diff options
Diffstat (limited to '40350-8.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 40350-8.txt | 9003 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 9003 deletions
diff --git a/40350-8.txt b/40350-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 8737c69..0000000 --- a/40350-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9003 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of Government in Republican China, by -Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Government in Republican China - -Author: Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger - -Release Date: July 27, 2012 [EBook #40350] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GOVERNMENT IN REPUBLICAN CHINA *** - - - - -Produced by Adam Buchbinder and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - - - - - - - - - GOVERNMENT IN REPUBLICAN CHINA - - - - - GOVERNMENT - IN - REPUBLICAN CHINA - - BY - PAUL MYRON ANTHONY LINEBARGER - _The Department of Political Science_ - _Duke University_ - - FOREWORD BY - FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX - - - FIRST EDITION - - [Illustration] - - HYPERION PRESS, INC. - WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT - - - - - Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data - - Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony, 1913-1966. - Government in republican China. - - Reprint of the 1st ed. published by McGraw-Hill, - New York, in series: McGraw-Hill studies in political science. - Includes bibliographical references. - 1. China--Politics and government--1912-1949. - I. Title. - DS775.L48 1973 320.9'51'04 73-888 - ISBN 0-88355-081-4 - - - Published in 1938 - by The McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York - Copyright 1938 by The McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. - - First Hyperion reprint edition 1973 - - Library of Congress Catalogue Number 73-888 - - ISBN 0-88355-081-4 - - Printed in the United States of America - - - - - _Dedicated with filial affection_ - _to_ - - PAUL MYRON WENTWORTH LINEBARGER - - United States Judge in the Philippines, - Counselor to and Biographer of President - Sun Yat-sen, Formerly Legal Adviser to - the National Government of China - - - - -FOREWORD - - -To the cynic, two nations clasped in murderous embrace yet nominally -living in peace with each other might well be one of the miracles of our -century. No less miraculous has been for many the tenacity of Chinese -resistance to Japan's invasion ever since the first bullets whizzed -through the night near the Marco Polo Bridge southwest of Peking early -in July, 1937. The undeclared war has spread disaster through an area -larger than that immediately affected in Europe's battles from 1914 to -1918; hundreds of thousands have died in action; for months China's -capital has been in the hands of the enemy. But China is not on her -knees. - -The explanation is simple. For the first time in her history, China -fights as a nation. More is involved than can be attributed to -Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek's personal leadership or the strategic -and organizational services rendered, until his recent recall to -Germany, by Alexander von Falkenhausen, chief of staff of the Turkish -armies during the World War. A people without allegiance to its -government and without faith in itself would have been incapable of -braving the ordeal of retreat, massacre, and occupation as successfully -as have the Chinese. That China fights today as a nation is no small -tribute to the National Government of the Kuomintang established at -Nanking in 1927. How long she will be able to fight as a nation is a -question to be answered only by reference to the national mentality and -political institutions which have emerged since the collapse of the -Manchu Empire in 1911-1912. It is the purpose of this volume to appraise -the record of China's republican era. - -The author was compelled to beat his own path. Only a few books on -modern government in China are available in English, and these, written -by Chinese, are modeled in their presentation on Western prototypes to -an extent of obscuring, though unintentionally, the very substance of -Chinese politics. In Dr. Linebarger's pioneer venture the dynamics of -internal instability, typical of the earlier phases of the Republic, and -the gradual consolidation under the Nanking regime are analyzed with -extraordinary penetration. Instead of being confronted with meaningless -form and empty legality, the reader is placed in a position to view step -by step the evolution of conflicting and merging forces: political -movements and their contest for the loyalty of the masses, the rough and -ready rule of military might, and the official hierarchies representing -organized governments. Throughout this work, as in Dr. Linebarger's -earlier _Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_, the broad stream of -Confucian thought fertilizing age after age of China's social existence -and Sun's purposeful ideological adaptations combined in his _San Min -Chu I_ are shown in fundamental harmony. One distinction, however, -stands out clearly. The Confucian tradition applied itself to a vaguely -conceived but essentially unified world order. In the _San Min Chu -I_ we encounter the elements of a national credo, self-assertive and -militant. - -The role of ideology in modern government has suffered curious neglect -among students of politics for a considerable time. In periods of -relative ideational saturation or stagnation, the mechanics of -constitutional law or the give and take of legislative barter may -distract from the basic framework of values and objectives giving shape -to the political order. The rise of totalitarian systems relying heavily -on ideological appeal and propaganda techniques has laid new stress upon -those factors which predetermine political behavior. In China's vast -experience we have the supreme example of ideological guidance so firmly -established as to reduce to a minimum direct governmental intervention -in the affairs of the individual. It is perhaps Sun Yat-sen's tragedy -that for years he placed his faith in the magic of democratic verbiage -imported from the West; a new orientation came to prevail after 1923, -when at Sun's instance tested practitioners of mass organization from -the Soviet Union began to overhaul and streamline the Kuomintang -apparatus. - -Government in China has become migratory as a result of Japan's advance. -A mere description of its previous structure and functions would today -have little relevance. But Dr. Linebarger has probed deeply enough into -the foundations of Chinese political life to distinguish with uncommon -discernment between the ephemeral and the durable. His long-range -exposition transcends the exigencies of the hour and delineates the -issues of China's future. - - FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX. - ADAMS HOUSE, - HARVARD UNIVERSITY. - - - - -ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - - -I am deeply indebted to the five gentlemen who have read the entire -manuscript in some one of its stages. My father, Judge Paul Myron -Wentworth Linebarger, has given me tireless help in this as in all my -projects, for which I shall never be able to tender sufficient thanks. -My teacher, Professor Harley Farnsworth MacNair of the University of -Chicago, supplied numerous addenda and corrigenda of great value from -his knowledge of modern Chinese history. Professor Arthur N. Holcombe of -Harvard University suggested changes which have made the work more -realistic. Assistance offered me by the Sinologue and philosopher, -Professor H. H. Dubs of Duke University, was of the utmost value. -Professor Paul H. Clyde, Duke University, provided many useful and -significant hints, especially in the field of Sino-foreign relations. - -I am also under obligation to Mr. J. C. Yang, Library of Congress, and -Professor James R. Ware, Harvard University, for further suggestions; to -Professor Charles Sidney Gardner and Dr. John Fairbank, Harvard -University, and Professor George Kennedy, Yale University, for aid in -the general course of my Chinese studies; to Professor Maria Magdalena -Schoch, until recently of the University of Hamburg, Germany, for a -critical reading of the revised manuscript; and to Miss Hazel Foster and -Mr. M. F. Nelson for similar assistance. Mrs. W. M. Gibson, Miss Whitty -Daniel, and my wife have helped in the preparation of the manuscript. - - P. M. A. L. - DURHAM, N. C., - _August_, 1938. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - FOREWORD BY FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX vii - - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi - - INTRODUCTION 1 - Duality or Confluence? 1 - The Peculiarities of Old China 2 - The Peculiarities of Modern China 6 - The World Significance of Chinese Government 7 - The Main Factors in Modern Chinese Government 9 - The Approach 11 - - - FIRST PART - MOVEMENTS - - CHAPTER I - CONFUCIANISM 13 - The Ages before Confucius 13 - The Ideology Called Confucian 15 - Government in the Confucian Ideology 18 - The Replacement of the Confucian Ideology 22 - The Chief Movements in the Rebuilding of China 24 - Confucianism in the Republic 26 - - CHAPTER II - THE RISE OF NATIONALISM 31 - Nationalism: Patriotic Anti-Manchu Phase 31 - Nationalism: Revolutionary Modernist Phase 34 - Nationalism: Republican Phase 36 - Nationalism: Constitutionalist Phase 38 - The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen 41 - Opportunist Movements and Their Anticonstitutional Effects 44 - Christianity as a Political Force 48 - Nationalism: Social Revolutionary Phase 50 - - CHAPTER III - BATTLING CREEDS 57 - Nationalism: Governing Phase 57 - Independent Marxism in China 63 - Japanese Efforts to Participate in Creating a New China 69 - Patriotism: The United Front 72 - - - SECOND PART - ARMIES - - CHAPTER IV - WARRIORS 76 - Military Rule and Political Economy 76 - The Downfall of the Charioteers 79 - Military Elements in Chinese Imperial History 83 - The Military Organization of the Manchu Dynasty 86 - The Army and the Republican Revolution 97 - - CHAPTER V - CAUSES 102 - The Age of the War Lords 102 - The Age of Air Conquest 108 - Governmental and Political Role of the Armies 113 - War and the Agrarian Economy 115 - Imperialism and Chinese Wars 119 - - - THIRD PART - GOVERNMENTS - - CHAPTER VI - THE EMPIRE 126 - Government to the End of the Warring States 126 - The Chinese Imperial Government 129 - Family, Village, and _Hui_ 136 - Governmental Changes Foreshadowing the Republic 139 - - CHAPTER VII - THE REVOLUTION 145 - The Presidency of Sun Yat-sen and the Republican Revolution 145 - The Parliamentary Republic 149 - The Presidential Dictatorship of Yüan Shih-k'ai 152 - The Phantom Republic in Peking 155 - The Governments of Sun Yat-sen in Canton 160 - The Nationalist Government, Soviet in Form 162 - - CHAPTER VIII - RECONSTRUCTION 167 - The National Government of China 167 - The Chinese Soviet Republic 182 - Other Governments in China 184 - The Growth of Government in China 186 - - - CONCLUSION 191 - The Collapse of the Imperial Society 191 - The Nature of the Transformation 192 - The Problems of Government in China 193 - The Question of Chinese Political Survival 195 - - CHRONOLOGY OF DYNASTIES 197 - - INDEX 199 - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -The origins of Chinese society may reach half a million years into the -past. Anthropologists have suggested that Sinanthropus Pekinensis, among -the earliest forms of man, resembles the modern Chinese more closely -than he does any other modern race. In what specific period the earliest -ancestors of the Chinese came to China is not known. It is certain, -however, that about 1500 B. C. there existed a well-developed -civilized society in the Yellow River valley, and that this same society -has lived on--modified by the centuries, but in unbroken -continuity--down into the present. China has outlasted Crete, Tyre, -Greece, and Rome. The Aztec empire, which arose in Mexico when China was -already ancient, has become only a memory, while China is still vital. -How is it that China's institutions survive, while those of other -nations did not? How real are Chinese institutions today? What, -precisely, is the Republic of China? - - -_Duality or Confluence?_ - -The phrase _Republican China_ indicates an era rather than a system. The -preceding ages of China have been known by the names of great dynasties. -T'ang China (620-906 A. D.) overawed and instructed all eastern Asia. -Sung China (A. D. 960-1279) flourished, civilian and tolerant, in a -world marked by bigotry and arms. Well into the past century the West -remained distant and vague. Republican China struggles in the presence -of the modern world and subject to its superior force; her very name is -a capitulation to the twentieth century. The problems of the Republican -era are not merely the problems of republican government; they involve -the broad question of the meeting and interpenetration of civilizations. -How are the Chinese, schooled for thousands of years in the effective -operation of their own political system, to adapt themselves fast enough -to the Western scheme? What happens when they must and yet cannot -effectuate such adaptation? These are not queries to be answered simply -in the routine terms of Western politics. - -For the past three thousand years and more the eastern end of the -European-Asiatic land mass has formed a world to itself. Most of this -time it was larger, richer, and more civilized than the European world. -Down to the nineteenth century of the Christian era the Chinese had no -reason to suppose that theirs was not the most advanced and powerful of -civilized societies. They looked upon the Far East as the all-inclusive -universe of civilization; to them, their way of life was the -common-sense way. The Europeans did likewise, with reference to their -own sphere. When the European realm expanded so as to include the whole -planet, when Western civilization began to dominate the earth, and the -Christian family of nations became the world-wide international system, -the Chinese were forced to concede that the Far East could not be kept -to itself. They have found it indispensable to respond, as individuals -and as a people, to the new environment closing in on them. Doing so has -necessitated the reexamination and restatement of nearly all basic -values of Chinese life. - -Since the nineteenth century the Chinese have been faced with the -alternative of adhering to their own traditions or accepting those of -the West. Institutions and practices which are so well established that -they seem to rest on sheer common sense in each of the competing -civilizations have been placed in juxtaposition. As a result, the -Chinese now know two kinds of common sense to justify a course of -action. The ensuing difficulty at times goes deeper; for they may be -said to have even two kinds of sanity. In old China a man who wanted no -sons seemed a patent lunatic; in the Western world he might be perfectly -sane. A modern Chinese faces thousands of such choices. - - -_The Peculiarities of Old China_ - -Obviously, government in Republican China cannot be understood without -analysis of the foundations upon which it is built. Such an analysis -requires an inquiry, however cursory, into the peculiarities of old -China and those of contemporary China. Some of the difficulties of -modern China arise from the very adequacy of the old system. Had the -Chinese of the past been less satisfied with their society, they might -have become more accustomed to change and transience. - -China from the first millennium B. C. occupied the central position in -the Far East. No other country in that part of the earth was so powerful -or so civilized. India, despite important contributions to Chinese -religious thought, was too far away to impinge greatly upon the Chinese. -Japan was heavily indebted to the Chinese, and encouraged the Chinese in -viewing themselves as the most civilized of peoples. This had important -consequences. As China was unified most of the time, and as there was no -other polity to compare with the Chinese, their political system took on -the appearance of a universal empire. The neighboring states paid formal -tribute, and the Chinese were unprepared to meet another people who -might claim political equality as an organized state. Even today, in the -attitudes of the Chinese and Japanese toward one another, there are -strong traces of this traditional point of view and indications that the -Japanese would like to restore a closed Far Eastern order with -themselves in supremacy. - -Since old China was rarely confronted with international problems, the -Chinese were not aware of their realm as a nation-state. There was no -sharp territorial limit to the Chinese polity, and no requirement that -within certain boundaries one authority be defined as supreme. The -Chinese were able to make their adjustments in the interplay of social -and political controls with less frequent resort to theory than the -Westerners. Nor was the Chinese ruler ever so firmly entrenched as to -eliminate the chance of being overthrown or to preclude the existence of -other--pluralistic--independent social controls. The power of government -was indeed limited. It maintained the peace of the Chinese world, -directed education, supported the social proprieties, and was ornamental -rather than efficient for the greater part of its activities. - -The Chinese lived primarily under the dominance of nonpolitical -agencies. These were the family (comparable to the Western clan), the -village and district, and the _hui_ (association, guild, society--in the -narrowest sense of the term). The family was intimately bound up with -the Chinese religious system, which stressed the continuity of each -individual in the flesh. A personal immortality was to be secured with -greatest certainty through the survival of one's own blood. The village -was the main economic unit, and the union of villages into districts -(_hsien_) provided an administrative division of importance: below the -_hsien_ level, common interests were fostered by community home rule; -above it, by the government. This meant that elders, clans in council, -village bosses, and other nongovernmental agencies carried on police -work, all local public construction, and most of the activities which -are regarded in the modern West as falling under the jurisdiction of the -state. The _hui_ was able to supplement the family and the village; in -guild form, it provided the chief framework of commercial and industrial -organization. - -If the government was weak and limited, and social control ensured -primarily by nongovernmental agencies, how did the Chinese achieve so -great a political stability? Why did their polity not break up into a -wilderness of tiny social groups, each jealous and particularistic, like -medieval Europe? The answer is to be found in the psychological controls -which the Chinese established. They devised a system of indoctrination -unequaled by that of any other people. - -The Chinese sought to guide men through the guidance of their ideas: -government by education, or government by propaganda. For this purpose -scholarship and administration were closely allied. The government was -made up of scholars, who thereby occupied the position of greatest -prestige in the society; the scholars were trained to serve as -government officials. Few officials were not scholars; few scholars -pursued a nonpolitical course. This led to a profound uniformity of -thought, and was in accord with the dictates of the Confucian -tradition.[1] - -From the earliest times Chinese thought was social and political in -emphasis, rather than metaphysical and scientific. For thousands of -years scholars studied problems of society, government, and ethics. They -appealed to tradition, and interpreted it. They organized the primitive -religion of the Chinese into a sophisticated social philosophy, and over -the centuries their work took effect. Chinese of different racial -backgrounds, using different spoken languages and unable to communicate -with one another by writing, living under different climatic and -economic conditions, came to show a startling uniformity of behavior. -Custom and common sense were woven into a solid pattern by the scholars -and accepted by the masses. Everything in human life bore some relation -to everything else, and the life of man was related to the world of -nature. There was no sharp distinction between natural science and -social philosophy. - -The educational integration of government, mores, and physical existence -created a system of control which has exceeded all others in lasting -power. The group in command was the scholastic bureaucracy, but -membership in it was not hereditary. Scholar-officials were recruited by -civil service examinations, and to this degree the society was a -democratic one. Every child in the society had the theoretical -opportunity of becoming prime minister. Furthermore, the power exercised -by the scholar-officials was different in its nature from that of legal -rulers in the West. Government was preventive rather than remedial. -Constitutionality was not confined to legal matters; in a broader sense -it extended to all subjects. The scholars were as much subject to -established tradition as the humblest Chinese, and everyone knew the -tradition. The scholars excelled only in knowing it more thoroughly. - -It may be stated as a truism that under any government the actual scope -of its intervention is confined to a certain category of affairs, -bounded on the one hand by matters which are so trivial or so unexplored -that they are left to the citizen's free choice and on the other by -subjects in which there is such general agreement as to make political -action unnecessary. This latter sphere might be called ideological -compliance--control of men brought about by the inculcation of broad -uniform patterns of belief and behavior. If men are induced to agree -upon a traditionally fixed mode of behavior, they will unite in -persecuting dissenters and will not be conscious of the tyranny of -ideological doctrine. But if they think in many different ways, they -will be able to gain security only by promises of mutual -noninterference. Liberty--as absence of governmental restraint--may thus -result either from a complete concord, in which every man is free to do -as he wishes since all men wish to do basically the same, or from a -specific guarantee of each individual's freedom to follow his own -interest or caprice within a defined limit. The old system of China was -a free society in so far as dissent calling for government interference -was relatively negligible, and at the same time a society rigidly -controlled with respect to the uniformity of individual behavior. - -This tradition was pragmatic and realistic. The Chinese ideological -controls operated successfully because they corresponded reasonably well -with the actualities of social and economic existence. With the coming -of the West, the old Chinese system was affected in two ways: First, the -amorphous Chinese society was threatened by the strong, effectively -organized states of the West. Secondly, the competitive accomplishments -of Western civilization destroyed, in large part, the assumption of -universality upon which much Chinese tradition depended, and thereby -impaired the power of the scholar-officials. The twentieth century -brought China a new freedom, unaccustomed and unsought. The old system -was threatened with ruin, and modern China faced the problem: -replacement or reconstitution? Or, more dangerously: chaos or political -extinction? - - -_The Peculiarities of Modern China_ - -The lifetime of one man can span the gap between old China and new. -There are men living in Peking today who can remember when the Forbidden -City (the palace-city of the emperors) was sacred and inviolate, and -when the mandarinate ruled in accordance with immemorial usage. These -may regard all Western science as a confusion, a wild torrent of exotic -words, which answers no problems, gives human life no aim and no -dignity, and is bound to return to the alien dust whence it came. -Opposing them are younger Chinese who hate the dead hand of the past and -look forward to a Westernized, scientific, industrial China which will -differ from Europe and America only in being even more modern than they. - -Most Chinese fall into neither of these groups. Many of them, however, -have a definite conception of the West and of the benefits which Western -civilization has to bestow. They also realize the threat which it -contains for those who do not master it. Yet they have been nurtured in -the serene humanity of ancient custom and hold to it with the -effortlessness of habit long transmitted. Out of this dual standard -there spring daily problems of ethics and conduct, of private life and -public policy. Administrative organization versus family loyalty and -nepotism, promptness versus leisureliness, discipline versus courtesy: -these and many others are omnipresent antitheses. - -Anachronism is China's second self. There is no set scheme of things. -Modern Western civilization has not been adopted so fully as to make the -traditional habits seem outmoded, nor has the past survived to an extent -as to make everything modern appear ridiculous. The notion of world -government, for example, is gone from China, and the notion of -multi-national government not yet clear. The relation of the individual -to society and of the parts of society to the whole are not yet -reformulated; this affects such matters as criminal law, political -organization, and economic development. Virtually every adaptation in -China must be thought through from the beginning by the Chinese; and -even in thinking there are varying styles. Are the Chinese to think -after the fashion of the West--scientifically and logically--or are they -to think in their accustomed traditional and empirical manner? - -It is thus patent that the new Chinese world which is appearing must -grow out of the background of the past and the necessities of the -present. It cannot readily be planned because there are not enough -formulas common to the old Far Eastern and the new Western worlds. New -China must be a blending, from use, from habit, from new skills imposed -upon old. Out of the dangers and misfortunes of the years since 1912 the -Chinese have developed a small body of political methods which is -temporarily workable. But the greater part of their social and -governmental thought and custom has yet to go through the process of -reevaluation by practice. Chinese political development has perforce to -be emergent and not planned. - -According to either time scheme, that of her long past or of the modern -world, modern China is anachronistic. The transformation of the Chinese -world of the past to the China of the future involves the creation of a -whole set of transitional institutions designed to lead from one to the -other. Contemporary Chinese institutions are neither those of the past -nor those of the future; they are a peculiar scheme of more recent -origin and bound to be replaced. Old China is gone. Modern China is -novel and unstable; in time it too will yield to a China of which -prophecy affords but few glimpses. - - -_The World Significance of Chinese Government_ - -If government in Republican China is an extemporized and doomed system, -rooted in no past, committed to no future, why should it be scrutinized -at all? A number of reasons for examining Chinese government suggest -themselves. Some of these are of sufficient significance to merit -statement, so as to suggest facts and issues worthy of special notice. -If certain points of key importance are kept in mind, they may serve as -references whereby the relative ranking of any specific topic may be -ascertained. - -First, the mere geographic extent of China is such as to make her -government necessary to a picture of contemporary governments. At least -every fifth human being now living is a Chinese. - -Second, in international relations China has been of great passive -importance. The wars between Western and Far Eastern nations have all -been fought over the so-called Chinese question. The partition of China -and the open door in China have been issues of international concern. -Since 1931 the Chinese have been active participants in the struggle for -the control of China, and the nature of their government determines in -large part the effectiveness of their resistance. China is a vast -market, and an even vaster reserve of man power--for troops or for -industrial labor. - -Third, the pathology of government deserves attention. Chronic social -disorder may provide a great variety of political facts wherewith to -gauge the nature of political power. Well-governed societies do not -supply similar material because they rarely need to probe political -fundamentals. - -Fourth, old China offers a challenging demonstration of secular, -civilian, pacific world government. The Chinese commonwealth of the past -was supernational; it seemed to the Chinese like unified civilized -humanity. Among the conflicting currents of present world politics, -there are some which drift toward world unity; old China may present -significant analogies to the international institutions of today. - -Fifth, the universal features of government may be more fruitfully -scrutinized in a novel cultural and social setting. China presents a -background radically different from the Western one, and affords a -unique test whereby Western political patterns and those of world-wide -significance may be distinguished from one another. - -Sixth, the question of method in political science may meet -qualifications after being applied to Chinese political thought. The -Chinese did not seek that illusory precision which has been one of the -chief goals of Western thought ever since logical procedure was -established by the Greeks. The Western man in the street, however, -depends very little on mathematics or logic in his everyday thinking. -Indirectly, the effect of inductive and deductive method has been -revolutionary, but their importance in routine operation or -unspecialized thought is open to question--especially in view of the -findings of modern psychology. It may well be that Chinese thought can -assist in the interpretation of everyday experience in the West, -precisely because it is not too specialized or scientific. - -Seventh, the Chinese may contribute in a practical way to political -knowledge and leadership throughout the world. These contributions may -be anticipated by a consideration of past and present Chinese -government. - -Eighth, the Chinese have lived in a peculiar historical environment, -consideration of which may broaden our outlook. Most Western "world -histories"--with few exceptions such as H. G. Wells's brilliant -_Outline_--are histories of the West Asiatic and European worlds, with -only perfunctory references to China. - -The relative novelty of Chinese materials to Western research explains -in great part the neglect accorded them in the Western social sciences. -With the narrowing of the world by modern means of transport and -communication the situation is changing. The science of Sinology -(systematic study of China through Chinese texts) has won its place -among the archaeological disciplines. Sinologists have made available to -Westerners a great deal of material, but its value depends in large part -upon the degree to which it is incorporated into the generally -accessible and usable body of knowledge. - - -_The Main Factors in Modern Chinese Government_ - -In the consideration of modern Chinese government a somewhat novel -approach to government is called for: one which distinguishes different -elements and levels of control and makes plain their interrelation. The -narrow consideration of the formal structure would be puzzling and -discouraging, since the various governments of modern China have been -the ornaments rather than the engines of political power. An attempt to -explain modern China in terms of constitutional legal development alone -would lead to exasperation or frustration; the ideological and -institutional context which might convey meaning would be lost. - -How can government be studied when politics are antecedent to -government? If the rulers make and unmake the form of government almost -at will, where is the real source of their power? If armies can dissolve -overnight and be reassembled under different banners on the morrow, -military power may seem tenuous and dependent on other factors. What are -these? If property is insecure and the standards of wealth subject to -variation, how can economic power be treated as an ultimate determinant? -How do men wield authority of any sort, while they create or destroy the -machinery of authority? - -For centuries China had been held together by a close-knit system -dependent upon tradition. This tradition, the ideology called -_Confucian_, was the device whereby the scholar-officials of the old -imperial bureaucracy controlled society. Government itself was -subordinate to the moral and social leadership of the intellectuals, who -relegated the economic and military professions to the less honored -categories of society. The whole fabric of Chinese life was made up of -interlocking patterns; the West, by destroying a part, tore the whole -asunder. Modern China faces more than political problems; a totalitarian -revolution has engulfed it. China has been proceeding not from partial -control to complete control, as are Italy,[2] Germany,[3] and the -Soviets,[4] but from complete control to something not far from -universal license--freedom all-pervading, unwanted, and terrifying. The -problem of modern Chinese government is the problem of re-creating -government out of its raw materials: land, people, doctrine, force, and -law. - -In this problem certain factors stand forth as preeminent: ideological -movements, military and economic factors, governments. - -First, the movements. These supplant the ancient tradition and the old -hierarchy of scholars. In the place of one settled authority over all -subjects, there suddenly appeared thousands of little authorities. -Anarchism, dress reform, Christianity, feminism, nationalism, -pro-Japanism, communism, atheism, capitalism--discordant and partially -contradictory, these all compete for the authority or a part of the -authority once held by the old system. China undergoes intellectual, -moral, educational, political, economic, military, scientific, and -industrial revolutions all at once, and all for the same reason--the -passing of the old unified order. Imagine the Renaissance, the -Reformation, the French Revolution, the industrial revolution, the Gold -Rush of '49, the World War, and the Russian Revolution all happening in -the same country in the same generation! This is a common-place -comparison, frequently made. Movements determined the loyalty of troops, -the title to property, the form of government. Power inhered in them, -since they determined the conditions under which men would seek and -wield power. A great part of the control of China has been exerted -directly, by means of the movements themselves. - -Second, the armies took the power which goes with military force, simply -because theirs was military force. They did not have to seek power. It -accrued to them, out of the disorder of society. Along with military -power went economic power as the most tangible and negotiable. Guns and -property seem very realistic indices of power, as long as the troops are -loyal and the property safe from confiscation or devaluation. - -Third, the governments. Between ideological movements, which sought to -rebuild the ideas and habits of men, and armies wielding a brief but -nearly unrestricted authority, government played its tertiary role. It -was at times of ludicrous unimportance, and on some occasions possessed -power in its own right. It leaped to a sharply improved position after -1928, but never possessed the generality of assent or the monopoly of -force to the degree common in the West. - - -_The Approach_ - -Government may mean the control (or attempted control) of society by men -professing to act in the name of all society. In this sense it includes -propagandists and educators who seek to reconstitute society, leaders of -movements, soldiers, economic leaders of all classes, and government -leaders (so far as they use government establishments as an actual means -of control). Viewed thus, the political processes of modern China are -manifold and significant. Here is power stripped naked, power without -ornament, power resting squarely upon the brains or guns of men. Men -rise and fall in the contest for power; they rise and fall absolutely, -not in a fictitious scheme which establishes a fictitious order of -constitutional offices sometimes providing asylum for popular leaders in -eclipse. - -Government may also mean the structure and function of that formally -organized group in society which claims to act upon the mandate of legal -sovereignty. When the concept of sovereignty itself is vague, confused, -or absent, government by title may be merely one among several factors -of power. Government in China is broader than the governments of China; -the two should be distinguished from one another. - -In outlining government in Republican China, the present analysis -follows the broader construction of the word _government_. The -governments proper are accordingly discussed in the last part, the first -two being devoted to the ideological movements and to the military and -economic factors. For the purpose of defining the three sets of controls -as clearly as possible, each is treated separately. This has -necessitated a corresponding arrangement of the historical data, though -in each part presented from a different point of view. But it is highly -desirable that the long-range Chinese chronology be kept in mind. To -this end a table of Chinese dynasties has been provided.[5] As a result -of separate analysis the movements, the armies, and the governments may -appear in bolder relief than would otherwise be possible, and the role -of government in the broadest sense may be made clearer, not only for -China but for the West as well. - - -NOTES - -[1] For a description of this system see below, pp. 18 ff. - -[2] _Cf._ H. Arthur Sterner, _Government in Fascist Italy_, New York and -London, 1938. - -[3] _Cf._ Fritz Morstein Marx, _Government in the Third Reich_, 2d ed., -New York and London, 1937. - -[4] _Cf._ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, _Soviet Communism_, 2d ed., New -York, 1937. - -[5] See below, p. 197. - - - - -FIRST PART - - -MOVEMENTS - - - - -_Chapter_ I - -CONFUCIANISM - - -The continuity of Chinese civilization depends not alone upon its -political virtues, but upon its working effectiveness in all relevant -spheres of human activity. In emphasizing certain aspects of old China, -it is impossible to trace the entire broad evolution.[1] In fact, the -emergence of those devices which, along with government in the narrow -sense, guided China in her long past dates back to prehistory. -Throughout the ages, however, Chinese life has preserved its identity. - - Chinese culture is unique in its continuity. Its most striking - characteristic is a capacity for change without disruption. It would - appear that that characteristic goes back even to [those] cultures - which preceded the Shang in northeast China. Shang culture, like all - great cultures, was eclectic, fertilized by influences from many - quarters. But these influences and techniques, when they were - accepted, met the same fate which has overtaken every people, every - religion, every philosophy which has invaded China. They were taken - up, developed to accord with Chinese conditions, and transmuted into - organic parts of a culture which remained fundamentally and - characteristically Chinese.[2] - -This is the comment of H. G. Creel, an American Sinologue who has helped -to explain the archaeological sites of a Chinese civilization -considerably older than any other. Even in its historical beginnings the -civilization of man in China displayed features corresponding to that of -the modern Chinese. - - -_The Ages before Confucius_ - -The earliest Chinese state known is the Hsia, which is traditionally -termed a dynasty in the Chinese chronicles and given the dates 2205-1765 -B. C. More critical examination of the materials of Chinese tradition, -the excavation of the engraved bones and bronzes from succeeding -periods, and an interpretation of Chinese history with the technique of -modern archaeology have upset the credibility of the records of the -earliest periods. All that is established is the fact that the Hsia was -a state before the Shang. It is unlikely that Hsia exercised any -imperial hegemony over other peoples, since the empire system did not -rise till Chou times. - -Of the Shang dynasty (traditionally 1765-1123 B. C.) much more is -known. Thirty years ago most Western scholars thought the Shang -chronicles to be myth, but excavations in northeast China have located a -Shang capital and have unearthed a large body of inscriptions on -bone.[3] The Shang culture must have been highly developed, possessing -an urban life, writing, and a definite system of monarchical government. -The germs of scholastic leadership were present. Power was in the hands -of a single ruler (_wang_, or king), who claimed hegemony for an -undetermined distance beyond the walls of the capital. - -In the twelfth century B. C. the Shang dynasty was overthrown by -conquerors from the west, the Chou. The Chou dynasty bridges the gap -between the semihistoric and the definitely historic period of Chinese -antiquity. Under the Chou the chief features of Chinese social and -intellectual existence took on clear form. From the Chou conquest and -their attempts to establish stable government China derived striking -social and political characteristics. One of the astonishing facts about -early Chinese history is the manner in which the Chou rulers utilized -propaganda to make their conquest secure, and in which their propaganda -furnished dynamic concepts of Chinese social thought and development. - -The most important of these widely propagandized concepts was that of -the Chinese Empire. The city of Shang had been the center of a dominion -which could not possibly have included more than a fraction of what is -known today as China. The civilized areas along the Yellow River were -probably no larger than Palestine. Most of what is now China was -conquered in succeeding centuries. Even in this small area, it is not -known what relationship existed between the ruler of Shang and other -rulers. The Chou monarchs built up the legend that the Shang rulers had -occupied a position of primacy among the rulers of the civilized world, -and then claimed the position themselves by right of succession through -conquest. There was thus fostered the notion of one ruler, central and -supreme. - -Secondly, the Chou themselves taught the doctrine of the right of -revolution. They identified their god with the Shang god instead of -declaring that their god had overwhelmed the other. They asserted that -this one god had been displeased by the profligacy and wickedness of the -Shang and had called upon the Chou to overthrow the Shang rulers. Both -these theories, refined and amplified, became fundamentals of Chinese -political thought in later ages.[4] - -The Chou established a system of government which left an imprint on -Chinese politics for three thousand years. In relating their -metropolitan administration to their occupation of the lands of North -and Central China they were less successful. Lacking any other device of -government, they turned to feudalism, and on the quasi-feudal -foundations of the Shang they imposed a fief system. This led first to -the division of China into many small feudal units and later to the -appearance of powerful territorial states. The first of these -periods--that in which feudalism predominated--was known as the Ch'un -Ch'iu, or Spring and Autumn epoch (770-473 B. C.). The second--in -which the states developed--was known as the Chan Kuo, or Warring States -epoch (473-221 B. C.). - -The rise of the Chou provided China with her first government on an -imperial scale and with the beginnings of a theory concerning the nature -of imperial government. The increasing disorganization during the Ch'un -Ch'iu and Chan Kuo periods led to the development of the Confucian and -other philosophies, wherein the Chinese, conscious of political -shortcomings, sought the good society. - - -_The Ideology Called Confucian_ - -551 B. C. is most commonly given as the year of Confucius' birth. -Confucius (K'ung Ch'iu; also Master K'ung--K'ung Fu-tz[)u], from which -Confucius is derived) was a wandering scholar and would-be official -whose life was spent in the advocacy of political and social reform. He -was important because of his part in establishing the profession of -teaching and for his doctrines upholding good government. Discontented -with the present, he turned to the past--becoming conservative and -aristocratic in outlook. His position in the history of political -thought he owes to the bent which he gave aristocratic conservatism. He -sought the leadership of the _chün-tz[)u]_ (the upright, superior, or -aristocratic man) rather than the domination of laws. He developed an -ethical system secular and practical in its orientation and humane in -its tenets. He emphasized the necessity of the individual's appropriate -self-consciousness in the society, and the need for following _li_ -(propriety), the established values. He stressed family loyalty above -all others, and insisted on respect for tradition. After his death in -479 B. C. his ideas were elaborated, clarified, and revised into what -is known as the _Confucian system_.[5] - -This system underwent many changes. The Confucian influences came to -prevail in the Han dynasty, in the second and first centuries B. C., -but lost its official preeminence with the fall of the Han in the third -century. It nevertheless retained a great share of intellectual -leadership. In the Sung period (960-1279) the philosopher Chu Hsi -developed Confucianism into its most recent accepted form. Others joined -him in sharpening and refining Confucianism. - -The Sung philosophers evolved a Confucianism which showed the influence -of the Taoist and Buddhist philosophies. They reinterpreted the classics -by emphasizing works other than those hitherto regarded as preeminent. -With reference to the concept _li_, they developed the notion of a truly -complete order running through both spirit and matter. Metaphysics, -alien to the mind of Confucius himself, became an operative part of -Confucian thought. Through their ethical and psychological studies the -Sung Confucians translated the Confucian rationale into an effective -ideological technique for domination. It is not inconsistent to find -them opposing any action definitely governmental. Furthermore, they -showed themselves to be conservatives in politics, and through their -commentaries on the classics--which were studied in succeeding centuries -along with the texts themselves--imprinted their conservatism upon the -Chinese mind. - -The ideology called _Confucian_ is not identical with Confucianism as -the philosophic system proper. In the first place, it is not known how -much of the social doctrines taught by Confucius and his successors was -original and how much mere transmission of preexisting beliefs. -Confucius himself regarded his work as that of a transmitter and not a -creator. Secondly, the whole Chinese culture contributed elements of -strength to the ideology to which the name of Confucius became attached -by Westerners. Thirdly, the system developed in practice to an extent -which Confucius could not have anticipated. The Confucian ideology and -society bear the relation to Confucius which Christendom bears to Jesus -Christ; both founders would scarcely recognize the derivations to which -their teachings have led. - -The Confucian ideology came to prevail in China just before the day of -Christ. At the time of Christ, Wang Mang, a usurper and a zealous -Confucian, shook the Han Empire with his experiments. A period of -reaction against Confucianism set in. Taoism and Buddhism provided rival -cults. After the twelfth century, Confucianism rose slowly to power over -men's minds again--although it had never been wholly superseded by other -doctrines, it had long lacked its all-compelling primacy. Not until the -Ming dynasty (1368-1643) did it become the state philosophy of China, -the ideology whereby China lived politically and whereby she was -governed. - -Descriptions of Confucian China apply, therefore, with particular -cogency to the past five hundred years, if account is taken of the role -of Confucianism as a state philosophy. But if those elements of Chinese -culture which are subsumed under the name of Confucianism are considered -apart from Confucian philosophy, the time may be extended indefinitely. -Confucian doctrine is one aspect of Chinese culture which has in various -centuries risen to the forefront. Underneath this doctrine there are -tenets, near the level of unconscious habit, which apply to almost all -ages of China. It is difficult to separate the two phenomena and to -distinguish between Chinese culture and its most representative -philosophy. An analogy, remote but suggestive, is the influence of -Aristotle in the West. Periods of Aristotelian predominance can be -distinguished from the general history of Western thought, in which -Aristotle plays a consistent but lesser role. As Aristotle was -interpreted by Aquinas, so was Confucianism by the Sung philosophers. -Aristotelian politics are far removed from the specific problems of -representative or modern authoritarian government; nevertheless they -possess great value and exercise an indeterminable influence upon the -entire West. The analogy holds for China if left in its loosest terms. -Confucianism is far from oblivion. The China which met the Western -impact--"old China" in the eyes of the twentieth century--was in fact -more Confucian than was the West Aristotelian. She was permeated by an -ideology in which Confucius' teachings were the key pattern, though not -one which he had made up in its entirety. - - -_Government in the Confucian Ideology_ - -In Confucian China, government was reduced to a minimum. There existed a -set of institutions which in many respects afforded a remarkable -although misleading parallel to the governments of the West. In fact, -the earliest Western visitors to China found no difficulty in applying -their own political language to China. The supreme Chinese leader they -called the _emperor_, despite the inevitable Caesarian connotations of -the term and the fact that it erased the peculiar significance of the -Chinese title. Subordinate areas were called _provinces_. All the way -through, the use of European concepts compelled whole series of -unwarranted parallels. The term _mandarin_ forced its way into Western -tongues, however, since there was no existing term to describe the -members of the curious hierarchy of scholar-bureaucrats occupying a -position of hegemony among the institutions of Chinese society. -Unfortunately for Chinese as well as Westerners, both were so poorly -informed in the beginnings of intercourse that the Chinese could not -secure an adequate picture of Europe, while the Europeans assumed that -the Chinese were more, rather than less, like themselves. The Chinese -society, with a single supreme ritual leader, was termed an _empire_, -and the predominant hierarchy of that society a _government_. - -Actually, modern political scientists would have to hesitate before -applying the term _government_ to the hierarchy of old China. In many -respects that hierarchy was more like Europe's medieval universities and -our fraternal societies than the governments of the West. The prestige -accruing to positions in the system was not derived so much from -political power as from the status which the system offered to its -members. An official, although he might value his power, was regarded in -the society at large almost as much for what he was as for the dignity -with which the office invested him. This arose from his peculiar role, -in which his function was to provide a model of propriety in his private -and public life rather than to interfere in the lives of others. -Interference, to be sure, occurred--sharply, Draconically, directed more -against the social group of the offender than against the offender -himself, on the theory that it was the function of the group to keep its -members in line with the common-sense traditions. In such rare cases the -officialdom became a government--government as the institution of men -who seek to control society in the name of all society. Normally the -officialdom was not a government in this sense, as it claimed leadership -rather than control, preached rather than punished, shamed rather than -intimidated the people. - -Confucius said, "If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to -be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but -have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought -to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of -shame, and moreover will become good."[6] In a governmental system which -was avowedly Confucian, the officials were discouraged from trying to -formulate rules, for such rules, if specific, could only duplicate the -enactments of custom and, if general, might entangle the official in a -web of words. If the officials were personally and individually -worthless, there would be no hope for good government and the only -remedy would consist in selecting good officials and placing them in -high positions. If the officials were good, their integrity and common -sense would show them the solutions to problems and they would have no -need to solicit advice from some manual of commands. No lifeless paper -and ink could guide a people unless there were upright officials to -study the classics and put the judicious rules found in them into -effect. The only safeguard against bad government was good government by -good men; the only remedy for bad government was the effort of good men. -The Chinese never set up an imaginary machinery and turned themselves -into its cogs. To the simple, common-sense humanity of the Confucians, a -government made up of rigid laws--a system having no reference to the -personality or value of individuals, but embedded in a vast mechanism of -numbers--would have seemed anathema and lunacy. - -Government in China was an auxiliary activity, the reserve power of a -hierarchy given to the pursuit of different ends. The officials were -teachers first and magistrates afterward; the emperor was a supreme -model first and a ruler afterward; the people were shamed, and punished -only when they were shameless. Such was the ideal theory upon which the -Chinese built their world society. The facts were rarely as bright as -they might have hoped; the reserve power never disappeared. - -The necessity for government did not always proceed from the frailties -of the governed. The Confucian system, although worthy of its great -esteem, was marked by the difficulties which attend all human -organization. Corruption and tyranny appeared, and were not by any means -negligible. In many cases it may be supposed that a system of laws would -have provided redress for individuals treated arbitrarily or unjustly; -but, if one is to judge by experience in the West, even law brings with -it other types of injustice peculiar to itself. In China some of the -most benevolent and effective emperors advocated at times a government -of rules and not of men, in order to check the caprice and the -oppression of officials; yet the role of law in China, in contrast to -the part it has played in the West, remained slight. The West affords -instances of effective political work outside legal systems, while the -Chinese have produced law codes of considerable breadth and -significance. Nevertheless, the power of Chinese government aside from -law is just as clear as the Western development of government within -law. - -The old Chinese system was based upon control through ideas, control -exercised through the maintenance of clear notions of right and wrong, -as founded in certain well-established common-sense traditions. The -world of fact and the world of right and wrong were bound together, and -the whole ideology was one of general and all-pervasive order. While the -Western impact was felt cumulatively through the nineteenth century, the -Chinese world of fact went down into the limbo of myth in a few -disestablished generations, and with it went the compulsion which -Confucian common sense had exerted.[7] The consequent development of new -ways of acting, which had nothing to do with traditional control, upset -the entire scheme. When the system of ideological guidance began -breaking down, there was a stampede to get away from it. Men no longer -trusted it, no longer trusted the tameness of their neighbors. A new -wildness, a savagery armed with science, had come with the aliens from -beyond the seas. It was the old hierarchy to which men turned, calling -it _the state_. - -As a state, as an all-embracing control institution, the old Chinese -hierarchy was a pseudomorph--it looked like a state but was not really -one. Now it had to develop those characteristics of regularity, -impersonality, and machine effectiveness demanded of a state in the -modern world. It had to restore the virtue of men by telling them how it -was possible to be virtuous in a world in which all things turned and -changed with the days and not with the centuries. It had to gather -together the members of the old Chinese world-community, reorient them -with respect to the new, divided world around them, and fight off the -inroads of outsiders. Above everything else, it had to grow strong, so -that it might institute order, so that it might someday grow weak again. -On the other hand, if a governmental system were set up which tried to -maintain the precarious supremacy that Western states have enjoyed, and -which was subject to uncontrolled fluctuations in the thought of the -people upon whom it rested, the Chinese might lose their character as -Chinese. They might be absorbed into the Western world and become a -group of yellow-skinned traditionless men, living according to the -heritage of white men's laws and doomed to a perpetual inferiority -because these laws were not their own. They might be aliens upon the -earth, with no group to call their own. Such a nightmarish vision may -have come to Sun Yat-sen when he pleaded with all his heart for the -unification and defense of a China still Chinese. - -The old system broke and collapsed in 1911-1912. This collapse was -hastened by the fact that the imperial family was incapable of -leadership. A succession of degenerates and children occupied the -throne--the one intelligent emperor was imprisoned by a clique--and a -fanatical old woman held enough power to keep anyone else from using it, -but not enough to lead or to want to lead a revolution from above. When -the old structure caved in, over four hundred million people were -without effective government, and no one really knew how to create it. - - -_The Replacement of the Confucian Ideology_ - -Only some of the movements which have occurred in China have had -political significance. With the collapse of the old stable order, the -Chinese fell into great confusion, devoting themselves to a variety of -doctrines and crusades. Some of these movements may be regarded as -subordinate to the day-to-day struggle for military or governmental -power; others, though within the sphere of politics as far as their -interests were concerned, never acquired sufficient importance to -impress themselves upon the general political scene. - -The only movements which need be here considered are constituent ones. -It has been noted that the real basis for the stability and operation of -the old Chinese society lay not in the power of an organized body of -law-makers, law-enforcers, and law-interpreters but in the -constitutionalism of common sense, in the deep harmony of agreement -which the Confucian outlook on fact and value had created. Men were -raised tame, and what tamed them was an ideology--a unified, coherent -body of ideas--which related the knowledge of the world to the sphere of -morals, which was applied by the intellectually dominant classes as a -means of control, and which secured for the controlling classes hegemony -over all groups in society. - -The moment the old order weakened, it was inevitable that men would try -to find substitutes which met four criteria: (1) a plausibly -satisfactory explanation for the world of fact; (2) a persuasively -related scheme of values (right, wrong; good, bad); (3) use of this -explanation and the value scheme (both together forming an ideology) to -control behavior; (4) authoritative status of the individuals promoting -the ideology, whether or not organized as a group. - -It will be recognized that these criteria fit the great religious -movements of mankind; it is equally apparent that they lend themselves -to the promotion of governance. Governing under conditions of -ideological anarchy is at best a precarious effort--a makeshift, a -pitiable building upon sand. The Western world faces today the same -problem that the Chinese face: How are men to agree widely enough to -live together in peace? But the Chinese approached this problem from an -experience of deliberately fostered agreement. Confucianism had the -effectiveness of the great religions and a sophistication and -malleability superior, perhaps, to any of them. As a consequence, the -modern Chinese were keenly aware of the necessity of the last two -criteria. The problem of ideological guidance is only half solved with -the presentation of a new scheme of facts and a new scheme of morals; -propaganda and institutionalization remain. - -Complaints are current in the West to the effect that art, science, and -letters are becoming propaganda--that is, that they are being used to -control men, or as attempts to control men. The Chinese of 1912 and -after never had similar scruples. All human effort was propaganda, and -whatever was not, was of only passing interest. There was no alternative -while the Chinese tried to found a new common sense in the discredited -ruins of their old world order. Their natural science had been impeached -by the demonstrable superiority of Western science. Their code of -ethics, whatever its aesthetic appeal, was ineffectual as a way of -conduct among people who had different, more violent notions of right -and wrong. Even the code of personal behavior--the elaborate courtesies, -the leisureliness, the grace of life in old China--was worthless in an -environment which put a high premium upon speed, impersonality, -efficiency. As the Chinese turned to a revision of all aspects of their -mode of life at once, different groups, trying to find some one key -reform which would solve all difficulties, fell into discord. Economic -advance, political reorganization, "realism" in outlook, educational -reform--all these had their adherents. None was allowed, by either -adherents or opponents, to stand simply as a group of separate reform -measures to be considered on their own merits; the drive for a new -ideology made all proposals important for their bent rather than their -content. A simple thing like the desirability of using Latin letters in -mass education immediately took on a vast significance when related to -the _Kulturpolitik_ of the time. The left-wingers once attacked the -missionaries who had first tried to introduce it, on the ground that the -missionaries were seeking to prostitute the Chinese mind and to make the -Chinese betray the past. Later the Communists enthusiastically pushed -the same scheme, stating that the Chinese ideographs were a stronghold -of reactionary thought. The torments of the struggle inevitably caused -the terms of conflict to resolve; gradually several more or less -determinant movements emerged, around which all other reforms tended to -cluster, because of sympathy or logical relationship. - - -_The Chief Movements in the Rebuilding of China_ - -Among the movements, Confucianism stands first. Even with its limpness -and decadence, it still represents the greatest single intellectual -force in the country. To the Chinese, this force may not even be -apparent, and they take it as much for granted as the air they breathe. -Nevertheless, the outside observer can see that even though Confucianism -is inert as a movement, its inertia is more important than the pressures -of other causes. Unconsciously, the Chinese accept whole tracts of -Confucian thought. They accept, in other words, the guidance of -Confucian ideology in much the same way that Americans who are not -churchgoers still accept the major premises of Christianity, simply -because their whole environment is charged with it. Just as in the West -a universal and potent Christian revival in politics is not likely but -is nevertheless conceivable, so in China it is not very probable but -quite possible that there will be a successful resurrection of the -orthodox Confucian philosophy. Whether a strict Confucianism could -return without monarchy is doubtful; and Sun Yat-sen's blend of -republicanism and Confucianism is so well established that it may -prevent the successful promotion of uninterpreted Confucianism. - -The Taoists and Buddhists are similarly inactive in politics. More -strictly concerned with the supernatural than is Confucianism, they -represent significant tangential forces upon the flow of political -development, but do not express themselves in overt intervention. Among -the leaders of all groups except the Communists there are important -members of both sects. It is not uncommon for any of them, defeated in -war or temporarily eliminated from politics, to turn to a monastery and -study ancient texts, much in the way that an idle American politician -goes to a farm, cultivating his health and his reputation. - -Islam is a minor but living force in China. It has long prevailed in the -border territories of the Northwest, and for generations has presented -vital and effective opposition to the Chinese influence. The territory -of the Mohammedans was consequently a hotbed of rebellion and -separatism, until the ghastly religious wars of the past century drowned -autonomous tendencies in an ocean of blood. At the present time the -Islamic movement faces another equal to itself in ferocity and -persuasiveness--Marxism--in Outer Mongolia, across the border in the U. -S. S. R., and in the northwest controlled by the Chinese Red Army. Thus -far Islam has given no promise of power. - -Nationalism--the movement launched by Sun Yat-sen, which follows his -doctrines of the _San Min Chu I_[8]--is the official movement of the -National Government of China and of the Nationalist armies under Chiang -K'ai-shek. It is consequently the chief power of positive action in the -whole country. At various times, Sun's followers have been known as -Progressives, Revolutionists, Republicans, and Nationalists--according -to the phase of their program then uppermost. - -Opportunism, rationalized by one or another ornamental philosophy, has -been very common in modern China. It has accepted ideological materials -the way they are used in superficial struggles of the West--making -ideals fit the facts and using them for the sake of the facts. -Opportunism has been characterized by the avid acceptance of wholly -implausible doctrines, or by a disingenuous "realism." Proalien and -defeatist movements have been opportunist in practical matters; "strong -man" philosophies have served the causes of individual ambitions. -Ideologically these currents were noteworthy only because they stirred -up the mud, making genuine intellectual clarification all the more -difficult. - -Finally, three important movements have come from outside. These are -Christianity, Marxism, and pro-Japanism. - -Each sociopolitical movement in China has had economic connections. Some -movements are avowedly bourgeois and capitalist and find their roots in -Western tradition. Others are inspired by the challenge of the land -problem, which is very acute. World production has upset Chinese farm -prices; international trade has ruined many peasant craft industries; -modern armies have imposed unprecedented tax burdens; opium and erosion -ruin large portions of the people and the land. In some cases the chaos -in the countryside can only be stilled by massacre. Despite the presence -of capitalist, proletarian, and agrarian economic movements, it seems -likely that economic questions will be settled by groups which do not -concentrate upon them to the exclusion of all others. Meanwhile, each of -the movements seeking to create a new China will have to provide for -reform or replacement of the economic system, which is decrepit because -of its internal decline and the appearance of economic devices from the -West vastly more effective, but inconsistent with Chinese modes of -existence. - - -_Confucianism in the Republic_ - -Confucianism as an official movement has been used to support other -tendencies, to further the opportunist activities of particular cliques, -and to bolster--by disguising--the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. It -is incorrect, however, to limit the role of Confucianism in modern China -to these facts. In serving as a foundation for other movements it -possesses unmeasured potentialities. - -Confucianism supposes that the truth and the socially desirable are -identical; that both are identical with the Confucian tradition; and -that an elite of scholars is required to propagate truth, clothing it -with the language of tradition and morality. Confucianism is hostile to -the very notion of sovereignty, leaves no room for a system of -permanently separate nations, and is unable to accommodate the Western -idea of an accidental growth in knowledge, dependent upon sporadic -individual initiative. Confucianism is strong in so far as it promotes a -society based upon knowledge, in which individuals can ascend or descend -according to their personal virtue and competence. Such an ideal has a -definite end in the physical universe by working toward a human -immortality of the flesh and the spirit--flesh through the perpetuation -of the family name in the male line, spirit through the transmission of -records and knowledge. Its present-day defects are obvious. The world of -fact in the Confucian ideology does not correspond with the beliefs -accepted as fact by the dominant West. The intellectual insulation -against the outside necessary to ideological control could not be -achieved by any single modern nation without the use of tyranny. -Moreover, Confucian ethics and politics, more than twenty-four centuries -old, can scarcely be expected to conform to the changed minutiae of -human life, dominated by technology. Nevertheless, while the Chinese may -not turn again to the classics for guidance in concrete situations, or -consult ancient authorities for solutions to simple practical problems, -the moral and social doctrines of Confucianism, redefined or modified, -could well play a definite role in the modern world. In China the chief -rivals to Confucianism will be the new heterodox schools of -reinterpreted Confucianism--such as the versions posed by Sun Yat-sen -and Chiang K'ai-shek, or the watery Confucianism of Manchoukuo. - -The nonformal unorganized power of Confucianism weighs more heavily. If -Confucianism were to be considered alone on the strength of the -movements featuring the password "Back to Confucius!" it would be so -negligible as to merit no attention. Not the strength of its partisans -but the concessions of its opponents and rivals make Confucianism -important. Confucius can no more be eradicated from modern China than -Plato, Aristotle, and Christ from the background of Western society. -Every Chinese movement, starting with Confucianism as the status quo, -will have to incorporate a large part of the traditional doctrines. It -may well be that in the new breeds of thought the Confucian strain will -prove dominant and most lasting. - -Until the breakdown of the Empire, Confucian texts were studied -appreciatively rather than critically. One does not criticize common -sense unless one is anxious for the reputation of a crank. With the -blinding dawn of Western knowledge, Confucianism went into the -wastebasket. Two years in New York were worth a generation of study over -the ancient authorities. From time to time, under the Republic, the -various governments discussed plans for educational reform, or -haphazardly encouraged the dying traditionalist schools; but nothing -could restore the prestige of classicism. Strangely, the greatest -impetus toward classical learning was provided by the challengers of the -classics. Modern Chinese scholarship, using Western methods of critical -study, and armed with new specializations undreamed of by the archaists, -found that the traditional authorities were valuable not only for what -they pretended to be--plain, direct, factual records--but also as source -material for penetrating interpretations. - -The Chinese have turned to this task since the opening of the various -scientific agencies of the National Government at Nanking and have -already produced works of importance on their own past. They have pushed -back their scientifically ascertainable history almost a thousand years. -The modern Chinese students, who hated the classics when they were -mouthed by sedate old scholars ignorant of the modern world, now devote -themselves to the classics to criticize them; criticizing them, they -study them; studying them, they love them. The "science of the country" -(Sinology) has recently been added to the curriculum of the modern -schools; it is causing a veritable renaissance. In fact, the Chinese are -constantly becoming more anxious to find precedent for political growth -and development in their own past rather than in the past of the West, -which they could never appreciate as much as do Westerners. - -The actual Confucian movements do not warrant attention. Militarists -have sponsored little Confucian coteries, or have paid for the -publication of sumptuous editions of the Confucian classics, with the -expectation of acquiring a reputation for benevolence and intelligence. -Wu P'ei-fu, the most accomplished scholar among the military leaders of -his period, who owed part of his prestige to his scholarship, was -diligent in promoting Confucianism. With his decline (1926) his example -was no longer felt to be worth following; Confucianism as a practical -political expedient passed from the scene. It gave too little sanction -to the raising of local conscript armies, inflation of the currency, and -the doubling of taxes. Its complete silence on such necessities could -not be taken for consent. - -In the Japanese-occupied territory in Manchuria, however, an interesting -experiment in Confucianism has been made. The customs and organization -of the last Chinese dynasty have been resurrected, touched up by a few -classical scholars, given a somewhat more orthodox and unrealistic air, -and proclaimed as the constitution of the Great Empire of Manchou -(Manchoukuo). Since the effective government of the country is under -strong Japanese influence, the venture is significant only as a -political narcotic. The laws proclaimed are in Chinese; the officials' -names are Chinese; the miranda of government, whatever the fact, are -consistent with the grand traditions of Chinese history. The Japanese -might have placed a handful of dreaming reactionaries in actual power -and helped the growth of an anachronistic Chinese Empire in the -northeast, but they seem to have spoiled their opportunity of creating a -friendly and subservient state by acting too arbitrarily and making it -impossible for the Confucian experiment to work. - -Confucianism in modern China owes its position not so much to its -prospects as to the fact that it has provided a frame of reference, -however obsolescent, for the political struggle. Hence, through the -tumultuous modern period, the Chinese have been strengthened by a -philosophy which emphasized the separateness and stability of each -institution in society, and which did not make them lose all with the -fortunes of a single supreme organization. As a positive political -force, Confucianism has done two things: It has kept the Chinese from -depending too much on political control, and it has provided a rationale -in the contest for power. It accomplished the first by making police a -function of society as a whole, by stressing the appropriateness of -behavior rather than its legality; and it has given the Chinese ethical -values despite their sorry political condition. Confucianism has -rationalized struggle by supplying each individual participant with a -code to apply if he came to power, and by giving him a good pretense for -seeking power. Confucius himself lived in a time when Chinese political -organization was chaotic. He noted the need for righteous men in high -places and pointed out the good which could be done, apart from general -reform, by the furtherance of virtue through scattered efforts. -Confucius supplied the ambitious men of his own time with a reason for -aspiring to power--by making political responsibility a duty for the man -of intelligence. The Confucian scholar was no saint contemplating -eternity; he was a proud, correct, self-righteous, patient individual, -obliged by his training to take public office wherein his talent could -gain wide influence. - -In modern China, the seekers of political office have been able to avoid -the appearance of abject venality by professing respectability. Even -though they may have been just as corrupt as the politicians of other -nations, and more efficiently so, they nevertheless had the saving grace -to eschew hard realism and cloak their ambition with a pleasantly -virtuous tradition. A military leader could surround himself with a few -scholars and give his efforts to reach power the air of a mild and -well-mannered crusade. Whenever political strife in China has had no -meaning but vanity and greed it has at least worn the decent cloak of -the Confucian tradition. - - -NOTES - -[1] For a good general introduction to Far Eastern history and politics -see G. Nye Steiger, _A History of the Far East_, Boston, 1936, the most -complete of one-volume works; Harold M. Vinacke, _A History of the Far -East in Modern Times_, New York, 1937, especially good for social, -economic, and governmental developments; René Grousset, _Histoire de -l'Extrême Orient_, Paris, 1929; and Richard Wilhelm, _Ostasien_, Potsdam -and Zurich, 1928, a brilliant short outline. Diplomatic history is dealt -with by H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, _Far Eastern International -Relations_, Boston, 1931, the most detailed one-volume work; Paul H. -Clyde, A _History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East_, New York, -1937, the most recent; and Payson J. Treat, _The Far East_, New York, -1935. The most useful one-volume history of China is Kenneth Scott -Latourette, _The Chinese: Their History and Culture_, New York, 1934. -All these works carry bibliographies; those of Steiger and Latourette -are particularly informing. - -[2] Herrlee Glessner Creel, _Studies in Early Chinese Culture, First -Series_, p. 254, Baltimore, 1937. Quoted by permission of the author. - -[3] H. G. Creel, _The Birth of China_, London, 1936, provides a -brilliant popular account of the earliest known Chinese culture. - -[4] Creel, _Studies_, pp. 50 ff. For relevant information the writer is -indebted to Professor H. H. Dubs, Duke University. - -[5] On Confucianism and its immediate background see Marcel Granet, -_Chinese Civilization_, New York, 1930; Fung Yu-lan (Derk Bodde, -translator), _A History of Chinese Philosophy: The Period of the -Philosophers_, Peiping, 1937, an authoritative work; Liang Chi-chao, _A -History of Chinese Political Thought_, New York, 1930; and Leonard -Shihlien Hsü, _The Political Philosophy of Confucianism_, New York, -1932, brilliant but open to criticism. For a popular portrait of -Confucius see Carl Crow, _Master Kung_, New York, 1938. - -[6] _Confucian Analects_, Book II, Chapter III. - -[7] For its loss of political support see below, pp. 34 ff. - -[8] See below, pp. 41 ff. - - - - -_Chapter_ II - -THE RISE OF NATIONALISM - - -Of the constituent movements of modern China, the most important has -focused on the personality, principles, and following of Sun Yat-sen -(1867-1925). Now known primarily as the Nationalist movement, it has at -various times emphasized different aspects of its program. In its -simplest and most fundamental points, the movement has fallen heir to -early patriotism. It has assumed different names: the Society for the -Regeneration of China (1894-1905), or _Hsing Chung Hui_; the League of -Common Alliance (1905-1912), or _T'ung Mêng Hui_; the Nationalist -Democratic Party or National People's Party (1912-1914), or Kuomintang; -the Chung Hua Kê Ming Tang (1914-1920), or Chinese Revolutionary Party; -and since 1920, again the _Kuomintang_. Kuomintang is the combination of -three Chinese words meaning "country" or "realm," "people," and "party." -The name of the party can be translated in innumerable ways: nationalist -democratic, nationalist popular, national people's party, etc. The -commonest rendering is "Nationalist," but it is to be remembered that -the word "people" figures in the name. Furthermore, the Chinese version -of patriotism has more cosmopolitan and fewer restrictive connotations -than patriotism ever had in the West. - - -_Nationalism: Patriotic Anti-Manchu Phase_ - -Even in a world society that knew neither state nor nation the Chinese -felt attached to their homes and their native land, which led them to -repel invaders. They never personified this loyalty or tried to express -it in specific institutions; nor did they admit outsiders to equality -and concede that there was more of the civilized world outside, thus -admitting the existence of nations. Their attitude rested on sentiment -rather than theory. There was no elaborate bolstering of Chinese racial -superiority, for--by and large--all the peoples in China, conquerors or -conquered, seemed racially alike, fused under the pressure of great -social homogeneity. - -At the time of the Manchu conquest (about 1644) the Chinese developed a -passionate hatred for the invaders from the northeast. In entrenching -themselves the Manchus committed a fateful blunder which was to bring -momentary strength but ultimate ruin: they enforced racial segregation -in the political, social, and economic sphere. Legend has it that a -Chinese statesman, forced into Manchu service, suggested this plan and -thus laid the cornerstone for the eventual Chinese liberation. The -Manchus prohibited miscegenation; they established Manchu garrisons -throughout the Empire, keeping their troops from work (which might have -led to intermingling with the Chinese) and thus ruining them by sloth. A -fixed quota of Manchus was introduced into the government service, -irrespective of the operation of the examination system. In time the -Chinese scholars submitted willingly enough to the alien rule; two of -the Manchu emperors were the most enlightened patrons which Chinese -letters and arts had had in centuries, and the intellectual opposition -dwindled away to a minimum. - -Among the populace there was no such general reconciliation. Deprived -for the first time of scholarly leadership, the common people, peasants -and artisans, organized numerous secret societies. The societies -flourished, coming to supersede the government in whole areas and -marking many decades with insurrection and riot. Scholars fought the -secret societies because of their uncouth rituals, their heterodoxy of -ideas, their opposition to the existing system. The societies answered -by building up political agencies which were able to act on the lower -and more generally understood levels of ideology. - -These groups kept patriotism afire. The greatest of their uprisings, the -T'ai-p'ing rebellion of 1849-1865, was put down with the assistance of -the Western Christian states, but it left a permanent mark on Chinese -society. The rebels had shown that it was possible to wrest the greater -part of China from Manchu rule. They were the first to welcome the -invasion of Christianity, adopting a fantastically modified Christian -faith. They awakened the Chinese to the immediate possibility of a war -of liberation against the outsiders who held the throne of the Chinese -world. - -The T'ai-p'ing rebellion showed its strength as a patriotic movement. It -was successful in shaking the established ideology with a rival -compounded of the more vulgar parts of the old, combined with -Christianity. And it indicated the weakest point of the -dynasty--governmental inadequacy in dealing with the agrarian problem. -The years of formal stability gave China a much increased population; -the same years were years of political decline which raised the cost of -government. A house-cleaning was in order. The T'ai-p'ing demonstrated -the need for it; the Manchu dynasty refused to yield to the demand. - -Sun Yat-sen was born in 1866 or 1867. An uncle of his had been one of -the rebels. At Sun's parental home the countryside had known of the -T'ai-p'ing rebellion; many in his native village had participated in it. -He was as patriotic as any Chinese could be in the far south, where the -Manchu conquest had penetrated least deeply, but his patriotism did not -differ from the patriotism of his neighbors until he came to know life -outside China. From the patriotism of the old Chinese realm to the -nationalism required of China in the new Westernized world--this was a -step to be traversed only by rich personal experience. - -Sun took this step as a boy, when he went to Honolulu. He soon was -converted to Christianity, learned English, and became acquainted with -Western life. He was able to see the world in terms of nations, and he -saw that from the Western point of view China was a large but weak -nation. Already committed from childhood to the revolutionary cause, he -was led by his knowledge of the West to change patriotism into -nationalism. When he returned to China, after studying medicine in -Hongkong, he arrived with the notion of transforming the old world -community into an effective modern nation-state. - -He did not seem at first to realize how necessary it was to dispose of -the monarchy. For a while he petitioned the authorities, trusting that -immediate reforms might be effected within the existing framework, -pending an ultimate revolution of patriots. His success must be measured -in terms of what he and his few fellow workers learned, rather than of -what they accomplished. His technique of revolution was based upon the -established traditions of Chinese history--the formation of a small -nucleus, the gathering of affiliated groups, the permeation of a -regional bureaucracy when possible, and the launching of terroristic -attacks to shake the apparent stability of the government. - -At the beginning of his work he came into contact with the secret -groups. When he started organizing in earnest, the first major -development was the admittance en bloc of a small secret society. In an -unpublished autobiography Sun wrote: "After my graduation I practised -medicine in Canton and Macao as a pretext for spreading my revolutionary -ideas."[1] - - -_Nationalism: Revolutionary Modernist Phase_ - -The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was the cause of much disturbance in -China and the first major event to shake the belief of the masses in -their own ideology. Fantastic barbarians with deadly contrivances might -harry the coasts and even allow themselves impertinences with the -dynasty, but the situation became different when a small, inoffensive, -ineffectual neighbor nation took over these same weapons and spoiled the -internal arrangements of the Far Eastern universe. The peripheral -countries could perhaps even demolish the central suzerainty; this was -the _mene-tekel_ of the Empire. - -The revolutionary organization of Sun Yat-sen had by now become -definitely modernist, nationalist, and antimonarchical, instead of -merely patriotic and antidynastic. Under the name of _Hsing Chung Hui_ -there was established a confederacy of secret societies. After a short -while the member societies were liquidated, and a modern revolutionary -organization emerged, advocating overthrow of the Manchus. The -intellectual elite of this group had no part in the ideological control -which gripped the rest of China, in the form of the traditional -mandarinate. As a new elite, with a new ideology, it broke the monopoly -of leadership, the monopoly of thought. The consequences cannot be -exaggerated. It was symptomatic that Sun's own family became estranged -in part and that many members of the society had to die a civil death -before working in the organization. They left their property to heirs -and changed their names, lest--under the principle of group -responsibility--terrible punishments be visited upon their native -villages and their families. Furthermore, an important bloc of -participants consisted of Chinese from overseas. - -The Chinese overseas were for the most part men who had been kidnaped -and sold in the coolie trade or who had stealthily deserted their native -regions for adventure and wealth. With the increased foreign commerce it -was possible for many Chinese to become wealthier outside their own -country than within. But in leaving they left their custom and tradition -and met peoples--especially Europeans and Americans--whose way of life, -though utterly different, was effective in the practical, tangible terms -of wealth and security. Chinese in increasing numbers bettered their -condition outside. They did not amass wealth through family effort, nor -did they broaden their learning through the classics. What they won, -they won themselves; and they learned something for which the Confucian -ideology had no place. When they returned home, they were greeted with -contempt, though also with covert admiration. Those among them who had -gathered knowledge of the West, of modern methods of business, of -European languages, found that in the eyes of the traditional literati -and officials they were lower than the lowest illiterates. - -Such men came in great numbers to the revolutionary party. Among -overseas Chinese merchants, workers, and students, there developed a -group--possessing power in the form of money and family -connections--which was determined to overthrow the existing order and -bring China in line with the outside world. Their effort was idealistic, -because the Chinese overseas felt that the economic and cultural -advantages of the West should be secured for their countrymen at home; -it was also realistic, since they were fighting in the only way they -knew for a respectable, honorable return to their homes. They could not -throw their lives away and admit that their ventures and dangers were of -no profit. They felt that they had acquired something, and they wanted -it recognized. It was Sun Yat-sen who showed them how they could do it. - -In a sense, this feature of the Nationalist movement might be taken as -the pivot of modern Chinese government and politics. Controlling men -through controlling their minds and through making sure that every -possible leader would lead from within the hierarchy--these devices of -the past had failed. There were now Chinese to whom the Confucian rules -were pleasant and homelike but not the real material of modern life. -These Chinese possessed intellectually trained leaders who had nothing -in common with the dominant elite--who were more interested in building -railroads, improving water supplies, defending China's frontiers, and -modernizing the country than in augmenting the virtue of mankind. - - -_Nationalism: Republican Phase_ - -Every year brought the Nationalists increased strength. The Manchu court -yielded a series of constitutional reforms which by their promises -disturbed the minds of those still content with the old order and by -their nonfulfillment raised fresh storms of resentment against the -Manchu rule. The court did not really seek to master the drift in the -thought of the people; it tried to defeat change rather than direct -it.[2] In a few short years before and after 1900 the Dragon Throne -declined from the supreme office of mankind to an obsolete and -picturesque ornament of a government so weak and disorganized as to -render ornament artificial. While the Empire lost prestige, the -Nationalists came to emphasize the republican part of their program more -and more. As Nationalists, they differed little from the generations of -patriots who had fought the alien rulers of China. As republicans, they -were the Chinese vanguard of modernization. Some people accepted -republican ideas as good in themselves; far more thought them better -than the Manchu rule, especially since there was no Chinese pretender in -sight--the heir of the Mings, the last native dynasty, was a pensioner -in Peking. A large number probably thought little about the abstract -issue one way or another but trusted the revolutionary leaders because -they seemed to have a competence consonant with the times. - -As the Nationalists advanced, they reorganized their party mechanism, -and formed the T'ung Mêng Hui in 1905. At this time the principles which -were later to become the _San Min Chu I_[3] were given public -formulation. The Nationalists began to feel the necessity of an ideology -with which to replace that of the Confucian monarchy. It had been -possible to leave doubt unsettled so long as they were a small, -conspiratorial group. As soon as they began to secure adherents among -the masses it became necessary to provide their followers with a common -set of ideas. In seeking agreement on fundamentals, they found -disagreements within the party. Sun Yat-sen's role began to change from -conspiracy to statesmanship. The future was to show that even a -statesman was not enough--that a lawgiver, a state founder, was needed. - -The T'ung Mêng Hui was one of the most effective revolutionary -organizations which the modern world has seen, so far as achievement of -immediate aims was concerned. In a series of activities which would -rouse a mystery-story addict to startled incredulity, the -revolutionaries tried to awaken the populace by spectacular revolts. -They capitalized on the impotence of a government alien to China, one so -ineffectual that it could not protect the Chinese from the other, newer -aliens who had appeared. They realized that it was hopeless to attack -the monarchy along its entire front, since the old ideological guidance, -although waning, still held the broad masses in inertia. The -revolutionaries accordingly attacked the Empire at its top level, its -most obvious and conspicuous points of strength--the military and -political headquarters of the viceroyalties and other significant -positions. Knowing that they themselves could not monopolize the -government of China, they looked forward to attaining a position of -leadership among the various groups in the Chinese society and to -keeping that leadership through parliamentary methods to be established -under the Republic. Instead of regarding the Empire as a set of -institutions, they considered it the mere decoration of the country. -They had no reason to suppose, nor any way of telling, that in -destroying the old regime they destroyed government and all possibility -of government for a long time to come. They consequently tried to set in -motion a snowball revolution--an initial conspiracy of terror which -would intimidate the Manchus and cause the whole house of cards to -collapse. It was their task only to start the movement, which could be -counted upon to avalanche itself into history. - -To the revolutionary group a republican scheme seemed possible. They -felt that in the twentieth century men would disagree but amicably, and -they regarded democracy as a form of government so excellent that its -mere inauguration would guarantee success. Furthermore, republicanism -and democracy were closely associated with nationalism; how could a -nation be free unless it governed itself in the most direct -manner--through the votes of its broad majorities? - -In failing to provide a stopping point for the revolution before they -started it, the Nationalists were scarcely guilty of rash action. No -human being could have foretold the consequences of revolt against a -civilization. The revolutionaries were men who had passed through the -transition from the old Confucian ideology to that of the West with -relative ease. They did not realize that what was obvious to them would -be a mystery to the masses and that the political changes contemplated -would rip asunder the very fabric of thought in China. It is evidence of -the simplicity and usefulness of Confucian ideas that--even when -admitted to be challenged by the new environment--they continued to -operate without the sanction of intelligence, and operated well as empty -habits. - -With the old patriotic forces behind them, and an untested Utopia ahead, -the Nationalists raced the Manchu Empire into revolution. The story of -the revolution is not complex.[4] In a great part of China the people -awoke to find no government. In the North the imperial officials and -princes clamored for the assistance of a man whom they had once -slighted: Yüan Shih-k'ai, the leader of the modernized armies of the -Empire. He held the fate of China in his hands. But he betrayed the -Empire so that he might betray the Republic; he joined the -revolutionaries and thrust a settlement upon the ruling house. With his -intervention the whole picture of Chinese politics changed. Yüan brought -troops into the play of power, troops dependent upon himself, men no -longer interested in ideas now that the all-compelling force of the old -way of thought was gone. - - -_Nationalism: Constitutionalist Phase_ - -The Republic at Nanking enjoyed a brief Utopian existence, with Sun -Yat-sen as its president. The revolutionaries were independent from -October, 1911, to March, 1912, when the Republic became the instrument -of Yüan Shih-k'ai. No substantial power accrued to the legislative. - -During their bright heyday of power as a parliamentary party under the -Republic--which they had founded only to give it away to the -military--the Nationalists were known as the _Kuomintang_. At this time -the Chinese name of the party was significantly translated "Democratic -Party." Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionaries had expected that the -Chinese people would accept the new ideology without understanding it -and then would come to understand it very quickly. They could not hope -to replace the old ideology before the revolution, because the presence -of the imperial government made large-scale educational work impossible. -After the establishment of the Republic, however, they found themselves -hamstrung because they had not inculcated republicanism. It was a -vicious circle. The governmental pattern set up at Nanking was replaced -by another to make room for Yüan Shih-k'ai, who proposed a third, in -which he should have more power, in order that he might create a fourth -government, in which he should be emperor.[5] The armies of the -revolutionaries, such as they were, became absorbed in the forces of -Yüan. When, in a few months, the Republic had been won and lost, the -Nationalists realized that the revolution of 1911-1912 was only the -first step in their labors. They experimented with a minor revolution in -1913, and then turned to other measures for securing a return to -constitutional government and the creation of a republic which should be -as firmly rooted in men's minds as the majestic but irretrievable -Confucian order had been. They had won the revolution by creating doubt -and giving it tangible expression; they lost their revolution because -doubt persisted, swallowed everything, leaving China in a turmoil beyond -all systematic thought. - -The first years of the nominal Republic, the beginning of the new order -in China, were marked by a feverish pretense of changed forms. The -outlook which superseded the ancient ideology was curious. It was a -mixture of traditionalist acceptance of temporary disorder and -resignation to a period of transformation into an unconceived and -unproclaimed future. This outlook gave life no purpose, but it kept men -from falling into complete anarchy. People were willing to accept -illegal authorities, since local administrators had traditionally -maintained a spotty cloak of public order. Modern Chinese were prepared -to pay lip service to a preposterous parliamentary regime but soon found -that it was comfortable to think in terms such as armies, foreign -interference, and money--thus allowing their thinking to settle in the -large framework of an accepted disorder. - -The Nationalists tried to combat this anticonstitutional way of thought. -For six years (1914-1920) they combined conspiratorial techniques with -the role of a legally constituted power fighting for law. They assumed -the name _Chinese Revolutionary Party_ until they discovered that they -could secure no ideological foothold upon which to base the order they -proposed. Some of them went so far as to become anarchists, favoring a -continuance of disorder until the world joined China in collapse. Others -followed an unrealistic legalism; they held to the paper constitution, -to the text of the president's oath of allegiance to the constitution, -to the election laws, thinking that the magic of ink would conjure up a -government. Sun Yat-sen, and the body of his followers with him, -attempted to chart a middle course; in 1917 there was created a "lawful" -administration in the South. With extraordinary good fortune the -Republic might have succeeded, but the war in Europe, the Japanese -interventions, and other adverse circumstances prevented this. - -The Nationalists changed the name of their party back to _Kuomintang_ -after 1920 but did not discontinue their reformist policies until about -two years later. Sun Yat-sen had spent years in study and propaganda; -eventually his program became an ideology. No sharp line can be drawn -between the two. In some respects the very first programs of the -revolutionaries were ideological, in that they presupposed a change in -man's outlook which would accommodate republican government. On the -other hand, programmatic proposals may be distinguished from ideological -theses by the fact that programs refer to things which should be done -and ideologies to things in which men should believe in order to do -anything at all. A program which is rooted in no ideology is one lacking -context; unless a program refers to some accepted scheme of thought it -is words in a vacuum. Similarly, an ideology without programs to put it -into men's minds, to persuade men to believe in it and give it effect, -is an airy prettiness for philosophers. The Nationalists had stood on -the foundations of Confucian common sense and proposed a republic; they -had destroyed the organization which made that common sense seem real -and had cut the ground from under their own feet. They could not -distinguish values because their critical attitude enveloped all moral -notions or made them isolated points without coherent significance. The -Nationalists themselves fell prey to day-dreaming when they appealed to -worthless paper for their right to govern. The epoch is significant in -the history of the movement in that it taught the Nationalists that men -would not fight unless there was something to fight for and that there -was nothing to fight for until men could find desirable elements -embedded in some larger scheme of life. Politics had to have an end and -an environment; without either it was a series of monologues in the -wilderness, the soliloquies of logicians. - -Sun Yat-sen during this time wrote the drafts of monumental treatises -which were to relate the general body of his doctrines to the background -of fact and thought from which they had emerged. He never finished them, -but meanwhile he and his followers realized that if they were to have a -grip over government they must grasp power within the brains of men. The -revolutionary reformists had to supply some better medium of persuasion -than the frivolity of military cynicism or the impudence of shadow -government. They had to abandon legalism and bring forth an ideology -capable of serving as the new foundation for a just and effective system -of government in China. If their original importance was that of an -effective counter-elite springing up in the intellectual borderlands -between the Western and Chinese ideologies, their second period of -significance begins with their realization that a new framework of -thought would have to be set up before any of their programs could be -effectuated. - - -_The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_ - -The ideology which the Nationalists were to teach was one which had lain -dormant in the party for more than thirty years. It was the invention of -Sun Yat-sen--his reinterpretation of Confucianism to suit the modern -world. He did not settle down with books before him, pen in hand and -notebooks all about, to formulate a Utopia; nor did he approach the -subject as a historian, seeking scientific causes for the emotions and -loyalties of men. He came to the subject as a political leader, -modifying the given background only so far as was necessary. His -doctrines grew with his personal growth and the development of his -movement. They are scattered among a variety of writings and utterances, -and are contradictory in many points although remarkably consistent as a -whole. - -Sun Yat-sen asked himself: What is China? China is a race, he said, a -race which was once great and which held benevolent world leadership in -the world it knew. It has declined because it has fallen upon evil days, -under the rule of outsiders, barbarians, and has failed to develop in -ways which the West discovered. This race should be a nation in the -modern world; a great, powerful, united, effective nation in a world of -nations. It should fight for its right of self-rule and should support -justice in the international community. In order to achieve greatness, -the Chinese will have to turn their nation into an effective state and -add the devices of law to the devices of social control through -ideology. They should rethink their ideology, keeping the old ethical -philosophy and the old social knowledge (the technique of control -through thought, as in Confucianism) but adding Western technics. They -should then strive to make their nation the leader in progress toward -world peace and eventual cosmopolitanism. China should turn to -nationalism for the time--decades or centuries--that remained for the -travail of nations, but the Chinese should never forget the world -society whence they came. This is the first of Sun's three principles, -_nationalism_. - -The second principle referred to the problem of leadership and the -organization of government. Obviously, the Chinese could not return to -monarchy in the modern world. In the first place, it would not be -modern; Sun lived at a time when the democratic tide was sweeping to its -high point and when the world triumph of democracy seemed a foregone -conclusion. Secondly, Sun thought it disloyal to China's past for the -Chinese to evade the responsibility of democracy, as it was implicit in -their most ancient traditions and thus an obligation laid upon them by -their first great leaders. Thirdly, he thought that good administration -was to be derived from democracy more readily than from any other -system. Fourthly, because democracy was a modernizing force, it should -be introduced; the people, participating in progress, would themselves -become progressive. Fifthly and most necessarily, democracy was simply -the self-control of a nation. If the nation was to be created and made -free through nationalism it had to become democratic, since there was no -other way for a whole people to express and rule itself. But the Chinese -needed specific devices[6] in order to assure that the old system of -selecting an intellectual leadership would not be compromised or -destroyed by democracy. They should see to it that democracy did not -become mob rule. The Chinese people should become self-indoctrinating -and thus maintain ideological control along with political. But the -Chinese should accommodate the concept of the state in their thinking, -since the concentration of power in Western states made it necessary -that there be in China an equivalent social device for canalizing and -concentrating power, in order to meet Western and Japanese attacks. The -egalitarian features of democracy should be congenial to the democracy -of customs and manners which was indigenous to old China. This was the -second principle, _democracy_. - -The third principle was the restatement in modern political terms of the -cardinal economic principles of the past, together with an infusion of -newly invented doctrines. It protected the livelihood of the people, and -may be summed up in a single sentence: No government deserves to exist -unless it assures its people of the maximum of material welfare possible -under prevailing physical conditions. Government was of no use if the -people perished. The state was nothing if its substance was lost. -Political leadership should aim at constant improvement of economic -conditions, spread economic benefits, and make the nation healthy. In -doing so it was not to be bound by any creed of capitalism or communism -but was to experiment and seek the most efficient measures for the -benefit of the whole community. This last principle involved the _life_ -of the nation, as nationalism did its _birth_ and democracy its -_freedom_. It was an ethical doctrine rather than a schematic principle, -and cannot be properly translated. It should best be left in the -Chinese, and expressed by two words which mean "people" and -"generation": _min shêng_. - -This ideology gave the Nationalists a faith to propagate. It was -designed to achieve the revision of the old Confucian ideology; -experience and the accepted ideology would supply this new skeleton with -flesh. It differed radically from the Marxian doctrine in that it was -traditionalistic and nationalistic; it resembled the Marxian doctrine in -that it sought to create a whole new intellectual civilization before -turning to the question of government. - -The new ideology had to make headway against other propagandas, the -partially adequate ways of thought which had grown up since the -establishment of the Republic. It had to restore life to the vast corpse -of Confucianism, and soon after its first general promulgation (1924) -had to fight its temporary ally--communism--for power over Chinese -minds. - - -_Opportunist Movements and their Anticonstitutional Effects_ - -The field which the Nationalists invaded to propagate their doctrines -was already occupied. The slow evaporation of the Confucian moral, -intellectual, and social system had given rise to various movements -which, for lack of a better term, may be called _half-ideological_. -These movements made no pretense of presenting a new order sufficient -for Chinese thought and belief, but--in the opinion of those -constituting them--they did afford an adequate frame of reference for -immediate action. Some of the half-ideologies were: (1) military -feudalism, (2) provincial _tuchünism_ (3) China-wide militarism, (4) -bureaucratism, and (5) capitalism. Although none of them succeeded in -indoctrinating broad masses of the population, yet each was effective in -a negative way. Each obstructed the development of any coherent system -of social and political life. Each was anticonstitutional, since it -proposed to constitute a scheme narrowly pragmatic or unattainable in -fact. - -The presence of these movements gave China an appearance of considerable -freedom in the earlier years of the Republican era. Diversity of opinion -based upon a fundamental concord in outlook--diversity circumscribed by -one cohesive ideology--may be most wholesome in social and political -life. When diversity penetrates so deep as to include all major aspects -of human existence, it becomes insupportable, a hindrance and not a -stimulant to action. When policy is predetermined by tradition, thought -is easy, action relatively more difficult; when there is discord even on -fundamentals, thought is difficult, action easy. Almost any scheme -mitigating the evils of discord will be assured a hearing; if the world -cannot be rationalized, the individual will be. - -Yüan Shih-k'ai inaugurated, in his efforts to control China through -military means, a way of thought which might be characterized as -military feudalism of the twentieth century variety, an order based upon -contract between commander and soldier, upon the payment of wages by the -former and the performance of any task by the latter. This militarism -never flowered in literature, never developed a political theory, never -achieved governmental form. Even Yüan felt its inadequacy as a state -philosophy, and by his attempt to establish a modern monarchy ruined -what chances he might have had for anticipating Mussolini with a Fascist -movement. As it was, the movement of military thought was derived from -the facts rather than propagated to excuse the facts. The militarists -themselves abandoned it whenever they found substitutes. - -Nevertheless, the movement for a military ideology was at times the -prevailing mode of thought among the men who held power in China. They -were able to gain perspective on their own behavior by reference to the -old traditions, regarding themselves as upright magistrates in a time of -chaos. For working purposes they could claim from their subordinates and -superiors a vague constitutionalism limited to army circles. Amid the -cowardice, betrayal, and corruption in the military dictatorships, -tendencies occasionally appeared leading toward an effective military -spirit. Certain kinds of betrayal or cruelty were beyond the limits of -good soldiering, but not many. - -A more effective explanation for the condition of the armies in China -from 1916 to about 1931 may be found in _tuchünism_. A _tuchün_ was a -military commandant ruling an area ranging from a few districts to a -number of provinces.[7] The imperial regime maintained a military -counterpart to the provincial governor. After the Republican Revolution -provinces tended to become separate and autonomous under military -leaders. The military man, who was prone to apologize for his position -by admitting that he was not developing a permanent establishment, who -held his troops together by a modern feudalism, could also rationalize -his role by presenting himself to his province as a good son, by -stressing the wickedness and strangeness of the soldiers in other -provinces, and by suggesting the thought of federalism. The scheme was -not convincing or edifying, but it could become temporarily popular. A -great part of the news from China is still written in terms of -_tuchünism_--since it is a simple pattern and requires no explanation -involving Chinese peculiarities. Satrapies have become tyrannies in all -ages. At the very best the _tuchünist_ movement could not have served -well as the constituent force of a new China. It would necessarily have -ended in one-man government, almost unthinkable with modern Chinese -conditions; or it would have implied a military federalism which is -scarcely a solution to the problem of unity. - -Military cliques at times had China-wide proportions, but despite the -proclamations which were occasionally issued, there was no effective -single movement for a general military regime. Such movements as there -were developed within the framework of the shadow Republic. Moreover, -the shifting alignments of Chinese wars within the nominal organization -of the Republic were so confused as to make almost anything but order -seem possible. Yet many Chinese thought in terms of a "realism" -compounded of slogans and military exigencies. - -If movements for military feudalism, provincial _tuchünism_, and (most -nebulous of all) China-wide militarism failed to provide more than an -explanation of immediate fact, there were counterparts in the civilian -administration aspiring to political autonomy for particular cliques. -Ministries tended at times to develop a spirit of independence. Finance -was too close to the military, but the revenue collection services (with -a large European and Japanese personnel) and the postal services behaved -as _imperia in imperio_. The foreign office functioned frequently -without effective superiors. Working without pay a great part of the -time, in a period which offered no near solution for its disastrous -troubles, bureaucrats saw in the increase of bureaucracy a possible -inauguration of order. The ministries did function in a way, despite the -chaos about them. They might have evolved a new bureaucratism to steal -the _tuchüns'_ power. Their spirit was helpful in particular and -damaging in general, since it was bound to sabotage any government which -might come to power. A few years of insecurity may weld a bureaucracy -together more closely than would decades of spoils; this was the case -between 1916 and 1928. Bureaucratism demonstrates the limitations of -opportunist ideology as a foundation for government. - -Capitalism flourished wherever economic conditions made it possible; -such economic conditions did not last very long under the jurisdiction -of the military. In treaty ports[8] the Chinese capitalists prospered, -secure under governments which were international in effect, Chinese -only in legal fiction. There Chinese soon amassed enough capital to -compete with economic institutions erected by foreigners, and exercised -an important indirect influence on the growth of Chinese government. -Capitalism helped to thwart a peasant-labor alliance in China, for -although the capitalists were an insignificant minority without -country-wide influence, its form of control was mobile. No army, no -surge of popular resentment, no propaganda, no conspirator can travel as -fast as a telegraphic money order. The ideology of capitalism was -content in China to remain subordinate as long as the political and -legal conditions were favorable to it. Capitalist groups supported any -sort of strong government which might protect property and increase -opportunities for investment. - -Among the most pitiful of the movements for the construction of a -general agreement in China were the proalien movements. They were -pitiful because they represented a prostitution of thought by men -conscious of the nature of their action. The Anfu Party flourished in -the first decade after the death of Yüan in 1916; together with its -militarism and its meaningless "realism" it was pro-Japanese. The -present "government" in North China[9] is another such movement. -Manchoukuo bases little of her official ideology on such a dangerous -outlook and prefers to propagate a Confucianist traditionalism in so far -as she propagates anything. Pro-Japanese action may express a discontent -with the competence of the Chinese for self-government, but more -forcefully it relates to theories of Pan-Asianism or Pan-Mongolism. - -The opportunist movements--militarism, _tuchünism_, military federalism, -bureaucratic separatism, capitalism, and political puppetry--served to -confuse the basic alternatives. Because they reflected a narrow and -accidental scheme of power rather than long-range transformation, they -possessed a specious realism which obfuscated real issues. They -distracted attention without rewarding it and polarized opinion around -conflicts which were beyond settlement. There is no possibility of -agreement between men who think one another deluded in regard to -fundamentals. Disorder in China was the more violent because of these -different explanations. They delayed the creation of a framework in -which men could find a common reasonableness, an ideology sufficient to -rationalize all interests and to sublimate all frustrations. - - -_Christianity as a Political Force_ - -Ever since the establishment of American and British Protestant missions -in the nineteenth century, Christianity has been a conditioning force -for a democratic ideology in Asia.[10] The Protestants were among the -first to make a breach in the stronghold of Confucianism; they secured -international action to assist them. Their role was that of -counter-ideologues whose position was guaranteed by treaty (British -Treaty of Tientsin, 1858; American Treaty of Tientsin, 1858). They -possessed the power, under the legal sanction of the Chinese government, -to preach against the moral foundations upon which that government -rested. A missionary wrote in 1887: - - The foremost opposition to the introduction of Christianity comes from - those who esteem themselves the followers of Confucius. They assent to - our views about the "emptiness" of Buddhism, the deceptions of Taoism, - the character of the priesthood, the mud and stone of the images, but - when we gently allude to ancestral idolatry, the worship of heaven and - earth, and the sacrifices of the mandarins, they are offended. Also, - the Confucianists do the thinking for the people; they have the minds, - the books, the schools, and the offices. Without a long residence in - the country it is hard to imagine the influence of a penniless scholar - in his neighbourhood, and the mental control he exercises over the - minds of the peasantry. More than this, the graduates at the - government examinations form a clique or "ring," and their voice is - the unwritten law of China, their authority above that of His - Excellency the Governor. The lamented Carstairs Douglas said at the - Shanghai Missionary Conference of 1877, "Confucianism is the citadel; - take it, and the war is ended."[11] - -But for the presence of Christianity, a Chinese counter-elite with -sufficient moral self-assurance and intellectual ability to attack the -traditional institutions of the Empire might not have developed. Sun -Yat-sen was a Christian, although in his case Christianity has been less -of a modernizing force compared with the influence of his actual -experience abroad. Large numbers of the reformist and republican leaders -were Christian, some of them with missionary or Y. M. C. A. connections. -These men were not bound by the moral tenets of Confucianism; those -among them who had mission school educations had little in common with -the long intellectual tradition of the Chinese. For a while Christianity -spelled Westernization and provided an avenue of self-advancement -hitherto unprecedented in China--one outside the archaic scheme of -things. - -With the coming of the Republic, Christian ethics appeared to have an -open field. The emphasis which Christianity places upon the value of -individual human life was favorable to the emergence of modern -republican institutions. Even Yüan Shih-k'ai is said to have -acknowledged the influence of Christianity in this respect; he is -reported to have said, in an interview with a leading missionary -educator, "You missionaries are responsible for this revolution. Now you -must see us through."[12] The implication of doctrines of human -brotherhood is obvious, despite the fact that such doctrines--in less -forceful and spiritual form--were a familiar feature of certain Chinese -philosophies. - -In its more direct effects Christianity demonstrated a variety of new -points to the Chinese. The intervention of the missionaries was not only -moral; it was scientific, and the early mission leaders brought Western -engineering and industrial methods with them. They published the first -journal in Chinese to give regular accounts of practical mechanics. As -the missions themselves developed, the physical presence of the -Protestant missionaries and of Western ways of life--to which they -adhered in contrast with the Catholics--became strong informational -influences. Later the rise of churches and of Christian establishments -gave the Chinese experience in the Western methods of social and -business organization. - -In practical administration the Christian impact has been striking. -American missionaries were influential in developing popular education -in China. They have led the way in public health. They have organized -model orphanages and have assailed infanticide, footbinding, and -concubinage. They have been the public opinion of the Western world, -right on the spot, and have introduced the Chinese to a great many of -the best features of Western life. Finally, the Christians have -embellished and justified Western imperialism in China. The mission -enterprises have been among the most expensive and elaborate -philanthropic agencies ever set up by one state for the benefit of -another. The advance of the West has been saved from seeming unrelieved -imperialism. The West has taken, but it has also returned. Christianity -has been the companion and the antagonist of Western exploitation in the -East; it has suffered and benefited because of this position. - -The total contribution of Christianity to Chinese politics cannot be -assessed. The ways of Christian influence are frequently pervasive and -incalculable. In the headquarters of the Chinese Red Army, Chinese -Communist leaders have quietly gone away to pray. The Christians have -breached the Confucian citadel and have weakened the ideological -foundations of government. They have also torn the web of Chinese -popular superstition and afforded a foothold for religion in a truer -sense. There has been no genuine Christian party, no real Christian -army, no government avowedly Christian in policy. Nevertheless, the -first president of the Republic was a Christian, as was the outstanding -founder of the National Government at Nanking, Chiang K'ai-shek. The -Protestant Church counts among its members a large number of the highest -government personnel; no other religion plays as active a part. -Christianity, then, has been an indirect force, not a program or an -immediate political challenge. - - -_Nationalism: Social-revolutionary Phase_ - -In 1912 the Nationalists had won their revolution, which was political -in nature, but they found in the ensuing years that mere change in the -form of government would not of itself bring about the needed -regeneration of Chinese society. By 1922 Sun Yat-sen and his followers -possessed a well-defined ideology and a definite new revolutionary -program but they had neither a way of propagating the ideology nor a -method of realizing the program. Sun himself thought in political and -economic rather than agitational terms. He sought loans from abroad and -schemed for power in the turbulent military politics of the time. His -slogan was still that of the Confucians: "Hold office in order to -teach." The Nationalists intended to gain a political rostrum from which -to expound their teachings, since they no longer hoped to rule -effectively without converting the masses to their way of thought. They -had not yet realized that conversion scarcely required governing and -that--given the appropriate technique--they might agitate more -successfully as an opposition than as a government. - -The means of systematically winning men's minds--wholesale and -high-speed agitation--did not occur to the Nationalists because the -Bolshevist revolution was the only successful demonstration of such -methods, and Russia was not yet understood. China was just reaching that -phase of revolution which the Communists had already traversed in -Russia. Without the benefit of Russian advice, the Kuomintang might have -become a political sect with long-range plans. Fortunately for their -cause, the Kuomintang leaders were willing to learn and the Russians -willing to teach. Mere physical contact served to inaugurate the -process. - -Contact was not afforded by way of the Communist Party of China, a small -and largely academic group which developed after 1920, but through -direct correspondence and negotiation between Sun Yat-sen and Moscow. -Sun had communicated with persons of influence all over the world, -trying to build up interest in the future of a united and powerful -China. He had conceived a plan for the international development of -China which envisaged the extension of Allied war budgets for one year -after the war, and the lending of vast sums for the modernization of -China. He believed that his project would appeal to imperialism and at -the same time would serve to create in China a modern state-socialist -industrialism. China would thereby become a customer for all the -capitalist nations of the world and alleviate the depression which was -bound to follow the war. Correspondence about other projects for -ideological and political reconstruction elicited more replies from -Russia than from anywhere else. Sun was not doctrinaire in the -furtherance of immediate projects. He was willing to accept help from -the Russians, just as he would have accepted help from the imperialist -nations had they been prepared to risk their money. From 1920 onward he -was in touch with the Bolsheviks. - -In December, 1922, and January, 1923, the decisive turning point was -reached. Adolf Joffe, the Soviet representative in China, had come to -Shanghai and conferred with Sun Yat-sen. These two found that there were -terms on which they could cooperate. The Communist ideology and that of -the Nationalists coincided in their general opposition to imperialism. -Resistance to the treaties which bound China[13] became more and more -apparent to Sun as a necessity for further revolutionary progress. He -had met polite regret or open ridicule in his solicitation of help for -China from the imperialist powers, and his invitation to Western capital -had not been taken seriously. The Communists seemed to have adequate -idealistic and practical motives for joining the Chinese. - -The Communists, moreover, conceded a point which they had not conceded -to any other country up to that time. They willingly assumed a secondary -position, agreed that the communist order of things was not suited to -China, and in effect guaranteed their practical assistance to the -Nationalists without demanding, as the price, the acceptance of Marxism. -Sun and Joffe gave out a joint memorandum which made the issue perfectly -plain. It was to be the constitutional compact between the Nationalists -and the Communists for the period of their collaboration. The most -significant paragraph read: - - Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the communistic order, or even the Soviet - system, cannot actually be introduced into China because there do not - exist the conditions for the successful establishment of either - communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who - is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing - problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national - independence; and regarding this great task he has assured Dr. Sun - Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and - can count on the support of Russia.[14] - -In the autumn of 1923 Chiang K'ai-shek was sent by Sun to Russia to -study the Soviet military system. This was the first step in the -formation of a non-mercenary Nationalist army. About the same time -Michael Borodin arrived in Canton, where Sun had come to power for the -third time. The ensuing period was marked by an intensive reorganization -of the Nationalist Party and of its technique of revolution, to the end -that it might become a movement depending upon mass conversion, not upon -mass apathy, for power. The military mission was followed by other and -more important grants of aid. The Bolsheviks not only trained Chinese -sent to Russia but also supplied military instructors who reorganized -the Nationalist forces on the spot.[15] - -The assistance rendered by the Soviets in the application of tested -propaganda methods to a revolutionary situation resulted in vast -changes. The Russians found that approximately the same devices could be -used in China as in Russia without affecting the fundamentals of -Nationalist philosophy. Integration and regularization of the party -machinery, formulation of immediate programs to bring large groups into -the Nationalist fold, development of large-scale propaganda techniques, -and other improvements designed to enlarge and speed up the Nationalist -advance were effected within the Kuomintang. - -Throughout, Sun Yat-sen worked in close collaboration with Borodin. The -details of Nationalist party reforms and of Nationalist participation in -local politics are now part of the history of the modern Far East. These -details, while significant, tend to blur the cardinal change: the -transformation of the Nationalist party from a revolutionary elite with -long-range effectiveness into a mass organization designed for -propaganda and immediate general measures. The Russian Communists made -it possible for the Kuomintang to perform in weeks what had been planned -for the decades, or at least to reach the equivalent of the contemplated -performance. - -A new era had begun. At first the Nationalists had proposed to develop a -parliamentary government which would gradually foster a modernized -ideology, and to govern China well in the meanwhile; when this hope -vanished with the rise of Yüan Shih-k'ai's military power, in 1913, they -had to reroute the revolution. Had they relied upon the experience of -the liberal nations, they might have resigned themselves to a policy of -gradualism. The Communist process of conversion was different from the -Confucian. The Confucians had gradually built up a body of the most -public-spirited men and permeated the ruling intellectual class with -Confucian ideas. Their slow process of persuasion triumphed with the -elevation of their main texts to the status of bibles in China and with -their monopoly of advanced education. The Communists proposed to take a -few simple, obvious issues, to present them dramatically, to win as many -people as possible to the support of immediate policies and to reach -power through such support. Once political and military authority had -been established, they expected to go further in the "education" of the -masses of the people. - -To obtain tangible results quickly the Nationalists had to make -extensive promises. On the advice of the Communists, they led vigorous -anti-imperialist movements which embittered both Chinese and foreigners -and provided the whole country with issues more real than the -personalities of war lords or the machinations of cliques. -Communist-trained propagandists took the reforms which the Nationalists -had proposed among themselves and carried them into the people. Sun's -principle of _min shêng_ appeared in practical programs as an immediate -call for socio-economic revolution. Mass organizations grew, swelling -their ranks by promises to all subordinate economic groups. These -organizations were bound to cause difficulty as soon as it became -apparent that the Nationalist-Communist promises could not be realized -immediately and in full. - -In the meantime, the Communists maintained their separate party -organization within the Kuomintang. The Russians found China a fertile -field for conversion, and while they assisted the Nationalists they -fostered the growth of a Chinese Communist Party. From an academic group -which meant nothing in 1921, the Communist Party grew in 1925-1926 to -comprise the radical vanguard of the revolution. The Communists assumed -the vanguard position because they were less bound by loyalty to the -existing groups in Chinese society than were the Nationalists. The -working alliance, in which the Nationalists received Communist help in -money, technical political services, and arms, made the seizure of -political power a reality. Sun Yat-sen died in March, 1925, before the -great surge of the revolution came, but in 1926 and 1927 the -Nationalist-Communist forces proceeded north, brushing the militarists -aside as they went. The combination of a patriotic, foreign-trained, -professionalized army, a powerful agitation department, and a party -organization able to govern after conquest, came to prevail everywhere. -Half of China was now under Kuomintang dominion, which operated through -a council form of government.[16] Then came the schism. Conflict was -inevitable between Communists and Nationalists when the Communists -proved unwilling to look forward to the establishment of a republic -according to Sun's principles, pushing on with the revolution as soon as -the Nationalists slowed down or stopped. - -Communist training helped the Nationalists to power, but under -circumstances which made necessary either the institution of terror or -the partial inhibition of the Nationalist programs. The Nationalists had -promised almost anything to almost everyone in order to secure power; -this was a part of the propaganda methods which Communists taught. After -seizing power in 1926-1927 the Nationalists could resort only to -military dictatorship and party terrorism in order to achieve the -fulfillment of their extravagant promises. But the Nationalists were -Chinese, and as such cherished the old notions of moderation and -humanity in government. They were not the master of any legalism or -dialectic which would justify the slaughter of millions for the good of -a system. Millions have died in China, but the Chinese never -acknowledged the massacre. They could not face the program of class war -which their promises inevitably implied. The Communists kept pressing -forward, now giving pledges in their own name and in the name of the -Nationalists, redeemable only by class warfare or involving the -discredit of the Nationalists. The situation came to a head when the -Communists began taking independent action. Indiscreet Communists -informed Nationalist leaders that the Kuomintang was to be discarded so -that the revolution could continue--along Communist lines. The breaks, -first with the Kuomintang Right and then with the Kuomintang Left, -occurred in 1927. The Russians went back to Russia. The Chinese -Communists faced their future alone. - -The Canton-Moscow Entente--as the Nationalist-Communist coalition has -been called--changed the Nationalist movement profoundly in 1923-1927. -It found the movement a small elite of opposition and left it a swollen -party with a government and an army under its control, a vast schedule -of promises to fulfill, a second revolution to vindicate.[17] - - -NOTES - -[1] Sun Yat-sen, _How China Was Made a Republic_ (unpublished manuscript -written in Shanghai in 1919, now in possession of the present author), -p. 4. - -[2] On the Manchu reforms see H. M. Vinacke, _Modern Constitutional -Development in China_, Princeton, 1920, and Meribeth E. Cameron, _The -Reform Movement in China_, 1898-1912, Stanford, 1931. On the -revolutionary group see T'ang Leang-li, _The Inner History of the -Chinese Revolution_, New York, 1930. - -[3] See below, pp. 41 ff. - -[4] See below, pp. 145 ff. - -[5] See below, pp. 149 ff. - -[6] See below, p. 60. A description of other plans for democracy in -China is given in M. J. Bau, _Modern Democracy in China_, Shanghai, -1923. - -[7] See below, pp. 102 ff. - -[8] See below, pp. 139 ff. - -[9] See below, pp. 185 ff. - -[10] See, among others, Tyler Dennett, _The Democratic Movement in -Asia_, New York, 1918; R. Y. Lo, _China's Revolution from the Inside_, -New York, 1930. The author wishes to thank J. J. Holmes, School of -Religion, Duke University, for suggestions concerning this section. - -[11] Hampden C. DuBose, _The Dragon, Image, and Demon ..._, pp. 48-49, -New York, 1887. - -[12] Paul Hutchinson, _China's Real Revolution_, p. 155, New York, 1924. - -[13] See the literature cited above, p. 30, n. 1. - -[14] Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning_, p. 248, New -York, 1934. This is the most critical of the biographies of Sun Yat-sen. -The one which Sun himself authorized and on which he collaborated to -some extent is Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese -Republic_, New York, 1924. - -[15] For the military development of this period see below, pp. 105 ff. - -[16] See below, pp. 163 ff. - -[17] For some of the ideological developments involved in the -Moscow-Canton Entente see Tsui Shu-chin, "The Influence of the -Canton-Moscow Entente upon Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy," _The -Chinese Social and Political Science Review_ (Peiping), vol. 18, pp. 177 -ff., 1934. On the role of nationalism in education see Victor Purcell, -_Problems of Chinese Education_, London, 1936. - - - - -_Chapter_ III - -BATTLING CREEDS - - -The right-wing Nationalists, establishing the National Government of -China at Nanking in 1927, found themselves in the position of -revolutionaries sitting at roll-top desks. After more than forty years -of criticism and opposition, the movement had assumed the -responsibilities of government. In breaking with the Communists the -Nationalists lost the doctrinal edge of the extreme Left; thenceforth -there were to be groups more radical than themselves. This disheartened -some of the revolutionaries, who either lost interest in politics or -continued revolutionary opposition to the regime their colleagues had -formed. - - -_Nationalism: Governing Phase_ - -The Kuomintang was confronted with the issues of national unification, -development toward democracy, and realization of the economic reforms -and programs postulated by Sun's principle, of _min shêng_. The -instrument for their task was a brand-new form of government, fresh -from the pages of Sun Yat-sen, which at its birth was beset with -difficult military, administrative, economic, and diplomatic problems. -But the Nationalists had one particular advantage which they shared only -with the Communists--that of possessing a well-integrated ideology. It -was possible for them to couch intra-Party struggles in a reasonably -consistent set of terms. Even when respect for one of Sun Yat-sen's -theories had been reduced to mere lip service another from the same -source took its place. The intellectual outlook inherited from the -humanistic political training of Confucianism kept the Chinese from a -dogmatic political pseudo-theology, while the wide circulation of Sun's -principles provided a moral and programmatic foundation for governmental -routine. - -The break with the Communists and the development of a Red military -problem were continuing forces driving the Nationalists to the Right, -where opportunists and reactionaries of all categories welcomed them. -They were also drawn to the Left--by the social revolution which had -carried them to power and by the need of agrarian and labor reform. -Central to the very continuance of the government, however, was the -military power of the Nationalist armies led by Chiang K'ai-shek. -Without the armed force to implement their decisions the Nationalists -would have been compelled to let their endeavors subside into -subterranean defeat. To the considerations of Right, Left, and armed -force were added responsibilities incident to government. The Kuomintang -in its governing phase, therefore, plotted its course with reference to -three points: doctrinal consistency, military necessity, governmental -responsibility.[1] As an ideologically constituent movement, how did -Nationalism use its power? - -The Nationalists in power had to find their way through class -alignments, inert and meaningless oppositions, the rancor of the Left, -the contempt of the established monarchist Right. Personalities in -conflict, cliques forming and disbanding, factions denied overt -expression--these lay behind the pressure politics of the intra-Party -contest for the control of policy conducted on a thin and novel -constitutional plane. The written formulas guiding the struggle for -power were supplemented by the bodies of unwritten practice which had -developed in the years of the Republic. There were appropriate forms for -extraconstitutional action, just as for constitutional. It was the -outstanding contribution of the Kuomintang to modern Chinese government -that it kept its internal conflicts within its own constitutional -framework, and did so more successfully than any other movement in -modern China. - -The meandering and difficult course of Kuomintang policy flowed within -the valley rather than the river bed of Sun Yat-sen's doctrine. The -planning power of Sun's intellect bound the movement long after his -death. In his plans for the regeneration of China are to be found the -ideal requirements for the growth of modern government under the -tutelage of a patriotic elite of overseas men, revolutionary veterans, -and scholars. The Nanking government of the Kuomintang had to meet all -the problems of government while keeping within the broad boundaries of -Sun's demands. The movement as a whole, however, displayed certain broad -shifts which are readily traceable.[2] Sun Yat-sen envisaged the -establishment of authentic democracy by a course of action including -three steps: (1) the military period, in which the movement should -acquire power over the nation through the use of force; (2) the period -of tutelage, in which the members of the movement should exercise a -benevolent party dictatorship over the nation, while training the -populace for democracy; (3) the period of constitutional democracy, in -which the people should exercise actual self-government. - -Shortly after its establishment, the National Government announced the -ending of the period of military conquest and the opening of the period -of tutelage, which was set for 1930-1935. The Japanese invasions caused -the establishment of constitutional government to be postponed -indefinitely, and it is to be feared that even if constitutional -government were installed it would fall far short of Sun's programs, -which called for truly effective training in the arts of democracy -before Chinese government could be entrusted to the broad masses of the -electorate. In the meantime, the arbitrariness, the political -composition, and the outlook of the transitional Party dictatorship -became subjects of hot controversy among the Kuomintang leaders. - -The Party dictatorship demanded a rigor of discipline and a deflation of -revolutionary enthusiasm which soon drove the militant Left out of the -Kuomintang. Even Sun Yat-sen's brilliant young second wife remained -outside the Party--a permanent and indefatigable opposition. Within the -Party personalities came to dominate--Hu Han-min, the chief Rightist -disciple and interpreter of Sun Yat-sen; Chiang K'ai-shek, Sun's -outstanding military protege; and Wang Ch'ing-wei, the chief Leftist -disciple of the Leader. There were also Sun Fo (Sun K'ê), the only son -of Sun Yat-sen, and other ranking Party members whose opinions ranged -from philosophic anarchism (as in the case of Wu Chih-hui) to a -progressive business outlook not unlike Mr. Hoover's (as in the instance -of T. V. Soong). - -The National Government settled down with Chiang and Hu Han-min -(military and Right) holding the leadership, which Wang Ch'ing-wei -decried as reactionary. In 1931 Chiang ousted Hu, in the course of a -conflict over a proposed American silver loan and over constitutional -questions. Shortly thereafter Wang Ch'ing-wei assumed a place in the -government, after participating in an unsuccessful armed rebellion (the -"Nationalist Government" in Peking, 1930-1931). - -This might seem to indicate a swing from the Right to the Left within -the Party. Actually it was indicative of the growing practicality of the -Nationalist movement and its preoccupation with problems of installing -the form of government planned by Sun.[3] With the passage of time, the -Nationalists adopted three main lines of endeavor: (1) the suppression -of the Communists at all cost, even that of temporary nonresistance to -Japan; (2) the tendency to abandon revolutionary fervor for -administrative zeal, and to become governmental in spirit as well as -form--a tendency illustrated most notably in the promotion of industry -under H. H. Kung, railways under Sun Fo, and finance under T. V. Soong; -(3) a policy of emphasizing military power, which meant the rise to -effective personal leadership of Chiang K'ai-shek. The development of a -United Front policy in 1937 and the war with Japan led to the reversal -of the first two policies and an enormous emphasis on the third. The -Nationalists again turned to patriotism on the mass level rather than -government action in a patriotically bureaucratic sphere. This latter -policy, although it may seem strangely nonrevolutionary, was actually a -part of Sun's programs to which the Nationalists were bound. - -The class theory held by Sun was based upon a distinction between power -and competence. The people should have _power_ to determine the range of -government policy; they obviously did not have the _competence_. -Competence was confined to the intellectual leaders and the thinking -people of society (who were to form two classes) and could not be found -in the vast majority of people untrained to contemplate political -problems. Accordingly, Sun's scheme of government assumed the continuity -of a bureaucracy made up of men of competence, but subject to the -periodic check of the populace, which possessed the power. - -Another of Sun's programs relates to the question: How can democracy be -reconciled with ideological control? The Chinese had lived in a society -so completely under the rule of common ideas that independent individual -thinking had to be moderate, careful, and orthodox in appearance before -it met with any welcome. The individual was not free to think freely; -but since most did not think freely, sensing no need for it, they were -unconscious of control. A problem larger than that of individual freedom -is raised by the question of ideological control, since the controlled -individual himself transmits control to his neighbors and his -dependents. The ideology must be filtered, as it were, at some point. -Sun believed that democracy would effectuate the filtering, allowing -long-range revision from outside the bureaucracy. He expected that the -bureaucracy of democratic China would rule well but would be subject to -control from a people not completely under its thumb. The ideology was -to be officially fostered, but it was to be subject to the check of the -electorate. The Chinese were still to use orthodoxy as a tool of control -and social pressure as the major instrument of constraint, but they were -not to be allowed to fall into a blind traditionalism which would -isolate them. - -The old ideology was to be adjusted and supplemented with Western -science, so that the new would be compounded of three things: old -Chinese social and political experience, old Chinese ethical knowledge, -and modern scientific truth. With respect to Western science, the -Nationalists had to present few startling governmental innovations, -since the need for a knowledge of the physical and technical sciences -was widely recognized in China--not only by the Nationalists. That the -Western technology should serve to build the new China was obvious; -trade schools needed encouragement rather than initiation. As to the old -Chinese social and political experience, the Kuomintang stressed study -of China's past. They attempted to mend the gap between the generation -born in the 1880's and that born in the 1910's by encouraging -concentration on the classical texts, reverently, but critically as -well. Archaeology has heightened interest of the Chinese in their past. -As a consequence, their sense of national value has deepened. - -For the restoration of the old Chinese moral and ethical system the New -Life movement, which has been fostered personally by Generalissimo -Chiang K'ai-shek, is of great importance. Its principles consist of a -simple restatement of the cardinal Confucian personal virtues, -interpreted to suit modern conditions. It has presumably been influenced -by Protestant Christianity, and may be said to be a form of puritanism. -Although the Nationalist movement has not been as successful in ten -years as was the Confucian in two hundred, it has at least created a -state pattern. A state in the full sense would require a type of -organization so clear in its ideology that people would personify it -willingly, would accord it existence whether leaders and governments -fell or not, and would be loyal to it and to those who claimed to wield -its power. - -Among negative influences running against the Nationalist ideology, the -Nationalist neo-militarism has stood forth. As in the other -ideologically integrated states of the world (Russia, Germany, Italy), -the army assumed especial importance because its type of law and order -required no common understanding higher than the assent of idiots. An -army is the one institution where complete harmony of thought is a -luxury and not a necessity, where simple agreement on rewards, -punishments, and organization morale will hold the structure together. -The Nationalist armies, however, rose to a new position. Ideological -control was introduced; the literate armies fought best. But despite the -civilian and intellectual factors from outside, the mere force -concentrated in weapons was so great as to amount to a constant -temptation. Whenever the day's fortunes were inclement, the men in -command tended to settle things with guns. In contrast with sheer -ideals, the Nationalists were strongly military; in contrast with their -predecessors, the Nationalist generals showed respect for civilian -authority. The charge of Nationalist neo-militarism focused upon the -personal popularity of army leaders, especially that of Chiang -K'ai-shek. It can be adjudicated only by history. - -The Nationalist movement neared its most drastic ordeal in 1936. The -predetermined period of tutelage as decreed was passing, while the -inauguration of constitutional government had to be deferred. With the -approaching abolition of the Party dictatorship the Nationalist leaders -were to demonstrate their consistency with their own ideals and -programs. The programs of Sun Yat-sen called for the abdication of the -patriotic elite, and the requirement--coupled as it had been with the -proclamation of definite time limits--placed the issue squarely before -the Kuomintang leadership. Were they to attempt the democratic -experiment in a nation patently unripe for it, or were they to disavow -the commands of their deceased and sainted Leader, and continue in -power? - - -_Independent Marxism in China_ - -The proponents of Marxism were welcomed into China as trusted friends. -In 1926 it was obvious to the whole world that China was definitely -within the orbit of Marxism; in 1935 it was just as apparent that the -Marxists faced a military doom, and that their forcible suppression -might mean the end of their political effectiveness. Never ruined beyond -all hope of recovery and triumph, never successful beyond all danger of -disaster, the Marxists and their doctrines are the greatest uncertainty -facing China. - -Sinologues, judging from past experience and impressed with the deep -continuities and repetitions of Chinese history, may well argue that -Marxism is another religious distributive cult such as periods of -turmoil always produce in China. They can point to the rise and fall of -the Yellow Turbans in the third century A. D., when the two leaders--the -Duke of Heaven and the Duke of Humanity--shook the great Han dynasty -down into everlasting ruin. Or they can refer to the T'ai-p'ing -rebellion, which held a territory infinitely greater than that ever -occupied by the Marxists, which impressed a fantastic but politically -operative Christianity upon its followers, and which promised to do in -South China what Brigham Young and the Mormons had done with the United -Order in Utah; but the T'ai-p'ing went down to an extinction so complete -that no living advocate of the cult practiced by millions seventy years -ago can be found today. Thus it would be no violation of the set -patterns of Chinese history if the movement of Marxism were to rise to -world-dazzling splendor and then pass into utter oblivion. Yet Chinese -history is no longer the only kind of history which holds weight for -precedent in China, and if the T'ai-p'ing rebellion is one example, the -Russian Revolution is another. Bolshevism certainly has better chances -of succeeding in China than it could have seemed to have--to anyone but -a fanatic--in the Russia of 1915. - -The Marxian doctrines had already eaten well into Chinese territory -before entering upon the Chinese scene proper. One of the less savory -bequests which the tsarist regime left the Communists was the question -of Outer Mongolia, a vast stretch of land under the admitted suzerainty -but beyond the real control of the Chinese. The area was used by White -Russians as a base for operations, and--whether or not it accorded with -their principles--the Red forces had to cross the frontier to pacify -Siberia. Once in, they could not get out. It was essentially the sort of -absent-minded conquest which has contributed so much to the British -Empire: a strategic occupation leading inevitably to political -domination. The Russians compromised as well as they might, setting up -an Outer Mongolian People's Republic and administering the area in the -way which the world was to observe on a much grander scale in the case -of the Japanese in Manchuria--through advisers. - -Marxism became a force in China through men and literature and money and -arms reaching China by the sea route, as have most Western things. Its -position reflected, however, the facts that Russia is China's greatest -neighbor and that the Russo-Chinese land frontier is one of the longest -in the world. China is much nearer to San Francisco, in terms of -shipping costs and speed of connections, than it is to Leningrad, but -the appearance of closer proximity to the latter played a considerable -role. The Nationalist-Communist coalition[4] was the result of the -impact of Marxism from Russia upon China proper. The Communists entered -as allies, not as leaders. The period of Nationalist-Communist -cooperation lasted because the practical projects of the two -revolutionary parties lay in a common direction. The gradual shift in -the role of the Communists from advisers and allies to teachers and -masters led to the break between the two organizations. - -How did this shift develop? From the Marxian standpoint it was the move -of a party leadership which was bound by a true ideology, that of -dialectic materialism. Whatever the ethics of broken individual pledges, -there is no question that the Communists were justified according to -their own beliefs in abandoning the Nationalists when the Nationalists -ceased positive revolutionary action and began a Nationalist -reconstitution. The Communists felt themselves bound to take up the -standards of the revolution and proceed against Nationalists as against -others. There was no room in the Marxian ideology for anything but the -officially approved Communist Party; there was no ground for conceding -that the Nationalists might be wise in calling a breathing spell. - -The Kuomintang leaders, on the other hand, had every reason to feel -aggrieved at the Communists. The Communists had come to help the Chinese -revolutionaries in their struggle for national liberation and to bring -about a common front against imperialism in the Far East. When the -revolution of national liberation was more than half accomplished, the -Communists had increased their following to such an extent that they -regarded the Nationalist alliance as a mere episode in the growth of -Marxian power in China. Marxists had come to help the cause of Sun -Yat-sen; Marxism was spread to fight and undo it. The sobering shock of -a grasp on power sent the Nationalists into relative conservatism. An -eminent Chinese writer has suggested the change of mood: - - Our imagination was fired, our enthusiasm was kindled; thousands of - young men have fled from home and school from the outermost provinces - to join the Nationalist forces; they have toiled and they have - sweated, and thousands have gladly laid down their lives on the altar - of Nationalism that their dream of a regenerated and redeemed China - might come true. But, alas!... The war has ended--so has all - idealism.[5] - -The Soviet Communists, deprived of their opportunity to broadcast -propaganda on a large scale, and unable to ride the back of the -Nationalist tiger any longer, found themselves on a defensive which -seemed to be permanent. At the same time, the Marxists in China -encountered difficulties in adjusting their ideology to the fact that -their strength lay in elements which official Marxism discredited. They -owed their existence to agrarian discontent and to their excellent -army--the shock troops, in many cases, of the former coalition. The -leader of Chinese Marxism, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, broke the party wide open with -a schism; he believed in modernizing effort rather than orthodox Marxist -symbols. Other schisms from the Left produced Marxisms intent on -applying the European technique to China's small proletariat, -indifferent to the land question and eager to make an Asiatic revolution -from the textbooks of European labor conflict. Such deviations were as -unrealistic and sterile as Blanquism, against which the nineteenth -century Marxists inveighed so heavily. Even so the official Communist -Party withstood nine years of savage attack and persecution because -necessity forced the Reds to pursue a simple line of policy--survival. -Out of the test of deadly experience the Chinese Communists evolved -means of allying themselves with the discontented peasantry, and found -the point at which further social reform yielded diminishing returns in -popular support. In relying on the people for practical help, instead of -invoking theoretically popular appeals, the Chinese Communists attained -a defensive strength which could easily be turned into an offensive. - -The reorientation in attitude--the splitting off of both extremes, the -iron necessity for an immediate and effectual popularization of the -Party among the peasantry, and the lessons derived from responding to -actual conditions--enabled the Communists to establish a state in -Kiangsi in 1931: the Chinese Soviet Republic.[6] In 1935 and 1936 Chiang -K'ai-shek began the most vigorous of his attacks, which led to the -removal of the Chinese Red Army some two thousand miles from South -Central to Northwest China--one of the most astonishing military feats -of modern times. Some observers have suggested that Chiang had no -intention of allowing the Communists to disappear altogether from the -scene, as they provided his military power with a _raison d'être_ in the -eyes of the Japanese. Had he run them utterly to ground, the Japanese -might have dispensed with him. Later events have made such an -explanation seem less persuasive, after the _coup d'état_ at Sian in -December, 1936. - -The personal factors and political events in this extraordinary drama -are not yet known in their entirety, and it may be decades before the -whole story is pieced together from the accounts of eyewitnesses and -interpreters. Chiang K'ai-shek in his published diary mentions no formal -agreement for the institution of a United Front policy, but the rumors -from the Left persist in affirming the existence of a truce between the -Nationalists and the Communists, the fruits of which were to be action -against Japan. Certainly the military and political effects of Chiang's -kidnaping were substantial,[7] and the ideological scarcely less. In -brief, the kidnaping arose from action on the part of Chinese National -Army troops under the command of Chang Hsüeh-liang, the ex-_tuchün_ of -Manchuria. His forces were mostly from the Manchurian provinces and had -no stomach for fighting the Communists in the far west of China while -the Japanese remained in undisturbed occupation of their homelands. They -had inaugurated an informal understanding with the Communists, and -fraternization had begun between the opposing armies. When Chiang came -up to investigate conditions, he was promptly kidnaped (December, 1936). -His bodyguard was slaughtered and he himself was injured in the spine. -The kidnaping was nominally the act of the _Tungpei_ (ex-Manchurian) -troops. Even the Communist forces worked for the release of Chiang, -since they felt that his death would mean national disaster. The release -of Chiang was finally procured through the mediation of an Australian -editor with a long experience in Chinese politics.[8] - -The effect on popular thinking was twofold. In the first place, Chiang's -popularity was made fully apparent by the vigor of the demonstrations in -his favor all over China. It had long been asserted that even the most -momentary relaxation of Chiang's despotism, as its opponents termed it, -would be followed either by anarchy or a new revolutionary regime. -Neither appeared. The strength of the National Government as a -government was apparent, despite a strong odor of treason in widely -separated quarters, and the people as a whole kept quiet. Students, -workers, capitalists, officials, military men--all groups sought -Chiang's release. Their anxiety for his personal safety was in some -cases qualified by a hearty dislike of the man himself, but almost -everyone admitted to an admiration, either grudging or whole-hearted, -for the effectiveness of his work. The National Government and its chief -military leader were indeed strongly entrenched in popular sympathy and -thought--more so than even the most optimistic observers had dared to -hope. - -The second consequence of the _coup d'état_ at Sian was even more -important. The mere physical juxtaposition of the two leaderships, -Marxian and Nationalist, and the probability that forced arbitration -would be the result of the kidnaping, led to a wild stimulation of -hopes. At the same time it was generally realized that failure to come -to terms might end in the murder of Chiang and in fateful results for -all groups in China. The kidnapers demanded a United Front; the -Communists had issued a manifesto in behalf of it several months earlier -(August 1, 1936). The problem was: could Chiang accede without ruining -his prestige or impairing the ideological position he had so laboriously -built up for himself? - -A compromise was found, which amounted to a paper victory for Chiang, -nominal punishment of Chang and the other perpetrators of the kidnaping, -ceremonial apology to the nation by Chiang for having been kidnaped, and -a series of formally unrelated but probably linked events--all of which -brought the two ideologies and their adherents to a common ground. -Throughout the following spring, progress was made in the negotiation of -a truce, which broadened into an armistice and ended as an alliance. On -April 30, 1937, for instance, the Young Communist Congress, composed of -men whose brains Chiang would have cheerfully blown out a few months -before, elected Chiang and other Nationalist leaders to honorary -membership. On occasion, the Communists and the Nationalists exchanged -classical Chinese poems; each side sought to excel in sincere courtesy. -The armistice lasted through the period of the Japanese invasion in the -summer of 1937; formal union was achieved in September.[9] - -On the political surface, the course of Marxism in China has been one of -the most startling developments in modern history. Alliance between -Hitler and Stalin would seem more plausible than the reunion of -Nationalist and Communist groups in China. To those in the service of -the Nanking regime in 1936, such an eventuality was the one thing -certain not to happen. The break between the Marxist and Nationalist -leaderships and their subsequent reconciliation appeared, however, less -improbable in consideration of the course steered by the Communist world -movement during the decade 1927-1937. The United Front in China made it -possible for the Chinese Communists to concede more than they would -otherwise have dared to except at the suggestion of the Russian and -international Communists. - -The future role of Marxism in China is still undecided. Nothing can be -regarded as beyond the limit of probability, except the immediate -establishment of a permanent and unalterable regime. The challenges the -Marxists raise are too important to be ignored--land and labor reform -and the devising of workable techniques for distributive justice. If -they do not take control of the country themselves, they will at least -be a formidable factor for whoever does control the government. In the -event of foreign conquest the Marxians could provide an underground -resistance of spectacular value. If the Chinese, applying terror and -espionage against the Marxians then regarded as traitors, were not able -to root them out in ten years of ferocious warfare, what will aliens -do--against Communists who have become patriots in the eyes of all the -people and who are assured help from all sides? - - -_Japanese Efforts to Participate in Creating a New China_ - -China is Japan's greatest outside problem; she is only a secondary -problem in the foreign policies of the other great powers. Japan owes -much to China in the way of borrowed ideas and institutions. Japan and -Siam are the only free nations in the modern world which share with -China the background of a Chinese-dominated world society in the Far -East.[10] The Japanese resisted the extension of Chinese suzerainty to -their islands, and on only one occasion did they concede formally that -the Chinese emperor was the head of all civilized society; this they -bitterly regret. While the Siamese have maintained their independence, -they are in no position to take an active part in the creation of a new -Far East, and the issue is between China and Japan, with the other -Pacific powers largely as spectators. The construction of a way of -thinking to accommodate the men and territories no longer guided by the -old order is a problem shared by Japan and China; the competition for -imposing a feasible system is sharp. Japan wishes to create a new Far -East in which the Japanese shall constitute the most cultured core; the -Chinese take their ancient position for granted. - -In addition to the ideational conflict for prestige between Chinese and -Japanese, there is another realm wherein the two nations compete, using -ideas not as ends but as means. The extension of Western industry and -trade to the East produced acute dislocations both in China and in -Japan, and in the case of Japan involved transforming the Japanese -autarchy into a most dangerous dependence upon a share of the world -economy. Japan is truly a commercial and capitalist power; hers is no -mere affectation of modernity. It is conceivable, should the West go -down to its Armageddon, that the Chinese might swing back to the ways of -their past. The Japanese could not; their economic and political system -has expanded too far. They are inextricably bound up with the rest of -the industrial, capitalist modern world. In China the stock exchanges -have a mere toehold on the country; in Japan they have become the spine -of national life. The Japanese must either pay the price of -modernization by accepting the lowly place of the latecomer or make up -their tardiness in entering the imperialist scene by a veritable frenzy -of expansion. Apart from the future of capitalism, there remains the -question: Will Japan collapse before reaching imperial success in the -world economy? - -China and the unpredictable but colossal Chinese markets are Japan's -goal, formulated after contact with the West. China and her unquestioned -cultural prestige are the targets of the Japanese drive for the -acquisition of standing, a campaign couched in indigenous Far Eastern -terms. The conflict between the two countries weaves its way back and -forth through elaborate and self-contradictory sets of terms. The -Japanese have toyed with a multitude of policies for China. Some of -these are: (1) simple conquest; (2) the establishment of a peculiar Far -Eastern order under Japanese leadership--either in terms harmonious with -Western concepts of international affairs (the "Japanese Monroe -Doctrine") or in terms derived from a modification of the past -("Pan-Asia"); (3) a common cause of Japanese and Chinese against the -white peril, without any special emphasis on the relative positions of -the two countries; (4) a divine Japanese mission, not merely to save the -yellow race but to rescue the whole world and put all nations under the -protecting benevolence of Japanese overlordship; (5) a strict policy of -day-to-day opportunism--binding those parts of China accessible for such -procedure with treaties and agreements, and catching the Chinese as they -come forth into the arena of modern economic life; (6) expediency -couched in military terms, looking to absolute Japanese gains on the -map, regardless of the erection of a social system to perpetuate the -immediate military advances; (7) a pro-Chinese policy, to assure the -Japanese a close ally (but in such a case a strong independent China -would inevitably excel Japan, and the Japanese would have to yield to -Chinese hegemony--however friendly--or else retreat from it into the -isolation from which they emerged in the 1850's). - -Direct military conquest has a considerable appeal to the Japanese, -except for its limitations. All the armies of the modern world would not -be enough to garrison and patrol a China desperately hostile through and -through. The Chinese would not stop at suicide to embarrass their -enemies, if there were complete ideological antagonism. The Japanese -would have to persuade the Chinese whom they conquered to remain alive, -to keep working, to grow wealthy so that the conquest might not be -without value. It is not possible to consider a policy involving the -outright murder of from one hundred and fifty to two hundred million -persons; short of such extermination, there is no way for the Japanese -to clear the field for colonization in Chinese territories. If the -Japanese cannot replace the Chinese, they must make use of them; to make -use of them, they must teach them to think in a way which will permit -exploitation, for even the most inequitable exploitation involves some -cooperation. - -Ever since their peculiar Far Eastern order had been partially -recognized the Japanese began building up theories of a zone of -influence to be based not upon law but upon geographic and racial fact. -The doctrines of Pan-Asia fitted their purpose. Writers in the different -Asiatic countries had pointed out the desirability of a union of those -Asiatic peoples which were not yet under colonial rule to prevent -further occidental advance and to rescue their conquered neighbors. Sun -Yat-sen himself thought well of the Pan-Asia idea and stressed it, along -with the recommendation that all economically exploited powers confront -the exploiting powers--a class war between nations. As soon as the -Japanese began turning to Pan-Asia for furtherance of their own peculiar -ends, these arguments lost much of their realism. The Japanese policies -generated more disturbance in Asia than did the Western. Their call to -prevent Western aggression, at a time when the Western powers were in -retreat, sounded artificial. Nevertheless, the Pan-Asian movement forms -a link between ideology-conscious leaders in China and Japan; Japan's -ultra-patriotic Toyama had been friendly and helpful to Sun at the time -when the former led the _Genyosha_ and the latter the _Hsing Chung -Hui_.[11] It was natural, however, that the Pan-Asian doctrine, although -it never disappeared altogether in China, should be strongest in Japan. -Pan-Asia or its restricted form--Far-Easternism (_Toa-shugi_)--played a -significant part in the military indoctrination in Japan, even though -attempts to propagate it in China ended in almost complete failure. - -To the ideological conquest of China the Japanese have contributed very -little. Their theories, summed up, amount to but a drop in the sea of -doctrines. Only as the spokesman of China's ultra-reactionary -monarchists--who flourished twenty-five years ago--has Japan presented -an ideological program which is other than derisible. Rich in the -ceremonial trappings of government, and in the personal elegance of its -powerless ministers, the Great Manchou Empire makes a strong appeal to -literary persons with archaic tastes. Even there, the blunt modernism of -the Japanese military machine destroys the illusion. - - -_Patriotism: The United Front_ - -1937 was one of the most critical years of modern China. It marked a -swift and startling grouping of the three active forces in China: -Nationalism, Communism, and Japanese compulsion. For ten years the -Nationalists and the Communists had waged a war of terror against each -other; for six years a Chinese Soviet Republic had defied the National -Government of China established at Nanking. Six years had passed since -the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, five since the establishment of a -Manchoukuo government. The Nationalists had hated the Japanese, but they -hated the Communists more; at the humiliating price of non-resistance to -Japan, Chiang K'ai-shek had brought the full military and agitational -power of Nationalism to the suppression of the Marxians. The Japanese -had no great attachment to Chiang and the Nationalists and regarded -Nationalism itself as a force subversive to Japanese order in the Far -East. But they had tolerated the Kuomintang because it seemed a buffer -between themselves and the Communists, and because they did not have the -power or the immediate inclination to destroy the Nationalist regime. - -This triangular deadlock was first broken by the kidnaping at Sian. -Nationalist and Communist leaderships were brought face to face, and -preliminary terms were agreed upon. With each step toward a termination -of the Nationalist-Communist wars the danger of a powerful China became -more striking to Japan, while simultaneously the Nanking regime became -less valuable to the Japanese as a bulwark against Communism. The spring -of 1937 marked the settlement with the Communists in the Northwest, the -continuance of a general armistice, and the sharp improvement of -Nationalist prestige throughout the country. Circles which had been -Rightist recognized the increased military and financial power of the -Nationalists, now that the long and wasteful struggle with the -Communists was ended, releasing men, weapons, and money for application -in other quarters. Leftist groups again found the Nanking state -philosophy palatable, and discovered in the official tenets of the -Nationalist Party enough common principles to justify the re-coalition -of revolutionary forces. The radical intellectuals and students, who had -swung sharply to the Left as a result of continued Nationalist yielding -to Japan, turned again to Nationalist leadership. - -As practical solutions to the Nationalist-Communist conflict were found, -the people in the larger cities were released from the governmental -restrictions which the Nationalists--upon Japanese insistence and threat -of force--had placed on the expression of patriotic sentiments. A vast -and vigorous patriotic feeling came suddenly to life, having grown more -intense under the cramping inhibitions of police prohibition. The -patriotism was revolutionary in mood but not wholly different from -Chinese patriotism of the past. The slogans all centered on national -defense. Release of political prisoners, cessation of internal war, and -democratization of the government were regarded as steps to union and -defense. - -When the Japanese decided to push forward in earnest and began fighting -in North China in the summer of 1937, the patriotic movement became so -powerful that for the time it supplanted all other separate movements. -Only a number of aged or cynical opportunists remained outside. It was -now possible, under the slogan of a United Front of all China against -Japan, to disregard the fundamental differences between the Nationalists -and the Communists. A Chinese Communist wrote: - - While we declare ourselves, despite the differences in principle that - exist between communism and Sun-Yat-sen-ism, advocates of the basic - revolutionary slogans of Sun Yat-sen, of the best revolutionary - traditions of the Chinese people, we Communists never for an instant - under any circumstances cease to be true followers of the - Marxist-Leninist teachings.[12] - -Such utterances were matched by similar ones from the Nationalist side. - -In their haste the Japanese utilized an ideology which they had -practiced in Manchuria--literary Confucianism colored by notions adopted -from the Japanese cult of the emperor. They also appealed to the -practical and immediate needs of the Chinese living in the areas which -they conquered, setting up governments[13] to govern for them. But this -was hardly more than an expedient. Of far greater importance than even -the war itself is its long-range impact upon the Chinese mind. - -The formulation of the present Chinese patriotic movement into a -definite drive for the establishment of a new Chinese way of life may -emerge as one of the lasting facts of the century. The various movements -of the Republican era failed to disturb and arouse the masses -sufficiently to make possible a replacement of the decrepit remnants of -the old Chinese social and intellectual world, or a reinterpretation -adding the ingredients needed in a modern civilization. If patriotism -unites the Chinese permanently, Japanese invasion may have provoked what -twenty-five years of Chinese effort could not bring about. - -Furthermore, the Chinese have reacted to the emergencies of war in a -manner almost unprecedented among modern nations. War has not meant the -creation of a temporary despotism; it has brought democracy instead. The -ideological concord, the supremacy of a common national purpose, which -could not be achieved in a quarter century of peacetime agony, was -brought forth in the ordeal of national resistance. Democracy and not -tyranny was the unifying force. The Kuomintang Party Congress, meeting -in Hankow from March 29 to April 2, 1938, reaffirmed the primacy of the -_San Min Chu I_, but at the same time guaranteed the sanctity of private -rights, even in wartime, of groups who had been liable to official -suppression for years. The Communist press was flourishing openly in -Hankow, a testimony to the curious tolerance with which the Chinese -united for national defense. The governmental structure was increasingly -democratized. Japan had provided a body of common assumptions strong -enough to sustain democracy, despite the burden of mutually tolerated -disagreements. - - -NOTES - -[1] For the military aspects see below, pp. 108 ff.; for the immediate -governmental aspects see below, pp. 167 ff. - -[2] The best account of the internal politics of the Kuomintang between -1927 and 1933 is to be found in Gustav Amann, _Chiang Kaishek und die -Regierung der Kuomintang in China_, Berlin and Heidelberg, 1936. - -[3] See below, pp. 172 ff. - -[4] See above, pp. 51 ff. - -[5] Lin Yutang, _Letters of a Chinese Amazon and War-Time Essays_, p. -vi, Shanghai, 1930. - -[6] See below, pp. 182 ff. - -[7] See below, p. 184 ff. - -[8] On the Sian incident see General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, -_General Chiang Kai-shek_, Garden City, 1937; James M. Bertram, _First -Act in China_, New York, 1938, an account by an Australian newspaperman -in Sian at the time; and Edgar Snow, _Red Star over China_, New York, -1938--an extraordinarily valuable work on all phases of Chinese -Communism, by an observer of great insight and acuteness. - -[9] See the references below, p. 190, n. 10. - -[10] See Yoshi S. Kuno, _Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent_, -vol. I, Berkeley, 1937, for an authoritative description of early -Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese records of the time of Christ describe -the payment of tribute by Japanese chieftains. The most explicit -acknowledgment of Chinese suzerainty occurred in the time of Yoshemitsu, -the third Ashikaga shogun (see Kuno, pp. 92-93). - -[11] The Japanese patriotic leagues are described in Kenneth Colegrove, -_Militarism in Japan_, Boston, 1936. - -[12] Wang Ming, _China Can Win!_ p. 44, New York, 1938. Wang Ming is a -Chinese expert on Marxism residing in the U. S. S. R. - -[13] See below, pp. 184 ff. - - - - -SECOND PART - -ARMIES - - - - -_Chapter_ IV - -WARRIORS - - -From the outside, militarism seems to dominate the Chinese scene. China -is frequently interpreted in terms of personalities instead of mass -inclinations, wide-filtering habits, and extensive relocations of -thought. The picturesqueness of the Chinese leaders has done nothing to -prevent the notion of many romantic autocracies from appearing real: the -Dog-Meat General, six feet tall, diabolically cruel and brazenly comic, -with his veritable zoological garden of ladies from all over the world; -the Christian General, burly, bluff, honest, Christian and Bolshevik, -with the happy naïveté of a feudal politician; the Bandit General and -his infatuation with fine arsenals; the Generalissimo, with his -Christian wife, himself a Christian, rolling up a military machine -against the third greatest naval power of the earth--such figures make -Chinese news a confused but exciting serial story. - - -_Military Rule and Political Economy_ - -For long-range effects, the literary experiments of men like Hu Shih and -the mass-education drive of Dr. James Yen and his associates are more -significant than any one of hundreds of military leaders, but long-range -trends are never news. The armies and their commanders have occupied the -center of the stage, overshadowing the quest of the Chinese for civilian -rule. Civilian rule, however, presupposes a sufficient area of common -agreement on which to build laws and usages for government; armies -require nothing but a nearly mechanical discipline and the crudest rule -of thumb administration. The civilian government of Republican China has -had to await the coming of at least a minimum of order out of the -turmoil; armies, for lack of government, have dominated and continued -that turmoil. China has been disunited in great part because she was -impoverished by military rule; she has been ruled by arms partly because -she was disunited. No unifier of the nation would have needed to -maintain the armed hordes which were the greatest impediment to real -national defense--hordes powerful enough to wreck governments but not -powerful enough to build them. The war lords, as they are perhaps too -flatteringly termed, do by no means measure up to the note of the -intellectual and political leaders; but they have unquestionably held -the greater bulk of day-to-day authority in China since 1912. - -The most significant function of the armies is one which is quite -frequently overlooked: their power as agencies of unsettlement. They -have created disturbances more profound than mere public disorder; they -have attacked institutions more vital than the public treasury; they -have kept all parts of China from the dull apathy of conservatism. The -arrogance and rapacity of the military rulers, their utter incompetence -as administrators (with a number of honorable exceptions), and their -ineffectiveness as propagandists have provided that loose and haphazard -tyranny which some philosophers consider the prime requisite for social -ferment. The military men have never been intelligent enough to impose -truly totalitarian regimes, nor efficient enough to make the people of -any one area content with a permanent separatism. The presence of the -military rank and file has turned the Chinese social system upside down, -reversing the accepted scale of ranks within the society and infringing -upon the interests of every group--even the minimum interest of the very -poor, their right not to starve to death. More conspicuously, the armies -have given a picture of power which, in contrast with the scarcely -traceable lines of influence and persuasion arising from ideological -movements, is intelligible and reducible to concrete terms. - -Without the militarists, there would have been no visible series of -events to trace the change in China, no stereotypes at all by which to -show the immediate alterations on the scene of power. Many men did rise -and fall regardless of military considerations, but such occurrences -were loosely and popularly ascribed to intrigue or else dismissed as -beyond all rational understanding. The armies subsisted and roamed -about, leaders and men both helpless on a sea of ignorance and doctrinal -conflict; but the mere assent to unthinking discipline looked like -order, and the most shadowy and insubstantial military hierarchy held -out a promise of Caesarian peace. From 1915 to 1925 foreign comment -stressed the movements of the war lords, singling out the man who might -play the role of a Chinese Napoleon, and to the present this simple -approach satisfies many. Meanwhile the foundations of social life -shifted, falling away here, growing more solid there, behind the gloomy -panorama of brutal, ineffectual warfare. - -Closely related to the problem of armies was another category partially -understandable in narrowly factual terms--political economy. The armies -conditioned and set the pace, a slow one, for economic development. All -financial projects were jeopardized by military rule, both by the -exactions which the military might impose and by the constant threat -that militarists, devaluating the currency or arbitrarily changing the -political controls of economy, might alter the very economic system in -which the project was being considered and fostered. Economic life in -China could not continue through the traditional agricultural, guild, -semicapitalist devices; Western trade and social dislocation prevented -that. Yet no new economy could automatically replace the ruins of the -old, since economic matters were part of a _political_ economy subject -to the extra-economic interferences which ideological change, military -power, and halfway government could impose. One of the truly important -achievements of the National Government at Nanking was the creation of a -core for a twentieth century army. But all the military achievements in -modern China pale before the staggering surprise of a managed currency, -displacing a commodity and specie system which was older than all modern -warfare. - -One need not subscribe to either military or economic determinism to -concede the relevance of military and economic matters in any society. -In China there exists a peculiarly close correlation between the two. -The absence of a class founded squarely on economic privilege and the -subordination of the military to the bureaucratic elements in the -imperial society were largely the result of the position occupied by the -average nonacademic Chinese, who was typically a farmer capable of being -a militiaman or a bandit. This duality of role strongly affected the -development of government in China, and is a factor which still plays a -great part. The Chinese owe many of their social and political -peculiarities to the effectiveness of their mass action, which is able -to take place with a minimum of formal leadership and coordination and -with a maximum of secrecy and totality. In times when foreign conquest -of China is no longer in the realm of the improbable, it is worth -remembering that the Chinese are a people adamant in resistance to force -and schooled in centuries of rebellion. Neither pacific nor military -resistance could take place in the traditional Chinese way without the -diffusion of military and economic power among broad masses of the -population. - -How, it may be asked, have the Chinese succeeded in being such a -peaceful people, and yet a people so prone to popular uprising? How is -it that, with their great talents for organization, they have let a -shabby third-rate militarism sweep their land in modern times? The -Chinese generals did not command the allegiance widely extended to even -the meanest of South American despots; yet the people trembled before -them. Not until the war lords lost power was there great popular -enthusiasm for military ideals. If Chinese armies are considered solely -as rough and primitive parallels to their European counterparts, paradox -will follow paradox without rational explanation. To understand the -Chinese military situation one must go back across the centuries and -trace a system and a tradition which, at times obscure and frequently -submerged, must come to the surface in the decisions upon which rest the -question of national life or death for China. - - -_The Downfall of the Charioteers_ - -The Chinese have differed from other peoples not in being peaceful so -much as in extolling peace. Not even in the Christian tradition of peace -and love are there condemnations of war stronger than those of the -Confucians. Yet, century to century, the Chinese have known war against -the outside barbarians and with each other. Throughout historic times -there are records of struggle and slaughter. H. G. Creel writes, "If we -are to locate the traditional Chinese time of 'great peace' it must be -far back in the Neolithic stage. Experts agree that in the earlier of -the Neolithic sites known to us there is little evidence of warfare."[1] - -At the very edge of history, about 1500 B. C., the Chinese appear as -accomplished archers, using bows which were probably not dissimilar to -those in use down to the twentieth century--heavy reflex bows, with a -pull that was sometimes far greater than the longbow of the celebrated -English yeomen of medieval times. The pellet bow, a form of slingshot, -was also common in the earliest times. Armor was known in the earliest -historic dynasty, the Shang, which by Chinese tradition is dated -1765-1123 B. C. The chariot, however, seems to have been less widely -used than it later came to be.[2] - -Under the Chou dynasty, in all Chinese history the most caste-bound, -militaristic, and feudal (traditionally dated 1122-256 B. C.), the -implements of warfare and the management of conflict fell into the hands -of the ruling class. Previous to the Chou there was a relative military -equality of all, despite the sharp lines between masters and men. After -the Chou the great military states culminating in the warrior-bureaucrat -tyranny of the Ch'in Shih Huang Ti (third century B. C.) tended to -reduce war to mass movements, in which establishments, management, and -broader considerations constantly increased. During this period the -master class developed a scheme which was not as elaborately traced out -in legal terms as Norman-English feudalism, nor as solidly grounded in -outright military effectiveness as the Japanese system twenty-odd -centuries later, but which amounted to a chivalric order within the -limits of an ideology rooted in the family. The lords were the spiritual -guardians and clan leaders as well as the earthly despots of their -subjects. Standing above the law and invested with positions of high -political dignity, their class nearly became a caste. Warfare--as apart -from slaughter--was formalized and ritualized beyond all Western dreams -of gallantry. According to Marcel Granet, who has brilliantly described -public life of the period, - - The battle is a confused mélée of boasts, generosities, homages, - insults, devotions, curses, blessings and sorceries. Much more than a - clash of arms, it is a duel of moral values, an encounter of competing - honours.... The battle is the great moment in which each warrior - proves his nobility, while in addition they prove to all present the - nobility of their prince, their cause and their country.[3] - -Our very word _chivalry_ suggests horsemen; the Chinese nobles ruled -their elaborate realm not from horseback but from chariots. The -education of every patrician youth involved archery, music, writing, and -reckoning, among other arts and virtues.[4] Archery was something which -might be learned, after a fashion, by large numbers of common men; even -peasants, with a bow and a lance or pike, might constitute light cavalry -when provided, or providing themselves, with mounts. But the use of the -four-horse chariot necessarily remained the exclusive privilege of the -nobles. The chariot fighter had to have a driver and one or two others -with him in his vehicle, which was itself costly, hard to obtain, and -difficult to operate. A Chou noble driving forth to war thirty centuries -ago was as technical a unit as an aviator in a combat plane today or a -small group of men in a tank. Just as there is a democracy implicit in -the light machine gun or the automatic rifle, so was there the -potentiality of equality in vast masses of infantry, supported by light, -cheaply armed cavalry. Aristocratic individualism meant something when -wars were short and fought with elaborate equipment; but no noble could -stand up against the mass forces which emerged and continued fighting -until the feudal system lost any real significance and left the country -open to the development of bureaucratic government and military power. - -There was no overt attack on the feudal system. The system, however, -possessed within itself contradictions which led to its doom. The -central power was insufficient to keep the peace, and certain local -groups were--by talent, economic factors, or geography--too strong to -remain subordinate. The period known as the Spring and Autumn epoch -(Ch'un Ch'iu; 770-473 B. C.) yielded to that known as the Age of Warring -States (Chan Kuo; 473-221 B. C.). From feudal cores there grew states, -which began to follow the course of development that led to the -appearance of a system of sovereign nations in Europe; they increasingly -interfered with the free operation of the feudal economy. By effecting -the massing of power they eliminated the overawing charioteer from the -field of decisive combat.[5] The chariots remained as the vehicles of -the leaders or the focal points of battles, but they no longer implied a -skill so great as to make up a monopoly of first-rate military force. -While the most eminent thinker of the age, Confucius, lamented the -decline of order, a new order was being shaped from the social, -economic, and military realities laid bare by rapid development, -Machiavellian intrigue, and the hard necessities of wartime economies. - -The state of Ch'in, a Chinese Prussia, attained overwhelming hegemony in -the third century before Christ. Its power rested on universal -registration of the inhabitants, conscription, heavy policing, taxation -involving constant intervention in economic matters, and legalistic -administration. In its warfare there was little of the ritual which -characterized the military period when chariots were dominant; codes did -not amount to much. The immediate end of war was slaughter for political -and economic purposes, not the hazardous parade of a feudal class. The -Ch'in monarch who finally established a centralized empire took the -vainglorious title of Shih Huang Ti (The First Emperor), and set himself -the task of eradicating the regionalist ideologies of his conquered -rivals by suppressing all political history but that of his native -state. Proceeding from innovation to innovation, he ended by becoming -one of the historic figures detested by later epochs. One of the -practices which he extended throughout the Empire of China was the -regularization of military service. He is also known as the originator -of the grandiose project of the Great Wall; it is less well known that -he forbade the erection of walls around cities within the Empire. His -system of conscription involved three years of compulsory military -service for all young men, and a corvee of three days' service each year -at the frontier for every citizen; the former came to depend for its -inclusiveness upon administrative integrity, while the latter was soon -replaced by a money tax. - -Although the First Empire established by the Ch'in did not last long, -the Han dynasty (202 B. C. to A. D. 220) continued its military -system[6] and kept standing armies at the northern frontier and at the -imperial capital. The frontier forces were composed of militia augmented -for special campaigns by volunteers and criminals. The Chinese fought -the barbarians with the tactics of mounted archers, devices learned from -the nomads. Away from the northern steppes, infantry seems to have -gained constantly in importance. By the time of Christ the chivalry of -the religious-social-military class of charioteers was ancient history, -and mass armies had taken their place. - - -_Military Elements in Chinese Imperial History_ - -Through the greater part of the past two thousand years, Chinese society -has been governed by civilians. The scholastic bureaucracy secured and -kept a position of primacy, and a common ranking of the social classes -was: scholars, farmers, merchants, soldiers. The Confucians were -antagonistic to war, and bureaucrats--if for governmental reasons -alone--suspected the danger which lay in the broad dissemination of -military knowledge. The Chinese consistently ranked the military man -below the civilian; as a natural consequence most of the abler men went -into scholarship and politics. Chinese history has its great military -names and ample accounts of spectacular military exploits, but even here -the elements of strategy, of diplomatic and cunning warfare, rate higher -than in the corresponding European histories. Despite the fact that arms -did not play as great a role in Chinese history as in Western, the -difference is one of degree only; military considerations appeared and -persisted which colored governmental action and social organization. -Among these was the relation of the armed forces to the social order--in -point of numbers and in point of force. When elections are lacking in a -civilized society, fighting power demarcates an electorate of force, as -it were; the distribution of power determines the center of political -gravity as located in the society. In China there were, however, -elements distinctly different from those in the West. - -One of these was the correlation of mass power and military power. In -epoch after epoch, armies seem to spring forth out of the very -soil--armed groups radically unlike the Roman legion. For seasoned -veterans marching forth with elaborately effective disciplines China -substituted mass forces drawn directly from the populace, as need arose. -In some dynasties the system was regularized in militia form. Of the -Han, H. H. Dubs writes: - - Chinese armies were largely militia. Everyone was compelled to serve - three years in the army or in forced labor; at the northern border, - the whole male population had constantly to be ready to repel Hun - forays. Hence all males seem to have been able to fight and to be - required to do so. When the Emperor Wu [ca. 120 B. C.] wanted armies - and none would volunteer, he merely had his officials sentence - criminals to army service--and thus secured armies which seemed to be - able to fight as successfully as his previous armies. Universal - military conscription plus a registration of all able-bodied males - seems to have been the Han method.[7] - -The common people had crossbows for shooting birds or pronged hoes for -digging which were efficient even in fighting standing armies; they were -also frequently in possession of weapons because they were called up as -militia against barbarians. Underlying such military conditions, with -their highly important political consequences, there were several -surprisingly concrete and simple mechanical considerations. The -charioteers had come to an end partly because the chariots were drawn by -horses yoked in such a fashion that when the horses pulled hard, they -often choked themselves. Other factors are suggested by Dubs: - - By the time that horses became plentiful, so that cavalry was - employed, the crossbow had reached such a state of development that - cavalry was shown to be inferior to infantry with crossbows. The - medieval European crossbow was hampered by the mechanical weakness of - its trigger mechanism--the crossbow was likely to be discharged - prematurely by a jar; the Chinese Han crossbow had no such defect and - was a powerful weapon. A group of crossbowmen with others in the rear - to string crossbows and others to bring cocked bows to the marksmen in - the front rank, could shoot down cavalry before they could come near - enough to discharge the lighter bows cavalry necessarily carried. - Cocked crossbows could be carried around safely and fired when needed. - A bolt from a powerful crossbow could pierce any armor. Hence the - strong-backed peasant with a crossbow had an advantage over the noble - no matter how well the noble was armed or how good horses the latter - possessed. The only advantage retained by the noble was that of - leadership--tactical skill and command of large bodies of infantry. - Cavalry became useful for scouting and pursuit chiefly.[8] - -The character of military techniques caused Chinese politics to be -qualified by rebellion or the fear of rebellion. The difference between -a mob and an army became slight. In times of poor government there were -rebellions almost yearly. Insurrectionary forces gained momentum -overnight; from era to era huge mobs, tens and hundreds of thousands -strong, swept away governmental armies and erased corrupt or oppressive -dynasties. The process may be described as popular unrest made effective -with arms, which professional armies could not resist. The low place of -the soldier in society prevented men of genius from organizing a -dominant military caste; the professional armies were insufficient to -make military government effective. By a crude and brutal democracy of -mob and murder the populace of China could destroy dynasties and -governments whenever economic, social, or political conditions veered -too far beyond the limits of the tolerable. - -Trained fighters there were, but they had the function of frontier -defense; when civil war broke out behind them, the imperial governments -frequently called back the frontier forces together with the barbarians -they had been fighting. At least two great dynasties, the T'ang and the -Ming, were destroyed because they used the nomads of the northern wilds -in order to put down domestic insurrections. Light cavalry supplemented -enormous bodies of infantry. In fact, the Chinese were put down by -foreign conquerors only when the foreigners had Chinese allies, or when -a campaign of terror had broken the spirit of popular resistance. -Chinese warfare showed the disadvantages as well as the advantages of -being carried on by what were in effect militia forces. The cruelty was -personal and direct, and not covered with fine disclaimers; restraint of -armed forces was the distinguished exception rather than the rule. The -line between soldier and peasant was one which could be crossed easily, -and the line between soldiery and banditry a matter of intention. At its -best, military technique was honest and robustly egalitarian; at its -worst it led to abuse of force such as lynching, robbery, and fanatical -turbulence. The formal records of Chinese dynasties show the use of -trained armies in foreign expeditions, in some of which they achieved -feats of military accomplishment which rank with any of world history. -Domestic troops were also employed as guards and ornamental bodies -attached to the throne and other great offices of the Empire. - -The convenience of rebellion was such as to make revolt a part of the -unwritten constitutional practice--that broad ideological framework upon -which the Chinese world rested. It was sanctioned by the classics. It -served as a barometer of popular opinion. An unsuccessful rebellion, one -without the dimmest chance of success, might well be launched by -intelligent and patriotic men because its very appearance could prompt -the government to reform. In the words of one of the earliest Western -writers on the subject: - - A military and police is maintained sufficient to crush merely - factious risings, but totally inadequate, both in numbers and in - nature, to put down a disgusted and indignant people. But though no - despotism, this same government is in form and machinery a pure - autocracy. In his district the magistrate is absolute; in his - province, the governor; in the empire, the Emperor. The Chinese people - have no right of legislation, they have no right of self-taxation, - they have not the power of voting out their rulers or of limiting or - stopping supplies. _They have therefore the right of rebellion._ - Rebellion is in China the old, often exercised, legitimate, and - constitutional means of stopping arbitrary and vicious legislation and - administration.[9] - -Thomas Taylor Meadows, the author just quoted, also noted that "of all -nations that have attained a certain degree of civilization, the Chinese -are the least revolutionary and the most rebellious."[10] _Revolution_ -is a word broad enough to include principles; _rebellion_, more -narrowly, suggests action against men. The same tight, enduring system -of ideological control served to restrain the Chinese in their thinking -even when they had the material power sufficient to shake off their past -and build Utopia in its place. Rebels themselves obeyed the unwritten -precepts. The triumph of the civilians was complete: with infantry -prevailing on the battlefield, the peasants were the strongest; and with -the total population saturated in compelling, uniform ideas of right and -wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, the scholars had only to await the -establishment of administration to assume the leadership. Against -malgovernment, the populace retained the power of rebellion. Against -misrule, the scholars held the power which came to them as interpreters -of a vast and persuasive code of tradition. Whereas Western courts, -citing the past, can negate the acts of the executive or legislative by -interpretation or annulment, the Chinese scholars would do the same not -merely for law, but for manners, morals, thoughts, and social activities -as well. The great peasant armies, though able to destroy military -dictatorship, were by their very nature too loosely organized to -establish it. - - -_The Military Organization of the Manchu Dynasty_ - -Although the Manchus, who conquered China in the first half of the -seventeenth century and ruled it until the opening of the twentieth, did -not profoundly modify Chinese culture, they affected the military -scheme. The general outline of Chinese war and its place in society -remained largely the same; but there were two innovations: the -establishment of a warrior caste and the introduction of military -techniques from the West. - -The Manchus were a non-Chinese people living in the northeastern -peripheral zone of Chinese civilization. They had adopted the Chinese -form of empire and bureaucracy in their capital at Mukden in the early -seventeenth century, before advancing toward China proper. Invited by -the Chinese to lend their aid in a civil war, the Manchus found -themselves excelling in effectiveness and leadership, which soon led -them to conquer the whole country. The numerical disproportion between -Chinese and Manchus was such that the conquerors would never have taken -over the Empire and founded a new dynasty (the Ch'ing) had they not been -assisted by large numbers of Chinese. On the other hand, the spectacular -terrorism of the Manchu cavalry was a potent weapon, and the Manchus did -not feel that they owed their throne entirely to the Chinese. They were -in the anomalous position of half-conquerors, a people coming into China -partly as aliens and partly as the new leaders of the Chinese. At the -very beginning of their rule (commonly dated 1644) they had to decide on -a policy to determine their relations with the Chinese: Should they -allow their people to mingle with and disappear into the vast Chinese -masses, or should they attempt a policy of racial separateness to keep -their blood clear of Chinese dilution? Underlying this question there -was the even more practical one: Should the Manchus rule China simply as -another imperial house, or should they attempt to maintain their status -as a racially separate caste of conquerors? - -There is a Chinese legend which tells of a high minister of state, a -Chinese in the service of the Manchu conquerors, who saw no remedy from -the oppression of China in his own generation, but who nevertheless -worked with craftily concealed patriotism to sow the undoing of the -house of the Ch'ing. He recommended to the Manchus that they keep their -fighting men from demoralization by ordaining that no Manchu warrior -should enter any trade or profession but those of warfare and public -administration, and that they should guard the ancient heritage of their -valiant blood by making miscegenation a crime. Thus he schemed to -stiffen the Manchu monarchy in a position of unbounded arrogance, so -that a few generations of peace would find its armies sloven, atrophied, -and useless, and its people still alien to the Chinese. With neither -military power to overawe the masses nor popular affection to uphold -their foreign-rooted dynasty, they were bound to go down; all this, the -legend tells, the Chinese adviser who lived and died with high Manchu -honors clearly foresaw. Actually the Manchus did move in such a -direction, and with the prophesied results. - -They had conquered China with their own tribal-military system intact, -organized into units termed _banners_. Unable to hold the country by -their own force alone and, after putting down serious rebellions, -unwilling to depend on the Chinese, they arranged a method of dual -garrisoning. A Manchu military hierarchy paralleled the Chinese -bureaucracy throughout the Empire, and Manchu bannermen were placed in -every city of strategic importance. The Manchu garrisons were made up of -men destined to arms, men who were the descendants of the wild horsemen -of the northeastern plains, but who soon became tragic and useless -idlers. Forbidden entrance into the vast and vital civilian society of -the Chinese, by a decree of their own kinsman on the throne, they spent -generation after generation in profound peace, forgetting war and losing -their self-respect as warriors. Whatever the reason, they did not engage -in practices such as the extended hunts, amounting in fact to great army -maneuvers, by which Kublai Khan kept his Mongol troops hard and ready -for war. An English writer, familiar with the state of the Manchu -garrisons in their last years, thus described them: - - But, unhappily, the inactive bannermen, both at Peking and in the - provinces, had towards the end degenerated into idle, flabby, and too - often opium-smoking parasites; they had long neglected to keep up - their archery, which in any case had become useless in these days of - magazine rifles, though it might have nourished a wholesome muscular - habit of body if persisted in.... In the provinces these degenerate - Manchus were often, practically, honourable prisoners, rigidly - confined within the limits of the city walls, in the midst of a - semi-hostile population speaking a dialect which the bannermen ... had - to learn, ... if they wished even to buy a cabbage in the streets; and - the Tartar General, who nominally outranked even the Chinese Viceroy, - was really often a self-indulgent, ignorant incompetent.[11] - -Politically, the Chinese found themselves face to face with a foreign -group imbued with an arrogant racial pride and determined to maintain a -separate existence. The Manchus did not bend to the superior numbers of -the Chinese, nor yield to the attractions of Chinese culture. They -maintained the Manchu language at the innermost citadel of Chinese -civilization--the Forbidden City at Peking--and stamped their West -Asiatic script on the money of the Empire. They worked out schemes by -which the Manchus would retain a majority in the highest offices of the -Empire, on the sole ground of race. Elementary rationalizations of two -opposing racial attitudes were the result. The Manchu policy fortified -and brought back from the past the racial pride of the Chinese. They -were not merely the civilized heart of humanity; they were, civilization -or no civilization, bound together by blood. If the Manchu garrisons -served no other purpose, the presence of alien troops in the cities -taught the Chinese the first lessons of resentment; it prepared them for -the vigorous racial-nationalist appeal which the Nationalists were to -put forth. - -Governmentally, the effect of Manchu dual government was to force the -Chinese to an increased consciousness of the implied presuppositions of -their social and political system. The use of the garrisons constituted -one of the four main causes of Manchu decline; the second cause was the -violation of the strict merit system by racial preference in the -bureaucracy; the other two were failure to maintain domestic -tranquillity, and corruption in the hierarchy of scholar-officials.[12] -Manchu rule by military power was unrealistic and a political affront. -Their army of permanent occupation committed slow suicide in idleness -and at the same time kept the Manchu dynasty from nativizing itself so -that the Chinese might think of it as Chinese. Their creation of a -hierarchy of bannermen, paralleling the older Chinese civilian -institutions, brought to the surface of thought those prejudices and -assumptions which had guided and controlled Chinese destiny for -centuries. Government and society had been one to such a degree that the -special features of a universal control did not require legalization or -sharp tracing. The Manchus removed government from the rest of society -by staining it with militarism and racial preference; it became -ominously disparate and a conspicuous target for examination and -consideration. - -In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Manchu rule brought into a -sharper focus the largely unformulated constitutional theory which had -underlain the Chinese imperial society for nearly twenty centuries. With -the sharper demarcation of rulers and ruled, the Manchus had to make -frequent and overt use of legal authority over the ideology. The Chinese -read of the sanction of rebellion in their own classics; they could turn -to their histories for a description of the ignoble origins of their -present masters. The dynasty turned therefore to literary censorship and -ordered extensive excisions from all writings scholarly, artistic, or -other, which might weaken the prestige of their house.[13] They ordained -a most rigid and dogmatic interpretation of the classics so as to suit -their purposes. This the Chinese met with sharp criticism. The literary -struggle did much to weaken the scholastic class and to deprive the -Manchus of academic supporters. At the same time it deprived the peasant -Chinese of their natural leaders, with the consequence that secret and -half-literate political associations faced an arbitrary government -military in character. The old Chinese system remained, but it became -more and more of a form with every generation. The theory of moral -agency and ideological control was defamed by the very presence of the -barbarian garrisons. The barbarians themselves weakened so much that in -the later days of the Manchu Empire the military occupation became a -myth instead of being a political fact. For the time being, however, -Manchu military organization acted as a force-displaying agency until -the scholars and the less favored classes of society were able to -combine in a revolution. - -Pacific government, government by moral agency, derives its greatest -powers from assent and agreement; it thrives on symbolization and is -never necessarily dependent upon the display of outright force. -Government by force, on the other hand, remains effective almost in -proportion to the exercise and vigor of that force; stereotyped and -ritualized, it is essentially weak. Purely ceremonial administration and -offices may be a burden on the body politic, yet their dignity may make -up for their lack of efficiency. But an army that cannot fight is an -object of ridicule, and its very presence a challenge to the resources -of intelligence. - -The Manchu garrisons in the key cities were under the command of Manchu -military officers, whom Europeans dubbed with the picturesque title of -_Tartar Generals_. The garrisons were made up of three racial elements: -Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese. The Chinese in the banner armies were the -descendants of soldiers in the renegade Han army (_han chün_), the -Chinese section of the Manchu-Mongol-Chinese formations which conquered -China for the Manchus in the seventeenth century. The military -organization seems to have been a simplified copy of civilian -bureaucracy, with examiners, censors, and other familiar devices of -Chinese government appearing in quasi-military form. The principle of -merit was violated, however, in that certain categories of men claimed -special rank by hereditary right.[14] It was also possible for some of -the bannermen to transfer between the civilian and the military branches -of the government. - -In the early nineteenth century the _han chün_ possessed considerable -artillery. There was a separate navy, comprising more than two thousand -war vessels equipped from a score of dockyards. Even then, Chinese -military technology was markedly inferior to European; the Chinese navy -was no match even for Europe's wooden warships. When ironclads entered -Far Eastern waters and breech-loading cannon were employed, the -difference made Chinese naval and artillery establishments almost -antiquarian in nature. With most of the banner forces of the Empire kept -at Peking and the rest scattered over the country in the great cities, -the Manchu force was widely diffused. In practice their armies hardly -exceeded a quarter of a million men; whatever the exact total, the -military were outnumbered far over a thousand to one by the Chinese, in -the realm which the Manchus supposedly held by conquest. - -The effective army in the later years of the Ch'ing dynasty was formed -for the most part of the Green Standard (_lü ying_), provincial -regulars, and the vast hordes of irregulars (_yung_, or "braves") who -have traditionally done the greater share of the fighting in Chinese -history. The Green Standard troops appear to have suffered, although to -a lesser degree, from the long peace which ruined the banner armies, but -their use in major police enterprises and troubles with primitive -peoples kept them from the utter demoralization of the banners. The -common practice under the Ch'ing was to recruit the local toughs, to -appoint their leaders as probationary officers, and to use such -emergency armies for real and immediate fighting. Although the Manchu -dynasty had no system of organized reserves and little machinery for -rapid mobilization, they were thus nevertheless able to swell their -armies to astonishing numbers in a very short while. American military -commentators said in 1900 that the peacetime size of the Chinese -imperial army was about three hundred thousand men and its wartime -strength about one million--minute figures for China's reserve of man -power--and added: - - The total strength of the standing army of China can not be exactly - ascertained, and if a statement of the number of men belonging to it - could be given, it would be of little value, as many of the men who - are carried on the rolls are neither armed nor equipped, and a great - number of them are not even performing military service, but are - following their usual vocations.[15] - -This military regime bears the air of a vast preparation for some -foreseen but remote emergency. The Manchus themselves seemed to sleep; -armies drowsed through the centuries, weapons rusting, tactics forgotten -in the mimicry of parade, while all about them the factual potency of -military power passed to the Chinese. Even the Europeans at first shared -the illusion of great although latent military power behind the Manchu -throne. The easy defeat of the Manchu Chinese forces in the wars with -England and France in the early and middle nineteenth century led -writers such as Thomas De Quincey to cry out against the great fraud of -Asia--the sleeping Manchu giant, who was not sleeping but dead. - -The T'ai-p'ing rebellion[16] lasting from 1849 to 1865 provided an -actual test of military power in the Manchu Empire, and demonstrated two -remarkable new facts. First, the real forces were no longer the regular -troops, whether banner or Green Standard, but the militia which might be -organized and trained for immediate results by robust civilians like the -viceroys Li Hung-chang and Tsêng Kuo-fan.[17] Second, the military -technique of the Far East was obsolete; even a little Western equipment, -leadership, and training made any Chinese army immediately more -effective. The consequences were contradictory. If the military regime -of the Manchus existed only in a formal sense, and actual power had -passed to the Chinese masses, who had only to await a leadership to -exhibit their power, then force had failed and government by moral -agency would again be the need of the epoch. At the same time, the -introduction of Western technique showed the possibility of a new regime -of force, another opportunity for a minority to overwhelm the vast -majority by sheer technical military effectiveness, and government by -moral agency could not be sufficient. The center of military gravity -would not simply pass to the group possessing the largest army. A new -form of government, making intelligent use of modern weapons, was called -for. - -Undoubtedly China was and is too large to be governed by mere military -occupation--unless forces far larger than any which have heretofore -operated in the Far East are employed. The very garrisoning of the -country would absorb tremendous armies. At the same time, military force -is sufficient to overawe and intimidate civilians in any given area, -since the man with a rifle is superior to the man with the crossbow or -spear. Conceivably, however, a rhythm may originate between the progress -in introducing new weapons and the progress of the populace in learning -new means of counteraction. In 1860 the British and French entered -Peking and later burned the Summer Palace of the Manchu emperors as a -lesson to the imperial government. The expedition, casual when measured -by Western standards, showed that the Manchu bannermen and Chinese -levies were equally powerless before the intrusion of a more advanced -skill in warfare. As soon as peace was declared the Chinese began -organizing some of their metropolitan forces after the Western manner, -obtaining foreign instructors to put them through the Western manual of -arms. - -At the same time that the Manchu court was learning to its discomfort -the importance of Western warfare, it was calling Westerners to its aid -in putting down the T'ai-p'ings. The Manchus assembled a nineteenth -century navy including steam vessels from British and other sources, -which broke up without having accomplished much. With land forces there -was much greater success; an American, Frederick Townsend Ward, and an -Englishman, Major Charles George ("Chinese") Gordon, organized a small -body of imperial regular troops along Western lines and with Western -officers. This force was given the honorific title of "Ever Victorious -Army" by the court, and together with the militia organized by Tsêng -Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang suppressed the T'ai-p'ing rebellion after the -banner and Green Standard armies had failed. - -The ensuing thirty years (1865-1895) witnessed the slow decline in -Manchu foreign policy and military development and a gradual crumbling -of Chinese society at large. Revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen -received their first baptism of Westernization in the 1870's and 1880's, -and foreign trade rose by great leaps. Occasionally the Empire's -military regime seemed to rally. Between 1883 and 1885 the Chinese -forces fighting the French in Indo-China were equipped with Mannlicher -rifles far more up-to-date than the weapons of their enemies. In the -preceding decade the Chinese destroyed a Mohammedan state set up in -Chinese Turkestan in defiance of their suzerainty, and overawed the -Russians into evacuating an area along the Ili seized under the pretence -of maintaining order. The lack of coordination between the different -agencies of government was as much to blame for China's weakness as were -the specific defects of the central departments. When the army was -winning, the diplomatic agencies yielded; when the army was unprepared, -the diplomatic agencies, by some ill-timed impertinence, gave aliens the -pretext for hostilities. - -The first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) offered another test. Hitherto, -the armed conflicts with Europeans, even including the entry of -Westerners into Peking in 1860, had seemed remote from the actual -problem of military power in China. The Europeans might possibly -withdraw and leave the Empire in peace. But incalculable danger would -arise to Chinese prestige should the _wo_, the sea dwarfs, defeat the -Chinese and eat more deeply into the mainland. Chinese began to realize -that in this war their status was at stake, not only in the dimly -perceived wide universe of the Westerners but also in that of the Far -East in which they had long held such comfortable hegemony. They entered -the war relatively well equipped, so that even outside observers were -doubtful of the outcome of the struggle. No one was more amazed than the -Chinese themselves when they were whipped as no modern nation has been -whipped, routed ignominiously in a sequence of slaughters, and -ultimately forced to make important territorial and financial -concessions to the Japanese. - -This catastrophe was followed by a series of reforms, some designed to -enable China to meet the West on its own ground. In January, 1896, a -turning point was reached with the appointment of Yüan Shih-k'ai to -command the one efficient brigade assembled in the course of the -war.[18] Yüan was to find in modern arms the career which led to his -dictatorship after the fall of the Empire, and was to perform notable -work as a military and administrative reformer, although of restricted -value. He joined the reactionaries and brought to an end the Hundred -Days of Reform of 1898, a movement generated by the initiative of the -idealistic young Emperor Kuang Hsü, who sought to direct China into the -course already taken by Japan--modernization within the imperial system. -In 1900 there occurred the wild upheaval of the Boxers. It began as a -native racial uprising against the Manchus, but was deflected by the -Manchus into the support of the court and hostility against the Western -intruders. During the Boxer movement part of the fighting against the -Westerners was done by regular banner and Green Standard troops, but the -greater part by bands of desperadoes and fanatics. The imperial army -suffered in the chaos following the international occupation of Peking. - -Under the name of the _Wu Wei Chün_ the first large-scale attempt was -made to modernize the Chinese armed forces. After the military and naval -experiments of the 1860's and later decades, this enterprise evoked -great hopes. The new army was inaugurated in 1895 with foreign -instruction and foreign arms. In 1901 one division was made the core of -Yüan Shih-k'ai's new modern force. Rodney Gilbert, a British publicist, -has summarized the military changes down to the end of the Manchu -dynasty as follows: - - In January 1901 the Yangtze Viceroys submitted a memorial to the - Throne suggesting among other things the disbandment of the useless - _Lü Ying_ [Armies of the Green Standard], the employment of the - Bannermen, almost as useless, in service other than military, and the - creation of a modern army. This brought forth an Imperial decree - ordering reorganization of the army, of which Yuan Shih-kai, then - Viceroy of Chihli, took advantage to build up six new divisions, four - of which were transferred to the Ministry of War in 1906. This was - the real beginning of the _Lu Chun_, the Chinese National Army. In - January, 1905, a comprehensive scheme was outlined designed to give - China an army of 36 Divisions or 360,000 men, by the year 1911. Three - years after this decision was made there were about 60,000 men, with - 360 guns, in the North, and 40,000 men, with 174 guns, in the South. - The army was developing along sound lines when Yuan Shih-kai was - removed from office in 1908 after the death of his great patroness - the Empress Dowager, and the direction of military, as well as - other affairs, fell into the hands of the Manchu princes, whose - mismanagement contributed much to the downfall of their dynasty three - years later.[19] - -The beginning, although auspicious, did not mean that even the model -sections of the modernized forces were comparable to those of other -lands. The confusion of weapons was already evident. A member of the -United States General Staff wrote in 1910: - - To arm these masses China has been obliged to use weapons that are - considered somewhat out of date. There are four types of rifles, - mostly Mausers and Japanese Murata rifles of old pattern. They are, - however, breech-loading, small-caliber weapons, not to be despised, - even if they do not reach the ideal which some nations set. In fact - they are the weapons which have been used in the great wars of most - recent date. - - It is so also with the artillery where even a greater difference of - types is to be observed. This is, undoubtedly, a serious drawback, - owing, of course, to the great difficulty of providing ammunition.[20] - -It was during this period, from the decisive defeat of the dynasty by -Japan in 1895 to the Republican Revolution of 1911-1912, that the -Chinese revolutionaries most eagerly studied military manuals and sought -to purchase Western arms to offset the great advantages gained by the -modernized portions of the imperial army. Sun Yat-sen became almost as -much a military authority as he was a political philosopher and leader; -his chief military follower, General Huang Hsing, performed for the -revolutionaries the services rendered for the regime by Yüan Shih-k'ai. -On both sides there was the anxiety to master the mysteries of twentieth -century warfare. The World War had not yet begun, nor had the staggering -burdens of modern armament become evident. Great as were the -improvements in fighting, prewar military organization seemed still -primarily a matter of well-equipped infantry, properly led, properly -drilled, and supported by adequate artillery and other auxiliary -services. Wireless, gas, airplanes, tanks, submarines, torpedo launches, -and mechanized or aerialized infantry were little more than a matter of -speculation. The proportions of present-day military budgets no one -could foresee. - - -_The Army and the Republican Revolution_ - -The Republican Revolution of 1911-1912 was the last overt act in the -collapse of the ideologically maintained social system; it brought -armies into violently free play in the support of movements toward -re-formation of the ideology and articulation and control of the -society. On October 10, 1911, the troops of the Wuch'ang garrison rose -in mutiny and sided with the revolution. A series of uprisings -engineered by military and agitational leaders followed, province by -province, all directed against the imperial power in the North. The use -of violence in Chinese politics served to accentuate a condition which -had affected China even in the earliest historic times--the unresolved -contradictions between the North and the South. Differences of race, -spoken language, and economy produced fundamental cleavages accentuated -by temperament. Traditionally the North was more conservative and -solidaristic, the South more rebellious and enterprising. Sun Yat-sen -was a Southerner; militarism reached its sharpest effectiveness in the -North. - -Yüan Shih-k'ai, who had proved himself the evil genius of Emperor Kuang -Hsü by betraying the monarch's reforms of 1898, was called to the aid of -the Manchus only to betray them to the Republic; he then served the -Republic with the intention of seizing complete power for himself. The -Republicans set up their regime in Nanking on January 1, 1912, with Sun -Yat-sen as president. They established contact with Yüan, who acted in -the triple capacity of negotiator for the Manchus, representative of the -modernized armies of the North (which were his), and leader in his own -right and in his own interest. The Republicans realized that Yüan could -not be dispossessed--indeed, it is fairly certain that he could have -upheld the throne had he so wished. Their power was indefinite, and as -Chinese they preferred compromise and order to ideals pushed to the -bitter end. In the middle of February they yielded to Yüan, and Sun -surrendered to him the presidency as a reward for his allegiance to the -Republic. Yüan, for the Manchus, secured a settlement by which the -Forbidden City (the residence of the emperor in Peking) was made into a -second Vatican City; the emperor was allowed his formal and ritual -titles (a status remarkably like that of the Pope) and a very -substantial stipend. For the Northern armies and himself Yüan obtained -actual power over the country. A civilian, but a soldier as well, Yüan -rose by both intrigue and the implied threat of force. - -The Republic was launched by valedictory imperial edicts ordering the -imperial officials throughout the realm to obey Yüan and the new form of -government; by Republicans nominally headed by their greatest and -coldest antagonist; and by a soldier of higher professional standing in -the Western sense than any Chinese leader for centuries past undertaking -the task of keeping order and ushering China through drastic -reconstruction. For a few halcyon months it seemed as though the -Republic might grow into reality from under the aegis of military -dictatorship.[21] But soon it became apparent that the revolution was -not a transfer of power and renovation of order but the dissolution of -power and the erasure of order. What was left was ideological -uncertainty, social turmoil, economic disorganization--with politics -reduced to mere pageantry, and the armies, ominously growing under the -care of President Yüan, maintaining what little order was left to -maintain. In 1913 the Nationalist-Republicans rebelled in the Yangtze -valley and were crushed by the armies of the government of the Republic -of China. - -From the military rule of Yüan Shih-k'ai there emerged an army system -which was to bring China to almost complete political ruin in the decade -after Yüan's death. Although he organized a model regiment as a sample -of what could be done in China, inflation of numbers and deterioration -of morale and _matériel_ were the most obvious symptoms of the new role -of the army--a role much more concerned with problems of domestic -intrigue than with defense against the outsiders. For an army of -national defense, high technical excellence and a commensurate smallness -of numbers are desirable features; for an army of dictatorship or -occupation, inferior equipment, poor supplies, and inefficient training -are all trifling handicaps in comparison with the advantage of vast -numbers which can be used to garrison large sections of the realm and -meet the threat of civil war. The very shift from empire to republic -involved the enlistment of additional thousands of revolutionary -fighters; once in the army, they were hard to dislodge. The personal -military interests of Yüan led him to expand the army, and his political -ambitions nourished the thought that the country would be secure beneath -him only through the medium of an extensive garrison system. Finally, -there was a far-reaching shift in the Chinese social pyramid. Men of -intelligence and of education flocked to the army, and Japan's military -schools were crowded with young Chinese who saw in war their easiest -avenue to fortune or to the service of their country. - -A reconstituted army, soldiers who could command greater respect than -ever before, numerical extension and qualitative deterioration of the -national armed forces--these were the more patent military changes under -the Republic. To them must be added the factors fusing the elements into -a system that was to bring immediate fortune and ultimate ruin to -practically all who ventured into its operations. Many of the provinces -which turned to the cause of the revolutionaries in 1911 and 1912 became -gradually militarized. When the Manchus were gone, the old distinction -between the Tartar General and the civilian viceroy had lost its -purpose; the new provincial executives combined both military and -governmental powers. Provincial jealousies and the growing disorder -favored a strong factual autonomy for the various provinces, even though -there was no technical claim of provincial independence and very little -even of confederation. The first Republic was in name a centralized -parliamentary-presidential state with quasi-federal features; in fact it -was the combination of an impotent, headless imperial bureaucracy and a -presidential military dictatorship possessing physically limited and -indefinable authority over a large group of provinces. Between China and -the accomplishment of regular and orderly republican government there -stood ignorance, turmoil, poverty, reaction, and despair. Between Yüan's -regime and the _tuchün_ system there stood only Yüan's might. - - -NOTES - -[1] Herrlee G. Creel, _The Birth of China_, p. 141, London, 1936. - -[2] _Ibid._, pp. 142-154. - -[3] Marcel Granet, _Chinese Civilization_, p. 270, New York, 1930. -Quoted by permission of the American publishers, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. - -[4] Henri Maspero, _La Chine antique_, p. 131, Paris, 1927. This is one -of the most valuable surveys of ancient China. - -[5] An elementary discussion of this period is to be found in Paul M. -A. Linebarger, _The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_, pp. 25-29, -"Nation and State in Chinese Antiquity," Baltimore, 1937. - -[6] Pan Ku (H. H. Dubs, translator), _The History of the Former Han -Dynasty, passim_, Baltimore, 1938. - -[7] In a memorandum prepared in response to a request by the present -writer. - -[8] _Ibid._ - -[9] Thomas Taylor Meadows, _The Chinese and Their Rebellions_, p. 24, -London, 1856. His accounts of the T'ai-p'ing rebellion even today -possess great liveliness and interest and illuminate twentieth century -Chinese problems. - -[10] _Ibid._, p. 25. - -[11] E. H. Parker, _China ..._, pp. 259-260, New York, 1917. - -[12] A. N. Holcombe, _The Chinese Revolution_, pp. 70-81, Cambridge, -1930. - -[13] See Luther Carrington Goodrich, _The Literary Inquisition of -Ch'ien-lung_, Baltimore, 1935. - -[14] The most extensive source of information on Manchu military -organization in China is T. F. Wade, "The Army of the Chinese Empire: -Its Two Great Divisions, the Bannermen or National Guard, and the Green -Standard or Provincial Troops; Their Organization, Pay, Condition &c.," -_The Chinese Repository_ (Canton), vol. 20, pp. 250-280, 300-340, -363-422, 1851, which is now unfortunately rare. William James Hail, -_Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion_, New Haven, 1927, presents an -accessible and informative digest of this and other material in its -opening pages. Two French works based on Wade are Jules Picard, _État -générale des forces maritimes et militaires de la Chine ..._, Paris, -1860, and P. Dabry, _Organisation militaire des Chinois, ou la Chine et -ses armées_, Paris, 1859. William Frederick Mayers, _The Chinese -Government_, Shanghai, 1897, is one of the most valuable references for -the structure of the last imperial government of China; designed as a -manual of titles, it presents a concise outline of all major civil and -military offices. A more elaborate treatise is P. C. Hsieh, _The Chinese -Government_, 1644-1911, Baltimore, 1925. See also Anatol M. Kotenev, -_The Chinese Soldier_, Shanghai, 1937. The text refers to Wade, p. 391, -and Hsieh, p. 260. - -[15] United States War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, no. 30, -_Notes on China_, pp. 57-69, "The Chinese Army," Washington, 1900. -Except for cursory references, this pamphlet is of no great value. - -[16] See above, pp. 32 ff. - -[17] See Hail, _op. cit._ in note 14. - -[18] See Meribeth E. Cameron, _The Reform Movement in China_, 1898-1912, -p. 59, Stanford, 1931. - -[19] H. G. W. Woodhead (ed.), _The China Year Book_, 1921-2, Tientsin, -1921; chap. XIX, "Defense," by Rodney Gilbert, pp. 511-512. Gilbert's is -a competent contemporary account of tuchünism, sketching the background -very clearly. - -[20] George H. Blakeslee (ed.), _China and the Far East_, New York, -1910, Chapter X, "The Chinese Army--Its Development and Present -Strength," by Major Eben Swift, p. 181. See also General H. Frey, -_L'Armée chinoise: l'armée ancienne, l'armée nouvelle, l'armée chinoise -dans l'avenir_, Paris, 1904. - -[21] For a discussion of the governmental changes of the period see -below, pp. 145 ff. See also H. F. MacNair, _China in Revolution_, -Chicago, 1931; A. N. Holcombe, _The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution_, -New York, 1931. For a contemporary censure of Yüan Shih-k'ai see Paul -Myron [Paul M. W. Linebarger], _Our Chinese Chances_, Chicago, 1915. - - - - -_Chapter_ V - -CAUSES - - -Yüan's closing years might have resembled Napoleon's rise from the -position of First Consul to that of emperor, had he not been checked at -the very last moment by armed uprisings and expressions of deep popular -contempt. Even so, he retained control of the country.[1] The -humiliation of his defeat lacked even dramatic compensations, and he -died in June, 1916, of disease, poison, or chagrin. With his death the -Republic had a chance to stand by itself, but it could not. - - -_The Age of the War Lords_ - -Yüan had fastened the symbols of old on the scaffolding of a new order. -With his death the momentum of administrative routine retained from the -Manchu dynasty was lost; the Republican government in Peking degenerated -from impotence to comedy. The process called government began to -nauseate patriotic Chinese and foreigners alike; few were able to take a -long view, to maintain their courage, and to keep on fighting against -disgusting and disheartening realities. With the decomposition of the -central government--except the modern bureaucracies such as posts and -customs, which were kept intact by their foreign personnel and their -special international status--the armies, though divided provincially, -stepped into positions of unprecedented authority. There was a veritable -epidemic of monarchical ambition, greed, and willfulness among the -provincial military commanders; many Chinese expected a new Yüan to -emerge from that group and become the "strong man of China." With such a -stage to strut on, it is not surprising that the Chinese military lost -constructive vision. A sober nucleus of idealistically hard-headed, -patriotic men, each a George Washington, might have used military power -to reunite the country, but order could not be expected to emerge from -the unsystematized competition of armed forces. - -Three broader factors affected the ascendancy of war lords, in addition -to obvious motives and interests. The ideological ruin was bad enough; -the consequent social disorder crippled China. But the armies now came -to provide a refuge for the unemployed and dispossessed. A second -factor, the mechanical mobilization of military forces through the -railways, made warfare more expensive and ruinous than it would have -been with the slow-moving infantry of the past. Thirdly, the war lords -gave physical embodiment to the ideological and social disunity of -China, inviting the constant intervention of the Western powers and of -Japan in Chinese affairs. - -Individually the war lords warrant no special attention. There was Chang -Tso-lin in Manchuria; Tuan Chi-jui and Ts'ao Kun in North China; Yen -Hsi-shan ("The Model Governor") and, to the west of him, Fêng Yü-hsiang -("The Christian General"); Chang Chung-chang in Shantung, significant -more for his brutality than for his political and military position; the -quaint, conservative scholar Wu P'ei-fu, in the Yangtze valley, minor -figures in the South and West. It was not the generals who were -important, but militarism. - -Militarism machine-gunned the Confucian ethics out of politics; it taxed -the land into ruin; it laid China wide open to imperialistic thrusts, -and--by the same act--made her a poor market. Militarism built roads -when they were strategically required, established a few railways and -spoiled more, modernized China, but did so in the costliest way of all. -Only in the intellectual world was military domination not outright -destruction. The generals and their staffs were surprisingly ignorant of -the power of ideas, ineffectual in their censorship, oblivious to the -great leverage of undercover agitation. Trusting arms, they failed to -see that the only opposition able to destroy them was not military but -mental. - -While the soldiery stirred the country with murder and oppression, their -system progressed steadily toward self-destruction. Two great pressures -forced constant further expansion of the armies. The first is obvious: -military rivalry. The second was the growing abuse of army organization -as a means of unemployment relief. Military taxation drove the peasants -off the land, whereupon they had no recourse but to become bandits or -soldiers. If they were bandits, consolidation under a chieftain -transformed them into military irregulars and induced some ambitious -general to include them in his forces. If they were soldiers, the bandit -stage remained in reach. In either case, they added to the burden -falling upon their commander, which in turn led to still greater -impoverishment of the peasants, a further increase of dispossessed men, -bandits, and soldiers. With the widening circulation of arms, Western -guns and fighting methods became less and less a secret of small groups -capable of establishing a firm military oligarchy and more and more the -property of a cross section of the Chinese masses. - -From an estimated total of 1,369,880 in 1921,[2] the number of men under -arms rose to a figure estimated to be between 1,883,300 and 1,933,300 -five years later.[3] This increase occurred in one of the poorest -countries of the world, despite conditions of extreme misery: - - Recruiting goes on incessantly in every town in North China where - there is a garrison. There are no statistics available, but it is - known that the death rate from disease is very high because, even in - garrison, sanitary precautions are crude and the medical service is - inefficient and inadequate. In battle the care of the wounded is - barbarously primitive, even in the best units, and death from infected - wounds is rather the rule than the exception; while those who cannot - walk from the field to the nearest hospital more often than not die of - exposure or clumsy handling. One of a Chinese commander's major - concerns is filling the gaps in the ranks, but at the same time these - conditions have kept the proportions of the armies down to a fairly - constant figure. Chinese officers have advanced the theory that if - recruiting were everywhere abandoned, disease, desertions and losses - in battle would account for ten per cent. per annum, so that the - armies would automatically cease to exist in ten years.[4] - -The use of the railways for military purposes unsettled large groups of -Chinese geographically and caused meetings of extensive bodies of men -from different areas. At first such contacts, especially under wartime -conditions, would only intensify provincial sentiment and mistrust of -strangers, but gradually this influence began to make for a new national -consciousness. In the meantime, the troops learned the intricacies of -modern transport. A coolie in a peaceful part of Asia might see trains -for years, observing the Westerners riding in them, and remain impressed -by the sight; a Chinese bandit sitting on a freight car in a -commandeered train would become rapidly familiar with the fire vehicles. - -The role of the militarists with respect to China's international status -was ambiguous. In the first place, the weakness which they created -reduced China to an international pawn. The discord into which she had -fallen allowed for semipartitions--various foreign interests backing -different war lords--although a genuine partition may thereby have been -staved off. In China proper the influence of the Japanese seemed to be -behind Chang Tso-lin and the Northern militarists; the British were -regarded as friendly to Wu P'ei-fu in the Yangtze valley; and the French -achieved something not far from domination in the province farthest -southwest, Yünnan. Fêng Yü-hsiang was supposed to have veered -picturesquely for foreign friends between the Protestant missions and -the Bolshevik agents. A miniature replica of the European balance of -power could be played in China, with outside groups friendly to one or -the other war lord. An agreement between the chief participants in 1919 -sought to prevent the shipping of arms to unauthorized military groups -in China but proved largely ineffectual in the end. - -Between 1922 and 1926 there was formed in South China a nexus of armies -which were to provide the military edge to ideological revolution and -establish the followers of Sun Yat-sen in power. These armies were built -up with the assistance of Russian and German advisers and with American -arms which had been left in Siberia and had fallen into the hands of the -Bolsheviks; the troops were led by new-style Chinese officers under the -leadership of Chiang K'ai-shek. The Whampoa Academy was the most obvious -sign of the new school of military thought, coming forth as a -consequence of the Nationalist-Communist coalition.[5] Armaments did not -differ in any substantial degree from those of the war lords, but they -were more carefully kept and more skillfully used. The military machine -which arose in the South was better organized, better disciplined, -better led, and better cared for than any army on the Chinese scene for -a decade. - -From 1926 to 1927 the ensuing campaign for the Nationalist conquest of -China, as outlined in the principles of Sun Yat-sen,[6] drove forward -with striking success. The Nationalist troops everywhere pushed their -enemies before them with astonishing speed. The explanation is to be -found in part in the efficiency and military honesty of officers and -men, but even more in the nonmilitary factors which fortified the armies -and the ideological weapons which cleared the ground before it. The new -armies not only represented military might; they were also propaganda -machines. To every regiment there was attached a political staff to keep -up the morale of the troops and to win over the enemy and the civilian -population. The troops themselves were propaganda brigades as well as -military units. Literacy in the armies was made a point of great pride, -and certain divisions made novel reputations for themselves on this -ground. The Nationalists were known by many as the soldiers who did not -harm the people. Without the troops the Nationalists would never have -come to power; but without the supporting sweep of mass propaganda the -Nationalist movement might have gone on for decades in the form of -civilian conspirators fighting against overwhelming odds or else seeking -to make venal mercenaries the prime instrument for the regeneration of -Chinese civilization. - -The military revolution of 1926-1927 brought new factors to the Chinese -military scene. It indicated that a point of equilibrium had been -reached between the military and the ideological modes of control and -that it was no longer possible for sheer force and a minimum of -intelligence to hold unchallenged power in the Chinese society. It was, -furthermore, a threefold struggle: a patriotic and progressive uprising -against domestic and foreign oppression and inefficiency; an agrarian -revolt on a grand scale; and a proletarian uprising on the part of the -relatively small but strategically placed Chinese proletariat. Only in -the first of these aspects did the revolution meet with the approval of -most Chinese--the victims and not the bearers of arms. Men of all shades -of opinion were able to agree on a policy of attacking the system of -_tuchüns_, which offered no planning for the future, no resurrection of -the past, and little public order. The patriotic troops were enraged by -the corruption and inadequacy all about them and by the fortresses of -privilege reared by aliens on their coasts and in their greatest inland -cities. - -The campaign of 1926-1927 marked the identification of the coolie -soldier with his own class and of the peasant fighter with his. The rank -and file were given to understand that they were not fighting in some -game beyond their understanding but for the security of people like -themselves. Under the influence of the propaganda put forth by the -Nationalists and the allied Communists, an incipient agrarian revolt was -fanned into flame and proletarian uprisings in the cities were made -possible for the first time. Whole sections of the countryside fell into -a condition not far from anarchy as the revolutionary troops led the -people in revolt. After 1927, however, the military forces developed -along two antagonistic lines. The Nationalists, seizing the political -instruments of the revolution but finding its ideological factors -largely beyond their control, began to create a professionalized army -with which to stabilize their regime. The Communists, and their agrarian -allies, standing to the Left of the newborn Nanking government, were -eager to fight on in the tested informal fashion. In the year of the -establishment of the Nanking government, 1927, the Red Army could still -demonstrate its effectiveness. Shortly afterward the precautionary arms -embargo of the foreign powers, which had prevailed since 1919, was -lifted, thereby opening up the means by which Chiang K'ai-shek could -renovate and specialize the armies under his command. - -The break with the war-lord tradition was much more obvious in the case -of the Communists than in the case of the Nationalists. The Communists, -lacking sufficient support to occupy any broad contiguous territory, -fell back on guerrilla fighting of their own. The Nationalists, strong -enough to hold a certain portion of the area, nevertheless compromised -with the existing military system to seek mastery. For three years after -the establishment of the Nanking government, it remained doubtful -whether the whole government might not subside into inertia and neglect, -leaving Chiang standing alone, distinguished from the other war lords -only by his character. - -Late in 1930 and early in 1931 a menacing alliance was organized between -two of the most influential remaining Northern _tuchüns_ and the -"liberal" wing of the Nationalists. Operating from the north, after the -proclamation of an insurgent "National Government" at Peking, the rebels -at first seemed to have the military advantage. Chiang had learned many -lessons, however, and in the most serious fighting which China had seen -in years he broke the force of the Northern offensive. Airplanes -appeared as a threat against the civilian population of Peking, although -no actual deaths were reported. There were ugly rumors that gas was -being used at the front. Small tanks from England, though giving a -rather poor performance, symbolized a novel trend. More and better heavy -artillery was used than ever before. Trenches came up to World War -standards. The war ended with the intervention from Manchuria of Chang -Hsüeh-liang, a strangely progressive and patriotic _tuchün_; but the -fighting had been enough to show that of all the great armed forces in -China the Nationalist armies of Chiang K'ai-shek and the Nanking -government were the most effective. - -The rehabilitation of men's thinking had not proceeded far enough to -eliminate the dangers of an overemphasized military leadership, but the -tide had turned. After 1931 the military situation in China had become -subordinate to the problems of ideology and of government. The chief -military factors were now the governmentalized armies, the guerrilla -opposition of the Communists, and the problem of foreign war. - - -_The Age of Air Conquest_ - -The new military period which replaced the war-lord system was marked by -(1) technical improvement of the armies, especially in the direction of -air power; (2) supplementation of the armies by the quasi-military power -of the civil government, so that Chinese wars ceased to be a question -of armed bands drifting about the surface of the social system; -(3) organization of the Nationalist armies into national units in -fact as well as name; (4) increasing pressure of the disbandment -problem; (5) development of guerrilla tactics by the Reds and of -guerrilla-suppression tactics by the Nationalists; (6) problems arising -from Japanese conquest, which overwhelmed Manchuria in one fierce -onslaught and harassed China for six years of military aggressions -before breaking forth anew in the catastrophic surge of 1937-1938. - -Aviation was to leap to a sensational place. Aviation and national -civilian government became almost natural complements of one another. -Only by aviation could all parts of the country be brought under the -jurisdiction of Nanking and the geographical handicaps of China be -overcome, and only a national government could afford the long-term -investments in machines and men necessary to effective air armament. The -record of technical improvement in the Nationalist armies is clearly -symbolized by the advancement of military aircraft. Military aviation in -China previous to the establishing of the Nanking government -demonstrated the weakness of the preceding regime. As early as 1909 a -French aviator was giving demonstration flights over Shanghai.[7] The -Ch'ing dynasty sought to establish an airplane factory but met with no -success. Yüan Shih-k'ai purchased a few planes and set up a flying -school. The first telling use of planes in Chinese politics and war -occurred, however, with the bombardment of the imperial palace by a lone -aviator in the course of an attempted monarchical restoration in 1917. -In the period of the war lords there were many isolated efforts to build -up flying services. The most promising of these, undertaken by the -Peking Republic with British assistance after 1920, failed through -neglect, mismanagement, and corruption. As late as 1928 there was no -prospect of significant air fighting in China. - -By 1931 the Nanking government had built up an air force of about -seventy serviceable planes; a contemporary commentator observed, -"Aeroplanes played a very considerable--some would even say a -decisive--part in the civil war of 1930...."[8] By 1932, when an -American aviation mission arrived to help in the training of a Chinese -military air force, the estimates ran into a total of 125 to 140 -commercial and training planes.[9] In the ensuing five years the Chinese -national air force developed rapidly. It played the leading role in -suppressing the Fukien uprising of 1932-1933 and in driving the -Communists into the Northwest. In 1937 the head of the American aviation -mission, Colonel John Jouett, wrote, "Japan maintains that China has a -thousand planes; my guess would be seven hundred and fifty of all types. -But no one knows...."[10] Other experts would reduce the figure to -one-third or less by the elimination of planes which would not be of -first-class utility in actual combat. The preparations for foreign -hostilities up to 1937 were accompanied by such a degree of secrecy that -definite figures are not available. For domestic purposes, however, -almost every plane would count, and the cardinal fact remains that -domestically the National Government possesses a monopoly of air power -in China. It is thereby in a better position to make its supreme will -formidably known than was any emperor of any dynasty. The future may -show that Chinese mastery of aircraft is psychologically as important as -was mastery of the steamship for the Japanese--a visible demonstration -to an Asiatic people of their own accomplishments with Western -technology. - -As for other improvements of the armies, only three factors need be -mentioned. The armies were consolidated generally, and with their better -status--in literacy, pay, means of subsistence, and regularity of -control--there came a realization that the military force was the -creature of the national state. The Chinese nation was taking form as an -ideological and social entity of sufficient strength to command the -direct allegiance of fighting men. A new respect arose for the officers -and men of the armies. Under Yüan Shih-k'ai the armies had been able to -evolve a respectability of their own making; under Chiang K'ai-shek this -respectability began to be accepted at its face value by the rest of the -society, so that a pilot was not only admired by the crowd but was -recognized as an expert among experts, even in literary and civil-minded -circles. Secondly, the armies affected the nation by road construction. -In the course of the Nationalist-Communist wars of 1927-1937 the -Nationalists built thousands of miles of highway in order to make full -use of their new mobility gained from machine power. The military roads, -supplemented by civilian roads built with an eye to military use, -constituted a network of communications upon which a new political -geography could be framed--with new strategic points and new avenues of -commerce. Thirdly, the armies began to emphasize culture and comfort. -The soldiers were given a taste of twentieth century life and standards; -their civilian kin and friends who lived under less favorable conditions -saw in the elite sections of the armies a mass demonstration of China's -modernization. - -In the age of air power in China the relation between the army, the -government, and the economy was revolutionized. The new power of a state -with actual authority[11] led to the creation of an army dependent on an -intricate and sensitive financial and economic system, operating under a -regular scheme of law. The strength of the government made modern armies -possible; modern armies made corresponding political forms imperative. A -resulting tendency was for the armies to take on national form. Even in -those areas where _tuchünism_ had left its imprint upon society, or -where provincial autonomy provided a factual check upon the national -authorities, the regional armies accepted organizational details and -long-range plans set forth by the central government. Armies which had -arisen as dumps for the unemployed or as resources for civil war were -fitted together so as to make the Chinese forces resemble the other -armies of the world--which exist for the preservation, defense, or -aggrandizement of national states. Foreign military observers, equipped -with the critical faculties of their profession, might look at the -Chinese armies and state point-blank that China had not an army but -merely armed men. They could not, however, deny that the Chinese armed -forces in their latest phase were on the way to becoming an army -nationally organized and fit to serve as the instrument of a great -nation. The lessons of nearly a thousand years of European and American -political experience may be epitomized in great part in the word -_nation_; the Chinese armies helped to give this word true significance -in China. - -For the time being, the armies continued to serve their role of a refuge -for the economically displaced. Armed paupers are a menace to the -security and stability of any society; with the emergence of a higher -degree of Chinese unity a great proportion of the armed forces lost -their _raison d'être_. Nevertheless, the last great war-lord war, that -of 1930-1931, was fought largely over the issue of army reduction. The -National Government forces gradually increased in preparation for the -disbandment of others--extensive bodies of irregulars were roughly -systematized and placed under central supervision. They were used in -moderately successful but insufficient colonization efforts in the -Northwest, and as labor reserves in the construction of highways, -airports, and similar projects. Even so, the size of the armies did not -cease to interfere with their rapid improvement. Too much had to go into -pay, even with the ridiculously low rates of compensation. As against -the estimates of nearly 1,400,000 men for 1921 and about 1,900,000 for -1926, the size of the armies was unofficially estimated at 2,379,770 for -1936.[12] This figure did not include Communists, brigands, or the -Manchurian garrisons in the service of the Japanese (the Manchoukuo -army), which would bring the total to well over 2,500,000 men. -Differences in definition of what made a coolie or peasant into a -soldier caused violent discrepancies in the estimates. If training equal -to that of a German Republican Reichswehr soldier were set as the -criterion, the Chinese army could be measured in scores. If some more or -less vague relation to a military payroll, or to the possession of arms, -or both, were taken as the requirements, the number would run into -millions. Japanese propagandists, in the light of these facts, made -injudicious statements when commenting thus on the Chinese army of 1937: - - China had 198 divisions comprising 2,250,000 officers and men. This - gigantic army has further been reinforced by 200,000 Communist - soldiers whom Nanking worked hard to set against Japan. - - In comparison the Japanese Army is a puny affair, consisting of 17 - divisions of 250,000 officers and men.[13] - -The well-informed expert on Chinese famine relief, Walter H. Mallory, -set the total for 1937 at 1,650,000, of which 150,000 were Communist and -350,000 the crack troops of Chiang K'ai-shek; arms would be available -for less than 1,000,000.[14] All factors considered, the figure of -2,000,000 armed men with nonproductive occupations seems to be in rough -accord with the facts. Two salient conclusions emerge from these -figures: Firstly, the armies constituted an enormous burden, which could -only be reduced by partial disbandment; this in turn would not be -achieved until greater national prosperity had become a fact. Secondly, -and in China's favor, the armed forces have spread some elementary -notions of modern fighting throughout the rest of the population and -have enhanced not merely the willingness of the Chinese masses to fight -but also their capacity to do so. - -Disbandment programs had not made enough progress by 1937 to alter the -general position of the armies in Chinese society. Nevertheless, the -counterpart of disbandment--selective recruiting--produced a central -force which became the vocation, avocation, and passion of Generalissimo -Chiang K'ai-shek. Though not marked in any recognizable way as apart -from the rest of the armed forces, the central units were given special -arms, special equipment, regular pay, mass education, and training in -the patriotic and reform doctrines of the New Life movement. "Chiang's -own" were to distinguish themselves; they seem to have profited by new -_matériel_, modern military instruction (chiefly from Germans), and the -excellent opportunities for practice which arose from the Communist wars -of 1928-1937. They were a testimonial to the fact that, had the -disbandment program fully materialized, a more effective and much -smaller Chinese army might have appeared. Despite the failure of -disbandment, alliance with the quondam enemies, the Chinese Red Army, -gave the national forces of 1937 a great diversity and wealth of actual -experience in all types of fighting. Although the Chinese have never had -adequate training for aggressive, coordinated warfare, they possess a -marvelous background in guerrilla methods. The Communist forces have -been hunted for a decade; technical superiority they have learned to -meet by tactics which force the enemy to meet them on their own terms. -Ultimately they were driven by the Nationalists across China, but at -most disproportionate cost. The Nationalists, on the other hand, learned -to master the terrain of inland war and thus acquired the very knowledge -which a foreign enemy would need most. - -In time, the Chinese armies became increasingly less the free agencies -of domestic tyrants and, after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, more -and more the protective force for the whole nation. The enemy began to -force Chinese society into national form more sharply than could any -pressure from within. Even the efforts of the National Government at -Nanking to make a truce with the Japanese in order to continue the drive -against the Communists failed to still the widespread clamor for -unification. Whether or not Chiang, as a soldier, thought successful war -with Japan conceivable, he found that destiny had cast him in the role -of the defender--he had only the choice of accepting or rejecting the -challenge. - - -_Governmental and Political Role of the Armies_ - -Broadly, the political role of the armies was that of giving a -day-to-day index for the influence of ideological control, and of -providing the framework to which government had to accommodate itself. -The Republic was born with Sun Yat-sen as its father but with Yüan -Shih-k'ai as its midwife. Yüan and his armies established the order in -which the parliamentary Republic had its illusory success; with his -death the military order broke into military anarchy, and the political -order disappeared almost completely from the arena of actual power. The -armies and the tuchüns expressed a certain provincial autonomy and a -desire for a crude stability. They ruled the chaos but kept the society -stirred by war until the Nationalist-Communist revolution in 1926-1927 -brought ideology back to a conspicuous place in the play of events. The -armies developed under Yüan into separate entities exercising the power -derived from the monopoly of force. In time this monopoly of force was -broken. The problem was one not of tyranny but of anarchy. Force was too -broadly distributed, order too insufficiently achieved. The Chinese, -said Sun Yat-sen, did not need liberty; they needed wealth, in the form -of food for those starving and the necessities of life for impoverished -millions.[15] When even soldiers were treacherous and tumultuous, order -could not come from bayonets. It had to arise within men's minds, -including the minds of the soldiers. This happened; the ideological -revolution absorbed the military forces, but only to disgorge them, as -it were, into opposing camps--the one identifying military power and the -masses, the other seeking to build up a new military elite with which to -impose government and law on the society. Each of the two incompatible -ideals reached a considerable measure of fulfillment, and they were -reconciled only by the very presence of alien invaders. From being the -_de facto_ rulers, the armies found themselves called upon to act as _de -facto_ defenders. Hitherto the forces unsettling ideological control, -they became the instruments of ideologies reconciled on the minimal -terms of national defense for national existence. - -The armies had supplied the power necessary to government but not the -order. The Peking Republic lost its claim to authority when it was made -the tool of Yüan Shih-k'ai. The years after his death were a pitiful -period wherein the civilian authorities in the central government -constituted either the puppets of the war lords or their sycophants. The -Peking Republic fell into the expedient of giving _de jure_ status to -every shift in the interplay of power. Military leaders of provincial -importance easily captured the functions of _tuchüns_; regional leaders -obtained correspondingly higher titles. The Peking Republic tried to -govern on the Western pattern when the country was not ready for it, and -it governed poorly. Soon it passed from nominal control into -nonexistence. - -The National Government established at Nanking in 1927[16] gained actual -effectiveness partly because the armies under its command were in need -of essentials not obtainable by merely military measures. The modernized -Nationalist armies under Chiang K'ai-shek were dependent upon a -complementing state which would provide support behind the lines. -Furthermore, the cry from the educated classes for civilian government -was loud, and practical considerations prompted the acquiescence of the -Nationalist generals in the development of civilian government. Although -by 1938 a government primarily civilian was not yet in evidence, the -auspices were favorable to the regularization and demilitarization of -government. - -Finally, the most significant role of the armies may be found in their -destructive powers. Modern weapons coming into China pressed on her the -mold of a modern state. By preventing any tranquil change from the -Ch'ing dynasty to another form of government preserving the older -controls of village and family, Western armament brought China into a -condition of military anarchy in which a strong modern government became -imperative. The armies and their irresponsible leaders goaded the masses -into the revolution of 1926-1927, and the necessity of establishing -military superiority for the sake of stability led the victorious -Nationalists to create a modern defensive force, a working government, -and the outline of operative statehood--to be partly Chinese, but -modified by Western influences, according to the teachings of Sun -Yat-sen. From 1931 on, the army and the government became more and more -the integral parts of a single machine. - - -_War and the Agrarian Economy_ - -There is a close correlation between militarism and agricultural -conditions in China. Distress among the Chinese farming masses is both a -cause and an effect of war. Misery creates unrest, unrest brings war, -war brings misery--until government stops the vicious circle. On the -whole, the economic system of old China was probably more stable, and -ensured greater distributive justice, than did the Western systems -during the same centuries; but periods of famine, flood, and--worst of -all--oppression were far from rare.[17] - -At its best, the old economy rested on a vast body of farmers, -associated in villages (_hui_) and families but tilling their own land -in fairly small units. The farming class provided the nourishment for -the bulk of society but did not hold a low status, since the -compensations of interclass kinship and of free play in the hierarchy of -politics and intellect made families (if not individuals) approximately -equal. There were no families in old China to compare with the -aristocracy which Europe inherited from the Middle Ages, nor castes to -compare with those of India. When functioning well, the Chinese economic -system resembled some Western ideals of freehold farming governed by a -hierarchy of scholars. - -But at its worst, when the government became sterile and unimaginative, -or corrupt and demoralized, the taxes rose sharply, and usurers added to -the burden. Lack of resources caused the loss of the land, and the -peasant proprietor found himself a tenant farmer. When economic and -political exploitation overreached itself, social upheaval followed, and -peasant rebellions tore down the government and the economy together. -Most Chinese dynasties met their end as a consequence of the land -problem.[18] - -Moreover, the Chinese farmer maintained very slight reserves of -foodstuffs, so that flood or drought resulted in appalling famines, -sometimes costing the lives of millions in one year. Governments -established large granaries which, under good management, were filled in -time of plenty and dispersed in time of need. R. H. Tawney says of -drought and flood: - - Those directly affected by them cannot meet the blow, for they have no - reserves. The individual cannot be rescued by his neighbors, since - whole districts together are in the same position. The district cannot - be rescued by the nation, because means of communication do not permit - of food being moved in sufficient quantities. Famine is, in short, the - last stage of a disease which, though not always conspicuous, is - always present.[19] - -Whether or not natural calamities struck in conjunction with specific -extortions sanctioned by social injustice, the Chinese farmer has been -faced with threefold oppression whenever times were bad. The tax -collector, the usurer, and the landlord were able to lay their hands on -the harvest, reduce the peasant to subsistence level or beneath it, and -place him under a system of exploitation which was as severe as Western -feudalism. The check which provided a stop to any indefinite decline -into greater and greater horror was the fighting power of the peasants. -Peasant revolts periodically followed agrarian oppression, and swept the -land free for the time. The Han dynasty, in some ways the greatest in -all Chinese history, went down in an uproar of peasant rebellions. -Peasant bandits have provided the ancestry of many imperial houses. -Politics or war might ease the economy, until the government again -became weak and exploitation common. - -It is one of the tragic coincidences of history that the Europeans -should have appeared in China at a time when the Chinese were entering -upon one of their most acute periods of agrarian decline and class -exploitation. Roughly, from the middle of the eighteenth century down to -the present day the lot of the Chinese farmers has become worse and -worse. At periods the country as a whole seemed fairly prosperous, but -the broad agricultural recession remained constant. The nineteenth -century was one long record of rebellions, and the twentieth amplified -the disturbances. - -Government in modern China has fallen heir to a depression centuries -old, arising from inequitable land distribution, overtaxation, -insufficient public works for drainage and communications, and--in more -recent generations--the evils attendant upon sharp economic change. Most -economic writers agree that some of the difficulties of Chinese -agriculture are caused by the smallness of individual holdings and by -population pressure. Such factors are not subject to immediate remedy; -the peasants have attributed their misfortune primarily to landlordism -and political oppression. The Chinese Communists, on their economic -front, may perform a valuable service if they are able to devise new -methods of social organization which will provide relief for the organic -difficulties of Chinese agriculture. Of all the important problems of -China, the land problem shows government ineffectiveness at its worst. - -Behind the T'ai-p'ing rebellion which flared up in unparalleled -fanaticism in the 1850's and 1860's, there was the long provocation of a -land system which made farming unprofitable and a government supine in -the face of unreversed decline. The Boxer rebellion burst forth from the -unrest of the peasants, although it could be deflected by the -demagoguery of the Manchu officials and changed into wild xenophobia. -When the fiercely discordant economics of imperialism and international -industrialism intruded upon the old and already corrupted economy, farm -existence became even less tolerable than it might have been if left to -its native miseries. Dynastic decomposition was hastened by the collapse -of handicraft economy and the fiscal disorganization caused by Western -commercial activity. - -In the earliest days of the Republican-Nationalist movement led by Sun -Yat-sen, emphasis was on land reform. Sun Yat-sen's family had suffered -from overtaxation when he was a boy.[20] Nationalization and -equalization of the land were slogans used at the founding of the _Tung -Mêng Hui_; the program seems at that time to have been derived from old -Chinese distributism and from Henry George.[21] With the coming of the -Republic, two years went by, however, before any agrarian legislation -was passed, and the new laws had no perceptible consequence.[22] The -problem of land reform had to be fought out on the ideological front and -placed above the military before it could become a fit subject for -competent government action. - -The epoch of the _tuchüns_ added to agricultural misfortune. Militarism -had a direct effect on the deterioration of the land economy, and an -indirect one in that it led to the cultivation of opium as the one -money-making crop which could meet the excessive tax demands of the -militarists. A Chinese writer has described the years which marked the -ending of the _tuchün_ system as follows: - - The ... misery among the farming population in the decennial period - 1920-1930 [must be] attributed to (1) internal warfare; (2) neglect of - agriculture; (3) low stage of art; and (4) over-population. The civil - wars during the last eighteen years have increased the cost of - production, have added to the farmers' ... burden of taxation, have - raised the rate of interest on loan, and have caused endless suffering - to [those] who form the basis of our social and economic life. Great - many people have often wondered as to why a country like China with 75 - per cent of her total population engaged in farming and with such a - vast territory should suffer from the high cost of living; but to the - student of social problems the question is comparatively simple, for - the recurrence of civil war since the establishment of the Republic - has [changed] conditions of supply and has driven millions of farmers - out of cultivated areas, and this alone suffices to explain an - unprecedented rise of prices of food and other necessities of life - during the last few years, especially since 1926.[23] - -These conditions led to farmers' movements, which became effective, -however, only as they merged with the broader ideological tendencies in -China. - - The Farmers' Movement ... may ... be divided into four periods: (1) - the period of reaction to bad conditions ... (1921-1925); (2) the - period of communistic activities and violence (1925-1927); (3) the - period of retrenchment and preparation for reconstruction (from the - spring of 1927-1928); and (4) the period of reconstruction (since - 1928).[24] - -The Kuomintang-Communist alliance struck severely at the _tuchün_ armies -by giving their own forces a sense of doctrine and by tying together the -causes of patriotism and agricultural reform. The joint agrarian program -was a failure in that it accentuated precisely those issues on which -neither of the parties could compromise. When the Communists and the -Nationalists parted, the Nationalists took one portion of Sun Yat-sen's -economic program (industrialization and communications) for emphasis, -and the Communists another (land reform). The agrarian issue was a -source of strength to the Chinese Red Army, intent upon winning the -peasantry. It was a military weakness to the new-style Nationalist -armies officered largely by the relatives of landlords; they had little -sympathy for the economic troubles of the farmers whose lands they -occupied. The Nationalist Reconstruction aimed in great part at removing -both the acute and the latent causes of peasant rebellion, thereby -cutting the ground from under the feet of the Communists. Although it -met with more success than any other project of its type in modern -China, Western observers agree in regarding it as inadequate.[25] - - -_Imperialism and Chinese Wars_ - -A great part of the military disturbances in modern China can be -regarded as both the cause and the effect of agrarian evils, and some of -the struggles as peasant rebellions in modern guise, carrying on the -immemorial farmer-infantry tradition. Another part is traceable to the -impact of the Western economy on China. It was Western economic activity -that gave most compelling proof of the fact that the Westerners had -encircled China and were compressing it from a world in its own right -into a nation. The military intervention of Western powers in China not -only caused much of the ideological reaction and forced a reorganization -of the government, but also provided deadly evidence of the superiority -of Western fighting. Western economy helped to bring the confusion which -meant war in China; and Western economy itself waged war. - -Sun Yat-sen saw China's unfortunate position as a whole, and in his -programs there may be discerned three separate demands, for (1) a -national economic revolution, (2) an industrial revolution, and (3) a -social revolution.[26] Since the Chinese could no longer function as a -self-contained world economically, and scorn foreign trade as a -magnanimous concession to the outer barbarians,[27] the Chinese would -have to develop an economic system conforming to national patterns in -the society and in thought. They must relate their economy to their -independence and defense, if they were to survive. In the first place, -they could not afford to remain the only free market of the world, -subject to exploitation and haphazard development. It would be necessary -for them to establish governmental controls over economic matters and -protect their national livelihood. Secondly, they had to work toward a -complete transformation of their technological system and meet Western -productive practices, if they were to claim a competitive position; this -involved an industrial revolution. Thirdly, they had to correct the -abuses inherited from their forefathers. Simultaneously they would have -to construct an economic system not only modern but equitable, if they -wished to avoid the horrors of early capitalism and the tragedy of the -industrialist class war. This would require a social revolution. - -At the time that Sun Yat-sen formulated his ideas (1924), none of the -three revolutions was making any progress. The Chinese did not -constitute a nation in fact; they had even lost the old unity of the -Confucian society. The _tuchüns_ opposed Chinese nationalism by -preventing the development of any one authority able to monopolize -force, and by acting as agents of, or in alliance with, foreign powers. -Thus they helped to make China something not far from a quasi colony -under pooled control of all the industrial capitalist nations. The -Nationalists and Communists were able to join forces on this issue of a -class war of nations, both believing in the independence of China. The -Nationalists, however, saw China's most direct approach toward national -unity in the development of a national economic system, with a -reasonable military independence of imports and the economic devices -current throughout the world as instruments of national policy. The -Communists did not agree that such an economy, national in form, would -have much meaning unless it were grounded upon a peasant-proletarian -regime. Nor did they feel that change from imperialist to native -capitalism would constitute an advance in itself. - -After the schism, the Nationalists devoted themselves to the -national-economic and industrial revolutions, while the Communists -stressed the social revolution, particularly the land problem. The -Nationalists were able to secure tariff autonomy for China, and -thereupon entered upon a policy of protective tariffs and other -mechanisms designed to make China a reasonably self-sufficient nation. -At the same time they pushed hard toward the industrial revolution, in -developing highways, railroads, airways, and radio, and in creating the -economic controls required for modern government--standard weights, -measures, currency, civil law, and fiscal uniformity. - -T. V. Soong (Sung Tz[)u]-wên), a veteran minister of finance, stands out -as the organizer of the modern Chinese economy. Veritable miracles were -performed in the development of national credit; after 1928 the National -Government adopted the policy--as remote as a mirage to its -predecessors--of floating all government loans within the country and -making the Chinese government independent of Japanese and Western -financiers. The only loans of any importance contracted abroad were -taken up with other governments. Financial independence was a great step -toward the realization of the Nationalist ideals, but it may be -questioned whether the loss of financial allies was a price to be paid -without hesitation in a capitalist world. Had the Chinese had more bonds -in the Western capital markets, or larger debts to the American or -British governments, they might have elicited greater international -support in repelling the Japanese invasion in 1931. - -The crowning point in the economic achievements of the National -Government at Nanking was the successful institution of a managed -currency. China had dealt with currency merely as a convenient form for -specie, and the Chinese were accustomed to regard a dollar as worth only -the amount of metal in it. When the National Government placed the -currency on a national basis, it drew together the whole financial -structure of China by one gigantic move, and placed finance in a -position of greater unity and dependence upon government than ever -before. Together with the financial reforms, the Nationalists organized -a legal system providing a minimum foundation of law and order. The -codification of laws, the revamping of the judiciary, the clarification -of policies by legal formulation--all these contributed to China's -emergent nationhood. - -The economic program accorded with considerations partly Hamiltonian, -partly state-socialist. The economy had first of all to be organized and -integrated in national terms, and later to be revised so as to ensure -social justice. The Nationalists were convinced that a policy of -immediate land reform would lead to internal disharmony and frustrate -the very purposes for which the revolution of 1926-1927 had been -launched. The Communists, on the other hand, succeeded in keeping the -agrarian issue from being forgotten and forced the Nationalists to -better the lot of the peasant. In the meantime, China's boom in physical -development and the unification of the commercial, financial, -productive, and legal systems began to startle observers. - -As a result, China was able to build national armies in direct ratio -with the invigoration of her national economic system. The war machine -of the National Government, under the care and leadership of -Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek, became the most powerful in China. The -central government's military power in turn speeded up the pace of -general unification. There was thus a remarkable interaction of forces -tending toward national integration. From 1932 to 1937, between the -first and second major phases of the Japanese invasion, progress was -rapid--stimulated, perhaps, by the external menace. - -The two greatest dangers to the Nationalist policy of military and -economic unification were (1) the dismal condition of the Chinese -proletariat, as yet small but constantly growing, and (2) the vested -interests of the industrial powers. Had China's growth been less rapid, -the foreigners might have withdrawn slowly and found compensation in -Chinese commerce for their losses in direct ownership in China. There -was one power, however, to which Chinese unification was a living and -increasing threat. The rising military-economic power of the Chinese was -incompatible with the position which Japanese leaders visualized as part -of the manifest destiny of their country. The Japanese might have -tolerated the _tuchün_ system for decades had the _tuchüns_ been able to -establish orderly regional governments; or they might have aided a -reactionary Chinese regime which asked for survival only. The appearance -of a genuine republic in the Far East was a menace to Japan; if that -republic was bound by sheer physical proportions to overshadow Japan, -the unification and modernization of China had to be averted at all -costs. - -Nevertheless, China's development, even apart from the hindrances of -war, cannot be regarded as possessing the same potentialities as did -American growth during the past century. China, from all indications -available to date, is an area much poorer in natural resources than is -the United States; she does not offer comparable opportunities for the -heavy industries. The steel, coal, oil, and water power necessary for -large-scale industrialization are by no means negligible, but not -sufficient to make possible the rise of another America. The far future -may change man's dependence upon currently utilized resources and -facilitate greater strides in China's technological advancement. -Meanwhile, she can look forward to decades of measurable development -through exploiting raw materials already available, if political -conditions permit. - -The conflict with Japan has thrown Chinese economic development back to -conditions not too far from the pre-Nanking stage. China not only faces -the handicaps of social dislocations but also the ruin of her factories -and her industrial centers. The Japanese have destroyed much of the -Chinese manufacturing equipment and are placing what remains under -Japanese control. Significantly, the deadliest enemy of Japanese -business--in the unlikely event of a complete Japanese success--will be -Japanese-owned factories in China. Chinese labor will deeply affect -Japan's domestic production, unless the Japanese succeed in -rationalizing their economic system to an extent not yet contemplated. -Hence, Japan's losing the war may well be brought about by bankruptcy -from sheer military indebtedness; her winning the war, however, may lead -to more remote but no less certain ruin--through the competition of -Chinese output with Japanese home industries disadvantaged by the -cheaper labor markets of China. But Japan's loss is not inevitably -China's gain, and the Chinese may find themselves, at some point in the -future, controlling an industrial system which has been wrecked, looted, -and bankrupted. - -Whatever the ultimate outcome, loans will again play a part in Chinese -development. The placing of large foreign loans has been a key part of -Chinese development, and the task of reconstruction in China--no matter -who undertakes to do it--will require large amounts of capital. -Consequently, the loan policies of the wealthier nations may return to -the importance which they enjoyed in 1913, and the dictates of the -Western states may again direct the lines of Chinese economic progress. -The effects of the Japanese conquest, if it is partial and then lapses -into a stalemate, may well be determined by the extension of loans to -the Chinese or to the Japanese in China. The effect of the war has -already complicated the picture of China's economic future to the extent -of making even cautious prophecy hazardous.[28] - -In the military sphere, the Chinese have come of age, although their -fighting strength will be determined by the importance of infantry. If -later wars continue to depend upon man power, China will become more and -more significant in world politics. Internally, the armies provided (1) -a transitional administration from the Empire to the Republic; (2) a -physical expression of the ideological confusion and the regional -disunity of China from 1916 to 1931 (the period of _tuchüns_); (3) the -armed edge of the ideological revolution of 1926-1927; (4) decisive -instruments in the conflict between the Communists and Nationalists from -1927 to 1937; and (5) one of the most powerful unifying agencies at the -command of the National Government at Nanking. The Chinese military -system spread the knowledge of Western warfare and, with it, of modern -techniques throughout the country; it shaped the ideological and -governmental experience of modern China. - - -NOTES - -[1] See below, pp. 154 ff. - -[2] Rodney Gilbert in _The China Year Book_, 1921-2, p. 519, Tientsin, -1921. - -[3] _Ibid._, 1926, p. 1065. - -[4] _Ibid._, p. 1062. - -[5] See above, pp. 51 ff. - -[6] See above, pp. 58 ff. - -[7] Gilbert, _loc. cit._, 1928, pp. 1283-1285. - -[8] _Ibid._, 1931, pp. 251 ff. - -[9] Source confidential. - -[10] John H. Jouett, "War Planes over China," _Asia_, vol. 37, pp. -827-830, 1937. - -[11] See below, pp. 167 ff. - -[12] _The China Year Book_, 1936, p. 427. - -[13] Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, _The Sino-Japanese -Crisis_, 1937, p. 18, New York, 1937. - -[14] Walter H. Mallory, "Japan Attacks, China Resists," _Foreign -Affairs_, vol. 16, pp. 135-136, 1937. - -[15] Paschal M. d'Elia, S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, pp. -252-273, Wuchang, 1931. This is one of the most useful translations of -Sun Yat-sen's lectures on the _San Min Chu I_. Others are Frank Price, -_San Min Chu I, The Three Principles of the People_, Shanghai, 1930; and -L. S. Hsü, _Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals_, Los Angeles, -1933. - -[16] See below, pp. 167 ff. It is to be noted that the Nanking -government did not secure international recognition until 1928--the year -following its establishment. - -[17] Among the more recent discussions of economics in Chinese history -is Chi Chao-ting, _Key Areas in Chinese Economic History_, New York, -1936. - -[18] See Karl August Wittfogel, _Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas_, -Leipzig, 1931, and the same author's outline of one of the boldest -programs of Chinese studies, "A Large-Scale Investigation of China's -Socio-Economic Structure," _Pacific Affairs_, vol. 11, pp. 81-94, 1938. - -[19] R. H. Tawney, _Land and Labour in China_, p. 77, New York, 1932. - -[20] Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese Republic_, pp. -67-71, New York, 1924. - -[21] See Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning_, New -York, 1934; and Paul M. A. Linebarger, _The Political Doctrines of Sun -Yat-sen_, pp. 132-156, Baltimore, 1937, for discussion of the -development of Sun's economic programs. - -[22] Jefferson D. H. Lamb (Lin Tung-hai), _The Development of the -Agrarian Movement and Agrarian Legislation in China_, p. 134, Shanghai, -1934. - -[23] _Ibid._, p. 221. - -[24] _Ibid._, p. 77. - -[25] See _Pacific Affairs_ for 1934 and 1935, for articles by George -Taylor and others dealing with reconstruction. - -[26] Linebarger, _op. cit._ in note 21, chap. VII, "The Programs of Min -Shêng," discusses these points at greater length. - -[27] See P. H. B. Kent, _The Twentieth Century in the Far East_, p. -364, London, 1937, for an extract from the mandate sent by the -Chinese-Manchu Emperor Ch'ien-lung to England's George III. - -[28] See G. E. Hubbard, _Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on -the West_, London, 1935, for a very illuminating survey. J. E. Orchard, -_Japan's Economic Position_, New York, 1930, is equally informative. -Much current information will be found in _Far Eastern Survey_ -(semimonthly, New York), and _Amerasia_ (monthly, New York) on economic -matters. _Pacific Affairs_ (quarterly, New York) and _International -Affairs_ (bimonthly, London) possess book review sections which are -useful guides to the literature. The _Bulletin of Far Eastern -Bibliography_ (quarterly, Washington, D. C.) is the most complete guide -of its kind, but has just completed its initial volumes. - - - - -THIRD PART - -GOVERNMENTS - - - - -_Chapter_ VI - -THE EMPIRE - - -The governing of China is not and has not been confined to governments. -In many instances the working of specific institutions called -_governments_ has been of less importance than that of other -establishments and organizations. The problems of government in -Republican China are affected but not determined by the fate of -individual governments. Movements and armies have predetermined action; -governments have reflected it. Government in China may be divided into -three chief periods. The first extends from prehistory to 221 B. C. The -second is the imperial period.[1] The third--the Republican epoch--did -not begin until 1912, although it was foreshadowed in the nineteenth -century. - - -_Government to the End of the Warring States_ - -In the semihistoric Shang dynasty, which ruled China during the second -millennium B. C., there was a central overlordship which might well have -claimed primacy over all offices of the world. In its own territory, -Shang rule seems to have been based not upon a feudal system such as -developed later in the time of the charioteering lords but upon the -reduction of defeated princes to positions of vassaldom. History cannot -yet tell of the exact relations between the Shang overlord and his -vassal princes, nor of other monarchs who, in the shadowy bypaths of -present knowledge, stand forth vaguely from complete obscurity as rivals -to the hegemony of Shang. The rulers of twenty-five or twenty-six -centuries ago are recognized by modern Chinese as the direct -predecessors of the Ch'ing emperor who in turn yielded to the Republic. -This is no case of a Mussolini seeking to weave together the long-broken -threads between Augustan and modern Rome; in China the succession is as -direct as that from St. Pius I to Pius XI. The central monarchy comes -over the edge of history as an identifiable institution. - -In rudimentary form this monarchy already suggests the features of -bureaucracy. Like the Prussian kings thousands of years later, the Shang -monarchs seem to have relied upon commoners as their royal officials, -and for the same reasons. A commoner strengthened the position of the -monarch: "He could not easily usurp the place of his master, even if he -had the power. And if he was disobedient he could be executed on the -spot, with complete impunity; he had no powerful clan to exact -vengeance."[2] Whether or not the system of loose overlordship be termed -_feudalism_, social forms not too unlike European feudalism originated -under the next dynasty, the Chou (traditionally dated 1122-256 B. C.). -Conquering the great city of the Shang, the Chou turned to feudalism for -means of internal control and defense. Powerful vassals arose, however, -so that after the eighth century B. C. the original Chou dynasty was no -longer in actual command. From the eighth to the third century B. C., -when China was consolidated under the Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, a rapid -spread of feudal organization brought about a state system resembling -that of early modern Europe. - -Before the Chou rulers lost their power and became the faraway analogues -of the late Holy Roman emperors or the Tennos of shogunal Japan, there -emerged from their house one of the most remarkable of all Chinese -political leaders. The Duke of Chou, who lived in the eleventh century -B. C., seems to have done most in founding the system which later ages -called _Confucian_--after Confucius had reformed it, clarified it, and -given it ethical stature. He is also regarded as the father of the -Constitution of Chou, a plan for a bureaucratic monarchy with an -emperor, three Great Dukes, and six ministers (in charge of -administrative, educational and economic, religious and historiographic, -military, judicial, and engineering matters, respectively) ruling over -nine large provinces.[3] The Duke of Chou is finally credited with the -authorship of several important treatises. He has served as the -archetype of intellectual statesmanship in Chinese legend. His work may -have contributed in great part to the long life of the Chou dynasty, as -a _de jure_ ruling house, since a family which had produced such an -eminent member was not to be set aside lightly. - -In the earlier part of this period the feudal order seems to have -ensured relative stability, but in the later part a system of states -arose. The greatest Chinese philosophers, Confucius (Kung Fu-tz[)u]) and -Lao Tz[)u], lived in interstate turmoil. They saw all about them the -displacement of virtues which had long been recognized, the advance of -states which substituted greed for morality, the centralization of -power, the destruction of the feudal economy, the transformation of -ceremonial warfare into outright slaughter, and the rising disrespect of -the advancing kings for the Chou overlord. Lao Tz[)u] preached a -philosophy devoid of constructive politics; he had little use for the -state and for the organization of society. Not quite an anarchist, his -programs are probably closer to those of Herbert Spencer than of any -other Western thinker. But the spiritual and psychological background -from which he wrote is roughly identical with that of the world's great -mystical intuitionists. Confucius (551-479 B. C.) preached a system of -ethics and education which was to rationalize and systematize preceding -Chinese thought and lead to the system of ideological control known as -Confucian. - -Chinese historians themselves term the closing period of the Chou the -Age of Warring States. Diplomacy lubricated the machinery of conflict, -smoothing struggle without eliminating it. The regional governments -fought each other for centuries, though at times venturing into -collective security pacts entrusting authority to a preeminent king for -defense against the outer barbarians. The last years of interstate wars, -however, were marked by an ever increasing awareness of the meaningless -character of a struggle which had enveloped the Chinese world. Legalism -and militarism, twin media of centralized monarchy, blossomed forth. -While the Western political system, molded by geography and conditioned -by language, has frozen into a pattern of theoretically sovereign and -theoretically eternal states--the "mortal Gods" of Hobbes's -imagination--without promise of workable universal government, China's -states were swept aside by the conqueror Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, who -established imperial unity for Chinese government. With the rise to -domination of the state of Ch'in, its king took the title of _Shih_ -(First) _Huang Ti_ (Emperor), and the Chinese Empire was established. - - -_The Chinese Imperial Government_ - -The Shih Huang Ti was not revered by succeeding ages for the great -mission which he performed. His methods were those not of a cautious -reformer but of a bullying conqueror. With the aid and advice of a -legalist philosopher, he organized all of China (covering the area of -much of modern China) into a strongly centralized and despotic military -monarchy. He destroyed all books not of obvious practical use, -completely eradicating the histories of rival states and the works of -philosophers whose opinions might undermine his regime. His tyranny -brought his house to a rapid end; his heirs held the throne only a short -while. But the work he had done was done. He had persecuted the worship -of the past. He had extirpated a large part of the literature which -might have survived as a source of dissent. He had cleared China of all -military power but his own. He had brought operative law into being and -had spread the institution of private ownership of land. Feudalism might -remain as a form, but its economic and political realities were lost. - -In 206 B. C. there began the reign of the Han dynasty. They effected a -compromise between the past and the governmental, military, and -political system created by the Shih Huang Ti. They retained legalism in -practice but turned more and more to Confucianism. Under them the cult -of Confucius grew into the major influence on the state.[4] The Han -allowed the imperial system to grow, whereas the Shih Huang Ti had -sought to build it. In consequence, Han rule--although interrupted in -the time of Christ by a Utopian usurper--lasted from the third century -B. C. to the third century A. D. There followed the turbulent Chinese -middle ages, extending until the reinstitution of organized government -with the Chin and the Sui.[5] - -Out of the earliest tradition attributed to the Duke of Chou and put in -definite shape by Confucius, out of the arbitrary military despotism of -the conqueror of the Chinese world, Shih Huang Ti, and out of the actual -practices of the Han, there evolved a governmental system which, though -altered dynasty by dynasty and epoch by epoch, nevertheless retained its -general form down into the days of men now living. It never became, -however, the prime agency of government, even of the men governing. -Ritual and scholarship were more significant functions of the dominant -hierarchy than was administration itself. The emperor was the head of -the country's family structure, the focal point in the social sphere, -the outstanding member of the community at large, the chief examiner and -model of the scholars, the pontiff of the quasi-religious hierarchy, the -moral scapegoat and intermediary between destiny and mankind, and the -autocrat of a despotism constitutionalized, as it were, by the power of -traditional practices. - -The imperial system of China was thus a monarchy in the proper sense of -the word, with none of the parvenu features suggested by the etymology -of the word _imperial_. As the preeminent leader in an organic society, -the emperor held a position comparable with that of other family heads. -His authority could rival that of a father but not excel it; among all -the families of the Chinese Empire the imperial stood forth as a family. -Second, the emperor was the chief dignitary in the social life of the -Chinese world. He was not unlike the British monarchs, providing a model -of formal propriety and elegance in setting the fashions of the decade. -The physical isolation of most of the emperors prevented them from -playing this role with widespread effectiveness, but it was a part of -their function. Third, the emperor bore the relation to the Empire which -the outstanding villager bore to the village. It was he of whom men -talked; his behavior commanded greatest interest; his future conduct was -a constant source of speculation. Apart from his role as a formal -dignitary, he occupied the more immediate position of most conspicuous -person, of the first member of society. He had the human accountability -of a leader and was to be praised or blamed for his actions in the -histories and by his subjects. In the normal routine, the emperor -himself was not to govern; but he selected and supervised his ministers, -who did and who consequently bore the odium for evil deeds. - -Fourth, the emperor himself was the ultimate examiner of scholars. He -thus had contact with the most successful of the civil service -candidates and completed their examination. These examinations served -the emperor as a means of selecting advisers who upon further testing -became ministers. The Forest of Pencils (_Han Lin_, the Imperial -Academy) was within his jurisdiction, and the emperor was supposed to be -enough of a scholar to check the most important of the documents of -state. The myth of intellectual supremacy is suggested by the fact that -the chief implement of the imperial office was a red pencil. The -imperial symbolism did not stop here. Fifth, the quasi-religious -hierarchy of the Chinese, competing with Buddhism and the superstitions -of popular Taoism for the support of the people, centered on the -performance of certain rites in the propitiation of fortune and the -honoring of the dead. To this were added the cult rituals of -Confucianism. The Confucian temples, with tablets bearing the names of -worthies, served as the visible demonstration of the ideological power -wielded by the scholars over the populace, and of the emperor over the -scholars. - -Sixth, the emperor had the more definitely religious status referred to -in his title _Son of Heaven_. He was the intermediate figure between the -will of Heaven and mankind. In him were summarized and epitomized the -virtues or the evils of the generation; he had to represent mankind in -its best light to all supernatural forces or agencies. Upon his conduct -of worship depended the good or ill will of the deities and hence -weather, crops, life and death. Conversely, he was responsible to -mankind for the misbehavior of nature, and an earthquake, a two-headed -calf, or any other monstrous occurrence was blamed on his disturbance of -the routine of things. The order which enveloped the Confucian society -was conceived not merely as a set of traditional and moral man-made -customs but as a type of behavior which fitted in with the life of the -natural world. In the eyes of the Chinese, perturbations in the world of -men soon produced consequent natural calamities. Lastly, the Chinese -emperor was the autocrat of the administration. His action, however, was -limited by various customary devices; for example, while the -countersignature of a minister was not needed on an edict, the emperor -was supposed not to take the initiative but to secure the wisest -suggestions and adopt them. Practical considerations rendered a stable -bureaucracy impervious to constant intermeddling of the emperor, -although the effect of imperial action was not negligible. - -The administrative outline of Chinese government from the establishment -of the Empire by the Ch'in Shih Huang Ti in 221 B. C. to its overthrow -by Sun Yat-sen and his followers in 1911 varied from dynasty to dynasty -and ruler to ruler. Nevertheless, certain general characteristics were -common to the whole period. The government operated as the chief -implementation of the emperor's power over the people. The people -maintained its social organizations, but none of these developed office -hierarchies comparable to that of the government. The government alone -served as the connecting link between the ideologically unified Chinese -world as a whole and its many separate parts. The T'ang dynasty (A. D. -620-906) provided an exceptionally clear articulation of the Empire, -which not only compelled the admiration and imitation of later ages but -even served as a model for state governments on the periphery of the -Chinese world. In the great Taikwa Reforms of 645, the Japanese made a -heroic attempt to adapt the T'ang form of government to dissimilar -conditions; the scheme worked on paper but failed to recast the -fundamental mold of Japanese society, which remained feudal. - -The three most striking features of the Chinese bureaucracy were: (1) -the central administrative organization; (2) the operation of civil -service examinations and the use of administrative supervision; (3) the -integration of government operation on the imperial, regional, and local -levels. The metropolitan administrative organization under the T'ang -dynasty was headed by the emperor. But the intricate regularity of the -hierarchy beneath him was such as to preclude imperial autocratic -caprice. The outline of the hierarchical organization was as follows:[6] - - THE THRONE - - THE GRAND COUNCIL - - The Departments: - - _a._ Department of Ministerial Coordination - 1. Ministry of Administrators - 2. Ministry of Finance - 3. Ministry of Rites - 4. Ministry of War - 5. Ministry of Justice - 6. Ministry of Public Works - _b._ The Imperial Chancery - _c._ The Grand Secretariat - - The Tribunal of Censors - - Imperial Commissioners - - Provinces (10) and _Governments-General_ (at the frontiers) - Prefectures - Subprefectures - Townships - Villages - -The general structure of Chinese administration differed little from -that of preceding ages, and has not changed markedly during the -following centuries. Later developments strengthened the provinces, at -the expense of both the central government and the local areas; earlier -conditions had tolerated a much greater extent of feudal establishments. -Nevertheless, the six ministries may have been established as early as -about 1000 B. C., and remained a feature of Chinese government until -1906. - -The Grand Council met daily. It was composed of grand ministers, who--in -the phrase of Baron des Rotours--"under the T'ang held in their hands -the government of the Empire."[7] The emperor's chief power lay in -appointing the council members, to whom fell the greater share of -governing in fact. Directly under the Grand Council there were the three -departments. The Department of Ministerial Coordination served as an -administrative center and clearinghouse for the work of the separate -ministries under it. The names of the ministries are self-explanatory. -The Ministry of Administrators was in charge of the examination system -and the arrangement of the offices in the bureaucracy. The Ministry of -Rites, by an extension of its protocol features, was in charge of the -reception of foreign ("barbarian") princes and ambassadors, and -emissaries. The other two departments provided one of the most ingenious -systems of checks and balances to be found in any constitutional scheme. -The Imperial Chancery received all communications from the various parts -of the Empire. Since most of the governing was carried out by means of -written orders, instructions, and requests for reports, the Chancery -occupied an important place. But the function of drafting replies to -such communications, preparing manifestoes, or issuing ordinances was in -the hands of the Grand Secretariat. Thus the Chancery was prevented from -exerting an outside influence, while it was impossible for the -Secretariat to receive any communication directly. As a final check, all -outgoing documents of state had to pass through the Chancery to receive -the official seal, without which they were invalid. Thus any item of -government business was routed first through the Chancery for -registration and classification, then to the Secretariat for reply, and -back to the Chancery for what amounted to countersignature (by seal).[8] -Yet the Secretariat was no mere drafting agency for the Chancery. - -The Tribunal of Censors occupied a position not unlike that of the great -independent establishments of the United States government. It was -directed by a president and two vice-presidents, and concerned itself -with ferreting out and exposing irregularities and abuses in the -administration. The morale of the censorate varied from time to time, -but at its optimum efficiency it was a formidable and significant -institution. Han Confucianism provided the general background from which -the organization rose to effectiveness. - -This sophisticated and rationally designed central bureaucracy was -supplemented by regional administrations. Under the T'ang the regional -establishments were a source of trouble to the government. The Empire -was divided into provinces, but the provincial administrations were -superseded by Imperial Commissioners whenever an emergency arose. Later -dynasties placed the provincial system on a more stable basis, which -resulted in genuine and geographically sound regionalism. The provincial -governments were replicas in miniature of the central; their heads might -be regarded as appointive and removable satraps whose authority was a -smaller reproduction of the power of the emperor. It was not until the -Ming dynasty (A. D. 1368-1643) that the provinces took on their modern -form. The provincial governments were a source of great strength to -China in that they made possible a quasi-federal government. In the -Ch'ing period no officer was eligible to a post in his native -province;[9] this custom had considerable centripetal effect and offset -the danger that populace and officials, united by common sympathies, -might revolt or secede.[10] - -Another feature to be noted about the Chinese government under the -Empire was the examination and civil service system. The T'ang dynasty -provided for three major types of examination: (1) The _chü_ -corresponded most closely to a modern academic degree, and allowed the -candidate to qualify in any one of a number of subjects, including the -classics, law, and mathematics. (2) The _hsüan_ was the special -examination necessary for appointment to a post in the bureaucracy; it -was both written and oral and included the personal history of the -candidate. (3) The _k'ao_, an in-service examination, consisted of -annual reports on the performance of all officers in the Empire. They -were transmitted to the Bureau for Examination of Merits in the Ministry -of Administrators on a schedule varying with the distance of the office -from the capital. There were five points on which to report: virtue and -justice; integrity and circumspection; equity and impartiality; -diligence and activity; and one of twenty-seven special talents suitable -to the particular office in question. The grades received on these -reports determined the advancement or demotion of the officer, in -accordance with an elaborate and exact schedule.[11] All three -examinations provided the administrative form for the close relation -between the government and the scholastic elite. The _chü_, with its -emphasis on the classics, framed the content of all curriculums. The -_hsüan_, with its oral examination and personal record, made the -prospective candidate careful in observing the customs. The _k'ao_ kept -up the morale and efficiency of the bureaucracy, while the ominous -Tribunal of Censors was present to guard against abuse of the system. -Every detail was precise, well ordered, explicit, to a degree that would -delight present-day industrial personnel managers. Formulation was -refined and impressive. In fact the T'ang laws, although their part in -Chinese life was less than a Westerner might expect, were a code of such -force and appeal that the Japanese and the Annamese used them as a model -for their juridical systems.[12] - -The decline of particular dynasties in China--caused by poor economic -policy, demoralization of the court, corruption of the bureaucracy, -laxity in the examinations, oppression of the farmers--did not effect -great alterations in the structure of government. With the centuries the -Chinese government settled into more and more definitive form. -Unfortunately, the Manchu government (1644-1911)[13] had sunk into -administrative demoralization when the full force of the Western impact -was felt. In the early nineteenth century a British observer wrote of an -imperial official: - - The late _tungling_ [gendarmerie commander] Wanking, degraded last - year for connecting himself with a magician whose confessions went to - implicate a large number of nobles and public servants, was a Reader - at the Classical Feasts, Manchu President of the Board of Civil - Office, Revisor-General of the Veritable Records of the Reign, a - Superior of the Academy, Supervisor of the Household, t'utung of a - Banner [military division], superintendent of the Gymnasium in the - Ning-shan Palace, and of the Treasuries of the Board of Revenue, and - Visitor of the 17 Granaries in the City, and at Tungchau.[14] - -When such conditions of indifference toward sharply defined hierarchic -ethics began to be common among the bureaucracy, the end of the dynasty -was near. The Chinese Empire had remained intact even when it had fallen -into the hands of Tartars, Mongols, and Manchus. It had returned to the -bases of its former greatness, and the administrative machinery created -since the day of the Shih Huang Ti continued for twenty centuries. With -the decrepitude of the Manchu dynasty, and the simultaneous collision -with the Western world, the old political system broke and had to be -reshaped into new forms. Nevertheless, even in the Republican era -techniques of the T'ang have reappeared in the administration of -government services. - -Underneath all shifts there remained a series of social groupings which -were affected far less than were the broad and conspicuous central -regimes. They have existed since the times before organized government, -and may well be sufficiently strong to set the conditions under which -any government or any race of rulers will succeed or fail in China. - - -_Family, Village, and Hui_ - -The ideological control in old China operated through those groups most -closely attached to the individual. The government was not one of them. -The fundamental strength of Chinese society rests upon the cohesion and -power of three outstanding quasi-political agencies: the family system, -the village and district, and the _hui_ (associations, leagues, -societies or guilds.)[15] The family was an intricate structure, -"composed of a plurality of kin alignments into four families: the -natural family, the economic family, the religious family, and the -sib."[16] The natural family corresponded to the family of the West. The -economic family commonly extended through several degrees of kinship, -and may have included from thirty to one hundred individuals, who formed -a single economic unit, living collectively. The religious family was an -aggregate of economic families; it would be difficult to give any -specified number of constituent families as an average. This unit -provided the organization for the proper commemoration and reverence of -ancestors and maintained an ancestral shrine where the genealogical -records were kept; the cult feature has largely disappeared in modern -times. The sib resembled the clan as found in the West; its role was -determined by the immediate environment. In some cases, especially in -the South, the sib was powerful enough to engage in feuds; at times one -or more sibs dominated whole communities. In the greater part of China -it was a loose organization, holding meetings from time to time to unite -the various local religious families which constituted it. - -Family consciousness played its part in sustaining certain elements of -the Confucian ideology. It stressed the idea of the carnal immortality -of the human race. It oriented the individual not only philosophically -but socially as well. The size of each family determined his position -spatially, and family continuity fixed a definite location in time for -him. With its many-handed grasp upon the individual, the family system -held him securely in place and prevented his aspiring to the arrogant -heights of nobility or falling into the degradation of a slavery in -which he might become a mere commodity. A Chinese surrounded by his -kinsmen was shielded against humiliations inflicted upon him by -outsiders and against the menace of his own potential follies. It was -largely through the family system, with its religious as well as -economic and social foundation, that the Chinese counteracted -undesirable mobility of individuals in a society stable as a whole. -Stability thus obtained a clear and undeniable purpose--the continued -generation of the human race through the continuity of innumerable -families, each determined upon survival. A materialistic interpretation -would point out the need for cheap and plentiful human labor in -maintaining the agrarian economy of China, and reduce the rationale of -the system to a mere web of justifications. - -The family was equaled if not excelled in importance by the village.[17] -Had the family been the only vital social grouping, it might have been -impossible for democratic processes to develop in China. The family -pattern provided, indeed, the model for the government, but the -influence of villages in Chinese life mitigated the familistic -tendencies of government. It would have been heresy to revolt against an -unrighteous father; but there was nothing to prevent the deposition of -an evil village elder. In times of contentment, the emperor was the -father of the society; at other times he might be looked upon as a -fellow villager subject to the criticism of the people. The village was -the largest working unit of local self-government; it, and the groups -within it, such as the sib, was almost completely autonomous and subject -to outside interference only in very rare cases. At the same time, the -village was the smallest unit of district organization. The District -Magistrate, as the government officer in charge of a district containing -from one to twenty villages, relied on the village leaders in performing -the duties imposed upon him. Village government was at times very -democratic.[18] - -Next in importance was the _hui_. It was in all probability the last to -appear. Neither ordained, as the family seemed to be, by the eternal -physical and biological order of things, nor made to seem natural, as -was the village, by the geographic and economic environment, this -association emerged from the Chinese propensity toward cooperation. -Paralleling and supplementing family and village, the _hui_ won for -itself an unchallenged place in the Chinese social structure. The _hui_ -may be classified into six categories[19]: (1) fraternal societies; (2) -insurance groups; (3) economic guilds; (4) religious societies; (5) -political societies; and (6) militia and vigilante organizations. The -_hui_ made up the greater part of the economic organization of old -China, and offered vocational education to men not destined for -literature and administration. Under such names as the Triad and the -Lotus the _hui_ provided the party organizations of old China and -challenged the dynasties whenever resentment was ripe. - -The old Chinese society, made up of innumerable families, villages, and -_hui_, comprised the whole "known world." Its strength was -inexhaustible. Having no one nerve center, the world society could not -be destroyed by the inroads of barbarians or the ravages of famine, -pestilence, and insurrection. The Confucian ideology continued. At no -one time were conditions so bad as to break the many threads of Chinese -culture and to release a new generation from tradition. Throughout the -centuries education and government continued side by side, even though -dynasties fell and the country was overrun by conquerors. The absence of -any rigid organization of legal authority facilitated survival, while a -certain minimum of order could be maintained even in the absence of an -emperor or, as more commonly occurred, in the presence of several. - -The governmental superstructure kept the Chinese world together in a -formal manner; it did not give it vitality. The family, the village, and -the _hui_ were fit subjects for imperial attention, but the emperor -could not remove his sanction from their existence and thereby -annihilate them. No precarious legal personality was attributed to the -family, the village, and the _hui_, which could be extirpated by a mere -edict. It was possible for the English kings to destroy the Highland -clan of the MacGregor--"the proscribed name"--without liquidating the -members of the clan _in toto_. In China the emperor could wipe out a -family by massacre, but it was practically impossible for him to destroy -an organization without destroying all its members. On the whole, -however, the government of China pursued its three main ends--the -maintenance of the ideology (education), the defense of the realm -against barbarians (military affairs) and against adverse forces of -nature (public works), and the collection of funds for the fulfilment of -these functions (revenue). - - -_Governmental Changes Foreshadowing the Republic_ - -The pressure of the West compelled the Chinese government to define more -clearly than ever before its own boundaries, its relations with the -vassal states, and its lines of contact with the Chinese people. By the -Treaty of Nerchinsk, negotiated in 1689 with Russia, the Chinese tried -to demarcate their land frontier. The vassal nations presented a crucial -problem. The Chinese failed to make explicit their quasi suzerainty in -terms comprehensible to Western jurisprudence. At the same time they -followed a policy of brisk exaggeration of territorial rights -alternating with outright disclaimer of responsibility. The scope of -government itself was affected by new functions which arose with the -coming of the Westerners. The tax system was expanded. The development -of an imperial customs service with Western personnel and Western -methods of accounting provided the government with a source of large -revenue. The demands that Western states be given adequate consideration -in the transaction of business led to the establishment in 1860 of the -Foreign Office (_Tsung-li Yamên_), a new institution which modified the -traditional administrative pattern. - -In addition, the Western states introduced their own type of government -into China through the demand that their citizens be subject only to the -law with which they were familiar at home. In dealing with Westerners -the Chinese had at first employed a code far more Draconic than the -provisions of Chinese penal practice. After many years of irritation the -Western powers, under the leadership of Great Britain, secured -extraterritorial privileges for their citizens. Extraterritoriality -placed Westerners in China solely under the jurisdiction of their -respective national representatives. If an American today were to shoot -down the Dalai Lama in Tibet, he could be tried legally only in the -United States Court in Shanghai--although it is improbable that the -Tibetans would insist upon juridical niceties. Apart from the guarantee -of personal immunity from Chinese law for their citizens, wherever they -might be in China, the Western powers, through a long series of special -arrangements and actual usage, obtained certain footholds on Chinese -soil where even Chinese were under Western rule. These areas were known -as _concessions_ and _settlements_, and the cities of their location as -the _treaty ports_. Both the presence of Westerners subject only to -Western law throughout the Empire, and of areas where Western governance -was paramount, taught the Chinese the lesson of strong government. - -Nor was this all. The British-Chinese treaty of Nanking (1842) and that -with the United States (1844) both contained provisions relating to the -protection of the life and property of foreigners. The imperial -government found itself pledged to the fulfillment of a policy which -collided directly with the xenophobia engendered by ideological control. -The enforcement of these provisions, half-hearted as it was, involved -constantly increasing imperial intervention in regional affairs, -although the issues arising between the central government and the -provincial authorities were settled through negotiation rather than -enforceable commands. - -Toward the end of the nineteenth century the gradual transformation in -China gave rise to a reform movement carried forward by a group of -constitutional monarchists. One of their leaders, K'ang Yu-wei, became -in 1898 the tutor of the young Emperor Kuang Hsü. The summer of that -year witnessed a steady stream of edicts which ultimately might have -made China under the leadership of the throne as progressive as Japan. -The reforms aimed primarily at efficiency and modernization, and -partially at the parliamentarization of the regime. The young Emperor, -however, was soon checked by Yüan Shih-k'ai, his leading military -adviser, and outmaneuvered by the reactionary Empress Dowager. He spent -the rest of his life in actual imprisonment, and the Six Geniuses--as -the reformers behind his policy were called--were exiled or executed. -One of those who were put to death was the poet Tan Shih-tung, a man of -great skill in the classical literature and of ambitious visions for the -future, who might, had the Hundred Days succeeded, have lived to be a -guardian of the throne in a modern Chinese Empire. Just before his -execution he wrote the following poem, calling forth the memory of -Chiang-ch'ing and Tou-keng, upright men of the past, and comparing his -faith with the mountain range of Kuang-lêng: - - LAST SONG FROM PRISON - - _Prison door facing me--thoughts of Chiang-ch'ing-- - I could die easily, if like Tou-keng ... - Laughing and alone, I lift the knife to heaven: - I die but leave behind hopes higher than Kuang-lêng!_[20] - -Reform, indeed, could not be downed. The Manchu dynasty itself began to -tread cautiously in the footsteps of Japan. In 1905 an agency was set up -for the purpose of studying various foreign forms of government and of -making recommendations for the modernization of the imperial government. -In 1908 a draft constitution, very similar to the constitution of the -Japanese Empire, was approved. A nine-year program, from 1908 to 1916 -inclusive, was to lead to constitutional, parliamentary monarchy--if -parliamentary monarchy be regarded merely as a monarchy with a -parliament appended. The principle of cabinet responsibility to -parliament was not established, and from the very beginning the Manchus, -less wise than the ruling house in Japan, not only failed to grant -sufficient powers on paper but began packing the quasi-parliamentary -institutions before they were set up. Hand-picked, the preliminary -National Assembly which met in 1909 began wrangling with the Throne.[21] -The old Empress Dowager had died in the preceding year; so had the -imprisoned Emperor Kuang Hsü. The new Emperor was an infant, and the -court was little more than a gathering of bewildered Manchu princes -listening to the advice of the eunuchs and palace officials.[22] Reform -from above, had there been a single man of will and courage to take -charge of it, might have had considerable chances of success. But while -the Manchus tinkered with the superstructure of government, the -foundations of society were washing away beneath their feet. More was -involved than the improvement of administrative technique and the -illusion of popular representation. A political and social revolution -was in the making. Sun Yat-sen was the man who, more than any other -single person, shaped its course. - -In 1893 Sun had gone north to advocate reform and present a petition to -Li Hung-chang, an eminent imperial statesman.[23] The mission failed. In -1897 Sun was willing to speak openly of revolution. He refrained, -however, from advocating a republic before Western audiences, even -though his party was committed to it. He wrote in his book _Kidnapped in -London_: - - The prime essence of the movement was the establishment of a form of - constitutional government to supplement the old-fashioned, corrupt, - and worn-out system under which China is groaning. - - It is unnecessary to enter into details as to what form of rule - obtains in China at present. It may be summed up, however, in a few - words. The people have no say whatever in the management of Imperial, - National, or even Municipal affairs. The mandarins, or local - magistrates, have full power of adjudication, from which there is no - appeal. Their word is law, and they have full scope to practice their - machinations with irresponsibility, and every officer may fatten - himself with impunity. Extortion by officials is an institution; it is - the condition on which they take office; and it is only when the - bleeder is a bungler that the government steps in with pretended - benevolence to ameliorate but more often to complete the depletion.... - - This official thief, with his mind warped by his mode of life, is the - ultimate authority in all matters of social, political, and criminal - life....[24] - -In 1905 Sun Yat-sen lashed out at the monarchical reformers, subjecting -their motives to vigorous criticism: - - Since the Boxer war many have been led to believe that the Tartar - [Manchu or Ch'ing government] is beginning to see the sign of time and - to reform itself for the betterment of the country, just from the - occasional ... edicts ... not knowing that they are mere dead letters - made for the express purpose of pacifying popular agitations. It is - absolutely impossible for the Manchus to reform the country because - reformation means detriment to them. By reformation they would be - absorbed by the Chinese people and would lose the special rights and - privileges which they are enjoying. The still darker side of the - government can be seen when the ignorance and corruptness of the - official class are brought to light. These fossilized, rotten, - good-for-nothing officials know only how to flatter and bribe the - Manchus, whereby their position may be strengthened to carry on the - trade of squeezing [graft].[25] - -He also insisted that China's difficulties could be solved only by the -establishment of a republic, which he envisaged with great optimism: - - A new, enlightened and progressive government must be substituted in - place of the old one; in such a case China would not only be able to - support herself but would also relieve the other countries of the - trouble of maintaining her independence and integrity. There are many - highly educated and able men among the people who would be competent - to take up the task of forming a new government, and carefully - thought-out plans have long been drawn up for the transformation of - this ... Tartar monarchy into a Republic of China. The ... masses of - the people are also ready to accept the new order of things and are - longing for a change for better to uplift them from their ... - deplorable condition of life. China is now on the eve of a great - national movement, for just a spark of light would set the whole - political forest on fire to drive out the Tartar from our land. Our - task is indeed great but it will not be an impossible one....[26] - -Sun's diagnosis of the situation was remarkably correct; he clearly -sensed the coming Republic whose first president he was to become seven -years later. The ideological revolution was already under way, and the -Empire about to dissolve into the past. What neither Sun nor anyone else -realized was that ahead of China there lay government problems more -serious than misrule. The ideological shift had terminated the reality -of the old regime, and the military conditions were favorable; but would -men be ready to invest their faith durably in a new order? - - -NOTES - -[1] See above, pp. 17 ff., 83 ff. - -[2] Herrlee G. Creel, _The Birth of China_, p. 138, London, 1936. - -[3] Leon Wieger, S. J., _La Chine à travers les âges: hommes et -choses_, pp. 22-25, Hsien-hsien, 1920. This is among the most useful -handbooks of Chinese history and bibliography. It is written on a -popular level and designed for the rapid and easy information of -Catholic missionaries in China. H. F. MacNair, _Modern Chinese History, -Selected Readings_, Shanghai, 1923, will be found entertaining as well -as highly informative. - -[4] See John K. Shryock, _The Origin and Development of the State Cult -of Confucius_, New York, 1932, for a description of the rise of -Confucianism. - -[5] For a list of the Chinese dynasties see below, p. 197. - -[6] T'ang government is outlined on the basis of Baron Robert des -Rotours, _Le Traité des examens_, Paris, 1932, a lucid and detailed -translation of a section of the T'ang dynastic history dealing with the -civil service. The book includes a valuable account of the organization -of T'ang government and may well be cited as a model of Sinological -achievement. The rendering _Department of Ministerial Coordination_ was -suggested by the usage of Professor C. S. Gardner, Harvard-Yenching -Institute. - -[7] Rotours, _op. cit._, p. 10. See also _ibid._, p. 3. - -[8] Cf. Hans Wist, _Das Chinesische Zensorat_, Hamburg, 1932. - -[9] For a Western parallel see Fritz Morstein Marx, _Civil Service in -Germany_, in: _Civil Service Abroad_, p. 181 _n._ 31, New York and -London, 1935. - -[10] For further detail on local home rule see below, pp. 177 ff. - -[11] Rotours, _op. cit._, pp. 26-55, "Les examens sous la dynastie des -T'ang." - -[12] Jean Escarra, _Le droit chinois_, p. 97, Peiping and Paris, 1936. -This is the outstanding work on Chinese law, by a French scholar long in -the service of Chinese governments. The exhaustive bibliography of -Escarra may be supplemented by Cyrus H. Peake, "Recent Studies in -Chinese Law," _Political Science Quarterly_, vol. 52, pp. 117-138, 1937. - -[13] P. C. Hsieh, _The Chinese Government_, 1644-1911, Baltimore, 1925; -William F. Mayers, _The Chinese Government_, Shanghai, 1897. - -[14] T. F. Wade, "The Army of the Chinese Empire," _The Chinese -Repository_ (Canton), vol. 20, p. 300 n., 1851. - -[15] The following discussion has been taken from the author's _The -Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen_, pp. 38-43, Baltimore, 1937. - -[16] D. H. Kulp, _Family Life in South China_, p. xxiv, New York, 1925. - -[17] See H. G. Creel, _Sinism_, Chicago, 1929. - -[18] See Arthur H. Smith, _Village Life in China_, p. 228, New York, -1899. - -[19] See J. S. Burgess, _The Guilds of Peking_, New York, 1928. The -present classification is a modification of that of Burgess. - -[20] Translation by the present author. - -[21] See Hsieh, _op. cit_., in note 13; Meribeth E. Cameron, _The -Reform Movement in China_, 1898-1912, Stanford, 1931; Harold M. Vinacke, -_Modern Constitutional Development in China_, Princeton, 1920. - -[22] Reginald Johnston, _Twilight in the Forbidden City_, London, 1934, -presents an interesting narrative of court life before and after the -revolution of 1911-1912. - -[23] Lyon Sharman, _Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning_, pp. 30-32, -New York, 1934. - -[24] Sun Yat-sen, _Kidnapped in London_, pp. 13-15, Bristol and London, -1897. This is a most engrossing work, whether considered as a political -revelation, a personal narrative, or a story of adventure. - -[25] Sun Yat-sen (Hu Han-min, editor), _Tsung-li Ch'üan-chi (The -Complete Works of the Leader)_, vol. IV, p. 357, Shanghai, 1930; from -"The True Solution to the Chinese Question," pp. 347-368, an article -written by Sun himself in English. - -[26] _Ibid._, p. 366. - - - - -_Chapter_ VII - -THE REVOLUTION - - -On October 9, 1911, a follower of Sun Yat-sen, one of the heroic and -desperate "Dare-to-dies" who had harassed the imperial government for -years, was working over a bomb in the Russian concession in the upriver -port of Hankow. The bomb exploded accidentally; the secret storage of -munitions was discovered; the next day, in the ensuing turmoil, the -Republic of China was born. Double Ten Day (October 10, 1911) has since -been celebrated as the Chinese Fourth of July. When the imperial -officials sought to suppress the insurrection, they uncovered a -conspiracy in the ranks of their own troops; in self-protection the -troops revolted. In the next two months the Manchu Empire crumbled away. -Sun Yat-sen, who was in Chicago at the time of the outbreak,[1] could -trust his organization. Sure that destiny was working with him, he took -his leisure in returning to China and stopped in London to forestall -financial aid to the collapsing Empire. - - -_The Presidency of Sun Yat-sen and the Republican Revolution_ - -The fall of the Empire was not the result of a great mass movement -agitating the whole population; it developed from the revolutionary -nucleus which Sun and his followers had built up to secure power. They -had hammered away at the imperial regime by instigating mutiny and -terror for many years, since they realized that the incompetence of the -government was matched only by its impotence. The revolution itself was -a chain of rebellions, occurring province by province under the -leadership of revolutionaries or officials joining the revolution. -Except for the massacre of Manchus in some of the cities, it was a -nearly bloodless revolution. However, the various groups pushed in -different directions, and different men tried to seize power. The -constitutional monarchists compelled the throne to issue a very liberal -constitution, which might be accepted by the populace in place of the -Republican programs. Military men began to come to the fore, as the army -units alone were in a position of unchallengeable power. Men who had no -thought of revolution might join it in time to become leaders of the -revolutionary-military juntas. Li Yüan-hung, an officer of the Empire, -hid under his bed when revolutionary soldiers sought him out; given the -choice between death and adherence to the revolutionaries, he sided with -the new powers, and in a short while became the commanding officer of -the revolutionary forces in the Wu-han cities. Similar instances were -not uncommon. - -The revolutionaries managed to call together representatives of their -party and of the troops to a National Convention at Nanking. They were -seriously handicapped by the absence of Sun Yat-sen, who now hastened -back to China from London. Few of the members of the revolutionary -group--heretofore forced to operate as a secret society--were well -enough known to have the prestige needed to form a new government. Huang -Hsing, Sun's chief military follower, sought to manage in the interim, -but not until the arrival of Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai on December 24, -1911, was there a prospect of consolidation. Five days later the -National Convention elected him president of the Provisional Government -of the United Provinces. On January 1, 1912, he took office; with the -adoption of the Gregorian calendar now in use, this date became the -first day of the Year I of the Chinese Republic. With the presidency -there was created a cabinet, whose ministers did not yet hold any -specific portfolios. The portions of the country under revolutionary -control were ruled for the time being by a temporary system which -combined the military and civilian governments in each province. - -Meanwhile, the Empire was still the internationally recognized -government of China and continued to function in Peking. Thoroughly -frightened, the imperial court saw no alternative to calling into its -service the one man who could be expected to master the situation--Yüan -Shih-k'ai, who had ruthlessly terminated the experiment of the Hundred -Days in 1898 and whipped up the first effective modern army of the -Empire. Yüan, who had fallen into disfavor as a result of court -machinations a few years before, waited his time, receiving offers from -both sides. Finally he went to Peking, on October 27, 1911. - -The negotiations which ensued over the establishment of a new government -and the pacification of the country brought into the spotlight two of -the outstanding personalities of modern China--men whose characters were -to mold the institutions in a highly plastic society and whose -influences were to last beyond their deaths. Sun Yat-sen, a Cantonese -with many overseas connections, stood outside the old-style elite--a -constitutionalist and an idealist. Yüan was a soldier and diplomat from -the North, narrow in outlook, altogether a tradition-bound official -despite his up-to-date military ideas--an opportunist and a realist in -politics. Rarely have two leaders represented such opposite extremes. - -In the conclusion of the negotiations Yüan played a part which would -have filled Machiavelli with admiration. The imperial family was cajoled -into taking the baby Emperor off the throne but was at the same time -wheedled into refusing outright abdication. The edicts of February 12, -1912, are among the most curious state papers of modern times. They -turned over "the power of government" to Yüan, admitted the faults of -the dynasty, and ordered him to negotiate with the revolutionists and -establish a Republic of China. Nothing was said about any eventual -resumption of power by the dynasty, although provision was to be made -for the comfort and dignity of the court. The Manchu house was to retain -the Forbidden City (imperial palace) in Peking, where the monarch could -continue to exercise his functions, freed from the cares of government. - -Sun Yat-sen indignantly repudiated any idea that the Republic derived -from a formal authorization extended by the hated Manchus--the Republic -for which he and his revolutionists had struggled for decades. But he -held his peace, unwilling to upset the chances of national unification -on a point of form. Yüan was recognized as an able man, although he -lacked trustworthiness and intellectual ability; it seemed possible to -make use of him and simultaneously to satisfy him by giving him a -position within the Republican framework. After the edicts of -abdication, the issue became one of ultra-idealist constitutionalism -versus brutal military realism. - -It was agreed that Sun should keep the provisional presidency until Yüan -could be inaugurated as president. Under the circumstances it was the -only possible course. Yüan possessed decisive military power, and there -could have been no hope of bending him. Furthermore, Sun actually did -not wish the office of president. He realized that his own strength was -that of ideologue and leader and felt that by enforcing his principle of -_min shêng_[2] he could serve China best. - -Yüan, it was arranged, was to come south to the new capital at Nanking. -This was something which he had no desire to do, as the city was in the -hands of the revolutionists and his army was in the north. When he was -pressed to take office, he engineered a military mutiny in the Peking -area, which did enormous property damage and gave him an adequate excuse -for remaining where he was. By thus forcing the government to establish -itself at Peking, he followed out the spirit of the imperial abdication -edict and brought the Republican regime to the very city in which the -Emperor still lived, and in which the imperial bureaucracy awaited its -new Republican garments--socially and ideologically the stronghold of -resourceful reaction. There was thus no problem of creating a new modern -administration. The old Peking mandarinate continued, and the -revolutionary Republicans came into the government offices as strangers -intruding into a closed system. For the initial months of the Republican -experiment Peking's novel status was merely the evidence of Yüan's -prestige; thereafter, Peking was to become the embodiment of archaism, -blind pragmatism, and corruption. - -On March 10, 1912, Yüan Shih-k'ai took a solemn oath to preserve and -defend the Republic and assumed office as president. On the same day a -Provisional Constitution went into effect, whereby the National -Convention placed the greater share of government power in the hands of -a National Council, to serve until the promulgation of election laws for -the choice of a national parliament. Republican mistrust of Yüan was -evident in this action. Yet Sun Yat-sen was satisfied that his first -principle, nationalism, had been realized in great part by the expulsion -of the Manchus, and that his second, democracy, was in the process of -fulfillment. He turned to the realization of the third, _min shêng_.[2] -Yüan placed him in charge of all railway development in China, and Sun -cherished the freedom to carry out the practical aspect of the -revolution. He had passed beyond the stage of agitation and conspiracy, -of wandering about in the world, his life in year-long daily jeopardy, -seeking men and funds for a revolution which seemed Utopian to most. Now -he could do his work quietly, without inducing simple merchants and -workers to risk sudden death or the torture racks of the Board of -Punishments. He had no way of realizing that his miraculous success was -to be followed by defeat and that the revolution for which he had fought -was not over but had only begun. - -The presidency of Sun Yat-sen in Nanking, terminated by Yüan Shih-k'ai's -assumption of office, was little more than a military and revolutionary -junta linking together the various provincial revolutionary groups. It -had to face no serious problems of administration, and the collection of -taxes was the last thing that a brand-new revolutionary government would -dare to stress in China. Its principles were republican, but it -inaugurated no formal institutions and resorted to no elections, -referenda, or plebiscites. The task of constituting democracy in China -was placed under the stewardship of the most versatile military -opportunist of the age: Yüan Shih-k'ai. - - -_The Parliamentary Republic_ - -After Sun Yat-sen relinquished the presidency to Yüan Shih-k'ai and the -Republican regime settled down in the citadel of the old regime, a form -of government was set up which did not immediately reveal itself as -patently unworkable but which in retrospect seems a curiously -ill-conceived experiment in transplanting institutions. Sun and his -followers assumed that democratic, parliamentary institutions were -adaptable, that the existing grouping would soon lend itself to the -purpose of effective multi-party government, and that parties would -arise organically from honest differences of opinion. They considered -the republicanization of the provincial and local governments of less -immediate importance than the establishment of a national democratic -order. They expected to have a constitutional government with the five -"races" of China--Chinese, Mongol, Manchu, Tibetan, and Turkic -(Mohammedan)--united under the new five-barred banner. At the time, -these assumptions seemed practicable. - -The Provisional Constitution of March, 1912, established a relatively -weak presidency though with somewhat greater powers than the French. -Article 45 required the countersignature of all presidential orders by -the appropriate cabinet minister; the ministers were to be appointed by -the president with the concurrence of the legislative. Unfortunately, -the principle of ministerial responsibility to parliament was not -explicitly stated, although it might have been expected that the -far-reaching powers of the legislative body would have led to actual -parliamentarism very shortly. It was obviously the intention of the -Republicans to promote Yüan to a position of ineffectiveness. The -premier and the cabinet selected by the president with legislative -concurrence were to be subject to interpellation. On the other hand, -they were granted the privilege of speaking in the legislative body -(Articles 43-47). The unicameral National Council (_ts'an-i-yüan_)--to -continue only until the election of the legislative body--was to be -constituted in the following manner, under Article 18: - - The Provinces, Inner and Outer Mongolia, and Tibet shall each elect - and depute five members to the National Council, and Ch'inghai - [Kokonor] shall elect one member. - - The electoral districts and methods of election shall be decided by - the localities concerned.[3] - -As a result of this procedural latitude, the delegates to the National -Council were either elected by the provincial assemblies or appointed by -the military governors or came with no formal credentials whatever. All -officials were ordered to continue in their posts. The revolutionists -still exerted control over large military bodies in the South and held -many of the provinces under their military leaders or juntas, so that -Yüan proceeded cautiously in the creation of his first administration. -He chose personalities acceptable to the revolutionists, but appointed -no outstanding men of Sun's Tung Mêng Hui. - -The parliamentary system looked well enough on the surface, but the -basis of government had disappeared and the problem of mass democracy -was more fundamental than anyone then imagined. Many groups in the -country began organizing as parties; Yüan himself appeared to further -the new way. But he had his own thoughts. He ordered his followers to -enter the revolutionary units to undermine them, and simultaneously -pushed for the establishment of a party of his own. There was on all -sides a pathetic eagerness to live up to the formal expectations of the -Western world. Tragically, this government was comic opera. Yüan began -having skirmishes with the Council within a few months. The Republicans -allowed the actual power to slip away from them while seeking to -exercise the authority derived from a constitution which most citizens -of the new Republic could not understand at all. In the summer of 1912 -Sun Yat-sen's followers began to face a definitely hostile executive. -The Council looked for redress but found that parliamentary tricks -turned easily against it. The conservative members, supporting Yüan, -walked out, and the Council lacked a quorum. - -In August, 1912, the old revolutionary organization of Sun Yat-sen, -founded by his coordination of earlier secret societies, was transformed -into a regular party, the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang devoted themselves -to the development of genuine party government; looking upon the -Republic as their own creation, they were less ready for compromise than -Chinese usage might have required. This did not improve the position of -Sun's adherents. Yüan countered by forming the Progressive Party -(_Chinputang_). While both sides lost control over the people, the party -system was not even important enough to amount to carpetbagging. The -only power in the country, as doctrine and administration melted away, -was the military.[4] - -Under the terms of the Provisional Constitution the Council was to yield -to a bicameral National Assembly, for which it should provide by law -within ten months. It was to be the duty of the National Assembly to -prepare a permanent constitution (Articles 53 and 54). In the summer of -1912 the Council passed the required law, providing for the indirect -election of a Senate and the direct election, by a limited electorate -and under a very complicated electoral scheme,[5] of a House of -Representatives. About 1/35 of 1 per cent of the total population voted. -The Kuomintang came out far ahead of any other party, with a definite -plurality but one insufficient to give it absolute control of the -Assembly, which met early in 1913. Inexperienced even in the elementary -requirements of parliamentary practice, let alone the conduct of -government, the legislative branch was destined to be sheer ornament. -The Kuomintang had relegated themselves to the occupancy of the least -important branch of the government. The new parliament met amid great -theatricals and placed heavy emphasis on form but was unable to make its -will felt. The quarrels with the President over foreign loans, -democratic policy and party rule were not settled by a showdown, but by -resort to technicalities on both sides. - -Yüan, however, had his finger on the trigger. March, 1913, was marked by -the murder of Sung Chiao-jên, one of the ablest of Sun's followers. It -was the first political act to indicate that Yüan was embarking upon a -program of assassinations. Even upon this occasion, Sun Yat-sen held his -hand, ready to let the new regime prove its character. Yüan used the -waiting spell to replace Kuomintang men in the provincial armies and -governments with his own adherents. In July, 1913, a second revolution -broke out. It was a move of self-defense on the part of the Republicans, -followers of Sun. The revolution was suppressed by Yüan. - -Undisturbed, the work of constitution drafting proceeded apace in the -North. Again, the trend, paradoxically, was toward French precedent. The -paradox became patent when Yüan forced the advance adoption of the -provisions relating to the presidency; on October 10, 1913, the Assembly -elected him president of the Republic. This gave him full _de jure_ -status as head of the Chinese state in the eyes of the foreign powers. -On November 4 Yüan suppressed the party which had created the Republic, -the Kuomintang. This not only eliminated serious opposition to him but -paralyzed the Assembly as well. It was left without a quorum and without -a constitution under which a new Assembly could be elected--one of the -most surprising constitutional cul-de-sacs in modern times. The -dictatorship began. - - -_The Presidential Dictatorship of Yüan Shih-k'ai_ - -Not content with having immobilized the National Assembly, Yüan -proceeded to kill it. He called together an extraconstitutional body of -his supporters, known as the Political Council. It recommended two -measures: the dissolution of the National Assembly and the calling of a -Constitutional Council to frame a permanent constitution. On January 10, -1914, Yüan suspended the Assembly by presidential decree. With that day -the Chinese Republic ceased to have a government consonant with its -laws. Technically the whole Republic lapsed into unconstitutionality and -illegality, until it was swept out of existence by the National -Government in 1928.[6] Nevertheless, the military leaders had sufficient -belief in the political value of twentieth century formalities to -preserve the appearance of constitutional procedure. During the -following months Yüan's Constitutional Council, which succeeded the -Political Council and was, similarly, made up of persons favorable to -his rule, labored over another constitutional document. On May 1, 1914, -the document was promulgated under the name _Constitutional Compact_. -The Compact changed the style of Yüan's rule from a nominal -parliamentarism to presidential government, and legitimatized the -dictatorship. - -Two and a half years after the establishment of the Republic, the -country had grown accustomed to the rule of Yüan. His government had the -advantage of carrying on from the seat of the former imperial -administration. Yüan's peculiar faculties of old-school diplomacy and -his grasp of modern militarism stood him in good stead. The Republic was -generally admitted to be not much of a democracy, but even democratic -Westerners applauded the hard-headed competence of the "strong man of -China." Government was more efficient and more despotic than it had been -in the last days of the Manchu dynasty; resistance and defiance did not -take open forms, except for the activities of Sun Yat-sen and his -followers, who had reverted to revolutionary tactics since the outlawry -of their party. Their agitation was spreading with rapidity. Yüan made -the same mistake the Republicans had made before: he failed to sink the -roots of government into the minds of the people and to provide a -coherent explanation for his own existence. Underestimating the change -which had taken place, Yüan sustained the illusion that the Chinese -society in which he was reared still existed. While he failed to evolve -a symbolism emphasizing the rise of a new order with him as the head, -the realization that the old Empire was gone was allowed to spread -slowly across China. There was no more throne; the child Emperor dwelt -quietly in his museum. - -In 1915 Yüan embarked upon one of the strangest exploits in modern -Chinese politics. After prostituting the democratic formulas in -accordance with which he professed to govern, he began to use the same -formulas for a cautious approach to the creation of a new monarchy. He -was partly encouraged by a memorandum presented to him on August 9, -1915, by his constitutional adviser, Professor Frank Goodnow. The -memorandum suggested, as a sane political theorem, the desirability of -establishing a constitutional monarchy _if_ there was general demand for -it rather than of maintaining the trappings of Republicanism without -operative democracy. But Yüan's scheming met with strong opposition. -Both sides to the ensuing monarchical controversy misconstrued Professor -Goodnow's memorandum; Yüan's foes denounced it even as a recommendation -for autocracy. Seen from a purely institutional point of view, there was -no harm in the proposal. A disadvantage might lie in the fact that other -military leaders would be jealous of Yüan's obtaining the throne on -which so many of them speculated. If the state of mind of the Chinese -and the new doctrines of the Republicans are considered, the proposal -becomes less feasible. Having gone through the terrific mental and moral -jolt of a fundamental shift of living forms, and having realized that -the Empire was irrecoverable, substantial sections of the population -were in no mood to allow an untried Republic to be superseded by an even -less tried modern military monarchy. - -Yüan used Japan's Twenty-one Demands of 1915, which might have made -China a quasi protectorate of Japan, as an argument for the immediate -necessity of strengthening the central government. In sponsoring the -movement for monarchy he virtually copied the procedure of Napoleon III -in establishing the Second Empire. The whole technique of modern -usurpation was brought into play, and no one stopped to consider who -might be impressed by it. The only audience which might have taken at -their face value Yüan's carefully staged "popular demonstrations" and -his recommendations for "representative" public bodies was the Western -public outside. Chinese familiar enough with elections to understand -their meaning were for a Republic; the Chinese who did not understand -them were not impressed. - -Had China possessed a man with the administrative and military talents -of George Washington, a genuine republic might have developed from -beneath the tutelage of a strong military ruler. Sun Yat-sen, because of -his Southern birth, his thoroughly revolutionary tenets, and his -impatience with the jobbery of petty politics, was not prepared for the -presidential office in Peking. He might have headed a revolutionary -government elsewhere in China but not a carry-over administration in -Peking. Yüan misjudged his own opportunities and went back to the ritual -of the Empire in an endeavor to place himself on a widely coveted -throne. In December, 1915, after a circus of plebiscites and -constitutional councils had been provided, the constitutional monarchy -was proclaimed. In the same month Yüan performed the ancient ceremonials -of the Imperial Sacrifice to Heaven, clad in the traditional gowns of -the emperor. On Christmas Day, 1915, the province of Yünnan--in the -extreme southwest of China--revolted against Yüan. The revolt spread, -and in March, 1916, Yüan renounced the throne. His dream had come to a -dismal end; he died on June 6, 1916. In the same month Vice-President Li -Yüan-hung--the imperial officer whose political career began when he was -dragged from beneath his bed in 1911--assumed the title of president. -The National Assembly was convoked. The Provisional Constitution was put -into effect again. And, as a sign of the times, the provincial military -commanders took the new title _tuchün_ in place of the older version -_tutu_. - - -_The Phantom Republic in Peking_ - -When the Manchu Empire fell in 1911-1912, it left the military power to -Yüan Shih-k'ai, who cloaked it with the Republic which he appropriated. -When Yüan died, control of the armies passed to the provincial military -commandants whom he had installed as a prime feature of his "strong man" -regime. With the passing of the Empire, civilian bureaucracy fell into -disuse yet retained just enough cohesion to serve the purposes of Yüan, -so far as they were to be served by government. After Yüan's death, the -governments in the provinces followed the flow of power--to the -provincial commanders. The Indian summer of the parliamentary Republic -was founded upon its toleration of the army system which Yüan had left -standing in its fragments. The weight of power was now to go into these -fragments and not into the Republic, which fell heir merely to Yüan's -naive and almost contemptuously conceived "constitutional" show. - -Sun Yat-sen was favorable to the newly restored Republic but did not -participate in it, since it was made up largely of second-string -revolutionists--men who had joined when the cause was winning in -1911--with a sprinkling of his own followers, together with a -substantial cohort of the new-style military. Sun had been in exile in -Japan during Yüan's regime, sounding out the possibility of Japanese -assistance in furthering his movement. Without the participation of any -group competent to attract ideological support to civilian government, -and without any one military leader able to serve or master its cause, -the Republic had to rest upon the administrative structure. Its power -was virtually nil. The legislative, as in the early days of the -Republic, was dominated by Sun's revolutionary Republicans, the -executive by a conservative cabal of soldiers. The situation differed -from the earlier one in that the military leader from the North, Tüan -Chi-jui, occupied the post of premier instead of that of president. -Within a year the fundamental contradictions in the regime displayed -themselves. Tüan quarreled with the President and the Assembly, -demanding dissolution of the latter. Not obtaining what he wished, he -joined in 1917 other military chieftains in forming a provisional -military junta in Tientsin. The President called in for his support the -most reactionary army man of all, Chang Hsün. Chang forced the -dissolution of the Assembly, the very contingency he was supposed to -prevent. He capped this act by restoring the Manchu dynasty and putting -the boy ex-Emperor Hsüan T'ung back on the throne (July 1, 1917). - -While the country was startled to learn of the restoration of the -dynasty, and to receive edicts by telegraph issued in the name of Hsüan -T'ung, forces of opposition began to gather. The restoration lasted -until the Northern military leaders could catch their breaths; on July -12 Tüan Chi-jui marched back into Peking to prevent Chang Hsün from -stealing a march on him. The unfortunate ex-Emperor was promptly deposed -for the second time. He was not to be put on a throne again until he -became the Emperor of Manchoukuo in 1934. - -At this juncture the arena was to broaden. In October, 1917, Sun Yat-sen -was elected Generalissimo of the South by the remnants of the parliament -which had gathered in Canton. Their action was provoked largely by -China's declaration of war on Germany--a step which Sun bitterly opposed -as serving no Chinese interest. From now on there were to be _two_ -Republican traditions in China, each one of them with theoretical claims -to the legitimate succession from the 1912-1913 Republic. The government -established by Sun Yat-sen in the South did not secure any international -recognition, nor did it contain remnants of the imperial bureaucracy, or -win the respect of the soldiery. But it did fall heir to the ideological -revolution. The people were still skeptically indulgent toward Sun the -idealist and his ramshackle governments, although they conceived of -government in China largely as the problem of fattening the Peking -phantom and raising it to husky manhood. The Northern Republic survived -until 1928, increasingly a puzzle and an illusion.[7] - -The details of its slow death are intricate. The military did not ignore -the Republic altogether. They requested its sanction for their -manipulation of the balance of power. The Republic legitimized the -gradations of military strength which grew out of conspiracy, tax -exploitation, opium farming, and ineffectual war. The Republic and its -presidency were the chief pawns in the pointless game of Chinese -militarism. The Republic lent a color of unity to the country and -preserved those proprieties dominant in the Chinese mind. Even banditry -becomes respectable if it observes "political" formalities, and at times -the line between banditry and generalship became a matter of day-to-day -intentions or of the size of the armed forces at hand. The government in -Peking struggled to provide a suitable organizational form for the -status quo, though never quite catching up with the new _faits -accomplis_ of each week. - -In three connections the Republic of China at Peking is worthy of -consideration: in its constitutional development, which in a dreamlike -and ineffectual way mirrored the political ideals of the -nonrevolutionary elite;[8] in its international role, which was of -genuine importance and value to China; and in its administrative -accomplishments, which--for a government--were negligible to the point -of absurdity, but admirable indeed for bureaucracy working in chaos. - -The Peking government was technically based on the Provisional -Constitution of 1912. At the earliest period of the restored Republic -(1917) it fell into the hands of the Anfu clique, which administered to -China a dose of Reconstruction on the American model. The treasury was -literally looted, and the politicos who attached themselves to the -government and to the military dominating it fell over each other in -their haste to sell the nation out to Japan. A peace conference with the -representatives of the South met in 1919 but accomplished nothing. A new -parliament was chosen from the areas claimed by Peking; when this passed -out of existence another parliament stemming from the National Assembly -dissolved by Yüan in 1913 assembled in 1922--a rare modern instance of a -legislative body succeeding its successors. This so-called Old -Parliament returned to the task which had been interrupted ten years -before and in 1923 gave birth to a constitution. - -The 1923 constitution--China's third Republican constitution, after the -Provisional Constitution of 1912 and the Constitutional Compact of -1914--was adopted by a body revoltingly corrupt. The constitution itself -was the work of political scientists; it was as admirable a document as -John Locke's constitution for the colony of Carolina, although the -parliament elected Ts'ao Kun president under conditions which set a -record for indefensible practices. The constitution itself was -federalist, but with many adaptations of French institutions in so far -as the central government was concerned. As a theoretical device for -government, it would stand high among the constitutions of the world, -but if not stillborn it was never brought to life. Within a year it was -set aside, and another provisional system of government was established. -A committee was set to work on a fourth constitution more strongly -federal.[9] The provisional government lasted from 1924 to 1926. In 1926 -Chang Tso-lin, the _tuchün_ of Manchuria, took over the city of Peking -and the government. In doing so he did not bother to appoint a -constitutional committee or to bribe a parliament. He appointed himself -dictator (_ta yüan shuai_) and let the legalistic logicians construe it -as they might. On June 5, 1928, Sun Yat-sen's armies from the South -occupied Peking, and the Peking Republic was at an end. A ghost of a -ghost, it was to reappear as a Japanese device in 1937, at a time when -constitutional debate was at a minimum. - -From the metamorphoses of the Peking Republic the Chinese learned most -bitterly the lessons of political reality. It dawned upon them that -government would have to rest upon foundations reaching deep into -society and could not be superimposed upon the existing disorder. Their -constitutional experience also satiated the Chinese with Western -formalism. Yet the phantom governments at Peking enjoyed the full -recognition of the Great Powers, and the Waichiaopu (Foreign Office) -maintained an impeccable diplomatic front. Although the Chinese scored -no triumph at the Paris peace conference, they came off much better than -they would have done without any representation. Three years later, at -the Washington Conference, the Chinese, favored by the jealousies -prevailing between the other powers, won a notable diplomatic victory. -Representing a government whose authority scarcely reached beyond its -own capital and whose limited financial resources threw its diplomatic -corps largely on their own, the members of the Chinese delegation -secured advantages for China greater than any won at the time by the -Soviet Union.[10] - -In the international field the Chinese owed their strength to the same -factors that weakened them at home: careful attention to form, the -anxious cherishing of prestige and appearance, and a limitless patience -which did not predispose the diplomats to violent action. Since the -Peking regime, in point of military forces available for world-wide -action, was on about the same level as Liberia, the fact that China -remained a second-rate power instead of becoming a plain victim suggests -the degree of her international prestige. The Peking government provided -a background, however shadowy, for the Chinese Foreign Office, and the -Foreign Office carefully nursed the fictions of China's international -status. Moreover, some domestic machinery remained. Around the Peking -government there clustered a group of administrations which were so -purely bureaucratic and non-policy-making in character that they were -tolerated even by the military, or else were under the protection of -international agreements. The Maritime Customs in Shanghai was staffed -in its key positions with Westerners. This feature arose out of -conditions during the T'ai-p'ing rebellion; it was later given -international status by Chinese assurances that under certain -stipulations the customs were to retain their foreign personnel. The -autonomy of the customs became a striking characteristic of the -international legal and financial position of China, since most of the -Chinese debts were secured by a mortgage on customs receipts.[11] The -Salt Revenue Administration was similarly separated from the rest of the -Chinese bureaucracy by international agreement, since loans had been -secured upon this revenue. The surpluses from both services were paid -for the greater part to the central government at Peking and provided a -definite fiscal incentive for the maintenance of the Republic. The -Chinese Post Office was also manned in part by Westerners, and it -managed to preserve reasonably good postal service throughout the -country despite the governmental anarchy which otherwise prevailed. -These administrations were largely autonomous; they made up the -deficiencies of the Peking government so far as it was within their -power. Thus the regime could boast of an excellent written constitution, -a first-class Foreign Office, several good revenue agencies, a good -postal service, and almost nothing else. - -In the age of the _tuchüns_ the Peking regime had no domestic power to -speak of; most of the time government was by courtesy only. - - -_The Governments of Sun Yat-sen in Canton_ - -In 1917, when the National Assembly was dissolved for the second time by -the intervention of the _tuchün_ Chang Hsün, a group of its members met -first in Shanghai and then adjourned to Canton. Assembling as an -Extraordinary Parliament, it elected Sun Yat-sen Generalissimo of the -South. He was not given the title of president because he did not wish -to create the appearance of national disunity. Sun was in the peculiar -position of being placed in military command at the sufferance of -regional military leaders. He even had to fight for support in the rump -parliament which had elected him. - -In this first Cantonese government, Sun's military objectives -overshadowed all others. Attempts were made to promote a frontal assault -on the army plague, and various expeditions were launched against the -North. Sun Yat-sen had his experiences in the years of revolt before -1911 to hearten him. The Republican Revolution of 1911-1912 was not so -much a carefully timed universal conspiracy as it was the seizure of a -few pivotal points by small bands of revolutionists, backed by -provincial support. Sun did not think in terms of nationalism as yet, -for he felt that with the expulsion of the Manchus the Chinese had -solved the major problem of foreign oppression. His course of action in -the first Cantonese government was therefore that of a man fighting on a -constitutional and democratic issue while leaning on a temporary -military government. His new regime had acquired at one time an enormous -reach of territory by bringing under its fold, through a process of -negotiation and intrigue, the leading military figures of Southern -China. - -Sun was, however, working too much outside his own party. He had both -the parliament and the Southern militarists to contend with. The task of -maintaining a revolutionary movement with troops who were no more -interested in it than the troops opposing them, transcended even Sun's -optimism and courage. Despite demonstrations of his personal capacity -and bravery, he felt that his work lacked momentum. In May, 1918, after -his office as generalissimo had been abolished and he had been made one -of a Supreme Committee of Seven, Sun left for Shanghai. - -In Shanghai Sun had time to ponder organizational strategy, to conduct -the world-wide operations of the Kuomintang officially now _Chung-hua -Kê-ming Tang_, or Chinese Revolutionary Party, and to consider types of -government and methods of propaganda. He worked with Judge Paul -Linebarger, his sympathizer and supporter since 1906, on a biography -similar to the campaign biographies of American presidential -candidates.[12] At this time he was still devoting himself to the -organization of the existing groups in Chinese society for revolutionary -purposes. He saw himself as the moral leader of the revolution and -simultaneously as the necessary advocate of constitutionalism. He was -anxious to implement the ideological revolution but thought that the -parliamentary democratic techniques had been designed in the West to -accomplish just that end. While he was in Shanghai, the Canton regime -carried on a fragmentary existence. In November, 1920, he returned to -Canton after his military friends had cleared the way for him. On this -occasion the Canton government came forth as a fully civilian regime. -Sun was elected Extraordinary President of the Republic of China by the -Southern parliament in April, 1921. Using the city of Canton as his -base, Sun continued the long series of military expeditions he had led -for years, trying to whip the _tuchüns_ at their own game without -becoming one himself. He personally went with forces into the field -again. In 1922 treason on the part of his chief war-lord supporter drove -him out of Canton. Back in Shanghai, he established contact with the -representative of the Soviets, Adolf Joffe; both men stipulated the -terms of the alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists.[13] - -In 1923 Sun laid new emphasis on one part of his program hitherto -neglected: the doctrine of the three stages of revolution. The -revolution had failed in fact because it had not provided adequate -measures for democratic training. The revolutionists had assumed an -organic political change, and militarists had profited by their mistake -in taking over the Republic and using its forms to subvert what were the -merest beginnings of democracy. Henceforth, the revolutionary group -would have to emphasize a sequential process in democratic state -construction: (1) the acquisition of political power by the missionaries -of the revolution; (2) the teaching of the new ideology of democracy and -the training of the people in the techniques of self-government; (3) the -establishment of constitutional democracy.[14] When offered the -opportunity of forming his third Canton government, he took no chances -and himself assumed the title generalissimo and the command of the -armies. In October, 1923, a plan was drawn up for the reorganization of -the Kuomintang, with the advice of Borodin. Next January the First -Congress of the Party opened. Sun Yat-sen, delighted with the new -instrument for promoting the ideological revolution, allowed government -problems to recede. The Party came to the front, and with the Party -organization were to be solved the problems of a universe in revolution. -During the fifteen months of life which remained to Sun Yat-sen, his -third government at Canton was not to undergo any transformation. The -strictly political purposes of the revolution had become mere adjuncts -to the ideological and military features. The government continued to -possess the now familiar parliamentary-democratic formulas which, -misused and deformed as they were throughout China, had come to be the -embroidery of might. - - -_The Nationalist Government, Soviet in Form_ - -The sorry picture of inadequacy in both the North and the South was -interrupted by the launching of the Nationalist Revolution of 1926-1927. -As a preparatory step to the acquisition of revolutionary power, Sun -Yat-sen's followers reorganized the Canton government in June, 1925. -This action followed Sun's death on March 11, 1925, in Peking, where he -had gone to take part in a reunification conference with the leading -_tuchüns_ of the North. The conference had failed, but it is -characteristic that Sun, embittered though he was, lent his last hours -to formulating a compromise. The new Canton government took the name of -_The Nationalist Government of China_, thereby disavowing succession -from the ineffectual Republic which preceded it. It remained in Canton -until the end of 1926; on January 1, 1927, it was transferred to Hankow, -the greatest inland city of China, located some six hundred miles up the -Yangtze River from Shanghai. Hankow is one of three sister cities -collectively termed the Wu-han cities; hence this phase of the -Nationalist Government is referred to as the Wu-han regime. It came to -an end in the fall of 1927, enjoyed a momentary resurrection in Canton, -and then passed into history, being succeeded by another Nationalist -Government at Nanking. - -In the last two years of his life, Sun had come to stress again his -principle of nationalism. After the birth of the 1912 Republic he had -for some years placed in the foreground democracy and _min shêng_, until -he became aware that the problem of China's internal reconstruction -could not be solved without an adequate adjustment of foreign relations. -He saw that the _tuchün_ wars were influenced by competing imperialisms, -agreed upon resistance to the Chinese revolution while expressing pious -hopes for Chinese unity. Accordingly, the Kuomintang began emphasizing -its nationalist character, and Sun's followers, previously termed -Republicans or merely revolutionaries, were called Nationalists. With a -program of anti-imperialism, anti-_tuchünism_, and national unification, -the Party began making great headway. The propaganda machinery which the -Russian advisers had devised was turned against the vested interests. In -addition, the rapid rise of the Nationalists must be explained through -their party organization and the creation of agencies linked with the -Party, such as youth groups, labor unions, peasant unions, and women's -associations. Thus, instead of trying to superimpose a modern government -upon preexisting social forms, the Nationalists built their government -by molding the social groups necessary to its support. - -The government was composed of a hierarchy of committees, similar to the -Soviet system in Russia. The topmost committees of the government were -subject to the control of the Central Executive Committee of the Party. -The Party secured its authority through a policy of democratic -centralism buttressed by the election of a Party Congress from the -various branches of the party. Power thus followed a perfectly clear and -traceable line; it did not depend upon mock elections or upon indefinite -delegations of authority. The party members elected the delegates to the -Party Congress; the Party Congress chose a Central Executive Committee; -the Central Executive Committee or its Standing Committee controlled the -Political Council (policy-making) and the Administrative Council -(cabinet), together with the Military Council. These three were the -supreme government agencies. The same party authorities appointed and -removed all members of all other councils in provincial or municipal -governments. There was not the faintest show of popular participation in -the government; government had become the exclusive tool of the Party. -But by being admittedly a tool, the government possessed definite power. - -Party agencies opened wide the doors of mass participation, not in the -government but in the movement. The Nationalist Revolution won with the -assistance of the Communists in 1926-1927 rested on the extension of -every conceivable agitational device to every group of the population. -The government tied these devices together. Halfway on the road to -victory the differences between the Right and Left Kuomintang, and -between the Communists and the Kuomintang, became too acute to allow for -further operation. In April, 1927, Chiang K'ai-shek, the Nationalist -Generalissimo, established a Nationalist Government at Nanking. The -Nationalist Government, soviet in form, remained in Hankow for a few -more months, transferred again to Canton, and then expired. Even so, the -councils of the Nationalist governments at Canton and Wu-han had served -their purpose well; they had effected the concentration of power, -instead of its division, in the course of a revolution when -concentration was at a premium. With the approaching victory and peace, -the council form of government began to appear to the Chinese as no less -alien than parliamentarism. The Nanking government set out to -reconstitute a government both Chinese and modern. - - -NOTES - -[1] Sun Yat-sen, _How China Was Made a Republic_ (unpublished -manuscript written in Shanghai in 1919, now in possession of the present -author), p. 40. - -[2] See above, pp. 43 ff. - -[3] Wu Chih-fang, _Chinese Government and Politics_, p. 361, Shanghai, -1934. Wu's work, and Kalfred Dip Lum, _Chinese Government_, Shanghai, -1934, are the two surveys in a Western language of modern Chinese -government. Wu's work, while carefully done and containing a great deal -of useful material, is patterned rather closely after Western works on -Western government and makes no attempt to transpose Chinese politics -into Chinese terms, nor does it give adequate documentation of Chinese -sources; Lum's outline is based in great part on first-hand contact with -Chinese politics and, while brief, is helpful, especially on Kuomintang -organization and problems. M. T. Z. Tyau, _Two Years of Nationalist -China_, Shanghai, 1930, is a statistical and official commemoration -volume and useful within its obvious limitations; anonymous, -_Twenty-five Years of the Chinese Republic_, Nanking, 1937, contains -short essays and monographs, some excellent, some undistinguished, on -the Nanking regime and its predecessors. See also Sih-gung Cheng, -_Modern China: A Political Study_, Oxford, 1919, and the "China" issue -of _The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_, -vol. 152, Philadelphia, 1930. - -[4] Jermyn Chi-hung Lynn, _Political Parties in China_, Peking, 1930, -gives the most detailed outline of political parties yet available. -Bitterly anti-Kuomintang, the author became pro-Japanese in the autumn -of 1937. - -[5] Harold M. Vinacke, _Modern Constitutional Development in China_, -pp. 145-146, 150, Princeton, 1920. - -[6] See Wu, _op. cit._ in note 3, pp. 50-51, for the problem of -constitutional succession. - -[7] Bertram Lennox-Simpson, who wrote under the pseudonym Putnam Weale, -was an Englishman native to North China who spent his life editing -newspapers, writing books, and playing the game of North Chinese -politics. He was murdered in 1931. His books cover the period from the -Boxer incident to the triumph of the Nationalists of Nanking, and--while -not always reliable in detail--are stimulating contemporary documents. -_The Fight for the Republic in China_, London, 1918, and _The Vanished -Empire_, London, 1926, are very readable. His novels, which suffer from -neglect, present some aspects of Chinese and foreign life in the North -which are not dealt with by any other writer with the same -qualifications. - -[8] A. N. Holcombe, _The Chinese Revolution_, pp. 96-101, Cambridge, -1930, discusses this point with clarity and vigor. - -[9] Jean Escarra, _Le droit chinois_, p. 133, Peiping and Paris, 1936. - -[10] W. W. Willoughby, the very competent and sympathetic adviser to -the Chinese delegation at the Washington Conference, has written _China -at the Conference_, Baltimore, 1922, and _Foreign Rights and Interests -in China_, 2 vols., Baltimore, 1927. For further treatment of recent -Chinese foreign relations see, among others, R. T. Pollard, _China's -Foreign Relations_, 1917-1931, New York, 1933. - -[11] For the origin of this system see John K. Fairbank, "The Creation -of the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs at Shanghai," _The Chinese Social -and Political Science Review_ (Peiping), vol. 19, pp. 469 ff., -1935-1936. - -[12] Paul M. W. Linebarger, _Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese Republic_, New -York, 1924. - -[13] See above, pp. 51 ff. - -[14] This program is very pithily put by Sun in his _Fundamentals of -National Reconstruction_, issued the following year (to be found in M. -T. Z. Tyau, _op. cit._ in note 3, pp. 439 ff., and L. S. Hsü, _Sun -Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals_, pp. 85 ff., Los Angeles, -1933). The point is elaborated by Tsui Shu-chin, "The Influence of the -Canton-Moscow Entente upon Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy," _The -Chinese Social and Political Science Review_ (Peiping), vol. 18, pp. 177 -ff., 1934; and Paul M. A. Linebarger, _The Political Doctrines of Sun -Yat-sen_, pp. 209-214, "The Three Stages of Revolution," Baltimore, -1937. See also Hou Yong-ling, _La vie politique et constitutionelle en -Chine_, Peiping, 1935; Tsêng Yü-hao, _Modern Chinese Legal and Political -Philosophy_, Shanghai, 1930. - - - - -_Chapter_ VIII - -RECONSTRUCTION - - -The National Government of China set up at Nanking in April, 1927, was -not definitively organized until late that year. Chiang K'ai-shek had to -resign from the government before the Left Kuomintang group would accept -the regime. In the following year, with the return of Chiang and the -adoption of a new constitution (Organic Law of the National Government), -the Nanking government was more firmly established than any previous -government since the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai. A high price had been paid -for stability: Northern military leaders had been allowed to join it, -much as those of the South had supported Sun Yat-sen ten years before. -The break with the Communists meant stopping a vast agrarian-proletarian -revolution midway in its course, at a cost of many lives. The -Nationalists, thrust into the role of governors, could not avoid turning -against many of those who had helped to put them in power but wished to -continue the revolution. - - -_The National Government of China_ - -Despite the difficulties which it faced, the National Government had -many assets. In the realm of ideology, it had the advantage of -possessing a state philosophy and a patron saint: the _San Min Chu I_[1] -and its author, Sun Yat-sen. In the military sphere, it had at its -disposal an army unequaled in China; in the economic, the support of the -Chinese bourgeoisie, together with the friendly interest of the -capitalist powers. In the province of politics, it carried with it much -of the personnel formerly serving the Nationalist Government, soviet in -form, to which it claimed succession. Its officials were accustomed to -devote themselves seriously to government, so that from the very -beginning the Nanking government was inclined to enforce its laws as -well as promulgate them--thereby breaking with the usage of the shadow -Republic at Peking. Finally, the new government secured full -international recognition with the flight of Chang Tso-lin from Peking -and the disappearance of the rival regime in the North (1928). - -Sun's state philosophy fulfilled a cardinal function. Even in its most -troubled phases, when military factors came closest to the surface of -government, the new government did not lapse into fiction. There was a -programmatic index against which Nanking's accomplishments could be -tested, and a definite long-range plan to follow. The program enabled -the National Government to utilize the forms of revolution for the -purpose of stabilizing government--far less dangerous than the practice -of their Northern predecessors, to use government in order to further -disunited military despotism. The officers of the Kuomintang exhibited a -meticulous respect for the dead Leader of their Party. Sun Yat-sen, -known by his honorific pseudonym _Chung Shan_, was buried in one of the -most magnificent tombs of modern times. In carrying out Sun's legacy, -the Kuomintang was pledged to the principles of intraparty democratic -centralism and party dictatorship over the rest of the nation. The -formal party organization was not seriously effected by the change from -a soviet form of government. - -Government under the Kuomintang, despite the breakdown of morale which -followed the disintegration of the Great Revolution (1927), was -radically unlike that of the Peking regimes. In 1927, when Chiang -K'ai-shek turned against the peasant unions and officialized the labor -unions, a tendency toward outright military dictatorship became -apparent. The developments of the following ten years did not at any -time suggest that military power had meekly yielded to governmental -power, but they did indicate that government was taking an increasing -part in the control of society. The close interrelation of ideology and -government, dating from the period of the Nationalist-Communist -alliance, was to endure after the revolution had been transformed into a -reconstructive process and rebellion had been superseded by -administration. However much Sun and his teachings failed to create a -new political Islam, they weathered criticism sufficiently well to -provide a scheme of policy, political values, and broad objectives. - -The influence of Sun Yat-sen was harmed, rather than reinforced, by the -hysterical ritualists who seem to be the parasites of all one-party -governments. The memory of the Leader and his teachings settled into the -stabilizing roles of founding father and general dogma. Only a few -veterans of the movement are still inspired by the fire of his words and -the vigor of his personality. To the vast bulk of Chinese public opinion -Sun Yat-sen is the human embodiment of virtuous, brave, and intelligent -conduct, whose theories are acceptable in their general form and whose -programs have proved pragmatically usable. The _San Min Chu I_ failed to -cause widespread political ecstasy; it succeeded in bringing direction -and sanity, after a limited fashion. To spread allegiance the government -fostered a Sun Yat-sen memorial ritual; every Monday morning, in every -government office, college, school, police station, and other public -building, there was held a service consisting of the reading of Sun -Yat-sen's political testament and passages from his speeches clarifying -his doctrines. The services seemed for a while to resemble a state -religion; but the moderateness and formalism of Chinese life was -inimical to the fervor necessary for political religion. The Kuomintang -and its government came to see these limitations; although the services -have remained, they are now severely secular in spirit. - -The most dynamic part of the _San Min Chu I_, the doctrine of -nationalism, had contributed to placing the Kuomintang in power. The new -government was accordingly nationalist and centralistic; it opposed any -type of regionalism--political, administrative, economic, or military. -The Northern generals who sided with the government at the time of its -formation were brought within the operation of the national military -laws. When they revolted--quite properly, according to their _tuchün_ -standards--against reduction of their forces in the Disbandment War of -1930-1931, they were defeated. With the Southern and the Western -military leaders Chiang was not as successful, until Japanese and -Communist pressure brought first the one and then the other group into -his fold. After actual autonomy for a number of years, the province of -Kuangtung (Canton) submitted in 1936 to the authority of the National -Government, thereby bringing to an end the generation-old division of -North and South. Nationalism and centralism affected not only the armies -but also the entire administration, whose service functions and police -powers developed amazingly. Although the Nanking government had -originally faced broad popular suspicion, it began to win genuine -respect because of its accomplishments. - -Was the Nanking government a dictatorship? Its record does not justify -the assumption that it was merely to camouflage a military dictatorship -commandeered by Chiang K'ai-shek. Moreover, the policy-making power was -not by any means a prerogative of Chiang K'ai-shek. Chiang was nearly -sovereign in technical military matters and possessed more political -influence than did any other single individual. Yet the power of policy -making rested with a small group of men not over a hundred in number. -Some of the gentlest, sincerest, and quietest of these leaders had once -been _tuchüns_ in their own right; some of the most military and -forthright had never handled anything more lethal than a cash register. -The leaders tended to work within the party and government structure, so -that the political organization, while not of great simplicity or -clarity, accurately portrayed the distribution of power. No one can -gauge the degree of interdependence between the leaders of a government -system in its formative period, and between the offices which these -leaders occupy. The Sian episode indicated that the Nanking government -could continue without Chiang and that Chiang's incarceration was not -the signal for immediate anarchy. But Chiang was not actually dead, nor -was the government deprived of the support which his prestige had -generated. From 1927 to 1937 the Nanking government remained under -approximately the same leading officials. - -The last test for the sources of Nanking's power may be found in -considering the relation between the men in command and the authority -which placed them there. The supreme organ of the party was the Party -Congress. This body did determine the course of government policy -frequently, and on such occasions clarified issues through action. The -Congress elected the Central Executive Committee and the Central -Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang. The entire membership of the -Congress would vote in the elections, any of the members being eligible. -Since the Congress was composed of representatives from the various -regional and functional divisions of the party, intraparty democracy was -insured in theory and--though to a lesser extent--in practice. The two -top committees elected smaller Standing Committees; the Central -Executive Committee in addition elected the Central Political Council, -which was the highest organ of government in China and the agency -through which the party controlled the government. The Central Political -Council did not seek to keep track of the detail of government; it -outlined governmental policy, appointed major officials, and directed -rather than supervised administration. It was a policy-making body in -the strictest sense, and its action took effect upon the Council of -State, which coordinated the government establishments.[2] - -Had there been a schism between the Nanking government and the -Kuomintang, it might have been possible to trace a political issue as it -was fought out--all the way from the party membership up through the -Party Congress and the Central Executive Committee, from party to -government by action of the Central Political Council, and down through -the Council of State and the subordinated government organs to the -administrative network operating upon the broad masses of the populace. -In fact, however, no issue saw the light, since the same group that -dominated the party controlled the government. The relation between the -leaders and the Party Congresses can perhaps best be compared with that -between the leading personalities of a Republican or Democratic -convention in the United States and the convention delegates. Convention -action rarely transfers power or upsets leadership, nor do constructive -plans or formulated policies emerge from convention sessions; and yet -the conventions cannot be regarded merely as tools in the hands of the -party leadership. A similar situation existed in China. Even when Chiang -and the other leaders seemed to hold the bag, the meetings of the Party -Congress did not lack importance, and the issues before the Congress -were not considered predetermined. This was no personal regime in the -Napoleonic sense. Party dictatorship expressed itself in defined forms, -as a part of Sun Yat-sen's state philosophy. Benevolent oligarchy of -patriotic modernists, acting with party sanction obtained through -intraparty democratic processes, was not foreign to Sun's mind. The -Nanking government further differed from fascist governments, and -resembled the Russian, in that it was democratic in intent; its -dictatorial character was avowedly temporary. Throughout the period -during which the Kuomintang ruled from Nanking, democracy was regarded -as a definite goal of governmental policy. The Japanese invasions -culminating in open war made impossible the immediate abrogation of -Kuomintang party dictatorship. Yet when war broke out in 1937, the -National Government was on the verge of reconstituting itself as a -democracy; but now the regime itself became itinerant, moving into the -hinterland. - -The Nanking government was organized under Kuomintang rule in a form -unique among modern states. Its three most distinctive features were: -(1) the concentration of power in the supreme agencies; (2) a fivefold -division of power and function through the _yüans_; and (3) the absence -of parliamentary chambers.[3] While the Organic Law was in effect as a -constitution (1928-1931), the government was headed by a president -wielding considerable power and a Council of State which served as the -chief control agency. In 1931 a National People's Convention made up of -representatives of the Kuomintang and of occupational groups adopted a -Provisional Constitution.[4] Under this constitution the power of the -president was sharply reduced, making him practically a titular officer. -The Council of State became a more formalized agency, and the greater -weight of government routine was placed in the Executive _Yüan_. Under -the draft constitution proposed for the period after the end of party -dictatorship a presidential system was to have been inaugurated. - -The years 1931-1937 were characterized by the use of the Council of -State as the supreme agency of formal government. The president of the -National Government was little more than the chairman of the Council. -The Council received instructions from the Central Political Council, -and transmitted them to the five regular departments of government in -the form of policies. Great as its powers may seem to be, the Council of -State was largely an intermediary agency, although the personal -influence of its members was extensive. The Council, with its -administrative adjuncts, was of value in that it provided an -institutional center for the government and gave governmental form to -the commands of the party. There was no judicial check on the executive -or the legislative branches. - -The fivefold division of powers (adopted as the _yüan_ system) is one of -the most original points in Sun Yat-sen's political scheme. _Yüan_ is an -almost untranslatable Chinese term signifying a "public body" and used -in modern China to designate the five great coordinate departments of -government. - - - PARTY MEMBERSHIP - - PARTY CONGRESS - - CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CENTRAL SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE - STANDING COMMITTEE STANDING COMMITTEE - - CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL - - 1. Secretariat for Civil Affairs - 2. Secretariat for Military Affairs - 3. Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Political Officials - - PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT - COUNCIL OF STATE - - 1. Commission of Military Affairs - 2. Board of General Staff - 3. Directorate-General of Military Training - 4. Military Advisory Council - 5. National Reconstruction Commission - 6. Academia Sinica - 7. National Economic Council - 8. Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum Commission - - I. EXECUTIVE YÜAN - President - Vice-president - Secretariat - 1. Ministry of the Interior - 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs - 3. Ministry of Military Affairs - 4. Ministry of the Navy - 5. Ministry of Finance - 6. Ministry of Industries - 7. Ministry of Education - 8. Ministry of Communications - 9. Ministry of Railways - 10. Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs - 11. Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs - 12. National Health Service - 13. Hopei-Chahar Political Council - 14. Mongolian Local Autonomy Council - 15. Weihaiwei Administration - 16. Preparatory Commission for the Sikang Provincial Government - 17. Boards of Trustees for Boxer Refunds - 18. Committee on Efficiency - - II. LEGISLATIVE YÜAN - President - Vice-president - Legislative Members - Legislative Research Bureau - Bureau of Statistics - - III. JUDICIAL YÜAN - President - Vice-president - Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Functionaries - Administrative Court - Supreme Court - Ministry of Justice - - IV. EXAMINATION YÜAN - President - Vice-president - Examination Commission - Ministry of Personnel - - V. CONTROL YÜAN - President - Vice-president - Ministry of Audit - - PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONS - _Hsien_ Municipalities - Villages - -The Executive _Yüan_ was headed, as were all the others, by a -_yüan_ president (_yüan-chang_), assisted by a vice-president, a -secretary-general, and a director of political affairs. The yüan -included all the major executive ministries, and the formal meeting of -the Executive _Yüan_ was a meeting of the _Yüan_ officers, the heads of -the ministries, and other directing officials. Such meetings took place -once a week and corresponded to cabinet meetings in Western countries. -The executive work of the entire government was performed by the -Executive _Yüan_ and--through characteristic Chinese devices--the _Yüan_ -Secretariat, divided into bureaus and committees, came to occupy a -position of high strategic importance in Chinese government. All -executive measures were funneled through the Secretariat, which cast -them into proper form and determined whether or not they should be put -on the _yüan_ agenda. It thus occupied a position not unlike that of the -Grand Chancery and Grand Secretariat of the T'ang dynasty or of the -Office of Transmissions under the Manchus. The Executive _Yüan_ combined -within itself nine ministries: Interior (having charge of provincial and -local government), Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, Navy, Finance, -Industries, Education, Communications, and Railways. Included were also -a number of special commissions and agencies. - -The Legislative _Yüan_ consisted of a president, a vice-president, and -eighty-six members, with an extensive administrative staff attached to -it. The _yüan_ was divided, as are parliaments, into committees, but it -was not a representative body, nor able to enact laws independently of -the other divisions of government. Its president's powers were so wide -as to make the cameral organization of the _yüan_ more apparent than -real and to reduce the _yüan_ to a legislative drafting and research -agency. The Judicial _Yüan_ was made up of four establishments: Supreme -Court, Administrative Court, Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment -of Public Functionaries (dealing with the government personnel below -political rank), and the Ministry of Justice. The Examination _Yüan_, -composed of two divisions (Examination Commission and Ministry of -Personnel) gave expression to the Chinese tradition of separate -examining agencies. Its function was to provide a merit system -applicable to the whole government staff, except those relatively few -positions which were political in nature. Because of the difficulty of -developing elaborate machinery under unusual circumstances, the -Examination _Yüan_ did not establish for itself a high standard of -accomplishment. Finally, the Control _Yüan_ served as a chamber of -censors entitled to bring suit against dishonest or treacherous -officials, and maintained a central Ministry of Audit. In the last few -years of the Nanking regime it brought over two hundred and fifty cases -to bar each year. - -An informative picture of the practical workings of one of the key parts -of the National Government, the Secretariat of the Executive _Yüan_, is -given by Tsiang Ting-fu, the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union and -formerly one of the ranking officials of that _Yüan_: - - The Bureau of General Affairs keeps the internal machinery of the - Secretariat going. It receives the dispatches and distributes them - among the sections. It manages the funds and looks after supplies. - - The Bureau of Confidential Affairs handles confidential telegrams and - keeps the secret codes. - - The Secretaries in the Drafting Bureau draft documents that require - high literary finish, usually formal documents. - - The Reception Bureau takes care of callers and visitors and sees to it - that dignitaries who come to the Executive Yüan for business or - courtesy calls are accorded a due reception. - - The Meetings Bureau arranges for all meetings held in, or under the - auspices of, the Executive Yüan. - - The Compilation and Translation Bureau watches over the periodical - press, both Chinese and foreign. - - The real political work is done in the Sections. Let us take up first - political correspondence. A minister, governor, or mayor sends a - dispatch to the Executive Yüan, asking for instructions in regard to, - let us say, a problem in raising funds. It goes to Section 5. The head - clerk and his assistants look up regulations, precedents, and other - relevant facts and write a memorandum. The dispatch with the - memorandum goes to the secretary or councillor in charge of the - Section, who writes a minute suggesting a solution or approving a - solution suggested by the head clerk. Then the dispatch, memorandum, - and minute go to the Director of Political Affairs, who, taking into - consideration political factors, renders a tentative decision for - final approval by the Secretary-General. The clerical staff sticks to - law, tradition, and precedent. Adjustments are usually made only by - the ranks above. As the majority of problems are so-called routine - problems, in connection with which the opinion of the clerical staff - is usually sound, the ranks above usually accept the proposed - solution. What is important and bothersome is the minority of unusual - problems, for the treatment of which procedures are varied. - - The sender of a dispatch dealing with an unusual problem may call, or - send a representative to call, on the Secretary-General or the - Director of Political Affairs before or simultaneously with the - sending of the dispatch, giving a personal detailed explanation of the - matter and sounding the opinion of the Executive Yüan as represented - by the Secretary-General and the Director of Political Affairs. An - agreed solution may be arrived at during the interview. In that case - the correspondence will be only formal. But the parties involved may - disagree, in which case the Secretary-General will courteously say - that the matter must be referred to the President or to the Yüan - meeting, and the Director has an additional solution of the problem by - resorting to consultation with the Secretary-General. In some cases - the Secretary-General and the Director will decide the matter during - the interview whether the caller likes it or not. - - Some unusual matters touch several jurisdictions, _i.e._, two or three - ministries; or a number of provinces or cities; or both. The Executive - Yüan then calls a meeting of representatives of the jurisdictions - affected and the matter is threshed out there. The conclusions of such - meetings may be referred to the President or to the Yüan meetings. - - In dealing with unusual problems of primary importance the - Secretary-General usually consults the President, and the Director of - Political Affairs consults the Secretary-General in most cases and the - President in some cases where the work is specifically assigned to the - Director by the President. - - The average of dispatches (including telegrams) received and sent out - daily by the Executive Yüan is about three hundred, of which number - only two or three need to be referred to the President or the Yüan - meeting, the rest being handled by the Secretariat without such - reference. - - The Secretariat on its part, by the order of the President as Chairman - of the Yüan meeting, or on the initiative of the Secretary-General or - at the suggestion of the Director of Political Affairs, sends - dispatches to the ministries, commissions, provinces and - municipalities, in the form of decrees, ordinances, instructions, - inquiries and requests. - - The energies of the clerical staff are devoted entirely to the - incoming and outgoing correspondence. About half of the time of the - secretaries and councillors is devoted to correspondence and half to - conferences. The sub-committees created by the Yüan meeting are - numerous and are almost always convoked by the Secretariat. In a few - cases the Secretary-General and the Director of Political Affairs, - usually accompanied by a secretary or councillor, attend; in most - cases, however a secretary or a councillor is designated as the Yüan's - representative. The conclusions of such sub-committees are always - reported back to the Yüan meeting.[5] - -Strange as the _yüan_ system may appear, it seems to have been the most -effectual form of government that the Chinese have devised in the -Republican era. In times of military or revolutionary crisis, however, -this elaborate scheme of bureaucratic departmentalization would prove -too cumbersome for rapid readjustment and action; during the Japanese -invasions, great reliance was placed on the creation of emergency -commissions. In addition to the _yüans_ there were a number of agencies -which did not fit into the five-power scheme. Great independent -establishments were attached directly to the Council of State. An -Academia Sinica took the place of the Han Lin of imperial times as a -national center for scholarship. A National Economic Council and a -National Reconstruction Commission performed specialized functions -effectively, with assistance from experts provided by the League of -Nations. In fact, there was a scattering of foreign advisers throughout -the government. Of these the highest in rank were placed at the disposal -of the Council of State, some rendering actual technical service, others -active in unofficial representation abroad, propaganda, lobbying in -foreign capitals, or similar tasks. Other advisers were attached to the -_yüans_ and to the ministries. - -Provincial government under the Nanking regime was subordinated to the -Executive _Yüan_ through the Ministry of the Interior. The provinces -each possessed a commission form of government, with the commission -chairman serving as titular head of the province. The actual operation -of the provincial governments exhibited a great deal of variation, -depending on the character of the area, the extent of its political -development, and the tangible influence enjoyed by the National -Government. The provincial commission combined the policy-making, -policy-executing, and quasi-judicial functions, operating largely on the -basis of instructions from Nanking and transmitting reports through the -Secretariat of the Executive _Yüan_ at the other end. Attached to each -commission were a secretariat and four or more departments--mainly civil -affairs, finance, reconstruction, and education. The department heads -were members of the commission--a type of government not unlike that of -American cities under the Galveston plan. The theory of Sun Yat-sen -provided, however, that the province should decrease in importance with -the growth of modern government in China, so that the dangerous -regionalism in the country would eventually be denied overt political -expression. He saw the future significance of the provincial governments -only in their role as intermediaries for _hsien_-national relationships. -Under the National Government while at Nanking, the tendency was to -centralize control and to emphasize national guidance in those provinces -squarely under Nationalist rule. In other provinces the provincial -governments tended to follow local conditions and mirror the national -standards as a matter of decorum only. The provincial governments were -far less important in the life of the provinces than was the National -Government for the nation. They had the national civilian and military -authorities to cope with, in addition to the impositions of their own -local military. Their sources of revenue were not ample, and their -authority not well established. In some provinces the commission form -was adopted only as a matter of legal compliance, leaving to local -leaders the actual conduct of affairs. In fact, reform centered on the -_hsien_ rather than the province, partly because the province was a -potential rival to the nation, and partly because the _hsien_ was a more -organic unit in Chinese society. - -Between the provincial authorities and those of the _hsien_ there stood -Special Commissioners of Administrative Inspection, whose function was -to relate the two administrative units and to work for the modernization -of _hsien_ organization. The _hsien_ served, and still serves, not only -a rural area but also the central municipality in which the _hsien_ -magistrate has his headquarters. The _yamên_ (official building) -occupies the center of the town, mostly a one-story edifice built around -a courtyard; some _yamêns_ still display the two flagpoles and the two -stone lions that were required by the custom of the Empire. Usually the -_yamên_ contains: - -"(_a_) the rooms occupied by the tax collectors and the administrative -and judicial police; (_b_) the court and the assembly room; (_c_) the -offices of the various bureaus; (_d_) the residence for magistrates and -the dormitory for officers."[6] The conduct of _hsien_ government is -influenced by three main groups--the illiterate masses, the conservative -gentry, and the younger progressives. In those _hsien_ units where no -reformist or revolutionary pressure is felt, the magistrate and the tax -collector do little more than collect funds, and the administration is -marked by the laxity which characterized old Chinese government in its -inadequate form. The gentry, the scholar-administrators, and the tax -collectors represent a single social group and manage to rule in their -own economic interest. In other _hsien_ units the influence of modern -government is noticeable; the magistrate is in most cases a man -determined to put into effect the standards of twentieth-century -administration. The prestige and power of young men with modern -educations have so increased that they are able to obtain a considerable -number of magistracies, and if they are willing they may introduce a -respectable measure of good government and reform. - -The magistrate selects his secretary and four bureau heads, subject to -the approval of the provincial authorities. The secretary performs the -work usually expected of permanent officials, carrying on much of the -routine so as to leave the magistrate free for political and -quasi-judicial functions. The secretary is virtually a vice-magistrate -and, if successful, keeps the governmental machinery of the _hsien_ in -smooth operation. When the magistrate is absent, he acts as the -substitute. The four bureaus of the _hsien_ correspond to the four chief -administrative divisions of the province--civil affairs, finance, -reconstruction, and education. An opium suppression bureau is often -added, carrying on the anti-narcotic campaign. The civil affairs bureau -has charge of the census, and supervises local areas within the -district. Such matters as police, militia, sanitary administration, -public buildings, classical shrines, and parks are frequently under its -jurisdiction. The subordinate units of administration are provisional, -but the _pao-chia_ system has been restored at the lowest level. This is -a device for the mutual guarantee, protection, and responsibility of -citizens, in which ten families make a _pao_ and ten _pao_ make a -_chia_. The tax bureau is one of the weakest links in Chinese local -government, as in this office corruption is rife, and severe oppression -of the farmers most frequent. In unreformed _hsien_ units, the tax -bureau is likely to be the political plum of members of the local -gentry, who use it to extend their tenant farms, promote usury, and -defraud the government. The provincial governments have begun to send -out accountants and to install regular bookkeeping systems--an -undertaking which if completed would be one of the major reforms of -local administration. - -In the smaller _hsien_ units the magistrate is assisted for judicial -purposes by a judge; in the larger, separate courts are provided. Up to -the outbreak of hostilities in 1937 the national and provincial -governments were making great strides in reorganizing judicial -administration and in the professionalization of police work. The judges -are appointees of the provincial courts, a factor which may make for -greater professional capacity and independence. The general importance -of the _hsien_ is illustrated by the fact that in Manchoukuo the -Japanese have been forced to revive this system. They have, however, -implemented it with a Japanese officer known as the _Kanjikan_, who is -supposed to advise his Chinese colleague. The experiment is of great -interest, as it provides the acid test for the Japanese attempt actually -to administer a Chinese area. Without firm _hsien_ governments beneath -them, the Japanese puppet regimes are foredoomed to failure.[7] - -Until the beginning of the undeclared war, the departmentalization and -modernization of the _hsien_ had proceeded most extensively in certain -model districts selected for the purpose of political and administrative -experimentation. Some of these had reached a level of efficiency which -augured well for the future of Chinese government. With the coming of -war, however, administrative interests had to yield in many cases to -political or military ones, but in one significant respect _hsien_ -government was constructively affected. The evocation of popular -interest in and cooperation with the government caused a great -acceleration of progress toward local democracy, and focused attention -on reaction and corruption in the inland regions. War propaganda among -the masses of the people amounted to a call for public-spirited action; -such action is bound to take the form of direct military enlistment or -of collaboration in local patriotic and defense schemes. - -Municipal government in old China was carried on largely by the -officials of the imperial or provincial bureaucracy. Cities and towns -were graded and even named according to the rank of the office for which -they served as headquarters. The imperial administration thus extended -to municipal affairs; each municipal government included a designated -rural area surrounding the city. With the growth of modern government in -China, plans were considered for a definite and systematic development -of municipal administration. The foreign-controlled cities of the coast -provided models of Western administration, and the Chinese were not slow -to copy. A few years ago the cities of China were divided for -administrative purposes into three categories: those administered -directly by the national government; those placed directly under the -provincial governments; and those for which no special category was -provided, leaving them under the established bureaucratic hierarchy. In -1936 there were five cities of the first class (Nanking, Peiping, -Shanghai, Tientsin, and Tsingtao) and eighteen of the second class, -including the very important cities of Hankow and Canton. The municipal -administration is headed by the mayor and the council. The mayor is -appointed by the authority under whose jurisdiction the city is placed. -The council is composed of two appointed councillors and the chiefs of -the municipal bureaus--four or more. The four required bureaus are civil -affairs, finance, public works, and education. Intracity organization -was accomplished through the use of _ch'u_, or wards, subdivided into -family groups of defined size. With the development of democracy it was -intended for each of these to take part in the promotion of -self-government; at each level representatives should be chosen by free -suffrage. The family foundation has remained a significant feature even -of municipal administration. - -The chief political question before the National Government at the -outbreak of hostilities in the summer of 1937 was the adoption of a -permanent democratic constitution. This was to be accomplished in much -the same way that the Provisional Constitution had been adopted in -1931--by means of a specially elected People's Congress. In the -meantime, a draft constitution had reached a nearly final form. The -outstanding features of the draft included the strengthening of the -presidency, the abolition of the Kuomintang party dictatorship, the -extension of a widely defined suffrage to operate on an unprecedented -scale, and provision for periodically assembling People's Congresses to -take, by and large, the position of the Kuomintang by exercising the -four powers of the people: initiative, referendum, election, and recall. -The elective offices would be reduced to a few. The installation and -removal of the major government officers was a function to be divided -between the People's Congress and the president, who was himself to be -elected and recalled by the Congress. - -The Japanese invasion led to the scattering and the partial suspension -of government. Military needs began to rule the hour. The Kuomintang -Party Congress held in the spring of 1938 elevated Chiang K'ai-shek to -the newly-created position of _Tsung-tsai_--a term meaning Party Leader, -which had been the office held by Sun Yat-sen under the more august -synonym _Tsung-li_. Not only was this a partial recognition of the -leadership principle[8] in a democracy at war and a testimonial to -Chiang as the supreme military leader of the Republic, but it was also a -substantial grant of power. Four new powers were given Chiang as Party -Leader: (1) the position of Chairman of the National Kuomintang -Congress; (2) the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee of the -Kuomintang; (3) the power to ask (impliedly, to demand) that the -National Kuomintang Congress reconsider its resolutions, which amounted -to the grant of a courteous but effective conditional veto; and (4) -final authority on Central Executive Committee resolutions, by means of -a parallel veto.[9] This apparent trend toward emergency one-man control -was, however, offset by the convening on July 6, 1938, of the People's -Political Council, an advisory all-Party representative body, designed -to substitute temporarily for the again-postponed National Congress. Its -appearance was the widest break in the formal front of one-party -Kuomintang rule to occur in a decade, and was heralded as a signal for -the practical democratization of the government. - - -_The Chinese Soviet Republic_ - -After the suppression of the Marxists by Chiang K'ai-shek and the -liquidation of the Nationalist government at Wu-han, the Chinese -Communist movement took to underground agitation. It demonstrated its -power, however, by proclaiming the Canton Commune on December 11, 1927. -The Commune ended in bloody suppression. At the same time, in the far -interior, the first Chinese Soviet had been established; from it, in -Tsalin on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, was to develop the Chinese Soviet -Republic. - -On the fourth anniversary of the Canton Commune the Chinese Soviet -Republic came into official being. A constitution was adopted, and soon -in the Communist districts soviets began to spread during a period of -relative peace. Nevertheless, the Soviet organization was always under -considerable pressure because of the war waged upon it by Chiang. -Although labor and agrarian legislation was adopted, the regime -had to operate under conditions of extreme military activity, -counterrevolution, and terror. Despite all these handicaps, the -Communists kept their government intact; they were able to move it -thousands of miles across China in the historic Long March from South -Central to Northwest China, which began October 16, 1934, and ended -October 20, 1935. - -Under its constitution, the Chinese Soviet Republic is declared to be -"the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants."[10] The -suffrage was set at the age of sixteen. The government was formed in a -manner similar to that employed in the U. S. S. R. before the adoption -of the new Soviet Constitution: local soviets elect district or city -soviets, which in turn elect provincial soviets, which elect a National -Congress of Soviets. In practice, the pattern could not be followed -closely, since elections were difficult to hold and territorial division -not always certain. The Central Executive Committee of the Congress of -Soviets was the chief political authority of the Communist regime; it -had the familiar executive organization of the Soviet system: a -Presidium of the Central Executive Committee and under it the People's -Council, the equivalent of a cabinet. The strength of the Chinese -Communists lay in their Party and adjunct organizations, in their land -policy, and in their Red Army. - -The central government of the Chinese Soviet Republic was no mere torso. -It included the following agencies immediately subordinate to the -People's Council: the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Inspection, the -Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Land, the Ministry of Labor, the -Revolutionary Military Commissariat, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the -Political Safety Bureau, the Ministry of Communications, the People's -Economic Commissariat, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Food, the -Ministry of Education, and--strangely--the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. - -As a result of the kidnaping at Sian at the end of 1936, the -Nationalists and the Communists drifted toward a _rapprochement_. The -next February the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang accepted -the Communist offer of United Front collaboration, although disguising -the acceptance by formal conditions for a Communist surrender. In -September the Chinese Soviet Republic was ready to assume the name of -_Special Administrative District of the Chinese Republic_. This left -their governmental and administrative organization unaffected; nor did -it mean the dissolution of the Red Army, now also under a new name, that -of the Eighth Route Army. With the commencement of the Japanese advance, -Communist leaders began taking part in the work of the National -Government, first at Nanking and then inland. - - -_Other Governments in China_ - -As the National Government at Nanking rose to a dominant position in -Chinese affairs, regional regimes outside its fold found it less easy to -fit themselves into the framework of the new Chinese state. The -Disbandment War of 1930-1931 had witnessed the defeat of the two most -redoubtable _tuchüns_ remaining in the North. On the other hand, it -became increasingly evident that acceptance of the Nanking hegemony in -name led to the infiltration of Nanking rule in fact. - -Nothing but a register of encyclopedic proportions could list and -describe the various political institutions which arose calling -themselves _governments_ in the troubled quarter-century of the Chinese -Republican era. Some have bordered on the pathological: Islamistan, for -instance, which was the work of an Englishman who proclaimed himself -emperor of a new Moslem Empire in Central Asia. The provincial -authorities of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) drove him out by using -airplanes borrowed from the Soviet Union. In Foochow, in 1932-1933, -there arose a movement headed by exiled Left Kuomintang leaders and -other ultra-patriots eager for immediate war with Japan. This government -was the first in years which did not pay lip service to the _San Min Chu -I_, nor claimed legitimate descent from the movement of Sun Yat-sen and -his revolutionaries--a surprising circumstance. Its very flexible -constitution would have permitted collaboration with the Chinese -Soviets--had the Red leaders not decided against it. The other main -point in which it varied from the pattern set by the Nanking government -was its profession of federalism. Known as the Federal Revolutionary -Government of China, it lasted a few months only to be destroyed by -Chiang, who had no scruples against using the weight of his modern -armies, including planes and motorized troops. These vegetations of -government can only interest the political botanist. Far more -troublesome have been the opposition governments mentored or sponsored -by outside forces. Tibet and Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) provided a -fertile field of anti-Nanking agitation. Two "states" in China proper-- -Manchoukuo and an equally Japanese-controlled Peking Republic -(1937)--find their counterparts in three others located in Chinese -dependencies: the Communist republics of Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva, -and the ambiguous "state" in Eastern Inner Mongolia (sometimes called -_Mêngkokuo_). - -These Communist republics are under stable government, and, judged from -reports which reach the outside, seem efficiently administered. They lie -in the former Imperial Russian sphere of influence, south of the -Sino-Russian border; except for the complications which would have -arisen internationally, they might just as well have been in the Soviet -Union as outside. Both governments maintain legations in Moscow. It -might be mentioned that when the Russian Red Army invaded Manchuria in -1929 during the conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway, a Barga -Mongol Soviet was temporarily established. The Communist "states" cannot -be compared with the Chinese Soviet Republic, which depended on no -outside military support and resulted from a great ideological drive. -They serve as advance posts of the Soviet Union--precedent for the -creation of puppet states within China. Years later the Japanese -manufactured a "state" in Eastern Inner Mongolia, with the cooperation -of anti-Chinese Mongol princes, which Japan has publicized very little. -Known in the world press as _Mêngkokuo_, it provides a Japanese buffer -state to meet the Russian buffer of Outer Mongolia. On October 29, 1937, -it reached its latest phase with the proclamation of the Autonomous -Government of Inner Mongolia. - -The Great Empire of Manchou, to use its present official name, arose as -Manchoukuo. The word itself was a concession to world opinion, as -Manchuria is known to the Chinese simply as the Three Eastern Provinces -(Tung San Shêng); its population is overwhelmingly Chinese. With the -development of Chinese national unity, the Japanese position in this -area was threatened. They invaded Manchuria in September, 1931; the -following year they proclaimed the independence of Manchoukuo, inviting -the young man who as a child had been the last Manchu emperor of China -to serve as the head of the state. In 1934 he was installed as Emperor -Kang Têh of the Great Empire of Manchou. The Japanese have done a great -deal toward bettering their own economic position in Manchuria, but the -effect of their policies on the Chinese population is of doubtful merit. -Equal motives underlay the rebirth of Peking, where on December 14, -1937, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was -proclaimed.[11] The old Peking-Republican flag was flown. The heads of -the new regime were aged men who already twenty years ago had cooperated -with the Japanese. Others served under duress and performed their mock -routine in the cold agony of treason. The new administration is -honeycombed with Japanese "advisers" and under the domination of the -Japanese army. - -To round out their collection of puppet governments, the Japanese -established in the spring of 1938 a Reformed Government of the Republic -of China in Nanking, and even went so far as to adopt--provisionally, at -least--the constitutional form of the National Government, which had -moved upriver. This regime was admittedly even more ephemeral than the -others, and the Japanese announced their intention of consolidating it -with the set-up they had organized in Peiping. For the time, it was to -be subordinate for purposes of theory to the Northern regime, but the -future of the whole Japanese adventure was in doubt, and that of their -half-conceived instrumentalities even more dubious. - - -_The Growth of Government in China_ - -In the decade following 1927, Chinese government became more significant -than it had been since the days of the founding emperors of the Ch'in -and the Han. Power was based on a correlation of government with -ideological and military forces. The Nationalist Party was the first to -effectuate this correlation, in part as a result of lessons learned from -the Soviet advisers in the period of collaboration.[12] The Nationalists -utilized the doctrinal bases of the _San Min Chu I_, tested in the -social revolution which arose from the Nationalist-Communist propaganda. -The great personal prestige of Sun Yat-sen was one of the most important -contributing factors to the growth of Nationalist administration in -Canton. - -The military ability and political leadership of Chiang K'ai-shek -largely determined the success of the subsequent National Government. -Chiang created a military machine superior to any other in China and -coordinated army and government in such a way as to add strength to -both.[13] But Chiang stood not alone. His wife became his _alter ego_ -for press relations, and important in her own right. His brother-in-law -T. V. Soong, resourceful financier, and his sisters-in-law, Mme Sun -Yat-sen (Sun's second wife) and Mme H. H. K'ung (wife of a later -minister of finance), were strong influences at Nanking. Yet these -members of the "Soong dynasty" did not shape the course of Nanking -policies as a closed concern. They were part of a larger group sharing -responsibility equally. - -Once the National Government was established its success was largely the -result of success. Improvements in the international status of China -accrued to the prestige of the regime, and a new surge toward -reconstruction, delayed intolerably long by the anarchy of _tuchüns_, -occurred as the result of the Nanking hegemony. In the later years of -the National Government, before the Japanese onslaught transformed it -into a quasi-military regime fighting for its existence, the increased -extent of the national police power was brought into sharp relief. With -the extension of a unified gendarmery service over great parts of the -nation, and the development of a court system which worked well except -when under political pressure, the individual came to face government as -a reality--more than ever before, under any dynasty. The government -defied custom and tradition in promoting public health, in attacking -epidemics, in sponsoring modern burial practices, and in deriding -unhygienic superstitions. In the broad field of mores which adjoins -public health, the influence of the government made itself felt--in -reducing the cost of marriage, in promoting municipal cleanliness and -tidiness in public places, in furthering temperance. The New Life -movement combined the prestige of the government with the elasticity of -voluntary association. In its closing days Nanking whipped up an -unprecedented wave of public spirit among the masses. - -As to government control of the economy, the Nanking government aimed at -system, in place of the inchoate conditions which existed before its -ascendancy. Chinese banks began to be as reliable as those of the West. -The currency was standardized on a national basis. A national fiscal -policy was adopted. A great achievement was the introduction of a -managed paper currency in a country where specie alone had been -respected for ages. Agriculture, however, was lagging behind. - -Government disavowed its previous identification with a scholastic -officialdom. It dispensed with a state religion, although the -commemoration of Sun Yat-sen compensated in part for the change. -Government disclaimed any vague totalitarianism and instead clarified -its zone of functioning through the use of law. By narrowing the field -of its authority, it increased its effectiveness. Nationalization, -centralization, bureaucratization, the development of lawful process, -the emergence of a half-Western state working for Chinese needs--thus -may the growth of government be characterized in the period after 1928. -Obstacles remained, enough to dismay any ruler; but they had become -obstacles and were not impassable barriers of cynicism, incomprehension, -and futility. - -The Japanese invasion of 1937 had two immediate effects on the -government. It shattered overnight the structure erected by the Nanking -regime. The work of a decade was undone. On the other hand, the Japanese -threat helped to drive the Communists and Nationalists together and -forced into the national nexus those regional leaders who were -maintaining the last vestiges of separatism. Most consequential of all: -Japan's push--the greatest invasion the Chinese had known since the -1600's--thrust government and people toward each other. Foreign troops -taught inland China what nationalism really meant. - -They taught nationalism not merely with the fury of their guns, or with -the cruelties of their hysterical troops in Nanking. The Japanese -fostered nationalism most strikingly when they drove inland the -protagonists of nationalism. Students, merchants, engineers, soldiers, -administrators, physicians, and scientists of the coast were forced into -the far interior. Villagers to whom the sight of these modern Chinese -was as rare as the sight of a lama in Arkansas now had such refugees -dwelling among them. The effect of forced cultural cross-fertilization -is yet to be seen, but it may prove to be of extraordinary significance. -Chinese able to hold their own with any representative of the Western -world can now be found in the remote valleys and plateaus of the -hinterland--twentieth-century China and timeless China, united in their -hatred of the invaders, and deeply aware of their new national unity, -their desperate need for power. - - -NOTES - -[1] See above, pp. 41 ff. - -[2] See Wu Chih-fang, _Chinese Government and Politics_, pp. 147 ff., -Shanghai, 1934. - -[3] The outline given and the description offered are brief and -generalized because the Japanese invasion will probably lead to -recurrent reorganization of the government. Shih Chao-ying and Chang -Chi-hsien (editors), _The Chinese Year Book_, 1936-1937, have an -excellent series of short descriptions by acknowledged authorities of -the organs of government. Some of these are: Tsui Wei-wu, "Kuomintang," -pp. 223-229; Ray Chang, "Central and Local Administrative Systems," pp. -230-240; Tsiang Ting-fu, "Executive Yüan," pp. 241-246; Hsieh Pao-chao, -"Legislative Yüan," pp. 247-292; Hsieh Kuan-sheng, "Judicial Yüan," pp. -293-336; Chien Chih-shiu, "Control Yüan," pp. 337-347; Chen Ta-chi, -"Examination Yüan," pp. 348-362; and Chu Shih-ming, "Army," pp. 946-955. -This annual, which is written by Chinese in English and edited by -Chinese, is not to be confused with the British _China Year Book_, -1912-; the latter gives a broad outline of Chinese government. - -[4] Kalfred Dip Lum, _Chinese Government_, Shanghai, 1934. The author -was himself a member of this convention; his work, therefore, possesses -unusual interest. - -[5] Tsiang Ting-fu, _loc. cit._ in note 3, pp. 244-245. - -[6] A number of French doctoral dissertations by Chinese students deal -with Chinese local government. Although they are of uneven quality, some -give considerable material not otherwise available in a Western -language. Among these are Chang-Yu-Sing, _L'Autonomie locale en Chine_, -Nancy, 1933; Hsu Han-hao, _L'Administration provinciale en Chine_, -Nancy, 1931; Ku-Yen-Ju, _Le Regime actuel le l'indépendance -decentralisée en Chine_, Nancy, 1931; and Loo Kon-tung, _La Vie -municipale et l'urbanisme en Chine_, Lyon, 1934. Among the most valuable -and informing pictures of hsien government is "Hsien Government and -Functions" by W. H. Ma, _The Chinese Recorder_ (Shanghai), vol. 68, pp. -506-512, 1937. The quotation is from p. 506. The _Information Bulletins_ -published by the Council of International Affairs, Nanking, 1936-1937, -include much material on Chinese politics and government. Especially -interesting are E. C. Tang, _Five Years of the Control Yüan_, Nanking, -1936, and C. L. Hsia, _Background and Features of the Draft Constitution -of China_, Nanking, 1937. - -[7] See "An Account of the Hsien and Banner Council System of -Manchoukuo," _Contemporary Manchuria_ (Dairen), vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 92 -ff., 1938. - -[8] Compare the position of Chiang as Party Leader in China with that -of the _Führer_ in Germany, as described in Fritz Morstein Marx, -_Government in the Third Reich_, 2d ed., pp. 62 ff., New York and -London, 1937. - -[9] See the news reports in _The China Weekly Review_ (Shanghai), vol. -84, pp. 150 ff., 1938. - -[10] See _Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic_, p. 18, New -York, 1934. Edgar Snow's _Red Star Over China_, New York, 1938, is the -best book on the Chinese Communists. P. Miff, _Heroic China_, New York, -1937, is a useful condensed history of Communism in China based on the -material currently available in the Soviet press. Mao Tse-tung, Wang -Ming and others, _China: The March Toward Unity_, New York, 1937, -contains some of Snow's material and also translations of important -speeches and manifestoes regarding the inauguration of a United Front -policy. A considerable amount of Chinese Communist material is to be -found in the magazines _The Voice of China_ (now suspended), Shanghai, -and _China Today_, New York. - -[11] For a description of the nature and organization of the -pro-Japanese Peking regime of 1937-1938 see Andrew W. Canniff, "Japan's -Puppets in China," _Asia_, vol. 38, pp. 151-153, 1938. The new Nanking -regime is described in the _China Weekly Review_ (Shanghai), Apr. 2, -1938. - -[12] Tsui Shu-chin, "The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente upon -Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Tactics," _The Chinese Social and Political -Science Review_ (Peiping), vol. 20, pp. 101 ff., 1936. - -[13] For biographies of Chiang K'ai-shek see Chen Tsung-hsi, Wang -An-tsiang, and Wang I-ting, _General Chiang Kai-shek, the Builder of New -China_, Shanghai, 1929; Gustav Amann, _Chiang Kaishek und die Regierung -der Kuomintang in China_, Berlin and Heidelberg, 1936, which is only -incidentally a biography of Chiang, since its scope is that of providing -nation-wide reportage; Hollington K. Tong, _Chiang Kai-shek_, 2 vols., -Shanghai, 1937; and Robert Berkov, _Strong Man of China_, Boston, 1938. -The Japanese retired Admiral Ishimaru Tota published a sensational life -of Chiang (which appeared in Chinese as _Chiang Chieh-shih Wei-ta_, -Shanghai, 1937); since Mr. Ishimaru's other works have been translated -into English, this one may soon be available for Western readers. - - - - -CONCLUSION - - -Government in China has in the Republican era undergone one of the most -significant transformations to be found anywhere in the world's -political experience. The oldest society on earth found itself forced to -redefine its position and to reconstruct its ways of thought and -internal means of organization. Pressure from without compelled China to -adopt the modern state. Chinese society was required to incorporate this -state and all implied institutions in its routine living. The earlier -period of the Republic marks an epoch in which modern forms had been -established in harmony with the accepted standards of the Western state -system. Chinese society fell into chaos beneath the up-to-date -superstructure. The later period witnessed the correlation of state and -society by coordination of ideological, military, and governmental -power. From the collapse of the Manchu rule in 1911 to the operative -zest of the National Government at Nanking in 1937 there was a -revolution in the processes of government which for completeness can -compare with any century of Western transformation. - - -_The Collapse of the Imperial Society_ - -Western ideology has failed to enter China as a constructive whole, but -it has smashed whatever reality there was to the old world view. -Western-educated Chinese leadership has undertaken the task of governing -a people which has learned only indirectly of the West. In carrying out -a program of adaptation, contemporary Chinese leadership has relied on -Sun Yat-sen's phrase, "modernization without Westernization." But a -dilemma remains. How can the standards of the modern world be divorced -from their Western origins? How can Western technology be used without -the attitude of mind which has created it and brought it to operative -efficiency? How can a world which never knew Rome or the Normanic _Curia -Regis_ know jurisprudence? How can modern government be made Chinese, -when government itself has meant something far different in China from -what it has meant in the West? - -Further, the nature of Chinese leadership has not only been transformed -from being literary and ethical in its orientation to being technical -and legal; it has also been transformed socially in the replacement of -scholars by soldiers. The ideal ruler of old was a humane classicist -with a taste for historical studies; the contemporary Chinese ruler must -be military, if not militaristic, and must have the inevitable -background of engineering and management which modern war connotes. The -soldier must collaborate with the modern administrator, while both -recapture the high ideals of devotion typical of the old scholastic -rule, even if they cannot use its substance. These imperatives are -indispensable if China is to live. - -Finally, the language system which did so much to create and then -perpetuate the scholastic elite through thousands of years of Chinese -culture has now submitted to changes deeper and more far-reaching than -any in the past. The development of the _pai-hua_ school of literature -and the progress of mass education indicate that even with ideographs -the Chinese can reach conditions of uniform literacy approximating those -which prevail in the advanced Western nations. If the alphabetization of -the Chinese language, which is now in the form of tentative experiment, -should become a fact, even more striking developments could take place. -Reading and writing, and on this basis the transmission of authoritative -tenets, does not presuppose profound economic adjustments. The modern -Chinese will know his classics increasingly through paraphrases no more -difficult than a newspaper column. When it is realized that the -simplification of intellectual activity is offered to a people schooled -in the idolatry of books, the potentialities of educational and -intellectual renaissance--already partially realized--become apparent. - -With the disappearance of the imperial world society of the Confucians -as a consequence of its encirclement by Westernized states, with the -passing of the scholars and the rise of Western-trained soldiers, -lawyers, and technicians, and with the alteration of the linguistic and -intellectual foundation upon which the old society rested, what is there -left of old China? - - -_The Nature of the Transformation_ - -In the first place, the ideological change is not complete. No Western -idea can enter China unimpaired. Sun Yat-sen was influenced by the -almost entirely contradictory notions of Western nationalism, democracy, -and socialism. In the _San Min Chu I_ their Western identity was -destroyed, and the new doctrines had much in common with the past. -Western ideas served largely as a mold; when the mold was removed, the -form was Western but the content was still Chinese. Mazzini and -Confucius might both approve of Sun's political doctrines. - -Secondly, the extrapolitical agencies of Chinese life remain. Chinese -society may be shattered in dogma, but it persists in fact. The family, -though subject to legal redefinition caused by Western cultural and -economic influences, nevertheless plays a role far greater than in the -West. The village is still the fundamental grouping among the rural -masses. The guild system is impaired by the Western impact, but the -party organizations--Nationalist and Communist--have absorbed much of -the strength which once lay in the _hui_. Under foreign domination, -these institutions may play a determining role in the struggle against -the intruder. - -Thirdly, for modern government the Chinese have resources of their own -experience on which to rely. But they also have Western devices and -prescriptions. The National Government, while falling short of Western -levels of government efficiency, nevertheless trained large numbers of -Chinese to think in terms of the modern state. But no new pattern has as -yet crystallized. Chinese political and military development may well -present a flexibility beyond Western grasp. - -Fourth, the Chinese have still ahead of them the choice of criteria of -authority to prevail in society. Learning, office, property played a -decisive part in the old society. Hitherto, the Republic has grown with -three modes of power: ideological, military, governmental. The relation -between them is not yet determined. - - -_The Problems of Government in China_ - -Among the governmental problems confronting China the acquisition of -national territorial sovereignty stands out. Ever since the -establishment of the Republic the Chinese have grown acutely conscious -of the fact that some of their most important economic centers have been -lifted out of the national territory. Sun Yat-sen realized in the -frustration of his first efforts toward republicanization and social -policy that the problems of internal government could not be settled -unless the people as a whole were free. Without general freedom there -could be no question of democracy, no question of a coordinated plan for -the realization of the _min shêng_ principle.[1] Observing the intimate -relation between the _tuchüns_ and the foreign interests, which often -favored them, Sun and his followers began to stress their nationalist -role. With the Japanese invasion of the Northeast in 1931, of Shanghai -in 1932, of Inner Mongolia and North China in the following years, and -of China as a whole in 1937, the issue of territorial sovereignty has -become the most important one of all. Until it is settled, all other -questions must necessarily be considered in their relation to it. - -Second, the question of economic sustenance and development is becoming -pressing. Without an adequate economic base, the Chinese population -lives under the constant threat of simply starving to death. Military -difficulties emphasize this problem; in fact, military effectiveness and -strategy will have to depend upon the physical existence of the people -in and behind the lines. The Chinese masses have lived close to the edge -of starvation for a long time. As a consequence, the Chinese cannot wage -war but in close proximity to the point of economic paralysis--plain -exhaustion of the physical necessities of life. The economic problem -cannot wait for spontaneous self-cure. - -Third, the Chinese will have to recognize the need for politicalization -of public opinion. They must evolve the faculty of transforming group -opinion into governmental or organizational action. They must acquire -techniques for group collaboration which will allow them to break down -traditional groups into more diversified units--a government commission, -a factory workshop, an army unit--without reference to family bonds or -village and _hui_ connections. This is less a problem of doctrine or -education than one of habit and practice. - -Fourth, the restoration of national prestige is necessary to the -security of the Chinese nation in the international sphere, and to the -wholesome development of the Chinese people within their national -boundaries as well. They cannot effectively borrow from the West if they -do so reluctantly, overcome by the thought of inferiority or by shame. -Unless they conquer their present handicap, the Chinese will continue to -lack self-confidence. - -Fifth, the army problem must be solved. In the last analysis, the excess -of men under arms damages the Chinese military, as the number of -well-equipped effectives remains disproportionately small. The hordes of -half-armed soldiers constitute a heavy burden upon the society, reduce -the general economic level, and--by affording one particular group a -disproportionate opportunity for making its preferences felt--brutalize -the operation of public opinion and discourage peaceable group pursuit. - -Sixth, the Chinese state--if China is to solve political questions -through governmental procedures--must be constituted as a clear and -legal entity. The old imperial society of China was able to dispense -with law through reliance upon social forces expressing themselves in a -large number of small but stable units. If these disappear the question -arises: How can the individual conceive clearly his relationships within -Chinese society? Systematized modern organization requires a legal -framework. - - -_The Question of Chinese Political Survival_ - -That the Chinese will survive, biologically, as a race--this no one -doubts. That the Chinese will survive culturally is more open to -question. The Chinese absorbed all their conquerors of the past because -the country was large, because the people were extraordinarily -homogeneous in ideology and habit, because the Chinese were wealthier -than their conquerors and more cultured. Absorption or cultural -extinction is not a matter of race; it is a question of ideology, of -thought and the habits which arise from ways of thought. What ways of -thought are there today that will absorb the conquerors? What ways of -thought are there that the conquerors might tear apart from the long -past, to change China into a mere geographical expression? - -In the past, China has been conquered by invaders who accepted the -Chinese estimate of China, and who reciprocated the Chinese self-esteem -with a deep admiration for Chinese culture. China's modern invaders -bring with them a veritable cult of national self-aggrandizement. Their -fondness for the Chinese past is mixed with contempt for modern China. -Will the Chinese preserve their national equanimity and sanity in the -face of such an attitude? Much depends upon their military and political -fortune and its effect upon their confidence. - -Government in the Republican era demonstrates the fertility and -inventiveness of the Chinese mind in building political and -administrative institutions and in finding means of uniting and -controlling the Chinese as a people. When the chaos from which they have -been emerging is considered, their recent accomplishments are an -attestation of political ability. The National Government and the -Chinese Soviet Republic were worthy adversaries; each met disastrous -odds, not the least of which was the other. Their governmental forms may -be destroyed and yet reappear so long as the Chinese remain Chinese in -the sense of their long past. Sun Yat-sen expressed his countrymen's -elementary social and national consciousness, so different from the -feverish nationalism of the West, in very clear language: - - Suppose that we, Chinese, were naturalized English or Americans and - helped England or America to conquer China on the principle that we - accept cosmopolitanism, would our consciences, I ask you, be at rest - or not? If our consciences troubled us, that would be a sign that we - have nationalism; nationalism would trouble our consciences.[2] - -Such nationalism may prove indestructible. With democracy and _min -shêng_ as nationalism's corollaries, China promises to contribute a gift -of peace and political intelligence to the world, and may yet return to -her ancient role as the pacific preceptress of nations. - - -NOTES - -[1] See above, pp. 41 ff. - -[2] Paschal M. d'Elia, S. J., _The Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen_, -p. 132, Wuchang, 1931. - - - - -CHRONOLOGY OF DYNASTIES - - -This is the accepted time scheme in China. The dates are the Western -equivalents of the most widely current Chinese computation, which is -known to be incorrect or haphazard from the eighth century B.C. back. -The periods given for the dynasties are chronological formulas rather -than the exact expression of political realities. For a discussion of -the materials of Chinese historiography, see Charles S. Gardner, -_Chinese Traditional Historiography_, Cambridge, 1938. For an excellent -short summary of Chinese history, see the "Historical Sketch" by Lei -Hai-tsung in _The Chinese Year Book_, 1936-1937, Shanghai. Chronologies -are to be found in the major Chinese-English dictionaries, and--among -many others--in Leon Wieger, S. J., _La Chine à travers les âges_, -Hsien-hsien, 1920, where they are accompanied by a great deal of the -old-style, uncritical, but nevertheless informative, Chinese -scholarship. - - HSIA ended 1765 (?)B.C. } prehistoric - SHANG 1765(?)-1123 (?)B.C. } or - CHOU 1122(?)-256 B.C. } semihistoric - _Ch'un Ch'in_ (Spring and - Autumn Epoch) 770-473 B.C. - _Chan Kuo_ (Warring States - Epoch) 473-221 B.C. - CH'IN 221-203 B.C. - EARLY HAN (including Wang Mang) 202 B.C.-A.D. 25 - LATER HAN A.D. 25-220 - SAN KUO (Three Kingdoms) A.D. 221-264 } - CHIN A.D. 265-419 } China's - NAN PEI CH'AO (Northern } "dark ages" - and Southern Dynasties) A.D. 420-588 } - SUI A.D. 589-619 - T'ANG A.D. 620-906 - WU TAI (Five Dynasties) A.D. 907-960 - SUNG A.D. 960-1279 - YÜAN (the Mongols) A.D. 1280-1367 - MING A.D. 1368-1643 - CH'ING (the Manchus) A.D. 1644-1911 - MIN KUO (The Republic) 1912- - - - - -INDEX - - - A - - Administration (_see_ Hsien; Scholastic bureaucracy; and _Yüan_ - system) - - Agrarian problems, 115ff. - - Aircraft, military, 108ff. - - Anfu party, after 1916, 47, 157 - - Armies, under the Han, 83ff.; - Manchu period, 86ff.; - Nationalist, 105ff.; - national, 110ff.; - _tuchünal_, 104ff. - - - B - - Barga Mongol Soviet Republic, 185 - - Borodin, Michael, 53, 162 - - Boxer uprising, 95, 117 - - Buddhism, 24, 131 - - - C - - Canton governments (established by Sun in opposition to the Peking - Republic), 156ff., 160ff. - - Canton-Moscow entente (_see_ Nationalist-Communist coalition) - - Capitalism, 46, 69 - - Chan Kuo epoch, 473-221 B.C., 15ff., 82 - - Chang Chung-chang, the Dog-Meat General, 103 - - Chang Hsüeh-liang, 1898- (ex-_tuchün_ of Manchuria, son of - Chang Tso-lin), 108 - - Chang Hsün (monarchist _tuchün_), 156 - - Chang Tso-lin, 1876-1928 (_tuchün_ of Manchuria), 103ff., 158, 168 - - Charioteers (Chou period), 80ff. - - Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 1879- (excommunicated Communist leader), 65 - - Chiang K'ai-shek [Chiang Chieh-shih], 1888- (military heir - to Sun Yat-sen; educated in Japan, further trained by Russians, - advised by Germans; leading general in China after 1927, and - outstanding figure in the National Government), 52, 105ff., 122, - 164, 182 - - Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, 259-210 B.C. (king of Ch'in, legalist, despot, - unifier, conquered all China by 221 B.C.), 80ff., 128ff. - - Chinese Soviet Republic (established in Kiangsi, 1931; merged with - National Government, 1937), 66, 182ff. - - Ch'ing dynasty (_see_ Manchu dynasty) - - Chinputang (Progressive Party), 151 - - Chou, Duke of (died 1105 B.C.[?]; semi-historic state founder), 127 - - Chou dynasty, 1122(?)-256 B.C., 14ff., 80ff., 127ff. - - Christianity, 48ff. - - Chu Hsi, 1130-1200 (Sung philosopher; interpreter of Confucianism), 16 - - Ch'un Ch'iu epoch, 770-473 B.C., 15, 81, 128 - - Communism, 51ff., 63ff., 72ff., 182ff. - - Communist Party, 54ff., 68, 182ff. - - Concessions, foreign, 140 - - Confucius [K'ung Ch'iu], 551-479 B.C. (China's most important - philosopher, spent his life teaching, with intervals of practical - administration), 15ff., 128 - - Constitutions: Constitution of 1923, 158; - Constitutional Compact, 1914, 153; - Draft Constitution, 1937, 181; - Nanking Organic Law, 1928, 172; - Nanking Provisional Constitution, 1931, 172; - Provisional Constitution of 1912, 148ff. - - Council of State (_see_ Yüan system) - - Customs, Maritime, 159 - - - D - - Democracy (_see_ San Min Chu I) - - Double Ten Day, 145 - - - E - - Emperor, in old China, 18ff., 130ff. - - Empress Dowager Tzu[)u] Hsi [Yeho-nola], 1835-1908 (actual ruler of - China in the latter days of the Ch'ing), 141 - - Extraterritoriality, 140 - - - F - - Family system, 3, 136ff. - - Federal Revolutionary Government, 1932-1933 (Foochow), 184ff. - - Fêng Yü-hsiang, 1880- (the Christian general, - later pro-Soviet, joined the Nationalists, revolted in 1930, took - part in anti-Japanese agitation), 103ff. - - Feudalism, 80ff. - - Foreign Office, 139, 159 - - - G - - Genyosha (ultra-patriotic Japanese group), 71 - - George, Henry, 118 - - Goodnow, Professor Frank, 154 - - Gordon, Charles George, 1833-1885 (British commander of the - Ever-Victorious Army), 93 - - - H - - Han dynasty, 202 B.C.-A.D. 220, 82ff., 116, 129 - - Han Lin (Imperial Academy), 130, 177 - - Hsia dynasty, 2205(?)-1765(?) B.C., 13 - - _Hsien_ (district) system, 178ff. - - Hsüan T'ung (last Manchu emperor of China; abdicated in his boyhood; - now Kang Têh, Emperor of Manchoukuo), 156, 186 - - Hu Han-min, 1886-1937 (leader, Right Kuomintang), 59 - - Hu Shih, 1891- (philosopher, literary critic, language reformer), 76 - - Huang Hsing (early military leader of Republicans), 96 - - _Hui_ (guild, league) system, 3, 136ff. - - Hundred Days, the (see Reform Movement) - - - I - - Ideology (see San Min Chu I) - - Imperialism, 119ff. - - Islam, 24ff., 94 - - Islamistan, 184 - - - J - - Japanese-Chinese conflict, 34, 69ff., 74, 122ff., 154, 188ff. - - "Japanese Monroe Doctrine," 70 - - Joffe, Adolf (Soviet agent in China), 51ff., 161ff. - - - K - - K'ang Yu-wei, 1856-1928 (monarchical reformer), 140 - - Kuang Hsü, Emperor, 1871-1908 (modernist and reformer), 95, 140ff. - - Kublai Khan, 1214-1294 (emperor, Yüan dynasty), 88 - - K'ung, H. H. [K'ung Hsiang-hsi], 1881- (industrial and financial - administrator; Kuomintang leader), 60 - - Kuomintang, 31ff., 38ff., 50ff., 57ff., 72ff., 161ff., 167ff. - - - L - - Lao Tz[)u], traditionally 6th century B.C. (founder of Taoism, - mystical philosophy antistate in effect), 24, 128 - - Li Hung-chang, 1822-1901 (Ch'ing viceroy), 92, 142 - - Li Yüan-hung (military opportunist; once President), 146, 155 - - Linebarger, Judge Paul (adviser to Sun Yat-sen), 161 - - Local government (_see_ Hsien) - - - M - - Manchoukuo, 28, 72, 185ff. - - Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty, 1644-1911, 32, 86ff., 135ff. - - Mandarins (_see_ Scholastic bureaucracy) - - Marxism (_see_ Communism) - - Mêngkokuo, 185 - - Militarism (_see_ Armies; _Tuchünism_) - - _Min shêng_ (_see_ San Min Chu I) - - Ming dynasty, A.D. 1368-1643, 17, 85 - - Missionaries (_see_ Christianity) - - Mohammedanism (_see_ Islam) - - Municipal government, 181 - - - N - - Nanking government (_see_ National Government of China; "Reformed - Government") - - National Government of China (Nanking, 1927-1937; inland thereafter), - 114, 164, 167ff. - - Nationalism (_see_ San Min Chu I) - - Nationalist-Communist coalition 1923-1927, 54ff., 161ff. - - Nationalist Government at Nanking (_see_ National Government of - China) - - "Nationalist Government" of Peking, 1930-1931 (rebellious coalition of - Northern tuchüns and Left Kuomintang; suppressed), 59, 107 - - Nationalist Government, soviet in form (Canton, 1925-1926; Wu-han, - 1926-1927), 162ff. - - Nationalists (_see_ Kuomintang) - - New Life movement, 61 - - - O - - Opportunist movements, 44ff. - - Outer Mongol People's Republic, 185ff. - - Overseas Chinese, 35ff. - - - P - - Pan-Asianism, 47, 70ff. - - Pan-Mongolism, 47 - - Parliamentary Republic at Peking, 1912-1928, 114ff., 149ff., 157ff. - - Party Congress, Kuomintang, 170ff. - - Political doctrines, Sun Yat-sen's, 41ff. - - Pro-Japanese movements, 47 - - Propaganda, 23ff. - - Provincial government, 134, 177ff. - - "Provisional Government" at Peking, 1937- , 186 - - Provisional Government of the United Provinces of China, Nanking, - 1911-1912, 146 - - - R - - Red Army, Chinese, 107, 182ff. - - Reform Movement, Manchu, 140ff. - - "Reformed Government" at Nanking, 1938- , 186 - - Republicans (_see_ Kuomintang) - - Revolution, doctrine of, 59, 162; - of 1911-1912 [the Republican Revolution], 38, 97ff., 145ff.; - of 1926-1927 [the Great Revolution], 55, 105ff., 168 - - Revolutionists (_see_ Kuomintang) - - - S - - Salt Revenue Administration, 159ff. - - San Min Chu I (the philosophy of Sun Yat-sen, since 1927 the official - state dogma of China), 36, 41ff., 59ff., 72ff., 120, 167ff. - - Scholastic bureaucracy, 5, 86, 129ff., 188 - - Settlements, foreign, 140 - - Shang dynasty, 1765(?)-1123(?) B.C., 14, 80, 126 - - Shih Huang Ti (_see_ Ch'in Shih Huang Ti) - - Siam, 69 - - Sian, kidnaping of Chiang K'ai-shek at, 62, 66ff. - - Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, 34 - - Soong, T. V. [Sung Tz[)u]-wen], 1894- (brother-in-law of Sun - Yat-sen; Kuomintang leader; finance administrator), 59ff., 121 - - Soviet Republic, Chinese (_see_ Chinese Soviet Republic) - - Soviet Russia (_see_ Nationalist-Communist coalition) - - Sun K'ê [Sun Fo], 1891- (son of Sun Yat-sen; Kuomintang - leader; railway administrator), 59ff. - - Sun Yat-sen [Sun I-hsien; Sun Wên], 1867(?)-1925 (agitated for a - republic; first President, 1912; author of the San Min Chu I; elected - Leader, Tsung-li, of the Kuomintang; known after death as Chung Shan), - 31ff. - - Sun Yat-sen, Mme., 59 - - Sung Chiao-jen, Nationalist, 152 - - Sung dynasty, A.D. 960-1279, 1, 16 - - - T - - Taikwa reforms, 645 A.D., 132 - - T'ai-p'ing rebellion, 1849-1865 (Christian agrarian jacquerie), 32ff., - 117 - - T'ang dynasty, A.D. 620-906, 1, 85, 132ff. - - Tannu-Tuva People's Republic, 185 - - Taoism (_see_ Lao Tz[)u]) - - Toa-shugi [Far-Easternism], 71 - - Treaties, with Western states, 48, 139ff. - - Treaty ports, 140 - - Tsao Kun (Northern tuchün), 103 - - Tsêng Kuo-fan, 1811-1872 (Ch'ing viceroy), 82 - - Tuan Chi-jui (Northern _tuchün_; once President), 103 - - _Tuchünism_, 45ff., 76ff., 107ff., 114ff., 157 - - Tungpei troops (Chinese soldiers exiled from Manchuria), 67 - - - U - - United Front policy, 1937- , 60, 67ff., 72ff., 184 - - - V - - Village system, 3, 136ff. - - - W - - Wang Ch'ing-wei, 1885- (leader, Left Kuomintang), 59 - - Wang Mang, 33 B.C.-A.D. 23 (Utopian who usurped the throne, dividing - early and later Han), 17 - - War, in Chinese thought, 79 - - War lord (_see Tuchünism_) - - Ward, Frederick Townsend, 1831-1862 (American adventurer in Manchu - service), 93 - - Whampoa Military Academy, 105 - - Wu Chih-hui, 1864- (Kuomintang leader with anarchist leanings), 59 - - Wu P'ei-fu (_tuchün_ of the Yangtze valley), 28, 103ff. - - Wu-han regime (_see_ Nationalist Government, soviet in form) - - - Y - - Yellow Turbans, 3rd century A.D. (farmer rebels), 63 - - Yen Hsi-shan, 1881- (the "Model Governor"; Northern _tuchün_ who - joined the Nationalists, revolted in 1930, subsequently retired), 103 - - Yen, Dr. James [Yen Yang-chu], 1894- (mass-education leader), 76 - - Yüan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (administrator, soldier, politician; served - the Manchus, leading in army modernization; became President, - attempted usurpation, failed, and died), 38, 44, 94ff., 146ff. - - _Yüan_ system (five-fold division of powers), 172ff. - - - - -Transcriber's Notes: Obvious errors in spelling have been silently -corrected. Also 'u' with breve is represented as [)u] in this text. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Government in Republican China, by -Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GOVERNMENT IN REPUBLICAN CHINA *** - -***** This file should be named 40350-8.txt or 40350-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/0/3/5/40350/ - -Produced by Adam Buchbinder and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at -http://gutenberg.org/license). - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at -http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at -809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email -business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact -information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official -page at http://pglaf.org - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit http://pglaf.org - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - http://www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |