diff options
Diffstat (limited to '40305-8.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | 40305-8.txt | 8793 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 8793 deletions
diff --git a/40305-8.txt b/40305-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 6853d20..0000000 --- a/40305-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8793 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook, Problems of the Pacific, by Frank Fox - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - - - - - -Title: Problems of the Pacific - - -Author: Frank Fox - - - -Release Date: July 23, 2012 [eBook #40305] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - - -***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC*** - - -E-text prepared by Bruce Albrecht, Colin M. Kendall, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) - - - -Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this - file which includes the original map. - See 40305-h.htm or 40305-h.zip: - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/40305/40305-h/40305-h.htm) - or - (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/40305/40305-h.zip) - - - - - -PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC - -by - -FRANK FOX - -Author of "Ramparts of Empire" - - - - - - - -London -Williams & Norgate -14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden -1912 - - - - -CONTENTS - - -CHAP. PAGE - - 1. THE OCEAN OF THE FUTURE 1 - - 2. RUSSIA IN THE PACIFIC 16 - - 3. THE RISE OF JAPAN 31 - - 4. CHINA AND THE TEEMING MILLIONS OF ASIA 47 - - 5. THE UNITED STATES--AN IMPERIAL POWER 66 - - 6. GREAT BRITAIN'S ENTRY INTO THE PACIFIC 85 - - 7. THE BRITISH CONTINENT IN THE PACIFIC 100 - - 8. NEW ZEALAND AND THE SMALLER BRITISH PACIFIC COLONIES 120 - - 9. THE NATIVE RACES 136 - - 10. LATIN AMERICA 147 - - 11. CANADA AND THE PACIFIC 165 - - 12. THE NAVIES OF THE PACIFIC 176 - - 13. THE ARMIES OF THE PACIFIC 186 - - 14. TREATIES IN THE PACIFIC 199 - - 15. THE PANAMA CANAL 216 - - 16. THE INDUSTRIAL POSITION IN THE PACIFIC 228 - - 17. SOME STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 245 - - 18. THE RIVALS 263 - -[Illustration] - - - - -PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE OCEAN OF THE FUTURE - - -The Pacific is the ocean of the future. As civilisation grows and -distances dwindle, man demands a larger and yet larger stage for the -fighting-out of the ambitions of races. The Mediterranean sufficed for -the settlement of the issues between the Turks and the Christians, -between the Romans and the Carthaginians, between the Greeks and the -Persians, and who knows what other remote and unrecorded struggles of -the older peoples of its littoral. Then the world became too great to be -kept in by the Pillars of Hercules, and Fleets--in the service alike of -peace and war--ranged over the Atlantic. The Mediterranean lost its -paramount importance, and dominance of the Atlantic became the test of -world supremacy. - -Now greater issues and greater peoples demand an even greater stage. On -the bosom of the Pacific will be decided, in peace or in war, the next -great struggle of civilisation, which will give as its prize the -supremacy of the world. Shall it go to the White Race or the Yellow -Race? If to the White Race, will it be under the British Flag, or the -flag of the United States, or of some other nation? That is the problem -of the Pacific. - -Since Cortes first looked on the waters of the ocean from a peak in -Darien, since Balboa of Castile waded into its waters and claimed them -for the dominion of the King of Castile, events have rushed forward with -bewildering haste to transfer the centre of the world's interest to the -Pacific. Cortes in his day looked to a North Pacific coast inhabited by -a few wandering Indians. (The powerful national organisation of Mexico -had not extended its influence as far as the Pacific coast.) Now there -stretch along that coast the Latin-American Power of Mexico, doomed, -probably, to be absorbed before the great issue of Pacific dominance is -decided, but having proved under Diaz some capacity for organisation; -the gigantic Power of the United States with the greatest resources of -wealth and material force ever possessed by a single nation of the -world; and the sturdy young Power of Canada. - -To the South, Cortes looked to a collection of Indian States, of which -Peru was the chief, boasting a gracious but unwarlike civilisation, -doomed to utter destruction at the hands of Spain. Now that stretch of -Pacific littoral is held by a group of Latin-American nations, the -possibilities of which it is difficult accurately to forecast, but which -are in some measure formidable if Chili is accepted as a standard by -which to judge, though, on the whole, they have shown so far but little -capacity for effective national organisation. - -Looking westward, Cortes in his day could see nothing but darkness. It -was surmised rather than known that there lay the Indies, the kingdoms -of the Cham of Tartary and the great Mogul, lands which showed on the -horizon of the imagination, half real, half like the fantasy of a -mirage. To-day the west coast of the Pacific is held by the European -Power of Russia; by the aspiring Asiatic Power of Japan, which within -half a century has forgotten the use of the bow and the fan in warfare -and hammered its way with modern weapons into the circle of the world's -great Powers; by China, stirring uneasily and grasping at the same -weapons which won greatness for Japan; by a far-flung advance guard of -the great Power of the United States in the Philippines, won -accidentally, held grimly; by England's lonely outposts, Australia and -New Zealand, where less than five millions of the British race hold a -territory almost as large as Europe. - -Sprinkled over the surface of the ocean, between East and West, are -various fortresses or trading stations, defending interests or arousing -cupidities. Germany and France are represented. The United States holds -Hawaii, the key to the Pacific coast of North America, either for -offence or defence. Great Britain has Fiji and various islets. The -Japanese Power stretches down towards the Philippines with the recent -acquisition of Formosa. - -Here are seen all the great actors in European rivalry. Added to them -are the new actors in world-politics, who represent the antagonism of -the Yellow Race to the White Race. Before all is dangled the greatest -temptation to ambition and cupidity. Who is master of the Pacific, who -has the control of its trade, the industrial leadership of its peoples, -the disposal of its warrior forces, will be master of the world. - -It is a problem not only of navies and armies (though with our present -defective civilisation these are the most important factors): it is a -problem also of populations and their growth, of industries, of the -development of natural resources, of trade and commerce. The Pacific -littoral is in part unpeopled, in part undeveloped, unorganised, -unappropriated. Its Asiatic portion must change, it is changing, from a -position which may be compared with that of Japan fifty years ago to a -position such as Japan's to-day. Its American and Australian portion -must develop power and wealth surpassing that of Europe. Under whose -leadership will the change be made? To discuss that question is the -purpose of this book: and at the outset the lines on which the -discussion will proceed and the conclusions which seem to be inevitable -may be foreshadowed. - -At one time Russia seemed destined to the hegemony of the Pacific. Yet -she was brought to the Pacific coast by accident rather than by design. -Her natural destiny was westward and southward rather than eastward, -though it was natural that she should slowly permeate the Siberian -region. As far back as the reign of Ivan the Terrible (the Elizabethan -epoch in Anglo-Saxon history), the curious celibate military -organisation of the Cossacks had won much of Siberia for the Czars. But -there was no dream then, nor at a very much later period, of penetration -to the Pacific. - -European jealousy of Russia, a jealousy which is explainable only with -the reflection that vast size naturally fills with awe the human mind, -stopped her advance towards the Mediterranean. In the north her ports -were useless in winter. In the south she was refused a development of -her territory which was to her mind natural and just. Thus thwarted, -Russia groped in a blind way from the Siberian provinces which had been -won by the Cossacks towards a warm-water port in Asia. At first the -movement was southward and filled England with alarm as to the fate of -India. Then it turned eastward, and in Manchuria and Corea this European -Power seemed to find its destiny. But Japan was able to impose an -effective check upon Russian ambitions in the Far East. At the present -moment Russia has been supplanted in control of the Asiatic seaboard by -Japan. - -Japan has everything but money to equip her for a bold bid for the -mastery of the Pacific before the completion of the Panama Canal. Europe -has taught to Japan, in addition to the material arts of warfare, a -cynical faith in the moral value, indeed, the necessity, of war to -national welfare. She considers that respect is only to be gained by -war: that war with a European nation is an enterprise of small risk: -that in short her experience with the Russian Fleet was fairly typical -of war with any European Power. She believes that she has the most -thoroughly efficient army and navy, considering their size, in the -world; and has much to justify the belief. - -This ambition and the warlike confidence of Japan constitute to-day a -more important factor in the problem of the Pacific than her actual -fighting strength. But the check to prompt decisive action on her part -is that of poverty. Japan is very poor. The last war, in spite of great -gain of prestige, brought no gain of money. Its cost bled her veins -white, and there was no subsequent transfusion in the shape of a Russian -indemnity. Nor are the natural resources of Japan such as to hold out -much hope of a quick industrial prosperity. She has few minerals. Her -soil is in the bulk wretchedly poor. From the territories control of -which she has won in battle--Manchuria and Corea--she will reap some -advantage by steadily ignoring the "open door" obligation in trade, and -by dispossessing the native peasantry. But it cannot be very great. -There is no vast natural wealth to be exploited. The native peasantry -can be despoiled and evicted, but the booty is trifling and the cost of -the process not inconsiderable since even the Corean will shoot from his -last ditch. - -Japan is now seeking desperately a material prosperity by industrial -expansion. A tariff and bounty system, the most rigid and scientific the -world knows, aims to make the country a great textile-weaving, -ship-building, iron-making country. The smallest scrap of an industry is -sedulously nurtured, and Japanese matches, Japanese soap, Japanese beer, -penetrate to the markets of the outer world as evidence of the ambition -of the people to be manufacturers. But when one explores down to -bedrock, the only real bases for industrial prosperity in Japan are a -supply of rather poor coal and a great volume of cheap labour. The -second is of some value in cheap production, but it is yet to be found -possible to build up national prosperity on the sole basis of cheap -labour. Further, with the growth of modernity in Japan, there is -naturally a labour movement. Doctrines of Socialism are finding -followers: strikes are heard of occasionally. The Japanese artisan and -coolie may not be content to slave unceasingly on wages which deny life -all comfort, to help a method of national aggrandisement the purport of -which they can hardly understand. - -The position of Japan in the Pacific has to be considered, therefore, in -the light of the future rather than of the present. At the time of the -conclusion of the war with Russia it seemed supreme. Since then it has -steadily deteriorated. If she had succeeded in the realisation of her -ambition to undertake the direction of China's military and industrial -reorganisation, the Japanese Power would have been firmly established -for some generations at least. But the defects in her national character -prevented that. Inspiring no confidence among the Chinese, the Japanese -found all attempts at peaceful assumption of a controlling influence in -China checked by sullen antipathy; and a forced assumption would not -have been tolerated by Europe. It will not be found possible, on a full -survey of the facts, to credit Japan with the power to hold a supreme -place in the Pacific. She is, even now, among the dwindling Powers. - -China, on the other hand, has the possibilities of a mighty future. -To-day she is in the throes of nation-birth. To-morrow she may unbind -her feet and prepare to join in the race for supremacy. The bringing of -China into the current of modern life will not be an easy task, but it -is clearly not an impossible one. Before the outbreak of the present -Revolution (which may place China among the democratic Republics of the -world), the people of the Celestial Empire had begun to reconsider -seriously their old attitude of intolerance towards European -civilisation. To understand fully the position of China it is necessary -to keep in mind the fact that the actual Chinese nation, some -400,000,000 of people, enervated as were the Peruvians of South America, -by a system of theocratic and pacific Socialism, were subjected about -250 years ago to the sovereignty of the Manchus, a warrior race from the -Steppes. Since then the Manchus have governed China, tyrannously, -incompetently, on the strength of a tradition of military superiority -stronger far than the _Raj_ by which the British have held India. But -the Manchus--in numbers and in intellect far inferior to the -Chinese--forgot in time their military enterprise and skill. The -tradition of it, however, remained until the events of the nineteenth -and twentieth centuries showed that the Manchu military power was -contemptible not only against the white foreigner, but also against the -Japanese _parvenu_. Patient China, finding her tyrant to be a weak -despot, revolts now, not only against the Manchu dynasty, but also -against the Conservatism which has kept her from emulating Japan's -success in the world. - -At present the power of China in the Pacific is negligible. In the -future it may be the greatest single force in that ocean. Almost -certainly it may be reckoned to take the place of Japan as the chief -Asiatic factor. - -Japan and China having been considered, the rest of Asia is negligible -as affecting the destiny of the Pacific except in so far as India can -serve as basis of action for British power. An independent Indian nation -is hardly one of the possibilities of the future. Religious, racial, and -caste distinctions make a united, independent India at present -impossible. Unless the British Power carries too far a tendency to -conciliate the talking tribes of the Hindoo peninsula at the expense of -the fighting tribes, it should hold India by right of a system of -government which is good though not perfect, and by reason of the -impossibility of suggesting any substitute. In the event of a failure of -the British Power, India would still, in all probability, fail to take a -place among the great nations of the earth. Either she would fall a -victim to some other nation or relapse into the condition, near to -anarchy, which was hers before the coming of the Europeans. - -It is not possible to imagine to-day any European Power other than Great -Britain--with the possible exception of Russia--becoming strongly -established in the Pacific. France and Germany have footholds certainly. -But in neither case is the territory held by them possible of great -development, and in neither case is there a chain of strategic stations -to connect the Pacific colony with the Mother Country. The despatch of -the German "mailed fist" to Kiao-Chou in China some years ago is still -remembered as one of the comic rather than the serious episodes of -history. The squadron bearing to the Chinese the martial threat of the -German Emperor had to beg its way from one British coaling station to -another because of the lack of German ports. - -The influence of South America in the Pacific need not yet be -calculated. It is a possible far-future factor in the problem; and the -completion of Trans-Andine railways may quickly enhance the importance -of Chili and Peru. But for the present South America can take no great -part in the Pacific struggle. - -It is when British influence and American influence in the Pacific come -to be considered that the most important factors in the contest for its -supremacy enter upon the stage. Let us consider, for the nonce, the two -Powers separately. - -The British Empire--holding Australia and New Zealand with an audacious -but thin garrison; having a long chain of strategic stations such as -Hong Kong and Singapore; having in India a powerful rear base for -supplies; holding a great part of the North-West Coast of America with a -population as yet scanty but beginning to develop on the same lines as -the Australasian people--is clearly well situated to win and to hold the -mastery of the Pacific. Such mastery would have to be inspired with -peaceful ideals; it could not survive as an aggressive force. It is -indeed the main strength of the British position in the Pacific that it -is naturally anxious, not for a disturbance but for a preservation of -the present state of things, which gives to the British Empire all that -a reasonable ambition could require. It is wise and easy to be peaceable -when one has all the best of the spoils. - -For a secure British mastery of the Pacific, India would need to be held -with the military assistance of South Africa and Australia, and made a -great naval base; Australia and New Zealand would need to be populated -seriously; Canada would need to be guarded against absorption by the -United States and its new population kept as far as possible to the -British type; the friendship and co-operation of the United States would -need to be sought. - -Turning next to the United States it will be recognised that she has in -a realised form all the force and wealth possible to an organised China -or a fully developed Australia. She has one hundred million people, who -have reached the highest stage of civilised organisation. Their material -wealth--and wealth counts for much in modern war--is almost -incalculable. Their national ambition has never been checked by defeat. -Lately it has been fed with foreign war and territorial conquest and it -has found the taste good. The American people face the future possessed -of all the material for a policy of aggressive Imperialism and with a -splendidly youthful faith in their own good motives, a faith which can -justify an action better than any degree of cynicism. There is as much -of the "old Adam" in them as in the peoples of any of the "effete -monarchies," and many circumstances seem to point to them as anxious to -take the lead among the White Races in the future. - -As regards the Pacific, American ambition is clear. The United States -holds the Philippines at great expense of treasure and blood. She is -fortifying Honolulu, with the idea of making it a naval base "stronger -than Gibraltar."[1] She is cutting the Panama Canal and fortifying the -entrances with the probable purpose of giving to the United States a -monopoly of that gateway in time of war. With splendid audacity the -American despises secrecy in regard to his future plans. In New York -Naval Yard three years ago I was informed, with an amplitude of detail -that was convincing, of the United States' scheme for patrolling the -whole Pacific with her warships when the Canal had been finished. - -Supposing, then, the United States to continue her present industrial -and commercial progress; supposing her to gradually tighten her hold on -the rest of the American continent; supposing her to overcome certain -centrifugal forces now at work, the problem of the Pacific, should the -United States decide to play a "lone hand," will be solved. It will -become an American lake, probably after a terrible struggle in which the -pretensions of the Yellow Races will be shattered, possibly after -another fratricidal struggle in which the British possessions in the -Pacific, Australia, and New Zealand, equally with Canada, will be forced -to obedience. - -But is there any necessity to consider the United States and the British -Empire as playing mutually hostile parts in the Pacific? They have been -the best of friends there in the past. They have many good reasons to -remain friends in the future. A discussion as to whether the Pacific -Ocean is destined to be controlled by the American or by the British -Power could be reasonably ended with the query: Why not by an -Anglo-Celtic union representing both? - -An Anglo-Celtic alliance embracing Great Britain, the United States and -the British Dominions, would settle in the best way the problem of the -Pacific. No possible combination, Asiatic, European, or Asia-European, -could threaten its position. But there are certain difficulties in the -way, which will be discussed later. For the present, it has only to be -insisted that both Powers are potential rather than actual masters of -the Pacific. Neither in the case of Great Britain nor of the United -States is a great Pacific force at the moment established. After her -treaty with Japan, Great Britain abandoned for a while the idea of -maintaining any serious naval strength in the Pacific. The warships she -maintained there, on the Australian station and elsewhere, had no -fighting value against modern armaments, and were kept in the Pacific as -a step towards the scrap-heap. That policy has since been reversed, and -the joint efforts of Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand directed -towards re-establishing British Pacific naval strength. At the -moment, however, the actual British naval force in the Pacific is -inconsiderable, if obsolete or obsolescent vessels are ruled out of -consideration. The United States also has no present naval force in the -Pacific that could contest the issue with even a fraction of the -Japanese navy. Clearly, too, she has no intention of attempting the -organisation of a powerful Pacific Fleet separate from her Atlantic -Fleet, but aims at the bolder policy of holding her interests in both -oceans by one great Fleet which will use the Panama Canal to mobilise at -an emergency in either. - -If the resources of the present with their probable growth in the future -are taken into account, Great Britain and the United States will appear -as massing enormous naval and military forces in the Pacific. The -preponderance of naval force will be probably on the side of the United -States for very many years--since it is improbable that Great Britain -will ever be able to detach any great proportion of her Fleet from -European waters and her Pacific naval force will be comprised mainly of -levies from Australia and New Zealand, and possibly Canada, India, and -South Africa. The preponderance of military force will be probably on -the side of Great Britain, taking into count the citizen armies of -Australia and New Zealand (and possibly of Canada) and the great forces -available in India. Complete harmony between Great Britain and the -United States in the Pacific would thus give the hegemony of the ocean -to the Anglo-Saxon race. Rivalry between them might lead to another -result. In the natural course of events that "other result" might be -Asiatic dominion in one form or another. - -These factors in Pacific rivalry will be discussed in detail in the -following chapters. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Since the above was written it is reported that the United States -has taken possession of Palmyra Island--once a British possession--to -the south of Honolulu, obviously for strategic purposes. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -RUSSIA IN THE PACIFIC - - -Russia, for generations the victim of Asia, when at last she had won to -national greatness, was impelled by pressure from the West rather than -by a sense of requital to turn back the tide of invasion. That pressure -from the West was due to a misunderstanding in which Great Britain led -the way, and which the late Lord Salisbury happily described when he -stated that England "had backed the wrong horse" in opposing Russia and -in aiding Turkey against her. - -Russia, because she broke Napoleon's career of victory by her power of -resistance, a power which was founded on a formlessness of national life -rather than a great military strength, was credited by Europe with a -fabulous might. Properly understood, the successful Russian resistance -to the greatest of modern captains was akin to that of an earthwork -which absorbs the sharpest blows of artillery and remains unmoved, -almost unharmed. But it was misinterpreted, and a mental conception -formed of the Russian earthwork as a mobile, aggressive force eager to -move forward and to overwhelm Europe. Russia's feat of beating back the -tide of Napoleonic invasion was merely the triumph of a low biological -type of national organism. Yet it inspired Europe with a mighty fear. -The "Colossus of the North" came into being to haunt every Chancellery. - -Nowhere was the fear felt more acutely than in Great Britain. It is a -necessary consequence of the British Imperial expansion of the past, an -expansion that came about very often in spite of the Mother Country's -reluctance and even hostility, that Great Britain must now always view -with distrust, with suspicion, that country which is the greatest of the -European Continental Powers for the time being, whether it be France, -Russia, or Germany. If British foreign policy is examined carefully it -will be found to have been based on that guiding principle for many -generations. Whatever nation appears to aim at a supreme position in -Europe must be confronted by Great Britain. - -Sometimes British statesmen, following instinctively a course which was -set for them by force of circumstances, have not recognised the real -reason of their actions. They have imagined that there was some ethical -warrant for the desire for a European "balance of power." They have seen -in the malignant disposition of whatever nation was the greatest Power -in Europe for the time being a just prompting to arrange restraining -coalitions, to wage crippling wars. But the truth is that the British -race, with so much that is desirable of the earth under its flag, with -indeed almost all the good empty lands in its keeping, must be jealous -of the next European Power. On the other hand, every growing Power in -Europe must look with envy on the rich claim which one prospector, and -that one not the earliest, has pegged out in the open fields of the -world. Thus between Great Britain and the next European Power in rank -there is always a mutual jealousy. The growing Power is credited with a -desire to seize the rich lands of the British Empire; and generally has -the desire. The holding Power is apprehensive of every step forward of -any rival, seeing in it a threat to her Empire's security. There is such -a thing in this world as being too rich to be comfortable. That is Great -Britain's national position. - -Thus when the power of France was broken and Napoleon was safely shut up -in St Helena, the British nation, relieved of one dread, promptly found -another. Russia was credited with designs on India. She was supposed to -be moving south towards the Mediterranean, and her object in seeking to -be established there was obviously to challenge British naval supremacy, -and to capture British overseas colonies. British diplomacy devoted -itself sternly to the task of checkmating Russia. Russia, the big -blundering amorphous nation, to whom England had given, some generations -before, early promptings to national organisation, and who now sprawled -clumsily across Europe groping for a way out of her ice-chains towards -a warm-water port, became the traditional enemy of the British Empire. - -This idea of Russian rivalry grew to be an obsession. The melodramas of -the British people had for their favourite topic the odious cruelty of -Russian tyranny. If a submarine cable to a British colony were -interrupted, or a quarry explosion startled the air, the colonists at -once turned their thoughts to a Russian invasion, and mobilised their -volunteers. Colonists of this generation can remember the thrills of -early childhood, when more than once they "prepared for the Russians," -and the whole force of some hundreds of volunteers and cadets determined -to sell their lives dearly on the battlefield to keep Russian knouts -from the backs of their womenfolk, it being seriously considered that -the Russian always celebrated a victory by a general knouting. - -Not until the idea of Russia establishing a hegemony over Europe had -been dissipated by the Russo-Japanese War did British statesmanship -really discover qualities of good neighbourliness in the Russian. But by -that time the main direction of Russian expansion had been definitely -settled as eastward instead of southward. Perhaps this was to the -ultimate advantage of civilisation, even though the decision left the -Hellenic peninsula in the grip of the Turk, for it pushed the buffer -territory between Europe and Asia far forward into Asia. Should an -Asiatic Power, with revived militancy, ever seek again the conquest of -Europe, as Asiatic Powers have done before this, the war must commence -in Manchuria, and not on the plains below the Ural Mountains. - -The position which Russia has occupied as a buffer state between Asia -and Europe has kept her back in the ranks of the army of civilisation. -Not only has she had to suffer the first of the savage blows which Asian -hordes have from time to time aimed at Europe, but also she has had to -endure Asiatic additions to her population, reducing the standard of her -race. - -The instinct against race-mixture which Nature has implanted in man is -the great safeguard of the work of evolution to a higher type. The White -Race, having developed on certain lines to a position which promises, if -it does not fulfil, the evolution of a yet higher type, has an -instinctive repugnance to mixing its blood with peoples in other stages -of evolution. It is this instinct, this transcendental instinct, which -is responsible for the objection to miscegenation in the United States, -and for the lynchings by which that objection is impressed upon the -negro mind. The same instinct is at the back of the "White Australia" -laws, forbidding coloured people any right of entry into Australia. - -It is not difficult to argue from a point of view of Christian religion -and humanity against an instinct which finds its extreme, but yet its -logical, expression in the burning of some negro offender at the stake. -But all the arguments in the world will not prevail against Nature. Once -a type has won a step up it must be jealous and "selfish," and even -brutal in its scorn of lower types; or must climb down again. This may -not be good ethics, but it is Nature. Russian backwardness in -civilisation to-day is a living proof that the scorn of the coloured man -is a necessary condition of the progress of the White Man's -civilisation. - -But the race-mixture which was of evil to Russia has been of benefit to -the rest of Europe. To borrow a metaphor from modern preventive -medicine, the Russian marches between Europe and Asia have had their -power of resistance to Yellow invasion strengthened by the infusion of -some Yellow blood. - -A land of high steppes, very cold in winter, very hot in summer, and of -great forests, which were difficult to traverse except where the rivers -had cut highways, Russia was never so tempting to the early European -civilisations as to lead to her area being definitely occupied and held -as a province. Neither Greek nor Roman attempted much colonisation in -Russia. By general consent the country was left to be a No-Man's-Land -between Asia and Europe. Alexander, whose army penetrated through to -India and actually brought back news of the existence of Australia, -never marched far north into the interior of Russia. There the mixed -tribes of Finns, Aryans, Semites, Mongols held a great gloomy country -influenced little by civilisation, but often temporarily submerged by -waves of barbarians from the Asiatic steppes. Still Western Europe in -time made some little impression on the Russian mass. Byzantine culture -impressed its mark on the Southern Slavs; Roman culture, after filtering -through Germany, reached the Lithuanians of the north. In the twelfth -century we hear of Arabian caravans making their way as far as the -Baltic in search of amber. - -But more important to the Russian civilisation was the advent of the -Normans in the ninth century. They consolidated White Russia during the -ninth to the thirteenth centuries, appeared as warriors before the walls -of Byzantium, and learned the Christian faith from the priests of the -Eastern communion. (Russia has since been faithful always to the Greek -Church.) That period was rich in national heroes, such as Rurik, Simeon -and Truvor, and definitely set the current of Russian national life -towards a place in the European family of nations. By the thirteenth -century the White Russians, with their capital established at Moscow, -were able to withstand for a while a new Mongol invasion. But they could -not prevent Gengis Khan's lieutenants establishing themselves on the -lower Volga, and the Grand Prince of Moscow had to be content to become -a suzerain of the Grand Khan of Tartary. - -For three centuries Russia now, amid many troubles, prepared herself to -take a place amongst European Powers. She was still more or less subject -to the Asiatic. But she was not Asiatic, and her vast area stood between -Europe and Asia and allowed the more Western nations to grow up free -from interference from any Eastern people, except in the case of the -great invasion of the Turks coming up from the south-east. How great was -the service that Russia unconsciously did to civilisation during those -centuries! If the Tartar had come with the Turk, or had followed him, -the White Races and their civilisation might have been swept away. - -After being the bulwark of Europe for centuries Russia at last found her -strength and became the avenger of the White Races. By the sixteenth -century the Russian power had been consolidated under the Muscovite -Czars, and a great nation, of which the governing class was altogether -European, began to push back the Asiatic. From the sixteenth to the -nineteenth centuries the Russian Power grew. The natural direction of -expansion was southward. The new nation wanted a place in the sun, and -looked longingly towards the Mediterranean. Only the Turk stood in the -path, and for the Russian Czars war with the Turk had something of a -religious attraction. It was the Cross against the Crescent. It was the -champion of the Greek Church winning back the Byzantine Empire to -Christian domination. - -For Russia to march south, driving the infidel from Europe, freeing the -Greeks, establishing herself in Constantinople, winning warm-water ports -and warm-climate fields, seemed to the Russian mind a national policy -which served both God and Mammon. That it served God was no slight thing -to the Russian people. They, then as now, cherished a simplicity and a -strenuousness of faith which may be called "superstitious" or -"beautiful and childlike" as the observer may wish, but which is -undoubtedly sincere. "There has been only one Christian," wrote Heine. -If he had known the Russians he would have qualified the gibe. They have -a real faith, and it is an important factor in the making of their -national policy which has to be taken into account. - -How much there was of religious impulse and how much of mere -materialistic national ambition in Russia's move southward did not in -the least concern other European Powers. Whatever its motive they -considered the development dangerous. It threatened to give the Russian -an overwhelming power, a paramountcy in Europe, and that could not be -tolerated even if it had the most worthy of motives. Above all, Great -Britain was alarmed. In the days of Elizabeth Great Britain had been a -very good friend to Russia. But Russia was then no possible rival either -on land or on the high seas. In the days of Victoria the position had -changed. Russia still wore the laurels of her "victories" over Napoleon. -She was credited with being the greatest military Power in the world, -and credited also with a relentless and Machiavellian diplomacy that -added vastly to the material resources of her armies and fleets. - -The Crimean War, with its resulting humiliating restrictions on Russian -power in the Black Sea, taught Russia that Europe was determined to -block her path south and preferred to buttress Turkish misrule than to -permit Russian expansion. Baffled but still restless, Russia turned -east and marched steadily towards the Pacific, with a side glance at the -Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, which caused Great Britain fresh -apprehension as to the fate of India. - -The progress of the Russian Power in Asia throughout the nineteenth -century and its sudden check at the dawn of the twentieth century make -one of the most dramatic chapters of the world's history. European -rivalry had followed Russia on her march across Siberia, and the British -Power in particular was alarmed to see the "Colossus of the North" with -a naval base in the Pacific. Alarm was deepened when, after reaching the -waters of the Pacific, Russia turned south, again eager for a warm-water -port. At the time China seemed to be on the verge of dissolution as a -national entity, and it seemed as though Russia were destined to win a -great Asiatic Empire beside which even India would be a poor prize. In -1885 Great Britain nearly went to war with Russia in the defence of the -integrity of Corea. - -But the decisive check to Russia was to come from another source. The -time had arrived for Asia to reassert some of her old warlike might. The -island power of Japan, having shaken off the cumbrous and useless armour -of medievalism, set herself sturdily in the path of modern progress and -aspired to a place among the great nations of the earth. Japan saw -clearly that Russia was the immediate enemy and prepared for a decisive -war, with an uncanny determinedness and a scrupulous attention to every -detail. Vast military and naval armaments had to be prepared. The -necessary money had to be wrung from a bitterly poor population or -borrowed at usurious rates. The political art with which that was done -was not the least wonderful part of a great national achievement. -Then--the weapons of war forged--it seemed good to Japanese -statesmanship to flesh them on an easy victim. It fell to China's lot to -teach the Japanese confidence in their new warlike arts, and to pay in -the shape of an indemnity something towards the cost of the great -struggle which Japan contemplated. - -Had Russia had that relentless and Machiavellian diplomacy with which -she used to be credited, she would never have permitted the Japanese -attack upon China. Constituting herself the champion of China, she would -at one stroke have pushed back the growing power of Japan and -established a claim to some suzerainty over the Celestial Empire. In -carrying out her plans Japan had to take this chance, of Russia coming -on top of her when she attacked China. She took the chance and won. -Russia would have had to take the chance of a great European upheaval if -she had interfered in the Japo-Chinese struggle. She did not take the -chance, and allowed her rival to arm at China's expense to meet her. - -The Chinese war finished, Japan, equipped with a full war-chest, a -veteran army and navy, was now ready to meet Russia. But she was faced -by the difficulty that in meeting Russia she might also have to meet a -European coalition, or the almost equally dangerous eventuality of a -veto on the war on the part of the United States. Japan was convinced of -her ability to fight Russia single-handed. Probably she would, in the -last event, have decided to take the risks of any coalition and enter -upon the war, since she had to fight Russia or perish as an expanding -Power. But she determined in the first instance to attempt to obtain a -safeguarding alliance. - -There are indications that Japan had in the first instance thoughts of -the United States, of Germany and of Great Britain, as alternative -allies. She thought of the United States because of her great financial -strength, her appreciable naval power in the Pacific, and her likely -value in keeping Great Britain out of the ring: of Germany because of -her military power on the Russian frontier; of Great Britain because of -her overwhelming naval power. Some held that Great Britain was only -approached in the second place. Whether that were so or not, the British -Power proved favourable. - -Japan was lucky in the moment of her approach. It had become obvious at -that time to British statesmanship that the old ideal of "splendid -isolation" was no longer tenable. The British Empire needed alliances, -or at least safeguarding understandings with other nations. But it -almost seemed as though the knowledge had come too late. Apparently -there were no European friendships offering. Japan thus found Great -Britain in a somewhat anxious mood, and an alliance was concluded -between the Power which had hitherto followed a policy of splendid -isolation and the _parvenu_ Power of the Far East. Japan was now all -ready, and Russia was doomed to be ousted from her position as a great -Power in the Pacific. - -A great deal of nonsense has been written and accepted as true -concerning the war between Japan and Russia. Throughout the course of -that war the Japanese took the best of care to put their own view of the -case before the world. The "wonderful heroism," "the marvellous -strategical and tactical skill," "the perfect medical and transport -arrangements" of the Japanese forces received something more than their -fair share of praise, because of the intelligent and perspicuous -industry of the Japanese publicity agencies. The Japanese conducted a -fine campaign. Their generals and admirals followed the best models in -their dispositions. Both in the movements and in the sanitary regulation -of the troops, the commanders were much helped by the habit of -discipline of a nation inured to yield blind obedience to a god-born -ruler. Still there was no inspired genius for war shown by the Japanese. -Their movements were copied from the books. A well-led White army of -much less strength would, I believe, have driven them ultimately from -Corea into the sea. Their seeming want of power of original thought and -their reliance on routine made their movements slow and flabby. They won -by the inferiority of the enemy rather than by a great genius for -warfare. - -The Russians on their side fought under the dispiriting conditions of -having a well-trained enemy in front and a revolution behind. The heart -of the nation was not with them, and the Russian autocracy was hampered -at every turn by the internal disorders of European Russia. It seems -probable that the autocracy hoped to solve in part a double problem by -the mischievous ingenuity of drafting as many as possible of the -discontented at home to the war abroad. That helped things in Russia, -but added to the difficulties of the generals in Manchuria. Withal, the -Russians put up a good fight. The early engagements were but rearguard -actions, the Japanese having an enormous superiority of force, and the -Russians striving to delay rather than to arrest their advance. It was -not until Mukden that the single line of railway to Russia had brought -General Kouropatkin a fair equality of force: and he had to contend then -with the tradition of retreat which had been perforce established in his -army, and with the growing paralysis of his home government confronted -by a great revolutionary movement. Even so, Mukden was a defeat and not -a rout. - -It is necessary to keep in mind these facts in order to arrive at a -sound conclusion as to the future position of Russia in the Pacific. It -is not safe to rule her out of the reckoning altogether. A second war, -waged by a united Russia against Japan, would probably have a far -different result, and would drive Japan off the Asiatic mainland were -the ring to be kept clear. For the present, however, Russia is a Power -with a great territory washed by the Pacific Ocean, but with no decisive -voice in its destinies. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -THE RISE OF JAPAN - - -The misfortune of success has never been better exemplified in the -world's history than in the results which have followed from the White -Man's attempt to arouse Japan to an appreciation of the blessings of -European civilisation. Our fathers and grandfathers of the middle -nineteenth century battered at the barred and picturesque doors of the -land of the Mikado with a vague idea that there was plunder, trade or -some other tangible benefit to be got from dragging the quaint Yellow -Recluse out of his retirement. Without a foreboding, every civilised -Power that had a fighting ship and the time to spare, took some part in -urging Japan to awake and be modern. A great deal of gunpowder was -burned before the little Asiatic nation stirred. Then she seemed in a -flash to learn the whole lesson of our combative civilisation. Naval -strategy; the forging of trade-marks; military organisation; -appreciation of the value of cheap labour and of machinery in industry; -aseptic surgery; resolute and cunning diplomacy--all these were suddenly -added to the mental equipment of an Asiatic people, and all used in -reprisal against Europe. To-day Japan is the greatest warrior Power in -the Pacific, and is also a powerful factor in that war for markets which -is not the least important manifestation of race rivalry. As sailors, -soldiers, merchants and factory hands, the Japanese are unmistakably -awake. - -With a discipline impossible of achievement by a European race, the -Japanese people pursued the methods of eclectic philosophy in their -nation-making. They copied the best from the army systems of Germany and -France: duplicated the British naval discipline: adopted what they -thought most efficient of the industrial machinery of Europe and -America, including a scientific tariff. Nothing that seemed likely to be -of advantage was neglected. Even the question of religion was seriously -considered, and these awakened people were at one time on the point of a -simultaneous national adoption of some form of Christianity. But they -were convinced on reflection that nothing of Europe's success in this -world was due to religion; and, unconcerned for the moment with anything -that was not of this world, decided to forbear from "scrapping" -Shintoism and sending it to the rubbish heap where reposed the -two-handled sword of the Sumarai.[10] - -This miracle of the complete transformation of a race has been -accomplished in half a century. Within the memory of some living people -the Japanese were content with a secluded life on their hungry islands, -where they painted dainty pictures, wove quaint and beautiful fabrics, -cultivated children and flowers in a spirit of happy artistry, and -pursued war among themselves as a sport, with enthusiasm certainly, but -without any excessive cruelty, if consideration be given to Asiatic -ideas of death and the Asiatic degree of sensitiveness to torture. They -were without any ideas of foreign conquest. The world had no respect for -Japan then. Specimens of Japanese painting and pottery were admired by a -few connoisseurs in little corners of the world (such as Bond Street, -London), and that was all. Now, Japan having learned the art of modern -warfare, we know also that the Japanese are great artists, great -philosophers, great poets. Of a sudden a nation has jumped from being -naturally chosen as the most absurd and harmless vehicle for a Gilbert -satire to that of being "the honoured ally" of Great Britain, in respect -to whose susceptibilities that satire should be suppressed. - -But our belated respect for the artistry of the Japanese gives little, -if any, explanation of the miracle of their sudden transformation. The -Chinese are greater artists, greater philosophers, superior -intellectually and physically. They heard at an even earlier date the -same harsh summons from Europe to wake up. But it was neglected, and, -whatever the outcome of the revolutionary movement now progressing, the -Chinese are not yet a Power to be taken into present consideration as -regards the Pacific Ocean or world-politics generally. The most patient -search gives no certain guidance as to the causes of Japan's sudden -advance to a position amongst the world's great nations. If we could -accurately determine those causes it would probably give a valuable clue -to the study of the psychology of races. But the effort is in vain. An -analogy is often drawn between the Japanese and the British. Except that -both were island races, there are few points of resemblance. The British -islands, inhabited originally by the Gauls, had their human stock -enriched from time to time by the Romans, the Danes, the Teutons, the -Normans. The British type, in part Celtic, in part Roman, in part -Danish, in part Anglo-Saxon, in part Norman, was naturally a -hard-fighting, stubborn, adventurous race fitted for the work of -exploration and colonisation. - -But the Japanese had, so far as can be ascertained, little advantage -from cross-breeding. Probably they were originally a Tartar race. The -primitive inhabitants of the islands were ancestors of the Hairy Ainus, -who still survive in small numbers. Like the aboriginals of Australia, -the Ainus were a primitive rather than a degraded type, closely allied -to the ancestors of the European races. Probably the Tartar invaders who -colonised Japan came by way of Corea. But after their advent there was -no new element introduced to give the human race in Japan a fresh -stimulus; and that original Tartar stock, though vigorous and warlike, -has never proved elsewhere any great capacity for organisation. - -In the sixth century of the Christian Era, Chinese civilisation and the -Buddhistic religion came to the Japanese, who at the time had about the -same standard of culture as the Red Indians of the American continent -when the _Mayflower_ sailed. For some four centuries the Japanese island -race was tributary to China, and during that time there was evolved a -national religion, Shintoism, which probably represented the old Tartar -faith modified by Chinese philosophy. In the eighth and subsequent -centuries, Japan in its national organisation very closely resembled -feudal Europe. As in Europe, there was a service tenure for the land; a -system by which organised groups, or KO's, became answerable -collectively for the deeds of each member of the group; and, as in -feudal Europe, Church and State made rival claims to supreme power. - -Indiscriminate fighting between rival feudal lords, a constant strife -between the Shoguns, representing the priestly power, and the Mikados, -representing the civil power, make up the islands' history for century -after century. Through it all there is no gleam of light on the -evolution of the latent powers which were to come to maturity, as in an -hour, during the nineteenth century. Japan appeared to be an average -example of a semi-civilised country which would never evolve to a much -higher state because of the undisciplined quarrelsomeness of its people. - -In the sixteenth century Europe first made the acquaintance of Japan. -Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, British traders and explorers -visited the country. St Francis Xavier established missions there and -baptized many in the Christian faith. After two centuries of general -toleration, with intervals of welcome and yet other intervals of -resolute massacre, in 1741 the last of the Europeans were ordered out of -the islands, the Japanese having decided that they wanted neither the -religion, the trade, nor the friendship of the White Man. The same -prohibitions were applied at the same time to Chinese traders. A -resolute policy of exclusiveness was adopted. - -Japan seems to have learned absolutely nothing from her first contact -with European civilisation. She settled down to the old policy of -rigorous exclusiveness, and to a renewal of her tribal and religious -warfare, in the midst of which, like a strange flower in a rocky cleft, -flourished a dainty æstheticism. The nineteenth century thus dawned on -Japan, a bitterly poor country, made poorer by the devotion of much of -her energies to internal warfare and by the devotion of some of her -scanty supply of good land to the cultivation of flowers instead of -grain. The observer of the day could hardly have imagined more -unpromising material for the making of the modern Japanese nation, -organised with Spartan thoroughness for naval, military and industrial -warfare. - -The United States in 1853 led the way in the successful attempt of White -civilisation to open up trade relations with Japan. The method was -rude; and it was followed by resolute offers of "friendship," backed by -armed threats, from Great Britain, France, Russia and Portugal. The -Japanese wanted none of them. The feeling of the people was distinctly -anti-foreign. They wished to be left to their flowers and their family -feuds. But the White Man insisted. In 1864 a combination of Powers -forced the Straits of Shimonoseki. The Japanese were compelled by these -and other outrages to a feeling of national unity. In the face of a -foreign danger domestic feuds were forgotten. By 1869 Japan had -organised her policy on a basis which has kept internal peace ever since -(with the exception of the revolt of the Satsuma in 1884), and she had -resolved on fighting out with Russia the issue of supremacy in the -Pacific. Within a quarter of a century the new nation had established -herself as a Power by the sensational defeat, on land and sea, of China. -The Peace of Shimonoseki extended her territory to Formosa and the -Pescadores, and filled her treasury with the great war indemnity of -£57,000,000. She then won, too, a footing on the Asiatic mainland, but -was for the time being cheated of that by the interference of Europe, an -interference which was not repeated when, later, having defeated Russia -in war and having won an alliance with Great Britain, she finally -annexed Corea. - -From the Peace of Shimonoseki in 1895 the progress of Japan has been -marvellous. In 1900 she appeared as one of the civilised Powers which -invaded China with a view to impress upon that Empire the duty a -semi-civilised Power owed to the world of maintaining internal order. In -1902 she entered into a defensive and offensive alliance with Great -Britain, by which she was guaranteed a ring clear from interference on -the part of a European combination in the struggle with Russia which she -contemplated. The treaty was a triumph of diplomatic wisdom. Appearing -to get little, Japan in real truth got all that her circumstances -required. A treaty binding Great Britain to come to her aid in any war -would have been hopeless to ask for, and not very useful when obtained, -for the Japanese attack on Russia might then have been the signal for a -general European war in which possibly a European combination would have -crippled Great Britain and then turned its united attention to the -destruction of Japan's nascent power. A treaty which kept the ring clear -for a single-handed struggle with Russia was better than that risk. In -return Japan gave nothing in effect except a pledge to make war on her -own immediate enemy, Russia, for the assistance of Great Britain if -necessity arose. - -The conditions created by the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902 developed -naturally to the Battle of Mukden, the culminating point of a campaign -in which for the first time for many years the Yellow Race vanquished -the White Race in war. That Battle of Mukden not only established -Japan's position in the world. It made the warlike awakening of China -inevitable, and restored to the daylight again the long-hidden yet -always existing arrogance of Asia. Asia has ever nurtured an insolence -beside which any White Race pride is insignificant. That fact is made -patent during recurring epochs of history. The Persian Darius sent to -the Greeks for earth and water, symbols to acknowledge that "Persia -ruled the land and the oceans." The Huns later looked upon the White Men -whom they conquered as something lower than animals. The Turks, another -great Asiatic race to war against Europe, could compare the White Man -only to that unclean beast, the dog. The first European ambassadors who -went to China were forced to crawl with abject humility to the feet of -the Chinese dignitaries. In his secret heart--of which the European mind -knows so little--the Asiatic, whether he be Japanese, Chinese, or -Indian, holds a deep disdain for the White. The contempt we feel for -them is returned more than one hundredfold. - -Mukden brought that disdain out of its slumber. The battle was therefore -an event of history more important than any since the fall of -Constantinople. For very many years the European hegemony had been -unquestioned. True, as late as 1795, Napoleon is credited with having -believed that the power of the Grand Turk might be revived and an -Ottoman suzerainty of Europe secured. But it was only a dream; more than -half a century before that the doom of the Turk, who had been the most -serious foe to Christian Europe, was sealed. From 1711 to 1905, -whatever questions of supremacy arose among the different European -Powers, there was never any doubt as to the superiority of the European -race over all coloured races. The White Man moved from one easy conquest -to another. In Asia, India, China, Persia and Japan were in turn -humbled. Africa was made the slave-farm of the White Race. - -Now in the twentieth century at Mukden the White Race supremacy was -again challenged. It was a long-dormant though not a new issue which was -thus raised. From the times beyond which the memory of man does not -stretch, Asia had repeatedly threatened Europe. The struggle of the -Persian Empire to smother the Greek republics is the first of the -invasions which has been accurately recorded by historians; but probably -it had been preceded by many others. The waves of war that followed were -many. The last was the Ottoman invasion in the fourteenth century, which -brought the banners of Asia right up to the walls of Vienna, swept the -Levant of Christian ships, and threatened even the Adriatic; and which -has left the Turk still in the possession of Constantinople. But by the -beginning of the eighteenth century the fear of the Turks gaining the -mastery of Europe had practically disappeared, and after then the -Europeans treated the coloured races as subject to them, and their -territories as liable to partition whenever the method of division among -rival White nations could be agreed upon. - -Mukden made a new situation. The European Powers were prompt to -recognise the fact. Doubt even came to Great Britain whether the part -she had played as foster-mother to this Asiatic infant of wonderful -growth had been a wise one. A peace was practically forced upon Japan, a -peace which secured for her at the moment nothing in the way of -indemnity, but little in the way of territorial rights, and not even the -positive elimination of her enemy from the Asiatic coast. True, she has -since won Corea on the basis of that peace and has made secure certain -suzerain rights in Manchuria, but this harvest had to be garnered by -resolute diplomacy and by maintaining a naval and military expenditure -after the war which called for an extreme degree of self-abnegation from -her people. - -If the present position of affairs could be accepted as permanent, there -would be no "problem of the Pacific." That ocean would be Japan's -home-water. Holding her rugged islands with a veteran army and navy; so -established on the mainland of Asia as to be able to make a flank -movement on China; she is the one "Power in being" of the Pacific -littoral. But as already stated, the verdict of the war with Russia -cannot be taken as final. And soon the United States will come into the -Pacific with overwhelming force on the completion of the Panama -Canal--an event which is already foreshadowed in a modification of the -Anglo-Japanese treaty to relieve Great Britain of the possible -responsibility of going to war with America on behalf of Japan. The -permanence of the Japanese position as the chief Power of the Pacific -cannot therefore be presumed. The very suddenness with which her -greatness has been won is in itself a prompting to the suspicion that it -will not last. It has been a mushroom growth, and there are many -indications that the forcing process by which a Power has been so -quickly raised has exhausted the culture bed. In the character of her -population Japan is in some respects exceedingly rich. The events of the -past few years have shown them to possess great qualities of heroism, -patience and discipline. But they have yet to prove that they possess -powers of initiative, without which they must fail ultimately in -competition with peoples who make one conquest over Nature a -stepping-stone to another. And it is not wholly a matter of race -prejudice that makes many observers view with suspicion the "staying -power" of the character of a nation which thinks so differently from the -average European in matters of sex, in commercial honesty, and in the -obligations of good faith. Many of those who have travelled in the East, -or have done business with Japan, profess a doubt that an enduring -greatness can be built upon a national character which runs contrary in -most matters to our accepted ideas of ethics. They profess to see in the -present greatness of achievement marking Japanese national life a "flash -in the pan"--the astonishing precocity and quickness of progress of that -type of doomed infant which quickly flowers and quickly fades in the -European slums and which is known as "The Mongol" to medical science -because of a facial peculiarity which identifies it infallibly. "The -Mongol" of European child-life comes to an astonishingly early maturity -of brain: its smartness is marvellous. But it is destined always to an -early end from an ineradicable internal weakness which is, in some -strange way, the cause of its precocious cleverness. - -Whether the Japanese cleverness and progressiveness will last or not, -the nation has to be credited with them now as a live asset. But apart -from the national character the nation possesses little of "natural -capital." There is practically no store of precious metals; a poor -supply of the useful minerals; small area of good land; and the local -fisheries have been exploited with such energy for many generations that -they cannot possibly be expanded in productivity now. The statesmen of -New Japan have certainly won some overseas Empire as an addition to the -resources available for a sound fabric of national greatness. But what -has been won is quite insufficient to weigh in the scale against the -"natural capital" of almost any of Japan's rivals in the Pacific. - -For want of territory to colonise under her own flag, Japan has lost -many subjects to alien flags. Japanese settlements of some strength -exist on the Pacific coast of America, in the Hawaiian Islands, and in -parts of China. There is little doubt that Japanese policy has hoped -that in some cases at least her flag would follow her nationals. Talk, -not all of it quite irresponsible, has credited Japan with definite -designs on many Pacific settlements, especially the Hawaiian Group where -her nationals to-day outnumber any other single element of the -population. But there are now no islands or territories without a -protecting flag. Even when, as was said to be the case with Mexico and -another Latin-American country, a weak and friendly nation seems to -offer the chance of annexation of territory following a peaceable -penetration, there is the power of the United States to interpose a -veto. Japan thus cannot add to her natural resources without a war; and -she has not, it would seem, sufficient natural resources to back up a -war with the enemies she would have to meet now in the Pacific. - -If she were to put aside dreams of conquest and Empire, has Japan a -sound future in the Pacific as a thriving minor manufacturing and -trading power? I must say that it seems to me doubtful. The nation has -drunk of the wine of life and could hardly settle down to a humdrum -existence. No peaceable policy could allow of a great prosperity, for -the reasons of natural poverty already stated. It would be a life of -drudgery without the present dream of glory. To study the Japanese -emigrant away from his own country is to understand that he has not the -patience for such a life. In British Columbia, in California, in Hawaii, -the same conclusion is come to by European fellow-residents, that the -Japanese worker is arrogant, unruly, unreliable. In Japan itself there -are signs that the industrial population will not tolerate for ever a -life of very poor living and very hard working if there is not a -definite and immediate benefit of national glory promised. - -The position of Japan in the Pacific seems to me, then, that she cannot -reasonably expect to win in a struggle for its mastery: and yet that she -will inevitably be forced to enter into that struggle. A recent report -in a Tokio paper stated: "At a secret session of the Budget Commission -on February 3, Baron Saito, Minister of Marine, declared that the -irreducible minimum of naval expansion was eight battleships of the -super-Dreadnought class, and eight armoured cruisers of the same class, -which must be completed by 1920, construction being begun in 1913. The -cost is estimated at £35,000,000." And the paper (_Asahi Shimbun_) went -on to hint at the United States as the Power which had to be confronted. -That is only one of very many indications of Japanese national feeling. -She has gone too far on the path to greatness to be able to retire -safely into obscurity. She must "see it through." Feats of strength far -nearer to the miraculous than those which marked her astonishing victory -over Russia would be necessary to give Japan the slightest chance of -success in the next struggle for the hegemony of the Pacific. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[10] Since writing the above, the Japanese Government has revived in a -modified form the proposal for a State adoption, in part at least, of -the Christian religion. A communication to the Japanese Press on 20th -January 1912 from the Minister for Home Affairs stated:--"In order to -bring about an affiliation of the three religions, it is necessary to -connect religion with the State more closely, so as to give it -(religion) added dignity, and thus impress upon the public the necessity -of attaching greater importance to religious matters. The culture of -national ethics can be perfected by education combined with religion. At -present moral doctrines are inculcated by education alone, but it is -impossible to inculcate firmly fair and upright ideas in the minds of -the nation unless the people are brought into touch with the fundamental -conception known as God, Buddha, or Heaven, as taught in the religions. -It is necessary, therefore, that education and religion should go hand -in hand to build up the basis of the national ethics, and it is, -therefore, desirable that a scheme should be devised to bring education -and religion into closer relations to enable them to promote the -national welfare. All religions agree in their fundamental principles, -but the present-day conceptions of morals differ according to the time -and place and according to the different points of view. It is ever -evolving. It may, therefore, be necessary for Shintoism and Buddhism to -carry their steps towards Western countries. Christianity ought also to -step out of the narrow circle within which it is confined, and endeavour -to adapt itself to the national sentiments and customs, and to conform -to the national polity in order to ensure greater achievements. Japan -has adopted a progressive policy in politics and economics in order to -share in the blessings of Western civilisation. It is desirable to bring -Western thought and faith into harmonious relationship with Japanese -thought and faith in the spiritual world." - -This proposal to change in one act the religion of a nation "to ensure -greater achievements" will perhaps do something to support the -contention, which will be put forward later, that a nation which takes -such a curious view of life is not capable of a real and lasting -greatness, however wonderful may be its feats of imitation. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -CHINA AND THE TEEMING MILLIONS OF ASIA - - -China is potentially the greatest Power on the western littoral of the -Pacific. Her enormous territory has vast agricultural and mineral -resources. Great rivers give easy access to some of the best of her -lands. A huge population has gifts of patient labour and craftsmanship -that make the Chinaman a feared competitor by every White worker in the -world. In courage he is not inferior to the Japanese, as General Gordon -found. In intelligence, in fidelity and in that common sense which -teaches "honesty to be the best policy," the Chinaman is far superior to -the Japanese. - -The Chinaman has been outstripped up to the present by the Japanese in -the acquirement of the arts of Western civilisation, not because of his -inferior mind, but because of his deeper disdain. He has stood aside -from the race for world supremacy on modern lines, not as one who is too -exhausted for effort, but as one who is too experienced to try. China -has in the past experimented with many of the vaunted ideas and methods -of the new civilisation, from gunpowder to a peerage chosen by -competitive examination, and long ago came to the conclusion that all -was vanity and vexation of spirit. - -The Chinaman is not humble; not content to take an inferior place in the -world. He has all the arrogance of Asia. The name of "Heavenly Kingdom" -given to the land by its inhabitants, the grandiose titles assumed by -its rulers, the degrading ceremonies which used to be exacted from -foreigners visiting China as confessions of their inferiority to the -Celestial race, show an extravagant pride of birth. In the thirteenth -century, when Confucian China, alike with Christian Europe, had to fear -the growing power of the fanatical Mohammedans, a treaty of alliance was -suggested between France and China: and the negotiations were broken off -because of the claim of China that France should submit to her as a -vassal, by way of preliminary. The Chinaman's idea of his own importance -has not abated since then. His attitude towards the "foreign devils" is -still one of utter contempt. But at present that contempt has not the -backing of naval and military strength, and so in practice counts for -nothing. - -China cherishes the oldest of living civilisations. Her legendary -history dates back to 2404 B.C., her actual history to 875 B.C., when a -high state of mental culture had been reached, and a very advanced -material civilisation also; though some caution is necessary in -accepting the statements that at that time China made use of gunpowder, -of the mariner's compass, and of printing type. But certainly weaving, -pottery, metal-working, and pictorial art flourished. The noble height -to which philosophy had reached centuries before the Christian Era is -shown by the records of Confucianism and Taoism. Political science had -been also cultivated, and there were then Chinese Socialists to claim -that "everyone should sow and reap his own harvest." - -There seem to have been at least two great parent races of the present -population of the Chinese Empire--a race dwelling in the valleys and -turning its thoughts to peace and the arts, and a race dwelling on the -Steppes and seeking joy in war. It was the Tartar and Mongol tribes of -the Steppes which sent wave after wave of attack westward towards -Europe, under chiefs the greatest of whom was Gengis Khan. But it was -the race of the valleys, the typical Chinese, stolid, patient, -laborious, who established ultimate supremacy in the nation, gradually -absorbing the more unruly elements and producing modern China with its -contempt for military glory. But the Mongols by their wars left a deep -impression on the Middle Ages, founding kingdoms which were tributary to -China, in Persia, Turkestan and as far west as the Russian Volga. - -The earliest record of European relations with China was in the seventh -century, when the Emperor Theodosius sent an embassy to the Chinese -Emperor. In the thirteenth century Marco Polo visited the Court of the -Grand Khan at Pekin, and for a while fairly constant communication -between Europe and China seems to have been maintained, the route -followed being by caravan across Asia. Christian missionaries settled in -China, and in 1248 there is a record of the Pope and the Grand Khan -exchanging greetings. - -When towards the end of the fourteenth century the Ming dynasty -supplanted the Mongol dynasty, communication with Europe was broken off -for more than a century. But in 1581 Jesuit missionaries again entered -China, and the Manchu dynasty of the seventeenth century at first -protected the Christian faith and seemed somewhat to favour Western -ideas. But in the next century the Christian missions were persecuted -and almost extirpated, to be revived in 1846. Since that date "the -mailed fist" of Europe has exacted from the Chinese a forced tolerance -of European trade and missions. - -But Chinese prejudice against foreign intrusion was given no reason for -abatement by the conduct of the European Powers, as shown, for example, -in the Opium War of 1840. That prejudice, smouldering for long, broke -out in the savage fanaticism of the Boxer outbreak of 1900, which led to -a joint punitive expedition by the European Powers, in conjunction with -Japan. China had the mortification then of being scourged not only by -the "white devils" but also by an upstart Yellow Man, who was her near -and her despised neighbour. All China that knew of the expedition to -Pekin of 1900 and understood its significance, seems to have resolved -then on some change of national policy involving the acceptance of -European methods, in warfare at least. Responding to the stimulus of -Japan's flaunting of her success in acquiring the ways of the European, -China began to consider whether there was not after all something useful -to be learned from the Western barbarians. The older Asiatic country has -a deep contempt for the younger: but proof of Japan's superior position -in the world's estimation had become too convincing to be disregarded. -China saw Japan treated with respect, herself with contumely. She found -herself humiliated in war and in diplomacy by the upstart relative. The -reason was plain, the conclusion equally plain. China began to arm and -lay the foundations of a modern naval and military system. The national -spirit began to show, too, in industry. Chinese capital claimed its -right and its duty to develop the resources of China. - -Early in the twentieth century "modern ideas" had so far established -themselves in China that Grand Councillor Chang Chih-tung was able, -without the step being equivalent to suicide, to memorialise the Throne -with these suggestions for reform:-- - -1. That the Government supply funds for free education. - -2. That the Army and Navy be reorganised without delay. - -3. That able and competent officials be secured for Government services. - -4. That Princes of the blood be sent abroad to study. - -5. That arsenals for manufacturing arms, ammunition, and other weapons -of war, and docks and shipbuilding yards for constructing warships, be -established without delay. - -6. That only Chinese capital be invested in railway and mining enterprises. - -7. That a date be given for the granting of a Constitution. - -Chang Chih-tung may be taken as the representative of the new school of -Chinese thought. His book _Chuen Hsueh Pien_ (China's Only Hope) is the -Bible of the moderate reformers. He states in that book:-- - -"In order to render China powerful, and at the same time preserve our -own institutions, it is absolutely necessary that we should utilise -Western knowledge. But unless Chinese learning is made the basis of -education, and a Chinese direction given to thought, the strong will -become anarchists, and the weak slaves. Thus the latter end will be -worse than the former.... Travel abroad for one year is more profitable -than study at home for five years. It has been well said that seeing is -a hundred times better than hearing. One year's study in a foreign -institution is better than three years in a Chinese. Mencius remarks -that a man can learn foreign things best abroad; but much more benefit -can be derived from travel by older and experienced men than by the -young, and high mandarins can learn more than petty officials.... Cannot -China follow the _viam mediam_, and learn a lesson from Japan? As the -case stands to-day, study by travel can be better done in that country -than in Europe, for the following reasons.... If it were deemed -advisable, some students could afterwards be sent to Europe for a fuller -course." - -After the Russian-Japanese War Chinese students went to Japan in -thousands, and these students laid the foundation of the Republican -school of reformers which is the greatest of the forces striving for -mastery in China to-day. The flow of students to Japan was soon checked -by the then Chinese Government, for the reason that Republican -sentiments seemed to be absorbed in the atmosphere of Japan, despite the -absolutism of the Government there. In the United States and in Europe -the Chinese scholar was able, however, to absorb Western knowledge -without acquiring Republican opinions! There is some suggestion of a -grim jest on the part of the Chinese in holding to this view. It recalls -Boccaccio's story of the Christian who despaired of the conversion of -his Jewish friend when he knew that he contemplated a visit to Rome. The -Chinese seemed to argue that a safe precaution against acquiring -Republican views is to live in a Republican country. Chinese confidence -in the educational advantages offered by the United States has been -justified by results. American-educated Chinese are prominent in every -phase of the Reform movement in China, except Republican agitation. The -first Reform Foreign Minister in China, the first great native Chinese -railway builder, the first Chinese women doctors, the greatest native -Chinese banker, are examples of American training. - -It would be outside the scope of this work to attempt to deal in any way -exhaustively with the present position in China. What the ultimate -outcome will be, it is impossible to forecast. At present a Republic is -in process of formation, after the baby Emperor through the Dowager -Empress had promulgated an edict stating: - -"We, the Emperor, have respectfully received the following Edict from -her Majesty the Dowager: - -"In consequence of the uprising of the Republican Army, to which the -people in the Provinces have responded, the Empire seethed liked a -boiling cauldron, and the people were plunged in misery. Yuan Shih-kai, -therefore, commanded the despatch of Commissioners to confer with the -Republicans with a view to a National Assembly deciding the form of -government. Months elapsed without any settlement being reached. It is -now evident that the majority of the people favour a Republic, and, from -the preference of the people's hearts, the will of Heaven is -discernible. How could we oppose the desires of millions for the glory -of one family? Therefore, the Dowager Empress and the Emperor hereby -vest the sovereignty in the people. Let Yuan Shih-kai organise with -full powers a provisional Republican Government, and let him confer with -the Republicans on the methods of establishing a union which shall -assure the peace of the Empire, and of forming a great Republic, uniting -Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Tibetans." - -But all men whom I have met who have had chances of studying Chinese -conditions at first hand, agree that the Chinese national character is -not favourable to the permanent acceptance of Republican ideas. If there -is one thing which seems fixed in the Chinese character it is -ancestor-worship, and that is essentially incompatible with -Republicanism.[3] But what seems absolutely certain is that a new China -is coming to birth. Slowly the great mass is being leavened with a new -spirit. - -Now a new China, armed with modern weapons, would be a terrible engine -of war. A new China organised to take the field in modern industry would -be a formidable rival in neutral markets to any existing nation. The -power of such a new China put at the disposal of Japan could at least -secure all Asia for the Asiatics and hold the dominant position in the -Northern Pacific. Possibly it could establish a world supremacy, unless -such a Yellow union forced White Races to disregard smaller issues and -unite against a common foe. Fortunately a Chinese-Japanese alliance is -not at present in the least likely. The Chinese hatred of the Japanese -is of long standing and resolute, though it is sometimes dissembled. The -Japanese have an ill-concealed contempt for the Chinese. Conflict is -more likely than alliance between the two kindred races. - -Further, the Chinese will probably move far more slowly on any path of -aggression than did the Japanese, for they are intensely pacific. For -many generations they have been taught to regard the soldier as -contemptible, the recluse scholar as admirable. Ideas of overseas Empire -on their part are tempered by the fanatic wish of every Chinaman that -his bones should rest in his native land. It will only be in response to -enormous pressure that China will undertake a policy of adventure. - -That pressure is now being engendered from within and without. From -without it is being engendered by insolent robberies of territory and -other outrages on the part of foreign Powers. More particularly of late -has the modern arrogance of Japan impressed upon the old-fashioned -arrogance of China the fact that the grave scholar, skilled in all the -lore of Confucius, is a worthless atom beside a drilled coolie who can -shoot straight. From within the pressure is being engendered by the -great growth of population. For some time past infanticide has been -common in China as a Malthusian check. Now European missionaries seek to -discourage that. European medicine further sets itself to teach the -Yellow Man to cope with plague, smallpox, and cholera, while European -engineering abates the terrors of flood and of crop failure. - -Machiavelli would have found prompting for some grim aphorism in this -curious eagerness of Europe to teach the teeming millions of Asia to rid -themselves of checks on their greater growth, and thus to increase the -pressure of the Asiatic surplus seeking an outlet at the expense of -Europe. It is in respect to the urgent demand for room for an -overcrowding population that there exists alike to China and Japan the -strongest stimulus to warlike action in the Pacific. China in particular -wants colonies, even if they be only such colonies as provide -opportunities for her coolies to amass enough wealth to return in old -age to China. From the fertile basin of China there have been overflow -waves of humanity ever since there has been any record of history. -Before the era of White settlement in the Pacific the Chinese population -had pushed down the coast of Asia and penetrated through a great part of -the Malay Archipelago, an expansion not without its difficulties, for -the fierce Malay objected to the patient Chinaman and often the Chinaman -remained to fertilise but not to colonise the alien soil. By some -Providential chance neither the Chinaman nor the Japanese ever reached -to Australia in the early days of the Pacific, though there are records -of Japanese fishermen getting as far as the Hawaiian Group, a much more -hazardous journey. If the Asiatics had reached Australia the great -island would doubtless have become the southern province of Asia, for -its native population could have offered no resistance to the feeblest -invader. - -In the past, however, the great natural checks kept the Asiatic -populations within some limits. Internal wars, famines, pestilences, -infanticide--all claimed their toll. Nature exercised on man the checks -which exist throughout the whole animal kingdom, and which in some -regions of biology are so stern that it is said that only one adult -survives of 5,000,000 spawn of a kind of oyster. Now European influence -is steadily directed in Asia to removing all obstacles to the growth of -population. When the Asiatics wish to fight among themselves Europe is -inclined to interfere (as at the time of the Boxer outbreak in China), -on the ground that a state of disorder cannot be tolerated. In India -internecine warfare is strictly prohibited by the paramount Power. In -Japan all local feuds have been healed by pressure from Europe and -America, and the fighting power of the people concentrated for external -warfare. - -Not alone by checking internal warfare does Europe insist on encouraging -the growth of the Asiatic myriads. European science suggests railways, -which make famine less terrible; flood prevention works which save -millions of lives. European moralists make war on such customs as the -suicide of young widows and the exposure for death of female children. -But, far more efficacious than all, European scientists come forward to -teach to the Asiatics aseptic surgery, inoculation, and the rest of the -wisdom of preventive and curative medicine. Sometimes Nature is stronger -than science. The Plague, for instance, still claims its millions. But -even the Plague diminishes before modern medical science. - -In his _Health and Empire_ (1911), Dr Francis Fremantle tells of the -campaign against plague in India. He writes: - -"The death-rate from plague in 1904 in the Lahore and Amritsar districts -in which I worked was 25 per 1000. Over 1,000,000 Indians died of plague -in 1904, over 1,000,000 in 1905; in 1906, 332,000, and it was thought -the end was in sight. But 640,000 died in the first four months of 1907; -in 1908, 321,000 died; in 1909 only 175,000, but in 1910 again very -nearly 500,000, and this year more than ever. The United Provinces had -barely been reached by the epidemic in 1904; now with a population equal -to that of the United Kingdom, they have been losing 20,000 every week; -and the Punjab 34,000 in one week, 39,000, 47,000, 54,000, 60,000 and so -on--over 430,000 in the first four months of this year in a population -of 25,000,000. Imagine Great Britain and Ireland losing the same -proportion--over 1,000,000 from plague in half a year. And India as a -whole has in fifteen years lost over 7,000,000 from plague. Why wonder -at her unrest? - -"What, then, can the Government do? Extermination of rats is impossible; -disinfection on a large scale is impracticable; evacuation of villages -cannot be done voluntarily on any universal scale; the Government will -not apply compulsion, and such evacuation is quite useless without a -rigid cordon of police or military that will prevent communication -between one infected village and others not yet infected. A cordon, it -has been proved over and over again, cannot be maintained; the native -who wishes to pass it has only to present some official with a cautious -rupee. Extermination of rats in an Asiatic country has often failed; but -here is without a shadow of doubt the key to the problem. The methods -formerly adopted had been to give a capitation grant for every rat -brought to the appointed place, and before long it was found, for -instance in Bombay, that an extensive trade had grown up in the breeding -of rats, whereby, at a few annas apiece from the Government, many -families were able to sustain a comfortable existence.... But since -sentence on the rat-flea has been pronounced for the murder of 7,000,000 -persons and over, the best method for his extermination will not be far -off. - -"It is often debated whether even half-measures are worth being -continued. Professor W. J. Simpson, in his exhaustive monograph on the -plague, and in 1907 in his _Croonian Lectures_, has shown how in history -epidemics of plague have come and gone in different countries with long -intervals between them, often of one hundred and thirty to one hundred -and fifty years. In the eighteenth century, for instance, India seems to -have been almost free of the plague, but early in the seventeenth -century it suffered severely. The present epidemic is assuming, as far -as we can trust previous records, unprecedented proportions; probably -after a few years it will die out again. - -"An occasional cynic may argue that, since we have saved so many -thousands of lives annually from famine and wars, it may be just as well -to let the plague take their place. To such a pessimistic and inhuman -conclusion it is impossible for one moment to submit. It may be that for -economic reasons some parts of the Indian Empire would be happier if -their population were less dense; but it does not follow that we should -allow Death to stalk uninterrupted, unopposed, and apparently without -limit, throughout the country. Economics apart, we may yet be absolutely -convinced, whether as doctors or as statesmen, that it is our mission, -our duty, to protect the populations included under British rule to the -best of our ability against every scourge as it may arise; and therefore -it is urgent that such measures as we have be pushed forward with the -utmost vigour." - -That tells (in a more convincing way, because of the impatience of the -doctor, accustomed to European conditions, at the slow result of work in -India) how resolute is the White Man's campaign against the Yellow Man's -death-rate in one part of Asia. Such a campaign in time must succeed in -destroying the disease against which it is directed and thus adding -further to the fecundity of Asia. - -Nor is the fight against diseases confined to those parts of Asia under -direct White rule. The cult of White medicine spreads everywhere, -carried by Japanese as well as by European doctors and missionaries. Its -effects already show in the enormous increase of Asiatic population, -proved wherever definite figures are available. That growth adds year by -year to the danger that the Yellow Man will overrun the Pacific and -force the White Man to a second place in the ocean's affairs, perhaps -not even leaving him that. - -An older and sterner school of thought would have condemned as fatuous -the White Races' humanitarian nurture of the Yellow Races. But the -gentler thought of to-day will probably agree with Dr Fremantle that the -White Man cannot "allow Death to stalk uninterrupted, unopposed" even -through the territory of our racial rivals. But we must give serious -thought to the position which is thus created, especially in view of the -"levelling" racial tendency of modern weapons of warfare. China has a -population to-day, according to Chinese estimates, of 433,000,000; -according to an American diplomatist's conclusions, of not much more -than half that total. But it is, without a doubt, growing as it never -grew before; and modern reform ideas will continue to make it grow and -render the menace of its overflow more imminent. - -At present the trend of thought in China is pacific. But it is not -possible to be sure that there will not be a change in that regard with -the ferment of new ideas. The discussion to-day of a Republic in China, -of womanhood suffrage in China, of democratic socialism in China, -suggests that the vast Empire, which has been for so long the example of -conservative immobility most favoured by rhetoricians anxious to -illustrate a political argument, may plunge into unexpected adventures. -China has in the past provided great invaders of the world's peace. She -may in the near future turn again to the thoughts of military adventure. -The chance of this would be increased if in the settlement of her -constitutional troubles a long resort to arms were necessary. Then the -victorious army, whether monarchical or Republican, might aspire to win -for a new China recognition abroad. - -It is a fortunate fact that supposing a revival of militancy in China, a -revival which is possible but not probable, the first brunt of the -trouble would probably fall upon Japan. At the present moment Japan is -the most serious offender against China's national pride. As the -conqueror of Corea and the occupier of Manchuria, she trespasses most of -all foreign Powers on the territories and the rights of China. After -Japan, Russia would have to expect a demand for a reckoning; Great -Britain would come third and might come into collision with an -aggressive China, either because of the existence of such settlements as -Hong Kong or because of the Thibetan boundary. A China in search of -enemies, however, would find no lack of good pretexts for quarrelling. -There are, for instance, the offensive and humiliating restrictions on -Chinese immigration of the United States, of Canada, New Zealand and -Australia. - -I find it necessary, however, to conclude that so far as the near -future is concerned, China will not take a great warrior part in the -determining of Pacific issues. She may be able to enforce a more -wholesome respect for her territorial integrity: she may push away some -intruders: she may even insist on a less injurious and contemptuous -attitude towards her nationals abroad. But she will not, I think, seek -greatness by a policy of aggression. There is no analogy between her -conditions and those of Japan at the time of the Japanese acceptance of -European arts and crafts. Japan at the time was a bitterly quarrelsome -country: she turned from civil to foreign war. China has been -essentially pacific for some centuries. Japan was faced at the outset of -her national career with the fact that she had to expand her territory -or else she could not hope to exist as a great Power. China has within -her own borders all that is necessary for national greatness. - -If at a later date the Chinese, either from a too-thorough study of the -lore of European civilisation, or from the pressure of a population -deprived of all Malthusian checks and thus finding an outlet absolutely -necessary, should decide to put armies and navies to work for the -obtaining of new territory, the peril will be great to the White Man. -Such a Chinese movement could secure Asia for the Asiatics, and might -not stop at that point. But that danger is not of this decade, though -it may have to be faced later by the White Power which wins the -supremacy of the Pacific. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[3] A very clear statement as to the position in China was that given in -London during January of 1912 by Mr Kwei Chih, a secretary of the -Chinese Legation. - -"None of the dynasties in China," he said, "has ever maintained a -tyrannical _régime_ for any length of time, least of all the Manchu -dynasty, the policy of which has consisted rather of a mixture of -paternalism and obscurantism than of hard repression of the people.... -The present unanimous desire of the Chinese to remove the Manchu dynasty -arises solely from the fact that the Chinese have fully awakened to the -realisation that only a policy of thoroughgoing Westernisation can save -China from disruption and partition. The removal of the Manchu dynasty -is of no greater national moment to China than would be the fall of a -Cabinet to any European country. Personal animus enters, indeed, so -little into the determination of the new Chinese _régime_ that the -question of setting apart lands for the deposed dynasty, and even of -granting it ex-territorial privileges, may eventually be accepted in the -way of a solution. In regard to the adoption of Republican ideas, it may -be said that the Chinese statesman does not understand the meaning of -the Republican principle, and if a new _régime_ should declare itself -Republican, its Republicanism will be of a much more strongly democratic -type than any known to Europe. It will even be more popular in its -constitution than the American, and will far more fully seek the -development of the common weal than most bureaucratic systems bearing -the name. The suggested application of Christian principles to the new -_régime_ may be regarded as wholly impossible. Confucianism, by which -China stands or falls, is a secular philosophy, the only semblance of a -spiritual or religious tenet in which is the principle of -ancestor-worship, and though a theocratic idea is admitted in the -creation of the universe, the question of a life hereafter is wholly -excluded from its teachings." - - - - -CHAPTER V - -THE UNITED STATES--AN IMPERIAL POWER - - -Following the map of the North-Western Pacific littoral, the eye -encounters, on leaving the coast of China, the Philippine Islands, proof -of the ambition of the United States to hold a place in the Pacific. - -It is a common fallacy to ascribe to the United States a Quakerish -temperament in foreign affairs. Certain catch-words of American local -politics have been given a fictitious value, both at home and abroad. -"Republican Simplicity," "The Rights of Man," "European Tyranny," -"Imperial Aggression," "The Vortex of Militarism"--from these and -similar texts some United State publicists are wont to preach of the -tyranny of European kings and emperors; of their greed to swallow up -weak neighbours; and of the evils of the military and naval systems -maintained to gratify such greed. By much grandiose assertion, or by -that quiet implication which is more complete proof of a convinced mind -than the most grandiose of assertion, the American nation has been -pictured in happy contrast to others, pursuing a simple and peaceful -life; with no desire for more territory; no wish to interfere with the -affairs of others; in the world, but not of the world. - -Astonishment that such professions should carry any weight at all in the -face of the great mass of facts showing that the American national -temper is exactly the reverse of Quakerish, is modified in the political -student by the fact that it is the rule for nations as well as -individuals to be judged in the popular estimation by phrases rather -than by facts. Ignoring the phrases of politicians and considering only -the facts, it will be found that the American people have Imperial -ambitions worthy of their ancestry and inseparable from the -responsibility towards civilisation which their national greatness -involves. - -It was in the middle of the eighteenth century that the United States -began national housekeeping within a small territory on the seaboard of -the Atlantic. By the nineteenth century that area had extended over a -section of the continent of America as large almost as Europe. By the -twentieth century this Power, still represented as incurably "peaceful -and stay-at-home" by its leaders, was established in the Caribbean Sea, -on the Isthmus of Panama, in the North and South Pacific, along the -coast of Asia, and had set up firmly the principle that whatever affair -of the world demanded international attention, from a loan to China, to -the fate of an Atlantic port of Morocco, the United States had -"interests" which must be considered, and advice which must be -regarded. The only circumstance that genuinely suggests a Quaker spirit -in United States foreign diplomacy is her quaint directness of language. -More effete peoples may wrap every stage of a negotiation up to an -ultimatum in honeyed phrases of respect. America "tutoyers" all courts -and is mercilessly blunt in claim and warning. - -It would be very strange if the United States were otherwise than -Imperial in spirit. Nations, like individuals, are affected by -biological laws; a young, strong nation is as naturally aggressive and -ambitious as a young, strong boy. Contentment with things as they are, a -disposition to make anxious sacrifices to the gods who grant peace, are -the signs of old age. If a boy is quite good his parents have a -reasonable right to suspect some constitutional weakness. A new nation -which really resembled what a great many of the American people think -the United States to be, would show as a morbid anomaly. No; the course -of the world's future history will never be correctly forecasted except -on the assumption that the United States is an aggressively Imperial -nation, having an influence at least equal to that of any European Power -in the settlement of international issues; and determined to use that -influence and to extend its scope year by year. In the Problem of the -Pacific particularly, the United States must be counted, not merely as a -great factor but the greatest factor. - -If the American citizen of to-day is considered as though he were a -British citizen of some generations back, with a healthy young appetite -for conquest still uncloyed, some idea near to the truth will have been -reached. But since the deference exacted by public opinion nowadays -compels some degree of pretence and does not permit us to parade our -souls naked, it is improbable that the United States citizen of this -century will adopt the frank freebooting attitude of the Elizabethan -Englishman when he was laying the foundations of his Empire by methods -inspired somewhat by piracy as well as by patriotism. The American will -have to make some concession to the times and seek always a moral -sanction for the extension of his boundaries. Such a search, however, is -rarely made in vain when it is backed by a resolved purpose. It was -sufficient for Francis Drake to know that a settlement was Spanish and -rich. The attack followed. The United States needs to know that a -possession is foreign, is desirable, and is grossly ill-governed before -she will move to a remonstrance in the sacred name of Liberty. Since -good government is an ideal which seldom comes at all close to -realisation, and the reputation of no form of administration can survive -the ordeal of resolute foreign criticism, the practical difference is -slight. The American Empire will grow with the benediction always of a -high moral purpose; but it will grow. - -It is interesting to recall the fact that at its very birth the United -States was invested by a writer of prophetic insight with the purple of -Empire. Said the _London Gazette_ of 1765:--"Little doubt can be -entertained that America will in time be the greatest and most -prosperous Empire that perhaps the world has ever seen." But the early -founders of the new nation, then as now, deceived themselves and others -with the view that a pacific little Republic, not a mighty Empire, was -their aim. The Imperial instinct showed, however, in the fact that the -baby nation had in its youngest days set up a formidable navy. It was -ostensibly "for the local defence of its shores," but naval power and -overseas Empire are inseparably linked. - -The austere Republic began to grow in territory and influence at a rate -putting to shame the early feats of the Roman power. By 1893 the United -States had made it clear that she would not allow her independence to be -fettered in the slightest degree by any claims of gratitude from France: -and her Declaration of Neutrality in the European War then raging was a -clear statement of claim to be considered as a Power. The war with the -Barbary States in 1802 to suppress piracy was a claim to police rights -on the high seas, police rights which custom gives only to a paramount -sea Power. By the next year Spain and France had been more or less -politely relieved of all responsibilities in North America, and the -United States stretched from ocean to ocean, and from the Great Lakes to -the Gulf of Mexico. - -It is upon the early eloquence of her founders as to the duty of the -United States to confine her attention strictly to America, that the -common misconception of America's place in foreign policy has been built -up. That talk, however, was in the first instance dictated largely by -prudence. Alexander Hamilton, who controlled the foreign policy of the -infant Republic at the outset, was particularly anxious that she should -find her feet before attempting any deeds of enterprise. In particular, -he was anxious that the United States should not, through considerations -of sentiment, be drawn into the position of a mere appanage of France. -He set the foundations of what was known afterwards as the "Monroe -doctrine," with the one thought that, at the time, a policy of -non-interference with European affairs was a necessary condition of free -growth for the young nation. The same idea governed Washington's -farewell address in 1796 with its warning against "foreign -entanglements." - -Afterwards the "Monroe doctrine"--deriving its name from a message by -President Monroe in 1823--was given the meaning that the United States -would not tolerate any interference with the affairs of the American -continent by Europe. Finally the "Monroe doctrine," which had begun with -an affirmation of America's non-participation in European affairs, and -had developed into a declaration against European interference with -American affairs, took its present form, which is, in effect, that over -all America the United States has a paramount interest which must not be -questioned, and that as regards the rest of the world she claims an -equal voice with other Powers. Yet, though that is the actual position, -there is still an idea in some minds that the Monroe doctrine is an -instrument of humbleness by which the United States claims the immunity -of America from foreign interference and guarantees foreign countries -from American interference. - -It will be of value to recall, in illustration of the rapid growth of an -aggressive national pride in the United States, the circumstances which -led up to Mr. President Monroe's formal message in 1823. The dawn of the -nineteenth century found the young American nation, after about a -quarter of a century's existence, fairly on her feet; able to vindicate -her rights abroad by a war against the Barbary pirates: given by the -cession of Louisiana from France, a magnificent accession of territory. -The Empire of Spain was crumbling to pieces, and between 1803 and 1825 -the Latin-American Republics in South and Central America were being -established on the ruins of that Empire. Spain, her attention engaged in -European wars, was able to do little or nothing to assert herself -against the rebellious colonies. But in 1815, Napoleon having been -vanquished, the Holy Alliance in Europe attempted to reassert the old -power of the European monarchies. The terror of Napoleon's army had -forced the kings of the earth into a union which forgot national -differences and was anxious only to preserve the Divine Right of Kings. -The formation of this Holy Alliance was viewed with suspicion and -dislike in the United States, and when in 1823 the Alliance raised the -question of joint action by European monarchies to restore Spanish rule -in South America, the United States responded with Monroe's famous -message forbidding any European interference on the continent of -America. Such European colonies as already existed would be tolerated, -and that was all. The message stated: - - "The American continents by the free and independent conditions - which they have assumed are henceforth not to be considered as - subjects for future colonisation by any European Power. - - "We could not view any interposition for purpose of oppressing them - or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European - Power in any other way than as the manifestation of an unfriendly - disposition towards the United States." - -That "Monroe doctrine" was destined to be extended greatly in scope. In -1845 Mr. President Polk declared that no future European colony should -be planted on any part of the North American continent, and laid it down -as the duty of the United States "to annex American territory lest it be -annexed by European countries." True to that faith, he was responsible -for the annexation of Texas, Oregon and California. The United States -claim to overlordship of North America was still more remarkably -extended in 1867, when a protest was entered against the Federation of -the Canadian Provinces. The protest was not insisted upon then, though -in 1870 Mr. President Grant revived the spirit of the protest with his -forecast of "the end of European political connection with this -continent." The Venezuela controversy between Great Britain and the -United States in 1895 was responsible for another extension of the -Monroe doctrine. It was then claimed that "foreign colonies ought to -cease in this hemisphere." Insistence on that would, however, have led -to a war in which Great Britain probably would have had the assistance -of other European Powers affected; and the Monroe doctrine receded a -little. - -Exactly how this chief article of the United States foreign policy -stands to-day one cannot say. Certainly the Monroe doctrine does not -mean, as it was once supposed to mean, that the United States in return -for foreign abstention from interference in American affairs pledges -herself to keep apart from all extra-American affairs. In world politics -she claims and exercises the privileges to which her vast resources and -her high state of civilisation are the warrants. In regard to American -affairs the Monroe doctrine clearly forbids any further European -colonisation in North or South America, and constitutes the United -States as the Suzerain Power of all the Latin-American Republics -(whether they are willing or not). What else it will be found to mean -will depend on the circumstances of the moment and the feelings of the -newspaper proprietors who exercise so great an influence on the -American man-in-the-street, the governing factor in shaping his -country's foreign policy. In European countries, however democratic, the -man-in-the-street has rarely any immediate authority over Foreign -Affairs. In Great Britain, for example, the questions of the relations -of the Government with other countries are not canvassed before the -voters. The close oligarchy of the Cabinet (acting often with the -Opposition Front Bench) comes to decisions of peace and war, of treaty -and _entente_, and, after decision, allows Parliament and the electorate -to acquiesce. But in the United States foreign policy is actually -dictated by the voters; and that means, in effect, by the newspapers. On -occasion the Monroe doctrine has already been interpreted into a notice -to quit to all European Powers holding settlements on the American -continent. It may in the near future revive that claim to paramount and -exclusive authority, and it may cover a declaration of direct suzerainty -over Mexico, and over the smaller republics intervening between the -United States border and the Panama Canal. In most Latin-American -republics disorder is the rule rather than the exception; and it may -become at any moment the honest opinion of the man-in-the-street of the -United States that the Panama Canal is too important to civilisation to -be left to the chances of interference from less stable governments than -his own. - -These conclusions are inevitable to anyone making any study of American -history and the American character. They are not hostile criticisms. -They are rather appreciations. A great nation with a belief in its -destiny must be "Imperialist" in spirit, because it has a natural desire -to spread the blessings of its rule. The people of the United States -believe as strongly in themselves as did the ancient Hebrews, and all -must have a genuine respect for that fierce spirit of elect nationality -which made the Hebrews found a great nation on a goat-patch. In -Elizabethan England the same spirit flourished and was responsible for -the founding of the British Empire. (It survives still in the British -Isles, though somewhat spasmodically.) There is no ground at all either -for wonder or for complaint in the fact that Imperialism has been born -to vigorous life in the United States, where the people of "God's own -country" are firm in these two articles of faith: that any interference -in the affairs of the United States is unjust, unnecessary, tyrannical -and impious; that any United States interference with another nation is -a necessary and salutary effort on behalf of civilisation. Let no man of -British blood complain. But let no one in making calculations of world -policy be deceived into any other conclusion than that the United States -is the great Imperial force of this century, and also the one Power that -has enough of the splendid illusions of youth to indulge in crusading -wars, for which Europe nowadays is too old and cautious. - -In the countries of Europe other than Great Britain that which I have -stated is coming to be generally recognised, and if at any time a -combination could be proposed with any hope of success "to put America -in her place," the combination would be formed and the Old World would -grapple with the New to try conclusions. Without Great Britain, however, -such an alliance would have at present no chance of success, and British -adherence is not within the realm of practical thought to-day. - -The Imperialist tendency of United States policy is shown with -particular clarity in the history of the Pacific Ocean. Very early in -her life the vigorous young nation saw the Fates beckoning her across -the Pacific. The downfall of the Spanish power in North America left the -United States heir to a great stretch of rich coast line, including the -noble province of California. Russia was ousted from the north-west -coast of the Continent by a wise purchase. Before then, American whalers -sailing out of Boston had begun to exploit the Southern Pacific. Their -whaling trips brought back knowledge of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Group, -and, following exactly the methods of British colonisation, American -missionaries were the pioneers of American nationalisation. As far back -as 1820 Hiram Bingham preached his first sermon at Honolulu from the -text, "Fear not, for, behold, I bring you glad tidings of great joy." A -handsome church now marks the gratitude of his native converts. With -equal justice Bingham's American compatriots might have set up a great -statue to him as the first warden of the Marches of the Pacific for the -United States. For from that day the annexation of Hawaii was -inevitable. The process took the familiar course. First the United -States Republic exercised a benevolent suzerainty over the Hawaiian -kingdom. Then the blessing of free institutions was bestowed on the -natives by the foundation of an Hawaiian Republic. The next step was -definite annexation. Following that, came steps for the formation of a -great naval base at Honolulu. - -When I visited the Hawaiian Group in the spring of 1909 the work of -fortifying Honolulu was being pushed on with great vigour, and the -American military and civil authorities boasted of their intention to -make it the Gibraltar of the Pacific. The city of Honolulu has at -present a very small harbour, a little bay to which access is given by -an opening in the coral reefs which surround the island. This port would -hardly afford shelter to a squadron of cruisers. But to the left as one -enters is Pearl Harbour, a magnificent stretch of land-locked water -sufficient to float a great Fleet. But Pearl Harbour basin in its -natural state is too well protected, there being no means of access -except for very small boats. American energy is now remedying that, and -a deep-water channel is being cut from Honolulu Harbour to Pearl Harbour -to take vessels of the largest draught at all tides. When that channel -is completed, Pearl Harbour will be at once commodious and easily -protected. The single narrow entrance will be dominated by the guns of -Malakiki Hill, a great eminence, somewhat like Gibraltar in shape, to -the right of the town, which commands the sea-front east and west: and -within Pearl Harbour the American Pacific Fleet will find a safe haven. -It will be absolutely impregnable from the sea. Hostile ships -approaching Honolulu would have to steer straight for Malakiki and then -defile amid the coral reefs past its guns before the entrance to Pearl -Harbour would open before them. - -But land defence has also to be taken into account. The chief male -element of the Hawaiian population is not American, not native Hawaiian. -It is Japanese. The Mikado's subjects represent now the largest fighting -element in the population, outnumbering even the natives. These -Japanese, imported as coolies for the sugar-fields, are mostly men of -military training. Further influx of them has now been stopped, not -under an Immigration Restriction Act, but by private treaty with Japan; -and, as a measure of precaution, an Arms Registration Ordinance provides -that no citizen shall have in his possession firearms unless he is -licensed by the Government. But this precaution would be in vain if -Japan ever seriously thought of using her 50,000 soldier-citizens in the -Hawaiian Group against the United States; for the whole of the fishing -industry is in the hands of the Japanese, and their sampans could land -arms at various places on the islands with ease. Such a contingency has -been foreseen in the laying out of Honolulu as a naval base, and the -land fortifications are designed with the same thoroughness as those -designed to beat off a sea attack. - -A glance at the map will show that the Power which holds Hawaii with a -powerful Fleet can dominate the whole of the Northern Pacific, -threatening every point east and west. The American position there is -weakened by only one circumstance, the great Japanese population. This, -though it may not be recruited with further drafts of males from its -native source, will always be a very considerable, if not the most -considerable, element of the Hawaiian population, for most of the -coolies are married, and the Japanese abroad as well as at home fills -the cradle industriously. - -I remember on the morning of April 1, 1909, coming into Honolulu city -from the Moana Hotel on the sea-beach, I found the tram rushed by -Japanese at all the stopping places. Two cruisers of their navy had -entered the harbour--cruisers which were once upon a time the Russian -_Variag_ and _Koreitz_. All Japan in Honolulu was making holiday. A -fleet of sampans (the Japanese fishing-vessel) surrounded the ships, -which commemorated so signally a great and successful war. The water -front was lined with Japanese, the women and children mostly in their -national costume. One Japanese father came on to the tram with seven -boys, the eldest of whom did not seem more than ten years of age. -Asked, he said that they were all his own children. There will never be -a lack of a big Japanese population in Hawaii. - -The definite acquisition of Hawaii may be fairly dated from 1851. Before -then there had been a significant proof of America's gaze turning -westward by the appointment in 1844 of Mr Caleb Cushing as the United -States Ambassador to the Court of China. A little later (1854) the -American Power found the Japanese policy of exclusiveness intolerable, -and United States warships broke a way into Japanese ports. It had also -been decided by then that the task, originally undertaken by a French -Company, of cutting a waterway across the Panama Isthmus should be the -responsibility of the United States. British susceptibilities on the -point were soothed by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty guaranteeing the -neutrality of the canal, a treaty which was subsequently abrogated in -response to the increasing deference which the growing power of the -American Republic could exact. That abrogation created the present -position which gives the United States sole control of that canal, and -the right to fortify its entrances. - -By the middle of the nineteenth century, therefore, the United States, a -Power which some people still insist on regarding as an essentially -domestic character interested only in purely American affairs, had -established herself in a commanding strategical position in the North -Pacific, had constituted herself the arbiter of Japanese national -manners, and had obtained the control of the future waterway from the -Atlantic to the Pacific. The second half of the same century was -destined to see an even more remarkable Imperial expansion. The -misgovernment of Cuba by Spain became intolerable to American public -opinion, and in 1898 war was declared with the avowed purpose of -conferring the blessings of freedom on the people of Cuba. If one -accepted the nonsensical view that the United States is a Power lifted -above ordinary human nature by some mysterious racial alchemy, it would -be difficult to understand why a war to free Cuba should also have been -waged in another ocean to acquire the Philippines. But, looking at the -matter in a sane light, it was natural that, being engaged in a war with -Spain, the United States should strike at Spain wherever a blow was -possible and should destroy the Spanish power in the Pacific Ocean as -well as in the Caribbean Sea. Besides, the opportunity offered of -stretching the arm of America right across the Pacific to the very coast -of Asia. The Filipinos did not relish the substitution for the weak rule -of Spain of the strong rule of the United States, and American -Imperialism had the experience of having to force, by stern warfare on -the liberated, acceptance of its rôle of liberator. Perhaps the -experience taught it some sympathy with older players at the game of -Empire-making: certainly it did not abate its ardour in the good work. - -So much for the past history of the United States in the Pacific. A -forecast of her influence on the future of the ocean is clearly -indicated by the past. The United States spread from the east of the -North American continent to the west, because there is no method known -to prevent the extension of a highly civilised, a young, an ardent -nation at the expense of backward, effete and tired peoples. It was -impossible that either the Red Indian tribes or the picturesque old -settlements of the Californian Spanish should stand in the way of the -American Republic stretching from ocean to ocean. Once the United States -was established on the Pacific coast, it was equally inevitable that the -arm of her power should stretch across the ocean. The acquisition of the -Hawaiian Group was necessary for the sound defence of the coast. The -American trading ships which sought the coast of Asia and found barbaric -barriers against commerce being battered down by European venturers, had -to do as the other White Men did. The flag thus had to follow in the -wake of the trade. It was all natural, necessary and ultimately -beneficial to civilisation. Equally inevitable will be the future -expansion of the United States in the Pacific. The overwhelming strength -of her industrial organisation will give her a first call on the neutral -markets of the ocean--_i.e._ those markets to which she has the same -right of access as her trade rivals. As the tendency shows for the area -of those neutral markets to narrow through coming under the domination -of various Powers, the United States will seek to extend her domination -too. The protection of what she has will enforce the need of acquiring -other strategical points. So her Pacific possessions will grow, almost -unconsciously, just as the British Empire grew. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -GREAT BRITAIN'S ENTRY INTO THE PACIFIC - - -Off the coast of China at a point where, in a strategical map the -"spheres of influence" of Japan and the United States and Germany would -impinge, is the island of Hong Kong, the Far East station of the British -Empire. Further south, in the Malay Peninsula, is Singapore, standing -guard over the entrance to the Indian Ocean. On these two coaling -stations British naval power in the North Pacific is based. The -abandonment of either of them is unthinkable to-day, yet neither was -taken possession of until the nineteenth century--Singapore in 1819, -Hong Kong in 1841. In the South Pacific there was shown an even stronger -hesitation in acquiring territory. - -Why Great Britain entered so reluctantly into the Pacific as a -colonising Power may probably be explained by the fact that at the time -the ocean came to be exploited British earth hunger had been satiated. -The unsuccessful war which attempted to hold the American colonies to -the Mother Country, had made her doubtful whether overseas dominions -were altogether a blessing and whether the advantage to be gained from -them outweighed the responsibilities which their holding entailed. It -seemed to be the natural conclusion from the American War of -Independence, that once a colony or a group of colonies arrived at the -stage of growth which allowed it to be of some use to the Mother -Country, the inevitable next development was for it to throw off the -bonds of kinship and enter upon a career of independence at the price of -an expensive and humiliating war to its parent. Thus, whilst British -sailors were to the front in the exploration of the Pacific, British -statesmen showed a great reluctance to take any advantage of their -discoveries; and it was a series of accidents rather than any settled -purpose which planted the Anglo-Saxon race so firmly in this ocean. -India, it must be noted, a century ago was a country having very little -direct concern with the Pacific. The holding of the Indian Empire did -not depend on any position in the Pacific. That situation has since -changed, and Great Britain would be forced to an interest in the Pacific -by her Indian Empire if she had no other possessions in the ocean. - -In an earlier chapter on Japan, something has been written concerning -the reasons which would argue for the absence of an Imperial impulse in -the Japanese islands and its presence in the British islands. The -inquiry then suggested as to the instincts of expansion and dominion -which were primarily responsible for the growth of the British Empire is -full of fascination for the historian. If it comes to be considered -carefully, the Empire-making of the British people was throughout the -result of a racial impulse working instinctively, spasmodically, though -unerringly, towards an unseen goal, rather than of a designed and -purposeful statesmanship. - -The racial origin of the British people dictated peremptorily a policy -of oversea adventure, and that adventure led inevitably to colonisation. -In the beginning Britain was a part of Gaul, a temperate and fertile -peninsula which by right of latitude should have had the temperature of -Labrador, but which, because of the Gulf Stream, enjoyed a climate -singularly mild and promotive of fecundity. When the separation from the -mainland came because of the North Sea cutting the English Channel, the -Gallic tribes left in Britain began to acquire, as the fruits of their -gracious environment and their insular position, an exclusive patriotism -and a comparative immunity from invasion. These made the Briton at once -very proud of his country and not very fitted to defend its shores. - -With the Roman invasion there came to the future British race a benefit -from both those causes. The comparative ease of the conquest by the -Roman Power, holding as it did the mastery of the seas, freed the -ensuing settlement by the conquerors from a good deal of the bitterness -which would have followed a desperate resistance. The Romans were -generous winners and good colonists. Once their power was established -firmly, they treated a subject race with kindly consideration. Soon, -too, the local pride of the Britons affected their victors. The Roman -garrison came to take an interest in their new home, an interest which -was aided by the singular beauty and fertility of the country. It was -not long before Carausius, a Roman general in Britain, had set himself -up as independent of Italy, and with the aid of sea-power he maintained -his position for some years. The Romans and the Britons, too, freely -intermarried, and at the time when the failing power of the Empire -compelled the withdrawal of the Roman garrison, the south of Britain was -as much Romanised as, say, northern Africa or Spain. - -Thus from the very dawn of known history natural position and climate -marked out Britain as the vat for the brewing of a strenuous blood. The -sea served her "in the office of a wall or of a moat defensive to a -house" to keep away all but the most vigorous of invaders. The charm and -fertility of the land made it certain that a bold and vigorous invader -would be tempted to become a colonist and not be satisfied with robbing -and passing on. - -With the decay of the Roman Empire, and the withdrawal of the Roman -legions to the defence of Rome, the Romanised Britons were left -helpless. Civilisation and the growth of riches had made them at once -more desirable objects of prey, and less able to resist attack. The -province which Rome abandoned was worried on all sides by the incursion -of the fierce clans of the north and the west. A decision, ultimately -wise, judged by its happy results, but at the moment disastrous, induced -some of the harried Britons to call in to their aid the Norsemen -pirates, who at the time, taking advantage of the failing authority of -Rome, were swarming out from Scandinavia and from the shores of the -Baltic in search of booty. The Angles, the Saxons, the Jutes, were -willing enough to come to Britain as mercenaries, even more willing to -stay as colonists. An Anglo-Saxon wave swept over the greater part of -England, and was stopped only by the mountains of Wales or of Scotland. -That was the end of the Britons as the chief power in Britain, but they -mingled with their conquerors to modify the Anglo-Saxon type with an -infusion of Celtic blood. In the mountainous districts the Celtic blood -continued to predominate, and does to this day. - -The Anglo-Saxons would have been very content to settle down peacefully -on the fat lands which had fallen to them, but the piratical nests from -which they themselves had issued still sent forth broods of hungry -adventurers, and the invasions of the Danes taught the Anglo-Saxons that -what steel had won must be guarded by steel. They learned, too, that any -race holding England must rely upon sea-power for peaceful existence. -After the Danish, the last great element in the making of the present -British race, was the Norman. The Normans were not so much foreigners -as might be supposed. The Anglo-Saxons of the day were descendants of -sea-pirates who had settled in Britain and mingled their blood with the -British. The Normans were descendants of kindred sea-pirates who had -settled in Gaul, and mingled their blood with that of the Gauls and -Franks. The two races, Anglo-Saxon and Normans, after a while combined -amicably enough, the Anglo-Saxon blood predominating, and the British -type was evolved, in part Celtic, in part Danish, in part Anglo-Saxon, -in part Norman--a hard-fighting, stubborn adventurous race, which in its -making from such varied elements had learned the value of compromise, -and of the common-sense principle of give-and-take. One can see that it -was just the race for the work of exploration and colonisation. - -When this British people, thus constituted, were driven back to a -sea-frontier by the French nation, it was natural that they should turn -their energies overseas. To this their Anglo-Saxon blood, their Danish -blood, their Norman blood prompted. The Elizabethan era, which was the -era of the foundation of the British Empire overseas, was marked by a -form of patriotism which was hard to distinguish in some of its -manifestations from plain robbery. The fact calls for no particular -condemnation. It was according to the habit of thought of the time. But -it is necessary to bear in mind that the hunt for loot and not the -desire for territory was the chief motive of the flashing glories of the -Elizabethan era of seamanship; for that is the explanation why there -was left as the fruit of many victories few permanent settlements. - -Drake was the first English naval leader to penetrate to the Pacific. -His famous circumnavigation of the world is one of the boldest exploits -of history. Drake's log entry on entering the Pacific stirs the blood: - -"Now, as we were fallen to the uttermost parts of these islands on -October 28, 1578, our troubles did make an end, the storm ceased, and -all our calamities (only the absence of our friends excepted) were -removed, as if God all this while by His secret Providence had led us to -make this discovery, which being had according to His will, He stayed -His hand." - -On this voyage Drake put in at San Francisco, which he named New Albion. -He went back to Europe through the East Indies and around Africa. But -Drake made no attempt at colonisation. Looting of the Spanish treasure -ships was the first and last object of his cruise. What was, according -to our present lights, a more honourable descent upon the Pacific was -that of Admiral Anson in the eighteenth century. He, in 1740, took a -Fleet round the stormy Horn to subdue the Philippines and break the -power of Spain in the Pacific. The force thought fitting for such an -enterprise in those days was 961 men! Anson did not subdue the -Philippines; but they were guarded by the scurvy, which attacked the -English Fleet, rather than by the Spanish might, and the little -disease-racked English squadron was able to cripple the Spanish power in -the Pacific by the mere dread of its presence. Anson took prizes and -made them masquerade before the enemy's coast as hostile warships, and -paralysed the Spanish commerce in those seas. He returned to England -with only 335 men out of his original complement of 961. Practically all -the deaths had been from disease. But again the idea of the Pacific -expedition was not to colonise but to strike a blow at a rival European -Power. It was not until the nineteenth century that Great Britain -established herself on the western flank of the North Pacific. - -So far as the South Pacific was concerned British indifference was -complete, and it was shared by other nations. In the days when the -fabled wealth of the Indies was the magnet to draw men of courage and -worth to perilous undertakings by sea and land, there was nothing in the -South Pacific to attract their greed, and nothing, therefore, to -stimulate their enterprise. The Spaniard, blundering on America in his -quest for a western sea-passage to the ivory, the gold, and the spices -of India, found there a land with more possibilities of plunder than -that which he had originally sought. He was content to remain, looting -the treasuries of the Mexicans and of the Peruvians for metals, and -laying the forests of Central America under contribution for precious -woods. He ventured but little westward, and the Hawaiian Islands -represented for a time the extreme western limit of his adventures. -Following him for plunder came the English, and they too were content to -sweep along the western coast of South America without venturing further -towards the unknown west. - -From another direction the sea-route to India was sought by Portuguese, -and Dutch, and English and French. Groping round the African coast, they -came in time to the land of their desires, and found besides India and -Cathay, Java, the Spice Islands, and other rich groups of the Malay -Archipelago. But they, just as the Spaniards, did not venture west from -South America; and neither Portuguese, Dutch, French nor English set the -course of their vessels south from the East Indies. - -It was thus Australia remained for many years an unknown continent. And -when at last navigators, more bold or less bound to an immediate greed, -touched upon the shores of Australia, or called at the South Sea -Islands, they found little that was attractive. In no case had the -simple natives won to a greed for gold and silver, and so they had no -accumulations of wealth to tempt cupidity. In the case of Australia the -coast-line was dour and forbidding, and promised nothing but sterility. - -The exploring period in which the desire for plunder was the chief -motive passed away, having spared the South Pacific. It was therefore -the fate of Australia, of New Zealand, and of most of the islands of -Polynesia and Melanesia, to be settled under happier conditions, and to -be spared the excesses of cruelty which marked the European invasion of -the West Indies and the Americas. The Newest World began its -acquaintance with civilisation under fairly happy auspices. - -It was not until the middle of the seventeenth century that a scientific -expedition brought the South Pacific before the attention of Britain. A -transit of Venus across the sun promised to yield valuable knowledge as -to the nature of solar phenomena. To observe the transit under the best -conditions, astronomers knew that a station in the South Seas was -necessary, and Lieutenant Cook, R.N., an officer who had already -distinguished himself in the work of exploration, was promoted to be -Captain and entrusted to lead a scientific expedition to Otaheite. Added -to his commission was an injunction to explore the South Seas if time -and opportunity offered. Captain Cook was of the type which makes time -and opportunity. Certainly there was little in the equipment of his -expedition to justify an extension of its duties after the transit of -Venus had been duly observed. But he took it that his duty was to -explore the South Seas, and explore them he did, incidentally annexing -for the British Empire the Continent of Australia. - -That was in 1770. But still there was so little inviting in the prospect -of settlement in the South Seas that it was some eighteen years before -any effort was made to follow up by colonisation this annexation by -Captain Cook. When the effort was made it was not on very dignified -lines. The American colonies had at one time served as an outlet for the -overflow of the British prisons. The War of Independence had closed that -channel. The overcrowding of the British prisons became desperate, and, -because it was necessary to find some relief for this--not because it -was considered advantageous to populate the new possession--the First -Fleet sailed for the foundation of Australia in 1788. - -We shall see in subsequent chapters how the reluctance of the governing -Power of the British race in the Home Country to establish an Empire in -the South Pacific found a curious response in the stubborn resoluteness -of the colonists who settled in Australia and New Zealand to be more -English than the English themselves, to be as aggressively Imperialistic -almost as the men of the Elizabethan era. (What might almost be called -the "Jingoism" of the British nations in the South Pacific must have a -very important effect in settling the mastery of that ocean.) In the -present chapter the establishment of the British Power in the North -Pacific chiefly will be considered. - -Singapore is to-day the capital of the three Straits Settlements-- -Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, but it is the youngest of the three -settlements. Malacca is the oldest. It was taken possession of by the -Portuguese under Albuquerque in 1511, and held by them until 1641, when -the Dutch were successful in driving them out. The settlement remained -under the Government of the Dutch till 1795, when it was captured by -the English, and held by them till 1818, at which date it was restored -to the Dutch, and finally passed into British hands in pursuance of the -treaty with Holland of 1824. By that treaty it was arranged that the -Dutch should leave the Malay Peninsula, the British Government agreeing -at the same time to leave Sumatra to the Dutch. When Malacca was taken -possession of by the Portuguese in 1511, it was one of the great -centres for the commerce of the East; but under Dutch rule it dwindled, -and Penang acquired a monopoly of the trade of the Malayan Peninsula -and Sumatra, together with a large traffic with China, Siam, Borneo, -the Celebes, and other places in the Archipelago. When Singapore was -established Penang in its turn had to yield the first place to the new -city. - -Singapore was acquired for Britain by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819, by -virtue of a treaty with the Johore princes. It was at first subordinate -to Bencoolen in Sumatra, but in 1823 it was placed under the Government -of Bengal; it was afterwards incorporated in 1826, with Penang and -Malacca, and placed under the Governor and Council of the Incorporated -Settlements. Singapore is now one of the great shipping ports of the -world, served by some fifty lines of steamers, and with a trade of over -20,000,000 tons a year. The harbour of Singapore is fortified, and the -port is indicated by one advanced school of British Imperialists as the -future chief base of a Fleet, contributed to by India, Australia, New -Zealand, South Africa, and Canada, and kept to a standard of strength -equal to that available to any other two Powers in the Pacific. Captain -Macaulay, in a strategical scheme for Imperial Defence which has been -received with deep attention in Great Britain, suggests:-- - -"The influence which an Indian Ocean Fleet, based on Colombo and -Singapore, would have on Imperial Defence can hardly be exaggerated. The -Indian Ocean--a British Mediterranean to the Pacific--with its openings -east and west in our hands, is a position of readiness for naval action -in the Western Pacific, the South Atlantic, or the Mediterranean. In the -first case it influences the defence of Canada and the Australasian -States; in the second, that of South Africa. An Indian Ocean Fleet can -reinforce, or be reinforced by the Fleets in European waters, if the -storm centre be confined to Europe or to the Pacific. As regards the -direct naval defence of the Australasian Provinces, no better position -could be chosen than that of a Fleet based on Singapore, with an -advanced base at Hong Kong, because it flanks all possible attack on -them. An advanced flank defence is better than any direct defence of so -large a coast-line as that of Australia from any point within it. -Moreover, Singapore and Hong Kong are much nearer to the naval bases of -any Powers in the Western Pacific than those countries are to Australia -or to Canada. Hence, in operations for the defence of any Province, they -favour offensive-defensive action on our part. And offensive-defensive -is the great characteristic of naval power. Any East Asian Power -contemplating aggression against Australasian or North American -territory must evidently first deal with the Indian Ocean Fleet. - -"It is impossible to ignore the strategical and political significance -of the Imperial triangle of India based on South Africa and the -Australasian States, and its influence in the solution of the new -problems of Imperial Defence. The effective naval defence of the -self-governing Provinces is best secured by a Fleet maintained in the -North Indian Ocean; and the reinforcement of the British garrison in -India is best secured by units of the Imperial Army maintained in the -self-governing Provinces. If these two conditions are satisfied, the -problem of the defence of the Mother Country is capable of easy -solution." - -Hong Kong is of less strategical importance than Singapore. But it is -marked out as the advanced base of British naval power in the North -Pacific. It has one of the most magnificent harbours in the world, with -an area of ten square miles. The granite hills which surround it rise -between 2000 and 3000 feet high. The city of Victoria extends for four -miles at the base of the hills which protect the south side of the -harbour, and contains, with its suburbs, 326,961 inhabitants. It is the -present base of the China squadron, and is fortified and garrisoned. - -As already stated, the conditions which some years ago made the mastery -of the Pacific unimportant to India no longer exist, and the safety of -the Indian Empire depends almost as closely on the position in the -Pacific as the safety of England does on the position in the Atlantic. -But, except by making some references in future chapters on strategy and -on trade to her resources and possibilities, I do not propose to attempt -any consideration of India in this volume. That would unduly enlarge its -scope. In these days of quick communication, both power and trade are -very fluid, and there is really not any country of the earth which has -not in some way an influence on the Pacific. But so far as possible I -have sought to deal only with the direct factors. - -Having noted the British possessions in the North Pacific, it is -necessary to turn south and study the young "nations of the blood" below -the Equator before estimating British Power in the Pacific. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -THE BRITISH CONTINENT IN THE PACIFIC - - -Those who seek to find in history the evidence of an all-wise purpose -might gather from the fantastic history of Australasia facts to confirm -their faith. Far back in prehistoric ages, this great island was cut -adrift from the rest of the world and left lonely and apart in the -Southern Pacific. A few prehistoric marsupials wandered over its -territory and were hunted by poor nomads of men, without art or -architecture, condemned by the conditions of their life to step aside -from the great onward current of human evolution. - -Over this land the winds swept and the rains fell, and, volcanic action -having ceased, the mountains were denuded and their deep stores of -minerals bared until gold lay about on the surface. Coal, copper, -silver, tin, and iron too, were made plentifully accessible. At the same -time enormous agricultural plains were formed in the interior, but under -climatic conditions which allowed no development of vegetable or animal -types without organised culture by a civilised people. - -Nature thus seemed to work consciously for the making of a country -uniquely fitted for civilisation by a White Race, whilst at the same -time ensuring that its aboriginal inhabitants should not be able to -profit by its betterment, and thus raise themselves to a degree of -social organisation which would allow them to resist an invading White -Race. In the year when Captain Cook acquired the Continent of Australia -for Great Britain, it was ripe for development by civilised effort in a -way which no other territory of the earth then was; and yet was so -hopelessly sterile to man without machinery and the other apparatus of -human science, that its aboriginal inhabitants were the most forlorn of -the world's peoples, living a starveling life dependent on poor hunting, -scanty fisheries and a few roots for existence. - -It needs no great stretch of fancy to see a mysterious design in the -world-history of Australia. Here was a great area of land stuffed with -precious and useful minerals, hidden away from the advancing -civilisation of man as effectually as if it had been in the planet Mars. -In other parts of the globe great civilisations rose and fell--the -Assyrian, the Egyptian, the Chinese, the Greek, the Roman,--all drawing -from the bowels of the earth her hidden treasures, and drawing on her -surface riches with successive harvests. In America, the Mexican, -Peruvian and other civilisations learned to gather from the great stocks -of Nature, and built up fabrics of greatness from her rifled treasures. -In Australia alone, amid dim, mysterious forests, the same prehistoric -animals roamed, the same poor nomads of men lived and died, neither -tilling nor mining the earth--tenants in occupation, content with a bare -and accidental livelihood in the midst of mighty riches. - -Australia too was not discovered by the White Man until the moment when -a young nation could be founded on the discovered principles of Justice. -To complete the marvel, as it would seem, Providence ordained that its -occupation and development should be by the one people most eminently -fitted for the founding of a new nation on the virgin soil. - -The fostering care of Nature did not end there. The early settlers -coming to Australia not only found that nothing had been drawn from the -soil or reef, that an absolutely virgin country was theirs to exploit, -but also were greeted by a singularly happy climate, free of all the -diseases which afflicted older lands. Prolific Australia, with all its -marvellous potentialities, lay open to them, with no warlike tribes to -enforce a bloody beginning to history, no epidemics to war against, no -savage beasts to encounter. And they were greeted by an energising -climate which seemed to encourage the best faculties of man, just as it -gave to harvests a wonderful richness and to herds a marvellous -fecundity. - -How it came to be that such a vast area of the earth's surface, so near -to the great Indian and Chinese civilisations, should have so long -remained unknown, it is difficult to understand. There is faint evidence -that the existence of the great Southern continent was guessed at in -very early days, but no attempt at exploration or settlement was made by -the Hindoos or the Chinese. When the Greeks, who had penetrated to India -under Alexander the Great, returned to their homes, they brought back -some talk of a continent south from India, and the later Greek -literature and some Latin writers have allusions to the tale. Marco Polo -(thirteenth century), during his voyages to the East Indies, seems to -have heard of a Southern continent, for he speaks of a Java Major, a -land much greater than the isle of Java (which he knew), and which was -probably either New Guinea or Australia. On a fifteenth-century map of -the world now in the British Museum there are indications of a knowledge -of the existence of Australia; and it is undoubtedly included in a map -of the world of the sixteenth century. - -But there was evidently no curiosity as to the suspected new continent. -Australia to-day contains not the slightest trace of contact with -ancient or Middle Ages civilisation. Exploration was attracted to the -East Indies and to Cathay by the tales of spices, scents, gold, silver, -and ivory. No such tales came from Australia. It was to prove the -greatest gold-producing country of the world, but its natives had no -hunger for the precious metal, though it was strewn about the ground in -great lumps in some places. Nor did sugar, spice, and ivory come from -the land; nor, indeed, any product of man's industry or Nature's -bounty. Wrapped in its mysterious grey-green forests, protected by a -coast-line which appeared always barren and inhospitable, Australia -remained unknown until comparatively modern times. - -In 1581 the Spaniards, under Magalhaes, reached the Philippine Islands -by sailing west from the South American coast. In the nature of things -their ships would have touched the coast of Australia. In 1606 De Quiros -and De Torres reached some of the Oceanian islands, and named one _Terra -Austrialia del Espiritu Santo_ (the Southern Land of the Holy Spirit). -As was the case with Columbus in his voyage of discovery to America, De -Quiros had not touched the mainland, but his voyage gave the name -"Australia" to the new continent. - -The English were late in the work of exploring the coast of Australia, -though as far back as 1624 there is a record of Sir William Courteen -petitioning King James I. for leave to plant colonies in "Terra -Australis." In 1688, William Dampier, in the _Cygnet_, touched at the -north-western coast of Australia. The next year, in H.M.S. _Roebuck_, he -paid a visit to the new land, and, on returning to England, put on -record his impressions of its fauna and flora. It was in 1770 that -Captain Cook made the first landing at Botany Bay. - -The British nation at the time could find no use for Australia. Annexed -in 1770 it was not colonised until 1787, when the idea was adopted of -using the apparently sterile and miserable Southern continent as a -depôt for enforced exiles. It was a happy chance that sent a "racketty" -element of British social life to be the first basis of the new -Australian population. The poachers, English Chartists, Irish Fenians, -Scottish land rebels (who formed the majority of the convicts sent to -Australia) were good as nation-building material. - -There was work to do there in the Pacific, there is further work in the -future, which calls for elements of audacity, of contempt for -convention, which are being worked out of the average British type. -There could be no greater contrast between, say, a London suburbanite, -whose life travels along an endless maze of little gravel paths between -fences and trimly-kept hedges, and the Australian of the "back country," -who any day may ride out solitary on a week's journey into a great -sun-baked wilderness, his life and that of his dog and his two horses -dependent on the accurate finding of a series of water-holes: his joy in -existence coming from the solitude and the desert, the companionship of -his three animals, his tobacco, and the thought of his "mate" somewhere, -whom he would meet after six months' absence with a handshake and a -monosyllable by way of greeting, and yet with the love of a fond -brother. - -That London suburbanite gives the key to his kindly and softly -sentimental character in his subscription to a society which devotes -itself to seeing that the suburban house cat is not left shut up without -food when a family goes away on holidays. That Australian shows how far -he has reverted to the older human type of relentless purpose when, in -the pursuit of his calling, he puts ten thousand sheep to the chance of -death from thirst. It is not that he is needlessly cruel, but that he is -sternly resolute. The same man would share his last water with his dog -in the desert to give both an equal chance of life. He feels the misery -of beasts but says nothing, and allows it to interfere nothing with his -purpose. - -There is a story of a clergyman coming to a back-country station in -Australia during the agony of a great drought. He asked of the squatter -permission to hold prayers for rain in the woolshed. The squatter turned -on him, fiercely gripping him by the arm. - -"Listen!" he cried. - -From all around came the hoarse, pitiful lowing and bleating of -thousands of animals dying of thirst and hunger. - -"Listen! If the Almighty does not hear _that_, will he hear us?" - -That is the type of man, bred from the wilder types of the British race, -who is the backbone of the Australian population, and who will be the -backbone of the resistance which the White Man will make to any overflow -of Asia along the Pacific littoral. - -The Australian took instinctively to his task in the work of White -civilisation--that of keeping the Asiatic out of Australia. In the early -days of the goldfields, the Chinese began to crowd to the continent, and -some squatters of those days designed to introduce them as cheap and -reliable shepherds. The mass of the White population protested, with -riot and rebellion in some cases. At one time it seemed as though the -guns of British warships would fire on Australian citizens in -vindication of the right of Chinese to enter Australia. But maternal -affection was stronger than logic. The cause of "White Australia" had -its way; and by poll taxes and other restrictive legislation any great -influx of Asiatics was stopped. At a later date the laws regarding alien -immigration were so strengthened that it is now almost impossible for a -coloured man to enter Australia as a colonist, even though he be a -British subject and a graduate of Oxford University. - -Around the ethics of the "White Australia" policy there has raged a -fierce controversy. But it is certain that, without that policy, without -an instinctive revolt on the part of the Australian colonists against -any intrusion of coloured races, Australia would be to-day an Asiatic -colony, still nominally held, perhaps, by a small band of White -suzerains, but ripe to fall at any moment into the hands of its -10,000,000 or 20,000,000 Asiatic inhabitants. - -Instead of that, Australia is at once the fortress which the White Race -has thinly garrisoned against an Asiatic advance southward, and the most -tempting prize to inspire the Asiatic to that advance. There is not the -least doubt that, given Australia, Japan could establish a power -threatening the very greatest in Europe. Her fecund people within a -couple of generations would people the coast-line and prepare for the -colonisation of the interior. Rich fields and rich mines put at the -disposal of a frugal and industrious people would yield enormous -material wealth. - -An organised China would put the island continent to even greater use. -But there Australia is, held by a tiny White population, which increases -very slowly (for men and women have the ideas of comfort and luxury -which lead to small families), but which is now fairly awake to the fact -that on the bosom of the Pacific and along its shores will be fought the -great race battles of the future. - -It is curious for the peoples of Europe, accustomed to associate extreme -democracy and socialistic leanings with ideals of pacificism and -"international brotherhood," to observe the warlike spirit of the -Australian peoples. There are no folk more "advanced" in politics. Their -ideal is frankly stated to be to make a "working man's Paradise" of the -continent. Yet they are entering cheerfully on a great naval -expenditure, and their adoption of a system of universal training for -military service provides the only instance, except that of Switzerland, -where the responsibility of national defence is freely accepted by the -citizen manhood of the nation. - -Universal training for military service in Australia, legally enforced -in 1909, was made inevitable in 1903, when in taking over the -administration of the defences the first Commonwealth Government -provided in its Defence Act for the levying of the whole male population -for service in case of war. That provision was evidence of the wholesome -and natural view taken by Australians of the citizen's duty to his -nation. It was also evidence of an ignorance of, or a blindness to, the -conditions of modern campaigning. Raw levies, if equipped with courage -and hardihood, could be of almost immediate usefulness in the warfare of -a century ago. To-day they would be worse than useless, a burden on the -commissariat, no support in the field. The logical Australian mind was -quick to recognise this. Within five years it was established that, -admitting a universal duty to serve, a necessary sequence was universal -training for service. - -One argument the Australian advocates of universal service had not to -meet. In that pioneer country the feeling which is responsible for a -kind of benevolent cosmopolitanism, and finds expression in Peace -Societies, had little chance of growth. The direct conflict with Nature -had brought a sense of the reality of life's struggle, of its reality -and of its essential beauty. There is no maundering horror of the -natural facts of existence. Australian veins when scratched bleed red -blood, not a pale ichor of Olympus. The combative instinct is recognised -as a part of human nature, a necessary and valuable part. That -defencelessness is the best means of defence would never occur to the -Australian as being anything but an absurd idea. He recognises the part -which the combative instinct has played, the part it still must play in -civilisation: how in its various phases it has assisted man in his -upward path; how it has still some part to play in the preservation and -further evolution of civilisation. - -The original fighting instinct was purely brutal--a rough deadly -scramble for food. But it undoubtedly had its value in securing the -survival of the best types for the propagation of the species. With its -first great refinement, in becoming the fight for mateship, the -combative instinct was still more valuable to evolution. The next step, -when fights came to be for ideas, marked a rapid growth of civilisation. -Exclude chivalry, patriotism, Imperialism, from the motives of the -world, and there would never have been a great civilisation. - -A distinguished British statesman spoke the other day of the expenditure -on armaments as possibly a sign of "relapsing into barbarism." He might -more truly have described it as an insurance against barbarism--at once -a sign of the continued existence of the forces which made civilisation, -and a proof that the advanced races are prepared to guard with the sword -what they have won by the sword. The Pacific has seen the tragedy of one -nation which, having won to a suave and graceful civilisation, came to -utter ruin through the elimination of the combative instinct from its -people. The Peruvians had apparently everything to make life happy: but -because they had eliminated the fighting instinct their civilisation was -shattered to fragments in a year by the irruption of a handful of -Spaniards. - -The Australian feels that safety and independence must be paid for with -strength, and not with abjectness. He does not wish to be another -Peruvian: and he builds up his socialistic Utopia with a sword in one -hand as was built a temple of Jerusalem. - -Some doubt having arisen in the Australian mind, after a system of -universal training had been adopted, whether the scheme of training was -sufficient, the greatest organiser of the British Army, Field Marshal -Lord Kitchener, was asked to visit the Commonwealth and report on that -point. His report suggested some slight changes, which were promptly -adopted, but on the whole he approved thoroughly of the proposed scheme, -though it provided periods of training which seem startlingly small to -the European soldier. But Lord Kitchener agreed, as every other -competent observer has agreed, that the Australian is so much of a -natural soldier owing to his pioneering habit of life, that it takes but -little special military discipline to make him an effective fighting -unit. - -Committed to a military system which will, in a short time, make some -200,000 citizens soldiers available in case of need, Australia's martial -enthusiasm finds expression also in a naval programme which is of great -magnitude for so small a people. In July 1909, an Imperial Conference on -Defence met in London, and the British Admiralty brought down certain -proposals for Imperial naval co-operation. _Inter alia_, the British -Admiralty memorandum stated:-- - -"In the opinion of the Admiralty, a Dominion Government desirous of -creating a Navy should aim at forming a distinct Fleet unit; and the -smallest unit is one which, while manageable in time of peace, is -capable of being used in its component parts in the time of war. - -"Under certain conditions the establishment of local defence flotillas, -consisting of torpedo craft and submarines, might be of assistance in -time of war to the operations of the Fleet, but such flotillas cannot -co-operate on the high seas in the wider duties of protection of trade -and preventing attacks from hostile cruisers and squadrons. The -operations of Destroyers and torpedo-boats are necessarily limited to -the waters near the coast or to a radius of action not far distant from -a base, while there are great difficulties in manning such a force and -keeping it always thoroughly efficient. - -"A scheme limited to torpedo craft would not in itself, moreover, be a -good means of gradually developing a self-contained Fleet capable of -both offence and defence. Unless a naval force--whatever its -size--complies with this condition, it can never take its proper place -in the organisation of an Imperial Navy distributed strategically over -the whole area of British interests. - -"The Fleet unit to be aimed at should, therefore, in the opinion of the -Admiralty, consist at least of the following: one armoured cruiser (new -_Indomitable_ class, which is of the _Dreadnought_ type), three -unarmoured cruisers (_Bristol_ class), six destroyers, three submarines, -with the necessary auxiliaries such as depôt and store ships, etc., -which are not here specified. - -"Such a Fleet unit would be capable of action not only in the defence of -coasts, but also of the trade routes, and would be sufficiently powerful -to deal with small hostile squadrons, should such ever attempt to act in -its waters. - -"Simply to man such a squadron, omitting auxiliary requirements and any -margin for reliefs, sickness, etc., the minimum numbers required would -be about 2300 officers and men, according to the Admiralty scheme of -complements. - -"The estimated first cost of building and arming such a complete Fleet -unit would be approximately £3,700,000, and the cost of maintenance, -including upkeep of vessels, pay, and interest and sinking fund, at -British rates, approximately £600,000 per annum. - -"The estimated cost of the officers and men required to man the ships -does not comprise the whole cost. There would be other charges to be -provided for, such as the pay of persons employed in subsidiary -services, those undergoing training, sick, in reserve, etc. - -"As the armoured cruiser is the essential part of the Fleet unit, it is -important that an _Indomitable_ of the _Dreadnought_ type should be the -first vessel to be built in commencing the formation of a Fleet unit. -She should be officered and manned, as far as possible, by Colonial -officers and men, supplemented by the loan of Imperial officers and men -who might volunteer for the service. While on the station the ship would -be under the exclusive control of the Dominion Government as regards her -movements and general administration, but officers and men would be -governed by regulations similar to the King's Regulations, and be under -naval discipline. The question of pay and allowances would have to be -settled on lines the most suitable to each Dominion Government -concerned. The other vessels, when built, would be treated in the same -manner. - -"It is recognised that, to carry out completely such a scheme as that -indicated, would ultimately mean a greater charge for naval defence than -that which the Dominions have hitherto borne; but, on the other hand, -the building of a _Dreadnought_ (or its equivalent), which certain -Governments have offered to undertake, would form part of the scheme, -and therefore, as regards the most expensive item of the shipbuilding -programme suggested, no additional cost to those Governments would be -involved. - -"_Pari passu_ with the creation of the Fleet unit, it would be necessary -to consider the development of local resources in everything which -relates to the maintenance of a Fleet. A careful inquiry should be made -into the shipbuilding and repairing establishments, with a view to their -general adaptation to the needs of the local squadron. Training schools -for officers and men would have to be established; arrangements would -have to be made for the manufacture, supply, and replenishment of the -various naval, ordnance, and victualling stores required by the -squadron. - -"All these requirements might be met according to the views of the -Dominion Governments, in so far as the form and manner of the provision -made are concerned. But as regards shipbuilding, armaments, and warlike -stores, etc., on the one hand, and training and discipline in peace and -war, on the other, there should be one common standard. If the Fleet -unit maintained by a Dominion is to be treated as an integral part of -the Imperial forces, with a wide range of interchangeability among its -component parts with those forces, its general efficiency should be the -same, and the facilities for refitting and replenishing His Majesty's -ships, whether belonging to a Dominion Fleet or to the Fleet of the -United Kingdom, should be the same. Further, as it is a _sine quâ non_ -that successful action in time of war depends upon unity of command and -direction, the general discipline must be the same throughout the whole -Imperial service, and without this it would not be possible to arrange -for that mutual co-operation and assistance which would be -indispensable in the building up and establishing of a local naval force -in close connection with the Royal Navy. It has been recognised by the -Colonial Governments that, in time of war, the local naval forces should -come under the general directions of the Admiralty." - -The Commonwealth of Australia representatives accepted in full the -proposals as set forth in the Admiralty memorandum. It was agreed that -the Australian Fleet unit thus constituted should form part of the -Eastern Fleet of the Empire, to be composed of similar units of the -Royal Navy, to be known as the China and the East Indies units -respectively, and the Australian unit. - -The initial cost was estimated to be approximately: - - 1 armoured cruiser (new _Indomitable_ class). £2,000,000 - 3 unarmoured cruisers (_Bristols_) at £350,000. 1,050,000 - 6 destroyers (_River_ class) at £80,000 480,000 - 3 submarines (_C_ class) at £55,000 165,000 - ---------- - Total £3,695,000 - -The annual expenditure in connection with the maintenance of the Fleet -unit, pay of personnel, and interest on first cost and sinking fund, was -estimated to be about £600,000, to which amount a further additional sum -would have to be added in view of the higher rates of pay in Australia -and the cost of training and subsidiary establishments, making an -estimated total of £750,000 a year. - -The Imperial Government, until such time as the Commonwealth could take -over the whole cost, offered to assist the Commonwealth Government by an -annual contribution of £250,000 towards the maintenance of the complete -Fleet unit; but the offer was refused, and the Australian taxpayer took -on the whole burden at once. - -Still not content, the Australian Government arranged for a British -Admiral of standing to visit the Commonwealth and report on its naval -needs. His report suggested the quick construction of a Fleet and of -docks, etc., involving an expenditure, within a very short time, of -£28,000,000. There was no grumbling at this from the Labour Party -Government then in power. "We have called in a doctor. We must take his -prescription," said one of the Australian Cabinet philosophically. - -The Australian, so aggressive in his patriotism, so determined in his -warlike preparations, so fitted by heredity and environment for martial -exploits, is to-day the greatest factor in the Southern Pacific. His -aggressiveness, which is almost truculence, is a guarantee that the -British Empire will never be allowed to withdraw from a sphere into -which it entered reluctantly. It will be necessary to point out in a -future chapter how the failure, so far, of the Australian colonists to -people their continent adequately constitutes one of the grave dangers -to the British Power in the Pacific. That failure has been the prompting -for much criticism. It has led to some extraordinary proposals being -put forward in Great Britain, one of the latest being that half of -Australia should be made over to Germany as a peace offering! But, apart -from all failures and neglect of the past (which may be remedied for the -future: indeed are now in process of remedy), Australia is probably -potentially the greatest asset of the British race. Her capacity as a -varied food producer in particular gives her value. There is much talk -in the world to-day of "places in the sun." Claims founded on national -pride are put forward for the right to expand. Very soon there must be a -far more weighty and dangerous clamour for "places at table," for the -right to share in the food lands of the Earth. Populations begin to -press against their boundaries. Modern science has helped the race of -man to reach numbers once considered impossible. Machinery, preventive -medicine, surgery, sanitation, all have helped to raise vastly his -numbers. The feeding of these increasing numbers becomes with each year -a more difficult problem. Territories do not stretch with populations. -Even the comparatively new nation of the United States finds her food -supply and raw material supply tightening, and has just been checked in -an attempt to obtain a lien on the natural resources of the British -Dominion of Canada. Now, excluding manufactures, the 4½ million people -of Australia produce wealth from farm and field and mine to the total of -£134,500,000 a year. Those 4½ millions could be raised to 40 millions -without much lessening of the average rate of production (only mining -and forestry would be affected). - -The food production possibilities of Australia make her of enormous -future importance. They make her, too, the object of the bitterest envy -on the part of the overcrowded, hungry peoples of the Asiatic littoral. -The Continent must be held by the British race. It would appear to be -almost as certain that it must be attacked one day by an Asiatic race. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -NEW ZEALAND AND THE SMALLER BRITISH PACIFIC COLONIES - - -A thousand miles east of Australia is another aggressive young democracy -preparing to arm to the teeth for the conflict of the Pacific, and eager -to embark upon a policy of forward Imperialism on its own account: with -aspirations, indeed, to be made overlord of all the Pacific islands -under the British Flag. - -New Zealand had a softer beginning than Australia, and did not win, -therefore, the advantages and disadvantages springing from the wild type -of colonists who gave to the Australian Commonwealth a sturdy -foundation. Nor has New Zealand the "Bush" conditions which make the -back-country Australian quite a distinct type of white man. On those hot -plains of Australia, cruel to a first knowledge, very rich in profit and -welcome to the man who learns their secrets, most potent of attraction -with familiarity and mastery, Nature exacts from man a resolute wooing -before she grants a smile of favour. But, once conquered, she responds -with most generous lavishness. In return, however, she sets her stamp -on the men who come to her favour, and they show that stamp on their -faces. Thin, wiry, with deep-set peering eyes, they suggest sun-dried -men. But whilst leaching out the fat and softness from them, Nature has -compensated the "Bush" Australians with an enduring vitality. No other -men, probably, of the world's peoples could stand such strain of work, -of hunger, of thirst. No men have finer nerves, greater courage. They -must dice with Death for their lives, time and again staking all on -their endurance, and on the chance of the next water-hole being still -unparched. This gives them a contempt of danger, and some contempt of -life, which shows in a cruel touch in their character. - -Imagine a white man who, keeping all his education and maintaining his -sympathy with modern science and modern thought, withal reverts in some -characteristics to the type of the Bedouin of the desert, and you have -the typical Australian Bushman. He is fierce in his friendships, stern -in his enmities, passionately fond of his horse, so contemptuous of -dwellings that he will often refuse to sleep in them, Arabian in his -hospitality, fatalistic in his philosophy. He has been known to inflict -torture on a native whom he suspects of concealing the whereabouts of a -water-hole, and yet will almost kill himself to get help for a mate in -need. He is so independent that he hates working for a "boss," and will -rarely take work on wages, preferring to live as his own master, by -hunting or fossicking, or by undertaking contract work for forest -clearing. - -There is material for a great warrior nation in these Bushmen, with -their capacity for living anyhow, their deadliness as shots, their -perfect command of the horse, their Stoic cruelty which would enable -them to face any hardship without flinching, and to inflict any revenge -without remorse. - -New Zealand has not the "Bushman" type. But as some compensation, the -early New Zealand settlers had the advantage of meeting at the very -outset an effective savage. The Australian learned all his hardihood -from Nature; the New Zealand colonist had the Maori to teach him, not -only self-reliance but community reliance. Whilst Nature was very kind -to him, sparing the infliction of the drought, giving always a -reasonable surety of food, he was obliged to walk warily in fear of the -powerful and warlike Maori tribes. The phenomenon, so frequent in -Australia, of a squatter leading his family, his flocks, and his herds -out into the wilderness and fighting out there, alone, a battle with -Nature was rare in New Zealand. There the White settlers were forced -into groups by the fear of and respect for the Maoris. From the first -they knew the value of a fortified post. Until a very late period of -their history they saw frequently the uniforms of troops from Great -Britain helping them to garrison the towns against the natives. - -As was the case with Australia, the British Empire was very reluctant to -assume control of New Zealand. Captain Cook, who annexed Australia in -1770, had visited New Zealand in 1769, but had not acquired it formally -for the British Crown. The same explorer returned to New Zealand several -years after. But from the date of his last departure, 1776, three -decades passed before any White settlement was attempted. In 1788 the -colonisation of Australia was begun, but it was not until 1814 that a -small body of Europeans left Sydney and settled in New Zealand. The Rev. -Samuel Marsden, who had been Chaplain to the Convict Colony of New South -Wales, was the leader of the band, and its mission was to Christianise -the natives. A little later the Wesleyan Church founded a Mission in the -same neighbourhood. In 1825 a Company was formed in London to colonise -New Zealand, and it sent away a band of pioneers in the ship _Rosanna_. -The wild mien of the natives so thoroughly frightened these colonists -that almost all of them returned to England. Desultory efforts at -settlement followed, small bands of British subjects forming tiny -stations at various points of the New Zealand coast, and getting on as -well as they might with the natives, for they had no direct protection -from the British Government, which was entirely opposed to any idea of -annexing the group. There was no fever for expansion in England at the -time. The United States had broken away. Canada seemed to be on the -point of secession. The new settlement in Australia promised little. But -the hand of the British Government was destined to be forced in the -matter, and, willy-nilly, Britain had to take over a country which is -now one of her most valued possessions. - -Mr Edward Gibbon Wakefield was responsible for forcing on the British -Government the acquisition of New Zealand. The era was one of -philanthropy and keen thought for social reform in Great Britain. The -doctrines of the French Revolution still reverberated through Europe, -and the rights of humanity were everywhere preached to men confronted -with the existence of great social misery, which seemed to deny to the -majority of mankind even the degree of comfort enjoyed by animals. -Wakefield's remedy was the emigration of the surplus population of the -British islands--well, the British islands except Ireland, to which -country and its inhabitants Wakefield had an invincible antipathy. The -prospectus of the Company to colonise New Zealand stated: - -"The aim of this Company is not confined to mere emigration, but is -directed to colonisation in its ancient and systematic form. Its object -is to transplant English society with its various graduations in due -proportions, carrying out our laws, customs, associations, habits, -manners, feelings--everything of England, in short, but the soil. We -desire so now to cast the foundations of the colony that in a few -generations New Zealand shall offer to the world a counterpart of our -country in all the most cherished peculiarities of our own social system -and national character, as well as in wealth and power." - -In due time twelve ships carrying 1125 people sailed for New Zealand. -That was the beginning of a steady flow of emigrants mostly recruited by -various Churches, and settled in groups in different parts of the New -Zealand islands--members of the Free Church of Scotland at Otago, of the -Church of England at Canterbury, men of Devon and Cornwall men at New -Plymouth. - -The British Government could hardly shake off all responsibility for -these exiles. But it did its best to avoid annexation, and even adopted -the remarkable expedient of recognising the Maoris as a nation, and -encouraging them to choose a national standard. The Maori Flag was -actually flown on the high seas for a while, and at least on one -occasion received a salute from a British warship. But no standard could -give a settled polity to a group of savage tribes. The experiment of -setting up "The Independent Tribes of New Zealand" as a nation failed. -In 1840, Great Britain formally took over the New Zealand islands from -the natives under the treaty of Waitangi, which is said to be the only -treaty on record between a white race and a coloured race which has been -faithfully kept to this day. - -"This famous instrument," writes a New Zealand critic, "by which the -Maoris, at a time when they were apparently unconquerable, voluntarily -ceded sovereign rights over their country to Queen Victoria, is -practically the only compact between a civilised and an uncivilised race -which has been regarded and honoured through generations of -difficulties, distrust, and even warfare. By guaranteeing to the Maori -the absolute ownership of their patrimonial lands and the enjoyment of -their ancestral rights and customs, it enabled them to take their place -as fully enfranchised citizens of the British Empire, and to present the -solitary example of a dark race surviving contact with a white, and -associating with it on terms of mutual regard, equality and unquestioned -loyalty. The measure of this relationship is evident from the fact that -Maori interests are represented by educated natives in both houses of -the New Zealand Parliament and in the Ministry. The strict observance of -the Treaty of Waitangi is part and parcel of the national faith of the -New Zealanders, and a glorious monument to the high qualities of one of -the finest races of aboriginal peoples the world has ever seen." - -The New Zealand colonists, having won the blessing of the British Flag, -were not well content. Very shortly afterwards we find Mr James Edward -FitzGerald writing to Wakefield, who was contemplating a trip to New -Zealand. - -"After all, this place is but a village. Its politics are not large -enough for you. But there are politics on this side the world which -would be so. It seems unquestionable that in the course of a very few -years--sometimes I think months--the Australian colonies will declare -their independence. We shall live to see an Australasian Empire -rivalling the United States in greatness, wealth and power. There is a -field for great statesmen. Only yesterday I was saying, talking about -you, that if you come across the world it must be to Australia; just in -time to draw up the Declaration of Independence." - -But that phase passed. New Zealand to-day emulates Australia in a -fervent Imperial patriotism, and at the 1911 Imperial Conference her -Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, was responsible for the following -proposal which was too forward in its Imperialism to be immediately -acceptable to his fellow delegates: - -"That the Empire has now reached a stage of Imperial development which -renders it expedient that there should be an Imperial Council of State, -with representatives from all the self-governing parts of the Empire, in -theory and in fact advisory to the Imperial Government on all questions -affecting the interests of his Majesty's Dominions oversea." - -He urged the resolution on the following grounds: - -(1) Imperial unity; (2) organised Imperial defence; (3) the equal -distribution of the burden of defence throughout the Empire; (4) the -representation of self-governing oversea Dominions in an Imperial -Parliament of defence for the purpose of determining peace or war, the -contributions to Imperial defence, foreign policy as far as it affects -the Empire, international treaties so far as they affect the Empire, and -such other Imperial matters as might by agreement be transferred to such -Parliament. - -In advocating his resolution Sir Joseph Ward made an interesting -forecast of the future of the British nations whose shores were washed -by the Pacific. He estimated that if the present rate of increase were -maintained, Canada would have in twenty-five years from now between -30,000,000 and 40,000,000 inhabitants. In Australia, South Africa, and -New Zealand the proportionate increase could not be expected to be so -great, but he believed that in twenty-five years' time the combined -population of those oversea Dominions would be much greater than that of -the United Kingdom. Those who controlled the destinies of the British -Empire would have to consider before many years had passed the expansion -of these oversea countries into powerful nations, all preserving their -own local autonomy, all being governed to suit the requirements of the -people within their own territory, but all deeply concerned in keeping -together in some loose form of federation to serve the general interests -of all parts of the Empire. - -At a later stage, in reply to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister of -Canada, Sir Joseph Ward indulged in an even more optimistic prophecy. -The United States, he said, had something like 100,000,000 people. The -prospective possibility of Canada for settlement purposes was not less -than that of the United States, and the Dominion was capable of holding -a population of 100,000,000 in the future. Australia also was capable of -holding a similar number, although it would necessarily be a great -number of years before that position was reached. South Africa, too, -could hold 100,000,000 people. It was no exaggeration to suggest that -those three Dominions were capable of holding 300,000,000 of people with -great comfort as compared with certain overcrowded countries. New -Zealand, in the opinion of many well-qualified men, could carry upwards -of 40,000,000 people with comparative ease and comfort. - -But these figures are hardly scientific. Climatic and other -considerations will prevent Canada from reaching quite the same degree -of greatness as the United States. British South Africa could "hold" -100,000,000 people, but it could not support them on present -appearances. The possibilities of Australian settlement are difficult to -be exaggerated in view of the steady dwindling of the "desert" area in -the light of recent research and exploration, and of the fact that all -her area is blessed with a genial climate. New Zealand, to keep -40,000,000 people, would need, however, to have a density of 400 people -per square mile, a density surpassed to-day in Belgium and Holland but -not reached by Great Britain. A fairly conservative estimate of the -possibilities of the British Empire would allow it for the future a -white population of 200,000,000, of whom at least half would be grouped -near the shores of the Pacific. Presuming a British Imperial Federation -on Sir Joseph Ward's lines with such a population, and the mastery of -the Pacific would be settled. But that is for the future, the far -future. - -Sir Joseph Ward, in the event, was not able to carry the Imperial -Conference with him, the majority of the delegates considering that the -time had not yet come for the organisation of an Imperial Federal -system. But it is possible that with the passing of time and the growth -of the population of the Dominions overseas, some such system may -evolve: and a British Empire Parliament may sit one day at Westminster, -at Vancouver or at Sydney. Certainly the likelihood is that the -numerical balance of the British race will shift one day from the -Atlantic to the Pacific. - -Following Australia's example, New Zealand has adopted a system of -universal training for military service, but there are indications that -she will not enforce it quite so rigorously as her neighbour. In the -matter of naval defence, at the Conference of 1909 the New Zealand -attitude was thus defined by her Prime Minister:-- - -"I favour one great Imperial Navy with all the Overseas Dominions -contributing, either in ships or money, and with naval stations at the -self-governing Dominions supplied with ships by and under the control of -the Admiralty. I, however, realise the difficulties, and recognise that -Australia and Canada in this important matter are doing that which their -respective Governments consider to be best; but the fact remains that -the alterations that will be brought about upon the establishment of an -Australian unit will alter the present position with New Zealand. - -"New Zealand's maritime interests in her own waters, and her dependent -islands in the Pacific would, under the altered arrangements, be almost -entirely represented by the Australian Fleet unit, and not, as at -present, by the Imperial Fleet. This important fact, I consider, -necessitates some suitable provision being made for New Zealand, which -country has the most friendly feeling in every respect for Australia and -her people, and I am anxious that in the initiation of new arrangements -with the Imperial Government under the altered conditions, the interests -of New Zealand should not be over-looked. I consider it my duty to point -this out, and to have the direct connection between New Zealand and the -Royal Navy maintained in some concrete form. - -"New Zealand will supply a _Dreadnought_ for the British Navy as already -offered, the ship to be under the control of and stationed wherever the -Admiralty considers advisable. - -"I fully realise that the creation of specific units, one in the East, -one in Australia, and, if possible, one in Canada, would be a great -improvement upon the existing condition of affairs, and the fact that -the New Zealand _Dreadnought_ was to be the flag-ship of the -China-Pacific unit is, in my opinion, satisfactory. I, however, consider -it is desirable that a portion of the China-Pacific unit should remain -in New Zealand waters, and I would suggest that two of the new "Bristol" -cruisers, together with three destroyers and two submarines, should be -detached from the China station in time of peace and stationed in New -Zealand waters; that these vessels should come under the flag of the -Admiral of the China unit; that the flagship should make periodical -visits to New Zealand waters; and that there should be an interchange in -the service of the cruisers between New Zealand and China, under -conditions to be laid down. - -"The ships should be manned, as far as possible, by New Zealand officers -and men, and, in order that New Zealanders might be attracted to serve -in the Fleet, local rates should be paid to those New Zealanders who -enter, in the same manner as under the present Australian and New -Zealand agreement, such local rates being treated as deferred pay. - -"The determination of the agreement with Australia has, of necessity, -brought up the position of New Zealand under that joint agreement. I -therefore suggest that on completion of the China unit, the present -agreement with New Zealand should cease, that its contribution of -£100,000 per annum should continue and be used to pay the difference in -the rates of pay to New Zealanders above what would be paid under the -ordinary British rate. If the contribution for the advanced rate of pay -did not amount to £100,000 per annum, any balance to be at the disposal -of the Admiralty. - -"The whole of this Fleet unit to be taken in hand and completed before -the end of 1912, and I should be glad if the squadron as a whole would -then visit New Zealand on the way to China, leaving the New Zealand -detachment there under its senior officer." - -From the difference between the naval arrangements of Australia and New -Zealand can be gathered some hints of the difference between the -national characteristics of the two young nations. Australia is -aggressively independent in all her arrangements: loyal to the British -Empire and determined to help its aims in every way, but to help after -her own fashion and with armies and navies recruited and trained by -herself. New Zealand, with an equal Imperial zeal, has not the same -national self-consciousness and is willing to allow her share of naval -defence to take the form of a cash payment. Probably the most effective -naval policy of New Zealand would be founded on a close partnership with -Australia, the two nations combining to maintain one Fleet. But that New -Zealand does not seem to desire. She is, however, content to be a -partner with Australia in one detail of military administration. The -military college for the training of officers at the Australian Federal -capital is shared with New Zealand. The present Prime Minister of -Australia, Mr Fisher, is taking steps towards securing a closer defence -bond with New Zealand.[4] - -In an aspiration towards forward Imperialism, New Zealand is fully at -one with Australia. But she has the idea that the control of the -Southern Pacific, outside of the continent of Australia, is the right of -New Zealand, and dreams of a New Zealand Empire embracing the island -groups of Polynesia. It will be one of the problems of the future for -the British Power to restrain the exuberant racial pride of these South -Pacific nations, who see nothing in the European situation which should -interfere with a full British control of the South Pacific. - -In addition to Australia and New Zealand, the British Empire has a -number of minor possessions in the South Pacific. In regard to almost -all of them, the same tale of reluctant acceptance has to be told. New -Guinea was annexed by the Colony of Queensland, anxious to set on foot a -foreign policy of her own, in 1883. The British Government repudiated -the annexation, and in the following year reluctantly consented to take -over for the Empire a third of the great island on condition that the -Australian States agreed to guarantee the cost of the administration of -the new possession. The Fiji Group was offered to Great Britain by King -Thakombau in 1859, and was refused. Some English settlers then began to -administer the group on a system of constitutional government under -Thakombau. It was not until 1874 that the British Government accepted -these rich islands, and then somewhat ungraciously and reluctantly, -influenced to the decision by the fact that the alternative was German -acquisition. - -It was no affectation of coyness on the part of the successive British -Governments which dictated a refusal when South Pacific annexations were -mooted. Time after time it was made clear that the Home Country wanted -no responsibilities there. Yet to-day, as the result mainly of the -impulse of Empire and adventure in individual British men, the British -Flag flies over the whole continent of Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, -a part of New Guinea, Fiji, and the Ellice, Gilbert, Kermadec, Friendly, -Chatham, Cook, and many other groups. It is a strange instance of -greatness thrust upon a people. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[4] Since writing, in March 1912, there has been an attempt on the part -of the Australian Prime Minister to come to some closer naval -arrangement with New Zealand; and the attempt seems to promise to be -successful. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -THE NATIVE RACES - - -The native races of the South Pacific, with the possible exception of -the Maori, will have no influence in settling the destiny of the ocean. -Neither the Australian aboriginal nor the Kanaka--under which last -general title may be grouped all the tribes of Papua, the Solomons, the -New Hebrides and other Oceanic islands--will provide the foundation of a -nation. It is one of the curiosities of world-history that no great race -has ever survived which had its origin in a land south of the Equator. -From the earliest civilisations to the latest, there is not a single -instance of a people of the southern hemisphere exercising any notable -effect on the world's destinies. Sometimes there seems no adequate -reason for this. That Africa north of the Equator should have produced a -great civilisation, which was the early guide and instructor of the -European civilisations, may be explained in part by the curious -phenomenon of the Nile delta, a tract of land the irrigation of which at -regular intervals by mysterious natural forces prompted inquiry, and -suggested that all the asperities of Nature could be softened by effort. -(The spirit of inquiry and the desire for artificial comfort are the -great promptings to civilisation.) But it is difficult to understand why -in America the aboriginal Mexicans should have been so much more warlike -than the Peruvians or any other people in South America; and why the -West Pacific should wash with its northern waters the lands of two great -races, and with its southern waters flow past lands which, though of -greater fertility, remained almost empty, or else were peopled by -childlike races, careless of progress and keen only to enjoy the simple -happiness offered by Nature's bounty. - -The Australian aboriginal race is rapidly dwindling: one of its -branches, that which populated the fertile and temperate island of -Tasmania, is already extinct. In Tasmania, reacting to the influence of -a mild and yet stimulating climate, a climate comparable with that of -Devon in England, but more sunny, the Australasian native had won to his -highest point of development. Apparently, too, he had won to his highest -possible point, for there is evidence that for many generations no -progress at all had been made towards civilisation. Yet that point was -so low in the stage of evolution that it was impossible for the poor -natives to take any part, either as a separate race, or by mingling -their blood with another race, in the future of the Pacific. The black -Australian is a primitive rather than a degraded man. Most ethnologists -have concluded that this black Australian is a Caucasian. Wallace -ascribes to him kinship with the Veddas and the Ainus of Asia. Stratz -takes the Australian as the prototype of all the races of man. -Schoetensack contends that the human race had its origin in the -Australian continent. - -But, however dignified by ancestry, the Australian aboriginal was -pathetically out of touch with modern civilisation. He broke down -utterly at its advent, not so much because of his bad qualities as -because of his childishness. Not only were alcohol, opium and greed -strange to him, but also weapons of steel and horses and clothing. He -had never learnt to dig, to build, to weave. War organisation had not -been thought of, and his tribal fights were prodigal of noise but -sparing of slaughter. When the White Man came, it was inevitable that -this simple primitive should dwindle from the face of the earth. It is -not possible to hold out any hope for the future of the Australian -blacks. They can never emulate the Maoris of New Zealand, who will take -a small share in the building up of a nation. All that may be hoped for -is that their certain end will be kept back as long as is humanly -possible, and that their declining days will be softened by all -kindness. A great reserve in the Northern Territory--a reserve from -which the White population would be jealously excluded, and almost as -jealously the White fashions of clothing and house-building--holds out -the best hope for their future. It is comforting to think that the -Australian Government is now resolved to do all in its power for the -aboriginals. Indeed, to be just, authority has rarely lacked in -kindness of intention; it has been the cruelty of individuals acting in -defiance of authority, but aided by the supineness of authority, that -has been responsible for most of the cruelty. - -The Maori or native New Zealander was of a different type. The Maori was -an immigrant to New Zealand. Some time back there was an overflow of -population from the fertile sub-tropical islands of Malaysia. A tribe -which had already learned some of the arts of life, which was of a proud -and warlike character, took to the sea, as the Norsemen did in Europe, -and sought fresh lands for colonisation. Not one wave, but several, of -this outflow of colonists struck New Zealand. The primitive people -there, the Morioris, could offer but little resistance to the warlike -Malaysians, and speedily were vanquished, a few remnants finding refuge -in the outlying islets of the New Zealand group. Probably much the same -type of emigrant occupied Hawaii at one time, for the Hawaiian and the -Maori have much in common. But whilst the perpetual summer of Hawaii -softened and enervated its colonists, the bracing and vigorous climate -of New Zealand had a precisely opposite effect. The dark race of the -Pacific reached there a very high state of development. - -The Maori system of government was tribal, and there does not seem to -have been, up to the time of the coming of the White Man, any attempt on -the part of one chief to seize supreme power and become king. Land was -held on a communal system, and cultivated fairly well. Art existed, and -was applied to boat-building, to architecture, to the embroidering of -fabrics, to the carving of stone and wood. War was the great pastime, -and cannibalism was customary. Probably this practice was brought by the -Maoris from their old home. If it had not been, it might well have -sprung up under the strange conditions of life in the new country, for -New Zealand naturally possessed not a single mammal, not a beast whose -flesh might be eaten. There were birds and lizards, and that was all. -The Maoris brought with them dogs, which were bred for eating, but were -too few in number to provide a satisfactory food-supply; and rats, which -were also eaten. With these exceptions there was no flesh food, and the -invitation to cannibalism was clear. - -A more pleasant feature of the national life of the Maori was a high -degree of chivalry. In war and in love he seems to have had very much -the same ideas of conduct as the European of the Age of Chivalry. He -liked the combat for the combat's own sake, and it is recorded as one of -the incidents of the Maori War that when a besieged British force ran -short of ammunition, the Maori enemy halved with them their supply, "so -as to have a fair fight." - -In his love affairs the Maori was romantic and poetic. His legends and -his native poetry suggest a state of society in which there was a high -respect for women, who had to be wooed and won, and were not the mere -chattels of the men-warriors. Since this respect for womenkind is a -great force for civilisation, there is but little doubt that, if the -Maoris had been left undisturbed for a few more centuries, they would -have evolved a state of civilisation comparable with that of the -Japanese or the Mexicans. - -When Captain Cook visited New Zealand in 1769 the Maori race probably -numbered some 100,000. The results of coming into contact with -civilisation quickly reduced that number to about 50,000. But there was -then a stay in the process of extinction. The Maori began to learn the -virtues as well as the vices of civilisation. "Pakeha" medicine and -sanitation were adopted, and the Maori birth-rate began to creep up, the -Maori death-rate to decrease. It is not probable that the Maori race -will ever come to such numbers as to be a factor of importance in the -Pacific. But it will have some indirect influence. Having established -the right to grow up side by side with the White colonists, possessing -full political and social rights, the Maoris will probably modify -somewhat the New Zealand national type. We shall see in New Zealand, -within a reasonable time, a population of at least 10,000,000 of people, -of whom perhaps 1,000,000 will be Maoris. The effect of this mixture of -the British colonising type with a type somewhat akin to the Japanese -will be interesting to watch. In all probability New Zealand will -shelter a highly aggressive and a fiercely patriotic nation in the -future (as indeed she does at present). - -The Malay States bred a vigorous and courageous race of seamen, and -Malay blood has been dispersed over many parts of the Pacific, Malays -probably providing the chief parent stock both for the Hawaiians and the -Maoris. But the Malay Power has been broken up to such an extent that a -Malay nation is now impossible. Since the British overlordship of the -Malay Peninsula, the Chinese have been allowed free access to the land -and free trading rights; and they have ousted the original inhabitants -to a large extent. - -The Maori excepted, no race of Polynesia or Melanesia will survive to -affect the destinies of the Pacific Ocean. Nature was cruelly kind to -the Kanaka peoples in the past, and they must pay for their happiness -now. In the South Pacific islands, until White civilisation intruded, -the curse of Adam, which is that with the sweat of the brow bread must -be won, had not fallen. Nature provided a Garden of Eden where rich food -came without digging and raiment was not needed. Laughing nations of -happy children grew up. True, wars they had, and war brought woe. But -the great trouble, and also the great incentive to progress of life, -they had not. There was no toiling for leave to live. Civilisation, -alas! intrudes now, more urgent each year, to bring its "blessings" of -toil, disease, and drabness of fettered life; and the Paradise of the -South Sea yields to its advance--here with the sullen and passionate -resentment of the angry child, there with the pathetic listlessness of -the child too afraid to be angry. But, still, there survives in tree and -flower, bird and beast, and in aboriginal man, much that has the -suggestion rather of the Garden of Eden than of this curious world which -man has made for himself--a world of exacting tasks and harsh -taskmasters, of ugly houses and smoke-stained skies, of machinery and of -enslaving conventions. - -With the White Man came sugar plantations and cotton fields. The Kanaka -heard the words "work" and "wages." He laughed brightly, and went on -chasing the butterfly happiness. To work a little while, for the fun of -the thing, he was willing enough. Indeed, any new sort of task had a -fascination for his childish nature. But steady toil he abhorred, and -for wages he had no use. - -Some three years ago I watched for an hour or two, from the veranda of a -house at Suva, a Fijian garden-boy at work. This was a "good" -garden-boy, noted in the town for his industry. And he played with his -work with an elegant naïveté that was altogether charming to one who had -not to be his paymaster. Almost bare of clothing, his fine bronzed -muscles rippled and glanced to show that he had the strength for any -task if he had but the will. Perhaps the gentleness of his energy was -inspired by the æsthetic idea of just keeping his bronze skin a little -moist, so as to bring out to the full its satin grace without blurring -the fine anatomical lines with drops of visible sweat. His languid grace -deserved that it should have had some such prompting. If a bird -alighted on a tree, the Fijian quickly dropped his hoe and pursued it -with stones, which--his bright smile said--were not maliciously meant, -but had a purpose of greeting. An insect, a passing wayfarer, the fall -of a leaf, a cloud in the sky, all provided equally good reasons for -stopping work. Finally, at three a little shower came, and the "model -boy" of Fijian industry thankfully ceased work for the day. - -A gracious, sweet, well-fed idleness was Nature's dower to the Pacific -Islander, until the White Man came with his work, as an angel with a -flaming sword, and Paradise ended. Now the fruit of that idleness is -that the Kanaka can take no part in the bustling life of modern -civilisation. - -In one British settlement, Papua, a part of New Guinea, the Australian -Government is endeavouring to lead a Kanaka race along the path of -modern progress. "Papua for the Papuans," is the keynote of the -administration, and all kinds of devices are adopted to tempt the -coloured man to industry. His Excellency, Colonel Murray, the -Administrator of Papua, told me in London (where he was on leave) last -year (1911) that he had some hopes that the cupidity of the Papuans -would in time tempt them to some settled industry. They had a great -liking for the White Man's adornments and tools, and, to gratify that -liking, were showing some inclination for work. The effort is well -meant, but probably vain. "Civilisation is impossible where the banana -grows," declared an American philosopher: and the generalisation was -sound. The banana tree provides food without tillage: and an organic law -of this civilisation of ours is that man must be driven, by hunger and -thirst and the desire for shelter, to plan, to organise, to make -machines, to store. - -Every nation in the Pacific has the same experience. In the Hawaiian -Group, the American Power finds the native race helpless material for -nation-making. The Hawaiian takes on a veneer of civilisation, but -nothing can shake him from his habits of indolence. He adopts American -clothes, lives in American houses, learns to eat pie and to enjoy -ice-cream soda. He plays at the game of politics with voluble zeal. But -he is still a Kanaka, and takes no real part in the progress of the -flourishing territory of Hawaii. Americans do the work of -administration. Imported Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese and others, are -the coolies and the traders. The Hawaiian talks, basks in the sun, -adorns himself with wreaths of odorous flowers, and occasionally -declaims with the pathetic bleat of an enraged sheep at "American -tyranny." - -When White civilisation came to the South Pacific, the various islands -held several millions of coloured peoples, very many of them enjoying an -idyllically happy system of existence. To-day, 50,000 Maoris, beginning -to hold their own in the islands of New Zealand, represent the sole hope -of all those peoples to have any voice at all in the Pacific. -Humanitarian effort may secure the survival for a time of other groups -of islanders, but the ultimate prospects are not bright. Probably what -is happening at Fiji, where the Fijian fades away in the face of a more -strenuous coolie type imported from India, and at Hawaii, will happen -everywhere in the South Pacific. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -LATIN AMERICA - - -Latin America is the world's great example of race-mixture. Europeans -and Indians have intermixed from Terra del Fuego to the northern -boundary of Mexico, and the resultant race, with some differences due to -climate, has general points of resemblance over all that vast territory. -There is prompting to speculation as to the reasons why in Spanish and -Portuguese America race mixture was the rule, in Anglo-Saxon America the -exception. It was not the superior kindness of the Latin people which -paved the way to confidence and inter-marriage. No one can doubt that, -badly stained as are the records of the Anglo-Saxons in America, the -records of the Latins are far, far worse. Yet the Latin, between -intervals of massacre, prepared the nuptial couch, and a Latin-Indian -race survives to-day whilst there is no Teutonic-Indian race. - -Probably it is a superior sense of racial responsibility and racial -superiority which has kept the Anglo-Saxon colonist from mingling his -blood with that of the races he made subject to him. He shows a -reproduction in a modern people of the old Hebraic spirit of elect -nationality. In truth; there may be advanced some excuse for those -fantastic theorists who write large volumes to prove that ten tribes -were once lost from Israel and might have been found soon after in -Britain. If there were no other circumstances on which to found the -theory (which, I believe, has not the slightest historical basis), the -translation of the Old Testament into the English language would amply -serve. It is the one great successful translation of the world's -literary history: it makes any other version of the Bible in a European -language--including that pseudo-English one done at Douai--seem pallid -and feeble; it rescues the Hebrew sentiment and the Hebrew poetry from -out the morass of the dull Greek translation. And it does all this -seemingly because the Elizabethan Englishman resembled in temperament, -in outlook, in thought, the Chosen People of the time of David. - -The Elizabethan Anglo-Saxon wandering out on the Empire trail treated -with cruelty and contempt the Gentile races which he encountered. He has -since learned to treat them with kindness and contempt. But he has never -sunk the contempt, and the contempt saves him from any general practice -of miscegenation. In ruling the blind heathen, more fussy peoples fail -because they wish to set the heathen right: to induce the barbarian to -become as they are. The Anglo-Saxon does not particularly wish to set -the heathen right. He is right: that suffices. It is not possible for -inferior races ever to be like him. It is wise, therefore, to let them -wallow. So long as they give to him the proper reverence, he is -satisfied. Thus the superb, imperturbable Anglo-Saxon holds aloof from -inferior races: governs them coolly, on the whole justly; but never -attempts to share their life. His plan is to enforce strictly from a -subject people the one thing that he wants of them, and to leave the -rest of their lives without interference. They may fill the interval -with hoodoo rites, caste divisions or Mumbo-Jumbo worship, as they -please. So long as such diversions have no seditious tendencies they are -viewed, if not with approval, at least with tolerance. Indeed, if that -be suitable to his purpose, the Anglo-Saxon governor of the heathen will -subsidise the Dark Races' High Priest of Mumbo-Jumbo. Thus a favourite -British remedy for the sorcerer, who is the great evil of the South Sea -Islands, is not a crusade against sorcery, which would be very -troublesome and rather useless, but to purchase over the chief -sorcerers--who come very cheap when translated into English -currency--and make them do their incantations on behalf of orderly -government (insisting, by the way, on more faithful service than Balaam -gave). - -It is his race arrogance, equally with his robust common-sense, that -makes the Anglo-Saxon the ideal coloniser and governor of Coloured -Races: and there is no room for miscegenation in an ideal system. -America, considered in its two sections, Latin America and Anglo-Saxon -America, gives a good opportunity for comparison of colonising methods. -To-day North of the 30th parallel the Republic of the United States -shows as the greatest White nation of the world, greatest in population -and material prosperity; and the young nation of Canada enters buoyantly -upon the path of a big career. South of that parallel there are great -populations, but they are poor in resources, and as a rule poorly -governed, poorly educated. Some of the Latin-American races show -promise--Chili and the Argentine Republic most of all,--yet none is -comparable or ever likely to be comparable with the Republic of North -America. - -Yet before Columbus sailed from Europe the position was exactly -reversed. North of the 30th parallel of northern latitude there was but -a vagabond beginning of civilisation. South of that parallel two fine -nations had built up polities comparable in many respects with those of -the European peoples of to-day. What Peru and Mexico would have become -under conditions of Anglo-Saxon conquest, it is, of course, impossible -to say. But there is an obvious conclusion to be drawn from the fact -that the Anglo-Saxon colonists found a wilderness and built up two great -nations: the Latin colonists found two highly organised civilisations, -and left a wilderness from which there now emerges a hope, faint and not -yet certain, of a Latin-American Power. - -The story of Peru is one of the great tragedies of history. The Peruvian -Empire at the time of the Spanish invasion stretched along the Pacific -Ocean over the territory which now comprises Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and -Chili. Natural conditions along that coastal belt had been favourable to -the growth of civilisation. A strip of land about twenty leagues wide -runs along the coast, hemmed in by the Andes on one side, by the sea on -the other. This strip of coast land is fed by a few scanty streams. -Above, the steppes of the Sierra, of granite and porphyry, have their -heights wrapped in eternal snows. Here was the call for work, which is -the main essential of civilisation. The Peruvians constructed a system -of canals and subterranean aqueducts, wrought with extraordinary skill -by instruments and tools made of stone and copper (though iron was -plentiful its use had not been learned). Thus they cultivated the waste -places. In some respects their life conditions were similar to those of -the Egyptians. Their agriculture was highly advanced and comprehensive. -Their religion was sun-worship, and on it was based a highly organised -theocracy. Tradition said that a son and daughter of the Sun, who were -also man and wife, were sent by their father to teach the secrets of -life to the Peruvians. These divinities were the first Incas. - -The civil and military systems of the Peruvians were admirable in -theory, though doomed to break down utterly under the savage test of the -Spanish invasion. The Empire was divided into four parts; into each ran -one of the great roads which diverged from Cuzco ("the navel"), the -capital. The provinces were ruled by viceroys, assisted by councils; all -magistrates and governors were selected from the nobility. By law, the -Peruvian was forced to marry at a certain age. Sufficient land was -allotted him to maintain himself and his wife, and an additional grant -was made for each child. There was a yearly adjustment and renewal of -land grants. Conditions of theocratic and despotic socialism marked most -departments of civil life. In what may be called "foreign politics" the -Incas pursued conquest by a Florentine policy of negotiation and -intrigue. In dealing with neighbouring foes they acted so that when they -at last came into the Peruvian Empire, they should have uncrippled -resources and amicable sentiments. The Spaniards have described the -Peruvians as "lazy, luxurious and sensual." It would have been equally -correct to have said that they were contented, refined and amiable. -Their very virtues made it impossible for them to defend themselves -against the Spaniards. - -The Spanish adventurers who were destined to destroy the elegant and -happy civilisation of the Peruvians--a civilisation which had solved the -problem of poverty, and gave to every citizen a comfortable -existence--were children of Spain at her highest pitch of power and -pride. Gold and his God were the two objects of worship of the Spaniard -of that day, and his greed did no more to sully his wild courage with -cruelty than his religion, which had been given a fierce and gloomy bent -towards persecution by the struggles with the Moors. - -In 1511 Vasco Nunez da Balboa was told in Mexico of a fabulously rich -land where "gold was as cheap as iron." Balboa in the search for it -achieved the fine feat of crossing from Central America the mountain -rampart of the isthmus. Reaching the Pacific, he rushed into its waters -crying, "I claim this unknown sea with all it contains for the King of -Castile, and I will make good this claim against all who dare to gainsay -it." There Balboa got clearer news of Peru, and pushed on to within -about twenty leagues of the Gulf of St Michael. But the achievement of -Peru was reserved for another man. In 1524 Francisco Pizarro set out -upon the conquest of Peru. Pizarro had all the motives for wild -adventure. An illegitimate child--his father a colonel of infantry, his -mother of humble condition,--he had reached middle age without winning a -fortune, yet without abating his ambition. He was ready for any -desperate enterprise. After two unsuccessful attempts to reach Peru, the -Spanish freebooter finally succeeded, leading a tiny force across the -Andes to Caxamalco, where he encountered the Inca, who received the -strangers peaceably. But no kindness could stave off the lust for gold -and slaughter of the Spaniards. Because the Inca refused at a moment's -notice to accept the Christian God, as explained to him by a Spanish -friar, a holy war was declared against the Peruvians. The wretched -people understood as little the treachery and the resolute cruelty of -the Spaniards as their gunpowder and their horses. Paralysed by their -virtues, they fell easy victims, as sheep to wolves. - -A career of rapine and bloodshed led to the complete occupation of the -country by the Spaniards, and the vassalage of the natives. Civil war -amongst the conquerors, into which the natives were willy-nilly dragged, -aggravated the horrors of this murder of a nation. The Spaniards looted -and tortured the men, violated the women, and were so merciless as to -carry on their war even against the natural resources of the country. -They used to kill the llama or native sheep for the sake of its brains, -which were considered a delicacy. Yet Pizarro, in his instructions from -Spain, which secured to him the right of conquest and discovery in Peru, -and various titles and privileges, was expressly enjoined "to observe -all regulations for the good government and protection of the natives." - -The fact that the Spaniards condescended to racial mixture with the -Indians did nothing to heal the scars of such suffering. The half-breeds -grew up with a hatred of Spain, and they had borrowed from their fathers -some of their savagery. The mild Peruvian would have bred victims for -generation after generation. The Spanish-Peruvian cross bred avengers. -Early in the nineteenth century Spain was driven out of South America -and a series of Latin-American Republics instituted. - -In 1815 the Napoleonic wars having ended with the caging of the great -soldier, Spain proposed to the Holy Alliance of European monarchs a -joint European effort to restore her dominion over the revolted colonies -in South America. But Napoleon had done his work too well to allow of -any alliance, however "holy," to reassert the divine right of kings. -Whilst he had been overthrowing the thrones of Europe, both in North and -South America free nations had won recognition with the blood of their -people. The United States, still nationally an infant, but sturdy -withal, promulgated the Monroe doctrine as a veto on any European war of -revenge against the South American Republics. Great Britain was more -sympathetic to America than to the Holy Alliance. The momentarily -re-established Kings and Emperors of Europe had therefore to hold their -hand. It was a significant year, creating at once a free Latin America -and a tradition that Latin America should look to Anglo-Saxon America -for protection. - -Passing north of the Isthmus of Panama, there come up for consideration -another group of Latin-American States of which the racial history -resembles closely that of South America. The little cluster of Central -American States can hardly be taken seriously. Their ultimate fate will -probably be that of Cuba--nominal independence under the close -surveillance of the United States. But, farther north, Mexico claims -more serious attention. Some time before Peru had received the blessings -of civilisation from Pizarro, Mexico had reluctantly yielded her -independence to Cortez, a Spanish leader whose task was much more severe -than that of Pizarro. Whilst the mild Peruvians gave up without a -struggle, the fierce Mexicans contested the issue with stubbornness and -with a courage which was enterprising enough to allow them to seize the -firearms of dead Spanish soldiers and use them against the invaders. - -The original Aztec civilisation was warlike and Spartan. Extreme -severity marked the penal codes. Intemperance, the consuming canker of -Indian races, was severely penalised. There were several classes of -slaves, the most unhappy being prisoners of war, who were often used as -sacrificial victims to the gods. Sacrificed human beings were eaten at -banquets attended by both sexes. The Aztecs were constantly at war with -their neighbours, and needed no better pretext for a campaign than the -need to capture sacrifices for their gods. - -Grijalba was the first Spaniard to set foot on Mexico. He held a -conference with an Aztec chief, and interchanged toys and trinkets for a -rich treasure of jewels and gold. Cortez, the conqueror of Mexico, was -sent to Mexico by Velasquez, conqueror of Cuba. He landed in Mexico with -the avowed object of Christianising the natives, and considered himself -a Soldier of the Cross. Like a good Crusader, he was ready to argue -with the sword when words failed to convince. For some while he engaged -in amicable relations with the Mexicans, exchanging worthless trifles -for Mexican gold. But eventually various small wars led up to a three -months' siege of the Aztec capital, which fell after a display of grand -courage on the part of the Mexicans. Their civilisation, when at a point -of high development, was then blotted out for ever. - -It was in 1521 that the Spaniards first landed in Mexico. Their rule -extended over three centuries. In 1813 Mexico first declared her -independence, and in 1821 achieved the separation from Spain. The war of -liberation had been fierce and sanguinary. It was succeeded by civil -wars which threatened to tear to pieces the new nation. In 1822 an -Empire was attempted. It ended with the assassination of the Emperor, -Augustin de Yturbidi. A series of military dictatorships followed, until -in 1857 a Republican constitution was promulgated. Because this -constitution was strongly anti-clerical, it led to another series of -wars. - -Meanwhile greedy eyes were fixed upon the rich territories thus ravaged -by civil strife. The United States to the north coveted the coastal -provinces of California. Napoleon III. of France conceived the idea of -reviving French influence on the American continent, and in 1864 helped -to set up the second Empire of Mexico with the unhappy Maximilian at its -head. Maximilian left Europe in the spring of 1864. After three years -of civil war he was shot by the revolutionary commander. His rule had -not commended itself to the Mexicans and was viewed with suspicion by -the United States, which saw in it an attempt to revive European -continental influences. - -Then anarchy reigned for many years, until in 1876 the strong hands of -Diaz, one of the great men of the century, took control. He did for the -Mexican revolutionaries what Napoleon had done for the French -Terrorists. But it was different material that he had to work upon. The -Mexicans, their Aztec blood not much improved by an admixture of -European, gave reluctant obedience to Diaz, and he was never able to -lead them towards either a peaceful and stable democracy or a really -progressive despotism. For more than a quarter of a century, however, he -held power, nominally as the elected head of a Republic, really as the -despotic centre of a tiny oligarchy. The country he ruled over, however, -was not the old Spanish Mexico. There had been a steady process of -absorption of territory by her powerful northern neighbour. Over -1,000,000 square miles, included in the rich Californian and Texas -districts, had passed over by right of conquest or forced sale to the -United States. The present area of Mexico is 767,000 square miles. So -more than half of this portion of Spanish America has passed over to the -Stars and Stripes. - -The fall of Diaz in 1911 seemed to presage the acquirement by the -United States of the rest of Mexico. There had been for some months -rumours of an alliance between Mexico and Japan, which would have had an -obviously unfriendly purpose towards the United States. The rumours were -steadily denied. But many believed that they had some foundation, and -that the mobilisation of United States troops on the Mexican frontier -was not solely due to the desire to keep the frontier line secure from -invasions by the Mexican revolutionaries. Whatever the real position, -the tension relaxed when the abdication of Diaz allayed for a while the -revolutionary disorders in Mexico. Now (1912) disorder again riots -through Mexico, and again the authorities of the United States are -anxiously considering whether intervention is not necessary.[5] - -I am strongly of the opinion that by the time the Panama Canal has been -opened for world shipping, the United States will have found some form -of supervision over all Latin North America necessary: and that her -diplomacy is now shaping also for the inclusion of Latin South America -in an American Imperial system by adding to the present measure of -diplomatic suzerainty which the Monroe doctrine represents a -preferential tariff system. Before discussing that point, the actual -strength of Latin America should be summarised. To-day the chief nations -of Latin America--all of Spanish-Indian or of Portuguese-Indian -origin--are:-- - -The Republic of Argentina, area 3,954,911 square miles; population, -6,489,000 (increasing largely by immigration from all parts of Europe); -revenue, about £20,000,000 a year. - -The Republic of Bolivia, area 605,400 square miles; population -2,049,000; revenue, about £1,300,000 a year. - -The Republic of Brazil, area 3,218,991 square miles; population -21,461,000 (there is a great European immigration); revenue, about -£18,000,000 a year. - -The Republic of Chili, area 2474 square miles; population about -4,500,000; revenue about £1,400,000 a year. - -The Republic of Ecuador, area 116,000 square miles; population about -1,400,000; revenue about £1,400,000. - -The Republic of Uruguay, area 72,210 square miles; population 1,042,668; -revenue about £5,000,000. - -The Republic of Venezuela, area 393,870 square miles; revenue about -£2,000,000. - -The Republic of Paraguay, area 98,000 square miles; population about -650,000. - -The Republic of Mexico, area 767,000 square miles; population about -14,000,000. - -The total of populations is between 50,000,000 and 60,000,000. - -These peoples have the possibility--but as yet only the possibility--of -organising appreciable naval power, and are possessed now of a military -power, not altogether contemptible, and equal to the task at most points -of holding the land against a European or Asiatic invader, if that -invader had to face the United States' naval power also. Presuming their -peaceable acceptance of a plan to embrace them in the ambit of an -American Imperial system--a system which would still leave them with -their local liberties,--there is no doubt at all that they could add -enormously to the strength of the United States. Presuming, on the other -hand, a determined plan on their part to form among themselves a grand -Federal League, and to aim at a Latin-American Empire, they might make -some counterbalance to the power of the United States on the American -continent and in the Pacific. - -Neither contingency seems immediately likely. These Latin-American -peoples have not yet shown any genius for self-government. They produce -revolutionary heroes, but not statesmen. Among themselves they quarrel -bitterly, and a Latin-American Confederation does not seem to be -possible. On the other hand, Latin America is jealous of the United -States: resents, whilst it accepts the benefits of, the Monroe doctrine, -and would take as a danger signal any action hostile to the Mexican -Republic which the Anglo-Celtic Republic should be forced to take. Any -attempt on the part of the United States to "force the pace" in regard -to Latin America would saddle her with half a dozen annoying wars. - -What seems to be the aim of United States diplomacy, and what seems to -be an attainable aim, is that very gradually the countries of South -America will be brought closer to the northern Republic, coaxed by a -system of reciprocity in trade which would offer them advantageous -terms. Commercial union would thus pave the way to a closer political -union. Such a development would be a very serious detriment to British -trade interests, and to the British position in the Pacific. British -export trade with Latin America is very considerable, amounting to some -£60,000,000 worth a year. The two greatest contributors to the total are -Brazil (£16,426,000 in 1910) and the Argentine Republic (£19,097,000 in -1910). Their communications with Great Britain will be left unchanged -with the opening of the Panama Canal: and that event consequently will -not strengthen American influence there. The same remark applies to -trade with Mexico (£2,399,000 in 1910), with Columbia (£1,196,000), with -Uruguay (£2,940,000). But trade with Peru (£1,315,000) and Chili -(£5,479,000) will be affected by the canal bringing New York competition -nearer. - -There would, however, be a very serious position created for British -trading interests if a proposal were carried out of an American -preferential tariff system embracing the United States and Latin -America. The total of British trade with Latin America (about -£60,000,000) is nearly one-third of the total of British foreign trade -(£183,986,000 in 1910), and is more than half the total British trade -with British possessions. Moreover, it is almost exclusively in lines in -which United States competition is already keenly felt. A tariff -preference of any extent to the United States would drive British goods, -to a large degree, out of the Latin-American market. - -The position of Latin America in its effect on the dominance of the -Pacific may be summed up as this: racial instability will probably -prevent the Latin-American nations from federating and forming a great -Power; the veto of the United States will prevent them from falling into -the sphere of influence of any European Power; their jealousy and -distrust of the United States, whether it be without or with reason, -will stand in the way of their speedy absorption in an American Imperial -system. But that absorption seems ultimately inevitable (though its form -will leave their local independence intact). Its first step has been -taken with the Monroe declaration; its second step is now being prepared -with proposals for trade reciprocity. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[5] A dispatch from Washington, February 7, 1912, stated: - -President Taft and Secretary Knox held a long conference this morning on -the state of affairs in Mexico, which, it is believed, are worse than is -officially admitted. Reluctant as the President is to take any steps -that might compel intervention or the military occupation of Mexico, he -is forced to view both as ultimate possibilities, and to make -preparations accordingly. Thus the Army on the border is being -strengthened, although thus far no important military movements have -taken place, but the plans are complete for mobilisation. - -While Congress is opposed to involving the country in war, or to any -action which will lead to hostilities with Mexico, it will support the -President if war is the only alternative, and the large amount of -British and other foreign capital invested in Mexico makes it incumbent -upon the United States, in view of the Monroe doctrine, to protect the -lives and property of foreigners in the Republic. Otherwise, the duty of -protection must be undertaken by the Governments whose nationals are in -jeopardy, which would be an admission on the part of the United States -that the Monroe doctrine exists for the benefit of the United States, -but imposes no obligations. That is an admission Congress will not make -so long as there is an Army ready to take the field. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -CANADA AND THE PACIFIC - - -The existence, side by side, of two races and two languages in Canada -makes it a matter of some doubt as to what the future Canadian nation -will be. The French race, so far proving more stubborn in its -characteristics than the British race in Canada, has been the -predominant influence up to recently, though its influence has sought -the impossible aim of a French-Canadian nation rather than a Canadian -nation. Thus it was at once a bulwark of national spirit and yet an -obstacle to a genuinely progressive nationalism. Patriotic in its -resistance to all external influences which threatened Canadian -independence, it yet failed in its duty to promote an internal progress -towards a homogeneous people. - -Canada, it is perhaps needless to recall to mind, was originally a -French colony. In the sixteenth century, when the British settlements in -America were scattered along the Atlantic seaboard of what is now the -United States, the French colonised in the valley of the Mississippi and -along the course of the great river known as the St Lawrence. Their -design of founding an Empire in America, a "New France," took the bold -form of isolating the seaboard colonies of the British, and effectively -occupying all of what is now the Middle-West of the United States, -together with Canada and the country bordering on the Gulf of Mexico. It -is not possible to imagine greater courage, more patient endurance, more -strenuous enterprise, than was shown by the early founders of New -France. If they did not achieve, they at least fully deserved an Empire. - -French colonists in Canada occupied at first the province of Acadia, now -known as Nova Scotia, and the province of Quebec on the River St -Lawrence. Jacques Cartier, a sailor of St Malo, was the first explorer -of the St Lawrence. Acadia was colonised in 1604 by an expedition from -the Huguenot town of La Rochelle, under the command of Champlain, De -Monts, and Poutrincourt. Then a tardy English rivalry was aroused. In -1614 the Governor of Virginia, Sir Thomas Dale, sent an expedition to -Acadia, and took possession of the French fort. That was the first blow -in a long struggle between English and French for supremacy in North -America. In 1629, the date of Richelieu's supremacy in France, an -incident of a somewhat irregular war between England and France was the -capture, by David Kirk, an English Admiral, of Quebec, the newly-founded -capital of "New France"; and the English Flag floated over Fort St -Louis. But it was discovered that this capture had been effected after -peace had been declared between the two European Powers, and, by the -treaty of St Germain-en-Laye, Quebec was restored to France. - -But the French colonies in America were still inconsiderable and were -always threatened by the Red Indians, until Colbert, the great Minister -of Louis XIV., made them a royal province, and, with Jean Baptiste Talon -as Governor, Monseigneur Laval as Bishop, and the Marquis de Tracy as -soldier, French Canada was organised under a system of theocratic -despotism. The new régime was strictly paternal. The colonists were -allowed no self-governing rights; a feudal system was set up, and the -land divided into seignories, whose vassals were known as "habitants," a -name which still survives. In all things the Governor and the Bishop -exercised a sway. Wives were brought from France for the habitants, -early marriages and large families encouraged, and religious orthodoxy -carefully safeguarded. - -The French Canada of to-day shows the enduring nature of the lessons -which Talon and Laval then inculcated. With the growth of modern thought -the feudal system has passed away, and the habitants are independent -farmers instead of vassals to a seigneur. But in most other things they -are the same as their forefathers of the seventeenth century. When -Canada passed into the hands of the English, it had to be recognised -that there was no hope of holding the country on any terms antagonistic -to the habitants and their firmly fixed principles of life. In regard -to religion, to education, to marriage and many other things, the old -Roman Catholic ecclesiastical influence was preserved, and continues -almost undiminished to this day. - -The French-Canadian is a Frenchman of the era before the Revolution--a -Frenchman without scepticism, and with a belief in large families. He is -the Breton peasant of a century ago, who has come to a new land, -increased and multiplied. He is devoutly attached to the Roman Catholic -Church, and follows its guidance in all things. - -A somewhat frigid and calculating "loyalty" to Great Britain; a deep -sentimental attachment to France as "the Mother Country"; a rooted -dislike to the United States, founded on the conviction that if Canada -joined the great Republic he would lose his language and religious -privileges--these are the elements which go to the making of the -French-Canadian's national character. - -Very jealously the French-Canadian priesthood preserves the ideas of the -ancient order. Marriage of French-Canadians with Protestants, or even -with Roman Catholics of other than French-Canadian blood, is -discouraged. The education of the children--the numerous children of -this race which counts a family not of respectable size until it has -reached a dozen--is kept in the hands of the Church in schools where the -French tongue alone is taught. Thus the French-Canadian influence, -instead of permeating through the whole nation, aims at a people within -a people. The aim cannot be realised; and already the theocratic idea, -on which French-Canadian nationalism is largely based, shows signs of -weakening. There are to be found French-Canadians who are confessedly -"anti-clerical." That marks the beginning of the end. One may foresee in -the near future the French-Canadian element merging in the general mass -of the community to the great benefit of all--of the French-Canadian, -who needs to be somewhat modernised; of the British-Canadian, who will -be all the better for a mingling of a measure of the exalted idealism -and spiritual strength of the French element; and of the nation at -large, for a complete merging of the two races, French and British, in -Canada would produce a people from which might be expected any degree of -greatness. - -Canada, facing to-day both the Atlantic and the Pacific, has the -possibilities of greatness on either ocean, or indeed on both; I do not -think it a wild forecast to say that ultimately her Pacific provinces -may be greater than those bordering the Atlantic, and may draw to their -port a large share of the trade of the Middle-West. Entering Canada by -her Pacific gate, and passing through the coastal region over the -Selkirks and Rockies to the prairie, one sees all the material for the -making of a mighty nation. The coastal waters, and the rivers flowing -into them, teem with fish, and here are the possibilities of a huge -fishing population. At present those possibilities are, in the main, -neglected, or allowed to be exploited by Asiatics. But a movement is -already afoot to organise their control for the benefit of a British -population. The coastal strip and the valleys running into the ranges -are mild of climate and rich of soil. An agricultural population of -10,000,000 could here find sustenance, first levying toll on the great -forests, and later growing grain and fruit. Within the ranges are great -stores of minerals, from gold down to coal and iron. Everywhere are -rushing rivers and rapids to provide electrical power. Fishermen, -lumbermen, farmers, mountain graziers, miners, manufacturers--for all -these there is golden opportunity. The rigours of the Eastern Canadian -climate are missing: but there is no enervating heat. The somewhat -old-fashioned traditions of the Eastern provinces are also missing, and -the people facing the Pacific have the lusty confidence of youth. - -At present the balance of political power in Canada is with the east. -But each year sees it move farther west. The Pacific provinces count for -more and more, partly from their increasing population, partly from -their increasing influence over the prairie farmers and ranchers. The -last General Election in Canada showed clearly this tendency. In every -part of the nation there was a revulsion from the political ideals -represented by Sir Wilfrid Laurier: and that revulsion was most complete -in the west, where as a movement it had had its birth. - -It would be outside of the scope of this book to discuss the domestic -politics of Canada, but the Canadian General Election of 1911 was so -significant in its bearing on the future of the Pacific, that some -reference to its issues and decisions is necessary. Sir Wilfrid Laurier -up to 1911 had held the balance even between the British and the French -elements in Canada without working for their amalgamation. His aim -always was to pursue a programme of peaceful material development. With -the ideals of British Imperialism he had but little real sympathy, and -his conception of the duty of the Canadian nation was that it should -grow prosperous quickly, push forward with its railways, and avoid -entangling participation in matters outside the boundaries of Canada. He -was not blind to the existence of the United States Monroe doctrine as a -safeguard to Canadian territory against European invasion, and was not -disposed to waste money on armaments which, to his mind, were -unnecessary. The Canadian militia, which from the character of the -people might have been the finest in the world, was allowed to become a -mostly ornamental institution.[6] - -At the Imperial Defence Conference in 1909, Sir Wilfrid refused to -follow the lead of other self-governing Dominions in organising Fleet -units, and the Canadian attitude was recorded officially as this: - -"As regards Canada, it was recognised that while on naval strategical -considerations a Fleet unit on the Pacific might in the future form an -acceptable system of naval defence, Canada's double seaboard rendered -the provision of such a Fleet unit unsuitable for the present. Two -alternative plans, based upon annual expenditures respectively of -£600,000 and £400,000, were considered, the former contemplating the -provision of four cruisers of the 'Bristol' class, one cruiser of the -'Boadicea' class, and six destroyers of the improved 'River' class, the -'Boadicea' and destroyers to be placed on the Atlantic side and the -'Bristol' cruisers to be divided between the Atlantic and Pacific -oceans." Yet it had been expected that Canada would at least have -followed the Australian offer of a Pacific Fleet unit at a cost of -£3,000,000 a year. - -Sir Wilfrid Laurier's fall came when, in the natural development of his -ideals of a peaceful and prosperous Canada, sharing none of the -responsibilities of the British Empire, but reckoning for her safety -partly on its power, partly on the power of the United States, he -proposed to enter into a Trade Reciprocity Treaty with the United -States. The proposal was fiercely attacked, not only on the ground that -it represented a partial surrender of Canadian nationalist ideals, but -also on the charge that it was against the interests of British -Imperialism. At the General Election which followed, Sir Wilfrid Laurier -was decisively defeated. As an indication of the issues affecting the -result, there is the anecdote that one of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's -supporters ascribed the defeat chiefly to "the chap who wrote 'Rule -Britannia.'" - -Canada to-day faces the future with a purpose made clear, of cherishing -her separate nationalism and her partnership in the British Empire. She -will cultivate friendship with the United States, but she will not -tolerate anything leading to absorption with the great Republic: and she -will take a more active part in the defence of the Empire. The Laurier -naval policy, which was to spend a little money uselessly, has been set -aside, and Canada's share in the naval defence of the Empire is to be -discussed afresh with the British Admiralty. A military reorganisation, -of which the full details are not available yet, is also projected. It -is known that the Defence Minister, Colonel Hughes, intends to -strengthen the rural regiments, to establish local in addition to -central armouries, and to stimulate recruiting by increasing the pay of -the volunteers. He also contemplates a vigorous movement for the -organisation of cadet corps throughout the whole country. It is a -reasonable forecast that Canada, in the near future, will contribute to -the defence of the Pacific a Fleet unit based on a "Dreadnought" cruiser -and a militia force capable of holding her western coast against any but -a most powerful invader. Her ultimate power in the Pacific can hardly be -over-estimated. The wheat lands of the Middle-West and the cattle lands -of the West will probably find an outlet west as well as east, when the -growing industrial populations of Asia begin to come as customers into -the world's food markets. Electric power developed in the great mountain -ranges will make her also a great manufacturing nation: and she will -suffer less in the future than in the past from the draining away of the -most ambitious of her young men to the United States. The tide of -migration has turned, and it is Canada now which draws away young blood -from the Southern Republic. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[6] It can be at least said on behalf of the Canadian militia that their -condition was no worse than that of the militia of the United States. In -1906 Mr President Taft (then Secretary for War) contributed a preface to -a pamphlet by Mr Huidekoper on the United States Army. Mr Taft then -wrote:-- - -"Our confidence in ourselves and in our power of quickly adapting -circumstances to meet any national emergency so far has carried away -some of our public men so that they have been deliberately blind to the -commonest and most generally accepted military principles, and they have -been misled by the general success or good luck which has attended us in -most of our wars. The awful sacrifice of life and money which we had to -undergo during the four years in order to train our civil war veterans -and to produce that army is entirely forgotten, and the country is -lulled into the utterly unfounded assurance that a volunteer enlisted -to-day, or a militiaman enrolled to-morrow, can in a week or month be -made an effective soldier. The people of this country and the Government -of this country, down to the time of the Spanish War, had pursued a -policy which seemed utterly to ignore the lessons of the past." - -Mr Huidekoper (an acknowledged expert) maintained:-- - -"Judged by purely military standards, the invasion of Cuba was a trivial -affair; but never in modern times has there been an expedition which -contained so many elements of weakness; that it succeeded at all is, -indeed, a marvel. The disorders of demoralisation and incapacity which -attended the opening operations were nothing but the logical outcome of -the unwillingness of Congress to prepare for war until the last possible -moment, and merely demonstrated once again the utterly vicious system to -which our legislators have persistently bound us, by neglecting to -provide a force of thoroughly trained soldiers either large enough or -elastic enough to meet the requirements of war as well as peace, -supported by a militia which has previously had sufficient training to -make it, when called out as volunteers, fairly dependable against the -regular forces of other nations." - -Then in 1911, Mr Dickinson, U.S. Secretary for War, in an official -report, condemned absolutely the U.S. militia on the grounds that: "It -is lacking in proper proportions of cavalry, field artillery, engineer, -signal corps and sanitary troops; it is not fully or properly organised -into the higher units, brigades and divisions; it has no reserve -supplies of arms and field equipment to raise its units from a peace to -a war footing; it is so widely scattered throughout the country as to -make its prompt concentration impossible; its personnel is deficient in -training; it is to a degree deficient in physical stamina, and has upon -its rolls a large number of men who by reason of their family relations -and business responsibilities cannot be counted upon for service during -any long period of war." - -It will thus be seen that not only in Canada, but also in the United -States, the militia has become "mostly ornamental." But the United -States is now awakening to the possibility of having to defend the -Pacific coast against an Asiatic Power or combination of Powers holding -command of the ocean, and promises to reorganise her militia. It is -perhaps interesting to note that whilst to-day the British Imperial -Defence authorities discourage Canada from any militia dispositions or -manoeuvres founded on the idea of an invasion from the United States, -the militia of the Republic, when it takes the field for mimic warfare, -often presumes "an invasion by the British forces." - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -THE NAVIES OF THE PACIFIC - - -The present year (1912) is not a good one for an estimate of the naval -forces of the Pacific. The Powers interested in the destiny of that -ocean have but recently awakened to a sense of the importance of speedy -naval preparation to avert, or to face with confidence, the struggle -that they deem to be impending. By 1915 the naval forces in the Pacific -will be vastly greater, and the opening of the Panama Canal will have -materially altered the land frontiers of the ocean. A statement of the -naval forces of to-day, to be useful, must be combined with a reasonable -forecast of their strength in 1915. - -Following, for convenience' sake, geographical order, the Pacific Powers -have naval strength as follows:-- - -_Russia._--Russia is spending some £12,000,000 a year on her navy, and -is said to contemplate a force of sixteen "Dreadnoughts." Of these, four -are now in hand, but the date of their completion is uncertain. At -present Russia has no effective naval force in the Pacific, and but -little elsewhere. The "Dreadnoughts" building--which are of a -much-criticised type--are intended for use in European waters. The -naval force of Russia in the Pacific for the present and the near future -may be set down as negligible. - -_Japan._--Japan has two battleships of the "Dreadnought" class, the -_Satsuma_ and the _Aki_, in actual commission. By the time that this -book is in print there should be two more in commission. They were -launched in November 1910. According to modern methods of computation, -a navy can be best judged by its "Dreadnought" strength, always -presuming that the subsidiary vessels of a Fleet unit--cruisers, -destroyers and submarines--are maintained in proper proportion of -strength. Japan's naval programme aims at a combination of fortress -ships ("Dreadnoughts"), speed ships (destroyers) and submarines, in -practically the same proportion as that ruling in the British navy. The -full programme, at first dated for completion in 1915, now in 1920, -provides for twenty modern battleships, twenty modern armoured -cruisers, one hundred destroyers, fifty submarines and various other -boats. But it is likely that financial need will prevent that programme -from being realised. For the current year the Japanese naval estimates -amount to £8,800,000. At present the Japanese navy includes some two -hundred ships, of which thirty-eight are practically useless. The -possibly useful Fleet comprises seventeen battleships and battleship -cruisers, nine armoured cruisers, fifty-seven destroyers, twelve -submarines, four torpedo gunboats and forty-nine torpedo boats. - -The Japanese navy is by far the strongest force in the Pacific, and is -the only navy in the world with actual experience of up-to-date warfare, -though its experience, recent as it is, has not tested the value of the -"Dreadnought" type, which theoretically is the only effective type of -battleship. - -_China._--At present China has twenty-six small boats in commission and -five building. Her biggest fighting ship is a protected cruiser carrying -six-inch guns. The naval strength of China is thus negligible. - -_The United States._--The United States cannot be considered as a -serious Pacific naval Power until the Panama Canal has been -completed.[7] Then under certain circumstances the greater part of her -Fleet would be available for service in the Pacific. She spends some -£26,000,000 yearly on her navy. She has at present four "Dreadnoughts" -in commission, and by the time that this book is in print should have -six. Her building programme provides for two new "Dreadnoughts," and the -proper complement of smaller craft, each year. - -In the last annual report on the United States navy (December 1911), -Secretary Meyer stated that a total of forty battleships, with a -proportional number of other fighting and auxiliary vessels, was the -least that would place the United States on a safe basis in its -relations with the other world Powers, and "while at least two other -Powers have more ambitious building plans, it is believed that if we -maintain an efficient Fleet of the size mentioned, we shall be secure -from attack, and our country will be free to work out its destiny in -peace and without hindrance. The history of all times, including the -present, shows the futility and danger of trusting to good-will and fair -dealing, or even to the most solemnly binding treaties between nations, -for the protection of a nation's sovereign rights and interests, and -without doubt the time is remote when a comparatively unarmed and -helpless nation may be reasonably safe from attack by ambitious -well-armed Powers, especially in a commercial age such as the present." - -Battleships 36 and 37, at the time in course of construction, were, he -claimed, a distinct advance on any vessels in existence. These vessels -would be oil-burners, and would carry no coal. They were to be of about -the same size as the _Delaware_, but their machinery would weigh 3000 -tons less, or a saving of 30 per cent., and the fire-room force would be -reduced by 50 per cent. Concluding his report, Mr. Meyer said: "The -Panama Canal is destined to become the most important strategical point -in the Western Hemisphere, and makes a Caribbean base absolutely -necessary. The best base is Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which Cuba has ceded -to the United States for naval purposes. This base will enable the -United States to control the Caribbean with all its lines of approach to -the canal, and, with a torpedo base at Key West, will render the Gulf of -Mexico immune from attack." - -A new type of war machine, which is a combination of a submarine and a -torpedo boat, is now being prepared for use in the United States navy. -She is known as the "sub-surface torpedo boat." There is a submarine -hull with machinery and torpedo armaments, and a surface hull--said to -be unsinkable--divided into compartments. The whole vessel weighs six -tons, can be carried on the deck of a battleship, travels eighteen knots -an hour for a radius of two hundred miles, and needs a crew of two men. -She carries a thousand pounds of gun-cotton. The sub-surface boat may be -used as an ordinary torpedo boat, or she may be bodily directed at a -hostile ship after her crew of two have left. It is estimated that the -sub-surface boat will cost about £5000, all told, and it seems possible -that it will be a serious weapon of naval warfare. - -_Great Britain._--Great Britain spent last year nearly £45,000,000 on -her navy, which is the supreme naval force of the world. But its weight -in a Pacific combat at present would be felt chiefly in regard to -keeping the ring clear. No European Power hostile to Great Britain could -send a Fleet into the Pacific. The United States could not despatch its -Atlantic Fleet for service in the Pacific without a foreknowledge of -benevolent neutrality on the part of Great Britain. - -At the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, it was decided to re-create -the British Pacific Fleet, which, after the alliance with Japan, had -been allowed to dwindle to insignificance. The future Pacific naval -strength of Great Britain may be set down, estimating most -conservatively, at a unit on the China station consisting of one -"Dreadnought" cruiser, three swift unarmoured cruisers, six destroyers -and three submarines. This would match the Australian unit of the same -strength. But it is probable that a far greater strength will shortly be -reached. It may be accepted as an axiom that the British--_i.e._ the -Home Country--Fleet in Pacific waters will be at least kept up to the -strength of the Australian unit. The future growth of that unit is -indicated in the report on naval defence presented to the Commonwealth -Government by Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, a report which has been -accepted in substance. - -He proposes a completed Fleet to be composed as follows:-- - - 8 Armoured Cruisers, - 10 Protected Cruisers, - 18 Destroyers, - 12 Submarines, - 3 Depôt Ships for Flotillas, - 1 Fleet Repair Ship, - -- - 52. - -This Fleet would, when fully manned, require a personnel of -approximately 15,000 officers and men. - -The Fleet to be divided into two divisions as follows:-- - - EASTERN DIVISION. - +---------------------------+--------------------------+ - | | Number. | - | +-----------+-------+------+ - | Class of Vessel. |In Full | With |Total.| - | |Commission.|Reduced| | - | | | Crew. | | - +---------------------------+-----------+-------+------+ - | | | | | - |Armoured cruiser | 3 | 1 | 4 | - |Protected cruiser | 3 | 2 | 5 | - |Torpedo-boat destroyer | 8 | 4 | 12 | - |Submarine | 3 | ... | 3 | - |Depôt ship for torpedo-boat| | | | - | destroyers | 2 | ... | 2 | - |Fleet repair ship | ... | ... | ... | - | +-----------+-------+------+ - | Total | 19 | 7 | 26 | - +---------------------------+-----------+-------+------+ - | | - | WESTERN DIVISION. | - | | - +---------------------------+-----------+-------+------+ - |Armoured cruiser | 3 | 1 | 4 | - |Protected cruiser | 3 | 2 | 5 | - |Torpedo-boat destroyer | 4 | 2 | 6 | - |Submarine | 9 | ... | 9 | - |Depôt ship for torpedo-boat| | | | - | destroyers | 1 | ... | 1 | - |Fleet repair ship | 1 | ... | 1 | - | +-----------+-------+------+ - | Total | 21 | 5 | 26 | - +---------------------------+-----------+-------+------+ - | Grand total of both | | | | - | divisions | 40 | 12 | 52 | - +---------------------------+-----------+-------+------+ - -That would necessitate £3,000,000 a year expenditure for the first five -years, rising gradually to £5,000,000 a year. To this the Australian -Government is understood to be agreeable. - -New Zealand does not propose to organise a naval force of her own, but -will assist the British Admiralty with a subsidy. That subsidy is to be -devoted to the use of the unit in China waters. - -Canada's naval plans at present are not known. After the Imperial -Defence Conference of 1909 Sir Wilfrid Laurier found both his instincts -for frugality and for peace outraged by the forward policy favoured by -other of the Dominions. He decided to sacrifice the former and not the -latter, and embarked on a naval programme which, whilst it involved a -good deal of expenditure, made it fairly certain that no Canadian -warship would ever fire a shot in anger, since none would be completed -until she had become hopelessly obsolete. His successor in office has -stopped that naval programme. It is possible that the new administration -will decide that Canada should contribute in some effective form to -Imperial naval defence, and she may be responsible for a naval unit in -the Pacific. - -_Latin America._--Brazil (whose interests, however, are in the Atlantic -rather than the Pacific) has two modern battleships of the "Dreadnought" -type, and one other building. Chili has at present no really modern -warship, but projects two "Dreadnoughts" and up-to-date small craft. The -existing Fleet consists of one battleship, two armoured cruisers, and -four protected cruisers. The Republic of Argentine has at present -several vessels practically obsolete, the most modern cruisers having -been built in 1896. There are three battleships, four armoured -cruisers, and three protected cruisers. A modern navy is projected with, -as a nucleus, two 25,000-ton battleships of twenty-two knots, armed with -twelve-inch guns. Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, -Venezuela, have no useful Fleets. - -The following table will give as accurate a forecast as possible of -naval strength in the Pacific in the immediate future:-- - - "DREADNOUGHT" TYPES IN 1912 AND 1915. - - 1912. 1915. - - British Empire 20 38 - Germany 11 21 - United States 8 14 - Japan 4 8 - Brazil 3 4 - Argentine Republic ... 2 - Chili ... 2 - -_Note._--All the South American "Dreadnoughts" are open to some doubt, -though Brazil has three vessels of the type actually in the water. -Battleships and cruisers of the "Dreadnought" type are included in the -above table. It has been computed on the presumption that there will be -no change in the 1912 naval programmes. The United States, the British -Empire and Japan, are stronger in battleships of the pre-Dreadnought -period than is Germany. Russia is ignored, for she has no present -intention of restoring her Pacific naval Power. Germany is included -because of her future position as the second naval Power of the world, -and her possible appearance in the Pacific as the ally of one or other -of the Powers established there now. - -The following additional table deals not merely with warships of the -"Dreadnought" type, but with the effective tonnage, _i.e._ the tonnage -of ships of all classes of the three greatest naval Powers:-- - - "EFFECTIVE TONNAGE" IN 1912 AND 1913-14. - - 1912. 1913-14. - - British Empire 1,896,149 2,324,579 - United States 757,711 885,066 - Germany 749,699 1,087,399 - -FOOTNOTES: - -[7] A "Reuter" telegram from Washington, dated March 17, stated: - -"Significant orders have been issued by the Navy Department directing -three big armoured cruisers of the Pacific Fleet to proceed immediately -to the Philippines for an indefinite stay. Their arrival will make the -American Fleet in the Orient the most powerful there excepting the -Japanese. The vessels under order are the cruisers _California_, _South -Dakota_, and _Colorado_." - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -THE ARMIES OF THE PACIFIC - - -The military forces available for service in the Pacific are those (1) -of Russia; (2) of China; (3) of Japan; (4) of the United States; (5) of -the British Empire including India; (6) of the Latin-American peoples of -Mexico and South America. The great armies of France, Germany, and -Austro-Hungary can have no voice in the destinies of the Pacific Ocean -unless indirectly, as, for instance, through Germany or Austria helping -or hindering a Russian movement in the Far East by guaranteeing or -threatening her European frontier. - -The Russian army, though driven back by the forces of Japan during the -recent war, still demands respectful consideration in any calculations -as to the future of the Asian littoral of the Pacific Ocean. The -Russians, as has been pointed out in a previous chapter, fought that -campaign under many serious disadvantages. The Siberian railway gave -them a very slender line of communication with their base. Now that -railway is being duplicated, and in a future war would have at least -double its old military capacity. The conditions of unrest at home in -Russia during the war were so serious as almost to paralyse the -executive government. Those conditions are not likely to be repeated, -since Russia has now entered upon a fairly peaceful, if somewhat slow, -progress towards constitutional reform. In a war on a land frontier for -which the people were enthusiastic, the military power of Russia would -be tremendous, though there was never any real foundation for the bogey -of Russia as an all-powerful aggressive force. - -The Russian army, based upon conditions of universal liability to -service, can muster in the field for war some 4,000,000 of men. But -considering the vast frontiers to be defended, and the great claims -therefore made by garrison fortresses, it is not likely that more than -1,500,000 could be mobilised in any one district. It is reasonably -possible to imagine a Russian army of a million men being brought to and -maintained on the Pacific littoral: of an even greater army based on, -say, Harbin. That would be a formidable force, especially if enrolled to -fight for the White Races against an Asiatic peril: for then it would -share the old military enthusiasm of the Cossacks. - -There is nothing which will give the inquirer into national -characteristics a better key to the Russian than a knowledge of the old -Cossack organisation. It was formed, in the days of Russia's making as a -nation, from the free spirits of the land, suffering on the one side -from Turkish cruelty, on the other from the devastations of the -Tartars. "Cossacks" meant simply "free men," and, at the outset, they -were freebooters mainly, the Robin Hoods and Hereward the Wakes of -Russia. But the patriotic work of resisting the Tartars and the Turks -gave them a national aim, and in time they formed a military and -religious organisation, unique in the history of European civilisation. -From the village Cossacks--irregular volunteer troops, pursuing normally -the life of villagers, but ready ever to take up arms against Tartar or -Turkish bandits, or to become in turn themselves raiders of the enemy's -caravans and villages--sprung up the Cossack Zaporojskoe, garrisoning -the "Setch," a great military camp in the heart of the Cossack country. -The Cossacks who joined the Setch devoted themselves wholly to military -life. They had to swear to complete chastity, to abstinence whilst at -war from alcohol, and to obedience to the Greek Church. The Cossack -could leave the Setch if he were so inclined, but while he remained -within its boundaries discipline was inexorable. - -In the Setch there was neither organised training, nor compulsory drill, -nor military manoeuvres. With the exception of a few elected officers, -there were, in time of peace, no social distinctions; but the bravest -and the most experienced were treated with respect. For war a Cossack -was elected to command each hundred men; his power was absolute. Several -hundreds formed a regiment, with a colonel at its head, a temporary -officer, elected for one campaign only. The organisation had some -artillery and infantry, but its chief strength lay in its cavalry. It -also built a Fleet of small boats with which it repeatedly raided the -Turkish coast. - -This military monastic order passed away with the closer organisation of -the Russian nation. Despotic Czars could not tolerate a community so -formidable in its virtues. Characteristically enough, it was Catherine -the Great who dealt the final blow to the Cossack Setch. But the Cossack -organisation and spirit, as well as the Cossack name, survive in the -Russian army to-day, and the million or so men whom Russia could muster -on the shores of the North Pacific might have some great say in the -future destinies of the ocean. - -The Japanese army of to-day, an army of veterans, must be credited, in -calculating its value as a military engine, with the moral force of its -record of victory. I confess to a belief in the superiority of the White -Man, _qua_ White Man over any Asiatic: and I am not inclined, therefore, -to accept Japanese generalship and Japanese initiative at their Tokio -valuation. But the 600,000 men whom Japan can put into the field, -perfect in discipline, armed as to the infantry with a first-class -rifle, a little deficient though they may be in artillery and cavalry, -is a most formidable force, unassailable in Japan's home territory, not -to be regarded lightly if called to a campaign on the Asiatic mainland. -Since the war with Russia the Japanese army has been increased: the fact -is evidence of the unslaked warlike enthusiasm of the people. - -China will probably emerge from her present revolutionary troubles, -whatever may be their result, with a seasoned army of great proportions. -The actual military organisation of China at the time of the outbreak of -the present revolt was somewhat nebulous. But an effort was being made -to organise an Imperial army (on plans laid down in 1905) which would -have numbered about 360,000 men trained on the Japanese model. Should -the reformed China decide to follow in the footsteps of Japan as regards -military organisation, the Chinese field force of the future would -number some 2,500,000 men. It is already announced that the new Chinese -Republic will adopt universal military training as part of its system of -national reorganisation. - -The United States, relying on a purely voluntary system for its military -organisation, has, in the opinion of most critics, the framework of an -army rather than an army. The peace strength of the United States -regular army is about 100,000, and from these the Philippine garrison -draws 13,000 men, and the Hawaiian garrison 1000 of all ranks. A -partially trained militia numbers about 100,000 men. For the rest there -are 16,000,000 of men of military age in the nation, but they are -absolutely untrained. In case of a powerful enemy obtaining naval -control of the Pacific, there is danger that the United States would -suffer the ignominy of the occupation, for a time, of her Pacific coast. - -British military forces available for the Pacific come under three -headings: - - British garrisons in India and elsewhere in the Pacific. - - The citizen armies of Australia and New Zealand, and the militia - forces of Canada. - - The Sepoy forces in India. - -The British garrisons total some 80,000 men. They may be classed, -without prejudice, among the best troops in the world, well trained and -with some experience of warfare. But the majority of them are stationed -in India, and few of them could be safely drawn from there in an -emergency. The Sepoy troops number some 250,000, officered generally by -British leaders. It is conceivable that a portion of them could be used -outside of India against coloured races. - -The citizen armies of Australia and New Zealand must be spoken of in the -future tense: for their organisation has just begun, and it will be some -five years before that organisation will be well under way. But so -important is the bearing on Pacific problems of the training of some -quarter of a million of citizen soldiers in the Australasian Dominions -of the British Empire, that attention must be given here to a -description of this army of the future. - -Taking the Australian organisation as the model: The population of -Australia in 1911 was about 4-1/2 millions, of whom there were, on the -basis of the last census-- - - 188,000 males of 14 years and under 18 years; and - 295,000 males of 18 years and under 25 years. - -Allowing for those living in districts too thinly populated to admit of -training without excessive expenditure, or medically unfit for training, -upon the figures at present available, it is estimated that Australia -will have in training, when the scheme is in full operation, each year-- - - 100,000 senior cadets; and - 112,000 citizen soldiers. - -The system will give in eight years' time a force of 126,000 trained -men, and fully equipped. Every year afterwards will increase the reserve -by 12,000 men. And if the training be extended into the country areas, -the numbers may be increased by 40 per cent. Increase of population will -bring, too, an increase of numbers, and my estimate of an eventual -200,000 for the Australian army and 50,000 for the New Zealand army is -probably correct. - -For the leading positions in this army there is provision to train a -number of professional officers. The Military College of Australia is -already in existence, and is organised on a basis of simplicity and -efficiency which reflects the serious purpose of this democratic -military organisation. It is not reserved for the children of the rich. -It is not allowed to become intolerable to the children of the poor by -the luxury of wealthy cadets. To quote from the official conditions:-- - -"The Military College of Australia is established to educate candidates -for commissions in all arms of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth. - -"Only candidates who intend to make the Military Forces their profession -in life will be admitted as Cadets to the Military College. Parents or -guardians are therefore not at liberty to withdraw their sons or wards -at will. - -"Cadets, in joining the Military College, shall be enlisted in the -Permanent Military Forces for a term of twelve years. Service as a Cadet -at the Military College shall be deemed service in the ranks of the -Permanent Military Forces of the Commonwealth. - -"No fees will be charged for equipment or instruction or maintenance of -Cadets, and their travelling expenses within the Commonwealth between -their parents' or guardians' residences and the College will be paid on -first joining and on graduation. - -"The following charges will be admitted against the public and credited -to Cadets' accounts after they have joined:-- - - "Outfit allowance--£30 on joining. - - "Daily allowance of five shillings and sixpence (5s. 6d.) to cover - cost of uniform and clothing, books, instruments, messing, washing - and other expenses. - -"No Cadet will be permitted to receive money, or any other supplies from -his parents or guardians, or any person whomsoever, without the -sanction of the Commandant. A most rigid observance of this order is -urged upon all parents and guardians, as its violation would make -distinctions between Cadets, which it is particularly desired to -prevent. - -"No Cadet, when within the Federal Territory, or when absent on duty -from College, or when in uniform, shall drink any spirituous or -intoxicating liquor, or bring or cause the same to be brought within the -College, or have the same in his room, tent, or otherwise in his -possession. - -"Gambling, lotteries, and raffles are strictly prohibited. They are -serious offences, which will be severely punished. - -"Smoking may be permitted during certain hours and in authorised places. -The smoking of cigarettes is at all times prohibited. A Cadet found in -possession of cigarettes is liable to punishment for disobedience of -orders." - -Canada has a militia force credited at present with a total strength of -55,000 men. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who controlled the destinies of Canada -for fifteen years up to 1911, was no military enthusiast and believed -profoundly in a peaceful future for his country. In one respect, and in -one respect only, Canada under his rule progressed in defence -organisation: she had her own rifle factory turning out a rifle of -Canadian design. - -But a new spirit moves in Canada to-day in matters of Defence as in -other things. I remember in 1909 speaking at Toronto in advocacy of a -system of universal training for military service. Lieut.-Col. Wm. -Hamilton Merritt, a Canadian militia officer who had learned enthusiasm -for the idea of a "citizen army" on a visit to Switzerland, invited me -to come up to Toronto from New York to speak on the Australian campaign -for the universal training of citizens. The meeting was friendly but not -particularly enthusiastic. My strongest recollection of it is that one -Canadian paper most unjustifiably and absurdly twisted some words of -mine advocating Canadian self-reliance into advice that Canada should -arm "to attack the United States." But the outcome of the meeting was -that a "Canadian Patriotic League" was formed, and from it sprang the -"Canadian Defence League, a non-political association to urge the -importance to Canada of universal physical and naval or military -training." For two years and more, in spite of the earnest efforts of -Canadian enthusiasts, the movement languished. After the General -Election of 1911, however, a quickening came to every department of -Canadian life, and this particularly showed itself in matters of -Defence. In November of that year, Colonel the Hon. S. Hughes, the -Canadian Minister of Militia, called a conference of experts to consider -the organisation of the militia. To that conference the Canadian Defence -League was invited to send representatives, and their presence seemed to -inspire the whole gathering with an enthusiasm for a universal service -system. Summarising from a report sent to me by the Canadian Defence -League: "Universal military training has at last become a live issue -throughout the Dominion of Canada. It was the mainspring behind the -whole machinery of the Militia Conference; almost every man present was -in favour of it, but a few, if the question had come to vote, would have -either refrained from voting or voted against it, because they were -afraid of the possibility of being misunderstood by the public at large. -The cavalry section made no recommendation, and the infantry section -discussed it, while the artillery, which is always in the front, was -strongly in favour of it. Colonel Logie of Hamilton moved and Colonel -Fotheringham of Toronto seconded a resolution recommending the adoption -of the Australian system in Canada. This motion was with a view to -placing the conference on record; but the Minister, in his wisdom, held -the resolution in abeyance, and it did not come to a vote. But in the -closing hours of the conference Senator Power of Nova Scotia positively -and definitely advocated universal military training for the whole of -Canada." - -A universal service system in Canada would provide a citizen army -of--probably--250,000 men of the finest type: and the effect of this -force on Pacific issues would be equal to that of the combined armies of -Australia and New Zealand. - -The military strength of Latin America (the South American Republics and -Mexico) it is difficult to estimate accurately. In almost all cases the -constitution of the Republics provides for "universal service" but fails -to provide for universal training for service. Under modern conditions -of warfare, it is useless to enact that men shall serve unless the -necessary sacrifices of money and leisure are made to train them to -serve. Raw levies could be made of some use almost immediately in a past -epoch of warfare, when the soldier with his "Brown Bess" musket had the -injunction from the drill sergeant to "wait until he could see the -whites of the eyes" of his enemy and then to fire. That needed stolid -nerves mainly, and but little training. In these days raw levies would -be worse than useless, of no value in battles, a burden on the -commissariat and hospital services between battles. The Latin-American -armies must be judged in the light of that fact. Apart from that -caution, the numbers are imposing enough. - -Mexico has an army organisation providing for 30,000 men on a peace -footing and 84,000 men on a war footing. The Argentine army on a peace -footing is about 18,000 strong; on a war footing about 120,000 strong, -exclusive of the National Guard and Territorial troops (forming a second -line). In the Republic of Bolivia the peace footing of the army is 2500: -the probable war footing 30,000. The Republic of Brazil has a universal -service system. The peace strength of the army is 29,000 (to which may -be added a gendarmerie of 20,000). On the outbreak of war there could be -mobilised, it is claimed, five divisions totalling, say, 60,000 men. -Chili has, on a peace footing, about 10,000 men; on a war footing -50,000, exclusive of the reserves (about 34,000). Colombia makes every -man liable to service, but the training is not regular. Possibly 10,000 -men could be mobilised in time of war. Ecuador maintains a permanent -force of about 5000 men, and claims that it could mobilise 90,000 in -case of war. Paraguay has a permanent force of 2500 men and a National -Guard available for service in case of war. - -The South American has proved himself, on occasions, a good and plucky -fighter. But I doubt whether his military forces can be seriously -considered as a factor in the fate of the Pacific, except in the matter -of defending his own territory from invasion. The only armies that count -greatly to-day in the Pacific are those of Japan, Russia, and Great -Britain, in that order, with China and the United States as potential -rather than actual military forces. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -TREATIES IN THE PACIFIC - - -There is one actual alliance between two Pacific Powers, Great Britain -and Japan: an _entente_ between Great Britain and Russia: and an -instinct towards friendliness between Great Britain and the United -States. There are several other possible combinations affecting the -ocean in the future. But no Power of the Triple Alliance, nor yet -France, can be considered a factor in the Pacific except in so far as it -may help or hinder a Power already established there. Germany, for -instance, might enter the Pacific as an ally of Japan or the United -States; but she could not without an alliance bring naval or military -force there unless Great Britain had first been humbled in a European -war. - -To the alliance between Great Britain and Japan not very much importance -can be ascribed since its revision in 1911. It threatens to die now of -inanition, as it becomes clear that British aims and Japanese aims in -the Pacific do not move towards a common end. The first British-Japanese -treaty, signed on January 30, 1902, had for its main provisions-- - -"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire -to maintain the _status quo_ and general peace in the extreme East, -being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and -territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, -and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce -and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:-- - -"The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognised the -independence of China and of Corea, declare themselves to be entirely -uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in -view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain -relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests -which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree -politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Corea, the -High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either -of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to -safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action -of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and -necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties -for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects. - -"If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective -interests as above described, should become involved in war with another -Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict -neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in -hostilities against its ally. - -"If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in -hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will -come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make -peace in mutual agreement with it. - -"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without -consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another -Power to the prejudice of the interests above described. - -"Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the -above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will -communicate with one another fully and frankly." - -A letter covering the treaty, addressed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to -the British Minister at Tokio, Sir C. Macdonald, explained the fact that -there was to be no disturbance of Chinese or Corean territory: "We have -each of us desired that the integrity and independence of the Chinese -Empire should be preserved, that there should be no disturbance of the -territorial _status quo_ either in China or in the adjoining regions, -that all nations should, within those regions, as well as within the -limits of the Chinese Empire, be afforded equal opportunities for the -development of their commerce and industry, and that peace should not -only be restored, but should, for the future, be maintained. We have -thought it desirable to record in the preamble of that instrument the -main objects of our common policy in the Far East to which I have -already referred, and in the first Article we join in entirely -disclaiming any aggressive tendencies either in China or Corea." - -But that stipulation did nothing to safeguard Corea's independence, -which was soon sacrificed to Japanese ambition. There was a widespread -feeling of uneasiness in the British Dominions in the Pacific when this -treaty was announced. At the time Canada was having serious trouble on -her Pacific Coast with Japanese immigrants, and the Canadian Pacific -provinces were anxious to prohibit absolutely the entry of more Japanese -to their territory.[8] Australia in 1901 had made the first great deed -of her new national organisation a law practically prohibiting all -coloured immigration, and making the entry of Japanese colonists -impossible. The Act certainly veiled its hostility to the Asiatic races -by a subterfuge. It was not stated in so many words that black skin, -brown skin, and yellow skin were prohibited from entry, but an -educational standard was set up which might be applied to any immigrant, -but needed to be applied to none. In practice it is never applied to the -decent White but always to the coloured man: and its application is such -that the coloured man can never be sure that his standard of education -will be sufficiently high to satisfy the fastidious sense of culture of -an Australian Customs officer. He may be a learned Baboo, B.A. of -Oxford, and Barrister of the Inner Temple, and yet fail to pass the -Australian Education Test, for the ordeal is to take dictation in any -European language, not necessarily English, but perhaps Russian or -modern Greek. New Zealand, without going so far by her legislation, -shows an equal repugnance to any form of Asiatic immigration. - -The "official" view of the British Alliance with Japan, advocated with -some energy, was that it was a benefit to the White Dominions in the -Pacific, for it made them secure against the one aggressive Asiatic -Power. But nevertheless the policy of making the wolf a guardian of the -sheep-fold was questioned in many quarters. The question was asked: -"Presuming a Pacific war in which the United States was the enemy of -Japan?" The answer in the minds of many, in Australia at any rate, and -probably also in Canada and New Zealand, was that in such event the -sympathy, if not the active support, of the British Dominions in the -Pacific would be with the United States, whether Great Britain kept to -her Treaty or not. It was recognised, however, as almost unthinkable -that Great Britain would go to war by the side of Japan against the -American Republic. - -Great Britain is very sensitive to the opinions of her Dominions in -these days of the industrious promulgation of Imperialist sentiment in -Great Britain: and a Canadian or an Australian voter--though he has no -vote for the House of Commons--has far more influence on the destinies -of the Empire than his British compeer. The overseas objection to the -Treaty with Japan had its full effect in the British Cabinet, and that -effect was seen in subsequent modifications of the Treaty. - -On August 12, 1905, the British-Japanese Treaty was renewed, and the -chief articles of the new treaty were:-- - -"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing -the agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh -stipulations, have agreed upon the following articles, which have for -their object-- - -"(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the -regions of Eastern Asia and of India; - -"(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by -insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the -principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all -nations in China; - -"(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting -Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of -their special interests in the said regions:-- - -"It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or -Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of -this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate -with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the -measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or -interests. - -"If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever -arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either Contracting -Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or -special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other -Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and -will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with -it. - -"Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests -in Corea, Great Britain recognises the right of Japan to take such -measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem -proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided -always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal -opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations. - -"Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the -security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognises her right to take such -measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for -safeguarding her Indian possessions. - -"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without -consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another -Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this -Agreement. - -"The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either -Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present -Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made -available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the -Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another -fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest. - -"The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI., -come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain -in force for ten years from that date." - -It will be noted that there is, as regards the general responsibility -under the Treaty, some watering down. One Power is bound to come to the -help of the other Power only by reason of "unprovoked attack or -aggressive action" on the part of another Power. The fiction of -preserving the independence of Corea is abandoned. - -On April 3, 1911, a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was entered into -between Great Britain and Japan. The Japanese Government had revised its -tariff in such a way as to prejudice seriously foreign trade. It was -announced in Japan that certain nations would have the benefit of -"most-favoured nation" rates under the new tariff, but that Great -Britain would not have that benefit, since, being a Free Trade country, -she was able to give no concessions in return. Then the diplomatic -Treaty of 1905 was used by the British Government as an argument for -securing more favoured treatment for British merchants. If the Trade -Treaty of 1911 is closely studied, it will be found that the trade -advantages given to Japan by Great Britain, in return for some real -concessions on the part of Japan to Great Britain, are wholly illusory. -It is difficult to see how they could have been otherwise, since a Free -Trade country can give nothing better than Free Trade to another -country. But Great Britain, a good deal out of conceit at this time with -the diplomatic value of the Treaty of 1905, did not hesitate to use it -as a means of securing some trade benefits. The effect on Japanese -public opinion was not favourable. But the diplomatic position had so -changed that that was not considered a serious circumstance in Great -Britain. - -Two articles of the British-Japanese Trade Treaty of 1911 should be -quoted to show the mutual acceptance by the two Powers of the -independent right of the British overseas Dominions to restrict or -prohibit Japanese immigration: - -"The subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have full -liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other, -and, conforming themselves to the laws of the country, - -"They shall in all that relates to travel and residence be placed in all -respects on the same footing as native subjects. - -"They shall have the right, equally with native subjects, to carry on -their commerce and manufacture, and to trade in all kinds of merchandise -of lawful commerce, either in person or by agents, singly or in -partnerships with foreigners or native subjects. - -"They shall in all that relates to the pursuit of their industries, -callings, professions, and educational studies be placed in all respects -on the same footing as the subjects or citizens of the most favoured -nation." - -But Article 26 makes this reservation: - -"The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not be applicable to any -of His Britannic Majesty's Dominions, Colonies, Possessions, or -Protectorates beyond the seas, unless notice of adhesion shall have been -given on behalf of any such Dominion, Colony, Possession, or -Protectorate by His Britannic Majesty's Representative at Tokio before -the expiration of two years from the date of the exchange of the -ratifications of the present Treaty." - -A few weeks after the conclusion of this Trade Treaty the -British-Japanese Alliance was renewed on terms which practically "draw -its sting" and abolish the contingency of a British-Japanese war against -the United States, or against any Power with which Great Britain makes -an Arbitration Treaty. The preamble of the British-Japanese Treaty now -reads: - -"The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in -view the important changes which have taken place in the situation -since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, -1905, and believing that a revision of that Agreement responding to such -changes would contribute to the general stability and repose, have -agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above -mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said -Agreement, namely: - -"(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the -regions of Eastern Asia and of India. - -"(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by -insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the -principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all -nations in China. - -"(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting -Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defence of -their special interests in the said regions." - -The chief clauses are: - -"If, by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action wherever -arising on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting -Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or -special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other -High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally -and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement -with it. - -"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without -consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another -Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this -Agreement. - -"Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of General -Arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this -Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go -to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force. - -"The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date -of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date." - -It will be recognised that there is very little left now of the very -thorough Treaty of 1902. It does not suit Japanese foreign policy that -this fact should be accentuated, and public opinion in that country has -been generally muzzled. Nevertheless, some candid opinions on the -subject have been published in the Japanese press. Thus the Osaka -_Mainichi_ last January, discussing evidently a Japanese disappointment -at the failure of Great Britain to join Japan in some move against -Russia, claimed that "for all practical purposes, the Anglo-Japanese -Alliance ended with its revision last July." In the opinion of the -_Mainichi_, "the Alliance no longer furnishes any guarantee for the -preservation of Chinese integrity. So far from Japan and Great Britain -taking, as the terms of the Alliance provide, joint action to protect -the rights and interests of the two nations when the same are -threatened, no measures have been taken at all." According to the -_Mainichi_, "England is no longer faithful to the principle of the -Alliance as regards the territorial integrity of China, and it is even -rumoured that she has intentions on Tibet, similar to those of Russia in -Mongolia. Consequently it is a matter of supreme importance to know -whether the Alliance is to be considered as still alive or not, and the -Japanese Government would do well to make some explicit declaration on -the subject." - -This view was supported by the Tokio _Nichi-Nichi_, which wrote: "For a -long time now the feeling between Great Britain and Japan has been -undergoing a change. There is no concealing the fact that it is no -longer what it was before the Russo-Japanese War. At the time of the -Tariff the friendly relations were only maintained by concessions from -the side of the Japanese. The revision of the terms of the Alliance has -reduced it from a real value to this country to a merely nominal value. -The friendship which has been steadily growing between Great Britain and -Russia is something to be watched. The action of Great Britain in the -China trouble has not been true to the Alliance. The tacit consent given -to Russian action in Mongolia is a violation of the integrity of China, -and on top of it we are informed that Great Britain at the right moment -will adopt similar steps in Tibet." - -The British-Japanese Treaty, for as much as it stands for, is the only -definite treaty affecting big issues in the Pacific to-day. To attempt -to discuss all possible treaties and combinations in the Pacific would -be, of course, impossible. But some notice must be given of the recent -remarkable hint of the possibilities of an "understanding" between -Germany and the United States on Pacific questions. In February Mr Knox, -the United States Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, communicated -in a formal Note to Germany some views on Pacific questions. Commenting -on this, the _New York Sun_, whose correspondent at Washington is a -great deal in the confidence of the Government, commented: "The -significance of Mr Knox's Note as a warning will, it is thought, be -clearly seen by the other Powers. The fact that the writing and -publication of Mr Knox's Note are the result of an understanding between -Germany and the United States will greatly add to the force of the -document. The other Powers, according to the Washington view, will -hesitate long before embarking upon the policy of advancing their -special interests by taking advantage of China's distress when Germany -and the United States are standing together before the world in -opposition to any such move." - -An "understanding" between Germany and the United States to act together -on the Asiatic side of the Pacific littoral would have its strategic -importance in the fact that German power in the Atlantic would help to -lessen certain risks consequent upon the United States concentrating her -naval forces in the Pacific. - -Another reasonably possible combination should be noted. As one of three -partners in the Triple Entente, Great Britain has an understanding with -Russia, which might possibly affect one day the position in the Pacific. -It is a fact rumoured among European diplomats that France, with the -idea of maintaining the Triple Entente as a basis of future -world-action, has urged Russia to build a Pacific Fleet, abandoning -naval expansion in the Baltic and the Black Sea. With a strong Pacific -Fleet Russia would certainly be a much more valuable friend to France -and to Great Britain than at present. But that is "in the air." The -actual position is that Great Britain and Russia are on such excellent -terms that they can fish amicably together to-day in the very disturbed -waters of Persia, and are possible future partners in the Pacific. - -Those who consider a British-Russian alliance as impossible, forget the -history of centuries and remember only that of a generation. Anciently -the Russian and the Englishman were the best of friends, and Russian aid -was often of very material use to Great Britain. It was in the eleventh -century that King Canute established English naval power in the Baltic, -and thus opened up a great trade with the Russian town of Novgorod. He -helped the young Russian nation much in so doing. After Canute's death -this trade with Russia languished for five centuries. But in the -sixteenth century it was revived, and some centuries later it was said -of this revival: "The discovery of a maritime intercourse with the Great -Empire of Russia, and the consequent extension of commerce and -navigation, is justly regarded by historians as the first dawn of the -wealth and naval preponderance of England." Some indeed hold that the -great exploits of the Elizabethan era of British seamanship would not -have been possible without the maritime supplies--cordage, canvas, -tallow, spars and salt beef--obtained from Russia. - -The benefits of the friendship were not all on one side. In the -seventeenth century England helped Russia with arms, supplies and troops -against the Poles. In 1747 England paid Russia to obtain an army of -37,000 troops which was employed in Holland. Later it was agreed that -Russia was to keep ready, on the frontiers of Livonia, an army of 47,000 -troops beside forty galleys to be used in the defence of Hanover, for -England, if needed. At a later date Catherine the Great of Russia was -appealed to for 20,000 troops for service against the revolted American -colonies, an appeal which she very wisely rejected. In the wars against -Napoleon, Great Britain and Russia were joint chiefs of the European -coalition, and a Russian Fleet was stationed in British waters doing -good service at the time of the Mutiny of the Nore. A British-Russian -understanding, in short, has been the rule rather than the exception in -European politics since the fifteenth century. - -An instinct of friendliness between Great Britain and the United States, -though expressed in no formal bonds, is yet a great force in the -Pacific. There has been at least one occasion on which an American force -in the Pacific has gone to the help of a British naval force engaging an -Asiatic enemy. There are various more or less authentic stories showing -the instinct of the armed forces of both nations to fraternise. -Sometimes it is the American, sometimes the British sailor who is -accused of breaking international law in his bias for the men of his own -speech and race. It would not be wise to record incidents, which were -irregular if they ever happened, and which, therefore, had best be -forgotten. But the fact of the American man-of-war's-men in Apia -Harbour, Samoa, finding time during their own rush to destruction at the -hands of a hurricane to cheer a British warship steaming out to safety, -is authentic, and can be cited without any harm as one instance of the -instinctive friendship of the two peoples in the Pacific of common blood -and common language. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[8] This proposal has now (1912) been revived in the face of the -disquieting uprise of Chinese power. It is an indication of the stubborn -resolve of the White populations to prohibit Asiatic immigration. - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -THE PANAMA CANAL - - -The poetry that is latent in modern science, still awaiting its singer, -shows in the story of the Panama Canal. Nature fought the great French -engineer, de Lesseps, on that narrow peninsula, and conquered him. His -project for uniting the waterways of the Pacific and the Atlantic was -defeated. But not by hills or distances. Nature's chief means of -resistance to science was the mobilising of her armies of subtle -poisoners. The microbes of malaria, yellow fever, of other diseases of -the tropical marshes, fell upon the canal workers. The mortality was -frightful. Coolie workers, according to one calculation, had a year's -probability of life when they took to work on the canal. The -superintendents and engineers of the White Race went to their tasks as -soldiers go to a forlorn hope. Finally the forces of disease conquered. -The French project for cutting a canal through the isthmus of Panama was -abandoned, having ruined the majority of those who had subscribed to its -funds, having killed the majority of those who had given to it of their -labour. - -The United States having decided to take over the responsibility for a -task of such advantage to the world's civilisation, gave to it at the -outset the benefit of a scientific consideration touched with -imagination. There were hills to be levelled, ditches to be dug, -water-courses to be tamed, locks to be built. All that was clear enough. -But how to secure the safety of the workers? Nature's defenders, though -fed fat with victory, were still eager, relentless for new victims. -Science said that to build a canal wholesome working conditions must be -created: yellow fever and malaria abolished. Science also told how. The -massacre of the mosquitoes of the isthmus was the first task in -canal-building. - -The mosquitoes, the disseminators of the deadly tropical diseases, were -attacked in their breeding grounds, and their larvæ easily destroyed by -putting a film of oil over the surface of the shallow waters in which -they lived. The oil smothered the life in the larvæ, and they perished -before they had fully developed. The insect fortunately has no great -range of flight. Its life is short, and it cannot pass far from its -birthplace. Herodotus tells how Egyptians avoided mosquitoes by sleeping -in high towers. The natives of Papua escape them by building their huts -in the forks of great trees. If the mosquitoes are effectively -exterminated within a certain area, there is certainty of future -immunity from them within that area if the marshes, the pools--the -stagnant waters generally on its boundaries--are thereafter guarded -during the hatching season against the chance of mosquito larvæ coming -to winged life. At Suez scientists had found this all out. Science -conquered the mosquito in Panama as it had been conquered elsewhere, and -the entrenchments of Nature crumbled away. Henceforth it was a matter of -rock-cutters, steam shovels and explosives, the A B C of modern -knowledge. But the mosquito put up a stubborn fight. Driven out of the -marshes, it found a refuge in the cisterns of houses, even in the -holy-water founts of churches. Every bit of stagnant water within the -isthmus area had to be protected against the chance of mosquitoes coming -to life before the campaign was successful. To-day the isthmus of Panama -is by no means unhealthy, and the work of canal-cutting progresses so -well that Mr President Taft was able to announce recently the -probability of it being opened two years before the due date. That -brings the canal as a realised fact right into the present. - -Some few facts regarding this engineering work. It will cost about -£70,000,000. The total length of the canal to be made from sea to sea is -50-1/2 miles, with a maximum width on the bottom of 1000 feet. The land -excavation is 40-1/2 miles of cutting through rock, sand and clay, -leaving 10 miles of channel to be deepened to reach the sea at either -end. Some of the other construction dimensions are these:-- - - Locks, usable length 1,000 feet. - Locks, usable width 110 feet. - Gatun Lake, area 164 square miles. - Gatun Lake, channel depth 84 to 45 feet. - Excavation, estimated total 174,666,594 cubic yards. - Concrete, total estimated for canal 5,000,000 cubic yards. - -The Gatun is the greatest rock and earth-fill dam ever attempted. -Forming Gatun Lake by impounding the waters of the Chagres and other -streams, it will be nearly 1-1/2 miles long, nearly 1/2 mile wide at its -base, about 400 feet wide at the water surface, about 100 feet wide at -the top. Its crest, as planned, will be at an elevation of 115 feet -above mean sea-level, or 30 feet above the normal level of the lake. The -interior of the dam is being formed of a natural mixture of sand and -clay placed between two large masses of rock, and miscellaneous material -obtained from steam-shovel excavation at various points along the canal. - -Gatun Lake will cover an area of 164 square miles, with a depth in the -ship channel varying from 85 to 45 feet. The necessity for this -artificial lake is because of the rugged hills of Panama. A sea-level -canal would have been a financial impossibility. By a lock system -lifting vessels up to Gatun Lake (a height of 85 feet), an immense -amount of excavation was saved. Incidentally the alarm was allayed of -that ingenious speculator who foretold that the Gulf Stream would take a -new path through the Panama Canal and desert the West Coast of Europe, -on the climate of which it has so profound an influence. When the canal -was opened England was to revert to her "natural climate"--that of -Labrador! But since the canal will not be a sea-level one, it cannot of -course have the slightest effect on ocean currents. The amount of -Pacific and Atlantic water which will be mutually exchanged by its -agency each year will be insignificant. - -The Panama Canal, when opened, will be exclusively United States -property; it will be fortified and defended by the United States army -and navy: and it will probably in time of peace be used to help United -States trade, and in time of war to help the United States arms. All -those conclusions are natural, since the United States has found the -money for the work, and claims under the Monroe doctrine an exclusive -hegemony of the American continent south of the Canadian border. But -originally it was thought that the canal would be, in a sense, an -international one. Later the idea was entertained, and actually -embodied, in a treaty between Great Britain and the United States that -whilst "the United States should have the exclusive right of providing -for the regulation and management of the canal," it should not be -fortified. But the Treaty of 1902 between Great Britain and the United -States abrogated that, and provided for the "neutralisation" of the -canal. It was stipulated that "the United States adopts, as the basis of -the neutralisation of such ship canal, the following rules, -substantially as embodied in the Convention of Constantinople, signed -the 28th October 1888, for the free navigation of the Suez Canal." The -Rules provide that the canal shall be open to the vessels of commerce -and war of all nations on terms of equality, so that there shall be no -discrimination against any nation or its citizens or subjects in respect -to conditions or charges. - -Rule 2 states: "The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right -of war be exercised, nor any act of hostility be committed within it. -The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such -military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it -against lawlessness and disorder." The third rule prohibits vessels of -war of a belligerent from revictualling or taking on stores in the canal -except so far as may be strictly necessary. Under Rule 4 belligerents -may not embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike -materials, except in case of accidental hindrance in transit, "and in -that case the transit shall be resumed with all possible despatch. -Waters adjacent to the canal within three marine miles of either end are -considered as part of the canal. Vessels of war of a belligerent are not -permitted to remain in those waters longer than twenty-four hours, -except in case of distress." The last rule makes the plant, -establishments, buildings, and the works necessary for the construction, -maintenance and operation of the canal part of the canal, "and in time -of war, as in time of peace, they shall enjoy complete immunity from -attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair -their usefulness as part of the canal." - -But it seems clear that anything, stated or implied, in that Treaty, -which is calculated to limit the sovereign rights of the United States -in regard to the canal, will be allowed to be forgotten, for the canal -has lately, since the question of the control of the Pacific came to the -front, shown to the United States even more as a military than as an -industrial necessity. In war time the United States will use the canal -so that she may mobilise her Fleet in either ocean. Already she has -passed estimates amounting to £3,000,000 for installing 14-inch guns, -searchlights, and submarine mines at either entrance. She is also -establishing a naval base at Cuba to guard the Atlantic entrance, and -designs yet another base at the Galapagos Islands. At present those -islands belong to Ecuador, and Ecuador objects to parting with them. But -it is probable that a way will be found out of that difficulty, for it -is clear that a strong United States naval base must be established on -the Pacific as well as the Atlantic threshold of the canal. This base, -with another at Cuba, would meet the objection I saw raised by an -American Admiral last year when he said: "In the event of the United -States being at war with a first-class naval Power, I doubt very much -whether the canal would be used once hostilities were declared. I assume -that our opponent would have so disposed his Fleets as to engage ours in -the Atlantic or Pacific coasts according as circumstances might -require, and that if we were stupid or careless enough to be caught -napping with our vessels scattered, no person in authority with any -sense would risk sending our ships through the canal. Our enemy would -lie in wait for us and pick off our vessels as they entered or emerged -from the canal, and every advantage would be on their side and against -us. This, of course, is on the assumption that the opposing force would -be at least as powerful as our own. If we had preponderating strength -conditions would be different, but if the navies were evenly matched it -would be hazardous in the extreme to use the canal. Nor would the -fortifications be of much help to us. So long as our ships remained -within the waters of the canal zone they would, of course, be under the -protection of the guns of the forts, but as soon as they came on the -high seas, where they would have to come if they were to be of any use, -the fortifications would be of little benefit to them, and little injury -to the enemy." - -But when to the actual fortification of the canal is added the provision -of a strong advanced base near each entrance, this criticism falls to -the ground. Between those advanced bases would be "American water," and -on either base a portion of the American Fleet could hold an enemy in -check until the mobilisation of the whole Fleet. - -The world must make up its mind to the fact that the Panama Canal is -intended by the United States as a means of securing her dominance in -the Pacific, without leaving her Atlantic coast too bare of protection -in the event of a great war. Great Britain is the only Power with any -shadow of a claim to object, and her claim would be founded on treaties -and arrangements which she has either abrogated or allowed to fall into -oblivion. Probably it will never be put forward. By a course of -negotiation, which, for steadiness of purpose and complete concealment -of that purpose until the right time came for disclosure, might be a -pattern to the most effective fighting despotism, the American democracy -has surmounted all obstacles of diplomacy in Panama just as the -obstacles of disease and distance were surmounted. The reluctance of a -disorderly sister Republic to grant the territory for the canal was -overcome by adding a beneficent one to its numerous useless revolutions. -The jealousy of Europe was first soothed and ultimately defied. It is -safe to venture the opinion that the reluctance of Ecuador to part with -the Galapagos will also be overcome. Then from New York to Pekin will -stretch a series of American naval bases--Cuba, Panama, the Galapagos, -Hawaii, the Philippines. - -The intention, announced on some authority, of the United States to use -the canal in times of peace as a tariff weapon for the furthering of -American trade may arouse some protest, but it is difficult to see how -such a protest can have any effect. The United States will be able to -reply that it is her canal, bought with her own money, and that it is -her right, therefore, to do with it as she pleases. In a special message -to Congress at the end of 1911, Mr Taft urged the necessity for the -establishment of preferential rates for American shipping passing -through the Panama Canal. He cited the practice of foreign Governments -in subsidising their merchant vessels, and declared that an equivalent -remission of canal tolls in favour of American commerce could not be -held to be discrimination. The message went on: "Mr Taft does not -believe that it would be the best policy wholly to remit the tolls for -domestic commerce for reasons purely fiscal. He desires to make the -canal sufficiently profitable to meet the debt amassed for its -construction, and to pay the interest upon it. On the other hand, he -wishes to encourage American commerce between the Atlantic and the -Pacific, especially in so far as it will insure the effectiveness of the -canal as a competitor with the trans-Continental railways." The -President concluded, therefore, that some experimentation in tolls would -be necessary before rates could be adjusted properly, or the burden -which American shipping could equitably bear could be definitely -ascertained. He hinted at the desirability of entrusting such -experimentation to the executive rather than to the legislative branch -of the Government. - -In plain language, the United States Government asked for a free hand to -shape rates for the use of the Panama Canal so that American shipping -interests could be promoted. The shipping affected would not be merely -from one American port to another, but between American and foreign -countries. By the present shipping laws American "coastal trade" i.e. -trade between one American port and another, even if one of the ports be -Manila or Honolulu, is closely safeguarded for American bottoms by a -rigid system of Protection. - -A _Daily Telegraph_ correspondent, writing from New York to London at -the time of Mr President Taft's message, described the trend of American -public opinion which was shown by the changing of the registry of the -Red Star liners _Kroonland_ and _Finland_ from Belgian to American. -"This morning Captain Bradshaw, an American, assumed command, and the -ceremony of hauling down the foreign flag and hoisting the Stars and -Stripes took place. The reasons for the change are not announced, but it -is said that the approaching completion of the Panama Canal has -something to do with it, and shipping circles here declare that the -change of registry presages the entry of the _Kroonland_ and her sister -ship the _Finland_ into the American coast trade between Pacific and -Atlantic ports, _via_ the Panama Canal. It is expected that a heavy -subsidy will be given to American steamships by the United States -Government carrying mails from the Atlantic to the Pacific _via_ Panama, -and it is generally believed that the owners of the _Kroonland_ and the -_Finland_ have this in mind." - -Clearly the United States, having expended £70,000,000 directly, and a -great deal indirectly, on the Panama Canal, intends to put it to some -profitable use, both in war time and in peace time. Naval supremacy in -the Pacific in war time, industrial supremacy in peace time--those are -the benefits which she expects to derive. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI - -THE INDUSTRIAL POSITION IN THE PACIFIC - - -That our civilisation is based on conditions of warring struggle is -shown by the fact that even matters of production and industry are -discussed in terms of conflict. The "war of tariffs," the "struggle for -markets," the "defence of trade," the "protection of our work"--these -are every-day current phrases; and the problem of the Pacific as it -presents itself to the statesmen of some countries has little concern -with navies or armies, but almost exclusively comes as an industrial -question: "Will our national interests be affected adversely by the -cheap competition of Asiatic labour, either working on its home -territory or migrating to our own land, now that the peoples of the -Pacific are being drawn into the affairs of the world?" - -Viewed in the light of abstract logic, it seems the quaintest of -paradoxes that the very act of production of the comforts and -necessities of life can be considered, under any circumstances, a -hostile one. Viewed in the light of the actual living facts of the day, -it is one of the clearest of truths that a nation and a race may be -attacked and dragged down through its industries, and that national -greatness is lost and won in destructive competition in the workshops of -the world. That industry itself may be turned to bad account is another -proof that an age, in which there is much talk of peace, is still -governed in the main by the ideas of warfare. The other day, to Dr Hall -Edwards, known as the "X-ray Martyr," a grateful nation gave a pension -of £120 a year after he had had his second hand amputated. He had given -practically his life ("for you do take my life when you take the means -whereby I live") to Humanity. As truly as any martyr who died for a -religious idea or a political principle, or for the rescue of another in -danger, he had earned the blessing decreed to whomsoever gives up his -life for his brother. And he was awarded a pension of £120 a year to -comfort the remainder of his maimed existence! At the same time that Dr -Hall Edwards was awarded his pension, an engineer thought he had -discovered a new principle in ballistics. His bold and daring mind -soared above the puny guns by which a man can hardly dare to hope to -kill a score of other men at a distance of five miles. He dreamed of an -electric catapult which "could fire shells at the rate of thousands per -minute from London to Paris, and even further." The invention would have -raised the potential homicidal power of man a thousandfold. And the -inventor asked--and, without a doubt, if he had proved his weapon to be -what he said, would have got--£1,000,000. The invention did not justify -at the time the claims made on its behalf. But a new method of -destruction which did, could command its million pounds with certainty -from almost any civilised government in the world. - -In industry also the greatest fortunes await those who can extend their -markets by destroying the markets of their rivals, and nations aim at -increasing their prosperity by driving other nations out of a home or a -neutral market. There is thus a definitely destructive side to the work -of production; and some foresee in the future an Asiatic victory over -the White Races, not effected directly by force of arms but by -destructive industrial competition which would sap away the foundations -of White power. How far that danger is real and how far illusory is a -matter worthy of examination. - -At the outset the theoretical possibility of such a development must be -admitted, though the practical danger will be found to be not serious, -since it can be met by simple precautions. There are several familiar -instances in European history of a nation being defeated first in the -industrial or commercial arena, and then, as an inevitable sequel, -falling behind in the rivalry of war fleets and armies. In the Pacific -there may be seen some facts illustrating the process. The Malay -Peninsula, for instance, is becoming rapidly a Chinese instead of a -Malay Colony of Great Britain. In the old days the Malays, instinctively -hostile to the superior industry and superior trading skill of the -Chinese, kept out Chinese immigrants at the point of the kris. With the -British overlordship the Chinaman has a fair field, and he peacefully -penetrates the peninsula, ousting the original inhabitants. In Fiji, -again, Hindoo coolies have been imported by the sugar-planters to take -the place of the capricious Fijian worker. Superior industry and -superior trading skill tell, and the future fate of Fiji is to be an -Indian colony with White overseers, the Fijian race vanishing. - -In both these instances, however, the dispossessed race is a coloured -one. Could a White Race be ousted from a land in the same way, presuming -that the White Race is superior and not inferior? Without doubt, yes, if -the coloured race were allowed ingress, for they would instil into the -veins of the White community the same subtle poison as would a slave -class. The people of every land which comes into close contact with the -Asiatic peoples of the West Pacific littoral know this, and in all the -White communities of the ocean there is a jealousy and fear of Asiatic -colonisation. The British colonies in the Pacific, in particular, are -determined not to admit the Asiatic races within their border. That -determination was ascribed by a British Colonial Secretary of a past era -as due to "an industrial reason and a trade union reason, the -determination that a country having been won by the efforts and the -struggle of a White Race and rescued from barbarism should not be made -the ground of competition by men who had not been engaged in that -struggle." But I prefer to think that the reason lies deeper than the -fear of cheaper labour. It springs rather from the consciousness that a -higher race cannot live side by side with a lower race and preserve its -national type. If the labouring classes have always been in the van of -anti-Asiatic movements in the White colonies of the Pacific, it is -because the labouring classes have come first into contact with the -evils of Asiatic colonisation. It is now some years since I first put -forward as the real basis of the "White Australia" policy "the instinct -against race-mixture which Nature has implanted in man to promote her -work of evolution." That view was quoted by Mr Richard Jebb in his -valuable _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, and at once it won some -acceptance in Great Britain which before had been inclined to be hostile -to the idea of "White Australia." Subsequently in a paper before the -Royal Society of Arts Mr Jebb took occasion to say: - -"Let me enter a protest against the still popular fallacy that the -Pacific attitude (_i.e._ in regard to Asiatic labour) is dictated merely -by the selfish insistence of well-organised and rapacious labour. Two -circumstances tell decisively against this view. One is that responsible -local representatives, not dependent upon labour suffrages, invariably -argue for restriction or exclusion on the higher social and political -grounds in relation to which the labour question is subsidiary, although -essential. The second evidence is the modern adherence to the -restriction movement of nearly all Australasians and an increasing -number of Canadians, who are not 'in politics' and whose material -interests in many cases are opposed to the extravagant demands of -labour. Their insight contrasts favourably, I think, with that perverse -body of opinion, to be found in all countries, which instinctively -opposes some policy of enormous national importance lest the immediate -advantage should accrue to persons not thought to deserve the benefit." - -But whilst the industrial reason is not the only reason, nor even the -chief reason, against Asiatic immigration into a White colony, there is, -of course, a special objection on the part of the industrial classes to -such immigration. It is for that reason that there has been in all the -White settlements of the Pacific a small section, angered by what they -considered to be the exorbitant demands of the workers, anxious to -enlist the help of Asiatic labour for the quick development of new -territories, and in some cases this section has had its way to an -extent. Some of the Canadian railways were built with the help of -Chinese labour: and Western Canada has that fact chiefly to thank for -her coloured race troubles to-day--not so serious as those of the United -States with the Negroes, but still not negligible altogether. In -Australia it was at one time proposed to introduce Chinese as workers in -the pastoral industry: and one monstrous proposal was that Chinese men -should be mated with Kanaka women in the South Sea Islands to breed -slave labour for sheep stations and farms in Australia. - -Fortunately that was frustrated, as were all other plans of Asiatic -immigration, and as soon as the Australian colonists had been allowed -the right to manage their own affairs they made a first use of their -power by passing stringent laws against Asiatic immigrations. A typical -Act was that passed in 1888 in New South Wales. By that Act it was -provided that no ship should bring Chinese immigrants to a greater -number than one for every 300 tons of cargo measurement (thus a ship of -3000 tons could not bring more than ten Chinese): and each Chinaman on -landing had to pay a poll tax of £100. Chinese could not claim -naturalisation rights and could not engage in gold-mining without -permission. Since then the Australian Commonwealth has passed a law -which absolutely prohibits coloured immigration, under the subterfuge of -an Education Test. New Zealand shares with Australia a policy of -rigorous exclusion of Asiatics. In Canada the desire lately evinced of -the Western people to exclude Asiatics altogether has been thwarted, so -far, by the political predominance of the Eastern states, which have not -had a first-hand knowledge of the evils following upon Asiatic -immigration, and have vetoed the attempts of British Columbia to bar out -the objectionable colonists. But some measures of exclusion have been -adopted enforcing landing fees on Chinese; and, by treaty, limiting the -number of Japanese permitted to enter. Further rights of exclusion are -still sought. In the United States there have been from time to time -rigorous rules for the exclusion of Chinese, sometimes effected by -statute, sometimes by agreement with China, and at present Chinese -immigration is forbidden. The influx of Japanese is also prevented under -a treaty with Japan. - -The industrial position in the Pacific is thus governed largely by the -fact that in all the White settlements on its borders there are more or -less complete safeguards against competition by Asiatic labour on the -White man's territory: and that the tendency is to make these safeguards -more stringent rather than to relax them. Nothing short of a war in the -Pacific, giving an Asiatic Power control of its waters, would allow -Asiatics to become local competitors in the labour markets of those -White settlements. - -But debarred from colonisation the Asiatic has still two other chances -of competition: - -(1) In the home markets of his White rivals in the Pacific; - -(2) In such neutral markets as are open to his goods on equal terms with -theirs. - -The first chance can be swept away almost completely by hostile tariffs, -which it is in the power of any of the White nations to impose. There -are no Free Trade ideas in the Pacific; the United States, Canada, New -Zealand, and Australia, all alike protect their home markets against any -destructive Asiatic competition. If Japanese boots or Chinese steel -work began to invade the markets of Australia or America to any serious -extent, the case would be met at once by a hostile tariff revision. - -The second chance, open to the Asiatic industrial, that of competing -with White labour in neutral markets, of cutting into the export trade -of his rivals, is greater. But even it is being constantly limited by -the tendency to-day which makes for the linking up of various nations -into groups for mutual benefit in matters of trade; and which also makes -for the gradual absorption of independent markets into the sphere of -influence of one or other group. Some students of tariff subjects -foresee the day when a nation will rely for export markets on dominions -actually under its sway and on a strictly limited entrance to foreign -markets paid for by reciprocal concessions. They foresee the whole world -divided up into a limited number of "spheres of influence" and no areas -left for free competition of traders of rival nations. Under such -circumstances a Power would have free and full entry only into those -territories actually under its sway. Into other markets its entry would -be restricted by local national considerations and also by the interests -of the Imperial system having dominion there. - -Present facts certainly point to the dwindling of neutral markets. An -effort is constantly made by "open-door" agreements to keep new markets -from being monopolised by any one Power, and great nations have shown -their appreciation of the importance of keeping some markets "open" by -intimations of their willingness to fight for the "open door" in some -quarter or other of the world. Nevertheless doors continue to be shut -and events continue to trend towards an industrial position matching the -military position, a world dominated in various spheres by great Powers -as jealous for their trading rights as for their territorial rights. - -Imagining such a position, the Asiatic industrial influence in the -Pacific would depend strictly on the Asiatic military and naval -influence. For the present, however, there are many neutral markets, and -in these, without a doubt, Asiatic production is beginning to oust -European production to some extent. In the textile industries, -particularly, Asiatic production, using European machinery, is -noticeably cheaper than European. Yet, withal, the cheapness of Asiatic -labour is exaggerated a great deal by many economists. It will be found -on close examination that whilst the Asiatic wage rate is very low, the -efficiency rate is low in almost equal proportion. Some effective -comparisons are possible from the actual experience of Asiatic and other -coloured labour. In the mining industry, for instance, Chinese labour, -the most patient, industrious, tractable and efficient form of Asiatic -labour, does not stand comparison with White industry. In Australia -Chinese labour has been largely employed in the Northern Territory -mines: it has not proved economical.[9] The Broken Hill (silver) and -Kalgoorlie (gold) mines in the same continent, worked exclusively by -highly-paid White labour, show better results as regards economy of -working than the Rand (South Africa) gold mines with Kaffir or with -Chinese coolie labour. - -The Chinaman has a great reputation as an agriculturist, and at -vegetable-growing he seems able to hold his own in competition with -White labour, for he can follow in that a patient and laborious routine -with success. In no other form of agriculture does he compete -successfully with the White farmer. In Australia, for example, where the -Chinese are still established as market-gardeners, they fail at all -other sorts of farming, and it is an accepted fact that a Chinese tiller -will ruin orchard land in a very short time if it comes under his -control. - -In navvying work and in dock-labouring work the Asiatic coolie is not -really economical. To see four coolies struggling to carry one frozen -carcase of mutton off a steamer at Durban, with a fifth coolie to -oversee and help the voluble discussion which usually accompanies coolie -work; and to contrast the unloading of the same cargo by White labour, -with one man one carcase the rule, is to understand why low wages do not -always mean low labour costs. - -When any particular problem of production has been reduced to a -practically mechanical process, when the need of initiative, of thought, -of keen attention, has been eliminated, Asiatic work can compete -successfully with White work, though the individual Asiatic worker will -not, even then, be capable of the same rate of production as the -individual White worker. But in most domains of human industry the -Asiatic worker, in spite of his very much lower initial cost, cannot -compete with the European. Intelligent labour is still the cheapest -ultimately in most callings, even though its rate of pay be very much -higher. In practical experience it has often been found that a White -worker can do more whilst working eight hours a day than whilst working -ten hours, on account of the superior quality of his work when he has -better opportunities for rest and recreation. The same considerations -apply, with greater force, to comparisons between White and "coloured" -labour. - -A fact of importance in the discussion of this point is the effect of -impatient White labour in encouraging, of patient Asiatic labour in -discouraging, the invention and use of machinery. The White worker is -always seeking to simplify his tasks, to find a less onerous way. (He -discovers, for instance, that the wheel-barrow saves porterage.) Now -that coloured labour is being banished from cotton-fields and -sugar-brakes, we hear talk of machines which will pick cotton and trash -cane-fields. - -The industrial position in the Pacific as regards White and "coloured" -labour is then to-day this: Owing to the efforts, sometimes expressed in -terms of legal enactment, sometimes of riot and disorder,[2] of the -British race colonists in the Pacific, the settlements of Australia and -New Zealand have been kept almost entirely free from Asiatic colonists: -and the Pacific slopes of the United States and Canada have been but -little subjected to the racial taint. Asiatic rivalry in the industrial -sphere must therefore be directed from Asiatic territory. The goods, not -the labour, must be exported; and the goods can be met with hostile -tariffs just as the labour is met with Exclusion Acts. In neutral -markets the products of Asiatic labour can compete with some success -with the products of the labour of the White communities, but not with -that overwhelming success which an examination of comparative wage rates -would suggest. Under "open door" conditions Asiatic peoples could kill -many White industries in the Pacific; but "open door" conditions could -only be enforced by a successful war. Such a war, of course, would be -followed by the sweeping away of immigration restrictions as well as -goods restrictions. - -There is another, the Asiatic, side to the question. Without a doubt the -Asiatic territories in the Pacific will not continue to offer rich -prizes for European Powers seeking trade advantages through setting up -"spheres of influence." Since Japan won recognition as a nation she has -framed her tariffs to suit herself. In the earlier stages of her -industrial progress she imported articles, learned to copy them, and -then imposed a prohibitive tariff on their importation. Various kinds of -machinery were next copied and their importation stopped. China may be -expected to follow the same plan. Europe and America may not expect to -make profits out of exploiting her development. A frank recognition of -this fact would conduce to peace in the Pacific. If it can be agreed -that neither as regards her territory nor her markets is China to be -served up as the prize of successful dominance of the Pacific, one of -the great promptings to warfare there would disappear. "Asia for the -Asiatics" is a just policy, and would probably prove a wise one. - -In discussing the position of Asiatic labour in the Pacific I have taken -a view which will dissatisfy some alarmists who cite the fact that the -wage rate for labour in Western Canada and Australia is about 8s. a day, -and in China and Japan about 1s. a day; and conclude therefore that the -Asiatic power in the industrial field is overwhelming. But an -examination of actual working results rather than theoretical -conclusions from a limited range of facts will very much modify that -conclusion. Asiatic labour competition, if allowed liberty of access for -the worker as well as his work, would undoubtedly drag down the White -communities of the Pacific. But when the competition is confined to the -work, and the workman is kept at a distance, it is not at all as serious -a matter as some have held, and can always be easily met with tariff -legislation. The most serious blow to European and American -industrialism that Asia could inflict would be an extension of the -Japanese protective system to the Asiatic mainland. Yet that we could -not grumble at; and it would have a compensating advantage in taking -away the temptation to conflict which the rich prize of a suzerainty -over the Chinese market now dangles before the industrial world. - -There are now one or two industrial facts of less importance to which -attention may be drawn. The United States, with the completion of the -Panama Canal, will be the greatest industrial Power of the Pacific. Her -manufacturing interests are grouped nearer to the east than the west -coast--partly because of the position of her coalfields,--and the fact -has hitherto stood in the way of her seaport trade to the Pacific. With -the opening of the canal her eastern ports will find the route to the -Pacific reduced greatly, and they will come into closer touch with the -western side of South America, with Asia, and with the British -communities in the South Pacific. The perfect organisation of the -industrial machinery of the United States will give her a position of -superiority analogous to that which Great Britain had in the Atlantic at -the dawn of the era of steam and steel. - -Western Canada is a possible great industrial factor of the future when -she learns to utilise the tremendous water power of the Selkirks and -Rockies. The Canadian people have the ambition to become manufacturers, -and already they satisfy the home demand for many lines of manufactured -goods, and have established an export trade in manufactures worth about -£7,000,000 a year. Australia, too, aspires to be a manufacturing -country, and though she has not risen yet to the dignity of being an -exporter of manufactures to any considerable extent, the valuation of -her production from manufactures (_i.e._ value added in process of -manufacture) is some £180,000,000 a year. - -To sum up: in neutral markets of the Pacific (_i.e._ markets in which -the goods of all nations can compete on even terms) the Asiatic producer -(the Japanese and the Indian at present, the Chinese later) will be -formidable competitors in some lines, notably textiles. But the United -States should be the leading industrial Power. British competition for -Pacific markets will come not only from the Mother Country but from the -Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Neutral markets will, -however, tend to be absorbed in the spheres of influence of rival Powers -striving for markets as well as for territory. A position approaching -monopoly of the markets of the Pacific could only be reached as the -result of a campaign of arms. - -FOOTNOTES: - -[9] The Northern Territory has been the one part of Australia where -coloured labour has been obtainable in practically any quantity for -mining; yet it is the part of Australia where the experience of -mine-owners has been generally the most disastrous. In 1906 the -production amounted to £126,000; in the last four years, according to a -report just furnished by the Chief Warden (1911), it has got down to -£60,000 a year, and is now shrivelling so fast that the whole industry -is threatened. "The values of the properties worked in the past are not -accountable for this depressed condition," says the Chief Warden, "for -there is every reason for the belief that, if the mineral wealth here -were exploited, it would compare favourably with that of any of the -States; but the depression has been caused chiefly through the -pernicious system of mining that has been carried out in the past, and -the wasteful expenditure in most instances of the capital forthcoming -for development." - -[2] The Australian Labour organ, _The Worker_, boasted (Oct. 22, 1908): -"When the law was not sufficient to guard race purity, 'selfish' Labour -risked its life and liberty to go beyond the law, and to show, as was -shown at another time in California, that the White Race would not -tolerate Asiatic colonisation. The Chinese Exclusion Acts in various -states of Australia were thus the monuments, not of the politicians who -passed them into law, but of the courage of the workers who were -willing--as the Eureka miners were willing--to sacrifice everything in -the cause of a clean, free Australia." - - - - -CHAPTER XVII - -SOME STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS - - -Soundly considered, any great strategical problem is a matter of: - -1. Naval and military strength; rarely exercised separately but usually -in combination. - -2. Disposition of fortified stations and of bases of supplies. - -3. The economic and political conditions of countries concerned. - -Such phrases as the "Blue-water School of Strategy" are either -misleading, inasmuch as they give an incorrect impression of the ideas -of the people described as belonging to such a school, wrongly -representing them as considering naval strength, and naval strength -alone, in a problem of attack and defence; or else they rightly describe -an altogether incorrect conception of strategy. It will be found on -examination of any great typical struggle between nations that all three -matters I have mentioned have usually entered into the final -determination of the issue; that superior military or naval force has -often been countered by superior disposition of fortresses, fitting -stations, and supply bases: that sometimes clear superiority both in -armaments and disposition of armaments has been countered by greater -financial and industrial resources and more resolute national character. - -On all questions of strategy the Napoleonic wars will provide leading -cases, for Napoleon brought to his campaigns the full range of -weapons--military, naval, political, economic; and his early victories -were won as much by the audaciously new reading he gave to the politics -of war as to his skill in military strategy and in tactics. It would be -a fascinating task to imagine a Napoleon setting his mind to a -consideration of the strategy of the Pacific with all its vast problems. -But since to give to "strategy" its properly wide definition would be to -deal again in this chapter with many matters already fully discussed, I -propose to touch upon it here in a much narrower sense, and suggest -certain of the more immediate strategical problems, particularly in -regard to the disposition of fortified stations and bases of supplies. - -A glance at the map will show that the British Empire has at the present -moment an enormous strategical superiority over any other Power in the -Pacific. That Empire is established on both flanks, in positions with -strong and safe harbours for fleets, and with great tracts of fertile -country for recruiting local military forces and providing garrisons. -(For the time being I put aside political limitations and consider only -military and naval possibilities unhampered by any restrictions.) On -the eastern flank of the Pacific Ocean is the Columbian province of -Canada provided with several fine harbours and allowing of the -construction of an ideal naval base behind the shelter of Vancouver -Island. The coastal waters and the coastal rivers alike make possible -great fisheries, and consequently are good nurseries for seamen. The -coastal territory has supplies of coal, of timber, of oil. The -hinterland is rich pastoral, agricultural, and mineral country capable -of carrying an enormous population and, therefore, of providing a great -army. - -Considered in relation to its neighbours in the Pacific, Canada is -strategically quite safe except as regards attack from one quarter--the -United States. A Russian attack upon Canada, for instance, would be -strategically hopeless (I presume some equality of force), since a -Russian Fleet would have to cross the Pacific and meet the Canadian -Fleet where the Canadians chose, or else batter a fortified coast with -the Canadian Fleet sheltering in some port on a flank waiting a chance -to attack. The same remark applies to an attack from Japan, from China, -or from a South American nation. As regards an attack from the United -States, the position, of course, is different. But even in that case the -strategical position of Canada would be at least not inferior to that of -the enemy (apart from superiority of numbers), since that enemy would be -liable to diverting attacks from Great Britain in the Atlantic and from -Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific (whose forces would, however, -have to subdue the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands before they -could safely approach the North American coast). An attack by the United -States on Canada is, however, not within the bounds of present -probability, and need not be discussed. - -The very great importance of Canada to the British position in the -Pacific cannot, however, be too strongly impressed. Canada holds the -right flank of the Pacific Ocean, and that flank rests upon the main -British strength concentrated in the Atlantic. With the loss of Canada -British mastery in the Pacific would be impossible. To make the -strategical position of Western Canada (naturally very strong) secure -there is needed-- - -(a) A British Pacific Fleet strong enough to meet any enemy in the -ocean, and so stationed as to be capable of concentrating quickly either -at a base near Vancouver on the outbreak of hostilities, or in the rear -of any Fleet attacking the coast. - -(b) A greater population in Western Canada with an army (not necessarily -of Regulars) capable of defending Canadian territory against a landing -party. - -On the west flank of the Pacific Great Britain is established at -Wei-hai-wei, Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, Borneo, New Guinea, -Australia, New Zealand, and various small islands. There are here -possibilities of enormous strength and several points of grave danger. - -At the outset let us consider the continental position of the British -Empire on the west flank of the Pacific. The occupation of India gives -to the British Power at once a great position and a great -responsibility. Occupation of India, presuming the loyalty of the -majority of the native inhabitants--a presumption which seems to become -more and more reasonable with the passage of time--gives great material -resources and command of a vast population of good fighting men. It is -admitted, however, that these native troops require a certain -"stiffening" of White troops before taking the field. To provide that -stiffening is the greatest single task of the British Regular army. -Strategically, the transfer from Great Britain to India of a large -number of soldiers to leaven the native forces is not an ideal system. -The distance between the source of supply and the field of operations is -so great that in peace it is necessary to have a larger force than would -be necessary if that distance were reduced, and in war the repairing of -wastage would be a matter of some difficulty. Further, the British -soldier, coming from a very different climate, suffers a great deal from -sickness in India. A more economical and effective system, if that were -found to be politically possible, would be to strengthen the White -garrison of India in part from Australia and New Zealand and South -Africa in case of war. - -The defence of India has to be considered in the light of-- - -(a) An attack from Japan or China based on a Pan-Asiatic movement. - -(b) Internal sedition. - -(c) An attack from Russia through Persia. - -(d) An attack from Germany allied with Turkey by way of the Persian -Gulf. - -The two former are the more immediate dangers. But on the whole, India -is a far greater source of strength than of weakness. She makes the -British Empire a great military power on the mainland of Asia, and she -can contribute materially to the strength of the Pacific naval forces. - -Passing from India we find the British Empire in possession of several -very important strategical positions on or near the coast of Asia, -Wei-hai-wei and Hong Kong being the advance stations in the north, and -Singapore (the favoured meeting-place of the Pacific squadron of the -British Navy) being a well-situated central point. A British Pacific -Fleet making Singapore its chief base would be in the best position to -dominate the western littoral of the ocean. South of Singapore the large -settlements (Australia and New Zealand) are friendly. From the north any -possible enemy would be best watched, best met, from a Singapore base. -That base would be central for aid from India and South Africa; and it -would also be the best point of departure for a Pacific Fleet finding it -necessary to rendezvous on the American flank of the ocean. - -This is a convenient point at which to call attention to one grave -strategical weakness of the British Empire position in the Pacific--the -lack of a fortified coaling station near to the centre of the ocean. -Between Hong Kong and Vancouver there is no fortified coaling station. -There are rumours, as I write, of the want being met by the -fortification of Fanning Island, at present the landing-place of the -Pacific cable between Vancouver and Norfolk Island. Fanning Island is -not an ideal station either by position or natural advantages. But it -would be better than nothing. - -The strategical position of Australia and New Zealand comes next for -consideration. Looking to the future, these British Dominions, which can -be grouped under the one title, Australasia, will probably form the most -important national element in the South Pacific. Considered at present, -Australia must be a source of the gravest anxiety strategically, for it -has within its vast, and everywhere insufficiently populated, area one -great tract, the Northern Territory, which is practically empty, and -which contains to-day twice as many Asiatics as Whites. Embracing -335,000,000 acres, the Northern Territory possesses several splendid -rivers, in the inland portion a great artesian water supply, and a wide -diversity of land and of climate. On the uplands is a warm, dry, -exhilarating area, not very rich in soil, but suitable for pastoral -occupation, and giving great promise of mineral wealth. On the lowlands, -with a climate which is sub-tropical to tropical, but, on account of the -wide spread of the gum tree, is practically nowhere dangerously -malarial, every agricultural industry is possible, from dairy-farming -and maize-growing to the cultivation of coffee, sugar, sago, hemp, and -spices. Almost every expert who has explored the Territory has been -struck with its possibilities. Mr Dashwood, the former Government -resident, considered the "area of land suitable for tropical agriculture -enormous." Mr Sydney Kidman, the great cattle breeder, reported on the -land about Herbert River as "ideal cattle country." A dozen other -authorities acclaim the pastoral possibilities of the uplands. The -probability of vast tin, copper and gold deposits is certified to by -every geological explorer. - -The Northern Territory thus offers a tempting prize for an Asiatic Power -seeking new outlets for its population. Yet, with all its advantages the -Territory remains empty. It is known that the Government of Great -Britain is profoundly anxious for its settlement. It is an open gate -through which an Asiatic invader may occupy Australia. It is an empty -land which we do not "effectively occupy," and therefore is, according -to the theories of international law, open to colonisation by some other -Power. - -Further, the Northern Territory is specially vulnerable, because an -enemy landing there could find horses, oxen, pasturage, timber, some -metals, a good soil, plenty of water, any number of easily defensible -harbours--in short, all the raw material of war. And to prevent a -landing there is nothing. The local White population is nil, -practically; the fortifications are nil; the chances of an Australian -force ever getting there to dislodge an enemy, nil. - -An ingenious Australian romance (_The Commonwealth Crisis_, by C. H. -Kirness), recently published, imagines a "colonising invasion" of -Australia by Japan. A certain Thomas Burt and his friend, while on a -hunting trip in the Northern Territory, observe the landing of bodies of -Japanese troops at Junction Bay. They ride to the south-west to bring -the news to Port Darwin, the small White settlement in the Territory. -For some years preceding Japan had contemplated a secret "peaceful -invasion" of the Northern Territory. The project was planned with great -care. First a huge military colony was organised at Formosa, and the men -trained in agriculture. Later, the men were supplied with wives. Three -months were allowed to elapse, and the men were transported secretly to -the Northern Territory. Quite 6000 "colonists" had been thus landed -before "White Australia" was able to take any action. Japan, when -concealment is no longer possible, officially states through its -Ambassador in London that, quite without authority from the Mikado, a -private colonising organisation had settled a body of Japanese in the -Northern Territory. The Mikado regretted this, and was willing that -these subjects should disavow their Japanese citizenship and swear -devotion to the British Flag. A deputation from the Japanese colony in -the Northern Territory then arrives at Port Darwin to offer its -allegiance, and to ask that schools should be established in the new -settlement. - -From that point the story develops to the downfall of "White Australia" -so far as all the north of the Continent is concerned. That romance was, -though in some of its details fantastic, in its main idea possible. It -was one of many efforts in warning. Such warnings seem to be taking -effect now, for the Commonwealth Government is moving at last to -colonise the Northern Territory, and to build a railway which will bring -it into touch with the more populous portions of the Continent. A -scientific expedition was sent recently to investigate the conditions of -the Territory as regards productiveness and health. The preliminary -report of that expedition (presented to the Australian Parliament -October 1911) was generally favourable. It enlarged on the great -capacity of the Territory for production, and was optimistic about the -climatic conditions: - -"Bearing in mind that the country was visited at the time of year when -the climate was most suitable for Europeans, the general health was -remarkably good. The families of the second generation examined showed -no signs of physical deterioration. There are none of the tropical -diseases, such as malaria and dysentery, endemic in the settlements; -and, as long as the necessary hygienic precautions are observed, there -is no reason to anticipate their appearance. - -"There are, at present, men who have spent from three to four decades in -the Territory, and every one of them compares favourably, both as -regards physique and energy, with men of similar ages elsewhere. - -"The healthiest and strongest are those, both men and women, who take -regular open-air exercises both in the relatively cool and in the hot -season. - -"Life in the back country, provided the ordinary precautions necessary -in tropical parts are taken, is decidedly healthy. The summer months are -undoubtedly trying, but the winter months, when at night-time the -temperature falls below 40 degrees F., afford recuperation from the -excessive damp heat of the summer. In addition, the open-air life is in -itself a great safeguard against enervation and physical deterioration." - -That bears out the views of those who are in the best position to know -the Northern Territory of Australia. Clearly, there are no obstacles to -its White settlement except such as arise from the apathy and -carelessness of the governments concerned. But with the strategical -question of populating the Northern Territory is bound up the other idea -of populating Australia itself. In 1904, the Government of New South -Wales, one of the Australian states, alarmed by the fall of the -birth-rate, appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the cause. One -thing made clear by the investigations of the Commission was "that a -very large section of the population keeps down the birth-rate so far -as it can, and that the limit of birth-suppression is defined by the -limit of knowledge on the subject." That was practically the main -conclusion in the Commissioners' report. It probably did not need a -Commission of Inquiry to tell the social observer of Australia so much. -That the decreasing birth-rate in the Commonwealth was not primarily due -to any physical degeneracy of the people, had long been the conviction -of all who had had the opportunity and the desire to make the most -cursory inquiry into the subject. Not lack of capacity, but lack of -willingness to undertake parental responsibility, was the cause of the -Australian movement towards sterility. Coming to a conclusion as to -"why" was thus an easy task in investigating the dwindling birth-rate. -It was quite clear that the Australian cradle did not fill, mainly -because the Australian parent preferred to have a very small family. - -The evil--it is an evil, for there could be no better, no more welcome -immigrants to any country than those coming on the wings of the -stork--does not affect Australia alone, but is observable in almost -every civilised country. It has successfully defied one of the strongest -of natural sentiments. Every sane adult is by instinct desirous of being -a parent. But instinct seems to weaken with civilisation and its -accompanying artificiality of life. If, on an essentially vital point, -it is to become so weak as to be ineffective, and is to be replaced by -no ethical or other motive working towards the same end, then -civilisation will involve extinction. That is the melancholy conclusion -which some pessimists even now come to, pointing to the fact that the -White races of the earth, as a whole, despite the still prolific Slav -and German, show a tendency to dwindle. - -Alarm at such a conclusion may yet prove in itself a remedy. Already -there is a general agreement that for the community's good it is well -that there should be a higher birth-rate, but, so far, the general -agreement lacks particular application. With a further recognition of -the fate to which artificially-secured sterility points, there may be an -acuter alarm, which will convert the individual not only to good belief, -but to good practice. What is wanted is a generally accepted conviction -that childlessness is either unfortunate or disgraceful, and that -anything but a moderately large family is a condition calling for -apology. In Australia that is particularly wanted. There are there--in a -new country with plenty of room for many millions yet--none of the -excuses which can be held to justify "small families" in more thickly -populated lands. It is satisfactory to note that since the Birth-rate -Commission aroused the public mind on the subject in Australia, there -has been a distinct betterment of the birth-rate; and there has been an -end to the old objection to immigration. "Empty Australia" is filling up -somewhat more rapidly now; but the process is still far too slow, from -the point of view of strategical safety. - -With Australia, including the Northern Territory, populated and -defended, the strategical position of the British Empire on the Asiatic -flank of the Pacific Ocean could be organised on a sound basis. An -Imperial Fleet, contributed to by the Mother Country, by Australia, New -Zealand, South Africa, India, and the Crown Colonies, having a rallying -point at Singapore, could hold the Indian Ocean (which is to the Pacific -what the Mediterranean is to the Atlantic) as a "British lake," and this -powerful naval force would straddle the centre of the western littoral -of the ocean, keeping secure the British communities in the south from -the Asiatic communities in the north, and ready to respond to a call -from Canada. On the western, as on the eastern flank, there is present -all the "raw material" for Fleets and armies--great supplies of coal, -oil, timber, metals, fecund fishing grounds, and enormous areas of -agricultural and pastoral territory. - -When the strategical position of the United States in the Pacific comes -to be examined, it is found to be for the moment one full of anxiety. -The Power which may, five years hence, have undisputed hegemony of the -ocean, holds a difficult position there to-day. The map will show that -if the United States had had no expansion ideas at all, in the Pacific -or elsewhere, national safety demanded that she should stretch out her -arm to take in the Hawaiian Islands. This group, if held by an enemy, -would be as a sword pointed to the heart of the Pacific States of the -Republic: but held by the United States it is a buckler against any -enemy from south or west. A foe approaching the United States Pacific -coast would inevitably seek to occupy first the Hawaiian Islands and use -them as a base: and just as surely would not dare to pass those islands -leaving there an American Fleet. With Honolulu Harbour strongly -fortified and sheltering a Fleet of any real fighting strength, the -Pacific coast of the United States is safe from invasion by sea -(invasion by land from Canada hardly needs to be considered; nor from -Mexico). At the present time Honolulu is in the process of being -fortified rather than is fortified: and a powerful American Fleet awaits -the completion of the Panama Canal before it can enter the Pacific -without leaving the Atlantic coast of the Republic unduly exposed. - -The Philippine Islands, too, are a source of anxiety rather than of -strength at present. When the Panama Canal has been completed and -Honolulu fortified, and the Philippines mark the terminal point of an -American Fleet patrol, their strategical weight will count in the other -scale, for they will then give the American Power a strong vedette post -in the waters of a possible enemy. Any attack from the Pacific on the -United States would in prudence have to be preceded by the reduction of -the Philippines, or at least their close investment. Yet the temporary -loss of the group would inflict no great disadvantage on the American -plan of campaign. Thus the enemy could not afford to leave the -Philippines alone, and yet would gain no decisive advantage from the -sacrifices necessary to secure them. In the case of a war in which the -United States was acting on the offensive against an Asiatic Power, the -Philippines would be of great value as an advanced base. - -The ultimate strategical position of the United States in the Pacific -cannot be forecasted until there is a clearer indication of how far she -proposes to carry a policy of overseas expansion. But in the near future -it can be seen that she will keep on the high seas one great Fleet, its -central rallying point being probably Cuba, with the Galapagos Islands, -San Francisco, Honolulu and Manila as the Pacific bases. At present the -Galapagos belong to Ecuador, and Ecuador does not seem disposed to -"lease" them to the United States. But that difficulty will probably be -overcome, since the United States must have an advance guard to protect -the Panama Canal on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic side. Viewed -from a purely defensive standpoint, such a strategical position is sound -and courageous. If offensive action is contemplated, on the Asiatic -mainland for example, a military force far greater than that existing -to-day in the United States must be created. - -Japan has consolidated a sound strategical position by the annexation of -Corea, Russian naval power having ceased to exist in the Pacific. Japan -now holds the Sea of Japan as her own Narrow Water. The possibility of a -hostile China making a sea attack can be viewed without dread, for -naturally and artificially the Japanese naval position is very strong. -Holding the Sea of Japan as securely as she does, Japan may also -consider that her land frontier on the mainland is more accessible to -her bases than to the bases of any possible enemy. - -Russia has been harshly criticised for the conception of naval strategy -which gave her one Fleet in the Baltic, another in the Black Sea, and a -third in the Pacific. But she was forced by her geographical position -into a "straggle" policy. It is extremely unlikely that she will now -adopt the policy, recommended to her in some quarters, of concentrating -naval strength in the Pacific: though, should the _Entente_ with Great -Britain develop into an actual triple alliance between Great Britain, -France and Russia, that concentration is just possible. It would have an -important effect on the strategical position in the Pacific: but is too -unlikely a contingency to call for any discussion. The same may be said -in regard to any possibility of a great development of power in the -Pacific by Germany or France. - -The interest of the strategical position in the Pacific thus centres in -the rivalry, or friendly emulation, between the United States and the -British Empire. Without any very clear indications of a conscious -purpose, the British Empire has blundered into a strategical position -which is rich in possibilities of strength and has but two glaring -weaknesses, the absence of a Mid-Pacific fortress and the emptiness of -the Northern Territory of Australia. With a very clear idea of what she -is about, the United States has prepared for a thoroughly scientific -siege of the Pacific, but she has not the same wealth of natural -material as has the British Empire. - - - - -CHAPTER XVIII - -THE RIVALS - - -The essential superiority of a White Race over a Coloured Race may -fairly be accepted as a "first principle" in any discussion of world -politics. There are numberless facts to be gathered from 2500 years of -history to justify that faith, and there is lacking as yet any great -body of evidence to support the other idea, that modern conditions of -warfare and of industry at last have so changed the factors in human -greatness that mere numbers and imitative faculty can outweigh the -superior intellectual capacity and originating genius characteristic of -the European peoples. Nevertheless it must be admitted that the -conditions, in warfare and in industry, of life to-day as compared with -life in past centuries, have increased the value of numbers and of a -faculty of blind obedience, and have proportionately decreased the -relative value of individual character. An Asiatic army to-day is -relatively better fitted to cope with a European army; an Asiatic -factory is relatively more efficient. - -It is necessary, therefore, to call to aid all the reassuring records of -history if one would keep a serene faith that the future of the Pacific, -and with it the future of the world, is not destined to be dominated by -the Asiatic rather than by the European. Japan with her fertile people -and sterile soil has done so much since she discovered that the test -imposed on a people by Christian civilisation is based on their powers -of destruction, that there is good reason for the alarm expressed by -many thinkers (with the German Emperor as their leader) as to "the -Yellow Peril." China, too, awaking now after the slumber of centuries -and grasping at the full equipment of a modern nation, reinforces that -alarm. It is conceivable that White civilisation may be for a while -worsted and driven from some of its strongholds by the arms which it has -taught the Coloured Races to use. "Asia for the Asiatics," may be a -battle-cry raised in the future not without avail. But in time European -superiority must again assert itself. - -There are many pessimists who foretell the doom of the White Races -coming from a sterility self-imposed for the sake of better ease. They -see in every advance of comfort a cause of further weakness, and they -picture luxury as rapidly corroding the supports of our society. But it -is comforting to recall that every age has had the same gloomy critics, -and the Golden Age has always been represented in the past by the -pessimists of the present. For myself, I am daring enough to think that -the White Races of to-day are neither enervated nor decadent: that in -physique, in good health and in sense of public duty they are improving -rather than deteriorating; and that the Europe of next century will be -more happy, more vigorous and more sane than the Europe of to-day. There -_was_ a time for the joy of pessimists, but it is a past time, that -dismal past century when the industrial epoch rushed on man all -unawares, when the clattering machine came to sweep away handicrafts, -and the new economic idea of human beings as "hands" affected -poisonously all social relations. It was as though a cumbrous wain, -well-built for its slow and sedate rumbling, had suddenly been hitched -to a rushing steam engine. There were disturbances, clatterings, -groanings, and creakings. The period of adjustment was a painful one. -But it is passing. Meliorism is the justifiable faith of the future. - -The future of the Pacific, I hold then, is with the White Races. At the -best, the Asiatic can hope to hold his own continent in security. Japan -had the chance of securing a temporary dominance after the war with -Russia, and at one time was said to have been on the verge of a struggle -with the United States, as an assertion of that dominance. But the cloud -passed over. With the opening of the Panama Canal, now a matter only of -months, the opportunity of Japan will have finally passed. With the -gradual re-establishment of British naval power in the ocean, a -re-establishment which will come through the agency of Australia, -Canada, and New Zealand, if not through the Home Country, and which will -be "anti-Asiatic" in purpose, a further veto will be put on any -aggressive ambitions on the part of an Asiatic Power. The statesmen of -Japan, indeed, seem to recognise that she has had her day of greatest -power, and must be content for the future to be tolerated in her present -position as one of the "Powers" forming the great council of the -foremost nations. But in considering Japan, allowance must always be -made for the danger of the people getting out of the hands of the -oligarchy which rules them. The Japanese people, fed fat on praise of -their own prowess, may one day force a mad course on statesmen asked to -choose between civil and foreign war. Such a war would be doomed to -failure for financial if for no other reasons. But it might leave a deep -stain of blood on the Pacific. - -China--a Federal Republic, and rid of the Manchus if present appearances -(1912) are not belied--will have no aggressive ambitions for some years -to come. She may insist, and rightly insist, on more honourable -treatment from foreign nations. But it is not likely that she will set -Fleets ranging over the Pacific in search of conquests. By the time that -China has come to a warlike mood--if she does ever come--the White Races -will be fully equipped for any struggle. The greatest Asiatic peril, so -far as warlike forces are concerned, is of a Japanese-Chinese alliance: -and the chance of that is slight, for the two peoples are not -sympathetic. It will be noted that the very first official paper of the -nascent Chinese Republic is a letter of complaint to the Japanese -Government. - -If it is agreed that the Pacific will fall, as the Mediterranean did, as -the Atlantic did, to the rule of the White Man, the next step is to -consider, which people? There is, in addition to much evidence, the -temptation of race-pride to suggest that of all the European peoples the -Anglo-Celtic (controlling the British Empire and the United States) is -inherently the best equipped for world dominance. But that is not nearly -so sure as is the superiority of the White over the Coloured Races. The -Latin peoples--Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards--have in their day won to -lofty greatness. The French--in the main Latin, but with a large element -of Celtic and some element of Teutonic blood--were supreme in the world -for many generations, and are not exhausted to-day. There is not an -incident of Anglo-Saxon history; either of fighting against tremendous -odds and winning a victory which the stars in their courses seemed to -forbid; or of making disaster glorious by a Spartan death; or of pushing -out on some frail plank into an unknown sea--which cannot be matched by -some incident equally noble from the records of the Latin peoples or the -French people. The Teutons are only now making their bid for mastery: -the Slavs may have a great future. The future dominance of Europe may be -for any one of the European peoples. - -But the position in the Pacific can be simplified for the present by -the elimination of all the European Powers but two. Spain and Portugal -have had their day there, and have passed away. Neither France, Germany, -Austria nor Italy can venture any great force from Europe. Nor is any -one of them strongly established in the Pacific. Great Britain would be -content with the Atlantic but that her overseas Empire gives her duties -and advantages in the new ocean. The Pacific possessions of the British -Empire were unsought. But they will be held. The other European Power in -the Pacific is Russia, which has been checked but not destroyed there. -That the supremacy of Europe--at present held, so far as any enterprises -beyond its seas are concerned, by Great Britain--may pass to other hands -is not impossible; and that would affect, of course, the position in the -Pacific. Speculation on that point, however, is outside the scope of -this book, which has attempted to deal with the Pacific conditions of -the present and immediate future. - -On the facts there must be a further elimination of European Powers in -the Pacific, since Russia has no naval forces there and no design of -creating such forces. There is at present a natural bewilderment in the -Russian mind as a consequence of the recent war with Japan. That -struggle destroyed her power in Europe as well as in Asia, and the -European balance must be restored first. During the next five -years--which will be the critical years--Russia will not count in the -Pacific except as the useful ally of some powerful naval nation--either -of Japan, the United States or Great Britain. - -Great Britain is thus left as the sole European Power capable of -independent effort in the Pacific. Clearly the rivalry for the dominance -of the ocean lies between her and the United States. To discuss that -rivalry is to discuss the real problem of the Pacific. It may be done -frankly, I trust, without raising suggestions of unfriendliness. A frank -discussion of the problem, carried out on both sides of the Atlantic, -would be of the greatest value to civilisation. For the position seems -to be that both Powers are preparing to capture the Pacific; that -neither Power can hold it against the other; and that a peaceful -settlement can only be founded on complete mutual understanding. - -It is true that if the United States decides "to play a lone hand," she -may win through if all the circumstances are favourable, for she seems -destined to control the resources of all America. It is likely that -within this decade the United States Flag will fly (either as that of -the actually governing or the suzerain Power) over all the territory -south of the Canadian border to the southern bank of the Panama Canal. -Intervention has been threatened once already in Mexico. With any -further disorder it may be carried into effect. The United States cannot -afford to allow the chance of a disorderly force marching down to -destroy £70,000,000 worth of United States property. Central America -has been marked down for a process of peaceful absorption. The treaty -with Honduras (a similar one exists with Nicaragua) shows the method of -this absorption. It provides: - -"The Government of Honduras undertakes to make and negotiate a contract -providing for the refunding of its present internal and external debt -and the adjustment and settlement of unliquidated claims for the placing -of its finances upon a sound and stable basis, and for the future -development of the natural and economic resources of that country. The -Governments of the United States and Honduras will take due note of all -the provisions of the said contract when made, and will consult, in -order that all the benefits to Honduras and the security of the loan may -at the same time be assured. - -"The loan, which shall be made pursuant to the above undertaking, shall -be secured upon the customs of Honduras, and the Government of Honduras -agrees not to alter the import or export Customs duties, or other -charges affecting the entry, exit, or transit of goods, during the -existence of the loan under the said contract, without consultation and -agreement with the Government of the United States. - -"A full and detailed statement of the operations under this contract -shall be submitted by the fiscal agent of the loan to the Department of -State of the United States and to the Minister of Finance of the -Government of Honduras at the expiration of each twelve months, and at -such other times as may be requested by either of the two Governments. - -"The Government of Honduras, so long as the loan exists, will appoint -from a list of names to be presented to it by the fiscal agent of the -loan and approved by the President of the United States of America, a -collector-general of Customs, who shall administer the Customs in -accordance with the contract securing said loan, and will give this -official full protection in the exercise of his functions. The -Government of the United States will in turn afford such protection as -it may find necessary." - -Under the terms of these loan conventions the independence of Honduras -and Nicaragua dwindles to nothing. The purpose of the arrangements was -stated by Mr President Taft in his message to Congress: "Now that the -linking of the oceans by the Isthmian Canal is nearing assured -realisation, the conservation of stable conditions in the adjacent -countries becomes a still more pressing need, and all that the United -States has hitherto done in that direction is amply justified, if there -were no other consideration, by the one fact that this country has -acquired such vast interest in that quarter as to demand every effort on -its part to make solid and durable the tranquillity of the neighbouring -countries." - -"Solid and durable tranquillity" means in effect United States control. -From the control of Central America to that of South America is a big -step, but not an impossible one; and the United States already claims -some form of suzerainty over the Latin-American peoples there. It -insists upon giving them protection against Europe, whether they wish it -or not, and under certain circumstances would exercise a right of veto -over their foreign policy. The United States also is engaged in -promoting through the Pan-American Bureau a policy of American -continental unity. This Bureau was the outcome of the Pan-American -Conference convened by Mr Blaine in 1890. The general object of the -Bureau "is not only to develop friendship, commerce, and trade, but to -promote close relations, better acquaintance, and more intimate -association along economic, intellectual, educational and social lines, -as well as political and material lines, among the American Republics." -"The Bureau for commercial purposes," its Director, Mr Barrett, reports, -"is in touch in both North and South America, on the one hand with -manufacturers, merchants, exporters, and importers, doing all it can to -facilitate the exchange and building up of trade among the American -nations, and on the other hand with University and College Presidents, -professors, and students, writers, newspaper men, scientists, and -travellers, providing them with a large variety of information that will -increase their interests in the different American nations." The Bureau -publishes handbooks and reports on the various countries containing -information relating to their commercial development and tariffs. - -There will be held this year (1912) at Washington a Pan-American -Conference on trade, organised by the Bureau, "to awaken the commercial -organisations, representative business men, and the general public of -both North and South America to an appreciation of the possibilities of -Pan-American commerce, and the necessity of preparing for the opening of -the Panama Canal." "The Conference," says the official announcement, -"will have a novel feature in that it will consider the exchange of -trade--imports as well as exports--and the opportunities not only of the -United States to extend the sale of her products in Latin America, but -of Latin America to sell her products in the United States, for only -upon the basis of reciprocal exchange of trade can a permanent large -commerce and lasting good relations be built up between the United -States and her twenty sister American Republics. Heretofore all -discussions and meetings have considered only the export field, with a -corresponding unfortunate effect on public opinion in Latin America, and -her attitude towards the efforts of the United States to increase her -commerce with that important part of the world. Another special feature -will be a careful consideration, from the standpoint of the business -interests of all the American countries interested in the Panama Canal, -of what should be done to get ready for greater exchange of trade -through that waterway, and to gain practical advantages to their -commerce from the day it is opened." - -The policy of Pan-America may one day come into effect, and the United -States Power command the resources of all America except Canada. (That -Canada will ever willingly come under her suzerainty seems now little -likely.) But from Cape Horn to the Gulf of St Lawrence is an Empire of -mighty resources, great enough to sate the ambition of any Power, but -yet not forbidding the ambition to make it the base for further -conquests. - -Yet, withal, the United States cannot rely confidently on an unchecked -career of prosperity. She may have her troubles. Indeed, she has her -troubles. No American of to-day professes to know a solution of the -negro problem. "There are two ways out of the difficulty," said one -American grimly; "to kill all the negroes, and to deport all the -negroes; and neither is humanly possible." To allow them to be absorbed -by intermarriage with the White population is unthinkable, and would, in -a generation or two, drag the United States down to the level of a -larger Hayti. A settlement of the black question will one day, sooner or -later, absorb the American mind for some time to the exclusion of all -else. Neither the acquisition of territories with great coloured -populations, nor the extension of suzerainty over half-breed countries -will do anything to simplify that problem. - -There is also a possible social difficulty to be faced by the United -States. The present differences between rich and poor are too extreme to -be safe. Too many of the rich despise the poor on the ground that to be -poor is to be a failure: too many of the poor hate the rich with a -wolfish hatred as successful bandits. The quick growth of material -prosperity has cloaked over this class feeling. When there were good -crumbs for everybody the too-great wealth of the rich was not so -obvious. But the time comes when the United States is no longer a Tom -Tiddler's ground where everybody can pick up something: and the rivalry -between those who have too much and those who have too little begins to -show nakedly. - -In short, the United States, justified as she is to keep a superb -confidence in her own resources, might find a policy of hostile rivalry -to the British Power in the Pacific an impossible one to carry through, -for it would not be wise statesmanship on her part to presume that her -future history will be, at home and abroad, an uninterrupted course of -prosperity. - -There is no need to presume that hostile rivalry. On the other hand, -there is no wisdom in following blindly a policy of drift which may lead -to that rivalry. The question of the future of the Pacific narrows down -to this: Will two great Powers, sprung from the same race, take -advantage of a common tongue to talk out frankly, honestly, their aims -and purpose so that they may arrive at a common understanding? - -There are some obstacles to such an understanding. The first is American -diplomacy, which, whilst truthful to the point of brusqueness, is -strangely reluctant to avow its real objects, for the reason, I think, -that it often acts without admitting even its own mind into confidence. -The boy who makes his way to the unguarded apple orchard does not admit -to himself that he is after apples. He professes to like the scenery in -that direction. American diplomacy acts in the same way. It would have -been impossible, for instance, to have obtained from the American -Government ten years ago a confidential declaration, in a friendly way, -of the Pacific policy which is now announced. Yet it should have been -quite plain to the American mind after the seizure of the Philippines -and the fortification of Hawaii, if the American mind would have -consented to examine into itself. Now, it is not possible for two great -nations to preserve a mutual friendship without a mutual confidence. - -Another obstacle to a perfect British-American understanding is that -British diplomacy is always at its worst in dealing with the United -States. That combination of firmness with politeness which is used in -European relations is abandoned for a policy of gush when dealing with -America. Claims for a particular consideration founded on relationship -are made which are sometimes a little resented, sometimes a little -ridiculed. British diplomats do not "keep their dignity" well in -negotiating with the United States. They are so obsessed with the -feeling that to drift into bad terms with the great English-speaking -Republic would be calamitous, that they give a suspicion sometimes of -truckling. There would be a better feeling if relationship were not so -much insisted upon and reliance were placed instead on a mutual respect -for power and on a community of purpose in most quarters of the globe. -Meekness does not sit well on the British manner, and often the -American's view of "relationship talk" is that it is intended as a -prelude to inducing him into a bad bargain. - -It should always be the aim of the leaders of American and British -public opinion to encourage friendship between the two nations. But it -is not wise to be for ever insisting that, because of their blood -relationship, a serious quarrel between them is impossible. True, a -struggle between Great Britain and the United States would have all the -horrors of a civil war, but even civil wars happen; and it is human -nature that relatives should sometimes let bickering, not intended at -the outset to be serious, drift into open rupture. The sentimental talk -founded, as it were, on the idea that the United States and Great -Britain are married and must hold together "for better or for worse," is -dangerous. - -When Pacific questions come up for discussion in the near future, there -is likely, however, to be a modification in the old British methods of -diplomacy, for the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand must -be allowed to take part in the discussions; and Australia and New -Zealand have a certain impatient Imperialism on which I have remarked -before. Their attitude in foreign affairs appears as almost truculent to -European ideas of diplomacy. Probably Canada will show the same spirit, -for it is the spirit of youth in nationhood, with its superb -self-confidence still lacking the sobering effects of experience. - -It is a mistaken idea, though an idea generally held in some quarters, -that the British Dominions in the Pacific are more sympathetic with -American than with British ideas. The contrary is the case. Where there -are points of difference between the Anglo-Celtic race in Great Britain -and in the United States, the British Dominions lean to their Mother -Country. Their progressive democracy is better satisfied with the -conditions under the shadow of a Throne, which has nothing of tyranny -and little of privilege, than with those offering under a Republic whose -freedom is tempered a good deal with plutocratic influences. "To be -exactly opposite to everything which is known as 'American'--that is the -ideal of Australian democracy," said a responsible statesman of the -Commonwealth. The statement was put strongly so as to arrest attention; -but it contained a germ of truth. In spite of the theoretical -Republicanism of a majority of the Australian people, their practical -decisions would almost always favour the British rather than the -American political system. - -The fervid welcome recently given in the Pacific to the Fleet of -American battleships which circumnavigated the world, gave rise to some -misconceptions. American press correspondents with the Fleet generally -formed the idea that Australia in particular was ready to fall into the -arms of the United States at the first advance. But that welcome was in -part simply the expression of a warm feeling of hospitality for visitors -of a kindred race. For the rest, it was an expression of gratitude for -the reassurance which the American Fleet gave that a White Race was -determined to be a Power in the Pacific. Great Britain had just renewed -her treaty with Japan, which had defeated Russia, and this treaty left -the Japanese Fleet as the guardian of the British interests in the -ocean. To the Australian mind such guardianship was worse than useless. -If it were ever a question between accepting the guardianship of the -United States--with all its implied obligations--and modifying their -anti-Asiatic policy, Australia, Canada and New Zealand would, without a -doubt, accept the first alternative. But they would very much prefer -that the British Power should be the guardian of their safety, -especially a British Power largely supplied and controlled by -themselves. - -It is towards that development that events now move. It has its danger -in that there may be a growing brusqueness in British negotiations in -the Pacific. The Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand (I -include Canada because all the indications are that she will now fall -into line with the other Pacific British nations), paying so much to the -piper, will want to call the tune: and whereas British diplomacy with -the United States is to-day a shade too deferential, Australasian and -Canadian diplomacy possibly will fall into the other error. Experience, -of course, will cure the impatience of youth in time. But it is -important that at the outset there should be no occasions for bad -feeling. A friendly informal conference between Great Britain, the -United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, ushering in the -opening of the Panama Canal, would provide an opportunity for beginning -the frank discussion which is needed. - -The position in the Pacific confronting such a conference would be this: -that friendly co-operation between the United States and Great Britain -would give to the Anglo-Saxon race the mastery of the world's greatest -ocean, laying for ever the fear of the Yellow Peril, securing for the -world that its greatest readjustment of the balance of power shall be -effected in peace: but that rivalry between these two kindred nations -may cause the gravest evils, and possibly irreparable disasters. - - -THE END - - - - -INDEX - - - Acadia (_see_ Nova Scotia). - - Adriatic, the, 41. - - Ainus, the, 35, 138. - - Albuquerque takes Malacca, 96. - - Alexander the Great, 21, 103. - - Alliance between Great Britain and Japan, 39, 42, 199 _et seq._ - - Amber, the Arabian search for, 22. - - America: a "New France" in, 165. - - American bureau, the, 272, 273. - conferences, 272, 273. - diplomacy, 224, 275, 276. - --educated Chinese, 53, 54. - Empire, growth of, 69. - Imperial system, an, 12, 161, 164. - Imperialism and the Filipinos, 82. - national temper, the, 67. - naval bases, 224. - "relationship talk," 277. - War of Independence, the, 86. - - Andes, the, 151. - - Anglo-Celtic alliance, an, 14, 15. - race and the British Dominions, 278. - race best equipped for world dominance, 267. - - Anglo-Saxon, the Elizabethan, 69, 148. - - Anson, Admiral, 91. - - Apia Harbour, Samoa, 215. - - Arabians search for amber, 22. - - Arabs and the Baltic, 22. - - Argentine Republic, the, 150, 160, 162. - army of, 197. - navy of, 183. - - Armies of the Pacific: - Argentine, 197. - Australian, 191. - Bolivian, 197. - Brazilian, 197. - British, 191. - Canadian, 191. - Chinese, 190. - Colombian, 198. - Ecuador, 198. - Indian, 191. - Japanese, 189. - Mexican, 197. - New Zealand, 191. - Paraguay, 198. - Russian, 186, 187. - South American, 198. - United States, 190. - - Aryans, the, 21. - - _Asahi Shimbun_, the, 46. - - Asia, arrogance of, 40. - for the Asiatics, 241, 264. - - Asiatic colonisation, White fear of, 231. - immigration, 234. - labour, 228. - labour, cheapness exaggerated, 237. - peril, the greatest, 266. - populations, natural checks, 58. - European influence on, 59. - trade competition, 235, 236, 237. - - Asiatics as navvies and dock-labourers, 239. - preventive medicine and, 59. - cannot compete with Europeans, 239. - - Atlantic, the, and the White Man, 267. - German power in, 212. - - Australasia, 100. - - Australasia and the White Race, 101. - - Australasian Empire, an, 126. - - Australia, 3, 11, 13, 21, 93, 94, 109, 248, 250, 265, 277. - a "colonising invasion" of, by Japan, 253. - and Imperial naval co-operation, 116. - annexed by Capt. Cook, 94-95, 101, 123. - anti-Asiatic policy of, 106, 279. - army of, 191. - Chinese poll-tax in, 234. - coloured labour in the mines, 238 (footnote). - Defence Act, the, 109. - early settlers, 102. - first Fleet sails for, 95. - food production possibilities of, 119. - impatient Imperialism of, 277. - Imperialism of, 110. - in 1901 prohibits coloured immigration, 202. - keeping the Asiatic out of, 106. - laws against Asiatic immigration, 234. - Military College of, 192, 193. - official conditions, 193. - cadets, 193. - gambling and cigarette-smoking prohibited, 194. - nation-building material, 105. - Northern Territory of, 138, 238 (footnote), 251, 252, 253, 254, 262. - populating, 255. - potentially the greatest asset of the British race, 118. - prayers for rain, 106. - prolific, 102. - strategical position of, 251. - universal training for military service, 108. - unvisited by Asiatics in the early days of the Pacific, 58. - William Dampier in, 104. - - Australian aboriginal race, the, 137, 138. - birth-rate, 256, 257. - Bushman, the, 121. - as material for a great warrior nation, 122. - colonists aggressively Imperial, 95. - democracy, ideal of, 278. - Education Test, 203, 234. - Fleet unit, the, 113 _et seq._ - Pacific Fleet, the, 181. - sternly resolute, 106. - - Australians, warlike spirit of, 108. - aggressive patriotism of, 117. - - Aztecs, the, 156. - - - "Balance of power," 17. - - Balboa of Castile, 2, 153. - - Baltic, the, 22. - - Banana tree, the, 145. - - Barbary States, U.S.A., war with, 70, 72. - - Barrett, Mr, 272. - - Bible, the, 148. - - Bingham, Hiram, at Honolulu, 77. - - Blaine, Mr, 272. - - "Blue-water School of Strategy," 245. - - Boccaccio's story of a Christian, 53. - - Bolivia, 151, 160. - army of, 197. - - Bombay, rats in, 61. - - Borneo, 248. - - Boston, 77. - - Botany Bay, 104. - - Boxer outbreak of 1900, the, 50, 59. - - Brazil, army of, 197. - Republic of, 160, 162. - - Britain, military forces, 191. - Roman invasion of, 87. - - British Admiralty and Imperial naval co-operation, 112. - and Japanese, analogy between, 35. - Columbia and Asiatic immigration, 45, 234. - Continent in the Pacific, the, 100 _et seq._ - diplomacy in Pacific, 276, 279. - modification of, in the future, 277. - Dominions, their loyalty to the Mother Country, 277. - Empire, one grave strategical weakness, 251. - foundation of, 76. - strategical position of, 258. - the possibilities of, 129. - White population of, 129. - Flag in the South Pacific, the 135. - foreign policy, 17. - garrisons in India, 191. - Government recognise Maoris as a nation, 125. - Imperial expansion, 17. - intentions on Tibet, 211. - --Japanese Alliance, renewal of, 208. - Trade Treaty, right of British overseas Dominions regarding Japanese - immigration, 207. - Treaties: of 1902, 199. - of 1905, 204, 209. - of 1911, 199, 206, 207-208. - Treaty, the, 279. - provisions of, 199-201, 204-206. - War against United States, contingency abolished, 208. - maritime intercourse with Russia, 214. - naval power in the Pacific, re-establishment of, 265. - Navy: effective tonnage, 185. - Pacific Fleet, a, 181. - Pacific naval strength, 14. - people, the, Empire-making of, 87. - people, the racial origin of, 87. - --Russian Alliance not impossible, 213. - trade with Latin America, 162, 163. - treaty with Holland, 96. - - Britons, Romanised, 88. - - "Brown Bess" musket, the, 197. - - "Bush," the, in Australia, 121. - in New Zealand, 120. - - Byzantine culture and the Southern Slavs, 22. - Empire, the Greek Church and the, 23. - - Byzantium and the Normans, 22. - - - California, annexation of, 73. - Japanese in, 45. - - Canada, 2, 11, 13, 259, 265, 277. - and the Japanese immigrants, 202. - and the Pacific, 165 _et seq._ - anti-Asiatic policy of, 279. - French in, 165, 167, 168. - importance of, to British position in the Pacific, 248. - landing fees on Chinese, 234. - militia forces of, 191, 194. - naval plans, 183. - organisation of militia, 195. - originally a French colony, 165. - policy of Colonel Hughes, Defence Minister, 174. - political tendencies, 170. - proposed Reciprocity Treaty with United States, 174. - race troubles in, 233. - religion of, 168. - rifle factory, 194. - strategical position of, 247. - the coastal waters of, 169. - the new spirit regarding Defence, 194. - universal military training and, 196. - water power of, 243. - - Canadian Defence League, The, 195. - feudal system, 167. - Fleet unit, Sir Wilfrid Laurier on, 172. - General Election of 1911, the, 171, 195. - militia, the, 171. - naval policy, 172. - Pacific provinces and Japanese immigration, 202 (and footnote). - Provinces, federation of, 73. - protests against, 73, 74. - railways and Chinese labour, 233. - - Cannibalism, 140. - - Canute, King, 213. - - Carausius, 88. - - Caribbean naval base for United States, 179. - Sea, Spanish power destroyed, 82. - the United States and the, 67. - - Cartier, Jacques, 166. - - Castile, the King of, 2. - - Catherine the Great, 189, 214. - - Caxamalco, Pizarro at, 153. - - Chagres, the, 219. - - Champlain, 166. - - Chang Chih-tung, 51, 52. - - Chili, 2, 10, 150, 151. - army of, 197. - navy of, 183. - Republic of, 160, 163. - - China, 3, 25, 266. - a new, 56. - ancestor worship in, 55. - and the German Emperor, 10. - and the teeming millions of Asia, 47. - and the White Race, 56. - army of, 190. - Chang Chih-tung's suggestions for reform, 51, 52. - Christian missionaries in, 50. - Confucianism in, 48, 49, 56 (footnote), 57. - deprived of Malthusian checks, 57, 65. - first European ambassadors to, 40. - infanticide in, 57. - Jesuit missionaries in, 50. - legendary history of, 48. - militancy in, 64. - Mohammedans in, 48. - nation-birth of, 8. - navy of, 178. - not a Power in world-politics generally, 34. - persecution of missionaries, 50. - population of, 8, 63. - Republic of, 54. - a united, 55. - Republicanism in, 54, 55. - Mr Kwei Chih on, 55 (footnote). - Revolution in, 8. - suggested alliance with France, 48. - Taoism in, 49. - territorial integrity of, 200, 201, 202, 204, 209, 210, 211. - the Manchu dynasty, 50, 55 (footnote). - the Ming dynasty, 50. - the Mongol dynasty, 49. - the power of, in the Pacific, 9. - the Reform movement in, 51 _et seq._ - - Chinaman, the, arrogance of, 48. - courage of the, 47. - superior to Japanese, 47. - - China's attitude regarding Pacific issues, 65. - indemnity to Japan, 26. - - Chinese ancestor worship, 55. - - Chinese, artistry of the, 34. - as agriculturists, 238. - as miners, 237. - contempt of, by Japanese, 56. - distaste for adventure, 57. - Grand Khan, the, 49. - exchanges greetings with Pope of Rome, 50. - hatred of the Japanese, 56. - immigration forbidden in United States, 235. - immigration, restrictions on, 64. - in the Malay Archipelago, 58. - in the United States, 53. - --Japanese alliance not likely, 56. - labour on Canadian railways, 233. - landing fees in Canada, 234. - national spirit of the, 51. - non-aggressive, 56. - parent races of, 49. - poll-tax in Australia, 234. - rights in the Malay Peninsula, 142. - Socialists, 49. - students visit Japan, 53. - war, the, 26. - - Christian missionaries in China, 50. - - _Chuen Hsueh Pien_, the Bible of Chinese moderate reformers, 52. - - Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the, 81. - - Colbert, the Minister of Louis XIV., 167. - - Colombia, army of, 198. - - Colombo, Capt. Macaulay on, 97. - - "Colossus of the North," the, 17, 25. - - Columbia, 163. - - Columbus, 104, 105. - - _Commonwealth Crisis, The_, 253. - - Commonwealth of Australia, birth-rate of, 256, 257. - - Confucianism in China, 48, 49, 56 (footnote), 57. - - Constantinople, Convention of, 221. - Russia in, 23. - the Turk in possession of, 41. - - Cook, Captain, 94, 101. - annexes Australia, 95, 123. - lands at Botany Bay, 104. - visits New Zealand, 123, 141. - - Corea, 5, 6. - and the Tartar invaders of Japan, 35. - annexed by Japan, 38, 42, 260. - independence of, 202. - Japan and, 64. - Japanese interests in, 205. - territorial integrity of, 25, 200, 202, 206. - - Cortes, 2, 3, 156. - - Cossacks, the, 187, 188. - the, and Siberia, 5. - - Courteen, Sir William, 104. - - Crimean War, the, 24. - - Cross and Crescent, 23. - - Cuba, 260. - conquered by Velasquez, 156. - fate of, 155. - Guantanamo Bay, 179. - naval base at, 222. - Spain's misgovernment of, 82. - - Cushing, Mr Caleb, 81. - - _Cygnet_, the, 104. - - - Dale, Sir Thomas, 166. - - Dampier, William, visits Australia, 104. - - Darius and the Greeks, 40. - - Dashwood, Mr, 252. - - Declaration of Neutrality of 1893, American, 68. - - De Monts, 166. - - De Quiros, 104. - - De Torres, 104. - - Diaz, 2. - abdication of, 159. - and the Mexican revolutionaries, 158. - fall of, 158. - - Dickinson, Mr, United States Secretary for War, 172 (footnote). - - Drake, Sir Francis, 69, 91. - - "Dreadnought" types in 1912 and 1915, forecast of, 184. - - - Ecuador, 151, 161, 260. - army of, 198. - - Edward, Dr Hall, 229. - - Effective tonnage of the three greatest Naval Powers in 1912 and - 1915, 185. - - Egyptians' device for avoiding mosquitoes, 217. - - Elizabeth, Queen, 24. - - Elizabethan Englishman, the, 69, 148. - era, the, 90, 214. - - England, an ingenious speculation as to her climate on opening of Panama - Canal, 220. - Elizabethan, the spirit of, 76. - her sea-power, 89. - - English Channel, the, 87. - - Englishman, the Elizabethan, 69, 148. - - _Entente_ between Great Britain and Russia, 199. - - Europe prohibits Asiatic internecine warfare, 59. - - European ambassadors to China, the first, 40. - "balance of power," a, 17. - hegemony, the, 40. - relations with China, 49. - scientists and Asiatics, 59. - trade and missions in China, 50. - - - Fanning Island, 251. - - Fiji, 3. - Group acquired by Great Britain, 134. - Hindoo labourers in, 231. - - Fijian, a typical gardener, 143. - - Filipinos, the, 82. - - Finns, the, 21. - - Fisher, Mr, Prime Minister of Australia, 133. - - Fitz-Gerald, Mr James Edward, 126. - - Fleet unit, the Australian, 113 _et seq._ - - Formosa, 4. - ceded by China to Japan, 38. - - Fotheringham, Colonel, 196. - - France, 3, 10, 199. - and China, suggested alliance, 48. - Napoleon and, 18. - trade relations with Japan, 38. - - Fremantle, Dr Francis, 60. - - French Canada of to-day, 167. - under theocratic despotism, 167. - - French-Canadian priesthood, the, 168. - - French Canadians, 165, 168. - their national character, 168. - - French project for Panama Canal, 216. - Revolution, the, 124. - - French, the, 267. - - - Galapagos Islands, the, 222, 224, 260. - - Gatun Lake, area of, 218, 219. - - Gengis Khan, 22, 49. - - German navy: effective tonnage, 185. - power in the Atlantic, 212. - - Germans, the, in Kiao-Chau, 10. - - Germany, 3, 10. - a possible ally of Japan, 199. - a possible ally of United States, 199, 212. - - Gordon, General, 47. - - Grant, President, 74. - - Great Britain a Free Trade country, 206. - abandons "splendid isolation" ideal, 27. - acquires the Fiji Group, 134. - and her Indian Empire, 86. - and Japan, alliance, 14, 28, 34, 39, 199. - Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan, 206, 207-211. - and Russia, an understanding between, 213, 214. - _entente_ between, 199. - friendship between, 211. - and the Pacific, 269. - and United States, an instinct towards friendliness, 199. - friendliness between, 215. - treaty with United States, 220. - annexes New Zealand, 125. - entry into the Pacific, 85. - her naval strength in the Pacific, 14. - Imperialist sentiment in, 203. - navy of, 180. - sensitive to opinions of her Dominions, 203. - the rivalry of the United States, 269. - trade relations with Japan, 38. - - Great Britain, where established on west of Pacific, 248. - - Great Lakes, the, and the United States, 70. - - Greek Church, the, 22, 188. - and the Byzantine Empire, 23. - republics, the, and the Persian Empire, 41. - - Greeks and Persians, 40. - - Grijalba in Mexico, 156. - - Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 179. - - Gulf Stream, the, 87, 219. - - - "Habitants," 167. - - Hairy Ainus, the, 35. - - Hamilton, Alexander, 71. - - Hawaii and the Maoris, 139. - Arms Registration Ordinance, 79. - Spaniards in, 93. - the coolies and traders of, 145. - the key to the Pacific coast of North America, 3. - - Hawaiian garrison, the, 190. - Group, natives helpless material for nation-making, 145. - Islands, the, 77, 258, 259. - annexation of, 78, 81, 83. - Japanese in the, 44, 45, 58. - Republic formed, 78. - population: the chief element, 79, 80, 81. - - Hawaiians, the parent stock of the, 142, 145. - - _Health and Empire_, cit., 59-62. - - Hegemony of Pacific Ocean, 258. - - Heine, cit., 24. - - Henderson, Sir Reginald, 181. - - Hercules, the Pillars of, 1. - - Herodotus, 217. - - Holland, British treaty with, 96. - - Holy Alliance, the, 72, 155. - - Honduras, U.S.A., treaty with, 270-271. - - Hong Kong, 11, 85, 97, 248, 250. - harbour of, 98. - - Honolulu, 12, 260. - a holiday scene at, 80. - Harbour, 259. - Hiram Bingham's first sermon at, 77. - naval base at, 78, 80. - - Hughes, Colonel, 174, 195. - - Huidekoper, Mr, 171 (footnote), 172 (footnote). - - Huns, the, 40. - - - Imperial Conference of 1911, the, 127 _et seq._ - Defence Conference of 1909, the, 111, 172, 181, 183. - the British Admiralty memorandum concerning, 112. - Navy, an, 112, 130. - - Imperialism of Australia, 110. - - Imperialist sentiment in Great Britain, 203. - - Incas, the, 151, 152, 153. - - "Independent Tribes of New Zealand," the, 125. - - India, 11. - an independent, 9. - British garrisons in, 191. - defence of, 249. - Great Britain's apprehensions regarding, 25. - internecine warfare prohibited in, 59. - occupation of, 249. - Russia and, 25. - the British in, 9. - the _Raj_ and, 9. - the Sepoy forces in, 191. - western sea-passage to, 92. - White garrison of, 249. - - Indian Empire, the, Great Britain and, 86. - frontier, the, 205. - Ocean, the, 85. - - Industrial position in the Pacific, 235, 240. - "spheres of influence," 236, 240. - - Infanticide in China, 57. - - Internecine warfare prohibited by Europe, 59. - - Isthmian Canal, the, 271. - - Ivan the Terrible, 5. - - - James I., 104. - - Japan, 3, 4 _et al._ - a dwindling Power, 8. - alliance with Great Britain, 39. - an offender against China's national pride, 64. - and Christianity, 32, 33. - and Corea, 64. - and Great Britain, alliance, 14, 199. - and Manchuria, 64. - and Russia, 25, 26. - and Shintoism, 32. - and the Christian faith, 37. - and the problem of the Pacific, 42. - and trade relations with White - civilisation, 37, 38. - army of, 189. - army and navy of, 6. - bases for industrial prosperity in, 7. - character of her population, 43. - exclusiveness of, 37. - feudal, 36. - Germany a possible ally of, 199. - healing of local feuds in, 59. - in the Pacific, strategical position of, 260. - industrial expansion of, 7. - labour movement in, 7. - "most-favoured-nation" rates, 206. - nation-making, 32. - "natural capital" of, 44. - natural resources of, 6. - navy of, 14, 177, 178. - poverty of, 5, 6. - rumoured alliance with Mexico, 159. - Sea of, 260. - Shintoism in, 36. - territories won in battle, 6. - the awakening of, 31. - the greatest warrior Power in the Pacific, 32. - the "honoured ally" of Great Britain, 33. - the Mikados of, 31, 36. - the rise of, 31. - the Tartar invaders of, 35. - Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain, 206, 207-211. - war with China, 26. - war with Russia, 7, 25 _et seq._, 265, 268. - warlike confidence of, 6. - - Japanese acquire Formosa, 38. - acquire the Pescadores, 38. - ancestry of, 35. - and British, analogy between, 35. - annex Corea, 38, 42. - arrogance of the, 46. - artistry of the, 34. - as painters and potters, 33. - --Chinese alliance the greatest Asiatic peril, 266. - contempt for Chinese, 56. - disappointment with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 210-211. - emigrants, 45, 46. - Government proposes State adoption of Christian religion, 32 (footnote). - hatred of, by Chinese, 56. - interests in Corea, 205. - Minister for Home Affairs: communication to Japanese - Press, 32-33 (footnote). - national feeling of the, 46. - naval estimates (current), 177. - settlements, 44. - tariffs, 241, 242. - the chief element of Hawaiian population, 79, 80, 81. - their reputed genius for war, 28. - transformation of the race, 33. - - Java, 93. - - Java Major, 103. - - Jebb, Mr Richard, 232. - - Jesuit missionaries in China, 50. - - "Jingoism" of British nations in South Pacific, the, 95. - - - Kanakas, the, 136, 142, 143, 144, 145. - - Kiao-Chou and the German "mailed fist," 10. - - Kidman, Mr Sydney, 252. - - Kirk, David, 166. - - Kirness, C. H., 253. - - Kitchener, Field-Marshal Lord, 111. - - Knox, Secretary, 159 (footnote), 212. - - Kouropatkin, General, 29. - - Kwei Chih, Mr, 55 (footnote). - - - Labour and anti-Asiatic movements, 232, 233. - movement in Japan, the, 7. - - Lansdowne, Marquess of, 201. - - Latin America, 147 _et seq._, 162, 273. - and the Monroe doctrine, 162. - British export trade with, 162, 163. - navy of, 183. - race-mixture in, 147. - strength of, 160-161. - summary of position of, 163. - the military strength of, 196. - universal service in, 197. - - Latin-American armies, the, 197. - Empire, a, 161. - Power, a, 150. - Republics, the, 72, 75. - United States, the Suzerain Power of, 74. - - Latin-Indian race, the, 147. - - Latin peoples, the, 267. - - Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, 128, 183, 194. - defeat of, 170 _et seq._ - - Laval, Monseigneur, 167. - - Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 216. - - Levant, the, 41. - - Lithuania, Roman culture in, 22. - - Lithuanians, the, 22. - - Logie, Colonel, 196. - - _London Gazette_, the, on America, 70. - - Louis XIV. of France, 167. - - Louisiana, cession of, 72. - - - Macaulay, Captain, 97. - - Macdonald, Sir C., 201. - - Machiavelli, 57. - - Magalhaes, 104. - - Malacca, 95. - - Malakiki Hill, the Gibraltar of Honolulu, 79. - - Malay Archipelago, the, 58. - Peninsula, the, 230. - Chinese rights in, 142. - States, the, 142. - - Malays and Chinese, 230. - - Malaysians, the, 139. - - Malthusian checks, 57, 65. - - Manchu dynasty, the, 50, 55 (footnote). - - Manchuria, 5, 6, 20. - Japan and, 64. - Russian generals in, 29. - - Manchus, the, 8, 9, 266. - - Manila, 260. - - Maori flag saluted by British warship, 125. - - Maori, the, 122, 136, 138, 139. - race in 1769, population of, 141. - system of government, the, 139. - War, the, 140. - - Maoris, cannibalism prevalent among, 140. - cede their country to Queen Victoria, 125. - chivalry of, 140. - in New Zealand, population of, 145. - results of civilisation, 141. - similarity to Japanese, 141. - the parent stock of the, 142. - - Marco Polo, 49, 103. - - Marsden, Rev. Samuel, 123. - - Maximilian, 157. - - Mediterranean, the, 1. - and the White Man, 267. - Russia and, 18, 23. - - Melanesia, 94. - - Meliorism, 265. - - Mencius, 52. - - Merritt, Lieut.-Col. Wm. Hamilton, 195. - - Mexicans, the aboriginal, 137. - the, and Diaz, 158. - - Mexico, 2, 150, 259. - army of, 197. - Balboa in, 153. - Empire of, 157. - Grijalba lands at, 156. - Gulf of, and the United States, 70. - Republic of, 161, 163. - rumoured alliance with Japan, 159. - Spaniards in, 92. - under Spanish rule, 157. - United States and intervention, 159, 269. - Velasquez in, 156-157. - yields independence to Cortes, 156. - - Meyer, Secretary, U.S. Navy, 178, 179. - - Mikados of Japan, 31, 36. - - Military College of Australia, the, 192. - official conditions of, 193. - strength of Latin America, the, 196. - training in Canada, 196. - - Militia, Canadian, a conference on organisation, 195. - - Militia force of Canada, 194. - - Ming dynasty, the, 50. - - Miscegenation, 148, 149. - - Mississippi, the, 165. - - Mogul, the Great, 3. - - Mohammedans and China, 48. - - Mongol dynasty, the, 49. - invasion of Russia, 22. - - Mongolia, Russia's designs on, 211. - - Mongols, the, 21, 44. - - Monroe doctrine, the, 155, 159 (footnote), 160, 171, 220. - in United States, 71, 72, 73, 75. - extended in scope, 73-74. - - Monroe, President, 71. - his formal message, 72 _et seq._ - - Morioris, the, 139. - - Moscow, 22. - - Mosquitoes, 217. - Herodotus on, 217. - massacre of, in Panama Canal-building, 217. - Papuan natives and, 217. - trouble of, in cutting Suez Canal, 218. - - Mukden, battle of, 29, 39, 40, 41, 42. - - Murray, His Excellency Colonel, 144. - - Muscovite Czars, the, 23. - - - Napoleon, 16, 17, 18, 40, 72, 157, 246. - and Russia, 24. - - Napoleonic Wars, the, 155. - - Naval forces of the Pacific, 176 _et seq._ - - Navies of the Pacific: - Argentine Republic, 183. - Australia, 182. - Canada, 183. - Chili, 183. - China, 178. - Great Britain, 180. - Japan, 177. - Latin America, 183. - Russia, 176. - United States, 178. - - Navy, an Imperial, 130. - - Neutral market, a, 230. - markets, Asiatics in, 235, 236, 237. - in which Asiatics can compete, 244. - - Negro problem, the, 274. - - "New France," a, in America, 165. - the early founders of, 166. - - New Guinea, 248. - annexed by Queensland, 134. - - New South Wales, birth-rate of, 255. - Royal Commission on fall of birth-rate, 255, 257. - - New York, Naval Yard of, 13. - - _New York Sun_, the, 212. - - New Zealand, 3, 11, 13, 94, 248, 250, 265, 277. - a Company formed to colonise, 123. - its prospectus, 124. - a steady flow of emigrants to, 125. - and the smaller Colonies, 120 _et seq._ - anti-Asiatic policy of, 279. - army of, 191. - Captain Cook visits, 123, 141. - Christianity introduced, 123. - colonists aggressively Imperial, 95. - early settlers, 122. - Empire, a, 134. - exclusion of Asiatics, 234. - formally taken over by Great Britain, 125. - impatient Imperialism of, 277. - Imperial patriotism of, 127. - Maoris in, 145. - naval agreement with, 132, 133 (footnote). - naval policy of, 133. - population of, 141. - strategical position of, 251. - the "Bush," 120. - the Treaty of Waitangi, 125, 126. - universal training for military service, 130. - - Nicaragua, U.S.A., treaty with, 270. - - Norfolk Island, 251. - - Normans, the, 22, 89, 90. - - Norsemen pirates, the, 89. - - North America, the Republic of, 150. - - North Sea, the, 87. - - Northern Territory of Australia, the, 138, 238 (footnote), 251, 252, - 253, 254, 262. - conditions as regards productiveness and health, 254. - decidedly healthy, 254. - life in, 254. - - Novgorod, 213. - - - Ocean of the future, the, 1 _et seq._ - - "Open-door" agreements, 236, 241. - - Opium War of 1840, the, 50. - - Oregon, annexation of, 73. - - Osaka _Mainichi_, the, on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 210. - - Ottoman invasion, the, 41. - suzerainty of Europe, Napoleon and the, 40. - - Oversea Dominions, population of, 128, 129. - - - Pacific armies, the chief, 198. - British Dominions, uneasiness regarding British-Japanese Treaty, 202, - 204. - Fleet: Australian unit, 181. - of American battleships, the welcome given to, 278. - Russia urged to build a, 213. - - Pacific, the, American influence in, 11-12. - and Great Britain, 269. - and the United States, 269. - armies of the, 186 _et seq._ - British Empire and the mastery of, 11. - British influence in, 11. - British possessions in, 13. - British trade interests in, 162. - China and, 8 _et seq._ - control of: an Anglo-Celtic union advisable, 14. - Drake's log on entering, 91. - fortresses and trading stations, 3. - France and, 10. - future of, Japan's chance, 265. - future of, with White Races, 265. - Germany and, 10. - Great Britain and, 10. - hegemony of, 4, 46. - India and, 9, 10. - industrial position, governed by excluding Asiatic labour, 235, 240. - industrial position in, 228 _et seq._ - Japan and, 5 _et seq._ - Japan the greatest warrior Power in, 32. - naval and military forces in, 15. - navies of the, 176 _et seq._ - no Free Trade ideas in the, 235. - ocean of the future, 1. - position of Japan in, 46. - rivals for, 263 _et seq._ - Russia in, 16 _et seq._, 268. - Russian influence in, 4. - South America and, 10. - Spain in, 91. - strategical position of Japan in, 260. - of United States in, 260. - strategy of, 246. - Treaties in, 199. - United States and, 68. - Yellow and White Races and, 63. - - Palmyra Island, 12 (footnote). - - Pan-American Bureau, the, 272. - Conferences, 272, 273. - - Panama Canal, the, 5, 12, 13, 42, 75, 160, 163, 176, 178, 179, 216 - _et seq._, 218, 220, 243, 259, 260, 265, 280. - and United States, 269. - American commerce and, 225. - amount expended by United States, 227. - amount of Pacific and Atlantic water exchanged by, 220. - as a tariff weapon, 224. - early difficulties, 216. - free navigation of, 221. - intended by United States as means of securing dominance in Pacific, - 223, 224. - military police for, 221. - naval base at Cuba, 222. - "neutralisation" of the, 220. - plague of mosquitoes, 217. - Secretary Meyer on, 179. - sovereign rights of the United States, 222. - tolls, 225. - treaty regarding management, 220. - - Panama, hills of, 219 - Isthmus, the, 81, 155. - by no means unhealthy, 218. - the United States and, 67. - - Papua, natives of, and mosquitoes, 217. - - Papua, New Guinea, 144. - - Paraguay, army of, 198. - Republic of, 161. - - Peace Societies, 109. - - Peace of Shimonoseki, the, and its consequences, 38. - - Pearl Harbour, 78, 79. - - Pekin, the expedition of 1900 to, 50. - - Penang, 95. - - Persia and the Greeks, 40. - - Persian Gulf, the, 25. - - Peru, 2, 10, 92, 150, 151 _et seq._, 160. - occupied by Spaniards, 154. - - Peruvians, the, 8, 137. - and the elimination of the fighting instinct, 111. - Spanish description of, 152. - - Pescadores, the, acquired by Japan, 38. - - Philippine garrison, the, 190. - - Philippines, the, 3, 4, 12, 104, 259. - Anson's attempt to subdue, 91. - the Spaniards at, 104. - United States acquire, 82. - - Pizarro, Francisco, 153, 156. - - "Places at table," 118. - - "Places in the sun," 118. - - Plague, the, 59. - Dr Francis Fremantle on, 60. - Prof. W. J. Simpson on, 61. - - Polk, President, 73. - - Polo, Marco, 49, 103. - - Polynesia, 94. - - Pope of Rome exchanges greetings with Chinese Grand Khan, 50. - - Portugal: trade relations with Japan, 38. - - Poutrincourt, 166. - - Power, Senator, 196. - - Prayers for rain, 106. - - Preventive medicine as aid to population, 118. - - Protection, a rigid system of, 226. - - - Quebec, 166. - captured by Admiral Kirk, 166. - restored to France, 167. - the capital of "New France," 166. - - Queensland annexes New Guinea, 134. - - - Race-mixture, instinct against, 20. - - Race troubles in Canada, 233. - - Races, psychology of, 35. - - Raffles, Sir Stamford, 96. - - Rain, prayers for, 106. - - Raw levies, uselessness of, 197. - - Republicanism in China, 54, 55. - Mr Kwei Chih on, 55 (footnote). - - Richelieu, 166. - - Rocky Mountains, the, 169, 243. - - _Roebuck_, the, 104. - - Roman Catholics in Canada, 168. - - Roman invasion of Britain, 87, 88. - - Romanised Britons, 88. - - _Rosanna_, the, conveys pioneers to New Zealand, 123. - - Rurik, 22. - - Russia, 3, 4. - and a Pacific Fleet, 213. - and Great Britain, _entente_ between, 199. - and India, 18. - and Japan, 25, 26. - and Napoleon, 24. - and Siberia, 25. - and the Mediterranean, 18, 23. - and the Napoleonic invasion, 16, 17. - and the Pacific, 10. - and the Persian Gulf, 25. - army of, 186, 187. - British dread of, 18. - British maritime intercourse with, 214. - Cross versus Crescent, 23. - early European civilisations, 21. - European jealousy of, 5. - expansion of, 19. - mistrust of European Powers, 24. - future position of, in the Pacific, 29. - Great Britain's alarm of, 24, 25. - Greeks and Romans in, 21. - in Constantinople, 23. - interior of, 21. - invasion of the Turks, 23. - Lord Salisbury on, 16. - national heroes of, 22. - naval strategy of, 261. - navy of, 176. - race-mixture in, 20. - religious faith, 22. - service to civilisation, 23. - the avenger of the White Races, 23. - war with Japan, 7, 19, 25 _et seq._, 265. - - Russian intentions on Mongolia, 211. - - Russians, faith of the, 23. - - Russo-Japanese War, the, 7, 19, 25 _et seq._, 265. - difficulties of Russians, 29. - - - St Francis Xavier, 37. - - St Germain-en-Laye, Treaty of, 167. - - St Helena, Napoleon in, 18. - - St Lawrence, the, 165. - - Saito, Baron, 46. - - Salisbury, Lord, 16. - - Sandwich Islands, 77. - - San Francisco, 91, 260. - - Satsuma, revolt of the, 38. - - Sea of Japan, 260, 261. - - Selkirks, the, 169, 243. - - Semites, the, 21. - - Sepoy forces in India, 191. - - "Setch," the Cossack, 188, 189. - - Shimonoseki, the Peace of, 38. - the Straits of, 38. - - Shintoism, 32, 36. - - Shoguns, the, 36. - - Siberia, Russia and, 25. - the Cossacks and, 5. - - Siberian Railway, the, 186. - - Simeon, 22. - - Simpson, Prof. W. J., on the Plague, 61. - - Singapore, 11, 85, 95, 96, 250, 258. - harbour of, 97. - - Slavs, the, 22, 267. - - Socialism in Japan, 7. - - Socialists in China, 49. - - Sorcerer, the, in the South Sea Islands, 149. - - South America, 10. - - South American armies, 198. - - South Pacific, the British Flag in, 135. - the native races, 135. - - South Sea Islands, 93, 149. - - Spain: war with United States, 82. - - "Spheres of influence," the, 85, 236, 240. - - Spice Islands, the, 93. - - Straits of Shimonoseki forced, 38. - - Straits Settlements, the, 248. - - Strategical considerations, 245 _et seq._ - - Suez Canal, free navigation of, 221. - the mosquito trouble, 218. - - Sumarai, the, 32. - - Sun-worship, 151. - - Suva, 143. - - - Taft, President, 159 (footnote), 171 (footnote), 218, 225, 271. - - Talon, Jean Baptiste, 167. - - Taoism, 49. - - Tartar and Mongol tribes, the, 49. - - Tartary, 3, 22. - - Tasmania, 137. - - Teutons, the, 267. - - Texas, annexation of, 73. - - Thakombau, King, 134. - - Theodosius, Emperor, 49. - - Tibet, British intentions on, 211. - - Tokio _Nichi-Nichi_, the, 211. - - Tracy, Marquis de, 167. - - Trade reciprocity, 164, 174. - - Trans-Andine railways, the, 10. - - Treaties in the Pacific, 199. - - Treaties with Japan, British (1902), 199. - (1905), 204-209. - (1911), 199, 206, 207-211. - - Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan, 206, - 207-211. - of St Germain-en-Laye, 167. - - Triple Alliance, the, 199. - - Triple Entente, the, 213. - - Truvor, 22. - - Turkey, Lord Salisbury on, 16. - - Turks, the, 23, 40. - at Constantinople, 41. - Russia and, 19. - - - United States, the, 2, 3, 12, 13. - a social difficulty, 274. - absorption of Mexican territory by, 158. - acquisition of Hawaii, 78, 81, 83. - aggressively Imperial, 68. - and Cuba, 82. - and Germany, possibilities of an "understanding" between, 212. - and Great Britain, an instinct towards friendliness, 199, 215. - and the Atlantic, 67. - and the Negroes, 233. - and the Philippines, 82. - and trade relations with Japan, 37. - army of, 190. - British diplomacy and, 276, 277, 279. - considering intervention in Mexico, 159. - control waterway from Atlantic to Pacific, 82. - decide to construct Panama Canal, 216. - Declaration of Neutrality, 70. - established in the Caribbean Sea, 67. - on the Isthmus of Panama, 67. - establishing naval base at Cuba, 222. - foreign policy, 75. - Germany a possible ally of, 199. - imperialism in, 66. - in the Pacific, strategical position of, 260. - lynchings in, 20. - marvellous growth of, 70, 72. - miscegenation in, 20. - naval strength of, in the Pacific, 14. - navy, 178. - effective tonnage, 185. - Secretary Meyer's report on, 178. - neutral markets, 83. - organisation of industrial machinery, 243. - Pacific possessions, 84. - policy, Imperialist tendency of, 77. - rivals of Great Britain, 269. - rules for exclusion of Chinese, 235. - strategical position of, 258. - the greatest factor in the Problem of the Pacific, 68. - the greatest White nation of the world, 150. - the "Monroe doctrine" in, 71, 72, 73, 75. - the Suzerain Power of the Latin-American Republics, 74. - war with Spain, 82 - when Panama Canal opened, the greatest Power of the Pacific, 243. - - Universal military training proposed in Canada, 196. - - "Universal service" in Latin America, 197. - - Ural Mountains, the, 20. - - Uruguay, 161, 163. - - - Vancouver, 251. - - Veddas, the, 138. - - Velasquez, conqueror of Cuba, 156. - - Venezuela controversy, the, 74. - Republic of, 161. - - Victoria, Queen, 24, 125. - - Vienna and the Ottoman invasion, 41. - - - Waitangi, the Treaty of, 125, 126. - - Wakefield, Mr Edward Gibbon, 124. - - Wallace on the black Australian, 137. - - War, the necessity of, 6. - - Ward, Sir Joseph, 127 _et seq._ - - Washington's farewell address, 71. - - Wei-hai-wei, 248, 250. - - Wesleyan mission to New Zealand, 132. - - "White Australia," 107, 254. - laws, the, 20. - policy, basis of, 232. - - White garrison of India, the, 249. - labour, impatient, 240. - Man and the Pacific, 63. - Race, the, 2, 4, 107. - conquests of, 41. - superiority of, 263, 267. - Races, America and the, 12. - birth-rate, 257. - neither enervated nor decadent, 264. - the future of the Pacific with the, 265. - Russia consolidated by the Normans, 22. - Mongol invasion of, 22. - - _Worker, The_, on Asiatic colonisation, 240 (footnote). - - - Xavier, St Francis, 37. - - "X-Ray Martyr," the, 229. - - - Yellow Man, danger of overrunning the Pacific, 63. - - "Yellow Peril," the, 264, 280. - - Yellow Race, the, 2, 4. - defeats the White Race in war, 39. - - Yellow Races, the United States and the, 13. - - Yturbidi, Emperor Augustin de, 157. - - Yuan Shih-Kai, 54. - - -PRINTED BY NEILL AND CO., LTD., EDINBURGH. - - - - - * * * * * - - - - -Transcriber's note: - -1. Except as noted below, spelling and inconsistencies have been -retained as they appear in the original publication. - -2. "X-ray" in the text appears as "X-Ray" in the index. - -3. "FitzGerald" in the text appears as "Fitz-Gerald" in the index. - -4. On page 205, in the sentence starting "Japan possessing paramount", -"Great Britain" was "Gerat Britain" in the original. - -5. On page 240, "wheel-barrow" was "wheel-barrrow" in the original. - -6. The punctuation in the index has been made consistent. - -7. The name "Terra Austrialia del Espiritu Santo" is correct. -"Austrialia" was an invented hybrid word combining the names "Austria" -and "australis" as a compliment to King Phillip III of Spain who was a -member of the House of Habsburg (Austria). - -8. "the cageing of the great soldier" was changed to "the caging of the -great soldier" - -9. "Hayti" is an old spelling of "Haiti". It has been retained. - -10. On p. 155 the word "reassert" has been changed from "re-assert" to -match the spelling elsewhere in the book. - - - -***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC*** - - -******* This file should be named 40305-8.txt or 40305-8.zip ******* - - -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: -http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/4/0/3/0/40305 - - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, -set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to -copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to -protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project -Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you -charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you -do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the -rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose -such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and -research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do -practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is -subject to the trademark license, especially commercial -redistribution. - - - -*** START: FULL LICENSE *** - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project -Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at - www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy -all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. -If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the -terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or -entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement -and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" -or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the -collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an -individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are -located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from -copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative -works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg -are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project -Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by -freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of -this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with -the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by -keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project -Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in -a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check -the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement -before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or -creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project -Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning -the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United -States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate -access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently -whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, -copied or distributed: - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived -from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is -posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied -and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees -or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work -with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the -work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 -through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the -Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or -1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional -terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked -to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the -permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any -word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or -distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than -"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version -posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), -you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a -copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon -request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other -form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided -that - -- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is - owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he - has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the - Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments - must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you - prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax - returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and - sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the - address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to - the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." - -- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or - destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium - and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of - Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any - money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days - of receipt of the work. - -- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set -forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from -both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael -Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the -Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm -collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain -"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or -corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual -property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a -computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by -your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with -your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with -the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a -refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity -providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to -receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy -is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further -opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER -WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO -WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. -If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the -law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be -interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by -the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any -provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance -with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, -promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, -harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, -that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do -or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm -work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any -Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. - - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers -including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists -because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from -people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. -To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation -and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 -and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org - - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive -Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent -permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. -Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered -throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 -North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email -contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the -Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -For additional contact information: - Dr. Gregory B. Newby - Chief Executive and Director - gbnewby@pglaf.org - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide -spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To -SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any -particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. -To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic -works. - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm -concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared -with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project -Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. -unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily -keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. - -Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: - - www.gutenberg.org - -This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |