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diff --git a/40435-0.txt b/40435-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2552681 --- /dev/null +++ b/40435-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,25634 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40435 *** + +PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. + + + +ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS. + + + +PLATO, + +AND THE + +OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. + +BY + +GEORGE GROTE + + + +_A NEW EDITION._ + +IN FOUR VOLUMES. + +VOL. I. + + + +LONDON: + +JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. + +1885. + +_The right of Translation is reserved._ + + + + +ADVERTISEMENT. + +In the present Edition, with a view to the distribution into four +volumes, there is a slight transposition of the author's arrangement. +His concluding chapters (XXXVIII., XXXIX.), entitled "Other Companions +of Sokrates," and "Xenophon," are placed in the First Volume, as +chapters III. and IV. By this means each volume is made up of nearly +related subjects, so as to possess a certain amount of unity. + +Volume First contains the following subjects:--Speculative Philosophy +in Greece before Sokrates; Growth of Dialectic; Other Companions of +Sokrates; Xenophon; Life of Plato; Platonic Canon; Platonic +Compositions generally; Apology of Sokrates; Kriton; Euthyphron. + +Volume Second comprises:--Alkibiades I. and II.; Hippias +Major--Hippias Minor; Hipparchus--Minos; Theages; Erastæ or +Anterastæ--Rivales; Ion; Laches; Charmides; Lysis; Euthydemus; +Menon; Protagoras; Gorgias; Phædon. + +Volume Third:--Phædrus--Symposion; Parmenides; Theætetus; Sophistes; +Politikus; Kratylus; Philebus; Menexenus; Kleitophon. + +Volume Fourth:--Republic; Timæus and Kritias; Leges and Epinomis; +General Index. + +The Volumes may be obtained separately. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +The present work is intended as a sequel and supplement to my History +of Greece. It describes a portion of Hellenic philosophy: it dwells +upon eminent individuals, enquiring, theorising, reasoning, confuting, +&c., as contrasted with those collective political and social +manifestations which form the matter of history, and which the modern +writer gathers from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. + +Both Sokrates and Plato, indeed, are interesting characters in history +as well as in philosophy. Under the former aspect, they were described +by me in my former work as copiously as its general purpose would +allow. But it is impossible to do justice to either of them--above +all, to Plato, with his extreme variety and abundance--except in a +book of which philosophy is the principal subject, and history only +the accessory. + +The names of Plato and Aristotle tower above all others in Grecian +philosophy. Many compositions from both have been preserved, though +only a small proportion of the total number left by Aristotle. Such +preservation must be accounted highly fortunate, when we read in +Diogenes Laertius and others, the long list of works on various topics +of philosophy, now irrecoverably lost, and known by little except +their titles. Respecting a few of them, indeed, we obtain some partial +indications from fragmentary extracts and comments of later critics. +But none of these once celebrated philosophers, except Plato and +Aristotle, can be fairly appreciated upon evidence furnished by +themselves. The Platonic dialogues, besides the extraordinary genius +which they display as compositions, bear thus an increased price (like +the Sibylline books) as the scanty remnants of a lost philosophical +literature, once immense and diversified. + +Under these two points of view, I trust that the copious analysis and +commentary bestowed upon them in the present work will not be +considered as unnecessarily lengthened. I maintain, full and +undiminished, the catalogue of Plato's works as it was inherited from +antiquity and recognised by all critics before the commencement of the +present century. Yet since several subsequent critics have contested +the canon, and set aside as spurious many of the dialogues contained +in it,--I have devoted a chapter to this question, and to the +vindication of the views on which I have proceeded. + +The title of these volumes will sufficiently indicate that I intend to +describe, as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic +philosophy at Athens during the half century immediately following the +death of Sokrates in 399 B.C. My first two chapters do indeed furnish +a brief sketch of Pre-Sokratic philosophy: but I profess to take my +departure from Sokrates himself, and these chapters are inserted +mainly in order that the theories by which he found himself surrounded +may not be altogether unknown. Both here, and in the sixty-ninth +chapter of my History, I have done my best to throw light on the +impressive and eccentric personality of Sokrates: a character original +and unique, to whose peculiar mode of working on other minds I +scarcely know a parallel in history. He was the generator, indirectly +and through others, of a new and abundant crop of compositions--the +"Sokratic dialogues": composed by many different authors, among whom +Plato stands out as unquestionable coryphæus, yet amidst other names +well deserving respectful mention as seconds, companions, or +opponents. + +It is these Sokratic dialogues, and the various companions of Sokrates +from whom they proceeded, that the present work is intended to +exhibit. They form the dramatic manifestation of Hellenic philosophy--as +contrasted with the formal and systematising, afterwards prominent +in Aristotle. + +But the dialogue is a process containing commonly a large +intermixture, often a preponderance, of the negative vein: which was +more abundant and powerful in Sokrates than in any one. In discussing +the Platonic dialogues, I have brought this negative vein into the +foreground. It reposes upon a view of the function and value of +philosophy which is less dwelt upon than it ought to be, and for which +I here briefly prepare the reader. + +Philosophy is, or aims at becoming, reasoned truth: an aggregate of +matters believed or disbelieved after conscious process of examination +gone through by the mind, and capable of being explained to others: +the beliefs being either primary, knowingly assumed as self-evident--or +conclusions resting upon them, after comparison of all relevant +reasons favourable and unfavourable. "Philosophia" (in the words of +Cicero), "ex rationum collatione consistit." This is not the form in +which beliefs or disbeliefs exist with ordinary minds: there has been +no conscious examination--there is no capacity of explaining to +others--there is no distinct setting out of primary truths assumed--nor +have any pains been taken to look out for the relevant reasons on +both sides, and weigh them impartially. Yet the beliefs nevertheless +exist as established facts generated by traditional or other +authority. They are sincere and often earnest, governing men's +declarations and conduct. They represent a cause in which sentence has +been pronounced, or a rule made absolute, without having previously +heard the pleadings.[1] + +[Footnote 1: Napoléon, qui de temps en temps, au milieu de sa fortune +et de sa puissance, songeait à Robespierre et à sa triste +fin--interrogeait un jour son archi-chancelier Cambacérès sur le neuf +Thermidor. "_C'est un procès jugé et non plaidé_," répondait +Cambacérès, avec la finesse d'un jurisconsulte courtisan.--(Hippolyte +Carnot--Notice sur Barère, p. 109; Paris, 1842.)] + +Now it is the purpose of the philosopher, first to bring this omission +of the pleadings into conscious notice--next to discover, evolve, and +bring under hearing the matters omitted, as far as they suggest +themselves to his individual reason. He claims for himself, and he +ought to claim for all others alike, the right of calling for proof +where others believe without proof--of rejecting the received +doctrines, if upon examination the proof given appears to his mind +unsound or insufficient--and of enforcing instead of them any others +which impress themselves upon his mind as true. But the truth which he +tenders for acceptance must of necessity be _reasoned truth_; +supported by proofs, defended by adequate replies against +preconsidered objections from others. Only hereby does it properly +belong to the history of philosophy: hardly even hereby has any such +novelty a chance of being fairly weighed and appreciated. + +When we thus advert to the vocation of philosophy, we see that (to use +the phrase of an acute modern author[2]) it is by necessity polemical: +the assertion of independent reason by individual reasoners, who +dissent from the unreasoning belief which reigns authoritative in the +social atmosphere around them, and who recognise no correction or +refutation except from the counter-reason of others. We see besides, +that these dissenters from the public will also be, probably, more or +less dissenters from each other. The process of philosophy may be +differently performed by two enquirers equally free and sincere, even +of the same age and country: and it is sure to be differently +performed, if they belong to ages and countries widely apart. It is +essentially relative to the individual reasoning mind, and to the +medium by which the reasoner is surrounded. Philosophy herself has +every thing to gain by such dissent; for it is only thereby that the +weak and defective points of each point of view are likely to be +exposed. If unanimity is not attained, at least each of the +dissentients will better understand what he rejects as well as what he +adopts. + +[Footnote 2: Professor Ferrier, in his instructive volume, 'The +Institutes of Metaphysic,' has some valuable remarks on the scope and +purpose of Philosophy. I transcribe some of them, in abridgment. + +(Sections 1-8) "A system of philosophy is bound by two main +requisitions: it ought to be true--and it ought to be reasoned. +Philosophy, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth. Of +these obligations, the latter is the more stringent. It is more proper +that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true: +because, while truth may perhaps be unattainable by man, to reason is +certainly his province and within his power. . . . A system is of the +highest value only when it embraces both these requisitions--that is, +when it is both true, and reasoned. But a system which is reasoned +without being true, is always of higher value than a system which is +true without being reasoned. The latter kind of system is of no value: +because philosophy is the attainment of truth _by the way of reason_. +That is its definition. A system, therefore, which reaches the truth +but not by the way of reason, is not philosophy at all, and has +therefore no scientific worth. Again, an unreasoned philosophy, even +though true, carries no guarantee of its truth. It may be true, but it +cannot be certain. On the other hand, a system, which is reasoned +without being true, has always some value. It creates reason by +exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, though +it may fail to reach it." (Sections 38-41)--"The student will find +that the system here submitted to his attention is of a very polemical +character. Why! Because philosophy exists only to correct the +inadvertencies of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to +fulfil. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not be taught to think +aright. If he is already in possession of the truth, he does not +require to be put in possession of it. The occupation of philosophy is +gone: her office is superfluous. Therefore philosophy assumes and must +assume that man does not naturally think aright, but must be taught to +do so: that truth does not come to him spontaneously, but must be +brought to him by his own exertions. If man does not naturally think +aright, he must think, we shall not say wrongly (for that implies +malice prepense) but inadvertently: the native occupant of his mind +must be, we shall not say falsehood (for that too implies malice +prepense) but error. The original dowry then of universal man is +inadvertency and error. This assumption is the ground and only +justification of the existence of philosophy. The circumstance that +philosophy exists only to put right the oversights of common +thinking--renders her polemical not by choice, but by necessity. She is +controversial as the very tenure and condition of her existence: for +how can she correct the slips of common opinion, the oversights of +natural thinking, except by controverting them?" Professor Ferrier +deserves high commendation for the care taken in this volume to set +out clearly Proposition and Counter-Proposition: the thesis which he +impugns, as well as that which he sustains.] + +The number of individual intellects, independent, inquisitive, and +acute, is always rare everywhere; but was comparatively less rare in +these ages of Greece. The first topic, on which such intellects broke +loose from the common consciousness of the world around them, and +struck out new points of view for themselves, was in reference to the +Kosmos or the Universe. The received belief, of a multitude of unseen +divine persons bringing about by volitions all the different phenomena +of nature, became unsatisfactory to men like Thales, Anaximander, +Parmenides, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras. Each of these volunteers, +following his own independent inspirations, struck out a new +hypothesis, and endeavoured to commend it to others with more or less +of sustaining reason. There appears to have been little of negation or +refutation in their procedure. None of them tried to disprove the +received point of view, or to throw its supporters upon their defence. +Each of them unfolded his own hypothesis, or his own version of +affirmative reasoned truth, for the adoption of those with whom it +might find favour. + +The dialectic age had not yet arrived. When it did arrive, with +Sokrates as its principal champion, the topics of philosophy were +altered, and its process revolutionised. We have often heard repeated +the Ciceronian dictum--that Sokrates brought philosophy down from the +heavens to the earth: from the distant, abstruse, and complicated +phenomena of the Kosmos--in respect to which he adhered to the vulgar +point of view, and even disapproved any enquiries tending to +rationalise it--to the familiar business of man, and the common +generalities of ethics and politics. But what has been less observed +about Sokrates, though not less true, is, that along with this change +of topics he introduced a complete revolution in method. He placed the +negative in the front of his procedure; giving to it a point, an +emphasis, a substantive value, which no one had done before. His +peculiar gift was that of cross-examination, or the application of his +Elenchus to discriminate pretended from real knowledge. He found men +full of confident beliefs on these ethical and political +topics--affirming with words which they had never troubled themselves +to define--and persuaded that they required no farther teaching: yet at +the same time unable to give clear or consistent answers to his +questions, and shown by this convincing test to be destitute of real +knowledge. Declaring this false persuasion of knowledge, or confident +unreasoned belief, to be universal, he undertook, as the mission of +his life, to expose it: and he proclaimed that until the mind was +disabused thereof and made painfully conscious of ignorance, no +affirmative reasoned truth could be presented with any chance of +success. + +Such are the peculiar features of the Sokratic dialogue, exemplified +in the compositions here reviewed. I do not mean that Sokrates always +talked so; but that such was the marked peculiarity which +distinguished his talking from that of others. It is philosophy, or +reasoned truth, approached in the most polemical manner; operative at +first only to discredit the natural, unreasoned intellectual growths +of the ordinary mind, and to generate a painful consciousness of +ignorance. I say this here, and I shall often say it again throughout +these volumes. It is absolutely indispensable to the understanding of +the Platonic dialogues; one half of which must appear unmeaning, +unless construed with reference to this separate function and value of +negative dialectic. Whether readers may themselves agree in such +estimation of negative dialectic, is another question: but they must +keep it in mind as the governing sentiment of Plato during much of his +life, and of Sokrates throughout the whole of life: as being moreover +one main cause of that antipathy which Sokrates inspired to many +respectable orthodox contemporaries. I have thought it right to take +constant account of this orthodox sentiment among the ordinary public, +as the perpetual drag-chain, even when its force is not absolutely +repressive, upon free speculation. + +Proceeding upon this general view, I have interpreted the numerous +negative dialogues in Plato as being really negative and nothing +beyond. I have not presumed, still less tried to divine, an ulterior +Affirmative beyond what the text reveals--neither _arcana coelestia_, +like Proklus and Ficinus,[3] nor any other _arcanum_ of terrestrial +character. While giving such an analysis of each dialogue as my space +permitted and as will enable the reader to comprehend its general +scope and peculiarities--I have studied each as it stands written, and +have rarely ascribed to Plato any purpose exceeding what he himself +intimates. Where I find difficulties forcibly dwelt upon without any +solution, I imagine, not that he had a good solution kept back in his +closet, but that he had failed in finding one: that he thought it +useful, as a portion of the total process necessary for finding and +authenticating reasoned truth, both to work out these unsolved +difficulties for himself, and to force them impressively upon the +attention of others.[4] + +[Footnote 3: F. A. Wolf, Vorrede, Plato, Sympos. p. vi. + +"Ficinus suchte, wie er sich in der Zueignungsschrift seiner Vision +ausdrückt, im Platon allenthalben _arcana coelestia_: und da er sie +in seinem Kopfe mitbrachte, so konnte es ihm nicht sauer werden, +etwas zu finden, was freilich jedem andern verborgen bleiben muss."] + +[Footnote 4: A striking passage from Bentham illustrates very well +both the Sokratic and the Platonic point of view. (Principles of +Morals and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. xvi. p. 57, ed. 1823.) + +"Gross ignorance descries no difficulties. Imperfect knowledge finds +them out and struggles with them. It must be perfect knowledge that +overcomes them." + +Of the three different mental conditions here described, the first is +that against which Sokrates made war, _i.e._ real ignorance, and false +persuasion of knowledge, which therefore descries no difficulties. + +The second, or imperfect knowledge struggling with difficulties, is +represented by the Platonic negative dialogues. + +The third--or perfect knowledge victorious over difficulties--will be +found in the following pages marked by the character [Greek: to\ +du/nasthai lo/gon dido/nai kai\ de/chesthai]. You do not possess "perfect +knowledge," until you are able to answer, with unfaltering promptitude +and consistency, all the questions of a Sokratic cross-examiner--and +to administer effectively the like cross-examination yourself, for the +purpose of testing others. [Greek: O(\lôs de\ sêmei=on tou= ei)do/tos +to\ du/nasthai dida/skein e)/stin.] (Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 981, b. +8.) + +Perfect knowledge, corresponding to this definition, will not be found +manifested in Plato. Instead of it, we note in his latter years the +lawgiver's assumed infallibility.] + +Moreover, I deal with each dialogue as a separate composition. Each +represents the intellectual scope and impulse of a peculiar moment, +which may or may not be in harmony with the rest. Plato would have +protested not less earnestly than Cicero,[5] against those who sought +to foreclose debate, in the grave and arduous struggles for searching +out reasoned truth--and to bind down the free inspirations of his +intellect in one dialogue, by appealing to sentence already pronounced +in another preceding. Of two inconsistent trains of reasoning, both +cannot indeed be true--but both are often useful to be known and +studied: and the philosopher, who professes to master the theory of +his subject, ought not to be a stranger to either. All minds athirst +for reasoned truth will be greatly aided in forming their opinions by +the number of points which Plato suggests, though they find little +which he himself settles for them finally. + +[Footnote 5: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 11, 38. + +The collocutor remarks that what Cicero says is inconsistent with +what he (Cicero) had written in the fourth book De Finibus. +To which Cicero replies:-- + +"Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum, et testificaris, quid +dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus +impositis disputant. Nos in diem vivimus: quodcunque nostros animos +probabilitate percussit, id dicimus: itaque soli sumus liberi."] + +There have been various critics, who, on perceiving inconsistencies in +Plato, either force them into harmony by a subtle exegêsis, or discard +one of them as spurious.[6] I have not followed either course. I +recognise such inconsistencies, when found, as facts--and even as very +interesting facts--in his philosophical character. To the marked +contradiction in the spirit of the Leges, as compared with the earlier +Platonic compositions, I have called special attention. Plato has been +called by Plutarch a mixture of Sokrates with Lykurgus. The two +elements are in reality opposite, predominant at different times: +Plato begins his career with the confessed ignorance and philosophical +negative of Sokrates: he closes it with the peremptory, dictatorial, +affirmative of Lykurgus. + +[Footnote 6: Since the publication of the first edition of this work, +there have appeared valuable commentaries on the philosophy of the +late Sir William Hamilton, by Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. Stirling +and others. They have exposed inconsistencies, both grave and +numerous, in some parts of Sir William Hamilton's writings as compared +with others. But no one has dreamt of drawing an inference from this +fact, that one or other of the inconsistent trains of reasoning must +be spurious, falsely ascribed to Sir William Hamilton. + +Now in the case of Plato, this same fact of inconsistency is accepted +by nearly all his commentators as a sound basis for the inference that +both the inconsistent treatises cannot be genuine: though the dramatic +character of Plato's writings makes inconsistencies much more easily +supposable than in dogmatic treatises such as those of Hamilton.] + +To Xenophon, who belongs only in part to my present work, and whose +character presents an interesting contrast with Plato, I have devoted +a separate chapter. To the other less celebrated Sokratic Companions +also, I have endeavoured to do justice, as far as the scanty means of +knowledge permit: to them, especially, because they have generally +been misconceived and unduly depreciated. + +The present volumes, however, contain only one half of the speculative +activity of Hellas during the fourth century B.C. The second half, in +which Aristotle is the hero, remains still wanting. If my health and +energies continue, I hope one day to be able to supply this want: and +thus to complete from my own point of view, the history, speculative +as well as active, of the Hellenic race, down to the date which I +prescribed to myself in the Preface of my History near twenty years +ago. + +The philosophy of the fourth century B.C. is peculiarly valuable and +interesting, not merely from its intrinsic speculative worth--from the +originality and grandeur of its two principal heroes--from its +coincidence with the full display of dramatic, rhetorical, artistic +genius--but also from a fourth reason not unimportant--because it is +purely Hellenic; preceding the development of Alexandria, and the +amalgamation of Oriental veins of thought with the inspirations of the +Academy or the Lyceum. The Orontes[7] and the Jordan had not yet begun +to flow westward, and to impart their own colour to the waters of +Attica and Latium. Not merely the real world, but also the ideal +world, present to the minds of Plato and Aristotle, were purely +Hellenic. Even during the century immediately following, this had +ceased to be fully true in respect to the philosophers of Athens: and +it became less and less true with each succeeding century. New foreign +centres of rhetoric and literature--Asiatic and Alexandrian +Hellenism--were fostered into importance by regal encouragement. Plato +and Aristotle are thus the special representatives of genuine Hellenic +philosophy. The remarkable intellectual ascendancy acquired by them in +their own day, and maintained over succeeding centuries, was one main +reason why the Hellenic vein was enabled so long to maintain itself, +though in impoverished condition, against adverse influences from the +East, ever increasing in force. Plato and Aristotle outlasted all +their Pagan successors--successors at once less purely Hellenic and +less highly gifted. And when Saint Jerome, near 750 years after the +decease of Plato, commemorated with triumph the victory of unlettered +Christians over the accomplishments and genius of Paganism--he +illustrated the magnitude of the victory, by singling out Plato and +Aristotle as the representatives of vanquished philosophy.[8] + +[Footnote 7: Juvenal iii. 62:-- + +"Jampridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes," &c.] + +[Footnote 8: The passage is a remarkable one, as marking both the +effect produced on a Latin scholar by Hebrew studies, and the neglect +into which even the greatest writers of classical antiquity had then +fallen (about 400 A.D.). + +Hieronymus--Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas, iii. 5, p. 486-487, ed. +Venet. 1769:-- + +"Sed omnem sermonis elegantiam, et Latini sermonis venustatem, stridor +lectionis Hebraicæ sordidavit. Nostis enim et ipsæ" (_i.e._ Paula and +Eustochium, to whom his letter is addressed) "quod plus quam quindecim +anni sunt, ex quo in manus meas nunquam Tullius, nunquam Maro, nunquam +Gentilium literarum quilibet Auctor ascendit: et si quid forte inde, +dum loquimur, obrepit, quasi antiqua per nebulam somnii recordamur. +Quod autem profecerim ex linguæ illius infatigabili studio, aliorum +judicio derelinquo: _ego quid in meâ amiserim, scio_ . . . Si quis +eloquentiam quærit vel declamationibus delectatur, habet in utrâque +linguâ Demosthenem et Tullium, Polemonem et Quintilianum. Ecclesia +Christi non de Academiâ et Lyceo, sed de vili plebeculâ congregata +est. . . . Quotusquisque nunc Aristotelem legit? Quanti Platonis vel +libros novêre vel nomen? Vix in angulis otiosi eos senes recolunt. +Rusticanos vero et piscatores nostros totus orbis loquitur, universus +mundus sonat."] + + + + +CONTENTS. + +PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. + +CHAPTER I. + +Speculative Philosophy in Greece, before and in the time of Sokrates. + + +Change in the political condition of Greece during the life of Plato 1 + +Early Greek mind, satisfied with the belief in polytheistic personal +agents, as the real producing causes of phenomena 2 + +Belief in such agency continued among the general public, even after +the various sects of philosophy had arisen 3 + +Thales, the first Greek who propounded the hypothesis of physical +agency in place of personal. Water, the primordial substance, or +[Greek: a)rchê/] 4 + +Anaximander--laid down as [Greek: a)rchê/] the Infinite or +Indeterminate--generation of the elements out of it, by evolution of +latent, fundamental contraries--astronomical and geological doctrines +_ib._ + +Anaximenes--adopted Air as [Greek: a)rchê/]--rise of substances out of +it, by condensation and rarefaction 7 + +Pythagoras--his life and career--Pythagorean brotherhood--great +political influence which it acquired among the Greco-Italian +cities--incurred great enmity, and was violently put down 8 + +The Pythagoreans continue as a recluse sect, without political power 9 + +Doctrine of the Pythagoreans--Number the Essence of Things _ib._ + +The Monas--[Greek: a)rchê/], or principle of Number--geometrical +conception of number--symbolical attributes of the first ten numbers, +especially of the Dekad 11 + +Pythagorean Kosmos and Astronomy--geometrical and harmonic laws +guiding the movements of the cosmical bodies 12 + +Music of the Spheres 14 + +Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries--Ten opposing pairs _ib._ + +Eleatic philosophy--Xenophanes 16 + +His censures upon the received Theogony and religious rites _ib._ + +His doctrine of Pankosmism; or Pantheism--the whole Kosmos is Ens Unum +or God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pan]. Non-Ens inadmissible 17 + +Scepticism of Xenophanes--complaint of philosophy as unsatisfactory 18 + +His conjectures on physics and astronomy _ib._ + +Parmenides continues the doctrine of Xenophanes--Ens Parmenideum, +self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, extended--Non-Ens, an unmeaning +phrase 19 + +He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and relative, apart from +Ens 20 + +Parmenidean ontology--stands completely apart from phenomenology 21 + +Parmenidean phenomenology--relative and variable 23 + +Parmenides recognises no truth, but more or less of probability, in +phenomenal explanations.--His physical and astronomical conjectures 24 + +Herakleitus--his obscure style, impressive metaphors, confident and +contemptuous dogmatism 26 + +Doctrine of Herakleitus--perpetual process of generation and +destruction--everything flows, nothing stands--transition of the +elements into each other backwards and forwards 27 + +Variety of metaphors employed by Herakleitus, signifying the same +general doctrine 28 + +Nothing permanent except the law of process and implication of +contraries--the transmutative force. Fixity of particulars is an +illusion for the most part: so far as it exists, it is a sin against +the order of Nature 29 + +Illustrations by which Herakleitus symbolized his perpetual force, +destroying and generating 30 + +Water--Intermediate between Fire (Air) and Earth 31 + +Sun and Stars--not solid bodies, but meteoric aggregations dissipated +and renewed--Eclipses--[Greek: e)kpu/rôsis], or destruction of the +Kosmos by fire 32 + +His doctrines respecting the human soul and human knowledge. All +wisdom resided in the Universal Reason--individual Reason is +worthless 34 + +By Universal Reason, he did not mean the Reason of most men as it is, +but as it ought to be 35 + +Herakleitus at the opposite pole from Parmenides 37 + +Empedokles--his doctrine of the four elements and two moving or +restraining forces _ib._ + +Construction of the Kosmos from these elements and forces--action and +counteraction of love and enmity. The Kosmos alternately made and +unmade 38 + +Empedoklean predestined cycle of things--complete empire of Love +Sphærus--Empire of Enmity--disengagement or separation of the +elements--astronomy and meteorology 39 + +Formation of the Earth, of Gods, men, animals, and plants 41 + +Physiology of Empedokles--Procreation--Respiration--movement of the +blood 43 + +Doctrine of effluvia and pores--explanation of +perceptions--intercommunication of the elements with the sentient +subject--like acting upon like 44 + +Sense of vision 45 + +Senses of hearing, smell, taste 46 + +Empedokles declared that justice absolutely forbade the killing of +anything that had life. His belief in the metempsychosis. Sufferings +of life, are an expiation for wrong done during an antecedent life. +Pretensions to magical power 46 + +Complaint of Empedokles on the impossibility of finding out truth 47 + +Theory of Anaxagoras denied--generation and destruction--recognised +only mixture and severance of pre-existing kinds of matter 48 + +Homoeomeries--small particles of diverse kinds of matter, all mixed +together _ib._ + +First condition of things all--the primordial varieties of matter were +huddled together in confusion. [Greek: Nou=s] or reason, distinct from +all of them, supervened and acted upon this confused mass, setting the +constituent particles in movement 49 + +Movement of rotation in the mass, originated by [Greek: Nou=s] on a +small scale, but gradually extending itself. Like particles congregate +together--distinguishable aggregates are formed 50 + +Nothing (except [Greek: Nou=s]) can be entirely pure or unmixed; but +other things may be comparatively pure. Flesh, Bone, &c., are purer +than Air or Earth 51 + +Theory of Anaxagoras, compared with that of Empedokles 52 + +Suggested partly by the phenomena of of animal nutrition 53 + +Chaos common to both Empedokles and Anaxagoras: moving agency, +different in one from the other theory 54 + +[Greek: Nou=s], or mind, postulated by Anaxagoras--how understood by +later writers--how intended by Anaxagoras himself _ib._ + +Plato and Aristotle blame Anaxagoras for deserting his own theory 56 + +Astronomy and physics of Anaxagoras 57 + +His geology, meteorology, physiology 58 + +The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and impious 59 + +Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element 60 + +Air was the primordial, universal element 61 + +Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was eminently +modifiable _ib._ + +Physiology of Diogenes--his description of the veins in the human +body 62 + +Kosmology and Meteorology 64 + +Leukippus and Demokritus--Atomic theory 65 + +Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions, of Demokritus +_ib._ + +Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of Parmenides 66 + +Demokritean theory--Atoms Plena and Vacua--Ens and Non-Ens 67 + +Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, position, and +arrangement--they had no qualities, but their movements and +combinations generated qualities 69 + +Combination of atoms--generating different qualities in the compound 70 + +All atoms essentially separate from each other 71 + +All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, were phenomenal +and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no knowledge of the +real and absolute _ib._ + +Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little of it was +attainable 72 + +No separate force required to set the atoms in motion--they moved by +an inherent force of their own. Like atoms naturally tend towards +like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the Kosmos 72 + +Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal generation 75 + +His account of mind--he identified it with heat or fire, diffused +throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental particles +intermingled throughout all frame with corporeal particles _ib._ + +Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body 76 + +Explanation of different sensations and perceptions. Colours 77 + +Vision caused by the outflow of effluvia or images from objects. +Hearing 78 + +Difference of tastes--how explained _ib._ + +Thought or intelligence--was produced by influx of atoms from without 79 + +Sensation, obscure knowledge relative to the sentient: Thought, +genuine knowledge--absolute, or object _per se_ 80 + +Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which determined the +tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c. 81 + +Universality of Demokritus--his ethical views 82 + + +CHAPTER II. + + +General Remarks on the Earlier Philosophers--Growth of Dialectic--Zeno +and Gorgias. + +Variety of sects and theories--multiplicity of individual authorities +is the characteristic of Greek philosophy 84 + +These early theorists are not known from their own writings, which +have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about them 85 + +Abundance of speculative genius and invention--a memorable fact in the +Hellenic mind 86 + +Difficulties which a Grecian philosopher had to overcome--prevalent +view of Nature, established, impressive, and misleading _ib._ + +Views of the Ionic philosophers--compared with the more recent +abstractions of Plato and Aristotle 87 + +Parmenides and Pythagoras--more nearly akin to Plato and Aristotle 89 + +Advantage derived from this variety of constructive imagination among +the Greeks 90 + +All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, Zeno, Plato, +and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of negative +Dialectic 91 + +The early theorists were studied, along with Plato and Aristotle, in +the third and second centuries B.C. 92 + +Negative attribute common to all the early theorists--little or no +dialectic 93 + +Zeno of Elea--Melissus _ib._ + +Zeno's Dialectic--he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, by showing +that their assumptions led to contradictions and absurdities 93 + +Consequences of their assumption of Entia Plura Discontinua. +Reductiones ad absurdum 94 + +Each thing must exist in its own place--Grain of millet not sonorous 95 + +Zenonian arguments in regard to motion 97 + +General purpose and result of the Zenonian Dialectic. Nothing is +knowable except the relative 98 + +Mistake of supposing Zeno's _reductiones ad absurdum_ of an opponent's +doctrine, to be contradictions of data generalized from experience 99 + +Zenonian Dialectic--Platonic Parmenides 100 + +Views of historians of philosophy, respecting Zeno 101 + +Absolute and relative--the first, unknowable _ib._ + +Zeno did not deny motion, as a fact, phenomenal and relative 102 + +Gorgias the Leontine--did not admit the Absolute, even as conceived by +Parmenides 103 + +His reasonings against the Absolute, either as Ens or Entia _ib._ + +Ens, incogitable and unknowable 104 + +Ens, even if granted to be knowable, is still incommunicable to others +_ib._ + +Zeno and Gorgias--contrasted with the earlier Grecian philosophers 105 + +New character of Grecian philosophy--antithesis of affirmative and +negative--proof and disproof _ib._ + + +CHAPTER III. + + +Other Companions of Sokrates. + +Influence exercised by Sokrates over his companions 110 + +Names of those companions 111 + +Æschines--Oration of Lysias against him 112 + +Written Sokratic Dialogues--their general character 114 + +Relations between the companions of Sokrates--Their proceedings after +the death of Sokrates 116 + +No Sokratic school--each of the companions took a line of his own 117 + +Eukleides of Megara--he blended Parmenides with Sokrates 118 + +Doctrine of Eukleides about _Bonum_ 119 + +The doctrine compared to that of Plato--changes in Plato _ib._ + +Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as Eukleides 120 + +Megaric succession of philosophers. Eleian or Eretrian succession 121 + +Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus--Ethical, not transcendental 122 + +Preponderance of the negative vein in the Platonic age 123 + +Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the negative +vein _ib._ + +Negative method in philosophy essential to the controul of the +affirmative _ib._ + +Sokrates--the most persevering and acute Eristic of his age 124 + +Platonic Parmenides--its extreme negative character 125 + +The Megarics shared the negative impulse with Sokrates and Plato 126 + +Eubulides--his logical problems or puzzles--difficulty of solving +them--many solutions attempted 128 + +Real character of the Megaric sophisms, not calculated to deceive, but +to guard against deception 129 + +If the process of theorising be admissible, it must include negative +as well as affirmative 130 + +Logical position of the Megaric philosophers erroneously described by +historians of philosophy. Necessity of a complete collection of +difficulties 131 + +Sophisms propounded by Eubulides. 1. Mentiens. 2. The Veiled Man. 3. +Sorites. 4. Cornutus 133 + +Causes of error constant--The Megarics were sentinels against them 135 + +Controversy of the Megarics with Aristotle about Power. Arguments of +Aristotle _ib._ + +These arguments not valid against the Megarici 136 + +His argument cited and criticised 137 + +Potential as distinguished from the Actual--What it is 139 + +Diodôrus Kronus--his doctrine about [Greek: to\ dunato/n] 140 + +Sophism of Diodôrus [Greek: O( Kurieu/ôn] 141 + +Question between Aristotle and Diodôrus, depends upon whether +universal regularity of sequence be admitted or denied _ib._ + +Conclusion of Diodôrus defended by Hobbes--Explanation given by +Hobbes 143 + +Reasonings of Diodôrus--respecting Hypothetical +Propositions--respecting Motion. His difficulties about the _Now_ +of time 145 + +Motion is always present, past, and future 146 + +Stilpon of Megara--His great celebrity 147 + +Menedêmus and the Eretriacs 148 + +Open speech and licence of censure assumed by Menedêmus 149 + +Antisthenes took up Ethics principally, but with negative Logic +intermingled _ib._ + +He copied the manner of life of Sokrates, in plainness and rigour 150 + +Doctrines of Antisthenes exclusively ethical and ascetic. He despised +music, literature, and physics 151 + +Constant friendship of Antisthenes with Sokrates--Xenophontic +Symposion 152 + +Diogenes, successor of Antisthenes--His Cynical perfection--striking +effect which he produced _ib._ + +Doctrines and smart sayings of Diogenes--Contempt of +pleasure--training and labour required--indifference to literature +and geometry 154 + +Admiration of Epiktêtus for Diogenes, especially for his consistency +in acting out his own ethical creed 157 + +Admiration excited by the asceticism of the Cynics--Asceticism extreme +in the East. Comparison of the Indian Gymnosophists with Diogenes +_ib._ + +The precepts and principles laid down by Sokrates were carried into +fullest execution by the Cynics 160 + +Antithesis between Nature and Law or Convention insisted on by the +Indian Gymnosophists 162 + +The Greek Cynics--an order of ascetic or mendicant friars 163 + +Logical views of Antisthenes and Diogenes--they opposed the Platonic +Ideas _ib._ + +First protest of Nominalism against Realism 164 + +Doctrine of Antisthenes about predication--He admits no other +predication but identical 165 + +The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of Aristotle 166 + +Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental predication 167 + +Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could belong to +more than one subject 169 + +Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenides _ib._ + +Menedêmus disallowed all negative predications 170 + +Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and complex +objects. Simple objects undefinable 171 + +Remarks of Plato on this doctrine 172 + +Remarks of Aristotle upon the same _ib._ + +Later Grecian Cynics--Monimus--Krates--Hipparchia 173 + +Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus 174 + +Aristippus--life, character, and doctrine 175 + +Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus _ib._ + +Choice of Hêraklês 177 + +Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting Good and +Evil _ib._ + +Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates 178 + +Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus--Kalliklês in Platonic +Gorgias 179 + +Language held by Aristippus--his scheme of life 181 + +Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the character of +the hearer 182 + +Conversation between Sokrates and Aristippus about the Good and +Beautiful 184 + +Remarks on the conversation--Theory of Good 185 + +Good is relative to human beings and wants in the view of Sokrates +_ib._ + +Aristippus adhered to the doctrine of Sokrates 186 + +Life and dicta of Aristippus--His type of character _ib._ + +Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates 187 + +Self mastery and independence--the great aspiration of Aristippus 188 + +Aristippus compared with Antisthenes and Diogenes--Points of agreement +and disagreement between them 190 + +Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and philosophy--contempt for other +studies 192 + +Aristippus taught as a Sophist. His reputation thus acquired procured +for him the attentions of Dionysius and others 193 + +Ethical theory of Aristippus and the Kyrenaic philosophers 195 + +Prudence--good, by reason of the pleasure which it ensured, and of the +pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and honourable, by law or +custom--not by nature 197 + +Their logical theory--nothing knowable except the phenomenal, our own +sensations and feelings--no knowledge of the absolute 197 + +Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus passed to the Stoics and +Epikureans 198 + +Ethical theory of Aristippus is identical with that of the Platonic +Sokrates in the Protagoras 199 + +Difference in the manner of stating the theory by the two 200 + +Distinction to be made between a general theory--and the particular +application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes and +circumstances 201 + +Kyrenaic theorists after Aristippus 202 + +Theodôrus--Annikeris--Hegesias _ib._ + +Hegesias--Low estimation of life--renunciation of +pleasure--coincidence with the Cynics 203 + +Doctrine of Relativity affirmed by the Kyrenaics, as well as by +Protagoras 204 + + +CHAPTER IV. + + +Xenophon. + + +Xenophon--his character--essentially a man of action and not a +theorist--the Sokratic element is in him an accessory 206 + +Date of Xenophon--probable year of his birth 207 + +His personal history--He consults Sokrates--takes the opinion of the +Delphian oracle 208 + +His service and command with the Ten Thousand Greeks, afterwards under +Agesilaus and the Spartans.--He is banished from Athens 209 + +His residence at Skillus near Olympia 210 + +Family of Xenophon--his son Gryllus killed at Mantineia _ib._ + +Death of Xenophon at Corinth--Story of the Eleian Exegetæ 211 + +Xenophon different from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren 212 + +His various works--Memorabilia, Oekonomikus, &c. 213 + +Ischomachus, hero of the Oekonomikus--ideal of an active citizen, +cultivator, husband, house-master, &c. 214 + +Text upon which Xenophon insists--capital difference between command +over subordinates willing and subordinates unwilling 215 + +Probable circumstances generating these reflections in Xenophon's +mind 215 + +This text affords subjects for the Hieron and Cyropædia--Name of +Sokrates not suitable 216 + +Hieron--Persons of the dialogue--Simonides and Hieron _ib._ + +Questions put to Hieron, view taken by Simonides. Answer of Hieron 217 + +Misery of governing unwilling subjects declared by Hieron 218 + +Advice to Hieron by Simonides--that he should govern well, and thus +make himself beloved by his subjects 219 + +Probable experience had by Xenophon of the feelings at Olympia against +Dionysius 220 + +Xenophon could not have chosen a Grecian despot to illustrate his +theory of the happiness of governing willing subjects 222 + +Cyropædia--blending of Spartan and Persian customs--Xenophon's +experience of Cyrus the Younger _ib._ + +Portrait of Cyrus the Great--his education--Preface to the Cyropædia 223 + +Xenophon does not solve his own problem--The governing aptitude and +popularity of Cyrus come from nature, not from education 225 + +Views of Xenophon about public and official training of all citizens 226 + +Details of (so called) Persian education--Severe +discipline--Distribution of four ages 227 + +Evidence of the good effect of this discipline--Hard and dry condition +of the body 228 + +Exemplary obedience of Cyrus to the public discipline--He had learnt +justice well--His award about the two coats--Lesson inculcated upon +him by the Justice-Master 229 + +Xenophon's conception of the Sokratic problems--He does not recognise +the Sokratic order of solution of those problems 230 + +Definition given by Sokrates of Justice--Insufficient to satisfy the +exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus 231 + +Biography of Cyrus--constant military success earned by suitable +qualities--Variety of characters and situations 232 + +Generous and amiable qualities of Cyrus. Abradates and Pantheia 233 + +Scheme of government devised by Cyrus when his conquests are +completed--Oriental despotism, wisely arranged 234 + +Persian present reality--is described by Xenophon as thoroughly +depraved, in striking contrast to the establishment of Cyrus 236 + +Xenophon has good experience of military and equestrian +proceedings--No experience of finance and commerce 236 + +Discourse of Xenophon on Athenian finance and the condition of Athens. +His admiration of active commerce and variety of pursuits _ib._ + +Recognised poverty among the citizens. Plan for improvement 238 + +Advantage of a large number of Metics. How these may be encouraged +_ib._ + +Proposal to raise by voluntary contributions a large sum to be +employed as capital by the city. Distribution of three oboli per head +per day to all the citizens _ib._ + +Purpose and principle of this distribution 240 + +Visionary anticipations of Xenophon, financial and commercial 241 + +Xenophon exhorts his countrymen to maintain peace 243 + +Difference of the latest compositions of Xenophon and Plato, from +their point of view in the earlier 244 + + +CHAPTER V. + + +Life of Plato. + + +Scanty information about Plato's life 246 + +His birth, parentage, and early education 247 + +Early relations of Plato with Sokrates 248 + +Plato's youth--service as a citizen and soldier 249 + +Period of political ambition 251 + +He becomes disgusted with politics 252 + +He retires from Athens after the death of Sokrates--his travels 253 + +His permanent establishment at Athens--386 B.C. _ib._ + +He commences his teaching at the Academy 254 + +Plato as a teacher--pupils numerous and wealthy, from different +cities 255 + +Visit of Plato to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse, 367 B.C. Second +visit to the same--mortifying failure 258 + +Expedition of Dion against Dionysius--sympathies of Plato and the +Academy 259 + +Success, misconduct, and death of Dion _ib._ + +Death of Plato, aged 80, 347 B.C. 260 + +Scholars of Plato--Aristotle _ib._ + +Little known about Plato's personal history 262 + + +CHAPTER VI. + + +Platonic Canon, as Recognised by Thrasyllus. + +Platonic Canon--Ancient and modern discussions 264 + +Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its favour 265 + +Fixed residence and school at Athens--founded by Plato and transmitted +to successors _ib._ + +Importance of this foundation. Preservation of Plato's manuscripts. +School library 266 + +Security provided by the school for distinguishing what were Plato's +genuine writings 267 + +Unfinished fragments and preparatory sketches, preserved and published +after Plato's death 268 + +Peripatetic school at the Lykeum--its composition and arrangement 269 + +Peripatetic school library, its removal from Athens to Skêpsis--its +ultimate restitution in a damaged state to Athens, then to Rome 270 + +Inconvenience to the Peripatetic school from the loss of its library +_ib._ + +Advantage to the Platonic school from having preserved its MSS. 272 + +Conditions favourable, for preserving the genuine works of Plato +_ib._ + +Historical facts as to their preservation _ib._ + +Arrangement of them into Trilogies, by Aristophanes 273 + +Aristophanes, librarian at the Alexandrine library _ib._ + +Plato's works in the Alexandrine library, before the time of +Aristophanes 274 + +Kallimachus--predecessor of Aristophanes--his published Tables of +authors whose works were in the library 275 + +Large and rapid accumulation of the Alexandrine Library _ib._ + +Plato's works--in the library at the time of Kallimachus 276 + +First formation of the library--intended as a copy of the Platonic and +Aristotelian [Greek: Mousei=a] at Athens 277 + +Favour of Ptolemy Soter towards the philosophers at Athens 279 + +Demetrius Phalereus--his history and character _ib._ + +He was chief agent in the first establishment of the Alexandrine +Library 280 + +Proceedings of Demetrius in beginning to collect the library 282 + +Certainty that the works of Plato and Aristotle were among the +earliest acquisitions made by him for the library 283 + +Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring good MSS. 285 + +Catalogue of Platonic works, prepared by Aristophanes, is trustworthy +_ib._ + +No canonical or exclusive order of the Platonic dialogues, when +arranged by Aristophanes 286 + +Other libraries and literary centres, besides Alexandria, in which +spurious Platonic works might get footing _ib._ + +Other critics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different arrangements +of the Platonic dialogues 287 + +Panætius, the Stoic--considered the Phædon to be spurious--earliest +known example of a Platonic dialogue disallowed upon internal +grounds 288 + +Classification of Platonic works by the rhetor +Thrasyllus--dramatic--philosophical 289 + +Dramatic principle--Tetralogies _ib._ + +Philosophical principle--Dialogues of Search--Dialogues of +Exposition 291 + +Incongruity and repugnance of the two classifications 294 + +Dramatic principle of classification--was inherited by Thrasyllus from +Aristophanes 295 + +Authority of the Alexandrine library--editions of Plato published, +with the Alexandrine critical marks _ib._ + +Thrasyllus followed the Alexandrine library and Aristophanes, as to +genuine Platonic works 296 + +Ten spurious dialogues, rejected by all other critics as well as by +Thrasyllus--evidence that these critics followed the common authority +of the Alexandrine library 297 + +Thrasyllus did not follow an internal sentiment of his own in +rejecting dialogues as spurious 298 + +Results as to the trustworthiness of the Thrasyllean Canon 299 + + +CHAPTER VII. + + +Platonic Canon, as Appreciated and Modified by Modern Critics. + +The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally acknowledged, by the +Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the succeeding critics after +the revival of learning 301 + +Serranus--his six Syzygies--left the aggregate Canon unchanged, +Tennemann--importance assigned to the Phædrus 302 + +Schleiermacher--new theory about the purposes of Plato. One +philosophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the beginning--essential +order and interdependence of the dialogues, as contributing to the +full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not constituent items in +the series, but lying alongside of it. Order of arrangement 303 + +Theory of Ast--he denies the reality of any preconceived +scheme--considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas 304 + +His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen dialogues as +genuine, rejecting all the rest 305 + +Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme--his arrangement +of the dialogues, differing from both Ast and Schleiermacher--he +rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias, with +many others 306 + +Schleiermacher and Ast both consider Phædrus and Protagoras as early +compositions--Socher puts Protagoras into the second period, Phædrus +into the third 307 + +K. F. Hermann--Stallbaum--both of them consider the Phædrus as a late +dialogue--both of them deny preconceived order and system--their +arrangements of the dialogues--they admit new and varying +philosophical points of view _ib._ + +They reject several dialogues 309 + +Steinhart--agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's fundamental +postulate--his arrangement of the dialogues--considers the Phædrus +as late in order--rejects several _ib._ + +Susemihl--coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hermann--his order of +arrangement 310 + +Edward Munk--adopts a different principle of arrangement, founded upon +the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the life, +philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates--his arrangement, +founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of +composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic +plan 311 + +Views of Ueberweg--attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and +Hermann--admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues, +composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the +earlier 313 + +His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the dialogues, He +rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, Parmenidês: he is +inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus 314 + +Other Platonic critics--great dissensions about scheme and order of +the dialogues 316 + +Contrast of different points of view instructive--but no solution has +been obtained _ib._ + +The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of the theory +propounded by Schleiermacher--slenderness of his proofs 317 + +Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived scheme, and a +peremptory order of interdependence among the dialogues 318 + +Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the Phædrus inadmissible 319 + +Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet produced any +tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic dialogues +_ib._ + +Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most gratuitous, next to +Schleiermacher's 320 + +The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a circumstance of +little moment _ib._ + +No intentional sequence or interdependence of the dialogues can be +made out 322 + +Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is reasonable--successive +changes in Plato's point of view: but we cannot explain either the +order or the causes of these changes _ib._ + +Hermann's view more tenable than Schleiermacher's 323 + +Small number of certainties, or even reasonable presumptions, as to +date or order of the dialogues 324 + +Trilogies indicated by Plato himself 325 + +Positive dates of all the dialogues--unknown 326 + +When did Plato begin to compose? Not till after the death of Sokrates +_ib._ + +Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition--does not consist +with youth of the author 327 + +Reasons founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his relations with +Plato 328 + +Reasons, founded on the early life, character, and position of Plato 330 + +Plato's early life--active by necessity, and to some extent +ambitious 331 + +Plato did not retire from political life until after the restoration +of the democracy, nor devote himself to philosophy until after the +death of Sokrates 333 + +All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one years after +the death of Sokrates 334 + +The Thrasyllean Canon is more worthy of trust than the modern critical +theories by which it has been condemned 335 + +Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed 336 + +Opinions of Schleiermacher, tending to show this 337 + +Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties, and must be +based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to the exclusion +of the rest 339 + + +CHAPTER VIII. + + +Platonic Compositions Generally. + +Variety and abundance visible in Plato's writings 342 + +Plato both sceptical and dogmatical _ib._ + +Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in all 343 + +Form of dialogue--universal to this extent, that Plato never speaks in +his own name 344 + +No one common characteristic pervading all Plato's works _ib._ + +The real Plato was not merely a writer of dialogues, but also lecturer +and president of a school. In this last important function he is +scarcely at all known to us. Notes of his lectures taken by +Aristotle 346 + +Plato's lectures De Bono obscure and transcendental. Effect which they +produced on the auditors 347 + +They were delivered to miscellaneous auditors. They coincide mainly +with what Aristotle states about the Platonic Ideas 348 + +The lectures De Bono may perhaps have been more transcendental than +Plato's other lectures 349 + +Plato's Epistles--in them only he speaks in his own person _ib._ + +Intentional obscurity of his Epistles in reference to philosophical +doctrine 350 + +Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. His anxiety to +confine philosophy to discussion among select and prepared minds 351 + +He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative exposition of his own +philosophical doctrine 352 + +He illustrates his doctrine by the successive stages of geometrical +teaching. Difficulty to avoid the creeping in of error at each of +these stages 353 + +No written exposition can keep clear of these chances of error 355 + +Relations of Plato with Dionysius II. and the friends of the deceased +Dion. Pretensions of Dionysius to understand and expound Plato's +doctrines _ib._ + +Impossibility of teaching by written exposition assumed by Plato; the +assumption intelligible in his day 357 + +Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the expository +process.--Power of sustaining a Sokratic cross-examination 358 + +Plato never published any of the lectures which he delivered at the +Academy _ib._ + +Plato would never publish his philosophical opinions in his own name; +but he may have published them in the dialogues under the name of +others 360 + +Groups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown 361 + +Distribution made by Thrasyllus defective, but still useful--Dialogues +of Search, Dialogues of Exposition _ib._ + +Dialogues of Exposition--present affirmative result. Dialogues of +Search are wanting in that attribute 362 + +The distribution coincides mainly with that of Aristotle--Dialectic, +Demonstrative 363 + +Classification of Thrasyllus in its details. He applies his own +principles erroneously 364 + +The classification, as it would stand, if his principles were applied +correctly 365 + +Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over the +expository and dogmatical 366 + +Dialogues of Search--sub-classes among them recognised by +Thrasyllus--Gymnastic and Agonistic, &c. _ib._ + +Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative teaching, +positive results, direct proofs _ib._ + +The Platonic Dialogues of Search disclaim authority and +teaching--assume truth to be unknown to all alike--follow a process +devious as well as fruitless 367 + +The questioner has no predetermined course, but follows the lead given +by the respondent in his answers _ib._ + +Relation of teacher and learner. Appeal to authority is suppressed 368 + +In the modern world the search for truth is put out of sight. Every +writer or talker professes to have already found it, and to proclaim +it to others 369 + +The search for truth by various interlocutors was a recognised process +in the Sokratic age. Acute negative Dialectic of Sokrates 370 + +Negative procedure supposed to be represented by the Sophists and the +Megarici; discouraged and censured by historians of philosophy 371 + +Vocation of Sokrates and Plato for the negative procedure: absolute +necessity of it as a condition of reasoned truth. Parmenidês of +Plato 372 + +Sokrates considered the negative procedure to be valuable by itself, +and separately. His theory of the natural state of the human mind; not +ignorance, but false persuasion of knowledge 373 + +Declaration of Sokrates in the Apology; his constant mission to make +war against the false persuasion of knowledge 374 + +Opposition of feeling between Sokrates and the Dikasts 375 + +The Dialogues of Search present an end in themselves. Mistake of +supposing that Plato had in his mind an ulterior affirmative end, not +declared _ib._ + +False persuasion of knowledge--had reference to topics social, +political, ethical 376 + +To those topics, on which each community possesses established dogmas, +laws, customs, sentiments, consecrated and traditional, peculiar to +itself. The local creed, which is never formally proclaimed or taught, +but is enforced unconsciously by every one upon every one else. +Omnipotence of King Nomos 377 + +Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not yield to +the established orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own +judgment 382 + +Early appearance of a few free-judging individuals, or free-thinkers +in Greece 384 + +Rise of Dialectic--Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery 386 + +Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social topics by +Sokrates _ib._ + +Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the right of satisfaction for his +own individual reason 386 + +Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure of Sokrates. +Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs peculiarly +to the Sophists and the Megarici 387 + +The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring against the +Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates. They +represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual with an orthodox +public 388 + +Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme publicity of +speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of knowledge is +universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating Plato's +Dialogues of Search 393 + +Result called _Knowledge_, which Plato aspires to. Power of going +through a Sokratic cross-examination; not attainable except through +the Platonic process and method 396 + +Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics--man and society 397 + +Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties which he has +raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him completely +distinct. His dogmas are enunciations _à priori_ of some impressive +sentiment 399 + +Hypothesis--that Plato had solved all his own difficulties for +himself; but that he communicated the solution only to a few select +auditors in oral lectures--Untenable 401 + +Characteristic of the oral lectures--that they were delivered in +Plato's own name. In what other respects they departed from the +dialogues, we cannot say 402 + +Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the process of search +and debate _per se_. Protracted enquiry is a valuable privilege, not a +tiresome obligation 403 + +Plato has done more than any one else to make the process of enquiry +interesting to others, as it was to himself 405 + +Process of generalisation always kept in view and illustrated +throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search--general terms and +propositions made subjects of conscious analysis 406 + +The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by the same +author, illustrating each other, but without assignable +inter-dependence 407 + +Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under separate +review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges, Epinomis last +_ib._ + +Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The intermediate +dialogues present no convincing grounds for any determinate order 408 + + +CHAPTER IX. + + +Apology of Sokrates. + +The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates before the +Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional transformation 410 + +Even if it be Plato's own composition, it comes naturally first in the +review of his dialogues 411 + +General character of the Apology--Sentiments entertained towards +Sokrates at Athens 412 + +Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom of +Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the +citizens generally--The oracle is proved to be true 413 + +False persuasion of wisdom is universal--the God alone is wise 414 + +Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the cross-examining mission imposed +upon him by the God _ib._ + +He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission, and he +intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger 416 + +He disclaims the function of a teacher--he cannot teach, for he is not +wiser than others. He differs from others by being conscious of his +own ignorance _ib._ + +He does not know where competent teachers can be found. He is +perpetually seeking for them, but in vain 417 + +Impression made by the Platonic Apology on Zeno the Stoic 418 + +Extent of efficacious influence claimed by Sokrates for +himself--exemplified by Plato throughout the Dialogues of +Search--Xenophon and Plato enlarge it _ib._ + +Assumption by modern critics, that Sokrates is a positive teacher, +employing indirect methods for the inculcation of theories of his +own 419 + +Incorrectness of such assumption--the Sokratic Elenchus does not +furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the respondent, +stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own 420 + +Value and importance of this process--stimulating active individual +minds to theorise each for itself 421 + +View taken by Sokrates about death. Other men profess to know what it +is, and think it a great misfortune: he does not know 422 + +Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether agreeing or +disagreeing with others 423 + +Formidable efficacy of established public beliefs, generated without +any ostensible author 424 + + +CHAPTER X. + + +Kriton. + +General purpose of the Kriton 425 + +Subject of the dialogue--interlocutors _ib._ + +Answer of Sokrates to the appeal made by Kriton 426 + +He declares that the judgment of the general public is not worthy of +trust: he appeals to the judgment of the one Expert, who is wise on +the matter in debate _ib._ + +Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the question with +Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? Never in any +case to act unjustly 427 + +Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and that most persons +hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point is cardinal +_ib._ + +Pleading supposed to be addressed by the Laws of Athens to Sokrates, +demanding from him implicit obedience 428 + +Purpose of Plato in this pleading--to present the dispositions of +Sokrates in a light different from that which the Apology had +presented--unqualified submission instead of defiance _ib._ + +Harangue of Sokrates delivered in the name of the Laws, would have +been applauded by all the democratical patriots of Athens 430 + +The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with other +citizens, overlooking the specialties of his character 431 + +Still Sokrates is represented as adopting the resolution to obey, from +his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, but which would +not weigh with others _ib._ + +The harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, but +represents feelings common among Athenian citizens 432 + +Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason and +conscience, for the individual himself _ib._ + +The Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference between Rhetoric +and Dialectic 433 + +The Kriton makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but overlooks the +ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be solved _ib._ + +Incompetence of the general public or [Greek: i)diô=tai]--appeal to +the professional Expert 435 + +Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been declared--he does +not name who the trustworthy Expert is _ib._ + +Sokrates acts as the Expert himself: he finds authority in his own +reason and conscience 436 + + +CHAPTER XI + + +Euthyphron. + +Situation supposed in the dialogue--interlocutors 437 + +Indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates--Antipathy of the Athenians +towards those who spread heretical opinions 437 + +Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment for murder +against his own father--Displeasure of his friends at the proceeding +438 + +Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his is both +required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks him--What +is Holiness? 439 + +Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son Kronus and +of Kronus by his son Zeus 440 + +Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these stories of +discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief in them, +as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much circulation +_ib._ + +Bearing of this dialogue on the relative position of Sokrates and the +Athenian public 441 + +Dramatic moral set forth by Aristophanes against Sokrates and the +freethinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox +champion 442 + +Sequel of the dialogue--Euthyphron gives a particular example as the +reply to a general question 444 + +Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion _ib._ + +First general answer given by Euthyphron--that which is pleasing to +the Gods is holy. Comments of Sokrates thereon 445 + +To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the Holy--they love it +because it is holy. In what then does its essence consist? Perplexity +of Euthyphron 446 + +Sokrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or variety of +the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministration by men to the +Gods 447 + +Ministration to the Gods? How? To what purpose? _ib._ + +Holiness--rectitude in sacrifice and prayer--right traffic between men +and the Gods 448 + +This will not stand--the Gods gain nothing--they receive from men +marks of honour and gratitude--they are pleased therewith--the Holy, +therefore, must be that which is pleasing to the Gods 448 + +This is the same explanation which was before declared insufficient. A +fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He breaks off the +dialogue _ib._ + +Sokratic spirit of the dialogue--confessed ignorance applying the +Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge 449 + +The questions always difficult, often impossible to answer. Sokrates +is unable to answer them, though he exposes the bad answers of others +_ib._ + +Objections of Theopompus to the Platonic procedure 450 + +Objective view of Ethics, distinguished by Sokrates from the +subjective 451 + +Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent _ib._ + +Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental condition by +Sokrates--position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to it 452 + +The Holy--it has an essential characteristic--what is this?--not the +fact that it is loved by the Gods--this is true, but is not its +constituent essence 454 + +Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the Holy--different from +those of the Platonic Sokrates--he disallows any common absolute +general type of the Holy--he recognises an indefinite variety of +types, discordant and relative _ib._ + +The Holy a branch of the Just--not tenable as a definition, but useful +as bringing to view the subordination of logical terms 455 + +The Euthyphron represents Plato's way of replying to the charge of +impiety, preferred by Melêtus against Sokrates--comparison with +Xenophon's way of replying _ib._ + + + + +CHAPTER I. + + + +PLATO. + + + +PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY. + + + +CHAPTER I. + +SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE, BEFORE AND IN THE TIME OF SOKRATES. + + +[Side-note: Change in the political condition of Greece during the +life of Plato.] + +The life of Plato extends from 427-347 B.C. He was born in the fourth +year of the Peloponnesian war, and he died at the age of 80, about the +time when Olynthus was taken by the Macedonian Philip. The last years +of his life thus witnessed a melancholy breach in the integrity of the +Hellenic world, and even exhibited data from which a far-sighted +Hellenic politician might have anticipated something like the coming +subjugation, realised afterwards by the victory of Philip at +Chæroneia. But during the first half of Plato's life, no such +anticipations seemed even within the limits of possibility. The forces +of Hellas, though discordant among themselves, were superabundant as +to defensive efficacy, and were disposed rather to aggression against +foreign enemies, especially against a country then so little +formidable as Macedonia. It was under this contemplation of Hellas +self-acting and self-sufficing--an aggregate of cities, each a +political unit, yet held together by strong ties of race, language, +religion, and common feelings of various kinds--that the mind of Plato +was both formed and matured. + +In appreciating, as far as our scanty evidence allows, the +circumstances which determined his intellectual and speculative +character, I shall be compelled to touch briefly upon the various +philosophical theories which were propounded anterior to Sokrates--as +well as to repeat some matters already brought to view in the +sixteenth, sixty-seventh, and sixty-eighth chapters of my History of +Greece. + +[Side-note: Early Greek mind, satisfied with the belief in +polytheistic personal agents as the real producing causes of +phenomena.] + +To us, as to Herodotus, in his day, the philosophical speculation of +the Greeks begins with the theology and cosmology of Homer and Hesiod. +The series of divine persons and attributes, and generations presented +by these poets, and especially the Theogony of Hesiod, supplied at one +time full satisfaction to the curiosity of the Greeks respecting the +past history and present agencies of the world around them. In the +emphatic censure bestowed by Herakleitus on the poets and philosophers +who preceded him, as having much knowledge but no sense--he includes +Hesiod, as well as Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hekatæus: upon Homer +and Archilochus he is still more severe, declaring that they ought to +be banished from the public festivals and scourged.[1] The sentiment +of curiosity as it then existed was only secondary and derivative, +arising out of some of the strong primary or personal sentiments--fear +or hope, antipathy or sympathy,--impression of present +weakness,--unsatisfied appetites and longings,--wonder and awe under the +presence of the terror-striking phenomena of nature, &c. Under this state +of the mind, when problems suggested themselves for solution, the answers +afforded by Polytheism gave more satisfaction than could have been +afforded by any other hypothesis. Among the indefinite multitude of +invisible, personal, quasi-human agents, with different attributes and +dispositions, some one could be found to account for every perplexing +phenomenon. The question asked was, not What are the antecedent +conditions or causes of rain, thunder, or earthquakes, but Who rains +and thunders? Who produces earthquakes?[2] The Hesiodic Greek was +satisfied when informed that it was Zeus or Poseidon. To be told of +physical agencies would have appeared to him not merely +unsatisfactory, but absurd, ridiculous, and impious. It was the task +of a poet like Hesiod to clothe this general polytheistic sentiment in +suitable details: to describe the various Gods, Goddesses, Demigods, +and other quasi-human agents, with their characteristic attributes, +with illustrative adventures, and with sufficient relations of +sympathy and subordination among each other, to connect them in men's +imaginations as members of the same brotherhood. Okeanus, Gæa, Uranus, +Helios, Selênê,--Zeus, Poseidon, Hades--Apollo and Artemis, Dionysus +and Aphroditê--these and many other divine personal agents, were +invoked as the producing and sustaining forces in nature, the past +history of which was contained in their filiations or contests. +Anterior to all of them, the primordial matter or person, was Chaos. + +[Footnote 1: Diogen. Laert. ix. 1. [Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on ou) +dida/skei;] ([Greek: ou) phu/ei,] ap. Proclum in Platon. Timæ. p. 31 F., +p. 72, ed. Schneider), [Greek: Ê(si/odon ga\r a)\n e)di/daxe kai\ +Puthago/rên, auti/s te Xenopha/nea/ te kai\ E(katai=on; to/n th' +O(/mêron e)/phasken a)/xion ei)=nai e)k tô=n agô/nôn e)kba/llesthai +kai\ rhapi/zesthai, kai\ A)rchi/lochon o(moi/ôs.] + +[Footnote 2: Aristophanes, Nubes, 368, [Greek: A)lla\ ti/s u(/ei?] +Herodot. vii. 129.] + +[Side-note: Belief in such agency continued among the general public, +even after the various sects of philosophy had arisen.] + +Hesiod represents the point of view ancient and popular (to use +Aristotle's expression[3]) among the Greeks, from whence all their +philosophical speculation took its departure; and which continued +throughout their history, to underlie all the philosophical +speculations, as the faith of the ordinary public who neither +frequented the schools nor conversed with philosophers. While +Aristophanes, speaking in the name of this popular faith, denounces +and derides Sokrates as a searcher, alike foolish and irreligious, +after astronomical and physical causes--Sokrates himself not only +denies the truth of the allegation, but adopts as his own the +sentiment which dictated it; proclaiming Anaxagoras and others to be +culpable for prying into mysteries which the Gods intentionally kept +hidden.[4] The repugnance felt by a numerous public, against +scientific explanation--as eliminating the divine agents and +substituting in their place irrational causes,[5]--was a permanent +fact of which philosophers were always obliged to take account, and +which modified the tone of their speculations without being powerful +enough to repress them. + +[Footnote 3: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 8, p. 989, a. 10. [Greek: Phêsi\ +de/ kai\ Ê(si/odos tê\n gê=n prô/tên gene/sthai tô=n sôma/tôn; ou(/tôs +a)rchai/an kai\ dêmotikê\n sumbe/bêken ei)=nai tê\n u(po/lêpsin.] + +Again in the beginning of the second book of the Meteorologica, +Aristotle contrasts the ancient and primitive theology with the "human +wisdom" which grew up subsequently: [Greek: Oi( a)rchai=oi kai\ +diatri/bontes peri\ ta\s theologi/as--oi( sophô/teroi tê\n +a)nthrôpi/nên sophi/an] (Meteor, ii. i. p. 353, a.)] + +[Footnote 4: Xenophon, Memor. iv. 7, 5; i. 1, 11-15. Plato, Apolog. p. +26 E.] + +[Footnote 5: Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23. [Greek: Ou) ga\r ê)neichonto +tou\s phusikou\s kai\ meteôrole/schas to/te kaloume/nous, ô(s ei)s +ai)ti/as a)lo/gous kai\ duna/meis a)pronoê/tous kai\ katênagkasme/na +pa/thê diatri/bontas to\ thei=on.]] + +[Side-note: Thales, the first Greek who propounded the hypothesis of +physical agency in place of personal. Water, the primordial substance, +or [Greek: a)rchê/].] + +Even in the sixth century B.C., when the habit of composing in prose +was first introduced, Pherekydes and Akusilaus still continued in +their prose the theogony, or the mythical cosmogony, of Hesiod and the +other old Poets: while Epimenides and the Orphic poets put forth +different theogonies, blended with mystical dogmas. It was, however, +in the same century, and in the first half of it, that Thales of +Miletus (620-560 B.C.), set the example of a new vein of thought. +Instead of the Homeric Okeanus, father of all things, Thales assumed +the material substance, Water, as the primordial matter and the +universal substratum of everything in nature. By various +transmutations, all other substances were generated from water; all of +them, when destroyed, returned into water. Like the old poets, Thales +conceived the surface of the earth to be flat and round; but he did +not, like them, regard it as stretching down to the depths of +Tartarus: he supposed it to be flat and shallow, floating on the +immensity of the watery expanse or Ocean.[6] This is the main feature +of the Thaletian hypothesis, about which, however, its author seems to +have left no writing. Aristotle says little about Thales, and that +little in a tone of so much doubt,[7] that we can hardly confide in +the opinions and discoveries ascribed to him by others.[8] + +[Footnote 6: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 3, p. 983, b. 21. De Coelo, ii. +13, p. 294, a. 29. [Greek: Thalê=s, o( tê=s toiau/tês a)rchêgo\s +philosophi/as], &c. Seneca, Natural. Quæst. vi. 6. + +Pherekydes, Epimenides, &c., were contemporary with the earliest Ionic +philosophers (Brandis, Handbuch der Gesch. der Gr.-Röm. Phil., s. 23). + +According to Plutarch (Aquæ et Ignis Comparatio, p. 955, init.), most +persons believed that Hesiod, by the word Chaos, meant Water. Zeno the +Stoic adopted this interpretation (Schol. Apollon. Rhod. i. 498). On +the other hand, Bacchylides the poet, and after him Zenodotus, called +Air by the name Chaos (Schol. Hesiod. Theogon. p. 392, Gaisf.). +Hermann considers that the Hesiodic Chaos means empty space (see note, +Brandis, Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-Röm. Phil., vol. i., p. 71).] + +[Footnote 7: See two passages in Aristotle De Animâ, i. 2, and i. 5.] + +[Footnote 8: Cicero says (De Naturâ Deorum, i. 10), "Thales--aquam +dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aquâ cuncta +fingeret." That the latter half of this Ciceronian statement, +respecting the doctrines of Thales, is at least unfounded, and +probably erroneous, is recognised by Preller, Brandis, and Zeller. +Preller, Histor. Philos. Græc. ex Fontium Locis Contexta, sect. 15; +Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos. sect. 31, p. 118; Zeller, Die +Philos. der Griechen, vol. i., p. 151, ed. 2. + +It is stated by Herodotus that Thales foretold the year of the +memorable solar eclipse which happened during the battle between the +Medes and the Lydians (Herod. i. 74). This eclipse seems to have +occurred in B.C. 585, according to the best recent astronomical +enquiries by Professor Airy.] + +[Side-note: Anaximander--laid down as [Greek: a)rchê/] the Infinite or +indeterminate--generation of the elements out of it, by evolution of +latent fundamental contraries--astronomical and geological doctrines.] + +The next of the Ionic philosophers, and the first who published his +opinions in writing, was Anaximander, of Miletus, the countryman and +younger contemporary of Thales (570-520 B.C.). He too searched for an +[Greek: A)rchê/], a primordial Something or principle, self-existent +and comprehending in its own nature a generative, motive, or +transmutative force. Not thinking that water, or any other known and +definite substance fulfilled these conditions, he adopted as the +foundation of his hypothesis a substance which he called the Infinite +or Indeterminate. Under this name he conceived Body simply, without +any positive or determinate properties, yet including the fundamental +contraries, Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, &c., in a potential or latent +state, including farther a self-changing and self-developing force,[9] +and being moreover immortal and indestructible.[10] By this inherent +force, and by the evolution of one or more of these dormant contrary +qualities, were generated the various definite substances of +nature--Air, Fire, Water, &c. But every determinate substance thus +generated was, after a certain time, destroyed and resolved again into +the Indeterminate mass. "From thence all substances proceed, and into +this they relapse: each in its turn thus making atonement to the others, +and suffering the penalty of injustice."[11] Anaximander conceived +separate existence (determinate and particular existence, apart from +the indeterminate and universal) as an unjust privilege, not to be +tolerated except for a time, and requiring atonement even for that. As +this process of alternate generation and destruction was unceasing, so +nothing less than an Infinite could supply material for it. Earth, +Water, Air, Fire, having been generated, the two former, being cold +and heavy, remained at the bottom, while the two latter ascended. Fire +formed the exterior circle, encompassing the air like bark round a +tree: this peripheral fire was broken up and aggregated into separate +masses, composing the sun, moon, and stars. The sphere of the fixed +stars was nearest to the earth: that of the moon next above it: that +of the sun highest of all. The sun and moon were circular bodies +twenty-eight times larger than the earth: but the visible part of them +was only an opening in the centre, through which[12] the fire or light +behind was seen. All these spheres revolved round the earth, which was +at first semi-fluid or mud, but became dry and solid through the heat +of the sun. It was in shape like the section of a cylinder, with a +depth equal to one-third of its breadth or horizontal surface, on +which men and animals live. It was in the centre of the Kosmos; it +remained stationary because of its equal distance from all parts of +the outer revolving spheres; there was no cause determining it to move +upward rather than downward or sideways, therefore it remained +still.[13] Its exhalations nourished the fire in the peripheral +regions of the Kosmos. Animals were produced from the primitive muddy +fluid of the earth: first, fishes and other lower animals--next, in +process of time man, when circumstances permitted his development.[14] +We learn farther respecting the doctrines of Anaximander, that he +proposed physical explanations of thunder, lightning, and other +meteorological phenomena:[15] memorable as the earliest attempt of +speculation in that department, at a time when such events inspired +the strongest religious awe, and were regarded as the most especial +manifestations of purposes of the Gods. He is said also to have been +the first who tried to represent the surface and divisions of the +earth on a brazen plate, the earliest rudiment of a map or chart.[16] + +[Footnote 9: See Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 157, +seq., ed. 2nd. + +Anaximander conceived [Greek: to\ a)peiron] as _infinite matter_; the +Pythagoreans and Plato conceived it as a distinct nature by itself--as +a subject, not as a predicate (Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, p. 203, a. +2). + +About these fundamental contraries, Aristotle says (Physic. i. 4, +init.): [Greek: oi( d' e)k tou e(no\s e)nou/sas ta\s e)nantio/têtas +e)kkri/nesthai, ô(/sper A)naxi/mandro/s phêsi]. Which Simplikius +explains, [Greek: e)nantio/tête/s ei)si, thermo\n, psuchro\n, xêro\n, +u(gro\n, kai\ ai( a)/llai], &c. + +Compare also Schleiermacher, "Ueber Anaximandros," in his Vermischte +Schriften, vol. ii. p. 178, seq. Deutinger (Gesch. der Philos. vol. i. +p. 165, Regensb. 1852) maintains that this [Greek: e)/krisis] of +contraries is at variance with the hypothesis of Anaximander, and has +been erroneously ascribed to him. But the testimony is sufficiently +good to outweigh this suspicion.] + +[Footnote 10: Anaximander spoke of his [Greek: a)/peiron] as [Greek: +a)tha/naton kai\ a)nô/lethron] (Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, 7, p. 203, +b. 15).] + +[Footnote 11: Simplikius ad Aristotel. Physic. fol. 6 a. apud Preller, +Histor. Philos. Græco-Rom. § 57, [Greek: e)x ô(=n de\ ê( ge/nesi/s +e)sti toi=s ou)=si, kai\ tê\n phthora\n ei)s tau)ta\ gi/nesthai kata\ +to\ chreô/n; dido/nai ga\r au)ta\ ti/sin kai\ di/kên a)llê/lois tê=s +a)diki/as kata\ tê\n tou= chro/nou ta/xin.] Simplikius remarks upon +the poetical character of this phraseology, [Greek: poiêtikôte/rois +o)no/masin au)ta\ le/gôn].] + +[Footnote 12: Origen. Philosophumen. p. 11, ed. Miller; Plutarch ap. +Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8, xv. 23-46-47; Stobæus Eclog. i. p. 510. +Anaximander supposed that eclipses of the sun and moon were caused by +the occasional closing of these apertures (Euseb. xv. 50-61). The part +of the sun visible to us was, in his opinion, not smaller than the +earth, and of the purest fire (Diog. Laert. ii. 1). + +Eudêmus, in his history of astronomy, mentioned Anaximander as the +first who had discussed the magnitudes and distances of the celestial +bodies (Simplikius ad Aristot. De Coelo, ap. Schol. Brand, p. 497, a. +12).] + +[Footnote 13: Aristotel. Meteorol. ii. 2, p. 355, a. 21, which is +referred by Alexander of Aphrodisias to Anaximander; also De Coelo, +ii. 13, p. 295, b. 12. + +A doctrine somewhat like it is ascribed even to Thales. See +Alexander's Commentary on Aristotel. Metaphys. i. p. 983, b. 17. + +The reason here assigned by Anaximander why the Earth remained still, +is the earliest example in Greek philosophy of that fallacy called the +principle of the Sufficient Reason, so well analysed and elucidated by +Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, book v., ch. 3, sect. 5. + +The remarks which Aristotle himself makes upon it are also very +interesting, when he cites the opinion of Anaximander. Compare Plato, +Phædon, p. 109, c. 132, with the citations in Wyttenbach's note.] + +[Footnote 14: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. v. 19.] + +[Footnote 15: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iii. 3; Seneca, Quæst. Nat. +ii. 18-19.] + +[Footnote 16: Strabo, i. p. 7. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 1) states that +Anaximander affirmed the figure of the earth to be spherical; and Dr. +Whewell, in his History of the Inductive Sciences, follows his +statement. But Schleiermacher (Ueber Anaximandros, vol. ii. p. 204 of +his Sämmtliche Werke) and Gruppe (Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, +p. 38) contest this assertion, and prefer that of Plutarch (ap. +Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8, Placit. Philos. iii. 10), which I have +adopted in the text. It is to be remembered that Diogenes himself, in +another place (ix. 3, 21), affirms Parmenides to have been the first +who propounded the spherical figure of the earth. See the facts upon +this subject collected and discussed in the instructive dissertation +of L. Oettinger, Die Vorstellungen der Griechen und Römer ueber die +Erde als Himmelskörper, p. 38; Freiburg, 1850.] + +[Side-note: Anaximenes--adopted Air as [Greek: a)rchê/]--rise of +substances out of it, by condensation and rarefaction.] + +The third physical philosopher produced by Miletus, seemingly before +the time of her terrible disasters suffered from the Persians after +the Ionic revolt between 500-494 B.C., was Anaximenes, who struck out +a third hypothesis. He assumed, as the primordial substance, and as +the source of all generation or transmutation, Air, eternal in +duration, infinite in extent. He thus returned to the principle of the +Thaletian theory, selecting for his beginning a known substance, +though not the same substance as Thales. To explain how generation of +new products was possible (as Anaximander had tried to explain by his +theory of evolution of latent contraries), Anaximenes adverted to the +facts of condensation and rarefaction, which he connected respectively +with cold and heat.[17] The Infinite Air, possessing and exercising an +inherent generative and developing power, perpetually in motion, +passing from dense to rare or from rare to dense, became in its utmost +rarefaction, Fire and Æther; when passing through successive stages of +increased condensation it became first cloud, next water, then earth, +and, lastly, in its utmost density, stone.[18] Surrounding, embracing, +and pervading the Kosmos, it also embodied and carried with it a vital +principle, which animals obtained from it by inspiration, and which +they lost as soon as they ceased to breathe.[19] Anaximenes included +in his treatise (which was written in a clear Ionic dialect) many +speculations on astronomy and meteorology, differing widely from those +of Anaximander. He conceived the Earth as a broad, flat, round plate, +resting on the air.[20] Earth, Sun, and Moon were in his view +condensed air, the Sun acquiring heat by the extreme and incessant +velocity with which he moved. The Heaven was not an entire hollow +sphere encompassing the Earth below as well as above, but a hemisphere +covering the Earth above, and revolving laterally round it like a cap +round the head.[21] + +[Footnote 17: Origen. Philosophumen. c. 7; Simplikius in Aristot. +Physic. f. 32; Brandis, Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-R. Phil. p. 144. + +Cicero, Academic. ii. 37, 118. "Anaximenes infinitum aera, sed ea, quæ +ex eo orirentur, definita." + +The comic poet Philemon introduced in one of his dramas, of which a +short fragment is preserved (Frag. 2, Meineke, p. 840), the +omnipresent and omniscient Air, to deliver the prologue: + +[Greek: ----ou(to/s ei)m' e)gô\ +A)ê/r, o(\n a)/n tis o)noma/seie kai\ Di/a. +e)gô\ d', o(\ theou=' stin e)/rgon, ei)mi\ pantachou=-- +pa/nt' e)x a)na/gkês oi)=da, pantachou= parô/n.]] + +[Footnote 18: Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p. 917; Plutarch, ap. Euseb. +P. E. i. 8.] + +[Footnote 19: Plutarch, Placit. Philosophor, i. 3, p. 878.] + +[Footnote 20: Aristotel. De Coelo, ii. 13; Plutarch, Placit. +Philosoph. iii. 10, p. 895.] + +[Footnote 21: Origen. Philosophum. p. 12, ed. Miller: [Greek: +ô(sperei\ peri\ tê\n ê(mete/ran kephalê\n stre/phetai to\ pili/on.]] + +The general principle of cosmogony, involved in the hypothesis of +these three Milesians--one primordial substance or Something endued +with motive and transmutative force, so as to generate all the variety +of products, each successive and transient, which our senses +witness--was taken up with more or less modification by others, especially +by Diogenes of Apollonia, of whom I shall speak presently. But there were +three other men who struck out different veins of thought--Pythagoras, +Xenophanes, and Herakleitus: the two former seemingly contemporary +with Anaximenes (550-490 B.C.), the latter somewhat later. + +[Side-note: Pythagoras--his life and career--Pythagorean brotherhood, +great political influence which it acquired among the Greco-Italian +cities--incurred great enmity and was violently put down.] + +Of Pythagoras I have spoken at some length in the thirty-seventh +chapter of my History of Greece. Speculative originality was only one +among many remarkable features in his character. He was an +inquisitive traveller, a religious reformer or innovator, and the +founder of a powerful and active brotherhood, partly ascetic, partly +political, which stands without parallel in Grecian history. The +immortality of the soul, with its transmigration (metempsychosis) +after death into other bodies, either of men or of other animals--the +universal kindred thus recognised between men and other animals, and +the prohibition which he founded thereupon against the use of animals +for food or sacrifice--are among his most remarkable doctrines: said +to have been borrowed (together with various ceremonial observances) +from the Egyptians.[22] After acquiring much celebrity in his native +island of Samos and throughout Ionia, Pythagoras emigrated (seemingly +about 530 B.C.) to Kroton and Metapontum in Lower Italy, where the +Pythagorean brotherhood gradually acquired great political ascendancy: +and from whence it even extended itself in like manner over the +neighbouring Greco-Italian cities. At length it excited so much +political antipathy among the body of the citizens,[23] that its rule +was violently put down, and its members dispersed about 509 B.C. +Pythagoras died at Metapontum. + +[Footnote 22: Herodot. ii. 81; Isokrates, Busirid. Encom. s. 28.] + +[Footnote 23: Polybius, ii. 39; Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 54, seq.] + +[Side-note: The Pythagoreans continue as a recluse sect, without +political power.] + +Though thus stripped of power, however, the Pythagoreans still +maintained themselves for several generations as a social, religious, +and philosophical brotherhood. They continued and extended the vein of +speculation first opened by the founder himself. So little of +proclaimed individuality was there among them, that Aristotle, in +criticising their doctrine, alludes to them usually under the +collective name Pythagoreans. Epicharmus, in his comedies at Syracuse +(470 B.C.) gave occasional utterance to various doctrines of the sect; +but the earliest of them who is known to have composed a book, was +Philolaus,[24] the contemporary of Sokrates. Most of the opinions +ascribed to the Pythagoreans originated probably among the successors +of Pythagoras; but the basis and principle upon which they proceed +seems undoubtedly his. + +[Footnote 24: Diogen. Laert. viii. 7-15-78-85. + +Some passages of Aristotle, however, indicate divergences of doctrine +among the Pythagoreans themselves (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, a. 22). He +probably speaks of the Pythagoreans of his own time when dialectical +discussion had modified the original orthodoxy of the order. Compare +Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas, cap. 5, p. 61-63. About the +gradual development of the Pythagorean doctrine, see Brandis, Handbuch +der Gr.-R. Philos. s. 74, 75.] + +[Side-note: Doctrine of the Pythagoreans--Number the Essence of +Things.] + +The problem of physical philosophy, as then conceived, was to find +some primordial and fundamental nature, by and out of which the +sensible universe was built up and produced; something which +co-existed always underlying it, supplying fresh matter and force for +generation of successive products. The hypotheses of Thales, +Anaximander, and Anaximenes, to solve this problem, have been already +noticed: Pythagoras solved it by saying, That the essence of things +consisted in Number. By this he did not mean simply that all things +were numerable, or that number belonged to them as a predicate. +Numbers were not merely predicates inseparable from subjects, but +subjects in themselves: substances or magnitudes, endowed with active +force, and establishing the fundamental essences or types according to +which things were constituted. About water,[25] air, or fire, +Pythagoras said nothing.[26] He conceived that sensible phenomena had +greater resemblance to numbers than to any one of these substrata +assigned by the Ionic philosophers. Number was (in his doctrine) the +self-existent reality--the fundamental material and in-dwelling force +pervading the universe. Numbers were not separate from things[27] +(like the Platonic Ideas), but _fundamenta_ of things--their essences +or determining principles: they were moreover conceived as having +magnitude and active force.[28] In the movements of the celestial +bodies, in works of human art, in musical harmony--measure and number +are the producing and directing agencies. According to the Pythagorean +Philolaus, "the Dekad, the full and perfect number, was of supreme and +universal efficacy as the guide and principle of life, both to the +Kosmos and to man. The nature of number was imperative and lawgiving, +affording the only solution of all that was perplexing or unknown; +without number all would be indeterminate and unknowable."[29] + +[Footnote 25: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 27. [Greek: E)n +de\ toi=s a)rithmoi=s, e)ndo/koun theôrei=n o(moiô/mata polla\ toi=s +ou)=si kai\ gignome/nois, ma=llon ê)\ e)n puri\ kai\ gê=| kai\ +u(/dati], &c. Cf. N. 3, p. 1090, a. 21.] + +[Footnote 26: Aristotel. Metaph. A. 9, p. 990, a. 16. [Greek: Dio\ +peri\ puro\s ê)\ gê=s ê)\ tô=n a)/llôn tô=n toiou/tôn sôma/tôn ou)d' +o(tiou=n ei)rê/kasin], &c. (the Pythagoreans); also N. 3.] + +[Footnote 27: Physic. iii. 4, p. 203, a. 6. [Greek: Ou) ga\r +chôristo\n poiou=si] (the Pythagoreans) [Greek: to\n a)rithmo/n], &c. +Metaphys. M. 6, p. 1080, b. 19: [Greek: ta\s mona/das u(polamba/nousin +e)/chein me/gethos]. M. 8, p. 1083, b. 17: [Greek: e)kei=noi] (the +Pythagoreans) [Greek: to\n a)rithmo\n ta\ o)/nta le/gousin; ta\ gou=n +theôrê/mata prosa/ptousi toi=s sô/masin ô(s e)x e)kei/nôn o)/ntôn tô=n +a)rithmô=n.]] + +[Footnote 28: An analogous application of this principle (Number as +the fundamental substance and universal primary agent) may be seen in +an eminent physical philosopher of the nineteenth century, Oken's +Elements of Physio-Philosophy, translated by Tulk. Aphorism +57:--"While numbers in a mathematical sense are positions and negations +of nothing, in the philosophical sense they are positions and negations +of the Eternal. Every thing which is real, posited, finite, has become +this, out of numbers; or more strictly speaking, every Real is +absolutely nothing else than a number. This must be the sense +entertained of numbers in the Pythagorean doctrine--namely, that every +thing, or the whole universe, had arisen from numbers. This is not to +be taken in a merely quantitative sense, as it has hitherto been +erroneously; but in an intrinsic sense, as implying that all things +are numbers themselves, or the acts of the Eternal. The essence in +numbers is nought else than the Eternal. The Eternal only is or +exists, and nothing else is when a number exists. There is therefore +nothing real but the Eternal itself; for every Real, or every thing +that is, is only a number and only exists by virtue of a number." + +Ibid., Aphorism 105-107:--"Arithmetic is the science of the second +idea, or that of time or motion, or life. It is therefore the first +science. Mathematics not only begin with it, but creation also, with +the becoming of time and of life. Arithmetic is, accordingly, the +truly absolute or divine science; and therefore every thing in it is +also directly certain, because every thing in it resembles the Divine. +Theology is arithmetic personified."--"A natural thing is nothing but +a self-moving number. An organic or living thing is a number moving +itself out of itself or spontaneously: an inorganic thing, however, is +a number moved by another thing: now as this other thing is also a +real number, so then is every inorganic thing a number moved by +another number, and so on _ad infinitum_. The movements in nature are +only movements of numbers by numbers: even as arithmetical computation +is none other than a movement of numbers by numbers; but with this +difference--that in the latter, this operates in an ideal manner, in +the former after a real."] + +[Footnote 29: Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 139. seqq. + +[Greek: Theôrei=n dei= ta\ e)/rga kai\ ta\n e)ssi/an (ou)si/an) tô= +a)rithmô= katta\n du/namin, a(/tis e)nti\ e)n ta=| deka/di; mega/la +ga\r kai\ pantelê\s kai\ pantoergo\s kai\ thei/ô kai\ ou)rani/ô bi/ô +kai\ a)nthrôpi/nô a)rcha\ kai\ a(gemô\n . . . a)/neu de\ tau/tas pa/nta +a)/peira kai\ a)/dêla kai\ a)phanê=; nomika\ ga\r a( phu/sis tô= +a)rithmô= kai\ a(gemonika\ kai\ didaskalika\ tô= a)poroume/nô panto\s +kai\ a)gnooume/nô panti/]. Compare the Fr. p. 58, of the same work. + +According to Plato, as well as the Pythagoreans, number extended to +ten, and not higher: all above ten were multiples and increments of +ten. (Aristot. Physic. iii. 6, p. 203, b. 30).] + +[Side-note: The Monas--[Greek: a)rchê/], or principle of +Number--geometrical conception of number--symbolical attributes of the +first ten numbers, especially of the Dekad.] + +The first principle or beginning of Number, was the One or +Monas--which the Pythagoreans conceived as including both the two +fundamental contraries--the Determining and the Indeterminate.[30] All +particular numbers, and through them all things, were compounded from +the harmonious junction and admixture of these two fundamental +contraries.[31] All numbers being either odd or even, the odd numbers +were considered as analogous to the Determining, the even numbers to +the Indeterminate. In One or the Monad, the Odd and Even were supposed +to be both contained, not yet separated: Two was the first +indeterminate even number; Three, the first odd and the first +determinate number, because it included beginning, middle, and end. +The sum of the first four numbers--One, Two, Three, Four = Ten (1 + 2 ++ 3 + 4) was the most perfect number of all.[32] To these numbers, +one, two, three, four, were understood as corresponding the +fundamental conceptions of Geometry--Point, Line, Plane, Solid. _Five_ +represented colour and visible appearance: _Six_, the phenomenon of +Life: _Seven_, Health, Light, Intelligence, &c.: _Eight_, Love or +Friendship.[33] Man, Horse, Justice and Injustice, had their +representative numbers: that corresponding to Justice was a square +number, as giving equal for equal.[34] + +[Footnote 30: See the instructive explanations of Boeckh, in his work +on the Fragments of Philolaus, p. 54 seq.] + +[Footnote 31: Philolaus, Fr., p. 62, Boeckh.--Diogen. L. viii. 7, 85. + +By [Greek: a(rmoni/a], Philolaus meant the musical octave: and his +work included many explanations and comparisons respecting the +intervals of the musical scale. (Boeckh, p. 65 seq.)] + +[Footnote 32: Aristotel. De Coelo, i. 1, p. 268, a. 10. [Greek: +katha/per ga/r phasin oi( Puthago/reioi, to\ pa=n kai\ ta\ pa/nta +toi=s tri/sin ô(/ristai; teleutê\ ga\r kai\ me/son kai\ a)rchê\ to\n +a)rithmo\n e)/chei to\n tou= panto\s, tau=ta de\ to\n tê=s tria/dos. +Dio\ para\ tê=s phu/seôs ei)lêpho/tes ô(/sper no/mous e)kei/nês, kai\ +pro\s ta\s a(gistei/as chrô/metha tô=n theô=n tô=| a)rithmô=| tou/tô|] +(i. e. three). It is remarkable that Aristotle here adopts and +sanctions, in regard to the number Three, the mystic and fanciful +attributes ascribed by the Pythagoreans.] + +[Footnote 33: Strümpell, Geschichte der theoretischen Philosophie der +Griechen, s. 78. Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-Röm. Phil., sect. 80, p. +467 seq. + +The number Five also signified marriage, because it was a junction of +the first masculine number Three with the first feminine Two. Seven +signified also [Greek: kairo\s] or Right Season. See Aristotel. +Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 26, and M. 4, p. 1078, b. 23, compared with +the commentary of Alexander on the former passage.] + +[Footnote 34: Aristotel. Ethica Magna, i. 1.] + +[Side-note: Pythagorean Kosmos and Astronomy--geometrical and harmonic +laws guiding the movements of the cosmical bodies.] + +The Pythagoreans conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single +system, generated out of numbers.[35] Of this system the central +point--the determining or limiting One--was first in order of time, +and in order of philosophical conception. By the determining influence +of this central constituted One, portions of the surrounding Infinite +were successively attracted and brought into system: numbers, +geometrical figures, solid substances, were generated. But as the +Kosmos thus constituted was composed of numbers, there could be no +continuum: each numerical unit was distinct and separated from the +rest by a portion of vacant space, which was imbibed, by a sort of +inhalation, from the infinite space or spirit without.[36] The central +point was fire, called by the Pythagoreans the Hearth of the Universe +(like the public hearth or perpetual fire maintained in the prytaneum +of a Grecian city), or the watch-tower of Zeus. Around it revolved, +from West to East, ten divine bodies, with unequal velocities, but in +symmetrical movement or regular dance.[37] Outermost was the circle of +the fixed stars, called by the Pythagoreans Olympus, and composed of +fire like the centre. Within this came successively,--with orbits more +and more approximating to the centre,--the five planets, Saturn, +Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury: next, the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth. +Lastly, between the Earth and the central fire, an hypothetical body, +called the Antichthon or Counter-Earth, was imagined for the purpose +of making up a total represented by the sacred number Ten, the symbol +of perfection and totality. The Antichthon was analogous to a +separated half of the Earth; simultaneous with the Earth in its +revolutions, and corresponding with it on the opposite side of the +central fire. + +[Footnote 35: Aristot. Metaph. M. 6, p. 1080, b. 18. [Greek: to\n ga\r +o(/lon ou)/ranon kataskeua/zousin e)x a)rithmô=n]. Compare p. 1075, b. +37, with the Scholia. + +A poet calls the tetraktys (consecrated as the sum total of the first +four numbers 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10) [Greek: pêgê\n a)ena/ou phu/seôs +rhizô/mat' e)/chousan]. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 94.] + +[Footnote 36: Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 91-95. [Greek: to\ pra=ton +a(rmosthe\n, to\ e(/n e)n tô=| me/sô| tê=s sphai/ras e(sti/a +kalei=tai--bômo/n te kai\ sunochê\n kai\ me/tron phu/seôs--prô=ton +ei)=nai phu/sei to\ me/son]. + +Aristot. Metaph. N. 3, p. 1091, a. 15. [Greek: phanerô=s ga\r +le/gousin] (the Pythagoreans) [Greek: ô(s tou= e(no\s +sustathe/ntos--eu)thu\s to\ e)/ggista tou= a)pei/rou o(/ti ei(lketo +kai\ e)perai/neto u(po\ tou= pe/ratos]. + +Aristot. Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b. 21. [Greek: Ei)=nai d' e)/phasan +kai\ oi( Puthago/reioi keno/n, kai\ e)peisie/nai au)to\ tô=| ou)ra/nô| +e)k tou= a)pei/rou pneu/matos, ô(s a)napne/onti; kai\ to\ keno/n, o(\ +diori/zei ta\s phu/seis, ô(s o)/ntos tou= kenou= chôrismou= tinos tô=n +e)phexê=s kai\ tê=s diori/seôs, kai\ tou=t' ei)=nai prô=ton e)n toi=s +a)rithmoi=s; to\ ga\r keno\n diori/zein tê\n phu/sin au)tô=n]. Stobæus +(Eclog. Phys. i. 18, p. 381, Heer.) states the same, referring to the +lost work of Aristotle on the Pythagorean philosophy. Compare Preller, +Histor. Philos. Gr. ex Font. Loc. Context., sect. 114-115.] + +[Footnote 37: Philolaus, p. 94. Boeckh. [Greek: peri\ de\ tou=to de/ka +sô/mata thei=a choreu/ein], &c. Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 13. Metaphys. A. +5.] + +The inhabited portion of the Earth was supposed to be that which was +turned away from the central fire and towards the Sun, from which it +received light. But the Sun itself was not self-luminous: it was +conceived as a glassy disk, receiving and concentrating light from the +central fire, and reflecting it upon the Earth, so long as the two +were on the same side of the central fire. The Earth revolved, in an +orbit obliquely intersecting that of the Sun, and in twenty-four +hours, round the central fire, always turning the same side towards +that fire. The alternation of day and night was occasioned by the +Earth being during a part of such revolution on the same side of the +central fire with the Sun, and thus receiving light reflected from +him: and during the remaining part of her revolution on the side +opposite to him, so that she received no light at all from him. The +Earth, with the Antichthon, made this revolution in one day: the Moon, +in one month:[38] the Sun, with the planets, Mercury and Venus, in one +year: the planets, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, in longer periods +respectively, according to their distances from the centre: lastly, +the outermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the Aplanes), +in some unknown period of very long duration.[39] + +[Footnote 38: The Pythagoreans supposed that eclipses of the moon took +place, sometimes by the interposition of the earth, sometimes by that +of the Antichthon, to intercept from the moon the light of the sun +(Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. 27, p. 560. Heeren). Stobæus here cites the +history ([Greek: i(stori/an]) of the Pythagorean philosophy by +Aristotle, and the statement of Philippus of Opus, the friend of +Plato.] + +[Footnote 39: Aristot. de Coelo, ii. 13. Respecting this Pythagorean +cosmical system, the elucidations of Boeckh are clear and valuable. +Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, Berlin, 1852, p. +99-102; completing those which he had before given in his edition of +the fragments of Philolaus. + +Martin (in his Études sur le Timée de Platon, vol. ii. p. 107) and +Gruppe (Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, ch. iv.) maintain that +the original system proposed by Pythagoras was a geocentric system, +afterwards transformed by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans into that +which stands in the text. But I agree with Boeckh (Ueber das Kosmische +System des Platon, p. 89 seqq.), and with Zeller (Phil. d. Griech., +vol. i. p. 308, ed. 2), that this point is not made out. That which +Martin and Gruppe (on the authority of Alexander Polyhistor, Diog. +viii. 25, and others) consider to be a description of the original +Pythagorean system as it stood before Philolaus, is more probably a +subsequent transformation of it; introduced after the time of +Aristotle, in order to suit later astronomical views.] + +[Side-note: Music of the Spheres.] + +The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take place, in the +opinion of the' Pythagoreans, without producing a loud and powerful +sound; and as their distances from the central fire were supposed to +be arranged in musical ratios,[40] so the result of all these separate +sounds was full and perfect harmony. To the objection--Why were not +these sounds heard by us?--they replied, that we had heard them +constantly and without intermission from the hour of our birth; hence +they had become imperceptible by habit.[41] + +[Footnote 40: Playfair observes (in his dissertation on the Progress +of Natural Philosophy, p. 87) respecting Kepler--"Kepler was perhaps +the first person who conceived that there must be always a law capable +of being expressed by arithmetic or geometry, which connects such +phenomena as have a physical dependence on each other". But this seems +to be exactly the fundamental conception of the Pythagoreans: or +rather a part of their fundamental conception, for they also +considered their numbers as active forces bringing such law into +reality. To illustrate the determination of the Pythagoreans to make +up the number of Ten celestial bodies, I transcribe another passage +from Playfair (p. 98). Huygens, having discovered one satellite of +Saturn, "believed that there were no more, and that the number of the +planets was now complete. The planets, primary and secondary, thus +made up twelve--the double of six, the first of the perfect numbers."] + +[Footnote 41: Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 9; Pliny, H.N. ii. 20. + +See the Pythagorean system fully set forth by Zeller, Die Philosophie +der Griechen, vol. i. p. 302-310, ed. 2nd.] + +[Side-note: Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries--Ten opposing +pairs.] + +Ten was, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, the perfection and +consummation of number. The numbers from One to Ten were all that they +recognised as primary, original, generative. Numbers greater than ten +were compounds and derivatives from the decad. They employed this +perfect number not only as a basis on which to erect a bold +astronomical hypothesis, but also as a sum total for their list of +contraries. Many Hellenic philosophers[42] recognised pairs of +opposing attributes as pervading nature, and as the fundamental +categories to which the actual varieties of the sensible world might +be reduced. While others laid down Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry, as the +fundamental contraries, the Pythagoreans adopted a list of ten pairs. +1. Limit and Unlimited; 2. Odd and Even; 3. One and Many; 4. Right and +Left; 5. Male and Female; 6. Rest and Motion; 7. Straight and Curve; +8. Light and Darkness; 9. Good and Evil; 10. Square and Oblong.[43] Of +these ten pairs, five belong to arithmetic or to geometry, one to +mechanics, one to physics, and three to anthropology or ethics. Good +and Evil, Regularity and Irregularity, were recognised as alike +primordial and indestructible.[44] + +[Footnote 42: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 2, p. 1004, b. 30. +[Greek: ta\ d' o)/nta kai\ tê\n ou)sian o(mologou=sin e)x e)nanti/ôn +schedo\n a(/pantes sugkei=sthai.]] + +[Footnote 43: Aristot. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, a. 22. He goes on to +say that Alkmæon, a semi-Pythagorean and a younger contemporary of +Pythagoras himself, while agreeing in the general principle that +"human affairs were generally in pairs," ([Greek: ei)=nai du/o ta\ +polla\ tô=n a)nthrôpi/nôn]), laid down pairs of fundamental contraries +at random ([Greek: ta\s e)nantio/têtas ta\s tuchou/sas])--black and +white, sweet and bitter, good and evil, great and little. All that you +can extract from these philosophers is (continues Aristotle) the +general axiom, that "contraries are the principia of existing +things"--[Greek: o(/ti ta)na/ntia a)rchai\ tô=n o)/ntôn]. + +This axiom is to be noted as occupying a great place in the minds of +the Greek philosophers.] + +[Footnote 44: Theophrast. Metaphys. 9. Probably the recognition of one +dominant antithesis--[Greek: To\ E(/n--ê( a)o/ristos Dua\s]--is the +form given by Plato to the Pythagorean doctrine. Eudorus (in +Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 39) seems to blend the two +together.] + +The arithmetical and geometrical view of nature, to which such +exclusive supremacy is here given by the Pythagoreans, is one of the +most interesting features of Grecian philosophy. They were the +earliest cultivators of mathematical science,[45] and are to be +recognised as having paved the way for Euclid and Archimedes, +notwithstanding the symbolical and mystical fancies with which they +so largely perverted what are now regarded as the clearest and most +rigorous processes of the human intellect. The important theorem which +forms the forty-seventh Proposition of Euclid's first book, is +affirmed to have been discovered by Pythagoras himself: but how much +progress was made by him and his followers in the legitimate province +of arithmetic and geometry, as well as in the applications of these +sciences to harmonics,[46] which they seem to have diligently +cultivated, we have not sufficient information to determine with +certainty. + +[Footnote 45: Aristot. Metaph. A. 5, p. 985, b. 23. [Greek: oi( +Puthagorei=oi tô=n mathêma/tôn a)psa/menoi _prô=toi tau=ta +proê/gagon_, kai\ e)ntraphe/ntes e)n au)toi=s ta\s tou/tôn a)rcha\s +tô=n o)/ntôn a)rcha\s ô)|ê/thêsan ei)=nai pa/ntôn.]] + +[Footnote 46: Concerning the Pythagorean doctrines on Harmonics, see +Boeckh's Philolaus, p. 60-84, with his copious and learned comments.] + +[Side-note: Eleatic philosophy--Xenophanes.] + +Contemporary with Pythagoras, and like him an emigrant from Ionia to +Italy, was Xenophanes of Kolophon. He settled at the Phokæan colony of +Elea, on the Gulf of Poseidonia; his life was very long, but his +period of eminence appears to belong (as far as we can make out amidst +conflicting testimony) to the last thirty years of the sixth century +B.C. (530-500 B.C.). He was thus contemporary with Anaximander and +Anaximenes, as well as with Pythagoras, the last of whom he may have +personally known.[47] He composed, and recited in person, poems--epic, +elegiac, and iambic--of which a very few fragments remain. + +[Footnote 47: Karsten. Xenophanis Fragm., s. 4, p. 9, 10.] + +[Side-note: His censures upon the received Theogony and religious +rites.] + +Xenophanes takes his point of departure, not from Thales or +Anaximander, but from the same ancient theogonies which they had +forsaken. But he follows a very different road. The most prominent +feature in his poems (so far as they remain), is the directness and +asperity with which he attacks the received opinions respecting the +Gods--and the poets Hesiod and Homer, the popular exponents of those +opinions. Xenophanes not only condemns these poets for having ascribed +to the Gods discreditable exploits, but even calls in question the +existence of the Gods, and ridicules the anthropomorphic conception +which pervaded the Hellenic faith. "If horses or lions could paint, +they would delineate their Gods in form like themselves. The +Ethiopians conceive their Gods as black, the Thracians conceive theirs +as fair and with reddish hair."[48] Dissatisfied with much of the +customary worship and festivals, Xenophanes repudiated divination** +altogether, and condemned the extravagant respect shown to victors in +Olympic contests,[49] not less than the lugubrious ceremonies in +honour of Leukothea. He discountenanced all Theogony, or assertion of +the birth of Gods, as impious, and as inconsistent with the prominent +attribute of immortality ascribed to them.[50] He maintained that +there was but one God, identical with, or a personification of, the +whole Uranus. "The whole Kosmos, or the whole God, sees, hears, and +thinks." The divine nature (he said) did not admit of the conception +of separate persons one governing the other, or of want and +imperfection in any way.[51] + +[Footnote 48: Xenophanis Fragm. 5-6-7, p. 39 seq. ed. Karsten; Clemens +Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 601; vii. p. 711.] + +[Footnote 49: Xenophan. Fragm. 19, p. 60, ed. Karsten; Cicero, +Divinat. i. 3, 5.] + +[Footnote 50: Xenophanis Fragment. 34-35, p. 85, ed. Karsten; +Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 23; Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 19.] + +[Footnote 51: Xenoph. Frag. 1-2, p. 35. + +[Greek: Ou)=los o(ra=|, ou)=los de\ noei=, ou)=los de t' a)kou/ei.] + +Plutarch ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. i. 8; Diogen. Laert. ix. 19.] + +[Side-note: His doctrine of Pankosmism, or Pantheism--The whole Kosmos +is Ens Unum or God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pa=n]. Non-Ens inadmissible.] + +Though Xenophanes thus appears (like Pythagoras) mainly as a religious +dogmatist, yet theogony and cosmogony were so intimately connected in +the sixth century B.C., that he at the same time struck out a new +philosophical theory. His negation of theogony was tantamount to a +negation of cosmogony. In substituting Ens Unum--one God for many, he +set aside all distinct agencies in the universe, to recognise only one +agent, single, all-pervading, indivisible. He repudiated all genesis +of a new reality, all actual existence of parts, succession, change, +beginning, end, etc., in reference to the universe, as well as in +reference to God. "Wherever I turned my mind (he exclaimed) everything +resolved itself into One and the same: all things existing came back +always and everywhere into one similar and permanent nature."[52] The +fundamental tenet of Xenophanes was partly religious, partly +philosophical, Pantheism, or Pankosmism: looking upon the universe as +one real all-comprehensive Ens, which he would not call either finite +or infinite, either in motion or at rest.[53] Non-Ens he pronounced to +be an absurdity--an inadmissible and unmeaning phrase. + +[Footnote 52: Timon, fragment of the Silli ap. Sext. Empiric. Hypot. +Pyrrh. i. 33, sect. 224. + +[Greek: o)/ppê ga\r e)mo\n no/on ei)ru/saimi, +ei)s e(\n tau)to/ te pa=n a)nelu/eto, pa=n de o)\n ai)ei\ +pa/ntê a)nelko/menon mi/an ei)s phu/sin i)/stath' o(moi/an]. + +[Greek: Ai)ei\] here appears to be more conveniently construed with +[Greek: i)/stath'] not (as Karsten construes it, p. 118) with [Greek: +o)/n]. + +It is fair to presume that these lines are a reproduction of the +sentiments of Xenophanes, if not a literal transcript of his words.] + +[Footnote 53: Theophrastus ap. Simplikium in Aristotel. Physic. f. 6, +Karsten, p. 106; Arist. Met. A. 5, p. 986, b. 21: [Greek: Xenopha/nês +de\ prô=tos tou/tôn e(ni/sas, o( ga\r Parmeni/dês tou/ton le/getai +mathêtê/s,--eis to\n o(/lon ou)/ranon a)poble/psas to\ e(\n ei)=nai/ +phêsi to\n theo/n.]] + +[Side-note: Scepticism of Xenophanes--complaint of philosophy as +unsatisfactory.] + +It was thus from Xenophanes that the doctrine of Pankosmism obtained +introduction into Greek philosophy, recognising nothing real except +the universe as an indivisible and unchangeable whole. Such a creed +was altogether at variance with common perception, which apprehends +the universe as a plurality of substances, distinguishable, divisible, +changeable, &c. And Xenophanes could not represent his One and All, +which excluded all change, to be the substratum out of which +phenomenal variety was generated--as Water, Air, the Infinite, had +been represented by the Ionic philosophers. The sense of this +contradiction, without knowing how to resolve it, appears to have +occasioned the mournful complaints of irremediable doubt and +uncertainty, preserved as fragments from his poems. "No man (he +exclaims) knows clearly about the Gods or the universe: even if he +speak what is perfectly true, he himself does not know it to be true: +all is matter of opinion."[54] + +[Footnote 54: Xenophan. Fragm. 14, p. 51, ed. Karsten. + +[Greek: kai\ to\ me\n ou)=n saphe\s ou)/tis a)nê\r ge/net' ou)/de tis +e)/stai +ei)dô\s, a)mphi\ theô=n te kai\ a)/ssa le/gô peri\ pa/ntôn; +ei) ga\r kai\ ta\ ma/lista tu/choi tetelesme/non ei)pô\n, +au)to\s o(mô=s ou)k oi)=de; do/kos d' e)pi\ pa=si te/tuktai]. + +Compare the extract from the Silli of Timon in Sextus +Empiricus--Pyrrhon. Hypot. i. 224; and the same author, adv. +Mathemat. vii. 48-52.] + +Nevertheless while denying all real variety or division in the +universe, Xenophanes did not deny the variety of human perceptions and +beliefs. But he allowed them as facts belonging to man, not to the +universe--as subjective or relative, not as objective or absolute. He +even promulgated opinions of his own respecting many of the physical +and cosmological subjects treated by the Ionic philosophers. + +[Side-note: His conjectures on physics and astronomy.] + +Without attempting to define the figure of the Earth, he considered it +to be of vast extent and of infinite depth;[55] including, in its +interior cavities, prodigious reservoirs both of fire and water. He +thought that it had at one time been covered with water, in proof of +which he noticed the numerous shells found inland and on mountain +tops, together with the prints of various fish which he had observed +in the quarries of Syracuse, in the island of Paros, and elsewhere. +From these facts he inferred that the earth had once been covered with +water, and even that it would again be so covered at some future time, +to the destruction of animal and human life.[56] He supposed that the +sun, moon, and stars were condensations of vapours exhaled from the +Earth, collected into clouds, and alternately inflamed and +extinguished.[57] + +[Footnote 55: Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 13.] + +[Footnote 56: Xenophan. Fragm. p. 178, ed. Karsten; Achilles Tatius, +[Greek: Ei)sagôgê\] in Arat. Phænom. p. 128, [Greek: ta\ ka/tô d' e)s +a)/peiron i(ka/nei]. + +This inference from the shells and prints of fishes is very remarkable +for so early a period. Compare Herodotus (ii. 12) who notices the +fact, and draws the same inference, as to Lower Egypt; also Plutarch, +De Isid. et Osirid. c. 40, p. 367; and Strabo, i. p. 49-50, from whom +we learn that the Lydian historian Xanthus had made the like +observation, and also the like inference, for himself. Straton of +Lampsakus, Eratosthenes, and Strabo himself, approved what Xanthus +said.] + +[Footnote 57: Xenophanes Frag. p. 161 seq., ed. Karsten. Compare +Lucretius, v. 458. + + "per rara foramina, terræ +Partibus erumpens primus se sustulit æther +Ignifer et multos secum levis abstulit ignis . . . . +Sic igitur tum se levis ac diffusilis æther +Corpore concreto circumdatus undique flexit: . . . . +Hunc exordia sunt solis lunæque secuta."] + +[Side-note: Parmenides continues the doctrine of Xenophanes--Ens +Parmenideum, self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, extended,--Non-Ens, +an unmeaning phrase.] + +Parmenides, of Elea, followed up and gave celebrity to the Xenophanean +hypothesis in a poem, of which the striking exordium is yet preserved. +The two veins of thought, which Xenophanes had recognised and lamented +his inability to reconcile, were proclaimed by Parmenides as a sort of +inherent contradiction in the human mind--Reason or Cogitation +declaring one way, Sense (together with the remembrances and +comparisons of sense) suggesting a faith altogether opposite. Dropping +that controversy with the popular religion which had been raised by +Xenophanes, Parmenides spoke of many different Gods or Goddesses, and +insisted on the universe as one, without regarding it as one God. He +distinguished Truth from matter of Opinion.[58] Truth was knowable +only by pure mental contemplation or cogitation, the object of which +was Ens or Being, the Real or Absolute: here the Cogitans and the +Cogitatum were identical, one and the same.[59] Parmenides conceived +Ens not simply as existent, but as self-existent, without beginning or +end,[60] as extended, continuous, indivisible, and unchangeable. The +Ens Parmenideum comprised the two notions of Extension and +Duration:[61] it was something Enduring and Extended; Extension +including both space, and matter so far forth as filling space. +Neither the contrary of Ens (Non-Ens), nor anything intermediate +between Ens and Non-Ens, could be conceived, or named, or reasoned +about. Ens comprehended all that was Real, without beginning or end, +without parts or difference, without motion or change, perfect and +uniform like a well-turned sphere.[62] + +[Footnote 58: Parmenid. Fr. v. 29.] + +[Footnote 59: Parm. Frag. v. 40, 52-56. + + [Greek: to\ ga\r au)to\ noei=n e)sti/n te kai\ ei)=nai. +A)lla\ su\ tê=s d' a)ph' o(dou= dizê/sios ei)=rge no/êma, +mêde/ s' e)/thos polu/peiron o(do\n kata\ tê/nde bia/sthô, +nôma=|n a)/skopon o)/mma kai\ ê)chê/essan a)kouê\n +kai\ glô=ssan; kri=nai de\ lo/gô| polu/dênin e)/legchon +e)x e)me/then rhêthe/nta.]] + +[Footnote 60: Parm. Frag. v. 81. + +[Greek: au)ta\r a)ki/nêton mega/lôn e)n pei/rasi desmô=n +e)sti\n, a)/narchon, a)/pauston], &c.] + +[Footnote 61: Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griech., i. p. 403, ed. 2) +maintains, in my opinion justly, that the Ens Parmenideum is conceived +by its author as extended. Strümpell (Geschichte der theor. Phil. der +Griech., s. 44) represents it as unextended: but this view seems not +reconcilable with the remaining fragments.] + +[Footnote 62: Parm. Frag. v. 102.] + +[Side-note: He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and +relative, apart from Ens.] + +In this subject Ens, with its few predicates, chiefly negative, +consisted all that Parmenides called Truth. Everything else belonged +to the region of Opinion, which embraced all that was phenomenal, +relative, and transient: all that involved a reference to man's +senses, apprehension, and appreciation, all the indefinite diversity +of observed facts and inferences. Plurality, succession, change, +motion, generation, destruction, division of parts, &c., belonged to +this category. Parmenides did not deny that he and other men had +perceptions and beliefs corresponding to these terms, but he denied +their application to the Ens or the self-existent. We are conscious of +succession, but the self-existent has no succession: we perceive +change of colour and other sensible qualities, and change of place or +motion, but Ens neither changes nor moves. We talk of things generated +or destroyed--things coming into being or going out of being--but this +phrase can have no application to the self-existent Ens, which _is_ +always and cannot properly be called either past or future.[63] +Nothing is really generated or destroyed, but only in appearance to +us, or relatively to our apprehension.[64] In like manner we perceive +plurality of objects, and divide objects into parts. But Ens is +essentially One, and cannot be divided.[65] Though you may divide a +piece of matter you cannot divide the extension of which that matter +forms part: you cannot (to use the expression of Hobbes[66]) pull +asunder the first mile from the second, or the first hour from the +second. The milestone, or the striking of the clock, serve as marks to +assist you in making a mental division, and in considering or +describing one hour and one mile apart from the next. This, however, +is your own act, relative to yourself: there is no real division of +extension into miles, or of duration into hours. You may consider the +same space or time as one or as many, according to your convenience: +as one hour or as sixty minutes, as one mile or eight furlongs. But +all this is a process of your own mind and thoughts; another man may +divide the same total in a way different from you. Your division noway +modifies the reality without you, whatever that may be--the Extended +and Enduring Ens--which remains still a continuous one, undivided and +unchanged. + +[Footnote 63: Parm. Frag. v. 96. + +[Greek: ----e)pei\ to/ ge moi=r' e)pe/dêsen +Oi)=on a)ki/nêton tele/thein tô=| pa/nt' o)/nom' _ei)=nai_, +O)/ssa brotoi\ kate/thento, pepoitho/tes ei)=nai a)lêthê=, +gi/gnesthai/ te kai\ o)/llusthai, ei)=nai/ te kai\ ou)ki\, +kai\ to/pon a)lla/ssein, dia/ te chro/a phano\n a)mei/bein; + +v. 75:-- + +ei)/ ge ge/noit', ou)k e)/st'; ou)d' ei)/ po/te me/llei e)/sesthai; +tô=s ge/nesis me\n a)pe/sbestai, kai\ a)/pistos o)/lethros.]] + +[Footnote 64: Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 1. [Greek: Oi( me\n ga\r +au)tô=n o(/lôs a)nei=lon ge/nesin kai\ phthora/n; ou)the\n ga\r ou)/te +gi/gnesthai/ phasin ou)/te phthei/resthai tô=n o)/ntôn, _a)lla\ mo/non +dokei=n ê(mi=n_; oi)=on oi( peri\ Me/lisson kai\ Parmeni/dên], &c.] + +[Footnote 65: Parm. Frag. v. 77. + +[Greek: Ou)de\ diai/reto/n e)stin, e)pei\ pa=n e)sti\n o(/moion, +ou)de/ ti tê=| ma=llon to/ ken ei)/rgoi min xune/chesthai, +ou)de/ ti cheiro/teron; pa=n de\ ple/on e)sti\n e)o/ntos; +tô=| xuneche\s pa=n e)sti/n; e)o\n ga\r e)o/nti pela/zei]. + +Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 29, with the Scholia, and +Physic. i. 2, 3. Simplikius Comm. in Physic. Aristot. (apud Tennemann +Geschichte der Philos. b. i. s. 4, vol. i. p. 170) [Greek: pa/nta ga/r +phêsi (Parmeni/dês) ta\ o)/nta, katho\ o)/nta, e(n e)sti/n]. This +chapter, in which Tennemann gives an account of the Eleatic +philosophy, appears to me one of the best and most instructive in his +work.] + +[Footnote 66: "To make parts,--or to part or divide, Space or Time,--is +nothing else but to consider one and another within the same: so +that if any man divide space or time, the diverse conceptions he has +are more, by one, than the parts which he makes. For his first +conception is of that which is to be divided--then, of some part of +it--and again of some other part of it: and so forwards, as long as he +goes in dividing. But it is to be noted, that here, by _division_, I +do not mean the severing or pulling asunder of one space or time from +another (for does any man think that one hemisphere may be separated +from the other hemisphere, or the first hour from the second?), but +_diversity of consideration_: so that division is not made by the +operation of the hands, but of the mind."--Hobbes, First Grounds of +Philosophy, chap. vii. 5, vol. i. p. 96, ed. Molesworth. + +"Expansion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they +are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not +separable one from another, not even in thought; though the parts of +bodies from which we take our measure of the one--and the parts of +motion, from which we may take the measure of the other--may be +interrupted or separated."--Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, +book ii. ch. 15. s. 11. + +In the Platonic Parmenides, p. 156 D., we find the remarkable +conception of what he calls [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnês, a)/topo/s tis +phu/sis]--a break in the continuity of duration, an extra-temporal +moment.] + +[Side-note: Parmenidean ontology stands completely apart from +phenomenology.] + +The Ens of Parmenides thus coincided mainly with that which (since +Kant) has been called the Noumenon--the Thing in itself--the Absolute; +or rather with that which, by a frequent illusion, passes for the +absolute--no notice being taken of the cogitant and believing apart +from mind, as if cogitation and belief, _cogitata_ and _credita_, +would be had without it. By Ens was understood the remnant in his +mind, after leaving out all that abstraction, as far as it had then +been carried, could leave out. It was the minimum indispensable to the +continuance of thought; you cannot think (Parmenides says) without +thinking of Something, and that Something Extended and Enduring. +Though he and others talk of this Something as an Absolute (_i.e._ +apart from or independent of his own thinking mind), yet he also uses +some juster language ([Greek: to\ ga\r au)to\ noei=n e)/stin te kai\ +ei)=nai]), showing that it is really relative: that if the Cogitans +implies a Cogitatum, the Cogitatum also implies no less its +correlative Cogitans: and that though we may divide the two in words, +we cannot divide them in fact. It is to be remarked that Parmenides +distinguishes the Enduring or Continuous from the Transient or +Successive, Duration from Succession (both of which are included in +the meaning of the word Time), and that he considers Duration alone as +belonging to Ens or the Absolute--to the region of Truth--setting it +in opposition or antithesis to Succession, which he treats as relative +and phenomenal. We have thus (with the Eleates) the first appearance +of Ontology, the science of Being or Ens, in Grecian philosophy. Ens +is everything, and everything is Ens. In the view of Parmenides, +Ontology is not merely narrow, but incapable of enlargement or +application; we shall find Plato and others trying to expand it into +numerous imposing generalities.[67] + +[Footnote 67: Leibnitz says, Réponse à M. Foucher, p. 117, ed. +Erdmann, "Comment seroit il possible qu'aucune chose existât, si +l'être même, ipsum Esse, n'avoit l'existence? Mais bien au contraire +ne pourrait on pas dire avec beaucoup plus de raison, qu'il n'y a que +lui qui existe véritablement, les êtres particuliers n'ayant rien de +permanent? Semper generantur, et nunquam sunt."] + +[Side-note: Parmenidean phenomenology--relative and variable.] + +Apart from Ontology, Parmenides reckons all as belonging to human +opinions. These were derived from the observations of sense (which he +especially excludes from Ontology) with the comparisons, inferences, +hypothesis, &c., founded thereupon: the phenomena of Nature +generally.[68] He does not attempt (as Plato and Aristotle do after +him) to make Ontology serve as a principle or beginning for anything +beyond itself,[69] or as a premiss from which the knowledge of nature +is to be deduced. He treats the two--Ontology and Phenomenology, to +employ an Hegelian word--as radically disparate, and incapable of any +legitimate union. Ens was essentially one and enduring: Nature was +essentially multiform, successive, ever changing and moving relative +to the observer, and different to observers at different times and +places. Parmenides approached the study of Nature from its own +starting point, the same as had been adopted by the Ionic +philosophers--the data of sense, or certain agencies selected among +them, and vaguely applied to explain the rest. Here he felt that he +relinquished the full conviction, inseparable from his intellectual +consciousness, with which he announced his few absolute truths +respecting Ens and Non-Ens, and that he entered upon a process of +mingled observation and conjecture, where there was great room for +diversity of views between man and man. + +[Footnote 68: Karsten observes that the Parmenidean region of opinion +comprised not merely the data of sense, but also the comparisons, +generalisations, and notions, derived from sense. + +"[Greek: Doxasto\n] et [Greek: noêto\n] vocantur duo genera inter se +diversa, quorum alterum complectitur res externas et fluxas, +_notionesque quæ ex his ducuntur_--alterum res æternas et à conspectu +remotas," &c. (Parm. Fragm. p. 148-149).] + +[Footnote 69: Marbach (Lehrbuch der Gesch. der Philos., s. 71, not. 3) +after pointing out the rude philosophical expression of the +Parmenidean verses, has some just remarks upon the double aspect of +philosophy as there proclaimed, and upon the recognition by Parmenides +of that which he calls the "illegitimate" vein of enquiry along with +the "legitimate." + +"Learn from me (says Parmenides) the opinions of mortals, brought to +your ears in the deceitful arrangement of my words. This is not +philosophy (Marbach says): it is Physics. We recognise in modern times +two perfectly distinct ways of contemplating Nature: the philosophical +and the physical. Of these two, the second dwells in plurality, the +first in unity: the first teaches everything as infallible truth, the +second as multiplicity of different opinions. We ought not to ask why +Parmenides, while recognising the fallibility of this second road of +enquiry, nevertheless undertook to march in it,--any more than we can +ask, Why does not modern philosophy render physics superfluous?" + +The observation of Marbach is just and important, that the line of +research which Parmenides treated as illegitimate and deceitful, but +which he nevertheless entered upon, is the analogon of modern Physics. +Parmenides (he says) indicated most truly the contrast and divergence +between Ontology and Physics; but he ought to have gone farther, and +shown how they could be reconciled and brought into harmony. This +(Marbach affirms) was not even attempted, much less achieved, by +Parmenides: but it was afterwards attempted by Plato, and achieved by +Aristotle. + +Marbach is right in saying that the reconciliation was attempted by +Plato; but he is not right (I think) in saying that it was achieved by +Aristotle--nor by any one since Aristotle. It is the merit of +Parmenides to have brought out the two points of view as radically +distinct, and to have seen that the phenomenal world, if explained at +all, must be explained upon general principles of its own, raised out +of its own data of facts--not by means of an illusory Absolute and +Real. The subsequent philosophers, in so far as they hid and slurred +over this distinction, appear to me to have receded rather than +advanced.] + +[Side-note: Parmenides recognises no truth, but more or less +probability, in phenomenal explanations.--His physical and +astronomical conjectures.] + +Yet though thus passing from Truth to Opinions, from full certainty to +comparative and irremediable uncertainty,[70] Parmenides does not +consider all opinions as equally true or equally untrue. He announces +an opinion of his own--what he thinks most probable or least +improbable--respecting the structure and constitution of the Kosmos, +and he announces it without the least reference to his own doctrines +about Ens. He promises information respecting Earth, Water, Air, and +the heavenly bodies, and how they work, and how they came to be what +they are.[71] He recognises two elementary principles or beginnings, +one contrary to the other, but both of them positive--Light, +comprehending the Hot, the Light, and the Rare--Darkness, +comprehending the Cold, the Heavy, and the Dense.[72] These two +elements, each endued with active and vital properties, were brought +into junction and commixture by the influence of a Dea Genitalis +analogous to Aphroditê,[73] with her first-born son Eros, a personage +borrowed from the Hesiodic Theogony. From hence sprang the other +active forces of nature, personified under various names, and the +various concentric circles or spheres of the Kosmos. Of those spheres, +the outer-most was a solid wall of fire--"flammantia moenia +mundi"--next under this the Æther, distributed into several circles of +fire unequally bright and pure--then the circle called the Milky Way, +which he regarded as composed of light or fire combined with denser +materials--then the Sun and Moon, which were condensations of fire +from the Milky Way--lastly, the Earth, which he placed in the centre +of the Kosmos.[74] He is said to have been the first who pronounced +the earth to be spherical, and even distributed it into two or five +zones.[75] He regarded it as immovable, in consequence of its exact +position in the centre. He considered the stars to be fed by +exhalation from the Earth. Midway between the Earth and the outer +flaming circle, he supposed that there dwelt a Goddess--Justice or +Necessity--who regulated all the movements of the Kosmos, and +maintained harmony between its different parts. He represented the +human race as having been brought into existence by the power of the +sun,[76] and he seems to have gone into some detail respecting animal +procreation, especially in reference to the birth of male and female +offspring. He supposed that the human mind, as well as the human body, +was compounded of a mixture of the two elemental influences, diffused +throughout all Nature: that like was perceived and known by like: that +thought and sensation were alike dependent upon the body, and upon the +proportions of its elemental composition: that a certain limited +knowledge was possessed by every object in Nature, animate or +inanimate.[77] + +[Footnote 70: Parmen. Fr. v. 109. + +[Greek: e)n tô=| soi\ pau/ô pisto\n lo/gon ê)de\ no/êma +a)mphi\s a)lêthei/ês; do/xas d' a)po\ tou=de brotei/as +ma/nthane, ko/smon e)mô=n e)pe/ôn a)patêlo\n a)kou/ôn.]] + +[Footnote 71: Parm. Frag. v. 132-142.] + +[Footnote 72: Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 987, a. 1) represents +Parmenides as assimilating one of his phenomenal principles (Heat) to +Ens, and the other (Cold) to Non-Ens. There is nothing in the +fragments of Parmenides to justify this supposed analogy. Heat as well +as Cold belongs to Non-Ens, not to Ens, in the Parmenidean doctrine. +Moreover Cold or Dense is just as much a positive principle as Hot or +Rare, in the view of Parmenides; it is the female to the male (Parm. +Fragm. v. 129; comp. Karsten, p. 270). Aristotle conceives Ontology as +a substratum for Phenomenology; and his criticisms on Parmenides imply +(erroneously in my judgment) that Parmenides did the same. The remarks +which Brucker makes both on Aristotle's criticism and on the Eleatic +doctrine are in the main just, though the language is not very +suitable. + +Brucker, Hist. Philosoph., part ii. lib. ii. ch. xi. tom. 1, p. +1152-3, about Xenophanes:--"Ex iis enim quæ apud Aristotelem ex ejus +mente contra motum disputantur, patet Xenophanem motûs notionem aliam +quam quæ in physicis obtinet, sibi concepisse; et ad verum motum +progressum a nonente ad ens ejusque existentiam requisivisse. Quo sensu +notionis hujus semel admisso, sequebatur (cum illud impossibile sit, ut +ex nihilo fiat aliquid) universum esse immobile, adeoque et partes ejus +non ita moveri, ut ex statu nihili procederent ad statum existentiæ. +Quibus admissis, de rerum tamen mutationibus disserere poterat, quas +non alterationes, generationes, et extinctiones, rerum naturalium, sed +modificationes, esse putabat: hoc nomine indignas, eo quod rerum +universi natura semper maneret immutabilis, soliusque materiæ æternum +fluentis particulæ varie inter se modificarentur. Hâc ratione si +Eleaticos priores explicemus de motu disserentes, rationem facile +dabimus, quî de rebus physicis disserere et phenomena naturalia +explicare, salvâ istâ hypothesi, potuerint. Quod tamen de iis negat +Aristoteles, _conceptum motûs metaphysicum ad physicum transferens_: +ut, more suo, Eleatico systemate corrupto, eò vehementius illud +premeret."] + +[Footnote 73: Parmenides, ap. Simplik. ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 9 a. + +[Greek: e)n de\ me/sô| tou/tôn Daimôn, ê(\ pa/nta kuberna=|], &c. + +Plutarch, Amator, 13.] + +[Footnote 74: See especially the remarkable passage from Stobæus, +Eclog. Phys. i. 23, p. 482, cited in Karsten, Frag. Parm. p. 241, and +Cicero, De Natur. Deor, i. 11, s. 28, with the Commentary of Krische, +Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, viii. p. 98, seqq. + +It is impossible to make out with any clearness the Kosmos and its +generation as conceived by Parmenides. We cannot attain more than a +general approximation to it.] + +[Footnote 75: Diogen. Laert. ix. 21, viii. 48; Strabo, ii. p. 93 (on +the authority of Poseidonius). Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iii. 11) and +others ascribe to Parmenides the recognition not of five zones, but +only of two. If it be true that Parmenides held this opinion about the +figure of the earth, the fact is honourable to his acuteness; for +Leukippus, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes the Apolloniate, and +Demokritus, all thought the earth to be a flat, round surface, like a +dish or a drum: Plato speaks about it in so confused a manner that his +opinion cannot be made out: and Aristotle was the first who both +affirmed and proved it to be spherical. The opinion had been +propounded by some philosophers earlier than Anaxagoras, who +controverted it. See the dissertation of L. Oettinger. Die +Vorstellungen der Griechen über die Erde als Himmelskörper, Freiburg, +1850, p. 42-46.] + +[Footnote 76: Diogen. Laert. ix. 22.] + +[Footnote 77: Parmen. Frag. v. 145; Theophrastus, De Sensu, Karsten. +pp. 268, 270. + +Parmenides (according to Theophrastus) thought that the dead body, +having lost its fiery element, had no perception of light, or heat, or +sound; but that it had perception of darkness, cold, and +silence--[Greek: kai\ o(/lôs de\ pa=n to\ o)\n e)/chein tina gnô=sin].] + +Before we pass from Parmenides to his pupil and successor Zeno, who +developed the negative and dialectic side of the Eleatic doctrine, it +will be convenient to notice various other theories of the same +century: first among them that of Herakleitus, who forms as it were +the contrast and antithesis to Xenophanes and Parmenides. + +[Side-note: Herakleitus--his obscure style, impressive metaphors, +confident and contemptuous dogmatism.] + +Herakleitus of Ephesus, known throughout antiquity by the denomination +of the Obscure, comes certainly after Pythagoras and Xenophanes and +apparently before Parmenides. Of the two first he made special +mention, in one of the sentences, alike brief and contemptuous which +have been preserved from his lost treatise:--"Much learning does not +teach reason: otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, +Xenophanes and Hekatæus." In another passage Herakleitus spoke of the +"extensive knowledge, cleverness, and wicked arts" of Pythagoras. He +declared that Homer as well as Archilochus deserved to be scourged and +expelled from the public festivals.[78] His thoughts were all embodied +in one single treatise, which he is said to have deposited in the +temple of the Ephesian Artemis. It was composed in a style most +perplexing and difficult to understand, full of metaphor, symbolical +illustration, and antithesis: but this very circumstance imparted to +it an air of poetical impressiveness and oracular profundity.[79] It +exercised a powerful influence on the speculative minds of Greece, +both in the Platonic age, and subsequently: the Stoics especially both +commented on it largely (though with many dissentient opinions among +the commentators), and borrowed with partial modifications much of its +doctrine.[80] + +[Footnote 78: Diogen. L. ix. 1. [Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on ou) +dida/skei; Ê(si/odon ga\r a)\n e)di/daxe kai\ Puthago/rên, au)=tis te +Xenopha/nea kai\ E(katai=on], &c. Ib. viii. 1, 6. [Greek: Puthago/rês +Mnêsa/rchou i(stori/ên ê)/skêsen a)nthrô/pôn ma/lista pa/ntôn, kai\ +e)klexa/menos tau/tas ta\s suggrapha\s e)poi/êsen e(ôu+tou= sophi/ên, +polumathi/ên, kakotechni/ên.]] + +[Footnote 79: Diogen. Laert. ix. 1-6. Theophrastus conceived that +Herakleitus had left the work unfinished, from eccentricity of +temperament ([Greek: u(po\ melagcholi/as]). Of him, as of various +others, it was imagined by some that his obscurity was intentional +(Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 26, 74, De Finib. 2, 5). The words of Lucretius +about Herakleitus are remarkable (i. 641):-- + +Clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanes +Quamde graves inter Græcos qui vera requirunt: +Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque +Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt. + +Even Aristotle complains of the difficulty of understanding +Herakleitus, and even of determining the proper punctuation (Rhetoric. +iii. 5).] + +[Footnote 80: Cicero, Nat. Deor., iii. 14, 35.] + +[Side-note: Doctrine of Herakleitus--perpetual process of generation +and destruction--everything flows, nothing stands--transition of the +elements into each other, backwards and forwards.] + +The expositors followed by Lucretius and Cicero conceived Herakleitus +as having proclaimed Fire to be the universal and all-pervading +element of nature;[81] as Thales had recognised water, and Anaximenes +air. This interpretation was countenanced by some striking passages of +Herakleitus: but when we put together all that remains from him, it +appears that his main doctrine was not physical, but metaphysical or +ontological: that the want of adequate general terms induced him to +clothe it in a multitude of symbolical illustrations, among which fire +was only one, though the most prominent and most significant.[82] +Xenophanes and the Eleates had recognised, as the only objective +reality, One extended Substance or absolute Ens, perpetual, infinite, +indeterminate, incapable of change or modification. They denied the +objective reality of motion, change, generation, and +destruction--considering all these to be purely relative and phenomenal. +Herakleitus on the contrary denied everything in the nature of a +permanent and perpetual substratum: he laid down nothing as permanent +and perpetual except the process of change--the alternate sequence of +generation and destruction, without beginning or end--generation and +destruction being in fact coincident or identical, two sides of the +same process, since the generation of one particular state was the +destruction of its antecedent contrary. All reality consisted in the +succession and transition, the coming and going, of these finite and +particular states: what he conceived as the infinite and universal, +was the continuous process of transition from one finite state to the +next--the perpetual work of destruction and generation combined, which +terminated one finite state in order to make room for a new and +contrary state. + +[Footnote 81: To some it appeared that Herakleitus hardly +distinguished Fire from Air. Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Empiric. +adv. Mathemat. vii. 127-129, ix. 360.] + +[Footnote 82: Zeller's account of the philosophy of Herakleitus in the +second edition of his Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 450-496, is +instructive. Marbach also is useful (Gesch. der Phil. s. 46-49); and +his (Hegelian) exposition of Herakleitus is further developed by +Ferdinand Lassalle (Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen, published +1858). This last work is very copious and elaborate, throwing great +light upon a subject essentially obscure and difficult.] + +[Side-note: Variety of metaphors employed by Herakleitus, signifying +the same general doctrine.] + +This endless process of transition, or ever-repeated act of generation +and destruction in one, was represented by Herakleitus under a variety +of metaphors and symbols--fire consuming its own fuel--a stream of +water always flowing--opposite currents meeting and combating each +other--the way from above downwards, and the way from below upwards, +one and the same--war, contest, penal destiny or retributive justice, +the law or decree of Zeus realising each finite condition of things +and then destroying its own reality to make place for its contrary and +successor. Particulars are successively generated and destroyed, none +of them ever arriving at permanent existence:[83] the universal +process of generation and destruction alone continues. There is no +Esse, but a perpetual Fieri: a transition from Esse to Non-Esse, from +Non-Esse to Esse, with an intermediate temporary halt between them: a +ceaseless meeting and confluence of the stream of generation with the +opposite stream of destruction: a rapid and instant succession, or +rather coincidence and coalescence, of contraries. Living and dead, +waking and sleeping, light and dark, come into one or come round into +each other: everything twists round into its contrary: everything both +is and is not.[84] + +[Footnote 83: Plato, Kratylus, p. 402, and Theætet. p. 152, 153. + +Plutarch, De [Greek: Ei] apud Delphos, c. 18, p. 392. [Greek: Potamô=| +ga\r ou)/k e)stin e)mbê=nai di\s tô=| au)tô=| kath' Ê(ra/kleiton, +ou)de\ thnêtê=s ou)si/as di\s a(/psasthai kata\ e(/xin; a)ll' +o)xu/têti kai\ tachei metabolês skidnêsi kai\ pa/lin suna/gei, +_ma=llon de\ ou)de\ pa/lin ou)de\ u(/steron, a)ll' a(/ma suni/statai +kai\ a)polei/pei, pro/seisi kai\ a)/peisi. O(/then ou)d' ei)s to\ +ei)=nai perai/nei to\ gigno/menon au)tê=s_, tô=| mêde/pote lê/gein +mêd' i(/stasthai tê\n ge/nesin, a)ll' a)po\ spe/rmatos a)ei\ +metaba/llousan--ta\s prô/tas phthei/rousan gene/seis kai\ ê(liki/as +tai=s e)pigignome/nais]. + +Clemens Alex. Strom. v. 14, p. 711. [Greek: Ko/smon to\n au)to\n +a(pa/ntôn ou)/te tis theô=n ou)/t' a)nthrô/pôn e)poi/êsen; a)ll' ê=n +a)ei\ kai\ e)/stai pu=r a)ei/zôon, a(pto/menon me/tra kai\ +a)posbennu/menon me/tra]. Compare also Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. xiv. +3, 8; Diogen. L. ix. 8.] + +[Footnote 84: Plato, Sophist. p. 242 E. [Greek: Diaphero/menon ga\r +a)ei\ xumphe/retai]. + +Plutarch, Consolat. ad Apollonium c. 10, p. 106. [Greek: Po/te ga\r +e)n ê(mi=n au)toi=s ou)k e)/stin o( tha/natos? kai\ ê(=| phêsin +Ê(ra/kleitos, tau)to/ t' e)/ni zô=n kai\ tethnêko/s, kai\ to\ +e)grêgoro\s kai\ to\ katheu=don, kai\ ne/on kai\ gêraio/n; ta/de ga\r +metapeso/nta e)kei=na e)sti, ka)kei=na pa/lin metapeso/nta tau=ta]. + +Pseudo-Origenes, Refut. Hær. ix. 10, [Greek: O( theo\s ê(me/rê, +eu)phro/nê--chei/môn, the/ros--po/lemos, ei)rê/nê--ko/ros, li/mos], +&c.] + +[Side-note: Nothing permanent except the law of process and +implication of contraries--the transmutative force. Fixity of +particulars is an illusion for most part, so far as it exists, it is a +sin against the order of Nature.] + +The universal law, destiny, or divine working (according to +Herakleitus), consists in this incessant process of generation and +destruction, this alternation of contraries. To carry out such law +fully, each of the particular manifestations ought to appear and pass +away instantaneously--to have no duration of its own, but to be +supplanted by its contrary at once. And this happens to a great +degree, even in cases where it does not appear to happen: the river +appears unchanged, though the water which we touched a short time ago +has flowed away:[85] we and all around us are in rapid movement, +though we appear stationary: the apparent sameness and fixity is thus +a delusion. But Herakleitus does not seem to have thought that his +absolute universal force was omnipotent, or accurately carried out in +respect to all particulars. Some positive and particular +manifestations, when once brought to pass, had a certain measure of +fixity, maintaining themselves for more or less time before they were +destroyed. There was a difference between one particular and another, +in this respect of comparative durability: one was more durable, +another less.[86] But according to the universal law or destiny, each +particular ought simply to make its appearance, then to be supplanted +and re-absorbed; so that the time during which it continued on the +scene was, as it were, an unjust usurpation, obtained by encroaching +on the equal right of the next comer, and by suspending the negative +agency of the universal. Hence arises an antithesis or hostility +between the universal law or process on one side, and the persistence +of particular states on the other. The universal law or process is +generative and destructive, positive and negative, both in one: but +the particular realities in which it manifests itself are all +positive, each succeeding to its antecedent, and each striving to +maintain itself against the negativity or destructive interference of +the universal process. Each particular reality represented rest and +fixity: each held ground as long as it could against the pressure of +the cosmical force, essentially moving, destroying, and renovating. +Herakleitus condemns such pretensions of particular states to separate +stability, inasmuch as it keeps back the legitimate action of the +universal force, in the work of destruction and renovation. + +[Footnote 85: Aristot. De Coelo, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30; Physic. viii. +3, p. 253, b. 9. [Greek: Phasi/ tines kinei=sthai tô=n o)/ntôn ou) ta\ +me\n ta\ d' ou)/, a)lla\ pa/nta kai\ a)ei\, a)lla\ lantha/nein tou=to +tê\n ê(mete/ran ai)/sthêsin]--which words doubtless refer to +Herakleitus. See Preller, Hist. Phil. Græc. Rom. s. 47.] + +[Footnote 86: Lassalle, Philosophie des Herakleitos, vol. i. pp. 54, +55. "Andrerseits bieten die sinnlichen Existenzen _graduelle_ oder +_Mass-Unterschiede_ dar, je nachdem in ihnen das Moment des festen +Seins über die Unruhe des Werdens vorwiegt oder nicht; und diese +Graduation wird also zugleich den Leitfaden zur Classification der +verschiedenen Existenz-formen bilden."] + +[Side-note: Illustrations by which Herakleitus symbolized his +perpetual force, destroying and generating.] + +The theory of Herakleitus thus recognised no permanent substratum, or +Ens, either material or immaterial--no category either of substance or +quality--but only a ceaseless principle of movement or change, +generation and destruction, position and negation, immediately +succeeding, or coinciding with each other.[87] It is this principle or +everlasting force which he denotes under so many illustrative +phrases--"the common ([Greek: to\ xuno\n]), the universal, the +all-comprehensive ([Greek: to\ perie/chon]), the governing, the divine, +the name or reason of Zeus, fire, the current of opposites, strife or +war, destiny, justice, equitable measure, Time or the Succeeding," &c. +The most emphatic way in which this theory could be presented was, as +embodied, in the coincidence or co-affirmation of contraries. Many of +the dicta cited and preserved out of Herakleitus are of this +paradoxical tenor.[88] Other dicta simply affirm perpetual flow, +change, or transition, without express allusion to contraries: which +latter, however, though not expressed, must be understood, since +change was conceived as a change from one contrary to the other.[89] +In the Herakleitean idea, contrary forces come simultaneously into +action: destruction and generation always take effect together: there +is no negative without a positive, nor positive without a +negative.[90] + +[Footnote 87: Aristot. De Coelo, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30. [Greek: Oi( +de\ ta\ me\n a)/lla pa/nta gi/nesthai/ te/ phasi kai\ rhei=n, ei)=nai +de\ pagi/ôs ou)de/n, e(\n de/ ti mo/non u(pome/nein, e)x ou(= tau=ta +pa/nta metaschêmati/zesthai pe/phuken; o(/per e)oi/kasin bou/lesthai +le/gein a)/lloi te polloi\ kai\ Ê(ra/kleitos o( E)phe/sios]. See the +explanation given of this passage by Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 21, 39, 40, +founded on the comment of Simplikius. He explains it as an universal +law or ideal force--die reine Idee des Werdens selbst (p. 24), and +"eine unsinnliche Potenz" (p. 25). Yet, in i. p. 55 of his elaborate +exposition, he does indeed say, about the theory of Herakleitus, "Hier +sind zum erstenmale die sinnlichen Bestimmtheiten zu bloss +verschiedenen und absolut in einander übergehenden Formen eines +identischen, ihnen zu Grunde liegenden, _Substrats_ herabgesetzt". +But this last expression appears to me to contradict the whole tenor +and peculiarity of Lassalle's own explanation of the Herakleitean +theory. He insists almost in every page (compare ii. p. 156) that "das +Allgemeine" of Herakleitus is "reines Werden; reiner, steter, +erzeugender, Prozess". This process cannot with any propriety be +called a _substratum_, and Herakleitus admitted no other. In thus +rejecting any substratum he stood alone. Lassalle has been careful in +showing that Fire was not understood by Herakleitus as a substratum +(as water by Thales), but as a symbol for the universal force or law. +In the theory of Herakleitus no substratum was recognised--no [Greek: +to/de ti] or [Greek: ou)si/a]--in the same way as Aristotle observes +about [Greek: to\ a)/peiron] (Physic. iii. 6, a. 22-31) [Greek: ô(/ste +to\ a)/peiron ou) dei= lamba/nein ô(s to/de ti, oi(=on a)/nthrôpon ê)\ +oi)ki/an, a)ll' ô(s ê( ê(me/ra le/getai kai\ o( a)gô\n, oi(=s to\ +ei)=nai _ou)ch' ô(s ou)si/a tis ge/gonen, a)ll' a)ei\ e)n gene/sei ê(\ +phthora=|_, ei) kai\ peperasme/non, _a)ll' a)ei/ ge e(/teron kai\ +e(/teron_.]] + +[Footnote 88: Aristotle or Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo, c. 5, p. 396, +b. 20. [Greek: Tau)to\ de\ tou=to ê)=n kai\ to\ para\ tô=| skoteinô=| +lego/menon Ê(rakleitô=|: "suna/pseias ou)=la kai\ ou)chi\ ou)=la, +sumphero/menon kai\ diaphero/menon, suna=|don kai\ dia=|don, kai\ e)k +pa/ntôn e(\n kai\ e)x e(no\s pa/nta."] Heraclid. Allegor. ap. +Schleiermacher (Herakleitos, p. 529), [Greek: potamoi=s toi=s au)toi=s +e)mbai/nome/n te kai\ ou)k e)mbai/nomen, ei)me/n te kai\ ou)k +ei)me/n]: Plato, Sophist, p. 242, E., [Greek: diaphero/menon a)ei\ +xumphe/retai]: Aristotle, Metaphys. iii. 7, p. 1012, b. 24, [Greek: +e)/oike d' o( me\n Ê(raklei/tou lo/gos, le/gôn pa/nta ei)=nai kai\ mê\ +ei)=nai, a(/panta a)lêthê= poei=n]: Aristot. Topic. viii. 5, p. 155, +b., [Greek: oi(=on a)gatho\n kai\ kako\n ei)=nai tau)to\n, katha/per +Ê(ra/kleito/s phêsin]: also Aristot. Physic. i. 2, p. 185, b. Compare +the various Herakleitean phrases cited in Pseudo-Origen. Refut. Hæres. +Fragm. ix. 10; also Krische, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten +Philosophie, vol. i. p. 370-468. + +Bernays and Lassalle (vol. i. p. 81) contend, on reasonable grounds +(though in opposition to Zeller, p. 495), that the following verses in +the Fragments of Parmenides refer to Herakleitus: + +[Greek: oi(=s to\ pe/lein te kai\ ou)k ei)=nai tau)to\n neno/mistai +kou) tau)to\n, pa/ntôn de\ pali/ntropo/s e)sti ke/leuthos]. + +The commentary of Alexander Aphrodis. on the Metaphysica says, +"Heraclitus ergo cum diceret omnem rem esse et non esse et opposita +simul consistere, contradictionem veram simul esse statuebat, et omnia +dicebat esse vera" (Lassalle, p. 83). + +One of the metaphors by which Herakleitus illustrated his theory of +opposite and co-existent forces, was the pulling and pushing of two +sawyers with the same saw. See Bernays, Heraclitea, part i. p. 16; Bonn, +1848.] + +[Footnote 89: Aristot. Physic. viii. 3, p. 253, b. 30, [Greek: ei)s +tou)nanti/on ga\r ê( a)lloi/ôsis]: also iii. 5, p. 205, a. 6, [Greek: +pa/nta ga\r metaba/llei e)x e)nanti/ou ei)s e)nanti/on, oi(=on e)k +thermou= ei)s psuchro/n.]] + +[Footnote 90: Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. i. p. 323.] + +[Side-note: Water--intermediate between Fire (Air) and Earth.] + +Such was the metaphysical or logical foundation of the philosophy of +Herakleitus: the idea of an eternal process of change, manifesting +itself in the perpetual destruction and renovation of particular +realities, but having itself no reality apart from these +particulars, and existing only in them as an immanent principle or +condition. This principle, from the want of appropriate abstract +terms, he expressed in a variety of symbolical and metaphorical +phrases, among which Fire stood prominent.[91] But though Fire was +thus often used to denote the principle or ideal process itself, the +same word was also employed to denote that one of the elements which +formed the most immediate manifestation of the principle. In this +latter sense, Fire was the first stage of incipient reality: the +second stage was water, the third earth. This progression, fire, +water, earth, was in Herakleitean language "the road downwards," which +was the same as "the road upwards," from earth to water and again to +fire. The death of fire was its transition into water: that of water +was its transition partly into earth, partly into flame. As fire was +the type of extreme mobility, perpetual generation and destruction--so +earth was the type of fixed and stationary existence, resisting +movement or change as much as possible.[92] Water was intermediate +between the two. + +[Footnote 91: See a striking passage cited from Gregory of Nyssa by +Lassalle (vol. i. p. 287), illustrating this characteristic of fire; +the flame of a lamp appears to continue the same, but it is only a +succession of flaming particles, each of which takes fire and is +extinguished in the same instant: [Greek: ô(/sper to\ e)pi\ tê=s +thrualli/dos pu=r tô=| me\n dokei=n a)ei\ to\ au)to\ phai/netai--to\ +ga\r suneche\s a)ei\ tê=s kinê/seôs a)dia/spaston au)to\ kai\ +ê(nôme/non pro\s e(auto\ dei/knusi--tê=| de\ a)lêthei/a| pa/ntote +au)to\ e(auto\ diadecho/menon, ou)de/pote to\ au)to\ me/nei--ê( ga\r +e)xelkusthei=sa dia\ tê=s thermo/têtos i)kma\s _o(mou= te +e)xephlogô/thê kai\ ei)s lignu\n e)kkauthei=sa metapoiê/thê_], &c.] + +[Footnote 92: Diogen. Laert. ix. 9; Clemens Alexand. Strom. v. 14, p. +599, vi. 2, p. 624. [Greek: Puro\s tropai\ prô=ton tha/lassa, +thala/ttês de\ to\ me\n ê(/misu gê=, to\ d' ê(/misu prêstê/r]. A full +explanation of the curious expression [Greek: prêstê/r] is given by +Lassalle (Herakl. vol. ii. p. 87-90). See Brandis (Handbuch der Gr. +Philos. sect, xliii. p. 164), and Plutarch (De Primo Frigido, c. 17, +p. 952, F.). + +The distinction made by Herakleitus, but not clearly marked out or +preserved, between the _ideal fire_ or universal process, and the +_elementary fire_ or first stage towards realisation, is brought out +by Lassalle (Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 25-29).] + +[Side-note: Sun and stars--not solid bodies but meteoric aggregations +dissipated and renewed--Eclipses--[Greek: e)kpu/rôsis], or +destructions of the Kosmos by fire.] + +Herakleitus conceived the sun and stars, not as solid bodies, but as +meteoric aggregations perpetually dissipated and perpetually renewed +or fed, by exhalation upward from the water and earth. The sun became +extinguished and rekindled in suitable measure and proportion, under +the watch of the Erinnyes, the satellites of Justice. These celestial +lights were contained in troughs, the open side of which was turned +towards our vision. In case of eclipses the trough was for the time +reversed, so that the dark side was turned towards us; and the +different phases of the moon were occasioned by the gradual turning +round of the trough in which her light was contained. Of the phenomena +of thunder and lightning also, Herakleitus offered some explanation, +referring them to aggregations and conflagrations of the clouds, and +violent currents of winds.[93] Another hypothesis was often ascribed +to Herakleitus, and was really embraced by several of the Stoics in +later times--that there would come a time when all existing things +would be destroyed by fire ([Greek: e)kpu/rôsis]), and afterwards +again brought into reality in a fresh series of changes. But this +hypothesis appears to have been conceived by him metaphysically rather +than physically. Fire was not intended to designate the physical +process of combustion, but was a symbolical phrase for the universal +process; the perpetual agency of conjoint destruction and renovation, +manifesting itself in the putting forth and re-absorption of +particulars, and having no other reality except as immanent in these +particulars.[94] The determinate Kosmos of the present moment is +perpetually destroyed, passing into fire or the indeterminate: it is +perpetually renovated or passes out of fire into water, earth--out of +the indeterminate, into the various determinate modifications. At the +same time, though Herakleitus seems to have mainly employed these +symbols for the purpose of signifying or typifying a metaphysical +conception, yet there was no clear apprehension, even in his own mind, +of this generality, apart from all symbols: so that the illustration +came to count as a physical fact by itself, and has been so understood +by many.[95] The line between what he meant as the ideal or +metaphysical process, and the elementary or physical process, is not +easy to draw, in the fragments which now remain. + +[Footnote 93: Aristot. Meteorol. ii. e. p. 355, a. Plato, Republ. vi. +p. 498, c. 11; Plutarch, De Exilio, c. 11, p. 604 A.; Plutarch. De +Isid. et Osirid. c. 48, p. 370, E.; Diogen. L. ix. 10; Plutarch, +Placit. Philos. ii. 17-22-24-28, p. 889-891; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. +p. 594. + +About the doctrine of the Stoics, built in part upon this of +Herakleitus, see Cicero, Natur. Deor. ii. 46; Seneca, Quæst. Natur. +ii. 5, vi. 16.] + +[Footnote 94: Aristot. or Pseudo-Aristot., De Mundo, [Greek: e)k +pa/ntôn e(\n kai\ e)x e(no\s pa/nta].] + +[Footnote 95: See Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. s. 26-27, +p. 182-258. + +Compare about the obscure and debated meaning of the Herakleitean +[Greek: e)kpu/rôsis], Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 103; Zeller, +Philos. der Griech. vol. i. p. 477-479. + +The word [Greek: diako/smêsis] stands as the antithesis (in the +language of Herakleitus) to [Greek: e)kpu/rôsis]. A passage from Philo +Judæus is cited by Lassalle illustrating the Herakleitean movement +from ideal unity into totality of sensible particulars, forwards and +backwards--[Greek: o( de\ gonorrhuê\s (lo/gos) e)k ko/smou pa/nta kai\ +ei)s ko/smon a)na/gôn, u(po\ theou= de\ mêde\n oi)o/menos, +Ê(rakleitei/ou do/xês e(tai=ros, ko/ron kai\ chrêsmosu/nên, kai\ e(\n +to\ pa=n kai\ pa/nta a)moibê=| ei)sa/gôn]--where [Greek: ko/ros] and +[Greek: chrêsmosu/nê] are used to illustrate the same ideal antithesis +as [Greek: diako/smêsis] and [Greek: e)kpu/rôsis] (Lassalle, vol. i. +p. 232).] + +[Side-note: His doctrines respecting the human soul and human +knowledge. All wisdom resided in the Universal Wisdom--individual +Reason is worthless.] + +The like blending of metaphysics and physics--of the abstract and the +concrete and sensible--is to be found in the statements remaining from +Herakleitus respecting the human soul and human knowledge. The human +soul, according to him, was an effluence or outlying portion of the +Universal[96]--the fire--the perpetual movement or life of things. As +such, its nature was to be ever in movement: but it was imprisoned and +obstructed by the body, which represented the stationary, the fixed, +the particular--that which resisted the universal force of change. So +long as a man lived, his soul or mind, though thus confined, +participated more or less in the universal movement: but when he died, +his body ceased to participate in it, and became therefore vile, "fit +only to be cast out like dung". Every man, individually considered, +was irrational;[97] reason belonged only to the universal or the +whole, with which the mind of each living man was in conjunction, +renewing itself by perpetual absorption, inspiration or inhalation, +vaporous transition, impressions through the senses and the pores, &c. +During sleep, since all the media of communication, except only those +through respiration, were suspended, the mind became stupefied and +destitute of memory. Like coals when the fire is withdrawn, it lost +its heat and tended towards extinction.[98] On waking, it recovered +its full communication with the great source of intelligence +without--the universal all-comprehensive process of life and movement. +Still, though this was the one and only source of intelligence open to all +waking men, the greater number of men could neither discern it for +themselves, nor understand it without difficulty even when pointed out +to them. Though awake, they were not less unconscious or forgetful of +the process going on around them, than if they had been asleep.[99] +The eyes and ears of men with barbarous or stupid souls, gave them +false information.[100] They went wrong by following their own +individual impression or judgment: they lived as if reason or +intelligence belonged to each man individually. But the only way to +attain truth was, to abjure all separate reason, and to follow the +common or universal reason. Each man's mind must become identified and +familiar with that common process which directed and transformed the +whole: in so far as he did this, he attained truth: whenever he +followed any private or separate judgment of his own, he fell into +error.[101] The highest pitch of this severance of the individual +judgment was seen during sleep, at which time each man left the common +world to retire into a world of his own.[102] + +[Footnote 96: Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. vii. 130. [Greek: ê( +e)pixenôthei=sa toi=s ê(mete/rois sô/masin a)po\ tou= perie/chontos +moi=ra]. + +Plutarch, Sympos., p. 644. [Greek: neku/es kopri/ôn e)kblêto/teroi]. + +Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 23, p. 884. [Greek: Ê(ra/kleitos +ê)remi/an kai\ sta/sin e)k tô=n o(/lôn a)nê/|rei; e)sti\ ga\r tou=to +tô=n nekrô=n.]] + +[Footnote 97: See Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 522; Sext. Empir. +adv. Mathem. viii. 286.] + +[Footnote 98: The passage of Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. +127-134) is curious and instructive about Herakleitus. + +[Greek: A)re/skei ga\r tô=| phusikô=|] (Herakleitus) [Greek: to +perie/chon ê(ma=s logiko/n te o)\n kai\ phrenê=res--tou=ton dê\ to\n +thei=on lo/gon, kath' Ê(ra/kleiton, di' a)napnoê=s spa/santes noeroi\ +gino/metha, kai\ e)n me\n u(/pnois lêthai=oi, kata\ de\ e)/gersin +pa/lin e)/mphrones. e)n ga\r toi=s u(/pnois musa/ntôn tô=n +ai)sthêtikô=n po/rôn chôri/zetai tê=s pro\s to\ perie/chon sumphui+/as +o( e)n ê(mi=n nou=s, monê=s tê=s kata\ a)napnoê\n prosphu/seôs +sôzome/nês oi(onei/ tinos rhi/zês, chôristhei/s te a)poba/llei ê)\n +pro/teron ei)=che mnêmonikê\n du/namin. e)n de\ e)grêgoro/si pa/lin +dia\ tô=n ai)sthêtikô=n po/rôn ô(/sper dia\ tinô=n thuri/dôn +proku/psas kai\ tô=| perie/chonti sumba/llôn logikê\n e)ndu/etai +du/namin.] Then follows the simile about coals brought near to, or +removed away from, the fire. + +The Stoic version of this Herakleitean doctrine, is to be seen in +Marcus Antoninus, viii. 54. [Greek: Mêke/ti mo/non _sumpnei=n tô=| +perie/chonti a)e/ri, a)ll' ê)/dê kai\ sumphronei=n tô=| perie/chonti +pa/nta noerô=|_. Ou) ga\r ê(=tton ê( noera\ du/namis pa/ntê ke/chutai +kai\ diapephoi/têke tô=| spa=sai boulome/nô|, ê(/per ê( a)erô/dês tô=| +a)napneu=sai duname/nô|]. + +The Stoics, who took up the doctrine of Herakleitus with farther +abstraction and analysis, distinguished and named separately matters +which he conceived in one and named together--the physical inhalation +of air--the metaphysical supposed influx of +intelligence--_inspiration_ in its literal and metaphorical senses. The +word [Greek: to\ perie/chon], as he conceives it, seems to denote, not any +distinct or fixed local region, but the rotatory movement or circulation +of the elements, fire, water, earth, reverting back into each other. +Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 119-120; which transition also is denoted by the +word [Greek: a)nathumi/asis] in the Herakleitean sense--cited from +Herakleitus by Aristotle. De Animâ, i. 2, 16.] + +[Footnote 99: Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. vii. 132) here cites the +first words of the treatise of Herakleitus (compare also Aristotle, +Rhet. iii. 5). [Greek: lo/gou tou=de e)o/ntos a)xu/netoi gi/gnontai +a)/nthrôpoi kai\ pro/sthen ê)\ a)kou=sai kai\ a)kou/santes to\ +prô=ton;--tou\s de\ a)/llous a)nthrô/pous lantha/nei o(ko/sa +e)gerthe/ntes poiou=sin o(/kôsper o(ko/sa eu(/dontes +e)pilantha/nontai.]] + +[Footnote 100: Sext. Empiric. ib. vii. 126, a citation from +Herakleitus.] + +[Footnote 101: Sext. Emp. ib. vii. 133 (the words of Herakleitus) +[Greek: dio\ dei= _e(/pesthai tô=| xunô=|_;--tou= lo/gou de\ e)o/ntos +xunou=, zô/ousin oi( polloi\ ô(s i)di/an e)/chontes phro/nêsin; ê( d' +e)/stin ou)k a)/llo ti _a)ll' e)xê/gêsis tou= tro/pou tê=s tou= +pa/ntos dioikê/seôs_; dio\ kath' o(/ ti a)\n au)tou= tê=s mnê/mês +koinônê/sômen, a)lêtheu/omen, a(\ de\ a)\n i)dia/sômen, +pseudo/metha.]] + +[Footnote 102: Plutarch, De Superstit. c. 3, p. 166, C. See also the +passage in Clemens Alexandr. Strom. iv. 22, about the comparison of +sleep to death by Herakleitus.] + +[Side-note: By Universal Reason he did not mean the Reason of most men +as it is, but as it ought to be.] + +By this denunciation of the mischief of private judgment, Herakleitus +did not mean to say that a man ought to think like his neighbours or +like the public. In his view the public were wrong, collectively as +well as individually. The universal reason to which he made appeal, +was not the reason of most men as it actually is but that which, in +his theory, ought to be their reason:[103] that which formed the +perpetual and governing process throughout all nature, though most men +neither recognised nor attended to it, but turned away from it in +different directions equally wrong. No man was truly possessed of +reason, unless his individual mind understood the general scheme of +the universe, and moved in full sympathy with its perpetual movement +and alternation or unity of contraries.[104] The universal process +contained in itself a sum-total of particular contraries which were +successively produced and destroyed: to know the universal was to know +these contraries in one, and to recognise them as transient, but +correlative and inseparable, manifestations, each implying the +other--not as having each a separate reality and each excluding its +contrary.[105] In so far as a man's mind maintained its kindred nature +and perpetual conjoint movement with the universal, he acquired true +knowledge; but the individualising influences arising from the body +usually overpowered this kindred with the universal, and obstructed +the continuity of this movement, so that most persons became plunged +in error and illusion. + +[Footnote 103: Sextus Empiricus misinterprets the Herakleitean theory +when he represents it (vii. 134) as laying down--[Greek: ta\ koinê=| +phaino/mena, pista\, ô(s a)\n tô=| koinô=| krino/mena lo/gô|, ta\ de\ +kat' i)di/an e(ka/stô|, pseudê=]. Herakleitus denounces mankind +generally as in error. Origen. Philosophum. i. 4; Diog. Laert. ix. 1.] + +[Footnote 104: The analogy and sympathy between the individual mind +and the Kosmical process--between the knowing and the known--was +reproduced in many forms among the ancient philosophers. It appears in +the Platonic Timæus, c. 20, p. 47 C. + +[Greek: To\ kinou/menon tô=| kinoume/nô| gignô/skesthai] was the +doctrine of several philosophers. Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2. Plato, +Kratylus, p. 412 A: [Greek: kai\ mê\n ê)/ ge e)pistê/mê mênu/ei ô(s +pherome/nois toi=s pra/gmasin e)pome/nês tê=s psuchê=s tê=s a)xi/as +lo/gou, kai\ ou)/te a)poleipome/nês ou)/te protheou/sês]. A remarkable +passage from the comment of Philoponus (on the treatise of Aristotle +De Animâ) is cited by Lassalle, ii. p. 339, describing the Herakleitean +doctrine, [Greek: dia\ tou=to e)k tê=s a)nathumia/seôs au)tê\n +e)/legen] (Herakleitus); [Greek: tô=n ga\r pragma/tôn e)n kinê/sei +o)/ntôn dei=n kai\ to\ gi/nôskon ta\ pra/gmata e)n kinê/sei ei)=nai, +i(/na _sumpara/theon au)toi=s e)pha/ptêtai kai\ e)pharmo/zê|_ +au)toi=s]. Also Simplikius ap. Lassalle, p. 341: [Greek: e)n +metabolê=| ga\r sunechei= ta\ o)/nta u(potithe/menos o( Ê(ra/kleitos, +kai\ to\ gnôso/menon au)ta\ tê=| e)paphê=| gi/nôskon, sune/pesthai +e)bou/leto ô(s a)ei\ ei)=nai kata\ to\ gnôstiko\n e)n kinê/sei.]] + +[Footnote 105: Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 58; and the passage of Philo +Judæus, cited by Schleiermacher, p. 437; as well as more fully by +Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 265-267 (Quis rerum divinar. hæres, p. 503, +Mangey): [Greek: e(\n ga\r to\ e)x a)mphoi=n tô=n e)nanti/ôn, ou(= +tmêthe/ntos gnô/rima ta\ e)nanti/a. Ou) tou=t' e)sti\n o(/ phasin +E(/llênes to\n me/gan kai\ a)oi/dimon par' au)toi=s Ê(ra/kleiton, +kephalai=on tê=s au)tou= prostêsa/menon philosophi/as, au)chei=n ô(s +eu(re/sei kainê=|? palaio\n ga\r eu(/rêma Môu/seô/s e)stin.]] + +[Side-note: Herakleitus at the opposite pole from Parmenides] + +The absolute of Herakleitus stands thus at the opposite pole as +compared with that of Parmenides: it is absolute movement, change, +generation and destruction--negation of all substance and +stability,[106] temporary and unbecoming resistance of each successive +particular to the destroying and renewing current of the universal. +The Real, on this theory, was a generalisation, not of substances, but +of facts, events, changes, revolutions, destructions, generations, +&c., determined by a law of justice or necessity which endured, and +which alone endured, for ever. Herakleitus had many followers, who +adopted his doctrine wholly or partially, and who gave to it +developments which he had not adverted to, perhaps might not have +acknowledged.[107] It was found an apt theme by those who, taking a +religious or poetical view of the universe, dwelt upon the transitory +and contemptible value of particular existences, and extolled the +grandeur or power of the universal. It suggested many doubts and +debates respecting the foundations of logical evidence, and the +distinction of truth from falsehood; which debates will come to be +noticed hereafter, when we deal with the dialectical age of Plato and +Aristotle. + +[Footnote 106: The great principle of Herakleitus, which Aristotle +states in order to reject (Physic. viii. 3, p. 253, b. 10, [Greek: +phasi/ tines kinei=sthai tô=n o)/ntôn ou) ta\ me\n ta\ d' ou), a)lla\ +pa/nta kai\ a)ei\; a)lla\ lantha/nein tou=to tê\n ê(mete/ran +ai)/sthêsin]) now stands averred in modern physical philosophy. Mr. +Grove observes, in his instructive Treatise on the Correlation of +Physical Forces, p. 22: + +"Of absolute rest, Nature gives us no evidence. All matter, as far as +we can discern, is ever in movement: not merely in masses, as in the +planetary spheres, but also molecularly, or throughout its intimate +structure. Thus every alteration of temperature produces a molecular +change throughout the whole substance heated or cooled: slow chemical +or electrical forces, actions of light or invisible radiant forces, +are always at play; so that, as a fact, we cannot predicate of any +portion of matter, that it is absolutely at rest."] + +[Footnote 107: Many references to Herakleitus are found in the +recently published books of the Refutatio Hæresium by Pseudo-Origen or +Hippolytus--especially Book ix. p. 279-283, ed. Miller. To judge by +various specimens there given, it would appear that his +juxta-positions of contradictory predicates, with the same subject, +would be recognised as paradoxes merely in appearance, and not in +reality, if we had his own explanation. Thus he says (p. 282) "the pure +and the corrupt, the drinkable and the undrinkable, are one and the +same." Which is explained as follows: "The sea is most pure and most +corrupt: to fish, it is drinkable and nutritive; to men, it is +undrinkable and destructive." This explanation appears to have been +given by Herakleitus himself, [Greek: tha/lassa, _phêsi\n_], &c. + +These are only paradoxes in appearance--the relative predicate being +affirmed without mention of its correlate. When you supply the +correlate to each predicate, there remains no contradiction at all.] + +[Side-note: Empedokles--his doctrine of the four elements, and two +moving or restraining forces.] + +After Herakleitus, and seemingly at the same time with Parmenides, we +arrive at Empedokles (about 500-430 B. C.) and his memorable doctrine +of the Four Elements. This philosopher, a Sicilian of Agrigentum, and +a distinguished as well as popular-minded citizen, expounded his views +in poems, of which Lucretius[108] speaks with high admiration, but of +which few fragments are preserved. He agreed with Parmenides, and +dissented from Herakleitus and the Ionic philosophers, in rejecting +all real generation and destruction.[109] That which existed had not +been generated and could not be destroyed. Empedokles explained what +that was, which men mistook for generation and destruction. There +existed four distinct elements--Earth, Water, Air, and Fire--eternal, +inexhaustible, simple, homogeneous, equal, and co-ordinate with each +other. Besides these four substances, there also existed two moving +forces, one contrary to the other--Love or Friendship, which brought +the elements into conjunction--Enmity or Contest, which separated +them. Here were alternate and conflicting agencies, either bringing +together different portions of the elements to form a new product, or +breaking up the product thus formed and separating the constituent +elements. Sometimes the Many were combined into One; sometimes the One +was decomposed into Many. Generation was simply this combination of +elements already existing separately--not the calling into existence +of anything new: destruction was in like manner the dissolution of +some compound, not the termination of any existent simple substance. +The four simple substances or elements (which Empedokles sometimes +calls by names of the popular Deities--Zeus, Hêrê, Aidoneus, &c.), +were the roots or foundations of everything.[110] + +[Footnote 108: Lucretius, i. 731. + +Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris ejus +Vociferantur, et exponunt præclara reperta: +Ut vix humanâ videatur stirpe creatus.] + +[Footnote 109: Empedokles, Frag. v. 77-83, ed. Karsten, p. 96: + +[Greek: phu/sis ou)deno/s e)stin a(pa/ntôn +thnêtô=n, ou)de/ tis ou)lome/nou thanatoi=o teleutê\, +a)lla\ mo/non mi/xis te dia/llaxi/s te mige/ntôn +e)sti, phu/sis d' e)pi\ toi=s o)noma/zetai a)nthrô/poisin. . . . ] + +[Greek: Phu/sis] here is remarkable, in its primary sense, as +derivative from [Greek: phu/omai], equivalent to [Greek: ge/nesis]. +Compare Plutarch adv. Koloten, p. 1111, 1112.] + +[Footnote 110: Emp. Fr. v. 55. [Greek: Te/ssara tô=n pa/ntôn +rhizô/mata].] + +[Side-note: Construction of the Kosmos from these elements and +forces--action and counter action of love and enmity. The Kosmos +alternately made and unmade.] + +From the four elements--acted upon by these two forces, abstractions +or mythical personifications--Empedokles showed how the Kosmos was +constructed. He supposed both forces to be perpetually operative, but +not always with equal efficacy: sometimes the one was predominant, +sometimes the other, sometimes there was equilibrium between them. +Things accordingly pass through a perpetual and ever-renewed cycle. +The complete preponderance of Love brings alternately all the elements +into close and compact unity, Enmity being for the time eliminated. +Presently the action of the latter recommences, and a period ensues in +which Love and Enmity are simultaneously operative; until at length +Enmity becomes the temporary master, and all union is for the time +dissolved. But this condition of things does not last. Love again +becomes active, so that partial and increasing combination of the +elements is produced, and another period commences--the simultaneous +action of the two forces, which ends in renewed empire of Love, +compact union of the elements, and temporary exclusion of Enmity.[111] + +[Footnote 111: Zeller, Philos. der Griech., vol. i. p. 525-528, ed. +2nd.] + +[Side-note: Empedoklean predestined cycle of things--complete empire +of Love--Sphærus--Empire of Enmity--disengagement or separation of the +elements--astronomy and meteorology.] + +This is the Empedoklean cycle of things,[112] divine or predestined, +without beginning or end: perpetual substitution of new for old +compounds--constancy only in the general principle of combination and +dissolution. The Kosmos which Empedokles undertakes to explain, takes +its commencement from the period of complete empire of Love, or +compact and undisturbed union of all the elements. This he conceives +and divinises under the name of Sphærus--as One sphere, harmonious, +uniform, and universal, having no motion, admitting no parts or +separate existences within it, exhibiting no one of the four elements +distinctly, "instabilis tellus, innabilis unda"--a sort of chaos.[113] +At the time prescribed by Fate or Necessity, the action of Enmity +recommenced, penetrating gradually through the interior of Sphærus, +"agitating the members of the God one after another,"[114] disjoining +the parts from each other, and distending the compact ball into a vast +porous mass. This mass, under the simultaneous and conflicting +influences of Love and Enmity, became distributed partly into +homogeneous portions, where each of the four elements was accumulated +by itself--partly into compounds or individual substances, where two +or more elements were found in conjunction. Like had an appetite for +Like--Air for Air, Fire for Fire, and so forth: and a farther +extension of this appetite brought about the mixture of different +elements in harmonious compounds. First, the Air disengaged itself, +and occupied a position surrounding the central mass of Earth and +Water: next, the Fire also broke forth, and placed itself externally +to the Air, immediately in contact with the outermost crystalline +sphere, formed of condensed and frozen air, which formed the wall +encompassing the Kosmos. A remnant of Fire and Air still remained +embodied in the Earth, but the great mass of both so distributed +themselves, that the former occupied most part of one hemisphere, the +latter most part of the other.[115] The rapid and uniform rotation of +the Kosmos, caused by the exterior Fire, compressed the interior +elements, squeezed the water out of the earth like perspiration from +the living body, and thus formed the sea. The same rotation caused the +earth to remain unmoved, by counterbalancing and resisting its +downward pressure or gravity.[116] In the course of the rotation, the +light hemisphere of Fire, and the comparatively dark hemisphere of +Air, alternately came above the horizon: hence the interchange of day +and night. Empedokles (like the Pythagoreans) supposed the sun to be +not self-luminous, but to be a glassy or crystalline body which +collected and reflected the light from the hemisphere of Fire. He +regarded the fixed stars as fastened to the exterior crystalline +sphere, and revolving along with it, but the planets as moving free +and detached from any sphere.[117] He supposed the alternations of +winter and summer to arise from a change in the proportions of Air and +Fire in the atmospheric regions: winter was caused by an increase of +the Air, both in volume and density, so as to drive back the exterior +Fire to a greater distance from the Earth, and thus to produce a +diminution of heat and light: summer was restored when the Fire, in +its turn increasing, extruded a portion of the Air, approached nearer +to the Earth, and imparted to the latter more heat and light.[118] +Empedokles farther supposed (and his contemporaries, Anaxagoras and +Diogenes, held the same opinion) that the Earth was round and flat at +top and bottom, like a drum or tambourine: that its surface had been +originally horizontal, in reference to the rotation of the Kosmos +around it, but that it had afterwards tilted down to the south and +upward towards the north, so as to lie aslant instead of horizontal. +Hence he explained the fact that the north pole of the heavens now +appeared obliquely elevated above the horizon.[119] + +[Footnote 112: Emp. Frag. v. 96, Karst., p. 98: + +[Greek: Ou(/tôs ê)=| me\n e(\n e)k pleo/nôn mema/thêke phu/esthai, +ê)de\ pa/lin diaphunto\s e(no\s ple/on e)ktele/thousi, +tê=| me\n gi/gnontai/ te kai\ ou)/ sphisin e)/mpedos ai)ô/n; +ê(=| de\ ta/d' a)lla/ssonta diampere\s ou)dama\ lê/gei, +tau/tê| d' ai)e\n e)/asin a)ki/nêta kata\ ku/klon.] + +Also:-- + +[Greek: kai\ ga\r kai\ paro\s ê(=n te kai\ e)/ssetai ou)de/ pot', +oi)/ô, +tou/tôn a)mphote/rôn] (Love and Discord) [Greek: keinô/setai a)/spetos +ai)ô/n]. + +These are new Empedoklean verses, derived from the recently published +fragments of Hippolytus (Hær. Refut.) printed by Stein, v. 110, in his +collection of the Fragments of Empedokles, p. 43. Compare another +passage in the same treatise of Hippolytus, p. 251.] + +[Footnote 113: Emped. Fr. v. 59, Karsten: + +[Greek: Ou(/tôs a(rmoni/ês pukinô=| kruphô=| e)stê/riktai +sphai/ros kuklote/rês, moniê=| periêge/i+ gai/ôn]. + +Plutarch, De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, c. 12. + +About the divinity ascribed by Empedokles to Sphærus, see Aristot. +Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1000, a. 29. [Greek: a(/panta ga\r e)k tou/tou +(nei/kous) ta)/lla/ e)sti plê\n o( theo/s] (i.e. Sphærus).--[Greek: +Ei) ga\r mê\ ê)=n to\ nei=kos e)n toi=s pra/gmasi, e(\n a)\n ê)=n +a(/panta, ô(s phêsi/n] (Empedokles). See Preller, Hist. Philos. ex +Font. Loc. Contexta, sect. 171, 172, ed. 3. + +The condition of things which Empedokles calls Sphærus may be +illustrated (translating his Love and Enmity into the modern +phraseology of _attraction_ and _repulsion_) from an eminent modern +work on Physics:--"Were there only atoms and attraction, as now +explained, the whole material of creation would rush into close +contact, and the universe would be one huge solid mass of stillness +and death. There is heat or caloric, however, which directly +counteracts attraction and singularly modifies the results. It has +been described by some as a most subtile fluid pervading things, as +water does a sponge: others have accounted it merely a vibration among +the atoms. The truth is, that we know little more of heat as a cause +of repulsion, than of gravity as a cause of attraction: but we can +study and classify the phenomena of both most accurately." (Dr. +Arnott, Elements of Physics, vol. i. p. 26.)] + +[Footnote 114: Emp. Fr. v. 66-70, Karsten: + +[Greek: pa/nta ga\r e)xei/ês pelemi/zeto gui=a theoi=o.]] + +[Footnote 115: Plutarch ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8, 10; Plutarch, +Placit. Philos. ii. 6, p. 887; Aristot. Ethic. Nic. viii. 2.] + +[Footnote 116: Emped. Fr. 185, Karsten. [Greek: ai)thê\r sphi/ggôn +peri\ ku/klon a(/panta]. Aristot. De Coelo, ii. 13, 14; iii. 2, 2. +[Greek: tê\n gê=n u(po\ tê=s di/nês ê)remei=n], &c. Empedokles called +the sea [Greek: i(/drôta tê=s gê=s]. Emp. Fr. 451, Karsten; Aristot. +Meteor. ii. 3.] + +[Footnote 117: Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 20, p. 890.] + +[Footnote 118: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 532-535, 2nd ed.: +Karsten--De Emped. Philos. p. 424-431. + +The very imperfect notices which remain, of the astronomical and +meteorological doctrines of Empedokles, are collected and explained by +these two authors.] + +[Footnote 119: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Schaubach, Anaxag. +Fragm. p. 175. Compare the remarks of Gruppe (Ueber die Kosmischen** +Systeme der Griechen, p. 98) upon the obscure Welt-Gebäude of +Empedokles.] + +[Side-note: Formation of the Earth, of Gods, men, animals, and +plants.] + +From astronomy and meteorology Empedokles[120] proceeded to describe +the Earth, its tenants, and its furniture; how men were first +produced, and how put together. All were produced by the Earth: being +thrown up under the stimulus of Fire still remaining within it. In its +earliest manifestations, and before the influence of Discord had been +sufficiently neutralized, the Earth gave birth to plants only, being +as yet incompetent to produce animals.[121] After a certain time she +gradually acquired power to produce animals, first imperfectly and +piecemeal, trunks without limbs and limbs without trunks; next, +discordant and monstrous combinations, which did not last, such as +creatures half man half ox; lastly, combinations with parts suited to +each other, organizations perfect and durable, men, horses, &c., which +continued and propagated.[122] Among these productions were not only +plants, birds, fishes, and men, but also the "long-lived Gods".[123] +All compounds were formed by intermixture of the four elements, in +different proportions, more or less harmonious.[124] These elements +remained unchanged: no one of them was transformed into another. But +the small particles of each flowed into the pores of the others, and +the combination was more or less intimate, according as the structure +of these pores was more or less adapted to receive them. So intimate +did the mixture of these fine particles become, when the effluvia of +one and the pores of another were in symmetry, that the constituent +ingredients, like colours compounded together by the painter,[125] +could not be discerned or handled separately. Empedokles rarely +assigned any specific ratio in which he supposed the four elements to +enter into each distinct compound, except in the case of flesh and +blood, which were formed of all the four in equal portions; and of +bones, which he affirmed to be composed of one-fourth earth, +one-fourth water, and the other half fire. He insisted merely on the +general fact of such combinations, as explaining what passed for +generation of new substances without pointing out any reason to +determine one ratio of combination rather than another, and without +ascribing to each compound a distinct ratio of its own. This omission +in his system is much animadverted on by Aristotle. + +[Footnote 120: Hippokrates--[Greek: Peri\ a)rchai/ês i)êtrikê=s]--c. +20, p. 620, vol. i. ed. Littré. [Greek: katha/per E)mpedoklê=s ê)\ +a)/lloi oi(\ peri\ phu/sios gegra/phasin e)x a)rchê=s o(/ ti/ e)stin +a)/nthrôpos, kai\ o(/pôs e)geneto prô/ton, kai\ o(/pôs xunepa/gê]. + +This is one of the most ancient allusions to Empedokles, recently +printed by M. Littré, out of one of the MSS. in the Parisian library.] + +[Footnote 121: Emp. Fr. v. 253, Kar. [Greek: tou\s me\n pu=r a)nepemp' +e)/thelon pro\s o(/moion i(ke/sthai], &c. + +Aristot., or Pseudo-Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2. [Greek: ei)=pe pa/lin +o( E)mpedoklê=s, o(/ti ta\ phuta\ e)/chousi ge/nesin e)n ko/smô| +ê)lattôme/nô|, kai\ ou) telei/ô| kata\ tê\n sumplê/rôsin au)tou=; +tau/tês de\ sumplêroume/nês] (while it is in course of being +completed), [Greek: ou) genna=tai zô=on.]] + +[Footnote 122: Emp. Frag. v. 132, 150, 233, 240, ed. Karst. Ver. 238:-- + +[Greek: polla\ me\n a)mphipro/sôpa kai\ a)mphi/stern' e)phu/onto, +bougenê= a)ndro/prôra], &c. Ver. 251:-- +[Greek: Ou)lophuei=s me\n prô=ta tu/poi chthono\s e(xane/tellon], &c. + +Lucretius, v. 834; Aristotel. Gen. Animal. i. 18, p. 722, b. 20; +Physic. ii. 8, 2, p. 198, b. 32; De Coelo, iii. 2, 5, p. 300, b. 29; +with the commentary of Simplikius ap. Schol. Brand. b. 512.] + +[Footnote 123: Emp. Frag. v. 135, Kar.] + +[Footnote 124: Plato, Menon. p. 76 A.; Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. +324, b. 30 seq.] + +[Footnote 125: [Greek: E)mpedoklê=s e)x a)metablê/tôn tô=n tetta/rôn +stoichei/ôn ê(gei=to gi/gnesthai tê\n tô=n sunthe/tôn sôma/tôn +phu/sin, ou(/tôs a)namemigme/nôn a)llê/lois tô=n prô/tôn, ô(s ei)/ tis +leiô/sas a)kribô=s kai\ chnoô/dê poiê/sas i)o\n kai\ chalki=tin kai\ +kadmei/an kai\ mi/su mi/xeien, ô(s mêde\n e)x au)tou= +metacheiri/sasthai chôri\s e(te/rou]. + +Galen, Comm. in Hippokrat. De Homin. Nat. t. iii. p. 101. See Karsten, +De Emped. Phil. p. 407, and Emp. Fr. v. 155. + +Galen says, however (after Aristot. Gen. et Corr. ii. 7, p. 334, a. +30), that this mixture, set forth by Empedokles, is not mixture +properly speaking, but merely close proximity. Hippokrates (he says) +was the first who propounded the doctrine of real mixture. But +Empedokles seems to have intended a real mixture, in all cases where the +structure of the pores was in symmetry with the inflowing particles. +Oil and water (he said) would not mix together, because there was no +such symmetry between them--[Greek: o(/lôs ga\r poiei=] (Empedokles) +[Greek: tê\n mi/xin tê=| summetri/a| tô=n po/rôn; dio/per e)/laion +me\n kai\ u(/dôr ou) mi/gnusthai, ta\ de\ a)/lla u(gra\ kai\ peri\ +o(/sôn dê\ katarithmei=tai ta\s i)di/as kra/seis] (Theophrastus, De +Sensu et Sensili, s. 12, vol. i. p. 651, ed. Schneider).] + +[Side-note: Physiology of +Empedokles--Procreation--Respiration--movement of the blood.] + +Empedokles farther laid down many doctrines respecting physiology. He +dwelt on the procreation of men and animals, entered upon many details +respecting gestation and the foetus, and even tried to explain what it +was that determined the birth of male or female offspring. About +respiration, alimentation, and sensation, he also proposed theories: +his explanation of respiration remains in one of the fragments. He +supposed that man breathed, partly through the nose, mouth, and lungs, +but partly also through the whole surface of the body, by the pores +wherewith it was pierced, and by the internal vessels connected with +those pores. Those internal vessels were connected with the blood +vessels, and the portion of them near the surface was alternately +filled with blood or emptied of blood, by the flow outwards from the +centre or the ebb inwards towards the centre. Such was the movement +which Empedokles considered as constantly belonging to the blood: +alternately a projection outwards from the centre and a recession +backwards towards the centre. When the blood thus receded, the +extremities of the vessels were left empty, and the air from without +entered: when the outward tide of blood returned, the air which had +thus entered was expelled.[126] Empedokles conceived this outward tide +of blood to be occasioned by the effort of the internal fire to escape +and join its analogous element without.[127] + +[Footnote 126: Emp. Fr. v. 275, seqq. Karst. + +The comments of Aristotle on this theory of Empedokles are hardly +pertinent: they refer to respiration by the nostrils, which was not +what Empedokles had in view (Aristot. De Respirat. c. 3).] + +[Footnote 127: Karsten, De Emp. Philosoph. p. 480. + +Emp. Fr. v. 307--[Greek: to/ t' e)n mê/nigxin e)ergme/non ô)gu/gion +pu=r--pu=r d' e)/xô diathrô=skon], &c. + +Empedokles illustrates this influx and efflux of air in respiration by +the klepsydra, a vessel with one high and narrow neck, but with a +broad bottom pierced with many small holes. When the neck was kept +closed by the finger or otherwise, the vessel might be plunged into +water, but no water would ascend into it through the holes in the +bottom, because of the resistance of the air within. As soon as the +neck was freed from pressure, and the air within allowed to escape, +the water would immediately rush up through the holes in the bottom. + +This illustration is interesting. It shows that Empedokles was +distinctly aware of the pressure of the air as countervailing the +ascending movement of the water, and the removal of that pressure as +allowing such movement. Vers. 286:-- + +[Greek: ou)de/ t' e)s a)/ggos d' o)/mbros e)se/rchetai, a)lla/ min +ei)/rgei +a)e/ros o)/gkos e)/sôthe pesô\n e)pi\ trê/mata pukna/], &c. + +This dealing with the klepsydra seems to have been a favourite +amusement with children.] + +[Side-note: Doctrine of effluvia and pores--explanation of +perceptions--Intercommunication of the elements with the sentient +subject--like acting upon like.] + +The doctrine of pores and effluvia, which formed so conspicuous an +item in the physics of Empedokles, was applied by him to explain +sensation. He maintained the general doctrine (which Parmenides had +advanced before him, and which Plato retained after him), that +sensation was produced by like acting upon like: Herakleitus before +him, and Anaxagoras after him, held that it was produced by unlike +acting upon unlike. Empedokles tried (what Parmenides had not tried) +to apply his doctrine to the various senses separately.[128] Man was +composed of the same four elements as the universe around him: and +since like always tended towards like, so by each of the four elements +within himself, he perceived and knew the like element without. +Effluvia from all bodies entered his pores, wherever they found a +suitable channel: hence he perceived and knew earth by earth, water by +water, and so forth.[129] Empedokles, assuming perception and +knowledge to be produced by such intercommunication of the four +elements, believed that not man and animals only, but plants and other +substances besides, perceived and knew in the same way. Everything +possessed a certain measure of knowledge, though less in degree, than +man, who was a more compound structure.[130] Perception and knowledge +was more developed in different animals in proportion as their +elementary composition was more mixed and varied. The blood, as the +most compound portion of the whole body, was the principal seat of +intelligence.[131] + +[Footnote 128: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 2, p. 647, Schneid.] + +[Footnote 129: Emp. Frag. Karst. v. 267, seq. + +[Greek: gnô=th', o(/ti pa/ntôn ei)si\n a)por)r(oai\ o(/ss' e)ge/nonto], +&c. + +ib. v. 321: + +[Greek: gai/ê| me\n ga\r gai=an o)pô/pamen, u(/dati d' u(/dôr, +ai)the/ri d' ai)the/ra di=on, a)ta\r puri\ pu=r a)i+\dêlon, +storgê=| de\ storgê/n, nei=kos de/ te nei/kei+ lugrô=|]. + +Theophrastus, De Sensu, c. 10, p. 650, Schneid. + +Aristotle says that Empedokles regarded each of these six as a [Greek: +psuchê\] (_soul_, _vital principle_) by itself. Sextus Empiricus +treats Empedokles as considering each of the six to be a [Greek: +kritê/rion a)lêthei/as] (Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Emp. adv. +Mathem. vii. 116).] + +[Footnote 130: Emp. Fr. v. 313, Karst. ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. +viii. 286; also apud Diogen. L. viii. 77. + +[Greek: pa/nta ga\r i)/sth' phro/nêsin e)/chein kai\ nô/matos +ai)=san]. + +Stein gives (Emp. Fr. v. 222-231) several lines immediately preceding +this from the treatise of Hippolytus; but they are sadly corrupt. + +Parmenides had held the same opinion before--[Greek: kai\ o(/lôs pa=n +to\ o)\n e)/chein tina\ gnô=sin]--ap. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 4. + +Theophrastus, in commenting upon the doctrine of Empedokles, takes as +one of his grounds of objection--That Empedokles, in maintaining +sensation and knowledge to be produced by influx of the elements into +pores, made no difference between animated and inanimate substances +(Theophr. De Sens. s. 12-23). Theophrastus puts this as if it were an +inconsistency or oversight of Empedokles: but it cannot be so +considered, for Empedokles (as well as Parmenides) appears to have +accepted the consequence, and to have denied all such difference, +except one of degree, as to perception and knowledge.] + +[Footnote 131: Emp. Frag. 316, Karst. [Greek: ai(=ma ga\r a)nthrô/pois +perika/rdio/n e)sti no/êma.] Comp. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 11.] + +[Side-note: Sense of vision.] + +In regard to vision, Empedokles supposed that it was operated mainly +by the fire or light within the eye, though aided by the light +without. The interior of the eye was of fire and water, the exterior +coat was a thin layer of earth and air. Colours were brought to the +eye as effluvia from objects, and became apprehended as sensations by +passing into the alternate pores or ducts of fire and water: white +colour was fitted to (or in symmetry with) the pores of fire, black +colour with those of water.[132] Some animals had the proportions of +fire and water in their eyes better adjusted, or more conveniently +located, than others: in some, the fire was in excess, or too much on +the outside, so as to obstruct the pores or ducts of water: in others, +water was in excess, and fire in defect. The latter were the animals +which saw better by day than by night, a great force of external light +being required to help out the deficiency of light within: the former +class of animals saw better by night, because, when there was little +light without, the watery ducts were less completely obstructed--or +left more free to receive the influx of black colour suited to +them.[133] + +[Footnote 132: Emp. Frag. v. 301-310, Karst. [Greek: to/ t' e)n +mê/nigxin e)ergme/non ô)gu/gion pu=r], &c. Theophr. De Sensu, s. 7, 8; +Aristot. De Sensu, c. 3; Aristot. De Gen. et Corrupt. i. 8.] + +[Footnote 133: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 7, 8.] + +[Side-note: Senses of hearing, smell, taste.] + +In regard to hearing, Empedokles said that the ear was like a bell or +trumpet set in motion by the air without; through which motion the +solid parts were brought into shock against the air flowing in, and +caused the sensation of sound within.[134] Smell was, in his view, an +adjunct of the respiratory process: persons of acute smell were those +who had the strongest breathing: olfactory effluvia came from many +bodies, and especially from such as were light and thin. Respecting +taste and touch, he gave no further explanation than his general +doctrine of effluvia and pores: he seems to have thought that such +interpenetration was intelligible by itself, since here was immediate +and actual contact. Generally, in respect to all the senses, he laid +it down that pleasure ensued when the matter which flows in was not +merely fitted in point of structure to penetrate the interior pores or +ducts (which was the condition of all sensation), but also harmonious +with them in respect to elementary mixture.[135] + +[Footnote 134: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 9-21. + +Empedokles described the ear under the metaphor of [Greek: sa/rkinon +o)/zon], "the fleshy branch."] + +[Footnote 135: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 9, 10. The criticisms of +Theophrastus upon this theory of Empedokles are extremely interesting, +as illustrating the change in the Grecian physiological point of view +during a century and a half, but I reserve them until I come to the +Aristotelian age. I may remark, however, that Theophrastus, disputing +the doctrine of sensory effluvia generally, disputes the existence of +the olfactory effluvia not less than the rest (s. 20).] + +[Side-note: Empedokles declared that justice absolutely forbade the +killing of anything that had life. His belief in the metempsychosis. +Sufferings of life are an expiation for wrong done during an +antecedent life. Pretensions to magic power.] + +Empedokles held various opinions in common with the Pythagoreans and +the brotherhood of the Orphic mysteries--especially that of the +metempsychosis. He represented himself as having passed through prior +states of existence, as a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish. He +proclaims it as an obligation of justice, absolute and universal, not +to kill anything that had life: he denounces as an abomination the +sacrificing of or eating of an animal, in whom perhaps might dwell the +soul of a deceased friend or brother.[136] His religious faith, +however, and his opinions about Gods, Dæmons, and the human soul, +stood apart (mostly in a different poem) from his doctrines on +kosmology and physiology. In common with many Pythagoreans, he laid +great stress on the existence of Dæmons (of intermediate order and +power between Gods and men), some of whom had been expelled from the +Gods in consequence of their crimes, and were condemned to pass a long +period of exile, as souls embodied in various men or animals. He +laments the misery of the human soul, in himself as well as in others, +condemned to this long period of expiatory degradation, before they +could regain the society of the Gods.[137] In one of his remaining +fragments, he announces himself almost as a God upon earth, and +professes his willingness as well as ability to impart to a favoured +pupil the most wonderful gifts--powers to excite or abate the winds, +to bring about rain or dry weather, to raise men from the dead.[138] +He was in fact a man of universal pretensions; not merely an expositor +of nature, but a rhetorician, poet, physician, prophet, and conjurer. +Gorgias the rhetor had been personally present at his magical +ceremonies.[139] + +[Footnote 136: Emp. Frag. v. 380-410, Karsten; Plutarch, De Esu +Carnium, p. 997-8. + +Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 13, 2: [Greek: e)sti\ ga\r, o(\ manteu/ontai/ ti +pa/ntes, phu/sei koino\n di/kaion kai\ a)/dikon, ka)\n mêdemi/a +koinôni/a pro\s a)llê/lous ê)=|, mêde\ sunthê/kê--ô(s E)mpedoklê=s +le/gei peri\ tou= mê\ ktei/nein to\ e)/mpsuchon; tou=to ga\r ou) tisi\ +me\n di/kaion, tisi\ d' ou) di/kaion, + +A)lla\ to\ me\n pa/ntôn no/mimon dia/ t' eu)rume/dontos +Ai)the/ros ê)neke/ôs te/tatai dia/ t' a)ple/tou au)gê=s]. + +Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. ix. 127.] + +[Footnote 137: Emp. Frag. v. 5-18, Karst.; compare Herod. ii. 123; +Plato, Phædrus, 55, p. 246 C.; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 26. +Plutarch observes in another place on the large proportion of +religious mysticism blended with the philosophy of Empedokles--[Greek: +Sôkra/tês, phasma/tôn kai\ deisidaimoni/as a)naple/ô philosophi/an +a)po\ Puthago/rou kai\ E)mpedokle/ous dexa/menos, eu)= ma/la +bebakcheume/nên], &c. (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 580, C.) + +See Fr. Aug. Ukert, Ueber Daemonen, Heroen, und Genien, p. 151.] + +[Footnote 138: Emp. Fr. v. 390-425, Karst.] + +[Footnote 139: Diog. Laert. viii. 59.] + +[Side-note: Complaint of Empedokles on the impossibility of finding +out truth.] + +None of the remaining fragments of Empedokles are more remarkable than +a few in which he deplores the impossibility of finding out any great +or comprehensive truth, amidst the distraction and the sufferings +of our short life. Every man took a different road, confiding only in +his own accidental experience or particular impressions; but no man +could obtain or communicate satisfaction about the whole.[140] + +[Footnote 140: Emp. Fr. v. 34, ed. Karst., p. 88. + +[Greek: pau=ron de\ zô/ês a)bi/ou me/ros a)thlê/santes +ô)ku/moroi, ka/pnoio di/kên a)rthe/ntes, a)pe/ptan, +au)to\ mo/non peisthe/ntes o(/tô| prose/kursen e(/kastos, +pa/ntos' e)launo/menoi; to\ de\ ou)=lon e)peu/chetai eu(rei=n +au)/tôs. ou)/t' e)piderkta\ ta/d' a)ndra/sin ou)/t' e)pakousta\ +ou)/te no/ô| perilêpta/.]] + +[Side-note: Theory of Anaxagoras--denied generation and +destruction--recognises only mixture and severance of pre-existing +kinds of matter.] + +Anaxagoras of Klazomenæ, a friend of the Athenian Perikles, and +contemporary of Empedokles, was a man of far simpler and less +ambitious character: devoted to physical contemplation and geometry, +without any of those mystical pretentions common among the +Pythagoreans. His doctrines were set forth in prose, and in the Ionic +dialect.[141] His theory, like all those of his age, was +all-comprehensive in its purpose, starting from a supposed beginning, +and shewing how heaven, earth, and the inhabitants of earth, had come +into those appearances which were exhibited to sense. He agreed with +Empedokles in departing from the point of view of Thales and other +Ionic theorists, who had supposed one primordial matter, out of which, +by various transformations, other sensible things were generated--and +into which, when destroyed, they were again resolved. Like Empedokles, +and like Parmenides previously, he declared that generation, +understood in this sense, was a false and impossible notion: that no +existing thing could have been generated, or could be destroyed, or +could undergo real transformation into any other thing different from +what it was.[142] Existing things were what they were, possessing +their several inherent properties: there could be no generation except +the putting together of these things in various compounds, nor any +destruction except the breaking up of such compounds, nor any +transformation except the substitution of one compound for another. + +[Footnote 141: Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. i. 4, 5; Diogen. Laert. ii. +10.] + +[Footnote 142: Anaxagor. Fr. 22, p. 135, ed. Schaubach. [Greek: to\ +de\ gi/nesthai kai\ a)po/llusthai ou)k o)rthô=s nomi/zousin oi( +E(/llênes. Ou)de\n ga\r chrê=ma gi/netai, ou)de\ a)po/llutai, a)ll' +a)p' e)o/ntôn chrêma/tôn summi/sgetai/ te kai\ diakri/netai; kai\ +ou(/tôs a)\n o)rthô=s kaloi=en to/ te gi/nesthai summi/sgesthai kai\ +to\ a)po/llusthai diakri/nesthai.]] + +[Side-note: Homoeomeries--small particles of diverse kinds of matter, +all mixed together.] + +But Anaxagoras did not accept the Empedoklean four elements as the sum +total of first substances. He reckoned all the different sorts of +matter as original and primæval existences: he supposed them all to +lie ready made, in portions of all sizes, whereof there was no +greatest and no least.[143] Particles of the same sort he called +Homoeomeries: the aggregates of which formed bodies of like parts; +wherein the parts were like each other and like the whole. Flesh, +bone, blood, fire,[144] earth, water, gold, &c., were aggregations of +particles mostly similar, in which each particle was not less flesh, +bone, and blood, than the whole mass. + +[Footnote 143: Anaxag. Fr. 5, ed. Schaub, p. 94. + +[Greek: Ta\ o(moiomerê=] are the primordial particles themselves: +[Greek: o(moiome/reia] is the abstract word formed from this +concrete--existence in the form or condition of [Greek: o(moiomerê=]. +Each distinct substance has its own [Greek: o(moiomerê=], little +particles like each other, and each possessing the characteristics of +the substance. But the state called [Greek: o(moiome/reia] pervades all +substances (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, s. 53, +note 3.)] + +[Footnote 144: Lucretius, i. 830: + +Nunc et Anaxagoræ scrutemur Homoeomerian, +Quam Grai memorant, nec nostrâ dicere linguâ +Concedit nobis patrii sermonis egestas. + +Lucretius calls this theory Homoeomeria, and it appears to me that +this name must have been bestowed upon it by its author. Zeller and +several others, after Schleiermacher, conceive the name to date first +from Aristotle and his physiological classification. But what other +name was so natural or likely for Anaxagoras himself to choose?] + +But while Anaxagoras held that each of these Homoeomeries[145] was a +special sort of matter with its own properties, and each of them +unlike every other: he held farther the peculiar doctrine, that no one +of them could have an existence apart from the rest. Everything was +mixed with everything: each included in itself all the others: not one +of them could be obtained pure and unmixed. This was true of any +portion however small. The visible and tangible bodies around us +affected our senses, and received their denominations according to +that one peculiar matter of which they possessed a decided +preponderance and prominence. But each of them included in itself all +the other matters, real and inseparable, although latent.[146] + +[Footnote 145: Anaxag. Fr. 8; Schaub. p. 101; compare p. 113. [Greek: +e(/teron de\ ou)de/n e)stin o(/moion ou)deni\ a)/llô|. A)ll' o(/teô| +plei=sta e)/ni, tau=ta e)ndêlo/tata e(\n e(/kasto/n e)sti kai\ ê)=n.]] + +[Footnote 146: Lucretius, i. 876: + +Id quod Anaxagoras sibi sumit, ut omnibus omnes +Res putet inmixtas rebus latitare, sed illud +Apparere unum cujus sint plurima mixta,** +Et magis in promptu primâque in fronte** locata. + +Aristotel. Physic. i. 4, 3. [Greek: Dio/ phasi pa=n e)n panti\ +memi=chthai, dio/ti pa=n e)k panto\s e(ô/rôn gigno/menon; phai/nesthai +de\ diaphe/ronta kai/ prosagoreu/esthai e(/tera a)llê/lôn, e)k tou= +ma/lista u(pere/chontos, dia\ to\ plê=thos e)n tê=| mi/xei tô=n +a)pei/rôn; ei)likrinô=s me\n ga\r o(/lon leuko\n ê)\ me/lan ê)\ sa/rka +ê)\ o)stou=n, ou)k ei)=nai; o(/tou de\ plei=ston e(/kaston e)/chei, +tou=to dokei=n ei)=nai tê\n phu/sin tou= pra/gmatos.] Also Aristot. De +Coelo, iii. 3; Gen. et Corr. i. 1.] + +[Side-note: First condition of things--all the primordial varieties of +matter were huddled together in confusion. Nous, or Reason, distinct +from all of them, supervened and acted upon this confused mass, +setting the constituent particles in movement.] + +In the beginning (said Anaxagoras) all things (all sorts of matter) +were together, in one mass or mixture. Infinitely numerous and +infinite in diversity of magnitude, they were so packed and confounded +together that no one could be distinguished from the rest: no definite +figure, or colour, or other property, could manifest itself. Nothing +was distinguishable except the infinite mass of Air and Æther (Fire), +which surrounded the mixed mass and kept it together.[147] Thus all +things continued for an infinite time in a state of rest and nullity. +The fundamental contraries--wet, dry, hot, cold, light, dark, dense, +rare,--in their intimate contact neutralised each other.[148] Upon +this inert mass supervened the agency of Nous or Mind. The +characteristic virtue of mind was, that it alone was completely +distinct, peculiar, pure in itself, unmixed with anything else: thus +marked out from all other things which were indissolubly mingled with +each other. Having no communion of nature with other things, it was +noway acted upon by them, but was its own master or autocratic, and +was of very great force. It was moreover the thinnest and purest of +all things; possessing complete knowledge respecting all other things. +It was like to itself throughout--the greater manifestations of mind +similar to the less.[149] + +[Footnote 147: Anaxag. Frag. 1; Schaub. p. 65; [Greek: O(mou= pa/nta +chrê/mata ê)=n, a)/peira kai\ plê=thos kai\ smikro/têta. Kai\ ga\r to\ +smikro\n a)/peiron ê)=n. Kai\ pa/ntôn o(mou= e)o/ntôn ou)de\n +eu)/dêlon ê)=n u(po\ smikro/têtos. Pa/nta ga\r a)ê/r te kai\ ai)thê\r +katei=chen, a)mpho/tera a)/peira e)o/nta. Tau=ta ga\r me/gista +e)/nestin e)n toi=s sumpa=si kai\ plê/thei kai\ mege/thei]. + +The first three words--[Greek: o(mou= pa/nta chrê/mata]--were the +commencement of the Anaxagorean treatise, and were more recollected +and cited than any other words in it. See Fragm. 16, 17, Schaubach, +and p. 66-68. Aristotle calls this primeval chaos [Greek: to\ mi/gma].] + +[Footnote 148: Anax. Frag. 6, Schaub. p. 97; Aristotel. Physic. i. 4, +p. 187, a, with the commentary of Simplikius ap. Scholia, p. 335; +Brandis also, iii. 203, a. 25; and De Coelo, iii. 301, a. 12, [Greek: +e)x a)kinê/tôn ga\r a)/rchetai] (Anaxagoras) [Greek: kosmopoiei=n.]] + +[Footnote 149: Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Schaub. [Greek: Ta\ me\n a)/lla +panto\s moi=ran e)/chei, nou=s de/ e)stin a)/peiron kai\ au)tokrate\s +kai\ me/miktai ou)deni\ chrê/mati, a)lla\ mo/nos au)to\s e)ph' +e(ôu+tou= e)stin. Ei) mê\ ga\r e)ph' e(ôu+tou= ê)=n, a)lla/ teô| +e)me/mikto a)/llô|, metei=chen a)\n a(pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn ei)/ +e)me/mikto teô| . . . . Kai\ a)nekô/luen au)to\n ta\ summemigme/na, +ô(/ste mêdeno\s chrê/matos kratei=n o(moi/ôs, ô(s kai\ mo/non e)o/nta +e)ph' e(ôu+tou=. E)sti\ ga\r lepto/tato/n te pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn kai\ +katharô/taton, kai\ gnô/mên ge peri\ panto\s pa=san i)/schei, kai\ +i)schu/ei me/giston.] + +Compare Plato, Kratylus, c. 65, p. 413, c. [Greek: nou=n au)tokra/tora +kai\ ou)deni\ memigme/non (o(\ le/gei A)naxago/ras).]] + +[Side-note: Movement of rotation in the mass initiated by Nous on a +small scale, but gradually extending itself. Like particles congregate +together--distinguishable aggregates are formed.] + +But though other things could not act upon mind, mind could act upon +them. It first originated movement in the quiescent mass. The movement +impressed was that of rotation, which first began on a small scale, +then gradually extended itself around, becoming more efficacious as it +extended, and still continuing to extend itself around more and more. +Through the prodigious velocity of this rotation, a separation was +effected of those things which had been hitherto undistinguishably +huddled together.[150] Dense was detached from rare, cold from hot, +dark from light, dry from wet.[151] The Homoeomeric particles +congregated together, each to its like; so that bodies were +formed--definite and distinguishable aggregates, possessing such a +preponderance of some one ingredient as to bring it into clear +manifestation.[152] But while the decomposition of the multifarious +mass was thus carried far enough to produce distinct bodies, each of +them specialised, knowable, and regular--still the separation can +never be complete, nor can any one thing be "cut away as with a +hatchet" from the rest. Each thing, great or small, must always +contain in itself a proportion or trace, latent if not manifest, of +everything else.[153] Nothing except mind can be thoroughly pure and +unmixed. + +[Footnote 150: Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Sch. [Greek: kai\ tê=s +perichôrê/sios tê=s sumpa/sês nou=s e)kra/têsen, ô(/ste perichôrê=sai +tê\n a)rchê/n. Kai\ prô=ton a)po\ tou= smikrou= ê)/rxato +perichôrê=sai, e)/peiten plei=on perichôre/ei, kai\ perichôrê/sei +e)pi\ ple/on. Kai\ ta\ summisgo/mena/ te kai\ a)pokrino/mena kai\ +diakrino/mena, pa/nta e)/gnô nou=s]. Also Fr. 18, p. 129; Fr. 21, p. +134, Schau.] + +[Footnote 151: Anaxag. Fr. 8-19, Schaubach.] + +[Footnote 152: Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 101, Schaub. [Greek: o(/teô| plei=sta +e)/ni, tau=ta e)ndêlo/tata e(/n e(/kasto/n e)sti kai\ ê)=n]. +Pseudo-Origen. Philosophumen. 8. [Greek: kinê/seôs de mete/chein ta\ +pa/nta u(po\ tou= nou= kinou/mena, sunelthei=n te ta\ o(/moia], &c. +Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. i. p. 188, a. 13 (p. 337, Schol. +Brandis).] + +[Footnote 153: Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, 5, p. 203, a. 23, [Greek: +o(tiou=n tô=n mori/ôn ei)=nai mi=gma o(moi/ôs tô=| pa/nti], &c. Anaxag. +Fr. 16, p. 126, Schaub. + +Anaxag. Fr. 11, p. 119, Schaub. [Greek: ou) kechô/ristai ta\ e(n e(ni\ +ko/smô|, ou)de\ _a)poke/koptai pele/kei_], &c. Frag. 12, p. 122. +[Greek: e)n panti\ pa/nta, ou)de\ chôri\s e)/stin ei)=nai].--Frag. 15, +p. 125.] + +[Side-note: Nothing (except [Greek: Nou=s]) can be entirely pure or +unmixed, but other things may be comparatively pure. Flesh, Bone, &c. +are purer than Air or Earth.] + +Nevertheless other things approximate in different degrees to purity, +according as they possess a more or less decided preponderance of some +few ingredients over the remaining multitude. Thus flesh, bone, and +other similar portions of the animal organism, were (according to +Anaxagoras) more nearly pure (with one constituent more thoroughly +preponderant and all other coexistent natures more thoroughly +subordinate and latent) than the four Empedoklean elements, Air, Fire, +Earth, &c.; which were compounds wherein many of the numerous +ingredients present were equally effective, so that the manifestations +were more confused and complicated. In this way the four Empedoklean +elements formed a vast seed-magazine, out of which many distinct +developments might take place, of ingredients all pre-existing within +it. Air and Fire appeared to generate many new products, while flesh +and bone did not.[154] Amidst all these changes, however, the infinite +total mass remained the same, neither increased nor diminished.[155] + +[Footnote 154: Aristotle, in two places (De Coelo, iii. 3, p. 302, a. +28, and Gen. et Corr. i. 1, p. 314, a. 18) appears to state that +Anaxagoras regarded flesh and bone as simple and elementary: air, +fire, and earth, as compounds from these and other Homoeomeries. So +Zeller (Philos. d. Griech., v. i. p. 670, ed. 2), with Ritter, and +others, understand him. Schaubach (Anax. Fr. p. 81, 82) dissents from +this opinion, but does not give a clear explanation. Another passage +of Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 3, p. 984, a. 11) appears to contradict the +above two passages, and to put fire and water, in the Anaxagorean +theory, in the same general category as flesh and bone: the +explanatory note of Bonitz, who tries to show that the passage in the +Metaphysica is in harmony with the other two above named passages, +seems to me not satisfactory. + +Lucretius (i. 835, referred to in a previous note) numbers flesh, +bone, fire, and water, all among the Anaxagorean Homoeomeries; and I +cannot but think that Aristotle, in contrasting Anaxagoras with +Empedokles, has ascribed to the former language which could only have +been used by the latter. [Greek: E)nanti/ôs de\ phai/nontai le/gontes +oi( peri\ A)naxago/ran toi=s peri\ E)mpedokle/a. O( me\n ga/r] (Emp.) +[Greek: phêsi pu=r kai\ u(/dôr kai\ a)e/ra kai\ gê=n stoichei=a +te/ssara kai\ a(pla= ei)=nai, ma=llon ê)\ sa/rka kai\ o)stou=n kai\ +ta\ toiau=ta tô=n o(moiomerô=n. Oi( de\] (Anaxag.) [Greek: tau=ta me\n +a(pla= kai\ stoichei=a, gê=n de\ kai\ pu=r kai\ a)e/ra su/ntheta; +panspermi/an ga\r ei)=nai tou/tôn.] (Gen. et Corr. i. 1.) The last +words ([Greek: panspermi/an]) are fully illustrated by a portion of +the other passage, De Coelo, iii. 3, [Greek: a)e/ra de\ kai\ pu=r +mi=gma tou/tôn] (the Homoeomeries, such as flesh and blood) [Greek: +kai\ tô=n a)/llôn sperma/tôn pa/ntôn; ei)=nai ga\r e(ka/teron au)tô=n +e)x a)ora/tôn o(moiomerô=n pa/ntôn ê)throisme/nôn; dio\ kai\ +gi/gnesthai pa/nta e)k tou/tôn]. + +Now it can hardly be said that Anaxagoras recognised one set of bodies +as simple and elementary, and that Empedokles recognised another set +of bodies as such. Anaxagoras expressly denied _all simple bodies_. In +his theory, all bodies were compound: _Nous_ alone formed an +exception. Everything existed in everything. But they were compounds +in which particles of one sort, or of a definite number of sorts, had +come together into such positive and marked action, as practically to +nullify the remainder. The generation of the Homoeomeric aggregate was +by disengaging these like particles from the confused mixture in which +their agency had before lain buried ([Greek: ge/nesis, e)/kphansis +mo/non kai\ e)/kkrisis tou= pri\n kruptome/nou]. Simplikius ap. +Schaub. Anax. Fr. p. 115). The Homoeomeric aggregates or bodies were +infinite in number: for ingredients might be disengaged and recombined +in countless ways, so that the result should always be some positive +and definite manifestations. Considered in reference to the +Homoeomeric body, the constituent particles might in a certain sense +be called elements.] + +[Footnote 155: Anaxag. Fr. 14, p. 125, Schaub.] + +[Side-note: Theory of Anaxagoras compared with that of Empedokles.] + +In comparing the theory of Anaxagoras with that of Empedokles, we +perceive that both of them denied not only the generation of new +matter out of nothing (in which denial all the ancient physical +philosophers concurred), but also the transformation of one form of +matter into others, which had been affirmed by Thales and others. Both +of them laid down as a basis the existence of matter in a variety of +primordial forms. They maintained that what others called generation +or transformation, was only a combination or separation of these +pre-existing materials, in great diversity of ratios. Of such primordial +forms of matter Empedokles recognised only four, the so-called +Elements; each simple and radically distinct from the others, and +capable of existing apart from them, though capable also of being +combined with them. Anaxagoras recognised primordial forms of matter +in indefinite number, with an infinite or indefinite stock of +particles of each; but no one form of matter (except Nous) capable of +being entirely severed from the remainder. In the constitution of +every individual body in nature, particles of all the different forms +were combined; but some one or a few forms were preponderant and +manifest, all the others overlaid and latent. Herein consisted the +difference between one body and another. The Homoeomeric body was one +in which a confluence of like particles had taken place so numerous +and powerful, as to submerge all the coexistent particles of other +sorts. The majority thus passed for the whole, the various minorities +not being allowed to manifest themselves, yet not for that reason +ceasing to exist: a type of human society as usually constituted, +wherein some one vein of sentiment, ethical, æsthetical, religious, +political, &c., acquires such omnipotence as to impose silence on +dissentients, who are supposed not to exist because they cannot +proclaim themselves without ruin. + +[Side-note: Suggested partly by the phenomena of animal nutrition.] + +The hypothesis of multifarious forms of matter, latent yet still real +and recoverable, appears to have been suggested to Anaxagoras mainly +by the phenomena of animal nutrition.[156] The bread and meat on which +we feed nourishes all the different parts of our body--blood, flesh, +bones, ligaments, veins, trachea, hair, &c. The nutriment must contain +in itself different matters homogeneous with all these tissues and +organs; though we cannot see such matters, our reason tells us that +they must be there. This physiological divination is interesting from +its general approximation towards the results of modern analysis. + +[Footnote 156: See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, Placit. +Philosoph. i. 3.] + +[Side-note: Chaos common to both Empedokles and Anaxagoras: moving +agency, different in one from the other theory.] + +Both Empedokles and Anaxagoras begin their constructive process from a +state of stagnation and confusion both tantamount to Chaos; which is +not so much active discord (as Ovid paints it), as rest and nullity +arising from the equilibrium of opposite forces. The chaos is in fact +almost a reproduction of the Infinite of Anaximander.[157] But +Anaxagoras as well as Empedokles enlarged his hypothesis by +introducing (what had not occurred or did not seem necessary to +Anaximander) a special and separate agency for eliciting positive +movement and development out of the negative and stationary Chaos. The +Nous or Mind is the Agency selected for this purpose by Anaxagoras: +Love and Enmity by Empedokles. Both the one and the other initiate the +rotatory cosmical motion; upon which follows as well the partial +disgregation of the chaotic mass, as the congregation of like +particles of it towards each other. + +[Footnote 157: This is a just comparison of Theophrastus. See the +passage from his [Greek: phusikê\ i(stori/a], referred to by +Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. i. p. 187, a. 21 (p. 335, Schol. +Brand.).] + +[Side-note: Nous, or mind, postulated by Anaxagoras--how understood by +later writers--how intended by Anaxagoras himself.] + +The Nous of Anaxagoras was understood by later writers as a God;[158] +but there is nothing in the fragments now remaining to justify the +belief that the author himself conceived it in that manner--or that he +proposed it (according to Aristotle's expression[159]) as the cause of +all that was good in the world, assigning other agencies as the causes +of all evil. It is not characterised by him as a person--not so much +as the Love and Enmity of Empedokles. It is not one but multitudinous, +and all its separate manifestations are alike, differing only as +greater or less. It is in fact identical with the soul, the vital +principle, or vitality, belonging not only to all men and to all +plants also.[160] It is one substance, or form of matter among the +rest, but thinner than all of them (thinner than even fire or air), +and distinguished by the peculiar characteristic of being absolutely +unmixed. It has moving power and knowledge, like the air of Diogenes +the Apolloniate: it initiates movement; and it knows about all the +things which either pass into or pass out of combination. It disposes +or puts in order all things that were, are, or will be; but it effects +this only by acting as a fermenting principle, to break up the huddled +mass, and to initiate rotatory motion, at first only on a small scale, +then gradually increasing. Rotation having once begun, and the mass +having been as it were unpacked and liberated the component +Homoeomeries are represented as coming together by their own inherent +attraction.[161] The Anaxagorean Nous introduces order and symmetry +into Nature, simply by stirring up rotatory motion in the inert mass, +so as to release the Homoeomeries from prison. It originates and +maintains the great cosmical fact of rotatory motion; which variety of +motion, from its perfect regularity and sameness, is declared by Plato +also to be the one most consonant to Reason and Intelligence.[162] +Such rotation being once set on foot, the other phenomena of the +universe are supposed to be determined by its influence, and by their +own tendencies and properties besides: but there is no farther agency +of Nous, which only _knows_ these phenomena as and when they occur. +Anaxagoras tried to explain them as well as he could; not by reference +to final causes, nor by assuming good purposes of Nous which each +combination was intended to answer--but by physical analogies, well or +ill chosen, and especially by the working of the grand cosmical +rotation.[163] + +[Footnote 158: Cicero, Academ. iv. 37; Sext. Empiric. adv. +Mathematicos, ix. 6, [Greek: to\n me\n nou=n, o(/s e)sti kat' au)to\n +theo\s], &c. + +Compare Schaubach, Anax. Frag. p. 153.] + +[Footnote 159: Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 984, b. 17. He praises +Anaxagoras for this, [Greek: oi(=on nê/phôn par' ei)kê= le/gontas +tou\s pro/teron], &c.] + +[Footnote 160: Aristoteles (or Pseudo-Aristot.) De Plantis, i. 1. + +Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 65-6-13. + +Aristotle says that the language of Anaxagoras about [Greek: nou=s] +and [Greek: psuchê\] was not perfectly clear or consistent. But it +seems also from Plato De Legg. xii. p. 967, B, that Anaxagoras made no +distinction between [Greek: nou=s] and [Greek: psuchê/]. Compare +Plato, Kratylus, p. 400 A.] + +[Footnote 161: Anaxag. Fr. 8, and Schaubach's Comm. p. 112-116. + +"Mens erat id, quod movebat molem homoeomeriarum: hâc ratione, per +hunc motum à mente excitatum, secretio facta est . . . . Materiæ autem +propriæ insunt vires: proprio suo pondere hæc, quæ mentis vi mota et +secreta sunt, feruntur in eum locum, quo nunc sunt." + +Compare Alexand. Aphrod. ap. Scholia ad Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194, +a. (Schol. p. 348 a. Brandis); Marbach, Lehrbuch der Gesch. Philos. s. +54, note 2, p. 82; Preller, Hist. Phil. ex Font. Loc. Contexta, s. 53, +with his comment.] + +[Footnote 162: Plato, Phædo, c. 107, 108, p. 98; Plato, De Legg. xii. +p. 967 B; Aristot. Metaphys. A. 4, p. 985, b. 18; Plato, Timæus, 34 A. +88 E.] + +[Footnote 163: Aristoph. Nub. 380, 828. [Greek: ai)the/rios +Di=nos--Di=nos basileu/ei, to\n Di/' e)xelêlakô/s]--the sting of which +applies to Anaxagoras and his doctrines. + +Anaxagoras [Greek: di/nous tina\s a)noê/tous a)nazôgraphô=n, su\n tê=| +tou= nou= a)praxi/a| kai\ a)noi/a|] (Clemens. Alexandrin. Stromat. ii. +p. 365). + +To _move_ (in the active sense, _i.e._ to cause movement in) and to +_know_, are the two attributes of the Anaxagorean [Greek: Nou=s] +(Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 18).] + +[Side-note: Plato and Aristotle blame Anaxagoras for deserting his own +theory.] + +This we learn from Plato and Aristotle, who blame Anaxagoras for +inconsistency in deserting his own hypothesis, and in invoking +explanations from physical agencies, to the neglect of Nous and its +supposed optimising purposes. But Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge +by his remaining fragments, seems not to have committed any such +inconsistency. He did not proclaim his Nous to be a powerful +extra-cosmical Architect, like the Demiurgus of Plato--nor an +intra-cosmical, immanent, undeliberating instinct (such as Aristotle +calls Nature), tending towards the production and renewal of regular +forms and conjunctions, yet operating along with other agencies which +produced concomitants irregular, unpredictable, often even obstructive +and monstrous. Anaxagoras appears to conceive his Nous as one among +numerous other real agents in Nature, material like the rest, yet +differing from the rest as being powerful, simple, and pure from all +mixture,[164] as being endued with universal cognizance, as being the +earliest to act in point of time, and as furnishing the primary +condition to the activity of the rest by setting on foot the cosmical +rotation. The Homoeomeries are coeternal with, if not anterior to, +Nous. They have laws and properties of their own, which they follow, +when once liberated, without waiting for the dictation of Nous. What +they do is known by, but not ordered by, Nous.[165] It is therefore no +inconsistency in Anaxagoras that he assigns to mind one distinct and +peculiar agency, but nothing more; and that when trying to explain the +variety of phenomena he makes reference to other physical agencies, as +the case seems to require.[166] + +[Footnote 164: Anaxagoras, Fr. 8,** p. 100, Schaub. + +[Greek: e)sti\ ga\r lepto/tato/n te pa/ntôn chrêma/tôn], &c. + +This means, not that [Greek: nou=s] was unextended or immaterial, but +that it was thinner or more subtle than either fire or air. +Herakleitus regarded [Greek: to\ perie/chon] as [Greek: logiko\n kai\ +phrenê=res]. Diogenes of Apollonia considered air as endued with +cognition, and as imparting cognition by being inhaled. Compare +Plutarch, De Placit. Philos. iv. 3. + +I cannot think, with Brücker (Hist. Philosop. part ii. b. ii. De Sectâ +Ionicâ, p. 504, ed. 2nd), and with Tennemann, Ges. Ph. i. 8, p. 312, +that Anaxagoras was "primus qui Dei ideam inter Græcos à materialitate +quasi purificavit," &c. I agree rather with Zeller (Philos. der +Griech. i. p. 680-683, ed. 2nd), that the Anaxagorean Nous is not +conceived as having either immateriality or personality.] + +[Footnote 165: Simplikius, in Physic. Aristot. p. 73. [Greek: kai\ +A)naxago/ras de\ to\n nou=n e)a/sas, ô(/s phêsin Eu)/dêmos, kai\ +au)tomati/zôn ta\ polla\ suni/stêsin.]] + +[Footnote 166: Diogen. Laert. ii. 8. [Greek: Nou=n . . . a)rchê\n +kinê/seôs]. + +Brücker, Hist. Philos. ut supra. "Scilicet, semel inducto in materiam +à mente motu, sufficere putavit Anaxagoras, juxta leges naturæ +motûsque, rerum ortum describere."] + +[Side-note: Astronomy and physics of Anaxagoras.] + +In describing the formation of the Kosmos, Anaxagoras supposed that, +as a consequence of the rotation initiated by mind, the primitive +chaos broke up. "The Dense, Wet, Cold, Dark, Heavy, came together into +the place where now Earth is: Hot, Dry, Bare, Light, Bright, departed +to the exterior region of the revolving Æther."[167] In such +separation each followed its spontaneous and inherent tendency. Water +was disengaged from air and clouds, earth from water: earth was still +farther consolidated into stones by cold.[168] Earth remained +stationary in the centre, while fire and air were borne round it by +the force and violence of the rotatory movement. The celestial +bodies--Sun, Moon, and Stars--were solid bodies analogous to the earth, +either caught originally in the whirl of the rotatory movement, or +torn from the substance of the earth and carried away into the outer +region of rotation.[169] They were rendered hot and luminous by the +fiery fluid in the rapid whirl of which they were hurried along. The +Sun was a stone thus made red-hot, larger than Peloponnesus: the Moon +was of earthy matter, nearer to the Earth, deriving its light from the +Sun, and including not merely plains and mountains, but also cities +and inhabitants.[170] Of the planetary movements, apart from the +diurnal rotation of the celestial sphere, Anaxagoras took no +notice.[171] He explained the periodical changes in the apparent +course of the sun and moon by resistances which they encountered, the +former from accumulated and condensed air, the latter from the +cold.[172] Like Anaximenes and Demokritus, Anaxagoras conceived the +Earth as flat, round in the surface, and not deep, resting on and +supported by the air beneath it. Originally (he thought) the earth was +horizontal, with the axis of celestial rotation perpendicular, and the +north pole at the zenith, so that this rotation was then lateral, like +that of a dome or roof; it was moreover equable and unchanging with +reference to every part of the plane of the earth's upper surface, and +distributed light and heat equally to every part. But after a certain +time the Earth tilted over of its own accord to the south, thus +lowering its southern half, raising the northern half, and causing the +celestial rotation to appear oblique.[173] + +[Footnote 167: Anaxag. Fr. 19, p. 131, Schaub.; compare Fr. 6, p. 97; +Diogen. Laert. ii. 8.] + +[Footnote 168: Anaxag. Fr. 20, p. 133, Schau.] + +[Footnote 169: See the curious passage in Plutarch, Lysander 12, and +Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 B; Diogen. Laert. ii. 12; Plutarch, Placit. +Philos. ii. 13.] + +[Footnote 170: Plato, Kratylus, p. 409 A; Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 14; +Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7.] + +[Footnote 171: Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 165.] + +[Footnote 172: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. ii. 23.] + +[Footnote 173: Diogenes Laert. ii. 9. [Greek: ta\ d' a)/stra kat' +a)rcha\s tholoeidô=s e)nechthê=nai, ô(/ste kata\ koruphê\n tê=s gê=s +to\n a)ei\ phaino/menon ei)=nai po/lon, u(/steron de\ tê\n (gê=n) +e)/gklisin labei=n.] Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 8.] + +[Side-note: His geology, meteorology, physiology.] + +Besides these doctrines respecting the great cosmical bodies, +Anaxagoras gave explanations of many among the striking phenomena in +geology and meteorology--the sea, rivers, earthquakes, hurricanes, +hail, snow, &c.[174] He treated also of animals and plants--their +primary origin, and the manner of their propagation.[175] He thought +that animals were originally produced by the hot and moist earth; but +that being once produced, the breeds were continued by propagation. +The seeds of plants he supposed to have been originally contained in +the air, from whence they fell down to the warm and moist earth, where +they took root and sprung up.[176] He believed that all plants, as +well as all animals, had a certain measure of intelligence and +sentiment, differing not in kind but only in degree from the +intelligence and sentiment of men; whose superiority of intelligence +was determined, to a great extent, by their possession of hands.[177] +He explained sensation by the action of unlike upon unlike (contrary +to Empedokles, who referred it to the action of like upon like),[178] +applying this doctrine to the explanation of the five senses +separately. But he pronounced the senses to be sadly obscure and +insufficient as means of knowledge. Apparently, however, he did not +discard their testimony, nor assume any other means of knowledge +independent of it, but supposed a concomitant and controlling effect +of intelligence as indispensable to compare and judge between the +facts of sense when they appeared contradictory.[179] On this point, +however, it is difficult to make out his opinions. + +[Footnote 174: See Schaubach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 174-181. Among the +points to which Anaxagoras addressed himself was the annual inundation +of the Nile, which he ascribed to the melting of the snows in +Æthiopia, in the higher regions of the river's course.--Diodor. i. 38. +Herodotus notices this opinion (ii. 22), calling it plausible, but +false, yet without naming any one as its author. Compare Euripides, +Helen. 3.] + +[Footnote 175: Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 6, iv. 1.] + +[Footnote 176: Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iii. 2; Diogen. Laert. ii. +9; Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2.] + +[Footnote 177: Aristot. De Plantis, i. 1; Aristot. Part. Animal. iv. +10.] + +[Footnote 178: Theophrastus, De Sensu, sect. 1--sect. 27-30. + +This difference followed naturally from the opinions of the two +philosophers on the nature of the soul or mind. Anaxagoras supposed it +peculiar in itself, and dissimilar to the Homoeomeries without. +Empedokles conceived it as a compound of the four elements, analogous +to all that was without: hence man knew each exterior element by its +like within himself--earth by earth, water by water, &c.] + +[Footnote 179: Anaxag. Fr. 19, Schaub.; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathem. +vii. 91-140; Cicero, Academ. i. 12. + +Anaxagoras remarked that the contrast between black and white might be +made imperceptible to sense by a succession of numerous intermediate +colours very finely graduated. He is said to have affirmed that snow +was really black, notwithstanding that it appeared white to our +senses: since water was black, and snow was only frozen water (Cicero, +Academ. iv. 31; Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 33). "Anaxagoras non +modo id ita esse (_sc._ albam nivem esse) negabat, sed sibi, quia +sciret aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse +_ne videri quidem_." Whether Anaxagoras ever affirmed that snow did +not _appear to him_ white, may reasonably be doubted: his real +affirmation probably was, that snow, though it appeared white, was not +really white. And this affirmation depended upon the line which he +drew between the fact of sense, the phenomenal, the relative, on one +side--and the substratum, the real, the absolute, on the other. Most +philosophers recognise a distinction between the two; but the line +between the two has been drawn in very different directions. +Anaxagoras assumed as his substratum, real, or absolute, the +Homoeomeries--numerous primordial varieties of matter, each with its +inherent qualities. Among these varieties he reckoned _water_, but he +did not reckon _snow_. He also considered that water was really and +absolutely black or dark (the Homeric [Greek: me/lan u(/dôr])--that +blackness was among its primary qualities. Water, when consolidated +into snow, was so disguised as to produce upon the spectator the +appearance of whiteness; but it did not really lose, nor could it +lose, its inherent colour. A negro covered with white paint, and +therefore looking white, is still really black: a wheel painted with +the seven prismatic colours, and made to revolve rapidly, will look +white, but it is still really septi-coloured: _i.e._ the state of +rapid revolution would be considered as an exceptional state, not +natural to it. Compare Plato, Lysis, c. 32, p. 217 D.] + +[Side-note: The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and +impious.] + +Anaxagoras, residing at Athens and intimately connected with Perikles, +incurred not only unpopularity, but even legal prosecution, by the +tenor of his philosophical opinions, especially those on astronomy. To +Greeks who believed in Helios and Selênê as not merely living beings +but Deities, his declaration that the Sun was a luminous and fiery +stone, and the Moon an earthy mass, appeared alike absurd and impious. +Such was the judgment of Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon, as well as of +Aristophanes and the general Athenian public.[180] Anaxagoras was +threatened with indictment for blasphemy, so that Perikles was +compelled to send him away from Athens. + +[Footnote 180: Plato, Apol. So. c. 14; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7.] + +That physical enquiries into the nature of things, and attempts to +substitute scientific theories in place of the personal agency of the +Gods, were repugnant to the religious feelings of the Greeks, has been +already remarked.[181] Yet most of the other contemporary philosophers +must have been open to this reproach, not less than Anaxagoras; and we +learn that the Apolloniate Diogenes left Athens from the same cause. +If others escaped the like prosecution which fell upon Anaxagoras, we +may probably ascribe this fact to the state of political party at +Athens, and to the intimacy of the latter with Perikles. The numerous +political enemies of that great man might fairly hope to discredit him +in the public mind--at the very least to vex and embarrass him--by +procuring the trial and condemnation of Anaxagoras. Against other +philosophers, even when propounding doctrines not less obnoxious +respecting the celestial bodies, there was not the same collateral +motive to stimulate the aggressive hostility of individuals. + +[Footnote 181: Plutarch, Nikias, 23.] + +[Side-note: Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element.] + +Contemporary with Anaxagoras--yet somewhat younger, as far as we can +judge, upon doubtful evidence--lived the philosopher Diogenes, a +native of Apollonia in Krete. Of his life we know nothing except that +he taught during some time at Athens, which city he was forced to quit +on the same ground as Anaxagoras. Accusations of impiety were either +brought or threatened against him:[182] physical philosophy being +offensive generally to the received religious sentiment, which was +specially awakened and appealed to by the political opponents of +Perikles. + +[Footnote 182: Diogen. Laert. ix. 52. The danger incurred by Diogenes +the Apolloniate at Athens is well authenticated, on the evidence of +Demetrius the Phalerean, who had good means of knowing. And the fact +may probably be referred to some time after the year B.C. 440, when +Athens was at the height of her power and of her attraction for +foreign visitors--when the visits of philosophers to the city had been +multiplied by the countenance of Perikles--and when the political +rivals of that great man had set the fashion of assailing them in +order to injure him. This seems to me one probable reason for +determining the chronology of the Apolloniate Diogenes: another is, +that his description of the veins in the human body is so minute and +detailed as to betoken an advanced period of philosophy between B.C. +440-410. See the point discussed in Panzerbieter, Fragment. Diogen. +Apoll. c. 12-18 (Leipsic, 1830). + +Simplikius (ad Aristot. Phys. fol. 6 A) describes Diogenes as having +been [Greek: schedo\n neô/tatos] in the series of physical theorists.] + +Diogenes the Apolloniate, the latest in the series of Ionic +philosophers or physiologists, adopted, with modifications and +enlargements, the fundamental tenet of Anaximenes. There was but one +primordial element--and that element was air. He laid it down as +indisputable that all the different objects in this Kosmos must be at +the bottom one and the same thing: unless this were the fact, they +would not act upon each other, nor mix together, nor do good and harm +to each other, as we see that they do. Plants would not grow out of +the earth, nor would animals live and grow by nutrition, unless there +existed as a basis this universal sameness of nature. No one thing +therefore has a peculiar nature of its own: there is in all the same +nature, but very changeable and diversified.[183] + +[Footnote 183: Diogen. Ap. Fragm. ii. c. 29 Panzerb.; Theophrastus, De +Sensu, s. 39. + +[Greek: ei) ga\r ta\ e)n tô=|de tô=| ko/smô| e)o/nta nu=n gê= kai\ +u(/dôr kai\ ta)/lla, o(/sa phainetai e)n tô=|de tô=| ko/smô| e)o/nta, +ei) toute/ôn ti ê)=n to\ e(/teron tou= e(te/rou e(/teron e)o\n tê=| +i)di/ê| phu/sei, kai\ mê\ to\ au)to\ e)o\n mete/pipte pollachô=s kai\ +ê(teroiou=to; ou)damê= ou)/te mi/sgesthai a)llê/lois ê)du/nato ou)/te +ô)phe/lêsis tô=| e(te/rô| ou)/te bla/bê], &c. + +Aristotle approves this fundamental tenet of Diogenes, the conclusion +that there must be one common Something out of which all things +came--[Greek: e)x e(no\s a(/panta] (Gen. et Corrupt. i. 6-7, +p. 322, a. 14), inferred from the fact that they acted upon each other.] + +[Side-note: Air was the primordial, universal element.] + +Now the fundamental substance, common to all, was air. Air was +infinite, eternal, powerful; it was, besides, full of intelligence and +knowledge. This latter property Diogenes proved by the succession of +climatic and atmospheric phenomena of winter and summer, night and +day, rain, wind, and fine weather. All these successions were disposed +in the best possible manner by the air: which could not have laid out +things in such regular order and measure, unless it had been endowed +with intelligence. Moreover, air was the source of life, soul, and +intelligence, to men and animals: who inhaled all these by +respiration, and lost all of them as soon as they ceased to +respire.[184] + +[Footnote 184: Diog. Apoll. Fr. iv.-vi. c. 36-42, Panz.--[Greek: Ou) +ga\r a)\n ou(/tô de/dasthai oi(=o/n te ê)=n a)/neu noê/sios, ô(/ste +pa/ntôn me/tra e)/chein, cheimô=no/s te kai\ the/reos kai nukto\s kai\ +ê(me/rês kai\ u(etô=n kai\ a)ne/môn kai\ eu)diô=n. kai\ ta\ a)/lla +ei)/ tis bou/letai e)nnoe/esthai, eu(/riskoi a)\n ou(/tô diakei/mena, +ô(s a)nusto\n ka/llista. E)/ti de pro\s tou/tois kai\ ta/de mega/la +sêmei=a; a)/nthrôpos ga\r kai\ ta\ a)/lla zô=a a)napne/onta zô/ei tô=| +a)e/ri. Kai\ tou=to au)toi=s kai\ psuchê/ e)sti kai\ no/êsis---- + +--Kai\ moi\ doke/ei to\ tê\n no/êsin e)/chon ei)=nai o( a)ê\r +kaleo/menos u(po\ tô=n a)nthrô/pôn], &c. + +Schleiermacher has an instructive commentary upon these fragments of +the Apolloniate Diogenes (Vermischte Schriften, vol. ii. p. 157-162; +Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia).] + +[Side-note: Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was +eminently modifiable.] + +Air, life-giving and intelligent, existed everywhere, formed the +essence of everything, comprehended and governed everything. Nothing +in nature could be without it: yet at the same time all things in +nature partook of it in a different manner.[185] For it was +distinguished by great diversity of properties and by many gradations +of intelligence. It was hotter or colder--moister or drier--denser or +rarer--more or less active and movable--exhibiting differences of +colour and taste. All these diversities were found in objects, though +all at the bottom were air. Reason and intelligence resided in the +warm air. So also to all animals as well as to men, the common source +of vitality, whereby they lived, saw, heard, and understood, was air; +hotter than the atmosphere generally, though much colder than that +near the sun.[186] Nevertheless, in spite of this common +characteristic, the air was in other respects so indefinitely +modifiable, that animals were of all degrees of diversity, in form, +habits, and intelligence. Men were doubtless more alike among +themselves: yet no two of them could be found exactly alike, furnished +with the same dose of aerial heat or vitality. All other things, +animate and inanimate, were generated and perished, beginning from air +and ending in air: which alone continued immortal and +indestructible.[187] + +[Footnote 185: Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. [Greek: kai\ e)sti mêde\ e(\n o(/, ti +mê\ mete/chei tou/tou] (air). [Greek: Mete/chei de\ ou)de\ e(\n +o(moi/ôs to\ e(/teron tô=| e(te/rô|; a)lla\ polloi\ tro/poi\ kai\ +au)tou\ tou= a)e/ros kai\ tê=s noê/sio/s ei)sin.] + +Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, p. 405, a. 21. [Greek: Dioge/nês d', +ô(/sper kai\ e(teroi/ tines, a)e/ra [u(pe/labe tê\n psuchê/n]], &c.] + +[Footnote 186: Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. [Greek: kai\ pa/ntôn zô/ôn dê\ ê( +psuchê\ to\ au)to/ e)stin, a)ê\r thermo/teros me\n tou= e)/xô e)n ô(=| +e)sme/n, tou= me/ntoi para\ tô=| ê(eli/ô| pollo\n psuchro/teros.]] + +[Footnote 187: Diogen. Apoll. Fr. v. ch. 38, Panz.] + +[Side-note: Physiology of Diogenes--his description of the veins in +the human body.] + +The intelligence of men and animals, very unequal in character and +degree, was imbibed by respiration, the inspired air passing by means +of the veins and along the blood into all parts of the body. Of the +veins Diogenes gave a description remarkable for its minuteness of +detail, in an age when philosophers dwelt almost exclusively in loose +general analogies.[188] He conceived the principal seat of +intelligence in man to be in the thoracic cavity, or in the ventricle +of the heart, where a quantity of air was accumulated ready for +distribution.[189] The warm and dry air concentrated round the brain, +and reached by veins from the organs of sense, was the centre of +sensation. Taste was explained by the soft and porous nature of the +tongue, and by the number of veins communicating with it. The juices +of sapid bodies were sucked up by it as by a sponge: the odorous +stream of air penetrated from without through the nostrils: both were +thus brought into conjunction with the sympathising cerebral air. To +this air also the image impressed upon the eye was transmitted, +thereby causing vision:[190] while pulsations and vibrations of the +air without, entering through the ears and impinging upon the same +centre, generated the sensation of sound. If the veins connecting the +eye with the brain were inflamed, no visual sensation could take +place;[191] moreover if our minds or attention were absorbed in other +things, we were often altogether insensible to sensations either of +sight or of sound: which proved that the central air within us was the +real seat of sensation.[192] Thought and intelligence, as well as +sensation, was an attribute of the same central air within us, +depending especially upon its purity, dryness, and heat, and impeded +or deadened by moisture or cold. Both children and animals had less +intelligence than men: because they had more moisture in their bodies, +so that the veins were choked up, and the air could not get along them +freely to all parts. Plants had no intelligence; having no apertures +or ducts whereby the air could pervade their internal structure. Our +sensations were pleasurable when there was much air mingled with the +blood, so as to lighten the flow of it, and to carry it easily to all +parts: they were painful when there was little air, and when the blood +was torpid and thick.[193] + +[Footnote 188: Diogen. Apoll. Fr. vii. ch. 48, Panz. The description +of the veins given by Diogenes is preserved in Aristotel. Hist. +Animal, iii. 2: yet seemingly only in a defective abstract, for +Theophrastus alludes to various opinions of Diogenes on the veins, +which are not contained in Aristotle. See Philippson, [Greek: U(/lê +a)nthrôpi/nê], p. 203.] + +[Footnote 189: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 5. [Greek: E)n tê=| +a)rtêriakê=| koili/a| tê=s kardi/as, ê(/tis e)sti\ kai\ pneumatikê/]. +See Panzerbieter's commentary upon these words, which are not very +clear (c. 50), nor easy to reconcile with the description given by +Diogenes himself of the veins.] + +[Footnote 190: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 18. Theophrast. De +Sensu, s. 39-41-43. [Greek: Kritikô/taton de\ ê(donê=s tê\n glô=ttan; +a(palô/taton ga\r ei)=nai kai\ mano\n kai\ ta\s phle/bas a(pa/sas +a)nê/kein ei)s au)tê/n.]] + +[Footnote 191: Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iv. 16; Theophrastus, De +Sensu, s. 40.] + +[Footnote 192: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 42. [Greek: O(/ti de\ o( +e)nto\s a)ê\r ai)stha/netai, mikro\n ô)\n mo/rion tou= theou=, +sêmei=on ei)=nai, o(/ti polla/kis pro\s a)/lla to\n nou=n e)/chontes +ou)/th' o(rô=men ou)/t' a)kou/omen]. The same opinion--that sensation, +like thought, is a mental process, depending on physical conditions--is +ascribed to Strato (the disciple and successor of Theophrastus) by +Porphyry, De Abstinentiâ, iii. 21. [Greek: Stra/tônos tou= phusikou= +lo/gos e)sti\n a)podeiknu/ôn, ô(s ou)de\ ai)stha/nesthai to para/pan +a)/neu tou= noei=n u(pa/rchei. kai\ ga\r gra/mmata polla/kis +e)piporeuome/nous tê=| o)/psei kai\ lo/goi prospi/ptontes tê=| a)koê=| +dialantha/nousin ê(ma=s kai\ diapheu/gousi pro\s e(te/rous to\n nou=n +e)/chontas--ê(=| kai\ le/lektai, nou=s o(rê= kai\ nou=s a)kou/ei, +ta)/lla kôpha\ kai\ tuphla/.] + +The expression ascribed to Diogenes by Theophrastus--[Greek: o( +e)nto\s a)ê\r, mikro\n ô)\n mo/rion _tou= theou=_]--is so printed by +Philippson; but the word [Greek: theou=] seems not well avouched as to +the text, and Schneider prints [Greek: thumou=]. It is not impossible +that Diogenes may have called the air God, without departing from his +physical theory; but this requires proof.] + +[Footnote 193: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 43-46; Plutarch, Placit. +Philos. v. 20. That moisture is the cause of dulness, and that the dry +soul is the best and most intelligent--is cited among the doctrines of +Herakleitus, with whom Diogenes of Apollonia is often in harmony. +[Greek: Au)/ê psuchê\ sophôta/tê kai\ a)ri/stê.] See Schleiermach. +Herakleitos, sect. 59-64.] + +[Side-note: Kosmology and meteorology.] + +The structure of the Kosmos Diogenes supposed to have been effected by +portions of the infinite air, taking upon them new qualities and +undergoing various transformations. Some air, becoming cold, dense, +and heavy, sunk down to the centre, and there remained stationary as +earth and water: while the hotter, rarer, and lighter air ascended and +formed the heavens, assuming through the intelligence included in it a +rapid rotatory movement round the earth, and shaping itself into sun, +moon, and stars, which were light and porous bodies like pumice stone. +The heat of this celestial matter acted continually upon the earth and +water beneath, so that the earth became comparatively drier, and the +water was more and more drawn up as vapour, to serve for nourishment +to the heavenly bodies. The stars also acted as breathing-holes to the +Kosmos, supplying the heated celestial mass with fresh air from the +infinite mass without.[194] Like Anaxagoras, Diogenes conceived the +figure of the earth as flat and round, like a drum; and the rotation +of the heavens as lateral, with the axis perpendicular to the surface +of the earth, and the north pole always at the zenith. This he +supposed to have been the original arrangement; but after a certain +time, the earth tilted over spontaneously towards the south--the +northern half was elevated and the southern half depressed--so that +the north pole was no longer at the zenith, and the axis of rotation +of the heavens became apparently oblique.[195] He thought, moreover, +that the existing Kosmos was only of temporary duration; that it would +perish and be succeeded by future analogous systems, generated from +the same common substance of the infinite and indestructible air.[196] +Respecting animal generation--and to some extent respecting +meteorological phenomena[197]--Diogenes also propounded several +opinions, which are imperfectly known, but which appear to have +resembled those of Anaxagoras. + +[Footnote 194: Plutarch ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. i. 8; Aristotel. De +Animâ, i. 2; Diogen. Laert. ix. 53. [Greek: Dioge/nês kissêroeidê= ta\ +a)/stra, diapnoi/as de\ au)ta\ nomi/zei tou= ko/smou, ei)=nai de\ +dia/pura; sumperiphe/resthai de\ toi=s phaneroi=s a)/strois a)phanei=s +li/thous kai\ par' au)to\ tou=t' a)nônu/mous; pi/ptonta de\ polla/kis +e)pi\ tê=s gê=s sbe/nnusthai; katha/per to\n e)n Ai)go\s potamoi=s +purôdô=s katenechthe/nta _a)ste/ra_ pe/trinon.] This remarkable +anticipation of modern astronomy--the recognition of aerolithes as a +class of non-luminous earthy bodies revolving round the sun, but +occasionally coming within the sphere of the earth's attraction, +becoming luminous in our atmosphere, falling on the earth, and there +being extinguished--is noticed by Alex. von Humboldt in his Kosmos, +vol. i. p. 98-104, Eng. trans. He says--"The opinion of Diogenes of +Apollonia entirely accords with that of the present day," p. 110. The +charm and value of that interesting book is greatly enhanced by his +frequent reference to the ancient points of view on astronomical +subjects.] + +[Footnote 195: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 8; Panzerbieter ad Diog. +Ap. c. 76-78; Schaubach ad Anaxagor. Fr. p. 175.] + +[Footnote 196: Plut. Ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8.] + +[Footnote 197: Preller, Hist. Philosoph. Græc.-Rom. ex Font. Loc. +Contexta, sect. 68. Preller thinks that Diogenes employed his chief +attention "in animantium naturâ ex aeris principio repetendâ"; and +that he was less full "in cognitione [Greek: tô=n meteô/rôn]". But the +fragments scarcely justify this.] + +[Side-note: Leukippus and Demokritus--Atomic theory.] + +Nearly contemporary with Anaxagoras and Empedokles, two other +enquirers propounded a new physical theory very different from those +already noticed--usually known under the name of the atomic theory. +This Atomic theory, though originating with the Eleate Leukippus, +obtained celebrity chiefly from his pupil Demokritus of Abdera, its +expositor and improver. Demokritus (born seemingly in B.C. 460, and +reported to have reached extreme old age) was nine years younger than +Sokrates, thirty-three years older than Plato, and forty years younger +than Anaxagoras.[198] The age of Leukippus is not known, but he can +hardly have been much younger than Anaxagoras. + +[Footnote 198: Diogen. Laert. ix. 41. See the chronology of Demokritus +discussed in Mullach, Frag. Dem. p. 12-25; and in Zeller, Phil. der +Griech., vol. i. p. 576-681, 2nd edit. The statement of Apollodorus as +to the date of his birth, appears more trustworthy than the earlier +date assigned by Thrasyllus (B.C. 470). Demokritus declared himself to +be forty years younger than Anaxagoras.] + +[Side-note: Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions of +Demokritus.] + +Of Leukippus we know nothing: of Demokritus, very little--yet enough +to exhibit a life, like that of Anaxagoras, consecrated to +philosophical investigation, and neglectful not merely of politics, +but even of inherited patrimony.[199] His attention was chiefly turned +towards the study of Nature, with conceptions less vague, and a more +enlarged observation of facts, than any of his contemporaries had ever +bestowed. He was enabled to boast that no one had surpassed him in +extent of travelling over foreign lands, in intelligent research and +converse with enlightened natives, or in following out the geometrical +relations of lines.[200] He spent several years in visiting Egypt, +Asia Minor, and Persia. His writings were numerous, and on many +different subjects, including ethics, as well as physics, astronomy, +and anthropology. None of them have been preserved. But we read, even +from critics like Dionysius of Halikarnassus and Cicero, that they +were composed in an impressive and semi-poetical style, not unworthy +to be mentioned in analogy with Plato; while in range and diversity of +subjects they are hardly inferior to Aristotle.[201] + +[Footnote 199: Dionys. ix. 36-39.] + +[Footnote 200: Demokrit. Fragm. 6, p. 238, ed. Mullach. Compare ib. p. +41; Diogen. Laert. ix. 35; Strabo, xv. p. 703. + +Pliny, Hist. Natur. "Democritus--vitam inter experimenta consumpsit," +&c.] + +[Footnote 201: Cicero, Orat. c. 20; Dionys. De Comp. Verbor. c. 24; +Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. vii. 265. [Greek: Dêmo/kritos, o( tê=| +Dio\s phô/nê| pareikazo/menos], &c. + +Diogenes (ix. 46-48) enumerates the titles of the treatises of +Demokritus, as edited in the days of Tiberius by the rhetor +Thrasyllus: who distributed them into tetralogies, as he also +distributed the dialogues of Plato. It was probably the charm of +style, common to Demokritus with Plato, which induced the rhetor thus +to edit them both. In regard to scope and spirit of philosophy, the +difference between the two was so marked, that Plato is said to have +had a positive antipathy to the works of Demokritus, and a desire to +burn them (Aristoxenus ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 40). It could hardly be +from congeniality of doctrine that the same editor attached himself to +both. It has been remarked that Plato never once names Demokritus, +while Aristotle cites him very frequently, sometimes with marked +praise.] + +[Side-note: Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of +Parmenides.] + +The theory of Leukippus and Demokritus (we have no means of +distinguishing the two) appears to have grown out the Eleatic +theory.[202] Parmenides the Eleate (as I have already stated) in +distinguishing Ens, the self-existent, real, or absolute, on one +side--from the phenomenal and relative on the other--conceived the former +in such a way that its connection with the latter was dissolved. The +real and absolute, according to him, was One, extended, enduring, +continuous, unchangeable, immovable: the conception of Ens included +these affirmations, and at the same time excluded peremptorily +Non-Ens, or the contrary of Ens. Now the plural, unextended, transient, +discontinuous, changeable, and moving, implied a mixture of Ens and +Non-Ens, or a partial transition from one to the other. Hence (since +Non-Ens was inadmissible) such plurality, &c., could not belong to the +real or absolute (ultra-phenomenal), and could only be affirmed as +phenomenal or relative. In the latter sense, Parmenides _did_ affirm +it, and even tried to explain it: he explained the phenomenal facts +from phenomenal assumptions, apart from and independent of the +absolute. While thus breaking down the bridge between the phenomenal +on one side and the absolute on the other, he nevertheless recognised +each in a sphere of its own. + +[Footnote 202: Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 7 A. [Greek: +Leu/kippos . . . . koinônê/sas Parmeni/dê| tê=s philosophi/as, ou) tê\n +au)tê\n e)ba/dise Parmeni/dê| kai\ Xenopha/nei peri\ tô=n o)/ntôn +do/xan, a)ll', ô(s dokei=, tê\n e)nanti/an]. Aristotel. De Gener. et +Corr. i. 8, p. 251, a. 31. Diogen. Laert. ix. 30.] + +[Side-note: Demokritean theory--Atoms--Plena and Vacua--Ens and +Non-Ens.] + +This bridge the atomists undertook to re-establish. They admitted that +Ens could not really change--that there could be no real generation, +or destruction--no transformation of qualities--no transition of many +into one, or of one into many. But they denied the unity and +continuity and immobility of Ens: they affirmed that it was +essentially discontinuous, plural, and moving. They distinguished the +extended, which Parmenides had treated as an _Unum continuum_, into +extension with body, and extension without body: into _plenum_ and +_vacuum_, matter and space. They conceived themselves to have thus +found positive meanings both for Ens and Non-Ens. That which +Parmenides called Non-Ens or nothing, was in their judgment the +_vacuum_; not less self-existent than that which he called Something. +They established their point by showing that Ens, thus interpreted, +would become reconcilable to the phenomena of sense: which latter they +assumed as their basis to start from. Assuming motion as a phenomenal +fact, obvious and incontestable, they asserted that it could not even +appear to be a fact, without supposing _vacuum_ as well as body to be +real: and the proof that both of them were real was, that only in this +manner could sense and reason be reconciled. Farther, they proved the +existence of a _vacuum_ by appeal to direct physical observation, +which showed that bodies were porous, compressible, and capable of +receiving into themselves new matter in the way of nutrition. Instead +of the Parmenidean Ens, one and continuous, we have a Demokritean Ens, +essentially many and discontinuous: _plena_ and _vacua_, spaces full +and spaces empty, being infinitely intermingled.[203] There existed +atoms innumerable, each one in itself essentially a plenum, admitting +no vacant space within it, and therefore indivisible as well as +indestructible: but each severed from the rest by surrounding vacant +space. The atom could undergo no change: but by means of the empty +space around, it could freely move. Each atom was too small to be +visible: yet all atoms were not equally small; there were fundamental +differences between them in figure and magnitude: and they had no +other qualities except figure and magnitude. As no atom could be +divided into two, so no two atoms could merge into one. Yet though two +or more atoms could not so merge together as to lose their real +separate individuality, they might nevertheless come into such close +approximation as to appear one, and to act on our senses as a +phenomenal combination manifesting itself by new sensible +properties.[204] + +[Footnote 203: It is chiefly in the eighth chapter of the treatise De +Gener. et Corr. (i. 8) that Aristotle traces the doctrine of Leukippus +as having grown out of that of the Eleates. [Greek: Leu/kippos d' +e)/chein ô)|ê/thê lo/gous, oi(/tines pro\s tê\n ai)/sthêsin +o(mologou/mena le/gontes ou)k a)nairê/sousin ou)/te ge/nesin ou)/te +phthora\n ou)/te ki/nêsin kai\ to\ plê=thos tô=n o)/ntôn], &c. + +Compare also Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 4, p. 303, a. 6; Metaphys. A. +4, p. 985, b. 5; Physic. iv. 6: [Greek: le/gousi de\] (Demokritus, +&c., in proving a vacuum) [Greek: e(\n me\n o(/ti ê( ki/nêsis ê( kata\ +to/pon ou)k a)\n ei)/ê, _ou) ga\r a)\n dokei=n_ ei)=nai ki/nêsin ei) +mê\ ei)/ê keno/n; to\ ga\r plê=res a)du/naton ei)=nai de/xasthai/ ti], +&c. + +Plutarch adv. Kolot. p. 1108. [Greek: Oi(=s ou)d' o)/nar e)ntuchô\n o( +Kolô/tês, e)spha/lê peri\ le/xin tou= a)ndro\s] (Demokritus) [Greek: +e)n ê)=| diori/zetai, mê\ ma=llon to\ de\n, ê)\ to\ mêde\n ei)=nai; +de\n me\n o)noma/zôn to\ sô=ma mêde\n de\ to\ keno/n, ô(s kai\ tou/tou +phu/sin tina\ kai\ u(po/stasin i)di/an e)/chontos.] + +The affirmation of Demokritus--That Nothing existed, just as much as +Something--appears a paradox which we must probably understand as +implying that he here adopted, for the sake of argument, the language +of the Eleates, his opponents. They called the vacuum _Nothing_, but +Demokritus did not so call it. If (said Demokritus) you call vacuum +_Nothing_, then I say that Nothing exists as well as Something. + +The direct observations by which Demokritus showed the existence of a +vacuum were--1. A vessel with ashes in it will hold as much water as +if it were empty: hence we know that there are pores in the ashes, +into which the water is received. 2. Wine can be compressed in skins. +3. The growth of organised bodies proves that they have pores, through +which new matter in the form of nourishment is admitted. (Aristot. +Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b.) + +Besides this, Demokritus set forth motion as an indisputable fact, +ascertained by the evidence of sense: and affirmed that motion was +impossible, except on the assumption that vacuum existed. Melissus, +the disciple of Parmenides, inverted the reasoning, in arguing against +the reality of motion. If it be real (he said), then there must exist +a vacuum: but no vacuum does or can exist: therefore there is no real +motion. (Aristot. Physic. iv. 6.) + +Since Demokritus started from these facts of sense, as the base of his +hypothesis of atoms and vacua, so Aristotle (Gen. et Corr. i. 2; De +Animâ, i. 2) might reasonably say that he took sensible appearances as +truth. But we find Demokritus also describing reason as an improvement +and enlightenment of sense, and complaining how little of truth was +discoverable by man. See Mullach, Demokritus (pp. 414, 415). Compare +Philippson--[Greek: U(=lê a)nthrôpi/nê]--Berlin, 1831.] + +[Footnote 204: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 25, [Greek: +ta\ prô=ta mege/thê ta\ a)diai/reta sterea/]. Diogen. Laert. ix. 44; +Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1110 seq. + +Zeller, Philos. der Griech., vol. i. p. 583-588, ed. 2nd; Aristotel. +Metaphys. Z. 13, p. 1039, a. 10, [Greek: a)du/naton ei)=nai/ phêsi +Dêmo/kritos e)k du/o e(\n ê)\| e)x e(no\s du/o gene/sthai; ta\ ga\r +mege/thê ta\ a)/toma ta\s ou)si/as poiei=.]] + +[Side-note: Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, +position, and arrangement--they had no qualities, but their movements +and combinations generated qualities.] + +The bridge, broken down by Parmenides, between the real and the +phenomenal world, was thus in theory re-established. For the real +world, as described by Demokritus, differed entirely from the sameness +and barrenness of the Parmenidean Ens, and presented sufficient +movement and variety to supply a basis of explanatory hypothesis, +accommodated to more or less of the varieties in the phenomenal world. +In respect of quality, indeed, all the atoms were alike, not less than +all the vacua: such likeness was (according to Demokritus) the +condition of their being able to act upon each other, or to combine as +phenomenal aggregates.[205] But in respect to quantity or magnitude as +well as in respect to figure, they differed very greatly: moreover, +besides all these diversities, the ordination and position of each +atom with regard to the rest were variable in every way. As all +objects of sense were atomic compounds, so, from such fundamental +differences--partly in the constituent atoms themselves, partly in the +manner of their arrangement when thrown into combination--arose all +the diverse qualities and manifestations of the compounds. When atoms +passed into new combination, then there was generation of a new +substance: when they passed out of an old combination there was +destruction: when the atoms remained the same, but were merely +arranged anew in order and relative position, then the phenomenon was +simply change. Hence all qualities and manifestations of such +compounds were not original, but derivative: they had no "nature of +their own," or law peculiar to them, but followed from the atomic +composition of the body to which they belonged. They were not real and +absolute, like the magnitude and figure of the constituent atoms, but +phenomenal and relative--_i.e._ they were powers of acting upon +correlative organs of sentient beings, and nullities in the absence of +such organs.[206] Such were the colour, sonorousness, taste, smell, +heat, cold, &c., of the bodies around us: they were relative, implying +correlative percipients. Moreover they were not merely relative, but +perpetually fluctuating; since the compounds were frequently changing +either in arrangement or in diversity of atoms, and every such atomic +change, even to a small extent, caused it to work differently upon our +organs.[207] + +[Footnote 205: Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 7, p. 323, b. 12. It was +the opinion of Demokritus, that there could be no action except where +agent and patient were alike. [Greek: Phêsi\ ga\r to\ au)to\ kai\ +o(/moion ei)=nai to/ te poiou=n kai\ to\ pa/schon; ou) ga\r +e)gchôrei=n ta\ e(/tera kai\ diaphe/ronta pa/schein u(p' a)llê/lôn; +a)lla\ ka)\n e(/tera o)/nta poiê=| ti ei)s a)/llêla, ou)ch ê(=| +e(/tera, a)ll' ê(=| tau)to/n ti u(pa/rchei, tau/tê| tou=to sumbai/nein +au)toi=s]. Many contemporary philosophers affirmed distinctly the +opposite. [Greek: To\ o(/moion u(po\ tou= o(moi/ou pa=n a)pathe/s], +&c. Diogenes the Apolloniate agreed on this point generally with +Demokritus; see above, p. 61, note 1 [*Footnote 185*]. The facility +with which these philosophers laid down general maxims is constantly +observable.] + +[Footnote 206: Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 316, a. 1; Theophrast. +De Sensu, s. 63, 64. [Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n bare/os kai\ kou/phou +kai\ sklêrou= kai\ malakou= e)n tou/tois a)phori/zei; tô=n de\ a)/llôn +ai)sthêtô=n ou)deno\s ei)=nai phu/sin, a)lla\ pa/nta pa/thê tê=s +ai)sthê/seôs a)lloioume/nês, e)x ê(=s gi/nesthai tê\n phantasi/an], +&c. + +Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. c. 16. [Greek: Phu/sin me\n mêde\n ei)=nai +chrô=ma, ta\ me\n ga\r stoichei=a a)/poia, ta/ te mesta\ kai\ to\ +keno/n; ta\ d' e)x au)tô=n sugkri/mata ke/chrô=sthai diatagê=| te kai\ +r(uthmô=| kai\ protropê=|], &c. + +Demokritus restricted the term [Greek: Phu/sis]--Nature--to the +primordial atoms and vacua (Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. p. 310 +A.).] + +[Footnote 207: Aristotel. Gener. et Corr. i. 2, p. 315, b. 10. [Greek: +Ô(/ste tai=s metabolai=s tou= sugkeime/nou to\ au)to\ e)nanti/on +dokei=n a)/llô| kai\ a)/llô|, kai\ metakinei=sthai mikrou= +e)mmignume/nou, _kai\ o(/lôs e(/teron phai/nesthai e(no\s +metakinêthe/ntos_.]] + +[Side-note: Combinations of atoms--generating different qualities in +the compounds.] + +Among the various properties of bodies, however, there were two which +Demokritus recognised as not merely relative to the observer, but also +as absolute and belonging to the body in itself. These were weight and +hardness--primary qualities (to use the phraseology of Locke and +Reid), as contrasted with the secondary qualities of colour, taste, +and the like. Weight, or tendency downward, belonged (according to +Demokritus) to each individual atom separately, in proportion to its +magnitude: the specific gravity of all atoms was supposed to be equal. +In compound bodies one body was heavier than another, in proportion as +its bulk was more filled with atoms and less with vacant space.[208] +The hardness and softness of bodies Demokritus explained by the +peculiar size and peculiar junction of their component atoms. Thus, +comparing lead with iron, the former is heavier and softer, the latter +is lighter and harder. Bulk for bulk, the lead contained a larger +proportion of solid, and a smaller proportion of interstices, than the +iron: hence it was heavier. But its structure was equable throughout; +it had a greater multitude of minute atoms diffused through its bulk, +equally close to and coherent with each other on every side, but not +more close and coherent on one side than on another. The structure of +the iron, on the contrary, was unequal and irregular, including larger +spaces of vacuum in one part, and closer approach of its atoms in +other parts: moreover these atoms were in themselves larger, hence +there was a greater force of cohesion between them on one particular +side, rendering the whole mass harder and more unyielding than the +lead.[209] + +[Footnote 208: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 61. [Greek: Baru\ me\n ou)=n +kai\ kou=phon tô=| mege/thei diairei= Dêmo/kritos], &c. + +Aristotel. De Coelo, iv. 2, 7, p. 309, a. 10; Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. +326, a. 9. [Greek: Kai/toi baru/teron ge kata\ tê\n u(perochê/n phêsin +ei)=nai Dêmo/kritos e(/kaston tô=n a)diaire/tôn], &c.] + +[Footnote 209: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 62.] + +[Side-note: All atoms essentially separate from each other.] + +We thus see that Demokritus, though he supposed single atoms to be all +of the same specific gravity, yet recognised a different specific +gravity in the various compounds of atoms or material masses. It is to +be remembered that, when we speak of contact or combination of atoms, +this is not to be understood literally and absolutely, but only in a +phenomenal and relative sense; as an approximation, more or less +close, but always sufficiently close to form an atomic combination +which our senses apprehended as one object. Still every atom was +essentially separate from every other, and surrounded by a margin of +vacant space: no two atoms could merge into one, any more than one +atom could be divided into two. + +[Side-note: All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, +were phenomenal and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no +knowledge of the real and absolute.] + +Pursuant to this theory, Demokritus proclaimed that all the properties +of objects, except weight, hardness, and softness, were not inherent +in the objects themselves, but simply phenomenal and relative to the +observer--"modifications of our sensibility". Colour, taste, smell, +sweet and bitter, hot and cold, &c., were of this description. In +respect to all of them, man differed from other animals, one man from +another, and even the same man from himself at different times and +ages. There was no sameness of impression, no unanimity or constancy +of judgment, because there was no real or objective "nature" +corresponding to the impression. From none of these senses could we at +all learn what the external thing was in itself. "Sweet and bitter, +hot and cold (he said) are by law or convention (_i.e._ these names +designate the impressions of most men on most occasions, taking no +account of dissentients): what really exists is, atoms and vacuum. The +sensible objects which we suppose and believe to exist do not exist in +truth; there exist only atoms and vacuum. We know nothing really and +truly about an object, either what it is or what it is not: our +opinions depend upon influences from without, upon the position of our +body, upon the contact and resistances of external objects. There are +two phases of knowledge, the obscure and the genuine. To the obscure +belong all our senses--sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The +genuine is distinct from these. When the obscure phase fails, when we +can no longer see, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch--from +minuteness and subtlety of particles--then the genuine phase, or +reason and intelligence, comes into operation."[210] + +[Footnote 210: Demokritus, Fr. p. 205, Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. +Mathemat. vii. p. 135; Diogen. Laert. ix. 72.] + +[Side-note: Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little +of it was attainable.] + +True knowledge (in the opinion of Demokritus) was hardly at all +attainable; but in so far as it could be attained, we must seek it, +not merely through the obscure and insufficient avenues of sense, but +by reason or intelligence penetrating to the ultimatum of corpuscular +structure, farther than sense could go. His atoms were not pure +Abstracta (like Plato's Ideas and geometrical plane figures, and +Aristotle's materia prima), but concrete bodies, each with its +own[211] magnitude, figure, and movement; too small to be seen or felt +by us, yet not too small to be seen or felt by beings endowed with +finer sensitive power. They were abstractions mainly in so far as all +other qualities were supposed absent. Demokritus professed to show how +the movements, approximations, and collisions of these atoms, brought +them into such combinations as to form the existing Kosmos; and not +that system alone, but also many other cosmical systems, independent +of and different from each other, which he supposed to exist. + +[Footnote 211: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 325, a. 29. [Greek: +A)/peira to\ plê=thos kai\ a)o/rata dia\ smikro/têta tô=n o)/gkôn], +&c. + +Marbach observes justly that the Demokritean atoms, though not really +objects of sense in consequence of their smallness (of their +disproportion to our visual power), are yet spoken of as objects of +sense: they are as it were microscopic objects, and the [Greek: +gnêsi/ê gnô/mê], or intelligence, is conceived as supplying something +of a microscopic power. (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der +Philosophie, sect. 58, vol. i. p. 94.)] + +[Side-note: No separate force required to set the atoms in +motion--they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms +naturally tend towards like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the +Kosmos.] + +How this was done we cannot clearly make out, not having before us the +original treatise of Demokritus, called the Great Diakosmos. It is +certain, however, that he did not invoke any separate agency to set +the atoms in motion--such as the Love and Discord of Empedokles--the +Nous or Intelligence of Anaxagoras. Demokritus supposed that the atoms +moved by an inherent force of their own: that this motion was as much +without beginning as the atoms themselves:[212] that eternal motion +was no less natural, no more required any special cause to account for +it, than eternal rest. "Such is the course of nature--such is and +always has been the fact," was his ultimatum.[213] He farther +maintained that all the motions of the atoms were necessary--that is, +that they followed each other in a determinate order, each depending +upon some one or more antecedents, according to fixed laws, which he +could not explain.[214] Fixed laws, known or unknown, he recognised +always. Fortune or chance was only a fiction imagined by men to cover +their own want of knowledge and foresight.[215] Demokritus seems to +have supposed that like atoms had a spontaneous tendency towards like; +that all, when uncombined, tended naturally downwards, yet with +unequal force, owing to their different size, and weight proportional +to size; that this unequal force brought them into impact and +collision one with another, out of which was generated a rotatory +motion, gradually extending itself, and comprehending a larger and +larger number of them, up to a certain point, when an exterior +membrane or shell was formed around them.[216] This rotatory motion +was the capital fact which both constituted the Kosmos, and maintained +the severance of its central and peripheral masses--Earth and Water in +the centre--Air, Fire, and the celestial bodies, near the +circumference. Demokritus, Anaxagoras, and Empedokles, imagined +different preliminary hypotheses to get at the fact of rotation; but +all employed the fact, when arrived at, as a basis from which to +deduce the formation of the various cosmical bodies and their known +manifestations.[217] In respect to these bodies--Sun, Moon, Stars, +Earth, &c.--Demokritus seems to have held several opinions like those +of Anaxagoras. Both of them conceived the Sun as a redhot mass, and +the Earth as a flat surface above and below, round horizontally like a +drum, stationary in the centre of the revolving celestial bodies, and +supported by the resistance of air beneath.[218] + +[Footnote 212: Aristotel. De Coelo, iii. 2, 3, p. 300, b. 9. [Greek: +Leuki/ppô| kai\ Dê/mokritô|, toi=s le/gousin a)ei\ kinei=sthai, ta\ +prô=ta sô/mata], &c. (Physic. viii. 3, 3, p. 253, b. 12, viii. 9, p. +265, b. 23; Cicero, De Finib. i. 6, 17.)] + +[Footnote 213: Aristot. Generat. Animal. ii. 6, p. 742, b. 20; Physic. +viii. 1, p. 252, b. 32. + +Aristotle blames Demokritus for thus acquiescing in the general course +of nature as an ultimatum, and for omitting all reference to final +causes. M. Lafaist, in a good dissertation, Sur la Philosophie +Atomistique (Paris, 1833, p. 78), shows that this is exactly the +ultimatum of natural philosophers at the present day. "Un phénomène se +passait-il, si on lui en demandait la raison, il (Demokritus) +répondait, 'La chose se passe ainsi, parcequ'elle s'est toujours +passée ainsi.' C'est, en d'autres termes, la seule réponse que font +encore aujourd'hui les naturalistes. Suivant eux, une pierre, quand +elle n'est pas soutenue, tombe en vertu de la loi de la pesanteur. +Qu'est-ce que la loi de la pesanteur? La généralisation de ce fait +plusieurs fois observé, qu'une pierre tombe quand elle n'est pas +soutenue. Le phénomène dans un cas particulier arrive ainsi, parceque +toujours il est arrivé ainsi. Le principe qu'implique l'explication +des naturalistes modernes est celle de Démokrite, c'est que la nature +demeure constante à elle-même. La proposition de Démokrite--'Tel +phénomène a lieu de cette façon, parceque toujours il a eu lieu de +cette même façon'--est la première forme qu' ait revêtue le principe +de la stabilité des lois naturelles."] + +[Footnote 214: Aristotle (Physic. ii. 4, p. 196, a. 25) says that +Demokritus (he seems to mean Demokritus) described the motion of the +atoms to form the cosmical system, as having taken place [Greek: a)po\ +tou= au)toma/tou]. Upon which Mullach (Dem. Frag. p. 382) justly +remarks--"Casu ([Greek: a)po\ tau)toma/tou]) videntur fieri, quæ +naturali quâdam necessitate cujus leges ignoramus evenire dicuntur. +Sed quamvis Aristoteles naturalem Abderitani philosophi necessitatem, +vitato [Greek: a)na/gkês] vocabulo, quod alii aliter usurpabant, casum +et fortunam vocaret--ipse tamen Democritus, abhorrens ab iis omnibus +quæ destinatam causarum seriem tollerent rerumque naturam +perturbarent, nihil juris fortunæ et casui in singulis rebus +concessit." + +Zeller has a like remark upon the phrase of Aristotle, which is +calculated to mislead as to the doctrine of Demokritus (Phil. d. +Griech., i. p. 600, 2nd.** ed.). + +Dugald Stewart, in one of the Dissertations prefixed to the +Encyclopædia Britannica, has the like comment respecting the +fundamental principle of the Epicurean (identical _quoad hoc_ with the +Demokritean) philosophy. + +"I cannot conclude this note without recurring to an observation +ascribed by Laplace to Leibnitz--'that the _blind chance_ of the +Epicureans involves the supposition of an effect taking place without +a cause'. This is a very incorrect statement of the philosophy taught +by Lucretius, which nowhere gives countenance to such a supposition. +The distinguishing tenet of this sect was, that the order of the +universe does not imply the existence of _intelligent_ causes, but may +be accounted for by the active powers belonging to the atoms of +matter: which active powers, being exerted through an indefinitely +long period of time, might have produced, nay must have produced, +exactly such a combination of things as that with which we are +surrounded. This does not call in question the necessity of a cause to +produce every effect, but, on the contrary, virtually assumes the +truth of that axiom. It only excludes from these causes the attribute +of intelligence. In the same way, when I apply the words _blind +chance_ to the throw of a die, I do not mean to deny that I am +ultimately the cause of the particular event that is to take place: +but only to intimate that I do not here act as a _designing_ cause, in +consequence of my ignorance of the various accidents to which the die +is subjected while shaken in the box. If I am not mistaken, this +Epicurean theory approaches very nearly to the scheme which it is the +main object of the Essay on Probabilities (by Laplace) to inculcate." +(Stewart--First Dissertation, part ii. p. 139, note.)] + +[Footnote 215: Demokrit. Frag. p. 167, ed. Mullach; Eusebius, Præp. +Evang. xiv. 27. [Greek: a)/nthrôpoi tu/chês ei)/dôlon e)pla/santo +pro/phasin i)di/ês a)bouli/ês.]] + +[Footnote 216: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 604 seq.; Demokrit. +Fragm. p. 207, Mull.; Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathem. vii. 117.] + +[Footnote 217: Demokrit. Fragm. p. 208, Mullach. [Greek: Dêmo/kritos +e)n oi(=s phêsi di/nê a)po\ panto\s a)pokri/nesthai pantoi/ôn +ei)de/ôn], &c. + +Diog. Laert. ix. 31-44.] + +[Footnote 218: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 612, ed. 2nd.] + +[Side-note: Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal +generation.] + +Among the researches of Demokritus there were some relating to animal +generation, and zoology; but we cannot find that his opinions on these +subjects were in peculiar connection with his atomic theory.[219] Nor +do we know how far he carried out that theory into detail by tracing +the various phenomenal manifestations to their basis in atomic +reality, and by showing what particular magnitude, figure, and +arrangement of atoms belonged to each. It was only in some special +cases that he thus connected determinate atoms with compounds of +determinate quality; for example, in regard to the four Empedoklean +elements. The atoms constituting heat or fire he affirmed to be small +and globular, the most mobile, rapid, and penetrating of all; those +constituting air, water, and earth, were an assemblage of all +varieties of figures, but differed from each other in magnitude--the +atoms of air being apparently smallest, those of earth largest.[220] + +[Footnote 219: Mullach, Demokr. Fragm. p. 395 seqq.] + +[Footnote 220: Aristotle, Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 5; De Coelo, +iii. 8, p. 306, b. 35; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.] + +[Side-note: His account of mind--he identified it with heat or fire +diffused throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental +particles intermingled throughout all the frame with corporeal +particles.] + +In regard to mind or soul generally, he identified it with heat or +fire, conceiving it to consist in the same very small, globular, +rapidly movable atoms, penetrating everywhere: which he illustrated by +comparison with the fine dust seen in sunbeams when shining through a +doorway. That these were the constituent atoms of mind, he proved by +the fact, that its first and most essential property was to move the +body, and to be itself moved.[221] Mind, soul, the vital principle, +fire, heat, &c., were, in the opinion of Demokritus, substantially +identical--not confined to man or even to animals, but +diffused, in unequal proportions, throughout plants, the air, and +nature generally. Sensation, thought, knowledge, were all motions of +mind or of these restless mental particles, which Demokritus supposed +to be distributed over every part of the living body, mingling and +alternating with the corporeal particles.[222] It was the essential +condition of life, that the mental particles should be maintained in +proper number and distribution throughout the body; but by their +subtle nature they were constantly tending to escape, being squeezed +or thrust out at all apertures by the pressure of air on all the +external parts. Such tendency was counteracted by the process of +respiration, whereby mental or vital particles, being abundantly +distributed throughout the air, were inhaled along with air, and +formed an inward current which either prevented the escape, or +compensated the loss, of those which were tending outwards. When +breathing ceased, such inward current being no longer kept up, the +vital particles in the interior were speedily forced out, and death +ensued.[223] + +[Footnote 221: Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2, 2-3, p. 403, b. 28; i. 3, p. +406, b. 20; Cicero, Tuscul. Disput. i. 11; Diogen. Laert. ix. 44.] + +[Footnote 222: Aristotel. De Respirat. (c. 4, p. 472, a. 5), [Greek: +le/gei] (Demokritus) [Greek: ô(s ê( psuchê\ kai\ to\ thermo\n +tau)to\n, ta\ prô=ta schê/mata tô=n sphairoeidô=n]. + +Lucretius, iii. 370. + +Illud in his rebus nequaquam sumere possis, +Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit; +Corporis atque animi primordia singula privis +Adposita alternis variare ac nectere membra.] + +[Footnote 223: Aristotel. De Respiratione, c. 4, p. 472, a. 10; De +Animâ, i. 2, p. 404, a. 12.] + +[Side-note: Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of +the body.] + +Though Demokritus conceived those mental particles as distributed all +over the body, yet he recognised different mental aptitudes attached +to different parts of the body. Besides the special organs of sense, +he considered intelligence as attached to the brain, passion to the +heart, and appetite to the liver:[224] the same tripartite division +afterwards adopted by Plato. He gave an explanation of perception or +sensation in its different varieties, as well as of intelligence or +thought. Sensation and thought were, in his opinion, alike material, +and alike mental. Both were affections of the same peculiar particles, +vital or mental, within us: both were changes operated in these +particles by effluvia or images from without; nevertheless the one +change was different from the other.[225] + +[Footnote 224: Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 618, ed. 2nd. + +Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iv. 4), ascribes a bipartite division of the +soul to Demokritus: [Greek: to\ logiko\n], in the thorax: [Greek: to\ +a)/logon], distributed over all the body. But in the next section (iv. +6), he departs from this statement, affirming that both Demokritus and +Plato supposed [Greek: to\ ê(gemoniko\n] of the soul to be in the +head.] + +[Footnote 225: Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 8. Demokritus and +Leukippus affirm [Greek: tê\n ai)/sthêsin kai\ tê\n no/êsin +gi/nesthai, ei)dô/lôn e)/xôthen prosio/ntôn; mêdeni\ ga\r e)piba/llein +mêdete/ran chôri\s tou= prospi/ptontos ei)dô/lou]. + +Cicero, De Finibus, i. 6, 21, "imagines, quæ idola nominant, quorum +incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus," &c.] + +In regard to sensations, Demokritus said little about those of touch, +smell, and hearing; but he entered at some length into those of sight +and taste.[226] + +[Footnote 226: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 64.] + +[Side-note: Explanation of different sensations and perceptions. +Colours.] + +Proceeding upon his hypothesis of atoms and vacua as the only +objective existences, he tried to show what particular modifications +of atoms, in figure, size, and position, produced upon the sentient +the impressions of different colours. He recognised four fundamental +or simple colours--white, black, red, and green--of which all other +colours were mixtures and combinations.[227] White colour (he said) +was caused by smooth surfaces, which presented straight pores and a +transparent structure, such as the interior surface of shells: where +these smooth substances were brittle or friable, this arose from the +constituent atoms being at once spherical and loosely connected +together, whereby they presented the clearest passage through their +pores, the least amount of shadow, and the purest white colour. From +substances thus constituted, the effluvia flowed out easily, and +passed through the intermediate air without becoming entangled or +confused with it. Black colour was caused by rough, irregular, unequal +substances, which had their pores crooked and obstructed, casting much +shadow, and sending forth slowly their effluvia, which became hampered +and entangled with the intervening medium of air. Red colour arose +from the effluvia of spherical atoms, like those of fire, though of +larger size: the connection between red colour and fire was proved by +the fact that heated substances, man as well as the metals, became +red. Green was produced by atoms of large size and wide vacua, not +restricted to any determinate shape, but arranged in peculiar order +and position. These four were given by Demokritus as the simple +colours. But he recognised an infinite diversity of compound colours, +arising from mixture of them in different proportions, several of +which he explained--gold-colour, purple, blue, violet, leek-green, +nut-brown, &c.[228] + +[Footnote 227: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 73 seq.; Aristotel. De +Sensu, c. iv. p. 442, b. 10. The opinions of Demokritus on colour are +illustrated at length by Prantl in his Uebersicht der Farbenlehre der +Alten (p. 49 seq.), appended to his edition of the Aristotelian or +Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, [Greek: Peri\ Chrôma/tôn] (Munich, +1849). + +Demokritus seems also to have attempted to show, that the sensation of +cold and shivering was produced by the irruption of jagged and acute +atoms. See Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p. 947, 948, c. 8.] + +[Footnote 228: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 76-78. [Greek: a)/peira ta\ +chrô/mata kai\ tou\s chulou\s kata\ ta\s mi/xeis--ou)de\n ga\r +o(/moion e)/sesthai tha)/teron tha)te/rou.]] + +[Side-note: Vision caused by the outflow of effluvia or images from +objects. Hearing.] + +Besides thus setting forth those varieties of atoms and atomic motions +which produced corresponding varieties of colour, Demokritus also +brought to view the intermediate stages whereby they realised the act +of vision. All objects, compounds of the atoms, gave out effluvia or +images resembling themselves. These effluvia stamped their impression, +first upon the intervening air, next upon the eye beyond: which, being +covered by a fine membrane, and consisting partly of water, partly of +vacuum, was well calculated to admit the image. Such an image, the +like of which any one might plainly see by looking into another +person's eye, was the immediate cause of vision.[229] The air, +however, was no way necessary as an intervening medium, but rather +obstructive: the image proceeding from the object would be more +clearly impressed upon the eye through a vacuum: if the air did not +exist, vision would be so distinct, even at the farthest distance, +that an object not larger than an ant might be seen in the +heavens.[230] Demokritus believed that the visual image, after having +been impressed upon the eye, was distributed or multiplied over the +remaining body.[231] In like manner, he believed that, in hearing, the +condensed air carrying the sound entered with some violence through +the ears, passed through the veins to the brain, and was from thence +dispersed over the body.[232] Both sight and hearing were thus not +simply acts of the organ of sense, but concurrent operations of the +entire frame: over all which (as has been already stated) the mental +or vital particles were assumed to be disseminated. + +[Footnote 229: Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 50. [Greek: to\n a)e/ra to\n +metaxu\ tê=s o)/pseôs kai\ tou= o(rôme/nou tupou=sthai], &c. +Aristotel. De Sensu, c. 2, p. 438, a. 6. + +Theophrastus notices this intermediate [Greek: a)potu/pôsis e)n tô=| +a)e/ri] as a doctrine peculiar ([Greek: i)di/ôs]) to Demokritus: he +himself proceeds to combat it (51, 52).] + +[Footnote 230: Aristotel. De Animâ, ii. 7-9, p. 419, a. 16.] + +[Footnote 231: Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 54.] + +[Footnote 232: Theophrastus, De Sensu, 55, 56. [Greek: tê\n ga\r +phônê\n ei)=nai puknoume/nou tou= a)e/ros kai\ meta\ bi/as +ei)sio/ntos], &c. + +Demokritus thought that air entered into the system not only through +the ears, but also through pores in other parts of the body, though so +gently as to be imperceptible to our consciousness: the ears afforded +a large aperture, and admitted a considerable mass.] + +[Side-note: Differences of taste--how explained.] + +Farther, Demokritus conceived that the diversities of taste were +generated by corresponding diversities of atoms, or compounds of +atoms, of particular figure, magnitude and position. Acid taste was +caused by atoms rough, angular, twisted, small, and subtle, which +forced their way through all the body, produced large interior vacant +spaces, and thereby generated great heat: for heat was always +proportional to the amount of vacuum within.[233] Sweet taste was +produced by spherical atoms of considerable bulk, which slid gently +along and diffused themselves equably over the body, modifying and +softening the atoms of an opposite character. Astringent taste was +caused by large atoms with many angles, which got into the vessels, +obstructing the movement of fluids both in the veins and intestines. +Salt taste was produced by large atoms, much entangled with each +other, and irregular. In like manner Demokritus assigned to other +tastes particular varieties of generating atoms: adding, however, that +in every actual substance, atoms of different figures were +intermingled, so that the effect of each on the whole was only +realised in the ratio of the preponderating figure.[234] Lastly, the +working of all atoms, in the way of taste, was greatly modified by the +particular system upon which they were brought to act: effects totally +opposite being sometimes produced by like atoms upon different +individuals.[235] + +[Footnote 233: Theophrast. De Sensu, 65-68.] + +[Footnote 234: Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. [Greek: a(pa/ntôn de\ tô=n +schêma/tôn ou)de\n a)ke/raion ei)=nai kai\ a)mige\s toi=s a)/llois, +a)ll' e)n e(ka/stô| polla\ ei)=nai . . . . ou)= d' a)\n e)nê=| plei=ston, +tou=to ma/lista e)nischu/ein pro/s te tê\n ai)/sthêsin kai\ tê\n +du/namin]. + +This essential intermixture, in each distinct substance, of atoms of +all different shapes, is very analogous to the essential intermixture +of all sorts of Homoeomeries in the theory of Anaxagoras.] + +[Footnote 235: Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. [Greek: ei)s o(poi/an e(/xin +a)\n ei)se/lthê|, diaphe/rein ou)k o)li/gon; kai\ dia\ tou=to to\ +au)to\ ta)nanti/a, kai\ ta)nanti/a to\ au)to\ pa/thos poiei=n +e)ni/ote.]] + +[Side-note: Thought or Intelligence--was produced by influx of atoms +from without.] + +As sensation, so also thought or intelligence, was produced by the +working of atoms from without. But in what manner the different +figures and magnitudes of atoms were understood to act, in producing +diverse modifications of thought, we do not find explained. It was, +however, requisite that there should be a symmetry, or correspondence +of condition between the thinking mind within and the inflowing atoms +from without, in order that these latter might work upon a man +properly: if he were too hot, or too cold, his mind went astray.[236] +Though Demokritus identified the mental or vital particles with the +spherical atoms constituting heat or fire, he nevertheless seems to +have held that these particles might be in excess as well as in +deficiency, and that they required, as a condition of sound mind, to +be diluted or attempered with others. The soundest mind, however, did +not work by itself or spontaneously, but was put in action by atoms or +effluvia from without: this was true of the intellectual mind, not +less than of the sensational mind. There was an objective something +without, corresponding to and generating every different thought--just +as there was an objective something corresponding to every different +sensation. But first, the object of sensation was an atomic compound +having some appreciable bulk, while that of thought might be separate +atoms or vacua so minute as to be invisible and intangible. Next, the +object of sensation did not reveal itself as it was in its own nature, +but merely produced changes in the percipient, and different changes +in different percipients (except as to heavy and light, hard and soft, +which were not simply modifications of our sensibility, but were also +primary qualities inherent in the objects themselves[237]): while the +object of thought, though it worked a change in the thinking subject, +yet also revealed itself as it was, and worked alike upon all. + +[Footnote 236: Theophrast. De Sensu, 58. [Greek: Peri\ de\ tou= +phronei=n e)pi\ tosou=ton ei)/rêken, o(/ti gi/netai summe/trôs +e)chou/sês tê=s psuchê=s meta\ tê\n ki/nêsin; e)a\n de\ peri/thermo/s +tis ê)\ peri/psuchros ge/nêtai, metalla/ttein phêsi/.]] + +[Footnote 237: Theophrastus, De Sensu, 71. [Greek: nu=n de\ sklêrou= +me\n kai\ malakou= kai\ bare/os kai\ kou/phou poiei= tê\n ou)si/an, +_o(/per (a(/per) ou)ch' ê(=tton e)/doxe le/gesthai pro\s ê(ma=s,_ +thermou= de\ kai\ psuchrou= kai\ tô=n a)/llôn ou)deno/s]. + +This is a remarkable point to be noted in the criticisms of +Theophrastus on the doctrine of Demokritus. Demokritus maintains that +_hot_ and _cold_ are relative to us: _hard_ and _soft_, _heavy_ and +_light_, are not only relative to us, but also absolute, objective, +things in their own nature,--though causing in us sensations which are +like them. Theophrastus denies this distinction altogether: and denies +it with the best reason. Not many of his criticisms on Demokritus are +so just and pertinent as this one.] + +[Side-note: Sensation, obscure knowledge relative to the sentient; +Thought, genuine knowledge--absolute, or object per se.] + +Hence Demokritus termed sensation, _obscure knowledge_--thought, +_genuine knowledge_.[238] It was only by thought (reason, +intelligence) that the fundamental realities of nature, atoms and +vacua, could be apprehended: even by thought, however, only +imperfectly, since there was always more or less of subjective +movements and conditions, which partially clouded the pure objective +apprehension--and since the atoms themselves were in perpetual +movement, as well as inseparably mingled one with another. Under such +obstructions, Demokritus proclaimed that no clear or certain knowledge +was attainable: that the sensible objects, which men believed to be +absolute realities, were only phenomenal and relative to us,--while +the atoms and vacua, the true existences or things in themselves, +could scarce ever be known as they were:[239] that truth was hidden in +an abyss, and out of our reach. + +[Footnote 238: Demokritus Fragm. Mullach, p. 205, 206; ap. Sext. +Empir. adv. Mathemat. vii. 135-139, [Greek: gnô/mês du/o ei)si\n +i)de/ai; ê( me\n gnêsi/ê, ê( de\ skoti/ê], &c.] + +[Footnote 239: Democr. Frag., Mull., p. 204-5. [Greek: A(/per +nomi/zetai me\n ei)=nai kai\ doxa/zetai ta\ ai)sthêta/, _ou)k e)/sti +de\ kata\ a)lê/theian tau=ta;_ a)lla\ ta\ a)/toma mo/non kai\ keno/n. +ê(me/es de\ tô=| me\n e)o/nti ou)de\n a)treke\s xuni/emen, meta/pipton +de\ kata/ te sô/matos diathigê/n, kai\ tô=n e)peisio/ntôn, kai\ tô=n +a)ntistêrizo/ntôn . . . . e)teê=| me/n nun, o(/ti oi(/on e(/kasto/n +e)stin ê)\ ou)/k e)stin, ou) xuni/emen, pollachê= dedê/lôtai], &c. + +Compare Cicero, Acad. Quæst. i. 13, ii. 10; Diog. Laert. ix. 72; +Aristotel. Metaphys. iii. 5, p. 1009, b. 10.] + +[Side-note: Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which +determined the tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c.] + +As Demokritus supposed both sensations and thoughts to be determined +by effluvia from without, so he assumed a similar cause to account for +beliefs, comfortable or uncomfortable dispositions, fancies, dreams, +presentiments, &c. He supposed that the air contained many effluences, +spectres, images, cast off from persons and substances in +nature--sometimes even from outlying very distant objects which lay +beyond the bounds of the Kosmos. Of these images, impregnated with the +properties, bodily and mental, of the objects from whence they came, +some were beneficent, others mischievous: they penetrated into the +human body through the pores and spread their influence all through +the system.[240] Those thrown off by jealous and vindictive men were +especially hurtful,[241] as they inflicted suffering corresponding to +the tempers of those with whom they originated. Trains of thought and +feeling were thus excited in men's minds; in sleep,[242] dreams, +divinations, prophetic warnings, and threats, were communicated: +sometimes, pestilence and other misfortunes were thus begun. +Demokritus believed that men's happiness depended much upon the nature +and character of the images which might approach them, expressing an +anxious wish that he might himself meet with such as were +propitious.[243] It was from grand and terrific images of this nature, +that he supposed the idea and belief of the Gods to have arisen: a +supposition countenanced by the numerous tales, respecting appearances +of the Gods both to dreaming and to waking men, current among the +poets and in the familiar talk of Greece. + +[Footnote 240: Demokriti Frag. p. 207, Mullach; Sext. Empiric. adv. +Mathemat. ix. 19; Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 10, p. 735 A.] + +[Footnote 241: Plutarch, Symposiac. v. 7, p. 683 A.] + +[Footnote 242: Aristotel. De Divinat. per Somnum, p. 464, a. 5; +Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 9, p. 733 E. [Greek: o(/ti kai\ ko/smôn +e)kto\s phthare/ntôn kai\ sôma/tôn a)llophu/lôn e)k tê=s a)por)r(oi/as +e)pir)r(eo/ntôn, e)ntau=tha polla/kis a)rchai\ parempi/ptousi loimô=n +kai\ pathô=n ou) sunê/thôn.]] + +[Footnote 243: Plutarch, De Oraculor. Defectu, p. 419. [Greek: au)to\s +eu)/chetai eu)lo/gchôn ei)dôlôn tugcha/nein.]] + +[Side-note: Universality of Demokritus--his ethical views.] + +Among the lost treasures of Hellenic intellect, there are few which +are more to be regretted than the works of Demokritus. Little is known +of them except the titles: but these are instructive as well as +multifarious. The number of different subjects which they embrace is +astonishing. Besides his atomic theory, and its application to +cosmogony and physics, whereby he is chiefly known, and from whence +his title of _physicus_ was derived--we find mention of works on +geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, optics, geography or geology, +zoology, botany, medicine, music, and poetry, grammar, history, +ethics, &c.[244] In such universality he is the predecessor, perhaps +the model, of Aristotle. It is not likely that this wide range of +subjects should have been handled in a spirit of empty generality, +without facts or particulars: for we know that his life was long, his +curiosity insatiable, and his personal travel and observation greater +than that of any contemporary. We know too that he entered more or +less upon the field of dialectics, discussing those questions of +evidence which became so rife in the Platonic age. He criticised, and +is said to have combated, the doctrine laid down by Protagoras, "Man +is the measure of all things". It would have been interesting to know +from what point of view he approached it: but we learn only the fact +that he criticised it adversely.[245] The numerous treatises of +Demokritus, together with the proportion of them which relate to +ethical and social subjects, rank him with the philosophers of the +Platonic and Aristotelian age. His Summum Bonum, as far as we can make +out, appears to have been the maintenance of mental serenity and +contentment: in which view he recommended a life of tranquil +contemplation, apart from money-making, or ambition, or the exciting +pleasures of life.[246] + +[Footnote 244: See the list of the works of Demokritus in Diogen. +Laert. ix. 46, and in Mullach's edition of the Fragments, p. 105-107. +Mullach mentions here (note 18) that Demokritus is cited seventy-eight +times in the extant works of Aristotle, and sometimes with honourable +mention. He is never mentioned by Plato. In the fragment of Philodemus +de Musica, Demokritus is called [Greek: a)nê\r ou) phusiologô/tatos +mo/non tô=n a)rchai/ôn, a)lla\ kai\ peri\ ta\ i(storou/mena ou)deno\s +ê)=tton polupra/gmôn] (Mullach, p. 237). Seneca calls him "Democritus, +subtilissimus antiquorum omnium".--Quæstion. Natural. vii. 2. And +Dionysius of Hal. (De Comp. Verb. p. 187, R.) characterises +Demokritus, Plato, and Aristotle (he arranges them in that order) as +first among all the philosophers, in respect of [Greek: su/nthesis +tô=n o)noma/tôn].] + +[Footnote 245: Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, p. 1108. + +Among the Demokritean treatises, was one entitled Pythagoras, which +contained probably a comment on the life and doctrines of that eminent +man, written in an admiring spirit. (Diog. Laert. ix. 38.)] + +[Footnote 246: Seneca, De Tranquill. Animæ, cap. 2. "Hanc stabilem +animi sedem Græci [Greek: Eu)thumi/an] vocant, de quo Democriti +volumen egregium est." Compare Cicero De Finib. v. 29; Diogen. Laert. +ix. 45. For [Greek: eu)thumi/a] Demokritus used as synonyms [Greek: +eu)estô/, a)thambi/ê, a)taraxi/ê], &c. See Mullach, p. 416.] + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +GENERAL REMARKS ON THE EARLIER PHILOSOPHERS +--GROWTH OF DIALECTIC--ZENO AND GORGIAS. + + +[Side-note: Variety of sects and theories--multiplicity of individual +authorities is the characteristic of Greek philosophy.] + +The first feeling of any reader accustomed to the astronomy and +physics of the present century, on considering the various theories +noticed in the preceding chapter, is a sort of astonishment that such +theories should have been ever propounded or accepted as true. Yet +there can be no doubt that they represent the best thoughts of +sincere, contemplative, and ingenious men, furnished with as much +knowledge of fact, and as good a method, as was then attainable. The +record of what such men have received as scientific truth or +probability, in different ages, is instructive in many ways, but in +none more than in showing how essentially relative and variable are +the conditions of human belief; how unfounded is the assumption of +those modern philosophers who proclaim certain first truths or first +principles as universal, intuitive, self-evident; how little any +theorist can appreciate _à priori_ the causes of belief in an age +materially different from his own, or can lay down maxims as to what +must be universally believed or universally disbelieved by all +mankind. We shall have farther illustration of this truth as we +proceed: here I only note variety of belief, even on the most +fundamental points, as being the essential feature of Grecian +philosophy even from its outset, long before the age of those who are +usually denounced as the active sowers of discord, the Sophists and +the professed disputants. Each philosopher followed his own individual +reason, departing from traditional or established creeds, and +incurring from the believing public more or less of obloquy; but no +one among the philosophers acquired marked supremacy over the rest. +There is no established philosophical orthodoxy, but a collection of +Dissenters--[Greek: a)/llê d' a)/llôn glô=ssa memigme/nê]--small +sects, each with its own following, each springing from a special +individual as authority, each knowing itself to be only one among +many. + +[Side-note: These early theorists are not known from their own writings, +which have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about +them.] + +It is a misfortune that we do not possess a complete work, or even +considerable fragments, from any one of these philosophers, so as to +know what their views were when stated by themselves, and upon what +reasons they insisted. All that we know is derived from a few detached +notices, in very many cases preserved by Aristotle; who, not content +(like Plato) with simply following out his own vein of ideas, exhibits +in his own writings much of that polymathy which he transmitted to the +Peripatetics generally, and adverts often to the works of +predecessors. Being a critic as well as a witness, he sometimes blends +together inconveniently the two functions, and is accused (probably +with reason to a certain extent) of making unfair reports; but if it +were not for him, we should really know nothing of the Hellenic +philosophers before Plato. It is curious to read the manner in which +Aristotle speaks of these philosophical predecessors as "the ancients" +([Greek: oi( a)rchai=oi]), and takes credit to his own philosophy for +having attained a higher and more commanding point of view.[1] + +[Footnote 1: Bacon ascribes the extinction of these early Greek +philosophers to Aristotle, who thought that he could not assure his +own philosophical empire, except by putting to death all his brothers, +like the Turkish Sultan. This remark occurs more than once in Bacon +(Nov. Org. Aph. 67; Redargutio Philosoph. vol. xi. p. 450, ed. +Montagu). In so far as it is a reproach, I think it is not deserved. +Aristotle's works, indeed, have been preserved, and those of his +predecessors have not: but Aristotle, far from seeking to destroy +their works, has been the chief medium for preserving to us the little +which we know about them. His attention to the works of his +predecessors is something very unusual among the theorists of the +ancient world. His friends Eudêmus and Theophrastus followed his +example, in embodying the history of the earlier theories in distinct +works of their own, now unfortunately lost. + +It is much to be regretted that no scholar has yet employed himself in +collecting and editing the fragments of the lost scientific histories +of Eudêmus (the Rhodian) and Theophrastus. A new edition of the +Commentaries of Simplikius is also greatly wanted: those which exist +are both rare and unreadable. + +Zeller remarks that several of the statements contained in Proklus's +commentary on Euclid, respecting the earliest Grecian mathematicians, +are borrowed from the [Greek: geômetrikai\ i(stori/ai] of the Rhodian +Eudêmus (Zeller--De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platonico, p. 12).] + +[Side-note: Abundance of speculative genius and invention--a memorable +fact in the Hellenic mind.] + +During the century and a half between Thales and the beginning of the +Peloponnesian war, we have passed in review twelve distinct schemes of +philosophy--Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Pythagoras, +Parmenides, Herakleitus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, the Apolloniate +Diogenes, Leukippus, and Demokritus. Of most of these philosophers it +may fairly be said that each speculated upon nature in an original +vein of his own. Anaximenes and Diogenes, Xenophanes and Parmenides, +Leukippus and Demokritus, may indeed be coupled together as kindred +pairs yet by no means in such manner that the second of the two is a +mere disciple and copyist of the first. Such abundance and variety of +speculative genius and invention is one of the most memorable facts in +the history of the Hellenic mind. The prompting of intelligent +curiosity, the thirst for some plausible hypothesis to explain the +Kosmos and its generation, the belief that a basis or point of +departure might be found in the Kosmos itself, apart from those +mythical personifications which dwelt both in the popular mind and in +the poetical Theogonies, the mental effort required to select some +known agency and to connect it by a chain of reasoning with the +result--all this is a new phenomenon in the history of the human mind. + +[Side-note: Difficulties which a Grecian philosopher had to +overcome--prevalent view of Nature, established, impressive, and +misleading.] + +An early Greek philosopher found nothing around him to stimulate or +assist the effort, and much to obstruct it. He found Nature disguised +under a diversified and omnipresent Polytheistic agency, eminently +captivating and impressive to the emotions--at once mysterious and +familiar--embodied in the ancient Theogonies, and penetrating deeply +all the abundant epic and lyric poetry, the only literature of the +time. It is perfectly true (as Aristotle remarks[2]) that Hesiod and +the other theological poets, who referred everything to the generation +and agency of the Gods, thought only of what was plausible to +themselves, without enquiring whether it would appear equally +plausible to their successors; a reproach which bears upon many +subsequent philosophers also. The contemporary public, to whom they +addressed themselves, knew no other way of conceiving Nature than +under this religious and poetical view, as an aggregate of +manifestations by divine personal agents, upon whose +volition--sometimes signified beforehand by obscure warnings intelligible +to the privileged interpreters, but often inscrutable--the turn of events +depended. Thales and the other Ionic philosophers were the first who +became dissatisfied with this point of view, and sought for some +"causes and beginnings" more regular, knowable, and predictable. They +fixed upon the common, familiar, widely-extended, material substances, +water, air, fire, &c.; and they could hardly fix upon any others. +Their attempt to find a scientific basis was unsuccessful; but the +memorable fact consisted in their looking for one. + +[Footnote 2: Aristot. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1000, a. 10. + +[Greek: Oi( me\n ou)=n peri\ Ê(si/odon, kai\ pa/ntes o(/soi +theo/logoi, mo/non e)phro/ntisan tou= pithanou= tou= pro\s au)tou/s, +ê(mô=n d' ô)ligô/rêsan; Theou\s ga\r poiou=ntes ta\s a)rcha\s kai\ e)k +theô=n gegone/nai], &c. Aristotle mentions them a few lines afterwards +as not worth serious notice, [Greek: peri\ tô=n muthikô=s +sophizome/nôn ou)k a)/xion meta\ spoudê=s skopei=n.]] + +[Side-note: Views of the Ionic philosophers--compared with the more +recent abstractions of Plato and Aristotle.] + +In the theories of these Ionic philosophers, the physical ideas of +generation, transmutation, local motion, are found in the foreground: +generation in the Kosmos to replace generation by the God. Pythagoras +and Empedokles blend with their speculations a good deal both of +ethics and theology, which we shall find yet more preponderant when we +come to the cosmical theories of Plato. He brings us back to the +mythical Prometheus, armed with the geometrical and arithmetical +combinations of the Pythagoreans: he assumes a chaotic substratum, +modified by the intentional and deliberate construction of the +Demiurgus and his divine sons, who are described as building up and +mixing like a human artisan or chemist. In the theory of Aristotle we +find Nature half personified, and assumed to be perpetually at work +under the influence of an appetite for good or regularity, which +determines her to aim instinctively and without deliberation (like +bees or spiders) at constant ends, though these regular tendencies are +always accompanied, and often thwarted, by accessories, irregular, +undefinable, unpredictable. Both Plato and Aristotle, in their +dialectical age, carried abstraction farther than it had been carried +by the Ionic philosophers.[3] Aristotle imputes to the Ionic +philosophers that they neglected three out of his four causes (the +efficient, formal, and final), and that they attended only to the +material. This was a height of abstraction first attained by Plato and +himself; in a way sometimes useful, sometimes misleading. The earlier +philosophers had not learnt to divide substance from its powers or +properties; nor to conceive substance without power as one thing, and +power without substance as another. Their primordial substance, with +its powers and properties, implicated together as one concrete and +without any abstraction, was at once an efficient, a formal, and a +material cause: a final cause they did not suppose themselves to want, +inasmuch as they always conceived a fixed terminus towards which the +agency was directed, though they did not conceive such fixed tendency +under the symbol of an appetite and its end. Water, Air, Fire, were in +their view not simply inert and receptive patients, impotent until +they were stimulated by the active force residing in the ever +revolving celestial spheres--but positive agents themselves, +productive of important effects. So also a geologist of the present +day, when he speculates upon the early condition[4] of the Kosmos, +reasons upon gaseous, fluid, solid, varieties of matter, as +manifesting those same laws and properties which experience attests, +but manifesting them under different combinations and circumstances. +The defect of the Ionic philosophers, unavoidable at the time, was, +that possessing nothing beyond a superficial experience, they either +ascribed to these physical agents powers and properties not real, or +exaggerated prodigiously such as were real; so that the primordial +substance chosen, though bearing a familiar name, became little better +than a fiction. The Pythagoreans did the same in regard to numbers, +ascribing to them properties altogether fanciful and imaginary. + +[Footnote 3: Plato (Sophistes, 242-243) observes respecting these +early theorists--what Aristotle says about Hesiod and the +Theogonies--that they followed out their own subjective veins of thought +without asking whether we, the many listeners, were able to follow them +or were left behind in the dark. I dare say that this was true (as indeed +it is true respecting most writers on speculative matters), but I am +sure that all of them would have made the same complaint if they had +heard Plato read his Timæus.] + +[Footnote 4: Bacon has some striking remarks on the contrast in this +respect between the earlier philosophers and Aristotle. + +Bacon, after commending the early Greek philosophers for having +adopted as their first principle some known and positive matter, not a +mere abstraction, goes on to say:-- + +"Videntur antiqui illi, in inquisitione principiorum, rationem non +admodum acutam instituisse, sed hoc solummodo egisse, ut ex corporibus +apparentibus et manifestis, quod maximé excelleret, quærerent, et quod +tale videbatur, principium rerum ponerent: tanquam per excellentiam, +non veré aut realiter. . . . Quod si principium illud suum teneant non +per excellentiam, sed simpliciter, videntur utique in duriorem tropum +incidere: cum res plané deducatur ad æquivocum, neque de igne +naturali, aut naturali ære, aut aquâ, quod asserunt, prædicari +videatur, sed de igne aliquo phantastico et notionali (et sic de +cæteris) qui nomen ignis retineat, definitionem abneget. . . . +Principium statuerunt secundum sensum, aliquod ens verum: modum autem +ejus dispensandi (liberius se gerentes) phantasticum." (Bacon, +Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia, vol. xi., p. 115-116, +ed. Montagu.) + +"Materia illa spoliata et passiva prorsus humanæ mentis commentum +quoddam videtur. Materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum principio +motûs primo, ut invenitur. Hæc tria (materia, forma, motus) nullo modo +discerpenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda, atque asserenda materia +(qualiscunque ea sit), ita ornata et apparata et formata, ut omnis +virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et +emanatio esse possit. Omnes ferè antiqui, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, +Anaximenes. Heraclitus, Democritus, de materiâ primâ in cæteris +dissidentes, in hoc convenerunt, quod materiam activam formâ nonnullâ, +et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se principium motûs habentem, +posuerunt." (Bacon, De Parmenidis, Telesii, et Campanellæ, Philosoph., +p. 653-654, t. v.) + +Compare Aphorism I. 50 of the Novum Organum. + +Bacon, Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia, vol. xi. ed. +Montagu, p. 106-107. "Sed omnes ferè antiqui (anterior to Plato), +Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, de materiâ +primâ in cæteris dissidentes, in hoc convenerunt, quod materiam +activam, formâ nonnullâ, et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se +principium motûs habentem, posuerunt. Neque aliter cuiquam opinari +licebit, qui non experientiæ plané desertor esse velit. Itaque hi +omnes mentem rebus submiserunt. At Plato mundum cogitationibus, +Aristoteles verò etiam cogitationes verbis, adjudicarunt." . . . . +"Omnino materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum formâ primâ, ac etiam +cum principio motûs primo, ut invenitur. Nam et motûs quoque +abstractio infinitas phantasias peperit, de animis, vitis, et +similibus--ac si iis per materiam et formam non satisfieret, sed ex +suis propriis penderent illa principiis. Sed hæc tria nullo modo +discerpenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda: atque asserenda materia +(qualiscunque ea sit) ita ornata et apparata et formata, ut omnis +virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et +emanatio esse possit. Neque propterea metuendum, ne res torpeant, aut +varietas ista, quam cernimus, explicari non possit--ut postea +docebimus." + +Playfair also observes, in his Dissertation on the Progress of Natural +Philosophy, prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, p. 31:-- + +"Science was not merely stationary, but often retrograde; and the +reasonings of Democritus and Anaxagoras were in many respects more +solid than those of Plato and Aristotle." + +See a good summary of Aristotle's cosmical views, in Ideler, Comm. in +Aristotel. Meteorologica, i. 2, p. 328-329.] + +[Side-note: Parmenides and Pythagoras--more nearly akin to Plato and +Aristotle.] + +Parmenides and Pythagoras, taking views of the Kosmos metaphysical and +geometrical rather than physical, supplied the basis upon which +Plato's speculations were built. Aristotle recognises Empedokles and +Anaxagoras as having approached to his own doctrine--force abstracted +or considered apart from substance, yet not absolutely detached from +it. This is true about Empedokles to a certain extent, since his +theory admits Love and Enmity as agents, the four elements as +patients: but it is hardly true about Anaxagoras, in whose theory Noûs +imparts nothing more than a momentary shock, exercising what modern +chemists call a catalytic agency in originating movement among a +stationary and stagnant mass of Homoeomeries, which, as soon as they +are liberated from imprisonment, follow inherent tendencies of their +own, not receiving any farther impulse or direction from Noûs. + +[Side-note: Advantage derived from this variety of constructive +imagination among the Greeks.] + +In the number of cosmical theories proposed, from Thales to +Demokritus, as well as in the diversity and even discordance of the +principles on which they were founded--we note not merely the growth +and development of scientific curiosity, but also the spontaneity and +exuberance of constructive imagination.[5] This last is a prominent +attribute of the Hellenic mind, displayed to the greatest advantage in +their poetical, oratorical, historical, artistic, productions, and +transferred from thence to minister to their scientific curiosity. +None of their known contemporaries showed the like aptitudes, not even +the Babylonians and Egyptians, who were diligent in the observation of +the heavens. Now the constructive imagination is not less +indispensable to the formation of scientific theories than to the +compositions of art, although in the two departments it is subject to +different conditions, and appeals to different canons and tests in the +human mind. Each of these early Hellenic theories, though all were +hypotheses and "anticipations of nature," yet as connecting together +various facts upon intelligible principles, was a step in advance; +while the very number and discordance of them (urged by Sokrates[6] as +an argument for discrediting the purpose common to all), was on the +whole advantageous. It lessened the mischief arising from the +imperfections of each, increased the chance of exposing such +imperfections, and prevented the consecration of any one among them +(with that inveterate and peremptory orthodoxy which Plato so much +admires[7] in the Egyptians) as an infallible dogma and an exclusive +mode of looking at facts. All the theorists laboured under the common +defect of a scanty and inaccurate experience: all of them were +prompted by a vague but powerful emotion of curiosity to connect +together the past and present of Nature by some threads intelligible +and satisfactory to their own minds; each of them followed out some +analogy of his own, such as seemed to carry with it a self-justifying +plausibility; and each could find some phenomena which countenanced +his own peculiar view. As far as we can judge, Leukippus and +Demokritus greatly surpassed the others, partly in the pains which +they took to elaborate their theory, partly in the number of facts +which they brought into consistency with it. The loss of the +voluminous writings of Demokritus is deeply to be regretted.[8] + +[Footnote 5: Karsten observes, in his account of the philosophy of +Parmenides (sect, 23, p. 241):-- + +"Primum mundi descriptionem consideremus. Argumentum illustre et +magnificum, cujus quanto major erat veterum in contemplando admiratio, +tanto minor ferè in observando diligentia fuit. Quippe universi +_ornatum et pulcritudinem admirati_, ejus _naturam partiumque ordinem +non sensu assequi_ studuerunt, sed _mente informarunt ad eam pulcri +perfectique speciem quæ in ipsorum animis_ insideret: sic ut +Aristoteles ait, non sua cogitata suasque notiones ad mundi naturam, +sed hanc illa accommodantes. Hujusmodi quoque fuit Parmenidea ratio."] + +[Footnote 6: Xenophon, Memor. i. 1, 13-14.] + +[Footnote 7: Plato, Legg. ii. 656-657.] + +[Footnote 8: About the style of Demokritus, see Cicero De Orat. i. 11. +Orator. c. 20.] + +[Side-note: All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, +Zeno, Plato, and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of +negative Dialectic.] + +In studying the writings of Plato and Aristotle, we must recollect +that they found all these theories pre-existent or contemporaneous. We +are not to imagine that they were the first who turned an enquiring +eye on Nature. So far is this from being the case that Aristotle is, +as it were, oppressed both by the multitude and by the discordance of +his predecessors, whom he cites, with a sort of indulgent +consciousness of superiority, as "the ancients" ([Greek: oi( +a)rchai=oi]).[9] The dialectic activity, inaugurated by Sokrates and +Zeno, lowered the estimation of these cosmical theories in more ways +than one: first, by the new topics of man and society, which Sokrates +put in the foreground for discussion, and treated as the only topics +worthy of discussion: next, by the great acuteness which each of them +displayed in the employment of the negative weapons, and in bringing +to view the weak part of an opponent's case. When we look at the +number of these early theories, and the great need which all of them +had to be sifted and scrutinised, we shall recognise the value of +negative procedure under such circumstances, whether the negationist +had or had not any better affirmative theory of his own. Sokrates, +moreover, not only turned the subject-matter of discussion from +physics to ethics, but also brought into conscious review the _method_ +of philosophising: which was afterwards still farther considered and +illustrated by Plato. General and abstract terms and their meaning, +stood out as the capital problems of philosophical research, and as +the governing agents of the human mind during the process: in Plato +and Aristotle, and the Dialectics of their age, we find the meaning or +concept corresponding to these terms invested with an objective +character, and represented as a cause or beginning; by which, or out +of which, real concrete things were produced. Logical, metaphysical, +ethical, entities, whose existence consists in being named and +reasoned about, are presented to us (by Plato) as the real antecedents +and producers of the sensible Kosmos and its contents, or (by +Aristotle) as coeternal with the Kosmos, but as its underlying +constituents--the [Greek: a)rchai\], primordia or ultimata--into which +it was the purpose and duty of the philosopher to resolve sensible +things. The men of words and debate, the dialecticians or metaphysical +speculators of the period since Zeno and Sokrates, who took little +notice of the facts of Nature, stand contrasted in the language of +Aristotle with the antecedent physical philosophers who meddled less +with debate and more with facts. The contrast is taken in his mind +between Plato and Demokritus.[10] + +[Footnote 9: Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 314, a. 6; 325, a. 2; Metaphys. +[Greek: L]. 1069, a. 25. See the sense of [Greek: a)rchai+kô=s], Met. +N. 1089, a. 2, with the note of Bonitz. + +Adam Smith, in his very instructive examination of the ancient systems +of Physics and Metaphysics, is too much inclined to criticise Plato +and Aristotle as if they were the earliest theorizers, and as if they +had no predecessors.] + +[Footnote 10: Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 316, a. 6.--[Greek: dio\ +o(/soi e)nô|kê/kasi ma=llon e)n toi=s phusikoi=s, ma=llon du/nantai +u(poti/thesthai toiau/tas a)rcha\s, ai(\ e)pi\ polu\ du/nantai +sunei/rein; oi( d' e)k tô=n pollô=n lo/gôn a)theô/rêtoi tô=n +u(parcho/ntôn o)/ntes, pro\s o)li/ga ble/psantes, a)pophai/nontai +r(a=|on; i)/doi d' a)/n tis kai\ e)k tou/tôn o(/son diaphe/rousin oi( +phusikô=s kai\ logikô=s skopou=ntes], &c. This remark is thoroughly +Baconian. + +[Greek: Oi( en toi=s lo/gois] is the phrase by which Aristotle +characterises the Platonici.--Metaphys. [Greek: Th]. 1050, b. 35.] + +[Side-note: The early theorists were studied along with Plato and +Aristotle, in the third and second centuries B.C.] + +Both by Stoics and by Epikureans, during the third and second +centuries B.C., Demokritus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Herakleitus +were studied along with Plato and Aristotle--by some, even more. +Lucretius mentions and criticises all the four, though he never names +Plato or Aristotle. Cicero greatly admires the style of Demokritus, +whose works were arranged in tetralogies by Thrasyllus, as those of +Plato were.[11] + +[Footnote 11: Epikurus is said to have especially admired Anaxagoras +(Diog. L. x. 12).] + +[Side-note: Negative attribute common to all the early +theorists--little or no dialectic.] + +In considering the early theorists above enumerated, there is great +difficulty in finding any positive characteristic applicable to all of +them. But a negative characteristic may be found, and has already been +indicated by Aristotle. "The earlier philosophers (says he) had no +part in dialectics: Dialectical force did not yet exist."[12] And the +period upon which we are now entering is distinguished mainly by the +introduction and increasing preponderance of this new +element--Dialectic--first made conspicuously manifest in the Eleatic +Zeno and Sokrates; two memorable persons, very different from each other, +but having this property in common. + +[Footnote 12: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 32. [Greek: Oi( ga\r +pro/teroi dialektikê=s ou) metei=chon].--M. 1078, b. 25; [Greek: +dialektikê\ ga\r i)schu\s ou)/pô to/t' ê)=n, ô(/ste du/nasthai], &c.] + +[Side-note: Zeno of Elea--Melissus.] + +It is Zeno who stands announced, on the authority of Aristotle, as the +inventor of dialectic: that is, as the first person of whose skill in +the art of cross-examination and refutation conspicuous illustrative +specimens were preserved. He was among the first who composed written +dialogues on controversial matters of philosophy.[13] Both he, and his +contemporary the Samian Melissus, took up the defence of the +Parmenidean doctrine. It is remarkable that both one and the other +were eminent as political men in their native cities. Zeno is even +said to have perished miserably, in generous but fruitless attempts to +preserve Elea from being enslaved by the despot Nearchus. + +[Footnote 13: Diogen. Laert. ix. 25-28. + +The epithets applied to Zeno by Timon are remarkable. + +[Greek: A)mphoteroglô/ssou te me/ga sthe/nos ou)k a)lapadno\n +Zê/nônos pa/ntôn e)pilê/ptoros], &c.] + +[Side-note: Zeno's Dialectic--he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, +by showing that their assumptions led to contradictions and +absurdities.] + +We know the reasonings of Zeno and Melissus only through scanty +fragments, and those fragments transmitted by opponents. But it is +plain that both of them, especially Zeno, pressed their adversaries +with grave difficulties, which it was more easy to deride than to +elucidate. Both took their departure from the ground occupied by +Parmenides. They agreed with him in recognising the phenomenal, +apparent, or relative world, the world of sense and experience, as a +subject of knowledge, though of uncertain and imperfect knowledge. +Each of them gave, as Parmenides had done, certain affirmative +opinions, or at least probable conjectures, for the purpose of +explaining it.[14] But beyond this world of appearances, there lay the +real, absolute, ontological, ultra-phenomenal, or Noumenal world, +which Parmenides represented as _Ens unum continuum_, and which his +opponents contended to be plural and discontinuous. These opponents +deduced absurd and ridiculous consequences from the theory of the One. +Herein both Zeno and Melissus defended Parmenides. Zeno, the better +dialectician of the two, retorted upon the advocates of absolute +plurality and discontinuousness, showing that their doctrine led to +consequences not less absurd and contradictory than the _Ens unum_ of +Parmenides. He advanced many distinct arguments; some of them +antinomies, deducing from the same premisses both the affirmative and +the negative of the same conclusion.[15] + +[Footnote 14: Diog. Laert. ix. 24-29. + +Zeller (Phil. d. Griech. i. p. 424, note 2) doubts the assertion that +Zeno delivered probable opinions and hypotheses, as Parmenides had +done before him, respecting phenomenal nature. But I see no adequate +ground for such doubt.] + +[Footnote 15: Simplikius, in Aristotel. Physic. f. 30. [Greek: e)n +me/ntoi tô=| suggra/mmati au)tou=, polla\ e)/chonti e)picheirê/mata, +kath' e(/kaston dei/knusin, o(/ti tô=| polla\ ei)=nai le/gonti +sumbai/nei ta\ e)nanti/a le/gein], &c.] + +[Side-note: Consequences of their assumption of Entia Plura +Discontinua. Reductiones ad absurdum.] + +If things in themselves were many (he said) they must be both +infinitely small and infinitely great. _Infinitely small_, because the +many things must consist in a number of units, each essentially +indivisible: but that which is indivisible has no magnitude, or is +infinitely small if indeed it can be said to have any existence +whatever:[16] _Infinitely great_, because each of the many things, if +assumed to exist, must have magnitude. Having magnitude, each thing +has parts which also have magnitude: these parts are, by the +hypothesis, essentially discontinuous, but this implies that they are +kept apart from each other by other intervening parts--and these +intervening parts must be again kept apart by others. Each body will +thus contain in itself an infinite number of parts, each having +magnitude. In other words, it will be infinitely great.[17] + +[Footnote 16: Aristotel. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1001, b. 7. [Greek: e)/ti +ei) a)diai/reton au)to\ to\ e(/n, kata\ me\n to\ Zê/nônos a)xi/ôma, +ou)the\n a)\n ei)/ê. + +o(\ ga\r mê/te prostithe/menon mête\ a)phairou/menon poiei= ti mei=zon +mêde\ e(/latton, ou)/ phêsin ei)=nai tou=to tô=n o)/ntôn, ô(s dê=lon +o(/ti o)/ntos mege/thous tou= o)/ntos]. + +Seneca (Epistol. 88) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (see the passages of +Themistius and Simplikius cited by Brandis, Handbuch Philos. i. p. +412-416) conceive Zeno as having dissented from Parmenides, and as +having denied the existence, not only of [Greek: ta\ polla\], but also +of [Greek: to\ e(/n]. But Zeno seems to have adhered to Parmenides; +and to have denied the existence of [Greek: to\ e(/n], only upon the +hypothesis opposed to Parmenides--namely, that [Greek: ta\ polla\] +existed. Zeno argued thus:--Assuming that the Real or Absolute is +essentially divisible and discontinuous, divisibility must be pushed +to infinity, so that you never arrive at any ultimatum, or any real +unit ([Greek: a)kribô=s e(/n]). If you admit [Greek: ta\ polla\], you +renounce [Greek: to\ e(/n]. The reasoning of Zeno, as far as we know +it, is nearly all directed against the hypothesis of _Entia plura +discontinua_. Tennemann (Gesch. Philos. i. 4, p. 205) thinks that the +reasoning of Zeno is directed against the world of sense: in which I +cannot agree with him.] + +[Footnote 17: Scholia ad Aristotel. Physic. p. 334, a. ed. Brandis.] + +Again--If things in themselves were many, they would be both finite +and infinite in number. _Finite_, because they are as many as they +are, neither more nor less: and every number is a finite number. +_Infinite_, because being essentially separate, discontinuous, units, +each must be kept apart from the rest by an intervening unit; and this +again by something else intervening. Suppose a multitude A, B, C, D, +&c. A and B would be continuous unless they were kept apart by some +intervening unit Z. But A and Z would then be continuous unless they +were kept apart by something else--Y: and so on ad infinitum: +otherwise the essential discontinuousness could not be maintained.[18] + +[Footnote 18: See the argument cited by Simplikius in the words of the +Zenonian treatise, in Preller, Hist. Philos. Græc. ex font. context. +p. 101, sect. 156.] + +By these two arguments,[19] drawn from the hypothesis which affirmed +perpetual divisibility and denied any Continuum, Zeno showed that such +_Entia multa discontinua_ would have contradictory attributes: they +would be both infinitely great and infinitely small--they would be +both finite and infinite in number. This he advanced as a _reductio ad +absurdum_ against the hypothesis. + +[Footnote 19: Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. f. 30. [Greek: kai\ +ou)/tô me\n to\ kata\ to\ plê=thos a)/peiron e)k tê=s dichotomi/as +e)/deixe, to\ de\ kata\ to\ me/gethos pro/teron kata\ tê\n au)tê\n +e)pichei/rêsin]. Compare Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. i. p. 427.] + +[Side-note: Each thing must exist in its own place--Grain of millet +not sonorous.] + +Again--If existing things be many and discontinuous, each of these +must exist in a place of its own. Nothing can exist except in some +place. But the place is itself an existing something: each place must +therefore have a place of its own to exist in: the second place must +have a third place to exist in and so forth ad infinitum.[20] We have +here a farther _reductio ad impossibile_ of the original hypothesis: +for that hypothesis denies the continuity of space, and represents +space as a multitude of discontinuous portions or places. + +[Footnote 20: Aristotel. Physic. iv. 1, p. 209, a. 22; iv. 3, p. 210, +b. 23. + +Aristotle here observes that the Zenonian argument respecting place is +easy to be refuted; and he proceeds to give the refutation. But his +refutation is altogether unsatisfactory. Those who despise these +Zenonian arguments as _sophisms_, ought to look at the way in which +they were answered, at or near the time. + +Eudêmus ap. Simplik. ad Aristot. Physic. f. 131. [Greek: a)/xion ga\r +pa=n tô=n o)/ntôn pou= ei)=nai; ei) de\ o( to/pos tô=n o)/ntôn, pou= +a)\n ei)/ê?]] + +Another argument of Zeno is to the following effect:--"Does a grain of +millet, when dropped upon the floor, make sound? No.--Does a bushel of +millet make sound under the same circumstances? Yes.--Is there not a +determinate proportion between the bushel and the grain? There +is.--There must therefore be the same proportion between the +sonorousness of the two. If one grain be not sonorous, neither can ten +thousand grains be so."[21] + +[Footnote 21: Aristotel. Physic. vii. 5, p. 250, a. 20, with the +Scholia of Simplikius on the passage, p. 423, ed. Brandis.] + +To appreciate the contradiction brought out by Zeno, we must recollect +that he is not here reasoning about facts of sense, phenomenal and +relative--but about things in themselves, absolute and +ultra-phenomenal** realities. He did not deny the fact of sense: +to appeal to that fact in reply, would have been to concede his point. +The adversaries against whom he reasoned (Protagoras is mentioned, but he +can hardly have been among them, if we have regard to his memorable +dogma, of which more will be said presently) were those who maintained +the plurality of absolute substances, each for itself, with absolute +attributes, apart from the fact of sense, and independent of any +sentient subject. One grain of millet (Zeno argues) has no absolute +sonorousness, neither can ten thousand such grains taken together have +any. Upon the hypothesis of absolute reality as a discontinuous +multitude, you are here driven to a contradiction which Zeno intends +as an argument against the hypothesis. There is no absolute +sonorousness in the ten thousand grains: the sound which they make is +a phenomenal fact, relative to us as sentients of sound, and having no +reality except in correlation with a hearer.[22] + +[Footnote 22: It will be seen that Aristotle in explaining this +[Greek: a)pori/a], takes into consideration the difference of force in +the vibrations of air, and the different impressibility of the ear. +The explanation is pertinent and just, if applied to the fact of +sense: but it is no reply to Zeno, who did not call in question the +fact of sense. Zeno is impugning the doctrine of absolute substances +and absolute divisibility. To say that ten thousand grains are +sonorous, but that no one of them separately taken is so, appears to +him a contradiction, similar to what is involved in saying that a real +magnitude is made up of mathematical points. Aristotle does not meet +this difficulty.] + +[Side-note: Zenonian arguments in regard to motion.] + +Other memorable arguments of Zeno against the same hypothesis were +those by which he proved that if it were admitted, motion would be +impossible. Upon the theory of absolute plurality and +discontinuousness, every line or portion of distance was divisible +into an infinite number of parts: before a moving body could get from +the beginning to the end of this line, it must pass in succession over +every one of these parts: but to do this in a finite time was +impossible: therefore motion was impossible.[23] + +[Footnote 23: Aristot. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239 b., with the Scholia, p. +412 seq. ed. Brandis; Aristotel. De Lineis Insecabilibus, p. 968, a. +19. + +These four arguments against absolute motion caused embarrassment to +Aristotle and his contemporaries. [Greek: te/ttares d' ei)si\ lo/goi +Zê/nônos oi( pare/chontes ta\s duskoli/as toi=s lu/ousin], &c.] + +A second argument of the same tendency was advanced in the form of +comparison between Achilles and the tortoise--the swiftest and slowest +movers. The two run a race, a certain start being given to the +tortoise. Zeno contends that Achilles can never overtake the tortoise. +It is plain indeed, according to the preceding argument, that motion +both for the one and for the other is an impossibility. Neither one +nor the other can advance from the beginning to the end of any line, +except by passing successively through all the parts of that line: but +those parts are infinite in number, and cannot therefore be passed +through in any finite time. But suppose such impossibility to be got +over: still Achilles will not overtake the tortoise. For while +Achilles advances one hundred yards, the tortoise has advanced ten: +while Achilles passes over these additional ten yards, the tortoise +will have passed over one more yard: while Achilles is passing over +this remaining one yard, the tortoise will have got over one-tenth of +another yard: and so on ad infinitum: the tortoise will always be in +advance of him by a certain distance, which, though ever diminishing, +will never vanish into nothing. + +The third Zenonian argument derived its name from the flight of an +arrow shot from a bow. The arrow while thus carried forward (says +Zeno) is nevertheless at rest.[24] For the time from the beginning to +the end of its course consists of a multitude of successive instants. +During each of these instants the arrow is in a given place of equal +dimension with itself. But that which is during any instant in a given +place, is at rest. Accordingly during each successive instant of its +flight, the arrow is at rest. Throughout its whole flight it is both +in motion and at rest. This argument is a deduction from the doctrine +of discontinuous time, as the preceding is a deduction from that of +discontinuous space. + +[Footnote 24: Aristotel. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239, b. 30. [Greek: tri/tos +o( nu=n r(êthei/s, o(/ti ê( o)i+sto\s pherome/nê e(/stêken.]] + +A fourth argument[25] was derived from the case of two equal bodies +moved with equal velocity in opposite directions, and passing each +other. If the body A B were at rest, the other body C D would move +along the whole length of C D in two minutes. But if C D be itself +moving with equal velocity in the opposite direction, A B will pass +along the whole length of C D in half that time, or one minute. Hence +Zeno infers that the motion of A B is nothing absolute, or belonging +to the thing in itself--for if that were so, it would not be varied +according to the movement of C D. It is no more than a phenomenal +fact, relative to us and our comparison. + +[Footnote 25: See the illustration of this argument at some length by +Simplikius, especially the citation from Eudêmus at the close of +it--ap. Scholia ad Aristotel. p. 414, ed. Brandis.] + +This argument, so far as I can understand its bearing, is not deduced +(as those preceding are) from the premisses of opponents: but rests +upon premisses of its own, and is intended to prove that motion is +only relative. + +[Side-note: General result and purpose of the Zenonian Dialectic. +Nothing is knowable except the relative.] + +These Zenonian reasonings are memorable as the earliest known +manifestations of Grecian dialectic, and are probably equal in +acuteness and ingenuity to anything which it ever produced. Their +bearing is not always accurately conceived. Most of them are +_argumenta ad hominem_: consequences contradictory and inadmissible, +but shown to follow legitimately from a given hypothesis, and +therefore serving to disprove the hypothesis itself.[26] The +hypothesis was one relating to the real, absolute, or +ultra-phenomenal, which Parmenides maintained to be _Ens Unum +Continuum_, while his opponents affirmed it to be essentially +multiple and discontinuous. Upon the hypothesis of Parmenides, the +Real and Absolute, being a continuous One, was obviously inconsistent +with the movement and variety of the phenomenal world: Parmenides +himself recognised the contradiction of the two, and his opponents +made it a ground for deriding his doctrine.[27] The counter-hypothesis, +of the discontinuous many, appeared at first sight not to be open to +the same objection: it seemed to be more in harmony with the facts of +the phenomenal and relative world, and to afford an absolute basis for +them to rest upon. Against this delusive appearance the dialectic of +Zeno was directed. He retorted upon the opponents, and showed that if +the hypothesis of the _Unum Continuum_ led to absurd consequences, +that of the discontinuous many was pregnant with deductions yet more +absurd and contradictory. He exhibits in detail several of these +contradictory deductions, with a view to refute the hypothesis from +whence they flow; and to prove that, far from performing what it +promises, it is worse than useless, as entangling us in contradictory +conclusions. The result of his reasoning, implied rather than +announced, is--That neither of the two hypotheses are of any avail to +supply a real and absolute basis for the phenomenal and relative +world: That the latter must rest upon its own evidence, and must be +interpreted, in so far as it can be interpreted at all, by its own +analogies. + +[Footnote 26: The scope of the Zenonian dialectic, as I have here +described it, is set forth clearly by Plato, in his Parmenides, c. +3-6, p. 127, 128. [Greek: Pô=s ô)= Zê/nôn, tou=to le/geis? _ei) polla/ +e)sti ta\ o)/nta,_ ô(s a)/ra dei= au)ta\ o(/moia/ te ei)=nai kai\ +a)no/moia, tou=to de\ dê\ a)du/naton.--Ou)kou=n ei) a)du/naton ta/ te +a)no/moia o(/moia ei)=nai kai\ ta\ o(/moia a)no/moia, _a)du/naton dê\ +kai\ polla\ ei)=nai?_ ei) ga\r polla\ ei)/ê, pa/schoi a)\n ta\ +a)du/nata. A)=ra _tou=to/ e)stin o(\ bou/lontai/ sou oi( lo/goi?_ ou)k +_a)llo ti ê)\ diama/chesthai para\ pa/nta ta\ lego/mena, ô(s ou) +polla/ e)stin?_] Again, p. 128 D. [Greek: A)ntile/gei ou)=n tou=to to\ +gra/mma pro\s tou\s ta polla\ le/gontas, kai\ a)ntapodi/dôsi tau=ta +kai\ plei/ô, tou=to boulo/menon dêlou=n, ô(s e)/ti geloio/tera +pa/schoi a)\n _au)tô=n ê( u(po/thesis, ê( ei) polla/ e)stin--ê)\ ê( +tou= e(\n ei)=nai--ei)/ tis i(kanô=s e)pexi/oi_]. + +Here Plato evidently represents Zeno as merely proving that +contradictory conclusions followed, _if you assumed a given +hypothesis_; which hypothesis was thereby shown to be inadmissible. +But Plato alludes to Zeno in another place (Phædrus, c. 97, p. 261) +under the name of the Eleatic Palamedes, as "showing his art in +speaking, by making the same things appear to the hearers like and +unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion". In this last passage, +the impression produced by Zeno's argumentation is brought to view, +apart from the scope and purpose with which he employed it: which +scope and purpose are indicated in the passage above cited from the +Parmenides. + +So also Isokrates (Encom. Helen. init.) [Greek: Zê/nôna, to\n tau)ta\ +dunata\ kai\ pa/lin a)du/nata peirô/menon a)pophai/nein.]] + +[Footnote 27: Plato, Parmenides, p. 128 D.] + +[Side-note: Mistake of supposing Zeno's _reductiones ad absurdum_ of +an opponents doctrines to be generalisations of data gathered from +experience.] + +But the purport of Zeno's reasoning is mistaken, when he is conceived +as one who wishes to delude his hearers by proving both sides of a +contradictory proposition. Zeno's contradictory conclusions are +elicited with the express purpose of disproving the premisses from +which they are derived. For these premisses Zeno himself is not to be +held responsible, since he borrows them from his opponents: a +circumstance which Aristotle forgets, when he censures the Zenonian +arguments as paralogisms, because they assume the Continua, Space, and +Time, to be discontinuous or divided into many distinct parts.[28] Now +this absolute discontinuousness of matter, space, and time, was not +advanced by Zeno as a doctrine of his own, but is the very doctrine of +his opponents, taken up by him for the purpose of showing that it led +to contradictory consequences, and thus of indirectly refuting it. The +sentence of Aristotle is thus really in Zeno's favour, though +apparently adverse to him. In respect to motion, a similar result +followed from the Zenonian reasonings; namely, to show That motion, as +an attribute of the Real and Absolute, was no less inconsistent with +the hypothesis of those who opposed Parmenides, than with the +hypothesis of Parmenides himself:--That absolute motion could no more +be reconciled with the doctrine of the discontinuous Many, than with +that of the Continuous One:--That motion therefore was only a +phenomenal fact, relative to our sensations, conceptions, and +comparisons; and having no application to the absolute. In this +phenomenal point of view, neither Zeno nor Parmenides nor Melissus +disputed the fact of motion. They recognised it as a portion of the +world of sensation and experience; which world they tried to explain, +well or ill, by analogies and conjectures derived from itself. + +[Footnote 28: Aristotel. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239 b. [Greek: Zê/nôn de\ +paralogi/zetai; ou) ga\r su/gketai o( chro/nos e)k tô=n nu=n o)/ntôn +tô=n a)diaire/tôn, ô(/sper ou)d' a)/llo me/gethos ou)de/n] &c. + +Aristotle, in the second and third chapters of his Physica, canvasses +and refutes the doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno respecting Ens and +Unum. He maintains that Ens and Unum are equivocal--[Greek: pollachô=s +lego/mena]. He farther maintained that no one before him had succeeded +in refuting Zeno. See the Scholia of Alexander ad Sophistic. Elench. +p. 320 b. 6, ed. Brandis.] + +[Side-note: Zenonian Dialectic--Platonic Parmenides.] + +Though we have not the advantage of seeing the Zenonian dialectics as +they were put forth by their author, yet if we compare the substance +of them as handed down to us, with those dialectics which form the +latter half of the Platonic dialogue called Parmenides, we shall find +them not inferior in ingenuity, and certainly more intelligible in +their purpose. Zeno furnishes no positive support to the Parmenidean +doctrine, but he makes out a good negative case against the +counter-doctrine. + +[Side-note: Views of historians of philosophy respecting Zeno.] + +Zeller and other able modern critics, while admitting the reasoning of +Zeno to be good against this counter-doctrine, complain that he takes +it up too exclusively; that One and Many did not exclude each other, +and that the doctrines of Parmenides and his opponents were both true +together, but neither of them true to the exclusion of the other. But +when we reflect that the subject of predication on both sides was the +Real (Ens _per se_) it was not likely that either Parmenides or his +opponents would affirm it to be both absolutely One and Continuous, +and absolutely Many and Discontinuous.[29] If the opponents of +Parmenides had taken this ground, Zeno need not have imagined +deductions for the purpose of showing that their hypothesis led to +contradictory conclusions; for the contradictions would have stood +avowedly registered in the hypothesis itself. If a man affirms both at +once, he divests the predication of its absolute character, as +belonging unconditionally to Ens _per se_; and he restricts it to the +phenomenal, the relative, the conditioned--dependent upon our +sensations and our fluctuating point of view. This was not intended +either by Parmenides or by his opponents. + +[Footnote 29: That both of them could not be true respecting Ens _per +se_, seems to have been considered indisputable. See the argument of +Sokrates in the Parmenides of Plato, p. 129 B-E.] + +[Side-note: Absolute and relative--the first unknowable.] + +If, indeed, we judge the question, not from their standing-point, but +from our own, we shall solve the difficulty by adopting the +last-mentioned answer. We shall admit that One and Many are predicates +which do not necessarily exclude each other; but we shall refrain from +affirming or denying either of them respecting the Real, the Absolute, +the Unconditioned. Of an object absolutely one and continuous--or of +objects absolutely many and discontinuous, apart from the facts of our +own sense and consciousness, and independent of any sentient subject--we +neither know nor can affirm anything. Both these predicates (One--Many) +are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and +comparisons of our own senses and consciousness, and serving only to +describe, to record, and to classify, those facts. Discrete quantity +or number, or succession of distinct unities--continuous quantity, or +motion and extension--are two conceptions derived from comparison, +abstracted and generalised from separate particular phenomena of our +consciousness; the continuous, from our movements and the +consciousness of persistent energy involved therein--the +discontinuous, from our movements, intermitted and renewed, as well as +from our impressions of sense. We compare one discrete quantity with +another, or one continual quantity with another, and we thus ascertain +many important truths: but we select our unit, or our standard of +motion and extension, as we please, or according to convenience, +subject only to the necessity of adapting our ulterior calculations +consistently to this unit, when once selected. The same object may +thus be considered sometimes as one, sometimes as many; both being +relative, and depending upon our point of view. Motion, Space, Time, +may be considered either as continuous or as discontinuous: we may +reason upon them either as one or the other, but we must not confound +the two points of view with each other. When, however, we are called +upon to travel out of the Relative, and to decide between Parmenides +and his opponents--whether the Absolute be One or Multitudinous--we +have only to abstain from affirming either, or (in other words) to +confess our ignorance. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, +self-existent One, or of an absolute, discontinuous Many. + +[Side-note: Zeno did not deny motion as a fact, phenomenal and +relative.] + +Some critics understand Zeno to have denied motion as a fact--opposing +sophistical reasoning to certain and familiar experience. Upon this +view is founded the well-known anecdote, that Diogenes the Cynic +refuted the argument by getting up and walking. But I do not so +construe the scope of his argument. He did not deny motion as a fact. +It rested with him on the evidence of sense, acknowledged by every +one. It was therefore only a phenomenal fact relative to our +consciousness, sensation, movements, and comparisons. As such, but as +such only, did Zeno acknowledge it. What he denied was, motion as a +fact belonging to the Absolute, or as deducible from the Absolute. He +did not deny the Absolute or Thing in itself, as an existing object, +but he struck out variety, divisibility, and motion, from the list of +its predicates. He admitted only the Parmenidean Ens, one, continuous, +unchanged, and immovable, with none but negative predicates, and +severed from the relative world of experience and sensation. + +[Side-note: Gorgias the Leontine--did not admit the Absolute, even as +conceived by Parmenides.] + +Other reasoners, contemporary with Zeno, did not agree with him, in +admitting the Absolute, even as an object with no predicates, except +unity and continuity. They denied it altogether, both as substratum +and as predicate. To establish this negation is the purpose of a short +treatise ascribed to the rhetor or Sophist Gorgias, a contemporary of +Zeno; but we are informed that all the reasonings, which Gorgias +employed, were advanced, or had already been advanced, by others +before him.[30] Those reasonings are so imperfectly preserved, that we +can make out little more than the general scope. + +[Footnote 30: See the last words of the Aristotelian or +Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgiâ, p. 980. + +[Greek: A(/pasai de\ au)=tai kai\ e(te/rôn a)rchaiote/rôn ei)si\n +a)po/riai, ô(/ste e)n tê=| peri\ e)kei/nôn ske/psei kai\ tau/tas +e)xetaste/on]. + +[Greek: A(/pasai] is the reading of Mullach in his edition of this +treatise (p. 79), in place of [Greek: a(/pantes] or [Greek: +a(/panta].] + +[Side-note: His reasonings against the Absolute, either as Ens or +Entia.] + +Ens, or Entity _per se_ (he contended), did not really exist. Even +granting that it existed, it was unknowable by any one. And even +granting that it both existed, and was known by any one, still such +person could not communicate his knowledge of it to others.[31] + +[Footnote 31: See the treatise of Aristotle or Pseudo-Aristotle, De +Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgiâ, in Aristot. p. 979-980, Bekker, also in +Mullach's edition, p. 62-78. The argument of Gorgias is also abridged +by Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. p. 384, sect. 65-86. + +See also a copious commentary on the Aristotelian treatise in Foss, De +Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 115 seq. + +The text of the Aristotelian treatise is so corrupt as to be often +unintelligible.] + +As to the first point, Ens was no more real or existent than Non-Ens: +the word Non-Ens must have an objective meaning, as well as the word +Ens: it was Non-Ens, therefore it _was_, or existed. Both of them +existed alike, or rather neither of them existed. Moreover, if Ens +existed, it must exist either as One or as Many--either as eternal or +as generated--either in itself, or in some other place. But Melissus, +Zeno, and other previous philosophers, had shown sufficient cause +against each of these alternatives separately taken. Each of the +alternative essential predicates had been separately disproved; +therefore the subject, Ens, could not exist under either of them, or +could not exist at all. + +[Side-note: Ens, incogitable and unknowable.] + +As to the second point, let us grant that Ens or Entia exist; they +would nevertheless (argued Gorgias) be incogitable and unknowable. To +be cogitated is no more an attribute of Ens than of Non-Ens. The fact +of cogitation does not require Ens as a condition, or attest Ens as an +absolute or thing in itself. If our cogitation required or attained +Ens as an indispensable object, then there could be no fictitious +_cogitata_ nor any false propositions. We think of a man flying in the +air, or of a chariot race on the surface of the sea. If our _cogitata_ +were realities, these must be so as well as the rest: if realities +alone were the object of cogitation, then these could not be thought +of. As Non-Ens was thus undeniably the object of cogitation, so Ens +could not be its object: for what was true respecting one of these +contraries, could not be true respecting the other. + +[Side-note: Ens, even if granted to be knowable, is still +incommunicable to others.] + +As to the third point: Assuming Ens both to exist and to be known by +you, you cannot (said Gorgias) declare or explain it to any one else. +You profess to have learnt what Ens is in itself, by your sight or +other perceptions but you declare to others by means of words, and +these words are neither themselves the absolute Ens, nor do they bring +Ens before the hearer. Even though you yourself know Ens, you cannot, +by your words, enable _him_ to know it. If he is to know Ens, he must +know it in the same way as you. Moreover, neither your words, nor Ens +itself, will convey to the hearer the same knowledge as to you; for +the same cannot be at once in two distinct subjects; and even if it +were, yet since you and the hearer are not completely alike, so the +effect of the same object on both of you will not appear to be +like.[32] + +[Footnote 32: In this third branch of the argument, showing that Ens, +even if known, cannot be communicable to others, Gorgias travels +beyond the Absolute, and directs his reasoning against the +communicability of the Relative or Phenomenal also. Both of his +arguments against such communicability have some foundation, and serve +to prove that the communicability cannot be exact or entire, even in +the case of sensible facts. The sensations thoughts, emotions, &c., of +one person are not _exactly_ like those of another.] + +Such is the reasoning, as far as we can make it out, whereby Gorgias +sought to prove that the absolute Ens was neither existent, nor +knowable, nor communicable by words from one person to another. + +[Side-note: Zeno and Gorgias--contrasted with the earlier Grecian +philosophers.] + +The arguments both of Zeno and of Gorgias (the latter presenting the +thoughts of others earlier than himself), dating from a time +coinciding with the younger half of the life of Sokrates, evince a new +spirit and purpose in Grecian philosophy, as compared with the +Ionians, the two first Eleates, and the Pythagoreans. Zeno and Gorgias +exhibit conspicuously the new element of dialectic: the force of the +negative arm in Grecian philosophy, brought out into the arena, +against those who dogmatized or propounded positive theories: the +fertility of Grecian imagination in suggesting doubts and +difficulties, for which the dogmatists, if they aspired to success and +reputation, had to provide answers. Zeno directed his attack against +one scheme of philosophy--the doctrine of the Absolute Many: leaving +by implication the rival doctrine--the Absolute One of Parmenides in +exclusive possession of the field, yet not reinforcing it with any new +defences against objectors. Gorgias impugned the philosophy of the +Absolute in either or both of its forms--as One or as Many: not with a +view of leaving any third form as the only survivor, or of providing +any substitute from his own invention, but of showing that Ens, the +object of philosophical research, could neither be found nor known. +The negative purpose, disallowing altogether the philosophy of Nature +(as then conceived, not as now conceived), was declared without +reserve by Gorgias, as we shall presently find that it was by Sokrates +also. + +[Side-note: New character of Grecian philosophy--antithesis of +affirmative and negative--proof and disproof.] + +It is the opening of the negative vein which imparts from this time +forward a new character to Grecian philosophy. The positive and +negative forces, emanating from different aptitudes in the human mind, +are now both of them actively developed, and in strenuous antithesis +to each other. Philosophy is no longer exclusively confined to +dogmatists, each searching in his imagination for the Absolute Ens of +Nature, and each propounding what seems to him the only solution of +the problem. Such thinkers still continue their vocation, but under +new conditions of success, and subject to the scrutiny of numerous +dissentient critics. It is no longer sufficient to propound a +theory,[33] either in obscure, oracular metaphors and +half-intelligible aphorisms, like Herakleitus--or in verse more or +less impressive, like Parmenides or Empedokles. The theory must be +sustained by proofs, guarded against objections, defended against +imputations of inconsistency: moreover, it must be put in comparison +with other rival theories, the defects of which must accordingly be +shown up along with it. Here are new exigencies, to which dogmatic +philosophers had not before been obnoxious. They were now required to +be masters of the art of dialectic attack and defence, not fearing the +combat of question and answer--a combat in which, assuming tolerable +equality between the duellists, the questioner had the advantage of +the sun, or the preferable position,[34] and the farther advantage of +choosing where to aim his blows. To expose fallacy or inconsistency, +was found to be both an easier process, and a more appreciable display +of ingenuity, than the discovery and establishment of truth in such +manner as to command assent. The weapon of negation, refutation, +cross-examination, was wielded for its own results, and was found hard +to parry by the affirmative philosophers of the day. + +[Footnote 33: The repugnance of the Herakleitean philosophers to the +scrutiny of dialectical interrogation is described by Plato in strong +language, it is indeed even caricatured. (Theætêtus, 179-180.)] + +[Footnote 34: Theokritus, Idyll, xxii. 83; the description of the +pugilistic contest between Pollux and Amykus:-- + +[Greek: e)/ntha polu/s sphisi mo/chthos e)peigome/noisin e)tu/chthê, +o(ppo/teros kata\ nô=ta la/bê| pha/os ê)eli/oio; +a)ll' i)dri/ê| me/gan a)/ndra parê/luthes ô)= Polu/deukes; +ba/lleto d' a)kti/nessin a(/pan A)mu/koio pro/sôpon]. + +To toss up for the sun, was a practice not yet introduced between +pugilists.] + + + + +APPENDIX. + + +To illustrate by comparison the form of Grecian philosophy, before +Dialectic was brought to bear upon it, I transcribe from two eminent +French scholars (M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire and Professor Robert Mohl) +some account of the mode in which the Indian philosophy has always +been kept on record and communicated. + +M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (in his Premier Mémoire sur le Sânkhya, pp. +5-11) gives the following observations upon the Sânkhya or philosophy +of Kapila, one of the principal systems of Sanskrit philosophy: date +(as supposed) about 700 B.C. + +There are two sources from whence the Sânkhya philosophy is known:-- + +"1. Les Soûtras ou aphorismes de Kapila. + +"2. Le traité déjà connu et traduit sous le nom de Sânkhya Kârikâ, +c'est à dire Vers Mémoriaux du Sânkhya. + +"Les Soûtras de Kapila sont en tout au nombre de 499, divisés en six +lectures, et répartis inégalement entre chacune d'elles. Les Soûtras +sont accompagnés d'un commentaire qui les explique, et qui est d'un +brahmane nommé le Mendiant. Le commentateur explique avec des +developpements plus ou moins longs les Soûtras de Kapila, qu'il cite +un à un. + +"Les Soûtras sont en général tres concis: parfois ils ne se composent +que de deux ou trois mots, et jamais ils ne comprennent plus d'une +phrase. Cette forme aphoristique, sous laquelle se présente à nous la +philosophie Indienne--est celle qu'a prise la science Indienne dans +toutes ses branches, depuis la grammaire jusqu'à la philosophie. Les +Soûtras de Panini, qui a réduit toutes les régles de la grammaire +sanscrite en 3996 aphorismes, ne sont pas moins concis que ceux de +Kapila. Ce mode étrange d'exposition tient dans l'Inde à la manière +même dont la science s'est transmise d'âge en âge. Un maître n'a +généralement qu'un disciple: il lui suffit, pour la doctrine qu'il +communique, d'avoir des points de repère, et le commentaire oral qu'il +ajoute à ces sentences pour leur expliquer, met le disciple en état de +les bien comprendre. Le disciple lui-même, une fois qu'il en a pénétré +le sens veritable, n'a pas besoin d'un symbole plus développé, et la +concision même des aphorismes l'aide a les mieux retenir. _C'est une +initiation qu'il a reçue: et les sentences, dans lesquelles cette +initiation se résume, restent toujours assez claires pour lui._ + +"Mais il n'en est pas de même pour les lecteurs étrangers, et il +serait difficile de trouver rien de plus obscur que ces Soûtras. Les +commentaires mêmes ne suffisent pas toujours à les rendre parfaitement +intelligibles. + +"Le seul exemple d'une forme analogue dans l'histoire de l'esprit +humain et de la science en Occident, nous est fourni par les +Aphorismes d'Hippocrate: eux aussi s'adressaient à des adeptes, et ils +réclamaient, comme les Soûtras Indiens, l'explication des maîtres pour +être bien compris par les disciples. Mais cet exemple unique n'a point +tiré à conséquence dans le monde occidental, tandis que dans le monde +Indien l'aphorisme est resté pendant de longs siècles la forme +spéciale de la science: et les développements de pensée qui nous sont +habituels, et qui nous semblent indispensables, ont été reservés aux +commentaires. + +"La Sânkhya Kârikâ est en vers: En Grèce, la poésie a été pendant +quelque temps la langue de la philosophie; Empédocle, Parménide, ont +écrit leurs systèmes en vers. Ce n'est pas Kapila qui l'a écrite. +Entre Kapila, et l'auteur de la Kârikâ, Isvara Krishna, on doit +compter quelques centaines d'années tout au moins: et le second n'a +fait que rediger en vers, pour aider la mémoire des élèves, la +doctrine que le maître avait laissée sous la forme axiomatique. + +"On conçoit, du reste, sans peine, que l'usage des vers mémoriaux se +soit introduit dans l'Inde pour l'enseignement et la transmission de +la science: c'était une conséquence nécessaire de l'usage des +aphorismes. Les sciences les plus abstraites (mathematics, astronomy, +algebra), emploient aussi ce procédé, quoiqu'il semble peu fait pour +leur austérité et leur precision. Ainsi, le rhythme est, avec les +aphorismes, et par le même motif, la forme à peu pres générale de la +science dans l'Inde." + +(Kapila as a personage is almost legendary; nothing exact is known +about him. His doctrine passes among the Indians "comme une sorte de +révélation divine".--Pp. 252, 253.) + +M. Mohl observes as follows:-- + +"Ceci m'amène aux Pouranas. Nous n'avons plus rien du Pourana +primitif, qui paraît avoir été une cosmogonie, suivie d'une histoire +des Dieux et des families héroïques. Les sectes ont fini par +s'approprier ce cadre, après des transformations dont nous ne savons +ni le nombre ni les époques: et s'en sont servies, pour exalter +chacune son dieu, et y fondre, avec des débris de l'ancienne +tradition, leur mythologie plus moderne. Ce que les Pouranas sont pour +le peuple, les six systèmes de philosophie le sont pour les savants. +Nous trouvons ces systèmes dans la forme abstruse que les Hindous +aiment à donner à leur science: chaque école a ses aphorismes, qui, +sous forme de vers mnémoniques, contiennent dans le moins grand nombre +de mots possible tous les résultats d'une école. Mais nous n'avons +aucun renseignement sur les commencements de l'école, sur les +discussions que l'élaboration du système a dû provoquer, sur les +hommes qui y ont pris part, sur la marche et le développement des +idées: nous avons le système dans sa dernière forme, et rien ne nous +permet de remplir l'espace qui le sépare des théories plus vagues que +l'on trouve dans les derniers écrits de l'époque védique, à laquelle +pourtant tout prétend se rattacher. À partir de ces aphorismes, nous +avons des commentaires et des traités d'exposition et +d'interprétation: mais les idées premières, les termes techniques, et +le systeme en tier, sont fixés antérieurement. Tous ces systèmes +reposent sur une analyse psychologique très raffinée; et chacun a sa +terminologie précise, et à laquelle la nôtre ne répond que fort +imparfaitement: il faut donc, sous peine de se tromper et de tromper +ses lecteurs, que les traducteurs créent une foule de termes +techniques, ce qui n'est pas la moindre difficulté de ce travail." R. +Mohl, 'Rapport Annuel Fait à la Société Asïatique,' 1863, pp. 103-105; +collected edition, 'Vingt-sept ans d'histoire des Études Orientales,' +vol. ii. pp. 496, 498-9. + +When the purpose simply is to imprint affirmations on the memory, and +to associate them with strong emotions of reverential belief--mnemonic +verses and aphorisms are suitable enough; Empedokles employed verse, +Herakleitus and the Pythagoreans expressed themselves in +aphorisms--brief, half-intelligible, impressive symbols. But if philosophy +is ever to be brought out of such twilight into the condition of +"reasoned truth," this cannot be done without submitting all the +affirmations to cross-examining opponents--to the scrutiny of a +negative Dialectic. It is the theory and application of this Dialectic +which we are about to follow in Sokrates and Plato. + + + + +CHAPTER III.* + +[Footnote *: As stated in the prefatory note to this edition, the +present and the following chapter have been, for convenience, +transferred from the place given to them by the author, to their +present position.] + +OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES. + + +Having dwelt at some length on the life and compositions of Plato, I +now proceed to place in comparison with him some other members of the +Sokratic philosophical family: less eminent, indeed, than the +illustrious author of the Republic, yet still men of marked character, +ability, and influence.[1] Respecting one of the brethren, Xenophon, +who stands next to Plato in celebrity, I shall say a few words +separately in my next and concluding chapter. + +[Footnote 1: Dionysius of Halikarnassus contrasts Plato with [Greek: +to\ Sôkra/tous didaskalei=on pa=n] (De Adm. Vi Dic. Demosthen. p. +956.) Compare also Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 762, where he contrasts +the style and phraseology of Plato with that of the [Greek: +Sôkratikoi\ dia/logoi] generally.] + +[Side-note: Influence exercised by Sokrates over his companions.] + +The ascendancy of Sokrates over his contemporaries was powerfully +exercised in more than one way. He brought into vogue new subjects +both of indefinite amplitude, and familiar as well as interesting to +every one. On these subjects, moreover, he introduced, or at least +popularised, a new method of communication, whereby the relation of +teacher and learner, implying a direct transfer of ready-made +knowledge from the one to the other, was put aside. He substituted an +interrogatory process, at once destructive and suggestive, in which +the teacher began by unteaching and the learner by unlearning what was +supposed to be already known, for the purpose of provoking in the +learner's mind a self-operative energy of thought, and an internal +generation of new notions. Lastly, Sokrates worked forcibly upon the +minds of several friends, who were in the habit of attending him when +he talked in the market-place or the palæstra. Some tried to copy his +wonderful knack of colloquial cross-examination: how far they did so +with success or reputation we do not know: but Xenophon says that +several of them would only discourse with those who paid them a fee, +and that they thus sold for considerable sums what were only small +fragments obtained gratuitously from the rich table of their +master.[2] There were moreover several who copied the general style of +his colloquies by composing written dialogues. And thus it happened +that the great master,--he who passed his life in the oral application +of his Elenchus, without writing anything,--though he left no worthy +representative in his own special career, became the father of +numerous written dialogues and of a rich philosophical literature.[3] + +[Footnote 2: Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 60. [Greek: ô(=n tine\s mikra\ +me/rê par' e)kei/nou proi=ka labo/ntes pollou= toi=s a)/llois +e)pô/loun, kai\ ou)k ê)=san ô(/sper e)kei=nos dêmotikoi/; toi=s ga\r +mê\ e)/chousi chrê/mata dido/nai ou)k ê)/thelon diale/gesthai.]] + +[Footnote 3: We find a remarkable proof how long the name and +conception of Sokrates lasted in the memory of the Athenian public, as +having been the great progenitor of the philosophy and philosophers of +the fourth century B.C. in Athens. It was about 306 B.C., almost a +century after the death of Sokrates, that Democharês (the nephew of +the orator Demosthenes) delivered an oration before the Athenian +judicature for the purpose of upholding the law proposed by Sophokles, +forbidding philosophers or Sophists to lecture without a license +obtained from the government; which law, passed a year before, had +determined the secession of all the philosophers from Athens until the +law was repealed. In this oration Democharês expatiated on the +demerits of many philosophers, their servility, profligate ambition, +rapacity, want of patriotism, &c., from which Athenæus makes several +extracts. [Greek: Toiou=toi ei)sin oi( a)po\ philosophi/as stratêgoi/; +peri\ ô(=n Dêmocha/rês e)/legen,--Ô(/sper e)k thu/mbras ou)dei\s a)\n +du/naito kataskeua/sai lo/gchên, ou)/d' e)k _Sôkra/tous stratiô/tên +a)/mempton_]. + +Demetrius Phalereus also, in or near that same time, composed a +[Greek: Sôkra/tous a)pologi/an] (Diog. La. ix. 37-57). This shows how +long the interest in the personal fate and character of Sokrates +endured at Athens.] + +[Side-note: Names of those companions.] + +Besides Plato and Xenophon, whose works are known to us, we hear of +Alexamenus, Antisthenes, Æschines, Aristippus, Bryson, Eukleides, +Phædon, Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, &c., as having composed dialogues of +this sort. All of them were companions of Sokrates; several among them +either set down what they could partially recollect of his +conversations, or employed his name as a dramatic speaker of their own +thoughts. Seven of these dialogues were ascribed to Æschines, +twenty-five to Aristippus, seventeen to Kriton, twenty-three to Simmias, +three to Kebês, six to Eukleides, four to Phædon. The compositions of +Antisthenes were far more numerous: ten volumes of them, under a +variety of distinct titles (some of them probably not in the form of +dialogues) being recorded by Diogenes.[4] Aristippus was the first of +the line of philosophers called Kyrenaic or Hedonic, afterwards (with +various modifications) Epikurean: Antisthenes, of the Cynics and +Stoics: Eukleides, of the Megaric school. It seems that Aristippus, +Antisthenes, Eukleides, and Bryson, all enjoyed considerable +reputation, as contemporaries and rival authors of Plato: Æschines, +Antisthenes (who was very poor), and Aristippus, are said to have +received money for their lectures; Aristippus being named as the first +who thus departed from the Sokratic canon.[5] + +[Footnote 4: Diogenes Laert. 1. 47-61-83, vi. 15; Athenæ. xi. p. 505 +C. + +Bryson is mentioned by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 508 D. +Theopompus, the contemporary of Aristotle and pupil of Isokrates, had +composed an express treatise or discourse against Plato's dialogues, +in which discourse he affirmed that most of them were not Plato's own, +but borrowed in large proportion from the dialogues of Antisthenes, +Aristippus, and Bryson. Ephippus also, the comic writer (of the fourth +century B.C., contemporary with Theopompus, perhaps even earlier), +spoke of Bryson as contemporary with Plato (Athenæ. xi. 509 C). This +is good proof to authenticate Bryson as a composer of "Sokratic +dialogues" belonging to the Platonic age, along with Antisthenes and +Aristippus: whether Theopompus is correct when he asserts that Plato +borrowed _much_, from the three, is very doubtful. + +Many dialogues were published by various writers, and ascribed falsely +to one or other of the _viri Sokratici_: Diogenes (ii. 64) reports the +judgment delivered by Panætius, which among them were genuine and +which not so. Panætius considered that the dialogues ascribed to +Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Æschines, were genuine; that those +assigned to Phædon and Eukleides were doubtful; and that the rest were +all spurious. He thus regarded as spurious those of Alexamenus, +Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, Simon, Bryson, &c., or he did not know them +all. It is possible that Panætius may not have known the dialogues of +Bryson; if he did know them and believed them to be spurious, I should +not accept his assertion, because I think that it is outweighed by the +contrary testimony of Theopompus. Moreover, though Panætius was a very +able man, confidence in his critical estimate is much shaken when we +learn that he declared the Platonic Phædon to be spurious.] + +[Footnote 5: Diogen. Laert. i. 62-65; Athenæus, xi. p. 507 C. + +Dion Chrysostom (Orat. lv. De Homero et Socrate, vol. ii. p. 289, +Reiske) must have had in his view some of these other Sokratic +dialogues, not those composed by Plato or Xenophon, when he alludes to +conversations of Sokrates with Lysikles, Glykon, and Anytus; what he +says about Anytus can hardly refer to the Platonic Menon.] + +[Side-note: Æschines--oration of Lysias against him.] + +Æschines the companion of Sokrates did not become (like Eukleides, +Antisthenes, Aristippus) the founder of a succession or sect of +philosophers. The few fragments remaining of his dialogues do not +enable us to appreciate their merit. He seems to have employed the +name of Aspasia largely as a conversing personage, and to have +esteemed her highly. He also spoke with great admiration of +Themistokles. But in regard to present or recent characters, he stands +charged with much bitterness and ill-nature: especially we learn that +he denounced the Sophists Prodikus and Anaxaras, the first on the +ground of having taught Theramenes, the second as the teacher of two +worthless persons--Ariphrades and Arignôtus. This accusation deserves +greater notice, because it illustrates the odium raised by Melêtus +against Sokrates as having instructed Kritias and Alkibiades.[6] +Moreover, we have Æschines presented to us in another character, very +unexpected in a _vir Socraticus_. An action for recovery of money +alleged to be owing was brought in the Athenian Dikastery against +Æschines, by a plaintiff, who set forth his case in a speech composed +by the rhetor Lysias. In this speech it is alleged that Æschines, +having engaged in trade as a preparer and seller of unguents, borrowed +a sum of money at interest from the plaintiff; who affirms that he +counted with assurance upon honest dealing from a disciple of +Sokrates, continually engaged in talking about justice and virtue.[7] +But so far was this expectation from being realized, that Æschines had +behaved most dishonestly. He repaid neither principal nor interest; +though a judgment of the Dikastery had been obtained against him, and +a branded slave belonging to him had been seized under it. Moreover, +Æschines had been guilty of dishonesty equally scandalous in his +dealings with many other creditors also. Furthermore, he had made love +to a rich woman seventy years old, and had got possession of her +property; cheating and impoverishing her family. His character as a +profligate and cheat was well known and could be proved by many +witnesses. Such are the allegations against Æschines, contained in the +fragment of a lost speech of Lysias, and made in open court by a real +plaintiff. How much of them could be fairly proved, we cannot say: but +it seems plain at least that Æschines must have been a trader as well +as a philosopher. All these writers on philosophy must have had their +root and dealings in real life, of which we know scarce anything. + +[Footnote 6: Plutarch, Perikles, c. 24-32; Cicero, De Invent. i. 31; +Athenæus, v. 220. Some other citations will be found in Fischer's +collection of the few fragments of Æschines Sokraticus (Leipsic, 1788, +p. 68 seq.), though some of the allusions which he produces seem +rather to belong to the orator Æschines. The statements of Athenæus, +from the dialogue of Æschines called Telaugês, are the most curious. +The dialogue contained, among other things, [Greek: tê\n Prodi/kou +kai\ A)naxago/rous _tô=n sophistô=n_ diamô/kêsin], where we see +Anaxagoras denominated a Sophist (see also Diodor. xii. 39) as well as +Prodikus. Fischer considers the three Pseudo-Platonic +dialogues--[Greek: Peri\ A)retê=s, Peri\ Plou/tou, Peri\ Thana/tou]--as +the works of Æschines. But this is noway established.] + +[Footnote 7: Athenæus, xiii. pp. 611-612. [Greek: Peisthei\s d' u(p' +au)tou= toiau=ta le/gontos, kai\ a(/ma oi)o/menos tou=ton Ai)schi/nên +Sôkra/tous gegone/nai mathêtê/n, kai\ peri\ dikaiosu/nês kai\ a)retê=s +pollou\s kai\ semnou\s le/gonta lo/gous, ou)k a)/n pote e)picheirê=sai +ou)de\ tolmê=sai a(/per oi( ponêro/tatoi kai\ a)dikô/tatoi a)/nthrôpoi +e)picheirou=si pra/ttein]. + +We read also about another oration of Lysias against Æschines--[Greek: +peri\ sukophanti/as] (Diogen. Laert. ii. 63), unless indeed it be the +same oration differently described.] + +[Side-note: Written Sokratic Dialogues--their general character.] + +The dialogues known by the title of Sokratic dialogues,[8] were +composed by all the principal companions of Sokrates, and by many who +were not companions. Yet though thus composed by many different +authors, they formed a recognised class of literature, noticed by the +rhetorical critics as distinguished for plain, colloquial, unstudied, +dramatic execution, suiting the parts to the various speakers: from +which general character Plato alone departed--and he too not in all of +his dialogues. By the Sokratic authors generally Sokrates appears to +have been presented under the same main features: his proclaimed +confession of ignorance was seldom wanting: and the humiliation which +his cross-questioning inflicted even upon insolent men like +Alkibiades, was as keenly set forth by Æschines as by Plato: moreover +the Sokratic disciples generally were fond of extolling the Dæmon or +divining prophecy of their master.[9] Some dialogues circulating under +the name of some one among the companions of Sokrates, were spurious, +and the authorship was a point not easy to determine. Simon, a currier +at Athens, in whose shop Sokrates often conversed, is said to have +kept memoranda of the conversations which he heard, and to have +afterwards published them: Æschines also, and some other of the +Sokratic companions, were suspected of having preserved or procured +reports of the conversations of the master himself, and of having made +much money after his death by delivering them before select +audiences.[10] Aristotle speaks of the followers of Antisthenes as +unschooled, vulgar men: but Cicero appears to have read with +satisfaction the dialogues of Antisthenes, whom he designates as acute +though not well-instructed.[11] Other accounts describe his dialogues +as composed in a rhetorical style, which is ascribed to the fact of +his having received lessons from Gorgias:[12] and Theopompus must have +held in considerable estimation the dialogues of that same author, as +well as those of Aristippus and Bryson, when he accused Plato of +having borrowed from them largely.[13] + +[Footnote 8: Aristotel. ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 505 C; Rhetoric. iii. 16. + +Dionys. Halikarnass. ad Cn. Pomp. de Platone, p. 762, Reiske. [Greek: +Traphei\s] (Plato) [Greek: e)n toi=s Sôkratikoi=s dialo/gois +i)schnota/tois ou)=si kai\ a)kribesta/tois, ou) mei/nas d' e)n +au)toi=s, a)lla\ tê=s Gorgi/ou kai\ Thoukudi/dou kataskeuê=s +e)rasthei/s]: also, De Admir. Vi Dicend. in Demosthene, p. 968. Again +in the same treatise De Adm. V. D. Demosth. p. 956. [Greek: ê( de\ +e(te/ra le/xis, ê( litê\ kai\ a)phelê\s kai\ dokou=sa kataskeuê/n te +kai\ i)schu\n tê\n pro\s i)diô/tên e)/chein lo/gon kai\ o(moio/têta, +pollou\s me\n e)/sche kai\ a)gathou\s a)/ndras prosta/tas--kai\ oi( +tô=n ê)thikô=n dialo/gôn poiêtai/, ô(=n ê)=n to\ Sôkratiko\n +didaskalei=on pa=n, e)/xô Pla/tônos], &c. + +Dionysius calls this style [Greek: o( Sôkratiko\s charaktê\r] p. 1025. +I presume it is the same to which the satirist Timon applies the +words:-- + +[Greek: A)sthenikê/ te lo/gôn duas ê)\ tria\s ê)\ e)/ti po/rsô, +Oi)=os Xeinopho/ôn, ê)/t' Ai)schi/nou ou)k e)pipeithê\s +gra/psai--] Diogen. La. ii. 55. + +Lucian, Hermogenes, Phrynichus, Longinus, and some later rhetorical +critics of Greece judged more favourably than Timon about the style of +Æschines as well as of Xenophon. See Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. ii. p. +171, sec. ed. And Demetrius Phalereus (or the author of the treatise +which bears his name), as well as the rhetor Aristeides, considered +Æschines and Plato as the best representatives of the [Greek: +Sôkratiko\s charaktê/r], Demetr. Phaler. De Interpretat. 310; +Aristeides, Orat. Platon. i. p. 35; Photius, Cods. 61 and 158; +Longinus, ap. Walz. ix. p. 559, c. 2. Lucian says (De Parasito, 33) +that Æschines passed some time with the elder Dionysius at Syracuse, +to whom he read aloud his dialogue, entitled Miltiades, with great +success. + +An inedited discourse of Michæl Psellus, printed by Mr. Cox in his +very careful and valuable catalogue of the MSS. in the Bodleian +Library, recites the same high estimate as having been formed of +Æschines by the chief ancient rhetorical critics: they reckoned him +among and alongside of the foremost Hellenic classical writers, as +having his own peculiar merits of style--[Greek: para\ me\n Pla/tôni, +tê\n dialogikê\n phra/sin, para\ de\ tou= Sôkratikou= Ai)schi/nou, +tê\n e)mmelê= sunthê/kên tô=n le/xeôn, para\ de\ Thoukudi/dou], &c. +See Mr. Cox's Catalogue, pp. 743-745. Cicero speaks of the Sokratic +philosophers generally, as writing with an elegant playfulness of +style (De Officiis, i. 29, 104): which is in harmony with Lucian's +phrase--[Greek: Ai)schi/nês o( tou\s dialo/gous makrou\s kai\ +a)stei/ous gra/psas], &c.] + +[Footnote 9: Cicero, Brutus, 85, s. 292; De Divinatione, i. 54-122; +Aristeides, Orat. xlv. [Greek: peri\ R(êtorikê=s] Orat. xlvi. [Greek: +U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], vol. ii. pp. 295-369, ed. Dindorf. It appears +by this that some of the dialogues composed by Æschines were mistaken +by various persons for actual conversations held by Sokrates. It was +argued, that because Æschines was inferior to Plato in ability, he was +more likely to have repeated accurately what he had heard Sokrates +say.] + +[Footnote 10: Diog. L. ii. 122. He mentions a collection of +thirty-three dialogues in one volume, purporting to be reports of real +colloquies of Sokrates, published by Simon. But they can hardly be +regarded as genuine. + +The charge here mentioned is advanced by Xenophon (see a preceding +note, Memorab. i. 2, 60), against some persons ([Greek: tine\s]), but +without specifying names. About Æschines, see Athenæus, xiii. p. 611 +C; Diogen. Laert. ii. 62.] + +[Footnote 11: Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, xii. 38:--"viri acuti magis +quam eruditi," is the judgment of Cicero upon Antisthenes. I presume +that these words indicate the same defect as that which is intended by +Aristotle when he says--[Greek: oi( A)nthisthe/neioi kai\ oi( ou(/tôs +_a)pai/deutoi_], Metaphysic. [Greek: Ê]. 3, p. 1043, b. 24. It is +plain, too, that Lucian considered the compositions of Antisthenes as +not unworthy companions to those of Plato (Lucian, adv. Indoctum, c. +27).] + +[Footnote 12: Diogen. Laert. vi. 1. If it be true that Antisthenes +received lessons from Gorgias, this proves that Gorgias must sometimes +have given lessons _gratis_; for the poverty of Antisthenes is well +known. See the Symposion of Xenophon.] + +[Footnote 13: Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xi. p. 508. See K. F. Hermann, +Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, p. 300. An extract of some +length, of a dialogue composed by Æschines between Sokrates and +Alkibiades, is given by Aristeides, Or. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n +Tetta/rôn], vol. ii. pp. 292-294, ed. Dindorf.] + +[Side-note: Relations between the companions of Sokrates--Their +proceedings after the death of Sokrates.] + +Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, were all companions and +admirers of Sokrates, as was Plato. But none of them were his +disciples, in the strict sense of the word: none of them continued or +enforced his doctrines, though each used his name as a spokesman. +During his lifetime the common attachment to his person formed a bond +of union, which ceased at his death. There is indeed some ground for +believing that Plato then put himself forward in the character of +leader, with a view to keep the body united.[14] We must recollect +that Plato though then no more than twenty-eight years of age, was the +only one among them who combined the advantages of a noble Athenian +descent, opulent circumstances, an excellent education, and great +native genius. Eukleides and Aristippus were neither of them +Athenians: Antisthenes was very poor: Xenophon was absent on service +in the Cyreian army. Plato's proposition, however, found no favour +with the others and was even indignantly repudiated by Apollodorus: a +man ardently attached to Sokrates, but violent and overboiling in all +his feelings.[15] The companions of Sokrates, finding themselves +unfavourably looked upon at Athens after his death, left the city for +a season and followed Eukleides to Megara. How long they stayed there +we do not know. Plato is said, though I think on no sufficient +authority, to have remained absent from Athens for several years +continuously. It seems certain (from an anecdote recounted by +Aristotle)[16] that he talked with something like arrogance among the +companions of Sokrates: and that Aristippus gently rebuked him by +reminding him how very different had been the language of Sokrates +himself. Complaints too were made by contemporaries, about Plato's +jealous, censorious, spiteful, temper. The critical and disparaging +tone of his dialogues, notwithstanding the admiration which they +inspire, accounts for the existence of these complaints: and anecdotes +are recounted, though not verified by any sufficient evidence, of +ill-natured dealing on his part towards other philosophers who were +poorer than himself.[17] Dissension or controversy on philosophical +topics is rarely carried on without some invidious or hostile feeling. +Athens, and the _viri Sokratici_, Plato included, form no exception to +this ordinary malady of human nature. + +[Footnote 14: Athenæus, xi. p. 507 A-B. from the [Greek: u(pomnê/mata] +of the Delphian Hegesander. Who Hegesander was, I do not know: but +there is nothing improbable in the anecdote which he recounts.] + +[Footnote 15: Plato, Phædon. pp. 59 A. 117 D. Eukleides, however, +though his school was probably at Megara, seems to have possessed +property in Attica: for there existed, among the orations of Isæus, a +pleading composed by that rhetor for some client--[Greek: Pro\s +Eu)klei/dên to\n Sôkratiko\n a)mphisbê/têsis u(pe\r tê=s tou= chôri/ou +lu/seôs] (Dion. Hal., Isæ., c. 14, p. 612 Reiske) Harpokr.--[Greek: +O(/ti ta\ e)pikêrutto/mena]: also under some other words by +Harpokration and by Pollux, viii. 48.] + +[Footnote 16: Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, p. 1398, b. 30. [Greek: ê)\ ô(s +A)ri/stippos, pro\s Pla/tôna e)paggeltikô/tero/n ti ei)po/nta, ô(s +ô(/|eto--a)lla\ mê\n o( g' e(tai=ros ê(mô=n, e)/phê, ou)the\n +toiou=ton--le/gôn to\n Sôkra/tên]. + +This anecdote, mentioned by Aristotle, who had good means of knowing, +appears quite worthy of belief. The jealousy and love of supremacy +inherent in Plato's temper ([Greek: to\ philo/timon]), were noticed by +Dionysius Hal. (Epist. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 756).] + +[Footnote 17: Athenæus, xi. pp. 505-508. Diog. Laert. ii. 60-65, iii. +36. + +The statement made by Plato in the Phædon--That Aristippus and +Kleombrotus were not present at the death of Sokrates, but were said +to be in Ægina--is cited as an example of Plato's ill-will and +censorious temper (Demetr. Phaler. s. 306). But this is unfair. The +statement ought not to be so considered, if it were true: and if not +true, it deserves a more severe epithet. We read in Athenæus various +other criticisms, citing or alluding to passages of Plato, which are +alleged to indicate ill-nature; but many of the passages cited do not +deserve the remark.] + +[Side-note: No Sokratic school--each of the companions took a line of +his own.] + +It is common for historians of philosophy to speak of a Sokratic +school: but this phrase, if admissible at all, is only admissible in +the largest and vaguest sense. The effect produced by Sokrates upon +his companions was, not to teach doctrine, but to stimulate +self-working enquiry, upon ethical and social subjects. Eukleides, +Antisthenes, Aristippus, each took a line of his own, not less +decidedly than Plato. But unfortunately we have no compositions +remaining from either of the three. We possess only brief reports +respecting some leading points of their doctrine, emanating altogether +from those who disagreed with it: we have besides aphorisms, dicta, +repartees, bons-mots, &c., which they are said to have uttered. Of +these many are evident inventions; some proceeding from opponents and +probably coloured or exaggerated, others hardly authenticated at all. +But if they were ever so well authenticated, they would form very +insufficient evidence on which to judge a philosopher--much less to +condemn him with asperity.[18] Philosophy (as I have already observed) +aspires to deliver not merely truth, but reasoned truth. We ought to +know not only what doctrines a philosopher maintained, but how he +maintained them:--what objections others made against him, and how he +replied:--what objections he made against dissentient doctrines, and +what replies were made to him. Respecting Plato and Aristotle, we +possess such information to a considerable extent:--respecting +Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, we are without it. All their +compositions (very numerous, in the case of Antisthenes) have +perished. + +[Footnote 18: Respecting these ancient philosophers, whose works are +lost, I transcribe a striking passage from Descartes, who complains, +in his own case, of the injustice of being judged from the statements +of others, and not from his own writings:--"Quod adeo in hâc materiâ +verum est, ut quamvis sæpe _aliquas ex meis opinionibus explicaverim +viris acutissimis_, et qui _me loquente videbantur eas valdé distincté +intelligere: attamen cum eas retulerunt, observavi_ ipsos fere _semper +illas ita mutavisse, ut pro meis agnoscere amplius non possem._ Quâ +occasione posteros hic oratos volo, ut nunquam credant, quidquam à me +esse profectum, quod ipse in lucem non edidero. _Et nullo modo miror +absurda illa dogmata, quæ veteribus illis philosophis tribuuntur, +quorum scripta non habemus_: nec propterea judico ipsorum cogitationes +valdé à ratione fuisse alienas, cum habuerint præstantissima suorum +sæculorum ingenia; sed tantum nobis perperam esse relatas." +(Descartes, Diss. De Methodo, p. 43.)] + + * * * * * + +EUKLEIDES. + +[Side-note: Eukleides of Megara--he blended Parmenides with Sokrates.] + +Eukleides was a Parmenidean, who blended the ethical point of view of +Sokrates with the ontology of Parmenides, and followed out that +negative Dialectic which was common to Sokrates with Zeno. Parmenides +(I have with already said)[19] and Zeno after him, recognised no +absolute reality except Ens Unum, continuous, indivisible: they denied +all real plurality: they said that the plural was Non-Ens or Nothing, +_i.e._ nothing real or absolute, but only apparent, perpetually +transient and changing, relative, different as appreciated by one man +and by another. Now Sokrates laid it down that wisdom or knowledge of +Good, was the sum total of ethical perfection, including within it all +the different virtues: he spoke also about the divine wisdom inherent +in, or pervading the entire Kosmos or universe.[20] Eukleides blended +together the Ens of Parmenides with the Good of Sokrates, saying that +the two names designated one and the same thing: sometimes called +Good, Wisdom, Intelligence, God, &c., and by other names also, but +always one and the same object named and meant. He farther maintained +that the opposite of Ens, and the opposite of Bonum (Non-Ens, +Non-Bonum, or Malum) were things non-existent, unmeaning names, +Nothing,[21] &c.: _i.e._ that they were nothing really, absolutely, +permanently, but ever varying and dependent upon our ever varying +conceptions. The One--the All--the Good--was absolute, immoveable, +invariable, indivisible. But the opposite thereof was a non-entity or +nothing: there was no one constant meaning corresponding to Non-Ens--but +a variable meaning, different with every man who used it. + +[Footnote 19: See ch. i. pp. 19-22.] + +[Footnote 20: Xenophon. Memor. i. 4, 17. [Greek: tê\n e)n tô=| panti\ +phro/nêsin]. Compare Plato, Philêbus, pp. 29-30; Cicero, Nat. Deor. +ii. 6, 6, iii. 11.] + +[Footnote 21: Diog. L. ii. 106. [Greek: Ou)=tos e)\n to\ a)gatho\n +a)pephê/|nato polloi=s o)no/masi kalou/menon; o(/te me\n ga\r +phro/nêsin, o(/te de\ theo/n, kai\ a)/llote nou=n kai\ ta\ loipa/. Ta\ +de\ a)ntikei/mena tô=| a)gathô=| a)nê/|rei, mê\ ei)=nai pha/skôn]. +Compare also vii. 2, 161, where the Megarici are represented as +recognising only [Greek: mi/an a)retê\n polloi=s o)no/masi +kaloume/nên]. Cicero, Academ. ii. 42.] + +[Side-note: Doctrine of Eukleides about _Bonum_.] + +It was in this manner that Eukleides solved the problem which Sokrates +had brought into vogue--What is the Bonum--or (as afterwards phrased) +the Summum Bonum? Eukleides pronounced the Bonum to be coincident with +the Ens Unum of Parmenides. The Parmenidean thesis, originally +belonging to Transcendental Physics or Ontology, became thus +implicated with Transcendental Ethics.[22] + +[Footnote 22: However, in the verse of Xenophanes, the predecessor of +Parmenides--[Greek: Ou(=los o(ra=|, ou(=los de\ noei=, ou(=los de/ t' +a)kou/ei]--the Universe is described as a thinking, seeing, hearing +God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pa=n]. Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. ix. 144; +Xenophan. Fragm. p. 36, ed. Karsten.] + +[Side-note: The doctrine compared to that of Plato--changes in Plato.] + +Plato departs from Sokrates on the same point. He agrees with +Eukleides in recognising a Transcendental Bonum. But it appears that +his doctrines on this head underwent some change. He held for some +time what is called the doctrine of Ideas: transcendental Forms, +Entia, Essences: he considered the Transcendental to be essentially +multiple, or to be an aggregate--whereas Eukleides had regarded it as +essentially One. This is the doctrine which we find in some of the +Platonic dialogues. In the Republic, the Idea of Good appears as one +of these, though it is declared to be the foremost in rank and the +most ascendant in efficacy.[23] But in the later part of his life, and +in his lectures (as we learn from Aristotle), Plato came to adopt a +different view. He resolved the Ideas into numbers. He regarded them +as made up by the combination of two distinct factors:--1. The One--the +Essentially One. 2. The Essentially Plural: The Indeterminate +Dyad: the Great and Little.--Of these two elements he considered the +Ideas to be compounded. And he identified the Idea of Good with the +essentially One--[Greek: to\ a)gatho\n] with [Greek: to\ e(/n]: the +principle of Good with the principle of Unity: also the principle of +Evil with the Indeterminate. But though Unity and Good were thus +identical, he considered Unity as logically antecedent, or the +subject--Good as logically consequent, or the predicate.[24] + +[Footnote 23: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E, vii. p. 517 A.] + +[Footnote 24: The account given by Aristotle of Plato's doctrine of +Ideas, as held by Plato in his later years, appears in various +passages of the Metaphysica, and in the curious account repeated by +Aristoxenus (who had often heard it from Aristotle--[Greek: +A)ristote/lês a)ei\ diêgei=to]) of the [Greek: a)kro/asis] or lecture +delivered by Plato, De Bono. See Aristoxen. Harmon. ii. p. 30, Meibom. +Compare the eighth chapter in this work,--Platonic Compositions +Generally. Metaphys. N. 1091, b. 13.[Greek: tô=n de\ ta\s a)kinê/tous +ou)si/as ei)=nai lego/ntôn] (sc. Platonici) [Greek: oi( me/n phasin +au)to\ to\ e(\n to\ a)gatho\n au)to\ ei)=nai; ou)si/an me/ntoi to\ +e(\n au)tou= ô)/|onto ei)=nai ma/lista], which words are very clearly +explained by Bonitz in the note to his Commentary, p. 586: also +Metaphys. 987, b. 20, and Scholia, p. 551, b. 20, p. 567, b. 34, where +the work of Aristotle, [Greek: Peri\ Ta\gathou=], is referred to: +probably the memoranda taken down by Aristotle from Plato's lecture on +that subject, accompanied by notes of his own. + +In Schol. p. 573, a. 18, it is stated that the astronomer Eudoxus was +a hearer both of Plato and of Eukleides. + +The account given by Zeller (Phil. der Griech. ii. p. 453, 2nd ed.) of +this latter phase of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, applies exactly +to that which we hear about the main doctrine of Eukleides. Zeller +describes the Platonic doctrine as being "Eine Vermischung des +ethischen Begriffes vom höchsten Gut, mit dem Metaphysischen des +Absoluten: Der Begriff des Guten ist zunächst aus dem menschlichen +Leben abstrahirt; er bezeichnet das, was dem Menschen zuträglich ist. +So noch bei Sokrates. Plato verallgemeinert ihn nun zum Begriff des +Absoluten; dabei spielt aber seine ursprüngliche Bedeutung noch +fortwährend herein, und so entsteht die Unklarheit, dass weder der +ethische noch der metaphysische Begriff des Guten rein gefasst wird." + +This remark is not less applicable to Eukleides than to Plato, both of +them agreeing in the doctrine here criticised. Zeller says truly, that +the attempt to identify Unum and Bonum produces perpetual confusion. +The two notions are thoroughly distinct and independent. It ought not +to be called (as he phrases it) "a generalization of Bonum". There is +no common property on which to found a generalization. It is a forced +conjunction between two disparates.] + +[Side-note: Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as that of +Eukleides.] + +This last doctrine of Plato in his later years (which does not appear +in the dialogues, but seems, as far as we can make out, to have been +delivered substantially in his oral lectures, and is ascribed to him +by Aristotle) was nearly coincident with that of Eukleides. Both held +the identity of [Greek: to\ e(/n] with [Greek: to\ a)gatho/n]. This +one doctrine is all that we know about Eukleides: what consequences he +derived from it, or whether any, we do not know. But Plato combined, +with this transcendental Unum = Bonum, a transcendental indeterminate +plurality: from which combination he considered his Ideas or Ideal +Numbers to be derivatives. + +[Side-note: Megaric succession of philosophers. Eleian or Eritrean +succession.] + +Eukleides is said to have composed six dialogues, the titles of which +alone remain. The scanty information which we possess respecting him +relates altogether to his negative logical procedure. Whether he +deduced any consequences from his positive doctrine of the +Transcendental Ens, Unum, Bonum, we do not know: but he, as Zeno had +been before him,[25] was acute in exposing contradictions and +difficulties in the positive doctrines of opponents. He was a citizen +of Megara, where he is said to have harboured Plato and the other +companions of Sokrates, when they retired for a time from Athens after +the death of Sokrates. Living there as a teacher or debater on +philosophy, he founded a school or succession of philosophers who were +denominated _Megarici_. The title is as old as Aristotle, who both +names them and criticises their doctrines.[26] None of their +compositions are preserved. The earliest who becomes known to us is +Eubulides, the contemporary and opponent of Aristotle; next Ichthyas, +Apollonius, Diodôrus Kronus, Stilpon, Alexinus, between 340-260 B.C. + +[Footnote 25: Plato, Parmenides, p. 128 C, where Zeno represents +himself as taking for his premisses the conclusions of opponents, to +show that they led to absurd consequences. This seems what is meant, +when Diogenes says about Eukleides--[Greek: tai=s a)podei/xesin +e)ni/stato ou) kata\ lê/mmata, a)lla\ kat' e)piphora/n] (ii. 107); +Deycks, De Megaricorum Doctrinâ, p. 34.] + +[Footnote 26: Aristot. Metaph. iv. p. 1046, b. 29. + +The sarcasm ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic implies that Eukleides was +really known as the founder of a _school_--[Greek: kai\ tê\n me\n +Eu)klei/dou scholê\n e)/lege cholê/n] (Diog. L. vi. 24)--the earliest +mention (I apprehend) of the word [Greek: scholê\] in that sense.] + +With the Megaric philosophers there soon become confounded another +succession, called Eleian or Eretrian, who trace their origin to +another Sokratic man--Phædon. The chief Eretrians made known to us are +Pleistanus, Menedêmus, Asklepiades. The second of the three acquired +some reputation. + +[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus--Ethical, not +transcendental.] + +The Megarics and Eretrians, as far as we know them, turned their +speculative activity altogether in the logical or intellectual +direction, paying little attention to the ethical and emotional field. +Both Antisthenes and Aristippus, on the contrary, pursued the ethical +path. To the Sokratic question, What is the Bonum? Eukleides had +answered by a transcendental definition: Antisthenes and Aristippus +each gave to it an ethical answer, having reference to human wants and +emotions, and to the different views which they respectively took +thereof. Antisthenes declared it to consist in virtue, by which he +meant an independent and self-sufficing character, confining all wants +within the narrowest limits: Aristippus placed it in the moderate and +easy pleasures, in avoiding ambitious struggles, and in making the +best of every different situation, yet always under the guidance of a +wise calculation and self-command. Both of them kept clear of the +transcendental: they neither accepted it as Unum et Omne (the view of +Eukleides), nor as Plura (the Eternal Ideas or Forms, the Platonic +view). Their speculations had reference altogether to human life and +feelings, though the one took a measure of this wide subject very +different from the other: and in thus confining the range of their +speculations, they followed Sokrates more closely than either +Eukleides or Plato followed him. They not only abstained from +transcendental speculation, but put themselves in declared opposition +to it. And since the intellectual or logical philosophy, as treated by +Plato, became intimately blended with transcendental +hypothesis--Antisthenes and Aristippus are both found on the negative side +against its pretensions. Aristippus declared the mathematical sciences to +be useless, as conducing in no way to happiness, and taking no account of +what was better or what was worse.[27] He declared that we could know +nothing except in so far as we were affected by it, and as it was or +might be in correlation with ourselves: that as to causes not relative +to ourselves, or to our own capacities and affections, we could know +nothing about them.[28] + +[Footnote 27: Aristotel. Metaph. B. 906, a. 32. [Greek: ô(/ste dia\ +tau=ta tô=n _sophistô=n tines_ oi(=on A)ri/stippos proepêla/kizon +au)ta\s (ta\s mathêmatika\s te/chnas);--e)n me\n ga\r tai=s a)/llais +te/chnais, kai\ tai=s banau/sois, oi(=on e)n tektonikê=| kai\ +skutikê=|, dio/ti be/ltion ê)\ chei=ron le/gesthai pa/nta, ta\s de\ +mathêmatika\s ou)the/na poiei=sthai lo/gon peri\ a)gathô=n kai\ +kakô=n.] + +Aristotle here ranks Aristippus among the [Greek: sophistai/]. + +Aristippus, in discountenancing [Greek: phusiologi/an], cited the +favourite saying of Sokrates that the proper study of mankind was +[Greek: o(/tti toi e)n mega/roisi kako/n t' a)gatho/n te te/tuktai]. + +Plutarch, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. i. 8.] + +[Footnote 28: Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 191; Diog. L. ii. 92.] + +[Side-note: Preponderance of the negative vein in the Platonic age.] + +Such were the leading writers and talkers contemporary with Plato, in +the dialectical age immediately following on the death of Sokrates. +The negative vein greatly preponderates in them, as it does on the +whole even in Plato--and as it was pretty sure to do, so long as the +form of dialogue was employed. Affirmative exposition and proof is +indeed found in some of the later Platonic works, carried on by +colloquy between two speakers. But the colloquial form manifests +itself evidently as unsuitable for the purpose: and we must remember +that Plato was a lecturer as well as a writer, so that his doctrines +made their way, at least in part, through continuous exposition. But +it is Aristotle with whom the form of affirmative continuous +exposition first becomes predominant, in matters of philosophy. Though +he composed dialogues (which are now lost), and though he appreciates +dialectic as a valuable exercise, yet he considers it only as a +discursive preparation; antecedent, though essential, to the more +close and concentrated demonstrations of philosophy. + +[Side-note: Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the +negative vein.] + +Most historians deal hardly with this negative vein. They depreciate +the Sophists, the Megarics and Eretrians, the Academics and Sceptics +of the subsequent ages--under the title of Eristics, or lovers of +contention for itself--as captious and perverse enemies of truth. + +[Side-note: Negative method in philosophy essential to the controul of +the affirmative.] + +I have already said that my view of the importance and value of the +negative vein of philosophy is altogether different. It appears to me +quite as essential as the affirmative. It is required as an +antecedent, a test, and a corrective. Aristotle deserves all honour +for his attempts to construct and defend various affirmative theories: +but the value of these theories depends upon their being defensible +against all objectors. Affirmative philosophy, as a body not only of +truth but of reasoned truth, holds the champion's belt, subject to the +challenge not only of competing affirmants, but of all deniers and +doubters. And this is the more indispensable, because of the vast +problems which these affirmative philosophers undertake to solve: +problems especially vast during the age of Plato and Aristotle. The +question has to be determined, not only which of two proposed +solutions is the best, but whether either of them is tenable, and even +whether any solution at all is attainable by the human faculties: +whether there exist positive evidence adequate to sustain any +conclusion, accompanied with adequate replies to the objections +against it. The burthen of proof lies upon the affirmant: and the +proof produced must be open to the scrutiny of every dissentient. + +[Side-note: Sokrates--the most persevering and acute Eristic of his +age.] + +Among these dissentients or negative dialecticians, Sokrates himself, +during his life, stood prominent. In his footsteps followed Eukleides +and the Megarics: who, though they acquired the unenviable surname of +Eristics or Controversialists, cannot possibly have surpassed Sokrates, +and probably did not equal him, in the refutative Elenchus. Of no one +among the Megarics, probably, did critics ever affirm, what the admiring +Xenophon says about Sokrates--"that he dealt with every one in colloquial +debate just as he chose," _i.e._, that he baffled and puzzled his +opponents whenever he chose. No one of these Megarics probably ever +enunciated so sweeping a negative programme, or declared so emphatically +his own inability to communicate positive instruction, as Sokrates in the +Platonic Apology. A person more thoroughly Eristic than Sokrates never +lived. And we see perfectly, from the Memorabilia of Xenophon (who +nevertheless strives to bring out the opposite side of his character), +that he was so esteemed among his contemporaries. Plato, as well as +Eukleides, took up this vein in the Sokratic character, and worked it +with unrivalled power in many of his dialogues. The Platonic Sokrates +is compared, and compares himself, to Antæus, who compelled every +new-comer, willing or unwilling, to wrestle with him.[29] + +[Footnote 29: Plato, Theætet. p. 169 A. _Theodorus_. [Greek: Ou) +r(a/|dion, ô)= Sô/krates, soi\ parakathê/menon mê\ dido/nai lo/gon, +a)ll' e)gô\ a)/rti parelê/rêsa pha/skôn se e)pitre/psein moi mê\ +a)podu/esthai, kai\ ou)chi\ a)nagka/sein katha/per Lakedaimo/nioi; su\ +de/ moi dokei=s pro\s to\n Ski/r)r(ôna ma=llon tei/nein. +Lakedaimo/nioi me\n ga\r a)pie/nai ê(\ a)podu/esthai keleu/ousi, su\ +de\ kat' A)ntai=o/n ti/ moi ma=llon dokei=s to\ dra=ma dra=|n; to\n +ga\r proseltho/nta ou)k a)ni/ês pri\n a)nagka/sê|s a)podu/sas e)n +toi=s lo/gois prospalai=sai.] + +_Sokrates_. [Greek: _A)=rista ge_, ô)= Theo/dôre, _tê\n no/son mou +a)pei/kasas_; i)schurikô/teros me/ntoi e)gô\ e)kei/nôn; muri/oi ga\r +ê)/dê moi Ê(rakle/es te kai\ Thêse/es e)ntucho/ntes karteroi\ pro\s +to\ le/gein ma/l' eu)= xugkeko/phasin, a)ll' e)gô\ ou)de/n ti ma=llon +a)phi/stamai. ou(/tô _tis e)rô\s deino\s e)nde/duke tê=s peri\ tau=ta +gumnasi/as_; mê\ ou)=n mêde\ su\ phthonê/sê|s prosanatripsa/menos +sauto/n te a(/ma kai\ e)me\ o)nê=sai]. + +How could the eristic appetite be manifested in stronger language +either by Eukleides, or Eubulides, or Diodôrus Kronus, or any of those +Sophists upon whom the Platonic commentators heap so many harsh +epithets? + +Among the compositions ascribed to Protagoras by Diogenes Laertius +(ix. 55), one is entitled [Greek: Te/chnê E)ristikô=n]. But if we look +at the last chapter of the Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis, we shall +find Aristotle asserting explicitly that there existed no [Greek: +Te/chnê E)ristikô=n] anterior to his own work the Topica.] + +[Side-note: Platonic Parmenides--its extreme negative character.] + +Of the six dialogues composed by Eukleides, we cannot speak +positively, because they are not preserved. But they cannot have been +more refutative, and less affirmative, than most of the Platonic +dialogues; and we can hardly be wrong in asserting that they were very +inferior both in energy and attraction. The Theætêtus and the +Parmenides, two of the most negative among the Platonic dialogues, +seem to connect themselves, by the _personnel_ of the drama, with the +Megaric philosophers: the former dialogue is ushered in by Eukleides, +and is, as it were, dedicated to him: the latter dialogue exhibits, as +its _protagonistes_, the veteran Parmenides himself, who forms the one +factor of the Megaric philosophy, while Sokrates forms the other. +Parmenides (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is made to enforce the +negative method in general terms, as a philosophical duty co-ordinate +with the affirmative; and to illustrate it by a most elaborate +argumentation, directed partly against the Platonic Ideas (here +advocated by the youthful Sokrates), partly against his own (the +Parmenidean) dogma of Ens Unum. Parmenides adduces unanswerable +objections against the dogma of Transcendental Forms or Ideas; yet +says at the same time that there can be no philosophy unless you admit +it. He reproves the youthful Sokrates for precipitancy in affirming +the dogma, and contends that you are not justified in affirming any +dogma until you have gone through a bilateral scrutiny of it--that is, +first assuming the doctrine to be true, next assuming it to be false, +and following out the deductions arising from the one assumption as +well as from the other.[30] Parmenides then gives a string of +successive deductions (at great length, occupying the last half of the +dialogue)--four pairs of counter-demonstrations or Antinomies--in +which contradictory conclusions appear each to be alike proved. He +enunciates the final result as follows:--"Whether Unum exists, or does +not exist, Unum itself and Cætera, both exist and do not exist, both +appear and do not appear, all things and in all ways--both in relation +to themselves and in relation to each other".[31] + +[Footnote 30: Plato, Parmen. p. 136.] + +[Footnote 31: Plato, Parmen. p. 166. [Greek: e(\n ei)/t' e)/stin, +ei)/te mê\ e)/stin, au)to/ te kai\ ta)/lla kai\ pro\s au)ta\ kai\ +pro\s a)/llêla pa/nta pa/ntôs e)sti/ te kai\ ou)k e)/sti, kai\ +phai/netai/ te kai\ ou) phai/netai.--A)lêthe/stata]. + +See below, vol. iii. chap. xxvii. Parmenides.] + +If this memorable dialogue, with its concluding string of elaborate +antinomies, had come down to us under the name of Eukleides, +historians would probably have denounced it as a perverse exhibition +of ingenuity, worthy of "that litigious person, who first infused into +the Megarians the fury of disputation "[32] But since it is of +Platonic origin, we must recognise Plato not only as having divided +with the Megaric philosophers the impulse of negative speculation +which they had inherited from Sokrates, but as having carried that +impulse to an extreme point of invention, combination, and dramatic +handling, much beyond their powers. Undoubtedly, if we pass from the +Parmenidês to other dialogues, we find Plato very different. He has +various other intellectual impulses, an abundant flow of ideality and +of constructive fancy, in many distinct channels. But negative +philosophy is at least one of the indisputable and prominent items of +the Platonic aggregate. + +[Footnote 32: This is the phrase of the satirical sillographer Timon, +who spoke with scorn of all the philosophers except Pyrrhon:-- + +[Greek: A)ll' ou)/ moi tou/tôn phledo/nôn me/lei, ou)de\ me\n a)/llou +Ou)deno/s, ou) Phai/dônos, o(/tis ge me\n--ou)/d' e)rida/nteô +Eu)klei/dou, Megareu=sin o(\s e)/mbale lu/ssan e)rismou=.]] + +[Side-note: The Megarics shared the negative impulse with Sokrates and +Plato.] + +While then we admit that the Megaric succession of philosophers +exhibited negative subtlety and vehement love of contentious debate, +we must recollect that these qualities were inherited from Sokrates +and shared with Plato. The philosophy of Sokrates, who taught nothing +and cross-examined every one, was essentially more negative and +controversial, both in him and his successors, than any which had +preceded it. In an age when dialectic colloquy was considered as +appropriate for philosophical subjects, and when long continuous +exposition was left to the rhetor--Eukleides established a succession +or school[33] which was more distinguished for impugning dogmas of +others than for defending dogmas of its own. Schleiermacher and others +suppose that Plato in his dialogue Euthydêmus intends to expose the +sophistical fallacies of the Megaric school:[34] and that in the +dialogue Sophistês, he refutes the same philosophers (under the vague +designation of "the friends of Forms") in their speculations about +Ens and Non-Ens. The first of these two opinions is probably true to +some extent, though we cannot tell how far: the second of the two is +supported by some able critics--yet it appears to me untenable.[35] + +[Footnote 33: If we may trust a sarcastic bon-mot ascribed to Diogenes +the Cynic, the contemporary of the _viri Sokratici_ and the follower +of Antisthenes, the term [Greek: scholê\] was applied to the visitors +of Eukleides rather than to those of Plato--[Greek: kai\ tê\n me\n +Eu)klei/dou scholê\n e)/lege _cholê/n_, tê\n de\ Pla/tônos diatribê/n, +_katatribê/n_]. Diog. L. vi. 24.] + +[Footnote 34: Schleierm. Einleitung to Plat. Euthyd. p. 403 seq.] + +[Footnote 35: Schleierm. Introduction to the Sophistês, pp. 134-135. + +See Deycks, Megaricorum Doctrina, p. 41 seq. Zeller, Phil. der Griech. +vol. ii. p. 180 seq., with his instructive note. Prantl, Gesch. der +Logik, vol. i. p. 37, and others cited by Zeller.--Ritter dissents +from this view, and I concur in his dissent. To affirm that Eukleides +admitted a plurality of Ideas or Forms, is to contradict the only one +deposition, certain and unequivocal, which we have about his +philosophy. His doctrine is that of the Transcendental Unum, Ens, +Bonum; while the doctrine of the Transcendental Plura (Ideas or Forms) +belongs to Plato and others. Both Deycks and Zeller (p. 185) recognise +this as a difficulty. But to me it seems fatal to their hypothesis; +which, after all, is only an hypothesis--first originated by +Schleiermacher. If it be true that the Megarici are intended by Plato +under the appellation [Greek: oi( tô=n ei)dô=n phi/loi], we must +suppose that the school had been completely transformed before the +time of Stilpon, who is presented as the great opponent of [Greek: ta\ +ei)/dê].] + +Of Eukleides himself, though he is characterised as strongly +controversial, no distinct points of controversy have been preserved: +but his successor Eubulides is celebrated for various sophisms. He was +the contemporary and rival of Aristotle: who, without however +expressly naming him, probably intends to speak of him when alluding +to the Megaric philosophers generally.[36] Another of the same school, +Alexinus (rather later than Eubulides) is also said to have written +against Aristotle. + +[Footnote 36: Aristokles, ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2. Eubulides is +said not merely to have controverted the philosophical theories of +Aristotle, but also to have attacked his personal character with +bitterness and slander: a practice not less common in ancient +controversy than in modern. About Alexinus, Diog. L. ii. 109. + +Among those who took lessons in rhetoric and pronunciation from +Eubulides, we read the name of the orator Demosthenes, who is said to +have improved his pronunciation thereby. Diog. Laert. ii. p. 108. +Plutarch, x. Orat. 21, p. 845 C.] + +[Side-note: Eubulides--his logical problems or puzzles--difficulty of +solving them--many solutions attempted.] + +Six sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides. 1.--[Greek: O( +pseudo/menos]--Mentiens. 2.--[Greek: O( dialantha/nôn], or +[Greek: e)gkekalumme/nos]--the person hidden under a veil. +3.--[Greek: Ê)le/ktra]. 4.--[Greek: Sôrei/tês]--Sorites. +5.--[Greek: Kerati/nês]--Cornutus. 6.--[Greek: Pha/lakros]--Calvus. +Of these the second is substantially the same with the third; and the +fourth the same with the sixth, only inverted.[37] + +[Footnote 37: Diog. L. ii. pp. 108-109; vii. 82. Lucian vit. Auct. 22. + +1. Cicero, Academ. ii. pp. 30-96. "Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, +mentiris. Dicis autem te mentiri, verumque dicis: mentiris igitur." 2, +3. [Greek: O( e)gkekalumme/nos]. You know your father: you are placed +before a person covered and concealed by a thick veil: you do not know +him. But this person is your father. Therefore you both know your +father and do not know him. 5. [Greek: Kerati/nês]. That which you +have not lost, you have: but you have not lost horns; therefore you +_have_ horns. 4, 6. [Greek: Sôrei/tês--Pha/lakros]. What number of +grains make a heap--or are many? what number are few? Are three grains +few, and four _many_?--or, where will you draw the line between Few +and Many? The like question about the hairs on a man's head--How many +must he lose before he can be said to have only a few, or to be bald?] + +These sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides, and belonged probably to the +Megaric school both before and after him. But it is plain both from +the Euthydêmus of Plato, and from the Topica of Aristotle, that there +were many others of similar character; frequently employed in the +abundant dialectic colloquies which prevailed at Athens during the +fourth and third centuries B.C. Plato and Aristotle handle such +questions and their authors contemptuously, under the name of Eristic: +but it was more easy to put a bad name upon them, as well as upon the +Eleate Zeno, than to elucidate the logical difficulties which they +brought to view. Neither Aristotle nor Plato provided a sufficient +answer to them: as is proved by the fact, that several subsequent +philosophers wrote treatises expressly in reference to them--even +philosophers of reputation, like Theophrastus and Chrysippus.[38] How +these two latter philosophers performed their task, we cannot say. But +the fact that they attempted the task, exhibits a commendable anxiety +to make their logical theory complete, and to fortify it against +objections. + +[Footnote 38: Diog. L. v. p. 49; vii. pp. 192-198. Seneca, Epistol. p. +45. Plutarch (De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1087) has some curious +extracts and remarks from Chrysippus; who (he says) spoke in the +harshest terms against the [Greek: Megarika\ e)rôtê/mata], as having +puzzled and unsettled men's convictions without ground--while he +(Chrysippus) had himself proposed puzzles and difficulties still more +formidable, in his treatise [Greek: kata\ Sunêthei/as].] + +[Side-note: Real character of the Megaric sophisms, not calculated to +deceive but to guard against deception.] + +It is in this point of view--in reference to logical theory--that the +Megaric philosophers have not been fairly appreciated. They, or +persons reasoning in their manner, formed one essential encouragement +and condition to the formation of any tolerable logical theory. They +administered, to minds capable and constructive, that painful sense of +contradiction, and shock of perplexity, which Sokrates relied upon as +the stimulus to mental parturition--and which Plato extols as a lever +for raising the student to general conceptions.[39] Their sophisms +were not intended to impose upon any one, but on the contrary, to +guard against imposition.[40] Whoever states a fallacy clearly and +nakedly, applying it to a particular case in which it conducts to a +conclusion known upon other evidence not to be true--contributes to +divest it of its misleading effect. The persons most liable to be +deceived by the fallacy are those who are not forewarned:--in cases +where the premisses are stated not nakedly, but in an artful form of +words--and where the conclusion, though false, is not known beforehand +to be false by the hearer. To use Mr. John Stuart Mill's phrase,[41] +the fallacy is a case of apparent evidence mistaken for real evidence: +you expose it to be evidence only apparent and not real, by giving a +type of the fallacy, in which the conclusion obtained is obviously +false: and the more obviously false it is, the better suited for its +tutelary purpose. Aristotle recognises, as indispensable in +philosophical enquiry, the preliminary wrestling into which he +conducts his reader, by means of a long string of unsolved +difficulties or puzzles--([Greek: a)po/riai]). He declares distinctly +and forcibly, that whoever attempts to lay out a positive theory, +without having before his mind a full list of the difficulties with +which he is to grapple, is like one who searches without knowing what +he is looking for; without being competent to decide whether what he +hits upon as a solution be really a solution or not.[42] Now that +enumeration of puzzles which Aristotle here postulates (and in part +undertakes, in reference to Philosophia Prima) is exactly what the +Megarics, and various other dialecticians (called by Plato and +Aristotle Sophists) contributed to furnish for the use of those who +theorised on Logic. + +[Footnote 39: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 523 A, 524. [Greek: ta\ me\n +e)n tai=s ai)sthê/sesin ou) parakalou=nta tê\n no/êsin ei)s +e)pi/skepsin, ô(s i(kanô=s u(po\ tê=s ai)sthê/seôs krino/mena--ta\ de\ +panta/pasi diakeleuo/mena e)kei/nên e)piske/psasthai, ô(s tê=s +ai)sthê/seôs ou)de\n u(gie\s poiou/sês . . . Ta\ me\n ou) +parakalou=nta, o(/sa mê\ e)kbai/nei ei)s e)nanti/an ai)/sthêsin a(/ma; +ta\ d' e)kbai/nonta, ô(s parakalou=nta ti/thêmi, e)peida\n ê( +ai)/sthêsis mêde\n ma=llon tou=to ê)\ to\ e)nanti/on dêloi=]. Compare +p. 524 E: the whole passage is very interesting.] + +[Footnote 40: The remarks of Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 189. +2nd ed.) upon these Megaric philosophers are more just and discerning +than those made by most of the historians of philosophy "Doch darf man +wohl annehmen, dass sie solche Trugschlüsse nicht zur Täuschung,** +sondern zur Belehrung für unvorsichtige, oder zur Warnung vor der +Seichtigkeit gewöhnlicher Vorstellungsweisen, gebrauchen wollten. So +viel ist gewiss, dass die Megariker sich viel mit den Formen des +Denken beschäftigten, vielleicht mehr zu Aufsuchung einzelner Regeln, +als zur Begründung eines wissenschaftlichen Zusammenhangs unter ihnen; +obwohl auch besondere Theile der Logik unter ihren Schriften erwähnt +werden." + +This is much more reasonable than the language of Prantl, who +denounces "the shamelessness of doctrinarism" (die Unverschämtheit des +Doctrinarismus) belonging to these Megarici "the petulance and vanity +which prompted them to seek celebrity by intentional offences against +sound common sense," &c. (Gesch. der Logik, pp. 39-40.--Sir Wm. +Hamilton has some good remarks on these sophisms, in his Lectures on +Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 452 seq.)] + +[Footnote 41: See the first chapter of his book v. on Fallacies, +System of Logic, vol. ii.] + +[Footnote 42: Aristotel. Metaphys. B. 1, p. 995, a. 33. + +[Greek: dio\ dei= ta\s duscherei/as tetheôrêke/nai pa/sas pro/teron, +tou/tôn de\ cha/rin kai\ dia\ to\ tou\s zêtou=ntas a)/neu tou= +diaporê=sai prô=ton o(moi/ous ei)=nai toi=s poi= dei= badi/zein +a)gnoou=si, kai\ pro\s tou/tois ou)d' ei) pote to\ zêtou/menon +eu(/rêken ê)\ mê\ gignô/skein; to\ ga\r te/los tou/tô| me\n ou) +dê=lon, tô=| de\ proêporêko/ti dê=lon]. + +Aristotle devotes the whole of this Book to an enumeration of [Greek: +a)po/riai].] + +[Side-note: If the process of theorising be admissible, it must +include negative as well as affirmative.] + +You may dislike philosophy: you may undervalue, or altogether +proscribe, the process of theorising. This is the standing-point usual +with the bulk of mankind, ancient as well as modern: who generally +dislike all accurate reasoning, or analysis and discrimination of +familiar abstract words, as mean and tiresome hair-splitting.[43] But +if you admit the business of theorising to be legitimate, useful, and +even honourable, you must reckon on free working of independent, +individual, minds as the operative force--and on the necessity of +dissentient, conflicting, manifestations of this common force, as +essential conditions to any successful result. Upon no other +conditions can you obtain any tolerable body of reasoned truth--or +even reasoned _quasi-truth_. + +[Footnote 43: See my account of the Platonic dialogue Hippias Major, +vol. ii. chap. xiii. Aristot. Metaphys. A. minor, p. 995, a. 9. +[Greek: tou\s de\ lupei= to\ a)kribe\s, ê)\ dia\ to\ mê\ du/nasthai +sunei/rein, ê)\ dia\ tê\n mikrologi/an; e)/chei ga/r ti to\ a)kribe\s +toiou=ton, ô(/ste katha/per e)pi\ tô=n sumbolai/ôn, kai\ e)pi\ tô=n +lo/gôn a)neleu/theron ei)=nai tisi dokei=]. Cicero (Paradoxa, c. 2) +talks of the "minutæ interrogatiunculæ" of the Stoics as tedious and +tiresome.] + +[Side-note: Logical position of the Megaric philosophers erroneously +described by historians of philosophy. Necessity of a complete +collection of difficulties.] + +Now the historians of philosophy seldom take this view of philosophy +as a whole--as a field to which the free antithesis of affirmative and +negative is indispensable. They consider true philosophy as +represented by Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, one or other of them: +while the contemporaries of these eminent men are discredited under +the name of Sophists, Eristics, or sham-philosophers, sowing tares +among the legitimate crop of wheat--or as devils whom the miraculous +virtue of Sokrates and Plato is employed in expelling from the +Athenian mind. Even the companions of Sokrates, and the Megarics among +them, whom we know only upon the imperfect testimony of opponents, +have fallen under this unmerited sentence:[44] as if they were +destructive agents breaking down an edifice of well-constituted +philosophy--no such edifice in fact having ever existed in Greece, +though there were several dissenting lecture rooms and conflicting +veins of speculation promoted by eminent individuals. + +[Footnote 44: The same charge is put by Cicero into the mouth of +Lucullus against the Academics: "Similiter vos (Academici) quum +perturbare, ut illi" (the Gracchi and others) "rempublicam, sic vos +philosophiam, benè jam constitutam velitis. . . . Tum exortus est, ut +in optimâ republicâ Tib. Gracchus, qui otium perturbaret, sic +Arcesilas, qui constitutam philosophiam everteret" (Acad. Prior, ii. 5, +14-15). + +Even in the liberal and comprehensive history of the Greek philosophy +by Zeller (vol. ii. p. 187, ed. 2nd), respecting Eukleides' and the +Megarians;--"Dagegen bot der _Streit gegen die geltenden Meinungen_ +dem Scharfsinn, der Rechthaberei, und dem wissenschaftlichen Ehrgeiz, +ein unerschöpfliches Feld dar, welches denn auch die Megarischen +Philosophen rüstig ausbeuteten." + +If by "die geltenden Meinungen" Zeller means the common sense of the +day that is, the opinions and beliefs current among the [Greek: +i)diô=tai], the working, enjoying, non-theorising public--it is very +true that the Megaric philosophers contended against them: but +Sokrates and Plato contended against them quite as much: we see this +in the Platonic Apology, Gorgias, Republic, Timæus, Parmenidês, &c. + +If, on the other hand, by "die geltenden Meinungen" Zeller means any +philosophical or logical theories generally or universally admitted by +thinking men as valid, the answer is that there were none such in the +fourth and third centuries B.C. Various eminent speculative +individuals were labouring to construct such theories, each in his own +way, and each with a certain congregation of partisans; but +established theory there was none. Nor can any theory (whether +accepted or not) be firm or trustworthy, unless it be exposed to the +continued thrusts of the negative weapon, searching out its vulnerable +points. We know of the Megarics only what they furnished towards that +negative testing; without which, however,--as we may learn from Plato +and Aristotle themselves,--the true value of the affirmative defences +can never be measured.] + +Whoever undertakes, _bonâ fide_, to frame a complete and defensible +logical theory, will desire to have before him a copious collection of +such difficulties, and will consider those who propound them as useful +auxiliaries.[45] If he finds no one to propound them, he will have to +imagine them for himself. "The philosophy of reasoning" (observes Mr. +John Stuart Mill) "must comprise the philosophy of bad as well as of +good reasoning."[46] The one cannot be complete without the other. To +enumerate the different varieties of apparent evidence which is not +real evidence (called Fallacies), and of apparent contradictions which +are not real contradictions--referred as far as may be to classes, +each illustrated by a suitable type--is among the duties of a +logician. He will find this duty much facilitated, if there happen to +exist around him an active habit of dialectic debate: ingenious men +who really study the modes of puzzling and confuting a well-armed +adversary, as well as of defending themselves against the like. Such a +habit did exist at Athens: and unless it had existed, the Aristotelian +theories on logic would probably never have been framed. Contemporary +and antecedent dialecticians, the Megarici among them, supplied the +stock of particular examples enumerated and criticised by Aristotle in +the Topica:[47] which treatise (especially the last book, De +Sophisticis Elenchis) is intended both to explain the theory, and to +give suggestions on the practice, of logical controversy. A man who +takes lessons in fencing must learn not only how to thrust and parry, +but also how to impose on his opponent by feints, and to meet the +feints employed against himself: a general who learns the art of war +must know how to take advantage of the enemy by effective cheating and +treachery (to use the language of Xenophon), and how to avoid being +cheated himself. The Aristotelian Topica, in like manner, teach the +arts both of dialectic attack and of dialectic defence.[48] + +[Footnote 45: Marbach (Gesch. der Philos. s. 91), though he treats the +Megarics as jesters (which I do not think they were), yet adds very +justly: "Nevertheless these puzzles (propounded by the Megarics) have +their serious and scientific side. We are forced to inquire, how it +happens that the contradictions shown up in them are not merely +possible but even necessary." + +Both Tiedemann and Winckelmann also remark that the debaters called +Eristics contributed greatly to the formation of the theory and +precepts of Logic, afterwards laid out by Aristotle. Winckelmann, +Prolegg. ad Platon. Euthydem. pp. xxiv.-xxxi. Even Stallbaum, though +full of harshness towards those Sophists whom he describes as +belonging to the school of Protagoras, treats the Megaric philosophers +with much greater respect. Prolegom. ad Platon. Euthydem. p. 9.] + +[Footnote 46: System of Logic, Book v. 1, 1.] + +[Footnote 47: Prantl (Gesch. der Logik, vol. i. pp. 43-50) ascribes to +the Megarics all or nearly all the sophisms which Aristotle notices in +the Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis. This is more than can be proved, +and more than I think probable. Several of them are taken from the +Platonic Euthydêmus.] + +[Footnote 48: See the remarkable passages in the discourses of +Sokrates (Memorab. iii. 1, 6; iv. 2, 15), and in that of Kambyses to +Cyrus, which repeats the same opinion--Cyropæd. i. 6, 27--respecting +the amount of deceit, treachery, the thievish and rapacious qualities +required for conducting war against an enemy--([Greek: ta\ pro\s tou\s +polemi/ous no/mima], i. 6, 34). + +Aristotle treats of Dialectic, as he does of Rhetoric, as an art +having its theory, and precepts founded upon that theory. I shall have +occasion to observe in a future chapter (xxi.), that logical Fallacies +are not generated or invented by persons called Sophists, but are +inherent liabilities to error in the human intellect; and that the +habit of debate affords the only means of bringing them into clear +daylight, and guarding against being deceived by them. Aristotle gives +precepts both how to thrust, and how to parry with the best effect: if +he had taught only how to parry, he would have left out one-half of +the art. + +One of the most learned and candid of the Aristotelian +commentators--M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire--observes as follows (Logique +d'Aristote, p. 435, Paris, 1838) respecting De Sophist. Elenchis:-- + +"Aristote va donc s'occuper de la marche qu'il faut donner aux +discussions sophistiques: et ici il serait difficile quelquefois de +décider, à la manière dont les choses sont présentées par lui, si ce +sont des conseils qu'il donne aux Sophistes, ou à ceux qui veulent +éviter leurs ruses. Tout ce qui précède, prouve, au reste, que c'est +en ce dernier sens qu'il faut entendre la pensée du philosophe. Ceci +est d'ailleurs la seconde portion du traîté." + +It appears to me that Aristotle intended to teach or to suggest both +the two things which are here placed in Antithesis--though I do not +agree with M. St. Hilaire's way of putting the alternative--as if +there were one class of persons, professional Sophists, who fenced +with poisoned weapons, while every one except them refrained from such +weapons. Aristotle intends to teach the art of Dialectic as a whole; +he neither intends nor wishes that any learners shall make a bad use +of his teaching; but if they do use it badly, the fault does not lie +with him. See the observations in the beginning of the Rhetorica, i. +p. 1355, a. 26, and the observations put by Plato into the mouth of +Gorgias (Gorg. p. 456 E). + +Even in the Analytica Priora (ii. 19, a. 34) (independent of the +Topica) Aristotle says:--[Greek: chrê\ d' o(/per phula/ttesthai +paragge/llomen a)pokrinome/nous, au)tou\s e)picheirou=ntas +peira=sthtai lantha/nein]. Investigations of the double or triple +senses of words (he says) are useful--[Greek: kai\ pro\s to\ mê\ +paralogisthê=nai, kai\ pro\s to\ paralogi/sasthai], Topica, i. 18, p. +108, a. 26. See also other passages of the Topica where artifices are +indicated for the purpose of concealing your own plan of proceeding +and inducing your opponent to make answer in the sense which you wish, +Topica, i. 2, p. 101, a. 25; vi. 10, p. 148, a. 37; viii. 1, p. 151, +b. 23; viii. 1, p. 153, a. 6; viii. 2, p. 154, a. 5; viii. 11, p. 161, +a. 24 seq. You must be provided with the means of meeting every sort +and variety of objection--[Greek: pro\s ga\r to\n pa/ntôs +e)nista/menon pa/ntôs a)ntitakte/on e)sti/n]. Topic. v. 4, p. 134, a. +4. + +I shall again have to touch on the Topica, in this point of view, as +founded upon and illustrating the Megaric logical puzzles (ch. viii. +of the present volume).] + +[Side-note: Sophisms propounded by Eubulides. 1. Mentiens. 2. The +Veiled Man. 3. Sorites. 4. Cornutus.] + +The Sophisms ascribed to Eubulidês, looked at from the point of view +of logical theory, deserve that attention which they seem to have +received. The logician lays down as a rule that no affirmative +proposition can be at the same time true and false. Now the first +sophism (called _Mentiens_) exhibits the case of a proposition which +is, or appears to be, at the same time true and false.[49] It is for +the logician to explain how this proposition can be brought under his +rule--or else to admit it as an exception. Again, the second sophism +in the list (the Veiled or Hidden Man) is so contrived as to involve +the respondent in a contradiction: he is made to say both that he +knows his father, and that he does not know his father. Both the one +answer and the other follow naturally from the questions and +circumstances supposed. The contradiction points to the loose and +equivocal way in which the word _to know_ is used in common speech. +Such equivocal meaning of words is not only one of the frequent +sources of error and fallacy in reasoning, but also one of the least +heeded by persons untrained in dialectics; who are apt to presume that +the same word bears always the same meaning. To guard against this +cause of error, and to determine (or impel others to determine) the +accurate meaning or various distinct meanings of each word, is among +the duties of the logician: and I will add that the verb _to know_ +stands high in the list of words requiring such determination--as the +Platonic Theætêtus[50] alone would be sufficient to teach us. +Farthermore, when we examine what is called the Soritês of Eubulides, +we perceive that it brings to view an inherent indeterminateness of +various terms: indeterminateness which cannot be avoided, but which +must be pointed out in order that it may not mislead. You cannot say +how many grains are _much_--or how many grains make _a heap_. When +this want of precision, pervading many words in the language, was +first brought to notice in a suitable special case, it would naturally +appear a striking novelty. Lastly, the sophism called [Greek: +Kerati/nês] or Cornutus, is one of great plausibility, which would +probably impose upon most persons, if the question were asked for the +first time without any forewarning. It serves to administer a lesson, +nowise unprofitable or superfluous, that before you answer a question, +you should fully weigh its import and its collateral bearings. + +[Footnote 49: Theophrastus wrote a treatise in three books on the +solution of the puzzle called [Greek: O( pseudo/menos] (see the list +of his lost works in Diogenes L. v. 49). We find also other treatises +entitled [Greek: Megariko\s a/] (which Diogenes cites, vi. +22),--[Greek: A)gônistiko\n tê=s peri\ tou\s e)ristikou\s lo/gous +theôri/as--Sophisma/tôn a/, b]--besides several more titles relating to +dialectics, and bearing upon the solution of syllogistic problems. +Chrysippus also, in the ensuing century, wrote a treatise in three +books, [Greek: Peri\ tê=s tou= pseudome/non lu/seôs] (Diog. vii. 107). +Such facts show the importance of these problems in their bearing upon +logical theory, as conceived by the ancient world. Epikurus also wrote +against the [Greek: Megarikoi/] (Diog. x. 27). + +The discussion of sophisms, or logical difficulties ([Greek: lu/seis +a)pori/ôn]), was a favourite occupation at the banquets of +philosophers at Athens, on or about 100 B.C. [Greek: A)nti/patros d' +o( philo/sophos, sumpo/sio/n pote suna/gôn, sune/taxe toi=s +e)rchome/nois ô(s peri\ sophisma/tôn e(rou=sin] (Athenæus, v. 186 C). +Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, p. 1096 C; De +Sanitate Præcepta, c. 20, p. 133 B.] + +[Footnote 50: Various portions of the Theætêtus illustrate this +Megaric sophism (pp. 165-188). The situation assumed in the question +of Eubulidês--having before your eyes a person veiled--might form a +suitable addition to the various contingencies specified in Theætêt. +pp. 192-193. + +The manner in which the Platonic Sokrates proves (Theæt. 165) that you +at the same time see, and do not see, an object before you, is quite +as sophistical as the way in which Eubulidês proves that you both +know, and do not know, your father.] + +[Side-note: Causes of error constant--the Megarics were sentinals +against them.] + +The causes of error and fallacy are inherent in the complication of +nature, the imperfection of language, the small range of facts which +we know, the indefinite varieties of comparison possible among those +facts, and the diverse or opposite predispositions, intellectual as +well as emotional, of individual minds. They are not fabricated by +those who first draw attention to them.[51] The Megarics, far from +being themselves deceivers, served as sentinels against deceit. They +planted conspicuous beacons upon some of the sunken rocks whereon +unwary reasoners were likely to be wrecked. When the general type of a +fallacy is illustrated by a particular case in which the conclusion is +manifestly untrue, the like fallacy is rendered less operative for the +future. + +[Footnote 51: Cicero, in his Academ. Prior, ii. 92-94, has very just +remarks on the obscurities and difficulties in the reasoning process, +which the Megarics and others brought to view--and were blamed for so +doing, as unfair and captious reasoners--as if they had themselves +created the difficulties--"(Dialectica) primo progressu festivé tradit +elementa loquendi et ambiguorum intelligentiam concludendique +rationem; tum paucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sané et +periculosum locum, quod tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi +genus. Quid ergo? _istius vitii num nostra culpa est_? Rerum natura +nullam nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ullâ in re statuere possimus +quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nullâ +omnino in re minutatim interroganti--dives, pauper--clarus, obscurus, +sit--multa, pauca, magna, parva, longa, brevia, lata, angusta, quanto +aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus, non habemus. At vitiosi +sunt soritæ. Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. . . +Sic me (inquit) sustineo, neque diutius captiosé interroganti +respondes. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbis: si non +habes, ne tu quidem percipis." + +The principle of the Sorites ([Greek: ê( sôritikê\ a)pori/a]--Sextus +adv. Gramm. s. 68), though differently applied, is involved in the +argument of Zeno the Eleate, addressed to Protagoras--see Simplikius +ad Aristot. Physic. 250, p. 423, b. 42. Sch. Brand. Compare chap. ii. +of this volume.] + +[Side-note: Controversy of the Megarics with Aristotle about Power. +Arguments of Aristotle.] + +Of the positive doctrines of the Megarics we know little: but there is +one upon which Aristotle enters into controversy with them, and upon +which (as far as can be made out) I think they were in the right. In +the question about Power, they held that the power to do a thing did +not exist, except when the thing was actually done: that an architect, +for example, had no power to build a house, except when he actually +did build one. Aristotle controverts this opinion at some length; +contending that there exists a sort of power or cause which is in +itself irregular and indeterminate, sometimes turning to the +affirmative, sometimes to the negative, to do or not to do;[52] that +the architect _has_ the _power to build_ constantly, though he exerts +it only on occasion: and that many absurdities would follow if we did +not admit, That a given power or energy--and the exercise of that +power--are things distinct and separable.[53] + +[Footnote 52: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 19, a. 6-20. [Greek: o(/lôs +e)/stin e)n toi=s mê\ a)ei\ e)nergou=si to\ dunato\n ei)=nai kai\ mê\ +o(moi/ôs; e)n oi(=s a)mphô e)nde/chetai, kai\ to\ ei)=nai kai\ to\ mê\ +ei)=nai, ô(/ste kai\ to\ gene/sthai kai\ to\ mê\ gene/sthai.]] + +[Footnote 53: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 3, p. 1046, b. 29. [Greek: +Ei)si\ de/ tines, oi)/ phasin, oi(=on oi( Megarikoi/, o(/tan +e)nergê=|, mo/non du/nasthai, o(/tan de\ mê\ e)nergê=|, mê\ +du/nasthai--oi(=on to\n mê\ oi)kodomou=nta ou) du/nasthai oi)kodomei=n, +a)lla\ to\n oi)kodomou=nta o(/tan oi)kodomê=|; o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ e)pi\ +tô=n a)/llôn]. + +Deycks (De Megaricorum Doctrinâ, pp. 70-71) considers this opinion of +the Megarics to be derived from their general Eleatic theory of the +Ens Unum et Immotum. But I see no logical connection between the two.] + +[Side-note: These arguments not valid against the Megarici.] + +Now these arguments of Aristotle are by no means valid against the +Megarics, whose doctrine, though apparently paradoxical, will appear +when explained to be no paradox at all, but perfectly true. When we +say that the architect has power to build, we do not mean that he has +power to do so under all supposable circumstances, but only under +certain conditions: we wish to distinguish him from non-professional +men, who under those same conditions have no power to build. The +architect must be awake and sober: he must have the will or +disposition to build:[54] he must be provided with tools and +materials, and be secure against destroying enemies. These and other +conditions being generally understood, it is unnecessary to enunciate +them in common speech. But when we engage in dialectic analysis, the +accurate discussion ([Greek: a)kribologi/a]) indispensable to +philosophy requires us to bring under distinct notice, that which the +elliptical character of common speech implies without enunciating. +Unless these favourable conditions be supposed, the architect is no +more able to build than an ordinary non-professional man. Now the +Megarics did not deny the distinctive character of the architect, as +compared with the non-architect: but they defined more accurately in +what it consisted, by restoring the omitted conditions. They went a +step farther: they pointed out that whenever the architect finds +himself in concert with these accompanying conditions (his own +volition being one of the conditions) he goes to work--and the +building is produced. As the house is not built, unless he wills to +build, and has tools and materials, &c.--so conversely, whenever he +has the will to build and has tools and materials, &c., the house is +actually built. The effect is not produced, except when the full +assemblage of antecedent conditions come together: but as soon as they +do come together, the effect is assuredly produced. The +accomplishments of the architect, though an essential item, are yet +only one item among several, of the conditions necessary to building +the house. He has no power to build, except when those other +conditions are assumed along with him: in other words, he has no such +power except when he actually does build. + +[Footnote 54: About this condition implied in the predicate [Greek: +dunato/s], see Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 366 D.] + +[Side-note: His arguments cited and criticised.] + +Aristotle urges against the Megarics various arguments, as +follows:--1. Their doctrine implies that the architect is not an +architect, and does not possess his professional skill,[55] except at +the moment when he is actually building.--But the Megarics would have +denied that their doctrine did imply this. The architect possesses his +art at all times: but his art does not constitute a power of building +except under certain accompanying conditions. + +[Footnote 55: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 3, 1047, a. 3. [Greek: +o(/tan pau/sêtai (oi)kodomô=n) ou)ch e(/xei tê\n te/chnên.]] + +2. The Megaric doctrine is the same as that of Protagoras, implying +that there exists no perceivable Object, and no Subject capable of +perceiving, except at the moment when perception actually takes +place.[56] On this we may observe, that the Megarics coincide with +Protagoras thus far, that they bring into open daylight the relative +and conditional, which the received phraseology tends to hide. But +neither they nor he affirm what is here put upon them. When we speak +of a perceivable Object, we mean that which may and will be perceived, +_if_ there be a proper Subject to perceive it: when we affirm a +Subject capable of perception, we mean, one which will perceive, under +those circumstances which we call the presence of an Object suitably +placed. The Subject and Object are correlates: but it is convenient to +have a language in which one of them alone is introduced +unconditionally, while the conditional sign is applied to the +correlate: though the matter affirmed involves a condition common to +both. + +[Footnote 56: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 3, 1047, a. 8-13.] + +3. According to the Megaric doctrine (Aristotle argues) every man when +not actually seeing, is blind; every man when not actually speaking, +is dumb.--Here the Megarics would have said that this is a +misinterpretation of the terms dumb and blind; which denote a person +who cannot speak or see, even though he wishes it. One who is now +silent, though not dumb, may speak if he wills it: but his own +volition is an essential condition.[57] + +[Footnote 57: The question between Aristotle and the Megarics has not +passed out of debate with modern philosophers. + +Dr. Thomas Brown observes, in his inquiry into Cause and Effect--"From +the mere silence of any one, we cannot infer that he is dumb in +consequence of organic imperfection. He may be silent only because he +has no desire of speaking, not because speech would not have followed +his desire: and it is not with the mere _existence_ of any one, but +_with his desire of speaking_, that we suppose utterance to be +connected. A man who has _no desire of speaking, has in truth_, and in +strictness of language, _no power of speaking, when in that state of +mind_: since he has not a circumstance which, as immediately prior, is +essential to speech. But since he has that power, as soon as the new +circumstance of desire arises--and as the presence or absence of the +desire cannot be perceived but in its effects--_there is no +inconvenience in the common language_, which ascribes the power, _as +if it were possessed at all times, and in all circumstances of mind_, +though unquestionably, nothing more is meant than that the desire +existing will be followed by utterance." (Brown, Essay on the Relation +of Cause and Effect, p. 200.) + +This is the real sense of what Aristotle calls [Greek: to\ de\ +(le/getai) dunato/n, oi(=on dunato\n ei)=nai badi/zein o(/ti badiseien +a)\n], _i.e._ he will walk _if_ he desires to do so (De Interpret. p. +23, a. 9-15).] + +4. According to the Megaric doctrine (says Aristotle) when you are now +lying down, you have no power to rise: when you are standing up, you +have no power to lie down: so that the present condition of affairs +must continue for ever unchanged: nothing can come into existence +which is not now in being.--Here again, the Megarics would have denied +his inference. The man who is now standing up, has power to lie down, +_if he wills_ to do so--or he may be thrown down by a superior force: +that is, he will lie down, _if_ some new fact of a certain character +shall supervene. The Megarics do not deny that he has power, _if_--so +and so: they deny that he has power, without the _if_--that is, +without the farther accompaniments essential to energy. + +[Side-note: Potential as distinguished from the Actual--What it is.] + +On the whole, it seems to me that Aristotle's refutation of the +Megarics is unsuccessful. A given assemblage of conditions is +requisite for the production of any act: while there are other +circumstances, which, if present at the same time, would defeat its +production. We often find it convenient to describe a state of things +in which some of the antecedent conditions are present without the +rest: in which therefore the act is not produced, yet would be +produced, if the remaining circumstances were present, and if the +opposing circumstances were absent.[58] The state of things thus +described is the _potential_ as distinguished from the _actual_: +power, distinguished from act or energy: it represents an incomplete +assemblage of the antecedent positive conditions--or perhaps a +complete assemblage, but counteracted by some opposing circumstances. +As soon as the assemblage becomes complete, and the opposing +circumstances removed, the potential passes into the actual. The +architect, when he is not building, possesses, not indeed the full or +plenary power to build, but an important fraction of that power, which +will become plenary when the other fractions supervene, but will then +at the same time become operative, so as to produce the actual +building.[59] + +[Footnote 58: Hobbes, in his Computation or Logic (chaps. ix. and x. +Of Cause and Effect. Of Power and Act) expounds this subject with his +usual perspicuity. + +"A Cause simply, or an Entire Cause, is the aggregate of all the +accidents, both of the agents, how many soever they be, and of the +patient, put together; which, when they are all supposed to be +present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at +the same instant: and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot be +understood but that the effect is not produced" (ix. 3). + +"Correspondent to Cause and Effect are Power and Act: nay, those and +these are the same things, though for divers considerations they have +divers names. For whensoever any agent has all those accidents which +are necessarily requisite for the production of some effect in the +patient, then we say that agent has power to produce that effect if it +be applied to a patient. In like manner, whensoever any patient has +all those accidents which it is requisite it should have for the +production of some effect in it, we say it is in the power of that +patient to produce that effect if it be applied to a fitting agent. +Power, active and passive, are parts only of plenary and entire power: +nor, except they be joined, can any effect proceed from them. And +therefore these powers are but conditional: namely, the agent has +power if it be applied to a patient, and the patient has power if it +be applied to an agent. _Otherwise neither of them have power, nor can +the accidents which are in them severally be properly called powers_: +nor any action be said to be possible for the power of the agent alone +or the patient alone."] + +[Footnote 59: Aristotle does in fact grant all that is here said, in +the same book and in the page next subsequent to that which contains +his arguments against the Megaric doctrine, Metaphys. [Greek: Th]. 5, +1048, a. 1-24. + +In this chapter Aristotle distinguishes powers belonging to things, +from powers belonging to persons--powers irrational from powers +rational--powers in which the agent acts without any will or choice, +from those in which the will or choice of the agent is one item of the +aggregate of conditions. He here expressly recognises that the power +of the agent, separately considered, is only _conditional_; that is, +conditional on the presence and suitable state of the patient, as well +as upon the absence of counteracting circumstances. But he contends +that such absence of counteracting circumstances is plainly implied, +and need not be expressly mentioned in the definition. + +[Greek: e)pei\ de\ to\ dunato\n ti\ dunato\n kai\ pote\ kai\ pô=s kai\ +o(/sa a)/lla a)na/gkê prosei=nai e)n tô=| diorismô=|-- + +to\ dunato\n kata\ lo/gon a(/pan a)na/gkê, o(/tan o)re/gêtai, ou)= t' +e)/chei tê\n du/namin kai\ ô(s e)/chei, tou=to poiei=n; e)/chei de\ +paro/ntos tou= pathêtikou= kai\ ô(di\ e)/chontos poiei=n; _ei) de\ +mê/, poiei=n ou) dunê/setai_. to\ ga\r mêtheno\s tô=n e(/xô kôlu/ontos +prosdiori/zesthai, ou)the\n e)/ti dei=; tê\n ga\r du/namin e)/chei +ô(/s e)/sti du/namis tou= poiei=n, _e)/sti d' ou) pa/ntôs_, a)ll' +e)cho/ntôn pô=s, e)n oi(=s a)phoristhê/setai kai\ ta\ e(/xô kôlu/onta; +a)phairei=tai ga\r tau=ta tô=n e)n tô=| diorismô=| proso/ntôn e)/nia]. +The commentary of Alexander Aphr. upon this chapter is well worth +consulting (pp. 546-548 of the edition of his commentary by Bonitz, +1847). Moreover Aristotle affirms in this chapter, that when [Greek: +to\ poiêtiko\n] and [Greek: to\ pathêtiko\n] come together under +suitable circumstances, the power will certainly pass into act. + +Here then, it seems to me, Aristotle concedes the doctrine which the +Megarics affirmed; or, if there be any difference between them, it is +rather verbal than real. In fact, Aristotle's reasoning in the third +chapter (wherein he impugns the doctrine of the Megarics), and the +definition of [Greek: dunato\n] which he gives in that chapter (1047, +a. 25), are hardly to be reconciled with his reasoning in the fifth +chapter. Bonitz (Notes on the Metaphys. pp. 393-395) complains of the +_mira levitas_ of Aristotle in his reasoning against the Megarics, and +of his omitting to distinguish between _Vermögen_ and _Möglichkeit_. I +will not use so uncourteous a phrase; but I think his refutation of +the Megarics is both unsatisfactory and contradicted by himself. I +agree with the following remark of Bonitz:--"Nec mirum, quod Megarici, +aliis illi quidem in rebus arguti, in hâc autem satis acuti, +existentiam [Greek: tô=| duna/mei o)/nti] tribuere recusarint," &c.] + +[Side-note: Diodôrus Kronus--his doctrine about [Greek: to\ dunato/n].] + +The doctrine which I have just been canvassing is expressly cited by +Aristotle as a Megaric doctrine, and was therefore probably held by +his contemporary Eubulidês. From the pains which Aristotle takes (in +the 'De Interpretatione' and elsewhere) to explain and vindicate his +own doctrine about the Potential and the Actual, we may see that it +was a theme much debated among the dialecticians of the day. And we +read of another Megaric, Diodorus[60] Kronus, perhaps contemporary +(yet probably a little later than Aristotle), as advancing a position +substantially the same as that of Eubulidês. That alone is possible +(Diodorus affirmed) which either is happening now, or will happen at +some future time. As in speaking about facts of an unrecorded past, we +know well that a given fact either occurred or did not occur, yet +without knowing which of the two is true--and therefore we affirm only +that the fact _may_ have occurred: so also about the future, either +the assertion that a given fact will at some time occur, is positively +true, or the assertion that it will never occur, is positively true: +the assertion that it may or may not occur some time or other, +represents only our ignorance, which of the two is true. That which +will never at any time occur, is impossible. + +[Footnote 60: The dialectic ingenuity of Diodorus is powerfully +attested by the verse of Ariston, applied to describe Arkesilaus +(Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. p. 234): + +[Greek: Pro/sthe Pla/tôn, o)/pithen Pu/r)r(ôn, me/ssos Dio/dôros.]] + +[Side-note: Sophism of Diodorus--[Greek: O( Kurieu/ôn].] + +The argument here recited must have been older than Diodorus, since +Aristotle states and controverts it: but it seems to have been handled +by him in a peculiar dialectic arrangement, which obtained the title +of [Greek: O( Kurieu/ôn].[61] The Stoics (especially Chrysippus), in +times somewhat later, impugned the opinion of Diodorus, though +seemingly upon grounds not quite the same as Aristotle. This problem +was one upon which speculative minds occupied themselves for several +centuries. Aristotle and Chrysippus maintained that affirmations +respecting the past were _necessary_ (one necessarily true and the +other necessarily false)--affirmations respecting the future, +_contingent_ (one must be true and the other false, but either might +be true). Diodorus held that both varieties of affirmations were +equally necessary--Kleanthes the Stoic thought that both were equally +contingent.[62] + +[Footnote 61: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 18, a. pp. 27-38. Alexander ad +Aristot. Analyt. Prior. 34, p. 163, b. 34, Schol. Brandis. See also +Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 464.] + +[Footnote 62: Arrian ad Epiktet. ii. p. 19. Upton, in his notes on +this passage of Arrian (p. 151) has embodied a very valuable and +elaborate commentary by Mr. James Harris (the great English +Aristotelian scholar of the 18th century), explaining the nature of +this controversy, and the argument called [Greek: o( Kurieu/ôn]. + +Compare Cicero, De Fato, c. 7-9. Epistol. Fam. ix. 4.] + +It was thus that the Megaric dialecticians, with that fertility of +mind which belonged to the Platonic and Aristotelian century, stirred +up many real problems and difficulties connected with logical +evidence, and supplied matters for discussion which not only occupied +the speculative minds of the next four or five centuries, but have +continued in debate down to the present day. + +[Side-note: Question between Aristotle and Diodôrus depends upon +whether universal regularity of sequence be admitted or denied.] + +The question about the Possible and Impossible, raised between +Aristotle and Diodorus, depends upon the larger question, Whether +there are universal laws of Nature or not? whether the sequences are, +universally and throughout, composed of assemblages of conditions +regularly antecedent, and assemblages of events regularly consequent; +though from the number and complication of causes, partly co-operating +and partly conflicting with each other, we with our limited +intelligence are often unable to predict the course of events in each +particular situation. Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all maintained +that regular sequence of antecedent and consequent was not universal, +but partial only:[63] that there were some agencies essentially +regular, in which observation of the past afforded ground for +predicting the future--other agencies (or the same agencies on +different occasions) essentially irregular, in which the observation +of the past afforded no such ground. Aristotle admitted a graduation +of causes from perfect regularity to perfect irregularity:--1. The +Celestial Spheres, with their included bodies or divine persons, which +revolved and exercised a great and preponderant influence throughout +the Kosmos, with perfect uniformity; having no power of contraries, +_i.e._, having no power of doing anything else but what they actually +did (having [Greek: e)nergei/a] without [Greek: du/namis]). 2. The +four Elements, in which the natural agencies were to a great degree +necessary and uniform, but also in a certain degree otherwise--either +always or for the most part uniform ([Greek: to\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ +polu/])--tending by inherent appetency towards uniformity, but not +always attaining it. 3. Besides these there were two other varieties +of Causes accidental, or perfectly irregular--Chance and Spontaneity: +powers of contraries, or with equal chance of contrary +manifestations--essentially capricious, undeterminable, unpredictable.[64] +This _Chance_ of Aristotle--with one of two contraries sure to turn up, +though you could never tell beforehand which of the two--was a +conception analogous to what logicians sometimes call an Indefinite +Proposition, or to what some grammarians have reckoned as a special +variety of genders called the _doubtful gender_. There were thus +positive causes of regularity, and positive causes of irregularity, +the co-operation or conflict of which gave the total manifestations of +the actual universe. The principle of irregularity, or the +Indeterminate, is sometimes described under the name of Matter,[65] as +distinguishable from, yet co-operating with, the three determinate +Causes--Formal, Efficient, Final. The Potential--the Indeterminate--the +_May or May not be_--is characterised by Aristotle as one of the inherent +principles operative in the Kosmos. + +[Footnote 63: Xenophon, Memor. i. 1; Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A. [Greek: +ê( planôme/nê ai)ti/a], &c.] + +[Footnote 64: [Greek: Ê( tu/chê--to\ o(po/ter' e)/tuche--to\ +au)to/maton] are in the conception of Aristotle independent [Greek: +A)rchai/], attached to and blending with [Greek: a)na/gkê] and [Greek: +to\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/]. See Physic. ii. 196, b. 11; Metaphys. E. +1026-1027. + +Sometimes [Greek: to\ o(po/ter' e)/tuche] is spoken of as an [Greek: +A)rchê/], but not as an [Greek: ai)/tion], or belonging to [Greek: +u(/lê] as the [Greek: A)rchê/]. 1027, b. 11. [Greek: dê=lon a)/ra +o(/ti me/chri tino\s badi/zei a)rchê=s, au)/tê d' ou)/keti ei)s +a)/llo; e)/stai ou)=n ê( tou= o(po/ter' e)/tuchen au)/tê, kai\ +ai)/tioi tê=s gene/seôs au)tê=s ou)the/n]. + +See, respecting the different notions of Cause held by ancient +philosophers, my remarks on the Platonic Phædon infrà, vol. iii.** ch. +xxv.] + +[Footnote 65: Aristot. Metaph. E. 1027, a. 13; A. 1071, a. 10. + +[Greek: ô(/ste ê( u(/lê e)/stai ai)ti/a, ê( e)ndechome/n ê para\ to\ +ô(s e)pi\ to polu\ a)/llôs tou= sumbebêko/tos]. + +Matter is represented as the principle of irregularity, of [Greek: to\ +o(po/ter' e)/tuche]--as the [Greek: du/namis tô=n e)nanti/ôn]. + +In the explanation given by Alexander of Aphrodisias of the +Peripatetic doctrine respecting chance--free-will, the principle of +irregularity--[Greek: tu/chê] is no longer assigned to the material +cause, but is treated as an [Greek: ai)ti/a kata\ sumbebêko/s], +distinguished from [Greek: ai)ti/a proêgou/mena] or [Greek: kath' +au(ta/]. The exposition given of the doctrine by Alexander is valuable +and interesting. See his treatise De Fato, addressed to the Emperor +Severus, in the edition of Orelli, Zurich. 1824 (a very useful volume, +containing treatises of Ammonius, Plotinus, Bardesanes, &c., on the +same subject); also several sections of his Quæstiones Naturales et +Morales, ed. Spengel, Munich, 1842, pp. 22-61-65-123, &c. He gives, +however, a different explanation of [Greek: to\ dunato\n] and [Greek: +to\ a)du/naton] in pp. 62-63, which would not be at variance with the +doctrine of Diodorus. We may remark that Alexander puts the antithesis +of the two doctrines differently from Aristotle,--in this way. 1. +Either all events happen [Greek: kath' ei(marme/nên]. 2. Or all events +do not happen [Greek: kath' ei(marme/nên], but some events are [Greek: +e)ph' ê(mi=n]. See De Fato, p. 14 seq. This way of putting the +question is directed more against the Stoics, who were the great +advocates of [Greek: ei(marme/nê], than against the Megaric Diodorus. +The treatises of Chrysippus and the other Stoics alter both the +wording and the putting of the thesis. We know that Chrysippus +impugned the doctrine of Diodorus, but I do not see how. + +The Stoic antithesis of [Greek: ta kath' ei(marme/nên--ta\ e)ph' +ê(mi=n] is different from the antithesis conceived by Aristotle and +does not touch the question about the universality of regular +sequence. [Greek: Ta\ e)ph' ê(mi=n] describes those sequences in which +human volition forms one among the appreciable conditions determining +or modifying the result; [Greek: ta\ kath' ei(marme/nên] includes all +the other sequences wherein human volition has no appreciable +influence. But the sequence [Greek: tô=n e)ph' ê(mi=n] is just as +regular as the sequence [Greek: tô=n kath' ei(marme/nên]: both the one +and the other are often imperfectly predictable, because our knowledge +of facts and power of comparison is so imperfect. + +Theophrastus discussed [Greek: to\ kath' ei(marme/nên], and explained +it to mean the same as [Greek: to\ kata\ phu/sin. phanerô/tata de\ +Theo/phrastos dei/knusi tau)to\n o(\n to\ kath' ei(marme/nên tô=| +kata\ phu/sin] (Alexander Aphrodisias ad Aristot. De Animâ, ii.).] + +[Side-note: Conclusion of Diodôrus--defended by Hobbes--Explanation +given by Hobbes.] + +In what manner Diodorus stated and defended his opinion upon this +point, we have no information. We know only that he placed +affirmations respecting the future on the same footing as affirmations +respecting the past: maintaining that our potential affirmation--_May +or May not be_--respecting some future event, meant no more than it +means respecting some past event, viz.: no inherent indeterminateness +in the future sequence, but our ignorance of the determining +conditions, and our inability to calculate their combined working.[66] +In regard to scientific method generally, this problem is of the +highest importance: for it is only so far as uniformity of sequence +prevails, that facts become fit matter for scientific study.[67] +Consistently with the doctrine of all-pervading uniformity of +sequence, the definition of Hobbes gives the only complete account of +the Impossible and Possible: _i.e._ an account such as would appear to +an omniscient calculator, where _May or May not_ merge in _Will or +Will not_. According as each person falls short of or approaches this +ideal standard--according to his knowledge and mental resource, +inductive and deductive--will be his appreciation of what may be or +may not be--as of what may have been or may not have been during the +past. But such appreciation, being relative to each individual mind, +is liable to vary indefinitely, and does not admit of being embodied +in one general definition. + +[Footnote 66: The same doctrine as that of the Megaric Diodorus is +declared by Hobbes in clear and explicit language (First Grounds of +Philosophy, ii. 10, 4-5):--"That is an impossible act, for the +production of which there is no power plenary. For seeing plenary +power is that in which all things concur which are requisite for the +production of an act,** if the power shall never be plenary, there will +always be wanting some of those things, without which the act cannot +be produced. Wherefore that act shall never be produced: that is, that +act is _impossible_. And every act, which is not impossible, is +_possible_. Every act therefore which is possible, shall at some time +or other be produced. For if it shall never be produced, then those +things shall never concur which are requisite for the production of +it; wherefore the act is _impossible_, by the definition; which is +contrary to what was supposed. + +"A _necessary act_ is that, the production of which it is impossible +to hinder: and therefore every act that shall be produced, shall +necessarily be produced; for that it shall not be produced is +impossible, because, as has already been demonstrated, every possible +act shall at some time be produced. Nay, this proposition--_What shall +be shall be_--is as necessary a proposition as this--_A man is a man_. + +"But here, perhaps, some man will ask whether those future things +which are commonly called _contingents_, are necessary. I say, then, +that generally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are +called _contingents_, in respect of other events on which they do not +depend--as the rain which shall be to-morrow shall be necessary, that +is, from necessary causes; but we think and say, it happens by chance, +because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though they exist +now. For men commonly call that _casual_ or _contingent_, whereof they +do not perceive the necessary cause: _and in the same manner they use +to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a thing be done or +not, they say, It is possible it never was done._ + +"Wherefore all propositions concerning future things, contingent or +not contingent, as this--It will rain to-morrow, or To-morrow the sun +will rise--are either necessarily true or necessarily false: but we +call them contingent, because we do not yet know whether they be true +or false; whereas their verity depends not upon our knowledge, but +upon the foregoing of their causes. But there are some, who, though +they will confess this whole proposition--_ To-morrow it will either +rain or not rain_--to be true, yet they will not acknowledge the parts +of it, as, _To-morrow it will rain_, or _To-morrow it will not rain_, +to be either of them true by itself; because (they say) neither this +nor that is true _determinately_. But what is this _true +determinately_, but true _upon our knowledge_ or _evidently true_? And +therefore they say no more but that it is not yet known whether it be +true or not; but they say it more obscurely, and darken the evidence +of the truth with the same words by which they endeavour to hide their +own ignorance."] + +[Footnote 67: The reader will find this problem admirably handled in +Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Book iii. ch. 21, and Book vi. +chs. 2 and 8; also in the volume of Professor Bain on the Emotions and +the Will, Chapter on Belief.] + +Besides the above doctrine respecting Possible and Impossible, there +is also ascribed to Diodorus a doctrine respecting Hypothetical +Propositions, which, as far as I comprehend it, appears to have been a +correct one.[68] He is also said to have reasoned against the reality +of motion, renewing the arguments of Zeno the Eleate. + +[Footnote 68: Sextus Emp. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. ii. pp. 110-115. [Greek: +a)lêthe\s sunêmme/non]. Adv. Mathemat. viii. 112. Philo maintained +that an hypothetical proposition was true, if both the antecedent and +consequent were true--"If it be day, I am conversing". Diodorus denied +that this proposition, as an Hypothetical proposition, was true: since +the consequent might be false, though the antecedent were true. An +Hypothetical proposition was true only when, assuming the antecedent +to be true, the consequent must be true also.] + +[Side-note: Reasonings of Diodôrus--respecting Hypothetical +Propositions--respecting Motion. His difficulties about the _Now_ of +time.] + +But if he reproduced the arguments of Zeno, he also employed another, +peculiar to himself. He admitted the reality of _past_ motion: but he +denied the reality of _present_ motion. You may affirm truly (he said) +that a thing _has been moved_: but you cannot truly affirm that any +thing _is being moved_. Since it was _here_ before, and is _there_ +now, you may be sure that it has been moved: but actual present motion +you cannot perceive or prove. Affirmation in the perfect tense may be +true, when affirmation in the present tense neither is nor ever was +true: thus it is true to say--Helen _had_ three husbands (Menelaus, +Paris, Deiphobus): but it was never true to say--Helen _has_ three +husbands, since they became her husbands in succession.[69] Diodorus +supported this paradox by some ingenious arguments, and the opinion +which he denied seems to have presented itself to him as involving the +position of indivisible minima--atoms of body, points of space, +instants of time. He admitted such minima of atoms, but not of space +or time: and without such admission he could not make intelligible to +himself the fact of present or actual motion. He could find no present +_Now_ or Minimum of Time; without which neither could any present +motion be found. Plato in the Parmenidês[70] professes to have found +this inexplicable moment of transition, but he describes it in terms +not likely to satisfy a dialectical mind: and Aristotle denying that +the Now is any portion or constituent part of time, considers it only +as a boundary of the past and future.[71] + +[Footnote 69: Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. x. pp. 85-101.] + +[Footnote 70: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 156 D-E. [Greek: Po/t' ou)=n, +metaba/llei? ou)/te ga\r e(sto\s a)\n ou)/te kenou/menon meta/balloi, +ou)/te e)n chro/nô| o)/n]. (Here Plato adverts to the difficulties +attending the supposition of actual [Greek: metabolê/], as Diodorus to +those of actual [Greek: ki/nêsis]. Next we have Plato's hypothesis for +getting over the difficulties.) [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n e)sti/ to\ +a)/topon tou=to, e)n ô)=| to/t' a)\n ei)/ê o(/te metaba/llei? To\ +poi=on dê/? _To\ e)xai/phnês; ê( e)xai/phnês au)/tê phu/sis a)/topos_ +tis e)gka/thêtai metaxu\ tê=s kinê/seôs te kai\ sta/seôs, e)n chro/nô| +ou)deni\ ou)=sa, kai\ ei)s tau/tên dê\ kai\ e)k tau/tês to/ te +kinou/menon metaba/llei e)pi\ to\ e)sta/nai kai\ to\ e)sto\s e)pi\ to\ +kinei=sthai]. + +Diodorus could not make out this [Greek: phu/sis a)/topos] which Plato +calls [Greek: to\ e)xai/phnês].] + +[Footnote 71: To illustrate this apparent paradox of Diodorus, +affirming past motion, but denying present motion, we may compare what +is said by Aristotle about the Now or Point of Present Time--that it +is not a part, but a boundary between Past and Future. + +Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 218, a. 4-10. [Greek: tou= de\ chro/non ta\ +me\n ge/gone, ta\ de\ me/llei, e)sti d' ou)de\n, o)/ntos meristou=; +to\ de\ nu=n ou) me/ros--to\ de\ nu=n pe/ras e)/sti] (a. 24)--p. 222, +a. 10-20-223, a. 20. [Greek: o( de\ chro/nos kai\ ê( ki/nêsis a(/ma +kata/ te du/namin kai\ kat' e)nergei/an]. + +Which doctrine is thus rendered by Harris in his Hermes, ch. vii. pp. +101-103-105:--"Both Points and Nows being taken as Bounds, and not as +Parts, it will follow that in the same manner as the same point may be +the end of one line and the beginning of another--so the same Now may +be the End of one time, and the beginning of another. . . I say of +these two times, that with respect to the _Now_, or Instant which they +include, the first of them is necessarily Past time, as being previous +to it: the other is necessarily Future, as being subsequent. . . From +the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be +called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the +first place, there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as +Time Present. For if all Time be transient, as well as continuous, it +cannot like a line be present altogether, but part will necessarily be +gone and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity +were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, +and be Time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus +present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such continuity is +essential?"--Compare Sir William Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy, +p. 581.] + +[Side-note: Motion is always present, past, and future.] + +This opinion of Aristotle is in the main consonant with that of +Diodorus; who, when he denied the reality of present motion, meant +probably only to deny the reality of _present motion apart from past +and future motion_. Herein also we find him agreeing with Hobbes, who +denies the same in clearer language.[72] Sextus Empiricus declares +Diodorus to have been inconsistent in admitting past motion while he +denied present motion.[73] But this seems not more inconsistent than +the doctrine of Aristotle respecting the _Now_ of time. I know, when I +compare a child or a young tree with what they respectively were a +year ago, that they have grown: but whether they actually are growing, +at every moment of the intervening time, is not ascertainable by +sense, and is a matter of probable inference only.[74] Diodorus could +not understand present motion, except in conjunction with past and +future motion, as being the common limit of the two: but he could +understand past motion, without reference to present or future. He +could not state to himself a satisfactory theory respecting the +beginning of motion: as we may see by his reasonings distinguishing +the motion of a body all at once in its integrity, from the motion of +a body considered as proceeding from the separate motion of its +constituent atoms--the moving atoms preponderating over the atoms at +rest, and determining them to motion,[75] until gradually the whole +body came to move. The same argument re-appears in another example, +when he argues--The wall does not fall while its component stones hold +together, for then it is still standing: nor yet when they have come +apart, for then it _has_ fallen.[76] + +[Footnote 72: Hobbes, First Grounds of Philosophy, ii. 8, 11. "That is +said to be at rest which, during any time, is in one place; and that +to be moved, or to have been moved, which whether it be now at rest or +moved, was formerly in another place from that which it is now in. +From which definition it may be inferred, first, that whatsoever is +moved _has been_ moved: for if it still be in the same place in which +it was formerly, it is at rest: but if it be in another place, it _has +been_ moved, by the definition of moved. Secondly, that what _is_ +moved, _will yet_ be moved: for that which is moved, leaveth the place +where it is, and consequently will be moved still. Thirdly, that +whatsoever is moved, is not in one place during any time, how little +soever that may be: for by the definition of rest, that which is in +one place during any time, is at rest. . . . From what is above +demonstrated--namely, that whatsoever _is_ moved, _has also been_ +moved, and _will be_ moved: this also may be collected, That there can +be no conception of motion without conceiving past and future time."] + +[Footnote 73: Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 91-97-112-116.] + +[Footnote 74: See this point touched by Plato in Philêbus, p. 43 B.] + +[Footnote 75: Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. 113. [Greek: ki/nêsis kat' +ei)likri/neian . . . ki/nêsis kat' e)pikra/teian]. Compare Zeller, Die +Philosophie der Griech. ii. p. 191, ed. 2nd.] + +[Footnote 76: Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 346-348.] + +[Side-note: Stilpon of Megara--His great celebrity.] + +That Diodorus was a person seriously anxious to solve logical +difficulties, as well as to propose them, would be incontestably +proved if we could believe the story recounted of him--that he hanged +himself because he could not solve a problem proposed by Stilpon in +the presence of Ptolemy Soter.[77] But this story probably grew out of +the fact, that Stilpon succeeded Diodorus at Megara, and eclipsed him +in reputation. The celebrity of Stilpon, both at Megara and at Athens +(between 320-300 B.C., but his exact date can hardly be settled), was +equal, if not superior, to that of any contemporary philosopher. He +was visited by listeners from all parts of Greece, and he drew away +pupils from the most renowned teachers of the day; from Theophrastus +as well as the others.[78] He was no less remarkable for fertility of +invention than for neatness of expression. Two persons, who came for +the purpose of refuting him, are said to have remained with him as +admirers and scholars. All Greece seemed as it were looking towards +him, and inclining towards the Megaric doctrines.[79] He was much +esteemed both by Ptolemy Soter and by Demetrius Poliorkêtes, though he +refused the presents and invitations of both: and there is reason to +believe that his reputation in his own day must have equalled that of +either Plato or Aristotle in theirs. He was formidable in disputation; +but the nine dialogues which he composed and published are +characterised by Diogenes as cold.[80] + +[Footnote 77: Diog. L. ii. 112.] + +[Footnote 78: This is asserted by Diogenes upon the authority of +[Greek: Phi/lippos o( Megriko/s], whom he cites [Greek: kata\ le/xin]. +We do not know anything about Philippus. + +Menedêmus, who spoke with contempt of the other philosophers, even of +Plato and Xenokrates, admired Stilpon (Diog. L. ii. 134).] + +[Footnote 79: The phrase of Diogenes is here singular, and must +probably have been borrowed from a partisan--[Greek: ô(/ste mikrou= +deê=sai pa=san tê\n E(lla/da a)phorô=san ei)s au)to\n megari/sai]. +Stilpon [Greek: eu(resilogi/a| kai\ sophistei/a| proê=ge tou\s +a)/llous--kompso/tatos] (Diog. L. ii. 113-115).] + +[Footnote 80: Diog. L. ii. 119-120. [Greek: psuchroi/].] + +[Side-note: Menedêmus and the Eretriacs.] + +Contemporary with Stilpon (or perhaps somewhat later) was Menedêmus of +Eretria, whose philosophic parentage is traced to Phædon. The name of +Phædon has been immortalised, not by his own works, but by the +splendid dialogue of which Plato has made him the reciter. He is said +(though I doubt the fact) to have been a native of Elis. He was of +good parentage, a youthful companion of Sokrates in the last years of +his life.[81] After the death of Sokrates, Phædon went to Elis, +composed some dialogues, and established a succession or sect of +philosophers--Pleistanus, Anchipylus, Moschus. Of this sect +Menedêmus,[82] contemporary and hearer of Stilpon, became the most +eminent representative, and from him it was denominated Eretriac +instead of Eleian. The Eretriacs, as well as the Megarics, took up the +negative arm of philosophy, and were eminent as puzzlers and +controversialists. + +[Footnote 81: The story given by Diogenes L. (ii. 31 and 106; compare +Aulus Gellius, ii. 18) about Phædon's adventures antecedent to his +friendship with Sokrates, is unintelligible to me. "Phædon was made +captive along with his country (Elis), sold at Athens, and employed in +a degrading capacity; until Sokrates induced Alkibiades or Kriton to +pay his ransom." Now, no such event as the capture of Elis, and the +sale of its Eupatrids as slaves, happened at that time: the war +between Sparta and Elis (described by Xenophon, Hell. iii. 2, 21 seq.) +led to no such result, and was finished, moreover, after the death of +Sokrates. Alkibiades had been long in exile. If, in the text of +Diogenes, where we now read [Greek: Phai/dôn, _Ê(/leios_, tô=n +eu)patridô=n]--we were allowed to substitute [Greek: Phai/dôn, +_Mê/lios_, tô=n eu)patridô=n]--the narrative would be rendered +consistent with known historical facts. The Athenians captured the +island of Melos in 415 B.C., put to death the Melians of military age, +and sold into slavery the younger males as well as the females +(Thucyd. v. 116). If Phædon had been a Melian youth of good family, he +would have been sold at Athens, and might have undergone the +adventures narrated by Diogenes. We know that Alkibiades purchased a +female Melian as slave (Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad.).] + +[Footnote 82: Diog. L. ii. 105, 126 seq. There was a statue of +Menedêmus in the ancient stadium of Eretria: Diogenes speaks as if it +existed in his time, and as if he himself had seen it (ii. 132).] + +[Side-note: Open speech and licence of censure assumed by Menedêmus.] + +But though this was the common character of the two, in a logical +point of view, yet in Stilpon, as well as Menedêmus, other elements +became blended with the logical. These persons combined, in part at +least, the free censorial speech of Antisthenes with the subtlety of +Eukleides. What we hear of Menedêmus is chiefly his bitter, stinging +sarcasms, and clever repartees. He did not, like the Cynic Diogenes, +live in contented poverty, but occupied a prominent place (seemingly +under the patronage of Antigonus and Demetrius) in the government of +his native city Eretria. Nevertheless he is hardly less celebrated +than Diogenes for open speaking of his mind, and carelessness of +giving offence to others.[83] + +[Footnote 83: Diog. L. ii. 129-142.] + + * * * * * + +ANTISTHENES. + + +[Side-note: Antisthenes took up Ethics principally, but with negative +Logic intermingled.] + +Antisthenes, the originator of the Cynic succession of philosophers, +was one of those who took up principally the ethical element of the +Sokratic discoursing, which the Megarics left out or passed lightly +over. He did not indeed altogether leave out the logical element: all +his doctrines respecting it, as far as we hear of them, appear to have +been on the negative side. But respecting ethics, he laid down +affirmative propositions,[84] and delivered peremptory precepts. His +aversion to pleasure, by which he chiefly meant sexual pleasure, was +declared in the most emphatic language. He had therefore, in the +negative logic, a point of community with Eukleides and the Megarics: +so that the coalescence of the two successions, in Stilpon and +Menedêmus, is a fact not difficult to explain. + +[Footnote 84: Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. 20, p. 485, Potter. +[Greek: e)gô\ d' a)pode/chomai to\n A)phrodi/tên le/gonta ka)\|n +katatoxeu/saimi, ei) la/boimi], &c. + +[Greek: Manei/ên ma=llon ê)\ ê)sthei/ên], Diog. L. vi. 3.] + +The life of Sokrates being passed in conversing with a great variety +of persons and characters, his discourses were of course multifarious, +and his ethical influence operated in different ways. His mode of +life, too, exercised a certain influence of its own. + +[Side-note: He copied the manner of life of Sokrates, in plainness and +rigour.] + +Antisthenes, and his disciple Diogenes, were in many respects closer +approximations to Sokrates than either Plato or any other of the +Sokratic companions. The extraordinary colloquial and cross-examining +force was indeed a peculiar gift, which Sokrates bequeathed to none of +them: but Antisthenes took up the Sokratic purpose of inculcating +practical ethics not merely by word of mouth, but also by manner of +life. He was not inferior to his master in contentment under poverty, +in strength of will and endurance,[85] in acquired insensibility both +to pain and pleasure, in disregard of opinion around him, and in +fearless exercise of a self-imposed censorial mission. He learnt from +Sokrates indifference to conventional restraints and social +superiority, together with the duty of reducing wants to a minimum, +and stifling all such as were above the lowest term of necessity. To +this last point, Sokrates gave a religious colour, proclaiming that +the Gods had no wants, and that those who had least came nearest to +the Gods.[86] By Antisthenes, these qualities were exhibited in +eminent measure; and by his disciple Diogenes they were still farther +exaggerated. Epiktetus, a warm admirer of both, considers them as +following up the mission from Zeus which Sokrates (in the Platonic +Apology) sets forth as his authority, to make men independent of the +evils of life by purifying and disciplining the appreciation of good +and evil in the mind of each individual.[87] + +[Footnote 85: Cicero, de Orator. iii. 17, 62; Diog. L. vi. 2. [Greek: +par' ou)=] (Sokrates) [Greek: kai\ to\ karteriko\n labô\n kai\ to\ +a)pathe\s zêlô/sas katê=rxe prô=tos tou= kunismou=]: also vi. 15. The +appellation of Cynics is said to have arisen from the practice of +Antisthenes to frequent the gymnasium called [Greek: Kuno/sarges] (D. +L. vi. 13), though other causes are also assigned for the denomination +(Winckelmann, Antisth. Frag. pp. 8-10).] + +[Footnote 86: Sokrates had said, [Greek: to\ mêdeno\s de/esthai, +thei=on ei)=nai; to\ d' ô(s e)lachi/stôn, e)gguta/tô tou= thei/ou] +(Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 10. Compare Apuleius, Apol. p. 25). Plato, +Gorgias, p. 492 E. The same dictum is ascribed to Diogenes (Diog. L. +vi. 105).] + +[Footnote 87: Epiktetus, Dissert. iii. 1, 19-22, iii. 21-19, iii. +24-40-60-69. The whole of the twenty-second Dissertation, [Greek: Peri\ +Kunismou=], is remarkable. He couples Sokrates with Diogenes more +closely than with any one else.] + +[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes exclusively ethical and ascetic. +He despised music, literature, and physics.] + +Antisthenes declared virtue to be the End for men to aim at--and to be +sufficient _per se_ for conferring happiness; but he also declared +that virtue must be manifested in acts and character, not by words. +Neither much discourse nor much learning was required for virtue; +nothing else need be postulated except bodily strength like that of +Sokrates.[88] He undervalued theory even in regard to Ethics: much +more in regard to Nature (Physics) and to Logic: he also despised +literary, geometrical, musical teaching, as distracting men's +attention from the regulation of their own appreciative sentiment, and +the adaptation of their own conduct to it. He maintained strenuously +(what several Platonic dialogues call in question) that virtue both +could be taught and must be taught: when once learnt, it was +permanent, and could not be eradicated. He prescribed the simplest +mode of life, the reduction of wants to a minimum, with perfect +indifference to enjoyment, wealth, or power. The reward was, exemption +from fear, anxiety, disappointments, and wants: together with the +pride of approximation to the Gods.[89] Though Antisthenes thus +despised both literature and theory, yet he had obtained a rhetorical +education, and had even heard the rhetor Gorgias. He composed a large +number of dialogues and other treatises, of which only the titles +(very multifarious) are preserved to us.[90] One dialogue, entitled +Sathon, was a coarse attack on Plato: several treated of Homer and of +other poets, whose verses he seems to have allegorised. Some of his +dialogues are also declared by Athenæus to contain slanderous abuse of +Alkibiades and other leading Athenians. On the other hand, the +dialogues are much commended by competent judges; and Theopompus even +affirmed that much in the Platonic dialogues had been borrowed from +those of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson.[91] + +[Footnote 88: Diog. L. vi. 11.] + +[Footnote 89: Diog. L. vi. 102-104.] + +[Footnote 90: Diog. L. vi. 1, 15-18. The two remaining +fragments--[Greek: Ai)/as, O)/dusseu\s] (Winckelmann, Antisth. Fragm. +pp. 38-42)--cannot well be genuine, though Winckelmann seems to think +them so.] + +[Footnote 91: Athenæus, v. 220, xi. 508; Diog. L. iii. 24-35; +Phrynichus ap. Photium, cod. 158; Epiktêtus, ii. 16-35. Antisthenes is +placed in the same line with Kritias and Xenophon, as a Sokratic +writer, by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Thucyd. Jud. p. 941. That +there was standing reciprocal hostility between Antisthenes and Plato +we can easily believe. Plato never names Antisthenes: and if the +latter attacked Plato, it was under the name of Sathon. How far Plato +in his dialogues intends to attack Antisthenes without naming him--is +difficult to determine. Probably he does intend to designate +Antisthenes as [Greek: ge/rôn o)psimathê/s], in Sophist. 251. +Schleiermacher and other commentators think that he intends to attack +Antisthenes in Philêbus, Theætêtus, Euthydêmus, &c. But this seems to +me not certain. In Philêbus, p. 44, he can hardly include Antisthenes +among the [Greek: ma/la deinoi\ peri\ phu/sin]. Antisthenes neglected +the study of [Greek: phu/sis].] + +[Side-note: Constant friendship of Antisthenes with +Sokrates--Xenophontic Symposion.] + +Antisthenes was among the most constant friends and followers of +Sokrates, both in his serious and in his playful colloquies.[92] The +Symposion of Xenophon describes both of them, in their hours of +joviality. The picture drawn by an author, himself a friend and +companion, exhibits Antisthenes (so far as we can interpret caricature +and jocular inversion) as poor, self-denying, austere, repulsive, and +disputatious--yet bold and free-spoken, careless of giving offence, +and forcible in colloquial repartee.[93] + +[Footnote 92: Xenophon, Memor. iii. 11, 17.] + +[Footnote 93: Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 11, 17; Symposion, ii. 10, iv. +2-3-44. Plutarch (Quæst. Symp. ii. 1, 6, p. 632) and Diogenes Laertius +(vi. 1, 15) appear to understand the description of Xenophon as +ascribing to Antisthenes a winning and conciliatory manner. To me it +conveys the opposite impression. We must recollect that the pleasantry +of the Xenophontic Symposion (not very successful as pleasantry) is +founded on the assumption, by each person, of qualities and +pretensions the direct reverse of that which he has in reality--and on +his professing to be proud of that which is a notorious disadvantage. +Thus Sokrates pretends to possess great personal beauty, and even puts +himself in competition with the handsome youth Kritobulus; he also +prides himself on the accomplishments of a good [Greek: mastropo/s]. +Antisthenes, quite indigent, boasts of his wealth; the neglected +Hermogenes boasts of being powerfully friended. The passage, iv. 57, +61, which talks of the winning manners of Antisthenes, and his power +of imparting popular accomplishments, is to be understood in this +ironical and inverted sense.] + +[Side-note: Diogenes, successor of Antisthenes--His Cynical +perfection--striking effect which he produced.] + +In all these qualities, however, Antisthenes was surpassed by his +pupil and successor Diogenes of Sinôpê; whose ostentatious austerity +of life, eccentric and fearless character, indifference to what was +considered as decency, great acuteness and still greater power of +expression, freedom of speech towards all and against all--constituted +him the perfect type of the Cynical sect. Being the son of a +money-agent at Sinôpê, he was banished with his father for fraudulently +counterfeiting the coin of the city. On coming to Athens as an exile, +he was captivated with the character of Antisthenes, who was at first +unwilling to admit him, and was only induced to do so by his +invincible importunity. Diogenes welcomed his banishment, with all its +poverty and destitution, as having been the means of bringing him to +Antisthenes,[94] and to a life of philosophy. It was Antisthenes (he +said) who emancipated him from slavery, and made him a freeman. He was +clothed in one coarse garment with double fold: he adopted the wallet +(afterwards the symbol of cynicism) for his provisions, and is said to +have been without any roof or lodging--dwelling sometimes in a tub +near the Metroon, sometimes in one of the public porticoes or temples: +he is also said to have satisfied all his wants in the open day. He +here indulged unreservedly in that unbounded freedom of speech, which +he looked upon as the greatest blessing of life. No man ever turned +that blessing to greater account: the string of repartees, sarcasms, +and stinging reproofs, which are attributed to him by Diogenes +Laertius, is very long, but forms only a small proportion of those +which that author had found recounted.[95] Plato described Diogenes as +Sokrates running mad:[96] and when Diogenes, meeting some Sicilian +guests at his house and treading upon his best carpet, exclaimed "I am +treading on Plato's empty vanity and conceit," Plato rejoined "Yes, +with a different vanity of your own ". The impression produced by +Diogenes in conversation with others, was very powerfully felt both by +young and old. Phokion, as well as Stilpon, were among his +hearers.[97] In crossing the sea to Ægina, Diogenes was captured by +pirates, taken to Krete, and there put up to auction as a slave: the +herald asked him what sort of work he was fit for: whereupon Diogenes +replied--To command men. At his own instance, a rich Corinthian named +Xeniades bought him and transported him to Corinth. Diogenes is said +to have assumed towards Xeniades the air of a master: Xeniades placed +him at the head of his household, and made him preceptor of his sons. +In both capacities Diogenes discharged his duty well.[98] As a slave +well treated by his master, and allowed to enjoy great freedom of +speech, he lived in greater comfort than he had ever enjoyed as a +freeman: and we are not surprised that he declined the offers of +friends to purchase his liberation. He died at Corinth in very old +age: it is said, at ninety years old, and on the very same day on +which Alexander the Great died at Babylon (B.C. 323). He was buried at +the gate of Corinth leading to the Isthmus: a monument being erected +to his honour, with a column of Parian marble crowned by the statue of +a dog.[99] + +[Footnote 94: Diog. L. vi. 2, 21-49; Plutarch Quæst. Sympos. ii. 1, 7; +Epiktetus, iii. 22, 67, iv. 1, 114; Dion Chrysostom. Orat. viii.-ix.-x. + +Plutarch quotes two lines from Diogenes respecting Antisthenes:-- + +[Greek: O(/s me r(a/kê t' ê)/mpische ka\xêna/gkase +Ptôcho\n gene/sthai kai\ do/môn a)na/staton-- + ou) ga\r a)\n o(moi/ôs pithano\s ê)=n le/gôn--O(/s me sopho\n kai\ +au)ta/rkê kai\ maka/rion e)poi/êse]. + +The interpretation given of the passage by Plutarch is curious, but +quite in the probable meaning of the author. However, it is not easy +to reconcile with the fact of this extreme poverty another fact +mentioned about Diogenes, that he asked fees from listeners, in one +case as much as a mina (Diog. L. vi. 2, 67).] + +[Footnote 95: Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 2, 69. [Greek: e)rôtêthei\s ti/ +ka/lliston e)n a)nthrô/pois e)/phê--par)r(êsi/a]. Among the numerous +lost works of Theophrastus (enumerated by Diogen. Laert. v. 43) one is +[Greek: Tô=n Dioge/nous Sunagôgê\, a/], a remarkable evidence of the +impression made by the sayings and proceedings of Diogenes upon his +contemporaries. Compare Dion Chrysostom. Or. ix. (vol. i. 288 seq. +Reiske) for the description of the conduct of Diogenes at the Isthmian +festival, and the effect produced by it on spectators. + +These smart sayings, of which so many are ascribed to Diogenes, and +which he is said to have practised beforehand, and to have made +occasions for--[Greek: o(/ti chrei/an ei)/ê memeletêkô/s] (Diog. L. v. +18, vi. 91, vii. 26)--were called by the later rhetors [Greek: +Chrei=ai]. See Hermogenes and Theon, apud Walz, Rhetor. Græc. i. pp. +19-201; Quintilian, i. 9, 4. + +Such collections of _Ana_ were ascribed to all the philosophers in +greater or less number. Photius, in giving the list of books from +which the Sophist Sopater collected extracts, indicates one as [Greek: +Ta\ Dioge/nous tou= Kunikou= A)pophthe/gmata] (Codex 161).] + +[Footnote 96: Diog. L. vi. 54: [Greek: Sôkra/tês maino/ menos]. vi. 26: +[Greek: Oi( de\ phasi to\n Dioge/nên ei)pei=n, Patô= to\n Pla/tônos +tu=phon; to\n de\ pha/nai, E(te/rô| ge tu/phô|, Dio/genes]. The term +[Greek: tu=phos] ("vanity, self-conceit, assumption of knowing better +than others, being puffed up by the praise of vulgar minds") seems to +have been mach interchanged among the ancient philosophers, each of +them charging it upon his opponents; while the opponents of philosophy +generally imputed it to all philosophers alike. Pyrrho the Sceptic +took credit for being the only [Greek: a)/tuphos]: and he is +complimented as such by his panegyrist Timon in the Silli. Aristokles +affirmed that Pyrrho had just as much [Greek: tu=phon] as the rest. +Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 18.] + +[Footnote 97: Diog. L. vi. 2, 75-76.] + +[Footnote 98: Diog. L. vi. 2, 74. Xeniades was mentioned by +Democritus: he is said to have been a sceptic (Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. +vii. 48-53), at least he did not recognise any [Greek: kritê/rion].] + +[Footnote 99: Diog. L. vi. 2, 77-78. + +Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under the +title of [Greek: o( Ku/ôn]. Aristotle cites from him a witty comparison +under that designation, Rhetoric. iii. 10, 1410, a. 24. [Greek: kai\ +o( Ku/ôn (e)ka/lei) ta\ kapêlei=a, ta\ A)ttika\ phidi/tia.]] + +[Side-note: Doctrines and smart sayings of Diogenes--Contempt of +pleasure--training and labour required--indifference to literature and +geometry.] + +In politics, ethics, and rules for human conduct, Diogenes adopted +views of his own, and spoke them out freely. He was a freethinker +(like Antisthenes) as to the popular religion: and he disapproved of +marriage laws, considering that the intercourse of the sexes ought to +be left to individual taste and preference.[100] Though he respected +the city and conformed to its laws, yet he had no reverence for +existing superstitions, or for the received usages as to person, sex, +or family. He declared himself to be a citizen of the Kosmos and of +Nature.[101] His sole exigency was, independence of life, and freedom +of speech: having these, he was satisfied, fully sufficient to himself +for happiness, and proud of his own superiority to human weakness. The +main benefit which he derived from philosophy (he said) was, that he +was prepared for any fortune that might befall him. To be ready to +accept death easily, was the sure guarantee of a free and independent +life.[102] He insisted emphatically upon the necessity of exercise or +training ([Greek: a)/skêsis]) both as to the body and as to the mind. +Without this, nothing could be done: by means of it everything might +be achieved. But he required that the labours imposed should be +directed to the acquisition of habits really useful; instead of being +wasted, as they commonly were, upon objects frivolous and showy. The +truly wise man ought to set before him as a model the laborious life +of Hêraklês: and he would find, after proper practice and training, +that the contempt of pleasures would afford him more enjoyment than +the pleasures themselves.[103] + +[Footnote 100: Diog. L. vi. 2, 72. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 13.] + +[Footnote 101: Diog. L. vi. 2, 63-71. The like declaration is ascribed +to Sokrates. Epiktêtus, i. 9, 1.] + +[Footnote 102: Diog. L. vi. 2, 63, 72. [Greek: mêde\n e)leutheri/as +prokri/nôn]. Epiktêtus, iv. 1, 30. [Greek: Ou(/tô kai\ Dioge/nês +le/gei, mi/an ei)=nai mêchanê\n pro\s e)leutheri/an--to\ eu)ko/lôs +a)pothnê/skein]. Compare iv. 7-28, i. 24, 6.] + +[Footnote 103: Diog. L. vi. 2, 70-71. [Greek: kai\ ga\r au)tê\ tê=s +ê(donê=s ê( kataphro/nêsis ê(duta/tê promeletêthei=sa, kai\ ô(/sper +oi( sunethisthe/ntes ê(de/ôs zê=|n, a)êdô=s e)pi\ tou)nanti/on +meti/asin, ou(/tô oi( tou)nanti/on a)skêthe/ntes ê(/dion au)tô=n tô=n +ê(donô=n kataphronou=si]. See Lucian, Vitar. Auct. c. 9, about the +hard life and the happiness of Diogenes. Compare s. 26 about the +[Greek: tu=phos] of Diogenes treading down the different [Greek: +tu=phos] of Plato, and Epiktêtus iii. 22, 57. Antisthenes, in his +dialogue or discourse called [Greek: Ê(raklê=s], appears to have +enforced the like appeal to that hero as an example to others. See +Winckelmann, Fragm. Antisthen. pp. 15-18.] + +[Side-note: Admiration of Epiktêtus for Diogenes, especially for his +consistency in acting out his own ethical creed.] + +Diogenes declared that education was sobriety to the young, +consolation to the old, wealth to the poor, ornament to the rich. But +he despised much of what was commonly imparted as education--music, +geometry, astronomy, &c.: and he treated with equal scorn Plato and +Eukleides.[104] He is said however to have conducted the education of +the sons of his master Xeniades[105] without material departure from +the received usage. He caused them to undergo moderate exercise (not +with a view to athletic success) in the palæstra, and afterwards to +practise riding, shooting with the bow, hurling the javelin, slinging +and hunting: he cultivated their memories assiduously, by recitations +from poets and prose authors, and even from his own compositions: he +kept them on bread and water, without tunic or shoes, with clothing +only such as was strictly necessary, with hair closely cut, habitually +silent, and fixing their eyes on the ground when they walked abroad. +These latter features approximate to the training at Sparta (as +described by Xenophon) which Diogenes declared to contrast with Athens +as the apartments of the men with those of the women. Diogenes is said +to have composed several dialogues and even some tragedies.[106] But +his most impressive display (like that of Sokrates) was by way of +colloquy--prompt and incisive interchange of remarks. He was one of +the few philosophers who copied Sokrates in living constantly before +the public--in talking with every one indiscriminately and fearlessly, +in putting home questions like a physician to his patient.[107] +Epiktêtus,--speaking of Diogenes as equal, if not superior, to +Sokrates--draws a distinction pertinent and accurate. "To Sokrates" +(says he) "Zeus assigned the elenchtic or cross-examining function: to +Diogenes, the magisterial and chastising function: to Zeno (the Stoic) +the didactic and dogmatical." While thus describing Diogenes justly +enough, Epiktetus nevertheless insists upon his agreeable person and +his extreme gentleness and good-nature:[108] qualities for which +probably Diogenes neither took credit himself, nor received credit +from his contemporaries. Diogenes seems to have really possessed--that +which his teacher Antisthenes postulated as indispensable--the +Sokratic physical strength and vigour. His ethical creed, obtained +from Antisthenes, was adopted by many successors, and (in the main) by +Zeno and the Stoics in the ensuing century. But the remarkable feature +in Diogenes which attracts to him the admiration of Epiktêtus, is--that +he set the example of acting out his creed, consistently and +resolutely, in his manner of life:[109] an example followed by some of +his immediate successors, but not by the Stoics, who confined +themselves to writing and preaching. Contemporary both with Plato and +Aristotle, Diogenes stands to both of them in much the same relation +as Phokion to Demosthenes in politics and oratory: he exhibits +strength of will, insensibility to applause as well as to reproach, +and self-acting independence--in antithesis to their higher gifts and +cultivation of intellect. He was undoubtedly, next to Sokrates, the +most original and unparalleled manifestation of Hellenic philosophy. + +[Footnote 104: Diog. L. vi. 2, 68-73-24-27.] + +[Footnote 105: Diog. L. vi. 2, 30-31.] + +[Footnote 106: Diog. L. vi. 2, 80. Diogenes Laertius himself cites a +fact from one of the dialogues--Pordalus (vi. 2, 20): and Epiktêtus +alludes to the treatise on Ethics by Diogenes--[Greek: e)n tê=| +Ê)thikê=|]--ii. 20, 14. It appears however that the works ascribed to +Diogenes were not admitted by all authors as genuine (Diog. L. c.).] + +[Footnote 107: Dion Chrysost. Or. x.; De Servis, p. 295 E. Or. ix.; +Isthmicus, p. 289 R. [Greek: ô(/sper i)atroi\ a)nakri/nousi tou\s +a)sthenou=ntas, ou(/tôs Dioge/nês a)ne/krine to\n a)/nthrôpon], &c.] + +[Footnote 108: Epiktêtus, iii. 21, 19. [Greek: ô(s Sôkra/tei +sunebou/leue tê\n e)legktikê\n chô/ran e)/chein, ô(s Dioge/nei tê\n +basilikê\n kai\ e)piplêktikê/n, ô(s Zê/nôni tê\n didaskalikê\n kai\ +dogmatikê/n]. + +About [Greek: to\ ê(/meron kai\ phila/nthrôpon] of Diogenes, see +Epiktêtus, iii. 24, 64; who also tells us (iv. 11, 19), professing to +follow the statements of contemporaries, that the bodies both of +Sokrates and Diogenes were by nature so sweet and agreeable ([Greek: +e)pi/chari kai\ ê(du/]) as to dispense with the necessity of washing. + +"Ego certé" (says Seneca, Epist. 108, 13-14, about the lectures of the +eloquent Stoic Attalus) "cum Attalum audirem, in vitia, in errores, in +mala vitæ perorantem, sæpé misertus sum generis humani, et illum +sublimem altioremque humano fastigio credidi. Ipse regem se esse +dicebat: sed plus quam regnare mihi videbatur, cui liceret censuram +agere regnantium." See also his treatises De Beneficiis, v. 4-6, and +De Tranquillitate Animi (c. 8), where, after lofty encomium on +Diogenes, he exclaims--"Si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest +idem dubitare et de Deorum immortalium statu, an parum beaté degant," +&c.] + +[Footnote 109: Cicero, in his Oration in defence of Murena (30-61-62) +compliments Cato (the accuser) as one of the few persons who adopted +the Stoic tenets with a view of acting them out, and who did really +act them out--"Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato, autoribus +eruditissimis inductus, arripuit: neque disputandi causa, ut magna +pars, sed ita vivendi". Tacitus (Histor. iv. 5) pays the like +compliment to Helvidius Priscus. + +M. Gaston Boissier (Étude sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de Varron, pp. +113-114, Paris, 1861) expresses an amount of surprise which I should +not have expected, on the fact that persons adopted a philosophical +creed for the purpose only of debating it and defending it, and not of +acting it out. But he recognises the fact, in regard to Varro and his +contemporaries, in terms not less applicable to the Athenian world: +amidst such general practice, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Krates, &c., +stood out as memorable exceptions. "Il ne faut pas non plus oublier de +quelle manière, et dans quel esprit, les Romains lettrés étudiaient la +philosophie Grecque. Ils venaient écouter les plus habiles maîtres, +connaître les sectes les plus célèbres: mais ils les étudiaient plutôt +en curieux, qu'ils ne s'y attachaient en adeptes. On ne les voit +guères approfondir un système et s'y tenir, adopter un ensemble de +croyances, et y conformer leur conduite. On étudiait le plus souvent +la philosophie pour discuter. C'était seulement une matière à des +conversations savantes, un exercice et un aliment pour les esprits +curieux. Voilà pourquoi la secte Académique étoit alors mieux +accueillie que les autres," &c.] + +[Side-note: Admiration excited by the asceticism of the +Cynics--Asceticism extreme in the East--Comparison of the Indian +Gymnosophists with Diogenes.] + +Respecting Diogenes and the Cynic philosophers generally, we have to +regard not merely their doctrines, but the effect produced by their +severity of life. In this point Diogenes surpassed his master +Antisthenes, whose life he criticised as not fully realising the lofty +spirit of his doctrine. The spectacle of man not merely abstaining +from enjoyment, but enduring with indifference hunger, thirst, heat, +cold, poverty, privation, bodily torture, death, &c., exercises a +powerful influence on the imagination of mankind. It calls forth +strong feelings of reverence and admiration in the beholders: while in +the sufferer himself also, self-reverence and self-admiration, the +sense of power and exaltation above the measure of humanity, is +largely developed. The extent to which self-inflicted hardships and +pains have prevailed in various regions of the earth, the +long-protracted and invincible resolution with which they have been +endured, and the veneration which such practices have procured for the +ascetics who submitted to them are among the most remarkable chapters +in history.[110] The East, especially India, has always been, and +still is, the country in which these voluntary endurances have reached +their extreme pitch of severity; even surpassing those of the +Christian monks in Egypt and Syria, during the fourth and fifth +centuries of the Christian era.[111] When Alexander the Great first +opened India to the observation of Greeks, one of the novelties which +most surprised him and his followers was, the sight of the +Gymnosophists or naked philosophers. These men were found lying on the +ground, either totally uncovered or with nothing but a cloth round the +loins; abstaining from all enjoyment, nourishing themselves upon a +minimum of coarse vegetables or fruits, careless of the extreme heat +of the plain, and the extreme cold of the mountain; and often +superadding pain, fatigue, or prolonged and distressing uniformity of +posture. They passed their time either in silent meditation or in +discourse on religion and philosophy: they were venerated as well as +consulted by every one, censuring even the most powerful persons in +the land. Their fixed idea was to stand as examples to all, of +endurance, insensibility, submission only to the indispensable +necessities of nature, and freedom from all other fear or authority. +They acted out the doctrine, which Plato so eloquently preaches under +the name of Sokrates in the Phædon--That the whole life of the +philosopher is a preparation for death: that life is worthless, and +death an escape from it into a better state.[112] It is an interesting +fact to learn that when Onesikritus (one of Alexander's officers, who +had known and frequented the society of Diogenes in Greece), being +despatched during the Macedonian march through India for the purpose +of communicating with these Gymnosophists, saw their manner of life +and conversed with them he immediately compared them with Diogenes, +whom he had himself visited--as well as with Sokrates and Pythagoras, +whom he knew by reputation. Onesikritus described to the Gymnosophists +the manner of life of Diogenes: but Diogenes wore a threadbare mantle, +and this appeared to them a mark of infirmity and imperfection. They +remarked that Diogenes was right to a considerable extent; but wrong +for obeying convention in preference to nature, and for being ashamed +of going naked, as they did.[113] + +[Footnote 110: Dion Chrysostom, viii. p. 275, Reiske.] + +[Footnote 111: See the striking description in Gibbon, Decl. and Fall, +ch. xxxvii. pp. 253-265.] + +[Footnote 112: Strabo, xv. 713 A (probably from Onesikritus, see +Geier, Fragment. Alexandr. Magn. Histor. p. 379). [Greek: Plei/stous +d' au)toi=s ei)=nai lo/gous peri\ tou= thana/tou; nomi/zein ga\r dê\ +to\n me\n e)ntha/de bi/on ô(s a)\n a)kmê\n kuome/nôn ei)=nai, to\n de\ +tha/naton ge/nesin ei)s to\n o)/ntôs bi/on kai\ to\n eu)dai/mona toi=s +philosophê/sasi; dio\ tê=| a)skê/sei plei/stê| chrê=sthai pro\s to\ +e)toimotha/naton; a)gatho\n de\ ê)\ kako\n mêde\n ei)=nai tô=n +sumbaino/ntôn a)nthrô/pois], &c. + +This is an application of the doctrines laid down by the Platonic +Sokrates in the Phædon, p. 64 A: [Greek: Kinduneu/ousi ga\r o(/soi +tugcha/nousin o)rthô=s a)pto/menoi philosophi/as lelêthe/nai tou\s +a)/llous, o(/ti ou)de\n a)/llo au)toi\ e)pitêdeu/ousin ê)\ +a)pothnê/skein te kai\ tethna/nai]. Compare p. 67 D.; Cicero. Tusc. D. +i. 30. Compare Epiktêtus, iv. i. 30 (cited in a former note) about +Diogenes the Cynic. Also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 27; Valerius Maximus, +iii. 3, 6; Diogen. L. Prooem. s. 6; Pliny, H. N. vii. 2. + +Bohlen observes (Das Alte Indien, ch. ii. pp. 279-289), "It is a +remarkable fact that Indian writings of the highest antiquity depict +as already existing the same ascetic exercises as we see existing at +present: they were even then known to the ancients, who were +especially astonished at such fanaticism.] + +[Footnote 113: Strabo gives a condensed summary of this report, made +by Onesikritus respecting his conversation with the Indian +Gymnosophist Mandanis, or Dandamis (Strabo, xv. p. 716 B):--[Greek: +Tau=t' ei)po/nta e)xere/sthai] (Dandamis asked Onesikritus), [Greek: +ei) kai\ e)n toi=s E(/llêsi lo/goi toiou=toi le/gointo. Ei)po/ntos d' +(O)nêsikri/tou), o(/ti kai\ Puthago/ras toiau=ta le/goi, keleu/oi te +e)mpsu/chôn a)pe/chesthai, kai\ Sôkra/tês, kai\ Dioge/nês, _ou(= kai\ +au)to\s_] (Onesikritus) [Greek: _a)kroa/saito_, a)pokri/nasthai] +(Dandamis), [Greek: o(/ti ta)/lla me\n nomi/zoi phroni/môs au)toi=s +dokei=n, e(\n d' a(marta/nein--no/mon pro\ tê=s phu/seôs titheme/nous; +ou) ga\r a)\n ai)schu/nesthai gumnou/s, ô(/sper au)to/n, dia/gein, +a)po\ litô=n zô=ntas; kai\ ga\r oi)ki/an a)ri/stên ei)=nai, ê)/tis +a)\n e)piskeuê=s e)lachi/stês de/êtai]. + +About Onesikritus, Diog. Laert. vi. 75-84; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 65; +Plutarch, De Fortuna Alexandri, p. 331. + +The work of August Gladitsch (Einleitung in das Verständniss der +Weltgeschichte, Posen, 1841) contains an instructive comparison +between the Gymnosophists and the Cynics, as well as between the +Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophers--between the Eleatic sect +and the Hindoo philosophers. The points of analogy, both in doctrine +and practice, are very numerous and strikingly brought out, pp. +356-377. I cannot, however, agree in his conclusion, that the doctrines +and practice of Antisthenes were borrowed, not from Sokrates with +exaggeration, but from the Parmenidean theory, and the Vedanta theory +of the Ens Unum, leading to negation and contempt of the phenomenal +world.] + +[Side-note: The precepts and principles laid down by Sokrates were +carried into fullest execution by the Cynics.] + +These observations of the Indian Gymnosophist are a reproduction and +an application in practice[114] of the memorable declaration of +principle enunciated by Sokrates--"That the Gods had no wants: and +that the man who had fewest wants, approximated most nearly to the +Gods". This principle is first introduced into Grecian ethics by +Sokrates: ascribed to him both by Xenophon and Plato, and seemingly +approved by both. In his life, too, Sokrates carried the principle +into effect, up to a certain point. Both admirers and opponents attest +his poverty, hard fare, coarse clothing, endurance of cold and +privation:[115] but he was a family man, with a wife and children to +maintain, and he partook occasionally, of indulgences which made him +fall short of his own ascetic principle. Plato and Xenophon--both of +them well-born Athenians, in circumstances affluent, or at least easy, +the latter being a knight, and even highly skilled in horses and +horsemanship--contented themselves with preaching on the text, +whenever they had to deal with an opponent more self-indulgent than +themselves; but made no attempt to carry it into practice.[116] Zeno +the Stoic laid down broad principles of self-denial and apathy: but in +practice he was unable to conquer the sense of shame, as the Cynics +did, and still more the Gymnosophists. Antisthenes, on the other hand, +took to heart, both in word and act, the principle of Sokrates: yet +even he, as we know from the Xenophontic Symposion, was not altogether +constant in rigorous austerity. His successors Diogenes and Krates +attained the maximum of perfection ever displayed by the Cynics of +free Greece. They stood forth as examples of endurance, +abnegation--insensibility to shame and fear--free-spoken censure of +others. Even they however were not so recognised by the Indian +Gymnosophists; who, having reduced their wants, their fears, and +their sensibilities, yet lower, had thus come nearer to that which they +called the perfection of Nature, and which Sokrates called the close +approach to divinity.[117] When Alexander the Great (in the first year of +his reign and prior to any of his Asiatic conquests) visited Diogenes at +Corinth, found him lying in the sun, and asked if there was anything +which he wanted--Diogenes made the memorable reply--"Only that you and +your guards should stand out of my sunshine". This reply doubtless +manifests the self-satisfied independence of the philosopher. Yet it +is far less impressive than the fearless reproof which the Indian +Gymnosophists administered to Alexander, when they saw him in the +Punjab at the head of his victorious army, after exploits, dangers, +and fatigues almost superhuman, as conqueror of Persia and +acknowledged son of Zeus.[118] + +[Footnote 114: Onesikritus observes, respecting the Indian +Gymnosophists, that "they were more striking in act than in discourse" +([Greek: e)n e)/rgois ga\r au)tou\s krei/ttous ê)\ lo/gois ei)=nai], +Strabo, xv. 713 B); and this is true about the Cynic succession of +philosophers, in Greece as well as in Rome. Diogenes Laertius (compare +his prooem, s. 19, 20, and vi. 103) ranks the Cynic philosophy as a +distinct [Greek: ai(/resis]: but he tells us that other writers +(especially Hippobotus) would not reckon it as an [Greek: ai(/resis], +but only as an [Greek: e)/nstasis bi/ou]--practice without theory.] + +[Footnote 115: Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 2-5; Plato, Sympos. 219, 220. + +The language of contemporary comic writers, Ameipsias, Eupolis, +Aristophanes, &c., about Sokrates--is very much the same as that of +Menander a century afterwards about Kratês. Sokrates is depicted as a +Cynic in mode of life (Diogen. L. ii. 28; Aristophan. Nubes, +104-362-415).] + +[Footnote 116: Zeno, though he received instructions from Kratês, was +[Greek: a)/llôs me\n eu)/tonos pro\s tê\n philosophi/an, ai)dê/môn de\ +ô(s pro\s tê\n kunikê\n a)naischunti/an] (Diog. L. vii. 3). + +"Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicure +quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere," +&c. This is the distinction which Seneca draws between Stoic and Cynic +(De Brevitat. Vitæ, 14, 5). His admiration for the "seminudus" Cynic +Demetrius, his contemporary and companion, was extreme (Epist. 62, 2, +and Epist. 20, 18).] + +[Footnote 117: Xenoph. Memor. i. 6, 10 (the passage is cited in a +previous note). The Emperor Julian (Orat. vi. p. 192 Spanh.) says +about the Cynics--[Greek: a)pa/theian ga\r poiou=ntai to\ te/los, +tou=to de\ i)/son e)sti\ tô=| theo\n gene/sthai]. Dion Chrysostom (Or. +vi. p. 208) says also about Diogenes the Cynic--[Greek: kai\ ma/lista +e)mimei=to tô=n theô=n to\n bi/on.]] + +[Footnote 118: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 32, 92, and the Anabasis of +Arrian, vii. 1-2-3, where both the reply of Diogenes and that of the +Indian Gymnosophists are reported. Dion Chrysostom (Orat. iv. p. 145 +seq. Reiske) gives a prolix dialogue between Alexander and Diogenes. +His picture of the effect produced by Diogenes upon the different +spectators at the Isthmian festival, is striking and probable. + +Kalanus, one of the Indian Gymnosophists, was persuaded, by the +instances of Alexander, to abandon his Indian mode of life and to come +away with the Macedonian army--very much to the disgust of his +brethren, who scornfully denounced him as infirm and even as the +slave of appetite ([Greek: a)ko/laston], Strabo, xv. 718). He was +treated with the greatest consideration and respect by Alexander and +his officers; yet when the army came into Persis, he became sick of +body and tired of life. He obtained the reluctant consent of Alexander +to allow him to die. A funeral pile was erected, upon which he +voluntarily burnt himself in presence of the whole army; who witnessed +the scene with every demonstration of military honour. See the +remarkable description in Arrian, Anab. vii. 3. Cicero calls him +"Indus indoctus ac barbarus" (Tusc. Disp. ii. 22, 52); but the +impression which he made on Alexander himself, Onesikritus, +Lysimachus, and generally upon all who saw him, was that of respectful +admiration (Strabo, xv. 715; Arrian, l. c.). One of these Indian +sages, who had come into Syria along with the Indian envoys sent by an +Indian king to the Roman Emperor Augustus, burnt himself publicly at +Athens, with an exulting laugh when he leaped upon the funeral pile +(Strabo, xv. 720 A)--[Greek: kata\ ta\ pa/tria tô=n I)ndô=n e)/thê]. + +The like act of self-immolation was performed by the Grecian Cynic +Peregrinus Proteus, at the Olympic festival in the reign of Marcus +Antoninus, 165 A.D. (See Clinton, Fasti Romani.) Lucian, who was +present and saw the proceeding, has left an animated description of +it, but ridicules it as a piece of silly vanity. Theagenes, the +admiring disciple of Peregrinus, and other Cynics, who were present in +considerable numbers--and also Lucian himself compare this act to that +of the Indian Gymnosophists--[Greek: ou(=tos de\ ti/nos ai)ti/as +e(/neken e)mba/llei phe/rôn e(auto\n ei)s to\ pu=r? nê\ Di/', o(/pôs +tê\n karteri/an e)pidei/xêtai, katha/per oi( Brachma=nes] (Lucian, De +Morte Peregrini, 25-39, &c.).] + +[Side-note: Antithesis between Nature--and Law or Convention--insisted +on by the Indian Gymnosophists.] + +Another point, in the reply made by the Indian Gymnosophist to +Onesikritus, deserves notice: I mean the antithesis between law (or +convention) and nature ([Greek: no/mos--phu/sis])--the supremacy which +he asserts for Nature over law--and the way in which he understands +Nature and her supposed ordinances. This antithesis was often put +forward and argued in the ancient Ethics: and it is commonly said, +without any sufficient proof, that the Sophists (speaking of them +collectively) recognised only the authority of law--while Sokrates and +Plato had the merit of vindicating against them the superior authority +of Nature. The Indian Gymnosophist agrees with the Athenian speaker in +the Platonic treatise De Legibus, and with the Platonic Kallikles in +the Gorgias, thus far--that he upholds the paramount authority of +Nature. But of these three interpreters, each hears and reports the +oracles of Nature differently from the other two: and there are many +other dissenting interpreters besides.[119] Which of them are we to +follow? And if, adopting any one of them, we reject the others, upon +what grounds are we to justify our preference? When the Gymnosophist +points out, that nakedness is the natural condition of man; when he +farther infers, that because natural it is therefore right and that +the wearing of clothes, being a departure from nature, is also a +departure from right--how are we to prove to him that his +interpretation of nature is the wrong one? These questions have +received no answer in any of the Platonic dialogues: though we have +seen that Plato is very bitter against those who dwell upon the +antithesis between Law and Nature, and who undertake to decide between +the two. + +[Footnote 119: Though Seneca (De Brevitate Vit. 14) talks of the +Stoics as "conquering Nature, and the Cynics as exceeding Nature," yet +the Stoic Epiktêtus considers his morality as the only scheme +conformable to Nature (Epiktêt. Diss. iv. 1, 121-128); while the +Epikurean Lucretius claims the same conformity for the precepts of +Epikurus.] + +[Side-note: The Greek Cynics--an order of ascetic or mendicant +friars.] + +Reverting to the Cynics, we must declare them to be in one respect the +most peculiar outgrowth of Grecian philosophy: because they are not +merely a doctrinal sect, with phrases, theories, reasonings, and +teachings, of their own--but still more prominently a body of +practical ascetics, a mendicant order[120] in philosophy, working up +the bystanders by exhibiting themselves as models of endurance and +apathy. These peculiarities seem to have originated partly with +Pythagoras, partly with Sokrates--for there is no known prior example +of it in Grecian history, except that of the anomalous priests of Zeus +at Dodona, called Selli, who lay on the ground with unwashed feet. The +discipline of Lykurgus at Sparta included severe endurance; but then +it was intended to form, and actually did form, good soldiers. The +Cynics had no view to military action. They exaggerated the +peculiarities of Sokrates, and we should call their mode of life the +Sokratic life, if we followed the example of those who gave names to +the Pythagorean or Orphic life, as a set of observances derived from +the type of Pythagoras or Orpheus.[121] + +[Footnote 120: Respecting the historical connexion between the Grecian +Cynics and the ascetic Christian monks, see Zeller, Philos. der +Griech. ii. p. 241, ed. 2nd. + +Homer, Iliad xvi. 233-5:-- + +[Greek: Zeu= a)/na, Dôdônai=e, Pelasgike/, têlo/thi nai/ôn, +Dôdô/nês mede/ôn duscheime/rou, a)mphi\ de\ Se/lloi +Soi\ nai/ous' u(pophê=tai a)nipto/podes, chamaieu=nai]. + +There is no analogy in Grecian history to illustrate this very curious +passage: the Excursus of Heyne furnishes no information (see his +edition of the Iliad, vol. vii. p. 289) except the general +remark:--"Selli--vitæ genus et institutum affectarunt abhorrens à communi +usu, vitæ monachorum mendicantium haud absimile, cum sine vitæ cultu +viverent, nec corpus abluerent, et humi cubarent. Ita inter barbaros +non modo, sed inter ipsas feras gentes intellectum est, eos qui +auctoritatem apud multitudinem consequi vellent, externâ specie, vitæ +cultu austeriore, abstinentiâ et continentiâ, oculos hominum in se +convertere et mirationem facere debere."] + +[Footnote 121: Plato, Republic, x. 600 B; Legib. vi. 782 C; Eurip. +Hippol. 955; Fragm. [Greek: Krê=tes]. + +See also the citations in Athenæus (iv. pp. 161-163) from the writers +of the Attic middle comedy, respecting the asceticism of the +Pythagoreans, analogous to that of the Cynics.] + +[Side-note: Logical views of Antisthenes and Diogenes--they opposed +the Platonic Ideas.] + +Though Antisthenes and Diogenes laid chief stress upon ethical topics, +yet they also delivered opinions on logic and evidence.[122] +Antisthenes especially was engaged in controversy, and seemingly in +acrimonious controversy, with Plato; whose opinions he impugned in an +express dialogue entitled Sathon. Plato on his side attacked the +opinions of Antisthenes, and spoke contemptuously of his intelligence, +yet without formally naming him. At least there are some criticisms in +the Platonic dialogues (especially in the Sophistês, p. 251) which the +commentators pronounce, on strong grounds, to be aimed at Antisthenes: +who is also unfavourably criticised by Aristotle. We know but little +of the points which Antisthenes took up against Plato and still less +of the reasons which he urged in support of them. Both he and +Diogenes, however, are said to have declared express war against the +Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas. The functions of general +Concepts and general propositions, together with the importance of +defining general terms, had been forcibly insisted on in the +colloquies of Sokrates; and his disciple Plato built upon this +foundation the memorable hypothesis of an aggregate of eternal, +substantive realities, called Ideas or Forms, existing separate from +the objects of sense, yet affording a certain participation in +themselves to those objects: not discernible by sense, but only by the +Reason or understanding. These bold creations of the Platonic fancy +were repudiated by Antisthenes and Diogenes: who are both said to have +declared "We see Man, and we see Horse; but Manness and Horseness we +do not see". Whereunto Plato replied "You possess that eye by which +Horse is seen: but you have not yet acquired that eye by which +Horseness is seen".[123] + +[Footnote 122: Among the titles of the works of Antisthenes, preserved +by Diogenes Laertius (vi. 15), several relate to dialectic or logic. +[Greek: A)lê/theia. Peri\ tou= diale/gesthai, a)ntilogiko/s. Sa/thôn, +peri\ tou= a)ntile/gein, a, b, g. Peri\ Diale/kton. Peri\ Paidei/as +ê)\ o)noma/tôn, a, b, g, d, e. Peri\ o)noma/tôn chrêseôs, ê)\ +e)ristiko/s. Peri\ e)rôtê/seôs kai\ a)pokri/seôs], &c., &c. + +Diogenes Laertius refers to _ten_ [Greek: to/moi] of these treatises.] + +[Footnote 123: Simplikius, ad Aristot. Categ. p. 66, b. 47, 67, b. 18, +68, b. 25, Schol. Brand.; Tzetzes, Chiliad. vii. 606. + +[Greek: tô=n de\ palaiô=n oi( me\n a)nê/|roun ta\s poio/têtas tele/ôs, +to\ poio\n sugchôrou=ntos ei)=nai; ô(/sper A)ntisthe/nês, o(/s pote +Pla/tôni diamphisbêtô=n--ô(= Pla/tôn, e)/phê, i(/ppon me\n o(rô=, +i(ppo/têta d' ou)ch o(rô=; kai\ o(\s ei)=pen, e)/cheis me\n ô(=| +i(/ppos o(ra=tai to/de to\ o)/mma, ô(=| de\ i(ppo/tês theôrei=tai, +ou)de/pô ke/ktêsai. kai\ a)/lloi de/ tines ê)=san tau/tês tê=s do/xês. +oi( de\ tina\s men a)nê/|roun poio/têtas, tina\s de\ kateli/mpanon]. + +[Greek: Anthrôpo/tês] occurs p. 58, a. 31. Compare p. 20, a. 2. + +The same conversation is reported as having taken place between +Diogenes and Plato, except that instead of [Greek: i(ppo/tês] and +[Greek: a)nthrôpo/tês], we have [Greek: trapezo/tês] and [Greek: +kuatho/tês] (Diog. L. vi, 53). + +We have [Greek: zôo/tês--A)thênaio/tês]--in Galen's argument against +the Stoics (vol. xix. p. 481, Kühn).] + +[Side-note: First protest of Nominalism against Realism.] + +This debate between Antisthenes and Plato marks an interesting point +in the history of philosophy. It is the first protest of Nominalism +against the doctrine of an extreme Realism. The Ideas or Forms of +Plato (according to many of his phrases, for he is not always +consistent with himself) are not only real existences distinct from +particulars, but absorb to themselves all the reality of particulars. +The real universe in the Platonic theory was composed of Ideas or +Forms such as Manness or Horseness[124] (called by Plato the [Greek: +Au)to\-A)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: Au)to\-I(/ppos]), of which particular +men and horses were only disfigured, transitory, and ever-varying +photographs. Antisthenes denied what Plato affirmed, and as Plato +affirmed it. Aristotle denied it also; maintaining that genera, +species, and attributes, though distinguishable as separate predicates +of, or inherencies in, individuals--yet had no existence apart from +individuals. Aristotle was no less wanting than Antisthenes, in the +intellectual eye required for discerning the Platonic Ideas. +Antisthenes is said to have declared these Ideas to be mere thoughts +or conceptions ([Greek: psila\s e)nnoi/as]): _i.e._, merely subjective +or within the mind, without any object corresponding to them. This is +one of the various modes of presenting the theory of Ideas, resorted +to even in the Platonic Parmenidês, not by one who opposes that +theory, but by one seeking to defend it--_viz._, by Sokrates, when he +is hard pressed by the objections of the Eleate against the more +extreme and literal version of the theory.[125] It is remarkable, that +the objections ascribed to Parmenides against that version which +exhibits the Ideas as mere Concepts of and in the mind, are decidedly +less forcible than those which he urges against the other versions. + +[Footnote 124: We know from Plato himself (Theætêtus, p. 182 A) that +even the word [Greek: poio/tês], if not actually first introduced by +himself, was at any rate so recent as to be still repulsive, and to +require an Apology, If [Greek: poio/tês] was strange, [Greek: +a)nthrôpo/tês] and [Greek: i(ppo/tês] would be still more strange. +Antisthenes probably invented them, to present the doctrine which he +impugned in a dress of greater seeming absurdity.] + +[Footnote 125: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 132 B. See, afterwards, chapter +xxvii., Parmenides.] + +[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes about predication--he admits no +other predication but identical.] + +There is another singular doctrine, which Aristotle ascribes to +Antisthenes, and which Plato notices and confutes; alluding to its +author contemptuously, but not mentioning his name. Every name +(Antisthenes argued) has its own special reason or meaning ([Greek: +oi)kei=os[126] lo/gos]), declaring the essence of the thing named, and +differing from every other word: you cannot therefore truly predicate +any one word of any other, because the reason or meaning of the two is +different: there can be no true propositions except identical +propositions, in which the predicate is the same with the subject--"man +is man, good is good". "Man is good" was an inadmissible +proposition: affirming different things to be the same, or one thing +to be many.[127] Accordingly, it was impossible for two speakers +really to contradict each other. There can be no contradiction between +them if both declare the essence of the same thing--nor if neither of +them declare the essence of it--nor if one speaker declares the +essence of one thing, and another speaker that of another. But one of +these three cases must happen: therefore there can be no +contradiction.[128] + +[Footnote 126: Diogen. L. vi. 3. [Greek: Prôto/s te ô(ri/sato] +(Antisthenes) [Greek: lo/gon, ei)pô/n, lo/gos e)sti\n o( to\ ti/ ê)=n +ê)/ e)sti dêlô=n.]] + +[Footnote 127: Aristotle, Metaphy. [Greek: D]. 1024, b. 32, attributes +this doctrine to Antisthenes by name; which tends to prove that Plato +meant Antisthenes, though not naming him, in Sophist, p. 251 B, where +he notices the same doctrine. Compare Philêbus, p. 14 D. + +It is to be observed that a doctrine exactly the same as that which +Plato here censures in Antisthenes, will be found maintained by the +Platonic Sokrates himself, in Plato, Hippias Major, p. 304 A. See +chap, xiii. vol. ii. of the present work.] + +[Footnote 128: Aristot. Topic. i. p. 104, b. 20. [Greek: the/sis de/ +e)stin u(po/lêpsis para/doxos tô=n gnôri/môn tino\s kata\ +philosophi/an; oi(=on o(/ti ou)k e)/stin a)ntile/gein, katha/per +e)/phê A)ntisthe/nês]. + +Plato puts this [Greek: the/sis] into the mouth of Dionysodorus, in +the Euthydêmus--p. 286 B; but he says (or makes Sokrates say) that it +was maintained by many persons, and that it had been maintained by +Protagoras, and even by others yet more ancient. + +Antisthenes had discussed it specially in a treatise of three sections +polemical against Plato--[Greek: Sa/thôn, ê)\ peri\ tou= a)ntile/gein, +a, b, g] (Diog. L. vi. 16).] + +[Side-note: The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of +Aristotle.] + +The works of Antisthenes being lost, we do not know how he himself +stated his own doctrine, nor what he said on behalf of it, declaring +contradiction to be impossible. Plato sets aside the doctrine as +absurd and silly; Aristotle--since he cites it as a paradox, apt for +dialectical debate, where the opinion of a philosopher stood opposed +to what was generally received--seems to imply that there were +plausible arguments to be urged in its favour.[129] And that the +doctrine actually continued to be held and advocated, in the +generation not only after Antisthenes but after Aristotle--we may see +by the case of Stilpon: who maintained (as Antisthenes had done) that +none but identical propositions, wherein the predicate was a +repetition of the subject, were admissible: from whence it followed +(as Aristotle observed) that there could be no propositions either +false or contradictory. Plutarch,[130] in reciting this doctrine of +Stilpon (which had been vehemently impugned by the Epikurean Kolôtês), +declares it to have been intended only in jest. There is no ground for +believing that it was so intended: the analogy of Antisthenes goes to +prove the contrary. + +[Footnote 129: Aristotle (Met. [Greek: D]. 1024) represents the +doctrine of Antisthenes, That contradictory and false propositions are +impossible--as a consequence deduced from the position laid down--That +no propositions except identical propositions were admissible. If you +grant this last proposition, the consequences will be undeniable. +Possibly Antisthenes may have reasoned in this way:"There are many +contradictory and false propositions now afloat; but this arises from +the way in which predication is conducted. So long as the predicate is +different from the subject, there is nothing _in the form of a +proposition_ to distinguish falsehood from truth (to distinguish +_Theætêtus sedet_, from _Theætêtus volat_--to take the instance in the +Platonic Sophistês--p. 263). There ought to be no propositions except +identical propositions: the form itself will then guarantee you +against both falsehood and contradiction: you will be sure always to +give [Greek: to\n oi)kei=on lo/gon tou= pra/gmatos]." There would be +nothing inconsistent in such a precept: but Aristotle might call it +silly [Greek: eu)êthô=s]), because, while shutting out falsehood and +contradiction, it would also shut out the great body of useful truth, +and would divest language of its usefulness as a means of +communication. + +Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Römisch. Phil. vol. ii. xciii. 1) gives +something like this as the probable purpose of Antisthenes--"Nur Eins +bezeichne die Wesenheit eines Dinges--die Wesenheit als einfachen +Träger des mannichfaltigen der Eigenschaften"(this is rather too +Aristotelian)--"zur Abwehr von Streitigkeiten auf dem Gebiete der +Erscheinungen". Compare also Ritter, Gesch. Phil. vol. ii. p. 130. We +read in the Kratylus, that there were persons who maintained the +rectitude of all names: to say that a name was not right, was (in +their view) tantamount to saying that it was no name at all, but only +an unmeaning sound (Plato, Krat. pp. 429-430).] + +[Footnote 130: Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, p. 1119 C-D.] + +[Side-note: Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental +predication.] + +Stilpon, however, while rejecting (as Antisthenes had done) the +universal Ideas[131] or Forms, took a larger ground of objection. He +pronounced them to be inadmissible both as subject and as predicate. +If you speak of Man in general (he said), what, or whom, do you mean? +You do not mean A or B, or C or D, &c.: that is, you do not mean any +one of these more than any other. You have no determinate meaning at +all: and beyond this indefinite multitude of individuals, there is +nothing that the term can mean. Again, as to predicates--when you say, +_The man runs_, or _The man is good_, what do you mean by the +predicate _runs_, or is _good_? You do not mean any thing specially +belonging to man: for you apply the same predicates to many other +subjects: you say _runs_, about a horse, a dog, or a cat--you say +_good_ in reference to food, medicine, and other things besides. Your +predicate, therefore, being applied to many and diverse subjects, +belongs not to one of them more than to another: in other words, it +belongs to neither: the predication is not admissible.[132] + +[Footnote 131: Hegel (Geschichte der Griech. Philos. i. p. 123) and +Marbach (Geschichte der Philos. s. 91) disallow the assertion of +Diogenes, that Stilpon [Greek: a)nê/rei ta\ ei)/dê]. They maintain +that Stilpon rejected the particular affirmations, and allowed only +general or universal affirmations. This construction appears to me +erroneous.] + +[Footnote 132: Diog. L. ii. 113; Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, 1119-1120. +[Greek: ei) peri\ i(/ppou to\ tre/chein katêgorou=men, ou)/ phêsi] +(Stilpon) [Greek: tau)to\n ei)=nai tô=| peri\ ou)= katêgorei=tai to\ +katêgorou/menon--e)kate/rou ga\r a)paitou/menoi to\n lo/gon, ou) to\n +au)to\n a)podi/domen u(pe\r a)mphoi=n. O(/then a(marta/nein tou\s +e(/teron e(te/rou katêgorou=ntas. Ei) me\n ga\r tau)ton e)sti tô=| +a)nthrô/pô| to\ a)gatho/n, kai\ tô=| i(/ppô| to\ tre/chein, pô=s kai\ +siti/ou kai\ pharma/kou to\ a)gatho/n? kai\ nê\ Di/a pa/lin le/ontos +kai\ kuno\s to\ tre/chein, katêgorou=men? ei) d' e(/teron, ou)k +o)rthô=s _a)/nthrôpon a)gatho\n kai\ i(/ppon tre/chein_ le/gomen]. + +Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. p. 269-282) gives a different vein +of reasoning respecting predication,--yet a view which illustrates +this doctrine of Antisthenes. Sextus does not require that all +predication shall be restricted to identical predication: but he +maintains that you cannot define any general word. To define, he says, +is to enunciate the essence of that which is defined. But when you +define Man--"a mortal, rational animal, capable of reason and +knowledge"--you give only certain attributes of Man, which go along +with the essence--you do not give the essence itself. If you enumerate +even all the accompaniments ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]), you will still +fail to tell me what the essence of Man is: which is what I desire to +know, and what you profess to do by your definition. It is useless to +enumerate accompaniments, until you explain to me what the essence is +which they accompany. + +These are ingenious objections, which seem to me quite valid, if you +assume the logical subject to be a real, absolute essence, apart from +all or any of its predicates. And this is a frequent illusion, +favoured even by many logicians. We enunciate the subject first, then +the predicate; and because the subject can be conceived after +abstraction of this, that, _or_ the other predicates--we are apt to +imagine that it may be conceived without _all or any_ of the +predicates. But this is an illusion. If you suppress all predicates, +the subject or supposed substratum vanishes along with them: just as +the Genus vanishes, if you suppress all the different species of it. + +"Scais-tu au moins ce que c'est que la matière? Très-bien. . . Par +exemple, cette pierre est grise, est d'une telle forme, a ses trois +dimensions; elle est pésante et divisible. Eh bien (dit le Sirien), +cette chose qui te paroît être divisible, pésante, et grise, me dirois +tu bien ce que c'est? Tu vois quelques attributs: mais le fond de la +chose, le connois tu? Non, dit l'autre. Tu ne scais donc point ce que +c'est que la matière." (Voltaire, Micromégas, c. 7.) + +"Le fond de la chose"--the Ding an sich--is nothing but the name +itself, divested of every fraction of meaning: it is _titulus sine +re_. But the name being familiar, and having been always used with a +meaning, still appears invested with much of the old emotional +associations, even though it has been stripped of all its meaning by +successive acts of abstraction. If you subtract from four, 1 + 1 + 1 + +1, there will remain zero. But by abstracting, from the subject _man_, +all its predicates, real and possible, you cannot reduce it to zero. +The _name_ man always remains, and appears by old association to carry +with it some meaning--though the meaning can no longer be defined. + +This illusion is well pointed out in a valuable passage of Cabanis (Du +Degré de Certitude de la Médecine, p. 61):-- + +"Je pourrois d'ailleurs demander ce qu'on entend par la nature et les +causes premières des maladies. Nous connoissons de leur nature, ce que +les faits en manifestent. Nous savons, par exemple, que la fièvre +produit tels et tels changements: ou plutôt, c'est par ces changements +qu'elle se montre à nos yeux: c'est _par eux seuls qu'elle existe pour +nous_. Quand un homme tousse, crache du sang, respire avec peine, +ressent une douleur de côté, a le pouls plus vite et plus dur, la peau +plus chaude que dans l'état naturel--l'on dit qu'il est attaqué d'une +pleurésie. Mais qu'est ce donc _qu'une pleurésie_? On vous répliquera +que c'est une maladie, dans laquelle tous, ou presque tous, ces +accidents se trouvent combinés. S'il en manque un ou plusieurs, ce +n'est point la pleurésie, du moins la vraie pleurésie essentielle des +écoles. _C'est donc le concours de ces accidents qui la constitue._ Le +mot _pleurésie ne fait que les retracer d'une manière plus courte. Ce +mot n'est pas un être par lui-même_: il exprime une abstraction de +l'esprit, et réveille par un seul trait toutes les images d'un assez +grand tableau. + +"Ainsi lorsque, non content de connoître une maladie par ce qu'elle +offre à nos sens, par ce qui seul la constitue, et sans quoi elle +n'existeroit pas, _vous demandez encore quelle est sa nature en +elle-même, quelle est son essence--c'est comme si vous demandiez quelle +est la nature ou l'essence d'un mot, d'une pure abstraction._ Il n'y a +donc pas beaucoup de justesse à dire, d'un air de triomphe, que les +médecins ignorent même la nature de la fièvre, et que sans cesse ils +agissent dans des circonstances, ou manient des instruments, dont +l'essence leur est inconnue."] + +[Side-note: Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could +belong to more than one subject.] + +Stilpon (like Antisthenes, as I have remarked above) seems to have had +in his mind a type of predication, similar to the type of reasoning +which Aristotle laid down the syllogism: such that the form of the +proposition should be itself a guarantee for the truth of what was +affirmed. Throughout the ancient philosophy, especially in the more +methodised debates between the Academics and Sceptics on one side, and +the Stoics on the other--what the one party affirmed and the other +party denied, was, the existence of a Criterion of Truth: some +distinguishable mark, such as falsehood could not possibly carry. To +find this infallible mark in propositions, Stilpon admitted none +except identical. While agreeing with Antisthenes, that no predicate +could belong to a subject different from itself, he added a new +argument, by pointing out that predicates applied to one subject were +also applied to many other subjects. Now if the predicates belonged to +one, they could not (in his view) belong to the others: and therefore +they did not really belong to any. He considered that predication +involved either identity or special and exclusive implication of the +predicate with the subject. + +[Side-note: Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenidês.] + +Stilpon was not the first who had difficulty in explaining to himself +how one and the same predicate could be applied to many different +subjects. The difficulty had already been set forth in the Platonic +Parmenidês.[133] How can the Form (Man, White, Good, &c.) be present +at one and the same time in many distinct individuals? It cannot be +present as a whole in each: nor can it be divided, and thus present +partly in one, partly in another. How therefore can it be present at +all in any of them? In other words, how can the One be Many, and how +can the Many be One? Of this difficulty (as of many others) Plato +presents no solution, either in the Parmenidês or anywhere else.[134] +Aristotle alludes to several contemporaries or predecessors who felt +it. Stilpon reproduces it in his own way. It is a very real +difficulty, requiring to be dealt with by those who lay down a theory +of predication; and calling upon them to explain the functions of +general propositions, and the meaning of general terms. + +[Footnote 133: Plato, Parmenidês, p. 131. Compare also Philêbus, p. +15, and Stallbaum's Proleg. to the Parmenidês, pp. 46-47. The long +commentary of Proklus (v. 100-110. pp. 670-682 of the edition of +Stallbaum) amply attests the [Greek: duskoli/an] of the problem. + +The argument of Parmenidês (in the dialogue called Parmenidês) is +applied to the Platonic [Greek: ei)/dê] and to [Greek: ta\ +mete/chonta]. But the argument is just as much applicable to +attributes, genera, species: to all general predicates.] + +[Footnote 134: Aristot. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 26-36. + +Lykophron and some others anterior to Aristotle proposed to elude the +difficulty, by ceasing to use the substantive verb as copula in +predication: instead of saying [Greek: Sôkra/tês e)sti\ leuko/s], they +said either [Greek: Sôkra/tês leuko/s], simply, or [Greek: Sôkra/tês +leleu/kôtai]. + +This is a remarkable evidence of the difficulty arising, even in these +early days of logic, about the logical function of the copula.] + +[Side-note: Menedêmus disallowed all negative predication.] + +Menedêmus the Eretrian, one among the hearers and admirers of Stilpon, +combined even more than Stilpon the attributes of the Cynic with those +of the Megaric. He was fearless in character, and uncontrouled in +speech, delivering harsh criticisms without regard to offence given: +he was also a great master of ingenious dialectic and puzzling +controversy.[135] His robust frame, grave deportment, and simplicity +of life, inspired great respect; especially as he occupied a +conspicuous position, and enjoyed political influence at Eretria. He +is said to have thought meanly both of Plato and Xenokrates. We are +told that Menedêmus, like Antisthenes and Stilpon, had doctrines of +his own on the subject of predication. He disallowed all negative +propositions, admitting none but affirmative: moreover even of the +affirmative propositions, he disallowed all the hypothetical, +approving only the simple and categorical.[136] + +[Footnote 135: Diog. L. ii. 127-134. [Greek: ê)=n ga\r kai\ +e)piko/ptês kai\ par)r(êsiastê/s.]] + +[Footnote 136: Diog. L. ii. 134.] + +It is impossible to pronounce confidently respecting these doctrines, +without knowing the reasons upon which they were grounded. +Unfortunately these last have not been transmitted to us. But we may +be very sure that there were reasons, sufficient or insufficient: and +the knowledge of those reasons would have enabled us to appreciate +more fully the state of the Greek mind, in respect to logical theory, +in and before the year 300 B.C. + +[Side-note: Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and +complex objects. Simple objects undefinable.] + +Another doctrine, respecting knowledge and definition, is ascribed by +Aristotle to "the disciples of Antisthenes and other such uninstructed +persons": it is also canvassed by Plato in the Theætêtus,[137] without +specifying its author, yet probably having Antisthenes in view. As far +as we can make out a doctrine which both these authors recite as +opponents, briefly and their own way, it is as follows:--"Objects must +be distinguished into--1. Simple or primary; and 2. Compound or +secondary combinations of these simple elements. This last class, the +compounds, may be explained or defined, because you can enumerate the +component elements. By such analysis, and by the definition founded +thereupon, you really come to _know_ them--describe them--predicate +about them. But the first class, the simple or primary objects, can +only be perceived by sense and named: they cannot be analysed, +defined, or known. You can only predicate about them that they are +like such and such other things: _e.g., silver_, you cannot say what +it is in itself, but only that it is like tin, or like something else. +There may thus be a _ratio_ and a definition of any compound object, +whether it be an object of perception or of conception: because one of +the component elements will serve as Matter or Subject of the +proposition, and the other as Form or Predicate. But there can be no +definition of any one of the component elements separately taken: +because there is neither Matter nor Form to become the Subject and +Predicate of a defining proposition." + +[Footnote 137: Plato, Theætêt, pp. 201-202. Aristotel. Metaph. [Greek: +Ê]. 1043, b. 22.] + +This opinion, ascribed to the followers of Antisthenes, is not in +harmony with the opinion ascribed by Aristotle to Antisthenes himself +(_viz._, That no propositions, except identical propositions, were +admissible): and we are led to suspect that the first opinion must +have been understood or qualified by its author in some manner not now +determinable. But the second opinion, drawing a marked logical +distinction between simple and complex Objects, has some interest from +the criticisms of Plato and Aristotle: both of whom select, for the +example illustrating the opinion, the syllable as the compound made up +of two or more letters which are its simple constituent elements. + +[Remarks of Plato on this doctrine.] + +Plato refutes the doctrine,[138] but in a manner not so much to prove +its untruth, as to present it for a verbal incongruity. How can you +properly say (he argues) that you _know_ the compound AB, when you +know neither A nor B separately? Now it may be incongruous to +restrict in this manner the use of the words _know--knowledge_: but +the distinction between the two cases is not denied by Plato. +Antisthenes said--"I feel a simple sensation (A or B) and can name it, +but I do not _know_ it: I can affirm nothing about it in itself, or +about its real essence. But the compound AB I do know, for I know its +essence: I can affirm about it that _it is_ compounded of A and B, and +this is its essence." Here is a real distinction: and Plato's argument +amounts only to affirming that it is an incorrect use of words to call +the compound _known_, when the component elements are not known. +Unfortunately the refutation of Plato is not connected with any +declaration of his own counter-doctrine, for Theætêtus ends in a +result purely negative. + +[Footnote 138: Plato, Theætêt. ut suprâ.] + +[Side-note: Remarks of Aristotle upon the same.] + +Aristotle, in his comment on the opinion of Antisthenes, makes us +understand better what it really is:--"Respecting simple essences (A +or B), I cannot tell what they really are: but I can tell what they +are like or unlike, _i.e._, I can compare them with other essences, +simple or compound. But respecting the compound AB, I can tell what it +really is: its essence is, to be compounded of A and B. And this I +call _knowing_ or _knowledge_."[139] The distinction here taken by +Antisthenes (or by his followers) is both real and useful: Plato does +not contest it: while Aristotle distinctly acknowledges it, only that +among the simple items he ranks both Percepta and Concepta. + +[Footnote 139: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. 1043, b. 24-32, with the +Scholia, p. 774, b. Br. + +Mr. J. S. Mill observes, Syst. of Logic, i. 5, 6, p. 116, +ed. 9:--"There is still another exceptional case, in which, though +the predicate is the name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm +nothing but resemblance: the class being founded not on resemblance in +any given particular, but on general unanalysable resemblance. The +classes in question are those into which our simple sensations, or +other simple feelings, are divided. Sensations of white, for instance, +are classed together, not because we can take them to pieces, and say, +they are alike in this, not alike in that but because we feel them to +be alike altogether, though in different degrees. When therefore I +say--The colour I saw yesterday was a white colour, or, The sensation +I feel is one of tightness--in both cases the attribute I affirm of +the colour or of the other sensation is mere resemblance: simple +likeness to sensations which I have had before, and which have had +that name bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other +concrete general names, are connotative: but they connote a mere +resemblance. When predicated of any individual feelings, the +information they convey is that of its likeness to the other feelings +which we have been accustomed to call by the same name."] + +[Side-note: Later Grecian Cynics--Monimus--Krates--Hipparchia.] + +Monimus a Syracusan, and Krates a Theban, with his wife +Hipparchia,[140] were successors of Diogenes in the Cynic vein of +philosophy: together with several others of less note. Both Monimus +and Krates are said to have been persons of wealthy condition,[141] +yet their minds were so powerfully affected by what they saw of +Diogenes, that they followed his example, renounced their wealth, and +threw themselves upon a life of poverty; with nothing beyond the +wallet and the threadbare cloak, but with fearless independence of +character, free censure of every one, and indifference to opinion. "I +choose as my country" (said Krates) "poverty and low esteem, which +fortune cannot assail: I am the fellow-citizen of Diogenes, whom the +snares of envy cannot reach."[142] Krates is said to have admonished +every one, whether they invited it or not: and to have gone unbidden +from house to house for the purpose of exhortation. His persistence in +this practice became so obtrusive that he obtained the title of "the +Door-Opener".[143] This feature, common to several other Cynics, +exhibits an approximation to the missionary character of Sokrates, as +described by himself in the Platonic Apology: a feature not found in +any of the other eminent heads of philosophy--neither in Plato nor in +Aristotle, Zeno, or Epikurus. + +[Footnote 140: Hipparchia was a native of Maroneia in Thrace; born in +a considerable station, and belonging to an opulent family. She came +to Athens with her brother Mêtroklês, and heard both Theophrastus and +Kratês. Both she and her brother became impressed with the strongest +admiration for Kratês: for his mode of life, as well as for his +discourses and doctrine. Rejecting various wealthy suitors, she +insisted upon becoming his wife, both against his will and against the +will of her parents. Her resolute enthusiasm overcame the reluctance +of both. She adopted fully his hard life, poor fare, and threadbare +cloak. She passed her days in the same discourses and controversies, +indifferent to the taunts which were addressed to her for having +relinquished the feminine occupations of spinning and weaving. +Diogenes Laertius found many striking dicta or replies ascribed to her +([Greek: a)/lla muri/a tê=s philoso/phou] vi. 96-98). He gives an +allusion made to her by the contemporary comic poet Menander, who (as +I before observed) handled the Cynics of his time as Aristophanes, +Eupolis, &c., had handled Sokrates-- + +[Greek: Sumperipatê/seis ga\r tri/bôn' e)/chous e)moi\, +ô(/sper Kra/têti tô=| Kunikô=| poth' ê( gunê\. +Kai\ thugate/r' e)xe/dôk' e)kei=nos, ô(s e)/phê +au)to\s, e)pi\ peira=| dou\s tria/konth' ê(me/ras]. +(vi. 93.)] + +[Footnote 141: Diog, L. vi. 82-88. [Greek: Mo/nimos o( Ku/ôn], Sext. +Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 48-88. + +About Krates, Plutarch, De Vit. Aere Alieno, 7, p. 831 F.] + +[Footnote 142: Diog. L. vi. 93. [Greek: e)/chein de\ patri/da a)doxi/an +te kai\ peni/an, a)na/lôta tê=| tu/chê|: kai\--Dioge/nous ei)=nai +poli/tês a)nepibouleu/tou phtho/nô|]. The parody or verses of Krates, +about his city of Pera (the Wallet), vi. 85, are very spirited-- + +[Greek: Pê/rê tis po/lis e)sti\ me/sô| e)ni\ oi)/nopi tu/phô|], &c. + +Krates composed a collection of philosophical Epistles, which Diogenes +pronounces to be excellent, and even to resemble greatly the style of +Plato (vi. 98).] + +[Footnote 143: Diog. L. vi. 86, [Greek: e)kalei=to de\ +_thurepanoi/ktês_, dia\ to\ ei)s pa=san ei)sie/nai oi)ki/an kai\ +nouthetei=n]. Compare Seneca, Epist. 29.] + +[Side-note: Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus.] + +Among other hearers of Krates, who carried on, and at the same time +modified, the Cynic discipline, we have to mention Zeno, of Kitium in +Cyprus, who became celebrated as the founder of the Stoic sect. In him +the Cynic, Megaric, and Herakleitean tendencies may be said to have +partially converged, though with considerable modifications:[144] the +ascetic doctrines (without the ascetic practices or obtrusive +forwardness) of the Cynics--and the logical subtleties of the others. +He blended them, however, with much of new positive theory, both +physical and cosmological. His compositions were voluminous; and those +of the Stoic Chrysippus, after him, were still more numerous. The +negative and oppugning function, which in the fourth century B.C. had +been directed by the Megarics against Aristotle, was in the third +century B.C. transferred to the Platonists, or Academy represented by +Arkesilaus: whose formidable dialectic was brought to bear upon the +Stoic and Epikurean schools--both of them positive, though greatly +opposed to each other. + +[Footnote 144: Numenius ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 5.] + +* * * * * + +ARISTIPPUS. + + +Along with Antisthenes, among the hearers and companions of Sokrates, +stood another Greek of very opposite dispositions, yet equally marked +and original--Aristippus of Kyrênê. The stimulus of the Sokratic +method, and the novelty of the topics on which it was brought to bear, +operated forcibly upon both, prompting each of them to theorise in his +own way on the best plan of life. + +[Side-note: Aristippus--life, character, and doctrine.] + +Aristippus, a Kyrenean of easy circumstances, having heard of the +powerful ascendancy exercised by Sokrates over youth, came to Athens +for the express purpose of seeing him, and took warm interest in his +conversation.[145] He set great value upon mental cultivation and +accomplishments; but his habits of life were inactive, easy, and +luxurious. Upon this last count, one of the most interesting chapters +in the Xenophontic Memorabilia reports an interrogative lecture +addressed to him by Sokrates, in the form of dialogue.[146] + +[Footnote 145: Plutarch (De Curiositate, p. 516 A) says that +Aristippus informed himself, at the Olympic games, from Ischomachus +respecting the influence of Sokrates.] + +[Footnote 146: See the first chapter of the Second Book of the +Memorabilia. + +I give an abstract of the principal points in the dialogue, not a +literal translation.] + +[Side-note: Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus.] + +Sokrates points out to Aristippus that mankind may be distributed into +two classes: 1. Those who have trained themselves to habits of +courage, energy, bodily strength, and command over their desires and +appetites, together with practice in the actual work of life:--these +are the men who become qualified to rule, and who do actually rule. 2. +The rest of mankind, inferior in these points, who have no choice but +to obey, and who do obey.[147]--Men of the first or ruling class +possess all the advantages of life: they perform great exploits, and +enjoy a full measure of delight and happiness, so far as human +circumstances admit. Men of the second class are no better than +slaves, always liable to suffer, and often actually suffering, +ill-treatment and spoliation of the worst kind. To which of these +classes (Sokrates asks Aristippus) do you calculate on belonging--and +for which do you seek to qualify yourself?--To neither of them (replies +Aristippus). I do not wish to share the lot of the subordinate +multitude: but I have no relish for a life of command, with all the +fatigues, hardships, perils, &c., which are inseparable from it. I +prefer a middle course: I wish neither to rule, nor to be ruled, but +to be a freeman: and I consider freedom as the best guarantee for +happiness.[148] I desire only to pass through life as easily and +pleasantly as possible.[149]--Which of the two do you consider to live +most pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled? asks Sokrates.--I do not +rank myself with either (says Aristippus): nor do I enter into active +duties of citizenship anywhere: I pass from one city to another, but +everywhere as a stranger or non-citizen.--Your scheme is impracticable +(says Sokrates). You cannot obtain security in the way that you +propose. You will find yourself suffering wrong and distress along +with the subordinates[150]--and even worse than the subordinates: for +a stranger, wherever he goes, is less befriended and more exposed to +injury than the native citizens. You will be sold into slavery, though +you are fit for no sort of work: and your master will chastise you +until you become fit for work.--But (replies Aristippus) this very art +of ruling, which you consider to be happiness,[151] is itself a hard +life, a toilsome slavery, not only stripped of enjoyment, but full of +privation and suffering. A man must be a fool to embrace such +discomforts of his own accord.--It is that very circumstance (says +Sokrates), that he does embrace them of his own accord--which renders +them endurable, and associates them with feelings of pride and +dignity. They are the price paid beforehand, for a rich reward to +come. He who goes through labour and self-denial, for the purpose of +gaining good friends or subduing enemies, and for the purpose of +acquiring both mental and bodily power, so that he may manage his own +concerns well and may benefit both his friends and his country--such a +man will be sure to find his course of labour pleasurable. He will +pass his life in cheerful[152] satisfaction, not only enjoying his own +esteem and admiration, but also extolled and envied by others. On the +contrary, whoever passes his earlier years in immediate pleasures and +indolent ease, will acquire no lasting benefit either in mind or body. +He will have a soft lot at first, but his future will be hard and +dreary.[153] + +[Footnote 147: Xen. Memor. ii. 1, 1 seq. [Greek: to\n me\n o(/pôs +i(kano\s e)/stai a)/rchein, to\n de\ o(/pôs mê/d' a)ntipoiê/setai +a)rchê=s--tou\s a)rchikou/s.]] + +[Footnote 148: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 11. [Greek: a)ll' ei)=nai ti/s moi +dokei= me/sê tou/tôn o(do/s, ê)\n peirô=mai badi/zein, ou)/te di' +a)rchê=s, ou)/te dia\ doulei/as, a)lla\ di' e)leutheri/as, ê)/per +ma/lista pro\s eu)daimoni/an a)/gei.]] + +[Footnote 149: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 9. [Greek: e)mauton toi/nun ta/ttô +ei)s tou\s boulome/nous ê)=| r(a=|sta kai\ ê(/dista bioteu/ein.]] + +[Footnote 150: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 12. [Greek: ei) me/ntoi e)n +a)nthrô/pois ô)\n mê/te a)/rchein a)xiô/seis mê/te a)/rchesthai, mê/te +tou\s a)/rchontas e(kô\n therapeu/seis, oi)=mai/ se o(ra=|n ô(s +e)pi/stantai oi( krei/ttones tou\s ê(/ttonas kai\ koinê=| kai\ i)di/a| +klai/ontas kathi/santes, ô(s dou/lois chrê=sthai]. + +What follows is yet more emphatic, about the unjust oppression of +rulers, and the suffering on the part of subjects.] + +[Footnote 151: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 17. [Greek: A)lla\ ga\r, ô)= +Sô/krates, oi( ei)s tê\n basilikê\n te/chnên paideuo/menoi, ê)\n +dokei=s moi su\ nomi/zein eu)daimoni/an ei)=nai]. + +Compare Memor. ii. 3, 4.] + +[Footnote 152: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 19. [Greek: pô=s ou)k oi)/esthai chrê\ +tou/tous kai\ ponei=n ê(de/ôs ei)s ta\ toiau=ta, kai\ zê=n +eu)phronome/nous, a)game/nous me\n e(autou\s, e)painoume/nous de\ kai\ +zêloume/nous u(po\ tô=n a)/llôn?] + +[Footnote 153: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 20, cited from Epicharmus:-- + +[Greek: mê\ ta\ malaka\ mô/eo, mê\ ta\ sklê/r' e)/chê|s.]] + +[Side-note: Choice of Hêraklês.] + +Sokrates enforces his lecture by reciting to Aristippus the memorable +lecture or apologue, which the Sophist Prodikus was then delivering in +lofty diction to numerous auditors[154]--the fable still known as the +Choice of Hêraklês. Virtue and Pleasure (the latter of the two being +here identified with Evil or Vice) are introduced as competing for the +direction of the youthful Hêraklês. Each sets forth her case, in +dramatic antithesis. Pleasure is introduced as representing altogether +the gratification of the corporeal appetites and the love of repose: +while Virtue replies by saying, that if youth be employed altogether +in pursuing such delights, at the time when the appetites are most +vigorous--the result will be nothing but fatal disappointment, +accompanied with entire loss of the different and superior pleasures +available in mature years and in old age. Youth is the season of +labour: the physical appetites must be indulged sparingly, and only at +the call of actual want: accomplishments of body and mind must be +acquired in that season, which will enable the mature man to perform +in after life great and glorious exploits. He will thus realise the +highest of all human delights--the love of his friends and the +admiration of his countrymen--the sound of his own praises and the +reflexion upon his own deserts. At the price of a youth passed in +labour and self-denial, he will secure the fullest measure of mature +and attainable happiness. + +[Footnote 154: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21-34. [Greek: e)n tô=| suggra/mmati +tô=| peri\ Ê(rakle/ous, o(/per dê\ kai\ plei/stois +e)pidei/knutai--megaleiote/rois r(ê/masin.]] + +"It is worth your while, Aristippus" (says Sokrates, in concluding +this lecture), "to bestow some reflexion on what is to happen in the +latter portions of your life." + +[Side-note: Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting +Good and Evil.] + +This dialogue (one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and +probably reported by Xenophon from actual hearing) is valuable in +reference not only to Aristippus, but also to Sokrates himself. Many +recent historians of philosophy describe Sokrates and Plato as setting +up an idea of Virtue or Good Absolute (_i.e._ having no essential +reference to the happiness or security of the agent or of any one +else) which they enforce--and an idea of Vice or Evil Absolute (_i.e._ +having no essential reference to suffering or peril, or +disappointment, either of the agent or of any one else) which they +denounce and discommend and as thereby refuting the Sophists, who are +said to have enforced Virtue and denounced Vice only relatively--_i.e._ +in consequence of the bearing of one and the other upon the +security and happiness of the agent or of others. Whether there be any +one doctrine or style of preaching which can be fairly ascribed to the +Sophists as a class, I will not again discuss here: but I believe that +the most eminent among them, Protagoras and Prodikus, held the +language here ascribed to them. But it is a mistake to suppose that +upon this point Sokrates was their opponent. The Xenophontic Sokrates +(a portrait more resembling reality than the Platonic) always holds +this same language: the Platonic Sokrates not always, yet often. In +the dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, as well as in the +apologue of Prodikus, we see that the devotion of the season of youth +to indulgence and inactive gratification of appetite, is blamed as +productive of ruinous consequences--as entailing loss of future +pleasures, together with a state of weakness which leaves no +protection against future suffering; while great care is taken to +show, that though laborious exercise is demanded during youth, such +labour will be fully requited by the increased pleasures and happiness +of after life. The pleasure of being praised, and the pleasure of +seeing good deeds performed by one's self, are especially insisted on. +On this point both Sokrates and Prodikus concur.[155] + +[Footnote 155: Xenoph. Mem. ii. 1, 31. [Greek: tou= de\ pa/ntôn +ê(di/stou a)kou/smatos, e)pai/nou seautê=s, a)nê/koos ei)=, kai\ tou= +pa/ntôn ê(distou thea/matos a)the/atos; ou)de\n ga\r pô/pote seautê=s +e)/rgon kalo\n tethe/asai. . . . + +ta\ me\n ê(de/a e)n tê=| veo/têti diadramo/ntes, ta\ de\ chalepa\ e)s +to\ gê=ras a)pothe/menoi.]] + +[Side-note: Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic +Sokrates.] + +If again we compare the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic +Sokrates, we shall find that the lecture of the former to Aristippus +coincides sufficiently with the theory laid down by the latter in the +dialogue Protagoras; to which theory the Sophist Protagoras is +represented as yielding a reluctant adhesion. But we shall find also +that it differs materially from the doctrine maintained by Sokrates in +the Platonic Gorgias. Nay, if we follow the argument addressed by the +Xenophontic Sokrates to Aristippus, we perceive that it is in +substance similar to that which the Platonic dialogue Gorgias puts in +the mouth of the rhetor Pôlus and the politician Kalliklês. The +Xenophontic Sokrates distributes men into two classes--the rulers and +the ruled: the former strong, well-armed, and well-trained, who enjoy +life at the expense of the submission and suffering of the latter: the +former committing injustice, the latter enduring injustice. He +impresses upon Aristippus the misery of being confounded with the +suffering many, and exhorts him to qualify himself by a laborious +apprenticeship for enrolment among the ruling few. If we read the +Platonic Gorgias, we shall see that this is the same strain in which +Pôlus and Kalliklês address Sokrates, when they invite him to exchange +philosophy for rhetoric, and to qualify himself for active political +life. "Unless you acquire these accomplishments, you will be helpless +and defenceless against injury and insult from others: while, if you +acquire them, you will raise yourself to political influence, and will +exercise power over others, thus obtaining the fullest measure of +enjoyment which life affords: see the splendid position to which the +Macedonian usurper Archelaus has recently exalted himself.[156] +Philosophy is useful, when studied in youth for a short time as +preface to professional and political apprenticeship: but if a man +perseveres in it and makes it the occupation of life, he will not only +be useless to others, but unable to protect himself; he will be +exposed to suffer any injustice which the well-trained and powerful +men may put upon him." To these exhortations of Pôlus and Kalliklês +Sokrates replies by admitting their case as true matter of fact. "I +know that I am exposed to such insults and injuries: but my life is +just and innocent. If I suffer, I shall suffer wrong: and those who do +the wrong will thereby inflict upon themselves a greater mischief than +they inflict upon me. Doing wrong is worse for the agent than +suffering wrong."[157] + +[Footnote 156: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 466-470-486.] + +[Footnote 157: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 508-509-521-527 C. [Greek: kai\ +e)/aso/n tina sou= kataphronê=sai ô(s a)noê/tou, kai\ propêlaki/sai +e)a\n bou/lêtai, kai\ nai\ ma\ Di/a su/ ge thar)r(ô=n pata/xai tê\n +a)/timon tau/tên plêgê/n; ou)de\n ga\r deino\n pei/sei, e)a\n tô=| +o)/nti ê(=|s kalo\s ka)gatho/s, a)skô=n a)retê/n.]] + +[Side-note: Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus--Kallikes in +Platonic Gorgias.] + +There is indeed this difference between the Xenophontic Sokrates in +his address to Aristippus, and the Platonic Kalliklês in his +exhortation to Sokrates: That whereas Kalliklês proclaims and even +vindicates it as natural justice and right, that the strong should +gratify their desires by oppressing and despoiling the weak--the +Xenophontic Sokrates merely asserts such oppression as an actual fact, +notorious and undeniable,[158] without either approving or blaming it. +Plato, constructing an imaginary conversation with the purpose that +Sokrates shall be victorious, contrives intentionally and with +dramatic consistency that the argument of Kalliklês shall be advanced +in terms so invidious and revolting that no one else would be bold +enough to speak it out:[159] which contrivance was the more necessary, +as Sokrates is made not only to disparage the poets, rhetors, and most +illustrious statesmen of historical Athens, but to sustain a thesis in +which he admits himself to stand alone, opposed to aristocrats as well +as democrats.[160] Yet though there is this material difference in the +manner of handling, the plan of life which the Xenophontic Sokrates +urges upon Aristippus, and the grounds upon which he enforces it, are +really the same as those which Kalliklês in the Platonic Gorgias urges +upon Sokrates. "Labour to qualify yourself for active political +power"--is the lesson addressed in the one case to a wealthy man who +passed his life in ease and indulgence, in the other case to a poor +man who devoted himself to speculative debate on general questions, +and to cross-examination of every one who would listen and answer. The +man of indulgence, and the man of speculation,[161] were both of them +equally destitute of those active energies which were necessary to +confer power over others, or even security against oppression by +others. + +[Footnote 158: If we read the conversation alleged by Thucydides (v. +94-105-112) to have taken place between the Athenian generals and the +executive council of Melos, just before the siege of that island by +the Athenians, we shall see that this same language is held by the +Athenians. "You, the Melians, being much weaker, must submit to us who +are much stronger; this is the universal law and necessity of nature, +which we are not the first to introduce, but only follow out, as +others have done before us, and will do after us. Submit--or it will +be worse for you. No middle course, or neutrality, is open to you."] + +[Footnote 159: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-487-492.] + +[Footnote 160: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 472-521.] + +[Footnote 161: If we read the treatise of Plutarch, [Greek: Peri\ +Stôi/kôn e)nantiôma/tôn] (c. 2-3, p. 1033 C-D), we shall see that the +Stoic writers, Zeno, Kleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater, all +of them earnestly recommended a life of active citizenship and +laborious political duty, as incumbent upon philosophers not less than +upon others; and that they treated with contempt a life of literary +leisure and speculation. Chrysippus explicitly declared [Greek: +ou)de\n diaphe/rein to\n scholastiko\n bi/on tou= ê(donikou=] _i. e._ +that the speculative philosopher who kept aloof from political +activity, was in substance a follower of Epikurus. Tacitus holds much +the same language (Hist. iv. 5) when he says about Helvidius +Priscus:--"ingenium illustre altioribus studiis juvenis admodum dedit: +non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo +constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret," &c. + +The contradiction which Plutarch notes is, that these very Stoic +philosophers (Chrysippus and the others) who affected to despise all +modes of life except active civic duty--were themselves, all, men of +literary leisure, spending their lives away from their native cities, +in writing and talking philosophy. The same might have been said about +Sokrates and Plato (except as to leaving their native cities), both of +whom incurred the same reproach for inactivity as Sokrates here +addresses to Aristippus.] + +[Side-note: Language held by Aristippus--his scheme of life.] + +In the Xenophontic dialogue, Aristippus replies to Sokrates that the +apprenticeship enjoined upon him is too laborious, and that the +exercise of power, itself laborious, has no charm for him. He desires +a middle course, neither to oppress nor to be oppressed: neither to +command, nor to be commanded--like Otanes among the seven Persian +conspirators.[162] He keeps clear of political obligation, and seeks +to follow, as much as he can, his own individual judgment. Though +Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue, is made to declare this middle +course impossible, yet it is substantially the same as what the +Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias aspires to:--moreover the same as +what the real Sokrates at Athens both pursued as far as he could, and +declared to be the only course consistent with his security.[163] The +Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias declares emphatically that no man can +hope to take active part in the government of a country, unless he be +heartily identified in spirit with the ethical and political system of +the country: unless he not merely professes, but actually and +sincerely shares, the creed, doctrines, tastes, and modes of +appreciation prevalent among the citizens.[164] Whoever is deficient +in this indispensable condition, must be content "to mind his own +business and to abstain from active meddling with public affairs". +This is the course which the Platonic Sokrates claims both for himself +and for the philosopher generally:[165] it is also the course which +Aristippus chooses for himself, under the different title of a middle +way between the extortion of the ruler and the suffering of the +subordinate. And the argument of Sokrates that no middle way is +possible--far from refuting Aristippus (as Xenophon says that it +did)[166] is founded upon an incorrect assumption: had it been +correct, neither literature nor philosophy could have been developed. + +[Footnote 162: Herodot. iii. 80-83.] + +[Footnote 163: Plato, Apol. So. p. 32 A. [Greek: i)diôteu/ein, a)lla\ +mê\ dêmosieu/ein].] + +[Footnote 164: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 510-513. [Greek: Ti/s ou)=n pot' +e)sti\ te/chnê tê=s paraskeuê=s tou= mêde\n a)dikei=sthai ê)\ ô(s +o)li/gista? ske/psai ei)/ soi dokei= ê(=|per e)moi/. e)moi\ me\n ga\r +dokei= ê(/de; ê)\ au)to\n a)/rchein dei=n e)n tê=| po/lei ê)\ kai\ +turannei=n, ê)\ tê=s u(parchou/sês politei/as e(tai=ron ei)=nai]. +(This is exactly the language which Sokrates holds to Aristippus, +Xenoph. Memor. ii. 1, 12.) + +[Greek: o(\s a)\n o(moê/thês ô)\n, tau)ta pse/gôn kai\ e)painô=n, +e)the/lê| a)/rchesthai kai\ u(pokei=sthai tô=| a)/rchonti--eu)thu\s +e)k ne/ou e)thi/zein au(to\n toi=s au)toi=s chai/rein kai\ +a)/chthesthai tô=| despo/tê|] (510 D). [Greek: ou) ga\r mimêtê\n dei= +ei)=nai a)ll' au)tophuô=s o(/moion tou/tois] (513 B).] + +[Footnote 165: Plato, Gorgias, p. 526 C-D. (Compare Republic, vi. p. +496 D.) [Greek: a)ndro\s i)diô/tou ê)\ a)/llou tino/s, ma/lista me/n, +e)/gôge/ phêmi, ô)= Kalli/kleis, philoso/phou ta\ au(tou= pra/xantos +kai\ ou) polupragmonê/santos e)n tô=| bi/ô|--kai\ dê\ kai\ se\ +a)ntiparakalô=] (Sokrates to Kalliklês) [Greek: e)pi\ tou=ton to\n +bi/on]. Upon these words Routh remarks: "Respicitur inter hæc verba ad +Calliclis orationem, quâ rerum civilium tractatio et [Greek: +polupragmosu/nê] Socrati persuadentur,"--which is the same invitation +as the Xenophontic Sokrates addresses to Aristippus. Again, in Plat. +Republ. viii. pp. 549 C, 550 A, we read, that corruption of the +virtuous character begins by invitations to the shy youth to depart +from the quiet plan of life followed by a virtuous father (who is +[Greek: ta\ e(autou= pra/ttei]) and to enter on a career of active +political ambition. The youth is induced, by instigation of his mother +and relatives without, to pass from [Greek: a)pragmosu/nê] to [Greek: +philopragmosu/nê], which is described as a change for the worse. Even +in Xenophon (Memor. iii. 11, 16) Sokrates recognises and jests upon +his own [Greek: a)pragmosu/nê].] + +[Footnote 166: Xen. Mem. iii. 8, 1. Diogenes L. says (and it is +probable enough, from radical difference of character) that Xenophon +was adversely disposed to Aristippus. In respect to other persons +also, Xenophon puts invidious constructions (for which at any rate no +ground is shown) upon their purposes in questioning Sokrates: thus, in +the dialogue (i. 6) with the Sophist Antiphon, he says that Antiphon +questioned Sokrates in order to seduce him away from his companions +(Mem. i. 6, 1).] + +[Side-note: Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the +character of the hearer.] + +The real Sokrates, since he talked incessantly and with every one, +must of course have known how to diversify his conversation and adapt +it to each listener. Xenophon not only attests this generally,[167] +but has preserved the proofs of it in his Memorabilia--real +conversations, reported though doubtless dressed up by himself. The +conversations which he has preserved relate chiefly to piety and to +the duties and proceedings of active life: and to the necessity of +controuling the appetites: these he selected partly because they +suited his proclaimed purpose of replying to the topics of indictment, +partly because they were in harmony with his own _idéal_. Xenophon was +a man of action, resolute in mind and vigorous in body, performing +with credit the duties of the general as well as of the soldier. His +heroes were men like Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus--warriors, +horsemen, hunters, husbandmen, always engaged in active competition +for power, glory, or profit, and never shrinking from danger, fatigue, +or privation. For a life of easy and unambitious indulgence, even +though accompanied by mental and speculative activity--"homines ignavâ +operâ et philosophiâ sententiâ"--he had no respect. It was on this +side that the character of Aristippus certainly seemed to be, and +probably really was, the most defective. Sokrates employed the +arguments the most likely to call forth within him habits of action--to +render him [Greek: praktikô/teron].[168] In talking with the +presumptuous youth Glaukon, and with the diffident Charmides,[169] +Sokrates used language adapted to correct the respective infirmities +of each. In addressing Kritias and Alkibiades, he would consider it +necessary not only to inculcate self-denial as to appetite, but to +repress an exorbitance of ambition.[170] But in dealing with +Aristippus, while insisting upon command of appetite and acquirement +of active energy, he at the same time endeavours to kindle ambition, +and the love of command: he even goes so far as to deny the +possibility of a middle course, and to maintain (what Kritias and +Alkibiades[171] would have cordially approved) that there was no +alternative open, except between the position of the oppressive +governors and that of the suffering subjects. Addressed to Aristippus, +these topics were likely to thrust forcibly upon his attention the +danger of continued indulgences during the earlier years of life, and +the necessity, in view to his own future security, for training in +habits of vigour, courage, self-command, endurance. + +[Footnote 167: Xen. Mem. iv. 1, 2-3.] + +[Footnote 168: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 1. [Greek: ô(s de\ kai\ +praktikôte/rous e)poi/ei tou\s suno/ntas au)tô=|, nu=n au)= tou=to +le/xô.]] + +[Footnote 169: Xenoph. Mem. iii. capp. 6 and 7.] + +[Footnote 170: Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 15-18-24. Respecting the different +tone and arguments employed by Sokrates, in his conversations with +different persons, see a good passage in the Rhetor Aristeides, Orat. +xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n tetta/rôn], p. 161, Dindorf.] + +[Footnote 171: We see from the first two chapters of the Memorabilia +of Xenophon (as well as from the subsequent intimation of Æschines, in +the oration against Timarchus, p. 173) how much stress was laid by the +accusers of Sokrates on the fact that he had educated Kritias and +Alkibiades; and how the accusers alleged that his teaching tended to +encourage the like exorbitant aspirations in others, dangerous to +established authority, traditional, legal, parental, divine. I do not +doubt (what Xenophon affirms) that Sokrates, when he conversed with +Kritias and Alkibiades, held a very opposite language. But it was +otherwise when he talked with men of ease and indulgence without +ambition, such as Aristippus. If Melêtus and Anytus could have put in +evidence the conversation of Sokrates with Aristippus, many points of +it would have strengthened their case against Sokrates before the +Dikasts. We read in Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 58) how the point was made to +tell, that Sokrates often cited and commented on the passage of the +Iliad (ii. 188) in which the Grecian chiefs, retiring from the agora +to their ships, are described as being respectfully addressed by +Odysseus--while the common soldiers are scolded and beaten by him, for +the very same conduct: the relation which Sokrates here dwells on as +subsisting between [Greek: oi( a)rchikoi\] and [Greek: oi( +a)rcho/menoi], would favour the like colouring.] + +[Side-note: Conversations between Sokrates and Aristippus about the +Good and Beautiful.] + +Xenophon notices briefly two other colloquies between Sokrates and +Aristippus. The latter asked Sokrates, "Do you know anything good?" in +order (says Xenophon) that if Sokrates answered in the affirmative and +gave as examples, health, wealth, strength, courage, bread, &c., he +(Aristippus) might show circumstances in which this same particular +was evil; and might thus catch Sokrates in a contradiction, as +Sokrates had caught him before.[172] But Sokrates (says Xenophon) far +from seeking to fence with the question, retorted it in such a way as +to baffle the questioner, and at the same time to improve and instruct +the by-standers.[173] "Do you ask me if I know anything good for a +fever?--No. Or for ophthalmic distemper?-No. Or for hunger?--No. Oh! +then, if you mean to ask me, whether I know anything good, which is +good for nothing--I reply that I neither know any such thing, nor care +to know it." + +[Footnote 172: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. Both Xenophon and some of his +commentators censure this as a captious string of questions put by +Aristippus--'captiosas Aristippi quæstiunculas". Such a criticism is +preposterous, when we recollect that Sokrates was continually +examining and questioning others in the same manner. See in particular +his cross-examination of Euthydêmus, reported by Xenophon, Memor. iv. +2; and many others like it, both in Xenophon and in Plato.] + +[Footnote 173: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. [Greek: boulo/menos tou\s +suno/ntas ô(phelei=n.]] + +Again, on another occasion Aristippus asked him "Do you know anything +beautiful?--Yes; many things.--Are they all like to each other?--No; +they are as unlike as possible to each other.--How then (continues +Aristippus) can that which is unlike to the beautiful, be itself +beautiful?--Easily enough (replies Sokrates); one man is beautiful for +running; another man, altogether unlike him, is beautiful for +wrestling. A shield which is beautiful for protecting your body, is +altogether unlike to a javelin, which is beautiful for being swiftly +and forcibly hurled.--Your answer (rejoined Aristippus) is exactly the +same as it was when I asked you whether you knew anything +good.--Certainly (replies Sokrates). Do you imagine, that the Good is one +thing, and the Beautiful another? Do you not know that all things are +good and beautiful in relation to the same purpose? Virtue is not good +in relation to one purpose, and beautiful in relation to another. Men +are called both good and beautiful in reference to the same ends: the +bodies of men, in like manner: and all things which men use, are +considered both good and beautiful, in consideration of their serving +their ends well.--Then (says Aristippus) a basket for carrying dung is +beautiful?--To be sure (replied Sokrates), and a golden shield is +ugly; if the former be well made for doing its work, and the latter +badly.--Do you then assert (asked Aristippus) that the same things are +beautiful and ugly?--Assuredly (replied Sokrates); and the same things +are both good and evil. That which is good for hunger, is often bad +for a fever: that which is good for a fever, is often bad for hunger. +What is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling--and _vice +versâ_. All things are good and beautiful, in relation to the ends +which they serve well: all things are evil and ugly, in relation to +the ends which they serve badly."[174] + +[Footnote 174: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1-9.] + +[Side-note: Remarks on the conversation--Theory of Good.] + +These last cited colloquies also, between Sokrates and Aristippus, are +among the most memorable remains of Grecian philosophy: belonging to +one of the years preceding 399 B.C., in which last year Sokrates +perished. Here (as in the former dialogue) the doctrine is distinctly +enunciated by Sokrates--That Good and Evil--Beautiful (or Honourable) +and Ugly (or Dishonourable--Base)--have no intelligible meaning except +in relation to human happiness and security. Good or Evil Absolute +(_i.e._, apart from such relation) is denied to exist. The theory of +Absolute Good (a theory traceable to the Parmenidean doctrines, and +adopted from them by Eukleides) becomes first known to us as +elaborated by Plato. Even in his dialogues it is neither always nor +exclusively advocated, but is often modified by, and sometimes even +exchanged for, the eudæmonistic or relative theory. + +[Side-note: Good is relative to human beings and wants, in the view of +Sokrates.] + +Sokrates declares very explicitly, in his conversation with +Aristippus, what _he_ means by the Good and the Beautiful: and when +therefore in the name of the Good and the Beautiful, he protests +against an uncontrolled devotion to the pleasures of sense (as in one +of the Xenophontic dialogues with Euthydemus[175]), what he means is, +that a man by such intemperance ruins his prospects of future +happiness, and his best means of being useful both to himself and +others. Whether Aristippus first learnt from Sokrates the relative +theory of the Good and the Beautiful, or had already embraced it +before, we cannot say. Some of his questions, as reported in Xenophon, +would lead us to suspect that it took him by surprise: just as we +find, in the Protagoras of Plato that a theory substantially the same, +though in different words, is proposed by the Platonic Sokrates to the +Sophist Protagoras: who at first repudiates it, but is compelled +ultimately to admit it by the elaborate dialectic of Sokrates.[176] If +Aristippus did not learn the theory from Sokrates, he was at any rate +fortified in it by the authority of Sokrates; to whose doctrine, in +this respect, he adhered more closely than Plato. + +[Footnote 175: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5. + +Sokrates exhorts those with whom he converses to be sparing in +indulgences, and to cultivate self-command and fortitude as well as +bodily energy and activity. The reason upon which these exhortations +are founded is eudæmonistic: that a person will thereby escape or be +able to confront serious dangers--and will obtain for himself +ultimately greater pleasures than those which he foregoes (Memor. i. +6, 8; ii. 1, 31-33; iii. 12, 2-5). [Greek: Tou= de\ mê\ douleu/ein +gastri\ mêde\ u(/pnô| kai\ lagnei/a| oi)/ei ti a)/llo ai)tiô/teron +ei)=nai, ê)\ to\ e(/tera e)/chein tou/tôn ê(di/ô, a(\ ou) mo/non e)n +chrei/a| o)/nta eu)phrai/nei, a)lla\ kai\ e)/lpidas pare/chonta +ô)phelê/sein a)ei/?] See also Memor. ii. 4, ii. 10, 4, about the +importance of acquiring and cultivating friends, because a good friend +is the most useful and valuable of all possessions. Sokrates, like +Aristippus, adopts the prudential view of life, and not the +transcendental; recommending sobriety and virtue on the ground of +pleasures secured and pains averted. We find Plutarch, in his very +bitter attacks on Epikurus, reasoning on the Hedonistic basis, and +professing to prove that Epikurus discarded pleasures more and greater +for the sake of obtaining pleasures fewer and less. See Plutarch, Non +posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, pp. 1096-1099.] + +[Footnote 176: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 351-361.] + +[Side-note: Aristippus adhered to the doctrine of Sokrates.] + +Aristippus is recognised by Aristotle[177] in two characters: both as +a Sophist, and as a companion of Sokrates and Plato. Moreover it is +remarkable that the doctrine, in reference to which Aristotle cites +him as one among the Sophists, is a doctrine unquestionably +Sokratic--contempt of geometrical science as useless, and as having no +bearing on the good or evil of life.[178] Herein also Aristippus followed +Sokrates, while Plato departed from him. + +[Footnote 177: Aristot. Rhetoric. ii. 24; Metaphysic. B. 996, a. 32.] + +[Footnote 178: Xenophon. Memor. iv. 7, 2.] + +[Side-note: Life and dicta of Aristippus--His type of character.] + +In estimating the character of Aristippus, I have brought into +particular notice the dialogues reported by Xenophon, because the +Xenophontic statements, with those of Aristotle, are the only +contemporary evidence (for Plato only names him once to say that he +was not present at the death of Sokrates, and was reported to be in +Ægina). The other statements respecting Aristippus, preserved by +Diogenes and others, not only come from later authorities, but give us +hardly any facts; though they ascribe to him a great many sayings and +repartees, adapted to a peculiar type of character. That type of +character, together with an imperfect notion of his doctrines, is all +that we can make out. Though Aristippus did not follow the +recommendation of Sokrates, to labour and qualify himself for a ruler, +yet both the advice of Sokrates, to reflect and prepare himself for +the anxieties and perils of the future--and the spectacle of +self-sufficing independence which the character of Sokrates +afforded--were probably highly useful to him. Such advice being adverse +to the natural tendencies of his mind, impressed upon him forcibly those +points of the case which he was most likely to forget: and contributed +to form in him that habit of self-command which is a marked feature in +his character. He wished (such are the words ascribed to him by +Xenophon) to pass through life as easily and agreeably as possible. +Ease comes before pleasure: but his plan of life was to obtain as much +pleasure as he could, consistent with ease, or without difficulty and +danger. He actually realised, as far as our means of knowledge extend, +that middle path of life which Sokrates declared to be impracticable. + +[Side-note: Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates.] + +Much of the advice given by Sokrates, Aristippus appears to have +followed, though not from the reasons which Sokrates puts forward for +giving it. When Sokrates reminds him that men liable to be tempted and +ensnared by the love of good eating, were unfit to command--when he +animadverts on the insanity of the passionate lover, who exposed +himself to the extremity of danger for the purpose of possessing a +married woman, while there were such abundant means of gratifying the +sexual appetite without any difficulty or danger whatever[179]--to all +this Aristippus assents: and what we read about his life is in perfect +conformity therewith. Reason and prudence supply ample motives for +following such advice, whether a man be animated with the love of +command or not. So again, when Sokrates impresses upon Aristippus that +the Good and the Beautiful were the same, being relative only to human +wants or satisfaction--and that nothing was either good or beautiful, +except in so far as it tended to confer relief, security, or +enjoyment--this lesson too Aristippus laid to heart, and applied in a +way suitable to his own peculiar dispositions and capacities. + +[Footnote 179: Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 5. [Greek: kai\ têlikou/tôn me\n +e)pikeime/nôn tô=| moicheu/onti kakô=n te kai\ ai)schrô=n, o)/ntôn de\ +pollô=n tô=n a)poluso/ntôn tê=s tô=n a)phrodisiô=n e)pithumi/as e)n +a)dei/a|, o(/môs ei)s ta\ e)piki/nduna phe/resthai, a)=r' ou)k ê)/dê +tou=to panta/pasi kakodaimonô=nto/s e)stin? E)/moige dokei=, e)/phê +(A)ri/stippos).]] + +[Side-note: Self-mastery and independence--the great aspiration of +Aristippus.] + +The type of character represented by Aristippus is the man who enjoys +what the present affords, so far as can be done without incurring +future mischief, or provoking the enmity of others--but who will on no +account enslave himself to any enjoyment; who always maintains his own +self-mastery and independence and who has prudence and intelligence +enabling him to regulate each separate enjoyment so as not to incur +preponderant evil in future.[180] This self-mastery and independence +is in point of fact the capital aspiration of Aristippus, hardly less +than of Antisthenes and Diogenes. He is competent to deal suitably +with all varieties of persons, places, and situations, and to make the +best of each--[Greek: Ou(= ga\r toiou/tôn dei=, touou=tos ei)=m' +e)gô/]:[181] but he accepts what the situation presents, without +yearning or struggling for that which it cannot present.[182] He +enjoys the society both of the Syracusan despot Dionysius, and of the +Hetæra Lais; but he will not make himself subservient either to one or +to the other: he conceives himself able to afford, to both, as much +satisfaction as he receives.[183] His enjoyments are not enhanced by +the idea that others are excluded from the like enjoyment, and that he +is a superior, privileged man: he has no jealousy or antipathy, no +passion for triumphing over rivals, no demand for envy or admiration +from spectators. Among the Hetæræ in Greece were included all the most +engaging and accomplished women--for in Grecian matrimony, it was +considered becoming and advantageous that the bride should be young +and ignorant, and that as a wife she should neither see nor know any +thing beyond the administration of her own feminine apartments and +household.[184] Aristippus attached himself to those Hetæræ who +pleased him; declaring that the charm of their society was in no way +lessened by the knowledge that others enjoyed it also, and that he +could claim no exclusive privilege.[185] His patience and mildness in +argument is much commended. The main lesson which he had learnt from +philosophy (he said), was self-appreciation--to behave himself with +confidence in every man's society: even if all laws were abrogated, +the philosopher would still, without any law, live in the same way as +he now did.[186] His confidence remained unshaken, when seized as a +captive in Asia by order of the Persian satrap Artaphernes: all that +he desired was, to be taken before the satrap himself.[187] Not to +renounce pleasure, but to enjoy pleasure moderately and to keep +desires under controul,--was in his judgment the true policy of life. +But he was not solicitous to grasp enjoyment beyond what was easily +attainable, nor to accumulate wealth or power which did not yield +positive result.[188] While Sokrates recommended, and Antisthenes +practised, the precaution of deadening the sexual appetite by +approaching no women except such as were ugly and +repulsive,[189]--while Xenophon in the Cyropædia,[190] working out the +Sokratic idea of the dangerous fascination of beauty, represents Cyrus +as refusing to see the captive Pantheia, and depicts the too confident +Araspes (who treats such precaution as exaggerated timidity, and fully +trusts his own self-possession), when appointed to the duty of guarding +her, as absorbed against his will in a passion which makes him forget all +reason and duty--Aristippus has sufficient self-mastery to visit the +most seductive Hetæræ without being drawn into ruinous extravagance or +humiliating subjugation. We may doubt whether he ever felt, even for +Lais, a more passionate sentiment than Plato in his Epigram expresses +towards the Kolophonian Hetæra Archeanassa. + +[Footnote 180: Diog. L. ii. 67. [Greek: ou)/tôs ê)=n kai\ e(le/sthai +kai\ kataphronê=sai polu\s.]] + +[Footnote 181: Diog. L. ii. 66. [Greek: ê)=n de\ i(kano\s +a(rmo/sasthai kai\ to/pô| kai\ chro/nô| kai\ prosô/pô|, kai\ pa=san +peri/stasin a(rmoni/ôs u(pokri/nasthai; dio\ kai\ para\ Dionusi/ô| +tô=n a)/llôn êu)doki/mei ma=llon, a)ei\ to\ prospeso\n eu)= +diatithe/menos; a)pe/laue me\n ga\r ê(donê=s tô=n paro/ntôn, ou)k +e)thê/ra de\ po/nô| tê\n a)po/lausin tô=n ou) paro/ntôn]. + +Horat. Epistol. i. 17, 23-24:-- + +"Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res, +Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum."] + +[Footnote 182: Sophokles, Philoktêtes, 1049 (the words of Odysseus).] + +[Footnote 183: Diog. L. ii. 75. [Greek: e)/chrêto kai\ Lai+/di tê=| +e(tai/ra|; pro\s ou)=n tou\s memphome/nous e)/phê, E)/chô Lai+/da, +a)ll' ou)k e)/chomai; e)pei\ to\ kratei=n kai\ mê\ ê(tta=sthai +ê(donô=n, a)/riston--ou) to\ mê\ chrê=sthai]. ii. 77, [Greek: +Dionusi/ou pote\ e)rome/nou, e)pi\ ti/ ê(/koi, e)/phê, e)pi\ tô=| +metadô/sein ô(=n e)/choi, kai\ metalê/psesthai ô(=n mê\ e)/choi]. + +Lucian introduces [Greek: A)retê\] and [Greek: Truphê\] as litigating +before [Greek: Di/kê] for the possession of Aristippus: the litigation +is left undecided (Bis Accusatus, c. 13-23).] + +[Footnote 184 Xenophon, Oeconomic. iii. 13, vii. 6, Ischomachus says +to Sokrates about his wife, [Greek: Kai\ ti/ a)\n e)pistame/nên +au)tê\n pare/labon, ê(\ e)/tê me\n ou)/pô pentekai/deka gegonui=a +ê)=lthe pro\s e)me/, to\n d' e)mprosthen _chro/non e)/zê u(po\ pollê=s +e)pimelei/as, o(/pôs ô(s e)/lachista me\n o)/psoito, e)la/chista d' +a)kou/soito, e)la/chista de\ e)/roito?_]] + +[Footnote 185: Diog.** L. ii. 74. On this point his opinion coincided +with that of Diogenes, and of the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus (D. L. +vii. 131), who maintained, that among the wise wives ought to be in +common, and that all marital jealousy ought to be discarded. [Greek: +A)re/skei d' au)toi=s kai\ koina\s ei)=nai ta\s gunai=kas dei=n para\ +toi=s sophoi=s ô(/ste to\n e)ntucho/nta tê=| e)ntuchou/sê| chrê=sthai, +katha/ phêsi Zê/nôn e)n tê=| Politei/a| kai\ Chru/sippos e)n tô=| +peri\ Politei/as, a)lla/ te Dioge/nês o( Kuniko\s kai\ Pla/tôn; +pa/ntas te pai=das e)pi/sês ste/rxomen pate/rôn tro/pon, kai\ ê( e)pi\ +moichei/a| zêlotupi/a periairethê/setai]. Compare Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. +H. iii. 205.] + +[Footnote 186: Diog. L. ii. 68. The like reply is ascribed to +Aristotle. Diog. L. v. 20; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtut. p. 80 D.] + +[Footnote 187: Diog. L. ii. 79.] + +[Footnote 188: Diog. L. ii. 72-74.] + +[Footnote 189: Xenoph. Memor. i. 3, 11-14; Symposion, iv. 38; Diog. L. +vi. 3. [Greek: (A)ntisthe/nês) e)/lege suneche\s--Manei/ên ma=llon ê)\ +ê(sthei/ên--kai\--chrê\ toiau/tais plêsia/zein gunaixi/n, ai(\ cha/rin +ei)/sontai.]] + +[Footnote 190: Xenoph. Cyropæd. v. 1, 2-18.] + +[Side-note: Aristippus compared with Antisthenes and Diogenes--Points +of agreement and disagreement between them.] + +Aristippus is thus remarkable, like the Cynics Antisthenes and +Diogenes, not merely for certain theoretical doctrines, but also for +acting out a certain plan of life.[191] We know little or nothing of +the real life of Aristippus, except what appears in Xenophon. The +biography of him (as of the Cynic Diogenes) given by Diogenes +Laertius, consists of little more than a string of anecdotes, mostly +sayings, calculated to illustrate a certain type of character.[192] +Some of these are set down by those who approved the type, and who +therefore place it in a favourable point of view--others by those who +disapprove it and give the opposite colour. + +[Footnote 191: Sextus Empiricus and others describe this by the Greek +word [Greek: a)gôgê/] (Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 150). Plato's beautiful +epigram upon Archeanassa is given by Diogenes L. iii. 31. Compare this +with the remark of Aristippus--Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 750 E. + +That the society of these fascinating Hetæræ was dangerous, and +exhaustive to the purses of those who sought it, may be seen from the +expensive manner of life of Theodotê, described in Xenophon, Mem. iii. +11, 4. + +The amorous impulses or fancies of Plato were censured by Dikæarchus. +See Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 34, 71, with Davies's note.] + +[Footnote 192: This is justly remarked by Wendt in his instructive +Dissertation, De Philosophiâ Cyrenaicâ, p. 8 (Göttingen, 1841).] + +We can understand and compare the different types of character +represented by Antisthenes or Diogenes, and by Aristippus: but we have +little knowledge of the real facts of their lives. The two types, each +manifesting that marked individuality which belongs to the Sokratic +band, though in many respects strongly contrasted, have also some +points of agreement. Both Aristippus and Diogenes are bent on +individual freedom and independence of character: both of them stand +upon their own appreciation of life and its phenomena: both of them +are impatient of that servitude to the opinions and antipathies of +others, which induces a man to struggle for objects, not because they +afford him satisfaction, but because others envy him for possessing +them--and to keep off evils, not because he himself feels them as +such, but because others pity or despise him for being subject to +them; both of them are exempt from the competitive and ambitious +feelings, from the thirst after privilege and power, from the sense of +superiority arising out of monopolised possession and exclusion of +others from partnership. Diogenes kept aloof from political life and +civil obligations as much as Aristippus; and would have pronounced (as +Aristippus replies to Sokrates in the Xenophontic dialogue) that the +task of ruling others, instead of being a prize to be coveted, was +nothing better than an onerous and mortifying servitude,[193] not at +all less onerous because a man took up the burthen of his own accord. +These points of agreement are real: but the points of disagreement are +not less real. Diogenes maintains his free individuality, and puts +himself out of the reach of human enmity, by clothing himself in +impenetrable armour: by attaining positive insensibility, as near as +human life permits. This is with him not merely the acting out of a +scheme of life, but also a matter of pride. He is proud of his ragged +garment and coarse[194] fare, as exalting him above others, and as +constituting him a pattern of endurance: and he indulges this +sentiment by stinging and contemptuous censure of every one. +Aristippus has no similar vanity: he achieves his independence without +so heavy a renunciation: he follows out his own plan of life, without +setting himself up as a pattern for others. But his plan is at the +same time more delicate; requiring greater skill and intelligence, +more of manifold sagacity, in the performer. Horace, who compares the +two and gives the preference to Aristippus, remarks that Diogenes, +though professing to want nothing, was nevertheless as much dependent +upon the bounty of those who supplied his wallet with provisions, as +Aristippus upon the favour of princes: and that Diogenes had only one +fixed mode of proceeding, while Aristippus could master and turn to +account a great diversity of persons and situations--could endure +hardship with patience and dignity, when it was inevitable, and enjoy +the opportunities of pleasure when they occurred. "To Aristippus alone +it is given to wear both fine garments and rags" is a remark ascribed +to Plato.[195] In truth, Aristippus possesses in eminent measure that +accomplishment, the want of which Plato proclaims to be so misleading +and mischievous--artistic skill in handling human affairs, throughout +his dealings with mankind.[196] + +[Footnote 193: It is this servitude of political life, making the +politician the slave of persons and circumstances around him, which +Horace contrasts with the philosophical independence of Aristippus:-- + +Ac ne forté roges, quo me duce, quo lare tuter; +Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri +Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes. +Nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis, +Virtutis veræ custos rigidusque satelles: +Nunc in Aristippi furtim præcepta relabor, +Et mihi res, non me rebus, subjungere conor. +(Epist. i. 1, 15.) + +So also the Platonic Sokrates (Theætêt. pp. 172-175) depicts forcibly +the cramped and fettered lives of rhetors and politicians; contrasting +them with the self-judgment and independence of speculative and +philosophical enquirers--[Greek: ô(s oi)ke/tai pro\s e)leuthe/rous +tethra/phthai--o( me\n tô=| o)/nti e)n e)leutheri/a| te kai\ scholê=| +tethramme/nos, o(\n dê\ philo/sophon kalei=s.]] + +[Footnote 194: Diog. L. ii. 36. [Greek: stre/psantos A)ntisthe/nous +to\ dier)r(ôgo\s tou= tri/bônos ei)s tou)mphane/s, O(rô= sou=, e)/phê +(Sôkra/tês), dia\ tou= tri/bônos tê\n kenodoxi/an.]] + +[Footnote 195: Horat. Epistol. i. 17, 13-24; Diog. L. vi. 46-56-66. + +"Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti +Nollet Aristippus." "Si sciret regibus uti, +Fastidiret olus, qui me notat." Utrius horum +Verba probes et facta, doce: vel junior audi +Cur sit Aristippi potior sententia. Namque +Mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt: +"Scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et +Splendidius multò est. Equus ut me portet, alat rex, +Officium facio: tu poscis vilia rerum, +Dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem." +Omnis Aristippum decuit color, et status, et res, +Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum. + +(Compare Diog. L. ii. 102, vi. 58, where this anecdote is reported as +of Plato instead of Aristippus.) + +Horace's view and scheme of life are exceedingly analogous to those of +Aristippus. Plutarch, Fragm. De Homero, p. 1190; De Fortunâ Alex. p. +330 D. Diog. Laert. ii. 67. [Greek: dio/ pote Stra/tôna, oi( de\ +Pla/tôna, pro\s au)to\n ei)pei=n, Soi\ mo/nô| de/dotai kai\ chlani/da +phorei=n kai\ r(a/kos]. The remark cannot have been made by Straton, +who was not contemporary with Aristippus. Even Sokrates lived by the +bounty of his rich friends, and indeed could have had no other means +of supporting his wife and children; though he accepted only a portion +of what they tendered to him, declining the remainder. See the remark +of Aristippus, Diog. L. ii. 74.] + +[Footnote 196: Plato, Phædon, p. 89 E. [Greek: o(/ti a)/neu te/chnês +tê=s peri\ ta)nthrô/peia o( toiou=tos chrê=sthai e)picheirei= toi=s +a)nthrô/pois.]] + +[Side-note: Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and +philosophy--contempt for other studies.] + +That the scheme of life projected by Aristippus was very difficult +requiring great dexterity, prudence, and resolution, to execute it--we +may see plainly by the Xenophontic dialogue; wherein Sokrates +pronounces it to be all but impracticable. As far as we can judge, he +surmounted the difficulties of it: yet we do not know enough of his +real life to determine with accuracy what varieties of difficulties he +experienced. He followed the profession of a Sophist, receiving fees +for his teaching: and his attachment to philosophy (both as contrasted +with ignorance and as contrasted with other studies not philosophy) +was proclaimed in the most emphatic language. It was better (he said) +to be a beggar, than an uneducated man:[197] the former was destitute +of money, but the latter was destitute of humanity. He disapproved +varied and indiscriminate instruction, maintaining that persons ought +to learn in youth what they were to practise in manhood: and he +compared those who, neglecting philosophy, employed themselves in +literature or physical science, to the suitors in the Odyssey who +obtained the favours of Melantho and the other female servants, but +were rejected by the Queen Penelopê herself.[198] He treated with +contempt the study of geometry, because it took no account, and made +no mention, of what was good and evil, beautiful and ugly. In other +arts (he said), even in the vulgar proceeding of the carpenter and the +currier, perpetual reference was made to good, as the purpose intended +to be served and to evil as that which was to be avoided: but in +geometry no such purpose was ever noticed.[199] + +[Footnote 197: Diog. L. ii. 70; Plutarch, Fragm. [Greek: U(pomnê/mat' +ei)s Ê(si/odon], s. 9. [Greek: A)ri/stippos de\ a)p' e)nanti/as o( +Sôkratiko\s e)/lege, sumbou/lou dei=sthai chei=ron ei)=nai ê)\ +prosaitei=n.]] + +[Footnote 198: Diog. L. ii. 79-80. [Greek: tou\s tô=n e)gkukli/ôn +paideuma/tôn metascho/ntas, philosophi/as de\ a)poleiphthe/ntas], &c. +Plutarch, Fragm. [Greek: Strômate/ôn], sect. 9.] + +[Footnote 199: Aristot. Metaph. B. 996, a 32, M. 1078, a. 35. [Greek: +ô(/ste dia\ tau=ta kai\ tô=n sophistô=n tine\s oi(=on A)ri/stippos +_proepêla/kizon_ au)ta\s], &c.] + +[Side-note: Aristippus taught as a Sophist. His reputation thus +acquired procured for him the attentions of Dionysius and others.] + +This last opinion of Aristippus deserves particular attention, +because it is attested by Aristotle. And it confirms what we hear upon +less certain testimony, that Aristippus discountenanced the department +of physical study generally (astronomy and physics) as well as +geometry; confining his attention to facts and reasonings which bore +upon the regulation of life.[200] In this restrictive view he followed +the example and precepts of Sokrates--of Isokrates--seemingly also of +Protagoras and Prodikus though not of the Eleian Hippias, whose course +of study was larger and more varied.[201] Aristippus taught as a +Sophist, and appears to have acquired great reputation in that +capacity both at Athens and elsewhere.[202] Indeed, if he had not +acquired such intellectual and literary reputation at Athens, he would +have had little chance of being invited elsewhere, and still less +chance of receiving favours and presents from Dionysius and other +princes:[203] whose attentions did not confer celebrity, but waited +upon it when obtained, and doubtless augmented it. If Aristippus lived +a life of indulgence at Athens, we may fairly presume that his main +resources for sustaining it, like those of Isokrates, were derived +from his own teaching: and that the presents which he received from +Dionysius of Syracuse, like those which Isokrates received from +Nikokles of Cyprus, were welcome additions, but not his main income. +Those who (like most of the historians of philosophy) adopt the +opinion of Sokrates and Plato, that it is disgraceful for an +instructor to receive payment from the persons taught will doubtless +despise Aristippus for such a proceeding: for my part I dissent from +this opinion, and I therefore do not concur in the disparaging +epithets bestowed upon him. And as for the costly indulgences, and +subservience to foreign princes, of which Aristippus stands accused, +we must recollect that the very same reproaches were advanced against +Plato and Aristotle by their contemporaries: and as far as we know, +with quite as much foundation.[204] + +[Footnote 200: Diog. L. ii. 92. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 11. +Plutarch, apud Eusebium Præp. Ev. i. 8, 9.] + +[Footnote 201: Plato, Protagor. p. 318 E, where the different methods +followed by Protagoras and Hippias are indicated.] + +[Footnote 202: Diog. Laert. ii. 62. Alexis Comicus ap. Athenæ. xii. +544. + +Aristokles (ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 18) treats the first Aristippus +as a mere voluptuary, who said nothing generally [Greek: peri\ tou= +te/lous]. All the doctrine (he says) came from the younger Aristippus. +I think this very improbable. To what did the dialogues composed by +the first Aristippus refer? How did he get his reputation?] + +[Footnote 203: Several anecdotes are recounted about sayings and +doings of Aristippus in his intercourse with _Dionysius_. _Which_ +Dionysius is meant?--the elder or the younger? Probably the elder. + +It is to be remembered that Dionysius the Elder lived and reigned +until the year 367 B.C., in which year his son Dionysius the Younger +succeeded him. The death of Sokrates took place in 399 B.C.: between +which, and the accession of Dionysius the Younger, an interval of 32 +years occurred. Plato was old, being sixty years of age, when he first +visited the younger Dionysius, shortly after the accession of the +latter. Aristippus cannot well have been younger than Plato, and he is +said to have been older than Æschines Sokraticus (D. L. ii. 83). +Compare D. L. ii. 41. + +When, with these dates present to our minds, we read the anecdotes +recounted by Diogenes L. respecting the sayings and doings of +Aristippus with _Dionysius_, we find: that several of them relate to +the contrast between the behaviour of Aristippus and that of Plato at +Syracuse. Now it is certain that Plato went _once_ to Syracuse when he +was forty years of age (Epist. vii. init.), in 387 B.C.--and according +to one report (Lucian, De Parasito, 34), he went there _twice_--while +the elder Dionysius was in the plenitude of power: but he made an +unfavourable impression, and was speedily sent away in displeasure. I +think it very probable that Aristippus may have visited the elder +Dionysius, and may have found greater favour with him than Plato found +(see Lucian, l. c.), since Dionysius was an accomplished man and a +composer of tragedies. Moreover Aristippus was a Kyrenæan, and +Aristippus wrote about Libya (D. L. ii. 83).] + +[Footnote 204: See the epigram of the contemporary poet, Theokritus of +Chios, in Diog. L. v. 11; compare Athenæus, viii. 354, xiii. 566. +Aristokles, ap. Eusebium Præp. Ev. xv. 2.] + +Aristippus composed several dialogues, of which the titles alone are +preserved.[205] They must however have been compositions of +considerable merit, since Theopompus accused Plato of borrowing +largely from them. + +[Footnote 205: Diog. L. ii. 84-85.] + +[Side-note: Ethical theory of Aristippus and the Kyrenaic +philosophers.] + +As all the works of Aristippus are lost, we cannot pretend to +understand fully his theory from the meagre abstract given in Sextus +Empiricus and Diogenes. Yet the theory is of importance in the history +of ancient speculation, since it passed with some modifications to +Epikurus, and was adopted by a large proportion of instructed men. The +Kyrenaic doctrine was transmitted by Aristippus to his disciples +Æthiops and Antipater: but his chief disciple appears to have been his +daughter Arêtê: whom he instructed so well, that she was able to +instruct her own son, the second Aristippus, called for that reason +Metrodidactus. The basis of his ethical theory was, pleasure and pain: +pleasure being _smooth motion_, pain, _rough motion_:[206] pleasure +being the object which all animals, by nature and without +deliberation, loved, pursued, and felt satisfaction in obtaining pain +being the object which they all by nature hated and tried to avoid. +Aristippus considered that no one pleasure was different from another, +nor more pleasurable than another:[207] that the attainment of these +special pleasurable moments, or as many of them as practicable, was +The End to be pursued in life. By _Happiness_, they understood the sum +total of these special pleasures, past, present, and future: yet +Happiness was desirable not on its own account, but on account of its +constituent items, especially such of those items as were present and +certainly future.[208] Pleasures and pains of memory and expectation +were considered to be of little importance. Absence of pain or relief +from pain, on the one hand--they did not consider as equivalent to +positive pleasure--nor absence of pleasure or withdrawal of pleasure, +on the other hand--as equivalent to positive pain. Neither the one +situation nor the other was a _motion_ ([Greek: ki/nêsis]), _i.e._ a +positive situation, appreciable by the consciousness: each was a +middle state--a mere negation of consciousness, like the phenomena of +sleep.[209] They recognised some mental pleasures and pains as +derivative from bodily sensation and as exclusively individual--others +as not so: for example, there were pleasures and pains of sympathy; +and a man often felt joy at the prosperity of his friends and +countrymen, quite as genuine as that which he felt for his own good +fortune. But they maintained that the bodily pleasures and pains were +much more vehement than the mental which were not bodily: for which +reason, the pains employed by the laws in punishing offenders were +chiefly bodily. The fear of pain was in their judgments more operative +than the love of pleasure: and though pleasure was desirable for its +own sake, yet the accompanying conditions of many pleasures were so +painful as to deter the prudent man from aiming at them. These +obstructions rendered it impossible for any one to realise the sum +total of pleasures constituting Happiness. Even the wise man sometimes +failed, and the foolish man sometimes did well, though in general the +reverse was the truth: but under the difficult conditions of life, a +man must be satisfied if he realised some particular pleasurable +conjunctions, without aspiring to a continuance or totality of the +like.[210] + +[Footnote 206: Diog. L. ii. 86-87. [Greek: du/o pa/thê u(phi/stanto, +po/non kai\ ê(donê/n; tê\n me\n lei/an ki/nêsin, tê\n ê(donê/n, to\n +de\ po/non, trachei=an ki/nêsin; mê\ diaphe/rein te ê(donê\n ê(donê=s, +mêde\ ê(/dion ti ei)=nai; kai\ tê\n me\n, eu)dokêtê\n** pa=si zô/ois, +to\n de\ a)pokroustiko/n.]] + +[Footnote 207: Diog. L. ii. p. 87. [Greek: mê\ diaphe/rein te ê(donê\n +ê(donê=s, mêde\ ê(/dion ti ei)=nai]. They did not mean by these words +to deny that one pleasure was more vehement and attractive than +another pleasure, or that one pain is more vehement and deterrent than +another pain: for it is expressly said afterwards (s. 90) that they +admitted this. They meant to affirm that one pleasure did not differ +from another _so far forth as pleasure_: that all pleasures must be +ranked as a class, and compared with each other in respect of +intensity, durability, and other properties possessed in greater or +less degree.] + +[Footnote 208: Diog. L. ii. pp. 88-89. Athenæus, xii. p. 544.] + +[Footnote 209: Diog. L. ii. 89-90. [Greek: mê\ ou)/sês tê=s a)poni/as +ê)\ tê=s a)êdoni/as kinê/seôs, e)pei\ ê( a)poni/a oi(onei\ +katheu/donto/s e)sti kata/stasis--me/sas katasta/seis ô)no/mazon +a)êdoni/an kai\ a)poni/an]. + +A doctrine very different from this is ascribed to Aristippus in +Galen--Placit. Philos. (xix. p. 230, Kühn). It is there affirmed that +by pleasure Aristippus understood, not the pleasure of sense, but that +disposition of mind whereby a person becomes insensible to pain, and +hard to be imposed upon ([Greek: a)na/lgêtos kai\ dusgoê/teutos]).] + +[Footnote 210: Diog. L. ii. 91. + +It does not appear that the Kyrenaic sect followed out into detail the +derivative pleasures and pains; nor the way in which, by force of +association, these come to take precedence of the primary, exercising +influence on the mind both more forcible and more constant. We find +this important fact remarkably stated in the doctrine of Kalliphon. + +Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. p. 415, ed. 1629. [Greek: Kata\ de\ +tou\s peri\ Kalliphô=nta, e(/neka me\n tê=s ê(donê=s pareisê=lthen ê( +a)retê/; chro/nô| de\ u(/steron, to\ peri\ au)tê\n ka/llos katidou=sa, +i)so/timon e(autê\n tê=| a)rchê=|, toute/sti tê=| ê(donê=|, +pare/schen.]] + +[Side-note: Prudence--good, by reason of the pleasure which it +ensured, and of the pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and +honourable, by law or custom--not by nature.] + +Aristippus regarded prudence or wisdom as good, yet not as good _per +se_, but by reason of the pleasures which it enabled us to procure and +the pains which it enabled us to avoid--and wealth as a good, for the +same reason. A friend also was valuable, for the use and necessities +of life: just as each part of one's own body was precious, so long as +it was present and could serve a useful purpose.[211] Some branches of +virtue might be possessed by persons who were not wise: and bodily +training was a valuable auxiliary to virtue. Even the wise man could +never escape pain and fear, for both of these were natural: +but he would keep clear of envy, passionate love, and superstition, +which were not natural, but consequences of vain opinion. A thorough +acquaintance with the real nature of Good and Evil would relieve him +from superstition as well as from the fear of death.[212] + +[Footnote 211: Diog. L. ii. 91. [Greek: tê\n phro/nêsin a)gatho\n me\n +ei)=nai le/gousin, ou) di' e(autê\n de\ ai(retê/n, a)lla\ dia\ ta\ e)x +au)tê=s perigino/mena; to\n phi/lon tê=s chrei/as e(/neka; kai\ ga\r +me/ros sô/matos, me/chris a)\n parê=|, a)spa/zesthai]. + +The like comparison is employed by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the +Memorabilia (i. 2, 52-55), that men cast away portions of their own +body, so soon as these portions cease to be useful.] + +[Footnote 212: Diog. L. ii. p. 92.] + +The Kyrenaics did not admit that there was anything just, or +honourable, or base, by nature: but only by law and custom: +nevertheless the wise man would be sufficiently restrained, by the +fear of punishment and of discredit, from doing what was repugnant to +the society in which he lived. They maintained that wisdom was +attainable; that the senses did not at first judge truly, but might be +improved by study; that progress was realised in philosophy as in +other arts, and that there were different gradations of it, as well as +different gradations of pain and suffering, discernible in different +men. The wise man, as they conceived him, was a reality; not (like the +wise man of the Stoics) a sublime but unattainable ideal.[213] + +[Footnote 213: Diog. L. ii. p. 93.] + +[Side-note: Their logical theory--nothing knowable except the +phenomenal, our own sensations and feelings--no knowledge of the +absolute.] + +Such were (as far as our imperfect evidence goes) the ethical and +emotional views of the Kyrenaic school: their theory and precepts +respecting the plan and prospects of life. In regard to truth and +knowledge, they maintained that we could have no knowledge of anything +but human sensations, affections, feelings, &c. ([Greek: pa/thê]): +that respecting the extrinsic, extra-sensational, absolute, objects or +causes from whence these feelings proceeded, we could know nothing at +all. Partly for this reason, they abstained from all attention to the +study of nature--to astronomy and physics: partly also because they +did not see any bearing of these subjects upon good and evil, or upon +the conduct of life. They turned their attention mainly to ethics, +partly also to logic as subsidiary to ethical reasoning.[214] + +[Footnote 214: Diog. L. ii. p. 92. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vi. +53.] + +Such low estimation of mathematics and physics and attention given +almost exclusively to the feelings and conduct of human life--is a +point common to the opposite schools of Aristippus and Antisthenes, +derived by both of them from Sokrates. Herein Plato stands apart from +all the three. + +The theory of Aristippus, as given above, is only derived from a +meagre abstract and from a few detached hints. We do not know how he +himself stated it: still less how he enforced and vindicated it.--He, +as well as Antisthenes, composed dialogues: which naturally implies +diversity of handling. Their main thesis, therefore--the text, as it +were, upon which they debated or expatiated (which is all that the +abstract gives)--affords very inadequate means, even if we could rely +upon the accuracy of the statement, for appreciating their +philosophical competence. We should form but a poor idea of the acute, +abundant, elastic and diversified dialectic of Plato, if all his +dialogues had been lost--and if we had nothing to rely upon except the +summary of Platonism prepared by Diogenes Laertius: which summary, +nevertheless, is more copious and elaborate than the same author has +furnished either of Aristippus or Antisthenes. + +[Side-note: Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus passed to the +Stoics and Epikureans.] + +In the history of the Greek mind these two last-mentioned philosophers +(though included by Cicero among the _plebeii philosophi_) are not +less important than Plato and Aristotle. The speculations and precepts +of Antisthenes passed, with various enlargements and modifications, +into the Stoic philosophy: those of Aristippus into the Epikurean: the +two most widely extended ethical sects in the subsequent Pagan +world.--The Cynic sect, as it stood before it embraced the enlarged +physical, kosmical, and social theories of Zeno and his contemporaries, +reducing to a minimum all the desires and appetites--cultivating +insensibility to the pains of life, and even disdainful insensibility to +its pleasures--required extraordinary force of will and obstinate +resolution, but little beyond. Where there was no selection or +discrimination, the most ordinary prudence sufficed. It was otherwise +with the scheme of Aristippus and the Kyrenaics: which, if it tasked +less severely the powers of endurance, demanded a far higher measure +of intelligent prudence. Selection of that which might safely be +enjoyed, and determination of the limit within which enjoyment must be +confined, were constantly indispensable. Prudence, knowledge, the art +of mensuration or calculation, were essential to Aristippus, and ought +to be put in the foreground when his theory is stated. + +[Side-note: Ethical theory of Aristippus is identical with that of the +Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras.] + +That theory is, in point of fact, identical with the theory expounded +by the Platonic Sokrates in Plato's Protagoras. The general features +of both are the same. Sokrates there lays it down explicitly, that +pleasure _per se_ is always good, and pain _per se_ always evil: that +there is no other good (_per se_) except pleasure and diminution of +pain--no other evil (_per se_) except pain and diminution of pleasure: +that there is no other object in life except to live through it as +much as possible with pleasures and without pains;[215] but that many +pleasures become evil, because they cannot be had without depriving us +of greater pleasures or imposing upon us greater pains while many +pains become good, because they prevent greater pains or ensure +greater pleasures: that the safety of life thus lies in a correct +comparison of the more or less in pleasures and pains, and in a +selection founded thereupon. In other words, the safety of life +depends upon calculating knowledge or prudence, the art or science of +measuring. + +[Footnote 215: Plato, Protag. p. 355 A. [Greek: ê)\ a)rkei= u(mi=n to\ +ê(de/ôs katabiô=nai to\n bi/on a)/neu lupô=n? ei) de\ a)rkei=, kai\ +mê\ e)/chete mêde\n a)/llo pha/nai ei)=nai a)gatho\n ê)\ kako/n, o(\ +mê\ ei)s tau=ta teleuta=|, to\ meta\ tou=to a)kou/ete]. + +The exposition of this theory, by the Platonic Sokrates, occupies the +latter portion of the Protagoras, from p. 351 to near the conclusion. +See below, ch. xxiii. of the present work. + +The language held by Aristippus to Sokrates, in the Xenophontic +dialogue (Memor. ii. 1. 9), is exactly similar to that of the Platonic +Sokrates, as above cited--[Greek: e)mauto\n ta/ttô ei)s tou\s +boulome/nous ê(=| r(a=|sta/ te kai\ ê(/dista bioteu/ein.]] + +[Side-note: Difference in the manner of stating the theory by the +two.] + +The theory here laid down by the Platonic Sokrates is the same as that +of Aristippus. The purpose of life is stated almost in the same words +by both: by the Platonic Sokrates, and by Aristippus in the +Xenophontic dialogue--"to live through with enjoyment and without +suffering." The Platonic Sokrates denies, quite as emphatically as +Aristippus, any good or evil, honourable or base, except as +representing the result of an intelligent comparison of pleasures and +pains. Judicious calculation is postulated by both: pleasures and +pains being assumed by both as the only ends of pursuit and avoidance, +to which calculation is to be applied. The main difference is, that +the prudence, art, or science, required for making this calculation +rightly, are put forward by the Platonic Sokrates as the prominent +item in his provision for passing through life: whereas, in the scheme +of Aristippus, as far as we know it, such accomplished intelligence, +though equally recognised and implied, is not equally thrust into the +foreground. So it appears at least in the abstract which we possess of +his theory; if we had his own exposition of it, perhaps we might find +the case otherwise. In that abstract, indeed, we find the writer +replying to those who affirmed prudence or knowledge, to be good _per +se_--and maintaining that it is only good by reason of its +consequences:[216] that is, that it is not good as End, in the same +sense in which pleasure or mitigation, of pain are good. This point of +the theory, however, coincides again with the doctrine of the Platonic +Sokrates in the Protagoras: where the art of calculation is extolled +simply as an indispensable condition to the most precious results of +human happiness. + +[Footnote 216: Diog. L. ii. p. 91.] + +What I say here applies especially to the Protagoras: for I am well +aware that in other dialogues the Platonic Sokrates is made to hold +different language.[217] But in the Protagoras he defends a theory the +same as that of Aristippus, and defends it by an elaborate argument +which silences the objections of the Sophist Protagoras; who at first +will not admit the unqualified identity of the pleasurable, +judiciously estimated and selected, with the good. The general and +comprehensive manner in which Plato conceives and expounds the theory, +is probably one evidence of his superior philosophical aptitude as +compared with Aristippus and his other contemporaries. He enunciates, +side by side, and with equal distinctness, the two conditions +requisite for his theory of life. 1. The calculating or measuring art. +2. A description of the items to which alone such measurement must be +applied--pleasures and pains.--These two together make the full +theory. In other dialogues Plato insists equally upon the necessity of +knowledge or calculating prudence: but then he is not equally distinct +in specifying the items to which such prudence or calculation is to be +applied. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Aristippus, in +laying out the same theory, may have dwelt with peculiar emphasis upon +the other element in the theory: _i.e._ that while expressly insisting +upon pleasures and pains, as the only data to be compared, he may have +tacitly assumed the comparing or calculating intelligence, as if it +were understood by itself, and did not require to be formally +proclaimed. + +[Footnote 217: See chapters xxiii., xxiv.,** xxxii. of the present work, +in which I enter more fully into the differences between the +Protagoras, Gorgias, and Philêbus, in respect to this point. + +Aristippus agrees with the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras, as to +the general theory of life respecting pleasure and pain. + +He agrees with the Platonic Sokrates _in the Gorgias_ (see pp. +500-515), in keeping aloof from active political life. [Greek: a\ +au(tou= pra/ttein, kai\ ou) polupragmonei=n e)n tô=| bi/ô|]--which +Sokrates, in the Gorgias (p. 526 C), proclaims as the conduct of the true +philosopher, proclaimed with equal emphasis by Aristippus. Compare the +Platonic Apology, p. 31 D-E.] + +[Side-note: Distinction to be made between a general theory--and the +particular application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes +and circumstances.] + +A distinction must here be made between the general theory of life +laid down by Aristippus--and the particular application which he made +of that theory to his own course of proceeding. What we may observe +is, that the Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras) agrees in the +first, or general theory: whether he would have agreed in the second +(or application to the particular case) we are not informed, but we +may probably assume the negative. And we find Sokrates (in the +Xenophontic dialogue) taking the same negative ground against +Aristippus--upon the second point, not upon the first. He seeks to +prove that the course of conduct adopted by Aristippus, instead of +carrying with it a preponderance of pleasure, will entail a +preponderance of pain. He does not dispute the general theory. + +[Side-note: Kyrenaic theorists after Aristippus.] + +Though Aristippus and the Kyrenaic sect are recognised as the first +persons who laid down this general theory, yet various others apart +from them adopted it likewise. We may see this not merely from the +Protagoras of Plato, but also from the fact that Aristotle, when +commenting upon the theory in his Ethics,[218] cites Eudoxus (eminent +both as mathematician and astronomer, besides being among the hearers +of Plato) as its principal champion. Still the school of Kyrênê are +recorded as a continuous body, partly defending, partly modifying the +theory of Aristippus.[219] Hegesias, Annikeris, and Theodôrus are the +principal Kyrenaics named: the last of them contemporary with Ptolemy +Soter, Lysimachus, Epikurus, Theophrastus, and Stilpon. + +[Footnote 218: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 2.] + +[Footnote 219: Sydenham, in his notes on Philêbus (note 39, p. 76), +accuses Aristippus and the Kyrenaics of prevarication and sophistry in +the statement of their doctrine respecting Pleasure. He says that they +called it indiscriminately [Greek: a)gatho\n] and +[Greek: ta)gatho/n]--(a good--The Good)--"they used the fallacy of +changing a particular term for a term which is universal, or vice versâ, +by the sly omission or insertion of the definite article _The_ before +the word Good" (p. 78). He contrasts with this prevarication the +ingenuousness of Eudoxus, as the advocate of Pleasure (Aristot. Eth. +N. x. 2). I know no evidence for either of these allegations: either +for the prevarication of Aristippus or the ingenuousness of Eudoxus.] + +[Side-note: Theodôrus--Annikeris--Hegesias.] + +Diogenes Laertius had read a powerfully written book of Theodôrus, +controverting openly the received opinions respecting the Gods:--which +few of the philosophers ventured to do. Cicero also mentions a +composition of Hegesias.[220] Of Annikeris we know none; but he, too, +probably, must have been an author. The doctrines which we find +ascribed to these Kyrenaics evince how much affinity there was, at +bottom, between them and the Cynics, in spite of the great apparent +opposition. Hegesias received the surname of the Death-Persuader: he +considered happiness to be quite unattainable, and death to be an +object not of fear, but of welcome acceptance, in the eyes of a wise +man. He started from the same basis as Aristippus: pleasure as the +_expetendum_, pain as the _fugiendum_, to which all our personal +friendships and aversions were ultimately referable. But he considered +that the pains of life preponderated over the pleasures, even under +the most favourable circumstances. For conferring pleasure, or for +securing continuance of pleasure--wealth, high birth, freedom, glory, +were of no greater avail than their contraries poverty, low birth, +slavery, ignominy. There was nothing which was, by nature or +universally, either pleasurable or painful. Novelty, rarity, satiety, +rendered one thing pleasurable, another painful, to different persons +and at different times. The wise man would show his wisdom, not in the +fruitless struggle for pleasures, but in the avoidance or mitigation +of pains: which he would accomplish more successfully by rendering +himself indifferent to the causes of pleasure. He would act always for +his own account, and would value himself higher than other persons: +but he would at the same time reflect that the mistakes of these +others were involuntary, and he would give them indulgent counsel, +instead of hating them. He would not trust his senses as affording any +real knowledge: but he would be satisfied to act upon the probable +appearances of sense, or upon phenomenal knowledge.[221] + +[Footnote 220: Diog. L. ii. 97. [Greek: Theo/dôros--panta/pasin +a)nairô=n ta\s peri\ theô=n do/xas]. Diog. L. ii. 86, 97. Cicero, Tusc. +Disp. i. 34, 83-84. [Greek: Ê(gêsi/as o( peisitha/natos].] + +[Footnote 221: Diog. L. ii. 93, 94.] + +[Side-note: Hegesias--Low estimation of life--renunciation of +pleasure--coincidence with the Cynics.] + +Such is the summary which we read of the doctrines of Hegesias: who is +said to have enforced his views,[222]--of the real character of life, +as containing a great preponderance of misfortune and suffering--in a +manner so persuasive, that several persons were induced to commit +suicide. Hence he was prohibited by the first Ptolemy from lecturing +in such a strain. His opinions respecting life coincide in the main +with those set forth by Sokrates in the Phædon of Plato: which +dialogue also is alleged to have operated so powerfully on the +Platonic disciple Kleombrotus, that he was induced to terminate his +own existence. Hegesias, agreeing with Aristippus that pleasure would +be the Good, if you could get it--maintains that the circumstances of +life are such as to render pleasure unattainable: and therefore +advises to renounce pleasure at once and systematically, in order that +we may turn our attention to the only practicable end--that of +lessening pain. Such deliberate renunciation of pleasure brings him +into harmony with the doctrine of the Cynics. + +[Footnote 222: Compare the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue entitled Axiochus, +pp. 366, 367, and the doctrine of Kleanthes in Sext. Empiric. adv. +Mathemat. ix. 88-92. Lucretius, v. 196-234.] + +[Side-note: Doctrine of Relativity affirmed by the Kyrenaics, as well +as by Protagoras.] + +On another point, however, Hegesias repeats just the same doctrine as +Aristippus. Both deny any thing like absolute knowledge: they maintain +that all our knowledge is phenomenal, or relative to our own +impressions or affections: that we neither do know, nor can know, +anything about any real or supposed ultra-phenomenal object, _i.e._, +things in themselves, as distinguished from our own impressions and +apart from our senses and other capacities. Having no writings of +Aristippus left, we know this doctrine only as it is presented by +others, and those too opponents. We cannot tell whether Aristippus or +his supporters stated their own doctrine in such a way as to be open +to the objections which we read as urged by opponents. But the +doctrine itself is not, in my judgment, refuted by any of those +objections. "Our affections ([Greek: pa/thê]) alone are known to us, +but not the supposed objects or causes from which they proceed." The +word rendered by _affections_ must here be taken in its most general +and comprehensive sense--as including not merely sensations, but also +remembrances, emotions, judgments, beliefs, doubts, volitions, +conscious energies, &c. Whatever we know, we can know only as it +appears to, or implicates itself somehow with, our own minds. All the +knowledge which I possess, is an aggregate of propositions affirming +facts, and the order or conjunction of facts, as they are, or have +been, or may be, relative to myself. This doctrine of Aristippus is in +substance the same as that which Protagoras announced in other words +as--"Man is the measure of all things". I have already explained and +illustrated it, at considerable length, in my chapter on the Platonic +Theætêtus, where it is announced by Theætetus and controverted by +Sokrates.[223] + +[Footnote 223: See below, vol. iii. ch. xxviii. Compare Aristokles ap. +Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xiv. 18, 19, and Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii. +190-197, vi. 53. Sextus gives a summary of this doctrine of the +Kyrenaics, more fair and complete than that given by Aristokles--at +least so far as the extract from the latter in Eusebius enables us to +judge. Aristokles impugns it vehemently, and tries to fasten upon it +many absurd consequences--in my judgment without foundation. It is +probable that by the term [Greek: pa/thos] the Kyrenaics meant simply +sensations internal and external: and that the question, as they +handled it, was about the reality of the supposed Substratum or Object +of sense, independent of any sentient Subject. It is also probable +that, in explaining their views, they did not take account of the +memory of past sensations--and the expectation of future sensations, +in successions or conjunctions more or less similar--associating in +the mind with the sensation present and actual, to form what is called +a permanent object of sense. I think it likely that they set forth +their own doctrine in a narrow and inadequate manner. + +But this defect is noway corrected by Aristokles their opponent. On +the contrary, he attacks them on their strong side: he vindicates +against them the hypothesis of the ultra phenomenal, absolute, +transcendental Object, independent of and apart from any sensation, +present, past, or future--and from any sentient Subject. Besides that, +he assumes them to deny, or ignore, many points which their theory +noway requires them to deny. He urges one argument which, when +properly understood, goes not against them, but strongly in their +favour. "If these philosophers," says Aristokles (Eus. xiv. 19, 1), +"know that they experience sensation and perceive, they must know +something beyond the sensation itself. If I say [Greek: e)gô\ +kai/omai], 'I am being burned,' this is a proposition, not a +sensation. These three things are of necessity co-essential--the +sensation itself, the Object which causes it, the Subject which feels +it ([Greek: a)na/gkê ge tri/a tau=ta sunuphi/stasthai--to/ te pa/thos +au)to\ kai\ to\ poiou=n kai\ to\ pa/schon])." In trying to make good +his conclusion--That you cannot know the sensation without the Object +of sense--Aristokles at the same time asserts that the Object cannot +be known apart from the sensation, nor apart from the knowing Subject. +He asserts that the three are by necessity _co-essential--i.e._ +implicated and indivisible in substance and existence: if +distinguishable therefore, distinguishable only logically ([Greek: +lo/gô| chôrista\]), admitting of being looked at in different points +of view. But this is exactly the case of his opponents, when properly +stated. They do not deny Object: they do not deny Subject: but they +deny the independent and separate existence of the one as well as of +the other: they admit the two only as relative to each other, or as +reciprocally implicated in the indivisible fact of cognition. The +reasoning of Aristokles thus goes to prove the opinion which he is +trying to refute. Most of the arguments, which Sextus adduces in +favour of the Kyrenaic doctrine, show forcibly that the Objective +Something, apart from its Subjective correlate, is unknowable and a +non-entity; but he does not include in the Subjective as much as ought +to be included; he takes note only of the present sensation, and does +not include sensations remembered or anticipated. Another very +forcible part of Sextus's reasoning may be found, vii. sect. 269-272, +where he shows that a logical Subject _per se_ is undefinable and +inconceivable--that those who attempt to define Man (_e.g._) do so by +specifying more or fewer of the predicates of Man--and that if you +suppose all the predicates to vanish, the Subject vanishes along with +them.] + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +XENOPHON. + + +[Side-note: Xenophon--his character--essentially a man of action and +not a theorist--the Sokratic element in him an accessory.] + +There remains one other companion of Sokrates, for whom a dignified +place must be reserved in this volume--Xenophon the son of Gryllus. It +is to him that we owe, in great part, such knowledge as we possess of +the real Sokrates. For the Sokratic conversations related by +Xenophon, though doubtless dressed up and expanded by him, appear to +me reports in the main of what Sokrates actually said. Xenophon was +sparing in the introduction of his master as titular spokesman for +opinions, theories, or controversial difficulties, generated in his +own mind: a practice in which Plato indulged without any reserve, as +we have seen by the numerous dialogues already passed in review. + +I shall not however give any complete analysis of Xenophon's works: +because both the greater part of them, and the leading features of his +personal character, belong rather to active than to speculative +Hellenic life. As such, I have dealt with them largely in my History +of Greece. What I have here to illustrate is the Sokratic element in +his character, which is important indeed as accessory and modifying--yet +not fundamental. Though he exemplifies and attests, as a witness, +the theorising negative vein, the cross-examining Elenchus of Sokrates +it is the preceptorial vein which he appropriates to himself and +expands in its bearing on practical conduct. He is the +semi-philosophising general; undervalued indeed as a hybrid by Plato--but +by high-minded Romans like Cato, Agricola, Helvidius Priscus, &c. +likely to be esteemed higher than Plato himself.[1] He is the military +brother of the Sokratic family, distinguished for ability and energy +in the responsible functions of command: a man of robust frame, +courage, and presence of mind, who affronts cheerfully the danger and +fatigues of soldiership, and who extracts philosophy from experience +of the variable temper of armies, together with the multiplied +difficulties and precarious authority of a Grecian general.[2] For our +knowledge, imperfect as it is, of real Grecian life, we are greatly +indebted to his works. All historians of Greece must draw largely from +his Hellenica and Anabasis: and we learn much even from his other +productions, not properly historical; for he never soars high in the +region of ideality, nor grasps at etherial visions--"nubes et +inania"--like Plato. + +[Footnote 1: See below, my remarks on the Platonic Euthydêmus, vol. +ii. chap, xxi.**] + +[Footnote 2: We may apply to Plato and Xenophon the following +comparison by Euripides, Supplices, 905. (Tydeus and Meleager.) + +[Greek: gnô/mê| d' a)delphou= Melea/grou leleimme/nos, +i)son pare/schen o)/noma dia\ te/chnên doro/s, +eu(rô\n a)kribê= mousikê\n e)n a)spi/di; +philo/timon ê)=thos, plou/sion phro/nêma de\ +e)n toi=sin e)/rgois, ou)chi\ toi=s lo/gois e)/chôn.]] + +[Side-note: Date of Xenophon--probable year of his birth.] + +Respecting the personal history of Xenophon himself, we possess but +little information: nor do we know the year either of his birth or +death. His Hellenica concludes with the battle of Mantineia in 362 +B.C. But he makes incidental mention in that work of an event five +years later--the assassination of Alexander, despot of Pheræ, which +took place in 357 B.C.[3]--and his language seems to imply that the +event was described shortly after it took place. His pamphlet De +Vectigalibus appears to have been composed still later--not before 355 +B.C. In the year 400 B.C., when Xenophon joined the Grecian military +force assembled at Sardis to accompany Cyrus the younger in his march +to Babylon, he must have been still a young man: yet he had even then +established an intimacy with Sokrates at Athens: and he was old enough +to call himself the "ancient guest" of the Boeotian Proxenus, who +engaged him to come and take service with Cyrus.[4] We may suppose him +to have been then about thirty years of age; and thus to have been +born about 430 B.C.--two or three years earlier than Plato. Respecting +his early life, we have no facts before us: but we may confidently +affirm (as I have already observed about[5] Plato), that as he became +liable to military service in 412 B.C., the severe pressure of the war +upon Athens must have occasioned him to be largely employed, among +other citizens, for the defence of his native city, until its capture +in 405 B.C. He seems to have belonged to an equestrian family in the +census, and therefore to have served on horseback. More than one of +his compositions evinces both intelligent interest in horsemanship, +and great familiarity with horses. + +[Footnote 3: Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 37. [Greek: tô=n de\ tau=ta +praxa/ntôn] (_i.e._ of the brothers of Thêbê, which brothers had +assassinated Alexander) [Greek: a)/chri ou)= o(de o( lo/gos +e)gra/pheto, Tisi/phonos, presbu/tatos ô(=n tô=n a)delphô=n, tê\n +a)rchê\n ei)=che.]] + +[Footnote 4: That he was still a young man appears from his language, +Anabas. iii. 1, 25. His intimacy with Sokrates, whose advice he asked +about the propriety of accepting the invitation of Proxenus to go to +Asia, is shown iii. 1, 5. Proxenus was his [Greek: xe/nos a)rchai=os], +iii. 1, 4. + +The story mentioned by Strabo (ix. 403) that Xenophon served in the +Athenian cavalry at the battle of Delium (424 B.C.), and that his life +was saved by Sokrates, I consider to be not less inconsistent with any +reasonable chronology, than the analogous anecdote--that Plato +distinguished himself at the battle of Delium. See below, ch. v.] + +[Footnote 5: See ch. v.] + +[Side-note: His personal history--He consults Sokrates--takes the +opinion of the Delphian oracle.] + +Our knowledge of his personal history begins with what he himself +recounts in the Anabasis. His friend Proxenus, then at Sardis +commanding a regiment of Hellenic mercenaries under Cyrus the younger, +wrote recommending him earnestly to come over and take service, in the +army prepared ostensibly against the Pisidians. Upon this Xenophon +asked the advice of Sokrates: who exhorted him to go and consult the +Delphian oracle--being apprehensive that as Cyrus had proved himself +the strenuous ally of Sparta, and had furnished to her the principal +means for crushing Athens, an Athenian taking service under him would +incur unpopularity at home. Xenophon accordingly went to Delphi: but +instead of asking the question broadly--"Shall I go, or shall I +decline to go?"--he put to Apollo the narrower question--"Having in +contemplation a journey, to which of the Gods must I sacrifice and +pray, in order to accomplish it best, and to come back with safety and +success?" Apollo indicated to him the Gods to whom he ought to address +himself: but Sokrates was displeased with him for not having first +asked, whether he ought to go at all. Nevertheless (continued +Sokrates), since you have chosen to put the question in your own way +you must act as the God has prescribed.[6] + +[Footnote 6: Xenoph. Anab. iii. 1, 4-6.] + +[Side-note: His service and command with the Ten Thousand Greeks; +afterwards under Agesilaus and the Spartans.--He is banished from +Athens.] + +The anecdote here recounted by Xenophon is interesting, as it +illustrates his sincere faith, as well as that of Sokrates, in the +Delphian oracle: though we might have expected that on this occasion, +Sokrates would have been favoured with some manifestation of that +divine sign, which he represents to have warned him afterwards so +frequently and on such trifling matters. Apollo however was perhaps +displeased (as Sokrates was) with Xenophon, for not having submitted +the question to him with full frankness: since the answer given was +proved by subsequent experience to be incomplete.[7] After fifteen +months passed, first, in the hard upward march--next, in the still +harder retreat--of the Ten Thousand, to the preservation of whom he +largely contributed by his energy, presence of mind, resolute +initiative, and ready Athenian eloquence, as one of their +leaders--Xenophon returned to Athens. It appears that he must have come +back not long after the death of Sokrates. But Athens was not at that time +a pleasant residence for him. The Sokratic companions shared in the +unpopularity of their deceased master, and many of them were absent: +moreover Xenophon himself was unpopular as the active partisan of +Cyrus. After a certain stay, we know not how long, at Athens, Xenophon +appears to have gone back to Asia; and to have resumed his command of +the remaining Cyreian soldiers, then serving under the Lacedæmonian +generals against the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. He +served first under Derkyllidas, next under Agesilaus. For the latter +he conceived the warmest admiration, and contracted with him an +intimate friendship. At the time when Xenophon rejoined the Cyreians +in Asia, Athens was not at war with the Lacedæmonians: but after some +time, the hostile confederacy of Athens, Thebes, and Corinth, against +them was organised: and Agesilaus was summoned home by them from Asia, +to fight their battles in Greece. Xenophon and his Cyreians were still +a portion of the army of Agesilaus, and accompanied him in his march +into Boeotia; where they took part in his desperate battle and bloody +victory at Koroneia.[8] But he was now lending active aid to the +enemies of Athens, and holding conspicuous command in their armies. A +sentence of banishment, on the ground of Laconism, was passed against +him by the Athenians, on the proposition of Eubulus.[9] + +[Footnote 7: Compare Anabas. vi. 1, 22, and vii. 8, 1-6. + +See also Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 33 C, and Plato, Theagês, p. 129; also +below, vol. ii. ch. xv. + +Sokrates and Xenophon are among the most imposing witnesses cited by +Quintus Cicero, in his long pleading to show the reality of divination +(Cicero, De Divinatione, i. 25, 52, i. 54, 122). Antipater the Stoic +collected a large number of examples, illustrating the miraculous +divining power of Sokrates. Several of these examples appear much more +trifling than this incident of Xenophon.] + +[Footnote 8: Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 6; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 18.] + +[Footnote 9: Diog. L. ii. 51-69. [Greek: e)pi\ Lakônismô=| phugê\n +u(p' A)thênai/ôn kategnô/sthê.]] + +[Side-note: His residence at Skillus near Olympia.] + +How long he served with Agesilaus, we are not told. At the end of his +service, the Lacedæmonians provided him with a house and land at the +Triphylian town of Skillûs near Olympia, which they had seemingly +taken from the Eleians and re-colonised. Near this residence he also +purchased, under the authority of the God (perhaps Olympian Zeus) a +landed estate to be consecrated to the Goddess Artemis: employing +therein a portion of the tithe of plunder devoted to Artemis by the +Cyreian army, and deposited by him for the time in the care of +Megabyzus, priest of Artemis at Ephesus. The estate of the Goddess +contained some cultivated ground, but consisted chiefly of pasture; +with wild ground, wood and mountain, abounding in game and favourable +for hunting. Xenophon became Conservator of this property for Artemis: +to whom he dedicated a shrine and a statue, in miniature copy of the +great temple at Ephesus. Every year he held a formal hunting-match, to +which he invited all the neighbours, with abundant hospitality, at the +expense of the Goddess. The Conservator and his successors were bound +by formal vow, on pain of her displeasure, to employ one tenth of the +whole annual produce in sacrifices to her: and to keep the shrine and +statue in good order, out of the remainder.[10] + +[Footnote 10: Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 8-12; Diog. L. ii. 52: Pausanias, v. +6, 3. + +[Greek: phêsi\ d' o( Dei/narchos o(/ti kai\ oi)ki/an kai\ a)/gron +au)tô=| e(/dosan Lakedaimo/nioi]. + +Deinarchus appears to have composed for a client at Athens a judicial +speech against Xenophon, the grandson of Xenophon Sokraticus. He +introduced into the speech some facts relating to the grandfather.] + +[Side-note: Family of Xenophon--his son Gryllus killed at Mantinea.] + +Xenophon seems to have passed many years of his life either at Skillus +or in other parts of Peloponnesus, and is said to have died very old +at Corinth. The sentence of banishment passed against him by the +Athenians was revoked after the battle of Leuktra, when Athens came +into alliance with the Lacedæmonians against Thebes. Some of +Xenophon's later works indicate that he must have availed himself of +this revocation to visit Athens: but whether he permanently resided +there is uncertain. He had brought over with him from Asia a wife +named Philesia, by whom he had two sons, Gryllus and Diodorus.[11] He +sent these two youths to be trained at Sparta, under the countenance +of Agesilaus:[12] afterwards the eldest of them, Gryllus, served with +honour in the Athenian cavalry which assisted the Lacedæmonians and +Mantineians against Epameinondas, B.C. 362. In the important +combat[13] of the Athenian and Theban cavalry, close to the gates of +Mantineia--shortly preceding the general battle of Mantineia, in which +Epameinondas was slain--Gryllus fell, fighting with great bravery. The +death of this gallant youth--himself seemingly of great promise, and +the son of so eminent a father--was celebrated by Isokrates and several +other rhetors, as well as by the painter Euphranor at Athens, and by +sculptors at Mantineia itself.[14] + +[Footnote 11: Æschines Sokraticus, in one of his dialogues, introduced +Aspasia conversing with Xenophon and his (Xenophon's) wife. Cicero, De +Invent. i. 31, 51-54; Quintil. Inst. Orat. v. p. 312.] + +[Footnote 12: Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 20.] + +[Footnote 13: Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, 15-16-17. This combat of cavalry +near the gates of Mantineia was very close and sharply contested; but +at the great battle fought a few days afterwards the Athenian cavalry +were hardly at all engaged, vii. 5, 25.] + +[Footnote 14: Pausanias, i. 3, 3, viii. 11, 4, ix. 15, 3; Diogenes L. +ii. 54. Harpokration v. [Greek: Kêphiso/dôros]. + +It appears that Euphranor, in his picture represented Gryllus as +engaged in personal conflict with Epameinondas and wounding him--a +compliment not justified by the facts. The Mantineians believed +Antikrates, one of their own citizens, to have mortally wounded the +great Theban general with his spear, and they awarded to him as +recompense immunity from public burthens ([Greek: a)te/leian]), both +for himself and his descendants. One of his descendants, Kallikrates, +continued even in Plutarch's time to enjoy this immunity. Plutarch, +Agesilaus, c. 35.] + +[Side-note: Death of Xenophon at Corinth--Story of the Eleian +Exegetæ.] + +Skillus, the place in which the Lacedæmonians had established +Xenophon, was retaken by the Eleians during the humiliation of +Lacedæmonian power, not long before the battle of Mantineia. Xenophon +himself was absent at the time; but his family were constrained to +retire to Lepreum. It was after this, we are told, that he removed to +Corinth, where he died in 355 B.C. or in some year later. The Eleian +Exegetæ told the traveller Pausanias, when he visited the spot five +centuries afterwards, that Xenophon had been condemned in the judicial +Council of Olympia as wrongful occupant of the property at Skillus, +through Lacedæmonian violence; but that the Eleians had granted him +indulgence, and had allowed him to remain.[15] As it seems clearly +asserted that he died at Corinth, he can hardly have availed himself +of the indulgence; and I incline to suspect that the statement is an +invention of subsequent Eleian Exegetæ, after they had learnt to +appreciate his literary eminence. + +[Footnote 15: Pausan. v. 6, 3; Diog. L. ii. 53-56.] + +[Side-note: Xenophon different from Plato and the other Sokratic +brethren.] + +From the brief outline thus presented of Xenophon's life, it will +plainly appear that he was quite different in character and habits +from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren. He was not only a man of +the world (as indeed Aristippus was also), but he was actively engaged +in the most responsible and difficult functions of military command: +he was moreover a landed proprietor and cultivator, fond of strong +exercise with dogs and horses, and an intelligent equestrian. His +circumstances were sufficiently easy to dispense with the necessity of +either composing discourses or taking pupils for money. Being thus +enabled to prosecute letters and philosophy in an independent way, he +did not, like Plato and Aristotle, open a school.[16] His relations, +as active coadjutor and subordinate, with Agesilaus, form a striking +contrast to those of Plato with Dionysius, as tutor and pedagogue. In +his mind, the Sokratic conversations, suggestive and stimulating to +every one, fell upon the dispositions and aptitudes of a +citizen-soldier, and fructified in a peculiar manner. My present work +deals with Xenophon, not as an historian of Grecian affairs or of the +Cyreian expedition, but only on the intellectual and theorising side:--as +author of the Memorabilia, the Cyropædia, Oekonomikus, Symposion, +Hieron, De Vectigalibus, &c. + +[Footnote 16: See, in the account of Theopompus by Photius (Cod. 176, +p. 120; compare also Photius, Cod. 159, p. 102, a. 41), the +distinction taken by Theopompus: who said that the four most +celebrated literary persons of his day were, his master Isokrates, +Theodektês of Phasêlis, Naukrates of Erythræ, and himself +(Theopompus). He himself and Naukrates were in good circumstances, so +that he passed his life in independent prosecution of philosophy and +philomathy. But Isokrates and Theodektês were compelled [Greek: di' +a)pori/an bi/ou, misthou= lo/gous gra/phein kai\ sophisteu/ein, +e)kpaideu/ontes tou\s ne/ous, ka)kei=then karpoume/nous ta\s +u(phelei/as]. + +Theopompus does not here present the profession of a Sophist (as most +Platonic commentators teach us to regard it) as a mean, +unprincipled, and corrupting employment.] + +[Side-note: His various works--Memorabilia, Oekonomikus, &c.] + +The Memorabilia were composed as records of the conversations of +Sokrates, expressly intended to vindicate Sokrates against charges of +impiety and of corrupting youthful minds, and to show that he +inculcated, before every thing, self-denial, moderation of desires, +reverence for parents, and worship of the Gods. The Oekonomikus and +the Symposion are expansions of the Memorabilia: the first[17] +exhibiting Sokrates not only as an attentive observer of the facts of +active life (in which character the Memorabilia present him also), but +even as a learner of husbandry[18] and family management from +Ischomachus--the last describing Sokrates and his behaviour amidst the +fun and joviality of a convivial company. Sokrates declares[19] that +as to himself, though poor, he is quite as rich as he desires to be; +that he desires no increase, and regards poverty as no disadvantage. +Yet since Kratobulus, though rich, is beset with temptations to +expense quite sufficient to embarrass him, good proprietary management +is to him a necessity. Accordingly, Sokrates, announcing that he has +always been careful to inform himself who were the best economists in +the city,[20] now cites as authority Ischomachus, a citizen of wealth +and high position, recognised by all as one of the +"super-excellent".[21] Ischomachus loves wealth, and is anxious to +maintain and even enlarge his property: desiring to spend magnificently +for the honour of the Gods, the assistance of friends, and the support +of the city.[22] His whole life is arranged, with intelligence and +forethought, so as to attain this object, and at the same time to keep +up the maximum of bodily health and vigour, especially among the +horsemen of the city as an accomplished rider[23] and cavalry +soldier. He speaks with respect, and almost with enthusiasm, of +husbandry, as an occupation not merely profitable, but improving to +the character: though he treats with disrespect other branches of +industry and craft.[24] In regard to husbandry, too, as in regard to +war or steersmanship, he affirms that the difference between one +practitioner and another consists, not so much in unequal knowledge, +as in unequal care to practise what both of them know.[25] + +[Footnote 17: Galen calls the Oekonomicus the last book of the +Memorabilia (ad Hippokrat. De Articulis, t. xviii. p. 301, Kühn). It +professes to be repeated by Xenophon from what he himself _heard_ +Sokrates say--[Greek: ê)/kousa de/ pote au)tou= kai\ peri\ +oi)konomi/as toia/de dialegome/nou], &c. Sokrates first instructs +Kritobulus that economy, or management of property, is an art, +governed by rules, and dependent upon principles; next, he recounts to +him the lessons which he professes to have himself received from +Ischomachus. + +I have already adverted to the Xenophontic Symposion as containing +jocular remarks which some erroneously cite as serious.] + +[Footnote 18: To _learn_ in this way the actualities of life, and the +way of extracting the greatest amount of wheat and barley from a given +piece of land, is the sense which Xenophon puts on the word [Greek: +philo/sophos] (Xen. Oek. xvi. 9; compare Cyropædia, vi. 1, 41).] + +[Footnote 19: Xenoph. Oekonom. ii. 3; xi. 3, 4. + +I have made some observations on the Xenophontic Symposion, comparing +it with the Platonic Symposion, in a subsequent chapter of this work, +ch. xxvi.] + +[Footnote 20: Xen. Oekon. ii. 16.] + +[Footnote 21: Xen. Oekon. vi. 17, xi. 3. [Greek: pro\s pa/ntôn kai\ +a)ndrô=n kai\ gunaikô=n, kai\ xe/nôn kai\ a)stô=n, kalo/n te +ka)gatho\n e)ponomazo/menon.]] + +[Footnote 22: Xen. Oekon. xi. 9.] + +[Footnote 23: Xen. Oekon. xi. 17-21. [Greek: e)n toi=s i(ppokôta/tois +te kai\ plousiôta/tois].] + +[Footnote 24: Xen. Oekon. iv. 2-3, vi. 5-7. Ischomachus asserts that +his father had been more devoted to agriculture ([Greek: +philogeôrgo/tatos]) than any man at Athens; that he had bought several +pieces of land ([Greek: chô/rous]) when out of order, improved them, +and then resold them with very large profit, xx. 26.] + +[Footnote 25: Xen. Oekon. xx. 2-10.] + +[Side-note: Ischomachus, hero of the Oekonomikus--ideal of an active +citizen, cultivator, husband, house-master, &c.] + +Ischomachus describes to Sokrates, in reply to a string of successive +questions, both his scheme of life and his scheme of husbandry. He had +married his wife before she was fifteen years of age: having first +ascertained that she had been brought up carefully, so as to have seen +and heard as little as possible, and to know nothing but spinning and +weaving.[26] He describes how he took this very young wife into +training, so as to form her to the habits which he himself approved. +He declares that the duties and functions of women are confined to +in-door work and superintendence, while the out-door proceedings, +acquisition as well as defence, belong to men:[27] he insists upon +such separation of functions emphatically, as an ordinance of +nature--holding an opinion the direct reverse of that which we have seen +expressed by Plato.[28] He makes many remarks on the arrangements of +the house, and of the stores within it: and he dwells particularly on +the management of servants, male and female. + +[Footnote 26: Xen. Oekon. vii. 3-7. [Greek: to\n d' e)/mprosthen +chro/non e)/zê u(po\ pollê=s e)pimelei/as, o(/pôs ô(s e)la/chista me\n +o)/psoito, e)la/chista de\ a)kou/soito, e)la/chista de\ e)/roito]. + +The [Greek: didaskali/a] addressed to Sokrates by Ischomachus is in +the form of [Greek: e)rô/têsis], xix. 15. The Sokratic interrogation +is here brought to bear _upon_ Sokrates, instead of by Sokrates: like +the Elenchus in the Parmenidês of Plato.] + +[Footnote 27: Xen. Oekon. vii. 22-32.] + +[Footnote 28: See below, ch. xxxvii. + +Compare also Aristotel. Politic. iii. 4, 1277, b. 25, where Aristotle +lays down the same principle as Xenophon.] + +[Side-note: Text upon which Xenophon insists--capital difference +between command over subordinates willing, and subordinates +unwilling.] + +It is upon this last point that he lays more stress than upon any +other. To know how to command men--is the first of all accomplishments +in the mind of Xenophon. Ischomachus proclaims it as essential that +the superior shall not merely give orders to his subordinates, but +also see them executed, and set the example of personal active +watchfulness in every way. Xenophon aims at securing not simply +obedience, but cheerful and willing obedience--even attachment from +those who obey. "To exercise command over willing subjects"[29] (he +says) "is a good more than human, granted only to men truly +consummated in virtue of character essentially divine. To exercise +command over unwilling subjects, is a torment like that of Tantalus." + +[Footnote 29: Xen. Oekon. xxi. 10-12. [Greek: ê)/thous +basilikou=--thei=on gene/sthai. Ou) ga\r pa/nu moi\ dokei= touti\ to\ +a)gatho\n a)nthrô/pinon ei)=nai, a)lla\ thei=on, to\ _e)thelo/ntôn +a)/rchein_; saphô=s de\ di/dotai toi=s a)lêthinô=s sôphrosu/nê| +tetelesme/nois. To\ de\ a)ko/ntôn turannei=n dido/asin, ô(s e)moi\ +dokei=, ou(\s a)\n ê(gô=ntai a)xi/ous ei)=nai bioteu/ein, ô(/sper o( +Ta/ntalos e)n a(/|dou le/getai]. Compare also iv. 19, xiii. 3-7.] + +[Side-note: Probable circumstances generating these reflections in +Xenophon's mind.] + +The sentence just transcribed (the last sentence in the Oekonomikus) +brings to our notice a central focus in Xenophon's mind, from whence +many of his most valuable speculations emanate. "What are the +conditions under which subordinates will cheerfully obey their +commanders?"--was a problem forced upon his thoughts by his own +personal experience, as well as by contemporary phenomena in Hellas. +He had been elected one of the generals of the Ten Thousand: a large +body of brave warriors from different cities, most of them unknown to +him personally, and inviting his authority only because they were in +extreme peril, and because no one else took the initiative.[30] He +discharged his duties admirably: and his ready eloquence was an +invaluable accomplishment, distinguishing him from all his colleagues. +Nevertheless when the army arrived at the Euxine, out of the reach of +urgent peril, he was made to feel sensibly the vexations of authority +resting upon such precarious basis, and perpetually traversed by +jealous rivals. Moreover, Xenophon, besides his own personal +experience, had witnessed violent political changes running +extensively through the cities of the Grecian world: first, at the +close of the Peloponnesian war--next, after the battle of Knidus--again, +under Lacedæmonian supremacy, after the peace of Antalkidas, +and the subsequent seizure of the citadel of Thebes--lastly, after the +Thebans had regained their freedom and humbled the Lacedæmonians by +the battle of Leuktra. To Xenophon--partly actor, partly +spectator--these political revolutions were matters of anxious interest; +especially as he ardently sympathised with Agesilaus, a political +partisan interested in most of them, either as conservative or +revolutionary. + +[Footnote 30: The reader will find in my 'History of Greece,' ch. 70, + p. 103 seq., a narrative of the circumstances under which Xenophon +was first chosen to command, as well as his conduct afterwards.] + +[Side-note: This text affords subjects for the Hieron and +Cyropædia--Name of Sokrates not suitable.] + +We thus see, from the personal history of Xenophon, how his attention +came to be peculiarly turned to the difficulty of ensuring steady +obedience from subordinates, and to the conditions by which such +difficulty might be overcome. The sentence, above transcribed from the +Oekonomikus, embodies two texts upon which he has discoursed in two of +his most interesting compositions--Cyropædia and Hieron. In Cyropædia +he explains and exemplifies the divine gift of ruling over cheerful +subordinates: in Hieron, the torment of governing the disaffected and +refractory. For neither of these purposes would the name and person of +Sokrates have been suitable, exclusively connected as they were with +Athens. Accordingly Xenophon, having carried that respected name +through the Oekonomikus and Symposion, now dismisses it, yet retaining +still the familiar and colloquial manner which belonged to Sokrates. +The Epilogue, or concluding chapter, of the Cyropædia, must +unquestionably have been composed after 364 B.C.--in the last ten +years of Xenophon's life: the main body of it may perhaps have been +composed earlier. + +[Side-note: Hieron--Persons of the dialogue--Simonides and Hieron.] + +The Hieron gives no indication of date: but as a picture purely +Hellenic, it deserves precedence over the Cyropædia, and conveys to my +mind the impression of having been written earlier. It describes a +supposed conversation (probably suggested by current traditional +conversations, like that between Solon and Kroesus) between the poet +Simonides and Hieron the despot of Syracuse; who, shortly after the +Persian invasion of Greece by Xerxes, had succeeded his brother Gelon +the former despot.[31] Both of them had been once private citizens, of +no remarkable consequence: but Gelon, an energetic and ambitious +military man, having raised himself to power in the service of +Hippokrates despot of Gela, had seized the sceptre on the death of his +master: after which he conquered Syracuse, and acquired a formidable +dominion, enjoyed after his death by his brother Hieron. This last was +a great patron of eminent poets--Pindar, Simonides, Æschylus, +Bacchylides: but he laboured under a painful internal complaint, and +appears to have been of an irritable and oppressive temper.[32] + +[Footnote 31: Plato, Epistol. ii. p. 311 A. Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 16, +1391, a. 9; Cicero, Nat. Deo. i. 22, 60. How high was the opinion +entertained about Simonides as a poet, may be seen illustrated in a +passage of Aristophanes, Vespæ, 1362.] + +[Footnote 32: See the first and second Pythian Odes of Pindar, +addressed to Hieron, especially Pyth. i. 55-61-90, with the Scholia +and Boeckh's Commentary. Pindar compliments Hieron upon having founded +his new city of Ætna--[Greek: theodma/tô| su\n e)leutheria|]. This does +not coincide with the view of Hieron's character taken by Xenophon; +but Pindar agrees with Xenophon in exhorting Hieron to make himself +popular by a liberal expenditure.] + +[Side-note: Questions put to Hieron; view taken by Simonides. Answer +of Hieron.] + +Simonides asks of Hieron, who had personally tried both the life of a +private citizen and that of a despot, which of the two he considered +preferable, in regard to pleasures and pains. Upon this subject, a +conversation of some length ensues, in which Hieron declares that the +life of a despot has much more pain, and much less pleasure, than that +of a private citizen under middling circumstances:[33] while Simonides +takes the contrary side, and insists in detail upon the superior means +of enjoyment, apparent at least, possessed by the despot. As each of +these means is successively brought forward, Hieron shews that however +the matter may appear to the spectator, the despot feels no greater +real happiness in his own bosom: while he suffers many pains and +privations, of which the spectator takes no account. As to the +pleasures of sight, the despot forfeits altogether the first and +greatest, because it is unsafe for him to visit the public festivals +and matches. In regard to hearing--many praises, and no reproach, +reach his ears: but then he knows that the praises are insincere--and +that reproach is unheard, only because speakers dare not express what +they really feel. The despot has finer cookery and richer unguents; +but others enjoy a modest banquet as much or more--while the scent of +the unguents pleases those who are near him more than himself.[34] +Then as to the pleasures of love, these do not exist, except where the +beloved person manifests spontaneous sympathy and return of +attachment. Now the despot can never extort such return by his power; +while even if it be granted freely, he cannot trust its sincerity and +is compelled even to be more on his guard, since successful +conspiracies against his life generally proceed from those who profess +attachment to him.[35] The private citizen on the contrary knows that +those who profess to love him, may be trusted, as having no motive for +falsehood. + +[Footnote 33: Xenoph. Hier. i. 8. [Greek: eu)= i)/sthi, ô)= Simôni/dê, +o(/ti polu\ mei/ô eu)phrai/nontai oi( tu/rannoi tô=n metri/ôs +diago/ntôn i)diôtô=n, polu\ de\ plei/ô kai\ mei/zô lupou=ntai.]] + +[Footnote 34: Xen. Hieron, i. 12-15-24.] + +[Footnote 35: Xen. Hier. i. 26-38. [Greek: Tô=| tura/nnô| ou)/ pot' +e)sti\ pisteu=sai, ô(s philei=tai. Ai( e)piboulai\ e)x ou)de/nôn +ple/ones toi=s tura/nnois ei)si\n ê)\ a)po\ tô=n ma/lista philei=n +au)tou\s prospoiêsame/nôn]. + +This chapter affords remarkable illustration of Grecian manners, +especially in the-distinction drawn between [Greek: ta\ paidika\ +a)phrodi/sia] and [Greek: ta\ teknopoia\ a)phrodi/sia].] + +[Side-note: Misery of governing unwilling subjects declared by +Hieron.] + +Still (contends Simonides) there are other pleasures greater than +those of sense. You despots possess the greatest abundance and variety +of possessions--the finest chariots and horses, the most splendid +arms, the finest palaces, ornaments, and furniture--the most brilliant +ornaments for your wives--the most intelligent and valuable servants. +You execute the greatest enterprises: you can do most to benefit your +friends, and hurt your enemies: you have all the proud consciousness +of superior might.[36]--Such is the opinion of the multitude (replies +Hieron), who are misled by appearances: but a wise man like you, +Simonides, ought to see the reality in the background, and to +recollect that happiness or unhappiness reside only in a man's +internal feelings. You cannot but know that a despot lives in +perpetual insecurity, both at home and abroad: that he must always go +armed himself, and have armed guards around him: that whether at war +or at peace, he is always alike in danger: that, while suspecting +every one as an enemy, he nevertheless knows that when he has put to +death the persons suspected, he has only weakened the power of the +city:[37] that he has no sincere friendship with any one: that he +cannot count even upon good faith, and must cause all his food to be +tasted by others, before he eats it: that whoever has slain a private +citizen, is shunned in Grecian cities as an abomination--while the +tyrannicide is everywhere honoured and recompensed: that there is no +safety for the despot even in his own family, many having been killed +by their nearest relatives:[38] that he is compelled to rely upon +mercenary foreign soldiers and liberated slaves, against the free +citizens who hate him: and that the hire of such inauspicious +protectors compels him to raise money, by despoiling individuals and +plundering temples:[39] that the best and most estimable citizens are +incurably hostile to him, while none but the worst will serve him for +pay: that he looks back with bitter sorrow to the pleasures and +confidential friendships which he enjoyed as a private man, but from +which he is altogether debarred as a despot.[40] + +[Footnote 36: Xen. Hier. ii. 2.] + +[Footnote 37: Xen. Hieron, ii. 5-17.] + +[Footnote 38: Xenoph. Hieron, ii. 8, iii. 1, 5. Compare Xenophon, +Hellenic. iii. 1, 14.] + +[Footnote 39: Xen. Hieron, iv. 7-11.] + +[Footnote 40: Xen. Hieron, vi. 1-12.] + +Nothing brings a man so near to the Gods (rejoins Simonides) as the +feeling of being honoured. Power and a brilliant position must be of +inestimable value, if they are worth purchasing at the price which you +describe.[41] Otherwise, why do you not throw up your sceptre? How +happens it that no despot has ever yet done this? To be honoured +(answers Hieron) is the greatest of earthly blessings, when a man +obtains honour from the spontaneous voice of freemen. But a despot +enjoys no such satisfaction. He lives like a criminal under sentence +of death by every one: and it is impossible for him to lay down his +power, because of the number of persons whom he has been obliged to +make his enemies. He can neither endure his present condition, nor yet +escape from it. The best thing he can do is to hang himself.[42] + +[Footnote 41: Xen. Hieron, vii. 1-5.] + +[Footnote 42: Xen. Hieron, vii. 5-13. [Greek: O( de\ tu/rannos, ô(s +u(po\ pa/ntôn a)nthrô/pôn katakekrime/nos di' a)diki/an +a)pothnê/skein--kai\ nu/kta kai\ ê(me/ran dia/gei. . . . A)ll' ei)/per +tô| a)/llô| lusitelei= a)pa/gxasthai, i)/sthi o(/ti tura/nnô| e)/gôge +eu(ri/skô ma/lista tou=to lusitelou=n poiê=sai. Mo/nô| ga\r au(tô=| +ou)/te e)/chein, ou)/te katathe/sthai ta\ kaka\ lusitelei=]. + +Solon in his poems makes the remark, that for the man who once usurps +the sceptre no retreat is possible. See my 'History of Greece,' chap. +xi. p. 132 seq. + +The impressive contrast here drawn by Hieron (c. vi.) between his +condition as a despot and the past enjoyments of private life and +citizenship which he has lost, reminds one of the still more sorrowful +contrast in the Atys of Catullus, v. 58-70.] + +[Side-note: Advice to Hieron by Simonides--that he should govern well, +and thus make himself beloved by his subjects.] + +Simonides in reply, after sympathising with Hieron's despondency, +undertakes to console him by showing that such consequences do not +necessarily attend despotic rule. The despot's power is an instrument +available for good as well as for evil. By a proper employment of it, +he may not only avoid being hated, but may even make himself beloved, +beyond the measure attainable by any private citizen. Even kind words, +and petty courtesies, are welcomed far more eagerly when they come +from a powerful man than from an equal: moreover a showy and brilliant +exterior seldom fails to fascinate the spectator.[43] But besides +this, the despot may render to his city the most substantial and +important services. He may punish criminals and reward meritorious +men: the punishments he ought to inflict by the hands of others, while +he will administer the rewards in person--giving prizes for superior +excellence in every department, and thus endearing himself to all.[44] +Such prizes would provoke a salutary competition in the performance of +military duties, in choric exhibitions, in husbandry, commerce, and +public usefulness of every kind. Even the foreign mercenaries, though +usually odious, might be so handled and disciplined as to afford +defence against foreign danger,--to ensure for the citizens +undisturbed leisure in their own private affairs--to protect and +befriend the honest man, and to use force only against criminals.[45] +If thus employed, such mercenaries, instead of being hated, would be +welcome companions: and the despot himself may count, not only upon +security against attack, but upon the warmest gratitude and +attachment. The citizens will readily furnish contributions to him +when asked, and will regard him as their greatest benefactor. "You +will obtain in this way" (Simonides thus concludes his address to +Hieron), "the finest and most enviable of all acquisitions. You will +have your subjects obeying you willingly, and caring for you of their +own accord. You may travel safely wherever you please, and will be a +welcome visitor at all the crowded festivals. You will be happy, +without jealousy from any one."[46] + +[Footnote 43: Xen. Hieron, viii. 2-7.] + +[Footnote 44: Xen. Hieron, ix. 1-4.] + +[Footnote 45: Xen. Hieron, x. 6-8.] + +[Footnote 46: Xen. Hieron, xi. 10-12-15. [Greek: ka)\n tau=ta pa/nta +poiê=s, eu)= i)/sthi pa/ntôn tô=n a)nthrô/pois ka/lliston kai\ +makariô/taton ktê=ma kektême/nos; eu)daimonô=n ga\r ou) +phthonêthê/sê|.]] + +[Side-note: Probable experience had by Xenophon of the feelings at +Olympia against Dionysius.] + +The dialogue of which I have given this short abstract, illustrates +what Xenophon calls the torment of Tantalus--the misery of a despot +who has to extort obedience from unwilling subjects:--especially if +the despot be one who has once known the comfort and security of +private life, under tolerably favourable circumstances. If we compare +this dialogue with the Platonic Gorgias, where we have seen a thesis +very analogous handled in respect to Archelaus,--we shall find Plato +soaring into a sublime ethical region of his own, measuring the +despot's happiness and misery by a standard peculiar to himself, and +making good what he admits to be a paradox by abundant eloquence +covering faulty dialectic: while Xenophon, herein following his +master, applies to human life the measure of a rational common sense, +talks about pleasures and pains which every one can feel to be such, +and points out how many of these pleasures the despot forfeits, how +many of these pains and privations he undergoes,--in spite of that +great power of doing hurt, and less power, though still considerable, +of doing good, which raises the envy of spectators. The Hieron gives +utterance to an interesting vein of sentiment, more common at Athens +than elsewhere in Greece; enforced by the conversation of Sokrates, +and serving as corrective protest against that unqualified worship of +power which prevailed in the ancient world no less than in the modern. +That the Syrakusan Hieron should be selected as an exemplifying name, +may be explained by the circumstance, that during thirty-eight years +of Xenophon's mature life (405-367 B.C.), Dionysius the elder was +despot of Syrakuse; a man of energy and ability, who had extinguished +the liberties of his native city, and acquired power and dominion +greater than that of any living Greek. Xenophon, resident at Skillus, +within a short distance from Olympia, had probably[47] seen the +splendid Thêory (or sacred legation of representative envoys) +installed in rich and ornamented tents, and the fine running horses +sent by Dionysius, at the ninety-ninth Olympic festival (384 B.C.): +but he probably also heard the execration with which the name of +Dionysius himself had been received by the spectators, and he would +feel that the despot could hardly shew himself there in person. There +were narratives in circulation about the interior life of +Dionysius,[48] analogous to those statements which Xenophon puts into +the mouth of Hieron. A predecessor of Dionysius as despot of +Syracuse[49] and also as patron of poets, was therefore a suitable +person to choose for illustrating the first part of Xenophon's +thesis--the countervailing pains and penalties which spoilt all the +value of power, if exercised over unwilling and repugnant subjects.[50] + +[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 11.] + +[Footnote 48: See chap. 83, vol. xi. pp. 40-50, of my 'History of +Greece,' where this memorable scene at Olympia is described.] + +[Footnote 49: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 20, 57-63; De Officiis, ii. 7, +24-25. + +"Multos timebit ille, quem multi timent."] + +[Footnote 50: An anecdote is told about a visit of Xenophon to +Dionysius at Syracuse--whether the elder or the younger is not +specified--but the tenor of the anecdote points to the younger; if so +the visit must have been later than 367 B.C. (Athenæus x. 427).] + +[Side-note: Xenophon could not have chosen a Grecian despot to +illustrate his theory of the happiness of governing willing subjects.] + +But when Xenophon came to illustrate the second part of his thesis--the +possibility of exercising power in such manner as to render the +holder of it popular and beloved--it would have been scarcely possible +for him to lay the scene in any Grecian city. The repugnance of the +citizens of a Grecian city towards a despot who usurped power over +them, was incurable--however much the more ambitious individuals +subjects among them might have wished to obtain such power for +themselves: a repugnance as great among oligarchs as among +democrats--perhaps even greater. When we read the recommendations +addressed by Simonides, teaching Hieron how he might render himself +popular, we perceive at once that they are alike well intentioned and +ineffectual. Xenophon could neither find any real Grecian despot +corresponding to this portion of his illustrative purpose--nor could he +invent one with any shew of plausibility. He was forced to resort to +other countries and other habits different from those of Greece. + +[Side-note: Cyropædia--blending of Spartan and Persian +customs--Xenophon's experience of Cyrus the Younger.] + +To this necessity probably we owe the Cyropædia: a romance in which +Persian and Grecian experience are singularly blended, and both of +them so transformed as to suit the philosophical purpose of the +narrator. Xenophon had personally served and communicated with Cyrus +the younger: respecting whom also he had large means of information, +from his intimate friend Proxenus, as well as from the other Grecian +generals of the expedition. In the first book of the Anabasis, we find +this young prince depicted as an energetic and magnanimous character, +faithful to his word and generous in his friendships--inspiring strong +attachment in those around him, yet vigorous in administration and in +punishing criminals--not only courting the Greeks as useful for his +ambitious projects, but appreciating sincerely the superiority of +Hellenic character and freedom over Oriental servitude.[51] And in the +Oekonomikus, Cyrus is quoted as illustrating in his character the +true virtue of a commander; the test of which Xenophon declares to +be--That his subordinates follow him willingly, and stand by him to the +death.[52] + +[Footnote 51: Xenoph. Anab. i. 9, also i. 7, 3, the address of Cyrus +to the Greek soldiers--[Greek: O(/pôs ou)=n e)/sesthe a)/ndres a)/xioi +tê=s e)leutheri/as ê(=s ke/ktêsthe, kai\ u(pe\r ê(=s u(ma=s +eu)daimoni/zô. Eu)= ga\r i)/ste, o(/ti te\n e)leutheri/an e(loi/mên +a)\n, a)nti\ ô(=n e)/chô pa/ntôn kai\ a)/llôn pollaplasi/ôn], +compared with i. 5, 16, where Cyrus gives his appreciation of the +Oriental portion of his army, and the remarkable description of the +trial of Orontes, i. 6.] + +[Footnote 52: Xenoph. Oeconom. iv. 18-19. [Greek: Ku=ros, ei) +e)bi/ôsen, a)/ristos a)\n dokei= a)/rchôn gene/sthai--ê(gou=mai me/ga +tekmê/rion a)/rchontos a)retê=s ei)=nai, ô(=| a)\n e(ko/ntes +e(/pôntai, kai\ e)n toi=s deinoi=s parame/nein e)the/lôsin]. Compare +Anab. i. 9, 29-30.] + +[Side-note: Portrait of Cyrus the Great--his education--Preface to the +Cyropædia.] + +It is this character Hellenised, Sokratised, idealised--that Xenophon +paints into his glowing picture of Cyrus the founder of the Persian +monarchy, or the Cyropædia. He thus escapes the insuperable difficulty +arising from the position of a Grecian despot; who never could acquire +willing or loving obedience, because his possession of power was felt +by a majority of his subjects to be wrongful, violent, tainted. The +Cyrus of the Cyropædia begins as son of Kambyses, king or chief of +Persia, and grandson of Astyages, king of Media; recognised according +to established custom by all, as the person to whom they look for +orders. Xenophon furnishes him with a splendid outfit of heroic +qualities, suitable to this ascendant position: and represents the +foundation of the vast Persian empire, with the unshaken fidelity of +all the heterogeneous people composing it, as the reward of a +laborious life spent in the active display of such qualities. In his +interesting Preface to the Cyropædia, he presents this as the solution +of a problem which had greatly perplexed him. He had witnessed many +revolutions in the Grecian cities--subversions of democracies, +oligarchies, and despotisms: he had seen also private establishments, +some with numerous servants, some with few, yet scarcely any +house-master able to obtain hearty or continued obedience. But as to +herds of cattle or flocks of sheep, on the contrary, he had seen them +uniformly obedient; suffering the herdsman or shepherd to do what he +pleased with, them, and never once conspiring against him. The first +inference of Xenophon from these facts was, that man was by nature the +most difficult of all animals to govern.[53] But he became satisfied +that he was mistaken, when he reflected on the history of Cyrus; who +had acquired and maintained dominion over more men than had ever been +united under one empire, always obeying him cheerfully and +affectionately. This history proved to Xenophon that it was not +impossible, nor even difficult,[54] to rule mankind, provided a man +undertook it with scientific or artistic competence. Accordingly, he +proceeded to examine what Cyrus was in birth, disposition, and +education--and how he came to be so admirably accomplished in the +government of men.[55] The result is the Cyropædia. We must observe, +however, that his solution of the problem is one which does not meet +the full difficulties. These difficulties, as he states them, had been +suggested to him by his Hellenic experience: by the instability of +government in Grecian cities. But the solution which he provides +departs from Hellenic experience, and implies what Aristotle and +Hippokrates called the more yielding and servile disposition of +Asiatics:[56] for it postulates an hereditary chief of heroic or +divine lineage, such as was nowhere acknowledged in Greece, except at +Sparta--and there, only under restrictions which would have rendered +the case unfit for Xenophon's purpose. The heroic and regal lineage of +Cyrus was a condition not less essential to success than his +disposition and education:[57] and not merely his lineage, but also +the farther fact, that besides being constant in the duties of prayer +and sacrifice to the Gods, he was peculiarly favoured by them with +premonitory signs and warnings in all difficult emergencies.[58] + +[Footnote 53: Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 2.] + +[Footnote 54: Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 3. [Greek: e)k tou/tou dê\ +ê)nagkazo/metha metanoei=n, mê\ ou)/te tô=n a)duna/tôn ou)/te tô=n +chalepô=n e)/rgôn ê(=| to\ a)nthrô/pôn a)/rchein, _ê)/n tis +e)pistame/nôs_ tou=to pra/ttê|.]] + +[Footnote 55: Xen. Cyrop. i. 1, 3-8.] + +[Footnote 56: Aristot. Politic. vii. 7, 1327, b. 25. [Greek: ta\ de\ +peri\ tê\n A)si/an, dianoêtika\ me\n kai\ te\chnika\ tê\n psuchê/n, +a)/thuma de/; dio/per a)rcho/mena kai\ douleu/onta diatelei=]. + +Hippokrates, De Aere, Locis, et Aquis, c. 19-23.] + +[Footnote 57: So it is stated by Xenophon himself, in the speech +addressed by Kroesus after his defeat and captivity to Cyrus, vii. 2, +24--[Greek: a)gnoô=n e)mauto\n o(/ti soi a)ntipolemei=n i(kano\s +ô(=|mên ei)=nai, prô=ton me\n e)k theô=n gegono/ti, e)/peita de\ dia\ +basile/ôn pephuko/ti, e)/peita de\ e)k paido\s a)retê\n a)skou=nti; +tô=n d' e)mô=n progo/nôn a)kou/ô to\n prô=ton basileu/santa a)/ma te +basile/a kai\ e)leu/theron gene/sthai]. Cyrop. i. 2, 1: [Greek: tou= +Perseidô=n ge/nous], &c.] + +[Footnote 58: See the remarkable words addressed by Cyrus, shortly +before his death, in sacrificing on the hill-top to [Greek: Zeu\s +Patrô=|os] and [Greek: Ê(/lios], Cyrop. viii. 7, 3. + +The special communications of the Gods to Cyrus are insisted on by +Xenophon, like those made to Sokrates, and like the constant aid of +Athênê to Odysseus in Homer, Odyss. iii. 221:-- + +[Greek: Ou) ga\r pô i)/don ô(=de theou\s a)naphanda\ phileu=ntas +ô(s kei/nô| a)naphanda\ pari/stato Palla\s A)thê/nê.]] + +[Side-note: Xenophon does not solve his own problem--The governing +aptitude and popularity of Cyrus come from nature, not from +education.] + +The fundamental principle of Xenophon is, that to obtain hearty and +unshaken obedience is not difficult for a ruler, provided he possesses +the science or art of ruling. This is a principle expressly laid down +by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.[59] We have seen Plato +affirming in the Politikus[60] that this is the only true government, +though very few individuals are competent to it: Plato gives to it a +peculiar application in the Republic, and points out a philosophical +or dialectic tuition whereby he supposes that his Elders will acquire +the science or art of command. The Cyropædia presents to us an +illustrative example. Cyrus is a young prince who, from twenty-six +years of age to his dying day, is always ready with his initiative, +provident in calculation of consequences, and personally active in +enforcement: giving the right order at the right moment, with good +assignable reasons. As a military man, he is not only personally +forward, but peculiarly dexterous in the marshalling and management of +soldiers; like the Homeric Agamemnon[61]-- + +[Greek: A)mpho/teron, basileu/s t' a)gatho/s, kratero/s t' +ai)chmêtê/s]. + +But we must consider this aptitude for command as a spontaneous growth +in Cyrus--a portion of his divine constitution or of the golden +element in his nature (to speak in the phrase of the Platonic +Republic): for no means are pointed out whereby he acquired it, and +the Platonic Sokrates would have asked in vain, where teachers of it +were to be found. It is true that he is made to go through a rigorous +and long-continued training: but this training is common to him with +all the other Persian youths of good family, and is calculated to +teach obedience, not to communicate aptitude for command; while the +master of tactics, whose lessons he receives apart, is expressly +declared to have known little about the duties of a commander.[62] +Kambyses indeed (father of Cyrus) gives to his son valuable general +exhortations respecting the multiplicity of exigencies which press +upon a commander, and the constant watchfulness, precautions, +fertility of invention, required on his part to meet them. We read the +like in the conversations of Sokrates in the Memorabilia:[63] but +neither Kambyses nor Sokrates are teachers of the art of commanding. +For this art, Cyrus is assumed to possess a natural aptitude; like the +other elements of his dispositions--his warm sympathies, his frank and +engaging manners, his ardent emulation combined with perfect freedom +from jealousy, his courage, his love of learning, his willingness to +endure any amount of labour for the purpose of obtaining praise, &c., +all which Xenophon represents as belonging to him by nature, together +with a very handsome person.[64] + +[Footnote 59: Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 10-12.] + +[Footnote 60: See what is said below about the Platonic Politikus, +chap. xxx.] + +[Footnote 61: Cicero, when called upon in his province of Cilicia to +conduct warlike operations against the Parthians, as well as against +some refractory mountaineers, improved his military knowledge by +studying and commenting on the Cyropædia. Epist. ad Famil. ix. 25. +Compare the remarkable observation made by Cicero (Academic. Prior. +ii. init.) about the way in which Lucullus made up his deficiency of +military experience by reading military books.] + +[Footnote 62: Xen. Cyrop. i. 6, 12-15.] + +[Footnote 63: Compare Cyropæd. i. 6, with Memorab. iii. 1.] + +[Footnote 64: Cyropæd. i. 2, 1. [Greek: _phu=nai_ de\ o( Ku=ros +le/getai], &c. i. 3, 1-2. [Greek: pa/ntôn tô=n ê(li/kôn diaphe/rôn +e)phai/neto . . . pai=s phu/sei philo/storgos], &c.] + +[Side-note: Views of Xenophon about public and official training of +all citizens.] + +The Cyropædia is a title not fairly representing the contents of the +work, which contains a more copious biography of the hero than any +which we read in Plutarch or Suetonius. But the education of Cyrus[65] +is the most remarkable part of it, in which the ethico-political +theory of Xenophon, generated by Sokratic refining criticism brought +to bear on the Spartan drill and discipline, is put forth. Professing +to describe the Persian polity, he in reality describes only the +Persian education; which is public, and prescribed by law, intended to +form the character of individuals so that they shall stand in no need +of coercive laws or penalties. Most cities leave the education of +youth to be conducted at the discretion of their parents, and think it +sufficient to enact and enforce laws forbidding, under penal sanction, +theft, murder, and various other acts enumerated as criminal. But +Xenophon (like Plato and Aristotle) disapproves of this system.[66] +His Persian polity places the citizen even from infancy under official +tuition, and aims at forming his first habits and character, as well +as at upholding them when formed, so that instead of having any +disposition of his own to commit such acts, he shall contract a +repugnance to them. He is kept under perpetual training, drill, and +active official employment throughout life, but the supervision is +most unremitting during boyhood and youth. + +[Footnote 65: I have already observed that the phrase of Plato in +Legg. iii. p. 694 C may be considered as conveying his denial of the +assertion, that Cyrus had received a good education.] + +[Footnote 66: Xenophon says the same about the scheme of Lykurgus at +Sparta, De Lac. Repub. c. 2.] + +[Side-note: Details of (so-called) Persian education--Severe +discipline--Distribution of four ages.] + +There are four categories of age:--boys, up to sixteen--young men or +ephêbi, from sixteen to twenty-six--mature men, as far as +fifty-one--above that age, elders. To each of these four classes there is +assigned a certain portion of the "free agora": _i.e._, the great +square of the city, where no buying or selling or vulgar occupation is +allowed--where the regal residence is situated, and none but dignified +functions, civil or military, are carried on. Here the boys and the +mature men assemble every day at sunrise, continue under drill, and +take their meals; while the young men even pass the night on guard +near the government house. Each of the four sections is commanded by +superintendents or officers: those superintending the boys are Elders, +who are employed in administering justice to the boys, and in teaching +them what justice is. They hold judicial trials of the boys for +various sorts of misconduct: for violence, theft, abusive words, +lying, and even for ingratitude. In cases of proved guilt, beating or +flogging is inflicted. The boys go there to learn justice (says +Xenophon), as boys in Hellas go to school to learn letters. Under this +discipline, and in learning the use of the bow and javelin besides, +they spend the time until sixteen years of age. They bring their food +with them from home (wheaten bread, with a condiment of kardamon, or +bruised seed of the nasturtium), together with a wooden cup to draw +water from the river: and they dine at public tables under the eye of +the teacher. The young men perform all the military and police duty +under the commands of the King and the Elders: moreover, they +accompany the King when he goes on a hunting expedition--which +accustoms them to fatigue and long abstinence, as well as to the +encounter of dangerous wild animals. The Elders do not take part in +these hunts, nor in any foreign military march, nor are they bound, +like the others, to daily attendance in the agora. They appoint all +officers, and try judicially the cases shown up by the +superintendents, or other accusers, of all youths or mature men who +have failed in the requirements of the public discipline. The gravest +derelictions they punish with death: where this is not called for, +they put the offender out of his class, so that he remains degraded +all his life.[67] + +[Footnote 67: Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 6-16. [Greek: kai\ ê)/n tis ê)\ e)n +e)phê/bois ê)\ e)n telei/ois a)ndra/sin e)lli/pê| ti tô=n nomi/môn, +phai/nousi me\n oi( phu/larchoi e(/kaston, kai\ tô=n a)/llôn o( +boulo/menos; oi( de\ gerai/teroi a)kou/santes e)kkri/nousin; o( de\ +e)kkrithei\s a)/timos to\n loipo\n bi/on diatelei=.]] + +[Side-note: Evidence of the good effect of this discipline--Hard and +dry condition of the body.] + +This severe discipline is by law open to all Persians who choose to +attend and the honours of the state are attainable by all equally. But +in practice it is confined to a few: for neither boys nor men can +attend it continuously, except such as possess an independent +maintenance; nor is any one allowed to enter the regiment of youths or +mature men, unless he has previously gone through the discipline of +boyhood. The elders, by whom the higher functions are exercised, must +be persons who have passed without reproach through all the three +preceding stages: so that these offices, though legally open to all, +are in practice confined to a few--the small class of Homotimoi.[68] + +[Footnote 68: Cyropæd. i. 2, 14-15.] + +Such is Xenophon's conception of a perfect Polity. It consists in an +effective public discipline and drill, begun in early boyhood and +continued until old age. The evidence on which he specially insists to +prove its good results relates first to the body. The bodies of the +Persians become so dry and hard, that they neither spit, nor have +occasion to wipe their noses, nor are full of wind, nor are ever seen +to retire for the satisfaction of natural wants.[69] Besides this, the +discipline enforces complete habits of obedience, sobriety, justice, +endurance of pain and privation. + +[Footnote 69: Cyrop. i. 2, 16.] + +We may note here both the agreement, and the difference, between +Xenophon and Plato, as to the tests applied for measuring the goodness +of their respective disciplinarian schemes. In regard to the ethical +effects desirable (obedience, sobriety, &c.) both were agreed. But +while Plato (in Republic) dwells much besides upon the musical +training necessary, Xenophon omits this, and substitutes in its place +the working off of all the superfluous moisture of the body.[70] + +[Footnote 70: See below, chap. xxxvii.] + +[Side-note: Exemplary obedience of Cyrus to the public discipline--He +had learnt justice well--His award about the two coats--Lesson +inculcated upon him by the Justice-Master.] + +Through the two youthful stages of this discipline Cyrus is +represented as having passed; undergoing all the fatigues as well as +the punishment (he is beaten or flogged by the superintendent[71]) +with as much rigour as the rest, and even surpassing all his comrades +in endurance and exemplary obedience, not less than in the bow and the +javelin. In the lessons about justice he manifests such pre-eminence, +that he is appointed by the superintendent to administer justice to +other boys: and it is in this capacity that he is chastised for his +well-known decision, awarding the large coat to the great boy and the +little coat to the little boy, as being more convenient to both,[72] +though the proprietorship was opposite: the master impressing upon +him, as a general explanation, that the lawful or customary was the +Just.[73] Cyrus had been brought as a boy by his mother Mandanê to +visit her father, the Median king Astyages. The boy wins the affection +of Astyages and all around by his child-like frankness and +affectionate sympathy (admirably depicted in Xenophon): while he at +the same time resists the corruptions of a luxurious court, and +adheres to the simplicity of his Persian training. When Mandanê is +about to depart and to rejoin her husband Kambyses in Persis, she is +entreated by Astyages to allow Cyrus to remain with him. Cyrus himself +also desires to remain: but Mandanê hesitates to allow it: putting to +Cyrus, among other difficulties, the question--How will you learn +justice here, when the teachers of it are in Persis? To which Cyrus +replies--I am already well taught in justice: as you may see by the +fact, that my teacher made me a judge over other boys, and compelled +me to render account to him of all my proceedings.[74] Besides which, +if I am found wanting, my grandfather Astyages will make up the +deficient teaching. But (says Mandanê) justice is not the same here +under Astyages, as it is in Persis. Astyages has made himself master +of all the Medes: while among the Persians equality is accounted +justice. Your father Kambyses both performs all that the city directs, +and receives nothing more than what the city allows: the measure for +him is, not his own inclination, but the law. You must therefore be +cautious of staying here, lest you should bring back with you to +Persia habits of despotism, and of grasping at more than any one else, +contracted from your grandfather: for if you come back in this spirit, +you will assuredly be flogged to death. Never fear, mother (answered +Cyrus): my grandfather teaches every one round him to claim less than +his due--not more than his due: and he will teach me the same.[75] + +[Footnote 71: Cyrop. i. 3, 17; i. 5, 4.] + +[Footnote 72: Cyrop. i. 3, 17. This is an ingenious and apposite +illustration of the law of property.] + +[Footnote 73: Cyrop. i. 3, 17. [Greek: e)/peita de\ e)/phê to\ me\n +no/mimon di/kaion ei)=nai; to\ de\ a)/nomon, bi/aion.]] + +[Footnote 74: Cyropæd. i. 4, 2.] + +[Footnote 75: Cyrop. i. 3, 17-18. [Greek: O(/pôs ou)=n mê\ a)polê=| +mastigou/menos, e)peida\n oi)/koi ê)=|s, a)\n para\ tou/tou mathô\n +ê(/kê|s a)nti\ tou= basilikou= to\ turanniko/n, e)n ô(=| e)sti to\ +ple/on oi)/esthai chrê=nai pa/ntôn e)/chein.]] + +[Side-note: Xenophon's conception of the Sokratic problems--He does +not recognise the Sokratic order of solution of those problems.] + +The portion of the Cyropædia just cited deserves especial attention, +in reference to Xenophon as a companion and pupil of Sokrates. The +reader has been already familiarised throughout this work with the +questions habitually propounded and canvassed by Sokrates--What is +Justice, Temperance, Courage, &c.? Are these virtues teachable? If +they are so, where are the teachers of them to be found?--for he +professed to have looked in vain for any teachers.[76] I have farther +remarked that Sokrates required these questions to be debated in the +order here stated. That is--you must first know what Justice is, +before you can determine whether it be teachable or not--nay, before +you are in a position to affirm any thing at all about it, or to +declare any particular acts to be either just or unjust.[77] + +[Footnote 76: Xenoph. Memor. i. 16, iv. 4, 5.] + +[Footnote 77: See below, ch. xiii., ch. xxii, and ch. xxiii.] + +Now Xenophon, in his description of the Persian official discipline, +provides a sufficient answer to the second question--Whether justice +is teachable--and where are the teachers thereof? It _is_ teachable: +there are official teachers appointed: and every boy passes through a +course of teaching prolonged for several years.--But Xenophon does not +at all recognise the Sokratic requirement, that the first question +shall be fully canvassed and satisfactorily answered, before the +second is approached. The first question is indeed answered in a +certain way--though the answer appears here only as an _obiter +dictum_, and is never submitted to any Elenchus at all. The master +explains--What is Justice?--by telling Cyrus, "That the lawful is +just, and that the lawless is violent". Now if we consider this as +preceptorial--as an admonition to the youthful Cyrus how he ought to +decide judicial cases--it is perfectly reasonable: "Let your decisions +be conformable to the law or custom of the country". But if we +consider it as a portion of philosophy or reasoned truth--as a +definition or rational explanation of Justice, advanced by a +respondent who is bound to defend it against the Sokratic +cross-examination--we shall find it altogether insufficient. Xenophon +himself tells us here, that Law or Custom is one thing among the +Medes, and the reverse among the Persians: accordingly an action which +is just in the one place will be unjust in the other. It is by +objections of this kind that Sokrates, both in Plato and Xenophon, +refutes explanations propounded by his respondents.[78] + +[Footnote 78: Plato, Republ. v. p. 479 A. [Greek: tou/tôn tô=n pollô=n +kalô=n mô=n ti e)/stin, o( ou)k ai)schro\n phanê/setai? kai\ tô=n +dikai/ôn, o(\ ou)k a)/dikon? kai\ tô=n o(si/ôn, o(\ ou)k a)no/sion?] +Compare Republ. i. p. 331 C, and the conversation of So krates with +Euthydêmus in the Xenophontic Memorab. iv. 2, 18-19, and Cyropædia, i. +6, 27-34, about what is just and good morality towards enemies. + +We read in Pascal, Pensées, i. 6, 8-9:-- + +"On ne voit presque rien de juste et d'injuste, qui ne change de +qualité en changeant de climat. Trois degrés d'élévation du pôle +renversent toute la jurisprudence. Un méridien décide de la verité: en +peu d'années de possession, les loix fondamentales changent: le droit +a ses époques. Plaisante justice, qu'une rivière ou une montagne +borne! Vérité au deçà des Pyrénées--erreur au delà! + +"Ils confessent que la justice n'est pas dans les coutumes, mais +qu'elle reside dans les loix naturelles, connues en tout pays. +Certainement ils la soutiendraient opiniâtrement, si la témérité du +hasard qui a semé les loix humaines en avait rencontré au moins une +qui fut universelle: mais la plaisanterie est telle, que le caprice +des hommes s'est si bien diversifié, qu'il n'y en a point. + +"Le larcin, l'inceste, le meurtre des enfans et des pères, tout a eu +sa place entre les actions vertueuses. Se peut-il rien de plus +plaisant, qu'un homme ait droit de me tuer parcequ'il demeure au-delà +de l'eau, et que son prince a querelle avec le mien, quoique je n'en +aie aucune avec lui? + +"L'un dit que l'essence de la justice est l'autorité du législateur: +l'autre, la commodité du souverain: l'autre, la coutume présente--et +c'est le plus sûr. Rien, suivant la seule raison, n'est juste de soi: +tout branle avec le temps. La coutume fait toute l'équité, par cela +seul qu'elle est reçue: c'est le fondement mystique de son autorité. +Qui la ramène à son principe, l'anéantit."] + +[Side-note: Definition given by Sokrates of Justice--Insufficient to +satisfy the exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus.] + +Though the explanation of Justice here given is altogether untenable, +yet we shall find it advanced by Sokrates himself as complete and +conclusive, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, where he is conversing +with the Sophist Hippias. That Sophist is represented as at first +urging difficulties against it, but afterwards as concurring with +Sokrates: who enlarges upon the definition, and extols it as perfectly +satisfactory. If Sokrates really delivered this answer to Hippias, as +a general definition of Justice--we may learn from it how much greater +was his negative acuteness in overthrowing the definitions of others, +than his affirmative perspicacity in discovering unexceptionable +definitions of his own. This is the deficiency admitted by himself in +the Platonic Apology--lamented by friends like Kleitophon--arraigned +by opponents like Hippias and Thrasymachus. Xenophon, whose intellect +was practical rather than speculative, appears not to be aware of it. +He does not feel the depth and difficulty of the Sokratic problems, +even while he himself enunciates them. He does not appreciate all the +conditions of a good definition, capable of being maintained against +that formidable cross-examination (recounted by himself) whereby +Sokrates humbled the youth Euthydêmus: still less does he enter into +the spirit of that Sokratic order of precedence (declared in the +negative Platonic dialogues), in the study of philosophical +questions:--First define Justice, and find a definition of it such as +you can maintain against a cross-examining adversary before you +proceed either to affirm or deny any predicates concerning it. The +practical advice and reflexions of Xenophon are, for the most part, +judicious and penetrating. But he falls very short when he comes to +deal with philosophical theory:--with reasoned truth, and with the +Sokratic Elenchus as a test for discriminating such truth from the +false, the doubtful, or the not-proven. + +[Side-note: Biography of Cyrus--constant military success earned by +suitable qualities--Variety of characters and situations.] + +Cyrus is allowed by his mother to remain amidst the luxuries of the +Median court. It is a part of his admirable disposition that he +resists all its temptations,[79] and goes back to the hard fare and +discipline of the Persians with the same exemplary obedience as +before. He is appointed by the Elders to command the Persian +contingent which is sent to assist Kyaxares (son of Astyages), king of +Media; and he thus enters upon that active military career which is +described as occupying his whole life, until his conquest of Babylon, +and his subsequent organization of the great Persian empire. His +father Kambyses sends him forth with excellent exhortations, many of +which are almost in the same words as those which we read ascribed to +Sokrates in the Memorabilia. In the details of Cyrus's biography which +follow, the stamp of Sokratic influence is less marked, yet seldom +altogether wanting. The conversation of Sokrates had taught Xenophon +how to make the most of his own large experience and observation. His +biography of Cyrus represents a string of successive situations, +calling forth and displaying the aptitude of the hero for command. The +epical invention with which these situations are imagined--the variety +of characters introduced, Araspes, Abradates, Pantheia, Chrysantas, +Hystaspes, Gadatas, Gobryas, Tigranes, &c.--the dramatic propriety +with which each of these persons is animated as speaker, and made to +teach a lesson bearing on the predetermined conclusion--all these are +highly honourable to the Xenophontic genius, but all of them likewise +bespeak the Companion of Sokrates. Xenophon dwells, with evident +pleasure, on the details connected with the _rationale_ of military +proceedings: the wants and liabilities of soldiers, the advantages or +disadvantages of different weapons or different modes of marshalling, +the duties of the general as compared with those of the soldier, &c. +Cyrus is not merely always ready with his orders, but also competent +as a speaker to explain the propriety of what he orders.[80] We have +the truly Athenian idea, that persuasive speech is the precursor of +intelligent and energetic action: and that it is an attribute +essentially necessary for a general, for the purpose of informing, +appeasing, re-assuring, the minds of the soldiers.[81] This, as well +as other duties and functions of a military commander, we find laid +down generally in the conversations of Sokrates,[82] who conceives +these functions, in their most general aspect, as a branch of the +comprehensive art of guiding or governing men. What Sokrates thus +enunciates generally, is exemplified in detail throughout the life of +Cyrus. + +[Footnote 79: Cyropæd. i. 5, 1.] + +[Footnote 80: Cyropæd. v. 5, 46. [Greek: lektikô/tatos kai\ +praktikô/tatos]. Compare the Memorabilia, iv. 6, 1-15.] + +[Footnote 81: Memorab. iii. 3, 11; Hipparch. viii. 22; Cyropæd. vi. 2, +13. Compare the impressive portion of the funeral oration delivered by +Perikles in Thucydides, ii. 40.] + +[Footnote 82: See the four first chapters of the third book of the +Xenophontic Memorabilia. The treatise of Xenophon called [Greek: +I(pparchiko\s] enumerates also the general duties required from a +commander of cavalry: among these, [Greek: pseudauto/moloi] are +mentioned (iv. 7). Now the employment, with effect, of a [Greek: +pseudauto/molos], is described with much detail in the Cyropædia. See +the case of Araspes (vi. 1, 37, vi. 3, 16).] + +[Side-note: Generous and amiable qualities of Cyrus, Abradates and +Pantheia.] + +Throughout all the Cyropædia, the heroic qualities and personal agency +of Cyrus are always in the foreground, working with unerring success +and determining every thing. He is moreover recommended to our +sympathies, not merely by the energy and judgment of a leader, but +also by the amiable qualities of a generous man--by the remarkable +combination of self-command with indulgence towards others--by +considerate lenity towards subdued enemies like Kroesus and the +Armenian prince--even by solicitude shown that the miseries of war +should fall altogether on the fighting men, and that the cultivators +of the land should be left unmolested by both parties.[83] Respecting +several other persons in the narrative, too--the Armenian Tigranes, +Gadatas, Gobryas, &c.--the adventures and scenes described are +touching: but the tale of Abradates and Pantheia transcends them all, +and is perhaps the most pathetic recital embodied in the works of +Hellenic antiquity.[84] In all these narratives the vein of sentiment +is neither Sokratic nor Platonic, but belongs to Xenophon himself. + +[Footnote 83: Cyrop. iii. 1, 10-38, vii. 2, 9-29, v. 4, 26, vi. 1, 37. +[Greek: A)lla\ su\ me\n, ô)= Ku=re, kai\ tau=ta o(/moios ei)=, +pra=|o/s te kai\ suggnô/môn tô=n a)nthrôpi/nôn a(martêma/tôn].\ + +[Footnote 84: Cyrop. vii. 3.] + +[Side-note: Scheme of government devised by Cyrus when his conquests +are completed--Oriental despotism, wisely arranged.] + +This last remark may also be made respecting the concluding +proceedings of Cyrus, after he has thoroughly completed his conquests, +and when he establishes arrangements for governing them permanently. +The scheme of government which Xenophon imagines and introduces him as +organizing, is neither Sokratic nor Platonic, nor even Hellenic: it +would probably have been as little acceptable to his friend Agesilaus, +the marked "hater of Persia,"[85] as to any Athenian politician. It is +altogether an Oriental despotism, skilfully organized both for the +security of the despot and for enabling him to keep a vigorous hold on +subjects distant as well as near: such as the younger Cyrus might +possibly have attempted, if his brother Artaxerxes had been slain at +Kunaxa, instead of himself. "Eam conditionem esse imperandi, ut non +aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur"[86]--is a maxim repugnant +to Hellenic ideas, and not likely to be rendered welcome even by the +regulations of detail with which Xenophon surrounds it; judicious as +these regulations are for their contemplated purpose. The amiable and +popular character which Cyrus has maintained from youth upwards, and +by means of which he has gained an uninterrupted series of victories, +is difficult to be reconciled with the insecurity, however imposing, +in which he dwells as Great King. When we find that he accounts it a +necessary precaution to surround himself with eunuchs, on the express +ground that they are despised by every one else and therefore likely +to be more faithful to their master--when we read also that in +consequence of the number of disaffected subjects, he is forced to +keep a guard composed of twenty thousand soldiers taken from poor +Persian mountaineers[87]--we find realised, in the case of the +triumphant Cyrus, much of that peril and insecurity which the despot +Hieron had so bitterly deplored in his conversation with Simonides. +However unsatisfactory the ideal of government may be, which Plato +lays out either in the Republic or the Leges--that which Xenophon sets +before us is not at all more acceptable, in spite of the splendid +individual portrait whereby he dazzles our imagination. Few Athenians +would have exchanged Athens either for Babylon under Cyrus, or for +Plato's Magnêtic colony in Krete. + +[Footnote 85: Xenoph. Agesilaus, vii. 7. [Greek: ei) d' au)= kalo\n +kai\ _misope/rsên_ ei)=nai--e)xe/pleusen, o(/, ti du/naito kako\n; +poiê/sôn to\n ba/rbaron.]] + +[Footnote 86: Tacit. Annal. i. 6.] + +[Footnote 87: Xen. Cyrop. vii. 5, 58-70.] + +[Side-note: Persian present reality--is described by Xenophon as +thoroughly depraved, in striking contrast to the establishment of +Cyrus.] + +The Xenophontic government is thus noway admirable, even as an ideal. +But he himself presents it only as an ideal--or (which is the same +thing in the eyes of a present companion of Sokrates) as a +quasi-historical fact, belonging to the unknown and undetermined past. +When Xenophon talks of what the Persians _are now_, he presents us with +nothing but a shocking contrast to this ideal; nothing but vice, +corruption, degeneracy of every kind, exorbitant sensuality, +faithlessness and cowardice.[88] His picture of Persia is like that of +the of Platonic Kosmos, which we can read in the Timæus:[89] a +splendid Kosmos in its original plan and construction, but full of +defects and evil as it actually exists. The strength and excellence of +the Xenophontic orderly despotism dies with its heroic beginner. His +two sons (as Plato remarked) do not receive the same elaborate +training and discipline as himself: nor can they be restrained, even +by the impressive appeal which he makes to them on his death-bed, from +violent dissension among themselves, and misgovernment of every +kind.[90] + +[Footnote 88: Cyrop. viii. 8.] + +[Footnote 89: See below, ch. xxxviii.] + +[Footnote 90: Cyropæd. viii. 7, 9-19: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 694 D.] + +[Side-note: Xenophon has good experience of military and equestrian +proceedings--No experience of finance and commerce.] + +Whatever we may think of the political ideal of Xenophon, his +Cyropædia is among the glories of the Sokratic family; as an excellent +specimen of the philosophical imagination, in carrying a general +doctrine into illustrative details--and of the epical imagination in +respect to varied characters and touching incident. In stringing +together instructive conversations, moreover, it displays the same art +which we trace in the Memorabilia, Oekonomikus, Hieron, &c., and which +is worthy of the attentive companion of Sokrates. Whenever Xenophon +talks about military affairs, horsemanship, agriculture, +house-management, &c., he is within the range of personal experience of +his own; and his recommendations, controlled as they thus are by known +realities, are for the most part instructive and valuable. Such is the +case not merely with the Cyropædia and Oekonomikus, but also in his +two short treatises, De Re Equestri and De Officio Magistri Equitum. + +But we cannot say so much when he discusses plans of finance. + +[Side-note: Discourse of Xenophon on Athenian finance and the +condition of Athens. His admiration of active commerce and variety of +pursuits.] + +We read among his works a discourse composed after his sentence of +exile had been repealed, and when he was very old, seemingly not +earlier than 355 B.C.[91]--criticising the actual condition of Athens, +and proposing various measures for the improvement of the finances, as +well as for relief of the citizens from poverty. He begins this +discourse by a sentiment thoroughly Sokratic and Platonic, which would +serve almost as a continuation of the Cyropædia. The government of a +city will be measured by the character and ability of its leaders.[92] +He closes it by another sentiment equally Sokratic and Platonic; +advising that before his measures are adopted, special messengers +shall be sent to Delphi and Dodona; to ascertain whether the Gods +approve them--and if they approve, to which Gods they enjoin that the +initiatory sacrifices shall be offered.[93] But almost everything in +the discourse, between the first and last sentences, is in a vein not +at all Sokratic--in a vein, indeed, positively anti-Platonic and +anti-Spartan. We have already seen that wealth, gold and silver, +commerce, influx of strangers, &c., are discouraged as much as possible +by Plato, and by the theory (though evaded partially in practice) of +Sparta. Now it is precisely these objects which Xenophon, in the +treatise before us, does his utmost to foster and extend at Athens. +Nothing is here said about the vulgarising influence of trade as +compared with farming, which we read in the Oekonomikus: nor about the +ethical and pædagogic dictation which pervades so much of the +Cyropædia, and reigns paramount throughout the Platonic Republic and +Leges. Xenophon takes Athens as she stands, with great variety of +tastes, active occupation, and condition among the inhabitants: her +mild climate and productive territory, especially her veins of silver +and her fine marble: her importing and exporting merchants, her +central situation, as convenient entrepôt for commodities produced in +the most distant lands:[94] her skilful artisans and craftsmen: her +monied capitalists: and not these alone, but also the congregation and +affluence of fine artists, intellectual men, philosophers, Sophists, +poets, rhapsodes, actors, &c.: last, though not least, the temples +adorning her akropolis, and the dramatic representations exhibited at +her Dionysiac festivals, which afforded the highest captivation to eye +as well as ear, and attracted strangers from all quarters as +visitors.[95] Xenophon extols these charms of Athens with a warmth +which reminds us of the Periklean funeral oration in Thucydides.[96] +He no longer speaks like one whose heart and affections are with the +Spartan drill: still less does he speak like Plato--to whom (as we see +both by the Republic and the Leges) such artistic and poetical +exhibitions were abominations calling for censorial repression--and in +whose eyes gold, silver, commerce, abundant influx of strangers, &c., +were dangerous enemies of all civic virtue. + +[Footnote 91: Xenophon, [Greek: Po/roi--ê(\ peri\ Proso/dôn]. De +Vectigalibus. See Schneider's Proleg. to this treatise, pp. 138-140.] + +[Footnote 92: De Vectig. i. 1. [Greek: e)gô\ me\n tou=to a)ei/ pote +nomi/zo, o(poi=oi/ tines a)\n oi( prosta/tai ô)=si, toiau/tas kai\ +ta\s politei/as gi/gnesthai.]] + +[Footnote 93: De Vect. vi. 2. Compare this with Anabas. iii. 1, 5, +where Sokrates reproves Xenophon for his evasive manner of putting a +question to the Delphian God. Xenophon here adopts the plenary manner +enjoined by Sokrates.] + +[Footnote 94: De Vectig. c. i. 2-3.] + +[Footnote 95: De Vect. v. 3-4. [Greek: Ti/ de\ oi( polue/laioi? ti/ +de\ oi( polupro/batoi? ti/ de\ oi( gnô/mê| kai\ a)rguri/ô| duna/menoi +chrêmati/zesthai? Kai\ mê\n cheirote/chnai te kai\ sophistai\ kai\ +philo/sophoi; oi( de\ poiêtai\, oi( de\ ta\ tou/tôn +metacheirizo/menoi, oi( de\ a)xiothea/tôn ê)\ a)xiakou/stôn i(erô=n +ê)\ o(si/ôn e)pithumou=ntes], &c.] + +[Footnote 96: Thucydid. ii. 34-42; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 12. Compare +Xenophon, Republ. Athen. ii. 7, iii. 8.] + +[Side-note: Recognised poverty among the citizens. Plan for +improvement.] + +Yet while recognising all these charms and advantages, Xenophon finds +himself compelled to lament great poverty among the citizens; which +poverty (he says) is often urged by the leading men as an excuse for +unjust proceedings. Accordingly he comes forward with various +financial suggestions, by means of which he confidently anticipates +that every Athenian citizen may obtain a comfortable maintenance from +the public.[97] + +[Footnote 97: De Vectig. iv. 33. [Greek: kai\ e)moi\ me\n dê\ +ei)/rêtai, ô(s a)\n ê(gou=mai kataskeuasthei/sês tê=s po/leôs i(kanê\n +a)\n pa=sin A)thênai/ois trophê\n a)po\ koinou= gene/sthai.]] + +[Side-note: Advantage of a large number of Metics. How these may be +encouraged.] + +First, he dwells upon the great advantage of encouraging metics, or +foreigners resident at Athens, each of whom paid an annual capitation +tax to the treasury. There were already many such, not merely Greeks, +but Orientals also, Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, &c.:[98] and by +judicious encouragement all expatriated men everywhere might be made +to prefer the agreeable residence at Athens, thus largely increasing +the annual amount of the tax. The metics ought (he says) to be +exempted from military service (which the citizens ought to perform +and might perform alone), but to be admitted to the honours of the +equestrian duty, whenever they were rich enough to afford it: and +farther, to be allowed the liberty of purchasing land and building +houses in the city. Moreover not merely resident metics, but also +foreign merchants who came as visitors, conducting an extensive +commerce--ought to be flattered by complimentary votes and occasional +hospitalities: while the curators of the harbour, whose function it +was to settle disputes among them, should receive prizes if they +adjudicated equitably and speedily.[99] + +[Footnote: 98: De Vect. ii. 3-7.] + +[Footnote: 99: De Vect. iii. 2-6.] + +[Side-note: Proposal to raise by voluntary contributions a large sum +to be employed as capital by the city. Distribution of three oboli per +head per day to all the citizens.] + +All this (Xenophon observes) will require only friendly and +considerate demonstrations. His farther schemes are more ambitious, +not to be effected without a large outlay. He proposes to raise an +ample fund for the purposes of the city, by voluntary contributions; +which he expects to obtain not merely from private Athenians and +metics, rich and in easy circumstances--but also from other cities, +and even from foreign despots, kings, satraps, &c. The tempting +inducement will be, that the names of all contributors with their +respecting contributions will be inscribed on public tablets, and +permanently commemorated as benefactors of the city.[100] Contributors +(he says) are found, for the outfit of a fleet, where they expect no +return: much more will they come forward here, where a good return +will accrue. The fund so raised will be employed under public +authority with the most profitable result, in many different ways. The +city will build docks and warehouses for bonding goods--houses near +the harbour to be let to merchants--merchant-vessels to be let out on +freight. But the largest profit will be obtained by working the silver +mines at Laureion in Attica. The city will purchase a number of +foreign slaves, and will employ them under the superintendence of old +free citizens who are past the age of labour, partly in working these +mines for public account, each of the ten tribes employing one tenth +part of the number--partly by letting them out to private mining +undertakers, at so much per diem for each slave: the slaves being +distinguished by a conspicuous public stamp, and the undertaker +binding himself under penalty always to restore the same number of +them as he received.[101] Such competition between the city and the +private mining undertakers will augment the total produce, and will be +no loss to either, but wholesome for both. The mines will absorb as +many workmen as are put into them: for in the production of silver +(Xenophon argues) there can never be any glut, as there is sometimes +in corn, wine, or oil. Silver is always in demand, and is not lessened +in value by increase of quantity. Every one is anxious to get it, and +has as much pleasure in hoarding it under ground as in actively +employing it.[102] The scheme, thus described, may (if found +necessary) be brought into operation by degrees, a certain number of +slaves being purchased annually until the full total is made up. From +these various financial projects, and especially from the fund thus +employed as capital under the management of the Senate, the largest +returns are expected. Amidst the general abundance which will ensue, +the religious festivals will be celebrated with increased splendour--the +temples will be repaired, the docks and walls will be put in +complete order--the priests, the Senate, the magistrates, the +horsemen, will receive the full stipends which the old custom of +Athens destined for them.[103] But besides all these, the object which +Xenophon has most at heart will be accomplished: the poor citizens +will be rescued from poverty. There will be a regular distribution +among all citizens, per head and equally. Three oboli, or half a +drachma, will be allotted daily to each, to poor and rich alike. For +the poor citizens, this will provide a comfortable subsistence, +without any contribution on their part: the poverty now prevailing +will thus be alleviated. The rich, like the poor, receive the daily +triobolon as a free gift: but if they even compute it as interest for +their investments, they will find that the rate of interest is full +and satisfactory, like the rate on bottomry. Three oboli per day +amount in the year of 360 days to 180 drachmæ: now if a rich man has +contributed ten minæ ( = 1000 drachmæ), he will thus receive interest +at the rate of 18 per cent. per annum: if another less rich citizen +has contributed one mina ( = 100 drachmæ), he will receive interest at +the rate of 180 per cent. per annum: more than he could realise in any +other investment.[104] + +[Footnote 100: De Vect. iii. 11.] + +[Footnote 101: De Vect. iv. 13-19.] + +[Footnote 102: De Vect. iv. 4-7.] + +[Footnote 103: De Vectig. vi. 1-2. [Greek: Kai\ o( me\n dê=mos +trophê=s eu)porê/sei, oi( de\ plou/sioi tê=s ei)s to\n po/lemon +dapa/nês a)pallagê/sontai, periousi/as de\ pollê=s genome/nês, +megaloprepe/steron me\n e)/ti ê(\ nu=n ta\s e(orta\s a)/xomen, i(era\ +d' e)piskeua/somen, tei/chê de\ kai\ neô/ria a)northô/somen, i(ereu=si +de\ kai\ boulê=| kai\ a)rchai=s kai\ i(ppeu=si ta\ pa/tria +a)podô/somen--pô=s ou)k a)/xion ô(s ta/chista tou/tois e)gcheirei=n, +i(/na e)/ti e)ph' ê(mô=n e)pi/dômen tê\n po/lin met' a)sphalei/as +eu)daimonou=san?] + +[Footnote 104: De Vectig. iii. 9-12.] + +[Side-note: Purpose and principle of this distribution.] + +Half a drachma, or three oboli, per day, was the highest rate of pay +ever received (the rate varied at different times) by the citizens as +Dikasts and Ekklesiasts, for attending in judicature or in assembly. +It is this amount of pay which Xenophon here proposes to ensure to +every citizen, without exception, out of the public treasury; which +(he calculates) would be enriched by his project so as easily to bear +such a disbursement. He relieves the poor citizens from poverty by +making them all pensioners on the public treasury, with or without +service rendered, or the pretence of service. He strains yet farther +the dangerous principle of the Theôrikon, without the same excuse as +can be shown for the Theôrikon itself on religious grounds.[105] If +such a proposition had been made by Kleon, Hyperbolus, Kleophon, +Agyrrhius, &c., it would have been dwelt upon by most historians of +Greece as an illustration of the cacoethes of democracy--to extract +money, somehow or other, from the rich, for the purpose of keeping the +poor in comfort. Not one of the democratical leaders, so far as we +know, ever ventured to propose so sweeping a measure: we have it here +from the pen of the oligarchical Xenophon. + +[Footnote 105: Respecting the Theôrikon at Athens, see my 'History of +Greece,' ch. 88, pp. 492-498.] + +[Side-note: Visionary anticipations of Xenophon, financial and +commercial.] + +But we must of course discuss Xenophon's scheme as a whole: the +aggregate enlargement of revenue, from his various visionary new ways +and means, on one side--against the new mode and increased amount of +expenditure, on the other side. He would not have proposed such an +expenditure, if he had not thoroughly believed in the correctness of +his own anticipations, both as to the profits of the mining scheme, +and as to the increase of receipts from other sources: such as the +multiplication of tax-paying Metics, the rent paid by them for the new +houses to be built by the city, the increase of the harbour dues from +expanded foreign trade. But of these anticipations, even the least +unpromising are vague and uncertain: while the prospects of the mining +scheme appear thoroughly chimerical. Nothing is clear or certain +except the disbursement. We scarcely understand how Xenophon could +seriously have imagined, either that voluntary contributors could have +been found to subscribe the aggregate fund as he proposes--or that, if +subscribed, it could have yielded the prodigious return upon which he +reckons. We must, however, recollect that he had no familiarity with +finance, or with the conditions and liabilities of commerce, or with +the raising of money from voluntary contributors for any collective +purpose. He would not have indulged in similar fancies if the question +had been about getting together supplies for an army. Practical +Athenian financiers would probably say, in criticising his financial +project--what Heraldus[106] observes upon some views of his opponent +Salmasius, about the relations of capital and interest in +Attica--"Somnium est hominis harum rerum, etiam cum vigilat, nihil +scientis".[107] The financial management of Athens was doubtless +defective in many ways: but it would not have been improved in the +hands of Xenophon--any more than the administrative and judiciary +department of Athens would have become better under the severe regimen +of Plato.[108] The merits of the Sokratic companions--and great merits +they were--lay in the region of instructive theory. + +[Footnote 106: This passage of Heraldus is cited by M. Boeckh in his +Public Economy of Athens, B. iv. ch. 21, p. 606, Eng. Trans. In that +chapter of M. Boeckh's work (pp. 600-610) some very instructive pages +will be found about the Xenophontic scheme here noticed. + +I will however mention one or two points on which my understanding of +the scheme differs from his. He says (p. 605):--"The author supposes +that the profit upon this speculation would amount to three oboli per +day, so that the subscribers would obtain a very high per centage on +their shares. Xenophon supposes unequal contributions, according to +the different amounts of property, agreeable to the principles of a +property-tax, but an equal distribution of the receipts for the +purpose of favouring and aiding the poor. What Xenophon is speaking of +is an income annually arising upon each share, either equal to or +exceeding the interest of the loans on bottomry. Where, however, is +the security that the undertaking would produce three oboli a day to +each subscriber?" + +I concur in most of what is here said; but M. Boeckh states the matter +too much as if the three oboli per diem were a real return arising +from the scheme, and payable to each shareholder upon each _share_ as +he calls it. This is an accident of the case, not the essential +feature. The poorest citizens--for whose benefit, more than for any +other object, the scheme is contrived--would not be shareholders at +all: they would be too poor to contribute anything, yet each of them +would receive his triobolon like the rest. Moreover, many citizens, +even though able to pay, might hold back, and decline to pay: yet +still each would receive as much. And again, the foreigners, kings, +satraps, &c., would be contributors, but would receive nothing at all. +The distribution of the triobolon would be made to citizens only. +Xenophon does indeed state the proportion of receipt to payments in +the cases of some rich contributors, as an auxiliary motive to +conciliate them. Bat we ought not to treat this receipt as if it were +a real return yielded by the public mining speculation, or as profit +actually brought in. + +As I conceive the scheme, the daily triobolon, and the respective +contributions furnished, have no premeditated ratio, no essential +connection with each other. The daily payment of the triobolon to +every citizen indiscriminately, is a new and heavy burden which +Xenophon imposes upon the city. But this is only one among many other +burdens, as we may see by cap. 6. In order to augment the wealth of +the city, so as to defray these large expenses, he proposes several +new financial measures. Of these the most considerable was the public +mining speculation; but it did not stand alone. The financial scheme +of Xenophon, both as to receipts and as to expenditure, is more +general than M. Boeckh allows for.] + +[Footnote 107: It is truly surprising to read in one of Hume's Essays +the following sentence. Essay XII. on Civil Liberty, p. 107 ed. of +Hume's Philosophical Works, 1825. + +"The Athenians, though governed by a Republic, paid near two hundred +per cent for those sums of money which any emergence made it necessary +for them to borrow, as we learn from Xenophon." + +In the note Hume quotes the following passage from this discourse, De +Vectigalibus:--[Greek: Ktê=sin de\ a)p' ou)deno\s a)\n ou(/tô kalê\n +ktê/sainto, ô(/sper a)ph' ou)= a)\n protele/sôsin ei)s tê\n +a)phormê/n. Oi( de/ ge plei=stoi A)thênai/ôn plei/ona lê/psontai kat' +e)niauto\n ê)\ o(/sa a)\n ei)sene/gkôsin. Oi( ga\r mna=n +protele/santes, e)ggu\s duoi=n mna=|n pro/sodon e)/xousi. O(\ dokei= +tô=n a)nthrôpi/nôn a)sphale/stato/n te kai\ poluchroniô/taton +ei)=nai]. + +Hume has been misled by dwelling upon one or two separate sentences. +If he had taken into consideration the whole discourse and its +declared scope, he would have seen that it affords no warrant for any +inference as to the rate of interest paid by the Athenian public when +they wanted to borrow. In Xenophon's scheme there is no fixed +proportion between what a contributor to the fund would pay and what +he would receive. The triobolon received is a fixed sum to each +citizen, whereas the contributions of _each_ would be different. +Moreover the foreigners and metics would contribute without receiving +anything, while the poor citizens would receive their triobolon per +head, without having contributed anything.] + +[Footnote 108: Aristeides the Rhetor has some forcible remarks in +defending Rhetoric and the Athenian statesmen against the bitter +criticisms of Plato in the Gorgias: pointing out that Plato himself +had never made trial of the difficulty of governing any real community +of men, or of the necessities under which a statesman in actual +political life was placed (Orat. xlv. [Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s], pp. +109-110, Dindorf).] + +[Side-note: Xenophon exhorts his countrymen to maintain peace.] + +Xenophon accompanies his financial scheme with a strong recommendation +to his countrymen that they should abstain from warlike enterprises +and maintain peace with every one. He expatiates on the manifest +advantages, nay, even on the necessity, of continued peace, under the +actual poverty of the city: for the purpose of recruiting the +exhausted means of the citizens, as well as of favouring his own new +projects for the improvement of finance and commerce. While he +especially deprecates any attempt on the part of Athens to regain by +force her lost headship over the Greeks, he at the same time holds out +hopes that this dignity would be spontaneously tendered to her, if, +besides abstaining from all violence, she conducted herself with a +liberal and conciliatory spirit towards all: if she did her best to +adjust differences among other cities, and to uphold the autonomy of +the Delphian temple.[109] As far as we can judge, such pacific +exhortations were at that time wise and politic. Athens had just then +concluded peace (355 B.C.) after the three years of ruinous and +unsuccessful war, called the Social War, carried on against her +revolted allies Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium. To attempt the +recovery of empire by force was most mischievous. There was indeed one +purpose, for which she was called upon by a wise forecast to put forth +her strength--to check the aggrandisement of Philip in Macedonia. But +this was a distant purpose: and the necessity, though it became every +year more urgent, was not so prominently manifest[110] in 355 B.C. as +to affect the judgment of Xenophon. At that early day, Demosthenes +himself did not see the danger from Macedonia: his first Philippic was +delivered in 351 B.C., and even then his remonstrances, highly +creditable to his own forecast, made little impression on others. But +when we read the financial oration De Symmoriis we appreciate his +sound administrative and practical judgment; compared with the +benevolent dreams and ample public largess in which Xenophon here +indulges.[111] + +[Footnote 109: Xenoph. De Vectig. v. 3-8.] + +[Footnote 110: See my 'History of Greece,' ch. 86, p. 325 seq. + +I agree with Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ut suprà, p. 601, that +this pamphlet of Xenophon is probably to be referred to the close of +the Social War, about 355 B.C.] + +[Footnote 111: Respecting the first Philippic, and the Oratio De +Symmoriis of Demosthenes, see my 'History of Greece,' ch. 87, +pp. 401-431.] + +[Side-note: Difference of the latest compositions of Xenophon and +Plato, from their point of view in the earlier.] + +We have seen that Plato died in 347 B.C., having reached the full age +of eighty: Xenophon must have attained the same age nearly, and may +perhaps have attained it completely--though we do not know the exact +year of his death. With both these two illustrious companions of +Sokrates, the point of view is considerably modified in their last +compositions as compared to their earlier. Xenophon shows the +alteration not less clearly than Plato, though in an opposite +direction. His discourse on the Athenian revenues differs quite as +much from the Anabasis, Cyropædia, and Oekonomikus--as the Leges and +Epinomis differ from any of Plato's earlier works. Whatever we may +think of the financial and commercial anticipations of Xenophon, his +pamphlet on the Athenian revenues betokens a warm sympathy for his +native city--a genuine appreciation of her individual freedom and her +many-sided intellectual activity--an earnest interest in her actual +career, and even in the extension of her commercial and manufacturing +wealth. In these respects it recommends itself to our feelings more +than the last Platonic production--Leges and Epinomis--composed nearly +at the same time, between 356-347 B.C. While Xenophon in old age, +becoming reconciled to his country, forgets his early passion for the +Spartan drill and discipline, perpetual, monotonous, unlettered--we +find in the senility of Plato a more cramping limitation of the +varieties of human agency--a stricter compression, even of individual +thought and speech, under the infallible official orthodoxy--a more +extensive use of the pædagogic rod and the censorial muzzle than he +had ever proposed before. + +In thus taking an unwilling leave of the Sokratic family, represented +by these two venerable survivors--to both of whom the students of +Athenian letters and philosophy are so deeply indebted--I feel some +satisfaction in the belief, that both of them died, as they were born, +citizens of free Athens and of unconquered Hellas: and that neither of +them was preserved to an excessive old age, like their contemporary +Isokrates, to witness the extinction of Hellenic autonomy by the +battle of Chæroneia.[112] + +[Footnote 112: Compare the touching passage in Tacitus's description +of the death of Agricola, c. 44-45. + +"Festinatæ mortis grande solatium tulit, evasisse postremum illud +tempus," &c.] + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +LIFE OF PLATO. + +[Side-note: Scanty information about Plato's life.] + +Of Plato's biography we can furnish nothing better than a faint +outline. We are not fortunate enough to possess the work on Plato's +life,[1] composed by his companion and disciple Xenokrates, like the +life of Plotinus by Porphyry, or that of Proklus by Marinus. Though +Plato lived eighty years, enjoying extensive celebrity--and though +Diogenes Laertius employed peculiar care in collecting information +about him--yet the number of facts recounted is very small, and of +those facts a considerable proportion is poorly attested.[2] + +[Footnote 1: This is cited by Simplikius, Schol. ad Aristot. De Coelo, +470, a. 27; 474, a. 12, ed. Brandis.] + +[Footnote 2: Diogen. Laert. iv. 1. The person to whom Diogenes +addressed his biography of Plato was a female: possibly the wife of +the emperor Septimius Severus (see Philostr. Vit. Apoll. i. 3), who +greatly loved and valued the Platonic philosophy (Diog. Laert. iii. +47). Ménage (in his commentary on the Prooemium) supposes the person +signified to be Arria: this also is a mere conjecture, and in my +judgment less probable. We know that the empress gave positive +encouragement to writers on philosophy. The article devoted by +Diogenes to Plato is of considerable length, including both biography +and exposition of doctrine. He makes reference to numerous +witnesses--Speusippus, Aristotle, Hermodôrus, Aristippus, Dikæarchus, +Aristoxenus, Klearchus, Herakleides, Theopompus, Timon in his Silli or +satirical poem, Pamphila, Hermippus, Neanthes, Antileon, Favorinus, +Athenodôrus. Timotheus, Idomeneus, Alexander [Greek: e)n diadochai=s +kath' Ê(ra/kleiton], Satyrus, Onêtor, Alkimus, Euphorion, Panætius, +Myronianus, Polemon, Aristophanes of Byzantium, the Alexandrine +critic, Antigonus of Karystus, Thrasyllus, &c. + +Of the other biographers of Plato, Olympiodorus and the Auctor +Anonymus cite no authorities. Apuleius, in his survey of the doctrine +of Plato (De Habitudine doctrinarum Platonis, init. p. 567, ed. +Paris), mentions only Speusippus, as having attested the early +diligence and quick apprehension of Plato. "Speusippus, domesticis +instructus documentis, et pueri ejus acre in percipiendo ingenium, et +admirandæ verecundiæ indolem laudat, et pubescentis primitias labore +atque amore studendi imbutas refert," &c. + +Speusippus had composed a funeral Discourse or Encomium on Plato +(Diogen. iii. 1, 2; iv. 1, 11). Unfortunately Diogenes refers to it +only once in reference to Plato. We can hardly make out whether any of +the authors, whom he cites, had made the life of Plato a subject of +attentive study. Hermodôrus is cited by Simplikius as having written a +treatise [Greek: peri\ Pla/tônos]. Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, and +Theopompus--perhaps also Hermippus, and Klearchus--had good means of +information. + +See K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, +p. 97, not. 45.] + +[Side-note: His birth, parentage, and early education.] + +Plato was born in Ægina (in which island his father enjoyed an estate +as kleruch or out-settled citizen) in the month Thargelion (May) of +the year B.C. 427.[3] His family, belonging to the Dême Kollytus, was +both ancient and noble, in the sense attached to that word at Athens. +He was son of Ariston (or, according to some admirers, of the God +Apollo) and Periktionê: his maternal ancestors had been intimate +friends or relatives of the law-giver Solon, while his father belonged +to a Gens tracing its descent from Kodrus, and even from the God +Poseidon. He was also nearly related to Charmides and to Kritias--this +last the well-known and violent leader among the oligarchy called the +Thirty Tyrants.[4] Plato was first called Aristoklês, after his +grandfather; but received when he grew up the name of Plato--on +account of the breadth (we are told) either of his forehead or of his +shoulders. Endowed with a robust physical frame, and exercised in +gymnastics, not merely in one of the palæstræ of Athens (which he +describes graphically in the Charmides) but also under an Argeian +trainer, he attained such force and skill as to contend (if we may +credit Dikæarchus) for the prize of wrestling among boys at the +Isthmian festival.[5] His literary training was commenced under a +schoolmaster named Dionysius, and pursued under Drakon, a celebrated +teacher of music in the large sense then attached to that word. He is +said to have displayed both diligence and remarkable quickness of +apprehension, combined too with the utmost gravity and modesty.[6] He +not only acquired great familiarity with the poets, but composed +poetry of his own--dithyrambic, lyric, and tragic: and he is even +reported to have prepared a tragic tetralogy, with the view of +competing for victory at the Dionysian festival. We are told that he +burned these poems, when he attached himself to the society of +Sokrates. No compositions in verse remain under his name, except a few +epigrams--amatory, affectionate, and of great poetical beauty. But +there is ample proof in his dialogues that the cast of his mind was +essentially poetical. Many of his philosophical speculations are +nearly allied to poetry, and acquire their hold upon the mind rather +through imagination and sentiment than through reason or evidence. + +[Footnote 3: It was affirmed distinctly by Hermodôrus (according to +the statement of Diogenes Laertius, iii. 6) that Plato was +twenty-eight years old at the time of the death of Sokrates: that is, +in May, 399 B.C. (Zeller, Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 39, ed. 2nd.) +This would place the birth of Plato in 427 B.C. Other critics refer +his birth to 428 or 429: but I agree with Zeller in thinking that the +deposition of Hermodôrus is more trustworthy than any other evidence +before us. + +Hermodôrus was a friend and disciple of Plato, and is even said to +have made money by publishing Plato's dialogues without permission +(Cic., Epist. ad Attic. xiii. 21). Suidas, [Greek: E(rmo/dôros]. He +was also an author: he published a treatise [Greek: Peri\ Mathêma/tôn] +(Diog. L., Prooem. 2). + +See the more recent Dissertation of Zeller, De Hermodoro Ephesio et +Hermodoro Platonico, Marburg, 1859, p. 19 seq. He cites two important +passages (out of the commentary of Simplikius on Aristot. Physic.) +referring to the work of Hermodôrus [Greek: o( Pla/tônos e(/tairos]--a +work [Greek: Peri\ Pla/tônos], on Plato.] + +[Footnote 4: The statements respecting Plato's relatives are obscure +and perplexing: unfortunately the _domestica documenta_, which were +within the knowledge of his nephew Speusippus, are no longer +accessible to us. It is certain that he had two brothers, Glaukon and +Adeimantus: besides which, it would appear from the Parmenides (126 B) +that he had a younger half-brother by the mother's side, named +Antiphon, and son of Pyrilampes (compare Charmides, p. 158 A, and +Plut., De Frat. Amore, 12, p. 484 E). But the age, which this would +assign to Antiphon, does not harmonise well with the chronological +postulates assumed in the exordium of the Parmenides. Accordingly, K. +F. Hermann and Stallbaum are led to believe, that besides the brothers +of Plato named Glaukon and Adeimantus, there must also have been two +uncles of Plato bearing these same names, and having Antiphon for +their younger brother. (See Stallbaum's Prolegg. ad Charm. pp. 84, 85, +and Prolegg. ad Parmen., Part iii. pp. 304-307.) This is not unlikely: +but we cannot certainly determine the point--more especially as we do +not know what amount of chronological inaccuracy Plato might hold to +be admissible in the _personnel_ of his dialogues. + +It is worth mentioning, that in the discourse of Andokides de +Mysteriis, persons named Plato, Charmides, Antiphon, are named among +those accused of concern in the sacrileges of 415 B.C.--the mutilation +of the Hermæ and the mock celebration of the mysteries. Speusippus is +also named as among the Senators of the year (Andokides de Myst. p. +13-27, seq.). Whether these persons belonged to the same family as the +philosopher Plato, we cannot say. He himself was then only twelve +years old.] + +[Footnote 5: Diog. L. iii. 4; Epiktêtus, i. 8-13, [Greek: ei) de\ +kalo\s ê)=n Pla/tôn kai\ i)schuro/s], &c. + +The statement of Sextus Empiricus--that Plato in his boyhood had his +ears bored and wore ear-rings--indicates the opulent family to which +he belonged. (Sex. Emp. adv. Gramm. s. 258.) Probably some of the old +habits of the great Athenian families, as to ornaments worn on the +head or hair, were preserved with the children after they had been +discontinued with adults. See Thuc. i. 6.] + +[Footnote 6: Diog. L. iii. 26.] + +[Side-note: Early relations of Plato with Sokrates.] + +According to Diogenes[7] (who on this point does not cite his +authority), it was about the twentieth year of Plato's age (407 B.C.) +that his acquaintance with Sokrates began. It may possibly have begun +earlier, but certainly not later--since at the time of the +conversation (related by Xenophon) between Sokrates and Plato's +younger brother Glaukon, there was already a friendship established +between Sokrates and Plato: and that time can hardly be later than 406 +B.C., or the beginning of 405 B.C.[8] From 406 B.C. down to 399 B.C., +when Sokrates was tried and condemned, Plato seems to have remained in +friendly relation and society with him: a relation perhaps interrupted +during the severe political struggles between 405 B.C. and 403 B.C., +but revived and strengthened after the restoration of the democracy in +the last-mentioned year. + +[Footnote 7: Ibid. 6.] + +[Footnote 8: Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 1. Sokrates was induced by his +friendship for Plato and for Charmides the cousin of Plato, to +admonish the forward youth Glaukon (Plato's younger brother), who +thrust himself forward obtrusively to speak in the public assembly +before he was twenty years of age. The two discourses of Sokrates--one +with the presumptuous Glaukon, the other with the diffident +Charmides--are both reported by Xenophon. + +These discourses must have taken place before the battle of +Ægospotami: for Charmides was killed during the Anarchy, and Glaukon +certainly would never have attempted such acts of presumption +after the restoration of the democracy, at a time when the tide of +public feeling had become vehemently hostile to Kritias, Charmides, +and all the names and families connected with the oligarchical rule +just overthrown. + +I presume the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon to have taken +place in 406 B.C. or 405 B.C.: it was in 405 B.C. that the disastrous +battle of Ægospotami occurred.] + +[Side-note: Plato's youth--service as a citizen and soldier.] + +But though Plato may have commenced at the age of twenty his +acquaintance with Sokrates, he cannot have been exclusively occupied +in philosophical pursuits between the nineteenth and the twenty-fifth +year of his age--that is, between 409-403 B.C. He was carried, partly +by his own dispositions, to other matters besides philosophy; and even +if such dispositions had not existed, the exigencies of the time +pressed upon him imperatively as an Athenian citizen. Even under +ordinary circumstances, a young Athenian of eighteen years of age, as +soon as he was enrolled on the public register of citizens, was +required to take the memorable military oath in the chapel of +Aglaurus, and to serve on active duty, constant or nearly constant, +for two years, in various posts throughout Attica, for the defence of +the country.[9] But the six years from 409-403 B.C. were years of an +extraordinary character. They included the most strenuous public +efforts, the severest suffering, and the gravest political revolution, +that had ever occurred at Athens. Every Athenian citizen was of +necessity put upon constant (almost daily) military service; either +abroad, or in Attica against the Lacedæmonian garrison established in +the permanent fortified post of Dekeleia, within sight of the Athenian +Akropolis. So habitually were the citizens obliged to be on guard, +that Athens, according to Thucydides,[10] became a military post +rather than a city. It is probable that Plato, by his family and its +place on the census, belonged to the Athenian Hippeis or Horsemen, who +were in constant employment for the defence of the territory. But at +any rate, either on horseback, or on foot, or on shipboard, a robust +young citizen like Plato, whose military age commenced in 409, must +have borne his fair share in this hard but indispensable duty. In the +desperate emergency, which preceded the battle of Arginusæ (406 B.C.), +the Athenians put to sea in thirty days a fleet of 110 triremes for +the relief of Mitylenê; all the men of military age, freemen, and +slaves, embarking.[11] We can hardly imagine that at such a season +Plato can have wished to decline service: even if he had wished it, +the Strategi would not have permitted him. Assuming that he remained +at home, the garrison-duty at Athens must have been doubled on account +of the number of departures. After the crushing defeat of the +Athenians at Ægospotami, came the terrible apprehension at Athens, +then the long blockade and famine of the city (wherein many died of +hunger); next the tyranny of the Thirty, who among their other +oppressions made war upon all free speech, and silenced even the voice +of Sokrates: then the gallant combat of Thrasybulus followed by the +intervention of the Lacedæmonians--contingencies full of uncertainty +and terror, but ending in the restoration of the democracy. After such +restoration, there followed all the anxieties, perils, of reaction, +new enactments and provisions, required for the revived democracy, +during the four years between the expulsion of the Thirty and the +death of Sokrates. + +[Footnote 9: Read the oath sworn by the Ephêbi in Pollux viii. 105. +Æschines tells us that he served his two ephebic years as [Greek: +peri/polos tê=s chô/ras], when there no was remarkable danger or foreign +pressure. See Æsch. De Fals. Legat. s. 178. See the facts about the +Athenian Ephêbi brought together in a Dissertation by W. Dittenberger, +p. 9-12.] + +[Footnote 10: Thuc. vii. 27: [Greek: o(sême/rai e)xelauno/ntôn tô=n +i(ppe/ôn], &c. Cf., viii. 69. Antiphon, who is described in the +beginning of the Parmenides, as devoted to [Greek: i(ppikê\], must +have been either brother or uncle of Plato.] + +[Footnote 11: Xen. Hell. i. 6, 24. [Greek: Oi( de\ A)thênai=oi, ta\ +gegenême/na kai\ tê\n poliorki/an e)pei\ ê)/kousan, e)psêphi/santo +boêthei=n nausi\n e(kato\n kai\ de/ka, ei)sbiba/zontes tou\s e)n +ê(liki/a| o)/ntas a(/pantas, kai\ dou/lous kai\ e)leuthe/rous; kai\ +plêrô/santes ta\s de/ka kai\ e(kato\n e)n tria/konta ê(me/rais, +a)pê=ran; ei)se/bêsan de\ kai\ tô=n i(ppe/ôn polloi/]. In one of the +anecdotes given by Diogenes (iii. 24) Plato alludes to his own +military service. Aristoxenus (Diog. L. iii. 8) said that Plato had +been engaged thrice in military expeditions out of Attica: once to +Tanagra, a second time to Corinth, a third time to Delium, where he +distinguished himself. Aristoxenus must have had fair means of +information, yet I do not know what to make of this statement. All the +three places named are notorious for battles fought by Athens; +nevertheless chronology utterly forbids the supposition that Plato +could have been present either at _the_ battle of Tanagra or at _the_ +battle of Delium. At the battle of Delium Sokrates was present, and is +said to have distinguished himself: hence there is ground for +suspecting some confusion between his name and that of Plato. It is +however possible that there may have been, during the interval between +410-405 B.C., partial invasions of the frontiers of Boeotia by +Athenian detachments: both Tanagra and Delium were on the Boeotian +frontier. The great battle of Corinth took place in 394 B.C. Plato +left Athens immediately after the death of Sokrates in 399 B.C., and +visited several foreign countries during the years immediately +following; but he may have been at Athens in 394 B.C., and may have +served in the Athenian force at Corinth. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hell. +ad ann. 395 B.C. I do not see how Plato could have been engaged in any +battle of Delium _after_ the battle of Corinth, for Athens was not +then at war with the Boeotians. + +At the same time I confess that the account given by or ascribed to +Aristoxenus appears to me to have been founded on little positive +information, when we compare it with the military duty which Plato +must have done between 410-405 B.C. + +It is curious that Antisthenes also is mentioned as having +distinguished himself at the battle of Tanagra (Diog. vi. 1). The same +remarks are applicable to him as have just been made upon Plato.] + +[Side-note: Period of political ambition.] + +From the dangers, fatigues, and sufferings of such an historical +decad, no Athenian citizen could escape, whatever might be his feeling +towards the existing democracy, or however averse he might be to +public employment by natural temper. But Plato was not thus averse, +during the earlier years of his adult life. We know, from his own +letters, that he then felt strongly the impulse of political ambition +usual with young Athenians of good family;[12] though probably not +with any such premature vehemence as his younger brother Glaukon, +whose impatience Sokrates is reported to have so judiciously +moderated.[13] Whether Plato ever spoke with success in the public +assembly, we do not know: he is said to have been shy by nature, and +his voice was thin and feeble, ill adapted for the Pnyx.[14] However, +when the oligarchy of Thirty was established, after the capture and +subjugation of Athens, Plato was not only relieved from the necessity +of addressing the assembled people, but also obtained additional +facilities for rising into political influence, through Kritias (his +near relative) and Charmides, leading men among the new oligarchy. +Plato affirms that he had always disapproved the antecedent democracy, +and that he entered on the new scheme of government with full hope of +seeing justice and wisdom predominant. He was soon undeceived. The +government of the Thirty proved a sanguinary and rapacious +tyranny,[15] filling him with disappointment and disgust. He was +especially revolted by their treatment of Sokrates, whom they not only +interdicted from continuing his habitual colloquy with young men,[16] +but even tried to implicate in nefarious murders, by ordering him +along with others to arrest Leon the Salaminian, one of their intended +victims: an order which Sokrates, at the peril of his life, disobeyed. + +[Footnote 12: Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 324-325.] + +[Footnote 13: Xen., Mem. iii. 6.] + +[Footnote 14: Diogen. Laert. iii. 5: [Greek: I)schno/phôno/s te ê)=n], +&c. iii. 26: [Greek: ai)dê/môn kai\ ko/smios].] + +[Footnote 15: History of Greece, vol. viii. ch. 65.] + +[Footnote 16: Xen. Mem. i. 2, 36; Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 20, p. 32.] + +[Side-note: He becomes disgusted with politics.] + +Thus mortified and disappointed, Plato withdrew from public functions. +What part he took in the struggle between the oligarchy and its +democratical assailants under Thrasybulus, we are not informed. But +when the democracy was re-established, his political ambition revived, +and he again sought to acquire some active influence on public +affairs. Now however the circumstances had become highly unfavourable +to him. The name of his deceased relative Kritias was generally +abhorred, and he had no powerful partisans among the popular leaders. +With such disadvantages, with anti-democratical sentiments, and with a +thin voice, we cannot wonder that Plato soon found public life +repulsive;[17] though he admits the remarkable moderation displayed by +the restored Demos. His repugnance was aggravated to the highest pitch +of grief and indignation by the trial and condemnation of Sokrates +(399 B.C.), four years after the renewal of the democracy. At that +moment doubtless the Sokratic men or companions were unpopular in a +body. Plato, after having yielded his best sympathy and aid at the +trial of Sokrates, retired along with several others of them to +Megara. He made up his mind that for a man of his views and opinions, +it was not only unprofitable, but also unsafe, to embark in active +public life, either at Athens or in any other Grecian city. He +resolved to devote himself to philosophical speculation, and to +abstain from practical politics; unless fortune should present to him +some exceptional case, of a city prepared to welcome and obey a +renovator upon exalted principles.[18] + +[Footnote 17: Ælian (V. H. iii. 27) had read a story to the effect, +that Plato, in consequence of poverty, was about to seek military +service abroad, and was buying arms for the purpose, when he was +induced to stay by the exhortation of Sokrates, who prevailed upon him +to devote himself to philosophy at home. + +If there be any truth in this story, it must refer to some time in the +interval between the restoration of the democracy (403 B.C.) and the +death of Sokrates (399 B.C.). The military service of Plato, prior to +the battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.), must have been obligatory, in +defence of his country, not depending on his own free choice. It is +possible also that Plato may have been for the time impoverished, like +many other citizens, by the intestine troubles in Attica, and may have +contemplated military service abroad, like Xenophon. + +But I am inclined to think that the story is unfounded, and that it +arises from some confusion between Plato and Xenophon.] + +[Footnote 18: The above account of Plato's proceedings, perfectly +natural and interesting, but unfortunately brief, is to be found in +his seventh Epistle, p. 325-326.] + +[Side-note: He retires from Athens after the death of Sokrates--his +travels.] + +At Megara Plato passed some time with the Megarian Eukleides, his +fellow-disciple in the society of Sokrates, and the founder of what is +termed the Megaric school of philosophers. He next visited Kyrênê, +where he is said to have become acquainted with the geometrician +Theodôrus, and to have studied geometry under him. From Kyrênê he +proceeded to Egypt, interesting himself much in the antiquities of the +country as well as in the conversation of the priests. In or about 394 +B.C.--if we may trust the statement of Aristoxenus about the military +service of Plato at Corinth, he was again at Athens. He afterwards +went to Italy and Sicily, seeking the society of the Pythagorean +philosophers, Archytas, Echekrates, Timæus, &c., at Tarentum and +Lokri, and visiting the volcanic manifestations of Ætna. It appears +that his first visit to Sicily was made when he was about forty years +of age, which would be 387 B.C. Here he made acquaintance with the +youthful Dion, over whom he acquired great intellectual ascendancy. By +Dion Plato was prevailed upon to visit the elder Dionysius at +Syracuse:[19] but that despot, offended by the free spirit of his +conversation and admonitions, dismissed him with displeasure, and even +caused him to be sold into slavery at Ægina in his voyage home. Though +really sold, however, Plato was speedily ransomed by friends. After +farther incurring some risk of his life as an Athenian citizen, in +consequence of the hostile feelings of the Æginetans, he was conveyed +away safely to Athens, about 386 B.C.[20] + +[Footnote 19: Plato. Epistol. vii. p. 324 A, 327 A.] + +[Footnote 20: Plut. Dion. c. 5: Corn. Nep., Dion, ii. 3; Diog. Laert. +iii. 19-20; Aristides, Or. xlvi., [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], p. +305-306, ed. Dindorf. + +Cicero (De Fin. v. 29; Tusc. Disp. i. 17), and others, had contracted a +lofty idea of Plato's Travels, more than the reality seems to warrant. +Val. Max. viii. 7, 3; Plin. Hist. Nat. xxx. 2. + +The Sophist Himerius repeats the same general statements about Plato's +early education, and extensive subsequent travels, but without adding +any new particulars (Orat. xiv. 21-25). + +If we can trust a passage of Tzetzes, cited by Mr. Clinton (F. H. ad +B.C. 366) and by Welcker (Trag. Gr. p. 1236), Dionysius the elder of +Syracuse had composed (among his various dramas) a tragi-comedy +directed against Plato.] + +[Side-note: His permanent establishment at Athens--386 B.C.] + +It was at this period, about 386 B.C., that the continuous and formal +public teaching of Plato, constituting as it does so great an epoch in +philosophy, commenced. But I see no ground for believing, as many +authors assume, that he was absent from Athens during the entire +interval between 399-386 B.C. I regard such long-continued absence as +extremely improbable. Plato had not been sentenced to banishment, nor +was he under any compulsion to stay away from his native city. He was +not born "of an oak-tree or a rock" (to use an Homeric phrase, +strikingly applied by Sokrates in his Apology to the Dikasts[21]), but +of a noble family at Athens, where he had brothers and other +connections. A temporary retirement, immediately after the death of +Sokrates, might be congenial to his feelings and interesting in many +ways; but an absence of moderate length would suffice for such +exigencies, and there were surely reasonable motives to induce him to +revisit his friends at home. I conceive Plato as having visited +Kyrênê, Egypt, and Italy during these thirteen years, yet as having +also spent part of this long time at Athens. Had he been continuously +absent from that city he would have been almost forgotten, and would +scarcely have acquired reputation enough to set up with success as a +teacher.[22] + +[Footnote 21: Plato, Apol. p. 34 D.] + +[Footnote 22: Stallbaum insists upon it as "certum et indubium" that +Plato was absent from Athens continuously, without ever returning to +it, for the thirteen years immediately succeeding the death of +Sokrates. But I see no good evidence of this, and I think it highly +improbable. See Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Politicum, p. 38, 39. +The statement of Strabo (xvii. 806), that Plato and Eudoxus passed +thirteen years in Egypt, is not admissible. + +Ueberweg examines and criticises the statements about Plato's travels. +He considers it probable that Plato passed some part of these thirteen +years at Athens (Ueber die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge der Platon. +Schrift. p. 126, 127). Mr Fynes Clinton thinks the same. F. H. B.C. +394; Append. c. 21, p. 366.] + +[Side-note: He commences his teaching at the Academy.] + +The spot selected by Plato for his lectures or teaching was a garden +adjoining the precinct sacred to the Hero Hekadêmus or Akadêmus, +distant from the gate of Athens called Dipylon somewhat less than a +mile, on the road to Eleusis, towards the north. In this precinct +there were both walks, shaded by trees, and a gymnasium for bodily +exercise; close adjoining, Plato either inherited or acquired a small +dwelling-house and garden, his own private property.[23] Here, under +the name of the Academy, was founded the earliest of those schools of +philosophy, which continued for centuries forward to guide and +stimulate the speculative minds of Greece and Rome. + +[Footnote 23: Diog. Laert. iii. 7, 8; Cic. De Fin. v. 1; C. G. Zumpt, +Ueber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in Athen, p. 8 (Berlin, +1843). The Academy was consecrated to Athênê; there was, however, a +statue of Eros there, to whom sacrifice was offered, in conjunction +with Athênê. Athenæus, xiii. 561. + +At the time when Aristophanes assailed Sokrates in the comedy of the +Nubes (423 B.C.), the Academy was known and familiar as a place for +gymnastic exercise; and Aristophanes (Nub. 995) singles it out as the +proper scene of action for the honest and muscular youth, who despises +rhetoric and philosophy. Aristophanes did not anticipate that within a +short time after the representation of his last comedy, the most +illustrious disciple of Sokrates would select the Academy as the spot +for his residence and philosophical lectures, and would confer upon +the name a permanent intellectual meaning, as designating the earliest +and most memorable of the Hellenic schools. + +In 369 B.C., when the school of Plato was in existence, the Athenian +hoplites, marching to aid the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, were +ordered by Iphikrates to make their evening meal in the Academy (Xen. +Hell. vi. 5, 49). + +The garden, afterwards established by Epikurus, was situated between +the gate of Athens and the Academy: so that a person passed by it, +when he walked forth from Athens to the Academy (Cic. De Fin. i. 1).] + +[Side-note: Plato as a teacher--pupils numerous and wealthy, from +different cities.] + +We have scarce any particulars respecting the growth of the Academy +from this time to the death of Plato, in 347 B.C. We only know +generally that his fame as a lecturer became eminent and widely +diffused: that among his numerous pupils were included Speusippus, +Xenokrates, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lykurgus, &c.: that he +was admired and consulted by Perdikkas in Macedonia and Dionysius at +Syracuse: that he was also visited by listeners and pupils from all +parts of Greece. Among them was Eudoxus of Knidus, who afterwards +became illustrious both in geometry and astronomy. At the age of +twenty-three, and in poor circumstances, Eudoxus was tempted by the +reputation of the Sokratic men, and enabled by the aid of friends, to +visit Athens: where, however, he was coldly received by Plato. Besides +preparing an octennial period or octaetêris, and a descriptive map of +the Heavens, Eudoxus also devised the astronomical hypothesis of +Concentric Spheres--the earliest theory proposed to show that the +apparent irregularity in the motion of the Sun and the Planets might +be explained, and proved to result from a multiplicity of co-operating +spheres or agencies, each in itself regular.[24] This theory of +Eudoxus is said to have originated in a challenge of Plato, who +propounded to astronomers, in his oral discourse, the problem which +they ought to try to solve.[25] + +[Footnote 24: For an account of Eudoxus himself, of his theory of +concentric spheres, and the subsequent extensions of it, see the +instructive volume of the late lamented Sir George Cornewall +Lewis,--Historical Survey of the Ancient Astronomy, ch. iii. sect. 3, +p. 146 seq. + +M. Boeckh also (in his recent publication, Ueber die vierjährigen +Sonnenkreise der Alten, vorzüglich den Eudoxischen, Berlin, 1863) has +given an account of the life and career of Eudoxus, not with reference +to his theory of concentric spheres, but to his Calendar and Lunisolar +Cycles or Periods, quadrennial and octennial. I think Boeckh is right +in placing the voyage of Eudoxus to Egypt at an _earlier_ period of +the life of Eudoxus; that is, about 378 B.C.; and not in 362 B.C., +where it is placed by Letronne and others. Boeckh shows that the +letters of recommendation from Agesilaus to Nektanebos, which Eudoxus +took with him, do not necessarily coincide in time with the military +expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt, but were more probably of earlier +date. (Boeckh, p. 140-148.) + +Eudoxus lived 53 years (406-353 B.C., about); being born when Plato +was 21, and dying when Plato was 75. He was one of the most +illustrious men of the age. He was born in poor circumstances; but so +marked was his early promise, that some of the medical school at +Knidus assisted him to prosecute his studies--to visit Athens and hear +the Sophists, Plato among them--to visit Egypt, Tarentum (where he +studied geometry with Archytas), and Sicily (where he studied [Greek: +ta\ i)atrika\] with Philistion). These facts depend upon the [Greek: +Pi/nakes] of Kallimachus, which are good authority. (Diog. L. viii. +86.) + +After thus preparing himself by travelling and varied study, Eudoxus +took up the profession of a Sophist, at Kyzikus and the neighbouring +cities in the Propontis. He obtained great celebrity, and a large +number of pupils. M. Boeckh says, "Dort lebte er als Sophist, sagt +Sotion: das heisst, er lehrte, und hielt Vortrage. Dasselbe bezeugt +Philostratos." + +I wish to call particular attention to the way in which M. Boeckh here +describes** a Sophist of the fourth century B.C. Nothing can be more +correct. Every man who taught and gave lectures to audiences more or +less numerous, was so called. The Platonic critics altogether darken +the history of philosophy, by using the word _Sophist_ with its modern +associations (and the unmeaning abstract _Sophistic_ which they derive +from it), to represent a supposed school of speculative and deceptive +corruptors. + +Eudoxus, having been coldly received when young and poor by Plato, had +satisfaction in revisiting Athens at the height of his reputation, +accompanied by numerous pupils--and in showing himself again to Plato. +The two then became friends. Menæchmus and Helikon, geometrical pupils +of Eudoxus, received instruction from Plato also; and Helikon +accompanied Plato on his third voyage to Sicily (Plato, Epist. xiii. +p. 360 D; Plut. Dion, c. 19). Whether Eudoxus accompanied him there +also, as Boeckh supposes, is doubtful: I think it improbable. + +Eudoxus ultimately returned to his native city of Knidus, where he was +received with every demonstration of honour: a public vote of esteem +and recognition being passed to welcome him. He is said to have been +solicited to give laws to the city, and to have actually done so: how +far this may be true, we cannot say. He also visited the neighbouring +prince Mausôlus of Karia, by whom he was much honoured. + +We know from Aristotle, that Eudoxus was not only illustrious as an +astronomer and geometer, but that he also proposed a theory of Ethics, +similar in its general formula to that which was afterwards laid down +by Epikurus. Aristotle dissents from the theory, but he bears express +testimony, in a manner very unusual with him, to the distinguished +personal merit and virtue of Eudoxus (Ethic. Nikom. x. 3, p. 1172, b. +16).] + +[Footnote 25: Respecting Eudoxus, see Diog. L. viii. 86-91. As the +life of Eudoxus probably extended from about 406-353 B.C., his first +visit to Athens would be about 383 B.C., some three years after Plato +commenced his school. Strabo (xvii. 806), when he visited Heliopolis +in Egypt, was shown by the guides certain cells or chambers which were +said to have been occupied by Plato and Eudoxus, and was assured that +the two had passed thirteen years together in Egypt. This account +deserves no credit. Plato and Eudoxus visited Egypt, but not together, +and neither of them for so long as thirteen years. Eudoxus stayed +there sixteen months (Diog. L. viii. 87). Simplikius, Schol. ad +Aristot. De Coelo, p. 497, 498, ed. Brandis, 498, a. 45. [Greek: Kai\ +prô=tos tô=n E(llê/nôn Eu)/doxos o( Kni/dios. ô(s Eu)/dêmo/s te e)n +tô=| deute/rô| tê=s A)strologikê=s I)stori/as a)pemnêmo/neuse kai\ +Sôsige/nês para\ _Eu)dê/mou tou=to labô\n_, a(/psasthai le/getai tô=n +toiou/tôn u(pothe/seôn; Pla/tônos, _ô(s phêsi Sôsige/nês_, pro/blêma +tou=to poiêsame/nou toi=s peri\ tau=ta e)spoudako/si--ti/nôn +u(potethei/sôn o(malô=n kai\ tetagme/nôn kinê/seôn diasôthê=| ta\ +peri\ ta\s kinê/seis tô=n planôme/nôn phaino/mena]. The Scholion of +Simplikius, which follows at great length, is exceedingly interesting +and valuable, in regard to the astronomical theory of Eudoxus, with +the modifications introduced into it by Kallippus, Aristotle, and +others. All the share in it which is claimed for Plato, is, that he +described in clear language the problem to be solved: and even _that_ +share depends simply upon the statement of the Alexandrine Sosigenes +(contemporary of Julius Cæsar), not upon the statement of Eudemus. At +least the language of Simplikius affirms, that Sosigenes copied from +Eudemus the fact, that Eudoxus was the first Greek who proposed a +systematic astronomical hypothesis to explain the motions of the +planets--([Greek: par' Eu)dê/mou _tou=to_ labô/n]) not the +circumstance, that Plato propounded the problem afterwards mentioned. +From whom Sosigenes derived this last information, is not indicated. +About his time, various fictions had gained credit in Egypt respecting +the connection of Plato with Eudoxus, as we may see by the story of +Strabo above cited. If Plato impressed upon others that which is here +ascribed to him, he must have done so in _conversation or oral +discourse_--for there is nothing in his written dialogues to that +effect. Moreover, there is nothing in the dialogues to make us suppose +that Plato adopted or approved the theory of Eudoxus. When Plato +speaks of astronomy, either in the Republic, or in Leges, or in +Epinomis, it is in a totally different spirit--not manifesting any +care to save the astronomical phenomena. Both Aristotle himself +(Metaphys. A. p. 1073 b.) and Simplikius, make it clear that Aristotle +warmly espoused and enlarged the theory of Eudoxus. Theophrastus, +successor of Aristotle, did the same. But we do not hear that either +Speusippus or Xenokrates (successor of Plato) took any interest in the +theory. This is one remarkable point of divergence between Plato and +the Platonists on one side--Aristotle and the Aristotelians on the +other--and much to the honour of the latter: for the theory of +Eudoxus, though erroneous, was a great step towards improved +scientific conceptions on astronomy, and a great provocative to +farther observation of astronomical facts.] + +Though Plato demanded no money as a fee for admission of pupils, yet +neither did he scruple to receive presents from rich men such as +Dionysius, Dion, and others.[26] In the jests of Ephippus, Antiphanes, +and other poets of the middle comedy, the pupils of Plato in the +Academy are described as finely and delicately clad, nice in their +persons even to affectation, with elegant caps and canes; which is the +more to be noticed because the preceding comic poets derided Sokrates +and his companions for qualities the very opposite--as prosing +beggars, in mean attire and dirt.[27] Such students must have belonged +to opulent families; and we may be sure that they requited their +master by some valuable present, though no fee may have been formally +demanded from them. Some conditions (though we do not know what) were +doubtless required for admission. Moreover the example of Eudoxus +shows that in some cases even ardent and promising pupils were +practically repelled. At any rate, the teaching of Plato formed a +marked contrast with that extreme and indiscriminate publicity which +characterised the conversation of Sokrates, who passed his days in the +market-place or in the public porticoes or palæstræ; while Plato both +dwelt and discoursed in a quiet residence and garden a little way out +of Athens. The title of Athens to be considered the training-city of +Hellas (as Perikles had called her fifty years before), was fully +sustained by the Athenian writers and teachers between 390-347; +especially by Plato and Isokrates, the most celebrated and largely +frequented. So many foreign pupils came to Isokrates that he affirms +most of his pecuniary gains to have been derived from non-Athenians. +Several of his pupils stayed with him three or four years. The like is +doubtless true about the pupils of Plato.[28] + +[Footnote 26: Plato, Epistol. xiii. p. 361, 362. We learn from this +epistle that Plato received pecuniary remittances not merely from +Dionysius, but also from other friends ([Greek: a)/llôn +e)pitêdei/ôn]--361 C); that he employed these not only for choregies and +other costly functions of his own, but also to provide dowry for female +relatives, and presents to friends (363 A).] + +[Footnote 27: See Meineke, Hist. Crit. Comic. Græc. p. 288, 289--and +the extracts there given from Ephippus and Antiphanes--apud Athenæum, +xi. 509, xii. 544. About the poverty and dirt which was reproached to +Sokrates and his disciples, see the fragment of Ameipsias in Meineke, +ibid. p. 203. Also Aristoph. Aves, 1555; Nubes, 827; and the Fragm. of +Eupolis in Meineke, p. 552--[Greek: Misô= d' e)gô\ kai\ Sôkra/tên, +to\n ptôcho\n a)dole/schên]. + +Meineke thinks that Aristophanes, in the Ekklesiazusæ, 646, and in the +Plutus, 313, intends to ridicule Plato under the name of Aristyllus: +Plato's name having been originally Aristokles. But I see no +sufficient ground for this opinion.] + +[Footnote 28: Perikles in the Funeral Oration (Thuc. ii. 41) calls +Athens [Greek: tê=s E(lla/dos pai/deusin]: the same eulogium is +repeated, with greater abundance of words, by Isokrates in his +Panegyrical Oration (Or. iv. sect. 56, p. 51). + +The declaration of Isokrates, that most of his money was acquired from +foreign (non-Athenian) pupils, and the interesting fact that many of +them not only stayed with him three or four years but were even then +loth to depart, will be found in Orat. xv. De Permutatione, sect. +93-175. Plutarch (Vit. x. Orat. 838 E) goes so far as to say that +Isokrates never required any pay from an Athenian pupil. + +Nearly three centuries after Plato's decease, Cicero sent his son +Marcus to Athens, where the son spent a considerable time, frequenting +the lectures of the Peripatetic philosopher Kratippus. Young Cicero, +in an interesting letter addressed to Tiro (Cic. Epist. Fam. xvi. 23), +describes in animated terms both his admiration for the person and +abilities, and his delight in the private society, of Kratippus. +Several of Plato's pupils probably felt as much or more towards him.] + +[Side-note: Visit of Plato to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse, 367 +B.C. Second visit to the same--mortifying failure.] + +It was in the year 367-366 that Plato was induced, by the earnest +entreaties of Dion, to go from Athens to Syracuse, on a visit to the +younger Dionysius, who had just become despot, succeeding to his +father of the same name. Dionysius II., then very young, had +manifested some dispositions towards philosophy, and prodigious +admiration for Plato: who was encouraged by Dion to hope that he would +have influence enough to bring about an amendment or thorough reform +of the government at Syracuse. This ill-starred visit, with its +momentous sequel, has been described in my 'History of Greece'. It not +only failed completely, but made matters worse rather than better: +Dionysius became violently alienated from Dion, and sent him into +exile. Though turning a deaf ear to Plato's recommendations, he +nevertheless liked his conversation, treated him with great respect, +detained him for some time at Syracuse, and was prevailed upon, only +by the philosopher's earnest entreaties, to send him home. Yet in +spite of such uncomfortable experience Plato was induced, after a +certain interval, again to leave Athens and pay a second visit to +Dionysius, mainly in hopes of procuring the restoration of Dion. In +this hope too he was disappointed, and was glad to return, after a +longer stay than he wished, to Athens. + +[Side-note: Expedition of Dion against Dionysius--sympathies of Plato +and the Academy.] + +[Side-note: Success, misconduct, and death of Dion.] + +It was in 359 B.C. that Dion, aided by friends in Peloponnesus, and +encouraged by warm sympathy and co-operation from many of Plato's +pupils in the Academy,[29] equipped an armament against Dionysius. +Notwithstanding the inadequacy of his force he had the good fortune to +make himself master of Syracuse, being greatly favoured by the popular +discontent of Syracusans against the reigning despot: but he did not +know how to deal with the people, nor did he either satisfy their +aspirations towards liberty, or realise his own engagements. Retaining +in his hands a despotic power, similar in the main to that of +Dionysius, he speedily became odious, and was assassinated by the +treachery of Kallippus, his companion in arms as well as fellow-pupil +of the Platonic Academy. The state of Syracuse, torn by the joint +evils of anarchy and despotism, and partially recovered by Dionysius, +became more unhappy than ever. + +[Footnote 29: Plutarch, Dion, c. 22. + +Xenokrates as well as Speusippus accompanied Plato to Sicily (Diog. L. +iv. 6). + +To show the warm interest taken, not only by Plato himself but also by +the Platonic pupils in the Academy in the conduct of Dion after he had +become master of Syracuse, Plutarch quotes both from the letter of +Plato to Dion (which now stands fourth among the Epistolæ Platonicæ, +p. 320) and also from a letter which he had read, written by +Speusippus to Dion; in which Speusippus exhorts Dion emphatically to +bless Sicily with good laws and government, "in _order that he may +glorify the Academy_"--[Greek: o(/pôs . . . eu)klea= thê/sei tê\n +A)kadêmi/an] (Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amic. c. 29, p. 70 A).] + +[Side-note: Death of Plato, aged 80, 347 B.C.] + +The visits of Plato to Dionysius were much censured, and his +motives[30] misrepresented by unfriendly critics; and these reproaches +were still further embittered by the entire failure of his hopes. The +closing years of his long life were saddened by the disastrous turn of +events at Syracuse, aggravated by the discreditable abuse of power and +violent death of his intimate friend Dion, which brought dishonour +both upon himself and upon the Academy. Nevertheless he lived to the +age of eighty, and died in 348-347 B.C., leaving a competent property, +which he bequeathed by a will still extant.[31] But his foundation, +the Academy, did not die with him. It passed to his nephew Speusippus, +who succeeded him as teacher, conductor of the school, or Scholarch: +and was himself succeeded after eight years by Xenokrates of +Chalkêdon: while another pupil of the Academy, Aristotle, after an +absence of some years from Athens, returned thither and established a +school of his own at the Lykeum, at another extremity of the city. + +[Footnote 30: Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistes) p. 285 C; +Aristeides, Orat. xlvi., [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], p. 234-235; +Apuleius, De Habit. Philos. Platon. p. 571.] + +[Footnote 31: Diog. Laert. iii. 41-42. Seneca (Epist. 58) says that +Plato died on the anniversary of his birth, in the month Thargelion.] + +[Side-note: Scholars of Plato--Aristotle.] + +The latter half of Plato's life in his native city must have been one +of dignity and consideration, though not of any of political activity. +He is said to have addressed the Dikastery as an advocate for the +accused general Chabrias: and we are told that he discharged the +expensive and showy functions of Chorêgus, with funds supplied by +Dion.[32] Out of Athens also his reputation was very great. When he +went to the Olympic festival of B.C. 360, he was an object of +conspicuous attention and respect: he was visited by hearers, young +men of rank and ambition, from the most distant Hellenic cities; and +his advice was respectfully invoked both by Perdikkas in Macedonia and +by Dionysius II. at Syracuse. During his last visit to Syracuse, it is +said that some of the students in the Academy, among whom Aristotle is +mentioned, became dissatisfied with his absence, and tried to set up a +new school; but were prevented by Iphikrates and Chabrias, the +powerful friends of Plato at Athens. This story is connected with +alleged ingratitude on the part of Aristotle towards Plato, and with +alleged repugnance on the part of Plato towards Aristotle.[33] The +fact itself--that during Plato's absence in Sicily his students sought +to provide for themselves instruction and discussion elsewhere--is +neither surprising nor blameable. And as to Aristotle, there is ground +for believing that he passed for an intimate friend and disciple of +Plato, even during the last ten years of Plato's life. For we read +that Aristotle, following speculations and principles of teaching of +his own, on the subject of rhetoric, found himself at variance with +Isokrates and the Isokratean school. Aristotle attacked Isokrates and +his mode of dealing with the subject: upon which Kephisodôrus (one of +the disciples of Isokrates) retaliated by attacking Plato and the +Platonic Ideas, considering Aristotle as one of Plato's scholars and +adherents.[34] + +[Footnote 32: Plut. Aristeides, c. 1; Diog. Laert. iii. 23-24. +Diogenes says that no other Athenian except Plato dared to speak +publicly in defence of Chabrias; but this can hardly be correct, since +Aristotle mentions another [Greek: sunê/goraos] named Lykoleon (Rhet. +iii. 10, p. 1411, b. 6). We may fairly presume that the trial of +Chabrias alluded to by Aristotle is the same as that alluded to by +Diogenes, that which arose out of the wrongful occupation of Orôpus by +the Thebans. If Plato appeared at the trial, I doubt whether it could +have occurred in 366 B.C., as Clinton supposes; Plato must have been +absent during that year in Sicily. + +The anecdote given by Diogenes, in relation to Plato's appearance at +this trial, deserves notice. Krobylus, one of the accusers, said to +him, "Are _you_ come to plead on behalf of another? Are not you aware +that the hemlock of Sokrates is in store for _you_ also?" Plato +replied: "I affronted dangers formerly, when I went on military +expedition, for my country, and I am prepared to affront them now in +discharge of my duty to a friend" (iii. 24). + +This anecdote is instructive, as it exhibits the continuance of the +anti-philosophical antipathies at Athens among a considerable portion +of the citizens, and as it goes to attest the military service +rendered personally by Plato. + +Diogenes (iii. 46) gives a long list of hearers; and Athenæus (xi. +506-509) enumerates several from different cities in Greece: Euphræus +of Oreus (in Euboea), who acquired through Plato's recommendation +great influence with Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, and who is said to +have excluded from the society of that king every one ignorant of +philosophy and geometry; Euagon of Lampsakus, Timæus of Kyzikus, +Chæron of Pellênê, all of whom tried, and the last with success, to +usurp the sceptre in their respective cities; Eudêmus of Cyprus; +Kallippus the Athenian, fellow-learner with Dion in the Academy, +afterwards his companion in his expedition to Sicily, ultimately his +murderer; Herakleides and Python from Ænus in Thrace, Chion and +Leonides, also Klearchus the despot from the Pontic Herakleia (Justin, +xvi. 5). + +Several of these examples seem to have been cited by the orator +Democharês (nephew of Demosthenes) in his speech at Athens vindicating +the law proposed by Sophokles for the expulsion of the philosophers +from Athens (Athenæ. xi. 508 F), a speech delivered about 306 B.C. +Plutarch compliments Plato for the active political liberators and +tyrannicides who came forth from the Academy: he considers Plato as +the real author and planner of the expedition of Dion against +Dionysius, and expatiates on the delight which Plato must have derived +from it--a supposition very incorrect (Plutarch, Non Posse Suav. p. +1097 B; adv. Kolôten, p. 1126 B-C).] + +[Footnote 33: Aristokles, ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. xv. 2: Ælian, V. +H. iii. 19: Aristeides, Or. 46, [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn] vol. +ii. p. 324-325. Dindorf. + +The friendship and reciprocity of service between Plato and Chabrias +is an interesting fact. Compare Stahr, Aristotelia, vol. i. p. 50 +seqq. + +Cicero affirms, on the authority of the Epistles of Demosthenes, that +Demosthenes describes himself as an assiduous hearer as well as reader +of Plato (Cic. Brut. 31 121; Orat. 4, 15). I think this fact highly +probable, but the epistles which Cicero read no longer exist. Among +the five Epistles remaining, Plato is once mentioned with respect in +the fifth (p. 1490), but this epistle is considered by most critics +spurious.] + +[Footnote 34: Numenius, ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 6, 9. [Greek: +oi)êthei\s] (Kephisodôrus) [Greek: kata\ Pla/tôna to\n A)ristote/lên +philosophei=n, e)pole/mei me\n A)ristote/lei, e)/balle de\ Pla/tôna], +&c. This must have happened in the latter years of Plato's life, for +Aristotle must have been at least twenty-five or twenty-six years of +age when he engaged in such polemics. He was born in 384 B.C.] + +[Side-note: Little known about Plato's personal history.] + +Such is the sum of our information respecting Plato. Scanty as it is, +we have not even the advantage of contemporary authority for any +portion of it. We have no description of Plato from any contemporary +author, friendly or adverse. It will be seen that after the death of +Sokrates we know nothing about Plato as a man and a citizen, except +the little which can be learnt from his few Epistles, all written when +he was very old, and relating almost entirely to his peculiar +relations with Dion and Dionysius. His dialogues, when we try to +interpret them collectively, and gather from them general results as +to the character and purposes of the author, suggest valuable +arguments and perplexing doubts, but yield few solutions. In no one of +the dialogues does Plato address us in his own person. In the Apology +alone (which is not a dialogue) is he alluded to even as present: in +the Phædon he is mentioned as absent from illness. Each of the +dialogues, direct or indirect, is conducted from beginning to end by +the persons whom he introduces.[35] Not one of the dialogues affords +any positive internal evidence showing the date of its composition. In +a few there are allusions to prove that they must have been composed +at a period later than others, or later than some given event of known +date; but nothing more can be positively established. Nor is there any +good extraneous testimony to determine the date of any one among them. +For the remark ascribed to Sokrates about the dialogue called Lysis +(which remark, if authentic, would prove the dialogue to have been +composed during the life-time of Sokrates) appears altogether +untrustworthy. And the statement of some critics, that the Phædrus was +Plato's earliest composition, is clearly nothing more than an +inference (doubtful at best, and, in my judgment, erroneous) from its +dithyrambic style and erotic subject.[36] + +[Footnote 35: On this point Aristotle, in the dialogues which he +composed, did not follow Plato's example. Aristotle introduced two or +more persons debating a question, but he appeared in his own person to +give the solution, or at least to wind up the debate. He sometimes +also opened the debate by a prooem or prefatory address in his own +person (Cic. ad Attic. iv. 16, 2, xiii. 19, 4). Cicero followed the +manner of Aristotle, not that of Plato. His dialogues are rhetorical +rather than dramatic. + +All the dialogues of Aristotle are lost.] + +[Footnote 36: Diog. L. iii. 38. Compare the Prolegomena [Greek: tê=s +Pla/tônos Philosophi/as], c. 24, in the Appendix Platonica of K. F. +Hermann's edition, p. 217.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +PLATONIC CANON, AS RECOGNISED BY THRASYLLUS. + + +As we know little about Plato except from his works, the first +question to be decided is, Which _are_ his real works? Where are we to +find a trustworthy Platonic Canon? + +[Side-note: Platonic Canon--Ancient and modern discussions.] + +Down to the close of the last century this question was not much +raised or discussed. The catalogue recognised by the rhetor Thrasyllus +(contemporary with the Emperor Tiberius) was generally accepted as +including none but genuine works of Plato; and was followed as such by +editors and critics, who were indeed not very numerous.[1] But the +discussions carried on during the present century have taken a +different turn. While editors, critics, and translators have been +greatly multiplied, some of the most distinguished among them, +Schleiermacher at the head, have either professedly set aside, or in +practice disregarded, the Thrasyllean catalogue, as if it carried no +authority and very faint presumption. They have reasoned upon each +dialogue as if its title to be considered genuine were now to be +proved for the first time; either by external testimony (mentioned in +Aristotle or others), or by internal evidences of style, handling, and +thoughts:[2] as if, in other words, the _onus probandi_ lay upon any +one who believed the printed works of Plato to be genuine--not upon an +opponent who disputes the authenticity of any one or more among them, +and rejects it as spurious. Before I proceed to examine the +conclusions, alike numerous and discordant, which these critics have +proclaimed, I shall enquire how far the method which they have pursued +is warrantable. Is there any presumption at all--and if so, what +amount of presumption--in favour of the catalogue transmitted from +antiquity by Thrasyllus, as a canon containing genuine works of Plato +and no others? + +[Footnote 1: The following passage from Wyttenbach, written in 1776, +will give an idea of the state of Platonic criticism down to the last +quarter of the last century. To provide a new Canon for Plato seems +not to have entered his thoughts. + +Wyttenbach, Bibliotheca Critica, vol. i. p. 28. Review of Fischer's +edition of Plato's Philêbus and Symposion. "Quæ Ciceroni obtigit +interpretum et editorum felicitas, eâ adeo caruit Plato, ut non solum +paucos nactus sit qui ejus scripta typis ederent--sed qui ejus +orationi nitorem restitueret, eamque a corruptelarum labe purgaret, et +sensus obscuros atque abditos ex interiore doctrinâ patefaceret, +omnino repererit neminem. Et ex ipso hoc editionum parvo numero--nam +sex omnino sunt--nulla est recentior anno superioris seculi secundo: +ut mirandum sit, centum et septuaginta annorum spatio neminem ex tot +viris doctis extitisse, qui ita suam crisin Platoni addiceret, ut +intelligentiam ejus veræ eruditionis amantibus aperiret. + +"Qui Platonem legant, pauci sunt: qui intelligant, paucissimi; qui +vero, vel ex versionibus, vel ex jejuno historiæ philosophicæ +compendio, de eo judicent et cum supercilio pronuncient, plurimi +sunt."] + +[Footnote 2: To see that this is the general method of proceeding, we +have only to look at the work of Ueberweg, one of the most recent and +certainly one of the ablest among the Platonic critics. Untersuchungen +über die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge der Platonischen Schriften, Wien, +1861, p. 130-131.] + +[Side-note: Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its +favour.] + +Upon this question I hold an opinion opposite to that of the Platonic +critics since Schleiermacher. The presumption appears to me +particularly strong, instead of particularly weak: comparing the +Platonic writings with those of other eminent writers, dramatists, +orators, historians, of the same age and country. + +[Side-note: Fixed residence and school at Athens--founded by Plato and +transmitted to successors.] + +We have seen that Plato passed the last thirty-eight years of his life +(except his two short visits to Syracuse) as a writer and lecturer at +Athens; that he purchased and inhabited a fixed residence at the +Academy, near the city. We know, moreover, that his principal pupils, +especially (his nephew) Speusippus and Xenokrates, were constantly +with him in this residence during his life; that after his death the +residence became permanently appropriated as a philosophical school +for lectures, study, conversation, and friendly meetings of studious +men, in which capacity it served for more than two centuries;[3] that +his nephew Speusippus succeeded him there as teacher, and taught there +for eight years, being succeeded after his death first by Xenokrates +(for twenty-five years), afterwards by Polemon, Krantor, Krates, +Arkesilaus, and others in uninterrupted series; that the school always +continued to be frequented, though enjoying greater or less celebrity +according to the reputation of the Scholarch. + +[Footnote 3: The teaching and conversation of the Platonic School +continued fixed in the spot known as the Academy until the siege of +Athens by Sylla in 87 B.C. The teacher was then forced to confine +himself to the interior of the city, where he gave lectures in the +gymnasium called Ptolemæum. In that gymnasium Cicero heard the +lectures of the Scholarch Antiochus, B.C. 79; walking out afterwards +to visit the deserted but memorable site of the Academy (Cic. De Fin. +v. 1; C. G. Zumpt, Ueber den Bestand der Philosophischen Schulen in +Athen, p. 14, Berlin, 1843). The ground of the Academy, when once +deserted, speedily became unhealthy, and continues to be so now, as +Zumpt mentions that he himself experienced in 1835.] + +[Side-note: Importance of this foundation. Preservation of Plato's +manuscripts. School library.] + +By thus perpetuating the school which his own genius had originated, +and by providing for it permanent support with a fixed domicile, Plato +inaugurated a new epoch in the history of philosophy: this example was +followed a few years afterwards by Aristotle, Zeno, and Epikurus. +Moreover the proceeding was important in another way also, as it +affected the preservation and authentication of his own manuscripts +and compositions. It provided not only safe and lasting custody, such +as no writer had ever enjoyed before, for Plato's original +manuscripts, but also a guarantee of some efficacy against any fraud +or error which might seek to introduce other compositions into the +list. That Plato himself was not indifferent on this head we may +fairly believe, since we learn from Dionysius of Halikarnassus, that +he was indefatigable in the work of correction: and his disciples, who +took the great trouble of noting down themselves what he spoke in his +lectures, would not be neglectful as to the simpler duty of preserving +his manuscripts.[4] Now Speusippus and Xenokrates (also Aristotle, +Hestiæus, the Opuntian Philippus, and the other Platonic pupils) must +have had personal knowledge of all that Plato had written, whether +finished dialogues, unfinished fragments, or preparatory sketches. +They had perfect means of distinguishing his real compositions from +forgeries passed off in his name: and they had every motive to expose +such forgeries (if any were attempted) wherever they could, in order +to uphold the reputation of their master. If any one composed a +dialogue and circulated it under the name of Plato, the school was a +known place, and its occupants were at hand to give information to all +who enquired about the authenticity of the composition. The original +MSS. of Plato (either in his own handwriting or in that of his +secretary, if he employed one[5]) were doubtless treasured up in the +school as sacred memorials of the great founder, and served as +originals from which copies of unquestionable fidelity might be made, +whenever the Scholarch granted permission. How long they continued to +be so preserved we cannot say: nor do we know what was the condition +of the MSS., or how long they were calculated to last. But probably +many of the students frequenting the school would come for the express +purpose of reading various works of Plato (either in the original +MSS., or in faithful copies taken from them) with the exposition of +the Scholarch; just as we know that the Roman M. Crassus (mentioned by +Cicero), during his residence at Athens, studied the Platonic Gorgias +with the aid of the Scholarch Charmadas.[6] The presidency of +Speusippus and Xenokrates (taken jointly) lasted for thirty-three +years; and even when they were replaced by successors who had enjoyed +no personal intimacy with Plato, the motive to preserve the Platonic +MSS. would still be operative, and the means of verifying what was +really Platonic would still be possessed in the school. The original +MSS. would be preserved, along with the treatises or dialogues which +each successive Scholarch himself composed; thus forming a permanent +and increasing school-library, probably enriched more or less by works +acquired or purchased from others. + +[Footnote 4: Simplikius, Schol. Aristotel. Physic. f. 32, p. 334, b. +28, Brandis: [Greek: la/boi d' a)/n tis kai\ para\ Speusi/ppou kai\ +para\ Xenokra/tous, kai\ tô=n a)/llôn oi(\ parege/nonto e)n tê=| peri\ +Ta)gathou= tou= Pla/tônos a)kroa/sei; pa/ntes ga\r sune/grapsan kai\ +diesô/santo tê\n do/xan au)tou=]. In another passage of the same +Scholia (p. 362, a. 12) Simplikius mentions Herakleides (of Pontus), +Hestiæus, and even Aristotle himself, as having taken notes of the +same lectures. + +Hermodôrus appears to have carried some of Plato's dialogues to +Sicily, and to have made money by selling them. See Cicero ad Atticum, +xiii. 21: Suidas et Zenobius--[Greek: lo/goisin E(rmo/dôros +e)mporeu/etai]. See Zeller, Dissert. De Hermodoro, p. 19. In the +above-mentioned epistle Cicero compares his own relations with +Atticus, to those of Plato with Hermodôrus. Hermodôrus had composed a +treatise respecting Plato, from which some extracts were given by +Derkyllides (the contemporary of Thrasyllus) as well as by Simplikius +(Zeller, De Hermod. p. 20-21).] + +[Footnote 5: We read in Cicero, (Academic. Priora, ii. 4, 11) that the +handwriting of the Scholarch Philo, when his manuscript was brought +from Athens to Alexandria, was recognised at once by his friends and +pupils.] + +[Footnote 6: Cicero, De Oratore, i. 11, 45-47: "florente Academiâ, +quod eam Charmadas et Clitomachus et Æschines obtinebant. . . Platoni, +cujus tum Athenis cum Charmadâ diligentius legi Gorgiam," &c.] + +[Side-note: Security provided by the school for distinguishing what +were Plato's genuine writings.] + +It appears to me that the continuance of this school--founded by Plato +himself at his own abode, permanently domiciliated, and including all +the MSS. which he left in it--gives us an amount of assurance for the +authenticity of the so-called Platonic compositions, such as does not +belong to the works of other eminent contemporary authors, Aristippus, +Antisthenes, Isokrates, Lysias, Demosthenes, Euripides, Aristophanes. +After the decease of these last-mentioned authors, who can say what +became of their MSS.? Where was any certain permanent custody provided +for them? Isokrates had many pupils during his life, but left no +school or [Greek: mousei=on] after his death. If any one composed a +discourse, and tried to circulate it as the composition of Isokrates, +among the bundles of judicial orations which were sold by the +booksellers[7] as his (according to the testimony of Aristotle)--where +was the person to be found, notorious and accessible, who could say: +"I possess all the MSS. of Isokrates, and I can depose that this is +not among them!" The chances of success for forgery or mistake were +decidedly greater, in regard to the works of these authors, than they +could be for those of Plato. + +[Footnote 7: Dionys. Halik. de Isocrate, p. 576 R. [Greek: desma\s +pa/nu polla\s dikanikô=n lo/gôn I)sokratei/ôn periphe/resthai/ phêsin +u(po\ tô=n bibliopôlô=n A)ristote/lês.]] + +[Side-note: Unfinished fragments and preparatory sketches, preserved +and published after Plato's death.] + +Again, the existence of this school-library explains more easily how +it is that unfinished, inferior, and fragmentary Platonic compositions +have been preserved. That there must have existed such compositions I +hold to be certain. How is it supposable that any author, even Plato +could have brought to completion such masterpieces as Republic, +Gorgias, Protagoras, Symposion, &c., without tentative and preparatory +sketches, each of course in itself narrow, defective, perhaps of +little value, but serving as material to be worked up or worked in? +Most of these would be destroyed, but probably not all. If (as I +believe) it be the fact, that all the Platonic MSS. were preserved as +their author left them, some would probably be published (and some +indeed are said to have been published) after his death; and among +them would be included more or fewer of these unfinished performances, +and sketches projected but abandoned. We can hardly suppose that Plato +himself would have published fragments never finished, such as +Kleitophon and Kritias[8]--the last ending in the middle of a +sentence. + +[Footnote 8: Straton, the Peripatetic Scholarch who succeeded +Theophrastus, B.C. 287, bequeathed to Lykon by his will both the +succession to his school ([Greek: diatribê\n]) and all his books, +except what he had written himself ([Greek: plê\n ô(=n au)toi\ +gegra/phamen]). What is to be done with these latter he does not say. +Lykon, in his last will, says:--[Greek: kai\ du/o mna=s au)tô=|] +(Chares, a manumitted slave) [Greek: di/dômi kai\ ta)ma\ bi/blia ta\ +a)negnôsme/na; ta\ de\ a)ne/kdota Kalli/nô|, o(/pôs e)pimelô=s au)ta\ +e)kdô=|]. See Diog. L. v. 62, 73. Here Lykon directs expressly that +Kallinus shall edit with care his (Lykon's) unpublished works. +Probably Straton may have given similar directions during his life, so +that it was unnecessary to provide in the will. [Greek: Ta\ +a)negnôsme/na] is equivalent to [Greek: ta\ e)kdedome/na]. Publication +was constituted by reading the MSS. aloud before a chosen audience of +friends or critics; which readings often led to such remarks as +induced the author to take his work back, and to correct it for a +second recitation. See the curious sentence extracted from the letter +of Theophrastus to Phanias (Diog. L. v. 37). Boeckh and other critics +agree that both the Kleitophon and the Kritias were transmitted from +antiquity in the fragmentary state in which we now read them: that +they were compositions never completed. Boeckh affirms this with +assurance respecting the Kleitophon, though he thinks that it is not a +genuine work of Plato; on which last point I dissent from him. He +thinks that the Kritias is a real work of Plato, though uncompleted +(Boeckh in Platonis Minoem, p. 11). + +Compare the remarks of M. Littré respecting the unfinished sketches, +treatises, and notes not intended for publication, included in the +Collectio Hippocratica (Oeuvres d' Hippocrate, vol. x. p. liv. seq.)] + +[Side-note: Peripatetic school at the Lykeum--its composition and +arrangement.] + +The second philosophical school, begun by Aristotle and perpetuated +(after his death in 322 B.C.) at the Lykeum on the eastern side of +Athens, was established on the model of that of Plato. That which +formed the centre or consecrating point was a Museum or chapel of the +Muses: with statues of those goddesses of place, and also a statue of +the founder. Attached to this Museum were a portico, a hall with seats +(one seat especially for the lecturing professor), a garden, and a +walk, together with a residence, all permanently appropriated to the +teacher and the process of instruction.[9] Theophrastus, the friend +and immediate successor of Aristotle, presided over the school for +thirty-five years; and his course, during part of that time at least, +was prodigiously frequented by students. + +[Footnote 9: Respecting the domicile of the Platonic School, and that +of the Aristotelian or Peripatetic school which followed it, the +particulars given by Diogenes are nearly coincident: we know more in +detail about the Peripatetic, from what he cites out of the will of +Theophrastus. See iv. 1-6-19, v. 51-63. + +The [Greek: mousei=on] at the Academy was established by Plato +himself. Speusippus placed in it statues of the Charities or Graces. +Theophrastus gives careful directions in his about repairing and +putting in the best condition, the Peripatetic [Greek: mousei=on], +with its altar, its statues of the Goddesses, and its statue of the +founder Aristotle. The [Greek: stoa\, e)xe/dra, kê=pos, peri/patos], +attached to both schools, are mentioned: the most zealous students +provided for themselves lodgings close adjoining. Cicero, when he +walked out from Athens to see the deserted Academy, was particularly +affected by the sight of the _exedra_, in which Charmadas had lectured +(De Fin. v. 2, 4). + +There were periodical meetings, convivial and conversational, among +the members both of the Academic and Peripatetic schools; and [Greek: +xumpotikoi\ no/moi] by Xenokrates and Aristotle to regulate them +(Athenæus, v. 184). + +Epikurus (in his interesting testament given by Diogen. Laert. x. +16-21) bequeaths to two Athenian citizens his garden and property, in +trust for his principal disciple the Mitylenæan Hermarchus, [Greek: +kai\ toi=s sumphilosophou=sin au)tô=|, kai\ oi(=s a)\n E(/rmarchos +katali/pê| diado/chois tê=s philosophi/as, e)ndiatri/bein kata\ +philosophi/an]. He at the same time directs all his books to be given +to Hermarchus: they would form the school-library.] + +[Side-note: Peripatetic school library, its removal from Athens to +Skêpsis--its ultimate restitution in a damaged state to Athens, then +to Rome.] + +Moreover, the school-library at the Lykeum acquired large development +and importance. It not only included all the MS. compositions, +published or unpublished, of Aristotle and Theophrastus, each of them +a voluminous writer--but also a numerous collection (numerous for that +day) of other works besides; since both of them were opulent and fond +of collecting books. The value of the school-library is shown by what +happened after the decease of Theophrastus, when Straton succeeded him +in the school (B.C. 287). Theophrastus--thinking himself entitled to +treat the library not as belonging to the school but as belonging to +himself--bequeathed it at his death to Neleus, a favourite scholar, +and a native of Skêpsis (in the Troad), by whom it was carried away to +Asia, and permanently separated from the Aristotelian school at +Athens. The manuscripts composing it remained in the possession of +Neleus and his heirs for more than a century and a half, long hidden +in a damp cellar, neglected, and sustaining great damage--until about +the year 100 B.C., when they were purchased by a rich Athenian named +Apellikon, and brought back to Athens. Sylla, after he had captured +Athens (86 B.C.), took for himself the library of Apellikon, and +transported it to Rome, where it became open to learned men +(Tyrannion, Andronikus, and others), but under deplorable +disadvantage--in consequence of the illegible state of the MSS. and +the unskilful conjectures and restitutions which had been applied, in +the new copies made since it passed into the hands of Apellikon.[10] + +[Footnote 10: The will of Theophrastus, as given in Diogenes (v. 52), +mentions the bequest of all his books to Neleus. But it is in Strabo +that we read the fullest account of this displacement of the +Peripatetic school-library, and the consequences which ensued from it +(xiii. 608, 609). [Greek: Nêleu\s, a)nê\r kai\ A)ristote/lous +ê)kroame/nos kai\ Theophra/stou, diadedegme/nos de\ tê\n bibliothê/kên +tou= Theophra/stou, e)n ê(=| ê)=n kai\ ê( tou= A)ristote/lous. o( +gou=n A)ristote/lês tê\n e(autou= Theophra/stô| pare/dôken, ô(=|per +kai\ tê\n scholê\n a)pe/lipe, _prô=tos, ô(=n i)/smen, sunagagô\n +bi/blia, kai\ dida/xas tou\s e)n Ai)gu/ptô| basile/as bibliothê/kês +su/ntaxin_]. + +The kings of Pergamus, a few years after the death of Theophrastus, +acquired possession of the town and territory of Skêpsis; so that the +heirs of Neleus became numbered among their subjects. These kings +(from about the year B.C. 280 downwards) manifested great eagerness to +collect a library at Pergamus, in competition with that of the +Ptolemies at Alexandria. The heirs of Neleus were afraid that these +kings would strip them of their Aristotelian MSS., either for nothing +or for a small price. They therefore concealed the MSS. in a cellar, +until they found an opportunity of selling them to a stranger out of +the country. (Strabo, l. c.) + +This narrative of Strabo is one of the most interesting pieces of +information remaining to us about literary antiquity. He had himself +received instruction from Tyrannion (xii. 548): he had gone through a +course of Aristotelian philosophy (xvi. 757), and he had good means of +knowing the facts from the Aristotelian critics, including his master +Tyrannion. Plutarch (Vit. Syllæ, c. 26) and Athenæus (i. 3) allude to +the same story. Athenæus says that Ptolemy Philadelphus purchased the +MSS. from the heirs of Neleus, which cannot be correct. + +Some critics have understood the narrative of Strabo, as if he had +meant to affirm, that the works of Aristotle had never got into +circulation until the time of Apellikon. It is against this +supposition that Stahr contends (very successfully) in his work +"Aristotelia". But Strabo does not affirm so much as this. He does not +say anything to contradict the supposition that there were copies of +various books of Aristotle in circulation, during the lives of +Aristotle and Theophrastus.] + +[Side-note: Inconvenience to the Peripatetic school from the loss of +its library.] + +If we knew the truth, it might probably appear that the transfer of +the Aristotelian library, from the Peripatetic school at Athens to the +distant and obscure town of Skêpsis, was the result of some jealousy +on the part of Theophrastus; that he wished to secure to Neleus the +honourable and lucrative post of becoming his successor in the school, +and conceived that he was furthering that object by bequeathing the +library to Neleus. If he entertained any such wish, it was +disappointed. The succession devolved upon another pupil of the +school, Straton of Lampsakus. But Straton and his successors were +forced to get on as well as they could without their library. The +Peripatetic school at Athens suffered severely by the loss. Its +professors possessed only a few of the manuscripts of Aristotle, and +those too the commonest and best known. If a student came with a view +to read any of the other Aristotelian works (as Crassus went to read +the Gorgias of Plato), the Scholarch was unable to assist him: as far +as Aristotle was concerned, they could only expand and adorn, in the +way of lecture, a few of his familiar doctrines.[11] We hear that the +character of the school was materially altered. Straton deserted the +track of Aristotle, and threw himself into speculations of his own +(seemingly able and ingenious), chiefly on physical topics.[12] The +critical study, arrangement, and exposition of Aristotle was postponed +until the first century before the Christian era--the Ciceronian age, +immediately preceding Strabo. + +[Footnote 11: Strabo, xiii. 609. [Greek: sune/bê de\ toi=s e)k tô=n +peripa/tôn toi=s me\n pa/lai, toi=s meta\ Theo/phraston, ou)k +e)/chousin o(/lôs ta\ bi/blia plê\n o)li/gôn, kai\ ma/lista tô=n +e)xôterikô=n, mêde\n e)/chein philosophei=n pragmatikô=s, a)lla\ +_the/seis lêkuthi/zein_.]] + +[Footnote 12: The change in the Peripatetic school, after the death of +Theophrastus, is pointed out by Cicero, Fin. v. 5, 18. Compare Academ. +Poster. i. 9.] + +[Side-note: Advantage to the Platonic school from having preserved its +MSS.] + +This history of the Aristotelian library illustrates forcibly, by way +of contrast, the importance to the Platonic school of having preserved +its MSS. from the beginning, without any similar interruption. What +Plato left in manuscript we may presume to have never been removed: +those who came to study his works had the means of doing so: those who +wanted to know whether any composition was written by him, what works +he had written altogether, or what was the correct reading in a case +of obscurity or dispute--had always the means of informing themselves. +Whereas the Peripatetic Scholarch, after the death of Theophrastus, +could give no similar information as to the works of Aristotle.[13] + +[Footnote 13: An interesting citation by Simplikius (in his commentary +on the Physica of Aristotle, fol. 216, a. 7, p. 404, b. 11, Schol. +Brandis shows us that Theophrastus, while he was resident at Athens as +Peripatetic Scholarch, had custody of the original MSS. of the works +of Aristotle and that he was applied to by those who wished to procure +correct copies. Eudêmus (of Rhodes) having only a defective copy of +the Physica, wrote to request that Theophrastus would cause to be +written out a certain portion of the fifth book, and send it to him, +[Greek: marturou=ntos peri\ tô=n prô/tôn kai\ Theophra/stou, +gra/psantos Eu)dê/mô|, peri/ tinos au)tou= tô=n diêmartême/nôn +a)ntigra/phôn; u(pe\r ô(=n, phêsin] (_sc._ Theophrastus) [Greek: +e)pe/steilas, keleu/ôn me gra/phein kai\ apostei=lai e)k tô=n +Phusikô=n, ê(/toi e)gô\ ou) suni/êmi, ê)\ mikro/n ti pantelô=s e)/chei +tou= a)na/meson tou= o(/per ê)remei=n kalô= tô=n a)kinê/tôn mo/non], +&c.] + +[Side-note: Conditions favourable, for preserving the genuine works of +Plato.] + +We thus see that the circumstances, under which Plato left his +compositions, were unusually favourable (speaking by comparison with +ancient authors generally) in regard to the chance of preserving them +all, and of keeping them apart from counterfeits. We have now to +enquire what information exists as to their subsequent diffusion. + +[Side-note: Historical facts as to their preservation.] + +The earliest event of which notice is preserved, is, the fact stated +by Diogenes, that "Some persons, among whom is the _Grammaticus_ +Aristophanes, distribute the dialogues of Plato into Trilogies; +placing as the first Trilogy--Republic, Timæus, Kritias. 2. Sophistes, +Politicus, Kratylus. 3. Leges, Minos, Epinomis. 4.** Theætêtus, +Euthyphron, Apology. 5. Kriton, Phædon, Epistolæ. The other dialogues +they place one by one, without any regular grouping."[14] + +[Footnote 14: Diog. L. iii. 61-62: [Greek: E)/nioi de/, ô(=n e)/sti +kai\ A)ristopha/nês o( grammatiko/s, ei)s trilogi/as e(/lkousi tou\s +dialo/gous; kai\ prô/tên me\n tithe/asin ê(=s ê(gei=tai Politei/a, +Ti/maios, Kriti/as; deute/ran, Sophistê/s, Politiko/s, Kra/tulos; +tri/tên, No/moi, Mi/nôs, E)pinomi/s; teta/rtên, Theai/têtos, +Eu)thu/phrôn, A)pologi/a; pe/mptên, Kri/tôn, Phai/dôn, E)pistolai/; +ta\ de\ a)/lla kath' e)\n kai\ a)ta/ktôs]. + +The word [Greek: grammatiko\s], unfortunately, has no single English +word exactly corresponding to it. + +Thrasyllus, when he afterwards applied the classification by +Tetralogies to the works of Demokritus (as he did also to those of +Plato) could only include a certain portion of the works in his +Tetralogies, and was forced to enumerate the remainder as [Greek: +a)su/ntakta] (Diog. L. ix. 46, 47). It appears that he included all +Plato's works in his Platonic Tetralogies.] + +[Side-note: Arrangement of them into Trilogies, by Aristophanes.] + +The name of Aristophanes lends special interest to this arrangement of +the Platonic compositions, and enables us to understand something of +the date and the place to which it belongs. The literary and critical +students (_Grammatici_) among whom he stood eminent, could scarcely be +said to exist as a class the time when Plato died. Beginning with +Aristotle, Herakleides of Pontus, Theophrastus, Demetrius Phalereus, +&c., at Athens, during the half century immediately succeeding Plato's +decease--these laborious and useful erudites were first called into +full efficiency along with the large collection of books formed by the +Ptolemies at Alexandria during a period beginning rather before 300 +B.C.: which collection served both as model and as stimulus to the +libraries subsequently formed by the kings at Pergamus and elsewhere. +In those libraries alone could materials be found for their +indefatigable application. + +[Side-note: Aristophanes, librarian at the Alexandrine library.] + +Of these learned men, who spent their lives in reading, criticising, +arranging, and correcting, the MSS. accumulated in a great library, +Aristophanes of Byzantium was the most distinguished representative, +in the eyes of men like Varro, Cicero, and Plutarch.[15] His life was +passed at Alexandria, and seems to have been comprised between 260-184 +B.C.; as far as can be made out. During the latter portion of it he +became chief librarian--an appointment which he had earned by long +previous studies in the place, as well as by attested experience in +the work of criticism and arrangement. He began his studious career at +Alexandria at an early age: and he received instruction, as a boy from +Zenodotus, as a young man from Kallimachus--both of whom were, in +succession, librarians of the Alexandrine library.[16] We must observe +that Diogenes does not expressly state the distribution of the +Platonic works into trilogies to have been _first proposed_ or +originated by Aristophanes (as he states that the tetralogies were +afterwards proposed by the rhetor Thrasyllus, of which presently): his +language is rather more consistent with the supposition, that it was +first proposed by some one earlier, and adopted or sanctioned by the +eminent authority of Aristophanes. But at any rate, the distribution +was proposed either by Aristophanes himself, or by some one before him +and known to him. + +[Footnote 15: Varro, De Linguâ Latinâ, v. 9, ed. Müller. "Non solum ad +Aristophanis lucernam, sed etiam ad Cleanthis, lucubravi." Cicero, De +Fin. v. 19, 50; Vitruvius, Præf. Lib. vii.; Plutarch, "Non posse +suaviter vivi sec. Epicurum," p. 1095 E. + +Aristophanes composed Argumenta to many of the Attic tragedies and +comedies: he also arranged in a certain order the songs of Alkæus and +the odes of Pindar. Boeckh (Præfat. ad Scholia Pindari, p. x. xi.) +remarks upon the mistake made by Quintilian as well as by others, in +supposing that Pindar arranged his own odes. Respecting the wide range +of erudition embraced by Aristophanes, see F. A. Wolf, Prolegg. in +Homer, pp. 218-220, and Schneidewin, De Hypothes. Traged. Græc. +Aristophani vindicandis, pp. 26, 27.] + +[Footnote 16: Suidas, vv. [Greek: A)ristopha/nês, Kalli/machos]. +Compare Clinton, Fast. Hellen. B.C. 256-200.] + +[Side-note: Plato's works in the Alexandrine library, before the time +of Aristophanes.] + +This fact is of material importance, because it enables us to Plato's +infer with confidence, that the Platonic works were included in the +Alexandrine library, certainly during the lifetime of Aristophanes, +and probably before it. It is there only that Aristophanes could have +known them; his whole life having been passed in Alexandria. The first +formal appointment of a librarian to the Alexandrine Museum was made +by Ptolemy Philadelphus, at some time after the commencement of his +reign in 285 B.C., in the person of Zenodotus; whose successors were +Kallimachus, Eratosthenes, Apollonius, Aristophanes, comprising in all +a period of a century.[17] + +[Footnote 17: See Ritschl, Die Alexandrinischen Bibliotheken, pp. +16-17, &c.; Nauck, De Aristophanis Vitâ et Scriptis, cap. i. p. 68 +(Halle, 1848). "Aristophanis et Aristarchi opera, cum opibus +Bibliothecæ Alexandrinæ digerendis et ad tabulas revocandis arctè +conjuncta, in eo substitisse censenda est, ut scriptores, in quovis +dicendi genere conspicuos, aut breviori indice comprehenderent, aut +uberiore enarratione describerent," &c. + +When Zenodotus was appointed, the library had already attained +considerable magnitude, so that the post and title of librarian was +then conspicuous and dignified. But Demetrius Phalereus, who preceded +Zenodotus, began his operations when there was no library at all, and +gradually accumulated the number of books which Zenodotus found. Heyne +observes justly: "Primo loco Demetrius Phalereus præfuisse dicitur, +_forte re verius quam nomine_, tum Zenodotus Ephesius, hic quidem sub +Ptolemæo Philadelpho," &c. (Heyne, De Genio Sæculi Ptolemæorum in +Opuscul. i. p. 129).] + +[Side-note: Kallimachus--predecessor of Aristophanes--his published +Tables of authors whose works were in the library.] + +Kallimachus, born at Kyrênê, was a teacher of letters at Alexandria +before he was appointed to the service and superintendence of the +Alexandrine library or museum. His life seems to have terminated about +230 B.C.: he acquired reputation as a poet, by his hymns, epigrams, +elegies, but less celebrity as a _Grammaticus_ than Aristophanes: +nevertheless the titles of his works still remaining indicate very +great literary activity. We read as titles of his works:-- + +1. The Museum (a general description of the Alexandrine +establishment). + +2. Tables of the persons who have distinguished themselves in every +branch of instruction, and of the works which they have composed--in +120 books. + +3. Table and specification of the (Didaskalies) recorded dramatic +representations and competitions; with dates assigned, and from the +beginning. + +4. Table of the peculiar phrases belonging to Demokritus, and of his +works. + +5. Table and specification of the rhetorical authors.[18] + +[Footnote 18: See Blomfleld's edition of the Fragm. of Kallimachus, p. +220-221. Suidas, v. [Greek: Kalli/machos], enumerates a large number +of titles of poetical, literary, historical, compositions of +Kallimachus; among them are-- + +[Greek: Mousei=on. Pi/nakes tô=n e)n pa/sê| paidei/a| dialampsa/ntôn, +kai\ ô(=n sune/grapsan, e)n bibli/ois k' kai\ r'. Pi/nax kai\ +a)nagraphê\ tô=n kata\ chro/nous kai\ a)p' a)rchê=s genome/nôn +didaskaliô=n. Pi/nax tô=n Dêmokri/tou glôssô=n kai\ suntagma/tôn. +Pi/nax kai\ a)nagraphê\ tô=n r(êtorikô=n]. See also Athenæus, xv. 669. +It appears from Dionys. Hal. that besides the Tables of Kallimachus, +enumerating and reviewing the authors whose works were contained in +the Alexandrine library or museum, there existed also [Greek: +Pergamênoi\ Pi/nakes], describing the contents of the library at +Pergamus (Dion. H. de Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosthene, p. 994; De Dinarcho, +pp. 630, 653, 661). + +Compare Bernhardy, Grundriss der Griech. Litt. sect. 36, pp. 132-133 +seq.] + +[Side-note: Large and rapid accumulation of the Alexandrine Library.] + +These tables of Kallimachus (of which one by itself, No. 2, reached to +120 books) must have been an encyclopædia, far more comprehensive than +any previously compiled, of Greek authors and literature. Such tables +indeed could not have been compiled before the existence of the +Alexandrine Museum. They described what Kallimachus had before him in +that museum, as we may see by the general title [Greek: Mousei=on] +prefixed: moreover we may be sure that nowhere else could he have had +access to the multitude of books required. Lastly, the tables also +show how large a compass the Alexandrine Museum and library had +attained at the time when Kallimachus put together his compilation: +that is, either in the reign of Ptolemy II. Philadelphia (285-247 +B.C.), or in the earlier portion of the reign of Ptolemy III., called +Euergetes (247-222 B.C.). Nevertheless, large as the library then was, +it continued to increase. A few years afterwards, Aristophanes +published a work commenting upon the tables of Kallimachus, with +additions and enlargements: of which work the title alone remains.[19] + +[Footnote 19: Athenæus, ix. 408. [Greek: A)ristopha/nês o( +grammatiko\s e)n toi=s pro\s tou\s Kallima/chou pi/nakas]. + +We see by another passage, Athenæ. viii. 336, that this work included +an addition or supplement to the Tables of Kallimachus. + +Compare Etymol. Magn. v. [Greek: Pi/nax].] + +[Side-note: Plato's works--in the library at the time of Kallimachus.] + +Now, I have already observed, that the works of Plato were certainly +in the Alexandrine library, at the time when Aristophanes either +originated or sanctioned the distribution of them into Trilogies. Were +they not also in the library at the time when Kallimachus compiled his +tables? I cannot but conclude that they were in it at that time also. +When we are informed that the catalogue of enumerated authors filled +so many books, we may be sure that it must have descended, and we know +in fact that it did descend, to names far less important and +distinguished than that of Plato.[20] The name of Plato himself can +hardly have been omitted. Demokritus and his works, especially the +peculiar and technical words ([Greek: glô=ssai]) in them, received +special attention from Kallimachus: which proves that the latter was +not disposed to pass over the philosophers. But Demokritus, though an +eminent philosopher, was decidedly less eminent than Plato: moreover +he left behind him no permanent successors, school, or [Greek: +mousei=on], at Athens, to preserve his MSS. or foster his celebrity. +As the library was furnished at that time with a set of the works of +Demokritus, so I infer that it could not have been without a set of +the works of Plato. That Kallimachus was acquainted with Plato's +writings (if indeed such a fact requires proof), we know, not only +from his epigram upon the Ambrakiot Kleombrotus (whom he affirms to +have killed himself after reading the Phædon), but also from a curious +intimation that he formally impugned Plato's competence to judge or +appreciate poets--alluding to the severe criticisms which we read in +the Platonic Republic.[21] + +[Footnote 20: Thus the Tables of Kallimachus included a writer named +Lysimachus, a disciple of Theodorus or Theophrastus, and his writings +(Athenæ. vi. 252)--a rhetor and poet named Dionysius with the epithet +of [Greek: chalkou=s] (Athenæ. xv. 669))--and even the treatises of +several authors on cakes and cookery (Athenæ. xiv. 643). The names of +authors absolutely unknown to us were mentioned by him (Athenæ. ii. +70). Compare Dionys. Hal. de Dinarcho, 630, 653, 661.] + +[Footnote 21: Kallimachus, Epigram. 23. + +Proklus in Timæum, p. 28 C. p. 64. Schneid. [Greek: ma/tên ou)=n +phlênaphou=si Kalli/machos kai\ Dou=ris, ô(s Pla/tônos ou)k o)/ntos +i(kanou= kri/nein poiêta/s]. + +Eratosthenes, successor of Kallimachus as librarian at Alexandria, +composed a work (now lost) entitled [Greek: Platôniko\n], as well as +various treatises on philosophy and philosophers (Eratosthenica, +Bernhardy, p. 168, 187, 197; Suidas, v. [Greek: E)ratosthe/nês]). He +had passed some time at Athens, had enjoyed the lessons and +conversation of Zeno the Stoic, but expressed still warmer admiration +of Arkesilaus and Ariston. He spoke in animated terms of Athens as the +great centre of congregation for philosophers in his day. He had +composed a treatise, [Greek: Peri\ tô=n a)gathô=n]: but Strabo +describes him as mixing up other subjects with philosophy (Strabo, i. +p. 15).] + +It would indeed be most extraordinary if, among the hundreds of +authors whose works must have been specified in the Tables of +Kallimachus as constituting the treasures of the Alexandrine +Museum,[22] the name of Plato had not been included. Moreover, the +distribution of the Platonic compositions into Trilogies, pursuant to +the analogy of the Didaskaliæ or dramatic records, may very probably +have originated with Kallimachus; and may have been simply approved +and continued, perhaps with some modifications, by Aristophanes. At +least this seems more consonant to the language of Diogenes Laertius, +than the supposition that Aristophanes was the first originator of it. + +[Footnote 22: About the number of books, or more properly of _rolls_ +(_volumina_), in the Alexandrine library, see the enquiries of +Parthey, Das Alexandrinische Museum, p. 76-84. Various statements are +made by ancient authors, some of them with very large numbers; and no +certainty is attainable. Many rolls would go to form one book. Parthey +considers the statement made by Epiphanius not improbable--54,800 +rolls in the library under Ptolemy Philadelphus (p. 83). + +The magnitude of the library at Alexandria in the time of +Eratosthenes, and the multitude of writings which he consulted in his +valuable geographical works, was admitted by his opponent Hipparchus +(Strabo, ii. 69).] + +[Side-note: First formation of the library--intended as a copy of the +Platonic and Aristotelian [Greek: Mousei=a] at Athens.] + +If we look back to the first commencement of the Alexandrine Museum +and library, we shall be still farther convinced that the works of +Plato, complete as well as genuine, must have been introduced into it +before the days of Kallimachus. Strabo expressly tells us that the +first stimulus and example impelling the Ptolemies to found this +museum and library, were furnished by the school of Aristotle and +Theophrastus at Athens.[23] I believe this to be perfectly true; and +it is farther confirmed by the fact that the institution at Alexandria +comprised the same constituent parts and arrangements, described by +the same titles, as those which are applied to the Aristotelian and +Platonic schools at Athens.[24] Though the terms library, museum, and +lecture-room, have now become familiar, both terms and meaning were at +that time alike novel. Nowhere, as far as we know, did there exist a +known and fixed domicile, consecrated in perpetuity to these purposes, +and to literary men who took interest therein. A special stimulus was +needed to suggest and enforce the project on Ptolemy Soter. That +stimulus was supplied by the Aristotelian school at Athens, which the +Alexandrine institution was intended to copy: [Greek: Mousei=on] (with +[Greek: e)xe/dra] and [Greek: peri/patos], a covered portico with +recesses and seats, and a walk adjacent), on a far larger scale and +with more extensive attributions.[25] We must not however imagine that +when this new museum was first begun, the founders entertained any +idea of the vast magnitude to which it ultimately attained. + +[Footnote 23: Strabo, xiii. 608. [Greek: o( gou=n A)ristote/lês tê\n +e(autou= (bibliothê/kên) Theophra/stô| pare/dôken, ô(=|per kai\ tê\n +scholê\n a)pe/lipe; _prô=tos_, ô(=n i)/smen, _sunagagô\n bi/blia_, +kai\ _dida/xas tou\s e)n Ai)gu/ptô| basile/as bibliothê/kês +su/ntaxin_.]] + +[Footnote 24: Strabo (xvii. 793-794) describes the Museum at +Alexandria in the following terms--[Greek: tô=n de\ basilei/ôn me/ros +e)sti\ kai\ _to\ Mousei=on, e)/chon peri/paton kai\ e)xe/dran_, kai\ +oi)=kon me/gan e)n ô(=| to\ sussi/tion tô=n metecho/ntôn tou= +Mousei/ou philolo/gôn a)ndrô=n], &c. Vitruvius, v. 11. + +If we compare this with the language in Diogenes Laertius respecting +the Academic and Peripatetic school residences at Athens, we shall +find the same phrases employed--[Greek: mousei=on, e)xe/dra], &c. (D. +L. iv. 19, v. 51-54). Respecting Speusippus, Diogenes tells us (iv, +1)--[Greek: Chari/tôn t' a)ga/lmat' a)ne/thêken e)n tô=| mousei/ô| +tô=| u(po\ Pla/tônos e)n A)kadêmi/a| i)druthe/nti.]] + +[Footnote 25: We see from hence what there was peculiar in the +Platonic and Aristotelian literary establishments. They included +something consecrated, permanent, and intended more or less for public +use. The collection of books was not like a private library, destined +only for the proprietor and such friends as he might allow--nor was it +like that of a bookseller, intended for sale and profit. I make this +remark in regard to the Excursus of Bekker, in his Charikles, i. 206, +216, a very interesting note on the book-trade and libraries of +ancient Athens. Bekker disputes the accuracy of Strabo's statement +that Aristotle was the first person at Athens who collected a library, +and who taught the kings of Egypt to do the like. In the literal sense +of the words Bekker is right. Other persons before Aristotle had +collected books (though I think Bekker makes more of the passages +which he cites than they strictly deserve); one example is the +youthful Euthydemus in Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2; and Bekker alludes +justly to the remarkable passage in the Anabasis of Xenophon, about +books exported to the Hellenic cities in the Euxine (Anabas. vii. 5, +14). There clearly existed in Athens regular professional booksellers; +we see that the bookseller read aloud to his visitors a part of the +books which he had to sell, in order to tempt them to buy, a feeble +foreshadowing of the advertisements and reviews of the present day +(Diogen. L. vii. 2). But there existed as yet nothing of the nature of +the Platonic and Aristotelian [Greek: mousei=on], whereof the +collection of books, varied, permanent, and intended for the use of +inmates and special visitors, was one important fraction. In this +sense it served as a model for Demetrius Phalereus and Ptolemy Soter +in regard to Alexandria. + +Vitruvius (v. 11) describes the _exhedræ_ as seats placed under a +covered portico--"in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui +studiis delectantur, sedentes disputare possint".] + +[Side-note: Favour of Ptolemy Soter towards the philosophers at +Athens.] + +Ptolemy Soter was himself an author,[26] and himself knew and +respected Aristotle, not only as a philosopher but also as the +preceptor of his friend and commander Alexander. To Theophrastus also, +the philosophical successor of Aristotle, Ptolemy showed peculiar +honour; inviting him by special message to come and establish himself +at Alexandria, which invitation however Theophrastus declined.[27] +Moreover Ptolemy appointed Straton (afterwards Scholarch in succession +to Theophrastus) preceptor to his youthful son Ptolemy Philadelphus, +from whom Straton subsequently received a large present of money:[28] +he welcomed at Alexandria the Megaric philosophers, Diodorus Kronus, +and Stilpon, and found pleasure in their conversation; he not only +befriended, but often confidentially consulted, the Kyrenaic +philosopher Theodôrus.[29] Kolôtes, the friend of Epikurus, dedicated +a work to Ptolemy Soter. Menander, the eminent comic writer, also +received an invitation from him to Egypt.[30] + +[Footnote 26: Respecting Ptolemy as an author, and the fragments of +his work on the exploits of Alexander, see R. Geier, Alexandri M. +Histor. Scriptores, p. 4-26.] + +[Footnote 27: Diog. L. v. 37. Probably this invitation was sent about +306 B.C., during the year in which Theophrastus was in banishment from +Athens, in consequence of the restrictive law proposed by Sophokles +against the schools of the philosophers, which law was repealed in the +ensuing year.] + +[Footnote 28: Diog. L. v. 58. Straton became Scholarch at the death of +Theophrastus in 287 B.C. He must have been preceptor to Ptolemy +Philadelphus before this time, during the youth of the latter; for he +could not have been at the same time Scholarch at Athens, and +preceptor of the king at Alexandria.] + +[Footnote 29: Diog. L. ii. 102, 111, 115. Plutarch adv. Kolôten, p. +1107. The Ptolemy here mentioned by Plutarch may indeed be +Philadelphus.] + +[Footnote 30: Meineke, Menand. et Philem. Reliq. Præf. p. xxxii.] + +[Side-note: Demetrius Phalereus--his history and character.] + +These favourable dispositions, on the part of the first Ptolemy, +towards philosophy and the philosophers at Athens, Demetrius appear to +have been mainly instigated and guided by the Phalerean Demetrius: an +Athenian citizen of good station, who enjoyed for ten years at Athens +(while that city was subject to Kassander) full political ascendancy, +but who was expelled about 307 B.C., by the increased force of the +popular party, seconded by the successful invasion of Demetrius +Poliorkêtês. By these political events Demetrius Phalereus was driven +into exile: a portion of which exile was spent at Thebes, but a much +larger portion of it at Alexandria, where he acquired the full +confidence of Ptolemy Soter, and retained it until the death of that +prince in 285 B.C. While active in politics, and possessing rhetorical +talent, elegant without being forcible--Demetrius Phalereus was yet +more active in literature and philosophy. He employed his influence, +during the time of his political power, to befriend and protect both +Xenokrates the chief of the Platonic school, and Theophrastus the +chief of the Aristotelian. In his literary and philosophical views he +followed Theophrastus and the Peripatetic sect, and was himself among +their most voluminous writers. The latter portion of his life was +spent at Alexandria, in the service of Ptolemy Soter; after whose +death, however, he soon incurred the displeasure of Ptolemy +Philadelphus, and died, intentionally or accidentally, from the bite +of an asp.[31] + +[Footnote 31: Diog. L. iv. 14, v. 39, 75, 80; Strabo, ix. 398; Plut., +De Exil. p. 601; Apophth. p. 189; Cic., De Fin. v. 19; Pro Rab. 30. + +Diogenes says about Demetrius Phalereus, (v. 80) [Greek: Plê/thei de\ +bibli/ôn kai\ a)rithmô=| sti/chôn, schedo\n a(/pantas parelê/lake +tou=s kat' au)to\n Peripatêtikou/s, eu)pai/deutos ô)\n kai\ +polu/peiros par' o(ntinou=n.]] + +[Side-note: He was chief agent in the first establishment of the +Alexandrine Library.] + +The Alexandrine Museum or library first acquired celebrity under the +reign of Ptolemy (II.) Philadelphus, by whom moreover it was greatly +enlarged and its treasures multiplied. Hence that prince is sometimes +entitled the founder. But there can be no doubt that its first +initiation and establishment is due to Ptolemy (I.) Soter.[32] +Demetrius Phalereus was his adviser and auxiliary, the link of +connection between him and the literary or philosophical world of +Greece. We read that Julius Cæsar, when he conceived the scheme (which +he did not live to execute) of establishing a large public library at +Rome, fixed upon the learned Varro to regulate the selection and +arrangement of the books.[33] None but an eminent literary man could +carry such an enterprise into effect, even at Rome, when there existed +the precedent of the Alexandrine library: much more when Ptolemy +commenced his operations at Alexandria, and when there were only the +two [Greek: Mousei=a] at Athens to serve as precedents. Demetrius, who +combined an organising head and political experience, with an +erudition not inferior to Varro, regard being had to the stock of +learning accessible--was eminently qualified for the task. It procured +for him great importance with Ptolemy, and compensated him for that +loss of political ascendancy at Athens, which unfavourable fortune had +brought about. + +[Footnote 32: Mr. Clinton says, Fast. Hell. App. 5, p. 380, 381: +"Athenæus distinctly ascribes the institution of the [Greek: +Mousei=on] to Philadelphus in v. 203, where he is describing the acts +of Philadelphus." This is a mistake: the passage in Athenæus does not +specify which of the two first Ptolemies was the founder: it is +perfectly consistent with the supposition that Ptolemy Soter founded +it. The same may be said about the passage cited by Mr. Clinton from +Plutarch; that too does not determine between the two Ptolemies, which +was the founder. Perizonius was in error (as Mr. Clinton points out) +in affirming that the passage in Plutarch determined the foundation to +the first Ptolemy: Mr. Clinton is in error by affirming that the +passage in Athenæus determines it to the second. Mr. Clinton has also +been misled by Vitruvius and Scaliger (p. 389), when he affirms that +the library at Alexandria was not formed until after the library at +Pergamus. Bernhardy (Grundriss der Griech. Litt., Part i. p. 359, 367, +369) has followed Mr. Clinton too implicitly in recognising +Philadelphus as the founder: nevertheless he too admits (p. 366) that +the foundations were laid by Ptolemy Soter, under the advice and +assistance of Demetrius Phalereus. + +The earliest declared king of the Attalid family at Pergamus acquired +the throne in 241 B.C. The library at Pergamus could hardly have been +commenced before his time: and it is his successor, Eumenes II. (whose +reign began in 197 B.C.), who is mentioned as the great collector and +adorner of the library at Pergamus. See Strabo, xiii. 624; Clinton, +Fast. Hellen. App. 6, p. 401-403. It is plain that the library at +Pergamus could hardly have been begun before the close of the reign of +Ptolemy Philadelphus in Egypt, by which time the library of Alexandria +had already acquired great extension and renown.] + +[Footnote 33: Sueton. Jul. Cæs. c. 44. Melissus, one of the Illustres +Grammatici of Rome, undertook by order of Augustus, "curam +ordinandarum bibliothecarum in Octaviæ porticu". (Sueton. De Illustr. +Grammat. c. 21.) + +Cicero replies in the following terms to his brother Quintus, who had +written to him, requesting advice and aid in getting together for his +own use a collection of Greek and Latin books. "De bibliothecâ tuâ +Græcâ supplendâ, libris commutandis, Latinis comparandis--valdé velim +ista confici, præsertim cum ad meum quoque usum spectent. Sed ego, +mihi ipsi ista per quem agam, non habeo. _Neque enim venalia sunt, quæ +quidem placeant: et confici nisi per hominem et peritum et diligentem +non possunt._ Chrysippo tamen imperabo, et cum Tyrannione loquar." +(Cic., Epist. ad Q. Fratr. iii. 4, 5.) + +Now the circulation of books was greatly increased, and the book trade +far more developed, at Rome when this letter was written (about three +centuries after Plato's decease) than it was at Athens during the +time of Demetrius Phalereus (320-300 B.C.). Yet we see the difficulty +which the two brothers Cicero had in collecting a mere private library +for use of the owner simply. _Good books, in a correct and +satisfactory condition, were not to be had for money_: it was +necessary to get access to the best MSS., and to have special copies +made, neatly and correctly: and this could not be done, except under +the superintendence of a laborious literary man like Tyrannion, by +well taught slaves subordinate to him. + +We may understand, from this analogy, the far greater obstacles which +the collectors of the Alexandrine museum and library must have had to +overcome, when _they_ began their work. No one could do it, except a +practised literary man such as Demetrius Phalereus: nor even he, +except by finding out the best MSS., and causing special copies to be +made for the use of the library. Respecting the extent and facility of +book-diffusion in the Roman world, information will be found in the +late Sir George Cornewall Lewis's _Enquiry into the Credibility of +Early Roman History_, vol. i. p. 196, seqq.; also, in the fifth +chapter of the work of Adolf Schmidt, _Geschichte der Denk-und +Glaubens-Freiheit im ersten Jahrhunderte der Kaiser-herrschaft_, +Berlin, 1847; lastly in a valuable review of Adolf Schmidt's work by +Sir George Lewis himself, in Fraser's Magazine for April, 1862, pp. +432-439. Adolf Schmidt represents the multiplication and cheapness of +books in that day as something hardly inferior to what it is +now--citing many authorities for this opinion. Sir G. Lewis has shown, +in my judgment most satisfactorily, that these authorities are +insufficient, and that the opinion is incorrect: this might have been +shown even more fully, if the review had been lengthened. I perfectly +agree with Sir G. Lewis on the main question: yet I think he narrows +the case on his own side too much, and that the number of copies of +such authors as Virgil and Horace, in circulation at one time, cannot +have been so small as he imagines.] + +[Side-note: Proceedings of Demetrius in beginning to collect the +library.] + +We learn that the ardour of Demetrius Phalereus was unremitting, and +that his researches were extended everywhere, to obtain for the new +museum literary monuments from all countries within contemporary +knowledge.[34] This is highly probable: such universality of literary +interest was adapted to the mixed and cosmopolitan character of the +Alexandrine population. But Demetrius was a Greek, born about the time +of Plato's death (347 B.C.), and identified with the political, +rhetorical, dramatic, literary, and philosophical, activity of Athens, +in which he had himself taken a prominent part. To collect the +memorials of Greek literature would be his first object, more +especially such as Aristotle and Theophrastus possessed in their +libraries. Without doubt he would procure the works of Homer and the +other distinguished poets, epic, lyric, and dramatic, as well as the +rhetors, orators, &c. He probably would not leave out the works of the +_viri Sokratici_ (Antisthenes, Aristippus, Æschines, &c.) and the +other philosophers (Demokritus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, &c.). But +there are two authors, whose compositions he would most certainly take +pains to obtain--Plato and Aristotle. These were the two commanding +names of Grecian philosophy in that day: the founders of the two +schools existing in Athens, upon the model of which the Alexandrine +Museum was to be constituted. + +[Footnote 34: Josephus, Antiquit. xii. 2, 1. [Greek: Dêmê/trios o( +Phalêreu/s, o(\s ê)=n e)pi\ tô=n bibliothêkô=n tou= basile/ôs, +spouda/zôn ei) dunato\n ei)/ê pa/nta ta\ kata\ tê\n oi)koume/nên +suna/gein bi/blia, kai\ sunônou/menos ei)/ ti/ pou mo/non a)kou/seie +spoudê=s a)/xion ê)\ ê(du/, tê=| tou= basile/ôs proaire/sei (ma/lista +ga\r peri\ tê\n sullogê\n tô=n bibli/ôn ei)=che philoka/lôs) +sunêgôni/zeto]. + +What Josephus affirms here, I apprehend to be perfectly true; though +he goes on to state much that is fabulous and apocryphal, respecting +the incidents which preceded and accompanied the translation of the +Hebrew Scriptures. Josephus is also mistaken in connecting Demetrius +Phalereus with Ptolemy Philadelphus. Demetrius Phalereus was +disgraced, and died shortly after that prince's accession. His time of +influence was under Ptolemy Soter. + +Respecting the part taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the first getting +up of the Alexandrine Museum, see Valckenaer, Dissertat. De Aristobulo +Judaico, p. 52-57; Ritschl, Die Alexandrin. Biblioth. p. 17, 18; +Parthey, Das Alexandrinische Museum, p. 70, 71 seq.] + +[Side-note: Certainty that the works of Plato and Aristotle were among +the earliest acquisitions made by him for the library.] + +Among all the books which would pass over to Alexandria as the +earliest stock of the new library, I know nothing upon which we can +reckon more certainly than upon the works of Plato.[35] For they were +acquisitions not only desirable, but also easily accessible. The +writings of Aristippus or Demokritus--of Lysias or Isokrates--might +require to be procured (or good MSS. thereof, fit to be specially +copied) at different places and from different persons, without any +security that the collection, when purchased, would be either complete +or altogether genuine. But the manuscripts of Plato and of Aristotle +were preserved in their respective schools at Athens, the Academic and +Peripatetic:[36] a collection complete as well as verifiable. +Demetrius could obtain permission, from Theophrastus in the +Peripatetic school, from Polemon or Krantor in the Academic school, to +have these MSS. copied for him by careful and expert hands. The cost +of such copying must doubtless have been considerable; amounting to a +sum which few private individuals would have been either able or +willing to disburse. But the treasures of Ptolemy were amply +sufficient for the purpose:[37] and when he once conceived the project +of founding a museum in his new capital, a large outlay, incurred for +transcribing from the best MSS. a complete and authentic collection of +the works of illustrious authors, was not likely to deter him. We know +from other anecdotes,[38] what vast sums the third Ptolemy spent, for +the mere purpose of securing better and more authoritative MSS. of +works which the Alexandrine library already possessed. + +[Footnote 35: Stahr, in the second part of his work "Aristotelia," +combats and refutes with much pains the erroneous supposition, that +there was no sufficient publication of the works of Aristotle, until +after the time when Apellikon purchased the MSS. from the heirs of +Neleus--_i.e._ B.C. 100. Stahr shows evidence to prove, that the +works, at least many of the works, of Aristotle were known and studied +before the year 100 B.C.: that they were in the library at Alexandria, +and that they were procured for that library by Demetrius Phalereus. +Stahr says (Thl. ii. p. 59): "Is it indeed credible--is it even +conceivable--that Demetrius, who recommended especially to his regal +friend Ptolemy the study of the political works of the +philosophers--that Demetrius, the friend both of the Aristotelian +philosophy and of Theophrastus, should have left the works of the two +greatest Peripatetic philosophers out of his consideration? May we not +rather be sure that he would take care to secure their works, before all +others, for his nascent library--if indeed he did not bring them with +him when he came to Alexandria?" The question here put by Stahr (and +farther insisted on by Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique +d'Aristote, Introd. p. 14) is very pertinent: and I put the like +question, with slight change of circumstances, respecting the works of +Plato. Demetrius Phalereus was the friend and patron of Xenokrates, as +well as of Theophrastus.] + +[Footnote 36: In respect to the Peripatetic school, this is true only +during the lifetime of Theophrastus, who died 287 B.C. I have already +mentioned that after the death of Theophrastus, the MSS. were +withdrawn from Athens. But all the operations of Demetrius Phalereus +were carried on during the lifetime of Theophrastus; much of them, +probably, in concert with Theophrastus, whose friend and pupil he was. +The death of Theophrastus, the death of Ptolemy Soter, and the +discredit and subsequent death of Demetrius are separated only by an +interval of two or three years.] + +[Footnote 37: We find interesting information, in the letters of +Cicero, respecting the _librarii_ or copyists whom he had in his +service; and the still more numerous and effective band of _librarii_ +and _anagnostæ_: (slaves, mostly home-born) whom his friend Atticus +possessed and trained (Corn. Nep., Vit. Attici, c. 13). See Epist. ad +Attic. xii. 6; xiii. 21-44; v. 12 seq. + +It appears that many of the compositions of Cicero were copied, +prepared for publication, and published, by the _librarii_ of Atticus: +who, in the case of the _Academica_, incurred a loss, because +Cicero--after having given out the work to be copied and published, and +after progress had been made in doing this--thought fit to alter +materially both the form and the speakers introduced (xiii. 13). In +regard to the Oration pro Ligario, Atticus sold it well, and brought +himself home ("Ligarianam præclaré vendidisti: posthac, quicquid +scripsero, tibi præconium deferam," xiii. 12). Cicero (xiii. 21) +compares the relation of Atticus towards himself, with that of +Hermodôrus towards Plato, as expressed in the Greek verse, +[Greek: lo/goisin E(rmo/dôros [e)mporeu/etai]]. (Suidas, s, v. +[Greek: lo/goisin E(rm. e)mp].) + +Private friends, such as Balbus and Cærellia (xiii. 21), considered it +a privilege to be allowed to take copies of his compositions at their +own cost, through _librarii_ employed for the purpose. And we find +Galen enumerating this among the noble and dignified ways for an +opulent man to expend money, in a remarkable passage, [Greek: ble/pô +ga\r se ou)de\ pro\s ta\ kala\ tô=n e)/rgôn dapanê=sai tolmô=nta, mêd' +ei)s bibli/ôn ô)nê\n kai\ kataskeuê\n kai\ tô=n grapho/ntôn a)/skêsin, +ê)/toi ge ei)s ta/chos dia\ sêmei/ôn, ê)\ ei)s kalô=n a)kri/beian, +ô(/sper ou)de\ tô=n a)naginôsko/ntôn o)rthô=s]. (De Cognoscendis +Curandisque Animi Morbis, t. v. p. 48, Kühn.)] + +[Footnote 38: Galen, Comm. ad Hippokrat. [Greek: E)pidêmi/as], vol. +xvii. p. 606, 607, ed. Kühn. + +Lykurgus, the contemporary of Demosthenes as an orator, conspicuous +for many years in the civil and financial administration of Athens, +caused a law to be passed, enacting that an official MS. should be +made of the plays of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides. No permission +was granted to represent any of these dramas at the Dionysiac +festival, except upon condition that the applicant and the actors whom +he employed, should compare the MS. on which they intended to proceed, +with the official MS. in the hands of the authorised secretary. The +purpose was to prevent arbitrary amendments or omissions in these +plays, at the pleasure of [Greek: u(pokri/tai]. + +Ptolemy Euergetes borrowed from the Athenians these public and +official MSS. of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides on the plea that +he wished to have exact copies of them taken at Alexandria, and under +engagement to restore them as soon as this was done. He deposited with +them the prodigious sum of fifteen talents, as a guarantee for the +faithful restitution. When he got the MSS. at Alexandria, he caused +copies of them to be taken on the finest paper. He then sent these +copies to Athens, keeping the originals for the Alexandrine library; +desiring the Athenians to retain the deposit of fifteen talents for +themselves. Ptolemy Euergetes here pays, not merely the cost of the +finest copying, but fifteen talents besides, for the possession of +official MSS. of the three great Athenian tragedians; whose works in +other manuscripts must have been in the library long before. + +Respecting these official MSS. of the three great tragedians, prepared +during the administration and under the auspices of the rhetor +Lykurgus, see Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator, p. 841, also Boeckh, Græcæ +Tragoed. Principia, pp. 13-15. The time when Lykurgus caused this to +be done, must have been nearly coincident with the decease of Plato, +347 B.C. See Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. i. p. 468, +ii. p. 244; Welcker, Griech. Trag. iii. p. 908; Korn, De Publico +Æschyli, &c., Exemplari, Lykurgo Auctore Confecto, p. 6-9, Bonn, 1863. + +In the passage cited above from Galen, we are farther informed, that +Ptolemy Euergetes caused inquiries to be made, from the masters of all +vessels which came to Alexandria, whether there were any MSS. on +board; if there were, the MSS. were brought to the library, carefully +copied out, and the copies given to the owners; the original MSS. +being retained in the library, and registered in a +separate compartment, under the general head of [Greek: Ta\ e)k +ploi/ôn], and with the name of the person from whom the acquisition +had been made, annexed. Compare Wolf, Prolegg. ad Homerum, p. clxxv. +These statements tend to show the care taken by the Alexandrine +librarians, not only to acquire the best MSS., but also to keep good +MSS. apart from bad, and to record the person and the quarter from +which each acquisition had been made.] + +[Side-note: Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring +good MSS.] + +We cannot doubt that Demetrius could obtain permission, if he asked +it, from the Scholarchs, to have such copies made. To them the +operation was at once complimentary and lucrative; while among the +Athenian philosophers generally, the name of Demetrius was acceptable, +from the favour which he had shown to them during his season of +political power--and that of Ptolemy popular from his liberalities. Or +if we even suppose that Demetrius, instead of obtaining copies of the +Platonic MSS. from the school, purchased copies from private persons +or book-sellers (as he must have purchased the works of Demokritus and +others)--he could, at any rate, assure himself of the authenticity of +what he purchased, by information from the Scholarch. + +[Side-note: Catalogue of Platonic works, prepared by Aristophanes, is +trustworthy.] + +My purpose, in thus calling attention to the Platonic school and the +Alexandrine Museum, is to show that the chance for preservation of +Plato's works complete and genuine after his decease, was unusually +favourable. I think that they existed complete and genuine in the +Alexandrine Museum before the time of Kallimachus, and, of course, +during that of Aristophanes. If there were in the Museum any other +works obtained from private vendors and professing to be Platonic, +Kallimachus and Aristophanes had the means of distinguishing these +from such as the Platonic school had furnished and could authenticate, +and motive enough for keeping them apart from the certified Platonic +catalogue. Whether there existed any spurious works of this sort in +the Museum, Diogenes Laertius does not tell us; nor, unfortunately, +does he set forth the full list of those which Aristophanes, +recognising as Platonic, distributed either in triplets or in units. +Diogenes mentions only the principle of distribution adopted, and a +select portion of the compositions distributed. But as far as his +positive information goes, I hold it to be perfectly worthy of trust. +I consider that all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes as +works of Plato are unquestionably such; and that his testimony greatly +strengthens our assurance for the received catalogue, in many of those +items which have been most contested by critics, upon supposed +internal grounds. Aristophanes authenticates, among others, not merely +the Leges, but also the Epinomis, the Minos, and the Epistolæ. + +[Side-note: No canonical or exclusive order of the Platonic dialogues, +when arranged by Aristophanes.] + +There is another point also which I conceive to be proved by what we +hear about Aristophanes. He (or Kallimachus before him) introduced a +new order or distribution of his own--the Trilogies--founded on the +analogy of the dramatic Didaskalies. This shows that the Platonic +dialogues were not received into the library in any canonical or +_exclusive order_ of their own, or in any interdependence as first, +second, third, &c., essential to render them intelligible as a system. +Had there been any such order, Kallimachus and Aristophanes would no +more have altered it, than they would have transposed the order of the +books in the Republic and Leges. The importance of what is here +observed will appear presently, when we touch upon the theory of +Schleiermacher. + +[Side-note: Other libraries and literary centres, besides Alexandria, +in which spurious Platonic works might get footing.] + +The distributive arrangement, proposed or sanctioned by Aristophanes, +applied (as I have already remarked) to the materials in the +Alexandrine library only. But this library, though it was the most +conspicuous portion, was not the whole, of the Grecian literary +aggregate. There were other great regal libraries (such as those of +the kings of Pergamus and the Seleukid kings[39]) commenced after the +Alexandrine library had already attained importance, and intended to +rival it: there was also an active literary and philosophising class, +in various Grecian cities, of which Athens was the foremost, but in +which Rhodes, Kyrênê, and several cities in Asia Minor, Kilikia, and +Syria, were included: ultimately the cultivated classes at Rome, and +the Western Hellenic city of Massalia, became comprised in the number. +Among this widespread literary public, there were persons who neither +knew nor examined the Platonic school or the Alexandrine library, nor +investigated what title either of them had to furnish a certificate +authenticating the genuine works of Plato. It is not certain that even +the great library at Pergamus, begun nearly half a century after that +of Alexandria, had any such initiatory agent as Demetrius Phalereus, +able as well as willing to go to the fountain-head of Platonism at +Athens: nor could the kings of Pergamus claim aid from Alexandria, +with which they were in hostile rivalry, and from which they were even +forbidden (so we hear) to purchase papyrus. Under these circumstances, +it is quite possible that spurious Platonic writings, though they +obtained no recognition in the Alexandrine library, might obtain more +or less recognition elsewhere, and pass under the name of Plato. To a +certain extent, such was the case. There existed some spurious +dialogues at the time when Thrasyllus afterwards formed his +arrangement. + +[Footnote 39: The library of Antiochus the Great or of his +predecessor, is mentioned by Suidas, [Greek: Eu)phori/ôn]. Euphorion +was librarian of it, seemingly about 230-220 B.C. See Clinton, Fast. +Hell. B.C. 221. + +Galen states (Comm. in Hippok. De Nat. Hom. vol. xv. p. 105, Kühn) +that the forgeries of books, and the practice of tendering books for +sale under the false names of celebrated authors, did not commence +until the time when the competition between the kings of Egypt and the +kings of Pergamus for their respective libraries became vehement. If +this be admitted, there could have been no forgeries tendered at +Alexandria until after the commencement of the reign of Euergetes +(B.C. 247-222): for the competition from Pergamus could hardly have +commenced earlier than 230 B.C. In the times of Soter and +Philadelphus, there would be no such forgeries tendered. I do not +doubt that such forgeries were sometimes successfully passed off:** but +I think Galen does not take sufficient account of the practice +(mentioned by himself) at the Alexandrine library, to keep faithful +record of the person and quarter from whence each book had been +acquired.] + +[Side-note: Other critics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different +arrangements of the Platonic dialogues.] + +Moreover the distribution made by Aristophanes of the Platonic +dialogues into Trilogies, and the order of priority which he +established among them was by no means universally accepted. Some +rejected altogether the dramatic analogy of Trilogies as a principle +of distribution. They arranged the dialogues into three classes:[40] +1. The Direct, or purely dramatic. 2. The Indirect, or narrative +(diegematic). 3. The Mixed--partly one, partly the other. Respecting +the order of priority, we read that while Aristophanes placed the +Republic first, there were eight other arrangements, each recognising +a different dialogue as first in order; these eight were, Alkibiades +I., Theagês, Euthyphron, Kleitophon, Timæus, Phædrus, Theætêtus, +Apology. More than one arrangement began with the Apology. Some even +selected the Epistolæ as the proper commencement for studying Plato's +works.[41] + +[Footnote 40: Diog. L. iii. 49. Schöne, in his commentary on the +Protagoras (pp. 8-12), lays particular stress on this division into +the direct or dramatic, and indirect or diegematic. He thinks it +probable, that Plato preferred one method to the other at different +periods of life: that all of one sort, and all of the other sort, come +near together in time.] + +[Footnote 41: Diog. L. iii. 62. Albinus, [Greek: Ei)sagôgê\], c. 4, in +K. F. Hermann's Appendix Platonica, p. 149.] + +[Side-note: Panætius, the Stoic--considered the Phædon to be +spurious--earliest known example of a Platonic dialogue disallowed upon +internal grounds.] + +We hear with surprise that the distinguished Stoic philosopher at +Athens, Panætius, rejected the Phædon as not being the work of +Plato.[42] It appears that he did not believe in the immortality of +the soul, and that he profoundly admired Plato; accordingly, he +thought it unworthy of so great a philosopher to waste so much logical +subtlety, poetical metaphor, and fable, in support of such a +conclusion. Probably he was also guided, in part, by one singularity +in the Phædon: it is the only dialogue wherein Plato mentions himself +in the third person.[43] If Panætius was predisposed, on other +grounds, to consider the dialogue as unworthy of Plato, he might be +induced to lay stress upon such a singularity, as showing that the +author of the dialogue must be some person other than Plato. Panætius +evidently took no pains to examine the external attestations of the +dialogue, which he would have found to be attested both by Aristotle +and by Kallimachus as the work of Plato. Moreover, whatever any one +may think of the cogency of the reasoning--the beauty of Platonic +handling and expression is manifest throughout the dialogue. This +verdict of Panætius is the earliest example handed down to us of a +Platonic dialogue disallowed on internal grounds that is, because it +appeared to the critic unworthy of Plato: and it is certainly among +the most unfortunate examples. + +[Footnote 42: See the Epigram out of the Anthology, and the extract +from the Scholia on the Categories of Aristotle, cited by Wyttenbach +in his note on the beginning of the Phædon. A more important passage +(which he has not cited) from the Scholia on Aristotle, is, that of +Asklepius on the Metaphysica, p. 991; Scholia, ed. Brandis, p. 576, a. +38. [Greek: O(/ti tou= Pla/tônos e)stin o( Phai/dôn, saphô=s o( +A)ristote/lês dêloi=--Panai/tios ga\r tis e)to/lmêse notheu=sai to\n +dia/logon. e)peidê\ ga\r e)/legen ei)=nai thnêtê\n tê\n psuchê/n, +e)bou/leto sugkataspa/sai to\n Pla/tôna; e)pei\ ou)=n e)n tô=| +Phai/dôni saphô=s a)pathanati/zei] (Plato) [Greek: tê\n logikê\n +psuchê/n, tou/tou cha/rin e)no/theuse to\n dia/logon]. Wyttenbach +vainly endeavours to elude the force of the passages cited by himself, +and to make out that the witnesses did not mean to assert that +Panætius had declared the Phædon to be spurious. One of the reasons +urged by Wyttenbach is--"Nec illud negligendum, quod dicitur [Greek: +u(po\ Panaiti/ou tino\s], à _Panætio quodam_ neque per contemptum dici +potuisse neque a Syriano neque ab hoc anonymo; quorum neuter eâ fuit +doctrinæ inopia, ut Panætii laudes et præstantiam ignoraret." But in +the Scholion of Asklepius on the Metaphysica (which passage was not +before Wyttenbach), we find the very same expression [Greek: +Panai/tio/s tis], and plainly used _per contemptum_: for Asklepius +probably considered it a manifestation of virtuous feeling to +describe, in contemptuous language, a philosopher who did not believe +in the immortality of the soul. We have only to read the still harsher +and more contemptuous language which he employs towards the +Manicheans, in another Scholion, p. 666, b. 5, Brandis. + +Favorinus said (Diog. iii. 37) that when Plato read aloud the Phædon, +Aristotle was the only person present who remained to the end: all the +other hearers went away in the middle. I have no faith in this +anecdote: I consider it, like so many others in Diogenes, as a myth: +but the invention of it indicates, that there were many persons who +had no sympathy with the Phædon, taking at the bottom the same view as +Panætius.] + +[Footnote 43: Plato, Phædon, p. 59. Plato is named also in the +Apology: but this is a report, more or less exact, of the real defence +of Sokrates.] + +[Side-note: Classification of Platonic works by the rhetor +Thrasyllus--dramatic--philosophical.] + +But the most elaborate classification of the Platonic works was that +made by Thrasyllus, in the days of Augustus or Tiberius, near to, or +shortly after, the Christian era: a rhetor of much reputation, +consulted and selected as travelling companion by the Emperor +Augustus.[44] + +[Footnote 44: Diog. L. iii. 56; Themistius, Orat. viii. ([Greek: +Pentetêriko\s]) p. 108 B. + +It appears that this classification by Thrasyllus was approved, or +jointly constructed, by his contemporary Derkyllides. (Albinus, +[Greek: Ei)sagôgê\], c. 4, p. 149, in K. F. Hermann's Appendix +Platonica.)] + +Thrasyllus adopted two different distributions of the Platonic works: +one was dramatic, the other philosophical. The two were founded on +perfectly distinct principles, and had no inherent connection with +each other; but Thrasyllus combined them together, and noted, in +regard to each dialogue, its place in the one classification as well +as in the other. + +[Side-note: Dramatic principle--Tetralogies.] + +One of these distributions was into Tetralogies, or groups of four +each. This was in substitution for the Trilogies introduced by +Aristophanes or by Kallimachus, and was founded upon the same +dramatic analogy: the dramas, which contended for the prize at the +Dionysiac festivals, having been sometimes exhibited in batches of +three, or Trilogies, sometimes in batches of four, or +Tetralogies--three tragedies, along with a satirical piece as +accompaniment. Because the dramatic writer brought forth four pieces at +a birth, it was assumed as likely that Plato would publish four dialogues +all at once. Without departing from this dramatic analogy, which seems to +have been consecrated by the authority of the Alexandrine Grammatici, +Thrasyllus gained two advantages. First, he included ALL the Platonic +compositions, whereas Aristophanes, in his Trilogies, had included +only a part, and had left the rest not grouped. Thrasyllus included +all the Platonic compositions, thirty-six in number, reckoning the +Republic, the Leges, and the Epistolæ in bulk, each as one--in nine +Tetralogies or groups of four each. Secondly, he constituted his first +tetralogy in an impressive and appropriate manner--Euthyphron, +Apology, Kriton, Phædon--four compositions really resembling a +dramatic tetralogy, and bound together by their common bearing, on the +last scenes of the life of a philosopher.[45] In Euthyphron, Sokrates +appears as having been just indicted and as thinking on his defence; +in the Apology, he makes his defence; in the Kriton, he appears as +sentenced by the legal tribunal, yet refusing to evade the sentence by +escaping from his prison; in the Phædon, we have the last dying scene +and conversation. None of the other tetralogies present an equal bond +of connection between their constituent items; but the first tetralogy +was probably intended to recommend the rest, and to justify the +system. + +[Footnote 45: Diog. L. iii. 57. [Greek: prô/tên me\n ou)=n +tetralogi/an ti/thêsi tê\n koinê\n u(po/thesin e)/chousan; paradei=xai +ga\r bou/letai o(/poiois a)\n ei)/ê o( tou= philoso/phou bi/os]. +Albinus, Introduct. ad Plat. c. 4, p. 149, in K. F. Hermann's Append. +Platon. + +Thrasyllus appears to have considered the Republic as ten dialogues +and the Leges as twelve, each book (of Republic and of Leges) +constituting a separate dialogue, so that he made the Platonic works +fifty-six in all. But for the purpose of his tetralogies he reckoned +them only as thirty-six--nine groups. + +The author of the Prolegomena [Greek: tê=s Pla/tônos Philosophi/as] in +Hermann's Append. Platon. pp. 218-219, gives the same account of the +tetralogies, and of the connecting bond which united the four** members +of the first tetralogical group: but he condemns altogether the +principle of the tetralogical division. He does not mention the name +of Thrasyllus. He lived after Proklus (p. 218), that is, after 480 +A.D. + +The argument urged by Wyttenbach and others--that Varro must have +considered the Phædon as _fourth_ in the order of the Platonic +compositions--an argument founded on a passage in Varro. L. L. vii. +37, which refers to the Phædon under the words _Plato in quarto_--this +argument becomes inapplicable in the text as given by O. Müller--not +_Varro in quarto_ but _Varro in quattuor fluminibus_, &c. Mullach +(Democriti Frag. p. 98) has tried unsuccessfully to impugn Müller's +text, and to uphold the word _quarto_ with the inference resting upon +it.] + +[Side-note: Philosophical principle--Dialogues of Search--Dialogues of +Exposition.] + +In the other distribution made by Thrasyllus,[46] Plato was regarded +not as a quasi-dramatist, but as a philosopher. The dialogues were +classified with reference partly to their method and spirit, partly to +their subject. His highest generic distinction was into:--1. Dialogues +of Investigation or Search. 2. Dialogues of Exposition or +Construction. The Dialogues of Investigation he subdivided into two +classes:--1. Gymnastic. 2. Agonistic. These were again subdivided, +each into two sub-classes; the Gymnastic, into 1. Obstetric. 2. +Peirastic. The Agonistic, into 1. Probative. 2. Refutative. Again, the +Dialogues of Exposition were divided into two classes: 1. Theoretical. +2. Practical. Each of these classes was divided into two sub-classes: +the Theoretical into 1. Physical. 2. Logical. The Practical into 1. +Ethical. 2. Political. + +[Footnote 46: The statement in Diogenes Laertius, in his life of +Plato, is somewhat obscure and equivocal; but I think it certain that +the classification which he gives in iii. 49, 50, 51, of the Platonic +dialogues, was made by Thrasyllus. It is a portion of the same +systematic arrangement as that given somewhat farther on (iii. 56-61), +which is ascribed by name to Thrasyllus, enumerating the Tetralogies. +Diogenes expressly states that Thrasyllus was the person who annexed +to each dialogue its double denomination, which it has since borne in +the published editions--[Greek: Eu)thu/phrôn--peri\ +o(si/ou--peirastiko/s]. In the Dialogues of examination or Search, one of +these names is derived from the subject, the other from the method, as in +the instance of Euthyphron just cited: in the Dialogues of Exposition +both names are derived from the subject, first the special, next the +general. [Greek: Phai/dôn, ê)\ peri\ psuchê=s, ê)thiko/s. Parmeni/dês, +ê)\ peri\ i)deô=n, logiko/s]. + +Schleiermacher (in the Einleitung prefixed to his translation of +Plato, p. 24) speaks somewhat loosely about "the well-known +dialectical distributions of the Platonic dialogues, which Diogenes +has preserved without giving the name of the author". Diogenes gives +only _one_ such dialectical (or logical) distribution; and though he +does not mention the name of Thrasyllus in direct or immediate +connection with it, we may clearly see that he is copying Thrasyllus. +This is well pointed out in an acute commentary on Schleiermacher, by +Yxem, Logos Protreptikos, Berlin, 1841, p. 12-13. + +Diogenes remarks (iii. 50) that the distribution of the dialogues into +narrative, dramatic, and mixed, is made [Greek: tragikô=s ma=llon ê)\ +philoso/phôs]. This remark would seem to apply more precisely to the +arrangement of the dialogues into trilogies and tetralogies. His word +[Greek: philoso/phôs] belongs very justly to the logical distribution +of Thrasyllus, apart from the tetralogies. + +Porphyry tells us that Plotinus did not bestow any titles upon his own +discourses. The titles were bestowed by his disciples; who did not +always agree, but gave different titles to the same discourse +(Porphyry, Vit. Plotin. 4).] + +The following table exhibits this philosophical classification of +Thrasyllus:-- + +Table I. + +PHILOSOPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKS OF PLATO BY THRASYLLUS. + +I. Dialogues of Investigation. II. Dialogues of Exposition. + +_Searching Dialogues_. _Guiding Dilogues_ +[Greek: Zêtêtikoi/]. [Greek: U(phêgêtikoi/]. + + + I. Dialogues of investigation. + + Gymnastic. Agonistic. + +[Greek: +Maieutikoi/. Peirastikoi/. E)ndeiktikoi/. A)natreptikpoi/.] + +Obstetric. Peirastic. Probative. Refutative. + ---- ---- ---- ---- +Alkibiades I. Charmidês. Protagoras. Euthydêmus. +Alkibiades II. Menon. Gorgias. +Theagês. Ion. Hippias I. +Lachês. Euthyphron. Hippias II. +Lysis. + + II. Dialogues of Exposition. + + + Theoretical. Practical + +[Greek: +Phusikoi/. Logikoi/. Ê)thikoi/. Politikoi/.] + +Physical Logical. Ethical. Political. + ---- ---- ---- ---- + +Timæus. Kratylus. Apology. Republic. + Sophistês. Kriton. Kritias. + Politikus. Phædon. Minos. + Parmenidês. Phædrus. Leges. + Theætêtus. Symposion. Epinomis. + Menexenus. + Kleitophon. + Epistolæ. + Philêbus. + Hipparchus. + Rivales. + +I now subjoin a second Table, containing the Dramatic Distribution of +the Platonic Dialogues, with the Philosophical Distribution combined +or attached to it. + +Table II. + +DRAMATIC DISTRIBUTION. PLATONIC DIALOGUES, AS ARRANGED IN TETRALOGIES +BY THRASYLLUS. + + Tetralogy 1. + +1. Euthyphron On Holiness Peirastic or Testing. +2. Apology of Sokrates Ethical Ethical. +3. Kriton On Duty in Action Ethical. +4. Phædon On the Soul Ethical. + + 2. + +1. Kratylus On Rectitude in Naming Logical. +2. Theætêtus On Knowledge Logical. +3. Sophistês On Ens or the Existent Logical. +4. Politikus On the Art of Governing Logical. + + 3. + +1. Parmenidês On Ideas Logical. +2. Philêbus On Pleasure Ethical. +3. Symposion On Good Ethical. +4. Phædrus On Love Ethical. + + 4. + +1. Alkibiadês I On the Nature of Man Obstetric or Evolving. +2. Alkibiadês II On Prayer Obstetric. +3. Hipparchus On the Love of Gain. Ethical. +4. Erastæ On Philosophy Ethical. + + 5. + +1. Theagês On Philosophy Obstetric. +2. Charmidês On Temperance Peirastic. +3. Lachês On Courage Obstetric. +4. Lysis On Friendship Obstetric. + + 6. + +1. Euthydêmus The Disputatious Man Refutative. +2. Protagoras The Sophists Probative. +3. Gorgias On Rhetoric Refutative. +4. Menon On Virtue Peirastic. + + 7. + +1. Hippias I On the Beautiful Refutative. +2. Hippias II On Falsehood Refutative. +3. Ion On the Iliad Peirastic. +4. Menexenus The Funeral Oration Ethical. + + 8. + +1. Kleitophon The Impulsive Ethical. +2. Republic On Justice Political. +3. Timæus On Nature Physical. +4. Kritias The Atlantid Ethical. + + 9. + +1. Minos On Law Political. +2. Leges On Legislation Political. +3. Epinomis The Night-Assembly, Political + or the Philosopher +4. Epistolæ XIII Ethical. + +The second Table, as it here stands, is given by Diogenes Laertius, +and is extracted by him probably from the work of Thrasyllus, or from +the edition of Plato as published by Thrasyllus. The reader will see +that each Platonic composition has a place assigned to it in two +classifications--1. The dramatic--2. The philosophical--each in itself +distinct and independent of the other, but here blended together. + +[Side-note: Incongruity and repugnance of the two classifications.] + +We may indeed say more. The two classifications are not only +independent, but incongruous and even repugnant. The better of the two +is only obscurely and imperfectly apprehended, because it is presented +as an appendage to the worse. The dramatic classification, which +stands in the foreground, rests upon a purely fanciful analogy, +determining preference for the number _four_. If indeed this objection +were urged against Thrasyllus, he might probably have replied that the +group of four volumes together was in itself convenient, neither too +large nor too small, for an elementary subdivision; and that the +fanciful analogy was an artifice for recommending it to the feelings, +better (after all) than selection of another number by haphazard. Be +that as it may, however, the fiction was one which Thrasyllus +inherited from Aristophanes: and it does some honour to his ability, +that he has built, upon so inconvenient a fiction, one tetralogy (the +first), really plausible and impressive.[47] But it does more honour +to his ability that he should have originated the philosophical +classification; distinguishing the dialogues by important attributes +truly belonging to each, and conducting the Platonic student to points +of view which ought to be made known to him. This classification forms +a marked improvement upon every thing (so far as we know) which +preceded it. + +[Footnote 47: It is probable that Aristophanes, in distributing Plato +into trilogies, was really influenced by the dramatic form of the +compositions to put them in a class with real dramas. But Thrasyllus +does not seem to have been influenced by such a consideration. He took +the number _four_ on its own merits, and adopted, as a way of +recommending it, the traditional analogy sanctioned by the Alexandrine +librarians. + +That such was the case, we may infer pretty clearly when we learn, +that Thrasyllus applied the same distribution (into tetralogies) to +the works of Demokritus, which were _not_ dramatic in form. (Diog. L. +ix. 45; Mullach, Democ. Frag. p. 100-107, who attempts to restore the +Thrasyllean tetralogies.) + +The compositions of Demokritus were not merely numerous, but related +to the greatest diversity of subjects. To them Thrasyllus could not +apply the same logical or philosophical distribution which he applied +to Plato. He published, along with the works of Demokritus, a preface, +which he entitled [Greek: Ta\ pro\ tê=s a)nagnô/seôs tô=n Dêmokri/tou +bibli/ôn] (Diog. L. ix. 41). + +Porphyry tells us, that when he undertook, as literary executor, the +arrangement and publication of the works of his deceased master +Plotinus, he found fifty-four discourses: which he arranged into six +Enneads or groups of nine each. He was induced to prefer this +distribution, by regard to the perfection of the number six ([Greek: +teleio/têti]). He placed in each Ennead discourses akin to each other, +or on analogous subjects (Porphyry, Vit. Plotin. 24).] + +[Side-note: Dramatic principle of classification--was inherited by +Thrasyllus from Aristophanes.] + +[Side-note: Authority of the Alexandrine library--editions of Plato +published, with the Alexandrine critical marks.] + +That Thrasyllus followed Aristophanes in the principle of his +classification, is manifest: that he adopted the dramatic ground and +principle of classification (while amending its details), not because +he was himself guided by it, but because he found it already in use +and sanctioned by the high authority of the Alexandrines--is also +manifest, because he himself constructed and tacked to it a better +classification, founded upon principles new and incongruous with the +dramatic. In all this we trace the established ascendancy of the +Alexandrine library and its eminent literati. Of which ascendancy a +farther illustration appears, when we read in Diogenes Laertius that +editions of Plato were published, carrying along with the text the +special marks of annotation applied by the Alexandrines to Homer and +other poets: the obelus to indicate a spurious passage, the obelus +with two dots to denote a passage which had been improperly declared +spurious, the X to signify peculiar locutions, the double line or +Diplê to mark important or characteristic opinions of Plato--and +others in like manner. A special price was paid for manuscripts of +Plato with these illustrative appendages:[48] which must have been +applied either by Alexandrines themselves, or by others trained in +their school. When Thrasyllus set himself to edit and re-distribute +the Platonic works, we may be sure that he must have consulted one or +more public libraries, either at Alexandria, Athens, Rome, Tarsus, or +elsewhere. Nowhere else could he find all the works together. Now the +proceedings ascribed to him show that he attached himself to the +Alexandrine library, and to the authority of its most eminent critics. + +[Footnote 48: Diog. L. iii. 65, 66. [Greek: E)pei\ de\ kai\ sêmei=a/ +tina toi=s bibli/ois au)tou= parati/thetai, phe/re kai\ peri\ tou/tôn +ti ei)/pômen], &c. He then proceeds to enumerate the [Greek: sêmei=a]. + +It is important to note that Diogenes cites this statement (respecting +the peculiar critical marks appended to manuscripts of the Platonic +works) from Antigonus of Karystus in his Life of Zeno the Stoic. Now +the date of Antigonus is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in B.C. 225, +before the death of Ptolemy III. Euergetes (see Fasti Hellen. B.C. +225, also Appendix, 12, 80). Antigonus must thus have been +contemporary both with Kallimachus and with Aristophanes of Byzantium: +he notices the marked manuscripts of Plato as something newly +edited--[Greek: neôsti\ e)kdothe/nta]): and we may thus see that the work +of critical marking must have been performed either by Kallimachus and +Aristophanes themselves (one or both) or by some of their +contemporaries. Among the titles of the lost treatises of Kallimachus, +one is--about the [Greek: glô=ssai] or peculiar phrases of Demokritus. +It is therefore noway improbable that Kallimachus should have bestowed +attention upon the peculiarities of the Platonic text, and the +inaccuracies of manuscripts. The library had probably acquired several +different manuscripts of the Platonic compositions, as it had of the +Iliad and Odyssey, and of the Attic tragedies.] + +[Side-note: Thrasyllus followed the Alexandrine library and +Aristophanes, as to genuine Platonic works.] + +Probably it was this same authority that Thrasyllus followed in +determining which were the real works of Plato, and in setting aside +pretended works. He accepted the collection of Platonic compositions +sanctioned by Aristophanes and recognised as such in the Alexandrine +library. As far as our positive knowledge goes, it fully bears out +what is here stated: all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes +(unfortunately Diogenes does not give a complete enumeration of those +which he recognised) are to be found in the catalogue of Thrasyllus. +And the evidentiary value of this fact is so much the greater, because +the most questionable compositions (I mean, those which modern critics +reject or even despise) are expressly included in the recognition of +Aristophanes, and passed from him to Thrasyllus--Leges, Epinomis, +Minos, Epistolæ, Sophistês, Politikus. Exactly on those points on +which the authority of Thrasyllus requires to be fortified against +modern objectors, it receives all the support which coincidence with +Aristophanes can impart. When we know that Thrasyllus adhered to +Aristophanes on so many disputable points of the catalogue, we may +infer pretty certainly that he adhered to him in the remainder. In +regard to the question, Which were Plato's genuine works? it was +perfectly natural that Thrasyllus should accept the recognition of the +greatest library then existing: a library, the written records of +which could be traced back to Demetrius Phalereus. He followed this +external authority: he did not take each dialogue to pieces, to try +whether it conformed to a certain internal standard--a "platonisches +Gefühl"--of his own. + +[Side-note: Ten spurious dialogues, rejected by all other critics as +well as by Thrasyllus--evidence that these critics followed the common +authority of the Alexandrine library.] + +That the question between genuine and spurious Platonic dialogues was +tried in the days of Thrasyllus, by external authority and not by +internal feeling--we may see farther by the way in which Diogenes +Laertius speaks of the spurious dialogues. "The following dialogues +(he says) are declared to be spurious _by common consent_: 1. Eryxias +or Erasistratus. 2. Akephali or Sisyphus. 3. Demodokus. 4. Axiochus. +5. Halkyon. 6. Midon or Hippotrophus. 7. Phæakes. 8. Chelidon. 9. +Hebdomê. 10. Epimenides."[49] There was, then, unanimity, so far as +the knowledge of Diogenes Laertius reached, as to genuine and +spurious. All the critics whom he valued, Thrasyllus among them, +pronounced the above ten dialogues to be spurious: all of them agreed +also in accepting the dialogues in the list of Thrasyllus as +genuine.[50] Of course the ten spurious dialogues must have been +talked of by some persons, or must have got footing in some editions +or libraries, as real works of Plato: otherwise there could have been +no trial had or sentence passed upon them. But what Diogenes affirms +is, that Thrasyllus and all the critics whose opinion he esteemed, +concurred in rejecting them. We may surely presume that this unanimity +among the critics, both as to all that they accepted and all that they +rejected, arose from common acquiescence in the authority of the +Alexandrine library.[51] The ten rejected dialogues were not in the +Alexandrine library--or at least not among the rolls therein +recognised as Platonic. + +[Footnote 49: Diog. L. iii. 62: [Greek: notheu/ontai de\ tô=n +dialo/gôn o(mologoume/nôs]. + +Compare Prolegomena [Greek: tê=s Pla/tônos Philosophi/as], in +Hermann's Appendix Platonica, p. 219.] + +[Footnote 50: It has been contended by some modern critics, that +Thrasyllus himself doubted whether the Hipparchus was Plato's work. +When I consider that dialogue, I shall show that there is no adequate +ground for believing that Thrasyllus doubted its genuineness.] + +[Footnote 51: Diogenes (ix. 49) uses the same phrase in regard to the +spurious works ascribed to Demokritus, [Greek: ta\ d' o(mologoume/nôs +e)sti\n a)llo/tria]. And I believe that he means the same thing by it: +that the works alluded to were not recognised in the Alexandrine +library as belonging to Demokritus, and were accordingly excluded from +the tetralogies (of Demokritus) prepared by Thrasyllus.] + +[Side-note: Thrasyllus did not follow an internal sentiment of his own +in rejecting dialogues as spurious.] + +If Thrasyllus and the others did not proceed upon this evidence in +rejecting the ten dialogues, and did not find in them any marks of +time such as to exclude the supposition of Platonic authorship--they +decided upon what is called internal evidence: a critical sentiment, +which satisfied them that these dialogues did not possess the Platonic +character, style, manner, doctrines, merits, &c. Now I think it highly +improbable that Thrasyllus could have proceeded upon any such +sentiment. For when we survey the catalogue of works which he +recognised as genuine, we see that it includes the widest diversity of +style, manner, doctrine, purpose, and merits: that the disparate +epithets, which he justly applies to discriminate the various +dialogues, cannot be generalised so as to leave any intelligible +"Platonic character" common to all. Now since Thrasyllus reckoned +among the genuine works of Plato, compositions so unlike, and so +unequal in merit, as the Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Lysis, +Parmenidês, Symposion, Philêbus, Menexenus, Leges, Epinomis, +Hipparchus, Minos, Theagês, Epistolæ, &c., not to mention a +composition obviously unfinished, such as the Kritias--he could have +little scruple in believing that Plato also composed the Eryxias, +Sisyphus, Demodokus, and Halkyon. These last-mentioned dialogues still +exist, and can be appreciated.[52] Allowing, for the sake of argument, +that we are entitled to assume our own sense of worth as a test of +what is really Plato's composition, it is impossible to deny, that if +these dialogues are not worthy of the author of Republic and +Protagoras, they are at least worthy of the author of the Leges, +Epinomis, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Accordingly, if the internal +sentiment of Thrasyllus did not lead him to reject these last four, +neither would it lead him to reject the Eryxias, Sisyphus, and +Halkyon. I conclude therefore that if he, and all the other critics +whom Diogenes esteemed, agreed in rejecting the ten dialogues as +spurious--their verdict depended not upon any internal sentiment, but +upon the authority of the Alexandrine library.[53] + +[Footnote 52: The Axiochus, Eryxias, Sisyphus, and Demodokus, are +printed as Apocrypha annexed to most editions of Plato, together with +two other dialogues entitled De Justo and De Virtute. The Halkyon has +generally appeared among the works of Lucian, but K. F. Hermann has +recently printed it in his edition of Plato among the Platonic +Apocrypha. + +The Axiochus contains a mark of time (the mention of [Greek: +A)kadêmi/a] and [Greek: Lukei=on], p. 367), as F. A. Wolf has +observed, proving that it was not composed until the Platonic and +Peripatetic schools were both of them in full establishment at +Athens--that is, certainly after the death of Plato, and probably after +the death of Aristotle. It is possible that Thrasyllus may have proceeded +upon this evidence of time, at least as collateral proof, in +pronouncing the dialogue not to be the work of Plato. The other four +dialogues contain no similar evidence of date. + +Favorinus affirmed that Halkyon was the work of an author named Leon. + +Some said (Diog. L. iii. 37) that Philippus of Opus, one of the +disciples of Plato, transcribed the Leges, which were on waxen tablets +([Greek: e)n kêrô=|]), and that the Epinomis was his work ([Greek: +tou/tou de\ kai\ tê\n E)pinomi/da phasi\n ei)=nai]). It was probably +the work of Philippus only in the sense in which the Leges were his +work--that he made a fair and durable copy of parts of it from the +wax. Thrasyllus admitted it with the rest as Platonic.] + +[Footnote 53: Mullach (Democr. Fragm. p. 100) accuses Thrasyllus of an +entire want of critical sentiment, and pronounces his catalogue to be +altogether without value as an evidence of genuine Platonic +works--because Thrasyllus admits many dialogues, "quos doctorum nostri +sæculi virorum acumen è librorum Platonicorum numero exemit". + +This observation exactly illustrates the conclusion which I desire to +bring out. I admit that Thrasyllus had a critical sentiment different +from that of the modern Platonic commentators; but I believe that in +the present case he proceeded upon other evidence--recognition by the +Alexandrine library. My difference with Mullach is, that I consider +this recognition (in a question of genuine or spurious) as more +trustworthy evidence than the critical sentiment of modern literati.] + +[Side-note: Results as to the trustworthiness of the Thrasyllean +Canon.] + +On this question, then, of the Canon of Plato's works (as compared +with the works of other contemporary authors) recognised by +Thrasyllus--I consider that its claim to trustworthiness is very high, +as including all the genuine works, and none but the genuine works, of +Plato: the following facts being either proved, or fairly presumable. + +1. The Canon rests on the authority of the Alexandrine library and its +erudite librarians;[54] whose written records went back to the days of +Ptolemy Soter, and Demetrius Phalereus, within a generation after the +death of Plato. + +2. The manuscripts of Plato at his death were preserved in the school +which he founded; where they continued for more than thirty years +under the care of Speusippus and Xenokrates, who possessed personal +knowledge of all that Plato had really written. After Xenokrates, they +came under the care of Polemon and the succeeding Scholarchs, from +whom Demetrius Phalereus probably obtained permission to take copies +of them for the nascent museum or library at Alexandria or through +whom at least (if he purchased from booksellers) he could easily +ascertain which were Plato's works, and which, if any, were spurious. + +3. They were received into that library without any known canonical +order, prescribed system, or interdependence essential to their being +properly understood. Kallimachus or Aristophanes devised an order of +arrangement for themselves, such as they thought suitable. + +[Footnote 54: Suckow adopts and defends the opinion here stated--that +Thrasyllus, in determining which were the genuine works of Plato and +which were not genuine, was guided mainly by the authority of the +Alexandrine library and librarians (G. F. W. Suckow, Form der +Platonischen Schriften, pp. 170-175). Ueberweg admits this opinion as +just (Untersuchungen, p. 195). + +Suckow farther considers (p. 175) that the catalogue of works of +esteemed authors, deposited in the Alexandrine library, may be +regarded as dating from the [Greek: Pi/nakes] of Kallimachus. + +This goes far to make out the presumption which I have endeavoured to +establish in favour of the Canon recognised by Thrasyllus, which, +however, these two authors do not fully admit. + +K. F. Hermann, too (see Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 44), +argues sometimes strongly in favour of this presumption, though +elsewhere he entirely departs from it.] + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +PLATONIC CANON AS APPRECIATED AND MODIFIED BY MODERN CRITICS. + + +[Side-note: The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally +acknowledged, by the Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the +succeeding critics after the revival of learning.] + +The Platonic Canon established by Thrasyllus maintained its authority +until the close of the last century, in regard to the distinction +between what was genuine and spurious. The distribution indeed did not +continue to be approved: the Tetralogies were neglected, and the order +of the dialogues varied: moreover, doubts were intimated about +Kleitophon and Epinomis. But nothing was positively removed from, or +positively added to, the total recognised by Thrasyllus. The +Neo-Platonists (from the close of the second century B.C., down to the +beginning of the sixth A.D.) introduced a new, mystic, and theological +interpretation, which often totally changed and falsified Plato's +meaning. Their principles of interpretation would have been strange +and unintelligible to the rhetors Thrasyllus and Dionysius of +Halikarnassus--or to the Platonic philosopher Charmadas, who expounded +Plato to Marcus Crassus at Athens. But they still continued to look +for Plato in the nine Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, in each and all of +them. So also continued Ficinus, who, during the last half of the +fifteenth century, did so much to revive in the modern world the study +of Plato. He revived along with it the neo-platonic interpretation. +The Argumenta, prefixed to the different dialogues by Ficinus, are +remarkable, as showing what an ingenious student, interpreting in that +spirit, discovered in them. + +But the scholars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth +centuries, speaking generally--though not neglecting these +neo-platonic refinements, were disposed to seek out, wherever they could +find it, a more literal interpretation of the Platonic text, correctly +presented and improved. The next great edition of the works of Plato +was published by Serranus and Stephens, in the latter portion of the +sixteenth century. + +[Side-note: Serranus--his six Syzygies--left the aggregate Canon +unchanged, Tennemann--importance assigned to the Phædrus.] + +Serranus distributed the dialogues of Plato into six groups which he +called Syzygies. In his first Syzygy were comprised Euthyphron, +Apologia, Kriton, Phædon (coinciding with the first Tetralogy of +Thrasyllus), as setting forth the defence of Sokrates and of his +doctrine. The second Syzygy included the dialogues introductory to +philosophy generally, and impugning the Sophists--Theagês, Erastæ, +Theætêtus, Sophistês, Euthydêmus, Protagoras, Hippias II. In the third +Syzygy were three dialogues considered as bearing on Logic--Kratylus, +Gorgias, Ion. The fourth Syzygy contained the dialogues on Ethics +generally--Philêbus, Menon, Alkibiadês I.; on special points of +Ethics--Alkibiadês II., Charmidês, Lysis, Hipparchus; and on +Politics--Menexenus, Politikus, Minos, Republic, Leges, Epinomis. The +fifth Syzygy included the dialogues on Physics, and Metaphysics (or +Theology)--Timæus, Kritias, Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædrus, Hippias +I.** In the sixth Syzygy were ranged the thirteen Epistles, the various +dialogues which Serranus considered spurious (Kleitophon among them, +which he regarded as doubtful), and the Definitions. + +Serranus, while modifying the distribution of the Platonic works, left +the entire Canon very much as he found it. So it remained throughout +the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the scholars who devoted +themselves to Plato were content with improvement of the text, +philological illustration, and citations from the ancient +commentators. But the powerful impulse, given by Kant to the +speculative mind of Europe during the last quarter of the eighteenth +century, materially affected the point of view from which Plato was +regarded. Tennemann, both in his System of the Platonic Philosophy, +and in dealing with Plato as a portion of his general history of +philosophy, applied the doctrines of Kant largely and even excessively +to the exposition of ancient doctrines. Much of his comment is +instructive, greatly surpassing his predecessors. Without altering the +Platonic Canon, he took a new view of the general purposes of Plato, +and especially he brought forward the dialogue Phædrus into a +prominence which had never before belonged to it, as an index or +key-note ([Greek: e)ndo/simon]) to the whole Platonic series. Shortly +after Tennemann, came Schleiermacher, who introduced a theory of his +own, ingenious as well as original, which has given a new turn to all +the subsequent Platonic criticism. + +[Side-note: Schleiermacher--new theory about the purposes of Plato. +One philosophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the +beginning--essential order and interdependence of the dialogues, as +contributing to the full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not +constituent items in the series, but lying alongside of it. Order of +arrangement.] + +Schleiermacher begins by assuming two fundamental postulates, both +altogether new. 1. A systematic unity of philosophic theme and +purpose, conceived by Plato in his youth, at first +obscurely--afterwards worked out through successive dialogues; each +dialogue disclosing the same purpose, but the later disclosing it more +clearly and fully, until his old age. 2. A peremptory, exclusive, and +intentional order by Plato of the dialogues, composed by Plato with a +view to the completion of this philosophical scheme. Schleiermacher +undertakes to demonstrate what this order was, and to point out the +contribution brought by each successive dialogue to the accomplishment +of Plato's premeditated scheme. + +To those who understand Plato, the dialogues themselves reveal (so +Schleiermacher affirms) their own essential order of sequence--their +own mutual relations of antecedent and consequent. Each presupposes +those which go before: each prepares for those which follow. +Accordingly, Schleiermacher distributes the Platonic dialogues into +three groups: the first, or elementary, beginning with Phædrus, +followed by Lysis, Protagoras, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron, +Parmenidês: the second, or preparatory, comprising Gorgias, Theætêtus, +Menon, Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, Symposion, Phædon, +Philêbus: the third, or constructive, including Republic, Timæus, and +Kritias. These groups or files are all supposed to be marshalled under +Platonic authority: both the entire files as first, second, third and +the dialogues composing each file, carrying their own place in the +order, imprinted in visible characters. But to each file, there is +attached what Schleiermacher terms an Appendix, containing one or more +dialogues, each a composition by itself, and lying not in the series, +but alongside of it (Nebenwerke). The Appendix to the first file +includes Apologia, Kriton, Ion, Hippias II., Hipparchus, Minos, +Alkibiadês II. The Appendix to the second file consists of Theagês, +Erastæ, Alkibiadês I., Menexenus, Hippias I., Kleitophon. That of the +third file consists of the Leges. The Appendix is not supposed to +imply any common positive character in the dialogues which it +includes, but simply the negative attribute of not belonging to the +main philosophical column, besides a greater harmony with the file to +which it is attached than with the other two files. Some dialogues +assigned to the Appendixes are considered by Schleiermacher as +spurious; some however he treats as compositions on special occasions, +or adjuncts to the regular series. To this latter category belong the +Apologia, Kriton, and Leges. Schleiermacher considers the Charmidês to +have been composed during the time of the Anarchy, B.C. 404: the +Phædrus (earliest of all), in Olymp. 93 (B.C. 406), two years +before:[1] the Lysis, Protagoras, and Lachês, to lie between them in +respect of date. + +[Footnote 1: Schleierm. vol. i. p. 72; vol. ii. p. 8.] + +[Side-note: Theory of Ast--he denies the reality of any preconceived +scheme--considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas.] + +Such is the general theory of Schleiermacher, which presents to us +Plato in the character of a Demiurgus, contemplating from the first an +Idea of philosophy, and constructing a series of dialogues (like a +Kosmos of Schleiermacher), with the express purpose of giving +embodiment to it as far as practicable. We next come to Ast, who +denies this theory altogether. According to Ast, there never was any +philosophical system, to the exposition and communication of which +each successive dialogue was deliberately intended to contribute: +there is no scientific or intentional connection between the +dialogues,--no progressive arrangement of first and second, of +foundation and superstructure: there is no other unity or connecting +principle between them than that which they involve as all emanating +from the same age, country, and author, and the same general view of +the world (Welt-Ansicht) or critical estimate of man and nature.[2] +The dialogues are dramatic (Ast affirms), not merely in their external +form, but in their internal character: each is in truth a +philosophical drama.[3] Their purpose is very diverse and many-sided: +we mistake if we imagine the philosophical purpose to stand alone. If +that were so (Ast argues), how can we explain the fact, that in most +of the dialogues there is no philosophical result at all? Nothing but +a discussion without definite end, which leaves every point +unsettled.[4] Plato is poet, artist, philosopher, blended in one. He +does not profess to lay down positive opinions. Still less does he +proclaim his own opinions as exclusive orthodoxy, to be poured +ready-prepared into the minds of recipient pupils. He seeks to urge the +pupils to think and investigate for themselves. He employs the form of +dialogue, as indispensable to generate in their minds this impulse of +active research, and to arm them with the power of pursuing it +effectively.[5] But each Platonic dialogue is a separate composition +in itself, and each of the greater dialogues is a finished and +symmetrical whole, like a living organism.[6] + +[Footnote 2: Ast, Leben und Schriften Platon's, p. 40.] + +[Footnote 3: Ast, ib. p. 46.] + +[Footnote 4: Ast, ibid. p. 89.] + +[Footnote 5: Ast, ib. p. 42.] + +[Footnote 6: The general view here taken by Ast--dwelling upon the +separate individuality as well as upon the dramatic character of each +dialogue--calling attention to the purpose of intellectual +stimulation, and of reasoning out different aspects of ethical and +dialectical questions, as distinguished from endoctrinating purpose--this +general view coincides more nearly with my own than that of any +other critic. But Ast does not follow it out consistently. If he were +consistent with it, he ought to be more catholic than other critics, +in admitting a large and undefinable diversity in the separate +Platonic manifestations: instead of which, he is the most sweeping of +all repudiators, on internal grounds. He is not even satisfied with +the Parmenides as it now stands; he insists that what is now the +termination was not the real and original termination; but that Plato +must have appended to the dialogue an explanation of its [Greek: +a)pori/ai], puzzles, and antinomies; which explanation is now lost.] + +[Side-note: His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen +dialogues as genuine, rejecting all the rest.] + +Though Ast differs thus pointedly from Schleiermacher in the +enunciation of his general principle, yet he approximates to him more +nearly when he comes to detail: for he recognises three classes of +dialogues, succeeding each other in a chronological order verifiable +(as he thinks) by the dialogues themselves. His first class (in which +he declares the poetical and dramatic element to be predominant) +consists of Protagoras, Phædrus, Gorgias, Phædon. His second class, +distinguished by the dialectic element, includes Theætêtus, Sophistês, +Politikus, Parmenidês, Kratylus. His third class, wherein the poetical +and dialectic element are found both combined, embraces Philêbus, +Symposion, Republic, Timæus, Kritias. These fourteen dialogues, in +Ast's view, constitute the whole of the genuine Platonic works. All +the rest he pronounces to be spurious. He rejects Leges, Epinomis, +Menon, Euthydêmus, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Alkibiades I. and II., +Hippias I. and II., Ion, Erastæ, Theages, Kleitophon, Apologia, +Kriton, Minos, Epistolæ--together with all the other dialogues which +were rejected in antiquity by Thrasyllus. Lastly, Ast considers the +Protagoras to have been composed in 408 B.C., when Plato was not more +than 21 years of age--the Phædrus in 407 B.C.--the Gorgias in 404 +B.C.[7] + +[Footnote 7: Ast, Leben und Schriften Platon's, p. 376.] + +[Side-note: Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme--his +arrangement of the dialogues, differing from both Ast and +Schleiermacher--he rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, +Politikus, Kritias, with many others.] + +Socher agrees with Ast in rejecting the fundamental hypothesis of +Schleiermacher--that of a preconceived scheme systematically worked +out by Plato. But on many points he differs from Ast no less than from +Schleiermacher. He assigns the earliest Platonic composition (which he +supposes to be Theagês), to a date preceding the battle of Arginusæ, +in 406 B.C., when Plato was about 22-23 years of age.[8] Assuming it +is certain that Plato composed dialogues during the lifetime of +Sokrates, he conceives that the earliest of them would naturally be +the most purely Sokratic in respect of theme, as well as the least +copious, comprehensive, and ideal, in manner of handling. During the +six and a half years between the battle of Arginusæ and the death of +Sokrates, Socher registers the following succession of Platonic +compositions: Theagês, Lachês, Hippias II., Alkibiadês I., Dialogus de +Virtute (usually printed with the spurious, but supposed by Socher to +be a sort of preparatory sketch for the Menon), Menon, Kratylus, +Euthyphron. These three last he supposes to precede very shortly the +death of Sokrates. After that event, and very shortly after, were +composed the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon. + +[Footnote 8: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 102. These critics +adopt 429** B.C. as the year of Plato's birth: I think 427** B.C. +is the true year.] + +These eleven dialogues fill up what Socher regards as the first period +of Plato's life, ending when he was somewhat more than thirty years of +age. The second period extends to the commencement of his teaching at +the Academy, when about 41 or 42 years old (B.C. 386). In this second +period were composed Ion, Euthydêmus, Hippias I, Protagoras, +Theætêtus, Gorgias, Philêbus--in the order here set forth. During the +third period of Plato's life, continuing until he was 65 or more, he +composed Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposion, Republic, Timæus. To the +fourth and last period, that of extreme old age, belongs the +composition of the Leges.[9] + +[Footnote 9: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 301-459-460.] + +Socher rejects as spurious Hipparchus, Minos, Kleitophon, Alkibiadês +II., Erastæ, Epinomis, Epistolæ, Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, +Kritias: also Charmidês, and Lysis, these two last however not quite +so decisively. + +[Side-note: Schleiermacher and Ast both consider Phædrus and +Protagoras as early compositions--Socher puts Protagoras into the +second period, Phædrus into the third.] + +Both Ast and Schleiermacher consider Phædrus and Protagoras as among +the earliest compositions of Plato. Herein Socher dissents from them. +He puts Protagoras into the second period, and Phædrus into the third. +But the most peculiar feature in his theory is, that he rejects as +spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias. + +[Side-note: K. F. Hermann--Stallbaum--both of them consider the +Phædrus as a late dialogue--both of them deny preconceived order and +system--their arrangements of the dialogues--they admit new and +varying philosophical points of view.] + +From Schleiermacher, Ast, and Socher, we pass to K. F. Hermann[10]--and +to Stallbaum, who has prefixed Prolegomena to his edition of each +dialogue. Both these critics protest against Socher's rejection of the +four dialogues last indicated: but they agree with Socher and Ast in +denying the reality of any preconceived system, present to Plato's +mind in his first dialogue, and advanced by regular steps throughout +each of the succeeding dialogues. The polemical tone of K. F. Hermann +against this theory, and against Schleiermacher, its author, is +strenuous and even unwarrantably bitter.[11] Especially the position +laid down by Schleiermacher--that Phædrus is the earliest of Plato's +dialogues, written when he was 22 or 23 years of age, and that the +general system presiding over all the future dialogues is indicated +therein as even then present to his mind, afterwards to be worked +out--is controverted by Hermann and Stallbaum no less than by Ast and +Socher. All three concur in the tripartite distribution of the life of +Plato. But Hermann thinks that Plato acquired gradually and +successively, new points of view, with enlarged philosophical +development: and that the dialogues as successively composed are +expressions of these varying phases. Moreover, Hermann thinks that +such variations in Plato's philosophy may be accounted for by external +circumstances. He reckons Plato's first period as ending with the +death of Sokrates, or rather at an epoch not long after the death of +Sokrates: the second as ending with the commencement of Plato's +teaching at the Academy, after his return from Sicily--about 385 B.C.: +the third, as extending from thence to his old age. To the first, or +Sokratic stadium, Hermann assigns the smaller dialogues: the earliest +of which he declares to be--Hippias II., Ion, Alkibiadês I., Lysis, +Charmidês, Lachês: after which come Protagoras and Euthydêmus, wherein +the batteries are opened against the Sophists, shortly before the +death of Sokrates. Immediately after the last mentioned event, come a +series of dialogues reflecting the strong and fresh impression left by +it upon Plato's mind--Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron, Menon, +Hippias I.--occupying a sort of transition stage between the first and +the second period. We now enter upon the second or dialectic period; +passed by Plato greatly at Megara, and influenced by the philosophical +intercourse which he there enjoyed, and characterised by the +composition of Theætêtus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, +Parmenidês.[12] To the third, or constructive period, greatly +determined by the influence of the Pythagorean philosophy, belong +Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposion, Phædon, Philêbus, Republic, Timæus, +Kritias: a series composed during Plato's teaching at the Academy, and +commencing with Phædrus, which last Hermann considers to be a sort of +(Antritts-Programme) inauguratory composition for the opening of his +school of oral discourse or colloquy. Lastly, during the final years +of the philosopher, after all the three periods, come the Leges or +treatise de Legibus: placed by itself as the composition of his old +age. + +[Footnote 10: K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen +Philosophie, p. 368, seq. Stallbaum, Disputatio de Platonis Vitâ et +Scriptis, prefixed to his edition of Plato's Works, p. xxxii., seq.] + +[Footnote 11: Ueberweg (Untersuchungen, pp. 50-52) has collected +several citations from K. F. Hermann, in which the latter treats +Schleiermacher "wie einen Sophisten, der sich in absichtlicher +Unwahrhaftigkeit gefalle, mitunter fast als einen Mann der innerlich +wohl wisse, wie die Sache stehe (nämlich, dass sie so sei, wie +Hermann lehrt), der sich aber, etwa aus Lust, seine überlegene +Dialektik zu beweisen, Mühe gebe, sie in einem anderen Lichte +erscheinen zu lassen; also--[Greek: to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô +poiei=n]--recht in rhetorisch sophistischer Manier." + +We know well, from other and independent evidence, what Schleiermacher +really was, that he was not only one of the most accomplished +scholars, but one of the most liberal and estimable men of his age. +But how different would be our appreciation if we had no other +evidence to judge by except the dicta of opponents, and even +distinguished opponents, like Hermann! If there be any point clear in +the history of philosophy, it is the uncertainty of all judgments, +respecting writers and thinkers, founded upon the mere allegations of +opponents. Yet the Athenian Sophists, respecting whom we have no +independent evidence (except the general fact that they had a number +of approvers and admirers), are depicted confidently by the Platonic +critics in the darkest colours, upon the evidence of their bitter +opponent Plato--and in colours darker than even his evidence warrants. +The often-repeated calumny, charged against almost all +debaters--[Greek: to\ to\n ê(/tto lo/gon krei/ttô poiei=n]--by Hermann +against Schleiermacher, by Melêtus against Sokrates, by Plato against the +Sophists--is believed only against these last.] + +[Footnote 12: K. F. Hermann, Gesch. u. Syst. d. Plat. Phil., p. 496, +seq. Stallbaum (p. xxxiii.) places the Kratylus during the lifetime of +Sokrates, a little earlier than Euthydêmus and Protagoras, all three +of which he assigns to Olymp. 94, 402-400 B.C. See also his Proleg. to +Kratylus, tom. v. p. 26. + +Moreover, Stallbaum places the Menon and Ion about the same time--a +few months or weeks before the trial of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Menonem, +tom. vi. pp. 20, 21; Proleg. ad Ionem, tom. iv. p. 289). He considers +the Euthyphron to have been actually composed at the moment to which +it professes to refer (viz., after Melêtus had preferred indictment +against Sokrates), and with a view of defending Sokrates against the +charge of impiety (Proleg. ad Euthyphron. tom. vi. pp. 138-139-142). +He places the composition of the Charmidês about six years before the +death of Sokrates (Proleg. ad Charm. p. 86). He seems to consider, +indeed, that the Menon and Euthydêmus were both written for the +purpose of defending Sokrates: thus implying that they too were +written _after_ the indictment was preferred (Proleg. ad Euthyphron. +p. 145). + +In regard to the date of the Euthyphron, Schleiermacher also had +declared, prior to Stallbaum, that it was _unquestionably_ +(unstreitig) composed at a period between the indictment and the trial +of Sokrates (Einl. zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. p. 53, of his transl. of +Plato).] + +[Side-note: They reject several dialogues.] + +Hermann and Stallbaum reject (besides the dialogues already rejected +by Thrasyllus) Alkibiadês II., Theagês, Erastæ, Hipparchus, Minos, +Epinomis: Stallbaum rejects the Kleitophon: Hermann hesitates, and is +somewhat inclined to admit it, as he also admits, to a considerable +extent, the Epistles.[13] + +[Footnote 13: Stallbaum, p. xxxiv. Hermann,** pp. 424, 425.] + +[Side-note: Steinhart--agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's +fundamental postulate--his arrangement of the dialogues--considers the +Phædrus as late in order--rejects several.] + +Steinhart, in his notes and prefaces to H. Müller's translation of the +Platonic dialogues, agrees in the main with K. F. Hermann, both in +denying the fundamental postulate of Schleiermacher, and in settling +the general order of the dialogues, though with some difference as to +individual dialogues. He considers Ion as the earliest, followed by +Hippias I, Hippias II., Alkibiadês I., Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês, +Protagoras. These constitute what Steinhart calls the +ethico-Sokratical series of Plato's compositions, having the common +attributes--That they do not step materially beyond the philosophical +range of Sokrates himself--That there is a preponderance of the mimic +and plastic element--That they end, to all appearance, with unsolved +doubts and unanswered questions.[14] He supposes the Charmidês to have +been composed during the time of the Thirty, the Lachês shortly +afterwards, and the Protagoras about two years before the death of +Sokrates. He lays it down as incontestable that the Protagoras was not +composed after the death of Sokrates.[15] Immediately prior to this +last-mentioned event, and posterior to the Protagoras, he places the +Euthydêmus, Menon, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Kratylus: +preparatory to the dialectic series consisting of Parmenidês, +Theætêtus, Sophistês, Politikus, the result of Plato's stay at Megara, +and contact with the Eleatic and Megaric philosophers. The third +series of dialogues, the mature and finished productions of Plato at +the Academy, opens with Phædrus. Steinhart rejects as spurious +Alkibiadês II., Erastæ, Theagês, &c. + +[Footnote 14: See Steinhart's Proleg. to the Protag. vol. i. p. 430. +of Müller's transl. of Plato.] + +[Footnote 15: Steinhart, Prolegg. to Charmidês, p. 295.] + +[Side-note: Susemihl--coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hermann +his order of arrangement.] + +Another author, also, Susemihl, coincides in the main with the +principles of arrangement adopted by K. F. Hermann for the Platonic +dialogues. First in the order of chronological composition he places +the shorter dialogues--the exclusively ethical, least systematic; and +he ranges them in a series, indicating the progressive development of +Plato's mind, with approach towards his final systematic +conceptions.[16] Susemihl begins this early series with Hippias II., +followed by Lysis, Charmidês, Lachês, Protagoras, Menon, Apologia, +Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron. The seven first, ending with the Menon, +he conceives to have been published successively during the lifetime +of Sokrates: the Menon itself, during the interval between his +indictment and his death;[17] the Apologia and Kriton, very shortly +after his death; followed, at no long interval, by Gorgias and +Euthyphron.[18] The Ion and Alkibiadês I. are placed by Susemihl among +the earliest of the Platonic compositions, but as not belonging to the +regular series. He supposes them to have been called forth by some +special situation, like Apologia and Kriton, if indeed they be +Platonic at all, of which he does not feel assured.[19] + +[Footnote 16: F. Susemihl, Die Genetische Entwickelung der +Platonischen Philosophie, Leipsic, 1865, p. 9.] + +[Footnote 17: Susemihl, ibid. pp. 40-61-89.] + +[Footnote 18: Susemihl, ib. pp. 113-125.] + +[Footnote 19: Susemihl, ib. p. 9.] + +Immediately after Euthyphron, Susemihl places Euthydêmus, which he +treats as the commencement of a second series of dialogues: the first +series, or ethical, being now followed by the dialectic, in which the +principles, process, and certainty of cognition are discussed, though +in an indirect and preparatory way. This second series consists of +Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Theætêtus, Phædrus, Sophistês, Politikus, +Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædon. Through all these dialogues Susemihl +professes to trace a thread of connection, each successively unfolding +and determining more of the general subject: but all in an indirect, +negative, round-about manner. Allowing for this manner, Susemihl +contends that the dialectical counter-demonstrations or Antinomies, +occupying the last half of the Parmenidês, include the solution of +those difficulties, which have come forward in various forms from the +Euthydêmus up to the Sophistês, against Plato's theory of Ideas.[20] +The Phædon closes the series of dialectic compositions, and opens the +way to the constructive dialogues following, partly ethical, partly +physical--Philêbus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias.[21] The Leges come last +of all. + +[Footnote 20: Susemihl, ib. p. 355, seq.] + +[Footnote 21: Susemihl, pp. 466-470. The first volume of Susemihl's +work ends with the Phædon.] + +[Side-note Edward Munk--adopts a different principle of arrangement, +founded upon the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the +life, philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates--his arrangement, +founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of +composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic +plan.] + +A more recent critic, Dr. Edward Munk, has broached a new and very +different theory as to the natural order of the Platonic dialogues. +Upon his theory, they were intended by Plato[22] to depict the life +and working of a philosopher, in successive dramatic exhibitions, from +youth to old age. The different moments in the life of Sokrates, +indicated in each dialogue, mark the place which Plato intended it +to occupy in the series. The Parmenidês is the first, wherein Sokrates +is introduced as a young man, initiated into philosophy by the ancient +Parmenidês: the Phædon is last, describing as it does the closing +scene of Sokrates. Plato meant his dialogues to be looked at partly in +artistic sequence, as a succession of historical dramas--partly in +philosophical sequence, as a record of the progressive development of +his own doctrine: the two principles are made to harmonize in the +main, though sometimes the artistic sequence is obscured for the +purpose of bringing out the philosophical, sometimes the latter is +partially sacrificed to the former.[23] Taken in the aggregate, the +dialogues from Parmenidês to Phædon form a Sokratic cycle, analogous +to the historical plays of Shakespeare, from King John to Henry +VIII.[24] But Munk at the same time contends that this natural order +of the dialogues--or the order in which Plato intended them to be +viewed--is not to be confounded with the chronological order of their +composition.[25] The Parmenidês, though constituting the opening +Prologue of the whole cycle, was not composed first: nor the Phædon +last. All of them were probably composed after Plato had attained the +full maturity of his philosophy: that is, probably after the opening +of his school at the Academy in 386 B.C. But in composing each, he had +always two objects jointly in view: he adapted the tone of each to the +age and situation in which he wished to depict Sokrates:[26] he +commemorated, in each, one of the past phases of his own +philosophising mind. + +[Footnote 22: Dr. Edward Munk. Die natürliche Ordnung der Platonischen +Schriften, Berlin, 1857. His scheme of arrangement is explained +generally, pp. 25-48, &c.] + +[Footnote 23: Munk, ib. p. 29.] + +[Footnote 24: Munk, ib. p. 27.] + +[Footnote 25: Munk, ibid. p. 27.] + +[Footnote 26: Munk, ib. p. 54; Preface, p. viii.] + +The Cycle taken in its intentional or natural order, is distributed by +Munk into three groups, after the Parmenidês as general prologue.[27] + +1. Sokratic or Indirect Dialogues.--Protagoras, Charmidês, Lachês, +Gorgias, Ion, Hippias I., Kratylus, Euthydêmus, Symposion. + +2. Direct or Constructive Dialogues.--Phædrus, Philêbus, Republic, +Timæus, Kritias. + +3. Dialectic and Apologetic Dialogues.--Menon, Theætêtus, Sophistês, +Politikus, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Phædon. + +The Leges and Menexenus stand apart from the Cycle, as compositions on +special occasion. Alkibiadês I., Hippias II., Lysis, are also placed +apart from the Cycle, as compositions of Plato's earlier years, before +he had conceived the general scheme of it.[28] + +[Footnote 27: Munk, ib. p. 50.] + +[Footnote 28: Munk, ib. pp. 25-34.] + +The first of the three groups depicts Sokrates in the full vigour of +life, about 35 years of age: the second represents him an elderly man, +about 60: the third, immediately prior to his death.[29] In the first +group he is represented as a combatant for truth: in the second as a +teacher of truth: in the third, as a martyr for truth.[30] + +[Footnote 29: Munk, ib. p. 26.] + +[Footnote 30: Munk, ib. p. 31.] + +[Side-note: Views of Ueberweg--attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and +Hermann--admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues, +composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the earlier.] + +Lastly, we have another German author still more recent, Frederick +Ueberweg, who has again investigated the order and authenticity of the +Platonic dialogues, in a work of great care and ability: reviewing the +theories of his predecessors, as well as proposing various +modifications of his own.[31] Ueberweg compares the different opinions +of Schleiermacher and K. F. Hermann, and admits both of them to a +certain extent, each concurrent with and limiting the other.[32] The +theory of a preconceived system and methodical series, proposed by +Schleiermacher, takes its departure from the Phædrus, and postulates +as an essential condition that that dialogue shall be recognised as +the earliest composition.[33] This condition Ueberweg does not admit. +He agrees with Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, in referring the +Phædrus to a later date (about 386 B.C.), shortly after Plato had +established his school in Athens, when he was rather above forty years +of age. At this period (Ueberweg thinks) Plato may be considered as +having acquired methodical views which had not been present to him +before; and the dialogues composed after the Phædrus follow out, to a +certain extent, these methodical views. In the Phædrus, the Platonic +Sokrates delivers the opinion that writing is unavailing as a means of +imparting philosophy: that the only way in which philosophy can be +imparted is, through oral colloquy adapted by the teacher to the +mental necessities, and varying stages of progress, of each individual +learner: and that writing can only serve, after such oral instruction +has been imparted, to revive it if forgotten, in the memory both of +the teacher and of the learner who has been orally taught. For the +dialogues composed after the opening of the school, and after the +Phædrus, Ueberweg recognises the influence of a preconceived method +and of a constant bearing on the oral teaching of the school: for +those anterior to that date, he admits no such influence: he refers +them (with Hermann) to successive enlargements, suggestions, +inspirations, either arising in Plato's own mind, or communicated from +without. Ueberweg does not indeed altogether exclude the influence of +this non-methodical cause, even for the later dialogues: he allows its +operation to a certain extent, in conjunction with the methodical: +what he excludes is, the influence of any methodical or preconceived +scheme for the earlier dialogues.[34] He thinks that Plato composed +the later portion of his dialogues (_i.e._, those subsequent to the +Phædrus and to the opening of his school), not for the instruction of +the general reader, but as reminders to his disciples of that which +they had already learnt from oral teaching: and he cites the analogy +of Paul and the apostles, who wrote epistles not to convert the +heathen, but to admonish or confirm converts already made by +preaching.[35] + +[Footnote 31: Ueberweg, Untersuchungen.] + +[Footnote 32: Ueberweg, p. 111.] + +[Footnote 33: Ueberweg, pp. 23-26.] + +[Footnote 34: Ueberweg, pp. 107-110-111. "Sind beide Gesichtspunkte, +der einer methodischen Absicht und der einer Selbst-Entwicklung +Platon's durchweg mit einander zu verbinden, so liegt es auch in der +Natur der Sache und wird auch von einigen seiner Nachfolger +(insbesondere nachdrücklich von Susemihl) anerkannt, dass der erste +Gesichtspunkt vorzugsweise für die späteren Schriften von der Gründung +der Schule an--der andere vorzugsweise für die früheren--gilt."] + +[Footnote 35: Ueberweg, pp. 80-86, "Ist unsere obige Deutung richtig, +wonach Platon nicht für Fremde zur Belehrung, sondern wesentlich für +seine Schüler zur Erinnerung an den mündlichen Unterricht, schrieb +(wie die Apostel nicht für Fremde zur Bekehrung, sondern für die +christlichen Gemeinden zur Stärke und Läuterung, nachdem denselben der +Glaube aus der Predigt gekommen war)--so folgt, dass jede +Argumentation, die auf den Phaedrus gegründet wird, nur für die Zeit +gelten kann, in welcher bereits die Platonische Schule bestand."] + +[Side-note: His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the +dialogues, He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, +Parmenidês: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus.] + +Ueberweg investigates the means which we possess, either from external +testimony (especially that of Aristotle) or from internal evidence, of +determining the authenticity as well as the chronological order of the +dialogues. He remarks that though, in contrasting the expository +dialogues with those which are simply enquiring and debating, we may +presume the expository to belong to Plato's full maturity of life, and +to have been preceded by some of the enquiring and debating--yet we +cannot safely presume _all_ these latter to be of his early +composition. Plato may have continued to inclined to compose dialogues +of mere search, even after the time when he began to compose +expository dialogues.[36] Ueberweg considers that the earliest of +Plato's dialogues are, Lysis, Hippias Minor, Lachês, Charmidês, +Protagoras, composed during the lifetime of Sokrates: next the +Apologia, and Kriton, not long after his death. All these (even the +Protagoras) he reckons among the "lesser Platonic writings".[37] None +of them allude to the Platonic Ideas or Objective Concepts. The +Gorgias comes next, probably soon after the death of Sokrates, at +least at some time earlier than the opening of the school in 386 +B.C.[38] The Menon and Ion may be placed about the same general +period.[39] The Phædrus (as has been already observed) is considered +by Ueberweg to be nearly contemporary with the opening of the school: +shortly afterwards Symposion and Euthydêmus:[40] at some subsequent +time, Republic, Timæus, Kritias, and Leges. In regard to the four +last, Ueberweg does not materially differ from Schleiermacher, +Hermann, and other critics: but on another point he differs from them +materially, _viz._: that instead of placing the Theætêtus, Sophistês, +and Politikus, in the Megaric period or prior to the opening of the +school, he assigns them (as well as the Phædon and Philêbus) to the +last twenty years of Plato's life. He places Phædon later than Timæus, +and Politikus later than Phædon: he considers that Sophistês, +Politikus, and Philêbus are among the latest compositions of +Plato.[41] He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, and +Parmenidês: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron. He scarcely +recognises Menexenus, in spite of the direct attestation of Aristotle, +which attestation he tries (in my judgment very unsuccessfully) to +invalidate.[42] He recognises the Kratylus, but without determining +its date. He determines nothing about Alkibiadês I. and II. + +[Footnote 36: Ueberweg, p. 81.] + +[Footnote 37: Ueberweg, pp. 100-105-296. "Eine Anzahl kleinerer +Platonischer Schriften."] + +[Footnote 38: Ueberweg, pp. 249-267-296.] + +[Footnote 39: Ueberweg, pp. 226, 227.] + +[Footnote 40: Ueberweg, p. 265.] + +[Footnote 41: Ueberweg, pp. 204-292.] + +[Footnote 42: Ueberweg, pp. 143-176-222-250.] + +[Side-note: Other Platonic critics--great dissensions about scheme and +order of the dialogues.] + +The works above enumerated are those chiefly deserving of notice, +though there are various others also useful, amidst the abundance of +recent Platonic criticism. All these writers, Schleiermacher, Ast, +Socher, K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, Munk, Ueberweg, +have not merely laid down general schemes of arrangement for the +Platonic dialogues, but have gone through the dialogues seriatim, each +endeavouring to show that his own scheme fits them well, and each +raising objections against the schemes earlier than his own. It is +indeed truly remarkable to follow the differences of opinion among +these learned men, all careful students of the Platonic writings. And +the number of dissents would be indefinitely multiplied, if we took +into the account the various historians of philosophy during the last +few years. Ritter and Brandis accept, in the main, the theory of +Schleiermacher: Zeller also, to a certain extent. But each of these +authors has had a point of view more or less belonging to himself +respecting the general scheme and purpose of Plato, and respecting the +authenticity, sequence, and reciprocal illustration of the +dialogues.[43] + +[Footnote 43: Socher remarks (Ueber, Platon. p. 225) (after +enumerating twenty-two dialogues of the Thrasyllean canon, which he +considers the earliest) that of these twenty-two, there are _only two_ +which have not been declared spurious by some one or more critics. He +then proceeds to examine the remainder, among which are Sophistês, +Politikus, Parmenidês. He (Socher) declares these three last to be +spurious, which no critic had declared before.] + +[Side-note: Contrast of different points of view instructive--but no +solution has been obtained.] + +By such criticisms much light has been thrown on the dialogues in +detail. It is always interesting to read the different views taken by +many scholars, all careful students of Plato, respecting the order and +relations of the dialogues: especially as the views are not merely +different but contradictory, so that the weak points of each are put +before us as well as the strong. But as to the large problem which +these critics have undertaken to solve--though several solutions have +been proposed, in favour of which something may be urged, yet we look +in vain for any solution at once sufficient as to proof and defensible +against objectors. + +[Side-note: The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of +the theory propounded by Schleiermacher--slenderness of his proofs.] + +It appears to me that the problem itself is one which admits of no +solution. Schleiermacher was the first who proposed it with the large +pretensions which it has since embraced, and which have been present +more or less to the minds of subsequent critics, even when they differ +from him. He tells us himself that he comes forward as _Restitutor +Platonis_, in a character which no one had ever undertaken before.[44] +And he might fairly have claimed that title, if he had furnished +proofs at all commensurate to his professions. As his theory is +confessedly novel as well as comprehensive, it required greater +support in the way of evidence. But when I read the Introductions (the +general as well as the special) in which such evidence ought to be +found, I am amazed to find that there is little else but easy and +confident assumption. His hypothesis is announced as if the simple +announcement were sufficient to recommend it[45]--as if no other +supposition were consistent with the recognised grandeur of Plato as a +philosopher--as if any one, dissenting from it, only proved thereby +that he did not understand Plato. Yet so far from being of this +self-recommending character, the hypothesis is really loaded with the +heaviest antecedent improbability. That in 406 B.C., and at the age of +23, in an age when schemes of philosophy elaborated in detail were +unknown--Plato should conceive a vast scheme of philosophy, to be +worked out underground without ever being proclaimed, through numerous +Sokratic dialogues one after the other, each ushering in that which +follows and each resting upon that which precedes: that he should have +persisted throughout a long life in working out this scheme, adapting +the sequence of his dialogues to the successive stages which he had +attained, so that none of them could be properly understood unless +when studied immediately after its predecessors and immediately before +its successors--and yet that he should have taken no pains to impress +this one peremptory arrangement on the minds of readers, and that +Schleiermacher should be the first to detect it--all this appears to +me as improbable as any of the mystic interpretations of Iamblichus or +Proklus. Like other improbabilities, it may be proved by evidence, if +evidence can be produced: but here nothing of the kind is producible. +We are called upon to grant the general hypothesis without proof, and +to follow Schleiermacher in applying it to the separate dialogues. + +[Footnote 44: Schleiermacher, Einleitung, pp. 22-29. "Diese natürliche +Folge (der Platonischen Gespräche) wieder herzustellen, diess ist, +wie jedermann sieht, eine Absicht, welche sich sehr weit entfernt von +allen bisherigen Versuchen zur Anordnung der Platonischen Werke," &c.] + +[Footnote 45: What I say about Schleiermacher here will be assented to +by any one who reads his Einleitung, pp. 10, 11, seq.] + +[Side-note: Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived +scheme, and a peremptory order of interdependence among the +dialogues.] + +Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes two parts. 1. A premeditated +philosophical scheme, worked out continuously from the first dialogue +to the last. 2. A peremptory canonical order, essential to this +scheme, and determined thereby. Now as to the scheme, though on the +one hand it cannot be proved, yet on the other hand it cannot be +disproved. But as to the canonical order, I think it may be disproved. +We know that no such order was recognised in the days of Aristophanes, +and Schleiermacher himself admits that before those days it had been +lost.[46] But I contend that if it was lost within a century after the +decease of Plato, we may fairly presume that it never existed at all, +as peremptory and indispensable to the understanding of what Plato +meant. A great philosopher such as Plato (so Schleiermacher argues) +must be supposed to have composed all his dialogues with some +preconceived comprehensive scheme: but a great philosopher (we may +add), if he does work upon a preconceived scheme, must surely be +supposed to take some reasonable precautions to protect the order +essential to that scheme from dropping out of sight. Moreover, +Schleiermacher himself admits that there are various dialogues which +lie apart from the canonical order and form no part of the grand +premeditated scheme. The distinction here made between these outlying +compositions (Nebenwerke) and the members of the regular series, is +indeed altogether arbitrary: but the admission of it tends still +farther to invalidate the fundamental postulate of a grand Demiurgic +universe of dialogues, each dovetailed and fitted into its special +place among the whole. The universe is admitted to have breaks: so +that the hypothesis does not possess the only merit which can belong +to gratuitous hypothesis--that of introducing, if granted, complete +symmetry throughout the phenomena. + +[Footnote 46: Schleiermacher, Einleitung, p. 24.] + +[Side-note: Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the Phædrus +inadmissible.] + +To these various improbabilities we may add another--that +Schleiermacher's hypothesis requires us to admit that the Phædrus is +Plato's earliest dialogue, composed about 406 B.C., when he was 21 +years of age, on my computation, and certainly not more than 23: that +it is the first outburst of the inspiration which Sokrates had +imparted to him,[47] and that it embodies, though in a dim and +poetical form, the lineaments of that philosophical system which he +worked out during the ensuing half century. That Plato at this early +age should have conceived so vast a system--that he should have +imbibed it from Sokrates, who enunciated no system, and abounded in +the anti-systematic negative--that he should have been inspired to +write the Phædrus (with its abundant veins, dithyrambic,[48] erotic, +and transcendental) by the conversation of Sokrates, which exhibited +acute dialectic combined with practical sagacity, but neither poetic +fervour nor transcendental fancy,--in all this hypothesis of +Schleiermacher, there is nothing but an aggravation of +improbabilities. + +[Footnote 47: See Schleiermacher's Einleitung to the Phædrus: "Der +Phaidros, der erste Ausbruch seiner Begeisterung vom Sokrates".] + +[Footnote 48: If we read Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De Admirab. Vi +Dic. in Demosth. pp. 968-971, Reiske), we shall find that rhetor +pointing out the Phædrus as a signal example of Plato's departure from +the manner and character of Sokrates, and as a specimen of misplaced +poetical exaggeration. Dikæarchus formed the same opinion about the +Phædrus (Diog. L. iii. 38).] + +[Side-note: Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet +produced any tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic +dialogues.] + +Against such improbabilities (partly external partly internal) +Schleiermacher has nothing to set except internal reasons: that is, +when he shall have arranged the dialogues and explained the +interdependence as well as the special place of each, the arrangement +will impress itself upon all as being the intentional work of Plato +himself.[49] But these "internal reasons" (innere Gründe), which are +to serve as constructive evidence (in the absence of positive +declarations) of Plato's purpose, fail to produce upon other minds the +effect which Schleiermacher demands. If we follow them as stated in +his Introductions (prefixed to the successive Platonic dialogues), we +find a number of approximations and comparisons, often just and +ingenious, but always inconclusive for his point: proving, at the very +best, what Plato's intention may possibly have been--yet subject to be +countervailed by other "internal reasons" equally specious, tending to +different conclusions. And the various opponents of Schleiermacher +prove just as much and no more, each on behalf of his own mode of +arrangement, by the like constructive evidence--appeal to "internal +reasons". But the insufficient character of these "internal reasons" +is more fatal to Schleiermacher than to any of his opponents: because +his fundamental hypothesis--while it is the most ambitious of all and +would be the most important, if it could be proved--is at the same +time burdened with the strongest antecedent improbability, and +requires the amplest proof to make it at all admissible. + +[Footnote 49: See the general Einleitung, p. 11.] + +[Side-note: Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most +gratuitous, next to Schleiermacher's.] + +Dr. Munk undertakes the same large problem as Schleiermacher. He +assumes the Platonic dialogues to have been composed upon a +preconceived system, beginning when Plato opened his school, about 41 +years of age. This has somewhat less antecedent improbability than the +supposition that Plato conceived his system at 21 or 23 years of age. +But it is just as much destitute of positive support. That Plato +intended his dialogues to form a fixed series, exhibiting the +successive gradations of his philosophical system--that he farther +intended this series to coincide with a string of artistic portraits, +representing Sokrates in the ascending march from youth to old age, so +that the characteristic feature which marks the place and time of each +dialogue, is to be found in the age which it assigns to Sokrates--these +are positions for the proof of which we are referred to "internal +reasons"; but which the dialogues do not even suggest, much less sanction. + +[Side-note: The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a +circumstance of little moment.] + +In many dialogues, the age assigned to Sokrates is a circumstance +neither distinctly brought out, nor telling on the debate. It is true +that in the Parmenidês he is noted as young, and is made to conduct +himself with the deference of youth, receiving hints and admonitions +from the respected veteran of Elea. So too in the Protagoras, he is +characterised as young, but chiefly in contrast with the extreme and +pronounced old age of the Sophist Protagoras: he does not conduct +himself like a youth, nor exhibit any of that really youthful or +deferential spirit which we find in the Parmenidês; on the contrary, +he stands forward as the rival, cross-examiner, and conqueror of the +ancient Sophist. On the contrary, in the Euthydêmus,[50] Sokrates is +announced as old; though that dialogue is indisputably very analogous +to the Protagoras, both of them being placed by Munk in the earliest +of his three groups. Moreover in the Lysis also, Sokrates appears as +old;--here Munk escapes from the difficulty by setting aside the +dialogue as a youthful composition, not included in the consecutive +Sokratic Cycle.[51] What is there to justify the belief, that the +Sokrates depicted in the Phædrus (which dialogue has been affirmed by +Schieiermacher and Ast, besides some ancient critics, to exhibit +decided marks of juvenility) is older than the Sokrates of the +Symposion? or that Sokrates in the Philêbus and Republic is older than +in the Kratylus or Gorgias? It is true that the dialogues Theætêtus +and Euthyphron are both represented as held a little before the death +of Sokrates, after the indictment of Melêtus against him had already +been preferred. This is a part of the hypothetical situation, in which +the dialogists are brought into company. But there is nothing in the +two dialogues themselves (or in the Menon, which Munk places in the +same category) to betoken that Sokrates is old. Holiness, in the +Euthyphron--Knowledge, in the Theætêtus--is canvassed and debated just +as Temperance and Courage are debated in the Charmidês and Lachês. +Munk lays it down that Sokrates appears as a Martyr for Truth in the +Euthyphron, Menon, and Theætêtus and as a Combatant for Truth in the +Lachês, Charmidês, Euthydêmus, &c. But the two groups of dialogues, +when compared with each other, will not be found to warrant this +distinctive appellation. In the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon, it may +be said with propriety that Sokrates is represented as a martyr for +truth: in all three he appears not merely as a talker, but as a +personal agent: but this is not true of the other dialogues which Munk +places in his third group. + +[Footnote 50: Euthydêmus, c. 4, p. 272.] + +[Footnote 51: Lysis, p. 223, ad fin. [Greek: Katage/lastoi gego/namen +e)gô/ te, ge/rôn a)nê/r, kai\ u(mei=s]. See Munk, p. 25.] + +[Side-note: No intentional sequence or interdependence of the +dialogues can be made out.] + +I cannot therefore accede to this "natural arrangement of the Platonic +dialogues," assumed to have been intended by Plato, and founded upon +the progress of Sokrates as he stands exhibited in each, from youth to +age--which Munk has proposed in his recent ingenious volume. It is +interesting to be made acquainted with that order of the Platonic +dialogues which any critical student conceives to be the "natural +order". But in respect to Munk as well as to Schleiermacher, I must +remark that if Plato had conceived and predetermined the dialogues, so +as to be read in one natural peremptory order, he would never have +left that order so dubious and imperceptible, as to be first divined +by critics of the nineteenth century, and understood by them too in +several different ways. If there were any peremptory and intentional +sequence, we may reasonably presume that Plato would have made it as +clearly understood as he has determined the sequence of the ten books +of his Republic. + +[Side-note: Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is +reasonable--successive changes in Plato's point of view: but we cannot +explain either the order or the causes of these changes.] + +The principle of arrangement proposed by K. F. Hermann (approved also +by Steinhart and Susemihl) is not open to the same antecedent +objection. Not admitting any preconceived, methodical, intentional, +system, nor the maintenance of one and the same successive +philosophical point of view throughout--Hermann supposes that the +dialogues as successively composed represent successive phases of +Plato's philosophical development and variations in his point of view. +Hermann farther considers that these variations may be assigned and +accounted for: first pure Sokratism, next the modifications +experienced from Plato's intercourse with the Megaric philosophers,--then +the influence derived from Kyrênê and Egypt--subsequently that +from the Pythagoreans in Italy--and so forth. The first portion of +this hypothesis, taken generally, is very reasonable and probable. But +when, after assuming that there must have been determining changes in +Plato's own mind, we proceed to inquire what these were, and whence +they arose, we find a sad lack of evidence for the answer to the +question. We neither know the order in which the dialogues were +composed,--nor the date when Plato first began to compose,--nor the +primitive philosophical mind which his earliest dialogues +represented,--nor the order of those subsequent modifications which +his views underwent. We are informed, indeed, that Plato went from +Athens to visit Megara, Kyrênê, Egypt, Italy; but the extent or kind +of influence which he experienced in each, we do not know at all.[52] +I think it a reasonable presumption that the points which Plato had in +common with Sokrates were most preponderant in the mind of Plato +immediately after the death of his master: and that other trains of +thought gradually became more and more intermingled as the +recollection of his master became more distant. There is also a +presumption that the longer, more elaborate, and more transcendental +dialogues (among which must be ranked the Phædrus), were composed in +the full maturity of Plato's age and intellect: the shorter and less +finished may have been composed either then or earlier in his life. +Here are two presumptions, plausible enough when stated generally, yet +too vague to justify any special inferences: the rather, if we may +believe the statement of Dionysius, that Plato continued to "comb and +curl his dialogues until he was eighty years of age".[53] + +[Footnote 52: Bonitz (in his instructive volume, Platonische Studien, +Wien, 1858, p. 5) points out how little we know about the real +circumstances of Plato's intellectual and philosophical development: a +matter which most of the Platonic critics are apt to forget. + +I confess that I agree with Strümpell, that it is impossible to +determine chronologically, from Plato's writings, and from the other +scanty evidence accessible to us, by what successive steps his mind +departed from the original views and doctrines held and communicated +by Sokrates (Strümpell, Gesch. der Griechen, p. 294, Leipsic, 1861).] + +[Footnote 53: Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p. 208; Diog. L. iii. 37; +Quintilian, viii. 6. + +F. A. Wolf, in a valuable note upon the [Greek: diaskeuastai\] +(Proleg. ad Homer. p. clii.) declares, upon this ground, that it is +impossible to determine the time when Plato composed his best +dialogues. "Ex his collatis apparet [Greek: diaskeua/zein] a veteribus +magistris adscitum esse in potestatem verbi [Greek: +e)pidiaskeua/zein]: ut in Scenicis propé idem esset quod [Greek: +a)nadida/skein]--h. e. repetito committere fabulam, sed mutando, +addendo, detrahendo, emendatam, refictam, et secundis curis +elaboratam. Id enim facere solebant illi poetæ sæpissimé: mox etiam +alii, ut Apollonius Rhodius. Neque aliter Plato fecit in optimis +dialogis suis: _quam ob causam exquirere non licet, quando quisque +compositus sit_; quum in scenicis fabulis saltem ex didascaliis +plerumque notum sit tempus, quo editæ sunt." + +Preller has a like remark (Hist. Phil. ex Font. Loc. Context., sect. +250). + +In regard to the habit of correcting compositions, the contrast +between Plato and Plotinus was remarkable. Porphyry tells us that +Plotinus, when once he had written any matter, could hardly bear even +to read it over--much less to review and improve it (Porph. Vit. +Plotini, 8).] + +[Side-note: Hermann's view more tenable than Schleiermacher's.] + +If we compare K. F. Hermann with Schleiermacher, we see that Hermann +has amended his position by abandoning Schleiermacher's gratuitous +hypothesis, of a preconceived Platonic system with a canonical order +of the dialogues adapted to that system--and by admitting only a +chronological order of composition, each dialogue being generated by +the state of Plato's mind at the time when it was composed. This, +taken generally, is indisputable. If we perfectly knew Plato's +biography and the circumstances around him, we should be able to +determine which dialogues were first, second, and third, &c., and what +circumstances or mental dispositions occasioned the successive +composition of those which followed. But can we do this with our +present scanty information? I think not. Hermann, while abandoning the +hypothesis of Schleiermacher, has still accepted the large conditions +of the problem first drawn up by Schleiermacher, and has undertaken to +decide the real order of the dialogues, together with the special +occasion and the phase of Platonic development corresponding to each. +Herein, I think, he has failed. + +[Side-note: Small number of certainties, or even reasonable +presumptions, as to date or order of the dialogues.] + +It is, indeed, natural that critics should form some impression as to +earlier and later in the dialogues. But though there are some peculiar +cases in which such impression acquires much force, I conceive that in +almost all cases it is to a high degree uncertain. Several dialogues +proclaim themselves as subsequent to the death of Sokrates. We know +from internal allusions that the Theætêtus must have been composed +after 394 B.C., the Menexenus after 387 B.C., and the Symposion after +385 B.C. We are sure, by Aristotle's testimony, that the Leges were +written at a later period than the Republic; Plutarch also states that +the Leges were composed during the old age of Plato, and this +statement, accepted by most modern critics, appears to me +trustworthy.[54] The Sophistês proclaims itself as a second meeting, +by mutual agreement, of the same persons who had conversed in the +Theætêtus, with the addition of a new companion, the Eleatic stranger. +But we must remark that the subject of the Theætêtus, though left +unsettled at the close of that dialogue, is not resumed in the +Sophistês: in which last, moreover, Sokrates acts only a subordinate +part, while the Eleatic stranger, who did not appear in the Theætêtus, +is here put forward as the prominent questioner or expositor. So too, +the Politikus offers itself as a third of the same triplet: with this +difference, that while the Eleatic stranger continues as the +questioner, a new respondent appears in the person of Sokrates Junior. +The Politikus is not a resumption of the same subject as the +Sophistês, but a second application of the same method (the method of +logical division and subdivision) to a different subject. Plato speaks +also as if he contemplated a third application of the same method--the +Philosophus: which, so far as we know, was never realised. Again, the +Timæus presents itself as a sequel to the Republic, and the Kritias as +a sequel to the Timæus: a fourth, the Hermokrates, being apparently +announced, as about to follow--but not having been composed. + +[Footnote 54: Plutarch, Isid. et Osirid. c. 48, p. 370.] + +[Side-note: Trilogies indicated by Plato himself.] + +Here then are two groups of three each (we might call them Trilogies, +and if the intended fourth had been realised, Tetralogies), indicated +by Plato himself. A certain relative chronological order is here +doubtless evident: the Sophistês must have been composed after the +Theætêtus and before the Politikus, the Timæus after the Republic and +before the Kritias. But this is all that we can infer: for it does not +follow that the sequence must have been immediate in point of time: +there may have been a considerable interval between the three forming +the so-called Trilogy.[55] We may add, that neither in the Theætêtus +nor in the Republic, do we find indication that either of them is +intended as the first of a Trilogy: the marks proving an intended +Trilogy are only found in the second and third of the series. + +[Footnote 55: It may seem singular that Schlelermacher is among those +who adopt this opinion. He maintains that the Sophistes does not +follow _immediately_ upon the Theætêtus; that Plato, though intending +when he finished the Theætêtus to proceed onward to the Sophistês, +altered his intention, and took up other views instead: that the Menon +(and the Euthydêmus) come in between them, in immediate sequel to the +Theætêtus (Einleitung zum Menon, vol. iii. p. 326). + +Here Schleiermacher introduces a new element of uncertainty, which +invalidates yet more seriously the grounds for his hypothesis of a +preconceived sequence throughout all the dialogues. In a case where +Plato directly intimates an intentional sequence, we are called upon +to believe, on "internal grounds" alone, that he altered his +intention, and introduced other dialogues. He may have done this: but +how are we to prove it? How much does it attenuate the value of his +intentions, as proofs of an internal philosophical sequence? We become +involved more and more in unsupported hypothesis. I think that K. F. +Hermann's objections against Schleiermacher, on the above ground, have +much force; and that Ueberweg's reply to them is unsatisfactory. +(Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Phil. p. 350. Ueberweg, +Untersuchungen, p. 82, seq.)] + +[Side-note: Positive dates of all the dialogues--unknown.] + +While even the relative chronology of the dialogues is thus faintly +marked in the case of a few, and left to fallible conjecture in the +remainder--the positive chronology, or the exact year of composition, +is not directly marked in the case of any one. Moreover, at the very +outset of the enquiry, we have to ask, At what period of life did +Plato begin to publish his dialogues? Did he publish any of them +during the lifetime of Sokrates? and if so, which? Or does the +earliest of them date from a time after the death of Sokrates? + +[Side-note: When did Plato begin to compose? Not till after the death +of Sokrates.] + +Amidst the many dissentient views of the Platonic critics, it is +remarkable that they are nearly unanimous in their mode of answering +this question.[56] Most of them declare without hesitation, that Plato +published several before the death of Sokrates--that is, before he was +28 years of age--though they do not all agree in determining which +these dialogues were. I do not perceive that they produce any external +proofs of the least value. Most of them disbelieve (though Stallbaum +and Hermann believe) the anecdote about Sokrates and his criticism on +the dialogue Lysis.[57] In spite of their unanimity, I cannot but +adopt the opposite conclusion. It appears to me that Plato composed no +Sokratic dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates. + +[Footnote 56: Valentine Rose (De Aristotelis Librorum ordine, p. 25, +Berlin, 1854), Mullach (Democriti Fragm. p. 99), and R. Schöne (in his +Commentary on the Platonic Protagoras), are among the critics known to +me, who intimate their belief that Plato published no Sokratic +dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates. In discussing the matter, +Schöne adverts to two of the three lines of argument brought forward +in my text:--1. The too early and too copious "productivity" which the +received supposition would imply in Plato. 2. The improbability that +the name of Sokrates would be employed in written dialogues, as +spokesman, by any of his scholars during his lifetime. + +Schöne does not touch upon the improbability of the hypothesis, +arising out of the early position and aspirations of Plato himself +(Schöne, Ueber Platon's Protagoras, p. 64, Leipsic, 1862).] + +[Footnote 57: Diog. Laert. iii. 85; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Lys. +p. 90; K. F. Hermann, Gesch. u. Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 370. +Schleiermacher (Einl. zum Lysis, i. p. 175) treats the anecdote about +the Lysis as unworthy of credence. Diogenes (iii. 38) mentions that +some considered the Phædrus as Plato's earliest dialogue; the reason +being that the subject of it was something puerile: [Greek: lo/gos de\ +prô=ton gra/psai au)to\n to\n Phai=dron; kai\ ga\r e)/chei +meirakiô=des ti to\ pro/blêma. Dikai/archos de\ kai\ to\n tro/pon tê=s +graphê=s o(/lon e)pime/mphetai ô(s phortiko/n]. Olympiodorus also in +his life of Plato mentions the same report, that the Phædrus was +Plato's earliest composition, and gives the same ground of belief, +"its dithyrambic character". Even if the assertion were granted, that +the Phædrus is the earliest Platonic composition, we could not infer +that it was composed during the life-time of Sokrates. But that +assertion cannot be granted. The two statements, above cited, give it +only as a report, suggested to those who believed it by the character +and subject-matter of the dialogue. I am surprised that Dr. +Volquardsen, who in a learned volume, recently published, has +undertaken the defence of the theory of Schleiermacher about the +Phædrus (Phädros, Erste Schrift Platon's, Kiel, 1862), can represent +this as a "_feste historische Ueberlieferung_"--the rather as he +admits that Schleiermacher himself placed no confidence in it, and +relied upon other reasons (pp. 90-92-93). Comp. Schleiermacher, Einl. +zum Phaidros, p. 76. + +Whoever will read the Epistle of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, addressed +to Cneius Pompeius (pp. 751-765, Reiske), will be persuaded that +Dionysius can neither have known, nor even believed, that the Phædrus +was the first composition, and a youthful composition, of Plato. If +Dionysius had believed this, it would have furnished him with the +precise excuse which his letter required. For the purpose of his +letter is to mollify the displeasure of Cn. Pompey, who had written to +blame him for some unfavourable criticisms on the style of Plato. +Dionysius justifies his criticisms by allusions to the Phædrus. If he +had been able to add, that the Phædrus was a first composition, and +that Plato's later dialogues were comparatively free from the like +faults--this would have been the most effective way of conciliating +Cn. Pompey.] + +[Side-note: Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition--does +not consist with youth of the author.] + +All the information (scanty as it is) which we obtain from the rhetor +Dionysius and others respecting the composition of the Platonic +dialogues, announces them to have cost much time and labour to their +author: a statement illustrated by the great number of inversions of +words which he is said to have introduced successively in the first +sentence of the Republic, before he was satisfied to let the sentence +stand. This corresponds, too, with all that we read respecting the +patient assiduity both of Isokrates and Demosthenes.[58] A first-rate +Greek composition was understood not to be purchasable at lower cost. +I confess therefore to great surprise, when I read in Ast the +affirmation that the Protagoras was composed when Plato was only 22 +years old--and when I find Schleiermacher asserting, as if it were a +matter beyond dispute, that Protagoras, Phædrus, and Parmenidês, all +bear evident marks of Plato's youthful age (Jugendlichkeit). In regard +to the Phædrus and Parmenidês, indeed, Hermann and other critics +contest the view of Schleiermacher; and detect, in those two +dialogues, not only no marks of "juvenility," but what they consider +plain proofs of maturity and even of late age. But in regard to the +Protagoras, most of them agree with Schleiermacher and Ast, in +declaring it to be a work of Plato's youth, some time before the death +of Sokrates. Now on this point I dissent from them: and since the +decision turns upon "internal grounds," each must judge for himself. +The Protagoras appears to me one of the most finished and elaborate of +all the dialogues: in complication of scenic arrangements, dramatic +vivacity, and in the amount of theory worked out, it is surpassed by +none--hardly even by the Republic.[59] Its merits as a composition are +indeed extolled by all the critics; who clap their hands, especially, +at the humiliation which they believe to be brought upon the great +Sophist by Sokrates. But the more striking the composition is +acknowledged to be, the stronger is the presumption that its author +was more than 22 or 24 years of age. Nothing short of good positive +testimony would induce me to believe that such a dialogue as the +Protagoras could have been composed, even by Plato, before he attained +the plenitude of his powers. No such testimony is produced or +producible. I extend a similar presumption, even to the Lysis, Lachês, +Charmidês, and other dialogues: though with a less degree of +confidence, because they are shorter and less artistic, not equal to +the Protagoras. All of them, in my judgment, exhibit a richness of +ideas and a variety of expression, which suggest something very +different from a young novice as the author. + +[Footnote 58: Timæus said that Alexander the Great conquered the +Persian empire in less time than Isokrates required for the +composition of his panegyrical oration (Longinus, De Sublim. c. 4).] + +[Footnote 59: "Als aesthetisches Kunstwerk ist der Dialog Protagoras +das meisterhafteste unter den Werken Platon's.' (Socher, Ueber Platon, +p. 226.)] + +But over and above this presumption, there are other reasons which +induce me to believe, that none of the Platonic dialogues were +published during the lifetime of Sokrates. My reasons are partly +connected with Sokrates, partly with Plato. + +[Side-note: Reasons founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his +relations with Plato.] + +First, in reference to Sokrates--we may reasonably doubt whether any +written reports of his actual conversations were published during his +lifetime. He was the most constant, public, and indiscriminate of all +talkers: always in some frequented place, and desiring nothing so much +as a respondent with an audience. Every one who chose to hear him, +might do so without payment and with the utmost facility. Why then +should any one wish to read written reports of his conversations? +especially when we know that the strong interest which they excited in +the hearers depended much upon the spontaneity of his inspirations, +and hardly less upon the singularity of his manner and physiognomy. +Any written report of what he said must appear comparatively tame. +Again, as to fictitious dialogues (like the Platonic) employing the +name of Sokrates as spokesman--such might doubtless be published +during his lifetime by derisory dramatists for the purpose of raising +a laugh, but not surely by a respectful disciple and admirer for the +purpose of giving utterance to doctrines of his own. The greater was +the respect felt by Plato for Sokrates, the less would he be likely to +take the liberty of making Sokrates responsible before the public for +what Sokrates had never said.[60] There is a story in Diogenes--to the +effect that Sokrates, when he first heard the Platonic dialogue called +Lysis, exclaimed--"What a heap of falsehoods does the young man utter +about me!"[61] This story merits no credence as a fact: but it +expresses the displeasure which Sokrates would be likely to feel, on +hearing that one of his youthful companions had dramatised him as he +appears in the Lysis. Xenophon tells us, and it is very probable, that +inaccurate oral reports of the real colloquies of Sokrates may have +got into circulation. But that the friends and disciples of Sokrates, +during his lifetime, should deliberately publish fictitious dialogues, +putting their own sentiments into his mouth, and thus contribute to +mislead the public--is not easily credible. Still less credible is it +that Plato, during the lifetime of Sokrates, should have published +such a dialogue as the Phædrus, wherein we find ascribed to Sokrates, +poetical and dithyrambic effusions utterly at variance with the real +manifestations which Athenians might hear every day from Sokrates in +the market-place.[62] Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, complains of +the comic poet Aristophanes for misrepresenting him. Had the Platonic +Phædrus been then in circulation, or any other Platonic dialogues, he +might with equally good reason have warned the Dikasts against judging +of him, a real citizen on trial, from the titular Sokrates whom even +disciples did not scruple to employ as spokesman for their own +transcendental doctrine, and their own controversial sarcasms. + +[Footnote 60: Valentine Rose observes, in regard to a dialogue +composed by some one else, wherein Plato was introduced as one of the +interlocutors, that it could not have been composed until after +Plato's death, and that the dialogues of Plato were not composed until +after the death of Sokrates. "Platonis autem sermones antequam mortuus +fuerit, scripto neminem tradidisse, neque magistri viventis personâ in +dialogis abusos fuisse (non magis quam vivum Socratem induxerunt +Xenophon, Plato, cæteri Socratici), hoc veterum mori et religioni +quivis facile concedet," &c. (V. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, +pp. 57, 74, Leipsic, 1863.)--Val. Rose expresses the same opinion (that +none of the Sokratic dialogues, either by Plato or the other +companions of Sokrates, were written until after the death of +Sokrates) in his earlier work, De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et +Auctoritate, p. 25.] + +[Footnote 61: Diog. L. iii. 35.] + +[Footnote 62: In regard to the theory (elaborated by Schleiermacher, +recently again defended by Volquardsen), that the Phædrus is the +earliest among the Platonic dialogues, composed about 406 B.C., it +appears to me inconsistent also with what we know about Lysias. In the +Platonic Phædrus, Lysias is presented as a [Greek: logogra/phos] of +the highest reputation and eminence (p. 228 A, 257 C, and indeed +throughout the whole dialogue). Now this is quite inconsistent with +what we read from Lysias himself in the indictment which he preferred +against Eratosthenes, not long after the restoration of the democracy, +403 B.C. He protests therein strenuously that he had never had +judicial affairs of his own, nor meddled with those of others; and he +expresses the greatest apprehension from his own [Greek: a)peiri/a] +(sects. 4-6). I cannot believe that this would be said by a person +whom Phædrus terms [Greek: deino/tatos ô(\n tô=n nu=n gra/phein]. +Moreover, Lysias, in that same discourse, describes his own position +at Athens, anterior to the Thirty: he belonged to a rich metic family, +and was engaged along with his brother Polemarchus in a large +manufactory of shields, employing 120 slaves (s. 20). A person thus +rich and occupied was not likely to become a professed and notorious +[Greek: logogra/phos], though he may have been a clever and +accomplished man. Lysias was plundered and impoverished by the Thirty; +and he is said to have incurred much expense in aiding the efforts of +Thrasybulus. It was after this change of circumstances that he took to +rhetoric as a profession; and it is to some one of these later years +that the Platonic Phædrus refers.] + +[Side-note: Reasons, founded on the early life, character, and +position of Plato.] + +Secondly, in regard to Plato, the reasons leading to the same +conclusion are yet stronger. Unfortunately, we know little of the life +of Plato before he attained the age of 28, that is, before the death +of Sokrates: but our best means of appreciating it are derived from +three sources. 1. Our knowledge of the history of Athens from 409-399 +B.C., communicated by Thucydides, Xenophon, &c. 2. The seventh Epistle +of Plato himself, written four or five years before his death (about +352 B.C.). 3. A few hints from the Memorabilia of Xenophon. + +[Side-note: Plato's early life--active by necessity, and to some +extent ambitious.] + +To these evidences about the life of Plato, it has not been customary +to pay much attention. The Platonic critics seem to regard Plato so +entirely as a spiritual person ("like a blessed spirit, visiting earth +for a short time," to cite a poetical phrase applied to him by Göthe), +that they disdain to take account of his relations with the material +world, or with society around him. Because his mature life was +consecrated to philosophy, they presume that his youth must have been +so likewise. But this is a hasty assumption. You cannot thus abstract +_any_ man from the social medium by which, he is surrounded. The +historical circumstances of Athens from Plato's nineteenth year to his +twenty-sixth (409-403 B.C.) were something totally different from what +they afterwards became. They were so grave and absorbing, that had he +been ever so much inclined to philosophy, he would have been compelled +against his will to undertake active and heavy duty as a citizen. +Within those years (as I have observed in a preceding chapter) fell +the closing struggles of the Peloponnesian war; in which (to repeat +words already cited from Thucydides) Athens became more a military +post than a city--every citizen being almost habitually under arms: +then the long blockade, starvation, and capture of the city, followed +by the violences of the Thirty, the armed struggle under Thrasybulus, +and the perilous, though fortunately successful and equitable, +renovation of the democracy. These were not times for a young citizen, +of good family and robust frame, to devote himself exclusively to +philosophy and composition. I confess myself surprised at the +assertion of Schleiermacher and Steinhart, that Plato composed the +Charmidês and other dialogues under the Anarchy.[63] Amidst such +disquietude and perils he could not have renounced active duty for +philosophy, even if he had been disposed to do so. + +[Footnote 63: Steinhart, Einl. zum Laches, vol. i. p. 358, where he +says that Plato composed the Charmidês, Lachês, and Protagoras, all in +404 B.C. under the Thirty. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Charmides, +vol. ii. p. 8. + +The lines of Lucretius (i. 41) bear emphatically upon this trying +season: + +Nam neque nos agere hoc patriai tempore iniquo +Possumus æquo animo nec Memmi clara propago +Talibus in rebus communi desse saluti.] + +But, to make the case stronger, we learn from Plato's own testimony, +in his seventh Epistle, that he was not at that time disposed to +renounce active political life. He tells us himself, that as a young +man he was exceedingly eager, like others of the same age, to meddle +and distinguish himself in active politics.[64] How natural such +eagerness was, to a young citizen of his family and condition, may be +seen by the analogy of his younger brother Glaukon, who was +prematurely impatient to come forward: as well as by that of his +cousin Charmides, who had the same inclination, but was restrained by +exaggerated diffidence of character. Now we know that the real +Sokrates (very different from the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias) +did not seek to deter young men of rank from politics, and to consign +them to inactive speculation. Sokrates gives[65] earnest encouragement +to Charmides; and he does not discourage Glaukon, but only presses him +to adjourn his pretensions until the suitable stock of preliminary +information has been acquired. We may thus see that assuming the young +Plato to be animated with political aspirations, he would certainly +not be dissuaded,--nay, he would probably be encouraged--by Sokrates. + +[Footnote 64: Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 C. [Greek: Ne/os e)gô/ pote +ô)\n polloi=s dê\ tau)to\n e)/pathon; ô)|ê/thên, ei) tha=tton +e)mautou= genoi/mên ku/rios, e)pi\ ta\ koina\ tê=s po/leôs eu)thu\s +i)e/nai]. Again, 325 E: [Greek: ô(/ste me, to\ prô=ton pollê=s mesto\n +o)/nta o(rmê=s e)pi\ to\ pra/ttein ta\ koina/], &c.] + +[Footnote 65: See the two interesting colloquies of Sokrates, with +Glaukon and Charmides (Xenoph. Mem. iii. 6, 7). + +Charmides was killed along with Kritias during the eight months called +The Anarchy, at the battle fought with Thrasybulus and the democrats +(Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 19). The colloquy of Sokrates with Charmides, +recorded by Xenophon in the Memorabilia, must have taken place at some +time before the battle of Ægospotami; perhaps about 407 or 406 B.C.] + +Plato farther tells us that when (after the final capitulation of +Athens) the democracy was put down and the government of the Thirty +established, he embarked in it actively under the auspices of his +relatives (Kritias, Charmides, &c., then in the ascendant), with the +ardent hopes of youth[66] that he should witness and promote the +accomplishment of valuable reforms. Experience showed him that he was +mistaken. He became disgusted with the enormities of the Thirty, +especially with their treatment of Sokrates; and he then ceased to +co-operate with them. Again, after the year called the Anarchy, the +democracy was restored, and Plato's political aspirations revived +along with it. He again put himself forward for active public life, +though with less ardent hopes.[67] But he became dissatisfied with the +march of affairs, and his relationship with the deceased Kritias was +now a formidable obstacle to popularity. At length, four years after +the restoration of the democracy, came the trial and condemnation of +Sokrates. It was that event which finally shocked and disgusted Plato, +converting his previous dissatisfaction into an utter despair of +obtaining any good results from existing governments. From +thenceforward, he turned away from practice and threw himself into +speculation.[68] + +[Footnote 66: Plato, Epist. vii. 324 D. [Greek: Kai\ e)gô\ thaumasto\n +ou)de\n e)/pathon u(po\ neo/têtos], &c.] + +[Footnote 67: Plato, Epist. vii. 325 A. [Greek: Pa/lin de/, +bradu/teron me\n, ei)=lke de/ me o(/môs ê( peri\ to\ pra/ttein ta\ +koina\ kai\ politika\ e)pithumi/a.]] + +[Footnote 68: Plato, Epist. vii. 325 C: [Greek: Skopou=nti dê/ moi +tau=ta te kai\ tou\s a)nthrô/pous tou\s pra/ttontas ta\ politika/], +&c. 325 E: [Greek: Kai\ tou= me\n skopei=n mê\ a)postê=nai, pê= pote\ +a)/meinon a)\n gi/gnoito peri/ te au)ta\ tau=ta kai\ dê\ kai\ peri\ +tê\n pa=san politei/an, tou= de\ pra/ttein au)= perime/nein ai)ei\ +kairou/s, teleutô=nta de\ noê=sai peri\ pasô=n tô=n nu=n po/leôn o(/ti +kakô=s xu/mpasai politeu/ontai]. + +I have already stated in the 84th chapter of my History, describing +the visit of Plato to Dionysius in Sicily, that I believe the Epistles +of Plato to be genuine, and that the seventh Epistle especially +contains valuable information. Some critics undoubtedly are of a +different opinion, and consider them as spurious. But even among these +critics, several consider that the author of the Epistles, though not +Plato himself, was a contemporary and well informed: so that his +evidence is trustworthy. See K. F. Hermann, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, +pp. 282-283. The question has been again discussed recently by +Ueberweg (Untersuch. über d. Aechth. u. Zeitf. d. Plat. Schriften, pp. +120-123-125-129), who gives his own opinion that the letters are not +by Plato, and produces various arguments to the point. His arguments +are noway convincing to me: for the mysticism and pedantry of the +Epistles appear to me in full harmony with the Timæus and Leges, and +with the Pythagorean bias of Plato's later years, though not in +harmony with the Protagoras, and various other dialogues. Yet Ueberweg +also declares his full belief that the seventh Epistle is the +composition of a well-informed contemporary, and perfectly worthy of +credit as to the facts and K. F. Hermann declares the same. This is +enough for my present purpose. + +The statement, trusted by all the critics, that Plato's first visit to +Syracuse was made when he was about 40 years of age, depends +altogether on the assertion of the seventh Epistle. How numerous are +the assertions made by Platonic critics respecting Plato, upon +evidence far slighter than that of these Epistles! Boeckh considers +the seventh Epistle as the genuine work of Plato. Valentine Rose also +pronounces it to be genuine, though he does not consider the other +Epistles to be so (De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine, p. 25, p. 114, +Berlin, 1854). Tennemann admits the Epistles generally to be genuine +(System der Platon. Philos. i. p. 106). + +It is undeniable that these Epistles of Plato were recognised as +genuine and trusted by all the critics of antiquity from Aristophanes +downwards. Cicero, Plutarch, Aristeides, &c., assert facts upon the +authority of the Epistles. Those who declare the Epistles to be +spurious and worthless, ought in consistency to reject the statements +which Plutarch makes on the authority of the Epistles: they will find +themselves compelled to discredit some of the best parts of his life +of Dion. Compare Aristeides, [Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s] Or. 45, pp. +90-106, Dindorf.] + +[Side-note: Plato did not retire from political life until after the +restoration of the democracy, nor devote himself to philosophy until +after the death of Sokrates.] + +This very natural recital, wherein Plato (at the age of 75) describes +his own youth between 21 and 28--taken in conjunction with the other +reasons just enumerated--impresses upon me the persuasion, that Plato +did not devote himself to philosophy, nor publish any of his +dialogues, before the death of Sokrates: though he may probably have +composed dramas, and the beautiful epigrams which Diogenes has +preserved. He at first frequented the society of Sokrates, as many +other aspiring young men frequented it (likewise that of Kratylus, and +perhaps that of various Sophists[69]), from love of ethical debate, +admiration of dialectic power, and desire to acquire a facility of the +same kind in his own speech: not with any view to take up philosophy +as a profession, or to undertake the task either of demolishing or +constructing in the region of speculation. No such resolution was +adopted until after he had tried political life and had been +disappointed:--nor until such disappointment had been still more +bitterly aggravated by the condemnation of Sokrates. It was under this +feeling that Plato first consecrated himself to that work of +philosophical meditation and authorship,--of inquisitive travel and +converse with philosophers abroad,--and ultimately of teaching in the +Academy,--which filled up the remaining fifty years of his life. The +death of Sokrates left that venerated name open to be employed as +spokesman in his dialogues: and there was nothing in the political +condition of Athens after 399 B.C., analogous to the severe and +perilous struggle which tasked all the energies of her citizens from +409 B.C. down to the close of the war. + +[Footnote 69: Compare Plat. Protag. 312 A-B, 315 A, where the +distinction is pointedly drawn between one who visited Protagoras +[Greek: e)pi\ te/chnê|, ô(s dêmiourgo\s e)so/menos], and others who +came simply [Greek: e)pi\ paidei/a|, ô(s to\n i)diô/tên kai\ to\n +e)leu/theron pre/pei.]] + +[Side-note: All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one +years after the death of Sokrates.] + +I believe, on these grounds, that Plato did not publish any dialogues +during the life of Sokrates. An interval of fifty-one years separates +the death of Sokrates from that of Plato. Such an interval is more +than sufficient for all the existing dialogues of Plato, without the +necessity of going back to a more youthful period of his age. As to +distribution of the dialogues, earlier or later, among these fifty-one +years, we have little or no means of judging. Plato has kept out of +sight--with a degree of completeness which is really surprising--not +merely his own personality, but also the marks of special date and the +determining circumstances in which each dialogue was composed. Twice +only does he mention his own name, and that simply in passing, as if +it were the name of a third person.[70] As to the point of time to +which he himself assigns each dialogue, much discussion has been held +how far Plato has departed from chronological or historical +possibility; how far he has brought persons together in Athens who +never could have been there together, or has made them allude to +events posterior to their own decease. A speaker in Athenæus[71] +dwells, with needless acrimony, on the anachronisms of Plato, as if +they were gross faults. Whether they are faults or not, may fairly be +doubted: but the fact of such anachronisms cannot be doubted, when we +have before us the Menexenus and the Symposion. It cannot be supposed, +in the face of such evidence, that Plato took much pains to keep clear +of anachronisms: and whether they be rather more or rather less +numerous, is a question of no great moment. + +[Footnote 70: In the Apologia, c. 28, p. 38, Sokrates alludes to Plato +as present in court, and as offering to become guarantee, along with +others, for his fine. In the Phædon, Plato is mentioned as being sick; +to explain why he was not present at the last scene of Sokrates +(Phædon, p. 59 B). Diog. L. iii. 37. + +The pathos as well as the detail of the narrative in the Phædon makes +one imagine that Plato really was present at the scene. But being +obliged, by the uniform scheme of his compositions, to provide another +narrator, he could not suffer it to be supposed that he was himself +present. + +I have already remarked that this mention of Plato in the third person +([Greek: Pla/tôn de/, oi)=mai, ê)sthe/nei]) was probably one of the +reasons which induced Panætius to declare the Phædon _not_ to be the +work of Plato.] + +[Footnote 71: Athenæus, v. pp. 220, 221. Didymus also attacked Plato +as departing from historical truth--[Greek: e)piphuo/menos tô=| +Pla/tôni ô(s paristorou=nti]--against which the scholiast (ad Leges, +i. p. 630) defends him. Groen van Prinsterer, Prosopogr. Plat. p. 16. +The rhetor Aristeides has some remarks of the same kind, though less +acrimonious (Orat. xlvii. p. 435, Dind.) than the speaker in +Athenæus.] + +[Side-note: The Thrasyllean Canon is more worthy of trust than the +modern critical theories by which it has been condemned.] + +I now conclude my enquiry respecting the Platonic Canon. The +presumption in favour of that Canon, as laid down by Thrasyllus, is +stronger (as I showed in the preceding chapter) than it is in regard +to ancient authors generally of the same age: being traceable, in the +last resort, through the Alexandrine Museum, to authenticating +manuscripts in the Platonic school, and to members of that school who +had known and cherished Plato himself.[72] I have reviewed the +doctrines of several recent critics who discard this Canon as unworthy +of trust, and who set up for themselves a type of what Plato _must +have_ been, derived from a certain number of items in the +Canon--rejecting the remaining items as unconformable to their +hypothetical type. The different theories which they have laid down +respecting general and systematic purposes of Plato (apart from the +purpose of each separate composition), appear to me uncertified and +gratuitous. The "internal reasons," upon which they justify rejection +of various dialogues, are only another phrase for expressing their own +different theories respecting Plato as a philosopher and as a writer. For +my part I decline to discard any item of the Thrasyllean Canon, upon such +evidence as they produce: I think it a safer and more philosophical +proceeding to accept the entire Canon, and to accommodate my general +theory of Plato (in so far as I am able to frame one) to each and all +of its contents. + +[Footnote 72: I find this position distinctly asserted, and the +authority of the Thrasyllean catalogue, as certifying the genuine +works of Plato, vindicated, by Yxem, in his able dissertation on the +Kleitophon of Plato (pp. 1-3, Berlin, 1846). But Yxem does not set +forth the grounds of this opinion so fully as the present state of the +question demands. Moreover, he combines it with another opinion, upon +which he insists even at greater length, and from which I altogether +dissent--that the tetralogies of Thrasyllus exhibit the genuine order +established by Plato himself among the Dialogues.] + +[Side-note: Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed.] + +Considering that Plato's period of philosophical composition extended +over fifty years, and that the circumstances of his life are most +imperfectly known to us--it is surely hazardous to limit the range of +his varieties, on the faith of a critical repugnance, not merely +subjective and fallible, but withal entirely of modern growth: to +assume, as basis of reasoning, the admiration raised by a few of the +finest dialogues--and then to argue that no composition inferior to +this admired type, or unlike to it in doctrine or handling, can +possibly be the work of Plato. "The Minos, Theagês, Epistolæ, +Epinomis, &c., are unworthy of Plato: nothing so inferior in +excellence can have been composed by him. No dialogue can be admitted +as genuine which contradicts another dialogue, or which advocates any +low or incorrect or un-Platonic doctrine. No dialogue can pass which +is adverse to the general purpose of Plato as an improver of morality, +and a teacher of the doctrine of Ideas." On such grounds as these we +are called upon to reject various dialogues: and there is nothing upon +which, generally speaking, so much stress is laid as upon inferior +excellence. For my part, I cannot recognise any of them as sufficient +grounds of exception. I have no difficulty in believing, not merely +that Plato (like Aristophanes) produced many successive novelties, +"not at all similar one to the other, and all clever"[73]--but also +that among these novelties, there were inferior dialogues as well as +superior: that in different dialogues he worked out different, even +contradictory, points of view--and among them some which critics +declare to be low and objectionable: that we have among his works +unfinished fragments and abandoned sketches, published without order, +and perhaps only after his death. + +[Footnote 73: Aristophan. Nubes, 547-8. + +[Greek: A)ll' a)ei\ kaina\s i)de/as ei)sphe/rôn sophi/zomai, +Ou)de\n a)llê/laisin o(moi/as, kai\ pa/sas dexia/s.]] + +[Side-note: Opinions of Schleiermacher, tending to show this.] + +It may appear strange, but it is true, that Schleiermacher, the +leading champion of Plato's central purpose and systematic unity from +the beginning, lays down a doctrine to the same effect. He says, +"Truly, nothing can be more preposterous, than when people demand that +all the works even of a great master shall be of equal perfection--or +that such as are not equal, shall be regarded as not composed by him". +Zeller expresses himself in the same manner, and with as little +reserve.[74] These eminent critics here proclaim a general rule which +neither they nor others follow out. + +[Footnote 74: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Menon, vol. iii. p. 337. +"Und wahrlich, nichts ist wohl wunderlicher, als wenn man verlangt, +dass alle Werke auch eines grossen Meisters von gleicher Volkommenheit +seyn sollten--oder die es nicht sind, soll er nicht verfertigt haben." + +Compare Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., vol. ii. p. 322, ed. 2nd. + +It is to be remembered that this opinion of Schleiermacher refers only +to _completed works_ of the same master. You are not authorised in +rejecting any completed work as spurious, on the ground that it is not +equal in merit to some other. Still less, then, are you authorised in +rejecting, on the like ground, an uncompleted work--a professed +fragment, or a preliminary sketch. Of this nature are several of the +minor items in the Thrasyllean canon. + +M. Boeckh, in his Commentary on the dialogue called Minos, has +assigned the reasons which induce him to throw out that dialogue, +together with the Hipparchus, from the genuine works of Plato (and +farther to consider both of them, and the pseudo-Platonic dialogues De +Justo and De Virtute, as works of [Greek: Si/môn o( skuteu/s]: with +this latter hypothesis I have here no concern). He admits fully that +the Minos is of the Platonic age and irreproachable in style--"veteris +esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui mores totus denique +character, spondent" (p. 32). Next, he not only admits that it is like +Plato, but urges the _too great likeness_ to Plato as one of the +points of his case. He says that it is a bad, stupid, and unskilful +imitation of different Platonic dialogues: "Pergamus ad alteram partem +nostræ argumentationis, eamque etiam firmiorem, de _nimiâ +similitudine_ Platonicorum aliquot locorum. Nam de hoc quidem +conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem se ipsum haud posse +imitari: ni forté quis dubitet de sanâ ejus mente" (p. 23). In the +sense which Boeckh intends, I agree that Plato did not imitate +himself: in another sense, I think that he did. I mean that his +consummate compositions were preceded by shorter, partial, incomplete +sketches, which he afterwards worked up, improved, and re-modelled. I +do not understand how Plato could have composed such works as +Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Symposion, Phædrus, Phædon, &c., +without having before him many of these preparatory sketches. That +some of these sketches should have been preserved is what we might +naturally expect; and I believe Minos and Hipparchus to be among them. +I do not wonder that they are of inferior merit. One point on which +Boeckh (pp. 7, 8) contends that Hipparchus and Minos are unlike to +Plato is, that the _collocutor_ with Sokrates is anonymous. But we +find anonymous talkers in the Protagoras, Sophistês, Politikus, and +Leges.] + +I find elsewhere in Schleiermacher, another opinion, not less +important, in reference to disallowance of dialogues, on purely +internal grounds. Take the Gorgias and the Protagoras: both these two +dialogues are among the most renowned of the catalogue: both have +escaped all suspicion as to legitimacy, even from Ast and Socher, the +two boldest of all disfranchising critics. In the Protagoras, Sokrates +maintains an elaborate argument to prove, against the unwilling +Protagoras, that the Good is identical with the Pleasurable, and the +Evil identical with the Painful--in the Gorgias, Sokrates holds an +argument equally elaborate, to show that Good is essentially different +from Pleasurable, Evil from Painful. What the one affirms, the other +denies. Moreover, Schleiermacher himself characterises the thesis +vindicated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, as "entirely un-Sokratic and +un-Platonic".[75] If internal grounds of repudiation are held to be +available against the Thrasyllean canon, how can such grounds exist in +greater force than those which are here admitted to bear against the +Protagoras--That it exhibits Sokrates as contradicting the Sokrates of +the Gorgias--That it exhibits him farther as advancing and proving, at +great length, a thesis "entirely un-Sokratic and un-Platonic"? Since +the critics all concur in disregarding these internal objections, as +insufficient to raise even a suspicion against the Protagoras, I +cannot concur with them when they urge the like objections as valid +and irresistible against other dialogues. + +[Footnote 75: Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Protag. vol. i. p. 232. "Jene +ganz unsokratische und unplatonische Ansicht, dass das Gute nichts +anderes ist als das Angenehme." + +So also, in the Parmenides, we find a host of unsolved objections +against the doctrine of Ideas; upon which in other dialogues Plato so +emphatically insists. Accordingly, Socher, resting upon this +discrepancy as an "internal ground," declares the Parmenides not to be +the work of Plato. But the other critics refuse to go along with this +inference. I think they are right in so refusing. But this only shows +how little such internal grounds are to be trusted, as evidence to +prove spuriousness.] + +I may add, as farther illustrating this point, that there are few +dialogues in the list against which stronger objections on internal +grounds can be brought, than Leges and Menexenus. Yet both of them +stand authenticated, beyond all reasonable dispute, as genuine works +of Plato, not merely by the Canon of Thrasyllus, but also by the +testimony of Aristotle.[76] + +[Footnote 76: See Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 384: and still +more, Zeller, Plat. Studien, pp. 1-131, Tübingen, 1839. In that +treatise, where Zeller has set forth powerfully the grounds for +denying the genuineness of the Leges, he relied so much upon the +strength of this negative case, as to discredit the direct testimony +of Aristotle affirming the Leges to be genuine. In his Phil. d. +Griech. Zeller altered this opinion, and admitted the Leges to be +genuine. But Strümpell adheres to the earlier opinion given by Zeller, +and maintains that the partial recantation is noway justified. (Gesch. +d. Prakt. Phil. d. Griech. p. 457.) + +Suckow mentions (Form der Plat. Schriften, 1855, p. 135) that Zeller +has in a subsequent work reverted to his former opinion, denying the +genuineness of the Leges. Suckow himself denies it also; relying not +merely on the internal objections against it, but also on a passage of +Isokrates (ad Philippum, p. 84), which he considers to sanction his +opinion, but which (in my judgment) entirely fails to bear him out. + +Suckow attempts to show (p. 55), and Ueberweg partly countenances the +same opinion, that the two passages in which Aristotle alludes to the +Menexenus (Rhet. i. 9, 30; iii. 14, 11) do not prove that he +(Aristotle) considered it as a work of Plato, because he mentions the +name of Sokrates only, and not that of Plato. But this is to require +from a witness such precise specification as we cannot reasonably +expect. Aristotle, alluding to the Menexenus, says, [Greek: Sôkra/tês +e)n tô=| E)pitaphi/ô|]: just as, in alluding to the Gorgias in another +place (Sophist. Elench. 12, p. 173), he says, [Greek: Kalliklê=s e)n +tô=| Gorgi/a|]: and again, in alluding to the Phædon, [Greek: o( e)n +Phai/dôni Sôkra/tês] (De Gen. et Corrupt. ii. 9, p. 335): not to +mention his allusions in the Politica to the Platonic Republic, under +the name of Sokrates. No instance can be produced in which Aristotle +cites any Sokratic dialogue, composed by Antisthenes, Æschines, &c., +or any other of the Sokratic companions except Plato. And when we read +in Aristotle's Politica (ii. 3, 3) the striking compliment +paid--[Greek: To\ me\n ou)=n peritto\n e)/chousi pa/ntes oi( tou= +Sôkra/tous lo/goi, kai\ to\ kompso/n, kai\ to\ kaino/tomon, kai\ to\ +zêtêtiko/n; kalô=s de\ pa/nta i)/sôs chalepo/n]--we cannot surely +imagine that he intends to designate any other dialogues than those +composed by Plato.] + +[Side-note: Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties, +and must be based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to +the exclusion of the rest.] + +While adhering therefore to the Canon of Thrasyllus, I do not think +myself obliged to make out that Plato is either like to himself, or +equal to himself, or consistent with himself, throughout all the +dialogues included therein, and throughout the period of fifty years +during which these dialogues were composed. Plato is to be found in +all and each of the dialogues, not in an imaginary type abstracted +from some to the exclusion of the rest. The critics reverence so much +this type of their own creation, that they insist on bringing out a +result consistent with it, either by interpretation specially +contrived, or by repudiating what will not harmonise. Such sacrifice +of the inherent diversity, and separate individuality, of the +dialogues, to the maintenance of a supposed unity of type, style, or +purpose, appears to me an error. In fact,[77] there exists, for us, no +personal Plato any more than there is a personal Shakespeare. Plato +(except in the Epistolæ) never appears before us, nor gives us any +opinion as his own: he is the unseen prompter of different characters +who converse aloud in a number of distinct dramas--each drama a +separate work, manifesting its own point of view, affirmative or +negative, consistent or inconsistent with the others, as the case may +be. In so far as I venture to present a general view of one who keeps +constantly in the dark--who delights to dive, and hide himself, not +less difficult to catch than the supposed Sophist in his own dialogue +called Sophistês--I shall consider it as subordinate to the dialogues, +each and all: and above all, it must be such as to include and +acknowledge not merely diversities, but also inconsistencies and +contradictions.[78] + +[Footnote 77: The only manifestation of the personal Plato is in the +Epistolæ. I have already said that I accept these as genuine, though +most critics do not. I consider them valuable illustrations of his +character, as far as they go. They are all written after he was more +than sixty years of age. And most of them relate to his relations with +Dionysius the younger, with Dion, and with Sicilian affairs generally. +This was a peculiar and outlying phase of Plato's life, during which +(through the instigation of Dion, and at the sacrifice of his own +peace of mind) he became involved in the world of political action: he +had to deal with real persons, passions, and interests--with the +feeble character, literary velleities, and jealous apprehensions of +Dionysius--the reforming vehemence and unpopular harshness of Dion--the +courtiers, the soldiers, and the people of Syracuse, all moved by +different passions of which he had had no practical experience. It +could not be expected that, amidst such turbulent elements, Plato as +an adviser could effect much: yet I do not think that he turned his +chances, doubtful as they were, to the best account. I have +endeavoured to show this in the tenth volume of my History of Greece, +c. 84. But at all events, these operations lay apart from Plato's true +world--the speculation, dialectic, and lectures of the Academy at +Athens. The Epistolæ, however, present some instructive points, +bearing upon Plato's opinions about writing as a medium of +philosophical communication and instruction to learners, which I shall +notice in the suitable place.] + +[Footnote 78: I transcribe from the instructive work of M. Ernest +Renan, _Averroès et l'Averroïsme_, a passage in which he deprecates +the proceeding of critics who presume uniform consistency throughout +the works of Aristotle, and make out their theory partly by forcible +exegesis, partly by setting aside as spurious all those compositions +which oppose them. The remark applies more forcibly to the dialogues +or Plato, who is much less systematic than Aristotle:-- + +"On a combattu l'interprétation d'Ibn-Rosehd (Averroès), et soutenu +que l'intellect actif n'est pour Aristote qu'une faculté de l'ame. +L'intellect passif n'est alors que la faculté de recevoir les [Greek: +phanta/smata]: l'intellect actif n'est que l'induction s'exerçant sur +les [Greek: phanta/smata] et en tirant les idées générales. Ainsi l'on +fait concorder la théorie exposée dans le troisième livre du Traité de +l'Ame, avec celle des Seconds Analytiques, où Aristote semble réduire +le rôle de la raison à l'induction généralisant les faits de la +sensation. Certes, je ne me dissimule pas qu'Aristote paraît souvent +envisager le [Greek: nou=s] comme personnel à l'homme. Son attention +constante à repéter que l'intellect est identique à l'intelligible, +que l'intellect passe à l'acte quand il devient l'objet qu'il pense, +est difficile à concilier avec l'hypothèse d'un intellect séparé de +l'homme. Mais il est dangereux de faire ainsi coincider de force les +différents aperçus des anciens. Les anciens philosophaient souvent +sans se limiter dans un système, traitant le même sujet selon les +points de vue qui s'offraient à eux, ou qui leur étaient offerts par +les écoles antérieures, sans s'inquiéter des dissonances qui pouvaient +exister entre ces divers tronçons de théorie. Il est puéril de +chercher à les mettre d'accord avec eux-mêmes, quand eux-mêmes s'en +sont peu souciés. Autant vaudrait, comme certains critiques Allemands, +déclarer interpolés tous les passages que l'on ne peut concilier avec +les autres. Ainsi, la théorie des Seconds Analytiques et celles du +troisième livre de l'Ame, sans se contredire expressément, +représentent deux aperçus profondément distincts et d'origine +différente, sur le fait de l'intelligence." (Averroès et l'Averroïsme, +p. 96-98, Paris, 1852.) + +There is also in Strümpell (Gesch. der Prakt. Phil. der Griech. vor +Aristot. p. 200) a good passage to the same purpose as the above from +M. Renan: disapproving this presumption,--that the doctrines of every +ancient philosopher must of course be systematic and coherent with +each other--as "a phantom of modern times": and pointing out that both +Plato and Aristotle founded their philosophy, not upon any one +governing [Greek: a)rchê\] alone, from which exclusively consequences +are deduced, but upon several distinct, co-ordinate, independent, +points of view: each of which is by turns followed out, not always +consistently with the others.] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY. + + +[Side-note: Variety and abundance visible in Plato's writings.] + +On looking through the collection of works enumerated in the +Thrasyllean Canon, the first impression made upon us respecting the +author is, that which is expressed in the epithets applied to him by +Cicero--"varius et multiplex et copiosus". Such epithets bring before +us the variety in Plato's points of view and methods of handling--the +multiplicity of the topics discussed--the abundance of the premisses +and illustrations suggested:[1] comparison being taken with other +literary productions of the same age. It is scarcely possible to find +any one predicate truly applicable to all of Plato's works. Every +predicate is probably true in regard to some:--none in regard to all. + +[Footnote 1: The rhetor Aristeides, comparing Plato with Æschines +(_i.e._ Æschines Socraticus, disciple of Sokrates also), remarks that +Æschines was more likely to report what Sokrates really said, from +being inferior in productive imagination. Plato (as he truly says +Orat. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], p. 295, Dindorf) [Greek: +tê=s phu/seôs chrê=tai periousi/a|], &c.] + +[Side-note: Plato both sceptical and dogmatical.] + +Several critics of antiquity considered Plato as essentially a +sceptic--that is, a Searcher or Enquirer, not reaching any assured or +proved result. They denied to him the character of a dogmatist: they +maintained that he neither established nor enforced any affirmative +doctrines.[2] This latter statement is carried too far. Plato is +sceptical in some dialogues, dogmatical in others. And the catalogue +of Thrasyllus shows that the sceptical dialogues (Dialogues of Search +or Investigation) are more numerous than the dogmatical (Dialogues of +Exposition)--as they are also, speaking generally, more animated and +interesting. + +[Footnote 2: Diogen. Laert. iii. 52. Prolegom. Platon. Philosoph. c. +10, vol. vi. 205, of K. F. Hermann's edition of Plato.] + +[Side-note: Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in +all.] + +Again, Aristotle declared the writing of Plato to be something between +poetry and prose, and even the philosophical doctrine of Plato +respecting Ideas, to derive all its apparent plausibility from poetic +metaphors. The affirmation is true, up to a certain point. Many of the +dialogues display an exuberant vein of poetry, which was declared--not +by Aristotle alone, but by many other critics contemporary with Plato--to +be often misplaced and excessive--and which appeared the more +striking because the dialogues composed by the other Sokratic +companions were all of them plain and unadorned.[3] The various +mythes, in the Phædrus and elsewhere, are announced expressly as +soaring above the conditions of truth and logical appreciation. +Moreover, we find occasionally an amount of dramatic vivacity, and of +artistic antithesis between the speakers introduced, which might have +enabled Plato, had he composed for the drama as a profession, to +contend with success for the prizes at the Dionysiac festivals. But +here again, though this is true of several dialogues, it is not true +of others. In the Parmenidês, Timæus, and the Leges, such elements +will be looked for in vain. In the Timæus, they are exchanged for a +professed cosmical system, including much mystic and oracular +affirmation, without proof to support it, and without opponents to +test it: in the Leges, for ethical sermons, and religious +fulminations, proclaimed by a dictatorial authority. + +[Footnote 3: See Dionys. Hal. Epist. ad Cn. Pomp. 756, De Adm. Vi Dic. +Dem. 956, where he recognises the contrast between Plato and [Greek: +to\ Sôkratiko\n didaskalei=on pa=n]. His expression is remarkable: +[Greek: Tau=ta ga\r oi(/ te kat' au)to\n geno/menoi pa/ntes +e)pitimô=sin ô(=n ta\ o)no/mata ou)de\n dei= me le/gein]. Epistol. ad +Cn. Pomp. p. 761; also 757. See also Diog. L. iii. 37; Aristotel. +Metaph. A. 991, a. 22. + +Cicero and Quintilian say the same about Plato's style: "Multum supra +prosam orationem, et quam pedestrem Græci vocant, surgit: ut mihi non +hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico videatur oraculo instinctus". +Quintil. x. 1, 81. Cicero, Orator, c. 20. Lucian, Piscator, c. 22. + +Sextus Empiricus designates the same tendency under the words [Greek: +tê\n Pla/tônos a)neidôlopoi/êsin]. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. iii. 189. + +The Greek rhetors of the Augustan age--Dionysius of Halikarnassus and +Kækilius of Kalaktê--not only blamed the style of Plato for excessive, +overstrained, and misplaced metaphor, but Kækilius goes so far as to +declare a decided preference for Lysias over Plato. (Dionys. Hal. De +Vi Demosth. pp. 1025-1037, De Comp. Verb. p. 196 R; Longinus, De +Sublimitat. c. 32.) The number of critics who censured the manner and +doctrine of Plato (critics both contemporary with him and subsequent) +was considerable (Dionys. H. Ep. ad Pomp. p. 757). Dionysius and the +critics of his age had before their eyes the contrast of the Asiatic +style of rhetoric, prevalent in their time, with the Attic style +represented by Demosthenes and Lysias. They wished to uphold the force +and simplicity of the Attic, against the tumid, wordy, pretensive +Asiatic: and they considered the Phædrus, with other compositions of +Plato, as falling under the same censure with the Asiatic. See Theoph. +Burckhardt, Cæcili Rhet. Frag., Berlin, 1863, p. 15.] + +[Side-note: Form of dialogue--universal to this extent, that Plato +never speaks in his own name.] + +One feature there is, which is declared by Schleiermacher and others +to be essential to all the works of Plato--the form of dialogue. Here +Schleiermacher's assertion, literally taken, is incontestable. Plato +always puts his thoughts into the mouth of some spokesman: he never +speaks in his own name. All the works of Plato which we possess +(excepting the Epistles, and the Apology, which last I consider to be +a report of what Sokrates himself said) are dialogues. But under this +same name, many different realities are found to be contained. In the +Timæus and Kritias the dialogue is simply introductory to a continuous +exposition--in the Menexenus, to a rhetorical discourse: while in the +Leges, and even in Sophistês, Politikus, and others, it includes no +antithesis nor interchange between two independent minds, but is +simply a didactic lecture, put into interrogatory form, and broken +into fragments small enough for the listener to swallow at once: he by +his answer acknowledging the receipt. If therefore the affirmation of +Schleiermacher is intended to apply to all the Platonic compositions, +we must confine it to the form, without including the spirit, of +dialogue. + +[Side-note: No one common characteristic pervading all Plato's works.] + +It is in truth scarcely possible to resolve all the diverse +manifestations of the Platonic mind into one higher unity; or to +predicate, about Plato as an intellectual person, anything which shall +be applicable at once to the Protagoras, Gorgias, Parmenidês, Phædrus, +Symposion, Philêbus, Phædon, Republic, Timæus, and Leges. Plato was +sceptic, dogmatist, religious mystic and inquisitor, mathematician, +philosopher, poet (erotic as well as satirical), rhetor, artist--all +in one:[4] or at least, all in succession, throughout the fifty years +of his philosophical life. At one time his exuberant dialectical +impulse claims satisfaction, manifesting itself in a string of +ingenious doubts and unsolved contradictions: at another time, he is +full of theological antipathy against those who libel Helios and +Selênê, or who deny the universal providence of the Gods: here, we +have unqualified confessions of ignorance, and protestations against +the false persuasion of knowledge, as alike widespread and +deplorable--there, we find a description of the process of building up +the Kosmos from the beginning, as if the author had been privy to the +inmost purposes of the Demiurgus. In one dialogue the erotic fever is +in the ascendant, distributed between beautiful youths and philosophical +concepts, and confounded with a religious inspiration and _furor_ +which supersedes and transcends human sobriety (Phædrus): in another, +all vehement impulses of the soul are stigmatised and repudiated, no +honourable scope being left for anything but the calm and passionless +Nous (Philêbus, Phædon). Satire is exchanged for dithyramb, and mythe, +and one ethical point of view for another (Protagoras, Gorgias). The +all-sufficient dramatising power of the master gives full effect to +each of these multifarious tendencies. On the whole--to use a +comparison of Plato himself[5]--the Platonic sum total somewhat +resembles those fanciful combinations of animals imagined in the +Hellenic mythology--an aggregate of distinct and disparate +individualities, which look like one because they are packed in the +same external wrapper. + +[Footnote 4: Dikæarchus affirmed that Plato was a compound of Sokrates +with Pythagoras. Plutarch calls him also a compound of Sokrates with +Lykurgus. (Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 2, p. 718 B.) + +Nemesius the Platonist (Eusebius, Præp. Evang. xiv. 5-7-8) repeats the +saying of Dikæarchus, and describes Plato as midway between Pythagoras +and Sokrates; [Greek: meseu/ôn Puthago/rou kai\ Sôkra/tous]. No three +persons could be more disparate than Lykurgus, Pythagoras, and +Sokrates. But there are besides various other attributes of Plato, +which are not included under either of the heads of this tripartite +character. + +The Stoic philosopher Sphærus composed a work in three books--[Greek: +Peri\ Lukou/rgou kai\ Sôkra/tous]--(Diog. La. vii. 178). He probably +compared therein the Platonic Republic with the Spartan constitution +and discipline.] + +[Footnote 5: Plato, Republ. ix. 588 C. [Greek: Oi(=ai muthologou=ntai +palaiai\ gene/sthai phu/seis, ê(/ te Chimai/ras kai\ ê( Sku/llês kai\ +Kerbe/rou, kai\ a)/llai tine\s suchnai\ le/gontai xumpephukui=ai +i)de/ai pollai\ ei)s e(\n gene/sthai . . . . Peri/plason dê\ au)toi=s +e)/xôthen e(no\s ei)ko/na, tê\n tou= a)nthrô/pou, ô(/ste tô=| mê\ +duname/nô| ta\ e)nto\s o(ra=|n, a)lla\ to\ e)/xô mo/non e)/lutron +o(rô=nti, e(\n zô=on phai/nesthai--a)/nthrôpon.]] + +[Side-note: The real Plato was not merely a writer of dialogues, but +also lecturer and president of a school. In this last important +function he is scarcely at all known to us. Notes of his lectures +taken by Aristotle.] + +Furthermore, if we intend to affirm anything about Plato as a whole, +there is another fact which ought to be taken into account.[6] We know +him only from his dialogues, and from a few scraps of information. But +Plato was not merely a composer of dialogues. He was lecturer, and +chief of a school, besides. The presidency of that school, commencing +about 386 B.C., and continued by him with great celebrity for the last +half (nearly forty years) of his life, was his most important +function. Among his contemporaries he must have exercised greater +influence through his school than through his writings.[7] Yet in this +character of school-teacher and lecturer, he is almost unknown to us: +for the few incidental allusions which have descended to us, through +the Aristotelian commentators, only raise curiosity without satisfying +it. The little information which we possess respecting Plato's +lectures, relates altogether to those which he delivered upon the +Ipsum Bonum or Summum Bonum at some time after Aristotle became his +pupil--that is, during the last eighteen years of Plato's life. +Aristotle and other hearers took notes of these lectures: Aristotle +even composed an express work now lost (De Bono or De Philosophiâ), +reporting with comments of his own these oral doctrines of Plato, +together with the analogous doctrines of the Pythagoreans. We learn +that Plato gave continuous lectures, dealing with the highest and most +transcendental concepts (with the constituent elements or factors of +the Platonic Ideas or Ideal Numbers: the first of these factors being +The One the second, The Indeterminate Dyad, or The Great and Little, +the essentially indefinite), and that they were mystic and +enigmatical, difficult to understand.[8] + +[Footnote 6: Trendelenburg not only adopts Schleiermacher's theory of +a preconceived and systematic purpose connecting together all Plato's +dialogues, but even extends this purpose to Plato's oral lectures: "Id +pro certo habendum est. sicut prioribus dialogis quasi præeparat +(Plato) posteriores, posterioribus evolvit priores--ita et in scholis +continuasse dialogos; quæ reliquerit, absolvisse; atque omnibus ad +summa principia perductis, intima quasi semina aperuisse". +(Trendelenburg, De Ideis et Numeris Platonis, p. 6.) + +This opinion is surely not borne out--it seems even contradicted--by +all the information which we possess (very scanty indeed) about the +Platonic lectures. Plato delivered therein his Pythagorean doctrines, +merging his Ideas in the Pythagorean numerical symbols: and Aristotle, +far from considering this as a systematic and intended evolution of +doctrine at first imperfectly unfolded, treats it as an additional +perversion and confusion, introduced into a doctrine originally +erroneous. In regard to the transition of Plato from the doctrine of +Ideas to that of Ideal Numbers, see Aristotel. Metaphys. M. 1078, b. +9, 1080, a. 12 (with the commentary of Bonitz, pp. 539-541), A. 987, +b. 20. + +M. Boeckh, too, accounts for the obscure and enigmatical speaking of +Plato in various dialogues, by supposing that he cleared up all the +difficulties in his oral lectures. "Platon deutet nur an--spricht +meinethalben räthselhaft (in den Gesetzen); aber gerade so räthselhaft +spricht er von diesen Sachen im Timaeus: er pflegt mathematische +Theoreme nur anzudeuten, nicht zu entwickeln: ich glaube, weil er sie +in den Vorträgen ausführte," &c. (Untersuchungen über das Kosmische +System des Platon, p. 50.) + +This may be true about the mathematical theorems; but I confess that I +see no proof of it. Though Plato admits that his doctrine in the +Timæus is [Greek: a)ê/thês lo/gos], yet he expressly intimates that +the hearers are instructed persons, able to follow him (Timæus, p. 53 +C.).] + +[Footnote 7: M. Renan, in his work, 'Averroès et l'Averroïsme,' pp. +257-325, remarks that several of the Italian professors of philosophy, +at Padua and other universities, exercised far greater influence +through their lectures than through their published works. He says (p. +325-6) respecting Cremonini (Professor at Padua, 1590-1620):--"Il a +été jusqu'ici apprécié d'une manière fort incomplète par les +historiens de la philosophie. On ne l'a jugé que par ses écrits +imprimés, qui ne sont que des dissertations de peu d'importance, et ne +peuvent en aucune manière faire comprendre la renommée colossale à +laquelle il parvint. Cremonini n'est qu'un professeur: ses _cours_ +sont sa véritable philosophie. Aussi, tandis que ses écrits imprimés +se vendaient fort mal, les rédactions de ses leçons se répandaient +dans toute l'Italie et même au delà des monts. On sait que les élèves +préfèrent souvent aux textes imprimés, les cahiers qu'ils ont ainsi +recueillis de la bouche de leurs professeurs. . . En général, c'est +dans les cahiers, beaucoup plus que dans les sources imprimées, qu'il +faut étudier l'école de Padoue. Pour Cremonini, cette tâche est +facile; car les copies de ses cours sont innombrables dans le nord de +l'Italie."] + +[Footnote 8: Aristotle (Physic. iv. p. 209, b. 34) alludes to [Greek: +ta\ lego/mena a)/grapha do/gmata] of Plato, and their discordance on +one point with the Timæus. + +Simplikius ad Aristot. Physic. f. 104 b. p. 362, a. 11, Brandis. +[Greek: A)rcha\s ga\r kai\ tô=n ai)sthêtô=n to\ e(\n kai\ tê\n +a)o/risto/n phasi dua/da le/gein to\n Pla/tôna. Tê\n de\ a)o/riston +dua/da kai\ e)n toi=s noêtoi=s tithei\s a)/peiron ei)=nai e)/legen, +kai\ to\ me/ga de\ kai\ to\ mikro\n a)rcha\s tithei\s a)/peira ei)=nai +e)/legen e)n toi=s peri\ Ta)gathou= lo/gois, oi(=s o( A)ristote/lês +kai\ Ê(raklei/dês kai\ E)stiai=os kai\ a)/lloi tou= Pla/tônos +e(tai=roi _parageno/menoi a)negra/psanto ta\ r(êthe/nta, +ai)nigmatôdô=s ô(s e)r)r(ê/thê_; Porphu/rios de\ diarthrou=n au)ta\ +e)paggello/menos ta/de peri\ au)tô=n ge/graphen e)n tô| Philê/bô|]. +Compare another passage of the same Scholia, p. 334, b. 28, p. 371, b. +26. [Greek: Ta\s a)gra/phous sunousi/as tou= Pla/tônos au)to\s o( +A)ristote/lês a)pegra/psato]. 372, a. [Greek: To\ methektiko\n e)n +me\n tai=s peri\ Ta)gathou sunousi/ais me/ga kai\ mikro\n e)ka/lei, +e)n de\ tô=| Timai/ô| u(/lên, ê)\n kai\ chô/ran kai\ to/pon +ô)no/maze]. Comp 371, a. 5, and the two extracts from Simplikius, +cited by Zeller, De Hermodoro, pp. 20, 21. By [Greek: a)/grapha +do/gmata], or [Greek: a)/graphoi sunou/siai], we are to understand +opinions or colloquies not written down (or not communicated to others +as writings) _by Plato himself_: thus distinguished from his written +dialogues. Aristotle, in the treatise, De Animâ, i. 2, p. 404, b. 18, +refers to [Greek: e)n toi=s peri\ Philosophi/as]: which Simplikius +thus explains [Greek: peri\ philosophi/as nu=n le/gei ta\ peri\ tou= +A)gathou= au)tô=| e)k tê=s Pla/tônos a)nagegramme/na sunousi/as, e)n +oi(=s i(storei= ta/s te Puthagorei/ous kai\ Platônika\s peri\ tô=n +o)/ntôn do/xas]. Philoponus reports the same thing: see +Trendelenburg's Comm. on De Animâ, p. 226. Compare Alexand. ad +Aristot. Met. A. 992, p. 581, a. 2, Schol. Brandis.] + +[Side-note: Plato's lectures De Bono obscure and transcendental. +Effect which they produced on the auditors.] + +One remarkable observation, made upon them by Aristotle, has been +transmitted to us.[9] There were lectures announced to be, On the +Supreme Good. Most of those who came to hear, expected that Plato +would enumerate and compare the various matters usually considered +_good_--_i.e._ health, strength, beauty, genius, wealth, power, &c. +But these hearers were altogether astonished at what they really +heard: for Plato omitting the topics expected, descanted only upon +arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy; and told them that The Good was +identical with The One (as contrasted with the Infinite or +Indeterminate which was Evil). + +[Footnote 9: Aristoxenus, Harmon. ii. p. 30. [Greek: Katha/per +A)ristote/lês a)ei\ diêgei=to tou\s plei/stous tô=n a)kousa/ntôn para\ +Pla/tônos tê\n peri\ tou= a)gathou= a)kro/asin pathei=n; prosei=nai +ga\r e(/kaston u(polamba/nonta lê/psesthai/ ti tô=n nomizome/nôn +a)nthrôpi/nôn a)gathô=n;--o(/te de\ phanei/êsan oi( lo/goi peri\ +mathêma/tôn kai\ a)rithmô=n kai\ geômetri/as kai\ a)strologi/as, kai\ +to\ pe/ras o(/ti a)gatho/n e)stin e(/n, pantelô=s oi)=mai para/doxon +e)phai/neto au)toi=s]. + +Compare Themistius, Orat. xxi. p. 245 D. Proklus also alludes to this +story, and to the fact that most of the [Greek: polu\s kai\ pantoi=os +o)/chlos], who were attracted to Plato's [Greek: a)kro/asis peri\ +Ta)gathou=], were disappointed or unable to understand him, and went +away. (Proklus ad Platon. Parmen. p. 92, Cousin. 528, Stallb.)] + +[Side-note: They were delivered to miscellaneous auditors. They +coincide mainly with what Aristotle states about the Platonic Ideas.] + +We see farther from this remark:--First, that Plato's lectures were +often above what his auditors could appreciate--a fact which we learn +from other allusions also: Next, that they were not confined to a +select body of advanced pupils, who had been worked up by special +training into a state fit for comprehending them.[10] Had such been +the case, the surprise which Aristotle mentions could never have +been felt. And we see farther, that the transcendental doctrine +delivered in the lectures De Bono (though we find partial analogies to +it in Philêbus, Epinomis, and parts of Republic) coincides more with +what Aristotle states and comments upon as Platonic doctrine, than +with any reasonings which we find in the Platonic dialogues. It +represents the latest phase of Platonism: when the Ideas originally +conceived by him as Entities in themselves, had become merged or +identified in his mind with the Pythagorean numbers or symbols. + +[Footnote 10: Respecting Plato's lectures, see Brandis (Gesch. der +Griech.-Röm. Phil. vol. ii. p. 180 seq., 306-319); also Trendelenburg, +Platonis De Ideis et Numeris Doctrina, pp. 3, 4, seq. + +Brandis, though he admits that Plato's lectures were continuous +discourses, thinks that they were intermingled with discussion and +debate: which may have been the case, though there is no proof of it. +But Schleiermacher goes further, and says (Einleitung. p. 18), "Any +one who can think that Plato in these oral _Vorträgen_ employed the +Sophistical method of long speeches, shows such an ignorance as to +forfeit all right of speaking about Plato". Now the passage from +Aristoxenus, given in the preceding note, is our only testimony; and +it distinctly indicates a continuous lecture to an unprepared +auditory, just as Protagoras or Prodikus might have given. K. F. +Hermann protests, with good reason, against Schleiermacher's opinion. +(Ueber Plato's schriftstellerische Motive, p. 289.) + +The confident declaration just produced from Schleiermacher +illustrates the unsound basis on which he and various other Platonic +critics proceed. They find, in some dialogues of Plato, a strong +opinion proclaimed, that continuous discourse is useless for the +purpose of instruction. This was a point of view which, at the time +when he composed these dialogues, he considered to be of importance, +and desired to enforce. But we are not warranted in concluding that he +must always have held the same conviction throughout his long +philosophical life, and in rejecting as un-platonic all statements and +all compositions which imply an opposite belief. We cannot with reason +bind down Plato to a persistence in one and the same type of +compositions.] + +[Side-note: The lectures De Bono may perhaps have been more +transcendental than Plato's other lectures.] + +This statement of Aristotle, alike interesting and unquestionable, +attests the mysticism and obscurity which pervaded Plato's doctrine in +his later years. But whether this lecture on _The Good_ is to be taken +as a fair specimen of Plato's lecturing generally, and from the time +when he first began to lecture, we may perhaps doubt:[11] since we +know that as a lecturer and converser he acquired extraordinary +ascendency over ardent youth. We see this by the remarkable instance +of Dion.[12] + +[Footnote 11: Themistius says (Orat. xxi. p. 245 D) that Plato sometimes +lectured in the Peiræus, and that a crowd then collected to hear him, +not merely from the city, but also from the country around: if he +lectured De Bono, however, the ordinary hearers became tired and +dispersed, leaving only [Greek: tou\s sunê/theis o(milêta/s]. + +It appears that Plato in his lectures delivered theories on the +principles of geometry. He denied the reality of geometrical points--or +at least admitted them only as hypotheses for geometrical +reasoning. He maintained that what others called _a point_ ought to be +called "_an indivisible line_". Xenokrates maintained the same +doctrine after him. Aristotle controverts it (see Metaphys. A., 992, +b. 20). Aristotle's words citing Plato's opinion ([Greek: tou/tô| me\n +ou)=n tô=| ge/nei kai\ diema/cheto Pla/tôn ô(s o)/nti geômetrikô=| +do/gmati, a)ll' e)ka/lei a)rchê\n grammê=s; tou=to de\ polla/kis +e)ti/thei ta\s a)to/mous gramma/s]) must be referred to Plato's oral +lectures; no such opinion occurs in the dialogues. This is the opinion +both of Bonitz and Schwegler in their comments on the passage: also of +Trendelenburg, De Ideis et Numeris Platonis, p. 66. That geometry and +arithmetic were matters of study and reflection both to Plato himself +and to many of his pupils in the Academy, appears certain; and perhaps +Plato may have had an interior circle of pupils, to which he applied +the well-known exclusion--[Greek: mêdei\s a)geôme/trêtos ei)si/tô]. +But we cannot make out clearly what was Plato's own proficiency, or +what improvements he may have introduced, in geometry, nor what there +is to justify the comparison made by Montucla between Plato and +Descartes. In the narrative respecting the Delian problem--the +duplication of the cube--Archytas, Menæchmus, and Eudoxus, appear as +the inventors of solutions, Plato as the superior who prescribes and +criticises (see the letter and epigram of Eratosthenes: Bernhardy, +Eratosthenica, pp. 176-184). The three are said to have been blamed by +Plato for substituting instrumental measurement in place of +geometrical proof (Plutarch, Problem. Sympos. viii. 2, pp. 718, 719; +Plutarch, Vit. Marcelli, c. 14). The geometrical construction of the +[Greek: Ko/smos], which Plato gives us in the Timæus, seems borrowed +from the Pythagoreans, though applied probably in a way peculiar to +himself (see Finger, De Primordiis Geometriæ ap. Græcos, p. 38, +Heidelb. 1831).] + +[Footnote 12: See Epist. vii. pp. 327, 328.] + +[Side-note: Plato's Epistles--in them only he speaks in his own +person.] + +The only occasions on which we have experience of Plato as speaking in +his own person, and addressing himself to definite individuals, are +presented by his few Epistles; all of them (as I have before remarked) +written after he he was considerably above sixty years of age, and +nearly all addressed to Sicilians or Italians--Dionysius II., Dion, +the friends of Dion after the death of the latter, and Archytas.[13] +In so far as these letters bear upon Plato's manner of lecturing or +teaching, they go to attest, first, his opinion that direct written +exposition was useless for conveying real instruction to the reader--next, +his reluctance to publish any such exposition under his own +name, and carrying with it his responsibility. When asked for +exposition, he writes intentionally with mystery, so that ordinary +persons cannot understand. + +[Footnote 13: Of the thirteen Platonic Epistles, Ep. 2, 3, 13, are +addressed to the second or younger Dionysius; Ep. 4 to Dion; Ep. 7, 8, +to the friends and relatives of Dion after Dion's death. The 13th +Epistle appears to be the earliest of all, being seemingly written +after the first voyage of Plato to visit Dionysius II. at Syracuse, in +367-366 B.C., and before his second visit to the same place and +person, about 363-362 B.C. Epistles 2 and 3 were written after his +return from that second visit, in 360 B.C., and prior to the +expedition of Dion against Dionysius in 357 B.C. Epistle 4 was written +to Dion shortly after Dion's victorious career at Syracuse, about 355 +B.C. Epistles 7 and 8 were written not long after the murder of Dion +in 354 B.C. The first in order, among the Platonic Epistles, is not +written by Plato, but by Dion, addressed to Dionysius, shortly after +the latter had sent Dion away from Syracuse. The fifth is addressed by +Plato to the Macedonian prince Perdikkas. The sixth, to Hermeias of +Atarneus, Erastus, and Koriskus. The ninth and twelfth, to Archytas of +Tarentum. The tenth, to Aristodôrus. The eleventh, to Laodamas. I +confess that I see nothing in these letters which compels me to depart +from the judgment of the ancient critics, who unanimously acknowledged +them as genuine. I do not think myself competent to determine _à +priori_ what the style of Plato's letters _must_ have been; what +topics he _must_ have touched upon, and what topics he _could not_ +have touched upon. I have no difficulty in believing that Plato, +writing a letter on philosophy, may have expressed himself with as +much mysticism and obscurity as we now read in Epist. 2 and 7. Nor +does it surprise me to find Plato (in Epist. 13) alluding to details +which critics, who look upon him altogether as a spiritual person, +disallow as mean and unworthy. His recommendation of the geometer, +Helikon of Kyzikus, to Dionysius and Archytas, is to me interesting: +to make known the theorems of Eudoxus, through the medium of Helikon, +to Archytas, was no small service to geometry in those days. I have an +interest in learning how Plato employed the money given to him by +Dionysius and other friends: that he sent to Dionysius a statue of +Apollo by a good Athenian sculptor named Leochares (this sculptor +executed a bust of Isokrates also, Plut. Vit. x. Orat. p. 838); and +another statue by the same sculptor for the wife of Dionysius, in +gratitude for the care which she had taken of him (Plato) when sick at +Syracuse; that he spent the money of Dionysius partly in discharging +his own public taxes and liturgies at Athens, partly in providing +dowries for poor maidens among his friends; that he was so beset by +applications, which he could not refuse, for letters of recommendation +to Dionysius, as to compel him to signify, by a private mark, to +Dionysius, which among the letters he wished to be most attended to. +"These latter" (he says) "I shall begin with [Greek: theo\s] (sing. +number), the others I shall begin with [Greek: theoi\] (plural)." +(Epist. xiii. 361, 362, 363.)] + +[Side-note: Intentional obscurity of his Epistles in reference to +philosophical doctrine.] + +Knowing as we do that he had largely imbued himself with the tenets of +the Pythagoreans (who designedly adopted a symbolical manner of +speaking--published no writings--for Philolaus is cited as an +exception to their rule--and did not care to be understood, except by +their own adepts after a long apprenticeship) we cannot be surprised +to find Plato holding a language very similar. He declares that the +highest principles of his philosophy could not be set forth in writing +so as to be intelligible to ordinary persons: that they could only be +apprehended by a few privileged recipients, through an illumination +kindled in the mind by multiplied debates and much mental effort: that +such illumination was always preceded by a painful feeling of want, +usually long-continued, sometimes lasting for nearly thirty years, and +exchanged at length for relief at some unexpected moment.[14] + +[Footnote 14: Plato, Epist. ii. pp. 313, 314.] + +Plato during his second visit had had one conversation, and only one, +with Dionysius respecting the higher mysteries of philosophy. He had +impressed upon Dionysius the prodigious labour and difficulty of +attaining truth upon these matters. The despot professed to thirst +ardently for philosophy, and the conversation turned upon the Natura +Primi--upon the first and highest principles of Nature.[15] Dionysius, +after this conversation with Plato, intimated that he had already +conceived in his own mind the solution of these difficulties, and the +truth upon philosophy in its greatest mysteries. Upon which Plato +expressed his satisfaction that such was the case,[16] so as to +relieve him from the necessity of farther explanations, though the +like had never happened to him with any previous hearer. + +[Footnote 15: Plat. Epist. ii. 312: [Greek: peri\ tê=s tou= prô/ton +phu/seôs]. Epist. vii. 344: [Greek: tô=n peri\ phu/seôs a)/krôn kai\ +prô/tôn].--One conversation only--Epist. vii. 345.] + +[Footnote 16: Plato, Epist. ii. 313 B. Plato asserts the same about +Dionysius in Epist. vii. 341 B.] + +[Side-note: Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. His +anxiety to confine philosophy to discussion among select and prepared +minds.] + +But Dionysius soon found that he could not preserve the explanation in +his mind, after Plato's departure--that difficulties again crowded +upon him--and that it was necessary to send a confidential messenger +to Athens to entreat farther elucidations. In reply, Plato sends back +by the messenger what is now numbered as the second of his Epistles. +He writes avowedly in enigmatical language, so that, if the letter be +lost, the finder will not be able to understand it; and he enjoins +Dionysius to burn it after frequent perusal.[17] He expresses his hope +that when Dionysius has debated the matter often with the best minds +near him, the clouds will clear away of themselves, and the moment of +illumination will supervene.[18] He especially warns Dionysius against +talking about these matters to unschooled men, who will be sure to +laugh at them; though by minds properly prepared, they will be +received with the most fervent welcome.[19] He affirms that Dionysius +is much superior in philosophical debate to his companions; who were +overcome in debate with him, not because they suffered themselves +designedly to be overcome (out of flattery towards the despot, as some +ill-natured persons alleged), but because they could not defend +themselves against the Elenchus as applied by Dionysius.[20] Lastly, +Plato advises Dionysius to write down nothing, since what has once +been written will be sure to disappear from the memory; but to trust +altogether to learning by heart, meditation, and repeated debate, as a +guarantee for retention in his mind. "It is for that reason" (Plato +says)[21] "that I have never myself written anything upon these +subjects. There neither is, nor shall there ever be, any treatise of +Plato. The opinions called by the name of Plato are those of Sokrates, +in his days of youthful vigour and glory." + +[Footnote 17: Plat. Epist. ii. 312 E: [Greek: phraste/on dê/ soi di' +ai)nigmô=n i(/n a)/n ti ê( de/ltos ê)\ po/ntos ê)\ gê=s e)n ptuchai=s +pa/thê|, o( a)nagnou\s mê\ gnô=|]. 314 C: [Greek: e)/r)r(hôso kai\ +pei/thou, kai\ tê\n e)pistolê\n tau/tên nu=n prô=ton polla/kis +a)nagnou\s kata/kauson]. + +Proklus, in his Commentary on the Timæus (pp. 40, 41), remarks the +fondness of Plato for [Greek: to\ ai)nigmatôde/s].] + +[Footnote 18: Plat. Epist. ii. 313 D.] + +[Footnote 19: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 A. [Greek: eu)labou= me/ntoi mê/ +pote e)kpe/sê| tau=ta ei)s a)nthrô/pous a)paideu/tous.]] + +[Footnote 20: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 D.] + +[Footnote 21: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 C. [Greek: megi/stê de\ phulakê\ +to\ mê\ gra/phein a)ll' e)kmantha/nein; ou) ga\r e)sti ta\ graphe/nta +mê\ ou)k e)kpesei=n. dia\ tau=ta ou)de\n pô/pot' e)gô\ peri\ tou/tôn +ge/grapha, ou)/d' e)/sti su/ggramma Pla/tônos ou)de\n ou)/d' e)/stai; +ta\ de\ nu=n lego/mena, Sôkra/tous e)sti\ kalou= kai\ ne/ou +gegono/tos]. + +"Addamus ad superiora" (says Wesseling, Epist. ad Venemam, p. 41, +Utrecht, 1748), "Platonem videri semper voluisse, dialogos, in quibus +de Philosophiâ, deque Republicâ, atque ejus Legibus, inter +confabulantes actum fuit, non sui ingenii sed Socratici, foetus +esse".] + +[Side-note: He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative +exposition of his own philosophical doctrine.] + +Such is the language addressed by Plato to the younger Dionysius, in a +letter written seemingly between 362-357 B.C. In another letter, +written about ten years afterwards (353-352 B.C.) to the friends of +Dion (after Dion's death), he expresses the like repugnance to the +idea of furnishing any written authoritative exposition of his +principal doctrines. "There never shall be any expository treatise of +mine upon them" (he declares). "Others have tried, Dionysius among the +number, to write them down; but they do not know what they attempt. I +could myself do this better than any one, and I should consider it the +proudest deed in my life, as well as a signal benefit to mankind, to +bring forward an exposition of Nature luminous to all.[22] But I think +the attempt would be nowise beneficial, except to a few, who require +only slight direction to enable them to find it for themselves: to +most persons it would do no good, but would only fill them with empty +conceit of knowledge, and with contempt for others.[23] These matters +cannot be communicated in words as other sciences are. Out of repeated +debates on them, and much social intercourse, there is kindled +suddenly a light in the mind, as from fire bursting forth, which, when +once generated, keeps itself alive."[24] + +[Footnote 22: Plato, Epist. vii. 341, B, C. [Greek: ti/ tou/tou +ka/llion e)pe/prakt' a)\n ê(mi=n e)n tô=| bi/ô| ê)\ toi=s te +a)nthrô/poisi me/ga o)/phelos gra/psai _kai\ tê\n phu/sin ei)s phô=s +pa=si proagagei=n_?]] + +[Footnote 23: Plat. Epist. vii. 341 E.] + +[Footnote 24: Plato, Epist. vii. 341 C. [Greek: ou)/koun e)mo/n ge +peri\ au)tô=n e)/sti su/ggramma ou)de mê/ pote ge/nêtai; r(êto\n ga\r +ou)damô=s e)stin ô(s a)/lla mathê/mata, a)ll' e)k pollê=s sunousi/as +gignome/nês peri\ to\ pra=gma au)to\ kai\ tou= suzê=|n, e)xai/phnês, +oi(=on a)po\ puro\s pêdê/santos e)xaphthe\n phô=s, e)n tê=| psuchê=| +geno/menon au)to\ e(auto\ ê)/dê tre/phei]. + +This sentence, as a remarkable one, I have translated literally in the +text: that which precedes is given only in substance. + +We see in the Republic that Sokrates, when questioned by Glaukon, and +urged emphatically to give some solution respecting [Greek: ê( tou= +a)gathou= i)de/a] and [Greek: ê( tou= diale/gesthai du/namis], answers +only by an evasion or a metaphor (Republic, vi. 506 E, vii. 533 A). +Now these are much the same points as what are signified in the letter +to Dionysius, under the terms [Greek: ta\ prô=ta kai\ a)/kra tê=s +phu/seôs--ê( tou= prô/tou phu/sis] (312 E): as to which Plato, when +questioned, replies in a mystic and unintelligible way.] + +[Side-note: He illustrates his doctrine by the successive stages of +geometrical teaching. Difficulty to avoid the creeping in of error at +each of these stages.] + +Plato then proceeds to give an example from geometry, illustrating the +uselessness both of writing and of direct exposition. In acquiring a +knowledge of the circle, he distinguishes five successive stages. 1. +The Name. 2. The Definition, a proposition composed of nouns and +verbs. 3. The Diagram. 4. Knowledge, Intelligence, True Opinion, +[Greek: Nou=s]. 5. The Noumenon--[Greek: Au)to\-Ku/klos]--ideal or +intelligible circle, the only true object of knowledge.[25] The fourth +stage is a purely mental result, not capable of being exposed either +in words or figure: it presupposes the three first, but is something +distinct from them; and it is the only mental condition immediately +cognate and similar to the fifth stage, or the self-existent idea.[26] + +[Footnote 25: Plato, Epist. vii. 342 A, B. The geometrical +illustration which follows is intended merely as an illustration, of +general principles which Plato asserts to be true about all other +enquiries, physical or ethical.] + +[Footnote 26: Plat. Epist. vii. 342 C. [Greek: ô(s de\ e(\n tou=to +au)= pa=n thete/on, ou)k e)n phônai=s ou)d' e)n sôma/tôn schê/masin +a)ll' e)n psuchai=s e)no/n, ô(=| dê=lon e(/teron te o)\n au)tou= tou= +ku/klou tê=s phu/seôs, tô=n te e)/mprosthen lechthe/ntôn triô=n. +tou/tôn de\ e)ggu/tata me\n xuggenei/a| kai\ o(moio/têti, tou= +pe/mptou] (_i. e._ [Greek: tou= Au)to\-ku/klou]) [Greek: nou=s] (the +fourth stage) [Greek: peplêsi/ake, ta)/lla de\ ple/on a)pe/chei]. + +In Plato's reckoning, [Greek: o( nou=s] is counted as the fourth, in +the ascending scale, from which we ascend to the fifth, [Greek: to\ +noou/menon], or [Greek: noêto/n]. [Greek: O( nou=s] and [Greek: to\ +noêto\n] are cognate or homogeneous--according to a principle +often insisted on in ancient metaphysics--like must be known by like. +(Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 404, b. 15.)] + +Now in all three first stages (Plato says) there is great liability to +error and confusion. The name is unavoidably equivocal, uncertain, +fluctuating: the definition is open to the same reproach, and often +gives special and accidental properties along with the universal and +essential, or instead of them: the diagram cannot exhibit the +essential without some variety of the accidental, nor without some +properties even contrary to reality, since any circle which you draw, +instead of touching a straight line in one point alone, will be sure +to touch it in several points.[27] Accordingly no intelligent man will +embody the pure concepts of his mind in fixed representation, either +by words or by figures.[28] If we do this, we have the _quid_ or +essence, which we are searching for, inextricably perplexed by +accompaniments of the _quale_ or accidents, which we are not searching +for.[29] We acquire only a confused cognition, exposing us to be +puzzled, confuted, and humiliated, by an acute cross-examiner, when he +questions us on the four stages which we have gone through to attain +it.[30] Such confusion does not arise from any fault in the mind, but +from the defects inherent in each of the four stages of progress. It +is only by painful effort, when each of these is naturally good--when +the mind itself also is naturally good, and when it has gone through +all the stages up and down, dwelling upon each--that true knowledge +can be acquired.[31] Persons whose minds are naturally bad, or have +become corrupt, morally or intellectually, cannot be taught to see +even by Lynkeus himself. In a word, if the mind itself be not cognate +to the matter studied, no quickness in learning nor force of memory +will suffice. He who is a quick learner and retentive, but not cognate +or congenial with just or honourable things--he who, though cognate +and congenial, is stupid in learning or forgetful--will never +effectually learn the truth about virtue or wickedness.[32] These can +only be learnt along with truth and falsehood as it concerns entity +generally, by long practice and much time.[33] It is only with +difficulty,--after continued friction, one against another, of all the +four intellectual helps, names and definitions, acts of sight and +sense,--after application of the Elenchus by repeated question and +answer, in a friendly temper and without spite--it is only after all +these preliminaries, that cognition and intelligence shine out with as +much intensity as human power admits.[34] + +[Footnote 27: Plat. Epist. vii. 343 B. This illustrates what is said +in the Republic about the geometrical [Greek: u(pothe/seis] (vi. 510 +E, 511 A; vii. 533 B.)] + +[Footnote 28: Plat. Epist. vii. 343 A. [Greek: ô(=n e(/neka nou=n +e)/chôn ou)dei\s tolmê/sei pote\ ei)s au)to\ tithe/nai ta\ nenoême/na, +kai\ tau=ta ei)s a)metaki/nêton, o(\ dê\ pa/schei ta\ gegramme/na +tu/pois.]] + +[Footnote 29: Plat. Epist. vii. 343 C.] + +[Footnote 30: Plat. Epist. vii. 343 D.] + +[Footnote 31: Plat. Epistol. vii. 343 E. [Greek: ê( de\ dia\ pa/ntôn +au)tô=n diagôgê/, a)/nô kai\ ka/tô metabai/nousa e)ph' e(/kaston, +mo/gis e)pistê/mên e)ne/teken eu)= pephuko/tos eu)= pephuko/ti.]] + +[Footnote 32: Plato, Epistol. vii. 344 A.] + +[Footnote 33: Plato, Epist. vii. 344 B. [Greek: a(/ma ga\r au)ta\ +a)na/gkê mantha/nein, kai\ to\ pseu=dos a(/ma kai\ a)lêthe\s tê=s +o(/lês ou)si/as.]] + +[Footnote 34: Plat. Epist. vii. 344 B. [Greek: mo/gis de\ tribo/mena +pro\s a)/llêla au)tô=n e(/kasta, o)no/mata kai\ lo/goi, o)/pseis te +kai\ ai)sthê/seis, e)n eu)mene/sin e)le/gchos e)legcho/mena kai\ +a)/neu phtho/nôn e)rôtê/sesi kai\ a)pokri/sesi chrôme/nôn, e)xe/lampse +phro/nêsis peri\ e(/kaston kai\ nou=s, suntei/nôn o(/ti ma/list' ei)s +du/namin a)nthrôpi/nên.]] + +[Side-note: No written exposition can keep clear of these chances of +error.] + +For this reason, no man of real excellence will ever write and publish +his views, upon the gravest matters, into a world of spite and +puzzling contention. In one word, when you see any published writings, +either laws proclaimed by the law-giver or other compositions by +others, you may be sure that, if he be himself a man of worth, these +were not matters of first-rate importance in his estimation. If they +really were so, and if he has published his views in writing, some +evil influence must have destroyed his good sense.[35] + +[Footnote 35: Plat. Epist. vii. 344 C-D.] + +[Side-note: Relations of Plato with Dionysius II. and the friends of +the deceased Dion. Pretensions of Dionysius to understand and expound +Plato's doctrines.] + +We see by these letters that Plato disliked and disapproved the idea +of publishing, for the benefit of readers generally, any written +exposition of _philosophia prima_, carrying his own name, and making +him responsible for it. His writings are altogether dramatic. All +opinions on philosophy are enunciated through one or other of his +spokesmen: that portion of the Athenian drama called the Parabasis, in +which the Chorus addressed the audience directly and avowedly in the +name of the poet, found no favour with Plato. We read indeed in +several of his dialogues (Phædon, Republic, Timæus, and others) dogmas +advanced about the highest and most recondite topics of philosophy: +but then they are all advanced under the name of Sokrates, Timæus, +&c.--[Greek: Ou)k e)mo\s o( mu=thos], &c. There never was any written +programme issued by Plato himself, declaring the Symbolum Fidei to +which he attached his own name.[36] Even in the Leges, the most +dogmatical of all his works, the dramatic character and the borrowed +voice are kept up. Probably at the time when Plato wrote his letter to +the friends of the deceased Dion, from which I have just quoted--his +aversion to written expositions was aggravated by the fact, that +Dionysius II., or some friend in his name, had written and published a +philosophical treatise of this sort, passing himself off as editor of +a Platonic philosophy, or of improved doctrines of his own built +thereupon, from oral communication with Plato.[37] We must remember +that Plato himself (whether with full sincerity or not) had +complimented Dionysius for his natural ability and aptitude in +philosophical debate:[38] so that the pretension of the latter to come +forward as an expositor of Plato appears the less preposterous. On the +other hand, such pretension was calculated to raise a belief that +Dionysius had been among the most favoured and confidential companions +of Plato: which belief Plato, writing as he was to the surviving +friends of Dion the enemy of Dionysius, is most anxious to remove, +while on the other hand he extols the dispositions and extenuates the +faults of his friend Dion. It is to vindicate himself from +misconception of his own past proceedings, as well as to exhort with +regard to the future, that Plato transmits to Sicily his long seventh +and eighth Epistles, wherein are embodied his objections against the +usefulness of written exposition intended for readers generally. + +[Footnote 36: The Platonic dialogue was in this respect different from +the Aristotelian dialogue. Aristotle, in his composed dialogues, +introduced other speakers, but delivered the principal arguments in +his own name. Cicero followed his example, in the De Finibus and +elsewhere: "Quæ his temporibus scripsi, [Greek: A)ristote/leion] morem +habent: in quo sermo ita inducitur cæterorum, ut penes ipsum sit +principatus". (Cic. ad Att. xiii. 19.) + +Herakleides of Pontus (Cicero, ibid.), in his composed dialogues, +introduced himself as a [Greek: kôpho\n pro/sôpon]. Plato does not +even do thus much.] + +[Footnote 37: We see this from Epist. vii. 341 B, 344 D, 345 A. Plato +speaks of the impression as then prevalent (when he wrote) in the mind +of Dionysius:--[Greek: po/teron Dionu/sios a)kou/sas mo/non a(/pax +ou(/tôs _ei)de/nai te oi)/etai_ kai\ i(kanôs oi)=den], &c.]] + +[Footnote 38: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 D.] + +[Side-note: Impossibility of teaching by written exposition assumed by +Plato; the assumption intelligible in his day.] + +These objections (which Plato had often insisted on,[39] and which are +also, in part, urged by Sokrates in the Phædrus) have considerable +force, if we look to the way in which Plato conceives them. In the +first place, Plato conceives the exposition as not merely written but +published: as being, therefore, presented to all minds, the large +majority being ignorant, unprepared, and beset with that false +persuasion of knowledge which Sokrates regarded as universal. In so +far as it comes before these latter, nothing is gained, and something +is lost; for derision is brought upon the attempt to teach.[40] In the +next place, there probably existed, at that time, no elementary work +whatever for beginners in any science: the Elements of Geometry by +Euclid were published more than a century after Plato's death, at +Alexandria. Now, when Plato says that written expositions, then +scarcely known, would be useless to the student--he compares them with +the continued presence and conversation of a competent teacher; whom +he supposes not to rely upon direct exposition, but to talk much +"about and about" the subject, addressing the pupil with a large +variety of illustrative interrogations, adapting all that was said to +his peculiar difficulties and rate of progress, and thus evoking the +inherent cognitive force of the pupil's own mind. That any Elements of +Geometry (to say nothing of more complicated inquiries) could be +written and published, such that an [Greek: a)geôme/trêtos] might take +up the work and learn geometry by means of it, without being misled by +equivocal names, bad definitions, and diagrams exhibiting the +definition as clothed with special accessories--this is a possibility +which Plato contests, and which we cannot wonder at his +contesting.[41] The combination of a written treatise, with the oral +exposition of a tutor, would have appeared to Plato not only useless +but inconvenient, as restraining the full liberty of adaptive +interrogation necessary to be exercised, different in the case of each +different pupil. + +[Footnote 39: Plato, Epist. vii. 342. [Greek: lo/gos a)lêthê/s, +polla/kis me\n u(p' e)mou= kai\ pro/sthen r(êthei/s], &c.] + +[Footnote 40: Plato (Epist. ii. 314 A) remarks this expressly: also in +the Phædrus, 275 E, 276 A. + +[Greek: A)/threi dê\ periskopô=n, mê/ tis tô=n a)muê/tôn e)pakou/sê|] +is the language of the Platonic Sokrates as a speaker in the Theætêtus +(155 E).] + +[Footnote 41: Some just and pertinent remarks, bearing on this +subject, are made by Condorcet, in one of his Academic Éloges: "Les +livres ne peuvent remplacer les leçons des maîtres habiles, lorsque +les sciences n'ont pas encore fait assez de progrès, pour que les +vérités, qui en forment l'ensemble, puissent êtres distribuées et +rapprochées entre elles suivant un ordre systématique: lorsque la +méthode d'en chercher de nouvelles n'a pas été réduite à des procédés +exacts et simples, à des règles sûres et précises. Avant cette époque, +il faut être déjà consommé dans une science pour lire avec utilité les +ouvrages qui en traitent: et comme cette espèce d'enfance de l'art est +le temps où les préjugés y regnent avec le plus d'empire, où les +savants sont les plus exposés à donner leurs hypothèses pour de +véritables principes, on risquerait encore de s'égarer si l'on se +bornait aux leçons d'un seul maître, quand même on aurait choisi celui +que la renommée place au premier rang; car ce temps est aussi celui +des reputations usurpées. Les voyages sont donc alors le seul moyen de +s'instruire, comme ils l'étaient dans l'antiquité et avant la +découverte de l'imprimerie." (Condorcet, Éloge de M. Margraaf, p. 349, +Oeuvres Complets, Paris, 1804. Éloges, vol. ii. Or Ed. Firmin Didot +Frères, Paris, 1847, vol. ii. pp. 598-9.)] + +[Side-note: Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the +expository process.--Power of sustaining a Sokratic +cross-examination.] + +Lastly, when we see by what standard Plato tests the efficacy of any +expository process, we shall see yet more clearly how he came to +consider written exposition unavailing. The standard which he applies +is, that the learner shall be rendered able both to apply to others, +and himself to endure from others, a Sokratic Elenchus or +cross-examination as to the logical difficulties involved in all the +steps and helps to learning. Unless he can put to others and follow up +the detective questions--unless he can also answer them, when put to +himself, pertinently and consistently, so as to avoid being brought to +confusion or contradiction--Plato will not allow that he has attained +true knowledge.[42] Now, if we try knowledge by a test so severe as +this, we must admit that no reading of written expositions will enable +the student to acquire it. The impression made is too superficial, and +the mind is too passive during such a process, to be equal to the task +of meeting new points of view, and combating difficulties not +expressly noticed in the treatise which has been studied. The only way +of permanently arming and strengthening the mind, is (according to +Plato) by long-continued oral interchange and stimulus, multiplied +comment and discussion from different points of view, and active +exercise in dialectic debate: not aiming at victory over an opponent, +but reasoning out each question in all its aspects, affirmative and +negative. It is only after a long course of such training--the living +word of the competent teacher, applied to the mind of the pupil, and +stimulating its productive and self-defensive force--that any such +knowledge can be realised as will suffice for the exigencies of the +Sokratic Elenchus.[43] + +[Footnote 42: Plato, Epist. vii. 343 D. The difficulties which Plato +had here in his eye, and which he required to be solved as conditions +indispensable to real knowledge--are jumped over in geometrical and +other scientific expositions, as belonging not to geometry, &c., but +to logic. M. Jouffroy remarks, in the Preface to his translation of +Reid's works (p. clxxiv.):--"Toute science particulière qui, au lieu +de prendre pour accordées les données _à priori_ qu'elle implique, +discute l'autorité de ces données--ajoute à son objet propre celui de +la logique, confond une autre mission avec la sienne, et par cela même +compromet la sienne: car nous verrons tout à-l'heure, et l'histoire de +la philosophic montre, quelles difficultés présentent ces problèmes +qui sont l'objet propre de la logique; et nous demeurerons convaincus +que, si les _différentes sciences avaient eu la prétention de les +éclaircir avant de passer outre, toutes peut-être en seraient encore à +cette préface_, et aucune n'aurait entamé sa véritable tâche." + +Remarks of a similar bearing will be found in the second paragraph of +Mr. John Stuart Mill's Essay on Utilitarianism. It has been found +convenient to distinguish the logic of a science from the expository +march of the same science. But Plato would not have acknowledged +[Greek: e)pistê/mê], except as including both. Hence his view about +the uselessness of written expository treatises. + +Aristotle, in a remarkable passage of the Metaphysica ([Greek: G]. p. +1005, a. 20 seqq.) takes pains to distinguish the Logic of Mathematics +from Mathematics themselves--as a separate province and matter of +study. He claims the former as belonging to Philosophia Prima or +Ontology. Those principles which mathematicians called Axioms were not +peculiar to Mathematics (he says), but were affirmations respecting +Ens quatenus Ens: the mathematician was entitled to assume them so far +as concerned his own department, and his students must take them for +granted: but if he attempted to explain or appreciate them in their +full bearing, he overstepped his proper limits, through want of proper +schooling in Analytica ([Greek: o(/sa d' e)gcheirou=si tô=n lego/ntôn +tine\s peri\ tê=s a)lêthei/as, o(\n tro/pon dei= a)pode/chesthai, di' +a)paideusi/an tô=n a)nalutikô=n tou=to drô=sin; dei= ga\r peri\ +tou/tôn ê(/kein proepistame/nous, a)lla\ mê\ a)kou/ontas zêtei=n]--p. +1005, b. 2.) We see from the words of Aristotle that many mathematical +enquirers of his time did not recognise (any more than Plato +recognised) the distinction upon which he here insists: we see also +that the term _Axioms_ had become a technical one for the _principia_ +of mathematical demonstration ([Greek: peri\ tô=n e)n toi=s mathê/masi +kaloume/nôn a)xiôma/tôn]--p. 1005, a. 20); I do not concur in Sir +William Hamilton's doubts on this point. (Dissertations on Reid's +Works, note A. p. 764.) + +The distinction which Aristotle thus brings to notice, seemingly for +the first time, is one of considerable importance.] + +[Footnote 43: This is forcibly put by Plato, Epistol. vii. 344 B. +Compare Plato, Republic, vi. 499 A. Phædrus, 276 A-E. [Greek: to\n +tou= ei)do/tos lo/gon zô=nta kai\ e)/mpsuchon], &c. + +Though Plato, in the Phædrus, declares oral teaching to be the only +effectual way of producing a permanent and deep-seated effect--as +contrasted with the more superficial effect produced by reading a +written exposition: yet even oral teaching, when addressed in the form +of continuous lecture or sermon ([Greek: a)/neu a)nakri/seôs kai\ +didachê=s], Phædrus, 277 E; [Greek: to\ nouthetêtiko\n ei)=dos], +Sophistês, p. 230), is represented elsewhere as of little effect. To +produce any permanent result, you must diversify the point of view--you +must test by circumlocutory interrogation--you must begin by +dispelling established errors, &c. See the careful explanation of the +passage in the Phædrus (277 E), given by Ueberweg, Aechtheit der +Platon. Schrift. pp. 16-22. Direct teaching, in many of the Platonic +dialogues, is not counted as capable of producing serious improvement. + +When we come to the Menon and the Phædon, we shall hear more of the +Platonic doctrine--that knowledge was to be evolved out of the mind, +not poured into it from without.] + +[Side-note: Plato never published any of the lectures which he +delivered at the Academy.] + +Since we thus find that Plato was unconquerably averse to publication +in his own name and with his own responsibility attached to the +writing, on grave matters of philosophy--we cannot be surprised that, +among the numerous lectures which he must have delivered to his pupils +and auditors in the Academy, none were ever published. Probably he may +himself have destroyed them, as he exhorts Dionysius to destroy the +Epistle which we now read as second, after reading it over frequently. +And we may doubt whether he was not displeased with Aristotle and +Hestiæus[44] for taking extracts from his lectures De Bono, and making +them known to the public: just as he was displeased with Dionysius for +having published a work purporting to be derived from conversations +with Plato. + +[Footnote 44: Themistius mentions it as a fact recorded (I wish he had +told us where or by whom) that Aristotle stoutly opposed the Platonic +doctrine of Objective Ideas, even during the lifetime of Plato, +[Greek: i(storei=tai de\ o(/ti kai\ zô=ntos tou= Pla/tônos +karterô/tata peri\ tou/tou tou= do/gmatos e)ne/stê o( A)ristote/lês +tô=| Pla/tôni]. (Scholia ad Aristotel. Analyt. Poster. p. 228 b. 16 +Brandis.)] + +[Side-note: Plato would never publish his philosophical opinions in +his own name; but he may have published them in the dialogues under +the name of others.] + +That Plato would never consent to write for the public in his own +name, must be taken as a fact in his character; probably arising from +early caution produced by the fate of Sokrates, combined with +preference for the Sokratic mode of handling. But to what extent he +really kept back his opinions from the public, or whether he kept them +back at all, by design--I do not undertake to say. The borrowed names +under which he wrote, and the veil of dramatic fiction, gave him +greater freedom as to the thoughts enunciated, and were adopted for +the express purpose of acquiring greater freedom. How far the lectures +which he delivered to his own special auditory differed from the +opinions made known in his dialogues to the general reader, or how far +his conversation with a few advanced pupils differed from both--are +questions which we have no sufficient means of answering. There +probably was a considerable difference. Aristotle alludes to various +doctrines of Plato which we cannot find in the Platonic writings: but +these doctrines are not such as could have given peculiar offence, if +published; they are, rather abstruse and hard to understand. It may +also be true (as Tennemann says) that Plato had two distinct modes of +handling philosophy--a popular and a scientific: but it cannot be true +(as the same learned author[45] asserts) that his published dialogues +contained the popular and not the scientific. No one surely can regard +the Timæus, Parmenidês, Philêbus, Theætêtus, Sophistês, Politikus, +&c., as works in which dark or difficult questions are kept out of +sight for the purpose of attracting the ordinary reader. Among the +dialogues themselves (as I have before remarked) there exist the +widest differences; some highly popular and attractive, others +altogether the reverse, and many gradations between the two. Though I +do not doubt therefore that Plato produced powerful effect both as +lecturer to a special audience, and as talker with chosen students--yet +in what respect such lectures and conversation differed from what +we read in his dialogues, I do not feel that we have any means of +knowing. + +[Footnote 45: See Tennemann, Gesch. d. Phil. vol. ii. p. 205, 215, 221 +seq. This portion of Tennemann's History is valuable, as it takes due +account of the seventh Platonic Epistle, compared with the remarkable +passage in the Phædrus about the inefficacy of written exposition for +the purpose of teaching. + +But I cannot think that Tennemann rightly interprets the Epistol. vii. +I see no proof that Plato had any secret or esoteric philosophy, +reserved for a few chosen pupils, and not proclaimed to the public +from apprehension of giving offence to established creeds: though I +believe such apprehension to have operated as one motive, deterring +him from publishing any philosophical exposition under his own +name--any [Greek: Pla/tônos su/ggramma].] + +[Side-note: Groups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown.] + +In judging of Plato, we must confine ourselves to the evidence +furnished by one or more of the existing Platonic compositions, adding +the testimony of Aristotle and a few others respecting Platonic views +not declared in the dialogues. Though little can be predicated +respecting the dialogues collectively, I shall say something about the +various groups into which they admit of being thrown, before I touch +upon them separately and _seriatim_. + +[Side-note: Distribution made by Thrasyllus defective, but still +useful--Dialogues of Search, Dialogues of Exposition.] + +The scheme proposed by Thrasyllus, so far as intended to furnish a +symmetrical arrangement of all the Platonic works, is defective, +partly because the apportionment of the separate works between the two +leading classes is in several cases erroneous--partly because the +discrimination of the two leading classes, as well as the sub-division +of one of the two, is founded on diversity of Method, while the +sub-division of the other class is founded on diversity of Subject. But +the scheme is nevertheless useful, as directing our attention to real +and important attributes belonging in common to considerable groups of +dialogues. It is in this respect preferable to the fanciful dramatic +partnership of trilogies and tetralogies, as well as to the mystical +interpretation and arrangement suggested by the Neo-platonists. The +Dialogues of Exposition--in which one who knows (or professes to know) +some truth, announces and developes it to those who do not know +it--are contrasted with those of Search or Investigation, in which the +element of knowledge and affirmative communication is wanting. All the +interlocutors are at once ignorant and eager to know; all of them are +jointly engaged in searching for the unknown, though one among them +stands prominent both in suggesting where to look and in testing all +that is found, whether it be really the thing looked for. Among the +expository dialogues, the most marked specimens are Timæus and +Epinomis, in neither of which is there any searching or testing debate +at all. Republic, Phædon, Philêbus, exhibit exposition preceded or +accompanied by a search. Of the dialogues of pure investigation, the +most elaborate specimen is the Theætêtus: Menon, Lachês, Charmidês, +Lysis, Euthyphron, &c., are of the like description, yet less worked +out. There are also several others. In the Menon, indeed,[46] Sokrates +goes so far as to deny that there can be any real teaching, and to +contend that what appears teaching is only resuscitation of buried or +forgotten knowledge. + +[Footnote 46: Plato, Menon, p. 81-82.] + +[Side-note: Dialogues of Exposition--present affirmative result. +Dialogues of Search are wanting in that attribute.] + +Of these two classes of Dialogues, the Expository are those which +exhibit the distinct attribute--an affirmative result or doctrine, +announced and developed by a person professing to know, and proved in +a manner more or less satisfactory. The other class--the Searching or +Investigative--have little else in common except the absence of this +property. We find in them debate, refutation, several points of view +canvassed and some shown to be untenable; but there is no affirmative +result established, or even announced as established, at the close. +Often there is even a confession of disappointment. In other respects, +the dialogues of this class are greatly diversified among one another: +they have only the one common attribute--much debate, with absence of +affirmative result. + +[Side-note: The distribution coincides mainly with that of +Aristotle--Dialectic, Demonstrative.] + +Now the distribution made by Thrasyllus of the dialogues under two +general heads (1. Dialogues of Search or Investigation, 2. Dialogues +of Exposition) coincides, to a considerable extent, with the two +distinct intellectual methods recognised by Aristotle as Dialectic and +Demonstrative: Dialectic being handled by Aristotle in the Topica, and +Demonstration in the Posterior Analytica. "Dialectic" (says Aristotle) +"is tentative, respecting those matters of which philosophy aims at +cognizance." Accordingly, Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) embraces all +matters without exception, but in a tentative and searching way, +recognising arguments _pro_ as well as _con_, and bringing to view the +antithesis between the two, without any preliminary assumption or +predetermined direction, the questioner being bound to proceed only on +the answers given by the respondent: while philosophy comes +afterwards, dividing this large field into appropriate compartments, +laying down authoritative _principia_ in regard to each, and deducing +from them, by logical process, various positive results.[47] Plato +does not use the term Dialectic exactly in the same sense as +Aristotle. He implies by it two things: 1. That the process shall be +colloquial, two or more minds engaged in a joint research, each of +them animating and stimulating the others. 2. That the matter +investigated shall be general--some general question or proposition: +that the premisses shall all be general truths, and that the objects +kept before the mind shall be Forms or Species, apart from +particulars.[48] Here it stands in contrast with Rhetoric, which aims +at the determination of some particular case or debated course of +conduct, judicial or political, and which is intended to end in some +immediate practical verdict or vote. Dialectic, in Plato's sense, +comprises the whole process of philosophy. His Dialogues of Search +correspond to Aristotle's Dialectic, being machinery for generating +arguments and for ensuring that every argument shall be subjected to +the interrogation of an opponent: his Dialogues of Exposition, wherein +some definite result is enunciated and proved (sufficiently or not), +correspond to what Aristotle calls Demonstration. + +[Footnote 47: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. 1004, b. 25. [Greek: +e)/sti de\ ê( dialektikê\ peirastikê\, peri\ ô(=n ê( philosophi/a +gnôristikê/]. Compare also Rhet. i. 2, p. 1356, a. 33, i. 4, p. 1359, +b. 12, where he treats Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) not as methods +of acquiring instruction on any definite matter, but as inventive and +argumentative aptitudes--powers of providing premisses and +arguments--[Greek: duna/meis tine\s tou= pori/sai lo/gous]. If (he says) +you try to convert Dialectic from a method of discussion into a method of +cognition, you will insensibly eliminate its true nature and +character:--[Greek: o(/sô| d' a)/n tis ê)\ tê\n dialektikê\n ê)\ +tau/tên, mê\ katha/per a)\n duna/meis a)ll' e)pistê/mas peira=tai +kataskeua/zein, lê/setai tê\n phu/sin au)tô=n a)phani/sas, tô=| +metabai/nein e)piskeua/zôn ei)s e)pistê/mas u(pokeime/nôn tinô=n +pragma/tôn, a)lla\ mê\ mo/non lo/gôn]. + +The Platonic Dialogues of Search are [Greek: duna/meis tou= pori/sai +lo/gous]. Compare the Prooemium of Cicero to his Paradoxa.] + +[Footnote 48: Plato, Republ. vi. 511, vii. 582. Respecting the +difference between Plato and Aristotle about Dialectic, see +Ravaisson--Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote--iii. 1, 2, p. 248.] + +[Side-note: Classification of Thrasyllus in its details. He applies +his own principles erroneously.] + +If now we take the main scheme of distributing the Platonic Dialogues, +proposed by Thrasyllus--1. Dialogues of Exposition, with an +affirmative result; 2. Dialogues of Investigation or Search, without +an affirmative result--and if we compare the number of Dialogues (out +of the thirty-six in all), which he specifies as belonging to each--we +shall find twenty-two specified under the former head, and fourteen +under the latter. Moreover, among the twenty-two are ranked Republic +and Leges: each of them greatly exceeding in bulk any other +composition of Plato. It would appear thus that there is a +preponderance both in number and bulk on the side of the Expository. +But when we analyse the lists of Thrasyllus, we see that he has unduly +enlarged that side of the account, and unduly contracted the other. He +has enrolled among the Expository--1. The Apology, the Epistolæ, and +the Menexenus, which ought not properly to be ranked under either +head. 2. The Theætêtus, Parmenidês, Hipparchus, Erastæ, Minos, +Kleitophon--every one of which ought to be transferred to the other +head. 3. The Phædrus, Symposion, and Kratylus, which are admissible by +indulgence, since they do indeed present affirmative exposition, but +in small proportion compared to the negative criticism, the rhetorical +and poetical ornament: they belong in fact to both classes, but more +preponderantly to one. 4. The Republic. This he includes with perfect +justice, for the eight last books of it are expository. Yet the first +book exhibits to us a specimen of negative and refutative dialectic +which is not surpassed by anything in Plato. + +On the other hand, Thrasyllus has placed among the Dialogues of Search +one which might, with equal or greater propriety, be ranked among the +Expository--the Protagoras. It is true that this dialogue involves +much of negation, refutation, and dramatic ornament: and that the +question propounded in the beginning (Whether virtue be teachable?) is +not terminated. But there are two portions of the dialogue which are, +both of them, decided specimens of affirmative exposition--the speech +of Protagoras in the earlier part (wherein the growth of virtue, +without special teaching or professional masters, is elucidated)--and +the argument of Sokrates at the close, wherein the identity of the +Good and the Pleasurable is established.[49] + +[Footnote 49: We may remark that Thrasyllus, though he enrols the +Protagoras under the class Investigative, and the sub-class Agonistic, +places it alone in a still lower class which he calls [Greek: +E)ndeiktiko/s]. Now, if we turn to the Platonic dialogue Euthydêmus, +p. 278 D, we shall see that Plato uses the words [Greek: e)ndei/xomai] +and [Greek: u(phêgê/somai] as exact equivalents: so that [Greek: +e)ndeiktiko\s] would have the same meaning as [Greek: u(phêgêtiko/s].] + +[Side-note: The classification, as it would stand, if his principles +were applied correctly.] + +If then we rectify the lists of Thrasyllus, they will stand as +follows, with the Expository Dialogues much diminished in number: + +_Dialogues of Investigation or Search._ + +[Greek: Zêtêtikoi/]. + +1. Theætêtus. +2. Parmenidês. +3. Alkibiadês I. +4. Alkibiadês II. +5. Theagês. +6. Lachês. +7. Lysis. +8. Charmidês. +9. Menon. +10. Ion. +11. Euthyphron. +12. Euthydêmus. +13. Gorgias. +14. Hippias I. +15. Hippias II. +16. Kleitophon. +17. Hipparchus. +18. Erastæ. +19. Minos. + +_Dialogues of Exposition_ + +[Greek: U(phêgêtikoi/]. + +1. Timæus. +2. Leges. +3. Epinomis. +4. Kritias. +5. Republic. +6. Sophistês. +7. Politikus. +8. Phædon. +9. Philêbus. +10. Protagoras. +11. Phædrus. +12. Symposion. +13. Kratylus. +14. Kriton. + +The Apology, Menexenus, Epistolæ, do not properly belong to either +head. + +[Side-note: Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over +the expository and dogmatical.] + +It will thus appear, from a fair estimate and comparison of lists, +that the relation which Plato bears to philosophy is more that of a +searcher, tester, and impugner, than that of an expositor and +dogmatist--though he undertakes both the two functions: more negative +than affirmative--more ingenious in pointing out difficulties, than +successful in solving them. I must again repeat that though this +classification is just, as far as it goes, and the best which can be +applied to the dialogues, taken as a whole--yet the dialogues have +much which will not enter into the classification, and each has its +own peculiarities. + +[Side-note: Dialogues of Search--sub-classes among them recognised by +Thrasyllus--Gymnastic and Agonistic, &c.] + +The Dialogues of Search, thus comprising more than half the Platonic +compositions, are again distributed by Thrasyllus into two +sub-classes--Gymnastic and Agonistic: the Gymnastic, again, into +Obstetric and Peirastic; the Agonistic, into Probative and Refutative. +Here, again, there is a pretence of symmetrical arrangement, which will +not hold good if we examine it closely. Nevertheless, the epithets point +to real attributes of various dialogues, and deserve the more +attention, inasmuch as they imply a view of philosophy foreign to the +prevalent way of looking at it. Obstetric and Tentative or Testing +(Peirastic) are epithets which a reader may understand; but he will +not easily see how they bear upon the process of philosophy. + +[Side-note: Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative +teaching, positive results, direct proofs.] + +The term _philosopher_ is generally understood to mean something else. +In appreciating a philosopher, it is usual to ask, What authoritative +creed has he proclaimed, for disciples to swear allegiance to? What +positive system, or positive truths previously unknown or unproved, +has he established? Next, by what arguments has he enforced or made +them good? This is the ordinary proceeding of an historian of +philosophy, as he calls up the roll of successive names. The +philosopher is assumed to speak as one having authority; to have +already made up his mind; and to be prepared to explain what his mind +is. Readers require positive results announced, and positive evidence +set before them, in a clear and straightforward manner. They are +intolerant of all that is prolix, circuitous, not essential to the +proof of the thesis in hand. Above all, an affirmative result is +indispensable. + +When I come to the Timæus, and Republic, &c., I shall consider what +reply Plato could make to these questions. In the meantime, I may +observe that if philosophers are to be estimated by such a scale, he +will not stand high on the list. Even in his expository dialogues, he +cares little about clear proclamation of results, and still less about +the shortest, straightest, and most certain road for attaining them. + +[Side-note: The Platonic Dialogues of Search disclaim authority and +teaching--assume truth to be unknown to all alike--follow a process +devious as well as fruitless.] + +But as to those numerous dialogues which are not expository, Plato +could make no reply to the questions at all. There are no affirmative +results:--and there is a process of enquiry, not only fruitless, but +devious, circuitous, and intentionally protracted. The authoritative +character of a philosopher is disclaimed. Not only Plato never +delivers sentence in his own name, but his principal spokesman, far +from speaking with authority, declares that he has not made up his own +mind, and that he is only a searcher along with others, more eager in +the chase than they are.[50] Philosophy is conceived as the search for +truth still unknown; not as an explanation of truth by one who knows +it, to others who do not know it. The process of search is considered +as being in itself profitable and invigorating, even though what is +sought be not found. The ingenuity of Sokrates is shown, not by what +he himself produces, for he avows himself altogether barren--but by +his obstetric aid: that is, by his being able to evolve, from a +youthful mind, answers of which it is pregnant, and to test the +soundness and trustworthiness of those answers when delivered: by his +power, besides, of exposing or refuting unsound answers, and of +convincing others of the fallacy of that which they confidently +believed themselves to know. + +[Footnote 50: In addition to the declarations of Sokrates to this +effect in the Platonic Apology (pp. 21-23), we read the like in many +Platonic dialogues. Gorgias, 506 A. [Greek: ou)de\ ga/r toi e)/gôge +ei)dô\s le/gô a(\ le/gô, a)lla\ zêtô= koinê=| meth' u(mô=n] (see +Routh's note): and even in the Republic, in many parts of which there +is much dogmatism and affirmation: v. p. 450 E. [Greek: a)pistou=nta +de\ kai\ zêtou=nta a(/ma tou\s lo/gous poiei=sthai, o(\ dê\ e)gô\ +drô=], &c.] + +[Side-note: The questioner has no predetermined course, but follows +the lead given by the respondent in his answers.] + +To eliminate affirmative, authoritative exposition, which proceeds +upon the assumption that truth is already known--and to consider +philosophy as a search for unknown truth, carried on by several +interlocutors all of them ignorant--this is the main idea which Plato +inherited from Sokrates, and worked out in more than one half of his +dialogues. It is under this general head that the subdivisions of +Thrasyllus fall--the Obstetric, the Testing or Verifying, the +Refutative. The process is one in which both the two concurrent minds +are active, but each with an inherent activity peculiar to itself. The +questioner does not follow a predetermined course of his own, but +proceeds altogether on the answer given to him. He himself furnishes +only an indispensable stimulus to the parturition of something with +which the respondent is already pregnant, and applies testing +questions to that which he hears, until the respondent is himself +satisfied that the answer will not hold. Throughout all this, there is +a constant appeal to the free, self-determining judgment of the +respondent's own mind, combined with a stimulus exciting the +intellectual productiveness of that mind to the uttermost. + +[Side-note: Relation of teacher and learner. Appeal to authority is +suppressed.] + +What chiefly deserves attention here, as a peculiar phase in the +history of philosophy, is, that the relation of teacher and learner is +altogether suppressed. Sokrates not only himself disclaims the +province and title of a teacher, but treats with contemptuous banter +those who assume it. Now "the learner" (to use a memorable phrase of +Aristotle[51]) "is under obligation to believe": he must be a passive +recipient of that which is communicated to him by the teacher. The +relation between the two is that of authority on the one side, and of +belief generated by authority on the other. But Sokrates requires from +no man implicit trust: nay he deprecates it as dangerous.[52] It is +one peculiarity in these Sokratic dialogues, that the sentiment of +authority, instead of being invoked and worked up, as is generally +done in philosophy, is formally disavowed and practically set aside. +"I have not made up my mind: I am not prepared to swear allegiance to +any creed: I give you the reasons for and against each: you must +decide for yourself."[53] + +[Footnote 51: Aristot. De Sophist. Elenchis, Top. ix. p. 165, b. 2. +[Greek: dei= ga\r pisteu/ein to\n mantha/nonta.]] + +[Footnote 52: Plato, Protagor. p. 314 B.] + +[Footnote 53: The sentiment of the Academic sect--descending from +Sokrates and Plato, not through Xenokrates and Polemon, but through +Arkesilaus and Karneades--illustrates the same elimination of the idea +of authority. "Why are you so curious to know what _I myself_ have +determined on the point? Here are the reasons _pro_ and _con_: weigh +the one against the other, and then judge for yourself." + +See Sir William Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy--Appendix, p. +681--about mediæval disputations: also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 4-7. +"Sed defendat quod quisque sentit: sunt enim judicia libera: nos +institutum tenebimus, nulliusque unius disciplinæ legibus adstricti, +quibus in philosophiâ necessario pareamus, quid sit in quâque re +maximé probabile, semper requiremus." + +Again, Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 5, 10-13. "Qui autem requirunt, quid +quâque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est. +_Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta +quærenda sunt._ Quin etiam obest plorumque iis, qui discere volunt, +auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum +judicium adhibere; id habent ratum, quod ab eo quem probant judicatum +vident. . . . Si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto +majus omnes? Quod facere iis necesse est, quibus propositum est, veri +reperiendi causâ, et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus +dicere. . . Nec tamen fieri potest, ut qui hâc ratione philosophentur, +ii nihil habeant quod sequantur. . . Non enim sumus ii quibus nihil +verum esse videatur, sed ii, qui omnibus veris falsa quædam adjuncta +esse dicamus, tantâ similitudine ut in iis nulla insit certa judicandi +et assentiendi nota. Ex quo exsistit illud, multa esse probabilia, quæ +quanquam non perciperentur, tamen quia visum haberent quendam insignem +et illustrem, his sapientis vita regeretur." + +Compare Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. sect. 2-3-5-9. Quintilian, xii. 2-25.] + +[Side-note: In the modern world the search for truth is put out of +sight. Every writer or talker professes to have already found it, and +to proclaim it to others.] + +This process--the search for truth as an unknown--is in the modern +world put out of sight. All discussion is conducted by persons who +profess to have found it or learnt it, and to be in condition to +proclaim it to others. Even the philosophical works of Cicero are +usually pleadings by two antagonists, each of whom professes to know +the truth, though Cicero does not decide between them: and in this +respect they differ from the groping and fumbling of the Platonic +dialogues. Of course the search for truth must go on in modern times, +as it did in ancient: but it goes on silently and without notice. The +most satisfactory theories have been preceded by many infructuous +guesses and tentatives. The theorist may try many different hypotheses +(we are told that Kepler tried nineteen) which he is forced +successively to reject; and he may perhaps end without finding any +better. But all these tentatives, verifying tests, doubts, and +rejections, are confined to his own bosom or his own study. He looks +back upon them without interest, sometimes even with disgust; least of +all does he seek to describe them in detail as objects of interest to +others. They are probably known to none but himself: for it does not +occur to him to follow the Platonic scheme of taking another mind into +partnership, and entering upon that distribution of active +intellectual work which we read in the Theætêtus. There are cases in +which two chemists have carried on joint researches, under many +failures and disappointments, perhaps at last without success. If a +record were preserved of their parley during the investigation, the +grounds for testing and rejecting one conjecture, and for selecting +what should be tried after it--this would be in many points a parallel +to the Platonic process. + +[Side-note: The search for truth by various interlocutors was a +recognised process in the Sokratic age. Acute negative Dialectic of +Sokrates.] + +But at Athens in the fourth century, B.C., the search for truth by two +or more minds in partnership was not so rare a phenomenon. The active +intellects of Athens were distributed between Rhetoric, which +addressed itself to multitudes, accepted all established sentiments, +and handled for the most part particular issues--and Dialectic, in +which a select few debated among themselves general questions.[54] Of +this Dialectic, the real Sokrates was the greatest master that Athens +ever saw: he could deal as he chose (says Xenophon[55]) with all +disputants: he turned them round his finger. In this process, one +person set up a thesis, and the other cross-examined him upon it: the +most irresistible of all cross-examiners was the real Sokrates. The +nine books of Aristotle's Topica (including the book De Sophisticis +Elenchis) are composed with the object of furnishing suggestions, and +indicating rules, both to the cross-examiner and to the respondent, in +such Dialectic debates. Plato does not lay down any rules: but he has +given us, in his dialogues of search, specimens of dialectic procedure +shaped in his own fashion. Several of his contemporaries, companions +of Sokrates, like him, did the same each in his own way: but their +compositions have not survived.[56] + +[Footnote 54: The habit of supposing a general question to be +undecided, and of having it argued by competent advocates before +auditors who have not made up their minds--is now so disused +(everywhere except in a court of law), that one reads with surprise +Galen's declaration that the different competing medical theories were +so discussed in his day. His master Pelops maintained a disputation of +two days with a rival;--[Greek: ê(ni/ka Pe/lops meta\ Phili/ppou tou= +e)mpeirikou= diele/chthê duoi=n ê(merô=n; tou= me\n Pe/lopos, ô(s mê\ +duname/nês tê=s i)atrikê=s di' e)mpeiri/as mo/nês sustê=nai, tou= +Phili/ppou de\ e)pideiknu/ntos du/nasthai]. (Galen, De Propriis +Libris, c. 2, p. 16, Kühn.) + +Galen notes (ib. 2, p. 21) the habit of literary men at Rome to +assemble in the temple of Pax, for the purpose of discussing logical +questions, prior to the conflagration which destroyed that temple.] + +[Footnote 55: Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2.] + +[Footnote 56: The dialogues composed by Aristotle himself were in +great measure dialogues of search, exercises of argumentation _pro_ +and _con_ (Cicero, De Finib. v. 4). "Aristoteles, ut solet, quærendi +gratiâ, quædam subtilitatis suæ argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo," &c. +(Quintilian, Inst. Orat. ii. 17.) + +Bernays indicates the probable titles of many among the lost +Aristotelian Dialogues (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 132, 133, +Berlin, 1868), and gives in his book many general remarks upon them. + +The observations of Aristotle in the Metaphys. (A. [Greek: e)la/ttôn] +993, b. 1-16) are conceived in a large and just spirit. He says that +among all the searchers for truth, none completely succeed, and none +completely fail: those, from whose conclusions we dissent, do us +service by exercising our intelligence--[Greek: tê\n ga\r e(/xin +proê/skêsan ê(mô=n]. The enumeration of [Greek: a)pori/ai] in the +following book B of the Metaphysica is a continuation of the same +views. Compare Scholia, p. 604, b. 29, Brandis.] + +Such compositions give something like fair play to the negative arm of +philosophy; in the employment of which the Eleate Zeno first became +celebrated, and the real Sokrates yet more celebrated. This negative +arm is no less essential than the affirmative, to the validity of a +body of reasoned truth, such as philosophy aspires to be. To know how +to disprove is quite as important as to know how to prove: the one is +co-ordinate and complementary to the other. And the man who disproves +what is false, or guards mankind against assenting to it,[57] renders +a service to philosophy, even though he may not be able to render the +ulterior service of proving any truth in its place. + +[Footnote 57: The Stoics had full conviction of this. In Cicero's +summary of the Stoic doctrine (De Finibus, iii. 21, 72) we read:--"Ad +easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, Dialecticam etiam adjungunt +(Stoici) et Physicam: easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant: alteram +(_sc._ Dialecticam), quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur, +neve unquam captiosâ probabilitate fallamur; eaque, quæ de bonis et +malis didicerimus, ut tenere tuerique possimus."] + +[Side-note: Negative procedure supposed to be represented by the +Sophists and the Megarici; discouraged and censured by historians of +philosophy.] + +By historians of ancient philosophy, negative procedure is generally +considered as represented by the Sophists and the Megarici, and is the +main ground for those harsh epithets which are commonly applied to +both of them. The negative (they think) can only be tolerated in small +doses, and even then merely as ancillary to the affirmative. That is, +if you have an affirmative theory to propose, you are allowed to urge +such objections as you think applicable against rival theories, but +only in order to make room for your own. It seems to be assumed as +requiring no proof that the confession of ignorance is an intolerable +condition; which every man ought to be ashamed of in himself, and +which no man is justified in inflicting on any one else. If yon +deprive the reader of one affirmative solution, you are required to +furnish him with another which you are prepared to guarantee as the +true one. "Le Roi est mort--Vive le Roi": the throne must never be +vacant. It is plain that under such a restricted application, the full +force of the negative case is never brought out. The pleadings are +left in the hands of counsel, each of whom takes up only such +fragments of the negative case as suit the interests of his client, +and suppresses or slurs over all such other fragments of it as make +against his client. But to every theory (especially on the topics +discussed by Sokrates and Plato) there are more or less of objections +applicable--even the best theory being true only on the balance. And +if the purpose be to ensure a complete body of reasoned truth, all +these objections ought to be faithfully exhibited, by one who stands +forward as their express advocate, without being previously retained +for any separate or inconsistent purpose. + +[Side-note: Vocation of Sokrates and Plato for the negative procedure: +absolute necessity of it as a condition of reasoned truth. Parmenidês +of Plato.] + +How much Plato himself, in his dialogues of search, felt his own +vocation as champion of the negative procedure, we see marked +conspicuously in the dialogue called Parmenidês. This dialogue is +throughout a protest against forward affirmation, and an assertion of +independent _locus standi_ for the negationist and objector. The +claims of the latter must first be satisfied, before the affirmant can +be considered as solvent. The advocacy of those claims is here +confided to veteran Parmenides, who sums them up in a formidable +total: Sokrates being opposed to him under the unusual disguise of a +youthful and forward affirmant. Parmenides makes no pretence of +advancing any rival doctrine. The theories which he selects for +criticism are the Platonic theory of intelligible Concepts, and his +own theory of the Unum: he indicates how many objections must be +removed--how many contradictions must be solved--how many opposite +hypotheses must be followed out to their results--before either of +these theories can be affirmed with assurance. The exigencies +enumerated may and do appear insurmountable:[58] but of that Plato +takes no account. Such laborious exercises are inseparable from the +process of searching for truth, and unless a man has strength to go +through them, no truth, or at least no reasoned truth, can be found +and maintained.[59] + +[Footnote 58: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. [Greek: dei= skopei=n--ei) +me/lleis tele/ôs gumnasa/menos kuri/ôs dio/psesthai to\ a)lêthe/s. +A)mê/chanon, e)/phê, le/geis, ô)= Parmeni/dê, pragmatei/an], &c. + +Aristotle declares that no man can be properly master of any +affirmative truth without having examined and solved all the +objections and difficulties--the negative portion of the enquiry. To +go through all these [Greek: a)pori/as] is the indispensable first +stage, and perhaps the enquirer may not be able to advance farther, +see Metaphysic. B. 995, a. 26, 996, a. 16--one of the most striking +passages in his works. Compare also what he says, De Coelo, ii. 294, b. +10, [Greek: dio\ dei= to\n me/llonta kalô=s zêtê/sein e)nstatiko\n +ei)=nai dia\ tô=n oi)kei/ôn e)nsta/seôn tô=| ge/nei, tou=to de\ +e)sti\n e)k tou= pa/sas tetheôrêke/nai ta\s diaphora/s.]] + +[Footnote 59: That the only road to trustworthy affirmation lies +through a string of negations, unfolded and appreciated by systematic +procedure, is strongly insisted on by Bacon, Novum Organum, ii. 15, +"Omnino Deo (formarum inditori et opifici), aut fortasse angelis et +intelligentiis competit formas per affirmationem immediate nosse, +atque ab initio contemplationis. Sed certe supra hominem est: cui +tantum conceditur, procedere primo per negativas, et postremo loco +desinere in affirmativas, post omnimodam exclusionem." Compare another +Aphorism, i. 46. + +The following passage, transcribed from the Lectures of a +distinguished physical philosopher of the present day, is conceived in +the spirit of the Platonic Dialogues of Search, though Plato would +have been astonished at such patient multiplication of experiments:-- + +"I should hardly sustain your interest in stating the difficulties +which at first beset the investigation conducted with this apparatus, +or the numberless precautions which the exact balancing of the two +powerful sources of heat, here resorted to, rendered necessary. I +believe the experiments, made with atmospheric air alone, might be +numbered by tens of thousands. Sometimes for a week, or even for a +fortnight, coincident and satisfactory results would be obtained: the +strict conditions of accurate experimenting would appear to be found, +when an additional day's experience would destroy this hope and +necessitate a recommencement, under changed conditions, of the whole +inquiry. It is this which daunts the experimenter. It is this +preliminary fight with the entanglements of a subject so dark, so +doubtful, so uncheering, without any knowledge whether the conflict is +to lead to anything worth possessing, that renders discovery difficult +and rare. But the experimenter, and particularly the _young_ +experimenter, ought to know that as regards his own moral manhood, he +cannot but win, if he only contend aright. _Even, with a negative +result, his consciousness that he has gone fairly to the bottom of his +subject, as far as his means allowed_--the feeling that he has not +shunned labour, _though that labour may have resulted in laying bare +the nakedness of his case_--re-acts upon his own mind, and gives it +firmness for future work." (Tyndall, Lectures on Heat, considered as a +Mode of Motion, Lect x. p. 332.)] + +[Side-note: Sokrates considered the negative procedure to be valuable +by itself, and separately. His theory of the natural state of the +human mind; not ignorance, but false persuasion of knowledge.] + +It will thus appear that among the conditions requisite for +philosophy, both Sokrates and Plato regarded the negative procedure as +co-ordinate in value with the affirmative, and indispensable as a +preliminary stage. But Sokrates went a step farther. He assigned to +the negative an intrinsic importance by itself, apart from all +implication with the affirmative; and he rested that opinion upon a +psychological ground, formally avowed, and far larger than anything +laid down by the Sophists. He thought that the natural state of the +human mind, among established communities, was not simply ignorance, +but ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge--false or uncertified +belief--false persuasion of knowledge. The only way of dissipating +such false persuasion was, the effective stimulus of the negative +test, or cross-examining Elenchus; whereby a state of non-belief, or +painful consciousness of ignorance, was substituted in its place. Such +second state was indeed not the best attainable. It ought to be +preliminary to a third, acquired by the struggles of the mind to +escape from such painful consciousness; and to rise, under the +continued stimulus of the tutelary Elenchus, to improved affirmative +and defensible beliefs. But even if this third state were never +reached, Sokrates declared the second state to be a material amendment +on the first, which he deprecated as alike pernicious and disgraceful. + +[Side-note: Declaration of Sokrates in the Apology; his constant +mission to make war against the false persuasion of knowledge.] + +The psychological conviction here described stands proclaimed by +Sokrates himself, with remarkable earnestness and emphasis, in his +Apology before the Dikasts, only a month before his death. So deeply +did he take to heart the prevalent false persuasion of knowledge, +alike universal among all classes, mischievous, and difficult to +correct--that he declared himself to have made war against it +throughout his life, under a mission imposed upon him by the Delphian +God; and to have incurred thereby wide-spread hatred among his +fellow-citizens. To convict men, by cross-examination, of ignorance in +respect to those matters which each man believed himself to know well +and familiarly--this was the constant employment and the mission of +Sokrates: not to teach--for he disclaimed the capacity of teaching--but +to make men feel their own ignorance instead of believing +themselves to know. Such cross-examination, conducted usually before +an audience, however it might be salutary and indispensable, was +intended to humiliate the respondent, and could hardly fail to offend +and exasperate him. No one felt satisfaction except some youthful +auditors, who admired the acuteness with which it was conducted. "I +(declared Sokrates) am distinguished from others, and superior to +others, by this character only--that I am conscious of my own +ignorance: the wisest of men would be he who had the like +consciousness; but as yet I have looked for such a man in vain."[60] + +[Footnote 60: Plat. Apol. S. pp. 23-29. It is not easy to select +particular passages for reference; for the sentiments which I have +indicated pervade nearly the whole discourse.] + +[Side-note: Opposition of feeling between Sokrates and the Dikasts.] + +In delivering this emphatic declaration, Sokrates himself intimates +his apprehension that the Dikasts will treat his discourse as mockery; +that they will not believe him to be in earnest: that they will +scarcely have patience to hear him claim a divine mission for so +strange a purpose.[61] The declaration is indeed singular, and +probably many of the Dikasts did so regard it; while those who thought +it serious, heard it with repugnance. The separate value of the +negative procedure or Elenchus was never before so unequivocally +asserted, or so highly estimated. To disabuse men of those false +beliefs which they mistook for knowledge, and to force on them the +painful consciousness that they knew nothing--was extolled as the +greatest service which could be rendered to them, and as rescuing them +from a degraded and slavish state of mind.[62] + +[Footnote 61: Plato, Apol. S. pp. 20-38.] + +[Footnote 62: Aristotle, in the first book of Metaphysica (982, b. +17), when repeating a statement made in the Theætêtus of Plato (155 +D), that wonder is the beginning, or point of departure, of +philosophy--explains the phrase by saying, that wonder is accompanied +by a painful conviction of ignorance and sense of embarrassment. +[Greek: o( de\ a)porô=n kai\ thauma/zôn oi)/etai a)gnoei=n . . . dia\ +to\ pheu/gein tê\n a)/gnoian e)philoso/phêsan . . . ou) chrê/seô/s tinos +e(/neken]. This painful conviction of ignorance is what Sokrates +sought to bring about.] + +[Side-note: The Dialogues of Search present an end in themselves. +Mistake of supposing that Plato had in his mind an ulterior +affirmative end, not declared.] + +To understand the full purpose of Plato's dialogues of +search--testing, exercising, refuting, but not finding or providing--we +must keep in mind the Sokratic Apology. Whoever, after reading the +Theætêtus, Lachês, Charmidês, Lysis, Parmenidês, &c., is tempted to +exclaim "But, after all, Plato _must_ have had in his mind some +ulterior doctrine of conviction which he wished to impress, but which +he has not clearly intimated," will see, by the Sokratic Apology, that +such a presumption is noway justifiable. Plato is a searcher, and has +not yet made up his own mind: this is what he himself tells us, and +what I literally believe, though few or none of his critics will admit +it. His purpose in the dialogues of search, is plainly and +sufficiently enunciated in the words addressed by Sokrates to +Theætêtus--"Answer without being daunted: for if we prosecute our +search, one of two alternatives is certain--either we shall find what +we are looking for, or we shall get clear of the persuasion that we +know what in reality we do not yet know. Now a recompense like this +will leave no room for dissatisfaction."[63] + +[Footnote 63: Plato, Theætet. 187 C. [Greek: e)a\n ga\r ou(/tô +drô=men, duoi=n tha/teron--ê)\ eu(rê/somen e)ph' o(\ e)rcho/metha, ê)\ +ê(=tton oi)êso/metha ei)de/nai o(\ mêdamê=| i)/smen; kai/toi ou)k a)\n +ei)/ê mempto\s o( toiou=tos]. Bonitz (in his Platonische Studien, pp. +8, 9, 74, 76, &c.) is one of the few critics who deprecate the +confidence and boldness with which recent scholars have ascribed to +Plato affirmative opinions and systematic purpose which he does not +directly announce. Bonitz vindicates the separate value and separate +_locus standi_ of the negative process in Plato's estimation, +particularly in the example of the Theætêtus. Susemihl, in the preface +to his second part, has controverted these views of Bonitz--in my +judgment without any success. + +The following observations of recent French scholars are just, though +they imply too much the assumption that there is always some +affirmative jewel wrapped up in Plato's complicated folds. M. Egger +observes (Histoire de la Critique chez les Grecs, Paris, 1849, p. 84, +ch. ii. sect. 4): + +"La philosophie de Platon n'offre pas, en général, un ensemble de +parties très rigoureusement liées entre elles. D'abord, il ne l'expose +que sous forme dialoguée: et dans ses dialogues, où il ne prend jamais +de rôle personnel, on ne voit pas clairement auquel des interlocuteurs +il a confié la défense de ses propres opinions. Parmi ces +interlocuteurs, Socrate lui-même, le plus naturel et le plus ordinaire +interprète de la pensée de son disciple, use fort souvent des libertés +de cette forme toute dramatique, pour se jouer dans les distinctions +subtiles, pour exagérer certains arguments, pour couper court à une +discussion embarrassante, au moyen de quelque plaisanterie, et pour se +retirer d'un débat sans conclure; en un mot, il a--ou, ce qui est plus +vrai, Platon a, sous son nom--_des opinions de circonstance et des +ruses de dialectique_, à travers lesquelles il est souvent difficile +de retrouver le fond sérieux de sa doctrine. Heureusement ces +difficultés ne touchent pas aux principes généraux du Platonisme. La +critique Platonicienne en particulier dans ce qu'elle a de plus +original, et de plus élevé, se rattache à la grande théorie des +_idées_ et de la _réminiscence_. On la retrouve exposée dans plusieurs +dialogues avec une clarté qui ne permet ni le doute ni l'incertitude." + +I may also cite the following remarks made by M. Vacherot (Histoire +Critique de l'École d'Alexandrie, vol. ii. p. 1, Pt. ii. Bk. ii. ch. +i.) after his instructive analysis of the doctrines of Plotinus. I +think the words are as much applicable to Plato as to Plotinus: the +rather, as Plato never speaks in his own name, Plotinus +always:--"Combien faut-il prendre garde d'ajouter à la pensée du +philosophe, et de lui prêter un arrangement artificiel! Ce génie, plein +d'enthousiasme et de fougue, n'a jamais connu ni mesure ni plan: +jamais il ne s'est astreint à developper régulièrement une théorie, ni +à exposer avec suite un ensemble de théories, de manière à en former +un système. _Fort incertain dans sa marche, il prend, quitte, et +reprend le même sujet, sans jamais paraître avoir dit son dernier +mot_; toujours il répand de vives et abondantes clartés sur les +questions qu'il traite, mais rarement il les conduit à leur dernière +et définitive solution; sa rapide pensée n'effleure pas seulement le +sujet sur lequel elle passe, elle le pénétre et le creuse toujours, +sans toutefois l'épuiser. Fort inégal dans ses allures, tantôt ce +génie s'échappe en inspirations rapides et tumultueuses, tantôt il +semble se traîner péniblement, et se perdre dans un dédale de subtiles +abstractions, &c."] + +[Side-note: False persuasion of knowledge--had reference to topics +social, political, ethical.] + +What those topics were, in respect to which Sokrates found this +universal belief of knowledge, without the reality of knowledge--we +know, not merely from the dialogues of Plato, but also from the +Memorabilia of Xenophon. Sokrates did not touch upon recondite +matters--upon the Kosmos, astronomy, meteorology. Such studies he +discountenanced as useless, and even as irreligious.[64] The subjects +on which he interrogated were those of common, familiar, every-day +talk: those which every one believed himself to know, and on which +every one had a confident opinion to give: the respondent being +surprised that any one could put the questions, or that there could be +any doubt requiring solution. What is justice? what is injustice? what +are temperance and courage? what is law, lawlessness, democracy, +aristocracy? what is the government of mankind, and the attributes +which qualify any one for exercising such government? Here were +matters upon which every one talked familiarly, and would have been +ashamed to be thought incapable of delivering an opinion. Yet it was +upon these matters that Sokrates detected universal ignorance, coupled +with a firm, but illusory, persuasion of knowledge. The conversation +of Sokrates with Euthydêmus, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia[65]--the +first Alkibiadês, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron, &c., of Plato--are +among the most marked specimens of such cross-examination or Elenchus--a +string of questions, to which there are responses in indefinite +number successively given, tested, and exposed as unsatisfactory. + +[Footnote 64: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1.] + +[Footnote 65: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2. A passage from Paley's preface to +his "Principles of Moral Philosophy," illustrates well this Sokratic +process: "Concerning the principle of morals, it would be premature to +speak: but concerning the manner of unfolding and explaining that +principle, I have somewhat which I wish to be remarked. An experience +of nine years in the office of a public tutor in one of the +Universities, and in that department of education to which these +sections relate, afforded me frequent opportunity to observe, that in +discoursing to young minds upon topics of morality, it _required much +more pains to make them perceive the difficulty than to understand the +solution_: that unless the subject was so drawn up to a point as to +exhibit the full force of an objection, or the exact place of a doubt, +before any explanation was entered upon--in other words, unless some +curiosity was excited, before it was attempted to be satisfied--the +teacher's labour was lost. When information was not desired, it was +seldom, I found, retained. I have made this observation my guide in +the following work: that is, I have endeavoured, before I suffered +myself to proceed in the disquisition, to put the reader in complete +possession of the question: _and to do it in a way that I thought most +likely to stir up his own doubts and solicitude about it_."] + +[Side-note: To those topics, on which each community possesses +established dogmas, laws, customs, sentiments, consecrated and +traditional, peculiar to itself. The local creed, which is never +formally proclaimed or taught, but is enforced unconsciously by every +one upon every one else. Omnipotence of King Nomos.] + +The answers which Sokrates elicited and exposed were simple +expressions of the ordinary prevalent belief upon matters on which +each community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs, +sentiments, fashions, points of view, &c., belonging to itself. When +Herodotus passed over to Egypt, he was astonished to find the +judgment, feelings, institutions, and practices of the Egyptians, +contrasting most forcibly with those of all other countries. He +remarks the same (though less in degree) respecting Babylonians, +Indians, Scythians, and others; and he is not less impressed with the +veneration of each community for its own creed and habits, coupled +with indifference or antipathy towards other creeds, disparate or +discordant, prevailing elsewhere.[66] + +[Footnote 66: Herodot. ii. 35-36-64; iii. 38-94, seq. i. 196; iv. +76-77-80. The discordance between the various institutions established +among the separate aggregations of mankind, often proceeding to the +pitch of reciprocal antipathy--the imperative character of each in its +own region, assuming the appearance of natural right and propriety--all +this appears brought to view by the inquisitive and observant +Herodotus, as well as by others (Xenophon, Cyropæd. i. 3-18): but many +new facts, illustrating the same thesis, were noticed by Aristotle and +the Peripatetics, when a larger extent of the globe became opened to +Hellenic survey. Compare Aristotle, Ethic. Nik. i. 3, 1094, b. 15; +Sextus Empiric. Pyrr. Hypotyp. i. sect 145-156, iii. sect 198-234; and +the remarkable extract from Bardesanes Syrus, cited by Eusebius, Præp. +Evang. vi., and published in Orelli's collection, pp. 202-219, +Alexandri Aphrodis. et Aliorum De Fato, Zurich, 1824. + +Many interesting passages in illustration of the same thesis might be +borrowed from Montaigne, Pascal, and others. But the most forcible of +all illustrations are those furnished by the Oriental world, when +surveyed or studied by intelligent Europeans, as it has been more +fully during the last century. See especially Sir William Sleeman's +Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official: two volumes which +unfold with equal penetration and fidelity the manifestations of +established sentiment among the Hindoos and Mahomedans. Vol. i. ch. +iv., describing a Suttee on the Nerbudda, is one of the most +impressive chapters in the work: the rather as it describes the +continuance of a hallowed custom, transmitted even from the days of +Alexander. I transcribe also some valuable matter from an eminent +living scholar, whose extensive erudition comprises Oriental as well +as Hellenic philosophy. + +M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Premier Mémoire sur le Sânkhya, Paris, +1852, pp. 392-396) observes as follows respecting the Sanscrit system +of philosophy called _Sânkhya_, the doctrine expounded and enforced by +the philosopher Kapila--and respecting Buddha and Buddhism which was +built upon the Sânkhya, amending or modifying it. Buddha is believed +to have lived about 547 B.C. Both the system of Buddha, and that of +Kapila, are atheistic, as described by M. St. Hilaire. + +"Le second point où Bouddha se sépare de Kapila concerne la doctrine. +L'homme ne peut rester dans l'incertitude que Kapila lui laisse +encore. L'âme délivrée, selon les doctrines de Kapila, peut toujours +renaître. Il n'y a qu'un moyen, un seul moyen, de le sauver,--c'est de +l'anéantir. Le néant seul est un sûr asile: on ne revient pas de celui +là.--Bouddha lui promet le néant; et c'est avec cette promesse inouie +qu'il a passionné les hommes et converti les peuples. Que cette +monstrueuse croyance, partagée aujourd'hui par trois cents millions de +sectateurs, révolte en nous les instincts les plus énergiques de notre +nature--qu'elle soulève toutes les répugnances et toutes les horreurs +de notre âme--qu'elle nous paraisse aussi incompréhensible que +hideuse--peu importe. Une partie considérable de l'humanité l'a +reçue,--prête même à la justifier par toutes les subtilités de la +metaphysique la plus raffinée, et à la confesser dans les tortures des +plus affreux supplices et les austérités homicides d'un fanatisme +aveugle. Si c'est une gloire que de dominer souverainement, à travers +les âges, la foi des hommes,--jamais fondateur de religion n'en eut +une plus grande que le Bouddha: car aucun n'eut de prosélytes plus +fidèles ni plus nombreux. Mais je me trompe: le Bouddha ne prétendait +jamais fonder une réligion. Il n'était que philosophe: et instruit +dans toutes les sciences des Brahmans, il ne voulut personnellement +que fonder, à leur exemple, un nouveau système. Seulement, les moyens +qu'il employait durent mener ses disciples plus loin qu'il ne comptait +aller lui même. En s'adressant à la foule, il faut bientôt la +discipliner et la régler. De là, cette ordination réligieuse que le +Bouddha donnait à ses adeptes, la hiérarchie qu'il établissait entre +eux, fondée uniquement, comme la science l'exigeait, sur le mérite +divers des intelligences et des vertus--la douce et sainte morale +qu'il prêchait,--le détachement de toutes choses en ce monde, si +convenable à des ascètes qui ne pensent qu'au salut éternel--le voeu +de pauvreté, qui est la première loi des Bouddhistes--et tout cet +ensemble de dispositions qui constituent un gouvernement au lieu d'une +école. + +"Mais ce n'est là que l'extérieur du Bouddhisme: c'en est le +développement matériel et nécessaire. Au fond, son principe est celui +du Sânkhya: seulement, il l'applique en grand.--C'est la science qui +délivre l'homme: et le Bouddha ajoute--Pour que l'homme soit délivré à +jamais, il faut qu'il arrive au Nirvâna, c'est à dire, qu'il soit +absolument anéanti. Le néant est donc le bout de la science: et le +salut eternel, c'est l'anéantissement." + +The same line of argument is insisted on by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire +in his other work--Bouddha et sa réligion, Paris, 1862, ed. 2nd: +especially in his Chapter on the Nirvâna: wherein moreover he +complains justly of the little notice which authors take of the +established beliefs of those varieties of the human race which are +found apart from Christian Europe.] + +This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe, ethical, +religious, æsthetical, social, respecting what is true or false, +probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy or unholy, honourable or +base, respectable or contemptible, pure or impure, beautiful or ugly, +decent or indecent, obligatory to do or obligatory to avoid, +respecting the status and relations of each individual in the society, +respecting even the admissible fashions of amusement and recreation--this +is an established fact and condition of things, the real origin +of which is for the most part unknown, but which each new member of +the society is born to and finds subsisting. It is transmitted by +tradition from parents to children, and is imbibed by the latter +almost unconsciously from what they see and hear around, without any +special season of teaching, or special persons to teach. It becomes a +part of each person's nature--a standing habit of mind, or fixed set +of mental tendencies, according to which, particular experience is +interpreted and particular persons appreciated.[67] It is not set +forth in systematic proclamation, nor impugned, nor defended: it is +enforced by a sanction of its own, the same real sanction or force in +all countries, by fear of displeasure from the Gods, and by certainty +of evil from neighbours and fellow-citizens. The community hate, +despise, or deride, any individual member who proclaims his dissent +from their social creed, or even openly calls it in question. Their +hatred manifests itself in different ways at different times and +occasions, sometimes by burning or excommunication, sometimes by +banishment or interdiction[68] from fire and water; at the very least, +by exclusion from that amount of forbearance, good-will, and +estimation, without which the life of an individual becomes +insupportable: for society, though its power to make an individual +happy is but limited, has complete power, easily exercised, to make +him miserable. The orthodox public do not recognise in any individual +citizen a right to scrutinise their creed, and to reject it if not +approved by his own rational judgment. They expect that he will +embrace it in the natural course of things, by the mere force of +authority and contagion--as they have adopted it themselves: as they +have adopted also the current language, weights, measures, divisions +of time, &c. If he dissents, he is guilty of an offence described in +the terms of the indictment preferred against Sokrates--"Sokrates +commits crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in the Gods, in whom +the city believes, but introduces new religious beliefs," &c.[69] +"Nomos (Law and Custom), King of All" (to borrow the phrase which +Herodotus cites from Pindar[70]), exercises plenary power, spiritual +as well as temporal, over individual minds; moulding the emotions as +well as the intellect according to the local type--determining the +sentiments, the belief, and the predisposition in regard to new +matters tendered for belief, of every one--fashioning thought, speech, +and points of view, no less than action--and reigning under the +appearance of habitual, self-suggested tendencies. Plato, when he +assumes the function of Constructor, establishes special officers for +enforcing in detail the authority of King Nomos in his Platonic +variety. But even where no such special officers exist, we find Plato +himself describing forcibly (in the speech assigned to Protagoras)[71] +the working of that spontaneous ever-present police by whom the +authority of King Nomos is enforced in detail--a police not the less +omnipotent because they wear no uniform, and carry no recognised +title. + +[Footnote 67: This general fact is powerfully set forth by Cicero, in +the beginning of the third Tusculan Disputation. Chrysippus the Stoic, +"ut est in omni historiâ curiosus," had collected striking examples of +these consecrated practices, cherished in one territory, abhorrent +elsewhere. (Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 45, 108.)] + +[Footnote 68: See the description of the treatment of Aristodêmus, one +of the two Spartans who survived the battle of Thermopylæ, after his +return home, Herodot. vii. 231, ix. 71. The interdiction from +communion of fire, water, eating, sacrifice, &c., is the strongest +manifestation of repugnance: so insupportable to the person +excommunicated, that it counted for a sentence of exile in the Roman +law. (Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton, s. 9. Heineccius, Ant. Rom. i. +16, 9, 10.)] + +[Footnote 69: Xenophon. Memor. i. 1, 1. [Greek: A)dikei= Sôkra/tês, +ou(\s me\n ê( po/lis nomi/zei theou\s ou) nomi/zôn, e(/tera de\ kaina\ +daimo/nia ei)sphe/rôn], &c. Plato (Leges, x. 909, 910) and Cicero +(Legib. ii. 19-25) forbid [Greek: kaina\ daimo/nia], "separatim nemo +habessit Deos," &c.] + +[Footnote 70: [Greek: No/mos pa/ntôn basileu/s] (Herodot. iii. 38). It +will be seen from Herodotus, as well as elsewhere, that the idea +really intended to be expressed by the word [Greek: No/mos] is much +larger than what is now commonly understood by _Law_. It is equivalent +to that which Epiktêtus calls [Greek: to\ do/gma--pantachou= +a)ni/kêton to\ do/gma] (Epiktet. iii. 16). It includes what is meant +by [Greek: to\ no/mimon] (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 13-24), [Greek: ta\ +no/mima, ta\ nomizo/mena, ta pa/tria, ta\ no/maia], including both +positive morality, and social æsthetical precepts, as well as civil or +political, and even personal habits, such as that of abstinence from +spitting or wiping the nose (Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 8, 8-10). The case +which Herodotus quotes to illustrate his general thesis is the +different treatment which, among different nations, is considered +dutiful and respectful towards senior relatives and the corpses of +deceased relatives; which matters come under [Greek: ta)/grapta +ka)sphalê= Theô=n No/mima] (Soph. Antig. 440)--of immemorial +antiquity;-- + +[Greek: Ou) ga/r ti nu=n ge ka)chthe\s a)ll' a)ei/ pote +Zê=| tau=ta, kou)dei\s oi)=den e)x' o(/tou' pha/nê]. + +[Greek: No/mos] and [Greek: e)pitê/deuma] run together in Plato's +mind, dictating every hour's proceeding of the citizen through life +(Leges, vii. 807-808-823). + +We find Plato, in the Leges, which represents the altered tone and +compressive orthodoxy of his old age, extolling the simple goodness +([Greek: eu)ê/theia]) of our early forefathers, who believed +implicitly all that was told them, and were not clever enough to raise +doubts, [Greek: ô(/sper tanu=n] (Legg. iii. 679, 680). Plato dwells +much upon the danger of permitting any innovation on the fixed modes +of song and dance (Legg. v. 727, vii. 797-800), and forbids it under +heavy penalties. He says that the lawgiver both _can_ consecrate +common talk, and ought to consecrate it--[Greek: kathierô=sai tê\n +phê/mên] (Legg. 838), the dicta of [Greek: No/mos Basileu/s]. + +Pascal describes, in forcible terms, the wide-spread authority of +[Greek: No/mos Basileu/s]:--"Il ne faut pas se méconnaître, nous +sommes automates autant qu'esprit: et delà vient que l'instrument, par +lequel la persuasion se fait, n'est pas la seule démonstration. +Combien y a-t-il peu de choses démontrées! Les preuves ne convainquent +que l'esprit. La coutume fait nos preuves les plus fortes et les plus +crues: _elle incline l'automate, qui entraîne l'esprit sans qu'il y +pense_. Qui a démontré qu'il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons--et +qu'y a-t-il de plus cru? C'est donc la coutume qui nous en +persuade, c'est elle qui fait tant de Chrétiens, c'est elle qui fait +les Turcs les Paiens, les métiers, les soldats, &c. Enfin, il faut +avoir recours à elle quand une fois l'esprit a vu où est la vérité, +afin de nous abreuver et nous teindre de cette créance, qui nous +échappe à toute heure; car d'en avoir toujours les preuves présentes, +c'est trop d'affaire. Il faut acquérir une créance plus facile, qui +est celle de l'habitude, qui, sans violence, sans art, sans argument, +nous fait croire les choses, et incline toutes nos puissances à cette +croyance, en sorte que notre âme y tombe naturellement. Quand on ne +croit que par la force de la conviction, et que l'automate est incliné +à croire le contraire, ce n'est pas assez." (Pascal, Pensées, ch. xi. +p. 237, ed. Louandre, Paris, 1854.) + +Herein Pascal coincides with Montaigne, of whom he often speaks +harshly enough: "Comme de vray nous n'avons aultre mire de la vérité +et de la raison, que l'exemple et idée des opinions et usances du païs +où nous sommes: là est tousiours la parfaicte religion, la parfaicte +police, parfaict et accomply usage de toutes choses." (Essais de +Montaigne, liv. i. ch. 30.) Compare the same train of thought in +Descartes (Discours sur la Méthode, pp. 132-139, ed. Cousin).] + +[Footnote 71: Plat. Protag. 320-328. The large sense of the word +[Greek: No/mos], as conceived by Pindar and Herodotus, must be kept in +mind, comprising positive morality, religious ritual, consecrated +habits, the local turns of sympathy and antipathy, &c. M. Salvador +observes, respecting the Mosaic Law: "Qu'on écrive tous les rapports +publics et privés qui unissent les membres d'un peuple quelconque, et +tous les principes sur lesquels ces rapports sont fondés--il en +résultera un ensemble complet, un véritable système plus ou moins +raisonnable, qui sera l'expression exacte de la manière d'exister de +ce peuple. Or, cet ensemble ou ce système est ce que les Hébreux +appellent la _tora_, la loi ou la constitution publique--en prenant ce +mot dans le sens le plus étendu." (Salvador, Histoire des Institutions +de Moise, liv. i. ch. ii. p. 96.) + +Compare also about the sense of the word _Lex_, as conceived by the +Arabs, M. Renan, Averroès, p. 286, and Mr. Mill's chapter respecting +the all-comprehensive character of the Hindoo law (Hist. of India, ch. +iv., beginning): "In the law books of the Hindus, the details of +jurisprudence and judicature occupy comparatively a very moderate +space. The doctrines and ceremonies of religion; the rules and +practice of education; the institutions, duties, and customs of +domestic life; the maxims of private morality, and even of domestic +economy; the rules of government, of war, and of negotiation; all form +essential parts of the Hindu code of law, and are treated in the same +style, and laid down with the same authority, as the rules for the +distribution of justice." + +Mr. Maine, in his admirable work on Ancient Law, notes both the +all-comprehensive and the irresistible ascendancy of what is called _Law_ +in early societies. He remarks emphatically that "the stationary +condition of the human race is the rule--the progressive condition the +exception--a rare exception in the history of the world". (Chap. i. +pp. 16-18-19; chap. ii. pp. 22-24.) + +Again, Mr. Maine observes:--"The other liability, to which the infancy +of society is exposed, has prevented or arrested the progress of far +the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of ancient law, arising +chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, +has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and +conduct which they entertained at the time when their institutions +were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two +races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity: and grafts +from these stocks have fertilised a few modern societies. But it is +still true that over the larger part of the world, the perfection of +law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the +ground-plan supposed to have been marked out by the legislator. _If +intellect has in such cases been exercised upon jurisprudence, it has +uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it +could build on ancient texts, without discoverable departure from +their literal tenor._" (Maine, Ancient Law, ch. iv. pp. 77-78.)] + +[Side-note: Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not +yield to the established orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own +judgment.] + +There are, however, generally a few exceptional minds to whom this +omnipotent authority of King Nomos is repugnant, and who claim a right +to investigate and judge for themselves on many points already settled +and foreclosed by the prevalent orthodoxy. In childhood and youth +these minds must have gone through the ordinary influences,[72] but +without the permanent stamp which such influences commonly leave +behind. Either the internal intellectual force of the individual is +greater, or he contracts a reverence for some new authority, or (as in +the case of Sokrates) he believes himself to have received a special +mission from the Gods--in one way or other the imperative character of +the orthodoxy around him is so far enfeebled, that he feels at liberty +to scrutinise for himself the assemblage of beliefs and sentiments +around him. If he continues to adhere to them, this is because they +approve themselves to his individual reason: unless this last +condition be fulfilled, he becomes a dissenter, proclaiming his +dissent more or less openly, according to circumstances. Such +disengagement from authority traditionally consecrated ([Greek: +e)xallagê\ tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn]),[73] and assertion of the right +of self-judgment, on the part of a small minority of [Greek: +i)diognô/mones],[74] is the first condition of existence for +philosophy or "reasoned truth". + +[Footnote 72: Cicero, Tusc. D. iii. 2; Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 10, +1179, b. 23. [Greek: o( de\ lo/gos kai\ ê( didachê\ mê/ pot' ou)k e)n +a(/pasin i)schu/ê|, a)lla\ de/ê| prodieirga/sthai toi=s e)/thesi tê\n +tou= a)kroatou= psuchê\n pro\s to\ kalô=s chai/rein kai\ misei=n, +ô(/sper gê=n tê\n thre/psousan to\ spe/rma]. To the same purpose +Plato, Republ. iii. 402 A, Legg. ii. 653 B, 659 E, Plato and Aristotle +(and even Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 3), aiming at the formation of a body +of citizens, and a community very different from anything which they +saw around them--require to have the means of shaping the early +sentiments, love, hatred, &c., of children, in a manner favourable to +their own ultimate views. This is exactly what [Greek: No/mos +Basileu\s] does effectively in existing societies, without need of +special provision for the purpose. See Plato, Protagor. 325, 326.] + +[Footnote 73: Plato, Phædrus, 265 A. See Sir Will. Hamilton's Lectures +on Logic, Lect. 29, pp. 88-90. In the Timæus (p. 40 E) Plato +interrupts the thread of his own speculations on cosmogony, to take in +all the current theogony on the authority of King Nomos. [Greek: +a)du/naton ou)=n theô=n paisi\n a)pistei=n, kai/per a)/neu te +ei)ko/tôn kai\ a)nagkai/ôn a)podei/xeôn le/gousin, a)ll' ô(s oi)kei=a +pha/skousin a)pagge/llein e(pome/nous tô=| no/mô| pisteute/on]. + +Hegel adverts to this severance of the individual consciousness from +the common consciousness of the community, as the point of departure +for philosophical theory:--"On one hand we are now called upon to find +some specific matter for the general form of Good; such closer +determination of The Good is the criterion required. On the other +hand, the exigencies of the individual subject come prominently +forward: this is the consequence of the revolution which Sokrates +operated in the Greek mind. So long as the religion, the laws, the +political constitution, of any people, are in full force--so long as +each individual citizen is in complete harmony with them all--no one +raises the question, What has the Individual to do for himself? In a +moralised and religious social harmony, each individual finds his +destination prescribed by the established routine; while this positive +morality, religion, laws, form also the routine of _his own_ mind. On +the contrary, if the Individual no longer stands on the custom of his +nation, nor feels himself in full agreement with the religion and +laws--he then no longer finds what he desires, nor obtains +satisfaction in the medium around him. When once such discord has +become confirmed, the Individual must fall back on his own +reflections, and seek his destination there. This is what gives rise +to the question--What is the essential scheme for the Individual? To +what ought he to conform--what shall he aim at? An _ideal_ is thus set +up for the Individual. This is, the Wise Man, or the Ideal of the Wise +Man, which is, in truth, the separate working of individual +self-consciousness, conceived as an universal or typical character." +(Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, Part ii. pp. 132, 133.)] + +[Footnote 74: This is an expression of the learned Huet, Bishop of +Avranches:--"Si quelqu'un me demande maintenant, ce que nous sommes, +puisque nous ne voulons être ni Académiciens, ni Sceptiques, ni +Eclectiques, ni d'aucune autre Secte, je répondrai que _nous sommes +nôtres_--c'est à dire libres: ne voulans soumettre notre esprit à +aucune autorité, et n'approuvans que ce qui nous paroit s'approcher +plus près de la vérité. Que si quelqu'un, par mocquerie ou par +flatterie, nous appelle [Greek: i)diognô/monas]--c'est à dire, +attachés à nos propres sentimens, nous n'y répugnerons pas." (Huet, +Traité Philosophique de la Foiblesse de l'Esprit Humain, liv. ii. ch. +xi. p. 224, ed. 1741.)] + +[Side-note: Early appearance of a few free-judging individuals, or +free-thinkers in Greece.] + +Amidst the epic and lyric poets of Greece, with their varied +productive impulse--as well as amidst the Gnomic philosophers, the +best of whom were also poets--there are not a few manifestations of +such freely judging individuality. Xenophanes the philosopher, who +wrote in poetry, censured severely several of the current narratives +about the Gods and Pindar, though in more respectful terms, does the +like. So too, the theories about the Kosmos, propounded by various +philosophers, Thales, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, +&c., were each of them the free offspring of an individual mind. But +these were counter-affirmations: novel theories, departing from the +common belief, yet accompanied by little or no debate, or attack, or +defence: indeed the proverbial obscurity of Herakleitus, and the +recluse mysticism of the Pythagoreans, almost excluded discussion. +These philosophers (to use the phrase of Aristotle[75]) had no concern +with Dialectic: which last commenced in the fifth century B.C., with +the Athenian drama and dikastery, and was enlisted in the service of +philosophy by Zeno the Eleate and Sokrates. + +[Footnote 75: Aristot. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 32. Eusebius, having set +forth the dissentient and discordant opinions of the various Hellenic +philosophers, triumphantly contrasts with them the steady adherence of +Jews and Christians to one body of truth, handed down by an uniform +tradition from father to son, from the first generation of +man--[Greek: a)po\ prô/tês a)nthrôpogoni/as]. (Præp. Ev. xiv. 3.) + +Cicero, in the treatise (not preserved) entitled _Hortensius_--set +forth, at some length, an attack and a defence of philosophy; the +former he assigned to Hortensius, the latter he undertook in his own +name. One of the arguments urged by Hortensius against philosophy, to +prove that it was not "vera sapientia," was, that it was both a human +invention and a recent novelty, not handed down by tradition _a +principio_, therefore not natural to man. "Quæ si secundum hominis +naturam est, cum homine ipso coeperit necesse est; si vero non est, +nec capere quidem illam posset humana natura. Ubi apud antiquiores +latuit amor iste investigandæ veritatis?" (Lactantius, Inst. Divin. +iii. 16.) The loss of this Ciceronian pleading (Philosophy _versus_ +Consecrated Tradition) is much to be deplored. Lactantius and Augustin +seem to have used it largely. + +The Hermotimus of Lucian, manifesting all his lively Sokratic +acuteness, is a dialogue intended to expose the worthlessness of all +speculative philosophy. The respondent Hermotimus happens to be a +Stoic, but the assailant expressly declares (c. 85) that the arguments +would be equally valid against Platonists or Aristotelians. Hermotimus +is advised to desist from philosophy, to renounce inquiry, to employ +himself in some of the necessary affairs of life, and to acquiesce in +the common received opinions, which would carry him smoothly along the +remainder of his life ([Greek: a)xiô= pra/ttein ti tô=n a)nagkai/ôn, +kai\ o(/ se parape/mpsei e)s to\ loipo\n tou= bi/ou, ta\ koina\ tau=ta +phronou=nta], c. 72). Among the worthless philosophical speculations +Lucian ranks geometry: the geometrical definitions (point and line) he +declares to be nonsensical and inadmissible (c. 74).] + +[Side-note: Rise of Dialectic--Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery.] + +Both the drama and the dikastery recognise two or more different ways +of looking at a question, and require that no conclusion shall be +pronounced until opposing disputants have been heard and compared. The +Eumenides plead against Apollo, Prometheus against the mandates and +dispositions of Zeus, in spite of the superior dignity as well as +power with which Zeus is invested: every Athenian citizen, in his +character of dikast, took an oath to hear both the litigant parties +alike, and to decide upon the pleadings and evidence according to law. +Zeno, in his debates with the anti-Parmenidean philosophers, did not +trouble himself to parry their thrusts. He assumed the aggressive, +impugned the theories of his opponents, and exposed the contradictions +in which they involved themselves. The dialectic process, in which +there are (at the least) two opposite points of view both represented--the +negative and the affirmative--became both prevalent and +interesting. + +[Side-note: Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social +topics by Sokrates.] + +I have in a former chapter explained the dialectic of Zeno, as it bore +upon the theories of the anti-Parmenidean philosophers. Still more +important was the proceeding of Sokrates, when he applied the like +scrutiny to ethical, social, political, religious topics. He did not +come forward with any counter-theories: he declared expressly that he +had none to propose, and that he was ignorant. He put questions to +those who on their side professed to know, and he invited answers from +them. His mission, as he himself described it, was, to scrutinise and +expose false pretensions to knowledge. Without such scrutiny, he +declares life itself to be not worth having. He impugned the common +and traditional creed, not in the name of any competing doctrine, but +by putting questions on the familiar terms in which it was confidently +enunciated, and by making its defenders contradict themselves and feel +the shame of their own contradictions. The persons who held it were +shown to be incapable of defending it, when tested by an acute +cross-examiner; and their supposed knowledge, gathered up insensibly +from the tradition around them, deserved the language which Bacon applies +to the science of his day, conducting indirectly to the necessity of +that remedial course which Bacon recommends. "Nemo adhuc tantâ mentis +constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi proposuerit, +theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum +et æquum ad particularia rursus applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam +habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus quas +primo hausimus notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries."[76] + +[Footnote 76: Bacon, Nov. Org. Aph. 97. I have already cited this +passage in a note on the 68th chapter of my 'History of Greece,' pp. +612-613; in which note I have also alluded to other striking passages +of Bacon, indicating the confusion, inconsistencies, and +misapprehensions of the "_intellectus sibi permissus_". In that note, +and in the text of the chapter, I have endeavoured to illustrate the +same view of the Sokratic procedure as that which is here taken.] + +[Side-note: Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the right of +satisfaction for his own individual reason.] + +Never before (so far as we know) had the authority of King Nomos been +exposed to such an enemy as this dialectic or cross-examination by +Sokrates: the prescriptive creed and unconsciously imbibed sentiment +("ratio ex fide, casu, et puerilibus notionibus") being thrown upon +their defence against negative scrutiny brought to bear upon them by +the inquisitive reason of an individual citizen. In the Apology, +Sokrates clothes his own strong intellectual _oestrus_ in the belief +(doubtless sincerely entertained) of a divine mission. In the Gorgias, +the Platonic Sokrates asserts it in naked and simple, yet not less +emphatic, language. "You, Polus, bring against me the authority of the +multitude, as well as that of the most eminent citizens, all of whom +agree in upholding your view. But I, one man standing here alone, do +_not_ agree with you. And I engage to compel you, my one respondent, +to agree with _me_."[77] The autonomy or independence of individual +reason against established authority, and the title of negative reason +as one of the litigants in the process of philosophising, are first +brought distinctly to view in the career of Sokrates. + +[Footnote 77: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 A. [Greek: kai\ nu=n, peri\ ô(=n +su\ le/geis, o)li/gou soi\ pa/ntes sumphê/sousi tau)ta A)thênai=oi +kai\ oi( xe/noi, e)a\n bou/lê kat' e)mou= ma/rturas parasche/sthai ô(s +ou)k a)lêthê= le/gô; marturê/sousi/ soi, e)a\n me\n bou/lê|, Niki/as +o( Nikêra/tou kai\ oi( a)delphoi\ met' au)tou=--e)a\n de\ bou/lê|, +A)ristokra/tês o( Skelli/ou--e)a\n de\ bou/lê|, ê( Perikle/ous o(/lê +oi)ki/a ê)\ a)/llê sugge/neia, ê(/ntina a)\n bou/lê| tô=n e)/nthade +e)kle/xasthai. _A)ll' e)gô/ soi ei)=s ô(\n ou)ch o(mologô=_; ou) ga/r +me su\ a)nagka/zeis], &c.] + +[Side-note: Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure +of Sokrates. Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs +peculiarly to the Sophists and the Megarici.] + +With such a career, we need not wonder that Sokrates, though esteemed +and admired by a select band of adherents, incurred a large amount of +general unpopularity. The public (as I have before observed) do not +admit the claim of independent exercise for individual reason. In the +natural process of growth in the human mind, belief does not follow +proof, but springs up apart from and independent of it: an immature +intelligence believes first, and proves (if indeed it ever seeks +proof) afterwards.[78] This mental tendency is farther confirmed by +the pressure and authority of King Nomos; who is peremptory in +exacting belief, but neither furnishes nor requires proof. The +community, themselves deeply persuaded, will not hear with calmness +the voice of a solitary reasoner, adverse to opinions thus +established; nor do they like to be required to explain, analyse, or +reconcile those opinions.[79] They disapprove especially that +dialectic debate which gives free play and efficacious prominence to +the negative arm. The like disapprobation is felt even by most of the +historians of philosophy; who nevertheless, having an interest in the +philosophising process, might be supposed to perceive that nothing +worthy of being called _reasoned truth_ can exist, without full and +equal scope to negative as well as to affirmative. + +[Footnote 78: See Professor Bain's Chapter on Belief; one of the most +original and instructive chapters in his volume on the Emotions and +the Will, pp. 578-584. [Third Ed., pp. 505-538.]] + +[Footnote 79: This antithesis and reciprocal repulsion--between the +speculative reason of the philosopher who thinks for himself, and the +established traditional convictions of the public--is nowhere more +strikingly enforced than by Plato in the sixth and seventh books of +the Republic; together with the corrupting influence exercised by King +Nomos, at the head of his vehement and unanimous public, over those +few gifted natures which are competent to philosophical speculation. +See Plato, Rep. vi. 492-493. + +The unfavourable feelings with which the attempts to analyse morality +(especially when quite novel, as such attempts were in the time of +Sokrates) are received in a community--are noticed by Mr. John Stuart +Mill, in his tract on Utilitarianism, ch. iii. pp. 38-39:-- + +"The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any +supposed moral standard, What is its sanction? What are the motives to +obey it? or more specifically, What is the source of its obligation? +Whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of +moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question: which though +frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian +morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above +others, really arises in _regard to all standards_. It arises in fact +whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard, or refer morality +to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the +customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, +is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of +being _in itself_ obligatory: and when a person is asked to believe +that this morality _derives_ its obligation from some general +principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the +assertion is to him a paradox. The supposed corollaries seem to have a +more binding force than the original theorem: the superstructure seems +to stand better without than with what is represented as its +foundation. . . . The difficulty has no peculiar application to the +doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to analyse +morality, and reduce it to principles: which, unless the principle is +already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its +applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their +sanctity." + +Epiktêtus observes that the refined doctrines acquired by the +self-reasoning philosopher, often failed to attain that intense hold +on his conviction, which the "rotten doctrines" inculcated from childhood +possessed over the conviction of ordinary men. [Greek: Dia\ ti/ ou)=n +e)kei=noi (oi( polloi\, oi( i)diô=tai) u(mô=n (tôn philoso/phôn) +i)schuro/teroi? O(/ti e)kei=noi me\n ta\ sapra\ tau=ta a)po\ dogma/tôn +lalou=sin? u(mei=s de\ ta\ kompsa\ a)po\ tô=n cheilô=n . . . . . Ou(/tôs +u(ma=s oi( i)diô=tai nikô=si; Pantachou= ga\r i)schuro\n to\ do/gma; +a)ni/kêton to\ do/gma]. (Epiktêtus, iii. 16.)] + +[Side-note: The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring +against the Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against +Sokrates. They represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual +with an orthodox public.] + +These historians usually speak in very harsh terms of the Sophists, as +well as of Eukleides and the Megaric sect; who are taken as the great +apostles of negation. But the truth is, that the Megarics inherited it +from Sokrates, and shared it with Plato. Eukleides cannot have laid +down a larger programme of negation than that which we read in the +Apology of Sokrates,--nor composed a dialogue more ultra-negative than +the Platonic Parmenidês: nor, again, did he depart so widely, in +principle as well as in precept, from existing institutions, as Plato +in his Republic. The charges which historians of philosophy urge +against the Megarics as well as against the persons whom they call the +Sophists--such as corruption of youth--perversion of truth and +morality, by making the worse appear the better reason--subversion of +established beliefs--innovation as well as deception--all these were +urged against Sokrates himself by his contemporaries,[80] and indeed +against all the philosophers indiscriminately, as we learn from +Sokrates himself in the Apology.[81] They are outbursts of feeling +natural to the practical, orthodox citizen, who represents the common +sense of the time and place; declaring his antipathy to these +speculative, freethinking innovations of theory, which challenges the +prescriptive maxims of traditional custom and tests them by a standard +approved by herself. The orthodox citizen does not feel himself in +need of philosophers to tell him what is truth or what is virtue, nor +what is the difference between real and fancied knowledge. On these +matters he holds already settled persuasions, acquired from his +fathers and his ancestors, and from the acknowledged civic +authorities, spiritual and temporal;[82] who are to him exponents of +the creed guaranteed by tradition:-- + + "Quod sapio, satis est mihi: non ego curo +Esse quod Arcesilas ærumnosique Solones." + +[Footnote 80: Themistius, in defending himself against contemporary +opponents, whom he represents to have calumniated him, consoles +himself by saying, among other observations, that these arrows have +been aimed at all the philosophers successively--Sokrates, Plato, +Aristotle, Theophrastus. [Greek: O( ga\r sophistê\s kai\ a)lazô\n kai\ +kaino/tomos prô=ton me\n Sôkra/tous o)nei/dê ê)=n, e)/peita Pla/tônos +e)phexê=s, ei)=th' u(/steron A)ristote/lous kai\ Theophra/stou]. +(Orat. xxiii. p. 346, Dindorf.) + +We read in Zeller's account of the Platonic philosophy (Phil. der +Griech. vol. ii. p. 368, ed. 2nd): + +"Die propädeutische Begründung der Platonischen Philosophie besteht im +Allgemeinen darin, dass der unphilosophische Standpunkt aufgelöst, und +die Erhebung zum philosophischen in ihrer Nothwendigkeit nachgewiesen +wird. Im Besondern können wir drey Stadien dieses Wegs unterscheiden. +Den Ausgangspunkt bildet das gewöhnliche Bewusstsein. Indem die +_Voraussetzungen, welche Diesem für ein Erstes und Festes gegolten +hatten, dialektisch zersetzt werden, so erhalten wir zunächst das +negative Resultat der Sophistik_. Erst wenn auch diese überwunden ist, +kann der philosophische Standpunkt positiv entwickelt werden." + +Zeller here affirms that it was the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, +Hippias and others) who first applied negative analysis to the common +consciousness; breaking up, by their dialectic scrutiny, those +hypotheses which had before exercised authority therein, as first +principles not to be disputed. + +I dissent from this position. I conceive that the Sophists +(Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias) did _not_ do what Zeller affirms, and +that Sokrates (and Plato after him) _did_ do it. The negative analysis +was the weapon of Sokrates, and not of Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, +&c. It was he who declared (see Platonic Apology) that false +persuasion of knowledge was at once universal and ruinous, and who +devoted his life to the task of exposing it by cross-examination. The +conversation of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydêmus (Memor. iv. +2), exhibits a complete specimen of that aggressive analysis, brought +to bear on the common consciousness, which Zeller ascribes to the +Sophists: the Platonic dialogues, in which Sokrates cross-examines +upon Justice, Temperance, Courage, Piety, Virtue, &c., are of the like +character; and we know from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1-16) that Sokrates +passed much time in such examinations with pre-eminent success. + +I notice this statement of Zeller, not because it is peculiar to him +(for most of the modern historians of philosophy affirm the same; and +his history, which is the best that I know, merely repeats the +ordinary view), but because it illustrates clearly the view which I +take of the Sophists and Sokrates. Instead of the unmeaning abstract +"_Sophistik_," given by Zeller and others, we ought properly to insert +the word "_Sokratik_," if we are to have any abstract term at all. + +Again--The negative analysis, which these authors call "Sophistik," +they usually censure as discreditable and corrupting. To me it +appears, on the contrary, both original and valuable, as one essential +condition for bringing social and ethical topics under the domain of +philosophy or "reasoned truth". + +Professor Charles Thurot (in his Études sur Aristote, Paris, 1860, p. +119) takes a juster view than Zeller of the difference between Plato +and the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias). "Les Sophistes, +comme tous ceux qui dissertent superficiellement sur des questions de +philosophie, et en particulier sur la morale et la politique, +s'appuyaient sur l'autorité et le témoignage; ils alléguaient les vers +des poètes célèbres qui passaient aux yeux des Grecs pour des oracles +de sagesse: ils invoquaient l'opinion du commun des hommes. Platon +récusait absolument ces deux espèces de témoignages. Ni les poètes ni +le commun des hommes ne savent ce qu'ils disent, puisqu'ils ne peuvent +en rendre raison. . . . . . Aux yeux de Platon, il n'y a d'autre méthode, +pour arriver au vrai et pour le communiquer, que la dialectique: qui +est à la fois l'art d'interroger et de répondre, et l'art de définir +et de diviser." + +M. Thurot here declares (in my judgment very truly) that the Sophists +appealed to the established ethical authorities, and dwelt upon or +adorned the received common-places--that Plato denied these +authorities, and brought his battery of negative cross-examination to +bear upon them as well as upon their defenders. M. Thurot thus gives a +totally different version of the procedure of the Sophists from that +which is given by Zeller. Nevertheless he perfectly agrees with +Zeller, and with Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates (Plat. Menon, pp. +91-92), in describing the Sophists as a class who made money by +deceiving and perverting the minds of hearers (p. 120).] + +[Footnote 81: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23 D. [Greek: i(/na de\ mê\ +dokô=sin a)porei=n, _ta\ kata\ pa/ntôn tô=n philosophou/ntôn +pro/cheira tau=ta le/gousin_, o(/ti ta\ mete/ôra kai\ ta\ u(po\ gê=s +_kai\ theou\s mê\ nomi/zein kai\ to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô +poiei=n_], &c. + +Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. [Greek: to\ koinê=| toi=s philoso/phois u(po\ +tô=n pollô=n epitimô/menon]. The rich families in Athens severely +reproached their relatives who frequented the society of Sokrates. +Xenophon, Sympos. iv. 32.] + +[Footnote 82: See this point strikingly set forth by Plato, Politikus, +299: also Plutarch, [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], c. 13, 756 A. + +This is the "auctoritas majorum," put forward by Cotta in his official +character of _Pontifex_, as conclusive _per se_: when reasons are +produced to sustain it, the reasons fail. (Cic. Nat. Deor. iii. 3, 5, +6, 9.) + +The "auctoritas maiorum," proclaimed by the Pontifex Cotta, may be +illustrated by what we read in Father Paul's History of the Council of +Trent, respecting the proceedings of that Council when it imposed the +duty of accepting the authoritative interpretation of +Scripture:--"Lorsqu'on fut à opiner sur le quatrième Article, presque tous +se rendirent à l'avis du Cardinal Pachèco, qui représenta: Que l'Écriture +ayant été expliquée par tant de gens éminens en piété et en doctrine, +l'on ne pouvoit pas espérer de rien ajouter de meilleur: Que les +nouvelles Hérésies etant toutes nées des nouveaux sens qu'on avoit +donnés à l'Écriture, il étoit nécessaire d'arrêter la licence des +esprits modernes, et de les obliger de se laisser gouverner par les +Anciens et par l'Église: Et que si quelqu'un naissoit avec un esprit +singulier, on devoit le forcer à le renfermer au dedans de lui-même, +et à ne pas troubler le monde en publiant tout ce qu'il pensoit." (Fra +Paolo, Histoire du Concile de Trente, traduction Françoise, par Le +Courayer, Livre II. p. 284, 285, in 1546, pontificate of Paul III.) + +P. 289. "Par le second Décret, il étoit ordonné en substance, de tenir +l'Edition Vulgate pour authentique dans les leçons publiques, les +disputes, les prédications, et les explications; et défendre à qui que +ce fut de la rejeter. On y défendoit aussi d'expliquer la Saint +Écriture dans un sens contraire à celui que lui donne la Sainte Église +notre Mère, et au consentement unanime des Pères, quand bien même on +auroit intention de tenir ces explications secrètes; et on ordonnoit +que ceux qui contreviendroient à cette défense fussent punis par les +Ordinaires."] + + +* * * * * + + +He will not listen to ingenious sophistry respecting these consecrated +traditions; he does not approve the tribe of fools who despise what +they are born to, and dream of distant, unattainable novelties:[83] he +cannot tolerate the nice discoursers, ingenious hair-splitters, +priests of subtleties and trifles--dissenters from the established +opinions, who corrupt the youth, teaching their pupils to be wise +above the laws, to despise or even beat their fathers and mothers,[84] +and to cheat their creditors--mischievous instructors, whose +appropriate audience are the thieves and malefactors, and who ought to +be silenced if they display ability to pervert others.[85] Such +feeling of disapprobation and antipathy against speculative philosophy +and dialectic--against the _libertas philosophandi_--counts as a +branch of virtue among practical and orthodox citizens, rich or poor, +oligarchical or democratical, military or civil, ancient or modern. It +is an antipathy common to men in other respects very different, to +Nikias as well as Kleon, to Eupolis and Aristophanes as well as to +Anytus and Demochares. It was expressed forcibly by the Roman Cato +(the Censor), when he censured Sokrates as a dangerous and violent +citizen; aiming, in his own way, to subvert the institutions and +customs of the country, and poisoning the minds of his fellow-citizens +with opinions hostile to the laws.[86] How much courage is required in +any individual citizen, to proclaim conscientious dissent in the face +of wide-spread and established convictions, is recognised by Plato +himself, and that too in the most orthodox and intolerant of all his +compositions.[87] He (and Aristotle after him), far from recognising +the infallibility of established King Nomos, were bold enough[88] to +try and condemn him, and to imagine (each of them) a new [Greek: +No/mos] of his own, representing the political Art or Theory of +Politics--a notion which would not have been understood by +Themistokles or Aristeides. + +[Footnote 83: Pindar, Pyth. iii. 21. + +[Greek: E)/sti de\ phu=lon e)n a)nthrô/poisi mataiotaton, +O(/stis ai)schu/nôn e)pichô/ria paptai/nei ta\ po/rsô, +Metamô/nia thêreu/ôn a)kra/ntois e)lpi/sin.]] + +[Footnote 84: [Greek: Ou)de\n sophizo/mestha toi=si dai/mosi; +Patri/ous paradocha\s, a(\s th' o(mê/likas chro/nô| +Kektê/meth', ou)dei\s au)ta\ katabalei= lo/gos, +Ou)/d' ei) di' a)/krôn to\ sopho\n êu(/rêtai phrenô=n]. + (Euripides, Bacchæ, 200.) + +Illud in his rebus vereor, ne forté rearis +Impia te rationis inire elementa, viamque +Endogredi sceleris. (Lucretius, i. 85.) + +Compare Valckenaer, Diatrib. Eurip. pp. 38, 39, cap. 5. + +About the accusations against Sokrates, of leading the youth to +contract doubts and to slight the authority of their fathers, see +Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 52; Plato, Gorgias, 522 B, p. 79, Menon, p. 70. A +touching anecdote, illustrating this displeasure of the fathers +against Sokrates, may be found in Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii. 1, 89, where +the father of Tigranes puts to death the [Greek: sophistê\s] who had +taught his son, because that son had contracted a greater attachment +to the [Greek: sophistê\s] than to his own father. + +Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 9; i. 2, 49. Apolog. So. s. 20; compare the +speech of Kleon in Thucyd. iii. 37. Plato, Politikus, p. 299 E. + +Timon in the Silli bestows on Sokrates and his successors the title of +[Greek: a)kribo/logoi]. Diog. Laert. ii. 19. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. +vii. 8. Aristophan. Nubes, 130, where Strepsiades says-- + +[Greek: pôs ou)=n gerô\n ô)=n ka)pilê/smôn kai\ bradu\s +lo/gôn a)kribô=n schindala/mous mathê/somai?] + +Compare 320-359 of the same comedy--[Greek: su/ te leptota/tôn lê/rôn +i(ereu=]--also Ranæ, 149, b. + +When Euripides ([Greek: o( skêniko\s philo/sophos]) went down to +Hades, he is described by Aristophanes as giving clever exhibitions +among the malefactors there, with great success and applause. Ranæ, +771-- + +[Greek: O(/te dê\ katê=lth' Eu)ripi/dês, e)pedei/knuto +toi=s lôpodu/tais kai\ toi=s balantiêto/mois . . . +o(/per e)/st' e)n A(/|dou plê=thos; oi( d' a)kroô/menoi +tô=n a)ntilogiô=n kai\ lugismô=n kai strophô=n +u(perema/nêsan, ka)no/misan sophô/taton]. + +These astute cavils and quibbles of Euripides are attributed by +Aristophanes, and the other comic writers, to his frequent +conversations with Sokrates. Ranæ, 1490-1500. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhet. +p. 301-355. Valckenaer, Diatribe in Euripid. c. 4. Aristophanes +describes Sokrates as having stolen a garment from the palæstra +(Nubes, 180); and Eupolis also introduces him as having stolen a +wine-ladle (Schol. ad loc. Eupolis, Fragm. Incert. ix. ed. Meineke). +The fragment of Eupolis (xi. p. 553, [Greek: A)doleschei=n au)to\n +e)kdi/daxon, ô)= sophista/]) seems to apply to Sokrates. About the +sympathy of the people with the attacks of the comic writers on +Sokrates, see Lucian, Piscat. c. 25. + +The rhetor Aristeides (Orat. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], pp. +406-407-408, Dindorf), after remarking on the very vague and general +manner in which the title [Greek: Sophistê\s] was applied among the +Greeks (Herodotus having so designated both Solon and Pythagoras), +mentions that Androtion not only spoke of the seven wise men as +[Greek: tou\s e(/pta sophista/s], but also called Sokrates [Greek: +sophistê\n tou=ton to\n pa/nu]: that Lysias called Plato [Greek: +sophistê\n], and called Æschines (the Sokratic) by the same title; +that Isokrates represented himself, and rhetors and politicians like +himself, as [Greek: philoso/phous], while he termed the dialecticians +and critics [Greek: sophista/s]. Nothing could be more indeterminate +than these names, [Greek: sophistê\s] and [Greek: philo/sophos]. It +was Plato who applied himself chiefly to discredit the name [Greek: +sophistê\s (o( ma/lista e)panasta\s tô=| o)no/mati)] but others had +tried to discredit [Greek: philo/sophos] and [Greek: to\ +philosophei=n] in like manner. It deserves notice that in the +restrictive or censorial law (proposed by Sophokles, and enacted by +the Athenians in B.C. 307, but repealed in the following year) against +the philosophers and their schools, the philosophers generally are +designated as [Greek: sophistai/]. Pollux, Onomast. ix. 42 [Greek: +e)/sti de\ kai\ no/mos A)ttiko\s kata\ tô=n philosophou/ntôn +graphei/s, o(\n Sophoklê=s A)mphiklei/dou Sounieu\s ei)=pen, e)n ô(=| +tina kata\ au)tô=n proeipô\n, e)pê/gage, mê\ e)xei=nai mêdeni\ _tô=n +sophistô=n_ diatribê\n kataskeua/sasthai.]] + +[Footnote 85: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. [Greek: A)thênai/ois ga\r +ou) spho/dra me/lei, a)\n tina deino\n oi)/ôntai ei)=nai, mê\ me/ntoi +didaskaliko\n tê=s au(tou= sophi/as; o(\n d' a)\n kai\ a)/llous +oi)/ôntai poiei=n toiou/tous, thumou=ntai, ei)=t' ou)=n phtho/nô|, ô(s +su le/geis, ei)/te di' a)/llo ti.]] + +[Footnote 86: Plato, Menon, pp. 90-92. The antipathy manifested here by +Anytus against the Sophists, is the same feeling which led him to +indict Sokrates, and which induced also Cato the Censor to hate the +character of Sokrates, and Greek letters generally. Plutarch, Cato, +23: [Greek: o(/lôs philosophi/a| proskekroukô\s, kai\ pa=san +E(llênikê\n mou=san kai\ paidei/an u(po\ philotimi/as propêlaki/zôn; +o(\s ge kai\ Sôkra/tê phêsi\ la/lon kai\ bi/aion geno/menon +e)picheirei=n, ô(=| tro/pô| dunato\n ê)=n, turannei=n tê=s patri/dos, +katalu/onta ta\ e)/thê, kai\ pro\s e)nanti/as toi=s no/mois do/xas +e(/lkonta kai\ methi/stanta tou\s poli/tas]. Comp. Cato, Epist. ap. +Plin. H. N. xxix. 7.] + +[Footnote 87: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 835 C. [Greek: nu=n de a)nthrô/pou +tolmêrou= kinduneu/ei dei=sthai/ tinos, o(\s par)r(êsi/an +diaphero/ntôs timô=n e)rei= ta\ dokou=nta a)/rist' ei)=nai po/lei kai\ +poli/tais, e)n psuchai=s diephtharme/nais to\ pre/pon kai\ e(po/menon +pa/sê| tê=| politei/a| ta/ttôn, e)nanti/a le/gôn tai=s megi/staisin +e)pithumi/ais kai\ ou)k e)/chôn boêtho\n a)nthrô/pôn ou)de/na, lo/gô| +e(po/menos mo/nô| mo/nos]. + +Here the dissenter who proclaims his sincere convictions is spoken of +with respect: compare the contrary feeling, Leges, ix. 881 A, and in +the tenth book generally. In the striking passage of the Republic, +referred to in a previous note (vi. 492) Plato declares the lessons +taught by the multitude--the contagion of established custom and +tradition, communicated by the crowd of earnest assembled believers--to +be of overwhelming and almost omnipotent force. The individual +philosopher (he says), who examines for himself and tries to stand +against it, can hardly maintain himself without special divine aid.] + +[Footnote 88: In the dialogue called Politikus, Plato announces +formally and explicitly (what the historical Sokrates had asserted +before him, Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10) the exclusive pretensions of the +[Greek: Basileu\s Techniko\s] (representing political science, art, or +theory) to rule mankind--the illusory nature of all other titles to +rule and the mischievous working of all existing governments. The same +view is developed in the Republic and the Leges. Compare also +Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. x. p. 1180, b. 27 ad fin. + +In a remarkable passage of the Leges (i. 637 D, 638 C), Plato +observes, in touching upon the discrepancy between different local +institutions at Sparta, Krete, Keos. Tarentum, &c.:--"If natives of +different cities argue with each other about their respective +institutions, each of them has a good and sufficient reason. This is +the custom _with us; with you perhaps it is different_. But we, who +are now conversing, do not apply our criticisms to the private +citizen; we criticise the lawgiver himself, and try to determine +whether his laws are good or bad." [Greek: ê(mi=n d' e)sti\n ou) peri\ +tô=n a)nthrô/pôn tô=n a)/llôn o( lo/gos, a)lla\ peri\ tô=n nomothetô=n +au)tô=n kaki/as te kai\ a)retê=s]. King Nomos was not at all pleased +to be thus put upon his trial.] + +[Side-note: Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme +publicity of speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of +knowledge is universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating +Plato's Dialogues of Search.] + +The dislike so constantly felt by communities having established +opinions, towards free speculation and dialectic, was aggravated in +its application to Sokrates, because his dialectic was not only novel, +but also public, obtrusive, and indiscriminate.[89] The name of +Sokrates, after his death, was employed not merely by Plato, but by +all the Sokratic companions, to cover their own ethical speculations: +moreover, all of them either composed works or gave lectures. But in +either case, readers or hearers were comparatively few in number, and +were chiefly persons prompted by some special taste or interest: while +Sokrates passed his day in the most public place, eager to interrogate +every one, and sometimes forcing his interrogations even upon +reluctant hearers.[90] That he could have been allowed to persist in +this course of life for thirty years, when we read his own account (in +the Platonic Apology) of the antipathy which he provoked--and when we +recollect that the Thirty, during their short dominion, put him under +an interdict--is a remarkable proof of the comparative tolerance of +Athenian practice. + +[Footnote 89: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. "Est enim philosophia paucis +contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et +suspecta et invisa," &c. + +The extreme publicity, and indiscriminate, aggressive conversation of +Sokrates, is strongly insisted on by Themistius (Orat. xxvi. p. 384, +[Greek: U(pe\r tou= le/gein]) as aggravating the displeasure of the +public against him.] + +[Footnote 90: Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2, 3-5-40.] + +However this may be, it is from the conversation of Sokrates that the +Platonic Dialogues of Search take their rise, and we must read them +under those same fundamental postulates which Sokrates enunciates to +the Dikasts. "False persuasion of knowledge is almost universal: the +Elenchus, which eradicates this, is salutary and indispensable: the +dialectic search for truth between two active, self-working minds, +both of them ignorant, yet both feeling their own ignorance, is +instructive, as well as fascinating, though it should end without +finding any truth at all, and without any other result than that of +discovering some proposed hypotheses to be untrue." The modern reader +must be invited to keep these postulates in mind, if he would fairly +appreciate the Platonic Dialogues of Search. He must learn to esteem +the mental exercise of free debate as valuable in itself,[91] even +though the goal recedes before him in proportion to the steps which he +makes in advance. He perceives a lively antithesis of opinions, +several distinct and dissentient points of view opened, various +tentatives of advance made and broken off. He has the first half of +the process of truth-seeking, without the last; and even without full +certainty that the last half can be worked out, or that the problem as +propounded is one which admits of an affirmative solution.[92] But +Plato presumes that the search will be renewed, either by the same +interlocutors or by others. He reckons upon responsive energy in the +youthful subject; he addresses himself to men of earnest purpose and +stirring intellect, who will be spurred on by the dialectic exercise +itself to farther pursuit--men who, having listened to the working out +of different points of view, will meditate on these points for +themselves, and apply a judicial estimate conformable to the measure +of their own minds. Those respondents, who, after having been puzzled +and put to shame by one cross-examination, became disgusted and never +presented themselves again--were despised by Sokrates as lazy and +stupid.[93] For him, as well as for Plato, the search after truth +counted as the main business of life. + +[Footnote 91: Aristotel. Topica, i. p. 101, a. 29, with the Scholion +of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who remarks that the habit of colloquial +debate had been very frequent in the days of Aristotle, and +afterwards; but had comparatively ceased in his own time, haying been +exchanged for written treatises. P. 254, b. Schol. Brandis, also +Plato, Parmenid. pp. 135, 136, and the Commentary of Proklus +thereupon, p. 776 seqq., and p. 917, ed. Stallbaum.] + +[Footnote 92: A passage in one of the speeches composed by Lysias, +addressed by a plaintiff in court to the Dikasts, shows how debate and +free antithesis of opposite opinions were accounted as essential to +the process [Greek: tou= philosophei=n--kai\ e)gô\ me\n ô)/|mên +philosophou=ntas au)tou\s peri\ tou= pra/gmatos a)ntile/gein to\n +e)nanti/on lo/gon; oi( d' a)/ra ou)k ante/legon, a)ll' a)nte/pratton]. +(Lysias, Or. viii. [Greek: Kakologiô=n] s. 11,** p. 273; compare +Plat. Apolog. p. 28 E.) + +Bacon describes his own intellectual cast of mind, in terms which +illustrate the Platonic [Greek: dia/logoi zêtêtikoi/],--the character +of the searcher, doubter, and tester, as contrasted with that of the +confident affirmer and expositor:--"Me ipsum autem ad veritatis +contemplationes quam ad alia magis fabrefactum deprehendi, ut qui +mentem et ad rerum similitudinem (quod maximum est) agnoscendum satis +mobilem, et ad differentiarum subtilitates observandas satis fixam et +intentam haberem--qui et _quærendi desiderium_, et _dubitandi +patientiam_, et _meditandi voluptatem_, et _asserendi cunctationem_, +et _resipiscendi facilitatem_, et disponendi sollicitudinem +tenerem--quique nec novitatem affectarem, nec antiquitatem admirarer, et +omnem imposturam odissem. Quare naturam meam cum veritate quandam +familiaritatem et cognationem habere judicavi." (Impetus Philosophici, +De Interpretatione Naturæ Prooemium.) + +[Greek: Sôkratikô=s ei)s e(ka/teron] is the phrase of Cicero, ad +Atticum ii. 3.] + +[Footnote 93: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 40. + +Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his Essay on Liberty, has the following +remarks, illustrating Plato's Dialogues of Search. I should have been +glad if I could have transcribed here many other pages of that +admirable Essay: which stands almost alone as an unreserved +vindication of the rights of the searching individual intelligence, +against the compression and repression of King Nomos (pp. 79-80-81):-- + +"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living +apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining +it to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to +outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefits of its universal +recognition. Where this advantage cannot be had, I confess I should +like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a +substitute for it: some contrivance for making the difficulties of the +question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were +pressed upon him by a dissentient champion eager for his conversion. + +"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost +those they formerly had. The Sokratic dialectics, so magnificently +exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this +description. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions +of life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose +of convincing any one, who had merely adopted the common-places of +received opinion, that he did not understand the subject--that he as +yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed: in +order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the +way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of +the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The +school-disputations of the middle ages had a similar object. They were +intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and +(by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it--and could +enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These +last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the +premisses appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and +as a discipline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the +powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the 'Socratici +viri'. But the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally +willing to admit; and the present modes of instruction contain nothing +which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or +of the other. . . It is the fashion of the present time to disparage +negative logic--that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors +in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative +criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a +means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the +name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again +systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a +low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and +physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one's +opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either +had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same +mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an +active controversy with opponents."] + +[Side-note: Result called _Knowledge_, which Plato aspires to. Power +of going through a Sokratic cross examination; not attainable except +through the Platonic process and method.] + +Another matter must here be noticed, in regard to these Dialogues of +Search. We must understand how Plato conceived the goal towards which +they tend: that is the state of mind which he calls _knowledge_ or +_cognition_. Knowledge (in his view) is not attained until the mind is +brought into clear view of the Universal Forms or Ideas, and intimate +communion with them: but the test (as I have already observed) for +determining whether a man has yet attained this end or not, is to +ascertain whether he can give to others a full account of all that he +professes to know, and can extract from them a full account of all +that they profess to know: whether he can perform, in a manner +exhaustive as well as unerring, the double and correlative function of +asking and answering: in other words, whether he can administer the +Sokratic cross-examination effectively to others, and reply to it +without faltering or contradiction when administered to himself.[94] +Such being the way in which Plato conceives knowledge, we may easily +see that it cannot be produced, or even approached, by direct, +demonstrative, didactic communication: by simply announcing to the +hearer, and lodging in his memory, a theorem to be proved, together +with the steps whereby it is proved. He must be made familiar with +each subject on many sides, and under several different aspects and +analogies: he must have had before him objections with their +refutation, and the fallacious arguments which appear to prove the +theorem, but do not really prove it:[95] he must be introduced to the +principal counter-theorems, with the means whereby an opponent will +enforce them: he must be practised in the use of equivocal terms and +sophistry, either to be detected when the opponent is cross-examining +him, or to be employed when he is cross-examining an opponent. All +these accomplishments must be acquired, together with full promptitude +and flexibility, before he will be competent to perform those two +difficult functions, which Plato considers to be the test of +knowledge. You may say that such a result is indefinitely distant and +hopeless: Plato considers it attainable, though he admits the arduous +efforts which it will cost. But the point which I wish to show is, +that if attainable at all, it can only be attained through a long and +varied course of such dialectic discussion as that which we read in +the Platonic Dialogues of Search. The state and aptitude of mind +called knowledge, can only be generated as a last result of this +continued practice (to borrow an expression of Longinus).[96] The +Platonic method is thus in perfect harmony and co-ordination with the +Platonic result, as described and pursued. + +[Footnote 94: See Plato, Republic, vii. 518, B, C, about [Greek: +paidei/a], as developing [Greek: tê\n e)nou=san e(ka/stou du/namin e0n +tê=| psuchê=|]: and 534, about [Greek: e)pistê/mê], with its test, +[Greek: to\ dou=nai kai\ de/xasthai lo/gon]. Compare also Republic, v. +477, 478, with Theætêt. 175, C, D; Phædon, 76, B, Phædrus, 276; and +Sympos. 202 A. [Greek: to\ o)rtha\ doxa/zein kai\ a)/neu tou= e)/chein +lo/gon dou=nai, ou)k oi)=sth' o(/ti ou)/te e)pi/stasthai e)stin? +a)/logon ga\r pra=gma pô=s a)\n ei)/ê e)pistê/mê?] + +[Footnote 95: On this point the scholastic manner of handling in the +Middle Ages furnishes a good illustration for the Platonic dialectic. +I borrow a passage from the treatise of M Hauréau, De la Phil. +Scolastique, vol. ii. p. 190. + +"Saint Thomas pouvait s'en tenir là: nous le comprenons, nous avons +tout son système sur l'origine des idées, et nous pouvons croire qu'il +n'a plus rien à nous apprendre à ce sujet: mais en scolastique, il ne +suffit pas de démontrer, par deux ou trois arguments, réputés +invincibles, ce que l'on suppose être la vérité, il faut, en outre, +répondre aux objections première, seconde, troisième, &c., &c., de +divers interlocuteurs, souvent imaginaires; il faut établir la +parfaite concordance de la conclusion enoncée et des conclusions +precédents ou subséquentes; il faut réproduire, à l'occasion de tout +problème controversé, l'ensemble de la doctrine pour laquelle on s'est +déclaré."] + +[Footnote 96: Longinus De Sublim. s. 6. [Greek: kai/toi to\ pra=gma +du/slêpton; ê( ga\r tô=n lo/gôn kri/sis pollê=s e)sti pei/ras +teleutai=on e)pige/nnêma]. Compare what is said in a succeeding +chapter about the Hippias Minor. And see also Sir W. Hamilton's +Lectures on Logic, Lect. 35, p. 224.] + +[Side-note: Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics--man and +society.] + +Moreover, not merely method and result are in harmony, but also the +topics discussed. These topics were ethical, social, and political: +matters especially human[97] (to use the phrase of Sokrates himself) +familiar to every man,--handled, unphilosophically, by speakers in the +assembly, pleaders in the dikastery, dramatists in the theatre. Now it +is exactly upon such topics that debate can be made most interesting, +varied, and abundant. The facts, multifarious in themselves, connected +with man and society, depend upon a variety of causes, co-operating +and conflicting. Account must be taken of many different points of +view, each of which has a certain range of application, and each of +which serves to limit or modify the others: the generalities, even +when true, are true only on the balance, and under ordinary +circumstances; they are liable to exception, if those circumstances +undergo important change. There are always objections, real as well as +apparent, which require to be rebutted or elucidated. To such +changeful and complicated states of fact, the Platonic dialectic was +adapted: furnishing abundant premisses and comparisons, bringing into +notice many distinct points of view, each of which must be looked at +and appreciated, before any tenable principle can be arrived at. Not +only Platonic method and result, but also Platonic topics, are thus +well suited to each other. The general terms of ethics were familiar +but undefined: the tentative definitions suggested, followed up by +objections available against each, included a large and instructive +survey of ethical phenomena in all their bearings. + +[Footnote 97: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 12-15. I transcribe the following +passage from an article in the Edinburgh Review (April, 1866, pp. +325-326), on the first edition of the present work: an article not +merely profound and striking as to thought, but indicating the most +comprehensive study and appreciation of the Platonic writings:-- + +"The enemy against whom Plato really fought, and the warfare against +whom was the incessant occupation of his life and writings, was--not +Sophistry, either in the ancient or modern sense of the term, +but--_Commonplace_. It was the acceptance of traditional opinions and +current sentiments as an ultimate fact; and bandying of the abstract +terms which express approbation and disapprobation, desire and +aversion, admiration and disgust, as if they had a meaning thoroughly +understood and universally assented to. The men of his day (like those +of ours) thought that they knew what Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, +Honourable and Shameful, were--because they could use the words +glibly, and affirm them of this or that, in agreement with existing +custom. But what the property was, which these several instances +possessed in common, justifying the application of the term, nobody +had considered; neither the Sophists, nor the rhetoricians, nor the +statesmen, nor any of those who set themselves up, or were set up by +others, as wise. Yet whoever could not answer this question was +wandering in darkness--had no standard by which his judgments were +regulated, and which kept them consistent with one another--no rule +which he knew and could stand by for the guidance of his life. Not +knowing what Justice and Virtue are, it was impossible to be just and +virtuous: not knowing what Good is, we not only fail to reach it, but +are certain to embrace evil instead. Such a condition, to any one +capable of thought, made life not worth having. The grand business of +human intellect ought to consist in subjecting these terms to the most +rigorous scrutiny, and bringing to light the ideas that lie at the +bottom of them. Even if this cannot be done and real knowledge +attained, it is already no small benefit to expel the false opinion of +knowledge: to make men conscious of the things most needful to be +known, fill them with shame and uneasiness at their own state, and +rouse a pungent internal stimulus, summoning up all their energies to +attack those greatest of all problems, and never rest until, as far as +possible, the true solutions are reached. This is Plato's notion of +the condition of the human mind in his time, and of what philosophy +could do to help it: and any one who does not think the description +applicable, with slight modifications, to the majority of educated +minds in our own time and in all times known to us, certainly has not +brought either the teachers or the practical men of any time to the +Platonic test." + +The Reviewer farther illustrates this impressive description by a +valuable citation from Max Müller to the same purpose (Lectures on the +Science of Language, Second Series, pp. 520-527). "Such terms as +Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance, Matter, Church, +State, Revelation, Inspiration, Knowledge, Belief, &c., are tossed +about in the war of words as if every body knew what they meant, and +as if every body used them exactly in the same sense; whereas most +people, and particularly those who represent public opinion, pick up +these complicated terms as children, beginning with the vaguest +conceptions, adding to them from time to time--perhaps correcting +likewise at haphazard some of their involuntary errors--but never +taking stock, never either enquiring into the history of the terms +which they handle so freely, or realising the fulness of their meaning +according to the strict rules of logical definition."] + +[Side-note: Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties +which he has raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him +completely distinct. His dogmas are enunciations _à priori_ of some +impressive sentiment.] + +The negative procedure is so conspicuous, and even so preponderant, in +the Platonic dialogues, that no historian of philosophy can omit to +notice it. But many of them (like Xenophon in describing Sokrates) +assign to it only a subordinate place and a qualified application: +while some (and Schleiermacher especially) represent all the doubts +and difficulties in the negative dialogues as exercises to call forth +the intellectual efforts of the reader, preparatory to full and +satisfactory solutions which Plato has given in the dogmatic dialogues +at the end. The first half of this hypothesis I accept: the last half +I believe to be unfounded. The doubts and difficulties were certainly +exercises to the mind of Plato himself, and were intended as exercises +to his readers; but he has nowhere provided a key to the solution of +them. Where he propounds positive dogmas, he does not bring them face +to face with objections, nor verify their authority by showing that +they afford satisfactory solution of the difficulties exhibited in his +negative procedure. The two currents of his speculation, the +affirmative and the negative, are distinct and independent of each +other. Where the affirmative is especially present (as in Timæus), the +negative altogether disappears. Timæus is made to proclaim the most +sweeping theories, not one of which the real Sokrates would have +suffered to pass without abundant cross-examination: but the Platonic +Sokrates hears them with respectful silence, and commends afterwards. +The declaration so often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a +teacher--that he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them +upon others, but cannot discover any good solution of them--this +declaration, which is usually considered mere irony, is literally +true.[98] The Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and +absolute, which the commentators often announce as if it cleared up +all difficulties--not only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones +belonging to itself. When Plato comes forward to affirm, his dogmas +are altogether _à priori_: they enunciate preconceptions or +hypotheses, which derive their hold upon his belief, not from any +aptitude for solving the objections which he has raised, but from deep +and solemn sentiment of some kind or other--religious, ethical, +æsthetical, poetical, &c., the worship of numerical symmetry or +exactness, &c. The dogmas are enunciations of some grand sentiment of +the divine, good, just, beautiful, symmetrical, &c.,[99] which Plato +follows out into corollaries. But this is a process of itself; and +while he is performing it, the doubts previously raised are not called +up to be solved, but are forgotten or kept out of sight. It is +therefore a mistake to suppose[100] that Plato ties knots in one +dialogue only with a view to untie them in another; and that the +doubts which he propounds are already fully solved in his own mind, +only that he defers the announcement of the solution until the +embarrassed hearer has struggled to find it for himself. + +[Footnote 98: See the conversation between Menippus and Sokrates. +(Lucian, Dialog. Mortuor. xx.)] + +[Footnote 99: Dionysius of Halikarnassus remarks that the topics upon +which Plato renounces the character of a searcher, and passes into +that of a vehement affirmative dogmatist, are those which are above +human investigation and evidence--the transcendental: [Greek: kai\ +ga\r e)kei=nos] (Plato) [Greek: ta\ do/gmata ou)k au)to\s +a)pophai/netai, ei)=ta peri\ au)tô=n diagôni/zetai; a)ll' e)n mesô| +tê\n zê/têsin poiou/menos pro\s tou\s dialegome/nous, eu(ri/skôn +ma=llon to\ de/on do/gma, ê)\ philoneikô=n u(pe\r au)tou= phai/netai; +plê\n o(/sa peri\ tô=n kreitto/nôn, ê)\ kath' ê(ma=s, le/getai] (Dion. +Hal. Ars Rhet. c. 10, p. 376, Reiske.) + +M. Arago, in the following passage, points to a style of theorising in +the physical sciences, very analogous to that of Plato, generally:-- + +Arago, Biographies, vol. i. p. 149, Vie de Fresnel. "De ces deux +explications des phénomènes de la lumière, l'une s'appelle la théorie +de l'émission; l'autre est connue sous le nom de système des ondes. On +trouve déjà des traces de la première dans les écrits d'Empédocle. +Chez les modernes, je pourrais citer parmi ses adhérents Képler, +Newton, Laplace. Le système des ondes ne compte pas des partisans +moins illustres: Aristote, Descartes, Hooke, Huygens, Euler, l'avaient +adopté . . + +"Au reste, si l'on s'étonnait de voir d'aussi grands génies ainsi +divisés, je dirais que de leurs temps la question on litige ne pouvait +être résolue; que les expériences nécessaires manquaient; qu'alors les +divers systèmes sur la lumière étaient, non _des déductions logiques +des faits_, mais, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, de _simples vérités de +sentiment_, qu'enfin, le don de l'infaillibilité n'est pas accordé +même aux plus habiles, des qu'en sortant du domaine des observations, +et se jetant dans celui des conjectures, ils abandonnent la marche +sévère et assurée dont les sciences se prévalent de nos jours avec +raison, et qui leur a fait faire de si incontestables progrès."] + +[Footnote 100: Several of the Platonic critics speak as if they +thought that Plato would never suggest any difficulty which he had +not, beforehand and ready-made, the means of solving; and Munk treats +the idea which I have stated in the text as ridiculous. "Plato (he +observes) must have held preposterous doctrines on the subject of +pædagogy. He undertakes to instruct others by his writings, before he +has yet cleared up his own ideas on the question, he proposes, in +propædeutic writings, enigmas for his scholars to solve, while he has +not yet solved them himself; and all this for the praiseworthy +(_ironically said_) purpose of correcting in their minds the false +persuasion of knowledge." (Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon Schrift. +p. 515.) + +That which Munk here derides, appears stated, again and again, by the +Platonic Sokrates, as his real purpose. Munk is at liberty to treat it +as ridiculous, but the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic +Sokrates disclaims the pædagogic function, describing himself as +nothing more than a fellow searcher with the rest. + +So too Munk declares (p. 79-80, and Zeller also, Philos. der Griech. +vol. ii. p. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato could not have composed the +Parmenidês, including, as it does, such an assemblage of difficulties +and objections against the theory of Ideas, until he possessed the +means of solving all of them himself. This is a bold assertion, +altogether conjectural; for there is no solution of them given in any +of Plato's writings, and the solutions to which Munk alludes as given +by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to be satisfactory, which +I do not admit) travel much beyond the limits of Plato. + +Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon. +Schriften, p. 103-104); that Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues, +though he appears as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a +matured thinker, who has already gone through the investigation for +himself, and solved all the difficulties, but who goes back upon the +work of search over again, for the instruction of the interlocutors. +"The special talent and dexterity (Virtuosität) which Sokrates +displays in conducting the dialogue, can only be explained by +supposing that he has already acquired for himself a firm and certain +conviction on the question discussed." + +This opinion of Ueberweg appears to me quite untenable, as well as +inconsistent with a previous opinion which he had given elsewhere +(Platonische Welt-seele, p. 69-70)--That the Platonic Ideenlehre was +altogether insufficient for explanation. The impression which the +Dialogues of Search make upon me is directly the reverse. My +difficulty is, to understand how the constructor of all these puzzles, +if he has the answer ready drawn up in his pocket, can avoid letting +it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the literal declarations, often +repeated, of Sokrates; while Munk and Ueberweg contradict them. + +For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into the mouth of +Sokrates (even in the Republic, one of his most expository +compositions) see a remarkable passage, Rep. v. p. 450 E. [Greek: +a)pistou=nta de\ kai\ zêtou=nta a)/ma tou\s lo/gous poiei=sthai, o(\ +dê\ e)gô\ drô=], &c.] + +[Side-note: Hypothesis--that Plato had solved all his own difficulties +for himself; but that he communicated the solution only to a few +select auditors in oral lectures--Untenable.] + +Some critics, assuming confidently that Plato must have produced a +full breadth of positive philosophy to countervail his own negative +fertility, yet not finding enough of it in the written dialogues look +for it elsewhere. Tennemann thinks, and his opinion is partly shared +by Boeckh and K. F. Hermann, that the direct, affirmative, and highest +principles of Plato's philosophy were enunciated only in his lectures: +that the core, the central points, the great principles of his system +(der Kern) were revealed thus orally to a few select students in plain +and broad terms, while the dialogues were intentionally written so as +to convey only indirect hints, illustrations, applications of these +great principles, together with refutation of various errors opposed +to them: that Plato did not think it safe or prudent to make any full, +direct, or systematic revelation to the general public.[101] I have +already said that I think this opinion untenable. Among the few points +which we know respecting the oral lectures, one is, that they were +delivered not to a select and prepared few, but to a numerous and +unprepared audience: while among the written dialogues, there are some +which, far from being popular or adapted to an ordinary understanding, +are highly perplexing and abstruse. The Timæus does not confine itself +to indirect hints, but delivers positive dogmas about the +super-sensible world: though they are of a mystical cast, as we know +that the oral lectures De Bono were also. + +[Footnote 101: Tennemann, Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 205-220. Hermann, +Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, pp. 290-294. + +Hermann considers this reserve and double doctrine to be unworthy of +Plato, and ascribes it to Protagoras and other Sophists, on the +authority of a passage in the Theætêtus (152 C), which does not at all +sustain his allegation. + +Hermann considers "die akroamatischen Lehren als Fortsetzung und +Schlussstein der schriftlichen, die dort erst zur vollen Klarheit +principieller Auffassung erhoben wurden, ohne jedoch über den +nämlichen Gegenstand, soweit die Rede auf denselben kommen musste, +etwas wesentlich Verschiedenes zu lehren" (p. 293).]] + +[Side-note: Characteristic of the oral lectures--that they were +delivered in Plato's own name. In what other respects they departed +from the dialogues, we cannot say.] + +Towards filling up this gap, then, the oral lectures cannot be shown +to lend any assistance. The cardinal point of difference between them +and the dialogues was, that they were delivered by Plato himself, in +his own name; whereas he never published any written composition in +his own name. But we do not know enough to say, in what particular way +this difference would manifest itself. Besides the oral lectures, +delivered to a numerous auditory, it is very probable that Plato held +special communications upon philosophy with a few advanced pupils. +Here however we are completely in the dark. Yet I see nothing, either +in these supposed private communications or in the oral lectures, to +controvert what was said in the last page--that Plato's affirmative +philosophy is not fitted on to his negative philosophy, but grows out +of other mental impulses, distinct and apart. Plato (as Aristotle +tells us[102]) felt it difficult to determine, whether the march of +philosophy was an ascending one toward the _principia_ ([Greek: +a)rcha\s]), or a descending one down from the _principia_. A good +philosophy ought to suffice for both, conjointly and alternately: in +Plato's philosophy, there is no road explicable either upwards or +downwards, between the two: no justifiable mode of participation +([Greek: me/thexis]) between the two disparate worlds--intellect and +sense. The _principia_ of Plato take an impressive hold on the +imagination: but they remove few or none of the Platonic difficulties; +and they only seem to do this because the Sokratic Elenchus, so +effective whenever it is applied, is never seriously brought to bear +against them. + +[Footnote 102: Aristot. Eth. Nik. i. 4, 5. [Greek: eu)= ga\r kai\ +Pla/tôn ê)po/rei tou=to kai\ e)zê/tei po/teron a)po\ tô=n archô=n ê)\ +e)pi\ ta\s a)rcha/s e)stin ê( o(do/s.]] + +[Side-note: Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the +process of search and debate _per se_. Protracted enquiry is a +valuable privilege, not a tiresome obligation.] + +With persons who complain of prolixity in the dialogue--of threads +which are taken up only to be broken off, devious turns and "passages +which lead to nothing"--of much talk "about it and about it," without +any peremptory decision from an authorised judge--with such +complainants Plato has no sympathy. He feels a strong interest in the +process of enquiry, in the debate _per se_: and he presumes a like +interest in his readers. He has no wish to shorten the process, nor to +reach the end and dismiss the question as settled.[103] On the +contrary, he claims it as the privilege of philosophical research, +that persons engaged in such discussions are noway tied to time; they +are not like judicial pleaders, who, with a klepsydra or water-clock +to measure the length of each speech, are under slavish dependence on +the feelings of the Dikasts, and are therefore obliged to keep +strictly to the point.[104] Whoever desires accurate training of mind +must submit to go through a long and tiresome circuit.[105] Plato +regards the process of enquiry as being in itself, both a stimulus and +a discipline, in which the minds both of questioner and respondent are +implicated and improved, each being indispensable to the other: he +also represents it as a process, carried on under the immediate +inspiration of the moment, without reflection or foreknowledge of the +result.[106] Lastly, Plato has an interest in the dialogue, not merely +as a mental discipline, but as an artistic piece of workmanship, +whereby the taste and imagination are charmed. The dialogue was to him +what the tragedy was to Sophokles, and the rhetorical discourse to +Isokrates. He went on "combing and curling it" (to use the phrase of +Dionysius) for as many years as Isokrates bestowed on the composition +of the Panegyrical Oration. He handles the dialectic drama so as to +exhibit some one among the many diverse ethical points of view, and to +show what it involves as well as what it excludes in the way of +consequence. We shall not find the ethical point of view always the +same: there are material inconsistencies and differences in this +respect between one dialogue and another. + +[Footnote 103: As an illustration of that class of minds which take +delight in the search for truth in different directions, I copy the +following passage respecting Dr. Priestley, from an excellent modern +scientific biography. "Dr. Priestley had seen so much of the evil of +obstinate adherence to opinions which time had rendered decrepit, not +venerable--and had been so richly rewarded in his capacity of natural +philosopher, by his adventurous explorations of new territories in +science--that he unavoidably and unconsciously over-estimated the +value of what was novel, and held himself free to change his opinions +to an extent not easily sympathised with by minds of a different +order. Some men love to _rest_ in truth, or at least in settled +opinions, and are uneasy till they find repose. They alter their +beliefs with great reluctance, and dread the charge of inconsistency, +even in reference to trifling matters. Priestley, on the other hand, +was a _follower after truth, who delighted in the chase, and was all +his life long pursuing, not resting in it_. + +On all subjects which interested him he held by certain cardinal +doctrines, but he left the outlines of his systems to be filled up as +he gained experience, and to an extent very few men have done, +disavowed any attempt to reconcile his changing views with each other, +or to deprecate the charge of inconsistency. . . I think it must be +acknowledged by all who have studied his writings, that in his +scientific researches at least he carried this feeling too far, and +that often when he had reached a truth in which he might and should +have rested, his dread of anything like a too hasty stereotyping of a +supposed discovery, induced him to welcome whatever seemed to justify +him in renewing the _pursuit_ of truth, and thus led him completely +astray. Priestley indeed missed many a discovery, the clue to which +was in his hands and in his alone, by not knowing where to stop." + +(Dr. Geo Wilson--Life of the Hon. H. Cavendish, among the publications +of the Cavendish Society, 1851, p. 110-111.)] + +[Footnote 104: Plato, Theætêt. p. 172.] + +[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, v. 450 B. [Greek: me/tron de/ g', +e)/phê, ô)= Sô/krates, o( Glau/kôn, toiou/tôn lo/gôn a)kou/ein, o(/los +o( bi/os nou=n e)/chousin]. vi. 504 D. [Greek: Tê\n makrote/ran +peri+ite/on tô=| toiou/tô|, kai\ ou)ch ê(=tton mantha/nonti ponête/on +ê)\ gumnazome/nô|]. Also Phædrus, 274 A, Parmenid. p. 135 D, 136 D, +[Greek: a)mê/chanon pragmatei/an--a)doleschi/as], &c. Compare +Politikus, 286, in respect to the charge of prolixity against him. + +In the Hermotimus of Lucian, the assailant of philosophy draws one of +his strongest arguments from the number of years required to examine +the doctrines of all the philosophical sects--the whole of life would +be insufficient (Lucian, Hermot. c. 47-48). The passages above cited, +especially the first of them, show that Sokrates and Plato would not +have been discouraged by this protracted work.] + +[Footnote 106: Plato, Republic, iii. 394 D. [Greek: Manteu/omai] (says +Glaukon) [Greek: skopei=sthai se, ei)/te paradexo/metha tragô|di/an te +kai\ kômô|di/an ei)s tê\n po/lin, ei)/te kai\ ou)/. I)/sôs] (says +Sokrates) [Greek: kai\ plei/ô e)/ti tou/tôn; _ou) ga\r dê\ e)/gôge pô +oi)=da, a)ll' o(/pê| a)\n o( lo/gos ô(/sper pneu=ma phe/rê|, tau/tê| +i)teon_. Kai\ kalô=s g', e)/phê, le/geis]. + +The Republic, from the second book to the close, is one of those +Platonic compositions in which Sokrates is most expository. + +We find a remarkable passage in Des Cartes, wherein that very +self-working philosopher expresses his conviction that the longer he +continued enquiring, the more his own mind would become armed for the +better appreciation of truth--and in which he strongly protests +against any barrier restraining the indefinite liberty of enquiry. + +"Et encore qu'il y en ait peut-être d'aussi bien sensés parmi les +Perses ou les Chinois que parmi nous, il me sembloit que le plus utile +étoit, de me régler selon ceux avec lesquels j'aurois à vivre; et que, +pour savoir quelles étoient véritablement leurs opinions, je devois +plutôt prendre garde à ce qu'ils pratiquaient qu'à ce qu'ils disaient; +non seulement à cause qu'en la corruption de nos moeurs, _il y a peu +de gens qui veuillent dire tout ce qu'ils croient--mais aussi à cause +que plusieurs l'ignorent eux mêmes; car l'action de la pensée, par +laquelle on croit une chose étant différente de celle par laquelle on +connoit qu'on la croit, elles sont souvent l'une sans l'autre._ Et +entre plusieurs opinions également reçues, je ne choisissois que les +plus modérées; tant à cause que ce sont toujours les plus commodes +pour la pratique, et vraisemblablement les meilleures--tous excès +ayans coutume d'être mauvais--comme aussi afin de me détourner moins +du vrai chemin, en cas que je faillisse, que si, ayant choisi l'un des +deux extrêmes, c'eût été l'autre qu'il eut fallu suivre. + +"Et particulièrement, je _mettois entre les excès toutes les promesses +par lesquelles on retranche quelque chose de sa liberté_; non que je +désapprouvasse les lois, qui pour remédier à l'inconstance des esprits +foibles, permettent, lorsqu'on a quelque bon dessein (ou même, pour la +sureté du commerce, quelque dessein qui n'est qu'indifférent), qu'on +fasse des voeux ou des contrats qui obligent à y persévérer: mais à +cause que je ne voyois au monde aucune chose qui demeurât toujours en +même état, et _que comme pour mon particulier, je me promettois de +perfectionner de plus en plus en mes jugemens, et non point de les +rendre pires, j'eusse pensé commettre une grande faute contre le bon +sens, si, parceque j'approuvois alors quelque chose, je me fusse +obligé de la prendre pour bonne encore après, lorsqu'elle auroit +peut-être cessé de l'être, ou que j'aurois cessé de l'estimer telle_." +Discours de la Méthode, part iii. p. 147-148, Cousin edit.; p. 16, +Simon edit.] + +[Side-note: Plato has done more than any one else to make the process +of enquiry interesting to others, as it was to himself.] + +But amidst all these differences--and partly indeed by reason of these +differences--Plato succeeds in inspiring his readers with much of the +same interest in the process of dialectic enquiry which he evidently +felt in his own bosom. The charm, with which he invests the process of +philosophising, is one main cause of the preservation of his writings +from the terrible ship-wreck which has overtaken so much of the +abundant contemporary literature. It constitutes also one of his +principle titles to the gratitude of intellectual men. This is a merit +which may be claimed for Cicero also, but hardly for Aristotle, in so +far as we can judge from the preserved portion of the Aristotelian +writings: whether for the other _viri Socratici_ his contemporaries, +or in what proportion, we are unable to say. Plato's works charmed and +instructed all; so that they were read not merely by disciples and +admirers (as the Stoic and Epikurean treatises were), but by those who +dissented from him as well as by those who agreed with him.[107] The +process of philosophising is one not naturally attractive except to a +few minds: the more therefore do we owe to the colloquy of Sokrates +and the writing of Plato, who handled it so as to diffuse the appetite +for enquiry, and for sifting dissentient opinions. The stimulating and +suggestive influence exercised by Plato--the variety of new roads +pointed out to the free enquiring mind--are in themselves sufficiently +valuable: whatever we may think of the positive results in which he +himself acquiesced.[108] + +[Footnote 107: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3, 8. + +Cicero farther commends the Stoic Panætius for having relinquished the +"tristitiam atque asperitatem" of his Stoic predecessors, Zeno, +Chrysippus, &c., and for endeavouring to reproduce the style and +graces of Plato and Aristotle, whom he was always commending to his +students (De Fin. iv. 28, 79).] + +[Footnote 108: The observation which Cicero applies to Varro, is +applicable to the Platonic writings also. "Philosophiam multis locis +_inchoasti_, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum" (Academ. +Poster. i. 3, 9). + +I shall say more about this when I touch upon the Platonic Kleitophon; +an unfinished dialogue, which takes up the point of view here +indicated by Cicero.] + +I have said thus much respecting what is common to the Dialogues of +Search, because this is a species of composition now rare and strange. +Modern readers do not understand what is meant by publishing an +enquiry without any result--a story without an end. Respecting the +Dialogues of Exposition, there is not the like difficulty. This is a +species of composition, the purpose of which is generally understood. +Whether the exposition be clear or obscure--orderly or confused--true +or false--we shall see when we come to examine each separately. But +these Dialogues of Exposition exhibit Plato in a different character: +as the counterpart, not of Sokrates, but of Lykurgus (Republic and +Leges) or of Pythagoras (in Timæus).[109] + +[Footnote 109: See the citation from Plutarch in an earlier note of +this chapter.] + +[Side-note: Process of generalisation always kept in view and +illustrated throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search--general terms +and propositions made subjects of conscious analysis.] + +A farther remark which may be made, bearing upon most of the +dialogues, relates to matter and not to manner. Everywhere (both in +the Dialogues of Search and in those of exposition) the process of +generalisation is kept in view and brought into conscious notice, +directly or indirectly. The relation of the universal to its +particulars, the contrast of the constant and essential with the +variable and accidental, are turned and returned in a thousand +different ways. The principles of classification, with the breaking +down of an extensive genus into species and sub-species, form the +special subject of illustration in two of the most elaborate Platonic +dialogues, and are often partially applied in the rest. To see the One +in the Many, and the Many in the One, is represented as the great aim +and characteristic attribute of the real philosopher. The testing of +general terms, and of abstractions already embodied in familiar +language, by interrogations applying them to many concrete and +particular cases--is one manifestation of the Sokratic cross-examining +process, which Plato multiplies and diversifies without limit. It is +in his writings and in the conversation of Sokrates, that general +terms and propositions first become the subject of conscious attention +and analysis, and Plato was well aware that he was here opening the +new road towards formal logic, unknown to his predecessors, unfamiliar +even to his contemporaries. This process is indeed often overlaid in +his writings by exuberant poetical imagery and by transcendental +hypothesis: but the important fact is, that it was constantly present +to his own mind and is impressed upon the notice of his readers. + +[Side-note: The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by +the same author, illustrating each other, but without assignable +inter-dependence.] + +After these various remarks, having a common bearing upon all, or +nearly all, the Platonic dialogues, I shall proceed to give some +account of each dialogue separately. It is doubtless both practicable +and useful to illustrate one of them by others, sometimes in the way +of analogy, sometimes in that of contrast. But I shall not affect to +handle them as contributories to one positive doctrinal system--nor as +occupying each an intentional place in the gradual unfolding of one +preconceived scheme--nor as successive manifestations of change, +knowable and determinable, in the views of the author. For us they +exist as distinct imaginary conversations, composed by the same author +at unknown times and under unknown specialities of circumstance. Of +course it is necessary to prefer some one order for reviewing the +Dialogues, and for that purpose more or less of hypothesis must be +admitted; but I shall endeavour to assume as little as possible. + +[Side-note: Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under +separate review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges, +Epinomis last.] + +The order which I shall adopt for considering the dialogues coincides +to a certain extent with that which some other expositors have +adopted. It begins with those dialogues which delineate Sokrates, and +which confine themselves to the subjects and points of view belonging +to him, known as he is upon the independent testimony of Xenophon. +First of all will come the Platonic Apology, containing the explicit +negative programme of Sokrates, enunciated by himself a month before +his death, when Plato was 28 years of age. + +Last of all, I shall take those dialogues which depart most widely +from Sokrates, and which are believed to be the products of Plato's +most advanced age--Timæus, Kritias, and Leges, with the sequel, +Epinomis. These dialogues present a glaring contrast to the searching +questions, the negative acuteness, the confessed ignorance, of +Sokrates: Plato in his old age has not maintained consistency with his +youth, as Sokrates did, but has passed round from the negative to the +affirmative pole of philosophy. + +[Side-note: Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The +intermediate dialogues present no convincing grounds for any +determinate order.] + +Between the Apology and the dialogues named as last--I shall examine +the intermediate dialogues according as they seem to approximate or +recede from Sokrates and the negative dialectic. Here, however, the +reasons for preference are noway satisfactory. Of the many dissentient +schemes, professing to determine the real order in which the Platonic +dialogues were composed, I find a certain plausibility in some, but no +conclusive reason in any. Of course the reasons in favour of each one +scheme, count against all the rest. I believe (as I have already said) +that none of Plato's dialogues were composed until after the death of +Sokrates: but at what dates, or in what order, after that event, they +were composed, it is impossible to determine. The Republic and +Philêbus rank among the constructive dialogues, and may suitably be +taken immediately before Timæus: though the Republic belongs to the +highest point of Plato's genius, and includes a large measure of his +negative acuteness combined with his most elaborate positive +combinations. In the Sophistês and Politikus, Sokrates appears only in +the character of a listener: in the Parmenidês also, the part assigned +to him, instead of being aggressive and victorious, is subordinate to +that of Parmenidês and confined to an unsuccessful defence. These +dialogues, then, occupy a place late in the series. On the other hand, +Kriton and Euthyphron have an immediate bearing upon the trial of +Sokrates and the feelings connected with it. I shall take them in +immediate sequel to the Apology. + +For the intermediate dialogues, the order is less marked and +justifiable. In so far as a reason can be given, for preference as to +former and later, I shall give it when the case arises. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +APOLOGY OF SOKRATES. + + +Adopting the order of precedence above described, for the review of +the Platonic compositions, and taking the point of departure from +Sokrates or the Sokratic point of view, I begin with the memorable +composition called the Apology. + +[Side-note: The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates +before the Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional +transformation.] + +I agree with Schleiermacher[1]--with the more recent investigations of +Ueberweg--and with what (until recent times) seems to have been the +common opinion,--that this is in substance the real defence pronounced +by Sokrates; reported, and of course drest up, yet not intentionally +transformed, by Plato.[2] If such be the case, it is likely to have +been put together shortly after the trial, and may thus be ranked +among the earliest of the Platonic compositions: for I have already +intimated my belief that Plato composed no dialogues under the name of +Sokrates, during the lifetime of Sokrates. + +[Footnote 1: Zeller is of opinion that the Apology, as well as the +Kriton, were put together at Megara by Plato, shortly after the death +of Sokrates. (Zeller, De Hermodoro Ephesio, p. 19.) + +Schleiermacher, Einl. zur Apologie, vol. ii. pp. 182-185. Ueberweg, +Ueber die Aechtheit der Plat. Schrift. p. 246. + +Steinhart thinks (Einleitung, pp. 236-238) that the Apology contains +more of Plato, and less of Sokrates: but he does not make his view +very clear to me. Ast, on the contrary, treats the Apology as spurious +and unworthy of Plato. (Ueber Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 477, +seq.) His arguments are rather objections against the merits of the +composition, than reasons for believing it not to be the work of +Plato. I dissent from them entirely: but they show that an acute +critic can make out a plausible case, satisfactory to himself, against +any dialogue. If it be once conceded that the question of genuine or +spurious is to be tried upon such purely internal grounds of critical +admiration and complete harmony of sentiment, Ast might have made out +a case even stronger against the genuineness of the Phædrus, +Symposion, Philêbus, Parmenidês.] + +[Footnote 2: See chapter lxviii. of my History of Greece. + +The reader will find in that chapter a full narrative of all the +circumstances known to us respecting both the life and the +condemnation of Sokrates. + +A very admirable account may also be seen of the character of +Sokrates, and his position with reference to the Athenian people, in +the article entitled _Sokrates und Sein Volk_, Akademischer Vortrag, +by Professor Hermann Köchly; a lecture delivered at Zurich in 1855, +and published with enlargements in 1859. + +Professor Köchly's article (contained in a volume entitled +_Akademische Vorträge_, Zurich, 1859) is eminently deserving of +perusal. It not only contains a careful summary of the contemporary +history, so far as Sokrates is concerned, but it has farther the great +merit of fairly estimating that illustrious man in reference to the +actual feeling of the time, and to the real public among whom he +moved. I feel much satisfaction in seeing that Professor Köchly's +picture, composed without any knowledge of my History of Greece, +presents substantially the same view of Sokrates and his +contemporaries as that which is taken in my sixty-eighth chapter. + +Köchly considers that the Platonic Apology preserves the Sokratic +character more faithfully than any of Plato's writings; and that it +represents what Sokrates said, as nearly as the "dichterische Natur" +of Plato would permit (Köchly, pp. 302-364.)] + +[Side-note: Even if it be Plato's own composition, it comes naturally +first in the review of his dialogues.] + +Such, in my judgment, is the most probable hypothesis respecting the +Apology. But even if we discard this hypothesis; if we treat the +Apology as a pure product of the Platonic imagination (like the +dialogues), and therefore not necessarily connected in point of time +with the event to which it refers--still there are good reasons for +putting it first in the order of review. For it would then be Plato's +own exposition, given more explicitly and solemnly than anywhere else, +of the Sokratic point of view and life-purpose. It would be an +exposition embodying that union of generalising impulse, mistrust of +established common-places, and aggressive cross-examining ardour--with +eccentric religious persuasion, as well as with perpetual immersion in +the crowd of the palæstra and the market-place: which immersion was +not less indispensable to Sokrates than repugnant to the feelings of +Plato himself. An exposition, lastly, disavowing all that taste for +cosmical speculation, and that transcendental dogmatism, which formed +one among the leading features of Plato as distinguished from +Sokrates. In whichever way we look at the Apology, whether as a real +or as an imaginary defence, it contains more of pure Sokratism than +any other composition of Plato, and as such will occupy the first +place in the arrangement which I adopt.[3] + +[Footnote 3: Dionysius Hal. regards the Apology, not as a report of +what Sokrates really said, nor as approximating thereunto, but as a +pure composition of Plato himself, for three purposes combined:--1. To +defend and extol Sokrates. 2. To accuse the Athenian public and +Dikasts. 3. To furnish a picture of what a philosopher ought to be.--All +these purposes are to a certain extent included and merged in a +fourth, which I hold to be the true one,--to exhibit what Sokrates was +and had been, in relation to the Athenian public. + +The comparison drawn by Dionysius between the Apology and the oration +De Coronâ of Demosthenes, appears to me unsuitable. The two are +altogether disparate, in spirit, in purpose, and in execution. (See +Dion. H. Ars Rhet. pp. 295-298: De Adm. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1026.)] + +In my History of Greece, I have already spoken of this impressive +discourse as it concerns the relations between Sokrates himself and +the Dikasts to whom he addressed it. I here regard it only as it +concerns Plato; and as it forms a convenient point of departure for +entering upon and appreciating the Platonic dialogues. + +[Side-note: General character of the Apology--Sentiments entertained +towards Sokrates at Athens.] + +The Apology of Sokrates is not a dialogue but a continuous discourse +addressed to the Dikasts, containing nevertheless a few questions and +answers interchanged between him and the accuser Melêtus in open +court. It is occupied, partly, in rebutting the counts of the +indictment (_viz._, 1. That Sokrates did not believe in the Gods or in +the Dæmons generally recognised by his countrymen: 2. That he was a +corruptor of youth[4])--partly in setting forth those proceedings of +his life out of which such charges had grown, and by which he had +become obnoxious to a wide-spread feeling of personal hatred. By his +companions, by those who best knew him, and by a considerable number +of ardent young men, he was greatly esteemed and admired: by the +general public, too, his acuteness as well as his self-sufficing and +independent character, were appreciated with a certain respect. Yet he +was at the same time disliked, as an aggressive disputant who "tilted +at all he met"--who raised questions novel as well as perplexing, who +pretended to special intimations from the Gods--and whose views no one +could distinctly make out.[5] By the eminent citizens of all +varieties--politicians, rhetors, Sophists, tragic and comic poets, +artisans, &c.--he had made himself both hated and feared.[6] He +emphatically denies the accusation of general disbelief in the Gods, +advanced by Melêtus: and he affirms generally (though less distinctly) +that the Gods in whom he believed, were just the same as those in whom +the whole city believed. Especially does he repudiate the idea, that +he could be so absurd as to doubt the divinity of Helios and Selênê, +in which all the world believed;[7] and to adopt the heresy of +Anaxagoras, who degraded these Divinities into physical masses. +Respecting his general creed, he thus puts himself within the pale of +Athenian orthodoxy. He even invokes that very sentiment (with some +doubt whether the Dikasts will believe him[8]) for the justification +of the obnoxious and obtrusive peculiarities of his life; representing +himself as having acted under the mission of the Delphian God, +expressly transmitted from the oracle. + +[Footnote 4: Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 1. [Greek: A)dikei= Sôkra/tês, ou(\s +me\n e( po/lis nomi/zei theou\s ou) nomi/zôn; e(/tera de\ kaina\ +daimo/nia ei)sphe/rôn; a)dikei= de\ kai\ tou\s ne/ous diaphthei/rôn]. + +Plato, Apolog. c. 3, p. 19 B. [Greek: Sôkra/tês a)dikei= kai\ +perierga/zetai, zêtô=n ta/ te u(po\ gê=s kai\ ta\ e)poura/nia, kai\ +to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô poiô=n, kai\ a)/llous tau)ta\ tau=ta +dida/skôn]. + +The reading of Xenophon was conformable to the copy of the indictment +preserved in the Metrôon at Athens in the time of Favorinus. There +were three distinct accusers--Melêtus, Anytus, and Lykon. Plat. Apol. +p. 23-24 B.] + +[Footnote 5: Plato, Apol. c. 28, p. 38 A; c. 23, p. 35 A.] + +[Footnote 6: Plato, Apol. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23. [Greek: e)k tautêsi\ dê\ +tê\s e)xeta/seôs pollai\ me\n a)pe/chtheiai/ moi gego/nasi kai\ oi)=ai +chalepô/tatai kai\ baru/tatai, ô(/ste polla\s diabola\s a)p' au)tô=n +gegone/nai, o)/noma de\ tou=to le/gesthai, sopho\s ei)=nai.]] + +[Footnote 7: Plato, Apol. c. 14, p. 26 D. [Greek: ô)= thauma/sie +Me/lête, i(na ti/ tau=ta le/geis? ou)de\ ê(/lion ou)de\ selê/nên a)/ra +nomi/zô theou\s ei)=nai, ô(/sper oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi?]] + +[Footnote 8: Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D.] + +[Side-note: Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom +of Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the +citizens generally--The oracle is proved to be true.] + +According to his statement, his friend and earnest admirer Chærephon, +had asked the question at the oracle of Delphi, whether any one was +wiser than Sokrates? The reply of the oracle declared, that no one was +wiser. On hearing this declaration from an infallible authority, +Sokrates was greatly perplexed: for he was conscious to himself of not +being wise upon any matter, great or small.[9] He at length concluded +that the declaration of the oracle could be proved true, only on the +hypothesis that other persons were less wise than they seemed to be or +fancied themselves. To verify this hypothesis, he proceeded to +cross-examine the most eminent persons in many different walks--political +men, rhetors, Sophists, poets, artisans. On applying his Elenchus, and +putting to them testing interrogations, he found them all without +exception destitute of any real wisdom, yet fully persuaded that they +_were_ wise, and incapable of being shaken in that persuasion. The +artisans indeed did really know each his own special trade; but then, +on account of this knowledge, they believed themselves to be wise on +other great matters also. So also the poets were great in their own +compositions; but on being questioned respecting these very +compositions, they were unable to give any rational or consistent +explanations: so that they plainly appeared to have written beautiful +verses, not from any wisdom of their own, but through inspiration from +the Gods, or spontaneous promptings of nature. The result was, that +these men were all proved to possess no more real wisdom than +Sokrates: but _he_ was aware of his own deficiency; while _they_ were +fully convinced of their own wisdom, and could not be made sensible of +the contrary. In this way Sokrates justified the certificate of +superiority vouchsafed to him by the oracle. He, like all other +persons, was destitute of wisdom; but he was the only one who knew, or +could be made to feel, his own real mental condition. With others, and +most of all with the most conspicuous men, the false persuasion of +their own wisdom was universal and inexpugnable.[10] + +[Footnote 9: Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. [Greek: tau=ta ga\r e)gô\ +a)kou/sas e)nethumou/mên ou(tôsi/, Ti/ pote le/gei o( theo\s kai\ ti/ +pote ai)ni/ttetai? e)gô\ ga\r dê\ ou)/te me/ga ou)/te smikro\n +xu/noida e)mautô=| sopho\s ô)/n; ti/ ou)=n pote le/gei pha/skôn e)me\ +sophô/taton ei)=nai? ou) ga\r dê/pou pseu/detai/ ge; ou) ga\r the/mis +au)tô=|. Kai\ polu\n me\n chro/non ê)po/roun], &c.] + +[Footnote 10: Plato, Apolog. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23.] + +[Side-note: False persuasion of wisdom is universal--the God alone is +wise.] + +This then was the philosophical mission of Sokrates, imposed upon him +by the Delphian oracle, and in which he passed the mature portion of +his life: to cross-examine every one, to expose that false persuasion +of knowledge which every one felt, and to demonstrate the truth of +that which the oracle really meant by declaring the superior wisdom of +Sokrates. "People suppose me to be wise myself (says Sokrates) on +those matters on which I detect and prove the non-wisdom of +others.[11] But that is a mistake. The God alone is wise: and his +oracle declares human wisdom to be worth little or nothing, employing +the name of Sokrates as an example. He is the wisest of men, who, like +Sokrates, knows well that he is in truth worthless so far as wisdom is +concerned.[12] The really disgraceful ignorance is--to think that you +know what you do not really know."[13] + +[Footnote 11: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A. [Greek: oi)/ontai ga/r me +e(ka/stote oi( paro/ntes tau=ta au)to\n ei)=nai sopho/n, a(\ a)\n +a)/llon e)xele/gxô.]] + +[Footnote 12: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A; c. 17, p. 28 E.] + +[Footnote 13: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 B. [Greek: kai\ tou=to pô=s +ou)k a)mathi/a e)sti\n au)tê\ ê( e)ponei/distos, ê( tou= oi)/esthai +ei)de/nai a(\ ou)k oi)=den?]] + +[Side-note: Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the cross-examining +mission imposed upon him by the God.] + +"The God has marked for me my post, to pass my life in the search for +wisdom, cross-examining myself as well as others: I shall be +disgraced, if I desert that post from fear either of death or of any +other evil."[14] "Even if you Dikasts acquit me, I shall not alter my +course: I shall continue, as long as I hold life and strength, to +exhort and interrogate in my usual strain, telling every one whom I +meet[15]--You, a citizen of the great and intelligent Athens, are you +not ashamed of busying yourself to procure wealth, reputation, and +glory, in the greatest possible quantity; while you take neither +thought nor pains about truth, or wisdom, or the fullest measure of +goodness for your mind? If any one denies the charge, and professes +that he _does_ take thought for these objects,--I shall not let him +off without questioning, cross-examining, and exposing him.[16] And if +he appears to me to affirm that he is virtuous without being so in +reality, I shall reproach him for caring least about the greater +matter, and most about the smaller. This course I shall pursue with +every one whom I meet, young or old, citizen or non-citizen: most of +all with you citizens, because you are most nearly connected with me. +For this, you know, is what the God commands, and I think that no +greater blessing has ever happened to the city than this ministration +of mine under orders from the God. For I go about incessantly +persuading you all, old as well as young, not to care about your +bodies, or about riches, so much as about acquiring the largest +measure of virtue for your minds. I urge upon you that virtue is not +the fruit of wealth, but that wealth, together with all the other +things good for mankind publicly and privately, are the fruits of +virtue.[17] If I am a corruptor of youth, it is by these discourses +that I corrupt them: and if any one gives a different version of my +discourses, he talks idly. Accordingly, men of Athens, I must tell you +plainly: decide with Anytus, or not,--acquit me or not--I shall do +nothing different from what I have done, even if I am to die many +times over for it." + +[Footnote 14: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 28 E.] + +[Footnote 15: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 D. [Greek: ou) mê\ pau/sômai +philosophô=n kai\ u(mi=n parakeleuo/meno/s te kai\ e)ndeiknu/menos, +o(/tô| a)\n a)ei\ e)ntugcha/nô u(mô=n, le/gôn oi(=a/per ei)/ôtha], +&c.] + +[Footnote 16: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 E. [Greek: kai\ e)a/n tis +u(mô=n a)mphisbêtê/sê| kai\ phê=| e)pimelei=sthai, ou)k eu)thu\s +a)phê/sô au)to\n ou)d' a)/peimi, a)ll' e)rê/somai au)to\n kai\ +e)xeta/sô kai\ e)le/gxô, kai\ e)a/n moi mê\ dokê=| kektê=sthai +a)retê/n, pha/nai de/, o)neidiô=], &c.] + +[Footnote 17: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 30, B. [Greek: le/gôn o(/ti ou)k +e)k chrêma/tôn a)retê\ gi/gnetai, a)ll' e)x a)retê=s chrê/mata kai\ +ta)/lla a)gatha\ toi=s a)nthrô/pois a(/panta kai\ i)di/a| kai\ +dêmosi/a|.]] + +[Side-note: He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission, +and he intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger.] + +Such is the description given by Sokrates of his own profession and +standing purpose, imposed upon him as a duty by the Delphian God. He +neglected all labour either for profit, or for political importance, +or for the public service; he devoted himself, from morning till +night, to the task of stirring up the Athenian public, as the gadfly +worries a large and high-bred but over-sleek horse:[18] stimulating +them by interrogation, persuasion, reproach, to render account of +their lives and to seek with greater energy the path of virtue. By +continually persisting in such universal cross-examination, he had +rendered himself obnoxious to the Athenians generally;[19] who were +offended when called upon to render account, and when reproached that +they did not live rightly. Sokrates predicts that after his death, +younger cross-examiners, hitherto kept down by his celebrity, would +arise in numbers,[20] and would pursue the same process with greater +keenness and acrimony than he had done. + +[Footnote 18: Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 E. [Greek: a)technô=s, ei) +kai\ geloio/teron ei)pei=n, proskei/menon tê=| po/lei u(po\ tou= +theou= ô(/sper i(/ppô| mega/lô| me\n kai\ gennai/ô|, u(po\ mege/thous +de\ nôtheste/rô| kai\ _deome/nô| e)gei/resthai u(po\ mu/ôpo/s tinos_; +oi(=on dê/ moi dokei= o( theo\s e)me\ tê=| po/lei prostetheike/nai +toiou=to/n tina, o(\s u(ma=s _e)gei/rôn kai\ pei/thôn kai\ +o)neidi/zôn_ e(/na e(/kaston ou)de\n pau/omai tê\n ê(me/ran o(/lên +pantachou= proskathi/zôn]. Also c. 26, p. 36 D.] + +[Footnote 19: Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 D; c. 16, p. 28 A; c. 30, p. 39 +C.] + +[Footnote 20 Plato, Apol. c. 30, p. 39 C. [Greek: nu=n ga\r tou=to +ei)/rgasthe] (i.e. [Greek: e)me\ a)pekto/nate]) [Greek: _oi)o/menoi +a)palla/xesthai tou= dido/nai e)/legchon tou= bi/ou_. to\ de\ u(mi=n +polu\ e)nanti/on a)pobê/setai, ô(s e)go/ phêmi. plei/ous e)/sontai +u(ma=s oi( e)le/gchontes, ou(=s nu=n e)gô\ katei=chon, u(mei=s de\ +ou)k ê)|stha/nesthe; kai\ chalepô/teroi e)/sontai o(/sô| neô/teroi/ +ei)si, kai\ u(mei=s ma=llon a)ganaktê/sete], &c. + +I have already remarked (in chapter lxviii. of my general History of +Greece relating to Sokrates) that this prediction was not fulfilled.] + +[Side-note: He disclaims the function of a teacher--he cannot teach, +for he is not wiser than others. He differs from others by being +conscious of his own ignorance.] + +While Sokrates thus extols, and sanctifies under the authority of the +Delphian God, his habitual occupation of interrogating, +cross-examining, and stimulating to virtue, the Athenians +indiscriminately--he disclaims altogether the function of a teacher. +His disclaimer on this point is unequivocal and emphatic. He cannot +teach others, because he is not at all wiser than they. He is fully +aware that he is not wise on any point, great or small--that he knows +nothing at all, so to speak.[21] He can convict others, by their own +answers, of real though unconscious ignorance, or (under another +name) false persuasion of knowledge: and because he can do so, he is +presumed to possess positive knowledge on the points to which the +exposure refers. But this presumption is altogether unfounded: he +possesses no such positive knowledge. Wisdom is not to be found in +any man, even among the most distinguished: Sokrates is as ignorant +as others; and his only point of superiority is, that he is fully +conscious of his own ignorance, while others, far from having the +like consciousness, confidently believe themselves to be in +possession of wisdom and truth.[22] In this consciousness of his +own ignorance Sokrates stands alone; on which special ground he is +proclaimed by the Delphian God as the wisest of mankind. + +[Footnote 21: Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. [Greek: e)gô\ ga\r dê\ +ou)/te me/ga ou)/te smikro\n xu/noida e)mautô=| sopho\s ô)/n], &c. c. +8, p. 22 D. [Greek: e)mautô=| ga\r xunê/|dein ou)de\n e)pistame/nô|, +ô(s e)/pos ei)pei=n.]] + +[Footnote 22: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A-B. [Greek: Ou(=tos u(mô=n, +ô)= a)/nthrôpoi, sophô/tato/s e)stin, o(/stis ô(/sper Sôkra/tês +e)/gnôken o(/ti ou)deno\s a)/xio/s e)sti tê=| a)lêthei/a| pro\s +sophi/an.]] + +[Side-note: He does not know where competent teachers can be found. He +is perpetually seeking for them, but in vain.] + +Being thus a partner in the common ignorance, Sokrates cannot of +course teach others. He utterly disclaims having ever taught, or +professed to teach. He would be proud indeed, if he possessed the +knowledge of human and social virtue: but he does not know it himself, +nor can he find out who else knows it.[23] He is certain that there +cannot be more than a few select individuals who possess the art of +making mankind wiser or better--just as in the case of horses, none +but a few practised trainers know how to make them better, while the +handling of these or other animals, by ordinary men, certainly does +not improve the animals, and generally even makes them worse.[24] But +where any such select few are to be found, who alone can train +men--Sokrates is obliged to inquire from others; he cannot divine for +himself.[25] He is perpetually going about, with the lantern of +cross-examination, in search of a wise man: but he can find only +those who pretend to be wise, and whom his cross-examination exposes +as pretenders.[26] + +[Footnote 23: Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20 B-C. [Greek: ti/s tê=s +toiau/tês a)retê=s, tê=s a)nthrôpi/nês te kai\ politikê=s, e)pistê/môn +e)sti/n? . . . e)gô\ gou=n kai\ au)to\s e)kalluno/mên te kai\ +ê(bruno/mên a)\n, ei) ê)pista/mên tau=ta; a)ll' ou) ga\r e)pi/stamai, +ô)= a)/ndres A)thênai=oi]. + +c. 21, p. 33 A. [Greek: e)gô\ de\ dida/skalos me\n ou)deno\s pô/pot' +e)geno/mên]. c. 4, p. 19 E.] + +[Footnote 24: Plato, Apol. c. 12, p. 25 B.] + +[Footnote 25: Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20.] + +[Footnote 26: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 B. [Greek: tau=t' ou)=n e)gô\ +me\n e)/ti kai\ nu=n periiô\n zêtô= kai\ e)reunô= kata\ to\n theo/n, +kai\ tô=n a)stôn kai\ tô=n xe/nôn a)\n tina oi)/ômai sopho\n ei)=nai; +kai\ e)peida/n moi mê\ dokê=|, tô=| theô=| boêthô=n e)ndei/knumai +o(/ti ou)k e)/sti sopho/s]. c. 32, p. 41 B.] + +This _then_is the mission and vocation of Sokrates--1. To +cross-examine men, and to destroy that false persuasion of wisdom and +virtue which is so widely diffused among them. 2. To reproach them, +and make them ashamed of pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom +and virtue.[27] + +[Footnote 27: Plato, Apol. c. 33, p. 41 E.] + +But Sokrates is not empowered to do more for them. He cannot impart +any positive knowledge to heal their ignorance. He cannot teach them +what WISDOM OR VIRTUE is. + +[Side-note: Impression made by the Platonic Apology on Zeno the +Stoic.] + +Such is the substance of the Platonic Apology of Sokrates. How strong +was the impression which it made, on many philosophical readers, we +may judge from the fact, that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, +being a native of Kition in Cyprus, derived from the perusal of the +Apology his first inducement to come over to Athens, and devote +himself to the study and teaching of philosophy in that city.[28] +Sokrates depicts, with fearless sincerity, what he regards as the +intellectual and moral deficiencies of his countrymen, as well as the +unpalatable medicine and treatment which he was enjoined to administer +to them. With equal sincerity does he declare the limits within which +that treatment was confined. + +[Footnote 28: Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistês) p. 357, Dindorf. +[Greek: Ta\ de\ a)mphi\ Zê/nônos a)ri/dêla/ te/ e)sti kai\ a)|do/mena +u(po\ pollôn, o(/ti au)to\n ê( Sôkra/tous a)pologi/a e)k Phoini/kês +ê)/gagen ei)s tê\n Poiki/lên]. + +This statement deserves full belief: it probably came from Zeno +himself, a voluminous writer. The father of Zeno was a merchant who +traded with Athens, and brought back books for his son to read, +Sokratic books among them. Diogen. Laert. vii. 31. + +Respecting another statement made by Themistius in the same page, I do +not feel so certain. He says that the accusatory discourse pronounced +against Sokrates by Anytus was composed by Polykrates, as a [Greek: +logogra/phos], and paid for. This may be the fact but the words of +Isokrates in the Busiris rather lead me to the belief that the [Greek: +katêgori/a Sôkra/tous] composed by Polykrates was a sophistical +exercise, composed to acquire reputation and pupils, not a discourse +really delivered in the Dikastery.] + +[Side-note: Extent of efficacious influence claimed by Sokrates for +himself--exemplified by Plato throughout the Dialogues of +Search--Xenophon and Plato enlarge it.] + +But neither of his two most eminent companions can endure to restrict +his competence within such narrow limits. Xenophon[29] affirms that +Sokrates was assiduous in communicating useful instruction and +positive edification to his hearers. Plato sometimes, though more +rarely, intimates the same: but for the most part, and in the +Dialogues of Search throughout, he keeps Sokrates within the circle of +procedure which the Apology claims for him. These dialogues exemplify +in detail the aggressive operations, announced therein by Sokrates in +general terms as his missionary life-purpose, against contemporaries +of note, very different from each other--against aspiring youths, +statesmen, generals, Rhetors, Sophists, orthodox pietists, poets, +rhapsodes, &c. Sokrates cross-examines them all, and convicts them of +humiliating ignorance: but he does not furnish, nor does he profess to +be able to furnish, any solution of his own difficulties. Many of the +persons cross-examined bear historical names: but I think it necessary +to warn the reader, that all of them speak both language and +sentiments provided for them by Plato, and not their own.[30] + +[Footnote 29: Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 64, i. 3. 1, i. 4, 2, iv. 2, 40; +iv. 3, 4.] + +[Footnote 30: It might seem superfluous to give such a warning; but +many commentators speak as if they required it. They denounce the +Platonic speakers in harsh terms, which have no pertinence, unless +supposed to be applied to a real man expressing his own thoughts and +feelings. + +It is useless to enjoin us, as Stallbaum and Steinhart do, to mark the +aristocratical conceit of Menon!--the pompous ostentation and +pretensive verbosity of Protagoras and Gorgias!--the exorbitant +selfishness of Polus and Kalliklês!--the impudent brutality of +Thrasymachus!--when all these persons speak entirely under the +prompting of Plato himself. + +You might just as well judge of Sokrates by what we read in the Nubes +of Aristophanes, or of Meton by what we find in the Aves, as describe +the historical characters of the above-named personages out of the +Platonic dialogues. They ought to be appreciated as dramatic pictures, +drest up by the author for his own purpose, and delivering such +opinions as he assigns to them--whether he intends them to be refuted +by others, or not.] + +[Side-note: Assumption by modern critics, that Sokrates is a positive +teacher, employing indirect methods for the inculcation of theories of +his own.] + +The disclaimer, so often repeated by Sokrates,--that he possessed +neither positive knowledge nor wisdom in his own person,--was +frequently treated by his contemporaries as ironical. He was not +supposed to be in earnest when he made it. Every one presumed that he +must himself know that which he proved others not to know, whatever +motive he might have for affecting ignorance.[31] His personal manner +and homely vein of illustration seemed to favour the supposition that +he was bantering. This interpretation of the character of Sokrates +appears in the main to be preferred by modern critics. Of course (they +imagine) an able man who cross-questions others on the definitions of +Law, Justice, Democracy, &c., has already meditated on the subject, +and framed for himself unimpeachable definitions of these terms. +Sokrates (they suppose) is a positive teacher and theorist, employing +a method, which, though indirect and circuitous, is nevertheless +calculated deliberately beforehand for the purpose of introducing and +inculcating premeditated doctrines of his own. Pursuant to this +hypothesis, it is presumed that the positive theory of Sokrates is to +be found in his negative cross-examinations,--not indeed set down +clearly in any one sentence, so that he who runs may read--yet +disseminated in separate syllables or letters, which may be +distinguished, picked out, and put together into propositions, by an +acute detective examiner. And the same presumption is usually applied +to the Sokrates of the Platonic dialogues: that is, to Plato employing +Sokrates as spokesman. Interpreters sift with microscopic accuracy the +negative dialogues of Plato, in hopes of detecting the ultimate +elements of that positive solution which he is supposed to have lodged +therein, and which, when found, may be put together so as to clear up +all the antecedent difficulties. + +[Footnote 31: Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D; c. 9, p. 23 A. + +Aristeides the Rhetor furnishes a valuable confirmation of the truth +of that picture of Sokrates, which we find in the Platonic Apology. +All the other companions of Sokrates who wrote dialogues about him +(not preserved to us), presented the same general features. 1. Avowed +ignorance. 2. The same declaration of the oracle concerning him. 3. +The feeling of frequent signs from [Greek: to\ daimo/nion]. + +[Greek: O(mologei=tai me/n ge le/gein au)to\n] (Sokrates) [Greek: ô(s +a)/ra ou)de\n e)pi/staito, _kai\ pa/ntes tou=to/ phasin oi( +suggeno/menoi_; o(mologei=tai d' au)= kai\ tou=to, sophô/taton ei)=nai +Sôkra/tê tê\n Puthi/an ei)rêke/nai], &c. + +(Aristeides, Orat. xlv. [Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s], pp. 23, 24, 25, +Dindorf.)] + +[Side-note: Incorrectness of such assumption--the Sokratic Elenchus +does not furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the +respondent, stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own.] + +I have already said (in the preceding chapter) that I cannot take this +view either of Sokrates or of Plato. Without doubt, each of them had +affirmative doctrines and convictions, though not both the same. But +the affirmative vein, with both of them, runs in a channel completely +distinct from the negative. The affirmative theory has its roots +_aliunde_, and is neither generated, nor adapted, with a view to +reconcile the contradictions, or elucidate the obscurities, which the +negative Elenchus has exposed. That exposure does indeed render the +embarrassed respondent painfully conscious of the want of some +rational, consistent, and adequate theoretical explanation: it farther +stimulates him to make efforts of his own for the supply of that want. +But such efforts must be really his own; the Elenchus gives no farther +help: it furnishes problems, but no solutions, nor even any assurance +that the problems as presented, admit of affirmative solutions. +Whoever expects that such consummate masters of the negative process +as Sokrates and Plato, when they come to deliver affirmative dogmas of +their own, will be kept under restraint by their own previous +Elenchus, and will take care that their dogmas shall not be vulnerable +by the same weapons as they had employed against others--will be +disappointed. They do not employ any negative test against themselves. +When Sokrates preaches in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, or the Athenian +Stranger in the Platonic Leges, they jump over, or suppose to be +already solved, the difficulties under the pressure of which other +disputants had been previously discredited: they assume all the +undefinable common-places to be clearly understood, and all the +inconsistent generalities to be brought into harmony. Thus it is that +the negative cross-examination, and the affirmative dogmatism, are +(both in Sokrates and in Plato) two unconnected operations of thought: +the one does not lead to, or involve, or verify, the other. + +[Side-note: Value and importance of this process--stimulating active +individual minds to theorise each for itself.] + +Those who depreciate the negative process simply, unless followed up +by some new positive doctrine which shall be proof against all such +attack--cannot be expected to admire Sokrates greatly, even as he +stands rated by himself. Even if I concurred in this opinion, I should +still think myself obliged to exhibit him as he really was. But I do +not concur in the opinion. I think that the creation and furtherance +of individual, self-thinking minds, each instigated to form some +rational and consistent theory for itself, is a material benefit, even +though no farther aid be rendered to the process except in the way of +negative suggestion. That such minds should be made to feel the +arbitrary and incoherent character of that which they have imbibed by +passive association as ethics and æsthetics,--and that they should +endeavour to test it by some rational and consistent standard--would +be an improving process, though no one theory could be framed +satisfactory to all. The Sokratic Elenchus went directly to this +result. Plato followed in the same track, not of pouring new matter of +knowledge into the pupil, but of eliciting new thoughts and beliefs +out of him, by kindling the latent forces of his intellect. A large +proportion of Plato's dialogues have no other purpose or value. And in +entering upon the consideration of these dialogues, we cannot take a +better point of departure than the Apology of Sokrates, wherein the +speaker, alike honest and decided in his convictions, at the close of +a long cross-examining career, re-asserts expressly his devoted +allegiance to the negative process, and disclaims with equal emphasis +all power over the affirmative. + +[Side-note: View taken by Sokrates about death. Other men profess to +know what it is, and think it a great misfortune: he does not know.] + +In that touching discourse, the Universal Cross-Examiner declares a +thorough resolution to follow his own individual conviction and his +own sense of duty--whether agreeing or disagreeing with the +convictions of his countrymen, and whether leading to danger or to +death for himself. "Where a man may have posted himself either--under +his own belief that it is best, or under orders from the +magistrate--there he must stay and affront danger, not caring for death or +anything else in comparison with disgrace."[32] As to death, Sokrates +knows very little what it is, nor whether it is good or evil. The fear +of death, in his view, is only one case of the prevalent mental +malady--men believing themselves to know that of which they really +know nothing. If death be an extinction of all sensation, like a +perpetual and dreamless sleep, he will regard it as a prodigious +benefit compared with life: even the Great King will not be a loser by +the exchange.[33] If on the contrary death be a transition into Hades, +to keep company with those who have died before--Homer, Hesiod, the +heroes of the Trojan war, &c.--Sokrates will consider it supreme +happiness to converse with and cross-examine the potentates and clever +men of the past--Agamemnon, Odysseus, Sisyphus; thus discriminating +which of them are really wise, and which of them are only unconscious +pretenders. He is convinced that no evil can ever happen to the good +man; that the protection, of the Gods can never be wanting to him, +whether alive or dead.[34] "It is not lawful for a better man to be +injured by a worse. He may indeed be killed, or banished, or +disfranchised; and these may appear great evils, in the eye of others. +But I do not think them so. It is a far greater evil to do what +Melêtus is now doing--trying to kill a man unjustly."[35] + +[Footnote 32: Plato, Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D.] + +[Footnote 33: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 A. c. 32, p. 40 D. [Greek: kai\ +ei)/te dê\ mêdemi/a ai)/sthêsi/s e)stin, a)ll' oi(=on u(/pnos, +e)peida/n tis katheu/dôn mêd' o)/nar mêde\n o(ra=|, thauma/sion +ke/rdos a)\n ei)/ê o( tha/natos]. + +Ast remarks (Plat. Leb. und Schrift. p. 488) that the language of +doubt and uncertainty in which Sokrates here speaks of the +consequences of death, is greatly at variance with the language which +he is made to hold in Phædon. Ast adduces this as one of his arguments +for disallowing the authenticity of the Apology. I do not admit the +inference. I am prepared for divergence between the opinions of +Sokrates in different dialogues; and I believe, moreover, that the +Sokrates of the Phædon is spokesman chosen to argue in support of the +main thesis of that dialogue. But it is impossible to deny the +variance which Ast points out, and which is also admitted by +Stallbaum. Steinhart indeed (Einleitung, p. 246) goes the length of +denying it, in which I cannot follow him. The sentiment of Sokrates in +the Apology embodies the same alternative uncertainty, as what we read +in Marcus Antoninus, v. 33. [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? perime/neis i(/leôs +tê\n ei)/te sbe/sin ei)/te meta/stasin], &c.] + +[Footnote 34: Plato, Apol. c. 32, p. 41 A-B.] + +[Footnote 35: Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 D.] + +[Side-note: Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether +agreeing or disagreeing with others.] + +Sokrates here gives his own estimate of comparative good and evil. +Death, banishment, disfranchisement, &c., are no great evils: to put +another man to death unjustly, is a great evil to the doer: the good +man can suffer no evil at all. These are given as the judgments of +Sokrates, and as dissentient from most others. Whether they are +Sokratic or Platonic opinions, or common to both--we shall find them +reappearing in various other Platonic dialogues, hereafter to be +noticed. We have also to notice that marked feature in the character +of Sokrates[36]--the standing upon his own individual reason and +measure of good and evil: nay, even pushing his confidence in it so +far, as to believe in a divine voice informing and moving him. This +reliance on the individual reason is sometimes recognised, at other +times rejected, in the Platonic dialogues. Plato rejects it in his +comments (contained in the dialogue Theætêtus) on the doctrine of +Protagoras: he rejects it also in the constructive dialogues, Republic +and Leges, where he constitutes himself despotic legislator, +prescribing a standard of orthodox opinion; he proclaims it in the +Gorgias, and implies it very generally throughout the negative +dialogues. + +[Footnote 36: Plat. Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D. [Greek: ou(= a)/n tis e(auto\n +ta/xê| ê)\ ê(gêsa/menos be/ltion ei)=nai ê)\ u(p' a)/rchontos +tachthê=|, e)ntau=tha dei=, ô(s e)moi\ dokei=, me/nonta kinduneu/ein], +&c. + +Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 8, 11 [Greek: phro/nimos de/, ô(/ste mê\ +diamarta/nein kri/nôn ta\ belti/ô kai\ ta\ chei/rô, mêde\ a)/llou +prosde/esthai, a)ll' au)ta/rchês ei)=nai pro\s tê\n tou/tôn gnô=sin], +&c. + +Compare this with Memor. i. 1, 3-4-5, and the Xenophontic Apology, 4, +5, 13, where this [Greek: au)tarkei/a] finds for itself a +justification in the hypothesis of a divine monitor without. + +The debaters in the treatise of Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, upon the +question of the Sokratic [Greek: daimo/nion], insist upon this +resolute persuasion and self-determination as the most indisputable +fact in the case (c. 11, p. 581 C) [Greek: Ai( de\ Sôkra/tous o(rmai\ +to\ be/baion e)/chousai kai\ sphodro/têta phai/nontai pro\s a(/pan, +ô(s a)\n e)x o)rthê=s kai\ i)schura=s a)pheime/nai kri/eôs kai\ +a)rchê=s]. Compare p. 589 E. The speculations of the speakers upon the +[Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: du/namis tou= Sôkra/tous daimoni/ou], +come to little result. + +There is a curious passage in Plutarch's life of Coriolanus (c. 32), +where he describes the way in which the Gods act upon the minds of +particular men, under difficult and trying circumstances. They do not +inspire new resolutions or volitions, but they work upon the +associative principle, suggesting new ideas which conduct to the +appropriate volition--[Greek: ou)d' o(rma\s e)nergazo/menon, a)lla\ +phantasi/as o(rmô=n a)gôgou/s], &c.] + +[Side-note: Formidable efficacy of established public beliefs, +generated without any ostensible author.] + +Lastly, we find also in the Apology distinct notice of the formidable +efficacy of established public impressions, generated without any +ostensible author, circulated in the common talk, and passing without +examination from one man to another, as portions of accredited faith. +"My accusers Melêtus and Anytus (says Sokrates) are difficult enough +to deal with: yet far less difficult than the prejudiced public, who +have heard false reports concerning me for years past, and have +contracted a settled belief about my character, from nameless authors +whom I cannot summon here to be confuted."[37] + +[Footnote 37: Plato, Apol. c. 2, p. 18 C-D.] + +It is against this ancient, established belief, passing for +knowledge--communicated by unconscious contagion without any rational +process--against the "procès jugé mais non plaidé", whereby King Nomos +governs--that the general mission of Sokrates is directed. It is against +the like belief, in one of its countless manifestations, that he here +defends himself before the Dikastery. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +KRITON. + + +[Side-note: General purpose of the Kriton.] + +The dialogue called Kriton is, in one point of view, a second part or +sequel--in another point of view, an antithesis or corrective--of the +Platonic Apology. For that reason, I notice it immediately after the +Apology: though I do not venture to affirm confidently that it was +composed immediately after: it may possibly have been later, as I +believe the Phædon also to have been later.[1] + +[Footnote 1: Steinhart affirms with confidence that the Kriton was +composed immediately after the Apology, and shortly after the death of +Sokrates (Einleitung, p. 303). The fact may be so, but I do not feel +thus confident of it when I look to the analogy of the later Phædon.] + +[Side-note: Subject of the dialogue--interlocutors.] + +The Kriton describes a conversation between Sokrates and his friend +Kriton in the prison, after condemnation, and two days before the cup +of hemlock was administered. Kriton entreats and urges Sokrates (as +the sympathising friends had probably done frequently during the +thirty days of imprisonment) to make his escape from the prison, +informing him that arrangements have already been made for enabling +him to escape with ease and safety, and that money as well as good +recommendations will be provided, so that he may dwell comfortably +either in Thessaly, or wherever else he pleases. Sokrates ought not, +in justice to his children and his friends, to refuse the opportunity +offered, and thus to throw away his life. Should he do so, it will +appear to every one as if his friends had shamefully failed in their +duty, when intervention on their part might easily have saved him. He +might have avoided the trial altogether: even when on trial, he might +easily have escaped the capital sentence. Here is now a third +opportunity of rescue, which if he declines, it will turn this grave +and painful affair into mockery, as if he and his friends were +impotent simpletons.[2] Besides the mournful character of the event, +Sokrates and his friends will thus be disgraced in the opinion of +every one. + +[Footnote 2: Plato, Krito. c. 5, p. 45 E. [Greek: ô(s e)/gôge kai\ +u(pe\r sou= kai\ u(pe\r ê(mô=n tô=n sô=n e)pitêdei/ôn ai)schu/nomai, +mê\ do/xê| a(/pan to\ pra=gma to\ peri\ se\ a)nandri/a| tini\ tê=| +ê(mete/ra| pepra=chthai, kai\ ê( ei)/sodos tê=s di/kês ei)s to\ +dikastê/rion, ô(s ei)sê=lthes, e)xo\n mê\ ei)selthei=n, kai\ au)to\s +o( a)gô\n tê=s di/kês ô(s e)ge/neto, kai\ to\ teleutai=on dê\ touti/, +ô(/sper katage/lôs tê=s pra/xeôs, kaki/a| tini\ kai\ a)nandri/a| tê=| +ê(mete/ra| diapepheuge/nai ê(ma=s dokei=n, oi(tine/s se ou)chi\ +e)sô/samen ou)de\ su\ sauto/n, oi(=o/n te o)\n kai\ dunato/n, ei)/ ti +kai\ smikro\n ê(mô=n o)/phelos ê)=n]. + +This is a remarkable passage, as evincing both the trial and the death +of Sokrates, even in the opinion of his own friends, might have been +avoided without anything which they conceived dishonourable to his +character. + +Professor Köchly puts this point very forcibly in his _Vortrag_, +referred to in my notes on the Platonic Apology, p. 410 seq.] + +[Side-note: Answer of Sokrates to the appeal made by Kriton.] + +"Disgraced in the opinion of every one," replies Sokrates? That is not +the proper test by which the propriety of your recommendation must be +determined. I am now, as I always have been, prepared to follow +nothing but that voice of reason which approves itself to me in +discussion as the best and soundest.[3] We have often discussed this +matter before, and the conclusions on which we agreed are not to be +thrown aside because of my impending death. We agreed that the +opinions general among men ought not to be followed in all cases, but +only in some: that the good opinions, those of the wise men, were to +be followed--the bad opinions, those of the foolish men, to be +disregarded. In the treatment and exercise of the body, we must not +attend to the praise, the blame, or the opinion of every man, but only +to those of the one professional trainer or physician. If we disregard +this one skilful man, and conduct ourselves according to the praise or +blame of the unskilful public, our body will become corrupted and +disabled, so that life itself will not be worth having. + +[Footnote 3: Plato, Krito. c. 6, p. 46 B. [Greek: ô(s e)gô\ ou) mo/non +nu=n a)lla\ kai\ a)ei\ toiou=tos, oi(=os tô=n e)mô=n mêdeni\ a)/llô| +pei/thesthai ê)\ tô=| lo/gô|, o(\s a)/n moi logizome/nô| be/ltistos +phai/nêtai.]] + +[Side-note: He declares that the judgment of the general public is not +worthy of trust: he appeals to the judgment of the one Expert, who is +wise on the matter in debate.] + +In like manner, on the question what is just and unjust, honourable or +base, good or evil, to which our present subject belongs--we must not +yield to the praise and censure of the many, but only to that of the +one, whoever he may be, who is wise on these matters.[4] We must be +afraid and ashamed of him more than of all the rest. Not the verdict +of the many, but that of the one man skilful about just and unjust, +and that of truth itself, must be listened to. Otherwise we shall +suffer the like debasement and corruption of mind as of body in the +former case. Life will become yet more worthless. True--the many may +put us to death. But what we ought to care for most, is, not simply to +live, but to live well, justly, honourably.[5] + +[Footnote 4: Plato, Krito. c. 7, p. 47 C-D. [Greek: kai\ dê\ kai\ +peri\ tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn, kai\ ai)schrô=n kai\ kalô=n, kai\ +a)gathô=n kai\ kakô=n, peri\ ô(=n nu=n ê( boulê\ ê(mi=n e)stin, +po/teron tê=| tô=n pollô=n do/xê| dei= ê(ma=s e(/pesthai kai\ +phobei=sthai au)tê/n, ê)\ tê=| tou= e(no/s, ei)/ ti/s e)stin +e)pai+/ôn, o(\n dei= kai\ ai)schu/nesthai kai\ phobei=sthai ma=llon +ê)\ xu/mpantas tou\s a)/llous?] + +c. 8, p. 48 A. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra pa/nu ê(mi=n ou(/tô phrontiste/on +o(/, ti e)rou=sin oi( polloi\ ê(ma=s, a)ll' o(\, ti o( e)pai+/ôn peri\ +tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn, o( ei)=s, kai\ au)tê\ ê( a)lê/theia.]] + +[Footnote 5: Plato, Krito. c. 7-8, pp. 47-48.] + +Sokrates thus proceeds:-- + +The point to be decided, therefore, with reference to your +proposition, Kriton, is, not what will be generally said if I decline, +but whether it will be just or unjust--right or wrong--if I comply; +that is, if I consent to escape from prison against the will of the +Athenians and against the sentence of law. + +[Side-note: Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the +question with Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? +Never in any case to act unjustly.] + +To decide the point, I assume this principle, which we have + +often before agreed upon in our reasonings, and which must stand +unshaken now.[6] + +[Footnote 6: Plato, Krito. c. 9, p. 48 E. [Greek: o(/ra de\ dê\ _tê=s +ske/pseôs tê\n a)rchê/n_], &c.] + +We ought not in any case whatever to act wrong or unjustly. To act so +is in every case both bad for the agent and dishonourable to the +agent, whatever may be its consequences. Even though others act wrong +to us, we ought not to act wrong to them in return. Even though others +do evil to us, we ought not to do evil to them in return.[7] + +[Footnote 7: Plato, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 B. [Greek: Ou)de\ +a)dikou/menon a)/ra a)ntadikei=n, _ô(s oi( polloi\ oi)/ontai_, +e)peidê/ ge ou)damô=s dei = a)dikei=n], &c.] + +[Side-note: Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and that +most persons hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point +is cardinal.] + +This is the principle which I assume as true, though I know that very +few persons hold it, or ever will hold it. Most men say the contrary--that +when other persons do wrong or harm to us, we may do wrong or +harm to them in return. This is a cardinal point. Between those who +affirm it, and those who deny it, there can be no common measure or +reasoning. Reciprocal contempt is the sentiment with which, by +necessity, each contemplates the other's resolutions.[8] + +[Footnote 8: Plato. Krito. c. 10, p. 49 D. [Greek: Oi)=da ga\r o(/ti +o)li/gois tisi\ tau=ta kai\ dokei= kai\ do/xei; O(=is ou)=n ou(/tô +de/doktai kai\ oi(=s mê/, _tou/tois ou)k e)/sti koinê\ boulê/, a)ll' +a)na/gkê tou/tous a)llê/lôn kataphronei=n, o(rôntas ta\ a)llê/lôn +bouleu/mata_. Sko/pei dê\ ou)=n kai\ su\ eu)= ma/la, po/teron +koinônei=s kai\ xundokei= soi; kai\ _a)rchô/metha e)nteu=then +bouleuo/menoi_, ô(s ou)de/pote o)rthô=s e)/chontos ou)/te tou= +a)dikei=n ou)/te tou= a)ntadikei=n, ou)/te kakô=s pa/schonta +a)mu/nesthai a)ntidrô=nta kakô=s]. + +Compare the opposite impulse, to revenge yourself upon your country +from which you believe yourself to have received wrong, set forth in +the speech of Alkibiades at Sparta after he had been exiled by the +Athenians. Thucyd. vi. 92. [Greek: to/ te philo/poli ou)k e)n ô(=| +a)dikou=mai e)/chô, a)ll' e)n ô(=| a)sphalô=s e)politeu/thên.]] + +[Side-note: Pleading supposed to be addressed by the Laws of Athens to +Sokrates, demanding from him implicit obedience.] + +Sokrates then delivers a well-known and eloquent pleading, wherein he +imagines the Laws of Athens to remonstrate with him on his purpose of +secretly quitting the prison, in order to evade a sentence legally +pronounced. By his birth, and long residence in Athens, he has entered +into a covenant to obey exactly and faithfully what the laws +prescribe. Though the laws should deal unjustly with him, he has no +right of redress against them--neither by open disobedience, nor +force, nor evasion. Their rights over him are even more uncontrolled +and indefeasible than those of his father and mother. The laws allow +to every citizen full liberty of trying to persuade the assembled +public: but the citizen who fails in persuading, must obey the public +when they enact a law adverse to his views. Sokrates having been +distinguished beyond all others for the constancy of his residence at +Athens, has thus shown that he was well satisfied with the city, and +with those laws without which it could not exist as a city. If he now +violates his covenants and his duty, by breaking prison like a runaway +slave, he will forfeit all the reputation to which he has pretended +during his long life, as a preacher of justice and virtue.[9] + +[Footnote 9: Plato, Krito. c. 11-17, pp. 50-54.] + +[Side-note: Purpose of Plato in this pleading--to present the +dispositions of Sokrates in a light different from that which the +Apology had presented--unqualified submission instead of defiance.] + +This striking discourse, the general drift of which I have briefly +described, appears intended by Plato--as far as I can pretend to guess +at his purpose--to set forth the personal character and dispositions +of Sokrates in a light different from that which they present in the +Apology. In defending himself before the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted +himself into a position which would undoubtedly be construed by his +auditors as disobedience and defiance to the city and its +institutions. He professed to be acting under a divine mission, which +was of higher authority than the enactments of his countrymen: he +warned them against condemning him, because his condemnation would be +a mischief, not to him, but to them and because by doing so they would +repudiate and maltreat the missionary sent to them by the Delphian God +as a valuable present.[10] In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts, +Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus +confirming the charge which his accusers advanced, and which they +justified by some of his public remarks. He had manifested by +unmistakable language the same contempt for the Athenian constitution +as that which had been displayed in act by Kritias and Alkibiades,[11] +with whom his own name was associated as teacher and companion.[12] +Xenophon in his Memorabilia recognises this impression as prevalent +among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what he thinks a +suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and +such I imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the Kriton. + +[Footnote 10: Plato, Apol. c. 17-18, p. 29-30.] + +[Footnote 11: This was among the charges urged against Sokrates by +Anytus and the other accusers (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9. [Greek: u(perora=|n +e)poi/ei tô=n kathestô/tôn no/môn tou\s suno/ntas]). It was also the +judgment formed respecting Sokrates by the Roman censor, the elder +Cato; a man very much like the Athenian Anytus, constitutional and +patriotic as a citizen, devoted to the active duties of political +life, but thoroughly averse to philosophy and speculative debate, as +Anytus is depicted in the Menon of Plato.--Plutarch, Cato c. 23, a +passage already cited in a note on the chapter next but one preceding. + +The accusation of "putting himself above the laws," appears in the +same way in the Nubes of Aristophanes, 1035-1400, &c.:-- + +[Greek: ô(s ê(du\ kainoi=s pra/gmasin kai\ dexioi=s o(milei=n +kai\ tô=n kathestô/tôn no/môn u(per phronei=n du/nasthai]. + +Compare the rhetor Aristeides--[Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], p. 133; +vol. iii. p. 480, Dindorf.] + +[Footnote 12: The dramatic position of Sokrates has been compared by +Köchly, p. 382, very suitably with that of Antigoné, who, in burying +her deceased brother, acts upon her own sense of right and family +affections, in defiance of an express interdict from sovereign +authority. This tragical conflict of obligations, indicated by +Aristotle as an ethical question suited for dialectic debate (Topic. +i. p. 105, b. 22), was handled by all the three great tragedians; and +has been ennobled by Sophokles in one of his best remaining tragedies. +The Platonic Apology presents many points of analogy with the +Antigoné, while the Platonic Kriton carries us into an opposite vein +of sentiment. Sokrates after sentence, and Antigoné after sentence, +are totally different persons. The young maiden, though adhering with +unshaken conviction to the rectitude of her past disobedience, cannot +submit to the sentence of death without complaint and protestation. +Though above all fear she is clamorous in remonstrances against both +the injustice of the sentence and the untimely close of her career: so +that she is obliged to be dragged away by the officers (Soph. Antig. +870-877; compare 497-508, with Plato, Krito. p. 49 C; Apolog. p. 28 D, +29 C). All these points enhance the interest of the piece, and are +suited to a destined bride in the flower of her age. But an old +philosopher of seventy years of age has no such attachment to life +remaining. He contemplates death with the eye of calm reason: he has +not only silenced "the child within us who fears death" (to use the +remarkable phrase of Plato, Phædon, p. 77 E), but he knows well that +what remains to him of life must be short; that it will probably be of +little value, with diminished powers, mental as well as bodily; and +that if passed in exile, it will be of no value at all. To close his +life with dignity is the best thing which can happen to him. While by +escape from the prison he would have gained little or nothing; he is +enabled, by refusing the means of escape, to manifest an ostentatious +deference to the law, and to make peace with the Athenian authorities +after the opposition which had been declared in his Apology. Both in +the Kriton and in the Phædon, Sokrates exhibits the specimen of a man +adhering to previous conviction, unaffected by impending death, and by +the apprehensions which that season brings upon ordinary minds; +estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and +independent reason.] + +[Side-note: Harangue of Sokrates delivered in the name of the Laws, +would have been applauded by all the democratical patriots of Athens.] + +This dialogue puts into the mouth of Sokrates a rhetorical harangue +forcible and impressive, which he supposes himself to hear from +personified Nomos or Athens, claiming for herself and her laws plenary +and unmeasured obedience from all her citizens, as a covenant due to +her from each. He declares his own heartfelt adhesion to the claim. +Sokrates is thus made to express the feelings and repeat the language +of a devoted democratical patriot. His doctrine is one which every +Athenian audience would warmly applaud--whether heard from speakers in +the assembly, from litigants in the Dikastery, or from dramatists in +the theatre. It is a doctrine which orators of all varieties +(Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Lysis, Isokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines, +Lykurgus) would be alike emphatic in upholding: upon which probably +Sophists habitually displayed their own eloquence, and tested the +talents of their pupils. It may be considered as almost an Athenian +common-place. Hence it is all the better fitted for Plato's purpose of +restoring Sokrates to harmony with his fellow-citizens. It serves as +his protestation of allegiance to Athens, in reply to the adverse +impressions prevalent against him. The only singularity which bestows +special pertinence on that which is in substance a discourse of +venerated common-place, is--that Sokrates proclaims and applies his +doctrine of absolute submission, under the precise circumstances in +which many others, generally patriotic, might be disposed to recede +from it--where he is condemned (unjustly, in his own persuasion) to +suffer death--yet has the opportunity to escape. He is thus presented +as a citizen not merely of ordinary loyalty but of extraordinary +patriotism. Moreover his remarkable constancy of residence at Athens +is produced as evidence, showing that the city was eminently +acceptable to him, and that he had no cause of complaint against +it.[13] + +[Footnote 13: Plato, Krito. c. 14, p. 52 B. [Greek: ou) ga\r a)/n pote +tô=n a)/llôn A)thênai/ôn a(pa/ntôn diaphero/ntôs e)n au)tê=| +e)pedê/meis, ei) mê/ soi diaphero/ntôs ê)/reske;] c. 12, p. 50 D. +[Greek: phe/re ga/r, ti/ e)gkalô=n ê(li=n te kai\ tê=| po/lei +e)picheirei=s ê(ma=s a)pollu/nai?]] + +[Side-note: The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with +other citizens, overlooking the specialties of his character.] + +Throughout all this eloquent appeal addressed by Athens to her citizen +Sokrates, the points insisted on are those common to him with other +citizens: the marked specialties of his character being left +unnoticed. Such are the points suitable to the purpose (rather +Xenophontic than Platonic, herein) of the Kriton; when Sokrates is to +be brought back within the pale of democratical citizenship, and +exculpated from the charge of incivism. But when we read the language +of Sokrates both in the Apology and in the Gorgias, we find a very +different picture given of the relations between him and Athens. We +find him there presented as an isolated and eccentric individual, a +dissenter, not only departing altogether from the character and +purposes general among his fellow-citizens, but also certain to incur +dangerous antipathy, in so far as he publicly proclaimed what he was. +The Kriton takes him up as having become a victim to such antipathy: +yet as reconciling himself with the laws by voluntarily accepting the +sentence; and as persuaded to do so, moreover, by a piece of rhetoric +imbued with the most genuine spirit of constitutional democracy. It is +the compromise of his long-standing dissent with the reigning +orthodoxy, just before his death. [Greek: E)n eu)phêmi/a| chrê\ +teleuta=|n].[14] + +[Footnote 14: Plato, Phædon, p. 117 D.] + +[Side-note: Still Sokrates is represented as adopting the resolution +to obey, from his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, +but which would not weigh with others.] + +Still, however, though adopting the democratical vein of sentiment for +this purpose, Sokrates is made to adopt it on a ground peculiar to +himself. His individuality is thus upheld. He holds the sentence +pronounced against him to have been unjust, but he renounces all use +of that plea, because the sentence has been legally pronounced by the +judicial authority of the city, and because he has entered into a +covenant with the city. He entertains the firm conviction that no one +ought to act unjustly, or to do evil to others, in any case; not even +in the case in which they have done injustice or evil to him. "This +(says Sokrates) is my conviction, and the principle of my reasoning. +Few persons do accept it, or ever will: yet between those who do +accept it, and those who do not--there can be no common counsel: by +necessity of the case, each looks upon the other, and upon the +reasonings of the other, with contempt."[15] + +[Footnote 15: Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, note i.] + +[Side-note: The harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, +but represents feelings common among Athenian citizens.] + +This general doctrine, peculiar to Sokrates, is decisive _per se_, in +its application to the actual case, and might have been made to +conclude the dialogue. But Sokrates introduces it as a foundation to +the arguments urged by the personified Athenian Nomos:--which, +however, are not corollaries from it, nor at all peculiar to Sokrates, +but represent sentiments held by the Athenian democrats more cordially +than they were by Sokrates. It is thus that the dialogue Kriton +embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct +elements--constitutional allegiance, and Sokratic individuality. + +[Side-note: Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason +and conscience, for the individual himself.] + +Apart from the express purpose of this dialogue, however, the general +doctrine here proclaimed by Sokrates deserves attention, in regard to +the other Platonic dialogues which we shall soon review. The doctrine +involves an emphatic declaration of the paramount authority of +individual reason and conscience; for the individual himself--but for +him alone. "This (says Sokrates) is, and has long been _my_ +conviction. It is the basis of the whole reasoning. Look well whether +you agree to it: for few persons do agree to it, or ever will: and +between those who do and those who do not, there can be no common +deliberation: they must of necessity despise each other."[16] Here we +have the Protagorean dogma, _Homo Mensura_--which Sokrates will be +found combating in the Theætêtus--proclaimed by Sokrates himself. As +things appear to me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they +are to you. My reason and conscience is the measure for me: yours for +you. It is for you to see whether yours agrees with mine. + +[Footnote 16: Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, note i.] + +I shall revert to this doctrine in handling other Platonic dialogues, +particularly the Theætêtus. + +[Side-note: The Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference +between Rhetoric and Dialectic.] + +I have already observed that the tone of the Kriton is rhetorical, not +dialectical--especially the harangue ascribed to Athens. The business +of the rhetorician is to plant and establish some given point of +persuasion, whether as to a general resolution or a particular fact, +in the bosoms of certain auditors before him: hence he gives +prominence and emphasis to some views of the question, suppressing or +discrediting others, and especially keeping out of sight all the +difficulties surrounding the conclusion at which he is aiming. On the +other hand, the business of the dialectician is, not to establish any +foreknown conclusion, but to find out which among all supposable +conclusions are untenable, and which is the most tenable or best. +Hence all the difficulties attending every one of them must be brought +fully into view and discussed: until this has been done, the process +is not terminated, nor can we tell whether any assured conclusion is +attainable or not. + +Now Plato, in some of his dialogues, especially the Gorgias, greatly +depreciates rhetoric and its purpose of persuasion: elsewhere he +employs it himself with ability and effect. The discourse which we +read in the Kriton is one of his best specimens: appealing to +pre-established and widespread emotions, veneration for parents, love of +country, respect for covenants--to justify the resolution of Sokrates +in the actual case: working up these sentiments into fervour, but +neglecting all difficulties, limits, and counter-considerations: +assuming that the familiar phrases of ethics and politics are +perfectly understood and indisputable. + +[Side-note: The Kriton makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but +overlooks the ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be +solved.] + +But these last-mentioned elements--difficulties, qualifications, +necessity for definitions even of the most hackneyed words--would have +been brought into the foreground had Sokrates pursued the dialectical +path, which (as we know both from Xenophon and Plato) was his real +habit and genius. He was perpetually engaged (says Xenophon[17]) in +dialectic enquiry. "Wheat is the Holy, what is the Unholy? What is the +Honourable and the Base? What is the Just and the Unjust? &c." Now in +the rhetorical appeal embodied in the Kriton, the important question, +What is the Just and the Unjust (_i.e._ Justice and Injustice in +general), is assumed to be already determined and out of the reach of +dispute. We are called upon to determine what is just and unjust in a +particular case, as if we already knew what justice and injustice +meant generally: to inquire about modifications of justice, before we +have ascertained its essence. This is the fundamental assumption +involved in the rhetorical process; which assumption we shall find +Plato often deprecating as unphilosophical and preposterous. + +[Footnote 17: Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 16. [Greek: Au)to\s de\ peri\ tô=n +a)nthrôpei/ôn a)ei\ diele/geto, skopô=n, ti/ eu)sebe/s, ti/ a)sebe/s; +ti/ kalo/n, ti/ ai)schro/n; ti/ di/kaion, ti/ a)/dikon; ti/ +sôphrosu/nê, ti/ mani/a; ti/ a)ndrei/a, ti/ deili/a; ti/ po/lis, ti/ +politiko/s; ti/ a)rchê\ a)nthrô/pôn, ti/ a)rchiko\s a)nthrô/pôn], &c. + +We see in Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 40-46, iv. 2, 37, in the Platonic +dialogue Minos and elsewhere, the number of dialectic questions which +Sokrates might have brought to bear upon the harangue in the Kriton, +had it been delivered by any opponent whom he sought to perplex or +confute. What is a law? what are the limits of obedience to the laws? +Are there no limits (as Hobbes is so much denounced for maintaining)? +While the oligarchy of Thirty were the constituted authority at +Athens, they ordered Sokrates himself, together with four other +citizens, to go and arrest a citizen whom they considered dangerous to +the state, the Salaminian Leon. The other four obeyed the order; +Sokrates alone disobeyed, and takes credit for having done so, +considering Leon to be innocent. Which was in the right here? the four +obedient citizens, or the one disobedient? Might not the four have +used substantially the same arguments to justify their obedience, as +those which Sokrates hears from personified Athens in the Kriton? We +must remember that the Thirty had come into authority by resolutions +passed under constitutional forms, when fear of foreign enemies +induced the people to sanction the resolutions proposed by a party +among themselves. The Thirty also ordered Sokrates to abstain from +discourse with young men; he disobeyed (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 3). Was +he right in disobeying? + +I have indicated briefly these questions, to show how completely the +rhetorical manner of the Kriton submerges all those difficulties, +which would form the special matter of genuine Sokratic dialectics. + +Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Kriton, pp. 233, 234) considers the +Kriton as a composition of special occasion--Gelegenheitsschrift--which +I think is true; but which may be said also, in my judgment, of +every Platonic dialogue. The term, however, in Schleiermacher's +writing, has a peculiar meaning, viz. a composition for which there is +no place in the regular rank and file of the Platonic dialogues, as he +marshals them. He remarks the absence of dialectic in the Kriton, and +he adduces this as one reason for supposing it not to be genuine. + +But it is no surprise to me to find Plato rhetorical in one dialogue, +dialectical in others. Variety, and want of system, seem to me among +his most manifest attributes. + +The view taken of the Kriton by Steinhart (Einleit. pp. 291-302), in +the first page of his very rhetorical Introduction, coincides pretty +much with mine.] + +So far indeed Sokrates goes in this dialogue, to affirm a positive +analogy. That Just and Honourable are, to the mind, what health and +strength are to the body:--Unjust and Base, what distemper and +weakness are to the body. And he follows this up by saying, that the +general public are incompetent to determine what is just or +honourable--as they are incompetent to decide what is wholesome or +unwholesome. Respecting both one and the other, you must consult some +one among the professional Experts, who alone are competent to +advise.[18] + +[Footnote 18: Plato, Kriton, c. 7, p. 47 D. [Greek: tou= e(no\s, ei)/ +ti/s e)stin e)pai+/ôn], &c.] + +[Side-note: Incompetence of the general public or +[Greek: i)diô=tai]--appeal to the professional Expert.] + +Both these two doctrines will be found recurring often, in our survey +of the dialogues. The first of the two is an obscure and imperfect +reply to the great Sokratic problem--What is Justice? What is +Injustice? but it is an analogy useful to keep in mind, as a help to +the exposition of many passages in which Plato is yet more obscure. +The second of the two will also recur frequently. It sets out an +antithesis of great moment in the Platonic dialogues--"The one +specially instructed, professional, theorizing, Expert--_versus_ (the +[Greek: i)diô=tai] of the time and place, or) common sense, common +sentiment, intuition, instinct, prejudice," &c. (all these names +meaning the same objective reality, but diversified according as the +speaker may happen to regard the particular case to which he is +alluding). This antithesis appears as an answer when we put the +question--What is the ultimate authority? where does the right of +final decision reside, on problems and disputes ethical, political, +æsthetical? It resides (Sokrates here answers) with some one among a +few professional Experts. They are the only persons competent. + +[Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been +declared--he does not name who the trustworthy Expert is.] + +I shall go more fully into this question elsewhere. Here I shall +merely notice the application which Sokrates makes (in the Kriton) of +the general doctrine. We might anticipate that after having declared +that none was fit to pronounce upon the Just and the Unjust, except a +professional Expert,--he would have proceeded to name some person +corresponding to that designation--to justify the title of that person +to confidence by such evidences as Plato requires in other dialogues--and +then to cite the decision of the judge named, on the case in hand. +This is what Sokrates would have done, if the case had been one of +health or sickness. He would have said "I appeal to Hippokrates, +Akumenus, &c., as professional Experts on medicine: they have given +proof of competence by special study, successful practice, writing, +teaching, &c.: they pronounce so and so". He would not have considered +himself competent to form a judgment or announce a decision of his +own. + +[Side-note: Sokrates acts as the Expert himself: he finds authority in +his own reason and conscience.] + +But here, when the case in hand is that of Just and Unjust, the +conduct of Sokrates is altogether different. He specifies no +professional Expert, and he proceeds to lay down a dogma of his own; +in which he tells us that few or none will agree, though it is +fundamental, so that dissenters on the point must despise each other +as heretics. We thus see that it is he alone who steps in to act +himself the part of professional Expert, though he does not openly +assume the title. The ultimate authority is proclaimed in words to +reside with some unnamed Expert: in fact and reality, he finds it in +his own reason and conscience. You are not competent to judge for +yourself: you must consult the professional Expert: but your own +reason and conscience must signify to you who the Expert is. + +The analogy here produced by Plato of questions about health and +sickness--is followed out only in its negative operation; as it serves +to scare away the multitude, and discredit the Vox Populi. But when +this has been done, no oracular man can be produced or authenticated. +In other dialogues, we shall find Sokrates regretting the absence of +such an oracular man, but professing inability to proceed without him. +In the Kriton, he undertakes the duty himself; unmindful of the many +emphatic speeches in which he had proclaimed his own ignorance, and +taken credit for confessing it without reserve. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +EUTHYPHRON. + + +The dialogue called Euthyphron, over and above its contribution to the +ethical enquiries of Plato, has a certain bearing on the character and +exculpation of Sokrates. It will therefore come conveniently in +immediate sequel to the Apology and the Kriton. + +[Side-note: Situation supposed in the dialogue--interlocutors.] + +The indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates is assumed to have been +formally entered in the office of the King Archon. Sokrates has come +to plead to it. In the portico before that office, he meets +Euthyphron: a man of ultra-pious pretensions, possessing special +religious knowledge (either from revelation directly to himself, or +from having been initiated in the various mysteries consecrated +throughout Greece), delivering authoritative opinions on doubtful +theological points, and prophesying future events.[1] + +[Footnote 1: Plato, Euthyphr. c. 2, p. 3 D; compare Herodot. ii. 51.] + +What brings you here, Sokrates (asks Euthyphron), away from your usual +haunts? Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment +against you? + +[Side-note: Indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates--Antipathy of the +Athenians towards those who spread heretical opinions.] + +Yes (replies Sokrates), a young man named Melêtus. He takes +commendable interest in the training of youth, and has indicted me as +a corruptor of youth. He says that I corrupt them by teaching belief +in new gods, and unbelief in the true and ancient Gods. + +_Euthyph._--I understand: it is because you talk about the Dæmon or +Genius often communicating with you, that Melêtus calls you an +innovator in religion. He knows that such calumnies find ready +admission with most minds.[2] So also, people laugh at me, when I talk +about religion, and when I predict future events in the assembly. It +must be from jealousy; because all that I have predicted has come +true. + +[Footnote 2: Plato, Euthyph. c. 2, p. 3 B: [Greek: phêsi\ ga/r me +poiêtê\n ei)=nai theô=n kai\ ô(s kainou\s poiou=nta theou/s, tou\s d' +a)rchai/ous ou) nomi/zonta, e)gra/psato tou/tôn au)tô=n e(/neka, ô(/s +phêsin]. c. 5, p. 5 A: [Greek: au)toschedia/zonta kai\ kainotomou=nta +peri\ tô=n thei/ôn e)xamarta/nein].] + +_Sokr._--To be laughed at is no great matter. The Athenians do not +care much when they regard a man as overwise, but as not given to +teach his wisdom to others: but when they regard him besides, as +likely to make others such as he is himself, they become seriously +angry with him--be it from jealousy, as you say, or from any other +cause. You keep yourself apart, and teach no one; for my part, I +delight in nothing so much as in teaching all that I know. If they +take the matter thus seriously, the result may be very doubtful.[3] + +[Footnote 3: Plato, Euthyphr. c. 3, p. 3 C.-D. [Greek: A)thênai/ois +ga\r ou) spho/dra me/lei, a)/n tina deino\n oi)/ôntai ei)=nai, mê\ +me/ntoi didaskaliko\n tê=s au)tou= sophi/as; o(\n d' a)\n kai\ +a)/llous oi)/ôntai poiei=n toiou/tous, thumou=ntai, ei)=t' ou)=n +phtho/nô|, ô(s su\ le/geis, ei)/te di' a)/llo ti.]] + +[Side-note: Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment +for murder against his own father--Displeasure of his friends at the +proceeding.] + +Sokrates now learns what is Euthyphron's business at the archontic +office. Euthyphron is prosecuting an indictment before the King +Archon, against his own father; as having caused the death of a +dependent workman, who in a fit of intoxication had quarrelled with +and killed a fellow-servant. The father of Euthyphron, upon this +occurrence, bound the homicide hand and foot, and threw him into a +ditch: at the same time sending to the Exêgêtês (the canonical +adviser, supposed to be conversant with the divine sanctions, whom it +was customary to consult when doubts arose about sacred things) to ask +what was to be done with him. The incident occurred at Naxos, and the +messenger was sent to the Exêgêtês at Athens: before he could return, +the prisoner had perished, from hunger, cold, and bonds. Euthyphron +has indicted his father for homicide, as having caused the death of +the prisoner: who (it would appear) had remained in the ditch, tied +hand and foot, without food, and with no more than his ordinary +clothing, during the time occupied in the voyage from Naxos to Athens, +in obtaining the answer of the Exêgêtês, and in returning to Naxos. + +My friends and relatives (says Euthyphron) cry out against me for this +proceeding, as if I were mad. They say that my father did not kill the +man:[4] that even if he had, the man had committed murder: lastly, +that however the case may have been, to indict my own father is +monstrous and inexcusable. Such reasoning is silly. The only point to +be considered is, whether my father killed the deceased justly or +unjustly. If justly there is nothing to be said; if unjustly, then my +father becomes a man tainted with impiety and accursed. I and every +one else, who, knowing the facts, live under the same roof and at the +same table with him, come under the like curse; unless I purify myself +by bringing him to justice. The course which I am now taking is +prescribed by piety or holiness. My friends indeed tell me that it is +unholy for a son to indict his father. But I know better than they, +what holiness is and I should be ashamed of myself if I did not.[5] + +[Footnote 4: According to the Attic law every citizen was bound, in +case any one of his relatives ([Greek: me/chris a)nepsiadô=n]) or any +member of his household ([Greek: oi)ke/tês]) had been put to death, to +come forward as prosecutor and indict the murderer. This was binding +upon the citizen alike in law and in religion. + +Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. p. 1161. Jul. Pollux, viii. 118. + +Euthyphron would thus have been considered as acting with propriety, +if the person indicted had been a stranger.] + +[Footnote 5: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 4. Respecting the [Greek: +mi/asma], which a person who had committed criminal homicide was +supposed to carry about with him wherever he went, communicating it +both to places and to companions, see Antiphon. Tetralog. i. 2, 5, 10; +iii. s. 7, p. 116; and De Herodis Cæde s. 81, p. 139. The argument +here employed by Euthyphron is used also by the Platonic Sokrates in +the Gorgias, 480 C-D. If a man has committed injustice, punishment is +the only way of curing him. That he should escape unpunished is the +worst thing that can happen to him. If you yourself, or your father, +or your friend, have committed injustice, do not seek to avert the +punishment either from yourself or them, but rather invoke it. This is +exactly what Euthyphron is doing, and what the Platonic Sokrates (in +dialogue Euthyphron) calls in question.] + +[Side-note: Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his +is both required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks +him--What is Holiness?] + +I confess myself (says Sokrates) ignorant respecting the question,[6] +and I shall be grateful if you will teach me: the rather as I shall be +able to defend myself better against Melêtus. Tell me what is the +general constituent feature of _Holiness_? What is that common +essence, or same character, which belongs to and distinguishes all +holy or pious acts?[7] + +[Footnote 6: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. [Greek: ti/ ga\r kai\ +phê/somen, oi(/ ge kai\ au)toi\ o(mologou=men peri\ au)tô=n mêde\n +ei)de/nai?]] + +[Footnote 7: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 D. Among the various +reasons (none of them valid in my judgment) given by Ueberweg +(Untersuch. p. 251) for suspecting the authenticity of the Euthyphron, +one is that [Greek: to\ a)no/sion] is reckoned as an [Greek: ei)=dos] +as well as [Greek: to\ o(/sion]. Ueberweg seems to think this absurd, +since he annexes to the word a note of admiration. But Plato expressly +gives [Greek: to\ a)/dikon] as an [Greek: ei)=dos], along with [Greek: +to\ di/kaion] (Repub. v. 476 A); and one of the objections taken +against his theory by Aristotle was, that it would assume substantive +Ideas corresponding to negative terms--[Greek: tô=n a)popha/seôn +i)de/as]. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13, with the Scholion of +Alexander, p. 565, a. 81, r.] + +[Side-note: Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son +Kronus and of Kronus by his son Zeus.] + +It is holy (replies Euthyphron) to do what I am now doing: to bring to +justice the man who commits impiety, either by homicide or sacrilege +or any other such crime, whoever he be--even though it be your own +father. The examples of the Gods teach us this. Kronus punished his +father Uranus for wrong-doing: Zeus, whom every one holds to be the +best and justest of the Gods, did the like by _his_ father Kronus. I +only follow their example. Those who blame my conduct contradict +themselves when they talk about the Gods and about me.[8] + +[Footnote 8: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5-6. + +We see here that Euthyphron is made to follow out the precept +delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in the Theætêtus and elsewhere--to +make himself as like to the Gods as possible--([Greek: o(moi/ôsis +theô=| kata\ to\ dunato/n]. Theætêt. p. 176 B; compare Phædrus, 252 +C)--only that he conceives the attributes and proceedings of the Gods +differently from Sokrates.] + +[Side-note: Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these +stories of discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief +in them, as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much +circulation.] + +Do you really confidently believe these stories (asks Sokrates), as +well as many others about the discord and conflicts among the Gods, +which are circulated among the public by poets and painters? For my +part, I have some repugnance in believing them;[9] it is for reason +probably, I am now to be indicted, and proclaimed as doing wrong. If +you tell me that you are persuaded of their truth, I must bow to your +superior knowledge. I cannot help doing so, since for my part I +pretend to no knowledge whatever about them. + +[Footnote 9: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 A. [Greek: A)ra/ ge tou=t' +e)/stin, ou)= e(/neka tê\n graphê\n pheu/gô, o(/ti ta\ toiau=ta +e)peida/n tis peri\ tô=n theô=n le/gê|, duscherô=s pôs a)pode/chomai? +di' a(\ dê\, ô(s e)/oike, phê/sei ti/s me e)xamarta/nein.]] + +I am persuaded that these narratives are true (says Euthyphron): and +not only they, but many other narratives yet more surprising, of which +most persons are ignorant. I can tell you some of them, if you like to +hear. You shall tell me another time (replies Sokrates): now let me +repeat my question to you respecting holiness.[10] + +[Footnote 10: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 C.] + +[Side-note: Bearing of this dialogue on the relative position of +Sokrates and the Athenian public.] + +Before we pursue this enquiry respecting holiness, which is the +portion of the dialogue bearing on the Platonic ethics, I will say one +word on the portion which has preceded, and which appears to bear on +the position and character of Sokrates. He (Sokrates) has incurred +odium from the Dikastery and the public, because he is heretical and +incredulous. "He does not believe in those Gods in whom the city +believes, but introduces religious novelties"--to use the words of the +indictment preferred against him by Melêtus. The Athenian public felt +the same displeasure and offence in hearing their divine legends, such +as those of Zeus and Kronus,[11] called in question or criticised in +an ethical spirit different from their own--as is felt by Jews or +Christians when various narratives of the Old Testament are criticised +in an adverse spirit, and when the proceedings ascribed to Jehovah are +represented as unworthy of a just and beneficent god. We read in +Herodotus what was the sentiment of pious contemporaries respecting +narratives of divine matters. Herodotus keeps back many of them by +design, and announces that he will never recite them except in case of +necessity: while in one instance, where he has been betrayed into +criticism upon a few of them, as inconsiderate and incredible, he is +seized with misgivings, and prays that Gods and heroes will not be +offended with him.[12] The freethinkers, among whom Sokrates was +numbered, were the persons from whom adverse criticism came. It is +these men who are depicted by orthodox opponents as committing lawless +acts, and justifying themselves by precedents drawn from the +proceedings or Zeus.[13] They are, besides, especially accused of +teaching children to despise or even to ill-use their parents.[14] + +[Footnote 11: I shall say more about Plato's views on the theological +legends generally believed by his countrymen, when I come to the +language which he puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the second and +third books of the Republic. Eusebius considers it matter of praise +when he says "that Plato rejected all the opinions of his country-men +concerning the Gods and exposed their absurdity"--[Greek: o(/pôs te +pa/sas ta\s patri/ous peri\ tô=n theô=n u(polê/pseis ê)the/tei, kai\ +tê\n a)topi/an au)tô=n diê/legchen] (Præp. Evan. xiii. 1)--the very +same thing which is averred in the indictment laid by Melêtus against +Sokrates.] + +[Footnote 12: Herodot. ii. 65: [Greek: tô=n de\ ei(/neken a)nei=tai +ta\ i(ra\, ei) le/goimi, katabai/ên a)\n tô=| lo/gô| e)s ta\ thei=a +prê/gmata, ta\ e)gô\ pheu/gô ma/lista a)pêgee/sthai. ta\ de\ kai\ +ei)/rêka au)tô=n e)pipsau/sas, a)nagkai/ê katalambano/menos ei)=pon +. . . .] 45. [Greek: Le/gousi de\ polla\ kai\ a)/lla a)nepiske/ptôs +oi( E(/llênes; eu)ê/thês de\ au)tô=n kai\ o(/de o( mu=thos e)sti, to\n +peri\ tou= Ê(rakle/os le/gousi . . . . e)/ti de\ e(/na e)o/nta to\n +Ê(rakle/a, kai\ e)/ti a)/nthrôpon, ô(s dê/ phasi, kô=s phu/sin e)/chei +polla\s muria/das phoneu=sai? kai\ peri\ me\n tou/tôn tosau=ta ê(mi=n +ei)pou=si, kai\ para\ tô=n theô=n kai\ para\ tô=n ê(rô/ôn eu)me/neia +ei)/ê.] + +About the [Greek: i(roi\ lo/goi] which he keeps back, see cap. 51, 61, +62, 81, 170, &c.] + +[Footnote 13: Aristoph. Nubes, 905-1080.] + +[Footnote 14: Aristoph. Nubes, 994-1333-1444. Xenophon, Mem. i. 2, 49. +[Greek: Sôkra/tês--tou\s pate/ras propêlaki/zein e)di/daske] +(accusation by Melêtus).] + +[Side-note: Dramatic moral set forth by Aristophanes against Sokrates +and the freethinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox +champion.] + +Now in the dialogue here before us, Plato retorts this attack. +Euthyphron possesses in the fullest measure the virtues of a believer. +He believes not only all that orthodox Athenians usually believed +respecting the Gods, but more besides.[15] His faith is so implicit, +that he proclaims it as accurate knowledge, and carries it into +practice with full confidence; reproaching other orthodox persons with +inconsistency and short-coming, and disregarding the judgment of the +multitude, as Sokrates does in the Kriton.[16] Euthyphron stands +forward as the champion of the Gods, determined not to leave +unpunished the man who has committed impiety, let him be who he +may.[17] These lofty religious pretensions impel him, with full +persuasion of right, to indict his own father for homicide, under the +circumstances above described. Now in the eyes of the Athenian public, +there could hardly be any act more abhorrent, than that of a man thus +invoking upon his father the severest penalties of law. It would +probably be not less abhorrent than that of a son beating his own +father. When therefore we read, in the Nubes of Aristophanes, the +dramatic moral set forth against Sokrates, "See the consequences to +which free-thinking and the new system of education lead[18]--the son +Pheidippides beating his own father, and justifying the action as +right, by citing the violence of Zeus towards his father Kronus"--we +may take the Platonic Euthyphron as an antithesis to this moral, +propounded by a defender of Sokrates, "See the consequences to which +consistent orthodoxy and implicit faith conduct. The son Euthyphron +indicts his own father for homicide; he vindicates the step as +conformable to the proceedings of the gods; he even prides himself on +it as championship on their behalf, such as all religious men ought to +approve."[19] + +[Footnote 15: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. [Greek: kai\ e)/ti ge +tou/tôn thaumasiô/tera, a(\ oi( polloi\ ou)k i)/sasin]. + +Euthyphron belonged to the class described in Euripides, Hippol. 45:-- + +[Greek: O(/soi men ou)=n grapha/s te tô=n palaite/rôn +E)/choisin, au)toi/ t' ei)si\n e)n mou/sais a)ei/, +I)/sasin], &c. + +Compare also Euripid. Herakleidæ, 404.] + +[Footnote 16: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 5 A; c. 6, p. 6 A.] + +[Footnote 17: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 E. [Greek: mê\ +e)pitre/pein tô=| a)sebou=nti mêd' a)\n o(stisou=n tugcha/nê| ô)=n.]] + +[Footnote 18: Aristoph. Nubes, 937. [Greek: tê\n kainê\n pai/deusin], +&c.] + +[Footnote 19: Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. pp. +51-54) has many remarks on the Euthyphron in which I do not concur; +but his conception of its "unverkennbare apologetische Absicht" is +very much the same as mine. He describes Euthyphron as a man "der sich +besonders auf das Göttliche zu verstehen vorgab, und die +rechtglaubigen aus den alten theologischen Dichtern gezogenen Begriffe +tapfer vertheidigte. Diesen nun gerade bei der Anklage des Sokrates +mit ihm in Berührung, und durch den unsittlichen Streich, den sein +Eifer für die Frömmigkeit veranlasste, in Gegensatz zu bringen--war +ein des Platon nicht unwürdiger Gedanke" (p. 54). But when +Schleiermacher affirms that the dialogue was indisputably composed +(unstreitig) between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates,--and +when he explains what he considers the defects of the dialogue, by the +necessity of finishing it in a hurry (p. 53), I dissent from him +altogether, though Steinhart adopts the same opinion. Nor can I +perceive in what way the Euthyphron is (as he affirms) either "a +natural out-growth of the Protagoras," or "an approximation and +preparation for the Parmenidês" (p. 52). Still less do I feel the +force of his reasons for hesitating in admitting it to be a genuine +work of Plato. + +I have given my reasons, in a preceding chapter, for believing that +Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates. +But that he should publish such a dialogue while the trial of Sokrates +was impending, is a supposition altogether inadmissible, in my +judgment. The effect of it would be to make the position of Sokrates +much worse on his trial. Herein I agree with Ueberweg (Untersuch. p. +250), though I do not share his doubts of the authenticity of the +dialogue. + +The confident assertion of Stallbaum surprises me. "Constat enim +Platonem eo tempore, quo Socrati tantum erat odium conflatum, ut ei +judicii immineret periculum, complures dialogos composuisse; in quibus +id egit, ut viri sanctissimi adversarios in eo ipso genere, in quo +sibi plurimum sapere videbantur, inscitiæ et ignorantiæ coargueret. +Nam Euthyphronem novimus, ad vates ignorantiæ rerum gravissimarum +convincendos, esse compositum; ut in quo eos ne pietatis quidem +notionem tenere ostenditur. In Menone autem id agitur, ut sophistas et +viros civiles non scientiâ atque arte, sed coeco quodam impetu mentis +et sorte divinâ duci demonstretur: quod quidem ita fit, ut colloquium +ex parte cum Anyto, Socratis accusatore, habeatur. . . . . . Nam +Menonem quidem et Euthyphronem Plato eo confecit tempore, quo Socratis +causa haud ita pridem in judicio versabatur, nec tamen jam tanta ei +videbatur imminere calamitas, quanta postea consecuta est. Ex quo sané +verisimiliter colligere licet Ionem, cujus simile argumentum et +consilium est, circa idem tempus literis consignatum esse." Stallbaum, +Prolegom. ad Platonis Ionem, pp. 288-289, vol. iv. [Comp. Stallb. +ibid., 2nd ed. pp. 339-341]. + +"Imo uno exemplo Euthyphronis, boni quidem hominis ideoque ne Socrati +quidem inimici, sed ejusdem _superstitiosi, vel ut hodie loquuntur, +orthodoxi_, qualis Athenis vulgò esset religionis conditio, declarare +instituit. Ex quo nobis quidem clarissimé videtur apparere Platonem +hoc unum spectavisse, ut judices admonerentur, ne populari +superstitioni in sententiis ferendis plus justo tribuerent." +Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyphron. T. vi. p. 146. + +Steinhart also (in his Einleitung, p. 190) calls Euthyphron "ein +rechtgläubiger von reinsten Wasser--ein ueberfrommer, fanatischer, +Mann," &c. + +In the two preceding pages Stallbaum defends himself against +objections made to his view, on the ground that Plato, by composing +such dialogues at this critical moment, would increase the +unpopularity and danger of Sokrates, instead of diminishing it. +Stallbaum contends (p. 145) that neither Sokrates nor Plato nor any of +the other Sokratic men, believed that the trial would end in a verdict +of guilty: which is probably true about Plato, and would have been +borne out by the event if Sokrates had made a different defence. But +this does not assist the conclusion which Stallbaum wishes to bring +out; for it is not the less true that the dialogues of Plato, if +published at that moment, would increase the exasperation against +Sokrates, and the chance, whatever it was, that he would be found +guilty. Stallbaum refers by mistake to a passage in the Platonic +Apology (p. 36 A), as if Sokrates there expressed his surprise at the +verdict of guilty, anticipating a verdict of acquittal. The passage +declares the contrary: Sokrates expresses his surprise that the +verdict of guilty had passed by so small a majority as five; he had +expected that it would pass by a larger majority.] + +[Side-note: Sequel of the dialogue--Euthyphron gives a particular +example as the reply to a general question.] + +I proceed now with that which may be called the Platonic purpose in +the dialogue--the enquiry into the general idea of Holiness. When the +question was first put to Euthyphron, What is the Holy?--he replied, +"That which I am now doing." _Sokr._ That may be: but many other +things besides are also holy.--_Euthyph._ Certainly.--_Sokr._ Then +your answer does not meet the question. You have indicated one particular +holy act, among many. But the question asked was--What is Holiness +generally? What is that specific property, by the common possession of +which all holy things are entitled to be called holy? I want to know +this general Idea, in order that I may keep it in view as a type +wherewith to compare each particular case, thus determining whether +the case deserves to be called holy or not.[20] + +[Footnote 20: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 7, p. 6 E.] + +Here we have a genuine specimen of the dialectic interrogatory in +which Xenophon affirms[21] Sokrates to have passed his life, and which +Plato prosecutes under his master's name. The question is generalised +much more than in the Kriton. + +[Footnote 21: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 16.] + +[Side-note: Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion.] + +It is assumed that there is one specific Idea or essence--one +objective characteristic or fact--common to all things called Holy. +The purpose of the questioner is: to determine what this Idea is: to +provide a good definition of the word. The first mistake made by the +respondent is, that he names simply one particular case, coming under +the general Idea. This is a mistake often recurring, and often +corrected in the Platonic dialogues. Even now, such a mistake is not +unfrequent: and in the time of Plato, when general ideas, and the +definition of general terms, had been made so little the subject of +direct attention, it was doubtless perpetually made. When the question +was first put, its bearing would not be properly conceived. And even +if the bearing were properly conceived, men would find it easier then, +and do find it easier now, to make answer by giving one particular +example than to go over many examples, and elicit what is common to +all. + +[Side-note: First general answer given by Euthyphron--that which is +pleasing to the Gods is holy. Comments of Sokrates thereon.] + +Euthyphron next replies--That which is pleasing to the Gods is holy: +that which is not pleasing, or which is displeasing to the Gods, is +unholy.--_Sokr._ That is the sort of answer which I desired to have: +now let us examine it. We learn from the received theology, which you +implicitly believe, that there has been much discord and quarrel among +the Gods. If the Gods quarrel, they quarrel about the same matters as +men. Now men do not quarrel about questions of quantity--for such +questions can be determined by calculation and measurement: nor about +questions of weight--for there the balance may be appealed to. The +questions about which you and I and other men quarrel are, What is +just or unjust, honourable or base, good or evil? Upon these there is +no accessible standard. Some men feel in one way, some in another; and +each of us fights for his own opinions.[22] We all indeed agree that +the wrong-doer ought to be punished: but we do not agree who the +wrong-doer is, nor what is wrong-doing. The same action which some of +us pronounce to be just, others stigmatise as unjust.[23] + +[Footnote 22: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 8, p. 7 C-D. [Greek: Peri\ ti/nos +de\ dê\ dienechthe/ntes kai\ e)pi\ ti/na kri/sin ou) duna/menoi +a)phike/sthai e)chthroi/ ge a)\n a)llê/lois ei)=men kai\ +o)rgizoi/metha? i)/sôs ou) pro/cheiro/n soi/ e)stin, a)ll' e)mou= +le/gontos sko/pei, ei) ta/d' e)sti\ to/ te di/kaion kai\ to\ a)/dikon, +kai\ kalo\n kai\ ai)schro/n, kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ kako/n. A)=r' ou) +tau=ta e)sti peri\ ô(=n dienechthe/ntes kai\ ou) duna/menoi e)pi\ +i)kanê\n kri/sin au)tô=n e)lthei=n e)chthroi\ a)llê/lois gigno/metha, +o(/tan gignô/metha, kai\ e)gô\ kai\ su\ kai\ oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi +pa/ntes?]] + +[Footnote 23: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 9, p. 8 D. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra +e)kei=no/ ge a)mphisbêtou=sin, ô(s ou) to\n a)dikou=nta dei= dido/nai +di/kên; a)ll' e)kei=no i)/sôs a)mphisbêtou=si, to\ _ti/s e)stin o( +a)dikôn_ kai\ _ti/ drô=n_, kai\ _po/te_? Pra/xeô/s tinos peri\ +diaphero/menoi, oi( me\n dikai/ôs phasi\n au)tê\n pepra=chthai, oi( +de\ a)di/kôs.]] + +So likewise the quarrels of the Gods must turn upon these same +matters--just and unjust, right and wrong, good and evil. What one God +thinks right, another God thinks wrong. What is pleasing to one God, +is displeasing to another. The same action will be both pleasing and +displeasing to the Gods. + +According to your definition of holy and unholy, therefore, the same +action may be both holy and unholy. Your definition will not hold, for +it does not enable me to distinguish the one from the other.[24] + +[Footnote 24: In regard to Plato's ethical enquiries generally, and to +what we shall find in future dialogues, we must take note of what is +here laid down, that mankind are in perpetual dispute, and have not +yet any determinate standard for just and unjust, right and wrong, +honourable and base, good and evil. Plato had told us, somewhat +differently, in the Kriton, that on these matters, though the judgment +of the many was not to be trusted, yet there was another trustworthy +judgment, that of the one wise man. This point will recur for future +comment.] + +_Euthyph._--I am convinced that there are some things which _all_ the +Gods love, and some things which _all_ the Gods hate. That which I am +doing, for example--indicting my father for homicide--belongs to the +former category. Now that which all the Gods love is the holy: that +which they all hate, is the unholy.[25] + +[Footnote 25: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 11, p. 9.] + +[Side-note: To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the +Holy--they love it because it is holy. In what then does its essence +consist? Perplexity of Euthyphron.] + +_Sokr._--Do the Gods love the holy, because it _is_ holy? Or is it +holy for this reason, because they do love it? _Euthyph._--They love +it because it is holy.[26] _Sokr._--Then the holiness is one thing; +the fact of being loved by the Gods is another. The latter fact is not +of the essence of holiness: it is true, but only as an accident and an +accessory. You have yet to tell me what that essential character is, +by virtue of which the holy comes to be loved by all the Gods, or to +be the subject of various other attributes.[27] + +[Footnote 26: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 10 A-D. The manner in which +Sokrates conducts this argument is over-subtle. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra +dio/ti o(rô/menon ge/ e)sti dia\ tou=to o(ra=tai, a)lla\ tou)nanti/on +dio/ti o(ra=tai, dia\ tou=to o(rô/menon; ou)de\ dio/ti a)go/meno/n +e)sti, dia\ tou=to a)/getai, a)lla\ dio/ti a)/getai, dia\ tou=to +a)go/menon; ou)de\ dio/ti phero/menon, phe/retai, a)lla\ dio/ti +phe/retai, phero/menon.] + +The difference between the meaning of [Greek: phe/retai] and [Greek: +phero/meno/n e)sti] is not easy to see. The former may mean to affirm +the beginning of an action, the latter the continuance: but in this +case the inference would not necessarily follow. + +Compare Aristotel. Physica, p. 185, b. 25, with the Scholion of +Simplikius, p. 330, a. 2nd ed. Bekk. where [Greek: badi/zôn e)/sti] is +recognised as equivalent to [Greek: badi/zei].] + +[Footnote 27: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 A. [Greek: kinduneu/eis, +e)rôtô/menos to\ o(/sion, o(/, ti/ pot' e)/stin, tê\n _me\n ou)si/an_ +moi au)tou= ou) bou/lesthai dêlô=sai, _pa/thos de/ ti peri\ au)tou= +le/gein, o(/, ti pe/ponthe_ tou=to to\ o(/sion, philei=sthai u(po\ +pa/ntôn tô=n theô=n; _o(/, ti de\ o)\n, ou)/pô ei)=pes_. . . . pa/lin +ei)pe\ e)x a)rchê=s, ti/ pote o)\n to\ o(/sion ei)/te philei=tai u(po\ +theô=n, ei)/te o(/ti dê\ pa/schei.]] + +_Euthyph._--I hardly know how to tell you what I think. None of my +explanations will stand. Your ingenuity turns and twists them in every +way. _Sokr._--If I am ingenious, it is against my own will;[28] for I +am most anxious that some one of the answers should stand unshaken. +But I will now put you in the way of making a different answer. You +will admit that all which is holy is necessarily just. But is all that +is just necessarily holy? + +[Footnote: 28: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 D. [Greek: a)/kôn +ei)mi\ sopho/s], &c.] + +[Side-note: Sokrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or +variety of the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministration by +men to the Gods.] + +Euthyphron does not at first understand the question. He does not +comprehend the relation between two words, generic and specific with +reference to each other: the former embracing all that the latter +embraces, and more besides (denoting more objects, connoting fewer +attributes). This is explained by analogies and particular examples, +illustrating a logical distinction highly important to be brought out, +at a time when there were no treatises on Logic.[29] So much therefore +is made out--That the Holy is a part, or branch, of the Just. But what +part? or how is it to be distinguished from other parts or branches of +the just? Euthyphron answers. The holy is that portion or branch of +the Just which concerns ministration to the Gods: the remaining branch +of the Just is, what concerns ministration to men.[30] + +[Footnote 29: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13-14, p. 12.] + +[Footnote 30: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 14, p. 12 E. [Greek: to\ me/ros +tou= dikai/ou ei)=nai eu)sebe/s te kai\ o(/sion, to\ peri\ tê\n tô=n +theô=n therapei/an; to\ de\ peri\ tê\n tô=n a)nthrô/pôn, to\ loipo\n +ei)=nai tou= dikai/ou me/ros.]] + +[Side-note: Ministration to the Gods? How? To what purpose?]\ + +_Sokr._--What sort of ministration? Other ministrations, to horses, +dogs, working cattle, &c., are intended for the improvement or benefit +of those to whom they are rendered:--besides, they can only be +rendered by a few trained persons. In what manner does ministration, +called _holiness_, benefit or improve the Gods? _Euthyph._--In no way: +it is of the same nature as that which slaves render to their masters. +_Sokr._--You mean, that it is work done by us for the Gods. Tell me--to +what end does the work conduce? What is that end which the Gods +accomplish, through our agency as workmen? Physicians employ their +slaves for the purpose of restoring the sick to health: shipbuilders +put their slaves to the completion of ships. But what are those great +works which the Gods bring about by our agency? _Euthyph._--Their +works are numerous and great. _Sokr._--The like may be said of +generals: but the summary and main purpose of all that generals do is--to +assure victory in war. So too we may say about the husbandman: but +the summary of his many proceedings is, to raise corn from the earth. +State to me, in like manner, the summary of that which the Gods +perform through our agency.[31] + +[Footnote 31: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, pp. 13, 14.] + +[Side-note: Holiness--rectitude in sacrifice and prayer--right traffic +between men and the Gods.] + +_Euthyph._--It would cost me some labour to go through the case fully. +But so much I tell you in plain terms. If a man, when sacrificing and +praying, knows what deeds and what words will be agreeable to the +Gods, that is holiness: this it is which upholds the security both of +private houses and public communities. The contrary is unholiness, +which subverts and ruins them.[32] _Sokr._--Holiness, then, is the +knowledge of rightly sacrificing and praying to the Gods; that is, of +giving to them, and asking from them. To ask rightly, is to ask what +we want from them: to give rightly, is to give to them what they want +from us. Holiness will thus be an art of right traffic between Gods +and men. Still, you must tell me how the Gods are gainers by that +which we give to them. That we are gainers by what they give, is clear +enough; but what do they gain on their side? + +[Footnote 32: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, p. 14 B. Compare this third +unsuccessful answer of Euthyphron with the third answer assigned to +Hippias (Hipp. Maj. 291 C-E). Both of them appear lengthened, +emphatic, as if intended to settle a question which had become +vexatious.] + +[Side-note: This will not stand--the Gods gain nothing--they receive +from men marks of honour and gratitude--they are pleased +therewith--the Holy, therefore, must be that which is pleasing to the +Gods.] + +_Euthyph._--The Gods gain nothing. The gifts which we present to them +consist in honour, marks of respect, gratitude. _Sokr._--The holy, +then, is that which obtains favour from the Gods; not that which +gainful to them, nor that which they love. _Euthyph._--Nay: I think +they love it especially. _Sokr._--Then it appears that the holy is +what the Gods love? _Euthyph._--Unquestionably. + +[Side-note: This is the same explanation which was before declared +insufficient. A fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He +breaks off the dialogue.] + +_Sokr._--But this is the very same explanation which we rejected a +short time ago as untenable.[33] It was agreed between us, that to be +loved by the Gods was not of the essence of holiness, and could not +serve as an explanation of holiness: though it might be truly affirmed +thereof as an accompanying predicate. Let us therefore try again to +discover what holiness is. I rely upon you to help me, and I am sure +that you must know, since under a confident persuasion that you know, +you are indicting your own father for homicide. + +[Footnote 33: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 19, p. 15 C. [Greek: me/mnêsai +ga/r pou, o(/ti e)n tô=| e)mprosthen to/ te o(/sion kai\ to\ +theophile\s ou) tau)to\n ê(mi=n e)pha/nê, a)ll' e(/tera a)llê/lôn.]] + +_Euthyph._--"The investigation must stand over to another time, I have +engagements now which call me elsewhere." + +[Side-note: Sokratic spirit of the dialogue--confessed ignorance +applying the Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge.] + +So Plato breaks off the dialogue. It is conceived in the truly +Sokratic spirit:--an Elenchus applied to implicit and unexamined +faith, even though that faith be accredited among the public as +orthodoxy: warfare against the confident persuasion of knowledge, upon +topics familiar to every one, and on which deep sentiments and +confused notions have grown up by association in every one's mind, +without deliberate study, systematic teaching, or testing +cross-examination. Euthyphron is a man who feels unshaken confidence +in his own knowledge, and still more in his own correct religious belief. +Sokrates appears in his received character as confessing ignorance, +soliciting instruction, and exposing inconsistencies and contradiction +in that which is given to him for instruction. + +[Side-note: The questions always difficult, often impossible to +answer. Sokrates is unable to answer them, though he exposes the bad +answers of others.] + +We must (as I have before remarked) take this ignorance on the part of +the Platonic Sokrates not as assumed, but as very real. In no part of +the Platonic writings do we find any tenable definition of the Holy +and the Unholy, such as is here demanded from Euthyphron. The talent +of Sokrates consists in exposing bad definitions, not in providing +good ones. This negative function is all that he claims for himself--with +deep regret that he can do no more. "Sokrates" (says +Aristotle[34]) "put questions, but gave no answers: for he professed +not to know." In those dialogues where Plato makes him attempt more +(there also, against his own will and protest, as in the Philêbus and +Republic), the affirmative Sokrates will be found only to stand his +ground because no negative Sokrates is allowed to attack him. I insist +upon this the rather, because the Platonic commentators usually +present the dialogues in a different light, as if such modesty on the +part of Sokrates was altogether simulated: as if he was himself,[35] +from the beginning, aware of the proper answer to his own questions, +but refrained designedly from announcing it: nay, sometimes, as if the +answers were in themselves easy, and as if the respondents who failed +must be below par in respect of intelligence. This is an erroneous +conception. The questions put by Sokrates, though relating to familiar +topics, are always difficult: they are often even impossible to +answer, because they postulate and require to be assigned a common +objective concept which is not to be found. They only appear easy to +one who has never attempted the task of answering under the pressure +of cross-examination. Most persons indeed never make any such trial, +but go on affirming confidently as if they knew, without trial. It is +exactly against such illusory confidence of knowledge that Sokrates +directs his questions: the fact belongs to our days no less than to +his.[36] + +[Footnote 34: Aristotel. Sophist. Elench. p. 183, b. 7. [Greek: e)pei\ +kai\ dia\ tou=to Sôkra/tês ê)rô/ta kai\ ou)k a)pekri/neto; ô(molo/gei +ga\r ou)k ei)de/nai.]] + +[Footnote 35: See Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Euthyphron. p. 140.] + +[Footnote 36: Adam Smith observes, in his Essay on the Formation of +Languages (p. 20 of the fifth volume of his collected Works), "Ask a +man what relation is expressed by the preposition _of_: and if he has +not beforehand employed his thoughts a good deal upon these subjects, +you may safely allow him a week to consider of his answer." + +The Platonic problem assumes, not only that he shall give an answer, +but that it shall be an answer which he can maintain against the +Elenchus of Sokrates.] + +[Side-note: Objections of Theopompus to the Platonic procedure.] + +The assumptions of some Platonic commentators--that Sokrates and Plato +of course knew the answers to their own questions--that an honest and +pious man, of ordinary intelligence, has the answer to the question in +his heart, though he cannot put it in words--these assumptions were +also made by many of Plato's contemporaries, who depreciated his +questions as frivolous and unprofitable. The rhetor and historian +Theopompus (one of the most eminent among the numerous pupils of +Isokrates, and at the same time unfriendly to Plato, though younger in +age), thus criticised Plato's requirement, that these familiar terms +should be defined: "What! (said he) have none of us before your time +talked about the Good and the Just? Or do you suppose that we cannot +follow out what each of them is, and that we pronounce the words as +empty and unmeaning sounds?"[37] Theopompus was the scholar of +Isokrates, and both of them probably took the same view, as to the +uselessness of that colloquial analysis which aims at determining the +definition of familiar ethical or political words.[38] They considered +that Plato and Sokrates, instead of clearing up what was confused, +wasted their ingenuity in perplexing what was already clear. They +preferred the rhetorical handling (such as we noticed in the Kriton) +which works upon ready-made pre-established sentiments, and impresses +a strong emotional conviction, but presumes that all the intellectual +problems have already been solved. + +[Footnote 37: Epiktêtus, ii. 17, 5-10. [Greek: To\ d' e)xapatô=n tou\s +pollou\s tou=t' e)/stin, o(/per kai\ Theo/pompon to\n r(ê/tora o(/s +pou kai\ Pla/tôni e)gkalei= e)pi\ tô=| bou/lesthai e(/kasta +o(ri/zesthai. Ti/ ga\r le/gei? Ou)dei\s ê(mô=n pro\ sou= e)/legen +a)gatho\n ê)\ di/kaion? ê)\ mê\ parakolouthou=ntes ti/ e)sti tou/tôn +e(/kaston, a)sê/môs kai\ kenô=s e)phtheggo/metha ta\s phôna/s?] + +Respecting Theopompus, compare Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium +de Platone, p. 757; also De Præcip. Historicis, p. 782.] + +[Footnote 38: Isokrates, Helen. Encom. Or. x. init. De Permut. Or. xv. +sect. 90. + +These passages do not name Sokrates and Plato, but have every +appearance of being intended to allude to them.] + +[Side-note: Objective view of Ethics, distinguished by Sokrates from +the subjective.] + +All this shows the novelty of the Sokratic point of view: the +distinction between the essential constituent and the objective +accidental accompaniment,[39] and the search for a definition +corresponding to the former: which search was first prosecuted by +Sokrates (as Aristotle[40] points out) and was taken up from him by +Plato. It was Sokrates who first brought conspicuously into notice the +objective intellectual, scientific view of ethics--as distinguished +from the subjective, emotional, incoherent, and uninquiring. I mean +that he was the first who proclaimed himself as feeling the want of +such an objective view, and who worked upon other minds so a to create +the like want in them: I do not mean that he provided satisfaction for +this requirement. + +[Footnote 39: This distinction is pointedly noticed in the Euthyphron, +p. 11 A.] + +[Footnote 40: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 2, M. 1078, b. 28.] + +[Side-note: Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent.] + +Undoubtedly (as Theopompus remarked) men had used these ethical terms +long before the time of Sokrates, and had used them, not as empty and +unmeaning, but with a full body of meaning (_i.e._ emotional meaning). +Strong and marked emotion had become associated with each term; and +the same emotion, similar in character, though not equal in force--was +felt by the greater number of different minds. Subjectively and +emotionally, there was no difference between one man and another, +except as to degree. But it was Sokrates who first called attention to +the fact as a matter for philosophical recognition and criticism,--that +such subjective and emotional unanimity does not exclude the +widest objective and intellectual dissension.[41] + +[Footnote 41: It is this distinction between the subjective and the +objective which is implied in the language of Epiktêtus, when he +proceeds to answer the objection cited from Theopompus (note 1 p. +451): [Greek: Ti/s ga\r soi le/gei, Theo/pompe, o(/ti e)nnoi/as ou)k +ei)=chomen e(ka/stou tou/tôn phusika/s kai\ prolê/pseis? A)ll' ou)ch +oi(=on te e)pharmo/zein ta\s prolê/pseis tai=s katallê/lois ou)si/ais, +mê\ diarthrô/santa au)ta/s, kai\ au)to\ tou=to skepsa/menon, poi/an +tina\ e(ka/stê| au)tô=n ou)si/an u(potakte/on.] + +To the same purpose Epiktêtus, in another passage, i. 22, 4-9: [Greek: +Au)tê\ e)stin ê( tô=n I)oudai/ôn, kai\ Su/rôn, kai\ Ai)gupti/ôn, kai\ +R(ômai/ôn ma/chê; ou) peri\ tou=, o(/ti to\ o(/sion pa/ntôn +protimête/on, kai\ e)n panti\ metadiôkte/on--a)lla\ po/tero/n e)stin +o(/sion tou=to, to\ choirei/ou phagei=n, ê)\ a)no/sion.] + +Again, Origen also, in a striking passage of his reply to Celsus (v. +p. 263, ed. Spencer; i. p. 614 ed. Delarue), observes that the name +_Justice_ is the same among all Greeks (he means, the name with the +emotional associations inseparable from it), but that the thing +designated was very different, according to those who pronounced +it:--[Greek: lekte/on, o(/ti to\ tê=s dikaiosu/nês o)/noma tau)ton me\n +e)/stin para\ pa=sin E(/llêsin; ê)/dê de\ a)podei/knutai a)/llê me\n +ê( kat' E)pi/kouron dikaiosu/nê, a)/llê de\ ê( kata\ tou\s a)po\ tê=s +Stoa=s, a)rnoume/nôn to\ trimere\s tê=s psuchê=s, a)/llê de\ kata\ +tou\s a)po\ Pla/tônos, i)diopragi/an tô=n merô=n tê=s psuchê=s +pha/skontas ei)=nai tê\n dikaiosu/nên. Ou(/tô de\ kai\ a)/llê me\n ê( +E)pikou/rou a)ndri/a], &c. + +"Je n'aime point les mots nouveaux" (said Saint Just, in his +Institutions, composed during the sitting of the French Convention, +1793), "je ne connais que le juste et l'injuste: ces mots sont +entendus par toutes les consciences. Il faut ramener toutes les +définitions à la conscience: l'esprit est un sophiste qui conduit les +vertus à l'échafaud." (Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution +Française, t. xxxv. p. 277.) This is very much the language which +honest and vehement [Greek: i)diô=tai] of Athens would hold towards +Sokrates and Plato.] + +[Side-note: Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental +condition by Sokrates--position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to +it.] + +As the Platonic Sokrates here puts it in the Euthyphron--all men agree +that the person who acts unjustly must be punished; but they dispute +very much _who it is_ that acts unjustly--_which_ of his actions are +unjust--or under _what_ circumstances they are so. The emotion in each +man's mind, as well as the word by which it is expressed, is the +same:[42] but the person, or the acts, to which it is applied by each, +although partly the same, are often so different, and sometimes so +opposite, as to occasion violent dispute. There is subjective +agreement, with objective disagreement. It is upon this disconformity +that the Sokratic cross-examination is brought to bear, making his +hearers feel its existence, for the first time, and dispelling their +fancy of supposed knowledge as well as of supposed unanimity. Sokrates +required them to define the general word--to assign some common +objective characteristic, corresponding in all cases to the common +subjective feeling represented by the word. But no man could comply +with his requirement, nor could he himself comply with it, any more +than his respondents. So far Sokrates proceeded, and no farther, +according to Aristotle. He never altogether lost his hold on +particulars: he assumed that there must be something common to them +all, if you could but find out what it was, constituting the objective +meaning of the general term. Plato made a step beyond him, though +under the name of Sokrates as spokesman. Not being able (any more than +Sokrates) to discover or specify any real objective characteristic, +common to all the particulars--he objectivised[43] the word itself: +that is, he assumed or imagined a new objective Ens of his own, the +Platonic Idea, corresponding to the general word: an idea not common +to the particulars, but existing apart from them in a sphere of its +own--yet nevertheless lending itself in some inexplicable way to be +participated by all the particulars. It was only in this way that +Plato could explain to himself how knowledge was possible: this +universal Ens being the only object of knowledge: particulars being an +indefinite variety of fleeting appearances, and as such in themselves +unknowable. The imagination of Plato created a new world of Forms, +Ideas, Concepts, or objects corresponding to general terms: which he +represents as the only objects of knowledge, and as the only +realities. + +[Footnote 42: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 8, C-D, Euripides, Phoenissæ, +499-- + +[Greek: ei) pa=si tau)to\ kalo\n e)/phu, sopho/n th' a)/ma, +ou)k ê)=n a)\n a)mphilekto\s a)nthrô/pois e)/ris; +nu=n d' ou)th' o(/moion ou)de\n ou)/t' i)/son bro/tois, +plê\n o)noma/sai; to\ d' e)/rgon ou)k e)/stin to/de]. + +Hobbes expresses, in the following terms, this fact of subjective +similarity co-existent with great objective dissimilarity among +mankind. + +"For the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the +thoughts and passions of another, whoever looketh into himself and +considereth what he does when he does _think_, _opine_, _reason_, +_hope_, _fear_, &c., and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and +know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like +occasions. I say the similitude of _passions_, which are the same in +all men, _desire_, _fear_, _hope_, &c., not the similitude of the +_objects_ of the passions, which are the things _desired_, _feared_, +_hoped_, &c., for these the constitution individual, and particular +education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our +knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded +as they are with lying, dissembling, counterfeiting, and erroneous +doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts." +Introduction to Leviathan.] + +[Footnote 43: Aristot. Metaphys. M. 1078, b. 30, 1086, b. 4.] + +[Side-note: The Holy--it has an essential characteristic--what is +this?--not the fact that it is loved by the Gods--this is true, but is +not its constituent essence.] + +In the Euthyphron, however, we have not yet passed into this Platonic +world, of self-existent Forms--objects of conception--concepts +detached from sensible particulars. We are still with Sokrates and +with ordinary men among the world of particulars, only that Sokrates +introduced a new mode of looking at all the particulars, and searched +among them for some common feature which he did not find. The Holy +(and the Unholy) is a word freely pronounced by every speaker, and +familiarly understood by every hearer, as if it denoted something one +and the same in all these particulars.[44] What is that something--the +common essence or idea? Euthyphron cannot tell; though he agrees with +Sokrates that there must be such essence. His attempts to explain it +prove failures. + +[Footnote 44: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 D, 6 E.] + +The definition of the Holy--that it is what the Gods love--is +suggested in this dialogue, but rejected. The Holy is not Holy because +the Gods love it: on the contrary, its holiness is an independent +fact, and the Gods love it because it is Holy. The Holy is thus an +essence, _per se_, common to, or partaken by, all holy persons and +things. + +[Side-note: Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the +Holy--different from those of the Platonic Sokrates--he disallows any +common absolute general type of the Holy--he recognises an indefinite +variety of types, discordant and relative.] + +So at least the Platonic Sokrates here regards it. But the Xenophontic +Sokrates, if we can trust the Memorabilia, would not have concurred in +this view: for we read that upon all points connected with piety or +religious observance, he followed the precept which the Pythian +priestess delivered as an answer to all who consulted the Delphian +oracle on similar questions--You will act piously by conforming to the +law of the city. Sokrates (we are told) not only acted upon this +precept himself, but advised his friends to do the like, and regarded +those who acted otherwise as foolish and over-subtle triflers.[45] It +is plain that this doctrine disallows all supposition of any general +essence, called the Holy, to be discovered and appealed to, as type in +cases of doubt; and recognises the equal title of many separate local, +discordant, and variable types, each under the sanction of King Nomos. +The procedure of Sokrates in the Euthyphron would not have been +approved by the Xenophontic Sokrates. It is in the spirit of Plato, +and is an instance of that disposition which he manifests yet more +strongly in the Republic and elsewhere, to look for his supreme +authority in philosophical theory and not in the constituted societies +around him: thus to innovate in matters religious as well as +political--a reproach to him among his own contemporaries, an honour +to him among various subsequent Christian writers. Plato, not +conforming to any one of the modes of religious belief actually +prevalent in his contemporary world, postulates a canon, suitable to +the exigencies of his own mind, of that which the Gods ought to love +and must love. In this respect, as in others, he is in marked contrast +with Herodotus--a large observer of mankind, very pious in his own +way, curious in comparing the actual practices consecrated among +different nations, but not pretending to supersede them by any canon +of his own. + +[Footnote 45: Compare Xen. Mem. i. 3, 1. [Greek: ê(/ te ga\r Puthi/a +no/mô| po/leôs a)nairei= poiou=ntas eu)sebô=s a)\n poiei=n; Sôkra/tês +te ou(/tôs kai\ au)to\s e)poi/ei kai\ toi=s a)/llois parê/|nei, tou\s +de\ a)/llôs pôs poiou=ntas perie/rgous kai\ matai/ous e)no/mizen +ei)=nai.]] + +[Side-note: The Holy a branch of the Just--not tenable as a +definition, but useful as bringing to view the subordination of +logical terms.] + +Though the Holy, and the Unholy, are pronounced to be each an essence, +partaken of by all the particulars so-called; yet what that essence +is, the dialogue Euthyphron noway determines. Even the suggestion of +Sokrates--that the Holy is a branch of the Just, only requiring to be +distinguished by some assignable mark from the other branches of the +Just--is of no avail, since the Just itself had been previously +declared to be one of the matters in perpetual dispute. It procures +for Sokrates however the opportunity of illustrating the logical +subordination of terms; the less general comprehended in the more +general, and requiring to be parted off by some _differentia_ from the +rest of what this latter comprehends. Plato illustrates the matter at +some length;[46] and apparently with a marked purpose of drawing +attention to it. We must keep in mind, that logical distinctions had +at that time received neither special attention nor special +names--however they may have been unconsciously followed in practice. + +[Footnote 46: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 12.] + +[Side-note: The Euthyphron represents Plato's way of replying to the +charge of impiety, preferred by Melêtus against Sokrates--comparison +with Xenophon's way of replying.] + +What I remarked about the Kriton, appears to me also true about the +Euthyphron. It represents Plato's manner of replying to the charge of +impiety advanced by Melêtus and his friends against Sokrates, just as +the four first chapters of the Memorabilia represent Xenophon's manner +of repelling the same charge. Xenophon joins issue with the +accusers,--describes the language and proceedings of Sokrates, so as to +show that he was orthodox and pious, above the measure of ordinary men, in +conduct, in ritual, and in language; and expresses his surprise that +against such a man the verdict of guilty could have been returned by +the Dikasts.[47] Plato handles the charge in the way in which Sokrates +himself would have handled it, if he had been commenting on the same +accusation against another person and as he does in fact deal with +Melêtus, in the Platonic Apology. Plato introduces Euthyphron, a very +religious man, who prides himself upon being forward to prosecute +impiety in whomsoever it is found, and who in this case, under the +special promptings of piety, has entered a capital prosecution against +his own father.[48] The occasion is here favourable to the Sokratic +interrogatories, applicable to Melêtus no less than to Euthyphron. "Of +course, before you took this grave step, you have assured yourself +that you are right, and that you know what piety and impiety are. Pray +tell me, for I am ignorant on the subject: that I may know better and +do better for the future.[49] Tell me, what is the characteristic +essence of piety as well as impiety?" It turns out that the accuser +can make no satisfactory answer: that he involves himself in confusion +and contradiction:--that he has brought capital indictments against +citizens, without having ever studied or appreciated the offence with +which he charges them. Such is the manner in which the Platonic +Sokrates is made to deal with Euthyphron, and in which the real +Sokrates deals with Melêtus:[50] rendering the questions instrumental +to two larger purposes--first, to his habitual crusade against the +false persuasion of knowledge--next, to the administering of a logical +or dialectical lesson. When we come to the Treatise De Legibus (where +Sokrates does not appear) we shall find Plato adopting the dogmatic +and sermonising manner of the first chapters of the Xenophontic +Memorabilia. Here, in the Euthyphron and in the Dialogues of Search +generally, the Platonic Sokrates is something entirely different.[51] + +[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 4; also iv. 8, 11.] + +[Footnote 48: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 E.] + +[Footnote 49: Compare, even in Xenophon, the conversation of Sokrates +with Kritias and Chariklês--Memorab. i. 2, 32-38: and his +cross-examination of the presumptuous youth Glaukon, Plato's +brother (Mem. iii. 7).] + +[Footnote 50: Plato, Apol. c. 11, p. 24 C. [Greek: a)dikei=n phêmi\ +Me/lêton, o(/ti spoudê=| charienti/zetai, r(a|di/ôs ei)s a)gô=nas +kathista\s a)nthrô/pous], &c.] + +[Footnote 51: Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 199) agrees with the opinion +of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, that the Euthyphron was composed and +published during the interval between the lodging of the indictment +and the trial of Sokrates. K. F. Hermann considers it as posterior to +the death of Sokrates. + +I concur on this point with Hermann. Indeed I have already given my +opinion, that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed before +the death of Sokrates.] + + + + +END OF VOL. I. + + + +************************************* +Transcriber's Note + +The text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive. + +For the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used: +) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute +accent; \ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript. +ch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta; +ê for eta and ô for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases. + +Corrections to the text, indicated in text with **: + +Location Text of scan of 3rd edition Correction +Ch. 1, after fn. 47 devination divination +Ch. 1, fn. 119 Kosmichen Kosmischen +Ch. 1, fn. 146 mizta mixta +Ch. 1, fn. 146 front fronte +Ch. 1, fn. 164 & 8, +Ch. 1, fn. 164 perie/chno perie/chon +Ch. 1, fn. 214 2d 2nd. +Ch. 2, after fn. 21 ultra phenomenal ultra-phenomenal +Ch. 3, fn. 40 Taüschung Täuschung +Ch. 3, fn. 64 vol. iii. vol. ii. +Ch. 3, fn. 66 art act +Ch. 3, fn. 185 Dion. Diog. +Ch. 3, fn. 206 okêtê\neu)d eu)dokêtê\n +Ch. 3, fn. 217 xxix. xxiv. +Ch. 4, fn. 1 chap. xxii. chap. xxi. +Ch. 5, fn. 24 de-describes describes +Ch. 6, before fn. 14 blank space 4. +Ch. 6, fn. 39 passed of : passed off: +Ch. 6, fn. 45 the our the four +Ch. 7, 3rd para. Hippias II. Hippias I. +Ch. 7, fn. 8 409 429 +Ch. 7, fn. 8 407 427 +Ch. 7, fn. 13 Herman Hermann +Ch. 8, fn. 92 s. 12, s. 11, + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Plato and the Other Companions of +Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume I (of 4), by George Grote + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 40435 *** |