to=n e)stin e(/kaston_. pro=ton me\n to\ -toio/nde; e( dikaiosu/ne pra=gma/ ti/ e)stin? e)\ ou)de\n pra=gma? -e)moi\ me\n ga\r dokei=; ti/ de\ soi/?]] - -[Footnote 61: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C. [Greek: tou=to to\ pra=gma o(/ -o)noma/sate a)/rti, e( dikaiosu/ne, au)to\ tou=to di/kaio/n e)stin -e)\ a)/dikon?]] - -[Footnote 62: Plato, Protag. p. 331 C. [Greek: ei) ga\r bou/lei, -e)/sto e(mi=n kai\ dikaiosu/ne o(/sion kai\ o(sio/tes di/kaion. Me/ -moi, e(=n d' e)go/; ou)de\n ga\r de/omai to\ "ei/ bou/lei" tou=to -kai\ "_ei) soi dokei=_" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te kai\ -se/.] - -This passage seems intended to illustrate the indifference of -Protagoras for dialectic forms and strict accuracy of discussion. The -[Greek: a)kribologi/a] of Sokrates and Plato was not merely -unfamiliar but even distasteful to rhetorical and practical men. -Protagoras is made to exhibit himself as thinking the distinctions -drawn by Sokrates too nice, not worth attending to. Many of the -contemporaries of both shared this opinion. One purpose of our -dialogue is to bring such antitheses into view.] - -[Footnote 63: Plat. Prot. p. 331 D.] - -[Footnote 64: Plat. Prot. p. 332 A.] - -[Side-note: Intelligence and moderation are identical, because -they have the same contrary.] - -Sokrates then attempts to show that intelligence and moderation are -identical with each other ([Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek: -sophrosu/ne]). The proof which he produces, elicited by several -questions, is--that both the one and the other are contrary to folly -([Greek: a)phrosu/ne]), and, that as a general rule, nothing can have -more than one single contrary.[65] - -[Footnote 65: Plat. Protag. p. 332.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom -cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term.] - -Sokrates thus seems to himself to have made much progress in proving -all the names of different virtues to be names of one and the same -thing. Moderation and intelligence are shown to be the same: justice -and holiness had before been shown to be nearly the same:[66] though -we must recollect that this last point had not been admitted by -Protagoras. It must be confessed however that neither the one nor the -other is proved by any conclusive reasons. In laying down the -maxim--that nothing can have more than one single contrary--Plato seems -to have forgotten that the same term may be used in two different -senses. Because the term folly ([Greek: a)phrosu/ne]), is used -sometimes to denote the opposite of moderation ([Greek: -sophrosu/ne]), sometimes the opposite of intelligence ([Greek: -sophi/a]), it does not follow that moderation and intelligence are -the same thing.[67] Nor does he furnish more satisfactory proof of -the other point, _viz._: That holiness and justice are the same, -or as much alike as possible. The intermediate position which is -assumed to form the proof, _viz._: That holiness is holy, and -that justice is just--is either tautological, or unmeaning; and -cannot serve as a real proof of any thing. It is indeed so futile, -that if it were found in the mouth of Protagoras and not in that -of Sokrates, commentators would probably have cited it as an -illustration of the futilities of the Sophists. As yet therefore -little has been done to elucidate the important question to which -Sokrates addresses himself--What is the extent of analogy between the -different virtues? Are they at bottom one and the same thing under -different names? In what does the analogy or the sameness consist? - -[Footnote 66: Plato, Protag. p. 338 B. [Greek: sche/don ti tau)to\n -o)/n.]] - -[Footnote 67: Aristotle would probably have avoided such a mistake as -this. One important point (as I have already remarked, vol. ii. p. -170) in which he is superior to Plato is, in being far more careful -to distinguish the different meanings of the same word--[Greek: ta\ -pollacho=s lego/mena]. Plato rarely troubles himself to notice such -distinction, and seems indeed generally unaware of it. He constantly -ridicules Prodikus, who tried to distinguish words apparently -synonymous.] - -[Side-note: Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated.] - -But though little progress has been made in determining the question -mooted by Sokrates, enough has been done to discompose and mortify -Protagoras. The general tenor of the dialogue is, to depict this man, -so eloquent in popular and continuous exposition, as destitute of the -analytical acumen requisite to meet cross-examination, and of -promptitude for dealing with new aspects of the case, on the very -subjects which form the theme of his eloquence. He finds himself -brought round, by a series of short questions, to a conclusion -which--whether conclusively proved or not--is proved in a manner binding -upon him, since he has admitted all the antecedent premisses. He -becomes dissatisfied with himself, answers with increasing -reluctance,[68] and is at last so provoked as to break out of the -limits imposed upon a respondent. - -[Footnote 68: Plato, Protag. pp. 333 B, 335 A.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose -is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry -prolixity.] - -Meanwhile Sokrates pursues his examination, with intent to prove that -justice ([Greek: dikaiosu/ne]) and moderation ([Greek: sophrosu/ne]) -are identical. Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with -moderation? I should be ashamed (replies Protagoras) to answer in the -affirmative, though many people say so. _Sokr._--It is -indifferent to me whether you yourself think so or not, provided only -you consent to make answer. What I principally examine is the opinion -itself: though it follows perhaps as a consequence, that I the -questioner, and the respondent along with me, undergo examination at -the same time.[69] You answer then (though without adopting the -opinion) that men who act unjustly sometimes behave with moderation, -or with intelligence: that is, that they follow a wise policy in -committing injustice. _Prot._--Be it so. _Sokr._--You admit -too that there exist certain things called good things. Are those -things good, which are profitable to mankind? _Prot._--By Zeus, -I call some things good, even though they be not profitable to men -(replies Protagoras, with increasing acrimony).[70] _Sokr._--Do -you mean those things which are not profitable to any _man_, or -those which are not profitable to any creature whatever? Do you call -these latter _good_ also? _Prot._--Not at all: but there -are many things profitable to men, yet unprofitable or hurtful to -different animals. Good is of a character exceedingly diversified and -heterogeneous.[71] - -[Footnote 69: Plato, Protag. p. 333 C. [Greek: to\n ga\r lo/gon -e)/goge ma/lista e)xeta/zo, sumbai/nei me/ntoi i)/sos kai\ e)me\ to\n -e)roto=nta kai\ to\n e)roto/menon e)xeta/zesthai.] - -Here again we find Plato drawing special attention to the conditions -of dialectic debate.] - -[Footnote 70: Plato, Protag. p. 333 E.] - -[Footnote 71: Plato, Protag. p. 334 B. [Greek: Ou(/to de\ poiki/lon -ti/ e)sti to\ a)gatho\n kai\ pantodapo/n], &c. - -The explanation here given by Protagoras of _good_ is the same -as that which is given by the historical Sokrates himself in the -Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 8). Things called good are diverse in -the highest degree; but they are all called _good_ because they -all contribute in some way to human security, relief, comfort, or -prosperity. To one or other of these ends _good_, in all its -multifarious forms, is relative.] - -[Side-note: Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as -inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates -rises to depart.] - -Protagoras is represented as giving this answer at considerable -length, and in a rhetorical manner, so as to elicit applause from the -hearers.[72] Upon this Sokrates replies, "I am a man of short memory, -and if any one speaks at length, I forget what he has said. If you -wish me to follow you, I must entreat you to make shorter answers." -_Prot._--What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers? -Do you mean shorter than the case requires? _Sokr._--No, -certainly not. _Prot._--But who is to be judge of the brevity -necessary, you or I? _Sokr._--I have understood that you profess -to be master and teacher both of long speech and of short speech: -what I beg is, that you will employ only short speech, if you expect -me to follow you. _Prot._--Why, Sokrates, I have carried on many -debates in my time; and if, as you ask me now, I had always talked -just as my opponent wished, I should never have acquired any -reputation at all. _Sokr._--Be it so: in that case I must -retire; for as to long speaking, I am incompetent: I can neither make -long speeches, nor follow them.[73] - -[Footnote 72: Plato, Protag. p. 334 D.] - -[Footnote 73: Plato, Prot. pp. 334 E, 335 A-C.] - -[Side-note: Interference of Kallias to get the debate -continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that -Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue.] - -Here Sokrates rises to depart; but Kallias, the master of the house, -detains him, and expresses an earnest wish that the debate may be -continued. A promiscuous conversation ensues, in which most persons -present take part. Alkibiades, as the champion of Sokrates, gives, -what seems really to be the key of the dialogue, when he says--"Sokrates -admits that he has no capacity for long speaking, and that he is no -match therein for Protagoras. But as to dialectic debate, or -administering and resisting cross-examination, I should be surprised -if any one were a match for him. If Protagoras admits that on this -point he is inferior, Sokrates requires no more: if he does not, let -him continue the debate: but he must not lengthen his answers so that -hearers lose the thread of the subject." - -[Side-note: Claim of a special _locus standi_ and -professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric.] - -This remark of Alkibiades, speaking altogether as a vehement partisan -of Sokrates, brings to view at least one purpose--if not the main -purpose--of Plato in the dialogue. "Sokrates acknowledges the -superiority of Protagoras in rhetoric: if Protagoras acknowledges the -superiority of Sokrates in dialectic, Sokrates is satisfied."[74] An -express _locus standi_ is here claimed for dialectic, and a -recognised superiority for its professors on their own ground. -Protagoras professes to be master both of long speech and of short -speech: but in the last he must recognise a superior. - -[Footnote 74: Plat. Prot. p. 336 C-D.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and -invites Protagoras to question him.] - -Kritias, Prodikus, and Hippias all speak (each in a manner of his -own) deprecating marked partisanship on either side, exhorting both -parties to moderation, and insisting that the conversation shall be -continued. At length Sokrates consents to remain, yet on condition -that Protagoras shall confine himself within the limits of the -dialectic procedure. Protagoras (he says) shall first question me as -long as he pleases: when he has finished, I will question him. The -Sophist, though at first reluctant, is constrained, by the instance -of those around, to accede to this proposition.[75] - -[Footnote 75: Plat. Prot. pp. 337-338.] - -[Side-note: Protagoras extols the importance of knowing -the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of -Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song.] - -For the purpose of questioning, Protagoras selects a song of -Simonides: prefacing it with a remark, that the most important -accomplishment of a cultivated man consists in being thorough master -of the works of the poets, so as to understand and appreciate them -correctly, and answer all questions respecting them.[76] Sokrates -intimates that he knows and admires the song: upon which Protagoras -proceeds to point out two passages in it which contradict each other, -and asks how Sokrates can explain or justify such contradiction.[77] -The latter is at first embarrassed, and invokes the aid of Prodikus; -who interferes to uphold the consistency of his fellow-citizen -Simonides, but is made to speak (as elsewhere by Plato) in a stupid -and ridiculous manner. After a desultory string of remarks,[78] with -disputed interpretation of particular phrases and passages of the -song, but without promise of any result--Sokrates offers to give an -exposition of the general purpose of the whole song, in order that -the company may see how far he has advanced in that accomplishment -which Protagoras had so emphatically extolled--complete mastery of -the works of the poets.[79] - -[Footnote 76: Plat. Prot. p. 339 A. [Greek: e(gou=mai e)go\ a)ndri\ -paidei/as me/giston me/ros ei)=nai, peri\ e)po=n deino\n ei)=nai.]] - -[Footnote 77: Plat. Prot. p. 339 C-D.] - -[Footnote 78: Plat. Prot. pp. 340-341.] - -[Footnote 79: Plat. Prot. p. 342 A. [Greek: ei) bou/lei labei=n mou -pei=ran o(/pos e)/cho, o(\ su\ le/geis tou=to, peri\ e)po=n.]] - -[Side-note: Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of -the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous -concealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech.] - -He then proceeds to deliver a long harangue, the commencement of -which appears to be a sort of counter-part and parody of the first -speech delivered by Protagoras in this dialogue. That Sophist had -represented that the sophistical art was ancient:[80] and that -the poets, from Homer downward, were Sophists, but dreaded the odium -of the name, and professed a different avocation with another title. -Sokrates here tells us that philosophy was more ancient still in -Krete and Sparta, and that there were more Sophists (he does not -distinguish between the Sophist and the philosopher), female as well -as male, in those regions, than anywhere else: but that they -concealed their name and profession, for fear that others should copy -them and acquire the like eminence:[81] that they pretended to -devote themselves altogether to arms and gymnastic--a pretence -whereby (he says) all the other Greeks were really deluded. The -special characteristic of these philosophers or Sophists was, short -and emphatic speech--epigram shot in at the seasonable moment, and -thoroughly prostrating an opponent.[82] The Seven Wise Men, among -whom Pittakus was one, were philosophers on this type, of supreme -excellence: which they showed by inscribing their memorable brief -aphorisms at Delphi. So great was the celebrity which Pittakus -acquired by his aphorism, that Simonides the poet became jealous, and -composed this song altogether for the purpose of discrediting him. -Having stated this general view, Sokrates illustrates it by going -through the song, with exposition and criticism of several different -passages.[83] As soon as Sokrates has concluded, Hippias[84] -compliments him, and says that he too has a lecture ready prepared on -the same song: which he would willingly deliver: but Alkibiades and -the rest beg him to postpone it. - -[Footnote 80: Plat. Prot. pp. 316-317.] - -[Footnote 81: Plat. Prot. p. 342.] - -[Footnote 82: Plat. Prot. p. 342 E, 343 B-C. [Greek: O(/ti ou(=tos o( -tro/pos e)=n to=n palaio=n te=s philosophi/as, brachulogi/a tis -Lakonike/.]] - -[Footnote 83: Plat. Prot. pp. 344-347.] - -[Footnote 84: Plat. Prot. p. 347.] - -[Side-note: Character of this speech--its connection with the -dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in -continuous speech.] - -No remark is made by any one present, either upon the circumstance -that Sokrates, after protesting against long speeches, has here -delivered one longer by far than the first speech of Protagoras, and -more than half as long as the second, which contains a large -theory--nor upon the sort of interpretation that he bestows upon the -Simonidean song. That interpretation is so strange and forced--so -violent in distorting the meaning of the poet--so evidently -predetermined by the resolution to find Platonic metaphysics in a -lyric effusion addressed to a Thessalian prince[85]--that if such an -exposition had been found under the name of Protagoras, critics -would have dwelt upon it as an additional proof of dishonest -perversions by the Sophists.[86] It appears as if Plato, intending in -this dialogue to set out the contrast between long or continuous -speech (sophistical, rhetorical, poetical) represented by Protagoras, -and short, interrogatory speech (dialectical) represented by -Sokrates--having moreover composed for Protagoras in the earlier part -of the dialogue, an harangue claiming venerable antiquity for his own -accomplishment--has thought it right to compose for Sokrates a -pleading with like purpose, to put the two accomplishments on a par. -And if that pleading includes both pointless irony and misplaced -comparisons (especially what is said about the Spartans)--we must -remember that Sokrates has expressly renounced all competition with -Protagoras in continuous speech, and that he is here handling the -weapon in which he is confessedly inferior. Plato secures a decisive -triumph to dialectic, and to Sokrates as representing it: but he -seems content here to leave Sokrates on the lower ground as a -rhetorician. - -[Footnote 85: Especially his explanation of [Greek: e(ko\n e)rde=|] -(p. 345 D.). Heyne (Opuscula, i. p. 160) remarks upon the strange -interpretation given by Sokrates of the Simonidean song. Compare -Plato in Lysis, p. 212 E, and in Alkib. ii. p. 147 D. In both these -cases, Sokrates cites passages of poetry, assigning to them a sense -which their authors plainly did not intend them to bear. Heindorf in -his note on the Lysis (l. c.) observes--"Videlicet, ut exeat -sententia, quam Solon ne somniavit quidem, versuum horum structuram, -neglecto plane sermonis usu, hanc statuit.--Cujusmodi -interpretationis aliud est luculentum exemplum in Alcib. ii. p. 147 -D." - -See also Heindorf's notes on the Charmides, p. 163 B; Laches, p. 191 -B; and Lysis, p. 214 D. - -M. Boeckh observes (ad Pindar. Isthm. v. p. 528) respecting an -allusion made by Pindar to Hesiod-- - -"Num male intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba -Hesiodi? Non credo: sed bene sciens, consulto alium sensum intulit, -suo consilio accommodatum! Simile exemplum offert gravissimus auctor -Plato Theaetet. p. 155 D." Stallbaum in his note on the Theaetetus -adopts this remark of Boeckh. Groen van Prinsterer gives a similar -opinion. (Prosopographia Platonica, p. 17.)] - -[Footnote 86: K. F. Hermann observes (Gesch. der Plat. Philos, p. -460) that Sokrates, in his interpretation of the Simonidean song, -shows that he can play the Sophist as well as other people can.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the -poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from -themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the -task of answering.] - -Moreover, when Sokrates intends to show himself off as a master of -poetical lore ([Greek: peri\ e)po=n deino\s]), he at the same time -claims a right of interpreting the poets in his own way. He considers -the poets either as persons divinely inspired, who speak fine things -without rational understanding (we have seen this in the Apology and -the Ion)--or as men of superior wisdom, who deliver valuable truth -lying beneath the surface, and not discernible by vulgar eyes. Both -these views differ from that of literal interpretation, which is here -represented by Protagoras and Prodikus. And these two Sophists are -here contrasted with Sokrates as interpreters of the poets. -Protagoras and Prodikus look upon poetical compositions as sources of -instruction: and seek to interpret them literally, as an -intelligent hearer would have understood them when they were sung or -recited for the first time. Towards that end, discrimination of the -usual or grammatical meaning of words was indispensable. Sokrates, on -the contrary, disregards the literal interpretation, derides verbal -distinctions as useless, or twists them into harmony with his own -purpose: Simonides and other poets are considered as superior men, -and even as inspired men in whose verses wisdom and virtue must be -embodied and discoverable[87]--only that they are given in an obscure -and enigmatical manner: requiring to be extracted by the divination -of the philosopher, who alone knows what wisdom and virtue are. It is -for the philosopher to show his ingenuity by detecting the traces of -them. This is what Sokrates does with the song of Simonides. He -discovers in it supposed underlying thoughts ([Greek: -u(ponoi/as]):[88] distinctions of Platonic Metaphysics (between -[Greek: ei)=nai] and [Greek: gene/sthai]), and principles of Platonic -Ethics ([Greek: ou)dei\s e(/ko kako/s])--he proceeds to point out -passages in which they are to be found, and explains the song -conformably to them, in spite of much violence to the obvious meaning -and verbal structure.[89] But though Sokrates accepts, when required, -the task of discussing what is said by the poets, and deals with them -according to his own point of view--yet he presently lets us see that -they are witnesses called into court by his opponent and not by -himself. Alkibiades urges that the debate which had been interrupted -shall be resumed and Sokrates himself requests Protagoras to consent. -"To debate about the compositions of poets" (says Sokrates), "is to -proceed as silly and common-place men do at their banquets: where -they cannot pass the time without hiring musical or dancing girls. -Noble and well-educated guests, on the contrary, can find enough to -interest them in their own conversation, even if they drink ever so -much wine.[90] Men such as we are, do not require to be amused by -singers nor to talk about the poets, whom no one can ask what they -mean; and who, when cited by different speakers, are affirmed by one -to mean one thing, and by another to mean something else, without any -decisive authority to appeal to. Such men as you and I ought to lay -aside the poets, and test each other by colloquy of our own. If you -wish to persist in questioning, I am ready to answer: if not, consent -to answer me, and let us bring the interrupted debate to a -close."[91] - -[Footnote 87: See Plato, Phaedrus, p. 245 A-B; Apol. p. 22 B-C; Ion, -pp. 533-534. - -Compare the distinction drawn in Timaeus, p. 72 A-B, between the -[Greek: ma/ntis] and the [Greek: prophe/tes].] - -[Footnote 88: About the [Greek: u(po/noiai] ascribed to the poets, -see Repub. ii. p. 378 D.; Xen. Sympos. iii. 6; and F. A. Wolf, -Prolegom. Homer. p. clxii.-clxiv. - -F. A. Wolf remarks, respecting the various allegorical -interpretations of Homer and other Greek poets-- - -"Sed nec prioribus illis, sive allegorica et anagogica somnia sua -ipsi crediderunt, sive ab aliis duntaxat credi voluerunt, idonea -deest excusatio. Ita enim ratio comparata est, ut libris, quos a -teneris statim annis cognoscimus, omnes prope nostras nostraeque -aetatis opiniones subjiciamus: ac si illi jampridem populari usu -consecrati sunt, ipsa obstat veneratio, quominus in iis absurda et -ridicula inesse credamus. Lenimus ergo atque adeo ornamus -interpretando, quicquid proprio sensu non ferendum videtur. Atque ita -factum est omni tempore in libris iis, qui pro sacris habiti sunt." - -The distinction was similar in character, and even more marked in -respect of earnest reciprocal antipathy, between the different -schools of the Jews in Alexandria and Palestine about the -interpretation of the Pentateuch. 1. Those who interpreted literally, -[Greek: kata\ te\n r(ete\n dia/noian]. 2. Those who set aside the -literal interpretation, and explained the text upon a philosophy of -their own, above the reach of the vulgar (Eusebius, Praep. Ev. viii. -10). Some admitted both the two interpretations, side by side. - -Respecting these allegorising schools of the Hellenistic Jews, from -Aristobulus (150 B.C.) down to Philo, see the learned and -valuable work of Gfroerer--_Philo und die Juedisch.-Alexandr. -Theosophie_, vol. i. pp. 84-86, ii. p. 356 seq.] - -[Footnote 89: Plat. Prot. p. 345.] - -[Footnote 90: Plato, Prot. p. 347 D. [Greek: ka)\n ma/nu polu\n -oi)=non pi/osin]--a phrase which will be found suitably illustrated -by the persistent dialectic of Sokrates, even at the close of the -Platonic Symposion, after he has swallowed an incredible quantity of -wine.] - -[Footnote 91: Plat. Prot. pp. 347-348. This remark--that the poet may -be interpreted in many different ways, and that you cannot produce -him in court to declare or defend his own meaning--is highly -significant, in regard to the value set by Sokrates on living -conversation and dialectic.] - -[Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he -really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion -for this purpose.] - -In spite of this appeal, Protagoras is still unwilling to resume, and -is only forced to do so by a stinging taunt from Alkibiades, enforced -by requests from Kallias and others. He is depicted as afraid of -Sokrates, who, as soon as consent is given, recommences the -discussion by saying--"Do not think, Protagoras, that I have any -other purpose in debating, except to sift through and through, in -conjunction with you, difficulties which puzzle my own mind. Two of -us together can do more in this way than any one singly.[92] - -[Footnote 92: Plat. Prot. p. 348 C. [Greek: me\ oi)/ou diale/gesthai -me/ soi a)/llo ti boulo/menon e)\ a)\ au)to\s a)poro=, e(ka/stote -tau=ta diaske/psasthai.] - -The remark here given should be carefully noted in appreciating the -Sokratic frame of mind. The cross-examination which he bestows, is -not that of one who himself knows--and who only gets up artificial -difficulties to ascertain whether others know as much as he does. On -the contrary, it proceeds from one who is himself puzzled; and -that which puzzles him he states to others, and debates with others, -as affording the best chance of clearing up his own ideas and -obtaining a solution. - -The grand purpose with Sokrates is to bring into clear daylight the -difficulties which impede the construction of philosophy or "reasoned -truth," and to sift them thoroughly, instead of slurring them over or -hiding them.] - -"We are all more fertile and suggestive, with regard to thought, -word, and deed, when we act in couples. If a man strikes out anything -new by himself, he immediately goes about looking for a companion to -whom he can communicate it, and with whom he can jointly review it. -Moreover, you are the best man that I know for this purpose, -especially on the subject of virtue: for you are not only virtuous -yourself, but you can make others so likewise, and you proclaim -yourself a teacher of virtue more publicly than any one has ever done -before. Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and -communication on these very subjects?"[93] - -[Footnote 93: Plato, Protag. pp. 348-349.] - -[Side-note: The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says -that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue.] - -After this eulogy on dialectic conversation (illustrating still -farther the main purpose of the dialogue), Sokrates resumes the -argument as it stood when interrupted. _Sokr._--You, -Protagoras, said that intelligence, moderation, justice, holiness, -courage, were all parts of virtue; but each different from the -others, and each having a separate essence and properties of its own. -Do you still adhere to that opinion? _Prot._--I now think that -the first four are tolerably like and akin to each other, but that -courage is very greatly different from all the four. The proof is, -that you will find many men pre-eminent for courage, but thoroughly -unjust, unholy, intemperate, and stupid.[94] _Sokr._--Do you -consider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and -honourable? _Prot._--I consider it in the highest degree fine -and honourable: I must be mad to think otherwise.[95] - -[Footnote 94: Plato, Protag. p, 349 D. [Greek: ta\ me\n te/ttara -au)to=n e)pieiko=s paraple/sia a)lle/lois e)sti/n, e( de\ a)ndrei/a -pa/nu polu\ diaphe/ron pa/nton tou/ton.]] - -[Footnote 95: Plato, Protag. p. 349 E. [Greek: ka/lliston me\n ou)=n, -ei) me\ mai/nomai/ ge. o(/lon pou kalo\n o(s oi(=o/n te ma/lista.] - -It is not unimportant to notice such declarations as this, put by -Plato into the mouth of Protagoras. They tend to show that Plato did -not seek (as many of his commentators do) to depict Protagoras as a -corruptor of the public mind.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in -knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates -changes his attack.] - -Sokrates then shows that the courageous men are confident men, -forward in dashing at dangers, which people in general will not -affront: that men who dive with confidence into the water, are those -who know how to swim; men who go into battle with confidence as -horse-soldiers or light infantry, are those who understand their -profession as such. If any men embark in these dangers, without such -preliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? Not at -all (says Protagoras), they are madmen: courage would be a -dishonourable thing, if _they_ were reckoned courageous.[96] -Then (replies Sokrates) upon this reasoning, those who face dangers -confidently, with preliminary knowledge, are courageous: those who do -so without it, are madmen. Courage therefore must consist in -knowledge or intelligence?[97] Protagoras declines to admit this, -drawing a distinction somewhat confused:[98] upon which Sokrates -approaches the same argument from a different point. - -[Footnote 96: Plato, Protag. p. 350 B. [Greek: Ai)schro\n me/nt' -a)\n, e)/phe, ei)/e, e( a)ndrei/a; e)pei\ ou(=toi/ ge maino/menoi/ -ei)sin.]] - -[Footnote 97: Plato, Protag. p. 350 C.] - -[Footnote 98: Plato, Protag. pp. 350-351.] - -[Side-note: Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the -painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. -Debate.] - -_Sokr._--You say that some men live well, others badly. Do you -think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress? -_Prot._--No. _Sokr._--But if he passes his life pleasurably -until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well? -_Prot._--I think so. _Sokr._--To live pleasurably therefore -is good: to live disagreeably is evil. _Prot._--Yes: at least -provided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things.[99] -_Sokr._--What! do you concur with the generality of people in -calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good? -_Prot._--That is my opinion. _Sokr._--But are not all -pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, to that extent good, -unless some consequences of a different sort result from them? And -again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things -evil, so far forth as they are painful? _Prot._--To that -question, absolutely as you put it, I do not know whether I can reply -affirmatively--that all pleasurable things are good, and all painful -things evil. I think it safer--with reference not merely to the -present answer, but to my manner of life generally--to say, that -there are some pleasurable things which are good, others which are -not good--some painful things which are evil, others which are not -evil: again, some which are neither, neither good nor evil.[100] -_Sokr._--You call those things pleasurable, which either partake -of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? _ -Prot._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--When I ask whether pleasurable things -are not good, in so far forth as pleasurable--I ask in other words, -whether pleasure itself be not good? _Prot._--As you observed -before, Sokrates,[101] let us examine the question on each side, to -see whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same. - -[Footnote 99: Plat. Prot. p. 351 C. [Greek: To\ me\n a)/ra e(de/os -ze=n, a)gatho/n, to\ d' a)edo=s, kako/n? Ei)/per toi=s kaloi=s g', -e)/phe, zo/|e e(do/menos.]] - -[Footnote 100: Plato, Protag. p. 351 D. [Greek: a)lla/ moi dokei= ou) -mo/non pro\s te\n nu=n a)po/krisin e)moi\ a)sphale/steron ei)=nai -a)pokri/nasthtai, _a)lla\ kai\ pro\s pa/nta to\n a)/llon bi/on to\n -e)mo/n_, o(/ti e)/sti me\n a)\ to=n e(de/on ou)k e)/stin a)gatha/, -e)/sti d' au)= kai\ a(\ to=n a)niaro=n ou)k e)sti kaka/, e)/sti d' -a(\ e)/sti, kai\ tri/ton a(\ ou)de/tera, ou)/te kaka\ ou)/t' -a)gatha/.] - -These words strengthen farther what I remarked in a recent note, -about the character which Plato wished to depict in Protagoras, so -different from what is imputed to that Sophist by the Platonic -commentators.] - -[Footnote 101: Plato, Protag. p. 351 E. [Greek: o(/sper su\ le/geis, -e(ka/stote, o)= So/krates, skopo/metha au)to/.] - -This is an allusion to the words used by Sokrates not long -before,--[Greek: a(\ au)to\s a)poro= e(ka/stote tau=ta -diaske/psasthai], p. 348 C.] - -[Side-note: Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency -in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure -or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant.] - -_Sokr._--Let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of -the question.[102] What is your opinion about knowledge? Do -you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about -pleasure and pain? Mankind regard knowledge as something neither -strong nor directive nor dominant. Often (they say), when knowledge -is in a man, it is not knowledge which governs him, but something -else--passion, pleasure, pain, love, fear--all or any of which -overpower knowledge, and drag it round about in their train like a -slave. Are you of the common opinion on this point also?[103] Or do -you believe that knowledge is an honourable thing, and made to -govern man: and that when once a man knows what good and evil things -are, he will not be over-ruled by any other motive whatever, so as to -do other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge--his own -intelligence being a sufficient defence to him?[104] -_Prot._--The last opinion is what I hold. To me, above all others, -it would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence -was the governing element of human affairs. - -[Footnote 102: Plato, Protag. p. 352 A.] - -[Footnote 103: Plato, Protag. p. 352 B-C. [Greek: po/teron kai\ -tou=to/ soi dokei= o(/sper toi=s polloi=s a)nthro/pois e)\ a)/llos? -. . . dianoou/menoi peri\ te=s e)piste/mes o(/sper peri\ a)ndrapo/don, -perielkome/nes u(po\ to=n a)/llon a(pa/nton.] Aristotle in the -Nikomachean Ethics cites and criticises the opinion of Sokrates, -wherein the latter affirmed the irresistible supremacy of knowledge, -when really possessed, over all passions and desires. Aristotle cites -it with the express phraseology and illustration contained in this -passage of the Protagoras. [Greek: E)pista/menon me\n ou)=n ou)/ -phasi/ tines oi(=o/n te ei)=nai [a)krateu/esthai]. deino\n ga/r, -e)piste/mes e)nou/ses, o(s o)/|eto Sokra/tes, a)/llo ti kratei=n, -kai\ perie/lkein au)te\n o(/sper a)ndra/podon. Sokra/tes me\n ga\r -o(/los e)ma/cheto pro\s to\n lo/gon, o(s ou)k ou)/ses a)krasi/as; -ou)the/na ga\r u(polamba/nonta, pra/ttein para\ to\ be/ltiston, -a)lla\ di' a)/gnoian] (Ethic. N. vii. 2, vii. 3, p. 1145, b. 24). The -same metaphor [Greek: perie/lketai e)piste/me] is again ascribed to -Sokrates by Aristotle, a little farther on in the same treatise, p. -1147, b. 15. - -We see from hence that when Aristotle comments upon _the doctrine -of Sokrates_, what he here means is, the doctrine of the Platonic -Sokrates in the Protagoras; the citation of this particular metaphor -establishes the identity. - -In another passage of the Nikom. Eth., Aristotle also cites a fact -respecting the Sophist Protagoras, which fact is mentioned in the -Platonic dialogue Protagoras--respecting the manner in which that -Sophist allowed his pupils to assess their own fee for his teaching -(Ethic. Nik. ix. 1, 1164, a. 25).] - -[Footnote 104: Plato, Protag. p. 352 C. [Greek: a)ll' i(kane\n -ei)=nai te\n phro/nesin boethei=n to=| a)nthro/po|.]] - -[Side-note: Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to -knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a -preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures.] - -_Sokr._--You speak well and truly. But you are aware that most -men are of a different opinion. They affirm that many who know what -is best, act against their own knowledge, overcome by pleasure or by -pain. _Prot._--Most men think so: incorrectly, in my judgment, -as they say many other things besides.[105] _Sokr._--When they -say that a man, being overcome by food or drink or other temptations, -will do things which he knows to be evil, we must ask them, On what -ground do you call these things evil? Is it because they impart -pleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and -other such things, for the future?[106] Most men would reply, I -think, that they called these things evil not on account of the -present pleasure which the things produced, but on account of their -ulterior consequences--poverty and disease being both of them -distressing? _Prot._--Most men would say this. _Sokr._--It -would be admitted then that these things were evil for no other -reason, than because they ended in pain and in privation of -pleasure.[107] _Prot._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Again, when it -is said that some good things are painful, such things are meant as -gymnastic exercises, military expeditions, medical treatment. Now no -one will say that these things are good because of the immediate -suffering which they occasion, but because of the ulterior results of -health, wealth, and security, which we obtain by them. Thus, -these also are good for no other reason, than because they end in -pleasures, or in relief or prevention of pain.[108] Or can you -indicate any other end, to which men look when they call these -matters evil? _Prot._--No other end can be indicated. - -[Footnote 105: Plato, Protag. pp. 352-353.] - -[Footnote 106: Plato, Protag. p. 353 D. [Greek: ponera\ de\ au)ta\ -pe=| phate ei)=nai? po/teron o(/ti te\n e(done\n tau/ten e)n to=| -parachre=ma pare/chei kai\ e(du/ e)stin e(/kaston au)to=n, e)\ o(/ti -ei)s to\n u(/steron chro/non no/sous te poiei= kai\ peni/as kai\ -a)/lla toiau=ta polla\ paraskeua/zei?]] - -[Footnote 107: Plato, Protag. p. 353 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n phai/netai. -. . . di' ou)de\n a)/llo tau=ta kaka\ o)/nta, e)\ dio/ti ei)s a)ni/as -te a)poteleuta=| kai\ a)/llon e(dono=n a)posterei=?]] - -[Footnote 108: Plato, Protag. p. 354 B-C. [Greek: Tau=ta de\ a)gatha/ -e)sti di' a)/llo ti e)\ o(/ti ei)s e(dona\s a)poteleuta=| kai\ lupo=n -a)pallaga\s kai\ a)potropa/s? e)\ e)/chete/ ti a)/llo te/los le/gein, -ei)s o(\ a)poble/psantes au)ta\ a)gatha\ kalei=te, a)ll' e)\ e(dona/s -te kai\ lu/pas? ou)k a)\n phai=en, o(s e)go)=|mai. . . . Ou)kou=n te\n -me\n e(done\n dio/kete o(s a)gatho\n o)/n, te\n de\ lu/pen pheu/gete -o(s kako/n?]] - -[Side-note: Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No -man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between -pleasures present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and -pain.] - -_Sokr._--It thus appears that you pursue pleasure as good, and -avoid pain as evil. Pleasure is what you think good: pain is what you -think evil: for even pleasure itself appears to you evil, when it -either deprives you of pleasures greater than itself, or entails upon -you pains outweighing itself. Is there any other reason, or any other -ulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be -evil? If there be any other between reason, or any other end, tell us -what it is.[109] _Prot._--There is none whatever. _Sokr._--The -case is similar about pains: you call pain good, when it -preserves you from greater pains, or procures for you a future -balance of pleasure. If there be any other end to which you look when -you call pain good, tell us what it is. _Prot._--You speak -truly. _Sokr._--If I am asked why I insist so much on the topic -now before us, I shall reply, that it is no easy matter to explain -what is meant by being overcome by pleasure; and that the whole proof -hinges upon this point--whether there is any other good than -pleasure, or any other evil than pain; and whether it be not -sufficient, that we should go through life pleasurably and without -pains.[110] If this be sufficient, and if no other good or evil can -be pointed out, which does not end in pleasures and pains, mark the -consequences. Good and evil being identical with pleasurable and -painful, it is ridiculous to say that a man does evil voluntarily, -knowing it to be evil, under the overpowering influence of pleasure: -that is, under the overpowering influence of good.[111] How can -it be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? It -never can be wrong, except in this case--when the good obtained is of -smaller amount than the consequent good forfeited or the consequent -evil entailed. What other exchangeable value can there be between -pleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity--greater or -less, more or fewer?[112] If an objector tells me that there is a -material difference between pleasures and pains of the moment, and -pleasures and pains postponed to a future time, I ask him in reply, -Is there any other difference, except in pleasure and pain? An -intelligent man ought to put them both in the scale, the pleasures -and the pains, the present and the future, so as to determine the -balance. Weighing pleasures against pleasures, he ought to prefer the -more and the greater: weighing pains against pains, the fewer and the -less. If pleasures against pains, then when the latter outweigh the -former, reckoning distant as well as near, he ought to abstain from -the act: when the pleasures outweigh, he ought to do it. -_Prot._--The objectors could have nothing to say against -this.[113] - -[Footnote 109: Plato, Protag, p. 354 D. [Greek: e)pei\ ei) kat' -a)/llo ti au)to\ to\ chai/rein kako\n kalei=te kai\ ei)s a)/llo ti -te/los a)poble/psantes, e)/choite a)\n kai\ e(mi=n ei)pei=n; a)ll' -ou)ch e(/xete. Ou)d' e)moi\ dokou=sin, e)/phe o( Protago/ras.]] - -[Footnote 110: Plato, Protag. p. 354 E. [Greek: e)/peita e)n tou/to| -ei)si\ pa=sai ai( a)podei/xeis; a)ll' e)/ti kai\ nu=n a)nathe/sthai -e)/xestin, ei) pe| e)/chete a)/llo ti pha/nai ei)=nai to\ a)gatho\n -e)\ te\n e(done/n, e)\ to\ kako\n a)/llo ti e)\ te\n a)ni/an, e)\ -a)rkei= u(mi=n to\ e(de/os katabio=nai to\n bi/on a)/neu lupo=n?]] - -[Footnote 111: Plato, Protag. p. 355 C.] - -[Footnote 112: Plato, Protag. p. 356 A. [Greek: kai\ ti/s a)/lle -a)xi/a e(done=| pro\s lu/pon e)sti\n a)ll' e)\ u(perbole\ a)lle/lon -kai\ e)/lleipsis? tau=ta d' e)sti\ mei/zo te kai\ smikro/tera -gigno/mena a)lle/lon, kai\ plei/o kai\ e)la/tto, kai\ ma=llon kai\ -e(=tton.]] - -[Footnote 113: Plato, Protag. p. 356 C.] - -[Side-note: Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing -pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it.] - -_Sokr._--Well then--I shall tell them farther--you know that the -same magnitude, and the same voice, appears to you greater when near -than when distant. Now, if all our well-doing depended upon our -choosing the magnitudes really greater and avoiding those really -less, where would the security of our life be found? In the art of -mensuration, or in the apparent impression?[114] Would not the latter -lead us astray, causing us to vacillate and judge badly in our choice -between great and little, with frequent repentance afterwards? Would -not the art of mensuration set aside these false appearances, and by -revealing to us the truth, impart tranquillity to our minds and -security to our lives? Would not the objectors themselves -acknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of -mensuration? _Prot._--They would acknowledge it. _Sokr._--Again, -If the good conduct of our lives depended on the choice of odd -and even, and in distinguishing rightly the greater from the less, -whether far or near, would not our safety reside in knowledge, and in -a certain knowledge of mensuration too, in Arithmetic? -_Prot._--They would concede to you that also. _Sokr._--Well then, my -friends, since the security of our lives has been found to depend on -the right choice of pleasure and pain--between the more and fewer, -greater and less, nearer and farther--does it not come to a simple -estimate of excess, deficiency, and equality between them? in other -words, to mensuration, art, or science?[115] What kind of art or -science it is, we will enquire another time: for the purpose of our -argument, enough has been done when we have shown that it _is_ -science. - -[Footnote 114: Plato, Protag. p. 356 D. [Greek: ei) ou)=n e)n tou/to| -e(mi=n e)=n to\ eu)= pra/ttein, e)n to=| ta\ me\n mega/la me/ke kai\ -pra/ttein kai\ lamba/nein, ta\ de\ smikra\ kai\ pheu/gein kai\ me\ -pra/ttein, ti/s a)\n e(mi=n soteri/a e)pha/ne tou= bi/ou? a)=ra e( -metretike\ te/chne, e)\ e( tou= phainome/nou du/namis? . . . A)=r' a)\n -o(mologoi=en oi( a)/nthropoi pro\s tau=ta e(ma=s te\n metretike\n -so/zein a)\n te/chnen, e)\ a)/llen?]] - -[Footnote 115: Plato, Protag. p. 357 A-v. [Greek: e)peide\ de\ -e(done=s te kai\ lu/pes e)n o)rthe=| te=| ai(re/sei e)pha/ne -_e(mi=n e( soteri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa, tou= te ple/onos_ kai\ -e(la/ttonos kai\ mei/zonos kai\ smikrote/ron kai\ por)r(ote/ro kai\ -e)ggute/ro, a)=ra pro=ton me\n ou) metretike\ phai/netai, u(perbole=s -te kai\ e)ndei/as ou)=sa kai\ i)so/tetos pro\s a)lle/las ske/psis? -A)ll' a)na/gke. E)pei\ de\ metretike/, a)na/gke| de/pou te/chne kai\ -e)piste/me.]] - -[Side-note: To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad -phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance.] - -For when _we_ (Protagoras and Sokrates) affirmed, that nothing -was more powerful than science or knowledge, and that this, in -whatsoever minds it existed, prevailed over pleasure and every thing -else--_you_ (the supposed objectors) maintained, on the -contrary, that pleasure often prevailed over knowledge even in the -instructed man: and you called upon us to explain, upon our -principles, what that mental affection was, which people called, -being overcome by the seduction of pleasure. We have now shown you -that this mental affection is nothing else but ignorance, and the -gravest ignorance. You have admitted that those who go wrong in the -choice of pleasures and pains--that is, in the choice of good and -evil things--go wrong from want of knowledge, of the knowledge or -science of mensuration. The wrong deed done from want of knowledge, -is done through ignorance. What you call being overcome by pleasure -is thus, the gravest ignorance; which these Sophists, Protagoras, -Prodikus, and Hippias, engage to cure: but you (the objectors whom we -now address) not believing it to be ignorance, or perhaps -unwilling to pay them their fees, refuse to visit them, and therefore -go on doing ill, both privately and publicly.[116] - -[Footnote 116: Plato, Protag. p. 357 E.] - -[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions -which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable.] - -Now then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias (continues Sokrates), I -turn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false? -(All of them pronounced it to be surpassingly true.) -_Sokr._--You all agree, then, all three, that the pleasurable is good, -and that the painful is evil:[117] for I take no account at present of -the verbal distinctions of Prodikus, discriminating between the -_pleasurable_, the _delightful_, and the _enjoyable_. -If this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of -pleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? and is not the -honourable deed, good and profitable?[118] (In this, all persons -present concurred.) If then the pleasurable is good, no one ever does -anything, when he either knows or believes other things in his power -to be better. To be inferior to yourself is nothing else than -ignorance: to be superior to yourself, is nothing else than wisdom. -Ignorance consists in holding false opinions, and in being deceived -respecting matters of high importance. (Agreed by all.) Accordingly, -no one willingly enters upon courses which are evil, or which he -believes to be evil; nor is it in the nature of man to enter upon -what he thinks evil courses, in preference to good. When a man is -compelled to make choice between two evils, no one will take the -greater when he might take the less.[119] (Agreed to by all three.) -Farther, no one will affront things of which he is afraid, when other -things are open to him, of which he is not afraid: for fear is an -expectation of evil, so that what a man fears, he of course thinks to -be an evil,--and will not approach it willingly. (Agreed.)[120] - -[Footnote 117: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphuo=s e)do/kei -a(/pasin a)lethe= ei)=nai ta\ ei)reme/na. O(mologei=te a)/ra, e)=n d' -e)go/, to\ me\n e(du\ a)gatho\n ei)=nai, to\ de\ a)niaro\n kako/n.]] - -[Footnote 118: Plato, Protag. p. 358 B. [Greek: ai( e)pi\ tou/tou -pra/xeis a(/pasai e)pi\ tou= a)lu/pos ze=n kai\ e)de/os, a)=r' ou) -kalai/? kai\ to\ kalo\n e)/rgon, a)gatho/n te kai\ o)phe/limon?]] - -[Footnote 119: Plato, Protag. p. 358 C-D. [Greek: e)pi/ ge ta\ kaka\ -ou)dei\s e(ko\n e)/rchetai, ou)de\ e)pi\ a(\ oi)/etai kaka\ ei)=nai, -ou)d' e)sti\ tou=to, o(s e)/oiken, e)n a)nthro/pou phu/sei, e)pi\ a(\ -oi)/etai kaka\ ei)=nai e)the/lein i)e/nai a)nti\ to=n a)gatho=n; -o(/tan te a)nagka/sthe| duoi=n kakoi=n to\ e(/teron ai)rei=sthai, -ou)dei\s to\ mei=zon ai(re/setai, e)xo\n to\ e)/latton.]] - -[Footnote 120: Plato, Protag. p. 358 E.] - -[Side-note: Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise -estimate of things terrible and not terrible.] - -_Sokr._--Let us now revert to the explanation of courage, given -by Protagoras. He said that four out of the five parts of virtue were -tolerably similar; but that courage differed greatly from all of -them. And he affirmed that there were men distinguished for courage; -yet at the same time eminently unjust, immoderate, unholy, and -stupid. He said, too, that the courageous men were men to attempt -things which timid men would not approach. Now, Protagoras, what are -these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt? -Will they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible? -_Prot._--That is impossible, as you have shown just now. -_Sokr._--No one will enter upon that which he believes to be -terrible,--or, in other words, will go into evil knowing it to be -evil: a man who does so is inferior to himself--and this, as we have -agreed, is ignorance, or the contrary of knowledge. All men, both -timid and brave, attempt things upon which they have a good heart: in -this respect, the things which the timid and the brave go at, are the -same.[121] _Prot._--How can this be? The things which the timid -and the brave go at or affront, are quite contrary: for example, the -latter are willing to go to war, which the former are not. -_Sokr._--Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable? -_Prot._--Honourable. _Sokr._--If it be honourable, it must -also be good:[122] for we have agreed, in the preceding debate, that -all honourable things were good. _Prot._--You speak truly.[123] -I at least always persist in thinking so. _Sokr._--Which of the -two is it, who (you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an -honourable and good thing? _Prot._--The cowards. _Sokr._--But -if going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also -pleasurable? _Prot._--Certainly that has been admitted.[124] -_Sokr._--Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into -war, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? -_Prot._--We cannot say so, without contradicting our preceding -admissions. _Sokr._--What about the courageous man? does not he -affront or go at what is more honourable, better, and more -pleasurable? _Prot._--It cannot be denied. _Sokr._--Courageous -men then, generally, are those whose fears, when they are -afraid, are honourable and good--not dishonourable or bad: and whose -confidence, when they feel confident, is also honourable and -good?[125] On the contrary, cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both -fear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions? -_Prot._--Agreed. _Sokr._--When they thus view with confidence things -dishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from -ignorance and stupidity? Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a -stupid estimate of things terrible? And is it not in this ignorance, -or stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible--that -cowardice consists? Lastly,[126]--courage being the opposite of -cowardice--is it not in the knowledge, or wise estimate, of things -terrible and things not terrible, that courage consists? - -[Footnote 121: Plato, Protag. p. 359 D. [Greek: e)pi\ me\n a(\ deina\ -e(gei=tai ei)=nai ou)dei\s e)/rchetai, e)peide\ to\ e(/tto ei)=nai -e(autou= eu(re/the a)mathi/a ou)=sa. O(molo/gei. A)lla\ me\n e)pi\ -a(/ ge thar)r(ou=si pa/ntes au)= e)/rchontai, kai\ deiloi\ kai\ -a)ndrei=oi, kai\ tau/te| ge e)pi\ ta\ au)ta\ e)/rchontai oi( deiloi/ -te kai\ oi( a)ndrei=oi.]] - -[Footnote 122: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: po/teron kalo\n o(\n -i)e/nai (ei)s to\n po/lemon) e)\ ai)schro/n? Kalo/n, e)/phe. -Ou)kou=n, ei)/per kalo/n, kai\ a)gatho\n o(mologe/samen e)n toi=s -e)/mprosthen; ta\s ga\r kala\s pra/xeis a(pa/sas a)gatha\s -o(mologe/samen?]] - -[Footnote 123: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: A)lethe= le/geis, -kai\ a)ei\ e)/moige dokei= ou(/tos.] - -This answer, put into the mouth of Protagoras, affords another proof -that Plato did not intend to impute to him the character which many -commentators impute.] - -[Footnote 124: Plato, Protag. p. 360 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n, e)\n d' -e)go/, ei)/per kalo\n kai\ a)gatho/n, kai\ e(du/? O(molo/getai gou=n, -e)/phe.]] - -[Footnote 125: Plato, Protag. p. 360 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o(/los oi( -a)ndrei=oi ou)k ai)schrou\s pho/bous phobou=ntai, o(/tav phobo=ntai, -ou)de\ ai)schra\ tha/r)r(e tha/r)r(ou=sin? . . . Ei) de\ me\ ai)schra/, -a)=r' ou) kala/? . . . Ei) de\ kala/, kai\ a)gatha/?]] - -[Footnote 126: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n e( to=n -deinon kai\ me\ deino=n a)mathi/a deili/a a)\n ei)/e? . . . E( sophi/a -a)/ra to=n deino=n kai\ me\ deino=n, a)ndrei/a e)sti/n, e)nanti/a -ou)=sa te=| tou/ton a)mathi/a|?]] - -[Side-note: Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. -Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still -in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. -Amicable reply of Protagoras.] - -Protagoras is described as answering the last few questions with -increasing reluctance. But at this final question, he declines -altogether to answer, or even to imply assent by a gesture.[127] -_Sokr._--Why will you not answer my question, either -affirmatively or negatively? _Prot._--Finish the exposition by -yourself. _Sokr._--I will only ask you one more question. Do you -still think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely -stupid, but extremely courageous? _Prot._--You seem to be -obstinately bent on making me answer: I will therefore comply with -your wish: I say that according to our previous admissions, it -appears to me impossible. _Sokr._--I have no other motive for -questioning you thus, except the wish to investigate how the truth -stands respecting virtue and what virtue is in itself.[128] To -determine this, is the way to elucidate the question which you -and I first debated at length:--I, affirming that virtue was not -teachable--you, that it was teachable. The issue of our conversation -renders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be -teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which -is the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed -that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in every -thing rather than knowledge: on which supposition it would be hardly -teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly -confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear -them up;[129] and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through -the whole investigation--First, what Virtue is,--Next, whether it is -teachable or not. It is with a provident anxiety for the conduct of -my own life that I undertake this research, and I should be delighted -to have you as a coadjutor.[130] _Prot._--I commend your -earnestness, Sokrates, and your manner of conducting discussion. I -think myself not a bad man in other respects: and as to jealousy, I -have as little of it as any one. For I have always said of you, that -I admire you much more than any man of my acquaintance--decidedly -more than any man of your own age. It would not surprise me, if you -became one day illustrious for wisdom. - -[Footnote 127: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: ou)ke/ti e)ntau=tha -ou)/t' e)pineu=sai e)the/lesen, e)si/ga te.]] - -[Footnote 128: Plato, Protag. p. 360-361. [Greek: Ou)/toi a)/llou -e(/neka e)roto= pa/nta tau=ta, e)\ ske/psasthai boulo/menos po=s pot' -e)/chei ta\ peri\ te=s a)rete=s, kai\ _ti/ pot' e)sti\n au)to\ e( -a)rete/_. Oi)=da ga\r o(/ti tou/tou phanerou= genome/nou ma/list' -a)\n kata/delon ge/noito e)kei=no, peri\ ou)= e)go/ te kai\ su\ -makro\n lo/gon e(ka/teros a)petei/namen, e)go\ me\n le/gon, o(s ou) -didakto\n a)rete/, su\ d', o(s didakto/n.]] - -[Footnote 129: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C. [Greek: e)go\ ou)=n pa/nta -tau=ta kathoro=n a)/no ka/to taratto/mena deino=s, pa=san prothumi/an -e)/cho kataphane= au)ta\ gene/sthai, kai\ bouloi/men a)\n _tau=ta -diexeltho/ntas e(ma=s e)xelthei=n kai\ e)pi\ te\n a)rete\n o(/ ti -e)/stin_.]] - -[Footnote 130: Plato, Protag. p. 361 D. [Greek: promethou/menos -u(pe\r tou= bi/ou tou= e)mautou= panto/s.]] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the -least allusion to Hippokrates.] - -Such is the end of this long and interesting dialogue.[131] We remark -with some surprise that it closes without any mention of Hippokrates, -and without a word addressed to him respecting his anxious request -for admission to the society of Protagoras: though such request had -been presented at the beginning, with much emphasis, as the sole -motive for the intervention of Sokrates. Upon this point[132] -the dialogue is open to the same criticism as that which Plato (in -the Phaedrus) bestows on the discourse of Lysias: requiring that every -discourse shall be like a living organism, neither headless nor -footless, but having extremities and a middle piece adapted to each -other. - -[Footnote 131: Most critics treat the Protagoras as a composition of -Plato's younger years--what they call his _first period_--before -the death of Sokrates. They fix different years, from 407 -B.C. (Ast) down to 402 B.C. I do not agree with -this view. I can admit no dialogue earlier than 399 B.C.: -and I consider the Protagoras to belong to Plato's full maturity.] - -[Footnote 132: Plato, Phaedrus, p. 264 C. [Greek: dei=n pa/nta lo/gon -o(/sper zo=on sunesta/nai, so=ma/ ti e)/chonta au)to\n au(tou=, o/ste -me/te a)ke/phalon ei)=nai me/te a)/poun], &c.] - -[Side-note: Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics -exhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of -Sokrates.] - -In our review of this dialogue, we have found first, towards the -beginning, an expository discourse from Protagoras, describing the -maintenance and propagation of virtue in an established community: -next, towards the close, an expository string of interrogatories by -Sokrates, destined to establish the identity of Good with -Pleasurable, Evil with Painful; and the indispensable supremacy of -the calculating or measuring science, as the tutelary guide of human -life. Of the first, I speak (like other critics) as the discourse of -Protagoras: of the second, as the theory of Sokrates. But I must -again remind the reader, that both the one and the other are -compositions of Plato; both alike are offspring of his ingenious and -productive imagination. Protagoras is not the author of that which -appears here under his name: and when we read the disparaging -epithets which many critics affix to his discourse, we must recollect -that these epithets, if they were well-founded, would have no real -application to the historical Protagoras, but only to Plato himself. -He has set forth two aspects, distinct and in part opposing, of -ethics and politics: and he has provided a worthy champion for each. -Philosophy, or "reasoned truth," if it be attainable at all, cannot -most certainly be attained without such many-sided handling: still -less can that which Plato calls knowledge be attained--or such -command of philosophy as will enable a man to stand a Sokratic -cross-examination in it. - -[Side-note: Order of ethical problems, as conceived by -Sokrates.] - -In the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,[133] we find him -proclaiming, that the first of all problems to be solved was, What -virtue really is? upon which there prevails serious confusion of -opinions. It was a second question--important, yet still second and -presupposing the solution of the first--Whether virtue is teachable? -We noticed the same judgment as to the order of the two -questions delivered by Sokrates in the Menon.[134] - -[Footnote 133: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C.] - -[Footnote 134: See the last preceding chapter of this volume, p. -242.** - -Upon this order, necessarily required, of the two questions, -Schleiermacher has a pertinent remark in his general Einleitung to -the works of Plato, p. 26. Eberhard (he says) affirms that the end -proposed by Plato in his dialogues was to form the minds of the noble -Athenian youth, so as to make them virtuous citizens. Schleiermacher -controverts the position of Eberhard; maintaining "that this is far -too subordinate a standing-point for philosophy,--besides that it is -reasoning in a circle, since philosophy has first to determine what -the virtue of a citizen is".] - -[Side-note: Difference of method between him and Protagoras -flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue -is, without enquiry.] - -Now the conception of ethical questions in this order--the reluctance -to deal with the second until the first has been fully debated and -settled--is one fundamental characteristic of Sokrates. The -difference of method, between him and Protagoras, flows from this -prior difference between them in fundamental conception. What virtue -is, Protagoras neither defines nor analyses, nor submits to debate. -He manifests no consciousness of the necessity of analysis: he -accepts the ground already prepared for him by King Nomos: he thus -proceeds as if the first step had been made sure, and takes his -departure from hypotheses of which he renders no account--as the -Platonic Sokrates complains of the geometers for doing.[135] To -Protagoras, social or political virtue is a known and familiar datum, -about which no one can mistake: which must be possessed, in greater -or less measure, by every man, as a condition of the existence of -society: which every individual has an interest in promoting in all -his neighbours: and which every one therefore teaches and enforces -upon every one else. It is a matter of common sense or common -sentiment, and thus stands in contrast with the special professional -accomplishments; which are confined only to a few--and the -possessors, teachers, and learners of which are each an assignable -section of the society. The parts or branches of virtue are, in like -manner, assumed by him as known, in their relations to each other and -to the whole. This persuasion of knowledge, without preliminary -investigation, he adopts from the general public, with whom he is in -communion of sentiment. What they accept and enforce as virtue, he -accepts and enforces also. - -[Footnote 135: See supra, vol. i. ch. viii. p. 358 and ch. xvii.** p. -136, respecting these remarks of Plato on the geometers.] - -[Side-note: Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures -addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in -harmony.] - -Again, the method pursued by Protagoras, is one suitable to a teacher -who has jumped over this first step; who assumes virtue, as something -fixed in the public sentiments--and addresses himself to those -sentiments, ready-made as he finds them. He expands and illustrates -them in continuous lectures of some length, which fill both the ears -and minds of the listener--"Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna": he -describes their growth, propagation, and working in the community: he -gives interesting comments on the poets, eulogising the admired -heroes who form the theme of their verses, and enlarging on their -admonitions. Moreover, while resting altogether upon the authority of -King Nomos, he points out the best jewel in the crown of that -potentate; the great social fact of punishment prospective, -rationally apportioned, and employed altogether for preventing and -deterring--instead of being a mere retrospective impulse, vindictive -or retributive for the past. He describes instructively the machinery -operative in the community for ensuring obedience to what they think -right: he teaches, in his eloquent expositions and interpretations, -the same morality, public and private, that every one else teaches: -while he can perform the work of teaching, somewhat more effectively -than they. Lastly, his method is essentially showy and popular; -intended for numerous assemblies, reproducing the established creeds -and sentiments of those assemblies, to their satisfaction and -admiration. He is prepared to be met and answered in his own way, by -opposing speakers; and he conceives himself more than a match for -such rivals. He professes also to possess the art of short -conversation or discussion. But in the exercise of this art, he runs -almost involuntarily into his more characteristic endowment of -continuous speech: besides that the points which he raises for -discussion assume all the fundamental principles, and turn only upon -such applications of those principles as are admitted by most persons -to be open questions, not foreclosed by a peremptory orthodoxy. - -[Side-note: Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the -problem which Protagoras had left out.] - -Upon all these points, Sokrates is the formal antithesis of -Protagoras. He disclaims altogether the capacities to which that -Sophist lays claim. Not only he cannot teach virtue, but he professes -not to know what it is, nor whether it be teachable at all, He -starts from a different point of view: not considering virtue as a -known datum, or as an universal postulate, but assimilating it to a -special craft or accomplishment, in which a few practitioners suffice -for the entire public: requiring that in this capacity it shall be -defined, and its practitioners and teachers pointed out. He has no -common ground with Protagoras; for the difficulties which he moots -are just such as the common consciousness (and Protagoras along with -it) overleaps or supposes to be settled. His first requirement, -advanced under the modest guise of a small doubt[136] which -Protagoras must certainly be competent to remove, is, to know--What -virtue is? What are the separate parts of virtue--justice, -moderation, holiness, &c.? What is the relation which they bear -to each other and to the whole--virtue? Are they homogeneous, -differing only in quantity or has each of them its own specific -essence and peculiarity?[137] Respecting virtue as a whole, we must -recollect, Protagoras had discoursed eloquently and confidently, as -of a matter perfectly known. He is now called back as it were to meet -an attack in the rear: to answer questions which he had never -considered, and which had never even presented themselves to him as -questions. At first he replies as if the questions offered no -difficulty;[138] sometimes he does not feel their importance, so that -it seems to him a matter of indifference whether he replies in the -affirmative or negative.[139] But he finds himself brought round, by -a series of questions, to assent to conclusions which he nevertheless -thinks untrue, and which are certainly unwelcome. Accordingly, he -becomes more and more disgusted with the process of analytical -interrogation: and at length answers with such impatience and -prolixity, that the interrogation can no longer be prosecuted. Here -comes in the break--the remonstrance of Sokrates--and the mediation -of the by-standers. - -[Footnote 136: Plato, Protag. p. 328 E. [Greek: ple\n smikro/n ti/ -moi e)mpodo/n, o(/ de=lon o(/ti Protago/ras r(a|di/os e)pekdida/xei], -&c.] - -[Footnote 137: Respecting Ariston of Chios, Diogenes Laertius tells -us--[Greek: A)reta\s d' ou)/te polla\s ei)se=gen, o(s o( Ze/non, -ou)/te mi/an polloi=s o)no/masin kaloume/nen--a)lla\ kai\ to\ pro\s -ti/ pos e)/chein] (Diog. Laert. vii. 161).] - -[Footnote 138: Plato, Protag. p. 329 D. [Greek: A)lla\ r(a/|dion -tou=to/ g', e)/phe, a)pokri/nasthai], &c.] - -[Footnote 139: Plato, Protag. p. 321 D. [Greek: ei) ga\r bou/lei, -e)/sto e(mi=n kai\ dikaiosu/ne o(/sion kai\ o(sio/tes di/kaion. Me/ -moi, e)=n d' e)go/; ou)de\n ga\r de/omai to\ "_ei) bou/lei_" -tou=to kai\ "_ei) soi dokei=_" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te -kai\ se/.]] - -[Side-note: Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and -the analytical cross-examiner.] - -It is this antithesis between the eloquent popular lecturer, and the -analytical enquirer and cross-examiner, which the dialogue seems -mainly intended to set forth. Protagoras professes to know that which -he neither knows, nor has ever tried to probe to the bottom. Upon -this false persuasion of knowledge, the Sokratic Elenchus is brought -to bear. We are made to see how strange, repugnant, and perplexing, -is the process of analysis to this eloquent expositor: how -incompetent he is to go through it without confusion: how little he -can define his own terms, or determine the limits of those notions on -which he is perpetually descanting. - -[Side-note: Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, -though he is described as brought to a contradiction.] - -It is not that Protagoras is proved to be wrong (I speak now of this -early part of the conversation, between chapters 51-62--pp. 329-335) -in the substantive ground which he takes. I do not at all believe (as -many critics either affirm or imply) that Plato intended all which he -in the composed under the name of Protagoras to be vile perversion of -truth, with nothing but empty words and exorbitant pretensions. I do -not even believe that Plato intended all those observations, to which -the name of Protagoras is prefixed, to be accounted silly--while all -that is assigned to Sokrates,[140] is admirable sense and acuteness. -It is by no means certain that Plato intended to be understood as -himself endorsing the opinions which he ascribes everywhere to -Sokrates: and it is quite certain that he does not always make the -Sokrates of one dialogue consistent with the Sokrates of another. For -the purpose of showing the incapacity of the respondent to satisfy -the exigencies of analysis, we need not necessarily suppose that the -conclusion to which the questions conduct should be a true one. If -the respondent be brought, through his own admissions, to a -contradiction, this is enough to prove that he did not know the -subject deeply enough to make the proper answers and distinctions. - -[Footnote 140: Schoene, in his Commentary on the Protagoras, is of -opinion that a good part of Plato's own doctrine is given under the -name of Protagoras (Ueber den Protag. von Platon, p. 180 seq.).] - -[Side-note: Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is -affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere.] - -But whatever may have been the intention of Plato, if we look at the -fact, we shall find that what he has assigned to Sokrates is not -always true, nor what he has given to Protagoras, always false. -The positions laid down by the latter--That many men are courageous, -but unjust: that various persons are just, without being wise and -intelligent: that he who possesses one virtue, does not of necessity -possess all:[141]--are not only in conformity with the common -opinion, but are quite true, though Sokrates is made to dispute them. -Moreover, the arguments employed by Sokrates (including in those -arguments the strange propositions that justice is just, and that -holiness is holy) are certainly noway conclusive.[142] Though -Protagoras, becoming entangled in difficulties, and incapable of -maintaining his consistency against an embarrassing -cross-examination, is of course exhibited as ignorant of that which he -professes to know--the doctrine which he maintains is neither untrue -in itself, nor even shown to be apparently untrue. - -[Footnote 141: Plato, Protag. p. 329 E. Protagoras is here made to -affirm that many men are courageous who are neither just, nor -temperate, nor virtuous in other respects. Sokrates contradicts the -position. But in the Treatise De Legibus (i. p. 630 B), Plato himself -says same thing as Protagoras is here made to say: at least assuming -that the Athenian speaker in De Legg. represents the sentiment of -Plato himself at the time when he composed that treatise.] - -[Footnote 142: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C, p. 333 B. - -To say "Justice is just," or "Holiness is holy," is indeed either -mere tautology, or else an impropriety of speech. Dr. Hutcheson -observes on an analogous case: "None can apply moral attributes to -the very faculty of perceiving moral qualities: or call his moral -Sense morally Good or Evil, any more than he calls the power of -tasting, sweet or bitter--or the power of seeing, straight or -crooked, white or black" (Hutcheson on the Passions, sect. i. p. -234).] - -[Side-note: The harsh epithets applied by critics to -Protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same -ground as the common consciousness.] - -As to the arrogant and exorbitant pretensions which the Platonic -commentators ascribe to Protagoras, more is said than the reality -justifies. He pretends to know what virtue, justice, moderation, -courage, &c., are, and he is proved not to know. But this is what -every one else pretends to know also, and what every body else -teaches as well as he--"_Haec Janus summus ab imo Perdocet: haec -recinunt juvenes dictata senesque_". What he pretends to do, -beyond the general public, he really can do. He can discourse, -learnedly and eloquently, upon these received doctrines and -sentiments: he can enlist the feelings and sympathies of the public -in favour of that which he, in common with the public, believes to be -good--and against that which he and they believe to be bad: he -can thus teach virtue more effectively than others. But whether that -which is received as virtue, be really such--he has never analysed or -verified: nor does he willingly submit to the process of analysis. -Here again he is in harmony with the general public; for they hate, -as much as he does, to be dragged back to fundamentals, and forced to -explain, defend, revise, or modify, their established sentiments and -maxims: which they apply as _principia_ for deduction to -particular cases, and which they recognise as axioms whereby other -things are to be tried, not as liable to be tried themselves. -Protagoras is one of the general public, in dislike of, and -inaptitude for, analysis and dialectic discussion: while he stands -above them in his eloquence and his power of combining, illustrating, -and adorning, received doctrines. These are points of superiority, -not pretended, but real. - -[Side-note: Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude -about the song of Simonides.] - -The aversion of Protagoras for dialectic discussion--after causing an -interruption of the ethical argument, and an interlude of comment on -the poet Simonides--is at length with difficulty overcome, and the -argument is then resumed. The question still continues, What is -virtue? What are the five different parts of virtue? Yet it is so far -altered that Protagoras now admits that the four parts of virtue -which Sokrates professed to have shown to be nearly identical, really -are tolerably alike: but he nevertheless contends that courage is -very different from all of them, repeating his declaration that many -men are courageous, but unjust and stupid at the same time. This -position Sokrates undertakes to refute. In doing so, he lays out one -of the largest, most distinct, and most positive theories of virtue, -which can be found in the Platonic writings. - -[Side-note: Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at -length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation -of pleasures and pains of the agent.] - -Virtue, according to this theory, consists in a right measurement and -choice of pleasures and pains: in deciding correctly, wherever we -have an alternative, on which side lies the largest pleasure or the -least pain--and choosing the side which presents this balance. To -live pleasurably, is pronounced to be good: to live without pleasure -or in pain, is evil. Moreover, nothing but pleasure, or comparative -mitigation of pain, is good: nothing but pain is evil.[143] -Good, is identical with the greatest pleasure or least pain: evil, -with greatest pain: meaning thereby each pleasure and each pain when -looked at along with its consequences and concomitants. The grand -determining cause and condition of virtue is knowledge: the -knowledge, science, or art, of correctly measuring the comparative -value of different pleasures and pains. Such knowledge (the theory -affirms), wherever it is possessed, will be sure to command the whole -man, to dictate all his conduct, and to prevail over every temptation -of special appetite or aversion. To say that a man who knows on which -side the greatest pleasure or the least pain lies, will act against -his knowledge--is a mistake. If he acts in this way, it is plain that -he does not possess the knowledge, and that he sins through -ignorance. - -[Footnote 143: The substantial identity of Good with Pleasure, of -Evil with Pain, was the doctrine of the historical Sokrates as -declared in Xenophon's Memorabilia. See, among other passages, i. 6, -8. [Greek: Tou= de\ me\ douleu/ein gastri\ mede\ u(/pno| kai\ -lagnei/a|, oi)/ei ti a)/llo ai)tio/teron ei)=nai, e)\ to\ e(/tera -e)/chein tou/ton e(di/o, a(\ ou) mo/non e)n chrei/a| o)/nta -eu)phrai/nei, a)lla\ kai\ e)lpi/das pare/chonta o)phele/sein a)ei/? -Kai\ me\n tou=to/ ge oi)=stha, o(/ti oi( me\n oi)o/menoi mede\n eu)= -pra/ttein ou)k eu)phrai/nontai, oi( de\ e(gou/menoi kalo=s -prochorei=n e(autoi=s, e)\ georgi/an e)\ naukleri/an e)\ a)/ll' o(/, -ti a)\n tugcha/nosin e)rgazo/menoi, o(s eu)= pra/ttontes -eu)phrai/nontai. Oi)/ei ou)=n a)po\ pa/nton tou/ton tosau/ten -e(done\n ei)=nai, o(/sen a)po\ tou= e(auto/n te e(gei=sthai belti/o -gi/gnesthai kai\ phi/lous a)mei/nous kta=sthai? E)go\ toi/nun -diatelo= tau=ta nomi/zon.] - -Locke says, 'Essay on Human Understanding,' Book ii. ch. 28, "Good or -Evil is nothing but pleasure or pain to us--or that which procures -pleasure or pain to us. Moral good or evil then is only the -conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, -whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the -law-maker; which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our -observance or breach of the law, is that we call reward or punishment." - -The formal distinction here taken by Locke between pleasure and that -which procures pleasure--both the one and the other being called -Good--(the like in regard to pain and evil) is not distinctly stated -by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though he says nothing inconsistent -with it: but it is distinctly stated in the Republic, ii. p. 357, -where Good is distributed under three heads. 1. That which we desire -immediately and for itself--such as Enjoyment, Innocuous pleasure. 2. -That which we desire both for itself and for its consequences--health, -intelligence, good sight or hearing, &c. 3. That which we -do not desire (perhaps even shun) for itself, but which we accept by -reason of its consequences in averting greater pains or procuring -greater pleasures. - -This discrimination of the varieties of Good, given in the Republic, -is quite consistent with what is stated by Sokrates in the -Protagoras, though it is more full and precise. But it is not -consistent with what Sokrates says in the Gorgias, where he asserts a -radical dissimilarity of nature between [Greek: e(du\] and [Greek: -a)gatho/n].] - -[Side-note: Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory.] - -Protagoras agrees with Sokrates in the encomiums bestowed on the -paramount importance and ascendancy of knowledge: but does not at -first agree with him in identifying good with pleasure, and evil with -pain. Upon this point, too, he is represented as agreeing in -opinion with the Many. He does not admit that to live pleasurably is -good, unless where a man takes his pleasure in honourable things. He -thinks it safer, and more consistent with his own whole life, to -maintain--That pleasurable things, or painful things, may be either -good, or evil, or indifferent, according to the particular case. - -[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates.] - -This doctrine Sokrates takes much pains to refute. He contends that -pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, are always good--and -painful things, so far forth as painful, always evil. When some -pleasures are called evil, that is not on account of any thing -belonging to the pleasure itself, but because of its ulterior -consequences and concomitants, which are painful or distressing in a -degree more than countervailing the pleasure. So too, when some pains -are pronounced to be good, this is not from any peculiarity in the -pain itself, but because of its consequences and concomitants: such -pain being required as a condition to the attainment of health, -security, wealth, and other pleasures or satisfactions more than -counter-balancing. Sokrates challenges opponents to name any other -end, with reference to which things are called _good_, except -their tendency to prevent or relieve pains and to ensure a balance of -pleasure: he challenges them to name any other end, with reference to -which things are called _evil_, except their tendency to produce -pains and to intercept or destroy pleasures. In measuring pleasures -and pains against each other, there is no other difference to be -reckoned except that of greater or less, more or fewer. The -difference between near and distant, does indeed obtrude itself upon -us as a misleading element. But it is the special task of the -"measuring science" to correct this illusion--and to compare -pleasures or pains, whether near or distant, according to their real -worth: just as we learn to rectify the illusions of the sight in -regard to near and distant objects. - -[Side-note: Application of that reasoning to the case of -courage.] - -Sokrates proceeds to apply this general principle in correcting the -explanation of courage given by Protagoras. He shows, or tries to -show, that courage, like all the other branches of virtue, consists -in acting on a just estimate of comparative pleasures and pains. No -man affronts evil, or the alternative of greater pain, knowing it -to be such: no man therefore adventures himself in any terrible -enterprise, knowing it to be so: neither the brave nor the timid do -this. Both the brave and the timid affront that which they think not -terrible, or the least terrible of two alternatives: but they -estimate differently what is such. The former go readily to war when -required, the latter evade it. Now to go into war when required, is -honourable: being honourable, it is good: being honourable and good, -it is pleasurable. The brave know this, and enter upon it willingly: -the timid not only do not know it, but entertain the contrary -opinion, looking upon war as painful and terrible, and therefore -keeping aloof. The brave men fear what it is honourable to fear, the -cowards what it is dishonourable to fear: the former act upon the -knowledge of what is really terrible, the latter are misled by their -ignorance of it. Courage is thus, like the other virtues, a case of -accurate knowledge of comparative pleasures and pains, or of good and -evil.[144] - -[Footnote 144: Compare, respecting Courage, a passage in the -Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, which is better stated there (though -substantially the same opinion) than here in the Protagoras. - -The opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be illustrated by a sentence -from the funeral oration delivered by Perikles, Thucyd. ii. 43, fin. -[Greek: A)lgeinote/ra ga\r a)ndri/ ge phro/nema e)/chonti e( e)n to=| -meta\ tou= malakisthe=nai ka/kosis, e)\ o( meta\ r(o/mes kai\ koine=s -e)lpi/dos a(/ma gigno/menos a)nai/sthetos tha/natos]--which Dr. -Arnold thus translates in his note: "For more grievous to a man of -noble mind is the misery which comes together with cowardice, than -the unfelt death which befalls him in the midst of his strength and -hopes for the common welfare." - -So again in the Phaedon (p. 68) Sokrates describes the courage of the -ordinary unphilosophical citizen to consist in braving death from -fear of greater evils (which is the same view as that of Sokrates in -the Protagoras), while the philosopher is courageous on a different -principle; aspiring only to reason and intelligence, with the -pleasures attending it, he welcomes death as releasing his mind from -the obstructive companionship of the body. - -The fear of disgrace and dishonour, in his own eyes and in those of -others, is more intolerable to the brave man than the fear of wounds -and death in the service of his country. See Plato, Leg. i. pp. -646-647. He is [Greek: phobero\s meta\ no/mou, meta\ di/kes], p. 647 E. -Such is the way in which both Plato and Thucydides conceive the -character of the brave citizen as compared with the coward. - -It is plain that this resolves itself ultimately into a different -estimate of prospective pains; the case being one in which pleasure -is not concerned. That the pains of self-reproach and infamy in the -eyes of others are among the most agonising in the human bosom, need -hardly be remarked. At the same time the sentiments here conceived -embrace a wide field of sympathy, comprising the interests, honour, -and security, of others as well as of the individual agent.] - -[Side-note: The theory which Plato here lays down is more -distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues.] - -Such is the ethical theory which the Platonic Sokrates enunciates in -this dialogue, and which Protagoras and others accept. It is positive -and distinct, to a degree very unusual with Plato. We shall find that -he theorises differently in other dialogues; whether for the -better or the worse, will be hereafter seen. He declares here -explicitly that pleasure, or happiness, is the end to be pursued; and -pain, or misery, the end to be avoided: and that there is no other -end, in reference to which things can be called good or evil, except -as they tend to promote pleasure or mitigate suffering, on the one -side--to entail pain or suffering on the other. He challenges -objectors to assign any other end. And thus much is certain--that in -those other dialogues where he himself departs from the present -doctrine, he has not complied with his own challenge. Nowhere has he -specified a different end. In other dialogues, as well as in the -Protagoras, Plato has insisted on the necessity of a science or art -of calculation: but in no other dialogue has he told us distinctly -what are the items to be calculated. - -[Side-note: Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. -It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential.] - -I perfectly agree with the doctrine laid down by Sokrates in the -Protagoras, that pain or suffering is the End to be avoided or -lessened as far as possible--and pleasure or happiness the End to be -pursued as far as attainable--by intelligent forethought and -comparison: that there is no other intelligible standard of -reference, for application of the terms Good and Evil, except the -tendency to produce happiness or misery: and that if this standard be -rejected, ethical debate loses all standard for rational discussion, -and becomes only an enunciation of the different sentiments, -authoritative and self-justifying, prevalent in each community. But -the End just mentioned is highly complex, and care must be taken to -conceive it in its full comprehension. Herein I conceive the argument -of Sokrates (in the Protagoras) to be incomplete. It carries -attention only to a part of the truth, keeping out of sight, though -not excluding, the remainder. It considers each man as an individual, -determining good or evil for himself by calculating his own pleasures -and pains: as a prudent, temperate, and courageous agent, but neither -as just nor beneficent. It omits to take account of him as a member -of a society, composed of many others akin or co-ordinate with -himself. Now it is the purpose of an ethical or political reasoner -(such as Plato both professes to be and really is) to study the means -of happiness, not simply for the agent himself, but for that -agent together with others around him--for the members of the -community generally.[145] The Platonic Sokrates says this himself in -the Republic: and accordingly, he there treats of other points which -are not touched upon by Sokrates in the Protagoras. He proclaims that -the happiness of each citizen must be sought only by means consistent -with the security, and to a certain extent with the happiness, of -others: he provides as far as practicable that all shall derive their -pleasures and pains from the same causes: common pleasures, and -common pains, to all.[146] The doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras -requires to be enlarged so as to comprehend these other important -elements. Since the conduct of every agent affects the happiness of -others, he must be called upon to take account of its consequences -under both aspects, especially where it goes to inflict hurt or -privation upon others. Good and evil depend upon that scientific -computation and comparison of pleasures and pains which Sokrates in -the Protagoras prescribes: but the computation must include, to a -certain extent, the pleasures and pains (security and rightful -expectations) of others besides the agent himself, implicated in the -consequences of his acts.[147] - -[Footnote 145: Plato, Republ. iv. pp. 420-421, v. p. 466 A.] - -[Footnote 146: Plato, Republ. v. pp. 462 A-B-D, 464 A-D. - -Throughout the first of these passages we see [Greek: a)gatho\n] used -as the equivalent of [Greek: e(done/], [Greek: kako\n] as the -equivalent of [Greek: lu/pe].] - -[Footnote 147: See, especially on this point, the brief but valuable -Tract on Utilitarianism by Mr. John Stuart Mill. In page 16 of that -work attention is called to the fact, that in Utilitarianism the -standard is not the greatest happiness of the agent himself alone, -but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. So that we cannot -with exactness call the doctrine of Sokrates, in his conversation -with Protagoras, "the theory of Utilitarianism," as Mr. Mill calls it -in page 1.] - -[Side-note: Comparison with the Republic.] - -As to this point, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates not always -correct, nor even consistent with himself. This will appear -especially when we come to see the account which he gives of Justice -in the Republic. In that branch of the Ethical End, a direct regard -to the security of others comes into the foreground. For in an act of -injustice, the prominent characteristic is that of harm, done to -others--though that is not the whole, since the security of the agent -himself is implicated with that of others in the general fulfilment -of these obligations. It is this primary regard to others, and -secondary regard to self, implicated in one complex feeling--which -distinguishes justice from prudence. The Platonic Sokrates in -the Republic (though his language is not always clear) does not admit -this; but considers justice as a branch of prudence, necessary to -ensure the happiness of the individual agent himself. - -[Side-note: The discourse of Protagoras brings out an -important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by -Sokrates.] - -Now in the Protagoras, what the Platonic Sokrates dwells upon (in the -argument which I have been considering) is prudence, temperance, -courage: little or nothing is said about justice: there was therefore -the less necessity for insisting on that prominent -reference to the security of others (besides the agent himself) which -justice involves. If, however, we turn back to the earlier part of -the dialogue, to the speech delivered by Protagoras, we see justice -brought into the foreground. It is not indeed handled analytically -(which is not the manner of that Sophist), nor is it resolved into -regard to pleasure and pain, happiness and misery: but it is -announced as a social sentiment indispensably and reciprocally -necessary from every man towards every other ([Greek: di/ke--ai)do\s]), -distinguishable from those endowments which supply the -wants and multiply the comforts of the individual himself. The very -existence of the social union requires, that each man should feel a -sentiment of duties on his part towards others, and duties on their -parts towards him: or (in other words) of rights on his part to have -his interests considered by others, and rights on their parts to have -their interests considered by him. Unless this sentiment of -reciprocity--reciprocal duty and right--exist in the bosom of each -individual citizen, or at least in the large majority--no social -union could subsist. There are doubtless different degrees of the -sentiment: moreover the rights and duties may be apportioned better -or worse, more or less fairly, among the individuals of a society; -thus rendering the society more or less estimable and comfortable. -But without a certain minimum of the sentiment in each individual -bosom, even the worst constituted society could not hold together. -And it is this sentiment of reciprocity which Protagoras (in the -dialogue before us) is introduced as postulating in his declaration, -that justice and the sense of shame (unlike to professional -aptitudes) must be distributed universally and without exception -among all the members of a community. Each man must feel them, -in his conduct towards others: each man must also be able to reckon -that others will feel the like, in their behaviour towards him.[148] - -[Footnote 148: Professor Bain (in his work on the Emotions and the -Will, ch. xv. On the Ethical Emotions, pp. 271-3) has given remarks -extremely pertinent to the illustration of that doctrine which Plato -has here placed under the name of Protagoras. - -"The supposed uniformity of moral distinctions resolves itself into -the two following particulars. First, the common end of _public -security_, which is also individual preservation, demands certain -precautions that are everywhere very much alike, and can in no case -be dispensed with. Some sort of constituted authority to control the -individual impulses and to protect each man's person and property, -must exist wherever a number of human beings live together. The -duties springing out of this necessary arrangement are essentially -the same in all societies. . . They have a pretty uniform character -all over the globe. If the sense of the common safety were not -sufficiently strong to constitute the social tie of obedience to some -common regulations, society could not exist. . . . It is no proof of -the universal spread of a special innate faculty of moral -distinctions, but of a certain rational appreciation of what is -necessary for the very existence of every human being living in the -company of others: Doubtless, if the sad history of the human race -had been preserved in all its details, we _should have many -examples of tribes that perished from being unequal to the conception -of a social system, or to the restraints imposed by it_. We know -enough of the records of anarchy, to see how difficult it is for -human nature to comply in full with the social conditions of -security; but if this were not complied with at all, the result would -be mutual and swift destruction. . . . In the second place, mankind -have been singularly unanimous in the practice of imposing upon -individual members of societies some observances or restraints of -purely _sentimental_ origin, having no reference, direct or -indirect, to the maintenance of the social tie, with all the -safeguards implied in it. Certain maxims founded in taste, liking, -aversion, or fancy, have, in every community known to us, been raised -to the dignity of authoritative morality; being rendered (so to -speak) 'terms of communion,' and have been enforced by punishment. -. . . In the rules, founded on men's sentiments, likings, aversions, -and antipathies, there is nothing common but the fact that some one -or other of these are carried to the length of public requirement, -and mixed up in one code with the imperative duties that hold society -together." - -The postulate of the Platonic Protagoras--that [Greek: di/ke] and -[Greek: ai)do\s] must be felt to a certain extent in each man's -bosom, as a condition to the very existence of society--agrees with -the first of the two elements here distinguished by Mr. Bain, and -does not necessarily go beyond it. But the unsystematic teaching and -universal propagandism, which Protagoras describes as the agency -whereby virtue is communicated, applies alike to both the two -elements distinguished by Mr. Bain: to the factitious exigencies of -King Nomos, as well as to his tutelary control. It is this mixed mass -that the Sokratic analysis is brought to examine.] - -[Side-note: The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of -Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of -other persons besides the agent himself.] - -If we thus compare the Ethical End, as implied, though not explicitly -laid down, by Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue,--and as -laid down by Sokrates in the later part--we shall see that while -Sokrates restricts it to a true comparative estimate of the pains and -pleasures of the agent himself, Protagoras enlarges it so as to -include a direct reference to those of others also, coupled with an -expectation of the like reference on the part of others.[149] -Sokrates is satisfied with requiring from each person calculating -prudence for his own pleasures and pains: while Protagoras proclaims -that after this attribute had been obtained by man, and individual -wants supplied, still there was a farther element necessary in the -calculation--the social sentiment or reciprocity of regard implanted -in every one's bosom: without this the human race would have -perished. Prudence and skill will suffice for an isolated existence; -but if men are to live and act in social communion, the services as -well as the requirements of each man must be shaped, in a certain -measure, with a direct view to the security of others as well as to -his own. - -[Footnote 149: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322.] - -In my judgment, the Ethical End, exclusively self-regarding, here -laid down by Sokrates, is too narrow. And if we turn to other -Platonic dialogues, we shall find Sokrates still represented as -proclaiming a self-regarding Ethical End, though not the same as what -we read in the Protagoras. In the Gorgias, Republic, Phaedon, &c., -we shall find him discountenancing the calculation (recommended in -the Protagoras) of pleasures and pains against each other, as -greater, more certain, durable, &c., and insisting that all shall -be estimated according as they bear on the general condition or -health of the mind, which he assimilates to the general condition or -health of the body. The health of the body, considered as an End to -be pursued, is essentially self-regarding: so also is the health of -the mind. I shall touch upon this farther when I consider the -above-mentioned dialogues: at present, I only remark that they agree -with the Sokrates of the Protagoras in assuming a self-regarding Ethical -End, though they do not agree with him in describing what that End -should be. - -[Side-note: Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or -satisfactory, especially about courage.] - -The application which Sokrates makes (in the Protagoras) of his own -assumed Ethical End to the explanation of courage, is certainly -confused and unsatisfactory. And indeed, we may farther remark that -the general result at which Plato seems to be aiming in this -dialogue, viz.: That all the different virtues are at the bottom one -and the same, and that he who possesses one of them must also -possess the remainder--cannot be made out even upon his own -assumptions. Though it be true that all the virtues depend upon -correct calculation, yet as each of them applies to a different set -of circumstances and different disturbing and misleading causes, the -same man who calculates well under one set of circumstances, may -calculate badly under others. The position laid down by Protagoras, -that men are often courageous but unjust--just, but not wise--is -noway refuted by Plato. Nor is it even inconsistent with Plato's own -theory, though he seems to think it so. - -[Side-note: Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not -correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended -by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists.] - -Some of the Platonic commentators maintain,[150] that the doctrine -here explicitly laid down and illustrated by Sokrates, _viz._: -the essential identity of the pleasurable with the good, of the -painful with the evil--is to be regarded as not serious, but as taken -up in jest for the purpose of mocking and humiliating Protagoras. -Such an hypothesis appears to me untenable; contradicted by the whole -tenor of the dialogue. Throughout all the Platonic compositions, -there is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct, more -serious, and more elaborate, than that by which Sokrates here proves -the identity of good with pleasure, of pain with evil (p. 351 to -end). Protagoras begins by denying it, and is only compelled to -accept the conclusion against his own will, by the series of -questions which he cannot otherwise answer.[151] Sokrates admits that -the bulk of mankind are also opposed to it: but he establishes it -with an ingenuity which is pronounced to be triumphant by all the -hearers around.[152] The commentators are at liberty to impeach -the reasoning as unsound; but to set it aside as mere banter and -mockery, is preposterous. Assume it even to be intended as -mockery--assume that Sokrates is mystifying the hearers, by a string of -delusive queries, to make out a thesis which he knows to be untrue -and silly--how can the mockery fall upon Protagoras, who denies the -thesis from the beginning?[153] The irony, if it were irony, would be -misplaced and absurd. - -[Footnote 150: See Brandis, Gesch. d. Griech.-Roem., Phil. Part ii. -sect. 114, note 3 p. 458; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Protag. -pp. 15-33-34. - -So too Ficinus says in his Argumentum to the Protagoras: (p. 765) -"Tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur. Siquidem prudentia est -scientia eligendi boni, malique vitandi. Ambigitur autem utrum bonum -malumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor. _Neque -affirmatur id quidem omnino, neque manifeste omnino negatur._ De -hoc enim in Gorgia Phileboque et alibi," &c. - -When a critic composes an Argument to the Protagoras, he is surely -under obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is declared by -Sokrates _in the Protagoras_, whether it be consistent or not -with the Gorgias and Philebus. Yet here we find Ficinus -misrepresenting the Protagoras, in order to force it into harmony -with the other two.] - -[Footnote 151: This is so directly stated that I am surprised to find -Zeller (among many other critics) announcing that Plato here accepts -for the occasion the _Standpunkt_ of his enemies (Philos. der -Griech. vol. ii. p. 380, ed. 2nd).] - -[Footnote 152: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphuo=s e)do/kei -a(/pasin a)lethe= ei)=nai ta\ ei)reme/na.]] - -[Footnote 153: When Stallbaum asserts that the thesis is taken up by -Sokrates as one which was maintained by Protagoras and the other -Sophists (Proleg. p. 33), he says what is distinctly at variance with -the dialogue, p. 351. - -Schleiermacher maintains that this same thesis (the fundamental -identity of good with pleasure, evil with pain) is altogether -"unsokratic and unplatonic"; that it is handled here by Sokrates in a -manner visibly ironical (sichtbar ironisch); that the purpose of the -argument is to show the stupidity of Protagoras, who is puzzled and -imposed upon by such obvious fallacies (Einleitung zum Protag. 230, -bottom of p. 232), and who is made to exhibit (so Schleiermacher -says, Einl. zum Gorgias, p. 14) a string of ludicrous absurdities. - -Upon this I have to remark first, that if the stupidity of Protagoras -is intended to be shown up, that of all the other persons present -must be equally manifested; for all of them assent emphatically, at -the close, to the thesis as having been proved (Prot. p. 358 A): -next, that I am unable to see either the absurdities of Protagoras or -the irony of Sokrates, which Schleiermacher asserts to be so visible. -The argument of Sokrates is as serious and elaborate as any thing -which we read in Plato. Schleiermacher seems to me to misconceive -altogether (not only here but also in his Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. -10) the concluding argument of Sokrates in the Protagoras. To -describe the identity between [Greek: e(du\] and [Greek: a)gatho\n] -as a "scheinbare Voraussetzung" is to depart from the plain meaning -of words. - -Again, Steinhart contends that Sokrates assumes this doctrine -(identity of pleasure with good, pain with evil), "not as his own -opinion, but only hypothetically, with a sarcastic side-glance at the -absurd consequences which many deduced from it--only as the received -world-morality, as the opinion of the majority" (Einleit. zum Protag. -p. 419). How Steinhart can find proof of this in the dialogue, I am -at a loss to understand. The dialogue presents to us Sokrates -introducing the opinion as his own, against that of Protagoras and -against that of the multitude (p. 351 C). On hearing this opposition -from Protagoras, Sokrates invites him to an investigation, whether -the opinion be just; Sokrates then conducts the investigation -himself, along with Protagoras, at considerable length, and -ultimately brings out the doctrine as proved, with the assent of all -present. - -These forced interpretations are resorted to, because the critics -cannot bear to see the Platonic Sokrates maintaining a thesis -substantially the same as that of Eudoxus and Epikurus. Upon this -point, K. F. Hermann is more moderate than the others; he admits the -thesis to be seriously maintained in the dialogue--states that it was -really the opinion of the historical Sokrates--and adds that it was -also the opinion of Plato himself during his early Sokratic stadium, -when the Protagoras (as he thinks) was composed (Gesch. und Syst. der -Plat. Phil. pp. 462-463). - -Most of the critics agree in considering the Protagoras to be one of -Plato's earlier dialogues, about 403 B.C. Ast even refers it -to 407 B.C. when Plato was about twenty-one years of age. I -have already given my reasons for believing that none of the Platonic -dialogues were composed before 399 B.C. The Protagoras -belongs, in my opinion, to Plato's most perfect and mature period.] - -[Side-note: Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency.] - -The commentators resort to this hypothesis, partly because the -doctrine in question is one which they disapprove--partly -because doctrines inconsistent with it are maintained in other -Platonic dialogues. These are the same two reasons upon which, in -other cases, various dialogues have been rejected as not genuine -works of Plato. The first of the two reasons is plainly irrelevant: -we must accept what Plato gives us, whether we assent to it or not. -The second reason also, I think, proves little. The dialogues are -distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and -purpose: we have no right to require that they shall be all -consistent with each other in doctrine, especially when we look to -the long philosophical career of Plato. To suppose that the elaborate -reasoning of Sokrates in the latter portion of the Protagoras is mere -irony, intended to mystify both Protagoras himself and all the -by-standers, who accept it as earnest and convincing--appears to me far -less reasonable than the admission, that the dialectic pleading -ascribed to Sokrates in one dialogue is inconsistent with that -assigned to him in another. - -[Side-note: Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the -close of the dialogue.] - -Though there is every mark of seriousness, and no mark of irony, in -this reasoning of Sokrates, yet we must remember that he does not -profess to leave the subject settled at the close of the dialogue. On -the contrary, he declares himself to be in a state of puzzle and -perplexity. The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is -teachable? remains undecided. - - - - - - -CHAPTER XXIV. - -GORGIAS. - - -[Side-note: Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the -historical Gorgias.] - -Aristotle, in one of his lost dialogues, made honourable mention of a -Corinthian cultivator, who, on reading the Platonic Gorgias, was -smitten with such vehement admiration, that he abandoned his fields -and his vines, came to Athens forthwith, and committed himself to the -tuition of Plato.[1] How much of reality there may be in this -anecdote, we cannot say: but the Gorgias itself is well calculated to -justify such warm admiration. It opens with a discussion on the -nature and purpose of Rhetoric, but is gradually enlarged so as to -include a comparison of the various schemes of life, and an outline -of positive ethical theory. It is carried on by Sokrates with three -distinct interlocutors--Gorgias, Polus, and Kallikles; but I must -again remind the reader that all the four are only spokesmen prompted -by Plato himself.[2] It may indeed be considered almost as three -distinct dialogues, connected by a loose thread. The historical -Gorgias, a native of Leontini in Sicily, was the most celebrated of -the Grecian rhetors; an elderly man during Plato's youth. He paid -visits to different cities in all parts of Greece, and gave lessons -in rhetoric to numerous pupils, chiefly young men of ambitious -aspirations.[3] - -[Footnote 1: Themistius, Or. xxiii. p. 356, Dindorf. [Greek: O( de\ -georgo\s o( Kori/nthios to=| Gorgi/a| xuggeno/menos--ou)k au)to=| -e)kei/no| Gorgi/a|, a)lla\ to=| lo/go| o(\n Pla/ton e)/grapsen e)p' -e)le/gcho| tou= sophistou=--au)ti/ka a)phei\s to\n a)/gron kai\ tou\s -a)mpe/lous, Pla/toni u(pe/theke te\n psuche\n kai\ ta\ e)kei/nou -e)spei/reto kai\ e)phuteu/eto; kai\ ou(=to/s e)stin o(\n tima=| -A)ristote/les e)n to=| dialo/go| to=| Korinthi/o|.]] - -[Footnote 2: Aristeides, Orat. xlvi. p. 387, Dindorf. [Greek: Ti/s -ga\r ou)k oi)=den, o(/ti kai\ o( Sokra/tes kai\ o( Kallikle=s kai\ o( -Gorgi/as kai\ o( Po=los, pa/nta tau=t' e)sti\ Pla/ton, pro\s to\ -dokou=n au)to=| tre/pon tou\s lo/gous?] Though Aristeides asks -reasonably enough, Who is ignorant of this?--the remarks of Stallbaum -and others often imply forgetfulness of it.] - -[Footnote 3: Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, vol. iii. p. 22) -is of opinion that Plato composed the Gorgias shortly after returning -from his first voyage to Sicily, 387 B.C. - -I shall not contradict this: but I see nothing to prove it. At the -same time, Schleiermacher assumes as certain that Aristophanes in the -Ekklesiazusae alludes to the doctrines published by Plato in his -Republic (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 20). Putting these two -statements together, the Gorgias would be later in date of -composition than the Republic, which I hardly think probable. -However, I do not at all believe that Aristophanes in the -Ekklesiazusae makes any allusion to the Republic of Plato. Nor shall I -believe, until some evidence is produced, that the Republic was -composed at so early a date as 390 B.C.] - -[Side-note: Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. -Polus and Kallikles.] - -Sokrates and Chaerephon are described as intending to come to a -rhetorical lecture of Gorgias, but as having been accidentally -detained so as not to arrive until just after it has been finished, -with brilliant success. Kallikles, however, the host and friend of -Gorgias, promises that the rhetor will readily answer any questions -put by Sokrates; which Gorgias himself confirms, observing at the -same time that no one had asked him any new question for many years -past.[4] Sokrates accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is? -what it is that he teaches? what is the definition of rhetoric? Not -receiving a satisfactory answer, Sokrates furnishes a definition of -his own: out of which grow two arguments of wide ethical bearing: -carried on by Sokrates, the first against Polus, the second against -Kallikles. Both these two are represented as voluble speakers, of -confident temper, regarding the acquisition of political power and -oratorical celebrity as the grand objects of life. Polus had even -composed a work on Rhetoric, of which we know nothing: but the tone -of this dialogue would seem to indicate (as far as we can judge from -such evidence) that the style of the work was affected, and the -temper of the author flippant. - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Gorg. pp. 447-448 A. The dialogue is supposed to -be carried on in the presence of many persons, seemingly belonging to -the auditory of the lecture which Gorgias has just finished, p. 455 -C.] - -[Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a -good definition.] - -Here, as in the other dialogues above noticed, the avowed aim of -Sokrates is--first, to exclude long speaking--next, to get the -question accurately conceived, and answered in an appropriate manner. -Specimens are given of unsuitable and inaccurate answers, which -Sokrates corrects. The conditions of a good definition are made plain -by contrast with bad ones; which either include much more than the -thing defined, or set forth what is accessory and occasional in place -of what is essential and constant. These tentatives and gropings to -find a definition are always instructive, and must have been -especially so in the Platonic age, when logical distinctions had -never yet been made a subject of separate attention or analysis. - -[Side-note: Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is -the artisan of persuasion.] - -About what is Rhetoric as a cognition concerned, Gorgias? -_Gorg._--About words or discourses. _Sokr._--About what -discourses? such as inform sick men how they are to get well? -_Gorg._--No. _Sokr._--It is not about all discourses? -_Gorg._--It makes men competent to speak: of course therefore -also to think, upon the matters on which they speak.[5] -_Sokr._--But the medical and gymnastic arts do this likewise, each -with reference to its respective subject: what then is the difference -between them and Rhetoric? _Gorg._--The difference is, that each -of these other arts tends mainly towards some actual work or -performance, to which the discourses, when required at all, are -subsidiary: but Rhetoric accomplishes every thing by discourses -alone.[6] _Sokr._--But the same may be said about arithmetic, -geometry, and other sciences. How are they distinguished from -Rhetoric? You must tell me upon what matters the discourses with -which Rhetoric is conversant turn; just as you would tell me, if I -asked the like question about arithmetic or astronomy. -_Gorg._--The discourses, with which Rhetoric is conversant, turn upon -the greatest of all human affairs. _Sokr._--But this too, Gorgias, -is indistinct and equivocal. Every man, the physician, the gymnast, -the money-maker, thinks his own object and his own affairs the -greatest of all.[7] _Gorg._--The function of Rhetoric, is to -persuade assembled multitudes, and thus to secure what are in truth -the greatest benefits: freedom to the city, political command to the -speaker.[8] _Sokr._--Rhetoric is then the artisan of persuasion. -Its single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers? -_Gorg._--It is so. - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Gorgias, p. 449 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n peri\ o(=nper -le/gein, kai\ phronei=n? Po=s ga\r ou)/?]] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Gorgias, p. 450 B-C. [Greek: te=s r(etorike=s -. . . . pa=sa e( pra=xis kai\ e( ku/rosis dia\ lo/gon e)sti/n . . . .]] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 451-452.] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Gorgias, p. 452 D. [Greek: O(/per e)/sti te=| -a)lethei/a| me/giston a)gatho/n, kai\ ai)/tion, a)/ma me\n -e)leutheri/as au)toi=s toi=s a)nthro/pois, a)/ma de\ tou= a)/llon -a)/rchein e)n te=| au(tou= po/lei e(ka/sto|.]] - -[Side-note: The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon -what matters is he competent to advise?] - -_Sokr._--But are there not other persons besides the Rhetor, who -produce persuasion? Does not the arithmetical teacher, and every -other teacher, produce persuasion? How does the Rhetor differ -from them? What mode of persuasion does he bring about? Persuasion -about what? _Gorg._--I reply--it is that persuasion which is -brought about in Dikasteries, and other assembled multitudes--and -which relates to just and unjust.[9] _Sokr._--You recognise that -to have learnt and to know any matter, is one thing--to believe it, -is another: that knowledge and belief are different--knowledge being -always true, belief sometimes false? _Gorg._--Yes. _Sokr._--We -must then distinguish two sorts of persuasion: one carrying with -it knowledge--the other belief without knowledge. Which of the two -does the Rhetor bring about? _Gorg._--That which produces belief -without knowledge. He can teach nothing. _Sokr._--Well, then, -Gorgias, on what matters will the Rhetor be competent to advise? When -the people are deliberating about the choice of generals or -physicians, about the construction of docks, about practical -questions of any kind--there will be in each case a special man -informed and competent to teach or give counsel, while the Rhetor is -not competent. Upon what then can the Rhetor advise--upon just and -unjust--nothing else?[10] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Gorgias, p. 454 B.] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Gorgias, p. 455 D.] - -[Side-note: The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, -even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, -among the ignorant.] - -The Rhetor (says Gorgias) or accomplished public speaker, will give -advice about all the matters that you name, and others besides. He -will persuade the people and carry them along with him, even against -the opinion of the special _Expert_. He will talk more -persuasively than the craftsman about matters of the craftsman's own -business. The power of the Rhetor is thus very great: but he ought to -use it, like all other powers, for just and honest purposes; not to -abuse it for wrong and oppression. If he does the latter, the misdeed -is his own, and not the fault of his teacher, who gave his lessons -with a view that they should be turned to proper use. If a man, who -has learnt the use of arms, employs them to commit murder, this abuse -ought not to be imputed to his master of arms.[11] - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 456-457.] - -You mean (replies Sokrates) that he, who has learnt Rhetoric from -you, will become competent not to teach, but to persuade the -multitude:--that is, competent among the ignorant. He has acquired an -engine of persuasion; so that he will appear, when addressing the -ignorant, to know more than those who really do know.[12] - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Gorgias, p. 459 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ peri\ -ta\s a)/llas a(pa/sas te/chnas o(sau/tos e)/chei o( r(e/tor kai\ e( -r(etorike/; au)ta\ me\n ta\ pra/gmata ou)de\n dei= au)te\n ei)de/nai -o(/pos e)/chei, mechane\n de/ tina peithou=s eu(reke/nai, o(/ste -phai/nesthai toi=s ou)k ei)do/si ma=llon ei)de/nai to=n ei)do/ton.]] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus -takes up the debate with Sokrates.] - -Thus far, the conversation is carried on between Sokrates and -Gorgias. But the latter is now made to contradict himself--apparently -rather than really--for the argument whereby Sokrates reduces him to -a contradiction, is not tenable, unless we admit the Platonic -doctrine that the man who has learnt just and unjust, may be relied -on to act as a just man;[13] in other words, that virtue consists in -knowledge. - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Gorgias, p. 460 B. [Greek: o( ta\ di/kaia -mematheko/s, di/kaios]. Aristotle notices this confusion of Sokrates, -who falls into it also in the conversation with Euthydemus, Xenoph. -Memorab. iv. 2, 20, iii. 9, 5.] - -[Side-note: Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of -Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an -empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, -analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head -flattery.] - -Polus now interferes and takes up the conversation: challenging -Sokrates to furnish what _he_ thinks the proper definition of -Rhetoric. Sokrates obeys, in a tone of pungent polemic. Rhetoric (he -says) is no art at all, but an empirical knack of catering for the -pleasure and favour of hearers; analogous to cookery.[14] It is a -talent falling under the general aptitude called Flattery; possessed -by some bold spirits, who are forward in divining and adapting -themselves to the temper of the public.[15] It is not honourable, but -a mean pursuit, like cookery. It is the shadow or false imitation of -a branch of the political art.[16] In reference both to the body and -the mind, there are two different conditions: one, a condition really -and truly good--the other, good only in fallacious appearance, -and not so in reality. To produce, and to verify, the really good -condition of the body, there are two specially qualified professions, -the gymnast or trainer and the physician: in regard to the mind, the -function of the trainer is performed by the law-giving power, that of -the physician by the judicial power. Law-making, and adjudicating, -are both branches of the political art, and when put together make up -the whole of it. Gymnastic and medicine train and doctor the body -towards its really best condition: law-making and adjudicating do the -same in regard to the mind. To each of the four, there corresponds a -sham counterpart or mimic, a branch under the general head -_flattery_--taking no account of what is really best, but only -of that which is most agreeable for the moment, and by this trick -recommending itself to a fallacious esteem.[17] Thus Cosmetic, or -Ornamental Trickery, is the counterfeit of Gymnastic; and Cookery the -counterfeit of Medicine. Cookery studies only what is immediately -agreeable to the body, without considering whether it be good or -wholesome: and does this moreover, without any truly scientific -process of observation or inference, but simply by an empirical -process of memory or analogy. But Medicine examines, and that too by -scientific method, only what is good and wholesome for the body, -whether agreeable or not. Amidst ignorant men, Cookery slips in as -the counterfeit of medicine; pretending to know what food is -_good_ for the body, while it really knows only what food is -_agreeable_. In like manner, the artifices of ornament dress up -the body to a false appearance of that vigour and symmetry, which -Gymnastics impart to it really and intrinsically. - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Gorgias, p. 462 C. [Greek: e)mpeiri/a . . . . -cha/rito/s tinos kai\ e(done=s a)pergasi/as]. In the Philebus (pp. -55-56) Sokrates treats [Greek: i)atrike\] differently, as falling -short of the idea of [Greek: te/chne], and coming much nearer to what -is here called [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] or [Greek: stochastike/]. -Asklepiades was displeased with the Thracian Dionysius for calling -[Greek: grammatike\] by the name of [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] instead of -[Greek: te/chne]: see Sextus Empiric. adv. Grammat. s. 57-72, p. 615, -Bekk.] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 A. [Greek: dokei= moi ei)=nai/ -ti e)pite/deuma, techniko\n me\n ou)/, psuche=s de\ stochastike=s -kai\ a)ndrei/as kai\ phu/sei deine=s prosomilei=n toi=s a)nthro/pois; -kalo= de\ au)tou= e)go\ to\ kepha/laion _kolakei/an_.]] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 D. [Greek: politike=s mori/ou -ei)/dolon].] - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Gorgias, p. 464 C. [Greek: tetta/ron de\ tou/ton -ou)so=n, kai\ a)ei\ pro\s to\ be/ltiston therapeuouso=n, to=n me\n -to\ so=ma, to=n de\ te\n psuche/n, e( kolakeutike\ ai)sthome/ne, ou) -gnou=sa le/go a)lla\ stochasame/ne, te/tracha e(aute\n dianei/masa, -u(podu=sa u(po\ e(/kaston to=n mori/on, prospoiei=tai ei)=nai tou=to -o(/per u(pe/du; kai\ tou= me\n belti/stou ou)de\n phronti/zei, to=| -de\ a)ei\ e(di/sto| thereu/etai te\n a)/noian kai\ e)xapata=|, o(/ste -dokei= plei/stou a)xi/a ei)=nai.]] - -[Side-note: Distinction between the true arts which aim at the -good of the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to -the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure.] - -The same analogies hold in regard to the mind. Sophistic is the -shadow or counterfeit of law-giving: Rhetoric, of judging or -adjudicating. The lawgiver and the judge aim at what is good for the -mind: the Sophist and the Rhetor aim at what is agreeable to it. This -distinction between them (continues Sokrates) is true and real: -though it often happens that the Sophist is, both by himself and by -others, confounded with and mistaken for the lawgiver, because he -deals with the same topics and occurrences: and the Rhetor, in the -same manner, is confounded with the judge.[18] The Sophist and the -Rhetor, addressing themselves to the present relish of an -undiscerning public, are enabled to usurp the functions and the -credit of their more severe and far-sighted rivals. - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Gorgias, p. 465 C. [Greek: die/steke me\n ou(/to -phu/sei; a(/te de\ e)ggu\s o)/nton, phu/rontai e)n to=| au)to=| kai\ -peri\ tau)ta\ sophistai\ kai\ r(e/tores, kai\ ou)k e)/chousin o(/, ti -chre/sontai ou)/te au)toi\ e(autoi=s ou)/te oi( a)/lloi a)/nthropoi -tou/tois.] - -It seems to me that the persons whom Plato here designates as being -confounded together are, the Sophist with the lawgiver, the Rhetor -with the judge or dikast; which is shown by the allusion, three lines -farther on, to the confusion between the cook and the physician. -Heindorf supposes that the persons designated as being confounded -are, the Sophist with the Rhetor; which I cannot think to be the -meaning of Plato.] - -[Side-note: Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the -Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they -really wish.] - -This is the definition given by Sokrates of Rhetoric and of the -Rhetor. Polus then asks him: You say that Rhetoric is a branch of -Flattery: Do you think that good Rhetors are considered as flatterers -in their respective cities? _Sokr._--I do not think that[19] -they are considered at all. _Polus._--How! not considered? Do -not good Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities? -_Sokr._--No: if you understand the possession of power as a good -thing for the possessor. _Polus._--I do understand it so. -_Sokr._--Then I say that the Rhetors possess nothing beyond the -very minimum of power. _Polus._--How can that be? Do not they, -like despots, kill, impoverish, and expel any one whom they please? -_Sokr._--I admit that both Rhetors and Despots can do what seems -good to themselves, and can bring penalties of death, poverty, or -exile upon others: but I say that nevertheless they have no -power, because they can do nothing which they really wish.[20] - -[Footnote 19: Plat. Gorg. p. 466 B. _Polus._ [Greek: A)=r' -ou)=n dokou=si/ soi o(s ko/lakes e)n tai=s po/lesi phau=loi -nomi/zesthai oi( a)gathoi\ r(e/tores? . . . . ] _Sokr._ [Greek: -Ou)de\ nomi/zesthai e)/moige dokou=sin.] - -The play on words here--for I see nothing else in it--can be -expressed in English as well as in Greek. It has very little -pertinence; because, as a matter of fact, the Rhetors certainly had -considerable importance, whether they deserved it or not. How little -Plato cared to make his comparisons harmonise with the fact, may be -seen by what immediately follows--where he compares the Rhetors to -Despots? and puts in the mouth of Polus the assertion that they kill -or banish any one whom they choose.] - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Gorgias, p. 466 E. [Greek: ou)de\n ga\r poiei=n -o(=n bou/lontai, o(s e)/pos ei)pei=n; poiei=n me/ntoi o(\, ti a)\n -au)toi=s do/xe| be/ltiston ei)=nai.]] - -[Side-note: All men wish for what is good for them. Despots -and Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good -for them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, -and therefore have no real power.] - -That which men wish (Sokrates lays down as a general proposition) is -to obtain good, and to escape evil. Each separate act which they -perform, is performed not with a view to its own special result, but -with a view to these constant and paramount ends. Good things, or -profitable things (for Sokrates alternates the phrases as -equivalent), are wisdom, health, wealth, and other such things. Evil -things are the contraries of these.[21] Many things are in themselves -neither good nor evil, but may become one or the other, according to -circumstances--such as stones, wood, the acts of sitting still or -moving, &c. When we do any of these indifferent acts, it is with -a view to the pursuit of good, or to the avoidance of evil: we do not -wish for the act, we wish for its good or profitable results. We do -every thing for the sake of good: and if the results are really good -or profitable, we accomplish what we wish: if the contrary, not. Now, -Despots and Rhetors, when they kill or banish or impoverish any one, -do so because they think it will be better for them, or -profitable.[22] If it be good for them, they do what they wish: if -evil for them, they do the contrary of what they wish and therefore -have no power. - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Gorgias, p. 467 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n le/geis -ei)=nai a)gatho\n me\n sophi/an te kai\ u(gi/eian kai\ plou=ton kai\ -ta)/lla ta\ toiau=ta, kaka\ de\ ta)nanti/a tou/ton? E)/goge.]] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Gorgias, p. 468 B-C. [Greek: ou)kou=n kai\ -a)pokti/nnumen, ei)/ tin' a)pokti/nnumen, . . . . oi)o/menoi a)/meinon -ei)=nai e(mi=n tau=ta e)\ me/? . . . e(/nek' a)/ra tou= a)gathou= -a(/panta tau=ta poiou=sin oi( poiou=ntes . . . . e)a\n me\n o)phe/lima -e)=| tau=ta, boulo/metha pra/ttein au)ta/; blabera\ de\ o)/nta, ou) -boulo/metha. . . . . ta\ ga\r a)gatha\ boulo/metha, o(=s phe\|s su/], -&c.] - -To do evil (continues Sokrates), is the worst thing that can happen -to any one; the evil-doer is the most miserable and pitiable of men. -The person who suffers evil is unfortunate, and is to be pitied; but -much less unfortunate and less to be pitied than the evil-doer. If I -have a concealed dagger in the public market-place, I can kill any -one whom I choose: but this is no good to me, nor is it a proof of -great power, because I shall be forthwith taken up and punished. The -result is not profitable, but hurtful: therefore the act is not -good, nor is the power to do it either good or desirable.[23] It is -sometimes good to kill, banish, or impoverish--sometimes bad. It is -good when you do it justly: bad, when you do it unjustly.[24] - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Gorgias, p. 469-470.] - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 C.] - -[Side-note: Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of -Macedonia--Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one -thinks so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless -denies it.] - -_Polus._--A child can refute such doctrine. You have heard of -Archelaus King of Macedonia. Is he, in your opinion, happy or -miserable? _Sokr._--I do not know: I have never been in his -society. _Polus._--Cannot you tell without that, whether he is -happy or not? _Sokr._--No, certainly not. _Polus._--Then -you will not call even the Great King happy? _Sokr._--No: I do -not know how he stands in respect to education and justice. -_Polus._--What! does all happiness consist in that? -_Sokr._--I say that it does. I maintain that the good and -honourable man or woman is happy: the unjust and wicked, -miserable.[25] _Polus._--Then Archelaus is miserable, according -to your doctrine? _Sokr._--Assuredly, if he is wicked. -_Polus._--Wicked, of course; since he has committed enormous -crimes: but he has obtained complete kingly power in Macedonia. Is -there any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be -Archelaus than any other man in Macedonia?[26] _Sokr._--All the -public, with Nikias, Perikles, and the most eminent men among them, -will agree with you in declaring Archelaus to be happy. I alone do -not agree with you. You, like a Rhetor, intend to overwhelm me and -gain your cause, by calling a multitude of witnesses: I shall prove -my case without calling any other witness than yourself.[27] Do you -think that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been -defeated in his conspiracy and punished? _Polus._--Certainly -not: he would then have been very miserable. _Sokr._--Here again -I differ from you: I think that Archelaus, or any other wicked man, -is under all circumstances miserable; but he is less miserable, if -afterwards punished, than he would be if unpunished and -successful.[28] _Polus._--How say you? If a man, unjustly -conspiring to become despot, be captured, subjected to torture, -mutilated, with his eyes burnt out and with many other outrages -inflicted, not only upon himself but upon his wife and children--do -you say that he will be more happy than if he succeeded in his -enterprise, and passed his life in possession of undisputed authority -over his city--envied and extolled as happy, by citizens and -strangers alike?[29] _Sokr._--More happy, I shall not say: for -in both cases he will be miserable; but he will be less miserable on -the former supposition. - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 E.] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Gorgias, p. 471 B-C.] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 B. [Greek: A)ll' e)go/ soi ei)=s -o)\n ou)ch o(mologo=. . . . e)go\ de\ a)\n me\ se\ au)to\n e(/na o)/nta -ma/rtura para/schomai o(mologou=nta peri\ o(=n le/go, ou)de\n -oi)=mai a)/xion lo/gou pepera/nthai peri\ o(=n a)\n e(mi=n o( lo/gos -e)=|; oi)=mai de\ ou)de\ soi/, e)a\n me\ e)go/ soi marturo= ei(=s -o)\n mo/nos, tou\s d' a)/llous pa/ntas tou/tous chai/rein e)a=|s.]] - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 C.] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 D.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil -to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, -it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished.] - -_Sokr._--Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer -wrong? _Polus._--To suffer wrong. _Sokr._--Which of the two -is the most disgraceful? _Polus._--To do wrong. _Sokr._--If -more ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? _Polus._--By no -means. _Sokr._--You do not think then that the good--and the -fine or honourable--are one and the same; nor the bad--and the ugly -or disgraceful? _Polus._--No: certainly not. _Sokr._--How -is this? Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies, -colours, figures, voices, pursuits, &c., so denominated from some -common property? Are not fine bodies said to be fine, either from -rendering some useful service, or from affording some pleasure to the -spectator who contemplates them?[30] And are not figures, colours, -voices, laws, sciences, &c., called fine or honourable for the -same reason, either for their agreeableness or their usefulness, or -both? _Polus._--Certainly: your definition of the fine or -honourable, by reference to pleasure, or to good, is satisfactory. -_Sokr._--Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be -defined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil? -_Polus._--Doubtless.[31] _Sokr._--If therefore one thing be -finer or more honourable than another, this is because it -surpasses the other either in pleasure, or in profit: if one thing be -more ugly or disgraceful than another, it must surpass that other -either in pain, or in evil? _Polus._--Yes. - -[Footnote 30: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 D. [Greek: e)a\n e)n to=| -theorei=sthai chai/rein poie=| tou\s theorou=ntas?]] - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Gorgias, p. 474 E. _Sokr._ [Greek: Kai\ -me\n ta/ ge kata\ tou\s no/mous kai\ ta\ e)pitedeu/mata, ou) de/pou -e)kto\s tou/ton e)sti\ ta\ kala/, tou= e)\ _o)phe/lima ei)=nai e)\ -e(de/a e)\_ a)mpho/tera.] _Pol._ [Greek: Ou)k e)/moige -dokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\ to=n mathema/ton ka/llos -o(sau/tos?] _Pol._ [Greek: Pa/nu ge; kai\ kalo=s ge nu=n -o(rizei, _e(done=| te kai\ a)gatho=|_ o(rizo/menos to\ kalo/n.] -_Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\ ai)schro\n to=| e)nanti/o|, -_lu/pe| te kai\ kako=|_?] _Pol._ [Greek: A)na/gke.] - -A little farther on [Greek: blabe\] is used as equivalent to [Greek: -kako/n]. These words--[Greek: kalo/n, ai)schro/n]--(very difficult to -translate properly) introduce a reference to the feeling or judgment -of spectators, or of an undefined public, not concerned either as -agents or sufferers.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and -Turpe--Proof of the first point.] - -_Sokr._--Well, then! what did you say about doing wrong and -suffering wrong? You said that to suffer wrong was the worst of the -two, but to do wrong was the most ugly or disgraceful. Now, if to do -wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be because -it has a preponderance either of pain or of evil? -_Polus._--Undoubtedly. _Sokr._--Has it a preponderance of pain? Does -the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer? -_Polus._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--Then it must have a preponderance -of evil? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--To do wrong therefore is -worse than to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful? -_Polus._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Since therefore it is -both worse and more disgraceful, I was right in affirming that -neither you, nor I, nor any one else, would choose to do wrong in -preference to suffering wrong. _Polus._--So it seems.[32] - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Gorgias, p. 475 C-D.] - -[Side-note: Proof of the second point.] - -_Sokr._--Now let us take the second point--Whether it be the -greatest evil for the wrong-doer to be punished, or whether it be not -a still greater evil for him to remain unpunished. If punished, the -wrong-doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things -fine or honourable, in so far as they are just? _Polus._--I -think so. _Sokr._--When a man does anything, must there not be -some correlate which suffers; and must it not suffer in a way -corresponding to what the doer does? Thus if any one strikes, there -must also be something stricken: and if he strikes quickly or -violently, there must be something which is stricken quickly or -violently. And so, if any one burns or cuts, there must be something -burnt or cut. As the agent acts, so the patient suffers. -_Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now if a man be punished for wrong -doing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher does what is just? -_Polus._--He does. _Sokr._--You admitted that all just -things were honourable: therefore the agent does what is honourable, -the patient suffers what is honourable.[33] But if honourable, it -must be either agreeable--or good and profitable. In this case, -it is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be good and -profitable. The wrong-doer therefore, when punished, suffers what is -good and is profited. _Polus._--Yes.[34] _Sokr._--In what -manner is he profited? It is, as I presume, by becoming better in his -mind--by being relieved from badness of mind. -_Polus._--Probably. _Sokr._--Is not this badness of mind the greatest -evil? In regard to wealth, the special badness is poverty: in regard -to the body, it is weakness, sickness, deformity, &c.: in regard -to the mind, it is ignorance, injustice, cowardice, &c. Is not -injustice, and other badness of mind, the most disgraceful of the -three? _Polus._--Decidedly. _Sokr._--If it be most -disgraceful, it must therefore be the worst. _Polus._--How? -_Sokr._--It must (as we before agreed) have the greatest -preponderance either of pain, or of hurt and evil. But the -preponderance is not in pain: for no one will say that the being -unjust and intemperate and ignorant, is more painful than being poor -and sick. The preponderance must therefore be great in hurt and evil. -Mental badness is therefore a greater evil than either poverty, or -disease and bodily deformity. It is the greatest of human evils. -_Polus._--It appears so.[35] - -[Footnote 33: See Aristotle, Rhet. i. 9, p. 1366, b. 30, where the -contrary of this opinion is maintained, and maintained with truth.] - -[Footnote 34: Plato, Gorgias, p. 476 D-E.] - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Gorgias, p. 477 E.] - -[Side-note: The criminal labours under a mental distemper, -which though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only -cure for him. To be punished is best for him.] - -_Sokr._--The money-making art is, that which relieves us from -poverty: the medical art, from sickness and weakness: the judicial or -punitory, from injustice and wickedness of mind. Of these three -relieving forces, which is the most honourable? _Polus._--The -last, by far. _Sokr._--If most honourable, it confers either -most pleasure or most profit? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now, -to go through medical treatment is not agreeable; but it answers to a -man to undergo the pain, in order to get rid of a great evil, and to -become well. He would be a happier man, if he were never sick: he is -less miserable by undergoing the painful treatment and becoming well, -than if he underwent no treatment and remained sick. Just so the man -who is mentally bad: the happiest man is he who never becomes so; but -if a man has become so, the next best course for him is, to undergo -punishment and to get rid of the evil. The worst lot of all is, that -of him who remains mentally bad, without ever getting rid of -badness.[36] - -[Footnote 36: Plato, Gorgias, p. 478 D-E.] - -[Side-note: Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our -friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we -ought to keep him unpunished.] - -This last, Polus (continues Sokrates), is the condition of Archelaus, -and of despots and Rhetors generally. They possess power which -enables them, after they have committed injustice, to guard -themselves against being punished: which is just as if a sick man -were to pride himself upon having taken precautions against being -cured. They see the pain of the cure, but they are blind to the -profit of it; they are ignorant how much more miserable it is to have -an unhealthy and unjust mind than an unhealthy body.[37] There is -therefore little use in Rhetoric: for our first object ought to be, -to avoid doing wrong: our next object, if we have done wrong, not to -resist or elude punishment by skilful defence, but to present -ourselves voluntarily and invite it: and if our friends or relatives -have done wrong, far from helping to defend them, we ought ourselves -to accuse them, and to invoke punishment upon them also.[38] On the -other hand, as to our enemy, we ought undoubtedly to take precautions -against suffering any wrong from him ourselves: but if he has done -wrong to others, we ought to do all we can, by word or deed, not to -bring him to punishment, but to prevent him from suffering punishment -or making compensation: so that he may live as long as possible in -impunity.[39] These are the purposes towards which rhetoric is -serviceable. For one who intends to do no wrong, it seems of no great -use.[40] - -[Footnote 37: Plato, Gorgias, p. 479 B. [Greek: to\ a)lgeino\n -au)tou= kathora=|n, pro\s de\ to\ o)phe/limon tuphlo=s e)/chein, kai\ -a)gnoei=n o(/so| a)thlio/tero/n e)sti me\ u(giou=s so/matos me\ -u(giei= psuche=| sunoikei=n, a)lla\ sathra=| kai\ a)di/ko| kai\ -a)nosi/o|.]] - -[Footnote 38: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 480 C, 508 B. [Greek: kategorete/on -ei)/e kai\ au(tou= kai\ ui(e/os kai\ e(tai/ron, e)a/n ti a)dike=|], -&c. - -Plato might have put this argument into the mouth of Euthyphron as a -reason for indicting his own father on the charge of murder: as I -have already observed in reviewing the Euthyphron, which see above, -vol. i. ch. xi., p. 442.] - -[Footnote 39: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481 A. [Greek: e)a\n de\ a)/llon -a)dike=| o( e)chthro/s, panti\ tro/po| paraskeuaste/on kai\ -pra/ttonta kai\ le/gonta, o(/pos me\ do=| di/ken. . . . e)a/n te -chrusi/on e(rpako\s e)=| polu/, me\ a)podido=| tou=to, a)ll' e)/chon -a)nali/sketai . . . a)di/kos kai\ a)the/os], &c.] - -[Footnote 40: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.] - - -* * * * * - - -This dialogue between Sokrates and Polus exhibits a -representation of Platonic Ethics longer and more continuous -than is usual in the dialogues. I have therefore given a tolerably -copious abridgment of it, and shall now proceed to comment upon its -reasoning. - -[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed -by Kallikles whether he means it seriously.] - -The whole tenor of its assumptions, as well as the conclusions in -which it ends, are so repugnant to received opinions, that Polus, -even while compelled to assent, treats it as a paradox: while -Kallikles, who now takes up the argument, begins by asking from -Chaerephon--"Is Sokrates really in earnest, or is he only -jesting?"[41] Sokrates himself admits that he stands almost alone. He -has nothing to rely upon, except the consistency of his dialectics--and -the verdict of philosophy.[42] This however is a matter of little -moment, in discussing the truth and value of the reasoning, except in -so far as it involves an appeal to the judgment of the public as a -matter of fact. Plato follows out the train of reasoning--which at -the time presents itself to his mind as conclusive, or at least as -plausible--whether he may agree or disagree with others. - -[Footnote 41: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.] - -[Footnote 42: Plato, Gorgias, p. 482.] - -[Side-note: Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one -acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of -misery.] - -Plato has ranked the Rhetor in the same category as the Despot: a -classification upon which I shall say something presently. But -throughout the part of the dialogue just extracted, he treats the -original question about Rhetoric as part of a much larger ethical -question.[43] Every one (argues Sokrates) wishes for the attainment -of good and for the avoidance of evil. Every one performs each -separate act with a view not to its own immediate end, but to one or -other of these permanent ends. In so far as he attains them, he is -happy: in so far as he either fails in attaining the good, or incurs -the evil, he is unhappy or miserable. The good and honourable man or -woman is happy, the unjust and wicked is miserable. Power acquired or -employed unjustly, is no boon to the possessor: for he does not -thereby obtain what he really wishes, good or happiness; but incurs -the contrary, evil and misery. The man who does wrong is more -miserable than he who suffers wrong: but the most miserable of all is -he who does wrong and then remains unpunished for it.[44] - -[Footnote 43: I may be told that this comparison is first made by -Polus (p. 466 C), and that Sokrates only takes it up from him to -comment upon. True, but the speech of Polus is just as much the -composition of Plato as that of Sokrates. Many readers of Plato are -apt to forget this.] - -[Footnote 44: Isokrates, in his Panathenaic Oration (Or. xii. sect. -126, pp. 257-347), alludes to the same thesis as this here advanced -by Plato, treating it as one which all men of sense would reject, and -which none but a few men pretending to be wise would -proclaim--[Greek: a(/per a(/pantes me\n a)\n oi( nou=n e)/chontes -e)/lointo kai\ boulethei=en, o)li/goi de/ tines to=n prospoioume/non -ei)=nai sopho=n, e)rotethe/ntes ou)k a)\n phe/saien.] - -In this last phrase Isokrates probably has Plato in his mind, though -without pronouncing the name.] - -Polus, on the other hand, contends, that Archelaus, who has "waded -through slaughter" to the throne of Macedonia, is a happy man both in -his own feelings and in those of every one else, envied and admired -by the world generally: That to say--Archelaus would have been more -happy, or less miserable, if he had failed in his enterprise and had -been put to death under cruel torture--is an untenable paradox. - -[Side-note: Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness.] - -The issue here turns, and the force of Plato's argument rests -(assuming Sokrates to speak the real sentiments of Plato), upon -the peculiar sense which he gives to the words -Good--Evil--Happiness:--different from the sense in which they are -conceived by mankind generally, and which is here followed by Polus. -It is possible that to minds like Sokrates and Plato, the idea of -themselves committing enormous crimes for ambitious purposes might be -the most intolerable of all ideas, worse to contemplate than any amount of -suffering: moreover, that if they could conceive themselves as having been -thus guilty, the sequel the least intolerable for them to imagine would -be one of expiatory pain. This, taken as the personal sentiment of -Plato, admits of no reply. But when he attempts to convert this -subjective judgment into an objective conclusion binding on all, he -fails of success, and misleads himself by equivocal language. - -[Side-note: Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with -the Platonic meaning.] - -Plato distinguishes two general objects of human desire, and two of -human aversion. 1. The immediate, and generally transient, -object--Pleasure or the Pleasurable--Pain or the Painful. 2. The distant, -ulterior, and more permanent object--Good or the profitable--Evil or -the hurtful.--In the attainment of Good and avoidance of Evil -consists happiness. But now comes the important question--In what -sense are we to understand the words Good and Evil? What did -Plato mean by them? Did he mean the same as mankind generally? Have -mankind generally one uniform meaning? In answer to this question, we -must say, that neither Plato, nor mankind generally, are consistent -or unanimous in their use of the words: and that Plato sometimes -approximates to, sometimes diverges from, the more usual meaning. -Plato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good and -Evil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know -it: we learn only, that Good is a mental perfection--Evil a mental -taint--answering to indescribable but characteristic sentiments in -Plato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this -circumstance--That they have no reference either to pleasure or pain. -In the vulgar sense, Good stands distinguished from pleasure (or -relief from pain), and Evil from pain (or loss of pleasure), as the -remote, the causal, the lasting from the present, the product, the -transient. Good and Evil are explained by enumerating all the things -so called, of which enumeration Plato gives a partial specimen in -this dialogue: elsewhere he dwells upon what he calls the Idea of -Good, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. Having said that -all men aim at good, he gives, as examples of good things--Wisdom, -Health, Wealth, and other such things: while the contrary of these, -Stupidity, Sickness, Poverty, are evil things: the list of course -might be much enlarged. Taking Good and Evil generally to denote the -common property of each of these lists, it is true that men perform a -large portion of their acts with a view to attain the former and -avoid the latter:--that the approach which they make to happiness -depends, speaking generally, upon the success which attends their -exertions for the attainment of and avoidance of these permanent -ends: and moreover that these ends have their ultimate reference to -each man's own feelings. - -But this meaning of Good is no longer preserved, when Sokrates -proceeds to prove that the triumphant usurper Archelaus is the most -miserable of men, and that to do wrong with impunity is the greatest -of all evils. - -[Side-note: Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency -between the general answer of Polus and his previous -declarations--Law and Nature.] - -Sokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking Polus,[45] -which of the two is most disgraceful--To do wrong--or to suffer -wrong? Polus answers--To do wrong: and this answer is -inconsistent with what he had previously said about Archelaus. That -prince, though a wrong-doer on the largest scale, has been declared -by Polus to be an object of his supreme envy and admiration: while -Sokrates also admits that this is the sentiment of almost all -mankind, except himself. To be consistent with such an assertion, -Polus ought to have answered the contrary of what he does answer, -when the general question is afterwards put to him: or at least he -ought to have said--"Sometimes the one, sometimes the other". But -this he is ashamed to do, as we shall find Kallikles intimating at a -subsequent stage of the dialogue:[46] because of King Nomos, or the -established habit of the community--who feel that society rests upon -a sentiment of reciprocal right and obligation animating every one, -and require that violations of that sentiment shall be marked with -censure in general words, however widely the critical feeling may -depart from such censure in particular cases.[47] Polus is forced to -make profession of a faith, which neither he nor others (except -Sokrates with a few companions) universally or consistently apply. To -bring such a force to bear upon the opponent, was one of the known -artifices of dialecticians:[48] and Sokrates makes it his point of -departure, to prove the unparalleled misery of Archelaus. - -[Footnote 45: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 C.] - -[Footnote 46: Plat. Gorg. p. 482 C. To maintain that [Greek: to\ -a)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai] was an [Greek: a)/doxos -u(po/thesis]--one which it was [Greek: chei/ronos e)/thous -e(le/sthai]: which therefore Aristotle advises the dialectician not -to defend (Aristot. Topic. viii. 156, 6-15).] - -[Footnote 47: This portion of the Gorgias may receive illustration -from the third chapter (pp. 99-101) of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral -Sentiments, entitled, "Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, -which is occasioned by the disposition to admire the rich and great, -and to neglect or despise persons of poor and mean condition". He -says--"The disposition to admire and almost to worship the rich and -the powerful, and to despise, or at least to neglect, persons of poor -and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and maintain -the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same -time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our -moral sentiments. . . . They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly--a -select, though I am afraid, a small party--who are the real and -steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are -the admirers and worshippers--and what may seem more extraordinary, -most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers--of wealth -and greatness. . . . . It is scarce _agreeable to good morals_, or -even to good language, perhaps, to say that mere wealth and -greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve our respect. We -must acknowledge, however, that they _almost constantly obtain -it_: and _that they may therefore in a certain sense be -considered as the natural objects of it_." - -Now Archelaus is a most conspicuous example of this disposition of -the mass of mankind to worship and admire, disinterestedly, power and -greatness: and the language used by Adam Smith in the last sentence -illustrates the conversation of Sokrates, Polus, and Kallikles. Adam -Smith admits that energetic proceedings, ending in great power, such -as those of Archelaus, obtain honour and worship from the vast -majority of disinterested spectators: and that, therefore they are in -a certain sense the _natural objects_ of such a sentiment -([Greek: kata\ phu/sin]). But if the question be put to him, Whether -such proceedings, with such a position, are _worthy of honour_, -he is constrained by good morals ([Greek: kata\ no/mon]) to reply in -the negative. It is true that Adam Smith numbers himself with the -small minority, while Polus shares the opinion of the large majority. -But what is required by King Nomos must be professed even by -dissentients, unless they possess the unbending resolution of -Sokrates.] - -[Footnote 48: Aristot. De Soph. Elench. pp. 172-173, where he -contrasts the opinions which men must make a show of holding, with -those which they really do--[Greek: ai( phanerai\ do/xai--ai( -a)phanei=s, a)pokekrumme/nai, do/xai.]] - -[Side-note: The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by -Sokrates, will not hold.] - -He proceeds to define Pulchrum and Turpe ([Greek: -kalo\n-ai)schro/n]). When we recollect the Hippias Major, in which -dialogue many definitions of Pulchrum were canvassed and all rejected, -so that the search ended in total disappointment--we are surprised to -see that Sokrates hits off at once a definition satisfactory both to -himself and Polus: and we are the more surprised, because the -definition here admitted without a remark, is in substance one of -those shown to be untenable in the Hippias Major.[49] It depends upon -the actual argumentative purpose which Plato has in hand, whether he -chooses to multiply objections and give them effect--or to ignore -them altogether. But the definition which he here proposes, even if -assumed as incontestable, fails altogether to sustain the conclusion -that he draws from it. He defines Pulchrum to be that which either -confers pleasure upon the spectator when he contemplates it, or -produces ulterior profit or good--we must presume profit to the -spectator, or to him along with others--at any rate it is not said -_to whom_. He next defines the ugly and disgraceful ([Greek: to\ -ai)schro\n]) as comprehending both the painful and the hurtful or -evil. If then (he argues) to do wrong is more ugly and disgraceful -than to suffer wrong, this must be either because it is more painful--or -because it is more hurtful, more evil (worse). It certainly is -not more painful: therefore it must be worse. - -[Footnote 49: Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 45-46. See above, vol. ii. ch. -xiii.] - -[Side-note: Worse or better--for whom? The argument of -Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for -his inference, the definition would be inadmissible.] - -But worse, for whom? For the spectators, who declare the proceedings -of Archelaus to be disgraceful? For the persons who suffer by his -proceedings? Or for Archelaus himself? It is the last of the three -which Sokrates undertakes to prove: but his definition does not -help him to the proof. Turpe is defined to be either what causes -immediate pain to the spectator, or ulterior hurt--to whom? If we say -to the spectator--the definition will not serve as a ground of -inference to the condition of the agent contemplated. If on the other -hand, we say--to the agent--the definition so understood becomes -inadmissible: as well for other reasons, as because there are a great -many Turpia which are not agents at all, and which the definition -therefore would not include. Either therefore the definition given by -Sokrates is a bad one--or it will not sustain his conclusion. And -thus, on this very important argument, where Sokrates admits that he -stands alone, and where therefore the proof would need to be doubly -cogent--an argument too where the great cause (so Adam Smith terms -it) of the corruption of men's moral sentiments has to be -combated--Sokrates has nothing to produce except premisses alike -far-fetched and irrelevant. What increases our regret is, that the real -arguments establishing the turpitude of Archelaus and his acts are obvious -enough, if you look for them in the right direction. You discover -nothing while your eye is fixed on Archelaus himself: far from -presenting any indications of misery, which Sokrates professes to -discover, he has gained much of what men admire as good wherever they -see it. But when you turn to the persons whom he has killed, -banished, or ruined--to the mass of suffering which he has inflicted--and -to the widespread insecurity which such acts of successful -iniquity spread through all societies where they become known--there -is no lack of argument to justify that sentiment which prompts a -reflecting spectator to brand him as a disgraceful man. This argument -however is here altogether neglected by Plato. Here, as elsewhere, he -looks only at the self-regarding side of Ethics. - -[Side-note: Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness -and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of -Archelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it.] - -Sokrates proceeds next to prove--That the wrong-doer who remains -unpunished is more miserable than if he were punished. The wrong-doer -(he argues) when punished suffers what is just: but all just things -are honourable: therefore he suffers what is honourable. But all -honourable things are so called because they are either agreeable, or -profitable, or both together. Punishment is certainly not agreeable: -it must therefore be profitable or good. Accordingly the -wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good. He -is benefited, by being relieved of mental evil or wickedness, which is -a worse evil than either bodily sickness or poverty. In proportion to -the magnitude of this evil, is the value of the relief which removes -it, and the superior misery of the unpunished wrong-doer who -continues to live under it.[50] - -[Footnote 50: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 477-478.] - -Upon this argument, I make the same remark as upon that immediately -preceding. We are not expressly told, whether good, evil, happiness, -misery, &c., refer to the agent alone or to others also: but the -general tenor implies that the agent alone is meant. And in this -sense, Plato does not make out his case. He establishes an arbitrary -standard of his own, recognised only by a few followers, and -altogether differing from the ordinary standard, to test and compare -happiness and misery. The successful criminal, Archelaus himself, far -from feeling any such intense misery as Plato describes, is satisfied -and proud of his position, which most others also account an object -of envy. This is not disputed by Plato himself. And in the face of -this fact, it is fruitless as well as illogical to attempt to prove, -by an elaborate process of deductive reasoning, that Archelaus -_must_ be miserable. That step of Plato's reasoning, in which he -asserts, that the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is -profitable or good--is only true if you take in (what Plato omits to -mention) the interests of society as well as those of the agent. His -punishment is certainly profitable to (conducive to the security and -well being of) society: it may possibly be also profitable to -himself, but very frequently it is not so. The conclusion brought out -by Plato, therefore, while contradicted by the fact, involves also a -fallacy in the reasoning process. - -[Side-note: If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of -view in which punishment is considered would be reversed.] - -Throughout the whole of this dialogue, Plato intimates decidedly how -great a paradox the doctrine maintained by Sokrates must appear: how -diametrically it was opposed to the opinion not merely of the less -informed multitude, but of the wiser and more reflecting citizen--even -such a man as Nikias. Indeed it is literally exact--what -Plato here puts into the mouth of Kallikles--that if the doctrine -here advocated by Sokrates were true, the whole of social life would -be turned upside down.[51] If, for example, it were true, as Plato -contends,--That every man who commits a crime, takes upon him thereby -a terrible and lasting distemper, incurable except by the application -of punishment, which is the specific remedy in the case--every theory -of punishment would, literally speaking, be turned upside down. The -great discouragement from crime would then consist in the fear of -that formidable distemper with which the criminal was sure to -inoculate himself: and punishment, instead of being (as it is now -considered, and as Plato himself represents it in the Protagoras) the -great discouragement to the commission of crime, would operate in the -contrary direction. It would be the means of removing or impairing -the great real discouragement to crime: and a wise legislator would -hesitate to inflict it. This would be nothing less than a reversal of -the most universally accepted political or social precepts (as -Kallikles is made to express himself). - -[Footnote 51: Plato, Gorg. p. 481 C. _Kall._--[Greek: ei) me\n -ga\r spouda/zeis te kai\ tugcha/nei tau=ta a)lethe= o)/nta a(\ -le/geis, a)/llo ti e)\ e(mo=n o( bi/os a)natetramme/nos a)\n ei)/e -to=n a)nthro/pon, kai\ pa/nta ta\ e)nanti/a pra/ttomen, e)\ a(\ -dei=?]] - -[Side-note: Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental -distemper and bodily distemper--Material difference between the -two--Distemper must be felt by the distempered persons.] - -It will indeed be at once seen, that the taint or distemper with -which Archelaus is supposed to inoculate himself, when he commits -signal crime--is a pure fancy or poetical metaphor on the part of -Plato himself.[52] A distemper must imply something painful, -enfeebling, disabling, to the individual who feels it: there is no -other meaning: we cannot recognise a distemper, which does not make -itself felt in any way by the distempered person. Plato is misled by -his ever-repeated analogy between bodily health and mental health: -real, on some points--not real on others. When a man is in bad bodily -health, his sensations warn him of it at once. He suffers pain, -discomfort, or disabilities, which leave no doubt as to the -fact: though he may not know either the precise cause, or the -appropriate remedy. Conversely, in the absence of any such warnings, -and in the presence of certain positive sensations, he knows himself -to be in tolerable or good health. If Sokrates and Archelaus were -both in good bodily health, or both in bad bodily health, each would -be made aware of the fact by analogous evidences. But by what measure -are we to determine _when_ a man is in a good or bad mental -state? By his own feelings? In that case, Archelaus and Sokrates are -in a mental state equally good: each is satisfied with his own. By -the judgment of by-standers? Archelaus will then be the better of the -two: at least his admirers and enviers will outnumber those of -Sokrates. By my judgment? If my opinion is asked, I agree with -Sokrates: though not on the grounds which he here urges, but on other -grounds. Who is to be the ultimate referee--the interests or security -of other persons, who have suffered or are likely to suffer by -Archelaus, being by the supposition left out of view? - -[Footnote 52: The disposition of Plato to build argument on a -metaphor is often shown. Aristotle remarks it of him in respect to -his theory of Ideas; and Aristotle in his Topica gives several -precepts in regard to the general tendency--precepts enjoining -disputants to be on their guard against it in dialectic discussion -(Topica, iv. 123, a. 33, vi. 139-140)--[Greek: pa=n ga\r a)saphe\s -to\ kata\ metaphora\n lego/menon], &c.] - -Polus is now dismissed as vanquished, after having been forced, -against his will, to concede--That the doer of wrong is more -miserable than the sufferer: That he is more miserable, if -unpunished,--less so, if punished: That a triumphant criminal on a -great scale, like Archelaus, is the most miserable of men. - -[Side-note: Kallikles begins to argue against Sokrates--he -takes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of -Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly -understood.] - -Here, then, we commence with Kallikles: who interposes, to take up -the debate with Sokrates. Polus (says Kallikles), from deference to -the opinions of mankind, has erroneously conceded the point--That it -is more disgraceful to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. This is indeed -true (continues Kallikles), according to what is just by law or -convention, that is, according to the general sentiment of mankind: -but it is not true, according to justice by nature, or natural -justice. Nature and Law are here opposed.[53] The justice of Nature -is, that among men (as among other animals) the strong individual -should govern and strip the weak, taking and keeping as much as he -can grasp. But this justice will not suit the weak, who are the -many, and who defeat it by establishing a different justice--justice -according to law--to curb the strong man, and prevent him from having -more than his fair share.[54] The many, feeling their own weakness, -and thankful if they can only secure a fair and equal division, make -laws and turn the current of praise and blame for their own -protection, in order to deter the strong man from that encroachment -and oppression to which he is disposed. _The just according to -law_ is thus a tutelary institution, established by the weak to -defend themselves against _the just according to nature_. Nature -measures right by might, and by nothing else: so that according to -the right of nature, suffering wrong is more disgraceful than doing -wrong. Herakles takes from Geryon his cattle, by the right of nature -or of the strongest, without either sale or gift.[55] - -[Footnote 53: Plato, Gorgias, p. 482 E. [Greek: o(s ta\ polla\ de\ -tau=ta e)nanti/a a)lle/lois e)sti/n, e(/ te phu/sis kai\ o( -no/mos.]] - -[Footnote 54: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B. [Greek: a)ll', oi)=mai, oi( -tithe/menoi tou\s no/mous oi( a)sthenei=s a)/nthropoi/ ei)si kai\ oi( -polloi\. Pro\s au(tou\s ou)=n kai\ to\ au)toi=s sumphe/ron tou/s te -no/mous ti/thentai kai\ tou\s e)pai/nous e)painou=si kai\ tou\s -pso/gous pse/gousin, e)kphobou=nte/s te tou\s e)r)r(omeneste/rous -to=n a)nthro/pon kai\ dunatou\s o)/ntas ple/on e)/chein, i(/na me\ -au)to=n ple/on e)/chosin, le/gousin o(s ai)schro\n kai\ a)/dikon to\ -pleonektei=n, kai\ tou=to e)sti to\ a)dikei=n, to\ zetei=n to=n -a)/llon ple/on e)/chein; a)gapo=si ga/r, oi)=mai, au)toi\ a)\n to\ -i)/son e)/chosi phaulo/teroi o)/ntes.]] - -[Footnote 55: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-488.] - -But (rejoins Sokrates) the many are by nature stronger than the one; -since, as you yourself say, they make and enforce laws to restrain -him and defeat his projects. Therefore, since the many are the -strongest, the right which they establish is the right of (or by) -nature. And the many, as you admit, declare themselves in favour of -the answer given by Polus--That to do wrong is more disgraceful than -to suffer wrong.[56] Right by nature, and right by institution, -sanction it alike. - -[Footnote 56: Plato, Gorgias, p. 488 D-E.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: What Kallikles says is not to be taken as a sample -of the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kallikles--rhetor and -politician.] - -Several commentators have contended, that the doctrine which Plato -here puts into the mouth of Kallikles was taught by the Sophists at -Athens: who are said to have inculcated on their hearers that true -wisdom and morality consisted in acting upon the right of the -strongest and taking whatever they could get, without any regard to -law or justice. I have already endeavoured to show, in my -History of Greece, that the Sophists cannot be shown to have taught -either this doctrine, or any other common doctrine: that one at least -among them (Prodikus) taught a doctrine inconsistent with it: and -that while all of them agreed in trying to impart rhetorical -accomplishments, or the power of handling political, ethical, -judicial, matters in a manner suitable for the Athenian public--each -had his own way of doing this. Kallikles is not presented by Plato as -a Sophist, but as a Rhetor aspiring to active political influence; -and taking a small dose of philosophy, among the preparations for -that end.[57] He depreciates the Sophists as much as the -philosophers, and in fact rather more.[58] Moreover Plato represents -him as adapting himself, with accommodating subservience, to the -Athenian public assembly, and saying or unsaying exactly as they -manifested their opinion.[59] Now the Athenian public assembly would -repudiate indignantly all this pretended right of the strongest, if -any orator thought fit to put it forward as over-ruling established -right and law. Any aspiring or subservient orator, such as Kallikles -is described, would know better than to address them in this strain. -The language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kallikles is noway -consistent with the attribute which he also ascribes to him--slavish -deference to the judgments of the Athenian Demos. - -[Footnote 57: Plato, Gorgias, p. 487 C, 485.] - -[Footnote 58: Plato, Gorgias, p. 520 A.] - -[Footnote 59: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481-482.] - -[Side-note: Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an -authority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The -theory of Kallikles is made to appear repulsive by the language in -which he expresses it.] - -Kallikles is made to speak like one who sympathises with the right of -the strongest, and who decorates such iniquity with the name and -authority of that which he calls Nature. But this only shows the -uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority.[60] It may be -pleaded in favour of different and opposite theories. Nature prompts -the strong man to take from weaker men what will gratify his desires: -Nature also prompts these weaker men to defeat him and protect -themselves by the best means in their power. The many are -weaker, taken individually--stronger taken collectively: hence they -resort to defensive combination, established rules, and collective -authority.[61] The right created on one side, and the opposite right -created on the other, flow alike from Nature: that is, from -propensities and principles natural, and deeply seated, in the human -mind. The authority of Nature, considered as an enunciation of actual -and wide-spread facts, may be pleaded for both alike. But a man's -sympathy and approbation may go either with the one or the other; and -he may choose to stamp that which he approves, with the name of -Nature as a personified law-maker. This is what is here done by -Kallikles as Plato exhibits him.[62] He sympathises with, and -approves, the powerful individual. Now the greater portion of mankind -are, and always have been, governed upon this despotic principle, and -brought up to respect it: while many, even of those who dislike -Kallikles because they regard him as the representative of -Athenian democracy (to which however his proclaimed sentiments stand -pointedly opposed), when they come across a great man or so-called -hero, such as Alexander or Napoleon, applaud the most exorbitant -ambition if successful, and if accompanied by military genius and -energy--regarding communities as made for little else except to serve -as his instruments, subjects, and worshippers. Such are represented -as the sympathies of Kallikles: but those of the Athenians went with -the second of the two rights--and mine go with it also. And though -the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kallikles, in -describing this second right, abounds in contemptuous rhetoric, -proclaiming offensively the individual weakness of the multitude[63]--yet -this very fact is at once the most solid and most respectable -foundation on which rights and obligations can be based. The -establishment of them is indispensable, and is felt as indispensable, -to procure security for the community: whereby the strong man whom -Kallikles extols as the favourite of Nature, may be tamed by -discipline and censure, so as to accommodate his own behaviour to -this equitable arrangement.[64] Plato himself, in his Republic,[65] -traces the generation of a city to the fact that each man -individually taken is not self-sufficing, but stands in need of many -things: it is no less true, that each man stands also in fear of many -things, especially of depredations from animals, and depredations -from powerful individuals of his own species. In the mythe of -Protagoras,[66] we have fears from hostile animals--in the speech -here ascribed to Kallikles, we have fears from hostile strong -men--assigned as the generating cause, both of political communion and -of established rights and obligations to protect it. - -[Footnote 60: Aristotle (Sophist. Elench. 12, p. 173, a. 10) makes -allusion to this argument of Kallikles in the Gorgias, and notices it -as a frequent point made by disputants in Dialectics--to insist on -the contradiction between the Just according to Nature and the Just -according to Law: which contradiction (Aristotle says) all the -ancients recognised as a real one ([Greek: oi( a)rchai=oi pa/ntes -o)/|onto sumbai/nein]). It was doubtless a point on which the -Dialectician might find much to say on either side.] - -[Footnote 61: In the conversation between Sokrates and Kritobulus, -one of the best in Xenophon's Memorabilia (ii. 6, 21), respecting the -conditions on which friendship depends, we find Sokrates clearly -stating that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity, -though different and opposite, nevertheless both exist _by -nature_. [Greek: A)ll' e)/chei me/n, e)/phe o( Sokra/tes, -poiki/los pos tau=ta: Phu/sei ga\r e)/chousin oi( a)/nthropoi ta\ -me\n philika/--de/ontai/ te ga\r a)lle/lon, kai\ e)leou=si, kai\ -sunergou=ntes o)phelou=ntai, kai\ tou=to sunie/ntes cha/rin -e)/chousin a)lle/lois--ta\ de\ polemika/--ta/ te ga\r au)ta\ kala\ -kai\ e(de/a nomi/zontes u(pe\r tou/ton ma/chontai kai\ -dichognomonou=ntes e)nantiou=ntai; polemiko\n de\ kai\ e)/ris kai\ -o)rge/, kai\ dusmene\s me\n o( tou= pleonektei=n e)/ros, miseto\n de\ -o( phtho/nos. A)ll' o(/mos dia\ tou/ton pa/nton e( phili/a -diaduome/ne suna/ptei tou\s kalou/s te ka)gathou/s], &c. - -We read in the speech of Hermokrates the Syracusan, at the congress -of Gela in Sicily, when exhorting the Sicilians to unite for the -purpose of repelling the ambitious schemes of Athens, Thucyd. iv. 61: -[Greek: kai\ tou\s me\n A)thenai/ous tau=ta pleonektei=n te kai\ -pronoei=sthai polle\ xuggno/me, kai\ ou) toi=s a)/rchein boulome/nois -me/mphomai a)lla\ toi=s u(pakou/ein e(toimote/rois ou)=si; _ -pe/phuke ga\r to\ a)nthro/peion dia\ panto\s a)/rchein me\n tou= -ei)/kontos, phula/ssesthai de\ to\ e)pio/n_. o(/soi de\ -gigno/skontes au)ta\ me\ o)rtho=s proskopou=men, mede\ tou=to/ tis -presbu/taton e(/kei kri/nas, to\ koino=s phobero\n a(/pantas eu)= -the/sthai, a(marta/nomen.] A like sentiment is pronounced by the -Athenian envoys in their debate with the Melians, Thuc. v. 105: -[Greek: e(gou/metha ga\r to/ te thei=on do/xe|, to\ a)nthro/peio/n te -sapho=s dia\ panto/s, u(po\ _phu/seos a)nagkai/as_, ou)= a)\n -krate=|, a)/rchein.] Some of the Platonic critics would have us -believe that this last-cited sentiment emanates from the corrupt -teaching of Athenian Sophists: but Hermokrates the Syracusan had -nothing to do with Athenian Sophists.] - -[Footnote 62: Respecting the vague and indeterminate phrases--Natural -Justice, Natural Right, Law of Nature--see Mr. Austin's Province of -Jurisprudence Determined, p. 160, ed. 2nd. [Jurisp., 4th ed, pp. 179, -591-2], and Sir H. S. Maine's Ancient Law, chapters iii. and iv. - -Among the assertions made about the Athenian Sophists, it is said by -some commentators that they denied altogether any Just or Unjust by -_nature_--that they recognised no Just or Unjust, except by -_law or convention_. - -To say that the _Sophists_ (speaking of them collectively) -either affirmed or denied anything, is, in my judgment, incorrect. -Certain persons are alluded to by Plato (Theaetet. 172 B) as adopting -partially the doctrine of Protagoras (_Homo Mensura_) and as -denying altogether the Just by _nature_. - -In another Platonic passage (Protagor. 337) which is also cited as -contributing to prove that the Sophists denied [Greek: to\ di/kaion -phu/sei]--nothing at all is said about [Greek: to\ di/kaion]. Hippias -the Sophist is there introduced as endeavouring to appease the angry -feeling between Protagoras and Sokrates by reminding them, "I am of -opinion that we all (_i.e._ men of literature and study) are -kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by _nature_ though not by -_law_: for law, the despot of mankind, carries many things by -force, contrary to nature". The remark is very appropriate from one -who is trying to restore good feeling between literary disputants: -and the cosmopolitan character of literature is now so familiar a -theme, that I am surprised to find Heindorf (in his note) making it -an occasion for throwing the usual censure upon the Sophist, because -some of them distinguished Nature from the Laws, and despised the -latter in comparison with the former. - -Kallikles here, in the Gorgias, maintains an opinion not only -different from, but inconsistent with, the opinion alluded to above -in the Theaetetus, 172 B. The persons noticed in the Theaetetus -said--There is no Natural Justice: no Justice, except Justice by Law. -Kallikles says--There is a Natural Justice quite distinct from (and -which he esteems more than) Justice by Law: he then explains what he -believes Natural Justice to be--That the strong man should take what -he pleases from the weak. - -Though these two opinions are really inconsistent with each other, -yet we see Plato in the Leges (x. 889 E, 890 A) alluding to them both -as the same creed, held and defended by the same men; whom he -denounces with extreme acrimony. Who they were, he does not name; he -does not mention [Greek: sophistai/], but calls them [Greek: a)ndro=n -sopho=n, i)dioto=n te kai\ poieto=n]. - -We see, in the third chapter of Sir H. S. Maine's excellent work on -Ancient Law, the meaning of these phrases--Natural Justice, Law of -Nature. It designated or included "a set of legal principles entitled -to supersede the existing laws, on the ground of intrinsic -superiority". It denoted an ideal condition of society, supposed to -be much better than what actually prevailed. This at least seems to -have been the meaning which began to attach to it in the time of -Plato and Aristotle. What this ideal perfection of human society was, -varied in the minds of different speakers. In each speaker's mind the -word and sentiment was much the same, though the objects to which it -attached were often different. Empedokles proclaims in solemn and -emphatic language that the Law of Nature peremptorily forbids us to -kill any animal. (Aristot. Rhetor. i. 13, 1373 b. 15.) Plato makes -out to his own satisfaction, that his Republic is thoroughly in -harmony with the Law of Nature: and he insists especially on this -harmony, in the very point which even the Platonic critics admit to -be wrong--that is, in regard to the training of women and the -relations of the sexes (Republic, v. 456 C, 466 D). We learn from -Plato himself that the propositions of the Republic were thoroughly -adverse to what other persons reverenced as the Law of Nature. - -In the notes of Beck and Heindorf on Protagor. p. 337 we read, -"Hippias prae caeteris Sophistis contempsit leges, iisque opposuit -Naturam. Naturam legibus plures certe Sophistarum opposuisse, easque -prae illa contempsisse, multis veterum locis constat." Now this -allegation is more applicable to Plato than to the Sophists. Plato -speaks with the most unmeasured contempt of existing communities and -their laws: the scheme of his Republic, radically departing from them -as it does, shows what he considered as required by the exigencies of -human nature. Both the Stoics and the Epikureans extolled what they -called the Law of Nature above any laws actually existing. - -The other charge made against the Sophists (quite opposite, yet -sometimes advanced by the same critics) is, that they recognised no -Just by Nature, but only Just by Law: _i.e._ all the actual laws -and customs considered as binding in each different community. This -is what Plato ascribes to some persons (Sophists or not) in the -Theaetetus, p. 172. But in this sense it is not exact to call -Kallikles (as Heindorf does, Protagor. p. 337) "germanus ille -Sophistarum alumnus in Gorgia Callicles," nor to affirm (with -Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theaetet. p. 183) that Plato meant to -refute Aristippus under the name of Kallikles, Aristippus maintaining -that there was no Just by Nature, but only Just by Law or -Convention.] - -[Footnote 63: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B, p. 492 A. [Greek: oi( -polloi\, a)pokrupto/menoi te\n e(auto=n a)dunami/an], &c.] - -[Footnote 64: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 E.] - -[Footnote 65: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B. [Greek: o(/ti tugcha/nei -e(mo=n e(/kastos ou)k au)tarke\s o)/n, a)lla\ pollo=n e)ndee/s.]] - -[Footnote 66: Plato, Protag. p. 322 B.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Sokrates maintains that self-command and -moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. -Kallikles defends the negative.] - -Kallikles now explains, that by _stronger_ men, he means better, -wiser, braver men. It is they (he says) who ought, according to right -by nature, to rule over others and to have larger shares than others. -_Sokr._--Ought they not to rule themselves as well as -others:[67] to control their own pleasures and desires: to be sober -and temperate? _Kall._--No, they would be foolish if they did. -The weak multitude must do so; and there grows up accordingly among -_them_ a sentiment which requires such self-restraint from all. -But it is the privilege of the superior few to be exempt from this -necessity. The right of nature authorises them to have the largest -desires, since their courage and ability furnish means to satisfy the -desires. It would be silly if a king's son or a despot were to limit -himself to the same measure of enjoyment with which a poor citizen -must be content; and worse than silly if he did not enrich his -friends in preference to his enemies. He need not care for that -public law and censure which must reign paramount over each man among -the many. A full swing of enjoyment, if a man has power to procure -and maintain it, is virtue as well as happiness.[68] - -[Footnote 67: Plato, Gorgias, p. 491 D.] - -[Footnote 68: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 A-C.] - -[Side-note: Whether the largest measure of desires is good for -a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all -varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good -are identical?] - -_Sokr._--I think on the contrary that a sober and moderate life, -regulated according to present means and circumstances, is better -than a life of immoderate indulgence.[69] _Kall._--The man who -has no desires will have no pleasure, and will live like a stone. The -more the desires, provided they can all be satisfied, the happier a -man will be. _Sokr._--You mean that a man shall be continually -hungry, and continually satisfying his hunger: continually thirsty, -and satisfying his thirst; and so forth. _Kall._--By having and -by satisfying those and all other desires, a man will enjoy -happiness. _Sokr._--Do you mean to include all varieties of -desire and satisfaction of desire: such for example as itching and -scratching yourself:[70] and other bodily appetites which might be -named? _Kall._--Such things are not fit for discussion. -_Sokr._--It is you who drive me to mention them, by laying down -the principle, that men who enjoy, be the enjoyment of what sort it -may, are happy; and by not distinguishing what pleasures are -good and what are evil. Tell me again, do you think that the -pleasurable and the good are identical? Or are there any pleasurable -things which are not good?[71] _Kall._--I think that the -pleasurable and the good are the same. - -[Footnote 69: Plato, Gorgias, p. 493 C. [Greek: e)a/n pos oi(=o/s t' -o)= pei=sai metathe/sthai kai\ a)nti\ tou= a)ple/stos kai\ -a)kola/stos e)/chontos bi/ou to\n kosmi/os kai\ toi=s a)ei\ parou=sin -i(kano=s kai\ e)xarkou/ntos e)/chonta bi/on e(le/sthai.]] - -[Footnote 70: Plato, Gorg. p. 494 E.] - -[Footnote 71: Plato, Gorg. pp. 494-495. [Greek: e)= ga\r e)go\ a)/go -e)ntau=tha, e)\ e)kei=nos o(\s a)\n phe=| a)ne/den ou(/to tou\s -chai/rontas, o(/pos a)\n chairosin, eu)dai/monas ei)=nai, kai\ me\ -diori/zetai to=n e(dono=n o(poi=ai a)gathai\ kai\ kakai/? a)ll' e)/ti -kai\ nu=n le/ge, po/teron phe\| ei)=nai to\ au)to\ e(du\ kai\ -a)gatho/n, e)\ ei)=nai ti to=n e(de/on o(\ ou)k e)/stin a)gatho/n?]] - -[Side-note: Kallikles maintains that pleasurable and good are -identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. -A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them.] - -Upon this question the discussion now turns: whether pleasure and -good are the same, or whether there are not some pleasures good, -others bad. By a string of questions much protracted, but subtle -rather than conclusive, Sokrates proves that pleasure is not the same -as good--that there are such things as bad pleasures and good pains. -And Kallikles admits that some pleasures are better, others -worse.[72] Profitable pleasures are good: hurtful pleasures are bad. -Thus the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, if they impart to -us health and strength--bad, if they produce sickness and weakness. -We ought to choose the good pleasures and pains, and avoid the bad -ones. It is not every man who is competent to distinguish what -pleasures are good, and what are bad. A scientific and skilful -adviser, judging upon general principles, is required to make this -distinction.[73] - -[Footnote 72: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 496-499.] - -[Footnote 73: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 499-500. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n -panto\s a)ndro/s e)stin e)kle/xasthai poi=a a)gatha\ to=n e(de/on -e)sti\ kai\ o(poi=a kaka/, e)= technikou= dei= ei)s e(/kaston? -Technikou=.]] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and -Sokrates in the Protagoras.] - -This debate between Sokrates and Kallikles, respecting the "Quomodo -vivendum est,"[74] deserves attention on more than one account. In -the first place, the relation which Sokrates is here made to declare -between the two pairs of general terms, Pleasurable--Good: -Painful--Evil: is the direct reverse of that which he both declares -and demonstrates in the Protagoras. In that dialogue, the Sophist -Protagoras is represented as holding an opinion very like that which -is maintained by Sokrates in the Gorgias. But Sokrates (in the -Protagoras) refutes him by an elaborate argument; and demonstrates -that pleasure and good (also pain and evil) are names for the same -fundamental ideas under different circumstances: pleasurable and -painful referring only to the sensation of the present moment--while -good and evil include, besides, an estimate of its future -consequences and accompaniments, both pleasurable and painful, and -represent the result of such calculation. In the Gorgias, Sokrates -demonstrates the contrary, by an argument equally elaborate but not -equally convincing. He impugns a doctrine advocated by Kallikles, and -in impugning it, proclaims a marked antithesis and even repugnance -between the pleasurable and the good, the painful and the evil: -rejecting the fundamental identity of the two, which he advocates in -the Protagoras, as if it were a disgraceful heresy. - -[Footnote 74: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 D. [Greek: i(/na to=| o)/nti -kata/delon ge/netai, po=s biote/on], &c. 500 C: [Greek: o(/ntina -chre\ tro/pon ze=|n.]] - -[Side-note: Views of critics about this contradiction.] - -The subject evidently presented itself to Plato in two different ways -at different times. Which of the two is earliest, we have no means of -deciding. The commentators, who favour generally the view taken in -the Gorgias, treat the Protagoras as a juvenile and erroneous -production: sometimes, with still less reason, they represent -Sokrates as arguing in that dialogue, from the principles of his -opponents, not from his own. For my part, without knowing whether the -Protagoras or the Gorgias is the earliest, I think the Protagoras an -equally finished composition, and I consider that the views which -Sokrates is made to propound in it, respecting pleasure and good, are -decidedly nearer to the truth. - -[Side-note: Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of -Sokrates in both dialogues.] - -That in the list of pleasures there are some which it is proper to -avoid,--and in the list of pains, some which it is proper to accept -or invite--is a doctrine maintained by Sokrates alike in both the -dialogues. Why? Because some pleasures are good, others bad: some -pains bad, others good--says Sokrates in the Gorgias. The same too is -said by Sokrates in the Protagoras; but then, he there explains what -he means by the appellation. All pleasure (he there says), so far as -it goes, is good--all pain is bad. But there are some pleasures which -cannot be enjoyed without debarring us from greater pleasures or -entailing upon us greater pains: on that ground therefore, such -pleasures are bad. So again, there are some pains, the suffering -of which is a condition indispensable to our escaping greater pains, -or to our enjoying greater pleasures: such pains therefore are good. -Thus this apparent exception does not really contradict, but -confirms, the general doctrine--That there is no good but the -pleasurable, and the elimination of pain--and no evil except the -painful, or the privation of pleasure. Good and evil have no -reference except to pleasures and pains; but the terms imply, in each -particular case, an estimate and comparison of future pleasurable and -painful consequences, and express the result of such comparison. "You -call enjoyment itself evil" (says Sokrates in the Protagoras),[75] -"when it deprives us of greater pleasures or entails upon us greater -pains. If you have any other ground, or look to any other end, in -calling it evil, you may tell us what that end is; but you will not -be able to tell us. So too, you say that pain is a good, when it -relieves us from greater pains, or when it is necessary as the -antecedent cause of greater pleasures. If you have any other end in -view, when you call pain good, you may tell us what that end is; but -you will not be able to tell us."[76] - -[Footnote 75: Plato, Protagoras,** p. 354 D. [Greek: e)pei/, ei) kat' -a)/llo ti au)to\ to\ chai/rein kako\n kalei=te kai\ ei)s a)/llo ti -te/los a)poble/psantes, e)/choite a)\n kai\ e(mi=n ei)pei=n; a)ll' -ou)ch e(/xete. . . . e)pei\ ei) pro\s a)/llo ti te/los a)poble/pete, -o(/tan kale=te au)to\ to\ lupei=sthai a)gatho/n, e)\ pro\s o(\ e)go\ -le/go, e)/chete e(mi=n ei)pein; a)ll' ou)ch e(/xete.]] - -[Footnote 76: In a remarkable passage of the De Legibus, Plato denies -all essential distinction between Good and Pleasure, and all reality -of Good apart from Pleasure (Legg. ii. pp. 662-663). [Greek: ei) d' -au)= to\n dikaio/taton eu)daimone/staton a)pophai/noito bi/on -ei)=nai, zetoi= pou pa=s a)\n o( a)kou/on, oi)=mai, ti/ pot' e)n -au)to=| to\ te=s e(done=s krei=tton a)gatho/n te kai\ kalo\n o( -no/mos e)no\n e)painei=? ti/ ga\r de\ dikai/o| chorizo/menon e(done=s -a)gatho\n a)\n ge/noito?] - -Plato goes on to argue as follows: Even though it were not true, as I -affirm it to be, that the life of justice is a life of pleasure, and -the life of injustice a life of pain--still the law-giver must -proclaim this proposition as a useful falsehood, and compel every one -to chime in with it. Otherwise the youth will have no motive to just -conduct. For no one will willingly consent to obey any recommendation -from which he does not expect more pleasure than pain; [Greek: -ou)dei\s ga\r a)\n e(/kon e)/theloi pei/thesthai pra/ttein tou=to -o(/, to| me\ to\ chai/rein tou= lupei=sthai ple/on e(/petai] (663 -B).] - -[Side-note: Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are -good and evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to -proceed in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the -Gorgias.] - -In the Gorgias, too, Sokrates declares that some pleasures are good, -others bad--some pains bad, others good. But here he stops. He does -not fulfil the reasonable demand urged by Sokrates in the Protagoras--"If -you make such a distinction, explain the ground on which you -make it, and the end to which you look". The distinction in the -Gorgias stands without any assigned ground or end to rest upon. And -this want is the more sensibly felt, when we read in the same -dialogue, that--"It is not every man who can distinguish the good -pleasures from the bad: a scientific man, proceeding on principle, is -needed for the purpose".[77] But upon what criterion is the -scientific man to proceed? Of what properties is he to take account, -in pronouncing one pleasure to be bad, another good--or one pain to -be bad and another good--the estimate of consequences, measured in -future pleasures and pains, being by the supposition excluded? No -information is given. The problem set to the scientific man is one of -which all the quantities are unknown. Now Sokrates in the -Protagoras[78] also lays it down, that a scientific or rational -calculation must be had, and a mind competent to such calculation -must be postulated, to decide which pleasures are bad or fit to be -rejected--which pains are good, or proper to be endured. But then he -clearly specifies the elements which alone are to be taken into the -calculation--_viz._, the future pleasures and pains accompanying -or dependent upon each with the estimate of their comparative -magnitude and durability. The theory of this calculation is clear and -intelligible: though in many particular cases, the data necessary for -making it, and the means of comparing them, may be very imperfectly -accessible. - -[Footnote 77: Plato, Gorgias, p. 500 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n panto\s -a)ndro/s** e)stin e)kle/xasthai poi=a a)/gatha\ to=n e(de/on -e)sti\ kai\ o(poi=a kaka/? e)\ technikou= dei= ei)s e(/kaston? -Technikou=.]] - -[Footnote 78: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 357 B, 356 E.] - -[Side-note: Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense--not -recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues.] - -According to various ethical theories, which have chiefly obtained -currency in modern times, the distinction--between pleasures good or -fit to be enjoyed, and pleasures bad or unfit to be enjoyed--is -determined for us by a moral sense or intuition: by a simple, -peculiar, sentiment of right and wrong, or a conscience, which -springs up within us ready-made, and decides on such matters without -appeal; so that a man has only to look into his own heart for a -solution. We need not take account of this hypothesis, in reviewing -Plato's philosophy: for he evidently does not proceed upon it. He -expressly affirms, in the Gorgias as well as in the Protagoras, that -the question is one requiring science or knowledge to determine it, -and upon which none but the man of science or _expert_ -([Greek: techniko\s]) is a competent judge. - -[Side-note: In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is -self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the pleasures -and pains of other persons, so far as affected by the agent.] - -Moreover, there is another point common to both the two dialogues, -deserving of notice. I have already remarked when reviewing the -doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, that it appears to me -seriously defective, inasmuch as it takes into account the pleasures -and pains of the agent only, and omits the pleasures and pains of -other persons affected by his conduct. But this is not less true -respecting the doctrine of Sokrates in the Gorgias: for whatever -criterion he may there have in his mind to determine which among our -pleasures are bad, it is certainly not this--that the agent in -procuring them is obliged to hurt others. For the example which -Sokrates cites as specially illustrating the class of bad -pleasures--_viz._, the pleasure of scratching an itching part of the -body[79]--is one in which no others besides the agent are concerned. -As in the Protagoras, so in the Gorgias--Plato in laying down his -rule of life, admits into the theory only what concerns the agent -himself, and makes no direct reference to the happiness of others as -affected by the agent's behaviour. - -[Footnote 79: The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have reckoned this -among the bad pleasures, because the discomfort and distress of body -out of which it arises more than countervail the pleasure.] - -[Side-note: Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues -is in substance the same, but differing in classification.] - -There are however various points of analogy between the Protagoras -and the Gorgias, which will enable us, after tracing them out, to -measure the amount of substantial difference between them; I speak of -the reasoning of Sokrates in each. Thus, in the Protagoras,[80] -Sokrates ranks health, strength, preservation of the community, -wealth, command, &c., under the general head of Good things, but -expressly on the ground that they are the producing causes and -conditions of pleasures and of exemption from pains: he also ranks -sickness and poverty under the head of Evil things, as productive -causes of pain and suffering. In the Gorgias also, he numbers wisdom, -health, strength, perfection of body, riches, &c., among Good -things or profitable things[81]--(which two words he treats as -equivalent)--and their contraries as Evil things. Now he does -not expressly say here (as in the Protagoras) that these things are -_good_, because they are productive causes of pleasure or -exemption from pain: but such assumption must evidently be supplied -in order to make the reasoning valid. For upon what pretence can any -one pronounce strength, health, riches, to be _good_--and -helplessness, sickness, poverty, to be _evil_--if no reference -be admitted to pleasures and pains? Sokrates in the Gorgias[82] -declares that the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, in so -far as they impart health and strength to the body--evil, in so far -as they produce a contrary effect. Sokrates in the Protagoras reasons -in the same way--but with this difference--that he would count the -pleasure of the repast itself as one item of good: enhancing the -amount of good where the future consequences are beneficial, -diminishing the amount of evil where the future consequences are -Unfavourable: while Sokrates in the Gorgias excludes immediate -pleasure from the list of good things, and immediate pain from the -list of evil things. - -[Footnote 80: Plato, Protagor. pp. 353 D, 354 A.] - -[Footnote 81: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467-468-499.] - -[Footnote 82: Plato, Gorgias, p. 499 D.] - -This last exclusion renders the theory in the Gorgias untenable and -inconsistent. If present pleasure be not admitted as an item of good -so far as it goes--then neither can the future and consequent -aggregates of pleasure, nor the causes of them, be admitted as good. -So likewise, if present pain be no evil, future pain cannot be -allowed to rank as an evil.[83] - -[Footnote 83: Compare a passage in the Republic (ii. p. 357) where -Sokrates gives (or accepts, as given by Glaukon) a description of -Good much more coincident with the Protagoras than with the Gorgias. -The common property of all Good is to be desired or loved; and there -are three varieties of it--1. That which we desire for itself, and -for its own sake, apart from all ulterior consequences, such as -innocuous pleasures or enjoyments. 2. That which we desire both for -itself and for its ulterior consequences, such as good health, good -vision, good sense, &c. 3. That which we do not desire--nay, -which we perhaps hate or shun, _per se_: but which we -nevertheless desire and invite, in connection with and for the sake -of ulterior consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical -treatment when we are sick, labour in our trade or profession. - -Here Plato admits the immediately pleasurable _per se_ as one -variety of good, always assuming that it is not countervailed by -consequences or accompaniments of a painful character. This is the -doctrine of the Protagoras, as distinguished from the Gorgias, where -Sokrates sets pleasure in marked opposition to good.] - -[Side-note: Kallikles, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, -maintains a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in -the Protagoras.] - -Each of the two dialogues, which I am now comparing, is in truth an -independent composition: in each, Sokrates has a distinct argument to -combat; and in the latest of the two (whichever that was), no heed is -taken of the argumentation in the earlier. In the Protagoras, he -exalts the dignity and paramount force of knowledge or prudence: if a -man knows how to calculate pleasures and pains, he will be sure to -choose the result which involves the greater pleasure or the less -pain, on the whole: to say that he is overpowered by immediate -pleasure or pain into making a bad choice, is a wrong description--the -real fact being, that he is deficient in the proper knowledge how -to choose. In the Gorgias, the doctrine assigned to Kallikles and -impugned by Sokrates is something very different. That justice, -temperance, self-restraint, are indeed indispensable to the happiness -of ordinary men; but if there be any one individual, so immensely -superior in force as to trample down and make slaves of the rest, -this one man would be a fool if he restrained himself: having the -means of gratifying all his appetites, the more appetites he has, the -more enjoyments will he have and the greater happiness.[84] -Observe--that Kallikles applies this doctrine only to the one omnipotent -despot: to all other members of society, he maintains that -self-restraint is essential. This is the doctrine which Sokrates in the -Gorgias undertakes to refute, by denying community of nature between -the pleasurable and the good--between the painful and the evil. - -[Footnote 84: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 B.] - -[Side-note: The refutation of Kallikles by Sokrates in the -Gorgias, is unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts -unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras.] - -To me his refutation appears altogether unsuccessful, and the -position upon which he rests it incorrect. The only parts of the -refutation really forcible, are those in which he unconsciously -relinquishes this position, and slides into the doctrine of the -Protagoras. Upon this latter doctrine, a refutation might be -grounded: you may show that even an omnipotent despot (regard for the -comfort of others being excluded by the hypothesis) will gain by -limiting the gratification of his appetites to-day so as not to spoil -his appetites of tomorrow. Even in his case, prudential restraint is -required, though his motives for it would be much less than in the -case of ordinary social men. But Good, as laid down by Plato in the -Gorgias, entirely disconnected from pleasure--and Evil, entirely -disconnected from pain--have no application to this supposed despot. -He has no desire for such Platonic Good--no aversion for such -Platonic Evil. His happiness is not diminished by missing the former -or incurring the latter. In fact, one of the cardinal principles of -Plato's ethical philosophy, which he frequently asserts both in this -dialogue and elsewhere,[85]--That every man desires Good, and acts -for the sake of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil--becomes untrue, if -you conceive Good and Evil according to the Gorgias, as having no -reference to pleasure or the avoidance of pain: untrue, not merely in -regard to a despot under these exceptional conditions, but in regard -to the large majority of social men. They desire to obtain Good and -avoid Evil, in the sense of the Protagoras: but not in the sense of -the Gorgias.[86] Sokrates himself proclaims in this dialogue: "I and -philosophy stand opposed to Kallikles and the Athenian public. What I -desire is, to reason consistently with myself." That is, to speak the -language of Sokrates in the Protagoras--"To me, Sokrates, the -consciousness of inconsistency with myself and of an unworthy -character, the loss of my own self-esteem and the pungency of my own -self-reproach, are the greatest of all pains: greater than those -which you, Kallikles, and the Athenians generally, seek to avoid at -all price and urge me also to avoid at all price--poverty, political -nullity, exposure to false accusation, &c."[87] The noble -scheme of life, here recommended by Sokrates, may be correctly -described according to the theory of the Protagoras: without any -resort to the paradox of the Gorgias, that Good has no kindred or -reference to Pleasure, nor Evil to Pain. - -[Footnote 85: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467 C, 499 E.] - -[Footnote 86: The reasoning of Plato in the Gorgias, respecting this -matter, rests upon an equivocal phrase. The Greek phrase [Greek: eu)= -pra/ttein] has two meanings; it means _recte agere_, to act -rightly; and it also means _felicem esse_, to be happy. There is -a corresponding double sense in [Greek: kako=s pra/ttein]. Heindorf -has well noticed the fallacious reasoning founded by Plato on this -double sense. We read in the Gorgias, p. 507 C: [Greek: a)na/gke to\n -so/phrona, di/kaion o)/nta kai\ a)ndrei=on kai\ o(/sion, a)gatho\n -a)/ndra ei)=nai tele/os, to\n de\ a)gatho\n ei)= te kai\ kalo=s -pra/ttein a)\ a)\n pra/tte|, to\n d' eu)= pra/ttonta maka/rio/n te -kai\ eu)dai/mona ei)=nai, to\n de\ ponero\n kai\ kako=s pra/ttonta -a)/thlion.] Upon which Heindorf remarks, citing a note of Routh, who -says, "Vix enim potest credi, Platonem duplici sensu verborum [Greek: -eu)= pra/ttein] ad argumentum probandum abuti voluisse, quae fallacia -esset amphiboliae". "Non meminerat" (says Heindorf) "vir doctus -ceteros in Platone locos, ubi eodem modo ex duplici illa potestate -argumentatio ducitur, cujusmodi plura attulimus ad Charmidem, 42, p. -172 A." Heindorf observes, on the Charmides l. c.: "Argumenti hujus -vim positam apparet in duplici dictionis [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein] -significatu: quum vulgo sit _felicem esse_, non _recte -facere_. Hoc aliaque ejusdem generis saepius sic ansam praebuerunt -sophismatis magis quam justi syllogismi." Heindorf then refers to -analogous passages in Plato, Repub. i. p. 354 A: Alkib. i. p. 116 B, -p. 134 A. A similar fallacy is found in Aristotle, Politic. vii. i. -p. 1323, a. 17, b. 32--[Greek: a)/rista ga\r pra/ttein prose/kei -tou\s a)/rista politeuome/nous--a)du/naton de\ kalo=s pra/ttein toi=s -me\ ta\ kala\ pra/ttousin.] This fallacy is recognised and properly -commented on as a "logisches Wortspiel," by Bernays, in his -instructive volume, _Die** Dialoge des Aristoteles_, pp. 80-81 -(Berlin, 1863).] - -[Footnote 87: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 481 D, 482 B.] - -[Side-note: Permanent elements--and transient elements--of -human agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues.] - -Lastly I will compare the Protagoras and the Gorgias (meaning always, -the reasoning of Sokrates in each of them) under one more point of -view. How does each of them describe and distinguish the permanent -elements, and the transient elements, involved in human agency? What -function does each of them assign to the permanent element? The -distinction of these two is important in its ethical bearing. The -whole life both of the individual and of society consists of -successive moments of action or feeling. But each individual (and the -society as an aggregate of individuals) has within him embodied and -realised an element more or less permanent--an established character, -habits, dispositions, intellectual acquirements, &c.--a sort of -capital accumulated from the past. This permanent element is of -extreme importance. It stands to the transient element in the same -relation as the fixed capital of a trader or manufacturer to his -annual produce. The whole use and value of the fixed capital, of -which the skill and energy of the trader himself make an important -part, consists in the amount of produce which it will yield: but at -the same time the trader must keep it up in its condition of fixed -capital, in order to obtain such amount: he must set apart, and -abstain from devoting to immediate enjoyment, as much of the annual -produce as will suffice to maintain the fixed capital unimpaired--and -more, if he desires to improve his condition. The capital cannot be -commuted into interest; yet nevertheless its whole value depends -upon, and is measured by, the interest which it yields. Doubtless the -mere idea of possessing the capital is pleasurable to the possessor, -because he knows that it can and will be profitably employed, so long -as he chooses. - -[Side-note: In the Protagoras.] - -Now in the Protagoras, the permanent element is very pointedly -distinguished from the transient, and is called Knowledge--the -Science or Art of Calculation. Its function also is clearly -announced--to take comparative estimate and measurement of the -transient elements; which are stated to consist of pleasures and -pains, present and future--near and distant--certain and -uncertain--faint and strong. To these elements, manifold yet -commensurable, the calculation is to apply. "The safety of life" -(says Sokrates[88]) "resides in our keeping up this science or art -of calculation." No present enjoyment must be admitted, which would -impair it; no present pain must be shunned, which is essential to -uphold it. Yet the whole of its value resides in its application to -the comparison of the pleasures and pains. - -[Footnote 88: Plato, Protag. p. 357 A. [Greek: e)peide\ de\ e(done=s -te kai\ lu/pes e)n o)rthe=| te=| ai(re/sei e)pha/ne e(mi=n e( -soteri/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa, tou= te ple/onos kai\ e)lattonos kai\ -mei/zonos kai\ smikrote/rou kai\ por)r(ote/ro kai\ e)ggute/ro], -&c.] - -[Side-note: In the Gorgias.] - -In the Gorgias the same two elements are differently described, and -less clearly explained. The permanent is termed, Order, arrangement, -discipline, a lawful, just, and temperate, cast of mind (opposed to -the doctrine ascribed to Kallikles, which negatived this element -altogether, in the mind of the despot), parallel to health and -strength of body: the unordered mind is again the parallel of the -corrupt, distempered, helpless, body; life is not worth having until -this is cured.[89] This corresponds to the knowledge or Calculating -Science in the Protagoras; but we cannot understand what its function -is, in the Gorgias, because the calculable elements are incompletely -enumerated. - -[Footnote 89: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 504 B-C, 506 D-E. -[Greek: Ta/xis--ko/smos--psuche\ kosmi/a a)mei/non tou= a)kosme/tou.]] - -In the Protagoras, these calculable elements are two-fold--immediate -pleasures and pains--and future or distant pleasures and pains. -Between these two there is intercommunity of nature, so that they are -quite commensurable; and the function of the calculating reason is, -to make a right estimate of the one against the other.[90] But in the -Gorgias, no mention is made of future or distant pleasures and pains: -the calculable element is represented only by immediate pleasure or -pain--and from thence we pass at once to the permanent calculator--the -mind, sound or corrupt. You must abstain from a particular -enjoyment, because it will taint the soundness of your mind: -this is a pertinent reason (and would be admitted as such by Sokrates -in the Protagoras, who instead of sound mind would say, calculating -intelligence), but it is neither the ultimate reason (since this -soundness of mind is itself valuable with a view to future -calculations), nor the only reason: for you must also abstain, if it -will bring upon yourself (or upon others) preponderating pains in the -particular case--if the future pains would preponderate over the -present pleasure. Of this last calculation no notice is taken in the -Gorgias: which exhibits only the antithesis (not merely marked but -even over-done[91]) between the immediate pleasure or pain and the -calculating efficacy of mind, but leaves out the true function which -gives value to the sound mind as distinguished from the unsound and -corrupt. That function consists in its application to particular -cases: in right dealing with actual life, as regards the agent -himself and others: in [Greek: e)nergei/a], as distinguished from -[Greek: e(/xis], to use Aristotelian language.[92] I am far from -supposing that this part of the case was absent from Plato's mind. -But the theory laid out in the Gorgias (as compared with that in the -Protagoras) leaves no room for it; giving exclusive prominence to the -other elements, and acknowledging only the present pleasure or pain, -to be set against the permanent condition of mind, bad or good as it -may be. - -[Footnote 90: There would be also the like intercommunity of nature, -if along with the pains and pleasures of the agent himself (which -alone are regarded in the calculation of Sokrates in the Protagoras) -you admit into the calculation the pleasures and pains of others -concerned, and the rules established with a view to both the two -together with a view to the joint interest both of the agent and of -others.] - -[Footnote 91: Epikurus and his followers assigned the greatest value, -in their ethical theory, to the permanent element, or established -character of the agent, intellectual and emotional. But great as they -reckoned this value to be, they resolved it all into the diminution -or mitigation of pains, and, in a certain though inferior degree, the -multiplication of pleasures. They did not put it in a separate -category of its own, altogether disparate and foreign to pleasures -and pains. - -See the letter of Epikurus to Menoekeus, Diog. L. x. 128-132; -Lucretius, v. 18-45, vi. 12-25; Horat. Epist. i. 2, 48-60.] - -[Footnote 92: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7. The remark of Aristotle in -the same treatise, i. 5--[Greek: dokei= ga\r e)nde/chesthai kai\ -katheu/dein e)/chonta te\n a)rete/n, e)\ a)praktei=n dia\ bi/ou]--might -be applied to the theory of the Gorgias. Compare also Ethic. -Nik. vii. 3 (vii. 4, p. 1146, b. 31, p. 1147, a. 12).] - -[Side-note: Character of the Gorgias generally--discrediting -all the actualities of life.] - -Indeed there is nothing more remarkable in the Gorgias, than the -manner in which Sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured, -exorbitant, maleficent desires, but also depreciates and degrades all -the actualities of life--all the recreative and elegant arts, -including music and poetry, tragic as well as dithyrambic--all -provision for the most essential wants, all protection against -particular sufferings and dangers, even all service rendered to -another person in the way of relief or of rescue[93]--all the -effective maintenance of public organised force, such as ships, -docks, walls, arms, &c. Immediate satisfaction or relief, and -those who confer it, are treated with contempt, and presented as in -hostility to the perfection of the mental structure. And it is in -this point of view that various Platonic commentators extol in an -especial manner the Gorgias: as recognising an Idea of Good -superhuman and supernatural, radically disparate from pleasures and -pains of any human being, and incommensurable with them: an Universal -Idea, which, though it is supposed to cast a distant light upon -its particulars, is separated from them by an incalculable space, and -is discernible only by the Platonic telescope. - -[Footnote 93: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 501-502-511-512-517-519. [Greek: -a)/neu ga\r dikaiosu/nes kai\ sophrosu/nes lime/non kai\ neori/on -kai\ teicho=n kai\ pho/ron kai\ toiou/ton phluario=n e)mpeple/kasi -te\n po/lin.] - -This is applied to the provision of food, drink, clothing, bedding, -for the hunger, thirst, &c., of the community (p. 517 D), to the -saving of life (p. 511 D). The boatman between AEgina and Peiraeus -(says Plato) brings over his passengers in safety, together with -their families and property, preserving them from all the dangers of -the sea. The engineer, who constructs good fortifications, preserves -from danger and destruction all the citizens with their families and -their property (p. 512 B). But neither of these persons takes credit -for this service: because both of them know that it is doubtful -whether they have done any real service to the persons preserved, -since they have not rendered them any better; and that it is even -doubtful whether they may not have done them an actual mischief. -Perhaps these persons may be wicked and corrupt; in that case it is a -misfortune to them that their lives should be prolonged; it would be -better for them to die. It is under this conviction (says Plato) that -the boatman and the engineer, though they do preserve our lives, take -to themselves no credit for it. - -We shall hardly find any greater rhetorical exaggeration than this, -among all the compositions of the rhetors against whom Plato declares -war in the Gorgias. Moreover, it is a specimen of the way in which -Plato colours and misinterprets the facts of social life, in order to -serve the purpose of the argument of the moment. He says truly that -when the passage boat from AEgina to Peiraeus has reached its -destination, the steersman receives his fare and walks about on the -shore, without taking any great credit to himself, as if he had -performed a brilliant deed or conferred an important service. But how -does Plato explain this? By supposing in the steersman's mind -feelings which never enter into the mind of a real agent; feelings -which are put into words only when a moralist or a satirist is -anxious to enforce a sentiment. The service which the steersman -performs is not only adequately remunerated, but is, on most days, a -regular and easy one, such as every man who has gone through a decent -apprenticeship can perform. But suppose an exceptional day--suppose a -sudden and terrible storm to supervene on the passage--suppose the -boat full of passengers, with every prospect of all on board being -drowned--suppose she is only saved by the extraordinary skill, -vigilance, and efforts of the steersman. In that case he will, on -reaching the land, walk about full of elate self-congratulation and -pride: the passengers will encourage this sentiment by expressions of -the deepest gratitude; while friends as well as competitors will -praise his successful exploit. How many of the passengers there are -for whom the preservation of life may be a curse rather than a -blessing--is a question which neither they themselves, nor the -steersman, nor the public, will ever dream of asking.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of -flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure.] - -We have now established (continues Sokrates) that pleasure is -essentially different from good, and pain from evil: also, that to -obtain good and avoid evil, a scientific choice is required--while to -obtain pleasure and avoid pain, is nothing more than blind imitation -or irrational knack. There are some arts and pursuits which aim only -at procuring immediate pleasure--others which aim at attaining good -or the best;[94] some arts, for a single person,--others for a -multitude. Arts and pursuits which aim only at immediate pleasure, -either of one or of a multitude, belong to the general head of -Flattery. Among them are all the musical, choric, and dithyrambic -representations at the festivals--tragedy as well as comedy--also -political and judicial rhetoric. None of these arts aim at any thing -except to gratify the public to whom they are addressed: none of them -aim at the permanent good: none seek to better the character of the -public. They adapt themselves to the prevalent desires: but whether -those desires are such as, if realised, will make the public worse or -better, they never enquire.[95] - -[Footnote 94: The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have admitted a -twofold distinction of aims, but would have stated the distinction -otherwise. Two things (he would say) may be looked at in regard to -any course of conduct: first, the immediate pleasure or pain which it -yields; secondly, this item, not alone, but combined with all the -other pleasures and pains which can be foreseen as its conditions, -consequences, or concomitants. To obey the desire of immediate -pleasure, or the fear of immediate pain, requires no science; to -foresee, estimate, and compare the consequences, requires a -scientific calculation often very difficult and complicated--a -[Greek: te/chne] or [Greek: e)piste/me metretike/]. - -Thus we are told not only in what cases the calculation is required, -but what are the elements to be taken into the calculation. In the -Gorgias, we are not told on what elements the calculation of good and -evil is to be based: we are told that there _must be science_, -but we learn nothing more.] - -[Footnote 95: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 502-503.] - -[Side-note: The Rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even -the best past Rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the -four great Rhetors by Kallikles.] - -_Sokr._--Do you know any public speakers who aim at anything -more than gratifying the public, or who care to make the public -better? _Kall._--There are some who do, and others who do not. -_Sokr._--Which are those who do? and which of them has ever made -the public better?[96] _Kall._--At any rate, former -statesmen did so; such as Miltiades, Themistokles, Kimon, Perikles. -_Sokr._--None of them. If they had, you would have seen them -devoting themselves systematically and obviously to their one end. As -a builder labours to construct a ship or a house, by putting together -its various parts with order and symmetry--so these statesmen would -have laboured to implant order and symmetry in the minds and bodies -of the citizens: that is, justice and temperance in their minds, -health and strength in their bodies.[97] Unless the statesman can do -this, it is fruitless to supply the wants, to fulfil the desires and -requirements, to uphold or enlarge the power, of the citizens. This -is like supplying ample nourishment to a distempered body: the more -such a body takes in, the worse it becomes. The citizens must be -treated with refusal of their wishes and with punishment, until their -vices are healed, and they become good.[98] - -[Footnote 96: Plato, Gorgias, p. 503 C.] - -[Footnote 97: Plato, Gorgias, p. 504 D.] - -[Footnote 98: Plato, Gorgias, p. 505 B.] - -[Side-note: Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This -is the condition of virtue and happiness.] - -We ought to do (continues Sokrates) what is pleasing for the sake of -what is good: not _vice versa_. But every thing becomes good by -possessing its appropriate virtue or regulation. The regulation -appropriate to the mind is to be temperate. The temperate man will do -what is just--his duty towards men: and what is holy--his duty -towards the Gods. He will be just and holy. He will therefore also be -courageous: for he will seek only such pleasures as duty permits, and -he will endure all such pains as duty requires. Being thus temperate, -just, brave, holy, he will be a perfectly good man, doing well and -honourably throughout. The man who does well, will be happy: the man -who does ill and is wicked, will be miserable.[99] It ought to be our -principal aim, both for ourselves individually and for the city, to -attain temperance and to keep clear of intemperance: not to let our -desires run immoderately (as you, Kallikles, advise), and then seek -repletion for them: which is an endless mischief, the life of a -pirate. He who pursues this plan can neither be the friend of any -other man, nor of the Gods: for he is incapable of communion, and -therefore of friendship.[100] - -[Footnote 99: Plato, Gorgias, p, 507 D (with Routh and Heindorf's -notes).] - -[Footnote 100: Plato, Gorgias, p. 507 E. [Greek: koinonei=n ga\r -a)du/natos; o(/to| de\ me\ e(/ni koinoni/a, phili/a ou)k a)\n -ei)/e.]] - -[Side-note: Impossible to succeed in public life, unless -a man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force.] - -Now, Kallikles (pursues Sokrates), you have reproached me with -standing aloof from public life in order to pursue philosophy. You -tell me that by not cultivating public speaking and public action, I -am at the mercy of any one who chooses to accuse me unjustly and to -bring upon me severe penalties. But I tell you, that it is a greater -evil to do wrong than to suffer wrong; and that my first business is, -to provide for myself such power and such skill as shall guard me -against doing wrong.[101] Next, as to suffering wrong, there is only -one way of taking precautions against it. You must yourself rule in -the city: or you must be a friend of the ruling power. Like is the -friend of like:[102] a cruel despot on the throne will hate and -destroy any one who is better than himself, and will despise any one -worse than himself. The only person who will have influence is, one -of the same dispositions as the despot: not only submitting to him -with good will, but praising and blaming the same things as he -does--accustomed from youth upwards to share in his preferences and -aversions, and assimilated to him as much as possible.[103] Now if -the despot be a wrong-doer, he who likens himself to the despot will -become a wrong-doer also. And thus, in taking precautions against -suffering wrong, he will incur the still greater mischief and -corruption of doing wrong, and will be worse off instead of better. - -[Footnote 101: Plato, Gorgias, p. 509 C. Compare Leges, viii. 829 A, -where [Greek: to\ me\ a)dikei=n] is described as easy of attainment; -[Greek: to\ me\ a)dikei=sthai], as being [Greek: pagcha/lepon]: and -both equally necessary [Greek: pro\s to\ eu)daimo/nos ze=|n].] - -[Footnote 102: Plat. Gorg. 510 B. [Greek: phi/los--o( o(/moios to=| -o(moi/o|]. We have already seen this principle discussed and rejected -in the Lysis, p. 214. See above, ch. xx., p. 179.] - -[Footnote 103: Plato, Gorgias, p. 510 C. [Greek: lei/petai de\ -e)kei=nos mo/nos a)/xios lo/gou phi/los to=| toiou/to|, o(\s a)\n, -o(moe/thes o)/n, tau)ta\ pse/gon kai\ e)paino=n, e)the/le| -a)/rchesthai kai\ u(pokei=sthai to=| a)/rchonti. Ou(=tos me/ga e)n -tau/te| te=| po/lei dune/setai, tou=ton ou)dei\s chai/ron a)dike/sei. -. . . Au(/te o(do/s e)stin, eu)thu\s e)k ve/ou e)thi/zein au)to\n toi=s -au)toi=s chai/rein kai\ a)/chthesthtai to=| despo/te|, kai\ -paraskeua/zein o(/pos o(/ ti ma/lista o(/moios e)/stai e)kei/no|.]] - -[Side-note: Danger of one who dissents from the public, either -for better or for worse.] - -_Kall._--But if he does not liken himself to the despot, the -despot may put him to death, if he chooses? _Sokr._--Perhaps he -may: but it will be death inflicted by a bad man upon a good -man.[104] To prolong life is not the foremost consideration, but to -decide by rational thought what is the best way of passing that -length of life which the Fates allot.[105] Is it my best plan to do -as you recommend, and to liken myself as much as possible to the -Athenian people--in order that I may become popular and may acquire -power in the city? For it will be impossible for you to acquire power -in the city, if you dissent from the prevalent political character -and practice, be it for the better or for the worse. Even imitation -will not be sufficient: you must be, by natural disposition, -homogeneous with the Athenians, if you intend to acquire much favour -with them. Whoever makes you most like to them, will help you forward -most towards becoming an effective statesman and speaker: for every -assembly delight in speeches suited to their own dispositions, and -reject speeches of an opposite tenor.[106] - -[Footnote 104: Plato, Gorgias, p. 511 B.] - -[Footnote 105: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 511 B, 512 E.] - -[Footnote 106: Plato, Gorgias, p. 513 A. [Greek: kai\ nu=n de\ a)/ra -dei= se o(s o(moio/taton gi/gnesthai to=| demo| to=| A)thenai/on, ei) -me/lleis tou/to| prosphile\s ei)=nai kai\ me/ga du/nasthai e)n te=| -po/lei. . . . ei) de/ soi oi)/ei o(ntinou=n a)nthro/pon parado/sein -te/chnen tina\ toiau/ten, e(/ ti/s se poie/sei me/ga du/nasthai e)n -te=| po/lei te=|de, _a)no/moion o)/nta te=| politei/a| ei)/t' e)pi\ -to\ be/ltion ei)/t' e)pi\ to\ chei=ron_, ou)k o)rtho=s bouleu/ei; -ou) ga\r mimete\n dei= ei)=nai, a)ll' au)tophuo=s o(/moion toou/tois, -ei) me/lleis ti gne/sion a)perga/zesthai ei)s phili/an to=| -A)thenai/on de/mo|.]] - -[Side-note: Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for -himself--to study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction.] - -Such are the essential conditions of political success and -popularity. But I, Kallikles, have already distinguished two schemes -of life; one aiming at pleasure, the other aiming at good: one, that -of the statesman who studies the felt wants, wishes, and impulses of -the people, displaying his genius in providing for them effective -satisfaction--the other, the statesman who makes it his chief or sole -object to amend the character and disposition of the people. The last -scheme is the only one which I approve: and if it be that to which -you invite me, we must examine whether either you, Kallikles, or I, -have ever yet succeeded in amending or improving the character of any -individuals privately, before we undertake the task of amending the -citizens collectively.[107] None of the past statesmen whom you -extol, Miltiades, Kimon, Themistokles, Perikles, has produced any -such amendment.[108] Considered as ministers, indeed, they were -skilful and effective; better than the present statesmen. They were -successful in furnishing satisfaction to the prevalent wants and -desires of the citizens: they provided docks, walls, ships, tribute, -and other such follies, abundantly:[109] but they did nothing to -amend the character of the people--to transfer the desires of the -people from worse things to better things--or to create in them -justice and temperance. They thus did no real good by feeding the -desires of the people: no more good than would be done by a skilful -cook for a sick man, in cooking for him a sumptuous meal before the -physician had cured him. - -[Footnote 107: Plato, Gorgias, p. 515 A.] - -[Footnote 108: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 516, 517.] - -[Footnote 109: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 517, 519. [Greek: a)/neu ga\r -sophrosu/nes kai\ dikaiosu/nes lime/non kai\ neori/on kai\ teicho=n -kai\ pho/ron kai\ toiou/ton phluario=n e)mpeple/kasi te\n po/lin.]] - -[Side-note: Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man -at Athens, who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing -this.] - -I believe myself (continues Sokrates) to be the only man in Athens,--or -certainly one among a very few,--who am a true statesman, -following out the genuine purposes of the political art.[110] I aim -at what is best for the people, not at what is most agreeable. I do -not value those captivating accomplishments which tell in the -Dikastery. If I am tried, I shall be like a physician arraigned by -the confectioner before a jury of children. I shall not be able to -refer to any pleasures provided for them by me: pleasures which -_they_ call benefits, but which I regard as worthless. If any -one accuses me of corrupting the youth by making them sceptical, or -of libelling the older men in my private and public talk--it will be -in vain for me to justify myself by saying the real truth.--Dikasts, -I do and say all these things justly, for your real benefit. I shall -not be believed when I say this, and I have nothing else to say: so -that I do not know what sentence may be passed on me.[111] My only -refuge and defence will be, the innocence of my life. As for death, -no one except a fool or a coward fears _that_: the real evil, -and the greatest of all evils, is to pass into Hades with a corrupt -and polluted mind.[112] - -[Footnote 110: Plato, Gorgias, p. 521 D.] - -[Footnote 111: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 521-522.] - -[Footnote 112: Plato, Gorgias, p. 522 E. [Greek: au)to\ me\n ga\r to\ -a)pothne/skein ou)dei\s phobei=tai, o(/stis me\ panta/pasin -a)lo/gisto/s te kai\ a)/nandro/s e)sti, to\ de\ a)dikei=n -phobei=tai], &c. -] - -[Side-note: Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of -deceased persons therein, according to their merits during life--the -philosopher who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be -rewarded.] - -Sokrates then winds up the dialogue, by reciting a [Greek: Ne/kuia], -a mythe or hypothesis about judgment in Hades after death, and -rewards and punishments to be apportioned to deceased men, according -to their merits during life, by Rhadamanthus and Minos. The greatest -sufferers by these judgments (he says) will be the kings, despots, -and men politically powerful, who have during their lives committed -the greatest injustices,--which indeed few of them avoid.[113] -The man most likely to fare well and to be rewarded, will be the -philosopher, "who has passed through life minding his own business, -and not meddling with the affairs of others".[114] - -[Footnote 113: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 525-526.] - -[Footnote 114: Plato, Gorgias, p. 526 C. [Greek: philoso/phou ta\ -au)tou= pra/xantos, kai\ ou) polupragmone/santos e)n to=| bi/o|.] - -It must be confessed that these terms do not correspond to the life -of Sokrates, as he himself describes it in the Platonic Apology. He -seems to have fancied that no one was [Greek: polupra/gmon] except -those who spoke habitually in the Ekklesia and the Dikastery.] - - -* * * * * - - -[Side-note: Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates--Rhetorical or -dogmatical character of the Gorgias.] - -"Dicuntur ista magnifice,"[115]--we may exclaim, in Ciceronian words, -on reaching the close of the Gorgias. It is pre-eminently solemn and -impressive; all the more so, from the emphasis of Sokrates, when -proclaiming the isolation in which he stands at Athens, and the -contradiction between his ethico-political views and those of his -fellow-citizens. In this respect it harmonises with the Apology, the -Kriton, Republic, and Leges: in all which, the peculiarity of his -ethical points of view stands proclaimed--especially in the Kriton, -where he declares that his difference with his opponents is -fundamental, and that there can be between them no common ground for -debate--nothing but reciprocal contempt.[116] - -[Footnote 115: Cicero, De Finib. iii. 3, 11.] - -[Footnote 116: Plato, Kriton, p. 49 D.] - -[Side-note: He merges politics in Ethics--he conceives the -rulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community.] - -The argument of Sokrates in the Gorgias is interesting, not merely as -extolling the value of ethical self-restraint, but also as -considering political phenomena under this point of view: that is, -merging politics in ethics. The proper and paramount function of -statesmen (we find it eloquently proclaimed) is to serve as spiritual -teachers in the community: for the purpose of amending the lives and -characters of the citizens, and of converting them from bad -dispositions to good. We are admonished that until this is effected, -more is lost than gained by realising the actual wants and wishes of -the community, which are disorderly and distempered: like the state -of a sick man, who would receive harm and not benefit from a -sumptuous banquet. - -[Side-note: _Ideal_ of Plato--a despotic lawgiver or -man-trainer, on scientific principles, fashioning all characters -pursuant to certain types of his own.] - -This is the conception of Plato in the Gorgias, speaking through the -person of Sokrates, respecting the ends for which the political -magistrate ought to employ his power. The magistrate, as -administering law and justice, is to the minds of the community what -the trainer and the physician are to their bodies: he produces -goodness of mind, as the two latter produce health and strength of -body. The Platonic _ideal_ is that of a despotic law-giver and -man-trainer, wielding the compulsory force of the secular arm for -what he believes to be spiritual improvement. However instructive it -is to study the manner in which a mind like that of Plato works out -such a purpose in theory, there is no reason for regret that he never -had an opportunity of carrying it into practice. The manner in which -he always keeps in view the standing mental character, as an object -of capital importance to be attended to, and as the analogon of -health in the body--deserves all esteem. But when he assumes the -sceptre of King Nomos (as in Republic and Leges) to fix by -unchangeable authority what shall be the orthodox type of character, -and to suppress all the varieties of emotion and intellect, except -such as will run into a few predetermined moulds--he oversteps all -the reasonable aims and boundaries of the political office. - -[Side-note: Platonic analogy between mental goodness and -bodily health--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference.] - -Plato forgets two important points of difference, in that favourite -and very instructive analogy which he perpetually reproduces, between -mental goodness and bodily health. First, good health and strength of -the body (as I have observed already) are states which every man -knows when he has got them. Though there is much doubt and dispute -about causes, preservative, destructive, and restorative, there is -none about the present fact. Every sick man derives from his own -sensations an anxiety to get well. But virtue is not a point thus -fixed, undisputed, indubitable: it is differently conceived by -different persons, and must first be discovered and settled by a -process of enquiry; the Platonic Sokrates himself, in many of the -dialogues--after declaring that neither he nor any one else -within his knowledge, knows what it is--tries to find it out without -success. Next, the physician, who is the person actively concerned in -imparting health and strength, exercises no coercive power over any -one: those who consult him have the option whether they will follow -the advice given, or not. To put himself upon the same footing with -the physician, the political magistrate ought to confine himself to -the function of advice; a function highly useful, but in which he -will be called upon to meet argumentative opposition, and frequent -failure, together with the mortification of leaving those whom he -cannot convince, to follow their own mode of life. Here are two -material differences, modifying the applicability of that very -analogy on which Plato so frequently rests his proof. - -[Side-note: Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter -among a community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a -dissenter, on important points, should acquire any public influence.] - -In Plato's two imaginary commonwealths, where he is himself despotic -law-giver, there would have been no tolerable existence possible for -any one not shaped upon the Platonic spiritual model. But in the -Gorgias, Plato (speaking in the person of Sokrates) is called upon to -define his plan of life in a free state, where he was merely a -private citizen. Sokrates receives from Kallikles the advice, to -forego philosophy and to aspire to the influence and celebrity of an -active public speaker. His reply is instructive, as revealing the -interior workings of every political society. No man (he says) can -find favour as an adviser--either of a despot, where there is one, or -of a people where there is free government--unless he be in harmony -with the sentiments and ideas prevalent, either with the ruling Many -or the ruling One. He must be moulded, from youth upwards, on the -same spiritual pattern as they are:[117] his love and hate, his -praise and blame, must turn towards the same things: he must have the -same tastes, the same morality, the same _ideal_, as theirs: he -must be no imitator, but a chip of the same block. If he be either -better than they or worse than they,[118] he will fail in acquiring -popularity, and his efforts as a competitor for public influence -will be not only abortive, but perhaps dangerous to himself. - -[Footnote 117: Plato, Gorgias, p. 510 C-D. [Greek: o(moe/thes o)/n, -tau)ta\ pse/gon kai\ e)paino=n to=| a)/rchonti. . . . eu)thu\s e)k -ne/ou e)thi/zein au(to\n toi=s au)toi=s chai/rein kai\ a)/chthesthai -to=| despo/te|, kai\ paraskeua/zein o(/pos o(/ ti ma/lista o(/moios -e)/stai e)kei/no|.] 513 B: [Greek: ou) mimete\n dei= ei)=nai a)ll' -au)tophuo=s o(/moion tou/tois.]] - -[Footnote 118: Plato, Gorgias, p. 513 A. [Greek: ei)/t' e)pi\ to\ -be/ltion ei)/t' e)pi\ to\ chei=ron.]] - -[Side-note: Sokrates feels his own isolation from his -countrymen. He is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic.] - -The reasons which Sokrates gives here (as well as in the Apology, and -partly also in the Republic) for not embarking in the competition of -political aspirants, are of very general application. He is an -innovator in religion; and a dissenter from the received ethics, -politics, social sentiment, and estimate of life and conduct.[119] -Whoever dissents upon these matters from the governing force (in -whatever hands that may happen to reside) has no chance of being -listened to as a political counsellor, and may think himself -fortunate if he escapes without personal hurt or loss. Whether his -dissent be for the better or for the worse, is a matter of little -moment: the ruling body always think it worse, and the consequences -to the dissenter are the same. - -[Footnote 119: Plato, Gorgias, p. 522 B; Theaetetus, p. 179; Menon, p. -79.] - -[Side-note: Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric.] - -Herein consists the real antithesis between Sokrates, Plato, and -philosophy, on the one side--Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Demosthenes, -and rhetoric, on the other. "You," (says Sokrates to Kallikles),[120] -"are in love with the Athenian people, and take up or renounce such -opinions as they approve or discountenance: I am in love with -philosophy, and follow her guidance. You and other active politicians -do not wish to have more than a smattering of philosophy; you are -afraid of becoming unconsciously corrupted, if you carry it beyond -such elementary stage."[121] Each of these orators, discussing -political measures before the public assembly, appealed to general -maxims borrowed from the received creed of morality, religion, taste, -politics, &c. His success depended mainly on the emphasis which -his eloquence could lend to such maxims, and on the skill with which -he could apply them to the case in hand. But Sokrates could not -follow such an example. Anxious in his research after truth, he -applied the test of analysis to the prevalent opinions--found them, -in his judgment, neither consistent nor rational--constrained many -persons to feel this, by an humiliating cross-examination--but became -disqualified from addressing, with any chance of assent, the -assembled public. - -[Footnote 120: Plato, Gorgias, p, 481 E.] - -[Footnote 121: Plato, Gorgias, p. 487 C. [Greek: e)ni/ka e)s u(mi=n -toia/de tis do/xa, me\ prothumei=sthai ei)s te\n a)kribei/an -philosophei=n, a)lla\ eu)labei=sthai. . . . o(/pos me\ pe/ra tou= -de/ontos sopho/teroi geno/menoi le/sete diaphthare/ntes.] - -The view here advocated by Kallikles:--That philosophy is good and -useful, to be studied up to a point in the earlier years of life, in -order to qualify persons for effective discharge of the duties of -active citizenship, but that it ought not to be made the main -occupation of mature life, nor be prosecuted up to the pitch of -accurate theorising: this view, since Plato here assigns it to -Kallikles, is denounced by most of the Platonic critics as if it were -low and worthless. Yet it was held by many of the most respectable -citizens of antiquity; and the question is, in point of fact, that -which has always been in debate between the life of theoretical -speculation and the life of action. - -Isokrates urges the same view both in Orat. xv. De Permutatione, -sect. 282-287, pp. 485-486, Bekker; and Orat. xii. Panathenaic. sect. -29-32, p. 321, Bekker. [Greek: diatri/psai me\n ou)=n peri\ ta\s -paidei/as tau/tas chro/non tina\ sumbouleu/saim' a)\n toi=s -neote/rois, me\ me/ntoi perii+dei=n te\n phu/sin te\n au)to=n -kataskeleteuthei=san e)pi\ tou/tois], &c. Cicero quotes a similar -opinion put by Ennius the poet into the mouth of Neoptolemus, Tusc. -D. ii. 1, 1; Aulus Gell. v. 16--"degustandum ex philosophia censet, -non in eam ingurgitandum". - -Tacitus, in describing the education of Agricola, who was taken by -his mother in his earlier years to study at Massilia, says, -c. 4:--"Memoria teneo, solitum ipsum narrare, se in prima juventa -studium philosophiae, _ultra quam concessum Romano et senatori_, -hausisse; ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum -coercuisset". - -I have already cited this last passage, and commented upon the same -point, in my notes at the end of the Euthydemus, p. 230.] - -[Side-note: Position of one who dissents, upon material -points, from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen.] - -That in order to succeed politically, a man must be a genuine -believer in the creed of King Nomos or the ruling force--cast in the -same spiritual mould--(I here take the word _creed_ not as -confined to religion, but as embracing the whole of a man's critical -_ideal_, on moral or social practice, politics, or taste--the -ends which he deems worthy of being aspired to, or proper to be -shunned, by himself or others) is laid down by Sokrates as a general -position: and with perfect truth. In disposing of the force or -influence of government, whoever possesses that force will use it -conformably to his own maxims. A man who dissents from these maxims -will find no favour in the public assembly; nor, probably, if his -dissent be grave and wide, will he ever be able to speak out his -convictions aloud in it, without incurring dangerous antipathy. But -what is to become of such a dissenter[122]--the man who frequents the -same porticos with the people, but does not hold the same creed, -nor share their judgments respecting social _expetenda_ and -_fugienda_? How is he to be treated by the government, or by the -orthodox majority of society in their individual capacity? Debarred, -by the necessity of the case, from influence over the public -councils--what latitude of pursuit, profession, or conduct, is to be -left to him as a citizen? How far is he to question, or expose, or -require to be proved, that which the majority believe without proof? -Shall he be required to profess, or to obey, or to refrain from -contradicting, religious or ethical doctrines which he has examined -and rejected? Shall such requirement be enforced by threat of legal -penalties, or of ill-treatment from individuals, which is not less -intolerable than legal penalties? What is likely to be his character, -if compelled to suppress all declaration of his own creed, and to act -and speak as if he were believer in another? - -[Footnote 122: Horat. Epist. i. 1, 70-- - -"Quod si me populus Romanus forte roget, cur -Non ut porticibus, sic judiciis fruar iisdem, -Nec sequar aut fugiam quae diligit ipse vel odit: -Olim quod vulpes aegroto cauta leoni -Respondit, referam: Quia me vestigia terrent -Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum."] - -[Side-note: Probable feelings of Plato on this subject. Claim -put forward in the Gorgias of an independent _locus standi_ for -philosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued -by Sokrates.] - -The questions here suggested must have impressed themselves forcibly -on the mind of Plato when he recollected the fate of Sokrates. In -spite of a blameless life, Sokrates had been judicially condemned and -executed for publicly questioning received opinions, innovating upon -the established religion, and instilling into young persons habits of -doubt. To dissent only for the better, afforded no assurance of -safety: and Plato knew well that his own dissent from the Athenian -public was even wider and more systematic than that of his master. -The position and plan of life for an active-minded reasoner, -dissenting from the established opinions of the public, could not but -be an object of interesting reflection to him.[123] The Gorgias -(written, in my judgment, long after the death of Sokrates, probably -after the Platonic school was established) announces the vocation of -the philosopher, and claims an open field for speculation, apart from -the actualities of politics--for the self-acting reason of the -individual doubter and investigator, against the authority of -numbers and the pressure of inherited tradition. A formal -assertion to this effect was worthy of the founder of the Academy--the -earliest philosophical school at Athens. Yet we may observe that -while the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias adopts the life of -philosophy, he does not renew that farther demand with which the -historical Sokrates had coupled it in his Apology--the liberty of -oral and aggressive cross-examination, addressed to individuals -personally and indiscriminately[124]--to the _primores populi_ -as well as to the _populum tributim_. The fate of Sokrates -rendered Plato more cautious, and induced him to utter his ethical -interrogations and novelties of opinion in no other way except that -of lectures to chosen hearers and written dialogue: borrowing the -name of Sokrates or some other speaker, and refraining upon system -(as his letters[125] tell us that he did) from publishing any -doctrines in his own name. - -[Footnote 123: I have already referred to the treatise of Mr. John -Stuart Mill "On Liberty," where this important topic is discussed in -a manner equally profound and enlightened. The co-existence of -individual reasoners enquiring and philosophising for themselves, -with the fixed opinions of the majority, is one of the main -conditions which distinguish a progressive from a stationary -community.] - -[Footnote 124: Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-22-23-28 E. [Greek: tou= de\ -theou= ta/ttontos, o(s e)go\ o)|e/then te kai\ u(pe/labon, -philophou=nta me dei=n ze=|n kai\ _e)xeta/zonta e)mauto/n te kai\ -tou\s a)/llous_], &c.] - -[Footnote 125: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 B. K. F. Hermann (Ueber Platon's -Schriftstellerische Motive, p. 290) treats any such prudential -discretion, in respect to the form and mode of putting forward -unpopular opinions, as unworthy of Plato, and worthy only of -Protagoras and other Sophists. I dissent from this opinion -altogether. We know that Protagoras was very circumspect as to form -(Timon ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat. ix. s. 57); but the passage of -Plato cited by Hermann does not prove it.] - -[Side-note: Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of -discussion. Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance.] - -As a man dissenting from received opinions, Sokrates had his path -marked out in the field of philosophy or individual speculation. To -such a mind as his, the fullest liberty ought to be left, of -professing and defending his own opinions, as well as of combating -other opinions, accredited or not, which he may consider false or -uncertified.[126] The public guidance of the state thus falls to one -class of minds, the activity of speculative discussion to another; -though accident may produce, here and there, a superior -individual, comprehensive or dexterous enough to suffice for both. -But the main desideratum is that this freedom of discussion should -exist: that room shall be made, and encouragement held out, to the -claims of individual reason, and to the full publication of all -doubts or opinions, be they what they may: that the natural tendency -of all ruling force, whether in few or in many hands, to perpetuate -their own dogmas by proscribing or silencing all heretics and -questioners, may be neutralised as far as possible. The great -expansive vigour of the Greek mind--the sympathy felt among the best -varieties of Greeks for intellectual superiority in all its forms--and -the privilege of free speech ([Greek: par)r(esi/a]), on which the -democratical citizens of Athens prided themselves--did in fact -neutralise very considerably these tendencies in Athens. A greater -and more durable liberty of philosophising was procured for Athens, -and through Athens for Greece generally, than had ever been known -before in the history of mankind. - -[Footnote 126: So Sokrates also says in the Platonic Apology, pp. -31-32. [Greek: Ou) ga\r e)/stin o(/stis a)nthro/pon sothe/setai ou)/te -u(mi=n ou)/te a)/llo| ple/thei ou)deni\ gnesi/os e)nantiou/menos, -kai\ diakolu/on polla\ a)/dika kai\ para/noma e)n te=| po/lei -gi/gnesthai; a)ll' a)nagkai=o/n e)sti to\n to=| o)/nti machou/menon -u(pe\r tou= dikai/ou, kai\ ei) me/llei o)li/gon chro/non -sothe/sesthai, _i)dioteu/ein a)lla\ me\ demosieu/ein_.] - -The reader will find the speculative individuality of Sokrates -illustrated in the sixty-eighth chapter of my History of Greece. - -The antithesis of the philosophising or speculative life, against the -rhetorical, political, forensic life--which is put so much to the -advantage of the former by Plato in the Gorgias, Theaetetus (p. 173, -seq.), and elsewhere was the theme of Cicero's lost dialogue called -Hortensius: wherein Hortensius was introduced pleading the cause -against philosophy, (see Orelli, Fragm. Ciceron. pp. 479-480), while -the other speakers were provided by Cicero with arguments mainly in -defence of philosophy, partly also against rhetoric. The competition -between the teachers of rhetoric and the teachers of philosophy -continued to be not merely animated but bitter, from Plato downward -throughout the Ciceronian age. (Cicero, De Orat. i. 45-46-47-75, -&c.) - -We read in the treatise of Plutarch against the Epikurean Kolotes, an -acrimonious invective against Epikurus and his followers, for -recommending a scheme of life such as to withdraw men from active -political functions (Plutarch, adv. Kolot. pp. 1125 C, 1127-1128); -the like also in his other treatise, Non Posse Suaviter Vivi secundum -Epicurum. But Plutarch at the same time speaks as if Epikurus were -the only philosopher who had recommended this, and as if all the -other philosophers had recommended an active life; nay, he talks of -Plato among the philosophers actively engaged in practical -reformatory legislation, through Dion and the pupils of the Academy -(p. 1126, B, C). Here Plutarch mistakes: the Platonic tendencies were -quite different from what he supposes. The Gorgias and Theaetetus -enforce upon the philosopher a life quite apart from politics, -pursuing his own course, and not meddling with others--[Greek: -philoso/phou ta\ au(tou= pra/xantos kai\ ou) polupragmone/santos e)n -to=| bi/o|] (Gorg. 526 C); which is the same advice as Epikurus gave. -It is set forth eloquently in the poetry of Lucretius, but it had -been set forth previously, not less eloquently, in the rhetoric of -Plato.] - -[Side-note: Issue between philosophy and rhetoric--not -satisfactorily handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble -manner in which it is presented by Polus and Kallikles.] - -This antithesis of the philosophical life to the rhetorical or -political, constitutes one of the most interesting features of the -Platonic Gorgias. But when we follow the pleadings upon which Plato -rests this grand issue, and the line which he draws between the two -functions, we find much that is unsatisfactory. Since Plato himself -pleads both sides of the case, he is bound in fairness to set forth -the case which he attacks (that of rhetoric), as it would be put by -competent and honourable advocates--by Perikles, for example, or -Demosthenes, or Isokrates, or Quintilian. He does this, to a certain -extent, in the first part of the dialogue, carried on by Sokrates -with Gorgias. But in the succeeding portions--carried on with Polus -and Kallikles, and occupying three-fourths of the whole--he alters -the character of the defence, and merges it in ethical theories which -Perikles, had he been the defender, would not only have put aside as -misplaced, but disavowed as untrue. Perikles would have listened with -mixed surprise and anger, if he had heard any one utter the monstrous -assertion which Plato puts into the mouth of Polus--That rhetors, -like despots, kill, impoverish, or expel any citizen at their -pleasure. Though Perikles was the most powerful of all Athenian -rhetors, yet he had to contend all his life against fierce opposition -from others, and was even fined during his last years. He would -hardly have understood how an Athenian citizen could have made any -assertion so completely falsified by all the history of Athens, -respecting the omnipotence of the rhetors. Again, if he had heard -Kallikles proclaiming that the strong giant had a natural right to -satiate all his desires at the cost of the weaker Many--and that -these latter sinned against Nature when they took precautions to -prevent him--Perikles would have protested against the proclamation -as emphatically as Plato.[127] - -[Footnote 127: Perikles might indeed have referred to his own -panegyrical oration in Thucydides, ii. 37.] - -[Side-note: Perikles would have accepted the defence of -rhetoric, as Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias.] - -If we suppose Perikles to have undertaken the defence of the -rhetorical element at Athens, against the dialectic element -represented by Sokrates, he would have accepted it, though not a -position of his own choosing, on the footing on which Plato places it -in the mouth of Gorgias: "Rhetoric is an engine of persuasion -addressed to numerous assembled auditors: it ensures freedom to the -city (through the free exercise of such a gift by many competing -orators) and political ascendency or command to the ablest rhetor. It -thus confers great power on him who possesses it in the highest -measure: but he ought by no means to employ that power for unjust -purposes." It is very probable that Perikles might have recommended -rhetorical study to Sokrates, as a means of defending himself -against unjust accusations, and of acquiring a certain measure of -influence on public affairs.[128] But he would have distinguished -carefully (as Horace does) between defending yourself against unjust -attacks, and making unjust attacks upon others: though the same -weapon may suit for both. - -[Footnote 128: Horat. Satir. ii. 1, 39-- - - "Hic stilus haud petet ultro -Quemquam animantem; et me veluti custodiet ensis -Vagina tectus; quem cur destringere coner, -Tutus ab infestis latronibus? Oh pater et rex -Jupiter! ut pereat positum rubigine telum, -Nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis! At ille -Qui me commorit (melius non tangere! clamo) -Flebit, et insignis tota cantabitur urbe." - -We need only read the Memorabilia of Xenophon (ii. 9), to see that -the historical Sokrates judged of these matters differently from the -Platonic Sokrates of the Gorgias. Kriton complained to Sokrates that -life was difficult at Athens for a quiet man who wished only to mind -his own business ([Greek: ta\ e(autou= pra/ttein]); because there -were persons who brought unjust actions at law against him, for the -purpose of extorting money to buy them off. The Platonic Sokrates of -the Gorgias would have replied to him: "Never mind: you are just, and -these assailants are unjust: they are by their own conduct entailing -upon themselves a terrible distemper, from which, if you leave them -unpunished, they will suffer all their lives: they injure themselves -more than they injure you". But the historical Sokrates in Xenophon -replies in quite another spirit. He advises Kriton to look out for a -clever and active friend, to attach this person to his interest by -attention and favours, and to trust to him for keeping off the -assailants. Accordingly, a poor but energetic man named Archedemus is -found, who takes Kriton's part against the assailants, and even -brings counterattacks against them, which force them to leave Kriton -alone, and to give money to Archedemus himself. The advice given by -the Xenophontic Sokrates to Kriton is the same in principle as the -advice given by Kallikles to the Platonic Sokrates.] - -[Side-note: The Athenian people recognise a distinction -between the pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which -Plato conceived.] - -Farther, neither Perikles, nor any defender of free speech, would -assent to the definition of rhetoric--That it is a branch of the art -of flattery, studying the immediately pleasurable, and disregarding -the good.[129] This indeed represents Plato's own sentiment, and was -true in the sense which the Platonic Sokrates assigns (in the -Gorgias, though not in the Protagoras) to the words _good_ and -_evil_. But it is not true in the sense which the Athenian -people and the Athenian public men assigned to those words. Both -the one and the other used the words _pleasurable_ and -_good_ as familiarly as Plato, and had sentiments corresponding -to both of them. The pleasurable and painful referred to present and -temporary causes: the Good and Evil to prospective causes and -permanent situations, involving security against indefinite future -suffering, combined with love of national dignity and repugnance to -degradation, as well as with a strong sense of common interests and -common obligations to each other. To provide satisfaction for these -common patriotic feelings--to sustain the dignity of the city by -effective and even imposing public establishments, against foreign -enemies--to protect the individual rights of citizens by an equitable -administration of justice--counted in the view of the Athenians as -objects _good_ and _honourable_: while the efforts and -sacrifices necessary for these permanent ends, were, so far as they -went, a renunciation of what they would call the -_pleasurable_. When, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, -the Athenians, acting on the advice of Perikles, allowed all Attica -to be ravaged, and submitted to the distress of cooping the whole -population within the long walls, rather than purchase peace by -abnegating their Hellenic dignity, independence, and security--they -not only renounced much that was pleasurable, but endured great -immediate distress, for the sake of what they regarded as a permanent -good.[130] Eighty years afterwards, when Demosthenes pointed out to -them the growing power and encroachments of the Macedonian Philip, -and exhorted them to the efforts requisite for keeping back that -formidable enemy, while there was yet time--they could not be wound -up to the pitch requisite for affronting so serious an amount of -danger and suffering. They had lost that sense of Hellenic dignity, -and that association of self-respect with active personal soldiership -and sailorship, which rendered submission to an enemy the most -intolerable of all pains, at the time when Perikles had addressed -them. They shut their eyes to an impending danger, which ultimately -proved their ruin. On both these occasions, we have the -_pleasurable_ and the _good_ brought into contrast in the -Athenian mind; in both we have the two most eminent orators of -Grecian antiquity enforcing the _good_ in opposition to the -_pleasurable_: the first successfully, the last vainly, in -opposition to other orators. - -[Footnote 129: The reply composed by the rhetor Aristeides to the -Gorgias of Plato is well deserving of perusal, though (like all his -compositions) it is very prolix and wordy. See Aristeides, Orationes -xlv. and xlvi.--[Greek: Perei\ R(etorike=s], and [Greek: U(pe\r to=n -Tetta/ron]. In the last of the two orations he defends the four -eminent Athenians (Miltiades, Themistokles, Perikles, Kimon) whom -Plato disparages in the Gorgias. - -Aristeides insists forcibly on the partial and narrow view here taken -by Plato of persuasion, as a working force both for establishing laws -and carrying on government. He remarks truly that there are only two -forces between which the choice must be made, intimidation and -persuasion: that the substitution of persuasion in place of force is -the great improvement which has made public and private life worth -having ([Greek: mo/ne bioto\n e(mi=n pepoi/eke to\n bi/on], Orat. -xlv. p. 64, Dindorf); that neither laws could be discussed and -passed, nor judicial trial held under them, without [Greek: -r(etorike\] as the engine of persuasion (pp. 66-67-136); that Plato -in attacking Rhetoric had no right to single out despots and violent -conspirators as illustrations of it--[Greek: ei)=t' e)le/gchein me\n -bou/letai te\n r(etorike/n, kategorei= de\ to=n tura/nnon kai\ -dunasto=n, _ta\ a)/mikta mignu/s--ti/s_ ga\r ou)k oi)=den, o(/ti -r(etorike\ kai\ turanni\s tosou=ton a)lle/lon kechori/stai, o(/son -to\ pei/thein tou= bia/zesthai] (p. 99). He impugns the distinction -which Plato has drawn between [Greek: i)atrike/, gumnastike/, -kubernetike/, nomothetike/], &c., on the one side, which Plato -calls [Greek: te/chnai], arts or sciences, and affirms to rest on -scientific principles--and [Greek: r(etorike/, mageirike/], &c., -on the other side, which Plato affirms to be only guess work or -groping, resting on empirical analogies. Aristeides says that [Greek: -i)atrike\] and [Greek: r(etorike\] are in this respect both on a par; -that both are partly reducible to rule, but partly also driven by -necessity to conjectures and analogies, and the physician not less -than the rhetor (pp. 45-48-49); which the Platonic Sokrates himself -affirms in another dialogue, Philebus, p. 56 A. - -The most curious part of the argument of Aristeides is where he -disputes the prerogative which Plato had claimed for [Greek: -i)atrike/, gumnastike/] &c., on the ground of their being arts or -reducible to rules. The effects of human art (says Aristeides) are -much inferior to those of [Greek: thei/a moi=ra] or divine -inspiration. Many patients are cured of disease by human art; but -many more are cured by the responses and directions of the Delphian -oracle, by the suggestion of dreams, and by other varieties of the -divine prompting, delivered through the Pythian priestess, a woman -altogether ignorant (p. 11). [Greek: kai/toi mikra\ me\n e( pa/ntas -ei)dui=a lo/gous i)atrike\ pro\s ta\s e)k Delpho=n du/natai lu/seis, -o(/sai kai\ i)di/a| kai\ koine=| kai\ no/son kai\ pathema/ton -a(panton a)nthropi/non e)pha/nthesan.] Patients who are cured in this -way by the Gods without medical art, acquire a natural impulse which -leads them to the appropriate remedy--[Greek: e)pithumi/a au)tou\s -a)/gei e)pi\ to\ o)/neson] (p. 20). Aristeides says that he can -himself depose--from his own personal experience as a sick man -seeking cure, and from personal knowledge of many other such--how -much more efficacious in healing is aid from the Gods, given in -dreams and other ways, than advice from physicians; who might well -shudder when they heard the stories which he could tell (pp. 21-22). -To undervalue science and art (he says) is the principle from which -men start, when they flee to the Gods for help--[Greek: tou= -kataphugei=n e)pi\ tou\s theou\s schedo\n a)rche/, to\ te=s te/chnes -u(peridei=n e)/stin.]] - -[Footnote 130: Nothing can be more at variance with the doctrine -which Plato assigns to Kallikles in the Gorgias, than the three -memorable speeches of Perikles in Thucydides, i. 144, ii. 35, ii. 60, -seq. All these speeches are penetrated with the deepest sense of that -[Greek: koinoni/a] and [Greek: phili/a] which the Platonic Sokrates -extols: not one of them countenances [Greek: pleonexi/an], which the -Platonic Sokrates forbids (Gorg. 508 E). [Greek: To\ prostalaiporei=n -to=| do/xanti kalo=|] (to use the expressive phrase of Thucydides, -ii. 53) was a remarkable feature in the character of the Athenians of -that day: it was subdued for the moment by the overwhelming misery of -pestilence and war combined.] - -[Side-note: Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to -all the various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous -inferences raised by the Kallikles of Plato.] - -Lastly, it is not merely the political power of the Athenians that -Perikles employs his eloquence to uphold. He dwells also with -emphasis on the elegance of taste, on the intellectual force and -activity, which warranted him in decorating the city with the title -of Preceptress of Hellas.[131] All this belongs, not to the -pleasurable as distinguished from the good, but to good (whether -immediately pleasurable or not) in its most comprehensive sense, -embracing the improvement and refinement of the collective mind. If -Perikles, in this remarkable funeral harangue, flattered the -sentiments of the people--as he doubtless did--he flattered them by -kindling their aspirations towards good. And Plato himself does the -same (though less nobly and powerfully), adopting the received -framework of Athenian sentiment, in his dialogue called Menexenus, -which we shall come to in a future chapter. - -[Footnote 131: Thucyd. ii. 41-42. [Greek: xunelo/n te le/go te/n te -pa=san po/lin te=s E(lla/dos pai/deusin ei)=nai], &c.] - -[Side-note: The Platonic Ideal exacts, as good, some order, -system, discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as -to good. Divergent ideas about virtue.] - -The issue, therefore, which Plato here takes against Rhetoric, must -stand or fall with the Platonic Ideal of Good and Evil. But when he -thus denounces both the general public and the most patriotic -rhetors, to ensure exclusive worship for his own Ideal of Good--we -may at least require that he shall explain, wherein consists that -Good--by what mark it is distinguishable--and on what authority -pre-eminence is claimed for it. So far, indeed, we advance by the help -of Plato's similes[132]--order, discipline, health and strength of -body--that we are called upon to recognise, apart from all particular -moments of enjoyment or suffering, of action or quiescence, a certain -permanent mental condition and habit--a certain order, regulation, -discipline--as an object of high importance to be attained. This (as -I have before remarked) is a valuable idea which pervades, in one -form or another, all the Hellenic social views, from Sokrates -downward, and even before Sokrates; an idea, moreover, which was -common to Peripatetics, Stoics, Epikureans. But mental order and -discipline is not in itself an end: it may be differently cast, and -may subserve many different purposes. The Pythagorean brotherhood was -intensely restrictive in its canons. The Spartan system exhibited the -strictest order and discipline--an assemblage of principles and -habits predetermined by authority and enforced upon all--yet neither -Plato nor Aristotle approve of its results. Order and discipline -attained full perfection in the armies of Julius Caesar and the -French Emperor Napoleon; in the middle ages, also, several of -the monastic orders stood high in respect to finished discipline -pervading the whole character: and the Jesuits stood higher than any. -Each of these systems has included terms equivalent to justice, -temperance, virtue, vice, &c., with sentiments associated -therewith, yet very different from what Plato would have approved. -The question--What is Virtue?--_Vir bonus est quis?_--will be -answered differently in each. The Spartans--when they entrapped (by a -delusive pretence of liberation and military decoration) two thousand -of their bravest Helot warriors, and took them off by private -assassinations,[133]--did not offend against their own idea of -virtue, or against the Platonic exigency of Order--Measure--System. - -[Footnote 132: Plat. Gorg. p. 504.] - -[Footnote 133: Thucydid. iv. 80.] - -[Side-note: How to discriminate the right order from the -wrong. Plato does not advise us.] - -It is therefore altogether unsatisfactory, when Plato--professing to -teach us how to determine scientifically, which pleasures are bad, -and which pains are good--refers to a durable mental order and -discipline. Of such order there existed historically many varieties; -and many more are conceivable, as Plato himself has shown in the -Republic and Leges. By what tests is the right order to be -distinguished from the wrong? If by its results, by _what_ -results?--calculations for minimising pains, and maximising -pleasures, being excluded by the supposition? Here the Sokrates of -the Gorgias is at fault. He has not told us by what scientific test -the intelligent Expert proceeds in determining what pleasures are -bad, and what pains are good. He leaves such determination to the -unscientific sentiment of each society and each individual. He has -not, in fact, responded to the clear and pertinent challenge thrown -out by the Sokrates of the Protagoras. - -[Side-note: The Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity -of the dissenting philosopher.] - -I think, for these reasons, that the logic of the Gorgias is not at -all on a par with its eloquence. But there is one peculiar feature -which distinguishes it among all the Platonic dialogues. Nowhere in -ancient literature is the title, position, and dignity of individual -dissenting opinion, ethical and political--against established -ethical and political orthodoxy--so clearly marked out and so boldly -asserted. "The Athenians will judge as they think right: none -but those speakers who are in harmony with them, have any chance of -addressing their public assemblies with effect, and acquiring -political influence. I, Sokrates, dissent from them, and have no -chance of political influence: but I claim the right of following -out, proclaiming, and defending, the conclusions of my own individual -reason, until debate satisfies me that I am wrong." - - - - - -CHAPTER XXV. - -PHAEDON. - - -[Side-note: The Phaedon is affirmative and expository.] - -The Phaedon is characterised by Proklus as a dialogue wherein Sokrates -unfolds fully his own mental history, and communicates to his -admirers the complete range of philosophical cognition.[1] This -criticism is partly well founded. The dialogue generally is among the -most affirmative and expository in the Platonic list. Sokrates -undertakes to prove the immortality of the soul, delivers the various -reasons which establish the doctrine to his satisfaction, and -confutes some dissentient opinions entertained by others. In regard -to the exposition, however, we must consider ourselves as listening -to Plato under the name of Sokrates: and we find it so conducted as -to specify both certain stages through which the mind of Plato had -passed, and the logical process which (at that time) appeared to him -to carry conviction. - -[Footnote 1: Proklus, in Platon. Republ. p. 392. [Greek: e)n -Phai/doni me\n ga\r o(/pou diaphero/ntos o( Sokra/tes te\n e(autou= -zoe\n a)naploi=, kai\ pa=n to\ te=s e)piste/mes ple=thos a)noi/gei -toi=s e(autou= zelotai=s], &c. Wyttenbach thinks (note, ad p. 108 -E) that Plato was young when he composed the Phaedon. But no -sufficient grounds are given for this: and the concluding sentence of -the dialogue affords good presumption that it was composed many years -after the death of Sokrates--[Greek: e)/de e( teleute/, o)= -E)che/krates, tou= e(tai/rou e(mi=n e)ge/neto, a)ndro/s, o(s e(mei=s -phai=men a)/n, _to=n to/te_ o(=n e)peira/themen a)ri/stou, kai\ -a)/llos phronimota/tou kai\ dikaiota/tou.] The phrase [Greek: to=n -to/te] which may probably have slipped unconsciously from Plato, -implies that Sokrates belonged to the past generation. The beginning -of the dialogue undoubtedly shows that Plato intended to place it -shortly after the death of Sokrates; but the word [Greek: to/te] at -the end is inconsistent with this supposition, and comes out -unconsciously as a mark of the real time.] - -[Side-note: Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phaedon. -Pathetic interest which they inspire.] - -The interest felt by most readers in the Phaedon, however, depends, -not so much on the argumentative exposition (which Wyttenbach[2] -justly pronounces to be obscure and difficult as well as -unsatisfactory) as on the personality of the expounding speaker, and -the irresistible pathos of the situation. Sokrates had been condemned -to death by the Dikastery on the day after the sacred ship, memorable -in connection with the legendary voyage of Theseus to Krete, had been -dispatched on her annual mission of religious sacrifice at the island -of Delos. The Athenian magistrates considered themselves as precluded -from putting any one to death by public authority, during the absence -of the ship on this mission. Thirty days elapsed between her -departure and her return: during all which interval, Sokrates -remained in the prison, yet with full permission to his friends to -visit him. They passed most of every day in the enjoyment of his -conversation.[3] In the Phaedon, we read the last of these -conversations, after the sacred vessel had returned, and after the -Eleven magistrates had announced to Sokrates that the draught of -hemlock would be administered to him before sunset. On communicating -this intelligence, the magistrates released Sokrates from the fetters -with which he had hitherto been bound. It is shortly after such -release that the friends enter the prison to see him for the last -time. One of the number, Phaedon, recounts to Echekrates not only the -conduct and discourse of Sokrates during the closing hours of his -life, but also the swallowing of the poison, and the manner of his -death. - -[Footnote 2: See the Prolegomena prefixed to Wyttenbach's edition of -the Phaedon, p. xxi. p. 10.] - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 58-50. - -It appears that Kriton became bail before the Dikasts, in a certain -sum of money, that Sokrates should remain in prison and not escape -(Plat. Phaedon, p. 115 D; Kriton, 45 B). Kriton would have been -obliged to pay this money if Sokrates had accepted his proposition to -escape, noticed already in chap. x.] - -[Side-note: Simmias and Kebes, the two collocutors with -Sokrates. Their feelings and those of Sokrates.] - -More than fifteen friends of the philosopher are noted as present at -this last scene: but the only two who take an active part in the -debate, are, two young Thebans named Kebes and Simmias.[4] These -friends, though deeply attached to Sokrates, and full of sorrow at -the irreparable loss impending over them, are represented as overawed -and fascinated by his perfect fearlessness, serenity and dignity.[5] -They are ashamed to give vent to their grief, when their master is -seen to maintain his ordinary frame of mind, neither disquieted -nor dissatisfied. The fundamental conception of the dialogue is, to -represent Sokrates as the same man that he was before his trial; -unmoved by the situation--not feeling that any misfortune is about to -happen to him--equally delighting in intellectual debate--equally -fertile in dialectic invention. So much does he care for debate, and -so little for the impending catastrophe, that he persists in a great -argumentative effort, notwithstanding the intimation conveyed by -Kriton from the gaoler, that if he heated himself with talking, the -poison might perhaps be languid in its operation, so that two or -three draughts of it would be necessary instead of one.[6] Sokrates -even advances the position that death appears to him as a benefit -rather than a misfortune, and that every true philosopher ought to -prefer death to life, assuming it to supervene without his own -act--suicide being forbidden by the Gods. He is represented as "placidus -ore, intrepidus verbis; intempestivas suorum lacrimas coercens"--to -borrow a phrase from Tacitus's striking picture of the last hours of -the Emperor Otho.[7] To see him thus undisturbed, and even welcoming -his approaching end, somewhat hurts the feelings of his assembled -friends, who are in the deepest affliction at the certainty of so -soon losing him. Sokrates undertakes to defend himself before them as -he had done before the Dikasts; and to show good grounds for his -belief, that death is not a misfortune, but a benefit, to the -philosopher.[8] Simmias and Kebes, though at first not satisfied with -the reasonings, are nevertheless reluctant to produce their doubts, -from fear of mortifying him in his last moments: but Sokrates -protests against such reluctance as founded on a misconception of his -existing frame of mind.[9] He is now the same man as he was before, -and he calls upon them to keep up the freedom of debate unimpaired. - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 59 B, 89 A. [Greek: to=n neani/skon -to\n lo/gon], &c. (p. 89 A).] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 58-59.] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Phaedon, p. 63 D.] - -[Footnote 7: Tacitus, Hist. ii. 48.] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Phaedon, p. 63.] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Phaedon, p. 84 D-E.] - -[Side-note: Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of -debate, active exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each -reasoner.] - -Indeed this freedom of debate and fulness of search--the paramount -value of "reasoned truth"--the necessity of keeping up the force of -individual reason by constant argumentative exercise--and the right -of independent judgment for hearer as well as speaker--stand -emphatically proclaimed in these last words of the dying philosopher. -He does not announce the immortality of the soul as a dogma of -imperative orthodoxy; which men, whether satisfied with the proofs or -not, must believe, or must make profession of believing, on pain of -being shunned as a moral pestilence, and disqualified from giving -testimony in a court of justice. He sets forth his own conviction, -with the grounds on which he adopts it. But he expressly recognises -the existence of dissentient opinions: he invites his companions to -bring forward every objection: he disclaims all special purpose of -impressing his own conclusions upon their minds: nay, he expressly -warns them not to be biassed by their personal sympathies, then wound -up to the highest pitch, towards himself. He entreats them to -preserve themselves from becoming tinged with _misology_, or the -hatred of free argumentative discussion: and he ascribes this mental -vice to the early habit of easy, uninquiring, implicit, belief: since -a man thus ready of faith, embracing opinions without any -discriminative test, presently finds himself driven to abandon one -opinion after another, until at last he mistrusts all opinions, and -hates the process of discussing them, laying the blame upon -philosophy instead of upon his own intellect.[10] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 89 C-D, 90. - -[Greek: Pro=ton eu)labetho=me/n ti pa/thos me\ pa/thomen. To\ poi=on, -e)=n d' e)go/? Me\ geno/metha, e)=| d' o(/s, miso/logoi, o(/sper oi( -misa/nthropoi gigno/menoi; o(s ou)k e)/stin, e)/phe, o(/, ti a)/n tis -mei=zon tou/tou kako\n pa/thoi e)\ lo/gous mise/sas.] p. 90 B. -[Greek: e)peida/n tis pisteu/se| lo/go| tini\ a)lethei= ei)=nai, -a)/neu te=s peri\ tou\s lo/gous te/chnes, ka)/peita o)li/gon -u(/steron au)to=| do/xe| pseude\s ei)=nai, e)ni/ote me\n o)/n, -e)ni/ote d' ou)k o)/n, kai\ au)=this e(/teros kai\ e(/teros], -&c.] - -[Side-note: Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on -their guard against being influenced by his authority--that they -shall follow only the convictions of their own reason.] - -"For myself" (says Sokrates) "I fear that in these my last hours I -depart from the true spirit of philosophy--like unschooled men, who, -when in debate, think scarcely at all how the real question stands, -but care only to make their own views triumphant in the minds of the -auditors. Between them and me there is only thus much of difference. -I regard it as a matter of secondary consequence, whether my -conclusions appear true to my hearers; but I shall do my best to make -them appear as much as possible true to myself.[11] My -calculation is as follows: mark how selfish it is. If my conclusion -as to the immortality of the soul is true, I am better off by -believing it: if I am in error, and death be the end of me, even then -I shall avoid importuning my friends with grief, during these few -remaining hours: moreover my error will not continue with me--which -would have been a real misfortune--but will be extinguished very -shortly. Such is the frame of mind, Simmias and Kebes, with which I -approach the debate. Do you follow my advice: take little thought of -Sokrates, but take much more thought of the truth. If I appear to you -to affirm any thing truly, assent to me: but if not, oppose me with -all your powers of reasoning: Be on your guard lest, through earnest -zeal, I should deceive alike myself and you, and should leave the -sting in you, like a bee, at this hour of departure." - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Phaedon, p. 91 A-C. [Greek: Ou) ga\r o(/pos toi=s -parou=sin a)\ e)go\ le/go do/xei a)lethe= ei)=nai, prothume/somai, ei) -me\ ei)/e pa/rergon, a)/ll' o(/pos au)to=| e)moi\ o(/ ti ma/lista -do/zei ou(/tos e)/chein. logi/zomai ga/r, o)= phi/le e(/taire--kai\ -the/asai o(s pleonektiko=s--ei) me\n tugcha/nei a)lethe= o)/nta a(\ -le/go, kalo=s de\ e)/chei to\ peisthe=nai; ei) de\ mede/n e)sti -teleute/santi, a)ll' ou)=n tou=to/n ge to\n chro/non au)to\n to\n -pro\ tou= thana/tou e(=tton toi=s parou=sin a)ede\s e)/somai -o)duro/menos . . . u(mei=s me/ntoi, a)\n e)moi\ pei/thesthe, -_smikro\n phronti/santes Sokra/tous, te=s de\ a)lethei/as polu\ -ma=llon, e)a\n me/n ti u(mi=n doko= a)lethe\s le/gein, -xunomologe/sate; ei) de\ me/, panti\ lo/go| a)ntitei/nete_, -eu)labou/menoi o(/pos me\ e)go\ u(po\ prothumi/as a(/ma e)mauto/n te -kai\ u(ma=s e)xapate/sas, o(/sper me/litta to\ ke/ntron e)gkatalipo\n -oi)che/somai.]] - -[Side-note: Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for -reasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent.] - -This is a remarkable passage, as illustrating the spirit and purpose -of Platonic dialogues. In my preceding Chapters, I have already -shown, that it is no part of the aim of Sokrates to thrust dogmas of -his own into other men's minds as articles of faith. But then, most -of these Chapters have dwelt upon Dialogues of Search, in which -Sokrates has appeared as an interrogator, or enquirer jointly with -others: scrutinising their opinions, but disclaiming knowledge or -opinions of his own. Here, however, in the Phaedon, the case is -altogether different. Sokrates is depicted as having not only an -affirmative opinion, but even strong conviction, on a subject of -great moment: which conviction, moreover, he is especially desirous -of preserving unimpaired, during his few remaining hours of life. Yet -even here, he manifests no anxiety to get that conviction into the -minds of his friends, except as a result of their own -independent scrutiny and self-working reason. Not only he does not -attempt to terrify them into believing, by menace of evil -consequences if they do not--but he repudiates pointedly even the -gentler machinery of conversion, which might work upon their minds -through attachment to himself and reverence for his authority. His -devotion is to "reasoned truth": he challenges his friends to the -fullest scrutiny by their own independent reason: he recognises the -sentence which they pronounce afterwards as valid _for them_, -whether concurrent with himself or adverse. Their reason is for them, -what his reason is for him: requiring, both alike (as Sokrates here -proclaims), to be stimulated as well as controlled by all-searching -debate--but postulating equal liberty of final decision for each one -of the debaters. The stress laid by Plato upon the full liberty of -dissenting reason, essential to philosophical debate--is one of the -most memorable characteristics of the Phaedon. When we come to the -treatise De Legibus (where Sokrates does not appear), we shall find a -totally opposite view of sentiment. In the tenth book of that -treatise Plato enforces the rigid censorship of an orthodox -persecutor, who makes his own reason binding and compulsory on all. - -[Side-note: Phaedon and Symposion--points of analogy and -contrast.] - -The natural counterpart and antithesis to the Phaedon, is found in the -Symposion.[12] In both, the personality of Sokrates stands out with -peculiar force: in the one, he is in the fulness of life and -enjoyment, along with festive comrades--in the other, he is on the -verge of approaching death, surrounded by companions in deep -affliction. The point common to both, is, the perfect self-command of -Sokrates under a diversity of trying circumstances. In the Symposion, -we read of him as triumphing over heat, cold, fatigue, danger, -amorous temptation, unmeasured potations of wine, &c.:[13] -in the Phaedon, we discover him rising superior to the fear of -death, and to the contagion of an afflicted company around him. -Still, his resolute volition is occasionally overpowered by fits of -absorbing meditation, which seize him at moments sudden and -unaccountable, and chain him to the spot for a long time. There is -moreover, in both dialogues, a streak of eccentricity in his -character, which belongs to what Plato calls the philosophical -inspiration and madness, rising above the measure of human temperance -and prudence.[14] The Phaedon depicts in Sokrates the same intense -love of philosophy and dialectic debate, as the Symposion and -Phaedrus: but it makes no allusion to that personal attachment, and -passionate admiration of youthful beauty, with which, according to -those two dialogues, the mental fermentation of the philosophical -aspirant is asserted to begin.[15] Sokrates in the Phaedon describes -the initial steps whereby he had been led to philosophical study:[16] -but the process is one purely intellectual, without reference to -personal converse with beloved companions, as a necessity of the -case. His discourse is that of a man on the point of death--"abruptis -vitae blandimentis"[17]--and he already looks upon his body, not as -furnishing the means of action and as requiring only to be trained by -gymnastic discipline (as it appears in the Republic), but as an -importunate and depraving companion, of which he is glad to get rid: -so that the ethereal substance of the soul may be left to its free -expansion and fellowship with the intelligible world, apart from -sense and its solicitations. - -[Footnote 12: Thus far I agree with Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum -Phaedon, p. 9, &c.); though I do not think that he has shown -sufficient ground for his theory regarding the Symposion and the -Phaedon, as jointly intended to depict the character of the -philosopher, promised by Plato as a sequel to the Sophist and the -Statesman. (Plato, Sophist. p. 217; Politic. p. 257.)] - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Symposion, pp. 214 A, 219 D, 220-221-223 D: -compare Phaedon, p. 116, c. 117. Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) compares on -this point his father Antoninus Pius to Sokrates: both were capable -of enjoyment as well as of abstinence, without ever losing their -self-command. [Greek: E)pharmo/seie d' a)\n au)to=|] (Antoninus P.) -[Greek: to\ peri\ tou= Sokra/tous mnemoneuo/menon, o(/ti kai\ -a)pe/chesthai kai\ a)polau/ein e)du/nato tou/ton, o(=n polloi\ pro/s -te ta\s a)pocha\s a)stheno=s, kai\ pro\s ta\s a)polau/seis -e)ndotiko=s, e)/chousin. To\ de\ i)schu/ein, kai\ e)/ti karterei=n -kai\ e)nne/phein e(kate/ro|, a)ndro\s e)/stin a)/rtion kai\ a)etteton -psuche\n e)/chontos.]] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, pp. 174-175-220 C-D. Compare Phaedon, -pp. 84 C, 95 E.] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Sympos. p. 215 A, p. 221 D. [Greek: oi(=os de\ -ou(tosi\ ge/gone te\n _a)topi/an_ a)/nthropos, kai\ au)to\s kai\ -oi( lo/goi au)tou=, ou)d' e)ggu\s a)\n eu(/roi tis zeto=n], &c. -p. 218 B: [Greek: pa/ntes ga\r kekoinone/kate te=s philoso/phou -mani/as te kai\ bakchei/as], &c. About the [Greek: philo/sophos -mani/a], compare Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 245-250. - -Plato, Phaedrus, pp. 251-253. Symposion, pp. 210-211. [Greek: o(/tan -tis a)po\ to=nde dia\ to\ o)rtho=s paiderastei=n e)panio\n e)kei=no -to\ kalo\n a)/rchetai kathora=|n], &c. (211 B).] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Phaedon, p. 96 A. [Greek: e)go\ ou)=n soi\ -di/eimi peri\ au)to=n ta/ g' e)ma\ pa/the], &c.] - -[Footnote 17: Tacitus, Hist. ii. 53. "Othonis libertus, habere se -suprema ejus mandata respondit: ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed -sola posteritatis cura, et abruptis vitae blandimentis."] - -[Side-note: Phaedon--compared with Republic and Timaeus. No -recognition of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and -body.] - -We have here one peculiarity of the Phaedon, whereby it stands -distinguished both from the Republic and the Timaeus. The antithesis -on which it dwells is that of the soul or mind, on one hand--the -body on the other. The soul or mind is spoken of as one and -indivisible: as if it were an inmate unworthily lodged or imprisoned -in the body. It is not distributed into distinct parts, kinds, or -varieties: no mention is made of that tripartite distribution which -is so much insisted on in the Republic and Timaeus:--the rational or -intellectual (encephalic) soul, located in the head--the courageous -or passionate (thoracic), between the neck and the diaphragm--the -appetitive (abdominal), between the diaphragm and the navel. In the -Phaedon, the soul is noted as the seat of reason, intellect, the love -of wisdom or knowledge, exclusively: all that belongs to passion and -appetite, is put to account of the body:[18] this is distinctly -contrary to the Philebus, in which dialogue Sokrates affirms that -desire or appetite cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to the -soul. In Phaedon, nothing is said about the location of the rational -soul, in the head,--nor about the analogy between its rotations in -the cranium and the celestial rotations (a doctrine which we read -both in the Timaeus and in the Republic): on the contrary, the soul is -affirmed to have lost, through its conjunction with the body, that -wisdom or knowledge which it possessed during its state of -pre-existence, while completely apart from the body, and while in -commerce with those invisible Ideas to which its own separate nature -was cognate.[19] That controul which in the Republic is exercised by -the rational soul over the passionate and appetitive souls, is in the -Phaedon exercised (though imperfectly) by the one and only soul over -the body.[20] In the Republic and Timaeus, the soul is a tripartite -aggregate, a community of parts, a compound: in the Phaedon, Sokrates -asserts it to be uncompounded, making this fact a point in his -argument.[21] Again, in the Phaedon, the soul is pronounced to be -essentially uniform and incapable of change: as such, it is placed in -antithesis with the body, which is perpetually changing: while -we read, on the contrary, in the Symposion, that soul and body alike -are in a constant and unremitting variation, neither one nor the -other ever continuing in the same condition.[22] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Phaedon, p. 66. Compare Plato, Philebus, p. 35, -C-D.] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Phaedon, p. 76.] - -[Footnote 20: Compare Phaedon, p. 94 C-E, with Republic, iv. pp. 439 -C, 440 A, 441 E, 442 C.] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Phaedon, p. 78. [Greek: a)xu/ntheton, monoeide\s] -(p. 80 B), contrasted with the [Greek: tri/a ei)de te=s psuche=s] -(Republic, p. 439). In the abstract given by Alkinous of the Platonic -doctrine, we read in cap. 24 [Greek: o(/ti trimere/s e)stin e( -psuche\ kata\ ta\s duna/meis, kai\ kata\ lo/gon ta\ me/re au)te=s -to/pois i)di/ois dianene/metai]: in cap. 25 that the [Greek: psuche\] -is [Greek: a)su/nthetos, a)dia/lutos, a)ske/dastos].] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 79-80; Symposion, pp. 207-208.] - -[Side-note: Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. -Whether all the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul -alone.] - -The difference which I have here noted shows how Plato modified his -doctrine to suit the purpose of each dialogue. The tripartite soul -would have been found inconvenient in the Phaedon, where the argument -required that soul and body should be as sharply distinguished as -possible. Assuming passion and appetite to be attributes belonging to -the soul, as well as reason--Sokrates will not shake them off when he -becomes divorced from the body. He believes and expects that the -post-existence of the soul will be, as its pre-existence has been, a -rational existence--a life of intellectual contemplation and commerce -with the eternal Ideas: in this there is no place for passion and -appetite, which grow out of its conjunction with the body. The soul -here represents Reason and Intellect, in commerce with their -correlates, the objective Entia Rationis: the body represents passion -and appetite as well as sense, in implication with their correlates, -the objects of sensible perception.[23] Such is the doctrine of the -Phaedon; but Plato is not always consistent with himself on the point. -His ancient as well as his modern commentators are not agreed, -whether, when he vindicated the immortality of the soul, he meant to -speak of the rational soul only, or of the aggregate soul with its -three parts as above described. There are passages which countenance -both suppositions.[24] Plato seems to have leaned sometimes to the -one view, sometimes to the other: besides which, the view taken -in the Phaedon is a third, different from both--_viz._: That the -two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive, are not -recognised as existing. - -[Footnote 23: This is the same antithesis as we read in Xenophon, -ascribed to Cyrus in his dying address to his sons--[Greek: o( -a)/kratos kai\ katharo\s nou=s--to\ a)/phron so=ma], Cyropaed. viii. -7, 20.] - -[Footnote 24: Alkinous, Introduct. c. 25. [Greek: o(/ti me\n ou)=n -ai( logikai\ psuchai\ a)tha/natoi u(pa/rchousi kata\ to\n a)/ndra -tou=ton, bebaio/sait' a)/n tis; ei) de\ kai\ ai( a)/logoi, tou=to -to=n a)mphisbetoume/non u(pa/rchei.] Galen considers Plato as -affirming that the two inferior souls are mortal--[Greek: Peri\ to=n -te=s psuche=s e)tho=n], T. iv. p. 773, Kuehn. - -This subject is handled in an instructive Dissertation of K. F. -Hermann--De Partibus Animae Immortalibus secundum Platonem--delivered -at Goettingen in the winter Session, 1850-1851. He inclines to the -belief that Plato intended to represent only the rational soul as -immortal, and the other two souls as mortal (p. 9). But the passages -which he produces are quite sufficient to show, that Plato sometimes -held one language, sometimes the other; and that Galen, who wrote an -express treatise (now lost) to prove that Plato was inconsistent with -himself in respect to the soul, might have produced good reasons for -his opinion. The "inconstantia Platonis" (Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 12) -must be admitted here as on other matters. We must take the different -arguments and doctrines of Plato as we find them in their respective -places. Hermann (p. 4) says about the commentators--"De irrationali -anima, alii ancipites haeserunt, alii claris verbis mortalem -praedicarunt: quumque Neoplatonicae sectae principes, Numenius et -Plotinus, non modo brutorum, sed ne plantarum quidem, animas -immortalitate privare ausi sunt,--mox insequentes in alia omnia -digressi aut plane perire irrationales partes affirmarunt, aut media -quadam via ingressi, quamvis corporum fato exemptis, mortalitatem -tamen et ipsi tribuerunt." It appears that the divergence of opinion -on this subject began as early as Xenokrates and Speusippus--see -Olympiodorus, Scholia in Phaedonem, Sec. 175. The large construction -adopted by Numenius and Plotinus is completely borne out by a passage -in the Phaedon, p. 70 E. - -I must here remark that Hermann does not note the full extent of -discrepancy between the Phaedon and Plato's other dialogues, -consisting in this--That in the Phaedon, Plato suppresses all mention -of the two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive: -insomuch that if we had only the Phaedon remaining, we should not have -known that he had ever affirmed the triple partition of the soul, or -the co-existence of the three souls. - -I transcribe an interesting passage from M. Degerando, respecting the -belief in different varieties of soul, and partial immortality. - -Degerando--Histoire Comparee des Systemes de Philosophie, vol. i. p. -213. - -"Les habitans du Thibet, du Groeenland, du nord de l'Amerique -admettent deux ames: les Caraeibes en admettent trois, dont une, -disent-ils, celle qui habite dans la tete, remonte seule au pays des -ames. Les habitans du Groeenland croient d'ailleurs les ames des -hommes semblables au principe de la vie des animaux: ils supposent -que les divers individus peuvent changer d'ames entre eux pendant la -vie, et qu'apres la vie ces ames executent de grands voyages, avec -toutes sortes de fatigues et de perils. Les peuples du Canada se -representent les ames sous la forme d'ombres errantes: les Patagons, -les habitans du Sud de l'Asie, croient entendre leurs voix dans -l'echo: et les anciens Romains eux-memes n'etaient pas etrangers a -cette opinion. Les Negres s'imaginent que la destinee de l'ame apres -la vie est encore liee a celle du corps, et fondent sur cette idee -une foule de pratiques."] - -[Side-note: The life and character of a philosopher is a -constant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone -enables him to do this completely.] - -The philosopher (contends Sokrates) ought to rejoice when death comes -to sever his soul altogether from his body: because he is, throughout -all his life, struggling to sever himself from the passions, -appetites, impulses and aspirations, which grow out of the body; and -to withdraw himself from the perceptions of the corporeal senses, -which teach no truth, and lead only to deceit or confusion: He is -constantly attempting to do what the body hinders him from doing -completely--to prosecute pure mental contemplation, as the only way -of arriving at truth: to look at essences or things in themselves, by -means of his mind or soul in itself apart from the body.[25] Until -his mind be purified from all association with the body, it -cannot be brought into contact with pure essence, nor can his -aspirations for knowledge be satisfied.[26] Hence his whole life is -really a training or approximative practice for death, which alone -will enable him to realise such aspirations.[27] Knowledge or wisdom -is the only money in which he computes, and which he seeks to receive -in payment.[28] He is not courageous or temperate in the ordinary -sense: for the courageous man, while holding death to be a great -evil, braves it from fear of greater evils--and the temperate man -abstains from various pleasures, because they either shut him out -from greater pleasures, or entail upon him disease and poverty. The -philosopher is courageous and temperate, but from a different motive: -his philosophy purifies him from all these sensibilities, and makes -him indifferent to all the pleasures and pains arising from the body: -each of which, in proportion to its intensity, corrupts his -perception of truth and falsehood, and misguides him in the search -for wisdom or knowledge.[29] While in the body, he feels imprisoned, -unable to look for knowledge except through a narrow grating and by -the deceptive media of sense. From this durance philosophy partially -liberates him,--purifying his mind, like the Orphic or Dionysiac -religious mysteries, from the contagion of body[30] and sense: -disengaging it, as far as may be during life, from sympathy with the -body: and translating it out of the world of sense, uncertainty, and -mere opinion, into the invisible region of truth and knowledge. If -such purification has been fully achieved, the mind of the -philosopher is at the moment of death thoroughly severed from the -body, and passes clean away by itself, into commerce with the -intelligible Entities or realities. - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Phaedon, p. 66 E. [Greek: ei) me/llome/n pote -katharo=s ti ei)/sesthai, a)pallakte/on au)tou= (tou= so/matos) kai\ -au)te=| te=| psuche=| theate/on au)ta\ ta\ pra/gmata.]] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Phaedon, p. 67 B. [Greek: me\ katharo=| ga\r -katharou= e)pha/ptesthai me\ ou) themito\n e)=|.]] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Phaedon, p. 64 A. [Greek: kinduneu/ousi ga\r -o(/soi tugcha/nousin o)rtho=s a)pto/menoi philosophi/as lelethe/nai -tou\s a)/llous o(/ti ou)de\n a)/llo au)toi\ e)pitedeu/ousin e)\ -a)pothne/skein te kai\ tethna/nai.] P. 67 E [Greek: oi( o)rtho=s -philosophou=ntes a)pothne/skein meleto=sin.]] - -[Footnote 28: Plato, Phaedon, p. 69 A. [Greek: a)ll' e)=| e)kei=no -mo/non to\ no/misma o)rtho/n, a)nth' ou(= dei= a(/panta tau=ta -katalla/ttesthai, phro/nesis.]] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Phaedon, p. 69-83-84.] - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Phaedon, p. 82 E.] - -[Side-note: Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass -after death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher -alone is relieved from all communion with body.] - -On the contrary, the soul or mind of the ordinary man, which has -undergone no purification and remains in close implication with the -body, cannot get completely separated even at the moment of death, -but remains encrusted and weighed down by bodily accompaniments, -so as to be unfit for those regions to which mind itself naturally -belongs. Such impure minds or souls are the ghosts or shadows which -haunt tombs; and which become visible, because they cling to the -visible world, and hate the invisible.[31] Not being fit for separate -existence, they return in process of time into conjunction with fresh -bodies, of different species of men or animals, according to the -particular temperament which they carry away with them.[32] The souls -of despots, or of violent and rapacious men, will pass into the -bodies of wolves or kites: those of the gluttonous and drunkards, -into asses and such-like animals. A better fate will be reserved for -the just and temperate men, who have been socially and politically -virtuous, but simply by habit and disposition, without any philosophy -or pure intellect: for their souls will pass into the bodies of other -gentle and social animals, such as bees, ants, wasps,[33] &c., or -perhaps they may again return into the human form, and may become -moderate men. It is the privilege only of him who has undergone the -purifying influence of philosophy, and who has spent his life in -trying to detach himself as much as possible from communion with the -body--to be relieved after death from the obligation of fresh -embodiment, that his soul may dwell by itself in a region akin to its -own separate nature: passing out of the world of sense, of transient -phenomena, and of mere opinion, into a distinct world where it will -be in full presence of the eternal Ideas, essences, and truth; in -companionship with the Gods, and far away from the miseries of -humanity.[34] - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Phaedon, p. 81 C-D. [Greek: o(\ de\ kai\ -e)/chousa e( toiau/te psuche\ baru/netai/ te kai\ e(/lketai pa/lin -ei)s to\n o(rato\n to/pon, pho/bo| tou= a)eidou=s te kai\ A(/idou, -o(/sper le/getai, peri\ ta\ mne/mata/ te kai\ tou\s ta/phous -kulindoume/ne, peri\ a(\ de\ kai\ o)/phthe a)/tta psucho=n skotoeide= -pha/smata] [al. [Greek: skioeode= phanta/smata]], [Greek: oi(=a -pare/chontai ai( toiau=tai psuchai\ ei)/dola, ai( me\ katharo=s -a)poluthei=sai a)lla\ tou= o(ratou= mete/chousai, dio\ kai\ -o(ro=ntai.]] - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 82-84.] - -[Footnote 33: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 82 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n -eu)daimone/statoi kai\ tou/ton ei)si\ kai\ ei)s be/ltiston to/pon -i)o/ntes oi( te\n demotike\n te kai\ politike\n a)rete\n -e)pitetedeuko/tes, e(\n de\ kalou=si sophrosu/nen te kai\ -dikaiosu/nen, e)x e)/thous te kai\ mele/tes gegonui=an a)/neu -philosophi/as te kai\ nou=? . . . O(/ti tou/tous ei)ko/s e)stin ei)s -toiou=ton pa/lin a)phiknei=sthai politiko/n te kai\ e(/meron ge/nos, -e)/pou melitto=n e)\ spheko=n e)\ murme/kon], &c.] - -[Footnote 34: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 82 B, 83 B, 84 B. Compare p. 114 C: -[Greek: tou/ton de\ au)to=n oi( philosophi/a| i(kano=s kathera/menoi -a)/neu te soma/ton zo=si to\ para/pan ei)s to\n e)/peita chro/non], -&c. Also p. 115 D.] - -[Side-note: Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the -Phaedon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers.] - -Such is the creed which Sokrates announces to his friends in the -Phaedon, as supplying good reason for the readiness and satisfaction -with which he welcomes death. It is upon the antithesis between soul -(or mind) and body, that the main stress is laid. The partnership -between the two is represented as the radical cause of mischief: and -the only true relief to the soul consists in breaking up the -partnership altogether, so as to attain a distinct, disembodied, -existence. Conformably to this doctrine, the line is chiefly drawn -between the philosopher, and the multitude who are not philosophers--not -between good and bad agents, when the good agents are not -philosophers. This last distinction is indeed noticed, but is kept -subordinate. The unphilosophical man of social goodness is allowed to -pass after death into the body of a bee, or an ant, instead of that -of a kite or ass;[35] but he does not attain the privilege of -dissolving connection altogether with body. Moreover the distinction -is one not easily traceable: since Sokrates[36] expressly remarks -that the large majority of mankind are middling persons, neither good -nor bad in any marked degree. Philosophers stand in a category by -themselves: apart from the virtuous citizens, as well as from the -middling and the vicious. Their appetites and ambition are indeed -deadened, so that they agree with the virtuous in abstaining from -injustice: but this is not their characteristic feature. Philosophy -is asserted to impart to them a special purification, like that of -the Orphic mysteries to the initiated: detaching the soul from both -the body and the world of sense, except in so far as is indispensable -for purposes of life: replunging the soul, as much as possible, in -the other world of intelligible essences, real forms or Ideas, which -are its own natural kindred and antecedent companions. The process -whereby this is accomplished is intellectual rather than ethical. It -is the process of learning, or (in the sense of Sokrates) the revival -in the mind of those essences or Ideas with which it had been -familiar during its anterior and separate life: accompanied by the -total abstinence from all other pleasures and temptations.[37] Only -by such love of learning, which is identical with philosophy -([Greek: philo/sophon, philomathe\s]), is the mind rescued from the -ignorance and illusions unavoidable in the world of sense. - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 81-82.] - -[Footnote 36: Plato, Phaedon, p. 90 A.] - -[Footnote 37: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 82-115.--[Greek: ta\s de\ (e(dona\s) -peri\ to\ mantha/nein e)spou/dase], &c. (p. 114 E). - -These doctrines, laid down by Plato in the Phaedon, bear great analogy -to the Sanskrit philosophy called _Sankhya_, founded by Kapila, -as expounded and criticised in the treatise of M. Barthelemy St. -Hilaire (Memoire sur le Sankhya, Paris, 1852, pp. 273-278)--and the -other work, Du Bouddhisme, by the same author (Paris, 1855), pp. -116-137, 187-194, &c.] - -[Side-note: Simmias and Kebes do not admit readily the -immortality of the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by -asking for proof. Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate.] - -In thus explaining his own creed, Sokrates announces a full -conviction that the soul or mind is immortal, but he has not yet -offered any proof of it: and Simmias as well as Kebes declare -themselves to stand in need of proof. Both of them however are -reluctant to obtrude upon him any doubts. An opportunity is thus -provided, that Sokrates may exhibit his undisturbed equanimity--his -unimpaired argumentative readiness--his keen anxiety not to relax the -grasp of a subject until he has brought it to a satisfactory -close--without the least reference to his speedily approaching death. -This last-mentioned anxiety is made manifest in a turn of the dialogue, -remarkable both for dramatic pathos and for originality.[38] We are -thus brought to the more explicit statement of those reasons upon -which Sokrates relies. - -[Footnote 38: Plato, Phaedon, p. 89 B-C,--the remark made by Sokrates, -when stroking down the head and handling the abundant hair of Phaedon, -in allusion to the cutting off of all this hair, which would be among -the acts of mourning performed by Phaedon on the morrow, after the -death of Sokrates: and the impressive turn given to this remark, in -reference to the solution of the problem then in debate.] - -[Side-note: Simmias and Kebes believe fully in the -pre-existence of the soul, but not in its post-existence. -Doctrine--That the soul is a sort of harmony--refuted by Sokrates.] - -If the arguments whereby Sokrates proves the immortality of the soul -are neither forcible nor conclusive, not fully satisfying even -Simmias[39] to whom they are addressed--the adverse arguments, upon -the faith of which the doctrine was denied (as we know it to have -been by many philosophers of antiquity), cannot be said to be -produced at all. Simmias and Kebes are represented as Sokratic -companions, partly Pythagoreans; desirous to find the doctrine true, -yet ignorant of the proofs. Both of them are earnest believers in the -pre-existence of the soul, and in the objective reality of Ideas or -intelligible essences. Simmias however adopts in part the opinion, -not very clearly explained, "That the soul is a harmony or -mixture": which opinion Sokrates refutes, partly by some other -arguments, partly by pointing out that it is inconsistent with the -supposition of the soul as pre-existent to the body, and that Simmias -must make his election between the two. Simmias elects without -hesitation, in favour of the pre-existence: which he affirms to be -demonstrable upon premisses or assumptions perfectly worthy of trust: -while the alleged harmony is at best only a probable analogy, not -certified by conclusive reasons.[40] Kebes again, while admitting -that the soul existed before its conjunction with the present body, -and that it is sufficiently durable to last through conjunction with -many different bodies--still expresses his apprehension that though -durable, it is not eternal. Accordingly, no man can be sure that his -present body is not the last with which his soul is destined to be -linked; so that immediately on his death, it will pass away into -nothing. The opinion of Kebes is remarkable, inasmuch as it shows how -constantly the metempsychosis, or transition of the soul from one -body to another, was included in all the varieties of ancient -speculation on this subject.[41] - -[Footnote 39: Plato, Phaedon, p. 107 B.] - -[Footnote 40: Plato, Phaedon, p. 92.] - -[Footnote 41: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 86-95. [Greek: kra=sin kai\ -a(rmoni/an], &c. - -"Animam esse harmoniam complures quidem statuerant, sed aliam alii, -et diversa ratione," says Wyttenbach ad Phaedon. p. 86. Lucretius as -well as Plato impugns the doctrine, iii. 97. - -Galen, a great admirer of Plato, though not pretending to determine -positively wherein the essence of the soul consists, maintains a -doctrine substantially the same as what is here impugned--that it -depends upon a certain [Greek: kra=sis] of the elements and -properties in the bodily organism--[Greek: Peri\ to=n te=s psuche=s -e)tho=n], vol. iv. pp. 774-775, 779-782, ed. Kuehn. He complains much -of the unsatisfactory explanations of Plato on this point.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or -wanderings through which his mind had passed.] - -Before replying to Simmias and Kebes, Sokrates is described as -hesitating and reflecting for a long time. He then enters into a -sketch of[42] his own intellectual history. How far the sketch as it -stands depicts the real Sokrates, or Plato himself, or a supposed -mind not exactly coincident with either--we cannot be certain: the -final stage however must belong to Plato himself. - -[Footnote 42: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 96-102. - -The following abstract is intended only to exhibit the train of -thought and argument pursued by Sokrates; not adhering to the exact -words, nor even preserving the interlocutory form. I could not have -provided room for a literal translation.] - -[Side-note: First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons -why he rejected it.] - -"You compel me (says Sokrates) to discuss thoroughly the cause of -generation and destruction.[43] I will tell you, if you like, my own -successive impressions on these subjects. When young, I was -amazingly eager for that kind of knowledge which people call the -investigation of Nature. I thought it matter of pride to know the -causes of every thing--through what every thing is either generated, -or destroyed, or continues to exist. I puzzled myself much to -discover first of all such matters as these--Is it a certain -putrefaction of the Hot and the Cold in the system (as some say), -which brings about the nourishment of animals? Is it the blood -through which we think--or air, or fire? Or is it neither one nor the -other, but the brain, which affords to us sensations of sight, -hearing, and smell, out of which memory and opinion are generated: -then, by a like process, knowledge is generated out of opinion and -memory when permanently fixed?[44] I tried to understand destructions -as well as generations, celestial as well as terrestrial phenomena. -But I accomplished nothing, and ended by fancying myself utterly -unfit for the enquiry. Nay--I even lost all the knowledge of that -which I had before believed myself to understand. For example--From -what cause does a man grow? At first, I had looked upon this as -evident--that it was through eating and drinking: flesh being thereby -added to his flesh, bone to his bone, &c. So too, when a tall and -a short man were standing together, it appeared to me that the former -was taller than the latter by the head--that ten were more than eight -because two were added to them[45]--that a rod of two cubits was -greater than a rod of one cubit, because it projected beyond it by a -half. Now--I am satisfied that I do not know the cause of any of -these matters. I cannot explain why, when one is added to one, such -addition makes them two; since in their separated state each was one. -In this case, it is approximation or conjunction which is said to -make the two: in another case, the opposite cause, -_disjunction_, is said also to make two--when one body is -bisected.[46] How two opposite causes can produce the same -effect--and how either conjunction or disjunction can produce two, -where there were not two before--I do not understand. In fact, I -could not explain to myself, by this method of research, the -generation, or destruction, or existence, of any thing; and I looked -out for some other method. - -[Footnote 43: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 95 E--96. [Greek: Ou) phau=lon -pra=gma zetei=s; o(/los ga\r dei= peri\ gene/seos kai\ phthora=s te\n -ai)ti/an diapragmateu/sasthai. e)go\ ou)=n soi\ di/eimi, e)a\n -bou/le|, ta/ g' e)ma\ pa/the], &c.] - -[Footnote 44: Phaedon, p. 96 B. [Greek: e)k de\ mne/mes kai\ do/xes, -labou/ses to\ e)remei=n, kata\ tau=ta gi/gnesthai e)piste/men.] - -This is the same distinction between [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek: -e)piste/me], as that which Sokrates gives in the Menon, though not -with full confidence (Menon, pp. 97-98). See supra, chap. xxii. p. -241.] - -[Footnote 45: Plato, Phaedon, p. 96 E. [Greek: kai\ e)/ti ge tou/ton -e)narge/stera, ta\ de/ka moi e)do/kei to=n o)kto\ plei/ona ei)=nai, -dia\ to\ du/o au)toi=s prosei=nai, kai\ to\ di/pechu tou= pechuai/ou -mei=zon ei)=nai dia\ to\ e(mi/sei au)tou= u(pere/chein.]] - -[Footnote 46: Plato, Phaedon, p. 97 B.] - -[Side-note: Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of -Anaxagoras.] - -"It was at this time that I heard a man reading out of a book, which -he told me was the work of Anaxagoras, the affirmation that Nous -(Reason, Intelligence) was the regulator and cause of all things. I -felt great satisfaction in this cause; and I was convinced, that if -such were the fact, Reason would ordain every thing for the best: so -that if I wanted to find out the cause of any generation, or -destruction, or existence, I had only to enquire in what manner it -was best that such generation or destruction should take place. Thus -a man was only required to know, both respecting himself and -respecting other things, what was the best: which knowledge, however, -implied that he must also know what was worse--the knowledge of the -one and of the other going together.[47] I thought I had thus found a -master quite to my taste, who would tell me, first whether the earth -was a disk or a sphere, and would proceed to explain the cause and -the necessity why it must be so, by showing me how such arrangement -was the best: next, if he said that the earth was in the centre, -would proceed to show that it was best that the earth should be in -the centre. Respecting the Sun, Moon, and Stars, I expected to hear -the like explanation of their movements, rotations, and other -phenomena: that is, how it was better that each should do and suffer -exactly what the facts show. I never imagined that Anaxagoras, while -affirming that they were regulated by Reason, would put upon them any -other cause than this--that it was best for them to be exactly as -they are. I presumed that, when giving account of the cause, both of -each severally and all collectively, he would do it by setting forth -what was best for each severally and for all in common. Such was -my hope, and I would not have sold it for a large price.[48] I took -up eagerly the book of Anaxagoras, and read it as quickly as I could, -that I might at once come to the knowledge of the better and worse. - -[Footnote 47: Plato, Phaedon, p. 97 C-D. [Greek: ei) ou)=n tis -bou/loito te\n ai)ti/an eu(rei=n peri\ e(ka/stou, o(/pe| gi/gnetai -e)\ a)po/llutai e)\ e)/sti, tou=to dei=n peri\ au)tou= eu(rei=n, -o(/pe| be/ltiston au)to=| e)stin e)\ ei)=nai e)\ a)/llo o(tiou=n -pa/schein e)\ poiei=n; e)k de\ de\ tou= lo/gou tou/tou ou)de\n a)/llo -skopei=n prose/kein a)nthro/po| kai\ peri\ au(tou= kai\ peri\ to=n -a)/llon, a)ll' e)\ to\ a)/riston kai\ to\ be/ltiston; a)nagkai=on de\ -ei)=nai to\n au)to\n tou=ton kai\ to\ chei=ron ei)de/nai; te\n -au)te\n ga\r ei)=nai e)piste/men peri\ au)to=n.]] - -[Footnote 48: Plato, Phaedon, p. 98 B. [Greek: kai\ ou)k a)\n -a)pedo/men pollou= ta\s e)lpi/das, a)lla\ pa/nu spoude=| labo\n ta\s -bi/blous o(s ta/chista oi(=o/s t' e)=n a)negi/gnoskon, i(/n' o(s -ta/chista ei)dei/en to\ be/ltiston kai\ to\ chei=ron.]] - -[Side-note: Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow -out the optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes -efficient and causes co-efficient.] - -"Great indeed was my disappointment when, as I proceeded with the -perusal, I discovered that the author never employed Reason at all, -nor assigned any causes calculated to regulate things generally: that -the causes which he indicated were, air, aether, water, and many other -strange agencies. The case seemed to me the same as if any one, while -announcing that Sokrates acts in all circumstances by reason, should -next attempt to assign the causes of each of my proceedings -severally:[49] As if he affirmed, for example, that the cause why I -am now sitting here is, that my body is composed of bones and -ligaments--that my bones are hard, and are held apart by commissures, -and my ligaments such as to contract and relax, clothing the bones -along with the flesh and the skin which keeps them together--that -when the bones are lifted up at their points of junction, the -contraction and relaxation of the ligaments makes me able to bend my -limbs--and that this is the reason why I am now seated here in my -present crumpled attitude: or again--as if, concerning the fact of my -present conversation with you, he were to point to other causes of a -like character--varieties of speech, air, and hearing, with numerous -other similar facts--omitting all the while to notice the true -causes, _viz._[50]--That inasmuch as the Athenians have deemed -it best to condemn me, for that reason I too have deemed it best and -most righteous to remain sitting here and to undergo the sentence -which they impose. For, by the Dog, these bones and ligaments would -have been long ago carried away to Thebes or Megara, by my -judgment of what is best--if I had not deemed it more righteous and -honourable to stay and affront my imposed sentence, rather than to -run away. It is altogether absurd to call such agencies by the name -of _causes_. Certainly, if a man affirms that unless I possessed -such joints and ligaments and other members as now belong to me, I -should not be able to execute what I have determined on, he will -state no more than the truth. But to say that these are the causes -why I, a rational agent, do what I am now doing, instead of saying -that I do it from my choice of what is best--this would be great -carelessness of speech: implying that a man cannot see the -distinction between that which is the cause in reality, and that -without which the cause can never be a cause.[51] It is this last -which most men, groping as it were in the dark, call by a wrong name, -as if it were itself the cause. Thus one man affirms that the earth -is kept stationary in its place by the rotation of the heaven around -it: another contends that the air underneath supports the earth, like -a pedestal sustaining a broad kneading-trough: but none of them ever -look out for a force such as this--That all these things now occupy -that position which it is best that they should occupy. These -enquirers set no great value upon this last-mentioned force, -believing that they can find some other Atlas stronger, more -everlasting, and more capable of holding all things together: they -think that the Good and the Becoming have no power of binding or -holding together any thing. - -[Footnote 49: Plato, Phaedon, p. 98 C. [Greek: kai\ moi\ e)/doxen -o(moio/taton peponthe/nai o(/sper a)\n ei)/ tis le/gon o(/ti -Sokra/tes pa/nta o(/sa pra/ttei no=| pra/ttei, ka)/peita -e)picheire/sas le/gein ta\s ai)ti/as e(ka/ston o(=n pra/tto, le/goi -pro=ton me\n o(/ti dia\ tau=ta nu=n e)ntha/de ka/themai, o(/ti -xugkeitai/ mou to\ so=ma e)x o)sto=n kai\ neu/ron, kai\ ta\ me\n -o)sta= e)sti sterea\ kai\ diaphua\s e)/chei chori\s a)p' a)lle/lon], -&c.] - -[Footnote 50: Plato, Phaedon, p. 98 E. [Greek: a)mele/sas ta\s o(s -a)letho=s ai)ti/as le/gein, o(/ti e)pei/de A)thenai/ois e)/doxe -be/ltion ei)=nai e)mou= katapsephi/sasthai, dia\ tau=ta de\ kai\ -e)moi\ be/ltion au)= de/doktai e)ntha/de kathe=sthai], &c.] - -[Footnote 51: Plato, Phaedon, p. 99 A. [Greek: a)ll' ai)/tia me\n ta\ -toiau=ta kalei=n li/an a)/topon; ei) de/ tis le/goi, o(/ti a)/neu -tou= ta\ toiau=ta e)/chein kai\ o(sta= kai\ neu=ra kai\ o(/sa a)/lla -e)/cho, ou)k a)\n oi(=o/s t' e)=n poiei=n ta\ do/xanta/ moi, a)lethe= -a)\n le/goi; o(s me/ntoi dia\ tau=ta poio=, kai\ tau/te| no=| -pra/tto, a)ll' ou) te=| tou= belti/stou ai(re/sei, polle\ a)\n kai\ -makra\ r(athumi/a ei)/e tou= lo/gou. to\ ga\r me\ diele/sthai oi(=o/n -t' ei)=nai, o(/ti a)/llo me/n ti/ e)sti to\ ai)/tion to=| o)/nti, -a)/llo d' e)kei=no a)/neu ou)= to\ ai)/tion ou)k a)/n pot' ei)/e -ai)/tion], &c.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic -principle for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, -and embraced a third doctrine about cause.] - -"Now, it is this sort of cause which I would gladly put myself under -any one's teaching to learn. But I could neither find any teacher, -nor make any way by myself. Having failed in this quarter, I took the -second best course, and struck into a new path in search of -causes.[52] Fatigued with studying objects through my eyes and -perceptions of sense, I looked out for images or reflections of -them, and turned my attention to words or discourses.[53] This -comparison is indeed not altogether suitable: for I do not admit that -he who investigates things through general words, has recourse to -images, more than he who investigates sensible facts: but such, at -all events, was the turn which my mind took. Laying down such general -assumption or hypothesis as I considered to be the strongest, I -accepted as truth whatever squared with it, respecting cause as well -as all other matters. In this way I came upon the investigation of -another sort of cause.[54] - -[Footnote 52: Plato, Phaedon, p. 99 C-D. [Greek: e)peide\ de\ tau/tes -e)stere/then, kai\ ou)/t' au)to\s eu(rei=n ou)/te par' a)/llou -mathei=n oi(=o/s te e)geno/men, to\n deu/teron plou=n e)pi\ te\n te=s -ai)ti/as ze/tesin e(=| pepragma/teumai, bou/lei soi\ e)pi/deixin -poie/somai?]] - -[Footnote 53: Plato, Phaedon, p. 99 E. [Greek: i)/sos me\n ou)=n o(=| -ei)ka/zo, tro/pon tina\ ou)k e)/oiken; ou) ga\r pa/nu xugchoro= to\n -e)n toi=s lo/gois skopou/menon ta\ o)/nta e)n ei)ko/si ma=llon -skopei=n e)\ to\n e)n toi=s e)/rgois.]] - -[Footnote 54: Plato, Phaedon, p. 100 B. [Greek: e)/rchomai ga\r de\ -e)picheiro=n soi\ e)pidei/xasthai te=s ai)ti/as to\ ei)=dos o(\ -pepragma/teumai], &c.] - -[Side-note: He now assumes the separate existence of ideas. -These ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain -attributes.] - -"I now assumed the separate and real existence of Ideas by -themselves--The Good in itself or the Self-Good, Self-Beautiful, -Great, and all such others. Look what follows next upon this -assumption. If any thing else be beautiful, besides the -Self-Beautiful, that other thing can only be beautiful because it -partakes of the Self-Beautiful: and the same with regard to other similar -Ideas. This is the only cause that I can accept: I do not understand -those other ingenious causes which I hear mentioned.[55] When any one -tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a showy colour or -figure, I pay no attention to him, but adhere simply to my own -affirmation, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, except the -presence or participation of the Self-Beautiful. In what way such -participation may take place, I cannot positively determine. But I -feel confident in affirming that it does take place: that things -which are beautiful, become so by partaking in the Self-Beautiful; -things which are great or little, by partaking in Greatness or -Littleness. If I am told that one man is taller than another by the -head, and that this other is shorter than the first by the very same -(by the head), I should not admit the proposition, but should repeat -emphatically my own creed,--That whatever is greater than another is -greater by nothing else except by Greatness and through -Greatness--whatever is less than another is less only by Littleness -and through Littleness. For I should fear to be entangled in a -contradiction, if I affirmed that the greater man was greater and the -lesser man less by the head--First, in saying that the greater was -greater and that the lesser was less, by the very same--Next, in -saying that the greater man was greater by the head, which is itself -small: it being absurd to maintain that a man is great by something -small.[56] Again, I should not say that ten is more than eight by -two, and that this was the cause of its excess;[57] my doctrine is, -that ten is more than eight by Multitude and through Multitude: so -the rod of two cubits is greater than that of one, not by half, but -by Greatness. Again, when One is placed alongside of One,--or when -one is bisected--I should take care not to affirm, that in the first -case the juxtaposition, in the last case the bisection, was the cause -why it became two.[58] I proclaim loudly that I know no other cause -for its becoming two except participation in the essence of the Dyad. -What is to become two, must partake of the Dyad: what is to become -one, of the Monad. I leave to wiser men than me these juxtapositions -and bisections and other such refinements: I remain entrenched within -the safe ground of my own assumption or hypothesis (the reality of -these intelligible** and eternal Ideas). - -[Footnote 55: Plato, Phaedon, p. 100 C. [Greek: ou) toi/nun e)/ti -mantha/no, ou)de\ du/namai ta\s a)/llas ai)ti/as ta\s sopha\s tau/tas -gigno/skein.]] - -[Footnote 56: Plato, Phaedon, p. 101 A. [Greek: phobou/menos me/ ti/s -soi e)nanti/os lo/gos a)pante/se|, e)a\n te=| kephale=| mei/zona/ -tina phe=|s ei)=nai kai\ e)la/tto, pro=ton me\n to=| au)to=| to\ -mei=zon mei=zon ei)=nai kai\ to\ e)/latton e)/latton, e)/peita te=| -kephale=| smikra=| ou)/se| to\n mei/zo mei/zo ei)=nai, kai\ tou=to -de\ te/ras ei)=nai, to\ smikro=| tini\ me/gan tina\ ei)=nai.]] - -[Footnote 57: Plato, Phaedon, p. 101 B. [Greek: Ou)/koun ta\ de/ka -to=n o)kto\ duoi=n plei/o ei)=nai, kai\ dia\ tau/ten te\n ai)ti/an -u(perba/llein, phoboi=o a)\n le/gein, a)lla\ me\ ple/thei kai\ dia\ -to\ ple=thos? kai\ to\ di/pechu tou= pechuai/ou e(mi/sei mei=zon -ei)=nai, a)ll' ou) mege/thei?]] - -[Footnote 58: Plato, Phaedon, p. 101 B-C. [Greek: ti/ de/? e(ni\ -e(no\s prostethe/ntos, te\n pro/sthesin ai)ti/an ei)=nai tou= du/o -gene/sthai, e)\ diaschisthe/ntos te\n schi/sin, ou)k eu)laboi=o a)\n -le/gein, kai\ me/ga a)\n boo/|es o(/ti ou)k oi)=stha a)/llos pos -e(/kaston gigno/menon e)\ metascho\n te=s i)di/as ou)si/as e(kastou -ou)= a)\n meta/sche|; kai\ e)n tou/tois ou)k e)/cheis a)/llen tina\ -ai)ti/an tou= du/o gene/sthai a)ll' e)\ te\n te=s dua/dos -meta/schesin], &c.] - -[Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were -impugned. He insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the -hypothesis and the discussion of its consequences.] - -"Suppose however that any one impugned this hypothesis itself? I -should make no reply to him until I had followed out fully the -consequences of it: in order to ascertain whether they were -consistent with, or contradictory to, each other. I should, when the -proper time came, defend the hypothesis by itself, assuming some -other hypothesis yet more universal, such as appeared to me -best, until I came to some thing fully sufficient. But I would not -permit myself to confound together the discussion of the hypothesis -itself, and the discussion of its consequences.[59] This is a method -which cannot lead to truth: though it is much practised by litigious -disputants, who care little about truth, and pride themselves upon -their ingenuity when they throw all things into confusion."-- - -[Footnote 59: Plato, Phaedon, p. 101 E. [Greek: e)peide\ de\ e)kei/nes -au)te=s (te=s u(pothe/seos) de/oi se dido/nai lo/gon, o(sau/tos a)\n -didoi/es, a)/llen au)= u(po/thesin u(pothe/menos, e(/tis to=n -a)/nothen belti/ste phai/noito . . . . a)/ma de\ ou)k a)\n phu/roio, -o(/sper oi( a)ntilogikoi/, peri/ te te=s a)rche=s dialego/menos kai\ -to=n e)x e)kei/nes o(rmeme/non, ei)/per bou/loio/ ti to=n o)/nton -eu(rei=n.]] - -[Side-note: Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. -Remarks upon it.] - -The exposition here given by Sokrates of successive intellectual -tentatives (whether of Sokrates or Plato, or partly one, partly the -other), and the reasoning embodied therein, is represented as -welcomed with emphatic assent and approbation by all his -fellow-dialogists.[60] It deserves attention on many grounds. It -illustrates instructively some of the speculative points of view, and -speculative transitions, suggesting themselves to an inquisitive -intellect of that day. - -[Footnote 60: Plato, Phaedon, p. 102 A. Such approbation is peculiarly -signified by the intervention of Echekrates.] - -[Side-note: The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned -upon different views as to a true cause.] - -If we are to take that which precedes as a description of the -philosophical changes of Plato himself, it differs materially from -Aristotle: for no allusion is here made to the intercourse of Plato -with Kratylus and other advocates of the doctrines of Herakleitus: -which intercourse is mentioned by Aristotle[61] as having greatly -influenced the early speculations of Plato. Sokrates describes three -different phases of his (or Plato's) speculative point of view: all -turning upon different conceptions of what constituted a true Cause. -His first belief on the subject was, that which he entertained before -he entered on physical and physiological investigations. It seemed -natural to him that eating and drinking should be the cause why a -young man grew taller: new bone and new flesh was added out of the -food. So again, when a tall man appeared standing near to a short -man, the former was tall by the head, or because of the head: ten -were more than eight, because two were added on: the measure of -two cubits was greater than that of one cubit, because it stretched -beyond by one half. When one object was added on to another, the -addition was the cause why they became two: when one object was -bisected, this bisection was the cause why the one became two. - -[Footnote 61: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, a. 32.] - -This was his first conception of a true Cause, which for the time -thoroughly satisfied him. But when he came to investigate physiology, -he could not follow out the same conception of Cause, so as to apply -it to more novel and complicated problems; and he became dissatisfied -with it altogether, even in regard to questions on which he had -before been convinced. New difficulties suggested themselves to him. -How can the two objects, which when separate were each one, be made -_two_, by the fact that they are brought together? What -alteration has happened in their nature? Then again, how can the very -same fact, the change from one to two, be produced by two causes -perfectly contrary to each other--in the first case, by -juxtaposition--in the last case, by bisection?[62] - -[Footnote 62: Sextus Empiricus embodies this argument of Plato among -the difficulties which he starts against the Dogmatists, adv. -Mathematicos, x. s. 302-308.] - -[Side-note: Problems and difficulties of which Sokrates first -sought solution.] - -That which is interesting here to note, is the sort of Cause which -first gave satisfaction to the speculative mind of Sokrates. In the -instance of the growing youth, he notes two distinct facts, the -earliest of which is (assuming certain other facts as accompanying -conditions) the cause of the latest. But in most of the other -instances, the fact is one which does not admit of explanation. -Comparisons of eight men with ten men, of a yard with half a yard, of -a tall man with a short man, are mental appreciations, beliefs, -affirmations, not capable of being farther explained or accounted -for: if any one disputes your affirmation, you prove it to him, by -placing him in a situation to make the comparison for himself, or to -go through the computation which establishes the truth of what you -affirm. It is not the juxtaposition of eight men which makes them to -be eight (they were so just as much when separated by ever so wide an -interval): though it may dispose or enable the spectator to count -them as eight. We may count the yard measure (whether actually -bisected or not), either as one yard, or as two half yards, or as -three feet, or thirty-six inches. Whether it be one, or two, or -three, depends upon the substantive which we choose to attach to the -numeral, or upon the comparison which we make (the unit which we -select) on the particular occasion. - -[Side-note: Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the -treatise of Anaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between -causes and co-efficients.] - -With this description of Cause Sokrates grew dissatisfied when he -extended his enquiries into physical and physiological problems. Is -it the blood, or air, or fire, whereby we think? and such like -questions. Such enquiries--into the physical conditions of mental -phenomena--did really admit of some answer, affirmative, or negative. -But Sokrates does not tell us how he proceeded in seeking for an -answer: he only says that he failed so completely, as even to be -disabused of his supposed antecedent knowledge. He was in this -perplexity when he first heard of the doctrine of Anaxagoras. -"_Nous_ or Reason is the regulator and the cause of all things." -Sokrates interpreted this to mean (what it does not appear that -Anaxagoras intended to assert)[63] that the Kosmos was an animal or -person[64] having mind or Reason analogous to his own: that this -Reason was an agent invested with full power and perpetually -operative, so as to regulate in the best manner all the phenomena of -the Kosmos; and that the general cause to be assigned for every thing -was one and the same--"It is best thus"; requiring that in each -particular case you should show _how_ it was for the best. -Sokrates took the type of Reason from his own volition and movements; -supposing that all the agencies in the Kosmos were stimulated or -checked by cosmical Reason for her purposes, as he himself put in -motion his own bodily members. This conception of Cause, borrowed -from the analogy of his own rational volition, appeared to Sokrates -very captivating, though it had not been his own first conception. -But he found that Anaxagoras, though proclaiming the doctrine as a -principium or initiatory influence, did not make applications of it -in detail; but assigned as causes, in most of the particular cases, -those agencies which Sokrates considered to be subordinate and -instrumental, as his own muscles were to his own volition. -Sokrates will not allow such agencies to be called Causes: he -says that they are only co-efficients indispensable to the efficacy -of the single and exclusive Cause--Reason. But he tells us himself -that most enquirers considered them as Causes; and that Anaxagoras -himself produced them as such. Moreover we shall see Plato himself in -the Timaeus, while he repeats this same distinction between Causes -Efficient and Causes Co-efficient--yet treats these latter as Causes -also, though inferior in regularity and precision to the Demiurgic -Nous.[65] - -[Footnote 63: I have given (in chap. i. p. 48 seq.) an abridgment and -explanation of what seems to have been the doctrine of Anaxagoras.] - -[Footnote 64: Plato, Timaeus, p. 30 D. [Greek: to/nde to\n ko/smon, -zo=on e)/mpsuchon e)/nnoun te], &c.] - -[Footnote 65: Plato, Timaeus, p. 46 C-D. -[Greek: ai)/tia--xunai/tia--xummetai/tia]. He says that most persons -considered the [Greek: xunai/tia] as [Greek: ai)/tia]. And he himself -registers them as such (Timaeus, p. 68 E). He there distinguishes the -[Greek: ai)/tia] and [Greek: xunai/tia] as two different sorts of -[Greek: ai)/tia], the _divine_ and the _necessary_, in a remarkable -passage: where he tells us that we ought to study the divine causes, with -a view to the happiness of life, as far as our nature permits--and the -necessary causes for the sake of the divine: for that we cannot in -any way apprehend, or understand, or get sight of the divine causes -alone, without the necessary causes along with them (69 A). - -In Timaeus, pp. 47-48, we find again [Greek: nou=s] and [Greek: -a)na/gke] noted as two distinct sorts of causes co-operating to -produce the four elements. It is farther remarkable that Necessity is -described as "the wandering or irregular description of -Cause"--[Greek: to\ te=s planome/nes ei)=dos ai)ti/as]. Eros and -[Greek: A)na/gke] are joined as co-operating--in Symposion, -pp. 195 C, 197 B.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of -substituting physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same -which Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates.] - -In truth, the complaint which Sokrates here raises against -Anaxagoras--that he assigned celestial Rotation as the cause of -phenomena, in place of a quasi-human Reason--is just the same as that -which Aristophanes in the Clouds advances against Sokrates -himself.[66] The comic poet accuses Sokrates of displacing Zeus to -make room for Dinos or Rotation. According to the popular religious -belief, all or most of the agencies in Nature were personified, or -supposed to be carried on by persons--Gods, Goddesses, Daemons, -Nymphs, &c., which army of independent agents were conceived, by -some thinkers, as more or less systematised and consolidated -under the central authority of the Kosmos itself. The causes of -natural phenomena, especially of the grand and terrible phenomena, -were supposed agents, conceived after the model of man, and assumed -to be endowed with volition, force, affections, antipathies, &c.: -some of them visible, such as Helios, Selene, the Stars; others -generally invisible, though showing themselves whenever it specially -pleased them.[67] Sokrates, as we see by the Platonic Apology, was -believed by his countrymen to deny these animated agencies, and to -substitute instead of them inanimate forces, not put in motion by the -quasi-human attributes of reason, feeling and volition. The Sokrates -in the Platonic Phaedon, taken at this second stage of his speculative -wanderings, not only disclaims such a doctrine, but protests against -it. He recognises no cause except a Nous or Reason borrowed by -analogy from that of which he was conscious within himself, choosing -what was best for himself in every special situation.[68] He tells -us however that most of the contemporary philosophers dissented -from this point of view. To them, such inanimate agencies were the -sole and real causes, in one or other of which they found what they -thought a satisfactory explanation. - -[Footnote 66: Aristophan. Nubes, 379-815. [Greek: Di=nos basileu/ei, -to\n Di/' e)xelelako/s]. We find Proklus making this same complaint -against Aristotle, "that he deserted theological _principia_, -and indulged too much in physical reasonings"--[Greek: to=n me\n -theologiko=n a)rcho=n a)phista/menos, toi=s de\ phusikoi=s lo/gois -pe/ra tou= de/ontos e)ndiatri/bon] (Proklus ad Timaeum, ii. 90 E, p. -212, Schneider). Pascal also expresses the like displeasure against -the Cartesian theory of the vortices. Descartes recognised God as -having originally established rotatory motion among the atoms, -together with an equal, unvarying quantity of motion: these two -points being granted, Descartes considered that all cosmical facts -and phenomena might be deduced from them. - -"Sur la philosophie de Descartes, Pascal etait de son sentiment sur -l'automate; et n'en etait point sur la matiere subtile, dont il se -moquait fort. Mais il ne pouvait souffrir sa maniere d'expliquer la -formation de toutes choses; et il disait tres souvent,--Je ne puis -pardonner a Descartes: il voudrait bien, dans toute sa philosophie, -pouvoir se passer de Dieu: mais il n'a pu s'empecher de lui accorder -une chiquenaude pour mettre le monde en mouvement: apres cela, il n'a -que faire de Dieu." (Pascal, Pensees, ch. xi. p. 237, edition de -Louandre, citation from Mademoiselle Perier, Paris, 1854.) - -Again, Lord Monboddo, in his Ancient Metaphysics (bk. ii. ch. 19, p. -276), cites these remarks of Plato and Aristotle on the deficiencies -of Anaxagoras, and expresses the like censure himself against the -cosmical theories of Newton:--"Sir Isaac puts me in mind of an -ancient philosopher Anaxagoras, who maintained, as Sir Isaac does, -that mind was the cause of all things; but when he came to explain -the particular phaenomena of nature, instead of having recourse to -mind, employed airs and aethers, subtle spirits and fluids, and I know -not what--in short, any thing rather than mind: a cause which he -admitted to exist in the universe; but rather than employ it, had -recourse to imaginary causes, of the existence of which he could give -no proof. The Tragic poets of old, when they could not otherwise -untie the knot of their fable, brought down a god in a machine, who -solved all difficulties: but such philosophers as Anaxagoras will -not, even when they cannot do better, employ _mind_ or divinity. -Our philosophers, since Sir Isaac's time, have gone on in the same -track, and still, I think, farther." - -Lord Monboddo speaks with still greater asperity about the Cartesian -theory, making a remark on it similar to what has been above cited -from Pascal. (See his Dissertation on the Newtonian Philosophy, -Appendix to Ancient Metaphysics, pp. 498-499.)] - -[Footnote 67: Plato, Timaeus, p. 41 A. [Greek: pa/ntes o(/soi te -peripolou=si phanero=s kai\ o(/soi phai/nontai kath' o(/son a)\n -e)the/losi theoi\], &c.] - -[Footnote 68: What Sokrates understands by the theory of Anaxagoras, -is evident from his language--Phaedon, pp. 98-99. He understands an -indwelling cosmical Reason or Intelligence, deliberating and -choosing, in each particular conjuncture, what was best for the -Kosmos; just as his own (Sokrates) Reason deliberated and chose what -was best for him ([Greek: te=| tou= belti/stou ai(re/sei]), in -consequence of the previous determination of the Athenians to condemn -and punish him. - -This point deserves attention, because it is altogether different -from Aristotle's conception of Nous or Reason in the Kosmos: in which -he recognises no consciousness, no deliberation, no choice, no -reference to any special situation: but a constant, instinctive, -undeliberating, movement towards Good as a determining -End--_i.e._ towards the reproduction and perpetuation of regular -Forms. - -Hegel, in his Geschichte der Philosophie (Part i. pp. 355, 368-369, -2nd edit.), has given very instructive remarks, in the spirit of the -Aristotelian Realism, both upon the principle announced by -Anaxagoras, and upon the manner in which Anaxagoras is criticised by -Sokrates in the Platonic Phaedon. Hegel observes:-- - -"Along with this principle (that of Anaxagoras) there comes in the -recognition of an Intelligence, or of a self-determining agency which -was wanting before. Herein we are not to imagine thought, -subjectively considered: when thought is spoken of, we are apt to -revert to thought as it passes in our consciousness: but here, on the -contrary, what is meant is, the Idea, considered altogether -objectively, or Intelligence as an effective agent: (N.B. -_Intellectum_, or _Cogitatum_--not _Intellectio_, or -_Cogitatio_, which would mean the conscious process--see this -distinction illustrated by Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Anima, i. 2, -5, p. 219: also Marbach, Gesch. der Phil. s. 54, 99 not. 2): as we -say, that there is reason in the world, or as we speak of Genera in -nature, which are the Universal. The Genus Animal is the Essential of -the Dog--it is the Dog himself: the laws of nature are her immanent -Essence. Nature is not formed from without, as men construct a table: -the table is indeed constructed intelligently, but by an Intelligence -extraneous to this wooden material. It is this extraneous form which -we are apt to think of as representing Intelligence, when we hear it -talked of: but what is really meant is, the Universal--the immanent -nature of the object itself. The [Greek: Nou=s] is not a thinking -Being without, which has arranged the world: by such an -interpretation the Idea of Anaxagoras would be quite perverted and -deprived of all philosophical value. For to suppose an individual, -particular, Something without, is to descend into the region of -phantasms and its dualism: what is called, a thinking Being, is not -an Idea, but a Subject. Nevertheless, what is really and truly -Universal is not for that reason Abstract: its characteristic -property, qua Universal, is to determine in itself, by itself, and -for itself, the particular accompaniments. While it carries on this -process of change, it maintains itself at the same time as the -Universal, always the same; this is a portion of its self-determining -efficiency."--What Hegel here adverts to seems identical with that -which Dr. Henry More calls an Emanative Cause (Immortality of the -Soul, ch. vi. p. 18), "the notion of a thing possible. An Emanative -Effect is co-existent with the very substance of that which is said -to be the Cause thereof. That which _emanes_, if I may so speak, -is the same in reality with its Emanative Cause." - -Respecting the criticism of Sokrates upon Anaxagoras, Hegel has -further acute remarks which are too long to cite (p. 368 seq.)] - -[Side-note: The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be -carried out, either by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates -turns to general words, and adopts the theory of ideas.] - -It is however singular, that Sokrates, after he has extolled -Anaxagoras for enunciating a grand general cause, and has blamed him -only for not making application of it in detail, proceeds to state -that neither he himself, nor any one else within his knowledge, could -find the way of applying it, any more than Anaxagoras had done. If -Anaxagoras had failed, no one else could do better. The facts before -Sokrates could not be reconciled, by any way that he could devise, -with his assumed principle of rational directing force, or constant -optimistic purpose, inherent in the Kosmos. Accordingly he abandoned -this track, and entered upon another: seeking a different sort of -cause ([Greek: te=s ai)ti/as to\ ei)=dos]), not by contemplation -of things, but by propositions and ratiocinative discourse. He now -assumed as a principle an universal axiom or proposition, from which -he proceeds to deduce consequences. The principle thus laid down is, -That there exist substantial Ideas--universal Entia. Each of these -Ideas communicates or imparts its own nature to the particulars which -bear the same name: and such communion or participation is the cause -why they are what they are. The cause why various objects are -beautiful or great, is, because they partake of the Self-Beautiful or -the Self-Great: the cause why they are two or three is, because they -partake of the Dyad or the Triad. - -[Side-note: Vague and dissentient meanings attached to the -word Cause. That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to -his inquisitive feelings.] - -Here then we have a third stage or variety of belief, in the -speculative mind of Sokrates, respecting Causes. The self-existent -Ideas ("propria Platonis supellex," to use the words of Seneca[69]) -are postulated as Causes: and in this belief Sokrates at last finds -satisfaction. But these Causative Ideas, or Ideal Causes, though -satisfactory to Plato, were accepted by scarcely any one else. They -were transformed--seemingly even by Plato himself before his death, -into Ideal Numbers, products of the One implicated with Great and -Little or the undefined Dyad--and still farther transformed by -his successors Speusippus and Xenokrates: they were impugned in -every way, and emphatically rejected, by Aristotle. - -[Footnote 69: Seneca, Epistol. - -About this disposition, manifested by many philosophers, and in a -particular manner by Plato, to "embrace logical phantoms as real -causes," I transcribe a good passage from Malebranche. - -"Je me sens encore extremement porte a dire que cette colonne est -dure _par sa nature_; ou bien que les petits liens dont sont -composes les corps durs, sont des atomes, dont les parties ne se -peuvent diviser, comme etant les parties _essentieles_ et -dernieres des corps--et qui sont _essentiellement_ crochues ou -branchues. - -Mais je reconnois franchement, que ce n'est point expliquer la -difficulte; et que, quittant les preoccupations et les illusions de -mes sens, j'aurais tort de recourir a une forme abstraite, et -d'_embrasser un fantome de logique_ pour la cause que je -cherche. Je veux dire, que j'aurois tort de concevoir, comme quelque -chose de reel et de distinct, l'idee vague de _nature_ et -d'_essence_, qui n'exprime que ce que l'on sait: et de prendre -ainsi une forme abstraite et universelle, comme une cause physique -d'un effet tres reel. Car il y a deux choses dont je ne saurais trop -defier. La premiere est, l'impression de mes sens: et l'autre est, la -facilite que j'ai de prendre les natures abstraites et les idees -generales de logique, pour celles qui sont reelles et particulieres: -et je me souviens d'avoir ete plusieurs fois seduit par ces deux -principes d'erreur." (Malebranche--Recherche de la Verite, vol. iii., -liv. vi., ch. 8, p. 245, ed. 1772.)] - -The foregoing picture given by Sokrates of the wanderings of his mind -([Greek: ta\s e)ma\s pla/nas]) in search of Causes, is interesting, -not only in reference to the Platonic age, but also to the process of -speculation generally. Almost every one talks of a Cause as a word of -the clearest meaning, familiar and understood by all hearers. There -are many who represent the Idea of Cause as simple, intuitive, -self-originated, universal; one and the same in all minds. These -philosophers consider the maxim that every phenomenon must have a -Cause--as self-evident, known _a priori_ apart from experience: -as something which no one can help believing as soon as it is stated -to him.[70] The gropings of Sokrates are among the numerous facts -which go to refute such a theory: or at least to show in what sense -alone it can be partially admitted. There is no fixed, positive, -universal Idea, corresponding to the word Cause. There is a wide -divergence, as to the question what a Cause really is, between -different ages of the same man (exemplified in the case of Sokrates): -much more between different philosophers at one time and another. -Plato complains of Anaxagoras and other philosophers for assigning as -Causes that which did not truly deserve the name: Aristotle also -blames the defective conceptions of his predecessors (Plato included) -on the same subject. If there be an intuitive idea corresponding to -the word Cause, it must be a different intuition in Plato and -Aristotle--in Plato himself at one age and at another age: in other -philosophers, different from both and from each other. The word is -equivocal--[Greek: pollacho=s lego/menon], in Aristotelian -phrase--men use it familiarly, but vary much in the thing signified. -_That_ is a Cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to the -inquisitive feelings--curiosity, anxious perplexity, speculative -embarrassment of his own mind. Now doubtless these inquisitive -feelings are natural and widespread: they are emotions of our nature, -which men seek (in some cases) to appease by some satisfactory -hypothesis. That answer which affords satisfaction, looked at in one -of its aspects, is called Cause; Beginning or -Principle--Element--represent other aspects of the same Quaesitum:-- - -"Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, -Atque metus omnes et inexorabile Fatum -Subjecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari," -is the exclamation of that sentiment of wonder and uneasiness out of -which, according to Plato and Aristotle, philosophy springs.[71] But -though the appetite or craving is common, in greater or less degree, -to most persons--the nourishment calculated to allay it is by no -means the same to all. Good (says Aristotle) is that which all men -desire:[72] but all men do not agree in their judgment, what Good is. -The point of communion between mankind is here emotional rather than -intellectual: in the painful feeling of difficulty to be solved, not -in the manner of conceiving what the difficulty is, nor in the -direction where solution is to be sought, nor in the solution itself -when suggested.[73] - -[Footnote 70: Dugald Stewart, Elem. Philos. Hum. Mind, vol. i. ch. 1, -sect. 2, pp. 98-99, ed. Hamilton, also note c same volume. - -"Several modern philosophers (especially Dr. Reid, On the Intell. -Powers) have been at pains to illustrate that law of our nature which -leads us to refer every change we perceive in the universe to the -operation of an efficient cause. This reference is not the result of -reasoning, but necessarily accompanies the perception, so as to -render it impossible for us to see the change, without feeling a -conviction of the operation of some cause by which it is produced; -much in the same manner in which we find it impossible to conceive a -sensation, without being impressed with a belief of the existence of -a sentient being. Hence I conceive it is that when we see two events -constantly conjoined, we are led to associate the idea of causation -or efficiency with the former, and to refer to it that power or -energy by which the change is produced; in consequence of which -association we come to consider philosophy as the knowledge of -efficient causes, and lose sight of the operation of mind in -producing the phenomena of nature. It is by an association somewhat -similar that we connect our sensations of colour with the primary -qualities of body. A moment's reflection must satisfy any one that -the sensation of colour can only reside in a mind. . . . In the same -way we are led to associate with inanimate matter the ideas of power, -force, energy, causation, which are all attributes of mind, and can -exist in a mind only."] - -[Footnote 71: Virgil, Georg. ii. 490-92. Compare Lucretius, vi. -50-65, and the letter of Epikurus to Herodotus, p. 25, ed. Orelli. -Plato, Theaetet. p. 155 D. [Greek: ma/la ga\r philoso/phou tou=to to\ -pa/thos, to\ thauma/zein; ou) ga\r a)rche\ a)/lle philosophi/as, e)\ -au(/te]:--Aristotel. Metaphys. A. p. 982, b. 10-20. [Greek: dia\ ga\r -to\ thauma/zein oi( a)/nthropoi kai\ nu=n kai\ to\ pro=ton e)rxanto -philosophei=n, o( de\ a)poro=n kai\ thauma/zon oi)/etai a)gnoei=n.]] - -[Footnote 72: Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 1. [Greek: dio\ kalo=s -a)pephe/|nanto ta)gatho/n, ou)= pa/ntes e)phi/entai.] Plato, Republ. -vi. p. 505 E. [Greek: O(/ de\ dio/kei me\n a(pa=sa psuche\ kai\ -tou/tou e(/neka pa/nta pra/ttei, a)pomanteuome/ne ti ei)=nai, -a)porou=sa de\ kai\ ou)k e)/chousa labei=n i(kano=s ti/ pot' -e)sti/n], &c. - -Seneca, Epistol. 118. "Bonum est, quod ad se impetum animi secundum -naturam movet."] - -[Footnote 73: Aristotle recognises the different nature of the -difficulties and problems which present themselves to the speculative -mind: he looks back upon the embarrassments of his predecessors as -antiquated and even silly, Metaphysic. N. 1089, a. 2. [Greek: Polla\ -me\n ou)=n ta\ ai)/tia te=s e)pi\ tau/tas ta\s ai)ti/as e)ktrope=s, -ma/lista de\ to\ a)pore=sai a)rchai+ko=s], which Alexander of -Aphrodisias paraphrases by [Greek: a)rchai+ko=s kai\ eu)etho=s]. -Compare A 993, a. 15. - -In another passage of the same book, Aristotle notes and -characterises the emotion experienced by the mind in possessing what -is regarded as truth--the mental satisfaction obtained when a -difficulty is solved, 1090, a. 38. [Greek: Oi( de\ choristo\n -poiou=ntes (to\n a)rithmo/n), o(/ti e)pi\ to=n ai)stheto=n ou)k -e)/stai ta\ a)xio/mata, a)lethe= de\ ta\ lego/mena _kai\ sai/nei -te\n psuche/n_, ei)=nai/ te u(polamba/nousi kai\ chorista\ -ei)=nai; o(moi/os de\ ta\ mege/the ta\ mathematika/.] - -The subjective origin of philosophy--the feelings which prompt to the -theorising process, striking out different hypotheses and analogies--are -well stated by Adam Smith, 'History of Astronomy,' sect. ii. and iii.] - -[Side-note: Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What -is a cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates--no intuition to -guide him.] - -When Sokrates here tells us that as a young man he felt anxious -curiosity to know what the cause of every phenomenon was, it is plain -that at this time he did not know what he was looking for: that he -proceeded only by successive steps of trial, doubt, discovered error, -rejection: and that each trial was adapted to the then existing state -of his own mind. The views of Anaxagoras he affirms to have presented -themselves to him as a new revelation: he then came to believe that -the only true Cause was, a cosmical reason and volition like to that -of which he was conscious in himself. Yet he farther tells us, that -others did not admit this Cause, but found other causes to satisfy -them: that even Anaxagoras did not follow out his own general -conception, but recognised Causes quite unconnected with it: lastly, -that neither could he (Sokrates) trace out the conception for -himself.[74] He was driven to renounce it, and to turn to another -sort of Cause--the hypothesis of self-existent Ideas, in which he -then acquiesced. And this last hypothesis, again, was ultimately much -modified in the mind of Plato himself, as we know from Aristotle. All -this shows that the Idea of Cause--far from being one and the same to -all, like the feeling of uneasiness which prompts the search for it--is -complicated, diverse, relative, and modifiable. - -[Footnote 74: The view of Cause, which Sokrates here declares himself -to renounce from inability to pursue it, is substantially the same as -what he lays down in the Philebus, pp. 23 D, 27 A, 30 E. - -In the Timaeus Plato assigns to Timaeus the task (to which Sokrates in -the Phaedon had confessed himself incompetent) of following into -detail the schemes and proceedings of the Demiurgic or optimising -[Greek: Nou=s]. But he also assumes the [Greek: ei)/de] or Ideas as -co-ordinate and essential conditions.] - -[Side-note: Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about -causation, causes regular and irregular. Inductive theory of -causation, elaborated in modern times.] - -The last among the various revolutions which Sokrates represents -himself to have undergone--the transition from designing and -volitional agency of the Kosmos conceived as an animated system, to -the sovereignty of universal Ideas--is analogous to that transition -which Auguste Comte considers to be the natural progress of the -human mind: to explain phenomena at first by reference to some -personal agency, and to pass from this mode of explanation to that by -metaphysical abstractions. It is true that these are two distinct -modes of conceiving Causation; and that in each of them the human -mind, under different states of social and individual instruction, -finds satisfaction. But each of the two theories admits of much -diversity in the mode of conception. Plato seems to have first given -prominence to these metaphysical causes; and Aristotle in this -respect follows his example: though he greatly censures the -incomplete and erroneous theories of Plato. It is remarkable that -both these two philosophers recognised Causes irregular and -unpredictable, as well as Causes regular and predictable. Neither of -them included even the idea of regularity, as an essential part of -the meaning of Cause.[75] Lastly, there has been elaborated in modern -times, owing to the great extension of inductive science, another -theory of Causation, in which unconditional regularity is the -essential constituent: recognising no true Causes except the -phenomenal causes certified by experience, as interpreted inductively -and deductively--the assemblage of phenomenal antecedents, uniform -and unconditional, so far as they can be discovered and verified. -Certain it is that these are the only causes obtainable by -induction and experience: though many persons are not satisfied -without looking elsewhere for transcendental or ontological causes of -a totally different nature. All these theories imply--what Sokrates -announces in the passage just cited--the deep-seated influence of -speculative curiosity, or the thirst for finding the Why of things -and events, as a feeling of the human mind: but all of them indicate -the discrepant answers with which, in different enquirers, this -feeling is satisfied, though under the same equivocal name -_Cause_. And it would have been a proceeding worthy of Plato's -dialectic, if he had applied to the word Cause the same -cross-examining analysis which we have seen him applying to the -equally familiar words--Virtue--Courage--Temperance--Friendship, &c. -"First, let us settle what a Cause really is: then, and not till -then, can we succeed in ulterior enquiries respecting it."[76] - -[Footnote 75: Monboddo, Ancient Metaphysics, B. 1. ch. iv. p. 32. -"Plato appears to have been the first of the Ionic School that -introduced _formal causes_ into natural philosophy. These he -called _Ideas_, and made the principles of all things. And the -reason why he insists so much upon this kind of cause, and so little -upon the other three, is given us by Aristotle in the end of his -first book of Metaphysics, _viz._, that he studied mathematics -too much, and instead of using them as the handmaid of philosophy, -made them philosophy itself. . . . Plato, however, in the Phaedon says -a good deal about final causes; but in the system of natural -philosophy which is in the Timaeus, he says very little of it." - -I have already observed that Plato in the Timaeus (48 A) recognises -erratic or irregular Causation--[Greek: e( planome/ne ai)ti/a]. -Aristotle recognises [Greek: Ai)ti/a] among the equivocal words -[Greek: pollacho=s lego/mena]; and he enumerates [Greek: Tu/che] and -[Greek: Au)to/maton]--irregular causes or causes by accident--among -them (Physic. ii. 195-198; Metaphys. K. 1065, a.) Schwegler, ad -Aristot. Metaphys. vi. 4, 3, "Das Zufaellige ist ein nothwendiges -Element alles Geschehens". Alexander of Aphrodisias, the best of the -Aristotelian commentators, is at pains to defend this view of [Greek: -Tu/che]--Causation by accident, or irregular. - -Proklus, in his Commentary on the Timaeus (ii. 80-81, p. 188, -Schneider), notices the labour and prolixity with which the -commentators before him set out the different varieties of Cause; -distinguishing sixty-four according to Plato, and forty-eight -according to Aristotle. Proklus adverts also (ad Timaeum, iii. p. 176) -to an animated controversy raised by Theophrastus against Plato, -about Causes and the speculations thereupon. - -An enumeration, though very incomplete, of the different meanings -assigned to the word Cause, may be seen in Professor Fleming's -Vocabulary of Philosophy.] - -[Footnote 76: See Sir William Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy, -Appendix, p. 585. The debates about what was meant in philosophy by -the word Cause are certainly older than Plato. We read that it was -discussed among the philosophers who frequented the house of -Perikles; and that that eminent statesman was ridiculed by his -dissolute son Xanthippus for taking part in such useless refinements -(Plutarch, Perikles, c. 36). But the Platonic dialogues are the -oldest compositions in which any attempts to analyse the meaning of -the word are preserved to us. - -[Greek: Ai)/tiai, A)rchai/, Stoichei=a] (Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: -D].), were the main objects of search with the ancient speculative -philosophers. While all of them set to themselves the same problem, -each of them hit upon a different solution. That which gave mental -satisfaction to one, appeared unsatisfactory and even inadmissible to -the rest. The first book of Aristotle's Metaphysica gives an -instructive view of this discrepancy. His own analysis of Cause will -come before us hereafter. Compare the long discussions on the subject -in Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhon. Hypo. iii. 13-30; and adv. Mathemat. -ix. 195-250. The discrepancy was so great among the dogmatical -philosophers, that he pronounces the reality of the causal sequence -to be indeterminable--[Greek: o(/son me\n ou)=n e)pi\ toi=s -legome/nois u(po\ to=n dogmatiko=n, ou)d' a)\n e)nnoe=sai/ tis to\ -ai)/tion du/naito, ei)/ ge pro\s to=| diapho/nous kai\ a)lloko/tous -(a)podido/nai) e)nnoi/as tou= ai)ti/ou e)/ti kai\ te\n u(po/stasin -au)tou= pepoie/kasin a)neu/reton dia\ te\n peri\ au)to\ diaphoni/an.] -Seneca (Epist. 65) blends together the Platonic and the Aristotelian -views, when he ascribes to Plato a quintuple variety of Causa. - -The quadruple variety of Causation established by Aristotle governed -the speculations of philosophers during the middle ages. But since -the decline of the Aristotelian philosophy, there are few subjects -which have been more keenly debated among metaphysicians than the -Idea of Cause. It is one of the principal points of divergence among -the different schools of philosophy now existing. A volume, and a -very instructive volume, might be filled with the enumeration and -contrast of the different theories on the subject. Upon the view -which a man takes on this point will depend mainly the scope or -purpose which he sets before him in philosophy. Many seek the -solution of their problem in transcendental, ontological, -extra-phenomenal causes, lying apart from and above the world of fact -and experience; Reid and Stewart, while acknowledging the existence of -such causes as the true efficient causes, consider them as being out -of the reach of human knowledge; others recognise no true cause -except personal, quasi-human, voluntary, agency, grounded on the type -of human volition. Others, again, with whom my own opinion coincides, -following out the analysis of Hume and Brown, understand by causes -nothing more than phenomenal antecedents constant and unconditional, -ascertainable by experience and induction. See the copious and -elaborate chapter on this subject in Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System -of Logic,' Book iii. ch. 5, especially as enlarged in the fourth, -fifth, and sixth editions of that work, including the criticism on -the opposite or volitional theory of Causation; also the work of -Professor Bain, 'The Emotions and the Will,' pp. 472-584. The -opposite view, in which Causes are treated as something essentially -distinct from Laws, and as ultra-phenomenal, is set forth by Dr. -Whewell, 'Novum Organon Renovatum,' ch. vii. p. 118 seq.] - -[Side-note: Last transition of the mind of Sokrates from -things to words--to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great -multitude of ideas assumed, each fitting a certain number of -particulars.] - -There is yet another point which deserves attention in this history -given by Sokrates of the transitions of his own mind. His last -transition is represented as one from things to words, that is, to -general propositions:[77] to the assumption in each case of an -universal proposition or hypothesis calculated to fit that case. He -does not seem to consider the optimistic doctrine, which he had -before vainly endeavoured to follow out, as having been an -hypothesis, or universal proposition assumed as true and as a -principle from which to deduce consequences. Even if it were so, -however, it was one and the same assumption intended to suit all -cases: whereas the new doctrine to which he passed included many -distinct assumptions, each adapted to a certain number of cases and -not to the rest.[78] He assumed an untold multitude of self-existent -Ideas--The Self-Beautiful, Self-Just, Self-Great, Self-Equal, -Self-Unequal, &c.--each of them adapted to a certain number of -particular cases: the Self-Beautiful was assumed as the cause why all -particular things were beautiful--as that, of which all and each of -them partakes--and so of the rest.[79] Plato then explains his -procedure. He first deduced various consequences from this -assumed hypothesis, and examined whether all of them were consistent -or inconsistent with each other. If he detected inconsistencies (as -_e.g._ in the last half of the Parmenides), we must suppose -(though Plato does not expressly say so) that he would reject or -modify his fundamental assumption: if he found none, he would retain -it. The point would have to be tried by dialectic debate with an -opponent: the logical process of inference and counter-inference is -here assumed to be trustworthy. But during this debate Plato would -require his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis -provisionally. If the opponent chose to impugn the latter, he must -open a distinct debate on that express subject. Plato insists that -the discussion of the consequences flowing from the hypothesis, shall -be kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the -hypothesis itself. From the language employed, he seems to have had -in view certain disputants known to him, by whom the two were so -blended together as to produce much confusion in the reasoning. - -[Footnote 77: Aristotle (Metaphysic. A. 987, b. 31, [Greek: Th]. -1050, b. 35) calls the Platonici [Greek: oi( e)n toi=s lo/gois]: see -the note of Bonitz.] - -[Footnote 78: Plato, Phaedon, p. 100 A. [Greek: a)ll' ou)=n de\ -tau/te| ge o(/rmesa, kai\ u(pothe/menos e(ka/stote lo/gon o(\n a)\n -kri/no e)r)r(omene/staton ei)=nai, a(\ me\n a)\n moi doke=| tou/to| -xumphonei=n, ti/themi o(s a)lethe= o)/nta, kai\ peri\ ai)ti/as kai\ -peri\ to=n a)/llon a(pa/nton; a(\ d' a)\n me/, o(s ou)k a)lethe=.]] - -[Footnote 79: Aristotle controverts this doctrine of Plato in a -pointed manner, De Gen. et Corrupt. ii. 9, p. 335, b. 10, also -Metaphys. A. 991, b. 3. The former passage is the most animated in -point of expression, where Aristotle says--[Greek: o(/sper o( e)n -to=| Phai/doni Sokra/tes; kai\ ga\r e)kei=nos, e)pitime/sas toi=s -a)/llois o(s ou)de\n ei)reko/sin, u(poti/thetai]--which is very true -about the Platonic dialogue _Phaedon_, &c. But in both the -two passages, Aristotle distinctly maintains that the Ideas cannot be -_Causes_ of any thing. - -This is another illustration of what I have observed above, that the -meaning of the word _Cause_ has been always fluctuating and -undetermined. - -We see that, while Aristotle affirmed that the Ideas could not be -Causes of anything, Plato here maintains that they are the only true -Causes.] - -[Side-note: Ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme -generality.] - -But if your opponent impugns the hypothesis itself, how are you to -defend it? Plato here tells us: by means of some other hypothesis or -assumption, yet more universal than itself. You must ascend upwards -in the scale of generality, until you find an assumption suitable and -sufficient.[80] - -[Footnote 80: Plato, Phaedon, p. 101 E.] - -We here see where it was that Plato looked for full, indisputable, -self-recommending and self-assuring, certainty and truth. Among the -most universal propositions. He states the matter here as if we were -to provide defence for an hypothesis less universal by ascending to -another hypothesis more universal. This is illustrated by what he -says in the Timaeus--Propositions are cognate with the matter which -they affirm: those whose affirmation is purely intellectual, -comprising only matter of the intelligible world, or of genuine -Essence, are solid and inexpugnable: those which take in more or less -of the sensible world, which is a mere copy of the intelligible -exemplar, become less and less trustworthy--mere probabilities. Here -we have the Platonic worship of the most universal propositions, as -the only primary and evident truths.[81] But in the sixth and -seventh books of the Republic, he delivers a precept somewhat -different, requiring the philosopher not to rest in any hypothesis as -an ultimatum, but to consider them all as stepping-stones for -enabling him to ascend into a higher region, above all hypothesis--to -the first principle of every thing: and he considers geometrical -reasoning as defective because it takes its departure from hypothesis -or assumptions of which no account is rendered.[82] In the Republic -he thus contemplates an intuition by the mind of some primary, clear, -self-evident truth, above all hypotheses or assumptions even the most -universal, and transmitting its own certainty to every thing which -could be logically deduced from it: while in the Phaedon, he does not -recognise any thing higher or more certain than the most universal -hypothesis--and he even presents the theory of self-existent Ideas as -nothing more than an hypothesis, though a very satisfactory one. In -the Republic, Plato has come to imagine the Idea of Good as -distinguished from and illuminating all the other Ideas: in the -Timaeus, it seems personified in the Demiurgus; in the Phaedon, that -Idea of Good appears to be represented by the Nous or Reason of -Anaxagoras. But Sokrates is unable to follow it out, so that it -becomes included, without any pre-eminence, among the Ideas -generally: all of them transcendental, co-ordinate, and primary -sources of truth to the intelligent mind--yet each of them exercising -a causative influence in its own department, and bestowing its own -special character on various particulars. - -[Footnote 81: Plato, Timaeus, p. 29 B. [Greek: o(=de ou)=n peri/ te -ei)ko/nos kai\ tou= paradei/gmatos dioriste/on, o(s a)/ra tou\s -lo/gous, o(=npe/r ei)sin e)xegetai/, tou/ton au)to=n kai\ xuggenei=s -o)/ntas. tou= me\n ou)=n moni/mou kai\ bebai/ou kai\ meta\ nou= -kataphanou=s, moni/mous kai\ a)metapto/tous . . . tou\s de\ tou= pro\s -me\n e)kei=no a)peikasthe/ntos, o)/ntos de\ ei)ko/nos, ei)ko/tas -a)na\ lo/gon te e)kei/non o)/ntas; o(/, tiper pro\s ge/nesin ou)si/a, -tou=to pro\s pi/stin a)lethei/a.]] - -[Footnote 82: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511. [Greek: _to=n -u(pothe/seon a)note/ro e)kbai/nein_ . . . . to\ e(/teron tme=ma tou= -noetou=, ou)= au)to\s o( lo/gos a)/ptetai te=| tou= diale/gesthai -duna/mei, ta\s u(pothe/seis poiou/menos ou)k a)rcha\s a)lla\ to=| -o)/nti u(pothe/seis, oi(=on e)piba/seis te kai\ o(rma/s, i(/na -_me/chri tou= a)nupothe/tou e)pi\ te\n tou= panto\s a)rche\n -i)o/n_, a(psa/menos au)te=s, pa/lin au)= e)cho/menos to=n -e)kei/nes e)chome/non, ou(/tos e)pi\ teleute\n katabai/ne|, -ai)stheto=| panta/pasin ou)deni\ proschro/menos, a)ll' ei)/desin -au)toi=s di' au)to=n ei)s au)ta/, kai\ teleuta=| ei)s ei)/de.] -Compare vii. p. 533.] - -[Side-note: Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the -soul rests upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to -prove this.] - -It is from the assumption of these Ideas as eternal Essences, that -Plato undertakes to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. One Idea -or Form will not admit, but peremptorily excludes, the approach of -that other Form which is opposite to it. Greatness will not -receive the form of littleness: nor will the greatness which is in -any particular subject receive the form of littleness. If the form of -littleness be brought to bear, greatness will not stay to receive it, -but will either retire or be destroyed. The same is true likewise -respecting that which essentially has the form: thus fire has -essentially the form of heat, and snow has essentially the form of -cold. Accordingly fire, as it will not receive the form of cold, so -neither will it receive snow: and snow, as it will not receive the -form of heat, so neither will it receive fire. If fire comes, snow -will either retire or will be destroyed. The Triad has always the -Form of Oddness, and will never receive that of Evenness: the Dyad -has always the Form of Evenness, and will never receive that of -Oddness--upon the approach of this latter it will either disappear or -will be destroyed: moreover the Dyad, while refusing to receive the -Form of Oddness, will refuse also to receive that of the Triad, which -always embodies that Form--although three is not in direct -contrariety with two. If then we are asked, What is that, the -presence of which makes a body hot? we need not confine ourselves to -the answer--It is the Form of Heat--which, though correct, gives no -new information: but we may farther say--It is Fire, which involves -the Form of Heat. If we are asked, What is that, the presence of -which makes a number odd, we shall not say--It is Oddness: but we -shall say--It is the Triad or the Pentad--both of which involve -Oddness. - -[Side-note: The soul always brings life, and is essentially -living. It cannot receive death: in other words, it is immortal.] - -In like manner, the question being asked, What is that, which, being -in the body, will give it life? we must answer--It is the soul. The -soul, when it lays hold of any body, always arrives bringing with it -life. Now death is the contrary of life. Accordingly the soul, which -always brings with it life, will never receive the contrary of life. -In other words, it is deathless or immortal.[83] - -[Footnote 83: Plato, Phaedon, p. 105 C-E. [Greek: A)pokri/nou de/, -o(=| a)\n ti/ e)gge/netai so/mati, zo=n e)/stai? O(=i a)\n psuche/, -e)/phe. Ou)kou=n a)ei\ tou=to ou(/tos e)/chei? Po=s ga\r ou)chi/? e)= -d' o(/s. E( psuche\ a)/ra o(/, ti a)\n au)te\ kata/sche|, a)ei\ -e(/kei e)p' e)kei=no phe/rousa zoe/n? E(/kei me/ntoi, e)/phe. -Po/teron d' e)/sti ti zoe=| e)nanti/on, e)\ ou)de/n? E)/stin, e)/phe. -Ti/? Tha/natos. ou)kou=n e( psuche\ to\ e)nanti/on o(=| au)te\ -e)piphe/rei a)ei\ ou) me/ pote de/xetai, o(s e)k to=n pro/sthen -o(molo/getai? Kai\ ma/la spho/dra, e)/phe o( Ke/bes. . . . O(\ d' a)\n -tha/naton me\ de/chetai, ti/ kalou=men? A)tha/naton, e)/phe. -A)tha/naton a)/ra e( psuche/? A)tha/naton.] - -Nemesius, the Christian bishop of Emesa, declares that the proofs -given by Plato of the immortality of the soul are knotty and -difficult to understand, such as even adepts in philosophical study -can hardly follow. His own belief in it he rests upon the inspiration -of the Christian Scriptures (Nemesius de Nat. Homin. c. 2. p. 55, ed. -1565).] - -[Side-note: The proof of immortality includes pre-existence -as well as post-existence--animals as well as man--also the -metempsychosis or translation of the soul from one body to another.] - -Such is the ground upon which Sokrates rests his belief in the -immortality of the soul. The doctrine reposes, in Plato's view, upon -the assumption of eternal, self-existent, unchangeable, Ideas or -Forms:[84] upon the congeniality of nature, and inherent correlation, -between these Ideas and the Soul: upon the fact, that the soul knows -these Ideas, which knowledge must have been acquired in a prior state -of existence: and upon the essential participation of the soul in the -Idea of life, so that it cannot be conceived as without life, or as -dead.[85] The immortality of the soul is conceived as necessary and -entire, including not merely post-existence, but also pre-existence. -In fact the reference to an anterior time is more essential to -Plato's theory than that to a posterior time; because it is employed -to explain the cognitions of the mind, and the identity of learning -with reminiscence: while Simmias, who even at the close is not -without reserve on the subject of the post-existence, proclaims -an emphatic adhesion on that of the pre-existence.[86] The proof, -moreover, being founded in great part on the Idea of Life, embraces -every thing living, and is common to animals[87] (if not to plants) -as well as to men: and the metempsychosis--or transition of souls not -merely from one human body to another, but also from the human to the -animal body, and _vice versa_--is a portion of the Platonic -creed. - -[Footnote 84: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 76 D-E, 100 B-C. It is remarkable -that in the Republic also, Sokrates undertakes to demonstrate the -immortality of the soul: and that in doing so he does not make any -reference or allusion to the arguments used in the Phaedon, but -produces another argument totally distinct and novel: an argument -which Meiners remarks truly to be quite peculiar to Plato, Republic, -x. pp. 609 E, 611 C; Meiners, Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. ii. -p. 780.] - -[Footnote 85: Zeller, Philosophie der Griech. Part ii. p. 267. - -"Die Seele ist ihrem Begriffe nach dasjenige, zu dessen Wesen es -gehoert zu leben--sie kann also in keinem Augenblicke als nicht lebend -gedacht werden: In diesem ontologischen Beweis fuer die -Unsterblichkeit, laufen nicht bloss alle die einzelnen Beweise des -Phaedon zusammen, sondern derselbe wird auch schon im Phaedrus -vorgetragen," &c. Compare Phaedrus, p. 245. - -Hegel, in his Geschichte der Philosophie (Part ii. pp. 186-187-189, -ed. 2), maintains that Plato did not conceive the soul as a separate -thing or reality--that he did not mean to affirm, in the literal -sense of the words, its separate existence either before or after the -present life--that he did not descend to so crude a conception (zu -dieser Rohheit herabzusinken) as to represent to himself the soul as -a thing, or to enquire into its duration or continuance after the -manner of a thing--that Plato understood the soul to exist -essentially as the Universal Notion or Idea, the comprehensive -aggregate of all other Ideas, in which sense he affirmed it to be -immortal--that the descriptions which Plato gives of its condition, -either before life or after death, are to be treated only as poetical -metaphors. There is ingenuity in this view of Hegel, and many -separate expressions of Plato receive light from it: but it appears -to me to refine away too much. Plato had in his own mind and belief -both the soul as a particular thing--and the soul as an universal. -His language implies sometimes the one sometimes the other.] - -[Footnote 86: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 92, 107 B.] - -[Footnote 87: See what Sokrates says about the swans, Phaedon, p. 85 -A-B.] - -[Side-note: After finishing his proof that the soul is -immortal, Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it -after the death of the body. He describes a [Greek: Nekui/a].] - -Having completed his demonstration of the immortality of the soul, -Sokrates proceeds to give a sketch of the condition and treatment -which it experiences after death. The [Greek: Nekui/a] here following -is analogous, in general doctrinal scope, to those others which we -read in the Republic and in the Gorgias: but all of them are -different in particular incidents, illustrative circumstances, and -scenery. The sentiment of belief in Plato's mind attaches itself to -general doctrines, which appear to him to possess an evidence -independent of particulars. When he applies these doctrines to -particulars, he makes little distinction between such as are true, or -problematical, or fictitious: he varies his mythes at pleasure, -provided that they serve the purpose of illustrating his general -view. The mythe which we read in the Phaedon includes a description of -the Earth which to us appears altogether imaginative and poetical: -yet it is hardly more so than several other current theories, -proposed by various philosophers antecedent and contemporary, -respecting Earth and Sea. Aristotle criticises the views expressed in -the Phaedon, as he criticises those of Demokritus and Empedokles.[88] -Each soul of a deceased person is conducted by his Genius to the -proper place, and there receives sentence of condemnation to -suffering, greater or less according to his conduct in life, in -the deep chasm called Tartarus, and in the rivers of mud and fire, -Styx, Kokytus, Pyriphlegethon.[89] To those who have passed their -lives in learning, and who have detached themselves as much as they -possibly could from all pleasures and all pursuits connected with the -body--in order to pursue wisdom and virtue--a full reward is given. -They are emancipated from the obligation of entering another body, -and are allowed to live ever afterwards disembodied in the pure -regions of Ideas.[90] - -[Footnote 88: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 107-111. Olympiodorus pronounces the -mythe to be a good imitation of the truth, Republ. x. 620 seq.; -Gorgias, p. 520; Aristotle, Meteorol. ii. pp. 355-356. Compare also -356, b. 10, 357, a. 25, where he states and canvasses the doctrines -of Demokritus and Empedokles; also 352, a. 35, about the [Greek: -a)rchai=oi theo/logoi]. He is rather more severe upon these others -than upon Plato. He too considers, like Plato, that the amount of -evidence which you ought to require for your belief depends upon the -nature of the subject; and that there are various subjects on which -you ought to believe on slighter evidence: see Metaphysic. A. 995, a. -2-16: Ethic. Nikom. i. 1, 1094, b. 12-14.] - -[Footnote 89: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 111-112. Compare Eusebius, Praep. Ev. -xiii. 13, and Arnobius adv. Gentes, ii. 14. Arnobius blames Plato for -inconsistency in saying that the soul is immortal in its own nature, -and yet that it suffers pain after death--"Rem inenodabilem suscipit -(Plato) ut cum animas dicat immortales, perpetuas, et ex corporali -soliditate privatas, puniri eas dicat tamen et doloris afficiat -sensu. Quis autem hominum non videt quod sit immortale, quod simplex, -nullum posse dolorem admittere; quod autem sentiat dolorem, -immortalitatem habere non posse?"] - -[Footnote 90: Plato, Phaedon, p. 114 C-E. - -[Greek: tou=ton de\ au)to=n oi( philosophi/a| i(kano=s kathera/menoi -a)/neu te soma/ton zo=si to\ para/pan ei)s to\n e)/peita chro/non], -&c.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates expects that his soul is going to the -islands of the blest. Reply to Kriton about burying his body.] - -Such, or something like it, Sokrates confidently expects will be the -fate awaiting himself.[91] When asked by Kriton, among other -questions, how he desired to be buried, he replies with a smile--"You -may bury me as you choose, if you can only catch me. But you will not -understand me when I tell you, that I, Sokrates, who am now speaking, -shall not remain with you after having drunk the poison, but shall -depart to some of the enjoyments of the blest. You must not talk -about burying or burning Sokrates, as if I were suffering some -terrible operation. Such language is inauspicious and depressing to -our minds. Keep up your courage, and talk only of burying the body of -Sokrates: conduct the burial as you think best and most decent."[92] - -[Footnote 91: Plato, Phaedon, p. 115 A.] - -[Footnote 92: Plato, Phaedon, p. 115 D. [Greek: o(s e)peida\n pi/o to\ -pha/rmakon ou)ke/ti u(mi=n parameno=, a)ll' oi)che/somai a)pio\n ei)s -maka/ron de/ tinas eu)daimoni/as.]] - -[Side-note: Preparations for administering the hemlock. -Sympathy of the gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates.] - -Sokrates then retires with Kriton into an interior chamber to bathe, -desiring that the women may be spared the task of washing his body -after his decease. Having taken final leave of his wife and children, -he returns to his friends as sunset is approaching. We are here made -to see the contrast between him and other prisoners under like -circumstances. The attendant of the Eleven Magistrates comes to warn -him that the hour has come for swallowing the poison; expressing -sympathy and regret for the necessity of delivering so painful a -message, together with admiration for the equanimity and rational -judgment of Sokrates, which he contrasts forcibly with the discontent -and wrath of other prisoners under similar circumstances. As he -turned away with tears in his eyes, Sokrates exclaimed--"How -courteous the man is to me and has been from the beginning! how -generously he now weeps for me! Let us obey him, and let the poison -be brought forthwith, if it be prepared: if not, let him prepare it." -"Do not hurry" (interposed Kriton): "there is still time, for the sun -is not quite set. I have known others who, even after receiving the -order, deferred drinking the poison until they had had a good supper -and other enjoyments." "It is natural that they should do so" -(replied Sokrates). "They think that they are gainers by it: for me, -it is natural that I should not do so--for I shall gain nothing but -contempt in my own eyes, by thus clinging to life, and saving up when -there is nothing left."[93] - -[Footnote 93: Plato, Phaedon, p. 117 A. [Greek: glicho/menos tou= -ze=|n, kai\ pheido/menos ou)deno\s e)/ti e)no/ntos.] - -Hesiod. Opp. et Dies, 367. [Greek: deile\ d' e)ni\ puthme/ni -pheido/.]] - -[Side-note: Sokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with -the gaoler.] - -Kriton accordingly gave orders, and the poison, after a certain -interval, was brought in. Sokrates, on asking for directions, was -informed, that after having swallowed it, he must walk about until -his legs felt heavy: he must then lie down and cover himself up: the -poison would do its work. He took the cup without any symptom of -alarm or change of countenance: then looking at the attendant with -his usual full and fixed gaze, he asked whether there was enough to -allow of a libation. "We prepare as much as is sufficient" (was the -answer), "but no more." "I understand" (said Sokrates): "but at least -I may pray, and I must pray, to the Gods, that my change of abode -from here to there may be fortunate." He then put the cup to his -lips, and drank it off with perfect ease and tranquillity.[94] - -[Footnote 94: Plato, Phaedon, p. 117 C.] - -[Side-note: Ungovernable sorrow of the friends present. -Self-command of Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death.] - -His friends, who had hitherto maintained their self-control, were -overpowered by emotion on seeing the cup swallowed, and broke out -into violent tears and lamentation. No one was unmoved, except -Sokrates himself: who gently remonstrated with them, and -exhorted them to tranquil resignation: reminding them that nothing -but good words was admissible at the hour of death. The friends, -ashamed of themselves, found means to repress their tears. Sokrates -walked about until he felt heavy in the legs, and then lay down in -bed. After some interval, the attendant of the prison came to examine -his feet and legs, pinched his foot with force, and enquired whether -he felt it. Sokrates replied in the negative. Presently the man -pinched his legs with similar result, and showed to the friends in -that way that his body was gradually becoming chill and benumbed: -adding that as soon as this should get to the heart, he would -die.[95] The chill had already reached his belly, when Sokrates -uncovered his face, which had been hitherto concealed by the -bed-clothes, and spoke his last words:[96] "Kriton, we owe a cock to -AEsculapius: pay the debt without fail." "It shall be done" (answered -Kriton); "have you any other injunctions?" Sokrates made no reply, -but again covered himself up.[97] After a short interval, he made -some movement: the attendant presently uncovered him, and found him -dead, with his eyes stiff and fixed. Kriton performed the last duty -of closing both his eyes and his mouth. - -[Footnote 95: Plato, Phaedon, p. 118. These details receive -interesting confirmation from the remarkable scene described by -Valerius Maximus, as witnessed by himself at Julis in the island of -Keos, when he accompanied Sextus Pompeius into Asia (Val. M. ii. 6, -8). A Keian lady of rank, ninety years of age, well in health, -comfortable, and in full possession of her intelligence, but deeming -it prudent (according to the custom in Keos, Strabo, x. p. 486) to -retire from life while she had as yet nothing to complain of--took -poison, by her own deliberate act, in the presence of her relatives -and of Sextus Pompeius, who vainly endeavoured to dissuade her. -"Cupido haustu mortiferam traxit potionem, ac sermone significans -quasnam subinde partes corporis sui rigor occuparet, cum jam -visceribus eum et cordi imminere esset elocuta, filiarum manus ad -supremum opprimendorum oculorum officium advocavit. Nostros autem, -tametsi novo spectaculo obstupefacti erant, suffusos tamen lacrimis -dimisit."] - -[Footnote 96: Plato, Phaedon, p. 118. [Greek: e)/de ou)=n schedo/n ti -au)tou= e)=n ta\ peri\ to\ e)=tron psucho/mena, kai\ e)kkalupsa/menos -(e)nekeka/lupto ga\r) ei)=pen, o(\ de\ teleutai=on e)phthe/gxato, O)= -Kri/ton, e)/phe, to=| A)sklepio=| o)phei/lomen a)lektru/ona; a)ll' -a)po/dote kai\ me\ a)mele/sete.] - -Cicero, after recovering from a bilious attack, writes to his wife -Terentia (Epist. Famil. xiv. 7): "Omnes molestias et solicitudines -deposui et ejeci. Quid causae autem fuerit, postridie intellexi quam a -vobis discessi. [Greek: Chole\n a)/kraton] noctu ejeci: statim ita -sum levatus, ut mihi Deus aliquis medicinam fecisse videatur. Cui -quidem Deo, quemadmodum tu soles, pie et caste satisfacies: id est, -Apollini et AEsculapio." Compare the rhetor Aristeides, Orat. xlv. pp. -22-23-155, ed. Dindorf. About the habit of sacrificing a cock to -AEsculapius, see also a passage in the [Greek: I(ero=n Lo/goi] of the -rhetor Aristeides (Orat. xxvii. p. 545, ed. Dindorf, at the top of -the page). I will add that the five [Greek: I(ero=n Lo/goi] of that -Rhetor (Oratt. xxiii.-xxvii.) are curious as testifying the multitude -of dreams and revelations vouchsafed to him by AEsculapius; also the -implicit faith with which he acted upon them in his maladies, and the -success which attended the curative prescriptions thus made known to -him. Aristeides declares himself to place more confidence in these -revelations than in the advice of physicians, and to have often acted -on them in preference to such advice (Orat. xlv. pp. 20-22, Dind.). - -The direction here given by Sokrates to Kriton (though some critics, -even the most recent, see Krische, Lehren der Griechischen Denker, p. -227, interpret it in a mystical sense) is to be understood simply and -literally, in my judgment. On what occasion, or for what, he had made -the vow of the cock, we are not told. Sokrates was a very religious -man, much influenced by prophecies, oracles, dreams, and special -revelations (Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-29-33; also Phaedon, p. 60).] - -[Footnote 97: Euripid. Hippol. 1455 - -[Greek: Kekarte/retai ta)/m'; o)/lela ga/r, pate/r. -Kru=pson de/ mou pro/sopon o(s ta/chos pe/plois.]] - -[Side-note: Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of -these personal details.] - -The pathetic details of this scene--arranged with so much dramatic -beauty, and lending imperishable interest to the Phaedon of Plato--may -be regarded as real facts, described from the recollection of an -eye-witness, though many years after their occurrence. They present to -us the personality of Sokrates in full harmony with that which we read -in the Platonic Apology. The tranquil ascendancy of resolute and -rational conviction, satisfied with the past, and welcoming instead -of fearing the close of life--is exhibited as triumphing in the one -case over adverse accusers and judges, in the other case over the -unnerving manifestations of afflicted friends. - -[Side-note: Contrast between the Platonic Apology and the -Phaedon.] - -But though the personal incidents of this dialogue are truly -Sokratic--the dogmatic emphasis, and the apparatus of argument and -hypothesis, are essentially Platonic. In these respects, the dialogue -contrasts remarkably with the Apology. When addressing the Dikasts, -Sokrates not only makes no profession of dogmatic certainty, but -expressly disclaims it. Nay more--he considers that the false -persuasion of such dogmatic certainty, universally prevalent among -his countrymen, is as pernicious as it is illusory: and that his own -superiority over others consists merely in consciousness of his own -ignorance, while they are unconscious of theirs.[98] To dissipate -such false persuasion of knowledge, by perpetual cross-examination of -every one around, is the special mission imposed upon him by the -Gods: in which mission, indeed, he has the firmest belief--but it is -a belief, like that in his Daemon or divine sign, depending upon -oracles, dreams, and other revelations peculiar to himself, which he -does not expect that the Dikasts will admit as genuine evidence.[99] -One peculiar example, whereby Sokrates exemplifies the false -persuasion of knowledge where men have no real knowledge, is borrowed -from the fear of death. No man knows (he says) what death is, not -even whether it may not be a signal benefit: yet every man fears it -as if he well knew that it was the greatest evil.[100] Death must be -one of two things: either a final extinction--a perpetual and -dreamless sleep--or else a transference of the soul to some other -place. Sokrates is persuaded that it will be in either case a benefit -to him, and that the Gods will take care that he, a good man, shall -suffer no evil, either living or dead: the proof of which is, to him, -that the divine sign has never interposed any obstruction in -regard to his trial and sentence. If (says he) I am transferred to -some other abode, among those who have died before me, how delightful -will it be to see Homer and Hesiod, Orpheus and Musaeus, Agamemnon, -Ajax or Palamedes--and to pass my time in cross-examining each as to -his true or false knowledge![101] Lastly, so far as he professes to -aim at any positive end, it is the diffusion of political, social, -human virtue, as distinguished from acquisitions above the measure of -humanity. He tells men that it is not wealth which produces virtue, -but virtue which produces wealth and other advantages, both public -and private.[102] - -[Footnote 98: Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-29. [Greek: kai\ tou=to po=s -ou)k a)mathi/a e)sti\n au(/te e( e)ponei/distos, e( tou= oi)/esthai -ei)de/nai a(\ ou)k oi)=den?] (29 A-B).] - -[Footnote 99: Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-23, 31 D; 33 C: [Greek: -e)moi\ de\ tou=to, o(s e)go/ phemi, proste/taktai u(po\ tou= theou= -pra/ttein kai\ e)k manteio=n kai\ e)x e)nupni/on kai\ panti\ tro/po|, -o(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\ a)/lle thei/a moi=ra a)nthro/po| kai\ -o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein.] p. 37 E: [Greek: e)a/n te ga\r le/go -o(/ti to=| theo=| a)peithei=n tou=t' e)sti\ kai\ dia\ tou=t' -a)du/naton e(suchi/an a)/gein, ou) pei/sesthe/ moi o(s -ei)roneuome/no|.]] - -[Footnote 100: Plato, Apol. S. p. 29 B. - -In the Xenophontic Apology of Sokrates, no allusion is made to the -immortality of the soul. Sokrates is there described as having shaped -his defence under a belief that he had arrived at a term when it was -better for him to die than to live, and that prolonged life would -only expose him to the unavoidable weaknesses and disabilities of -senility. It is a proof of the benevolence of the Gods that he is -withdrawn from life at so opportune a moment. This is the explanation -which Xenophon gives of the haughty tone of the defence (sects. -6-15-23-27). In the Xenophontic Cyropaedia, Cyrus, on his death-bed, -addresses earnest exhortations to his two sons: and to give greater -force to such exhortations, reminds them that his own soul will still -survive and will still exercise a certain authority after his death. -He expresses his own belief not only that the soul survives the body, -but also that it becomes more rational when disembodied; because--1. -Murderers are disturbed by the souls of murdered men. 2. Honours are -paid to deceased persons, which practice would not continue, unless -the souls of the deceased had efficacy to enforce it. 3. The souls of -living men are more rational during sleep than when awake, and sleep -affords the nearest analogy to death (viii. 7, 17-21). (Much the same -arguments were urged in the dialogues of Aristotle. Bernays, Dialog. -Aristot. pp. 23-105.) He however adds, that even if he be mistaken in -this point, and if his soul perish with his body, still he conjures -his sons, in the name of the gods, to obey his dying injunctions (s. -22). Again, he says (s. 27), "Invite all the Persians to my tomb, to -join with me in satisfaction that I shall now be in safety, so as to -suffer no farther harm, whether I am united to the divine element, or -perish altogether" ([Greek: sunesthesome/nous e)moi/, o(/ti e)n to=| -a)sphalei= e)/de e)/somai, o(s mede\n a)\n e)/ti kako\n pathei=n, -me/te e)\n meta\ tou= thei/ou ge/nomai, me/te e)\n mede\n e)/ti -o)=|]). The view taken here by Cyrus, of death in its analogy with -sleep ([Greek: u(/pno| kai\ thana/to| diduma/osin], Iliad, xvi. 672) -as a refuge against impending evil for the future, is much the same -as that taken by Sokrates in his Apology. Sokrates is not less proud -of his past life, spent in dialectic debate, than Cyrus of his -glorious exploits. [Greek: O( tha/natos, lime\n kako=n toi=s -dusdaimonou=sin], Longinus, de Subl. c. 9, p. 23. Compare also the -Oration of Julius Caesar in Sallust, Bell. Catilin. c. 51--"in luctu -atque miseriis, mortem aerumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse: illam -cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere: ultra neque curae neque gaudio locum -esse".] - -[Footnote 101: Plato, Apol. S. pp. 40-41.] - -[Footnote 102: Plato, Apol. S. pp. 20 C, 29-30. [Greek: le/gon o(/ti -ou)k e)k chrema/ton a)rete\ gi/gnetai, a)ll' e)x a)rete=s chre/mata, -kai\ ta)=lla a)gatha\ toi=s a)nthro/pois a(/panta, kai\ i)di/a| kai\ -demosi/a|] (30 B). Compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 8-9.] - -[Side-note: Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the -Phaedon compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the -Apology.] - -If from the Apology we turn to the Phaedon, we seem to pass, not -merely to the same speaker after the interval of one month (the -ostensible interval indicated) but to a different speaker and over a -long period. We have Plato speaking through the mouth of Sokrates, -and Plato too at a much later time.[103] Though the moral character -([Greek: e)=thos]) of Sokrates is fully maintained and even -strikingly dramatised--the intellectual personality is altogether -transformed. Instead of a speaker who avows his own ignorance, and -blames others only for believing themselves to know when they are -equally ignorant--we have one who indulges in the widest range of -theory and the boldest employment of hypothesis. Plato introduces his -own dogmatical and mystical views, leaning in part on the Orphic and -Pythagorean creeds.[104] He declares the distinctness of nature, the -incompatibility, the forced temporary union and active conflict, -between the soul and the body. He includes this in the still wider -and more general declaration, which recognises antithesis between the -two worlds: the world of Ideas, Forms, Essences, not perceivable but -only cogitable, eternal, and unchangeable, with which the soul or -mind was in kindred and communion--the world of sense, or of -transient and ever-changing appearances or phenomena, never -arriving at permanent existence, but always coming and going, with -which the body was in commerce and harmony. The philosopher, who -thirsts only after knowledge and desires to look at things[105] as -they are in themselves, with his mind by itself--is represented as -desiring, throughout all his life, to loosen as much as possible the -implication of his soul with his body, and as rejoicing when the hour -of death arrives to divorce them altogether. - -[Footnote 103: In reviewing the Apology (supra, vol. i. ch. ix. p. -410) I have already noticed this very material discrepancy, which is -insisted upon by Ast as an argument for disallowing the genuineness -of the Apology.] - -[Footnote 104: Plato, Phaedon, pp. 69 C, 70 C, 81 C, 62 B.] - -[Footnote 105: Plato, Phaedon, p. 66 E. [Greek: a)pallakte/on au)tou= -(tou= so/matos) kai\ au)te=| te=| psuche=| theate/on au)ta\ ta\ -pra/gmata.]] - -[Side-note: Total renunciation and discredit of the body in -the Phaedon. Different feeling about the body in other Platonic -dialogues.] - -Such total renunciation of the body is put, with dramatic propriety, -into the mouth of Sokrates during the last hour of his life. But it -would not have been in harmony with the character of Sokrates as -other Platonic dialogues present him--in the plenitude of -life--manifesting distinguished bodily strength and soldierly efficiency, -proclaiming gymnastic training for the body to be co-ordinate with -musical training for the mind, and impressed with the most intense -admiration for the personal beauty of youth. The human body, which in -the Phaedon is discredited as a morbid incumbrance corrupting the -purity of the soul, is presented to us by Sokrates in the Phaedrus as -the only sensible object which serves as a mirror and reflection of -the beauty of the ideal world:[106] while the Platonic Timaeus -proclaims (in language not unsuitable to Locke) that sight, hearing, -and speech are the sources of our abstract Ideas, and the generating -causes of speculative intellect and philosophy.[107] Of these, and of -the world of sense generally, an opposite view was appropriate in the -Phaedon; where the purpose of Sokrates is to console his distressed -friends by showing that death was no misfortune, but relief from -a burthen. And Plato has availed himself of this impressive -situation,[108] to recommend, with every charm of poetical -expression, various characteristic dogmas respecting the essential -distinction between Ideas and the intelligible world on one -side--Perceptions and the sensible world on the other: respecting the -soul, its nature akin to the intelligible world, its pre-existence -anterior to its present body, and its continued existence after the -death of the latter: respecting the condition of the soul before birth -and after death, its transition, in the case of most men, into other -bodies, either human or animal, with the condition of suffering -penalties commensurate to the wrongs committed in this life: finally, -respecting the privilege accorded to the souls of such as have passed -their lives in intellectual and philosophical occupation, that they -shall after death remain for ever disembodied, in direct communion -with the world of Ideas. - -[Footnote 106: Plato, Charmides, p. 155 D. Protagoras, init. Phaedrus, -p. 250 D. Symposion, pp. 177 C, 210 A. - -AEschines, one of the Socratici viri or fellow disciples of Sokrates -along with Plato, composed dialogues (of the same general nature as -those of Plato) wherein Sokrates was introduced conversing or -arguing. AEschines placed in the mouth of Sokrates the most intense -expressions of passionate admiration towards the person of -Alkibiades. See the Fragments cited by the Rhetor Aristeides, Orat. -xlv. pp. 20-23, ed. Dindorf. Aristeides mentions (p. 24) that various -persons in his time mistook these expressions ascribed to Sokrates -for the real talk of Sokrates himself. Compare also the Symposion of -Xenophon, iv. 27.] - -[Footnote 107: Plato, Timaeus, p. 47, A-D. Consult also the same -dialogue, pp. 87-88, where Plato insists on the necessity of -co-ordinate attention both to mind and to body, and on the mischiefs of -highly developed force in the mind unless it be accompanied by a -corresponding development of force in the body.] - -[Footnote 108: Compare the description of the last discourse of Paetus -Thrasea. Tacitus, Annal. xvi. 34.] - -[Side-note: Plato's argument does not prove the immortality of -the soul. Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence -and the mode of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite -undetermined.] - -The main part of Plato's argumentation, drawn from the general -assumptions of his philosophy, is directed to prove the separate and -perpetual existence of the soul, before as well as after the body. -These arguments, interesting as specimens of the reasoning which -satisfied Plato, do not prove his conclusion.[109] But even if -that conclusion were admitted to be proved, the condition of the -soul, during such anterior and posterior existence, would be -altogether undetermined, and would be left to the free play of -sentiment and imagination. There is no subject upon which the -poetical genius of Plato has been more abundantly exercised.[110] He -has given us two different descriptions of the state of the soul -before its junction with the body (Timaeus, and Phaedrus), and three -different descriptions of its destiny after separation from the body -(Republic, Gorgias, Phaedon). In all the three, he supposes an -adjudication and classification of the departed souls, and a better -or worse fate allotted** to each according to the estimate which he -forms of their merits or demerits during life: but in each of the -three, this general idea is carried out by a different machinery. The -Hades of Plato is not announced even by himself as anything more than -approximation to the truth: but it embodies his own ethical and -judicial sentence on the classes of men around him--as the Divina -Commedia embodies that of Dante on antecedent individual persons. -Plato distributes rewards and penalties in the measure which he -conceives to be deserved: he erects his own approbation and -disapprobation, his own sympathy and antipathy, into laws of the -unknown future state: the Gods, whom he postulates, are imaginary -agents introduced to execute the sentences which he dictates. While -others, in their conceptions of posthumous existence, assured the -happiest fate, sometimes even divinity itself, to great warriors and -law-givers--to devoted friends and patriots like Harmodius and -Aristogeiton--to the exquisite beauty of Helen--or to favourites of -the Gods like Ganymedes or Pelops[111]--Plato claims that supreme -distinction for the departed philosopher. - -[Footnote 109: Wyttenbach has annexed to his edition of the Phaedon an -instructive review of the argumentation contained in it respecting -the Immortality of the soul. He observes justly--"Videamus jam de -Phaedone, qui ab omni antiquitate is habitus est liber, in quo -rationes immortalitatis animarum gravissime luculentissimeque -exposita essent. Quae quidem libro laus et auctoritas conciliata est, -non tam firmitate argumentorum, quam eloquentia Platonis," &c. -(Disputat. De Placit. Immort. Anim. p. 10). The same feeling, -substantially, is expressed by one of the disputants in Cicero's -Tusculan Disputations, who states that he assented to the reasoning -while he was reading the dialogue, but that as soon as he had laid -down the book, his assent all slipped away from him. I have already -mentioned that Panaetius, an extreme admirer of Plato on most points, -dissented from him about the immortality of the soul (Cicero, Tusc. -Disp. i. 11, 24--i. 32, 79), and declared the Phaedon to be spurious. -Galen also mentions (De Format. Foetus, vol. iv. pp. 700-702. Kuehn) -that he had written a special treatise (now lost) to prove that the -reasonings in the Phaedon were self-contradictory, and that he could -not satisfy himself, either about the essence of the soul, or whether -it was mortal or immortal. Compare his treatise [Greek: Peri\ -Ou)si/as to=n phusiko=n duna/meon]--iv. pp. 762-763--and [Greek: -Peri\ to=n te=s Psuche=s e)tho=n], iv. 773. In this last passage, he -represents the opinion of Plato to be--That the two inferior souls, -the courageous and the appetitive, are mortal, in which he (Galen) -agrees, and that the rational soul alone is immortal, of which he -(Galen) is not persuaded. Now this view of Plato's opinion is derived -from the Republic and Timaeus, not from the Phaedon, in which last the -triple soul is not acknowledged. We may thus partly understand the -inconsistencies, which Galen pointed out in his lost Treatise, in the -argumentation of the Phaedon: wherein one of the proofs presented to -establish the immortality of the soul is--That the soul is -inseparably and essentially identified with life, and cannot admit -death (p. 105 D). This argument, if good at all, is just as good to -prove the immortality of the two inferior souls, as of the superior -and rational soul. Galen might therefore remark that it did not -consist with the conclusion which he drew from the Timaeus and the -Republic.] - -[Footnote 110: Wyttenbach, l. c. p. 19. "Vidimus de philosopha hujus -loci parte, qua demonstratur, Animos esse immortales. Altera pars, -qua ostenditur, qualis sit ille post hanc vitam status, fabulose et -poetice a Platone tractata est." &c.] - -[Footnote 111: Skolion of Kallistratus, Antholog. Graec. p. 155. -Isokrates, Encomium Helenae, Or. x. s. 70-72. Compare the [Greek: -Ne/kuia] of the Odyssey and that of the AEneid, respecting the -heroes-- - - "Quae gratia currum -Armorumque fuit vivis, quae cura nitentes -Pascere equos, eadem sequitur tellure repostos." (AEn. vi. 653-5.)] - -[Side-note: The philosopher will enjoy an existence of -pure soul unattached to any body.] - -The Philosopher, as a recompense for having detached himself during -life as much as possible from the body and all its functions, will be -admitted after death to existence as a soul pure and simple, -unattached to any body. The souls of all other persons, dying with -more or less of the taint of the body attached to each of them,[112] -and for that reason haunting the tombs in which the bodies are -buried, so as to become visible there as ghosts--are made subject, in -the Platonic Hades, to penalty and purification suitable to the -respective condition of each; after which they become attached to new -bodies, sometimes of men, sometimes of other animals. Of this -distributive scheme it is not possible to frame any clear idea, nor -is Plato consistent with himself except in a few material features. -But one feature there is in it which stands conspicuous--the belief -in the metempsychosis, or transfer of the same soul from one animal -body to another: a belief very widely diffused throughout the ancient -world, associated with the immortality of the soul, pervading the -Orphic and Pythagorean creeds, and having its root in the Egyptian -and Oriental religions.[113] - -[Footnote 112: Plato, Phaedon, p. 81 C-D. [Greek: o(\ de\ kai\ -e)/chousa e( toiau/te psuche\ baru/netai te kai\ e(/lketai pa/lin -ei)s to\n o(rato\n to/pon, pho/bo| tou= a)eidou=s te kai\ A(/idou, -o(/sper le/getai, peri\ ta\ mne/mata/ te kai\ tou\s ta/phous -kalindoume/ne; peri\ a(\ de\ kai\ o)/phthe a(/tta psucho=n skioeide= -phanta/smata oi(=a pare/chontai ai( toiau=tai psuchai\ ei)/dola, ai( -me\ katharo=s a)poluthei=sai, a)lla\ _tou= o(ratou= mete/chousai, -dio\ kai\ o(ro=ntai_.] - -Lactantius--in replying to the arguments of Demokritus, Epikurus, and -Dikaearchus against the immortality of the soul--reminded them that -any _Magus_ would produce visible evidence to refute them; by -calling up before them the soul of any deceased person to give -information and predict the future--"qui profecto non auderent de -animarum interitu mago praesente disserere, qui sciret certis -carminibus cieri ab infernis animas et adesse et praebere se videndas -et loqui et futura praedicere: et si auderent, re ipsa et documentis -praesentibus vincerentur" (Lactant. Inst. vii. 13). See Cicero, Tusc. -Disp. i. 31.] - -[Footnote 113: Compare the closing paragraph of the Platonic Timaeus: -Virgil, AEneid vi. 713, Herodot. ii. 123, Pausanias, iv. 32, 4, Sextus -Empiric. adv. Math. ix. 127, with the citation from Empedokles:-- - -"Tum pater Anchises: 'Animae quibus altera fato -Corpora debentur, Lethaei ad fluminis undam -Securos latices et longa oblivia potant'." - -The general doctrine, upon which the Metempsychosis rests, is set -forth by Virgil in the fine lines which follow, 723-751; compare -Georgic iv. 218. The souls of men, beasts, birds, and fishes, are all -of them detached fragments or portions from the universal soul, mind, -or life, aetherial or igneous, which pervades the whole Kosmos. The -soul of each individual thus detached to be conjoined with a distinct -body, becomes tainted by such communion; after death it is purified -by penalties, measured according to the greater or less taint, and -becomes then fit to be attached to a new body, yet not until it has -drunk the water of Lethe (Plato, Philebus, p. 30 A; Timaeus, p. 30 B). - -The statement of Nemesius is remarkable, that all Greeks who believed -the immortality of the soul, believed also in the -metempsychosis--[Greek: Koine=| me\n ou)=n pa/ntes E)/llenes, oi( te\n -psuche\n a)tha/naton a)pophe|na/menoi, te\n metensoma/tosin -dogmati/zousin] (De Natura Hominis, cap. ii. p. 50, ed. 1565). Plato -accepted the Egyptian and Pythagorean doctrine, continued in the Orphic -mysteries (Arnob. adv. Gentes, ii. 16), making no essential distinction -between the souls of men and those of animals, and recognising -reciprocal interchange from the one to the other. The Platonists -adhered to this doctrine fully, down to the third century A.D., -including Plotinus, Numenius, and others. But Porphyry, followed by -Jamblichus, introduced a modification of this creed, denying the -possibility of transition of a human soul into the body of another -animal, or of the soul of any other animal into the body of a man,--yet -still recognising the transition from one human body to another, and -from one animal body to another. (See Alkinous, Introd. in Platon. -c. 25.) This subject is well handled in a learned work published in -1712 by a Jesuit of Toulouse, Michel Mourgues. He shows (in opposition -to Dacier and others, who interpreted the doctrine in a sense merely -spiritual and figurative) that the metempsychosis was a literal -belief of the Platonists down to the time of Proklus. "Les quatre -Platoniciens qui ont tenu la Transmigration bornee" (_i.e._ from -one human body into another human body) "n'ont pas laisse d'admettre -la pluralite d'animations ou de vies d'une meme ame: et cela sans -figure et sans metaphore. Cet article, qui est l'essentiel, n'a -jamais trouve un seul contradicteur dans les sectes qui ont cru l'ame -immortelle: ni Porphyre, ni Hierocle, ni Procle, ni Salluste, n'ont -jamais touche a ce point que pour l'approuver. D'ou il suit que la -realite de la Metempsychose est indubitable; c'est a dire, qu'il est -indubitable que tous les sectateurs de Pythagore et de Platon l'ont -soutenue dans un sens tres reel quant a la pluralite des vies et -d'animations" (Tom. i. p. 525: also Tom. ii. p. 432) M. Cousin and M. -Barthelemy St Hilaire are of the same opinion. - -M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire observes in his Premier Memoire sur le -Sankhya p. 416, Paris, 1852. - -"Voila donc la transmigration dans les plus grands dialogues de -Platon--le Timee, la Republique, le Phedre, le Phedon. On peut en -retrouver la trace manifeste dans d'autres dialogues moins -considerables, le Menon et le Politique, par exemple. La -transmigration est meme positivement indiquee dans le dixieme Livre -des Lois, ou Platon traite avec tant de force et de solennite de la -providence et de la justice divines. - -"En presence de temoignages si serieux, et de tant de persistance a -revenir sur des opinions qui ne varient pas, je crois que tout esprit -sense ne peut que partager l'avis de M. Cousin. Il est impossible que -Platon ne se fasse de l'exposition de ces opinions qu'un pur -badinage. Il les a repetees, sans les modifier en rien, au milieu des -discussions les plus graves et les plus etendues. Ajoutez que ces -doctrines tiennent intimement a toutes celles qui sont le fond meme -du platonisme, et qu'elles s'y entrelacent si etroitement, que les en -detacher, c'est le mutiler et l'amoindrir. Le systeme des Idees ne se -comprend pas tout entier sans la reminiscence: et la reminiscence -elle meme implique necessairement l'existence anterieure de l'ame." - -Dr. Henry More, in his 'Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul,' -argues at considerable length in defence of pre-existence of each -soul, as a part of the doctrine. He considers himself to have clearly -proved--"That the pre-existence of the soul is an opinion both in -itself the most rational that can be maintained, and has had the -suffrage of the most renowned philosophers in all ages of the world". -Of these last-mentioned philosophers he gives a list, as follows--Moses, -on the authority of the Jewish Cabbala--Zoroaster, Pythagoras, -Epicharmus, Empedocles, Cebes, Euripides, Plato, Euclid, Philo, -Virgil, Marcus Cicero, Plotinus, Jamblichus, Proclus, Boethius, -&c. See chapters xii. and xiii. pages 116, 117, 121 of his -Treatise. Compare also what he says in Sect. 18 of his Preface -General, page xx.-xxiv.] - -[Side-note: Plato's demonstration of the immortality of -the soul did not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The -question remained debated and problematical.] - -We are told that one vehement admirer of Plato--the Ambrakiot -Kleombrotus--was so profoundly affected and convinced by reading the -Phaedon, that he immediately terminated his existence by leaping from -a high wall; though in other respects well satisfied with life. But -the number of persons who derived from it such settled conviction, -was certainly not considerable. Neither the doctrine nor the -reasonings of Plato were adopted even by the immediate successors in -his school: still less by Aristotle and the Peripatetics--or by the -Stoics--or by the Epikureans. The Epikureans denied altogether the -survivorship of soul over body: Aristotle gives a definition of the -soul which involves this same negation, though he admits as credible -the separate existence of the rational soul, without individuality or -personality. The Stoics, while affirming the soul to be material -as well as the body, considered it as a detached fragment of the -all-pervading cosmical or mundane soul, which was re-absorbed after the -death of the individual into the great whole to which it belonged. -None of these philosophers were persuaded by the arguments of Plato. -The popular orthodoxy, which he often censures harshly, recognised -some sort of posthumous existence as a part of its creed; and the -uninquiring multitude continued in the teaching and traditions of -their youth. But literary and philosophical men, who sought to form -some opinion for themselves without altogether rejecting (as the -Epikureans rejected) the basis of the current traditions--were in no -better condition for deciding the question with the assistance of -Plato, than they would have been without him. While the knowledge of -the bodily organism, and of mind or soul as embodied therein, -received important additions, from Aristotle down to Galen--no new -facts either were known or could become known, respecting soul _per -se_, considered as pre-existent or post-existent to body. Galen -expressly records his dissatisfaction with Plato on this point, -though generally among his warmest admirers. Questions of this kind -remained always problematical, standing themes for rhetoric or -dialectic.[114] Every man could do, though not with the same -exuberant eloquence, what Plato had done--and no man could do more. -Every man could coin his own hopes and fears, his own aesthetical -preferences and repugnances, his own ethical aspiration to distribute -rewards and punishments among the characters around him--into -affirmative prophecies respecting an unknowable future, where neither -verification nor Elenchus were accessible. The state of this -discussion throughout the Pagan world bears out the following remark -of Lord Macaulay, with which I conclude the present chapter:--"There -are branches of knowledge with respect to which the law of the -human mind is progress. . . . But with theology, the case is very -different. As respects natural religion--revelation being for the -present altogether left out of the question--it is not easy to see -that a philosopher of the present day is more favourably situated -than Thales or Simonides. . . . As to the other great question--the -question, what becomes of man after death--we do not see that a -highly educated European, left to his unassisted reason, is more -likely to be in the right than a Blackfoot Indian. Not a single one -of the many sciences in which we surpass the Blackfoot Indians, -throws the smallest light on the state of the soul after the animal -life is extinct. In truth, all the philosophers, ancient and modern, -who have attempted, without the help of revelation, to prove the -immortality of man--from Plato down to Franklin--appear to us to have -failed deplorably. Then again, all the great enigmas which perplex -the natural theologian are the same in all ages. The ingenuity of a -people just emerging from barbarism, is quite sufficient to propound -them. The genius of Locke or Clarke is quite unable to solve -them. . . . Natural Theology, then, is not a progressive science."[115] - -[Footnote 114: Seneca says, Epist. 88. "Innumerabiles sunt quaestiones -de animo: unde sit, qualis sit, quando esse incipiat, quamdiu sit; an -aliunde alio transeat, et domicilium mutet, ad alias animalium formas -aliasque conjectus, an non amplius quam semel serviat, et emissus -evagetur in toto; utrum corpus sit, an non sit: quid sit facturus, -quum per nos aliquid facere desierit: quomodo libertate usurus, cum -ex hac exierit cavea: an obliviscatur priorum et illic nosse -incipiat, postquam de corpore abductus in sublime secessit." Compare -Lucretius, i. 113.] - -[Footnote 115: Macaulay, Ranke's History of the Popes (Crit. and -Hist. Essays, vol. iii. p. 210). Sir Wm. Hamilton observes (Lectures -on Logic, Lect. 26, p. 55): "Thus Plato, in the Phaedon, demonstrates -the immortality of the soul from its simplicity: in the Republic, he -demonstrates its simplicity from its immortality."] - - - - -END OF VOL. II. - - - -************************************* -Transcriber's Note - -The text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive. - -For the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used: -) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute -accent; \ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript. -ch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta; -e for eta and o for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases. - -Corrections to the text, indicated in text with **: - -Location Text of scan of 3rd edition Correction -ToC, Ch. 13 s-n 3 Minor Major -ToC, Ch. 14 s-n 24 _pain_ _gain_ -Ch. 13 fn. 40 iv. 4, 5; iv. 4, 5, p. 220 seq.); -Ch. 13 near fn. 46 he was even fit he was not even fit -Ch. 17 near fn. 3 fulfiling fulfilling -Ch. 19 after fn. 32 sixth eighth -Ch. 19 fn. 44 p. . p. 31. -Ch. 20 after fn. 13 aud and -Ch. 22 after fn. 47 sixth eighth -Ch. 23 fn. 134 p. 240 p. 242 -Ch. 23 fn. 135 ch. xviii ch. xvii -Ch. 24 fn. 75 Pratagoras Protagoras -Ch. 24 fn. 77 a)nro/s a)ndro/s -Ch. 24 fn. 86 Die _Dialoge..._ _Die Dialoge..._ -Ch. 25 after fn. 58 intellegible intelligible -Ch. 25 after fn. 110 alloted allotted - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plato and the Other Companions of -Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume II (of 4), by George Grote - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO, COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, VOL II *** - -***** This file should be named 40436.txt or 40436.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/0/4/3/40436/ - -Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |