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diff --git a/40435-8.txt b/40435-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index c9fd7a5..0000000 --- a/40435-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26018 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, -3rd ed. Volume I (of 4), by George Grote - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - -Title: Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume I (of 4) - -Author: George Grote - -Release Date: August 7, 2012 [EBook #40435] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO, COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, VOL I *** - - - - -Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project - - - - - - - - -PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. - - - -ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS. - - - -PLATO, - -AND THE - -OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. - -BY - -GEORGE GROTE - - - -_A NEW EDITION._ - -IN FOUR VOLUMES. - -VOL. I. - - - -LONDON: - -JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. - -1885. - -_The right of Translation is reserved._ - - - - -ADVERTISEMENT. - -In the present Edition, with a view to the distribution into four -volumes, there is a slight transposition of the author's arrangement. -His concluding chapters (XXXVIII., XXXIX.), entitled "Other Companions -of Sokrates," and "Xenophon," are placed in the First Volume, as -chapters III. and IV. By this means each volume is made up of nearly -related subjects, so as to possess a certain amount of unity. - -Volume First contains the following subjects:--Speculative Philosophy -in Greece before Sokrates; Growth of Dialectic; Other Companions of -Sokrates; Xenophon; Life of Plato; Platonic Canon; Platonic -Compositions generally; Apology of Sokrates; Kriton; Euthyphron. - -Volume Second comprises:--Alkibiades I. and II.; Hippias -Major--Hippias Minor; Hipparchus--Minos; Theages; Erastæ or -Anterastæ--Rivales; Ion; Laches; Charmides; Lysis; Euthydemus; -Menon; Protagoras; Gorgias; Phædon. - -Volume Third:--Phædrus--Symposion; Parmenides; Theætetus; Sophistes; -Politikus; Kratylus; Philebus; Menexenus; Kleitophon. - -Volume Fourth:--Republic; Timæus and Kritias; Leges and Epinomis; -General Index. - -The Volumes may be obtained separately. - - - - -PREFACE. - - -The present work is intended as a sequel and supplement to my History -of Greece. It describes a portion of Hellenic philosophy: it dwells -upon eminent individuals, enquiring, theorising, reasoning, confuting, -&c., as contrasted with those collective political and social -manifestations which form the matter of history, and which the modern -writer gathers from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. - -Both Sokrates and Plato, indeed, are interesting characters in history -as well as in philosophy. Under the former aspect, they were described -by me in my former work as copiously as its general purpose would -allow. But it is impossible to do justice to either of them--above -all, to Plato, with his extreme variety and abundance--except in a -book of which philosophy is the principal subject, and history only -the accessory. - -The names of Plato and Aristotle tower above all others in Grecian -philosophy. Many compositions from both have been preserved, though -only a small proportion of the total number left by Aristotle. Such -preservation must be accounted highly fortunate, when we read in -Diogenes Laertius and others, the long list of works on various topics -of philosophy, now irrecoverably lost, and known by little except -their titles. Respecting a few of them, indeed, we obtain some partial -indications from fragmentary extracts and comments of later critics. -But none of these once celebrated philosophers, except Plato and -Aristotle, can be fairly appreciated upon evidence furnished by -themselves. The Platonic dialogues, besides the extraordinary genius -which they display as compositions, bear thus an increased price (like -the Sibylline books) as the scanty remnants of a lost philosophical -literature, once immense and diversified. - -Under these two points of view, I trust that the copious analysis and -commentary bestowed upon them in the present work will not be -considered as unnecessarily lengthened. I maintain, full and -undiminished, the catalogue of Plato's works as it was inherited from -antiquity and recognised by all critics before the commencement of the -present century. Yet since several subsequent critics have contested -the canon, and set aside as spurious many of the dialogues contained -in it,--I have devoted a chapter to this question, and to the -vindication of the views on which I have proceeded. - -The title of these volumes will sufficiently indicate that I intend to -describe, as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic -philosophy at Athens during the half century immediately following the -death of Sokrates in 399 B.C. My first two chapters do indeed furnish -a brief sketch of Pre-Sokratic philosophy: but I profess to take my -departure from Sokrates himself, and these chapters are inserted -mainly in order that the theories by which he found himself surrounded -may not be altogether unknown. Both here, and in the sixty-ninth -chapter of my History, I have done my best to throw light on the -impressive and eccentric personality of Sokrates: a character original -and unique, to whose peculiar mode of working on other minds I -scarcely know a parallel in history. He was the generator, indirectly -and through others, of a new and abundant crop of compositions--the -"Sokratic dialogues": composed by many different authors, among whom -Plato stands out as unquestionable coryphæus, yet amidst other names -well deserving respectful mention as seconds, companions, or -opponents. - -It is these Sokratic dialogues, and the various companions of Sokrates -from whom they proceeded, that the present work is intended to -exhibit. They form the dramatic manifestation of Hellenic philosophy--as -contrasted with the formal and systematising, afterwards prominent -in Aristotle. - -But the dialogue is a process containing commonly a large -intermixture, often a preponderance, of the negative vein: which was -more abundant and powerful in Sokrates than in any one. In discussing -the Platonic dialogues, I have brought this negative vein into the -foreground. It reposes upon a view of the function and value of -philosophy which is less dwelt upon than it ought to be, and for which -I here briefly prepare the reader. - -Philosophy is, or aims at becoming, reasoned truth: an aggregate of -matters believed or disbelieved after conscious process of examination -gone through by the mind, and capable of being explained to others: -the beliefs being either primary, knowingly assumed as self-evident--or -conclusions resting upon them, after comparison of all relevant -reasons favourable and unfavourable. "Philosophia" (in the words of -Cicero), "ex rationum collatione consistit." This is not the form in -which beliefs or disbeliefs exist with ordinary minds: there has been -no conscious examination--there is no capacity of explaining to -others--there is no distinct setting out of primary truths assumed--nor -have any pains been taken to look out for the relevant reasons on -both sides, and weigh them impartially. Yet the beliefs nevertheless -exist as established facts generated by traditional or other -authority. They are sincere and often earnest, governing men's -declarations and conduct. They represent a cause in which sentence has -been pronounced, or a rule made absolute, without having previously -heard the pleadings.[1] - -[Footnote 1: Napoléon, qui de temps en temps, au milieu de sa fortune -et de sa puissance, songeait à Robespierre et à sa triste -fin--interrogeait un jour son archi-chancelier Cambacérès sur le neuf -Thermidor. "_C'est un procès jugé et non plaidé_," répondait -Cambacérès, avec la finesse d'un jurisconsulte courtisan.--(Hippolyte -Carnot--Notice sur Barère, p. 109; Paris, 1842.)] - -Now it is the purpose of the philosopher, first to bring this omission -of the pleadings into conscious notice--next to discover, evolve, and -bring under hearing the matters omitted, as far as they suggest -themselves to his individual reason. He claims for himself, and he -ought to claim for all others alike, the right of calling for proof -where others believe without proof--of rejecting the received -doctrines, if upon examination the proof given appears to his mind -unsound or insufficient--and of enforcing instead of them any others -which impress themselves upon his mind as true. But the truth which he -tenders for acceptance must of necessity be _reasoned truth_; -supported by proofs, defended by adequate replies against -preconsidered objections from others. Only hereby does it properly -belong to the history of philosophy: hardly even hereby has any such -novelty a chance of being fairly weighed and appreciated. - -When we thus advert to the vocation of philosophy, we see that (to use -the phrase of an acute modern author[2]) it is by necessity polemical: -the assertion of independent reason by individual reasoners, who -dissent from the unreasoning belief which reigns authoritative in the -social atmosphere around them, and who recognise no correction or -refutation except from the counter-reason of others. We see besides, -that these dissenters from the public will also be, probably, more or -less dissenters from each other. The process of philosophy may be -differently performed by two enquirers equally free and sincere, even -of the same age and country: and it is sure to be differently -performed, if they belong to ages and countries widely apart. It is -essentially relative to the individual reasoning mind, and to the -medium by which the reasoner is surrounded. Philosophy herself has -every thing to gain by such dissent; for it is only thereby that the -weak and defective points of each point of view are likely to be -exposed. If unanimity is not attained, at least each of the -dissentients will better understand what he rejects as well as what he -adopts. - -[Footnote 2: Professor Ferrier, in his instructive volume, 'The -Institutes of Metaphysic,' has some valuable remarks on the scope and -purpose of Philosophy. I transcribe some of them, in abridgment. - -(Sections 1-8) "A system of philosophy is bound by two main -requisitions: it ought to be true--and it ought to be reasoned. -Philosophy, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth. Of -these obligations, the latter is the more stringent. It is more proper -that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true: -because, while truth may perhaps be unattainable by man, to reason is -certainly his province and within his power. . . . A system is of the -highest value only when it embraces both these requisitions--that is, -when it is both true, and reasoned. But a system which is reasoned -without being true, is always of higher value than a system which is -true without being reasoned. The latter kind of system is of no value: -because philosophy is the attainment of truth _by the way of reason_. -That is its definition. A system, therefore, which reaches the truth -but not by the way of reason, is not philosophy at all, and has -therefore no scientific worth. Again, an unreasoned philosophy, even -though true, carries no guarantee of its truth. It may be true, but it -cannot be certain. On the other hand, a system, which is reasoned -without being true, has always some value. It creates reason by -exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, though -it may fail to reach it." (Sections 38-41)--"The student will find -that the system here submitted to his attention is of a very polemical -character. Why! Because philosophy exists only to correct the -inadvertencies of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to -fulfil. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not be taught to think -aright. If he is already in possession of the truth, he does not -require to be put in possession of it. The occupation of philosophy is -gone: her office is superfluous. Therefore philosophy assumes and must -assume that man does not naturally think aright, but must be taught to -do so: that truth does not come to him spontaneously, but must be -brought to him by his own exertions. If man does not naturally think -aright, he must think, we shall not say wrongly (for that implies -malice prepense) but inadvertently: the native occupant of his mind -must be, we shall not say falsehood (for that too implies malice -prepense) but error. The original dowry then of universal man is -inadvertency and error. This assumption is the ground and only -justification of the existence of philosophy. The circumstance that -philosophy exists only to put right the oversights of common -thinking--renders her polemical not by choice, but by necessity. She is -controversial as the very tenure and condition of her existence: for -how can she correct the slips of common opinion, the oversights of -natural thinking, except by controverting them?" Professor Ferrier -deserves high commendation for the care taken in this volume to set -out clearly Proposition and Counter-Proposition: the thesis which he -impugns, as well as that which he sustains.] - -The number of individual intellects, independent, inquisitive, and -acute, is always rare everywhere; but was comparatively less rare in -these ages of Greece. The first topic, on which such intellects broke -loose from the common consciousness of the world around them, and -struck out new points of view for themselves, was in reference to the -Kosmos or the Universe. The received belief, of a multitude of unseen -divine persons bringing about by volitions all the different phenomena -of nature, became unsatisfactory to men like Thales, Anaximander, -Parmenides, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras. Each of these volunteers, -following his own independent inspirations, struck out a new -hypothesis, and endeavoured to commend it to others with more or less -of sustaining reason. There appears to have been little of negation or -refutation in their procedure. None of them tried to disprove the -received point of view, or to throw its supporters upon their defence. -Each of them unfolded his own hypothesis, or his own version of -affirmative reasoned truth, for the adoption of those with whom it -might find favour. - -The dialectic age had not yet arrived. When it did arrive, with -Sokrates as its principal champion, the topics of philosophy were -altered, and its process revolutionised. We have often heard repeated -the Ciceronian dictum--that Sokrates brought philosophy down from the -heavens to the earth: from the distant, abstruse, and complicated -phenomena of the Kosmos--in respect to which he adhered to the vulgar -point of view, and even disapproved any enquiries tending to -rationalise it--to the familiar business of man, and the common -generalities of ethics and politics. But what has been less observed -about Sokrates, though not less true, is, that along with this change -of topics he introduced a complete revolution in method. He placed the -negative in the front of his procedure; giving to it a point, an -emphasis, a substantive value, which no one had done before. His -peculiar gift was that of cross-examination, or the application of his -Elenchus to discriminate pretended from real knowledge. He found men -full of confident beliefs on these ethical and political -topics--affirming with words which they had never troubled themselves -to define--and persuaded that they required no farther teaching: yet at -the same time unable to give clear or consistent answers to his -questions, and shown by this convincing test to be destitute of real -knowledge. Declaring this false persuasion of knowledge, or confident -unreasoned belief, to be universal, he undertook, as the mission of -his life, to expose it: and he proclaimed that until the mind was -disabused thereof and made painfully conscious of ignorance, no -affirmative reasoned truth could be presented with any chance of -success. - -Such are the peculiar features of the Sokratic dialogue, exemplified -in the compositions here reviewed. I do not mean that Sokrates always -talked so; but that such was the marked peculiarity which -distinguished his talking from that of others. It is philosophy, or -reasoned truth, approached in the most polemical manner; operative at -first only to discredit the natural, unreasoned intellectual growths -of the ordinary mind, and to generate a painful consciousness of -ignorance. I say this here, and I shall often say it again throughout -these volumes. It is absolutely indispensable to the understanding of -the Platonic dialogues; one half of which must appear unmeaning, -unless construed with reference to this separate function and value of -negative dialectic. Whether readers may themselves agree in such -estimation of negative dialectic, is another question: but they must -keep it in mind as the governing sentiment of Plato during much of his -life, and of Sokrates throughout the whole of life: as being moreover -one main cause of that antipathy which Sokrates inspired to many -respectable orthodox contemporaries. I have thought it right to take -constant account of this orthodox sentiment among the ordinary public, -as the perpetual drag-chain, even when its force is not absolutely -repressive, upon free speculation. - -Proceeding upon this general view, I have interpreted the numerous -negative dialogues in Plato as being really negative and nothing -beyond. I have not presumed, still less tried to divine, an ulterior -Affirmative beyond what the text reveals--neither _arcana coelestia_, -like Proklus and Ficinus,[3] nor any other _arcanum_ of terrestrial -character. While giving such an analysis of each dialogue as my space -permitted and as will enable the reader to comprehend its general -scope and peculiarities--I have studied each as it stands written, and -have rarely ascribed to Plato any purpose exceeding what he himself -intimates. Where I find difficulties forcibly dwelt upon without any -solution, I imagine, not that he had a good solution kept back in his -closet, but that he had failed in finding one: that he thought it -useful, as a portion of the total process necessary for finding and -authenticating reasoned truth, both to work out these unsolved -difficulties for himself, and to force them impressively upon the -attention of others.[4] - -[Footnote 3: F. A. Wolf, Vorrede, Plato, Sympos. p. vi. - -"Ficinus suchte, wie er sich in der Zueignungsschrift seiner Vision -ausdrückt, im Platon allenthalben _arcana coelestia_: und da er sie -in seinem Kopfe mitbrachte, so konnte es ihm nicht sauer werden, -etwas zu finden, was freilich jedem andern verborgen bleiben muss."] - -[Footnote 4: A striking passage from Bentham illustrates very well -both the Sokratic and the Platonic point of view. (Principles of -Morals and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. xvi. p. 57, ed. 1823.) - -"Gross ignorance descries no difficulties. Imperfect knowledge finds -them out and struggles with them. It must be perfect knowledge that -overcomes them." - -Of the three different mental conditions here described, the first is -that against which Sokrates made war, _i.e._ real ignorance, and false -persuasion of knowledge, which therefore descries no difficulties. - -The second, or imperfect knowledge struggling with difficulties, is -represented by the Platonic negative dialogues. - -The third--or perfect knowledge victorious over difficulties--will be -found in the following pages marked by the character [Greek: to\ -du/nasthai lo/gon dido/nai kai\ de/chesthai]. You do not possess "perfect -knowledge," until you are able to answer, with unfaltering promptitude -and consistency, all the questions of a Sokratic cross-examiner--and -to administer effectively the like cross-examination yourself, for the -purpose of testing others. [Greek: O(\lôs de\ sêmei=on tou= ei)do/tos -to\ du/nasthai dida/skein e)/stin.] (Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 981, b. -8.) - -Perfect knowledge, corresponding to this definition, will not be found -manifested in Plato. Instead of it, we note in his latter years the -lawgiver's assumed infallibility.] - -Moreover, I deal with each dialogue as a separate composition. Each -represents the intellectual scope and impulse of a peculiar moment, -which may or may not be in harmony with the rest. Plato would have -protested not less earnestly than Cicero,[5] against those who sought -to foreclose debate, in the grave and arduous struggles for searching -out reasoned truth--and to bind down the free inspirations of his -intellect in one dialogue, by appealing to sentence already pronounced -in another preceding. Of two inconsistent trains of reasoning, both -cannot indeed be true--but both are often useful to be known and -studied: and the philosopher, who professes to master the theory of -his subject, ought not to be a stranger to either. All minds athirst -for reasoned truth will be greatly aided in forming their opinions by -the number of points which Plato suggests, though they find little -which he himself settles for them finally. - -[Footnote 5: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 11, 38. - -The collocutor remarks that what Cicero says is inconsistent with -what he (Cicero) had written in the fourth book De Finibus. -To which Cicero replies:-- - -"Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum, et testificaris, quid -dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus -impositis disputant. Nos in diem vivimus: quodcunque nostros animos -probabilitate percussit, id dicimus: itaque soli sumus liberi."] - -There have been various critics, who, on perceiving inconsistencies in -Plato, either force them into harmony by a subtle exegêsis, or discard -one of them as spurious.[6] I have not followed either course. I -recognise such inconsistencies, when found, as facts--and even as very -interesting facts--in his philosophical character. To the marked -contradiction in the spirit of the Leges, as compared with the earlier -Platonic compositions, I have called special attention. Plato has been -called by Plutarch a mixture of Sokrates with Lykurgus. The two -elements are in reality opposite, predominant at different times: -Plato begins his career with the confessed ignorance and philosophical -negative of Sokrates: he closes it with the peremptory, dictatorial, -affirmative of Lykurgus. - -[Footnote 6: Since the publication of the first edition of this work, -there have appeared valuable commentaries on the philosophy of the -late Sir William Hamilton, by Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. Stirling -and others. They have exposed inconsistencies, both grave and -numerous, in some parts of Sir William Hamilton's writings as compared -with others. But no one has dreamt of drawing an inference from this -fact, that one or other of the inconsistent trains of reasoning must -be spurious, falsely ascribed to Sir William Hamilton. - -Now in the case of Plato, this same fact of inconsistency is accepted -by nearly all his commentators as a sound basis for the inference that -both the inconsistent treatises cannot be genuine: though the dramatic -character of Plato's writings makes inconsistencies much more easily -supposable than in dogmatic treatises such as those of Hamilton.] - -To Xenophon, who belongs only in part to my present work, and whose -character presents an interesting contrast with Plato, I have devoted -a separate chapter. To the other less celebrated Sokratic Companions -also, I have endeavoured to do justice, as far as the scanty means of -knowledge permit: to them, especially, because they have generally -been misconceived and unduly depreciated. - -The present volumes, however, contain only one half of the speculative -activity of Hellas during the fourth century B.C. The second half, in -which Aristotle is the hero, remains still wanting. If my health and -energies continue, I hope one day to be able to supply this want: and -thus to complete from my own point of view, the history, speculative -as well as active, of the Hellenic race, down to the date which I -prescribed to myself in the Preface of my History near twenty years -ago. - -The philosophy of the fourth century B.C. is peculiarly valuable and -interesting, not merely from its intrinsic speculative worth--from the -originality and grandeur of its two principal heroes--from its -coincidence with the full display of dramatic, rhetorical, artistic -genius--but also from a fourth reason not unimportant--because it is -purely Hellenic; preceding the development of Alexandria, and the -amalgamation of Oriental veins of thought with the inspirations of the -Academy or the Lyceum. The Orontes[7] and the Jordan had not yet begun -to flow westward, and to impart their own colour to the waters of -Attica and Latium. Not merely the real world, but also the ideal -world, present to the minds of Plato and Aristotle, were purely -Hellenic. Even during the century immediately following, this had -ceased to be fully true in respect to the philosophers of Athens: and -it became less and less true with each succeeding century. New foreign -centres of rhetoric and literature--Asiatic and Alexandrian -Hellenism--were fostered into importance by regal encouragement. Plato -and Aristotle are thus the special representatives of genuine Hellenic -philosophy. The remarkable intellectual ascendancy acquired by them in -their own day, and maintained over succeeding centuries, was one main -reason why the Hellenic vein was enabled so long to maintain itself, -though in impoverished condition, against adverse influences from the -East, ever increasing in force. Plato and Aristotle outlasted all -their Pagan successors--successors at once less purely Hellenic and -less highly gifted. And when Saint Jerome, near 750 years after the -decease of Plato, commemorated with triumph the victory of unlettered -Christians over the accomplishments and genius of Paganism--he -illustrated the magnitude of the victory, by singling out Plato and -Aristotle as the representatives of vanquished philosophy.[8] - -[Footnote 7: Juvenal iii. 62:-- - -"Jampridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes," &c.] - -[Footnote 8: The passage is a remarkable one, as marking both the -effect produced on a Latin scholar by Hebrew studies, and the neglect -into which even the greatest writers of classical antiquity had then -fallen (about 400 A.D.). - -Hieronymus--Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas, iii. 5, p. 486-487, ed. -Venet. 1769:-- - -"Sed omnem sermonis elegantiam, et Latini sermonis venustatem, stridor -lectionis Hebraicæ sordidavit. Nostis enim et ipsæ" (_i.e._ Paula and -Eustochium, to whom his letter is addressed) "quod plus quam quindecim -anni sunt, ex quo in manus meas nunquam Tullius, nunquam Maro, nunquam -Gentilium literarum quilibet Auctor ascendit: et si quid forte inde, -dum loquimur, obrepit, quasi antiqua per nebulam somnii recordamur. -Quod autem profecerim ex linguæ illius infatigabili studio, aliorum -judicio derelinquo: _ego quid in meâ amiserim, scio_ . . . Si quis -eloquentiam quærit vel declamationibus delectatur, habet in utrâque -linguâ Demosthenem et Tullium, Polemonem et Quintilianum. Ecclesia -Christi non de Academiâ et Lyceo, sed de vili plebeculâ congregata -est. . . . Quotusquisque nunc Aristotelem legit? Quanti Platonis vel -libros novêre vel nomen? Vix in angulis otiosi eos senes recolunt. -Rusticanos vero et piscatores nostros totus orbis loquitur, universus -mundus sonat."] - - - - -CONTENTS. - -PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. - -CHAPTER I. - -Speculative Philosophy in Greece, before and in the time of Sokrates. - - -Change in the political condition of Greece during the life of Plato 1 - -Early Greek mind, satisfied with the belief in polytheistic personal -agents, as the real producing causes of phenomena 2 - -Belief in such agency continued among the general public, even after -the various sects of philosophy had arisen 3 - -Thales, the first Greek who propounded the hypothesis of physical -agency in place of personal. Water, the primordial substance, or -[Greek: a)rchê/] 4 - -Anaximander--laid down as [Greek: a)rchê/] the Infinite or -Indeterminate--generation of the elements out of it, by evolution of -latent, fundamental contraries--astronomical and geological doctrines -_ib._ - -Anaximenes--adopted Air as [Greek: a)rchê/]--rise of substances out of -it, by condensation and rarefaction 7 - -Pythagoras--his life and career--Pythagorean brotherhood--great -political influence which it acquired among the Greco-Italian -cities--incurred great enmity, and was violently put down 8 - -The Pythagoreans continue as a recluse sect, without political power 9 - -Doctrine of the Pythagoreans--Number the Essence of Things _ib._ - -The Monas--[Greek: a)rchê/], or principle of Number--geometrical -conception of number--symbolical attributes of the first ten numbers, -especially of the Dekad 11 - -Pythagorean Kosmos and Astronomy--geometrical and harmonic laws -guiding the movements of the cosmical bodies 12 - -Music of the Spheres 14 - -Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries--Ten opposing pairs _ib._ - -Eleatic philosophy--Xenophanes 16 - -His censures upon the received Theogony and religious rites _ib._ - -His doctrine of Pankosmism; or Pantheism--the whole Kosmos is Ens Unum -or God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pan]. Non-Ens inadmissible 17 - -Scepticism of Xenophanes--complaint of philosophy as unsatisfactory 18 - -His conjectures on physics and astronomy _ib._ - -Parmenides continues the doctrine of Xenophanes--Ens Parmenideum, -self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, extended--Non-Ens, an unmeaning -phrase 19 - -He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and relative, apart from -Ens 20 - -Parmenidean ontology--stands completely apart from phenomenology 21 - -Parmenidean phenomenology--relative and variable 23 - -Parmenides recognises no truth, but more or less of probability, in -phenomenal explanations.--His physical and astronomical conjectures 24 - -Herakleitus--his obscure style, impressive metaphors, confident and -contemptuous dogmatism 26 - -Doctrine of Herakleitus--perpetual process of generation and -destruction--everything flows, nothing stands--transition of the -elements into each other backwards and forwards 27 - -Variety of metaphors employed by Herakleitus, signifying the same -general doctrine 28 - -Nothing permanent except the law of process and implication of -contraries--the transmutative force. Fixity of particulars is an -illusion for the most part: so far as it exists, it is a sin against -the order of Nature 29 - -Illustrations by which Herakleitus symbolized his perpetual force, -destroying and generating 30 - -Water--Intermediate between Fire (Air) and Earth 31 - -Sun and Stars--not solid bodies, but meteoric aggregations dissipated -and renewed--Eclipses--[Greek: e)kpu/rôsis], or destruction of the -Kosmos by fire 32 - -His doctrines respecting the human soul and human knowledge. All -wisdom resided in the Universal Reason--individual Reason is -worthless 34 - -By Universal Reason, he did not mean the Reason of most men as it is, -but as it ought to be 35 - -Herakleitus at the opposite pole from Parmenides 37 - -Empedokles--his doctrine of the four elements and two moving or -restraining forces _ib._ - -Construction of the Kosmos from these elements and forces--action and -counteraction of love and enmity. The Kosmos alternately made and -unmade 38 - -Empedoklean predestined cycle of things--complete empire of Love -Sphærus--Empire of Enmity--disengagement or separation of the -elements--astronomy and meteorology 39 - -Formation of the Earth, of Gods, men, animals, and plants 41 - -Physiology of Empedokles--Procreation--Respiration--movement of the -blood 43 - -Doctrine of effluvia and pores--explanation of -perceptions--intercommunication of the elements with the sentient -subject--like acting upon like 44 - -Sense of vision 45 - -Senses of hearing, smell, taste 46 - -Empedokles declared that justice absolutely forbade the killing of -anything that had life. His belief in the metempsychosis. Sufferings -of life, are an expiation for wrong done during an antecedent life. -Pretensions to magical power 46 - -Complaint of Empedokles on the impossibility of finding out truth 47 - -Theory of Anaxagoras denied--generation and destruction--recognised -only mixture and severance of pre-existing kinds of matter 48 - -Homoeomeries--small particles of diverse kinds of matter, all mixed -together _ib._ - -First condition of things all--the primordial varieties of matter were -huddled together in confusion. [Greek: Nou=s] or reason, distinct from -all of them, supervened and acted upon this confused mass, setting the -constituent particles in movement 49 - -Movement of rotation in the mass, originated by [Greek: Nou=s] on a -small scale, but gradually extending itself. Like particles congregate -together--distinguishable aggregates are formed 50 - -Nothing (except [Greek: Nou=s]) can be entirely pure or unmixed; but -other things may be comparatively pure. Flesh, Bone, &c., are purer -than Air or Earth 51 - -Theory of Anaxagoras, compared with that of Empedokles 52 - -Suggested partly by the phenomena of of animal nutrition 53 - -Chaos common to both Empedokles and Anaxagoras: moving agency, -different in one from the other theory 54 - -[Greek: Nou=s], or mind, postulated by Anaxagoras--how understood by -later writers--how intended by Anaxagoras himself _ib._ - -Plato and Aristotle blame Anaxagoras for deserting his own theory 56 - -Astronomy and physics of Anaxagoras 57 - -His geology, meteorology, physiology 58 - -The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and impious 59 - -Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element 60 - -Air was the primordial, universal element 61 - -Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was eminently -modifiable _ib._ - -Physiology of Diogenes--his description of the veins in the human -body 62 - -Kosmology and Meteorology 64 - -Leukippus and Demokritus--Atomic theory 65 - -Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions, of Demokritus -_ib._ - -Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of Parmenides 66 - -Demokritean theory--Atoms Plena and Vacua--Ens and Non-Ens 67 - -Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, position, and -arrangement--they had no qualities, but their movements and -combinations generated qualities 69 - -Combination of atoms--generating different qualities in the compound 70 - -All atoms essentially separate from each other 71 - -All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, were phenomenal -and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no knowledge of the -real and absolute _ib._ - -Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little of it was -attainable 72 - -No separate force required to set the atoms in motion--they moved by -an inherent force of their own. Like atoms naturally tend towards -like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the Kosmos 72 - -Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal generation 75 - -His account of mind--he identified it with heat or fire, diffused -throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental particles -intermingled throughout all frame with corporeal particles _ib._ - -Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body 76 - -Explanation of different sensations and perceptions. Colours 77 - -Vision caused by the outflow of effluvia or images from objects. -Hearing 78 - -Difference of tastes--how explained _ib._ - -Thought or intelligence--was produced by influx of atoms from without 79 - -Sensation, obscure knowledge relative to the sentient: Thought, -genuine knowledge--absolute, or object _per se_ 80 - -Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which determined the -tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c. 81 - -Universality of Demokritus--his ethical views 82 - - -CHAPTER II. - - -General Remarks on the Earlier Philosophers--Growth of Dialectic--Zeno -and Gorgias. - -Variety of sects and theories--multiplicity of individual authorities -is the characteristic of Greek philosophy 84 - -These early theorists are not known from their own writings, which -have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about them 85 - -Abundance of speculative genius and invention--a memorable fact in the -Hellenic mind 86 - -Difficulties which a Grecian philosopher had to overcome--prevalent -view of Nature, established, impressive, and misleading _ib._ - -Views of the Ionic philosophers--compared with the more recent -abstractions of Plato and Aristotle 87 - -Parmenides and Pythagoras--more nearly akin to Plato and Aristotle 89 - -Advantage derived from this variety of constructive imagination among -the Greeks 90 - -All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, Zeno, Plato, -and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of negative -Dialectic 91 - -The early theorists were studied, along with Plato and Aristotle, in -the third and second centuries B.C. 92 - -Negative attribute common to all the early theorists--little or no -dialectic 93 - -Zeno of Elea--Melissus _ib._ - -Zeno's Dialectic--he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, by showing -that their assumptions led to contradictions and absurdities 93 - -Consequences of their assumption of Entia Plura Discontinua. -Reductiones ad absurdum 94 - -Each thing must exist in its own place--Grain of millet not sonorous 95 - -Zenonian arguments in regard to motion 97 - -General purpose and result of the Zenonian Dialectic. Nothing is -knowable except the relative 98 - -Mistake of supposing Zeno's _reductiones ad absurdum_ of an opponent's -doctrine, to be contradictions of data generalized from experience 99 - -Zenonian Dialectic--Platonic Parmenides 100 - -Views of historians of philosophy, respecting Zeno 101 - -Absolute and relative--the first, unknowable _ib._ - -Zeno did not deny motion, as a fact, phenomenal and relative 102 - -Gorgias the Leontine--did not admit the Absolute, even as conceived by -Parmenides 103 - -His reasonings against the Absolute, either as Ens or Entia _ib._ - -Ens, incogitable and unknowable 104 - -Ens, even if granted to be knowable, is still incommunicable to others -_ib._ - -Zeno and Gorgias--contrasted with the earlier Grecian philosophers 105 - -New character of Grecian philosophy--antithesis of affirmative and -negative--proof and disproof _ib._ - - -CHAPTER III. - - -Other Companions of Sokrates. - -Influence exercised by Sokrates over his companions 110 - -Names of those companions 111 - -Æschines--Oration of Lysias against him 112 - -Written Sokratic Dialogues--their general character 114 - -Relations between the companions of Sokrates--Their proceedings after -the death of Sokrates 116 - -No Sokratic school--each of the companions took a line of his own 117 - -Eukleides of Megara--he blended Parmenides with Sokrates 118 - -Doctrine of Eukleides about _Bonum_ 119 - -The doctrine compared to that of Plato--changes in Plato _ib._ - -Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as Eukleides 120 - -Megaric succession of philosophers. Eleian or Eretrian succession 121 - -Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus--Ethical, not transcendental 122 - -Preponderance of the negative vein in the Platonic age 123 - -Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the negative -vein _ib._ - -Negative method in philosophy essential to the controul of the -affirmative _ib._ - -Sokrates--the most persevering and acute Eristic of his age 124 - -Platonic Parmenides--its extreme negative character 125 - -The Megarics shared the negative impulse with Sokrates and Plato 126 - -Eubulides--his logical problems or puzzles--difficulty of solving -them--many solutions attempted 128 - -Real character of the Megaric sophisms, not calculated to deceive, but -to guard against deception 129 - -If the process of theorising be admissible, it must include negative -as well as affirmative 130 - -Logical position of the Megaric philosophers erroneously described by -historians of philosophy. Necessity of a complete collection of -difficulties 131 - -Sophisms propounded by Eubulides. 1. Mentiens. 2. The Veiled Man. 3. -Sorites. 4. Cornutus 133 - -Causes of error constant--The Megarics were sentinels against them 135 - -Controversy of the Megarics with Aristotle about Power. Arguments of -Aristotle _ib._ - -These arguments not valid against the Megarici 136 - -His argument cited and criticised 137 - -Potential as distinguished from the Actual--What it is 139 - -Diodôrus Kronus--his doctrine about [Greek: to\ dunato/n] 140 - -Sophism of Diodôrus [Greek: O( Kurieu/ôn] 141 - -Question between Aristotle and Diodôrus, depends upon whether -universal regularity of sequence be admitted or denied _ib._ - -Conclusion of Diodôrus defended by Hobbes--Explanation given by -Hobbes 143 - -Reasonings of Diodôrus--respecting Hypothetical -Propositions--respecting Motion. His difficulties about the _Now_ -of time 145 - -Motion is always present, past, and future 146 - -Stilpon of Megara--His great celebrity 147 - -Menedêmus and the Eretriacs 148 - -Open speech and licence of censure assumed by Menedêmus 149 - -Antisthenes took up Ethics principally, but with negative Logic -intermingled _ib._ - -He copied the manner of life of Sokrates, in plainness and rigour 150 - -Doctrines of Antisthenes exclusively ethical and ascetic. He despised -music, literature, and physics 151 - -Constant friendship of Antisthenes with Sokrates--Xenophontic -Symposion 152 - -Diogenes, successor of Antisthenes--His Cynical perfection--striking -effect which he produced _ib._ - -Doctrines and smart sayings of Diogenes--Contempt of -pleasure--training and labour required--indifference to literature -and geometry 154 - -Admiration of Epiktêtus for Diogenes, especially for his consistency -in acting out his own ethical creed 157 - -Admiration excited by the asceticism of the Cynics--Asceticism extreme -in the East. Comparison of the Indian Gymnosophists with Diogenes -_ib._ - -The precepts and principles laid down by Sokrates were carried into -fullest execution by the Cynics 160 - -Antithesis between Nature and Law or Convention insisted on by the -Indian Gymnosophists 162 - -The Greek Cynics--an order of ascetic or mendicant friars 163 - -Logical views of Antisthenes and Diogenes--they opposed the Platonic -Ideas _ib._ - -First protest of Nominalism against Realism 164 - -Doctrine of Antisthenes about predication--He admits no other -predication but identical 165 - -The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of Aristotle 166 - -Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental predication 167 - -Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could belong to -more than one subject 169 - -Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenides _ib._ - -Menedêmus disallowed all negative predications 170 - -Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and complex -objects. Simple objects undefinable 171 - -Remarks of Plato on this doctrine 172 - -Remarks of Aristotle upon the same _ib._ - -Later Grecian Cynics--Monimus--Krates--Hipparchia 173 - -Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus 174 - -Aristippus--life, character, and doctrine 175 - -Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus _ib._ - -Choice of Hêraklês 177 - -Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting Good and -Evil _ib._ - -Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates 178 - -Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus--Kalliklês in Platonic -Gorgias 179 - -Language held by Aristippus--his scheme of life 181 - -Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the character of -the hearer 182 - -Conversation between Sokrates and Aristippus about the Good and -Beautiful 184 - -Remarks on the conversation--Theory of Good 185 - -Good is relative to human beings and wants in the view of Sokrates -_ib._ - -Aristippus adhered to the doctrine of Sokrates 186 - -Life and dicta of Aristippus--His type of character _ib._ - -Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates 187 - -Self mastery and independence--the great aspiration of Aristippus 188 - -Aristippus compared with Antisthenes and Diogenes--Points of agreement -and disagreement between them 190 - -Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and philosophy--contempt for other -studies 192 - -Aristippus taught as a Sophist. His reputation thus acquired procured -for him the attentions of Dionysius and others 193 - -Ethical theory of Aristippus and the Kyrenaic philosophers 195 - -Prudence--good, by reason of the pleasure which it ensured, and of the -pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and honourable, by law or -custom--not by nature 197 - -Their logical theory--nothing knowable except the phenomenal, our own -sensations and feelings--no knowledge of the absolute 197 - -Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus passed to the Stoics and -Epikureans 198 - -Ethical theory of Aristippus is identical with that of the Platonic -Sokrates in the Protagoras 199 - -Difference in the manner of stating the theory by the two 200 - -Distinction to be made between a general theory--and the particular -application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes and -circumstances 201 - -Kyrenaic theorists after Aristippus 202 - -Theodôrus--Annikeris--Hegesias _ib._ - -Hegesias--Low estimation of life--renunciation of -pleasure--coincidence with the Cynics 203 - -Doctrine of Relativity affirmed by the Kyrenaics, as well as by -Protagoras 204 - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -Xenophon. - - -Xenophon--his character--essentially a man of action and not a -theorist--the Sokratic element is in him an accessory 206 - -Date of Xenophon--probable year of his birth 207 - -His personal history--He consults Sokrates--takes the opinion of the -Delphian oracle 208 - -His service and command with the Ten Thousand Greeks, afterwards under -Agesilaus and the Spartans.--He is banished from Athens 209 - -His residence at Skillus near Olympia 210 - -Family of Xenophon--his son Gryllus killed at Mantineia _ib._ - -Death of Xenophon at Corinth--Story of the Eleian Exegetæ 211 - -Xenophon different from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren 212 - -His various works--Memorabilia, Oekonomikus, &c. 213 - -Ischomachus, hero of the Oekonomikus--ideal of an active citizen, -cultivator, husband, house-master, &c. 214 - -Text upon which Xenophon insists--capital difference between command -over subordinates willing and subordinates unwilling 215 - -Probable circumstances generating these reflections in Xenophon's -mind 215 - -This text affords subjects for the Hieron and Cyropædia--Name of -Sokrates not suitable 216 - -Hieron--Persons of the dialogue--Simonides and Hieron _ib._ - -Questions put to Hieron, view taken by Simonides. Answer of Hieron 217 - -Misery of governing unwilling subjects declared by Hieron 218 - -Advice to Hieron by Simonides--that he should govern well, and thus -make himself beloved by his subjects 219 - -Probable experience had by Xenophon of the feelings at Olympia against -Dionysius 220 - -Xenophon could not have chosen a Grecian despot to illustrate his -theory of the happiness of governing willing subjects 222 - -Cyropædia--blending of Spartan and Persian customs--Xenophon's -experience of Cyrus the Younger _ib._ - -Portrait of Cyrus the Great--his education--Preface to the Cyropædia 223 - -Xenophon does not solve his own problem--The governing aptitude and -popularity of Cyrus come from nature, not from education 225 - -Views of Xenophon about public and official training of all citizens 226 - -Details of (so called) Persian education--Severe -discipline--Distribution of four ages 227 - -Evidence of the good effect of this discipline--Hard and dry condition -of the body 228 - -Exemplary obedience of Cyrus to the public discipline--He had learnt -justice well--His award about the two coats--Lesson inculcated upon -him by the Justice-Master 229 - -Xenophon's conception of the Sokratic problems--He does not recognise -the Sokratic order of solution of those problems 230 - -Definition given by Sokrates of Justice--Insufficient to satisfy the -exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus 231 - -Biography of Cyrus--constant military success earned by suitable -qualities--Variety of characters and situations 232 - -Generous and amiable qualities of Cyrus. Abradates and Pantheia 233 - -Scheme of government devised by Cyrus when his conquests are -completed--Oriental despotism, wisely arranged 234 - -Persian present reality--is described by Xenophon as thoroughly -depraved, in striking contrast to the establishment of Cyrus 236 - -Xenophon has good experience of military and equestrian -proceedings--No experience of finance and commerce 236 - -Discourse of Xenophon on Athenian finance and the condition of Athens. -His admiration of active commerce and variety of pursuits _ib._ - -Recognised poverty among the citizens. Plan for improvement 238 - -Advantage of a large number of Metics. How these may be encouraged -_ib._ - -Proposal to raise by voluntary contributions a large sum to be -employed as capital by the city. Distribution of three oboli per head -per day to all the citizens _ib._ - -Purpose and principle of this distribution 240 - -Visionary anticipations of Xenophon, financial and commercial 241 - -Xenophon exhorts his countrymen to maintain peace 243 - -Difference of the latest compositions of Xenophon and Plato, from -their point of view in the earlier 244 - - -CHAPTER V. - - -Life of Plato. - - -Scanty information about Plato's life 246 - -His birth, parentage, and early education 247 - -Early relations of Plato with Sokrates 248 - -Plato's youth--service as a citizen and soldier 249 - -Period of political ambition 251 - -He becomes disgusted with politics 252 - -He retires from Athens after the death of Sokrates--his travels 253 - -His permanent establishment at Athens--386 B.C. _ib._ - -He commences his teaching at the Academy 254 - -Plato as a teacher--pupils numerous and wealthy, from different -cities 255 - -Visit of Plato to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse, 367 B.C. Second -visit to the same--mortifying failure 258 - -Expedition of Dion against Dionysius--sympathies of Plato and the -Academy 259 - -Success, misconduct, and death of Dion _ib._ - -Death of Plato, aged 80, 347 B.C. 260 - -Scholars of Plato--Aristotle _ib._ - -Little known about Plato's personal history 262 - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -Platonic Canon, as Recognised by Thrasyllus. - -Platonic Canon--Ancient and modern discussions 264 - -Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its favour 265 - -Fixed residence and school at Athens--founded by Plato and transmitted -to successors _ib._ - -Importance of this foundation. Preservation of Plato's manuscripts. -School library 266 - -Security provided by the school for distinguishing what were Plato's -genuine writings 267 - -Unfinished fragments and preparatory sketches, preserved and published -after Plato's death 268 - -Peripatetic school at the Lykeum--its composition and arrangement 269 - -Peripatetic school library, its removal from Athens to Skêpsis--its -ultimate restitution in a damaged state to Athens, then to Rome 270 - -Inconvenience to the Peripatetic school from the loss of its library -_ib._ - -Advantage to the Platonic school from having preserved its MSS. 272 - -Conditions favourable, for preserving the genuine works of Plato -_ib._ - -Historical facts as to their preservation _ib._ - -Arrangement of them into Trilogies, by Aristophanes 273 - -Aristophanes, librarian at the Alexandrine library _ib._ - -Plato's works in the Alexandrine library, before the time of -Aristophanes 274 - -Kallimachus--predecessor of Aristophanes--his published Tables of -authors whose works were in the library 275 - -Large and rapid accumulation of the Alexandrine Library _ib._ - -Plato's works--in the library at the time of Kallimachus 276 - -First formation of the library--intended as a copy of the Platonic and -Aristotelian [Greek: Mousei=a] at Athens 277 - -Favour of Ptolemy Soter towards the philosophers at Athens 279 - -Demetrius Phalereus--his history and character _ib._ - -He was chief agent in the first establishment of the Alexandrine -Library 280 - -Proceedings of Demetrius in beginning to collect the library 282 - -Certainty that the works of Plato and Aristotle were among the -earliest acquisitions made by him for the library 283 - -Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring good MSS. 285 - -Catalogue of Platonic works, prepared by Aristophanes, is trustworthy -_ib._ - -No canonical or exclusive order of the Platonic dialogues, when -arranged by Aristophanes 286 - -Other libraries and literary centres, besides Alexandria, in which -spurious Platonic works might get footing _ib._ - -Other critics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different arrangements -of the Platonic dialogues 287 - -Panætius, the Stoic--considered the Phædon to be spurious--earliest -known example of a Platonic dialogue disallowed upon internal -grounds 288 - -Classification of Platonic works by the rhetor -Thrasyllus--dramatic--philosophical 289 - -Dramatic principle--Tetralogies _ib._ - -Philosophical principle--Dialogues of Search--Dialogues of -Exposition 291 - -Incongruity and repugnance of the two classifications 294 - -Dramatic principle of classification--was inherited by Thrasyllus from -Aristophanes 295 - -Authority of the Alexandrine library--editions of Plato published, -with the Alexandrine critical marks _ib._ - -Thrasyllus followed the Alexandrine library and Aristophanes, as to -genuine Platonic works 296 - -Ten spurious dialogues, rejected by all other critics as well as by -Thrasyllus--evidence that these critics followed the common authority -of the Alexandrine library 297 - -Thrasyllus did not follow an internal sentiment of his own in -rejecting dialogues as spurious 298 - -Results as to the trustworthiness of the Thrasyllean Canon 299 - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -Platonic Canon, as Appreciated and Modified by Modern Critics. - -The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally acknowledged, by the -Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the succeeding critics after -the revival of learning 301 - -Serranus--his six Syzygies--left the aggregate Canon unchanged, -Tennemann--importance assigned to the Phædrus 302 - -Schleiermacher--new theory about the purposes of Plato. One -philosophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the beginning--essential -order and interdependence of the dialogues, as contributing to the -full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not constituent items in -the series, but lying alongside of it. Order of arrangement 303 - -Theory of Ast--he denies the reality of any preconceived -scheme--considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas 304 - -His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen dialogues as -genuine, rejecting all the rest 305 - -Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme--his arrangement -of the dialogues, differing from both Ast and Schleiermacher--he -rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias, with -many others 306 - -Schleiermacher and Ast both consider Phædrus and Protagoras as early -compositions--Socher puts Protagoras into the second period, Phædrus -into the third 307 - -K. F. Hermann--Stallbaum--both of them consider the Phædrus as a late -dialogue--both of them deny preconceived order and system--their -arrangements of the dialogues--they admit new and varying -philosophical points of view _ib._ - -They reject several dialogues 309 - -Steinhart--agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's fundamental -postulate--his arrangement of the dialogues--considers the Phædrus -as late in order--rejects several _ib._ - -Susemihl--coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hermann--his order of -arrangement 310 - -Edward Munk--adopts a different principle of arrangement, founded upon -the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the life, -philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates--his arrangement, -founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of -composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic -plan 311 - -Views of Ueberweg--attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and -Hermann--admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues, -composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the -earlier 313 - -His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the dialogues, He -rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, Parmenidês: he is -inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus 314 - -Other Platonic critics--great dissensions about scheme and order of -the dialogues 316 - -Contrast of different points of view instructive--but no solution has -been obtained _ib._ - -The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of the theory -propounded by Schleiermacher--slenderness of his proofs 317 - -Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived scheme, and a -peremptory order of interdependence among the dialogues 318 - -Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the Phædrus inadmissible 319 - -Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet produced any -tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic dialogues -_ib._ - -Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most gratuitous, next to -Schleiermacher's 320 - -The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a circumstance of -little moment _ib._ - -No intentional sequence or interdependence of the dialogues can be -made out 322 - -Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is reasonable--successive -changes in Plato's point of view: but we cannot explain either the -order or the causes of these changes _ib._ - -Hermann's view more tenable than Schleiermacher's 323 - -Small number of certainties, or even reasonable presumptions, as to -date or order of the dialogues 324 - -Trilogies indicated by Plato himself 325 - -Positive dates of all the dialogues--unknown 326 - -When did Plato begin to compose? Not till after the death of Sokrates -_ib._ - -Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition--does not consist -with youth of the author 327 - -Reasons founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his relations with -Plato 328 - -Reasons, founded on the early life, character, and position of Plato 330 - -Plato's early life--active by necessity, and to some extent -ambitious 331 - -Plato did not retire from political life until after the restoration -of the democracy, nor devote himself to philosophy until after the -death of Sokrates 333 - -All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one years after -the death of Sokrates 334 - -The Thrasyllean Canon is more worthy of trust than the modern critical -theories by which it has been condemned 335 - -Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed 336 - -Opinions of Schleiermacher, tending to show this 337 - -Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties, and must be -based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to the exclusion -of the rest 339 - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - -Platonic Compositions Generally. - -Variety and abundance visible in Plato's writings 342 - -Plato both sceptical and dogmatical _ib._ - -Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in all 343 - -Form of dialogue--universal to this extent, that Plato never speaks in -his own name 344 - -No one common characteristic pervading all Plato's works _ib._ - -The real Plato was not merely a writer of dialogues, but also lecturer -and president of a school. In this last important function he is -scarcely at all known to us. Notes of his lectures taken by -Aristotle 346 - -Plato's lectures De Bono obscure and transcendental. Effect which they -produced on the auditors 347 - -They were delivered to miscellaneous auditors. They coincide mainly -with what Aristotle states about the Platonic Ideas 348 - -The lectures De Bono may perhaps have been more transcendental than -Plato's other lectures 349 - -Plato's Epistles--in them only he speaks in his own person _ib._ - -Intentional obscurity of his Epistles in reference to philosophical -doctrine 350 - -Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. His anxiety to -confine philosophy to discussion among select and prepared minds 351 - -He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative exposition of his own -philosophical doctrine 352 - -He illustrates his doctrine by the successive stages of geometrical -teaching. Difficulty to avoid the creeping in of error at each of -these stages 353 - -No written exposition can keep clear of these chances of error 355 - -Relations of Plato with Dionysius II. and the friends of the deceased -Dion. Pretensions of Dionysius to understand and expound Plato's -doctrines _ib._ - -Impossibility of teaching by written exposition assumed by Plato; the -assumption intelligible in his day 357 - -Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the expository -process.--Power of sustaining a Sokratic cross-examination 358 - -Plato never published any of the lectures which he delivered at the -Academy _ib._ - -Plato would never publish his philosophical opinions in his own name; -but he may have published them in the dialogues under the name of -others 360 - -Groups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown 361 - -Distribution made by Thrasyllus defective, but still useful--Dialogues -of Search, Dialogues of Exposition _ib._ - -Dialogues of Exposition--present affirmative result. Dialogues of -Search are wanting in that attribute 362 - -The distribution coincides mainly with that of Aristotle--Dialectic, -Demonstrative 363 - -Classification of Thrasyllus in its details. He applies his own -principles erroneously 364 - -The classification, as it would stand, if his principles were applied -correctly 365 - -Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over the -expository and dogmatical 366 - -Dialogues of Search--sub-classes among them recognised by -Thrasyllus--Gymnastic and Agonistic, &c. _ib._ - -Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative teaching, -positive results, direct proofs _ib._ - -The Platonic Dialogues of Search disclaim authority and -teaching--assume truth to be unknown to all alike--follow a process -devious as well as fruitless 367 - -The questioner has no predetermined course, but follows the lead given -by the respondent in his answers _ib._ - -Relation of teacher and learner. Appeal to authority is suppressed 368 - -In the modern world the search for truth is put out of sight. Every -writer or talker professes to have already found it, and to proclaim -it to others 369 - -The search for truth by various interlocutors was a recognised process -in the Sokratic age. Acute negative Dialectic of Sokrates 370 - -Negative procedure supposed to be represented by the Sophists and the -Megarici; discouraged and censured by historians of philosophy 371 - -Vocation of Sokrates and Plato for the negative procedure: absolute -necessity of it as a condition of reasoned truth. Parmenidês of -Plato 372 - -Sokrates considered the negative procedure to be valuable by itself, -and separately. His theory of the natural state of the human mind; not -ignorance, but false persuasion of knowledge 373 - -Declaration of Sokrates in the Apology; his constant mission to make -war against the false persuasion of knowledge 374 - -Opposition of feeling between Sokrates and the Dikasts 375 - -The Dialogues of Search present an end in themselves. Mistake of -supposing that Plato had in his mind an ulterior affirmative end, not -declared _ib._ - -False persuasion of knowledge--had reference to topics social, -political, ethical 376 - -To those topics, on which each community possesses established dogmas, -laws, customs, sentiments, consecrated and traditional, peculiar to -itself. The local creed, which is never formally proclaimed or taught, -but is enforced unconsciously by every one upon every one else. -Omnipotence of King Nomos 377 - -Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not yield to -the established orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own -judgment 382 - -Early appearance of a few free-judging individuals, or free-thinkers -in Greece 384 - -Rise of Dialectic--Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery 386 - -Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social topics by -Sokrates _ib._ - -Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the right of satisfaction for his -own individual reason 386 - -Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure of Sokrates. -Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs peculiarly -to the Sophists and the Megarici 387 - -The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring against the -Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates. They -represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual with an orthodox -public 388 - -Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme publicity of -speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of knowledge is -universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating Plato's -Dialogues of Search 393 - -Result called _Knowledge_, which Plato aspires to. Power of going -through a Sokratic cross-examination; not attainable except through -the Platonic process and method 396 - -Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics--man and society 397 - -Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties which he has -raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him completely -distinct. His dogmas are enunciations _à priori_ of some impressive -sentiment 399 - -Hypothesis--that Plato had solved all his own difficulties for -himself; but that he communicated the solution only to a few select -auditors in oral lectures--Untenable 401 - -Characteristic of the oral lectures--that they were delivered in -Plato's own name. In what other respects they departed from the -dialogues, we cannot say 402 - -Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the process of search -and debate _per se_. Protracted enquiry is a valuable privilege, not a -tiresome obligation 403 - -Plato has done more than any one else to make the process of enquiry -interesting to others, as it was to himself 405 - -Process of generalisation always kept in view and illustrated -throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search--general terms and -propositions made subjects of conscious analysis 406 - -The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by the same -author, illustrating each other, but without assignable -inter-dependence 407 - -Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under separate -review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges, Epinomis last -_ib._ - -Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The intermediate -dialogues present no convincing grounds for any determinate order 408 - - -CHAPTER IX. - - -Apology of Sokrates. - -The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates before the -Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional transformation 410 - -Even if it be Plato's own composition, it comes naturally first in the -review of his dialogues 411 - -General character of the Apology--Sentiments entertained towards -Sokrates at Athens 412 - -Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom of -Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the -citizens generally--The oracle is proved to be true 413 - -False persuasion of wisdom is universal--the God alone is wise 414 - -Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the cross-examining mission imposed -upon him by the God _ib._ - -He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission, and he -intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger 416 - -He disclaims the function of a teacher--he cannot teach, for he is not -wiser than others. He differs from others by being conscious of his -own ignorance _ib._ - -He does not know where competent teachers can be found. He is -perpetually seeking for them, but in vain 417 - -Impression made by the Platonic Apology on Zeno the Stoic 418 - -Extent of efficacious influence claimed by Sokrates for -himself--exemplified by Plato throughout the Dialogues of -Search--Xenophon and Plato enlarge it _ib._ - -Assumption by modern critics, that Sokrates is a positive teacher, -employing indirect methods for the inculcation of theories of his -own 419 - -Incorrectness of such assumption--the Sokratic Elenchus does not -furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the respondent, -stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own 420 - -Value and importance of this process--stimulating active individual -minds to theorise each for itself 421 - -View taken by Sokrates about death. Other men profess to know what it -is, and think it a great misfortune: he does not know 422 - -Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether agreeing or -disagreeing with others 423 - -Formidable efficacy of established public beliefs, generated without -any ostensible author 424 - - -CHAPTER X. - - -Kriton. - -General purpose of the Kriton 425 - -Subject of the dialogue--interlocutors _ib._ - -Answer of Sokrates to the appeal made by Kriton 426 - -He declares that the judgment of the general public is not worthy of -trust: he appeals to the judgment of the one Expert, who is wise on -the matter in debate _ib._ - -Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the question with -Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? Never in any -case to act unjustly 427 - -Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and that most persons -hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point is cardinal -_ib._ - -Pleading supposed to be addressed by the Laws of Athens to Sokrates, -demanding from him implicit obedience 428 - -Purpose of Plato in this pleading--to present the dispositions of -Sokrates in a light different from that which the Apology had -presented--unqualified submission instead of defiance _ib._ - -Harangue of Sokrates delivered in the name of the Laws, would have -been applauded by all the democratical patriots of Athens 430 - -The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with other -citizens, overlooking the specialties of his character 431 - -Still Sokrates is represented as adopting the resolution to obey, from -his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, but which would -not weigh with others _ib._ - -The harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, but -represents feelings common among Athenian citizens 432 - -Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason and -conscience, for the individual himself _ib._ - -The Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference between Rhetoric -and Dialectic 433 - -The Kriton makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but overlooks the -ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be solved _ib._ - -Incompetence of the general public or [Greek: i)diô=tai]--appeal to -the professional Expert 435 - -Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been declared--he does -not name who the trustworthy Expert is _ib._ - -Sokrates acts as the Expert himself: he finds authority in his own -reason and conscience 436 - - -CHAPTER XI - - -Euthyphron. - -Situation supposed in the dialogue--interlocutors 437 - -Indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates--Antipathy of the Athenians -towards those who spread heretical opinions 437 - -Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment for murder -against his own father--Displeasure of his friends at the proceeding -438 - -Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his is both -required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks him--What -is Holiness? 439 - -Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son Kronus and -of Kronus by his son Zeus 440 - -Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these stories of -discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief in them, -as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much circulation -_ib._ - -Bearing of this dialogue on the relative position of Sokrates and the -Athenian public 441 - -Dramatic moral set forth by Aristophanes against Sokrates and the -freethinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox -champion 442 - -Sequel of the dialogue--Euthyphron gives a particular example as the -reply to a general question 444 - -Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion _ib._ - -First general answer given by Euthyphron--that which is pleasing to -the Gods is holy. Comments of Sokrates thereon 445 - -To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the Holy--they love it -because it is holy. In what then does its essence consist? Perplexity -of Euthyphron 446 - -Sokrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or variety of -the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministration by men to the -Gods 447 - -Ministration to the Gods? How? To what purpose? _ib._ - -Holiness--rectitude in sacrifice and prayer--right traffic between men -and the Gods 448 - -This will not stand--the Gods gain nothing--they receive from men -marks of honour and gratitude--they are pleased therewith--the Holy, -therefore, must be that which is pleasing to the Gods 448 - -This is the same explanation which was before declared insufficient. A -fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He breaks off the -dialogue _ib._ - -Sokratic spirit of the dialogue--confessed ignorance applying the -Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge 449 - -The questions always difficult, often impossible to answer. Sokrates -is unable to answer them, though he exposes the bad answers of others -_ib._ - -Objections of Theopompus to the Platonic procedure 450 - -Objective view of Ethics, distinguished by Sokrates from the -subjective 451 - -Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent _ib._ - -Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental condition by -Sokrates--position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to it 452 - -The Holy--it has an essential characteristic--what is this?--not the -fact that it is loved by the Gods--this is true, but is not its -constituent essence 454 - -Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the Holy--different from -those of the Platonic Sokrates--he disallows any common absolute -general type of the Holy--he recognises an indefinite variety of -types, discordant and relative _ib._ - -The Holy a branch of the Just--not tenable as a definition, but useful -as bringing to view the subordination of logical terms 455 - -The Euthyphron represents Plato's way of replying to the charge of -impiety, preferred by Melêtus against Sokrates--comparison with -Xenophon's way of replying _ib._ - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - - -PLATO. - - - -PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. - - - -CHAPTER I. - -SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE, BEFORE AND IN THE TIME OF SOKRATES. - - -[Side-note: Change in the political condition of Greece during the -life of Plato.] - -The life of Plato extends from 427-347 B.C. He was born in the fourth -year of the Peloponnesian war, and he died at the age of 80, about the -time when Olynthus was taken by the Macedonian Philip. The last years -of his life thus witnessed a melancholy breach in the integrity of the -Hellenic world, and even exhibited data from which a far-sighted -Hellenic politician might have anticipated something like the coming -subjugation, realised afterwards by the victory of Philip at -Chæroneia. But during the first half of Plato's life, no such -anticipations seemed even within the limits of possibility. The forces -of Hellas, though discordant among themselves, were superabundant as -to defensive efficacy, and were disposed rather to aggression against -foreign enemies, especially against a country then so little -formidable as Macedonia. It was under this contemplation of Hellas -self-acting and self-sufficing--an aggregate of cities, each a -political unit, yet held together by strong ties of race, language, -religion, and common feelings of various kinds--that the mind of Plato -was both formed and matured. - -In appreciating, as far as our scanty evidence allows, the -circumstances which determined his intellectual and speculative -character, I shall be compelled to touch briefly upon the various -philosophical theories which were propounded anterior to Sokrates--as -well as to repeat some matters already brought to view in the -sixteenth, sixty-seventh, and sixty-eighth chapters of my History of -Greece. - -[Side-note: Early Greek mind, satisfied with the belief in -polytheistic personal agents as the real producing causes of -phenomena.] - -To us, as to Herodotus, in his day, the philosophical speculation of -the Greeks begins with the theology and cosmology of Homer and Hesiod. -The series of divine persons and attributes, and generations presented -by these poets, and especially the Theogony of Hesiod, supplied at one -time full satisfaction to the curiosity of the Greeks respecting the -past history and present agencies of the world around them. In the -emphatic censure bestowed by Herakleitus on the poets and philosophers -who preceded him, as having much knowledge but no sense--he includes -Hesiod, as well as Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hekatæus: upon Homer -and Archilochus he is still more severe, declaring that they ought to -be banished from the public festivals and scourged.[1] The sentiment -of curiosity as it then existed was only secondary and derivative, -arising out of some of the strong primary or personal sentiments--fear -or hope, antipathy or sympathy,--impression of present -weakness,--unsatisfied appetites and longings,--wonder and awe under the -presence of the terror-striking phenomena of nature, &c. Under this state -of the mind, when problems suggested themselves for solution, the answers -afforded by Polytheism gave more satisfaction than could have been -afforded by any other hypothesis. Among the indefinite multitude of -invisible, personal, quasi-human agents, with different attributes and -dispositions, some one could be found to account for every perplexing -phenomenon. The question asked was, not What are the antecedent -conditions or causes of rain, thunder, or earthquakes, but Who rains -and thunders? Who produces earthquakes?[2] The Hesiodic Greek was -satisfied when informed that it was Zeus or Poseidon. To be told of -physical agencies would have appeared to him not merely -unsatisfactory, but absurd, ridiculous, and impious. It was the task -of a poet like Hesiod to clothe this general polytheistic sentiment in -suitable details: to describe the various Gods, Goddesses, Demigods, -and other quasi-human agents, with their characteristic attributes, -with illustrative adventures, and with sufficient relations of -sympathy and subordination among each other, to connect them in men's -imaginations as members of the same brotherhood. Okeanus, Gæa, Uranus, -Helios, Selênê,--Zeus, Poseidon, Hades--Apollo and Artemis, Dionysus -and Aphroditê--these and many other divine personal agents, were -invoked as the producing and sustaining forces in nature, the past -history of which was contained in their filiations or contests. -Anterior to all of them, the primordial matter or person, was Chaos. - -[Footnote 1: Diogen. Laert. ix. 1. [Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on ou) -dida/skei;] ([Greek: ou) phu/ei,] ap. Proclum in Platon. Timæ. p. 31 F., -p. 72, ed. Schneider), [Greek: Ê(si/odon ga\r a)\n e)di/daxe kai\ -Puthago/rên, auti/s te Xenopha/nea/ te kai\ E(katai=on; to/n th' -O(/mêron e)/phasken a)/xion ei)=nai e)k tô=n agô/nôn e)kba/llesthai -kai\ rhapi/zesthai, kai\ A)rchi/lochon o(moi/ôs.] - -[Footnote 2: Aristophanes, Nubes, 368, [Greek: A)lla\ ti/s u(/ei?] -Herodot. vii. 129.] - -[Side-note: Belief in such agency continued among the general public, -even after the various sects of philosophy had arisen.] - -Hesiod represents the point of view ancient and popular (to use -Aristotle's expression[3]) among the Greeks, from whence all their -philosophical speculation took its departure; and which continued -throughout their history, to underlie all the philosophical -speculations, as the faith of the ordinary public who neither -frequented the schools nor conversed with philosophers. While -Aristophanes, speaking in the name of this popular faith, denounces -and derides Sokrates as a searcher, alike foolish and irreligious, -after astronomical and physical causes--Sokrates himself not only -denies the truth of the allegation, but adopts as his own the -sentiment which dictated it; proclaiming Anaxagoras and others to be -culpable for prying into mysteries which the Gods intentionally kept -hidden.[4] The repugnance felt by a numerous public, against -scientific explanation--as eliminating the divine agents and -substituting in their place irrational causes,[5]--was a permanent -fact of which philosophers were always obliged to take account, and -which modified the tone of their speculations without being powerful -enough to repress them. - -[Footnote 3: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 8, p. 989, a. 10. [Greek: Phêsi\ -de/ kai\ Ê(si/odos tê\n gê=n prô/tên gene/sthai tô=n sôma/tôn; ou(/tôs -a)rchai/an kai\ dêmotikê\n sumbe/bêken ei)=nai tê\n u(po/lêpsin.] - -Again in the beginning of the second book of the Meteorologica, -Aristotle contrasts the ancient and primitive theology with the "human -wisdom" which grew up subsequently: [Greek: Oi( a)rchai=oi kai\ -diatri/bontes peri\ ta\s theologi/as--oi( sophô/teroi tê\n -a)nthrôpi/nên sophi/an] (Meteor, ii. i. p. 353, a.)] - -[Footnote 4: Xenophon, Memor. iv. 7, 5; i. 1, 11-15. Plato, Apolog. p. -26 E.] - -[Footnote 5: Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23. [Greek: Ou) ga\r ê)neichonto -tou\s phusikou\s kai\ meteôrole/schas to/te kaloume/nous, ô(s ei)s -ai)ti/as a)lo/gous kai\ duna/meis a)pronoê/tous kai\ katênagkasme/na -pa/thê diatri/bontas to\ thei=on.]] - -[Side-note: Thales, the first Greek who propounded the hypothesis of -physical agency in place of personal. Water, the primordial substance, -or [Greek: a)rchê/].] - -Even in the sixth century B.C., when the habit of composing in prose -was first introduced, Pherekydes and Akusilaus still continued in -their prose the theogony, or the mythical cosmogony, of Hesiod and the -other old Poets: while Epimenides and the Orphic poets put forth -different theogonies, blended with mystical dogmas. It was, however, -in the same century, and in the first half of it, that Thales of -Miletus (620-560 B.C.), set the example of a new vein of thought. -Instead of the Homeric Okeanus, father of all things, Thales assumed -the material substance, Water, as the primordial matter and the -universal substratum of everything in nature. By various -transmutations, all other substances were generated from water; all of -them, when destroyed, returned into water. Like the old poets, Thales -conceived the surface of the earth to be flat and round; but he did -not, like them, regard it as stretching down to the depths of -Tartarus: he supposed it to be flat and shallow, floating on the -immensity of the watery expanse or Ocean.[6] This is the main feature -of the Thaletian hypothesis, about which, however, its author seems to -have left no writing. Aristotle says little about Thales, and that -little in a tone of so much doubt,[7] that we can hardly confide in -the opinions and discoveries ascribed to him by others.[8] - -[Footnote 6: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 3, p. 983, b. 21. De Coelo, ii. -13, p. 294, a. 29. [Greek: Thalê=s, o( tê=s toiau/tês a)rchêgo\s -philosophi/as], &c. Seneca, Natural. Quæst. vi. 6. - -Pherekydes, Epimenides, &c., were contemporary with the earliest Ionic -philosophers (Brandis, Handbuch der Gesch. der Gr.-Röm. Phil., s. 23). - -According to Plutarch (Aquæ et Ignis Comparatio, p. 955, init.), most -persons believed that Hesiod, by the word Chaos, meant Water. Zeno the -Stoic adopted this interpretation (Schol. Apollon. Rhod. i. 498). On -the other hand, Bacchylides the poet, and after him Zenodotus, called -Air by the name Chaos (Schol. Hesiod. Theogon. p. 392, Gaisf.). -Hermann considers that the Hesiodic Chaos means empty space (see note, -Brandis, Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-Röm. Phil., vol. i., p. 71).] - -[Footnote 7: See two passages in Aristotle De Animâ, i. 2, and i. 5.] - -[Footnote 8: Cicero says (De Naturâ Deorum, i. 10), "Thales--aquam -dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aquâ cuncta -fingeret." That the latter half of this Ciceronian statement, -respecting the doctrines of Thales, is at least unfounded, and -probably erroneous, is recognised by Preller, Brandis, and Zeller. -Preller, Histor. Philos. Græc. ex Fontium Locis Contexta, sect. 15; -Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos. sect. 31, p. 118; Zeller, Die -Philos. der Griechen, vol. i., p. 151, ed. 2. - -It is stated by Herodotus that Thales foretold the year of the -memorable solar eclipse which happened during the battle between the -Medes and the Lydians (Herod. i. 74). This eclipse seems to have -occurred in B.C. 585, according to the best recent astronomical -enquiries by Professor Airy.] - -[Side-note: Anaximander--laid down as [Greek: a)rchê/] the Infinite or -indeterminate--generation of the elements out of it, by evolution of -latent fundamental contraries--astronomical and geological doctrines.] - -The next of the Ionic philosophers, and the first who published his -opinions in writing, was Anaximander, of Miletus, the countryman and -younger contemporary of Thales (570-520 B.C.). He too searched for an -[Greek: A)rchê/], a primordial Something or principle, self-existent -and comprehending in its own nature a generative, motive, or -transmutative force. Not thinking that water, or any other known and -definite substance fulfilled these conditions, he adopted as the -foundation of his hypothesis a substance which he called the Infinite -or Indeterminate. Under this name he conceived Body simply, without -any positive or determinate properties, yet including the fundamental -contraries, Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, &c., in a potential or latent -state, including farther a self-changing and self-developing force,[9] -and being moreover immortal and indestructible.[10] By this inherent -force, and by the evolution of one or more of these dormant contrary -qualities, were generated the various definite substances of -nature--Air, Fire, Water, &c. But every determinate substance thus -generated was, after a certain time, destroyed and resolved again into -the Indeterminate mass. "From thence all substances proceed, and into -this they relapse: each in its turn thus making atonement to the others, -and suffering the penalty of injustice."[11] Anaximander conceived -separate existence (determinate and particular existence, apart from -the indeterminate and universal) as an unjust privilege, not to be -tolerated except for a time, and requiring atonement even for that. As -this process of alternate generation and destruction was unceasing, so -nothing less than an Infinite could supply material for it. Earth, -Water, Air, Fire, having been generated, the two former, being cold -and heavy, remained at the bottom, while the two latter ascended. Fire -formed the exterior circle, encompassing the air like bark round a -tree: this peripheral fire was broken up and aggregated into separate -masses, composing the sun, moon, and stars. The sphere of the fixed -stars was nearest to the earth: that of the moon next above it: that -of the sun highest of all. The sun and moon were circular bodies -twenty-eight times larger than the earth: but the visible part of them -was only an opening in the centre, through which[12] the fire or light -behind was seen. All these spheres revolved round the earth, which was -at first semi-fluid or mud, but became dry and solid through the heat -of the sun. It was in shape like the section of a cylinder, with a -depth equal to one-third of its breadth or horizontal surface, on -which men and animals live. It was in the centre of the Kosmos; it -remained stationary because of its equal distance from all parts of -the outer revolving spheres; there was no cause determining it to move -upward rather than downward or sideways, therefore it remained -still.[13] Its exhalations nourished the fire in the peripheral -regions of the Kosmos. Animals were produced from the primitive muddy -fluid of the earth: first, fishes and other lower animals--next, in -process of time man, when circumstances permitted his development.[14] -We learn farther respecting the doctrines of Anaximander, that he -proposed physical explanations of thunder, lightning, and other -meteorological phenomena:[15] memorable as the earliest attempt of -speculation in that department, at a time when such events inspired -the strongest religious awe, and were regarded as the most especial -manifestations of purposes of the Gods. He is said also to have been -the first who tried to represent the surface and divisions of the -earth on a brazen plate, the earliest rudiment of a map or chart.[16] - -[Footnote 9: See Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 157, -seq., ed. 2nd. - -Anaximander conceived [Greek: to\ a)peiron] as _infinite matter_; the -Pythagoreans and Plato conceived it as a distinct nature by itself--as -a subject, not as a predicate (Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, p. 203, a. -2). - -About these fundamental contraries, Aristotle says (Physic. i. 4, -init.): [Greek: oi( d' e)k tou e(no\s e)nou/sas ta\s e)nantio/têtas -e)kkri/nesthai, ô(/sper A)naxi/mandro/s phêsi]. Which Simplikius -explains, [Greek: e)nantio/tête/s ei)si, thermo\n, psuchro\n, xêro\n, -u(gro\n, kai\ ai( a)/llai], &c. - -Compare also Schleiermacher, "Ueber Anaximandros," in his Vermischte -Schriften, vol. ii. p. 178, seq. Deutinger (Gesch. der Philos. vol. i. -p. 165, Regensb. 1852) maintains that this [Greek: e)/krisis] of -contraries is at variance with the hypothesis of Anaximander, and has -been erroneously ascribed to him. But the testimony is sufficiently -good to outweigh this suspicion.] - -[Footnote 10: Anaximander spoke of his [Greek: a)/peiron] as [Greek: -a)tha/naton kai\ a)nô/lethron] (Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, 7, p. 203, -b. 15).] - -[Footnote 11: Simplikius ad Aristotel. Physic. fol. 6 a. apud Preller, -Histor. Philos. Græco-Rom. § 57, [Greek: e)x ô(=n de\ ê( ge/nesi/s -e)sti toi=s ou)=si, kai\ tê\n phthora\n ei)s tau)ta\ gi/nesthai kata\ -to\ chreô/n; dido/nai ga\r au)ta\ ti/sin kai\ di/kên a)llê/lois tê=s -a)diki/as kata\ tê\n tou= chro/nou ta/xin.] Simplikius remarks upon -the poetical character of this phraseology, [Greek: poiêtikôte/rois -o)no/masin au)ta\ le/gôn].] - -[Footnote 12: Origen. Philosophumen. p. 11, ed. Miller; Plutarch ap. -Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8, xv. 23-46-47; Stobæus Eclog. i. p. 510. -Anaximander supposed that eclipses of the sun and moon were caused by -the occasional closing of these apertures (Euseb. xv. 50-61). The part -of the sun visible to us was, in his opinion, not smaller than the -earth, and of the purest fire (Diog. Laert. ii. 1). - -Eudêmus, in his history of astronomy, mentioned Anaximander as the -first who had discussed the magnitudes and distances of the celestial -bodies (Simplikius ad Aristot. De Coelo, ap. Schol. Brand, p. 497, a. -12).] - -[Footnote 13: Aristotel. Meteorol. ii. 2, p. 355, a. 21, which is -referred by Alexander of Aphrodisias to Anaximander; also De Coelo, -ii. 13, p. 295, b. 12. - -A doctrine somewhat like it is ascribed even to Thales. See -Alexander's Commentary on Aristotel. Metaphys. i. p. 983, b. 17. - -The reason here assigned by Anaximander why the Earth remained still, -is the earliest example in Greek philosophy of that fallacy called the -principle of the Sufficient Reason, so well analysed and elucidated by -Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, book v., ch. 3, sect. 5. - -The remarks which Aristotle himself makes upon it are also very -interesting, when he cites the opinion of Anaximander. Compare Plato, -Phædon, p. 109, c. 132, with the citations in Wyttenbach's note.] - -[Footnote 14: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. v. 19.] - -[Footnote 15: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iii. 3; Seneca, Quæst. Nat. -ii. 18-19.] - -[Footnote 16: Strabo, i. p. 7. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 1) states that -Anaximander affirmed the figure of the earth to be spherical; and Dr. -Whewell, in his History of the Inductive Sciences, follows his -statement. But Schleiermacher (Ueber Anaximandros, vol. ii. p. 204 of -his Sämmtliche Werke) and Gruppe (Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, -p. 38) contest this assertion, and prefer that of Plutarch (ap. -Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8, Placit. Philos. iii. 10), which I have -adopted in the text. It is to be remembered that Diogenes himself, in -another place (ix. 3, 21), affirms Parmenides to have been the first -who propounded the spherical figure of the earth. See the facts upon -this subject collected and discussed in the instructive dissertation -of L. Oettinger, Die Vorstellungen der Griechen und Römer ueber die -Erde als Himmelskörper, p. 38; Freiburg, 1850.] - -[Side-note: Anaximenes--adopted Air as [Greek: a)rchê/]--rise of -substances out of it, by condensation and rarefaction.] - -The third physical philosopher produced by Miletus, seemingly before -the time of her terrible disasters suffered from the Persians after -the Ionic revolt between 500-494 B.C., was Anaximenes, who struck out -a third hypothesis. He assumed, as the primordial substance, and as -the source of all generation or transmutation, Air, eternal in -duration, infinite in extent. He thus returned to the principle of the -Thaletian theory, selecting for his beginning a known substance, -though not the same substance as Thales. To explain how generation of -new products was possible (as Anaximander had tried to explain by his -theory of evolution of latent contraries), Anaximenes adverted to the -facts of condensation and rarefaction, which he connected respectively -with cold and heat.[17] The Infinite Air, possessing and exercising an -inherent generative and developing power, perpetually in motion, -passing from dense to rare or from rare to dense, became in its utmost -rarefaction, Fire and Æther; when passing through successive stages of -increased condensation it became first cloud, next water, then earth, -and, lastly, in its utmost density, stone.[18] Surrounding, embracing, -and pervading the Kosmos, it also embodied and carried with it a vital -principle, which animals obtained from it by inspiration, and which -they lost as soon as they ceased to breathe.[19] Anaximenes included -in his treatise (which was written in a clear Ionic dialect) many -speculations on astronomy and meteorology, differing widely from those -of Anaximander. He conceived the Earth as a broad, flat, round plate, -resting on the air.[20] Earth, Sun, and Moon were in his view -condensed air, the Sun acquiring heat by the extreme and incessant -velocity with which he moved. The Heaven was not an entire hollow -sphere encompassing the Earth below as well as above, but a hemisphere -covering the Earth above, and revolving laterally round it like a cap -round the head.[21] - -[Footnote 17: Origen. Philosophumen. c. 7; Simplikius in Aristot. -Physic. f. 32; Brandis, Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-R. Phil. p. 144. - -Cicero, Academic. ii. 37, 118. "Anaximenes infinitum aera, sed ea, quæ -ex eo orirentur, definita." - -The comic poet Philemon introduced in one of his dramas, of which a -short fragment is preserved (Frag. 2, Meineke, p. 840), the -omnipresent and omniscient Air, to deliver the prologue: - -[Greek: ----ou(to/s ei)m' e)gô\ -A)ê/r, o(\n a)/n tis o)noma/seie kai\ Di/a. -e)gô\ d', o(\ theou=' stin e)/rgon, ei)mi\ pantachou=-- -pa/nt' e)x a)na/gkês oi)=da, pantachou= parô/n.]] - -[Footnote 18: Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p. 917; Plutarch, ap. Euseb. -P. E. i. 8.] - -[Footnote 19: Plutarch, Placit. Philosophor, i. 3, p. 878.] - -[Footnote 20: Aristotel. De Coelo, ii. 13; Plutarch, Placit. -Philosoph. iii. 10, p. 895.] - -[Footnote 21: Origen. Philosophum. p. 12, ed. Miller: [Greek: -ô(sperei\ peri\ tê\n ê(mete/ran kephalê\n stre/phetai to\ pili/on.]] - -The general principle of cosmogony, involved in the hypothesis of -these three Milesians--one primordial substance or Something endued -with motive and transmutative force, so as to generate all the variety -of products, each successive and transient, which our senses -witness--was taken up with more or less modification by others, especially -by Diogenes of Apollonia, of whom I shall speak presently. But there were -three other men who struck out different veins of thought--Pythagoras, -Xenophanes, and Herakleitus: the two former seemingly contemporary -with Anaximenes (550-490 B.C.), the latter somewhat later. - -[Side-note: Pythagoras--his life and career--Pythagorean brotherhood, -great political influence which it acquired among the Greco-Italian -cities--incurred great enmity and was violently put down.] - -Of Pythagoras I have spoken at some length in the thirty-seventh -chapter of my History of Greece. Speculative originality was only one -among many remarkable features in his character. He was an -inquisitive traveller, a religious reformer or innovator, and the -founder of a powerful and active brotherhood, partly ascetic, partly -political, which stands without parallel in Grecian history. The -immortality of the soul, with its transmigration (metempsychosis) -after death into other bodies, either of men or of other animals--the -universal kindred thus recognised between men and other animals, and -the prohibition which he founded thereupon against the use of animals -for food or sacrifice--are among his most remarkable doctrines: said -to have been borrowed (together with various ceremonial observances) -from the Egyptians.[22] After acquiring much celebrity in his native -island of Samos and throughout Ionia, Pythagoras emigrated (seemingly -about 530 B.C.) to Kroton and Metapontum in Lower Italy, where the -Pythagorean brotherhood gradually acquired great political ascendancy: -and from whence it even extended itself in like manner over the -neighbouring Greco-Italian cities. At length it excited so much -political antipathy among the body of the citizens,[23] that its rule -was violently put down, and its members dispersed about 509 B.C. -Pythagoras died at Metapontum. - -[Footnote 22: Herodot. ii. 81; Isokrates, Busirid. Encom. s. 28.] - -[Footnote 23: Polybius, ii. 39; Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 54, seq.] - -[Side-note: The Pythagoreans continue as a recluse sect, without -political power.] - -Though thus stripped of power, however, the Pythagoreans still -maintained themselves for several generations as a social, religious, -and philosophical brotherhood. They continued and extended the vein of -speculation first opened by the founder himself. So little of -proclaimed individuality was there among them, that Aristotle, in -criticising their doctrine, alludes to them usually under the -collective name Pythagoreans. Epicharmus, in his comedies at Syracuse -(470 B.C.) gave occasional utterance to various doctrines of the sect; -but the earliest of them who is known to have composed a book, was -Philolaus,[24] the contemporary of Sokrates. Most of the opinions -ascribed to the Pythagoreans originated probably among the successors -of Pythagoras; but the basis and principle upon which they proceed -seems undoubtedly his. - -[Footnote 24: Diogen. Laert. viii. 7-15-78-85. - -Some passages of Aristotle, however, indicate divergences of doctrine -among the Pythagoreans themselves (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, a. 22). He -probably speaks of the Pythagoreans of his own time when dialectical -discussion had modified the original orthodoxy of the order. Compare -Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas, cap. 5, p. 61-63. About the -gradual development of the Pythagorean doctrine, see Brandis, Handbuch -der Gr.-R. Philos. s. 74, 75.] - -[Side-note: Doctrine of the Pythagoreans--Number the Essence of -Things.] - -The problem of physical philosophy, as then conceived, was to find -some primordial and fundamental nature, by and out of which the -sensible universe was built up and produced; something which -co-existed always underlying it, supplying fresh matter and force for -generation of successive products. The hypotheses of Thales, -Anaximander, and Anaximenes, to solve this problem, have been already -noticed: Pythagoras solved it by saying, That the essence of things -consisted in Number. By this he did not mean simply that all things -were numerable, or that number belonged to them as a predicate. -Numbers were not merely predicates inseparable from subjects, but -subjects in themselves: substances or magnitudes, endowed with active -force, and establishing the fundamental essences or types according to -which things were constituted. About water,[25] air, or fire, -Pythagoras said nothing.[26] He conceived that sensible phenomena had -greater resemblance to numbers than to any one of these substrata -assigned by the Ionic philosophers. Number was (in his doctrine) the -self-existent reality--the fundamental material and in-dwelling force -pervading the universe. Numbers were not separate from things[27] -(like the Platonic Ideas), but _fundamenta_ of things--their essences -or determining principles: they were moreover conceived as having -magnitude and active force.[28] In the movements of the celestial -bodies, in works of human art, in musical harmony--measure and number -are the producing and directing agencies. According to the Pythagorean -Philolaus, "the Dekad, the full and perfect number, was of supreme and -universal efficacy as the guide and principle of life, both to the -Kosmos and to man. The nature of number was imperative and lawgiving, -affording the only solution of all that was perplexing or unknown; -without number all would be indeterminate and unknowable."[29] - -[Footnote 25: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 27. [Greek: E)n -de\ toi=s a)rithmoi=s, e)ndo/koun theôrei=n o(moiô/mata polla\ toi=s -ou)=si kai\ gignome/nois, ma=llon ê)\ e)n puri\ kai\ gê=| kai\ -u(/dati], &c. Cf. N. 3, p. 1090, a. 21.] - -[Footnote 26: Aristotel. Metaph. A. 9, p. 990, a. 16. [Greek: Dio\ -peri\ puro\s ê)\ gê=s ê)\ tô=n a)/llôn tô=n toiou/tôn sôma/tôn ou)d' -o(tiou=n ei)rê/kasin], &c. (the Pythagoreans); also N. 3.] - -[Footnote 27: Physic. iii. 4, p. 203, a. 6. [Greek: Ou) ga\r -chôristo\n poiou=si] (the Pythagoreans) [Greek: to\n a)rithmo/n], &c. -Metaphys. M. 6, p. 1080, b. 19: [Greek: ta\s mona/das u(polamba/nousin -e)/chein me/gethos]. M. 8, p. 1083, b. 17: [Greek: e)kei=noi] (the -Pythagoreans) [Greek: to\n a)rithmo\n ta\ o)/nta le/gousin; ta\ gou=n -theôrê/mata prosa/ptousi toi=s sô/masin ô(s e)x e)kei/nôn o)/ntôn tô=n -a)rithmô=n.]] - -[Footnote 28: An analogous application of this principle (Number as -the fundamental substance and universal primary agent) may be seen in -an eminent physical philosopher of the nineteenth century, Oken's -Elements of Physio-Philosophy, translated by Tulk. Aphorism -57:--"While numbers in a mathematical sense are positions and negations -of nothing, in the philosophical sense they are positions and negations -of the Eternal. Every thing which is real, posited, finite, has become -this, out of numbers; or more strictly speaking, every Real is -absolutely nothing else than a number. This must be the sense -entertained of numbers in the Pythagorean doctrine--namely, that every -thing, or the whole universe, had arisen from numbers. This is not to -be taken in a merely quantitative sense, as it has hitherto been -erroneously; but in an intrinsic sense, as implying that all things -are numbers themselves, or the acts of the Eternal. The essence in -numbers is nought else than the Eternal. The Eternal only is or -exists, and nothing else is when a number exists. There is therefore -nothing real but the Eternal itself; for every Real, or every thing -that is, is only a number and only exists by virtue of a number." - -Ibid., Aphorism 105-107:--"Arithmetic is the science of the second -idea, or that of time or motion, or life. It is therefore the first -science. Mathematics not only begin with it, but creation also, with -the becoming of time and of life. Arithmetic is, accordingly, the -truly absolute or divine science; and therefore every thing in it is -also directly certain, because every thing in it resembles the Divine. -Theology is arithmetic personified."--"A natural thing is nothing but -a self-moving number. An organic or living thing is a number moving -itself out of itself or spontaneously: an inorganic thing, however, is -a number moved by another thing: now as this other thing is also a -real number, so then is every inorganic thing a number moved by -another number, and so on _ad infinitum_. The movements in nature are -only movements of numbers by numbers: even as arithmetical computation -is none other than a movement of numbers by numbers; but with this -difference--that in the latter, this operates in an ideal manner, in -the former after a real."] - -[Footnote 29: Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 139. seqq. - -[Greek: Theôrei=n dei= ta\ e)/rga kai\ ta\n e)ssi/an (ou)si/an) tô= -a)rithmô= katta\n du/namin, a(/tis e)nti\ e)n ta=| deka/di; mega/la -ga\r kai\ pantelê\s kai\ pantoergo\s kai\ thei/ô kai\ ou)rani/ô bi/ô -kai\ a)nthrôpi/nô a)rcha\ kai\ a(gemô\n . . . a)/neu de\ tau/tas pa/nta -a)/peira kai\ a)/dêla kai\ a)phanê=; nomika\ ga\r a( phu/sis tô= -a)rithmô= kai\ a(gemonika\ kai\ didaskalika\ tô= a)poroume/nô panto\s -kai\ a)gnooume/nô panti/]. Compare the Fr. p. 58, of the same work. - -According to Plato, as well as the Pythagoreans, number extended to -ten, and not higher: all above ten were multiples and increments of -ten. (Aristot. Physic. iii. 6, p. 203, b. 30).] - -[Side-note: The Monas--[Greek: a)rchê/], or principle of -Number--geometrical conception of number--symbolical attributes of the -first ten numbers, especially of the Dekad.] - -The first principle or beginning of Number, was the One or -Monas--which the Pythagoreans conceived as including both the two -fundamental contraries--the Determining and the Indeterminate.[30] All -particular numbers, and through them all things, were compounded from -the harmonious junction and admixture of these two fundamental -contraries.[31] All numbers being either odd or even, the odd numbers -were considered as analogous to the Determining, the even numbers to -the Indeterminate. In One or the Monad, the Odd and Even were supposed -to be both contained, not yet separated: Two was the first -indeterminate even number; Three, the first odd and the first -determinate number, because it included beginning, middle, and end. -The sum of the first four numbers--One, Two, Three, Four = Ten (1 + 2 -+ 3 + 4) was the most perfect number of all.[32] To these numbers, -one, two, three, four, were understood as corresponding the -fundamental conceptions of Geometry--Point, Line, Plane, Solid. _Five_ -represented colour and visible appearance: _Six_, the phenomenon of -Life: _Seven_, Health, Light, Intelligence, &c.: _Eight_, Love or -Friendship.[33] Man, Horse, Justice and Injustice, had their -representative numbers: that corresponding to Justice was a square -number, as giving equal for equal.[34] - -[Footnote 30: See the instructive explanations of Boeckh, in his work -on the Fragments of Philolaus, p. 54 seq.] - -[Footnote 31: Philolaus, Fr., p. 62, Boeckh.--Diogen. L. viii. 7, 85. - -By [Greek: a(rmoni/a], Philolaus meant the musical octave: and his -work included many explanations and comparisons respecting the -intervals of the musical scale. (Boeckh, p. 65 seq.)] - -[Footnote 32: Aristotel. De Coelo, i. 1, p. 268, a. 10. [Greek: -katha/per ga/r phasin oi( Puthago/reioi, to\ pa=n kai\ ta\ pa/nta -toi=s tri/sin ô(/ristai; teleutê\ ga\r kai\ me/son kai\ a)rchê\ to\n -a)rithmo\n e)/chei to\n tou= panto\s, tau=ta de\ to\n tê=s tria/dos. -Dio\ para\ tê=s phu/seôs ei)lêpho/tes ô(/sper no/mous e)kei/nês, kai\ -pro\s ta\s a(gistei/as chrô/metha tô=n theô=n tô=| a)rithmô=| tou/tô|] -(i. e. three). It is remarkable that Aristotle here adopts and -sanctions, in regard to the number Three, the mystic and fanciful -attributes ascribed by the Pythagoreans.] - -[Footnote 33: Strümpell, Geschichte der theoretischen Philosophie der -Griechen, s. 78. Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-Röm. Phil., sect. 80, p. -467 seq. - -The number Five also signified marriage, because it was a junction of -the first masculine number Three with the first feminine Two. Seven -signified also [Greek: kairo\s] or Right Season. See Aristotel. -Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 26, and M. 4, p. 1078, b. 23, compared with -the commentary of Alexander on the former passage.] - -[Footnote 34: Aristotel. Ethica Magna, i. 1.] - -[Side-note: Pythagorean Kosmos and Astronomy--geometrical and harmonic -laws guiding the movements of the cosmical bodies.] - -The Pythagoreans conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single -system, generated out of numbers.[35] Of this system the central -point--the determining or limiting One--was first in order of time, -and in order of philosophical conception. By the determining influence -of this central constituted One, portions of the surrounding Infinite -were successively attracted and brought into system: numbers, -geometrical figures, solid substances, were generated. But as the -Kosmos thus constituted was composed of numbers, there could be no -continuum: each numerical unit was distinct and separated from the -rest by a portion of vacant space, which was imbibed, by a sort of -inhalation, from the infinite space or spirit without.[36] The central -point was fire, called by the Pythagoreans the Hearth of the Universe -(like the public hearth or perpetual fire maintained in the prytaneum -of a Grecian city), or the watch-tower of Zeus. Around it revolved, -from West to East, ten divine bodies, with unequal velocities, but in -symmetrical movement or regular dance.[37] Outermost was the circle of -the fixed stars, called by the Pythagoreans Olympus, and composed of -fire like the centre. Within this came successively,--with orbits more -and more approximating to the centre,--the five planets, Saturn, -Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury: next, the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth. -Lastly, between the Earth and the central fire, an hypothetical body, -called the Antichthon or Counter-Earth, was imagined for the purpose -of making up a total represented by the sacred number Ten, the symbol -of perfection and totality. The Antichthon was analogous to a -separated half of the Earth; simultaneous with the Earth in its -revolutions, and corresponding with it on the opposite side of the -central fire. - -[Footnote 35: Aristot. Metaph. M. 6, p. 1080, b. 18. [Greek: to\n ga\r -o(/lon ou)/ranon kataskeua/zousin e)x a)rithmô=n]. Compare p. 1075, b. -37, with the Scholia. - -A poet calls the tetraktys (consecrated as the sum total of the first -four numbers 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10) [Greek: pêgê\n a)ena/ou phu/seôs -rhizô/mat' e)/chousan]. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 94.] - -[Footnote 36: Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 91-95. [Greek: to\ pra=ton -a(rmosthe\n, to\ e(/n e)n tô=| me/sô| tê=s sphai/ras e(sti/a -kalei=tai--bômo/n te kai\ sunochê\n kai\ me/tron phu/seôs--prô=ton -ei)=nai phu/sei to\ me/son]. - -Aristot. Metaph. N. 3, p. 1091, a. 15. [Greek: phanerô=s ga\r -le/gousin] (the Pythagoreans) [Greek: ô(s tou= e(no\s -sustathe/ntos--eu)thu\s to\ e)/ggista tou= a)pei/rou o(/ti ei(lketo -kai\ e)perai/neto u(po\ tou= pe/ratos]. - -Aristot. Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b. 21. [Greek: Ei)=nai d' e)/phasan -kai\ oi( Puthago/reioi keno/n, kai\ e)peisie/nai au)to\ tô=| ou)ra/nô| -e)k tou= a)pei/rou pneu/matos, ô(s a)napne/onti; kai\ to\ keno/n, o(\ -diori/zei ta\s phu/seis, ô(s o)/ntos tou= kenou= chôrismou= tinos tô=n -e)phexê=s kai\ tê=s diori/seôs, kai\ tou=t' ei)=nai prô=ton e)n toi=s -a)rithmoi=s; to\ ga\r keno\n diori/zein tê\n phu/sin au)tô=n]. Stobæus -(Eclog. Phys. i. 18, p. 381, Heer.) states the same, referring to the -lost work of Aristotle on the Pythagorean philosophy. Compare Preller, -Histor. Philos. Gr. ex Font. Loc. Context., sect. 114-115.] - -[Footnote 37: Philolaus, p. 94. Boeckh. [Greek: peri\ de\ tou=to de/ka -sô/mata thei=a choreu/ein], &c. Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 13. Metaphys. A. -5.] - -The inhabited portion of the Earth was supposed to be that which was -turned away from the central fire and towards the Sun, from which it -received light. But the Sun itself was not self-luminous: it was -conceived as a glassy disk, receiving and concentrating light from the -central fire, and reflecting it upon the Earth, so long as the two -were on the same side of the central fire. The Earth revolved, in an -orbit obliquely intersecting that of the Sun, and in twenty-four -hours, round the central fire, always turning the same side towards -that fire. The alternation of day and night was occasioned by the -Earth being during a part of such revolution on the same side of the -central fire with the Sun, and thus receiving light reflected from -him: and during the remaining part of her revolution on the side -opposite to him, so that she received no light at all from him. The -Earth, with the Antichthon, made this revolution in one day: the Moon, -in one month:[38] the Sun, with the planets, Mercury and Venus, in one -year: the planets, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, in longer periods -respectively, according to their distances from the centre: lastly, -the outermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the Aplanes), -in some unknown period of very long duration.[39] - -[Footnote 38: The Pythagoreans supposed that eclipses of the moon took -place, sometimes by the interposition of the earth, sometimes by that -of the Antichthon, to intercept from the moon the light of the sun -(Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. 27, p. 560. Heeren). Stobæus here cites the -history ([Greek: i(stori/an]) of the Pythagorean philosophy by -Aristotle, and the statement of Philippus of Opus, the friend of -Plato.] - -[Footnote 39: Aristot. de Coelo, ii. 13. Respecting this Pythagorean -cosmical system, the elucidations of Boeckh are clear and valuable. -Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, Berlin, 1852, p. -99-102; completing those which he had before given in his edition of -the fragments of Philolaus. - -Martin (in his Études sur le Timée de Platon, vol. ii. p. 107) and -Gruppe (Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, ch. iv.) maintain that -the original system proposed by Pythagoras was a geocentric system, -afterwards transformed by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans into that -which stands in the text. But I agree with Boeckh (Ueber das Kosmische -System des Platon, p. 89 seqq.), and with Zeller (Phil. d. Griech., -vol. i. p. 308, ed. 2), that this point is not made out. That which -Martin and Gruppe (on the authority of Alexander Polyhistor, Diog. -viii. 25, and others) consider to be a description of the original -Pythagorean system as it stood before Philolaus, is more probably a -subsequent transformation of it; introduced after the time of -Aristotle, in order to suit later astronomical views.] - -[Side-note: Music of the Spheres.] - -The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take place, in the -opinion of the' Pythagoreans, without producing a loud and powerful -sound; and as their distances from the central fire were supposed to -be arranged in musical ratios,[40] so the result of all these separate -sounds was full and perfect harmony. To the objection--Why were not -these sounds heard by us?--they replied, that we had heard them -constantly and without intermission from the hour of our birth; hence -they had become imperceptible by habit.[41] - -[Footnote 40: Playfair observes (in his dissertation on the Progress -of Natural Philosophy, p. 87) respecting Kepler--"Kepler was perhaps -the first person who conceived that there must be always a law capable -of being expressed by arithmetic or geometry, which connects such -phenomena as have a physical dependence on each other". But this seems -to be exactly the fundamental conception of the Pythagoreans: or -rather a part of their fundamental conception, for they also -considered their numbers as active forces bringing such law into -reality. To illustrate the determination of the Pythagoreans to make -up the number of Ten celestial bodies, I transcribe another passage -from Playfair (p. 98). Huygens, having discovered one satellite of -Saturn, "believed that there were no more, and that the number of the -planets was now complete. The planets, primary and secondary, thus -made up twelve--the double of six, the first of the perfect numbers."] - -[Footnote 41: Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 9; Pliny, H.N. ii. 20. - -See the Pythagorean system fully set forth by Zeller, Die Philosophie -der Griechen, vol. i. p. 302-310, ed. 2nd.] - -[Side-note: Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries--Ten opposing -pairs.] - -Ten was, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, the perfection and -consummation of number. The numbers from One to Ten were all that they -recognised as primary, original, generative. Numbers greater than ten -were compounds and derivatives from the decad. They employed this -perfect number not only as a basis on which to erect a bold -astronomical hypothesis, but also as a sum total for their list of -contraries. Many Hellenic philosophers[42] recognised pairs of -opposing attributes as pervading nature, and as the fundamental -categories to which the actual varieties of the sensible world might -be reduced. While others laid down Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry, as the -fundamental contraries, the Pythagoreans adopted a list of ten pairs. -1. Limit and Unlimited; 2. Odd and Even; 3. One and Many; 4. Right and -Left; 5. Male and Female; 6. Rest and Motion; 7. Straight and Curve; -8. Light and Darkness; 9. Good and Evil; 10. Square and Oblong.[43] Of -these ten pairs, five belong to arithmetic or to geometry, one to -mechanics, one to physics, and three to anthropology or ethics. Good -and Evil, Regularity and Irregularity, were recognised as alike -primordial and indestructible.[44] - -[Footnote 42: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 2, p. 1004, b. 30. -[Greek: ta\ d' o)/nta kai\ tê\n ou)sian o(mologou=sin e)x e)nanti/ôn -schedo\n a(/pantes sugkei=sthai.]] - -[Footnote 43: Aristot. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, a. 22. He goes on to -say that Alkmæon, a semi-Pythagorean and a younger contemporary of -Pythagoras himself, while agreeing in the general principle that -"human affairs were generally in pairs," ([Greek: ei)=nai du/o ta\ -polla\ tô=n a)nthrôpi/nôn]), laid down pairs of fundamental contraries -at random ([Greek: ta\s e)nantio/têtas ta\s tuchou/sas])--black and -white, sweet and bitter, good and evil, great and little. All that you -can extract from these philosophers is (continues Aristotle) the -general axiom, that "contraries are the principia of existing -things"--[Greek: o(/ti ta)na/ntia a)rchai\ tô=n o)/ntôn]. - -This axiom is to be noted as occupying a great place in the minds of -the Greek philosophers.] - -[Footnote 44: Theophrast. Metaphys. 9. Probably the recognition of one -dominant antithesis--[Greek: To\ E(/n--ê( a)o/ristos Dua\s]--is the -form given by Plato to the Pythagorean doctrine. Eudorus (in -Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 39) seems to blend the two -together.] - -The arithmetical and geometrical view of nature, to which such -exclusive supremacy is here given by the Pythagoreans, is one of the -most interesting features of Grecian philosophy. They were the -earliest cultivators of mathematical science,[45] and are to be -recognised as having paved the way for Euclid and Archimedes, -notwithstanding the symbolical and mystical fancies with which they -so largely perverted what are now regarded as the clearest and most -rigorous processes of the human intellect. The important theorem which -forms the forty-seventh Proposition of Euclid's first book, is -affirmed to have been discovered by Pythagoras himself: but how much -progress was made by him and his followers in the legitimate province -of arithmetic and geometry, as well as in the applications of these -sciences to harmonics,[46] which they seem to have diligently -cultivated, we have not sufficient information to determine with -certainty. - -[Footnote 45: Aristot. Metaph. A. 5, p. 985, b. 23. [Greek: oi( -Puthagorei=oi tô=n mathêma/tôn a)psa/menoi _prô=toi tau=ta -proê/gagon_, kai\ e)ntraphe/ntes e)n au)toi=s ta\s tou/tôn a)rcha\s -tô=n o)/ntôn a)rcha\s ô)|ê/thêsan ei)=nai pa/ntôn.]] - -[Footnote 46: Concerning the Pythagorean doctrines on Harmonics, see -Boeckh's Philolaus, p. 60-84, with his copious and learned comments.] - -[Side-note: Eleatic philosophy--Xenophanes.] - -Contemporary with Pythagoras, and like him an emigrant from Ionia to -Italy, was Xenophanes of Kolophon. He settled at the Phokæan colony of -Elea, on the Gulf of Poseidonia; his life was very long, but his -period of eminence appears to belong (as far as we can make out amidst -conflicting testimony) to the last thirty years of the sixth century -B.C. (530-500 B.C.). He was thus contemporary with Anaximander and -Anaximenes, as well as with Pythagoras, the last of whom he may have -personally known.[47] He composed, and recited in person, poems--epic, -elegiac, and iambic--of which a very few fragments remain. - -[Footnote 47: Karsten. Xenophanis Fragm., s. 4, p. 9, 10.] - -[Side-note: His censures upon the received Theogony and religious -rites.] - -Xenophanes takes his point of departure, not from Thales or -Anaximander, but from the same ancient theogonies which they had -forsaken. But he follows a very different road. The most prominent -feature in his poems (so far as they remain), is the directness and -asperity with which he attacks the received opinions respecting the -Gods--and the poets Hesiod and Homer, the popular exponents of those -opinions. Xenophanes not only condemns these poets for having ascribed -to the Gods discreditable exploits, but even calls in question the -existence of the Gods, and ridicules the anthropomorphic conception -which pervaded the Hellenic faith. "If horses or lions could paint, -they would delineate their Gods in form like themselves. The -Ethiopians conceive their Gods as black, the Thracians conceive theirs -as fair and with reddish hair."[48] Dissatisfied with much of the -customary worship and festivals, Xenophanes repudiated divination** -altogether, and condemned the extravagant respect shown to victors in -Olympic contests,[49] not less than the lugubrious ceremonies in -honour of Leukothea. He discountenanced all Theogony, or assertion of -the birth of Gods, as impious, and as inconsistent with the prominent -attribute of immortality ascribed to them.[50] He maintained that -there was but one God, identical with, or a personification of, the -whole Uranus. "The whole Kosmos, or the whole God, sees, hears, and -thinks." The divine nature (he said) did not admit of the conception -of separate persons one governing the other, or of want and -imperfection in any way.[51] - -[Footnote 48: Xenophanis Fragm. 5-6-7, p. 39 seq. ed. Karsten; Clemens -Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 601; vii. p. 711.] - -[Footnote 49: Xenophan. Fragm. 19, p. 60, ed. Karsten; Cicero, -Divinat. i. 3, 5.] - -[Footnote 50: Xenophanis Fragment. 34-35, p. 85, ed. Karsten; -Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 23; Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 19.] - -[Footnote 51: Xenoph. Frag. 1-2, p. 35. - -[Greek: Ou)=los o(ra=|, ou)=los de\ noei=, ou)=los de t' a)kou/ei.] - -Plutarch ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. i. 8; Diogen. Laert. ix. 19.] - -[Side-note: His doctrine of Pankosmism, or Pantheism--The whole Kosmos -is Ens Unum or God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pa=n]. Non-Ens inadmissible.] - -Though Xenophanes thus appears (like Pythagoras) mainly as a religious -dogmatist, yet theogony and cosmogony were so intimately connected in -the sixth century B.C., that he at the same time struck out a new -philosophical theory. His negation of theogony was tantamount to a -negation of cosmogony. In substituting Ens Unum--one God for many, he -set aside all distinct agencies in the universe, to recognise only one -agent, single, all-pervading, indivisible. He repudiated all genesis -of a new reality, all actual existence of parts, succession, change, -beginning, end, etc., in reference to the universe, as well as in -reference to God. "Wherever I turned my mind (he exclaimed) everything -resolved itself into One and the same: all things existing came back -always and everywhere into one similar and permanent nature."[52] The -fundamental tenet of Xenophanes was partly religious, partly -philosophical, Pantheism, or Pankosmism: looking upon the universe as -one real all-comprehensive Ens, which he would not call either finite -or infinite, either in motion or at rest.[53] Non-Ens he pronounced to -be an absurdity--an inadmissible and unmeaning phrase. - -[Footnote 52: Timon, fragment of the Silli ap. Sext. Empiric. Hypot. -Pyrrh. i. 33, sect. 224. - -[Greek: o)/ppê ga\r e)mo\n no/on ei)ru/saimi, -ei)s e(\n tau)to/ te pa=n a)nelu/eto, pa=n de o)\n ai)ei\ -pa/ntê a)nelko/menon mi/an ei)s phu/sin i)/stath' o(moi/an]. - -[Greek: Ai)ei\] here appears to be more conveniently construed with -[Greek: i)/stath'] not (as Karsten construes it, p. 118) with [Greek: -o)/n]. - -It is fair to presume that these lines are a reproduction of the -sentiments of Xenophanes, if not a literal transcript of his words.] - -[Footnote 53: Theophrastus ap. Simplikium in Aristotel. Physic. f. 6, -Karsten, p. 106; Arist. Met. A. 5, p. 986, b. 21: [Greek: Xenopha/nês -de\ prô=tos tou/tôn e(ni/sas, o( ga\r Parmeni/dês tou/ton le/getai -mathêtê/s,--eis to\n o(/lon ou)/ranon a)poble/psas to\ e(\n ei)=nai/ -phêsi to\n theo/n.]] - -[Side-note: Scepticism of Xenophanes--complaint of philosophy as -unsatisfactory.] - -It was thus from Xenophanes that the doctrine of Pankosmism obtained -introduction into Greek philosophy, recognising nothing real except -the universe as an indivisible and unchangeable whole. Such a creed -was altogether at variance with common perception, which apprehends -the universe as a plurality of substances, distinguishable, divisible, -changeable, &c. And Xenophanes could not represent his One and All, -which excluded all change, to be the substratum out of which -phenomenal variety was generated--as Water, Air, the Infinite, had -been represented by the Ionic philosophers. The sense of this -contradiction, without knowing how to resolve it, appears to have -occasioned the mournful complaints of irremediable doubt and -uncertainty, preserved as fragments from his poems. "No man (he -exclaims) knows clearly about the Gods or the universe: even if he -speak what is perfectly true, he himself does not know it to be true: -all is matter of opinion."[54] - -[Footnote 54: Xenophan. Fragm. 14, p. 51, ed. Karsten. - -[Greek: kai\ to\ me\n ou)=n saphe\s ou)/tis a)nê\r ge/net' ou)/de tis -e)/stai -ei)dô\s, a)mphi\ theô=n te kai\ a)/ssa le/gô peri\ pa/ntôn; -ei) ga\r kai\ ta\ ma/lista tu/choi tetelesme/non ei)pô\n, -au)to\s o(mô=s ou)k oi)=de; do/kos d' e)pi\ pa=si te/tuktai]. - -Compare the extract from the Silli of Timon in Sextus -Empiricus--Pyrrhon. Hypot. i. 224; and the same author, adv. -Mathemat. vii. 48-52.] - -Nevertheless while denying all real variety or division in the -universe, Xenophanes did not deny the variety of human perceptions and -beliefs. But he allowed them as facts belonging to man, not to the -universe--as subjective or relative, not as objective or absolute. He -even promulgated opinions of his own respecting many of the physical -and cosmological subjects treated by the Ionic philosophers. - -[Side-note: His conjectures on physics and astronomy.] - -Without attempting to define the figure of the Earth, he considered it -to be of vast extent and of infinite depth;[55] including, in its -interior cavities, prodigious reservoirs both of fire and water. He -thought that it had at one time been covered with water, in proof of -which he noticed the numerous shells found inland and on mountain -tops, together with the prints of various fish which he had observed -in the quarries of Syracuse, in the island of Paros, and elsewhere. -From these facts he inferred that the earth had once been covered with -water, and even that it would again be so covered at some future time, -to the destruction of animal and human life.[56] He supposed that the -sun, moon, and stars were condensations of vapours exhaled from the -Earth, collected into clouds, and alternately inflamed and -extinguished.[57] - -[Footnote 55: Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 13.] - -[Footnote 56: Xenophan. Fragm. p. 178, ed. Karsten; Achilles Tatius, -[Greek: Ei)sagôgê\] in Arat. Phænom. p. 128, [Greek: ta\ ka/tô d' e)s -a)/peiron i(ka/nei]. - -This inference from the shells and prints of fishes is very remarkable -for so early a period. Compare Herodotus (ii. 12) who notices the -fact, and draws the same inference, as to Lower Egypt; also Plutarch, -De Isid. et Osirid. c. 40, p. 367; and Strabo, i. p. 49-50, from whom -we learn that the Lydian historian Xanthus had made the like -observation, and also the like inference, for himself. Straton of -Lampsakus, Eratosthenes, and Strabo himself, approved what Xanthus -said.] - -[Footnote 57: Xenophanes Frag. p. 161 seq., ed. Karsten. Compare -Lucretius, v. 458. - - "per rara foramina, terræ -Partibus erumpens primus se sustulit æther -Ignifer et multos secum levis abstulit ignis . . . . -Sic igitur tum se levis ac diffusilis æther -Corpore concreto circumdatus undique flexit: . . . . -Hunc exordia sunt solis lunæque secuta."] - -[Side-note: Parmenides continues the doctrine of Xenophanes--Ens -Parmenideum, self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, extended,--Non-Ens, -an unmeaning phrase.] - -Parmenides, of Elea, followed up and gave celebrity to the Xenophanean -hypothesis in a poem, of which the striking exordium is yet preserved. -The two veins of thought, which Xenophanes had recognised and lamented -his inability to reconcile, were proclaimed by Parmenides as a sort of -inherent contradiction in the human mind--Reason or Cogitation -declaring one way, Sense (together with the remembrances and -comparisons of sense) suggesting a faith altogether opposite. Dropping -that controversy with the popular religion which had been raised by -Xenophanes, Parmenides spoke of many different Gods or Goddesses, and -insisted on the universe as one, without regarding it as one God. He -distinguished Truth from matter of Opinion.[58] Truth was knowable -only by pure mental contemplation or cogitation, the object of which -was Ens or Being, the Real or Absolute: here the Cogitans and the -Cogitatum were identical, one and the same.[59] Parmenides conceived -Ens not simply as existent, but as self-existent, without beginning or -end,[60] as extended, continuous, indivisible, and unchangeable. The -Ens Parmenideum comprised the two notions of Extension and -Duration:[61] it was something Enduring and Extended; Extension -including both space, and matter so far forth as filling space. -Neither the contrary of Ens (Non-Ens), nor anything intermediate -between Ens and Non-Ens, could be conceived, or named, or reasoned -about. Ens comprehended all that was Real, without beginning or end, -without parts or difference, without motion or change, perfect and -uniform like a well-turned sphere.[62] - -[Footnote 58: Parmenid. Fr. v. 29.] - -[Footnote 59: Parm. Frag. v. 40, 52-56. - - [Greek: to\ ga\r au)to\ noei=n e)sti/n te kai\ ei)=nai. -A)lla\ su\ tê=s d' a)ph' o(dou= dizê/sios ei)=rge no/êma, -mêde/ s' e)/thos polu/peiron o(do\n kata\ tê/nde bia/sthô, -nôma=|n a)/skopon o)/mma kai\ ê)chê/essan a)kouê\n -kai\ glô=ssan; kri=nai de\ lo/gô| polu/dênin e)/legchon -e)x e)me/then rhêthe/nta.]] - -[Footnote 60: Parm. Frag. v. 81. - -[Greek: au)ta\r a)ki/nêton mega/lôn e)n pei/rasi desmô=n -e)sti\n, a)/narchon, a)/pauston], &c.] - -[Footnote 61: Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griech., i. p. 403, ed. 2) -maintains, in my opinion justly, that the Ens Parmenideum is conceived -by its author as extended. Strümpell (Geschichte der theor. Phil. der -Griech., s. 44) represents it as unextended: but this view seems not -reconcilable with the remaining fragments.] - -[Footnote 62: Parm. Frag. v. 102.] - -[Side-note: He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and -relative, apart from Ens.] - -In this subject Ens, with its few predicates, chiefly negative, -consisted all that Parmenides called Truth. Everything else belonged -to the region of Opinion, which embraced all that was phenomenal, -relative, and transient: all that involved a reference to man's -senses, apprehension, and appreciation, all the indefinite diversity -of observed facts and inferences. Plurality, succession, change, -motion, generation, destruction, division of parts, &c., belonged to -this category. Parmenides did not deny that he and other men had -perceptions and beliefs corresponding to these terms, but he denied -their application to the Ens or the self-existent. We are conscious of -succession, but the self-existent has no succession: we perceive -change of colour and other sensible qualities, and change of place or -motion, but Ens neither changes nor moves. We talk of things generated -or destroyed--things coming into being or going out of being--but this -phrase can have no application to the self-existent Ens, which _is_ -always and cannot properly be called either past or future.[63] -Nothing is really generated or destroyed, but only in appearance to -us, or relatively to our apprehension.[64] In like manner we perceive -plurality of objects, and divide objects into parts. But Ens is -essentially One, and cannot be divided.[65] Though you may divide a -piece of matter you cannot divide the extension of which that matter -forms part: you cannot (to use the expression of Hobbes[66]) pull -asunder the first mile from the second, or the first hour from the -second. The milestone, or the striking of the clock, serve as marks to -assist you in making a mental division, and in considering or -describing one hour and one mile apart from the next. This, however, -is your own act, relative to yourself: there is no real division of -extension into miles, or of duration into hours. You may consider the -same space or time as one or as many, according to your convenience: -as one hour or as sixty minutes, as one mile or eight furlongs. But -all this is a process of your own mind and thoughts; another man may -divide the same total in a way different from you. Your division noway -modifies the reality without you, whatever that may be--the Extended -and Enduring Ens--which remains still a continuous one, undivided and -unchanged. - -[Footnote 63: Parm. Frag. v. 96. - -[Greek: ----e)pei\ to/ ge moi=r' e)pe/dêsen -Oi)=on a)ki/nêton tele/thein tô=| pa/nt' o)/nom' _ei)=nai_, -O)/ssa brotoi\ kate/thento, pepoitho/tes ei)=nai a)lêthê=, -gi/gnesthai/ te kai\ o)/llusthai, ei)=nai/ te kai\ ou)ki\, -kai\ to/pon a)lla/ssein, dia/ te chro/a phano\n a)mei/bein; - -v. 75:-- - -ei)/ ge ge/noit', ou)k e)/st'; ou)d' ei)/ po/te me/llei e)/sesthai; -tô=s ge/nesis me\n a)pe/sbestai, kai\ a)/pistos o)/lethros.]] - -[Footnote 64: Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 1. [Greek: Oi( me\n ga\r -au)tô=n o(/lôs a)nei=lon ge/nesin kai\ phthora/n; ou)the\n ga\r ou)/te -gi/gnesthai/ phasin ou)/te phthei/resthai tô=n o)/ntôn, _a)lla\ mo/non -dokei=n ê(mi=n_; oi)=on oi( peri\ Me/lisson kai\ Parmeni/dên], &c.] - -[Footnote 65: Parm. Frag. v. 77. - -[Greek: Ou)de\ diai/reto/n e)stin, e)pei\ pa=n e)sti\n o(/moion, -ou)de/ ti tê=| ma=llon to/ ken ei)/rgoi min xune/chesthai, -ou)de/ ti cheiro/teron; pa=n de\ ple/on e)sti\n e)o/ntos; -tô=| xuneche\s pa=n e)sti/n; e)o\n ga\r e)o/nti pela/zei]. - -Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 29, with the Scholia, and -Physic. i. 2, 3. Simplikius Comm. in Physic. Aristot. (apud Tennemann -Geschichte der Philos. b. i. s. 4, vol. i. p. 170) [Greek: pa/nta ga/r -phêsi (Parmeni/dês) ta\ o)/nta, katho\ o)/nta, e(n e)sti/n]. This -chapter, in which Tennemann gives an account of the Eleatic -philosophy, appears to me one of the best and most instructive in his -work.] - -[Footnote 66: "To make parts,--or to part or divide, Space or Time,--is -nothing else but to consider one and another within the same: so -that if any man divide space or time, the diverse conceptions he has -are more, by one, than the parts which he makes. For his first -conception is of that which is to be divided--then, of some part of -it--and again of some other part of it: and so forwards, as long as he -goes in dividing. But it is to be noted, that here, by _division_, I -do not mean the severing or pulling asunder of one space or time from -another (for does any man think that one hemisphere may be separated -from the other hemisphere, or the first hour from the second?), but -_diversity of consideration_: so that division is not made by the -operation of the hands, but of the mind."--Hobbes, First Grounds of -Philosophy, chap. vii. 5, vol. i. p. 96, ed. Molesworth. - -"Expansion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they -are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not -separable one from another, not even in thought; though the parts of -bodies from which we take our measure of the one--and the parts of -motion, from which we may take the measure of the other--may be -interrupted or separated."--Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, -book ii. ch. 15. s. 11. - -In the Platonic Parmenides, p. 156 D., we find the remarkable -conception of what he calls [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnês, a)/topo/s tis -phu/sis]--a break in the continuity of duration, an extra-temporal -moment.] - -[Side-note: Parmenidean ontology stands completely apart from -phenomenology.] - -The Ens of Parmenides thus coincided mainly with that which (since -Kant) has been called the Noumenon--the Thing in itself--the Absolute; -or rather with that which, by a frequent illusion, passes for the -absolute--no notice being taken of the cogitant and believing apart -from mind, as if cogitation and belief, _cogitata_ and _credita_, -would be had without it. By Ens was understood the remnant in his -mind, after leaving out all that abstraction, as far as it had then -been carried, could leave out. It was the minimum indispensable to the -continuance of thought; you cannot think (Parmenides says) without -thinking of Something, and that Something Extended and Enduring. -Though he and others talk of this Something as an Absolute (_i.e._ -apart from or independent of his own thinking mind), yet he also uses -some juster language ([Greek: to\ ga\r au)to\ noei=n e)/stin te kai\ -ei)=nai]), showing that it is really relative: that if the Cogitans -implies a Cogitatum, the Cogitatum also implies no less its -correlative Cogitans: and that though we may divide the two in words, -we cannot divide them in fact. It is to be remarked that Parmenides -distinguishes the Enduring or Continuous from the Transient or -Successive, Duration from Succession (both of which are included in -the meaning of the word Time), and that he considers Duration alone as -belonging to Ens or the Absolute--to the region of Truth--setting it -in opposition or antithesis to Succession, which he treats as relative -and phenomenal. We have thus (with the Eleates) the first appearance -of Ontology, the science of Being or Ens, in Grecian philosophy. Ens -is everything, and everything is Ens. In the view of Parmenides, -Ontology is not merely narrow, but incapable of enlargement or -application; we shall find Plato and others trying to expand it into -numerous imposing generalities.[67] - -[Footnote 67: Leibnitz says, Réponse à M. Foucher, p. 117, ed. -Erdmann, "Comment seroit il possible qu'aucune chose existât, si -l'être même, ipsum Esse, n'avoit l'existence? Mais bien au contraire -ne pourrait on pas dire avec beaucoup plus de raison, qu'il n'y a que -lui qui existe véritablement, les êtres particuliers n'ayant rien de -permanent? Semper generantur, et nunquam sunt."] - -[Side-note: Parmenidean phenomenology--relative and variable.] - -Apart from Ontology, Parmenides reckons all as belonging to human -opinions. These were derived from the observations of sense (which he -especially excludes from Ontology) with the comparisons, inferences, -hypothesis, &c., founded thereupon: the phenomena of Nature -generally.[68] He does not attempt (as Plato and Aristotle do after -him) to make Ontology serve as a principle or beginning for anything -beyond itself,[69] or as a premiss from which the knowledge of nature -is to be deduced. He treats the two--Ontology and Phenomenology, to -employ an Hegelian word--as radically disparate, and incapable of any -legitimate union. Ens was essentially one and enduring: Nature was -essentially multiform, successive, ever changing and moving relative -to the observer, and different to observers at different times and -places. Parmenides approached the study of Nature from its own -starting point, the same as had been adopted by the Ionic -philosophers--the data of sense, or certain agencies selected among -them, and vaguely applied to explain the rest. Here he felt that he -relinquished the full conviction, inseparable from his intellectual -consciousness, with which he announced his few absolute truths -respecting Ens and Non-Ens, and that he entered upon a process of -mingled observation and conjecture, where there was great room for -diversity of views between man and man. - -[Footnote 68: Karsten observes that the Parmenidean region of opinion -comprised not merely the data of sense, but also the comparisons, -generalisations, and notions, derived from sense. - -"[Greek: Doxasto\n] et [Greek: noêto\n] vocantur duo genera inter se -diversa, quorum alterum complectitur res externas et fluxas, -_notionesque quæ ex his ducuntur_--alterum res æternas et à conspectu -remotas," &c. (Parm. Fragm. p. 148-149).] - -[Footnote 69: Marbach (Lehrbuch der Gesch. der Philos., s. 71, not. 3) -after pointing out the rude philosophical expression of the -Parmenidean verses, has some just remarks upon the double aspect of -philosophy as there proclaimed, and upon the recognition by Parmenides -of that which he calls the "illegitimate" vein of enquiry along with -the "legitimate." - -"Learn from me (says Parmenides) the opinions of mortals, brought to -your ears in the deceitful arrangement of my words. This is not -philosophy (Marbach says): it is Physics. We recognise in modern times -two perfectly distinct ways of contemplating Nature: the philosophical -and the physical. Of these two, the second dwells in plurality, the -first in unity: the first teaches everything as infallible truth, the -second as multiplicity of different opinions. We ought not to ask why -Parmenides, while recognising the fallibility of this second road of -enquiry, nevertheless undertook to march in it,--any more than we can -ask, Why does not modern philosophy render physics superfluous?" - -The observation of Marbach is just and important, that the line of -research which Parmenides treated as illegitimate and deceitful, but -which he nevertheless entered upon, is the analogon of modern Physics. -Parmenides (he says) indicated most truly the contrast and divergence -between Ontology and Physics; but he ought to have gone farther, and -shown how they could be reconciled and brought into harmony. This -(Marbach affirms) was not even attempted, much less achieved, by -Parmenides: but it was afterwards attempted by Plato, and achieved by -Aristotle. - -Marbach is right in saying that the reconciliation was attempted by -Plato; but he is not right (I think) in saying that it was achieved by -Aristotle--nor by any one since Aristotle. It is the merit of -Parmenides to have brought out the two points of view as radically -distinct, and to have seen that the phenomenal world, if explained at -all, must be explained upon general principles of its own, raised out -of its own data of facts--not by means of an illusory Absolute and -Real. The subsequent philosophers, in so far as they hid and slurred -over this distinction, appear to me to have receded rather than -advanced.] - -[Side-note: Parmenides recognises no truth, but more or less -probability, in phenomenal explanations.--His physical and -astronomical conjectures.] - -Yet though thus passing from Truth to Opinions, from full certainty to -comparative and irremediable uncertainty,[70] Parmenides does not -consider all opinions as equally true or equally untrue. He announces -an opinion of his own--what he thinks most probable or least -improbable--respecting the structure and constitution of the Kosmos, -and he announces it without the least reference to his own doctrines -about Ens. He promises information respecting Earth, Water, Air, and -the heavenly bodies, and how they work, and how they came to be what -they are.[71] He recognises two elementary principles or beginnings, -one contrary to the other, but both of them positive--Light, -comprehending the Hot, the Light, and the Rare--Darkness, -comprehending the Cold, the Heavy, and the Dense.[72] These two -elements, each endued with active and vital properties, were brought -into junction and commixture by the influence of a Dea Genitalis -analogous to Aphroditê,[73] with her first-born son Eros, a personage -borrowed from the Hesiodic Theogony. From hence sprang the other -active forces of nature, personified under various names, and the -various concentric circles or spheres of the Kosmos. Of those spheres, -the outer-most was a solid wall of fire--"flammantia moenia -mundi"--next under this the Æther, distributed into several circles of -fire unequally bright and pure--then the circle called the Milky Way, -which he regarded as composed of light or fire combined with denser -materials--then the Sun and Moon, which were condensations of fire -from the Milky Way--lastly, the Earth, which he placed in the centre -of the Kosmos.[74] He is said to have been the first who pronounced -the earth to be spherical, and even distributed it into two or five -zones.[75] He regarded it as immovable, in consequence of its exact -position in the centre. He considered the stars to be fed by -exhalation from the Earth. Midway between the Earth and the outer -flaming circle, he supposed that there dwelt a Goddess--Justice or -Necessity--who regulated all the movements of the Kosmos, and -maintained harmony between its different parts. He represented the -human race as having been brought into existence by the power of the -sun,[76] and he seems to have gone into some detail respecting animal -procreation, especially in reference to the birth of male and female -offspring. He supposed that the human mind, as well as the human body, -was compounded of a mixture of the two elemental influences, diffused -throughout all Nature: that like was perceived and known by like: that -thought and sensation were alike dependent upon the body, and upon the -proportions of its elemental composition: that a certain limited -knowledge was possessed by every object in Nature, animate or -inanimate.[77] - -[Footnote 70: Parmen. Fr. v. 109. - -[Greek: e)n tô=| soi\ pau/ô pisto\n lo/gon ê)de\ no/êma -a)mphi\s a)lêthei/ês; do/xas d' a)po\ tou=de brotei/as -ma/nthane, ko/smon e)mô=n e)pe/ôn a)patêlo\n a)kou/ôn.]] - -[Footnote 71: Parm. Frag. v. 132-142.] - -[Footnote 72: Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 987, a. 1) represents -Parmenides as assimilating one of his phenomenal principles (Heat) to -Ens, and the other (Cold) to Non-Ens. There is nothing in the -fragments of Parmenides to justify this supposed analogy. Heat as well -as Cold belongs to Non-Ens, not to Ens, in the Parmenidean doctrine. -Moreover Cold or Dense is just as much a positive principle as Hot or -Rare, in the view of Parmenides; it is the female to the male (Parm. -Fragm. v. 129; comp. Karsten, p. 270). Aristotle conceives Ontology as -a substratum for Phenomenology; and his criticisms on Parmenides imply -(erroneously in my judgment) that Parmenides did the same. The remarks -which Brucker makes both on Aristotle's criticism and on the Eleatic -doctrine are in the main just, though the language is not very -suitable. - -Brucker, Hist. Philosoph., part ii. lib. ii. ch. xi. tom. 1, p. -1152-3, about Xenophanes:--"Ex iis enim quæ apud Aristotelem ex ejus -mente contra motum disputantur, patet Xenophanem motûs notionem aliam -quam quæ in physicis obtinet, sibi concepisse; et ad verum motum -progressum a nonente ad ens ejusque existentiam requisivisse. Quo sensu -notionis hujus semel admisso, sequebatur (cum illud impossibile sit, ut -ex nihilo fiat aliquid) universum esse immobile, adeoque et partes ejus -non ita moveri, ut ex statu nihili procederent ad statum existentiæ. -Quibus admissis, de rerum tamen mutationibus disserere poterat, quas -non alterationes, generationes, et extinctiones, rerum naturalium, sed -modificationes, esse putabat: hoc nomine indignas, eo quod rerum -universi natura semper maneret immutabilis, soliusque materiæ æternum -fluentis particulæ varie inter se modificarentur. Hâc ratione si -Eleaticos priores explicemus de motu disserentes, rationem facile -dabimus, quî de rebus physicis disserere et phenomena naturalia -explicare, salvâ istâ hypothesi, potuerint. Quod tamen de iis negat -Aristoteles, _conceptum motûs metaphysicum ad physicum transferens_: -ut, more suo, Eleatico systemate corrupto, eò vehementius illud -premeret."] - -[Footnote 73: Parmenides, ap. Simplik. ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 9 a. - -[Greek: e)n de\ me/sô| tou/tôn Daimôn, ê(\ pa/nta kuberna=|], &c. - -Plutarch, Amator, 13.] - -[Footnote 74: See especially the remarkable passage from Stobæus, -Eclog. Phys. i. 23, p. 482, cited in Karsten, Frag. Parm. p. 241, and -Cicero, De Natur. Deor, i. 11, s. 28, with the Commentary of Krische, -Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, viii. p. 98, seqq. - -It is impossible to make out with any clearness the Kosmos and its -generation as conceived by Parmenides. We cannot attain more than a -general approximation to it.] - -[Footnote 75: Diogen. Laert. ix. 21, viii. 48; Strabo, ii. p. 93 (on -the authority of Poseidonius). Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iii. 11) and -others ascribe to Parmenides the recognition not of five zones, but -only of two. If it be true that Parmenides held this opinion about the -figure of the earth, the fact is honourable to his acuteness; for -Leukippus, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes the Apolloniate, and -Demokritus, all thought the earth to be a flat, round surface, like a -dish or a drum: Plato speaks about it in so confused a manner that his -opinion cannot be made out: and Aristotle was the first who both -affirmed and proved it to be spherical. The opinion had been -propounded by some philosophers earlier than Anaxagoras, who -controverted it. See the dissertation of L. Oettinger. Die -Vorstellungen der Griechen über die Erde als Himmelskörper, Freiburg, -1850, p. 42-46.] - -[Footnote 76: Diogen. Laert. ix. 22.] - -[Footnote 77: Parmen. Frag. v. 145; Theophrastus, De Sensu, Karsten. -pp. 268, 270. - -Parmenides (according to Theophrastus) thought that the dead body, -having lost its fiery element, had no perception of light, or heat, or -sound; but that it had perception of darkness, cold, and -silence--[Greek: kai\ o(/lôs de\ pa=n to\ o)\n e)/chein tina gnô=sin].] - -Before we pass from Parmenides to his pupil and successor Zeno, who -developed the negative and dialectic side of the Eleatic doctrine, it -will be convenient to notice various other theories of the same -century: first among them that of Herakleitus, who forms as it were -the contrast and antithesis to Xenophanes and Parmenides. - -[Side-note: Herakleitus--his obscure style, impressive metaphors, -confident and contemptuous dogmatism.] - -Herakleitus of Ephesus, known throughout antiquity by the denomination -of the Obscure, comes certainly after Pythagoras and Xenophanes and -apparently before Parmenides. Of the two first he made special -mention, in one of the sentences, alike brief and contemptuous which -have been preserved from his lost treatise:--"Much learning does not -teach reason: otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, -Xenophanes and Hekatæus." In another passage Herakleitus spoke of the -"extensive knowledge, cleverness, and wicked arts" of Pythagoras. He -declared that Homer as well as Archilochus deserved to be scourged and -expelled from the public festivals.[78] His thoughts were all embodied -in one single treatise, which he is said to have deposited in the -temple of the Ephesian Artemis. It was composed in a style most -perplexing and difficult to understand, full of metaphor, symbolical -illustration, and antithesis: but this very circumstance imparted to -it an air of poetical impressiveness and oracular profundity.[79] It -exercised a powerful influence on the speculative minds of Greece, -both in the Platonic age, and subsequently: the Stoics especially both -commented on it largely (though with many dissentient opinions among -the commentators), and borrowed with partial modifications much of its -doctrine.[80] - -[Footnote 78: Diogen. L. ix. 1. [Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on ou) -dida/skei; Ê(si/odon ga\r a)\n e)di/daxe kai\ Puthago/rên, au)=tis te -Xenopha/nea kai\ E(katai=on], &c. Ib. viii. 1, 6. [Greek: Puthago/rês -Mnêsa/rchou i(stori/ên ê)/skêsen a)nthrô/pôn ma/lista pa/ntôn, kai\ -e)klexa/menos tau/tas ta\s suggrapha\s e)poi/êsen e(ôu+tou= sophi/ên, -polumathi/ên, kakotechni/ên.]] - -[Footnote 79: Diogen. Laert. ix. 1-6. Theophrastus conceived that -Herakleitus had left the work unfinished, from eccentricity of -temperament ([Greek: u(po\ melagcholi/as]). Of him, as of various -others, it was imagined by some that his obscurity was intentional -(Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 26, 74, De Finib. 2, 5). The words of Lucretius -about Herakleitus are remarkable (i. 641):-- - -Clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanes -Quamde graves inter Græcos qui vera requirunt: -Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque -Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt. - -Even Aristotle complains of the difficulty of understanding -Herakleitus, and even of determining the proper punctuation (Rhetoric. -iii. 5).] - -[Footnote 80: Cicero, Nat. Deor., iii. 14, 35.] - -[Side-note: Doctrine of Herakleitus--perpetual process of generation -and destruction--everything flows, nothing stands--transition of the -elements into each other, backwards and forwards.] - -The expositors followed by Lucretius and Cicero conceived Herakleitus -as having proclaimed Fire to be the universal and all-pervading -element of nature;[81] as Thales had recognised water, and Anaximenes -air. This interpretation was countenanced by some striking passages of -Herakleitus: but when we put together all that remains from him, it -appears that his main doctrine was not physical, but metaphysical or -ontological: that the want of adequate general terms induced him to -clothe it in a multitude of symbolical illustrations, among which fire -was only one, though the most prominent and most significant.[82] -Xenophanes and the Eleates had recognised, as the only objective -reality, One extended Substance or absolute Ens, perpetual, infinite, -indeterminate, incapable of change or modification. They denied the -objective reality of motion, change, generation, and -destruction--considering all these to be purely relative and phenomenal. -Herakleitus on the contrary denied everything in the nature of a -permanent and perpetual substratum: he laid down nothing as permanent -and perpetual except the process of change--the alternate sequence of -generation and destruction, without beginning or end--generation and -destruction being in fact coincident or identical, two sides of the -same process, since the generation of one particular state was the -destruction of its antecedent contrary. All reality consisted in the -succession and transition, the coming and going, of these finite and -particular states: what he conceived as the infinite and universal, -was the continuous process of transition from one finite state to the -next--the perpetual work of destruction and generation combined, which -terminated one finite state in order to make room for a new and -contrary state. - -[Footnote 81: To some it appeared that Herakleitus hardly -distinguished Fire from Air. Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Empiric. -adv. Mathemat. vii. 127-129, ix. 360.] - -[Footnote 82: Zeller's account of the philosophy of Herakleitus in the -second edition of his Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 450-496, is -instructive. Marbach also is useful (Gesch. der Phil. s. 46-49); and -his (Hegelian) exposition of Herakleitus is further developed by -Ferdinand Lassalle (Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen, published -1858). This last work is very copious and elaborate, throwing great -light upon a subject essentially obscure and difficult.] - -[Side-note: Variety of metaphors employed by Herakleitus, signifying -the same general doctrine.] - -This endless process of transition, or ever-repeated act of generation -and destruction in one, was represented by Herakleitus under a variety -of metaphors and symbols--fire consuming its own fuel--a stream of -water always flowing--opposite currents meeting and combating each -other--the way from above downwards, and the way from below upwards, -one and the same--war, contest, penal destiny or retributive justice, -the law or decree of Zeus realising each finite condition of things -and then destroying its own reality to make place for its contrary and -successor. Particulars are successively generated and destroyed, none -of them ever arriving at permanent existence:[83] the universal -process of generation and destruction alone continues. There is no -Esse, but a perpetual Fieri: a transition from Esse to Non-Esse, from -Non-Esse to Esse, with an intermediate temporary halt between them: a -ceaseless meeting and confluence of the stream of generation with the -opposite stream of destruction: a rapid and instant succession, or -rather coincidence and coalescence, of contraries. Living and dead, -waking and sleeping, light and dark, come into one or come round into -each other: everything twists round into its contrary: everything both -is and is not.[84] - -[Footnote 83: Plato, Kratylus, p. 402, and Theætet. p. 152, 153. - -Plutarch, De [Greek: Ei] apud Delphos, c. 18, p. 392. [Greek: Potamô=| -ga\r ou)/k e)stin e)mbê=nai di\s tô=| au)tô=| kath' Ê(ra/kleiton, -ou)de\ thnêtê=s ou)si/as di\s a(/psasthai kata\ e(/xin; a)ll' -o)xu/têti kai\ tachei metabolês skidnêsi kai\ pa/lin suna/gei, -_ma=llon de\ ou)de\ pa/lin ou)de\ u(/steron, a)ll' a(/ma suni/statai -kai\ a)polei/pei, pro/seisi kai\ a)/peisi. O(/then ou)d' ei)s to\ -ei)=nai perai/nei to\ gigno/menon au)tê=s_, tô=| mêde/pote lê/gein -mêd' i(/stasthai tê\n ge/nesin, a)ll' a)po\ spe/rmatos a)ei\ -metaba/llousan--ta\s prô/tas phthei/rousan gene/seis kai\ ê(liki/as -tai=s e)pigignome/nais]. - -Clemens Alex. Strom. v. 14, p. 711. [Greek: Ko/smon to\n au)to\n -a(pa/ntôn ou)/te tis theô=n ou)/t' a)nthrô/pôn e)poi/êsen; a)ll' ê=n -a)ei\ kai\ e)/stai pu=r a)ei/zôon, a(pto/menon me/tra kai\ -a)posbennu/menon me/tra]. Compare also Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. xiv. -3, 8; Diogen. L. ix. 8.] - -[Footnote 84: Plato, Sophist. p. 242 E. [Greek: Diaphero/menon ga\r -a)ei\ xumphe/retai]. - -Plutarch, Consolat. ad Apollonium c. 10, p. 106. [Greek: Po/te ga\r -e)n ê(mi=n au)toi=s ou)k e)/stin o( tha/natos? kai\ ê(=| phêsin -Ê(ra/kleitos, tau)to/ t' e)/ni zô=n kai\ tethnêko/s, kai\ to\ -e)grêgoro\s kai\ to\ katheu=don, kai\ ne/on kai\ gêraio/n; ta/de ga\r -metapeso/nta e)kei=na e)sti, ka)kei=na pa/lin metapeso/nta tau=ta]. - -Pseudo-Origenes, Refut. Hær. ix. 10, [Greek: O( theo\s ê(me/rê, -eu)phro/nê--chei/môn, the/ros--po/lemos, ei)rê/nê--ko/ros, li/mos], -&c.] - -[Side-note: Nothing permanent except the law of process and -implication of contraries--the transmutative force. Fixity of -particulars is an illusion for most part, so far as it exists, it is a -sin against the order of Nature.] - -The universal law, destiny, or divine working (according to -Herakleitus), consists in this incessant process of generation and -destruction, this alternation of contraries. To carry out such law -fully, each of the particular manifestations ought to appear and pass -away instantaneously--to have no duration of its own, but to be -supplanted by its contrary at once. And this happens to a great -degree, even in cases where it does not appear to happen: the river -appears unchanged, though the water which we touched a short time ago -has flowed away:[85] we and all around us are in rapid movement, -though we appear stationary: the apparent sameness and fixity is thus -a delusion. But Herakleitus does not seem to have thought that his -absolute universal force was omnipotent, or accurately carried out in -respect to all particulars. Some positive and particular -manifestations, when once brought to pass, had a certain measure of -fixity, maintaining themselves for more or less time before they were -destroyed. There was a difference between one particular and another, -in this respect of comparative durability: one was more durable, -another less.[86] But according to the universal law or destiny, each -particular ought simply to make its appearance, then to be supplanted -and re-absorbed; so that the time during which it continued on the -scene was, as it were, an unjust usurpation, obtained by encroaching -on the equal right of the next comer, and by suspending the negative -agency of the universal. Hence arises an antithesis or hostility -between the universal law or process on one side, and the persistence -of particular states on the other. The universal law or process is -generative and destructive, positive and negative, both in one: but -the particular realities in which it manifests itself are all -positive, each succeeding to its antecedent, and each striving to -maintain itself against the negativity or destructive interference of -the universal process. Each particular reality represented rest and -fixity: each held ground as long as it could against the pressure of -the cosmical force, essentially moving, destroying, and renovating. -Herakleitus condemns such pretensions of particular states to separate -stability, inasmuch as it keeps back the legitimate action of the -universal force, in the work of destruction and renovation. - -[Footnote 85: Aristot. De Coelo, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30; Physic. viii. -3, p. 253, b. 9. [Greek: Phasi/ tines kinei=sthai tô=n o)/ntôn ou) ta\ -me\n ta\ d' ou)/, a)lla\ pa/nta kai\ a)ei\, a)lla\ lantha/nein tou=to -tê\n ê(mete/ran ai)/sthêsin]--which words doubtless refer to -Herakleitus. See Preller, Hist. Phil. Græc. Rom. s. 47.] - -[Footnote 86: Lassalle, Philosophie des Herakleitos, vol. i. pp. 54, -55. "Andrerseits bieten die sinnlichen Existenzen _graduelle_ oder -_Mass-Unterschiede_ dar, je nachdem in ihnen das Moment des festen -Seins über die Unruhe des Werdens vorwiegt oder nicht; und diese -Graduation wird also zugleich den Leitfaden zur Classification der -verschiedenen Existenz-formen bilden."] - -[Side-note: Illustrations by which Herakleitus symbolized his -perpetual force, destroying and generating.] - -The theory of Herakleitus thus recognised no permanent substratum, or -Ens, either material or immaterial--no category either of substance or -quality--but only a ceaseless principle of movement or change, -generation and destruction, position and negation, immediately -succeeding, or coinciding with each other.[87] It is this principle or -everlasting force which he denotes under so many illustrative -phrases--"the common ([Greek: to\ xuno\n]), the universal, the -all-comprehensive ([Greek: to\ perie/chon]), the governing, the divine, -the name or reason of Zeus, fire, the current of opposites, strife or -war, destiny, justice, equitable measure, Time or the Succeeding," &c. -The most emphatic way in which this theory could be presented was, as -embodied, in the coincidence or co-affirmation of contraries. Many of -the dicta cited and preserved out of Herakleitus are of this -paradoxical tenor.[88] Other dicta simply affirm perpetual flow, -change, or transition, without express allusion to contraries: which -latter, however, though not expressed, must be understood, since -change was conceived as a change from one contrary to the other.[89] -In the Herakleitean idea, contrary forces come simultaneously into -action: destruction and generation always take effect together: there -is no negative without a positive, nor positive without a -negative.[90] - -[Footnote 87: Aristot. De Coelo, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30. [Greek: Oi( -de\ ta\ me\n a)/lla pa/nta gi/nesthai/ te/ phasi kai\ rhei=n, ei)=nai -de\ pagi/ôs ou)de/n, e(\n de/ ti mo/non u(pome/nein, e)x ou(= tau=ta -pa/nta metaschêmati/zesthai pe/phuken; o(/per e)oi/kasin bou/lesthai -le/gein a)/lloi te polloi\ kai\ Ê(ra/kleitos o( E)phe/sios]. See the -explanation given of this passage by Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 21, 39, 40, -founded on the comment of Simplikius. He explains it as an universal -law or ideal force--die reine Idee des Werdens selbst (p. 24), and -"eine unsinnliche Potenz" (p. 25). Yet, in i. p. 55 of his elaborate -exposition, he does indeed say, about the theory of Herakleitus, "Hier -sind zum erstenmale die sinnlichen Bestimmtheiten zu bloss -verschiedenen und absolut in einander übergehenden Formen eines -identischen, ihnen zu Grunde liegenden, _Substrats_ herabgesetzt". -But this last expression appears to me to contradict the whole tenor -and peculiarity of Lassalle's own explanation of the Herakleitean -theory. He insists almost in every page (compare ii. p. 156) that "das -Allgemeine" of Herakleitus is "reines Werden; reiner, steter, -erzeugender, Prozess". This process cannot with any propriety be -called a _substratum_, and Herakleitus admitted no other. In thus -rejecting any substratum he stood alone. Lassalle has been careful in -showing that Fire was not understood by Herakleitus as a substratum -(as water by Thales), but as a symbol for the universal force or law. -In the theory of Herakleitus no substratum was recognised--no [Greek: -to/de ti] or [Greek: ou)si/a]--in the same way as Aristotle observes -about [Greek: to\ a)/peiron] (Physic. iii. 6, a. 22-31) [Greek: ô(/ste -to\ a)/peiron ou) dei= lamba/nein ô(s to/de ti, oi(=on a)/nthrôpon ê)\ -oi)ki/an, a)ll' ô(s ê( ê(me/ra le/getai kai\ o( a)gô\n, oi(=s to\ -ei)=nai _ou)ch' ô(s ou)si/a tis ge/gonen, a)ll' a)ei\ e)n gene/sei ê(\ -phthora=|_, ei) kai\ peperasme/non, _a)ll' a)ei/ ge e(/teron kai\ -e(/teron_.]] - -[Footnote 88: Aristotle or Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo, c. 5, p. 396, -b. 20. [Greek: Tau)to\ de\ tou=to ê)=n kai\ to\ para\ tô=| skoteinô=| -lego/menon Ê(rakleitô=|: "suna/pseias ou)=la kai\ ou)chi\ ou)=la, -sumphero/menon kai\ diaphero/menon, suna=|don kai\ dia=|don, kai\ e)k -pa/ntôn e(\n kai\ e)x e(no\s pa/nta."] Heraclid. Allegor. ap. -Schleiermacher (Herakleitos, p. 529), [Greek: potamoi=s toi=s au)toi=s -e)mbai/nome/n te kai\ ou)k e)mbai/nomen, ei)me/n te kai\ ou)k -ei)me/n]: Plato, Sophist, p. 242, E., [Greek: diaphero/menon a)ei\ -xumphe/retai]: Aristotle, Metaphys. iii. 7, p. 1012, b. 24, [Greek: -e)/oike d' o( me\n Ê(raklei/tou lo/gos, le/gôn pa/nta ei)=nai kai\ mê\ -ei)=nai, a(/panta a)lêthê= poei=n]: Aristot. Topic. viii. 5, p. 155, -b., [Greek: oi(=on a)gatho\n kai\ kako\n ei)=nai tau)to\n, katha/per -Ê(ra/kleito/s phêsin]: also Aristot. Physic. i. 2, p. 185, b. Compare -the various Herakleitean phrases cited in Pseudo-Origen. Refut. Hæres. -Fragm. ix. 10; also Krische, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten -Philosophie, vol. i. p. 370-468. - -Bernays and Lassalle (vol. i. p. 81) contend, on reasonable grounds -(though in opposition to Zeller, p. 495), that the following verses in -the Fragments of Parmenides refer to Herakleitus: - -[Greek: oi(=s to\ pe/lein te kai\ ou)k ei)=nai tau)to\n neno/mistai -kou) tau)to\n, pa/ntôn de\ pali/ntropo/s e)sti ke/leuthos]. - -The commentary of Alexander Aphrodis. on the Metaphysica says, -"Heraclitus ergo cum diceret omnem rem esse et non esse et opposita -simul consistere, contradictionem veram simul esse statuebat, et omnia -dicebat esse vera" (Lassalle, p. 83). - -One of the metaphors by which Herakleitus illustrated his theory of -opposite and co-existent forces, was the pulling and pushing of two -sawyers with the same saw. See Bernays, Heraclitea, part i. p. 16; Bonn, -1848.] - -[Footnote 89: Aristot. Physic. viii. 3, p. 253, b. 30, [Greek: ei)s -tou)nanti/on ga\r ê( a)lloi/ôsis]: also iii. 5, p. 205, a. 6, [Greek: -pa/nta ga\r metaba/llei e)x e)nanti/ou ei)s e)nanti/on, oi(=on e)k -thermou= ei)s psuchro/n.]] - -[Footnote 90: Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. i. p. 323.] - -[Side-note: Water--intermediate between Fire (Air) and Earth.] - -Such was the metaphysical or logical foundation of the philosophy of -Herakleitus: the idea of an eternal process of change, manifesting -itself in the perpetual destruction and renovation of particular -realities, but having itself no reality apart from these -particulars, and existing only in them as an immanent principle or -condition. This principle, from the want of appropriate abstract -terms, he expressed in a variety of symbolical and metaphorical -phrases, among which Fire stood prominent.[91] But though Fire was -thus often used to denote the principle or ideal process itself, the -same word was also employed to denote that one of the elements which -formed the most immediate manifestation of the principle. In this -latter sense, Fire was the first stage of incipient reality: the -second stage was water, the third earth. This progression, fire, -water, earth, was in Herakleitean language "the road downwards," which -was the same as "the road upwards," from earth to water and again to -fire. The death of fire was its transition into water: that of water -was its transition partly into earth, partly into flame. As fire was -the type of extreme mobility, perpetual generation and destruction--so -earth was the type of fixed and stationary existence, resisting -movement or change as much as possible.[92] Water was intermediate -between the two. - -[Footnote 91: See a striking passage cited from Gregory of Nyssa by -Lassalle (vol. i. p. 287), illustrating this characteristic of fire; -the flame of a lamp appears to continue the same, but it is only a -succession of flaming particles, each of which takes fire and is -extinguished in the same instant: [Greek: ô(/sper to\ e)pi\ tê=s -thrualli/dos pu=r tô=| me\n dokei=n a)ei\ to\ au)to\ phai/netai--to\ -ga\r suneche\s a)ei\ tê=s kinê/seôs a)dia/spaston au)to\ kai\ -ê(nôme/non pro\s e(auto\ dei/knusi--tê=| de\ a)lêthei/a| pa/ntote -au)to\ e(auto\ diadecho/menon, ou)de/pote to\ au)to\ me/nei--ê( ga\r -e)xelkusthei=sa dia\ tê=s thermo/têtos i)kma\s _o(mou= te -e)xephlogô/thê kai\ ei)s lignu\n e)kkauthei=sa metapoiê/thê_], &c.] - -[Footnote 92: Diogen. Laert. ix. 9; Clemens Alexand. Strom. v. 14, p. -599, vi. 2, p. 624. [Greek: Puro\s tropai\ prô=ton tha/lassa, -thala/ttês de\ to\ me\n ê(/misu gê=, to\ d' ê(/misu prêstê/r]. A full -explanation of the curious expression [Greek: prêstê/r] is given by -Lassalle (Herakl. vol. ii. p. 87-90). See Brandis (Handbuch der Gr. -Philos. sect, xliii. p. 164), and Plutarch (De Primo Frigido, c. 17, -p. 952, F.). - -The distinction made by Herakleitus, but not clearly marked out or -preserved, between the _ideal fire_ or universal process, and the -_elementary fire_ or first stage towards realisation, is brought out -by Lassalle (Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 25-29).] - -[Side-note: Sun and stars--not solid bodies but meteoric aggregations -dissipated and renewed--Eclipses--[Greek: e)kpu/rôsis], or -destructions of the Kosmos by fire.] - -Herakleitus conceived the sun and stars, not as solid bodies, but as -meteoric aggregations perpetually dissipated and perpetually renewed -or fed, by exhalation upward from the water and earth. The sun became -extinguished and rekindled in suitable measure and proportion, under -the watch of the Erinnyes, the satellites of Justice. These celestial -lights were contained in troughs, the open side of which was turned -towards our vision. In case of eclipses the trough was for the time -reversed, so that the dark side was turned towards us; and the -different phases of the moon were occasioned by the gradual turning -round of the trough in which her light was contained. Of the phenomena -of thunder and lightning also, Herakleitus offered some explanation, -referring them to aggregations and conflagrations of the clouds, and -violent currents of winds.[93] Another hypothesis was often ascribed -to Herakleitus, and was really embraced by several of the Stoics in -later times--that there would come a time when all existing things -would be destroyed by fire ([Greek: e)kpu/rôsis]), and afterwards -again brought into reality in a fresh series of changes. But this -hypothesis appears to have been conceived by him metaphysically rather -than physically. Fire was not intended to designate the physical -process of combustion, but was a symbolical phrase for the universal -process; the perpetual agency of conjoint destruction and renovation, -manifesting itself in the putting forth and re-absorption of -particulars, and having no other reality except as immanent in these -particulars.[94] The determinate Kosmos of the present moment is -perpetually destroyed, passing into fire or the indeterminate: it is -perpetually renovated or passes out of fire into water, earth--out of -the indeterminate, into the various determinate modifications. At the -same time, though Herakleitus seems to have mainly employed these -symbols for the purpose of signifying or typifying a metaphysical -conception, yet there was no clear apprehension, even in his own mind, -of this generality, apart from all symbols: so that the illustration -came to count as a physical fact by itself, and has been so understood -by many.[95] The line between what he meant as the ideal or -metaphysical process, and the elementary or physical process, is not -easy to draw, in the fragments which now remain. - -[Footnote 93: Aristot. Meteorol. ii. e. p. 355, a. Plato, Republ. vi. -p. 498, c. 11; Plutarch, De Exilio, c. 11, p. 604 A.; Plutarch. De -Isid. et Osirid. c. 48, p. 370, E.; Diogen. L. ix. 10; Plutarch, -Placit. Philos. ii. 17-22-24-28, p. 889-891; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. -p. 594. - -About the doctrine of the Stoics, built in part upon this of -Herakleitus, see Cicero, Natur. Deor. ii. 46; Seneca, Quæst. Natur. -ii. 5, vi. 16.] - -[Footnote 94: Aristot. or Pseudo-Aristot., De Mundo, [Greek: e)k -pa/ntôn e(\n kai\ e)x e(no\s pa/nta].] - -[Footnote 95: See Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. s. 26-27, -p. 182-258. - -Compare about the obscure and debated meaning of the Herakleitean -[Greek: e)kpu/rôsis], Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 103; Zeller, -Philos. der Griech. vol. i. p. 477-479. - -The word [Greek: diako/smêsis] stands as the antithesis (in the -language of Herakleitus) to [Greek: e)kpu/rôsis]. A passage from Philo -Judæus is cited by Lassalle illustrating the Herakleitean movement -from ideal unity into totality of sensible particulars, forwards and -backwards--[Greek: o( de\ gonorrhuê\s (lo/gos) e)k ko/smou pa/nta kai\ -ei)s ko/smon a)na/gôn, u(po\ theou= de\ mêde\n oi)o/menos, -Ê(rakleitei/ou do/xês e(tai=ros, ko/ron kai\ chrêsmosu/nên, kai\ e(\n -to\ pa=n kai\ pa/nta a)moibê=| ei)sa/gôn]--where [Greek: ko/ros] and -[Greek: chrêsmosu/nê] are used to illustrate the same ideal antithesis -as [Greek: diako/smêsis] and [Greek: e)kpu/rôsis] (Lassalle, vol. i. -p. 232).] - -[Side-note: His doctrines respecting the human soul and human -knowledge. All wisdom resided in the Universal Wisdom--individual -Reason is worthless.] - -The like blending of metaphysics and physics--of the abstract and the -concrete and sensible--is to be found in the statements remaining from -Herakleitus respecting the human soul and human knowledge. The human -soul, according to him, was an effluence or outlying portion of the -Universal[96]--the fire--the perpetual movement or life of things. As -such, its nature was to be ever in movement: but it was imprisoned and -obstructed by the body, which represented the stationary, the fixed, -the particular--that which resisted the universal force of change. So -long as a man lived, his soul or mind, though thus confined, -participated more or less in the universal movement: but when he died, -his body ceased to participate in it, and became therefore vile, "fit -only to be cast out like dung". Every man, individually considered, -was irrational;[97] reason belonged only to the universal or the -whole, with which the mind of each living man was in conjunction, -renewing itself by perpetual absorption, inspiration or inhalation, -vaporous transition, impressions through the senses and the pores, &c. -During sleep, since all the media of communication, except only those -through respiration, were suspended, the mind became stupefied and -destitute of memory. Like coals when the fire is withdrawn, it lost -its heat and tended towards extinction.[98] On waking, it recovered -its full communication with the great source of intelligence -without--the universal all-comprehensive process of life and movement. -Still, though this was the one and only source of intelligence open to all -waking men, the greater number of men could neither discern it for -themselves, nor understand it without difficulty even when pointed out -to them. Though awake, they were not less unconscious or forgetful of -the process going on around them, than if they had been asleep.[99] -The eyes and ears of men with barbarous or stupid souls, gave them -false information.[100] They went wrong by following their own -individual impression or judgment: they lived as if reason or -intelligence belonged to each man individually. But the only way to -attain truth was, to abjure all separate reason, and to follow the -common or universal reason. Each man's mind must become identified and -familiar with that common process which directed and transformed the -whole: in so far as he did this, he attained truth: whenever he -followed any private or separate judgment of his own, he fell into -error.[101] The highest pitch of this severance of the individual -judgment was seen during sleep, at which time each man left the common -world to retire into a world of his own.[102] - -[Footnote 96: Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. vii. 130. [Greek: ê( -e)pixenôthei=sa toi=s ê(mete/rois sô/masin a)po\ tou= perie/chontos -moi=ra]. - -Plutarch, Sympos., p. 644. [Greek: neku/es kopri/ôn e)kblêto/teroi]. - -Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 23, p. 884. [Greek: Ê(ra/kleitos -ê)remi/an kai\ sta/sin e)k tô=n o(/lôn a)nê/|rei; e)sti\ ga\r tou=to -tô=n nekrô=n.]] - -[Footnote 97: See Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 522; Sext. Empir. -adv. Mathem. viii. 286.] - -[Footnote 98: The passage of Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. -127-134) is curious and instructive about Herakleitus. - -[Greek: A)re/skei ga\r tô=| phusikô=|] (Herakleitus) [Greek: to -perie/chon ê(ma=s logiko/n te o)\n kai\ phrenê=res--tou=ton dê\ to\n -thei=on lo/gon, kath' Ê(ra/kleiton, di' a)napnoê=s spa/santes noeroi\ -gino/metha, kai\ e)n me\n u(/pnois lêthai=oi, kata\ de\ e)/gersin -pa/lin e)/mphrones. e)n ga\r toi=s u(/pnois musa/ntôn tô=n -ai)sthêtikô=n po/rôn chôri/zetai tê=s pro\s to\ perie/chon sumphui+/as -o( e)n ê(mi=n nou=s, monê=s tê=s kata\ a)napnoê\n prosphu/seôs -sôzome/nês oi(onei/ tinos rhi/zês, chôristhei/s te a)poba/llei ê)\n -pro/teron ei)=che mnêmonikê\n du/namin. e)n de\ e)grêgoro/si pa/lin -dia\ tô=n ai)sthêtikô=n po/rôn ô(/sper dia\ tinô=n thuri/dôn -proku/psas kai\ tô=| perie/chonti sumba/llôn logikê\n e)ndu/etai -du/namin.] Then follows the simile about coals brought near to, or -removed away from, the fire. - -The Stoic version of this Herakleitean doctrine, is to be seen in -Marcus Antoninus, viii. 54. [Greek: Mêke/ti mo/non _sumpnei=n tô=| -perie/chonti a)e/ri, a)ll' ê)/dê kai\ sumphronei=n tô=| perie/chonti -pa/nta noerô=|_. Ou) ga\r ê(=tton ê( noera\ du/namis pa/ntê ke/chutai -kai\ diapephoi/têke tô=| spa=sai boulome/nô|, ê(/per ê( a)erô/dês tô=| -a)napneu=sai duname/nô|]. - -The Stoics, who took up the doctrine of Herakleitus with farther -abstraction and analysis, distinguished and named separately matters -which he conceived in one and named together--the physical inhalation -of air--the metaphysical supposed influx of -intelligence--_inspiration_ in its literal and metaphorical senses. The -word [Greek: to\ perie/chon], as he conceives it, seems to denote, not any -distinct or fixed local region, but the rotatory movement or circulation -of the elements, fire, water, earth, reverting back into each other. -Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 119-120; which transition also is denoted by the -word [Greek: a)nathumi/asis] in the Herakleitean sense--cited from -Herakleitus by Aristotle. De Animâ, i. 2, 16.] - -[Footnote 99: Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. vii. 132) here cites the -first words of the treatise of Herakleitus (compare also Aristotle, -Rhet. iii. 5). [Greek: lo/gou tou=de e)o/ntos a)xu/netoi gi/gnontai -a)/nthrôpoi kai\ pro/sthen ê)\ a)kou=sai kai\ a)kou/santes to\ -prô=ton;--tou\s de\ a)/llous a)nthrô/pous lantha/nei o(ko/sa -e)gerthe/ntes poiou=sin o(/kôsper o(ko/sa eu(/dontes -e)pilantha/nontai.]] - -[Footnote 100: Sext. Empiric. ib. vii. 126, a citation from -Herakleitus.] - -[Footnote 101: Sext. Emp. ib. vii. 133 (the words of Herakleitus) -[Greek: dio\ dei= _e(/pesthai tô=| xunô=|_;--tou= lo/gou de\ e)o/ntos -xunou=, zô/ousin oi( polloi\ ô(s i)di/an e)/chontes phro/nêsin; ê( d' -e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti _a)ll' e)xê/gêsis tou= tro/pou tê=s tou= -pa/ntos dioikê/seôs_; dio\ kath' o(/ ti a)\n au)tou= tê=s mnê/mês -koinônê/sômen, a)lêtheu/omen, a(\ de\ a)\n i)dia/sômen, -pseudo/metha.]] - -[Footnote 102: Plutarch, De Superstit. c. 3, p. 166, C. See also the -passage in Clemens Alexandr. Strom. iv. 22, about the comparison of -sleep to death by Herakleitus.] - -[Side-note: By Universal Reason he did not mean the Reason of most men -as it is, but as it ought to be.] - -By this denunciation of the mischief of private judgment, Herakleitus -did not mean to say that a man ought to think like his neighbours or -like the public. In his view the public were wrong, collectively as -well as individually. The universal reason to which he made appeal, -was not the reason of most men as it actually is but that which, in -his theory, ought to be their reason:[103] that which formed the -perpetual and governing process throughout all nature, though most men -neither recognised nor attended to it, but turned away from it in -different directions equally wrong. No man was truly possessed of -reason, unless his individual mind understood the general scheme of -the universe, and moved in full sympathy with its perpetual movement -and alternation or unity of contraries.[104] The universal process -contained in itself a sum-total of particular contraries which were -successively produced and destroyed: to know the universal was to know -these contraries in one, and to recognise them as transient, but -correlative and inseparable, manifestations, each implying the -other--not as having each a separate reality and each excluding its -contrary.[105] In so far as a man's mind maintained its kindred nature -and perpetual conjoint movement with the universal, he acquired true -knowledge; but the individualising influences arising from the body -usually overpowered this kindred with the universal, and obstructed -the continuity of this movement, so that most persons became plunged -in error and illusion. - -[Footnote 103: Sextus Empiricus misinterprets the Herakleitean theory -when he represents it (vii. 134) as laying down--[Greek: ta\ koinê=| -phaino/mena, pista\, ô(s a)\n tô=| koinô=| krino/mena lo/gô|, ta\ de\ -kat' i)di/an e(ka/stô|, pseudê=]. Herakleitus denounces mankind -generally as in error. Origen. Philosophum. i. 4; Diog. Laert. ix. 1.] - -[Footnote 104: The analogy and sympathy between the individual mind -and the Kosmical process--between the knowing and the known--was -reproduced in many forms among the ancient philosophers. It appears in -the Platonic Timæus, c. 20, p. 47 C. - -[Greek: To\ kinou/menon tô=| kinoume/nô| gignô/skesthai] was the -doctrine of several philosophers. Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2. Plato, -Kratylus, p. 412 A: [Greek: kai\ mê\n ê)/ ge e)pistê/mê mênu/ei ô(s -pherome/nois toi=s pra/gmasin e)pome/nês tê=s psuchê=s tê=s a)xi/as -lo/gou, kai\ ou)/te a)poleipome/nês ou)/te protheou/sês]. A remarkable -passage from the comment of Philoponus (on the treatise of Aristotle -De Animâ) is cited by Lassalle, ii. p. 339, describing the Herakleitean -doctrine, [Greek: dia\ tou=to e)k tê=s a)nathumia/seôs au)tê\n -e)/legen] (Herakleitus); [Greek: tô=n ga\r pragma/tôn e)n kinê/sei -o)/ntôn dei=n kai\ to\ gi/nôskon ta\ pra/gmata e)n kinê/sei ei)=nai, -i(/na _sumpara/theon au)toi=s e)pha/ptêtai kai\ e)pharmo/zê|_ -au)toi=s]. Also Simplikius ap. Lassalle, p. 341: [Greek: e)n -metabolê=| ga\r sunechei= ta\ o)/nta u(potithe/menos o( Ê(ra/kleitos, -kai\ to\ gnôso/menon au)ta\ tê=| e)paphê=| gi/nôskon, sune/pesthai -e)bou/leto ô(s a)ei\ ei)=nai kata\ to\ gnôstiko\n e)n kinê/sei.]] - -[Footnote 105: Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 58; and the passage of Philo -Judæus, cited by Schleiermacher, p. 437; as well as more fully by -Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 265-267 (Quis rerum divinar. hæres, p. 503, -Mangey): [Greek: e(\n ga\r to\ e)x a)mphoi=n tô=n e)nanti/ôn, ou(= -tmêthe/ntos gnô/rima ta\ e)nanti/a. Ou) tou=t' e)sti\n o(/ phasin -E(/llênes to\n me/gan kai\ a)oi/dimon par' au)toi=s Ê(ra/kleiton, -kephalai=on tê=s au)tou= prostêsa/menon philosophi/as, au)chei=n ô(s -eu(re/sei kainê=|? palaio\n ga\r eu(/rêma Môu/seô/s e)stin.]] - -[Side-note: Herakleitus at the opposite pole from Parmenides] - -The absolute of Herakleitus stands thus at the opposite pole as -compared with that of Parmenides: it is absolute movement, change, -generation and destruction--negation of all substance and -stability,[106] temporary and unbecoming resistance of each successive -particular to the destroying and renewing current of the universal. -The Real, on this theory, was a generalisation, not of substances, but -of facts, events, changes, revolutions, destructions, generations, -&c., determined by a law of justice or necessity which endured, and -which alone endured, for ever. Herakleitus had many followers, who -adopted his doctrine wholly or partially, and who gave to it -developments which he had not adverted to, perhaps might not have -acknowledged.[107] It was found an apt theme by those who, taking a -religious or poetical view of the universe, dwelt upon the transitory -and contemptible value of particular existences, and extolled the -grandeur or power of the universal. It suggested many doubts and -debates respecting the foundations of logical evidence, and the -distinction of truth from falsehood; which debates will come to be -noticed hereafter, when we deal with the dialectical age of Plato and -Aristotle. - -[Footnote 106: The great principle of Herakleitus, which Aristotle -states in order to reject (Physic. viii. 3, p. 253, b. 10, [Greek: -phasi/ tines kinei=sthai tô=n o)/ntôn ou) ta\ me\n ta\ d' ou), a)lla\ -pa/nta kai\ a)ei\; a)lla\ lantha/nein tou=to tê\n ê(mete/ran -ai)/sthêsin]) now stands averred in modern physical philosophy. Mr. -Grove observes, in his instructive Treatise on the Correlation of -Physical Forces, p. 22: - -"Of absolute rest, Nature gives us no evidence. All matter, as far as -we can discern, is ever in movement: not merely in masses, as in the -planetary spheres, but also molecularly, or throughout its intimate -structure. Thus every alteration of temperature produces a molecular -change throughout the whole substance heated or cooled: slow chemical -or electrical forces, actions of light or invisible radiant forces, -are always at play; so that, as a fact, we cannot predicate of any -portion of matter, that it is absolutely at rest."] - -[Footnote 107: Many references to Herakleitus are found in the -recently published books of the Refutatio Hæresium by Pseudo-Origen or -Hippolytus--especially Book ix. p. 279-283, ed. Miller. To judge by -various specimens there given, it would appear that his -juxta-positions of contradictory predicates, with the same subject, -would be recognised as paradoxes merely in appearance, and not in -reality, if we had his own explanation. Thus he says (p. 282) "the pure -and the corrupt, the drinkable and the undrinkable, are one and the -same." Which is explained as follows: "The sea is most pure and most -corrupt: to fish, it is drinkable and nutritive; to men, it is -undrinkable and destructive." This explanation appears to have been -given by Herakleitus himself, [Greek: tha/lassa, _phêsi\n_], &c. - -These are only paradoxes in appearance--the relative predicate being -affirmed without mention of its correlate. When you supply the -correlate to each predicate, there remains no contradiction at all.] - -[Side-note: Empedokles--his doctrine of the four elements, and two -moving or restraining forces.] - -After Herakleitus, and seemingly at the same time with Parmenides, we -arrive at Empedokles (about 500-430 B. C.) and his memorable doctrine -of the Four Elements. This philosopher, a Sicilian of Agrigentum, and -a distinguished as well as popular-minded citizen, expounded his views -in poems, of which Lucretius[108] speaks with high admiration, but of -which few fragments are preserved. He agreed with Parmenides, and -dissented from Herakleitus and the Ionic philosophers, in rejecting -all real generation and destruction.[109] That which existed had not -been generated and could not be destroyed. Empedokles explained what -that was, which men mistook for generation and destruction. There -existed four distinct elements--Earth, Water, Air, and Fire--eternal, -inexhaustible, simple, homogeneous, equal, and co-ordinate with each -other. Besides these four substances, there also existed two moving -forces, one contrary to the other--Love or Friendship, which brought -the elements into conjunction--Enmity or Contest, which separated -them. Here were alternate and conflicting agencies, either bringing -together different portions of the elements to form a new product, or -breaking up the product thus formed and separating the constituent -elements. Sometimes the Many were combined into One; sometimes the One -was decomposed into Many. Generation was simply this combination of -elements already existing separately--not the calling into existence -of anything new: destruction was in like manner the dissolution of -some compound, not the termination of any existent simple substance. -The four simple substances or elements (which Empedokles sometimes -calls by names of the popular Deities--Zeus, Hêrê, Aidoneus, &c.), -were the roots or foundations of everything.[110] - -[Footnote 108: Lucretius, i. 731. - -Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris ejus -Vociferantur, et exponunt præclara reperta: -Ut vix humanâ videatur stirpe creatus.] - -[Footnote 109: Empedokles, Frag. v. 77-83, ed. Karsten, p. 96: - -[Greek: phu/sis ou)deno/s e)stin a(pa/ntôn -thnêtô=n, ou)de/ tis ou)lome/nou thanatoi=o teleutê\, -a)lla\ mo/non mi/xis te dia/llaxi/s te mige/ntôn -e)sti, phu/sis d' e)pi\ toi=s o)noma/zetai a)nthrô/poisin. . . . ] - -[Greek: Phu/sis] here is remarkable, in its primary sense, as -derivative from [Greek: phu/omai], equivalent to [Greek: ge/nesis]. -Compare Plutarch adv. Koloten, p. 1111, 1112.] - -[Footnote 110: Emp. Fr. v. 55. [Greek: Te/ssara tô=n pa/ntôn -rhizô/mata].] - -[Side-note: Construction of the Kosmos from these elements and -forces--action and counter action of love and enmity. The Kosmos -alternately made and unmade.] - -From the four elements--acted upon by these two forces, abstractions -or mythical personifications--Empedokles showed how the Kosmos was -constructed. He supposed both forces to be perpetually operative, but -not always with equal efficacy: sometimes the one was predominant, -sometimes the other, sometimes there was equilibrium between them. -Things accordingly pass through a perpetual and ever-renewed cycle. -The complete preponderance of Love brings alternately all the elements -into close and compact unity, Enmity being for the time eliminated. -Presently the action of the latter recommences, and a period ensues in -which Love and Enmity are simultaneously operative; until at length -Enmity becomes the temporary master, and all union is for the time -dissolved. But this condition of things does not last. Love again -becomes active, so that partial and increasing combination of the -elements is produced, and another period commences--the simultaneous -action of the two forces, which ends in renewed empire of Love, -compact union of the elements, and temporary exclusion of Enmity.[111] - -[Footnote 111: Zeller, Philos. der Griech., vol. i. p. 525-528, ed. -2nd.] - -[Side-note: Empedoklean predestined cycle of things--complete empire -of Love--Sphærus--Empire of Enmity--disengagement or separation of the -elements--astronomy and meteorology.] - -This is the Empedoklean cycle of things,[112] divine or predestined, -without beginning or end: perpetual substitution of new for old -compounds--constancy only in the general principle of combination and -dissolution. The Kosmos which Empedokles undertakes to explain, takes -its commencement from the period of complete empire of Love, or -compact and undisturbed union of all the elements. This he conceives -and divinises under the name of Sphærus--as One sphere, harmonious, -uniform, and universal, having no motion, admitting no parts or -separate existences within it, exhibiting no one of the four elements -distinctly, "instabilis tellus, innabilis unda"--a sort of chaos.[113] -At the time prescribed by Fate or Necessity, the action of Enmity -recommenced, penetrating gradually through the interior of Sphærus, -"agitating the members of the God one after another,"[114] disjoining -the parts from each other, and distending the compact ball into a vast -porous mass. This mass, under the simultaneous and conflicting -influences of Love and Enmity, became distributed partly into -homogeneous portions, where each of the four elements was accumulated -by itself--partly into compounds or individual substances, where two -or more elements were found in conjunction. Like had an appetite for -Like--Air for Air, Fire for Fire, and so forth: and a farther -extension of this appetite brought about the mixture of different -elements in harmonious compounds. First, the Air disengaged itself, -and occupied a position surrounding the central mass of Earth and -Water: next, the Fire also broke forth, and placed itself externally -to the Air, immediately in contact with the outermost crystalline -sphere, formed of condensed and frozen air, which formed the wall -encompassing the Kosmos. A remnant of Fire and Air still remained -embodied in the Earth, but the great mass of both so distributed -themselves, that the former occupied most part of one hemisphere, the -latter most part of the other.[115] The rapid and uniform rotation of -the Kosmos, caused by the exterior Fire, compressed the interior -elements, squeezed the water out of the earth like perspiration from -the living body, and thus formed the sea. The same rotation caused the -earth to remain unmoved, by counterbalancing and resisting its -downward pressure or gravity.[116] In the course of the rotation, the -light hemisphere of Fire, and the comparatively dark hemisphere of -Air, alternately came above the horizon: hence the interchange of day -and night. Empedokles (like the Pythagoreans) supposed the sun to be -not self-luminous, but to be a glassy or crystalline body which -collected and reflected the light from the hemisphere of Fire. He -regarded the fixed stars as fastened to the exterior crystalline -sphere, and revolving along with it, but the planets as moving free -and detached from any sphere.[117] He supposed the alternations of -winter and summer to arise from a change in the proportions of Air and -Fire in the atmospheric regions: winter was caused by an increase of -the Air, both in volume and density, so as to drive back the exterior -Fire to a greater distance from the Earth, and thus to produce a -diminution of heat and light: summer was restored when the Fire, in -its turn increasing, extruded a portion of the Air, approached nearer -to the Earth, and imparted to the latter more heat and light.[118] -Empedokles farther supposed (and his contemporaries, Anaxagoras and -Diogenes, held the same opinion) that the Earth was round and flat at -top and bottom, like a drum or tambourine: that its surface had been -originally horizontal, in reference to the rotation of the Kosmos -around it, but that it had afterwards tilted down to the south and -upward towards the north, so as to lie aslant instead of horizontal. -Hence he explained the fact that the north pole of the heavens now -appeared obliquely elevated above the horizon.[119] - -[Footnote 112: Emp. Frag. v. 96, Karst., p. 98: - -[Greek: Ou(/tôs ê)=| me\n e(\n e)k pleo/nôn mema/thêke phu/esthai, -ê)de\ pa/lin diaphunto\s e(no\s ple/on e)ktele/thousi, -tê=| me\n gi/gnontai/ te kai\ ou)/ sphisin e)/mpedos ai)ô/n; -ê(=| de\ ta/d' a)lla/ssonta diampere\s ou)dama\ lê/gei, -tau/tê| d' ai)e\n e)/asin a)ki/nêta kata\ ku/klon.] - -Also:-- - -[Greek: kai\ ga\r kai\ paro\s ê(=n te kai\ e)/ssetai ou)de/ pot', -oi)/ô, -tou/tôn a)mphote/rôn] (Love and Discord) [Greek: keinô/setai a)/spetos -ai)ô/n]. - -These are new Empedoklean verses, derived from the recently published -fragments of Hippolytus (Hær. Refut.) printed by Stein, v. 110, in his -collection of the Fragments of Empedokles, p. 43. Compare another -passage in the same treatise of Hippolytus, p. 251.] - -[Footnote 113: Emped. Fr. v. 59, Karsten: - -[Greek: Ou(/tôs a(rmoni/ês pukinô=| kruphô=| e)stê/riktai -sphai/ros kuklote/rês, moniê=| periêge/i+ gai/ôn]. - -Plutarch, De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, c. 12. - -About the divinity ascribed by Empedokles to Sphærus, see Aristot. -Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1000, a. 29. [Greek: a(/panta ga\r e)k tou/tou -(nei/kous) ta)/lla/ e)sti plê\n o( theo/s] (i.e. Sphærus).--[Greek: -Ei) ga\r mê\ ê)=n to\ nei=kos e)n toi=s pra/gmasi, e(\n a)\n ê)=n -a(/panta, ô(s phêsi/n] (Empedokles). See Preller, Hist. Philos. ex -Font. Loc. Contexta, sect. 171, 172, ed. 3. - -The condition of things which Empedokles calls Sphærus may be -illustrated (translating his Love and Enmity into the modern -phraseology of _attraction_ and _repulsion_) from an eminent modern -work on Physics:--"Were there only atoms and attraction, as now -explained, the whole material of creation would rush into close -contact, and the universe would be one huge solid mass of stillness -and death. There is heat or caloric, however, which directly -counteracts attraction and singularly modifies the results. It has -been described by some as a most subtile fluid pervading things, as -water does a sponge: others have accounted it merely a vibration among -the atoms. The truth is, that we know little more of heat as a cause -of repulsion, than of gravity as a cause of attraction: but we can -study and classify the phenomena of both most accurately." (Dr. -Arnott, Elements of Physics, vol. i. p. 26.)] - -[Footnote 114: Emp. Fr. v. 66-70, Karsten: - -[Greek: pa/nta ga\r e)xei/ês pelemi/zeto gui=a theoi=o.]] - -[Footnote 115: Plutarch ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8, 10; Plutarch, -Placit. Philos. ii. 6, p. 887; Aristot. Ethic. Nic. viii. 2.] - -[Footnote 116: Emped. Fr. 185, Karsten. [Greek: ai)thê\r sphi/ggôn -peri\ ku/klon a(/panta]. Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 13, 14; iii. 2, 2. -[Greek: tê\n gê=n u(po\ tê=s di/nês ê)remei=n], &c. Empedokles called -the sea [Greek: i(/drôta tê=s gê=s]. Emp. Fr. 451, Karsten; Aristot. -Meteor. ii. 3.] - -[Footnote 117: Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 20, p. 890.] - -[Footnote 118: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 532-535, 2nd ed.: -Karsten--De Emped. Philos. p. 424-431. - -The very imperfect notices which remain, of the astronomical and -meteorological doctrines of Empedokles, are collected and explained by -these two authors.] - -[Footnote 119: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Schaubach, Anaxag. -Fragm. p. 175. Compare the remarks of Gruppe (Ueber die Kosmischen** -Systeme der Griechen, p. 98) upon the obscure Welt-Gebäude of -Empedokles.] - -[Side-note: Formation of the Earth, of Gods, men, animals, and -plants.] - -From astronomy and meteorology Empedokles[120] proceeded to describe -the Earth, its tenants, and its furniture; how men were first -produced, and how put together. All were produced by the Earth: being -thrown up under the stimulus of Fire still remaining within it. In its -earliest manifestations, and before the influence of Discord had been -sufficiently neutralized, the Earth gave birth to plants only, being -as yet incompetent to produce animals.[121] After a certain time she -gradually acquired power to produce animals, first imperfectly and -piecemeal, trunks without limbs and limbs without trunks; next, -discordant and monstrous combinations, which did not last, such as -creatures half man half ox; lastly, combinations with parts suited to -each other, organizations perfect and durable, men, horses, &c., which -continued and propagated.[122] Among these productions were not only -plants, birds, fishes, and men, but also the "long-lived Gods".[123] -All compounds were formed by intermixture of the four elements, in -different proportions, more or less harmonious.[124] These elements -remained unchanged: no one of them was transformed into another. But -the small particles of each flowed into the pores of the others, and -the combination was more or less intimate, according as the structure -of these pores was more or less adapted to receive them. So intimate -did the mixture of these fine particles become, when the effluvia of -one and the pores of another were in symmetry, that the constituent -ingredients, like colours compounded together by the painter,[125] -could not be discerned or handled separately. Empedokles rarely -assigned any specific ratio in which he supposed the four elements to -enter into each distinct compound, except in the case of flesh and -blood, which were formed of all the four in equal portions; and of -bones, which he affirmed to be composed of one-fourth earth, -one-fourth water, and the other half fire. He insisted merely on the -general fact of such combinations, as explaining what passed for -generation of new substances without pointing out any reason to -determine one ratio of combination rather than another, and without -ascribing to each compound a distinct ratio of its own. This omission -in his system is much animadverted on by Aristotle. - -[Footnote 120: Hippokrates--[Greek: Peri\ a)rchai/ês i)êtrikê=s]--c. -20, p. 620, vol. i. ed. Littré. [Greek: katha/per E)mpedoklê=s ê)\ -a)/lloi oi(\ peri\ phu/sios gegra/phasin e)x a)rchê=s o(/ ti/ e)stin -a)/nthrôpos, kai\ o(/pôs e)geneto prô/ton, kai\ o(/pôs xunepa/gê]. - -This is one of the most ancient allusions to Empedokles, recently -printed by M. Littré, out of one of the MSS. in the Parisian library.] - -[Footnote 121: Emp. Fr. v. 253, Kar. [Greek: tou\s me\n pu=r a)nepemp' -e)/thelon pro\s o(/moion i(ke/sthai], &c. - -Aristot., or Pseudo-Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2. [Greek: ei)=pe pa/lin -o( E)mpedoklê=s, o(/ti ta\ phuta\ e)/chousi ge/nesin e)n ko/smô| -ê)lattôme/nô|, kai\ ou) telei/ô| kata\ tê\n sumplê/rôsin au)tou=; -tau/tês de\ sumplêroume/nês] (while it is in course of being -completed), [Greek: ou) genna=tai zô=on.]] - -[Footnote 122: Emp. Frag. v. 132, 150, 233, 240, ed. Karst. Ver. 238:-- - -[Greek: polla\ me\n a)mphipro/sôpa kai\ a)mphi/stern' e)phu/onto, -bougenê= a)ndro/prôra], &c. Ver. 251:-- -[Greek: Ou)lophuei=s me\n prô=ta tu/poi chthono\s e(xane/tellon], &c. - -Lucretius, v. 834; Aristotel. Gen. Animal. i. 18, p. 722, b. 20; -Physic. ii. 8, 2, p. 198, b. 32; De Coelo, iii. 2, 5, p. 300, b. 29; -with the commentary of Simplikius ap. Schol. Brand. b. 512.] - -[Footnote 123: Emp. Frag. v. 135, Kar.] - -[Footnote 124: Plato, Menon. p. 76 A.; Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. -324, b. 30 seq.] - -[Footnote 125: [Greek: E)mpedoklê=s e)x a)metablê/tôn tô=n tetta/rôn -stoichei/ôn ê(gei=to gi/gnesthai tê\n tô=n sunthe/tôn sôma/tôn -phu/sin, ou(/tôs a)namemigme/nôn a)llê/lois tô=n prô/tôn, ô(s ei)/ tis -leiô/sas a)kribô=s kai\ chnoô/dê poiê/sas i)o\n kai\ chalki=tin kai\ -kadmei/an kai\ mi/su mi/xeien, ô(s mêde\n e)x au)tou= -metacheiri/sasthai chôri\s e(te/rou]. - -Galen, Comm. in Hippokrat. De Homin. Nat. t. iii. p. 101. See Karsten, -De Emped. Phil. p. 407, and Emp. Fr. v. 155. - -Galen says, however (after Aristot. Gen. et Corr. ii. 7, p. 334, a. -30), that this mixture, set forth by Empedokles, is not mixture -properly speaking, but merely close proximity. Hippokrates (he says) -was the first who propounded the doctrine of real mixture. But -Empedokles seems to have intended a real mixture, in all cases where the -structure of the pores was in symmetry with the inflowing particles. -Oil and water (he said) would not mix together, because there was no -such symmetry between them--[Greek: o(/lôs ga\r poiei=] (Empedokles) -[Greek: tê\n mi/xin tê=| summetri/a| tô=n po/rôn; dio/per e)/laion -me\n kai\ u(/dôr ou) mi/gnusthai, ta\ de\ a)/lla u(gra\ kai\ peri\ -o(/sôn dê\ katarithmei=tai ta\s i)di/as kra/seis] (Theophrastus, De -Sensu et Sensili, s. 12, vol. i. p. 651, ed. Schneider).] - -[Side-note: Physiology of -Empedokles--Procreation--Respiration--movement of the blood.] - -Empedokles farther laid down many doctrines respecting physiology. He -dwelt on the procreation of men and animals, entered upon many details -respecting gestation and the foetus, and even tried to explain what it -was that determined the birth of male or female offspring. About -respiration, alimentation, and sensation, he also proposed theories: -his explanation of respiration remains in one of the fragments. He -supposed that man breathed, partly through the nose, mouth, and lungs, -but partly also through the whole surface of the body, by the pores -wherewith it was pierced, and by the internal vessels connected with -those pores. Those internal vessels were connected with the blood -vessels, and the portion of them near the surface was alternately -filled with blood or emptied of blood, by the flow outwards from the -centre or the ebb inwards towards the centre. Such was the movement -which Empedokles considered as constantly belonging to the blood: -alternately a projection outwards from the centre and a recession -backwards towards the centre. When the blood thus receded, the -extremities of the vessels were left empty, and the air from without -entered: when the outward tide of blood returned, the air which had -thus entered was expelled.[126] Empedokles conceived this outward tide -of blood to be occasioned by the effort of the internal fire to escape -and join its analogous element without.[127] - -[Footnote 126: Emp. Fr. v. 275, seqq. Karst. - -The comments of Aristotle on this theory of Empedokles are hardly -pertinent: they refer to respiration by the nostrils, which was not -what Empedokles had in view (Aristot. De Respirat. c. 3).] - -[Footnote 127: Karsten, De Emp. Philosoph. p. 480. - -Emp. Fr. v. 307--[Greek: to/ t' e)n mê/nigxin e)ergme/non ô)gu/gion -pu=r--pu=r d' e)/xô diathrô=skon], &c. - -Empedokles illustrates this influx and efflux of air in respiration by -the klepsydra, a vessel with one high and narrow neck, but with a -broad bottom pierced with many small holes. When the neck was kept -closed by the finger or otherwise, the vessel might be plunged into -water, but no water would ascend into it through the holes in the -bottom, because of the resistance of the air within. As soon as the -neck was freed from pressure, and the air within allowed to escape, -the water would immediately rush up through the holes in the bottom. - -This illustration is interesting. It shows that Empedokles was -distinctly aware of the pressure of the air as countervailing the -ascending movement of the water, and the removal of that pressure as -allowing such movement. Vers. 286:-- - -[Greek: ou)de/ t' e)s a)/ggos d' o)/mbros e)se/rchetai, a)lla/ min -ei)/rgei -a)e/ros o)/gkos e)/sôthe pesô\n e)pi\ trê/mata pukna/], &c. - -This dealing with the klepsydra seems to have been a favourite -amusement with children.] - -[Side-note: Doctrine of effluvia and pores--explanation of -perceptions--Intercommunication of the elements with the sentient -subject--like acting upon like.] - -The doctrine of pores and effluvia, which formed so conspicuous an -item in the physics of Empedokles, was applied by him to explain -sensation. He maintained the general doctrine (which Parmenides had -advanced before him, and which Plato retained after him), that -sensation was produced by like acting upon like: Herakleitus before -him, and Anaxagoras after him, held that it was produced by unlike -acting upon unlike. Empedokles tried (what Parmenides had not tried) -to apply his doctrine to the various senses separately.[128] Man was -composed of the same four elements as the universe around him: and -since like always tended towards like, so by each of the four elements -within himself, he perceived and knew the like element without. -Effluvia from all bodies entered his pores, wherever they found a -suitable channel: hence he perceived and knew earth by earth, water by -water, and so forth.[129] Empedokles, assuming perception and -knowledge to be produced by such intercommunication of the four -elements, believed that not man and animals only, but plants and other -substances besides, perceived and knew in the same way. Everything -possessed a certain measure of knowledge, though less in degree, than -man, who was a more compound structure.[130] Perception and knowledge -was more developed in different animals in proportion as their -elementary composition was more mixed and varied. The blood, as the -most compound portion of the whole body, was the principal seat of -intelligence.[131] - -[Footnote 128: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 2, p. 647, Schneid.] - -[Footnote 129: Emp. Frag. Karst. v. 267, seq. - -[Greek: gnô=th', o(/ti pa/ntôn ei)si\n a)por)r(oai\ o(/ss' e)ge/nonto], -&c. - -ib. v. 321: - -[Greek: gai/ê| me\n ga\r gai=an o)pô/pamen, u(/dati d' u(/dôr, -ai)the/ri d' ai)the/ra di=on, a)ta\r puri\ pu=r a)i+\dêlon, -storgê=| de\ storgê/n, nei=kos de/ te nei/kei+ lugrô=|]. - -Theophrastus, De Sensu, c. 10, p. 650, Schneid. - -Aristotle says that Empedokles regarded each of these six as a [Greek: -psuchê\] (_soul_, _vital principle_) by itself. Sextus Empiricus -treats Empedokles as considering each of the six to be a [Greek: -kritê/rion a)lêthei/as] (Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Emp. adv. -Mathem. vii. 116).] - -[Footnote 130: Emp. Fr. v. 313, Karst. ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. -viii. 286; also apud Diogen. L. viii. 77. - -[Greek: pa/nta ga\r i)/sth' phro/nêsin e)/chein kai\ nô/matos -ai)=san]. - -Stein gives (Emp. Fr. v. 222-231) several lines immediately preceding -this from the treatise of Hippolytus; but they are sadly corrupt. - -Parmenides had held the same opinion before--[Greek: kai\ o(/lôs pa=n -to\ o)\n e)/chein tina\ gnô=sin]--ap. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 4. - -Theophrastus, in commenting upon the doctrine of Empedokles, takes as -one of his grounds of objection--That Empedokles, in maintaining -sensation and knowledge to be produced by influx of the elements into -pores, made no difference between animated and inanimate substances -(Theophr. De Sens. s. 12-23). Theophrastus puts this as if it were an -inconsistency or oversight of Empedokles: but it cannot be so -considered, for Empedokles (as well as Parmenides) appears to have -accepted the consequence, and to have denied all such difference, -except one of degree, as to perception and knowledge.] - -[Footnote 131: Emp. Frag. 316, Karst. [Greek: ai(=ma ga\r a)nthrô/pois -perika/rdio/n e)sti no/êma.] Comp. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 11.] - -[Side-note: Sense of vision.] - -In regard to vision, Empedokles supposed that it was operated mainly -by the fire or light within the eye, though aided by the light -without. The interior of the eye was of fire and water, the exterior -coat was a thin layer of earth and air. Colours were brought to the -eye as effluvia from objects, and became apprehended as sensations by -passing into the alternate pores or ducts of fire and water: white -colour was fitted to (or in symmetry with) the pores of fire, black -colour with those of water.[132] Some animals had the proportions of -fire and water in their eyes better adjusted, or more conveniently -located, than others: in some, the fire was in excess, or too much on -the outside, so as to obstruct the pores or ducts of water: in others, -water was in excess, and fire in defect. The latter were the animals -which saw better by day than by night, a great force of external light -being required to help out the deficiency of light within: the former -class of animals saw better by night, because, when there was little -light without, the watery ducts were less completely obstructed--or -left more free to receive the influx of black colour suited to -them.[133] - -[Footnote 132: Emp. Frag. v. 301-310, Karst. [Greek: to/ t' e)n -mê/nigxin e)ergme/non ô)gu/gion pu=r], &c. Theophr. De Sensu, s. 7, 8; -Aristot. De Sensu, c. 3; Aristot. De Gen. et Corrupt. i. 8.] - -[Footnote 133: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 7, 8.] - -[Side-note: Senses of hearing, smell, taste.] - -In regard to hearing, Empedokles said that the ear was like a bell or -trumpet set in motion by the air without; through which motion the -solid parts were brought into shock against the air flowing in, and -caused the sensation of sound within.[134] Smell was, in his view, an -adjunct of the respiratory process: persons of acute smell were those -who had the strongest breathing: olfactory effluvia came from many -bodies, and especially from such as were light and thin. Respecting -taste and touch, he gave no further explanation than his general -doctrine of effluvia and pores: he seems to have thought that such -interpenetration was intelligible by itself, since here was immediate -and actual contact. Generally, in respect to all the senses, he laid -it down that pleasure ensued when the matter which flows in was not -merely fitted in point of structure to penetrate the interior pores or -ducts (which was the condition of all sensation), but also harmonious -with them in respect to elementary mixture.[135] - -[Footnote 134: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 9-21. - -Empedokles described the ear under the metaphor of [Greek: sa/rkinon -o)/zon], "the fleshy branch."] - -[Footnote 135: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 9, 10. The criticisms of -Theophrastus upon this theory of Empedokles are extremely interesting, -as illustrating the change in the Grecian physiological point of view -during a century and a half, but I reserve them until I come to the -Aristotelian age. I may remark, however, that Theophrastus, disputing -the doctrine of sensory effluvia generally, disputes the existence of -the olfactory effluvia not less than the rest (s. 20).] - -[Side-note: Empedokles declared that justice absolutely forbade the -killing of anything that had life. His belief in the metempsychosis. -Sufferings of life are an expiation for wrong done during an -antecedent life. Pretensions to magic power.] - -Empedokles held various opinions in common with the Pythagoreans and -the brotherhood of the Orphic mysteries--especially that of the -metempsychosis. He represented himself as having passed through prior -states of existence, as a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish. He -proclaims it as an obligation of justice, absolute and universal, not -to kill anything that had life: he denounces as an abomination the -sacrificing of or eating of an animal, in whom perhaps might dwell the -soul of a deceased friend or brother.[136] His religious faith, -however, and his opinions about Gods, Dæmons, and the human soul, -stood apart (mostly in a different poem) from his doctrines on -kosmology and physiology. In common with many Pythagoreans, he laid -great stress on the existence of Dæmons (of intermediate order and -power between Gods and men), some of whom had been expelled from the -Gods in consequence of their crimes, and were condemned to pass a long -period of exile, as souls embodied in various men or animals. He -laments the misery of the human soul, in himself as well as in others, -condemned to this long period of expiatory degradation, before they -could regain the society of the Gods.[137] In one of his remaining -fragments, he announces himself almost as a God upon earth, and -professes his willingness as well as ability to impart to a favoured -pupil the most wonderful gifts--powers to excite or abate the winds, -to bring about rain or dry weather, to raise men from the dead.[138] -He was in fact a man of universal pretensions; not merely an expositor -of nature, but a rhetorician, poet, physician, prophet, and conjurer. -Gorgias the rhetor had been personally present at his magical -ceremonies.[139] - -[Footnote 136: Emp. Frag. v. 380-410, Karsten; Plutarch, De Esu -Carnium, p. 997-8. - -Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 13, 2: [Greek: e)sti\ ga\r, o(\ manteu/ontai/ ti -pa/ntes, phu/sei koino\n di/kaion kai\ a)/dikon, ka)\n mêdemi/a -koinôni/a pro\s a)llê/lous ê)=|, mêde\ sunthê/kê--ô(s E)mpedoklê=s -le/gei peri\ tou= mê\ ktei/nein to\ e)/mpsuchon; tou=to ga\r ou) tisi\ -me\n di/kaion, tisi\ d' ou) di/kaion, - -A)lla\ to\ me\n pa/ntôn no/mimon dia/ t' eu)rume/dontos -Ai)the/ros ê)neke/ôs te/tatai dia/ t' a)ple/tou au)gê=s]. - -Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. ix. 127.] - -[Footnote 137: Emp. Frag. v. 5-18, Karst.; compare Herod. ii. 123; -Plato, Phædrus, 55, p. 246 C.; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 26. -Plutarch observes in another place on the large proportion of -religious mysticism blended with the philosophy of Empedokles--[Greek: -Sôkra/tês, phasma/tôn kai\ deisidaimoni/as a)naple/ô philosophi/an -a)po\ Puthago/rou kai\ E)mpedokle/ous dexa/menos, eu)= ma/la -bebakcheume/nên], &c. (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 580, C.) - -See Fr. Aug. Ukert, Ueber Daemonen, Heroen, und Genien, p. 151.] - -[Footnote 138: Emp. Fr. v. 390-425, Karst.] - -[Footnote 139: Diog. Laert. viii. 59.] - -[Side-note: Complaint of Empedokles on the impossibility of finding -out truth.] - -None of the remaining fragments of Empedokles are more remarkable than -a few in which he deplores the impossibility of finding out any great -or comprehensive truth, amidst the distraction and the sufferings -of our short life. Every man took a different road, confiding only in -his own accidental experience or particular impressions; but no man -could obtain or communicate satisfaction about the whole.[140] - -[Footnote 140: Emp. Fr. v. 34, ed. Karst., p. 88. - -[Greek: pau=ron de\ zô/ês a)bi/ou me/ros a)thlê/santes -ô)ku/moroi, ka/pnoio di/kên a)rthe/ntes, a)pe/ptan, -au)to\ mo/non peisthe/ntes o(/tô| prose/kursen e(/kastos, -pa/ntos' e)launo/menoi; to\ de\ ou)=lon e)peu/chetai eu(rei=n -au)/tôs. ou)/t' e)piderkta\ ta/d' a)ndra/sin ou)/t' e)pakousta\ -ou)/te no/ô| perilêpta/.]] - -[Side-note: Theory of Anaxagoras--denied generation and -destruction--recognises only mixture and severance of pre-existing -kinds of matter.] - -Anaxagoras of Klazomenæ, a friend of the Athenian Perikles, and -contemporary of Empedokles, was a man of far simpler and less -ambitious character: devoted to physical contemplation and geometry, -without any of those mystical pretentions common among the -Pythagoreans. His doctrines were set forth in prose, and in the Ionic -dialect.[141] His theory, like all those of his age, was -all-comprehensive in its purpose, starting from a supposed beginning, -and shewing how heaven, earth, and the inhabitants of earth, had come -into those appearances which were exhibited to sense. He agreed with -Empedokles in departing from the point of view of Thales and other -Ionic theorists, who had supposed one primordial matter, out of which, -by various transformations, other sensible things were generated--and -into which, when destroyed, they were again resolved. Like Empedokles, -and like Parmenides previously, he declared that generation, -understood in this sense, was a false and impossible notion: that no -existing thing could have been generated, or could be destroyed, or -could undergo real transformation into any other thing different from -what it was.[142] Existing things were what they were, possessing -their several inherent properties: there could be no generation except -the putting together of these things in various compounds, nor any -destruction except the breaking up of such compounds, nor any -transformation except the substitution of one compound for another. - -[Footnote 141: Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. i. 4, 5; Diogen. Laert. ii. -10.] - -[Footnote 142: Anaxagor. Fr. 22, p. 135, ed. Schaubach. [Greek: to\ -de\ gi/nesthai kai\ a)po/llusthai ou)k o)rthô=s nomi/zousin oi( -E(/llênes. Ou)de\n ga\r chrê=ma gi/netai, ou)de\ a)po/llutai, a)ll' -a)p' e)o/ntôn chrêma/tôn summi/sgetai/ te kai\ diakri/netai; kai\ -ou(/tôs a)\n o)rthô=s kaloi=en to/ te gi/nesthai summi/sgesthai kai\ -to\ a)po/llusthai diakri/nesthai.]] - -[Side-note: Homoeomeries--small particles of diverse kinds of matter, -all mixed together.] - -But Anaxagoras did not accept the Empedoklean four elements as the sum -total of first substances. He reckoned all the different sorts of -matter as original and primæval existences: he supposed them all to -lie ready made, in portions of all sizes, whereof there was no -greatest and no least.[143] Particles of the same sort he called -Homoeomeries: the aggregates of which formed bodies of like parts; -wherein the parts were like each other and like the whole. Flesh, -bone, blood, fire,[144] earth, water, gold, &c., were aggregations of -particles mostly similar, in which each particle was not less flesh, -bone, and blood, than the whole mass. - -[Footnote 143: Anaxag. Fr. 5, ed. Schaub, p. 94. - -[Greek: Ta\ o(moiomerê=] are the primordial particles themselves: -[Greek: o(moiome/reia] is the abstract word formed from this -concrete--existence in the form or condition of [Greek: o(moiomerê=]. -Each distinct substance has its own [Greek: o(moiomerê=], little -particles like each other, and each possessing the characteristics of -the substance. But the state called [Greek: o(moiome/reia] pervades all -substances (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, s. 53, -note 3.)] - -[Footnote 144: Lucretius, i. 830: - -Nunc et Anaxagoræ scrutemur Homoeomerian, -Quam Grai memorant, nec nostrâ dicere linguâ -Concedit nobis patrii sermonis egestas. - -Lucretius calls this theory Homoeomeria, and it appears to me that -this name must have been bestowed upon it by its author. Zeller and -several others, after Schleiermacher, conceive the name to date first -from Aristotle and his physiological classification. But what other -name was so natural or likely for Anaxagoras himself to choose?] - -But while Anaxagoras held that each of these Homoeomeries[145] was a -special sort of matter with its own properties, and each of them -unlike every other: he held farther the peculiar doctrine, that no one -of them could have an existence apart from the rest. Everything was -mixed with everything: each included in itself all the others: not one -of them could be obtained pure and unmixed. This was true of any -portion however small. The visible and tangible bodies around us -affected our senses, and received their denominations according to -that one peculiar matter of which they possessed a decided -preponderance and prominence. But each of them included in itself all -the other matters, real and inseparable, although latent.[146] - -[Footnote 145: Anaxag. Fr. 8; Schaub. p. 101; compare p. 113. [Greek: -e(/teron de\ ou)de/n e)stin o(/moion ou)deni\ a)/llô|. A)ll' o(/teô| -plei=sta e)/ni, tau=ta e)ndêlo/tata e(\n e(/kasto/n e)sti kai\ ê)=n.]] - -[Footnote 146: Lucretius, i. 876: - -Id quod Anaxagoras sibi sumit, ut omnibus omnes -Res putet inmixtas rebus latitare, sed illud -Apparere unum cujus sint plurima mixta,** -Et magis in promptu primâque in fronte** locata. - -Aristotel. Physic. i. 4, 3. [Greek: Dio/ phasi pa=n e)n panti\ -memi=chthai, dio/ti pa=n e)k panto\s e(ô/rôn gigno/menon; phai/nesthai -de\ diaphe/ronta kai/ prosagoreu/esthai e(/tera a)llê/lôn, e)k tou= -ma/lista u(pere/chontos, dia\ to\ plê=thos e)n tê=| mi/xei tô=n -a)pei/rôn; ei)likrinô=s me\n ga\r o(/lon leuko\n ê)\ me/lan ê)\ sa/rka -ê)\ o)stou=n, ou)k ei)=nai; o(/tou de\ plei=ston e(/kaston e)/chei, -tou=to dokei=n ei)=nai tê\n phu/sin tou= pra/gmatos.] Also Aristot. De -Coelo, iii. 3; Gen. et Corr. i. 1.] - -[Side-note: First condition of things--all the primordial varieties of -matter were huddled together in confusion. Nous, or Reason, distinct -from all of them, supervened and acted upon this confused mass, -setting the constituent particles in movement.] - -In the beginning (said Anaxagoras) all things (all sorts of matter) -were together, in one mass or mixture. Infinitely numerous and -infinite in diversity of magnitude, they were so packed and confounded -together that no one could be distinguished from the rest: no definite -figure, or colour, or other property, could manifest itself. Nothing -was distinguishable except the infinite mass of Air and Æther (Fire), -which surrounded the mixed mass and kept it together.[147] Thus all -things continued for an infinite time in a state of rest and nullity. -The fundamental contraries--wet, dry, hot, cold, light, dark, dense, -rare,--in their intimate contact neutralised each other.[148] Upon -this inert mass supervened the agency of Nous or Mind. The -characteristic virtue of mind was, that it alone was completely -distinct, peculiar, pure in itself, unmixed with anything else: thus -marked out from all other things which were indissolubly mingled with -each other. Having no communion of nature with other things, it was -noway acted upon by them, but was its own master or autocratic, and -was of very great force. It was moreover the thinnest and purest of -all things; possessing complete knowledge respecting all other things. -It was like to itself throughout--the greater manifestations of mind -similar to the less.[149] - -[Footnote 147: Anaxag. Frag. 1; Schaub. p. 65; [Greek: O(mou= pa/nta -chrê/mata ê)=n, a)/peira kai\ plê=thos kai\ smikro/têta. Kai\ ga\r to\ -smikro\n a)/peiron ê)=n. Kai\ pa/ntôn o(mou= e)o/ntôn ou)de\n -eu)/dêlon ê)=n u(po\ smikro/têtos. Pa/nta ga\r a)ê/r te kai\ ai)thê\r -katei=chen, a)mpho/tera a)/peira e)o/nta. Tau=ta ga\r me/gista -e)/nestin e)n toi=s sumpa=si kai\ plê/thei kai\ mege/thei]. - -The first three words--[Greek: o(mou= pa/nta chrê/mata]--were the -commencement of the Anaxagorean treatise, and were more recollected -and cited than any other words in it. See Fragm. 16, 17, Schaubach, -and p. 66-68. Aristotle calls this primeval chaos [Greek: to\ mi/gma].] - -[Footnote 148: Anax. Frag. 6, Schaub. p. 97; Aristotel. Physic. i. 4, -p. 187, a, with the commentary of Simplikius ap. Scholia, p. 335; -Brandis also, iii. 203, a. 25; and De Coelo, iii. 301, a. 12, [Greek: -e)x a)kinê/tôn ga\r a)/rchetai] (Anaxagoras) [Greek: kosmopoiei=n.]] - -[Footnote 149: Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Schaub. [Greek: Ta\ me\n a)/lla -panto\s moi=ran e)/chei, nou=s de/ e)stin a)/peiron kai\ au)tokrate\s -kai\ me/miktai ou)deni\ chrê/mati, a)lla\ mo/nos au)to\s e)ph' -e(ôu+tou= e)stin. Ei) mê\ ga\r e)ph' e(ôu+tou= ê)=n, a)lla/ teô| -e)me/mikto a)/llô|, metei=chen a)\n a(pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn ei)/ -e)me/mikto teô| . . . . Kai\ a)nekô/luen au)to\n ta\ summemigme/na, -ô(/ste mêdeno\s chrê/matos kratei=n o(moi/ôs, ô(s kai\ mo/non e)o/nta -e)ph' e(ôu+tou=. E)sti\ ga\r lepto/tato/n te pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn kai\ -katharô/taton, kai\ gnô/mên ge peri\ panto\s pa=san i)/schei, kai\ -i)schu/ei me/giston.] - -Compare Plato, Kratylus, c. 65, p. 413, c. [Greek: nou=n au)tokra/tora -kai\ ou)deni\ memigme/non (o(\ le/gei A)naxago/ras).]] - -[Side-note: Movement of rotation in the mass initiated by Nous on a -small scale, but gradually extending itself. Like particles congregate -together--distinguishable aggregates are formed.] - -But though other things could not act upon mind, mind could act upon -them. It first originated movement in the quiescent mass. The movement -impressed was that of rotation, which first began on a small scale, -then gradually extended itself around, becoming more efficacious as it -extended, and still continuing to extend itself around more and more. -Through the prodigious velocity of this rotation, a separation was -effected of those things which had been hitherto undistinguishably -huddled together.[150] Dense was detached from rare, cold from hot, -dark from light, dry from wet.[151] The Homoeomeric particles -congregated together, each to its like; so that bodies were -formed--definite and distinguishable aggregates, possessing such a -preponderance of some one ingredient as to bring it into clear -manifestation.[152] But while the decomposition of the multifarious -mass was thus carried far enough to produce distinct bodies, each of -them specialised, knowable, and regular--still the separation can -never be complete, nor can any one thing be "cut away as with a -hatchet" from the rest. Each thing, great or small, must always -contain in itself a proportion or trace, latent if not manifest, of -everything else.[153] Nothing except mind can be thoroughly pure and -unmixed. - -[Footnote 150: Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Sch. [Greek: kai\ tê=s -perichôrê/sios tê=s sumpa/sês nou=s e)kra/têsen, ô(/ste perichôrê=sai -tê\n a)rchê/n. Kai\ prô=ton a)po\ tou= smikrou= ê)/rxato -perichôrê=sai, e)/peiten plei=on perichôre/ei, kai\ perichôrê/sei -e)pi\ ple/on. Kai\ ta\ summisgo/mena/ te kai\ a)pokrino/mena kai\ -diakrino/mena, pa/nta e)/gnô nou=s]. Also Fr. 18, p. 129; Fr. 21, p. -134, Schau.] - -[Footnote 151: Anaxag. Fr. 8-19, Schaubach.] - -[Footnote 152: Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 101, Schaub. [Greek: o(/teô| plei=sta -e)/ni, tau=ta e)ndêlo/tata e(/n e(/kasto/n e)sti kai\ ê)=n]. -Pseudo-Origen. Philosophumen. 8. [Greek: kinê/seôs de mete/chein ta\ -pa/nta u(po\ tou= nou= kinou/mena, sunelthei=n te ta\ o(/moia], &c. -Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. i. p. 188, a. 13 (p. 337, Schol. -Brandis).] - -[Footnote 153: Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, 5, p. 203, a. 23, [Greek: -o(tiou=n tô=n mori/ôn ei)=nai mi=gma o(moi/ôs tô=| pa/nti], &c. Anaxag. -Fr. 16, p. 126, Schaub. - -Anaxag. Fr. 11, p. 119, Schaub. [Greek: ou) kechô/ristai ta\ e(n e(ni\ -ko/smô|, ou)de\ _a)poke/koptai pele/kei_], &c. Frag. 12, p. 122. -[Greek: e)n panti\ pa/nta, ou)de\ chôri\s e)/stin ei)=nai].--Frag. 15, -p. 125.] - -[Side-note: Nothing (except [Greek: Nou=s]) can be entirely pure or -unmixed, but other things may be comparatively pure. Flesh, Bone, &c. -are purer than Air or Earth.] - -Nevertheless other things approximate in different degrees to purity, -according as they possess a more or less decided preponderance of some -few ingredients over the remaining multitude. Thus flesh, bone, and -other similar portions of the animal organism, were (according to -Anaxagoras) more nearly pure (with one constituent more thoroughly -preponderant and all other coexistent natures more thoroughly -subordinate and latent) than the four Empedoklean elements, Air, Fire, -Earth, &c.; which were compounds wherein many of the numerous -ingredients present were equally effective, so that the manifestations -were more confused and complicated. In this way the four Empedoklean -elements formed a vast seed-magazine, out of which many distinct -developments might take place, of ingredients all pre-existing within -it. Air and Fire appeared to generate many new products, while flesh -and bone did not.[154] Amidst all these changes, however, the infinite -total mass remained the same, neither increased nor diminished.[155] - -[Footnote 154: Aristotle, in two places (De Coelo, iii. 3, p. 302, a. -28, and Gen. et Corr. i. 1, p. 314, a. 18) appears to state that -Anaxagoras regarded flesh and bone as simple and elementary: air, -fire, and earth, as compounds from these and other Homoeomeries. So -Zeller (Philos. d. Griech., v. i. p. 670, ed. 2), with Ritter, and -others, understand him. Schaubach (Anax. Fr. p. 81, 82) dissents from -this opinion, but does not give a clear explanation. Another passage -of Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 3, p. 984, a. 11) appears to contradict the -above two passages, and to put fire and water, in the Anaxagorean -theory, in the same general category as flesh and bone: the -explanatory note of Bonitz, who tries to show that the passage in the -Metaphysica is in harmony with the other two above named passages, -seems to me not satisfactory. - -Lucretius (i. 835, referred to in a previous note) numbers flesh, -bone, fire, and water, all among the Anaxagorean Homoeomeries; and I -cannot but think that Aristotle, in contrasting Anaxagoras with -Empedokles, has ascribed to the former language which could only have -been used by the latter. [Greek: E)nanti/ôs de\ phai/nontai le/gontes -oi( peri\ A)naxago/ran toi=s peri\ E)mpedokle/a. O( me\n ga/r] (Emp.) -[Greek: phêsi pu=r kai\ u(/dôr kai\ a)e/ra kai\ gê=n stoichei=a -te/ssara kai\ a(pla= ei)=nai, ma=llon ê)\ sa/rka kai\ o)stou=n kai\ -ta\ toiau=ta tô=n o(moiomerô=n. Oi( de\] (Anaxag.) [Greek: tau=ta me\n -a(pla= kai\ stoichei=a, gê=n de\ kai\ pu=r kai\ a)e/ra su/ntheta; -panspermi/an ga\r ei)=nai tou/tôn.] (Gen. et Corr. i. 1.) The last -words ([Greek: panspermi/an]) are fully illustrated by a portion of -the other passage, De Coelo, iii. 3, [Greek: a)e/ra de\ kai\ pu=r -mi=gma tou/tôn] (the Homoeomeries, such as flesh and blood) [Greek: -kai\ tô=n a)/llôn sperma/tôn pa/ntôn; ei)=nai ga\r e(ka/teron au)tô=n -e)x a)ora/tôn o(moiomerô=n pa/ntôn ê)throisme/nôn; dio\ kai\ -gi/gnesthai pa/nta e)k tou/tôn]. - -Now it can hardly be said that Anaxagoras recognised one set of bodies -as simple and elementary, and that Empedokles recognised another set -of bodies as such. Anaxagoras expressly denied _all simple bodies_. In -his theory, all bodies were compound: _Nous_ alone formed an -exception. Everything existed in everything. But they were compounds -in which particles of one sort, or of a definite number of sorts, had -come together into such positive and marked action, as practically to -nullify the remainder. The generation of the Homoeomeric aggregate was -by disengaging these like particles from the confused mixture in which -their agency had before lain buried ([Greek: ge/nesis, e)/kphansis -mo/non kai\ e)/kkrisis tou= pri\n kruptome/nou]. Simplikius ap. -Schaub. Anax. Fr. p. 115). The Homoeomeric aggregates or bodies were -infinite in number: for ingredients might be disengaged and recombined -in countless ways, so that the result should always be some positive -and definite manifestations. Considered in reference to the -Homoeomeric body, the constituent particles might in a certain sense -be called elements.] - -[Footnote 155: Anaxag. Fr. 14, p. 125, Schaub.] - -[Side-note: Theory of Anaxagoras compared with that of Empedokles.] - -In comparing the theory of Anaxagoras with that of Empedokles, we -perceive that both of them denied not only the generation of new -matter out of nothing (in which denial all the ancient physical -philosophers concurred), but also the transformation of one form of -matter into others, which had been affirmed by Thales and others. Both -of them laid down as a basis the existence of matter in a variety of -primordial forms. They maintained that what others called generation -or transformation, was only a combination or separation of these -pre-existing materials, in great diversity of ratios. Of such primordial -forms of matter Empedokles recognised only four, the so-called -Elements; each simple and radically distinct from the others, and -capable of existing apart from them, though capable also of being -combined with them. Anaxagoras recognised primordial forms of matter -in indefinite number, with an infinite or indefinite stock of -particles of each; but no one form of matter (except Nous) capable of -being entirely severed from the remainder. In the constitution of -every individual body in nature, particles of all the different forms -were combined; but some one or a few forms were preponderant and -manifest, all the others overlaid and latent. Herein consisted the -difference between one body and another. The Homoeomeric body was one -in which a confluence of like particles had taken place so numerous -and powerful, as to submerge all the coexistent particles of other -sorts. The majority thus passed for the whole, the various minorities -not being allowed to manifest themselves, yet not for that reason -ceasing to exist: a type of human society as usually constituted, -wherein some one vein of sentiment, ethical, æsthetical, religious, -political, &c., acquires such omnipotence as to impose silence on -dissentients, who are supposed not to exist because they cannot -proclaim themselves without ruin. - -[Side-note: Suggested partly by the phenomena of animal nutrition.] - -The hypothesis of multifarious forms of matter, latent yet still real -and recoverable, appears to have been suggested to Anaxagoras mainly -by the phenomena of animal nutrition.[156] The bread and meat on which -we feed nourishes all the different parts of our body--blood, flesh, -bones, ligaments, veins, trachea, hair, &c. The nutriment must contain -in itself different matters homogeneous with all these tissues and -organs; though we cannot see such matters, our reason tells us that -they must be there. This physiological divination is interesting from -its general approximation towards the results of modern analysis. - -[Footnote 156: See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, Placit. -Philosoph. i. 3.] - -[Side-note: Chaos common to both Empedokles and Anaxagoras: moving -agency, different in one from the other theory.] - -Both Empedokles and Anaxagoras begin their constructive process from a -state of stagnation and confusion both tantamount to Chaos; which is -not so much active discord (as Ovid paints it), as rest and nullity -arising from the equilibrium of opposite forces. The chaos is in fact -almost a reproduction of the Infinite of Anaximander.[157] But -Anaxagoras as well as Empedokles enlarged his hypothesis by -introducing (what had not occurred or did not seem necessary to -Anaximander) a special and separate agency for eliciting positive -movement and development out of the negative and stationary Chaos. The -Nous or Mind is the Agency selected for this purpose by Anaxagoras: -Love and Enmity by Empedokles. Both the one and the other initiate the -rotatory cosmical motion; upon which follows as well the partial -disgregation of the chaotic mass, as the congregation of like -particles of it towards each other. - -[Footnote 157: This is a just comparison of Theophrastus. See the -passage from his [Greek: phusikê\ i(stori/a], referred to by -Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. i. p. 187, a. 21 (p. 335, Schol. -Brand.).] - -[Side-note: Nous, or mind, postulated by Anaxagoras--how understood by -later writers--how intended by Anaxagoras himself.] - -The Nous of Anaxagoras was understood by later writers as a God;[158] -but there is nothing in the fragments now remaining to justify the -belief that the author himself conceived it in that manner--or that he -proposed it (according to Aristotle's expression[159]) as the cause of -all that was good in the world, assigning other agencies as the causes -of all evil. It is not characterised by him as a person--not so much -as the Love and Enmity of Empedokles. It is not one but multitudinous, -and all its separate manifestations are alike, differing only as -greater or less. It is in fact identical with the soul, the vital -principle, or vitality, belonging not only to all men and to all -plants also.[160] It is one substance, or form of matter among the -rest, but thinner than all of them (thinner than even fire or air), -and distinguished by the peculiar characteristic of being absolutely -unmixed. It has moving power and knowledge, like the air of Diogenes -the Apolloniate: it initiates movement; and it knows about all the -things which either pass into or pass out of combination. It disposes -or puts in order all things that were, are, or will be; but it effects -this only by acting as a fermenting principle, to break up the huddled -mass, and to initiate rotatory motion, at first only on a small scale, -then gradually increasing. Rotation having once begun, and the mass -having been as it were unpacked and liberated the component -Homoeomeries are represented as coming together by their own inherent -attraction.[161] The Anaxagorean Nous introduces order and symmetry -into Nature, simply by stirring up rotatory motion in the inert mass, -so as to release the Homoeomeries from prison. It originates and -maintains the great cosmical fact of rotatory motion; which variety of -motion, from its perfect regularity and sameness, is declared by Plato -also to be the one most consonant to Reason and Intelligence.[162] -Such rotation being once set on foot, the other phenomena of the -universe are supposed to be determined by its influence, and by their -own tendencies and properties besides: but there is no farther agency -of Nous, which only _knows_ these phenomena as and when they occur. -Anaxagoras tried to explain them as well as he could; not by reference -to final causes, nor by assuming good purposes of Nous which each -combination was intended to answer--but by physical analogies, well or -ill chosen, and especially by the working of the grand cosmical -rotation.[163] - -[Footnote 158: Cicero, Academ. iv. 37; Sext. Empiric. adv. -Mathematicos, ix. 6, [Greek: to\n me\n nou=n, o(/s e)sti kat' au)to\n -theo\s], &c. - -Compare Schaubach, Anax. Frag. p. 153.] - -[Footnote 159: Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 984, b. 17. He praises -Anaxagoras for this, [Greek: oi(=on nê/phôn par' ei)kê= le/gontas -tou\s pro/teron], &c.] - -[Footnote 160: Aristoteles (or Pseudo-Aristot.) De Plantis, i. 1. - -Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 65-6-13. - -Aristotle says that the language of Anaxagoras about [Greek: nou=s] -and [Greek: psuchê\] was not perfectly clear or consistent. But it -seems also from Plato De Legg. xii. p. 967, B, that Anaxagoras made no -distinction between [Greek: nou=s] and [Greek: psuchê/]. Compare -Plato, Kratylus, p. 400 A.] - -[Footnote 161: Anaxag. Fr. 8, and Schaubach's Comm. p. 112-116. - -"Mens erat id, quod movebat molem homoeomeriarum: hâc ratione, per -hunc motum à mente excitatum, secretio facta est . . . . Materiæ autem -propriæ insunt vires: proprio suo pondere hæc, quæ mentis vi mota et -secreta sunt, feruntur in eum locum, quo nunc sunt." - -Compare Alexand. Aphrod. ap. Scholia ad Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194, -a. (Schol. p. 348 a. Brandis); Marbach, Lehrbuch der Gesch. Philos. s. -54, note 2, p. 82; Preller, Hist. Phil. ex Font. Loc. Contexta, s. 53, -with his comment.] - -[Footnote 162: Plato, Phædo, c. 107, 108, p. 98; Plato, De Legg. xii. -p. 967 B; Aristot. Metaphys. A. 4, p. 985, b. 18; Plato, Timæus, 34 A. -88 E.] - -[Footnote 163: Aristoph. Nub. 380, 828. [Greek: ai)the/rios -Di=nos--Di=nos basileu/ei, to\n Di/' e)xelêlakô/s]--the sting of which -applies to Anaxagoras and his doctrines. - -Anaxagoras [Greek: di/nous tina\s a)noê/tous a)nazôgraphô=n, su\n tê=| -tou= nou= a)praxi/a| kai\ a)noi/a|] (Clemens. Alexandrin. Stromat. ii. -p. 365). - -To _move_ (in the active sense, _i.e._ to cause movement in) and to -_know_, are the two attributes of the Anaxagorean [Greek: Nou=s] -(Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 18).] - -[Side-note: Plato and Aristotle blame Anaxagoras for deserting his own -theory.] - -This we learn from Plato and Aristotle, who blame Anaxagoras for -inconsistency in deserting his own hypothesis, and in invoking -explanations from physical agencies, to the neglect of Nous and its -supposed optimising purposes. But Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge -by his remaining fragments, seems not to have committed any such -inconsistency. He did not proclaim his Nous to be a powerful -extra-cosmical Architect, like the Demiurgus of Plato--nor an -intra-cosmical, immanent, undeliberating instinct (such as Aristotle -calls Nature), tending towards the production and renewal of regular -forms and conjunctions, yet operating along with other agencies which -produced concomitants irregular, unpredictable, often even obstructive -and monstrous. Anaxagoras appears to conceive his Nous as one among -numerous other real agents in Nature, material like the rest, yet -differing from the rest as being powerful, simple, and pure from all -mixture,[164] as being endued with universal cognizance, as being the -earliest to act in point of time, and as furnishing the primary -condition to the activity of the rest by setting on foot the cosmical -rotation. The Homoeomeries are coeternal with, if not anterior to, -Nous. They have laws and properties of their own, which they follow, -when once liberated, without waiting for the dictation of Nous. What -they do is known by, but not ordered by, Nous.[165] It is therefore no -inconsistency in Anaxagoras that he assigns to mind one distinct and -peculiar agency, but nothing more; and that when trying to explain the -variety of phenomena he makes reference to other physical agencies, as -the case seems to require.[166] - -[Footnote 164: Anaxagoras, Fr. 8,** p. 100, Schaub. - -[Greek: e)sti\ ga\r lepto/tato/n te pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn], &c. - -This means, not that [Greek: nou=s] was unextended or immaterial, but -that it was thinner or more subtle than either fire or air. -Herakleitus regarded [Greek: to\ perie/chon] as [Greek: logiko\n kai\ -phrenê=res]. Diogenes of Apollonia considered air as endued with -cognition, and as imparting cognition by being inhaled. Compare -Plutarch, De Placit. Philos. iv. 3. - -I cannot think, with Brücker (Hist. Philosop. part ii. b. ii. De Sectâ -Ionicâ, p. 504, ed. 2nd), and with Tennemann, Ges. Ph. i. 8, p. 312, -that Anaxagoras was "primus qui Dei ideam inter Græcos à materialitate -quasi purificavit," &c. I agree rather with Zeller (Philos. der -Griech. i. p. 680-683, ed. 2nd), that the Anaxagorean Nous is not -conceived as having either immateriality or personality.] - -[Footnote 165: Simplikius, in Physic. Aristot. p. 73. [Greek: kai\ -A)naxago/ras de\ to\n nou=n e)a/sas, ô(/s phêsin Eu)/dêmos, kai\ -au)tomati/zôn ta\ polla\ suni/stêsin.]] - -[Footnote 166: Diogen. Laert. ii. 8. [Greek: Nou=n . . . a)rchê\n -kinê/seôs]. - -Brücker, Hist. Philos. ut supra. "Scilicet, semel inducto in materiam -à mente motu, sufficere putavit Anaxagoras, juxta leges naturæ -motûsque, rerum ortum describere."] - -[Side-note: Astronomy and physics of Anaxagoras.] - -In describing the formation of the Kosmos, Anaxagoras supposed that, -as a consequence of the rotation initiated by mind, the primitive -chaos broke up. "The Dense, Wet, Cold, Dark, Heavy, came together into -the place where now Earth is: Hot, Dry, Bare, Light, Bright, departed -to the exterior region of the revolving Æther."[167] In such -separation each followed its spontaneous and inherent tendency. Water -was disengaged from air and clouds, earth from water: earth was still -farther consolidated into stones by cold.[168] Earth remained -stationary in the centre, while fire and air were borne round it by -the force and violence of the rotatory movement. The celestial -bodies--Sun, Moon, and Stars--were solid bodies analogous to the earth, -either caught originally in the whirl of the rotatory movement, or -torn from the substance of the earth and carried away into the outer -region of rotation.[169] They were rendered hot and luminous by the -fiery fluid in the rapid whirl of which they were hurried along. The -Sun was a stone thus made red-hot, larger than Peloponnesus: the Moon -was of earthy matter, nearer to the Earth, deriving its light from the -Sun, and including not merely plains and mountains, but also cities -and inhabitants.[170] Of the planetary movements, apart from the -diurnal rotation of the celestial sphere, Anaxagoras took no -notice.[171] He explained the periodical changes in the apparent -course of the sun and moon by resistances which they encountered, the -former from accumulated and condensed air, the latter from the -cold.[172] Like Anaximenes and Demokritus, Anaxagoras conceived the -Earth as flat, round in the surface, and not deep, resting on and -supported by the air beneath it. Originally (he thought) the earth was -horizontal, with the axis of celestial rotation perpendicular, and the -north pole at the zenith, so that this rotation was then lateral, like -that of a dome or roof; it was moreover equable and unchanging with -reference to every part of the plane of the earth's upper surface, and -distributed light and heat equally to every part. But after a certain -time the Earth tilted over of its own accord to the south, thus -lowering its southern half, raising the northern half, and causing the -celestial rotation to appear oblique.[173] - -[Footnote 167: Anaxag. Fr. 19, p. 131, Schaub.; compare Fr. 6, p. 97; -Diogen. Laert. ii. 8.] - -[Footnote 168: Anaxag. Fr. 20, p. 133, Schau.] - -[Footnote 169: See the curious passage in Plutarch, Lysander 12, and -Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 B; Diogen. Laert. ii. 12; Plutarch, Placit. -Philos. ii. 13.] - -[Footnote 170: Plato, Kratylus, p. 409 A; Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 14; -Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7.] - -[Footnote 171: Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 165.] - -[Footnote 172: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. ii. 23.] - -[Footnote 173: Diogenes Laert. ii. 9. [Greek: ta\ d' a)/stra kat' -a)rcha\s tholoeidô=s e)nechthê=nai, ô(/ste kata\ koruphê\n tê=s gê=s -to\n a)ei\ phaino/menon ei)=nai po/lon, u(/steron de\ tê\n (gê=n) -e)/gklisin labei=n.] Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 8.] - -[Side-note: His geology, meteorology, physiology.] - -Besides these doctrines respecting the great cosmical bodies, -Anaxagoras gave explanations of many among the striking phenomena in -geology and meteorology--the sea, rivers, earthquakes, hurricanes, -hail, snow, &c.[174] He treated also of animals and plants--their -primary origin, and the manner of their propagation.[175] He thought -that animals were originally produced by the hot and moist earth; but -that being once produced, the breeds were continued by propagation. -The seeds of plants he supposed to have been originally contained in -the air, from whence they fell down to the warm and moist earth, where -they took root and sprung up.[176] He believed that all plants, as -well as all animals, had a certain measure of intelligence and -sentiment, differing not in kind but only in degree from the -intelligence and sentiment of men; whose superiority of intelligence -was determined, to a great extent, by their possession of hands.[177] -He explained sensation by the action of unlike upon unlike (contrary -to Empedokles, who referred it to the action of like upon like),[178] -applying this doctrine to the explanation of the five senses -separately. But he pronounced the senses to be sadly obscure and -insufficient as means of knowledge. Apparently, however, he did not -discard their testimony, nor assume any other means of knowledge -independent of it, but supposed a concomitant and controlling effect -of intelligence as indispensable to compare and judge between the -facts of sense when they appeared contradictory.[179] On this point, -however, it is difficult to make out his opinions. - -[Footnote 174: See Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 174-181. Among the -points to which Anaxagoras addressed himself was the annual inundation -of the Nile, which he ascribed to the melting of the snows in -Æthiopia, in the higher regions of the river's course.--Diodor. i. 38. -Herodotus notices this opinion (ii. 22), calling it plausible, but -false, yet without naming any one as its author. Compare Euripides, -Helen. 3.] - -[Footnote 175: Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 6, iv. 1.] - -[Footnote 176: Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iii. 2; Diogen. Laert. ii. -9; Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2.] - -[Footnote 177: Aristot. De Plantis, i. 1; Aristot. Part. Animal. iv. -10.] - -[Footnote 178: Theophrastus, De Sensu, sect. 1--sect. 27-30. - -This difference followed naturally from the opinions of the two -philosophers on the nature of the soul or mind. Anaxagoras supposed it -peculiar in itself, and dissimilar to the Homoeomeries without. -Empedokles conceived it as a compound of the four elements, analogous -to all that was without: hence man knew each exterior element by its -like within himself--earth by earth, water by water, &c.] - -[Footnote 179: Anaxag. Fr. 19, Schaub.; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathem. -vii. 91-140; Cicero, Academ. i. 12. - -Anaxagoras remarked that the contrast between black and white might be -made imperceptible to sense by a succession of numerous intermediate -colours very finely graduated. He is said to have affirmed that snow -was really black, notwithstanding that it appeared white to our -senses: since water was black, and snow was only frozen water (Cicero, -Academ. iv. 31; Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 33). "Anaxagoras non -modo id ita esse (_sc._ albam nivem esse) negabat, sed sibi, quia -sciret aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse -_ne videri quidem_." Whether Anaxagoras ever affirmed that snow did -not _appear to him_ white, may reasonably be doubted: his real -affirmation probably was, that snow, though it appeared white, was not -really white. And this affirmation depended upon the line which he -drew between the fact of sense, the phenomenal, the relative, on one -side--and the substratum, the real, the absolute, on the other. Most -philosophers recognise a distinction between the two; but the line -between the two has been drawn in very different directions. -Anaxagoras assumed as his substratum, real, or absolute, the -Homoeomeries--numerous primordial varieties of matter, each with its -inherent qualities. Among these varieties he reckoned _water_, but he -did not reckon _snow_. He also considered that water was really and -absolutely black or dark (the Homeric [Greek: me/lan u(/dôr])--that -blackness was among its primary qualities. Water, when consolidated -into snow, was so disguised as to produce upon the spectator the -appearance of whiteness; but it did not really lose, nor could it -lose, its inherent colour. A negro covered with white paint, and -therefore looking white, is still really black: a wheel painted with -the seven prismatic colours, and made to revolve rapidly, will look -white, but it is still really septi-coloured: _i.e._ the state of -rapid revolution would be considered as an exceptional state, not -natural to it. Compare Plato, Lysis, c. 32, p. 217 D.] - -[Side-note: The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and -impious.] - -Anaxagoras, residing at Athens and intimately connected with Perikles, -incurred not only unpopularity, but even legal prosecution, by the -tenor of his philosophical opinions, especially those on astronomy. To -Greeks who believed in Helios and Selênê as not merely living beings -but Deities, his declaration that the Sun was a luminous and fiery -stone, and the Moon an earthy mass, appeared alike absurd and impious. -Such was the judgment of Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon, as well as of -Aristophanes and the general Athenian public.[180] Anaxagoras was -threatened with indictment for blasphemy, so that Perikles was -compelled to send him away from Athens. - -[Footnote 180: Plato, Apol. So. c. 14; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7.] - -That physical enquiries into the nature of things, and attempts to -substitute scientific theories in place of the personal agency of the -Gods, were repugnant to the religious feelings of the Greeks, has been -already remarked.[181] Yet most of the other contemporary philosophers -must have been open to this reproach, not less than Anaxagoras; and we -learn that the Apolloniate Diogenes left Athens from the same cause. -If others escaped the like prosecution which fell upon Anaxagoras, we -may probably ascribe this fact to the state of political party at -Athens, and to the intimacy of the latter with Perikles. The numerous -political enemies of that great man might fairly hope to discredit him -in the public mind--at the very least to vex and embarrass him--by -procuring the trial and condemnation of Anaxagoras. Against other -philosophers, even when propounding doctrines not less obnoxious -respecting the celestial bodies, there was not the same collateral -motive to stimulate the aggressive hostility of individuals. - -[Footnote 181: Plutarch, Nikias, 23.] - -[Side-note: Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element.] - -Contemporary with Anaxagoras--yet somewhat younger, as far as we can -judge, upon doubtful evidence--lived the philosopher Diogenes, a -native of Apollonia in Krete. Of his life we know nothing except that -he taught during some time at Athens, which city he was forced to quit -on the same ground as Anaxagoras. Accusations of impiety were either -brought or threatened against him:[182] physical philosophy being -offensive generally to the received religious sentiment, which was -specially awakened and appealed to by the political opponents of -Perikles. - -[Footnote 182: Diogen. Laert. ix. 52. The danger incurred by Diogenes -the Apolloniate at Athens is well authenticated, on the evidence of -Demetrius the Phalerean, who had good means of knowing. And the fact -may probably be referred to some time after the year B.C. 440, when -Athens was at the height of her power and of her attraction for -foreign visitors--when the visits of philosophers to the city had been -multiplied by the countenance of Perikles--and when the political -rivals of that great man had set the fashion of assailing them in -order to injure him. This seems to me one probable reason for -determining the chronology of the Apolloniate Diogenes: another is, -that his description of the veins in the human body is so minute and -detailed as to betoken an advanced period of philosophy between B.C. -440-410. See the point discussed in Panzerbieter, Fragment. Diogen. -Apoll. c. 12-18 (Leipsic, 1830). - -Simplikius (ad Aristot. Phys. fol. 6 A) describes Diogenes as having -been [Greek: schedo\n neô/tatos] in the series of physical theorists.] - -Diogenes the Apolloniate, the latest in the series of Ionic -philosophers or physiologists, adopted, with modifications and -enlargements, the fundamental tenet of Anaximenes. There was but one -primordial element--and that element was air. He laid it down as -indisputable that all the different objects in this Kosmos must be at -the bottom one and the same thing: unless this were the fact, they -would not act upon each other, nor mix together, nor do good and harm -to each other, as we see that they do. Plants would not grow out of -the earth, nor would animals live and grow by nutrition, unless there -existed as a basis this universal sameness of nature. No one thing -therefore has a peculiar nature of its own: there is in all the same -nature, but very changeable and diversified.[183] - -[Footnote 183: Diogen. Ap. Fragm. ii. c. 29 Panzerb.; Theophrastus, De -Sensu, s. 39. - -[Greek: ei) ga\r ta\ e)n tô=|de tô=| ko/smô| e)o/nta nu=n gê= kai\ -u(/dôr kai\ ta)/lla, o(/sa phainetai e)n tô=|de tô=| ko/smô| e)o/nta, -ei) toute/ôn ti ê)=n to\ e(/teron tou= e(te/rou e(/teron e)o\n tê=| -i)di/ê| phu/sei, kai\ mê\ to\ au)to\ e)o\n mete/pipte pollachô=s kai\ -ê(teroiou=to; ou)damê= ou)/te mi/sgesthai a)llê/lois ê)du/nato ou)/te -ô)phe/lêsis tô=| e(te/rô| ou)/te bla/bê], &c. - -Aristotle approves this fundamental tenet of Diogenes, the conclusion -that there must be one common Something out of which all things -came--[Greek: e)x e(no\s a(/panta] (Gen. et Corrupt. i. 6-7, -p. 322, a. 14), inferred from the fact that they acted upon each other.] - -[Side-note: Air was the primordial, universal element.] - -Now the fundamental substance, common to all, was air. Air was -infinite, eternal, powerful; it was, besides, full of intelligence and -knowledge. This latter property Diogenes proved by the succession of -climatic and atmospheric phenomena of winter and summer, night and -day, rain, wind, and fine weather. All these successions were disposed -in the best possible manner by the air: which could not have laid out -things in such regular order and measure, unless it had been endowed -with intelligence. Moreover, air was the source of life, soul, and -intelligence, to men and animals: who inhaled all these by -respiration, and lost all of them as soon as they ceased to -respire.[184] - -[Footnote 184: Diog. Apoll. Fr. iv.-vi. c. 36-42, Panz.--[Greek: Ou) -ga\r a)\n ou(/tô de/dasthai oi(=o/n te ê)=n a)/neu noê/sios, ô(/ste -pa/ntôn me/tra e)/chein, cheimô=no/s te kai\ the/reos kai nukto\s kai\ -ê(me/rês kai\ u(etô=n kai\ a)ne/môn kai\ eu)diô=n. kai\ ta\ a)/lla -ei)/ tis bou/letai e)nnoe/esthai, eu(/riskoi a)\n ou(/tô diakei/mena, -ô(s a)nusto\n ka/llista. E)/ti de pro\s tou/tois kai\ ta/de mega/la -sêmei=a; a)/nthrôpos ga\r kai\ ta\ a)/lla zô=a a)napne/onta zô/ei tô=| -a)e/ri. Kai\ tou=to au)toi=s kai\ psuchê/ e)sti kai\ no/êsis---- - ---Kai\ moi\ doke/ei to\ tê\n no/êsin e)/chon ei)=nai o( a)ê\r -kaleo/menos u(po\ tô=n a)nthrô/pôn], &c. - -Schleiermacher has an instructive commentary upon these fragments of -the Apolloniate Diogenes (Vermischte Schriften, vol. ii. p. 157-162; -Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia).] - -[Side-note: Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was -eminently modifiable.] - -Air, life-giving and intelligent, existed everywhere, formed the -essence of everything, comprehended and governed everything. Nothing -in nature could be without it: yet at the same time all things in -nature partook of it in a different manner.[185] For it was -distinguished by great diversity of properties and by many gradations -of intelligence. It was hotter or colder--moister or drier--denser or -rarer--more or less active and movable--exhibiting differences of -colour and taste. All these diversities were found in objects, though -all at the bottom were air. Reason and intelligence resided in the -warm air. So also to all animals as well as to men, the common source -of vitality, whereby they lived, saw, heard, and understood, was air; -hotter than the atmosphere generally, though much colder than that -near the sun.[186] Nevertheless, in spite of this common -characteristic, the air was in other respects so indefinitely -modifiable, that animals were of all degrees of diversity, in form, -habits, and intelligence. Men were doubtless more alike among -themselves: yet no two of them could be found exactly alike, furnished -with the same dose of aerial heat or vitality. All other things, -animate and inanimate, were generated and perished, beginning from air -and ending in air: which alone continued immortal and -indestructible.[187] - -[Footnote 185: Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. [Greek: kai\ e)sti mêde\ e(\n o(/, ti -mê\ mete/chei tou/tou] (air). [Greek: Mete/chei de\ ou)de\ e(\n -o(moi/ôs to\ e(/teron tô=| e(te/rô|; a)lla\ polloi\ tro/poi\ kai\ -au)tou\ tou= a)e/ros kai\ tê=s noê/sio/s ei)sin.] - -Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 21. [Greek: Dioge/nês d', -ô(/sper kai\ e(teroi/ tines, a)e/ra [u(pe/labe tê\n psuchê/n]], &c.] - -[Footnote 186: Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. [Greek: kai\ pa/ntôn zô/ôn dê\ ê( -psuchê\ to\ au)to/ e)stin, a)ê\r thermo/teros me\n tou= e)/xô e)n ô(=| -e)sme/n, tou= me/ntoi para\ tô=| ê(eli/ô| pollo\n psuchro/teros.]] - -[Footnote 187: Diogen. Apoll. Fr. v. ch. 38, Panz.] - -[Side-note: Physiology of Diogenes--his description of the veins in -the human body.] - -The intelligence of men and animals, very unequal in character and -degree, was imbibed by respiration, the inspired air passing by means -of the veins and along the blood into all parts of the body. Of the -veins Diogenes gave a description remarkable for its minuteness of -detail, in an age when philosophers dwelt almost exclusively in loose -general analogies.[188] He conceived the principal seat of -intelligence in man to be in the thoracic cavity, or in the ventricle -of the heart, where a quantity of air was accumulated ready for -distribution.[189] The warm and dry air concentrated round the brain, -and reached by veins from the organs of sense, was the centre of -sensation. Taste was explained by the soft and porous nature of the -tongue, and by the number of veins communicating with it. The juices -of sapid bodies were sucked up by it as by a sponge: the odorous -stream of air penetrated from without through the nostrils: both were -thus brought into conjunction with the sympathising cerebral air. To -this air also the image impressed upon the eye was transmitted, -thereby causing vision:[190] while pulsations and vibrations of the -air without, entering through the ears and impinging upon the same -centre, generated the sensation of sound. If the veins connecting the -eye with the brain were inflamed, no visual sensation could take -place;[191] moreover if our minds or attention were absorbed in other -things, we were often altogether insensible to sensations either of -sight or of sound: which proved that the central air within us was the -real seat of sensation.[192] Thought and intelligence, as well as -sensation, was an attribute of the same central air within us, -depending especially upon its purity, dryness, and heat, and impeded -or deadened by moisture or cold. Both children and animals had less -intelligence than men: because they had more moisture in their bodies, -so that the veins were choked up, and the air could not get along them -freely to all parts. Plants had no intelligence; having no apertures -or ducts whereby the air could pervade their internal structure. Our -sensations were pleasurable when there was much air mingled with the -blood, so as to lighten the flow of it, and to carry it easily to all -parts: they were painful when there was little air, and when the blood -was torpid and thick.[193] - -[Footnote 188: Diogen. Apoll. Fr. vii. ch. 48, Panz. The description -of the veins given by Diogenes is preserved in Aristotel. Hist. -Animal, iii. 2: yet seemingly only in a defective abstract, for -Theophrastus alludes to various opinions of Diogenes on the veins, -which are not contained in Aristotle. See Philippson, [Greek: U(/lê -a)nthrôpi/nê], p. 203.] - -[Footnote 189: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 5. [Greek: E)n tê=| -a)rtêriakê=| koili/a| tê=s kardi/as, ê(/tis e)sti\ kai\ pneumatikê/]. -See Panzerbieter's commentary upon these words, which are not very -clear (c. 50), nor easy to reconcile with the description given by -Diogenes himself of the veins.] - -[Footnote 190: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 18. Theophrast. De -Sensu, s. 39-41-43. [Greek: Kritikô/taton de\ ê(donê=s tê\n glô=ttan; -a(palô/taton ga\r ei)=nai kai\ mano\n kai\ ta\s phle/bas a(pa/sas -a)nê/kein ei)s au)tê/n.]] - -[Footnote 191: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 16; Theophrastus, De -Sensu, s. 40.] - -[Footnote 192: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 42. [Greek: O(/ti de\ o( -e)nto\s a)ê\r ai)stha/netai, mikro\n ô)\n mo/rion tou= theou=, -sêmei=on ei)=nai, o(/ti polla/kis pro\s a)/lla to\n nou=n e)/chontes -ou)/th' o(rô=men ou)/t' a)kou/omen]. The same opinion--that sensation, -like thought, is a mental process, depending on physical conditions--is -ascribed to Strato (the disciple and successor of Theophrastus) by -Porphyry, De Abstinentiâ, iii. 21. [Greek: Stra/tônos tou= phusikou= -lo/gos e)sti\n a)podeiknu/ôn, ô(s ou)de\ ai)stha/nesthai to para/pan -a)/neu tou= noei=n u(pa/rchei. kai\ ga\r gra/mmata polla/kis -e)piporeuome/nous tê=| o)/psei kai\ lo/goi prospi/ptontes tê=| a)koê=| -dialantha/nousin ê(ma=s kai\ diapheu/gousi pro\s e(te/rous to\n nou=n -e)/chontas--ê(=| kai\ le/lektai, nou=s o(rê= kai\ nou=s a)kou/ei, -ta)/lla kôpha\ kai\ tuphla/.] - -The expression ascribed to Diogenes by Theophrastus--[Greek: o( -e)nto\s a)ê\r, mikro\n ô)\n mo/rion _tou= theou=_]--is so printed by -Philippson; but the word [Greek: theou=] seems not well avouched as to -the text, and Schneider prints [Greek: thumou=]. It is not impossible -that Diogenes may have called the air God, without departing from his -physical theory; but this requires proof.] - -[Footnote 193: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 43-46; Plutarch, Placit. -Philos. v. 20. That moisture is the cause of dulness, and that the dry -soul is the best and most intelligent--is cited among the doctrines of -Herakleitus, with whom Diogenes of Apollonia is often in harmony. -[Greek: Au)/ê psuchê\ sophôta/tê kai\ a)ri/stê.] See Schleiermach. -Herakleitos, sect. 59-64.] - -[Side-note: Kosmology and meteorology.] - -The structure of the Kosmos Diogenes supposed to have been effected by -portions of the infinite air, taking upon them new qualities and -undergoing various transformations. Some air, becoming cold, dense, -and heavy, sunk down to the centre, and there remained stationary as -earth and water: while the hotter, rarer, and lighter air ascended and -formed the heavens, assuming through the intelligence included in it a -rapid rotatory movement round the earth, and shaping itself into sun, -moon, and stars, which were light and porous bodies like pumice stone. -The heat of this celestial matter acted continually upon the earth and -water beneath, so that the earth became comparatively drier, and the -water was more and more drawn up as vapour, to serve for nourishment -to the heavenly bodies. The stars also acted as breathing-holes to the -Kosmos, supplying the heated celestial mass with fresh air from the -infinite mass without.[194] Like Anaxagoras, Diogenes conceived the -figure of the earth as flat and round, like a drum; and the rotation -of the heavens as lateral, with the axis perpendicular to the surface -of the earth, and the north pole always at the zenith. This he -supposed to have been the original arrangement; but after a certain -time, the earth tilted over spontaneously towards the south--the -northern half was elevated and the southern half depressed--so that -the north pole was no longer at the zenith, and the axis of rotation -of the heavens became apparently oblique.[195] He thought, moreover, -that the existing Kosmos was only of temporary duration; that it would -perish and be succeeded by future analogous systems, generated from -the same common substance of the infinite and indestructible air.[196] -Respecting animal generation--and to some extent respecting -meteorological phenomena[197]--Diogenes also propounded several -opinions, which are imperfectly known, but which appear to have -resembled those of Anaxagoras. - -[Footnote 194: Plutarch ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8; Aristotel. De -Animâ, i. 2; Diogen. Laert. ix. 53. [Greek: Dioge/nês kissêroeidê= ta\ -a)/stra, diapnoi/as de\ au)ta\ nomi/zei tou= ko/smou, ei)=nai de\ -dia/pura; sumperiphe/resthai de\ toi=s phaneroi=s a)/strois a)phanei=s -li/thous kai\ par' au)to\ tou=t' a)nônu/mous; pi/ptonta de\ polla/kis -e)pi\ tê=s gê=s sbe/nnusthai; katha/per to\n e)n Ai)go\s potamoi=s -purôdô=s katenechthe/nta _a)ste/ra_ pe/trinon.] This remarkable -anticipation of modern astronomy--the recognition of aerolithes as a -class of non-luminous earthy bodies revolving round the sun, but -occasionally coming within the sphere of the earth's attraction, -becoming luminous in our atmosphere, falling on the earth, and there -being extinguished--is noticed by Alex. von Humboldt in his Kosmos, -vol. i. p. 98-104, Eng. trans. He says--"The opinion of Diogenes of -Apollonia entirely accords with that of the present day," p. 110. The -charm and value of that interesting book is greatly enhanced by his -frequent reference to the ancient points of view on astronomical -subjects.] - -[Footnote 195: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Panzerbieter ad Diog. -Ap. c. 76-78; Schaubach ad Anaxagor. Fr. p. 175.] - -[Footnote 196: Plut. Ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8.] - -[Footnote 197: Preller, Hist. Philosoph. Græc.-Rom. ex Font. Loc. -Contexta, sect. 68. Preller thinks that Diogenes employed his chief -attention "in animantium naturâ ex aeris principio repetendâ"; and -that he was less full "in cognitione [Greek: tô=n meteô/rôn]". But the -fragments scarcely justify this.] - -[Side-note: Leukippus and Demokritus--Atomic theory.] - -Nearly contemporary with Anaxagoras and Empedokles, two other -enquirers propounded a new physical theory very different from those -already noticed--usually known under the name of the atomic theory. -This Atomic theory, though originating with the Eleate Leukippus, -obtained celebrity chiefly from his pupil Demokritus of Abdera, its -expositor and improver. Demokritus (born seemingly in B.C. 460, and -reported to have reached extreme old age) was nine years younger than -Sokrates, thirty-three years older than Plato, and forty years younger -than Anaxagoras.[198] The age of Leukippus is not known, but he can -hardly have been much younger than Anaxagoras. - -[Footnote 198: Diogen. Laert. ix. 41. See the chronology of Demokritus -discussed in Mullach, Frag. Dem. p. 12-25; and in Zeller, Phil. der -Griech., vol. i. p. 576-681, 2nd edit. The statement of Apollodorus as -to the date of his birth, appears more trustworthy than the earlier -date assigned by Thrasyllus (B.C. 470). Demokritus declared himself to -be forty years younger than Anaxagoras.] - -[Side-note: Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions of -Demokritus.] - -Of Leukippus we know nothing: of Demokritus, very little--yet enough -to exhibit a life, like that of Anaxagoras, consecrated to -philosophical investigation, and neglectful not merely of politics, -but even of inherited patrimony.[199] His attention was chiefly turned -towards the study of Nature, with conceptions less vague, and a more -enlarged observation of facts, than any of his contemporaries had ever -bestowed. He was enabled to boast that no one had surpassed him in -extent of travelling over foreign lands, in intelligent research and -converse with enlightened natives, or in following out the geometrical -relations of lines.[200] He spent several years in visiting Egypt, -Asia Minor, and Persia. His writings were numerous, and on many -different subjects, including ethics, as well as physics, astronomy, -and anthropology. None of them have been preserved. But we read, even -from critics like Dionysius of Halikarnassus and Cicero, that they -were composed in an impressive and semi-poetical style, not unworthy -to be mentioned in analogy with Plato; while in range and diversity of -subjects they are hardly inferior to Aristotle.[201] - -[Footnote 199: Dionys. ix. 36-39.] - -[Footnote 200: Demokrit. Fragm. 6, p. 238, ed. Mullach. Compare ib. p. -41; Diogen. Laert. ix. 35; Strabo, xv. p. 703. - -Pliny, Hist. Natur. "Democritus--vitam inter experimenta consumpsit," -&c.] - -[Footnote 201: Cicero, Orat. c. 20; Dionys. De Comp. Verbor. c. 24; -Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. vii. 265. [Greek: Dêmo/kritos, o( tê=| -Dio\s phô/nê| pareikazo/menos], &c. - -Diogenes (ix. 46-48) enumerates the titles of the treatises of -Demokritus, as edited in the days of Tiberius by the rhetor -Thrasyllus: who distributed them into tetralogies, as he also -distributed the dialogues of Plato. It was probably the charm of -style, common to Demokritus with Plato, which induced the rhetor thus -to edit them both. In regard to scope and spirit of philosophy, the -difference between the two was so marked, that Plato is said to have -had a positive antipathy to the works of Demokritus, and a desire to -burn them (Aristoxenus ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 40). It could hardly be -from congeniality of doctrine that the same editor attached himself to -both. It has been remarked that Plato never once names Demokritus, -while Aristotle cites him very frequently, sometimes with marked -praise.] - -[Side-note: Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of -Parmenides.] - -The theory of Leukippus and Demokritus (we have no means of -distinguishing the two) appears to have grown out the Eleatic -theory.[202] Parmenides the Eleate (as I have already stated) in -distinguishing Ens, the self-existent, real, or absolute, on one -side--from the phenomenal and relative on the other--conceived the former -in such a way that its connection with the latter was dissolved. The -real and absolute, according to him, was One, extended, enduring, -continuous, unchangeable, immovable: the conception of Ens included -these affirmations, and at the same time excluded peremptorily -Non-Ens, or the contrary of Ens. Now the plural, unextended, transient, -discontinuous, changeable, and moving, implied a mixture of Ens and -Non-Ens, or a partial transition from one to the other. Hence (since -Non-Ens was inadmissible) such plurality, &c., could not belong to the -real or absolute (ultra-phenomenal), and could only be affirmed as -phenomenal or relative. In the latter sense, Parmenides _did_ affirm -it, and even tried to explain it: he explained the phenomenal facts -from phenomenal assumptions, apart from and independent of the -absolute. While thus breaking down the bridge between the phenomenal -on one side and the absolute on the other, he nevertheless recognised -each in a sphere of its own. - -[Footnote 202: Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 7 A. [Greek: -Leu/kippos . . . . koinônê/sas Parmeni/dê| tê=s philosophi/as, ou) tê\n -au)tê\n e)ba/dise Parmeni/dê| kai\ Xenopha/nei peri\ tô=n o)/ntôn -do/xan, a)ll', ô(s dokei=, tê\n e)nanti/an]. Aristotel. De Gener. et -Corr. i. 8, p. 251, a. 31. Diogen. Laert. ix. 30.] - -[Side-note: Demokritean theory--Atoms--Plena and Vacua--Ens and -Non-Ens.] - -This bridge the atomists undertook to re-establish. They admitted that -Ens could not really change--that there could be no real generation, -or destruction--no transformation of qualities--no transition of many -into one, or of one into many. But they denied the unity and -continuity and immobility of Ens: they affirmed that it was -essentially discontinuous, plural, and moving. They distinguished the -extended, which Parmenides had treated as an _Unum continuum_, into -extension with body, and extension without body: into _plenum_ and -_vacuum_, matter and space. They conceived themselves to have thus -found positive meanings both for Ens and Non-Ens. That which -Parmenides called Non-Ens or nothing, was in their judgment the -_vacuum_; not less self-existent than that which he called Something. -They established their point by showing that Ens, thus interpreted, -would become reconcilable to the phenomena of sense: which latter they -assumed as their basis to start from. Assuming motion as a phenomenal -fact, obvious and incontestable, they asserted that it could not even -appear to be a fact, without supposing _vacuum_ as well as body to be -real: and the proof that both of them were real was, that only in this -manner could sense and reason be reconciled. Farther, they proved the -existence of a _vacuum_ by appeal to direct physical observation, -which showed that bodies were porous, compressible, and capable of -receiving into themselves new matter in the way of nutrition. Instead -of the Parmenidean Ens, one and continuous, we have a Demokritean Ens, -essentially many and discontinuous: _plena_ and _vacua_, spaces full -and spaces empty, being infinitely intermingled.[203] There existed -atoms innumerable, each one in itself essentially a plenum, admitting -no vacant space within it, and therefore indivisible as well as -indestructible: but each severed from the rest by surrounding vacant -space. The atom could undergo no change: but by means of the empty -space around, it could freely move. Each atom was too small to be -visible: yet all atoms were not equally small; there were fundamental -differences between them in figure and magnitude: and they had no -other qualities except figure and magnitude. As no atom could be -divided into two, so no two atoms could merge into one. Yet though two -or more atoms could not so merge together as to lose their real -separate individuality, they might nevertheless come into such close -approximation as to appear one, and to act on our senses as a -phenomenal combination manifesting itself by new sensible -properties.[204] - -[Footnote 203: It is chiefly in the eighth chapter of the treatise De -Gener. et Corr. (i. 8) that Aristotle traces the doctrine of Leukippus -as having grown out of that of the Eleates. [Greek: Leu/kippos d' -e)/chein ô)|ê/thê lo/gous, oi(/tines pro\s tê\n ai)/sthêsin -o(mologou/mena le/gontes ou)k a)nairê/sousin ou)/te ge/nesin ou)/te -phthora\n ou)/te ki/nêsin kai\ to\ plê=thos tô=n o)/ntôn], &c. - -Compare also Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 4, p. 303, a. 6; Metaphys. A. -4, p. 985, b. 5; Physic. iv. 6: [Greek: le/gousi de\] (Demokritus, -&c., in proving a vacuum) [Greek: e(\n me\n o(/ti ê( ki/nêsis ê( kata\ -to/pon ou)k a)\n ei)/ê, _ou) ga\r a)\n dokei=n_ ei)=nai ki/nêsin ei) -mê\ ei)/ê keno/n; to\ ga\r plê=res a)du/naton ei)=nai de/xasthai/ ti], -&c. - -Plutarch adv. Kolot. p. 1108. [Greek: Oi(=s ou)d' o)/nar e)ntuchô\n o( -Kolô/tês, e)spha/lê peri\ le/xin tou= a)ndro\s] (Demokritus) [Greek: -e)n ê)=| diori/zetai, mê\ ma=llon to\ de\n, ê)\ to\ mêde\n ei)=nai; -de\n me\n o)noma/zôn to\ sô=ma mêde\n de\ to\ keno/n, ô(s kai\ tou/tou -phu/sin tina\ kai\ u(po/stasin i)di/an e)/chontos.] - -The affirmation of Demokritus--That Nothing existed, just as much as -Something--appears a paradox which we must probably understand as -implying that he here adopted, for the sake of argument, the language -of the Eleates, his opponents. They called the vacuum _Nothing_, but -Demokritus did not so call it. If (said Demokritus) you call vacuum -_Nothing_, then I say that Nothing exists as well as Something. - -The direct observations by which Demokritus showed the existence of a -vacuum were--1. A vessel with ashes in it will hold as much water as -if it were empty: hence we know that there are pores in the ashes, -into which the water is received. 2. Wine can be compressed in skins. -3. The growth of organised bodies proves that they have pores, through -which new matter in the form of nourishment is admitted. (Aristot. -Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b.) - -Besides this, Demokritus set forth motion as an indisputable fact, -ascertained by the evidence of sense: and affirmed that motion was -impossible, except on the assumption that vacuum existed. Melissus, -the disciple of Parmenides, inverted the reasoning, in arguing against -the reality of motion. If it be real (he said), then there must exist -a vacuum: but no vacuum does or can exist: therefore there is no real -motion. (Aristot. Physic. iv. 6.) - -Since Demokritus started from these facts of sense, as the base of his -hypothesis of atoms and vacua, so Aristotle (Gen. et Corr. i. 2; De -Animâ, i. 2) might reasonably say that he took sensible appearances as -truth. But we find Demokritus also describing reason as an improvement -and enlightenment of sense, and complaining how little of truth was -discoverable by man. See Mullach, Demokritus (pp. 414, 415). Compare -Philippson--[Greek: U(=lê a)nthrôpi/nê]--Berlin, 1831.] - -[Footnote 204: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 25, [Greek: -ta\ prô=ta mege/thê ta\ a)diai/reta sterea/]. Diogen. Laert. ix. 44; -Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1110 seq. - -Zeller, Philos. der Griech., vol. i. p. 583-588, ed. 2nd; Aristotel. -Metaphys. Z. 13, p. 1039, a. 10, [Greek: a)du/naton ei)=nai/ phêsi -Dêmo/kritos e)k du/o e(\n ê)\| e)x e(no\s du/o gene/sthai; ta\ ga\r -mege/thê ta\ a)/toma ta\s ou)si/as poiei=.]] - -[Side-note: Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, -position, and arrangement--they had no qualities, but their movements -and combinations generated qualities.] - -The bridge, broken down by Parmenides, between the real and the -phenomenal world, was thus in theory re-established. For the real -world, as described by Demokritus, differed entirely from the sameness -and barrenness of the Parmenidean Ens, and presented sufficient -movement and variety to supply a basis of explanatory hypothesis, -accommodated to more or less of the varieties in the phenomenal world. -In respect of quality, indeed, all the atoms were alike, not less than -all the vacua: such likeness was (according to Demokritus) the -condition of their being able to act upon each other, or to combine as -phenomenal aggregates.[205] But in respect to quantity or magnitude as -well as in respect to figure, they differed very greatly: moreover, -besides all these diversities, the ordination and position of each -atom with regard to the rest were variable in every way. As all -objects of sense were atomic compounds, so, from such fundamental -differences--partly in the constituent atoms themselves, partly in the -manner of their arrangement when thrown into combination--arose all -the diverse qualities and manifestations of the compounds. When atoms -passed into new combination, then there was generation of a new -substance: when they passed out of an old combination there was -destruction: when the atoms remained the same, but were merely -arranged anew in order and relative position, then the phenomenon was -simply change. Hence all qualities and manifestations of such -compounds were not original, but derivative: they had no "nature of -their own," or law peculiar to them, but followed from the atomic -composition of the body to which they belonged. They were not real and -absolute, like the magnitude and figure of the constituent atoms, but -phenomenal and relative--_i.e._ they were powers of acting upon -correlative organs of sentient beings, and nullities in the absence of -such organs.[206] Such were the colour, sonorousness, taste, smell, -heat, cold, &c., of the bodies around us: they were relative, implying -correlative percipients. Moreover they were not merely relative, but -perpetually fluctuating; since the compounds were frequently changing -either in arrangement or in diversity of atoms, and every such atomic -change, even to a small extent, caused it to work differently upon our -organs.[207] - -[Footnote 205: Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 7, p. 323, b. 12. It was -the opinion of Demokritus, that there could be no action except where -agent and patient were alike. [Greek: Phêsi\ ga\r to\ au)to\ kai\ -o(/moion ei)=nai to/ te poiou=n kai\ to\ pa/schon; ou) ga\r -e)gchôrei=n ta\ e(/tera kai\ diaphe/ronta pa/schein u(p' a)llê/lôn; -a)lla\ ka)\n e(/tera o)/nta poiê=| ti ei)s a)/llêla, ou)ch ê(=| -e(/tera, a)ll' ê(=| tau)to/n ti u(pa/rchei, tau/tê| tou=to sumbai/nein -au)toi=s]. Many contemporary philosophers affirmed distinctly the -opposite. [Greek: To\ o(/moion u(po\ tou= o(moi/ou pa=n a)pathe/s], -&c. Diogenes the Apolloniate agreed on this point generally with -Demokritus; see above, p. 61, note 1 [*Footnote 185*]. The facility -with which these philosophers laid down general maxims is constantly -observable.] - -[Footnote 206: Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 316, a. 1; Theophrast. -De Sensu, s. 63, 64. [Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n bare/os kai\ kou/phou -kai\ sklêrou= kai\ malakou= e)n tou/tois a)phori/zei; tô=n de\ a)/llôn -ai)sthêtô=n ou)deno\s ei)=nai phu/sin, a)lla\ pa/nta pa/thê tê=s -ai)sthê/seôs a)lloioume/nês, e)x ê(=s gi/nesthai tê\n phantasi/an], -&c. - -Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. c. 16. [Greek: Phu/sin me\n mêde\n ei)=nai -chrô=ma, ta\ me\n ga\r stoichei=a a)/poia, ta/ te mesta\ kai\ to\ -keno/n; ta\ d' e)x au)tô=n sugkri/mata ke/chrô=sthai diatagê=| te kai\ -r(uthmô=| kai\ protropê=|], &c. - -Demokritus restricted the term [Greek: Phu/sis]--Nature--to the -primordial atoms and vacua (Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. p. 310 -A.).] - -[Footnote 207: Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 2, p. 315, b. 10. [Greek: -Ô(/ste tai=s metabolai=s tou= sugkeime/nou to\ au)to\ e)nanti/on -dokei=n a)/llô| kai\ a)/llô|, kai\ metakinei=sthai mikrou= -e)mmignume/nou, _kai\ o(/lôs e(/teron phai/nesthai e(no\s -metakinêthe/ntos_.]] - -[Side-note: Combinations of atoms--generating different qualities in -the compounds.] - -Among the various properties of bodies, however, there were two which -Demokritus recognised as not merely relative to the observer, but also -as absolute and belonging to the body in itself. These were weight and -hardness--primary qualities (to use the phraseology of Locke and -Reid), as contrasted with the secondary qualities of colour, taste, -and the like. Weight, or tendency downward, belonged (according to -Demokritus) to each individual atom separately, in proportion to its -magnitude: the specific gravity of all atoms was supposed to be equal. -In compound bodies one body was heavier than another, in proportion as -its bulk was more filled with atoms and less with vacant space.[208] -The hardness and softness of bodies Demokritus explained by the -peculiar size and peculiar junction of their component atoms. Thus, -comparing lead with iron, the former is heavier and softer, the latter -is lighter and harder. Bulk for bulk, the lead contained a larger -proportion of solid, and a smaller proportion of interstices, than the -iron: hence it was heavier. But its structure was equable throughout; -it had a greater multitude of minute atoms diffused through its bulk, -equally close to and coherent with each other on every side, but not -more close and coherent on one side than on another. The structure of -the iron, on the contrary, was unequal and irregular, including larger -spaces of vacuum in one part, and closer approach of its atoms in -other parts: moreover these atoms were in themselves larger, hence -there was a greater force of cohesion between them on one particular -side, rendering the whole mass harder and more unyielding than the -lead.[209] - -[Footnote 208: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 61. [Greek: Baru\ me\n ou)=n -kai\ kou=phon tô=| mege/thei diairei= Dêmo/kritos], &c. - -Aristotel. De Coelo, iv. 2, 7, p. 309, a. 10; Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. -326, a. 9. [Greek: Kai/toi baru/teron ge kata\ tê\n u(perochê/n phêsin -ei)=nai Dêmo/kritos e(/kaston tô=n a)diaire/tôn], &c.] - -[Footnote 209: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 62.] - -[Side-note: All atoms essentially separate from each other.] - -We thus see that Demokritus, though he supposed single atoms to be all -of the same specific gravity, yet recognised a different specific -gravity in the various compounds of atoms or material masses. It is to -be remembered that, when we speak of contact or combination of atoms, -this is not to be understood literally and absolutely, but only in a -phenomenal and relative sense; as an approximation, more or less -close, but always sufficiently close to form an atomic combination -which our senses apprehended as one object. Still every atom was -essentially separate from every other, and surrounded by a margin of -vacant space: no two atoms could merge into one, any more than one -atom could be divided into two. - -[Side-note: All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, -were phenomenal and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no -knowledge of the real and absolute.] - -Pursuant to this theory, Demokritus proclaimed that all the properties -of objects, except weight, hardness, and softness, were not inherent -in the objects themselves, but simply phenomenal and relative to the -observer--"modifications of our sensibility". Colour, taste, smell, -sweet and bitter, hot and cold, &c., were of this description. In -respect to all of them, man differed from other animals, one man from -another, and even the same man from himself at different times and -ages. There was no sameness of impression, no unanimity or constancy -of judgment, because there was no real or objective "nature" -corresponding to the impression. From none of these senses could we at -all learn what the external thing was in itself. "Sweet and bitter, -hot and cold (he said) are by law or convention (_i.e._ these names -designate the impressions of most men on most occasions, taking no -account of dissentients): what really exists is, atoms and vacuum. The -sensible objects which we suppose and believe to exist do not exist in -truth; there exist only atoms and vacuum. We know nothing really and -truly about an object, either what it is or what it is not: our -opinions depend upon influences from without, upon the position of our -body, upon the contact and resistances of external objects. There are -two phases of knowledge, the obscure and the genuine. To the obscure -belong all our senses--sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The -genuine is distinct from these. When the obscure phase fails, when we -can no longer see, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch--from -minuteness and subtlety of particles--then the genuine phase, or -reason and intelligence, comes into operation."[210] - -[Footnote 210: Demokritus, Fr. p. 205, Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. -Mathemat. vii. p. 135; Diogen. Laert. ix. 72.] - -[Side-note: Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little -of it was attainable.] - -True knowledge (in the opinion of Demokritus) was hardly at all -attainable; but in so far as it could be attained, we must seek it, -not merely through the obscure and insufficient avenues of sense, but -by reason or intelligence penetrating to the ultimatum of corpuscular -structure, farther than sense could go. His atoms were not pure -Abstracta (like Plato's Ideas and geometrical plane figures, and -Aristotle's materia prima), but concrete bodies, each with its -own[211] magnitude, figure, and movement; too small to be seen or felt -by us, yet not too small to be seen or felt by beings endowed with -finer sensitive power. They were abstractions mainly in so far as all -other qualities were supposed absent. Demokritus professed to show how -the movements, approximations, and collisions of these atoms, brought -them into such combinations as to form the existing Kosmos; and not -that system alone, but also many other cosmical systems, independent -of and different from each other, which he supposed to exist. - -[Footnote 211: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 29. [Greek: -A)/peira to\ plê=thos kai\ a)o/rata dia\ smikro/têta tô=n o)/gkôn], -&c. - -Marbach observes justly that the Demokritean atoms, though not really -objects of sense in consequence of their smallness (of their -disproportion to our visual power), are yet spoken of as objects of -sense: they are as it were microscopic objects, and the [Greek: -gnêsi/ê gnô/mê], or intelligence, is conceived as supplying something -of a microscopic power. (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der -Philosophie, sect. 58, vol. i. p. 94.)] - -[Side-note: No separate force required to set the atoms in -motion--they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms -naturally tend towards like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the -Kosmos.] - -How this was done we cannot clearly make out, not having before us the -original treatise of Demokritus, called the Great Diakosmos. It is -certain, however, that he did not invoke any separate agency to set -the atoms in motion--such as the Love and Discord of Empedokles--the -Nous or Intelligence of Anaxagoras. Demokritus supposed that the atoms -moved by an inherent force of their own: that this motion was as much -without beginning as the atoms themselves:[212] that eternal motion -was no less natural, no more required any special cause to account for -it, than eternal rest. "Such is the course of nature--such is and -always has been the fact," was his ultimatum.[213] He farther -maintained that all the motions of the atoms were necessary--that is, -that they followed each other in a determinate order, each depending -upon some one or more antecedents, according to fixed laws, which he -could not explain.[214] Fixed laws, known or unknown, he recognised -always. Fortune or chance was only a fiction imagined by men to cover -their own want of knowledge and foresight.[215] Demokritus seems to -have supposed that like atoms had a spontaneous tendency towards like; -that all, when uncombined, tended naturally downwards, yet with -unequal force, owing to their different size, and weight proportional -to size; that this unequal force brought them into impact and -collision one with another, out of which was generated a rotatory -motion, gradually extending itself, and comprehending a larger and -larger number of them, up to a certain point, when an exterior -membrane or shell was formed around them.[216] This rotatory motion -was the capital fact which both constituted the Kosmos, and maintained -the severance of its central and peripheral masses--Earth and Water in -the centre--Air, Fire, and the celestial bodies, near the -circumference. Demokritus, Anaxagoras, and Empedokles, imagined -different preliminary hypotheses to get at the fact of rotation; but -all employed the fact, when arrived at, as a basis from which to -deduce the formation of the various cosmical bodies and their known -manifestations.[217] In respect to these bodies--Sun, Moon, Stars, -Earth, &c.--Demokritus seems to have held several opinions like those -of Anaxagoras. Both of them conceived the Sun as a redhot mass, and -the Earth as a flat surface above and below, round horizontally like a -drum, stationary in the centre of the revolving celestial bodies, and -supported by the resistance of air beneath.[218] - -[Footnote 212: Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 2, 3, p. 300, b. 9. [Greek: -Leuki/ppô| kai\ Dê/mokritô|, toi=s le/gousin a)ei\ kinei=sthai, ta\ -prô=ta sô/mata], &c. (Physic. viii. 3, 3, p. 253, b. 12, viii. 9, p. -265, b. 23; Cicero, De Finib. i. 6, 17.)] - -[Footnote 213: Aristot. Generat. Animal. ii. 6, p. 742, b. 20; Physic. -viii. 1, p. 252, b. 32. - -Aristotle blames Demokritus for thus acquiescing in the general course -of nature as an ultimatum, and for omitting all reference to final -causes. M. Lafaist, in a good dissertation, Sur la Philosophie -Atomistique (Paris, 1833, p. 78), shows that this is exactly the -ultimatum of natural philosophers at the present day. "Un phénomène se -passait-il, si on lui en demandait la raison, il (Demokritus) -répondait, 'La chose se passe ainsi, parcequ'elle s'est toujours -passée ainsi.' C'est, en d'autres termes, la seule réponse que font -encore aujourd'hui les naturalistes. Suivant eux, une pierre, quand -elle n'est pas soutenue, tombe en vertu de la loi de la pesanteur. -Qu'est-ce que la loi de la pesanteur? La généralisation de ce fait -plusieurs fois observé, qu'une pierre tombe quand elle n'est pas -soutenue. Le phénomène dans un cas particulier arrive ainsi, parceque -toujours il est arrivé ainsi. Le principe qu'implique l'explication -des naturalistes modernes est celle de Démokrite, c'est que la nature -demeure constante à elle-même. La proposition de Démokrite--'Tel -phénomène a lieu de cette façon, parceque toujours il a eu lieu de -cette même façon'--est la première forme qu' ait revêtue le principe -de la stabilité des lois naturelles."] - -[Footnote 214: Aristotle (Physic. ii. 4, p. 196, a. 25) says that -Demokritus (he seems to mean Demokritus) described the motion of the -atoms to form the cosmical system, as having taken place [Greek: a)po\ -tou= au)toma/tou]. Upon which Mullach (Dem. Frag. p. 382) justly -remarks--"Casu ([Greek: a)po\ tau)toma/tou]) videntur fieri, quæ -naturali quâdam necessitate cujus leges ignoramus evenire dicuntur. -Sed quamvis Aristoteles naturalem Abderitani philosophi necessitatem, -vitato [Greek: a)na/gkês] vocabulo, quod alii aliter usurpabant, casum -et fortunam vocaret--ipse tamen Democritus, abhorrens ab iis omnibus -quæ destinatam causarum seriem tollerent rerumque naturam -perturbarent, nihil juris fortunæ et casui in singulis rebus -concessit." - -Zeller has a like remark upon the phrase of Aristotle, which is -calculated to mislead as to the doctrine of Demokritus (Phil. d. -Griech., i. p. 600, 2nd.** ed.). - -Dugald Stewart, in one of the Dissertations prefixed to the -Encyclopædia Britannica, has the like comment respecting the -fundamental principle of the Epicurean (identical _quoad hoc_ with the -Demokritean) philosophy. - -"I cannot conclude this note without recurring to an observation -ascribed by Laplace to Leibnitz--'that the _blind chance_ of the -Epicureans involves the supposition of an effect taking place without -a cause'. This is a very incorrect statement of the philosophy taught -by Lucretius, which nowhere gives countenance to such a supposition. -The distinguishing tenet of this sect was, that the order of the -universe does not imply the existence of _intelligent_ causes, but may -be accounted for by the active powers belonging to the atoms of -matter: which active powers, being exerted through an indefinitely -long period of time, might have produced, nay must have produced, -exactly such a combination of things as that with which we are -surrounded. This does not call in question the necessity of a cause to -produce every effect, but, on the contrary, virtually assumes the -truth of that axiom. It only excludes from these causes the attribute -of intelligence. In the same way, when I apply the words _blind -chance_ to the throw of a die, I do not mean to deny that I am -ultimately the cause of the particular event that is to take place: -but only to intimate that I do not here act as a _designing_ cause, in -consequence of my ignorance of the various accidents to which the die -is subjected while shaken in the box. If I am not mistaken, this -Epicurean theory approaches very nearly to the scheme which it is the -main object of the Essay on Probabilities (by Laplace) to inculcate." -(Stewart--First Dissertation, part ii. p. 139, note.)] - -[Footnote 215: Demokrit. Frag. p. 167, ed. Mullach; Eusebius, Præp. -Evang. xiv. 27. [Greek: a)/nthrôpoi tu/chês ei)/dôlon e)pla/santo -pro/phasin i)di/ês a)bouli/ês.]] - -[Footnote 216: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 604 seq.; Demokrit. -Fragm. p. 207, Mull.; Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathem. vii. 117.] - -[Footnote 217: Demokrit. Fragm. p. 208, Mullach. [Greek: Dêmo/kritos -e)n oi(=s phêsi di/nê a)po\ panto\s a)pokri/nesthai pantoi/ôn -ei)de/ôn], &c. - -Diog. Laert. ix. 31-44.] - -[Footnote 218: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 612, ed. 2nd.] - -[Side-note: Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal -generation.] - -Among the researches of Demokritus there were some relating to animal -generation, and zoology; but we cannot find that his opinions on these -subjects were in peculiar connection with his atomic theory.[219] Nor -do we know how far he carried out that theory into detail by tracing -the various phenomenal manifestations to their basis in atomic -reality, and by showing what particular magnitude, figure, and -arrangement of atoms belonged to each. It was only in some special -cases that he thus connected determinate atoms with compounds of -determinate quality; for example, in regard to the four Empedoklean -elements. The atoms constituting heat or fire he affirmed to be small -and globular, the most mobile, rapid, and penetrating of all; those -constituting air, water, and earth, were an assemblage of all -varieties of figures, but differed from each other in magnitude--the -atoms of air being apparently smallest, those of earth largest.[220] - -[Footnote 219: Mullach, Demokr. Fragm. p. 395 seqq.] - -[Footnote 220: Aristotle, Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 5; De Coelo, -iii. 8, p. 306, b. 35; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.] - -[Side-note: His account of mind--he identified it with heat or fire -diffused throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental -particles intermingled throughout all the frame with corporeal -particles.] - -In regard to mind or soul generally, he identified it with heat or -fire, conceiving it to consist in the same very small, globular, -rapidly movable atoms, penetrating everywhere: which he illustrated by -comparison with the fine dust seen in sunbeams when shining through a -doorway. That these were the constituent atoms of mind, he proved by -the fact, that its first and most essential property was to move the -body, and to be itself moved.[221] Mind, soul, the vital principle, -fire, heat, &c., were, in the opinion of Demokritus, substantially -identical--not confined to man or even to animals, but -diffused, in unequal proportions, throughout plants, the air, and -nature generally. Sensation, thought, knowledge, were all motions of -mind or of these restless mental particles, which Demokritus supposed -to be distributed over every part of the living body, mingling and -alternating with the corporeal particles.[222] It was the essential -condition of life, that the mental particles should be maintained in -proper number and distribution throughout the body; but by their -subtle nature they were constantly tending to escape, being squeezed -or thrust out at all apertures by the pressure of air on all the -external parts. Such tendency was counteracted by the process of -respiration, whereby mental or vital particles, being abundantly -distributed throughout the air, were inhaled along with air, and -formed an inward current which either prevented the escape, or -compensated the loss, of those which were tending outwards. When -breathing ceased, such inward current being no longer kept up, the -vital particles in the interior were speedily forced out, and death -ensued.[223] - -[Footnote 221: Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, 2-3, p. 403, b. 28; i. 3, p. -406, b. 20; Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. i. 11; Diogen. Laert. ix. 44.] - -[Footnote 222: Aristotel. De Respirat. (c. 4, p. 472, a. 5), [Greek: -le/gei] (Demokritus) [Greek: ô(s ê( psuchê\ kai\ to\ thermo\n -tau)to\n, ta\ prô=ta schê/mata tô=n sphairoeidô=n]. - -Lucretius, iii. 370. - -Illud in his rebus nequaquam sumere possis, -Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit; -Corporis atque animi primordia singula privis -Adposita alternis variare ac nectere membra.] - -[Footnote 223: Aristotel. De Respiratione, c. 4, p. 472, a. 10; De -Animâ, i. 2, p. 404, a. 12.] - -[Side-note: Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of -the body.] - -Though Demokritus conceived those mental particles as distributed all -over the body, yet he recognised different mental aptitudes attached -to different parts of the body. Besides the special organs of sense, -he considered intelligence as attached to the brain, passion to the -heart, and appetite to the liver:[224] the same tripartite division -afterwards adopted by Plato. He gave an explanation of perception or -sensation in its different varieties, as well as of intelligence or -thought. Sensation and thought were, in his opinion, alike material, -and alike mental. Both were affections of the same peculiar particles, -vital or mental, within us: both were changes operated in these -particles by effluvia or images from without; nevertheless the one -change was different from the other.[225] - -[Footnote 224: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 618, ed. 2nd. - -Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iv. 4), ascribes a bipartite division of the -soul to Demokritus: [Greek: to\ logiko\n], in the thorax: [Greek: to\ -a)/logon], distributed over all the body. But in the next section (iv. -6), he departs from this statement, affirming that both Demokritus and -Plato supposed [Greek: to\ ê(gemoniko\n] of the soul to be in the -head.] - -[Footnote 225: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 8. Demokritus and -Leukippus affirm [Greek: tê\n ai)/sthêsin kai\ tê\n no/êsin -gi/nesthai, ei)dô/lôn e)/xôthen prosio/ntôn; mêdeni\ ga\r e)piba/llein -mêdete/ran chôri\s tou= prospi/ptontos ei)dô/lou]. - -Cicero, De Finibus, i. 6, 21, "imagines, quæ idola nominant, quorum -incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus," &c.] - -In regard to sensations, Demokritus said little about those of touch, -smell, and hearing; but he entered at some length into those of sight -and taste.[226] - -[Footnote 226: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.] - -[Side-note: Explanation of different sensations and perceptions. -Colours.] - -Proceeding upon his hypothesis of atoms and vacua as the only -objective existences, he tried to show what particular modifications -of atoms, in figure, size, and position, produced upon the sentient -the impressions of different colours. He recognised four fundamental -or simple colours--white, black, red, and green--of which all other -colours were mixtures and combinations.[227] White colour (he said) -was caused by smooth surfaces, which presented straight pores and a -transparent structure, such as the interior surface of shells: where -these smooth substances were brittle or friable, this arose from the -constituent atoms being at once spherical and loosely connected -together, whereby they presented the clearest passage through their -pores, the least amount of shadow, and the purest white colour. From -substances thus constituted, the effluvia flowed out easily, and -passed through the intermediate air without becoming entangled or -confused with it. Black colour was caused by rough, irregular, unequal -substances, which had their pores crooked and obstructed, casting much -shadow, and sending forth slowly their effluvia, which became hampered -and entangled with the intervening medium of air. Red colour arose -from the effluvia of spherical atoms, like those of fire, though of -larger size: the connection between red colour and fire was proved by -the fact that heated substances, man as well as the metals, became -red. Green was produced by atoms of large size and wide vacua, not -restricted to any determinate shape, but arranged in peculiar order -and position. These four were given by Demokritus as the simple -colours. But he recognised an infinite diversity of compound colours, -arising from mixture of them in different proportions, several of -which he explained--gold-colour, purple, blue, violet, leek-green, -nut-brown, &c.[228] - -[Footnote 227: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 73 seq.; Aristotel. De -Sensu, c. iv. p. 442, b. 10. The opinions of Demokritus on colour are -illustrated at length by Prantl in his Uebersicht der Farbenlehre der -Alten (p. 49 seq.), appended to his edition of the Aristotelian or -Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, [Greek: Peri\ Chrôma/tôn] (Munich, -1849). - -Demokritus seems also to have attempted to show, that the sensation of -cold and shivering was produced by the irruption of jagged and acute -atoms. See Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p. 947, 948, c. 8.] - -[Footnote 228: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 76-78. [Greek: a)/peira ta\ -chrô/mata kai\ tou\s chulou\s kata\ ta\s mi/xeis--ou)de\n ga\r -o(/moion e)/sesthai tha)/teron tha)te/rou.]] - -[Side-note: Vision caused by the outflow of effluvia or images from -objects. Hearing.] - -Besides thus setting forth those varieties of atoms and atomic motions -which produced corresponding varieties of colour, Demokritus also -brought to view the intermediate stages whereby they realised the act -of vision. All objects, compounds of the atoms, gave out effluvia or -images resembling themselves. These effluvia stamped their impression, -first upon the intervening air, next upon the eye beyond: which, being -covered by a fine membrane, and consisting partly of water, partly of -vacuum, was well calculated to admit the image. Such an image, the -like of which any one might plainly see by looking into another -person's eye, was the immediate cause of vision.[229] The air, -however, was no way necessary as an intervening medium, but rather -obstructive: the image proceeding from the object would be more -clearly impressed upon the eye through a vacuum: if the air did not -exist, vision would be so distinct, even at the farthest distance, -that an object not larger than an ant might be seen in the -heavens.[230] Demokritus believed that the visual image, after having -been impressed upon the eye, was distributed or multiplied over the -remaining body.[231] In like manner, he believed that, in hearing, the -condensed air carrying the sound entered with some violence through -the ears, passed through the veins to the brain, and was from thence -dispersed over the body.[232] Both sight and hearing were thus not -simply acts of the organ of sense, but concurrent operations of the -entire frame: over all which (as has been already stated) the mental -or vital particles were assumed to be disseminated. - -[Footnote 229: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 50. [Greek: to\n a)e/ra to\n -metaxu\ tê=s o)/pseôs kai\ tou= o(rôme/nou tupou=sthai], &c. -Aristotel. De Sensu, c. 2, p. 438, a. 6. - -Theophrastus notices this intermediate [Greek: a)potu/pôsis e)n tô=| -a)e/ri] as a doctrine peculiar ([Greek: i)di/ôs]) to Demokritus: he -himself proceeds to combat it (51, 52).] - -[Footnote 230: Aristotel. De Animâ, ii. 7-9, p. 419, a. 16.] - -[Footnote 231: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 54.] - -[Footnote 232: Theophrastus, De Sensu, 55, 56. [Greek: tê\n ga\r -phônê\n ei)=nai puknoume/nou tou= a)e/ros kai\ meta\ bi/as -ei)sio/ntos], &c. - -Demokritus thought that air entered into the system not only through -the ears, but also through pores in other parts of the body, though so -gently as to be imperceptible to our consciousness: the ears afforded -a large aperture, and admitted a considerable mass.] - -[Side-note: Differences of taste--how explained.] - -Farther, Demokritus conceived that the diversities of taste were -generated by corresponding diversities of atoms, or compounds of -atoms, of particular figure, magnitude and position. Acid taste was -caused by atoms rough, angular, twisted, small, and subtle, which -forced their way through all the body, produced large interior vacant -spaces, and thereby generated great heat: for heat was always -proportional to the amount of vacuum within.[233] Sweet taste was -produced by spherical atoms of considerable bulk, which slid gently -along and diffused themselves equably over the body, modifying and -softening the atoms of an opposite character. Astringent taste was -caused by large atoms with many angles, which got into the vessels, -obstructing the movement of fluids both in the veins and intestines. -Salt taste was produced by large atoms, much entangled with each -other, and irregular. In like manner Demokritus assigned to other -tastes particular varieties of generating atoms: adding, however, that -in every actual substance, atoms of different figures were -intermingled, so that the effect of each on the whole was only -realised in the ratio of the preponderating figure.[234] Lastly, the -working of all atoms, in the way of taste, was greatly modified by the -particular system upon which they were brought to act: effects totally -opposite being sometimes produced by like atoms upon different -individuals.[235] - -[Footnote 233: Theophrast. De Sensu, 65-68.] - -[Footnote 234: Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. [Greek: a(pa/ntôn de\ tô=n -schêma/tôn ou)de\n a)ke/raion ei)=nai kai\ a)mige\s toi=s a)/llois, -a)ll' e)n e(ka/stô| polla\ ei)=nai . . . . ou)= d' a)\n e)nê=| plei=ston, -tou=to ma/lista e)nischu/ein pro/s te tê\n ai)/sthêsin kai\ tê\n -du/namin]. - -This essential intermixture, in each distinct substance, of atoms of -all different shapes, is very analogous to the essential intermixture -of all sorts of Homoeomeries in the theory of Anaxagoras.] - -[Footnote 235: Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. [Greek: ei)s o(poi/an e(/xin -a)\n ei)se/lthê|, diaphe/rein ou)k o)li/gon; kai\ dia\ tou=to to\ -au)to\ ta)nanti/a, kai\ ta)nanti/a to\ au)to\ pa/thos poiei=n -e)ni/ote.]] - -[Side-note: Thought or Intelligence--was produced by influx of atoms -from without.] - -As sensation, so also thought or intelligence, was produced by the -working of atoms from without. But in what manner the different -figures and magnitudes of atoms were understood to act, in producing -diverse modifications of thought, we do not find explained. It was, -however, requisite that there should be a symmetry, or correspondence -of condition between the thinking mind within and the inflowing atoms -from without, in order that these latter might work upon a man -properly: if he were too hot, or too cold, his mind went astray.[236] -Though Demokritus identified the mental or vital particles with the -spherical atoms constituting heat or fire, he nevertheless seems to -have held that these particles might be in excess as well as in -deficiency, and that they required, as a condition of sound mind, to -be diluted or attempered with others. The soundest mind, however, did -not work by itself or spontaneously, but was put in action by atoms or -effluvia from without: this was true of the intellectual mind, not -less than of the sensational mind. There was an objective something -without, corresponding to and generating every different thought--just -as there was an objective something corresponding to every different -sensation. But first, the object of sensation was an atomic compound -having some appreciable bulk, while that of thought might be separate -atoms or vacua so minute as to be invisible and intangible. Next, the -object of sensation did not reveal itself as it was in its own nature, -but merely produced changes in the percipient, and different changes -in different percipients (except as to heavy and light, hard and soft, -which were not simply modifications of our sensibility, but were also -primary qualities inherent in the objects themselves[237]): while the -object of thought, though it worked a change in the thinking subject, -yet also revealed itself as it was, and worked alike upon all. - -[Footnote 236: Theophrast. De Sensu, 58. [Greek: Peri\ de\ tou= -phronei=n e)pi\ tosou=ton ei)/rêken, o(/ti gi/netai summe/trôs -e)chou/sês tê=s psuchê=s meta\ tê\n ki/nêsin; e)a\n de\ peri/thermo/s -tis ê)\ peri/psuchros ge/nêtai, metalla/ttein phêsi/.]] - -[Footnote 237: Theophrastus, De Sensu, 71. [Greek: nu=n de\ sklêrou= -me\n kai\ malakou= kai\ bare/os kai\ kou/phou poiei= tê\n ou)si/an, -_o(/per (a(/per) ou)ch' ê(=tton e)/doxe le/gesthai pro\s ê(ma=s,_ -thermou= de\ kai\ psuchrou= kai\ tô=n a)/llôn ou)deno/s]. - -This is a remarkable point to be noted in the criticisms of -Theophrastus on the doctrine of Demokritus. Demokritus maintains that -_hot_ and _cold_ are relative to us: _hard_ and _soft_, _heavy_ and -_light_, are not only relative to us, but also absolute, objective, -things in their own nature,--though causing in us sensations which are -like them. Theophrastus denies this distinction altogether: and denies -it with the best reason. Not many of his criticisms on Demokritus are -so just and pertinent as this one.] - -[Side-note: Sensation, obscure knowledge relative to the sentient; -Thought, genuine knowledge--absolute, or object per se.] - -Hence Demokritus termed sensation, _obscure knowledge_--thought, -_genuine knowledge_.[238] It was only by thought (reason, -intelligence) that the fundamental realities of nature, atoms and -vacua, could be apprehended: even by thought, however, only -imperfectly, since there was always more or less of subjective -movements and conditions, which partially clouded the pure objective -apprehension--and since the atoms themselves were in perpetual -movement, as well as inseparably mingled one with another. Under such -obstructions, Demokritus proclaimed that no clear or certain knowledge -was attainable: that the sensible objects, which men believed to be -absolute realities, were only phenomenal and relative to us,--while -the atoms and vacua, the true existences or things in themselves, -could scarce ever be known as they were:[239] that truth was hidden in -an abyss, and out of our reach. - -[Footnote 238: Demokritus Fragm. Mullach, p. 205, 206; ap. Sext. -Empir. adv. Mathemat. vii. 135-139, [Greek: gnô/mês du/o ei)si\n -i)de/ai; ê( me\n gnêsi/ê, ê( de\ skoti/ê], &c.] - -[Footnote 239: Democr. Frag., Mull., p. 204-5. [Greek: A(/per -nomi/zetai me\n ei)=nai kai\ doxa/zetai ta\ ai)sthêta/, _ou)k e)/sti -de\ kata\ a)lê/theian tau=ta;_ a)lla\ ta\ a)/toma mo/non kai\ keno/n. -ê(me/es de\ tô=| me\n e)o/nti ou)de\n a)treke\s xuni/emen, meta/pipton -de\ kata/ te sô/matos diathigê/n, kai\ tô=n e)peisio/ntôn, kai\ tô=n -a)ntistêrizo/ntôn . . . . e)teê=| me/n nun, o(/ti oi(/on e(/kasto/n -e)stin ê)\ ou)/k e)stin, ou) xuni/emen, pollachê= dedê/lôtai], &c. - -Compare Cicero, Acad. Quæst. i. 13, ii. 10; Diog. Laert. ix. 72; -Aristotel. Metaphys. iii. 5, p. 1009, b. 10.] - -[Side-note: Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which -determined the tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c.] - -As Demokritus supposed both sensations and thoughts to be determined -by effluvia from without, so he assumed a similar cause to account for -beliefs, comfortable or uncomfortable dispositions, fancies, dreams, -presentiments, &c. He supposed that the air contained many effluences, -spectres, images, cast off from persons and substances in -nature--sometimes even from outlying very distant objects which lay -beyond the bounds of the Kosmos. Of these images, impregnated with the -properties, bodily and mental, of the objects from whence they came, -some were beneficent, others mischievous: they penetrated into the -human body through the pores and spread their influence all through -the system.[240] Those thrown off by jealous and vindictive men were -especially hurtful,[241] as they inflicted suffering corresponding to -the tempers of those with whom they originated. Trains of thought and -feeling were thus excited in men's minds; in sleep,[242] dreams, -divinations, prophetic warnings, and threats, were communicated: -sometimes, pestilence and other misfortunes were thus begun. -Demokritus believed that men's happiness depended much upon the nature -and character of the images which might approach them, expressing an -anxious wish that he might himself meet with such as were -propitious.[243] It was from grand and terrific images of this nature, -that he supposed the idea and belief of the Gods to have arisen: a -supposition countenanced by the numerous tales, respecting appearances -of the Gods both to dreaming and to waking men, current among the -poets and in the familiar talk of Greece. - -[Footnote 240: Demokriti Frag. p. 207, Mullach; Sext. Empiric. adv. -Mathemat. ix. 19; Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 10, p. 735 A.] - -[Footnote 241: Plutarch, Symposiac. v. 7, p. 683 A.] - -[Footnote 242: Aristotel. De Divinat. per Somnum, p. 464, a. 5; -Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 9, p. 733 E. [Greek: o(/ti kai\ ko/smôn -e)kto\s phthare/ntôn kai\ sôma/tôn a)llophu/lôn e)k tê=s a)por)r(oi/as -e)pir)r(eo/ntôn, e)ntau=tha polla/kis a)rchai\ parempi/ptousi loimô=n -kai\ pathô=n ou) sunê/thôn.]] - -[Footnote 243: Plutarch, De Oraculor. Defectu, p. 419. [Greek: au)to\s -eu)/chetai eu)lo/gchôn ei)dôlôn tugcha/nein.]] - -[Side-note: Universality of Demokritus--his ethical views.] - -Among the lost treasures of Hellenic intellect, there are few which -are more to be regretted than the works of Demokritus. Little is known -of them except the titles: but these are instructive as well as -multifarious. The number of different subjects which they embrace is -astonishing. Besides his atomic theory, and its application to -cosmogony and physics, whereby he is chiefly known, and from whence -his title of _physicus_ was derived--we find mention of works on -geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, optics, geography or geology, -zoology, botany, medicine, music, and poetry, grammar, history, -ethics, &c.[244] In such universality he is the predecessor, perhaps -the model, of Aristotle. It is not likely that this wide range of -subjects should have been handled in a spirit of empty generality, -without facts or particulars: for we know that his life was long, his -curiosity insatiable, and his personal travel and observation greater -than that of any contemporary. We know too that he entered more or -less upon the field of dialectics, discussing those questions of -evidence which became so rife in the Platonic age. He criticised, and -is said to have combated, the doctrine laid down by Protagoras, "Man -is the measure of all things". It would have been interesting to know -from what point of view he approached it: but we learn only the fact -that he criticised it adversely.[245] The numerous treatises of -Demokritus, together with the proportion of them which relate to -ethical and social subjects, rank him with the philosophers of the -Platonic and Aristotelian age. His Summum Bonum, as far as we can make -out, appears to have been the maintenance of mental serenity and -contentment: in which view he recommended a life of tranquil -contemplation, apart from money-making, or ambition, or the exciting -pleasures of life.[246] - -[Footnote 244: See the list of the works of Demokritus in Diogen. -Laert. ix. 46, and in Mullach's edition of the Fragments, p. 105-107. -Mullach mentions here (note 18) that Demokritus is cited seventy-eight -times in the extant works of Aristotle, and sometimes with honourable -mention. He is never mentioned by Plato. In the fragment of Philodemus -de Musica, Demokritus is called [Greek: a)nê\r ou) phusiologô/tatos -mo/non tô=n a)rchai/ôn, a)lla\ kai\ peri\ ta\ i(storou/mena ou)deno\s -ê)=tton polupra/gmôn] (Mullach, p. 237). Seneca calls him "Democritus, -subtilissimus antiquorum omnium".--Quæstion. Natural. vii. 2. And -Dionysius of Hal. (De Comp. Verb. p. 187, R.) characterises -Demokritus, Plato, and Aristotle (he arranges them in that order) as -first among all the philosophers, in respect of [Greek: su/nthesis -tô=n o)noma/tôn].] - -[Footnote 245: Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, p. 1108. - -Among the Demokritean treatises, was one entitled Pythagoras, which -contained probably a comment on the life and doctrines of that eminent -man, written in an admiring spirit. (Diog. Laert. ix. 38.)] - -[Footnote 246: Seneca, De Tranquill. Animæ, cap. 2. "Hanc stabilem -animi sedem Græci [Greek: Eu)thumi/an] vocant, de quo Democriti -volumen egregium est." Compare Cicero De Finib. v. 29; Diogen. Laert. -ix. 45. For [Greek: eu)thumi/a] Demokritus used as synonyms [Greek: -eu)estô/, a)thambi/ê, a)taraxi/ê], &c. See Mullach, p. 416.] - - - - -CHAPTER II. - -GENERAL REMARKS ON THE EARLIER PHILOSOPHERS ---GROWTH OF DIALECTIC--ZENO AND GORGIAS. - - -[Side-note: Variety of sects and theories--multiplicity of individual -authorities is the characteristic of Greek philosophy.] - -The first feeling of any reader accustomed to the astronomy and -physics of the present century, on considering the various theories -noticed in the preceding chapter, is a sort of astonishment that such -theories should have been ever propounded or accepted as true. Yet -there can be no doubt that they represent the best thoughts of -sincere, contemplative, and ingenious men, furnished with as much -knowledge of fact, and as good a method, as was then attainable. The -record of what such men have received as scientific truth or -probability, in different ages, is instructive in many ways, but in -none more than in showing how essentially relative and variable are -the conditions of human belief; how unfounded is the assumption of -those modern philosophers who proclaim certain first truths or first -principles as universal, intuitive, self-evident; how little any -theorist can appreciate _à priori_ the causes of belief in an age -materially different from his own, or can lay down maxims as to what -must be universally believed or universally disbelieved by all -mankind. We shall have farther illustration of this truth as we -proceed: here I only note variety of belief, even on the most -fundamental points, as being the essential feature of Grecian -philosophy even from its outset, long before the age of those who are -usually denounced as the active sowers of discord, the Sophists and -the professed disputants. Each philosopher followed his own individual -reason, departing from traditional or established creeds, and -incurring from the believing public more or less of obloquy; but no -one among the philosophers acquired marked supremacy over the rest. -There is no established philosophical orthodoxy, but a collection of -Dissenters--[Greek: a)/llê d' a)/llôn glô=ssa memigme/nê]--small -sects, each with its own following, each springing from a special -individual as authority, each knowing itself to be only one among -many. - -[Side-note: These early theorists are not known from their own writings, -which have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about -them.] - -It is a misfortune that we do not possess a complete work, or even -considerable fragments, from any one of these philosophers, so as to -know what their views were when stated by themselves, and upon what -reasons they insisted. All that we know is derived from a few detached -notices, in very many cases preserved by Aristotle; who, not content -(like Plato) with simply following out his own vein of ideas, exhibits -in his own writings much of that polymathy which he transmitted to the -Peripatetics generally, and adverts often to the works of -predecessors. Being a critic as well as a witness, he sometimes blends -together inconveniently the two functions, and is accused (probably -with reason to a certain extent) of making unfair reports; but if it -were not for him, we should really know nothing of the Hellenic -philosophers before Plato. It is curious to read the manner in which -Aristotle speaks of these philosophical predecessors as "the ancients" -([Greek: oi( a)rchai=oi]), and takes credit to his own philosophy for -having attained a higher and more commanding point of view.[1] - -[Footnote 1: Bacon ascribes the extinction of these early Greek -philosophers to Aristotle, who thought that he could not assure his -own philosophical empire, except by putting to death all his brothers, -like the Turkish Sultan. This remark occurs more than once in Bacon -(Nov. Org. Aph. 67; Redargutio Philosoph. vol. xi. p. 450, ed. -Montagu). In so far as it is a reproach, I think it is not deserved. -Aristotle's works, indeed, have been preserved, and those of his -predecessors have not: but Aristotle, far from seeking to destroy -their works, has been the chief medium for preserving to us the little -which we know about them. His attention to the works of his -predecessors is something very unusual among the theorists of the -ancient world. His friends Eudêmus and Theophrastus followed his -example, in embodying the history of the earlier theories in distinct -works of their own, now unfortunately lost. - -It is much to be regretted that no scholar has yet employed himself in -collecting and editing the fragments of the lost scientific histories -of Eudêmus (the Rhodian) and Theophrastus. A new edition of the -Commentaries of Simplikius is also greatly wanted: those which exist -are both rare and unreadable. - -Zeller remarks that several of the statements contained in Proklus's -commentary on Euclid, respecting the earliest Grecian mathematicians, -are borrowed from the [Greek: geômetrikai\ i(stori/ai] of the Rhodian -Eudêmus (Zeller--De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platonico, p. 12).] - -[Side-note: Abundance of speculative genius and invention--a memorable -fact in the Hellenic mind.] - -During the century and a half between Thales and the beginning of the -Peloponnesian war, we have passed in review twelve distinct schemes of -philosophy--Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Pythagoras, -Parmenides, Herakleitus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, the Apolloniate -Diogenes, Leukippus, and Demokritus. Of most of these philosophers it -may fairly be said that each speculated upon nature in an original -vein of his own. Anaximenes and Diogenes, Xenophanes and Parmenides, -Leukippus and Demokritus, may indeed be coupled together as kindred -pairs yet by no means in such manner that the second of the two is a -mere disciple and copyist of the first. Such abundance and variety of -speculative genius and invention is one of the most memorable facts in -the history of the Hellenic mind. The prompting of intelligent -curiosity, the thirst for some plausible hypothesis to explain the -Kosmos and its generation, the belief that a basis or point of -departure might be found in the Kosmos itself, apart from those -mythical personifications which dwelt both in the popular mind and in -the poetical Theogonies, the mental effort required to select some -known agency and to connect it by a chain of reasoning with the -result--all this is a new phenomenon in the history of the human mind. - -[Side-note: Difficulties which a Grecian philosopher had to -overcome--prevalent view of Nature, established, impressive, and -misleading.] - -An early Greek philosopher found nothing around him to stimulate or -assist the effort, and much to obstruct it. He found Nature disguised -under a diversified and omnipresent Polytheistic agency, eminently -captivating and impressive to the emotions--at once mysterious and -familiar--embodied in the ancient Theogonies, and penetrating deeply -all the abundant epic and lyric poetry, the only literature of the -time. It is perfectly true (as Aristotle remarks[2]) that Hesiod and -the other theological poets, who referred everything to the generation -and agency of the Gods, thought only of what was plausible to -themselves, without enquiring whether it would appear equally -plausible to their successors; a reproach which bears upon many -subsequent philosophers also. The contemporary public, to whom they -addressed themselves, knew no other way of conceiving Nature than -under this religious and poetical view, as an aggregate of -manifestations by divine personal agents, upon whose -volition--sometimes signified beforehand by obscure warnings intelligible -to the privileged interpreters, but often inscrutable--the turn of events -depended. Thales and the other Ionic philosophers were the first who -became dissatisfied with this point of view, and sought for some -"causes and beginnings" more regular, knowable, and predictable. They -fixed upon the common, familiar, widely-extended, material substances, -water, air, fire, &c.; and they could hardly fix upon any others. -Their attempt to find a scientific basis was unsuccessful; but the -memorable fact consisted in their looking for one. - -[Footnote 2: Aristot. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1000, a. 10. - -[Greek: Oi( me\n ou)=n peri\ Ê(si/odon, kai\ pa/ntes o(/soi -theo/logoi, mo/non e)phro/ntisan tou= pithanou= tou= pro\s au)tou/s, -ê(mô=n d' ô)ligô/rêsan; Theou\s ga\r poiou=ntes ta\s a)rcha\s kai\ e)k -theô=n gegone/nai], &c. Aristotle mentions them a few lines afterwards -as not worth serious notice, [Greek: peri\ tô=n muthikô=s -sophizome/nôn ou)k a)/xion meta\ spoudê=s skopei=n.]] - -[Side-note: Views of the Ionic philosophers--compared with the more -recent abstractions of Plato and Aristotle.] - -In the theories of these Ionic philosophers, the physical ideas of -generation, transmutation, local motion, are found in the foreground: -generation in the Kosmos to replace generation by the God. Pythagoras -and Empedokles blend with their speculations a good deal both of -ethics and theology, which we shall find yet more preponderant when we -come to the cosmical theories of Plato. He brings us back to the -mythical Prometheus, armed with the geometrical and arithmetical -combinations of the Pythagoreans: he assumes a chaotic substratum, -modified by the intentional and deliberate construction of the -Demiurgus and his divine sons, who are described as building up and -mixing like a human artisan or chemist. In the theory of Aristotle we -find Nature half personified, and assumed to be perpetually at work -under the influence of an appetite for good or regularity, which -determines her to aim instinctively and without deliberation (like -bees or spiders) at constant ends, though these regular tendencies are -always accompanied, and often thwarted, by accessories, irregular, -undefinable, unpredictable. Both Plato and Aristotle, in their -dialectical age, carried abstraction farther than it had been carried -by the Ionic philosophers.[3] Aristotle imputes to the Ionic -philosophers that they neglected three out of his four causes (the -efficient, formal, and final), and that they attended only to the -material. This was a height of abstraction first attained by Plato and -himself; in a way sometimes useful, sometimes misleading. The earlier -philosophers had not learnt to divide substance from its powers or -properties; nor to conceive substance without power as one thing, and -power without substance as another. Their primordial substance, with -its powers and properties, implicated together as one concrete and -without any abstraction, was at once an efficient, a formal, and a -material cause: a final cause they did not suppose themselves to want, -inasmuch as they always conceived a fixed terminus towards which the -agency was directed, though they did not conceive such fixed tendency -under the symbol of an appetite and its end. Water, Air, Fire, were in -their view not simply inert and receptive patients, impotent until -they were stimulated by the active force residing in the ever -revolving celestial spheres--but positive agents themselves, -productive of important effects. So also a geologist of the present -day, when he speculates upon the early condition[4] of the Kosmos, -reasons upon gaseous, fluid, solid, varieties of matter, as -manifesting those same laws and properties which experience attests, -but manifesting them under different combinations and circumstances. -The defect of the Ionic philosophers, unavoidable at the time, was, -that possessing nothing beyond a superficial experience, they either -ascribed to these physical agents powers and properties not real, or -exaggerated prodigiously such as were real; so that the primordial -substance chosen, though bearing a familiar name, became little better -than a fiction. The Pythagoreans did the same in regard to numbers, -ascribing to them properties altogether fanciful and imaginary. - -[Footnote 3: Plato (Sophistes, 242-243) observes respecting these -early theorists--what Aristotle says about Hesiod and the -Theogonies--that they followed out their own subjective veins of thought -without asking whether we, the many listeners, were able to follow them -or were left behind in the dark. I dare say that this was true (as indeed -it is true respecting most writers on speculative matters), but I am -sure that all of them would have made the same complaint if they had -heard Plato read his Timæus.] - -[Footnote 4: Bacon has some striking remarks on the contrast in this -respect between the earlier philosophers and Aristotle. - -Bacon, after commending the early Greek philosophers for having -adopted as their first principle some known and positive matter, not a -mere abstraction, goes on to say:-- - -"Videntur antiqui illi, in inquisitione principiorum, rationem non -admodum acutam instituisse, sed hoc solummodo egisse, ut ex corporibus -apparentibus et manifestis, quod maximé excelleret, quærerent, et quod -tale videbatur, principium rerum ponerent: tanquam per excellentiam, -non veré aut realiter. . . . Quod si principium illud suum teneant non -per excellentiam, sed simpliciter, videntur utique in duriorem tropum -incidere: cum res plané deducatur ad æquivocum, neque de igne -naturali, aut naturali ære, aut aquâ, quod asserunt, prædicari -videatur, sed de igne aliquo phantastico et notionali (et sic de -cæteris) qui nomen ignis retineat, definitionem abneget. . . . -Principium statuerunt secundum sensum, aliquod ens verum: modum autem -ejus dispensandi (liberius se gerentes) phantasticum." (Bacon, -Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia, vol. xi., p. 115-116, -ed. Montagu.) - -"Materia illa spoliata et passiva prorsus humanæ mentis commentum -quoddam videtur. Materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum principio -motûs primo, ut invenitur. Hæc tria (materia, forma, motus) nullo modo -discerpenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda, atque asserenda materia -(qualiscunque ea sit), ita ornata et apparata et formata, ut omnis -virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et -emanatio esse possit. Omnes ferè antiqui, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, -Anaximenes. Heraclitus, Democritus, de materiâ primâ in cæteris -dissidentes, in hoc convenerunt, quod materiam activam formâ nonnullâ, -et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se principium motûs habentem, -posuerunt." (Bacon, De Parmenidis, Telesii, et Campanellæ, Philosoph., -p. 653-654, t. v.) - -Compare Aphorism I. 50 of the Novum Organum. - -Bacon, Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia, vol. xi. ed. -Montagu, p. 106-107. "Sed omnes ferè antiqui (anterior to Plato), -Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, de materiâ -primâ in cæteris dissidentes, in hoc convenerunt, quod materiam -activam, formâ nonnullâ, et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se -principium motûs habentem, posuerunt. Neque aliter cuiquam opinari -licebit, qui non experientiæ plané desertor esse velit. Itaque hi -omnes mentem rebus submiserunt. At Plato mundum cogitationibus, -Aristoteles verò etiam cogitationes verbis, adjudicarunt." . . . . -"Omnino materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum formâ primâ, ac etiam -cum principio motûs primo, ut invenitur. Nam et motûs quoque -abstractio infinitas phantasias peperit, de animis, vitis, et -similibus--ac si iis per materiam et formam non satisfieret, sed ex -suis propriis penderent illa principiis. Sed hæc tria nullo modo -discerpenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda: atque asserenda materia -(qualiscunque ea sit) ita ornata et apparata et formata, ut omnis -virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et -emanatio esse possit. Neque propterea metuendum, ne res torpeant, aut -varietas ista, quam cernimus, explicari non possit--ut postea -docebimus." - -Playfair also observes, in his Dissertation on the Progress of Natural -Philosophy, prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, p. 31:-- - -"Science was not merely stationary, but often retrograde; and the -reasonings of Democritus and Anaxagoras were in many respects more -solid than those of Plato and Aristotle." - -See a good summary of Aristotle's cosmical views, in Ideler, Comm. in -Aristotel. Meteorologica, i. 2, p. 328-329.] - -[Side-note: Parmenides and Pythagoras--more nearly akin to Plato and -Aristotle.] - -Parmenides and Pythagoras, taking views of the Kosmos metaphysical and -geometrical rather than physical, supplied the basis upon which -Plato's speculations were built. Aristotle recognises Empedokles and -Anaxagoras as having approached to his own doctrine--force abstracted -or considered apart from substance, yet not absolutely detached from -it. This is true about Empedokles to a certain extent, since his -theory admits Love and Enmity as agents, the four elements as -patients: but it is hardly true about Anaxagoras, in whose theory Noûs -imparts nothing more than a momentary shock, exercising what modern -chemists call a catalytic agency in originating movement among a -stationary and stagnant mass of Homoeomeries, which, as soon as they -are liberated from imprisonment, follow inherent tendencies of their -own, not receiving any farther impulse or direction from Noûs. - -[Side-note: Advantage derived from this variety of constructive -imagination among the Greeks.] - -In the number of cosmical theories proposed, from Thales to -Demokritus, as well as in the diversity and even discordance of the -principles on which they were founded--we note not merely the growth -and development of scientific curiosity, but also the spontaneity and -exuberance of constructive imagination.[5] This last is a prominent -attribute of the Hellenic mind, displayed to the greatest advantage in -their poetical, oratorical, historical, artistic, productions, and -transferred from thence to minister to their scientific curiosity. -None of their known contemporaries showed the like aptitudes, not even -the Babylonians and Egyptians, who were diligent in the observation of -the heavens. Now the constructive imagination is not less -indispensable to the formation of scientific theories than to the -compositions of art, although in the two departments it is subject to -different conditions, and appeals to different canons and tests in the -human mind. Each of these early Hellenic theories, though all were -hypotheses and "anticipations of nature," yet as connecting together -various facts upon intelligible principles, was a step in advance; -while the very number and discordance of them (urged by Sokrates[6] as -an argument for discrediting the purpose common to all), was on the -whole advantageous. It lessened the mischief arising from the -imperfections of each, increased the chance of exposing such -imperfections, and prevented the consecration of any one among them -(with that inveterate and peremptory orthodoxy which Plato so much -admires[7] in the Egyptians) as an infallible dogma and an exclusive -mode of looking at facts. All the theorists laboured under the common -defect of a scanty and inaccurate experience: all of them were -prompted by a vague but powerful emotion of curiosity to connect -together the past and present of Nature by some threads intelligible -and satisfactory to their own minds; each of them followed out some -analogy of his own, such as seemed to carry with it a self-justifying -plausibility; and each could find some phenomena which countenanced -his own peculiar view. As far as we can judge, Leukippus and -Demokritus greatly surpassed the others, partly in the pains which -they took to elaborate their theory, partly in the number of facts -which they brought into consistency with it. The loss of the -voluminous writings of Demokritus is deeply to be regretted.[8] - -[Footnote 5: Karsten observes, in his account of the philosophy of -Parmenides (sect, 23, p. 241):-- - -"Primum mundi descriptionem consideremus. Argumentum illustre et -magnificum, cujus quanto major erat veterum in contemplando admiratio, -tanto minor ferè in observando diligentia fuit. Quippe universi -_ornatum et pulcritudinem admirati_, ejus _naturam partiumque ordinem -non sensu assequi_ studuerunt, sed _mente informarunt ad eam pulcri -perfectique speciem quæ in ipsorum animis_ insideret: sic ut -Aristoteles ait, non sua cogitata suasque notiones ad mundi naturam, -sed hanc illa accommodantes. Hujusmodi quoque fuit Parmenidea ratio."] - -[Footnote 6: Xenophon, Memor. i. 1, 13-14.] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Legg. ii. 656-657.] - -[Footnote 8: About the style of Demokritus, see Cicero De Orat. i. 11. -Orator. c. 20.] - -[Side-note: All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, -Zeno, Plato, and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of -negative Dialectic.] - -In studying the writings of Plato and Aristotle, we must recollect -that they found all these theories pre-existent or contemporaneous. We -are not to imagine that they were the first who turned an enquiring -eye on Nature. So far is this from being the case that Aristotle is, -as it were, oppressed both by the multitude and by the discordance of -his predecessors, whom he cites, with a sort of indulgent -consciousness of superiority, as "the ancients" ([Greek: oi( -a)rchai=oi]).[9] The dialectic activity, inaugurated by Sokrates and -Zeno, lowered the estimation of these cosmical theories in more ways -than one: first, by the new topics of man and society, which Sokrates -put in the foreground for discussion, and treated as the only topics -worthy of discussion: next, by the great acuteness which each of them -displayed in the employment of the negative weapons, and in bringing -to view the weak part of an opponent's case. When we look at the -number of these early theories, and the great need which all of them -had to be sifted and scrutinised, we shall recognise the value of -negative procedure under such circumstances, whether the negationist -had or had not any better affirmative theory of his own. Sokrates, -moreover, not only turned the subject-matter of discussion from -physics to ethics, but also brought into conscious review the _method_ -of philosophising: which was afterwards still farther considered and -illustrated by Plato. General and abstract terms and their meaning, -stood out as the capital problems of philosophical research, and as -the governing agents of the human mind during the process: in Plato -and Aristotle, and the Dialectics of their age, we find the meaning or -concept corresponding to these terms invested with an objective -character, and represented as a cause or beginning; by which, or out -of which, real concrete things were produced. Logical, metaphysical, -ethical, entities, whose existence consists in being named and -reasoned about, are presented to us (by Plato) as the real antecedents -and producers of the sensible Kosmos and its contents, or (by -Aristotle) as coeternal with the Kosmos, but as its underlying -constituents--the [Greek: a)rchai\], primordia or ultimata--into which -it was the purpose and duty of the philosopher to resolve sensible -things. The men of words and debate, the dialecticians or metaphysical -speculators of the period since Zeno and Sokrates, who took little -notice of the facts of Nature, stand contrasted in the language of -Aristotle with the antecedent physical philosophers who meddled less -with debate and more with facts. The contrast is taken in his mind -between Plato and Demokritus.[10] - -[Footnote 9: Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 314, a. 6; 325, a. 2; Metaphys. -[Greek: L]. 1069, a. 25. See the sense of [Greek: a)rchai+kô=s], Met. -N. 1089, a. 2, with the note of Bonitz. - -Adam Smith, in his very instructive examination of the ancient systems -of Physics and Metaphysics, is too much inclined to criticise Plato -and Aristotle as if they were the earliest theorizers, and as if they -had no predecessors.] - -[Footnote 10: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 316, a. 6.--[Greek: dio\ -o(/soi e)nô|kê/kasi ma=llon e)n toi=s phusikoi=s, ma=llon du/nantai -u(poti/thesthai toiau/tas a)rcha\s, ai(\ e)pi\ polu\ du/nantai -sunei/rein; oi( d' e)k tô=n pollô=n lo/gôn a)theô/rêtoi tô=n -u(parcho/ntôn o)/ntes, pro\s o)li/ga ble/psantes, a)pophai/nontai -r(a=|on; i)/doi d' a)/n tis kai\ e)k tou/tôn o(/son diaphe/rousin oi( -phusikô=s kai\ logikô=s skopou=ntes], &c. This remark is thoroughly -Baconian. - -[Greek: Oi( en toi=s lo/gois] is the phrase by which Aristotle -characterises the Platonici.--Metaphys. [Greek: Th]. 1050, b. 35.] - -[Side-note: The early theorists were studied along with Plato and -Aristotle, in the third and second centuries B.C.] - -Both by Stoics and by Epikureans, during the third and second -centuries B.C., Demokritus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Herakleitus -were studied along with Plato and Aristotle--by some, even more. -Lucretius mentions and criticises all the four, though he never names -Plato or Aristotle. Cicero greatly admires the style of Demokritus, -whose works were arranged in tetralogies by Thrasyllus, as those of -Plato were.[11] - -[Footnote 11: Epikurus is said to have especially admired Anaxagoras -(Diog. L. x. 12).] - -[Side-note: Negative attribute common to all the early -theorists--little or no dialectic.] - -In considering the early theorists above enumerated, there is great -difficulty in finding any positive characteristic applicable to all of -them. But a negative characteristic may be found, and has already been -indicated by Aristotle. "The earlier philosophers (says he) had no -part in dialectics: Dialectical force did not yet exist."[12] And the -period upon which we are now entering is distinguished mainly by the -introduction and increasing preponderance of this new -element--Dialectic--first made conspicuously manifest in the Eleatic -Zeno and Sokrates; two memorable persons, very different from each other, -but having this property in common. - -[Footnote 12: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 32. [Greek: Oi( ga\r -pro/teroi dialektikê=s ou) metei=chon].--M. 1078, b. 25; [Greek: -dialektikê\ ga\r i)schu\s ou)/pô to/t' ê)=n, ô(/ste du/nasthai], &c.] - -[Side-note: Zeno of Elea--Melissus.] - -It is Zeno who stands announced, on the authority of Aristotle, as the -inventor of dialectic: that is, as the first person of whose skill in -the art of cross-examination and refutation conspicuous illustrative -specimens were preserved. He was among the first who composed written -dialogues on controversial matters of philosophy.[13] Both he, and his -contemporary the Samian Melissus, took up the defence of the -Parmenidean doctrine. It is remarkable that both one and the other -were eminent as political men in their native cities. Zeno is even -said to have perished miserably, in generous but fruitless attempts to -preserve Elea from being enslaved by the despot Nearchus. - -[Footnote 13: Diogen. Laert. ix. 25-28. - -The epithets applied to Zeno by Timon are remarkable. - -[Greek: A)mphoteroglô/ssou te me/ga sthe/nos ou)k a)lapadno\n -Zê/nônos pa/ntôn e)pilê/ptoros], &c.] - -[Side-note: Zeno's Dialectic--he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, -by showing that their assumptions led to contradictions and -absurdities.] - -We know the reasonings of Zeno and Melissus only through scanty -fragments, and those fragments transmitted by opponents. But it is -plain that both of them, especially Zeno, pressed their adversaries -with grave difficulties, which it was more easy to deride than to -elucidate. Both took their departure from the ground occupied by -Parmenides. They agreed with him in recognising the phenomenal, -apparent, or relative world, the world of sense and experience, as a -subject of knowledge, though of uncertain and imperfect knowledge. -Each of them gave, as Parmenides had done, certain affirmative -opinions, or at least probable conjectures, for the purpose of -explaining it.[14] But beyond this world of appearances, there lay the -real, absolute, ontological, ultra-phenomenal, or Noumenal world, -which Parmenides represented as _Ens unum continuum_, and which his -opponents contended to be plural and discontinuous. These opponents -deduced absurd and ridiculous consequences from the theory of the One. -Herein both Zeno and Melissus defended Parmenides. Zeno, the better -dialectician of the two, retorted upon the advocates of absolute -plurality and discontinuousness, showing that their doctrine led to -consequences not less absurd and contradictory than the _Ens unum_ of -Parmenides. He advanced many distinct arguments; some of them -antinomies, deducing from the same premisses both the affirmative and -the negative of the same conclusion.[15] - -[Footnote 14: Diog. Laert. ix. 24-29. - -Zeller (Phil. d. Griech. i. p. 424, note 2) doubts the assertion that -Zeno delivered probable opinions and hypotheses, as Parmenides had -done before him, respecting phenomenal nature. But I see no adequate -ground for such doubt.] - -[Footnote 15: Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. f. 30. [Greek: e)n -me/ntoi tô=| suggra/mmati au)tou=, polla\ e)/chonti e)picheirê/mata, -kath' e(/kaston dei/knusin, o(/ti tô=| polla\ ei)=nai le/gonti -sumbai/nei ta\ e)nanti/a le/gein], &c.] - -[Side-note: Consequences of their assumption of Entia Plura -Discontinua. Reductiones ad absurdum.] - -If things in themselves were many (he said) they must be both -infinitely small and infinitely great. _Infinitely small_, because the -many things must consist in a number of units, each essentially -indivisible: but that which is indivisible has no magnitude, or is -infinitely small if indeed it can be said to have any existence -whatever:[16] _Infinitely great_, because each of the many things, if -assumed to exist, must have magnitude. Having magnitude, each thing -has parts which also have magnitude: these parts are, by the -hypothesis, essentially discontinuous, but this implies that they are -kept apart from each other by other intervening parts--and these -intervening parts must be again kept apart by others. Each body will -thus contain in itself an infinite number of parts, each having -magnitude. In other words, it will be infinitely great.[17] - -[Footnote 16: Aristotel. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1001, b. 7. [Greek: e)/ti -ei) a)diai/reton au)to\ to\ e(/n, kata\ me\n to\ Zê/nônos a)xi/ôma, -ou)the\n a)\n ei)/ê. - -o(\ ga\r mê/te prostithe/menon mête\ a)phairou/menon poiei= ti mei=zon -mêde\ e(/latton, ou)/ phêsin ei)=nai tou=to tô=n o)/ntôn, ô(s dê=lon -o(/ti o)/ntos mege/thous tou= o)/ntos]. - -Seneca (Epistol. 88) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (see the passages of -Themistius and Simplikius cited by Brandis, Handbuch Philos. i. p. -412-416) conceive Zeno as having dissented from Parmenides, and as -having denied the existence, not only of [Greek: ta\ polla\], but also -of [Greek: to\ e(/n]. But Zeno seems to have adhered to Parmenides; -and to have denied the existence of [Greek: to\ e(/n], only upon the -hypothesis opposed to Parmenides--namely, that [Greek: ta\ polla\] -existed. Zeno argued thus:--Assuming that the Real or Absolute is -essentially divisible and discontinuous, divisibility must be pushed -to infinity, so that you never arrive at any ultimatum, or any real -unit ([Greek: a)kribô=s e(/n]). If you admit [Greek: ta\ polla\], you -renounce [Greek: to\ e(/n]. The reasoning of Zeno, as far as we know -it, is nearly all directed against the hypothesis of _Entia plura -discontinua_. Tennemann (Gesch. Philos. i. 4, p. 205) thinks that the -reasoning of Zeno is directed against the world of sense: in which I -cannot agree with him.] - -[Footnote 17: Scholia ad Aristotel. Physic. p. 334, a. ed. Brandis.] - -Again--If things in themselves were many, they would be both finite -and infinite in number. _Finite_, because they are as many as they -are, neither more nor less: and every number is a finite number. -_Infinite_, because being essentially separate, discontinuous, units, -each must be kept apart from the rest by an intervening unit; and this -again by something else intervening. Suppose a multitude A, B, C, D, -&c. A and B would be continuous unless they were kept apart by some -intervening unit Z. But A and Z would then be continuous unless they -were kept apart by something else--Y: and so on ad infinitum: -otherwise the essential discontinuousness could not be maintained.[18] - -[Footnote 18: See the argument cited by Simplikius in the words of the -Zenonian treatise, in Preller, Hist. Philos. Græc. ex font. context. -p. 101, sect. 156.] - -By these two arguments,[19] drawn from the hypothesis which affirmed -perpetual divisibility and denied any Continuum, Zeno showed that such -_Entia multa discontinua_ would have contradictory attributes: they -would be both infinitely great and infinitely small--they would be -both finite and infinite in number. This he advanced as a _reductio ad -absurdum_ against the hypothesis. - -[Footnote 19: Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. f. 30. [Greek: kai\ -ou)/tô me\n to\ kata\ to\ plê=thos a)/peiron e)k tê=s dichotomi/as -e)/deixe, to\ de\ kata\ to\ me/gethos pro/teron kata\ tê\n au)tê\n -e)pichei/rêsin]. Compare Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. i. p. 427.] - -[Side-note: Each thing must exist in its own place--Grain of millet -not sonorous.] - -Again--If existing things be many and discontinuous, each of these -must exist in a place of its own. Nothing can exist except in some -place. But the place is itself an existing something: each place must -therefore have a place of its own to exist in: the second place must -have a third place to exist in and so forth ad infinitum.[20] We have -here a farther _reductio ad impossibile_ of the original hypothesis: -for that hypothesis denies the continuity of space, and represents -space as a multitude of discontinuous portions or places. - -[Footnote 20: Aristotel. Physic. iv. 1, p. 209, a. 22; iv. 3, p. 210, -b. 23. - -Aristotle here observes that the Zenonian argument respecting place is -easy to be refuted; and he proceeds to give the refutation. But his -refutation is altogether unsatisfactory. Those who despise these -Zenonian arguments as _sophisms_, ought to look at the way in which -they were answered, at or near the time. - -Eudêmus ap. Simplik. ad Aristot. Physic. f. 131. [Greek: a)/xion ga\r -pa=n tô=n o)/ntôn pou= ei)=nai; ei) de\ o( to/pos tô=n o)/ntôn, pou= -a)\n ei)/ê?]] - -Another argument of Zeno is to the following effect:--"Does a grain of -millet, when dropped upon the floor, make sound? No.--Does a bushel of -millet make sound under the same circumstances? Yes.--Is there not a -determinate proportion between the bushel and the grain? There -is.--There must therefore be the same proportion between the -sonorousness of the two. If one grain be not sonorous, neither can ten -thousand grains be so."[21] - -[Footnote 21: Aristotel. Physic. vii. 5, p. 250, a. 20, with the -Scholia of Simplikius on the passage, p. 423, ed. Brandis.] - -To appreciate the contradiction brought out by Zeno, we must recollect -that he is not here reasoning about facts of sense, phenomenal and -relative--but about things in themselves, absolute and -ultra-phenomenal** realities. He did not deny the fact of sense: -to appeal to that fact in reply, would have been to concede his point. -The adversaries against whom he reasoned (Protagoras is mentioned, but he -can hardly have been among them, if we have regard to his memorable -dogma, of which more will be said presently) were those who maintained -the plurality of absolute substances, each for itself, with absolute -attributes, apart from the fact of sense, and independent of any -sentient subject. One grain of millet (Zeno argues) has no absolute -sonorousness, neither can ten thousand such grains taken together have -any. Upon the hypothesis of absolute reality as a discontinuous -multitude, you are here driven to a contradiction which Zeno intends -as an argument against the hypothesis. There is no absolute -sonorousness in the ten thousand grains: the sound which they make is -a phenomenal fact, relative to us as sentients of sound, and having no -reality except in correlation with a hearer.[22] - -[Footnote 22: It will be seen that Aristotle in explaining this -[Greek: a)pori/a], takes into consideration the difference of force in -the vibrations of air, and the different impressibility of the ear. -The explanation is pertinent and just, if applied to the fact of -sense: but it is no reply to Zeno, who did not call in question the -fact of sense. Zeno is impugning the doctrine of absolute substances -and absolute divisibility. To say that ten thousand grains are -sonorous, but that no one of them separately taken is so, appears to -him a contradiction, similar to what is involved in saying that a real -magnitude is made up of mathematical points. Aristotle does not meet -this difficulty.] - -[Side-note: Zenonian arguments in regard to motion.] - -Other memorable arguments of Zeno against the same hypothesis were -those by which he proved that if it were admitted, motion would be -impossible. Upon the theory of absolute plurality and -discontinuousness, every line or portion of distance was divisible -into an infinite number of parts: before a moving body could get from -the beginning to the end of this line, it must pass in succession over -every one of these parts: but to do this in a finite time was -impossible: therefore motion was impossible.[23] - -[Footnote 23: Aristot. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239 b., with the Scholia, p. -412 seq. ed. Brandis; Aristotel. De Lineis Insecabilibus, p. 968, a. -19. - -These four arguments against absolute motion caused embarrassment to -Aristotle and his contemporaries. [Greek: te/ttares d' ei)si\ lo/goi -Zê/nônos oi( pare/chontes ta\s duskoli/as toi=s lu/ousin], &c.] - -A second argument of the same tendency was advanced in the form of -comparison between Achilles and the tortoise--the swiftest and slowest -movers. The two run a race, a certain start being given to the -tortoise. Zeno contends that Achilles can never overtake the tortoise. -It is plain indeed, according to the preceding argument, that motion -both for the one and for the other is an impossibility. Neither one -nor the other can advance from the beginning to the end of any line, -except by passing successively through all the parts of that line: but -those parts are infinite in number, and cannot therefore be passed -through in any finite time. But suppose such impossibility to be got -over: still Achilles will not overtake the tortoise. For while -Achilles advances one hundred yards, the tortoise has advanced ten: -while Achilles passes over these additional ten yards, the tortoise -will have passed over one more yard: while Achilles is passing over -this remaining one yard, the tortoise will have got over one-tenth of -another yard: and so on ad infinitum: the tortoise will always be in -advance of him by a certain distance, which, though ever diminishing, -will never vanish into nothing. - -The third Zenonian argument derived its name from the flight of an -arrow shot from a bow. The arrow while thus carried forward (says -Zeno) is nevertheless at rest.[24] For the time from the beginning to -the end of its course consists of a multitude of successive instants. -During each of these instants the arrow is in a given place of equal -dimension with itself. But that which is during any instant in a given -place, is at rest. Accordingly during each successive instant of its -flight, the arrow is at rest. Throughout its whole flight it is both -in motion and at rest. This argument is a deduction from the doctrine -of discontinuous time, as the preceding is a deduction from that of -discontinuous space. - -[Footnote 24: Aristotel. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239, b. 30. [Greek: tri/tos -o( nu=n r(êthei/s, o(/ti ê( o)i+sto\s pherome/nê e(/stêken.]] - -A fourth argument[25] was derived from the case of two equal bodies -moved with equal velocity in opposite directions, and passing each -other. If the body A B were at rest, the other body C D would move -along the whole length of C D in two minutes. But if C D be itself -moving with equal velocity in the opposite direction, A B will pass -along the whole length of C D in half that time, or one minute. Hence -Zeno infers that the motion of A B is nothing absolute, or belonging -to the thing in itself--for if that were so, it would not be varied -according to the movement of C D. It is no more than a phenomenal -fact, relative to us and our comparison. - -[Footnote 25: See the illustration of this argument at some length by -Simplikius, especially the citation from Eudêmus at the close of -it--ap. Scholia ad Aristotel. p. 414, ed. Brandis.] - -This argument, so far as I can understand its bearing, is not deduced -(as those preceding are) from the premisses of opponents: but rests -upon premisses of its own, and is intended to prove that motion is -only relative. - -[Side-note: General result and purpose of the Zenonian Dialectic. -Nothing is knowable except the relative.] - -These Zenonian reasonings are memorable as the earliest known -manifestations of Grecian dialectic, and are probably equal in -acuteness and ingenuity to anything which it ever produced. Their -bearing is not always accurately conceived. Most of them are -_argumenta ad hominem_: consequences contradictory and inadmissible, -but shown to follow legitimately from a given hypothesis, and -therefore serving to disprove the hypothesis itself.[26] The -hypothesis was one relating to the real, absolute, or -ultra-phenomenal, which Parmenides maintained to be _Ens Unum -Continuum_, while his opponents affirmed it to be essentially -multiple and discontinuous. Upon the hypothesis of Parmenides, the -Real and Absolute, being a continuous One, was obviously inconsistent -with the movement and variety of the phenomenal world: Parmenides -himself recognised the contradiction of the two, and his opponents -made it a ground for deriding his doctrine.[27] The counter-hypothesis, -of the discontinuous many, appeared at first sight not to be open to -the same objection: it seemed to be more in harmony with the facts of -the phenomenal and relative world, and to afford an absolute basis for -them to rest upon. Against this delusive appearance the dialectic of -Zeno was directed. He retorted upon the opponents, and showed that if -the hypothesis of the _Unum Continuum_ led to absurd consequences, -that of the discontinuous many was pregnant with deductions yet more -absurd and contradictory. He exhibits in detail several of these -contradictory deductions, with a view to refute the hypothesis from -whence they flow; and to prove that, far from performing what it -promises, it is worse than useless, as entangling us in contradictory -conclusions. The result of his reasoning, implied rather than -announced, is--That neither of the two hypotheses are of any avail to -supply a real and absolute basis for the phenomenal and relative -world: That the latter must rest upon its own evidence, and must be -interpreted, in so far as it can be interpreted at all, by its own -analogies. - -[Footnote 26: The scope of the Zenonian dialectic, as I have here -described it, is set forth clearly by Plato, in his Parmenides, c. -3-6, p. 127, 128. [Greek: Pô=s ô)= Zê/nôn, tou=to le/geis? _ei) polla/ -e)sti ta\ o)/nta,_ ô(s a)/ra dei= au)ta\ o(/moia/ te ei)=nai kai\ -a)no/moia, tou=to de\ dê\ a)du/naton.--Ou)kou=n ei) a)du/naton ta/ te -a)no/moia o(/moia ei)=nai kai\ ta\ o(/moia a)no/moia, _a)du/naton dê\ -kai\ polla\ ei)=nai?_ ei) ga\r polla\ ei)/ê, pa/schoi a)\n ta\ -a)du/nata. A)=ra _tou=to/ e)stin o(\ bou/lontai/ sou oi( lo/goi?_ ou)k -_a)llo ti ê)\ diama/chesthai para\ pa/nta ta\ lego/mena, ô(s ou) -polla/ e)stin?_] Again, p. 128 D. [Greek: A)ntile/gei ou)=n tou=to to\ -gra/mma pro\s tou\s ta polla\ le/gontas, kai\ a)ntapodi/dôsi tau=ta -kai\ plei/ô, tou=to boulo/menon dêlou=n, ô(s e)/ti geloio/tera -pa/schoi a)\n _au)tô=n ê( u(po/thesis, ê( ei) polla/ e)stin--ê)\ ê( -tou= e(\n ei)=nai--ei)/ tis i(kanô=s e)pexi/oi_]. - -Here Plato evidently represents Zeno as merely proving that -contradictory conclusions followed, _if you assumed a given -hypothesis_; which hypothesis was thereby shown to be inadmissible. -But Plato alludes to Zeno in another place (Phædrus, c. 97, p. 261) -under the name of the Eleatic Palamedes, as "showing his art in -speaking, by making the same things appear to the hearers like and -unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion". In this last passage, -the impression produced by Zeno's argumentation is brought to view, -apart from the scope and purpose with which he employed it: which -scope and purpose are indicated in the passage above cited from the -Parmenides. - -So also Isokrates (Encom. Helen. init.) [Greek: Zê/nôna, to\n tau)ta\ -dunata\ kai\ pa/lin a)du/nata peirô/menon a)pophai/nein.]] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Parmenides, p. 128 D.] - -[Side-note: Mistake of supposing Zeno's _reductiones ad absurdum_ of -an opponents doctrines to be generalisations of data gathered from -experience.] - -But the purport of Zeno's reasoning is mistaken, when he is conceived -as one who wishes to delude his hearers by proving both sides of a -contradictory proposition. Zeno's contradictory conclusions are -elicited with the express purpose of disproving the premisses from -which they are derived. For these premisses Zeno himself is not to be -held responsible, since he borrows them from his opponents: a -circumstance which Aristotle forgets, when he censures the Zenonian -arguments as paralogisms, because they assume the Continua, Space, and -Time, to be discontinuous or divided into many distinct parts.[28] Now -this absolute discontinuousness of matter, space, and time, was not -advanced by Zeno as a doctrine of his own, but is the very doctrine of -his opponents, taken up by him for the purpose of showing that it led -to contradictory consequences, and thus of indirectly refuting it. The -sentence of Aristotle is thus really in Zeno's favour, though -apparently adverse to him. In respect to motion, a similar result -followed from the Zenonian reasonings; namely, to show That motion, as -an attribute of the Real and Absolute, was no less inconsistent with -the hypothesis of those who opposed Parmenides, than with the -hypothesis of Parmenides himself:--That absolute motion could no more -be reconciled with the doctrine of the discontinuous Many, than with -that of the Continuous One:--That motion therefore was only a -phenomenal fact, relative to our sensations, conceptions, and -comparisons; and having no application to the absolute. In this -phenomenal point of view, neither Zeno nor Parmenides nor Melissus -disputed the fact of motion. They recognised it as a portion of the -world of sensation and experience; which world they tried to explain, -well or ill, by analogies and conjectures derived from itself. - -[Footnote 28: Aristotel. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239 b. [Greek: Zê/nôn de\ -paralogi/zetai; ou) ga\r su/gketai o( chro/nos e)k tô=n nu=n o)/ntôn -tô=n a)diaire/tôn, ô(/sper ou)d' a)/llo me/gethos ou)de/n] &c. - -Aristotle, in the second and third chapters of his Physica, canvasses -and refutes the doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno respecting Ens and -Unum. He maintains that Ens and Unum are equivocal--[Greek: pollachô=s -lego/mena]. He farther maintained that no one before him had succeeded -in refuting Zeno. See the Scholia of Alexander ad Sophistic. Elench. -p. 320 b. 6, ed. Brandis.] - -[Side-note: Zenonian Dialectic--Platonic Parmenides.] - -Though we have not the advantage of seeing the Zenonian dialectics as -they were put forth by their author, yet if we compare the substance -of them as handed down to us, with those dialectics which form the -latter half of the Platonic dialogue called Parmenides, we shall find -them not inferior in ingenuity, and certainly more intelligible in -their purpose. Zeno furnishes no positive support to the Parmenidean -doctrine, but he makes out a good negative case against the -counter-doctrine. - -[Side-note: Views of historians of philosophy respecting Zeno.] - -Zeller and other able modern critics, while admitting the reasoning of -Zeno to be good against this counter-doctrine, complain that he takes -it up too exclusively; that One and Many did not exclude each other, -and that the doctrines of Parmenides and his opponents were both true -together, but neither of them true to the exclusion of the other. But -when we reflect that the subject of predication on both sides was the -Real (Ens _per se_) it was not likely that either Parmenides or his -opponents would affirm it to be both absolutely One and Continuous, -and absolutely Many and Discontinuous.[29] If the opponents of -Parmenides had taken this ground, Zeno need not have imagined -deductions for the purpose of showing that their hypothesis led to -contradictory conclusions; for the contradictions would have stood -avowedly registered in the hypothesis itself. If a man affirms both at -once, he divests the predication of its absolute character, as -belonging unconditionally to Ens _per se_; and he restricts it to the -phenomenal, the relative, the conditioned--dependent upon our -sensations and our fluctuating point of view. This was not intended -either by Parmenides or by his opponents. - -[Footnote 29: That both of them could not be true respecting Ens _per -se_, seems to have been considered indisputable. See the argument of -Sokrates in the Parmenides of Plato, p. 129 B-E.] - -[Side-note: Absolute and relative--the first unknowable.] - -If, indeed, we judge the question, not from their standing-point, but -from our own, we shall solve the difficulty by adopting the -last-mentioned answer. We shall admit that One and Many are predicates -which do not necessarily exclude each other; but we shall refrain from -affirming or denying either of them respecting the Real, the Absolute, -the Unconditioned. Of an object absolutely one and continuous--or of -objects absolutely many and discontinuous, apart from the facts of our -own sense and consciousness, and independent of any sentient subject--we -neither know nor can affirm anything. Both these predicates (One--Many) -are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and -comparisons of our own senses and consciousness, and serving only to -describe, to record, and to classify, those facts. Discrete quantity -or number, or succession of distinct unities--continuous quantity, or -motion and extension--are two conceptions derived from comparison, -abstracted and generalised from separate particular phenomena of our -consciousness; the continuous, from our movements and the -consciousness of persistent energy involved therein--the -discontinuous, from our movements, intermitted and renewed, as well as -from our impressions of sense. We compare one discrete quantity with -another, or one continual quantity with another, and we thus ascertain -many important truths: but we select our unit, or our standard of -motion and extension, as we please, or according to convenience, -subject only to the necessity of adapting our ulterior calculations -consistently to this unit, when once selected. The same object may -thus be considered sometimes as one, sometimes as many; both being -relative, and depending upon our point of view. Motion, Space, Time, -may be considered either as continuous or as discontinuous: we may -reason upon them either as one or the other, but we must not confound -the two points of view with each other. When, however, we are called -upon to travel out of the Relative, and to decide between Parmenides -and his opponents--whether the Absolute be One or Multitudinous--we -have only to abstain from affirming either, or (in other words) to -confess our ignorance. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, -self-existent One, or of an absolute, discontinuous Many. - -[Side-note: Zeno did not deny motion as a fact, phenomenal and -relative.] - -Some critics understand Zeno to have denied motion as a fact--opposing -sophistical reasoning to certain and familiar experience. Upon this -view is founded the well-known anecdote, that Diogenes the Cynic -refuted the argument by getting up and walking. But I do not so -construe the scope of his argument. He did not deny motion as a fact. -It rested with him on the evidence of sense, acknowledged by every -one. It was therefore only a phenomenal fact relative to our -consciousness, sensation, movements, and comparisons. As such, but as -such only, did Zeno acknowledge it. What he denied was, motion as a -fact belonging to the Absolute, or as deducible from the Absolute. He -did not deny the Absolute or Thing in itself, as an existing object, -but he struck out variety, divisibility, and motion, from the list of -its predicates. He admitted only the Parmenidean Ens, one, continuous, -unchanged, and immovable, with none but negative predicates, and -severed from the relative world of experience and sensation. - -[Side-note: Gorgias the Leontine--did not admit the Absolute, even as -conceived by Parmenides.] - -Other reasoners, contemporary with Zeno, did not agree with him, in -admitting the Absolute, even as an object with no predicates, except -unity and continuity. They denied it altogether, both as substratum -and as predicate. To establish this negation is the purpose of a short -treatise ascribed to the rhetor or Sophist Gorgias, a contemporary of -Zeno; but we are informed that all the reasonings, which Gorgias -employed, were advanced, or had already been advanced, by others -before him.[30] Those reasonings are so imperfectly preserved, that we -can make out little more than the general scope. - -[Footnote 30: See the last words of the Aristotelian or -Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgiâ, p. 980. - -[Greek: A(/pasai de\ au)=tai kai\ e(te/rôn a)rchaiote/rôn ei)si\n -a)po/riai, ô(/ste e)n tê=| peri\ e)kei/nôn ske/psei kai\ tau/tas -e)xetaste/on]. - -[Greek: A(/pasai] is the reading of Mullach in his edition of this -treatise (p. 79), in place of [Greek: a(/pantes] or [Greek: -a(/panta].] - -[Side-note: His reasonings against the Absolute, either as Ens or -Entia.] - -Ens, or Entity _per se_ (he contended), did not really exist. Even -granting that it existed, it was unknowable by any one. And even -granting that it both existed, and was known by any one, still such -person could not communicate his knowledge of it to others.[31] - -[Footnote 31: See the treatise of Aristotle or Pseudo-Aristotle, De -Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgiâ, in Aristot. p. 979-980, Bekker, also in -Mullach's edition, p. 62-78. The argument of Gorgias is also abridged -by Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. p. 384, sect. 65-86. - -See also a copious commentary on the Aristotelian treatise in Foss, De -Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 115 seq. - -The text of the Aristotelian treatise is so corrupt as to be often -unintelligible.] - -As to the first point, Ens was no more real or existent than Non-Ens: -the word Non-Ens must have an objective meaning, as well as the word -Ens: it was Non-Ens, therefore it _was_, or existed. Both of them -existed alike, or rather neither of them existed. Moreover, if Ens -existed, it must exist either as One or as Many--either as eternal or -as generated--either in itself, or in some other place. But Melissus, -Zeno, and other previous philosophers, had shown sufficient cause -against each of these alternatives separately taken. Each of the -alternative essential predicates had been separately disproved; -therefore the subject, Ens, could not exist under either of them, or -could not exist at all. - -[Side-note: Ens, incogitable and unknowable.] - -As to the second point, let us grant that Ens or Entia exist; they -would nevertheless (argued Gorgias) be incogitable and unknowable. To -be cogitated is no more an attribute of Ens than of Non-Ens. The fact -of cogitation does not require Ens as a condition, or attest Ens as an -absolute or thing in itself. If our cogitation required or attained -Ens as an indispensable object, then there could be no fictitious -_cogitata_ nor any false propositions. We think of a man flying in the -air, or of a chariot race on the surface of the sea. If our _cogitata_ -were realities, these must be so as well as the rest: if realities -alone were the object of cogitation, then these could not be thought -of. As Non-Ens was thus undeniably the object of cogitation, so Ens -could not be its object: for what was true respecting one of these -contraries, could not be true respecting the other. - -[Side-note: Ens, even if granted to be knowable, is still -incommunicable to others.] - -As to the third point: Assuming Ens both to exist and to be known by -you, you cannot (said Gorgias) declare or explain it to any one else. -You profess to have learnt what Ens is in itself, by your sight or -other perceptions but you declare to others by means of words, and -these words are neither themselves the absolute Ens, nor do they bring -Ens before the hearer. Even though you yourself know Ens, you cannot, -by your words, enable _him_ to know it. If he is to know Ens, he must -know it in the same way as you. Moreover, neither your words, nor Ens -itself, will convey to the hearer the same knowledge as to you; for -the same cannot be at once in two distinct subjects; and even if it -were, yet since you and the hearer are not completely alike, so the -effect of the same object on both of you will not appear to be -like.[32] - -[Footnote 32: In this third branch of the argument, showing that Ens, -even if known, cannot be communicable to others, Gorgias travels -beyond the Absolute, and directs his reasoning against the -communicability of the Relative or Phenomenal also. Both of his -arguments against such communicability have some foundation, and serve -to prove that the communicability cannot be exact or entire, even in -the case of sensible facts. The sensations thoughts, emotions, &c., of -one person are not _exactly_ like those of another.] - -Such is the reasoning, as far as we can make it out, whereby Gorgias -sought to prove that the absolute Ens was neither existent, nor -knowable, nor communicable by words from one person to another. - -[Side-note: Zeno and Gorgias--contrasted with the earlier Grecian -philosophers.] - -The arguments both of Zeno and of Gorgias (the latter presenting the -thoughts of others earlier than himself), dating from a time -coinciding with the younger half of the life of Sokrates, evince a new -spirit and purpose in Grecian philosophy, as compared with the -Ionians, the two first Eleates, and the Pythagoreans. Zeno and Gorgias -exhibit conspicuously the new element of dialectic: the force of the -negative arm in Grecian philosophy, brought out into the arena, -against those who dogmatized or propounded positive theories: the -fertility of Grecian imagination in suggesting doubts and -difficulties, for which the dogmatists, if they aspired to success and -reputation, had to provide answers. Zeno directed his attack against -one scheme of philosophy--the doctrine of the Absolute Many: leaving -by implication the rival doctrine--the Absolute One of Parmenides in -exclusive possession of the field, yet not reinforcing it with any new -defences against objectors. Gorgias impugned the philosophy of the -Absolute in either or both of its forms--as One or as Many: not with a -view of leaving any third form as the only survivor, or of providing -any substitute from his own invention, but of showing that Ens, the -object of philosophical research, could neither be found nor known. -The negative purpose, disallowing altogether the philosophy of Nature -(as then conceived, not as now conceived), was declared without -reserve by Gorgias, as we shall presently find that it was by Sokrates -also. - -[Side-note: New character of Grecian philosophy--antithesis of -affirmative and negative--proof and disproof.] - -It is the opening of the negative vein which imparts from this time -forward a new character to Grecian philosophy. The positive and -negative forces, emanating from different aptitudes in the human mind, -are now both of them actively developed, and in strenuous antithesis -to each other. Philosophy is no longer exclusively confined to -dogmatists, each searching in his imagination for the Absolute Ens of -Nature, and each propounding what seems to him the only solution of -the problem. Such thinkers still continue their vocation, but under -new conditions of success, and subject to the scrutiny of numerous -dissentient critics. It is no longer sufficient to propound a -theory,[33] either in obscure, oracular metaphors and -half-intelligible aphorisms, like Herakleitus--or in verse more or -less impressive, like Parmenides or Empedokles. The theory must be -sustained by proofs, guarded against objections, defended against -imputations of inconsistency: moreover, it must be put in comparison -with other rival theories, the defects of which must accordingly be -shown up along with it. Here are new exigencies, to which dogmatic -philosophers had not before been obnoxious. They were now required to -be masters of the art of dialectic attack and defence, not fearing the -combat of question and answer--a combat in which, assuming tolerable -equality between the duellists, the questioner had the advantage of -the sun, or the preferable position,[34] and the farther advantage of -choosing where to aim his blows. To expose fallacy or inconsistency, -was found to be both an easier process, and a more appreciable display -of ingenuity, than the discovery and establishment of truth in such -manner as to command assent. The weapon of negation, refutation, -cross-examination, was wielded for its own results, and was found hard -to parry by the affirmative philosophers of the day. - -[Footnote 33: The repugnance of the Herakleitean philosophers to the -scrutiny of dialectical interrogation is described by Plato in strong -language, it is indeed even caricatured. (Theætêtus, 179-180.)] - -[Footnote 34: Theokritus, Idyll, xxii. 83; the description of the -pugilistic contest between Pollux and Amykus:-- - -[Greek: e)/ntha polu/s sphisi mo/chthos e)peigome/noisin e)tu/chthê, -o(ppo/teros kata\ nô=ta la/bê| pha/os ê)eli/oio; -a)ll' i)dri/ê| me/gan a)/ndra parê/luthes ô)= Polu/deukes; -ba/lleto d' a)kti/nessin a(/pan A)mu/koio pro/sôpon]. - -To toss up for the sun, was a practice not yet introduced between -pugilists.] - - - - -APPENDIX. - - -To illustrate by comparison the form of Grecian philosophy, before -Dialectic was brought to bear upon it, I transcribe from two eminent -French scholars (M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire and Professor Robert Mohl) -some account of the mode in which the Indian philosophy has always -been kept on record and communicated. - -M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (in his Premier Mémoire sur le Sânkhya, pp. -5-11) gives the following observations upon the Sânkhya or philosophy -of Kapila, one of the principal systems of Sanskrit philosophy: date -(as supposed) about 700 B.C. - -There are two sources from whence the Sânkhya philosophy is known:-- - -"1. Les Soûtras ou aphorismes de Kapila. - -"2. Le traité déjà connu et traduit sous le nom de Sânkhya Kârikâ, -c'est à dire Vers Mémoriaux du Sânkhya. - -"Les Soûtras de Kapila sont en tout au nombre de 499, divisés en six -lectures, et répartis inégalement entre chacune d'elles. Les Soûtras -sont accompagnés d'un commentaire qui les explique, et qui est d'un -brahmane nommé le Mendiant. Le commentateur explique avec des -developpements plus ou moins longs les Soûtras de Kapila, qu'il cite -un à un. - -"Les Soûtras sont en général tres concis: parfois ils ne se composent -que de deux ou trois mots, et jamais ils ne comprennent plus d'une -phrase. Cette forme aphoristique, sous laquelle se présente à nous la -philosophie Indienne--est celle qu'a prise la science Indienne dans -toutes ses branches, depuis la grammaire jusqu'à la philosophie. Les -Soûtras de Panini, qui a réduit toutes les régles de la grammaire -sanscrite en 3996 aphorismes, ne sont pas moins concis que ceux de -Kapila. Ce mode étrange d'exposition tient dans l'Inde à la manière -même dont la science s'est transmise d'âge en âge. Un maître n'a -généralement qu'un disciple: il lui suffit, pour la doctrine qu'il -communique, d'avoir des points de repère, et le commentaire oral qu'il -ajoute à ces sentences pour leur expliquer, met le disciple en état de -les bien comprendre. Le disciple lui-même, une fois qu'il en a pénétré -le sens veritable, n'a pas besoin d'un symbole plus développé, et la -concision même des aphorismes l'aide a les mieux retenir. _C'est une -initiation qu'il a reçue: et les sentences, dans lesquelles cette -initiation se résume, restent toujours assez claires pour lui._ - -"Mais il n'en est pas de même pour les lecteurs étrangers, et il -serait difficile de trouver rien de plus obscur que ces Soûtras. Les -commentaires mêmes ne suffisent pas toujours à les rendre parfaitement -intelligibles. - -"Le seul exemple d'une forme analogue dans l'histoire de l'esprit -humain et de la science en Occident, nous est fourni par les -Aphorismes d'Hippocrate: eux aussi s'adressaient à des adeptes, et ils -réclamaient, comme les Soûtras Indiens, l'explication des maîtres pour -être bien compris par les disciples. Mais cet exemple unique n'a point -tiré à conséquence dans le monde occidental, tandis que dans le monde -Indien l'aphorisme est resté pendant de longs siècles la forme -spéciale de la science: et les développements de pensée qui nous sont -habituels, et qui nous semblent indispensables, ont été reservés aux -commentaires. - -"La Sânkhya Kârikâ est en vers: En Grèce, la poésie a été pendant -quelque temps la langue de la philosophie; Empédocle, Parménide, ont -écrit leurs systèmes en vers. Ce n'est pas Kapila qui l'a écrite. -Entre Kapila, et l'auteur de la Kârikâ, Isvara Krishna, on doit -compter quelques centaines d'années tout au moins: et le second n'a -fait que rediger en vers, pour aider la mémoire des élèves, la -doctrine que le maître avait laissée sous la forme axiomatique. - -"On conçoit, du reste, sans peine, que l'usage des vers mémoriaux se -soit introduit dans l'Inde pour l'enseignement et la transmission de -la science: c'était une conséquence nécessaire de l'usage des -aphorismes. Les sciences les plus abstraites (mathematics, astronomy, -algebra), emploient aussi ce procédé, quoiqu'il semble peu fait pour -leur austérité et leur precision. Ainsi, le rhythme est, avec les -aphorismes, et par le même motif, la forme à peu pres générale de la -science dans l'Inde." - -(Kapila as a personage is almost legendary; nothing exact is known -about him. His doctrine passes among the Indians "comme une sorte de -révélation divine".--Pp. 252, 253.) - -M. Mohl observes as follows:-- - -"Ceci m'amène aux Pouranas. Nous n'avons plus rien du Pourana -primitif, qui paraît avoir été une cosmogonie, suivie d'une histoire -des Dieux et des families héroïques. Les sectes ont fini par -s'approprier ce cadre, après des transformations dont nous ne savons -ni le nombre ni les époques: et s'en sont servies, pour exalter -chacune son dieu, et y fondre, avec des débris de l'ancienne -tradition, leur mythologie plus moderne. Ce que les Pouranas sont pour -le peuple, les six systèmes de philosophie le sont pour les savants. -Nous trouvons ces systèmes dans la forme abstruse que les Hindous -aiment à donner à leur science: chaque école a ses aphorismes, qui, -sous forme de vers mnémoniques, contiennent dans le moins grand nombre -de mots possible tous les résultats d'une école. Mais nous n'avons -aucun renseignement sur les commencements de l'école, sur les -discussions que l'élaboration du système a dû provoquer, sur les -hommes qui y ont pris part, sur la marche et le développement des -idées: nous avons le système dans sa dernière forme, et rien ne nous -permet de remplir l'espace qui le sépare des théories plus vagues que -l'on trouve dans les derniers écrits de l'époque védique, à laquelle -pourtant tout prétend se rattacher. À partir de ces aphorismes, nous -avons des commentaires et des traités d'exposition et -d'interprétation: mais les idées premières, les termes techniques, et -le systeme en tier, sont fixés antérieurement. Tous ces systèmes -reposent sur une analyse psychologique très raffinée; et chacun a sa -terminologie précise, et à laquelle la nôtre ne répond que fort -imparfaitement: il faut donc, sous peine de se tromper et de tromper -ses lecteurs, que les traducteurs créent une foule de termes -techniques, ce qui n'est pas la moindre difficulté de ce travail." R. -Mohl, 'Rapport Annuel Fait à la Société Asïatique,' 1863, pp. 103-105; -collected edition, 'Vingt-sept ans d'histoire des Études Orientales,' -vol. ii. pp. 496, 498-9. - -When the purpose simply is to imprint affirmations on the memory, and -to associate them with strong emotions of reverential belief--mnemonic -verses and aphorisms are suitable enough; Empedokles employed verse, -Herakleitus and the Pythagoreans expressed themselves in -aphorisms--brief, half-intelligible, impressive symbols. But if philosophy -is ever to be brought out of such twilight into the condition of -"reasoned truth," this cannot be done without submitting all the -affirmations to cross-examining opponents--to the scrutiny of a -negative Dialectic. It is the theory and application of this Dialectic -which we are about to follow in Sokrates and Plato. - - - - -CHAPTER III.* - -[Footnote *: As stated in the prefatory note to this edition, the -present and the following chapter have been, for convenience, -transferred from the place given to them by the author, to their -present position.] - -OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. - - -Having dwelt at some length on the life and compositions of Plato, I -now proceed to place in comparison with him some other members of the -Sokratic philosophical family: less eminent, indeed, than the -illustrious author of the Republic, yet still men of marked character, -ability, and influence.[1] Respecting one of the brethren, Xenophon, -who stands next to Plato in celebrity, I shall say a few words -separately in my next and concluding chapter. - -[Footnote 1: Dionysius of Halikarnassus contrasts Plato with [Greek: -to\ Sôkra/tous didaskalei=on pa=n] (De Adm. Vi Dic. Demosthen. p. -956.) Compare also Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 762, where he contrasts -the style and phraseology of Plato with that of the [Greek: -Sôkratikoi\ dia/logoi] generally.] - -[Side-note: Influence exercised by Sokrates over his companions.] - -The ascendancy of Sokrates over his contemporaries was powerfully -exercised in more than one way. He brought into vogue new subjects -both of indefinite amplitude, and familiar as well as interesting to -every one. On these subjects, moreover, he introduced, or at least -popularised, a new method of communication, whereby the relation of -teacher and learner, implying a direct transfer of ready-made -knowledge from the one to the other, was put aside. He substituted an -interrogatory process, at once destructive and suggestive, in which -the teacher began by unteaching and the learner by unlearning what was -supposed to be already known, for the purpose of provoking in the -learner's mind a self-operative energy of thought, and an internal -generation of new notions. Lastly, Sokrates worked forcibly upon the -minds of several friends, who were in the habit of attending him when -he talked in the market-place or the palæstra. Some tried to copy his -wonderful knack of colloquial cross-examination: how far they did so -with success or reputation we do not know: but Xenophon says that -several of them would only discourse with those who paid them a fee, -and that they thus sold for considerable sums what were only small -fragments obtained gratuitously from the rich table of their -master.[2] There were moreover several who copied the general style of -his colloquies by composing written dialogues. And thus it happened -that the great master,--he who passed his life in the oral application -of his Elenchus, without writing anything,--though he left no worthy -representative in his own special career, became the father of -numerous written dialogues and of a rich philosophical literature.[3] - -[Footnote 2: Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 60. [Greek: ô(=n tine\s mikra\ -me/rê par' e)kei/nou proi=ka labo/ntes pollou= toi=s a)/llois -e)pô/loun, kai\ ou)k ê)=san ô(/sper e)kei=nos dêmotikoi/; toi=s ga\r -mê\ e)/chousi chrê/mata dido/nai ou)k ê)/thelon diale/gesthai.]] - -[Footnote 3: We find a remarkable proof how long the name and -conception of Sokrates lasted in the memory of the Athenian public, as -having been the great progenitor of the philosophy and philosophers of -the fourth century B.C. in Athens. It was about 306 B.C., almost a -century after the death of Sokrates, that Democharês (the nephew of -the orator Demosthenes) delivered an oration before the Athenian -judicature for the purpose of upholding the law proposed by Sophokles, -forbidding philosophers or Sophists to lecture without a license -obtained from the government; which law, passed a year before, had -determined the secession of all the philosophers from Athens until the -law was repealed. In this oration Democharês expatiated on the -demerits of many philosophers, their servility, profligate ambition, -rapacity, want of patriotism, &c., from which Athenæus makes several -extracts. [Greek: Toiou=toi ei)sin oi( a)po\ philosophi/as stratêgoi/; -peri\ ô(=n Dêmocha/rês e)/legen,--Ô(/sper e)k thu/mbras ou)dei\s a)\n -du/naito kataskeua/sai lo/gchên, ou)/d' e)k _Sôkra/tous stratiô/tên -a)/mempton_]. - -Demetrius Phalereus also, in or near that same time, composed a -[Greek: Sôkra/tous a)pologi/an] (Diog. La. ix. 37-57). This shows how -long the interest in the personal fate and character of Sokrates -endured at Athens.] - -[Side-note: Names of those companions.] - -Besides Plato and Xenophon, whose works are known to us, we hear of -Alexamenus, Antisthenes, Æschines, Aristippus, Bryson, Eukleides, -Phædon, Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, &c., as having composed dialogues of -this sort. All of them were companions of Sokrates; several among them -either set down what they could partially recollect of his -conversations, or employed his name as a dramatic speaker of their own -thoughts. Seven of these dialogues were ascribed to Æschines, -twenty-five to Aristippus, seventeen to Kriton, twenty-three to Simmias, -three to Kebês, six to Eukleides, four to Phædon. The compositions of -Antisthenes were far more numerous: ten volumes of them, under a -variety of distinct titles (some of them probably not in the form of -dialogues) being recorded by Diogenes.[4] Aristippus was the first of -the line of philosophers called Kyrenaic or Hedonic, afterwards (with -various modifications) Epikurean: Antisthenes, of the Cynics and -Stoics: Eukleides, of the Megaric school. It seems that Aristippus, -Antisthenes, Eukleides, and Bryson, all enjoyed considerable -reputation, as contemporaries and rival authors of Plato: Æschines, -Antisthenes (who was very poor), and Aristippus, are said to have -received money for their lectures; Aristippus being named as the first -who thus departed from the Sokratic canon.[5] - -[Footnote 4: Diogenes Laert. 1. 47-61-83, vi. 15; Athenæ. xi. p. 505 -C. - -Bryson is mentioned by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 508 D. -Theopompus, the contemporary of Aristotle and pupil of Isokrates, had -composed an express treatise or discourse against Plato's dialogues, -in which discourse he affirmed that most of them were not Plato's own, -but borrowed in large proportion from the dialogues of Antisthenes, -Aristippus, and Bryson. Ephippus also, the comic writer (of the fourth -century B.C., contemporary with Theopompus, perhaps even earlier), -spoke of Bryson as contemporary with Plato (Athenæ. xi. 509 C). This -is good proof to authenticate Bryson as a composer of "Sokratic -dialogues" belonging to the Platonic age, along with Antisthenes and -Aristippus: whether Theopompus is correct when he asserts that Plato -borrowed _much_, from the three, is very doubtful. - -Many dialogues were published by various writers, and ascribed falsely -to one or other of the _viri Sokratici_: Diogenes (ii. 64) reports the -judgment delivered by Panætius, which among them were genuine and -which not so. Panætius considered that the dialogues ascribed to -Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Æschines, were genuine; that those -assigned to Phædon and Eukleides were doubtful; and that the rest were -all spurious. He thus regarded as spurious those of Alexamenus, -Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, Simon, Bryson, &c., or he did not know them -all. It is possible that Panætius may not have known the dialogues of -Bryson; if he did know them and believed them to be spurious, I should -not accept his assertion, because I think that it is outweighed by the -contrary testimony of Theopompus. Moreover, though Panætius was a very -able man, confidence in his critical estimate is much shaken when we -learn that he declared the Platonic Phædon to be spurious.] - -[Footnote 5: Diogen. Laert. i. 62-65; Athenæus, xi. p. 507 C. - -Dion Chrysostom (Orat. lv. De Homero et Socrate, vol. ii. p. 289, -Reiske) must have had in his view some of these other Sokratic -dialogues, not those composed by Plato or Xenophon, when he alludes to -conversations of Sokrates with Lysikles, Glykon, and Anytus; what he -says about Anytus can hardly refer to the Platonic Menon.] - -[Side-note: Æschines--oration of Lysias against him.] - -Æschines the companion of Sokrates did not become (like Eukleides, -Antisthenes, Aristippus) the founder of a succession or sect of -philosophers. The few fragments remaining of his dialogues do not -enable us to appreciate their merit. He seems to have employed the -name of Aspasia largely as a conversing personage, and to have -esteemed her highly. He also spoke with great admiration of -Themistokles. But in regard to present or recent characters, he stands -charged with much bitterness and ill-nature: especially we learn that -he denounced the Sophists Prodikus and Anaxaras, the first on the -ground of having taught Theramenes, the second as the teacher of two -worthless persons--Ariphrades and Arignôtus. This accusation deserves -greater notice, because it illustrates the odium raised by Melêtus -against Sokrates as having instructed Kritias and Alkibiades.[6] -Moreover, we have Æschines presented to us in another character, very -unexpected in a _vir Socraticus_. An action for recovery of money -alleged to be owing was brought in the Athenian Dikastery against -Æschines, by a plaintiff, who set forth his case in a speech composed -by the rhetor Lysias. In this speech it is alleged that Æschines, -having engaged in trade as a preparer and seller of unguents, borrowed -a sum of money at interest from the plaintiff; who affirms that he -counted with assurance upon honest dealing from a disciple of -Sokrates, continually engaged in talking about justice and virtue.[7] -But so far was this expectation from being realized, that Æschines had -behaved most dishonestly. He repaid neither principal nor interest; -though a judgment of the Dikastery had been obtained against him, and -a branded slave belonging to him had been seized under it. Moreover, -Æschines had been guilty of dishonesty equally scandalous in his -dealings with many other creditors also. Furthermore, he had made love -to a rich woman seventy years old, and had got possession of her -property; cheating and impoverishing her family. His character as a -profligate and cheat was well known and could be proved by many -witnesses. Such are the allegations against Æschines, contained in the -fragment of a lost speech of Lysias, and made in open court by a real -plaintiff. How much of them could be fairly proved, we cannot say: but -it seems plain at least that Æschines must have been a trader as well -as a philosopher. All these writers on philosophy must have had their -root and dealings in real life, of which we know scarce anything. - -[Footnote 6: Plutarch, Perikles, c. 24-32; Cicero, De Invent. i. 31; -Athenæus, v. 220. Some other citations will be found in Fischer's -collection of the few fragments of Æschines Sokraticus (Leipsic, 1788, -p. 68 seq.), though some of the allusions which he produces seem -rather to belong to the orator Æschines. The statements of Athenæus, -from the dialogue of Æschines called Telaugês, are the most curious. -The dialogue contained, among other things, [Greek: tê\n Prodi/kou -kai\ A)naxago/rous _tô=n sophistô=n_ diamô/kêsin], where we see -Anaxagoras denominated a Sophist (see also Diodor. xii. 39) as well as -Prodikus. Fischer considers the three Pseudo-Platonic -dialogues--[Greek: Peri\ A)retê=s, Peri\ Plou/tou, Peri\ Thana/tou]--as -the works of Æschines. But this is noway established.] - -[Footnote 7: Athenæus, xiii. pp. 611-612. [Greek: Peisthei\s d' u(p' -au)tou= toiau=ta le/gontos, kai\ a(/ma oi)o/menos tou=ton Ai)schi/nên -Sôkra/tous gegone/nai mathêtê/n, kai\ peri\ dikaiosu/nês kai\ a)retê=s -pollou\s kai\ semnou\s le/gonta lo/gous, ou)k a)/n pote e)picheirê=sai -ou)de\ tolmê=sai a(/per oi( ponêro/tatoi kai\ a)dikô/tatoi a)/nthrôpoi -e)picheirou=si pra/ttein]. - -We read also about another oration of Lysias against Æschines--[Greek: -peri\ sukophanti/as] (Diogen. Laert. ii. 63), unless indeed it be the -same oration differently described.] - -[Side-note: Written Sokratic Dialogues--their general character.] - -The dialogues known by the title of Sokratic dialogues,[8] were -composed by all the principal companions of Sokrates, and by many who -were not companions. Yet though thus composed by many different -authors, they formed a recognised class of literature, noticed by the -rhetorical critics as distinguished for plain, colloquial, unstudied, -dramatic execution, suiting the parts to the various speakers: from -which general character Plato alone departed--and he too not in all of -his dialogues. By the Sokratic authors generally Sokrates appears to -have been presented under the same main features: his proclaimed -confession of ignorance was seldom wanting: and the humiliation which -his cross-questioning inflicted even upon insolent men like -Alkibiades, was as keenly set forth by Æschines as by Plato: moreover -the Sokratic disciples generally were fond of extolling the Dæmon or -divining prophecy of their master.[9] Some dialogues circulating under -the name of some one among the companions of Sokrates, were spurious, -and the authorship was a point not easy to determine. Simon, a currier -at Athens, in whose shop Sokrates often conversed, is said to have -kept memoranda of the conversations which he heard, and to have -afterwards published them: Æschines also, and some other of the -Sokratic companions, were suspected of having preserved or procured -reports of the conversations of the master himself, and of having made -much money after his death by delivering them before select -audiences.[10] Aristotle speaks of the followers of Antisthenes as -unschooled, vulgar men: but Cicero appears to have read with -satisfaction the dialogues of Antisthenes, whom he designates as acute -though not well-instructed.[11] Other accounts describe his dialogues -as composed in a rhetorical style, which is ascribed to the fact of -his having received lessons from Gorgias:[12] and Theopompus must have -held in considerable estimation the dialogues of that same author, as -well as those of Aristippus and Bryson, when he accused Plato of -having borrowed from them largely.[13] - -[Footnote 8: Aristotel. ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 505 C; Rhetoric. iii. 16. - -Dionys. Halikarnass. ad Cn. Pomp. de Platone, p. 762, Reiske. [Greek: -Traphei\s] (Plato) [Greek: e)n toi=s Sôkratikoi=s dialo/gois -i)schnota/tois ou)=si kai\ a)kribesta/tois, ou) mei/nas d' e)n -au)toi=s, a)lla\ tê=s Gorgi/ou kai\ Thoukudi/dou kataskeuê=s -e)rasthei/s]: also, De Admir. Vi Dicend. in Demosthene, p. 968. Again -in the same treatise De Adm. V. D. Demosth. p. 956. [Greek: ê( de\ -e(te/ra le/xis, ê( litê\ kai\ a)phelê\s kai\ dokou=sa kataskeuê/n te -kai\ i)schu\n tê\n pro\s i)diô/tên e)/chein lo/gon kai\ o(moio/têta, -pollou\s me\n e)/sche kai\ a)gathou\s a)/ndras prosta/tas--kai\ oi( -tô=n ê)thikô=n dialo/gôn poiêtai/, ô(=n ê)=n to\ Sôkratiko\n -didaskalei=on pa=n, e)/xô Pla/tônos], &c. - -Dionysius calls this style [Greek: o( Sôkratiko\s charaktê\r] p. 1025. -I presume it is the same to which the satirist Timon applies the -words:-- - -[Greek: A)sthenikê/ te lo/gôn duas ê)\ tria\s ê)\ e)/ti po/rsô, -Oi)=os Xeinopho/ôn, ê)/t' Ai)schi/nou ou)k e)pipeithê\s -gra/psai--] Diogen. La. ii. 55. - -Lucian, Hermogenes, Phrynichus, Longinus, and some later rhetorical -critics of Greece judged more favourably than Timon about the style of -Æschines as well as of Xenophon. See Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. ii. p. -171, sec. ed. And Demetrius Phalereus (or the author of the treatise -which bears his name), as well as the rhetor Aristeides, considered -Æschines and Plato as the best representatives of the [Greek: -Sôkratiko\s charaktê/r], Demetr. Phaler. De Interpretat. 310; -Aristeides, Orat. Platon. i. p. 35; Photius, Cods. 61 and 158; -Longinus, ap. Walz. ix. p. 559, c. 2. Lucian says (De Parasito, 33) -that Æschines passed some time with the elder Dionysius at Syracuse, -to whom he read aloud his dialogue, entitled Miltiades, with great -success. - -An inedited discourse of Michæl Psellus, printed by Mr. Cox in his -very careful and valuable catalogue of the MSS. in the Bodleian -Library, recites the same high estimate as having been formed of -Æschines by the chief ancient rhetorical critics: they reckoned him -among and alongside of the foremost Hellenic classical writers, as -having his own peculiar merits of style--[Greek: para\ me\n Pla/tôni, -tê\n dialogikê\n phra/sin, para\ de\ tou= Sôkratikou= Ai)schi/nou, -tê\n e)mmelê= sunthê/kên tô=n le/xeôn, para\ de\ Thoukudi/dou], &c. -See Mr. Cox's Catalogue, pp. 743-745. Cicero speaks of the Sokratic -philosophers generally, as writing with an elegant playfulness of -style (De Officiis, i. 29, 104): which is in harmony with Lucian's -phrase--[Greek: Ai)schi/nês o( tou\s dialo/gous makrou\s kai\ -a)stei/ous gra/psas], &c.] - -[Footnote 9: Cicero, Brutus, 85, s. 292; De Divinatione, i. 54-122; -Aristeides, Orat. xlv. [Greek: peri\ R(êtorikê=s] Orat. xlvi. [Greek: -U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], vol. ii. pp. 295-369, ed. Dindorf. It appears -by this that some of the dialogues composed by Æschines were mistaken -by various persons for actual conversations held by Sokrates. It was -argued, that because Æschines was inferior to Plato in ability, he was -more likely to have repeated accurately what he had heard Sokrates -say.] - -[Footnote 10: Diog. L. ii. 122. He mentions a collection of -thirty-three dialogues in one volume, purporting to be reports of real -colloquies of Sokrates, published by Simon. But they can hardly be -regarded as genuine. - -The charge here mentioned is advanced by Xenophon (see a preceding -note, Memorab. i. 2, 60), against some persons ([Greek: tine\s]), but -without specifying names. About Æschines, see Athenæus, xiii. p. 611 -C; Diogen. Laert. ii. 62.] - -[Footnote 11: Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, xii. 38:--"viri acuti magis -quam eruditi," is the judgment of Cicero upon Antisthenes. I presume -that these words indicate the same defect as that which is intended by -Aristotle when he says--[Greek: oi( A)nthisthe/neioi kai\ oi( ou(/tôs -_a)pai/deutoi_], Metaphysic. [Greek: Ê]. 3, p. 1043, b. 24. It is -plain, too, that Lucian considered the compositions of Antisthenes as -not unworthy companions to those of Plato (Lucian, adv. Indoctum, c. -27).] - -[Footnote 12: Diogen. Laert. vi. 1. If it be true that Antisthenes -received lessons from Gorgias, this proves that Gorgias must sometimes -have given lessons _gratis_; for the poverty of Antisthenes is well -known. See the Symposion of Xenophon.] - -[Footnote 13: Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xi. p. 508. See K. F. Hermann, -Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, p. 300. An extract of some -length, of a dialogue composed by Æschines between Sokrates and -Alkibiades, is given by Aristeides, Or. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n -Tetta/rôn], vol. ii. pp. 292-294, ed. Dindorf.] - -[Side-note: Relations between the companions of Sokrates--Their -proceedings after the death of Sokrates.] - -Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, were all companions and -admirers of Sokrates, as was Plato. But none of them were his -disciples, in the strict sense of the word: none of them continued or -enforced his doctrines, though each used his name as a spokesman. -During his lifetime the common attachment to his person formed a bond -of union, which ceased at his death. There is indeed some ground for -believing that Plato then put himself forward in the character of -leader, with a view to keep the body united.[14] We must recollect -that Plato though then no more than twenty-eight years of age, was the -only one among them who combined the advantages of a noble Athenian -descent, opulent circumstances, an excellent education, and great -native genius. Eukleides and Aristippus were neither of them -Athenians: Antisthenes was very poor: Xenophon was absent on service -in the Cyreian army. Plato's proposition, however, found no favour -with the others and was even indignantly repudiated by Apollodorus: a -man ardently attached to Sokrates, but violent and overboiling in all -his feelings.[15] The companions of Sokrates, finding themselves -unfavourably looked upon at Athens after his death, left the city for -a season and followed Eukleides to Megara. How long they stayed there -we do not know. Plato is said, though I think on no sufficient -authority, to have remained absent from Athens for several years -continuously. It seems certain (from an anecdote recounted by -Aristotle)[16] that he talked with something like arrogance among the -companions of Sokrates: and that Aristippus gently rebuked him by -reminding him how very different had been the language of Sokrates -himself. Complaints too were made by contemporaries, about Plato's -jealous, censorious, spiteful, temper. The critical and disparaging -tone of his dialogues, notwithstanding the admiration which they -inspire, accounts for the existence of these complaints: and anecdotes -are recounted, though not verified by any sufficient evidence, of -ill-natured dealing on his part towards other philosophers who were -poorer than himself.[17] Dissension or controversy on philosophical -topics is rarely carried on without some invidious or hostile feeling. -Athens, and the _viri Sokratici_, Plato included, form no exception to -this ordinary malady of human nature. - -[Footnote 14: Athenæus, xi. p. 507 A-B. from the [Greek: u(pomnê/mata] -of the Delphian Hegesander. Who Hegesander was, I do not know: but -there is nothing improbable in the anecdote which he recounts.] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Phædon. pp. 59 A. 117 D. Eukleides, however, -though his school was probably at Megara, seems to have possessed -property in Attica: for there existed, among the orations of Isæus, a -pleading composed by that rhetor for some client--[Greek: Pro\s -Eu)klei/dên to\n Sôkratiko\n a)mphisbê/têsis u(pe\r tê=s tou= chôri/ou -lu/seôs] (Dion. Hal., Isæ., c. 14, p. 612 Reiske) Harpokr.--[Greek: -O(/ti ta\ e)pikêrutto/mena]: also under some other words by -Harpokration and by Pollux, viii. 48.] - -[Footnote 16: Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, p. 1398, b. 30. [Greek: ê)\ ô(s -A)ri/stippos, pro\s Pla/tôna e)paggeltikô/tero/n ti ei)po/nta, ô(s -ô(/|eto--a)lla\ mê\n o( g' e(tai=ros ê(mô=n, e)/phê, ou)the\n -toiou=ton--le/gôn to\n Sôkra/tên]. - -This anecdote, mentioned by Aristotle, who had good means of knowing, -appears quite worthy of belief. The jealousy and love of supremacy -inherent in Plato's temper ([Greek: to\ philo/timon]), were noticed by -Dionysius Hal. (Epist. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 756).] - -[Footnote 17: Athenæus, xi. pp. 505-508. Diog. Laert. ii. 60-65, iii. -36. - -The statement made by Plato in the Phædon--That Aristippus and -Kleombrotus were not present at the death of Sokrates, but were said -to be in Ægina--is cited as an example of Plato's ill-will and -censorious temper (Demetr. Phaler. s. 306). But this is unfair. The -statement ought not to be so considered, if it were true: and if not -true, it deserves a more severe epithet. We read in Athenæus various -other criticisms, citing or alluding to passages of Plato, which are -alleged to indicate ill-nature; but many of the passages cited do not -deserve the remark.] - -[Side-note: No Sokratic school--each of the companions took a line of -his own.] - -It is common for historians of philosophy to speak of a Sokratic -school: but this phrase, if admissible at all, is only admissible in -the largest and vaguest sense. The effect produced by Sokrates upon -his companions was, not to teach doctrine, but to stimulate -self-working enquiry, upon ethical and social subjects. Eukleides, -Antisthenes, Aristippus, each took a line of his own, not less -decidedly than Plato. But unfortunately we have no compositions -remaining from either of the three. We possess only brief reports -respecting some leading points of their doctrine, emanating altogether -from those who disagreed with it: we have besides aphorisms, dicta, -repartees, bons-mots, &c., which they are said to have uttered. Of -these many are evident inventions; some proceeding from opponents and -probably coloured or exaggerated, others hardly authenticated at all. -But if they were ever so well authenticated, they would form very -insufficient evidence on which to judge a philosopher--much less to -condemn him with asperity.[18] Philosophy (as I have already observed) -aspires to deliver not merely truth, but reasoned truth. We ought to -know not only what doctrines a philosopher maintained, but how he -maintained them:--what objections others made against him, and how he -replied:--what objections he made against dissentient doctrines, and -what replies were made to him. Respecting Plato and Aristotle, we -possess such information to a considerable extent:--respecting -Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, we are without it. All their -compositions (very numerous, in the case of Antisthenes) have -perished. - -[Footnote 18: Respecting these ancient philosophers, whose works are -lost, I transcribe a striking passage from Descartes, who complains, -in his own case, of the injustice of being judged from the statements -of others, and not from his own writings:--"Quod adeo in hâc materiâ -verum est, ut quamvis sæpe _aliquas ex meis opinionibus explicaverim -viris acutissimis_, et qui _me loquente videbantur eas valdé distincté -intelligere: attamen cum eas retulerunt, observavi_ ipsos fere _semper -illas ita mutavisse, ut pro meis agnoscere amplius non possem._ Quâ -occasione posteros hic oratos volo, ut nunquam credant, quidquam à me -esse profectum, quod ipse in lucem non edidero. _Et nullo modo miror -absurda illa dogmata, quæ veteribus illis philosophis tribuuntur, -quorum scripta non habemus_: nec propterea judico ipsorum cogitationes -valdé à ratione fuisse alienas, cum habuerint præstantissima suorum -sæculorum ingenia; sed tantum nobis perperam esse relatas." -(Descartes, Diss. De Methodo, p. 43.)] - - * * * * * - -EUKLEIDES. - -[Side-note: Eukleides of Megara--he blended Parmenides with Sokrates.] - -Eukleides was a Parmenidean, who blended the ethical point of view of -Sokrates with the ontology of Parmenides, and followed out that -negative Dialectic which was common to Sokrates with Zeno. Parmenides -(I have with already said)[19] and Zeno after him, recognised no -absolute reality except Ens Unum, continuous, indivisible: they denied -all real plurality: they said that the plural was Non-Ens or Nothing, -_i.e._ nothing real or absolute, but only apparent, perpetually -transient and changing, relative, different as appreciated by one man -and by another. Now Sokrates laid it down that wisdom or knowledge of -Good, was the sum total of ethical perfection, including within it all -the different virtues: he spoke also about the divine wisdom inherent -in, or pervading the entire Kosmos or universe.[20] Eukleides blended -together the Ens of Parmenides with the Good of Sokrates, saying that -the two names designated one and the same thing: sometimes called -Good, Wisdom, Intelligence, God, &c., and by other names also, but -always one and the same object named and meant. He farther maintained -that the opposite of Ens, and the opposite of Bonum (Non-Ens, -Non-Bonum, or Malum) were things non-existent, unmeaning names, -Nothing,[21] &c.: _i.e._ that they were nothing really, absolutely, -permanently, but ever varying and dependent upon our ever varying -conceptions. The One--the All--the Good--was absolute, immoveable, -invariable, indivisible. But the opposite thereof was a non-entity or -nothing: there was no one constant meaning corresponding to Non-Ens--but -a variable meaning, different with every man who used it. - -[Footnote 19: See ch. i. pp. 19-22.] - -[Footnote 20: Xenophon. Memor. i. 4, 17. [Greek: tê\n e)n tô=| panti\ -phro/nêsin]. Compare Plato, Philêbus, pp. 29-30; Cicero, Nat. Deor. -ii. 6, 6, iii. 11.] - -[Footnote 21: Diog. L. ii. 106. [Greek: Ou)=tos e)\n to\ a)gatho\n -a)pephê/|nato polloi=s o)no/masi kalou/menon; o(/te me\n ga\r -phro/nêsin, o(/te de\ theo/n, kai\ a)/llote nou=n kai\ ta\ loipa/. Ta\ -de\ a)ntikei/mena tô=| a)gathô=| a)nê/|rei, mê\ ei)=nai pha/skôn]. -Compare also vii. 2, 161, where the Megarici are represented as -recognising only [Greek: mi/an a)retê\n polloi=s o)no/masi -kaloume/nên]. Cicero, Academ. ii. 42.] - -[Side-note: Doctrine of Eukleides about _Bonum_.] - -It was in this manner that Eukleides solved the problem which Sokrates -had brought into vogue--What is the Bonum--or (as afterwards phrased) -the Summum Bonum? Eukleides pronounced the Bonum to be coincident with -the Ens Unum of Parmenides. The Parmenidean thesis, originally -belonging to Transcendental Physics or Ontology, became thus -implicated with Transcendental Ethics.[22] - -[Footnote 22: However, in the verse of Xenophanes, the predecessor of -Parmenides--[Greek: Ou(=los o(ra=|, ou(=los de\ noei=, ou(=los de/ t' -a)kou/ei]--the Universe is described as a thinking, seeing, hearing -God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pa=n]. Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. ix. 144; -Xenophan. Fragm. p. 36, ed. Karsten.] - -[Side-note: The doctrine compared to that of Plato--changes in Plato.] - -Plato departs from Sokrates on the same point. He agrees with -Eukleides in recognising a Transcendental Bonum. But it appears that -his doctrines on this head underwent some change. He held for some -time what is called the doctrine of Ideas: transcendental Forms, -Entia, Essences: he considered the Transcendental to be essentially -multiple, or to be an aggregate--whereas Eukleides had regarded it as -essentially One. This is the doctrine which we find in some of the -Platonic dialogues. In the Republic, the Idea of Good appears as one -of these, though it is declared to be the foremost in rank and the -most ascendant in efficacy.[23] But in the later part of his life, and -in his lectures (as we learn from Aristotle), Plato came to adopt a -different view. He resolved the Ideas into numbers. He regarded them -as made up by the combination of two distinct factors:--1. The One--the -Essentially One. 2. The Essentially Plural: The Indeterminate -Dyad: the Great and Little.--Of these two elements he considered the -Ideas to be compounded. And he identified the Idea of Good with the -essentially One--[Greek: to\ a)gatho\n] with [Greek: to\ e(/n]: the -principle of Good with the principle of Unity: also the principle of -Evil with the Indeterminate. But though Unity and Good were thus -identical, he considered Unity as logically antecedent, or the -subject--Good as logically consequent, or the predicate.[24] - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E, vii. p. 517 A.] - -[Footnote 24: The account given by Aristotle of Plato's doctrine of -Ideas, as held by Plato in his later years, appears in various -passages of the Metaphysica, and in the curious account repeated by -Aristoxenus (who had often heard it from Aristotle--[Greek: -A)ristote/lês a)ei\ diêgei=to]) of the [Greek: a)kro/asis] or lecture -delivered by Plato, De Bono. See Aristoxen. Harmon. ii. p. 30, Meibom. -Compare the eighth chapter in this work,--Platonic Compositions -Generally. Metaphys. N. 1091, b. 13.[Greek: tô=n de\ ta\s a)kinê/tous -ou)si/as ei)=nai lego/ntôn] (sc. Platonici) [Greek: oi( me/n phasin -au)to\ to\ e(\n to\ a)gatho\n au)to\ ei)=nai; ou)si/an me/ntoi to\ -e(\n au)tou= ô)/|onto ei)=nai ma/lista], which words are very clearly -explained by Bonitz in the note to his Commentary, p. 586: also -Metaphys. 987, b. 20, and Scholia, p. 551, b. 20, p. 567, b. 34, where -the work of Aristotle, [Greek: Peri\ Ta\gathou=], is referred to: -probably the memoranda taken down by Aristotle from Plato's lecture on -that subject, accompanied by notes of his own. - -In Schol. p. 573, a. 18, it is stated that the astronomer Eudoxus was -a hearer both of Plato and of Eukleides. - -The account given by Zeller (Phil. der Griech. ii. p. 453, 2nd ed.) of -this latter phase of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, applies exactly -to that which we hear about the main doctrine of Eukleides. Zeller -describes the Platonic doctrine as being "Eine Vermischung des -ethischen Begriffes vom höchsten Gut, mit dem Metaphysischen des -Absoluten: Der Begriff des Guten ist zunächst aus dem menschlichen -Leben abstrahirt; er bezeichnet das, was dem Menschen zuträglich ist. -So noch bei Sokrates. Plato verallgemeinert ihn nun zum Begriff des -Absoluten; dabei spielt aber seine ursprüngliche Bedeutung noch -fortwährend herein, und so entsteht die Unklarheit, dass weder der -ethische noch der metaphysische Begriff des Guten rein gefasst wird." - -This remark is not less applicable to Eukleides than to Plato, both of -them agreeing in the doctrine here criticised. Zeller says truly, that -the attempt to identify Unum and Bonum produces perpetual confusion. -The two notions are thoroughly distinct and independent. It ought not -to be called (as he phrases it) "a generalization of Bonum". There is -no common property on which to found a generalization. It is a forced -conjunction between two disparates.] - -[Side-note: Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as that of -Eukleides.] - -This last doctrine of Plato in his later years (which does not appear -in the dialogues, but seems, as far as we can make out, to have been -delivered substantially in his oral lectures, and is ascribed to him -by Aristotle) was nearly coincident with that of Eukleides. Both held -the identity of [Greek: to\ e(/n] with [Greek: to\ a)gatho/n]. This -one doctrine is all that we know about Eukleides: what consequences he -derived from it, or whether any, we do not know. But Plato combined, -with this transcendental Unum = Bonum, a transcendental indeterminate -plurality: from which combination he considered his Ideas or Ideal -Numbers to be derivatives. - -[Side-note: Megaric succession of philosophers. Eleian or Eritrean -succession.] - -Eukleides is said to have composed six dialogues, the titles of which -alone remain. The scanty information which we possess respecting him -relates altogether to his negative logical procedure. Whether he -deduced any consequences from his positive doctrine of the -Transcendental Ens, Unum, Bonum, we do not know: but he, as Zeno had -been before him,[25] was acute in exposing contradictions and -difficulties in the positive doctrines of opponents. He was a citizen -of Megara, where he is said to have harboured Plato and the other -companions of Sokrates, when they retired for a time from Athens after -the death of Sokrates. Living there as a teacher or debater on -philosophy, he founded a school or succession of philosophers who were -denominated _Megarici_. The title is as old as Aristotle, who both -names them and criticises their doctrines.[26] None of their -compositions are preserved. The earliest who becomes known to us is -Eubulides, the contemporary and opponent of Aristotle; next Ichthyas, -Apollonius, Diodôrus Kronus, Stilpon, Alexinus, between 340-260 B.C. - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Parmenides, p. 128 C, where Zeno represents -himself as taking for his premisses the conclusions of opponents, to -show that they led to absurd consequences. This seems what is meant, -when Diogenes says about Eukleides--[Greek: tai=s a)podei/xesin -e)ni/stato ou) kata\ lê/mmata, a)lla\ kat' e)piphora/n] (ii. 107); -Deycks, De Megaricorum Doctrinâ, p. 34.] - -[Footnote 26: Aristot. Metaph. iv. p. 1046, b. 29. - -The sarcasm ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic implies that Eukleides was -really known as the founder of a _school_--[Greek: kai\ tê\n me\n -Eu)klei/dou scholê\n e)/lege cholê/n] (Diog. L. vi. 24)--the earliest -mention (I apprehend) of the word [Greek: scholê\] in that sense.] - -With the Megaric philosophers there soon become confounded another -succession, called Eleian or Eretrian, who trace their origin to -another Sokratic man--Phædon. The chief Eretrians made known to us are -Pleistanus, Menedêmus, Asklepiades. The second of the three acquired -some reputation. - -[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus--Ethical, not -transcendental.] - -The Megarics and Eretrians, as far as we know them, turned their -speculative activity altogether in the logical or intellectual -direction, paying little attention to the ethical and emotional field. -Both Antisthenes and Aristippus, on the contrary, pursued the ethical -path. To the Sokratic question, What is the Bonum? Eukleides had -answered by a transcendental definition: Antisthenes and Aristippus -each gave to it an ethical answer, having reference to human wants and -emotions, and to the different views which they respectively took -thereof. Antisthenes declared it to consist in virtue, by which he -meant an independent and self-sufficing character, confining all wants -within the narrowest limits: Aristippus placed it in the moderate and -easy pleasures, in avoiding ambitious struggles, and in making the -best of every different situation, yet always under the guidance of a -wise calculation and self-command. Both of them kept clear of the -transcendental: they neither accepted it as Unum et Omne (the view of -Eukleides), nor as Plura (the Eternal Ideas or Forms, the Platonic -view). Their speculations had reference altogether to human life and -feelings, though the one took a measure of this wide subject very -different from the other: and in thus confining the range of their -speculations, they followed Sokrates more closely than either -Eukleides or Plato followed him. They not only abstained from -transcendental speculation, but put themselves in declared opposition -to it. And since the intellectual or logical philosophy, as treated by -Plato, became intimately blended with transcendental -hypothesis--Antisthenes and Aristippus are both found on the negative side -against its pretensions. Aristippus declared the mathematical sciences to -be useless, as conducing in no way to happiness, and taking no account of -what was better or what was worse.[27] He declared that we could know -nothing except in so far as we were affected by it, and as it was or -might be in correlation with ourselves: that as to causes not relative -to ourselves, or to our own capacities and affections, we could know -nothing about them.[28] - -[Footnote 27: Aristotel. Metaph. B. 906, a. 32. [Greek: ô(/ste dia\ -tau=ta tô=n _sophistô=n tines_ oi(=on A)ri/stippos proepêla/kizon -au)ta\s (ta\s mathêmatika\s te/chnas);--e)n me\n ga\r tai=s a)/llais -te/chnais, kai\ tai=s banau/sois, oi(=on e)n tektonikê=| kai\ -skutikê=|, dio/ti be/ltion ê)\ chei=ron le/gesthai pa/nta, ta\s de\ -mathêmatika\s ou)the/na poiei=sthai lo/gon peri\ a)gathô=n kai\ -kakô=n.] - -Aristotle here ranks Aristippus among the [Greek: sophistai/]. - -Aristippus, in discountenancing [Greek: phusiologi/an], cited the -favourite saying of Sokrates that the proper study of mankind was -[Greek: o(/tti toi e)n mega/roisi kako/n t' a)gatho/n te te/tuktai]. - -Plutarch, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8.] - -[Footnote 28: Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 191; Diog. L. ii. 92.] - -[Side-note: Preponderance of the negative vein in the Platonic age.] - -Such were the leading writers and talkers contemporary with Plato, in -the dialectical age immediately following on the death of Sokrates. -The negative vein greatly preponderates in them, as it does on the -whole even in Plato--and as it was pretty sure to do, so long as the -form of dialogue was employed. Affirmative exposition and proof is -indeed found in some of the later Platonic works, carried on by -colloquy between two speakers. But the colloquial form manifests -itself evidently as unsuitable for the purpose: and we must remember -that Plato was a lecturer as well as a writer, so that his doctrines -made their way, at least in part, through continuous exposition. But -it is Aristotle with whom the form of affirmative continuous -exposition first becomes predominant, in matters of philosophy. Though -he composed dialogues (which are now lost), and though he appreciates -dialectic as a valuable exercise, yet he considers it only as a -discursive preparation; antecedent, though essential, to the more -close and concentrated demonstrations of philosophy. - -[Side-note: Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the -negative vein.] - -Most historians deal hardly with this negative vein. They depreciate -the Sophists, the Megarics and Eretrians, the Academics and Sceptics -of the subsequent ages--under the title of Eristics, or lovers of -contention for itself--as captious and perverse enemies of truth. - -[Side-note: Negative method in philosophy essential to the controul of -the affirmative.] - -I have already said that my view of the importance and value of the -negative vein of philosophy is altogether different. It appears to me -quite as essential as the affirmative. It is required as an -antecedent, a test, and a corrective. Aristotle deserves all honour -for his attempts to construct and defend various affirmative theories: -but the value of these theories depends upon their being defensible -against all objectors. Affirmative philosophy, as a body not only of -truth but of reasoned truth, holds the champion's belt, subject to the -challenge not only of competing affirmants, but of all deniers and -doubters. And this is the more indispensable, because of the vast -problems which these affirmative philosophers undertake to solve: -problems especially vast during the age of Plato and Aristotle. The -question has to be determined, not only which of two proposed -solutions is the best, but whether either of them is tenable, and even -whether any solution at all is attainable by the human faculties: -whether there exist positive evidence adequate to sustain any -conclusion, accompanied with adequate replies to the objections -against it. The burthen of proof lies upon the affirmant: and the -proof produced must be open to the scrutiny of every dissentient. - -[Side-note: Sokrates--the most persevering and acute Eristic of his -age.] - -Among these dissentients or negative dialecticians, Sokrates himself, -during his life, stood prominent. In his footsteps followed Eukleides -and the Megarics: who, though they acquired the unenviable surname of -Eristics or Controversialists, cannot possibly have surpassed Sokrates, -and probably did not equal him, in the refutative Elenchus. Of no one -among the Megarics, probably, did critics ever affirm, what the admiring -Xenophon says about Sokrates--"that he dealt with every one in colloquial -debate just as he chose," _i.e._, that he baffled and puzzled his -opponents whenever he chose. No one of these Megarics probably ever -enunciated so sweeping a negative programme, or declared so emphatically -his own inability to communicate positive instruction, as Sokrates in the -Platonic Apology. A person more thoroughly Eristic than Sokrates never -lived. And we see perfectly, from the Memorabilia of Xenophon (who -nevertheless strives to bring out the opposite side of his character), -that he was so esteemed among his contemporaries. Plato, as well as -Eukleides, took up this vein in the Sokratic character, and worked it -with unrivalled power in many of his dialogues. The Platonic Sokrates -is compared, and compares himself, to Antæus, who compelled every -new-comer, willing or unwilling, to wrestle with him.[29] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Theætet. p. 169 A. _Theodorus_. [Greek: Ou) -r(a/|dion, ô)= Sô/krates, soi\ parakathê/menon mê\ dido/nai lo/gon, -a)ll' e)gô\ a)/rti parelê/rêsa pha/skôn se e)pitre/psein moi mê\ -a)podu/esthai, kai\ ou)chi\ a)nagka/sein katha/per Lakedaimo/nioi; su\ -de/ moi dokei=s pro\s to\n Ski/r)r(ôna ma=llon tei/nein. -Lakedaimo/nioi me\n ga\r a)pie/nai ê(\ a)podu/esthai keleu/ousi, su\ -de\ kat' A)ntai=o/n ti/ moi ma=llon dokei=s to\ dra=ma dra=|n; to\n -ga\r proseltho/nta ou)k a)ni/ês pri\n a)nagka/sê|s a)podu/sas e)n -toi=s lo/gois prospalai=sai.] - -_Sokrates_. [Greek: _A)=rista ge_, ô)= Theo/dôre, _tê\n no/son mou -a)pei/kasas_; i)schurikô/teros me/ntoi e)gô\ e)kei/nôn; muri/oi ga\r -ê)/dê moi Ê(rakle/es te kai\ Thêse/es e)ntucho/ntes karteroi\ pro\s -to\ le/gein ma/l' eu)= xugkeko/phasin, a)ll' e)gô\ ou)de/n ti ma=llon -a)phi/stamai. ou(/tô _tis e)rô\s deino\s e)nde/duke tê=s peri\ tau=ta -gumnasi/as_; mê\ ou)=n mêde\ su\ phthonê/sê|s prosanatripsa/menos -sauto/n te a(/ma kai\ e)me\ o)nê=sai]. - -How could the eristic appetite be manifested in stronger language -either by Eukleides, or Eubulides, or Diodôrus Kronus, or any of those -Sophists upon whom the Platonic commentators heap so many harsh -epithets? - -Among the compositions ascribed to Protagoras by Diogenes Laertius -(ix. 55), one is entitled [Greek: Te/chnê E)ristikô=n]. But if we look -at the last chapter of the Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis, we shall -find Aristotle asserting explicitly that there existed no [Greek: -Te/chnê E)ristikô=n] anterior to his own work the Topica.] - -[Side-note: Platonic Parmenides--its extreme negative character.] - -Of the six dialogues composed by Eukleides, we cannot speak -positively, because they are not preserved. But they cannot have been -more refutative, and less affirmative, than most of the Platonic -dialogues; and we can hardly be wrong in asserting that they were very -inferior both in energy and attraction. The Theætêtus and the -Parmenides, two of the most negative among the Platonic dialogues, -seem to connect themselves, by the _personnel_ of the drama, with the -Megaric philosophers: the former dialogue is ushered in by Eukleides, -and is, as it were, dedicated to him: the latter dialogue exhibits, as -its _protagonistes_, the veteran Parmenides himself, who forms the one -factor of the Megaric philosophy, while Sokrates forms the other. -Parmenides (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is made to enforce the -negative method in general terms, as a philosophical duty co-ordinate -with the affirmative; and to illustrate it by a most elaborate -argumentation, directed partly against the Platonic Ideas (here -advocated by the youthful Sokrates), partly against his own (the -Parmenidean) dogma of Ens Unum. Parmenides adduces unanswerable -objections against the dogma of Transcendental Forms or Ideas; yet -says at the same time that there can be no philosophy unless you admit -it. He reproves the youthful Sokrates for precipitancy in affirming -the dogma, and contends that you are not justified in affirming any -dogma until you have gone through a bilateral scrutiny of it--that is, -first assuming the doctrine to be true, next assuming it to be false, -and following out the deductions arising from the one assumption as -well as from the other.[30] Parmenides then gives a string of -successive deductions (at great length, occupying the last half of the -dialogue)--four pairs of counter-demonstrations or Antinomies--in -which contradictory conclusions appear each to be alike proved. He -enunciates the final result as follows:--"Whether Unum exists, or does -not exist, Unum itself and Cætera, both exist and do not exist, both -appear and do not appear, all things and in all ways--both in relation -to themselves and in relation to each other".[31] - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Parmen. p. 136.] - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Parmen. p. 166. [Greek: e(\n ei)/t' e)/stin, -ei)/te mê\ e)/stin, au)to/ te kai\ ta)/lla kai\ pro\s au)ta\ kai\ -pro\s a)/llêla pa/nta pa/ntôs e)sti/ te kai\ ou)k e)/sti, kai\ -phai/netai/ te kai\ ou) phai/netai.--A)lêthe/stata]. - -See below, vol. iii. chap. xxvii. Parmenides.] - -If this memorable dialogue, with its concluding string of elaborate -antinomies, had come down to us under the name of Eukleides, -historians would probably have denounced it as a perverse exhibition -of ingenuity, worthy of "that litigious person, who first infused into -the Megarians the fury of disputation "[32] But since it is of -Platonic origin, we must recognise Plato not only as having divided -with the Megaric philosophers the impulse of negative speculation -which they had inherited from Sokrates, but as having carried that -impulse to an extreme point of invention, combination, and dramatic -handling, much beyond their powers. Undoubtedly, if we pass from the -Parmenidês to other dialogues, we find Plato very different. He has -various other intellectual impulses, an abundant flow of ideality and -of constructive fancy, in many distinct channels. But negative -philosophy is at least one of the indisputable and prominent items of -the Platonic aggregate. - -[Footnote 32: This is the phrase of the satirical sillographer Timon, -who spoke with scorn of all the philosophers except Pyrrhon:-- - -[Greek: A)ll' ou)/ moi tou/tôn phledo/nôn me/lei, ou)de\ me\n a)/llou -Ou)deno/s, ou) Phai/dônos, o(/tis ge me\n--ou)/d' e)rida/nteô -Eu)klei/dou, Megareu=sin o(\s e)/mbale lu/ssan e)rismou=.]] - -[Side-note: The Megarics shared the negative impulse with Sokrates and -Plato.] - -While then we admit that the Megaric succession of philosophers -exhibited negative subtlety and vehement love of contentious debate, -we must recollect that these qualities were inherited from Sokrates -and shared with Plato. The philosophy of Sokrates, who taught nothing -and cross-examined every one, was essentially more negative and -controversial, both in him and his successors, than any which had -preceded it. In an age when dialectic colloquy was considered as -appropriate for philosophical subjects, and when long continuous -exposition was left to the rhetor--Eukleides established a succession -or school[33] which was more distinguished for impugning dogmas of -others than for defending dogmas of its own. Schleiermacher and others -suppose that Plato in his dialogue Euthydêmus intends to expose the -sophistical fallacies of the Megaric school:[34] and that in the -dialogue Sophistês, he refutes the same philosophers (under the vague -designation of "the friends of Forms") in their speculations about -Ens and Non-Ens. The first of these two opinions is probably true to -some extent, though we cannot tell how far: the second of the two is -supported by some able critics--yet it appears to me untenable.[35] - -[Footnote 33: If we may trust a sarcastic bon-mot ascribed to Diogenes -the Cynic, the contemporary of the _viri Sokratici_ and the follower -of Antisthenes, the term [Greek: scholê\] was applied to the visitors -of Eukleides rather than to those of Plato--[Greek: kai\ tê\n me\n -Eu)klei/dou scholê\n e)/lege _cholê/n_, tê\n de\ Pla/tônos diatribê/n, -_katatribê/n_]. Diog. L. vi. 24.] - -[Footnote 34: Schleierm. Einleitung to Plat. Euthyd. p. 403 seq.] - -[Footnote 35: Schleierm. Introduction to the Sophistês, pp. 134-135. - -See Deycks, Megaricorum Doctrina, p. 41 seq. Zeller, Phil. der Griech. -vol. ii. p. 180 seq., with his instructive note. Prantl, Gesch. der -Logik, vol. i. p. 37, and others cited by Zeller.--Ritter dissents -from this view, and I concur in his dissent. To affirm that Eukleides -admitted a plurality of Ideas or Forms, is to contradict the only one -deposition, certain and unequivocal, which we have about his -philosophy. His doctrine is that of the Transcendental Unum, Ens, -Bonum; while the doctrine of the Transcendental Plura (Ideas or Forms) -belongs to Plato and others. Both Deycks and Zeller (p. 185) recognise -this as a difficulty. But to me it seems fatal to their hypothesis; -which, after all, is only an hypothesis--first originated by -Schleiermacher. If it be true that the Megarici are intended by Plato -under the appellation [Greek: oi( tô=n ei)dô=n phi/loi], we must -suppose that the school had been completely transformed before the -time of Stilpon, who is presented as the great opponent of [Greek: ta\ -ei)/dê].] - -Of Eukleides himself, though he is characterised as strongly -controversial, no distinct points of controversy have been preserved: -but his successor Eubulides is celebrated for various sophisms. He was -the contemporary and rival of Aristotle: who, without however -expressly naming him, probably intends to speak of him when alluding -to the Megaric philosophers generally.[36] Another of the same school, -Alexinus (rather later than Eubulides) is also said to have written -against Aristotle. - -[Footnote 36: Aristokles, ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2. Eubulides is -said not merely to have controverted the philosophical theories of -Aristotle, but also to have attacked his personal character with -bitterness and slander: a practice not less common in ancient -controversy than in modern. About Alexinus, Diog. L. ii. 109. - -Among those who took lessons in rhetoric and pronunciation from -Eubulides, we read the name of the orator Demosthenes, who is said to -have improved his pronunciation thereby. Diog. Laert. ii. p. 108. -Plutarch, x. Orat. 21, p. 845 C.] - -[Side-note: Eubulides--his logical problems or puzzles--difficulty of -solving them--many solutions attempted.] - -Six sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides. 1.--[Greek: O( -pseudo/menos]--Mentiens. 2.--[Greek: O( dialantha/nôn], or -[Greek: e)gkekalumme/nos]--the person hidden under a veil. -3.--[Greek: Ê)le/ktra]. 4.--[Greek: Sôrei/tês]--Sorites. -5.--[Greek: Kerati/nês]--Cornutus. 6.--[Greek: Pha/lakros]--Calvus. -Of these the second is substantially the same with the third; and the -fourth the same with the sixth, only inverted.[37] - -[Footnote 37: Diog. L. ii. pp. 108-109; vii. 82. Lucian vit. Auct. 22. - -1. Cicero, Academ. ii. pp. 30-96. "Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, -mentiris. Dicis autem te mentiri, verumque dicis: mentiris igitur." 2, -3. [Greek: O( e)gkekalumme/nos]. You know your father: you are placed -before a person covered and concealed by a thick veil: you do not know -him. But this person is your father. Therefore you both know your -father and do not know him. 5. [Greek: Kerati/nês]. That which you -have not lost, you have: but you have not lost horns; therefore you -_have_ horns. 4, 6. [Greek: Sôrei/tês--Pha/lakros]. What number of -grains make a heap--or are many? what number are few? Are three grains -few, and four _many_?--or, where will you draw the line between Few -and Many? The like question about the hairs on a man's head--How many -must he lose before he can be said to have only a few, or to be bald?] - -These sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides, and belonged probably to the -Megaric school both before and after him. But it is plain both from -the Euthydêmus of Plato, and from the Topica of Aristotle, that there -were many others of similar character; frequently employed in the -abundant dialectic colloquies which prevailed at Athens during the -fourth and third centuries B.C. Plato and Aristotle handle such -questions and their authors contemptuously, under the name of Eristic: -but it was more easy to put a bad name upon them, as well as upon the -Eleate Zeno, than to elucidate the logical difficulties which they -brought to view. Neither Aristotle nor Plato provided a sufficient -answer to them: as is proved by the fact, that several subsequent -philosophers wrote treatises expressly in reference to them--even -philosophers of reputation, like Theophrastus and Chrysippus.[38] How -these two latter philosophers performed their task, we cannot say. But -the fact that they attempted the task, exhibits a commendable anxiety -to make their logical theory complete, and to fortify it against -objections. - -[Footnote 38: Diog. L. v. p. 49; vii. pp. 192-198. Seneca, Epistol. p. -45. Plutarch (De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1087) has some curious -extracts and remarks from Chrysippus; who (he says) spoke in the -harshest terms against the [Greek: Megarika\ e)rôtê/mata], as having -puzzled and unsettled men's convictions without ground--while he -(Chrysippus) had himself proposed puzzles and difficulties still more -formidable, in his treatise [Greek: kata\ Sunêthei/as].] - -[Side-note: Real character of the Megaric sophisms, not calculated to -deceive but to guard against deception.] - -It is in this point of view--in reference to logical theory--that the -Megaric philosophers have not been fairly appreciated. They, or -persons reasoning in their manner, formed one essential encouragement -and condition to the formation of any tolerable logical theory. They -administered, to minds capable and constructive, that painful sense of -contradiction, and shock of perplexity, which Sokrates relied upon as -the stimulus to mental parturition--and which Plato extols as a lever -for raising the student to general conceptions.[39] Their sophisms -were not intended to impose upon any one, but on the contrary, to -guard against imposition.[40] Whoever states a fallacy clearly and -nakedly, applying it to a particular case in which it conducts to a -conclusion known upon other evidence not to be true--contributes to -divest it of its misleading effect. The persons most liable to be -deceived by the fallacy are those who are not forewarned:--in cases -where the premisses are stated not nakedly, but in an artful form of -words--and where the conclusion, though false, is not known beforehand -to be false by the hearer. To use Mr. John Stuart Mill's phrase,[41] -the fallacy is a case of apparent evidence mistaken for real evidence: -you expose it to be evidence only apparent and not real, by giving a -type of the fallacy, in which the conclusion obtained is obviously -false: and the more obviously false it is, the better suited for its -tutelary purpose. Aristotle recognises, as indispensable in -philosophical enquiry, the preliminary wrestling into which he -conducts his reader, by means of a long string of unsolved -difficulties or puzzles--([Greek: a)po/riai]). He declares distinctly -and forcibly, that whoever attempts to lay out a positive theory, -without having before his mind a full list of the difficulties with -which he is to grapple, is like one who searches without knowing what -he is looking for; without being competent to decide whether what he -hits upon as a solution be really a solution or not.[42] Now that -enumeration of puzzles which Aristotle here postulates (and in part -undertakes, in reference to Philosophia Prima) is exactly what the -Megarics, and various other dialecticians (called by Plato and -Aristotle Sophists) contributed to furnish for the use of those who -theorised on Logic. - -[Footnote 39: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 523 A, 524. [Greek: ta\ me\n -e)n tai=s ai)sthê/sesin ou) parakalou=nta tê\n no/êsin ei)s -e)pi/skepsin, ô(s i(kanô=s u(po\ tê=s ai)sthê/seôs krino/mena--ta\ de\ -panta/pasi diakeleuo/mena e)kei/nên e)piske/psasthai, ô(s tê=s -ai)sthê/seôs ou)de\n u(gie\s poiou/sês . . . Ta\ me\n ou) -parakalou=nta, o(/sa mê\ e)kbai/nei ei)s e)nanti/an ai)/sthêsin a(/ma; -ta\ d' e)kbai/nonta, ô(s parakalou=nta ti/thêmi, e)peida\n ê( -ai)/sthêsis mêde\n ma=llon tou=to ê)\ to\ e)nanti/on dêloi=]. Compare -p. 524 E: the whole passage is very interesting.] - -[Footnote 40: The remarks of Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 189. -2nd ed.) upon these Megaric philosophers are more just and discerning -than those made by most of the historians of philosophy "Doch darf man -wohl annehmen, dass sie solche Trugschlüsse nicht zur Täuschung,** -sondern zur Belehrung für unvorsichtige, oder zur Warnung vor der -Seichtigkeit gewöhnlicher Vorstellungsweisen, gebrauchen wollten. So -viel ist gewiss, dass die Megariker sich viel mit den Formen des -Denken beschäftigten, vielleicht mehr zu Aufsuchung einzelner Regeln, -als zur Begründung eines wissenschaftlichen Zusammenhangs unter ihnen; -obwohl auch besondere Theile der Logik unter ihren Schriften erwähnt -werden." - -This is much more reasonable than the language of Prantl, who -denounces "the shamelessness of doctrinarism" (die Unverschämtheit des -Doctrinarismus) belonging to these Megarici "the petulance and vanity -which prompted them to seek celebrity by intentional offences against -sound common sense," &c. (Gesch. der Logik, pp. 39-40.--Sir Wm. -Hamilton has some good remarks on these sophisms, in his Lectures on -Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 452 seq.)] - -[Footnote 41: See the first chapter of his book v. on Fallacies, -System of Logic, vol. ii.] - -[Footnote 42: Aristotel. Metaphys. B. 1, p. 995, a. 33. - -[Greek: dio\ dei= ta\s duscherei/as tetheôrêke/nai pa/sas pro/teron, -tou/tôn de\ cha/rin kai\ dia\ to\ tou\s zêtou=ntas a)/neu tou= -diaporê=sai prô=ton o(moi/ous ei)=nai toi=s poi= dei= badi/zein -a)gnoou=si, kai\ pro\s tou/tois ou)d' ei) pote to\ zêtou/menon -eu(/rêken ê)\ mê\ gignô/skein; to\ ga\r te/los tou/tô| me\n ou) -dê=lon, tô=| de\ proêporêko/ti dê=lon]. - -Aristotle devotes the whole of this Book to an enumeration of [Greek: -a)po/riai].] - -[Side-note: If the process of theorising be admissible, it must -include negative as well as affirmative.] - -You may dislike philosophy: you may undervalue, or altogether -proscribe, the process of theorising. This is the standing-point usual -with the bulk of mankind, ancient as well as modern: who generally -dislike all accurate reasoning, or analysis and discrimination of -familiar abstract words, as mean and tiresome hair-splitting.[43] But -if you admit the business of theorising to be legitimate, useful, and -even honourable, you must reckon on free working of independent, -individual, minds as the operative force--and on the necessity of -dissentient, conflicting, manifestations of this common force, as -essential conditions to any successful result. Upon no other -conditions can you obtain any tolerable body of reasoned truth--or -even reasoned _quasi-truth_. - -[Footnote 43: See my account of the Platonic dialogue Hippias Major, -vol. ii. chap. xiii. Aristot. Metaphys. A. minor, p. 995, a. 9. -[Greek: tou\s de\ lupei= to\ a)kribe\s, ê)\ dia\ to\ mê\ du/nasthai -sunei/rein, ê)\ dia\ tê\n mikrologi/an; e)/chei ga/r ti to\ a)kribe\s -toiou=ton, ô(/ste katha/per e)pi\ tô=n sumbolai/ôn, kai\ e)pi\ tô=n -lo/gôn a)neleu/theron ei)=nai tisi dokei=]. Cicero (Paradoxa, c. 2) -talks of the "minutæ interrogatiunculæ" of the Stoics as tedious and -tiresome.] - -[Side-note: Logical position of the Megaric philosophers erroneously -described by historians of philosophy. Necessity of a complete -collection of difficulties.] - -Now the historians of philosophy seldom take this view of philosophy -as a whole--as a field to which the free antithesis of affirmative and -negative is indispensable. They consider true philosophy as -represented by Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, one or other of them: -while the contemporaries of these eminent men are discredited under -the name of Sophists, Eristics, or sham-philosophers, sowing tares -among the legitimate crop of wheat--or as devils whom the miraculous -virtue of Sokrates and Plato is employed in expelling from the -Athenian mind. Even the companions of Sokrates, and the Megarics among -them, whom we know only upon the imperfect testimony of opponents, -have fallen under this unmerited sentence:[44] as if they were -destructive agents breaking down an edifice of well-constituted -philosophy--no such edifice in fact having ever existed in Greece, -though there were several dissenting lecture rooms and conflicting -veins of speculation promoted by eminent individuals. - -[Footnote 44: The same charge is put by Cicero into the mouth of -Lucullus against the Academics: "Similiter vos (Academici) quum -perturbare, ut illi" (the Gracchi and others) "rempublicam, sic vos -philosophiam, benè jam constitutam velitis. . . . Tum exortus est, ut -in optimâ republicâ Tib. Gracchus, qui otium perturbaret, sic -Arcesilas, qui constitutam philosophiam everteret" (Acad. Prior, ii. 5, -14-15). - -Even in the liberal and comprehensive history of the Greek philosophy -by Zeller (vol. ii. p. 187, ed. 2nd), respecting Eukleides' and the -Megarians;--"Dagegen bot der _Streit gegen die geltenden Meinungen_ -dem Scharfsinn, der Rechthaberei, und dem wissenschaftlichen Ehrgeiz, -ein unerschöpfliches Feld dar, welches denn auch die Megarischen -Philosophen rüstig ausbeuteten." - -If by "die geltenden Meinungen" Zeller means the common sense of the -day that is, the opinions and beliefs current among the [Greek: -i)diô=tai], the working, enjoying, non-theorising public--it is very -true that the Megaric philosophers contended against them: but -Sokrates and Plato contended against them quite as much: we see this -in the Platonic Apology, Gorgias, Republic, Timæus, Parmenidês, &c. - -If, on the other hand, by "die geltenden Meinungen" Zeller means any -philosophical or logical theories generally or universally admitted by -thinking men as valid, the answer is that there were none such in the -fourth and third centuries B.C. Various eminent speculative -individuals were labouring to construct such theories, each in his own -way, and each with a certain congregation of partisans; but -established theory there was none. Nor can any theory (whether -accepted or not) be firm or trustworthy, unless it be exposed to the -continued thrusts of the negative weapon, searching out its vulnerable -points. We know of the Megarics only what they furnished towards that -negative testing; without which, however,--as we may learn from Plato -and Aristotle themselves,--the true value of the affirmative defences -can never be measured.] - -Whoever undertakes, _bonâ fide_, to frame a complete and defensible -logical theory, will desire to have before him a copious collection of -such difficulties, and will consider those who propound them as useful -auxiliaries.[45] If he finds no one to propound them, he will have to -imagine them for himself. "The philosophy of reasoning" (observes Mr. -John Stuart Mill) "must comprise the philosophy of bad as well as of -good reasoning."[46] The one cannot be complete without the other. To -enumerate the different varieties of apparent evidence which is not -real evidence (called Fallacies), and of apparent contradictions which -are not real contradictions--referred as far as may be to classes, -each illustrated by a suitable type--is among the duties of a -logician. He will find this duty much facilitated, if there happen to -exist around him an active habit of dialectic debate: ingenious men -who really study the modes of puzzling and confuting a well-armed -adversary, as well as of defending themselves against the like. Such a -habit did exist at Athens: and unless it had existed, the Aristotelian -theories on logic would probably never have been framed. Contemporary -and antecedent dialecticians, the Megarici among them, supplied the -stock of particular examples enumerated and criticised by Aristotle in -the Topica:[47] which treatise (especially the last book, De -Sophisticis Elenchis) is intended both to explain the theory, and to -give suggestions on the practice, of logical controversy. A man who -takes lessons in fencing must learn not only how to thrust and parry, -but also how to impose on his opponent by feints, and to meet the -feints employed against himself: a general who learns the art of war -must know how to take advantage of the enemy by effective cheating and -treachery (to use the language of Xenophon), and how to avoid being -cheated himself. The Aristotelian Topica, in like manner, teach the -arts both of dialectic attack and of dialectic defence.[48] - -[Footnote 45: Marbach (Gesch. der Philos. s. 91), though he treats the -Megarics as jesters (which I do not think they were), yet adds very -justly: "Nevertheless these puzzles (propounded by the Megarics) have -their serious and scientific side. We are forced to inquire, how it -happens that the contradictions shown up in them are not merely -possible but even necessary." - -Both Tiedemann and Winckelmann also remark that the debaters called -Eristics contributed greatly to the formation of the theory and -precepts of Logic, afterwards laid out by Aristotle. Winckelmann, -Prolegg. ad Platon. Euthydem. pp. xxiv.-xxxi. Even Stallbaum, though -full of harshness towards those Sophists whom he describes as -belonging to the school of Protagoras, treats the Megaric philosophers -with much greater respect. Prolegom. ad Platon. Euthydem. p. 9.] - -[Footnote 46: System of Logic, Book v. 1, 1.] - -[Footnote 47: Prantl (Gesch. der Logik, vol. i. pp. 43-50) ascribes to -the Megarics all or nearly all the sophisms which Aristotle notices in -the Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis. This is more than can be proved, -and more than I think probable. Several of them are taken from the -Platonic Euthydêmus.] - -[Footnote 48: See the remarkable passages in the discourses of -Sokrates (Memorab. iii. 1, 6; iv. 2, 15), and in that of Kambyses to -Cyrus, which repeats the same opinion--Cyropæd. i. 6, 27--respecting -the amount of deceit, treachery, the thievish and rapacious qualities -required for conducting war against an enemy--([Greek: ta\ pro\s tou\s -polemi/ous no/mima], i. 6, 34). - -Aristotle treats of Dialectic, as he does of Rhetoric, as an art -having its theory, and precepts founded upon that theory. I shall have -occasion to observe in a future chapter (xxi.), that logical Fallacies -are not generated or invented by persons called Sophists, but are -inherent liabilities to error in the human intellect; and that the -habit of debate affords the only means of bringing them into clear -daylight, and guarding against being deceived by them. Aristotle gives -precepts both how to thrust, and how to parry with the best effect: if -he had taught only how to parry, he would have left out one-half of -the art. - -One of the most learned and candid of the Aristotelian -commentators--M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire--observes as follows (Logique -d'Aristote, p. 435, Paris, 1838) respecting De Sophist. Elenchis:-- - -"Aristote va donc s'occuper de la marche qu'il faut donner aux -discussions sophistiques: et ici il serait difficile quelquefois de -décider, à la manière dont les choses sont présentées par lui, si ce -sont des conseils qu'il donne aux Sophistes, ou à ceux qui veulent -éviter leurs ruses. Tout ce qui précède, prouve, au reste, que c'est -en ce dernier sens qu'il faut entendre la pensée du philosophe. Ceci -est d'ailleurs la seconde portion du traîté." - -It appears to me that Aristotle intended to teach or to suggest both -the two things which are here placed in Antithesis--though I do not -agree with M. St. Hilaire's way of putting the alternative--as if -there were one class of persons, professional Sophists, who fenced -with poisoned weapons, while every one except them refrained from such -weapons. Aristotle intends to teach the art of Dialectic as a whole; -he neither intends nor wishes that any learners shall make a bad use -of his teaching; but if they do use it badly, the fault does not lie -with him. See the observations in the beginning of the Rhetorica, i. -p. 1355, a. 26, and the observations put by Plato into the mouth of -Gorgias (Gorg. p. 456 E). - -Even in the Analytica Priora (ii. 19, a. 34) (independent of the -Topica) Aristotle says:--[Greek: chrê\ d' o(/per phula/ttesthai -paragge/llomen a)pokrinome/nous, au)tou\s e)picheirou=ntas -peira=sthtai lantha/nein]. Investigations of the double or triple -senses of words (he says) are useful--[Greek: kai\ pro\s to\ mê\ -paralogisthê=nai, kai\ pro\s to\ paralogi/sasthai], Topica, i. 18, p. -108, a. 26. See also other passages of the Topica where artifices are -indicated for the purpose of concealing your own plan of proceeding -and inducing your opponent to make answer in the sense which you wish, -Topica, i. 2, p. 101, a. 25; vi. 10, p. 148, a. 37; viii. 1, p. 151, -b. 23; viii. 1, p. 153, a. 6; viii. 2, p. 154, a. 5; viii. 11, p. 161, -a. 24 seq. You must be provided with the means of meeting every sort -and variety of objection--[Greek: pro\s ga\r to\n pa/ntôs -e)nista/menon pa/ntôs a)ntitakte/on e)sti/n]. Topic. v. 4, p. 134, a. -4. - -I shall again have to touch on the Topica, in this point of view, as -founded upon and illustrating the Megaric logical puzzles (ch. viii. -of the present volume).] - -[Side-note: Sophisms propounded by Eubulides. 1. Mentiens. 2. The -Veiled Man. 3. Sorites. 4. Cornutus.] - -The Sophisms ascribed to Eubulidês, looked at from the point of view -of logical theory, deserve that attention which they seem to have -received. The logician lays down as a rule that no affirmative -proposition can be at the same time true and false. Now the first -sophism (called _Mentiens_) exhibits the case of a proposition which -is, or appears to be, at the same time true and false.[49] It is for -the logician to explain how this proposition can be brought under his -rule--or else to admit it as an exception. Again, the second sophism -in the list (the Veiled or Hidden Man) is so contrived as to involve -the respondent in a contradiction: he is made to say both that he -knows his father, and that he does not know his father. Both the one -answer and the other follow naturally from the questions and -circumstances supposed. The contradiction points to the loose and -equivocal way in which the word _to know_ is used in common speech. -Such equivocal meaning of words is not only one of the frequent -sources of error and fallacy in reasoning, but also one of the least -heeded by persons untrained in dialectics; who are apt to presume that -the same word bears always the same meaning. To guard against this -cause of error, and to determine (or impel others to determine) the -accurate meaning or various distinct meanings of each word, is among -the duties of the logician: and I will add that the verb _to know_ -stands high in the list of words requiring such determination--as the -Platonic Theætêtus[50] alone would be sufficient to teach us. -Farthermore, when we examine what is called the Soritês of Eubulides, -we perceive that it brings to view an inherent indeterminateness of -various terms: indeterminateness which cannot be avoided, but which -must be pointed out in order that it may not mislead. You cannot say -how many grains are _much_--or how many grains make _a heap_. When -this want of precision, pervading many words in the language, was -first brought to notice in a suitable special case, it would naturally -appear a striking novelty. Lastly, the sophism called [Greek: -Kerati/nês] or Cornutus, is one of great plausibility, which would -probably impose upon most persons, if the question were asked for the -first time without any forewarning. It serves to administer a lesson, -nowise unprofitable or superfluous, that before you answer a question, -you should fully weigh its import and its collateral bearings. - -[Footnote 49: Theophrastus wrote a treatise in three books on the -solution of the puzzle called [Greek: O( pseudo/menos] (see the list -of his lost works in Diogenes L. v. 49). We find also other treatises -entitled [Greek: Megariko\s a/] (which Diogenes cites, vi. -22),--[Greek: A)gônistiko\n tê=s peri\ tou\s e)ristikou\s lo/gous -theôri/as--Sophisma/tôn a/, b]--besides several more titles relating to -dialectics, and bearing upon the solution of syllogistic problems. -Chrysippus also, in the ensuing century, wrote a treatise in three -books, [Greek: Peri\ tê=s tou= pseudome/non lu/seôs] (Diog. vii. 107). -Such facts show the importance of these problems in their bearing upon -logical theory, as conceived by the ancient world. Epikurus also wrote -against the [Greek: Megarikoi/] (Diog. x. 27). - -The discussion of sophisms, or logical difficulties ([Greek: lu/seis -a)pori/ôn]), was a favourite occupation at the banquets of -philosophers at Athens, on or about 100 B.C. [Greek: A)nti/patros d' -o( philo/sophos, sumpo/sio/n pote suna/gôn, sune/taxe toi=s -e)rchome/nois ô(s peri\ sophisma/tôn e(rou=sin] (Athenæus, v. 186 C). -Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, p. 1096 C; De -Sanitate Præcepta, c. 20, p. 133 B.] - -[Footnote 50: Various portions of the Theætêtus illustrate this -Megaric sophism (pp. 165-188). The situation assumed in the question -of Eubulidês--having before your eyes a person veiled--might form a -suitable addition to the various contingencies specified in Theætêt. -pp. 192-193. - -The manner in which the Platonic Sokrates proves (Theæt. 165) that you -at the same time see, and do not see, an object before you, is quite -as sophistical as the way in which Eubulidês proves that you both -know, and do not know, your father.] - -[Side-note: Causes of error constant--the Megarics were sentinals -against them.] - -The causes of error and fallacy are inherent in the complication of -nature, the imperfection of language, the small range of facts which -we know, the indefinite varieties of comparison possible among those -facts, and the diverse or opposite predispositions, intellectual as -well as emotional, of individual minds. They are not fabricated by -those who first draw attention to them.[51] The Megarics, far from -being themselves deceivers, served as sentinels against deceit. They -planted conspicuous beacons upon some of the sunken rocks whereon -unwary reasoners were likely to be wrecked. When the general type of a -fallacy is illustrated by a particular case in which the conclusion is -manifestly untrue, the like fallacy is rendered less operative for the -future. - -[Footnote 51: Cicero, in his Academ. Prior, ii. 92-94, has very just -remarks on the obscurities and difficulties in the reasoning process, -which the Megarics and others brought to view--and were blamed for so -doing, as unfair and captious reasoners--as if they had themselves -created the difficulties--"(Dialectica) primo progressu festivé tradit -elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intelligentiam concludendique -rationem; tum paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sané et -periculosum locum, quod tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi -genus. Quid ergo? _istius vitii num nostra culpa est_? Rerum natura -nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ullâ in re statuere possimus -quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nullâ -omnino in re minutatim interroganti--dives, pauper--clarus, obscurus, -sit--multa, pauca, magna, parva, longa, brevia, lata, angusta, quanto -aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus, non habemus. At vitiosi -sunt soritæ. Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. . . -Sic me (inquit) sustineo, neque diutius captiosé interroganti -respondes. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbis: si non -habes, ne tu quidem percipis." - -The principle of the Sorites ([Greek: ê( sôritikê\ a)pori/a]--Sextus -adv. Gramm. s. 68), though differently applied, is involved in the -argument of Zeno the Eleate, addressed to Protagoras--see Simplikius -ad Aristot. Physic. 250, p. 423, b. 42. Sch. Brand. Compare chap. ii. -of this volume.] - -[Side-note: Controversy of the Megarics with Aristotle about Power. -Arguments of Aristotle.] - -Of the positive doctrines of the Megarics we know little: but there is -one upon which Aristotle enters into controversy with them, and upon -which (as far as can be made out) I think they were in the right. In -the question about Power, they held that the power to do a thing did -not exist, except when the thing was actually done: that an architect, -for example, had no power to build a house, except when he actually -did build one. Aristotle controverts this opinion at some length; -contending that there exists a sort of power or cause which is in -itself irregular and indeterminate, sometimes turning to the -affirmative, sometimes to the negative, to do or not to do;[52] that -the architect _has_ the _power to build_ constantly, though he exerts -it only on occasion: and that many absurdities would follow if we did -not admit, That a given power or energy--and the exercise of that -power--are things distinct and separable.[53] - -[Footnote 52: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 19, a. 6-20. [Greek: o(/lôs -e)/stin e)n toi=s mê\ a)ei\ e)nergou=si to\ dunato\n ei)=nai kai\ mê\ -o(moi/ôs; e)n oi(=s a)mphô e)nde/chetai, kai\ to\ ei)=nai kai\ to\ mê\ -ei)=nai, ô(/ste kai\ to\ gene/sthai kai\ to\ mê\ gene/sthai.]] - -[Footnote 53: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 3, p. 1046, b. 29. [Greek: -Ei)si\ de/ tines, oi)/ phasin, oi(=on oi( Megarikoi/, o(/tan -e)nergê=|, mo/non du/nasthai, o(/tan de\ mê\ e)nergê=|, mê\ -du/nasthai--oi(=on to\n mê\ oi)kodomou=nta ou) du/nasthai oi)kodomei=n, -a)lla\ to\n oi)kodomou=nta o(/tan oi)kodomê=|; o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ e)pi\ -tô=n a)/llôn]. - -Deycks (De Megaricorum Doctrinâ, pp. 70-71) considers this opinion of -the Megarics to be derived from their general Eleatic theory of the -Ens Unum et Immotum. But I see no logical connection between the two.] - -[Side-note: These arguments not valid against the Megarici.] - -Now these arguments of Aristotle are by no means valid against the -Megarics, whose doctrine, though apparently paradoxical, will appear -when explained to be no paradox at all, but perfectly true. When we -say that the architect has power to build, we do not mean that he has -power to do so under all supposable circumstances, but only under -certain conditions: we wish to distinguish him from non-professional -men, who under those same conditions have no power to build. The -architect must be awake and sober: he must have the will or -disposition to build:[54] he must be provided with tools and -materials, and be secure against destroying enemies. These and other -conditions being generally understood, it is unnecessary to enunciate -them in common speech. But when we engage in dialectic analysis, the -accurate discussion ([Greek: a)kribologi/a]) indispensable to -philosophy requires us to bring under distinct notice, that which the -elliptical character of common speech implies without enunciating. -Unless these favourable conditions be supposed, the architect is no -more able to build than an ordinary non-professional man. Now the -Megarics did not deny the distinctive character of the architect, as -compared with the non-architect: but they defined more accurately in -what it consisted, by restoring the omitted conditions. They went a -step farther: they pointed out that whenever the architect finds -himself in concert with these accompanying conditions (his own -volition being one of the conditions) he goes to work--and the -building is produced. As the house is not built, unless he wills to -build, and has tools and materials, &c.--so conversely, whenever he -has the will to build and has tools and materials, &c., the house is -actually built. The effect is not produced, except when the full -assemblage of antecedent conditions come together: but as soon as they -do come together, the effect is assuredly produced. The -accomplishments of the architect, though an essential item, are yet -only one item among several, of the conditions necessary to building -the house. He has no power to build, except when those other -conditions are assumed along with him: in other words, he has no such -power except when he actually does build. - -[Footnote 54: About this condition implied in the predicate [Greek: -dunato/s], see Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 366 D.] - -[Side-note: His arguments cited and criticised.] - -Aristotle urges against the Megarics various arguments, as -follows:--1. Their doctrine implies that the architect is not an -architect, and does not possess his professional skill,[55] except at -the moment when he is actually building.--But the Megarics would have -denied that their doctrine did imply this. The architect possesses his -art at all times: but his art does not constitute a power of building -except under certain accompanying conditions. - -[Footnote 55: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 3, 1047, a. 3. [Greek: -o(/tan pau/sêtai (oi)kodomô=n) ou)ch e(/xei tê\n te/chnên.]] - -2. The Megaric doctrine is the same as that of Protagoras, implying -that there exists no perceivable Object, and no Subject capable of -perceiving, except at the moment when perception actually takes -place.[56] On this we may observe, that the Megarics coincide with -Protagoras thus far, that they bring into open daylight the relative -and conditional, which the received phraseology tends to hide. But -neither they nor he affirm what is here put upon them. When we speak -of a perceivable Object, we mean that which may and will be perceived, -_if_ there be a proper Subject to perceive it: when we affirm a -Subject capable of perception, we mean, one which will perceive, under -those circumstances which we call the presence of an Object suitably -placed. The Subject and Object are correlates: but it is convenient to -have a language in which one of them alone is introduced -unconditionally, while the conditional sign is applied to the -correlate: though the matter affirmed involves a condition common to -both. - -[Footnote 56: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 3, 1047, a. 8-13.] - -3. According to the Megaric doctrine (Aristotle argues) every man when -not actually seeing, is blind; every man when not actually speaking, -is dumb.--Here the Megarics would have said that this is a -misinterpretation of the terms dumb and blind; which denote a person -who cannot speak or see, even though he wishes it. One who is now -silent, though not dumb, may speak if he wills it: but his own -volition is an essential condition.[57] - -[Footnote 57: The question between Aristotle and the Megarics has not -passed out of debate with modern philosophers. - -Dr. Thomas Brown observes, in his inquiry into Cause and Effect--"From -the mere silence of any one, we cannot infer that he is dumb in -consequence of organic imperfection. He may be silent only because he -has no desire of speaking, not because speech would not have followed -his desire: and it is not with the mere _existence_ of any one, but -_with his desire of speaking_, that we suppose utterance to be -connected. A man who has _no desire of speaking, has in truth_, and in -strictness of language, _no power of speaking, when in that state of -mind_: since he has not a circumstance which, as immediately prior, is -essential to speech. But since he has that power, as soon as the new -circumstance of desire arises--and as the presence or absence of the -desire cannot be perceived but in its effects--_there is no -inconvenience in the common language_, which ascribes the power, _as -if it were possessed at all times, and in all circumstances of mind_, -though unquestionably, nothing more is meant than that the desire -existing will be followed by utterance." (Brown, Essay on the Relation -of Cause and Effect, p. 200.) - -This is the real sense of what Aristotle calls [Greek: to\ de\ -(le/getai) dunato/n, oi(=on dunato\n ei)=nai badi/zein o(/ti badiseien -a)\n], _i.e._ he will walk _if_ he desires to do so (De Interpret. p. -23, a. 9-15).] - -4. According to the Megaric doctrine (says Aristotle) when you are now -lying down, you have no power to rise: when you are standing up, you -have no power to lie down: so that the present condition of affairs -must continue for ever unchanged: nothing can come into existence -which is not now in being.--Here again, the Megarics would have denied -his inference. The man who is now standing up, has power to lie down, -_if he wills_ to do so--or he may be thrown down by a superior force: -that is, he will lie down, _if_ some new fact of a certain character -shall supervene. The Megarics do not deny that he has power, _if_--so -and so: they deny that he has power, without the _if_--that is, -without the farther accompaniments essential to energy. - -[Side-note: Potential as distinguished from the Actual--What it is.] - -On the whole, it seems to me that Aristotle's refutation of the -Megarics is unsuccessful. A given assemblage of conditions is -requisite for the production of any act: while there are other -circumstances, which, if present at the same time, would defeat its -production. We often find it convenient to describe a state of things -in which some of the antecedent conditions are present without the -rest: in which therefore the act is not produced, yet would be -produced, if the remaining circumstances were present, and if the -opposing circumstances were absent.[58] The state of things thus -described is the _potential_ as distinguished from the _actual_: -power, distinguished from act or energy: it represents an incomplete -assemblage of the antecedent positive conditions--or perhaps a -complete assemblage, but counteracted by some opposing circumstances. -As soon as the assemblage becomes complete, and the opposing -circumstances removed, the potential passes into the actual. The -architect, when he is not building, possesses, not indeed the full or -plenary power to build, but an important fraction of that power, which -will become plenary when the other fractions supervene, but will then -at the same time become operative, so as to produce the actual -building.[59] - -[Footnote 58: Hobbes, in his Computation or Logic (chaps. ix. and x. -Of Cause and Effect. Of Power and Act) expounds this subject with his -usual perspicuity. - -"A Cause simply, or an Entire Cause, is the aggregate of all the -accidents, both of the agents, how many soever they be, and of the -patient, put together; which, when they are all supposed to be -present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at -the same instant: and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot be -understood but that the effect is not produced" (ix. 3). - -"Correspondent to Cause and Effect are Power and Act: nay, those and -these are the same things, though for divers considerations they have -divers names. For whensoever any agent has all those accidents which -are necessarily requisite for the production of some effect in the -patient, then we say that agent has power to produce that effect if it -be applied to a patient. In like manner, whensoever any patient has -all those accidents which it is requisite it should have for the -production of some effect in it, we say it is in the power of that -patient to produce that effect if it be applied to a fitting agent. -Power, active and passive, are parts only of plenary and entire power: -nor, except they be joined, can any effect proceed from them. And -therefore these powers are but conditional: namely, the agent has -power if it be applied to a patient, and the patient has power if it -be applied to an agent. _Otherwise neither of them have power, nor can -the accidents which are in them severally be properly called powers_: -nor any action be said to be possible for the power of the agent alone -or the patient alone."] - -[Footnote 59: Aristotle does in fact grant all that is here said, in -the same book and in the page next subsequent to that which contains -his arguments against the Megaric doctrine, Metaphys. [Greek: Th]. 5, -1048, a. 1-24. - -In this chapter Aristotle distinguishes powers belonging to things, -from powers belonging to persons--powers irrational from powers -rational--powers in which the agent acts without any will or choice, -from those in which the will or choice of the agent is one item of the -aggregate of conditions. He here expressly recognises that the power -of the agent, separately considered, is only _conditional_; that is, -conditional on the presence and suitable state of the patient, as well -as upon the absence of counteracting circumstances. But he contends -that such absence of counteracting circumstances is plainly implied, -and need not be expressly mentioned in the definition. - -[Greek: e)pei\ de\ to\ dunato\n ti\ dunato\n kai\ pote\ kai\ pô=s kai\ -o(/sa a)/lla a)na/gkê prosei=nai e)n tô=| diorismô=|-- - -to\ dunato\n kata\ lo/gon a(/pan a)na/gkê, o(/tan o)re/gêtai, ou)= t' -e)/chei tê\n du/namin kai\ ô(s e)/chei, tou=to poiei=n; e)/chei de\ -paro/ntos tou= pathêtikou= kai\ ô(di\ e)/chontos poiei=n; _ei) de\ -mê/, poiei=n ou) dunê/setai_. to\ ga\r mêtheno\s tô=n e(/xô kôlu/ontos -prosdiori/zesthai, ou)the\n e)/ti dei=; tê\n ga\r du/namin e)/chei -ô(/s e)/sti du/namis tou= poiei=n, _e)/sti d' ou) pa/ntôs_, a)ll' -e)cho/ntôn pô=s, e)n oi(=s a)phoristhê/setai kai\ ta\ e(/xô kôlu/onta; -a)phairei=tai ga\r tau=ta tô=n e)n tô=| diorismô=| proso/ntôn e)/nia]. -The commentary of Alexander Aphr. upon this chapter is well worth -consulting (pp. 546-548 of the edition of his commentary by Bonitz, -1847). Moreover Aristotle affirms in this chapter, that when [Greek: -to\ poiêtiko\n] and [Greek: to\ pathêtiko\n] come together under -suitable circumstances, the power will certainly pass into act. - -Here then, it seems to me, Aristotle concedes the doctrine which the -Megarics affirmed; or, if there be any difference between them, it is -rather verbal than real. In fact, Aristotle's reasoning in the third -chapter (wherein he impugns the doctrine of the Megarics), and the -definition of [Greek: dunato\n] which he gives in that chapter (1047, -a. 25), are hardly to be reconciled with his reasoning in the fifth -chapter. Bonitz (Notes on the Metaphys. pp. 393-395) complains of the -_mira levitas_ of Aristotle in his reasoning against the Megarics, and -of his omitting to distinguish between _Vermögen_ and _Möglichkeit_. I -will not use so uncourteous a phrase; but I think his refutation of -the Megarics is both unsatisfactory and contradicted by himself. I -agree with the following remark of Bonitz:--"Nec mirum, quod Megarici, -aliis illi quidem in rebus arguti, in hâc autem satis acuti, -existentiam [Greek: tô=| duna/mei o)/nti] tribuere recusarint," &c.] - -[Side-note: Diodôrus Kronus--his doctrine about [Greek: to\ dunato/n].] - -The doctrine which I have just been canvassing is expressly cited by -Aristotle as a Megaric doctrine, and was therefore probably held by -his contemporary Eubulidês. From the pains which Aristotle takes (in -the 'De Interpretatione' and elsewhere) to explain and vindicate his -own doctrine about the Potential and the Actual, we may see that it -was a theme much debated among the dialecticians of the day. And we -read of another Megaric, Diodorus[60] Kronus, perhaps contemporary -(yet probably a little later than Aristotle), as advancing a position -substantially the same as that of Eubulidês. That alone is possible -(Diodorus affirmed) which either is happening now, or will happen at -some future time. As in speaking about facts of an unrecorded past, we -know well that a given fact either occurred or did not occur, yet -without knowing which of the two is true--and therefore we affirm only -that the fact _may_ have occurred: so also about the future, either -the assertion that a given fact will at some time occur, is positively -true, or the assertion that it will never occur, is positively true: -the assertion that it may or may not occur some time or other, -represents only our ignorance, which of the two is true. That which -will never at any time occur, is impossible. - -[Footnote 60: The dialectic ingenuity of Diodorus is powerfully -attested by the verse of Ariston, applied to describe Arkesilaus -(Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. p. 234): - -[Greek: Pro/sthe Pla/tôn, o)/pithen Pu/r)r(ôn, me/ssos Dio/dôros.]] - -[Side-note: Sophism of Diodorus--[Greek: O( Kurieu/ôn].] - -The argument here recited must have been older than Diodorus, since -Aristotle states and controverts it: but it seems to have been handled -by him in a peculiar dialectic arrangement, which obtained the title -of [Greek: O( Kurieu/ôn].[61] The Stoics (especially Chrysippus), in -times somewhat later, impugned the opinion of Diodorus, though -seemingly upon grounds not quite the same as Aristotle. This problem -was one upon which speculative minds occupied themselves for several -centuries. Aristotle and Chrysippus maintained that affirmations -respecting the past were _necessary_ (one necessarily true and the -other necessarily false)--affirmations respecting the future, -_contingent_ (one must be true and the other false, but either might -be true). Diodorus held that both varieties of affirmations were -equally necessary--Kleanthes the Stoic thought that both were equally -contingent.[62] - -[Footnote 61: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 18, a. pp. 27-38. Alexander ad -Aristot. Analyt. Prior. 34, p. 163, b. 34, Schol. Brandis. See also -Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 464.] - -[Footnote 62: Arrian ad Epiktet. ii. p. 19. Upton, in his notes on -this passage of Arrian (p. 151) has embodied a very valuable and -elaborate commentary by Mr. James Harris (the great English -Aristotelian scholar of the 18th century), explaining the nature of -this controversy, and the argument called [Greek: o( Kurieu/ôn]. - -Compare Cicero, De Fato, c. 7-9. Epistol. Fam. ix. 4.] - -It was thus that the Megaric dialecticians, with that fertility of -mind which belonged to the Platonic and Aristotelian century, stirred -up many real problems and difficulties connected with logical -evidence, and supplied matters for discussion which not only occupied -the speculative minds of the next four or five centuries, but have -continued in debate down to the present day. - -[Side-note: Question between Aristotle and Diodôrus depends upon -whether universal regularity of sequence be admitted or denied.] - -The question about the Possible and Impossible, raised between -Aristotle and Diodorus, depends upon the larger question, Whether -there are universal laws of Nature or not? whether the sequences are, -universally and throughout, composed of assemblages of conditions -regularly antecedent, and assemblages of events regularly consequent; -though from the number and complication of causes, partly co-operating -and partly conflicting with each other, we with our limited -intelligence are often unable to predict the course of events in each -particular situation. Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all maintained -that regular sequence of antecedent and consequent was not universal, -but partial only:[63] that there were some agencies essentially -regular, in which observation of the past afforded ground for -predicting the future--other agencies (or the same agencies on -different occasions) essentially irregular, in which the observation -of the past afforded no such ground. Aristotle admitted a graduation -of causes from perfect regularity to perfect irregularity:--1. The -Celestial Spheres, with their included bodies or divine persons, which -revolved and exercised a great and preponderant influence throughout -the Kosmos, with perfect uniformity; having no power of contraries, -_i.e._, having no power of doing anything else but what they actually -did (having [Greek: e)nergei/a] without [Greek: du/namis]). 2. The -four Elements, in which the natural agencies were to a great degree -necessary and uniform, but also in a certain degree otherwise--either -always or for the most part uniform ([Greek: to\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ -polu/])--tending by inherent appetency towards uniformity, but not -always attaining it. 3. Besides these there were two other varieties -of Causes accidental, or perfectly irregular--Chance and Spontaneity: -powers of contraries, or with equal chance of contrary -manifestations--essentially capricious, undeterminable, unpredictable.[64] -This _Chance_ of Aristotle--with one of two contraries sure to turn up, -though you could never tell beforehand which of the two--was a -conception analogous to what logicians sometimes call an Indefinite -Proposition, or to what some grammarians have reckoned as a special -variety of genders called the _doubtful gender_. There were thus -positive causes of regularity, and positive causes of irregularity, -the co-operation or conflict of which gave the total manifestations of -the actual universe. The principle of irregularity, or the -Indeterminate, is sometimes described under the name of Matter,[65] as -distinguishable from, yet co-operating with, the three determinate -Causes--Formal, Efficient, Final. The Potential--the Indeterminate--the -_May or May not be_--is characterised by Aristotle as one of the inherent -principles operative in the Kosmos. - -[Footnote 63: Xenophon, Memor. i. 1; Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A. [Greek: -ê( planôme/nê ai)ti/a], &c.] - -[Footnote 64: [Greek: Ê( tu/chê--to\ o(po/ter' e)/tuche--to\ -au)to/maton] are in the conception of Aristotle independent [Greek: -A)rchai/], attached to and blending with [Greek: a)na/gkê] and [Greek: -to\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/]. See Physic. ii. 196, b. 11; Metaphys. E. -1026-1027. - -Sometimes [Greek: to\ o(po/ter' e)/tuche] is spoken of as an [Greek: -A)rchê/], but not as an [Greek: ai)/tion], or belonging to [Greek: -u(/lê] as the [Greek: A)rchê/]. 1027, b. 11. [Greek: dê=lon a)/ra -o(/ti me/chri tino\s badi/zei a)rchê=s, au)/tê d' ou)/keti ei)s -a)/llo; e)/stai ou)=n ê( tou= o(po/ter' e)/tuchen au)/tê, kai\ -ai)/tioi tê=s gene/seôs au)tê=s ou)the/n]. - -See, respecting the different notions of Cause held by ancient -philosophers, my remarks on the Platonic Phædon infrà, vol. iii.** ch. -xxv.] - -[Footnote 65: Aristot. Metaph. E. 1027, a. 13; A. 1071, a. 10. - -[Greek: ô(/ste ê( u(/lê e)/stai ai)ti/a, ê( e)ndechome/n ê para\ to\ -ô(s e)pi\ to polu\ a)/llôs tou= sumbebêko/tos]. - -Matter is represented as the principle of irregularity, of [Greek: to\ -o(po/ter' e)/tuche]--as the [Greek: du/namis tô=n e)nanti/ôn]. - -In the explanation given by Alexander of Aphrodisias of the -Peripatetic doctrine respecting chance--free-will, the principle of -irregularity--[Greek: tu/chê] is no longer assigned to the material -cause, but is treated as an [Greek: ai)ti/a kata\ sumbebêko/s], -distinguished from [Greek: ai)ti/a proêgou/mena] or [Greek: kath' -au(ta/]. The exposition given of the doctrine by Alexander is valuable -and interesting. See his treatise De Fato, addressed to the Emperor -Severus, in the edition of Orelli, Zurich. 1824 (a very useful volume, -containing treatises of Ammonius, Plotinus, Bardesanes, &c., on the -same subject); also several sections of his Quæstiones Naturales et -Morales, ed. Spengel, Munich, 1842, pp. 22-61-65-123, &c. He gives, -however, a different explanation of [Greek: to\ dunato\n] and [Greek: -to\ a)du/naton] in pp. 62-63, which would not be at variance with the -doctrine of Diodorus. We may remark that Alexander puts the antithesis -of the two doctrines differently from Aristotle,--in this way. 1. -Either all events happen [Greek: kath' ei(marme/nên]. 2. Or all events -do not happen [Greek: kath' ei(marme/nên], but some events are [Greek: -e)ph' ê(mi=n]. See De Fato, p. 14 seq. This way of putting the -question is directed more against the Stoics, who were the great -advocates of [Greek: ei(marme/nê], than against the Megaric Diodorus. -The treatises of Chrysippus and the other Stoics alter both the -wording and the putting of the thesis. We know that Chrysippus -impugned the doctrine of Diodorus, but I do not see how. - -The Stoic antithesis of [Greek: ta kath' ei(marme/nên--ta\ e)ph' -ê(mi=n] is different from the antithesis conceived by Aristotle and -does not touch the question about the universality of regular -sequence. [Greek: Ta\ e)ph' ê(mi=n] describes those sequences in which -human volition forms one among the appreciable conditions determining -or modifying the result; [Greek: ta\ kath' ei(marme/nên] includes all -the other sequences wherein human volition has no appreciable -influence. But the sequence [Greek: tô=n e)ph' ê(mi=n] is just as -regular as the sequence [Greek: tô=n kath' ei(marme/nên]: both the one -and the other are often imperfectly predictable, because our knowledge -of facts and power of comparison is so imperfect. - -Theophrastus discussed [Greek: to\ kath' ei(marme/nên], and explained -it to mean the same as [Greek: to\ kata\ phu/sin. phanerô/tata de\ -Theo/phrastos dei/knusi tau)to\n o(\n to\ kath' ei(marme/nên tô=| -kata\ phu/sin] (Alexander Aphrodisias ad Aristot. De Animâ, ii.).] - -[Side-note: Conclusion of Diodôrus--defended by Hobbes--Explanation -given by Hobbes.] - -In what manner Diodorus stated and defended his opinion upon this -point, we have no information. We know only that he placed -affirmations respecting the future on the same footing as affirmations -respecting the past: maintaining that our potential affirmation--_May -or May not be_--respecting some future event, meant no more than it -means respecting some past event, viz.: no inherent indeterminateness -in the future sequence, but our ignorance of the determining -conditions, and our inability to calculate their combined working.[66] -In regard to scientific method generally, this problem is of the -highest importance: for it is only so far as uniformity of sequence -prevails, that facts become fit matter for scientific study.[67] -Consistently with the doctrine of all-pervading uniformity of -sequence, the definition of Hobbes gives the only complete account of -the Impossible and Possible: _i.e._ an account such as would appear to -an omniscient calculator, where _May or May not_ merge in _Will or -Will not_. According as each person falls short of or approaches this -ideal standard--according to his knowledge and mental resource, -inductive and deductive--will be his appreciation of what may be or -may not be--as of what may have been or may not have been during the -past. But such appreciation, being relative to each individual mind, -is liable to vary indefinitely, and does not admit of being embodied -in one general definition. - -[Footnote 66: The same doctrine as that of the Megaric Diodorus is -declared by Hobbes in clear and explicit language (First Grounds of -Philosophy, ii. 10, 4-5):--"That is an impossible act, for the -production of which there is no power plenary. For seeing plenary -power is that in which all things concur which are requisite for the -production of an act,** if the power shall never be plenary, there will -always be wanting some of those things, without which the act cannot -be produced. Wherefore that act shall never be produced: that is, that -act is _impossible_. And every act, which is not impossible, is -_possible_. Every act therefore which is possible, shall at some time -or other be produced. For if it shall never be produced, then those -things shall never concur which are requisite for the production of -it; wherefore the act is _impossible_, by the definition; which is -contrary to what was supposed. - -"A _necessary act_ is that, the production of which it is impossible -to hinder: and therefore every act that shall be produced, shall -necessarily be produced; for that it shall not be produced is -impossible, because, as has already been demonstrated, every possible -act shall at some time be produced. Nay, this proposition--_What shall -be shall be_--is as necessary a proposition as this--_A man is a man_. - -"But here, perhaps, some man will ask whether those future things -which are commonly called _contingents_, are necessary. I say, then, -that generally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are -called _contingents_, in respect of other events on which they do not -depend--as the rain which shall be to-morrow shall be necessary, that -is, from necessary causes; but we think and say, it happens by chance, -because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though they exist -now. For men commonly call that _casual_ or _contingent_, whereof they -do not perceive the necessary cause: _and in the same manner they use -to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a thing be done or -not, they say, It is possible it never was done._ - -"Wherefore all propositions concerning future things, contingent or -not contingent, as this--It will rain to-morrow, or To-morrow the sun -will rise--are either necessarily true or necessarily false: but we -call them contingent, because we do not yet know whether they be true -or false; whereas their verity depends not upon our knowledge, but -upon the foregoing of their causes. But there are some, who, though -they will confess this whole proposition--_ To-morrow it will either -rain or not rain_--to be true, yet they will not acknowledge the parts -of it, as, _To-morrow it will rain_, or _To-morrow it will not rain_, -to be either of them true by itself; because (they say) neither this -nor that is true _determinately_. But what is this _true -determinately_, but true _upon our knowledge_ or _evidently true_? And -therefore they say no more but that it is not yet known whether it be -true or not; but they say it more obscurely, and darken the evidence -of the truth with the same words by which they endeavour to hide their -own ignorance."] - -[Footnote 67: The reader will find this problem admirably handled in -Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Book iii. ch. 21, and Book vi. -chs. 2 and 8; also in the volume of Professor Bain on the Emotions and -the Will, Chapter on Belief.] - -Besides the above doctrine respecting Possible and Impossible, there -is also ascribed to Diodorus a doctrine respecting Hypothetical -Propositions, which, as far as I comprehend it, appears to have been a -correct one.[68] He is also said to have reasoned against the reality -of motion, renewing the arguments of Zeno the Eleate. - -[Footnote 68: Sextus Emp. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. ii. pp. 110-115. [Greek: -a)lêthe\s sunêmme/non]. Adv. Mathemat. viii. 112. Philo maintained -that an hypothetical proposition was true, if both the antecedent and -consequent were true--"If it be day, I am conversing". Diodorus denied -that this proposition, as an Hypothetical proposition, was true: since -the consequent might be false, though the antecedent were true. An -Hypothetical proposition was true only when, assuming the antecedent -to be true, the consequent must be true also.] - -[Side-note: Reasonings of Diodôrus--respecting Hypothetical -Propositions--respecting Motion. His difficulties about the _Now_ of -time.] - -But if he reproduced the arguments of Zeno, he also employed another, -peculiar to himself. He admitted the reality of _past_ motion: but he -denied the reality of _present_ motion. You may affirm truly (he said) -that a thing _has been moved_: but you cannot truly affirm that any -thing _is being moved_. Since it was _here_ before, and is _there_ -now, you may be sure that it has been moved: but actual present motion -you cannot perceive or prove. Affirmation in the perfect tense may be -true, when affirmation in the present tense neither is nor ever was -true: thus it is true to say--Helen _had_ three husbands (Menelaus, -Paris, Deiphobus): but it was never true to say--Helen _has_ three -husbands, since they became her husbands in succession.[69] Diodorus -supported this paradox by some ingenious arguments, and the opinion -which he denied seems to have presented itself to him as involving the -position of indivisible minima--atoms of body, points of space, -instants of time. He admitted such minima of atoms, but not of space -or time: and without such admission he could not make intelligible to -himself the fact of present or actual motion. He could find no present -_Now_ or Minimum of Time; without which neither could any present -motion be found. Plato in the Parmenidês[70] professes to have found -this inexplicable moment of transition, but he describes it in terms -not likely to satisfy a dialectical mind: and Aristotle denying that -the Now is any portion or constituent part of time, considers it only -as a boundary of the past and future.[71] - -[Footnote 69: Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. x. pp. 85-101.] - -[Footnote 70: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 156 D-E. [Greek: Po/t' ou)=n, -metaba/llei? ou)/te ga\r e(sto\s a)\n ou)/te kenou/menon meta/balloi, -ou)/te e)n chro/nô| o)/n]. (Here Plato adverts to the difficulties -attending the supposition of actual [Greek: metabolê/], as Diodorus to -those of actual [Greek: ki/nêsis]. Next we have Plato's hypothesis for -getting over the difficulties.) [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n e)sti/ to\ -a)/topon tou=to, e)n ô)=| to/t' a)\n ei)/ê o(/te metaba/llei? To\ -poi=on dê/? _To\ e)xai/phnês; ê( e)xai/phnês au)/tê phu/sis a)/topos_ -tis e)gka/thêtai metaxu\ tê=s kinê/seôs te kai\ sta/seôs, e)n chro/nô| -ou)deni\ ou)=sa, kai\ ei)s tau/tên dê\ kai\ e)k tau/tês to/ te -kinou/menon metaba/llei e)pi\ to\ e)sta/nai kai\ to\ e)sto\s e)pi\ to\ -kinei=sthai]. - -Diodorus could not make out this [Greek: phu/sis a)/topos] which Plato -calls [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnês].] - -[Footnote 71: To illustrate this apparent paradox of Diodorus, -affirming past motion, but denying present motion, we may compare what -is said by Aristotle about the Now or Point of Present Time--that it -is not a part, but a boundary between Past and Future. - -Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 218, a. 4-10. [Greek: tou= de\ chro/non ta\ -me\n ge/gone, ta\ de\ me/llei, e)sti d' ou)de\n, o)/ntos meristou=; -to\ de\ nu=n ou) me/ros--to\ de\ nu=n pe/ras e)/sti] (a. 24)--p. 222, -a. 10-20-223, a. 20. [Greek: o( de\ chro/nos kai\ ê( ki/nêsis a(/ma -kata/ te du/namin kai\ kat' e)nergei/an]. - -Which doctrine is thus rendered by Harris in his Hermes, ch. vii. pp. -101-103-105:--"Both Points and Nows being taken as Bounds, and not as -Parts, it will follow that in the same manner as the same point may be -the end of one line and the beginning of another--so the same Now may -be the End of one time, and the beginning of another. . . I say of -these two times, that with respect to the _Now_, or Instant which they -include, the first of them is necessarily Past time, as being previous -to it: the other is necessarily Future, as being subsequent. . . From -the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be -called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the -first place, there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as -Time Present. For if all Time be transient, as well as continuous, it -cannot like a line be present altogether, but part will necessarily be -gone and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity -were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, -and be Time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus -present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such continuity is -essential?"--Compare Sir William Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy, -p. 581.] - -[Side-note: Motion is always present, past, and future.] - -This opinion of Aristotle is in the main consonant with that of -Diodorus; who, when he denied the reality of present motion, meant -probably only to deny the reality of _present motion apart from past -and future motion_. Herein also we find him agreeing with Hobbes, who -denies the same in clearer language.[72] Sextus Empiricus declares -Diodorus to have been inconsistent in admitting past motion while he -denied present motion.[73] But this seems not more inconsistent than -the doctrine of Aristotle respecting the _Now_ of time. I know, when I -compare a child or a young tree with what they respectively were a -year ago, that they have grown: but whether they actually are growing, -at every moment of the intervening time, is not ascertainable by -sense, and is a matter of probable inference only.[74] Diodorus could -not understand present motion, except in conjunction with past and -future motion, as being the common limit of the two: but he could -understand past motion, without reference to present or future. He -could not state to himself a satisfactory theory respecting the -beginning of motion: as we may see by his reasonings distinguishing -the motion of a body all at once in its integrity, from the motion of -a body considered as proceeding from the separate motion of its -constituent atoms--the moving atoms preponderating over the atoms at -rest, and determining them to motion,[75] until gradually the whole -body came to move. The same argument re-appears in another example, -when he argues--The wall does not fall while its component stones hold -together, for then it is still standing: nor yet when they have come -apart, for then it _has_ fallen.[76] - -[Footnote 72: Hobbes, First Grounds of Philosophy, ii. 8, 11. "That is -said to be at rest which, during any time, is in one place; and that -to be moved, or to have been moved, which whether it be now at rest or -moved, was formerly in another place from that which it is now in. -From which definition it may be inferred, first, that whatsoever is -moved _has been_ moved: for if it still be in the same place in which -it was formerly, it is at rest: but if it be in another place, it _has -been_ moved, by the definition of moved. Secondly, that what _is_ -moved, _will yet_ be moved: for that which is moved, leaveth the place -where it is, and consequently will be moved still. Thirdly, that -whatsoever is moved, is not in one place during any time, how little -soever that may be: for by the definition of rest, that which is in -one place during any time, is at rest. . . . From what is above -demonstrated--namely, that whatsoever _is_ moved, _has also been_ -moved, and _will be_ moved: this also may be collected, That there can -be no conception of motion without conceiving past and future time."] - -[Footnote 73: Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 91-97-112-116.] - -[Footnote 74: See this point touched by Plato in Philêbus, p. 43 B.] - -[Footnote 75: Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. 113. [Greek: ki/nêsis kat' -ei)likri/neian . . . ki/nêsis kat' e)pikra/teian]. Compare Zeller, Die -Philosophie der Griech. ii. p. 191, ed. 2nd.] - -[Footnote 76: Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 346-348.] - -[Side-note: Stilpon of Megara--His great celebrity.] - -That Diodorus was a person seriously anxious to solve logical -difficulties, as well as to propose them, would be incontestably -proved if we could believe the story recounted of him--that he hanged -himself because he could not solve a problem proposed by Stilpon in -the presence of Ptolemy Soter.[77] But this story probably grew out of -the fact, that Stilpon succeeded Diodorus at Megara, and eclipsed him -in reputation. The celebrity of Stilpon, both at Megara and at Athens -(between 320-300 B.C., but his exact date can hardly be settled), was -equal, if not superior, to that of any contemporary philosopher. He -was visited by listeners from all parts of Greece, and he drew away -pupils from the most renowned teachers of the day; from Theophrastus -as well as the others.[78] He was no less remarkable for fertility of -invention than for neatness of expression. Two persons, who came for -the purpose of refuting him, are said to have remained with him as -admirers and scholars. All Greece seemed as it were looking towards -him, and inclining towards the Megaric doctrines.[79] He was much -esteemed both by Ptolemy Soter and by Demetrius Poliorkêtes, though he -refused the presents and invitations of both: and there is reason to -believe that his reputation in his own day must have equalled that of -either Plato or Aristotle in theirs. He was formidable in disputation; -but the nine dialogues which he composed and published are -characterised by Diogenes as cold.[80] - -[Footnote 77: Diog. L. ii. 112.] - -[Footnote 78: This is asserted by Diogenes upon the authority of -[Greek: Phi/lippos o( Megriko/s], whom he cites [Greek: kata\ le/xin]. -We do not know anything about Philippus. - -Menedêmus, who spoke with contempt of the other philosophers, even of -Plato and Xenokrates, admired Stilpon (Diog. L. ii. 134).] - -[Footnote 79: The phrase of Diogenes is here singular, and must -probably have been borrowed from a partisan--[Greek: ô(/ste mikrou= -deê=sai pa=san tê\n E(lla/da a)phorô=san ei)s au)to\n megari/sai]. -Stilpon [Greek: eu(resilogi/a| kai\ sophistei/a| proê=ge tou\s -a)/llous--kompso/tatos] (Diog. L. ii. 113-115).] - -[Footnote 80: Diog. L. ii. 119-120. [Greek: psuchroi/].] - -[Side-note: Menedêmus and the Eretriacs.] - -Contemporary with Stilpon (or perhaps somewhat later) was Menedêmus of -Eretria, whose philosophic parentage is traced to Phædon. The name of -Phædon has been immortalised, not by his own works, but by the -splendid dialogue of which Plato has made him the reciter. He is said -(though I doubt the fact) to have been a native of Elis. He was of -good parentage, a youthful companion of Sokrates in the last years of -his life.[81] After the death of Sokrates, Phædon went to Elis, -composed some dialogues, and established a succession or sect of -philosophers--Pleistanus, Anchipylus, Moschus. Of this sect -Menedêmus,[82] contemporary and hearer of Stilpon, became the most -eminent representative, and from him it was denominated Eretriac -instead of Eleian. The Eretriacs, as well as the Megarics, took up the -negative arm of philosophy, and were eminent as puzzlers and -controversialists. - -[Footnote 81: The story given by Diogenes L. (ii. 31 and 106; compare -Aulus Gellius, ii. 18) about Phædon's adventures antecedent to his -friendship with Sokrates, is unintelligible to me. "Phædon was made -captive along with his country (Elis), sold at Athens, and employed in -a degrading capacity; until Sokrates induced Alkibiades or Kriton to -pay his ransom." Now, no such event as the capture of Elis, and the -sale of its Eupatrids as slaves, happened at that time: the war -between Sparta and Elis (described by Xenophon, Hell. iii. 2, 21 seq.) -led to no such result, and was finished, moreover, after the death of -Sokrates. Alkibiades had been long in exile. If, in the text of -Diogenes, where we now read [Greek: Phai/dôn, _Ê(/leios_, tô=n -eu)patridô=n]--we were allowed to substitute [Greek: Phai/dôn, -_Mê/lios_, tô=n eu)patridô=n]--the narrative would be rendered -consistent with known historical facts. The Athenians captured the -island of Melos in 415 B.C., put to death the Melians of military age, -and sold into slavery the younger males as well as the females -(Thucyd. v. 116). If Phædon had been a Melian youth of good family, he -would have been sold at Athens, and might have undergone the -adventures narrated by Diogenes. We know that Alkibiades purchased a -female Melian as slave (Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad.).] - -[Footnote 82: Diog. L. ii. 105, 126 seq. There was a statue of -Menedêmus in the ancient stadium of Eretria: Diogenes speaks as if it -existed in his time, and as if he himself had seen it (ii. 132).] - -[Side-note: Open speech and licence of censure assumed by Menedêmus.] - -But though this was the common character of the two, in a logical -point of view, yet in Stilpon, as well as Menedêmus, other elements -became blended with the logical. These persons combined, in part at -least, the free censorial speech of Antisthenes with the subtlety of -Eukleides. What we hear of Menedêmus is chiefly his bitter, stinging -sarcasms, and clever repartees. He did not, like the Cynic Diogenes, -live in contented poverty, but occupied a prominent place (seemingly -under the patronage of Antigonus and Demetrius) in the government of -his native city Eretria. Nevertheless he is hardly less celebrated -than Diogenes for open speaking of his mind, and carelessness of -giving offence to others.[83] - -[Footnote 83: Diog. L. ii. 129-142.] - - * * * * * - -ANTISTHENES. - - -[Side-note: Antisthenes took up Ethics principally, but with negative -Logic intermingled.] - -Antisthenes, the originator of the Cynic succession of philosophers, -was one of those who took up principally the ethical element of the -Sokratic discoursing, which the Megarics left out or passed lightly -over. He did not indeed altogether leave out the logical element: all -his doctrines respecting it, as far as we hear of them, appear to have -been on the negative side. But respecting ethics, he laid down -affirmative propositions,[84] and delivered peremptory precepts. His -aversion to pleasure, by which he chiefly meant sexual pleasure, was -declared in the most emphatic language. He had therefore, in the -negative logic, a point of community with Eukleides and the Megarics: -so that the coalescence of the two successions, in Stilpon and -Menedêmus, is a fact not difficult to explain. - -[Footnote 84: Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. 20, p. 485, Potter. -[Greek: e)gô\ d' a)pode/chomai to\n A)phrodi/tên le/gonta ka)\|n -katatoxeu/saimi, ei) la/boimi], &c. - -[Greek: Manei/ên ma=llon ê)\ ê)sthei/ên], Diog. L. vi. 3.] - -The life of Sokrates being passed in conversing with a great variety -of persons and characters, his discourses were of course multifarious, -and his ethical influence operated in different ways. His mode of -life, too, exercised a certain influence of its own. - -[Side-note: He copied the manner of life of Sokrates, in plainness and -rigour.] - -Antisthenes, and his disciple Diogenes, were in many respects closer -approximations to Sokrates than either Plato or any other of the -Sokratic companions. The extraordinary colloquial and cross-examining -force was indeed a peculiar gift, which Sokrates bequeathed to none of -them: but Antisthenes took up the Sokratic purpose of inculcating -practical ethics not merely by word of mouth, but also by manner of -life. He was not inferior to his master in contentment under poverty, -in strength of will and endurance,[85] in acquired insensibility both -to pain and pleasure, in disregard of opinion around him, and in -fearless exercise of a self-imposed censorial mission. He learnt from -Sokrates indifference to conventional restraints and social -superiority, together with the duty of reducing wants to a minimum, -and stifling all such as were above the lowest term of necessity. To -this last point, Sokrates gave a religious colour, proclaiming that -the Gods had no wants, and that those who had least came nearest to -the Gods.[86] By Antisthenes, these qualities were exhibited in -eminent measure; and by his disciple Diogenes they were still farther -exaggerated. Epiktetus, a warm admirer of both, considers them as -following up the mission from Zeus which Sokrates (in the Platonic -Apology) sets forth as his authority, to make men independent of the -evils of life by purifying and disciplining the appreciation of good -and evil in the mind of each individual.[87] - -[Footnote 85: Cicero, de Orator. iii. 17, 62; Diog. L. vi. 2. [Greek: -par' ou)=] (Sokrates) [Greek: kai\ to\ karteriko\n labô\n kai\ to\ -a)pathe\s zêlô/sas katê=rxe prô=tos tou= kunismou=]: also vi. 15. The -appellation of Cynics is said to have arisen from the practice of -Antisthenes to frequent the gymnasium called [Greek: Kuno/sarges] (D. -L. vi. 13), though other causes are also assigned for the denomination -(Winckelmann, Antisth. Frag. pp. 8-10).] - -[Footnote 86: Sokrates had said, [Greek: to\ mêdeno\s de/esthai, -thei=on ei)=nai; to\ d' ô(s e)lachi/stôn, e)gguta/tô tou= thei/ou] -(Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 10. Compare Apuleius, Apol. p. 25). Plato, -Gorgias, p. 492 E. The same dictum is ascribed to Diogenes (Diog. L. -vi. 105).] - -[Footnote 87: Epiktetus, Dissert. iii. 1, 19-22, iii. 21-19, iii. -24-40-60-69. The whole of the twenty-second Dissertation, [Greek: Peri\ -Kunismou=], is remarkable. He couples Sokrates with Diogenes more -closely than with any one else.] - -[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes exclusively ethical and ascetic. -He despised music, literature, and physics.] - -Antisthenes declared virtue to be the End for men to aim at--and to be -sufficient _per se_ for conferring happiness; but he also declared -that virtue must be manifested in acts and character, not by words. -Neither much discourse nor much learning was required for virtue; -nothing else need be postulated except bodily strength like that of -Sokrates.[88] He undervalued theory even in regard to Ethics: much -more in regard to Nature (Physics) and to Logic: he also despised -literary, geometrical, musical teaching, as distracting men's -attention from the regulation of their own appreciative sentiment, and -the adaptation of their own conduct to it. He maintained strenuously -(what several Platonic dialogues call in question) that virtue both -could be taught and must be taught: when once learnt, it was -permanent, and could not be eradicated. He prescribed the simplest -mode of life, the reduction of wants to a minimum, with perfect -indifference to enjoyment, wealth, or power. The reward was, exemption -from fear, anxiety, disappointments, and wants: together with the -pride of approximation to the Gods.[89] Though Antisthenes thus -despised both literature and theory, yet he had obtained a rhetorical -education, and had even heard the rhetor Gorgias. He composed a large -number of dialogues and other treatises, of which only the titles -(very multifarious) are preserved to us.[90] One dialogue, entitled -Sathon, was a coarse attack on Plato: several treated of Homer and of -other poets, whose verses he seems to have allegorised. Some of his -dialogues are also declared by Athenæus to contain slanderous abuse of -Alkibiades and other leading Athenians. On the other hand, the -dialogues are much commended by competent judges; and Theopompus even -affirmed that much in the Platonic dialogues had been borrowed from -those of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson.[91] - -[Footnote 88: Diog. L. vi. 11.] - -[Footnote 89: Diog. L. vi. 102-104.] - -[Footnote 90: Diog. L. vi. 1, 15-18. The two remaining -fragments--[Greek: Ai)/as, O)/dusseu\s] (Winckelmann, Antisth. Fragm. -pp. 38-42)--cannot well be genuine, though Winckelmann seems to think -them so.] - -[Footnote 91: Athenæus, v. 220, xi. 508; Diog. L. iii. 24-35; -Phrynichus ap. Photium, cod. 158; Epiktêtus, ii. 16-35. Antisthenes is -placed in the same line with Kritias and Xenophon, as a Sokratic -writer, by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Thucyd. Jud. p. 941. That -there was standing reciprocal hostility between Antisthenes and Plato -we can easily believe. Plato never names Antisthenes: and if the -latter attacked Plato, it was under the name of Sathon. How far Plato -in his dialogues intends to attack Antisthenes without naming him--is -difficult to determine. Probably he does intend to designate -Antisthenes as [Greek: ge/rôn o)psimathê/s], in Sophist. 251. -Schleiermacher and other commentators think that he intends to attack -Antisthenes in Philêbus, Theætêtus, Euthydêmus, &c. But this seems to -me not certain. In Philêbus, p. 44, he can hardly include Antisthenes -among the [Greek: ma/la deinoi\ peri\ phu/sin]. Antisthenes neglected -the study of [Greek: phu/sis].] - -[Side-note: Constant friendship of Antisthenes with -Sokrates--Xenophontic Symposion.] - -Antisthenes was among the most constant friends and followers of -Sokrates, both in his serious and in his playful colloquies.[92] The -Symposion of Xenophon describes both of them, in their hours of -joviality. The picture drawn by an author, himself a friend and -companion, exhibits Antisthenes (so far as we can interpret caricature -and jocular inversion) as poor, self-denying, austere, repulsive, and -disputatious--yet bold and free-spoken, careless of giving offence, -and forcible in colloquial repartee.[93] - -[Footnote 92: Xenophon, Memor. iii. 11, 17.] - -[Footnote 93: Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 11, 17; Symposion, ii. 10, iv. -2-3-44. Plutarch (Quæst. Symp. ii. 1, 6, p. 632) and Diogenes Laertius -(vi. 1, 15) appear to understand the description of Xenophon as -ascribing to Antisthenes a winning and conciliatory manner. To me it -conveys the opposite impression. We must recollect that the pleasantry -of the Xenophontic Symposion (not very successful as pleasantry) is -founded on the assumption, by each person, of qualities and -pretensions the direct reverse of that which he has in reality--and on -his professing to be proud of that which is a notorious disadvantage. -Thus Sokrates pretends to possess great personal beauty, and even puts -himself in competition with the handsome youth Kritobulus; he also -prides himself on the accomplishments of a good [Greek: mastropo/s]. -Antisthenes, quite indigent, boasts of his wealth; the neglected -Hermogenes boasts of being powerfully friended. The passage, iv. 57, -61, which talks of the winning manners of Antisthenes, and his power -of imparting popular accomplishments, is to be understood in this -ironical and inverted sense.] - -[Side-note: Diogenes, successor of Antisthenes--His Cynical -perfection--striking effect which he produced.] - -In all these qualities, however, Antisthenes was surpassed by his -pupil and successor Diogenes of Sinôpê; whose ostentatious austerity -of life, eccentric and fearless character, indifference to what was -considered as decency, great acuteness and still greater power of -expression, freedom of speech towards all and against all--constituted -him the perfect type of the Cynical sect. Being the son of a -money-agent at Sinôpê, he was banished with his father for fraudulently -counterfeiting the coin of the city. On coming to Athens as an exile, -he was captivated with the character of Antisthenes, who was at first -unwilling to admit him, and was only induced to do so by his -invincible importunity. Diogenes welcomed his banishment, with all its -poverty and destitution, as having been the means of bringing him to -Antisthenes,[94] and to a life of philosophy. It was Antisthenes (he -said) who emancipated him from slavery, and made him a freeman. He was -clothed in one coarse garment with double fold: he adopted the wallet -(afterwards the symbol of cynicism) for his provisions, and is said to -have been without any roof or lodging--dwelling sometimes in a tub -near the Metroon, sometimes in one of the public porticoes or temples: -he is also said to have satisfied all his wants in the open day. He -here indulged unreservedly in that unbounded freedom of speech, which -he looked upon as the greatest blessing of life. No man ever turned -that blessing to greater account: the string of repartees, sarcasms, -and stinging reproofs, which are attributed to him by Diogenes -Laertius, is very long, but forms only a small proportion of those -which that author had found recounted.[95] Plato described Diogenes as -Sokrates running mad:[96] and when Diogenes, meeting some Sicilian -guests at his house and treading upon his best carpet, exclaimed "I am -treading on Plato's empty vanity and conceit," Plato rejoined "Yes, -with a different vanity of your own ". The impression produced by -Diogenes in conversation with others, was very powerfully felt both by -young and old. Phokion, as well as Stilpon, were among his -hearers.[97] In crossing the sea to Ægina, Diogenes was captured by -pirates, taken to Krete, and there put up to auction as a slave: the -herald asked him what sort of work he was fit for: whereupon Diogenes -replied--To command men. At his own instance, a rich Corinthian named -Xeniades bought him and transported him to Corinth. Diogenes is said -to have assumed towards Xeniades the air of a master: Xeniades placed -him at the head of his household, and made him preceptor of his sons. -In both capacities Diogenes discharged his duty well.[98] As a slave -well treated by his master, and allowed to enjoy great freedom of -speech, he lived in greater comfort than he had ever enjoyed as a -freeman: and we are not surprised that he declined the offers of -friends to purchase his liberation. He died at Corinth in very old -age: it is said, at ninety years old, and on the very same day on -which Alexander the Great died at Babylon (B.C. 323). He was buried at -the gate of Corinth leading to the Isthmus: a monument being erected -to his honour, with a column of Parian marble crowned by the statue of -a dog.[99] - -[Footnote 94: Diog. L. vi. 2, 21-49; Plutarch Quæst. Sympos. ii. 1, 7; -Epiktetus, iii. 22, 67, iv. 1, 114; Dion Chrysostom. Orat. viii.-ix.-x. - -Plutarch quotes two lines from Diogenes respecting Antisthenes:-- - -[Greek: O(/s me r(a/kê t' ê)/mpische ka\xêna/gkase -Ptôcho\n gene/sthai kai\ do/môn a)na/staton-- - ou) ga\r a)\n o(moi/ôs pithano\s ê)=n le/gôn--O(/s me sopho\n kai\ -au)ta/rkê kai\ maka/rion e)poi/êse]. - -The interpretation given of the passage by Plutarch is curious, but -quite in the probable meaning of the author. However, it is not easy -to reconcile with the fact of this extreme poverty another fact -mentioned about Diogenes, that he asked fees from listeners, in one -case as much as a mina (Diog. L. vi. 2, 67).] - -[Footnote 95: Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 2, 69. [Greek: e)rôtêthei\s ti/ -ka/lliston e)n a)nthrô/pois e)/phê--par)r(êsi/a]. Among the numerous -lost works of Theophrastus (enumerated by Diogen. Laert. v. 43) one is -[Greek: Tô=n Dioge/nous Sunagôgê\, a/], a remarkable evidence of the -impression made by the sayings and proceedings of Diogenes upon his -contemporaries. Compare Dion Chrysostom. Or. ix. (vol. i. 288 seq. -Reiske) for the description of the conduct of Diogenes at the Isthmian -festival, and the effect produced by it on spectators. - -These smart sayings, of which so many are ascribed to Diogenes, and -which he is said to have practised beforehand, and to have made -occasions for--[Greek: o(/ti chrei/an ei)/ê memeletêkô/s] (Diog. L. v. -18, vi. 91, vii. 26)--were called by the later rhetors [Greek: -Chrei=ai]. See Hermogenes and Theon, apud Walz, Rhetor. Græc. i. pp. -19-201; Quintilian, i. 9, 4. - -Such collections of _Ana_ were ascribed to all the philosophers in -greater or less number. Photius, in giving the list of books from -which the Sophist Sopater collected extracts, indicates one as [Greek: -Ta\ Dioge/nous tou= Kunikou= A)pophthe/gmata] (Codex 161).] - -[Footnote 96: Diog. L. vi. 54: [Greek: Sôkra/tês maino/ menos]. vi. 26: -[Greek: Oi( de\ phasi to\n Dioge/nên ei)pei=n, Patô= to\n Pla/tônos -tu=phon; to\n de\ pha/nai, E(te/rô| ge tu/phô|, Dio/genes]. The term -[Greek: tu=phos] ("vanity, self-conceit, assumption of knowing better -than others, being puffed up by the praise of vulgar minds") seems to -have been mach interchanged among the ancient philosophers, each of -them charging it upon his opponents; while the opponents of philosophy -generally imputed it to all philosophers alike. Pyrrho the Sceptic -took credit for being the only [Greek: a)/tuphos]: and he is -complimented as such by his panegyrist Timon in the Silli. Aristokles -affirmed that Pyrrho had just as much [Greek: tu=phon] as the rest. -Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 18.] - -[Footnote 97: Diog. L. vi. 2, 75-76.] - -[Footnote 98: Diog. L. vi. 2, 74. Xeniades was mentioned by -Democritus: he is said to have been a sceptic (Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. -vii. 48-53), at least he did not recognise any [Greek: kritê/rion].] - -[Footnote 99: Diog. L. vi. 2, 77-78. - -Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under the -title of [Greek: o( Ku/ôn]. Aristotle cites from him a witty comparison -under that designation, Rhetoric. iii. 10, 1410, a. 24. [Greek: kai\ -o( Ku/ôn (e)ka/lei) ta\ kapêlei=a, ta\ A)ttika\ phidi/tia.]] - -[Side-note: Doctrines and smart sayings of Diogenes--Contempt of -pleasure--training and labour required--indifference to literature and -geometry.] - -In politics, ethics, and rules for human conduct, Diogenes adopted -views of his own, and spoke them out freely. He was a freethinker -(like Antisthenes) as to the popular religion: and he disapproved of -marriage laws, considering that the intercourse of the sexes ought to -be left to individual taste and preference.[100] Though he respected -the city and conformed to its laws, yet he had no reverence for -existing superstitions, or for the received usages as to person, sex, -or family. He declared himself to be a citizen of the Kosmos and of -Nature.[101] His sole exigency was, independence of life, and freedom -of speech: having these, he was satisfied, fully sufficient to himself -for happiness, and proud of his own superiority to human weakness. The -main benefit which he derived from philosophy (he said) was, that he -was prepared for any fortune that might befall him. To be ready to -accept death easily, was the sure guarantee of a free and independent -life.[102] He insisted emphatically upon the necessity of exercise or -training ([Greek: a)/skêsis]) both as to the body and as to the mind. -Without this, nothing could be done: by means of it everything might -be achieved. But he required that the labours imposed should be -directed to the acquisition of habits really useful; instead of being -wasted, as they commonly were, upon objects frivolous and showy. The -truly wise man ought to set before him as a model the laborious life -of Hêraklês: and he would find, after proper practice and training, -that the contempt of pleasures would afford him more enjoyment than -the pleasures themselves.[103] - -[Footnote 100: Diog. L. vi. 2, 72. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 13.] - -[Footnote 101: Diog. L. vi. 2, 63-71. The like declaration is ascribed -to Sokrates. Epiktêtus, i. 9, 1.] - -[Footnote 102: Diog. L. vi. 2, 63, 72. [Greek: mêde\n e)leutheri/as -prokri/nôn]. Epiktêtus, iv. 1, 30. [Greek: Ou(/tô kai\ Dioge/nês -le/gei, mi/an ei)=nai mêchanê\n pro\s e)leutheri/an--to\ eu)ko/lôs -a)pothnê/skein]. Compare iv. 7-28, i. 24, 6.] - -[Footnote 103: Diog. L. vi. 2, 70-71. [Greek: kai\ ga\r au)tê\ tê=s -ê(donê=s ê( kataphro/nêsis ê(duta/tê promeletêthei=sa, kai\ ô(/sper -oi( sunethisthe/ntes ê(de/ôs zê=|n, a)êdô=s e)pi\ tou)nanti/on -meti/asin, ou(/tô oi( tou)nanti/on a)skêthe/ntes ê(/dion au)tô=n tô=n -ê(donô=n kataphronou=si]. See Lucian, Vitar. Auct. c. 9, about the -hard life and the happiness of Diogenes. Compare s. 26 about the -[Greek: tu=phos] of Diogenes treading down the different [Greek: -tu=phos] of Plato, and Epiktêtus iii. 22, 57. Antisthenes, in his -dialogue or discourse called [Greek: Ê(raklê=s], appears to have -enforced the like appeal to that hero as an example to others. See -Winckelmann, Fragm. Antisthen. pp. 15-18.] - -[Side-note: Admiration of Epiktêtus for Diogenes, especially for his -consistency in acting out his own ethical creed.] - -Diogenes declared that education was sobriety to the young, -consolation to the old, wealth to the poor, ornament to the rich. But -he despised much of what was commonly imparted as education--music, -geometry, astronomy, &c.: and he treated with equal scorn Plato and -Eukleides.[104] He is said however to have conducted the education of -the sons of his master Xeniades[105] without material departure from -the received usage. He caused them to undergo moderate exercise (not -with a view to athletic success) in the palæstra, and afterwards to -practise riding, shooting with the bow, hurling the javelin, slinging -and hunting: he cultivated their memories assiduously, by recitations -from poets and prose authors, and even from his own compositions: he -kept them on bread and water, without tunic or shoes, with clothing -only such as was strictly necessary, with hair closely cut, habitually -silent, and fixing their eyes on the ground when they walked abroad. -These latter features approximate to the training at Sparta (as -described by Xenophon) which Diogenes declared to contrast with Athens -as the apartments of the men with those of the women. Diogenes is said -to have composed several dialogues and even some tragedies.[106] But -his most impressive display (like that of Sokrates) was by way of -colloquy--prompt and incisive interchange of remarks. He was one of -the few philosophers who copied Sokrates in living constantly before -the public--in talking with every one indiscriminately and fearlessly, -in putting home questions like a physician to his patient.[107] -Epiktêtus,--speaking of Diogenes as equal, if not superior, to -Sokrates--draws a distinction pertinent and accurate. "To Sokrates" -(says he) "Zeus assigned the elenchtic or cross-examining function: to -Diogenes, the magisterial and chastising function: to Zeno (the Stoic) -the didactic and dogmatical." While thus describing Diogenes justly -enough, Epiktetus nevertheless insists upon his agreeable person and -his extreme gentleness and good-nature:[108] qualities for which -probably Diogenes neither took credit himself, nor received credit -from his contemporaries. Diogenes seems to have really possessed--that -which his teacher Antisthenes postulated as indispensable--the -Sokratic physical strength and vigour. His ethical creed, obtained -from Antisthenes, was adopted by many successors, and (in the main) by -Zeno and the Stoics in the ensuing century. But the remarkable feature -in Diogenes which attracts to him the admiration of Epiktêtus, is--that -he set the example of acting out his creed, consistently and -resolutely, in his manner of life:[109] an example followed by some of -his immediate successors, but not by the Stoics, who confined -themselves to writing and preaching. Contemporary both with Plato and -Aristotle, Diogenes stands to both of them in much the same relation -as Phokion to Demosthenes in politics and oratory: he exhibits -strength of will, insensibility to applause as well as to reproach, -and self-acting independence--in antithesis to their higher gifts and -cultivation of intellect. He was undoubtedly, next to Sokrates, the -most original and unparalleled manifestation of Hellenic philosophy. - -[Footnote 104: Diog. L. vi. 2, 68-73-24-27.] - -[Footnote 105: Diog. L. vi. 2, 30-31.] - -[Footnote 106: Diog. L. vi. 2, 80. Diogenes Laertius himself cites a -fact from one of the dialogues--Pordalus (vi. 2, 20): and Epiktêtus -alludes to the treatise on Ethics by Diogenes--[Greek: e)n tê=| -Ê)thikê=|]--ii. 20, 14. It appears however that the works ascribed to -Diogenes were not admitted by all authors as genuine (Diog. L. c.).] - -[Footnote 107: Dion Chrysost. Or. x.; De Servis, p. 295 E. Or. ix.; -Isthmicus, p. 289 R. [Greek: ô(/sper i)atroi\ a)nakri/nousi tou\s -a)sthenou=ntas, ou(/tôs Dioge/nês a)ne/krine to\n a)/nthrôpon], &c.] - -[Footnote 108: Epiktêtus, iii. 21, 19. [Greek: ô(s Sôkra/tei -sunebou/leue tê\n e)legktikê\n chô/ran e)/chein, ô(s Dioge/nei tê\n -basilikê\n kai\ e)piplêktikê/n, ô(s Zê/nôni tê\n didaskalikê\n kai\ -dogmatikê/n]. - -About [Greek: to\ ê(/meron kai\ phila/nthrôpon] of Diogenes, see -Epiktêtus, iii. 24, 64; who also tells us (iv. 11, 19), professing to -follow the statements of contemporaries, that the bodies both of -Sokrates and Diogenes were by nature so sweet and agreeable ([Greek: -e)pi/chari kai\ ê(du/]) as to dispense with the necessity of washing. - -"Ego certé" (says Seneca, Epist. 108, 13-14, about the lectures of the -eloquent Stoic Attalus) "cum Attalum audirem, in vitia, in errores, in -mala vitæ perorantem, sæpé misertus sum generis humani, et illum -sublimem altioremque humano fastigio credidi. Ipse regem se esse -dicebat: sed plus quam regnare mihi videbatur, cui liceret censuram -agere regnantium." See also his treatises De Beneficiis, v. 4-6, and -De Tranquillitate Animi (c. 8), where, after lofty encomium on -Diogenes, he exclaims--"Si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest -idem dubitare et de Deorum immortalium statu, an parum beaté degant," -&c.] - -[Footnote 109: Cicero, in his Oration in defence of Murena (30-61-62) -compliments Cato (the accuser) as one of the few persons who adopted -the Stoic tenets with a view of acting them out, and who did really -act them out--"Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato, autoribus -eruditissimis inductus, arripuit: neque disputandi causa, ut magna -pars, sed ita vivendi". Tacitus (Histor. iv. 5) pays the like -compliment to Helvidius Priscus. - -M. Gaston Boissier (Étude sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de Varron, pp. -113-114, Paris, 1861) expresses an amount of surprise which I should -not have expected, on the fact that persons adopted a philosophical -creed for the purpose only of debating it and defending it, and not of -acting it out. But he recognises the fact, in regard to Varro and his -contemporaries, in terms not less applicable to the Athenian world: -amidst such general practice, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Krates, &c., -stood out as memorable exceptions. "Il ne faut pas non plus oublier de -quelle manière, et dans quel esprit, les Romains lettrés étudiaient la -philosophie Grecque. Ils venaient écouter les plus habiles maîtres, -connaître les sectes les plus célèbres: mais ils les étudiaient plutôt -en curieux, qu'ils ne s'y attachaient en adeptes. On ne les voit -guères approfondir un système et s'y tenir, adopter un ensemble de -croyances, et y conformer leur conduite. On étudiait le plus souvent -la philosophie pour discuter. C'était seulement une matière à des -conversations savantes, un exercice et un aliment pour les esprits -curieux. Voilà pourquoi la secte Académique étoit alors mieux -accueillie que les autres," &c.] - -[Side-note: Admiration excited by the asceticism of the -Cynics--Asceticism extreme in the East--Comparison of the Indian -Gymnosophists with Diogenes.] - -Respecting Diogenes and the Cynic philosophers generally, we have to -regard not merely their doctrines, but the effect produced by their -severity of life. In this point Diogenes surpassed his master -Antisthenes, whose life he criticised as not fully realising the lofty -spirit of his doctrine. The spectacle of man not merely abstaining -from enjoyment, but enduring with indifference hunger, thirst, heat, -cold, poverty, privation, bodily torture, death, &c., exercises a -powerful influence on the imagination of mankind. It calls forth -strong feelings of reverence and admiration in the beholders: while in -the sufferer himself also, self-reverence and self-admiration, the -sense of power and exaltation above the measure of humanity, is -largely developed. The extent to which self-inflicted hardships and -pains have prevailed in various regions of the earth, the -long-protracted and invincible resolution with which they have been -endured, and the veneration which such practices have procured for the -ascetics who submitted to them are among the most remarkable chapters -in history.[110] The East, especially India, has always been, and -still is, the country in which these voluntary endurances have reached -their extreme pitch of severity; even surpassing those of the -Christian monks in Egypt and Syria, during the fourth and fifth -centuries of the Christian era.[111] When Alexander the Great first -opened India to the observation of Greeks, one of the novelties which -most surprised him and his followers was, the sight of the -Gymnosophists or naked philosophers. These men were found lying on the -ground, either totally uncovered or with nothing but a cloth round the -loins; abstaining from all enjoyment, nourishing themselves upon a -minimum of coarse vegetables or fruits, careless of the extreme heat -of the plain, and the extreme cold of the mountain; and often -superadding pain, fatigue, or prolonged and distressing uniformity of -posture. They passed their time either in silent meditation or in -discourse on religion and philosophy: they were venerated as well as -consulted by every one, censuring even the most powerful persons in -the land. Their fixed idea was to stand as examples to all, of -endurance, insensibility, submission only to the indispensable -necessities of nature, and freedom from all other fear or authority. -They acted out the doctrine, which Plato so eloquently preaches under -the name of Sokrates in the Phædon--That the whole life of the -philosopher is a preparation for death: that life is worthless, and -death an escape from it into a better state.[112] It is an interesting -fact to learn that when Onesikritus (one of Alexander's officers, who -had known and frequented the society of Diogenes in Greece), being -despatched during the Macedonian march through India for the purpose -of communicating with these Gymnosophists, saw their manner of life -and conversed with them he immediately compared them with Diogenes, -whom he had himself visited--as well as with Sokrates and Pythagoras, -whom he knew by reputation. Onesikritus described to the Gymnosophists -the manner of life of Diogenes: but Diogenes wore a threadbare mantle, -and this appeared to them a mark of infirmity and imperfection. They -remarked that Diogenes was right to a considerable extent; but wrong -for obeying convention in preference to nature, and for being ashamed -of going naked, as they did.[113] - -[Footnote 110: Dion Chrysostom, viii. p. 275, Reiske.] - -[Footnote 111: See the striking description in Gibbon, Decl. and Fall, -ch. xxxvii. pp. 253-265.] - -[Footnote 112: Strabo, xv. 713 A (probably from Onesikritus, see -Geier, Fragment. Alexandr. Magn. Histor. p. 379). [Greek: Plei/stous -d' au)toi=s ei)=nai lo/gous peri\ tou= thana/tou; nomi/zein ga\r dê\ -to\n me\n e)ntha/de bi/on ô(s a)\n a)kmê\n kuome/nôn ei)=nai, to\n de\ -tha/naton ge/nesin ei)s to\n o)/ntôs bi/on kai\ to\n eu)dai/mona toi=s -philosophê/sasi; dio\ tê=| a)skê/sei plei/stê| chrê=sthai pro\s to\ -e)toimotha/naton; a)gatho\n de\ ê)\ kako\n mêde\n ei)=nai tô=n -sumbaino/ntôn a)nthrô/pois], &c. - -This is an application of the doctrines laid down by the Platonic -Sokrates in the Phædon, p. 64 A: [Greek: Kinduneu/ousi ga\r o(/soi -tugcha/nousin o)rthô=s a)pto/menoi philosophi/as lelêthe/nai tou\s -a)/llous, o(/ti ou)de\n a)/llo au)toi\ e)pitêdeu/ousin ê)\ -a)pothnê/skein te kai\ tethna/nai]. Compare p. 67 D.; Cicero. Tusc. D. -i. 30. Compare Epiktêtus, iv. i. 30 (cited in a former note) about -Diogenes the Cynic. Also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 27; Valerius Maximus, -iii. 3, 6; Diogen. L. Prooem. s. 6; Pliny, H. N. vii. 2. - -Bohlen observes (Das Alte Indien, ch. ii. pp. 279-289), "It is a -remarkable fact that Indian writings of the highest antiquity depict -as already existing the same ascetic exercises as we see existing at -present: they were even then known to the ancients, who were -especially astonished at such fanaticism.] - -[Footnote 113: Strabo gives a condensed summary of this report, made -by Onesikritus respecting his conversation with the Indian -Gymnosophist Mandanis, or Dandamis (Strabo, xv. p. 716 B):--[Greek: -Tau=t' ei)po/nta e)xere/sthai] (Dandamis asked Onesikritus), [Greek: -ei) kai\ e)n toi=s E(/llêsi lo/goi toiou=toi le/gointo. Ei)po/ntos d' -(O)nêsikri/tou), o(/ti kai\ Puthago/ras toiau=ta le/goi, keleu/oi te -e)mpsu/chôn a)pe/chesthai, kai\ Sôkra/tês, kai\ Dioge/nês, _ou(= kai\ -au)to\s_] (Onesikritus) [Greek: _a)kroa/saito_, a)pokri/nasthai] -(Dandamis), [Greek: o(/ti ta)/lla me\n nomi/zoi phroni/môs au)toi=s -dokei=n, e(\n d' a(marta/nein--no/mon pro\ tê=s phu/seôs titheme/nous; -ou) ga\r a)\n ai)schu/nesthai gumnou/s, ô(/sper au)to/n, dia/gein, -a)po\ litô=n zô=ntas; kai\ ga\r oi)ki/an a)ri/stên ei)=nai, ê)/tis -a)\n e)piskeuê=s e)lachi/stês de/êtai]. - -About Onesikritus, Diog. Laert. vi. 75-84; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 65; -Plutarch, De Fortuna Alexandri, p. 331. - -The work of August Gladitsch (Einleitung in das Verständniss der -Weltgeschichte, Posen, 1841) contains an instructive comparison -between the Gymnosophists and the Cynics, as well as between the -Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophers--between the Eleatic sect -and the Hindoo philosophers. The points of analogy, both in doctrine -and practice, are very numerous and strikingly brought out, pp. -356-377. I cannot, however, agree in his conclusion, that the doctrines -and practice of Antisthenes were borrowed, not from Sokrates with -exaggeration, but from the Parmenidean theory, and the Vedanta theory -of the Ens Unum, leading to negation and contempt of the phenomenal -world.] - -[Side-note: The precepts and principles laid down by Sokrates were -carried into fullest execution by the Cynics.] - -These observations of the Indian Gymnosophist are a reproduction and -an application in practice[114] of the memorable declaration of -principle enunciated by Sokrates--"That the Gods had no wants: and -that the man who had fewest wants, approximated most nearly to the -Gods". This principle is first introduced into Grecian ethics by -Sokrates: ascribed to him both by Xenophon and Plato, and seemingly -approved by both. In his life, too, Sokrates carried the principle -into effect, up to a certain point. Both admirers and opponents attest -his poverty, hard fare, coarse clothing, endurance of cold and -privation:[115] but he was a family man, with a wife and children to -maintain, and he partook occasionally, of indulgences which made him -fall short of his own ascetic principle. Plato and Xenophon--both of -them well-born Athenians, in circumstances affluent, or at least easy, -the latter being a knight, and even highly skilled in horses and -horsemanship--contented themselves with preaching on the text, -whenever they had to deal with an opponent more self-indulgent than -themselves; but made no attempt to carry it into practice.[116] Zeno -the Stoic laid down broad principles of self-denial and apathy: but in -practice he was unable to conquer the sense of shame, as the Cynics -did, and still more the Gymnosophists. Antisthenes, on the other hand, -took to heart, both in word and act, the principle of Sokrates: yet -even he, as we know from the Xenophontic Symposion, was not altogether -constant in rigorous austerity. His successors Diogenes and Krates -attained the maximum of perfection ever displayed by the Cynics of -free Greece. They stood forth as examples of endurance, -abnegation--insensibility to shame and fear--free-spoken censure of -others. Even they however were not so recognised by the Indian -Gymnosophists; who, having reduced their wants, their fears, and -their sensibilities, yet lower, had thus come nearer to that which they -called the perfection of Nature, and which Sokrates called the close -approach to divinity.[117] When Alexander the Great (in the first year of -his reign and prior to any of his Asiatic conquests) visited Diogenes at -Corinth, found him lying in the sun, and asked if there was anything -which he wanted--Diogenes made the memorable reply--"Only that you and -your guards should stand out of my sunshine". This reply doubtless -manifests the self-satisfied independence of the philosopher. Yet it -is far less impressive than the fearless reproof which the Indian -Gymnosophists administered to Alexander, when they saw him in the -Punjab at the head of his victorious army, after exploits, dangers, -and fatigues almost superhuman, as conqueror of Persia and -acknowledged son of Zeus.[118] - -[Footnote 114: Onesikritus observes, respecting the Indian -Gymnosophists, that "they were more striking in act than in discourse" -([Greek: e)n e)/rgois ga\r au)tou\s krei/ttous ê)\ lo/gois ei)=nai], -Strabo, xv. 713 B); and this is true about the Cynic succession of -philosophers, in Greece as well as in Rome. Diogenes Laertius (compare -his prooem, s. 19, 20, and vi. 103) ranks the Cynic philosophy as a -distinct [Greek: ai(/resis]: but he tells us that other writers -(especially Hippobotus) would not reckon it as an [Greek: ai(/resis], -but only as an [Greek: e)/nstasis bi/ou]--practice without theory.] - -[Footnote 115: Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 2-5; Plato, Sympos. 219, 220. - -The language of contemporary comic writers, Ameipsias, Eupolis, -Aristophanes, &c., about Sokrates--is very much the same as that of -Menander a century afterwards about Kratês. Sokrates is depicted as a -Cynic in mode of life (Diogen. L. ii. 28; Aristophan. Nubes, -104-362-415).] - -[Footnote 116: Zeno, though he received instructions from Kratês, was -[Greek: a)/llôs me\n eu)/tonos pro\s tê\n philosophi/an, ai)dê/môn de\ -ô(s pro\s tê\n kunikê\n a)naischunti/an] (Diog. L. vii. 3). - -"Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicure -quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere," -&c. This is the distinction which Seneca draws between Stoic and Cynic -(De Brevitat. Vitæ, 14, 5). His admiration for the "seminudus" Cynic -Demetrius, his contemporary and companion, was extreme (Epist. 62, 2, -and Epist. 20, 18).] - -[Footnote 117: Xenoph. Memor. i. 6, 10 (the passage is cited in a -previous note). The Emperor Julian (Orat. vi. p. 192 Spanh.) says -about the Cynics--[Greek: a)pa/theian ga\r poiou=ntai to\ te/los, -tou=to de\ i)/son e)sti\ tô=| theo\n gene/sthai]. Dion Chrysostom (Or. -vi. p. 208) says also about Diogenes the Cynic--[Greek: kai\ ma/lista -e)mimei=to tô=n theô=n to\n bi/on.]] - -[Footnote 118: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 32, 92, and the Anabasis of -Arrian, vii. 1-2-3, where both the reply of Diogenes and that of the -Indian Gymnosophists are reported. Dion Chrysostom (Orat. iv. p. 145 -seq. Reiske) gives a prolix dialogue between Alexander and Diogenes. -His picture of the effect produced by Diogenes upon the different -spectators at the Isthmian festival, is striking and probable. - -Kalanus, one of the Indian Gymnosophists, was persuaded, by the -instances of Alexander, to abandon his Indian mode of life and to come -away with the Macedonian army--very much to the disgust of his -brethren, who scornfully denounced him as infirm and even as the -slave of appetite ([Greek: a)ko/laston], Strabo, xv. 718). He was -treated with the greatest consideration and respect by Alexander and -his officers; yet when the army came into Persis, he became sick of -body and tired of life. He obtained the reluctant consent of Alexander -to allow him to die. A funeral pile was erected, upon which he -voluntarily burnt himself in presence of the whole army; who witnessed -the scene with every demonstration of military honour. See the -remarkable description in Arrian, Anab. vii. 3. Cicero calls him -"Indus indoctus ac barbarus" (Tusc. Disp. ii. 22, 52); but the -impression which he made on Alexander himself, Onesikritus, -Lysimachus, and generally upon all who saw him, was that of respectful -admiration (Strabo, xv. 715; Arrian, l. c.). One of these Indian -sages, who had come into Syria along with the Indian envoys sent by an -Indian king to the Roman Emperor Augustus, burnt himself publicly at -Athens, with an exulting laugh when he leaped upon the funeral pile -(Strabo, xv. 720 A)--[Greek: kata\ ta\ pa/tria tô=n I)ndô=n e)/thê]. - -The like act of self-immolation was performed by the Grecian Cynic -Peregrinus Proteus, at the Olympic festival in the reign of Marcus -Antoninus, 165 A.D. (See Clinton, Fasti Romani.) Lucian, who was -present and saw the proceeding, has left an animated description of -it, but ridicules it as a piece of silly vanity. Theagenes, the -admiring disciple of Peregrinus, and other Cynics, who were present in -considerable numbers--and also Lucian himself compare this act to that -of the Indian Gymnosophists--[Greek: ou(=tos de\ ti/nos ai)ti/as -e(/neken e)mba/llei phe/rôn e(auto\n ei)s to\ pu=r? nê\ Di/', o(/pôs -tê\n karteri/an e)pidei/xêtai, katha/per oi( Brachma=nes] (Lucian, De -Morte Peregrini, 25-39, &c.).] - -[Side-note: Antithesis between Nature--and Law or Convention--insisted -on by the Indian Gymnosophists.] - -Another point, in the reply made by the Indian Gymnosophist to -Onesikritus, deserves notice: I mean the antithesis between law (or -convention) and nature ([Greek: no/mos--phu/sis])--the supremacy which -he asserts for Nature over law--and the way in which he understands -Nature and her supposed ordinances. This antithesis was often put -forward and argued in the ancient Ethics: and it is commonly said, -without any sufficient proof, that the Sophists (speaking of them -collectively) recognised only the authority of law--while Sokrates and -Plato had the merit of vindicating against them the superior authority -of Nature. The Indian Gymnosophist agrees with the Athenian speaker in -the Platonic treatise De Legibus, and with the Platonic Kallikles in -the Gorgias, thus far--that he upholds the paramount authority of -Nature. But of these three interpreters, each hears and reports the -oracles of Nature differently from the other two: and there are many -other dissenting interpreters besides.[119] Which of them are we to -follow? And if, adopting any one of them, we reject the others, upon -what grounds are we to justify our preference? When the Gymnosophist -points out, that nakedness is the natural condition of man; when he -farther infers, that because natural it is therefore right and that -the wearing of clothes, being a departure from nature, is also a -departure from right--how are we to prove to him that his -interpretation of nature is the wrong one? These questions have -received no answer in any of the Platonic dialogues: though we have -seen that Plato is very bitter against those who dwell upon the -antithesis between Law and Nature, and who undertake to decide between -the two. - -[Footnote 119: Though Seneca (De Brevitate Vit. 14) talks of the -Stoics as "conquering Nature, and the Cynics as exceeding Nature," yet -the Stoic Epiktêtus considers his morality as the only scheme -conformable to Nature (Epiktêt. Diss. iv. 1, 121-128); while the -Epikurean Lucretius claims the same conformity for the precepts of -Epikurus.] - -[Side-note: The Greek Cynics--an order of ascetic or mendicant -friars.] - -Reverting to the Cynics, we must declare them to be in one respect the -most peculiar outgrowth of Grecian philosophy: because they are not -merely a doctrinal sect, with phrases, theories, reasonings, and -teachings, of their own--but still more prominently a body of -practical ascetics, a mendicant order[120] in philosophy, working up -the bystanders by exhibiting themselves as models of endurance and -apathy. These peculiarities seem to have originated partly with -Pythagoras, partly with Sokrates--for there is no known prior example -of it in Grecian history, except that of the anomalous priests of Zeus -at Dodona, called Selli, who lay on the ground with unwashed feet. The -discipline of Lykurgus at Sparta included severe endurance; but then -it was intended to form, and actually did form, good soldiers. The -Cynics had no view to military action. They exaggerated the -peculiarities of Sokrates, and we should call their mode of life the -Sokratic life, if we followed the example of those who gave names to -the Pythagorean or Orphic life, as a set of observances derived from -the type of Pythagoras or Orpheus.[121] - -[Footnote 120: Respecting the historical connexion between the Grecian -Cynics and the ascetic Christian monks, see Zeller, Philos. der -Griech. ii. p. 241, ed. 2nd. - -Homer, Iliad xvi. 233-5:-- - -[Greek: Zeu= a)/na, Dôdônai=e, Pelasgike/, têlo/thi nai/ôn, -Dôdô/nês mede/ôn duscheime/rou, a)mphi\ de\ Se/lloi -Soi\ nai/ous' u(pophê=tai a)nipto/podes, chamaieu=nai]. - -There is no analogy in Grecian history to illustrate this very curious -passage: the Excursus of Heyne furnishes no information (see his -edition of the Iliad, vol. vii. p. 289) except the general -remark:--"Selli--vitæ genus et institutum affectarunt abhorrens à communi -usu, vitæ monachorum mendicantium haud absimile, cum sine vitæ cultu -viverent, nec corpus abluerent, et humi cubarent. Ita inter barbaros -non modo, sed inter ipsas feras gentes intellectum est, eos qui -auctoritatem apud multitudinem consequi vellent, externâ specie, vitæ -cultu austeriore, abstinentiâ et continentiâ, oculos hominum in se -convertere et mirationem facere debere."] - -[Footnote 121: Plato, Republic, x. 600 B; Legib. vi. 782 C; Eurip. -Hippol. 955; Fragm. [Greek: Krê=tes]. - -See also the citations in Athenæus (iv. pp. 161-163) from the writers -of the Attic middle comedy, respecting the asceticism of the -Pythagoreans, analogous to that of the Cynics.] - -[Side-note: Logical views of Antisthenes and Diogenes--they opposed -the Platonic Ideas.] - -Though Antisthenes and Diogenes laid chief stress upon ethical topics, -yet they also delivered opinions on logic and evidence.[122] -Antisthenes especially was engaged in controversy, and seemingly in -acrimonious controversy, with Plato; whose opinions he impugned in an -express dialogue entitled Sathon. Plato on his side attacked the -opinions of Antisthenes, and spoke contemptuously of his intelligence, -yet without formally naming him. At least there are some criticisms in -the Platonic dialogues (especially in the Sophistês, p. 251) which the -commentators pronounce, on strong grounds, to be aimed at Antisthenes: -who is also unfavourably criticised by Aristotle. We know but little -of the points which Antisthenes took up against Plato and still less -of the reasons which he urged in support of them. Both he and -Diogenes, however, are said to have declared express war against the -Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas. The functions of general -Concepts and general propositions, together with the importance of -defining general terms, had been forcibly insisted on in the -colloquies of Sokrates; and his disciple Plato built upon this -foundation the memorable hypothesis of an aggregate of eternal, -substantive realities, called Ideas or Forms, existing separate from -the objects of sense, yet affording a certain participation in -themselves to those objects: not discernible by sense, but only by the -Reason or understanding. These bold creations of the Platonic fancy -were repudiated by Antisthenes and Diogenes: who are both said to have -declared "We see Man, and we see Horse; but Manness and Horseness we -do not see". Whereunto Plato replied "You possess that eye by which -Horse is seen: but you have not yet acquired that eye by which -Horseness is seen".[123] - -[Footnote 122: Among the titles of the works of Antisthenes, preserved -by Diogenes Laertius (vi. 15), several relate to dialectic or logic. -[Greek: A)lê/theia. Peri\ tou= diale/gesthai, a)ntilogiko/s. Sa/thôn, -peri\ tou= a)ntile/gein, a, b, g. Peri\ Diale/kton. Peri\ Paidei/as -ê)\ o)noma/tôn, a, b, g, d, e. Peri\ o)noma/tôn chrêseôs, ê)\ -e)ristiko/s. Peri\ e)rôtê/seôs kai\ a)pokri/seôs], &c., &c. - -Diogenes Laertius refers to _ten_ [Greek: to/moi] of these treatises.] - -[Footnote 123: Simplikius, ad Aristot. Categ. p. 66, b. 47, 67, b. 18, -68, b. 25, Schol. Brand.; Tzetzes, Chiliad. vii. 606. - -[Greek: tô=n de\ palaiô=n oi( me\n a)nê/|roun ta\s poio/têtas tele/ôs, -to\ poio\n sugchôrou=ntos ei)=nai; ô(/sper A)ntisthe/nês, o(/s pote -Pla/tôni diamphisbêtô=n--ô(= Pla/tôn, e)/phê, i(/ppon me\n o(rô=, -i(ppo/têta d' ou)ch o(rô=; kai\ o(\s ei)=pen, e)/cheis me\n ô(=| -i(/ppos o(ra=tai to/de to\ o)/mma, ô(=| de\ i(ppo/tês theôrei=tai, -ou)de/pô ke/ktêsai. kai\ a)/lloi de/ tines ê)=san tau/tês tê=s do/xês. -oi( de\ tina\s men a)nê/|roun poio/têtas, tina\s de\ kateli/mpanon]. - -[Greek: Anthrôpo/tês] occurs p. 58, a. 31. Compare p. 20, a. 2. - -The same conversation is reported as having taken place between -Diogenes and Plato, except that instead of [Greek: i(ppo/tês] and -[Greek: a)nthrôpo/tês], we have [Greek: trapezo/tês] and [Greek: -kuatho/tês] (Diog. L. vi, 53). - -We have [Greek: zôo/tês--A)thênaio/tês]--in Galen's argument against -the Stoics (vol. xix. p. 481, Kühn).] - -[Side-note: First protest of Nominalism against Realism.] - -This debate between Antisthenes and Plato marks an interesting point -in the history of philosophy. It is the first protest of Nominalism -against the doctrine of an extreme Realism. The Ideas or Forms of -Plato (according to many of his phrases, for he is not always -consistent with himself) are not only real existences distinct from -particulars, but absorb to themselves all the reality of particulars. -The real universe in the Platonic theory was composed of Ideas or -Forms such as Manness or Horseness[124] (called by Plato the [Greek: -Au)to\-A)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: Au)to\-I(/ppos]), of which particular -men and horses were only disfigured, transitory, and ever-varying -photographs. Antisthenes denied what Plato affirmed, and as Plato -affirmed it. Aristotle denied it also; maintaining that genera, -species, and attributes, though distinguishable as separate predicates -of, or inherencies in, individuals--yet had no existence apart from -individuals. Aristotle was no less wanting than Antisthenes, in the -intellectual eye required for discerning the Platonic Ideas. -Antisthenes is said to have declared these Ideas to be mere thoughts -or conceptions ([Greek: psila\s e)nnoi/as]): _i.e._, merely subjective -or within the mind, without any object corresponding to them. This is -one of the various modes of presenting the theory of Ideas, resorted -to even in the Platonic Parmenidês, not by one who opposes that -theory, but by one seeking to defend it--_viz._, by Sokrates, when he -is hard pressed by the objections of the Eleate against the more -extreme and literal version of the theory.[125] It is remarkable, that -the objections ascribed to Parmenides against that version which -exhibits the Ideas as mere Concepts of and in the mind, are decidedly -less forcible than those which he urges against the other versions. - -[Footnote 124: We know from Plato himself (Theætêtus, p. 182 A) that -even the word [Greek: poio/tês], if not actually first introduced by -himself, was at any rate so recent as to be still repulsive, and to -require an Apology, If [Greek: poio/tês] was strange, [Greek: -a)nthrôpo/tês] and [Greek: i(ppo/tês] would be still more strange. -Antisthenes probably invented them, to present the doctrine which he -impugned in a dress of greater seeming absurdity.] - -[Footnote 125: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 132 B. See, afterwards, chapter -xxvii., Parmenides.] - -[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes about predication--he admits no -other predication but identical.] - -There is another singular doctrine, which Aristotle ascribes to -Antisthenes, and which Plato notices and confutes; alluding to its -author contemptuously, but not mentioning his name. Every name -(Antisthenes argued) has its own special reason or meaning ([Greek: -oi)kei=os[126] lo/gos]), declaring the essence of the thing named, and -differing from every other word: you cannot therefore truly predicate -any one word of any other, because the reason or meaning of the two is -different: there can be no true propositions except identical -propositions, in which the predicate is the same with the subject--"man -is man, good is good". "Man is good" was an inadmissible -proposition: affirming different things to be the same, or one thing -to be many.[127] Accordingly, it was impossible for two speakers -really to contradict each other. There can be no contradiction between -them if both declare the essence of the same thing--nor if neither of -them declare the essence of it--nor if one speaker declares the -essence of one thing, and another speaker that of another. But one of -these three cases must happen: therefore there can be no -contradiction.[128] - -[Footnote 126: Diogen. L. vi. 3. [Greek: Prôto/s te ô(ri/sato] -(Antisthenes) [Greek: lo/gon, ei)pô/n, lo/gos e)sti\n o( to\ ti/ ê)=n -ê)/ e)sti dêlô=n.]] - -[Footnote 127: Aristotle, Metaphy. [Greek: D]. 1024, b. 32, attributes -this doctrine to Antisthenes by name; which tends to prove that Plato -meant Antisthenes, though not naming him, in Sophist, p. 251 B, where -he notices the same doctrine. Compare Philêbus, p. 14 D. - -It is to be observed that a doctrine exactly the same as that which -Plato here censures in Antisthenes, will be found maintained by the -Platonic Sokrates himself, in Plato, Hippias Major, p. 304 A. See -chap, xiii. vol. ii. of the present work.] - -[Footnote 128: Aristot. Topic. i. p. 104, b. 20. [Greek: the/sis de/ -e)stin u(po/lêpsis para/doxos tô=n gnôri/môn tino\s kata\ -philosophi/an; oi(=on o(/ti ou)k e)/stin a)ntile/gein, katha/per -e)/phê A)ntisthe/nês]. - -Plato puts this [Greek: the/sis] into the mouth of Dionysodorus, in -the Euthydêmus--p. 286 B; but he says (or makes Sokrates say) that it -was maintained by many persons, and that it had been maintained by -Protagoras, and even by others yet more ancient. - -Antisthenes had discussed it specially in a treatise of three sections -polemical against Plato--[Greek: Sa/thôn, ê)\ peri\ tou= a)ntile/gein, -a, b, g] (Diog. L. vi. 16).] - -[Side-note: The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of -Aristotle.] - -The works of Antisthenes being lost, we do not know how he himself -stated his own doctrine, nor what he said on behalf of it, declaring -contradiction to be impossible. Plato sets aside the doctrine as -absurd and silly; Aristotle--since he cites it as a paradox, apt for -dialectical debate, where the opinion of a philosopher stood opposed -to what was generally received--seems to imply that there were -plausible arguments to be urged in its favour.[129] And that the -doctrine actually continued to be held and advocated, in the -generation not only after Antisthenes but after Aristotle--we may see -by the case of Stilpon: who maintained (as Antisthenes had done) that -none but identical propositions, wherein the predicate was a -repetition of the subject, were admissible: from whence it followed -(as Aristotle observed) that there could be no propositions either -false or contradictory. Plutarch,[130] in reciting this doctrine of -Stilpon (which had been vehemently impugned by the Epikurean Kolôtês), -declares it to have been intended only in jest. There is no ground for -believing that it was so intended: the analogy of Antisthenes goes to -prove the contrary. - -[Footnote 129: Aristotle (Met. [Greek: D]. 1024) represents the -doctrine of Antisthenes, That contradictory and false propositions are -impossible--as a consequence deduced from the position laid down--That -no propositions except identical propositions were admissible. If you -grant this last proposition, the consequences will be undeniable. -Possibly Antisthenes may have reasoned in this way:"There are many -contradictory and false propositions now afloat; but this arises from -the way in which predication is conducted. So long as the predicate is -different from the subject, there is nothing _in the form of a -proposition_ to distinguish falsehood from truth (to distinguish -_Theætêtus sedet_, from _Theætêtus volat_--to take the instance in the -Platonic Sophistês--p. 263). There ought to be no propositions except -identical propositions: the form itself will then guarantee you -against both falsehood and contradiction: you will be sure always to -give [Greek: to\n oi)kei=on lo/gon tou= pra/gmatos]." There would be -nothing inconsistent in such a precept: but Aristotle might call it -silly [Greek: eu)êthô=s]), because, while shutting out falsehood and -contradiction, it would also shut out the great body of useful truth, -and would divest language of its usefulness as a means of -communication. - -Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Römisch. Phil. vol. ii. xciii. 1) gives -something like this as the probable purpose of Antisthenes--"Nur Eins -bezeichne die Wesenheit eines Dinges--die Wesenheit als einfachen -Träger des mannichfaltigen der Eigenschaften"(this is rather too -Aristotelian)--"zur Abwehr von Streitigkeiten auf dem Gebiete der -Erscheinungen". Compare also Ritter, Gesch. Phil. vol. ii. p. 130. We -read in the Kratylus, that there were persons who maintained the -rectitude of all names: to say that a name was not right, was (in -their view) tantamount to saying that it was no name at all, but only -an unmeaning sound (Plato, Krat. pp. 429-430).] - -[Footnote 130: Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, p. 1119 C-D.] - -[Side-note: Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental -predication.] - -Stilpon, however, while rejecting (as Antisthenes had done) the -universal Ideas[131] or Forms, took a larger ground of objection. He -pronounced them to be inadmissible both as subject and as predicate. -If you speak of Man in general (he said), what, or whom, do you mean? -You do not mean A or B, or C or D, &c.: that is, you do not mean any -one of these more than any other. You have no determinate meaning at -all: and beyond this indefinite multitude of individuals, there is -nothing that the term can mean. Again, as to predicates--when you say, -_The man runs_, or _The man is good_, what do you mean by the -predicate _runs_, or is _good_? You do not mean any thing specially -belonging to man: for you apply the same predicates to many other -subjects: you say _runs_, about a horse, a dog, or a cat--you say -_good_ in reference to food, medicine, and other things besides. Your -predicate, therefore, being applied to many and diverse subjects, -belongs not to one of them more than to another: in other words, it -belongs to neither: the predication is not admissible.[132] - -[Footnote 131: Hegel (Geschichte der Griech. Philos. i. p. 123) and -Marbach (Geschichte der Philos. s. 91) disallow the assertion of -Diogenes, that Stilpon [Greek: a)nê/rei ta\ ei)/dê]. They maintain -that Stilpon rejected the particular affirmations, and allowed only -general or universal affirmations. This construction appears to me -erroneous.] - -[Footnote 132: Diog. L. ii. 113; Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, 1119-1120. -[Greek: ei) peri\ i(/ppou to\ tre/chein katêgorou=men, ou)/ phêsi] -(Stilpon) [Greek: tau)to\n ei)=nai tô=| peri\ ou)= katêgorei=tai to\ -katêgorou/menon--e)kate/rou ga\r a)paitou/menoi to\n lo/gon, ou) to\n -au)to\n a)podi/domen u(pe\r a)mphoi=n. O(/then a(marta/nein tou\s -e(/teron e(te/rou katêgorou=ntas. Ei) me\n ga\r tau)ton e)sti tô=| -a)nthrô/pô| to\ a)gatho/n, kai\ tô=| i(/ppô| to\ tre/chein, pô=s kai\ -siti/ou kai\ pharma/kou to\ a)gatho/n? kai\ nê\ Di/a pa/lin le/ontos -kai\ kuno\s to\ tre/chein, katêgorou=men? ei) d' e(/teron, ou)k -o)rthô=s _a)/nthrôpon a)gatho\n kai\ i(/ppon tre/chein_ le/gomen]. - -Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. p. 269-282) gives a different vein -of reasoning respecting predication,--yet a view which illustrates -this doctrine of Antisthenes. Sextus does not require that all -predication shall be restricted to identical predication: but he -maintains that you cannot define any general word. To define, he says, -is to enunciate the essence of that which is defined. But when you -define Man--"a mortal, rational animal, capable of reason and -knowledge"--you give only certain attributes of Man, which go along -with the essence--you do not give the essence itself. If you enumerate -even all the accompaniments ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]), you will still -fail to tell me what the essence of Man is: which is what I desire to -know, and what you profess to do by your definition. It is useless to -enumerate accompaniments, until you explain to me what the essence is -which they accompany. - -These are ingenious objections, which seem to me quite valid, if you -assume the logical subject to be a real, absolute essence, apart from -all or any of its predicates. And this is a frequent illusion, -favoured even by many logicians. We enunciate the subject first, then -the predicate; and because the subject can be conceived after -abstraction of this, that, _or_ the other predicates--we are apt to -imagine that it may be conceived without _all or any_ of the -predicates. But this is an illusion. If you suppress all predicates, -the subject or supposed substratum vanishes along with them: just as -the Genus vanishes, if you suppress all the different species of it. - -"Scais-tu au moins ce que c'est que la matière? Très-bien. . . Par -exemple, cette pierre est grise, est d'une telle forme, a ses trois -dimensions; elle est pésante et divisible. Eh bien (dit le Sirien), -cette chose qui te paroît être divisible, pésante, et grise, me dirois -tu bien ce que c'est? Tu vois quelques attributs: mais le fond de la -chose, le connois tu? Non, dit l'autre. Tu ne scais donc point ce que -c'est que la matière." (Voltaire, Micromégas, c. 7.) - -"Le fond de la chose"--the Ding an sich--is nothing but the name -itself, divested of every fraction of meaning: it is _titulus sine -re_. But the name being familiar, and having been always used with a -meaning, still appears invested with much of the old emotional -associations, even though it has been stripped of all its meaning by -successive acts of abstraction. If you subtract from four, 1 + 1 + 1 + -1, there will remain zero. But by abstracting, from the subject _man_, -all its predicates, real and possible, you cannot reduce it to zero. -The _name_ man always remains, and appears by old association to carry -with it some meaning--though the meaning can no longer be defined. - -This illusion is well pointed out in a valuable passage of Cabanis (Du -Degré de Certitude de la Médecine, p. 61):-- - -"Je pourrois d'ailleurs demander ce qu'on entend par la nature et les -causes premières des maladies. Nous connoissons de leur nature, ce que -les faits en manifestent. Nous savons, par exemple, que la fièvre -produit tels et tels changements: ou plutôt, c'est par ces changements -qu'elle se montre à nos yeux: c'est _par eux seuls qu'elle existe pour -nous_. Quand un homme tousse, crache du sang, respire avec peine, -ressent une douleur de côté, a le pouls plus vite et plus dur, la peau -plus chaude que dans l'état naturel--l'on dit qu'il est attaqué d'une -pleurésie. Mais qu'est ce donc _qu'une pleurésie_? On vous répliquera -que c'est une maladie, dans laquelle tous, ou presque tous, ces -accidents se trouvent combinés. S'il en manque un ou plusieurs, ce -n'est point la pleurésie, du moins la vraie pleurésie essentielle des -écoles. _C'est donc le concours de ces accidents qui la constitue._ Le -mot _pleurésie ne fait que les retracer d'une manière plus courte. Ce -mot n'est pas un être par lui-même_: il exprime une abstraction de -l'esprit, et réveille par un seul trait toutes les images d'un assez -grand tableau. - -"Ainsi lorsque, non content de connoître une maladie par ce qu'elle -offre à nos sens, par ce qui seul la constitue, et sans quoi elle -n'existeroit pas, _vous demandez encore quelle est sa nature en -elle-même, quelle est son essence--c'est comme si vous demandiez quelle -est la nature ou l'essence d'un mot, d'une pure abstraction._ Il n'y a -donc pas beaucoup de justesse à dire, d'un air de triomphe, que les -médecins ignorent même la nature de la fièvre, et que sans cesse ils -agissent dans des circonstances, ou manient des instruments, dont -l'essence leur est inconnue."] - -[Side-note: Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could -belong to more than one subject.] - -Stilpon (like Antisthenes, as I have remarked above) seems to have had -in his mind a type of predication, similar to the type of reasoning -which Aristotle laid down the syllogism: such that the form of the -proposition should be itself a guarantee for the truth of what was -affirmed. Throughout the ancient philosophy, especially in the more -methodised debates between the Academics and Sceptics on one side, and -the Stoics on the other--what the one party affirmed and the other -party denied, was, the existence of a Criterion of Truth: some -distinguishable mark, such as falsehood could not possibly carry. To -find this infallible mark in propositions, Stilpon admitted none -except identical. While agreeing with Antisthenes, that no predicate -could belong to a subject different from itself, he added a new -argument, by pointing out that predicates applied to one subject were -also applied to many other subjects. Now if the predicates belonged to -one, they could not (in his view) belong to the others: and therefore -they did not really belong to any. He considered that predication -involved either identity or special and exclusive implication of the -predicate with the subject. - -[Side-note: Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenidês.] - -Stilpon was not the first who had difficulty in explaining to himself -how one and the same predicate could be applied to many different -subjects. The difficulty had already been set forth in the Platonic -Parmenidês.[133] How can the Form (Man, White, Good, &c.) be present -at one and the same time in many distinct individuals? It cannot be -present as a whole in each: nor can it be divided, and thus present -partly in one, partly in another. How therefore can it be present at -all in any of them? In other words, how can the One be Many, and how -can the Many be One? Of this difficulty (as of many others) Plato -presents no solution, either in the Parmenidês or anywhere else.[134] -Aristotle alludes to several contemporaries or predecessors who felt -it. Stilpon reproduces it in his own way. It is a very real -difficulty, requiring to be dealt with by those who lay down a theory -of predication; and calling upon them to explain the functions of -general propositions, and the meaning of general terms. - -[Footnote 133: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 131. Compare also Philêbus, p. -15, and Stallbaum's Proleg. to the Parmenidês, pp. 46-47. The long -commentary of Proklus (v. 100-110. pp. 670-682 of the edition of -Stallbaum) amply attests the [Greek: duskoli/an] of the problem. - -The argument of Parmenidês (in the dialogue called Parmenidês) is -applied to the Platonic [Greek: ei)/dê] and to [Greek: ta\ -mete/chonta]. But the argument is just as much applicable to -attributes, genera, species: to all general predicates.] - -[Footnote 134: Aristot. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 26-36. - -Lykophron and some others anterior to Aristotle proposed to elude the -difficulty, by ceasing to use the substantive verb as copula in -predication: instead of saying [Greek: Sôkra/tês e)sti\ leuko/s], they -said either [Greek: Sôkra/tês leuko/s], simply, or [Greek: Sôkra/tês -leleu/kôtai]. - -This is a remarkable evidence of the difficulty arising, even in these -early days of logic, about the logical function of the copula.] - -[Side-note: Menedêmus disallowed all negative predication.] - -Menedêmus the Eretrian, one among the hearers and admirers of Stilpon, -combined even more than Stilpon the attributes of the Cynic with those -of the Megaric. He was fearless in character, and uncontrouled in -speech, delivering harsh criticisms without regard to offence given: -he was also a great master of ingenious dialectic and puzzling -controversy.[135] His robust frame, grave deportment, and simplicity -of life, inspired great respect; especially as he occupied a -conspicuous position, and enjoyed political influence at Eretria. He -is said to have thought meanly both of Plato and Xenokrates. We are -told that Menedêmus, like Antisthenes and Stilpon, had doctrines of -his own on the subject of predication. He disallowed all negative -propositions, admitting none but affirmative: moreover even of the -affirmative propositions, he disallowed all the hypothetical, -approving only the simple and categorical.[136] - -[Footnote 135: Diog. L. ii. 127-134. [Greek: ê)=n ga\r kai\ -e)piko/ptês kai\ par)r(êsiastê/s.]] - -[Footnote 136: Diog. L. ii. 134.] - -It is impossible to pronounce confidently respecting these doctrines, -without knowing the reasons upon which they were grounded. -Unfortunately these last have not been transmitted to us. But we may -be very sure that there were reasons, sufficient or insufficient: and -the knowledge of those reasons would have enabled us to appreciate -more fully the state of the Greek mind, in respect to logical theory, -in and before the year 300 B.C. - -[Side-note: Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and -complex objects. Simple objects undefinable.] - -Another doctrine, respecting knowledge and definition, is ascribed by -Aristotle to "the disciples of Antisthenes and other such uninstructed -persons": it is also canvassed by Plato in the Theætêtus,[137] without -specifying its author, yet probably having Antisthenes in view. As far -as we can make out a doctrine which both these authors recite as -opponents, briefly and their own way, it is as follows:--"Objects must -be distinguished into--1. Simple or primary; and 2. Compound or -secondary combinations of these simple elements. This last class, the -compounds, may be explained or defined, because you can enumerate the -component elements. By such analysis, and by the definition founded -thereupon, you really come to _know_ them--describe them--predicate -about them. But the first class, the simple or primary objects, can -only be perceived by sense and named: they cannot be analysed, -defined, or known. You can only predicate about them that they are -like such and such other things: _e.g., silver_, you cannot say what -it is in itself, but only that it is like tin, or like something else. -There may thus be a _ratio_ and a definition of any compound object, -whether it be an object of perception or of conception: because one of -the component elements will serve as Matter or Subject of the -proposition, and the other as Form or Predicate. But there can be no -definition of any one of the component elements separately taken: -because there is neither Matter nor Form to become the Subject and -Predicate of a defining proposition." - -[Footnote 137: Plato, Theætêt, pp. 201-202. Aristotel. Metaph. [Greek: -Ê]. 1043, b. 22.] - -This opinion, ascribed to the followers of Antisthenes, is not in -harmony with the opinion ascribed by Aristotle to Antisthenes himself -(_viz._, That no propositions, except identical propositions, were -admissible): and we are led to suspect that the first opinion must -have been understood or qualified by its author in some manner not now -determinable. But the second opinion, drawing a marked logical -distinction between simple and complex Objects, has some interest from -the criticisms of Plato and Aristotle: both of whom select, for the -example illustrating the opinion, the syllable as the compound made up -of two or more letters which are its simple constituent elements. - -[Remarks of Plato on this doctrine.] - -Plato refutes the doctrine,[138] but in a manner not so much to prove -its untruth, as to present it for a verbal incongruity. How can you -properly say (he argues) that you _know_ the compound AB, when you -know neither A nor B separately? Now it may be incongruous to -restrict in this manner the use of the words _know--knowledge_: but -the distinction between the two cases is not denied by Plato. -Antisthenes said--"I feel a simple sensation (A or B) and can name it, -but I do not _know_ it: I can affirm nothing about it in itself, or -about its real essence. But the compound AB I do know, for I know its -essence: I can affirm about it that _it is_ compounded of A and B, and -this is its essence." Here is a real distinction: and Plato's argument -amounts only to affirming that it is an incorrect use of words to call -the compound _known_, when the component elements are not known. -Unfortunately the refutation of Plato is not connected with any -declaration of his own counter-doctrine, for Theætêtus ends in a -result purely negative. - -[Footnote 138: Plato, Theætêt. ut suprâ.] - -[Side-note: Remarks of Aristotle upon the same.] - -Aristotle, in his comment on the opinion of Antisthenes, makes us -understand better what it really is:--"Respecting simple essences (A -or B), I cannot tell what they really are: but I can tell what they -are like or unlike, _i.e._, I can compare them with other essences, -simple or compound. But respecting the compound AB, I can tell what it -really is: its essence is, to be compounded of A and B. And this I -call _knowing_ or _knowledge_."[139] The distinction here taken by -Antisthenes (or by his followers) is both real and useful: Plato does -not contest it: while Aristotle distinctly acknowledges it, only that -among the simple items he ranks both Percepta and Concepta. - -[Footnote 139: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. 1043, b. 24-32, with the -Scholia, p. 774, b. Br. - -Mr. J. S. Mill observes, Syst. of Logic, i. 5, 6, p. 116, -ed. 9:--"There is still another exceptional case, in which, though -the predicate is the name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm -nothing but resemblance: the class being founded not on resemblance in -any given particular, but on general unanalysable resemblance. The -classes in question are those into which our simple sensations, or -other simple feelings, are divided. Sensations of white, for instance, -are classed together, not because we can take them to pieces, and say, -they are alike in this, not alike in that but because we feel them to -be alike altogether, though in different degrees. When therefore I -say--The colour I saw yesterday was a white colour, or, The sensation -I feel is one of tightness--in both cases the attribute I affirm of -the colour or of the other sensation is mere resemblance: simple -likeness to sensations which I have had before, and which have had -that name bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other -concrete general names, are connotative: but they connote a mere -resemblance. When predicated of any individual feelings, the -information they convey is that of its likeness to the other feelings -which we have been accustomed to call by the same name."] - -[Side-note: Later Grecian Cynics--Monimus--Krates--Hipparchia.] - -Monimus a Syracusan, and Krates a Theban, with his wife -Hipparchia,[140] were successors of Diogenes in the Cynic vein of -philosophy: together with several others of less note. Both Monimus -and Krates are said to have been persons of wealthy condition,[141] -yet their minds were so powerfully affected by what they saw of -Diogenes, that they followed his example, renounced their wealth, and -threw themselves upon a life of poverty; with nothing beyond the -wallet and the threadbare cloak, but with fearless independence of -character, free censure of every one, and indifference to opinion. "I -choose as my country" (said Krates) "poverty and low esteem, which -fortune cannot assail: I am the fellow-citizen of Diogenes, whom the -snares of envy cannot reach."[142] Krates is said to have admonished -every one, whether they invited it or not: and to have gone unbidden -from house to house for the purpose of exhortation. His persistence in -this practice became so obtrusive that he obtained the title of "the -Door-Opener".[143] This feature, common to several other Cynics, -exhibits an approximation to the missionary character of Sokrates, as -described by himself in the Platonic Apology: a feature not found in -any of the other eminent heads of philosophy--neither in Plato nor in -Aristotle, Zeno, or Epikurus. - -[Footnote 140: Hipparchia was a native of Maroneia in Thrace; born in -a considerable station, and belonging to an opulent family. She came -to Athens with her brother Mêtroklês, and heard both Theophrastus and -Kratês. Both she and her brother became impressed with the strongest -admiration for Kratês: for his mode of life, as well as for his -discourses and doctrine. Rejecting various wealthy suitors, she -insisted upon becoming his wife, both against his will and against the -will of her parents. Her resolute enthusiasm overcame the reluctance -of both. She adopted fully his hard life, poor fare, and threadbare -cloak. She passed her days in the same discourses and controversies, -indifferent to the taunts which were addressed to her for having -relinquished the feminine occupations of spinning and weaving. -Diogenes Laertius found many striking dicta or replies ascribed to her -([Greek: a)/lla muri/a tê=s philoso/phou] vi. 96-98). He gives an -allusion made to her by the contemporary comic poet Menander, who (as -I before observed) handled the Cynics of his time as Aristophanes, -Eupolis, &c., had handled Sokrates-- - -[Greek: Sumperipatê/seis ga\r tri/bôn' e)/chous e)moi\, -ô(/sper Kra/têti tô=| Kunikô=| poth' ê( gunê\. -Kai\ thugate/r' e)xe/dôk' e)kei=nos, ô(s e)/phê -au)to\s, e)pi\ peira=| dou\s tria/konth' ê(me/ras]. -(vi. 93.)] - -[Footnote 141: Diog, L. vi. 82-88. [Greek: Mo/nimos o( Ku/ôn], Sext. -Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 48-88. - -About Krates, Plutarch, De Vit. Aere Alieno, 7, p. 831 F.] - -[Footnote 142: Diog. L. vi. 93. [Greek: e)/chein de\ patri/da a)doxi/an -te kai\ peni/an, a)na/lôta tê=| tu/chê|: kai\--Dioge/nous ei)=nai -poli/tês a)nepibouleu/tou phtho/nô|]. The parody or verses of Krates, -about his city of Pera (the Wallet), vi. 85, are very spirited-- - -[Greek: Pê/rê tis po/lis e)sti\ me/sô| e)ni\ oi)/nopi tu/phô|], &c. - -Krates composed a collection of philosophical Epistles, which Diogenes -pronounces to be excellent, and even to resemble greatly the style of -Plato (vi. 98).] - -[Footnote 143: Diog. L. vi. 86, [Greek: e)kalei=to de\ -_thurepanoi/ktês_, dia\ to\ ei)s pa=san ei)sie/nai oi)ki/an kai\ -nouthetei=n]. Compare Seneca, Epist. 29.] - -[Side-note: Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus.] - -Among other hearers of Krates, who carried on, and at the same time -modified, the Cynic discipline, we have to mention Zeno, of Kitium in -Cyprus, who became celebrated as the founder of the Stoic sect. In him -the Cynic, Megaric, and Herakleitean tendencies may be said to have -partially converged, though with considerable modifications:[144] the -ascetic doctrines (without the ascetic practices or obtrusive -forwardness) of the Cynics--and the logical subtleties of the others. -He blended them, however, with much of new positive theory, both -physical and cosmological. His compositions were voluminous; and those -of the Stoic Chrysippus, after him, were still more numerous. The -negative and oppugning function, which in the fourth century B.C. had -been directed by the Megarics against Aristotle, was in the third -century B.C. transferred to the Platonists, or Academy represented by -Arkesilaus: whose formidable dialectic was brought to bear upon the -Stoic and Epikurean schools--both of them positive, though greatly -opposed to each other. - -[Footnote 144: Numenius ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 5.] - -* * * * * - -ARISTIPPUS. - - -Along with Antisthenes, among the hearers and companions of Sokrates, -stood another Greek of very opposite dispositions, yet equally marked -and original--Aristippus of Kyrênê. The stimulus of the Sokratic -method, and the novelty of the topics on which it was brought to bear, -operated forcibly upon both, prompting each of them to theorise in his -own way on the best plan of life. - -[Side-note: Aristippus--life, character, and doctrine.] - -Aristippus, a Kyrenean of easy circumstances, having heard of the -powerful ascendancy exercised by Sokrates over youth, came to Athens -for the express purpose of seeing him, and took warm interest in his -conversation.[145] He set great value upon mental cultivation and -accomplishments; but his habits of life were inactive, easy, and -luxurious. Upon this last count, one of the most interesting chapters -in the Xenophontic Memorabilia reports an interrogative lecture -addressed to him by Sokrates, in the form of dialogue.[146] - -[Footnote 145: Plutarch (De Curiositate, p. 516 A) says that -Aristippus informed himself, at the Olympic games, from Ischomachus -respecting the influence of Sokrates.] - -[Footnote 146: See the first chapter of the Second Book of the -Memorabilia. - -I give an abstract of the principal points in the dialogue, not a -literal translation.] - -[Side-note: Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus.] - -Sokrates points out to Aristippus that mankind may be distributed into -two classes: 1. Those who have trained themselves to habits of -courage, energy, bodily strength, and command over their desires and -appetites, together with practice in the actual work of life:--these -are the men who become qualified to rule, and who do actually rule. 2. -The rest of mankind, inferior in these points, who have no choice but -to obey, and who do obey.[147]--Men of the first or ruling class -possess all the advantages of life: they perform great exploits, and -enjoy a full measure of delight and happiness, so far as human -circumstances admit. Men of the second class are no better than -slaves, always liable to suffer, and often actually suffering, -ill-treatment and spoliation of the worst kind. To which of these -classes (Sokrates asks Aristippus) do you calculate on belonging--and -for which do you seek to qualify yourself?--To neither of them (replies -Aristippus). I do not wish to share the lot of the subordinate -multitude: but I have no relish for a life of command, with all the -fatigues, hardships, perils, &c., which are inseparable from it. I -prefer a middle course: I wish neither to rule, nor to be ruled, but -to be a freeman: and I consider freedom as the best guarantee for -happiness.[148] I desire only to pass through life as easily and -pleasantly as possible.[149]--Which of the two do you consider to live -most pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled? asks Sokrates.--I do not -rank myself with either (says Aristippus): nor do I enter into active -duties of citizenship anywhere: I pass from one city to another, but -everywhere as a stranger or non-citizen.--Your scheme is impracticable -(says Sokrates). You cannot obtain security in the way that you -propose. You will find yourself suffering wrong and distress along -with the subordinates[150]--and even worse than the subordinates: for -a stranger, wherever he goes, is less befriended and more exposed to -injury than the native citizens. You will be sold into slavery, though -you are fit for no sort of work: and your master will chastise you -until you become fit for work.--But (replies Aristippus) this very art -of ruling, which you consider to be happiness,[151] is itself a hard -life, a toilsome slavery, not only stripped of enjoyment, but full of -privation and suffering. A man must be a fool to embrace such -discomforts of his own accord.--It is that very circumstance (says -Sokrates), that he does embrace them of his own accord--which renders -them endurable, and associates them with feelings of pride and -dignity. They are the price paid beforehand, for a rich reward to -come. He who goes through labour and self-denial, for the purpose of -gaining good friends or subduing enemies, and for the purpose of -acquiring both mental and bodily power, so that he may manage his own -concerns well and may benefit both his friends and his country--such a -man will be sure to find his course of labour pleasurable. He will -pass his life in cheerful[152] satisfaction, not only enjoying his own -esteem and admiration, but also extolled and envied by others. On the -contrary, whoever passes his earlier years in immediate pleasures and -indolent ease, will acquire no lasting benefit either in mind or body. -He will have a soft lot at first, but his future will be hard and -dreary.[153] - -[Footnote 147: Xen. Memor. ii. 1, 1 seq. [Greek: to\n me\n o(/pôs -i(kano\s e)/stai a)/rchein, to\n de\ o(/pôs mê/d' a)ntipoiê/setai -a)rchê=s--tou\s a)rchikou/s.]] - -[Footnote 148: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 11. [Greek: a)ll' ei)=nai ti/s moi -dokei= me/sê tou/tôn o(do/s, ê)\n peirô=mai badi/zein, ou)/te di' -a)rchê=s, ou)/te dia\ doulei/as, a)lla\ di' e)leutheri/as, ê)/per -ma/lista pro\s eu)daimoni/an a)/gei.]] - -[Footnote 149: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 9. [Greek: e)mauton toi/nun ta/ttô -ei)s tou\s boulome/nous ê)=| r(a=|sta kai\ ê(/dista bioteu/ein.]] - -[Footnote 150: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 12. [Greek: ei) me/ntoi e)n -a)nthrô/pois ô)\n mê/te a)/rchein a)xiô/seis mê/te a)/rchesthai, mê/te -tou\s a)/rchontas e(kô\n therapeu/seis, oi)=mai/ se o(ra=|n ô(s -e)pi/stantai oi( krei/ttones tou\s ê(/ttonas kai\ koinê=| kai\ i)di/a| -klai/ontas kathi/santes, ô(s dou/lois chrê=sthai]. - -What follows is yet more emphatic, about the unjust oppression of -rulers, and the suffering on the part of subjects.] - -[Footnote 151: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 17. [Greek: A)lla\ ga\r, ô)= -Sô/krates, oi( ei)s tê\n basilikê\n te/chnên paideuo/menoi, ê)\n -dokei=s moi su\ nomi/zein eu)daimoni/an ei)=nai]. - -Compare Memor. ii. 3, 4.] - -[Footnote 152: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 19. [Greek: pô=s ou)k oi)/esthai chrê\ -tou/tous kai\ ponei=n ê(de/ôs ei)s ta\ toiau=ta, kai\ zê=n -eu)phronome/nous, a)game/nous me\n e(autou\s, e)painoume/nous de\ kai\ -zêloume/nous u(po\ tô=n a)/llôn?] - -[Footnote 153: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 20, cited from Epicharmus:-- - -[Greek: mê\ ta\ malaka\ mô/eo, mê\ ta\ sklê/r' e)/chê|s.]] - -[Side-note: Choice of Hêraklês.] - -Sokrates enforces his lecture by reciting to Aristippus the memorable -lecture or apologue, which the Sophist Prodikus was then delivering in -lofty diction to numerous auditors[154]--the fable still known as the -Choice of Hêraklês. Virtue and Pleasure (the latter of the two being -here identified with Evil or Vice) are introduced as competing for the -direction of the youthful Hêraklês. Each sets forth her case, in -dramatic antithesis. Pleasure is introduced as representing altogether -the gratification of the corporeal appetites and the love of repose: -while Virtue replies by saying, that if youth be employed altogether -in pursuing such delights, at the time when the appetites are most -vigorous--the result will be nothing but fatal disappointment, -accompanied with entire loss of the different and superior pleasures -available in mature years and in old age. Youth is the season of -labour: the physical appetites must be indulged sparingly, and only at -the call of actual want: accomplishments of body and mind must be -acquired in that season, which will enable the mature man to perform -in after life great and glorious exploits. He will thus realise the -highest of all human delights--the love of his friends and the -admiration of his countrymen--the sound of his own praises and the -reflexion upon his own deserts. At the price of a youth passed in -labour and self-denial, he will secure the fullest measure of mature -and attainable happiness. - -[Footnote 154: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21-34. [Greek: e)n tô=| suggra/mmati -tô=| peri\ Ê(rakle/ous, o(/per dê\ kai\ plei/stois -e)pidei/knutai--megaleiote/rois r(ê/masin.]] - -"It is worth your while, Aristippus" (says Sokrates, in concluding -this lecture), "to bestow some reflexion on what is to happen in the -latter portions of your life." - -[Side-note: Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting -Good and Evil.] - -This dialogue (one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and -probably reported by Xenophon from actual hearing) is valuable in -reference not only to Aristippus, but also to Sokrates himself. Many -recent historians of philosophy describe Sokrates and Plato as setting -up an idea of Virtue or Good Absolute (_i.e._ having no essential -reference to the happiness or security of the agent or of any one -else) which they enforce--and an idea of Vice or Evil Absolute (_i.e._ -having no essential reference to suffering or peril, or -disappointment, either of the agent or of any one else) which they -denounce and discommend and as thereby refuting the Sophists, who are -said to have enforced Virtue and denounced Vice only relatively--_i.e._ -in consequence of the bearing of one and the other upon the -security and happiness of the agent or of others. Whether there be any -one doctrine or style of preaching which can be fairly ascribed to the -Sophists as a class, I will not again discuss here: but I believe that -the most eminent among them, Protagoras and Prodikus, held the -language here ascribed to them. But it is a mistake to suppose that -upon this point Sokrates was their opponent. The Xenophontic Sokrates -(a portrait more resembling reality than the Platonic) always holds -this same language: the Platonic Sokrates not always, yet often. In -the dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, as well as in the -apologue of Prodikus, we see that the devotion of the season of youth -to indulgence and inactive gratification of appetite, is blamed as -productive of ruinous consequences--as entailing loss of future -pleasures, together with a state of weakness which leaves no -protection against future suffering; while great care is taken to -show, that though laborious exercise is demanded during youth, such -labour will be fully requited by the increased pleasures and happiness -of after life. The pleasure of being praised, and the pleasure of -seeing good deeds performed by one's self, are especially insisted on. -On this point both Sokrates and Prodikus concur.[155] - -[Footnote 155: Xenoph. Mem. ii. 1, 31. [Greek: tou= de\ pa/ntôn -ê(di/stou a)kou/smatos, e)pai/nou seautê=s, a)nê/koos ei)=, kai\ tou= -pa/ntôn ê(distou thea/matos a)the/atos; ou)de\n ga\r pô/pote seautê=s -e)/rgon kalo\n tethe/asai. . . . - -ta\ me\n ê(de/a e)n tê=| veo/têti diadramo/ntes, ta\ de\ chalepa\ e)s -to\ gê=ras a)pothe/menoi.]] - -[Side-note: Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic -Sokrates.] - -If again we compare the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic -Sokrates, we shall find that the lecture of the former to Aristippus -coincides sufficiently with the theory laid down by the latter in the -dialogue Protagoras; to which theory the Sophist Protagoras is -represented as yielding a reluctant adhesion. But we shall find also -that it differs materially from the doctrine maintained by Sokrates in -the Platonic Gorgias. Nay, if we follow the argument addressed by the -Xenophontic Sokrates to Aristippus, we perceive that it is in -substance similar to that which the Platonic dialogue Gorgias puts in -the mouth of the rhetor Pôlus and the politician Kalliklês. The -Xenophontic Sokrates distributes men into two classes--the rulers and -the ruled: the former strong, well-armed, and well-trained, who enjoy -life at the expense of the submission and suffering of the latter: the -former committing injustice, the latter enduring injustice. He -impresses upon Aristippus the misery of being confounded with the -suffering many, and exhorts him to qualify himself by a laborious -apprenticeship for enrolment among the ruling few. If we read the -Platonic Gorgias, we shall see that this is the same strain in which -Pôlus and Kalliklês address Sokrates, when they invite him to exchange -philosophy for rhetoric, and to qualify himself for active political -life. "Unless you acquire these accomplishments, you will be helpless -and defenceless against injury and insult from others: while, if you -acquire them, you will raise yourself to political influence, and will -exercise power over others, thus obtaining the fullest measure of -enjoyment which life affords: see the splendid position to which the -Macedonian usurper Archelaus has recently exalted himself.[156] -Philosophy is useful, when studied in youth for a short time as -preface to professional and political apprenticeship: but if a man -perseveres in it and makes it the occupation of life, he will not only -be useless to others, but unable to protect himself; he will be -exposed to suffer any injustice which the well-trained and powerful -men may put upon him." To these exhortations of Pôlus and Kalliklês -Sokrates replies by admitting their case as true matter of fact. "I -know that I am exposed to such insults and injuries: but my life is -just and innocent. If I suffer, I shall suffer wrong: and those who do -the wrong will thereby inflict upon themselves a greater mischief than -they inflict upon me. Doing wrong is worse for the agent than -suffering wrong."[157] - -[Footnote 156: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 466-470-486.] - -[Footnote 157: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 508-509-521-527 C. [Greek: kai\ -e)/aso/n tina sou= kataphronê=sai ô(s a)noê/tou, kai\ propêlaki/sai -e)a\n bou/lêtai, kai\ nai\ ma\ Di/a su/ ge thar)r(ô=n pata/xai tê\n -a)/timon tau/tên plêgê/n; ou)de\n ga\r deino\n pei/sei, e)a\n tô=| -o)/nti ê(=|s kalo\s ka)gatho/s, a)skô=n a)retê/n.]] - -[Side-note: Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus--Kallikes in -Platonic Gorgias.] - -There is indeed this difference between the Xenophontic Sokrates in -his address to Aristippus, and the Platonic Kalliklês in his -exhortation to Sokrates: That whereas Kalliklês proclaims and even -vindicates it as natural justice and right, that the strong should -gratify their desires by oppressing and despoiling the weak--the -Xenophontic Sokrates merely asserts such oppression as an actual fact, -notorious and undeniable,[158] without either approving or blaming it. -Plato, constructing an imaginary conversation with the purpose that -Sokrates shall be victorious, contrives intentionally and with -dramatic consistency that the argument of Kalliklês shall be advanced -in terms so invidious and revolting that no one else would be bold -enough to speak it out:[159] which contrivance was the more necessary, -as Sokrates is made not only to disparage the poets, rhetors, and most -illustrious statesmen of historical Athens, but to sustain a thesis in -which he admits himself to stand alone, opposed to aristocrats as well -as democrats.[160] Yet though there is this material difference in the -manner of handling, the plan of life which the Xenophontic Sokrates -urges upon Aristippus, and the grounds upon which he enforces it, are -really the same as those which Kalliklês in the Platonic Gorgias urges -upon Sokrates. "Labour to qualify yourself for active political -power"--is the lesson addressed in the one case to a wealthy man who -passed his life in ease and indulgence, in the other case to a poor -man who devoted himself to speculative debate on general questions, -and to cross-examination of every one who would listen and answer. The -man of indulgence, and the man of speculation,[161] were both of them -equally destitute of those active energies which were necessary to -confer power over others, or even security against oppression by -others. - -[Footnote 158: If we read the conversation alleged by Thucydides (v. -94-105-112) to have taken place between the Athenian generals and the -executive council of Melos, just before the siege of that island by -the Athenians, we shall see that this same language is held by the -Athenians. "You, the Melians, being much weaker, must submit to us who -are much stronger; this is the universal law and necessity of nature, -which we are not the first to introduce, but only follow out, as -others have done before us, and will do after us. Submit--or it will -be worse for you. No middle course, or neutrality, is open to you."] - -[Footnote 159: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-487-492.] - -[Footnote 160: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 472-521.] - -[Footnote 161: If we read the treatise of Plutarch, [Greek: Peri\ -Stôi/kôn e)nantiôma/tôn] (c. 2-3, p. 1033 C-D), we shall see that the -Stoic writers, Zeno, Kleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater, all -of them earnestly recommended a life of active citizenship and -laborious political duty, as incumbent upon philosophers not less than -upon others; and that they treated with contempt a life of literary -leisure and speculation. Chrysippus explicitly declared [Greek: -ou)de\n diaphe/rein to\n scholastiko\n bi/on tou= ê(donikou=] _i. e._ -that the speculative philosopher who kept aloof from political -activity, was in substance a follower of Epikurus. Tacitus holds much -the same language (Hist. iv. 5) when he says about Helvidius -Priscus:--"ingenium illustre altioribus studiis juvenis admodum dedit: -non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo -constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret," &c. - -The contradiction which Plutarch notes is, that these very Stoic -philosophers (Chrysippus and the others) who affected to despise all -modes of life except active civic duty--were themselves, all, men of -literary leisure, spending their lives away from their native cities, -in writing and talking philosophy. The same might have been said about -Sokrates and Plato (except as to leaving their native cities), both of -whom incurred the same reproach for inactivity as Sokrates here -addresses to Aristippus.] - -[Side-note: Language held by Aristippus--his scheme of life.] - -In the Xenophontic dialogue, Aristippus replies to Sokrates that the -apprenticeship enjoined upon him is too laborious, and that the -exercise of power, itself laborious, has no charm for him. He desires -a middle course, neither to oppress nor to be oppressed: neither to -command, nor to be commanded--like Otanes among the seven Persian -conspirators.[162] He keeps clear of political obligation, and seeks -to follow, as much as he can, his own individual judgment. Though -Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue, is made to declare this middle -course impossible, yet it is substantially the same as what the -Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias aspires to:--moreover the same as -what the real Sokrates at Athens both pursued as far as he could, and -declared to be the only course consistent with his security.[163] The -Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias declares emphatically that no man can -hope to take active part in the government of a country, unless he be -heartily identified in spirit with the ethical and political system of -the country: unless he not merely professes, but actually and -sincerely shares, the creed, doctrines, tastes, and modes of -appreciation prevalent among the citizens.[164] Whoever is deficient -in this indispensable condition, must be content "to mind his own -business and to abstain from active meddling with public affairs". -This is the course which the Platonic Sokrates claims both for himself -and for the philosopher generally:[165] it is also the course which -Aristippus chooses for himself, under the different title of a middle -way between the extortion of the ruler and the suffering of the -subordinate. And the argument of Sokrates that no middle way is -possible--far from refuting Aristippus (as Xenophon says that it -did)[166] is founded upon an incorrect assumption: had it been -correct, neither literature nor philosophy could have been developed. - -[Footnote 162: Herodot. iii. 80-83.] - -[Footnote 163: Plato, Apol. So. p. 32 A. [Greek: i)diôteu/ein, a)lla\ -mê\ dêmosieu/ein].] - -[Footnote 164: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 510-513. [Greek: Ti/s ou)=n pot' -e)sti\ te/chnê tê=s paraskeuê=s tou= mêde\n a)dikei=sthai ê)\ ô(s -o)li/gista? ske/psai ei)/ soi dokei= ê(=|per e)moi/. e)moi\ me\n ga\r -dokei= ê(/de; ê)\ au)to\n a)/rchein dei=n e)n tê=| po/lei ê)\ kai\ -turannei=n, ê)\ tê=s u(parchou/sês politei/as e(tai=ron ei)=nai]. -(This is exactly the language which Sokrates holds to Aristippus, -Xenoph. Memor. ii. 1, 12.) - -[Greek: o(\s a)\n o(moê/thês ô)\n, tau)ta pse/gôn kai\ e)painô=n, -e)the/lê| a)/rchesthai kai\ u(pokei=sthai tô=| a)/rchonti--eu)thu\s -e)k ne/ou e)thi/zein au(to\n toi=s au)toi=s chai/rein kai\ -a)/chthesthai tô=| despo/tê|] (510 D). [Greek: ou) ga\r mimêtê\n dei= -ei)=nai a)ll' au)tophuô=s o(/moion tou/tois] (513 B).] - -[Footnote 165: Plato, Gorgias, p. 526 C-D. (Compare Republic, vi. p. -496 D.) [Greek: a)ndro\s i)diô/tou ê)\ a)/llou tino/s, ma/lista me/n, -e)/gôge/ phêmi, ô)= Kalli/kleis, philoso/phou ta\ au(tou= pra/xantos -kai\ ou) polupragmonê/santos e)n tô=| bi/ô|--kai\ dê\ kai\ se\ -a)ntiparakalô=] (Sokrates to Kalliklês) [Greek: e)pi\ tou=ton to\n -bi/on]. Upon these words Routh remarks: "Respicitur inter hæc verba ad -Calliclis orationem, quâ rerum civilium tractatio et [Greek: -polupragmosu/nê] Socrati persuadentur,"--which is the same invitation -as the Xenophontic Sokrates addresses to Aristippus. Again, in Plat. -Republ. viii. pp. 549 C, 550 A, we read, that corruption of the -virtuous character begins by invitations to the shy youth to depart -from the quiet plan of life followed by a virtuous father (who is -[Greek: ta\ e(autou= pra/ttei]) and to enter on a career of active -political ambition. The youth is induced, by instigation of his mother -and relatives without, to pass from [Greek: a)pragmosu/nê] to [Greek: -philopragmosu/nê], which is described as a change for the worse. Even -in Xenophon (Memor. iii. 11, 16) Sokrates recognises and jests upon -his own [Greek: a)pragmosu/nê].] - -[Footnote 166: Xen. Mem. iii. 8, 1. Diogenes L. says (and it is -probable enough, from radical difference of character) that Xenophon -was adversely disposed to Aristippus. In respect to other persons -also, Xenophon puts invidious constructions (for which at any rate no -ground is shown) upon their purposes in questioning Sokrates: thus, in -the dialogue (i. 6) with the Sophist Antiphon, he says that Antiphon -questioned Sokrates in order to seduce him away from his companions -(Mem. i. 6, 1).] - -[Side-note: Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the -character of the hearer.] - -The real Sokrates, since he talked incessantly and with every one, -must of course have known how to diversify his conversation and adapt -it to each listener. Xenophon not only attests this generally,[167] -but has preserved the proofs of it in his Memorabilia--real -conversations, reported though doubtless dressed up by himself. The -conversations which he has preserved relate chiefly to piety and to -the duties and proceedings of active life: and to the necessity of -controuling the appetites: these he selected partly because they -suited his proclaimed purpose of replying to the topics of indictment, -partly because they were in harmony with his own _idéal_. Xenophon was -a man of action, resolute in mind and vigorous in body, performing -with credit the duties of the general as well as of the soldier. His -heroes were men like Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus--warriors, -horsemen, hunters, husbandmen, always engaged in active competition -for power, glory, or profit, and never shrinking from danger, fatigue, -or privation. For a life of easy and unambitious indulgence, even -though accompanied by mental and speculative activity--"homines ignavâ -operâ et philosophiâ sententiâ"--he had no respect. It was on this -side that the character of Aristippus certainly seemed to be, and -probably really was, the most defective. Sokrates employed the -arguments the most likely to call forth within him habits of action--to -render him [Greek: praktikô/teron].[168] In talking with the -presumptuous youth Glaukon, and with the diffident Charmides,[169] -Sokrates used language adapted to correct the respective infirmities -of each. In addressing Kritias and Alkibiades, he would consider it -necessary not only to inculcate self-denial as to appetite, but to -repress an exorbitance of ambition.[170] But in dealing with -Aristippus, while insisting upon command of appetite and acquirement -of active energy, he at the same time endeavours to kindle ambition, -and the love of command: he even goes so far as to deny the -possibility of a middle course, and to maintain (what Kritias and -Alkibiades[171] would have cordially approved) that there was no -alternative open, except between the position of the oppressive -governors and that of the suffering subjects. Addressed to Aristippus, -these topics were likely to thrust forcibly upon his attention the -danger of continued indulgences during the earlier years of life, and -the necessity, in view to his own future security, for training in -habits of vigour, courage, self-command, endurance. - -[Footnote 167: Xen. Mem. iv. 1, 2-3.] - -[Footnote 168: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 1. [Greek: ô(s de\ kai\ -praktikôte/rous e)poi/ei tou\s suno/ntas au)tô=|, nu=n au)= tou=to -le/xô.]] - -[Footnote 169: Xenoph. Mem. iii. capp. 6 and 7.] - -[Footnote 170: Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 15-18-24. Respecting the different -tone and arguments employed by Sokrates, in his conversations with -different persons, see a good passage in the Rhetor Aristeides, Orat. -xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n tetta/rôn], p. 161, Dindorf.] - -[Footnote 171: We see from the first two chapters of the Memorabilia -of Xenophon (as well as from the subsequent intimation of Æschines, in -the oration against Timarchus, p. 173) how much stress was laid by the -accusers of Sokrates on the fact that he had educated Kritias and -Alkibiades; and how the accusers alleged that his teaching tended to -encourage the like exorbitant aspirations in others, dangerous to -established authority, traditional, legal, parental, divine. I do not -doubt (what Xenophon affirms) that Sokrates, when he conversed with -Kritias and Alkibiades, held a very opposite language. But it was -otherwise when he talked with men of ease and indulgence without -ambition, such as Aristippus. If Melêtus and Anytus could have put in -evidence the conversation of Sokrates with Aristippus, many points of -it would have strengthened their case against Sokrates before the -Dikasts. We read in Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 58) how the point was made to -tell, that Sokrates often cited and commented on the passage of the -Iliad (ii. 188) in which the Grecian chiefs, retiring from the agora -to their ships, are described as being respectfully addressed by -Odysseus--while the common soldiers are scolded and beaten by him, for -the very same conduct: the relation which Sokrates here dwells on as -subsisting between [Greek: oi( a)rchikoi\] and [Greek: oi( -a)rcho/menoi], would favour the like colouring.] - -[Side-note: Conversations between Sokrates and Aristippus about the -Good and Beautiful.] - -Xenophon notices briefly two other colloquies between Sokrates and -Aristippus. The latter asked Sokrates, "Do you know anything good?" in -order (says Xenophon) that if Sokrates answered in the affirmative and -gave as examples, health, wealth, strength, courage, bread, &c., he -(Aristippus) might show circumstances in which this same particular -was evil; and might thus catch Sokrates in a contradiction, as -Sokrates had caught him before.[172] But Sokrates (says Xenophon) far -from seeking to fence with the question, retorted it in such a way as -to baffle the questioner, and at the same time to improve and instruct -the by-standers.[173] "Do you ask me if I know anything good for a -fever?--No. Or for ophthalmic distemper?-No. Or for hunger?--No. Oh! -then, if you mean to ask me, whether I know anything good, which is -good for nothing--I reply that I neither know any such thing, nor care -to know it." - -[Footnote 172: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. Both Xenophon and some of his -commentators censure this as a captious string of questions put by -Aristippus--'captiosas Aristippi quæstiunculas". Such a criticism is -preposterous, when we recollect that Sokrates was continually -examining and questioning others in the same manner. See in particular -his cross-examination of Euthydêmus, reported by Xenophon, Memor. iv. -2; and many others like it, both in Xenophon and in Plato.] - -[Footnote 173: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. [Greek: boulo/menos tou\s -suno/ntas ô(phelei=n.]] - -Again, on another occasion Aristippus asked him "Do you know anything -beautiful?--Yes; many things.--Are they all like to each other?--No; -they are as unlike as possible to each other.--How then (continues -Aristippus) can that which is unlike to the beautiful, be itself -beautiful?--Easily enough (replies Sokrates); one man is beautiful for -running; another man, altogether unlike him, is beautiful for -wrestling. A shield which is beautiful for protecting your body, is -altogether unlike to a javelin, which is beautiful for being swiftly -and forcibly hurled.--Your answer (rejoined Aristippus) is exactly the -same as it was when I asked you whether you knew anything -good.--Certainly (replies Sokrates). Do you imagine, that the Good is one -thing, and the Beautiful another? Do you not know that all things are -good and beautiful in relation to the same purpose? Virtue is not good -in relation to one purpose, and beautiful in relation to another. Men -are called both good and beautiful in reference to the same ends: the -bodies of men, in like manner: and all things which men use, are -considered both good and beautiful, in consideration of their serving -their ends well.--Then (says Aristippus) a basket for carrying dung is -beautiful?--To be sure (replied Sokrates), and a golden shield is -ugly; if the former be well made for doing its work, and the latter -badly.--Do you then assert (asked Aristippus) that the same things are -beautiful and ugly?--Assuredly (replied Sokrates); and the same things -are both good and evil. That which is good for hunger, is often bad -for a fever: that which is good for a fever, is often bad for hunger. -What is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling--and _vice -versâ_. All things are good and beautiful, in relation to the ends -which they serve well: all things are evil and ugly, in relation to -the ends which they serve badly."[174] - -[Footnote 174: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1-9.] - -[Side-note: Remarks on the conversation--Theory of Good.] - -These last cited colloquies also, between Sokrates and Aristippus, are -among the most memorable remains of Grecian philosophy: belonging to -one of the years preceding 399 B.C., in which last year Sokrates -perished. Here (as in the former dialogue) the doctrine is distinctly -enunciated by Sokrates--That Good and Evil--Beautiful (or Honourable) -and Ugly (or Dishonourable--Base)--have no intelligible meaning except -in relation to human happiness and security. Good or Evil Absolute -(_i.e._, apart from such relation) is denied to exist. The theory of -Absolute Good (a theory traceable to the Parmenidean doctrines, and -adopted from them by Eukleides) becomes first known to us as -elaborated by Plato. Even in his dialogues it is neither always nor -exclusively advocated, but is often modified by, and sometimes even -exchanged for, the eudæmonistic or relative theory. - -[Side-note: Good is relative to human beings and wants, in the view of -Sokrates.] - -Sokrates declares very explicitly, in his conversation with -Aristippus, what _he_ means by the Good and the Beautiful: and when -therefore in the name of the Good and the Beautiful, he protests -against an uncontrolled devotion to the pleasures of sense (as in one -of the Xenophontic dialogues with Euthydemus[175]), what he means is, -that a man by such intemperance ruins his prospects of future -happiness, and his best means of being useful both to himself and -others. Whether Aristippus first learnt from Sokrates the relative -theory of the Good and the Beautiful, or had already embraced it -before, we cannot say. Some of his questions, as reported in Xenophon, -would lead us to suspect that it took him by surprise: just as we -find, in the Protagoras of Plato that a theory substantially the same, -though in different words, is proposed by the Platonic Sokrates to the -Sophist Protagoras: who at first repudiates it, but is compelled -ultimately to admit it by the elaborate dialectic of Sokrates.[176] If -Aristippus did not learn the theory from Sokrates, he was at any rate -fortified in it by the authority of Sokrates; to whose doctrine, in -this respect, he adhered more closely than Plato. - -[Footnote 175: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5. - -Sokrates exhorts those with whom he converses to be sparing in -indulgences, and to cultivate self-command and fortitude as well as -bodily energy and activity. The reason upon which these exhortations -are founded is eudæmonistic: that a person will thereby escape or be -able to confront serious dangers--and will obtain for himself -ultimately greater pleasures than those which he foregoes (Memor. i. -6, 8; ii. 1, 31-33; iii. 12, 2-5). [Greek: Tou= de\ mê\ douleu/ein -gastri\ mêde\ u(/pnô| kai\ lagnei/a| oi)/ei ti a)/llo ai)tiô/teron -ei)=nai, ê)\ to\ e(/tera e)/chein tou/tôn ê(di/ô, a(\ ou) mo/non e)n -chrei/a| o)/nta eu)phrai/nei, a)lla\ kai\ e)/lpidas pare/chonta -ô)phelê/sein a)ei/?] See also Memor. ii. 4, ii. 10, 4, about the -importance of acquiring and cultivating friends, because a good friend -is the most useful and valuable of all possessions. Sokrates, like -Aristippus, adopts the prudential view of life, and not the -transcendental; recommending sobriety and virtue on the ground of -pleasures secured and pains averted. We find Plutarch, in his very -bitter attacks on Epikurus, reasoning on the Hedonistic basis, and -professing to prove that Epikurus discarded pleasures more and greater -for the sake of obtaining pleasures fewer and less. See Plutarch, Non -posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, pp. 1096-1099.] - -[Footnote 176: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 351-361.] - -[Side-note: Aristippus adhered to the doctrine of Sokrates.] - -Aristippus is recognised by Aristotle[177] in two characters: both as -a Sophist, and as a companion of Sokrates and Plato. Moreover it is -remarkable that the doctrine, in reference to which Aristotle cites -him as one among the Sophists, is a doctrine unquestionably -Sokratic--contempt of geometrical science as useless, and as having no -bearing on the good or evil of life.[178] Herein also Aristippus followed -Sokrates, while Plato departed from him. - -[Footnote 177: Aristot. Rhetoric. ii. 24; Metaphysic. B. 996, a. 32.] - -[Footnote 178: Xenophon. Memor. iv. 7, 2.] - -[Side-note: Life and dicta of Aristippus--His type of character.] - -In estimating the character of Aristippus, I have brought into -particular notice the dialogues reported by Xenophon, because the -Xenophontic statements, with those of Aristotle, are the only -contemporary evidence (for Plato only names him once to say that he -was not present at the death of Sokrates, and was reported to be in -Ægina). The other statements respecting Aristippus, preserved by -Diogenes and others, not only come from later authorities, but give us -hardly any facts; though they ascribe to him a great many sayings and -repartees, adapted to a peculiar type of character. That type of -character, together with an imperfect notion of his doctrines, is all -that we can make out. Though Aristippus did not follow the -recommendation of Sokrates, to labour and qualify himself for a ruler, -yet both the advice of Sokrates, to reflect and prepare himself for -the anxieties and perils of the future--and the spectacle of -self-sufficing independence which the character of Sokrates -afforded--were probably highly useful to him. Such advice being adverse -to the natural tendencies of his mind, impressed upon him forcibly those -points of the case which he was most likely to forget: and contributed -to form in him that habit of self-command which is a marked feature in -his character. He wished (such are the words ascribed to him by -Xenophon) to pass through life as easily and agreeably as possible. -Ease comes before pleasure: but his plan of life was to obtain as much -pleasure as he could, consistent with ease, or without difficulty and -danger. He actually realised, as far as our means of knowledge extend, -that middle path of life which Sokrates declared to be impracticable. - -[Side-note: Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates.] - -Much of the advice given by Sokrates, Aristippus appears to have -followed, though not from the reasons which Sokrates puts forward for -giving it. When Sokrates reminds him that men liable to be tempted and -ensnared by the love of good eating, were unfit to command--when he -animadverts on the insanity of the passionate lover, who exposed -himself to the extremity of danger for the purpose of possessing a -married woman, while there were such abundant means of gratifying the -sexual appetite without any difficulty or danger whatever[179]--to all -this Aristippus assents: and what we read about his life is in perfect -conformity therewith. Reason and prudence supply ample motives for -following such advice, whether a man be animated with the love of -command or not. So again, when Sokrates impresses upon Aristippus that -the Good and the Beautiful were the same, being relative only to human -wants or satisfaction--and that nothing was either good or beautiful, -except in so far as it tended to confer relief, security, or -enjoyment--this lesson too Aristippus laid to heart, and applied in a -way suitable to his own peculiar dispositions and capacities. - -[Footnote 179: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 5. [Greek: kai\ têlikou/tôn me\n -e)pikeime/nôn tô=| moicheu/onti kakô=n te kai\ ai)schrô=n, o)/ntôn de\ -pollô=n tô=n a)poluso/ntôn tê=s tô=n a)phrodisiô=n e)pithumi/as e)n -a)dei/a|, o(/môs ei)s ta\ e)piki/nduna phe/resthai, a)=r' ou)k ê)/dê -tou=to panta/pasi kakodaimonô=nto/s e)stin? E)/moige dokei=, e)/phê -(A)ri/stippos).]] - -[Side-note: Self-mastery and independence--the great aspiration of -Aristippus.] - -The type of character represented by Aristippus is the man who enjoys -what the present affords, so far as can be done without incurring -future mischief, or provoking the enmity of others--but who will on no -account enslave himself to any enjoyment; who always maintains his own -self-mastery and independence and who has prudence and intelligence -enabling him to regulate each separate enjoyment so as not to incur -preponderant evil in future.[180] This self-mastery and independence -is in point of fact the capital aspiration of Aristippus, hardly less -than of Antisthenes and Diogenes. He is competent to deal suitably -with all varieties of persons, places, and situations, and to make the -best of each--[Greek: Ou(= ga\r toiou/tôn dei=, touou=tos ei)=m' -e)gô/]:[181] but he accepts what the situation presents, without -yearning or struggling for that which it cannot present.[182] He -enjoys the society both of the Syracusan despot Dionysius, and of the -Hetæra Lais; but he will not make himself subservient either to one or -to the other: he conceives himself able to afford, to both, as much -satisfaction as he receives.[183] His enjoyments are not enhanced by -the idea that others are excluded from the like enjoyment, and that he -is a superior, privileged man: he has no jealousy or antipathy, no -passion for triumphing over rivals, no demand for envy or admiration -from spectators. Among the Hetæræ in Greece were included all the most -engaging and accomplished women--for in Grecian matrimony, it was -considered becoming and advantageous that the bride should be young -and ignorant, and that as a wife she should neither see nor know any -thing beyond the administration of her own feminine apartments and -household.[184] Aristippus attached himself to those Hetæræ who -pleased him; declaring that the charm of their society was in no way -lessened by the knowledge that others enjoyed it also, and that he -could claim no exclusive privilege.[185] His patience and mildness in -argument is much commended. The main lesson which he had learnt from -philosophy (he said), was self-appreciation--to behave himself with -confidence in every man's society: even if all laws were abrogated, -the philosopher would still, without any law, live in the same way as -he now did.[186] His confidence remained unshaken, when seized as a -captive in Asia by order of the Persian satrap Artaphernes: all that -he desired was, to be taken before the satrap himself.[187] Not to -renounce pleasure, but to enjoy pleasure moderately and to keep -desires under controul,--was in his judgment the true policy of life. -But he was not solicitous to grasp enjoyment beyond what was easily -attainable, nor to accumulate wealth or power which did not yield -positive result.[188] While Sokrates recommended, and Antisthenes -practised, the precaution of deadening the sexual appetite by -approaching no women except such as were ugly and -repulsive,[189]--while Xenophon in the Cyropædia,[190] working out the -Sokratic idea of the dangerous fascination of beauty, represents Cyrus -as refusing to see the captive Pantheia, and depicts the too confident -Araspes (who treats such precaution as exaggerated timidity, and fully -trusts his own self-possession), when appointed to the duty of guarding -her, as absorbed against his will in a passion which makes him forget all -reason and duty--Aristippus has sufficient self-mastery to visit the -most seductive Hetæræ without being drawn into ruinous extravagance or -humiliating subjugation. We may doubt whether he ever felt, even for -Lais, a more passionate sentiment than Plato in his Epigram expresses -towards the Kolophonian Hetæra Archeanassa. - -[Footnote 180: Diog. L. ii. 67. [Greek: ou)/tôs ê)=n kai\ e(le/sthai -kai\ kataphronê=sai polu\s.]] - -[Footnote 181: Diog. L. ii. 66. [Greek: ê)=n de\ i(kano\s -a(rmo/sasthai kai\ to/pô| kai\ chro/nô| kai\ prosô/pô|, kai\ pa=san -peri/stasin a(rmoni/ôs u(pokri/nasthai; dio\ kai\ para\ Dionusi/ô| -tô=n a)/llôn êu)doki/mei ma=llon, a)ei\ to\ prospeso\n eu)= -diatithe/menos; a)pe/laue me\n ga\r ê(donê=s tô=n paro/ntôn, ou)k -e)thê/ra de\ po/nô| tê\n a)po/lausin tô=n ou) paro/ntôn]. - -Horat. Epistol. i. 17, 23-24:-- - -"Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res, -Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum."] - -[Footnote 182: Sophokles, Philoktêtes, 1049 (the words of Odysseus).] - -[Footnote 183: Diog. L. ii. 75. [Greek: e)/chrêto kai\ Lai+/di tê=| -e(tai/ra|; pro\s ou)=n tou\s memphome/nous e)/phê, E)/chô Lai+/da, -a)ll' ou)k e)/chomai; e)pei\ to\ kratei=n kai\ mê\ ê(tta=sthai -ê(donô=n, a)/riston--ou) to\ mê\ chrê=sthai]. ii. 77, [Greek: -Dionusi/ou pote\ e)rome/nou, e)pi\ ti/ ê(/koi, e)/phê, e)pi\ tô=| -metadô/sein ô(=n e)/choi, kai\ metalê/psesthai ô(=n mê\ e)/choi]. - -Lucian introduces [Greek: A)retê\] and [Greek: Truphê\] as litigating -before [Greek: Di/kê] for the possession of Aristippus: the litigation -is left undecided (Bis Accusatus, c. 13-23).] - -[Footnote 184 Xenophon, Oeconomic. iii. 13, vii. 6, Ischomachus says -to Sokrates about his wife, [Greek: Kai\ ti/ a)\n e)pistame/nên -au)tê\n pare/labon, ê(\ e)/tê me\n ou)/pô pentekai/deka gegonui=a -ê)=lthe pro\s e)me/, to\n d' e)mprosthen _chro/non e)/zê u(po\ pollê=s -e)pimelei/as, o(/pôs ô(s e)/lachista me\n o)/psoito, e)la/chista d' -a)kou/soito, e)la/chista de\ e)/roito?_]] - -[Footnote 185: Diog.** L. ii. 74. On this point his opinion coincided -with that of Diogenes, and of the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus (D. L. -vii. 131), who maintained, that among the wise wives ought to be in -common, and that all marital jealousy ought to be discarded. [Greek: -A)re/skei d' au)toi=s kai\ koina\s ei)=nai ta\s gunai=kas dei=n para\ -toi=s sophoi=s ô(/ste to\n e)ntucho/nta tê=| e)ntuchou/sê| chrê=sthai, -katha/ phêsi Zê/nôn e)n tê=| Politei/a| kai\ Chru/sippos e)n tô=| -peri\ Politei/as, a)lla/ te Dioge/nês o( Kuniko\s kai\ Pla/tôn; -pa/ntas te pai=das e)pi/sês ste/rxomen pate/rôn tro/pon, kai\ ê( e)pi\ -moichei/a| zêlotupi/a periairethê/setai]. Compare Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. -H. iii. 205.] - -[Footnote 186: Diog. L. ii. 68. The like reply is ascribed to -Aristotle. Diog. L. v. 20; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtut. p. 80 D.] - -[Footnote 187: Diog. L. ii. 79.] - -[Footnote 188: Diog. L. ii. 72-74.] - -[Footnote 189: Xenoph. Memor. i. 3, 11-14; Symposion, iv. 38; Diog. L. -vi. 3. [Greek: (A)ntisthe/nês) e)/lege suneche\s--Manei/ên ma=llon ê)\ -ê(sthei/ên--kai\--chrê\ toiau/tais plêsia/zein gunaixi/n, ai(\ cha/rin -ei)/sontai.]] - -[Footnote 190: Xenoph. Cyropæd. v. 1, 2-18.] - -[Side-note: Aristippus compared with Antisthenes and Diogenes--Points -of agreement and disagreement between them.] - -Aristippus is thus remarkable, like the Cynics Antisthenes and -Diogenes, not merely for certain theoretical doctrines, but also for -acting out a certain plan of life.[191] We know little or nothing of -the real life of Aristippus, except what appears in Xenophon. The -biography of him (as of the Cynic Diogenes) given by Diogenes -Laertius, consists of little more than a string of anecdotes, mostly -sayings, calculated to illustrate a certain type of character.[192] -Some of these are set down by those who approved the type, and who -therefore place it in a favourable point of view--others by those who -disapprove it and give the opposite colour. - -[Footnote 191: Sextus Empiricus and others describe this by the Greek -word [Greek: a)gôgê/] (Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 150). Plato's beautiful -epigram upon Archeanassa is given by Diogenes L. iii. 31. Compare this -with the remark of Aristippus--Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 750 E. - -That the society of these fascinating Hetæræ was dangerous, and -exhaustive to the purses of those who sought it, may be seen from the -expensive manner of life of Theodotê, described in Xenophon, Mem. iii. -11, 4. - -The amorous impulses or fancies of Plato were censured by Dikæarchus. -See Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 34, 71, with Davies's note.] - -[Footnote 192: This is justly remarked by Wendt in his instructive -Dissertation, De Philosophiâ Cyrenaicâ, p. 8 (Göttingen, 1841).] - -We can understand and compare the different types of character -represented by Antisthenes or Diogenes, and by Aristippus: but we have -little knowledge of the real facts of their lives. The two types, each -manifesting that marked individuality which belongs to the Sokratic -band, though in many respects strongly contrasted, have also some -points of agreement. Both Aristippus and Diogenes are bent on -individual freedom and independence of character: both of them stand -upon their own appreciation of life and its phenomena: both of them -are impatient of that servitude to the opinions and antipathies of -others, which induces a man to struggle for objects, not because they -afford him satisfaction, but because others envy him for possessing -them--and to keep off evils, not because he himself feels them as -such, but because others pity or despise him for being subject to -them; both of them are exempt from the competitive and ambitious -feelings, from the thirst after privilege and power, from the sense of -superiority arising out of monopolised possession and exclusion of -others from partnership. Diogenes kept aloof from political life and -civil obligations as much as Aristippus; and would have pronounced (as -Aristippus replies to Sokrates in the Xenophontic dialogue) that the -task of ruling others, instead of being a prize to be coveted, was -nothing better than an onerous and mortifying servitude,[193] not at -all less onerous because a man took up the burthen of his own accord. -These points of agreement are real: but the points of disagreement are -not less real. Diogenes maintains his free individuality, and puts -himself out of the reach of human enmity, by clothing himself in -impenetrable armour: by attaining positive insensibility, as near as -human life permits. This is with him not merely the acting out of a -scheme of life, but also a matter of pride. He is proud of his ragged -garment and coarse[194] fare, as exalting him above others, and as -constituting him a pattern of endurance: and he indulges this -sentiment by stinging and contemptuous censure of every one. -Aristippus has no similar vanity: he achieves his independence without -so heavy a renunciation: he follows out his own plan of life, without -setting himself up as a pattern for others. But his plan is at the -same time more delicate; requiring greater skill and intelligence, -more of manifold sagacity, in the performer. Horace, who compares the -two and gives the preference to Aristippus, remarks that Diogenes, -though professing to want nothing, was nevertheless as much dependent -upon the bounty of those who supplied his wallet with provisions, as -Aristippus upon the favour of princes: and that Diogenes had only one -fixed mode of proceeding, while Aristippus could master and turn to -account a great diversity of persons and situations--could endure -hardship with patience and dignity, when it was inevitable, and enjoy -the opportunities of pleasure when they occurred. "To Aristippus alone -it is given to wear both fine garments and rags" is a remark ascribed -to Plato.[195] In truth, Aristippus possesses in eminent measure that -accomplishment, the want of which Plato proclaims to be so misleading -and mischievous--artistic skill in handling human affairs, throughout -his dealings with mankind.[196] - -[Footnote 193: It is this servitude of political life, making the -politician the slave of persons and circumstances around him, which -Horace contrasts with the philosophical independence of Aristippus:-- - -Ac ne forté roges, quo me duce, quo lare tuter; -Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri -Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes. -Nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis, -Virtutis veræ custos rigidusque satelles: -Nunc in Aristippi furtim præcepta relabor, -Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor. -(Epist. i. 1, 15.) - -So also the Platonic Sokrates (Theætêt. pp. 172-175) depicts forcibly -the cramped and fettered lives of rhetors and politicians; contrasting -them with the self-judgment and independence of speculative and -philosophical enquirers--[Greek: ô(s oi)ke/tai pro\s e)leuthe/rous -tethra/phthai--o( me\n tô=| o)/nti e)n e)leutheri/a| te kai\ scholê=| -tethramme/nos, o(\n dê\ philo/sophon kalei=s.]] - -[Footnote 194: Diog. L. ii. 36. [Greek: stre/psantos A)ntisthe/nous -to\ dier)r(ôgo\s tou= tri/bônos ei)s tou)mphane/s, O(rô= sou=, e)/phê -(Sôkra/tês), dia\ tou= tri/bônos tê\n kenodoxi/an.]] - -[Footnote 195: Horat. Epistol. i. 17, 13-24; Diog. L. vi. 46-56-66. - -"Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti -Nollet Aristippus." "Si sciret regibus uti, -Fastidiret olus, qui me notat." Utrius horum -Verba probes et facta, doce: vel junior audi -Cur sit Aristippi potior sententia. Namque -Mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt: -"Scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et -Splendidius multò est. Equus ut me portet, alat rex, -Officium facio: tu poscis vilia rerum, -Dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem." -Omnis Aristippum decuit color, et status, et res, -Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum. - -(Compare Diog. L. ii. 102, vi. 58, where this anecdote is reported as -of Plato instead of Aristippus.) - -Horace's view and scheme of life are exceedingly analogous to those of -Aristippus. Plutarch, Fragm. De Homero, p. 1190; De Fortunâ Alex. p. -330 D. Diog. Laert. ii. 67. [Greek: dio/ pote Stra/tôna, oi( de\ -Pla/tôna, pro\s au)to\n ei)pei=n, Soi\ mo/nô| de/dotai kai\ chlani/da -phorei=n kai\ r(a/kos]. The remark cannot have been made by Straton, -who was not contemporary with Aristippus. Even Sokrates lived by the -bounty of his rich friends, and indeed could have had no other means -of supporting his wife and children; though he accepted only a portion -of what they tendered to him, declining the remainder. See the remark -of Aristippus, Diog. L. ii. 74.] - -[Footnote 196: Plato, Phædon, p. 89 E. [Greek: o(/ti a)/neu te/chnês -tê=s peri\ ta)nthrô/peia o( toiou=tos chrê=sthai e)picheirei= toi=s -a)nthrô/pois.]] - -[Side-note: Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and -philosophy--contempt for other studies.] - -That the scheme of life projected by Aristippus was very difficult -requiring great dexterity, prudence, and resolution, to execute it--we -may see plainly by the Xenophontic dialogue; wherein Sokrates -pronounces it to be all but impracticable. As far as we can judge, he -surmounted the difficulties of it: yet we do not know enough of his -real life to determine with accuracy what varieties of difficulties he -experienced. He followed the profession of a Sophist, receiving fees -for his teaching: and his attachment to philosophy (both as contrasted -with ignorance and as contrasted with other studies not philosophy) -was proclaimed in the most emphatic language. It was better (he said) -to be a beggar, than an uneducated man:[197] the former was destitute -of money, but the latter was destitute of humanity. He disapproved -varied and indiscriminate instruction, maintaining that persons ought -to learn in youth what they were to practise in manhood: and he -compared those who, neglecting philosophy, employed themselves in -literature or physical science, to the suitors in the Odyssey who -obtained the favours of Melantho and the other female servants, but -were rejected by the Queen Penelopê herself.[198] He treated with -contempt the study of geometry, because it took no account, and made -no mention, of what was good and evil, beautiful and ugly. In other -arts (he said), even in the vulgar proceeding of the carpenter and the -currier, perpetual reference was made to good, as the purpose intended -to be served and to evil as that which was to be avoided: but in -geometry no such purpose was ever noticed.[199] - -[Footnote 197: Diog. L. ii. 70; Plutarch, Fragm. [Greek: U(pomnê/mat' -ei)s Ê(si/odon], s. 9. [Greek: A)ri/stippos de\ a)p' e)nanti/as o( -Sôkratiko\s e)/lege, sumbou/lou dei=sthai chei=ron ei)=nai ê)\ -prosaitei=n.]] - -[Footnote 198: Diog. L. ii. 79-80. [Greek: tou\s tô=n e)gkukli/ôn -paideuma/tôn metascho/ntas, philosophi/as de\ a)poleiphthe/ntas], &c. -Plutarch, Fragm. [Greek: Strômate/ôn], sect. 9.] - -[Footnote 199: Aristot. Metaph. B. 996, a 32, M. 1078, a. 35. [Greek: -ô(/ste dia\ tau=ta kai\ tô=n sophistô=n tine\s oi(=on A)ri/stippos -_proepêla/kizon_ au)ta\s], &c.] - -[Side-note: Aristippus taught as a Sophist. His reputation thus -acquired procured for him the attentions of Dionysius and others.] - -This last opinion of Aristippus deserves particular attention, -because it is attested by Aristotle. And it confirms what we hear upon -less certain testimony, that Aristippus discountenanced the department -of physical study generally (astronomy and physics) as well as -geometry; confining his attention to facts and reasonings which bore -upon the regulation of life.[200] In this restrictive view he followed -the example and precepts of Sokrates--of Isokrates--seemingly also of -Protagoras and Prodikus though not of the Eleian Hippias, whose course -of study was larger and more varied.[201] Aristippus taught as a -Sophist, and appears to have acquired great reputation in that -capacity both at Athens and elsewhere.[202] Indeed, if he had not -acquired such intellectual and literary reputation at Athens, he would -have had little chance of being invited elsewhere, and still less -chance of receiving favours and presents from Dionysius and other -princes:[203] whose attentions did not confer celebrity, but waited -upon it when obtained, and doubtless augmented it. If Aristippus lived -a life of indulgence at Athens, we may fairly presume that his main -resources for sustaining it, like those of Isokrates, were derived -from his own teaching: and that the presents which he received from -Dionysius of Syracuse, like those which Isokrates received from -Nikokles of Cyprus, were welcome additions, but not his main income. -Those who (like most of the historians of philosophy) adopt the -opinion of Sokrates and Plato, that it is disgraceful for an -instructor to receive payment from the persons taught will doubtless -despise Aristippus for such a proceeding: for my part I dissent from -this opinion, and I therefore do not concur in the disparaging -epithets bestowed upon him. And as for the costly indulgences, and -subservience to foreign princes, of which Aristippus stands accused, -we must recollect that the very same reproaches were advanced against -Plato and Aristotle by their contemporaries: and as far as we know, -with quite as much foundation.[204] - -[Footnote 200: Diog. L. ii. 92. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 11. -Plutarch, apud Eusebium Præp. Ev. i. 8, 9.] - -[Footnote 201: Plato, Protagor. p. 318 E, where the different methods -followed by Protagoras and Hippias are indicated.] - -[Footnote 202: Diog. Laert. ii. 62. Alexis Comicus ap. Athenæ. xii. -544. - -Aristokles (ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 18) treats the first Aristippus -as a mere voluptuary, who said nothing generally [Greek: peri\ tou= -te/lous]. All the doctrine (he says) came from the younger Aristippus. -I think this very improbable. To what did the dialogues composed by -the first Aristippus refer? How did he get his reputation?] - -[Footnote 203: Several anecdotes are recounted about sayings and -doings of Aristippus in his intercourse with _Dionysius_. _Which_ -Dionysius is meant?--the elder or the younger? Probably the elder. - -It is to be remembered that Dionysius the Elder lived and reigned -until the year 367 B.C., in which year his son Dionysius the Younger -succeeded him. The death of Sokrates took place in 399 B.C.: between -which, and the accession of Dionysius the Younger, an interval of 32 -years occurred. Plato was old, being sixty years of age, when he first -visited the younger Dionysius, shortly after the accession of the -latter. Aristippus cannot well have been younger than Plato, and he is -said to have been older than Æschines Sokraticus (D. L. ii. 83). -Compare D. L. ii. 41. - -When, with these dates present to our minds, we read the anecdotes -recounted by Diogenes L. respecting the sayings and doings of -Aristippus with _Dionysius_, we find: that several of them relate to -the contrast between the behaviour of Aristippus and that of Plato at -Syracuse. Now it is certain that Plato went _once_ to Syracuse when he -was forty years of age (Epist. vii. init.), in 387 B.C.--and according -to one report (Lucian, De Parasito, 34), he went there _twice_--while -the elder Dionysius was in the plenitude of power: but he made an -unfavourable impression, and was speedily sent away in displeasure. I -think it very probable that Aristippus may have visited the elder -Dionysius, and may have found greater favour with him than Plato found -(see Lucian, l. c.), since Dionysius was an accomplished man and a -composer of tragedies. Moreover Aristippus was a Kyrenæan, and -Aristippus wrote about Libya (D. L. ii. 83).] - -[Footnote 204: See the epigram of the contemporary poet, Theokritus of -Chios, in Diog. L. v. 11; compare Athenæus, viii. 354, xiii. 566. -Aristokles, ap. Eusebium Præp. Ev. xv. 2.] - -Aristippus composed several dialogues, of which the titles alone are -preserved.[205] They must however have been compositions of -considerable merit, since Theopompus accused Plato of borrowing -largely from them. - -[Footnote 205: Diog. L. ii. 84-85.] - -[Side-note: Ethical theory of Aristippus and the Kyrenaic -philosophers.] - -As all the works of Aristippus are lost, we cannot pretend to -understand fully his theory from the meagre abstract given in Sextus -Empiricus and Diogenes. Yet the theory is of importance in the history -of ancient speculation, since it passed with some modifications to -Epikurus, and was adopted by a large proportion of instructed men. The -Kyrenaic doctrine was transmitted by Aristippus to his disciples -Æthiops and Antipater: but his chief disciple appears to have been his -daughter Arêtê: whom he instructed so well, that she was able to -instruct her own son, the second Aristippus, called for that reason -Metrodidactus. The basis of his ethical theory was, pleasure and pain: -pleasure being _smooth motion_, pain, _rough motion_:[206] pleasure -being the object which all animals, by nature and without -deliberation, loved, pursued, and felt satisfaction in obtaining pain -being the object which they all by nature hated and tried to avoid. -Aristippus considered that no one pleasure was different from another, -nor more pleasurable than another:[207] that the attainment of these -special pleasurable moments, or as many of them as practicable, was -The End to be pursued in life. By _Happiness_, they understood the sum -total of these special pleasures, past, present, and future: yet -Happiness was desirable not on its own account, but on account of its -constituent items, especially such of those items as were present and -certainly future.[208] Pleasures and pains of memory and expectation -were considered to be of little importance. Absence of pain or relief -from pain, on the one hand--they did not consider as equivalent to -positive pleasure--nor absence of pleasure or withdrawal of pleasure, -on the other hand--as equivalent to positive pain. Neither the one -situation nor the other was a _motion_ ([Greek: ki/nêsis]), _i.e._ a -positive situation, appreciable by the consciousness: each was a -middle state--a mere negation of consciousness, like the phenomena of -sleep.[209] They recognised some mental pleasures and pains as -derivative from bodily sensation and as exclusively individual--others -as not so: for example, there were pleasures and pains of sympathy; -and a man often felt joy at the prosperity of his friends and -countrymen, quite as genuine as that which he felt for his own good -fortune. But they maintained that the bodily pleasures and pains were -much more vehement than the mental which were not bodily: for which -reason, the pains employed by the laws in punishing offenders were -chiefly bodily. The fear of pain was in their judgments more operative -than the love of pleasure: and though pleasure was desirable for its -own sake, yet the accompanying conditions of many pleasures were so -painful as to deter the prudent man from aiming at them. These -obstructions rendered it impossible for any one to realise the sum -total of pleasures constituting Happiness. Even the wise man sometimes -failed, and the foolish man sometimes did well, though in general the -reverse was the truth: but under the difficult conditions of life, a -man must be satisfied if he realised some particular pleasurable -conjunctions, without aspiring to a continuance or totality of the -like.[210] - -[Footnote 206: Diog. L. ii. 86-87. [Greek: du/o pa/thê u(phi/stanto, -po/non kai\ ê(donê/n; tê\n me\n lei/an ki/nêsin, tê\n ê(donê/n, to\n -de\ po/non, trachei=an ki/nêsin; mê\ diaphe/rein te ê(donê\n ê(donê=s, -mêde\ ê(/dion ti ei)=nai; kai\ tê\n me\n, eu)dokêtê\n** pa=si zô/ois, -to\n de\ a)pokroustiko/n.]] - -[Footnote 207: Diog. L. ii. p. 87. [Greek: mê\ diaphe/rein te ê(donê\n -ê(donê=s, mêde\ ê(/dion ti ei)=nai]. They did not mean by these words -to deny that one pleasure was more vehement and attractive than -another pleasure, or that one pain is more vehement and deterrent than -another pain: for it is expressly said afterwards (s. 90) that they -admitted this. They meant to affirm that one pleasure did not differ -from another _so far forth as pleasure_: that all pleasures must be -ranked as a class, and compared with each other in respect of -intensity, durability, and other properties possessed in greater or -less degree.] - -[Footnote 208: Diog. L. ii. pp. 88-89. Athenæus, xii. p. 544.] - -[Footnote 209: Diog. L. ii. 89-90. [Greek: mê\ ou)/sês tê=s a)poni/as -ê)\ tê=s a)êdoni/as kinê/seôs, e)pei\ ê( a)poni/a oi(onei\ -katheu/donto/s e)sti kata/stasis--me/sas katasta/seis ô)no/mazon -a)êdoni/an kai\ a)poni/an]. - -A doctrine very different from this is ascribed to Aristippus in -Galen--Placit. Philos. (xix. p. 230, Kühn). It is there affirmed that -by pleasure Aristippus understood, not the pleasure of sense, but that -disposition of mind whereby a person becomes insensible to pain, and -hard to be imposed upon ([Greek: a)na/lgêtos kai\ dusgoê/teutos]).] - -[Footnote 210: Diog. L. ii. 91. - -It does not appear that the Kyrenaic sect followed out into detail the -derivative pleasures and pains; nor the way in which, by force of -association, these come to take precedence of the primary, exercising -influence on the mind both more forcible and more constant. We find -this important fact remarkably stated in the doctrine of Kalliphon. - -Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. p. 415, ed. 1629. [Greek: Kata\ de\ -tou\s peri\ Kalliphô=nta, e(/neka me\n tê=s ê(donê=s pareisê=lthen ê( -a)retê/; chro/nô| de\ u(/steron, to\ peri\ au)tê\n ka/llos katidou=sa, -i)so/timon e(autê\n tê=| a)rchê=|, toute/sti tê=| ê(donê=|, -pare/schen.]] - -[Side-note: Prudence--good, by reason of the pleasure which it -ensured, and of the pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and -honourable, by law or custom--not by nature.] - -Aristippus regarded prudence or wisdom as good, yet not as good _per -se_, but by reason of the pleasures which it enabled us to procure and -the pains which it enabled us to avoid--and wealth as a good, for the -same reason. A friend also was valuable, for the use and necessities -of life: just as each part of one's own body was precious, so long as -it was present and could serve a useful purpose.[211] Some branches of -virtue might be possessed by persons who were not wise: and bodily -training was a valuable auxiliary to virtue. Even the wise man could -never escape pain and fear, for both of these were natural: -but he would keep clear of envy, passionate love, and superstition, -which were not natural, but consequences of vain opinion. A thorough -acquaintance with the real nature of Good and Evil would relieve him -from superstition as well as from the fear of death.[212] - -[Footnote 211: Diog. L. ii. 91. [Greek: tê\n phro/nêsin a)gatho\n me\n -ei)=nai le/gousin, ou) di' e(autê\n de\ ai(retê/n, a)lla\ dia\ ta\ e)x -au)tê=s perigino/mena; to\n phi/lon tê=s chrei/as e(/neka; kai\ ga\r -me/ros sô/matos, me/chris a)\n parê=|, a)spa/zesthai]. - -The like comparison is employed by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the -Memorabilia (i. 2, 52-55), that men cast away portions of their own -body, so soon as these portions cease to be useful.] - -[Footnote 212: Diog. L. ii. p. 92.] - -The Kyrenaics did not admit that there was anything just, or -honourable, or base, by nature: but only by law and custom: -nevertheless the wise man would be sufficiently restrained, by the -fear of punishment and of discredit, from doing what was repugnant to -the society in which he lived. They maintained that wisdom was -attainable; that the senses did not at first judge truly, but might be -improved by study; that progress was realised in philosophy as in -other arts, and that there were different gradations of it, as well as -different gradations of pain and suffering, discernible in different -men. The wise man, as they conceived him, was a reality; not (like the -wise man of the Stoics) a sublime but unattainable ideal.[213] - -[Footnote 213: Diog. L. ii. p. 93.] - -[Side-note: Their logical theory--nothing knowable except the -phenomenal, our own sensations and feelings--no knowledge of the -absolute.] - -Such were (as far as our imperfect evidence goes) the ethical and -emotional views of the Kyrenaic school: their theory and precepts -respecting the plan and prospects of life. In regard to truth and -knowledge, they maintained that we could have no knowledge of anything -but human sensations, affections, feelings, &c. ([Greek: pa/thê]): -that respecting the extrinsic, extra-sensational, absolute, objects or -causes from whence these feelings proceeded, we could know nothing at -all. Partly for this reason, they abstained from all attention to the -study of nature--to astronomy and physics: partly also because they -did not see any bearing of these subjects upon good and evil, or upon -the conduct of life. They turned their attention mainly to ethics, -partly also to logic as subsidiary to ethical reasoning.[214] - -[Footnote 214: Diog. L. ii. p. 92. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vi. -53.] - -Such low estimation of mathematics and physics and attention given -almost exclusively to the feelings and conduct of human life--is a -point common to the opposite schools of Aristippus and Antisthenes, -derived by both of them from Sokrates. Herein Plato stands apart from -all the three. - -The theory of Aristippus, as given above, is only derived from a -meagre abstract and from a few detached hints. We do not know how he -himself stated it: still less how he enforced and vindicated it.--He, -as well as Antisthenes, composed dialogues: which naturally implies -diversity of handling. Their main thesis, therefore--the text, as it -were, upon which they debated or expatiated (which is all that the -abstract gives)--affords very inadequate means, even if we could rely -upon the accuracy of the statement, for appreciating their -philosophical competence. We should form but a poor idea of the acute, -abundant, elastic and diversified dialectic of Plato, if all his -dialogues had been lost--and if we had nothing to rely upon except the -summary of Platonism prepared by Diogenes Laertius: which summary, -nevertheless, is more copious and elaborate than the same author has -furnished either of Aristippus or Antisthenes. - -[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus passed to the -Stoics and Epikureans.] - -In the history of the Greek mind these two last-mentioned philosophers -(though included by Cicero among the _plebeii philosophi_) are not -less important than Plato and Aristotle. The speculations and precepts -of Antisthenes passed, with various enlargements and modifications, -into the Stoic philosophy: those of Aristippus into the Epikurean: the -two most widely extended ethical sects in the subsequent Pagan -world.--The Cynic sect, as it stood before it embraced the enlarged -physical, kosmical, and social theories of Zeno and his contemporaries, -reducing to a minimum all the desires and appetites--cultivating -insensibility to the pains of life, and even disdainful insensibility to -its pleasures--required extraordinary force of will and obstinate -resolution, but little beyond. Where there was no selection or -discrimination, the most ordinary prudence sufficed. It was otherwise -with the scheme of Aristippus and the Kyrenaics: which, if it tasked -less severely the powers of endurance, demanded a far higher measure -of intelligent prudence. Selection of that which might safely be -enjoyed, and determination of the limit within which enjoyment must be -confined, were constantly indispensable. Prudence, knowledge, the art -of mensuration or calculation, were essential to Aristippus, and ought -to be put in the foreground when his theory is stated. - -[Side-note: Ethical theory of Aristippus is identical with that of the -Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras.] - -That theory is, in point of fact, identical with the theory expounded -by the Platonic Sokrates in Plato's Protagoras. The general features -of both are the same. Sokrates there lays it down explicitly, that -pleasure _per se_ is always good, and pain _per se_ always evil: that -there is no other good (_per se_) except pleasure and diminution of -pain--no other evil (_per se_) except pain and diminution of pleasure: -that there is no other object in life except to live through it as -much as possible with pleasures and without pains;[215] but that many -pleasures become evil, because they cannot be had without depriving us -of greater pleasures or imposing upon us greater pains while many -pains become good, because they prevent greater pains or ensure -greater pleasures: that the safety of life thus lies in a correct -comparison of the more or less in pleasures and pains, and in a -selection founded thereupon. In other words, the safety of life -depends upon calculating knowledge or prudence, the art or science of -measuring. - -[Footnote 215: Plato, Protag. p. 355 A. [Greek: ê)\ a)rkei= u(mi=n to\ -ê(de/ôs katabiô=nai to\n bi/on a)/neu lupô=n? ei) de\ a)rkei=, kai\ -mê\ e)/chete mêde\n a)/llo pha/nai ei)=nai a)gatho\n ê)\ kako/n, o(\ -mê\ ei)s tau=ta teleuta=|, to\ meta\ tou=to a)kou/ete]. - -The exposition of this theory, by the Platonic Sokrates, occupies the -latter portion of the Protagoras, from p. 351 to near the conclusion. -See below, ch. xxiii. of the present work. - -The language held by Aristippus to Sokrates, in the Xenophontic -dialogue (Memor. ii. 1. 9), is exactly similar to that of the Platonic -Sokrates, as above cited--[Greek: e)mauto\n ta/ttô ei)s tou\s -boulome/nous ê(=| r(a=|sta/ te kai\ ê(/dista bioteu/ein.]] - -[Side-note: Difference in the manner of stating the theory by the -two.] - -The theory here laid down by the Platonic Sokrates is the same as that -of Aristippus. The purpose of life is stated almost in the same words -by both: by the Platonic Sokrates, and by Aristippus in the -Xenophontic dialogue--"to live through with enjoyment and without -suffering." The Platonic Sokrates denies, quite as emphatically as -Aristippus, any good or evil, honourable or base, except as -representing the result of an intelligent comparison of pleasures and -pains. Judicious calculation is postulated by both: pleasures and -pains being assumed by both as the only ends of pursuit and avoidance, -to which calculation is to be applied. The main difference is, that -the prudence, art, or science, required for making this calculation -rightly, are put forward by the Platonic Sokrates as the prominent -item in his provision for passing through life: whereas, in the scheme -of Aristippus, as far as we know it, such accomplished intelligence, -though equally recognised and implied, is not equally thrust into the -foreground. So it appears at least in the abstract which we possess of -his theory; if we had his own exposition of it, perhaps we might find -the case otherwise. In that abstract, indeed, we find the writer -replying to those who affirmed prudence or knowledge, to be good _per -se_--and maintaining that it is only good by reason of its -consequences:[216] that is, that it is not good as End, in the same -sense in which pleasure or mitigation, of pain are good. This point of -the theory, however, coincides again with the doctrine of the Platonic -Sokrates in the Protagoras: where the art of calculation is extolled -simply as an indispensable condition to the most precious results of -human happiness. - -[Footnote 216: Diog. L. ii. p. 91.] - -What I say here applies especially to the Protagoras: for I am well -aware that in other dialogues the Platonic Sokrates is made to hold -different language.[217] But in the Protagoras he defends a theory the -same as that of Aristippus, and defends it by an elaborate argument -which silences the objections of the Sophist Protagoras; who at first -will not admit the unqualified identity of the pleasurable, -judiciously estimated and selected, with the good. The general and -comprehensive manner in which Plato conceives and expounds the theory, -is probably one evidence of his superior philosophical aptitude as -compared with Aristippus and his other contemporaries. He enunciates, -side by side, and with equal distinctness, the two conditions -requisite for his theory of life. 1. The calculating or measuring art. -2. A description of the items to which alone such measurement must be -applied--pleasures and pains.--These two together make the full -theory. In other dialogues Plato insists equally upon the necessity of -knowledge or calculating prudence: but then he is not equally distinct -in specifying the items to which such prudence or calculation is to be -applied. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Aristippus, in -laying out the same theory, may have dwelt with peculiar emphasis upon -the other element in the theory: _i.e._ that while expressly insisting -upon pleasures and pains, as the only data to be compared, he may have -tacitly assumed the comparing or calculating intelligence, as if it -were understood by itself, and did not require to be formally -proclaimed. - -[Footnote 217: See chapters xxiii., xxiv.,** xxxii. of the present work, -in which I enter more fully into the differences between the -Protagoras, Gorgias, and Philêbus, in respect to this point. - -Aristippus agrees with the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras, as to -the general theory of life respecting pleasure and pain. - -He agrees with the Platonic Sokrates _in the Gorgias_ (see pp. -500-515), in keeping aloof from active political life. [Greek: a\ -au(tou= pra/ttein, kai\ ou) polupragmonei=n e)n tô=| bi/ô|]--which -Sokrates, in the Gorgias (p. 526 C), proclaims as the conduct of the true -philosopher, proclaimed with equal emphasis by Aristippus. Compare the -Platonic Apology, p. 31 D-E.] - -[Side-note: Distinction to be made between a general theory--and the -particular application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes -and circumstances.] - -A distinction must here be made between the general theory of life -laid down by Aristippus--and the particular application which he made -of that theory to his own course of proceeding. What we may observe -is, that the Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras) agrees in the -first, or general theory: whether he would have agreed in the second -(or application to the particular case) we are not informed, but we -may probably assume the negative. And we find Sokrates (in the -Xenophontic dialogue) taking the same negative ground against -Aristippus--upon the second point, not upon the first. He seeks to -prove that the course of conduct adopted by Aristippus, instead of -carrying with it a preponderance of pleasure, will entail a -preponderance of pain. He does not dispute the general theory. - -[Side-note: Kyrenaic theorists after Aristippus.] - -Though Aristippus and the Kyrenaic sect are recognised as the first -persons who laid down this general theory, yet various others apart -from them adopted it likewise. We may see this not merely from the -Protagoras of Plato, but also from the fact that Aristotle, when -commenting upon the theory in his Ethics,[218] cites Eudoxus (eminent -both as mathematician and astronomer, besides being among the hearers -of Plato) as its principal champion. Still the school of Kyrênê are -recorded as a continuous body, partly defending, partly modifying the -theory of Aristippus.[219] Hegesias, Annikeris, and Theodôrus are the -principal Kyrenaics named: the last of them contemporary with Ptolemy -Soter, Lysimachus, Epikurus, Theophrastus, and Stilpon. - -[Footnote 218: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 2.] - -[Footnote 219: Sydenham, in his notes on Philêbus (note 39, p. 76), -accuses Aristippus and the Kyrenaics of prevarication and sophistry in -the statement of their doctrine respecting Pleasure. He says that they -called it indiscriminately [Greek: a)gatho\n] and -[Greek: ta)gatho/n]--(a good--The Good)--"they used the fallacy of -changing a particular term for a term which is universal, or vice versâ, -by the sly omission or insertion of the definite article _The_ before -the word Good" (p. 78). He contrasts with this prevarication the -ingenuousness of Eudoxus, as the advocate of Pleasure (Aristot. Eth. -N. x. 2). I know no evidence for either of these allegations: either -for the prevarication of Aristippus or the ingenuousness of Eudoxus.] - -[Side-note: Theodôrus--Annikeris--Hegesias.] - -Diogenes Laertius had read a powerfully written book of Theodôrus, -controverting openly the received opinions respecting the Gods:--which -few of the philosophers ventured to do. Cicero also mentions a -composition of Hegesias.[220] Of Annikeris we know none; but he, too, -probably, must have been an author. The doctrines which we find -ascribed to these Kyrenaics evince how much affinity there was, at -bottom, between them and the Cynics, in spite of the great apparent -opposition. Hegesias received the surname of the Death-Persuader: he -considered happiness to be quite unattainable, and death to be an -object not of fear, but of welcome acceptance, in the eyes of a wise -man. He started from the same basis as Aristippus: pleasure as the -_expetendum_, pain as the _fugiendum_, to which all our personal -friendships and aversions were ultimately referable. But he considered -that the pains of life preponderated over the pleasures, even under -the most favourable circumstances. For conferring pleasure, or for -securing continuance of pleasure--wealth, high birth, freedom, glory, -were of no greater avail than their contraries poverty, low birth, -slavery, ignominy. There was nothing which was, by nature or -universally, either pleasurable or painful. Novelty, rarity, satiety, -rendered one thing pleasurable, another painful, to different persons -and at different times. The wise man would show his wisdom, not in the -fruitless struggle for pleasures, but in the avoidance or mitigation -of pains: which he would accomplish more successfully by rendering -himself indifferent to the causes of pleasure. He would act always for -his own account, and would value himself higher than other persons: -but he would at the same time reflect that the mistakes of these -others were involuntary, and he would give them indulgent counsel, -instead of hating them. He would not trust his senses as affording any -real knowledge: but he would be satisfied to act upon the probable -appearances of sense, or upon phenomenal knowledge.[221] - -[Footnote 220: Diog. L. ii. 97. [Greek: Theo/dôros--panta/pasin -a)nairô=n ta\s peri\ theô=n do/xas]. Diog. L. ii. 86, 97. Cicero, Tusc. -Disp. i. 34, 83-84. [Greek: Ê(gêsi/as o( peisitha/natos].] - -[Footnote 221: Diog. L. ii. 93, 94.] - -[Side-note: Hegesias--Low estimation of life--renunciation of -pleasure--coincidence with the Cynics.] - -Such is the summary which we read of the doctrines of Hegesias: who is -said to have enforced his views,[222]--of the real character of life, -as containing a great preponderance of misfortune and suffering--in a -manner so persuasive, that several persons were induced to commit -suicide. Hence he was prohibited by the first Ptolemy from lecturing -in such a strain. His opinions respecting life coincide in the main -with those set forth by Sokrates in the Phædon of Plato: which -dialogue also is alleged to have operated so powerfully on the -Platonic disciple Kleombrotus, that he was induced to terminate his -own existence. Hegesias, agreeing with Aristippus that pleasure would -be the Good, if you could get it--maintains that the circumstances of -life are such as to render pleasure unattainable: and therefore -advises to renounce pleasure at once and systematically, in order that -we may turn our attention to the only practicable end--that of -lessening pain. Such deliberate renunciation of pleasure brings him -into harmony with the doctrine of the Cynics. - -[Footnote 222: Compare the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue entitled Axiochus, -pp. 366, 367, and the doctrine of Kleanthes in Sext. Empiric. adv. -Mathemat. ix. 88-92. Lucretius, v. 196-234.] - -[Side-note: Doctrine of Relativity affirmed by the Kyrenaics, as well -as by Protagoras.] - -On another point, however, Hegesias repeats just the same doctrine as -Aristippus. Both deny any thing like absolute knowledge: they maintain -that all our knowledge is phenomenal, or relative to our own -impressions or affections: that we neither do know, nor can know, -anything about any real or supposed ultra-phenomenal object, _i.e._, -things in themselves, as distinguished from our own impressions and -apart from our senses and other capacities. Having no writings of -Aristippus left, we know this doctrine only as it is presented by -others, and those too opponents. We cannot tell whether Aristippus or -his supporters stated their own doctrine in such a way as to be open -to the objections which we read as urged by opponents. But the -doctrine itself is not, in my judgment, refuted by any of those -objections. "Our affections ([Greek: pa/thê]) alone are known to us, -but not the supposed objects or causes from which they proceed." The -word rendered by _affections_ must here be taken in its most general -and comprehensive sense--as including not merely sensations, but also -remembrances, emotions, judgments, beliefs, doubts, volitions, -conscious energies, &c. Whatever we know, we can know only as it -appears to, or implicates itself somehow with, our own minds. All the -knowledge which I possess, is an aggregate of propositions affirming -facts, and the order or conjunction of facts, as they are, or have -been, or may be, relative to myself. This doctrine of Aristippus is in -substance the same as that which Protagoras announced in other words -as--"Man is the measure of all things". I have already explained and -illustrated it, at considerable length, in my chapter on the Platonic -Theætêtus, where it is announced by Theætetus and controverted by -Sokrates.[223] - -[Footnote 223: See below, vol. iii. ch. xxviii. Compare Aristokles ap. -Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xiv. 18, 19, and Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii. -190-197, vi. 53. Sextus gives a summary of this doctrine of the -Kyrenaics, more fair and complete than that given by Aristokles--at -least so far as the extract from the latter in Eusebius enables us to -judge. Aristokles impugns it vehemently, and tries to fasten upon it -many absurd consequences--in my judgment without foundation. It is -probable that by the term [Greek: pa/thos] the Kyrenaics meant simply -sensations internal and external: and that the question, as they -handled it, was about the reality of the supposed Substratum or Object -of sense, independent of any sentient Subject. It is also probable -that, in explaining their views, they did not take account of the -memory of past sensations--and the expectation of future sensations, -in successions or conjunctions more or less similar--associating in -the mind with the sensation present and actual, to form what is called -a permanent object of sense. I think it likely that they set forth -their own doctrine in a narrow and inadequate manner. - -But this defect is noway corrected by Aristokles their opponent. On -the contrary, he attacks them on their strong side: he vindicates -against them the hypothesis of the ultra phenomenal, absolute, -transcendental Object, independent of and apart from any sensation, -present, past, or future--and from any sentient Subject. Besides that, -he assumes them to deny, or ignore, many points which their theory -noway requires them to deny. He urges one argument which, when -properly understood, goes not against them, but strongly in their -favour. "If these philosophers," says Aristokles (Eus. xiv. 19, 1), -"know that they experience sensation and perceive, they must know -something beyond the sensation itself. If I say [Greek: e)gô\ -kai/omai], 'I am being burned,' this is a proposition, not a -sensation. These three things are of necessity co-essential--the -sensation itself, the Object which causes it, the Subject which feels -it ([Greek: a)na/gkê ge tri/a tau=ta sunuphi/stasthai--to/ te pa/thos -au)to\ kai\ to\ poiou=n kai\ to\ pa/schon])." In trying to make good -his conclusion--That you cannot know the sensation without the Object -of sense--Aristokles at the same time asserts that the Object cannot -be known apart from the sensation, nor apart from the knowing Subject. -He asserts that the three are by necessity _co-essential--i.e._ -implicated and indivisible in substance and existence: if -distinguishable therefore, distinguishable only logically ([Greek: -lo/gô| chôrista\]), admitting of being looked at in different points -of view. But this is exactly the case of his opponents, when properly -stated. They do not deny Object: they do not deny Subject: but they -deny the independent and separate existence of the one as well as of -the other: they admit the two only as relative to each other, or as -reciprocally implicated in the indivisible fact of cognition. The -reasoning of Aristokles thus goes to prove the opinion which he is -trying to refute. Most of the arguments, which Sextus adduces in -favour of the Kyrenaic doctrine, show forcibly that the Objective -Something, apart from its Subjective correlate, is unknowable and a -non-entity; but he does not include in the Subjective as much as ought -to be included; he takes note only of the present sensation, and does -not include sensations remembered or anticipated. Another very -forcible part of Sextus's reasoning may be found, vii. sect. 269-272, -where he shows that a logical Subject _per se_ is undefinable and -inconceivable--that those who attempt to define Man (_e.g._) do so by -specifying more or fewer of the predicates of Man--and that if you -suppose all the predicates to vanish, the Subject vanishes along with -them.] - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - -XENOPHON. - - -[Side-note: Xenophon--his character--essentially a man of action and -not a theorist--the Sokratic element in him an accessory.] - -There remains one other companion of Sokrates, for whom a dignified -place must be reserved in this volume--Xenophon the son of Gryllus. It -is to him that we owe, in great part, such knowledge as we possess of -the real Sokrates. For the Sokratic conversations related by -Xenophon, though doubtless dressed up and expanded by him, appear to -me reports in the main of what Sokrates actually said. Xenophon was -sparing in the introduction of his master as titular spokesman for -opinions, theories, or controversial difficulties, generated in his -own mind: a practice in which Plato indulged without any reserve, as -we have seen by the numerous dialogues already passed in review. - -I shall not however give any complete analysis of Xenophon's works: -because both the greater part of them, and the leading features of his -personal character, belong rather to active than to speculative -Hellenic life. As such, I have dealt with them largely in my History -of Greece. What I have here to illustrate is the Sokratic element in -his character, which is important indeed as accessory and modifying--yet -not fundamental. Though he exemplifies and attests, as a witness, -the theorising negative vein, the cross-examining Elenchus of Sokrates -it is the preceptorial vein which he appropriates to himself and -expands in its bearing on practical conduct. He is the -semi-philosophising general; undervalued indeed as a hybrid by Plato--but -by high-minded Romans like Cato, Agricola, Helvidius Priscus, &c. -likely to be esteemed higher than Plato himself.[1] He is the military -brother of the Sokratic family, distinguished for ability and energy -in the responsible functions of command: a man of robust frame, -courage, and presence of mind, who affronts cheerfully the danger and -fatigues of soldiership, and who extracts philosophy from experience -of the variable temper of armies, together with the multiplied -difficulties and precarious authority of a Grecian general.[2] For our -knowledge, imperfect as it is, of real Grecian life, we are greatly -indebted to his works. All historians of Greece must draw largely from -his Hellenica and Anabasis: and we learn much even from his other -productions, not properly historical; for he never soars high in the -region of ideality, nor grasps at etherial visions--"nubes et -inania"--like Plato. - -[Footnote 1: See below, my remarks on the Platonic Euthydêmus, vol. -ii. chap, xxi.**] - -[Footnote 2: We may apply to Plato and Xenophon the following -comparison by Euripides, Supplices, 905. (Tydeus and Meleager.) - -[Greek: gnô/mê| d' a)delphou= Melea/grou leleimme/nos, -i)son pare/schen o)/noma dia\ te/chnên doro/s, -eu(rô\n a)kribê= mousikê\n e)n a)spi/di; -philo/timon ê)=thos, plou/sion phro/nêma de\ -e)n toi=sin e)/rgois, ou)chi\ toi=s lo/gois e)/chôn.]] - -[Side-note: Date of Xenophon--probable year of his birth.] - -Respecting the personal history of Xenophon himself, we possess but -little information: nor do we know the year either of his birth or -death. His Hellenica concludes with the battle of Mantineia in 362 -B.C. But he makes incidental mention in that work of an event five -years later--the assassination of Alexander, despot of Pheræ, which -took place in 357 B.C.[3]--and his language seems to imply that the -event was described shortly after it took place. His pamphlet De -Vectigalibus appears to have been composed still later--not before 355 -B.C. In the year 400 B.C., when Xenophon joined the Grecian military -force assembled at Sardis to accompany Cyrus the younger in his march -to Babylon, he must have been still a young man: yet he had even then -established an intimacy with Sokrates at Athens: and he was old enough -to call himself the "ancient guest" of the Boeotian Proxenus, who -engaged him to come and take service with Cyrus.[4] We may suppose him -to have been then about thirty years of age; and thus to have been -born about 430 B.C.--two or three years earlier than Plato. Respecting -his early life, we have no facts before us: but we may confidently -affirm (as I have already observed about[5] Plato), that as he became -liable to military service in 412 B.C., the severe pressure of the war -upon Athens must have occasioned him to be largely employed, among -other citizens, for the defence of his native city, until its capture -in 405 B.C. He seems to have belonged to an equestrian family in the -census, and therefore to have served on horseback. More than one of -his compositions evinces both intelligent interest in horsemanship, -and great familiarity with horses. - -[Footnote 3: Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 37. [Greek: tô=n de\ tau=ta -praxa/ntôn] (_i.e._ of the brothers of Thêbê, which brothers had -assassinated Alexander) [Greek: a)/chri ou)= o(de o( lo/gos -e)gra/pheto, Tisi/phonos, presbu/tatos ô(=n tô=n a)delphô=n, tê\n -a)rchê\n ei)=che.]] - -[Footnote 4: That he was still a young man appears from his language, -Anabas. iii. 1, 25. His intimacy with Sokrates, whose advice he asked -about the propriety of accepting the invitation of Proxenus to go to -Asia, is shown iii. 1, 5. Proxenus was his [Greek: xe/nos a)rchai=os], -iii. 1, 4. - -The story mentioned by Strabo (ix. 403) that Xenophon served in the -Athenian cavalry at the battle of Delium (424 B.C.), and that his life -was saved by Sokrates, I consider to be not less inconsistent with any -reasonable chronology, than the analogous anecdote--that Plato -distinguished himself at the battle of Delium. See below, ch. v.] - -[Footnote 5: See ch. v.] - -[Side-note: His personal history--He consults Sokrates--takes the -opinion of the Delphian oracle.] - -Our knowledge of his personal history begins with what he himself -recounts in the Anabasis. His friend Proxenus, then at Sardis -commanding a regiment of Hellenic mercenaries under Cyrus the younger, -wrote recommending him earnestly to come over and take service, in the -army prepared ostensibly against the Pisidians. Upon this Xenophon -asked the advice of Sokrates: who exhorted him to go and consult the -Delphian oracle--being apprehensive that as Cyrus had proved himself -the strenuous ally of Sparta, and had furnished to her the principal -means for crushing Athens, an Athenian taking service under him would -incur unpopularity at home. Xenophon accordingly went to Delphi: but -instead of asking the question broadly--"Shall I go, or shall I -decline to go?"--he put to Apollo the narrower question--"Having in -contemplation a journey, to which of the Gods must I sacrifice and -pray, in order to accomplish it best, and to come back with safety and -success?" Apollo indicated to him the Gods to whom he ought to address -himself: but Sokrates was displeased with him for not having first -asked, whether he ought to go at all. Nevertheless (continued -Sokrates), since you have chosen to put the question in your own way -you must act as the God has prescribed.[6] - -[Footnote 6: Xenoph. Anab. iii. 1, 4-6.] - -[Side-note: His service and command with the Ten Thousand Greeks; -afterwards under Agesilaus and the Spartans.--He is banished from -Athens.] - -The anecdote here recounted by Xenophon is interesting, as it -illustrates his sincere faith, as well as that of Sokrates, in the -Delphian oracle: though we might have expected that on this occasion, -Sokrates would have been favoured with some manifestation of that -divine sign, which he represents to have warned him afterwards so -frequently and on such trifling matters. Apollo however was perhaps -displeased (as Sokrates was) with Xenophon, for not having submitted -the question to him with full frankness: since the answer given was -proved by subsequent experience to be incomplete.[7] After fifteen -months passed, first, in the hard upward march--next, in the still -harder retreat--of the Ten Thousand, to the preservation of whom he -largely contributed by his energy, presence of mind, resolute -initiative, and ready Athenian eloquence, as one of their -leaders--Xenophon returned to Athens. It appears that he must have come -back not long after the death of Sokrates. But Athens was not at that time -a pleasant residence for him. The Sokratic companions shared in the -unpopularity of their deceased master, and many of them were absent: -moreover Xenophon himself was unpopular as the active partisan of -Cyrus. After a certain stay, we know not how long, at Athens, Xenophon -appears to have gone back to Asia; and to have resumed his command of -the remaining Cyreian soldiers, then serving under the Lacedæmonian -generals against the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. He -served first under Derkyllidas, next under Agesilaus. For the latter -he conceived the warmest admiration, and contracted with him an -intimate friendship. At the time when Xenophon rejoined the Cyreians -in Asia, Athens was not at war with the Lacedæmonians: but after some -time, the hostile confederacy of Athens, Thebes, and Corinth, against -them was organised: and Agesilaus was summoned home by them from Asia, -to fight their battles in Greece. Xenophon and his Cyreians were still -a portion of the army of Agesilaus, and accompanied him in his march -into Boeotia; where they took part in his desperate battle and bloody -victory at Koroneia.[8] But he was now lending active aid to the -enemies of Athens, and holding conspicuous command in their armies. A -sentence of banishment, on the ground of Laconism, was passed against -him by the Athenians, on the proposition of Eubulus.[9] - -[Footnote 7: Compare Anabas. vi. 1, 22, and vii. 8, 1-6. - -See also Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 33 C, and Plato, Theagês, p. 129; also -below, vol. ii. ch. xv. - -Sokrates and Xenophon are among the most imposing witnesses cited by -Quintus Cicero, in his long pleading to show the reality of divination -(Cicero, De Divinatione, i. 25, 52, i. 54, 122). Antipater the Stoic -collected a large number of examples, illustrating the miraculous -divining power of Sokrates. Several of these examples appear much more -trifling than this incident of Xenophon.] - -[Footnote 8: Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 6; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 18.] - -[Footnote 9: Diog. L. ii. 51-69. [Greek: e)pi\ Lakônismô=| phugê\n -u(p' A)thênai/ôn kategnô/sthê.]] - -[Side-note: His residence at Skillus near Olympia.] - -How long he served with Agesilaus, we are not told. At the end of his -service, the Lacedæmonians provided him with a house and land at the -Triphylian town of Skillûs near Olympia, which they had seemingly -taken from the Eleians and re-colonised. Near this residence he also -purchased, under the authority of the God (perhaps Olympian Zeus) a -landed estate to be consecrated to the Goddess Artemis: employing -therein a portion of the tithe of plunder devoted to Artemis by the -Cyreian army, and deposited by him for the time in the care of -Megabyzus, priest of Artemis at Ephesus. The estate of the Goddess -contained some cultivated ground, but consisted chiefly of pasture; -with wild ground, wood and mountain, abounding in game and favourable -for hunting. Xenophon became Conservator of this property for Artemis: -to whom he dedicated a shrine and a statue, in miniature copy of the -great temple at Ephesus. Every year he held a formal hunting-match, to -which he invited all the neighbours, with abundant hospitality, at the -expense of the Goddess. The Conservator and his successors were bound -by formal vow, on pain of her displeasure, to employ one tenth of the -whole annual produce in sacrifices to her: and to keep the shrine and -statue in good order, out of the remainder.[10] - -[Footnote 10: Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 8-12; Diog. L. ii. 52: Pausanias, v. -6, 3. - -[Greek: phêsi\ d' o( Dei/narchos o(/ti kai\ oi)ki/an kai\ a)/gron -au)tô=| e(/dosan Lakedaimo/nioi]. - -Deinarchus appears to have composed for a client at Athens a judicial -speech against Xenophon, the grandson of Xenophon Sokraticus. He -introduced into the speech some facts relating to the grandfather.] - -[Side-note: Family of Xenophon--his son Gryllus killed at Mantinea.] - -Xenophon seems to have passed many years of his life either at Skillus -or in other parts of Peloponnesus, and is said to have died very old -at Corinth. The sentence of banishment passed against him by the -Athenians was revoked after the battle of Leuktra, when Athens came -into alliance with the Lacedæmonians against Thebes. Some of -Xenophon's later works indicate that he must have availed himself of -this revocation to visit Athens: but whether he permanently resided -there is uncertain. He had brought over with him from Asia a wife -named Philesia, by whom he had two sons, Gryllus and Diodorus.[11] He -sent these two youths to be trained at Sparta, under the countenance -of Agesilaus:[12] afterwards the eldest of them, Gryllus, served with -honour in the Athenian cavalry which assisted the Lacedæmonians and -Mantineians against Epameinondas, B.C. 362. In the important -combat[13] of the Athenian and Theban cavalry, close to the gates of -Mantineia--shortly preceding the general battle of Mantineia, in which -Epameinondas was slain--Gryllus fell, fighting with great bravery. The -death of this gallant youth--himself seemingly of great promise, and -the son of so eminent a father--was celebrated by Isokrates and several -other rhetors, as well as by the painter Euphranor at Athens, and by -sculptors at Mantineia itself.[14] - -[Footnote 11: Æschines Sokraticus, in one of his dialogues, introduced -Aspasia conversing with Xenophon and his (Xenophon's) wife. Cicero, De -Invent. i. 31, 51-54; Quintil. Inst. Orat. v. p. 312.] - -[Footnote 12: Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 20.] - -[Footnote 13: Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, 15-16-17. This combat of cavalry -near the gates of Mantineia was very close and sharply contested; but -at the great battle fought a few days afterwards the Athenian cavalry -were hardly at all engaged, vii. 5, 25.] - -[Footnote 14: Pausanias, i. 3, 3, viii. 11, 4, ix. 15, 3; Diogenes L. -ii. 54. Harpokration v. [Greek: Kêphiso/dôros]. - -It appears that Euphranor, in his picture represented Gryllus as -engaged in personal conflict with Epameinondas and wounding him--a -compliment not justified by the facts. The Mantineians believed -Antikrates, one of their own citizens, to have mortally wounded the -great Theban general with his spear, and they awarded to him as -recompense immunity from public burthens ([Greek: a)te/leian]), both -for himself and his descendants. One of his descendants, Kallikrates, -continued even in Plutarch's time to enjoy this immunity. Plutarch, -Agesilaus, c. 35.] - -[Side-note: Death of Xenophon at Corinth--Story of the Eleian -Exegetæ.] - -Skillus, the place in which the Lacedæmonians had established -Xenophon, was retaken by the Eleians during the humiliation of -Lacedæmonian power, not long before the battle of Mantineia. Xenophon -himself was absent at the time; but his family were constrained to -retire to Lepreum. It was after this, we are told, that he removed to -Corinth, where he died in 355 B.C. or in some year later. The Eleian -Exegetæ told the traveller Pausanias, when he visited the spot five -centuries afterwards, that Xenophon had been condemned in the judicial -Council of Olympia as wrongful occupant of the property at Skillus, -through Lacedæmonian violence; but that the Eleians had granted him -indulgence, and had allowed him to remain.[15] As it seems clearly -asserted that he died at Corinth, he can hardly have availed himself -of the indulgence; and I incline to suspect that the statement is an -invention of subsequent Eleian Exegetæ, after they had learnt to -appreciate his literary eminence. - -[Footnote 15: Pausan. v. 6, 3; Diog. L. ii. 53-56.] - -[Side-note: Xenophon different from Plato and the other Sokratic -brethren.] - -From the brief outline thus presented of Xenophon's life, it will -plainly appear that he was quite different in character and habits -from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren. He was not only a man of -the world (as indeed Aristippus was also), but he was actively engaged -in the most responsible and difficult functions of military command: -he was moreover a landed proprietor and cultivator, fond of strong -exercise with dogs and horses, and an intelligent equestrian. His -circumstances were sufficiently easy to dispense with the necessity of -either composing discourses or taking pupils for money. Being thus -enabled to prosecute letters and philosophy in an independent way, he -did not, like Plato and Aristotle, open a school.[16] His relations, -as active coadjutor and subordinate, with Agesilaus, form a striking -contrast to those of Plato with Dionysius, as tutor and pedagogue. In -his mind, the Sokratic conversations, suggestive and stimulating to -every one, fell upon the dispositions and aptitudes of a -citizen-soldier, and fructified in a peculiar manner. My present work -deals with Xenophon, not as an historian of Grecian affairs or of the -Cyreian expedition, but only on the intellectual and theorising side:--as -author of the Memorabilia, the Cyropædia, Oekonomikus, Symposion, -Hieron, De Vectigalibus, &c. - -[Footnote 16: See, in the account of Theopompus by Photius (Cod. 176, -p. 120; compare also Photius, Cod. 159, p. 102, a. 41), the -distinction taken by Theopompus: who said that the four most -celebrated literary persons of his day were, his master Isokrates, -Theodektês of Phasêlis, Naukrates of Erythræ, and himself -(Theopompus). He himself and Naukrates were in good circumstances, so -that he passed his life in independent prosecution of philosophy and -philomathy. But Isokrates and Theodektês were compelled [Greek: di' -a)pori/an bi/ou, misthou= lo/gous gra/phein kai\ sophisteu/ein, -e)kpaideu/ontes tou\s ne/ous, ka)kei=then karpoume/nous ta\s -u(phelei/as]. - -Theopompus does not here present the profession of a Sophist (as most -Platonic commentators teach us to regard it) as a mean, -unprincipled, and corrupting employment.] - -[Side-note: His various works--Memorabilia, Oekonomikus, &c.] - -The Memorabilia were composed as records of the conversations of -Sokrates, expressly intended to vindicate Sokrates against charges of -impiety and of corrupting youthful minds, and to show that he -inculcated, before every thing, self-denial, moderation of desires, -reverence for parents, and worship of the Gods. The Oekonomikus and -the Symposion are expansions of the Memorabilia: the first[17] -exhibiting Sokrates not only as an attentive observer of the facts of -active life (in which character the Memorabilia present him also), but -even as a learner of husbandry[18] and family management from -Ischomachus--the last describing Sokrates and his behaviour amidst the -fun and joviality of a convivial company. Sokrates declares[19] that -as to himself, though poor, he is quite as rich as he desires to be; -that he desires no increase, and regards poverty as no disadvantage. -Yet since Kratobulus, though rich, is beset with temptations to -expense quite sufficient to embarrass him, good proprietary management -is to him a necessity. Accordingly, Sokrates, announcing that he has -always been careful to inform himself who were the best economists in -the city,[20] now cites as authority Ischomachus, a citizen of wealth -and high position, recognised by all as one of the -"super-excellent".[21] Ischomachus loves wealth, and is anxious to -maintain and even enlarge his property: desiring to spend magnificently -for the honour of the Gods, the assistance of friends, and the support -of the city.[22] His whole life is arranged, with intelligence and -forethought, so as to attain this object, and at the same time to keep -up the maximum of bodily health and vigour, especially among the -horsemen of the city as an accomplished rider[23] and cavalry -soldier. He speaks with respect, and almost with enthusiasm, of -husbandry, as an occupation not merely profitable, but improving to -the character: though he treats with disrespect other branches of -industry and craft.[24] In regard to husbandry, too, as in regard to -war or steersmanship, he affirms that the difference between one -practitioner and another consists, not so much in unequal knowledge, -as in unequal care to practise what both of them know.[25] - -[Footnote 17: Galen calls the Oekonomicus the last book of the -Memorabilia (ad Hippokrat. De Articulis, t. xviii. p. 301, Kühn). It -professes to be repeated by Xenophon from what he himself _heard_ -Sokrates say--[Greek: ê)/kousa de/ pote au)tou= kai\ peri\ -oi)konomi/as toia/de dialegome/nou], &c. Sokrates first instructs -Kritobulus that economy, or management of property, is an art, -governed by rules, and dependent upon principles; next, he recounts to -him the lessons which he professes to have himself received from -Ischomachus. - -I have already adverted to the Xenophontic Symposion as containing -jocular remarks which some erroneously cite as serious.] - -[Footnote 18: To _learn_ in this way the actualities of life, and the -way of extracting the greatest amount of wheat and barley from a given -piece of land, is the sense which Xenophon puts on the word [Greek: -philo/sophos] (Xen. Oek. xvi. 9; compare Cyropædia, vi. 1, 41).] - -[Footnote 19: Xenoph. Oekonom. ii. 3; xi. 3, 4. - -I have made some observations on the Xenophontic Symposion, comparing -it with the Platonic Symposion, in a subsequent chapter of this work, -ch. xxvi.] - -[Footnote 20: Xen. Oekon. ii. 16.] - -[Footnote 21: Xen. Oekon. vi. 17, xi. 3. [Greek: pro\s pa/ntôn kai\ -a)ndrô=n kai\ gunaikô=n, kai\ xe/nôn kai\ a)stô=n, kalo/n te -ka)gatho\n e)ponomazo/menon.]] - -[Footnote 22: Xen. Oekon. xi. 9.] - -[Footnote 23: Xen. Oekon. xi. 17-21. [Greek: e)n toi=s i(ppokôta/tois -te kai\ plousiôta/tois].] - -[Footnote 24: Xen. Oekon. iv. 2-3, vi. 5-7. Ischomachus asserts that -his father had been more devoted to agriculture ([Greek: -philogeôrgo/tatos]) than any man at Athens; that he had bought several -pieces of land ([Greek: chô/rous]) when out of order, improved them, -and then resold them with very large profit, xx. 26.] - -[Footnote 25: Xen. Oekon. xx. 2-10.] - -[Side-note: Ischomachus, hero of the Oekonomikus--ideal of an active -citizen, cultivator, husband, house-master, &c.] - -Ischomachus describes to Sokrates, in reply to a string of successive -questions, both his scheme of life and his scheme of husbandry. He had -married his wife before she was fifteen years of age: having first -ascertained that she had been brought up carefully, so as to have seen -and heard as little as possible, and to know nothing but spinning and -weaving.[26] He describes how he took this very young wife into -training, so as to form her to the habits which he himself approved. -He declares that the duties and functions of women are confined to -in-door work and superintendence, while the out-door proceedings, -acquisition as well as defence, belong to men:[27] he insists upon -such separation of functions emphatically, as an ordinance of -nature--holding an opinion the direct reverse of that which we have seen -expressed by Plato.[28] He makes many remarks on the arrangements of -the house, and of the stores within it: and he dwells particularly on -the management of servants, male and female. - -[Footnote 26: Xen. Oekon. vii. 3-7. [Greek: to\n d' e)/mprosthen -chro/non e)/zê u(po\ pollê=s e)pimelei/as, o(/pôs ô(s e)la/chista me\n -o)/psoito, e)la/chista de\ a)kou/soito, e)la/chista de\ e)/roito]. - -The [Greek: didaskali/a] addressed to Sokrates by Ischomachus is in -the form of [Greek: e)rô/têsis], xix. 15. The Sokratic interrogation -is here brought to bear _upon_ Sokrates, instead of by Sokrates: like -the Elenchus in the Parmenidês of Plato.] - -[Footnote 27: Xen. Oekon. vii. 22-32.] - -[Footnote 28: See below, ch. xxxvii. - -Compare also Aristotel. Politic. iii. 4, 1277, b. 25, where Aristotle -lays down the same principle as Xenophon.] - -[Side-note: Text upon which Xenophon insists--capital difference -between command over subordinates willing, and subordinates -unwilling.] - -It is upon this last point that he lays more stress than upon any -other. To know how to command men--is the first of all accomplishments -in the mind of Xenophon. Ischomachus proclaims it as essential that -the superior shall not merely give orders to his subordinates, but -also see them executed, and set the example of personal active -watchfulness in every way. Xenophon aims at securing not simply -obedience, but cheerful and willing obedience--even attachment from -those who obey. "To exercise command over willing subjects"[29] (he -says) "is a good more than human, granted only to men truly -consummated in virtue of character essentially divine. To exercise -command over unwilling subjects, is a torment like that of Tantalus." - -[Footnote 29: Xen. Oekon. xxi. 10-12. [Greek: ê)/thous -basilikou=--thei=on gene/sthai. Ou) ga\r pa/nu moi\ dokei= touti\ to\ -a)gatho\n a)nthrô/pinon ei)=nai, a)lla\ thei=on, to\ _e)thelo/ntôn -a)/rchein_; saphô=s de\ di/dotai toi=s a)lêthinô=s sôphrosu/nê| -tetelesme/nois. To\ de\ a)ko/ntôn turannei=n dido/asin, ô(s e)moi\ -dokei=, ou(\s a)\n ê(gô=ntai a)xi/ous ei)=nai bioteu/ein, ô(/sper o( -Ta/ntalos e)n a(/|dou le/getai]. Compare also iv. 19, xiii. 3-7.] - -[Side-note: Probable circumstances generating these reflections in -Xenophon's mind.] - -The sentence just transcribed (the last sentence in the Oekonomikus) -brings to our notice a central focus in Xenophon's mind, from whence -many of his most valuable speculations emanate. "What are the -conditions under which subordinates will cheerfully obey their -commanders?"--was a problem forced upon his thoughts by his own -personal experience, as well as by contemporary phenomena in Hellas. -He had been elected one of the generals of the Ten Thousand: a large -body of brave warriors from different cities, most of them unknown to -him personally, and inviting his authority only because they were in -extreme peril, and because no one else took the initiative.[30] He -discharged his duties admirably: and his ready eloquence was an -invaluable accomplishment, distinguishing him from all his colleagues. -Nevertheless when the army arrived at the Euxine, out of the reach of -urgent peril, he was made to feel sensibly the vexations of authority -resting upon such precarious basis, and perpetually traversed by -jealous rivals. Moreover, Xenophon, besides his own personal -experience, had witnessed violent political changes running -extensively through the cities of the Grecian world: first, at the -close of the Peloponnesian war--next, after the battle of Knidus--again, -under Lacedæmonian supremacy, after the peace of Antalkidas, -and the subsequent seizure of the citadel of Thebes--lastly, after the -Thebans had regained their freedom and humbled the Lacedæmonians by -the battle of Leuktra. To Xenophon--partly actor, partly -spectator--these political revolutions were matters of anxious interest; -especially as he ardently sympathised with Agesilaus, a political -partisan interested in most of them, either as conservative or -revolutionary. - -[Footnote 30: The reader will find in my 'History of Greece,' ch. 70, - p. 103 seq., a narrative of the circumstances under which Xenophon -was first chosen to command, as well as his conduct afterwards.] - -[Side-note: This text affords subjects for the Hieron and -Cyropædia--Name of Sokrates not suitable.] - -We thus see, from the personal history of Xenophon, how his attention -came to be peculiarly turned to the difficulty of ensuring steady -obedience from subordinates, and to the conditions by which such -difficulty might be overcome. The sentence, above transcribed from the -Oekonomikus, embodies two texts upon which he has discoursed in two of -his most interesting compositions--Cyropædia and Hieron. In Cyropædia -he explains and exemplifies the divine gift of ruling over cheerful -subordinates: in Hieron, the torment of governing the disaffected and -refractory. For neither of these purposes would the name and person of -Sokrates have been suitable, exclusively connected as they were with -Athens. Accordingly Xenophon, having carried that respected name -through the Oekonomikus and Symposion, now dismisses it, yet retaining -still the familiar and colloquial manner which belonged to Sokrates. -The Epilogue, or concluding chapter, of the Cyropædia, must -unquestionably have been composed after 364 B.C.--in the last ten -years of Xenophon's life: the main body of it may perhaps have been -composed earlier. - -[Side-note: Hieron--Persons of the dialogue--Simonides and Hieron.] - -The Hieron gives no indication of date: but as a picture purely -Hellenic, it deserves precedence over the Cyropædia, and conveys to my -mind the impression of having been written earlier. It describes a -supposed conversation (probably suggested by current traditional -conversations, like that between Solon and Kroesus) between the poet -Simonides and Hieron the despot of Syracuse; who, shortly after the -Persian invasion of Greece by Xerxes, had succeeded his brother Gelon -the former despot.[31] Both of them had been once private citizens, of -no remarkable consequence: but Gelon, an energetic and ambitious -military man, having raised himself to power in the service of -Hippokrates despot of Gela, had seized the sceptre on the death of his -master: after which he conquered Syracuse, and acquired a formidable -dominion, enjoyed after his death by his brother Hieron. This last was -a great patron of eminent poets--Pindar, Simonides, Æschylus, -Bacchylides: but he laboured under a painful internal complaint, and -appears to have been of an irritable and oppressive temper.[32] - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Epistol. ii. p. 311 A. Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 16, -1391, a. 9; Cicero, Nat. Deo. i. 22, 60. How high was the opinion -entertained about Simonides as a poet, may be seen illustrated in a -passage of Aristophanes, Vespæ, 1362.] - -[Footnote 32: See the first and second Pythian Odes of Pindar, -addressed to Hieron, especially Pyth. i. 55-61-90, with the Scholia -and Boeckh's Commentary. Pindar compliments Hieron upon having founded -his new city of Ætna--[Greek: theodma/tô| su\n e)leutheria|]. This does -not coincide with the view of Hieron's character taken by Xenophon; -but Pindar agrees with Xenophon in exhorting Hieron to make himself -popular by a liberal expenditure.] - -[Side-note: Questions put to Hieron; view taken by Simonides. Answer -of Hieron.] - -Simonides asks of Hieron, who had personally tried both the life of a -private citizen and that of a despot, which of the two he considered -preferable, in regard to pleasures and pains. Upon this subject, a -conversation of some length ensues, in which Hieron declares that the -life of a despot has much more pain, and much less pleasure, than that -of a private citizen under middling circumstances:[33] while Simonides -takes the contrary side, and insists in detail upon the superior means -of enjoyment, apparent at least, possessed by the despot. As each of -these means is successively brought forward, Hieron shews that however -the matter may appear to the spectator, the despot feels no greater -real happiness in his own bosom: while he suffers many pains and -privations, of which the spectator takes no account. As to the -pleasures of sight, the despot forfeits altogether the first and -greatest, because it is unsafe for him to visit the public festivals -and matches. In regard to hearing--many praises, and no reproach, -reach his ears: but then he knows that the praises are insincere--and -that reproach is unheard, only because speakers dare not express what -they really feel. The despot has finer cookery and richer unguents; -but others enjoy a modest banquet as much or more--while the scent of -the unguents pleases those who are near him more than himself.[34] -Then as to the pleasures of love, these do not exist, except where the -beloved person manifests spontaneous sympathy and return of -attachment. Now the despot can never extort such return by his power; -while even if it be granted freely, he cannot trust its sincerity and -is compelled even to be more on his guard, since successful -conspiracies against his life generally proceed from those who profess -attachment to him.[35] The private citizen on the contrary knows that -those who profess to love him, may be trusted, as having no motive for -falsehood. - -[Footnote 33: Xenoph. Hier. i. 8. [Greek: eu)= i)/sthi, ô)= Simôni/dê, -o(/ti polu\ mei/ô eu)phrai/nontai oi( tu/rannoi tô=n metri/ôs -diago/ntôn i)diôtô=n, polu\ de\ plei/ô kai\ mei/zô lupou=ntai.]] - -[Footnote 34: Xen. Hieron, i. 12-15-24.] - -[Footnote 35: Xen. Hier. i. 26-38. [Greek: Tô=| tura/nnô| ou)/ pot' -e)sti\ pisteu=sai, ô(s philei=tai. Ai( e)piboulai\ e)x ou)de/nôn -ple/ones toi=s tura/nnois ei)si\n ê)\ a)po\ tô=n ma/lista philei=n -au)tou\s prospoiêsame/nôn]. - -This chapter affords remarkable illustration of Grecian manners, -especially in the-distinction drawn between [Greek: ta\ paidika\ -a)phrodi/sia] and [Greek: ta\ teknopoia\ a)phrodi/sia].] - -[Side-note: Misery of governing unwilling subjects declared by -Hieron.] - -Still (contends Simonides) there are other pleasures greater than -those of sense. You despots possess the greatest abundance and variety -of possessions--the finest chariots and horses, the most splendid -arms, the finest palaces, ornaments, and furniture--the most brilliant -ornaments for your wives--the most intelligent and valuable servants. -You execute the greatest enterprises: you can do most to benefit your -friends, and hurt your enemies: you have all the proud consciousness -of superior might.[36]--Such is the opinion of the multitude (replies -Hieron), who are misled by appearances: but a wise man like you, -Simonides, ought to see the reality in the background, and to -recollect that happiness or unhappiness reside only in a man's -internal feelings. You cannot but know that a despot lives in -perpetual insecurity, both at home and abroad: that he must always go -armed himself, and have armed guards around him: that whether at war -or at peace, he is always alike in danger: that, while suspecting -every one as an enemy, he nevertheless knows that when he has put to -death the persons suspected, he has only weakened the power of the -city:[37] that he has no sincere friendship with any one: that he -cannot count even upon good faith, and must cause all his food to be -tasted by others, before he eats it: that whoever has slain a private -citizen, is shunned in Grecian cities as an abomination--while the -tyrannicide is everywhere honoured and recompensed: that there is no -safety for the despot even in his own family, many having been killed -by their nearest relatives:[38] that he is compelled to rely upon -mercenary foreign soldiers and liberated slaves, against the free -citizens who hate him: and that the hire of such inauspicious -protectors compels him to raise money, by despoiling individuals and -plundering temples:[39] that the best and most estimable citizens are -incurably hostile to him, while none but the worst will serve him for -pay: that he looks back with bitter sorrow to the pleasures and -confidential friendships which he enjoyed as a private man, but from -which he is altogether debarred as a despot.[40] - -[Footnote 36: Xen. Hier. ii. 2.] - -[Footnote 37: Xen. Hieron, ii. 5-17.] - -[Footnote 38: Xenoph. Hieron, ii. 8, iii. 1, 5. Compare Xenophon, -Hellenic. iii. 1, 14.] - -[Footnote 39: Xen. Hieron, iv. 7-11.] - -[Footnote 40: Xen. Hieron, vi. 1-12.] - -Nothing brings a man so near to the Gods (rejoins Simonides) as the -feeling of being honoured. Power and a brilliant position must be of -inestimable value, if they are worth purchasing at the price which you -describe.[41] Otherwise, why do you not throw up your sceptre? How -happens it that no despot has ever yet done this? To be honoured -(answers Hieron) is the greatest of earthly blessings, when a man -obtains honour from the spontaneous voice of freemen. But a despot -enjoys no such satisfaction. He lives like a criminal under sentence -of death by every one: and it is impossible for him to lay down his -power, because of the number of persons whom he has been obliged to -make his enemies. He can neither endure his present condition, nor yet -escape from it. The best thing he can do is to hang himself.[42] - -[Footnote 41: Xen. Hieron, vii. 1-5.] - -[Footnote 42: Xen. Hieron, vii. 5-13. [Greek: O( de\ tu/rannos, ô(s -u(po\ pa/ntôn a)nthrô/pôn katakekrime/nos di' a)diki/an -a)pothnê/skein--kai\ nu/kta kai\ ê(me/ran dia/gei. . . . A)ll' ei)/per -tô| a)/llô| lusitelei= a)pa/gxasthai, i)/sthi o(/ti tura/nnô| e)/gôge -eu(ri/skô ma/lista tou=to lusitelou=n poiê=sai. Mo/nô| ga\r au(tô=| -ou)/te e)/chein, ou)/te katathe/sthai ta\ kaka\ lusitelei=]. - -Solon in his poems makes the remark, that for the man who once usurps -the sceptre no retreat is possible. See my 'History of Greece,' chap. -xi. p. 132 seq. - -The impressive contrast here drawn by Hieron (c. vi.) between his -condition as a despot and the past enjoyments of private life and -citizenship which he has lost, reminds one of the still more sorrowful -contrast in the Atys of Catullus, v. 58-70.] - -[Side-note: Advice to Hieron by Simonides--that he should govern well, -and thus make himself beloved by his subjects.] - -Simonides in reply, after sympathising with Hieron's despondency, -undertakes to console him by showing that such consequences do not -necessarily attend despotic rule. The despot's power is an instrument -available for good as well as for evil. By a proper employment of it, -he may not only avoid being hated, but may even make himself beloved, -beyond the measure attainable by any private citizen. Even kind words, -and petty courtesies, are welcomed far more eagerly when they come -from a powerful man than from an equal: moreover a showy and brilliant -exterior seldom fails to fascinate the spectator.[43] But besides -this, the despot may render to his city the most substantial and -important services. He may punish criminals and reward meritorious -men: the punishments he ought to inflict by the hands of others, while -he will administer the rewards in person--giving prizes for superior -excellence in every department, and thus endearing himself to all.[44] -Such prizes would provoke a salutary competition in the performance of -military duties, in choric exhibitions, in husbandry, commerce, and -public usefulness of every kind. Even the foreign mercenaries, though -usually odious, might be so handled and disciplined as to afford -defence against foreign danger,--to ensure for the citizens -undisturbed leisure in their own private affairs--to protect and -befriend the honest man, and to use force only against criminals.[45] -If thus employed, such mercenaries, instead of being hated, would be -welcome companions: and the despot himself may count, not only upon -security against attack, but upon the warmest gratitude and -attachment. The citizens will readily furnish contributions to him -when asked, and will regard him as their greatest benefactor. "You -will obtain in this way" (Simonides thus concludes his address to -Hieron), "the finest and most enviable of all acquisitions. You will -have your subjects obeying you willingly, and caring for you of their -own accord. You may travel safely wherever you please, and will be a -welcome visitor at all the crowded festivals. You will be happy, -without jealousy from any one."[46] - -[Footnote 43: Xen. Hieron, viii. 2-7.] - -[Footnote 44: Xen. Hieron, ix. 1-4.] - -[Footnote 45: Xen. Hieron, x. 6-8.] - -[Footnote 46: Xen. Hieron, xi. 10-12-15. [Greek: ka)\n tau=ta pa/nta -poiê=s, eu)= i)/sthi pa/ntôn tô=n a)nthrô/pois ka/lliston kai\ -makariô/taton ktê=ma kektême/nos; eu)daimonô=n ga\r ou) -phthonêthê/sê|.]] - -[Side-note: Probable experience had by Xenophon of the feelings at -Olympia against Dionysius.] - -The dialogue of which I have given this short abstract, illustrates -what Xenophon calls the torment of Tantalus--the misery of a despot -who has to extort obedience from unwilling subjects:--especially if -the despot be one who has once known the comfort and security of -private life, under tolerably favourable circumstances. If we compare -this dialogue with the Platonic Gorgias, where we have seen a thesis -very analogous handled in respect to Archelaus,--we shall find Plato -soaring into a sublime ethical region of his own, measuring the -despot's happiness and misery by a standard peculiar to himself, and -making good what he admits to be a paradox by abundant eloquence -covering faulty dialectic: while Xenophon, herein following his -master, applies to human life the measure of a rational common sense, -talks about pleasures and pains which every one can feel to be such, -and points out how many of these pleasures the despot forfeits, how -many of these pains and privations he undergoes,--in spite of that -great power of doing hurt, and less power, though still considerable, -of doing good, which raises the envy of spectators. The Hieron gives -utterance to an interesting vein of sentiment, more common at Athens -than elsewhere in Greece; enforced by the conversation of Sokrates, -and serving as corrective protest against that unqualified worship of -power which prevailed in the ancient world no less than in the modern. -That the Syrakusan Hieron should be selected as an exemplifying name, -may be explained by the circumstance, that during thirty-eight years -of Xenophon's mature life (405-367 B.C.), Dionysius the elder was -despot of Syrakuse; a man of energy and ability, who had extinguished -the liberties of his native city, and acquired power and dominion -greater than that of any living Greek. Xenophon, resident at Skillus, -within a short distance from Olympia, had probably[47] seen the -splendid Thêory (or sacred legation of representative envoys) -installed in rich and ornamented tents, and the fine running horses -sent by Dionysius, at the ninety-ninth Olympic festival (384 B.C.): -but he probably also heard the execration with which the name of -Dionysius himself had been received by the spectators, and he would -feel that the despot could hardly shew himself there in person. There -were narratives in circulation about the interior life of -Dionysius,[48] analogous to those statements which Xenophon puts into -the mouth of Hieron. A predecessor of Dionysius as despot of -Syracuse[49] and also as patron of poets, was therefore a suitable -person to choose for illustrating the first part of Xenophon's -thesis--the countervailing pains and penalties which spoilt all the -value of power, if exercised over unwilling and repugnant subjects.[50] - -[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 11.] - -[Footnote 48: See chap. 83, vol. xi. pp. 40-50, of my 'History of -Greece,' where this memorable scene at Olympia is described.] - -[Footnote 49: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 20, 57-63; De Officiis, ii. 7, -24-25. - -"Multos timebit ille, quem multi timent."] - -[Footnote 50: An anecdote is told about a visit of Xenophon to -Dionysius at Syracuse--whether the elder or the younger is not -specified--but the tenor of the anecdote points to the younger; if so -the visit must have been later than 367 B.C. (Athenæus x. 427).] - -[Side-note: Xenophon could not have chosen a Grecian despot to -illustrate his theory of the happiness of governing willing subjects.] - -But when Xenophon came to illustrate the second part of his thesis--the -possibility of exercising power in such manner as to render the -holder of it popular and beloved--it would have been scarcely possible -for him to lay the scene in any Grecian city. The repugnance of the -citizens of a Grecian city towards a despot who usurped power over -them, was incurable--however much the more ambitious individuals -subjects among them might have wished to obtain such power for -themselves: a repugnance as great among oligarchs as among -democrats--perhaps even greater. When we read the recommendations -addressed by Simonides, teaching Hieron how he might render himself -popular, we perceive at once that they are alike well intentioned and -ineffectual. Xenophon could neither find any real Grecian despot -corresponding to this portion of his illustrative purpose--nor could he -invent one with any shew of plausibility. He was forced to resort to -other countries and other habits different from those of Greece. - -[Side-note: Cyropædia--blending of Spartan and Persian -customs--Xenophon's experience of Cyrus the Younger.] - -To this necessity probably we owe the Cyropædia: a romance in which -Persian and Grecian experience are singularly blended, and both of -them so transformed as to suit the philosophical purpose of the -narrator. Xenophon had personally served and communicated with Cyrus -the younger: respecting whom also he had large means of information, -from his intimate friend Proxenus, as well as from the other Grecian -generals of the expedition. In the first book of the Anabasis, we find -this young prince depicted as an energetic and magnanimous character, -faithful to his word and generous in his friendships--inspiring strong -attachment in those around him, yet vigorous in administration and in -punishing criminals--not only courting the Greeks as useful for his -ambitious projects, but appreciating sincerely the superiority of -Hellenic character and freedom over Oriental servitude.[51] And in the -Oekonomikus, Cyrus is quoted as illustrating in his character the -true virtue of a commander; the test of which Xenophon declares to -be--That his subordinates follow him willingly, and stand by him to the -death.[52] - -[Footnote 51: Xenoph. Anab. i. 9, also i. 7, 3, the address of Cyrus -to the Greek soldiers--[Greek: O(/pôs ou)=n e)/sesthe a)/ndres a)/xioi -tê=s e)leutheri/as ê(=s ke/ktêsthe, kai\ u(pe\r ê(=s u(ma=s -eu)daimoni/zô. Eu)= ga\r i)/ste, o(/ti te\n e)leutheri/an e(loi/mên -a)\n, a)nti\ ô(=n e)/chô pa/ntôn kai\ a)/llôn pollaplasi/ôn], -compared with i. 5, 16, where Cyrus gives his appreciation of the -Oriental portion of his army, and the remarkable description of the -trial of Orontes, i. 6.] - -[Footnote 52: Xenoph. Oeconom. iv. 18-19. [Greek: Ku=ros, ei) -e)bi/ôsen, a)/ristos a)\n dokei= a)/rchôn gene/sthai--ê(gou=mai me/ga -tekmê/rion a)/rchontos a)retê=s ei)=nai, ô(=| a)\n e(ko/ntes -e(/pôntai, kai\ e)n toi=s deinoi=s parame/nein e)the/lôsin]. Compare -Anab. i. 9, 29-30.] - -[Side-note: Portrait of Cyrus the Great--his education--Preface to the -Cyropædia.] - -It is this character Hellenised, Sokratised, idealised--that Xenophon -paints into his glowing picture of Cyrus the founder of the Persian -monarchy, or the Cyropædia. He thus escapes the insuperable difficulty -arising from the position of a Grecian despot; who never could acquire -willing or loving obedience, because his possession of power was felt -by a majority of his subjects to be wrongful, violent, tainted. The -Cyrus of the Cyropædia begins as son of Kambyses, king or chief of -Persia, and grandson of Astyages, king of Media; recognised according -to established custom by all, as the person to whom they look for -orders. Xenophon furnishes him with a splendid outfit of heroic -qualities, suitable to this ascendant position: and represents the -foundation of the vast Persian empire, with the unshaken fidelity of -all the heterogeneous people composing it, as the reward of a -laborious life spent in the active display of such qualities. In his -interesting Preface to the Cyropædia, he presents this as the solution -of a problem which had greatly perplexed him. He had witnessed many -revolutions in the Grecian cities--subversions of democracies, -oligarchies, and despotisms: he had seen also private establishments, -some with numerous servants, some with few, yet scarcely any -house-master able to obtain hearty or continued obedience. But as to -herds of cattle or flocks of sheep, on the contrary, he had seen them -uniformly obedient; suffering the herdsman or shepherd to do what he -pleased with, them, and never once conspiring against him. The first -inference of Xenophon from these facts was, that man was by nature the -most difficult of all animals to govern.[53] But he became satisfied -that he was mistaken, when he reflected on the history of Cyrus; who -had acquired and maintained dominion over more men than had ever been -united under one empire, always obeying him cheerfully and -affectionately. This history proved to Xenophon that it was not -impossible, nor even difficult,[54] to rule mankind, provided a man -undertook it with scientific or artistic competence. Accordingly, he -proceeded to examine what Cyrus was in birth, disposition, and -education--and how he came to be so admirably accomplished in the -government of men.[55] The result is the Cyropædia. We must observe, -however, that his solution of the problem is one which does not meet -the full difficulties. These difficulties, as he states them, had been -suggested to him by his Hellenic experience: by the instability of -government in Grecian cities. But the solution which he provides -departs from Hellenic experience, and implies what Aristotle and -Hippokrates called the more yielding and servile disposition of -Asiatics:[56] for it postulates an hereditary chief of heroic or -divine lineage, such as was nowhere acknowledged in Greece, except at -Sparta--and there, only under restrictions which would have rendered -the case unfit for Xenophon's purpose. The heroic and regal lineage of -Cyrus was a condition not less essential to success than his -disposition and education:[57] and not merely his lineage, but also -the farther fact, that besides being constant in the duties of prayer -and sacrifice to the Gods, he was peculiarly favoured by them with -premonitory signs and warnings in all difficult emergencies.[58] - -[Footnote 53: Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 2.] - -[Footnote 54: Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 3. [Greek: e)k tou/tou dê\ -ê)nagkazo/metha metanoei=n, mê\ ou)/te tô=n a)duna/tôn ou)/te tô=n -chalepô=n e)/rgôn ê(=| to\ a)nthrô/pôn a)/rchein, _ê)/n tis -e)pistame/nôs_ tou=to pra/ttê|.]] - -[Footnote 55: Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 3-8.] - -[Footnote 56: Aristot. Politic. vii. 7, 1327, b. 25. [Greek: ta\ de\ -peri\ tê\n A)si/an, dianoêtika\ me\n kai\ te\chnika\ tê\n psuchê/n, -a)/thuma de/; dio/per a)rcho/mena kai\ douleu/onta diatelei=]. - -Hippokrates, De Aere, Locis, et Aquis, c. 19-23.] - -[Footnote 57: So it is stated by Xenophon himself, in the speech -addressed by Kroesus after his defeat and captivity to Cyrus, vii. 2, -24--[Greek: a)gnoô=n e)mauto\n o(/ti soi a)ntipolemei=n i(kano\s -ô(=|mên ei)=nai, prô=ton me\n e)k theô=n gegono/ti, e)/peita de\ dia\ -basile/ôn pephuko/ti, e)/peita de\ e)k paido\s a)retê\n a)skou=nti; -tô=n d' e)mô=n progo/nôn a)kou/ô to\n prô=ton basileu/santa a)/ma te -basile/a kai\ e)leu/theron gene/sthai]. Cyrop. i. 2, 1: [Greek: tou= -Perseidô=n ge/nous], &c.] - -[Footnote 58: See the remarkable words addressed by Cyrus, shortly -before his death, in sacrificing on the hill-top to [Greek: Zeu\s -Patrô=|os] and [Greek: Ê(/lios], Cyrop. viii. 7, 3. - -The special communications of the Gods to Cyrus are insisted on by -Xenophon, like those made to Sokrates, and like the constant aid of -Athênê to Odysseus in Homer, Odyss. iii. 221:-- - -[Greek: Ou) ga\r pô i)/don ô(=de theou\s a)naphanda\ phileu=ntas -ô(s kei/nô| a)naphanda\ pari/stato Palla\s A)thê/nê.]] - -[Side-note: Xenophon does not solve his own problem--The governing -aptitude and popularity of Cyrus come from nature, not from -education.] - -The fundamental principle of Xenophon is, that to obtain hearty and -unshaken obedience is not difficult for a ruler, provided he possesses -the science or art of ruling. This is a principle expressly laid down -by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.[59] We have seen Plato -affirming in the Politikus[60] that this is the only true government, -though very few individuals are competent to it: Plato gives to it a -peculiar application in the Republic, and points out a philosophical -or dialectic tuition whereby he supposes that his Elders will acquire -the science or art of command. The Cyropædia presents to us an -illustrative example. Cyrus is a young prince who, from twenty-six -years of age to his dying day, is always ready with his initiative, -provident in calculation of consequences, and personally active in -enforcement: giving the right order at the right moment, with good -assignable reasons. As a military man, he is not only personally -forward, but peculiarly dexterous in the marshalling and management of -soldiers; like the Homeric Agamemnon[61]-- - -[Greek: A)mpho/teron, basileu/s t' a)gatho/s, kratero/s t' -ai)chmêtê/s]. - -But we must consider this aptitude for command as a spontaneous growth -in Cyrus--a portion of his divine constitution or of the golden -element in his nature (to speak in the phrase of the Platonic -Republic): for no means are pointed out whereby he acquired it, and -the Platonic Sokrates would have asked in vain, where teachers of it -were to be found. It is true that he is made to go through a rigorous -and long-continued training: but this training is common to him with -all the other Persian youths of good family, and is calculated to -teach obedience, not to communicate aptitude for command; while the -master of tactics, whose lessons he receives apart, is expressly -declared to have known little about the duties of a commander.[62] -Kambyses indeed (father of Cyrus) gives to his son valuable general -exhortations respecting the multiplicity of exigencies which press -upon a commander, and the constant watchfulness, precautions, -fertility of invention, required on his part to meet them. We read the -like in the conversations of Sokrates in the Memorabilia:[63] but -neither Kambyses nor Sokrates are teachers of the art of commanding. -For this art, Cyrus is assumed to possess a natural aptitude; like the -other elements of his dispositions--his warm sympathies, his frank and -engaging manners, his ardent emulation combined with perfect freedom -from jealousy, his courage, his love of learning, his willingness to -endure any amount of labour for the purpose of obtaining praise, &c., -all which Xenophon represents as belonging to him by nature, together -with a very handsome person.[64] - -[Footnote 59: Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 10-12.] - -[Footnote 60: See what is said below about the Platonic Politikus, -chap. xxx.] - -[Footnote 61: Cicero, when called upon in his province of Cilicia to -conduct warlike operations against the Parthians, as well as against -some refractory mountaineers, improved his military knowledge by -studying and commenting on the Cyropædia. Epist. ad Famil. ix. 25. -Compare the remarkable observation made by Cicero (Academic. Prior. -ii. init.) about the way in which Lucullus made up his deficiency of -military experience by reading military books.] - -[Footnote 62: Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 12-15.] - -[Footnote 63: Compare Cyropæd. i. 6, with Memorab. iii. 1.] - -[Footnote 64: Cyropæd. i. 2, 1. [Greek: _phu=nai_ de\ o( Ku=ros -le/getai], &c. i. 3, 1-2. [Greek: pa/ntôn tô=n ê(li/kôn diaphe/rôn -e)phai/neto . . . pai=s phu/sei philo/storgos], &c.] - -[Side-note: Views of Xenophon about public and official training of -all citizens.] - -The Cyropædia is a title not fairly representing the contents of the -work, which contains a more copious biography of the hero than any -which we read in Plutarch or Suetonius. But the education of Cyrus[65] -is the most remarkable part of it, in which the ethico-political -theory of Xenophon, generated by Sokratic refining criticism brought -to bear on the Spartan drill and discipline, is put forth. Professing -to describe the Persian polity, he in reality describes only the -Persian education; which is public, and prescribed by law, intended to -form the character of individuals so that they shall stand in no need -of coercive laws or penalties. Most cities leave the education of -youth to be conducted at the discretion of their parents, and think it -sufficient to enact and enforce laws forbidding, under penal sanction, -theft, murder, and various other acts enumerated as criminal. But -Xenophon (like Plato and Aristotle) disapproves of this system.[66] -His Persian polity places the citizen even from infancy under official -tuition, and aims at forming his first habits and character, as well -as at upholding them when formed, so that instead of having any -disposition of his own to commit such acts, he shall contract a -repugnance to them. He is kept under perpetual training, drill, and -active official employment throughout life, but the supervision is -most unremitting during boyhood and youth. - -[Footnote 65: I have already observed that the phrase of Plato in -Legg. iii. p. 694 C may be considered as conveying his denial of the -assertion, that Cyrus had received a good education.] - -[Footnote 66: Xenophon says the same about the scheme of Lykurgus at -Sparta, De Lac. Repub. c. 2.] - -[Side-note: Details of (so-called) Persian education--Severe -discipline--Distribution of four ages.] - -There are four categories of age:--boys, up to sixteen--young men or -ephêbi, from sixteen to twenty-six--mature men, as far as -fifty-one--above that age, elders. To each of these four classes there is -assigned a certain portion of the "free agora": _i.e._, the great -square of the city, where no buying or selling or vulgar occupation is -allowed--where the regal residence is situated, and none but dignified -functions, civil or military, are carried on. Here the boys and the -mature men assemble every day at sunrise, continue under drill, and -take their meals; while the young men even pass the night on guard -near the government house. Each of the four sections is commanded by -superintendents or officers: those superintending the boys are Elders, -who are employed in administering justice to the boys, and in teaching -them what justice is. They hold judicial trials of the boys for -various sorts of misconduct: for violence, theft, abusive words, -lying, and even for ingratitude. In cases of proved guilt, beating or -flogging is inflicted. The boys go there to learn justice (says -Xenophon), as boys in Hellas go to school to learn letters. Under this -discipline, and in learning the use of the bow and javelin besides, -they spend the time until sixteen years of age. They bring their food -with them from home (wheaten bread, with a condiment of kardamon, or -bruised seed of the nasturtium), together with a wooden cup to draw -water from the river: and they dine at public tables under the eye of -the teacher. The young men perform all the military and police duty -under the commands of the King and the Elders: moreover, they -accompany the King when he goes on a hunting expedition--which -accustoms them to fatigue and long abstinence, as well as to the -encounter of dangerous wild animals. The Elders do not take part in -these hunts, nor in any foreign military march, nor are they bound, -like the others, to daily attendance in the agora. They appoint all -officers, and try judicially the cases shown up by the -superintendents, or other accusers, of all youths or mature men who -have failed in the requirements of the public discipline. The gravest -derelictions they punish with death: where this is not called for, -they put the offender out of his class, so that he remains degraded -all his life.[67] - -[Footnote 67: Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 6-16. [Greek: kai\ ê)/n tis ê)\ e)n -e)phê/bois ê)\ e)n telei/ois a)ndra/sin e)lli/pê| ti tô=n nomi/môn, -phai/nousi me\n oi( phu/larchoi e(/kaston, kai\ tô=n a)/llôn o( -boulo/menos; oi( de\ gerai/teroi a)kou/santes e)kkri/nousin; o( de\ -e)kkrithei\s a)/timos to\n loipo\n bi/on diatelei=.]] - -[Side-note: Evidence of the good effect of this discipline--Hard and -dry condition of the body.] - -This severe discipline is by law open to all Persians who choose to -attend and the honours of the state are attainable by all equally. But -in practice it is confined to a few: for neither boys nor men can -attend it continuously, except such as possess an independent -maintenance; nor is any one allowed to enter the regiment of youths or -mature men, unless he has previously gone through the discipline of -boyhood. The elders, by whom the higher functions are exercised, must -be persons who have passed without reproach through all the three -preceding stages: so that these offices, though legally open to all, -are in practice confined to a few--the small class of Homotimoi.[68] - -[Footnote 68: Cyropæd. i. 2, 14-15.] - -Such is Xenophon's conception of a perfect Polity. It consists in an -effective public discipline and drill, begun in early boyhood and -continued until old age. The evidence on which he specially insists to -prove its good results relates first to the body. The bodies of the -Persians become so dry and hard, that they neither spit, nor have -occasion to wipe their noses, nor are full of wind, nor are ever seen -to retire for the satisfaction of natural wants.[69] Besides this, the -discipline enforces complete habits of obedience, sobriety, justice, -endurance of pain and privation. - -[Footnote 69: Cyrop. i. 2, 16.] - -We may note here both the agreement, and the difference, between -Xenophon and Plato, as to the tests applied for measuring the goodness -of their respective disciplinarian schemes. In regard to the ethical -effects desirable (obedience, sobriety, &c.) both were agreed. But -while Plato (in Republic) dwells much besides upon the musical -training necessary, Xenophon omits this, and substitutes in its place -the working off of all the superfluous moisture of the body.[70] - -[Footnote 70: See below, chap. xxxvii.] - -[Side-note: Exemplary obedience of Cyrus to the public discipline--He -had learnt justice well--His award about the two coats--Lesson -inculcated upon him by the Justice-Master.] - -Through the two youthful stages of this discipline Cyrus is -represented as having passed; undergoing all the fatigues as well as -the punishment (he is beaten or flogged by the superintendent[71]) -with as much rigour as the rest, and even surpassing all his comrades -in endurance and exemplary obedience, not less than in the bow and the -javelin. In the lessons about justice he manifests such pre-eminence, -that he is appointed by the superintendent to administer justice to -other boys: and it is in this capacity that he is chastised for his -well-known decision, awarding the large coat to the great boy and the -little coat to the little boy, as being more convenient to both,[72] -though the proprietorship was opposite: the master impressing upon -him, as a general explanation, that the lawful or customary was the -Just.[73] Cyrus had been brought as a boy by his mother Mandanê to -visit her father, the Median king Astyages. The boy wins the affection -of Astyages and all around by his child-like frankness and -affectionate sympathy (admirably depicted in Xenophon): while he at -the same time resists the corruptions of a luxurious court, and -adheres to the simplicity of his Persian training. When Mandanê is -about to depart and to rejoin her husband Kambyses in Persis, she is -entreated by Astyages to allow Cyrus to remain with him. Cyrus himself -also desires to remain: but Mandanê hesitates to allow it: putting to -Cyrus, among other difficulties, the question--How will you learn -justice here, when the teachers of it are in Persis? To which Cyrus -replies--I am already well taught in justice: as you may see by the -fact, that my teacher made me a judge over other boys, and compelled -me to render account to him of all my proceedings.[74] Besides which, -if I am found wanting, my grandfather Astyages will make up the -deficient teaching. But (says Mandanê) justice is not the same here -under Astyages, as it is in Persis. Astyages has made himself master -of all the Medes: while among the Persians equality is accounted -justice. Your father Kambyses both performs all that the city directs, -and receives nothing more than what the city allows: the measure for -him is, not his own inclination, but the law. You must therefore be -cautious of staying here, lest you should bring back with you to -Persia habits of despotism, and of grasping at more than any one else, -contracted from your grandfather: for if you come back in this spirit, -you will assuredly be flogged to death. Never fear, mother (answered -Cyrus): my grandfather teaches every one round him to claim less than -his due--not more than his due: and he will teach me the same.[75] - -[Footnote 71: Cyrop. i. 3, 17; i. 5, 4.] - -[Footnote 72: Cyrop. i. 3, 17. This is an ingenious and apposite -illustration of the law of property.] - -[Footnote 73: Cyrop. i. 3, 17. [Greek: e)/peita de\ e)/phê to\ me\n -no/mimon di/kaion ei)=nai; to\ de\ a)/nomon, bi/aion.]] - -[Footnote 74: Cyropæd. i. 4, 2.] - -[Footnote 75: Cyrop. i. 3, 17-18. [Greek: O(/pôs ou)=n mê\ a)polê=| -mastigou/menos, e)peida\n oi)/koi ê)=|s, a)\n para\ tou/tou mathô\n -ê(/kê|s a)nti\ tou= basilikou= to\ turanniko/n, e)n ô(=| e)sti to\ -ple/on oi)/esthai chrê=nai pa/ntôn e)/chein.]] - -[Side-note: Xenophon's conception of the Sokratic problems--He does -not recognise the Sokratic order of solution of those problems.] - -The portion of the Cyropædia just cited deserves especial attention, -in reference to Xenophon as a companion and pupil of Sokrates. The -reader has been already familiarised throughout this work with the -questions habitually propounded and canvassed by Sokrates--What is -Justice, Temperance, Courage, &c.? Are these virtues teachable? If -they are so, where are the teachers of them to be found?--for he -professed to have looked in vain for any teachers.[76] I have farther -remarked that Sokrates required these questions to be debated in the -order here stated. That is--you must first know what Justice is, -before you can determine whether it be teachable or not--nay, before -you are in a position to affirm any thing at all about it, or to -declare any particular acts to be either just or unjust.[77] - -[Footnote 76: Xenoph. Memor. i. 16, iv. 4, 5.] - -[Footnote 77: See below, ch. xiii., ch. xxii, and ch. xxiii.] - -Now Xenophon, in his description of the Persian official discipline, -provides a sufficient answer to the second question--Whether justice -is teachable--and where are the teachers thereof? It _is_ teachable: -there are official teachers appointed: and every boy passes through a -course of teaching prolonged for several years.--But Xenophon does not -at all recognise the Sokratic requirement, that the first question -shall be fully canvassed and satisfactorily answered, before the -second is approached. The first question is indeed answered in a -certain way--though the answer appears here only as an _obiter -dictum_, and is never submitted to any Elenchus at all. The master -explains--What is Justice?--by telling Cyrus, "That the lawful is -just, and that the lawless is violent". Now if we consider this as -preceptorial--as an admonition to the youthful Cyrus how he ought to -decide judicial cases--it is perfectly reasonable: "Let your decisions -be conformable to the law or custom of the country". But if we -consider it as a portion of philosophy or reasoned truth--as a -definition or rational explanation of Justice, advanced by a -respondent who is bound to defend it against the Sokratic -cross-examination--we shall find it altogether insufficient. Xenophon -himself tells us here, that Law or Custom is one thing among the -Medes, and the reverse among the Persians: accordingly an action which -is just in the one place will be unjust in the other. It is by -objections of this kind that Sokrates, both in Plato and Xenophon, -refutes explanations propounded by his respondents.[78] - -[Footnote 78: Plato, Republ. v. p. 479 A. [Greek: tou/tôn tô=n pollô=n -kalô=n mô=n ti e)/stin, o( ou)k ai)schro\n phanê/setai? kai\ tô=n -dikai/ôn, o(\ ou)k a)/dikon? kai\ tô=n o(si/ôn, o(\ ou)k a)no/sion?] -Compare Republ. i. p. 331 C, and the conversation of So krates with -Euthydêmus in the Xenophontic Memorab. iv. 2, 18-19, and Cyropædia, i. -6, 27-34, about what is just and good morality towards enemies. - -We read in Pascal, Pensées, i. 6, 8-9:-- - -"On ne voit presque rien de juste et d'injuste, qui ne change de -qualité en changeant de climat. Trois degrés d'élévation du pôle -renversent toute la jurisprudence. Un méridien décide de la verité: en -peu d'années de possession, les loix fondamentales changent: le droit -a ses époques. Plaisante justice, qu'une rivière ou une montagne -borne! Vérité au deçà des Pyrénées--erreur au delà! - -"Ils confessent que la justice n'est pas dans les coutumes, mais -qu'elle reside dans les loix naturelles, connues en tout pays. -Certainement ils la soutiendraient opiniâtrement, si la témérité du -hasard qui a semé les loix humaines en avait rencontré au moins une -qui fut universelle: mais la plaisanterie est telle, que le caprice -des hommes s'est si bien diversifié, qu'il n'y en a point. - -"Le larcin, l'inceste, le meurtre des enfans et des pères, tout a eu -sa place entre les actions vertueuses. Se peut-il rien de plus -plaisant, qu'un homme ait droit de me tuer parcequ'il demeure au-delà -de l'eau, et que son prince a querelle avec le mien, quoique je n'en -aie aucune avec lui? - -"L'un dit que l'essence de la justice est l'autorité du législateur: -l'autre, la commodité du souverain: l'autre, la coutume présente--et -c'est le plus sûr. Rien, suivant la seule raison, n'est juste de soi: -tout branle avec le temps. La coutume fait toute l'équité, par cela -seul qu'elle est reçue: c'est le fondement mystique de son autorité. -Qui la ramène à son principe, l'anéantit."] - -[Side-note: Definition given by Sokrates of Justice--Insufficient to -satisfy the exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus.] - -Though the explanation of Justice here given is altogether untenable, -yet we shall find it advanced by Sokrates himself as complete and -conclusive, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, where he is conversing -with the Sophist Hippias. That Sophist is represented as at first -urging difficulties against it, but afterwards as concurring with -Sokrates: who enlarges upon the definition, and extols it as perfectly -satisfactory. If Sokrates really delivered this answer to Hippias, as -a general definition of Justice--we may learn from it how much greater -was his negative acuteness in overthrowing the definitions of others, -than his affirmative perspicacity in discovering unexceptionable -definitions of his own. This is the deficiency admitted by himself in -the Platonic Apology--lamented by friends like Kleitophon--arraigned -by opponents like Hippias and Thrasymachus. Xenophon, whose intellect -was practical rather than speculative, appears not to be aware of it. -He does not feel the depth and difficulty of the Sokratic problems, -even while he himself enunciates them. He does not appreciate all the -conditions of a good definition, capable of being maintained against -that formidable cross-examination (recounted by himself) whereby -Sokrates humbled the youth Euthydêmus: still less does he enter into -the spirit of that Sokratic order of precedence (declared in the -negative Platonic dialogues), in the study of philosophical -questions:--First define Justice, and find a definition of it such as -you can maintain against a cross-examining adversary before you -proceed either to affirm or deny any predicates concerning it. The -practical advice and reflexions of Xenophon are, for the most part, -judicious and penetrating. But he falls very short when he comes to -deal with philosophical theory:--with reasoned truth, and with the -Sokratic Elenchus as a test for discriminating such truth from the -false, the doubtful, or the not-proven. - -[Side-note: Biography of Cyrus--constant military success earned by -suitable qualities--Variety of characters and situations.] - -Cyrus is allowed by his mother to remain amidst the luxuries of the -Median court. It is a part of his admirable disposition that he -resists all its temptations,[79] and goes back to the hard fare and -discipline of the Persians with the same exemplary obedience as -before. He is appointed by the Elders to command the Persian -contingent which is sent to assist Kyaxares (son of Astyages), king of -Media; and he thus enters upon that active military career which is -described as occupying his whole life, until his conquest of Babylon, -and his subsequent organization of the great Persian empire. His -father Kambyses sends him forth with excellent exhortations, many of -which are almost in the same words as those which we read ascribed to -Sokrates in the Memorabilia. In the details of Cyrus's biography which -follow, the stamp of Sokratic influence is less marked, yet seldom -altogether wanting. The conversation of Sokrates had taught Xenophon -how to make the most of his own large experience and observation. His -biography of Cyrus represents a string of successive situations, -calling forth and displaying the aptitude of the hero for command. The -epical invention with which these situations are imagined--the variety -of characters introduced, Araspes, Abradates, Pantheia, Chrysantas, -Hystaspes, Gadatas, Gobryas, Tigranes, &c.--the dramatic propriety -with which each of these persons is animated as speaker, and made to -teach a lesson bearing on the predetermined conclusion--all these are -highly honourable to the Xenophontic genius, but all of them likewise -bespeak the Companion of Sokrates. Xenophon dwells, with evident -pleasure, on the details connected with the _rationale_ of military -proceedings: the wants and liabilities of soldiers, the advantages or -disadvantages of different weapons or different modes of marshalling, -the duties of the general as compared with those of the soldier, &c. -Cyrus is not merely always ready with his orders, but also competent -as a speaker to explain the propriety of what he orders.[80] We have -the truly Athenian idea, that persuasive speech is the precursor of -intelligent and energetic action: and that it is an attribute -essentially necessary for a general, for the purpose of informing, -appeasing, re-assuring, the minds of the soldiers.[81] This, as well -as other duties and functions of a military commander, we find laid -down generally in the conversations of Sokrates,[82] who conceives -these functions, in their most general aspect, as a branch of the -comprehensive art of guiding or governing men. What Sokrates thus -enunciates generally, is exemplified in detail throughout the life of -Cyrus. - -[Footnote 79: Cyropæd. i. 5, 1.] - -[Footnote 80: Cyropæd. v. 5, 46. [Greek: lektikô/tatos kai\ -praktikô/tatos]. Compare the Memorabilia, iv. 6, 1-15.] - -[Footnote 81: Memorab. iii. 3, 11; Hipparch. viii. 22; Cyropæd. vi. 2, -13. Compare the impressive portion of the funeral oration delivered by -Perikles in Thucydides, ii. 40.] - -[Footnote 82: See the four first chapters of the third book of the -Xenophontic Memorabilia. The treatise of Xenophon called [Greek: -I(pparchiko\s] enumerates also the general duties required from a -commander of cavalry: among these, [Greek: pseudauto/moloi] are -mentioned (iv. 7). Now the employment, with effect, of a [Greek: -pseudauto/molos], is described with much detail in the Cyropædia. See -the case of Araspes (vi. 1, 37, vi. 3, 16).] - -[Side-note: Generous and amiable qualities of Cyrus, Abradates and -Pantheia.] - -Throughout all the Cyropædia, the heroic qualities and personal agency -of Cyrus are always in the foreground, working with unerring success -and determining every thing. He is moreover recommended to our -sympathies, not merely by the energy and judgment of a leader, but -also by the amiable qualities of a generous man--by the remarkable -combination of self-command with indulgence towards others--by -considerate lenity towards subdued enemies like Kroesus and the -Armenian prince--even by solicitude shown that the miseries of war -should fall altogether on the fighting men, and that the cultivators -of the land should be left unmolested by both parties.[83] Respecting -several other persons in the narrative, too--the Armenian Tigranes, -Gadatas, Gobryas, &c.--the adventures and scenes described are -touching: but the tale of Abradates and Pantheia transcends them all, -and is perhaps the most pathetic recital embodied in the works of -Hellenic antiquity.[84] In all these narratives the vein of sentiment -is neither Sokratic nor Platonic, but belongs to Xenophon himself. - -[Footnote 83: Cyrop. iii. 1, 10-38, vii. 2, 9-29, v. 4, 26, vi. 1, 37. -[Greek: A)lla\ su\ me\n, ô)= Ku=re, kai\ tau=ta o(/moios ei)=, -pra=|o/s te kai\ suggnô/môn tô=n a)nthrôpi/nôn a(martêma/tôn].\ - -[Footnote 84: Cyrop. vii. 3.] - -[Side-note: Scheme of government devised by Cyrus when his conquests -are completed--Oriental despotism, wisely arranged.] - -This last remark may also be made respecting the concluding -proceedings of Cyrus, after he has thoroughly completed his conquests, -and when he establishes arrangements for governing them permanently. -The scheme of government which Xenophon imagines and introduces him as -organizing, is neither Sokratic nor Platonic, nor even Hellenic: it -would probably have been as little acceptable to his friend Agesilaus, -the marked "hater of Persia,"[85] as to any Athenian politician. It is -altogether an Oriental despotism, skilfully organized both for the -security of the despot and for enabling him to keep a vigorous hold on -subjects distant as well as near: such as the younger Cyrus might -possibly have attempted, if his brother Artaxerxes had been slain at -Kunaxa, instead of himself. "Eam conditionem esse imperandi, ut non -aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur"[86]--is a maxim repugnant -to Hellenic ideas, and not likely to be rendered welcome even by the -regulations of detail with which Xenophon surrounds it; judicious as -these regulations are for their contemplated purpose. The amiable and -popular character which Cyrus has maintained from youth upwards, and -by means of which he has gained an uninterrupted series of victories, -is difficult to be reconciled with the insecurity, however imposing, -in which he dwells as Great King. When we find that he accounts it a -necessary precaution to surround himself with eunuchs, on the express -ground that they are despised by every one else and therefore likely -to be more faithful to their master--when we read also that in -consequence of the number of disaffected subjects, he is forced to -keep a guard composed of twenty thousand soldiers taken from poor -Persian mountaineers[87]--we find realised, in the case of the -triumphant Cyrus, much of that peril and insecurity which the despot -Hieron had so bitterly deplored in his conversation with Simonides. -However unsatisfactory the ideal of government may be, which Plato -lays out either in the Republic or the Leges--that which Xenophon sets -before us is not at all more acceptable, in spite of the splendid -individual portrait whereby he dazzles our imagination. Few Athenians -would have exchanged Athens either for Babylon under Cyrus, or for -Plato's Magnêtic colony in Krete. - -[Footnote 85: Xenoph. Agesilaus, vii. 7. [Greek: ei) d' au)= kalo\n -kai\ _misope/rsên_ ei)=nai--e)xe/pleusen, o(/, ti du/naito kako\n; -poiê/sôn to\n ba/rbaron.]] - -[Footnote 86: Tacit. Annal. i. 6.] - -[Footnote 87: Xen. Cyrop. vii. 5, 58-70.] - -[Side-note: Persian present reality--is described by Xenophon as -thoroughly depraved, in striking contrast to the establishment of -Cyrus.] - -The Xenophontic government is thus noway admirable, even as an ideal. -But he himself presents it only as an ideal--or (which is the same -thing in the eyes of a present companion of Sokrates) as a -quasi-historical fact, belonging to the unknown and undetermined past. -When Xenophon talks of what the Persians _are now_, he presents us with -nothing but a shocking contrast to this ideal; nothing but vice, -corruption, degeneracy of every kind, exorbitant sensuality, -faithlessness and cowardice.[88] His picture of Persia is like that of -the of Platonic Kosmos, which we can read in the Timæus:[89] a -splendid Kosmos in its original plan and construction, but full of -defects and evil as it actually exists. The strength and excellence of -the Xenophontic orderly despotism dies with its heroic beginner. His -two sons (as Plato remarked) do not receive the same elaborate -training and discipline as himself: nor can they be restrained, even -by the impressive appeal which he makes to them on his death-bed, from -violent dissension among themselves, and misgovernment of every -kind.[90] - -[Footnote 88: Cyrop. viii. 8.] - -[Footnote 89: See below, ch. xxxviii.] - -[Footnote 90: Cyropæd. viii. 7, 9-19: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 694 D.] - -[Side-note: Xenophon has good experience of military and equestrian -proceedings--No experience of finance and commerce.] - -Whatever we may think of the political ideal of Xenophon, his -Cyropædia is among the glories of the Sokratic family; as an excellent -specimen of the philosophical imagination, in carrying a general -doctrine into illustrative details--and of the epical imagination in -respect to varied characters and touching incident. In stringing -together instructive conversations, moreover, it displays the same art -which we trace in the Memorabilia, Oekonomikus, Hieron, &c., and which -is worthy of the attentive companion of Sokrates. Whenever Xenophon -talks about military affairs, horsemanship, agriculture, -house-management, &c., he is within the range of personal experience of -his own; and his recommendations, controlled as they thus are by known -realities, are for the most part instructive and valuable. Such is the -case not merely with the Cyropædia and Oekonomikus, but also in his -two short treatises, De Re Equestri and De Officio Magistri Equitum. - -But we cannot say so much when he discusses plans of finance. - -[Side-note: Discourse of Xenophon on Athenian finance and the -condition of Athens. His admiration of active commerce and variety of -pursuits.] - -We read among his works a discourse composed after his sentence of -exile had been repealed, and when he was very old, seemingly not -earlier than 355 B.C.[91]--criticising the actual condition of Athens, -and proposing various measures for the improvement of the finances, as -well as for relief of the citizens from poverty. He begins this -discourse by a sentiment thoroughly Sokratic and Platonic, which would -serve almost as a continuation of the Cyropædia. The government of a -city will be measured by the character and ability of its leaders.[92] -He closes it by another sentiment equally Sokratic and Platonic; -advising that before his measures are adopted, special messengers -shall be sent to Delphi and Dodona; to ascertain whether the Gods -approve them--and if they approve, to which Gods they enjoin that the -initiatory sacrifices shall be offered.[93] But almost everything in -the discourse, between the first and last sentences, is in a vein not -at all Sokratic--in a vein, indeed, positively anti-Platonic and -anti-Spartan. We have already seen that wealth, gold and silver, -commerce, influx of strangers, &c., are discouraged as much as possible -by Plato, and by the theory (though evaded partially in practice) of -Sparta. Now it is precisely these objects which Xenophon, in the -treatise before us, does his utmost to foster and extend at Athens. -Nothing is here said about the vulgarising influence of trade as -compared with farming, which we read in the Oekonomikus: nor about the -ethical and pædagogic dictation which pervades so much of the -Cyropædia, and reigns paramount throughout the Platonic Republic and -Leges. Xenophon takes Athens as she stands, with great variety of -tastes, active occupation, and condition among the inhabitants: her -mild climate and productive territory, especially her veins of silver -and her fine marble: her importing and exporting merchants, her -central situation, as convenient entrepôt for commodities produced in -the most distant lands:[94] her skilful artisans and craftsmen: her -monied capitalists: and not these alone, but also the congregation and -affluence of fine artists, intellectual men, philosophers, Sophists, -poets, rhapsodes, actors, &c.: last, though not least, the temples -adorning her akropolis, and the dramatic representations exhibited at -her Dionysiac festivals, which afforded the highest captivation to eye -as well as ear, and attracted strangers from all quarters as -visitors.[95] Xenophon extols these charms of Athens with a warmth -which reminds us of the Periklean funeral oration in Thucydides.[96] -He no longer speaks like one whose heart and affections are with the -Spartan drill: still less does he speak like Plato--to whom (as we see -both by the Republic and the Leges) such artistic and poetical -exhibitions were abominations calling for censorial repression--and in -whose eyes gold, silver, commerce, abundant influx of strangers, &c., -were dangerous enemies of all civic virtue. - -[Footnote 91: Xenophon, [Greek: Po/roi--ê(\ peri\ Proso/dôn]. De -Vectigalibus. See Schneider's Proleg. to this treatise, pp. 138-140.] - -[Footnote 92: De Vectig. i. 1. [Greek: e)gô\ me\n tou=to a)ei/ pote -nomi/zo, o(poi=oi/ tines a)\n oi( prosta/tai ô)=si, toiau/tas kai\ -ta\s politei/as gi/gnesthai.]] - -[Footnote 93: De Vect. vi. 2. Compare this with Anabas. iii. 1, 5, -where Sokrates reproves Xenophon for his evasive manner of putting a -question to the Delphian God. Xenophon here adopts the plenary manner -enjoined by Sokrates.] - -[Footnote 94: De Vectig. c. i. 2-3.] - -[Footnote 95: De Vect. v. 3-4. [Greek: Ti/ de\ oi( polue/laioi? ti/ -de\ oi( polupro/batoi? ti/ de\ oi( gnô/mê| kai\ a)rguri/ô| duna/menoi -chrêmati/zesthai? Kai\ mê\n cheirote/chnai te kai\ sophistai\ kai\ -philo/sophoi; oi( de\ poiêtai\, oi( de\ ta\ tou/tôn -metacheirizo/menoi, oi( de\ a)xiothea/tôn ê)\ a)xiakou/stôn i(erô=n -ê)\ o(si/ôn e)pithumou=ntes], &c.] - -[Footnote 96: Thucydid. ii. 34-42; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 12. Compare -Xenophon, Republ. Athen. ii. 7, iii. 8.] - -[Side-note: Recognised poverty among the citizens. Plan for -improvement.] - -Yet while recognising all these charms and advantages, Xenophon finds -himself compelled to lament great poverty among the citizens; which -poverty (he says) is often urged by the leading men as an excuse for -unjust proceedings. Accordingly he comes forward with various -financial suggestions, by means of which he confidently anticipates -that every Athenian citizen may obtain a comfortable maintenance from -the public.[97] - -[Footnote 97: De Vectig. iv. 33. [Greek: kai\ e)moi\ me\n dê\ -ei)/rêtai, ô(s a)\n ê(gou=mai kataskeuasthei/sês tê=s po/leôs i(kanê\n -a)\n pa=sin A)thênai/ois trophê\n a)po\ koinou= gene/sthai.]] - -[Side-note: Advantage of a large number of Metics. How these may be -encouraged.] - -First, he dwells upon the great advantage of encouraging metics, or -foreigners resident at Athens, each of whom paid an annual capitation -tax to the treasury. There were already many such, not merely Greeks, -but Orientals also, Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, &c.:[98] and by -judicious encouragement all expatriated men everywhere might be made -to prefer the agreeable residence at Athens, thus largely increasing -the annual amount of the tax. The metics ought (he says) to be -exempted from military service (which the citizens ought to perform -and might perform alone), but to be admitted to the honours of the -equestrian duty, whenever they were rich enough to afford it: and -farther, to be allowed the liberty of purchasing land and building -houses in the city. Moreover not merely resident metics, but also -foreign merchants who came as visitors, conducting an extensive -commerce--ought to be flattered by complimentary votes and occasional -hospitalities: while the curators of the harbour, whose function it -was to settle disputes among them, should receive prizes if they -adjudicated equitably and speedily.[99] - -[Footnote: 98: De Vect. ii. 3-7.] - -[Footnote: 99: De Vect. iii. 2-6.] - -[Side-note: Proposal to raise by voluntary contributions a large sum -to be employed as capital by the city. Distribution of three oboli per -head per day to all the citizens.] - -All this (Xenophon observes) will require only friendly and -considerate demonstrations. His farther schemes are more ambitious, -not to be effected without a large outlay. He proposes to raise an -ample fund for the purposes of the city, by voluntary contributions; -which he expects to obtain not merely from private Athenians and -metics, rich and in easy circumstances--but also from other cities, -and even from foreign despots, kings, satraps, &c. The tempting -inducement will be, that the names of all contributors with their -respecting contributions will be inscribed on public tablets, and -permanently commemorated as benefactors of the city.[100] Contributors -(he says) are found, for the outfit of a fleet, where they expect no -return: much more will they come forward here, where a good return -will accrue. The fund so raised will be employed under public -authority with the most profitable result, in many different ways. The -city will build docks and warehouses for bonding goods--houses near -the harbour to be let to merchants--merchant-vessels to be let out on -freight. But the largest profit will be obtained by working the silver -mines at Laureion in Attica. The city will purchase a number of -foreign slaves, and will employ them under the superintendence of old -free citizens who are past the age of labour, partly in working these -mines for public account, each of the ten tribes employing one tenth -part of the number--partly by letting them out to private mining -undertakers, at so much per diem for each slave: the slaves being -distinguished by a conspicuous public stamp, and the undertaker -binding himself under penalty always to restore the same number of -them as he received.[101] Such competition between the city and the -private mining undertakers will augment the total produce, and will be -no loss to either, but wholesome for both. The mines will absorb as -many workmen as are put into them: for in the production of silver -(Xenophon argues) there can never be any glut, as there is sometimes -in corn, wine, or oil. Silver is always in demand, and is not lessened -in value by increase of quantity. Every one is anxious to get it, and -has as much pleasure in hoarding it under ground as in actively -employing it.[102] The scheme, thus described, may (if found -necessary) be brought into operation by degrees, a certain number of -slaves being purchased annually until the full total is made up. From -these various financial projects, and especially from the fund thus -employed as capital under the management of the Senate, the largest -returns are expected. Amidst the general abundance which will ensue, -the religious festivals will be celebrated with increased splendour--the -temples will be repaired, the docks and walls will be put in -complete order--the priests, the Senate, the magistrates, the -horsemen, will receive the full stipends which the old custom of -Athens destined for them.[103] But besides all these, the object which -Xenophon has most at heart will be accomplished: the poor citizens -will be rescued from poverty. There will be a regular distribution -among all citizens, per head and equally. Three oboli, or half a -drachma, will be allotted daily to each, to poor and rich alike. For -the poor citizens, this will provide a comfortable subsistence, -without any contribution on their part: the poverty now prevailing -will thus be alleviated. The rich, like the poor, receive the daily -triobolon as a free gift: but if they even compute it as interest for -their investments, they will find that the rate of interest is full -and satisfactory, like the rate on bottomry. Three oboli per day -amount in the year of 360 days to 180 drachmæ: now if a rich man has -contributed ten minæ ( = 1000 drachmæ), he will thus receive interest -at the rate of 18 per cent. per annum: if another less rich citizen -has contributed one mina ( = 100 drachmæ), he will receive interest at -the rate of 180 per cent. per annum: more than he could realise in any -other investment.[104] - -[Footnote 100: De Vect. iii. 11.] - -[Footnote 101: De Vect. iv. 13-19.] - -[Footnote 102: De Vect. iv. 4-7.] - -[Footnote 103: De Vectig. vi. 1-2. [Greek: Kai\ o( me\n dê=mos -trophê=s eu)porê/sei, oi( de\ plou/sioi tê=s ei)s to\n po/lemon -dapa/nês a)pallagê/sontai, periousi/as de\ pollê=s genome/nês, -megaloprepe/steron me\n e)/ti ê(\ nu=n ta\s e(orta\s a)/xomen, i(era\ -d' e)piskeua/somen, tei/chê de\ kai\ neô/ria a)northô/somen, i(ereu=si -de\ kai\ boulê=| kai\ a)rchai=s kai\ i(ppeu=si ta\ pa/tria -a)podô/somen--pô=s ou)k a)/xion ô(s ta/chista tou/tois e)gcheirei=n, -i(/na e)/ti e)ph' ê(mô=n e)pi/dômen tê\n po/lin met' a)sphalei/as -eu)daimonou=san?] - -[Footnote 104: De Vectig. iii. 9-12.] - -[Side-note: Purpose and principle of this distribution.] - -Half a drachma, or three oboli, per day, was the highest rate of pay -ever received (the rate varied at different times) by the citizens as -Dikasts and Ekklesiasts, for attending in judicature or in assembly. -It is this amount of pay which Xenophon here proposes to ensure to -every citizen, without exception, out of the public treasury; which -(he calculates) would be enriched by his project so as easily to bear -such a disbursement. He relieves the poor citizens from poverty by -making them all pensioners on the public treasury, with or without -service rendered, or the pretence of service. He strains yet farther -the dangerous principle of the Theôrikon, without the same excuse as -can be shown for the Theôrikon itself on religious grounds.[105] If -such a proposition had been made by Kleon, Hyperbolus, Kleophon, -Agyrrhius, &c., it would have been dwelt upon by most historians of -Greece as an illustration of the cacoethes of democracy--to extract -money, somehow or other, from the rich, for the purpose of keeping the -poor in comfort. Not one of the democratical leaders, so far as we -know, ever ventured to propose so sweeping a measure: we have it here -from the pen of the oligarchical Xenophon. - -[Footnote 105: Respecting the Theôrikon at Athens, see my 'History of -Greece,' ch. 88, pp. 492-498.] - -[Side-note: Visionary anticipations of Xenophon, financial and -commercial.] - -But we must of course discuss Xenophon's scheme as a whole: the -aggregate enlargement of revenue, from his various visionary new ways -and means, on one side--against the new mode and increased amount of -expenditure, on the other side. He would not have proposed such an -expenditure, if he had not thoroughly believed in the correctness of -his own anticipations, both as to the profits of the mining scheme, -and as to the increase of receipts from other sources: such as the -multiplication of tax-paying Metics, the rent paid by them for the new -houses to be built by the city, the increase of the harbour dues from -expanded foreign trade. But of these anticipations, even the least -unpromising are vague and uncertain: while the prospects of the mining -scheme appear thoroughly chimerical. Nothing is clear or certain -except the disbursement. We scarcely understand how Xenophon could -seriously have imagined, either that voluntary contributors could have -been found to subscribe the aggregate fund as he proposes--or that, if -subscribed, it could have yielded the prodigious return upon which he -reckons. We must, however, recollect that he had no familiarity with -finance, or with the conditions and liabilities of commerce, or with -the raising of money from voluntary contributors for any collective -purpose. He would not have indulged in similar fancies if the question -had been about getting together supplies for an army. Practical -Athenian financiers would probably say, in criticising his financial -project--what Heraldus[106] observes upon some views of his opponent -Salmasius, about the relations of capital and interest in -Attica--"Somnium est hominis harum rerum, etiam cum vigilat, nihil -scientis".[107] The financial management of Athens was doubtless -defective in many ways: but it would not have been improved in the -hands of Xenophon--any more than the administrative and judiciary -department of Athens would have become better under the severe regimen -of Plato.[108] The merits of the Sokratic companions--and great merits -they were--lay in the region of instructive theory. - -[Footnote 106: This passage of Heraldus is cited by M. Boeckh in his -Public Economy of Athens, B. iv. ch. 21, p. 606, Eng. Trans. In that -chapter of M. Boeckh's work (pp. 600-610) some very instructive pages -will be found about the Xenophontic scheme here noticed. - -I will however mention one or two points on which my understanding of -the scheme differs from his. He says (p. 605):--"The author supposes -that the profit upon this speculation would amount to three oboli per -day, so that the subscribers would obtain a very high per centage on -their shares. Xenophon supposes unequal contributions, according to -the different amounts of property, agreeable to the principles of a -property-tax, but an equal distribution of the receipts for the -purpose of favouring and aiding the poor. What Xenophon is speaking of -is an income annually arising upon each share, either equal to or -exceeding the interest of the loans on bottomry. Where, however, is -the security that the undertaking would produce three oboli a day to -each subscriber?" - -I concur in most of what is here said; but M. Boeckh states the matter -too much as if the three oboli per diem were a real return arising -from the scheme, and payable to each shareholder upon each _share_ as -he calls it. This is an accident of the case, not the essential -feature. The poorest citizens--for whose benefit, more than for any -other object, the scheme is contrived--would not be shareholders at -all: they would be too poor to contribute anything, yet each of them -would receive his triobolon like the rest. Moreover, many citizens, -even though able to pay, might hold back, and decline to pay: yet -still each would receive as much. And again, the foreigners, kings, -satraps, &c., would be contributors, but would receive nothing at all. -The distribution of the triobolon would be made to citizens only. -Xenophon does indeed state the proportion of receipt to payments in -the cases of some rich contributors, as an auxiliary motive to -conciliate them. Bat we ought not to treat this receipt as if it were -a real return yielded by the public mining speculation, or as profit -actually brought in. - -As I conceive the scheme, the daily triobolon, and the respective -contributions furnished, have no premeditated ratio, no essential -connection with each other. The daily payment of the triobolon to -every citizen indiscriminately, is a new and heavy burden which -Xenophon imposes upon the city. But this is only one among many other -burdens, as we may see by cap. 6. In order to augment the wealth of -the city, so as to defray these large expenses, he proposes several -new financial measures. Of these the most considerable was the public -mining speculation; but it did not stand alone. The financial scheme -of Xenophon, both as to receipts and as to expenditure, is more -general than M. Boeckh allows for.] - -[Footnote 107: It is truly surprising to read in one of Hume's Essays -the following sentence. Essay XII. on Civil Liberty, p. 107 ed. of -Hume's Philosophical Works, 1825. - -"The Athenians, though governed by a Republic, paid near two hundred -per cent for those sums of money which any emergence made it necessary -for them to borrow, as we learn from Xenophon." - -In the note Hume quotes the following passage from this discourse, De -Vectigalibus:--[Greek: Ktê=sin de\ a)p' ou)deno\s a)\n ou(/tô kalê\n -ktê/sainto, ô(/sper a)ph' ou)= a)\n protele/sôsin ei)s tê\n -a)phormê/n. Oi( de/ ge plei=stoi A)thênai/ôn plei/ona lê/psontai kat' -e)niauto\n ê)\ o(/sa a)\n ei)sene/gkôsin. Oi( ga\r mna=n -protele/santes, e)ggu\s duoi=n mna=|n pro/sodon e)/xousi. O(\ dokei= -tô=n a)nthrôpi/nôn a)sphale/stato/n te kai\ poluchroniô/taton -ei)=nai]. - -Hume has been misled by dwelling upon one or two separate sentences. -If he had taken into consideration the whole discourse and its -declared scope, he would have seen that it affords no warrant for any -inference as to the rate of interest paid by the Athenian public when -they wanted to borrow. In Xenophon's scheme there is no fixed -proportion between what a contributor to the fund would pay and what -he would receive. The triobolon received is a fixed sum to each -citizen, whereas the contributions of _each_ would be different. -Moreover the foreigners and metics would contribute without receiving -anything, while the poor citizens would receive their triobolon per -head, without having contributed anything.] - -[Footnote 108: Aristeides the Rhetor has some forcible remarks in -defending Rhetoric and the Athenian statesmen against the bitter -criticisms of Plato in the Gorgias: pointing out that Plato himself -had never made trial of the difficulty of governing any real community -of men, or of the necessities under which a statesman in actual -political life was placed (Orat. xlv. [Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s], pp. -109-110, Dindorf).] - -[Side-note: Xenophon exhorts his countrymen to maintain peace.] - -Xenophon accompanies his financial scheme with a strong recommendation -to his countrymen that they should abstain from warlike enterprises -and maintain peace with every one. He expatiates on the manifest -advantages, nay, even on the necessity, of continued peace, under the -actual poverty of the city: for the purpose of recruiting the -exhausted means of the citizens, as well as of favouring his own new -projects for the improvement of finance and commerce. While he -especially deprecates any attempt on the part of Athens to regain by -force her lost headship over the Greeks, he at the same time holds out -hopes that this dignity would be spontaneously tendered to her, if, -besides abstaining from all violence, she conducted herself with a -liberal and conciliatory spirit towards all: if she did her best to -adjust differences among other cities, and to uphold the autonomy of -the Delphian temple.[109] As far as we can judge, such pacific -exhortations were at that time wise and politic. Athens had just then -concluded peace (355 B.C.) after the three years of ruinous and -unsuccessful war, called the Social War, carried on against her -revolted allies Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium. To attempt the -recovery of empire by force was most mischievous. There was indeed one -purpose, for which she was called upon by a wise forecast to put forth -her strength--to check the aggrandisement of Philip in Macedonia. But -this was a distant purpose: and the necessity, though it became every -year more urgent, was not so prominently manifest[110] in 355 B.C. as -to affect the judgment of Xenophon. At that early day, Demosthenes -himself did not see the danger from Macedonia: his first Philippic was -delivered in 351 B.C., and even then his remonstrances, highly -creditable to his own forecast, made little impression on others. But -when we read the financial oration De Symmoriis we appreciate his -sound administrative and practical judgment; compared with the -benevolent dreams and ample public largess in which Xenophon here -indulges.[111] - -[Footnote 109: Xenoph. De Vectig. v. 3-8.] - -[Footnote 110: See my 'History of Greece,' ch. 86, p. 325 seq. - -I agree with Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ut suprà, p. 601, that -this pamphlet of Xenophon is probably to be referred to the close of -the Social War, about 355 B.C.] - -[Footnote 111: Respecting the first Philippic, and the Oratio De -Symmoriis of Demosthenes, see my 'History of Greece,' ch. 87, -pp. 401-431.] - -[Side-note: Difference of the latest compositions of Xenophon and -Plato, from their point of view in the earlier.] - -We have seen that Plato died in 347 B.C., having reached the full age -of eighty: Xenophon must have attained the same age nearly, and may -perhaps have attained it completely--though we do not know the exact -year of his death. With both these two illustrious companions of -Sokrates, the point of view is considerably modified in their last -compositions as compared to their earlier. Xenophon shows the -alteration not less clearly than Plato, though in an opposite -direction. His discourse on the Athenian revenues differs quite as -much from the Anabasis, Cyropædia, and Oekonomikus--as the Leges and -Epinomis differ from any of Plato's earlier works. Whatever we may -think of the financial and commercial anticipations of Xenophon, his -pamphlet on the Athenian revenues betokens a warm sympathy for his -native city--a genuine appreciation of her individual freedom and her -many-sided intellectual activity--an earnest interest in her actual -career, and even in the extension of her commercial and manufacturing -wealth. In these respects it recommends itself to our feelings more -than the last Platonic production--Leges and Epinomis--composed nearly -at the same time, between 356-347 B.C. While Xenophon in old age, -becoming reconciled to his country, forgets his early passion for the -Spartan drill and discipline, perpetual, monotonous, unlettered--we -find in the senility of Plato a more cramping limitation of the -varieties of human agency--a stricter compression, even of individual -thought and speech, under the infallible official orthodoxy--a more -extensive use of the pædagogic rod and the censorial muzzle than he -had ever proposed before. - -In thus taking an unwilling leave of the Sokratic family, represented -by these two venerable survivors--to both of whom the students of -Athenian letters and philosophy are so deeply indebted--I feel some -satisfaction in the belief, that both of them died, as they were born, -citizens of free Athens and of unconquered Hellas: and that neither of -them was preserved to an excessive old age, like their contemporary -Isokrates, to witness the extinction of Hellenic autonomy by the -battle of Chæroneia.[112] - -[Footnote 112: Compare the touching passage in Tacitus's description -of the death of Agricola, c. 44-45. - -"Festinatæ mortis grande solatium tulit, evasisse postremum illud -tempus," &c.] - - - - -CHAPTER V. - -LIFE OF PLATO. - -[Side-note: Scanty information about Plato's life.] - -Of Plato's biography we can furnish nothing better than a faint -outline. We are not fortunate enough to possess the work on Plato's -life,[1] composed by his companion and disciple Xenokrates, like the -life of Plotinus by Porphyry, or that of Proklus by Marinus. Though -Plato lived eighty years, enjoying extensive celebrity--and though -Diogenes Laertius employed peculiar care in collecting information -about him--yet the number of facts recounted is very small, and of -those facts a considerable proportion is poorly attested.[2] - -[Footnote 1: This is cited by Simplikius, Schol. ad Aristot. De Coelo, -470, a. 27; 474, a. 12, ed. Brandis.] - -[Footnote 2: Diogen. Laert. iv. 1. The person to whom Diogenes -addressed his biography of Plato was a female: possibly the wife of -the emperor Septimius Severus (see Philostr. Vit. Apoll. i. 3), who -greatly loved and valued the Platonic philosophy (Diog. Laert. iii. -47). Ménage (in his commentary on the Prooemium) supposes the person -signified to be Arria: this also is a mere conjecture, and in my -judgment less probable. We know that the empress gave positive -encouragement to writers on philosophy. The article devoted by -Diogenes to Plato is of considerable length, including both biography -and exposition of doctrine. He makes reference to numerous -witnesses--Speusippus, Aristotle, Hermodôrus, Aristippus, Dikæarchus, -Aristoxenus, Klearchus, Herakleides, Theopompus, Timon in his Silli or -satirical poem, Pamphila, Hermippus, Neanthes, Antileon, Favorinus, -Athenodôrus. Timotheus, Idomeneus, Alexander [Greek: e)n diadochai=s -kath' Ê(ra/kleiton], Satyrus, Onêtor, Alkimus, Euphorion, Panætius, -Myronianus, Polemon, Aristophanes of Byzantium, the Alexandrine -critic, Antigonus of Karystus, Thrasyllus, &c. - -Of the other biographers of Plato, Olympiodorus and the Auctor -Anonymus cite no authorities. Apuleius, in his survey of the doctrine -of Plato (De Habitudine doctrinarum Platonis, init. p. 567, ed. -Paris), mentions only Speusippus, as having attested the early -diligence and quick apprehension of Plato. "Speusippus, domesticis -instructus documentis, et pueri ejus acre in percipiendo ingenium, et -admirandæ verecundiæ indolem laudat, et pubescentis primitias labore -atque amore studendi imbutas refert," &c. - -Speusippus had composed a funeral Discourse or Encomium on Plato -(Diogen. iii. 1, 2; iv. 1, 11). Unfortunately Diogenes refers to it -only once in reference to Plato. We can hardly make out whether any of -the authors, whom he cites, had made the life of Plato a subject of -attentive study. Hermodôrus is cited by Simplikius as having written a -treatise [Greek: peri\ Pla/tônos]. Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, and -Theopompus--perhaps also Hermippus, and Klearchus--had good means of -information. - -See K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, -p. 97, not. 45.] - -[Side-note: His birth, parentage, and early education.] - -Plato was born in Ægina (in which island his father enjoyed an estate -as kleruch or out-settled citizen) in the month Thargelion (May) of -the year B.C. 427.[3] His family, belonging to the Dême Kollytus, was -both ancient and noble, in the sense attached to that word at Athens. -He was son of Ariston (or, according to some admirers, of the God -Apollo) and Periktionê: his maternal ancestors had been intimate -friends or relatives of the law-giver Solon, while his father belonged -to a Gens tracing its descent from Kodrus, and even from the God -Poseidon. He was also nearly related to Charmides and to Kritias--this -last the well-known and violent leader among the oligarchy called the -Thirty Tyrants.[4] Plato was first called Aristoklês, after his -grandfather; but received when he grew up the name of Plato--on -account of the breadth (we are told) either of his forehead or of his -shoulders. Endowed with a robust physical frame, and exercised in -gymnastics, not merely in one of the palæstræ of Athens (which he -describes graphically in the Charmides) but also under an Argeian -trainer, he attained such force and skill as to contend (if we may -credit Dikæarchus) for the prize of wrestling among boys at the -Isthmian festival.[5] His literary training was commenced under a -schoolmaster named Dionysius, and pursued under Drakon, a celebrated -teacher of music in the large sense then attached to that word. He is -said to have displayed both diligence and remarkable quickness of -apprehension, combined too with the utmost gravity and modesty.[6] He -not only acquired great familiarity with the poets, but composed -poetry of his own--dithyrambic, lyric, and tragic: and he is even -reported to have prepared a tragic tetralogy, with the view of -competing for victory at the Dionysian festival. We are told that he -burned these poems, when he attached himself to the society of -Sokrates. No compositions in verse remain under his name, except a few -epigrams--amatory, affectionate, and of great poetical beauty. But -there is ample proof in his dialogues that the cast of his mind was -essentially poetical. Many of his philosophical speculations are -nearly allied to poetry, and acquire their hold upon the mind rather -through imagination and sentiment than through reason or evidence. - -[Footnote 3: It was affirmed distinctly by Hermodôrus (according to -the statement of Diogenes Laertius, iii. 6) that Plato was -twenty-eight years old at the time of the death of Sokrates: that is, -in May, 399 B.C. (Zeller, Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 39, ed. 2nd.) -This would place the birth of Plato in 427 B.C. Other critics refer -his birth to 428 or 429: but I agree with Zeller in thinking that the -deposition of Hermodôrus is more trustworthy than any other evidence -before us. - -Hermodôrus was a friend and disciple of Plato, and is even said to -have made money by publishing Plato's dialogues without permission -(Cic., Epist. ad Attic. xiii. 21). Suidas, [Greek: E(rmo/dôros]. He -was also an author: he published a treatise [Greek: Peri\ Mathêma/tôn] -(Diog. L., Prooem. 2). - -See the more recent Dissertation of Zeller, De Hermodoro Ephesio et -Hermodoro Platonico, Marburg, 1859, p. 19 seq. He cites two important -passages (out of the commentary of Simplikius on Aristot. Physic.) -referring to the work of Hermodôrus [Greek: o( Pla/tônos e(/tairos]--a -work [Greek: Peri\ Pla/tônos], on Plato.] - -[Footnote 4: The statements respecting Plato's relatives are obscure -and perplexing: unfortunately the _domestica documenta_, which were -within the knowledge of his nephew Speusippus, are no longer -accessible to us. It is certain that he had two brothers, Glaukon and -Adeimantus: besides which, it would appear from the Parmenides (126 B) -that he had a younger half-brother by the mother's side, named -Antiphon, and son of Pyrilampes (compare Charmides, p. 158 A, and -Plut., De Frat. Amore, 12, p. 484 E). But the age, which this would -assign to Antiphon, does not harmonise well with the chronological -postulates assumed in the exordium of the Parmenides. Accordingly, K. -F. Hermann and Stallbaum are led to believe, that besides the brothers -of Plato named Glaukon and Adeimantus, there must also have been two -uncles of Plato bearing these same names, and having Antiphon for -their younger brother. (See Stallbaum's Prolegg. ad Charm. pp. 84, 85, -and Prolegg. ad Parmen., Part iii. pp. 304-307.) This is not unlikely: -but we cannot certainly determine the point--more especially as we do -not know what amount of chronological inaccuracy Plato might hold to -be admissible in the _personnel_ of his dialogues. - -It is worth mentioning, that in the discourse of Andokides de -Mysteriis, persons named Plato, Charmides, Antiphon, are named among -those accused of concern in the sacrileges of 415 B.C.--the mutilation -of the Hermæ and the mock celebration of the mysteries. Speusippus is -also named as among the Senators of the year (Andokides de Myst. p. -13-27, seq.). Whether these persons belonged to the same family as the -philosopher Plato, we cannot say. He himself was then only twelve -years old.] - -[Footnote 5: Diog. L. iii. 4; Epiktêtus, i. 8-13, [Greek: ei) de\ -kalo\s ê)=n Pla/tôn kai\ i)schuro/s], &c. - -The statement of Sextus Empiricus--that Plato in his boyhood had his -ears bored and wore ear-rings--indicates the opulent family to which -he belonged. (Sex. Emp. adv. Gramm. s. 258.) Probably some of the old -habits of the great Athenian families, as to ornaments worn on the -head or hair, were preserved with the children after they had been -discontinued with adults. See Thuc. i. 6.] - -[Footnote 6: Diog. L. iii. 26.] - -[Side-note: Early relations of Plato with Sokrates.] - -According to Diogenes[7] (who on this point does not cite his -authority), it was about the twentieth year of Plato's age (407 B.C.) -that his acquaintance with Sokrates began. It may possibly have begun -earlier, but certainly not later--since at the time of the -conversation (related by Xenophon) between Sokrates and Plato's -younger brother Glaukon, there was already a friendship established -between Sokrates and Plato: and that time can hardly be later than 406 -B.C., or the beginning of 405 B.C.[8] From 406 B.C. down to 399 B.C., -when Sokrates was tried and condemned, Plato seems to have remained in -friendly relation and society with him: a relation perhaps interrupted -during the severe political struggles between 405 B.C. and 403 B.C., -but revived and strengthened after the restoration of the democracy in -the last-mentioned year. - -[Footnote 7: Ibid. 6.] - -[Footnote 8: Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 1. Sokrates was induced by his -friendship for Plato and for Charmides the cousin of Plato, to -admonish the forward youth Glaukon (Plato's younger brother), who -thrust himself forward obtrusively to speak in the public assembly -before he was twenty years of age. The two discourses of Sokrates--one -with the presumptuous Glaukon, the other with the diffident -Charmides--are both reported by Xenophon. - -These discourses must have taken place before the battle of -Ægospotami: for Charmides was killed during the Anarchy, and Glaukon -certainly would never have attempted such acts of presumption -after the restoration of the democracy, at a time when the tide of -public feeling had become vehemently hostile to Kritias, Charmides, -and all the names and families connected with the oligarchical rule -just overthrown. - -I presume the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon to have taken -place in 406 B.C. or 405 B.C.: it was in 405 B.C. that the disastrous -battle of Ægospotami occurred.] - -[Side-note: Plato's youth--service as a citizen and soldier.] - -But though Plato may have commenced at the age of twenty his -acquaintance with Sokrates, he cannot have been exclusively occupied -in philosophical pursuits between the nineteenth and the twenty-fifth -year of his age--that is, between 409-403 B.C. He was carried, partly -by his own dispositions, to other matters besides philosophy; and even -if such dispositions had not existed, the exigencies of the time -pressed upon him imperatively as an Athenian citizen. Even under -ordinary circumstances, a young Athenian of eighteen years of age, as -soon as he was enrolled on the public register of citizens, was -required to take the memorable military oath in the chapel of -Aglaurus, and to serve on active duty, constant or nearly constant, -for two years, in various posts throughout Attica, for the defence of -the country.[9] But the six years from 409-403 B.C. were years of an -extraordinary character. They included the most strenuous public -efforts, the severest suffering, and the gravest political revolution, -that had ever occurred at Athens. Every Athenian citizen was of -necessity put upon constant (almost daily) military service; either -abroad, or in Attica against the Lacedæmonian garrison established in -the permanent fortified post of Dekeleia, within sight of the Athenian -Akropolis. So habitually were the citizens obliged to be on guard, -that Athens, according to Thucydides,[10] became a military post -rather than a city. It is probable that Plato, by his family and its -place on the census, belonged to the Athenian Hippeis or Horsemen, who -were in constant employment for the defence of the territory. But at -any rate, either on horseback, or on foot, or on shipboard, a robust -young citizen like Plato, whose military age commenced in 409, must -have borne his fair share in this hard but indispensable duty. In the -desperate emergency, which preceded the battle of Arginusæ (406 B.C.), -the Athenians put to sea in thirty days a fleet of 110 triremes for -the relief of Mitylenê; all the men of military age, freemen, and -slaves, embarking.[11] We can hardly imagine that at such a season -Plato can have wished to decline service: even if he had wished it, -the Strategi would not have permitted him. Assuming that he remained -at home, the garrison-duty at Athens must have been doubled on account -of the number of departures. After the crushing defeat of the -Athenians at Ægospotami, came the terrible apprehension at Athens, -then the long blockade and famine of the city (wherein many died of -hunger); next the tyranny of the Thirty, who among their other -oppressions made war upon all free speech, and silenced even the voice -of Sokrates: then the gallant combat of Thrasybulus followed by the -intervention of the Lacedæmonians--contingencies full of uncertainty -and terror, but ending in the restoration of the democracy. After such -restoration, there followed all the anxieties, perils, of reaction, -new enactments and provisions, required for the revived democracy, -during the four years between the expulsion of the Thirty and the -death of Sokrates. - -[Footnote 9: Read the oath sworn by the Ephêbi in Pollux viii. 105. -Æschines tells us that he served his two ephebic years as [Greek: -peri/polos tê=s chô/ras], when there no was remarkable danger or foreign -pressure. See Æsch. De Fals. Legat. s. 178. See the facts about the -Athenian Ephêbi brought together in a Dissertation by W. Dittenberger, -p. 9-12.] - -[Footnote 10: Thuc. vii. 27: [Greek: o(sême/rai e)xelauno/ntôn tô=n -i(ppe/ôn], &c. Cf., viii. 69. Antiphon, who is described in the -beginning of the Parmenides, as devoted to [Greek: i(ppikê\], must -have been either brother or uncle of Plato.] - -[Footnote 11: Xen. Hell. i. 6, 24. [Greek: Oi( de\ A)thênai=oi, ta\ -gegenême/na kai\ tê\n poliorki/an e)pei\ ê)/kousan, e)psêphi/santo -boêthei=n nausi\n e(kato\n kai\ de/ka, ei)sbiba/zontes tou\s e)n -ê(liki/a| o)/ntas a(/pantas, kai\ dou/lous kai\ e)leuthe/rous; kai\ -plêrô/santes ta\s de/ka kai\ e(kato\n e)n tria/konta ê(me/rais, -a)pê=ran; ei)se/bêsan de\ kai\ tô=n i(ppe/ôn polloi/]. In one of the -anecdotes given by Diogenes (iii. 24) Plato alludes to his own -military service. Aristoxenus (Diog. L. iii. 8) said that Plato had -been engaged thrice in military expeditions out of Attica: once to -Tanagra, a second time to Corinth, a third time to Delium, where he -distinguished himself. Aristoxenus must have had fair means of -information, yet I do not know what to make of this statement. All the -three places named are notorious for battles fought by Athens; -nevertheless chronology utterly forbids the supposition that Plato -could have been present either at _the_ battle of Tanagra or at _the_ -battle of Delium. At the battle of Delium Sokrates was present, and is -said to have distinguished himself: hence there is ground for -suspecting some confusion between his name and that of Plato. It is -however possible that there may have been, during the interval between -410-405 B.C., partial invasions of the frontiers of Boeotia by -Athenian detachments: both Tanagra and Delium were on the Boeotian -frontier. The great battle of Corinth took place in 394 B.C. Plato -left Athens immediately after the death of Sokrates in 399 B.C., and -visited several foreign countries during the years immediately -following; but he may have been at Athens in 394 B.C., and may have -served in the Athenian force at Corinth. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hell. -ad ann. 395 B.C. I do not see how Plato could have been engaged in any -battle of Delium _after_ the battle of Corinth, for Athens was not -then at war with the Boeotians. - -At the same time I confess that the account given by or ascribed to -Aristoxenus appears to me to have been founded on little positive -information, when we compare it with the military duty which Plato -must have done between 410-405 B.C. - -It is curious that Antisthenes also is mentioned as having -distinguished himself at the battle of Tanagra (Diog. vi. 1). The same -remarks are applicable to him as have just been made upon Plato.] - -[Side-note: Period of political ambition.] - -From the dangers, fatigues, and sufferings of such an historical -decad, no Athenian citizen could escape, whatever might be his feeling -towards the existing democracy, or however averse he might be to -public employment by natural temper. But Plato was not thus averse, -during the earlier years of his adult life. We know, from his own -letters, that he then felt strongly the impulse of political ambition -usual with young Athenians of good family;[12] though probably not -with any such premature vehemence as his younger brother Glaukon, -whose impatience Sokrates is reported to have so judiciously -moderated.[13] Whether Plato ever spoke with success in the public -assembly, we do not know: he is said to have been shy by nature, and -his voice was thin and feeble, ill adapted for the Pnyx.[14] However, -when the oligarchy of Thirty was established, after the capture and -subjugation of Athens, Plato was not only relieved from the necessity -of addressing the assembled people, but also obtained additional -facilities for rising into political influence, through Kritias (his -near relative) and Charmides, leading men among the new oligarchy. -Plato affirms that he had always disapproved the antecedent democracy, -and that he entered on the new scheme of government with full hope of -seeing justice and wisdom predominant. He was soon undeceived. The -government of the Thirty proved a sanguinary and rapacious -tyranny,[15] filling him with disappointment and disgust. He was -especially revolted by their treatment of Sokrates, whom they not only -interdicted from continuing his habitual colloquy with young men,[16] -but even tried to implicate in nefarious murders, by ordering him -along with others to arrest Leon the Salaminian, one of their intended -victims: an order which Sokrates, at the peril of his life, disobeyed. - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 324-325.] - -[Footnote 13: Xen., Mem. iii. 6.] - -[Footnote 14: Diogen. Laert. iii. 5: [Greek: I)schno/phôno/s te ê)=n], -&c. iii. 26: [Greek: ai)dê/môn kai\ ko/smios].] - -[Footnote 15: History of Greece, vol. viii. ch. 65.] - -[Footnote 16: Xen. Mem. i. 2, 36; Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 20, p. 32.] - -[Side-note: He becomes disgusted with politics.] - -Thus mortified and disappointed, Plato withdrew from public functions. -What part he took in the struggle between the oligarchy and its -democratical assailants under Thrasybulus, we are not informed. But -when the democracy was re-established, his political ambition revived, -and he again sought to acquire some active influence on public -affairs. Now however the circumstances had become highly unfavourable -to him. The name of his deceased relative Kritias was generally -abhorred, and he had no powerful partisans among the popular leaders. -With such disadvantages, with anti-democratical sentiments, and with a -thin voice, we cannot wonder that Plato soon found public life -repulsive;[17] though he admits the remarkable moderation displayed by -the restored Demos. His repugnance was aggravated to the highest pitch -of grief and indignation by the trial and condemnation of Sokrates -(399 B.C.), four years after the renewal of the democracy. At that -moment doubtless the Sokratic men or companions were unpopular in a -body. Plato, after having yielded his best sympathy and aid at the -trial of Sokrates, retired along with several others of them to -Megara. He made up his mind that for a man of his views and opinions, -it was not only unprofitable, but also unsafe, to embark in active -public life, either at Athens or in any other Grecian city. He -resolved to devote himself to philosophical speculation, and to -abstain from practical politics; unless fortune should present to him -some exceptional case, of a city prepared to welcome and obey a -renovator upon exalted principles.[18] - -[Footnote 17: Ælian (V. H. iii. 27) had read a story to the effect, -that Plato, in consequence of poverty, was about to seek military -service abroad, and was buying arms for the purpose, when he was -induced to stay by the exhortation of Sokrates, who prevailed upon him -to devote himself to philosophy at home. - -If there be any truth in this story, it must refer to some time in the -interval between the restoration of the democracy (403 B.C.) and the -death of Sokrates (399 B.C.). The military service of Plato, prior to -the battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.), must have been obligatory, in -defence of his country, not depending on his own free choice. It is -possible also that Plato may have been for the time impoverished, like -many other citizens, by the intestine troubles in Attica, and may have -contemplated military service abroad, like Xenophon. - -But I am inclined to think that the story is unfounded, and that it -arises from some confusion between Plato and Xenophon.] - -[Footnote 18: The above account of Plato's proceedings, perfectly -natural and interesting, but unfortunately brief, is to be found in -his seventh Epistle, p. 325-326.] - -[Side-note: He retires from Athens after the death of Sokrates--his -travels.] - -At Megara Plato passed some time with the Megarian Eukleides, his -fellow-disciple in the society of Sokrates, and the founder of what is -termed the Megaric school of philosophers. He next visited Kyrênê, -where he is said to have become acquainted with the geometrician -Theodôrus, and to have studied geometry under him. From Kyrênê he -proceeded to Egypt, interesting himself much in the antiquities of the -country as well as in the conversation of the priests. In or about 394 -B.C.--if we may trust the statement of Aristoxenus about the military -service of Plato at Corinth, he was again at Athens. He afterwards -went to Italy and Sicily, seeking the society of the Pythagorean -philosophers, Archytas, Echekrates, Timæus, &c., at Tarentum and -Lokri, and visiting the volcanic manifestations of Ætna. It appears -that his first visit to Sicily was made when he was about forty years -of age, which would be 387 B.C. Here he made acquaintance with the -youthful Dion, over whom he acquired great intellectual ascendancy. By -Dion Plato was prevailed upon to visit the elder Dionysius at -Syracuse:[19] but that despot, offended by the free spirit of his -conversation and admonitions, dismissed him with displeasure, and even -caused him to be sold into slavery at Ægina in his voyage home. Though -really sold, however, Plato was speedily ransomed by friends. After -farther incurring some risk of his life as an Athenian citizen, in -consequence of the hostile feelings of the Æginetans, he was conveyed -away safely to Athens, about 386 B.C.[20] - -[Footnote 19: Plato. Epistol. vii. p. 324 A, 327 A.] - -[Footnote 20: Plut. Dion. c. 5: Corn. Nep., Dion, ii. 3; Diog. Laert. -iii. 19-20; Aristides, Or. xlvi., [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], p. -305-306, ed. Dindorf. - -Cicero (De Fin. v. 29; Tusc. Disp. i. 17), and others, had contracted a -lofty idea of Plato's Travels, more than the reality seems to warrant. -Val. Max. viii. 7, 3; Plin. Hist. Nat. xxx. 2. - -The Sophist Himerius repeats the same general statements about Plato's -early education, and extensive subsequent travels, but without adding -any new particulars (Orat. xiv. 21-25). - -If we can trust a passage of Tzetzes, cited by Mr. Clinton (F. H. ad -B.C. 366) and by Welcker (Trag. Gr. p. 1236), Dionysius the elder of -Syracuse had composed (among his various dramas) a tragi-comedy -directed against Plato.] - -[Side-note: His permanent establishment at Athens--386 B.C.] - -It was at this period, about 386 B.C., that the continuous and formal -public teaching of Plato, constituting as it does so great an epoch in -philosophy, commenced. But I see no ground for believing, as many -authors assume, that he was absent from Athens during the entire -interval between 399-386 B.C. I regard such long-continued absence as -extremely improbable. Plato had not been sentenced to banishment, nor -was he under any compulsion to stay away from his native city. He was -not born "of an oak-tree or a rock" (to use an Homeric phrase, -strikingly applied by Sokrates in his Apology to the Dikasts[21]), but -of a noble family at Athens, where he had brothers and other -connections. A temporary retirement, immediately after the death of -Sokrates, might be congenial to his feelings and interesting in many -ways; but an absence of moderate length would suffice for such -exigencies, and there were surely reasonable motives to induce him to -revisit his friends at home. I conceive Plato as having visited -Kyrênê, Egypt, and Italy during these thirteen years, yet as having -also spent part of this long time at Athens. Had he been continuously -absent from that city he would have been almost forgotten, and would -scarcely have acquired reputation enough to set up with success as a -teacher.[22] - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Apol. p. 34 D.] - -[Footnote 22: Stallbaum insists upon it as "certum et indubium" that -Plato was absent from Athens continuously, without ever returning to -it, for the thirteen years immediately succeeding the death of -Sokrates. But I see no good evidence of this, and I think it highly -improbable. See Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Politicum, p. 38, 39. -The statement of Strabo (xvii. 806), that Plato and Eudoxus passed -thirteen years in Egypt, is not admissible. - -Ueberweg examines and criticises the statements about Plato's travels. -He considers it probable that Plato passed some part of these thirteen -years at Athens (Ueber die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge der Platon. -Schrift. p. 126, 127). Mr Fynes Clinton thinks the same. F. H. B.C. -394; Append. c. 21, p. 366.] - -[Side-note: He commences his teaching at the Academy.] - -The spot selected by Plato for his lectures or teaching was a garden -adjoining the precinct sacred to the Hero Hekadêmus or Akadêmus, -distant from the gate of Athens called Dipylon somewhat less than a -mile, on the road to Eleusis, towards the north. In this precinct -there were both walks, shaded by trees, and a gymnasium for bodily -exercise; close adjoining, Plato either inherited or acquired a small -dwelling-house and garden, his own private property.[23] Here, under -the name of the Academy, was founded the earliest of those schools of -philosophy, which continued for centuries forward to guide and -stimulate the speculative minds of Greece and Rome. - -[Footnote 23: Diog. Laert. iii. 7, 8; Cic. De Fin. v. 1; C. G. Zumpt, -Ueber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in Athen, p. 8 (Berlin, -1843). The Academy was consecrated to Athênê; there was, however, a -statue of Eros there, to whom sacrifice was offered, in conjunction -with Athênê. Athenæus, xiii. 561. - -At the time when Aristophanes assailed Sokrates in the comedy of the -Nubes (423 B.C.), the Academy was known and familiar as a place for -gymnastic exercise; and Aristophanes (Nub. 995) singles it out as the -proper scene of action for the honest and muscular youth, who despises -rhetoric and philosophy. Aristophanes did not anticipate that within a -short time after the representation of his last comedy, the most -illustrious disciple of Sokrates would select the Academy as the spot -for his residence and philosophical lectures, and would confer upon -the name a permanent intellectual meaning, as designating the earliest -and most memorable of the Hellenic schools. - -In 369 B.C., when the school of Plato was in existence, the Athenian -hoplites, marching to aid the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, were -ordered by Iphikrates to make their evening meal in the Academy (Xen. -Hell. vi. 5, 49). - -The garden, afterwards established by Epikurus, was situated between -the gate of Athens and the Academy: so that a person passed by it, -when he walked forth from Athens to the Academy (Cic. De Fin. i. 1).] - -[Side-note: Plato as a teacher--pupils numerous and wealthy, from -different cities.] - -We have scarce any particulars respecting the growth of the Academy -from this time to the death of Plato, in 347 B.C. We only know -generally that his fame as a lecturer became eminent and widely -diffused: that among his numerous pupils were included Speusippus, -Xenokrates, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lykurgus, &c.: that he -was admired and consulted by Perdikkas in Macedonia and Dionysius at -Syracuse: that he was also visited by listeners and pupils from all -parts of Greece. Among them was Eudoxus of Knidus, who afterwards -became illustrious both in geometry and astronomy. At the age of -twenty-three, and in poor circumstances, Eudoxus was tempted by the -reputation of the Sokratic men, and enabled by the aid of friends, to -visit Athens: where, however, he was coldly received by Plato. Besides -preparing an octennial period or octaetêris, and a descriptive map of -the Heavens, Eudoxus also devised the astronomical hypothesis of -Concentric Spheres--the earliest theory proposed to show that the -apparent irregularity in the motion of the Sun and the Planets might -be explained, and proved to result from a multiplicity of co-operating -spheres or agencies, each in itself regular.[24] This theory of -Eudoxus is said to have originated in a challenge of Plato, who -propounded to astronomers, in his oral discourse, the problem which -they ought to try to solve.[25] - -[Footnote 24: For an account of Eudoxus himself, of his theory of -concentric spheres, and the subsequent extensions of it, see the -instructive volume of the late lamented Sir George Cornewall -Lewis,--Historical Survey of the Ancient Astronomy, ch. iii. sect. 3, -p. 146 seq. - -M. Boeckh also (in his recent publication, Ueber die vierjährigen -Sonnenkreise der Alten, vorzüglich den Eudoxischen, Berlin, 1863) has -given an account of the life and career of Eudoxus, not with reference -to his theory of concentric spheres, but to his Calendar and Lunisolar -Cycles or Periods, quadrennial and octennial. I think Boeckh is right -in placing the voyage of Eudoxus to Egypt at an _earlier_ period of -the life of Eudoxus; that is, about 378 B.C.; and not in 362 B.C., -where it is placed by Letronne and others. Boeckh shows that the -letters of recommendation from Agesilaus to Nektanebos, which Eudoxus -took with him, do not necessarily coincide in time with the military -expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt, but were more probably of earlier -date. (Boeckh, p. 140-148.) - -Eudoxus lived 53 years (406-353 B.C., about); being born when Plato -was 21, and dying when Plato was 75. He was one of the most -illustrious men of the age. He was born in poor circumstances; but so -marked was his early promise, that some of the medical school at -Knidus assisted him to prosecute his studies--to visit Athens and hear -the Sophists, Plato among them--to visit Egypt, Tarentum (where he -studied geometry with Archytas), and Sicily (where he studied [Greek: -ta\ i)atrika\] with Philistion). These facts depend upon the [Greek: -Pi/nakes] of Kallimachus, which are good authority. (Diog. L. viii. -86.) - -After thus preparing himself by travelling and varied study, Eudoxus -took up the profession of a Sophist, at Kyzikus and the neighbouring -cities in the Propontis. He obtained great celebrity, and a large -number of pupils. M. Boeckh says, "Dort lebte er als Sophist, sagt -Sotion: das heisst, er lehrte, und hielt Vortrage. Dasselbe bezeugt -Philostratos." - -I wish to call particular attention to the way in which M. Boeckh here -describes** a Sophist of the fourth century B.C. Nothing can be more -correct. Every man who taught and gave lectures to audiences more or -less numerous, was so called. The Platonic critics altogether darken -the history of philosophy, by using the word _Sophist_ with its modern -associations (and the unmeaning abstract _Sophistic_ which they derive -from it), to represent a supposed school of speculative and deceptive -corruptors. - -Eudoxus, having been coldly received when young and poor by Plato, had -satisfaction in revisiting Athens at the height of his reputation, -accompanied by numerous pupils--and in showing himself again to Plato. -The two then became friends. Menæchmus and Helikon, geometrical pupils -of Eudoxus, received instruction from Plato also; and Helikon -accompanied Plato on his third voyage to Sicily (Plato, Epist. xiii. -p. 360 D; Plut. Dion, c. 19). Whether Eudoxus accompanied him there -also, as Boeckh supposes, is doubtful: I think it improbable. - -Eudoxus ultimately returned to his native city of Knidus, where he was -received with every demonstration of honour: a public vote of esteem -and recognition being passed to welcome him. He is said to have been -solicited to give laws to the city, and to have actually done so: how -far this may be true, we cannot say. He also visited the neighbouring -prince Mausôlus of Karia, by whom he was much honoured. - -We know from Aristotle, that Eudoxus was not only illustrious as an -astronomer and geometer, but that he also proposed a theory of Ethics, -similar in its general formula to that which was afterwards laid down -by Epikurus. Aristotle dissents from the theory, but he bears express -testimony, in a manner very unusual with him, to the distinguished -personal merit and virtue of Eudoxus (Ethic. Nikom. x. 3, p. 1172, b. -16).] - -[Footnote 25: Respecting Eudoxus, see Diog. L. viii. 86-91. As the -life of Eudoxus probably extended from about 406-353 B.C., his first -visit to Athens would be about 383 B.C., some three years after Plato -commenced his school. Strabo (xvii. 806), when he visited Heliopolis -in Egypt, was shown by the guides certain cells or chambers which were -said to have been occupied by Plato and Eudoxus, and was assured that -the two had passed thirteen years together in Egypt. This account -deserves no credit. Plato and Eudoxus visited Egypt, but not together, -and neither of them for so long as thirteen years. Eudoxus stayed -there sixteen months (Diog. L. viii. 87). Simplikius, Schol. ad -Aristot. De Coelo, p. 497, 498, ed. Brandis, 498, a. 45. [Greek: Kai\ -prô=tos tô=n E(llê/nôn Eu)/doxos o( Kni/dios. ô(s Eu)/dêmo/s te e)n -tô=| deute/rô| tê=s A)strologikê=s I)stori/as a)pemnêmo/neuse kai\ -Sôsige/nês para\ _Eu)dê/mou tou=to labô\n_, a(/psasthai le/getai tô=n -toiou/tôn u(pothe/seôn; Pla/tônos, _ô(s phêsi Sôsige/nês_, pro/blêma -tou=to poiêsame/nou toi=s peri\ tau=ta e)spoudako/si--ti/nôn -u(potethei/sôn o(malô=n kai\ tetagme/nôn kinê/seôn diasôthê=| ta\ -peri\ ta\s kinê/seis tô=n planôme/nôn phaino/mena]. The Scholion of -Simplikius, which follows at great length, is exceedingly interesting -and valuable, in regard to the astronomical theory of Eudoxus, with -the modifications introduced into it by Kallippus, Aristotle, and -others. All the share in it which is claimed for Plato, is, that he -described in clear language the problem to be solved: and even _that_ -share depends simply upon the statement of the Alexandrine Sosigenes -(contemporary of Julius Cæsar), not upon the statement of Eudemus. At -least the language of Simplikius affirms, that Sosigenes copied from -Eudemus the fact, that Eudoxus was the first Greek who proposed a -systematic astronomical hypothesis to explain the motions of the -planets--([Greek: par' Eu)dê/mou _tou=to_ labô/n]) not the -circumstance, that Plato propounded the problem afterwards mentioned. -From whom Sosigenes derived this last information, is not indicated. -About his time, various fictions had gained credit in Egypt respecting -the connection of Plato with Eudoxus, as we may see by the story of -Strabo above cited. If Plato impressed upon others that which is here -ascribed to him, he must have done so in _conversation or oral -discourse_--for there is nothing in his written dialogues to that -effect. Moreover, there is nothing in the dialogues to make us suppose -that Plato adopted or approved the theory of Eudoxus. When Plato -speaks of astronomy, either in the Republic, or in Leges, or in -Epinomis, it is in a totally different spirit--not manifesting any -care to save the astronomical phenomena. Both Aristotle himself -(Metaphys. A. p. 1073 b.) and Simplikius, make it clear that Aristotle -warmly espoused and enlarged the theory of Eudoxus. Theophrastus, -successor of Aristotle, did the same. But we do not hear that either -Speusippus or Xenokrates (successor of Plato) took any interest in the -theory. This is one remarkable point of divergence between Plato and -the Platonists on one side--Aristotle and the Aristotelians on the -other--and much to the honour of the latter: for the theory of -Eudoxus, though erroneous, was a great step towards improved -scientific conceptions on astronomy, and a great provocative to -farther observation of astronomical facts.] - -Though Plato demanded no money as a fee for admission of pupils, yet -neither did he scruple to receive presents from rich men such as -Dionysius, Dion, and others.[26] In the jests of Ephippus, Antiphanes, -and other poets of the middle comedy, the pupils of Plato in the -Academy are described as finely and delicately clad, nice in their -persons even to affectation, with elegant caps and canes; which is the -more to be noticed because the preceding comic poets derided Sokrates -and his companions for qualities the very opposite--as prosing -beggars, in mean attire and dirt.[27] Such students must have belonged -to opulent families; and we may be sure that they requited their -master by some valuable present, though no fee may have been formally -demanded from them. Some conditions (though we do not know what) were -doubtless required for admission. Moreover the example of Eudoxus -shows that in some cases even ardent and promising pupils were -practically repelled. At any rate, the teaching of Plato formed a -marked contrast with that extreme and indiscriminate publicity which -characterised the conversation of Sokrates, who passed his days in the -market-place or in the public porticoes or palæstræ; while Plato both -dwelt and discoursed in a quiet residence and garden a little way out -of Athens. The title of Athens to be considered the training-city of -Hellas (as Perikles had called her fifty years before), was fully -sustained by the Athenian writers and teachers between 390-347; -especially by Plato and Isokrates, the most celebrated and largely -frequented. So many foreign pupils came to Isokrates that he affirms -most of his pecuniary gains to have been derived from non-Athenians. -Several of his pupils stayed with him three or four years. The like is -doubtless true about the pupils of Plato.[28] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Epistol. xiii. p. 361, 362. We learn from this -epistle that Plato received pecuniary remittances not merely from -Dionysius, but also from other friends ([Greek: a)/llôn -e)pitêdei/ôn]--361 C); that he employed these not only for choregies and -other costly functions of his own, but also to provide dowry for female -relatives, and presents to friends (363 A).] - -[Footnote 27: See Meineke, Hist. Crit. Comic. Græc. p. 288, 289--and -the extracts there given from Ephippus and Antiphanes--apud Athenæum, -xi. 509, xii. 544. About the poverty and dirt which was reproached to -Sokrates and his disciples, see the fragment of Ameipsias in Meineke, -ibid. p. 203. Also Aristoph. Aves, 1555; Nubes, 827; and the Fragm. of -Eupolis in Meineke, p. 552--[Greek: Misô= d' e)gô\ kai\ Sôkra/tên, -to\n ptôcho\n a)dole/schên]. - -Meineke thinks that Aristophanes, in the Ekklesiazusæ, 646, and in the -Plutus, 313, intends to ridicule Plato under the name of Aristyllus: -Plato's name having been originally Aristokles. But I see no -sufficient ground for this opinion.] - -[Footnote 28: Perikles in the Funeral Oration (Thuc. ii. 41) calls -Athens [Greek: tê=s E(lla/dos pai/deusin]: the same eulogium is -repeated, with greater abundance of words, by Isokrates in his -Panegyrical Oration (Or. iv. sect. 56, p. 51). - -The declaration of Isokrates, that most of his money was acquired from -foreign (non-Athenian) pupils, and the interesting fact that many of -them not only stayed with him three or four years but were even then -loth to depart, will be found in Orat. xv. De Permutatione, sect. -93-175. Plutarch (Vit. x. Orat. 838 E) goes so far as to say that -Isokrates never required any pay from an Athenian pupil. - -Nearly three centuries after Plato's decease, Cicero sent his son -Marcus to Athens, where the son spent a considerable time, frequenting -the lectures of the Peripatetic philosopher Kratippus. Young Cicero, -in an interesting letter addressed to Tiro (Cic. Epist. Fam. xvi. 23), -describes in animated terms both his admiration for the person and -abilities, and his delight in the private society, of Kratippus. -Several of Plato's pupils probably felt as much or more towards him.] - -[Side-note: Visit of Plato to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse, 367 -B.C. Second visit to the same--mortifying failure.] - -It was in the year 367-366 that Plato was induced, by the earnest -entreaties of Dion, to go from Athens to Syracuse, on a visit to the -younger Dionysius, who had just become despot, succeeding to his -father of the same name. Dionysius II., then very young, had -manifested some dispositions towards philosophy, and prodigious -admiration for Plato: who was encouraged by Dion to hope that he would -have influence enough to bring about an amendment or thorough reform -of the government at Syracuse. This ill-starred visit, with its -momentous sequel, has been described in my 'History of Greece'. It not -only failed completely, but made matters worse rather than better: -Dionysius became violently alienated from Dion, and sent him into -exile. Though turning a deaf ear to Plato's recommendations, he -nevertheless liked his conversation, treated him with great respect, -detained him for some time at Syracuse, and was prevailed upon, only -by the philosopher's earnest entreaties, to send him home. Yet in -spite of such uncomfortable experience Plato was induced, after a -certain interval, again to leave Athens and pay a second visit to -Dionysius, mainly in hopes of procuring the restoration of Dion. In -this hope too he was disappointed, and was glad to return, after a -longer stay than he wished, to Athens. - -[Side-note: Expedition of Dion against Dionysius--sympathies of Plato -and the Academy.] - -[Side-note: Success, misconduct, and death of Dion.] - -It was in 359 B.C. that Dion, aided by friends in Peloponnesus, and -encouraged by warm sympathy and co-operation from many of Plato's -pupils in the Academy,[29] equipped an armament against Dionysius. -Notwithstanding the inadequacy of his force he had the good fortune to -make himself master of Syracuse, being greatly favoured by the popular -discontent of Syracusans against the reigning despot: but he did not -know how to deal with the people, nor did he either satisfy their -aspirations towards liberty, or realise his own engagements. Retaining -in his hands a despotic power, similar in the main to that of -Dionysius, he speedily became odious, and was assassinated by the -treachery of Kallippus, his companion in arms as well as fellow-pupil -of the Platonic Academy. The state of Syracuse, torn by the joint -evils of anarchy and despotism, and partially recovered by Dionysius, -became more unhappy than ever. - -[Footnote 29: Plutarch, Dion, c. 22. - -Xenokrates as well as Speusippus accompanied Plato to Sicily (Diog. L. -iv. 6). - -To show the warm interest taken, not only by Plato himself but also by -the Platonic pupils in the Academy in the conduct of Dion after he had -become master of Syracuse, Plutarch quotes both from the letter of -Plato to Dion (which now stands fourth among the Epistolæ Platonicæ, -p. 320) and also from a letter which he had read, written by -Speusippus to Dion; in which Speusippus exhorts Dion emphatically to -bless Sicily with good laws and government, "in _order that he may -glorify the Academy_"--[Greek: o(/pôs . . . eu)klea= thê/sei tê\n -A)kadêmi/an] (Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amic. c. 29, p. 70 A).] - -[Side-note: Death of Plato, aged 80, 347 B.C.] - -The visits of Plato to Dionysius were much censured, and his -motives[30] misrepresented by unfriendly critics; and these reproaches -were still further embittered by the entire failure of his hopes. The -closing years of his long life were saddened by the disastrous turn of -events at Syracuse, aggravated by the discreditable abuse of power and -violent death of his intimate friend Dion, which brought dishonour -both upon himself and upon the Academy. Nevertheless he lived to the -age of eighty, and died in 348-347 B.C., leaving a competent property, -which he bequeathed by a will still extant.[31] But his foundation, -the Academy, did not die with him. It passed to his nephew Speusippus, -who succeeded him as teacher, conductor of the school, or Scholarch: -and was himself succeeded after eight years by Xenokrates of -Chalkêdon: while another pupil of the Academy, Aristotle, after an -absence of some years from Athens, returned thither and established a -school of his own at the Lykeum, at another extremity of the city. - -[Footnote 30: Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistes) p. 285 C; -Aristeides, Orat. xlvi., [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], p. 234-235; -Apuleius, De Habit. Philos. Platon. p. 571.] - -[Footnote 31: Diog. Laert. iii. 41-42. Seneca (Epist. 58) says that -Plato died on the anniversary of his birth, in the month Thargelion.] - -[Side-note: Scholars of Plato--Aristotle.] - -The latter half of Plato's life in his native city must have been one -of dignity and consideration, though not of any of political activity. -He is said to have addressed the Dikastery as an advocate for the -accused general Chabrias: and we are told that he discharged the -expensive and showy functions of Chorêgus, with funds supplied by -Dion.[32] Out of Athens also his reputation was very great. When he -went to the Olympic festival of B.C. 360, he was an object of -conspicuous attention and respect: he was visited by hearers, young -men of rank and ambition, from the most distant Hellenic cities; and -his advice was respectfully invoked both by Perdikkas in Macedonia and -by Dionysius II. at Syracuse. During his last visit to Syracuse, it is -said that some of the students in the Academy, among whom Aristotle is -mentioned, became dissatisfied with his absence, and tried to set up a -new school; but were prevented by Iphikrates and Chabrias, the -powerful friends of Plato at Athens. This story is connected with -alleged ingratitude on the part of Aristotle towards Plato, and with -alleged repugnance on the part of Plato towards Aristotle.[33] The -fact itself--that during Plato's absence in Sicily his students sought -to provide for themselves instruction and discussion elsewhere--is -neither surprising nor blameable. And as to Aristotle, there is ground -for believing that he passed for an intimate friend and disciple of -Plato, even during the last ten years of Plato's life. For we read -that Aristotle, following speculations and principles of teaching of -his own, on the subject of rhetoric, found himself at variance with -Isokrates and the Isokratean school. Aristotle attacked Isokrates and -his mode of dealing with the subject: upon which Kephisodôrus (one of -the disciples of Isokrates) retaliated by attacking Plato and the -Platonic Ideas, considering Aristotle as one of Plato's scholars and -adherents.[34] - -[Footnote 32: Plut. Aristeides, c. 1; Diog. Laert. iii. 23-24. -Diogenes says that no other Athenian except Plato dared to speak -publicly in defence of Chabrias; but this can hardly be correct, since -Aristotle mentions another [Greek: sunê/goraos] named Lykoleon (Rhet. -iii. 10, p. 1411, b. 6). We may fairly presume that the trial of -Chabrias alluded to by Aristotle is the same as that alluded to by -Diogenes, that which arose out of the wrongful occupation of Orôpus by -the Thebans. If Plato appeared at the trial, I doubt whether it could -have occurred in 366 B.C., as Clinton supposes; Plato must have been -absent during that year in Sicily. - -The anecdote given by Diogenes, in relation to Plato's appearance at -this trial, deserves notice. Krobylus, one of the accusers, said to -him, "Are _you_ come to plead on behalf of another? Are not you aware -that the hemlock of Sokrates is in store for _you_ also?" Plato -replied: "I affronted dangers formerly, when I went on military -expedition, for my country, and I am prepared to affront them now in -discharge of my duty to a friend" (iii. 24). - -This anecdote is instructive, as it exhibits the continuance of the -anti-philosophical antipathies at Athens among a considerable portion -of the citizens, and as it goes to attest the military service -rendered personally by Plato. - -Diogenes (iii. 46) gives a long list of hearers; and Athenæus (xi. -506-509) enumerates several from different cities in Greece: Euphræus -of Oreus (in Euboea), who acquired through Plato's recommendation -great influence with Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, and who is said to -have excluded from the society of that king every one ignorant of -philosophy and geometry; Euagon of Lampsakus, Timæus of Kyzikus, -Chæron of Pellênê, all of whom tried, and the last with success, to -usurp the sceptre in their respective cities; Eudêmus of Cyprus; -Kallippus the Athenian, fellow-learner with Dion in the Academy, -afterwards his companion in his expedition to Sicily, ultimately his -murderer; Herakleides and Python from Ænus in Thrace, Chion and -Leonides, also Klearchus the despot from the Pontic Herakleia (Justin, -xvi. 5). - -Several of these examples seem to have been cited by the orator -Democharês (nephew of Demosthenes) in his speech at Athens vindicating -the law proposed by Sophokles for the expulsion of the philosophers -from Athens (Athenæ. xi. 508 F), a speech delivered about 306 B.C. -Plutarch compliments Plato for the active political liberators and -tyrannicides who came forth from the Academy: he considers Plato as -the real author and planner of the expedition of Dion against -Dionysius, and expatiates on the delight which Plato must have derived -from it--a supposition very incorrect (Plutarch, Non Posse Suav. p. -1097 B; adv. Kolôten, p. 1126 B-C).] - -[Footnote 33: Aristokles, ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. xv. 2: Ælian, V. -H. iii. 19: Aristeides, Or. 46, [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn] vol. -ii. p. 324-325. Dindorf. - -The friendship and reciprocity of service between Plato and Chabrias -is an interesting fact. Compare Stahr, Aristotelia, vol. i. p. 50 -seqq. - -Cicero affirms, on the authority of the Epistles of Demosthenes, that -Demosthenes describes himself as an assiduous hearer as well as reader -of Plato (Cic. Brut. 31 121; Orat. 4, 15). I think this fact highly -probable, but the epistles which Cicero read no longer exist. Among -the five Epistles remaining, Plato is once mentioned with respect in -the fifth (p. 1490), but this epistle is considered by most critics -spurious.] - -[Footnote 34: Numenius, ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 6, 9. [Greek: -oi)êthei\s] (Kephisodôrus) [Greek: kata\ Pla/tôna to\n A)ristote/lên -philosophei=n, e)pole/mei me\n A)ristote/lei, e)/balle de\ Pla/tôna], -&c. This must have happened in the latter years of Plato's life, for -Aristotle must have been at least twenty-five or twenty-six years of -age when he engaged in such polemics. He was born in 384 B.C.] - -[Side-note: Little known about Plato's personal history.] - -Such is the sum of our information respecting Plato. Scanty as it is, -we have not even the advantage of contemporary authority for any -portion of it. We have no description of Plato from any contemporary -author, friendly or adverse. It will be seen that after the death of -Sokrates we know nothing about Plato as a man and a citizen, except -the little which can be learnt from his few Epistles, all written when -he was very old, and relating almost entirely to his peculiar -relations with Dion and Dionysius. His dialogues, when we try to -interpret them collectively, and gather from them general results as -to the character and purposes of the author, suggest valuable -arguments and perplexing doubts, but yield few solutions. In no one of -the dialogues does Plato address us in his own person. In the Apology -alone (which is not a dialogue) is he alluded to even as present: in -the Phædon he is mentioned as absent from illness. Each of the -dialogues, direct or indirect, is conducted from beginning to end by -the persons whom he introduces.[35] Not one of the dialogues affords -any positive internal evidence showing the date of its composition. In -a few there are allusions to prove that they must have been composed -at a period later than others, or later than some given event of known -date; but nothing more can be positively established. Nor is there any -good extraneous testimony to determine the date of any one among them. -For the remark ascribed to Sokrates about the dialogue called Lysis -(which remark, if authentic, would prove the dialogue to have been -composed during the life-time of Sokrates) appears altogether -untrustworthy. And the statement of some critics, that the Phædrus was -Plato's earliest composition, is clearly nothing more than an -inference (doubtful at best, and, in my judgment, erroneous) from its -dithyrambic style and erotic subject.[36] - -[Footnote 35: On this point Aristotle, in the dialogues which he -composed, did not follow Plato's example. Aristotle introduced two or -more persons debating a question, but he appeared in his own person to -give the solution, or at least to wind up the debate. He sometimes -also opened the debate by a prooem or prefatory address in his own -person (Cic. ad Attic. iv. 16, 2, xiii. 19, 4). Cicero followed the -manner of Aristotle, not that of Plato. His dialogues are rhetorical -rather than dramatic. - -All the dialogues of Aristotle are lost.] - -[Footnote 36: Diog. L. iii. 38. Compare the Prolegomena [Greek: tê=s -Pla/tônos Philosophi/as], c. 24, in the Appendix Platonica of K. F. -Hermann's edition, p. 217.] - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - -PLATONIC CANON, AS RECOGNISED BY THRASYLLUS. - - -As we know little about Plato except from his works, the first -question to be decided is, Which _are_ his real works? Where are we to -find a trustworthy Platonic Canon? - -[Side-note: Platonic Canon--Ancient and modern discussions.] - -Down to the close of the last century this question was not much -raised or discussed. The catalogue recognised by the rhetor Thrasyllus -(contemporary with the Emperor Tiberius) was generally accepted as -including none but genuine works of Plato; and was followed as such by -editors and critics, who were indeed not very numerous.[1] But the -discussions carried on during the present century have taken a -different turn. While editors, critics, and translators have been -greatly multiplied, some of the most distinguished among them, -Schleiermacher at the head, have either professedly set aside, or in -practice disregarded, the Thrasyllean catalogue, as if it carried no -authority and very faint presumption. They have reasoned upon each -dialogue as if its title to be considered genuine were now to be -proved for the first time; either by external testimony (mentioned in -Aristotle or others), or by internal evidences of style, handling, and -thoughts:[2] as if, in other words, the _onus probandi_ lay upon any -one who believed the printed works of Plato to be genuine--not upon an -opponent who disputes the authenticity of any one or more among them, -and rejects it as spurious. Before I proceed to examine the -conclusions, alike numerous and discordant, which these critics have -proclaimed, I shall enquire how far the method which they have pursued -is warrantable. Is there any presumption at all--and if so, what -amount of presumption--in favour of the catalogue transmitted from -antiquity by Thrasyllus, as a canon containing genuine works of Plato -and no others? - -[Footnote 1: The following passage from Wyttenbach, written in 1776, -will give an idea of the state of Platonic criticism down to the last -quarter of the last century. To provide a new Canon for Plato seems -not to have entered his thoughts. - -Wyttenbach, Bibliotheca Critica, vol. i. p. 28. Review of Fischer's -edition of Plato's Philêbus and Symposion. "Quæ Ciceroni obtigit -interpretum et editorum felicitas, eâ adeo caruit Plato, ut non solum -paucos nactus sit qui ejus scripta typis ederent--sed qui ejus -orationi nitorem restitueret, eamque a corruptelarum labe purgaret, et -sensus obscuros atque abditos ex interiore doctrinâ patefaceret, -omnino repererit neminem. Et ex ipso hoc editionum parvo numero--nam -sex omnino sunt--nulla est recentior anno superioris seculi secundo: -ut mirandum sit, centum et septuaginta annorum spatio neminem ex tot -viris doctis extitisse, qui ita suam crisin Platoni addiceret, ut -intelligentiam ejus veræ eruditionis amantibus aperiret. - -"Qui Platonem legant, pauci sunt: qui intelligant, paucissimi; qui -vero, vel ex versionibus, vel ex jejuno historiæ philosophicæ -compendio, de eo judicent et cum supercilio pronuncient, plurimi -sunt."] - -[Footnote 2: To see that this is the general method of proceeding, we -have only to look at the work of Ueberweg, one of the most recent and -certainly one of the ablest among the Platonic critics. Untersuchungen -über die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge der Platonischen Schriften, Wien, -1861, p. 130-131.] - -[Side-note: Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its -favour.] - -Upon this question I hold an opinion opposite to that of the Platonic -critics since Schleiermacher. The presumption appears to me -particularly strong, instead of particularly weak: comparing the -Platonic writings with those of other eminent writers, dramatists, -orators, historians, of the same age and country. - -[Side-note: Fixed residence and school at Athens--founded by Plato and -transmitted to successors.] - -We have seen that Plato passed the last thirty-eight years of his life -(except his two short visits to Syracuse) as a writer and lecturer at -Athens; that he purchased and inhabited a fixed residence at the -Academy, near the city. We know, moreover, that his principal pupils, -especially (his nephew) Speusippus and Xenokrates, were constantly -with him in this residence during his life; that after his death the -residence became permanently appropriated as a philosophical school -for lectures, study, conversation, and friendly meetings of studious -men, in which capacity it served for more than two centuries;[3] that -his nephew Speusippus succeeded him there as teacher, and taught there -for eight years, being succeeded after his death first by Xenokrates -(for twenty-five years), afterwards by Polemon, Krantor, Krates, -Arkesilaus, and others in uninterrupted series; that the school always -continued to be frequented, though enjoying greater or less celebrity -according to the reputation of the Scholarch. - -[Footnote 3: The teaching and conversation of the Platonic School -continued fixed in the spot known as the Academy until the siege of -Athens by Sylla in 87 B.C. The teacher was then forced to confine -himself to the interior of the city, where he gave lectures in the -gymnasium called Ptolemæum. In that gymnasium Cicero heard the -lectures of the Scholarch Antiochus, B.C. 79; walking out afterwards -to visit the deserted but memorable site of the Academy (Cic. De Fin. -v. 1; C. G. Zumpt, Ueber den Bestand der Philosophischen Schulen in -Athen, p. 14, Berlin, 1843). The ground of the Academy, when once -deserted, speedily became unhealthy, and continues to be so now, as -Zumpt mentions that he himself experienced in 1835.] - -[Side-note: Importance of this foundation. Preservation of Plato's -manuscripts. School library.] - -By thus perpetuating the school which his own genius had originated, -and by providing for it permanent support with a fixed domicile, Plato -inaugurated a new epoch in the history of philosophy: this example was -followed a few years afterwards by Aristotle, Zeno, and Epikurus. -Moreover the proceeding was important in another way also, as it -affected the preservation and authentication of his own manuscripts -and compositions. It provided not only safe and lasting custody, such -as no writer had ever enjoyed before, for Plato's original -manuscripts, but also a guarantee of some efficacy against any fraud -or error which might seek to introduce other compositions into the -list. That Plato himself was not indifferent on this head we may -fairly believe, since we learn from Dionysius of Halikarnassus, that -he was indefatigable in the work of correction: and his disciples, who -took the great trouble of noting down themselves what he spoke in his -lectures, would not be neglectful as to the simpler duty of preserving -his manuscripts.[4] Now Speusippus and Xenokrates (also Aristotle, -Hestiæus, the Opuntian Philippus, and the other Platonic pupils) must -have had personal knowledge of all that Plato had written, whether -finished dialogues, unfinished fragments, or preparatory sketches. -They had perfect means of distinguishing his real compositions from -forgeries passed off in his name: and they had every motive to expose -such forgeries (if any were attempted) wherever they could, in order -to uphold the reputation of their master. If any one composed a -dialogue and circulated it under the name of Plato, the school was a -known place, and its occupants were at hand to give information to all -who enquired about the authenticity of the composition. The original -MSS. of Plato (either in his own handwriting or in that of his -secretary, if he employed one[5]) were doubtless treasured up in the -school as sacred memorials of the great founder, and served as -originals from which copies of unquestionable fidelity might be made, -whenever the Scholarch granted permission. How long they continued to -be so preserved we cannot say: nor do we know what was the condition -of the MSS., or how long they were calculated to last. But probably -many of the students frequenting the school would come for the express -purpose of reading various works of Plato (either in the original -MSS., or in faithful copies taken from them) with the exposition of -the Scholarch; just as we know that the Roman M. Crassus (mentioned by -Cicero), during his residence at Athens, studied the Platonic Gorgias -with the aid of the Scholarch Charmadas.[6] The presidency of -Speusippus and Xenokrates (taken jointly) lasted for thirty-three -years; and even when they were replaced by successors who had enjoyed -no personal intimacy with Plato, the motive to preserve the Platonic -MSS. would still be operative, and the means of verifying what was -really Platonic would still be possessed in the school. The original -MSS. would be preserved, along with the treatises or dialogues which -each successive Scholarch himself composed; thus forming a permanent -and increasing school-library, probably enriched more or less by works -acquired or purchased from others. - -[Footnote 4: Simplikius, Schol. Aristotel. Physic. f. 32, p. 334, b. -28, Brandis: [Greek: la/boi d' a)/n tis kai\ para\ Speusi/ppou kai\ -para\ Xenokra/tous, kai\ tô=n a)/llôn oi(\ parege/nonto e)n tê=| peri\ -Ta)gathou= tou= Pla/tônos a)kroa/sei; pa/ntes ga\r sune/grapsan kai\ -diesô/santo tê\n do/xan au)tou=]. In another passage of the same -Scholia (p. 362, a. 12) Simplikius mentions Herakleides (of Pontus), -Hestiæus, and even Aristotle himself, as having taken notes of the -same lectures. - -Hermodôrus appears to have carried some of Plato's dialogues to -Sicily, and to have made money by selling them. See Cicero ad Atticum, -xiii. 21: Suidas et Zenobius--[Greek: lo/goisin E(rmo/dôros -e)mporeu/etai]. See Zeller, Dissert. De Hermodoro, p. 19. In the -above-mentioned epistle Cicero compares his own relations with -Atticus, to those of Plato with Hermodôrus. Hermodôrus had composed a -treatise respecting Plato, from which some extracts were given by -Derkyllides (the contemporary of Thrasyllus) as well as by Simplikius -(Zeller, De Hermod. p. 20-21).] - -[Footnote 5: We read in Cicero, (Academic. Priora, ii. 4, 11) that the -handwriting of the Scholarch Philo, when his manuscript was brought -from Athens to Alexandria, was recognised at once by his friends and -pupils.] - -[Footnote 6: Cicero, De Oratore, i. 11, 45-47: "florente Academiâ, -quod eam Charmadas et Clitomachus et Æschines obtinebant. . . Platoni, -cujus tum Athenis cum Charmadâ diligentius legi Gorgiam," &c.] - -[Side-note: Security provided by the school for distinguishing what -were Plato's genuine writings.] - -It appears to me that the continuance of this school--founded by Plato -himself at his own abode, permanently domiciliated, and including all -the MSS. which he left in it--gives us an amount of assurance for the -authenticity of the so-called Platonic compositions, such as does not -belong to the works of other eminent contemporary authors, Aristippus, -Antisthenes, Isokrates, Lysias, Demosthenes, Euripides, Aristophanes. -After the decease of these last-mentioned authors, who can say what -became of their MSS.? Where was any certain permanent custody provided -for them? Isokrates had many pupils during his life, but left no -school or [Greek: mousei=on] after his death. If any one composed a -discourse, and tried to circulate it as the composition of Isokrates, -among the bundles of judicial orations which were sold by the -booksellers[7] as his (according to the testimony of Aristotle)--where -was the person to be found, notorious and accessible, who could say: -"I possess all the MSS. of Isokrates, and I can depose that this is -not among them!" The chances of success for forgery or mistake were -decidedly greater, in regard to the works of these authors, than they -could be for those of Plato. - -[Footnote 7: Dionys. Halik. de Isocrate, p. 576 R. [Greek: desma\s -pa/nu polla\s dikanikô=n lo/gôn I)sokratei/ôn periphe/resthai/ phêsin -u(po\ tô=n bibliopôlô=n A)ristote/lês.]] - -[Side-note: Unfinished fragments and preparatory sketches, preserved -and published after Plato's death.] - -Again, the existence of this school-library explains more easily how -it is that unfinished, inferior, and fragmentary Platonic compositions -have been preserved. That there must have existed such compositions I -hold to be certain. How is it supposable that any author, even Plato -could have brought to completion such masterpieces as Republic, -Gorgias, Protagoras, Symposion, &c., without tentative and preparatory -sketches, each of course in itself narrow, defective, perhaps of -little value, but serving as material to be worked up or worked in? -Most of these would be destroyed, but probably not all. If (as I -believe) it be the fact, that all the Platonic MSS. were preserved as -their author left them, some would probably be published (and some -indeed are said to have been published) after his death; and among -them would be included more or fewer of these unfinished performances, -and sketches projected but abandoned. We can hardly suppose that Plato -himself would have published fragments never finished, such as -Kleitophon and Kritias[8]--the last ending in the middle of a -sentence. - -[Footnote 8: Straton, the Peripatetic Scholarch who succeeded -Theophrastus, B.C. 287, bequeathed to Lykon by his will both the -succession to his school ([Greek: diatribê\n]) and all his books, -except what he had written himself ([Greek: plê\n ô(=n au)toi\ -gegra/phamen]). What is to be done with these latter he does not say. -Lykon, in his last will, says:--[Greek: kai\ du/o mna=s au)tô=|] -(Chares, a manumitted slave) [Greek: di/dômi kai\ ta)ma\ bi/blia ta\ -a)negnôsme/na; ta\ de\ a)ne/kdota Kalli/nô|, o(/pôs e)pimelô=s au)ta\ -e)kdô=|]. See Diog. L. v. 62, 73. Here Lykon directs expressly that -Kallinus shall edit with care his (Lykon's) unpublished works. -Probably Straton may have given similar directions during his life, so -that it was unnecessary to provide in the will. [Greek: Ta\ -a)negnôsme/na] is equivalent to [Greek: ta\ e)kdedome/na]. Publication -was constituted by reading the MSS. aloud before a chosen audience of -friends or critics; which readings often led to such remarks as -induced the author to take his work back, and to correct it for a -second recitation. See the curious sentence extracted from the letter -of Theophrastus to Phanias (Diog. L. v. 37). Boeckh and other critics -agree that both the Kleitophon and the Kritias were transmitted from -antiquity in the fragmentary state in which we now read them: that -they were compositions never completed. Boeckh affirms this with -assurance respecting the Kleitophon, though he thinks that it is not a -genuine work of Plato; on which last point I dissent from him. He -thinks that the Kritias is a real work of Plato, though uncompleted -(Boeckh in Platonis Minoem, p. 11). - -Compare the remarks of M. Littré respecting the unfinished sketches, -treatises, and notes not intended for publication, included in the -Collectio Hippocratica (Oeuvres d' Hippocrate, vol. x. p. liv. seq.)] - -[Side-note: Peripatetic school at the Lykeum--its composition and -arrangement.] - -The second philosophical school, begun by Aristotle and perpetuated -(after his death in 322 B.C.) at the Lykeum on the eastern side of -Athens, was established on the model of that of Plato. That which -formed the centre or consecrating point was a Museum or chapel of the -Muses: with statues of those goddesses of place, and also a statue of -the founder. Attached to this Museum were a portico, a hall with seats -(one seat especially for the lecturing professor), a garden, and a -walk, together with a residence, all permanently appropriated to the -teacher and the process of instruction.[9] Theophrastus, the friend -and immediate successor of Aristotle, presided over the school for -thirty-five years; and his course, during part of that time at least, -was prodigiously frequented by students. - -[Footnote 9: Respecting the domicile of the Platonic School, and that -of the Aristotelian or Peripatetic school which followed it, the -particulars given by Diogenes are nearly coincident: we know more in -detail about the Peripatetic, from what he cites out of the will of -Theophrastus. See iv. 1-6-19, v. 51-63. - -The [Greek: mousei=on] at the Academy was established by Plato -himself. Speusippus placed in it statues of the Charities or Graces. -Theophrastus gives careful directions in his about repairing and -putting in the best condition, the Peripatetic [Greek: mousei=on], -with its altar, its statues of the Goddesses, and its statue of the -founder Aristotle. The [Greek: stoa\, e)xe/dra, kê=pos, peri/patos], -attached to both schools, are mentioned: the most zealous students -provided for themselves lodgings close adjoining. Cicero, when he -walked out from Athens to see the deserted Academy, was particularly -affected by the sight of the _exedra_, in which Charmadas had lectured -(De Fin. v. 2, 4). - -There were periodical meetings, convivial and conversational, among -the members both of the Academic and Peripatetic schools; and [Greek: -xumpotikoi\ no/moi] by Xenokrates and Aristotle to regulate them -(Athenæus, v. 184). - -Epikurus (in his interesting testament given by Diogen. Laert. x. -16-21) bequeaths to two Athenian citizens his garden and property, in -trust for his principal disciple the Mitylenæan Hermarchus, [Greek: -kai\ toi=s sumphilosophou=sin au)tô=|, kai\ oi(=s a)\n E(/rmarchos -katali/pê| diado/chois tê=s philosophi/as, e)ndiatri/bein kata\ -philosophi/an]. He at the same time directs all his books to be given -to Hermarchus: they would form the school-library.] - -[Side-note: Peripatetic school library, its removal from Athens to -Skêpsis--its ultimate restitution in a damaged state to Athens, then -to Rome.] - -Moreover, the school-library at the Lykeum acquired large development -and importance. It not only included all the MS. compositions, -published or unpublished, of Aristotle and Theophrastus, each of them -a voluminous writer--but also a numerous collection (numerous for that -day) of other works besides; since both of them were opulent and fond -of collecting books. The value of the school-library is shown by what -happened after the decease of Theophrastus, when Straton succeeded him -in the school (B.C. 287). Theophrastus--thinking himself entitled to -treat the library not as belonging to the school but as belonging to -himself--bequeathed it at his death to Neleus, a favourite scholar, -and a native of Skêpsis (in the Troad), by whom it was carried away to -Asia, and permanently separated from the Aristotelian school at -Athens. The manuscripts composing it remained in the possession of -Neleus and his heirs for more than a century and a half, long hidden -in a damp cellar, neglected, and sustaining great damage--until about -the year 100 B.C., when they were purchased by a rich Athenian named -Apellikon, and brought back to Athens. Sylla, after he had captured -Athens (86 B.C.), took for himself the library of Apellikon, and -transported it to Rome, where it became open to learned men -(Tyrannion, Andronikus, and others), but under deplorable -disadvantage--in consequence of the illegible state of the MSS. and -the unskilful conjectures and restitutions which had been applied, in -the new copies made since it passed into the hands of Apellikon.[10] - -[Footnote 10: The will of Theophrastus, as given in Diogenes (v. 52), -mentions the bequest of all his books to Neleus. But it is in Strabo -that we read the fullest account of this displacement of the -Peripatetic school-library, and the consequences which ensued from it -(xiii. 608, 609). [Greek: Nêleu\s, a)nê\r kai\ A)ristote/lous -ê)kroame/nos kai\ Theophra/stou, diadedegme/nos de\ tê\n bibliothê/kên -tou= Theophra/stou, e)n ê(=| ê)=n kai\ ê( tou= A)ristote/lous. o( -gou=n A)ristote/lês tê\n e(autou= Theophra/stô| pare/dôken, ô(=|per -kai\ tê\n scholê\n a)pe/lipe, _prô=tos, ô(=n i)/smen, sunagagô\n -bi/blia, kai\ dida/xas tou\s e)n Ai)gu/ptô| basile/as bibliothê/kês -su/ntaxin_]. - -The kings of Pergamus, a few years after the death of Theophrastus, -acquired possession of the town and territory of Skêpsis; so that the -heirs of Neleus became numbered among their subjects. These kings -(from about the year B.C. 280 downwards) manifested great eagerness to -collect a library at Pergamus, in competition with that of the -Ptolemies at Alexandria. The heirs of Neleus were afraid that these -kings would strip them of their Aristotelian MSS., either for nothing -or for a small price. They therefore concealed the MSS. in a cellar, -until they found an opportunity of selling them to a stranger out of -the country. (Strabo, l. c.) - -This narrative of Strabo is one of the most interesting pieces of -information remaining to us about literary antiquity. He had himself -received instruction from Tyrannion (xii. 548): he had gone through a -course of Aristotelian philosophy (xvi. 757), and he had good means of -knowing the facts from the Aristotelian critics, including his master -Tyrannion. Plutarch (Vit. Syllæ, c. 26) and Athenæus (i. 3) allude to -the same story. Athenæus says that Ptolemy Philadelphus purchased the -MSS. from the heirs of Neleus, which cannot be correct. - -Some critics have understood the narrative of Strabo, as if he had -meant to affirm, that the works of Aristotle had never got into -circulation until the time of Apellikon. It is against this -supposition that Stahr contends (very successfully) in his work -"Aristotelia". But Strabo does not affirm so much as this. He does not -say anything to contradict the supposition that there were copies of -various books of Aristotle in circulation, during the lives of -Aristotle and Theophrastus.] - -[Side-note: Inconvenience to the Peripatetic school from the loss of -its library.] - -If we knew the truth, it might probably appear that the transfer of -the Aristotelian library, from the Peripatetic school at Athens to the -distant and obscure town of Skêpsis, was the result of some jealousy -on the part of Theophrastus; that he wished to secure to Neleus the -honourable and lucrative post of becoming his successor in the school, -and conceived that he was furthering that object by bequeathing the -library to Neleus. If he entertained any such wish, it was -disappointed. The succession devolved upon another pupil of the -school, Straton of Lampsakus. But Straton and his successors were -forced to get on as well as they could without their library. The -Peripatetic school at Athens suffered severely by the loss. Its -professors possessed only a few of the manuscripts of Aristotle, and -those too the commonest and best known. If a student came with a view -to read any of the other Aristotelian works (as Crassus went to read -the Gorgias of Plato), the Scholarch was unable to assist him: as far -as Aristotle was concerned, they could only expand and adorn, in the -way of lecture, a few of his familiar doctrines.[11] We hear that the -character of the school was materially altered. Straton deserted the -track of Aristotle, and threw himself into speculations of his own -(seemingly able and ingenious), chiefly on physical topics.[12] The -critical study, arrangement, and exposition of Aristotle was postponed -until the first century before the Christian era--the Ciceronian age, -immediately preceding Strabo. - -[Footnote 11: Strabo, xiii. 609. [Greek: sune/bê de\ toi=s e)k tô=n -peripa/tôn toi=s me\n pa/lai, toi=s meta\ Theo/phraston, ou)k -e)/chousin o(/lôs ta\ bi/blia plê\n o)li/gôn, kai\ ma/lista tô=n -e)xôterikô=n, mêde\n e)/chein philosophei=n pragmatikô=s, a)lla\ -_the/seis lêkuthi/zein_.]] - -[Footnote 12: The change in the Peripatetic school, after the death of -Theophrastus, is pointed out by Cicero, Fin. v. 5, 18. Compare Academ. -Poster. i. 9.] - -[Side-note: Advantage to the Platonic school from having preserved its -MSS.] - -This history of the Aristotelian library illustrates forcibly, by way -of contrast, the importance to the Platonic school of having preserved -its MSS. from the beginning, without any similar interruption. What -Plato left in manuscript we may presume to have never been removed: -those who came to study his works had the means of doing so: those who -wanted to know whether any composition was written by him, what works -he had written altogether, or what was the correct reading in a case -of obscurity or dispute--had always the means of informing themselves. -Whereas the Peripatetic Scholarch, after the death of Theophrastus, -could give no similar information as to the works of Aristotle.[13] - -[Footnote 13: An interesting citation by Simplikius (in his commentary -on the Physica of Aristotle, fol. 216, a. 7, p. 404, b. 11, Schol. -Brandis shows us that Theophrastus, while he was resident at Athens as -Peripatetic Scholarch, had custody of the original MSS. of the works -of Aristotle and that he was applied to by those who wished to procure -correct copies. Eudêmus (of Rhodes) having only a defective copy of -the Physica, wrote to request that Theophrastus would cause to be -written out a certain portion of the fifth book, and send it to him, -[Greek: marturou=ntos peri\ tô=n prô/tôn kai\ Theophra/stou, -gra/psantos Eu)dê/mô|, peri/ tinos au)tou= tô=n diêmartême/nôn -a)ntigra/phôn; u(pe\r ô(=n, phêsin] (_sc._ Theophrastus) [Greek: -e)pe/steilas, keleu/ôn me gra/phein kai\ apostei=lai e)k tô=n -Phusikô=n, ê(/toi e)gô\ ou) suni/êmi, ê)\ mikro/n ti pantelô=s e)/chei -tou= a)na/meson tou= o(/per ê)remei=n kalô= tô=n a)kinê/tôn mo/non], -&c.] - -[Side-note: Conditions favourable, for preserving the genuine works of -Plato.] - -We thus see that the circumstances, under which Plato left his -compositions, were unusually favourable (speaking by comparison with -ancient authors generally) in regard to the chance of preserving them -all, and of keeping them apart from counterfeits. We have now to -enquire what information exists as to their subsequent diffusion. - -[Side-note: Historical facts as to their preservation.] - -The earliest event of which notice is preserved, is, the fact stated -by Diogenes, that "Some persons, among whom is the _Grammaticus_ -Aristophanes, distribute the dialogues of Plato into Trilogies; -placing as the first Trilogy--Republic, Timæus, Kritias. 2. Sophistes, -Politicus, Kratylus. 3. Leges, Minos, Epinomis. 4.** Theætêtus, -Euthyphron, Apology. 5. Kriton, Phædon, Epistolæ. The other dialogues -they place one by one, without any regular grouping."[14] - -[Footnote 14: Diog. L. iii. 61-62: [Greek: E)/nioi de/, ô(=n e)/sti -kai\ A)ristopha/nês o( grammatiko/s, ei)s trilogi/as e(/lkousi tou\s -dialo/gous; kai\ prô/tên me\n tithe/asin ê(=s ê(gei=tai Politei/a, -Ti/maios, Kriti/as; deute/ran, Sophistê/s, Politiko/s, Kra/tulos; -tri/tên, No/moi, Mi/nôs, E)pinomi/s; teta/rtên, Theai/têtos, -Eu)thu/phrôn, A)pologi/a; pe/mptên, Kri/tôn, Phai/dôn, E)pistolai/; -ta\ de\ a)/lla kath' e)\n kai\ a)ta/ktôs]. - -The word [Greek: grammatiko\s], unfortunately, has no single English -word exactly corresponding to it. - -Thrasyllus, when he afterwards applied the classification by -Tetralogies to the works of Demokritus (as he did also to those of -Plato) could only include a certain portion of the works in his -Tetralogies, and was forced to enumerate the remainder as [Greek: -a)su/ntakta] (Diog. L. ix. 46, 47). It appears that he included all -Plato's works in his Platonic Tetralogies.] - -[Side-note: Arrangement of them into Trilogies, by Aristophanes.] - -The name of Aristophanes lends special interest to this arrangement of -the Platonic compositions, and enables us to understand something of -the date and the place to which it belongs. The literary and critical -students (_Grammatici_) among whom he stood eminent, could scarcely be -said to exist as a class the time when Plato died. Beginning with -Aristotle, Herakleides of Pontus, Theophrastus, Demetrius Phalereus, -&c., at Athens, during the half century immediately succeeding Plato's -decease--these laborious and useful erudites were first called into -full efficiency along with the large collection of books formed by the -Ptolemies at Alexandria during a period beginning rather before 300 -B.C.: which collection served both as model and as stimulus to the -libraries subsequently formed by the kings at Pergamus and elsewhere. -In those libraries alone could materials be found for their -indefatigable application. - -[Side-note: Aristophanes, librarian at the Alexandrine library.] - -Of these learned men, who spent their lives in reading, criticising, -arranging, and correcting, the MSS. accumulated in a great library, -Aristophanes of Byzantium was the most distinguished representative, -in the eyes of men like Varro, Cicero, and Plutarch.[15] His life was -passed at Alexandria, and seems to have been comprised between 260-184 -B.C.; as far as can be made out. During the latter portion of it he -became chief librarian--an appointment which he had earned by long -previous studies in the place, as well as by attested experience in -the work of criticism and arrangement. He began his studious career at -Alexandria at an early age: and he received instruction, as a boy from -Zenodotus, as a young man from Kallimachus--both of whom were, in -succession, librarians of the Alexandrine library.[16] We must observe -that Diogenes does not expressly state the distribution of the -Platonic works into trilogies to have been _first proposed_ or -originated by Aristophanes (as he states that the tetralogies were -afterwards proposed by the rhetor Thrasyllus, of which presently): his -language is rather more consistent with the supposition, that it was -first proposed by some one earlier, and adopted or sanctioned by the -eminent authority of Aristophanes. But at any rate, the distribution -was proposed either by Aristophanes himself, or by some one before him -and known to him. - -[Footnote 15: Varro, De Linguâ Latinâ, v. 9, ed. Müller. "Non solum ad -Aristophanis lucernam, sed etiam ad Cleanthis, lucubravi." Cicero, De -Fin. v. 19, 50; Vitruvius, Præf. Lib. vii.; Plutarch, "Non posse -suaviter vivi sec. Epicurum," p. 1095 E. - -Aristophanes composed Argumenta to many of the Attic tragedies and -comedies: he also arranged in a certain order the songs of Alkæus and -the odes of Pindar. Boeckh (Præfat. ad Scholia Pindari, p. x. xi.) -remarks upon the mistake made by Quintilian as well as by others, in -supposing that Pindar arranged his own odes. Respecting the wide range -of erudition embraced by Aristophanes, see F. A. Wolf, Prolegg. in -Homer, pp. 218-220, and Schneidewin, De Hypothes. Traged. Græc. -Aristophani vindicandis, pp. 26, 27.] - -[Footnote 16: Suidas, vv. [Greek: A)ristopha/nês, Kalli/machos]. -Compare Clinton, Fast. Hellen. B.C. 256-200.] - -[Side-note: Plato's works in the Alexandrine library, before the time -of Aristophanes.] - -This fact is of material importance, because it enables us to Plato's -infer with confidence, that the Platonic works were included in the -Alexandrine library, certainly during the lifetime of Aristophanes, -and probably before it. It is there only that Aristophanes could have -known them; his whole life having been passed in Alexandria. The first -formal appointment of a librarian to the Alexandrine Museum was made -by Ptolemy Philadelphus, at some time after the commencement of his -reign in 285 B.C., in the person of Zenodotus; whose successors were -Kallimachus, Eratosthenes, Apollonius, Aristophanes, comprising in all -a period of a century.[17] - -[Footnote 17: See Ritschl, Die Alexandrinischen Bibliotheken, pp. -16-17, &c.; Nauck, De Aristophanis Vitâ et Scriptis, cap. i. p. 68 -(Halle, 1848). "Aristophanis et Aristarchi opera, cum opibus -Bibliothecæ Alexandrinæ digerendis et ad tabulas revocandis arctè -conjuncta, in eo substitisse censenda est, ut scriptores, in quovis -dicendi genere conspicuos, aut breviori indice comprehenderent, aut -uberiore enarratione describerent," &c. - -When Zenodotus was appointed, the library had already attained -considerable magnitude, so that the post and title of librarian was -then conspicuous and dignified. But Demetrius Phalereus, who preceded -Zenodotus, began his operations when there was no library at all, and -gradually accumulated the number of books which Zenodotus found. Heyne -observes justly: "Primo loco Demetrius Phalereus præfuisse dicitur, -_forte re verius quam nomine_, tum Zenodotus Ephesius, hic quidem sub -Ptolemæo Philadelpho," &c. (Heyne, De Genio Sæculi Ptolemæorum in -Opuscul. i. p. 129).] - -[Side-note: Kallimachus--predecessor of Aristophanes--his published -Tables of authors whose works were in the library.] - -Kallimachus, born at Kyrênê, was a teacher of letters at Alexandria -before he was appointed to the service and superintendence of the -Alexandrine library or museum. His life seems to have terminated about -230 B.C.: he acquired reputation as a poet, by his hymns, epigrams, -elegies, but less celebrity as a _Grammaticus_ than Aristophanes: -nevertheless the titles of his works still remaining indicate very -great literary activity. We read as titles of his works:-- - -1. The Museum (a general description of the Alexandrine -establishment). - -2. Tables of the persons who have distinguished themselves in every -branch of instruction, and of the works which they have composed--in -120 books. - -3. Table and specification of the (Didaskalies) recorded dramatic -representations and competitions; with dates assigned, and from the -beginning. - -4. Table of the peculiar phrases belonging to Demokritus, and of his -works. - -5. Table and specification of the rhetorical authors.[18] - -[Footnote 18: See Blomfleld's edition of the Fragm. of Kallimachus, p. -220-221. Suidas, v. [Greek: Kalli/machos], enumerates a large number -of titles of poetical, literary, historical, compositions of -Kallimachus; among them are-- - -[Greek: Mousei=on. Pi/nakes tô=n e)n pa/sê| paidei/a| dialampsa/ntôn, -kai\ ô(=n sune/grapsan, e)n bibli/ois k' kai\ r'. Pi/nax kai\ -a)nagraphê\ tô=n kata\ chro/nous kai\ a)p' a)rchê=s genome/nôn -didaskaliô=n. Pi/nax tô=n Dêmokri/tou glôssô=n kai\ suntagma/tôn. -Pi/nax kai\ a)nagraphê\ tô=n r(êtorikô=n]. See also Athenæus, xv. 669. -It appears from Dionys. Hal. that besides the Tables of Kallimachus, -enumerating and reviewing the authors whose works were contained in -the Alexandrine library or museum, there existed also [Greek: -Pergamênoi\ Pi/nakes], describing the contents of the library at -Pergamus (Dion. H. de Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosthene, p. 994; De Dinarcho, -pp. 630, 653, 661). - -Compare Bernhardy, Grundriss der Griech. Litt. sect. 36, pp. 132-133 -seq.] - -[Side-note: Large and rapid accumulation of the Alexandrine Library.] - -These tables of Kallimachus (of which one by itself, No. 2, reached to -120 books) must have been an encyclopædia, far more comprehensive than -any previously compiled, of Greek authors and literature. Such tables -indeed could not have been compiled before the existence of the -Alexandrine Museum. They described what Kallimachus had before him in -that museum, as we may see by the general title [Greek: Mousei=on] -prefixed: moreover we may be sure that nowhere else could he have had -access to the multitude of books required. Lastly, the tables also -show how large a compass the Alexandrine Museum and library had -attained at the time when Kallimachus put together his compilation: -that is, either in the reign of Ptolemy II. Philadelphia (285-247 -B.C.), or in the earlier portion of the reign of Ptolemy III., called -Euergetes (247-222 B.C.). Nevertheless, large as the library then was, -it continued to increase. A few years afterwards, Aristophanes -published a work commenting upon the tables of Kallimachus, with -additions and enlargements: of which work the title alone remains.[19] - -[Footnote 19: Athenæus, ix. 408. [Greek: A)ristopha/nês o( -grammatiko\s e)n toi=s pro\s tou\s Kallima/chou pi/nakas]. - -We see by another passage, Athenæ. viii. 336, that this work included -an addition or supplement to the Tables of Kallimachus. - -Compare Etymol. Magn. v. [Greek: Pi/nax].] - -[Side-note: Plato's works--in the library at the time of Kallimachus.] - -Now, I have already observed, that the works of Plato were certainly -in the Alexandrine library, at the time when Aristophanes either -originated or sanctioned the distribution of them into Trilogies. Were -they not also in the library at the time when Kallimachus compiled his -tables? I cannot but conclude that they were in it at that time also. -When we are informed that the catalogue of enumerated authors filled -so many books, we may be sure that it must have descended, and we know -in fact that it did descend, to names far less important and -distinguished than that of Plato.[20] The name of Plato himself can -hardly have been omitted. Demokritus and his works, especially the -peculiar and technical words ([Greek: glô=ssai]) in them, received -special attention from Kallimachus: which proves that the latter was -not disposed to pass over the philosophers. But Demokritus, though an -eminent philosopher, was decidedly less eminent than Plato: moreover -he left behind him no permanent successors, school, or [Greek: -mousei=on], at Athens, to preserve his MSS. or foster his celebrity. -As the library was furnished at that time with a set of the works of -Demokritus, so I infer that it could not have been without a set of -the works of Plato. That Kallimachus was acquainted with Plato's -writings (if indeed such a fact requires proof), we know, not only -from his epigram upon the Ambrakiot Kleombrotus (whom he affirms to -have killed himself after reading the Phædon), but also from a curious -intimation that he formally impugned Plato's competence to judge or -appreciate poets--alluding to the severe criticisms which we read in -the Platonic Republic.[21] - -[Footnote 20: Thus the Tables of Kallimachus included a writer named -Lysimachus, a disciple of Theodorus or Theophrastus, and his writings -(Athenæ. vi. 252)--a rhetor and poet named Dionysius with the epithet -of [Greek: chalkou=s] (Athenæ. xv. 669))--and even the treatises of -several authors on cakes and cookery (Athenæ. xiv. 643). The names of -authors absolutely unknown to us were mentioned by him (Athenæ. ii. -70). Compare Dionys. Hal. de Dinarcho, 630, 653, 661.] - -[Footnote 21: Kallimachus, Epigram. 23. - -Proklus in Timæum, p. 28 C. p. 64. Schneid. [Greek: ma/tên ou)=n -phlênaphou=si Kalli/machos kai\ Dou=ris, ô(s Pla/tônos ou)k o)/ntos -i(kanou= kri/nein poiêta/s]. - -Eratosthenes, successor of Kallimachus as librarian at Alexandria, -composed a work (now lost) entitled [Greek: Platôniko\n], as well as -various treatises on philosophy and philosophers (Eratosthenica, -Bernhardy, p. 168, 187, 197; Suidas, v. [Greek: E)ratosthe/nês]). He -had passed some time at Athens, had enjoyed the lessons and -conversation of Zeno the Stoic, but expressed still warmer admiration -of Arkesilaus and Ariston. He spoke in animated terms of Athens as the -great centre of congregation for philosophers in his day. He had -composed a treatise, [Greek: Peri\ tô=n a)gathô=n]: but Strabo -describes him as mixing up other subjects with philosophy (Strabo, i. -p. 15).] - -It would indeed be most extraordinary if, among the hundreds of -authors whose works must have been specified in the Tables of -Kallimachus as constituting the treasures of the Alexandrine -Museum,[22] the name of Plato had not been included. Moreover, the -distribution of the Platonic compositions into Trilogies, pursuant to -the analogy of the Didaskaliæ or dramatic records, may very probably -have originated with Kallimachus; and may have been simply approved -and continued, perhaps with some modifications, by Aristophanes. At -least this seems more consonant to the language of Diogenes Laertius, -than the supposition that Aristophanes was the first originator of it. - -[Footnote 22: About the number of books, or more properly of _rolls_ -(_volumina_), in the Alexandrine library, see the enquiries of -Parthey, Das Alexandrinische Museum, p. 76-84. Various statements are -made by ancient authors, some of them with very large numbers; and no -certainty is attainable. Many rolls would go to form one book. Parthey -considers the statement made by Epiphanius not improbable--54,800 -rolls in the library under Ptolemy Philadelphus (p. 83). - -The magnitude of the library at Alexandria in the time of -Eratosthenes, and the multitude of writings which he consulted in his -valuable geographical works, was admitted by his opponent Hipparchus -(Strabo, ii. 69).] - -[Side-note: First formation of the library--intended as a copy of the -Platonic and Aristotelian [Greek: Mousei=a] at Athens.] - -If we look back to the first commencement of the Alexandrine Museum -and library, we shall be still farther convinced that the works of -Plato, complete as well as genuine, must have been introduced into it -before the days of Kallimachus. Strabo expressly tells us that the -first stimulus and example impelling the Ptolemies to found this -museum and library, were furnished by the school of Aristotle and -Theophrastus at Athens.[23] I believe this to be perfectly true; and -it is farther confirmed by the fact that the institution at Alexandria -comprised the same constituent parts and arrangements, described by -the same titles, as those which are applied to the Aristotelian and -Platonic schools at Athens.[24] Though the terms library, museum, and -lecture-room, have now become familiar, both terms and meaning were at -that time alike novel. Nowhere, as far as we know, did there exist a -known and fixed domicile, consecrated in perpetuity to these purposes, -and to literary men who took interest therein. A special stimulus was -needed to suggest and enforce the project on Ptolemy Soter. That -stimulus was supplied by the Aristotelian school at Athens, which the -Alexandrine institution was intended to copy: [Greek: Mousei=on] (with -[Greek: e)xe/dra] and [Greek: peri/patos], a covered portico with -recesses and seats, and a walk adjacent), on a far larger scale and -with more extensive attributions.[25] We must not however imagine that -when this new museum was first begun, the founders entertained any -idea of the vast magnitude to which it ultimately attained. - -[Footnote 23: Strabo, xiii. 608. [Greek: o( gou=n A)ristote/lês tê\n -e(autou= (bibliothê/kên) Theophra/stô| pare/dôken, ô(=|per kai\ tê\n -scholê\n a)pe/lipe; _prô=tos_, ô(=n i)/smen, _sunagagô\n bi/blia_, -kai\ _dida/xas tou\s e)n Ai)gu/ptô| basile/as bibliothê/kês -su/ntaxin_.]] - -[Footnote 24: Strabo (xvii. 793-794) describes the Museum at -Alexandria in the following terms--[Greek: tô=n de\ basilei/ôn me/ros -e)sti\ kai\ _to\ Mousei=on, e)/chon peri/paton kai\ e)xe/dran_, kai\ -oi)=kon me/gan e)n ô(=| to\ sussi/tion tô=n metecho/ntôn tou= -Mousei/ou philolo/gôn a)ndrô=n], &c. Vitruvius, v. 11. - -If we compare this with the language in Diogenes Laertius respecting -the Academic and Peripatetic school residences at Athens, we shall -find the same phrases employed--[Greek: mousei=on, e)xe/dra], &c. (D. -L. iv. 19, v. 51-54). Respecting Speusippus, Diogenes tells us (iv, -1)--[Greek: Chari/tôn t' a)ga/lmat' a)ne/thêken e)n tô=| mousei/ô| -tô=| u(po\ Pla/tônos e)n A)kadêmi/a| i)druthe/nti.]] - -[Footnote 25: We see from hence what there was peculiar in the -Platonic and Aristotelian literary establishments. They included -something consecrated, permanent, and intended more or less for public -use. The collection of books was not like a private library, destined -only for the proprietor and such friends as he might allow--nor was it -like that of a bookseller, intended for sale and profit. I make this -remark in regard to the Excursus of Bekker, in his Charikles, i. 206, -216, a very interesting note on the book-trade and libraries of -ancient Athens. Bekker disputes the accuracy of Strabo's statement -that Aristotle was the first person at Athens who collected a library, -and who taught the kings of Egypt to do the like. In the literal sense -of the words Bekker is right. Other persons before Aristotle had -collected books (though I think Bekker makes more of the passages -which he cites than they strictly deserve); one example is the -youthful Euthydemus in Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2; and Bekker alludes -justly to the remarkable passage in the Anabasis of Xenophon, about -books exported to the Hellenic cities in the Euxine (Anabas. vii. 5, -14). There clearly existed in Athens regular professional booksellers; -we see that the bookseller read aloud to his visitors a part of the -books which he had to sell, in order to tempt them to buy, a feeble -foreshadowing of the advertisements and reviews of the present day -(Diogen. L. vii. 2). But there existed as yet nothing of the nature of -the Platonic and Aristotelian [Greek: mousei=on], whereof the -collection of books, varied, permanent, and intended for the use of -inmates and special visitors, was one important fraction. In this -sense it served as a model for Demetrius Phalereus and Ptolemy Soter -in regard to Alexandria. - -Vitruvius (v. 11) describes the _exhedræ_ as seats placed under a -covered portico--"in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui -studiis delectantur, sedentes disputare possint".] - -[Side-note: Favour of Ptolemy Soter towards the philosophers at -Athens.] - -Ptolemy Soter was himself an author,[26] and himself knew and -respected Aristotle, not only as a philosopher but also as the -preceptor of his friend and commander Alexander. To Theophrastus also, -the philosophical successor of Aristotle, Ptolemy showed peculiar -honour; inviting him by special message to come and establish himself -at Alexandria, which invitation however Theophrastus declined.[27] -Moreover Ptolemy appointed Straton (afterwards Scholarch in succession -to Theophrastus) preceptor to his youthful son Ptolemy Philadelphus, -from whom Straton subsequently received a large present of money:[28] -he welcomed at Alexandria the Megaric philosophers, Diodorus Kronus, -and Stilpon, and found pleasure in their conversation; he not only -befriended, but often confidentially consulted, the Kyrenaic -philosopher Theodôrus.[29] Kolôtes, the friend of Epikurus, dedicated -a work to Ptolemy Soter. Menander, the eminent comic writer, also -received an invitation from him to Egypt.[30] - -[Footnote 26: Respecting Ptolemy as an author, and the fragments of -his work on the exploits of Alexander, see R. Geier, Alexandri M. -Histor. Scriptores, p. 4-26.] - -[Footnote 27: Diog. L. v. 37. Probably this invitation was sent about -306 B.C., during the year in which Theophrastus was in banishment from -Athens, in consequence of the restrictive law proposed by Sophokles -against the schools of the philosophers, which law was repealed in the -ensuing year.] - -[Footnote 28: Diog. L. v. 58. Straton became Scholarch at the death of -Theophrastus in 287 B.C. He must have been preceptor to Ptolemy -Philadelphus before this time, during the youth of the latter; for he -could not have been at the same time Scholarch at Athens, and -preceptor of the king at Alexandria.] - -[Footnote 29: Diog. L. ii. 102, 111, 115. Plutarch adv. Kolôten, p. -1107. The Ptolemy here mentioned by Plutarch may indeed be -Philadelphus.] - -[Footnote 30: Meineke, Menand. et Philem. Reliq. Præf. p. xxxii.] - -[Side-note: Demetrius Phalereus--his history and character.] - -These favourable dispositions, on the part of the first Ptolemy, -towards philosophy and the philosophers at Athens, Demetrius appear to -have been mainly instigated and guided by the Phalerean Demetrius: an -Athenian citizen of good station, who enjoyed for ten years at Athens -(while that city was subject to Kassander) full political ascendancy, -but who was expelled about 307 B.C., by the increased force of the -popular party, seconded by the successful invasion of Demetrius -Poliorkêtês. By these political events Demetrius Phalereus was driven -into exile: a portion of which exile was spent at Thebes, but a much -larger portion of it at Alexandria, where he acquired the full -confidence of Ptolemy Soter, and retained it until the death of that -prince in 285 B.C. While active in politics, and possessing rhetorical -talent, elegant without being forcible--Demetrius Phalereus was yet -more active in literature and philosophy. He employed his influence, -during the time of his political power, to befriend and protect both -Xenokrates the chief of the Platonic school, and Theophrastus the -chief of the Aristotelian. In his literary and philosophical views he -followed Theophrastus and the Peripatetic sect, and was himself among -their most voluminous writers. The latter portion of his life was -spent at Alexandria, in the service of Ptolemy Soter; after whose -death, however, he soon incurred the displeasure of Ptolemy -Philadelphus, and died, intentionally or accidentally, from the bite -of an asp.[31] - -[Footnote 31: Diog. L. iv. 14, v. 39, 75, 80; Strabo, ix. 398; Plut., -De Exil. p. 601; Apophth. p. 189; Cic., De Fin. v. 19; Pro Rab. 30. - -Diogenes says about Demetrius Phalereus, (v. 80) [Greek: Plê/thei de\ -bibli/ôn kai\ a)rithmô=| sti/chôn, schedo\n a(/pantas parelê/lake -tou=s kat' au)to\n Peripatêtikou/s, eu)pai/deutos ô)\n kai\ -polu/peiros par' o(ntinou=n.]] - -[Side-note: He was chief agent in the first establishment of the -Alexandrine Library.] - -The Alexandrine Museum or library first acquired celebrity under the -reign of Ptolemy (II.) Philadelphus, by whom moreover it was greatly -enlarged and its treasures multiplied. Hence that prince is sometimes -entitled the founder. But there can be no doubt that its first -initiation and establishment is due to Ptolemy (I.) Soter.[32] -Demetrius Phalereus was his adviser and auxiliary, the link of -connection between him and the literary or philosophical world of -Greece. We read that Julius Cæsar, when he conceived the scheme (which -he did not live to execute) of establishing a large public library at -Rome, fixed upon the learned Varro to regulate the selection and -arrangement of the books.[33] None but an eminent literary man could -carry such an enterprise into effect, even at Rome, when there existed -the precedent of the Alexandrine library: much more when Ptolemy -commenced his operations at Alexandria, and when there were only the -two [Greek: Mousei=a] at Athens to serve as precedents. Demetrius, who -combined an organising head and political experience, with an -erudition not inferior to Varro, regard being had to the stock of -learning accessible--was eminently qualified for the task. It procured -for him great importance with Ptolemy, and compensated him for that -loss of political ascendancy at Athens, which unfavourable fortune had -brought about. - -[Footnote 32: Mr. Clinton says, Fast. Hell. App. 5, p. 380, 381: -"Athenæus distinctly ascribes the institution of the [Greek: -Mousei=on] to Philadelphus in v. 203, where he is describing the acts -of Philadelphus." This is a mistake: the passage in Athenæus does not -specify which of the two first Ptolemies was the founder: it is -perfectly consistent with the supposition that Ptolemy Soter founded -it. The same may be said about the passage cited by Mr. Clinton from -Plutarch; that too does not determine between the two Ptolemies, which -was the founder. Perizonius was in error (as Mr. Clinton points out) -in affirming that the passage in Plutarch determined the foundation to -the first Ptolemy: Mr. Clinton is in error by affirming that the -passage in Athenæus determines it to the second. Mr. Clinton has also -been misled by Vitruvius and Scaliger (p. 389), when he affirms that -the library at Alexandria was not formed until after the library at -Pergamus. Bernhardy (Grundriss der Griech. Litt., Part i. p. 359, 367, -369) has followed Mr. Clinton too implicitly in recognising -Philadelphus as the founder: nevertheless he too admits (p. 366) that -the foundations were laid by Ptolemy Soter, under the advice and -assistance of Demetrius Phalereus. - -The earliest declared king of the Attalid family at Pergamus acquired -the throne in 241 B.C. The library at Pergamus could hardly have been -commenced before his time: and it is his successor, Eumenes II. (whose -reign began in 197 B.C.), who is mentioned as the great collector and -adorner of the library at Pergamus. See Strabo, xiii. 624; Clinton, -Fast. Hellen. App. 6, p. 401-403. It is plain that the library at -Pergamus could hardly have been begun before the close of the reign of -Ptolemy Philadelphus in Egypt, by which time the library of Alexandria -had already acquired great extension and renown.] - -[Footnote 33: Sueton. Jul. Cæs. c. 44. Melissus, one of the Illustres -Grammatici of Rome, undertook by order of Augustus, "curam -ordinandarum bibliothecarum in Octaviæ porticu". (Sueton. De Illustr. -Grammat. c. 21.) - -Cicero replies in the following terms to his brother Quintus, who had -written to him, requesting advice and aid in getting together for his -own use a collection of Greek and Latin books. "De bibliothecâ tuâ -Græcâ supplendâ, libris commutandis, Latinis comparandis--valdé velim -ista confici, præsertim cum ad meum quoque usum spectent. Sed ego, -mihi ipsi ista per quem agam, non habeo. _Neque enim venalia sunt, quæ -quidem placeant: et confici nisi per hominem et peritum et diligentem -non possunt._ Chrysippo tamen imperabo, et cum Tyrannione loquar." -(Cic., Epist. ad Q. Fratr. iii. 4, 5.) - -Now the circulation of books was greatly increased, and the book trade -far more developed, at Rome when this letter was written (about three -centuries after Plato's decease) than it was at Athens during the -time of Demetrius Phalereus (320-300 B.C.). Yet we see the difficulty -which the two brothers Cicero had in collecting a mere private library -for use of the owner simply. _Good books, in a correct and -satisfactory condition, were not to be had for money_: it was -necessary to get access to the best MSS., and to have special copies -made, neatly and correctly: and this could not be done, except under -the superintendence of a laborious literary man like Tyrannion, by -well taught slaves subordinate to him. - -We may understand, from this analogy, the far greater obstacles which -the collectors of the Alexandrine museum and library must have had to -overcome, when _they_ began their work. No one could do it, except a -practised literary man such as Demetrius Phalereus: nor even he, -except by finding out the best MSS., and causing special copies to be -made for the use of the library. Respecting the extent and facility of -book-diffusion in the Roman world, information will be found in the -late Sir George Cornewall Lewis's _Enquiry into the Credibility of -Early Roman History_, vol. i. p. 196, seqq.; also, in the fifth -chapter of the work of Adolf Schmidt, _Geschichte der Denk-und -Glaubens-Freiheit im ersten Jahrhunderte der Kaiser-herrschaft_, -Berlin, 1847; lastly in a valuable review of Adolf Schmidt's work by -Sir George Lewis himself, in Fraser's Magazine for April, 1862, pp. -432-439. Adolf Schmidt represents the multiplication and cheapness of -books in that day as something hardly inferior to what it is -now--citing many authorities for this opinion. Sir G. Lewis has shown, -in my judgment most satisfactorily, that these authorities are -insufficient, and that the opinion is incorrect: this might have been -shown even more fully, if the review had been lengthened. I perfectly -agree with Sir G. Lewis on the main question: yet I think he narrows -the case on his own side too much, and that the number of copies of -such authors as Virgil and Horace, in circulation at one time, cannot -have been so small as he imagines.] - -[Side-note: Proceedings of Demetrius in beginning to collect the -library.] - -We learn that the ardour of Demetrius Phalereus was unremitting, and -that his researches were extended everywhere, to obtain for the new -museum literary monuments from all countries within contemporary -knowledge.[34] This is highly probable: such universality of literary -interest was adapted to the mixed and cosmopolitan character of the -Alexandrine population. But Demetrius was a Greek, born about the time -of Plato's death (347 B.C.), and identified with the political, -rhetorical, dramatic, literary, and philosophical, activity of Athens, -in which he had himself taken a prominent part. To collect the -memorials of Greek literature would be his first object, more -especially such as Aristotle and Theophrastus possessed in their -libraries. Without doubt he would procure the works of Homer and the -other distinguished poets, epic, lyric, and dramatic, as well as the -rhetors, orators, &c. He probably would not leave out the works of the -_viri Sokratici_ (Antisthenes, Aristippus, Æschines, &c.) and the -other philosophers (Demokritus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, &c.). But -there are two authors, whose compositions he would most certainly take -pains to obtain--Plato and Aristotle. These were the two commanding -names of Grecian philosophy in that day: the founders of the two -schools existing in Athens, upon the model of which the Alexandrine -Museum was to be constituted. - -[Footnote 34: Josephus, Antiquit. xii. 2, 1. [Greek: Dêmê/trios o( -Phalêreu/s, o(\s ê)=n e)pi\ tô=n bibliothêkô=n tou= basile/ôs, -spouda/zôn ei) dunato\n ei)/ê pa/nta ta\ kata\ tê\n oi)koume/nên -suna/gein bi/blia, kai\ sunônou/menos ei)/ ti/ pou mo/non a)kou/seie -spoudê=s a)/xion ê)\ ê(du/, tê=| tou= basile/ôs proaire/sei (ma/lista -ga\r peri\ tê\n sullogê\n tô=n bibli/ôn ei)=che philoka/lôs) -sunêgôni/zeto]. - -What Josephus affirms here, I apprehend to be perfectly true; though -he goes on to state much that is fabulous and apocryphal, respecting -the incidents which preceded and accompanied the translation of the -Hebrew Scriptures. Josephus is also mistaken in connecting Demetrius -Phalereus with Ptolemy Philadelphus. Demetrius Phalereus was -disgraced, and died shortly after that prince's accession. His time of -influence was under Ptolemy Soter. - -Respecting the part taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the first getting -up of the Alexandrine Museum, see Valckenaer, Dissertat. De Aristobulo -Judaico, p. 52-57; Ritschl, Die Alexandrin. Biblioth. p. 17, 18; -Parthey, Das Alexandrinische Museum, p. 70, 71 seq.] - -[Side-note: Certainty that the works of Plato and Aristotle were among -the earliest acquisitions made by him for the library.] - -Among all the books which would pass over to Alexandria as the -earliest stock of the new library, I know nothing upon which we can -reckon more certainly than upon the works of Plato.[35] For they were -acquisitions not only desirable, but also easily accessible. The -writings of Aristippus or Demokritus--of Lysias or Isokrates--might -require to be procured (or good MSS. thereof, fit to be specially -copied) at different places and from different persons, without any -security that the collection, when purchased, would be either complete -or altogether genuine. But the manuscripts of Plato and of Aristotle -were preserved in their respective schools at Athens, the Academic and -Peripatetic:[36] a collection complete as well as verifiable. -Demetrius could obtain permission, from Theophrastus in the -Peripatetic school, from Polemon or Krantor in the Academic school, to -have these MSS. copied for him by careful and expert hands. The cost -of such copying must doubtless have been considerable; amounting to a -sum which few private individuals would have been either able or -willing to disburse. But the treasures of Ptolemy were amply -sufficient for the purpose:[37] and when he once conceived the project -of founding a museum in his new capital, a large outlay, incurred for -transcribing from the best MSS. a complete and authentic collection of -the works of illustrious authors, was not likely to deter him. We know -from other anecdotes,[38] what vast sums the third Ptolemy spent, for -the mere purpose of securing better and more authoritative MSS. of -works which the Alexandrine library already possessed. - -[Footnote 35: Stahr, in the second part of his work "Aristotelia," -combats and refutes with much pains the erroneous supposition, that -there was no sufficient publication of the works of Aristotle, until -after the time when Apellikon purchased the MSS. from the heirs of -Neleus--_i.e._ B.C. 100. Stahr shows evidence to prove, that the -works, at least many of the works, of Aristotle were known and studied -before the year 100 B.C.: that they were in the library at Alexandria, -and that they were procured for that library by Demetrius Phalereus. -Stahr says (Thl. ii. p. 59): "Is it indeed credible--is it even -conceivable--that Demetrius, who recommended especially to his regal -friend Ptolemy the study of the political works of the -philosophers--that Demetrius, the friend both of the Aristotelian -philosophy and of Theophrastus, should have left the works of the two -greatest Peripatetic philosophers out of his consideration? May we not -rather be sure that he would take care to secure their works, before all -others, for his nascent library--if indeed he did not bring them with -him when he came to Alexandria?" The question here put by Stahr (and -farther insisted on by Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique -d'Aristote, Introd. p. 14) is very pertinent: and I put the like -question, with slight change of circumstances, respecting the works of -Plato. Demetrius Phalereus was the friend and patron of Xenokrates, as -well as of Theophrastus.] - -[Footnote 36: In respect to the Peripatetic school, this is true only -during the lifetime of Theophrastus, who died 287 B.C. I have already -mentioned that after the death of Theophrastus, the MSS. were -withdrawn from Athens. But all the operations of Demetrius Phalereus -were carried on during the lifetime of Theophrastus; much of them, -probably, in concert with Theophrastus, whose friend and pupil he was. -The death of Theophrastus, the death of Ptolemy Soter, and the -discredit and subsequent death of Demetrius are separated only by an -interval of two or three years.] - -[Footnote 37: We find interesting information, in the letters of -Cicero, respecting the _librarii_ or copyists whom he had in his -service; and the still more numerous and effective band of _librarii_ -and _anagnostæ_: (slaves, mostly home-born) whom his friend Atticus -possessed and trained (Corn. Nep., Vit. Attici, c. 13). See Epist. ad -Attic. xii. 6; xiii. 21-44; v. 12 seq. - -It appears that many of the compositions of Cicero were copied, -prepared for publication, and published, by the _librarii_ of Atticus: -who, in the case of the _Academica_, incurred a loss, because -Cicero--after having given out the work to be copied and published, and -after progress had been made in doing this--thought fit to alter -materially both the form and the speakers introduced (xiii. 13). In -regard to the Oration pro Ligario, Atticus sold it well, and brought -himself home ("Ligarianam præclaré vendidisti: posthac, quicquid -scripsero, tibi præconium deferam," xiii. 12). Cicero (xiii. 21) -compares the relation of Atticus towards himself, with that of -Hermodôrus towards Plato, as expressed in the Greek verse, -[Greek: lo/goisin E(rmo/dôros [e)mporeu/etai]]. (Suidas, s, v. -[Greek: lo/goisin E(rm. e)mp].) - -Private friends, such as Balbus and Cærellia (xiii. 21), considered it -a privilege to be allowed to take copies of his compositions at their -own cost, through _librarii_ employed for the purpose. And we find -Galen enumerating this among the noble and dignified ways for an -opulent man to expend money, in a remarkable passage, [Greek: ble/pô -ga\r se ou)de\ pro\s ta\ kala\ tô=n e)/rgôn dapanê=sai tolmô=nta, mêd' -ei)s bibli/ôn ô)nê\n kai\ kataskeuê\n kai\ tô=n grapho/ntôn a)/skêsin, -ê)/toi ge ei)s ta/chos dia\ sêmei/ôn, ê)\ ei)s kalô=n a)kri/beian, -ô(/sper ou)de\ tô=n a)naginôsko/ntôn o)rthô=s]. (De Cognoscendis -Curandisque Animi Morbis, t. v. p. 48, Kühn.)] - -[Footnote 38: Galen, Comm. ad Hippokrat. [Greek: E)pidêmi/as], vol. -xvii. p. 606, 607, ed. Kühn. - -Lykurgus, the contemporary of Demosthenes as an orator, conspicuous -for many years in the civil and financial administration of Athens, -caused a law to be passed, enacting that an official MS. should be -made of the plays of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides. No permission -was granted to represent any of these dramas at the Dionysiac -festival, except upon condition that the applicant and the actors whom -he employed, should compare the MS. on which they intended to proceed, -with the official MS. in the hands of the authorised secretary. The -purpose was to prevent arbitrary amendments or omissions in these -plays, at the pleasure of [Greek: u(pokri/tai]. - -Ptolemy Euergetes borrowed from the Athenians these public and -official MSS. of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides on the plea that -he wished to have exact copies of them taken at Alexandria, and under -engagement to restore them as soon as this was done. He deposited with -them the prodigious sum of fifteen talents, as a guarantee for the -faithful restitution. When he got the MSS. at Alexandria, he caused -copies of them to be taken on the finest paper. He then sent these -copies to Athens, keeping the originals for the Alexandrine library; -desiring the Athenians to retain the deposit of fifteen talents for -themselves. Ptolemy Euergetes here pays, not merely the cost of the -finest copying, but fifteen talents besides, for the possession of -official MSS. of the three great Athenian tragedians; whose works in -other manuscripts must have been in the library long before. - -Respecting these official MSS. of the three great tragedians, prepared -during the administration and under the auspices of the rhetor -Lykurgus, see Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 841, also Boeckh, Græcæ -Tragoed. Principia, pp. 13-15. The time when Lykurgus caused this to -be done, must have been nearly coincident with the decease of Plato, -347 B.C. See Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. i. p. 468, -ii. p. 244; Welcker, Griech. Trag. iii. p. 908; Korn, De Publico -Æschyli, &c., Exemplari, Lykurgo Auctore Confecto, p. 6-9, Bonn, 1863. - -In the passage cited above from Galen, we are farther informed, that -Ptolemy Euergetes caused inquiries to be made, from the masters of all -vessels which came to Alexandria, whether there were any MSS. on -board; if there were, the MSS. were brought to the library, carefully -copied out, and the copies given to the owners; the original MSS. -being retained in the library, and registered in a -separate compartment, under the general head of [Greek: Ta\ e)k -ploi/ôn], and with the name of the person from whom the acquisition -had been made, annexed. Compare Wolf, Prolegg. ad Homerum, p. clxxv. -These statements tend to show the care taken by the Alexandrine -librarians, not only to acquire the best MSS., but also to keep good -MSS. apart from bad, and to record the person and the quarter from -which each acquisition had been made.] - -[Side-note: Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring -good MSS.] - -We cannot doubt that Demetrius could obtain permission, if he asked -it, from the Scholarchs, to have such copies made. To them the -operation was at once complimentary and lucrative; while among the -Athenian philosophers generally, the name of Demetrius was acceptable, -from the favour which he had shown to them during his season of -political power--and that of Ptolemy popular from his liberalities. Or -if we even suppose that Demetrius, instead of obtaining copies of the -Platonic MSS. from the school, purchased copies from private persons -or book-sellers (as he must have purchased the works of Demokritus and -others)--he could, at any rate, assure himself of the authenticity of -what he purchased, by information from the Scholarch. - -[Side-note: Catalogue of Platonic works, prepared by Aristophanes, is -trustworthy.] - -My purpose, in thus calling attention to the Platonic school and the -Alexandrine Museum, is to show that the chance for preservation of -Plato's works complete and genuine after his decease, was unusually -favourable. I think that they existed complete and genuine in the -Alexandrine Museum before the time of Kallimachus, and, of course, -during that of Aristophanes. If there were in the Museum any other -works obtained from private vendors and professing to be Platonic, -Kallimachus and Aristophanes had the means of distinguishing these -from such as the Platonic school had furnished and could authenticate, -and motive enough for keeping them apart from the certified Platonic -catalogue. Whether there existed any spurious works of this sort in -the Museum, Diogenes Laertius does not tell us; nor, unfortunately, -does he set forth the full list of those which Aristophanes, -recognising as Platonic, distributed either in triplets or in units. -Diogenes mentions only the principle of distribution adopted, and a -select portion of the compositions distributed. But as far as his -positive information goes, I hold it to be perfectly worthy of trust. -I consider that all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes as -works of Plato are unquestionably such; and that his testimony greatly -strengthens our assurance for the received catalogue, in many of those -items which have been most contested by critics, upon supposed -internal grounds. Aristophanes authenticates, among others, not merely -the Leges, but also the Epinomis, the Minos, and the Epistolæ. - -[Side-note: No canonical or exclusive order of the Platonic dialogues, -when arranged by Aristophanes.] - -There is another point also which I conceive to be proved by what we -hear about Aristophanes. He (or Kallimachus before him) introduced a -new order or distribution of his own--the Trilogies--founded on the -analogy of the dramatic Didaskalies. This shows that the Platonic -dialogues were not received into the library in any canonical or -_exclusive order_ of their own, or in any interdependence as first, -second, third, &c., essential to render them intelligible as a system. -Had there been any such order, Kallimachus and Aristophanes would no -more have altered it, than they would have transposed the order of the -books in the Republic and Leges. The importance of what is here -observed will appear presently, when we touch upon the theory of -Schleiermacher. - -[Side-note: Other libraries and literary centres, besides Alexandria, -in which spurious Platonic works might get footing.] - -The distributive arrangement, proposed or sanctioned by Aristophanes, -applied (as I have already remarked) to the materials in the -Alexandrine library only. But this library, though it was the most -conspicuous portion, was not the whole, of the Grecian literary -aggregate. There were other great regal libraries (such as those of -the kings of Pergamus and the Seleukid kings[39]) commenced after the -Alexandrine library had already attained importance, and intended to -rival it: there was also an active literary and philosophising class, -in various Grecian cities, of which Athens was the foremost, but in -which Rhodes, Kyrênê, and several cities in Asia Minor, Kilikia, and -Syria, were included: ultimately the cultivated classes at Rome, and -the Western Hellenic city of Massalia, became comprised in the number. -Among this widespread literary public, there were persons who neither -knew nor examined the Platonic school or the Alexandrine library, nor -investigated what title either of them had to furnish a certificate -authenticating the genuine works of Plato. It is not certain that even -the great library at Pergamus, begun nearly half a century after that -of Alexandria, had any such initiatory agent as Demetrius Phalereus, -able as well as willing to go to the fountain-head of Platonism at -Athens: nor could the kings of Pergamus claim aid from Alexandria, -with which they were in hostile rivalry, and from which they were even -forbidden (so we hear) to purchase papyrus. Under these circumstances, -it is quite possible that spurious Platonic writings, though they -obtained no recognition in the Alexandrine library, might obtain more -or less recognition elsewhere, and pass under the name of Plato. To a -certain extent, such was the case. There existed some spurious -dialogues at the time when Thrasyllus afterwards formed his -arrangement. - -[Footnote 39: The library of Antiochus the Great or of his -predecessor, is mentioned by Suidas, [Greek: Eu)phori/ôn]. Euphorion -was librarian of it, seemingly about 230-220 B.C. See Clinton, Fast. -Hell. B.C. 221. - -Galen states (Comm. in Hippok. De Nat. Hom. vol. xv. p. 105, Kühn) -that the forgeries of books, and the practice of tendering books for -sale under the false names of celebrated authors, did not commence -until the time when the competition between the kings of Egypt and the -kings of Pergamus for their respective libraries became vehement. If -this be admitted, there could have been no forgeries tendered at -Alexandria until after the commencement of the reign of Euergetes -(B.C. 247-222): for the competition from Pergamus could hardly have -commenced earlier than 230 B.C. In the times of Soter and -Philadelphus, there would be no such forgeries tendered. I do not -doubt that such forgeries were sometimes successfully passed off:** but -I think Galen does not take sufficient account of the practice -(mentioned by himself) at the Alexandrine library, to keep faithful -record of the person and quarter from whence each book had been -acquired.] - -[Side-note: Other critics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different -arrangements of the Platonic dialogues.] - -Moreover the distribution made by Aristophanes of the Platonic -dialogues into Trilogies, and the order of priority which he -established among them was by no means universally accepted. Some -rejected altogether the dramatic analogy of Trilogies as a principle -of distribution. They arranged the dialogues into three classes:[40] -1. The Direct, or purely dramatic. 2. The Indirect, or narrative -(diegematic). 3. The Mixed--partly one, partly the other. Respecting -the order of priority, we read that while Aristophanes placed the -Republic first, there were eight other arrangements, each recognising -a different dialogue as first in order; these eight were, Alkibiades -I., Theagês, Euthyphron, Kleitophon, Timæus, Phædrus, Theætêtus, -Apology. More than one arrangement began with the Apology. Some even -selected the Epistolæ as the proper commencement for studying Plato's -works.[41] - -[Footnote 40: Diog. L. iii. 49. Schöne, in his commentary on the -Protagoras (pp. 8-12), lays particular stress on this division into -the direct or dramatic, and indirect or diegematic. He thinks it -probable, that Plato preferred one method to the other at different -periods of life: that all of one sort, and all of the other sort, come -near together in time.] - -[Footnote 41: Diog. L. iii. 62. Albinus, [Greek: Ei)sagôgê\], c. 4, in -K. F. Hermann's Appendix Platonica, p. 149.] - -[Side-note: Panætius, the Stoic--considered the Phædon to be -spurious--earliest known example of a Platonic dialogue disallowed upon -internal grounds.] - -We hear with surprise that the distinguished Stoic philosopher at -Athens, Panætius, rejected the Phædon as not being the work of -Plato.[42] It appears that he did not believe in the immortality of -the soul, and that he profoundly admired Plato; accordingly, he -thought it unworthy of so great a philosopher to waste so much logical -subtlety, poetical metaphor, and fable, in support of such a -conclusion. Probably he was also guided, in part, by one singularity -in the Phædon: it is the only dialogue wherein Plato mentions himself -in the third person.[43] If Panætius was predisposed, on other -grounds, to consider the dialogue as unworthy of Plato, he might be -induced to lay stress upon such a singularity, as showing that the -author of the dialogue must be some person other than Plato. Panætius -evidently took no pains to examine the external attestations of the -dialogue, which he would have found to be attested both by Aristotle -and by Kallimachus as the work of Plato. Moreover, whatever any one -may think of the cogency of the reasoning--the beauty of Platonic -handling and expression is manifest throughout the dialogue. This -verdict of Panætius is the earliest example handed down to us of a -Platonic dialogue disallowed on internal grounds that is, because it -appeared to the critic unworthy of Plato: and it is certainly among -the most unfortunate examples. - -[Footnote 42: See the Epigram out of the Anthology, and the extract -from the Scholia on the Categories of Aristotle, cited by Wyttenbach -in his note on the beginning of the Phædon. A more important passage -(which he has not cited) from the Scholia on Aristotle, is, that of -Asklepius on the Metaphysica, p. 991; Scholia, ed. Brandis, p. 576, a. -38. [Greek: O(/ti tou= Pla/tônos e)stin o( Phai/dôn, saphô=s o( -A)ristote/lês dêloi=--Panai/tios ga\r tis e)to/lmêse notheu=sai to\n -dia/logon. e)peidê\ ga\r e)/legen ei)=nai thnêtê\n tê\n psuchê/n, -e)bou/leto sugkataspa/sai to\n Pla/tôna; e)pei\ ou)=n e)n tô=| -Phai/dôni saphô=s a)pathanati/zei] (Plato) [Greek: tê\n logikê\n -psuchê/n, tou/tou cha/rin e)no/theuse to\n dia/logon]. Wyttenbach -vainly endeavours to elude the force of the passages cited by himself, -and to make out that the witnesses did not mean to assert that -Panætius had declared the Phædon to be spurious. One of the reasons -urged by Wyttenbach is--"Nec illud negligendum, quod dicitur [Greek: -u(po\ Panaiti/ou tino\s], à _Panætio quodam_ neque per contemptum dici -potuisse neque a Syriano neque ab hoc anonymo; quorum neuter eâ fuit -doctrinæ inopia, ut Panætii laudes et præstantiam ignoraret." But in -the Scholion of Asklepius on the Metaphysica (which passage was not -before Wyttenbach), we find the very same expression [Greek: -Panai/tio/s tis], and plainly used _per contemptum_: for Asklepius -probably considered it a manifestation of virtuous feeling to -describe, in contemptuous language, a philosopher who did not believe -in the immortality of the soul. We have only to read the still harsher -and more contemptuous language which he employs towards the -Manicheans, in another Scholion, p. 666, b. 5, Brandis. - -Favorinus said (Diog. iii. 37) that when Plato read aloud the Phædon, -Aristotle was the only person present who remained to the end: all the -other hearers went away in the middle. I have no faith in this -anecdote: I consider it, like so many others in Diogenes, as a myth: -but the invention of it indicates, that there were many persons who -had no sympathy with the Phædon, taking at the bottom the same view as -Panætius.] - -[Footnote 43: Plato, Phædon, p. 59. Plato is named also in the -Apology: but this is a report, more or less exact, of the real defence -of Sokrates.] - -[Side-note: Classification of Platonic works by the rhetor -Thrasyllus--dramatic--philosophical.] - -But the most elaborate classification of the Platonic works was that -made by Thrasyllus, in the days of Augustus or Tiberius, near to, or -shortly after, the Christian era: a rhetor of much reputation, -consulted and selected as travelling companion by the Emperor -Augustus.[44] - -[Footnote 44: Diog. L. iii. 56; Themistius, Orat. viii. ([Greek: -Pentetêriko\s]) p. 108 B. - -It appears that this classification by Thrasyllus was approved, or -jointly constructed, by his contemporary Derkyllides. (Albinus, -[Greek: Ei)sagôgê\], c. 4, p. 149, in K. F. Hermann's Appendix -Platonica.)] - -Thrasyllus adopted two different distributions of the Platonic works: -one was dramatic, the other philosophical. The two were founded on -perfectly distinct principles, and had no inherent connection with -each other; but Thrasyllus combined them together, and noted, in -regard to each dialogue, its place in the one classification as well -as in the other. - -[Side-note: Dramatic principle--Tetralogies.] - -One of these distributions was into Tetralogies, or groups of four -each. This was in substitution for the Trilogies introduced by -Aristophanes or by Kallimachus, and was founded upon the same -dramatic analogy: the dramas, which contended for the prize at the -Dionysiac festivals, having been sometimes exhibited in batches of -three, or Trilogies, sometimes in batches of four, or -Tetralogies--three tragedies, along with a satirical piece as -accompaniment. Because the dramatic writer brought forth four pieces at -a birth, it was assumed as likely that Plato would publish four dialogues -all at once. Without departing from this dramatic analogy, which seems to -have been consecrated by the authority of the Alexandrine Grammatici, -Thrasyllus gained two advantages. First, he included ALL the Platonic -compositions, whereas Aristophanes, in his Trilogies, had included -only a part, and had left the rest not grouped. Thrasyllus included -all the Platonic compositions, thirty-six in number, reckoning the -Republic, the Leges, and the Epistolæ in bulk, each as one--in nine -Tetralogies or groups of four each. Secondly, he constituted his first -tetralogy in an impressive and appropriate manner--Euthyphron, -Apology, Kriton, Phædon--four compositions really resembling a -dramatic tetralogy, and bound together by their common bearing, on the -last scenes of the life of a philosopher.[45] In Euthyphron, Sokrates -appears as having been just indicted and as thinking on his defence; -in the Apology, he makes his defence; in the Kriton, he appears as -sentenced by the legal tribunal, yet refusing to evade the sentence by -escaping from his prison; in the Phædon, we have the last dying scene -and conversation. None of the other tetralogies present an equal bond -of connection between their constituent items; but the first tetralogy -was probably intended to recommend the rest, and to justify the -system. - -[Footnote 45: Diog. L. iii. 57. [Greek: prô/tên me\n ou)=n -tetralogi/an ti/thêsi tê\n koinê\n u(po/thesin e)/chousan; paradei=xai -ga\r bou/letai o(/poiois a)\n ei)/ê o( tou= philoso/phou bi/os]. -Albinus, Introduct. ad Plat. c. 4, p. 149, in K. F. Hermann's Append. -Platon. - -Thrasyllus appears to have considered the Republic as ten dialogues -and the Leges as twelve, each book (of Republic and of Leges) -constituting a separate dialogue, so that he made the Platonic works -fifty-six in all. But for the purpose of his tetralogies he reckoned -them only as thirty-six--nine groups. - -The author of the Prolegomena [Greek: tê=s Pla/tônos Philosophi/as] in -Hermann's Append. Platon. pp. 218-219, gives the same account of the -tetralogies, and of the connecting bond which united the four** members -of the first tetralogical group: but he condemns altogether the -principle of the tetralogical division. He does not mention the name -of Thrasyllus. He lived after Proklus (p. 218), that is, after 480 -A.D. - -The argument urged by Wyttenbach and others--that Varro must have -considered the Phædon as _fourth_ in the order of the Platonic -compositions--an argument founded on a passage in Varro. L. L. vii. -37, which refers to the Phædon under the words _Plato in quarto_--this -argument becomes inapplicable in the text as given by O. Müller--not -_Varro in quarto_ but _Varro in quattuor fluminibus_, &c. Mullach -(Democriti Frag. p. 98) has tried unsuccessfully to impugn Müller's -text, and to uphold the word _quarto_ with the inference resting upon -it.] - -[Side-note: Philosophical principle--Dialogues of Search--Dialogues of -Exposition.] - -In the other distribution made by Thrasyllus,[46] Plato was regarded -not as a quasi-dramatist, but as a philosopher. The dialogues were -classified with reference partly to their method and spirit, partly to -their subject. His highest generic distinction was into:--1. Dialogues -of Investigation or Search. 2. Dialogues of Exposition or -Construction. The Dialogues of Investigation he subdivided into two -classes:--1. Gymnastic. 2. Agonistic. These were again subdivided, -each into two sub-classes; the Gymnastic, into 1. Obstetric. 2. -Peirastic. The Agonistic, into 1. Probative. 2. Refutative. Again, the -Dialogues of Exposition were divided into two classes: 1. Theoretical. -2. Practical. Each of these classes was divided into two sub-classes: -the Theoretical into 1. Physical. 2. Logical. The Practical into 1. -Ethical. 2. Political. - -[Footnote 46: The statement in Diogenes Laertius, in his life of -Plato, is somewhat obscure and equivocal; but I think it certain that -the classification which he gives in iii. 49, 50, 51, of the Platonic -dialogues, was made by Thrasyllus. It is a portion of the same -systematic arrangement as that given somewhat farther on (iii. 56-61), -which is ascribed by name to Thrasyllus, enumerating the Tetralogies. -Diogenes expressly states that Thrasyllus was the person who annexed -to each dialogue its double denomination, which it has since borne in -the published editions--[Greek: Eu)thu/phrôn--peri\ -o(si/ou--peirastiko/s]. In the Dialogues of examination or Search, one of -these names is derived from the subject, the other from the method, as in -the instance of Euthyphron just cited: in the Dialogues of Exposition -both names are derived from the subject, first the special, next the -general. [Greek: Phai/dôn, ê)\ peri\ psuchê=s, ê)thiko/s. Parmeni/dês, -ê)\ peri\ i)deô=n, logiko/s]. - -Schleiermacher (in the Einleitung prefixed to his translation of -Plato, p. 24) speaks somewhat loosely about "the well-known -dialectical distributions of the Platonic dialogues, which Diogenes -has preserved without giving the name of the author". Diogenes gives -only _one_ such dialectical (or logical) distribution; and though he -does not mention the name of Thrasyllus in direct or immediate -connection with it, we may clearly see that he is copying Thrasyllus. -This is well pointed out in an acute commentary on Schleiermacher, by -Yxem, Logos Protreptikos, Berlin, 1841, p. 12-13. - -Diogenes remarks (iii. 50) that the distribution of the dialogues into -narrative, dramatic, and mixed, is made [Greek: tragikô=s ma=llon ê)\ -philoso/phôs]. This remark would seem to apply more precisely to the -arrangement of the dialogues into trilogies and tetralogies. His word -[Greek: philoso/phôs] belongs very justly to the logical distribution -of Thrasyllus, apart from the tetralogies. - -Porphyry tells us that Plotinus did not bestow any titles upon his own -discourses. The titles were bestowed by his disciples; who did not -always agree, but gave different titles to the same discourse -(Porphyry, Vit. Plotin. 4).] - -The following table exhibits this philosophical classification of -Thrasyllus:-- - -Table I. - -PHILOSOPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKS OF PLATO BY THRASYLLUS. - -I. Dialogues of Investigation. II. Dialogues of Exposition. - -_Searching Dialogues_. _Guiding Dilogues_ -[Greek: Zêtêtikoi/]. [Greek: U(phêgêtikoi/]. - - - I. Dialogues of investigation. - - Gymnastic. Agonistic. - -[Greek: -Maieutikoi/. Peirastikoi/. E)ndeiktikoi/. A)natreptikpoi/.] - -Obstetric. Peirastic. Probative. Refutative. - ---- ---- ---- ---- -Alkibiades I. Charmidês. Protagoras. Euthydêmus. -Alkibiades II. Menon. Gorgias. -Theagês. Ion. Hippias I. -Lachês. Euthyphron. Hippias II. -Lysis. - - II. Dialogues of Exposition. - - - Theoretical. Practical - -[Greek: -Phusikoi/. Logikoi/. Ê)thikoi/. Politikoi/.] - -Physical Logical. Ethical. Political. - ---- ---- ---- ---- - -Timæus. Kratylus. Apology. Republic. - Sophistês. Kriton. Kritias. - Politikus. Phædon. Minos. - Parmenidês. Phædrus. Leges. - Theætêtus. Symposion. Epinomis. - Menexenus. - Kleitophon. - Epistolæ. - Philêbus. - Hipparchus. - Rivales. - -I now subjoin a second Table, containing the Dramatic Distribution of -the Platonic Dialogues, with the Philosophical Distribution combined -or attached to it. - -Table II. - -DRAMATIC DISTRIBUTION. PLATONIC DIALOGUES, AS ARRANGED IN TETRALOGIES -BY THRASYLLUS. - - Tetralogy 1. - -1. Euthyphron On Holiness Peirastic or Testing. -2. Apology of Sokrates Ethical Ethical. -3. Kriton On Duty in Action Ethical. -4. Phædon On the Soul Ethical. - - 2. - -1. Kratylus On Rectitude in Naming Logical. -2. Theætêtus On Knowledge Logical. -3. Sophistês On Ens or the Existent Logical. -4. Politikus On the Art of Governing Logical. - - 3. - -1. Parmenidês On Ideas Logical. -2. Philêbus On Pleasure Ethical. -3. Symposion On Good Ethical. -4. Phædrus On Love Ethical. - - 4. - -1. Alkibiadês I On the Nature of Man Obstetric or Evolving. -2. Alkibiadês II On Prayer Obstetric. -3. Hipparchus On the Love of Gain. Ethical. -4. Erastæ On Philosophy Ethical. - - 5. - -1. Theagês On Philosophy Obstetric. -2. Charmidês On Temperance Peirastic. -3. Lachês On Courage Obstetric. -4. Lysis On Friendship Obstetric. - - 6. - -1. Euthydêmus The Disputatious Man Refutative. -2. Protagoras The Sophists Probative. -3. Gorgias On Rhetoric Refutative. -4. Menon On Virtue Peirastic. - - 7. - -1. Hippias I On the Beautiful Refutative. -2. Hippias II On Falsehood Refutative. -3. Ion On the Iliad Peirastic. -4. Menexenus The Funeral Oration Ethical. - - 8. - -1. Kleitophon The Impulsive Ethical. -2. Republic On Justice Political. -3. Timæus On Nature Physical. -4. Kritias The Atlantid Ethical. - - 9. - -1. Minos On Law Political. -2. Leges On Legislation Political. -3. Epinomis The Night-Assembly, Political - or the Philosopher -4. Epistolæ XIII Ethical. - -The second Table, as it here stands, is given by Diogenes Laertius, -and is extracted by him probably from the work of Thrasyllus, or from -the edition of Plato as published by Thrasyllus. The reader will see -that each Platonic composition has a place assigned to it in two -classifications--1. The dramatic--2. The philosophical--each in itself -distinct and independent of the other, but here blended together. - -[Side-note: Incongruity and repugnance of the two classifications.] - -We may indeed say more. The two classifications are not only -independent, but incongruous and even repugnant. The better of the two -is only obscurely and imperfectly apprehended, because it is presented -as an appendage to the worse. The dramatic classification, which -stands in the foreground, rests upon a purely fanciful analogy, -determining preference for the number _four_. If indeed this objection -were urged against Thrasyllus, he might probably have replied that the -group of four volumes together was in itself convenient, neither too -large nor too small, for an elementary subdivision; and that the -fanciful analogy was an artifice for recommending it to the feelings, -better (after all) than selection of another number by haphazard. Be -that as it may, however, the fiction was one which Thrasyllus -inherited from Aristophanes: and it does some honour to his ability, -that he has built, upon so inconvenient a fiction, one tetralogy (the -first), really plausible and impressive.[47] But it does more honour -to his ability that he should have originated the philosophical -classification; distinguishing the dialogues by important attributes -truly belonging to each, and conducting the Platonic student to points -of view which ought to be made known to him. This classification forms -a marked improvement upon every thing (so far as we know) which -preceded it. - -[Footnote 47: It is probable that Aristophanes, in distributing Plato -into trilogies, was really influenced by the dramatic form of the -compositions to put them in a class with real dramas. But Thrasyllus -does not seem to have been influenced by such a consideration. He took -the number _four_ on its own merits, and adopted, as a way of -recommending it, the traditional analogy sanctioned by the Alexandrine -librarians. - -That such was the case, we may infer pretty clearly when we learn, -that Thrasyllus applied the same distribution (into tetralogies) to -the works of Demokritus, which were _not_ dramatic in form. (Diog. L. -ix. 45; Mullach, Democ. Frag. p. 100-107, who attempts to restore the -Thrasyllean tetralogies.) - -The compositions of Demokritus were not merely numerous, but related -to the greatest diversity of subjects. To them Thrasyllus could not -apply the same logical or philosophical distribution which he applied -to Plato. He published, along with the works of Demokritus, a preface, -which he entitled [Greek: Ta\ pro\ tê=s a)nagnô/seôs tô=n Dêmokri/tou -bibli/ôn] (Diog. L. ix. 41). - -Porphyry tells us, that when he undertook, as literary executor, the -arrangement and publication of the works of his deceased master -Plotinus, he found fifty-four discourses: which he arranged into six -Enneads or groups of nine each. He was induced to prefer this -distribution, by regard to the perfection of the number six ([Greek: -teleio/têti]). He placed in each Ennead discourses akin to each other, -or on analogous subjects (Porphyry, Vit. Plotin. 24).] - -[Side-note: Dramatic principle of classification--was inherited by -Thrasyllus from Aristophanes.] - -[Side-note: Authority of the Alexandrine library--editions of Plato -published, with the Alexandrine critical marks.] - -That Thrasyllus followed Aristophanes in the principle of his -classification, is manifest: that he adopted the dramatic ground and -principle of classification (while amending its details), not because -he was himself guided by it, but because he found it already in use -and sanctioned by the high authority of the Alexandrines--is also -manifest, because he himself constructed and tacked to it a better -classification, founded upon principles new and incongruous with the -dramatic. In all this we trace the established ascendancy of the -Alexandrine library and its eminent literati. Of which ascendancy a -farther illustration appears, when we read in Diogenes Laertius that -editions of Plato were published, carrying along with the text the -special marks of annotation applied by the Alexandrines to Homer and -other poets: the obelus to indicate a spurious passage, the obelus -with two dots to denote a passage which had been improperly declared -spurious, the X to signify peculiar locutions, the double line or -Diplê to mark important or characteristic opinions of Plato--and -others in like manner. A special price was paid for manuscripts of -Plato with these illustrative appendages:[48] which must have been -applied either by Alexandrines themselves, or by others trained in -their school. When Thrasyllus set himself to edit and re-distribute -the Platonic works, we may be sure that he must have consulted one or -more public libraries, either at Alexandria, Athens, Rome, Tarsus, or -elsewhere. Nowhere else could he find all the works together. Now the -proceedings ascribed to him show that he attached himself to the -Alexandrine library, and to the authority of its most eminent critics. - -[Footnote 48: Diog. L. iii. 65, 66. [Greek: E)pei\ de\ kai\ sêmei=a/ -tina toi=s bibli/ois au)tou= parati/thetai, phe/re kai\ peri\ tou/tôn -ti ei)/pômen], &c. He then proceeds to enumerate the [Greek: sêmei=a]. - -It is important to note that Diogenes cites this statement (respecting -the peculiar critical marks appended to manuscripts of the Platonic -works) from Antigonus of Karystus in his Life of Zeno the Stoic. Now -the date of Antigonus is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in B.C. 225, -before the death of Ptolemy III. Euergetes (see Fasti Hellen. B.C. -225, also Appendix, 12, 80). Antigonus must thus have been -contemporary both with Kallimachus and with Aristophanes of Byzantium: -he notices the marked manuscripts of Plato as something newly -edited--[Greek: neôsti\ e)kdothe/nta]): and we may thus see that the work -of critical marking must have been performed either by Kallimachus and -Aristophanes themselves (one or both) or by some of their -contemporaries. Among the titles of the lost treatises of Kallimachus, -one is--about the [Greek: glô=ssai] or peculiar phrases of Demokritus. -It is therefore noway improbable that Kallimachus should have bestowed -attention upon the peculiarities of the Platonic text, and the -inaccuracies of manuscripts. The library had probably acquired several -different manuscripts of the Platonic compositions, as it had of the -Iliad and Odyssey, and of the Attic tragedies.] - -[Side-note: Thrasyllus followed the Alexandrine library and -Aristophanes, as to genuine Platonic works.] - -Probably it was this same authority that Thrasyllus followed in -determining which were the real works of Plato, and in setting aside -pretended works. He accepted the collection of Platonic compositions -sanctioned by Aristophanes and recognised as such in the Alexandrine -library. As far as our positive knowledge goes, it fully bears out -what is here stated: all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes -(unfortunately Diogenes does not give a complete enumeration of those -which he recognised) are to be found in the catalogue of Thrasyllus. -And the evidentiary value of this fact is so much the greater, because -the most questionable compositions (I mean, those which modern critics -reject or even despise) are expressly included in the recognition of -Aristophanes, and passed from him to Thrasyllus--Leges, Epinomis, -Minos, Epistolæ, Sophistês, Politikus. Exactly on those points on -which the authority of Thrasyllus requires to be fortified against -modern objectors, it receives all the support which coincidence with -Aristophanes can impart. When we know that Thrasyllus adhered to -Aristophanes on so many disputable points of the catalogue, we may -infer pretty certainly that he adhered to him in the remainder. In -regard to the question, Which were Plato's genuine works? it was -perfectly natural that Thrasyllus should accept the recognition of the -greatest library then existing: a library, the written records of -which could be traced back to Demetrius Phalereus. He followed this -external authority: he did not take each dialogue to pieces, to try -whether it conformed to a certain internal standard--a "platonisches -Gefühl"--of his own. - -[Side-note: Ten spurious dialogues, rejected by all other critics as -well as by Thrasyllus--evidence that these critics followed the common -authority of the Alexandrine library.] - -That the question between genuine and spurious Platonic dialogues was -tried in the days of Thrasyllus, by external authority and not by -internal feeling--we may see farther by the way in which Diogenes -Laertius speaks of the spurious dialogues. "The following dialogues -(he says) are declared to be spurious _by common consent_: 1. Eryxias -or Erasistratus. 2. Akephali or Sisyphus. 3. Demodokus. 4. Axiochus. -5. Halkyon. 6. Midon or Hippotrophus. 7. Phæakes. 8. Chelidon. 9. -Hebdomê. 10. Epimenides."[49] There was, then, unanimity, so far as -the knowledge of Diogenes Laertius reached, as to genuine and -spurious. All the critics whom he valued, Thrasyllus among them, -pronounced the above ten dialogues to be spurious: all of them agreed -also in accepting the dialogues in the list of Thrasyllus as -genuine.[50] Of course the ten spurious dialogues must have been -talked of by some persons, or must have got footing in some editions -or libraries, as real works of Plato: otherwise there could have been -no trial had or sentence passed upon them. But what Diogenes affirms -is, that Thrasyllus and all the critics whose opinion he esteemed, -concurred in rejecting them. We may surely presume that this unanimity -among the critics, both as to all that they accepted and all that they -rejected, arose from common acquiescence in the authority of the -Alexandrine library.[51] The ten rejected dialogues were not in the -Alexandrine library--or at least not among the rolls therein -recognised as Platonic. - -[Footnote 49: Diog. L. iii. 62: [Greek: notheu/ontai de\ tô=n -dialo/gôn o(mologoume/nôs]. - -Compare Prolegomena [Greek: tê=s Pla/tônos Philosophi/as], in -Hermann's Appendix Platonica, p. 219.] - -[Footnote 50: It has been contended by some modern critics, that -Thrasyllus himself doubted whether the Hipparchus was Plato's work. -When I consider that dialogue, I shall show that there is no adequate -ground for believing that Thrasyllus doubted its genuineness.] - -[Footnote 51: Diogenes (ix. 49) uses the same phrase in regard to the -spurious works ascribed to Demokritus, [Greek: ta\ d' o(mologoume/nôs -e)sti\n a)llo/tria]. And I believe that he means the same thing by it: -that the works alluded to were not recognised in the Alexandrine -library as belonging to Demokritus, and were accordingly excluded from -the tetralogies (of Demokritus) prepared by Thrasyllus.] - -[Side-note: Thrasyllus did not follow an internal sentiment of his own -in rejecting dialogues as spurious.] - -If Thrasyllus and the others did not proceed upon this evidence in -rejecting the ten dialogues, and did not find in them any marks of -time such as to exclude the supposition of Platonic authorship--they -decided upon what is called internal evidence: a critical sentiment, -which satisfied them that these dialogues did not possess the Platonic -character, style, manner, doctrines, merits, &c. Now I think it highly -improbable that Thrasyllus could have proceeded upon any such -sentiment. For when we survey the catalogue of works which he -recognised as genuine, we see that it includes the widest diversity of -style, manner, doctrine, purpose, and merits: that the disparate -epithets, which he justly applies to discriminate the various -dialogues, cannot be generalised so as to leave any intelligible -"Platonic character" common to all. Now since Thrasyllus reckoned -among the genuine works of Plato, compositions so unlike, and so -unequal in merit, as the Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Lysis, -Parmenidês, Symposion, Philêbus, Menexenus, Leges, Epinomis, -Hipparchus, Minos, Theagês, Epistolæ, &c., not to mention a -composition obviously unfinished, such as the Kritias--he could have -little scruple in believing that Plato also composed the Eryxias, -Sisyphus, Demodokus, and Halkyon. These last-mentioned dialogues still -exist, and can be appreciated.[52] Allowing, for the sake of argument, -that we are entitled to assume our own sense of worth as a test of -what is really Plato's composition, it is impossible to deny, that if -these dialogues are not worthy of the author of Republic and -Protagoras, they are at least worthy of the author of the Leges, -Epinomis, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Accordingly, if the internal -sentiment of Thrasyllus did not lead him to reject these last four, -neither would it lead him to reject the Eryxias, Sisyphus, and -Halkyon. I conclude therefore that if he, and all the other critics -whom Diogenes esteemed, agreed in rejecting the ten dialogues as -spurious--their verdict depended not upon any internal sentiment, but -upon the authority of the Alexandrine library.[53] - -[Footnote 52: The Axiochus, Eryxias, Sisyphus, and Demodokus, are -printed as Apocrypha annexed to most editions of Plato, together with -two other dialogues entitled De Justo and De Virtute. The Halkyon has -generally appeared among the works of Lucian, but K. F. Hermann has -recently printed it in his edition of Plato among the Platonic -Apocrypha. - -The Axiochus contains a mark of time (the mention of [Greek: -A)kadêmi/a] and [Greek: Lukei=on], p. 367), as F. A. Wolf has -observed, proving that it was not composed until the Platonic and -Peripatetic schools were both of them in full establishment at -Athens--that is, certainly after the death of Plato, and probably after -the death of Aristotle. It is possible that Thrasyllus may have proceeded -upon this evidence of time, at least as collateral proof, in -pronouncing the dialogue not to be the work of Plato. The other four -dialogues contain no similar evidence of date. - -Favorinus affirmed that Halkyon was the work of an author named Leon. - -Some said (Diog. L. iii. 37) that Philippus of Opus, one of the -disciples of Plato, transcribed the Leges, which were on waxen tablets -([Greek: e)n kêrô=|]), and that the Epinomis was his work ([Greek: -tou/tou de\ kai\ tê\n E)pinomi/da phasi\n ei)=nai]). It was probably -the work of Philippus only in the sense in which the Leges were his -work--that he made a fair and durable copy of parts of it from the -wax. Thrasyllus admitted it with the rest as Platonic.] - -[Footnote 53: Mullach (Democr. Fragm. p. 100) accuses Thrasyllus of an -entire want of critical sentiment, and pronounces his catalogue to be -altogether without value as an evidence of genuine Platonic -works--because Thrasyllus admits many dialogues, "quos doctorum nostri -sæculi virorum acumen è librorum Platonicorum numero exemit". - -This observation exactly illustrates the conclusion which I desire to -bring out. I admit that Thrasyllus had a critical sentiment different -from that of the modern Platonic commentators; but I believe that in -the present case he proceeded upon other evidence--recognition by the -Alexandrine library. My difference with Mullach is, that I consider -this recognition (in a question of genuine or spurious) as more -trustworthy evidence than the critical sentiment of modern literati.] - -[Side-note: Results as to the trustworthiness of the Thrasyllean -Canon.] - -On this question, then, of the Canon of Plato's works (as compared -with the works of other contemporary authors) recognised by -Thrasyllus--I consider that its claim to trustworthiness is very high, -as including all the genuine works, and none but the genuine works, of -Plato: the following facts being either proved, or fairly presumable. - -1. The Canon rests on the authority of the Alexandrine library and its -erudite librarians;[54] whose written records went back to the days of -Ptolemy Soter, and Demetrius Phalereus, within a generation after the -death of Plato. - -2. The manuscripts of Plato at his death were preserved in the school -which he founded; where they continued for more than thirty years -under the care of Speusippus and Xenokrates, who possessed personal -knowledge of all that Plato had really written. After Xenokrates, they -came under the care of Polemon and the succeeding Scholarchs, from -whom Demetrius Phalereus probably obtained permission to take copies -of them for the nascent museum or library at Alexandria or through -whom at least (if he purchased from booksellers) he could easily -ascertain which were Plato's works, and which, if any, were spurious. - -3. They were received into that library without any known canonical -order, prescribed system, or interdependence essential to their being -properly understood. Kallimachus or Aristophanes devised an order of -arrangement for themselves, such as they thought suitable. - -[Footnote 54: Suckow adopts and defends the opinion here stated--that -Thrasyllus, in determining which were the genuine works of Plato and -which were not genuine, was guided mainly by the authority of the -Alexandrine library and librarians (G. F. W. Suckow, Form der -Platonischen Schriften, pp. 170-175). Ueberweg admits this opinion as -just (Untersuchungen, p. 195). - -Suckow farther considers (p. 175) that the catalogue of works of -esteemed authors, deposited in the Alexandrine library, may be -regarded as dating from the [Greek: Pi/nakes] of Kallimachus. - -This goes far to make out the presumption which I have endeavoured to -establish in favour of the Canon recognised by Thrasyllus, which, -however, these two authors do not fully admit. - -K. F. Hermann, too (see Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 44), -argues sometimes strongly in favour of this presumption, though -elsewhere he entirely departs from it.] - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - -PLATONIC CANON AS APPRECIATED AND MODIFIED BY MODERN CRITICS. - - -[Side-note: The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally -acknowledged, by the Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the -succeeding critics after the revival of learning.] - -The Platonic Canon established by Thrasyllus maintained its authority -until the close of the last century, in regard to the distinction -between what was genuine and spurious. The distribution indeed did not -continue to be approved: the Tetralogies were neglected, and the order -of the dialogues varied: moreover, doubts were intimated about -Kleitophon and Epinomis. But nothing was positively removed from, or -positively added to, the total recognised by Thrasyllus. The -Neo-Platonists (from the close of the second century B.C., down to the -beginning of the sixth A.D.) introduced a new, mystic, and theological -interpretation, which often totally changed and falsified Plato's -meaning. Their principles of interpretation would have been strange -and unintelligible to the rhetors Thrasyllus and Dionysius of -Halikarnassus--or to the Platonic philosopher Charmadas, who expounded -Plato to Marcus Crassus at Athens. But they still continued to look -for Plato in the nine Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, in each and all of -them. So also continued Ficinus, who, during the last half of the -fifteenth century, did so much to revive in the modern world the study -of Plato. He revived along with it the neo-platonic interpretation. -The Argumenta, prefixed to the different dialogues by Ficinus, are -remarkable, as showing what an ingenious student, interpreting in that -spirit, discovered in them. - -But the scholars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth -centuries, speaking generally--though not neglecting these -neo-platonic refinements, were disposed to seek out, wherever they could -find it, a more literal interpretation of the Platonic text, correctly -presented and improved. The next great edition of the works of Plato -was published by Serranus and Stephens, in the latter portion of the -sixteenth century. - -[Side-note: Serranus--his six Syzygies--left the aggregate Canon -unchanged, Tennemann--importance assigned to the Phædrus.] - -Serranus distributed the dialogues of Plato into six groups which he -called Syzygies. In his first Syzygy were comprised Euthyphron, -Apologia, Kriton, Phædon (coinciding with the first Tetralogy of -Thrasyllus), as setting forth the defence of Sokrates and of his -doctrine. The second Syzygy included the dialogues introductory to -philosophy generally, and impugning the Sophists--Theagês, Erastæ, -Theætêtus, Sophistês, Euthydêmus, Protagoras, Hippias II. In the third -Syzygy were three dialogues considered as bearing on Logic--Kratylus, -Gorgias, Ion. The fourth Syzygy contained the dialogues on Ethics -generally--Philêbus, Menon, Alkibiadês I.; on special points of -Ethics--Alkibiadês II., Charmidês, Lysis, Hipparchus; and on -Politics--Menexenus, Politikus, Minos, Republic, Leges, Epinomis. The -fifth Syzygy included the dialogues on Physics, and Metaphysics (or -Theology)--Timæus, Kritias, Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædrus, Hippias -I.** In the sixth Syzygy were ranged the thirteen Epistles, the various -dialogues which Serranus considered spurious (Kleitophon among them, -which he regarded as doubtful), and the Definitions. - -Serranus, while modifying the distribution of the Platonic works, left -the entire Canon very much as he found it. So it remained throughout -the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the scholars who devoted -themselves to Plato were content with improvement of the text, -philological illustration, and citations from the ancient -commentators. But the powerful impulse, given by Kant to the -speculative mind of Europe during the last quarter of the eighteenth -century, materially affected the point of view from which Plato was -regarded. Tennemann, both in his System of the Platonic Philosophy, -and in dealing with Plato as a portion of his general history of -philosophy, applied the doctrines of Kant largely and even excessively -to the exposition of ancient doctrines. Much of his comment is -instructive, greatly surpassing his predecessors. Without altering the -Platonic Canon, he took a new view of the general purposes of Plato, -and especially he brought forward the dialogue Phædrus into a -prominence which had never before belonged to it, as an index or -key-note ([Greek: e)ndo/simon]) to the whole Platonic series. Shortly -after Tennemann, came Schleiermacher, who introduced a theory of his -own, ingenious as well as original, which has given a new turn to all -the subsequent Platonic criticism. - -[Side-note: Schleiermacher--new theory about the purposes of Plato. -One philosophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the -beginning--essential order and interdependence of the dialogues, as -contributing to the full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not -constituent items in the series, but lying alongside of it. Order of -arrangement.] - -Schleiermacher begins by assuming two fundamental postulates, both -altogether new. 1. A systematic unity of philosophic theme and -purpose, conceived by Plato in his youth, at first -obscurely--afterwards worked out through successive dialogues; each -dialogue disclosing the same purpose, but the later disclosing it more -clearly and fully, until his old age. 2. A peremptory, exclusive, and -intentional order by Plato of the dialogues, composed by Plato with a -view to the completion of this philosophical scheme. Schleiermacher -undertakes to demonstrate what this order was, and to point out the -contribution brought by each successive dialogue to the accomplishment -of Plato's premeditated scheme. - -To those who understand Plato, the dialogues themselves reveal (so -Schleiermacher affirms) their own essential order of sequence--their -own mutual relations of antecedent and consequent. Each presupposes -those which go before: each prepares for those which follow. -Accordingly, Schleiermacher distributes the Platonic dialogues into -three groups: the first, or elementary, beginning with Phædrus, -followed by Lysis, Protagoras, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron, -Parmenidês: the second, or preparatory, comprising Gorgias, Theætêtus, -Menon, Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, Symposion, Phædon, -Philêbus: the third, or constructive, including Republic, Timæus, and -Kritias. These groups or files are all supposed to be marshalled under -Platonic authority: both the entire files as first, second, third and -the dialogues composing each file, carrying their own place in the -order, imprinted in visible characters. But to each file, there is -attached what Schleiermacher terms an Appendix, containing one or more -dialogues, each a composition by itself, and lying not in the series, -but alongside of it (Nebenwerke). The Appendix to the first file -includes Apologia, Kriton, Ion, Hippias II., Hipparchus, Minos, -Alkibiadês II. The Appendix to the second file consists of Theagês, -Erastæ, Alkibiadês I., Menexenus, Hippias I., Kleitophon. That of the -third file consists of the Leges. The Appendix is not supposed to -imply any common positive character in the dialogues which it -includes, but simply the negative attribute of not belonging to the -main philosophical column, besides a greater harmony with the file to -which it is attached than with the other two files. Some dialogues -assigned to the Appendixes are considered by Schleiermacher as -spurious; some however he treats as compositions on special occasions, -or adjuncts to the regular series. To this latter category belong the -Apologia, Kriton, and Leges. Schleiermacher considers the Charmidês to -have been composed during the time of the Anarchy, B.C. 404: the -Phædrus (earliest of all), in Olymp. 93 (B.C. 406), two years -before:[1] the Lysis, Protagoras, and Lachês, to lie between them in -respect of date. - -[Footnote 1: Schleierm. vol. i. p. 72; vol. ii. p. 8.] - -[Side-note: Theory of Ast--he denies the reality of any preconceived -scheme--considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas.] - -Such is the general theory of Schleiermacher, which presents to us -Plato in the character of a Demiurgus, contemplating from the first an -Idea of philosophy, and constructing a series of dialogues (like a -Kosmos of Schleiermacher), with the express purpose of giving -embodiment to it as far as practicable. We next come to Ast, who -denies this theory altogether. According to Ast, there never was any -philosophical system, to the exposition and communication of which -each successive dialogue was deliberately intended to contribute: -there is no scientific or intentional connection between the -dialogues,--no progressive arrangement of first and second, of -foundation and superstructure: there is no other unity or connecting -principle between them than that which they involve as all emanating -from the same age, country, and author, and the same general view of -the world (Welt-Ansicht) or critical estimate of man and nature.[2] -The dialogues are dramatic (Ast affirms), not merely in their external -form, but in their internal character: each is in truth a -philosophical drama.[3] Their purpose is very diverse and many-sided: -we mistake if we imagine the philosophical purpose to stand alone. If -that were so (Ast argues), how can we explain the fact, that in most -of the dialogues there is no philosophical result at all? Nothing but -a discussion without definite end, which leaves every point -unsettled.[4] Plato is poet, artist, philosopher, blended in one. He -does not profess to lay down positive opinions. Still less does he -proclaim his own opinions as exclusive orthodoxy, to be poured -ready-prepared into the minds of recipient pupils. He seeks to urge the -pupils to think and investigate for themselves. He employs the form of -dialogue, as indispensable to generate in their minds this impulse of -active research, and to arm them with the power of pursuing it -effectively.[5] But each Platonic dialogue is a separate composition -in itself, and each of the greater dialogues is a finished and -symmetrical whole, like a living organism.[6] - -[Footnote 2: Ast, Leben und Schriften Platon's, p. 40.] - -[Footnote 3: Ast, ib. p. 46.] - -[Footnote 4: Ast, ibid. p. 89.] - -[Footnote 5: Ast, ib. p. 42.] - -[Footnote 6: The general view here taken by Ast--dwelling upon the -separate individuality as well as upon the dramatic character of each -dialogue--calling attention to the purpose of intellectual -stimulation, and of reasoning out different aspects of ethical and -dialectical questions, as distinguished from endoctrinating purpose--this -general view coincides more nearly with my own than that of any -other critic. But Ast does not follow it out consistently. If he were -consistent with it, he ought to be more catholic than other critics, -in admitting a large and undefinable diversity in the separate -Platonic manifestations: instead of which, he is the most sweeping of -all repudiators, on internal grounds. He is not even satisfied with -the Parmenides as it now stands; he insists that what is now the -termination was not the real and original termination; but that Plato -must have appended to the dialogue an explanation of its [Greek: -a)pori/ai], puzzles, and antinomies; which explanation is now lost.] - -[Side-note: His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen -dialogues as genuine, rejecting all the rest.] - -Though Ast differs thus pointedly from Schleiermacher in the -enunciation of his general principle, yet he approximates to him more -nearly when he comes to detail: for he recognises three classes of -dialogues, succeeding each other in a chronological order verifiable -(as he thinks) by the dialogues themselves. His first class (in which -he declares the poetical and dramatic element to be predominant) -consists of Protagoras, Phædrus, Gorgias, Phædon. His second class, -distinguished by the dialectic element, includes Theætêtus, Sophistês, -Politikus, Parmenidês, Kratylus. His third class, wherein the poetical -and dialectic element are found both combined, embraces Philêbus, -Symposion, Republic, Timæus, Kritias. These fourteen dialogues, in -Ast's view, constitute the whole of the genuine Platonic works. All -the rest he pronounces to be spurious. He rejects Leges, Epinomis, -Menon, Euthydêmus, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Alkibiades I. and II., -Hippias I. and II., Ion, Erastæ, Theages, Kleitophon, Apologia, -Kriton, Minos, Epistolæ--together with all the other dialogues which -were rejected in antiquity by Thrasyllus. Lastly, Ast considers the -Protagoras to have been composed in 408 B.C., when Plato was not more -than 21 years of age--the Phædrus in 407 B.C.--the Gorgias in 404 -B.C.[7] - -[Footnote 7: Ast, Leben und Schriften Platon's, p. 376.] - -[Side-note: Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme--his -arrangement of the dialogues, differing from both Ast and -Schleiermacher--he rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, -Politikus, Kritias, with many others.] - -Socher agrees with Ast in rejecting the fundamental hypothesis of -Schleiermacher--that of a preconceived scheme systematically worked -out by Plato. But on many points he differs from Ast no less than from -Schleiermacher. He assigns the earliest Platonic composition (which he -supposes to be Theagês), to a date preceding the battle of Arginusæ, -in 406 B.C., when Plato was about 22-23 years of age.[8] Assuming it -is certain that Plato composed dialogues during the lifetime of -Sokrates, he conceives that the earliest of them would naturally be -the most purely Sokratic in respect of theme, as well as the least -copious, comprehensive, and ideal, in manner of handling. During the -six and a half years between the battle of Arginusæ and the death of -Sokrates, Socher registers the following succession of Platonic -compositions: Theagês, Lachês, Hippias II., Alkibiadês I., Dialogus de -Virtute (usually printed with the spurious, but supposed by Socher to -be a sort of preparatory sketch for the Menon), Menon, Kratylus, -Euthyphron. These three last he supposes to precede very shortly the -death of Sokrates. After that event, and very shortly after, were -composed the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon. - -[Footnote 8: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 102. These critics -adopt 429** B.C. as the year of Plato's birth: I think 427** B.C. -is the true year.] - -These eleven dialogues fill up what Socher regards as the first period -of Plato's life, ending when he was somewhat more than thirty years of -age. The second period extends to the commencement of his teaching at -the Academy, when about 41 or 42 years old (B.C. 386). In this second -period were composed Ion, Euthydêmus, Hippias I, Protagoras, -Theætêtus, Gorgias, Philêbus--in the order here set forth. During the -third period of Plato's life, continuing until he was 65 or more, he -composed Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposion, Republic, Timæus. To the -fourth and last period, that of extreme old age, belongs the -composition of the Leges.[9] - -[Footnote 9: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 301-459-460.] - -Socher rejects as spurious Hipparchus, Minos, Kleitophon, Alkibiadês -II., Erastæ, Epinomis, Epistolæ, Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, -Kritias: also Charmidês, and Lysis, these two last however not quite -so decisively. - -[Side-note: Schleiermacher and Ast both consider Phædrus and -Protagoras as early compositions--Socher puts Protagoras into the -second period, Phædrus into the third.] - -Both Ast and Schleiermacher consider Phædrus and Protagoras as among -the earliest compositions of Plato. Herein Socher dissents from them. -He puts Protagoras into the second period, and Phædrus into the third. -But the most peculiar feature in his theory is, that he rejects as -spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias. - -[Side-note: K. F. Hermann--Stallbaum--both of them consider the -Phædrus as a late dialogue--both of them deny preconceived order and -system--their arrangements of the dialogues--they admit new and -varying philosophical points of view.] - -From Schleiermacher, Ast, and Socher, we pass to K. F. Hermann[10]--and -to Stallbaum, who has prefixed Prolegomena to his edition of each -dialogue. Both these critics protest against Socher's rejection of the -four dialogues last indicated: but they agree with Socher and Ast in -denying the reality of any preconceived system, present to Plato's -mind in his first dialogue, and advanced by regular steps throughout -each of the succeeding dialogues. The polemical tone of K. F. Hermann -against this theory, and against Schleiermacher, its author, is -strenuous and even unwarrantably bitter.[11] Especially the position -laid down by Schleiermacher--that Phædrus is the earliest of Plato's -dialogues, written when he was 22 or 23 years of age, and that the -general system presiding over all the future dialogues is indicated -therein as even then present to his mind, afterwards to be worked -out--is controverted by Hermann and Stallbaum no less than by Ast and -Socher. All three concur in the tripartite distribution of the life of -Plato. But Hermann thinks that Plato acquired gradually and -successively, new points of view, with enlarged philosophical -development: and that the dialogues as successively composed are -expressions of these varying phases. Moreover, Hermann thinks that -such variations in Plato's philosophy may be accounted for by external -circumstances. He reckons Plato's first period as ending with the -death of Sokrates, or rather at an epoch not long after the death of -Sokrates: the second as ending with the commencement of Plato's -teaching at the Academy, after his return from Sicily--about 385 B.C.: -the third, as extending from thence to his old age. To the first, or -Sokratic stadium, Hermann assigns the smaller dialogues: the earliest -of which he declares to be--Hippias II., Ion, Alkibiadês I., Lysis, -Charmidês, Lachês: after which come Protagoras and Euthydêmus, wherein -the batteries are opened against the Sophists, shortly before the -death of Sokrates. Immediately after the last mentioned event, come a -series of dialogues reflecting the strong and fresh impression left by -it upon Plato's mind--Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron, Menon, -Hippias I.--occupying a sort of transition stage between the first and -the second period. We now enter upon the second or dialectic period; -passed by Plato greatly at Megara, and influenced by the philosophical -intercourse which he there enjoyed, and characterised by the -composition of Theætêtus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, -Parmenidês.[12] To the third, or constructive period, greatly -determined by the influence of the Pythagorean philosophy, belong -Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposion, Phædon, Philêbus, Republic, Timæus, -Kritias: a series composed during Plato's teaching at the Academy, and -commencing with Phædrus, which last Hermann considers to be a sort of -(Antritts-Programme) inauguratory composition for the opening of his -school of oral discourse or colloquy. Lastly, during the final years -of the philosopher, after all the three periods, come the Leges or -treatise de Legibus: placed by itself as the composition of his old -age. - -[Footnote 10: K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen -Philosophie, p. 368, seq. Stallbaum, Disputatio de Platonis Vitâ et -Scriptis, prefixed to his edition of Plato's Works, p. xxxii., seq.] - -[Footnote 11: Ueberweg (Untersuchungen, pp. 50-52) has collected -several citations from K. F. Hermann, in which the latter treats -Schleiermacher "wie einen Sophisten, der sich in absichtlicher -Unwahrhaftigkeit gefalle, mitunter fast als einen Mann der innerlich -wohl wisse, wie die Sache stehe (nämlich, dass sie so sei, wie -Hermann lehrt), der sich aber, etwa aus Lust, seine überlegene -Dialektik zu beweisen, Mühe gebe, sie in einem anderen Lichte -erscheinen zu lassen; also--[Greek: to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô -poiei=n]--recht in rhetorisch sophistischer Manier." - -We know well, from other and independent evidence, what Schleiermacher -really was, that he was not only one of the most accomplished -scholars, but one of the most liberal and estimable men of his age. -But how different would be our appreciation if we had no other -evidence to judge by except the dicta of opponents, and even -distinguished opponents, like Hermann! If there be any point clear in -the history of philosophy, it is the uncertainty of all judgments, -respecting writers and thinkers, founded upon the mere allegations of -opponents. Yet the Athenian Sophists, respecting whom we have no -independent evidence (except the general fact that they had a number -of approvers and admirers), are depicted confidently by the Platonic -critics in the darkest colours, upon the evidence of their bitter -opponent Plato--and in colours darker than even his evidence warrants. -The often-repeated calumny, charged against almost all -debaters--[Greek: to\ to\n ê(/tto lo/gon krei/ttô poiei=n]--by Hermann -against Schleiermacher, by Melêtus against Sokrates, by Plato against the -Sophists--is believed only against these last.] - -[Footnote 12: K. F. Hermann, Gesch. u. Syst. d. Plat. Phil., p. 496, -seq. Stallbaum (p. xxxiii.) places the Kratylus during the lifetime of -Sokrates, a little earlier than Euthydêmus and Protagoras, all three -of which he assigns to Olymp. 94, 402-400 B.C. See also his Proleg. to -Kratylus, tom. v. p. 26. - -Moreover, Stallbaum places the Menon and Ion about the same time--a -few months or weeks before the trial of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Menonem, -tom. vi. pp. 20, 21; Proleg. ad Ionem, tom. iv. p. 289). He considers -the Euthyphron to have been actually composed at the moment to which -it professes to refer (viz., after Melêtus had preferred indictment -against Sokrates), and with a view of defending Sokrates against the -charge of impiety (Proleg. ad Euthyphron. tom. vi. pp. 138-139-142). -He places the composition of the Charmidês about six years before the -death of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Charm. p. 86). He seems to consider, -indeed, that the Menon and Euthydêmus were both written for the -purpose of defending Sokrates: thus implying that they too were -written _after_ the indictment was preferred (Proleg. ad Euthyphron. -p. 145). - -In regard to the date of the Euthyphron, Schleiermacher also had -declared, prior to Stallbaum, that it was _unquestionably_ -(unstreitig) composed at a period between the indictment and the trial -of Sokrates (Einl. zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. p. 53, of his transl. of -Plato).] - -[Side-note: They reject several dialogues.] - -Hermann and Stallbaum reject (besides the dialogues already rejected -by Thrasyllus) Alkibiadês II., Theagês, Erastæ, Hipparchus, Minos, -Epinomis: Stallbaum rejects the Kleitophon: Hermann hesitates, and is -somewhat inclined to admit it, as he also admits, to a considerable -extent, the Epistles.[13] - -[Footnote 13: Stallbaum, p. xxxiv. Hermann,** pp. 424, 425.] - -[Side-note: Steinhart--agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's -fundamental postulate--his arrangement of the dialogues--considers the -Phædrus as late in order--rejects several.] - -Steinhart, in his notes and prefaces to H. Müller's translation of the -Platonic dialogues, agrees in the main with K. F. Hermann, both in -denying the fundamental postulate of Schleiermacher, and in settling -the general order of the dialogues, though with some difference as to -individual dialogues. He considers Ion as the earliest, followed by -Hippias I, Hippias II., Alkibiadês I., Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês, -Protagoras. These constitute what Steinhart calls the -ethico-Sokratical series of Plato's compositions, having the common -attributes--That they do not step materially beyond the philosophical -range of Sokrates himself--That there is a preponderance of the mimic -and plastic element--That they end, to all appearance, with unsolved -doubts and unanswered questions.[14] He supposes the Charmidês to have -been composed during the time of the Thirty, the Lachês shortly -afterwards, and the Protagoras about two years before the death of -Sokrates. He lays it down as incontestable that the Protagoras was not -composed after the death of Sokrates.[15] Immediately prior to this -last-mentioned event, and posterior to the Protagoras, he places the -Euthydêmus, Menon, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Kratylus: -preparatory to the dialectic series consisting of Parmenidês, -Theætêtus, Sophistês, Politikus, the result of Plato's stay at Megara, -and contact with the Eleatic and Megaric philosophers. The third -series of dialogues, the mature and finished productions of Plato at -the Academy, opens with Phædrus. Steinhart rejects as spurious -Alkibiadês II., Erastæ, Theagês, &c. - -[Footnote 14: See Steinhart's Proleg. to the Protag. vol. i. p. 430. -of Müller's transl. of Plato.] - -[Footnote 15: Steinhart, Prolegg. to Charmidês, p. 295.] - -[Side-note: Susemihl--coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hermann -his order of arrangement.] - -Another author, also, Susemihl, coincides in the main with the -principles of arrangement adopted by K. F. Hermann for the Platonic -dialogues. First in the order of chronological composition he places -the shorter dialogues--the exclusively ethical, least systematic; and -he ranges them in a series, indicating the progressive development of -Plato's mind, with approach towards his final systematic -conceptions.[16] Susemihl begins this early series with Hippias II., -followed by Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês, Protagoras, Menon, Apologia, -Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron. The seven first, ending with the Menon, -he conceives to have been published successively during the lifetime -of Sokrates: the Menon itself, during the interval between his -indictment and his death;[17] the Apologia and Kriton, very shortly -after his death; followed, at no long interval, by Gorgias and -Euthyphron.[18] The Ion and Alkibiadês I. are placed by Susemihl among -the earliest of the Platonic compositions, but as not belonging to the -regular series. He supposes them to have been called forth by some -special situation, like Apologia and Kriton, if indeed they be -Platonic at all, of which he does not feel assured.[19] - -[Footnote 16: F. Susemihl, Die Genetische Entwickelung der -Platonischen Philosophie, Leipsic, 1865, p. 9.] - -[Footnote 17: Susemihl, ibid. pp. 40-61-89.] - -[Footnote 18: Susemihl, ib. pp. 113-125.] - -[Footnote 19: Susemihl, ib. p. 9.] - -Immediately after Euthyphron, Susemihl places Euthydêmus, which he -treats as the commencement of a second series of dialogues: the first -series, or ethical, being now followed by the dialectic, in which the -principles, process, and certainty of cognition are discussed, though -in an indirect and preparatory way. This second series consists of -Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Theætêtus, Phædrus, Sophistês, Politikus, -Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædon. Through all these dialogues Susemihl -professes to trace a thread of connection, each successively unfolding -and determining more of the general subject: but all in an indirect, -negative, round-about manner. Allowing for this manner, Susemihl -contends that the dialectical counter-demonstrations or Antinomies, -occupying the last half of the Parmenidês, include the solution of -those difficulties, which have come forward in various forms from the -Euthydêmus up to the Sophistês, against Plato's theory of Ideas.[20] -The Phædon closes the series of dialectic compositions, and opens the -way to the constructive dialogues following, partly ethical, partly -physical--Philêbus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias.[21] The Leges come last -of all. - -[Footnote 20: Susemihl, ib. p. 355, seq.] - -[Footnote 21: Susemihl, pp. 466-470. The first volume of Susemihl's -work ends with the Phædon.] - -[Side-note Edward Munk--adopts a different principle of arrangement, -founded upon the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the -life, philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates--his arrangement, -founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of -composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic -plan.] - -A more recent critic, Dr. Edward Munk, has broached a new and very -different theory as to the natural order of the Platonic dialogues. -Upon his theory, they were intended by Plato[22] to depict the life -and working of a philosopher, in successive dramatic exhibitions, from -youth to old age. The different moments in the life of Sokrates, -indicated in each dialogue, mark the place which Plato intended it -to occupy in the series. The Parmenidês is the first, wherein Sokrates -is introduced as a young man, initiated into philosophy by the ancient -Parmenidês: the Phædon is last, describing as it does the closing -scene of Sokrates. Plato meant his dialogues to be looked at partly in -artistic sequence, as a succession of historical dramas--partly in -philosophical sequence, as a record of the progressive development of -his own doctrine: the two principles are made to harmonize in the -main, though sometimes the artistic sequence is obscured for the -purpose of bringing out the philosophical, sometimes the latter is -partially sacrificed to the former.[23] Taken in the aggregate, the -dialogues from Parmenidês to Phædon form a Sokratic cycle, analogous -to the historical plays of Shakespeare, from King John to Henry -VIII.[24] But Munk at the same time contends that this natural order -of the dialogues--or the order in which Plato intended them to be -viewed--is not to be confounded with the chronological order of their -composition.[25] The Parmenidês, though constituting the opening -Prologue of the whole cycle, was not composed first: nor the Phædon -last. All of them were probably composed after Plato had attained the -full maturity of his philosophy: that is, probably after the opening -of his school at the Academy in 386 B.C. But in composing each, he had -always two objects jointly in view: he adapted the tone of each to the -age and situation in which he wished to depict Sokrates:[26] he -commemorated, in each, one of the past phases of his own -philosophising mind. - -[Footnote 22: Dr. Edward Munk. Die natürliche Ordnung der Platonischen -Schriften, Berlin, 1857. His scheme of arrangement is explained -generally, pp. 25-48, &c.] - -[Footnote 23: Munk, ib. p. 29.] - -[Footnote 24: Munk, ib. p. 27.] - -[Footnote 25: Munk, ibid. p. 27.] - -[Footnote 26: Munk, ib. p. 54; Preface, p. viii.] - -The Cycle taken in its intentional or natural order, is distributed by -Munk into three groups, after the Parmenidês as general prologue.[27] - -1. Sokratic or Indirect Dialogues.--Protagoras, Charmidês, Lachês, -Gorgias, Ion, Hippias I., Kratylus, Euthydêmus, Symposion. - -2. Direct or Constructive Dialogues.--Phædrus, Philêbus, Republic, -Timæus, Kritias. - -3. Dialectic and Apologetic Dialogues.--Menon, Theætêtus, Sophistês, -Politikus, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Phædon. - -The Leges and Menexenus stand apart from the Cycle, as compositions on -special occasion. Alkibiadês I., Hippias II., Lysis, are also placed -apart from the Cycle, as compositions of Plato's earlier years, before -he had conceived the general scheme of it.[28] - -[Footnote 27: Munk, ib. p. 50.] - -[Footnote 28: Munk, ib. pp. 25-34.] - -The first of the three groups depicts Sokrates in the full vigour of -life, about 35 years of age: the second represents him an elderly man, -about 60: the third, immediately prior to his death.[29] In the first -group he is represented as a combatant for truth: in the second as a -teacher of truth: in the third, as a martyr for truth.[30] - -[Footnote 29: Munk, ib. p. 26.] - -[Footnote 30: Munk, ib. p. 31.] - -[Side-note: Views of Ueberweg--attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and -Hermann--admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues, -composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the earlier.] - -Lastly, we have another German author still more recent, Frederick -Ueberweg, who has again investigated the order and authenticity of the -Platonic dialogues, in a work of great care and ability: reviewing the -theories of his predecessors, as well as proposing various -modifications of his own.[31] Ueberweg compares the different opinions -of Schleiermacher and K. F. Hermann, and admits both of them to a -certain extent, each concurrent with and limiting the other.[32] The -theory of a preconceived system and methodical series, proposed by -Schleiermacher, takes its departure from the Phædrus, and postulates -as an essential condition that that dialogue shall be recognised as -the earliest composition.[33] This condition Ueberweg does not admit. -He agrees with Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, in referring the -Phædrus to a later date (about 386 B.C.), shortly after Plato had -established his school in Athens, when he was rather above forty years -of age. At this period (Ueberweg thinks) Plato may be considered as -having acquired methodical views which had not been present to him -before; and the dialogues composed after the Phædrus follow out, to a -certain extent, these methodical views. In the Phædrus, the Platonic -Sokrates delivers the opinion that writing is unavailing as a means of -imparting philosophy: that the only way in which philosophy can be -imparted is, through oral colloquy adapted by the teacher to the -mental necessities, and varying stages of progress, of each individual -learner: and that writing can only serve, after such oral instruction -has been imparted, to revive it if forgotten, in the memory both of -the teacher and of the learner who has been orally taught. For the -dialogues composed after the opening of the school, and after the -Phædrus, Ueberweg recognises the influence of a preconceived method -and of a constant bearing on the oral teaching of the school: for -those anterior to that date, he admits no such influence: he refers -them (with Hermann) to successive enlargements, suggestions, -inspirations, either arising in Plato's own mind, or communicated from -without. Ueberweg does not indeed altogether exclude the influence of -this non-methodical cause, even for the later dialogues: he allows its -operation to a certain extent, in conjunction with the methodical: -what he excludes is, the influence of any methodical or preconceived -scheme for the earlier dialogues.[34] He thinks that Plato composed -the later portion of his dialogues (_i.e._, those subsequent to the -Phædrus and to the opening of his school), not for the instruction of -the general reader, but as reminders to his disciples of that which -they had already learnt from oral teaching: and he cites the analogy -of Paul and the apostles, who wrote epistles not to convert the -heathen, but to admonish or confirm converts already made by -preaching.[35] - -[Footnote 31: Ueberweg, Untersuchungen.] - -[Footnote 32: Ueberweg, p. 111.] - -[Footnote 33: Ueberweg, pp. 23-26.] - -[Footnote 34: Ueberweg, pp. 107-110-111. "Sind beide Gesichtspunkte, -der einer methodischen Absicht und der einer Selbst-Entwicklung -Platon's durchweg mit einander zu verbinden, so liegt es auch in der -Natur der Sache und wird auch von einigen seiner Nachfolger -(insbesondere nachdrücklich von Susemihl) anerkannt, dass der erste -Gesichtspunkt vorzugsweise für die späteren Schriften von der Gründung -der Schule an--der andere vorzugsweise für die früheren--gilt."] - -[Footnote 35: Ueberweg, pp. 80-86, "Ist unsere obige Deutung richtig, -wonach Platon nicht für Fremde zur Belehrung, sondern wesentlich für -seine Schüler zur Erinnerung an den mündlichen Unterricht, schrieb -(wie die Apostel nicht für Fremde zur Bekehrung, sondern für die -christlichen Gemeinden zur Stärke und Läuterung, nachdem denselben der -Glaube aus der Predigt gekommen war)--so folgt, dass jede -Argumentation, die auf den Phaedrus gegründet wird, nur für die Zeit -gelten kann, in welcher bereits die Platonische Schule bestand."] - -[Side-note: His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the -dialogues, He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, -Parmenidês: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus.] - -Ueberweg investigates the means which we possess, either from external -testimony (especially that of Aristotle) or from internal evidence, of -determining the authenticity as well as the chronological order of the -dialogues. He remarks that though, in contrasting the expository -dialogues with those which are simply enquiring and debating, we may -presume the expository to belong to Plato's full maturity of life, and -to have been preceded by some of the enquiring and debating--yet we -cannot safely presume _all_ these latter to be of his early -composition. Plato may have continued to inclined to compose dialogues -of mere search, even after the time when he began to compose -expository dialogues.[36] Ueberweg considers that the earliest of -Plato's dialogues are, Lysis, Hippias Minor, Lachês, Charmidês, -Protagoras, composed during the lifetime of Sokrates: next the -Apologia, and Kriton, not long after his death. All these (even the -Protagoras) he reckons among the "lesser Platonic writings".[37] None -of them allude to the Platonic Ideas or Objective Concepts. The -Gorgias comes next, probably soon after the death of Sokrates, at -least at some time earlier than the opening of the school in 386 -B.C.[38] The Menon and Ion may be placed about the same general -period.[39] The Phædrus (as has been already observed) is considered -by Ueberweg to be nearly contemporary with the opening of the school: -shortly afterwards Symposion and Euthydêmus:[40] at some subsequent -time, Republic, Timæus, Kritias, and Leges. In regard to the four -last, Ueberweg does not materially differ from Schleiermacher, -Hermann, and other critics: but on another point he differs from them -materially, _viz._: that instead of placing the Theætêtus, Sophistês, -and Politikus, in the Megaric period or prior to the opening of the -school, he assigns them (as well as the Phædon and Philêbus) to the -last twenty years of Plato's life. He places Phædon later than Timæus, -and Politikus later than Phædon: he considers that Sophistês, -Politikus, and Philêbus are among the latest compositions of -Plato.[41] He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, and -Parmenidês: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron. He scarcely -recognises Menexenus, in spite of the direct attestation of Aristotle, -which attestation he tries (in my judgment very unsuccessfully) to -invalidate.[42] He recognises the Kratylus, but without determining -its date. He determines nothing about Alkibiadês I. and II. - -[Footnote 36: Ueberweg, p. 81.] - -[Footnote 37: Ueberweg, pp. 100-105-296. "Eine Anzahl kleinerer -Platonischer Schriften."] - -[Footnote 38: Ueberweg, pp. 249-267-296.] - -[Footnote 39: Ueberweg, pp. 226, 227.] - -[Footnote 40: Ueberweg, p. 265.] - -[Footnote 41: Ueberweg, pp. 204-292.] - -[Footnote 42: Ueberweg, pp. 143-176-222-250.] - -[Side-note: Other Platonic critics--great dissensions about scheme and -order of the dialogues.] - -The works above enumerated are those chiefly deserving of notice, -though there are various others also useful, amidst the abundance of -recent Platonic criticism. All these writers, Schleiermacher, Ast, -Socher, K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, Munk, Ueberweg, -have not merely laid down general schemes of arrangement for the -Platonic dialogues, but have gone through the dialogues seriatim, each -endeavouring to show that his own scheme fits them well, and each -raising objections against the schemes earlier than his own. It is -indeed truly remarkable to follow the differences of opinion among -these learned men, all careful students of the Platonic writings. And -the number of dissents would be indefinitely multiplied, if we took -into the account the various historians of philosophy during the last -few years. Ritter and Brandis accept, in the main, the theory of -Schleiermacher: Zeller also, to a certain extent. But each of these -authors has had a point of view more or less belonging to himself -respecting the general scheme and purpose of Plato, and respecting the -authenticity, sequence, and reciprocal illustration of the -dialogues.[43] - -[Footnote 43: Socher remarks (Ueber, Platon. p. 225) (after -enumerating twenty-two dialogues of the Thrasyllean canon, which he -considers the earliest) that of these twenty-two, there are _only two_ -which have not been declared spurious by some one or more critics. He -then proceeds to examine the remainder, among which are Sophistês, -Politikus, Parmenidês. He (Socher) declares these three last to be -spurious, which no critic had declared before.] - -[Side-note: Contrast of different points of view instructive--but no -solution has been obtained.] - -By such criticisms much light has been thrown on the dialogues in -detail. It is always interesting to read the different views taken by -many scholars, all careful students of Plato, respecting the order and -relations of the dialogues: especially as the views are not merely -different but contradictory, so that the weak points of each are put -before us as well as the strong. But as to the large problem which -these critics have undertaken to solve--though several solutions have -been proposed, in favour of which something may be urged, yet we look -in vain for any solution at once sufficient as to proof and defensible -against objectors. - -[Side-note: The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of -the theory propounded by Schleiermacher--slenderness of his proofs.] - -It appears to me that the problem itself is one which admits of no -solution. Schleiermacher was the first who proposed it with the large -pretensions which it has since embraced, and which have been present -more or less to the minds of subsequent critics, even when they differ -from him. He tells us himself that he comes forward as _Restitutor -Platonis_, in a character which no one had ever undertaken before.[44] -And he might fairly have claimed that title, if he had furnished -proofs at all commensurate to his professions. As his theory is -confessedly novel as well as comprehensive, it required greater -support in the way of evidence. But when I read the Introductions (the -general as well as the special) in which such evidence ought to be -found, I am amazed to find that there is little else but easy and -confident assumption. His hypothesis is announced as if the simple -announcement were sufficient to recommend it[45]--as if no other -supposition were consistent with the recognised grandeur of Plato as a -philosopher--as if any one, dissenting from it, only proved thereby -that he did not understand Plato. Yet so far from being of this -self-recommending character, the hypothesis is really loaded with the -heaviest antecedent improbability. That in 406 B.C., and at the age of -23, in an age when schemes of philosophy elaborated in detail were -unknown--Plato should conceive a vast scheme of philosophy, to be -worked out underground without ever being proclaimed, through numerous -Sokratic dialogues one after the other, each ushering in that which -follows and each resting upon that which precedes: that he should have -persisted throughout a long life in working out this scheme, adapting -the sequence of his dialogues to the successive stages which he had -attained, so that none of them could be properly understood unless -when studied immediately after its predecessors and immediately before -its successors--and yet that he should have taken no pains to impress -this one peremptory arrangement on the minds of readers, and that -Schleiermacher should be the first to detect it--all this appears to -me as improbable as any of the mystic interpretations of Iamblichus or -Proklus. Like other improbabilities, it may be proved by evidence, if -evidence can be produced: but here nothing of the kind is producible. -We are called upon to grant the general hypothesis without proof, and -to follow Schleiermacher in applying it to the separate dialogues. - -[Footnote 44: Schleiermacher, Einleitung, pp. 22-29. "Diese natürliche -Folge (der Platonischen Gespräche) wieder herzustellen, diess ist, -wie jedermann sieht, eine Absicht, welche sich sehr weit entfernt von -allen bisherigen Versuchen zur Anordnung der Platonischen Werke," &c.] - -[Footnote 45: What I say about Schleiermacher here will be assented to -by any one who reads his Einleitung, pp. 10, 11, seq.] - -[Side-note: Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived -scheme, and a peremptory order of interdependence among the -dialogues.] - -Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes two parts. 1. A premeditated -philosophical scheme, worked out continuously from the first dialogue -to the last. 2. A peremptory canonical order, essential to this -scheme, and determined thereby. Now as to the scheme, though on the -one hand it cannot be proved, yet on the other hand it cannot be -disproved. But as to the canonical order, I think it may be disproved. -We know that no such order was recognised in the days of Aristophanes, -and Schleiermacher himself admits that before those days it had been -lost.[46] But I contend that if it was lost within a century after the -decease of Plato, we may fairly presume that it never existed at all, -as peremptory and indispensable to the understanding of what Plato -meant. A great philosopher such as Plato (so Schleiermacher argues) -must be supposed to have composed all his dialogues with some -preconceived comprehensive scheme: but a great philosopher (we may -add), if he does work upon a preconceived scheme, must surely be -supposed to take some reasonable precautions to protect the order -essential to that scheme from dropping out of sight. Moreover, -Schleiermacher himself admits that there are various dialogues which -lie apart from the canonical order and form no part of the grand -premeditated scheme. The distinction here made between these outlying -compositions (Nebenwerke) and the members of the regular series, is -indeed altogether arbitrary: but the admission of it tends still -farther to invalidate the fundamental postulate of a grand Demiurgic -universe of dialogues, each dovetailed and fitted into its special -place among the whole. The universe is admitted to have breaks: so -that the hypothesis does not possess the only merit which can belong -to gratuitous hypothesis--that of introducing, if granted, complete -symmetry throughout the phenomena. - -[Footnote 46: Schleiermacher, Einleitung, p. 24.] - -[Side-note: Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the Phædrus -inadmissible.] - -To these various improbabilities we may add another--that -Schleiermacher's hypothesis requires us to admit that the Phædrus is -Plato's earliest dialogue, composed about 406 B.C., when he was 21 -years of age, on my computation, and certainly not more than 23: that -it is the first outburst of the inspiration which Sokrates had -imparted to him,[47] and that it embodies, though in a dim and -poetical form, the lineaments of that philosophical system which he -worked out during the ensuing half century. That Plato at this early -age should have conceived so vast a system--that he should have -imbibed it from Sokrates, who enunciated no system, and abounded in -the anti-systematic negative--that he should have been inspired to -write the Phædrus (with its abundant veins, dithyrambic,[48] erotic, -and transcendental) by the conversation of Sokrates, which exhibited -acute dialectic combined with practical sagacity, but neither poetic -fervour nor transcendental fancy,--in all this hypothesis of -Schleiermacher, there is nothing but an aggravation of -improbabilities. - -[Footnote 47: See Schleiermacher's Einleitung to the Phædrus: "Der -Phaidros, der erste Ausbruch seiner Begeisterung vom Sokrates".] - -[Footnote 48: If we read Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De Admirab. Vi -Dic. in Demosth. pp. 968-971, Reiske), we shall find that rhetor -pointing out the Phædrus as a signal example of Plato's departure from -the manner and character of Sokrates, and as a specimen of misplaced -poetical exaggeration. Dikæarchus formed the same opinion about the -Phædrus (Diog. L. iii. 38).] - -[Side-note: Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet -produced any tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic -dialogues.] - -Against such improbabilities (partly external partly internal) -Schleiermacher has nothing to set except internal reasons: that is, -when he shall have arranged the dialogues and explained the -interdependence as well as the special place of each, the arrangement -will impress itself upon all as being the intentional work of Plato -himself.[49] But these "internal reasons" (innere Gründe), which are -to serve as constructive evidence (in the absence of positive -declarations) of Plato's purpose, fail to produce upon other minds the -effect which Schleiermacher demands. If we follow them as stated in -his Introductions (prefixed to the successive Platonic dialogues), we -find a number of approximations and comparisons, often just and -ingenious, but always inconclusive for his point: proving, at the very -best, what Plato's intention may possibly have been--yet subject to be -countervailed by other "internal reasons" equally specious, tending to -different conclusions. And the various opponents of Schleiermacher -prove just as much and no more, each on behalf of his own mode of -arrangement, by the like constructive evidence--appeal to "internal -reasons". But the insufficient character of these "internal reasons" -is more fatal to Schleiermacher than to any of his opponents: because -his fundamental hypothesis--while it is the most ambitious of all and -would be the most important, if it could be proved--is at the same -time burdened with the strongest antecedent improbability, and -requires the amplest proof to make it at all admissible. - -[Footnote 49: See the general Einleitung, p. 11.] - -[Side-note: Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most -gratuitous, next to Schleiermacher's.] - -Dr. Munk undertakes the same large problem as Schleiermacher. He -assumes the Platonic dialogues to have been composed upon a -preconceived system, beginning when Plato opened his school, about 41 -years of age. This has somewhat less antecedent improbability than the -supposition that Plato conceived his system at 21 or 23 years of age. -But it is just as much destitute of positive support. That Plato -intended his dialogues to form a fixed series, exhibiting the -successive gradations of his philosophical system--that he farther -intended this series to coincide with a string of artistic portraits, -representing Sokrates in the ascending march from youth to old age, so -that the characteristic feature which marks the place and time of each -dialogue, is to be found in the age which it assigns to Sokrates--these -are positions for the proof of which we are referred to "internal -reasons"; but which the dialogues do not even suggest, much less sanction. - -[Side-note: The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a -circumstance of little moment.] - -In many dialogues, the age assigned to Sokrates is a circumstance -neither distinctly brought out, nor telling on the debate. It is true -that in the Parmenidês he is noted as young, and is made to conduct -himself with the deference of youth, receiving hints and admonitions -from the respected veteran of Elea. So too in the Protagoras, he is -characterised as young, but chiefly in contrast with the extreme and -pronounced old age of the Sophist Protagoras: he does not conduct -himself like a youth, nor exhibit any of that really youthful or -deferential spirit which we find in the Parmenidês; on the contrary, -he stands forward as the rival, cross-examiner, and conqueror of the -ancient Sophist. On the contrary, in the Euthydêmus,[50] Sokrates is -announced as old; though that dialogue is indisputably very analogous -to the Protagoras, both of them being placed by Munk in the earliest -of his three groups. Moreover in the Lysis also, Sokrates appears as -old;--here Munk escapes from the difficulty by setting aside the -dialogue as a youthful composition, not included in the consecutive -Sokratic Cycle.[51] What is there to justify the belief, that the -Sokrates depicted in the Phædrus (which dialogue has been affirmed by -Schieiermacher and Ast, besides some ancient critics, to exhibit -decided marks of juvenility) is older than the Sokrates of the -Symposion? or that Sokrates in the Philêbus and Republic is older than -in the Kratylus or Gorgias? It is true that the dialogues Theætêtus -and Euthyphron are both represented as held a little before the death -of Sokrates, after the indictment of Melêtus against him had already -been preferred. This is a part of the hypothetical situation, in which -the dialogists are brought into company. But there is nothing in the -two dialogues themselves (or in the Menon, which Munk places in the -same category) to betoken that Sokrates is old. Holiness, in the -Euthyphron--Knowledge, in the Theætêtus--is canvassed and debated just -as Temperance and Courage are debated in the Charmidês and Lachês. -Munk lays it down that Sokrates appears as a Martyr for Truth in the -Euthyphron, Menon, and Theætêtus and as a Combatant for Truth in the -Lachês, Charmidês, Euthydêmus, &c. But the two groups of dialogues, -when compared with each other, will not be found to warrant this -distinctive appellation. In the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon, it may -be said with propriety that Sokrates is represented as a martyr for -truth: in all three he appears not merely as a talker, but as a -personal agent: but this is not true of the other dialogues which Munk -places in his third group. - -[Footnote 50: Euthydêmus, c. 4, p. 272.] - -[Footnote 51: Lysis, p. 223, ad fin. [Greek: Katage/lastoi gego/namen -e)gô/ te, ge/rôn a)nê/r, kai\ u(mei=s]. See Munk, p. 25.] - -[Side-note: No intentional sequence or interdependence of the -dialogues can be made out.] - -I cannot therefore accede to this "natural arrangement of the Platonic -dialogues," assumed to have been intended by Plato, and founded upon -the progress of Sokrates as he stands exhibited in each, from youth to -age--which Munk has proposed in his recent ingenious volume. It is -interesting to be made acquainted with that order of the Platonic -dialogues which any critical student conceives to be the "natural -order". But in respect to Munk as well as to Schleiermacher, I must -remark that if Plato had conceived and predetermined the dialogues, so -as to be read in one natural peremptory order, he would never have -left that order so dubious and imperceptible, as to be first divined -by critics of the nineteenth century, and understood by them too in -several different ways. If there were any peremptory and intentional -sequence, we may reasonably presume that Plato would have made it as -clearly understood as he has determined the sequence of the ten books -of his Republic. - -[Side-note: Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is -reasonable--successive changes in Plato's point of view: but we cannot -explain either the order or the causes of these changes.] - -The principle of arrangement proposed by K. F. Hermann (approved also -by Steinhart and Susemihl) is not open to the same antecedent -objection. Not admitting any preconceived, methodical, intentional, -system, nor the maintenance of one and the same successive -philosophical point of view throughout--Hermann supposes that the -dialogues as successively composed represent successive phases of -Plato's philosophical development and variations in his point of view. -Hermann farther considers that these variations may be assigned and -accounted for: first pure Sokratism, next the modifications -experienced from Plato's intercourse with the Megaric philosophers,--then -the influence derived from Kyrênê and Egypt--subsequently that -from the Pythagoreans in Italy--and so forth. The first portion of -this hypothesis, taken generally, is very reasonable and probable. But -when, after assuming that there must have been determining changes in -Plato's own mind, we proceed to inquire what these were, and whence -they arose, we find a sad lack of evidence for the answer to the -question. We neither know the order in which the dialogues were -composed,--nor the date when Plato first began to compose,--nor the -primitive philosophical mind which his earliest dialogues -represented,--nor the order of those subsequent modifications which -his views underwent. We are informed, indeed, that Plato went from -Athens to visit Megara, Kyrênê, Egypt, Italy; but the extent or kind -of influence which he experienced in each, we do not know at all.[52] -I think it a reasonable presumption that the points which Plato had in -common with Sokrates were most preponderant in the mind of Plato -immediately after the death of his master: and that other trains of -thought gradually became more and more intermingled as the -recollection of his master became more distant. There is also a -presumption that the longer, more elaborate, and more transcendental -dialogues (among which must be ranked the Phædrus), were composed in -the full maturity of Plato's age and intellect: the shorter and less -finished may have been composed either then or earlier in his life. -Here are two presumptions, plausible enough when stated generally, yet -too vague to justify any special inferences: the rather, if we may -believe the statement of Dionysius, that Plato continued to "comb and -curl his dialogues until he was eighty years of age".[53] - -[Footnote 52: Bonitz (in his instructive volume, Platonische Studien, -Wien, 1858, p. 5) points out how little we know about the real -circumstances of Plato's intellectual and philosophical development: a -matter which most of the Platonic critics are apt to forget. - -I confess that I agree with Strümpell, that it is impossible to -determine chronologically, from Plato's writings, and from the other -scanty evidence accessible to us, by what successive steps his mind -departed from the original views and doctrines held and communicated -by Sokrates (Strümpell, Gesch. der Griechen, p. 294, Leipsic, 1861).] - -[Footnote 53: Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p. 208; Diog. L. iii. 37; -Quintilian, viii. 6. - -F. A. Wolf, in a valuable note upon the [Greek: diaskeuastai\] -(Proleg. ad Homer. p. clii.) declares, upon this ground, that it is -impossible to determine the time when Plato composed his best -dialogues. "Ex his collatis apparet [Greek: diaskeua/zein] a veteribus -magistris adscitum esse in potestatem verbi [Greek: -e)pidiaskeua/zein]: ut in Scenicis propé idem esset quod [Greek: -a)nadida/skein]--h. e. repetito committere fabulam, sed mutando, -addendo, detrahendo, emendatam, refictam, et secundis curis -elaboratam. Id enim facere solebant illi poetæ sæpissimé: mox etiam -alii, ut Apollonius Rhodius. Neque aliter Plato fecit in optimis -dialogis suis: _quam ob causam exquirere non licet, quando quisque -compositus sit_; quum in scenicis fabulis saltem ex didascaliis -plerumque notum sit tempus, quo editæ sunt." - -Preller has a like remark (Hist. Phil. ex Font. Loc. Context., sect. -250). - -In regard to the habit of correcting compositions, the contrast -between Plato and Plotinus was remarkable. Porphyry tells us that -Plotinus, when once he had written any matter, could hardly bear even -to read it over--much less to review and improve it (Porph. Vit. -Plotini, 8).] - -[Side-note: Hermann's view more tenable than Schleiermacher's.] - -If we compare K. F. Hermann with Schleiermacher, we see that Hermann -has amended his position by abandoning Schleiermacher's gratuitous -hypothesis, of a preconceived Platonic system with a canonical order -of the dialogues adapted to that system--and by admitting only a -chronological order of composition, each dialogue being generated by -the state of Plato's mind at the time when it was composed. This, -taken generally, is indisputable. If we perfectly knew Plato's -biography and the circumstances around him, we should be able to -determine which dialogues were first, second, and third, &c., and what -circumstances or mental dispositions occasioned the successive -composition of those which followed. But can we do this with our -present scanty information? I think not. Hermann, while abandoning the -hypothesis of Schleiermacher, has still accepted the large conditions -of the problem first drawn up by Schleiermacher, and has undertaken to -decide the real order of the dialogues, together with the special -occasion and the phase of Platonic development corresponding to each. -Herein, I think, he has failed. - -[Side-note: Small number of certainties, or even reasonable -presumptions, as to date or order of the dialogues.] - -It is, indeed, natural that critics should form some impression as to -earlier and later in the dialogues. But though there are some peculiar -cases in which such impression acquires much force, I conceive that in -almost all cases it is to a high degree uncertain. Several dialogues -proclaim themselves as subsequent to the death of Sokrates. We know -from internal allusions that the Theætêtus must have been composed -after 394 B.C., the Menexenus after 387 B.C., and the Symposion after -385 B.C. We are sure, by Aristotle's testimony, that the Leges were -written at a later period than the Republic; Plutarch also states that -the Leges were composed during the old age of Plato, and this -statement, accepted by most modern critics, appears to me -trustworthy.[54] The Sophistês proclaims itself as a second meeting, -by mutual agreement, of the same persons who had conversed in the -Theætêtus, with the addition of a new companion, the Eleatic stranger. -But we must remark that the subject of the Theætêtus, though left -unsettled at the close of that dialogue, is not resumed in the -Sophistês: in which last, moreover, Sokrates acts only a subordinate -part, while the Eleatic stranger, who did not appear in the Theætêtus, -is here put forward as the prominent questioner or expositor. So too, -the Politikus offers itself as a third of the same triplet: with this -difference, that while the Eleatic stranger continues as the -questioner, a new respondent appears in the person of Sokrates Junior. -The Politikus is not a resumption of the same subject as the -Sophistês, but a second application of the same method (the method of -logical division and subdivision) to a different subject. Plato speaks -also as if he contemplated a third application of the same method--the -Philosophus: which, so far as we know, was never realised. Again, the -Timæus presents itself as a sequel to the Republic, and the Kritias as -a sequel to the Timæus: a fourth, the Hermokrates, being apparently -announced, as about to follow--but not having been composed. - -[Footnote 54: Plutarch, Isid. et Osirid. c. 48, p. 370.] - -[Side-note: Trilogies indicated by Plato himself.] - -Here then are two groups of three each (we might call them Trilogies, -and if the intended fourth had been realised, Tetralogies), indicated -by Plato himself. A certain relative chronological order is here -doubtless evident: the Sophistês must have been composed after the -Theætêtus and before the Politikus, the Timæus after the Republic and -before the Kritias. But this is all that we can infer: for it does not -follow that the sequence must have been immediate in point of time: -there may have been a considerable interval between the three forming -the so-called Trilogy.[55] We may add, that neither in the Theætêtus -nor in the Republic, do we find indication that either of them is -intended as the first of a Trilogy: the marks proving an intended -Trilogy are only found in the second and third of the series. - -[Footnote 55: It may seem singular that Schlelermacher is among those -who adopt this opinion. He maintains that the Sophistes does not -follow _immediately_ upon the Theætêtus; that Plato, though intending -when he finished the Theætêtus to proceed onward to the Sophistês, -altered his intention, and took up other views instead: that the Menon -(and the Euthydêmus) come in between them, in immediate sequel to the -Theætêtus (Einleitung zum Menon, vol. iii. p. 326). - -Here Schleiermacher introduces a new element of uncertainty, which -invalidates yet more seriously the grounds for his hypothesis of a -preconceived sequence throughout all the dialogues. In a case where -Plato directly intimates an intentional sequence, we are called upon -to believe, on "internal grounds" alone, that he altered his -intention, and introduced other dialogues. He may have done this: but -how are we to prove it? How much does it attenuate the value of his -intentions, as proofs of an internal philosophical sequence? We become -involved more and more in unsupported hypothesis. I think that K. F. -Hermann's objections against Schleiermacher, on the above ground, have -much force; and that Ueberweg's reply to them is unsatisfactory. -(Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Phil. p. 350. Ueberweg, -Untersuchungen, p. 82, seq.)] - -[Side-note: Positive dates of all the dialogues--unknown.] - -While even the relative chronology of the dialogues is thus faintly -marked in the case of a few, and left to fallible conjecture in the -remainder--the positive chronology, or the exact year of composition, -is not directly marked in the case of any one. Moreover, at the very -outset of the enquiry, we have to ask, At what period of life did -Plato begin to publish his dialogues? Did he publish any of them -during the lifetime of Sokrates? and if so, which? Or does the -earliest of them date from a time after the death of Sokrates? - -[Side-note: When did Plato begin to compose? Not till after the death -of Sokrates.] - -Amidst the many dissentient views of the Platonic critics, it is -remarkable that they are nearly unanimous in their mode of answering -this question.[56] Most of them declare without hesitation, that Plato -published several before the death of Sokrates--that is, before he was -28 years of age--though they do not all agree in determining which -these dialogues were. I do not perceive that they produce any external -proofs of the least value. Most of them disbelieve (though Stallbaum -and Hermann believe) the anecdote about Sokrates and his criticism on -the dialogue Lysis.[57] In spite of their unanimity, I cannot but -adopt the opposite conclusion. It appears to me that Plato composed no -Sokratic dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates. - -[Footnote 56: Valentine Rose (De Aristotelis Librorum ordine, p. 25, -Berlin, 1854), Mullach (Democriti Fragm. p. 99), and R. Schöne (in his -Commentary on the Platonic Protagoras), are among the critics known to -me, who intimate their belief that Plato published no Sokratic -dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates. In discussing the matter, -Schöne adverts to two of the three lines of argument brought forward -in my text:--1. The too early and too copious "productivity" which the -received supposition would imply in Plato. 2. The improbability that -the name of Sokrates would be employed in written dialogues, as -spokesman, by any of his scholars during his lifetime. - -Schöne does not touch upon the improbability of the hypothesis, -arising out of the early position and aspirations of Plato himself -(Schöne, Ueber Platon's Protagoras, p. 64, Leipsic, 1862).] - -[Footnote 57: Diog. Laert. iii. 85; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Lys. -p. 90; K. F. Hermann, Gesch. u. Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 370. -Schleiermacher (Einl. zum Lysis, i. p. 175) treats the anecdote about -the Lysis as unworthy of credence. Diogenes (iii. 38) mentions that -some considered the Phædrus as Plato's earliest dialogue; the reason -being that the subject of it was something puerile: [Greek: lo/gos de\ -prô=ton gra/psai au)to\n to\n Phai=dron; kai\ ga\r e)/chei -meirakiô=des ti to\ pro/blêma. Dikai/archos de\ kai\ to\n tro/pon tê=s -graphê=s o(/lon e)pime/mphetai ô(s phortiko/n]. Olympiodorus also in -his life of Plato mentions the same report, that the Phædrus was -Plato's earliest composition, and gives the same ground of belief, -"its dithyrambic character". Even if the assertion were granted, that -the Phædrus is the earliest Platonic composition, we could not infer -that it was composed during the life-time of Sokrates. But that -assertion cannot be granted. The two statements, above cited, give it -only as a report, suggested to those who believed it by the character -and subject-matter of the dialogue. I am surprised that Dr. -Volquardsen, who in a learned volume, recently published, has -undertaken the defence of the theory of Schleiermacher about the -Phædrus (Phädros, Erste Schrift Platon's, Kiel, 1862), can represent -this as a "_feste historische Ueberlieferung_"--the rather as he -admits that Schleiermacher himself placed no confidence in it, and -relied upon other reasons (pp. 90-92-93). Comp. Schleiermacher, Einl. -zum Phaidros, p. 76. - -Whoever will read the Epistle of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, addressed -to Cneius Pompeius (pp. 751-765, Reiske), will be persuaded that -Dionysius can neither have known, nor even believed, that the Phædrus -was the first composition, and a youthful composition, of Plato. If -Dionysius had believed this, it would have furnished him with the -precise excuse which his letter required. For the purpose of his -letter is to mollify the displeasure of Cn. Pompey, who had written to -blame him for some unfavourable criticisms on the style of Plato. -Dionysius justifies his criticisms by allusions to the Phædrus. If he -had been able to add, that the Phædrus was a first composition, and -that Plato's later dialogues were comparatively free from the like -faults--this would have been the most effective way of conciliating -Cn. Pompey.] - -[Side-note: Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition--does -not consist with youth of the author.] - -All the information (scanty as it is) which we obtain from the rhetor -Dionysius and others respecting the composition of the Platonic -dialogues, announces them to have cost much time and labour to their -author: a statement illustrated by the great number of inversions of -words which he is said to have introduced successively in the first -sentence of the Republic, before he was satisfied to let the sentence -stand. This corresponds, too, with all that we read respecting the -patient assiduity both of Isokrates and Demosthenes.[58] A first-rate -Greek composition was understood not to be purchasable at lower cost. -I confess therefore to great surprise, when I read in Ast the -affirmation that the Protagoras was composed when Plato was only 22 -years old--and when I find Schleiermacher asserting, as if it were a -matter beyond dispute, that Protagoras, Phædrus, and Parmenidês, all -bear evident marks of Plato's youthful age (Jugendlichkeit). In regard -to the Phædrus and Parmenidês, indeed, Hermann and other critics -contest the view of Schleiermacher; and detect, in those two -dialogues, not only no marks of "juvenility," but what they consider -plain proofs of maturity and even of late age. But in regard to the -Protagoras, most of them agree with Schleiermacher and Ast, in -declaring it to be a work of Plato's youth, some time before the death -of Sokrates. Now on this point I dissent from them: and since the -decision turns upon "internal grounds," each must judge for himself. -The Protagoras appears to me one of the most finished and elaborate of -all the dialogues: in complication of scenic arrangements, dramatic -vivacity, and in the amount of theory worked out, it is surpassed by -none--hardly even by the Republic.[59] Its merits as a composition are -indeed extolled by all the critics; who clap their hands, especially, -at the humiliation which they believe to be brought upon the great -Sophist by Sokrates. But the more striking the composition is -acknowledged to be, the stronger is the presumption that its author -was more than 22 or 24 years of age. Nothing short of good positive -testimony would induce me to believe that such a dialogue as the -Protagoras could have been composed, even by Plato, before he attained -the plenitude of his powers. No such testimony is produced or -producible. I extend a similar presumption, even to the Lysis, Lachês, -Charmidês, and other dialogues: though with a less degree of -confidence, because they are shorter and less artistic, not equal to -the Protagoras. All of them, in my judgment, exhibit a richness of -ideas and a variety of expression, which suggest something very -different from a young novice as the author. - -[Footnote 58: Timæus said that Alexander the Great conquered the -Persian empire in less time than Isokrates required for the -composition of his panegyrical oration (Longinus, De Sublim. c. 4).] - -[Footnote 59: "Als aesthetisches Kunstwerk ist der Dialog Protagoras -das meisterhafteste unter den Werken Platon's.' (Socher, Ueber Platon, -p. 226.)] - -But over and above this presumption, there are other reasons which -induce me to believe, that none of the Platonic dialogues were -published during the lifetime of Sokrates. My reasons are partly -connected with Sokrates, partly with Plato. - -[Side-note: Reasons founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his -relations with Plato.] - -First, in reference to Sokrates--we may reasonably doubt whether any -written reports of his actual conversations were published during his -lifetime. He was the most constant, public, and indiscriminate of all -talkers: always in some frequented place, and desiring nothing so much -as a respondent with an audience. Every one who chose to hear him, -might do so without payment and with the utmost facility. Why then -should any one wish to read written reports of his conversations? -especially when we know that the strong interest which they excited in -the hearers depended much upon the spontaneity of his inspirations, -and hardly less upon the singularity of his manner and physiognomy. -Any written report of what he said must appear comparatively tame. -Again, as to fictitious dialogues (like the Platonic) employing the -name of Sokrates as spokesman--such might doubtless be published -during his lifetime by derisory dramatists for the purpose of raising -a laugh, but not surely by a respectful disciple and admirer for the -purpose of giving utterance to doctrines of his own. The greater was -the respect felt by Plato for Sokrates, the less would he be likely to -take the liberty of making Sokrates responsible before the public for -what Sokrates had never said.[60] There is a story in Diogenes--to the -effect that Sokrates, when he first heard the Platonic dialogue called -Lysis, exclaimed--"What a heap of falsehoods does the young man utter -about me!"[61] This story merits no credence as a fact: but it -expresses the displeasure which Sokrates would be likely to feel, on -hearing that one of his youthful companions had dramatised him as he -appears in the Lysis. Xenophon tells us, and it is very probable, that -inaccurate oral reports of the real colloquies of Sokrates may have -got into circulation. But that the friends and disciples of Sokrates, -during his lifetime, should deliberately publish fictitious dialogues, -putting their own sentiments into his mouth, and thus contribute to -mislead the public--is not easily credible. Still less credible is it -that Plato, during the lifetime of Sokrates, should have published -such a dialogue as the Phædrus, wherein we find ascribed to Sokrates, -poetical and dithyrambic effusions utterly at variance with the real -manifestations which Athenians might hear every day from Sokrates in -the market-place.[62] Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, complains of -the comic poet Aristophanes for misrepresenting him. Had the Platonic -Phædrus been then in circulation, or any other Platonic dialogues, he -might with equally good reason have warned the Dikasts against judging -of him, a real citizen on trial, from the titular Sokrates whom even -disciples did not scruple to employ as spokesman for their own -transcendental doctrine, and their own controversial sarcasms. - -[Footnote 60: Valentine Rose observes, in regard to a dialogue -composed by some one else, wherein Plato was introduced as one of the -interlocutors, that it could not have been composed until after -Plato's death, and that the dialogues of Plato were not composed until -after the death of Sokrates. "Platonis autem sermones antequam mortuus -fuerit, scripto neminem tradidisse, neque magistri viventis personâ in -dialogis abusos fuisse (non magis quam vivum Socratem induxerunt -Xenophon, Plato, cæteri Socratici), hoc veterum mori et religioni -quivis facile concedet," &c. (V. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, -pp. 57, 74, Leipsic, 1863.)--Val. Rose expresses the same opinion (that -none of the Sokratic dialogues, either by Plato or the other -companions of Sokrates, were written until after the death of -Sokrates) in his earlier work, De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et -Auctoritate, p. 25.] - -[Footnote 61: Diog. L. iii. 35.] - -[Footnote 62: In regard to the theory (elaborated by Schleiermacher, -recently again defended by Volquardsen), that the Phædrus is the -earliest among the Platonic dialogues, composed about 406 B.C., it -appears to me inconsistent also with what we know about Lysias. In the -Platonic Phædrus, Lysias is presented as a [Greek: logogra/phos] of -the highest reputation and eminence (p. 228 A, 257 C, and indeed -throughout the whole dialogue). Now this is quite inconsistent with -what we read from Lysias himself in the indictment which he preferred -against Eratosthenes, not long after the restoration of the democracy, -403 B.C. He protests therein strenuously that he had never had -judicial affairs of his own, nor meddled with those of others; and he -expresses the greatest apprehension from his own [Greek: a)peiri/a] -(sects. 4-6). I cannot believe that this would be said by a person -whom Phædrus terms [Greek: deino/tatos ô(\n tô=n nu=n gra/phein]. -Moreover, Lysias, in that same discourse, describes his own position -at Athens, anterior to the Thirty: he belonged to a rich metic family, -and was engaged along with his brother Polemarchus in a large -manufactory of shields, employing 120 slaves (s. 20). A person thus -rich and occupied was not likely to become a professed and notorious -[Greek: logogra/phos], though he may have been a clever and -accomplished man. Lysias was plundered and impoverished by the Thirty; -and he is said to have incurred much expense in aiding the efforts of -Thrasybulus. It was after this change of circumstances that he took to -rhetoric as a profession; and it is to some one of these later years -that the Platonic Phædrus refers.] - -[Side-note: Reasons, founded on the early life, character, and -position of Plato.] - -Secondly, in regard to Plato, the reasons leading to the same -conclusion are yet stronger. Unfortunately, we know little of the life -of Plato before he attained the age of 28, that is, before the death -of Sokrates: but our best means of appreciating it are derived from -three sources. 1. Our knowledge of the history of Athens from 409-399 -B.C., communicated by Thucydides, Xenophon, &c. 2. The seventh Epistle -of Plato himself, written four or five years before his death (about -352 B.C.). 3. A few hints from the Memorabilia of Xenophon. - -[Side-note: Plato's early life--active by necessity, and to some -extent ambitious.] - -To these evidences about the life of Plato, it has not been customary -to pay much attention. The Platonic critics seem to regard Plato so -entirely as a spiritual person ("like a blessed spirit, visiting earth -for a short time," to cite a poetical phrase applied to him by Göthe), -that they disdain to take account of his relations with the material -world, or with society around him. Because his mature life was -consecrated to philosophy, they presume that his youth must have been -so likewise. But this is a hasty assumption. You cannot thus abstract -_any_ man from the social medium by which, he is surrounded. The -historical circumstances of Athens from Plato's nineteenth year to his -twenty-sixth (409-403 B.C.) were something totally different from what -they afterwards became. They were so grave and absorbing, that had he -been ever so much inclined to philosophy, he would have been compelled -against his will to undertake active and heavy duty as a citizen. -Within those years (as I have observed in a preceding chapter) fell -the closing struggles of the Peloponnesian war; in which (to repeat -words already cited from Thucydides) Athens became more a military -post than a city--every citizen being almost habitually under arms: -then the long blockade, starvation, and capture of the city, followed -by the violences of the Thirty, the armed struggle under Thrasybulus, -and the perilous, though fortunately successful and equitable, -renovation of the democracy. These were not times for a young citizen, -of good family and robust frame, to devote himself exclusively to -philosophy and composition. I confess myself surprised at the -assertion of Schleiermacher and Steinhart, that Plato composed the -Charmidês and other dialogues under the Anarchy.[63] Amidst such -disquietude and perils he could not have renounced active duty for -philosophy, even if he had been disposed to do so. - -[Footnote 63: Steinhart, Einl. zum Laches, vol. i. p. 358, where he -says that Plato composed the Charmidês, Lachês, and Protagoras, all in -404 B.C. under the Thirty. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Charmides, -vol. ii. p. 8. - -The lines of Lucretius (i. 41) bear emphatically upon this trying -season: - -Nam neque nos agere hoc patriai tempore iniquo -Possumus æquo animo nec Memmi clara propago -Talibus in rebus communi desse saluti.] - -But, to make the case stronger, we learn from Plato's own testimony, -in his seventh Epistle, that he was not at that time disposed to -renounce active political life. He tells us himself, that as a young -man he was exceedingly eager, like others of the same age, to meddle -and distinguish himself in active politics.[64] How natural such -eagerness was, to a young citizen of his family and condition, may be -seen by the analogy of his younger brother Glaukon, who was -prematurely impatient to come forward: as well as by that of his -cousin Charmides, who had the same inclination, but was restrained by -exaggerated diffidence of character. Now we know that the real -Sokrates (very different from the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias) -did not seek to deter young men of rank from politics, and to consign -them to inactive speculation. Sokrates gives[65] earnest encouragement -to Charmides; and he does not discourage Glaukon, but only presses him -to adjourn his pretensions until the suitable stock of preliminary -information has been acquired. We may thus see that assuming the young -Plato to be animated with political aspirations, he would certainly -not be dissuaded,--nay, he would probably be encouraged--by Sokrates. - -[Footnote 64: Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 C. [Greek: Ne/os e)gô/ pote -ô)\n polloi=s dê\ tau)to\n e)/pathon; ô)|ê/thên, ei) tha=tton -e)mautou= genoi/mên ku/rios, e)pi\ ta\ koina\ tê=s po/leôs eu)thu\s -i)e/nai]. Again, 325 E: [Greek: ô(/ste me, to\ prô=ton pollê=s mesto\n -o)/nta o(rmê=s e)pi\ to\ pra/ttein ta\ koina/], &c.] - -[Footnote 65: See the two interesting colloquies of Sokrates, with -Glaukon and Charmides (Xenoph. Mem. iii. 6, 7). - -Charmides was killed along with Kritias during the eight months called -The Anarchy, at the battle fought with Thrasybulus and the democrats -(Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 19). The colloquy of Sokrates with Charmides, -recorded by Xenophon in the Memorabilia, must have taken place at some -time before the battle of Ægospotami; perhaps about 407 or 406 B.C.] - -Plato farther tells us that when (after the final capitulation of -Athens) the democracy was put down and the government of the Thirty -established, he embarked in it actively under the auspices of his -relatives (Kritias, Charmides, &c., then in the ascendant), with the -ardent hopes of youth[66] that he should witness and promote the -accomplishment of valuable reforms. Experience showed him that he was -mistaken. He became disgusted with the enormities of the Thirty, -especially with their treatment of Sokrates; and he then ceased to -co-operate with them. Again, after the year called the Anarchy, the -democracy was restored, and Plato's political aspirations revived -along with it. He again put himself forward for active public life, -though with less ardent hopes.[67] But he became dissatisfied with the -march of affairs, and his relationship with the deceased Kritias was -now a formidable obstacle to popularity. At length, four years after -the restoration of the democracy, came the trial and condemnation of -Sokrates. It was that event which finally shocked and disgusted Plato, -converting his previous dissatisfaction into an utter despair of -obtaining any good results from existing governments. From -thenceforward, he turned away from practice and threw himself into -speculation.[68] - -[Footnote 66: Plato, Epist. vii. 324 D. [Greek: Kai\ e)gô\ thaumasto\n -ou)de\n e)/pathon u(po\ neo/têtos], &c.] - -[Footnote 67: Plato, Epist. vii. 325 A. [Greek: Pa/lin de/, -bradu/teron me\n, ei)=lke de/ me o(/môs ê( peri\ to\ pra/ttein ta\ -koina\ kai\ politika\ e)pithumi/a.]] - -[Footnote 68: Plato, Epist. vii. 325 C: [Greek: Skopou=nti dê/ moi -tau=ta te kai\ tou\s a)nthrô/pous tou\s pra/ttontas ta\ politika/], -&c. 325 E: [Greek: Kai\ tou= me\n skopei=n mê\ a)postê=nai, pê= pote\ -a)/meinon a)\n gi/gnoito peri/ te au)ta\ tau=ta kai\ dê\ kai\ peri\ -tê\n pa=san politei/an, tou= de\ pra/ttein au)= perime/nein ai)ei\ -kairou/s, teleutô=nta de\ noê=sai peri\ pasô=n tô=n nu=n po/leôn o(/ti -kakô=s xu/mpasai politeu/ontai]. - -I have already stated in the 84th chapter of my History, describing -the visit of Plato to Dionysius in Sicily, that I believe the Epistles -of Plato to be genuine, and that the seventh Epistle especially -contains valuable information. Some critics undoubtedly are of a -different opinion, and consider them as spurious. But even among these -critics, several consider that the author of the Epistles, though not -Plato himself, was a contemporary and well informed: so that his -evidence is trustworthy. See K. F. Hermann, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, -pp. 282-283. The question has been again discussed recently by -Ueberweg (Untersuch. über d. Aechth. u. Zeitf. d. Plat. Schriften, pp. -120-123-125-129), who gives his own opinion that the letters are not -by Plato, and produces various arguments to the point. His arguments -are noway convincing to me: for the mysticism and pedantry of the -Epistles appear to me in full harmony with the Timæus and Leges, and -with the Pythagorean bias of Plato's later years, though not in -harmony with the Protagoras, and various other dialogues. Yet Ueberweg -also declares his full belief that the seventh Epistle is the -composition of a well-informed contemporary, and perfectly worthy of -credit as to the facts and K. F. Hermann declares the same. This is -enough for my present purpose. - -The statement, trusted by all the critics, that Plato's first visit to -Syracuse was made when he was about 40 years of age, depends -altogether on the assertion of the seventh Epistle. How numerous are -the assertions made by Platonic critics respecting Plato, upon -evidence far slighter than that of these Epistles! Boeckh considers -the seventh Epistle as the genuine work of Plato. Valentine Rose also -pronounces it to be genuine, though he does not consider the other -Epistles to be so (De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine, p. 25, p. 114, -Berlin, 1854). Tennemann admits the Epistles generally to be genuine -(System der Platon. Philos. i. p. 106). - -It is undeniable that these Epistles of Plato were recognised as -genuine and trusted by all the critics of antiquity from Aristophanes -downwards. Cicero, Plutarch, Aristeides, &c., assert facts upon the -authority of the Epistles. Those who declare the Epistles to be -spurious and worthless, ought in consistency to reject the statements -which Plutarch makes on the authority of the Epistles: they will find -themselves compelled to discredit some of the best parts of his life -of Dion. Compare Aristeides, [Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s] Or. 45, pp. -90-106, Dindorf.] - -[Side-note: Plato did not retire from political life until after the -restoration of the democracy, nor devote himself to philosophy until -after the death of Sokrates.] - -This very natural recital, wherein Plato (at the age of 75) describes -his own youth between 21 and 28--taken in conjunction with the other -reasons just enumerated--impresses upon me the persuasion, that Plato -did not devote himself to philosophy, nor publish any of his -dialogues, before the death of Sokrates: though he may probably have -composed dramas, and the beautiful epigrams which Diogenes has -preserved. He at first frequented the society of Sokrates, as many -other aspiring young men frequented it (likewise that of Kratylus, and -perhaps that of various Sophists[69]), from love of ethical debate, -admiration of dialectic power, and desire to acquire a facility of the -same kind in his own speech: not with any view to take up philosophy -as a profession, or to undertake the task either of demolishing or -constructing in the region of speculation. No such resolution was -adopted until after he had tried political life and had been -disappointed:--nor until such disappointment had been still more -bitterly aggravated by the condemnation of Sokrates. It was under this -feeling that Plato first consecrated himself to that work of -philosophical meditation and authorship,--of inquisitive travel and -converse with philosophers abroad,--and ultimately of teaching in the -Academy,--which filled up the remaining fifty years of his life. The -death of Sokrates left that venerated name open to be employed as -spokesman in his dialogues: and there was nothing in the political -condition of Athens after 399 B.C., analogous to the severe and -perilous struggle which tasked all the energies of her citizens from -409 B.C. down to the close of the war. - -[Footnote 69: Compare Plat. Protag. 312 A-B, 315 A, where the -distinction is pointedly drawn between one who visited Protagoras -[Greek: e)pi\ te/chnê|, ô(s dêmiourgo\s e)so/menos], and others who -came simply [Greek: e)pi\ paidei/a|, ô(s to\n i)diô/tên kai\ to\n -e)leu/theron pre/pei.]] - -[Side-note: All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one -years after the death of Sokrates.] - -I believe, on these grounds, that Plato did not publish any dialogues -during the life of Sokrates. An interval of fifty-one years separates -the death of Sokrates from that of Plato. Such an interval is more -than sufficient for all the existing dialogues of Plato, without the -necessity of going back to a more youthful period of his age. As to -distribution of the dialogues, earlier or later, among these fifty-one -years, we have little or no means of judging. Plato has kept out of -sight--with a degree of completeness which is really surprising--not -merely his own personality, but also the marks of special date and the -determining circumstances in which each dialogue was composed. Twice -only does he mention his own name, and that simply in passing, as if -it were the name of a third person.[70] As to the point of time to -which he himself assigns each dialogue, much discussion has been held -how far Plato has departed from chronological or historical -possibility; how far he has brought persons together in Athens who -never could have been there together, or has made them allude to -events posterior to their own decease. A speaker in Athenæus[71] -dwells, with needless acrimony, on the anachronisms of Plato, as if -they were gross faults. Whether they are faults or not, may fairly be -doubted: but the fact of such anachronisms cannot be doubted, when we -have before us the Menexenus and the Symposion. It cannot be supposed, -in the face of such evidence, that Plato took much pains to keep clear -of anachronisms: and whether they be rather more or rather less -numerous, is a question of no great moment. - -[Footnote 70: In the Apologia, c. 28, p. 38, Sokrates alludes to Plato -as present in court, and as offering to become guarantee, along with -others, for his fine. In the Phædon, Plato is mentioned as being sick; -to explain why he was not present at the last scene of Sokrates -(Phædon, p. 59 B). Diog. L. iii. 37. - -The pathos as well as the detail of the narrative in the Phædon makes -one imagine that Plato really was present at the scene. But being -obliged, by the uniform scheme of his compositions, to provide another -narrator, he could not suffer it to be supposed that he was himself -present. - -I have already remarked that this mention of Plato in the third person -([Greek: Pla/tôn de/, oi)=mai, ê)sthe/nei]) was probably one of the -reasons which induced Panætius to declare the Phædon _not_ to be the -work of Plato.] - -[Footnote 71: Athenæus, v. pp. 220, 221. Didymus also attacked Plato -as departing from historical truth--[Greek: e)piphuo/menos tô=| -Pla/tôni ô(s paristorou=nti]--against which the scholiast (ad Leges, -i. p. 630) defends him. Groen van Prinsterer, Prosopogr. Plat. p. 16. -The rhetor Aristeides has some remarks of the same kind, though less -acrimonious (Orat. xlvii. p. 435, Dind.) than the speaker in -Athenæus.] - -[Side-note: The Thrasyllean Canon is more worthy of trust than the -modern critical theories by which it has been condemned.] - -I now conclude my enquiry respecting the Platonic Canon. The -presumption in favour of that Canon, as laid down by Thrasyllus, is -stronger (as I showed in the preceding chapter) than it is in regard -to ancient authors generally of the same age: being traceable, in the -last resort, through the Alexandrine Museum, to authenticating -manuscripts in the Platonic school, and to members of that school who -had known and cherished Plato himself.[72] I have reviewed the -doctrines of several recent critics who discard this Canon as unworthy -of trust, and who set up for themselves a type of what Plato _must -have_ been, derived from a certain number of items in the -Canon--rejecting the remaining items as unconformable to their -hypothetical type. The different theories which they have laid down -respecting general and systematic purposes of Plato (apart from the -purpose of each separate composition), appear to me uncertified and -gratuitous. The "internal reasons," upon which they justify rejection -of various dialogues, are only another phrase for expressing their own -different theories respecting Plato as a philosopher and as a writer. For -my part I decline to discard any item of the Thrasyllean Canon, upon such -evidence as they produce: I think it a safer and more philosophical -proceeding to accept the entire Canon, and to accommodate my general -theory of Plato (in so far as I am able to frame one) to each and all -of its contents. - -[Footnote 72: I find this position distinctly asserted, and the -authority of the Thrasyllean catalogue, as certifying the genuine -works of Plato, vindicated, by Yxem, in his able dissertation on the -Kleitophon of Plato (pp. 1-3, Berlin, 1846). But Yxem does not set -forth the grounds of this opinion so fully as the present state of the -question demands. Moreover, he combines it with another opinion, upon -which he insists even at greater length, and from which I altogether -dissent--that the tetralogies of Thrasyllus exhibit the genuine order -established by Plato himself among the Dialogues.] - -[Side-note: Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed.] - -Considering that Plato's period of philosophical composition extended -over fifty years, and that the circumstances of his life are most -imperfectly known to us--it is surely hazardous to limit the range of -his varieties, on the faith of a critical repugnance, not merely -subjective and fallible, but withal entirely of modern growth: to -assume, as basis of reasoning, the admiration raised by a few of the -finest dialogues--and then to argue that no composition inferior to -this admired type, or unlike to it in doctrine or handling, can -possibly be the work of Plato. "The Minos, Theagês, Epistolæ, -Epinomis, &c., are unworthy of Plato: nothing so inferior in -excellence can have been composed by him. No dialogue can be admitted -as genuine which contradicts another dialogue, or which advocates any -low or incorrect or un-Platonic doctrine. No dialogue can pass which -is adverse to the general purpose of Plato as an improver of morality, -and a teacher of the doctrine of Ideas." On such grounds as these we -are called upon to reject various dialogues: and there is nothing upon -which, generally speaking, so much stress is laid as upon inferior -excellence. For my part, I cannot recognise any of them as sufficient -grounds of exception. I have no difficulty in believing, not merely -that Plato (like Aristophanes) produced many successive novelties, -"not at all similar one to the other, and all clever"[73]--but also -that among these novelties, there were inferior dialogues as well as -superior: that in different dialogues he worked out different, even -contradictory, points of view--and among them some which critics -declare to be low and objectionable: that we have among his works -unfinished fragments and abandoned sketches, published without order, -and perhaps only after his death. - -[Footnote 73: Aristophan. Nubes, 547-8. - -[Greek: A)ll' a)ei\ kaina\s i)de/as ei)sphe/rôn sophi/zomai, -Ou)de\n a)llê/laisin o(moi/as, kai\ pa/sas dexia/s.]] - -[Side-note: Opinions of Schleiermacher, tending to show this.] - -It may appear strange, but it is true, that Schleiermacher, the -leading champion of Plato's central purpose and systematic unity from -the beginning, lays down a doctrine to the same effect. He says, -"Truly, nothing can be more preposterous, than when people demand that -all the works even of a great master shall be of equal perfection--or -that such as are not equal, shall be regarded as not composed by him". -Zeller expresses himself in the same manner, and with as little -reserve.[74] These eminent critics here proclaim a general rule which -neither they nor others follow out. - -[Footnote 74: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Menon, vol. iii. p. 337. -"Und wahrlich, nichts ist wohl wunderlicher, als wenn man verlangt, -dass alle Werke auch eines grossen Meisters von gleicher Volkommenheit -seyn sollten--oder die es nicht sind, soll er nicht verfertigt haben." - -Compare Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., vol. ii. p. 322, ed. 2nd. - -It is to be remembered that this opinion of Schleiermacher refers only -to _completed works_ of the same master. You are not authorised in -rejecting any completed work as spurious, on the ground that it is not -equal in merit to some other. Still less, then, are you authorised in -rejecting, on the like ground, an uncompleted work--a professed -fragment, or a preliminary sketch. Of this nature are several of the -minor items in the Thrasyllean canon. - -M. Boeckh, in his Commentary on the dialogue called Minos, has -assigned the reasons which induce him to throw out that dialogue, -together with the Hipparchus, from the genuine works of Plato (and -farther to consider both of them, and the pseudo-Platonic dialogues De -Justo and De Virtute, as works of [Greek: Si/môn o( skuteu/s]: with -this latter hypothesis I have here no concern). He admits fully that -the Minos is of the Platonic age and irreproachable in style--"veteris -esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui mores totus denique -character, spondent" (p. 32). Next, he not only admits that it is like -Plato, but urges the _too great likeness_ to Plato as one of the -points of his case. He says that it is a bad, stupid, and unskilful -imitation of different Platonic dialogues: "Pergamus ad alteram partem -nostræ argumentationis, eamque etiam firmiorem, de _nimiâ -similitudine_ Platonicorum aliquot locorum. Nam de hoc quidem -conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem se ipsum haud posse -imitari: ni forté quis dubitet de sanâ ejus mente" (p. 23). In the -sense which Boeckh intends, I agree that Plato did not imitate -himself: in another sense, I think that he did. I mean that his -consummate compositions were preceded by shorter, partial, incomplete -sketches, which he afterwards worked up, improved, and re-modelled. I -do not understand how Plato could have composed such works as -Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Symposion, Phædrus, Phædon, &c., -without having before him many of these preparatory sketches. That -some of these sketches should have been preserved is what we might -naturally expect; and I believe Minos and Hipparchus to be among them. -I do not wonder that they are of inferior merit. One point on which -Boeckh (pp. 7, 8) contends that Hipparchus and Minos are unlike to -Plato is, that the _collocutor_ with Sokrates is anonymous. But we -find anonymous talkers in the Protagoras, Sophistês, Politikus, and -Leges.] - -I find elsewhere in Schleiermacher, another opinion, not less -important, in reference to disallowance of dialogues, on purely -internal grounds. Take the Gorgias and the Protagoras: both these two -dialogues are among the most renowned of the catalogue: both have -escaped all suspicion as to legitimacy, even from Ast and Socher, the -two boldest of all disfranchising critics. In the Protagoras, Sokrates -maintains an elaborate argument to prove, against the unwilling -Protagoras, that the Good is identical with the Pleasurable, and the -Evil identical with the Painful--in the Gorgias, Sokrates holds an -argument equally elaborate, to show that Good is essentially different -from Pleasurable, Evil from Painful. What the one affirms, the other -denies. Moreover, Schleiermacher himself characterises the thesis -vindicated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, as "entirely un-Sokratic and -un-Platonic".[75] If internal grounds of repudiation are held to be -available against the Thrasyllean canon, how can such grounds exist in -greater force than those which are here admitted to bear against the -Protagoras--That it exhibits Sokrates as contradicting the Sokrates of -the Gorgias--That it exhibits him farther as advancing and proving, at -great length, a thesis "entirely un-Sokratic and un-Platonic"? Since -the critics all concur in disregarding these internal objections, as -insufficient to raise even a suspicion against the Protagoras, I -cannot concur with them when they urge the like objections as valid -and irresistible against other dialogues. - -[Footnote 75: Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Protag. vol. i. p. 232. "Jene -ganz unsokratische und unplatonische Ansicht, dass das Gute nichts -anderes ist als das Angenehme." - -So also, in the Parmenides, we find a host of unsolved objections -against the doctrine of Ideas; upon which in other dialogues Plato so -emphatically insists. Accordingly, Socher, resting upon this -discrepancy as an "internal ground," declares the Parmenides not to be -the work of Plato. But the other critics refuse to go along with this -inference. I think they are right in so refusing. But this only shows -how little such internal grounds are to be trusted, as evidence to -prove spuriousness.] - -I may add, as farther illustrating this point, that there are few -dialogues in the list against which stronger objections on internal -grounds can be brought, than Leges and Menexenus. Yet both of them -stand authenticated, beyond all reasonable dispute, as genuine works -of Plato, not merely by the Canon of Thrasyllus, but also by the -testimony of Aristotle.[76] - -[Footnote 76: See Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 384: and still -more, Zeller, Plat. Studien, pp. 1-131, Tübingen, 1839. In that -treatise, where Zeller has set forth powerfully the grounds for -denying the genuineness of the Leges, he relied so much upon the -strength of this negative case, as to discredit the direct testimony -of Aristotle affirming the Leges to be genuine. In his Phil. d. -Griech. Zeller altered this opinion, and admitted the Leges to be -genuine. But Strümpell adheres to the earlier opinion given by Zeller, -and maintains that the partial recantation is noway justified. (Gesch. -d. Prakt. Phil. d. Griech. p. 457.) - -Suckow mentions (Form der Plat. Schriften, 1855, p. 135) that Zeller -has in a subsequent work reverted to his former opinion, denying the -genuineness of the Leges. Suckow himself denies it also; relying not -merely on the internal objections against it, but also on a passage of -Isokrates (ad Philippum, p. 84), which he considers to sanction his -opinion, but which (in my judgment) entirely fails to bear him out. - -Suckow attempts to show (p. 55), and Ueberweg partly countenances the -same opinion, that the two passages in which Aristotle alludes to the -Menexenus (Rhet. i. 9, 30; iii. 14, 11) do not prove that he -(Aristotle) considered it as a work of Plato, because he mentions the -name of Sokrates only, and not that of Plato. But this is to require -from a witness such precise specification as we cannot reasonably -expect. Aristotle, alluding to the Menexenus, says, [Greek: Sôkra/tês -e)n tô=| E)pitaphi/ô|]: just as, in alluding to the Gorgias in another -place (Sophist. Elench. 12, p. 173), he says, [Greek: Kalliklê=s e)n -tô=| Gorgi/a|]: and again, in alluding to the Phædon, [Greek: o( e)n -Phai/dôni Sôkra/tês] (De Gen. et Corrupt. ii. 9, p. 335): not to -mention his allusions in the Politica to the Platonic Republic, under -the name of Sokrates. No instance can be produced in which Aristotle -cites any Sokratic dialogue, composed by Antisthenes, Æschines, &c., -or any other of the Sokratic companions except Plato. And when we read -in Aristotle's Politica (ii. 3, 3) the striking compliment -paid--[Greek: To\ me\n ou)=n peritto\n e)/chousi pa/ntes oi( tou= -Sôkra/tous lo/goi, kai\ to\ kompso/n, kai\ to\ kaino/tomon, kai\ to\ -zêtêtiko/n; kalô=s de\ pa/nta i)/sôs chalepo/n]--we cannot surely -imagine that he intends to designate any other dialogues than those -composed by Plato.] - -[Side-note: Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties, -and must be based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to -the exclusion of the rest.] - -While adhering therefore to the Canon of Thrasyllus, I do not think -myself obliged to make out that Plato is either like to himself, or -equal to himself, or consistent with himself, throughout all the -dialogues included therein, and throughout the period of fifty years -during which these dialogues were composed. Plato is to be found in -all and each of the dialogues, not in an imaginary type abstracted -from some to the exclusion of the rest. The critics reverence so much -this type of their own creation, that they insist on bringing out a -result consistent with it, either by interpretation specially -contrived, or by repudiating what will not harmonise. Such sacrifice -of the inherent diversity, and separate individuality, of the -dialogues, to the maintenance of a supposed unity of type, style, or -purpose, appears to me an error. In fact,[77] there exists, for us, no -personal Plato any more than there is a personal Shakespeare. Plato -(except in the Epistolæ) never appears before us, nor gives us any -opinion as his own: he is the unseen prompter of different characters -who converse aloud in a number of distinct dramas--each drama a -separate work, manifesting its own point of view, affirmative or -negative, consistent or inconsistent with the others, as the case may -be. In so far as I venture to present a general view of one who keeps -constantly in the dark--who delights to dive, and hide himself, not -less difficult to catch than the supposed Sophist in his own dialogue -called Sophistês--I shall consider it as subordinate to the dialogues, -each and all: and above all, it must be such as to include and -acknowledge not merely diversities, but also inconsistencies and -contradictions.[78] - -[Footnote 77: The only manifestation of the personal Plato is in the -Epistolæ. I have already said that I accept these as genuine, though -most critics do not. I consider them valuable illustrations of his -character, as far as they go. They are all written after he was more -than sixty years of age. And most of them relate to his relations with -Dionysius the younger, with Dion, and with Sicilian affairs generally. -This was a peculiar and outlying phase of Plato's life, during which -(through the instigation of Dion, and at the sacrifice of his own -peace of mind) he became involved in the world of political action: he -had to deal with real persons, passions, and interests--with the -feeble character, literary velleities, and jealous apprehensions of -Dionysius--the reforming vehemence and unpopular harshness of Dion--the -courtiers, the soldiers, and the people of Syracuse, all moved by -different passions of which he had had no practical experience. It -could not be expected that, amidst such turbulent elements, Plato as -an adviser could effect much: yet I do not think that he turned his -chances, doubtful as they were, to the best account. I have -endeavoured to show this in the tenth volume of my History of Greece, -c. 84. But at all events, these operations lay apart from Plato's true -world--the speculation, dialectic, and lectures of the Academy at -Athens. The Epistolæ, however, present some instructive points, -bearing upon Plato's opinions about writing as a medium of -philosophical communication and instruction to learners, which I shall -notice in the suitable place.] - -[Footnote 78: I transcribe from the instructive work of M. Ernest -Renan, _Averroès et l'Averroïsme_, a passage in which he deprecates -the proceeding of critics who presume uniform consistency throughout -the works of Aristotle, and make out their theory partly by forcible -exegesis, partly by setting aside as spurious all those compositions -which oppose them. The remark applies more forcibly to the dialogues -or Plato, who is much less systematic than Aristotle:-- - -"On a combattu l'interprétation d'Ibn-Rosehd (Averroès), et soutenu -que l'intellect actif n'est pour Aristote qu'une faculté de l'ame. -L'intellect passif n'est alors que la faculté de recevoir les [Greek: -phanta/smata]: l'intellect actif n'est que l'induction s'exerçant sur -les [Greek: phanta/smata] et en tirant les idées générales. Ainsi l'on -fait concorder la théorie exposée dans le troisième livre du Traité de -l'Ame, avec celle des Seconds Analytiques, où Aristote semble réduire -le rôle de la raison à l'induction généralisant les faits de la -sensation. Certes, je ne me dissimule pas qu'Aristote paraît souvent -envisager le [Greek: nou=s] comme personnel à l'homme. Son attention -constante à repéter que l'intellect est identique à l'intelligible, -que l'intellect passe à l'acte quand il devient l'objet qu'il pense, -est difficile à concilier avec l'hypothèse d'un intellect séparé de -l'homme. Mais il est dangereux de faire ainsi coincider de force les -différents aperçus des anciens. Les anciens philosophaient souvent -sans se limiter dans un système, traitant le même sujet selon les -points de vue qui s'offraient à eux, ou qui leur étaient offerts par -les écoles antérieures, sans s'inquiéter des dissonances qui pouvaient -exister entre ces divers tronçons de théorie. Il est puéril de -chercher à les mettre d'accord avec eux-mêmes, quand eux-mêmes s'en -sont peu souciés. Autant vaudrait, comme certains critiques Allemands, -déclarer interpolés tous les passages que l'on ne peut concilier avec -les autres. Ainsi, la théorie des Seconds Analytiques et celles du -troisième livre de l'Ame, sans se contredire expressément, -représentent deux aperçus profondément distincts et d'origine -différente, sur le fait de l'intelligence." (Averroès et l'Averroïsme, -p. 96-98, Paris, 1852.) - -There is also in Strümpell (Gesch. der Prakt. Phil. der Griech. vor -Aristot. p. 200) a good passage to the same purpose as the above from -M. Renan: disapproving this presumption,--that the doctrines of every -ancient philosopher must of course be systematic and coherent with -each other--as "a phantom of modern times": and pointing out that both -Plato and Aristotle founded their philosophy, not upon any one -governing [Greek: a)rchê\] alone, from which exclusively consequences -are deduced, but upon several distinct, co-ordinate, independent, -points of view: each of which is by turns followed out, not always -consistently with the others.] - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - -PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. - - -[Side-note: Variety and abundance visible in Plato's writings.] - -On looking through the collection of works enumerated in the -Thrasyllean Canon, the first impression made upon us respecting the -author is, that which is expressed in the epithets applied to him by -Cicero--"varius et multiplex et copiosus". Such epithets bring before -us the variety in Plato's points of view and methods of handling--the -multiplicity of the topics discussed--the abundance of the premisses -and illustrations suggested:[1] comparison being taken with other -literary productions of the same age. It is scarcely possible to find -any one predicate truly applicable to all of Plato's works. Every -predicate is probably true in regard to some:--none in regard to all. - -[Footnote 1: The rhetor Aristeides, comparing Plato with Æschines -(_i.e._ Æschines Socraticus, disciple of Sokrates also), remarks that -Æschines was more likely to report what Sokrates really said, from -being inferior in productive imagination. Plato (as he truly says -Orat. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], p. 295, Dindorf) [Greek: -tê=s phu/seôs chrê=tai periousi/a|], &c.] - -[Side-note: Plato both sceptical and dogmatical.] - -Several critics of antiquity considered Plato as essentially a -sceptic--that is, a Searcher or Enquirer, not reaching any assured or -proved result. They denied to him the character of a dogmatist: they -maintained that he neither established nor enforced any affirmative -doctrines.[2] This latter statement is carried too far. Plato is -sceptical in some dialogues, dogmatical in others. And the catalogue -of Thrasyllus shows that the sceptical dialogues (Dialogues of Search -or Investigation) are more numerous than the dogmatical (Dialogues of -Exposition)--as they are also, speaking generally, more animated and -interesting. - -[Footnote 2: Diogen. Laert. iii. 52. Prolegom. Platon. Philosoph. c. -10, vol. vi. 205, of K. F. Hermann's edition of Plato.] - -[Side-note: Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in -all.] - -Again, Aristotle declared the writing of Plato to be something between -poetry and prose, and even the philosophical doctrine of Plato -respecting Ideas, to derive all its apparent plausibility from poetic -metaphors. The affirmation is true, up to a certain point. Many of the -dialogues display an exuberant vein of poetry, which was declared--not -by Aristotle alone, but by many other critics contemporary with Plato--to -be often misplaced and excessive--and which appeared the more -striking because the dialogues composed by the other Sokratic -companions were all of them plain and unadorned.[3] The various -mythes, in the Phædrus and elsewhere, are announced expressly as -soaring above the conditions of truth and logical appreciation. -Moreover, we find occasionally an amount of dramatic vivacity, and of -artistic antithesis between the speakers introduced, which might have -enabled Plato, had he composed for the drama as a profession, to -contend with success for the prizes at the Dionysiac festivals. But -here again, though this is true of several dialogues, it is not true -of others. In the Parmenidês, Timæus, and the Leges, such elements -will be looked for in vain. In the Timæus, they are exchanged for a -professed cosmical system, including much mystic and oracular -affirmation, without proof to support it, and without opponents to -test it: in the Leges, for ethical sermons, and religious -fulminations, proclaimed by a dictatorial authority. - -[Footnote 3: See Dionys. Hal. Epist. ad Cn. Pomp. 756, De Adm. Vi Dic. -Dem. 956, where he recognises the contrast between Plato and [Greek: -to\ Sôkratiko\n didaskalei=on pa=n]. His expression is remarkable: -[Greek: Tau=ta ga\r oi(/ te kat' au)to\n geno/menoi pa/ntes -e)pitimô=sin ô(=n ta\ o)no/mata ou)de\n dei= me le/gein]. Epistol. ad -Cn. Pomp. p. 761; also 757. See also Diog. L. iii. 37; Aristotel. -Metaph. A. 991, a. 22. - -Cicero and Quintilian say the same about Plato's style: "Multum supra -prosam orationem, et quam pedestrem Græci vocant, surgit: ut mihi non -hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico videatur oraculo instinctus". -Quintil. x. 1, 81. Cicero, Orator, c. 20. Lucian, Piscator, c. 22. - -Sextus Empiricus designates the same tendency under the words [Greek: -tê\n Pla/tônos a)neidôlopoi/êsin]. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. iii. 189. - -The Greek rhetors of the Augustan age--Dionysius of Halikarnassus and -Kækilius of Kalaktê--not only blamed the style of Plato for excessive, -overstrained, and misplaced metaphor, but Kækilius goes so far as to -declare a decided preference for Lysias over Plato. (Dionys. Hal. De -Vi Demosth. pp. 1025-1037, De Comp. Verb. p. 196 R; Longinus, De -Sublimitat. c. 32.) The number of critics who censured the manner and -doctrine of Plato (critics both contemporary with him and subsequent) -was considerable (Dionys. H. Ep. ad Pomp. p. 757). Dionysius and the -critics of his age had before their eyes the contrast of the Asiatic -style of rhetoric, prevalent in their time, with the Attic style -represented by Demosthenes and Lysias. They wished to uphold the force -and simplicity of the Attic, against the tumid, wordy, pretensive -Asiatic: and they considered the Phædrus, with other compositions of -Plato, as falling under the same censure with the Asiatic. See Theoph. -Burckhardt, Cæcili Rhet. Frag., Berlin, 1863, p. 15.] - -[Side-note: Form of dialogue--universal to this extent, that Plato -never speaks in his own name.] - -One feature there is, which is declared by Schleiermacher and others -to be essential to all the works of Plato--the form of dialogue. Here -Schleiermacher's assertion, literally taken, is incontestable. Plato -always puts his thoughts into the mouth of some spokesman: he never -speaks in his own name. All the works of Plato which we possess -(excepting the Epistles, and the Apology, which last I consider to be -a report of what Sokrates himself said) are dialogues. But under this -same name, many different realities are found to be contained. In the -Timæus and Kritias the dialogue is simply introductory to a continuous -exposition--in the Menexenus, to a rhetorical discourse: while in the -Leges, and even in Sophistês, Politikus, and others, it includes no -antithesis nor interchange between two independent minds, but is -simply a didactic lecture, put into interrogatory form, and broken -into fragments small enough for the listener to swallow at once: he by -his answer acknowledging the receipt. If therefore the affirmation of -Schleiermacher is intended to apply to all the Platonic compositions, -we must confine it to the form, without including the spirit, of -dialogue. - -[Side-note: No one common characteristic pervading all Plato's works.] - -It is in truth scarcely possible to resolve all the diverse -manifestations of the Platonic mind into one higher unity; or to -predicate, about Plato as an intellectual person, anything which shall -be applicable at once to the Protagoras, Gorgias, Parmenidês, Phædrus, -Symposion, Philêbus, Phædon, Republic, Timæus, and Leges. Plato was -sceptic, dogmatist, religious mystic and inquisitor, mathematician, -philosopher, poet (erotic as well as satirical), rhetor, artist--all -in one:[4] or at least, all in succession, throughout the fifty years -of his philosophical life. At one time his exuberant dialectical -impulse claims satisfaction, manifesting itself in a string of -ingenious doubts and unsolved contradictions: at another time, he is -full of theological antipathy against those who libel Helios and -Selênê, or who deny the universal providence of the Gods: here, we -have unqualified confessions of ignorance, and protestations against -the false persuasion of knowledge, as alike widespread and -deplorable--there, we find a description of the process of building up -the Kosmos from the beginning, as if the author had been privy to the -inmost purposes of the Demiurgus. In one dialogue the erotic fever is -in the ascendant, distributed between beautiful youths and philosophical -concepts, and confounded with a religious inspiration and _furor_ -which supersedes and transcends human sobriety (Phædrus): in another, -all vehement impulses of the soul are stigmatised and repudiated, no -honourable scope being left for anything but the calm and passionless -Nous (Philêbus, Phædon). Satire is exchanged for dithyramb, and mythe, -and one ethical point of view for another (Protagoras, Gorgias). The -all-sufficient dramatising power of the master gives full effect to -each of these multifarious tendencies. On the whole--to use a -comparison of Plato himself[5]--the Platonic sum total somewhat -resembles those fanciful combinations of animals imagined in the -Hellenic mythology--an aggregate of distinct and disparate -individualities, which look like one because they are packed in the -same external wrapper. - -[Footnote 4: Dikæarchus affirmed that Plato was a compound of Sokrates -with Pythagoras. Plutarch calls him also a compound of Sokrates with -Lykurgus. (Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 2, p. 718 B.) - -Nemesius the Platonist (Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 5-7-8) repeats the -saying of Dikæarchus, and describes Plato as midway between Pythagoras -and Sokrates; [Greek: meseu/ôn Puthago/rou kai\ Sôkra/tous]. No three -persons could be more disparate than Lykurgus, Pythagoras, and -Sokrates. But there are besides various other attributes of Plato, -which are not included under either of the heads of this tripartite -character. - -The Stoic philosopher Sphærus composed a work in three books--[Greek: -Peri\ Lukou/rgou kai\ Sôkra/tous]--(Diog. La. vii. 178). He probably -compared therein the Platonic Republic with the Spartan constitution -and discipline.] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Republ. ix. 588 C. [Greek: Oi(=ai muthologou=ntai -palaiai\ gene/sthai phu/seis, ê(/ te Chimai/ras kai\ ê( Sku/llês kai\ -Kerbe/rou, kai\ a)/llai tine\s suchnai\ le/gontai xumpephukui=ai -i)de/ai pollai\ ei)s e(\n gene/sthai . . . . Peri/plason dê\ au)toi=s -e)/xôthen e(no\s ei)ko/na, tê\n tou= a)nthrô/pou, ô(/ste tô=| mê\ -duname/nô| ta\ e)nto\s o(ra=|n, a)lla\ to\ e)/xô mo/non e)/lutron -o(rô=nti, e(\n zô=on phai/nesthai--a)/nthrôpon.]] - -[Side-note: The real Plato was not merely a writer of dialogues, but -also lecturer and president of a school. In this last important -function he is scarcely at all known to us. Notes of his lectures -taken by Aristotle.] - -Furthermore, if we intend to affirm anything about Plato as a whole, -there is another fact which ought to be taken into account.[6] We know -him only from his dialogues, and from a few scraps of information. But -Plato was not merely a composer of dialogues. He was lecturer, and -chief of a school, besides. The presidency of that school, commencing -about 386 B.C., and continued by him with great celebrity for the last -half (nearly forty years) of his life, was his most important -function. Among his contemporaries he must have exercised greater -influence through his school than through his writings.[7] Yet in this -character of school-teacher and lecturer, he is almost unknown to us: -for the few incidental allusions which have descended to us, through -the Aristotelian commentators, only raise curiosity without satisfying -it. The little information which we possess respecting Plato's -lectures, relates altogether to those which he delivered upon the -Ipsum Bonum or Summum Bonum at some time after Aristotle became his -pupil--that is, during the last eighteen years of Plato's life. -Aristotle and other hearers took notes of these lectures: Aristotle -even composed an express work now lost (De Bono or De Philosophiâ), -reporting with comments of his own these oral doctrines of Plato, -together with the analogous doctrines of the Pythagoreans. We learn -that Plato gave continuous lectures, dealing with the highest and most -transcendental concepts (with the constituent elements or factors of -the Platonic Ideas or Ideal Numbers: the first of these factors being -The One the second, The Indeterminate Dyad, or The Great and Little, -the essentially indefinite), and that they were mystic and -enigmatical, difficult to understand.[8] - -[Footnote 6: Trendelenburg not only adopts Schleiermacher's theory of -a preconceived and systematic purpose connecting together all Plato's -dialogues, but even extends this purpose to Plato's oral lectures: "Id -pro certo habendum est. sicut prioribus dialogis quasi præeparat -(Plato) posteriores, posterioribus evolvit priores--ita et in scholis -continuasse dialogos; quæ reliquerit, absolvisse; atque omnibus ad -summa principia perductis, intima quasi semina aperuisse". -(Trendelenburg, De Ideis et Numeris Platonis, p. 6.) - -This opinion is surely not borne out--it seems even contradicted--by -all the information which we possess (very scanty indeed) about the -Platonic lectures. Plato delivered therein his Pythagorean doctrines, -merging his Ideas in the Pythagorean numerical symbols: and Aristotle, -far from considering this as a systematic and intended evolution of -doctrine at first imperfectly unfolded, treats it as an additional -perversion and confusion, introduced into a doctrine originally -erroneous. In regard to the transition of Plato from the doctrine of -Ideas to that of Ideal Numbers, see Aristotel. Metaphys. M. 1078, b. -9, 1080, a. 12 (with the commentary of Bonitz, pp. 539-541), A. 987, -b. 20. - -M. Boeckh, too, accounts for the obscure and enigmatical speaking of -Plato in various dialogues, by supposing that he cleared up all the -difficulties in his oral lectures. "Platon deutet nur an--spricht -meinethalben räthselhaft (in den Gesetzen); aber gerade so räthselhaft -spricht er von diesen Sachen im Timaeus: er pflegt mathematische -Theoreme nur anzudeuten, nicht zu entwickeln: ich glaube, weil er sie -in den Vorträgen ausführte," &c. (Untersuchungen über das Kosmische -System des Platon, p. 50.) - -This may be true about the mathematical theorems; but I confess that I -see no proof of it. Though Plato admits that his doctrine in the -Timæus is [Greek: a)ê/thês lo/gos], yet he expressly intimates that -the hearers are instructed persons, able to follow him (Timæus, p. 53 -C.).] - -[Footnote 7: M. Renan, in his work, 'Averroès et l'Averroïsme,' pp. -257-325, remarks that several of the Italian professors of philosophy, -at Padua and other universities, exercised far greater influence -through their lectures than through their published works. He says (p. -325-6) respecting Cremonini (Professor at Padua, 1590-1620):--"Il a -été jusqu'ici apprécié d'une manière fort incomplète par les -historiens de la philosophie. On ne l'a jugé que par ses écrits -imprimés, qui ne sont que des dissertations de peu d'importance, et ne -peuvent en aucune manière faire comprendre la renommée colossale à -laquelle il parvint. Cremonini n'est qu'un professeur: ses _cours_ -sont sa véritable philosophie. Aussi, tandis que ses écrits imprimés -se vendaient fort mal, les rédactions de ses leçons se répandaient -dans toute l'Italie et même au delà des monts. On sait que les élèves -préfèrent souvent aux textes imprimés, les cahiers qu'ils ont ainsi -recueillis de la bouche de leurs professeurs. . . En général, c'est -dans les cahiers, beaucoup plus que dans les sources imprimées, qu'il -faut étudier l'école de Padoue. Pour Cremonini, cette tâche est -facile; car les copies de ses cours sont innombrables dans le nord de -l'Italie."] - -[Footnote 8: Aristotle (Physic. iv. p. 209, b. 34) alludes to [Greek: -ta\ lego/mena a)/grapha do/gmata] of Plato, and their discordance on -one point with the Timæus. - -Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. f. 104 b. p. 362, a. 11, Brandis. -[Greek: A)rcha\s ga\r kai\ tô=n ai)sthêtô=n to\ e(\n kai\ tê\n -a)o/risto/n phasi dua/da le/gein to\n Pla/tôna. Tê\n de\ a)o/riston -dua/da kai\ e)n toi=s noêtoi=s tithei\s a)/peiron ei)=nai e)/legen, -kai\ to\ me/ga de\ kai\ to\ mikro\n a)rcha\s tithei\s a)/peira ei)=nai -e)/legen e)n toi=s peri\ Ta)gathou= lo/gois, oi(=s o( A)ristote/lês -kai\ Ê(raklei/dês kai\ E)stiai=os kai\ a)/lloi tou= Pla/tônos -e(tai=roi _parageno/menoi a)negra/psanto ta\ r(êthe/nta, -ai)nigmatôdô=s ô(s e)r)r(ê/thê_; Porphu/rios de\ diarthrou=n au)ta\ -e)paggello/menos ta/de peri\ au)tô=n ge/graphen e)n tô| Philê/bô|]. -Compare another passage of the same Scholia, p. 334, b. 28, p. 371, b. -26. [Greek: Ta\s a)gra/phous sunousi/as tou= Pla/tônos au)to\s o( -A)ristote/lês a)pegra/psato]. 372, a. [Greek: To\ methektiko\n e)n -me\n tai=s peri\ Ta)gathou sunousi/ais me/ga kai\ mikro\n e)ka/lei, -e)n de\ tô=| Timai/ô| u(/lên, ê)\n kai\ chô/ran kai\ to/pon -ô)no/maze]. Comp 371, a. 5, and the two extracts from Simplikius, -cited by Zeller, De Hermodoro, pp. 20, 21. By [Greek: a)/grapha -do/gmata], or [Greek: a)/graphoi sunou/siai], we are to understand -opinions or colloquies not written down (or not communicated to others -as writings) _by Plato himself_: thus distinguished from his written -dialogues. Aristotle, in the treatise, De Animâ, i. 2, p. 404, b. 18, -refers to [Greek: e)n toi=s peri\ Philosophi/as]: which Simplikius -thus explains [Greek: peri\ philosophi/as nu=n le/gei ta\ peri\ tou= -A)gathou= au)tô=| e)k tê=s Pla/tônos a)nagegramme/na sunousi/as, e)n -oi(=s i(storei= ta/s te Puthagorei/ous kai\ Platônika\s peri\ tô=n -o)/ntôn do/xas]. Philoponus reports the same thing: see -Trendelenburg's Comm. on De Animâ, p. 226. Compare Alexand. ad -Aristot. Met. A. 992, p. 581, a. 2, Schol. Brandis.] - -[Side-note: Plato's lectures De Bono obscure and transcendental. -Effect which they produced on the auditors.] - -One remarkable observation, made upon them by Aristotle, has been -transmitted to us.[9] There were lectures announced to be, On the -Supreme Good. Most of those who came to hear, expected that Plato -would enumerate and compare the various matters usually considered -_good_--_i.e._ health, strength, beauty, genius, wealth, power, &c. -But these hearers were altogether astonished at what they really -heard: for Plato omitting the topics expected, descanted only upon -arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy; and told them that The Good was -identical with The One (as contrasted with the Infinite or -Indeterminate which was Evil). - -[Footnote 9: Aristoxenus, Harmon. ii. p. 30. [Greek: Katha/per -A)ristote/lês a)ei\ diêgei=to tou\s plei/stous tô=n a)kousa/ntôn para\ -Pla/tônos tê\n peri\ tou= a)gathou= a)kro/asin pathei=n; prosei=nai -ga\r e(/kaston u(polamba/nonta lê/psesthai/ ti tô=n nomizome/nôn -a)nthrôpi/nôn a)gathô=n;--o(/te de\ phanei/êsan oi( lo/goi peri\ -mathêma/tôn kai\ a)rithmô=n kai\ geômetri/as kai\ a)strologi/as, kai\ -to\ pe/ras o(/ti a)gatho/n e)stin e(/n, pantelô=s oi)=mai para/doxon -e)phai/neto au)toi=s]. - -Compare Themistius, Orat. xxi. p. 245 D. Proklus also alludes to this -story, and to the fact that most of the [Greek: polu\s kai\ pantoi=os -o)/chlos], who were attracted to Plato's [Greek: a)kro/asis peri\ -Ta)gathou=], were disappointed or unable to understand him, and went -away. (Proklus ad Platon. Parmen. p. 92, Cousin. 528, Stallb.)] - -[Side-note: They were delivered to miscellaneous auditors. They -coincide mainly with what Aristotle states about the Platonic Ideas.] - -We see farther from this remark:--First, that Plato's lectures were -often above what his auditors could appreciate--a fact which we learn -from other allusions also: Next, that they were not confined to a -select body of advanced pupils, who had been worked up by special -training into a state fit for comprehending them.[10] Had such been -the case, the surprise which Aristotle mentions could never have -been felt. And we see farther, that the transcendental doctrine -delivered in the lectures De Bono (though we find partial analogies to -it in Philêbus, Epinomis, and parts of Republic) coincides more with -what Aristotle states and comments upon as Platonic doctrine, than -with any reasonings which we find in the Platonic dialogues. It -represents the latest phase of Platonism: when the Ideas originally -conceived by him as Entities in themselves, had become merged or -identified in his mind with the Pythagorean numbers or symbols. - -[Footnote 10: Respecting Plato's lectures, see Brandis (Gesch. der -Griech.-Röm. Phil. vol. ii. p. 180 seq., 306-319); also Trendelenburg, -Platonis De Ideis et Numeris Doctrina, pp. 3, 4, seq. - -Brandis, though he admits that Plato's lectures were continuous -discourses, thinks that they were intermingled with discussion and -debate: which may have been the case, though there is no proof of it. -But Schleiermacher goes further, and says (Einleitung. p. 18), "Any -one who can think that Plato in these oral _Vorträgen_ employed the -Sophistical method of long speeches, shows such an ignorance as to -forfeit all right of speaking about Plato". Now the passage from -Aristoxenus, given in the preceding note, is our only testimony; and -it distinctly indicates a continuous lecture to an unprepared -auditory, just as Protagoras or Prodikus might have given. K. F. -Hermann protests, with good reason, against Schleiermacher's opinion. -(Ueber Plato's schriftstellerische Motive, p. 289.) - -The confident declaration just produced from Schleiermacher -illustrates the unsound basis on which he and various other Platonic -critics proceed. They find, in some dialogues of Plato, a strong -opinion proclaimed, that continuous discourse is useless for the -purpose of instruction. This was a point of view which, at the time -when he composed these dialogues, he considered to be of importance, -and desired to enforce. But we are not warranted in concluding that he -must always have held the same conviction throughout his long -philosophical life, and in rejecting as un-platonic all statements and -all compositions which imply an opposite belief. We cannot with reason -bind down Plato to a persistence in one and the same type of -compositions.] - -[Side-note: The lectures De Bono may perhaps have been more -transcendental than Plato's other lectures.] - -This statement of Aristotle, alike interesting and unquestionable, -attests the mysticism and obscurity which pervaded Plato's doctrine in -his later years. But whether this lecture on _The Good_ is to be taken -as a fair specimen of Plato's lecturing generally, and from the time -when he first began to lecture, we may perhaps doubt:[11] since we -know that as a lecturer and converser he acquired extraordinary -ascendency over ardent youth. We see this by the remarkable instance -of Dion.[12] - -[Footnote 11: Themistius says (Orat. xxi. p. 245 D) that Plato sometimes -lectured in the Peiræus, and that a crowd then collected to hear him, -not merely from the city, but also from the country around: if he -lectured De Bono, however, the ordinary hearers became tired and -dispersed, leaving only [Greek: tou\s sunê/theis o(milêta/s]. - -It appears that Plato in his lectures delivered theories on the -principles of geometry. He denied the reality of geometrical points--or -at least admitted them only as hypotheses for geometrical -reasoning. He maintained that what others called _a point_ ought to be -called "_an indivisible line_". Xenokrates maintained the same -doctrine after him. Aristotle controverts it (see Metaphys. A., 992, -b. 20). Aristotle's words citing Plato's opinion ([Greek: tou/tô| me\n -ou)=n tô=| ge/nei kai\ diema/cheto Pla/tôn ô(s o)/nti geômetrikô=| -do/gmati, a)ll' e)ka/lei a)rchê\n grammê=s; tou=to de\ polla/kis -e)ti/thei ta\s a)to/mous gramma/s]) must be referred to Plato's oral -lectures; no such opinion occurs in the dialogues. This is the opinion -both of Bonitz and Schwegler in their comments on the passage: also of -Trendelenburg, De Ideis et Numeris Platonis, p. 66. That geometry and -arithmetic were matters of study and reflection both to Plato himself -and to many of his pupils in the Academy, appears certain; and perhaps -Plato may have had an interior circle of pupils, to which he applied -the well-known exclusion--[Greek: mêdei\s a)geôme/trêtos ei)si/tô]. -But we cannot make out clearly what was Plato's own proficiency, or -what improvements he may have introduced, in geometry, nor what there -is to justify the comparison made by Montucla between Plato and -Descartes. In the narrative respecting the Delian problem--the -duplication of the cube--Archytas, Menæchmus, and Eudoxus, appear as -the inventors of solutions, Plato as the superior who prescribes and -criticises (see the letter and epigram of Eratosthenes: Bernhardy, -Eratosthenica, pp. 176-184). The three are said to have been blamed by -Plato for substituting instrumental measurement in place of -geometrical proof (Plutarch, Problem. Sympos. viii. 2, pp. 718, 719; -Plutarch, Vit. Marcelli, c. 14). The geometrical construction of the -[Greek: Ko/smos], which Plato gives us in the Timæus, seems borrowed -from the Pythagoreans, though applied probably in a way peculiar to -himself (see Finger, De Primordiis Geometriæ ap. Græcos, p. 38, -Heidelb. 1831).] - -[Footnote 12: See Epist. vii. pp. 327, 328.] - -[Side-note: Plato's Epistles--in them only he speaks in his own -person.] - -The only occasions on which we have experience of Plato as speaking in -his own person, and addressing himself to definite individuals, are -presented by his few Epistles; all of them (as I have before remarked) -written after he he was considerably above sixty years of age, and -nearly all addressed to Sicilians or Italians--Dionysius II., Dion, -the friends of Dion after the death of the latter, and Archytas.[13] -In so far as these letters bear upon Plato's manner of lecturing or -teaching, they go to attest, first, his opinion that direct written -exposition was useless for conveying real instruction to the reader--next, -his reluctance to publish any such exposition under his own -name, and carrying with it his responsibility. When asked for -exposition, he writes intentionally with mystery, so that ordinary -persons cannot understand. - -[Footnote 13: Of the thirteen Platonic Epistles, Ep. 2, 3, 13, are -addressed to the second or younger Dionysius; Ep. 4 to Dion; Ep. 7, 8, -to the friends and relatives of Dion after Dion's death. The 13th -Epistle appears to be the earliest of all, being seemingly written -after the first voyage of Plato to visit Dionysius II. at Syracuse, in -367-366 B.C., and before his second visit to the same place and -person, about 363-362 B.C. Epistles 2 and 3 were written after his -return from that second visit, in 360 B.C., and prior to the -expedition of Dion against Dionysius in 357 B.C. Epistle 4 was written -to Dion shortly after Dion's victorious career at Syracuse, about 355 -B.C. Epistles 7 and 8 were written not long after the murder of Dion -in 354 B.C. The first in order, among the Platonic Epistles, is not -written by Plato, but by Dion, addressed to Dionysius, shortly after -the latter had sent Dion away from Syracuse. The fifth is addressed by -Plato to the Macedonian prince Perdikkas. The sixth, to Hermeias of -Atarneus, Erastus, and Koriskus. The ninth and twelfth, to Archytas of -Tarentum. The tenth, to Aristodôrus. The eleventh, to Laodamas. I -confess that I see nothing in these letters which compels me to depart -from the judgment of the ancient critics, who unanimously acknowledged -them as genuine. I do not think myself competent to determine _à -priori_ what the style of Plato's letters _must_ have been; what -topics he _must_ have touched upon, and what topics he _could not_ -have touched upon. I have no difficulty in believing that Plato, -writing a letter on philosophy, may have expressed himself with as -much mysticism and obscurity as we now read in Epist. 2 and 7. Nor -does it surprise me to find Plato (in Epist. 13) alluding to details -which critics, who look upon him altogether as a spiritual person, -disallow as mean and unworthy. His recommendation of the geometer, -Helikon of Kyzikus, to Dionysius and Archytas, is to me interesting: -to make known the theorems of Eudoxus, through the medium of Helikon, -to Archytas, was no small service to geometry in those days. I have an -interest in learning how Plato employed the money given to him by -Dionysius and other friends: that he sent to Dionysius a statue of -Apollo by a good Athenian sculptor named Leochares (this sculptor -executed a bust of Isokrates also, Plut. Vit. x. Orat. p. 838); and -another statue by the same sculptor for the wife of Dionysius, in -gratitude for the care which she had taken of him (Plato) when sick at -Syracuse; that he spent the money of Dionysius partly in discharging -his own public taxes and liturgies at Athens, partly in providing -dowries for poor maidens among his friends; that he was so beset by -applications, which he could not refuse, for letters of recommendation -to Dionysius, as to compel him to signify, by a private mark, to -Dionysius, which among the letters he wished to be most attended to. -"These latter" (he says) "I shall begin with [Greek: theo\s] (sing. -number), the others I shall begin with [Greek: theoi\] (plural)." -(Epist. xiii. 361, 362, 363.)] - -[Side-note: Intentional obscurity of his Epistles in reference to -philosophical doctrine.] - -Knowing as we do that he had largely imbued himself with the tenets of -the Pythagoreans (who designedly adopted a symbolical manner of -speaking--published no writings--for Philolaus is cited as an -exception to their rule--and did not care to be understood, except by -their own adepts after a long apprenticeship) we cannot be surprised -to find Plato holding a language very similar. He declares that the -highest principles of his philosophy could not be set forth in writing -so as to be intelligible to ordinary persons: that they could only be -apprehended by a few privileged recipients, through an illumination -kindled in the mind by multiplied debates and much mental effort: that -such illumination was always preceded by a painful feeling of want, -usually long-continued, sometimes lasting for nearly thirty years, and -exchanged at length for relief at some unexpected moment.[14] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Epist. ii. pp. 313, 314.] - -Plato during his second visit had had one conversation, and only one, -with Dionysius respecting the higher mysteries of philosophy. He had -impressed upon Dionysius the prodigious labour and difficulty of -attaining truth upon these matters. The despot professed to thirst -ardently for philosophy, and the conversation turned upon the Natura -Primi--upon the first and highest principles of Nature.[15] Dionysius, -after this conversation with Plato, intimated that he had already -conceived in his own mind the solution of these difficulties, and the -truth upon philosophy in its greatest mysteries. Upon which Plato -expressed his satisfaction that such was the case,[16] so as to -relieve him from the necessity of farther explanations, though the -like had never happened to him with any previous hearer. - -[Footnote 15: Plat. Epist. ii. 312: [Greek: peri\ tê=s tou= prô/ton -phu/seôs]. Epist. vii. 344: [Greek: tô=n peri\ phu/seôs a)/krôn kai\ -prô/tôn].--One conversation only--Epist. vii. 345.] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Epist. ii. 313 B. Plato asserts the same about -Dionysius in Epist. vii. 341 B.] - -[Side-note: Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. His -anxiety to confine philosophy to discussion among select and prepared -minds.] - -But Dionysius soon found that he could not preserve the explanation in -his mind, after Plato's departure--that difficulties again crowded -upon him--and that it was necessary to send a confidential messenger -to Athens to entreat farther elucidations. In reply, Plato sends back -by the messenger what is now numbered as the second of his Epistles. -He writes avowedly in enigmatical language, so that, if the letter be -lost, the finder will not be able to understand it; and he enjoins -Dionysius to burn it after frequent perusal.[17] He expresses his hope -that when Dionysius has debated the matter often with the best minds -near him, the clouds will clear away of themselves, and the moment of -illumination will supervene.[18] He especially warns Dionysius against -talking about these matters to unschooled men, who will be sure to -laugh at them; though by minds properly prepared, they will be -received with the most fervent welcome.[19] He affirms that Dionysius -is much superior in philosophical debate to his companions; who were -overcome in debate with him, not because they suffered themselves -designedly to be overcome (out of flattery towards the despot, as some -ill-natured persons alleged), but because they could not defend -themselves against the Elenchus as applied by Dionysius.[20] Lastly, -Plato advises Dionysius to write down nothing, since what has once -been written will be sure to disappear from the memory; but to trust -altogether to learning by heart, meditation, and repeated debate, as a -guarantee for retention in his mind. "It is for that reason" (Plato -says)[21] "that I have never myself written anything upon these -subjects. There neither is, nor shall there ever be, any treatise of -Plato. The opinions called by the name of Plato are those of Sokrates, -in his days of youthful vigour and glory." - -[Footnote 17: Plat. Epist. ii. 312 E: [Greek: phraste/on dê/ soi di' -ai)nigmô=n i(/n a)/n ti ê( de/ltos ê)\ po/ntos ê)\ gê=s e)n ptuchai=s -pa/thê|, o( a)nagnou\s mê\ gnô=|]. 314 C: [Greek: e)/r)r(hôso kai\ -pei/thou, kai\ tê\n e)pistolê\n tau/tên nu=n prô=ton polla/kis -a)nagnou\s kata/kauson]. - -Proklus, in his Commentary on the Timæus (pp. 40, 41), remarks the -fondness of Plato for [Greek: to\ ai)nigmatôde/s].] - -[Footnote 18: Plat. Epist. ii. 313 D.] - -[Footnote 19: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 A. [Greek: eu)labou= me/ntoi mê/ -pote e)kpe/sê| tau=ta ei)s a)nthrô/pous a)paideu/tous.]] - -[Footnote 20: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 D.] - -[Footnote 21: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 C. [Greek: megi/stê de\ phulakê\ -to\ mê\ gra/phein a)ll' e)kmantha/nein; ou) ga\r e)sti ta\ graphe/nta -mê\ ou)k e)kpesei=n. dia\ tau=ta ou)de\n pô/pot' e)gô\ peri\ tou/tôn -ge/grapha, ou)/d' e)/sti su/ggramma Pla/tônos ou)de\n ou)/d' e)/stai; -ta\ de\ nu=n lego/mena, Sôkra/tous e)sti\ kalou= kai\ ne/ou -gegono/tos]. - -"Addamus ad superiora" (says Wesseling, Epist. ad Venemam, p. 41, -Utrecht, 1748), "Platonem videri semper voluisse, dialogos, in quibus -de Philosophiâ, deque Republicâ, atque ejus Legibus, inter -confabulantes actum fuit, non sui ingenii sed Socratici, foetus -esse".] - -[Side-note: He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative -exposition of his own philosophical doctrine.] - -Such is the language addressed by Plato to the younger Dionysius, in a -letter written seemingly between 362-357 B.C. In another letter, -written about ten years afterwards (353-352 B.C.) to the friends of -Dion (after Dion's death), he expresses the like repugnance to the -idea of furnishing any written authoritative exposition of his -principal doctrines. "There never shall be any expository treatise of -mine upon them" (he declares). "Others have tried, Dionysius among the -number, to write them down; but they do not know what they attempt. I -could myself do this better than any one, and I should consider it the -proudest deed in my life, as well as a signal benefit to mankind, to -bring forward an exposition of Nature luminous to all.[22] But I think -the attempt would be nowise beneficial, except to a few, who require -only slight direction to enable them to find it for themselves: to -most persons it would do no good, but would only fill them with empty -conceit of knowledge, and with contempt for others.[23] These matters -cannot be communicated in words as other sciences are. Out of repeated -debates on them, and much social intercourse, there is kindled -suddenly a light in the mind, as from fire bursting forth, which, when -once generated, keeps itself alive."[24] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Epist. vii. 341, B, C. [Greek: ti/ tou/tou -ka/llion e)pe/prakt' a)\n ê(mi=n e)n tô=| bi/ô| ê)\ toi=s te -a)nthrô/poisi me/ga o)/phelos gra/psai _kai\ tê\n phu/sin ei)s phô=s -pa=si proagagei=n_?]] - -[Footnote 23: Plat. Epist. vii. 341 E.] - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Epist. vii. 341 C. [Greek: ou)/koun e)mo/n ge -peri\ au)tô=n e)/sti su/ggramma ou)de mê/ pote ge/nêtai; r(êto\n ga\r -ou)damô=s e)stin ô(s a)/lla mathê/mata, a)ll' e)k pollê=s sunousi/as -gignome/nês peri\ to\ pra=gma au)to\ kai\ tou= suzê=|n, e)xai/phnês, -oi(=on a)po\ puro\s pêdê/santos e)xaphthe\n phô=s, e)n tê=| psuchê=| -geno/menon au)to\ e(auto\ ê)/dê tre/phei]. - -This sentence, as a remarkable one, I have translated literally in the -text: that which precedes is given only in substance. - -We see in the Republic that Sokrates, when questioned by Glaukon, and -urged emphatically to give some solution respecting [Greek: ê( tou= -a)gathou= i)de/a] and [Greek: ê( tou= diale/gesthai du/namis], answers -only by an evasion or a metaphor (Republic, vi. 506 E, vii. 533 A). -Now these are much the same points as what are signified in the letter -to Dionysius, under the terms [Greek: ta\ prô=ta kai\ a)/kra tê=s -phu/seôs--ê( tou= prô/tou phu/sis] (312 E): as to which Plato, when -questioned, replies in a mystic and unintelligible way.] - -[Side-note: He illustrates his doctrine by the successive stages of -geometrical teaching. Difficulty to avoid the creeping in of error at -each of these stages.] - -Plato then proceeds to give an example from geometry, illustrating the -uselessness both of writing and of direct exposition. In acquiring a -knowledge of the circle, he distinguishes five successive stages. 1. -The Name. 2. The Definition, a proposition composed of nouns and -verbs. 3. The Diagram. 4. Knowledge, Intelligence, True Opinion, -[Greek: Nou=s]. 5. The Noumenon--[Greek: Au)to\-Ku/klos]--ideal or -intelligible circle, the only true object of knowledge.[25] The fourth -stage is a purely mental result, not capable of being exposed either -in words or figure: it presupposes the three first, but is something -distinct from them; and it is the only mental condition immediately -cognate and similar to the fifth stage, or the self-existent idea.[26] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Epist. vii. 342 A, B. The geometrical -illustration which follows is intended merely as an illustration, of -general principles which Plato asserts to be true about all other -enquiries, physical or ethical.] - -[Footnote 26: Plat. Epist. vii. 342 C. [Greek: ô(s de\ e(\n tou=to -au)= pa=n thete/on, ou)k e)n phônai=s ou)d' e)n sôma/tôn schê/masin -a)ll' e)n psuchai=s e)no/n, ô(=| dê=lon e(/teron te o)\n au)tou= tou= -ku/klou tê=s phu/seôs, tô=n te e)/mprosthen lechthe/ntôn triô=n. -tou/tôn de\ e)ggu/tata me\n xuggenei/a| kai\ o(moio/têti, tou= -pe/mptou] (_i. e._ [Greek: tou= Au)to\-ku/klou]) [Greek: nou=s] (the -fourth stage) [Greek: peplêsi/ake, ta)/lla de\ ple/on a)pe/chei]. - -In Plato's reckoning, [Greek: o( nou=s] is counted as the fourth, in -the ascending scale, from which we ascend to the fifth, [Greek: to\ -noou/menon], or [Greek: noêto/n]. [Greek: O( nou=s] and [Greek: to\ -noêto\n] are cognate or homogeneous--according to a principle -often insisted on in ancient metaphysics--like must be known by like. -(Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 404, b. 15.)] - -Now in all three first stages (Plato says) there is great liability to -error and confusion. The name is unavoidably equivocal, uncertain, -fluctuating: the definition is open to the same reproach, and often -gives special and accidental properties along with the universal and -essential, or instead of them: the diagram cannot exhibit the -essential without some variety of the accidental, nor without some -properties even contrary to reality, since any circle which you draw, -instead of touching a straight line in one point alone, will be sure -to touch it in several points.[27] Accordingly no intelligent man will -embody the pure concepts of his mind in fixed representation, either -by words or by figures.[28] If we do this, we have the _quid_ or -essence, which we are searching for, inextricably perplexed by -accompaniments of the _quale_ or accidents, which we are not searching -for.[29] We acquire only a confused cognition, exposing us to be -puzzled, confuted, and humiliated, by an acute cross-examiner, when he -questions us on the four stages which we have gone through to attain -it.[30] Such confusion does not arise from any fault in the mind, but -from the defects inherent in each of the four stages of progress. It -is only by painful effort, when each of these is naturally good--when -the mind itself also is naturally good, and when it has gone through -all the stages up and down, dwelling upon each--that true knowledge -can be acquired.[31] Persons whose minds are naturally bad, or have -become corrupt, morally or intellectually, cannot be taught to see -even by Lynkeus himself. In a word, if the mind itself be not cognate -to the matter studied, no quickness in learning nor force of memory -will suffice. He who is a quick learner and retentive, but not cognate -or congenial with just or honourable things--he who, though cognate -and congenial, is stupid in learning or forgetful--will never -effectually learn the truth about virtue or wickedness.[32] These can -only be learnt along with truth and falsehood as it concerns entity -generally, by long practice and much time.[33] It is only with -difficulty,--after continued friction, one against another, of all the -four intellectual helps, names and definitions, acts of sight and -sense,--after application of the Elenchus by repeated question and -answer, in a friendly temper and without spite--it is only after all -these preliminaries, that cognition and intelligence shine out with as -much intensity as human power admits.[34] - -[Footnote 27: Plat. Epist. vii. 343 B. This illustrates what is said -in the Republic about the geometrical [Greek: u(pothe/seis] (vi. 510 -E, 511 A; vii. 533 B.)] - -[Footnote 28: Plat. Epist. vii. 343 A. [Greek: ô(=n e(/neka nou=n -e)/chôn ou)dei\s tolmê/sei pote\ ei)s au)to\ tithe/nai ta\ nenoême/na, -kai\ tau=ta ei)s a)metaki/nêton, o(\ dê\ pa/schei ta\ gegramme/na -tu/pois.]] - -[Footnote 29: Plat. Epist. vii. 343 C.] - -[Footnote 30: Plat. Epist. vii. 343 D.] - -[Footnote 31: Plat. Epistol. vii. 343 E. [Greek: ê( de\ dia\ pa/ntôn -au)tô=n diagôgê/, a)/nô kai\ ka/tô metabai/nousa e)ph' e(/kaston, -mo/gis e)pistê/mên e)ne/teken eu)= pephuko/tos eu)= pephuko/ti.]] - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Epistol. vii. 344 A.] - -[Footnote 33: Plato, Epist. vii. 344 B. [Greek: a(/ma ga\r au)ta\ -a)na/gkê mantha/nein, kai\ to\ pseu=dos a(/ma kai\ a)lêthe\s tê=s -o(/lês ou)si/as.]] - -[Footnote 34: Plat. Epist. vii. 344 B. [Greek: mo/gis de\ tribo/mena -pro\s a)/llêla au)tô=n e(/kasta, o)no/mata kai\ lo/goi, o)/pseis te -kai\ ai)sthê/seis, e)n eu)mene/sin e)le/gchos e)legcho/mena kai\ -a)/neu phtho/nôn e)rôtê/sesi kai\ a)pokri/sesi chrôme/nôn, e)xe/lampse -phro/nêsis peri\ e(/kaston kai\ nou=s, suntei/nôn o(/ti ma/list' ei)s -du/namin a)nthrôpi/nên.]] - -[Side-note: No written exposition can keep clear of these chances of -error.] - -For this reason, no man of real excellence will ever write and publish -his views, upon the gravest matters, into a world of spite and -puzzling contention. In one word, when you see any published writings, -either laws proclaimed by the law-giver or other compositions by -others, you may be sure that, if he be himself a man of worth, these -were not matters of first-rate importance in his estimation. If they -really were so, and if he has published his views in writing, some -evil influence must have destroyed his good sense.[35] - -[Footnote 35: Plat. Epist. vii. 344 C-D.] - -[Side-note: Relations of Plato with Dionysius II. and the friends of -the deceased Dion. Pretensions of Dionysius to understand and expound -Plato's doctrines.] - -We see by these letters that Plato disliked and disapproved the idea -of publishing, for the benefit of readers generally, any written -exposition of _philosophia prima_, carrying his own name, and making -him responsible for it. His writings are altogether dramatic. All -opinions on philosophy are enunciated through one or other of his -spokesmen: that portion of the Athenian drama called the Parabasis, in -which the Chorus addressed the audience directly and avowedly in the -name of the poet, found no favour with Plato. We read indeed in -several of his dialogues (Phædon, Republic, Timæus, and others) dogmas -advanced about the highest and most recondite topics of philosophy: -but then they are all advanced under the name of Sokrates, Timæus, -&c.--[Greek: Ou)k e)mo\s o( mu=thos], &c. There never was any written -programme issued by Plato himself, declaring the Symbolum Fidei to -which he attached his own name.[36] Even in the Leges, the most -dogmatical of all his works, the dramatic character and the borrowed -voice are kept up. Probably at the time when Plato wrote his letter to -the friends of the deceased Dion, from which I have just quoted--his -aversion to written expositions was aggravated by the fact, that -Dionysius II., or some friend in his name, had written and published a -philosophical treatise of this sort, passing himself off as editor of -a Platonic philosophy, or of improved doctrines of his own built -thereupon, from oral communication with Plato.[37] We must remember -that Plato himself (whether with full sincerity or not) had -complimented Dionysius for his natural ability and aptitude in -philosophical debate:[38] so that the pretension of the latter to come -forward as an expositor of Plato appears the less preposterous. On the -other hand, such pretension was calculated to raise a belief that -Dionysius had been among the most favoured and confidential companions -of Plato: which belief Plato, writing as he was to the surviving -friends of Dion the enemy of Dionysius, is most anxious to remove, -while on the other hand he extols the dispositions and extenuates the -faults of his friend Dion. It is to vindicate himself from -misconception of his own past proceedings, as well as to exhort with -regard to the future, that Plato transmits to Sicily his long seventh -and eighth Epistles, wherein are embodied his objections against the -usefulness of written exposition intended for readers generally. - -[Footnote 36: The Platonic dialogue was in this respect different from -the Aristotelian dialogue. Aristotle, in his composed dialogues, -introduced other speakers, but delivered the principal arguments in -his own name. Cicero followed his example, in the De Finibus and -elsewhere: "Quæ his temporibus scripsi, [Greek: A)ristote/leion] morem -habent: in quo sermo ita inducitur cæterorum, ut penes ipsum sit -principatus". (Cic. ad Att. xiii. 19.) - -Herakleides of Pontus (Cicero, ibid.), in his composed dialogues, -introduced himself as a [Greek: kôpho\n pro/sôpon]. Plato does not -even do thus much.] - -[Footnote 37: We see this from Epist. vii. 341 B, 344 D, 345 A. Plato -speaks of the impression as then prevalent (when he wrote) in the mind -of Dionysius:--[Greek: po/teron Dionu/sios a)kou/sas mo/non a(/pax -ou(/tôs _ei)de/nai te oi)/etai_ kai\ i(kanôs oi)=den], &c.]] - -[Footnote 38: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 D.] - -[Side-note: Impossibility of teaching by written exposition assumed by -Plato; the assumption intelligible in his day.] - -These objections (which Plato had often insisted on,[39] and which are -also, in part, urged by Sokrates in the Phædrus) have considerable -force, if we look to the way in which Plato conceives them. In the -first place, Plato conceives the exposition as not merely written but -published: as being, therefore, presented to all minds, the large -majority being ignorant, unprepared, and beset with that false -persuasion of knowledge which Sokrates regarded as universal. In so -far as it comes before these latter, nothing is gained, and something -is lost; for derision is brought upon the attempt to teach.[40] In the -next place, there probably existed, at that time, no elementary work -whatever for beginners in any science: the Elements of Geometry by -Euclid were published more than a century after Plato's death, at -Alexandria. Now, when Plato says that written expositions, then -scarcely known, would be useless to the student--he compares them with -the continued presence and conversation of a competent teacher; whom -he supposes not to rely upon direct exposition, but to talk much -"about and about" the subject, addressing the pupil with a large -variety of illustrative interrogations, adapting all that was said to -his peculiar difficulties and rate of progress, and thus evoking the -inherent cognitive force of the pupil's own mind. That any Elements of -Geometry (to say nothing of more complicated inquiries) could be -written and published, such that an [Greek: a)geôme/trêtos] might take -up the work and learn geometry by means of it, without being misled by -equivocal names, bad definitions, and diagrams exhibiting the -definition as clothed with special accessories--this is a possibility -which Plato contests, and which we cannot wonder at his -contesting.[41] The combination of a written treatise, with the oral -exposition of a tutor, would have appeared to Plato not only useless -but inconvenient, as restraining the full liberty of adaptive -interrogation necessary to be exercised, different in the case of each -different pupil. - -[Footnote 39: Plato, Epist. vii. 342. [Greek: lo/gos a)lêthê/s, -polla/kis me\n u(p' e)mou= kai\ pro/sthen r(êthei/s], &c.] - -[Footnote 40: Plato (Epist. ii. 314 A) remarks this expressly: also in -the Phædrus, 275 E, 276 A. - -[Greek: A)/threi dê\ periskopô=n, mê/ tis tô=n a)muê/tôn e)pakou/sê|] -is the language of the Platonic Sokrates as a speaker in the Theætêtus -(155 E).] - -[Footnote 41: Some just and pertinent remarks, bearing on this -subject, are made by Condorcet, in one of his Academic Éloges: "Les -livres ne peuvent remplacer les leçons des maîtres habiles, lorsque -les sciences n'ont pas encore fait assez de progrès, pour que les -vérités, qui en forment l'ensemble, puissent êtres distribuées et -rapprochées entre elles suivant un ordre systématique: lorsque la -méthode d'en chercher de nouvelles n'a pas été réduite à des procédés -exacts et simples, à des règles sûres et précises. Avant cette époque, -il faut être déjà consommé dans une science pour lire avec utilité les -ouvrages qui en traitent: et comme cette espèce d'enfance de l'art est -le temps où les préjugés y regnent avec le plus d'empire, où les -savants sont les plus exposés à donner leurs hypothèses pour de -véritables principes, on risquerait encore de s'égarer si l'on se -bornait aux leçons d'un seul maître, quand même on aurait choisi celui -que la renommée place au premier rang; car ce temps est aussi celui -des reputations usurpées. Les voyages sont donc alors le seul moyen de -s'instruire, comme ils l'étaient dans l'antiquité et avant la -découverte de l'imprimerie." (Condorcet, Éloge de M. Margraaf, p. 349, -Oeuvres Complets, Paris, 1804. Éloges, vol. ii. Or Ed. Firmin Didot -Frères, Paris, 1847, vol. ii. pp. 598-9.)] - -[Side-note: Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the -expository process.--Power of sustaining a Sokratic -cross-examination.] - -Lastly, when we see by what standard Plato tests the efficacy of any -expository process, we shall see yet more clearly how he came to -consider written exposition unavailing. The standard which he applies -is, that the learner shall be rendered able both to apply to others, -and himself to endure from others, a Sokratic Elenchus or -cross-examination as to the logical difficulties involved in all the -steps and helps to learning. Unless he can put to others and follow up -the detective questions--unless he can also answer them, when put to -himself, pertinently and consistently, so as to avoid being brought to -confusion or contradiction--Plato will not allow that he has attained -true knowledge.[42] Now, if we try knowledge by a test so severe as -this, we must admit that no reading of written expositions will enable -the student to acquire it. The impression made is too superficial, and -the mind is too passive during such a process, to be equal to the task -of meeting new points of view, and combating difficulties not -expressly noticed in the treatise which has been studied. The only way -of permanently arming and strengthening the mind, is (according to -Plato) by long-continued oral interchange and stimulus, multiplied -comment and discussion from different points of view, and active -exercise in dialectic debate: not aiming at victory over an opponent, -but reasoning out each question in all its aspects, affirmative and -negative. It is only after a long course of such training--the living -word of the competent teacher, applied to the mind of the pupil, and -stimulating its productive and self-defensive force--that any such -knowledge can be realised as will suffice for the exigencies of the -Sokratic Elenchus.[43] - -[Footnote 42: Plato, Epist. vii. 343 D. The difficulties which Plato -had here in his eye, and which he required to be solved as conditions -indispensable to real knowledge--are jumped over in geometrical and -other scientific expositions, as belonging not to geometry, &c., but -to logic. M. Jouffroy remarks, in the Preface to his translation of -Reid's works (p. clxxiv.):--"Toute science particulière qui, au lieu -de prendre pour accordées les données _à priori_ qu'elle implique, -discute l'autorité de ces données--ajoute à son objet propre celui de -la logique, confond une autre mission avec la sienne, et par cela même -compromet la sienne: car nous verrons tout à-l'heure, et l'histoire de -la philosophic montre, quelles difficultés présentent ces problèmes -qui sont l'objet propre de la logique; et nous demeurerons convaincus -que, si les _différentes sciences avaient eu la prétention de les -éclaircir avant de passer outre, toutes peut-être en seraient encore à -cette préface_, et aucune n'aurait entamé sa véritable tâche." - -Remarks of a similar bearing will be found in the second paragraph of -Mr. John Stuart Mill's Essay on Utilitarianism. It has been found -convenient to distinguish the logic of a science from the expository -march of the same science. But Plato would not have acknowledged -[Greek: e)pistê/mê], except as including both. Hence his view about -the uselessness of written expository treatises. - -Aristotle, in a remarkable passage of the Metaphysica ([Greek: G]. p. -1005, a. 20 seqq.) takes pains to distinguish the Logic of Mathematics -from Mathematics themselves--as a separate province and matter of -study. He claims the former as belonging to Philosophia Prima or -Ontology. Those principles which mathematicians called Axioms were not -peculiar to Mathematics (he says), but were affirmations respecting -Ens quatenus Ens: the mathematician was entitled to assume them so far -as concerned his own department, and his students must take them for -granted: but if he attempted to explain or appreciate them in their -full bearing, he overstepped his proper limits, through want of proper -schooling in Analytica ([Greek: o(/sa d' e)gcheirou=si tô=n lego/ntôn -tine\s peri\ tê=s a)lêthei/as, o(\n tro/pon dei= a)pode/chesthai, di' -a)paideusi/an tô=n a)nalutikô=n tou=to drô=sin; dei= ga\r peri\ -tou/tôn ê(/kein proepistame/nous, a)lla\ mê\ a)kou/ontas zêtei=n]--p. -1005, b. 2.) We see from the words of Aristotle that many mathematical -enquirers of his time did not recognise (any more than Plato -recognised) the distinction upon which he here insists: we see also -that the term _Axioms_ had become a technical one for the _principia_ -of mathematical demonstration ([Greek: peri\ tô=n e)n toi=s mathê/masi -kaloume/nôn a)xiôma/tôn]--p. 1005, a. 20); I do not concur in Sir -William Hamilton's doubts on this point. (Dissertations on Reid's -Works, note A. p. 764.) - -The distinction which Aristotle thus brings to notice, seemingly for -the first time, is one of considerable importance.] - -[Footnote 43: This is forcibly put by Plato, Epistol. vii. 344 B. -Compare Plato, Republic, vi. 499 A. Phædrus, 276 A-E. [Greek: to\n -tou= ei)do/tos lo/gon zô=nta kai\ e)/mpsuchon], &c. - -Though Plato, in the Phædrus, declares oral teaching to be the only -effectual way of producing a permanent and deep-seated effect--as -contrasted with the more superficial effect produced by reading a -written exposition: yet even oral teaching, when addressed in the form -of continuous lecture or sermon ([Greek: a)/neu a)nakri/seôs kai\ -didachê=s], Phædrus, 277 E; [Greek: to\ nouthetêtiko\n ei)=dos], -Sophistês, p. 230), is represented elsewhere as of little effect. To -produce any permanent result, you must diversify the point of view--you -must test by circumlocutory interrogation--you must begin by -dispelling established errors, &c. See the careful explanation of the -passage in the Phædrus (277 E), given by Ueberweg, Aechtheit der -Platon. Schrift. pp. 16-22. Direct teaching, in many of the Platonic -dialogues, is not counted as capable of producing serious improvement. - -When we come to the Menon and the Phædon, we shall hear more of the -Platonic doctrine--that knowledge was to be evolved out of the mind, -not poured into it from without.] - -[Side-note: Plato never published any of the lectures which he -delivered at the Academy.] - -Since we thus find that Plato was unconquerably averse to publication -in his own name and with his own responsibility attached to the -writing, on grave matters of philosophy--we cannot be surprised that, -among the numerous lectures which he must have delivered to his pupils -and auditors in the Academy, none were ever published. Probably he may -himself have destroyed them, as he exhorts Dionysius to destroy the -Epistle which we now read as second, after reading it over frequently. -And we may doubt whether he was not displeased with Aristotle and -Hestiæus[44] for taking extracts from his lectures De Bono, and making -them known to the public: just as he was displeased with Dionysius for -having published a work purporting to be derived from conversations -with Plato. - -[Footnote 44: Themistius mentions it as a fact recorded (I wish he had -told us where or by whom) that Aristotle stoutly opposed the Platonic -doctrine of Objective Ideas, even during the lifetime of Plato, -[Greek: i(storei=tai de\ o(/ti kai\ zô=ntos tou= Pla/tônos -karterô/tata peri\ tou/tou tou= do/gmatos e)ne/stê o( A)ristote/lês -tô=| Pla/tôni]. (Scholia ad Aristotel. Analyt. Poster. p. 228 b. 16 -Brandis.)] - -[Side-note: Plato would never publish his philosophical opinions in -his own name; but he may have published them in the dialogues under -the name of others.] - -That Plato would never consent to write for the public in his own -name, must be taken as a fact in his character; probably arising from -early caution produced by the fate of Sokrates, combined with -preference for the Sokratic mode of handling. But to what extent he -really kept back his opinions from the public, or whether he kept them -back at all, by design--I do not undertake to say. The borrowed names -under which he wrote, and the veil of dramatic fiction, gave him -greater freedom as to the thoughts enunciated, and were adopted for -the express purpose of acquiring greater freedom. How far the lectures -which he delivered to his own special auditory differed from the -opinions made known in his dialogues to the general reader, or how far -his conversation with a few advanced pupils differed from both--are -questions which we have no sufficient means of answering. There -probably was a considerable difference. Aristotle alludes to various -doctrines of Plato which we cannot find in the Platonic writings: but -these doctrines are not such as could have given peculiar offence, if -published; they are, rather abstruse and hard to understand. It may -also be true (as Tennemann says) that Plato had two distinct modes of -handling philosophy--a popular and a scientific: but it cannot be true -(as the same learned author[45] asserts) that his published dialogues -contained the popular and not the scientific. No one surely can regard -the Timæus, Parmenidês, Philêbus, Theætêtus, Sophistês, Politikus, -&c., as works in which dark or difficult questions are kept out of -sight for the purpose of attracting the ordinary reader. Among the -dialogues themselves (as I have before remarked) there exist the -widest differences; some highly popular and attractive, others -altogether the reverse, and many gradations between the two. Though I -do not doubt therefore that Plato produced powerful effect both as -lecturer to a special audience, and as talker with chosen students--yet -in what respect such lectures and conversation differed from what -we read in his dialogues, I do not feel that we have any means of -knowing. - -[Footnote 45: See Tennemann, Gesch. d. Phil. vol. ii. p. 205, 215, 221 -seq. This portion of Tennemann's History is valuable, as it takes due -account of the seventh Platonic Epistle, compared with the remarkable -passage in the Phædrus about the inefficacy of written exposition for -the purpose of teaching. - -But I cannot think that Tennemann rightly interprets the Epistol. vii. -I see no proof that Plato had any secret or esoteric philosophy, -reserved for a few chosen pupils, and not proclaimed to the public -from apprehension of giving offence to established creeds: though I -believe such apprehension to have operated as one motive, deterring -him from publishing any philosophical exposition under his own -name--any [Greek: Pla/tônos su/ggramma].] - -[Side-note: Groups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown.] - -In judging of Plato, we must confine ourselves to the evidence -furnished by one or more of the existing Platonic compositions, adding -the testimony of Aristotle and a few others respecting Platonic views -not declared in the dialogues. Though little can be predicated -respecting the dialogues collectively, I shall say something about the -various groups into which they admit of being thrown, before I touch -upon them separately and _seriatim_. - -[Side-note: Distribution made by Thrasyllus defective, but still -useful--Dialogues of Search, Dialogues of Exposition.] - -The scheme proposed by Thrasyllus, so far as intended to furnish a -symmetrical arrangement of all the Platonic works, is defective, -partly because the apportionment of the separate works between the two -leading classes is in several cases erroneous--partly because the -discrimination of the two leading classes, as well as the sub-division -of one of the two, is founded on diversity of Method, while the -sub-division of the other class is founded on diversity of Subject. But -the scheme is nevertheless useful, as directing our attention to real -and important attributes belonging in common to considerable groups of -dialogues. It is in this respect preferable to the fanciful dramatic -partnership of trilogies and tetralogies, as well as to the mystical -interpretation and arrangement suggested by the Neo-platonists. The -Dialogues of Exposition--in which one who knows (or professes to know) -some truth, announces and developes it to those who do not know -it--are contrasted with those of Search or Investigation, in which the -element of knowledge and affirmative communication is wanting. All the -interlocutors are at once ignorant and eager to know; all of them are -jointly engaged in searching for the unknown, though one among them -stands prominent both in suggesting where to look and in testing all -that is found, whether it be really the thing looked for. Among the -expository dialogues, the most marked specimens are Timæus and -Epinomis, in neither of which is there any searching or testing debate -at all. Republic, Phædon, Philêbus, exhibit exposition preceded or -accompanied by a search. Of the dialogues of pure investigation, the -most elaborate specimen is the Theætêtus: Menon, Lachês, Charmidês, -Lysis, Euthyphron, &c., are of the like description, yet less worked -out. There are also several others. In the Menon, indeed,[46] Sokrates -goes so far as to deny that there can be any real teaching, and to -contend that what appears teaching is only resuscitation of buried or -forgotten knowledge. - -[Footnote 46: Plato, Menon, p. 81-82.] - -[Side-note: Dialogues of Exposition--present affirmative result. -Dialogues of Search are wanting in that attribute.] - -Of these two classes of Dialogues, the Expository are those which -exhibit the distinct attribute--an affirmative result or doctrine, -announced and developed by a person professing to know, and proved in -a manner more or less satisfactory. The other class--the Searching or -Investigative--have little else in common except the absence of this -property. We find in them debate, refutation, several points of view -canvassed and some shown to be untenable; but there is no affirmative -result established, or even announced as established, at the close. -Often there is even a confession of disappointment. In other respects, -the dialogues of this class are greatly diversified among one another: -they have only the one common attribute--much debate, with absence of -affirmative result. - -[Side-note: The distribution coincides mainly with that of -Aristotle--Dialectic, Demonstrative.] - -Now the distribution made by Thrasyllus of the dialogues under two -general heads (1. Dialogues of Search or Investigation, 2. Dialogues -of Exposition) coincides, to a considerable extent, with the two -distinct intellectual methods recognised by Aristotle as Dialectic and -Demonstrative: Dialectic being handled by Aristotle in the Topica, and -Demonstration in the Posterior Analytica. "Dialectic" (says Aristotle) -"is tentative, respecting those matters of which philosophy aims at -cognizance." Accordingly, Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) embraces all -matters without exception, but in a tentative and searching way, -recognising arguments _pro_ as well as _con_, and bringing to view the -antithesis between the two, without any preliminary assumption or -predetermined direction, the questioner being bound to proceed only on -the answers given by the respondent: while philosophy comes -afterwards, dividing this large field into appropriate compartments, -laying down authoritative _principia_ in regard to each, and deducing -from them, by logical process, various positive results.[47] Plato -does not use the term Dialectic exactly in the same sense as -Aristotle. He implies by it two things: 1. That the process shall be -colloquial, two or more minds engaged in a joint research, each of -them animating and stimulating the others. 2. That the matter -investigated shall be general--some general question or proposition: -that the premisses shall all be general truths, and that the objects -kept before the mind shall be Forms or Species, apart from -particulars.[48] Here it stands in contrast with Rhetoric, which aims -at the determination of some particular case or debated course of -conduct, judicial or political, and which is intended to end in some -immediate practical verdict or vote. Dialectic, in Plato's sense, -comprises the whole process of philosophy. His Dialogues of Search -correspond to Aristotle's Dialectic, being machinery for generating -arguments and for ensuring that every argument shall be subjected to -the interrogation of an opponent: his Dialogues of Exposition, wherein -some definite result is enunciated and proved (sufficiently or not), -correspond to what Aristotle calls Demonstration. - -[Footnote 47: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 1004, b. 25. [Greek: -e)/sti de\ ê( dialektikê\ peirastikê\, peri\ ô(=n ê( philosophi/a -gnôristikê/]. Compare also Rhet. i. 2, p. 1356, a. 33, i. 4, p. 1359, -b. 12, where he treats Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) not as methods -of acquiring instruction on any definite matter, but as inventive and -argumentative aptitudes--powers of providing premisses and -arguments--[Greek: duna/meis tine\s tou= pori/sai lo/gous]. If (he says) -you try to convert Dialectic from a method of discussion into a method of -cognition, you will insensibly eliminate its true nature and -character:--[Greek: o(/sô| d' a)/n tis ê)\ tê\n dialektikê\n ê)\ -tau/tên, mê\ katha/per a)\n duna/meis a)ll' e)pistê/mas peira=tai -kataskeua/zein, lê/setai tê\n phu/sin au)tô=n a)phani/sas, tô=| -metabai/nein e)piskeua/zôn ei)s e)pistê/mas u(pokeime/nôn tinô=n -pragma/tôn, a)lla\ mê\ mo/non lo/gôn]. - -The Platonic Dialogues of Search are [Greek: duna/meis tou= pori/sai -lo/gous]. Compare the Prooemium of Cicero to his Paradoxa.] - -[Footnote 48: Plato, Republ. vi. 511, vii. 582. Respecting the -difference between Plato and Aristotle about Dialectic, see -Ravaisson--Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote--iii. 1, 2, p. 248.] - -[Side-note: Classification of Thrasyllus in its details. He applies -his own principles erroneously.] - -If now we take the main scheme of distributing the Platonic Dialogues, -proposed by Thrasyllus--1. Dialogues of Exposition, with an -affirmative result; 2. Dialogues of Investigation or Search, without -an affirmative result--and if we compare the number of Dialogues (out -of the thirty-six in all), which he specifies as belonging to each--we -shall find twenty-two specified under the former head, and fourteen -under the latter. Moreover, among the twenty-two are ranked Republic -and Leges: each of them greatly exceeding in bulk any other -composition of Plato. It would appear thus that there is a -preponderance both in number and bulk on the side of the Expository. -But when we analyse the lists of Thrasyllus, we see that he has unduly -enlarged that side of the account, and unduly contracted the other. He -has enrolled among the Expository--1. The Apology, the Epistolæ, and -the Menexenus, which ought not properly to be ranked under either -head. 2. The Theætêtus, Parmenidês, Hipparchus, Erastæ, Minos, -Kleitophon--every one of which ought to be transferred to the other -head. 3. The Phædrus, Symposion, and Kratylus, which are admissible by -indulgence, since they do indeed present affirmative exposition, but -in small proportion compared to the negative criticism, the rhetorical -and poetical ornament: they belong in fact to both classes, but more -preponderantly to one. 4. The Republic. This he includes with perfect -justice, for the eight last books of it are expository. Yet the first -book exhibits to us a specimen of negative and refutative dialectic -which is not surpassed by anything in Plato. - -On the other hand, Thrasyllus has placed among the Dialogues of Search -one which might, with equal or greater propriety, be ranked among the -Expository--the Protagoras. It is true that this dialogue involves -much of negation, refutation, and dramatic ornament: and that the -question propounded in the beginning (Whether virtue be teachable?) is -not terminated. But there are two portions of the dialogue which are, -both of them, decided specimens of affirmative exposition--the speech -of Protagoras in the earlier part (wherein the growth of virtue, -without special teaching or professional masters, is elucidated)--and -the argument of Sokrates at the close, wherein the identity of the -Good and the Pleasurable is established.[49] - -[Footnote 49: We may remark that Thrasyllus, though he enrols the -Protagoras under the class Investigative, and the sub-class Agonistic, -places it alone in a still lower class which he calls [Greek: -E)ndeiktiko/s]. Now, if we turn to the Platonic dialogue Euthydêmus, -p. 278 D, we shall see that Plato uses the words [Greek: e)ndei/xomai] -and [Greek: u(phêgê/somai] as exact equivalents: so that [Greek: -e)ndeiktiko\s] would have the same meaning as [Greek: u(phêgêtiko/s].] - -[Side-note: The classification, as it would stand, if his principles -were applied correctly.] - -If then we rectify the lists of Thrasyllus, they will stand as -follows, with the Expository Dialogues much diminished in number: - -_Dialogues of Investigation or Search._ - -[Greek: Zêtêtikoi/]. - -1. Theætêtus. -2. Parmenidês. -3. Alkibiadês I. -4. Alkibiadês II. -5. Theagês. -6. Lachês. -7. Lysis. -8. Charmidês. -9. Menon. -10. Ion. -11. Euthyphron. -12. Euthydêmus. -13. Gorgias. -14. Hippias I. -15. Hippias II. -16. Kleitophon. -17. Hipparchus. -18. Erastæ. -19. Minos. - -_Dialogues of Exposition_ - -[Greek: U(phêgêtikoi/]. - -1. Timæus. -2. Leges. -3. Epinomis. -4. Kritias. -5. Republic. -6. Sophistês. -7. Politikus. -8. Phædon. -9. Philêbus. -10. Protagoras. -11. Phædrus. -12. Symposion. -13. Kratylus. -14. Kriton. - -The Apology, Menexenus, Epistolæ, do not properly belong to either -head. - -[Side-note: Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over -the expository and dogmatical.] - -It will thus appear, from a fair estimate and comparison of lists, -that the relation which Plato bears to philosophy is more that of a -searcher, tester, and impugner, than that of an expositor and -dogmatist--though he undertakes both the two functions: more negative -than affirmative--more ingenious in pointing out difficulties, than -successful in solving them. I must again repeat that though this -classification is just, as far as it goes, and the best which can be -applied to the dialogues, taken as a whole--yet the dialogues have -much which will not enter into the classification, and each has its -own peculiarities. - -[Side-note: Dialogues of Search--sub-classes among them recognised by -Thrasyllus--Gymnastic and Agonistic, &c.] - -The Dialogues of Search, thus comprising more than half the Platonic -compositions, are again distributed by Thrasyllus into two -sub-classes--Gymnastic and Agonistic: the Gymnastic, again, into -Obstetric and Peirastic; the Agonistic, into Probative and Refutative. -Here, again, there is a pretence of symmetrical arrangement, which will -not hold good if we examine it closely. Nevertheless, the epithets point -to real attributes of various dialogues, and deserve the more -attention, inasmuch as they imply a view of philosophy foreign to the -prevalent way of looking at it. Obstetric and Tentative or Testing -(Peirastic) are epithets which a reader may understand; but he will -not easily see how they bear upon the process of philosophy. - -[Side-note: Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative -teaching, positive results, direct proofs.] - -The term _philosopher_ is generally understood to mean something else. -In appreciating a philosopher, it is usual to ask, What authoritative -creed has he proclaimed, for disciples to swear allegiance to? What -positive system, or positive truths previously unknown or unproved, -has he established? Next, by what arguments has he enforced or made -them good? This is the ordinary proceeding of an historian of -philosophy, as he calls up the roll of successive names. The -philosopher is assumed to speak as one having authority; to have -already made up his mind; and to be prepared to explain what his mind -is. Readers require positive results announced, and positive evidence -set before them, in a clear and straightforward manner. They are -intolerant of all that is prolix, circuitous, not essential to the -proof of the thesis in hand. Above all, an affirmative result is -indispensable. - -When I come to the Timæus, and Republic, &c., I shall consider what -reply Plato could make to these questions. In the meantime, I may -observe that if philosophers are to be estimated by such a scale, he -will not stand high on the list. Even in his expository dialogues, he -cares little about clear proclamation of results, and still less about -the shortest, straightest, and most certain road for attaining them. - -[Side-note: The Platonic Dialogues of Search disclaim authority and -teaching--assume truth to be unknown to all alike--follow a process -devious as well as fruitless.] - -But as to those numerous dialogues which are not expository, Plato -could make no reply to the questions at all. There are no affirmative -results:--and there is a process of enquiry, not only fruitless, but -devious, circuitous, and intentionally protracted. The authoritative -character of a philosopher is disclaimed. Not only Plato never -delivers sentence in his own name, but his principal spokesman, far -from speaking with authority, declares that he has not made up his own -mind, and that he is only a searcher along with others, more eager in -the chase than they are.[50] Philosophy is conceived as the search for -truth still unknown; not as an explanation of truth by one who knows -it, to others who do not know it. The process of search is considered -as being in itself profitable and invigorating, even though what is -sought be not found. The ingenuity of Sokrates is shown, not by what -he himself produces, for he avows himself altogether barren--but by -his obstetric aid: that is, by his being able to evolve, from a -youthful mind, answers of which it is pregnant, and to test the -soundness and trustworthiness of those answers when delivered: by his -power, besides, of exposing or refuting unsound answers, and of -convincing others of the fallacy of that which they confidently -believed themselves to know. - -[Footnote 50: In addition to the declarations of Sokrates to this -effect in the Platonic Apology (pp. 21-23), we read the like in many -Platonic dialogues. Gorgias, 506 A. [Greek: ou)de\ ga/r toi e)/gôge -ei)dô\s le/gô a(\ le/gô, a)lla\ zêtô= koinê=| meth' u(mô=n] (see -Routh's note): and even in the Republic, in many parts of which there -is much dogmatism and affirmation: v. p. 450 E. [Greek: a)pistou=nta -de\ kai\ zêtou=nta a(/ma tou\s lo/gous poiei=sthai, o(\ dê\ e)gô\ -drô=], &c.] - -[Side-note: The questioner has no predetermined course, but follows -the lead given by the respondent in his answers.] - -To eliminate affirmative, authoritative exposition, which proceeds -upon the assumption that truth is already known--and to consider -philosophy as a search for unknown truth, carried on by several -interlocutors all of them ignorant--this is the main idea which Plato -inherited from Sokrates, and worked out in more than one half of his -dialogues. It is under this general head that the subdivisions of -Thrasyllus fall--the Obstetric, the Testing or Verifying, the -Refutative. The process is one in which both the two concurrent minds -are active, but each with an inherent activity peculiar to itself. The -questioner does not follow a predetermined course of his own, but -proceeds altogether on the answer given to him. He himself furnishes -only an indispensable stimulus to the parturition of something with -which the respondent is already pregnant, and applies testing -questions to that which he hears, until the respondent is himself -satisfied that the answer will not hold. Throughout all this, there is -a constant appeal to the free, self-determining judgment of the -respondent's own mind, combined with a stimulus exciting the -intellectual productiveness of that mind to the uttermost. - -[Side-note: Relation of teacher and learner. Appeal to authority is -suppressed.] - -What chiefly deserves attention here, as a peculiar phase in the -history of philosophy, is, that the relation of teacher and learner is -altogether suppressed. Sokrates not only himself disclaims the -province and title of a teacher, but treats with contemptuous banter -those who assume it. Now "the learner" (to use a memorable phrase of -Aristotle[51]) "is under obligation to believe": he must be a passive -recipient of that which is communicated to him by the teacher. The -relation between the two is that of authority on the one side, and of -belief generated by authority on the other. But Sokrates requires from -no man implicit trust: nay he deprecates it as dangerous.[52] It is -one peculiarity in these Sokratic dialogues, that the sentiment of -authority, instead of being invoked and worked up, as is generally -done in philosophy, is formally disavowed and practically set aside. -"I have not made up my mind: I am not prepared to swear allegiance to -any creed: I give you the reasons for and against each: you must -decide for yourself."[53] - -[Footnote 51: Aristot. De Sophist. Elenchis, Top. ix. p. 165, b. 2. -[Greek: dei= ga\r pisteu/ein to\n mantha/nonta.]] - -[Footnote 52: Plato, Protagor. p. 314 B.] - -[Footnote 53: The sentiment of the Academic sect--descending from -Sokrates and Plato, not through Xenokrates and Polemon, but through -Arkesilaus and Karneades--illustrates the same elimination of the idea -of authority. "Why are you so curious to know what _I myself_ have -determined on the point? Here are the reasons _pro_ and _con_: weigh -the one against the other, and then judge for yourself." - -See Sir William Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy--Appendix, p. -681--about mediæval disputations: also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 4-7. -"Sed defendat quod quisque sentit: sunt enim judicia libera: nos -institutum tenebimus, nulliusque unius disciplinæ legibus adstricti, -quibus in philosophiâ necessario pareamus, quid sit in quâque re -maximé probabile, semper requiremus." - -Again, Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 5, 10-13. "Qui autem requirunt, quid -quâque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est. -_Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta -quærenda sunt._ Quin etiam obest plorumque iis, qui discere volunt, -auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum -judicium adhibere; id habent ratum, quod ab eo quem probant judicatum -vident. . . . Si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto -majus omnes? Quod facere iis necesse est, quibus propositum est, veri -reperiendi causâ, et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus -dicere. . . Nec tamen fieri potest, ut qui hâc ratione philosophentur, -ii nihil habeant quod sequantur. . . Non enim sumus ii quibus nihil -verum esse videatur, sed ii, qui omnibus veris falsa quædam adjuncta -esse dicamus, tantâ similitudine ut in iis nulla insit certa judicandi -et assentiendi nota. Ex quo exsistit illud, multa esse probabilia, quæ -quanquam non perciperentur, tamen quia visum haberent quendam insignem -et illustrem, his sapientis vita regeretur." - -Compare Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. sect. 2-3-5-9. Quintilian, xii. 2-25.] - -[Side-note: In the modern world the search for truth is put out of -sight. Every writer or talker professes to have already found it, and -to proclaim it to others.] - -This process--the search for truth as an unknown--is in the modern -world put out of sight. All discussion is conducted by persons who -profess to have found it or learnt it, and to be in condition to -proclaim it to others. Even the philosophical works of Cicero are -usually pleadings by two antagonists, each of whom professes to know -the truth, though Cicero does not decide between them: and in this -respect they differ from the groping and fumbling of the Platonic -dialogues. Of course the search for truth must go on in modern times, -as it did in ancient: but it goes on silently and without notice. The -most satisfactory theories have been preceded by many infructuous -guesses and tentatives. The theorist may try many different hypotheses -(we are told that Kepler tried nineteen) which he is forced -successively to reject; and he may perhaps end without finding any -better. But all these tentatives, verifying tests, doubts, and -rejections, are confined to his own bosom or his own study. He looks -back upon them without interest, sometimes even with disgust; least of -all does he seek to describe them in detail as objects of interest to -others. They are probably known to none but himself: for it does not -occur to him to follow the Platonic scheme of taking another mind into -partnership, and entering upon that distribution of active -intellectual work which we read in the Theætêtus. There are cases in -which two chemists have carried on joint researches, under many -failures and disappointments, perhaps at last without success. If a -record were preserved of their parley during the investigation, the -grounds for testing and rejecting one conjecture, and for selecting -what should be tried after it--this would be in many points a parallel -to the Platonic process. - -[Side-note: The search for truth by various interlocutors was a -recognised process in the Sokratic age. Acute negative Dialectic of -Sokrates.] - -But at Athens in the fourth century, B.C., the search for truth by two -or more minds in partnership was not so rare a phenomenon. The active -intellects of Athens were distributed between Rhetoric, which -addressed itself to multitudes, accepted all established sentiments, -and handled for the most part particular issues--and Dialectic, in -which a select few debated among themselves general questions.[54] Of -this Dialectic, the real Sokrates was the greatest master that Athens -ever saw: he could deal as he chose (says Xenophon[55]) with all -disputants: he turned them round his finger. In this process, one -person set up a thesis, and the other cross-examined him upon it: the -most irresistible of all cross-examiners was the real Sokrates. The -nine books of Aristotle's Topica (including the book De Sophisticis -Elenchis) are composed with the object of furnishing suggestions, and -indicating rules, both to the cross-examiner and to the respondent, in -such Dialectic debates. Plato does not lay down any rules: but he has -given us, in his dialogues of search, specimens of dialectic procedure -shaped in his own fashion. Several of his contemporaries, companions -of Sokrates, like him, did the same each in his own way: but their -compositions have not survived.[56] - -[Footnote 54: The habit of supposing a general question to be -undecided, and of having it argued by competent advocates before -auditors who have not made up their minds--is now so disused -(everywhere except in a court of law), that one reads with surprise -Galen's declaration that the different competing medical theories were -so discussed in his day. His master Pelops maintained a disputation of -two days with a rival;--[Greek: ê(ni/ka Pe/lops meta\ Phili/ppou tou= -e)mpeirikou= diele/chthê duoi=n ê(merô=n; tou= me\n Pe/lopos, ô(s mê\ -duname/nês tê=s i)atrikê=s di' e)mpeiri/as mo/nês sustê=nai, tou= -Phili/ppou de\ e)pideiknu/ntos du/nasthai]. (Galen, De Propriis -Libris, c. 2, p. 16, Kühn.) - -Galen notes (ib. 2, p. 21) the habit of literary men at Rome to -assemble in the temple of Pax, for the purpose of discussing logical -questions, prior to the conflagration which destroyed that temple.] - -[Footnote 55: Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2.] - -[Footnote 56: The dialogues composed by Aristotle himself were in -great measure dialogues of search, exercises of argumentation _pro_ -and _con_ (Cicero, De Finib. v. 4). "Aristoteles, ut solet, quærendi -gratiâ, quædam subtilitatis suæ argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo," &c. -(Quintilian, Inst. Orat. ii. 17.) - -Bernays indicates the probable titles of many among the lost -Aristotelian Dialogues (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 132, 133, -Berlin, 1868), and gives in his book many general remarks upon them. - -The observations of Aristotle in the Metaphys. (A. [Greek: e)la/ttôn] -993, b. 1-16) are conceived in a large and just spirit. He says that -among all the searchers for truth, none completely succeed, and none -completely fail: those, from whose conclusions we dissent, do us -service by exercising our intelligence--[Greek: tê\n ga\r e(/xin -proê/skêsan ê(mô=n]. The enumeration of [Greek: a)pori/ai] in the -following book B of the Metaphysica is a continuation of the same -views. Compare Scholia, p. 604, b. 29, Brandis.] - -Such compositions give something like fair play to the negative arm of -philosophy; in the employment of which the Eleate Zeno first became -celebrated, and the real Sokrates yet more celebrated. This negative -arm is no less essential than the affirmative, to the validity of a -body of reasoned truth, such as philosophy aspires to be. To know how -to disprove is quite as important as to know how to prove: the one is -co-ordinate and complementary to the other. And the man who disproves -what is false, or guards mankind against assenting to it,[57] renders -a service to philosophy, even though he may not be able to render the -ulterior service of proving any truth in its place. - -[Footnote 57: The Stoics had full conviction of this. In Cicero's -summary of the Stoic doctrine (De Finibus, iii. 21, 72) we read:--"Ad -easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, Dialecticam etiam adjungunt -(Stoici) et Physicam: easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant: alteram -(_sc._ Dialecticam), quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur, -neve unquam captiosâ probabilitate fallamur; eaque, quæ de bonis et -malis didicerimus, ut tenere tuerique possimus."] - -[Side-note: Negative procedure supposed to be represented by the -Sophists and the Megarici; discouraged and censured by historians of -philosophy.] - -By historians of ancient philosophy, negative procedure is generally -considered as represented by the Sophists and the Megarici, and is the -main ground for those harsh epithets which are commonly applied to -both of them. The negative (they think) can only be tolerated in small -doses, and even then merely as ancillary to the affirmative. That is, -if you have an affirmative theory to propose, you are allowed to urge -such objections as you think applicable against rival theories, but -only in order to make room for your own. It seems to be assumed as -requiring no proof that the confession of ignorance is an intolerable -condition; which every man ought to be ashamed of in himself, and -which no man is justified in inflicting on any one else. If yon -deprive the reader of one affirmative solution, you are required to -furnish him with another which you are prepared to guarantee as the -true one. "Le Roi est mort--Vive le Roi": the throne must never be -vacant. It is plain that under such a restricted application, the full -force of the negative case is never brought out. The pleadings are -left in the hands of counsel, each of whom takes up only such -fragments of the negative case as suit the interests of his client, -and suppresses or slurs over all such other fragments of it as make -against his client. But to every theory (especially on the topics -discussed by Sokrates and Plato) there are more or less of objections -applicable--even the best theory being true only on the balance. And -if the purpose be to ensure a complete body of reasoned truth, all -these objections ought to be faithfully exhibited, by one who stands -forward as their express advocate, without being previously retained -for any separate or inconsistent purpose. - -[Side-note: Vocation of Sokrates and Plato for the negative procedure: -absolute necessity of it as a condition of reasoned truth. Parmenidês -of Plato.] - -How much Plato himself, in his dialogues of search, felt his own -vocation as champion of the negative procedure, we see marked -conspicuously in the dialogue called Parmenidês. This dialogue is -throughout a protest against forward affirmation, and an assertion of -independent _locus standi_ for the negationist and objector. The -claims of the latter must first be satisfied, before the affirmant can -be considered as solvent. The advocacy of those claims is here -confided to veteran Parmenides, who sums them up in a formidable -total: Sokrates being opposed to him under the unusual disguise of a -youthful and forward affirmant. Parmenides makes no pretence of -advancing any rival doctrine. The theories which he selects for -criticism are the Platonic theory of intelligible Concepts, and his -own theory of the Unum: he indicates how many objections must be -removed--how many contradictions must be solved--how many opposite -hypotheses must be followed out to their results--before either of -these theories can be affirmed with assurance. The exigencies -enumerated may and do appear insurmountable:[58] but of that Plato -takes no account. Such laborious exercises are inseparable from the -process of searching for truth, and unless a man has strength to go -through them, no truth, or at least no reasoned truth, can be found -and maintained.[59] - -[Footnote 58: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. [Greek: dei= skopei=n--ei) -me/lleis tele/ôs gumnasa/menos kuri/ôs dio/psesthai to\ a)lêthe/s. -A)mê/chanon, e)/phê, le/geis, ô)= Parmeni/dê, pragmatei/an], &c. - -Aristotle declares that no man can be properly master of any -affirmative truth without having examined and solved all the -objections and difficulties--the negative portion of the enquiry. To -go through all these [Greek: a)pori/as] is the indispensable first -stage, and perhaps the enquirer may not be able to advance farther, -see Metaphysic. B. 995, a. 26, 996, a. 16--one of the most striking -passages in his works. Compare also what he says, De Coelo, ii. 294, b. -10, [Greek: dio\ dei= to\n me/llonta kalô=s zêtê/sein e)nstatiko\n -ei)=nai dia\ tô=n oi)kei/ôn e)nsta/seôn tô=| ge/nei, tou=to de\ -e)sti\n e)k tou= pa/sas tetheôrêke/nai ta\s diaphora/s.]] - -[Footnote 59: That the only road to trustworthy affirmation lies -through a string of negations, unfolded and appreciated by systematic -procedure, is strongly insisted on by Bacon, Novum Organum, ii. 15, -"Omnino Deo (formarum inditori et opifici), aut fortasse angelis et -intelligentiis competit formas per affirmationem immediate nosse, -atque ab initio contemplationis. Sed certe supra hominem est: cui -tantum conceditur, procedere primo per negativas, et postremo loco -desinere in affirmativas, post omnimodam exclusionem." Compare another -Aphorism, i. 46. - -The following passage, transcribed from the Lectures of a -distinguished physical philosopher of the present day, is conceived in -the spirit of the Platonic Dialogues of Search, though Plato would -have been astonished at such patient multiplication of experiments:-- - -"I should hardly sustain your interest in stating the difficulties -which at first beset the investigation conducted with this apparatus, -or the numberless precautions which the exact balancing of the two -powerful sources of heat, here resorted to, rendered necessary. I -believe the experiments, made with atmospheric air alone, might be -numbered by tens of thousands. Sometimes for a week, or even for a -fortnight, coincident and satisfactory results would be obtained: the -strict conditions of accurate experimenting would appear to be found, -when an additional day's experience would destroy this hope and -necessitate a recommencement, under changed conditions, of the whole -inquiry. It is this which daunts the experimenter. It is this -preliminary fight with the entanglements of a subject so dark, so -doubtful, so uncheering, without any knowledge whether the conflict is -to lead to anything worth possessing, that renders discovery difficult -and rare. But the experimenter, and particularly the _young_ -experimenter, ought to know that as regards his own moral manhood, he -cannot but win, if he only contend aright. _Even, with a negative -result, his consciousness that he has gone fairly to the bottom of his -subject, as far as his means allowed_--the feeling that he has not -shunned labour, _though that labour may have resulted in laying bare -the nakedness of his case_--re-acts upon his own mind, and gives it -firmness for future work." (Tyndall, Lectures on Heat, considered as a -Mode of Motion, Lect x. p. 332.)] - -[Side-note: Sokrates considered the negative procedure to be valuable -by itself, and separately. His theory of the natural state of the -human mind; not ignorance, but false persuasion of knowledge.] - -It will thus appear that among the conditions requisite for -philosophy, both Sokrates and Plato regarded the negative procedure as -co-ordinate in value with the affirmative, and indispensable as a -preliminary stage. But Sokrates went a step farther. He assigned to -the negative an intrinsic importance by itself, apart from all -implication with the affirmative; and he rested that opinion upon a -psychological ground, formally avowed, and far larger than anything -laid down by the Sophists. He thought that the natural state of the -human mind, among established communities, was not simply ignorance, -but ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge--false or uncertified -belief--false persuasion of knowledge. The only way of dissipating -such false persuasion was, the effective stimulus of the negative -test, or cross-examining Elenchus; whereby a state of non-belief, or -painful consciousness of ignorance, was substituted in its place. Such -second state was indeed not the best attainable. It ought to be -preliminary to a third, acquired by the struggles of the mind to -escape from such painful consciousness; and to rise, under the -continued stimulus of the tutelary Elenchus, to improved affirmative -and defensible beliefs. But even if this third state were never -reached, Sokrates declared the second state to be a material amendment -on the first, which he deprecated as alike pernicious and disgraceful. - -[Side-note: Declaration of Sokrates in the Apology; his constant -mission to make war against the false persuasion of knowledge.] - -The psychological conviction here described stands proclaimed by -Sokrates himself, with remarkable earnestness and emphasis, in his -Apology before the Dikasts, only a month before his death. So deeply -did he take to heart the prevalent false persuasion of knowledge, -alike universal among all classes, mischievous, and difficult to -correct--that he declared himself to have made war against it -throughout his life, under a mission imposed upon him by the Delphian -God; and to have incurred thereby wide-spread hatred among his -fellow-citizens. To convict men, by cross-examination, of ignorance in -respect to those matters which each man believed himself to know well -and familiarly--this was the constant employment and the mission of -Sokrates: not to teach--for he disclaimed the capacity of teaching--but -to make men feel their own ignorance instead of believing -themselves to know. Such cross-examination, conducted usually before -an audience, however it might be salutary and indispensable, was -intended to humiliate the respondent, and could hardly fail to offend -and exasperate him. No one felt satisfaction except some youthful -auditors, who admired the acuteness with which it was conducted. "I -(declared Sokrates) am distinguished from others, and superior to -others, by this character only--that I am conscious of my own -ignorance: the wisest of men would be he who had the like -consciousness; but as yet I have looked for such a man in vain."[60] - -[Footnote 60: Plat. Apol. S. pp. 23-29. It is not easy to select -particular passages for reference; for the sentiments which I have -indicated pervade nearly the whole discourse.] - -[Side-note: Opposition of feeling between Sokrates and the Dikasts.] - -In delivering this emphatic declaration, Sokrates himself intimates -his apprehension that the Dikasts will treat his discourse as mockery; -that they will not believe him to be in earnest: that they will -scarcely have patience to hear him claim a divine mission for so -strange a purpose.[61] The declaration is indeed singular, and -probably many of the Dikasts did so regard it; while those who thought -it serious, heard it with repugnance. The separate value of the -negative procedure or Elenchus was never before so unequivocally -asserted, or so highly estimated. To disabuse men of those false -beliefs which they mistook for knowledge, and to force on them the -painful consciousness that they knew nothing--was extolled as the -greatest service which could be rendered to them, and as rescuing them -from a degraded and slavish state of mind.[62] - -[Footnote 61: Plato, Apol. S. pp. 20-38.] - -[Footnote 62: Aristotle, in the first book of Metaphysica (982, b. -17), when repeating a statement made in the Theætêtus of Plato (155 -D), that wonder is the beginning, or point of departure, of -philosophy--explains the phrase by saying, that wonder is accompanied -by a painful conviction of ignorance and sense of embarrassment. -[Greek: o( de\ a)porô=n kai\ thauma/zôn oi)/etai a)gnoei=n . . . dia\ -to\ pheu/gein tê\n a)/gnoian e)philoso/phêsan . . . ou) chrê/seô/s tinos -e(/neken]. This painful conviction of ignorance is what Sokrates -sought to bring about.] - -[Side-note: The Dialogues of Search present an end in themselves. -Mistake of supposing that Plato had in his mind an ulterior -affirmative end, not declared.] - -To understand the full purpose of Plato's dialogues of -search--testing, exercising, refuting, but not finding or providing--we -must keep in mind the Sokratic Apology. Whoever, after reading the -Theætêtus, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Parmenidês, &c., is tempted to -exclaim "But, after all, Plato _must_ have had in his mind some -ulterior doctrine of conviction which he wished to impress, but which -he has not clearly intimated," will see, by the Sokratic Apology, that -such a presumption is noway justifiable. Plato is a searcher, and has -not yet made up his own mind: this is what he himself tells us, and -what I literally believe, though few or none of his critics will admit -it. His purpose in the dialogues of search, is plainly and -sufficiently enunciated in the words addressed by Sokrates to -Theætêtus--"Answer without being daunted: for if we prosecute our -search, one of two alternatives is certain--either we shall find what -we are looking for, or we shall get clear of the persuasion that we -know what in reality we do not yet know. Now a recompense like this -will leave no room for dissatisfaction."[63] - -[Footnote 63: Plato, Theætet. 187 C. [Greek: e)a\n ga\r ou(/tô -drô=men, duoi=n tha/teron--ê)\ eu(rê/somen e)ph' o(\ e)rcho/metha, ê)\ -ê(=tton oi)êso/metha ei)de/nai o(\ mêdamê=| i)/smen; kai/toi ou)k a)\n -ei)/ê mempto\s o( toiou=tos]. Bonitz (in his Platonische Studien, pp. -8, 9, 74, 76, &c.) is one of the few critics who deprecate the -confidence and boldness with which recent scholars have ascribed to -Plato affirmative opinions and systematic purpose which he does not -directly announce. Bonitz vindicates the separate value and separate -_locus standi_ of the negative process in Plato's estimation, -particularly in the example of the Theætêtus. Susemihl, in the preface -to his second part, has controverted these views of Bonitz--in my -judgment without any success. - -The following observations of recent French scholars are just, though -they imply too much the assumption that there is always some -affirmative jewel wrapped up in Plato's complicated folds. M. Egger -observes (Histoire de la Critique chez les Grecs, Paris, 1849, p. 84, -ch. ii. sect. 4): - -"La philosophie de Platon n'offre pas, en général, un ensemble de -parties très rigoureusement liées entre elles. D'abord, il ne l'expose -que sous forme dialoguée: et dans ses dialogues, où il ne prend jamais -de rôle personnel, on ne voit pas clairement auquel des interlocuteurs -il a confié la défense de ses propres opinions. Parmi ces -interlocuteurs, Socrate lui-même, le plus naturel et le plus ordinaire -interprète de la pensée de son disciple, use fort souvent des libertés -de cette forme toute dramatique, pour se jouer dans les distinctions -subtiles, pour exagérer certains arguments, pour couper court à une -discussion embarrassante, au moyen de quelque plaisanterie, et pour se -retirer d'un débat sans conclure; en un mot, il a--ou, ce qui est plus -vrai, Platon a, sous son nom--_des opinions de circonstance et des -ruses de dialectique_, à travers lesquelles il est souvent difficile -de retrouver le fond sérieux de sa doctrine. Heureusement ces -difficultés ne touchent pas aux principes généraux du Platonisme. La -critique Platonicienne en particulier dans ce qu'elle a de plus -original, et de plus élevé, se rattache à la grande théorie des -_idées_ et de la _réminiscence_. On la retrouve exposée dans plusieurs -dialogues avec une clarté qui ne permet ni le doute ni l'incertitude." - -I may also cite the following remarks made by M. Vacherot (Histoire -Critique de l'École d'Alexandrie, vol. ii. p. 1, Pt. ii. Bk. ii. ch. -i.) after his instructive analysis of the doctrines of Plotinus. I -think the words are as much applicable to Plato as to Plotinus: the -rather, as Plato never speaks in his own name, Plotinus -always:--"Combien faut-il prendre garde d'ajouter à la pensée du -philosophe, et de lui prêter un arrangement artificiel! Ce génie, plein -d'enthousiasme et de fougue, n'a jamais connu ni mesure ni plan: -jamais il ne s'est astreint à developper régulièrement une théorie, ni -à exposer avec suite un ensemble de théories, de manière à en former -un système. _Fort incertain dans sa marche, il prend, quitte, et -reprend le même sujet, sans jamais paraître avoir dit son dernier -mot_; toujours il répand de vives et abondantes clartés sur les -questions qu'il traite, mais rarement il les conduit à leur dernière -et définitive solution; sa rapide pensée n'effleure pas seulement le -sujet sur lequel elle passe, elle le pénétre et le creuse toujours, -sans toutefois l'épuiser. Fort inégal dans ses allures, tantôt ce -génie s'échappe en inspirations rapides et tumultueuses, tantôt il -semble se traîner péniblement, et se perdre dans un dédale de subtiles -abstractions, &c."] - -[Side-note: False persuasion of knowledge--had reference to topics -social, political, ethical.] - -What those topics were, in respect to which Sokrates found this -universal belief of knowledge, without the reality of knowledge--we -know, not merely from the dialogues of Plato, but also from the -Memorabilia of Xenophon. Sokrates did not touch upon recondite -matters--upon the Kosmos, astronomy, meteorology. Such studies he -discountenanced as useless, and even as irreligious.[64] The subjects -on which he interrogated were those of common, familiar, every-day -talk: those which every one believed himself to know, and on which -every one had a confident opinion to give: the respondent being -surprised that any one could put the questions, or that there could be -any doubt requiring solution. What is justice? what is injustice? what -are temperance and courage? what is law, lawlessness, democracy, -aristocracy? what is the government of mankind, and the attributes -which qualify any one for exercising such government? Here were -matters upon which every one talked familiarly, and would have been -ashamed to be thought incapable of delivering an opinion. Yet it was -upon these matters that Sokrates detected universal ignorance, coupled -with a firm, but illusory, persuasion of knowledge. The conversation -of Sokrates with Euthydêmus, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia[65]--the -first Alkibiadês, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron, &c., of Plato--are -among the most marked specimens of such cross-examination or Elenchus--a -string of questions, to which there are responses in indefinite -number successively given, tested, and exposed as unsatisfactory. - -[Footnote 64: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1.] - -[Footnote 65: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2. A passage from Paley's preface to -his "Principles of Moral Philosophy," illustrates well this Sokratic -process: "Concerning the principle of morals, it would be premature to -speak: but concerning the manner of unfolding and explaining that -principle, I have somewhat which I wish to be remarked. An experience -of nine years in the office of a public tutor in one of the -Universities, and in that department of education to which these -sections relate, afforded me frequent opportunity to observe, that in -discoursing to young minds upon topics of morality, it _required much -more pains to make them perceive the difficulty than to understand the -solution_: that unless the subject was so drawn up to a point as to -exhibit the full force of an objection, or the exact place of a doubt, -before any explanation was entered upon--in other words, unless some -curiosity was excited, before it was attempted to be satisfied--the -teacher's labour was lost. When information was not desired, it was -seldom, I found, retained. I have made this observation my guide in -the following work: that is, I have endeavoured, before I suffered -myself to proceed in the disquisition, to put the reader in complete -possession of the question: _and to do it in a way that I thought most -likely to stir up his own doubts and solicitude about it_."] - -[Side-note: To those topics, on which each community possesses -established dogmas, laws, customs, sentiments, consecrated and -traditional, peculiar to itself. The local creed, which is never -formally proclaimed or taught, but is enforced unconsciously by every -one upon every one else. Omnipotence of King Nomos.] - -The answers which Sokrates elicited and exposed were simple -expressions of the ordinary prevalent belief upon matters on which -each community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs, -sentiments, fashions, points of view, &c., belonging to itself. When -Herodotus passed over to Egypt, he was astonished to find the -judgment, feelings, institutions, and practices of the Egyptians, -contrasting most forcibly with those of all other countries. He -remarks the same (though less in degree) respecting Babylonians, -Indians, Scythians, and others; and he is not less impressed with the -veneration of each community for its own creed and habits, coupled -with indifference or antipathy towards other creeds, disparate or -discordant, prevailing elsewhere.[66] - -[Footnote 66: Herodot. ii. 35-36-64; iii. 38-94, seq. i. 196; iv. -76-77-80. The discordance between the various institutions established -among the separate aggregations of mankind, often proceeding to the -pitch of reciprocal antipathy--the imperative character of each in its -own region, assuming the appearance of natural right and propriety--all -this appears brought to view by the inquisitive and observant -Herodotus, as well as by others (Xenophon, Cyropæd. i. 3-18): but many -new facts, illustrating the same thesis, were noticed by Aristotle and -the Peripatetics, when a larger extent of the globe became opened to -Hellenic survey. Compare Aristotle, Ethic. Nik. i. 3, 1094, b. 15; -Sextus Empiric. Pyrr. Hypotyp. i. sect 145-156, iii. sect 198-234; and -the remarkable extract from Bardesanes Syrus, cited by Eusebius, Præp. -Evang. vi., and published in Orelli's collection, pp. 202-219, -Alexandri Aphrodis. et Aliorum De Fato, Zurich, 1824. - -Many interesting passages in illustration of the same thesis might be -borrowed from Montaigne, Pascal, and others. But the most forcible of -all illustrations are those furnished by the Oriental world, when -surveyed or studied by intelligent Europeans, as it has been more -fully during the last century. See especially Sir William Sleeman's -Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official: two volumes which -unfold with equal penetration and fidelity the manifestations of -established sentiment among the Hindoos and Mahomedans. Vol. i. ch. -iv., describing a Suttee on the Nerbudda, is one of the most -impressive chapters in the work: the rather as it describes the -continuance of a hallowed custom, transmitted even from the days of -Alexander. I transcribe also some valuable matter from an eminent -living scholar, whose extensive erudition comprises Oriental as well -as Hellenic philosophy. - -M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Premier Mémoire sur le Sânkhya, Paris, -1852, pp. 392-396) observes as follows respecting the Sanscrit system -of philosophy called _Sânkhya_, the doctrine expounded and enforced by -the philosopher Kapila--and respecting Buddha and Buddhism which was -built upon the Sânkhya, amending or modifying it. Buddha is believed -to have lived about 547 B.C. Both the system of Buddha, and that of -Kapila, are atheistic, as described by M. St. Hilaire. - -"Le second point où Bouddha se sépare de Kapila concerne la doctrine. -L'homme ne peut rester dans l'incertitude que Kapila lui laisse -encore. L'âme délivrée, selon les doctrines de Kapila, peut toujours -renaître. Il n'y a qu'un moyen, un seul moyen, de le sauver,--c'est de -l'anéantir. Le néant seul est un sûr asile: on ne revient pas de celui -là.--Bouddha lui promet le néant; et c'est avec cette promesse inouie -qu'il a passionné les hommes et converti les peuples. Que cette -monstrueuse croyance, partagée aujourd'hui par trois cents millions de -sectateurs, révolte en nous les instincts les plus énergiques de notre -nature--qu'elle soulève toutes les répugnances et toutes les horreurs -de notre âme--qu'elle nous paraisse aussi incompréhensible que -hideuse--peu importe. Une partie considérable de l'humanité l'a -reçue,--prête même à la justifier par toutes les subtilités de la -metaphysique la plus raffinée, et à la confesser dans les tortures des -plus affreux supplices et les austérités homicides d'un fanatisme -aveugle. Si c'est une gloire que de dominer souverainement, à travers -les âges, la foi des hommes,--jamais fondateur de religion n'en eut -une plus grande que le Bouddha: car aucun n'eut de prosélytes plus -fidèles ni plus nombreux. Mais je me trompe: le Bouddha ne prétendait -jamais fonder une réligion. Il n'était que philosophe: et instruit -dans toutes les sciences des Brahmans, il ne voulut personnellement -que fonder, à leur exemple, un nouveau système. Seulement, les moyens -qu'il employait durent mener ses disciples plus loin qu'il ne comptait -aller lui même. En s'adressant à la foule, il faut bientôt la -discipliner et la régler. De là, cette ordination réligieuse que le -Bouddha donnait à ses adeptes, la hiérarchie qu'il établissait entre -eux, fondée uniquement, comme la science l'exigeait, sur le mérite -divers des intelligences et des vertus--la douce et sainte morale -qu'il prêchait,--le détachement de toutes choses en ce monde, si -convenable à des ascètes qui ne pensent qu'au salut éternel--le voeu -de pauvreté, qui est la première loi des Bouddhistes--et tout cet -ensemble de dispositions qui constituent un gouvernement au lieu d'une -école. - -"Mais ce n'est là que l'extérieur du Bouddhisme: c'en est le -développement matériel et nécessaire. Au fond, son principe est celui -du Sânkhya: seulement, il l'applique en grand.--C'est la science qui -délivre l'homme: et le Bouddha ajoute--Pour que l'homme soit délivré à -jamais, il faut qu'il arrive au Nirvâna, c'est à dire, qu'il soit -absolument anéanti. Le néant est donc le bout de la science: et le -salut eternel, c'est l'anéantissement." - -The same line of argument is insisted on by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire -in his other work--Bouddha et sa réligion, Paris, 1862, ed. 2nd: -especially in his Chapter on the Nirvâna: wherein moreover he -complains justly of the little notice which authors take of the -established beliefs of those varieties of the human race which are -found apart from Christian Europe.] - -This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe, ethical, -religious, æsthetical, social, respecting what is true or false, -probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy or unholy, honourable or -base, respectable or contemptible, pure or impure, beautiful or ugly, -decent or indecent, obligatory to do or obligatory to avoid, -respecting the status and relations of each individual in the society, -respecting even the admissible fashions of amusement and recreation--this -is an established fact and condition of things, the real origin -of which is for the most part unknown, but which each new member of -the society is born to and finds subsisting. It is transmitted by -tradition from parents to children, and is imbibed by the latter -almost unconsciously from what they see and hear around, without any -special season of teaching, or special persons to teach. It becomes a -part of each person's nature--a standing habit of mind, or fixed set -of mental tendencies, according to which, particular experience is -interpreted and particular persons appreciated.[67] It is not set -forth in systematic proclamation, nor impugned, nor defended: it is -enforced by a sanction of its own, the same real sanction or force in -all countries, by fear of displeasure from the Gods, and by certainty -of evil from neighbours and fellow-citizens. The community hate, -despise, or deride, any individual member who proclaims his dissent -from their social creed, or even openly calls it in question. Their -hatred manifests itself in different ways at different times and -occasions, sometimes by burning or excommunication, sometimes by -banishment or interdiction[68] from fire and water; at the very least, -by exclusion from that amount of forbearance, good-will, and -estimation, without which the life of an individual becomes -insupportable: for society, though its power to make an individual -happy is but limited, has complete power, easily exercised, to make -him miserable. The orthodox public do not recognise in any individual -citizen a right to scrutinise their creed, and to reject it if not -approved by his own rational judgment. They expect that he will -embrace it in the natural course of things, by the mere force of -authority and contagion--as they have adopted it themselves: as they -have adopted also the current language, weights, measures, divisions -of time, &c. If he dissents, he is guilty of an offence described in -the terms of the indictment preferred against Sokrates--"Sokrates -commits crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in the Gods, in whom -the city believes, but introduces new religious beliefs," &c.[69] -"Nomos (Law and Custom), King of All" (to borrow the phrase which -Herodotus cites from Pindar[70]), exercises plenary power, spiritual -as well as temporal, over individual minds; moulding the emotions as -well as the intellect according to the local type--determining the -sentiments, the belief, and the predisposition in regard to new -matters tendered for belief, of every one--fashioning thought, speech, -and points of view, no less than action--and reigning under the -appearance of habitual, self-suggested tendencies. Plato, when he -assumes the function of Constructor, establishes special officers for -enforcing in detail the authority of King Nomos in his Platonic -variety. But even where no such special officers exist, we find Plato -himself describing forcibly (in the speech assigned to Protagoras)[71] -the working of that spontaneous ever-present police by whom the -authority of King Nomos is enforced in detail--a police not the less -omnipotent because they wear no uniform, and carry no recognised -title. - -[Footnote 67: This general fact is powerfully set forth by Cicero, in -the beginning of the third Tusculan Disputation. Chrysippus the Stoic, -"ut est in omni historiâ curiosus," had collected striking examples of -these consecrated practices, cherished in one territory, abhorrent -elsewhere. (Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 45, 108.)] - -[Footnote 68: See the description of the treatment of Aristodêmus, one -of the two Spartans who survived the battle of Thermopylæ, after his -return home, Herodot. vii. 231, ix. 71. The interdiction from -communion of fire, water, eating, sacrifice, &c., is the strongest -manifestation of repugnance: so insupportable to the person -excommunicated, that it counted for a sentence of exile in the Roman -law. (Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton, s. 9. Heineccius, Ant. Rom. i. -16, 9, 10.)] - -[Footnote 69: Xenophon. Memor. i. 1, 1. [Greek: A)dikei= Sôkra/tês, -ou(\s me\n ê( po/lis nomi/zei theou\s ou) nomi/zôn, e(/tera de\ kaina\ -daimo/nia ei)sphe/rôn], &c. Plato (Leges, x. 909, 910) and Cicero -(Legib. ii. 19-25) forbid [Greek: kaina\ daimo/nia], "separatim nemo -habessit Deos," &c.] - -[Footnote 70: [Greek: No/mos pa/ntôn basileu/s] (Herodot. iii. 38). It -will be seen from Herodotus, as well as elsewhere, that the idea -really intended to be expressed by the word [Greek: No/mos] is much -larger than what is now commonly understood by _Law_. It is equivalent -to that which Epiktêtus calls [Greek: to\ do/gma--pantachou= -a)ni/kêton to\ do/gma] (Epiktet. iii. 16). It includes what is meant -by [Greek: to\ no/mimon] (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 13-24), [Greek: ta\ -no/mima, ta\ nomizo/mena, ta pa/tria, ta\ no/maia], including both -positive morality, and social æsthetical precepts, as well as civil or -political, and even personal habits, such as that of abstinence from -spitting or wiping the nose (Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 8, 8-10). The case -which Herodotus quotes to illustrate his general thesis is the -different treatment which, among different nations, is considered -dutiful and respectful towards senior relatives and the corpses of -deceased relatives; which matters come under [Greek: ta)/grapta -ka)sphalê= Theô=n No/mima] (Soph. Antig. 440)--of immemorial -antiquity;-- - -[Greek: Ou) ga/r ti nu=n ge ka)chthe\s a)ll' a)ei/ pote -Zê=| tau=ta, kou)dei\s oi)=den e)x' o(/tou' pha/nê]. - -[Greek: No/mos] and [Greek: e)pitê/deuma] run together in Plato's -mind, dictating every hour's proceeding of the citizen through life -(Leges, vii. 807-808-823). - -We find Plato, in the Leges, which represents the altered tone and -compressive orthodoxy of his old age, extolling the simple goodness -([Greek: eu)ê/theia]) of our early forefathers, who believed -implicitly all that was told them, and were not clever enough to raise -doubts, [Greek: ô(/sper tanu=n] (Legg. iii. 679, 680). Plato dwells -much upon the danger of permitting any innovation on the fixed modes -of song and dance (Legg. v. 727, vii. 797-800), and forbids it under -heavy penalties. He says that the lawgiver both _can_ consecrate -common talk, and ought to consecrate it--[Greek: kathierô=sai tê\n -phê/mên] (Legg. 838), the dicta of [Greek: No/mos Basileu/s]. - -Pascal describes, in forcible terms, the wide-spread authority of -[Greek: No/mos Basileu/s]:--"Il ne faut pas se méconnaître, nous -sommes automates autant qu'esprit: et delà vient que l'instrument, par -lequel la persuasion se fait, n'est pas la seule démonstration. -Combien y a-t-il peu de choses démontrées! Les preuves ne convainquent -que l'esprit. La coutume fait nos preuves les plus fortes et les plus -crues: _elle incline l'automate, qui entraîne l'esprit sans qu'il y -pense_. Qui a démontré qu'il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons--et -qu'y a-t-il de plus cru? C'est donc la coutume qui nous en -persuade, c'est elle qui fait tant de Chrétiens, c'est elle qui fait -les Turcs les Paiens, les métiers, les soldats, &c. Enfin, il faut -avoir recours à elle quand une fois l'esprit a vu où est la vérité, -afin de nous abreuver et nous teindre de cette créance, qui nous -échappe à toute heure; car d'en avoir toujours les preuves présentes, -c'est trop d'affaire. Il faut acquérir une créance plus facile, qui -est celle de l'habitude, qui, sans violence, sans art, sans argument, -nous fait croire les choses, et incline toutes nos puissances à cette -croyance, en sorte que notre âme y tombe naturellement. Quand on ne -croit que par la force de la conviction, et que l'automate est incliné -à croire le contraire, ce n'est pas assez." (Pascal, Pensées, ch. xi. -p. 237, ed. Louandre, Paris, 1854.) - -Herein Pascal coincides with Montaigne, of whom he often speaks -harshly enough: "Comme de vray nous n'avons aultre mire de la vérité -et de la raison, que l'exemple et idée des opinions et usances du païs -où nous sommes: là est tousiours la parfaicte religion, la parfaicte -police, parfaict et accomply usage de toutes choses." (Essais de -Montaigne, liv. i. ch. 30.) Compare the same train of thought in -Descartes (Discours sur la Méthode, pp. 132-139, ed. Cousin).] - -[Footnote 71: Plat. Protag. 320-328. The large sense of the word -[Greek: No/mos], as conceived by Pindar and Herodotus, must be kept in -mind, comprising positive morality, religious ritual, consecrated -habits, the local turns of sympathy and antipathy, &c. M. Salvador -observes, respecting the Mosaic Law: "Qu'on écrive tous les rapports -publics et privés qui unissent les membres d'un peuple quelconque, et -tous les principes sur lesquels ces rapports sont fondés--il en -résultera un ensemble complet, un véritable système plus ou moins -raisonnable, qui sera l'expression exacte de la manière d'exister de -ce peuple. Or, cet ensemble ou ce système est ce que les Hébreux -appellent la _tora_, la loi ou la constitution publique--en prenant ce -mot dans le sens le plus étendu." (Salvador, Histoire des Institutions -de Moise, liv. i. ch. ii. p. 96.) - -Compare also about the sense of the word _Lex_, as conceived by the -Arabs, M. Renan, Averroès, p. 286, and Mr. Mill's chapter respecting -the all-comprehensive character of the Hindoo law (Hist. of India, ch. -iv., beginning): "In the law books of the Hindus, the details of -jurisprudence and judicature occupy comparatively a very moderate -space. The doctrines and ceremonies of religion; the rules and -practice of education; the institutions, duties, and customs of -domestic life; the maxims of private morality, and even of domestic -economy; the rules of government, of war, and of negotiation; all form -essential parts of the Hindu code of law, and are treated in the same -style, and laid down with the same authority, as the rules for the -distribution of justice." - -Mr. Maine, in his admirable work on Ancient Law, notes both the -all-comprehensive and the irresistible ascendancy of what is called _Law_ -in early societies. He remarks emphatically that "the stationary -condition of the human race is the rule--the progressive condition the -exception--a rare exception in the history of the world". (Chap. i. -pp. 16-18-19; chap. ii. pp. 22-24.) - -Again, Mr. Maine observes:--"The other liability, to which the infancy -of society is exposed, has prevented or arrested the progress of far -the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of ancient law, arising -chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, -has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and -conduct which they entertained at the time when their institutions -were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two -races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity: and grafts -from these stocks have fertilised a few modern societies. But it is -still true that over the larger part of the world, the perfection of -law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the -ground-plan supposed to have been marked out by the legislator. _If -intellect has in such cases been exercised upon jurisprudence, it has -uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it -could build on ancient texts, without discoverable departure from -their literal tenor._" (Maine, Ancient Law, ch. iv. pp. 77-78.)] - -[Side-note: Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not -yield to the established orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own -judgment.] - -There are, however, generally a few exceptional minds to whom this -omnipotent authority of King Nomos is repugnant, and who claim a right -to investigate and judge for themselves on many points already settled -and foreclosed by the prevalent orthodoxy. In childhood and youth -these minds must have gone through the ordinary influences,[72] but -without the permanent stamp which such influences commonly leave -behind. Either the internal intellectual force of the individual is -greater, or he contracts a reverence for some new authority, or (as in -the case of Sokrates) he believes himself to have received a special -mission from the Gods--in one way or other the imperative character of -the orthodoxy around him is so far enfeebled, that he feels at liberty -to scrutinise for himself the assemblage of beliefs and sentiments -around him. If he continues to adhere to them, this is because they -approve themselves to his individual reason: unless this last -condition be fulfilled, he becomes a dissenter, proclaiming his -dissent more or less openly, according to circumstances. Such -disengagement from authority traditionally consecrated ([Greek: -e)xallagê\ tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn]),[73] and assertion of the right -of self-judgment, on the part of a small minority of [Greek: -i)diognô/mones],[74] is the first condition of existence for -philosophy or "reasoned truth". - -[Footnote 72: Cicero, Tusc. D. iii. 2; Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 10, -1179, b. 23. [Greek: o( de\ lo/gos kai\ ê( didachê\ mê/ pot' ou)k e)n -a(/pasin i)schu/ê|, a)lla\ de/ê| prodieirga/sthai toi=s e)/thesi tê\n -tou= a)kroatou= psuchê\n pro\s to\ kalô=s chai/rein kai\ misei=n, -ô(/sper gê=n tê\n thre/psousan to\ spe/rma]. To the same purpose -Plato, Republ. iii. 402 A, Legg. ii. 653 B, 659 E, Plato and Aristotle -(and even Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 3), aiming at the formation of a body -of citizens, and a community very different from anything which they -saw around them--require to have the means of shaping the early -sentiments, love, hatred, &c., of children, in a manner favourable to -their own ultimate views. This is exactly what [Greek: No/mos -Basileu\s] does effectively in existing societies, without need of -special provision for the purpose. See Plato, Protagor. 325, 326.] - -[Footnote 73: Plato, Phædrus, 265 A. See Sir Will. Hamilton's Lectures -on Logic, Lect. 29, pp. 88-90. In the Timæus (p. 40 E) Plato -interrupts the thread of his own speculations on cosmogony, to take in -all the current theogony on the authority of King Nomos. [Greek: -a)du/naton ou)=n theô=n paisi\n a)pistei=n, kai/per a)/neu te -ei)ko/tôn kai\ a)nagkai/ôn a)podei/xeôn le/gousin, a)ll' ô(s oi)kei=a -pha/skousin a)pagge/llein e(pome/nous tô=| no/mô| pisteute/on]. - -Hegel adverts to this severance of the individual consciousness from -the common consciousness of the community, as the point of departure -for philosophical theory:--"On one hand we are now called upon to find -some specific matter for the general form of Good; such closer -determination of The Good is the criterion required. On the other -hand, the exigencies of the individual subject come prominently -forward: this is the consequence of the revolution which Sokrates -operated in the Greek mind. So long as the religion, the laws, the -political constitution, of any people, are in full force--so long as -each individual citizen is in complete harmony with them all--no one -raises the question, What has the Individual to do for himself? In a -moralised and religious social harmony, each individual finds his -destination prescribed by the established routine; while this positive -morality, religion, laws, form also the routine of _his own_ mind. On -the contrary, if the Individual no longer stands on the custom of his -nation, nor feels himself in full agreement with the religion and -laws--he then no longer finds what he desires, nor obtains -satisfaction in the medium around him. When once such discord has -become confirmed, the Individual must fall back on his own -reflections, and seek his destination there. This is what gives rise -to the question--What is the essential scheme for the Individual? To -what ought he to conform--what shall he aim at? An _ideal_ is thus set -up for the Individual. This is, the Wise Man, or the Ideal of the Wise -Man, which is, in truth, the separate working of individual -self-consciousness, conceived as an universal or typical character." -(Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, Part ii. pp. 132, 133.)] - -[Footnote 74: This is an expression of the learned Huet, Bishop of -Avranches:--"Si quelqu'un me demande maintenant, ce que nous sommes, -puisque nous ne voulons être ni Académiciens, ni Sceptiques, ni -Eclectiques, ni d'aucune autre Secte, je répondrai que _nous sommes -nôtres_--c'est à dire libres: ne voulans soumettre notre esprit à -aucune autorité, et n'approuvans que ce qui nous paroit s'approcher -plus près de la vérité. Que si quelqu'un, par mocquerie ou par -flatterie, nous appelle [Greek: i)diognô/monas]--c'est à dire, -attachés à nos propres sentimens, nous n'y répugnerons pas." (Huet, -Traité Philosophique de la Foiblesse de l'Esprit Humain, liv. ii. ch. -xi. p. 224, ed. 1741.)] - -[Side-note: Early appearance of a few free-judging individuals, or -free-thinkers in Greece.] - -Amidst the epic and lyric poets of Greece, with their varied -productive impulse--as well as amidst the Gnomic philosophers, the -best of whom were also poets--there are not a few manifestations of -such freely judging individuality. Xenophanes the philosopher, who -wrote in poetry, censured severely several of the current narratives -about the Gods and Pindar, though in more respectful terms, does the -like. So too, the theories about the Kosmos, propounded by various -philosophers, Thales, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, -&c., were each of them the free offspring of an individual mind. But -these were counter-affirmations: novel theories, departing from the -common belief, yet accompanied by little or no debate, or attack, or -defence: indeed the proverbial obscurity of Herakleitus, and the -recluse mysticism of the Pythagoreans, almost excluded discussion. -These philosophers (to use the phrase of Aristotle[75]) had no concern -with Dialectic: which last commenced in the fifth century B.C., with -the Athenian drama and dikastery, and was enlisted in the service of -philosophy by Zeno the Eleate and Sokrates. - -[Footnote 75: Aristot. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 32. Eusebius, having set -forth the dissentient and discordant opinions of the various Hellenic -philosophers, triumphantly contrasts with them the steady adherence of -Jews and Christians to one body of truth, handed down by an uniform -tradition from father to son, from the first generation of -man--[Greek: a)po\ prô/tês a)nthrôpogoni/as]. (Præp. Ev. xiv. 3.) - -Cicero, in the treatise (not preserved) entitled _Hortensius_--set -forth, at some length, an attack and a defence of philosophy; the -former he assigned to Hortensius, the latter he undertook in his own -name. One of the arguments urged by Hortensius against philosophy, to -prove that it was not "vera sapientia," was, that it was both a human -invention and a recent novelty, not handed down by tradition _a -principio_, therefore not natural to man. "Quæ si secundum hominis -naturam est, cum homine ipso coeperit necesse est; si vero non est, -nec capere quidem illam posset humana natura. Ubi apud antiquiores -latuit amor iste investigandæ veritatis?" (Lactantius, Inst. Divin. -iii. 16.) The loss of this Ciceronian pleading (Philosophy _versus_ -Consecrated Tradition) is much to be deplored. Lactantius and Augustin -seem to have used it largely. - -The Hermotimus of Lucian, manifesting all his lively Sokratic -acuteness, is a dialogue intended to expose the worthlessness of all -speculative philosophy. The respondent Hermotimus happens to be a -Stoic, but the assailant expressly declares (c. 85) that the arguments -would be equally valid against Platonists or Aristotelians. Hermotimus -is advised to desist from philosophy, to renounce inquiry, to employ -himself in some of the necessary affairs of life, and to acquiesce in -the common received opinions, which would carry him smoothly along the -remainder of his life ([Greek: a)xiô= pra/ttein ti tô=n a)nagkai/ôn, -kai\ o(/ se parape/mpsei e)s to\ loipo\n tou= bi/ou, ta\ koina\ tau=ta -phronou=nta], c. 72). Among the worthless philosophical speculations -Lucian ranks geometry: the geometrical definitions (point and line) he -declares to be nonsensical and inadmissible (c. 74).] - -[Side-note: Rise of Dialectic--Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery.] - -Both the drama and the dikastery recognise two or more different ways -of looking at a question, and require that no conclusion shall be -pronounced until opposing disputants have been heard and compared. The -Eumenides plead against Apollo, Prometheus against the mandates and -dispositions of Zeus, in spite of the superior dignity as well as -power with which Zeus is invested: every Athenian citizen, in his -character of dikast, took an oath to hear both the litigant parties -alike, and to decide upon the pleadings and evidence according to law. -Zeno, in his debates with the anti-Parmenidean philosophers, did not -trouble himself to parry their thrusts. He assumed the aggressive, -impugned the theories of his opponents, and exposed the contradictions -in which they involved themselves. The dialectic process, in which -there are (at the least) two opposite points of view both represented--the -negative and the affirmative--became both prevalent and -interesting. - -[Side-note: Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social -topics by Sokrates.] - -I have in a former chapter explained the dialectic of Zeno, as it bore -upon the theories of the anti-Parmenidean philosophers. Still more -important was the proceeding of Sokrates, when he applied the like -scrutiny to ethical, social, political, religious topics. He did not -come forward with any counter-theories: he declared expressly that he -had none to propose, and that he was ignorant. He put questions to -those who on their side professed to know, and he invited answers from -them. His mission, as he himself described it, was, to scrutinise and -expose false pretensions to knowledge. Without such scrutiny, he -declares life itself to be not worth having. He impugned the common -and traditional creed, not in the name of any competing doctrine, but -by putting questions on the familiar terms in which it was confidently -enunciated, and by making its defenders contradict themselves and feel -the shame of their own contradictions. The persons who held it were -shown to be incapable of defending it, when tested by an acute -cross-examiner; and their supposed knowledge, gathered up insensibly -from the tradition around them, deserved the language which Bacon applies -to the science of his day, conducting indirectly to the necessity of -that remedial course which Bacon recommends. "Nemo adhuc tantâ mentis -constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi proposuerit, -theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum -et æquum ad particularia rursus applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam -habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus quas -primo hausimus notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries."[76] - -[Footnote 76: Bacon, Nov. Org. Aph. 97. I have already cited this -passage in a note on the 68th chapter of my 'History of Greece,' pp. -612-613; in which note I have also alluded to other striking passages -of Bacon, indicating the confusion, inconsistencies, and -misapprehensions of the "_intellectus sibi permissus_". In that note, -and in the text of the chapter, I have endeavoured to illustrate the -same view of the Sokratic procedure as that which is here taken.] - -[Side-note: Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the right of -satisfaction for his own individual reason.] - -Never before (so far as we know) had the authority of King Nomos been -exposed to such an enemy as this dialectic or cross-examination by -Sokrates: the prescriptive creed and unconsciously imbibed sentiment -("ratio ex fide, casu, et puerilibus notionibus") being thrown upon -their defence against negative scrutiny brought to bear upon them by -the inquisitive reason of an individual citizen. In the Apology, -Sokrates clothes his own strong intellectual _oestrus_ in the belief -(doubtless sincerely entertained) of a divine mission. In the Gorgias, -the Platonic Sokrates asserts it in naked and simple, yet not less -emphatic, language. "You, Polus, bring against me the authority of the -multitude, as well as that of the most eminent citizens, all of whom -agree in upholding your view. But I, one man standing here alone, do -_not_ agree with you. And I engage to compel you, my one respondent, -to agree with _me_."[77] The autonomy or independence of individual -reason against established authority, and the title of negative reason -as one of the litigants in the process of philosophising, are first -brought distinctly to view in the career of Sokrates. - -[Footnote 77: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 A. [Greek: kai\ nu=n, peri\ ô(=n -su\ le/geis, o)li/gou soi\ pa/ntes sumphê/sousi tau)ta A)thênai=oi -kai\ oi( xe/noi, e)a\n bou/lê kat' e)mou= ma/rturas parasche/sthai ô(s -ou)k a)lêthê= le/gô; marturê/sousi/ soi, e)a\n me\n bou/lê|, Niki/as -o( Nikêra/tou kai\ oi( a)delphoi\ met' au)tou=--e)a\n de\ bou/lê|, -A)ristokra/tês o( Skelli/ou--e)a\n de\ bou/lê|, ê( Perikle/ous o(/lê -oi)ki/a ê)\ a)/llê sugge/neia, ê(/ntina a)\n bou/lê| tô=n e)/nthade -e)kle/xasthai. _A)ll' e)gô/ soi ei)=s ô(\n ou)ch o(mologô=_; ou) ga/r -me su\ a)nagka/zeis], &c.] - -[Side-note: Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure -of Sokrates. Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs -peculiarly to the Sophists and the Megarici.] - -With such a career, we need not wonder that Sokrates, though esteemed -and admired by a select band of adherents, incurred a large amount of -general unpopularity. The public (as I have before observed) do not -admit the claim of independent exercise for individual reason. In the -natural process of growth in the human mind, belief does not follow -proof, but springs up apart from and independent of it: an immature -intelligence believes first, and proves (if indeed it ever seeks -proof) afterwards.[78] This mental tendency is farther confirmed by -the pressure and authority of King Nomos; who is peremptory in -exacting belief, but neither furnishes nor requires proof. The -community, themselves deeply persuaded, will not hear with calmness -the voice of a solitary reasoner, adverse to opinions thus -established; nor do they like to be required to explain, analyse, or -reconcile those opinions.[79] They disapprove especially that -dialectic debate which gives free play and efficacious prominence to -the negative arm. The like disapprobation is felt even by most of the -historians of philosophy; who nevertheless, having an interest in the -philosophising process, might be supposed to perceive that nothing -worthy of being called _reasoned truth_ can exist, without full and -equal scope to negative as well as to affirmative. - -[Footnote 78: See Professor Bain's Chapter on Belief; one of the most -original and instructive chapters in his volume on the Emotions and -the Will, pp. 578-584. [Third Ed., pp. 505-538.]] - -[Footnote 79: This antithesis and reciprocal repulsion--between the -speculative reason of the philosopher who thinks for himself, and the -established traditional convictions of the public--is nowhere more -strikingly enforced than by Plato in the sixth and seventh books of -the Republic; together with the corrupting influence exercised by King -Nomos, at the head of his vehement and unanimous public, over those -few gifted natures which are competent to philosophical speculation. -See Plato, Rep. vi. 492-493. - -The unfavourable feelings with which the attempts to analyse morality -(especially when quite novel, as such attempts were in the time of -Sokrates) are received in a community--are noticed by Mr. John Stuart -Mill, in his tract on Utilitarianism, ch. iii. pp. 38-39:-- - -"The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any -supposed moral standard, What is its sanction? What are the motives to -obey it? or more specifically, What is the source of its obligation? -Whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of -moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question: which though -frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian -morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above -others, really arises in _regard to all standards_. It arises in fact -whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard, or refer morality -to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the -customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, -is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of -being _in itself_ obligatory: and when a person is asked to believe -that this morality _derives_ its obligation from some general -principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the -assertion is to him a paradox. The supposed corollaries seem to have a -more binding force than the original theorem: the superstructure seems -to stand better without than with what is represented as its -foundation. . . . The difficulty has no peculiar application to the -doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to analyse -morality, and reduce it to principles: which, unless the principle is -already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its -applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their -sanctity." - -Epiktêtus observes that the refined doctrines acquired by the -self-reasoning philosopher, often failed to attain that intense hold -on his conviction, which the "rotten doctrines" inculcated from childhood -possessed over the conviction of ordinary men. [Greek: Dia\ ti/ ou)=n -e)kei=noi (oi( polloi\, oi( i)diô=tai) u(mô=n (tôn philoso/phôn) -i)schuro/teroi? O(/ti e)kei=noi me\n ta\ sapra\ tau=ta a)po\ dogma/tôn -lalou=sin? u(mei=s de\ ta\ kompsa\ a)po\ tô=n cheilô=n . . . . . Ou(/tôs -u(ma=s oi( i)diô=tai nikô=si; Pantachou= ga\r i)schuro\n to\ do/gma; -a)ni/kêton to\ do/gma]. (Epiktêtus, iii. 16.)] - -[Side-note: The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring -against the Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against -Sokrates. They represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual -with an orthodox public.] - -These historians usually speak in very harsh terms of the Sophists, as -well as of Eukleides and the Megaric sect; who are taken as the great -apostles of negation. But the truth is, that the Megarics inherited it -from Sokrates, and shared it with Plato. Eukleides cannot have laid -down a larger programme of negation than that which we read in the -Apology of Sokrates,--nor composed a dialogue more ultra-negative than -the Platonic Parmenidês: nor, again, did he depart so widely, in -principle as well as in precept, from existing institutions, as Plato -in his Republic. The charges which historians of philosophy urge -against the Megarics as well as against the persons whom they call the -Sophists--such as corruption of youth--perversion of truth and -morality, by making the worse appear the better reason--subversion of -established beliefs--innovation as well as deception--all these were -urged against Sokrates himself by his contemporaries,[80] and indeed -against all the philosophers indiscriminately, as we learn from -Sokrates himself in the Apology.[81] They are outbursts of feeling -natural to the practical, orthodox citizen, who represents the common -sense of the time and place; declaring his antipathy to these -speculative, freethinking innovations of theory, which challenges the -prescriptive maxims of traditional custom and tests them by a standard -approved by herself. The orthodox citizen does not feel himself in -need of philosophers to tell him what is truth or what is virtue, nor -what is the difference between real and fancied knowledge. On these -matters he holds already settled persuasions, acquired from his -fathers and his ancestors, and from the acknowledged civic -authorities, spiritual and temporal;[82] who are to him exponents of -the creed guaranteed by tradition:-- - - "Quod sapio, satis est mihi: non ego curo -Esse quod Arcesilas ærumnosique Solones." - -[Footnote 80: Themistius, in defending himself against contemporary -opponents, whom he represents to have calumniated him, consoles -himself by saying, among other observations, that these arrows have -been aimed at all the philosophers successively--Sokrates, Plato, -Aristotle, Theophrastus. [Greek: O( ga\r sophistê\s kai\ a)lazô\n kai\ -kaino/tomos prô=ton me\n Sôkra/tous o)nei/dê ê)=n, e)/peita Pla/tônos -e)phexê=s, ei)=th' u(/steron A)ristote/lous kai\ Theophra/stou]. -(Orat. xxiii. p. 346, Dindorf.) - -We read in Zeller's account of the Platonic philosophy (Phil. der -Griech. vol. ii. p. 368, ed. 2nd): - -"Die propädeutische Begründung der Platonischen Philosophie besteht im -Allgemeinen darin, dass der unphilosophische Standpunkt aufgelöst, und -die Erhebung zum philosophischen in ihrer Nothwendigkeit nachgewiesen -wird. Im Besondern können wir drey Stadien dieses Wegs unterscheiden. -Den Ausgangspunkt bildet das gewöhnliche Bewusstsein. Indem die -_Voraussetzungen, welche Diesem für ein Erstes und Festes gegolten -hatten, dialektisch zersetzt werden, so erhalten wir zunächst das -negative Resultat der Sophistik_. Erst wenn auch diese überwunden ist, -kann der philosophische Standpunkt positiv entwickelt werden." - -Zeller here affirms that it was the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, -Hippias and others) who first applied negative analysis to the common -consciousness; breaking up, by their dialectic scrutiny, those -hypotheses which had before exercised authority therein, as first -principles not to be disputed. - -I dissent from this position. I conceive that the Sophists -(Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias) did _not_ do what Zeller affirms, and -that Sokrates (and Plato after him) _did_ do it. The negative analysis -was the weapon of Sokrates, and not of Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, -&c. It was he who declared (see Platonic Apology) that false -persuasion of knowledge was at once universal and ruinous, and who -devoted his life to the task of exposing it by cross-examination. The -conversation of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydêmus (Memor. iv. -2), exhibits a complete specimen of that aggressive analysis, brought -to bear on the common consciousness, which Zeller ascribes to the -Sophists: the Platonic dialogues, in which Sokrates cross-examines -upon Justice, Temperance, Courage, Piety, Virtue, &c., are of the like -character; and we know from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1-16) that Sokrates -passed much time in such examinations with pre-eminent success. - -I notice this statement of Zeller, not because it is peculiar to him -(for most of the modern historians of philosophy affirm the same; and -his history, which is the best that I know, merely repeats the -ordinary view), but because it illustrates clearly the view which I -take of the Sophists and Sokrates. Instead of the unmeaning abstract -"_Sophistik_," given by Zeller and others, we ought properly to insert -the word "_Sokratik_," if we are to have any abstract term at all. - -Again--The negative analysis, which these authors call "Sophistik," -they usually censure as discreditable and corrupting. To me it -appears, on the contrary, both original and valuable, as one essential -condition for bringing social and ethical topics under the domain of -philosophy or "reasoned truth". - -Professor Charles Thurot (in his Études sur Aristote, Paris, 1860, p. -119) takes a juster view than Zeller of the difference between Plato -and the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias). "Les Sophistes, -comme tous ceux qui dissertent superficiellement sur des questions de -philosophie, et en particulier sur la morale et la politique, -s'appuyaient sur l'autorité et le témoignage; ils alléguaient les vers -des poètes célèbres qui passaient aux yeux des Grecs pour des oracles -de sagesse: ils invoquaient l'opinion du commun des hommes. Platon -récusait absolument ces deux espèces de témoignages. Ni les poètes ni -le commun des hommes ne savent ce qu'ils disent, puisqu'ils ne peuvent -en rendre raison. . . . . . Aux yeux de Platon, il n'y a d'autre méthode, -pour arriver au vrai et pour le communiquer, que la dialectique: qui -est à la fois l'art d'interroger et de répondre, et l'art de définir -et de diviser." - -M. Thurot here declares (in my judgment very truly) that the Sophists -appealed to the established ethical authorities, and dwelt upon or -adorned the received common-places--that Plato denied these -authorities, and brought his battery of negative cross-examination to -bear upon them as well as upon their defenders. M. Thurot thus gives a -totally different version of the procedure of the Sophists from that -which is given by Zeller. Nevertheless he perfectly agrees with -Zeller, and with Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates (Plat. Menon, pp. -91-92), in describing the Sophists as a class who made money by -deceiving and perverting the minds of hearers (p. 120).] - -[Footnote 81: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23 D. [Greek: i(/na de\ mê\ -dokô=sin a)porei=n, _ta\ kata\ pa/ntôn tô=n philosophou/ntôn -pro/cheira tau=ta le/gousin_, o(/ti ta\ mete/ôra kai\ ta\ u(po\ gê=s -_kai\ theou\s mê\ nomi/zein kai\ to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô -poiei=n_], &c. - -Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. [Greek: to\ koinê=| toi=s philoso/phois u(po\ -tô=n pollô=n epitimô/menon]. The rich families in Athens severely -reproached their relatives who frequented the society of Sokrates. -Xenophon, Sympos. iv. 32.] - -[Footnote 82: See this point strikingly set forth by Plato, Politikus, -299: also Plutarch, [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], c. 13, 756 A. - -This is the "auctoritas majorum," put forward by Cotta in his official -character of _Pontifex_, as conclusive _per se_: when reasons are -produced to sustain it, the reasons fail. (Cic. Nat. Deor. iii. 3, 5, -6, 9.) - -The "auctoritas maiorum," proclaimed by the Pontifex Cotta, may be -illustrated by what we read in Father Paul's History of the Council of -Trent, respecting the proceedings of that Council when it imposed the -duty of accepting the authoritative interpretation of -Scripture:--"Lorsqu'on fut à opiner sur le quatrième Article, presque tous -se rendirent à l'avis du Cardinal Pachèco, qui représenta: Que l'Écriture -ayant été expliquée par tant de gens éminens en piété et en doctrine, -l'on ne pouvoit pas espérer de rien ajouter de meilleur: Que les -nouvelles Hérésies etant toutes nées des nouveaux sens qu'on avoit -donnés à l'Écriture, il étoit nécessaire d'arrêter la licence des -esprits modernes, et de les obliger de se laisser gouverner par les -Anciens et par l'Église: Et que si quelqu'un naissoit avec un esprit -singulier, on devoit le forcer à le renfermer au dedans de lui-même, -et à ne pas troubler le monde en publiant tout ce qu'il pensoit." (Fra -Paolo, Histoire du Concile de Trente, traduction Françoise, par Le -Courayer, Livre II. p. 284, 285, in 1546, pontificate of Paul III.) - -P. 289. "Par le second Décret, il étoit ordonné en substance, de tenir -l'Edition Vulgate pour authentique dans les leçons publiques, les -disputes, les prédications, et les explications; et défendre à qui que -ce fut de la rejeter. On y défendoit aussi d'expliquer la Saint -Écriture dans un sens contraire à celui que lui donne la Sainte Église -notre Mère, et au consentement unanime des Pères, quand bien même on -auroit intention de tenir ces explications secrètes; et on ordonnoit -que ceux qui contreviendroient à cette défense fussent punis par les -Ordinaires."] - - -* * * * * - - -He will not listen to ingenious sophistry respecting these consecrated -traditions; he does not approve the tribe of fools who despise what -they are born to, and dream of distant, unattainable novelties:[83] he -cannot tolerate the nice discoursers, ingenious hair-splitters, -priests of subtleties and trifles--dissenters from the established -opinions, who corrupt the youth, teaching their pupils to be wise -above the laws, to despise or even beat their fathers and mothers,[84] -and to cheat their creditors--mischievous instructors, whose -appropriate audience are the thieves and malefactors, and who ought to -be silenced if they display ability to pervert others.[85] Such -feeling of disapprobation and antipathy against speculative philosophy -and dialectic--against the _libertas philosophandi_--counts as a -branch of virtue among practical and orthodox citizens, rich or poor, -oligarchical or democratical, military or civil, ancient or modern. It -is an antipathy common to men in other respects very different, to -Nikias as well as Kleon, to Eupolis and Aristophanes as well as to -Anytus and Demochares. It was expressed forcibly by the Roman Cato -(the Censor), when he censured Sokrates as a dangerous and violent -citizen; aiming, in his own way, to subvert the institutions and -customs of the country, and poisoning the minds of his fellow-citizens -with opinions hostile to the laws.[86] How much courage is required in -any individual citizen, to proclaim conscientious dissent in the face -of wide-spread and established convictions, is recognised by Plato -himself, and that too in the most orthodox and intolerant of all his -compositions.[87] He (and Aristotle after him), far from recognising -the infallibility of established King Nomos, were bold enough[88] to -try and condemn him, and to imagine (each of them) a new [Greek: -No/mos] of his own, representing the political Art or Theory of -Politics--a notion which would not have been understood by -Themistokles or Aristeides. - -[Footnote 83: Pindar, Pyth. iii. 21. - -[Greek: E)/sti de\ phu=lon e)n a)nthrô/poisi mataiotaton, -O(/stis ai)schu/nôn e)pichô/ria paptai/nei ta\ po/rsô, -Metamô/nia thêreu/ôn a)kra/ntois e)lpi/sin.]] - -[Footnote 84: [Greek: Ou)de\n sophizo/mestha toi=si dai/mosi; -Patri/ous paradocha\s, a(\s th' o(mê/likas chro/nô| -Kektê/meth', ou)dei\s au)ta\ katabalei= lo/gos, -Ou)/d' ei) di' a)/krôn to\ sopho\n êu(/rêtai phrenô=n]. - (Euripides, Bacchæ, 200.) - -Illud in his rebus vereor, ne forté rearis -Impia te rationis inire elementa, viamque -Endogredi sceleris. (Lucretius, i. 85.) - -Compare Valckenaer, Diatrib. Eurip. pp. 38, 39, cap. 5. - -About the accusations against Sokrates, of leading the youth to -contract doubts and to slight the authority of their fathers, see -Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 52; Plato, Gorgias, 522 B, p. 79, Menon, p. 70. A -touching anecdote, illustrating this displeasure of the fathers -against Sokrates, may be found in Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii. 1, 89, where -the father of Tigranes puts to death the [Greek: sophistê\s] who had -taught his son, because that son had contracted a greater attachment -to the [Greek: sophistê\s] than to his own father. - -Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 9; i. 2, 49. Apolog. So. s. 20; compare the -speech of Kleon in Thucyd. iii. 37. Plato, Politikus, p. 299 E. - -Timon in the Silli bestows on Sokrates and his successors the title of -[Greek: a)kribo/logoi]. Diog. Laert. ii. 19. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. -vii. 8. Aristophan. Nubes, 130, where Strepsiades says-- - -[Greek: pôs ou)=n gerô\n ô)=n ka)pilê/smôn kai\ bradu\s -lo/gôn a)kribô=n schindala/mous mathê/somai?] - -Compare 320-359 of the same comedy--[Greek: su/ te leptota/tôn lê/rôn -i(ereu=]--also Ranæ, 149, b. - -When Euripides ([Greek: o( skêniko\s philo/sophos]) went down to -Hades, he is described by Aristophanes as giving clever exhibitions -among the malefactors there, with great success and applause. Ranæ, -771-- - -[Greek: O(/te dê\ katê=lth' Eu)ripi/dês, e)pedei/knuto -toi=s lôpodu/tais kai\ toi=s balantiêto/mois . . . -o(/per e)/st' e)n A(/|dou plê=thos; oi( d' a)kroô/menoi -tô=n a)ntilogiô=n kai\ lugismô=n kai strophô=n -u(perema/nêsan, ka)no/misan sophô/taton]. - -These astute cavils and quibbles of Euripides are attributed by -Aristophanes, and the other comic writers, to his frequent -conversations with Sokrates. Ranæ, 1490-1500. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhet. -p. 301-355. Valckenaer, Diatribe in Euripid. c. 4. Aristophanes -describes Sokrates as having stolen a garment from the palæstra -(Nubes, 180); and Eupolis also introduces him as having stolen a -wine-ladle (Schol. ad loc. Eupolis, Fragm. Incert. ix. ed. Meineke). -The fragment of Eupolis (xi. p. 553, [Greek: A)doleschei=n au)to\n -e)kdi/daxon, ô)= sophista/]) seems to apply to Sokrates. About the -sympathy of the people with the attacks of the comic writers on -Sokrates, see Lucian, Piscat. c. 25. - -The rhetor Aristeides (Orat. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], pp. -406-407-408, Dindorf), after remarking on the very vague and general -manner in which the title [Greek: Sophistê\s] was applied among the -Greeks (Herodotus having so designated both Solon and Pythagoras), -mentions that Androtion not only spoke of the seven wise men as -[Greek: tou\s e(/pta sophista/s], but also called Sokrates [Greek: -sophistê\n tou=ton to\n pa/nu]: that Lysias called Plato [Greek: -sophistê\n], and called Æschines (the Sokratic) by the same title; -that Isokrates represented himself, and rhetors and politicians like -himself, as [Greek: philoso/phous], while he termed the dialecticians -and critics [Greek: sophista/s]. Nothing could be more indeterminate -than these names, [Greek: sophistê\s] and [Greek: philo/sophos]. It -was Plato who applied himself chiefly to discredit the name [Greek: -sophistê\s (o( ma/lista e)panasta\s tô=| o)no/mati)] but others had -tried to discredit [Greek: philo/sophos] and [Greek: to\ -philosophei=n] in like manner. It deserves notice that in the -restrictive or censorial law (proposed by Sophokles, and enacted by -the Athenians in B.C. 307, but repealed in the following year) against -the philosophers and their schools, the philosophers generally are -designated as [Greek: sophistai/]. Pollux, Onomast. ix. 42 [Greek: -e)/sti de\ kai\ no/mos A)ttiko\s kata\ tô=n philosophou/ntôn -graphei/s, o(\n Sophoklê=s A)mphiklei/dou Sounieu\s ei)=pen, e)n ô(=| -tina kata\ au)tô=n proeipô\n, e)pê/gage, mê\ e)xei=nai mêdeni\ _tô=n -sophistô=n_ diatribê\n kataskeua/sasthai.]] - -[Footnote 85: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. [Greek: A)thênai/ois ga\r -ou) spho/dra me/lei, a)\n tina deino\n oi)/ôntai ei)=nai, mê\ me/ntoi -didaskaliko\n tê=s au(tou= sophi/as; o(\n d' a)\n kai\ a)/llous -oi)/ôntai poiei=n toiou/tous, thumou=ntai, ei)=t' ou)=n phtho/nô|, ô(s -su le/geis, ei)/te di' a)/llo ti.]] - -[Footnote 86: Plato, Menon, pp. 90-92. The antipathy manifested here by -Anytus against the Sophists, is the same feeling which led him to -indict Sokrates, and which induced also Cato the Censor to hate the -character of Sokrates, and Greek letters generally. Plutarch, Cato, -23: [Greek: o(/lôs philosophi/a| proskekroukô\s, kai\ pa=san -E(llênikê\n mou=san kai\ paidei/an u(po\ philotimi/as propêlaki/zôn; -o(\s ge kai\ Sôkra/tê phêsi\ la/lon kai\ bi/aion geno/menon -e)picheirei=n, ô(=| tro/pô| dunato\n ê)=n, turannei=n tê=s patri/dos, -katalu/onta ta\ e)/thê, kai\ pro\s e)nanti/as toi=s no/mois do/xas -e(/lkonta kai\ methi/stanta tou\s poli/tas]. Comp. Cato, Epist. ap. -Plin. H. N. xxix. 7.] - -[Footnote 87: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 835 C. [Greek: nu=n de a)nthrô/pou -tolmêrou= kinduneu/ei dei=sthai/ tinos, o(\s par)r(êsi/an -diaphero/ntôs timô=n e)rei= ta\ dokou=nta a)/rist' ei)=nai po/lei kai\ -poli/tais, e)n psuchai=s diephtharme/nais to\ pre/pon kai\ e(po/menon -pa/sê| tê=| politei/a| ta/ttôn, e)nanti/a le/gôn tai=s megi/staisin -e)pithumi/ais kai\ ou)k e)/chôn boêtho\n a)nthrô/pôn ou)de/na, lo/gô| -e(po/menos mo/nô| mo/nos]. - -Here the dissenter who proclaims his sincere convictions is spoken of -with respect: compare the contrary feeling, Leges, ix. 881 A, and in -the tenth book generally. In the striking passage of the Republic, -referred to in a previous note (vi. 492) Plato declares the lessons -taught by the multitude--the contagion of established custom and -tradition, communicated by the crowd of earnest assembled believers--to -be of overwhelming and almost omnipotent force. The individual -philosopher (he says), who examines for himself and tries to stand -against it, can hardly maintain himself without special divine aid.] - -[Footnote 88: In the dialogue called Politikus, Plato announces -formally and explicitly (what the historical Sokrates had asserted -before him, Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10) the exclusive pretensions of the -[Greek: Basileu\s Techniko\s] (representing political science, art, or -theory) to rule mankind--the illusory nature of all other titles to -rule and the mischievous working of all existing governments. The same -view is developed in the Republic and the Leges. Compare also -Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. x. p. 1180, b. 27 ad fin. - -In a remarkable passage of the Leges (i. 637 D, 638 C), Plato -observes, in touching upon the discrepancy between different local -institutions at Sparta, Krete, Keos. Tarentum, &c.:--"If natives of -different cities argue with each other about their respective -institutions, each of them has a good and sufficient reason. This is -the custom _with us; with you perhaps it is different_. But we, who -are now conversing, do not apply our criticisms to the private -citizen; we criticise the lawgiver himself, and try to determine -whether his laws are good or bad." [Greek: ê(mi=n d' e)sti\n ou) peri\ -tô=n a)nthrô/pôn tô=n a)/llôn o( lo/gos, a)lla\ peri\ tô=n nomothetô=n -au)tô=n kaki/as te kai\ a)retê=s]. King Nomos was not at all pleased -to be thus put upon his trial.] - -[Side-note: Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme -publicity of speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of -knowledge is universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating -Plato's Dialogues of Search.] - -The dislike so constantly felt by communities having established -opinions, towards free speculation and dialectic, was aggravated in -its application to Sokrates, because his dialectic was not only novel, -but also public, obtrusive, and indiscriminate.[89] The name of -Sokrates, after his death, was employed not merely by Plato, but by -all the Sokratic companions, to cover their own ethical speculations: -moreover, all of them either composed works or gave lectures. But in -either case, readers or hearers were comparatively few in number, and -were chiefly persons prompted by some special taste or interest: while -Sokrates passed his day in the most public place, eager to interrogate -every one, and sometimes forcing his interrogations even upon -reluctant hearers.[90] That he could have been allowed to persist in -this course of life for thirty years, when we read his own account (in -the Platonic Apology) of the antipathy which he provoked--and when we -recollect that the Thirty, during their short dominion, put him under -an interdict--is a remarkable proof of the comparative tolerance of -Athenian practice. - -[Footnote 89: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. "Est enim philosophia paucis -contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et -suspecta et invisa," &c. - -The extreme publicity, and indiscriminate, aggressive conversation of -Sokrates, is strongly insisted on by Themistius (Orat. xxvi. p. 384, -[Greek: U(pe\r tou= le/gein]) as aggravating the displeasure of the -public against him.] - -[Footnote 90: Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2, 3-5-40.] - -However this may be, it is from the conversation of Sokrates that the -Platonic Dialogues of Search take their rise, and we must read them -under those same fundamental postulates which Sokrates enunciates to -the Dikasts. "False persuasion of knowledge is almost universal: the -Elenchus, which eradicates this, is salutary and indispensable: the -dialectic search for truth between two active, self-working minds, -both of them ignorant, yet both feeling their own ignorance, is -instructive, as well as fascinating, though it should end without -finding any truth at all, and without any other result than that of -discovering some proposed hypotheses to be untrue." The modern reader -must be invited to keep these postulates in mind, if he would fairly -appreciate the Platonic Dialogues of Search. He must learn to esteem -the mental exercise of free debate as valuable in itself,[91] even -though the goal recedes before him in proportion to the steps which he -makes in advance. He perceives a lively antithesis of opinions, -several distinct and dissentient points of view opened, various -tentatives of advance made and broken off. He has the first half of -the process of truth-seeking, without the last; and even without full -certainty that the last half can be worked out, or that the problem as -propounded is one which admits of an affirmative solution.[92] But -Plato presumes that the search will be renewed, either by the same -interlocutors or by others. He reckons upon responsive energy in the -youthful subject; he addresses himself to men of earnest purpose and -stirring intellect, who will be spurred on by the dialectic exercise -itself to farther pursuit--men who, having listened to the working out -of different points of view, will meditate on these points for -themselves, and apply a judicial estimate conformable to the measure -of their own minds. Those respondents, who, after having been puzzled -and put to shame by one cross-examination, became disgusted and never -presented themselves again--were despised by Sokrates as lazy and -stupid.[93] For him, as well as for Plato, the search after truth -counted as the main business of life. - -[Footnote 91: Aristotel. Topica, i. p. 101, a. 29, with the Scholion -of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who remarks that the habit of colloquial -debate had been very frequent in the days of Aristotle, and -afterwards; but had comparatively ceased in his own time, haying been -exchanged for written treatises. P. 254, b. Schol. Brandis, also -Plato, Parmenid. pp. 135, 136, and the Commentary of Proklus -thereupon, p. 776 seqq., and p. 917, ed. Stallbaum.] - -[Footnote 92: A passage in one of the speeches composed by Lysias, -addressed by a plaintiff in court to the Dikasts, shows how debate and -free antithesis of opposite opinions were accounted as essential to -the process [Greek: tou= philosophei=n--kai\ e)gô\ me\n ô)/|mên -philosophou=ntas au)tou\s peri\ tou= pra/gmatos a)ntile/gein to\n -e)nanti/on lo/gon; oi( d' a)/ra ou)k ante/legon, a)ll' a)nte/pratton]. -(Lysias, Or. viii. [Greek: Kakologiô=n] s. 11,** p. 273; compare -Plat. Apolog. p. 28 E.) - -Bacon describes his own intellectual cast of mind, in terms which -illustrate the Platonic [Greek: dia/logoi zêtêtikoi/],--the character -of the searcher, doubter, and tester, as contrasted with that of the -confident affirmer and expositor:--"Me ipsum autem ad veritatis -contemplationes quam ad alia magis fabrefactum deprehendi, ut qui -mentem et ad rerum similitudinem (quod maximum est) agnoscendum satis -mobilem, et ad differentiarum subtilitates observandas satis fixam et -intentam haberem--qui et _quærendi desiderium_, et _dubitandi -patientiam_, et _meditandi voluptatem_, et _asserendi cunctationem_, -et _resipiscendi facilitatem_, et disponendi sollicitudinem -tenerem--quique nec novitatem affectarem, nec antiquitatem admirarer, et -omnem imposturam odissem. Quare naturam meam cum veritate quandam -familiaritatem et cognationem habere judicavi." (Impetus Philosophici, -De Interpretatione Naturæ Prooemium.) - -[Greek: Sôkratikô=s ei)s e(ka/teron] is the phrase of Cicero, ad -Atticum ii. 3.] - -[Footnote 93: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 40. - -Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his Essay on Liberty, has the following -remarks, illustrating Plato's Dialogues of Search. I should have been -glad if I could have transcribed here many other pages of that -admirable Essay: which stands almost alone as an unreserved -vindication of the rights of the searching individual intelligence, -against the compression and repression of King Nomos (pp. 79-80-81):-- - -"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living -apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining -it to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to -outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefits of its universal -recognition. Where this advantage cannot be had, I confess I should -like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a -substitute for it: some contrivance for making the difficulties of the -question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were -pressed upon him by a dissentient champion eager for his conversion. - -"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost -those they formerly had. The Sokratic dialectics, so magnificently -exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this -description. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions -of life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose -of convincing any one, who had merely adopted the common-places of -received opinion, that he did not understand the subject--that he as -yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed: in -order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the -way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of -the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The -school-disputations of the middle ages had a similar object. They were -intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and -(by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it--and could -enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These -last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the -premisses appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and -as a discipline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the -powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the 'Socratici -viri'. But the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally -willing to admit; and the present modes of instruction contain nothing -which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or -of the other. . . It is the fashion of the present time to disparage -negative logic--that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors -in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative -criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a -means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the -name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again -systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a -low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and -physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one's -opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either -had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same -mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an -active controversy with opponents."] - -[Side-note: Result called _Knowledge_, which Plato aspires to. Power -of going through a Sokratic cross examination; not attainable except -through the Platonic process and method.] - -Another matter must here be noticed, in regard to these Dialogues of -Search. We must understand how Plato conceived the goal towards which -they tend: that is the state of mind which he calls _knowledge_ or -_cognition_. Knowledge (in his view) is not attained until the mind is -brought into clear view of the Universal Forms or Ideas, and intimate -communion with them: but the test (as I have already observed) for -determining whether a man has yet attained this end or not, is to -ascertain whether he can give to others a full account of all that he -professes to know, and can extract from them a full account of all -that they profess to know: whether he can perform, in a manner -exhaustive as well as unerring, the double and correlative function of -asking and answering: in other words, whether he can administer the -Sokratic cross-examination effectively to others, and reply to it -without faltering or contradiction when administered to himself.[94] -Such being the way in which Plato conceives knowledge, we may easily -see that it cannot be produced, or even approached, by direct, -demonstrative, didactic communication: by simply announcing to the -hearer, and lodging in his memory, a theorem to be proved, together -with the steps whereby it is proved. He must be made familiar with -each subject on many sides, and under several different aspects and -analogies: he must have had before him objections with their -refutation, and the fallacious arguments which appear to prove the -theorem, but do not really prove it:[95] he must be introduced to the -principal counter-theorems, with the means whereby an opponent will -enforce them: he must be practised in the use of equivocal terms and -sophistry, either to be detected when the opponent is cross-examining -him, or to be employed when he is cross-examining an opponent. All -these accomplishments must be acquired, together with full promptitude -and flexibility, before he will be competent to perform those two -difficult functions, which Plato considers to be the test of -knowledge. You may say that such a result is indefinitely distant and -hopeless: Plato considers it attainable, though he admits the arduous -efforts which it will cost. But the point which I wish to show is, -that if attainable at all, it can only be attained through a long and -varied course of such dialectic discussion as that which we read in -the Platonic Dialogues of Search. The state and aptitude of mind -called knowledge, can only be generated as a last result of this -continued practice (to borrow an expression of Longinus).[96] The -Platonic method is thus in perfect harmony and co-ordination with the -Platonic result, as described and pursued. - -[Footnote 94: See Plato, Republic, vii. 518, B, C, about [Greek: -paidei/a], as developing [Greek: tê\n e)nou=san e(ka/stou du/namin e0n -tê=| psuchê=|]: and 534, about [Greek: e)pistê/mê], with its test, -[Greek: to\ dou=nai kai\ de/xasthai lo/gon]. Compare also Republic, v. -477, 478, with Theætêt. 175, C, D; Phædon, 76, B, Phædrus, 276; and -Sympos. 202 A. [Greek: to\ o)rtha\ doxa/zein kai\ a)/neu tou= e)/chein -lo/gon dou=nai, ou)k oi)=sth' o(/ti ou)/te e)pi/stasthai e)stin? -a)/logon ga\r pra=gma pô=s a)\n ei)/ê e)pistê/mê?] - -[Footnote 95: On this point the scholastic manner of handling in the -Middle Ages furnishes a good illustration for the Platonic dialectic. -I borrow a passage from the treatise of M Hauréau, De la Phil. -Scolastique, vol. ii. p. 190. - -"Saint Thomas pouvait s'en tenir là: nous le comprenons, nous avons -tout son système sur l'origine des idées, et nous pouvons croire qu'il -n'a plus rien à nous apprendre à ce sujet: mais en scolastique, il ne -suffit pas de démontrer, par deux ou trois arguments, réputés -invincibles, ce que l'on suppose être la vérité, il faut, en outre, -répondre aux objections première, seconde, troisième, &c., &c., de -divers interlocuteurs, souvent imaginaires; il faut établir la -parfaite concordance de la conclusion enoncée et des conclusions -precédents ou subséquentes; il faut réproduire, à l'occasion de tout -problème controversé, l'ensemble de la doctrine pour laquelle on s'est -déclaré."] - -[Footnote 96: Longinus De Sublim. s. 6. [Greek: kai/toi to\ pra=gma -du/slêpton; ê( ga\r tô=n lo/gôn kri/sis pollê=s e)sti pei/ras -teleutai=on e)pige/nnêma]. Compare what is said in a succeeding -chapter about the Hippias Minor. And see also Sir W. Hamilton's -Lectures on Logic, Lect. 35, p. 224.] - -[Side-note: Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics--man and -society.] - -Moreover, not merely method and result are in harmony, but also the -topics discussed. These topics were ethical, social, and political: -matters especially human[97] (to use the phrase of Sokrates himself) -familiar to every man,--handled, unphilosophically, by speakers in the -assembly, pleaders in the dikastery, dramatists in the theatre. Now it -is exactly upon such topics that debate can be made most interesting, -varied, and abundant. The facts, multifarious in themselves, connected -with man and society, depend upon a variety of causes, co-operating -and conflicting. Account must be taken of many different points of -view, each of which has a certain range of application, and each of -which serves to limit or modify the others: the generalities, even -when true, are true only on the balance, and under ordinary -circumstances; they are liable to exception, if those circumstances -undergo important change. There are always objections, real as well as -apparent, which require to be rebutted or elucidated. To such -changeful and complicated states of fact, the Platonic dialectic was -adapted: furnishing abundant premisses and comparisons, bringing into -notice many distinct points of view, each of which must be looked at -and appreciated, before any tenable principle can be arrived at. Not -only Platonic method and result, but also Platonic topics, are thus -well suited to each other. The general terms of ethics were familiar -but undefined: the tentative definitions suggested, followed up by -objections available against each, included a large and instructive -survey of ethical phenomena in all their bearings. - -[Footnote 97: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 12-15. I transcribe the following -passage from an article in the Edinburgh Review (April, 1866, pp. -325-326), on the first edition of the present work: an article not -merely profound and striking as to thought, but indicating the most -comprehensive study and appreciation of the Platonic writings:-- - -"The enemy against whom Plato really fought, and the warfare against -whom was the incessant occupation of his life and writings, was--not -Sophistry, either in the ancient or modern sense of the term, -but--_Commonplace_. It was the acceptance of traditional opinions and -current sentiments as an ultimate fact; and bandying of the abstract -terms which express approbation and disapprobation, desire and -aversion, admiration and disgust, as if they had a meaning thoroughly -understood and universally assented to. The men of his day (like those -of ours) thought that they knew what Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, -Honourable and Shameful, were--because they could use the words -glibly, and affirm them of this or that, in agreement with existing -custom. But what the property was, which these several instances -possessed in common, justifying the application of the term, nobody -had considered; neither the Sophists, nor the rhetoricians, nor the -statesmen, nor any of those who set themselves up, or were set up by -others, as wise. Yet whoever could not answer this question was -wandering in darkness--had no standard by which his judgments were -regulated, and which kept them consistent with one another--no rule -which he knew and could stand by for the guidance of his life. Not -knowing what Justice and Virtue are, it was impossible to be just and -virtuous: not knowing what Good is, we not only fail to reach it, but -are certain to embrace evil instead. Such a condition, to any one -capable of thought, made life not worth having. The grand business of -human intellect ought to consist in subjecting these terms to the most -rigorous scrutiny, and bringing to light the ideas that lie at the -bottom of them. Even if this cannot be done and real knowledge -attained, it is already no small benefit to expel the false opinion of -knowledge: to make men conscious of the things most needful to be -known, fill them with shame and uneasiness at their own state, and -rouse a pungent internal stimulus, summoning up all their energies to -attack those greatest of all problems, and never rest until, as far as -possible, the true solutions are reached. This is Plato's notion of -the condition of the human mind in his time, and of what philosophy -could do to help it: and any one who does not think the description -applicable, with slight modifications, to the majority of educated -minds in our own time and in all times known to us, certainly has not -brought either the teachers or the practical men of any time to the -Platonic test." - -The Reviewer farther illustrates this impressive description by a -valuable citation from Max Müller to the same purpose (Lectures on the -Science of Language, Second Series, pp. 520-527). "Such terms as -Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance, Matter, Church, -State, Revelation, Inspiration, Knowledge, Belief, &c., are tossed -about in the war of words as if every body knew what they meant, and -as if every body used them exactly in the same sense; whereas most -people, and particularly those who represent public opinion, pick up -these complicated terms as children, beginning with the vaguest -conceptions, adding to them from time to time--perhaps correcting -likewise at haphazard some of their involuntary errors--but never -taking stock, never either enquiring into the history of the terms -which they handle so freely, or realising the fulness of their meaning -according to the strict rules of logical definition."] - -[Side-note: Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties -which he has raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him -completely distinct. His dogmas are enunciations _à priori_ of some -impressive sentiment.] - -The negative procedure is so conspicuous, and even so preponderant, in -the Platonic dialogues, that no historian of philosophy can omit to -notice it. But many of them (like Xenophon in describing Sokrates) -assign to it only a subordinate place and a qualified application: -while some (and Schleiermacher especially) represent all the doubts -and difficulties in the negative dialogues as exercises to call forth -the intellectual efforts of the reader, preparatory to full and -satisfactory solutions which Plato has given in the dogmatic dialogues -at the end. The first half of this hypothesis I accept: the last half -I believe to be unfounded. The doubts and difficulties were certainly -exercises to the mind of Plato himself, and were intended as exercises -to his readers; but he has nowhere provided a key to the solution of -them. Where he propounds positive dogmas, he does not bring them face -to face with objections, nor verify their authority by showing that -they afford satisfactory solution of the difficulties exhibited in his -negative procedure. The two currents of his speculation, the -affirmative and the negative, are distinct and independent of each -other. Where the affirmative is especially present (as in Timæus), the -negative altogether disappears. Timæus is made to proclaim the most -sweeping theories, not one of which the real Sokrates would have -suffered to pass without abundant cross-examination: but the Platonic -Sokrates hears them with respectful silence, and commends afterwards. -The declaration so often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a -teacher--that he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them -upon others, but cannot discover any good solution of them--this -declaration, which is usually considered mere irony, is literally -true.[98] The Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and -absolute, which the commentators often announce as if it cleared up -all difficulties--not only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones -belonging to itself. When Plato comes forward to affirm, his dogmas -are altogether _à priori_: they enunciate preconceptions or -hypotheses, which derive their hold upon his belief, not from any -aptitude for solving the objections which he has raised, but from deep -and solemn sentiment of some kind or other--religious, ethical, -æsthetical, poetical, &c., the worship of numerical symmetry or -exactness, &c. The dogmas are enunciations of some grand sentiment of -the divine, good, just, beautiful, symmetrical, &c.,[99] which Plato -follows out into corollaries. But this is a process of itself; and -while he is performing it, the doubts previously raised are not called -up to be solved, but are forgotten or kept out of sight. It is -therefore a mistake to suppose[100] that Plato ties knots in one -dialogue only with a view to untie them in another; and that the -doubts which he propounds are already fully solved in his own mind, -only that he defers the announcement of the solution until the -embarrassed hearer has struggled to find it for himself. - -[Footnote 98: See the conversation between Menippus and Sokrates. -(Lucian, Dialog. Mortuor. xx.)] - -[Footnote 99: Dionysius of Halikarnassus remarks that the topics upon -which Plato renounces the character of a searcher, and passes into -that of a vehement affirmative dogmatist, are those which are above -human investigation and evidence--the transcendental: [Greek: kai\ -ga\r e)kei=nos] (Plato) [Greek: ta\ do/gmata ou)k au)to\s -a)pophai/netai, ei)=ta peri\ au)tô=n diagôni/zetai; a)ll' e)n mesô| -tê\n zê/têsin poiou/menos pro\s tou\s dialegome/nous, eu(ri/skôn -ma=llon to\ de/on do/gma, ê)\ philoneikô=n u(pe\r au)tou= phai/netai; -plê\n o(/sa peri\ tô=n kreitto/nôn, ê)\ kath' ê(ma=s, le/getai] (Dion. -Hal. Ars Rhet. c. 10, p. 376, Reiske.) - -M. Arago, in the following passage, points to a style of theorising in -the physical sciences, very analogous to that of Plato, generally:-- - -Arago, Biographies, vol. i. p. 149, Vie de Fresnel. "De ces deux -explications des phénomènes de la lumière, l'une s'appelle la théorie -de l'émission; l'autre est connue sous le nom de système des ondes. On -trouve déjà des traces de la première dans les écrits d'Empédocle. -Chez les modernes, je pourrais citer parmi ses adhérents Képler, -Newton, Laplace. Le système des ondes ne compte pas des partisans -moins illustres: Aristote, Descartes, Hooke, Huygens, Euler, l'avaient -adopté . . - -"Au reste, si l'on s'étonnait de voir d'aussi grands génies ainsi -divisés, je dirais que de leurs temps la question on litige ne pouvait -être résolue; que les expériences nécessaires manquaient; qu'alors les -divers systèmes sur la lumière étaient, non _des déductions logiques -des faits_, mais, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, de _simples vérités de -sentiment_, qu'enfin, le don de l'infaillibilité n'est pas accordé -même aux plus habiles, des qu'en sortant du domaine des observations, -et se jetant dans celui des conjectures, ils abandonnent la marche -sévère et assurée dont les sciences se prévalent de nos jours avec -raison, et qui leur a fait faire de si incontestables progrès."] - -[Footnote 100: Several of the Platonic critics speak as if they -thought that Plato would never suggest any difficulty which he had -not, beforehand and ready-made, the means of solving; and Munk treats -the idea which I have stated in the text as ridiculous. "Plato (he -observes) must have held preposterous doctrines on the subject of -pædagogy. He undertakes to instruct others by his writings, before he -has yet cleared up his own ideas on the question, he proposes, in -propædeutic writings, enigmas for his scholars to solve, while he has -not yet solved them himself; and all this for the praiseworthy -(_ironically said_) purpose of correcting in their minds the false -persuasion of knowledge." (Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon Schrift. -p. 515.) - -That which Munk here derides, appears stated, again and again, by the -Platonic Sokrates, as his real purpose. Munk is at liberty to treat it -as ridiculous, but the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic -Sokrates disclaims the pædagogic function, describing himself as -nothing more than a fellow searcher with the rest. - -So too Munk declares (p. 79-80, and Zeller also, Philos. der Griech. -vol. ii. p. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato could not have composed the -Parmenidês, including, as it does, such an assemblage of difficulties -and objections against the theory of Ideas, until he possessed the -means of solving all of them himself. This is a bold assertion, -altogether conjectural; for there is no solution of them given in any -of Plato's writings, and the solutions to which Munk alludes as given -by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to be satisfactory, which -I do not admit) travel much beyond the limits of Plato. - -Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon. -Schriften, p. 103-104); that Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues, -though he appears as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a -matured thinker, who has already gone through the investigation for -himself, and solved all the difficulties, but who goes back upon the -work of search over again, for the instruction of the interlocutors. -"The special talent and dexterity (Virtuosität) which Sokrates -displays in conducting the dialogue, can only be explained by -supposing that he has already acquired for himself a firm and certain -conviction on the question discussed." - -This opinion of Ueberweg appears to me quite untenable, as well as -inconsistent with a previous opinion which he had given elsewhere -(Platonische Welt-seele, p. 69-70)--That the Platonic Ideenlehre was -altogether insufficient for explanation. The impression which the -Dialogues of Search make upon me is directly the reverse. My -difficulty is, to understand how the constructor of all these puzzles, -if he has the answer ready drawn up in his pocket, can avoid letting -it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the literal declarations, often -repeated, of Sokrates; while Munk and Ueberweg contradict them. - -For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into the mouth of -Sokrates (even in the Republic, one of his most expository -compositions) see a remarkable passage, Rep. v. p. 450 E. [Greek: -a)pistou=nta de\ kai\ zêtou=nta a)/ma tou\s lo/gous poiei=sthai, o(\ -dê\ e)gô\ drô=], &c.] - -[Side-note: Hypothesis--that Plato had solved all his own difficulties -for himself; but that he communicated the solution only to a few -select auditors in oral lectures--Untenable.] - -Some critics, assuming confidently that Plato must have produced a -full breadth of positive philosophy to countervail his own negative -fertility, yet not finding enough of it in the written dialogues look -for it elsewhere. Tennemann thinks, and his opinion is partly shared -by Boeckh and K. F. Hermann, that the direct, affirmative, and highest -principles of Plato's philosophy were enunciated only in his lectures: -that the core, the central points, the great principles of his system -(der Kern) were revealed thus orally to a few select students in plain -and broad terms, while the dialogues were intentionally written so as -to convey only indirect hints, illustrations, applications of these -great principles, together with refutation of various errors opposed -to them: that Plato did not think it safe or prudent to make any full, -direct, or systematic revelation to the general public.[101] I have -already said that I think this opinion untenable. Among the few points -which we know respecting the oral lectures, one is, that they were -delivered not to a select and prepared few, but to a numerous and -unprepared audience: while among the written dialogues, there are some -which, far from being popular or adapted to an ordinary understanding, -are highly perplexing and abstruse. The Timæus does not confine itself -to indirect hints, but delivers positive dogmas about the -super-sensible world: though they are of a mystical cast, as we know -that the oral lectures De Bono were also. - -[Footnote 101: Tennemann, Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 205-220. Hermann, -Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, pp. 290-294. - -Hermann considers this reserve and double doctrine to be unworthy of -Plato, and ascribes it to Protagoras and other Sophists, on the -authority of a passage in the Theætêtus (152 C), which does not at all -sustain his allegation. - -Hermann considers "die akroamatischen Lehren als Fortsetzung und -Schlussstein der schriftlichen, die dort erst zur vollen Klarheit -principieller Auffassung erhoben wurden, ohne jedoch über den -nämlichen Gegenstand, soweit die Rede auf denselben kommen musste, -etwas wesentlich Verschiedenes zu lehren" (p. 293).]] - -[Side-note: Characteristic of the oral lectures--that they were -delivered in Plato's own name. In what other respects they departed -from the dialogues, we cannot say.] - -Towards filling up this gap, then, the oral lectures cannot be shown -to lend any assistance. The cardinal point of difference between them -and the dialogues was, that they were delivered by Plato himself, in -his own name; whereas he never published any written composition in -his own name. But we do not know enough to say, in what particular way -this difference would manifest itself. Besides the oral lectures, -delivered to a numerous auditory, it is very probable that Plato held -special communications upon philosophy with a few advanced pupils. -Here however we are completely in the dark. Yet I see nothing, either -in these supposed private communications or in the oral lectures, to -controvert what was said in the last page--that Plato's affirmative -philosophy is not fitted on to his negative philosophy, but grows out -of other mental impulses, distinct and apart. Plato (as Aristotle -tells us[102]) felt it difficult to determine, whether the march of -philosophy was an ascending one toward the _principia_ ([Greek: -a)rcha\s]), or a descending one down from the _principia_. A good -philosophy ought to suffice for both, conjointly and alternately: in -Plato's philosophy, there is no road explicable either upwards or -downwards, between the two: no justifiable mode of participation -([Greek: me/thexis]) between the two disparate worlds--intellect and -sense. The _principia_ of Plato take an impressive hold on the -imagination: but they remove few or none of the Platonic difficulties; -and they only seem to do this because the Sokratic Elenchus, so -effective whenever it is applied, is never seriously brought to bear -against them. - -[Footnote 102: Aristot. Eth. Nik. i. 4, 5. [Greek: eu)= ga\r kai\ -Pla/tôn ê)po/rei tou=to kai\ e)zê/tei po/teron a)po\ tô=n archô=n ê)\ -e)pi\ ta\s a)rcha/s e)stin ê( o(do/s.]] - -[Side-note: Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the -process of search and debate _per se_. Protracted enquiry is a -valuable privilege, not a tiresome obligation.] - -With persons who complain of prolixity in the dialogue--of threads -which are taken up only to be broken off, devious turns and "passages -which lead to nothing"--of much talk "about it and about it," without -any peremptory decision from an authorised judge--with such -complainants Plato has no sympathy. He feels a strong interest in the -process of enquiry, in the debate _per se_: and he presumes a like -interest in his readers. He has no wish to shorten the process, nor to -reach the end and dismiss the question as settled.[103] On the -contrary, he claims it as the privilege of philosophical research, -that persons engaged in such discussions are noway tied to time; they -are not like judicial pleaders, who, with a klepsydra or water-clock -to measure the length of each speech, are under slavish dependence on -the feelings of the Dikasts, and are therefore obliged to keep -strictly to the point.[104] Whoever desires accurate training of mind -must submit to go through a long and tiresome circuit.[105] Plato -regards the process of enquiry as being in itself, both a stimulus and -a discipline, in which the minds both of questioner and respondent are -implicated and improved, each being indispensable to the other: he -also represents it as a process, carried on under the immediate -inspiration of the moment, without reflection or foreknowledge of the -result.[106] Lastly, Plato has an interest in the dialogue, not merely -as a mental discipline, but as an artistic piece of workmanship, -whereby the taste and imagination are charmed. The dialogue was to him -what the tragedy was to Sophokles, and the rhetorical discourse to -Isokrates. He went on "combing and curling it" (to use the phrase of -Dionysius) for as many years as Isokrates bestowed on the composition -of the Panegyrical Oration. He handles the dialectic drama so as to -exhibit some one among the many diverse ethical points of view, and to -show what it involves as well as what it excludes in the way of -consequence. We shall not find the ethical point of view always the -same: there are material inconsistencies and differences in this -respect between one dialogue and another. - -[Footnote 103: As an illustration of that class of minds which take -delight in the search for truth in different directions, I copy the -following passage respecting Dr. Priestley, from an excellent modern -scientific biography. "Dr. Priestley had seen so much of the evil of -obstinate adherence to opinions which time had rendered decrepit, not -venerable--and had been so richly rewarded in his capacity of natural -philosopher, by his adventurous explorations of new territories in -science--that he unavoidably and unconsciously over-estimated the -value of what was novel, and held himself free to change his opinions -to an extent not easily sympathised with by minds of a different -order. Some men love to _rest_ in truth, or at least in settled -opinions, and are uneasy till they find repose. They alter their -beliefs with great reluctance, and dread the charge of inconsistency, -even in reference to trifling matters. Priestley, on the other hand, -was a _follower after truth, who delighted in the chase, and was all -his life long pursuing, not resting in it_. - -On all subjects which interested him he held by certain cardinal -doctrines, but he left the outlines of his systems to be filled up as -he gained experience, and to an extent very few men have done, -disavowed any attempt to reconcile his changing views with each other, -or to deprecate the charge of inconsistency. . . I think it must be -acknowledged by all who have studied his writings, that in his -scientific researches at least he carried this feeling too far, and -that often when he had reached a truth in which he might and should -have rested, his dread of anything like a too hasty stereotyping of a -supposed discovery, induced him to welcome whatever seemed to justify -him in renewing the _pursuit_ of truth, and thus led him completely -astray. Priestley indeed missed many a discovery, the clue to which -was in his hands and in his alone, by not knowing where to stop." - -(Dr. Geo Wilson--Life of the Hon. H. Cavendish, among the publications -of the Cavendish Society, 1851, p. 110-111.)] - -[Footnote 104: Plato, Theætêt. p. 172.] - -[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, v. 450 B. [Greek: me/tron de/ g', -e)/phê, ô)= Sô/krates, o( Glau/kôn, toiou/tôn lo/gôn a)kou/ein, o(/los -o( bi/os nou=n e)/chousin]. vi. 504 D. [Greek: Tê\n makrote/ran -peri+ite/on tô=| toiou/tô|, kai\ ou)ch ê(=tton mantha/nonti ponête/on -ê)\ gumnazome/nô|]. Also Phædrus, 274 A, Parmenid. p. 135 D, 136 D, -[Greek: a)mê/chanon pragmatei/an--a)doleschi/as], &c. Compare -Politikus, 286, in respect to the charge of prolixity against him. - -In the Hermotimus of Lucian, the assailant of philosophy draws one of -his strongest arguments from the number of years required to examine -the doctrines of all the philosophical sects--the whole of life would -be insufficient (Lucian, Hermot. c. 47-48). The passages above cited, -especially the first of them, show that Sokrates and Plato would not -have been discouraged by this protracted work.] - -[Footnote 106: Plato, Republic, iii. 394 D. [Greek: Manteu/omai] (says -Glaukon) [Greek: skopei=sthai se, ei)/te paradexo/metha tragô|di/an te -kai\ kômô|di/an ei)s tê\n po/lin, ei)/te kai\ ou)/. I)/sôs] (says -Sokrates) [Greek: kai\ plei/ô e)/ti tou/tôn; _ou) ga\r dê\ e)/gôge pô -oi)=da, a)ll' o(/pê| a)\n o( lo/gos ô(/sper pneu=ma phe/rê|, tau/tê| -i)teon_. Kai\ kalô=s g', e)/phê, le/geis]. - -The Republic, from the second book to the close, is one of those -Platonic compositions in which Sokrates is most expository. - -We find a remarkable passage in Des Cartes, wherein that very -self-working philosopher expresses his conviction that the longer he -continued enquiring, the more his own mind would become armed for the -better appreciation of truth--and in which he strongly protests -against any barrier restraining the indefinite liberty of enquiry. - -"Et encore qu'il y en ait peut-être d'aussi bien sensés parmi les -Perses ou les Chinois que parmi nous, il me sembloit que le plus utile -étoit, de me régler selon ceux avec lesquels j'aurois à vivre; et que, -pour savoir quelles étoient véritablement leurs opinions, je devois -plutôt prendre garde à ce qu'ils pratiquaient qu'à ce qu'ils disaient; -non seulement à cause qu'en la corruption de nos moeurs, _il y a peu -de gens qui veuillent dire tout ce qu'ils croient--mais aussi à cause -que plusieurs l'ignorent eux mêmes; car l'action de la pensée, par -laquelle on croit une chose étant différente de celle par laquelle on -connoit qu'on la croit, elles sont souvent l'une sans l'autre._ Et -entre plusieurs opinions également reçues, je ne choisissois que les -plus modérées; tant à cause que ce sont toujours les plus commodes -pour la pratique, et vraisemblablement les meilleures--tous excès -ayans coutume d'être mauvais--comme aussi afin de me détourner moins -du vrai chemin, en cas que je faillisse, que si, ayant choisi l'un des -deux extrêmes, c'eût été l'autre qu'il eut fallu suivre. - -"Et particulièrement, je _mettois entre les excès toutes les promesses -par lesquelles on retranche quelque chose de sa liberté_; non que je -désapprouvasse les lois, qui pour remédier à l'inconstance des esprits -foibles, permettent, lorsqu'on a quelque bon dessein (ou même, pour la -sureté du commerce, quelque dessein qui n'est qu'indifférent), qu'on -fasse des voeux ou des contrats qui obligent à y persévérer: mais à -cause que je ne voyois au monde aucune chose qui demeurât toujours en -même état, et _que comme pour mon particulier, je me promettois de -perfectionner de plus en plus en mes jugemens, et non point de les -rendre pires, j'eusse pensé commettre une grande faute contre le bon -sens, si, parceque j'approuvois alors quelque chose, je me fusse -obligé de la prendre pour bonne encore après, lorsqu'elle auroit -peut-être cessé de l'être, ou que j'aurois cessé de l'estimer telle_." -Discours de la Méthode, part iii. p. 147-148, Cousin edit.; p. 16, -Simon edit.] - -[Side-note: Plato has done more than any one else to make the process -of enquiry interesting to others, as it was to himself.] - -But amidst all these differences--and partly indeed by reason of these -differences--Plato succeeds in inspiring his readers with much of the -same interest in the process of dialectic enquiry which he evidently -felt in his own bosom. The charm, with which he invests the process of -philosophising, is one main cause of the preservation of his writings -from the terrible ship-wreck which has overtaken so much of the -abundant contemporary literature. It constitutes also one of his -principle titles to the gratitude of intellectual men. This is a merit -which may be claimed for Cicero also, but hardly for Aristotle, in so -far as we can judge from the preserved portion of the Aristotelian -writings: whether for the other _viri Socratici_ his contemporaries, -or in what proportion, we are unable to say. Plato's works charmed and -instructed all; so that they were read not merely by disciples and -admirers (as the Stoic and Epikurean treatises were), but by those who -dissented from him as well as by those who agreed with him.[107] The -process of philosophising is one not naturally attractive except to a -few minds: the more therefore do we owe to the colloquy of Sokrates -and the writing of Plato, who handled it so as to diffuse the appetite -for enquiry, and for sifting dissentient opinions. The stimulating and -suggestive influence exercised by Plato--the variety of new roads -pointed out to the free enquiring mind--are in themselves sufficiently -valuable: whatever we may think of the positive results in which he -himself acquiesced.[108] - -[Footnote 107: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3, 8. - -Cicero farther commends the Stoic Panætius for having relinquished the -"tristitiam atque asperitatem" of his Stoic predecessors, Zeno, -Chrysippus, &c., and for endeavouring to reproduce the style and -graces of Plato and Aristotle, whom he was always commending to his -students (De Fin. iv. 28, 79).] - -[Footnote 108: The observation which Cicero applies to Varro, is -applicable to the Platonic writings also. "Philosophiam multis locis -_inchoasti_, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum" (Academ. -Poster. i. 3, 9). - -I shall say more about this when I touch upon the Platonic Kleitophon; -an unfinished dialogue, which takes up the point of view here -indicated by Cicero.] - -I have said thus much respecting what is common to the Dialogues of -Search, because this is a species of composition now rare and strange. -Modern readers do not understand what is meant by publishing an -enquiry without any result--a story without an end. Respecting the -Dialogues of Exposition, there is not the like difficulty. This is a -species of composition, the purpose of which is generally understood. -Whether the exposition be clear or obscure--orderly or confused--true -or false--we shall see when we come to examine each separately. But -these Dialogues of Exposition exhibit Plato in a different character: -as the counterpart, not of Sokrates, but of Lykurgus (Republic and -Leges) or of Pythagoras (in Timæus).[109] - -[Footnote 109: See the citation from Plutarch in an earlier note of -this chapter.] - -[Side-note: Process of generalisation always kept in view and -illustrated throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search--general terms -and propositions made subjects of conscious analysis.] - -A farther remark which may be made, bearing upon most of the -dialogues, relates to matter and not to manner. Everywhere (both in -the Dialogues of Search and in those of exposition) the process of -generalisation is kept in view and brought into conscious notice, -directly or indirectly. The relation of the universal to its -particulars, the contrast of the constant and essential with the -variable and accidental, are turned and returned in a thousand -different ways. The principles of classification, with the breaking -down of an extensive genus into species and sub-species, form the -special subject of illustration in two of the most elaborate Platonic -dialogues, and are often partially applied in the rest. To see the One -in the Many, and the Many in the One, is represented as the great aim -and characteristic attribute of the real philosopher. The testing of -general terms, and of abstractions already embodied in familiar -language, by interrogations applying them to many concrete and -particular cases--is one manifestation of the Sokratic cross-examining -process, which Plato multiplies and diversifies without limit. It is -in his writings and in the conversation of Sokrates, that general -terms and propositions first become the subject of conscious attention -and analysis, and Plato was well aware that he was here opening the -new road towards formal logic, unknown to his predecessors, unfamiliar -even to his contemporaries. This process is indeed often overlaid in -his writings by exuberant poetical imagery and by transcendental -hypothesis: but the important fact is, that it was constantly present -to his own mind and is impressed upon the notice of his readers. - -[Side-note: The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by -the same author, illustrating each other, but without assignable -inter-dependence.] - -After these various remarks, having a common bearing upon all, or -nearly all, the Platonic dialogues, I shall proceed to give some -account of each dialogue separately. It is doubtless both practicable -and useful to illustrate one of them by others, sometimes in the way -of analogy, sometimes in that of contrast. But I shall not affect to -handle them as contributories to one positive doctrinal system--nor as -occupying each an intentional place in the gradual unfolding of one -preconceived scheme--nor as successive manifestations of change, -knowable and determinable, in the views of the author. For us they -exist as distinct imaginary conversations, composed by the same author -at unknown times and under unknown specialities of circumstance. Of -course it is necessary to prefer some one order for reviewing the -Dialogues, and for that purpose more or less of hypothesis must be -admitted; but I shall endeavour to assume as little as possible. - -[Side-note: Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under -separate review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges, -Epinomis last.] - -The order which I shall adopt for considering the dialogues coincides -to a certain extent with that which some other expositors have -adopted. It begins with those dialogues which delineate Sokrates, and -which confine themselves to the subjects and points of view belonging -to him, known as he is upon the independent testimony of Xenophon. -First of all will come the Platonic Apology, containing the explicit -negative programme of Sokrates, enunciated by himself a month before -his death, when Plato was 28 years of age. - -Last of all, I shall take those dialogues which depart most widely -from Sokrates, and which are believed to be the products of Plato's -most advanced age--Timæus, Kritias, and Leges, with the sequel, -Epinomis. These dialogues present a glaring contrast to the searching -questions, the negative acuteness, the confessed ignorance, of -Sokrates: Plato in his old age has not maintained consistency with his -youth, as Sokrates did, but has passed round from the negative to the -affirmative pole of philosophy. - -[Side-note: Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The -intermediate dialogues present no convincing grounds for any -determinate order.] - -Between the Apology and the dialogues named as last--I shall examine -the intermediate dialogues according as they seem to approximate or -recede from Sokrates and the negative dialectic. Here, however, the -reasons for preference are noway satisfactory. Of the many dissentient -schemes, professing to determine the real order in which the Platonic -dialogues were composed, I find a certain plausibility in some, but no -conclusive reason in any. Of course the reasons in favour of each one -scheme, count against all the rest. I believe (as I have already said) -that none of Plato's dialogues were composed until after the death of -Sokrates: but at what dates, or in what order, after that event, they -were composed, it is impossible to determine. The Republic and -Philêbus rank among the constructive dialogues, and may suitably be -taken immediately before Timæus: though the Republic belongs to the -highest point of Plato's genius, and includes a large measure of his -negative acuteness combined with his most elaborate positive -combinations. In the Sophistês and Politikus, Sokrates appears only in -the character of a listener: in the Parmenidês also, the part assigned -to him, instead of being aggressive and victorious, is subordinate to -that of Parmenidês and confined to an unsuccessful defence. These -dialogues, then, occupy a place late in the series. On the other hand, -Kriton and Euthyphron have an immediate bearing upon the trial of -Sokrates and the feelings connected with it. I shall take them in -immediate sequel to the Apology. - -For the intermediate dialogues, the order is less marked and -justifiable. In so far as a reason can be given, for preference as to -former and later, I shall give it when the case arises. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - -APOLOGY OF SOKRATES. - - -Adopting the order of precedence above described, for the review of -the Platonic compositions, and taking the point of departure from -Sokrates or the Sokratic point of view, I begin with the memorable -composition called the Apology. - -[Side-note: The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates -before the Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional -transformation.] - -I agree with Schleiermacher[1]--with the more recent investigations of -Ueberweg--and with what (until recent times) seems to have been the -common opinion,--that this is in substance the real defence pronounced -by Sokrates; reported, and of course drest up, yet not intentionally -transformed, by Plato.[2] If such be the case, it is likely to have -been put together shortly after the trial, and may thus be ranked -among the earliest of the Platonic compositions: for I have already -intimated my belief that Plato composed no dialogues under the name of -Sokrates, during the lifetime of Sokrates. - -[Footnote 1: Zeller is of opinion that the Apology, as well as the -Kriton, were put together at Megara by Plato, shortly after the death -of Sokrates. (Zeller, De Hermodoro Ephesio, p. 19.) - -Schleiermacher, Einl. zur Apologie, vol. ii. pp. 182-185. Ueberweg, -Ueber die Aechtheit der Plat. Schrift. p. 246. - -Steinhart thinks (Einleitung, pp. 236-238) that the Apology contains -more of Plato, and less of Sokrates: but he does not make his view -very clear to me. Ast, on the contrary, treats the Apology as spurious -and unworthy of Plato. (Ueber Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 477, -seq.) His arguments are rather objections against the merits of the -composition, than reasons for believing it not to be the work of -Plato. I dissent from them entirely: but they show that an acute -critic can make out a plausible case, satisfactory to himself, against -any dialogue. If it be once conceded that the question of genuine or -spurious is to be tried upon such purely internal grounds of critical -admiration and complete harmony of sentiment, Ast might have made out -a case even stronger against the genuineness of the Phædrus, -Symposion, Philêbus, Parmenidês.] - -[Footnote 2: See chapter lxviii. of my History of Greece. - -The reader will find in that chapter a full narrative of all the -circumstances known to us respecting both the life and the -condemnation of Sokrates. - -A very admirable account may also be seen of the character of -Sokrates, and his position with reference to the Athenian people, in -the article entitled _Sokrates und Sein Volk_, Akademischer Vortrag, -by Professor Hermann Köchly; a lecture delivered at Zurich in 1855, -and published with enlargements in 1859. - -Professor Köchly's article (contained in a volume entitled -_Akademische Vorträge_, Zurich, 1859) is eminently deserving of -perusal. It not only contains a careful summary of the contemporary -history, so far as Sokrates is concerned, but it has farther the great -merit of fairly estimating that illustrious man in reference to the -actual feeling of the time, and to the real public among whom he -moved. I feel much satisfaction in seeing that Professor Köchly's -picture, composed without any knowledge of my History of Greece, -presents substantially the same view of Sokrates and his -contemporaries as that which is taken in my sixty-eighth chapter. - -Köchly considers that the Platonic Apology preserves the Sokratic -character more faithfully than any of Plato's writings; and that it -represents what Sokrates said, as nearly as the "dichterische Natur" -of Plato would permit (Köchly, pp. 302-364.)] - -[Side-note: Even if it be Plato's own composition, it comes naturally -first in the review of his dialogues.] - -Such, in my judgment, is the most probable hypothesis respecting the -Apology. But even if we discard this hypothesis; if we treat the -Apology as a pure product of the Platonic imagination (like the -dialogues), and therefore not necessarily connected in point of time -with the event to which it refers--still there are good reasons for -putting it first in the order of review. For it would then be Plato's -own exposition, given more explicitly and solemnly than anywhere else, -of the Sokratic point of view and life-purpose. It would be an -exposition embodying that union of generalising impulse, mistrust of -established common-places, and aggressive cross-examining ardour--with -eccentric religious persuasion, as well as with perpetual immersion in -the crowd of the palæstra and the market-place: which immersion was -not less indispensable to Sokrates than repugnant to the feelings of -Plato himself. An exposition, lastly, disavowing all that taste for -cosmical speculation, and that transcendental dogmatism, which formed -one among the leading features of Plato as distinguished from -Sokrates. In whichever way we look at the Apology, whether as a real -or as an imaginary defence, it contains more of pure Sokratism than -any other composition of Plato, and as such will occupy the first -place in the arrangement which I adopt.[3] - -[Footnote 3: Dionysius Hal. regards the Apology, not as a report of -what Sokrates really said, nor as approximating thereunto, but as a -pure composition of Plato himself, for three purposes combined:--1. To -defend and extol Sokrates. 2. To accuse the Athenian public and -Dikasts. 3. To furnish a picture of what a philosopher ought to be.--All -these purposes are to a certain extent included and merged in a -fourth, which I hold to be the true one,--to exhibit what Sokrates was -and had been, in relation to the Athenian public. - -The comparison drawn by Dionysius between the Apology and the oration -De Coronâ of Demosthenes, appears to me unsuitable. The two are -altogether disparate, in spirit, in purpose, and in execution. (See -Dion. H. Ars Rhet. pp. 295-298: De Adm. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1026.)] - -In my History of Greece, I have already spoken of this impressive -discourse as it concerns the relations between Sokrates himself and -the Dikasts to whom he addressed it. I here regard it only as it -concerns Plato; and as it forms a convenient point of departure for -entering upon and appreciating the Platonic dialogues. - -[Side-note: General character of the Apology--Sentiments entertained -towards Sokrates at Athens.] - -The Apology of Sokrates is not a dialogue but a continuous discourse -addressed to the Dikasts, containing nevertheless a few questions and -answers interchanged between him and the accuser Melêtus in open -court. It is occupied, partly, in rebutting the counts of the -indictment (_viz._, 1. That Sokrates did not believe in the Gods or in -the Dæmons generally recognised by his countrymen: 2. That he was a -corruptor of youth[4])--partly in setting forth those proceedings of -his life out of which such charges had grown, and by which he had -become obnoxious to a wide-spread feeling of personal hatred. By his -companions, by those who best knew him, and by a considerable number -of ardent young men, he was greatly esteemed and admired: by the -general public, too, his acuteness as well as his self-sufficing and -independent character, were appreciated with a certain respect. Yet he -was at the same time disliked, as an aggressive disputant who "tilted -at all he met"--who raised questions novel as well as perplexing, who -pretended to special intimations from the Gods--and whose views no one -could distinctly make out.[5] By the eminent citizens of all -varieties--politicians, rhetors, Sophists, tragic and comic poets, -artisans, &c.--he had made himself both hated and feared.[6] He -emphatically denies the accusation of general disbelief in the Gods, -advanced by Melêtus: and he affirms generally (though less distinctly) -that the Gods in whom he believed, were just the same as those in whom -the whole city believed. Especially does he repudiate the idea, that -he could be so absurd as to doubt the divinity of Helios and Selênê, -in which all the world believed;[7] and to adopt the heresy of -Anaxagoras, who degraded these Divinities into physical masses. -Respecting his general creed, he thus puts himself within the pale of -Athenian orthodoxy. He even invokes that very sentiment (with some -doubt whether the Dikasts will believe him[8]) for the justification -of the obnoxious and obtrusive peculiarities of his life; representing -himself as having acted under the mission of the Delphian God, -expressly transmitted from the oracle. - -[Footnote 4: Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 1. [Greek: A)dikei= Sôkra/tês, ou(\s -me\n e( po/lis nomi/zei theou\s ou) nomi/zôn; e(/tera de\ kaina\ -daimo/nia ei)sphe/rôn; a)dikei= de\ kai\ tou\s ne/ous diaphthei/rôn]. - -Plato, Apolog. c. 3, p. 19 B. [Greek: Sôkra/tês a)dikei= kai\ -perierga/zetai, zêtô=n ta/ te u(po\ gê=s kai\ ta\ e)poura/nia, kai\ -to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô poiô=n, kai\ a)/llous tau)ta\ tau=ta -dida/skôn]. - -The reading of Xenophon was conformable to the copy of the indictment -preserved in the Metrôon at Athens in the time of Favorinus. There -were three distinct accusers--Melêtus, Anytus, and Lykon. Plat. Apol. -p. 23-24 B.] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Apol. c. 28, p. 38 A; c. 23, p. 35 A.] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Apol. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23. [Greek: e)k tautêsi\ dê\ -tê\s e)xeta/seôs pollai\ me\n a)pe/chtheiai/ moi gego/nasi kai\ oi)=ai -chalepô/tatai kai\ baru/tatai, ô(/ste polla\s diabola\s a)p' au)tô=n -gegone/nai, o)/noma de\ tou=to le/gesthai, sopho\s ei)=nai.]] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Apol. c. 14, p. 26 D. [Greek: ô)= thauma/sie -Me/lête, i(na ti/ tau=ta le/geis? ou)de\ ê(/lion ou)de\ selê/nên a)/ra -nomi/zô theou\s ei)=nai, ô(/sper oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi?]] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D.] - -[Side-note: Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom -of Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the -citizens generally--The oracle is proved to be true.] - -According to his statement, his friend and earnest admirer Chærephon, -had asked the question at the oracle of Delphi, whether any one was -wiser than Sokrates? The reply of the oracle declared, that no one was -wiser. On hearing this declaration from an infallible authority, -Sokrates was greatly perplexed: for he was conscious to himself of not -being wise upon any matter, great or small.[9] He at length concluded -that the declaration of the oracle could be proved true, only on the -hypothesis that other persons were less wise than they seemed to be or -fancied themselves. To verify this hypothesis, he proceeded to -cross-examine the most eminent persons in many different walks--political -men, rhetors, Sophists, poets, artisans. On applying his Elenchus, and -putting to them testing interrogations, he found them all without -exception destitute of any real wisdom, yet fully persuaded that they -_were_ wise, and incapable of being shaken in that persuasion. The -artisans indeed did really know each his own special trade; but then, -on account of this knowledge, they believed themselves to be wise on -other great matters also. So also the poets were great in their own -compositions; but on being questioned respecting these very -compositions, they were unable to give any rational or consistent -explanations: so that they plainly appeared to have written beautiful -verses, not from any wisdom of their own, but through inspiration from -the Gods, or spontaneous promptings of nature. The result was, that -these men were all proved to possess no more real wisdom than -Sokrates: but _he_ was aware of his own deficiency; while _they_ were -fully convinced of their own wisdom, and could not be made sensible of -the contrary. In this way Sokrates justified the certificate of -superiority vouchsafed to him by the oracle. He, like all other -persons, was destitute of wisdom; but he was the only one who knew, or -could be made to feel, his own real mental condition. With others, and -most of all with the most conspicuous men, the false persuasion of -their own wisdom was universal and inexpugnable.[10] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. [Greek: tau=ta ga\r e)gô\ -a)kou/sas e)nethumou/mên ou(tôsi/, Ti/ pote le/gei o( theo\s kai\ ti/ -pote ai)ni/ttetai? e)gô\ ga\r dê\ ou)/te me/ga ou)/te smikro\n -xu/noida e)mautô=| sopho\s ô)/n; ti/ ou)=n pote le/gei pha/skôn e)me\ -sophô/taton ei)=nai? ou) ga\r dê/pou pseu/detai/ ge; ou) ga\r the/mis -au)tô=|. Kai\ polu\n me\n chro/non ê)po/roun], &c.] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Apolog. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23.] - -[Side-note: False persuasion of wisdom is universal--the God alone is -wise.] - -This then was the philosophical mission of Sokrates, imposed upon him -by the Delphian oracle, and in which he passed the mature portion of -his life: to cross-examine every one, to expose that false persuasion -of knowledge which every one felt, and to demonstrate the truth of -that which the oracle really meant by declaring the superior wisdom of -Sokrates. "People suppose me to be wise myself (says Sokrates) on -those matters on which I detect and prove the non-wisdom of -others.[11] But that is a mistake. The God alone is wise: and his -oracle declares human wisdom to be worth little or nothing, employing -the name of Sokrates as an example. He is the wisest of men, who, like -Sokrates, knows well that he is in truth worthless so far as wisdom is -concerned.[12] The really disgraceful ignorance is--to think that you -know what you do not really know."[13] - -[Footnote 11: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A. [Greek: oi)/ontai ga/r me -e(ka/stote oi( paro/ntes tau=ta au)to\n ei)=nai sopho/n, a(\ a)\n -a)/llon e)xele/gxô.]] - -[Footnote 12: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A; c. 17, p. 28 E.] - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 B. [Greek: kai\ tou=to pô=s -ou)k a)mathi/a e)sti\n au)tê\ ê( e)ponei/distos, ê( tou= oi)/esthai -ei)de/nai a(\ ou)k oi)=den?]] - -[Side-note: Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the cross-examining -mission imposed upon him by the God.] - -"The God has marked for me my post, to pass my life in the search for -wisdom, cross-examining myself as well as others: I shall be -disgraced, if I desert that post from fear either of death or of any -other evil."[14] "Even if you Dikasts acquit me, I shall not alter my -course: I shall continue, as long as I hold life and strength, to -exhort and interrogate in my usual strain, telling every one whom I -meet[15]--You, a citizen of the great and intelligent Athens, are you -not ashamed of busying yourself to procure wealth, reputation, and -glory, in the greatest possible quantity; while you take neither -thought nor pains about truth, or wisdom, or the fullest measure of -goodness for your mind? If any one denies the charge, and professes -that he _does_ take thought for these objects,--I shall not let him -off without questioning, cross-examining, and exposing him.[16] And if -he appears to me to affirm that he is virtuous without being so in -reality, I shall reproach him for caring least about the greater -matter, and most about the smaller. This course I shall pursue with -every one whom I meet, young or old, citizen or non-citizen: most of -all with you citizens, because you are most nearly connected with me. -For this, you know, is what the God commands, and I think that no -greater blessing has ever happened to the city than this ministration -of mine under orders from the God. For I go about incessantly -persuading you all, old as well as young, not to care about your -bodies, or about riches, so much as about acquiring the largest -measure of virtue for your minds. I urge upon you that virtue is not -the fruit of wealth, but that wealth, together with all the other -things good for mankind publicly and privately, are the fruits of -virtue.[17] If I am a corruptor of youth, it is by these discourses -that I corrupt them: and if any one gives a different version of my -discourses, he talks idly. Accordingly, men of Athens, I must tell you -plainly: decide with Anytus, or not,--acquit me or not--I shall do -nothing different from what I have done, even if I am to die many -times over for it." - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 28 E.] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 D. [Greek: ou) mê\ pau/sômai -philosophô=n kai\ u(mi=n parakeleuo/meno/s te kai\ e)ndeiknu/menos, -o(/tô| a)\n a)ei\ e)ntugcha/nô u(mô=n, le/gôn oi(=a/per ei)/ôtha], -&c.] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 E. [Greek: kai\ e)a/n tis -u(mô=n a)mphisbêtê/sê| kai\ phê=| e)pimelei=sthai, ou)k eu)thu\s -a)phê/sô au)to\n ou)d' a)/peimi, a)ll' e)rê/somai au)to\n kai\ -e)xeta/sô kai\ e)le/gxô, kai\ e)a/n moi mê\ dokê=| kektê=sthai -a)retê/n, pha/nai de/, o)neidiô=], &c.] - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 30, B. [Greek: le/gôn o(/ti ou)k -e)k chrêma/tôn a)retê\ gi/gnetai, a)ll' e)x a)retê=s chrê/mata kai\ -ta)/lla a)gatha\ toi=s a)nthrô/pois a(/panta kai\ i)di/a| kai\ -dêmosi/a|.]] - -[Side-note: He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission, -and he intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger.] - -Such is the description given by Sokrates of his own profession and -standing purpose, imposed upon him as a duty by the Delphian God. He -neglected all labour either for profit, or for political importance, -or for the public service; he devoted himself, from morning till -night, to the task of stirring up the Athenian public, as the gadfly -worries a large and high-bred but over-sleek horse:[18] stimulating -them by interrogation, persuasion, reproach, to render account of -their lives and to seek with greater energy the path of virtue. By -continually persisting in such universal cross-examination, he had -rendered himself obnoxious to the Athenians generally;[19] who were -offended when called upon to render account, and when reproached that -they did not live rightly. Sokrates predicts that after his death, -younger cross-examiners, hitherto kept down by his celebrity, would -arise in numbers,[20] and would pursue the same process with greater -keenness and acrimony than he had done. - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 E. [Greek: a)technô=s, ei) -kai\ geloio/teron ei)pei=n, proskei/menon tê=| po/lei u(po\ tou= -theou= ô(/sper i(/ppô| mega/lô| me\n kai\ gennai/ô|, u(po\ mege/thous -de\ nôtheste/rô| kai\ _deome/nô| e)gei/resthai u(po\ mu/ôpo/s tinos_; -oi(=on dê/ moi dokei= o( theo\s e)me\ tê=| po/lei prostetheike/nai -toiou=to/n tina, o(\s u(ma=s _e)gei/rôn kai\ pei/thôn kai\ -o)neidi/zôn_ e(/na e(/kaston ou)de\n pau/omai tê\n ê(me/ran o(/lên -pantachou= proskathi/zôn]. Also c. 26, p. 36 D.] - -[Footnote 19: Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 D; c. 16, p. 28 A; c. 30, p. 39 -C.] - -[Footnote 20 Plato, Apol. c. 30, p. 39 C. [Greek: nu=n ga\r tou=to -ei)/rgasthe] (i.e. [Greek: e)me\ a)pekto/nate]) [Greek: _oi)o/menoi -a)palla/xesthai tou= dido/nai e)/legchon tou= bi/ou_. to\ de\ u(mi=n -polu\ e)nanti/on a)pobê/setai, ô(s e)go/ phêmi. plei/ous e)/sontai -u(ma=s oi( e)le/gchontes, ou(=s nu=n e)gô\ katei=chon, u(mei=s de\ -ou)k ê)|stha/nesthe; kai\ chalepô/teroi e)/sontai o(/sô| neô/teroi/ -ei)si, kai\ u(mei=s ma=llon a)ganaktê/sete], &c. - -I have already remarked (in chapter lxviii. of my general History of -Greece relating to Sokrates) that this prediction was not fulfilled.] - -[Side-note: He disclaims the function of a teacher--he cannot teach, -for he is not wiser than others. He differs from others by being -conscious of his own ignorance.] - -While Sokrates thus extols, and sanctifies under the authority of the -Delphian God, his habitual occupation of interrogating, -cross-examining, and stimulating to virtue, the Athenians -indiscriminately--he disclaims altogether the function of a teacher. -His disclaimer on this point is unequivocal and emphatic. He cannot -teach others, because he is not at all wiser than they. He is fully -aware that he is not wise on any point, great or small--that he knows -nothing at all, so to speak.[21] He can convict others, by their own -answers, of real though unconscious ignorance, or (under another -name) false persuasion of knowledge: and because he can do so, he is -presumed to possess positive knowledge on the points to which the -exposure refers. But this presumption is altogether unfounded: he -possesses no such positive knowledge. Wisdom is not to be found in -any man, even among the most distinguished: Sokrates is as ignorant -as others; and his only point of superiority is, that he is fully -conscious of his own ignorance, while others, far from having the -like consciousness, confidently believe themselves to be in -possession of wisdom and truth.[22] In this consciousness of his -own ignorance Sokrates stands alone; on which special ground he is -proclaimed by the Delphian God as the wisest of mankind. - -[Footnote 21: Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. [Greek: e)gô\ ga\r dê\ -ou)/te me/ga ou)/te smikro\n xu/noida e)mautô=| sopho\s ô)/n], &c. c. -8, p. 22 D. [Greek: e)mautô=| ga\r xunê/|dein ou)de\n e)pistame/nô|, -ô(s e)/pos ei)pei=n.]] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A-B. [Greek: Ou(=tos u(mô=n, -ô)= a)/nthrôpoi, sophô/tato/s e)stin, o(/stis ô(/sper Sôkra/tês -e)/gnôken o(/ti ou)deno\s a)/xio/s e)sti tê=| a)lêthei/a| pro\s -sophi/an.]] - -[Side-note: He does not know where competent teachers can be found. He -is perpetually seeking for them, but in vain.] - -Being thus a partner in the common ignorance, Sokrates cannot of -course teach others. He utterly disclaims having ever taught, or -professed to teach. He would be proud indeed, if he possessed the -knowledge of human and social virtue: but he does not know it himself, -nor can he find out who else knows it.[23] He is certain that there -cannot be more than a few select individuals who possess the art of -making mankind wiser or better--just as in the case of horses, none -but a few practised trainers know how to make them better, while the -handling of these or other animals, by ordinary men, certainly does -not improve the animals, and generally even makes them worse.[24] But -where any such select few are to be found, who alone can train -men--Sokrates is obliged to inquire from others; he cannot divine for -himself.[25] He is perpetually going about, with the lantern of -cross-examination, in search of a wise man: but he can find only -those who pretend to be wise, and whom his cross-examination exposes -as pretenders.[26] - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20 B-C. [Greek: ti/s tê=s -toiau/tês a)retê=s, tê=s a)nthrôpi/nês te kai\ politikê=s, e)pistê/môn -e)sti/n? . . . e)gô\ gou=n kai\ au)to\s e)kalluno/mên te kai\ -ê(bruno/mên a)\n, ei) ê)pista/mên tau=ta; a)ll' ou) ga\r e)pi/stamai, -ô)= a)/ndres A)thênai=oi]. - -c. 21, p. 33 A. [Greek: e)gô\ de\ dida/skalos me\n ou)deno\s pô/pot' -e)geno/mên]. c. 4, p. 19 E.] - -[Footnote 24: Plato, Apol. c. 12, p. 25 B.] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20.] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 B. [Greek: tau=t' ou)=n e)gô\ -me\n e)/ti kai\ nu=n periiô\n zêtô= kai\ e)reunô= kata\ to\n theo/n, -kai\ tô=n a)stôn kai\ tô=n xe/nôn a)\n tina oi)/ômai sopho\n ei)=nai; -kai\ e)peida/n moi mê\ dokê=|, tô=| theô=| boêthô=n e)ndei/knumai -o(/ti ou)k e)/sti sopho/s]. c. 32, p. 41 B.] - -This _then_is the mission and vocation of Sokrates--1. To -cross-examine men, and to destroy that false persuasion of wisdom and -virtue which is so widely diffused among them. 2. To reproach them, -and make them ashamed of pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom -and virtue.[27] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Apol. c. 33, p. 41 E.] - -But Sokrates is not empowered to do more for them. He cannot impart -any positive knowledge to heal their ignorance. He cannot teach them -what WISDOM OR VIRTUE is. - -[Side-note: Impression made by the Platonic Apology on Zeno the -Stoic.] - -Such is the substance of the Platonic Apology of Sokrates. How strong -was the impression which it made, on many philosophical readers, we -may judge from the fact, that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, -being a native of Kition in Cyprus, derived from the perusal of the -Apology his first inducement to come over to Athens, and devote -himself to the study and teaching of philosophy in that city.[28] -Sokrates depicts, with fearless sincerity, what he regards as the -intellectual and moral deficiencies of his countrymen, as well as the -unpalatable medicine and treatment which he was enjoined to administer -to them. With equal sincerity does he declare the limits within which -that treatment was confined. - -[Footnote 28: Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistês) p. 357, Dindorf. -[Greek: Ta\ de\ a)mphi\ Zê/nônos a)ri/dêla/ te/ e)sti kai\ a)|do/mena -u(po\ pollôn, o(/ti au)to\n ê( Sôkra/tous a)pologi/a e)k Phoini/kês -ê)/gagen ei)s tê\n Poiki/lên]. - -This statement deserves full belief: it probably came from Zeno -himself, a voluminous writer. The father of Zeno was a merchant who -traded with Athens, and brought back books for his son to read, -Sokratic books among them. Diogen. Laert. vii. 31. - -Respecting another statement made by Themistius in the same page, I do -not feel so certain. He says that the accusatory discourse pronounced -against Sokrates by Anytus was composed by Polykrates, as a [Greek: -logogra/phos], and paid for. This may be the fact but the words of -Isokrates in the Busiris rather lead me to the belief that the [Greek: -katêgori/a Sôkra/tous] composed by Polykrates was a sophistical -exercise, composed to acquire reputation and pupils, not a discourse -really delivered in the Dikastery.] - -[Side-note: Extent of efficacious influence claimed by Sokrates for -himself--exemplified by Plato throughout the Dialogues of -Search--Xenophon and Plato enlarge it.] - -But neither of his two most eminent companions can endure to restrict -his competence within such narrow limits. Xenophon[29] affirms that -Sokrates was assiduous in communicating useful instruction and -positive edification to his hearers. Plato sometimes, though more -rarely, intimates the same: but for the most part, and in the -Dialogues of Search throughout, he keeps Sokrates within the circle of -procedure which the Apology claims for him. These dialogues exemplify -in detail the aggressive operations, announced therein by Sokrates in -general terms as his missionary life-purpose, against contemporaries -of note, very different from each other--against aspiring youths, -statesmen, generals, Rhetors, Sophists, orthodox pietists, poets, -rhapsodes, &c. Sokrates cross-examines them all, and convicts them of -humiliating ignorance: but he does not furnish, nor does he profess to -be able to furnish, any solution of his own difficulties. Many of the -persons cross-examined bear historical names: but I think it necessary -to warn the reader, that all of them speak both language and -sentiments provided for them by Plato, and not their own.[30] - -[Footnote 29: Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 64, i. 3. 1, i. 4, 2, iv. 2, 40; -iv. 3, 4.] - -[Footnote 30: It might seem superfluous to give such a warning; but -many commentators speak as if they required it. They denounce the -Platonic speakers in harsh terms, which have no pertinence, unless -supposed to be applied to a real man expressing his own thoughts and -feelings. - -It is useless to enjoin us, as Stallbaum and Steinhart do, to mark the -aristocratical conceit of Menon!--the pompous ostentation and -pretensive verbosity of Protagoras and Gorgias!--the exorbitant -selfishness of Polus and Kalliklês!--the impudent brutality of -Thrasymachus!--when all these persons speak entirely under the -prompting of Plato himself. - -You might just as well judge of Sokrates by what we read in the Nubes -of Aristophanes, or of Meton by what we find in the Aves, as describe -the historical characters of the above-named personages out of the -Platonic dialogues. They ought to be appreciated as dramatic pictures, -drest up by the author for his own purpose, and delivering such -opinions as he assigns to them--whether he intends them to be refuted -by others, or not.] - -[Side-note: Assumption by modern critics, that Sokrates is a positive -teacher, employing indirect methods for the inculcation of theories of -his own.] - -The disclaimer, so often repeated by Sokrates,--that he possessed -neither positive knowledge nor wisdom in his own person,--was -frequently treated by his contemporaries as ironical. He was not -supposed to be in earnest when he made it. Every one presumed that he -must himself know that which he proved others not to know, whatever -motive he might have for affecting ignorance.[31] His personal manner -and homely vein of illustration seemed to favour the supposition that -he was bantering. This interpretation of the character of Sokrates -appears in the main to be preferred by modern critics. Of course (they -imagine) an able man who cross-questions others on the definitions of -Law, Justice, Democracy, &c., has already meditated on the subject, -and framed for himself unimpeachable definitions of these terms. -Sokrates (they suppose) is a positive teacher and theorist, employing -a method, which, though indirect and circuitous, is nevertheless -calculated deliberately beforehand for the purpose of introducing and -inculcating premeditated doctrines of his own. Pursuant to this -hypothesis, it is presumed that the positive theory of Sokrates is to -be found in his negative cross-examinations,--not indeed set down -clearly in any one sentence, so that he who runs may read--yet -disseminated in separate syllables or letters, which may be -distinguished, picked out, and put together into propositions, by an -acute detective examiner. And the same presumption is usually applied -to the Sokrates of the Platonic dialogues: that is, to Plato employing -Sokrates as spokesman. Interpreters sift with microscopic accuracy the -negative dialogues of Plato, in hopes of detecting the ultimate -elements of that positive solution which he is supposed to have lodged -therein, and which, when found, may be put together so as to clear up -all the antecedent difficulties. - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D; c. 9, p. 23 A. - -Aristeides the Rhetor furnishes a valuable confirmation of the truth -of that picture of Sokrates, which we find in the Platonic Apology. -All the other companions of Sokrates who wrote dialogues about him -(not preserved to us), presented the same general features. 1. Avowed -ignorance. 2. The same declaration of the oracle concerning him. 3. -The feeling of frequent signs from [Greek: to\ daimo/nion]. - -[Greek: O(mologei=tai me/n ge le/gein au)to\n] (Sokrates) [Greek: ô(s -a)/ra ou)de\n e)pi/staito, _kai\ pa/ntes tou=to/ phasin oi( -suggeno/menoi_; o(mologei=tai d' au)= kai\ tou=to, sophô/taton ei)=nai -Sôkra/tê tê\n Puthi/an ei)rêke/nai], &c. - -(Aristeides, Orat. xlv. [Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s], pp. 23, 24, 25, -Dindorf.)] - -[Side-note: Incorrectness of such assumption--the Sokratic Elenchus -does not furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the -respondent, stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own.] - -I have already said (in the preceding chapter) that I cannot take this -view either of Sokrates or of Plato. Without doubt, each of them had -affirmative doctrines and convictions, though not both the same. But -the affirmative vein, with both of them, runs in a channel completely -distinct from the negative. The affirmative theory has its roots -_aliunde_, and is neither generated, nor adapted, with a view to -reconcile the contradictions, or elucidate the obscurities, which the -negative Elenchus has exposed. That exposure does indeed render the -embarrassed respondent painfully conscious of the want of some -rational, consistent, and adequate theoretical explanation: it farther -stimulates him to make efforts of his own for the supply of that want. -But such efforts must be really his own; the Elenchus gives no farther -help: it furnishes problems, but no solutions, nor even any assurance -that the problems as presented, admit of affirmative solutions. -Whoever expects that such consummate masters of the negative process -as Sokrates and Plato, when they come to deliver affirmative dogmas of -their own, will be kept under restraint by their own previous -Elenchus, and will take care that their dogmas shall not be vulnerable -by the same weapons as they had employed against others--will be -disappointed. They do not employ any negative test against themselves. -When Sokrates preaches in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, or the Athenian -Stranger in the Platonic Leges, they jump over, or suppose to be -already solved, the difficulties under the pressure of which other -disputants had been previously discredited: they assume all the -undefinable common-places to be clearly understood, and all the -inconsistent generalities to be brought into harmony. Thus it is that -the negative cross-examination, and the affirmative dogmatism, are -(both in Sokrates and in Plato) two unconnected operations of thought: -the one does not lead to, or involve, or verify, the other. - -[Side-note: Value and importance of this process--stimulating active -individual minds to theorise each for itself.] - -Those who depreciate the negative process simply, unless followed up -by some new positive doctrine which shall be proof against all such -attack--cannot be expected to admire Sokrates greatly, even as he -stands rated by himself. Even if I concurred in this opinion, I should -still think myself obliged to exhibit him as he really was. But I do -not concur in the opinion. I think that the creation and furtherance -of individual, self-thinking minds, each instigated to form some -rational and consistent theory for itself, is a material benefit, even -though no farther aid be rendered to the process except in the way of -negative suggestion. That such minds should be made to feel the -arbitrary and incoherent character of that which they have imbibed by -passive association as ethics and æsthetics,--and that they should -endeavour to test it by some rational and consistent standard--would -be an improving process, though no one theory could be framed -satisfactory to all. The Sokratic Elenchus went directly to this -result. Plato followed in the same track, not of pouring new matter of -knowledge into the pupil, but of eliciting new thoughts and beliefs -out of him, by kindling the latent forces of his intellect. A large -proportion of Plato's dialogues have no other purpose or value. And in -entering upon the consideration of these dialogues, we cannot take a -better point of departure than the Apology of Sokrates, wherein the -speaker, alike honest and decided in his convictions, at the close of -a long cross-examining career, re-asserts expressly his devoted -allegiance to the negative process, and disclaims with equal emphasis -all power over the affirmative. - -[Side-note: View taken by Sokrates about death. Other men profess to -know what it is, and think it a great misfortune: he does not know.] - -In that touching discourse, the Universal Cross-Examiner declares a -thorough resolution to follow his own individual conviction and his -own sense of duty--whether agreeing or disagreeing with the -convictions of his countrymen, and whether leading to danger or to -death for himself. "Where a man may have posted himself either--under -his own belief that it is best, or under orders from the -magistrate--there he must stay and affront danger, not caring for death or -anything else in comparison with disgrace."[32] As to death, Sokrates -knows very little what it is, nor whether it is good or evil. The fear -of death, in his view, is only one case of the prevalent mental -malady--men believing themselves to know that of which they really -know nothing. If death be an extinction of all sensation, like a -perpetual and dreamless sleep, he will regard it as a prodigious -benefit compared with life: even the Great King will not be a loser by -the exchange.[33] If on the contrary death be a transition into Hades, -to keep company with those who have died before--Homer, Hesiod, the -heroes of the Trojan war, &c.--Sokrates will consider it supreme -happiness to converse with and cross-examine the potentates and clever -men of the past--Agamemnon, Odysseus, Sisyphus; thus discriminating -which of them are really wise, and which of them are only unconscious -pretenders. He is convinced that no evil can ever happen to the good -man; that the protection, of the Gods can never be wanting to him, -whether alive or dead.[34] "It is not lawful for a better man to be -injured by a worse. He may indeed be killed, or banished, or -disfranchised; and these may appear great evils, in the eye of others. -But I do not think them so. It is a far greater evil to do what -Melêtus is now doing--trying to kill a man unjustly."[35] - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D.] - -[Footnote 33: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 A. c. 32, p. 40 D. [Greek: kai\ -ei)/te dê\ mêdemi/a ai)/sthêsi/s e)stin, a)ll' oi(=on u(/pnos, -e)peida/n tis katheu/dôn mêd' o)/nar mêde\n o(ra=|, thauma/sion -ke/rdos a)\n ei)/ê o( tha/natos]. - -Ast remarks (Plat. Leb. und Schrift. p. 488) that the language of -doubt and uncertainty in which Sokrates here speaks of the -consequences of death, is greatly at variance with the language which -he is made to hold in Phædon. Ast adduces this as one of his arguments -for disallowing the authenticity of the Apology. I do not admit the -inference. I am prepared for divergence between the opinions of -Sokrates in different dialogues; and I believe, moreover, that the -Sokrates of the Phædon is spokesman chosen to argue in support of the -main thesis of that dialogue. But it is impossible to deny the -variance which Ast points out, and which is also admitted by -Stallbaum. Steinhart indeed (Einleitung, p. 246) goes the length of -denying it, in which I cannot follow him. The sentiment of Sokrates in -the Apology embodies the same alternative uncertainty, as what we read -in Marcus Antoninus, v. 33. [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? perime/neis i(/leôs -tê\n ei)/te sbe/sin ei)/te meta/stasin], &c.] - -[Footnote 34: Plato, Apol. c. 32, p. 41 A-B.] - -[Footnote 35: Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 D.] - -[Side-note: Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether -agreeing or disagreeing with others.] - -Sokrates here gives his own estimate of comparative good and evil. -Death, banishment, disfranchisement, &c., are no great evils: to put -another man to death unjustly, is a great evil to the doer: the good -man can suffer no evil at all. These are given as the judgments of -Sokrates, and as dissentient from most others. Whether they are -Sokratic or Platonic opinions, or common to both--we shall find them -reappearing in various other Platonic dialogues, hereafter to be -noticed. We have also to notice that marked feature in the character -of Sokrates[36]--the standing upon his own individual reason and -measure of good and evil: nay, even pushing his confidence in it so -far, as to believe in a divine voice informing and moving him. This -reliance on the individual reason is sometimes recognised, at other -times rejected, in the Platonic dialogues. Plato rejects it in his -comments (contained in the dialogue Theætêtus) on the doctrine of -Protagoras: he rejects it also in the constructive dialogues, Republic -and Leges, where he constitutes himself despotic legislator, -prescribing a standard of orthodox opinion; he proclaims it in the -Gorgias, and implies it very generally throughout the negative -dialogues. - -[Footnote 36: Plat. Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D. [Greek: ou(= a)/n tis e(auto\n -ta/xê| ê)\ ê(gêsa/menos be/ltion ei)=nai ê)\ u(p' a)/rchontos -tachthê=|, e)ntau=tha dei=, ô(s e)moi\ dokei=, me/nonta kinduneu/ein], -&c. - -Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 8, 11 [Greek: phro/nimos de/, ô(/ste mê\ -diamarta/nein kri/nôn ta\ belti/ô kai\ ta\ chei/rô, mêde\ a)/llou -prosde/esthai, a)ll' au)ta/rchês ei)=nai pro\s tê\n tou/tôn gnô=sin], -&c. - -Compare this with Memor. i. 1, 3-4-5, and the Xenophontic Apology, 4, -5, 13, where this [Greek: au)tarkei/a] finds for itself a -justification in the hypothesis of a divine monitor without. - -The debaters in the treatise of Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, upon the -question of the Sokratic [Greek: daimo/nion], insist upon this -resolute persuasion and self-determination as the most indisputable -fact in the case (c. 11, p. 581 C) [Greek: Ai( de\ Sôkra/tous o(rmai\ -to\ be/baion e)/chousai kai\ sphodro/têta phai/nontai pro\s a(/pan, -ô(s a)\n e)x o)rthê=s kai\ i)schura=s a)pheime/nai kri/eôs kai\ -a)rchê=s]. Compare p. 589 E. The speculations of the speakers upon the -[Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: du/namis tou= Sôkra/tous daimoni/ou], -come to little result. - -There is a curious passage in Plutarch's life of Coriolanus (c. 32), -where he describes the way in which the Gods act upon the minds of -particular men, under difficult and trying circumstances. They do not -inspire new resolutions or volitions, but they work upon the -associative principle, suggesting new ideas which conduct to the -appropriate volition--[Greek: ou)d' o(rma\s e)nergazo/menon, a)lla\ -phantasi/as o(rmô=n a)gôgou/s], &c.] - -[Side-note: Formidable efficacy of established public beliefs, -generated without any ostensible author.] - -Lastly, we find also in the Apology distinct notice of the formidable -efficacy of established public impressions, generated without any -ostensible author, circulated in the common talk, and passing without -examination from one man to another, as portions of accredited faith. -"My accusers Melêtus and Anytus (says Sokrates) are difficult enough -to deal with: yet far less difficult than the prejudiced public, who -have heard false reports concerning me for years past, and have -contracted a settled belief about my character, from nameless authors -whom I cannot summon here to be confuted."[37] - -[Footnote 37: Plato, Apol. c. 2, p. 18 C-D.] - -It is against this ancient, established belief, passing for -knowledge--communicated by unconscious contagion without any rational -process--against the "procès jugé mais non plaidé", whereby King Nomos -governs--that the general mission of Sokrates is directed. It is against -the like belief, in one of its countless manifestations, that he here -defends himself before the Dikastery. - - - - -CHAPTER X. - -KRITON. - - -[Side-note: General purpose of the Kriton.] - -The dialogue called Kriton is, in one point of view, a second part or -sequel--in another point of view, an antithesis or corrective--of the -Platonic Apology. For that reason, I notice it immediately after the -Apology: though I do not venture to affirm confidently that it was -composed immediately after: it may possibly have been later, as I -believe the Phædon also to have been later.[1] - -[Footnote 1: Steinhart affirms with confidence that the Kriton was -composed immediately after the Apology, and shortly after the death of -Sokrates (Einleitung, p. 303). The fact may be so, but I do not feel -thus confident of it when I look to the analogy of the later Phædon.] - -[Side-note: Subject of the dialogue--interlocutors.] - -The Kriton describes a conversation between Sokrates and his friend -Kriton in the prison, after condemnation, and two days before the cup -of hemlock was administered. Kriton entreats and urges Sokrates (as -the sympathising friends had probably done frequently during the -thirty days of imprisonment) to make his escape from the prison, -informing him that arrangements have already been made for enabling -him to escape with ease and safety, and that money as well as good -recommendations will be provided, so that he may dwell comfortably -either in Thessaly, or wherever else he pleases. Sokrates ought not, -in justice to his children and his friends, to refuse the opportunity -offered, and thus to throw away his life. Should he do so, it will -appear to every one as if his friends had shamefully failed in their -duty, when intervention on their part might easily have saved him. He -might have avoided the trial altogether: even when on trial, he might -easily have escaped the capital sentence. Here is now a third -opportunity of rescue, which if he declines, it will turn this grave -and painful affair into mockery, as if he and his friends were -impotent simpletons.[2] Besides the mournful character of the event, -Sokrates and his friends will thus be disgraced in the opinion of -every one. - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Krito. c. 5, p. 45 E. [Greek: ô(s e)/gôge kai\ -u(pe\r sou= kai\ u(pe\r ê(mô=n tô=n sô=n e)pitêdei/ôn ai)schu/nomai, -mê\ do/xê| a(/pan to\ pra=gma to\ peri\ se\ a)nandri/a| tini\ tê=| -ê(mete/ra| pepra=chthai, kai\ ê( ei)/sodos tê=s di/kês ei)s to\ -dikastê/rion, ô(s ei)sê=lthes, e)xo\n mê\ ei)selthei=n, kai\ au)to\s -o( a)gô\n tê=s di/kês ô(s e)ge/neto, kai\ to\ teleutai=on dê\ touti/, -ô(/sper katage/lôs tê=s pra/xeôs, kaki/a| tini\ kai\ a)nandri/a| tê=| -ê(mete/ra| diapepheuge/nai ê(ma=s dokei=n, oi(tine/s se ou)chi\ -e)sô/samen ou)de\ su\ sauto/n, oi(=o/n te o)\n kai\ dunato/n, ei)/ ti -kai\ smikro\n ê(mô=n o)/phelos ê)=n]. - -This is a remarkable passage, as evincing both the trial and the death -of Sokrates, even in the opinion of his own friends, might have been -avoided without anything which they conceived dishonourable to his -character. - -Professor Köchly puts this point very forcibly in his _Vortrag_, -referred to in my notes on the Platonic Apology, p. 410 seq.] - -[Side-note: Answer of Sokrates to the appeal made by Kriton.] - -"Disgraced in the opinion of every one," replies Sokrates? That is not -the proper test by which the propriety of your recommendation must be -determined. I am now, as I always have been, prepared to follow -nothing but that voice of reason which approves itself to me in -discussion as the best and soundest.[3] We have often discussed this -matter before, and the conclusions on which we agreed are not to be -thrown aside because of my impending death. We agreed that the -opinions general among men ought not to be followed in all cases, but -only in some: that the good opinions, those of the wise men, were to -be followed--the bad opinions, those of the foolish men, to be -disregarded. In the treatment and exercise of the body, we must not -attend to the praise, the blame, or the opinion of every man, but only -to those of the one professional trainer or physician. If we disregard -this one skilful man, and conduct ourselves according to the praise or -blame of the unskilful public, our body will become corrupted and -disabled, so that life itself will not be worth having. - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Krito. c. 6, p. 46 B. [Greek: ô(s e)gô\ ou) mo/non -nu=n a)lla\ kai\ a)ei\ toiou=tos, oi(=os tô=n e)mô=n mêdeni\ a)/llô| -pei/thesthai ê)\ tô=| lo/gô|, o(\s a)/n moi logizome/nô| be/ltistos -phai/nêtai.]] - -[Side-note: He declares that the judgment of the general public is not -worthy of trust: he appeals to the judgment of the one Expert, who is -wise on the matter in debate.] - -In like manner, on the question what is just and unjust, honourable or -base, good or evil, to which our present subject belongs--we must not -yield to the praise and censure of the many, but only to that of the -one, whoever he may be, who is wise on these matters.[4] We must be -afraid and ashamed of him more than of all the rest. Not the verdict -of the many, but that of the one man skilful about just and unjust, -and that of truth itself, must be listened to. Otherwise we shall -suffer the like debasement and corruption of mind as of body in the -former case. Life will become yet more worthless. True--the many may -put us to death. But what we ought to care for most, is, not simply to -live, but to live well, justly, honourably.[5] - -[Footnote 4: Plato, Krito. c. 7, p. 47 C-D. [Greek: kai\ dê\ kai\ -peri\ tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn, kai\ ai)schrô=n kai\ kalô=n, kai\ -a)gathô=n kai\ kakô=n, peri\ ô(=n nu=n ê( boulê\ ê(mi=n e)stin, -po/teron tê=| tô=n pollô=n do/xê| dei= ê(ma=s e(/pesthai kai\ -phobei=sthai au)tê/n, ê)\ tê=| tou= e(no/s, ei)/ ti/s e)stin -e)pai+/ôn, o(\n dei= kai\ ai)schu/nesthai kai\ phobei=sthai ma=llon -ê)\ xu/mpantas tou\s a)/llous?] - -c. 8, p. 48 A. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra pa/nu ê(mi=n ou(/tô phrontiste/on -o(/, ti e)rou=sin oi( polloi\ ê(ma=s, a)ll' o(\, ti o( e)pai+/ôn peri\ -tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn, o( ei)=s, kai\ au)tê\ ê( a)lê/theia.]] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Krito. c. 7-8, pp. 47-48.] - -Sokrates thus proceeds:-- - -The point to be decided, therefore, with reference to your -proposition, Kriton, is, not what will be generally said if I decline, -but whether it will be just or unjust--right or wrong--if I comply; -that is, if I consent to escape from prison against the will of the -Athenians and against the sentence of law. - -[Side-note: Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the -question with Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? -Never in any case to act unjustly.] - -To decide the point, I assume this principle, which we have - -often before agreed upon in our reasonings, and which must stand -unshaken now.[6] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Krito. c. 9, p. 48 E. [Greek: o(/ra de\ dê\ _tê=s -ske/pseôs tê\n a)rchê/n_], &c.] - -We ought not in any case whatever to act wrong or unjustly. To act so -is in every case both bad for the agent and dishonourable to the -agent, whatever may be its consequences. Even though others act wrong -to us, we ought not to act wrong to them in return. Even though others -do evil to us, we ought not to do evil to them in return.[7] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 B. [Greek: Ou)de\ -a)dikou/menon a)/ra a)ntadikei=n, _ô(s oi( polloi\ oi)/ontai_, -e)peidê/ ge ou)damô=s dei = a)dikei=n], &c.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and that -most persons hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point -is cardinal.] - -This is the principle which I assume as true, though I know that very -few persons hold it, or ever will hold it. Most men say the contrary--that -when other persons do wrong or harm to us, we may do wrong or -harm to them in return. This is a cardinal point. Between those who -affirm it, and those who deny it, there can be no common measure or -reasoning. Reciprocal contempt is the sentiment with which, by -necessity, each contemplates the other's resolutions.[8] - -[Footnote 8: Plato. Krito. c. 10, p. 49 D. [Greek: Oi)=da ga\r o(/ti -o)li/gois tisi\ tau=ta kai\ dokei= kai\ do/xei; O(=is ou)=n ou(/tô -de/doktai kai\ oi(=s mê/, _tou/tois ou)k e)/sti koinê\ boulê/, a)ll' -a)na/gkê tou/tous a)llê/lôn kataphronei=n, o(rôntas ta\ a)llê/lôn -bouleu/mata_. Sko/pei dê\ ou)=n kai\ su\ eu)= ma/la, po/teron -koinônei=s kai\ xundokei= soi; kai\ _a)rchô/metha e)nteu=then -bouleuo/menoi_, ô(s ou)de/pote o)rthô=s e)/chontos ou)/te tou= -a)dikei=n ou)/te tou= a)ntadikei=n, ou)/te kakô=s pa/schonta -a)mu/nesthai a)ntidrô=nta kakô=s]. - -Compare the opposite impulse, to revenge yourself upon your country -from which you believe yourself to have received wrong, set forth in -the speech of Alkibiades at Sparta after he had been exiled by the -Athenians. Thucyd. vi. 92. [Greek: to/ te philo/poli ou)k e)n ô(=| -a)dikou=mai e)/chô, a)ll' e)n ô(=| a)sphalô=s e)politeu/thên.]] - -[Side-note: Pleading supposed to be addressed by the Laws of Athens to -Sokrates, demanding from him implicit obedience.] - -Sokrates then delivers a well-known and eloquent pleading, wherein he -imagines the Laws of Athens to remonstrate with him on his purpose of -secretly quitting the prison, in order to evade a sentence legally -pronounced. By his birth, and long residence in Athens, he has entered -into a covenant to obey exactly and faithfully what the laws -prescribe. Though the laws should deal unjustly with him, he has no -right of redress against them--neither by open disobedience, nor -force, nor evasion. Their rights over him are even more uncontrolled -and indefeasible than those of his father and mother. The laws allow -to every citizen full liberty of trying to persuade the assembled -public: but the citizen who fails in persuading, must obey the public -when they enact a law adverse to his views. Sokrates having been -distinguished beyond all others for the constancy of his residence at -Athens, has thus shown that he was well satisfied with the city, and -with those laws without which it could not exist as a city. If he now -violates his covenants and his duty, by breaking prison like a runaway -slave, he will forfeit all the reputation to which he has pretended -during his long life, as a preacher of justice and virtue.[9] - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Krito. c. 11-17, pp. 50-54.] - -[Side-note: Purpose of Plato in this pleading--to present the -dispositions of Sokrates in a light different from that which the -Apology had presented--unqualified submission instead of defiance.] - -This striking discourse, the general drift of which I have briefly -described, appears intended by Plato--as far as I can pretend to guess -at his purpose--to set forth the personal character and dispositions -of Sokrates in a light different from that which they present in the -Apology. In defending himself before the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted -himself into a position which would undoubtedly be construed by his -auditors as disobedience and defiance to the city and its -institutions. He professed to be acting under a divine mission, which -was of higher authority than the enactments of his countrymen: he -warned them against condemning him, because his condemnation would be -a mischief, not to him, but to them and because by doing so they would -repudiate and maltreat the missionary sent to them by the Delphian God -as a valuable present.[10] In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts, -Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus -confirming the charge which his accusers advanced, and which they -justified by some of his public remarks. He had manifested by -unmistakable language the same contempt for the Athenian constitution -as that which had been displayed in act by Kritias and Alkibiades,[11] -with whom his own name was associated as teacher and companion.[12] -Xenophon in his Memorabilia recognises this impression as prevalent -among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what he thinks a -suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and -such I imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the Kriton. - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Apol. c. 17-18, p. 29-30.] - -[Footnote 11: This was among the charges urged against Sokrates by -Anytus and the other accusers (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9. [Greek: u(perora=|n -e)poi/ei tô=n kathestô/tôn no/môn tou\s suno/ntas]). It was also the -judgment formed respecting Sokrates by the Roman censor, the elder -Cato; a man very much like the Athenian Anytus, constitutional and -patriotic as a citizen, devoted to the active duties of political -life, but thoroughly averse to philosophy and speculative debate, as -Anytus is depicted in the Menon of Plato.--Plutarch, Cato c. 23, a -passage already cited in a note on the chapter next but one preceding. - -The accusation of "putting himself above the laws," appears in the -same way in the Nubes of Aristophanes, 1035-1400, &c.:-- - -[Greek: ô(s ê(du\ kainoi=s pra/gmasin kai\ dexioi=s o(milei=n -kai\ tô=n kathestô/tôn no/môn u(per phronei=n du/nasthai]. - -Compare the rhetor Aristeides--[Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], p. 133; -vol. iii. p. 480, Dindorf.] - -[Footnote 12: The dramatic position of Sokrates has been compared by -Köchly, p. 382, very suitably with that of Antigoné, who, in burying -her deceased brother, acts upon her own sense of right and family -affections, in defiance of an express interdict from sovereign -authority. This tragical conflict of obligations, indicated by -Aristotle as an ethical question suited for dialectic debate (Topic. -i. p. 105, b. 22), was handled by all the three great tragedians; and -has been ennobled by Sophokles in one of his best remaining tragedies. -The Platonic Apology presents many points of analogy with the -Antigoné, while the Platonic Kriton carries us into an opposite vein -of sentiment. Sokrates after sentence, and Antigoné after sentence, -are totally different persons. The young maiden, though adhering with -unshaken conviction to the rectitude of her past disobedience, cannot -submit to the sentence of death without complaint and protestation. -Though above all fear she is clamorous in remonstrances against both -the injustice of the sentence and the untimely close of her career: so -that she is obliged to be dragged away by the officers (Soph. Antig. -870-877; compare 497-508, with Plato, Krito. p. 49 C; Apolog. p. 28 D, -29 C). All these points enhance the interest of the piece, and are -suited to a destined bride in the flower of her age. But an old -philosopher of seventy years of age has no such attachment to life -remaining. He contemplates death with the eye of calm reason: he has -not only silenced "the child within us who fears death" (to use the -remarkable phrase of Plato, Phædon, p. 77 E), but he knows well that -what remains to him of life must be short; that it will probably be of -little value, with diminished powers, mental as well as bodily; and -that if passed in exile, it will be of no value at all. To close his -life with dignity is the best thing which can happen to him. While by -escape from the prison he would have gained little or nothing; he is -enabled, by refusing the means of escape, to manifest an ostentatious -deference to the law, and to make peace with the Athenian authorities -after the opposition which had been declared in his Apology. Both in -the Kriton and in the Phædon, Sokrates exhibits the specimen of a man -adhering to previous conviction, unaffected by impending death, and by -the apprehensions which that season brings upon ordinary minds; -estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and -independent reason.] - -[Side-note: Harangue of Sokrates delivered in the name of the Laws, -would have been applauded by all the democratical patriots of Athens.] - -This dialogue puts into the mouth of Sokrates a rhetorical harangue -forcible and impressive, which he supposes himself to hear from -personified Nomos or Athens, claiming for herself and her laws plenary -and unmeasured obedience from all her citizens, as a covenant due to -her from each. He declares his own heartfelt adhesion to the claim. -Sokrates is thus made to express the feelings and repeat the language -of a devoted democratical patriot. His doctrine is one which every -Athenian audience would warmly applaud--whether heard from speakers in -the assembly, from litigants in the Dikastery, or from dramatists in -the theatre. It is a doctrine which orators of all varieties -(Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Lysis, Isokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, -Lykurgus) would be alike emphatic in upholding: upon which probably -Sophists habitually displayed their own eloquence, and tested the -talents of their pupils. It may be considered as almost an Athenian -common-place. Hence it is all the better fitted for Plato's purpose of -restoring Sokrates to harmony with his fellow-citizens. It serves as -his protestation of allegiance to Athens, in reply to the adverse -impressions prevalent against him. The only singularity which bestows -special pertinence on that which is in substance a discourse of -venerated common-place, is--that Sokrates proclaims and applies his -doctrine of absolute submission, under the precise circumstances in -which many others, generally patriotic, might be disposed to recede -from it--where he is condemned (unjustly, in his own persuasion) to -suffer death--yet has the opportunity to escape. He is thus presented -as a citizen not merely of ordinary loyalty but of extraordinary -patriotism. Moreover his remarkable constancy of residence at Athens -is produced as evidence, showing that the city was eminently -acceptable to him, and that he had no cause of complaint against -it.[13] - -[Footnote 13: Plato, Krito. c. 14, p. 52 B. [Greek: ou) ga\r a)/n pote -tô=n a)/llôn A)thênai/ôn a(pa/ntôn diaphero/ntôs e)n au)tê=| -e)pedê/meis, ei) mê/ soi diaphero/ntôs ê)/reske;] c. 12, p. 50 D. -[Greek: phe/re ga/r, ti/ e)gkalô=n ê(li=n te kai\ tê=| po/lei -e)picheirei=s ê(ma=s a)pollu/nai?]] - -[Side-note: The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with -other citizens, overlooking the specialties of his character.] - -Throughout all this eloquent appeal addressed by Athens to her citizen -Sokrates, the points insisted on are those common to him with other -citizens: the marked specialties of his character being left -unnoticed. Such are the points suitable to the purpose (rather -Xenophontic than Platonic, herein) of the Kriton; when Sokrates is to -be brought back within the pale of democratical citizenship, and -exculpated from the charge of incivism. But when we read the language -of Sokrates both in the Apology and in the Gorgias, we find a very -different picture given of the relations between him and Athens. We -find him there presented as an isolated and eccentric individual, a -dissenter, not only departing altogether from the character and -purposes general among his fellow-citizens, but also certain to incur -dangerous antipathy, in so far as he publicly proclaimed what he was. -The Kriton takes him up as having become a victim to such antipathy: -yet as reconciling himself with the laws by voluntarily accepting the -sentence; and as persuaded to do so, moreover, by a piece of rhetoric -imbued with the most genuine spirit of constitutional democracy. It is -the compromise of his long-standing dissent with the reigning -orthodoxy, just before his death. [Greek: E)n eu)phêmi/a| chrê\ -teleuta=|n].[14] - -[Footnote 14: Plato, Phædon, p. 117 D.] - -[Side-note: Still Sokrates is represented as adopting the resolution -to obey, from his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, -but which would not weigh with others.] - -Still, however, though adopting the democratical vein of sentiment for -this purpose, Sokrates is made to adopt it on a ground peculiar to -himself. His individuality is thus upheld. He holds the sentence -pronounced against him to have been unjust, but he renounces all use -of that plea, because the sentence has been legally pronounced by the -judicial authority of the city, and because he has entered into a -covenant with the city. He entertains the firm conviction that no one -ought to act unjustly, or to do evil to others, in any case; not even -in the case in which they have done injustice or evil to him. "This -(says Sokrates) is my conviction, and the principle of my reasoning. -Few persons do accept it, or ever will: yet between those who do -accept it, and those who do not--there can be no common counsel: by -necessity of the case, each looks upon the other, and upon the -reasonings of the other, with contempt."[15] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, note i.] - -[Side-note: The harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, -but represents feelings common among Athenian citizens.] - -This general doctrine, peculiar to Sokrates, is decisive _per se_, in -its application to the actual case, and might have been made to -conclude the dialogue. But Sokrates introduces it as a foundation to -the arguments urged by the personified Athenian Nomos:--which, -however, are not corollaries from it, nor at all peculiar to Sokrates, -but represent sentiments held by the Athenian democrats more cordially -than they were by Sokrates. It is thus that the dialogue Kriton -embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct -elements--constitutional allegiance, and Sokratic individuality. - -[Side-note: Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason -and conscience, for the individual himself.] - -Apart from the express purpose of this dialogue, however, the general -doctrine here proclaimed by Sokrates deserves attention, in regard to -the other Platonic dialogues which we shall soon review. The doctrine -involves an emphatic declaration of the paramount authority of -individual reason and conscience; for the individual himself--but for -him alone. "This (says Sokrates) is, and has long been _my_ -conviction. It is the basis of the whole reasoning. Look well whether -you agree to it: for few persons do agree to it, or ever will: and -between those who do and those who do not, there can be no common -deliberation: they must of necessity despise each other."[16] Here we -have the Protagorean dogma, _Homo Mensura_--which Sokrates will be -found combating in the Theætêtus--proclaimed by Sokrates himself. As -things appear to me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they -are to you. My reason and conscience is the measure for me: yours for -you. It is for you to see whether yours agrees with mine. - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, note i.] - -I shall revert to this doctrine in handling other Platonic dialogues, -particularly the Theætêtus. - -[Side-note: The Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference -between Rhetoric and Dialectic.] - -I have already observed that the tone of the Kriton is rhetorical, not -dialectical--especially the harangue ascribed to Athens. The business -of the rhetorician is to plant and establish some given point of -persuasion, whether as to a general resolution or a particular fact, -in the bosoms of certain auditors before him: hence he gives -prominence and emphasis to some views of the question, suppressing or -discrediting others, and especially keeping out of sight all the -difficulties surrounding the conclusion at which he is aiming. On the -other hand, the business of the dialectician is, not to establish any -foreknown conclusion, but to find out which among all supposable -conclusions are untenable, and which is the most tenable or best. -Hence all the difficulties attending every one of them must be brought -fully into view and discussed: until this has been done, the process -is not terminated, nor can we tell whether any assured conclusion is -attainable or not. - -Now Plato, in some of his dialogues, especially the Gorgias, greatly -depreciates rhetoric and its purpose of persuasion: elsewhere he -employs it himself with ability and effect. The discourse which we -read in the Kriton is one of his best specimens: appealing to -pre-established and widespread emotions, veneration for parents, love of -country, respect for covenants--to justify the resolution of Sokrates -in the actual case: working up these sentiments into fervour, but -neglecting all difficulties, limits, and counter-considerations: -assuming that the familiar phrases of ethics and politics are -perfectly understood and indisputable. - -[Side-note: The Kriton makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but -overlooks the ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be -solved.] - -But these last-mentioned elements--difficulties, qualifications, -necessity for definitions even of the most hackneyed words--would have -been brought into the foreground had Sokrates pursued the dialectical -path, which (as we know both from Xenophon and Plato) was his real -habit and genius. He was perpetually engaged (says Xenophon[17]) in -dialectic enquiry. "Wheat is the Holy, what is the Unholy? What is the -Honourable and the Base? What is the Just and the Unjust? &c." Now in -the rhetorical appeal embodied in the Kriton, the important question, -What is the Just and the Unjust (_i.e._ Justice and Injustice in -general), is assumed to be already determined and out of the reach of -dispute. We are called upon to determine what is just and unjust in a -particular case, as if we already knew what justice and injustice -meant generally: to inquire about modifications of justice, before we -have ascertained its essence. This is the fundamental assumption -involved in the rhetorical process; which assumption we shall find -Plato often deprecating as unphilosophical and preposterous. - -[Footnote 17: Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 16. [Greek: Au)to\s de\ peri\ tô=n -a)nthrôpei/ôn a)ei\ diele/geto, skopô=n, ti/ eu)sebe/s, ti/ a)sebe/s; -ti/ kalo/n, ti/ ai)schro/n; ti/ di/kaion, ti/ a)/dikon; ti/ -sôphrosu/nê, ti/ mani/a; ti/ a)ndrei/a, ti/ deili/a; ti/ po/lis, ti/ -politiko/s; ti/ a)rchê\ a)nthrô/pôn, ti/ a)rchiko\s a)nthrô/pôn], &c. - -We see in Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 40-46, iv. 2, 37, in the Platonic -dialogue Minos and elsewhere, the number of dialectic questions which -Sokrates might have brought to bear upon the harangue in the Kriton, -had it been delivered by any opponent whom he sought to perplex or -confute. What is a law? what are the limits of obedience to the laws? -Are there no limits (as Hobbes is so much denounced for maintaining)? -While the oligarchy of Thirty were the constituted authority at -Athens, they ordered Sokrates himself, together with four other -citizens, to go and arrest a citizen whom they considered dangerous to -the state, the Salaminian Leon. The other four obeyed the order; -Sokrates alone disobeyed, and takes credit for having done so, -considering Leon to be innocent. Which was in the right here? the four -obedient citizens, or the one disobedient? Might not the four have -used substantially the same arguments to justify their obedience, as -those which Sokrates hears from personified Athens in the Kriton? We -must remember that the Thirty had come into authority by resolutions -passed under constitutional forms, when fear of foreign enemies -induced the people to sanction the resolutions proposed by a party -among themselves. The Thirty also ordered Sokrates to abstain from -discourse with young men; he disobeyed (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 3). Was -he right in disobeying? - -I have indicated briefly these questions, to show how completely the -rhetorical manner of the Kriton submerges all those difficulties, -which would form the special matter of genuine Sokratic dialectics. - -Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Kriton, pp. 233, 234) considers the -Kriton as a composition of special occasion--Gelegenheitsschrift--which -I think is true; but which may be said also, in my judgment, of -every Platonic dialogue. The term, however, in Schleiermacher's -writing, has a peculiar meaning, viz. a composition for which there is -no place in the regular rank and file of the Platonic dialogues, as he -marshals them. He remarks the absence of dialectic in the Kriton, and -he adduces this as one reason for supposing it not to be genuine. - -But it is no surprise to me to find Plato rhetorical in one dialogue, -dialectical in others. Variety, and want of system, seem to me among -his most manifest attributes. - -The view taken of the Kriton by Steinhart (Einleit. pp. 291-302), in -the first page of his very rhetorical Introduction, coincides pretty -much with mine.] - -So far indeed Sokrates goes in this dialogue, to affirm a positive -analogy. That Just and Honourable are, to the mind, what health and -strength are to the body:--Unjust and Base, what distemper and -weakness are to the body. And he follows this up by saying, that the -general public are incompetent to determine what is just or -honourable--as they are incompetent to decide what is wholesome or -unwholesome. Respecting both one and the other, you must consult some -one among the professional Experts, who alone are competent to -advise.[18] - -[Footnote 18: Plato, Kriton, c. 7, p. 47 D. [Greek: tou= e(no\s, ei)/ -ti/s e)stin e)pai+/ôn], &c.] - -[Side-note: Incompetence of the general public or -[Greek: i)diô=tai]--appeal to the professional Expert.] - -Both these two doctrines will be found recurring often, in our survey -of the dialogues. The first of the two is an obscure and imperfect -reply to the great Sokratic problem--What is Justice? What is -Injustice? but it is an analogy useful to keep in mind, as a help to -the exposition of many passages in which Plato is yet more obscure. -The second of the two will also recur frequently. It sets out an -antithesis of great moment in the Platonic dialogues--"The one -specially instructed, professional, theorizing, Expert--_versus_ (the -[Greek: i)diô=tai] of the time and place, or) common sense, common -sentiment, intuition, instinct, prejudice," &c. (all these names -meaning the same objective reality, but diversified according as the -speaker may happen to regard the particular case to which he is -alluding). This antithesis appears as an answer when we put the -question--What is the ultimate authority? where does the right of -final decision reside, on problems and disputes ethical, political, -æsthetical? It resides (Sokrates here answers) with some one among a -few professional Experts. They are the only persons competent. - -[Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been -declared--he does not name who the trustworthy Expert is.] - -I shall go more fully into this question elsewhere. Here I shall -merely notice the application which Sokrates makes (in the Kriton) of -the general doctrine. We might anticipate that after having declared -that none was fit to pronounce upon the Just and the Unjust, except a -professional Expert,--he would have proceeded to name some person -corresponding to that designation--to justify the title of that person -to confidence by such evidences as Plato requires in other dialogues--and -then to cite the decision of the judge named, on the case in hand. -This is what Sokrates would have done, if the case had been one of -health or sickness. He would have said "I appeal to Hippokrates, -Akumenus, &c., as professional Experts on medicine: they have given -proof of competence by special study, successful practice, writing, -teaching, &c.: they pronounce so and so". He would not have considered -himself competent to form a judgment or announce a decision of his -own. - -[Side-note: Sokrates acts as the Expert himself: he finds authority in -his own reason and conscience.] - -But here, when the case in hand is that of Just and Unjust, the -conduct of Sokrates is altogether different. He specifies no -professional Expert, and he proceeds to lay down a dogma of his own; -in which he tells us that few or none will agree, though it is -fundamental, so that dissenters on the point must despise each other -as heretics. We thus see that it is he alone who steps in to act -himself the part of professional Expert, though he does not openly -assume the title. The ultimate authority is proclaimed in words to -reside with some unnamed Expert: in fact and reality, he finds it in -his own reason and conscience. You are not competent to judge for -yourself: you must consult the professional Expert: but your own -reason and conscience must signify to you who the Expert is. - -The analogy here produced by Plato of questions about health and -sickness--is followed out only in its negative operation; as it serves -to scare away the multitude, and discredit the Vox Populi. But when -this has been done, no oracular man can be produced or authenticated. -In other dialogues, we shall find Sokrates regretting the absence of -such an oracular man, but professing inability to proceed without him. -In the Kriton, he undertakes the duty himself; unmindful of the many -emphatic speeches in which he had proclaimed his own ignorance, and -taken credit for confessing it without reserve. - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - -EUTHYPHRON. - - -The dialogue called Euthyphron, over and above its contribution to the -ethical enquiries of Plato, has a certain bearing on the character and -exculpation of Sokrates. It will therefore come conveniently in -immediate sequel to the Apology and the Kriton. - -[Side-note: Situation supposed in the dialogue--interlocutors.] - -The indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates is assumed to have been -formally entered in the office of the King Archon. Sokrates has come -to plead to it. In the portico before that office, he meets -Euthyphron: a man of ultra-pious pretensions, possessing special -religious knowledge (either from revelation directly to himself, or -from having been initiated in the various mysteries consecrated -throughout Greece), delivering authoritative opinions on doubtful -theological points, and prophesying future events.[1] - -[Footnote 1: Plato, Euthyphr. c. 2, p. 3 D; compare Herodot. ii. 51.] - -What brings you here, Sokrates (asks Euthyphron), away from your usual -haunts? Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment -against you? - -[Side-note: Indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates--Antipathy of the -Athenians towards those who spread heretical opinions.] - -Yes (replies Sokrates), a young man named Melêtus. He takes -commendable interest in the training of youth, and has indicted me as -a corruptor of youth. He says that I corrupt them by teaching belief -in new gods, and unbelief in the true and ancient Gods. - -_Euthyph._--I understand: it is because you talk about the Dæmon or -Genius often communicating with you, that Melêtus calls you an -innovator in religion. He knows that such calumnies find ready -admission with most minds.[2] So also, people laugh at me, when I talk -about religion, and when I predict future events in the assembly. It -must be from jealousy; because all that I have predicted has come -true. - -[Footnote 2: Plato, Euthyph. c. 2, p. 3 B: [Greek: phêsi\ ga/r me -poiêtê\n ei)=nai theô=n kai\ ô(s kainou\s poiou=nta theou/s, tou\s d' -a)rchai/ous ou) nomi/zonta, e)gra/psato tou/tôn au)tô=n e(/neka, ô(/s -phêsin]. c. 5, p. 5 A: [Greek: au)toschedia/zonta kai\ kainotomou=nta -peri\ tô=n thei/ôn e)xamarta/nein].] - -_Sokr._--To be laughed at is no great matter. The Athenians do not -care much when they regard a man as overwise, but as not given to -teach his wisdom to others: but when they regard him besides, as -likely to make others such as he is himself, they become seriously -angry with him--be it from jealousy, as you say, or from any other -cause. You keep yourself apart, and teach no one; for my part, I -delight in nothing so much as in teaching all that I know. If they -take the matter thus seriously, the result may be very doubtful.[3] - -[Footnote 3: Plato, Euthyphr. c. 3, p. 3 C.-D. [Greek: A)thênai/ois -ga\r ou) spho/dra me/lei, a)/n tina deino\n oi)/ôntai ei)=nai, mê\ -me/ntoi didaskaliko\n tê=s au)tou= sophi/as; o(\n d' a)\n kai\ -a)/llous oi)/ôntai poiei=n toiou/tous, thumou=ntai, ei)=t' ou)=n -phtho/nô|, ô(s su\ le/geis, ei)/te di' a)/llo ti.]] - -[Side-note: Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment -for murder against his own father--Displeasure of his friends at the -proceeding.] - -Sokrates now learns what is Euthyphron's business at the archontic -office. Euthyphron is prosecuting an indictment before the King -Archon, against his own father; as having caused the death of a -dependent workman, who in a fit of intoxication had quarrelled with -and killed a fellow-servant. The father of Euthyphron, upon this -occurrence, bound the homicide hand and foot, and threw him into a -ditch: at the same time sending to the Exêgêtês (the canonical -adviser, supposed to be conversant with the divine sanctions, whom it -was customary to consult when doubts arose about sacred things) to ask -what was to be done with him. The incident occurred at Naxos, and the -messenger was sent to the Exêgêtês at Athens: before he could return, -the prisoner had perished, from hunger, cold, and bonds. Euthyphron -has indicted his father for homicide, as having caused the death of -the prisoner: who (it would appear) had remained in the ditch, tied -hand and foot, without food, and with no more than his ordinary -clothing, during the time occupied in the voyage from Naxos to Athens, -in obtaining the answer of the Exêgêtês, and in returning to Naxos. - -My friends and relatives (says Euthyphron) cry out against me for this -proceeding, as if I were mad. They say that my father did not kill the -man:[4] that even if he had, the man had committed murder: lastly, -that however the case may have been, to indict my own father is -monstrous and inexcusable. Such reasoning is silly. The only point to -be considered is, whether my father killed the deceased justly or -unjustly. If justly there is nothing to be said; if unjustly, then my -father becomes a man tainted with impiety and accursed. I and every -one else, who, knowing the facts, live under the same roof and at the -same table with him, come under the like curse; unless I purify myself -by bringing him to justice. The course which I am now taking is -prescribed by piety or holiness. My friends indeed tell me that it is -unholy for a son to indict his father. But I know better than they, -what holiness is and I should be ashamed of myself if I did not.[5] - -[Footnote 4: According to the Attic law every citizen was bound, in -case any one of his relatives ([Greek: me/chris a)nepsiadô=n]) or any -member of his household ([Greek: oi)ke/tês]) had been put to death, to -come forward as prosecutor and indict the murderer. This was binding -upon the citizen alike in law and in religion. - -Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. p. 1161. Jul. Pollux, viii. 118. - -Euthyphron would thus have been considered as acting with propriety, -if the person indicted had been a stranger.] - -[Footnote 5: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 4. Respecting the [Greek: -mi/asma], which a person who had committed criminal homicide was -supposed to carry about with him wherever he went, communicating it -both to places and to companions, see Antiphon. Tetralog. i. 2, 5, 10; -iii. s. 7, p. 116; and De Herodis Cæde s. 81, p. 139. The argument -here employed by Euthyphron is used also by the Platonic Sokrates in -the Gorgias, 480 C-D. If a man has committed injustice, punishment is -the only way of curing him. That he should escape unpunished is the -worst thing that can happen to him. If you yourself, or your father, -or your friend, have committed injustice, do not seek to avert the -punishment either from yourself or them, but rather invoke it. This is -exactly what Euthyphron is doing, and what the Platonic Sokrates (in -dialogue Euthyphron) calls in question.] - -[Side-note: Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his -is both required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks -him--What is Holiness?] - -I confess myself (says Sokrates) ignorant respecting the question,[6] -and I shall be grateful if you will teach me: the rather as I shall be -able to defend myself better against Melêtus. Tell me what is the -general constituent feature of _Holiness_? What is that common -essence, or same character, which belongs to and distinguishes all -holy or pious acts?[7] - -[Footnote 6: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. [Greek: ti/ ga\r kai\ -phê/somen, oi(/ ge kai\ au)toi\ o(mologou=men peri\ au)tô=n mêde\n -ei)de/nai?]] - -[Footnote 7: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 D. Among the various -reasons (none of them valid in my judgment) given by Ueberweg -(Untersuch. p. 251) for suspecting the authenticity of the Euthyphron, -one is that [Greek: to\ a)no/sion] is reckoned as an [Greek: ei)=dos] -as well as [Greek: to\ o(/sion]. Ueberweg seems to think this absurd, -since he annexes to the word a note of admiration. But Plato expressly -gives [Greek: to\ a)/dikon] as an [Greek: ei)=dos], along with [Greek: -to\ di/kaion] (Repub. v. 476 A); and one of the objections taken -against his theory by Aristotle was, that it would assume substantive -Ideas corresponding to negative terms--[Greek: tô=n a)popha/seôn -i)de/as]. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13, with the Scholion of -Alexander, p. 565, a. 81, r.] - -[Side-note: Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son -Kronus and of Kronus by his son Zeus.] - -It is holy (replies Euthyphron) to do what I am now doing: to bring to -justice the man who commits impiety, either by homicide or sacrilege -or any other such crime, whoever he be--even though it be your own -father. The examples of the Gods teach us this. Kronus punished his -father Uranus for wrong-doing: Zeus, whom every one holds to be the -best and justest of the Gods, did the like by _his_ father Kronus. I -only follow their example. Those who blame my conduct contradict -themselves when they talk about the Gods and about me.[8] - -[Footnote 8: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5-6. - -We see here that Euthyphron is made to follow out the precept -delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in the Theætêtus and elsewhere--to -make himself as like to the Gods as possible--([Greek: o(moi/ôsis -theô=| kata\ to\ dunato/n]. Theætêt. p. 176 B; compare Phædrus, 252 -C)--only that he conceives the attributes and proceedings of the Gods -differently from Sokrates.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these -stories of discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief -in them, as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much -circulation.] - -Do you really confidently believe these stories (asks Sokrates), as -well as many others about the discord and conflicts among the Gods, -which are circulated among the public by poets and painters? For my -part, I have some repugnance in believing them;[9] it is for reason -probably, I am now to be indicted, and proclaimed as doing wrong. If -you tell me that you are persuaded of their truth, I must bow to your -superior knowledge. I cannot help doing so, since for my part I -pretend to no knowledge whatever about them. - -[Footnote 9: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 A. [Greek: A)ra/ ge tou=t' -e)/stin, ou)= e(/neka tê\n graphê\n pheu/gô, o(/ti ta\ toiau=ta -e)peida/n tis peri\ tô=n theô=n le/gê|, duscherô=s pôs a)pode/chomai? -di' a(\ dê\, ô(s e)/oike, phê/sei ti/s me e)xamarta/nein.]] - -I am persuaded that these narratives are true (says Euthyphron): and -not only they, but many other narratives yet more surprising, of which -most persons are ignorant. I can tell you some of them, if you like to -hear. You shall tell me another time (replies Sokrates): now let me -repeat my question to you respecting holiness.[10] - -[Footnote 10: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 C.] - -[Side-note: Bearing of this dialogue on the relative position of -Sokrates and the Athenian public.] - -Before we pursue this enquiry respecting holiness, which is the -portion of the dialogue bearing on the Platonic ethics, I will say one -word on the portion which has preceded, and which appears to bear on -the position and character of Sokrates. He (Sokrates) has incurred -odium from the Dikastery and the public, because he is heretical and -incredulous. "He does not believe in those Gods in whom the city -believes, but introduces religious novelties"--to use the words of the -indictment preferred against him by Melêtus. The Athenian public felt -the same displeasure and offence in hearing their divine legends, such -as those of Zeus and Kronus,[11] called in question or criticised in -an ethical spirit different from their own--as is felt by Jews or -Christians when various narratives of the Old Testament are criticised -in an adverse spirit, and when the proceedings ascribed to Jehovah are -represented as unworthy of a just and beneficent god. We read in -Herodotus what was the sentiment of pious contemporaries respecting -narratives of divine matters. Herodotus keeps back many of them by -design, and announces that he will never recite them except in case of -necessity: while in one instance, where he has been betrayed into -criticism upon a few of them, as inconsiderate and incredible, he is -seized with misgivings, and prays that Gods and heroes will not be -offended with him.[12] The freethinkers, among whom Sokrates was -numbered, were the persons from whom adverse criticism came. It is -these men who are depicted by orthodox opponents as committing lawless -acts, and justifying themselves by precedents drawn from the -proceedings or Zeus.[13] They are, besides, especially accused of -teaching children to despise or even to ill-use their parents.[14] - -[Footnote 11: I shall say more about Plato's views on the theological -legends generally believed by his countrymen, when I come to the -language which he puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the second and -third books of the Republic. Eusebius considers it matter of praise -when he says "that Plato rejected all the opinions of his country-men -concerning the Gods and exposed their absurdity"--[Greek: o(/pôs te -pa/sas ta\s patri/ous peri\ tô=n theô=n u(polê/pseis ê)the/tei, kai\ -tê\n a)topi/an au)tô=n diê/legchen] (Præp. Evan. xiii. 1)--the very -same thing which is averred in the indictment laid by Melêtus against -Sokrates.] - -[Footnote 12: Herodot. ii. 65: [Greek: tô=n de\ ei(/neken a)nei=tai -ta\ i(ra\, ei) le/goimi, katabai/ên a)\n tô=| lo/gô| e)s ta\ thei=a -prê/gmata, ta\ e)gô\ pheu/gô ma/lista a)pêgee/sthai. ta\ de\ kai\ -ei)/rêka au)tô=n e)pipsau/sas, a)nagkai/ê katalambano/menos ei)=pon -. . . .] 45. [Greek: Le/gousi de\ polla\ kai\ a)/lla a)nepiske/ptôs -oi( E(/llênes; eu)ê/thês de\ au)tô=n kai\ o(/de o( mu=thos e)sti, to\n -peri\ tou= Ê(rakle/os le/gousi . . . . e)/ti de\ e(/na e)o/nta to\n -Ê(rakle/a, kai\ e)/ti a)/nthrôpon, ô(s dê/ phasi, kô=s phu/sin e)/chei -polla\s muria/das phoneu=sai? kai\ peri\ me\n tou/tôn tosau=ta ê(mi=n -ei)pou=si, kai\ para\ tô=n theô=n kai\ para\ tô=n ê(rô/ôn eu)me/neia -ei)/ê.] - -About the [Greek: i(roi\ lo/goi] which he keeps back, see cap. 51, 61, -62, 81, 170, &c.] - -[Footnote 13: Aristoph. Nubes, 905-1080.] - -[Footnote 14: Aristoph. Nubes, 994-1333-1444. Xenophon, Mem. i. 2, 49. -[Greek: Sôkra/tês--tou\s pate/ras propêlaki/zein e)di/daske] -(accusation by Melêtus).] - -[Side-note: Dramatic moral set forth by Aristophanes against Sokrates -and the freethinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox -champion.] - -Now in the dialogue here before us, Plato retorts this attack. -Euthyphron possesses in the fullest measure the virtues of a believer. -He believes not only all that orthodox Athenians usually believed -respecting the Gods, but more besides.[15] His faith is so implicit, -that he proclaims it as accurate knowledge, and carries it into -practice with full confidence; reproaching other orthodox persons with -inconsistency and short-coming, and disregarding the judgment of the -multitude, as Sokrates does in the Kriton.[16] Euthyphron stands -forward as the champion of the Gods, determined not to leave -unpunished the man who has committed impiety, let him be who he -may.[17] These lofty religious pretensions impel him, with full -persuasion of right, to indict his own father for homicide, under the -circumstances above described. Now in the eyes of the Athenian public, -there could hardly be any act more abhorrent, than that of a man thus -invoking upon his father the severest penalties of law. It would -probably be not less abhorrent than that of a son beating his own -father. When therefore we read, in the Nubes of Aristophanes, the -dramatic moral set forth against Sokrates, "See the consequences to -which free-thinking and the new system of education lead[18]--the son -Pheidippides beating his own father, and justifying the action as -right, by citing the violence of Zeus towards his father Kronus"--we -may take the Platonic Euthyphron as an antithesis to this moral, -propounded by a defender of Sokrates, "See the consequences to which -consistent orthodoxy and implicit faith conduct. The son Euthyphron -indicts his own father for homicide; he vindicates the step as -conformable to the proceedings of the gods; he even prides himself on -it as championship on their behalf, such as all religious men ought to -approve."[19] - -[Footnote 15: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. [Greek: kai\ e)/ti ge -tou/tôn thaumasiô/tera, a(\ oi( polloi\ ou)k i)/sasin]. - -Euthyphron belonged to the class described in Euripides, Hippol. 45:-- - -[Greek: O(/soi men ou)=n grapha/s te tô=n palaite/rôn -E)/choisin, au)toi/ t' ei)si\n e)n mou/sais a)ei/, -I)/sasin], &c. - -Compare also Euripid. Herakleidæ, 404.] - -[Footnote 16: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 5 A; c. 6, p. 6 A.] - -[Footnote 17: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 E. [Greek: mê\ -e)pitre/pein tô=| a)sebou=nti mêd' a)\n o(stisou=n tugcha/nê| ô)=n.]] - -[Footnote 18: Aristoph. Nubes, 937. [Greek: tê\n kainê\n pai/deusin], -&c.] - -[Footnote 19: Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. pp. -51-54) has many remarks on the Euthyphron in which I do not concur; -but his conception of its "unverkennbare apologetische Absicht" is -very much the same as mine. He describes Euthyphron as a man "der sich -besonders auf das Göttliche zu verstehen vorgab, und die -rechtglaubigen aus den alten theologischen Dichtern gezogenen Begriffe -tapfer vertheidigte. Diesen nun gerade bei der Anklage des Sokrates -mit ihm in Berührung, und durch den unsittlichen Streich, den sein -Eifer für die Frömmigkeit veranlasste, in Gegensatz zu bringen--war -ein des Platon nicht unwürdiger Gedanke" (p. 54). But when -Schleiermacher affirms that the dialogue was indisputably composed -(unstreitig) between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates,--and -when he explains what he considers the defects of the dialogue, by the -necessity of finishing it in a hurry (p. 53), I dissent from him -altogether, though Steinhart adopts the same opinion. Nor can I -perceive in what way the Euthyphron is (as he affirms) either "a -natural out-growth of the Protagoras," or "an approximation and -preparation for the Parmenidês" (p. 52). Still less do I feel the -force of his reasons for hesitating in admitting it to be a genuine -work of Plato. - -I have given my reasons, in a preceding chapter, for believing that -Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates. -But that he should publish such a dialogue while the trial of Sokrates -was impending, is a supposition altogether inadmissible, in my -judgment. The effect of it would be to make the position of Sokrates -much worse on his trial. Herein I agree with Ueberweg (Untersuch. p. -250), though I do not share his doubts of the authenticity of the -dialogue. - -The confident assertion of Stallbaum surprises me. "Constat enim -Platonem eo tempore, quo Socrati tantum erat odium conflatum, ut ei -judicii immineret periculum, complures dialogos composuisse; in quibus -id egit, ut viri sanctissimi adversarios in eo ipso genere, in quo -sibi plurimum sapere videbantur, inscitiæ et ignorantiæ coargueret. -Nam Euthyphronem novimus, ad vates ignorantiæ rerum gravissimarum -convincendos, esse compositum; ut in quo eos ne pietatis quidem -notionem tenere ostenditur. In Menone autem id agitur, ut sophistas et -viros civiles non scientiâ atque arte, sed coeco quodam impetu mentis -et sorte divinâ duci demonstretur: quod quidem ita fit, ut colloquium -ex parte cum Anyto, Socratis accusatore, habeatur. . . . . . Nam -Menonem quidem et Euthyphronem Plato eo confecit tempore, quo Socratis -causa haud ita pridem in judicio versabatur, nec tamen jam tanta ei -videbatur imminere calamitas, quanta postea consecuta est. Ex quo sané -verisimiliter colligere licet Ionem, cujus simile argumentum et -consilium est, circa idem tempus literis consignatum esse." Stallbaum, -Prolegom. ad Platonis Ionem, pp. 288-289, vol. iv. [Comp. Stallb. -ibid., 2nd ed. pp. 339-341]. - -"Imo uno exemplo Euthyphronis, boni quidem hominis ideoque ne Socrati -quidem inimici, sed ejusdem _superstitiosi, vel ut hodie loquuntur, -orthodoxi_, qualis Athenis vulgò esset religionis conditio, declarare -instituit. Ex quo nobis quidem clarissimé videtur apparere Platonem -hoc unum spectavisse, ut judices admonerentur, ne populari -superstitioni in sententiis ferendis plus justo tribuerent." -Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyphron. T. vi. p. 146. - -Steinhart also (in his Einleitung, p. 190) calls Euthyphron "ein -rechtgläubiger von reinsten Wasser--ein ueberfrommer, fanatischer, -Mann," &c. - -In the two preceding pages Stallbaum defends himself against -objections made to his view, on the ground that Plato, by composing -such dialogues at this critical moment, would increase the -unpopularity and danger of Sokrates, instead of diminishing it. -Stallbaum contends (p. 145) that neither Sokrates nor Plato nor any of -the other Sokratic men, believed that the trial would end in a verdict -of guilty: which is probably true about Plato, and would have been -borne out by the event if Sokrates had made a different defence. But -this does not assist the conclusion which Stallbaum wishes to bring -out; for it is not the less true that the dialogues of Plato, if -published at that moment, would increase the exasperation against -Sokrates, and the chance, whatever it was, that he would be found -guilty. Stallbaum refers by mistake to a passage in the Platonic -Apology (p. 36 A), as if Sokrates there expressed his surprise at the -verdict of guilty, anticipating a verdict of acquittal. The passage -declares the contrary: Sokrates expresses his surprise that the -verdict of guilty had passed by so small a majority as five; he had -expected that it would pass by a larger majority.] - -[Side-note: Sequel of the dialogue--Euthyphron gives a particular -example as the reply to a general question.] - -I proceed now with that which may be called the Platonic purpose in -the dialogue--the enquiry into the general idea of Holiness. When the -question was first put to Euthyphron, What is the Holy?--he replied, -"That which I am now doing." _Sokr._ That may be: but many other -things besides are also holy.--_Euthyph._ Certainly.--_Sokr._ Then -your answer does not meet the question. You have indicated one particular -holy act, among many. But the question asked was--What is Holiness -generally? What is that specific property, by the common possession of -which all holy things are entitled to be called holy? I want to know -this general Idea, in order that I may keep it in view as a type -wherewith to compare each particular case, thus determining whether -the case deserves to be called holy or not.[20] - -[Footnote 20: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 7, p. 6 E.] - -Here we have a genuine specimen of the dialectic interrogatory in -which Xenophon affirms[21] Sokrates to have passed his life, and which -Plato prosecutes under his master's name. The question is generalised -much more than in the Kriton. - -[Footnote 21: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 16.] - -[Side-note: Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion.] - -It is assumed that there is one specific Idea or essence--one -objective characteristic or fact--common to all things called Holy. -The purpose of the questioner is: to determine what this Idea is: to -provide a good definition of the word. The first mistake made by the -respondent is, that he names simply one particular case, coming under -the general Idea. This is a mistake often recurring, and often -corrected in the Platonic dialogues. Even now, such a mistake is not -unfrequent: and in the time of Plato, when general ideas, and the -definition of general terms, had been made so little the subject of -direct attention, it was doubtless perpetually made. When the question -was first put, its bearing would not be properly conceived. And even -if the bearing were properly conceived, men would find it easier then, -and do find it easier now, to make answer by giving one particular -example than to go over many examples, and elicit what is common to -all. - -[Side-note: First general answer given by Euthyphron--that which is -pleasing to the Gods is holy. Comments of Sokrates thereon.] - -Euthyphron next replies--That which is pleasing to the Gods is holy: -that which is not pleasing, or which is displeasing to the Gods, is -unholy.--_Sokr._ That is the sort of answer which I desired to have: -now let us examine it. We learn from the received theology, which you -implicitly believe, that there has been much discord and quarrel among -the Gods. If the Gods quarrel, they quarrel about the same matters as -men. Now men do not quarrel about questions of quantity--for such -questions can be determined by calculation and measurement: nor about -questions of weight--for there the balance may be appealed to. The -questions about which you and I and other men quarrel are, What is -just or unjust, honourable or base, good or evil? Upon these there is -no accessible standard. Some men feel in one way, some in another; and -each of us fights for his own opinions.[22] We all indeed agree that -the wrong-doer ought to be punished: but we do not agree who the -wrong-doer is, nor what is wrong-doing. The same action which some of -us pronounce to be just, others stigmatise as unjust.[23] - -[Footnote 22: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 8, p. 7 C-D. [Greek: Peri\ ti/nos -de\ dê\ dienechthe/ntes kai\ e)pi\ ti/na kri/sin ou) duna/menoi -a)phike/sthai e)chthroi/ ge a)\n a)llê/lois ei)=men kai\ -o)rgizoi/metha? i)/sôs ou) pro/cheiro/n soi/ e)stin, a)ll' e)mou= -le/gontos sko/pei, ei) ta/d' e)sti\ to/ te di/kaion kai\ to\ a)/dikon, -kai\ kalo\n kai\ ai)schro/n, kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ kako/n. A)=r' ou) -tau=ta e)sti peri\ ô(=n dienechthe/ntes kai\ ou) duna/menoi e)pi\ -i)kanê\n kri/sin au)tô=n e)lthei=n e)chthroi\ a)llê/lois gigno/metha, -o(/tan gignô/metha, kai\ e)gô\ kai\ su\ kai\ oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi -pa/ntes?]] - -[Footnote 23: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 9, p. 8 D. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra -e)kei=no/ ge a)mphisbêtou=sin, ô(s ou) to\n a)dikou=nta dei= dido/nai -di/kên; a)ll' e)kei=no i)/sôs a)mphisbêtou=si, to\ _ti/s e)stin o( -a)dikôn_ kai\ _ti/ drô=n_, kai\ _po/te_? Pra/xeô/s tinos peri\ -diaphero/menoi, oi( me\n dikai/ôs phasi\n au)tê\n pepra=chthai, oi( -de\ a)di/kôs.]] - -So likewise the quarrels of the Gods must turn upon these same -matters--just and unjust, right and wrong, good and evil. What one God -thinks right, another God thinks wrong. What is pleasing to one God, -is displeasing to another. The same action will be both pleasing and -displeasing to the Gods. - -According to your definition of holy and unholy, therefore, the same -action may be both holy and unholy. Your definition will not hold, for -it does not enable me to distinguish the one from the other.[24] - -[Footnote 24: In regard to Plato's ethical enquiries generally, and to -what we shall find in future dialogues, we must take note of what is -here laid down, that mankind are in perpetual dispute, and have not -yet any determinate standard for just and unjust, right and wrong, -honourable and base, good and evil. Plato had told us, somewhat -differently, in the Kriton, that on these matters, though the judgment -of the many was not to be trusted, yet there was another trustworthy -judgment, that of the one wise man. This point will recur for future -comment.] - -_Euthyph._--I am convinced that there are some things which _all_ the -Gods love, and some things which _all_ the Gods hate. That which I am -doing, for example--indicting my father for homicide--belongs to the -former category. Now that which all the Gods love is the holy: that -which they all hate, is the unholy.[25] - -[Footnote 25: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 11, p. 9.] - -[Side-note: To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the -Holy--they love it because it is holy. In what then does its essence -consist? Perplexity of Euthyphron.] - -_Sokr._--Do the Gods love the holy, because it _is_ holy? Or is it -holy for this reason, because they do love it? _Euthyph._--They love -it because it is holy.[26] _Sokr._--Then the holiness is one thing; -the fact of being loved by the Gods is another. The latter fact is not -of the essence of holiness: it is true, but only as an accident and an -accessory. You have yet to tell me what that essential character is, -by virtue of which the holy comes to be loved by all the Gods, or to -be the subject of various other attributes.[27] - -[Footnote 26: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 10 A-D. The manner in which -Sokrates conducts this argument is over-subtle. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra -dio/ti o(rô/menon ge/ e)sti dia\ tou=to o(ra=tai, a)lla\ tou)nanti/on -dio/ti o(ra=tai, dia\ tou=to o(rô/menon; ou)de\ dio/ti a)go/meno/n -e)sti, dia\ tou=to a)/getai, a)lla\ dio/ti a)/getai, dia\ tou=to -a)go/menon; ou)de\ dio/ti phero/menon, phe/retai, a)lla\ dio/ti -phe/retai, phero/menon.] - -The difference between the meaning of [Greek: phe/retai] and [Greek: -phero/meno/n e)sti] is not easy to see. The former may mean to affirm -the beginning of an action, the latter the continuance: but in this -case the inference would not necessarily follow. - -Compare Aristotel. Physica, p. 185, b. 25, with the Scholion of -Simplikius, p. 330, a. 2nd ed. Bekk. where [Greek: badi/zôn e)/sti] is -recognised as equivalent to [Greek: badi/zei].] - -[Footnote 27: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 A. [Greek: kinduneu/eis, -e)rôtô/menos to\ o(/sion, o(/, ti/ pot' e)/stin, tê\n _me\n ou)si/an_ -moi au)tou= ou) bou/lesthai dêlô=sai, _pa/thos de/ ti peri\ au)tou= -le/gein, o(/, ti pe/ponthe_ tou=to to\ o(/sion, philei=sthai u(po\ -pa/ntôn tô=n theô=n; _o(/, ti de\ o)\n, ou)/pô ei)=pes_. . . . pa/lin -ei)pe\ e)x a)rchê=s, ti/ pote o)\n to\ o(/sion ei)/te philei=tai u(po\ -theô=n, ei)/te o(/ti dê\ pa/schei.]] - -_Euthyph._--I hardly know how to tell you what I think. None of my -explanations will stand. Your ingenuity turns and twists them in every -way. _Sokr._--If I am ingenious, it is against my own will;[28] for I -am most anxious that some one of the answers should stand unshaken. -But I will now put you in the way of making a different answer. You -will admit that all which is holy is necessarily just. But is all that -is just necessarily holy? - -[Footnote: 28: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 D. [Greek: a)/kôn -ei)mi\ sopho/s], &c.] - -[Side-note: Sokrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or -variety of the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministration by -men to the Gods.] - -Euthyphron does not at first understand the question. He does not -comprehend the relation between two words, generic and specific with -reference to each other: the former embracing all that the latter -embraces, and more besides (denoting more objects, connoting fewer -attributes). This is explained by analogies and particular examples, -illustrating a logical distinction highly important to be brought out, -at a time when there were no treatises on Logic.[29] So much therefore -is made out--That the Holy is a part, or branch, of the Just. But what -part? or how is it to be distinguished from other parts or branches of -the just? Euthyphron answers. The holy is that portion or branch of -the Just which concerns ministration to the Gods: the remaining branch -of the Just is, what concerns ministration to men.[30] - -[Footnote 29: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13-14, p. 12.] - -[Footnote 30: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 14, p. 12 E. [Greek: to\ me/ros -tou= dikai/ou ei)=nai eu)sebe/s te kai\ o(/sion, to\ peri\ tê\n tô=n -theô=n therapei/an; to\ de\ peri\ tê\n tô=n a)nthrô/pôn, to\ loipo\n -ei)=nai tou= dikai/ou me/ros.]] - -[Side-note: Ministration to the Gods? How? To what purpose?]\ - -_Sokr._--What sort of ministration? Other ministrations, to horses, -dogs, working cattle, &c., are intended for the improvement or benefit -of those to whom they are rendered:--besides, they can only be -rendered by a few trained persons. In what manner does ministration, -called _holiness_, benefit or improve the Gods? _Euthyph._--In no way: -it is of the same nature as that which slaves render to their masters. -_Sokr._--You mean, that it is work done by us for the Gods. Tell me--to -what end does the work conduce? What is that end which the Gods -accomplish, through our agency as workmen? Physicians employ their -slaves for the purpose of restoring the sick to health: shipbuilders -put their slaves to the completion of ships. But what are those great -works which the Gods bring about by our agency? _Euthyph._--Their -works are numerous and great. _Sokr._--The like may be said of -generals: but the summary and main purpose of all that generals do is--to -assure victory in war. So too we may say about the husbandman: but -the summary of his many proceedings is, to raise corn from the earth. -State to me, in like manner, the summary of that which the Gods -perform through our agency.[31] - -[Footnote 31: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, pp. 13, 14.] - -[Side-note: Holiness--rectitude in sacrifice and prayer--right traffic -between men and the Gods.] - -_Euthyph._--It would cost me some labour to go through the case fully. -But so much I tell you in plain terms. If a man, when sacrificing and -praying, knows what deeds and what words will be agreeable to the -Gods, that is holiness: this it is which upholds the security both of -private houses and public communities. The contrary is unholiness, -which subverts and ruins them.[32] _Sokr._--Holiness, then, is the -knowledge of rightly sacrificing and praying to the Gods; that is, of -giving to them, and asking from them. To ask rightly, is to ask what -we want from them: to give rightly, is to give to them what they want -from us. Holiness will thus be an art of right traffic between Gods -and men. Still, you must tell me how the Gods are gainers by that -which we give to them. That we are gainers by what they give, is clear -enough; but what do they gain on their side? - -[Footnote 32: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, p. 14 B. Compare this third -unsuccessful answer of Euthyphron with the third answer assigned to -Hippias (Hipp. Maj. 291 C-E). Both of them appear lengthened, -emphatic, as if intended to settle a question which had become -vexatious.] - -[Side-note: This will not stand--the Gods gain nothing--they receive -from men marks of honour and gratitude--they are pleased -therewith--the Holy, therefore, must be that which is pleasing to the -Gods.] - -_Euthyph._--The Gods gain nothing. The gifts which we present to them -consist in honour, marks of respect, gratitude. _Sokr._--The holy, -then, is that which obtains favour from the Gods; not that which -gainful to them, nor that which they love. _Euthyph._--Nay: I think -they love it especially. _Sokr._--Then it appears that the holy is -what the Gods love? _Euthyph._--Unquestionably. - -[Side-note: This is the same explanation which was before declared -insufficient. A fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He -breaks off the dialogue.] - -_Sokr._--But this is the very same explanation which we rejected a -short time ago as untenable.[33] It was agreed between us, that to be -loved by the Gods was not of the essence of holiness, and could not -serve as an explanation of holiness: though it might be truly affirmed -thereof as an accompanying predicate. Let us therefore try again to -discover what holiness is. I rely upon you to help me, and I am sure -that you must know, since under a confident persuasion that you know, -you are indicting your own father for homicide. - -[Footnote 33: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 19, p. 15 C. [Greek: me/mnêsai -ga/r pou, o(/ti e)n tô=| e)mprosthen to/ te o(/sion kai\ to\ -theophile\s ou) tau)to\n ê(mi=n e)pha/nê, a)ll' e(/tera a)llê/lôn.]] - -_Euthyph._--"The investigation must stand over to another time, I have -engagements now which call me elsewhere." - -[Side-note: Sokratic spirit of the dialogue--confessed ignorance -applying the Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge.] - -So Plato breaks off the dialogue. It is conceived in the truly -Sokratic spirit:--an Elenchus applied to implicit and unexamined -faith, even though that faith be accredited among the public as -orthodoxy: warfare against the confident persuasion of knowledge, upon -topics familiar to every one, and on which deep sentiments and -confused notions have grown up by association in every one's mind, -without deliberate study, systematic teaching, or testing -cross-examination. Euthyphron is a man who feels unshaken confidence -in his own knowledge, and still more in his own correct religious belief. -Sokrates appears in his received character as confessing ignorance, -soliciting instruction, and exposing inconsistencies and contradiction -in that which is given to him for instruction. - -[Side-note: The questions always difficult, often impossible to -answer. Sokrates is unable to answer them, though he exposes the bad -answers of others.] - -We must (as I have before remarked) take this ignorance on the part of -the Platonic Sokrates not as assumed, but as very real. In no part of -the Platonic writings do we find any tenable definition of the Holy -and the Unholy, such as is here demanded from Euthyphron. The talent -of Sokrates consists in exposing bad definitions, not in providing -good ones. This negative function is all that he claims for himself--with -deep regret that he can do no more. "Sokrates" (says -Aristotle[34]) "put questions, but gave no answers: for he professed -not to know." In those dialogues where Plato makes him attempt more -(there also, against his own will and protest, as in the Philêbus and -Republic), the affirmative Sokrates will be found only to stand his -ground because no negative Sokrates is allowed to attack him. I insist -upon this the rather, because the Platonic commentators usually -present the dialogues in a different light, as if such modesty on the -part of Sokrates was altogether simulated: as if he was himself,[35] -from the beginning, aware of the proper answer to his own questions, -but refrained designedly from announcing it: nay, sometimes, as if the -answers were in themselves easy, and as if the respondents who failed -must be below par in respect of intelligence. This is an erroneous -conception. The questions put by Sokrates, though relating to familiar -topics, are always difficult: they are often even impossible to -answer, because they postulate and require to be assigned a common -objective concept which is not to be found. They only appear easy to -one who has never attempted the task of answering under the pressure -of cross-examination. Most persons indeed never make any such trial, -but go on affirming confidently as if they knew, without trial. It is -exactly against such illusory confidence of knowledge that Sokrates -directs his questions: the fact belongs to our days no less than to -his.[36] - -[Footnote 34: Aristotel. Sophist. Elench. p. 183, b. 7. [Greek: e)pei\ -kai\ dia\ tou=to Sôkra/tês ê)rô/ta kai\ ou)k a)pekri/neto; ô(molo/gei -ga\r ou)k ei)de/nai.]] - -[Footnote 35: See Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Euthyphron. p. 140.] - -[Footnote 36: Adam Smith observes, in his Essay on the Formation of -Languages (p. 20 of the fifth volume of his collected Works), "Ask a -man what relation is expressed by the preposition _of_: and if he has -not beforehand employed his thoughts a good deal upon these subjects, -you may safely allow him a week to consider of his answer." - -The Platonic problem assumes, not only that he shall give an answer, -but that it shall be an answer which he can maintain against the -Elenchus of Sokrates.] - -[Side-note: Objections of Theopompus to the Platonic procedure.] - -The assumptions of some Platonic commentators--that Sokrates and Plato -of course knew the answers to their own questions--that an honest and -pious man, of ordinary intelligence, has the answer to the question in -his heart, though he cannot put it in words--these assumptions were -also made by many of Plato's contemporaries, who depreciated his -questions as frivolous and unprofitable. The rhetor and historian -Theopompus (one of the most eminent among the numerous pupils of -Isokrates, and at the same time unfriendly to Plato, though younger in -age), thus criticised Plato's requirement, that these familiar terms -should be defined: "What! (said he) have none of us before your time -talked about the Good and the Just? Or do you suppose that we cannot -follow out what each of them is, and that we pronounce the words as -empty and unmeaning sounds?"[37] Theopompus was the scholar of -Isokrates, and both of them probably took the same view, as to the -uselessness of that colloquial analysis which aims at determining the -definition of familiar ethical or political words.[38] They considered -that Plato and Sokrates, instead of clearing up what was confused, -wasted their ingenuity in perplexing what was already clear. They -preferred the rhetorical handling (such as we noticed in the Kriton) -which works upon ready-made pre-established sentiments, and impresses -a strong emotional conviction, but presumes that all the intellectual -problems have already been solved. - -[Footnote 37: Epiktêtus, ii. 17, 5-10. [Greek: To\ d' e)xapatô=n tou\s -pollou\s tou=t' e)/stin, o(/per kai\ Theo/pompon to\n r(ê/tora o(/s -pou kai\ Pla/tôni e)gkalei= e)pi\ tô=| bou/lesthai e(/kasta -o(ri/zesthai. Ti/ ga\r le/gei? Ou)dei\s ê(mô=n pro\ sou= e)/legen -a)gatho\n ê)\ di/kaion? ê)\ mê\ parakolouthou=ntes ti/ e)sti tou/tôn -e(/kaston, a)sê/môs kai\ kenô=s e)phtheggo/metha ta\s phôna/s?] - -Respecting Theopompus, compare Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium -de Platone, p. 757; also De Præcip. Historicis, p. 782.] - -[Footnote 38: Isokrates, Helen. Encom. Or. x. init. De Permut. Or. xv. -sect. 90. - -These passages do not name Sokrates and Plato, but have every -appearance of being intended to allude to them.] - -[Side-note: Objective view of Ethics, distinguished by Sokrates from -the subjective.] - -All this shows the novelty of the Sokratic point of view: the -distinction between the essential constituent and the objective -accidental accompaniment,[39] and the search for a definition -corresponding to the former: which search was first prosecuted by -Sokrates (as Aristotle[40] points out) and was taken up from him by -Plato. It was Sokrates who first brought conspicuously into notice the -objective intellectual, scientific view of ethics--as distinguished -from the subjective, emotional, incoherent, and uninquiring. I mean -that he was the first who proclaimed himself as feeling the want of -such an objective view, and who worked upon other minds so a to create -the like want in them: I do not mean that he provided satisfaction for -this requirement. - -[Footnote 39: This distinction is pointedly noticed in the Euthyphron, -p. 11 A.] - -[Footnote 40: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 2, M. 1078, b. 28.] - -[Side-note: Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent.] - -Undoubtedly (as Theopompus remarked) men had used these ethical terms -long before the time of Sokrates, and had used them, not as empty and -unmeaning, but with a full body of meaning (_i.e._ emotional meaning). -Strong and marked emotion had become associated with each term; and -the same emotion, similar in character, though not equal in force--was -felt by the greater number of different minds. Subjectively and -emotionally, there was no difference between one man and another, -except as to degree. But it was Sokrates who first called attention to -the fact as a matter for philosophical recognition and criticism,--that -such subjective and emotional unanimity does not exclude the -widest objective and intellectual dissension.[41] - -[Footnote 41: It is this distinction between the subjective and the -objective which is implied in the language of Epiktêtus, when he -proceeds to answer the objection cited from Theopompus (note 1 p. -451): [Greek: Ti/s ga\r soi le/gei, Theo/pompe, o(/ti e)nnoi/as ou)k -ei)=chomen e(ka/stou tou/tôn phusika/s kai\ prolê/pseis? A)ll' ou)ch -oi(=on te e)pharmo/zein ta\s prolê/pseis tai=s katallê/lois ou)si/ais, -mê\ diarthrô/santa au)ta/s, kai\ au)to\ tou=to skepsa/menon, poi/an -tina\ e(ka/stê| au)tô=n ou)si/an u(potakte/on.] - -To the same purpose Epiktêtus, in another passage, i. 22, 4-9: [Greek: -Au)tê\ e)stin ê( tô=n I)oudai/ôn, kai\ Su/rôn, kai\ Ai)gupti/ôn, kai\ -R(ômai/ôn ma/chê; ou) peri\ tou=, o(/ti to\ o(/sion pa/ntôn -protimête/on, kai\ e)n panti\ metadiôkte/on--a)lla\ po/tero/n e)stin -o(/sion tou=to, to\ choirei/ou phagei=n, ê)\ a)no/sion.] - -Again, Origen also, in a striking passage of his reply to Celsus (v. -p. 263, ed. Spencer; i. p. 614 ed. Delarue), observes that the name -_Justice_ is the same among all Greeks (he means, the name with the -emotional associations inseparable from it), but that the thing -designated was very different, according to those who pronounced -it:--[Greek: lekte/on, o(/ti to\ tê=s dikaiosu/nês o)/noma tau)ton me\n -e)/stin para\ pa=sin E(/llêsin; ê)/dê de\ a)podei/knutai a)/llê me\n -ê( kat' E)pi/kouron dikaiosu/nê, a)/llê de\ ê( kata\ tou\s a)po\ tê=s -Stoa=s, a)rnoume/nôn to\ trimere\s tê=s psuchê=s, a)/llê de\ kata\ -tou\s a)po\ Pla/tônos, i)diopragi/an tô=n merô=n tê=s psuchê=s -pha/skontas ei)=nai tê\n dikaiosu/nên. Ou(/tô de\ kai\ a)/llê me\n ê( -E)pikou/rou a)ndri/a], &c. - -"Je n'aime point les mots nouveaux" (said Saint Just, in his -Institutions, composed during the sitting of the French Convention, -1793), "je ne connais que le juste et l'injuste: ces mots sont -entendus par toutes les consciences. Il faut ramener toutes les -définitions à la conscience: l'esprit est un sophiste qui conduit les -vertus à l'échafaud." (Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution -Française, t. xxxv. p. 277.) This is very much the language which -honest and vehement [Greek: i)diô=tai] of Athens would hold towards -Sokrates and Plato.] - -[Side-note: Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental -condition by Sokrates--position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to -it.] - -As the Platonic Sokrates here puts it in the Euthyphron--all men agree -that the person who acts unjustly must be punished; but they dispute -very much _who it is_ that acts unjustly--_which_ of his actions are -unjust--or under _what_ circumstances they are so. The emotion in each -man's mind, as well as the word by which it is expressed, is the -same:[42] but the person, or the acts, to which it is applied by each, -although partly the same, are often so different, and sometimes so -opposite, as to occasion violent dispute. There is subjective -agreement, with objective disagreement. It is upon this disconformity -that the Sokratic cross-examination is brought to bear, making his -hearers feel its existence, for the first time, and dispelling their -fancy of supposed knowledge as well as of supposed unanimity. Sokrates -required them to define the general word--to assign some common -objective characteristic, corresponding in all cases to the common -subjective feeling represented by the word. But no man could comply -with his requirement, nor could he himself comply with it, any more -than his respondents. So far Sokrates proceeded, and no farther, -according to Aristotle. He never altogether lost his hold on -particulars: he assumed that there must be something common to them -all, if you could but find out what it was, constituting the objective -meaning of the general term. Plato made a step beyond him, though -under the name of Sokrates as spokesman. Not being able (any more than -Sokrates) to discover or specify any real objective characteristic, -common to all the particulars--he objectivised[43] the word itself: -that is, he assumed or imagined a new objective Ens of his own, the -Platonic Idea, corresponding to the general word: an idea not common -to the particulars, but existing apart from them in a sphere of its -own--yet nevertheless lending itself in some inexplicable way to be -participated by all the particulars. It was only in this way that -Plato could explain to himself how knowledge was possible: this -universal Ens being the only object of knowledge: particulars being an -indefinite variety of fleeting appearances, and as such in themselves -unknowable. The imagination of Plato created a new world of Forms, -Ideas, Concepts, or objects corresponding to general terms: which he -represents as the only objects of knowledge, and as the only -realities. - -[Footnote 42: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 8, C-D, Euripides, Phoenissæ, -499-- - -[Greek: ei) pa=si tau)to\ kalo\n e)/phu, sopho/n th' a)/ma, -ou)k ê)=n a)\n a)mphilekto\s a)nthrô/pois e)/ris; -nu=n d' ou)th' o(/moion ou)de\n ou)/t' i)/son bro/tois, -plê\n o)noma/sai; to\ d' e)/rgon ou)k e)/stin to/de]. - -Hobbes expresses, in the following terms, this fact of subjective -similarity co-existent with great objective dissimilarity among -mankind. - -"For the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the -thoughts and passions of another, whoever looketh into himself and -considereth what he does when he does _think_, _opine_, _reason_, -_hope_, _fear_, &c., and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and -know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like -occasions. I say the similitude of _passions_, which are the same in -all men, _desire_, _fear_, _hope_, &c., not the similitude of the -_objects_ of the passions, which are the things _desired_, _feared_, -_hoped_, &c., for these the constitution individual, and particular -education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our -knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded -as they are with lying, dissembling, counterfeiting, and erroneous -doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts." -Introduction to Leviathan.] - -[Footnote 43: Aristot. Metaphys. M. 1078, b. 30, 1086, b. 4.] - -[Side-note: The Holy--it has an essential characteristic--what is -this?--not the fact that it is loved by the Gods--this is true, but is -not its constituent essence.] - -In the Euthyphron, however, we have not yet passed into this Platonic -world, of self-existent Forms--objects of conception--concepts -detached from sensible particulars. We are still with Sokrates and -with ordinary men among the world of particulars, only that Sokrates -introduced a new mode of looking at all the particulars, and searched -among them for some common feature which he did not find. The Holy -(and the Unholy) is a word freely pronounced by every speaker, and -familiarly understood by every hearer, as if it denoted something one -and the same in all these particulars.[44] What is that something--the -common essence or idea? Euthyphron cannot tell; though he agrees with -Sokrates that there must be such essence. His attempts to explain it -prove failures. - -[Footnote 44: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 D, 6 E.] - -The definition of the Holy--that it is what the Gods love--is -suggested in this dialogue, but rejected. The Holy is not Holy because -the Gods love it: on the contrary, its holiness is an independent -fact, and the Gods love it because it is Holy. The Holy is thus an -essence, _per se_, common to, or partaken by, all holy persons and -things. - -[Side-note: Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the -Holy--different from those of the Platonic Sokrates--he disallows any -common absolute general type of the Holy--he recognises an indefinite -variety of types, discordant and relative.] - -So at least the Platonic Sokrates here regards it. But the Xenophontic -Sokrates, if we can trust the Memorabilia, would not have concurred in -this view: for we read that upon all points connected with piety or -religious observance, he followed the precept which the Pythian -priestess delivered as an answer to all who consulted the Delphian -oracle on similar questions--You will act piously by conforming to the -law of the city. Sokrates (we are told) not only acted upon this -precept himself, but advised his friends to do the like, and regarded -those who acted otherwise as foolish and over-subtle triflers.[45] It -is plain that this doctrine disallows all supposition of any general -essence, called the Holy, to be discovered and appealed to, as type in -cases of doubt; and recognises the equal title of many separate local, -discordant, and variable types, each under the sanction of King Nomos. -The procedure of Sokrates in the Euthyphron would not have been -approved by the Xenophontic Sokrates. It is in the spirit of Plato, -and is an instance of that disposition which he manifests yet more -strongly in the Republic and elsewhere, to look for his supreme -authority in philosophical theory and not in the constituted societies -around him: thus to innovate in matters religious as well as -political--a reproach to him among his own contemporaries, an honour -to him among various subsequent Christian writers. Plato, not -conforming to any one of the modes of religious belief actually -prevalent in his contemporary world, postulates a canon, suitable to -the exigencies of his own mind, of that which the Gods ought to love -and must love. In this respect, as in others, he is in marked contrast -with Herodotus--a large observer of mankind, very pious in his own -way, curious in comparing the actual practices consecrated among -different nations, but not pretending to supersede them by any canon -of his own. - -[Footnote 45: Compare Xen. Mem. i. 3, 1. [Greek: ê(/ te ga\r Puthi/a -no/mô| po/leôs a)nairei= poiou=ntas eu)sebô=s a)\n poiei=n; Sôkra/tês -te ou(/tôs kai\ au)to\s e)poi/ei kai\ toi=s a)/llois parê/|nei, tou\s -de\ a)/llôs pôs poiou=ntas perie/rgous kai\ matai/ous e)no/mizen -ei)=nai.]] - -[Side-note: The Holy a branch of the Just--not tenable as a -definition, but useful as bringing to view the subordination of -logical terms.] - -Though the Holy, and the Unholy, are pronounced to be each an essence, -partaken of by all the particulars so-called; yet what that essence -is, the dialogue Euthyphron noway determines. Even the suggestion of -Sokrates--that the Holy is a branch of the Just, only requiring to be -distinguished by some assignable mark from the other branches of the -Just--is of no avail, since the Just itself had been previously -declared to be one of the matters in perpetual dispute. It procures -for Sokrates however the opportunity of illustrating the logical -subordination of terms; the less general comprehended in the more -general, and requiring to be parted off by some _differentia_ from the -rest of what this latter comprehends. Plato illustrates the matter at -some length;[46] and apparently with a marked purpose of drawing -attention to it. We must keep in mind, that logical distinctions had -at that time received neither special attention nor special -names--however they may have been unconsciously followed in practice. - -[Footnote 46: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 12.] - -[Side-note: The Euthyphron represents Plato's way of replying to the -charge of impiety, preferred by Melêtus against Sokrates--comparison -with Xenophon's way of replying.] - -What I remarked about the Kriton, appears to me also true about the -Euthyphron. It represents Plato's manner of replying to the charge of -impiety advanced by Melêtus and his friends against Sokrates, just as -the four first chapters of the Memorabilia represent Xenophon's manner -of repelling the same charge. Xenophon joins issue with the -accusers,--describes the language and proceedings of Sokrates, so as to -show that he was orthodox and pious, above the measure of ordinary men, in -conduct, in ritual, and in language; and expresses his surprise that -against such a man the verdict of guilty could have been returned by -the Dikasts.[47] Plato handles the charge in the way in which Sokrates -himself would have handled it, if he had been commenting on the same -accusation against another person and as he does in fact deal with -Melêtus, in the Platonic Apology. Plato introduces Euthyphron, a very -religious man, who prides himself upon being forward to prosecute -impiety in whomsoever it is found, and who in this case, under the -special promptings of piety, has entered a capital prosecution against -his own father.[48] The occasion is here favourable to the Sokratic -interrogatories, applicable to Melêtus no less than to Euthyphron. "Of -course, before you took this grave step, you have assured yourself -that you are right, and that you know what piety and impiety are. Pray -tell me, for I am ignorant on the subject: that I may know better and -do better for the future.[49] Tell me, what is the characteristic -essence of piety as well as impiety?" It turns out that the accuser -can make no satisfactory answer: that he involves himself in confusion -and contradiction:--that he has brought capital indictments against -citizens, without having ever studied or appreciated the offence with -which he charges them. Such is the manner in which the Platonic -Sokrates is made to deal with Euthyphron, and in which the real -Sokrates deals with Melêtus:[50] rendering the questions instrumental -to two larger purposes--first, to his habitual crusade against the -false persuasion of knowledge--next, to the administering of a logical -or dialectical lesson. When we come to the Treatise De Legibus (where -Sokrates does not appear) we shall find Plato adopting the dogmatic -and sermonising manner of the first chapters of the Xenophontic -Memorabilia. Here, in the Euthyphron and in the Dialogues of Search -generally, the Platonic Sokrates is something entirely different.[51] - -[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 4; also iv. 8, 11.] - -[Footnote 48: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 E.] - -[Footnote 49: Compare, even in Xenophon, the conversation of Sokrates -with Kritias and Chariklês--Memorab. i. 2, 32-38: and his -cross-examination of the presumptuous youth Glaukon, Plato's -brother (Mem. iii. 7).] - -[Footnote 50: Plato, Apol. c. 11, p. 24 C. [Greek: a)dikei=n phêmi\ -Me/lêton, o(/ti spoudê=| charienti/zetai, r(a|di/ôs ei)s a)gô=nas -kathista\s a)nthrô/pous], &c.] - -[Footnote 51: Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 199) agrees with the opinion -of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, that the Euthyphron was composed and -published during the interval between the lodging of the indictment -and the trial of Sokrates. K. F. Hermann considers it as posterior to -the death of Sokrates. - -I concur on this point with Hermann. Indeed I have already given my -opinion, that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed before -the death of Sokrates.] - - - - -END OF VOL. I. - - - -************************************* -Transcriber's Note - -The text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive. - -For the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used: -) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute -accent; \ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript. -ch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta; -ê for eta and ô for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases. - -Corrections to the text, indicated in text with **: - -Location Text of scan of 3rd edition Correction -Ch. 1, after fn. 47 devination divination -Ch. 1, fn. 119 Kosmichen Kosmischen -Ch. 1, fn. 146 mizta mixta -Ch. 1, fn. 146 front fronte -Ch. 1, fn. 164 & 8, -Ch. 1, fn. 164 perie/chno perie/chon -Ch. 1, fn. 214 2d 2nd. -Ch. 2, after fn. 21 ultra phenomenal ultra-phenomenal -Ch. 3, fn. 40 Taüschung Täuschung -Ch. 3, fn. 64 vol. iii. vol. ii. -Ch. 3, fn. 66 art act -Ch. 3, fn. 185 Dion. Diog. -Ch. 3, fn. 206 okêtê\neu)d eu)dokêtê\n -Ch. 3, fn. 217 xxix. xxiv. -Ch. 4, fn. 1 chap. xxii. chap. xxi. -Ch. 5, fn. 24 de-describes describes -Ch. 6, before fn. 14 blank space 4. -Ch. 6, fn. 39 passed of : passed off: -Ch. 6, fn. 45 the our the four -Ch. 7, 3rd para. Hippias II. Hippias I. -Ch. 7, fn. 8 409 429 -Ch. 7, fn. 8 407 427 -Ch. 7, fn. 13 Herman Hermann -Ch. 8, fn. 92 s. 12, s. 11, - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plato and the Other Companions of -Sokrates, 3rd ed. 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