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- float: left; - margin-right: 1em } - -.align-right { clear: right; - float: right; - margin-left: 1em } - -.align-center { margin-left: auto; - margin-right: auto } - -div.shrinkwrap { display: table; } - -/* SECTIONS */ - -body { margin: 5% 10% 5% 10% } - -/* compact list items containing just one p */ -li p.pfirst { margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0 } - -.first { margin-top: 0 !important; - text-indent: 0 !important } -.last { margin-bottom: 0 !important } - -span.dropcap { float: left; margin: 0 0.1em 0 0; line-height: 1 } -img.dropcap { float: left; margin: 0 0.5em 0 0; max-width: 25% } -span.dropspan { font-variant: small-caps } - -.no-page-break { page-break-before: avoid !important } - -/* PAGINATION */ - -@media screen { - .coverpage, .frontispiece, .titlepage, .verso, .dedication, .plainpage - { margin: 10% 0; } - - div.clearpage, div.cleardoublepage - { margin: 10% 0; border: none; border-top: 1px solid gray; } - - .vfill { margin: 5% 10% } -} - -@media print { - div.clearpage { page-break-before: always; padding-top: 10% } - div.cleardoublepage { page-break-before: right; padding-top: 10% } - - .vfill { margin-top: 20% } - h2.title { margin-top: 20% } -} - -</style> -<title>THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE</title> -<meta name="PG.Rights" content="Public Domain" /> -<meta name="PG.Title" content="The Bolsheviki and World Peace" /> -<meta name="PG.Producer" content="Al Haines" /> -<link rel="coverpage" href="images/img-cover.jpg" /> -<meta name="DC.Creator" content="Leon Trotzky" /> -<meta name="DC.Created" content="1918" /> -<meta name="PG.Id" content="40273" /> -<meta name="PG.Released" content="2012-07-18" /> -<meta name="DC.Language" content="en" /> -<meta name="DC.Title" content="The Bolsheviki and World Peace" /> - -<link href="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" rel="schema.DCTERMS" /> -<link href="http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators" rel="schema.MARCREL" /> -<meta content="The Bolsheviki and World Peace" name="DCTERMS.title" /> -<meta content="bolshev.rst" name="DCTERMS.source" /> -<meta content="en" scheme="DCTERMS.RFC4646" name="DCTERMS.language" /> -<meta content="2012-07-18T22:33:10.578330+00:00" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF" name="DCTERMS.modified" /> -<meta content="Project Gutenberg" name="DCTERMS.publisher" /> -<meta content="Public Domain in the USA." name="DCTERMS.rights" /> -<link href="http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40273" rel="DCTERMS.isFormatOf" /> -<meta content="Leon Trotzky" name="DCTERMS.creator" /> -<meta content="2012-07-18" scheme="DCTERMS.W3CDTF" name="DCTERMS.created" /> -<meta content="width=device-width" name="viewport" /> -<meta content="EpubMaker 0.3.19b4 by Marcello Perathoner <webmaster@gutenberg.org>" name="generator" /> -<style type="text/css"> -.pageno { position: absolute; right: 95%; font: medium sans-serif; text-indent: 0 } -.pageno:after { color: gray; content: '[' attr(title) ']' } -.lineno { position: absolute; left: 95%; font: medium sans-serif; text-indent: 0 } -.lineno:after { color: gray; content: '[' attr(title) ']' } -.toc-pageref { float: right } -pre { font-family: monospace; font-size: 0.9em; white-space: pre-wrap } -</style> -</head> -<body> -<div class="document" id="the-bolsheviki-and-world-peace"> -<h1 class="document-title level-1 pfirst title">THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE</h1> - -<!-- -*- encoding: utf-8 -*- --> -<div class="clearpage"> -</div> -<!-- -*- encoding: utf-8 -*- --> -<div class="align-None container language-en noindent pgheader" id="pg-header" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> -<p class="noindent pfirst">This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the <a class="reference internal" href="#project-gutenberg-license">Project Gutenberg License</a> -included with this eBook or online at -<a class="reference external" href="http://www.gutenberg.org/license">http://www.gutenberg.org/license</a>.</p> -<p class="noindent pnext"></p> -<div class="noindent vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<div class="align-None container noindent white-space-pre-line" id="pg-machine-header"> -<p class="noindent pfirst white-space-pre-line"><span class="white-space-pre-line">Title: The Bolsheviki and World Peace<br /> -<br /> -Author: Leon Trotzky<br /> -<br /> -Release Date: July 18, 2012 [EBook #40273]<br /> -<br /> -Language: English<br /> -<br /> -Character set encoding: UTF-8</span></p> -</div> -<div class="noindent vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="noindent pfirst" id="pg-start-line">*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK <span>THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE</span> ***</p> -<div class="noindent vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="noindent pfirst" id="pg-produced-by"><span>Produced by Al Haines.</span></p> -<div class="noindent vspace" style="height: 1em"> -</div> -<p class="noindent pfirst"><span></span></p> -</div> -<div class="align-None container coverpage"> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 3em"> -</div> -<div class="align-center auto-scaled figure" style="width: 44%" id="figure-11"> -<img class="align-center" style="display: block; width: 100%" alt=" " src="images/img-cover.jpg" /> -<div class="caption figure"> -Cover</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="align-None container frontispiece"> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 3em"> -</div> -<div class="align-center auto-scaled figure" style="width: 46%" id="figure-12"> -<img class="align-center" style="display: block; width: 100%" alt=" " src="images/img-front.jpg" /> -<div class="caption figure"> -Leon Trotzky</div> -</div> -</div> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<div class="align-None center container titlepage white-space-pre-line"> -<p class="pfirst white-space-pre-line x-large">THE BOLSHEVIKI<br /> -AND<br /> -WORLD PEACE</p> -<p class="medium pnext white-space-pre-line">BY LEON TROTZKY</p> -<p class="pnext small white-space-pre-line">INTRODUCTION BY LINCOLN STEFFENS</p> -<div class="vspace white-space-pre-line" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="medium pfirst white-space-pre-line">BONI AND LIVERIGHT<br /> -NEW YORK<br /> -1918</p> -<div class="vspace white-space-pre-line" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -</div> -<div class="align-None container verso white-space-pre-line"> -<p class="center pfirst small white-space-pre-line">Copyright<br /> -1918<br /> -Boni & Liveright Inc.</p> -</div> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 3em"> -</div> -<div class="align-None container plainpage white-space-pre-line"> -<p class="center large pfirst white-space-pre-line">CONTENTS</p> -<div class="vspace white-space-pre-line" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="left medium pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#introduction">Introduction</a> by Lincoln Steffens<br /> -<a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#author-s-preface">Author's Preface</a></p> -<div class="vspace white-space-pre-line" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote class="white-space-pre-line"> -<div> -<p class="pfirst white-space-pre-line">CHAPTER</p> -<ol class="upperroman simple white-space-pre-line"> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#the-balkan-question">The Balkan Question</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#austria-hungary">Austria-Hungary</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#the-war-against-czarism">The War against Czarism</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#the-war-against-the-west">The War against the West</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#the-war-of-defense">The War of Defense</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#what-have-socialists-to-do-with-capitalist-wars">What Have Socialists to do with Capitalist Wars?</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#the-collapse-of-the-international">The Collapse of the International</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#socialist-opportunism">Socialist Opportunism</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#the-decline-of-the-revolutionary-spirit">The Decline of the Revolutionary Spirit</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#working-class-imperialism">Working Class Imperialism</a></p> -</li> -<li class="white-space-pre-line"><p class="first pfirst white-space-pre-line"><a class="reference internal white-space-pre-line" href="#the-revolutionary-epoch">The Revolutionary Epoch</a></p> -</li> -</ol> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace white-space-pre-line" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="introduction">INTRODUCTION</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The voice that speaks in this book is the -voice of Leon Trotzky, the Bolshevik Minister -of Foreign Affairs for Revolutionary Russia. -It is expressing ideas and views which lighted -him on the course of his policy toward the War, -Peace and the Revolution. It throws light, -therefore, on that policy; it helps to an -understanding of it, if one wishes to understand. But -that isn't all. The spirit that flames and casts -shadows upon these pages is not only Trotzky's. -It is the spirit also of the Bolsheviki; of the red -left of the left wing of the revolutionary -movement of New Russia. It flashed from -Petrograd to Vladivostok, in the first week of the -revolt; it burned all along the Russian Front -before Trotzky appeared on the scene. It will -smoulder long after he is gone. It is a hot Fact -which has to be picked up and examined, this -spirit. Whether we like it or don't, it is there; -in Russia; it is elsewhere; it is everywhere -to-day. It is the spirit of war; class war, but war. -It is in this book.</p> -<p class="pnext">Nor is that all.</p> -<p class="pnext">The mind in this book--the point of view from -which it starts, the views to which it -points--Trotzky's mind is the international mind. We -have heard before of this new intelligence; we -have read books, heard speeches, witnessed acts -demonstrative of thoughts and feelings which -are not national, but international; not -patriotic, but loyal only to the lower-class-conscious -war aims of the workers of the world. The -class warrior is as familiar a figure to us as the -red spirit is of the red left of revolution. But -the voice which utters here the spirit and the -mind, not only of the Russian, but of the world -revolution is the voice of one having authority.</p> -<p class="pnext">And Trotzky, in power, has been as red as he -is in this book. The minister of foreign affairs -practised in Petrograd what he preached in -Switzerland, where he wrote most of the -chapters of his book. And he practised also what -all the other great International Socialist -leaders talked and wrote.</p> -<p class="pnext">That's what makes him so hard to understand, -him and his party and the Bolshevik -policy. We are accustomed to the sight of -Socialists and Radicals going into office and being -"sobered by the responsibilities of power." French -and Italian Socialists in the Liberal -ministries of their countries; British Labor -leaders in Parliament in England or in the -governments of their Colonies; and the whole -Socialist party in Germany and Austria -(except Liebknecht in prison)--all are examples -of the effect of power upon the International -Mind. The phenomenon of compromise and -surrender is so common that many radicals -oppose the taking of any responsible office by any -member of their parties; and some of the -extremists are advocating no political action -whatsoever, nothing but industrial, economic or -what they call "direct action." (Our I.W.W.'s -don't vote, on principle.) This is anarchism.</p> -<p class="pnext">Leon Trotzky is not an anarchist; except in -the ignorant sense of the word as used by -educated people. He is a Socialist; an orthodox -Marxian Socialist. But he has seen vividly the -danger of political power. The body of this -book was addressed originally to the German -and Austrian Socialists, and it is a reasoned, -but indignant reproach of them for letting their -political position and their nationalistic loyalty -carry them away into an undemocratic, patriotic, -political policy which betrayed the weaker -nations in their empires, helped break up the -Second (Socialist) International and led the -Socialist parties into the support of the War.</p> -<p class="pnext">Clear upon it, Trotzky himself does not -illustrate his own thesis. He not only detests -intellectually the secrecy and the sordid -wickedness of the "old diplomacy"; when he came as -minister into possession of the archives of the -Russian Foreign Office, he published the secret -treaties.</p> -<p class="pnext">That hurt. And so with the idea of a -people's peace. All the democratic world had been -talking ever since the war began of a peace -made, not by diplomats in a private room, but -by the chosen representatives of all the -peoples meeting in an open congress. The -Bolsheviki worked for that from the moment the -Russian Revolution broke; and they labored for -the Stockholm Conference while Paul -Milyoukov and Alexander Kerensky were -negotiating with the allied governments. When the -Bolsheviki succeeded to power, Lenine and -Trotzky formally authorized and officially -proposed such a congress. Moreover Trotzky -showed that they were willing, if they could, -to force the other countries to accept the -people's peace conference.</p> -<p class="pnext">This hurt. This hurt so much that the -governments united in extraordinary measures to -prevent the event. And when they succeeded, -and it was seen that no people's peace could be -made openly and directly, Trotzky proceeded -by another way to get to the same end. He -opened negotiations with the Kaiser's -government and allies; arranged an armistice and -agreed tentatively upon terms of peace.</p> -<p class="pnext">This act not only hurt; it stunned the world, -and no wonder! It was like a declaration of -war against a whole world at war. It was -unbelievable. The only explanation offered was -that Trotzky and Lenine were pro-German or -dishonest, or both, and these things were said -in high places; and they were said with conviction, -too. Moreover this conviction colored, if -it did not determine, the attitude the Allies took -toward New Russia and the peace proposals -Trotzky got from the German government. -Was this assumption of the dishonesty of -Trotzky the only explanation of his act?</p> -<p class="pnext">This book shows, as I have said, that Trotzky -saw things from the revolutionary, international -point of view, which is not that of his -judges; which is incomprehensible to them. He -wrote it after the War began; he finished the -main part of it before the Russian Revolution. -It is his view of the War, its causes and its -effects, especially upon international Socialism -and "the" Revolution. These are the things he -holds in his mind all through all these pages: -"the" Revolution and world democracy. Also -I have shown that, like the Russians generally, -his mind is literal. The Russians mean what -they say, exactly; and Trotzky not only means, -he does what he writes. Putting these -considerations together, we can make a -comprehensible statement of the motive and the -purpose of his policy; if we want to comprehend.</p> -<p class="pnext">To all the other secretaries of state or of -foreign affairs in the world, the Russian -Revolution was an incident, an interruption of the -War. To Minister Trotzky it was the other -way around.</p> -<p class="pnext">The World War was an incident, an effect, -a check of "the" Revolution. Not the Russian -Revolution, you understand. To Trotzky the -Russian Revolution is but one, the first of that -series of national revolutions which together -will become the Thing he yearns for and -prophesies: the World Revolution.</p> -<p class="pnext">His peace policy therefore is a peace drive -directed, not at a separate peace with the -Central Powers; and not even at a general peace, -but to an ending of the War in and by "the" -Revolution everywhere.</p> -<p class="pnext">Especially in Germany and Austria. He -said this. The correspondent of the London -<em class="italics">Daily News</em> cabled on January 2, right after -the armistice and the agreement upon peace -terms to be offered the Allies, that "Trotzky -is doing his utmost to stimulate a revolution -in Germany.... Our only chance to defeat -German designs is to publish terms (from the -Allies) ... to help the democratic movement -in Germany."</p> -<p class="pnext">Trotzky is not pro-German. He certainly -was not when he wrote this book. He hates -here both the Austrian and the German -dynasties, and his ill-will toward the House of -Hapsburg is so bitter that it sounds sometimes as if -there were something personal about it. And -there is. He shows a knowledge of and a living -sympathy with the small and subject nations -which Austria rules, exploits and mistreats. He -blames his Austrian comrades for their -allegiance to a throne which is not merely -undemocratic, but "senile" and tyrannical. That he, -the literal Trotzky, would turn right around -and, as the Russian Minister of Foreign -Affairs, do what he had so recently criticized the -Austrian Socialists for doing is unlikely.</p> -<p class="pnext">Trotzky is against all the present -governments of Europe, and the "bourgeois system" -everywhere in the world. He isn't pro-Allies; -he isn't even pro-Russian. He isn't a patriot -at all. He is for a class, the proletariat, the -working people of all countries, and he is for -his class only to get rid of classes and get down -or up to--humanity. And so with his people.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Russians have listened to the Socialist -propaganda for generations now. They have -learned the chief lessons it has taught: liberty, -land, industrial democracy and the class-war -the world over. This War was not their war; -it was the Czar's war; a war of the governments -in the interest of their enemies, the capitalists -of their several countries, who, as Trotzky says, -were forcing their states to fight for the right -to exploit other and smaller peoples. So when -they overthrew the Czar, the Russians wanted -to drop his war and go into their own, the class -war. Kerensky held them at the front in the -name of "the" Revolution; he would get peace -for them by arrangement with the allies. He -didn't; he couldn't; he was dismissed by them. -Not by the Bolsheviki, but by the Russian -people who know the three or four things they -want: land and liberty at home; the Revolution -and Democracy for all the world.</p> -<p class="pnext">I heard a radical assert one day that that -was the reason Trotzky could be such an -exception to the rule about radicals in power. -He came to the head of the Russian Revolution -when his ideas were the actual demands of -the Russian people and that it was not his -strength of character, but the force of a -democratic public opinion in mob power, which made -him stick to his philosophy and carry out his -theories and promises. I find upon inquiry -here in New York that while he was living and -working as a journalist on the East Side, he -left one paper after another because he could -not conform, to their editorial policies and -would not compromise. He was "stiff-necked," -"obstinate," "unreasonable." In other, kinder -words, Trotzky is a strong man, with a definite -mind and a purpose of his own, which he has -the will and the nerve to pursue.</p> -<p class="pnext">Also, however, Trotzky is a strong man who -is ruled by and represents a very simple-minded -people who are acting like him, literally upon -the theory that the people govern now, in -Russia; the common people; and that, since they -don't like the War of the Czar, the Kaiser, the -Kings and the Emperors, their government -should make peace with the peoples of the -world, a democratic peace against imperialism -and capitalism and the state everywhere, for -the establishment in its stead of a free, -world-wide democracy.</p> -<p class="pnext">That may be the true explanation of Trotzky's -Bolshevik peace policy in the world crisis -of the World War. That is the explanation -which is suggested by this book.</p> -<p class="pnext">"Written in extreme haste," he says at the -close of his preface, "under conditions far -from favorable to systematic work ... the -entire book, from the first page to the last, was -written with the idea of the New International -constantly in mind--the New International -which must rise out of the present world -cataclysm, the International of the last conflict and -the final victory."</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="left pfirst white-space-pre-line">LINCOLN STEFFENS.<br /> -New York, January 4th, 1918</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="author-s-preface">AUTHOR'S PREFACE</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The forces of production which capitalism -has evolved have outgrown the limits of nation -and state. The national state, the present -political form, is too narrow for the exploitation -of these productive forces. The natural -tendency of our economic system, therefore, -is to seek to break through the state boundaries. -The whole globe, the land and the sea, the -surface as well as the interior, has become one -economic workshop, the different parts of -which are inseparably connected with each -other. This work was accomplished by -capitalism. But in accomplishing it the capitalist -states were led to struggle for the subjection -of the world-embracing economic system to the -profit interests of the bourgeoisie of each -country. What the politics of imperialism has -demonstrated more than anything else is that -the old national state that was created in the -revolutions and the wars of 1789-1815, -1848-1859, 1864-1866, and 1870 has outlived itself, -and is now an intolerable hindrance to -economic development.</p> -<p class="pnext">The present War is at bottom a revolt of the -forces of production against the political form -of nation and state. It means the collapse of -the national state as an independent economic -unit.</p> -<p class="pnext">The nation must continue to exist as a -cultural, ideologic and psychological fact, but its -economic foundation has been pulled from -under its feet. All talk of the present bloody -clash being a work of national defense is either -hypocrisy or blindness. On the contrary, the -real, objective significance of the war is the -breakdown of the present national economic -centres, and the substitution of a world -economy in its stead. But the way the -governments propose to solve this problem of -imperialism is not through the intelligent, organized -coöperation of all of humanity's producers, but -through the exploitation of the world's -economic system by the capitalist class of the -victorious country; which country is by this War -to be transformed from a great power into the -world power.</p> -<p class="pnext">The War proclaims the downfall of the -national state. Yet at the same time it proclaims -the downfall of the capitalist system of -economy. By means of the national state capitalism -has revolutionized the whole economic -system of the world. It has divided the whole -earth among the oligarchies of the great -powers, around which were grouped the satellites, -the small nations, who lived off the rivalry -between the great ones. The future -development of world economy on the capitalistic -basis means a ceaseless struggle for new and -ever new fields of capitalist exploitation, which -must be obtained from one and the same source, -the earth. The economic rivalry under the -banner of militarism is accompanied by robbery -and destruction which violate the elementary -principles of human economy. World -production revolts not only against the confusion -produced by national and state divisions but also -against the capitalist economic organization, -which has now turned into barbarous -disorganization and chaos.</p> -<p class="pnext">The War of 1914 is the most colossal -breakdown in history of an economic system -destroyed by its own inherent contradictions.</p> -<p class="pnext">All the historical forces whose task it has -been to guide the bourgeois society, to speak in -its name and to exploit it, have declared their -historical bankruptcy by the War. They -defended capitalism as a system of human -civilization, and the catastrophe born out of that -system is primarily <em class="italics">their</em> catastrophe. The first -wave of events raised the national governments -and armies to unprecedented heights never -attained before. For the moment the nations -rallied around them. But the more terrible will -be the crash of the governments when the -people, deafened by the thunder of the cannon, -realize the meaning of the events now taking -place in all their truth and frightfulness.</p> -<p class="pnext">The revolutionary reaction of the masses will -be all the more powerful the more prodigious -the cataclysm which history is now bringing -upon them.</p> -<p class="pnext">Capitalism has created the material -conditions of a new Socialist economic system. -Imperialism has led the capitalist nations into -historic chaos. The War of 1914 shows the way -out of this chaos by violently urging the -proletariat on to the path of Revolution.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">For the economic backward countries of -Europe the War brings to the fore problems of -a far earlier historic origin--problems of -democracy and national unity. This is in a -large measure the case with the peoples of -Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Peninsula. -But these historically belated questions, -which were bequeathed to the present epoch as -a heritage from the past, do not alter the -fundamental character of the events. It is not the -national aspirations of the Serbs, Poles, -Roumanians or Finns that has mobilized twenty-five -million soldiers and placed them in the -battlefields, but the imperialistic interests of the -bourgeoisie of the Great Powers. It is imperialism -that has upset completely the European -<em class="italics">status quo</em>, maintained for forty-five years, and -raised again the old questions which the -bourgeois revolution proved itself powerless to -solve.</p> -<p class="pnext">Yet in the present epoch it is quite -impossible to treat these questions in and by -themselves. They are utterly devoid of an -independent character. The creation of normal -relations of national life and economic -development on the Balkan Peninsula is unthinkable -if Czarism and Austria-Hungary are -preserved. Czarism is now the indispensable -military reservoir for the financial imperialism of -France and the conservative colonial power of -England. Austria-Hungary is the mainstay -of Germany's imperialism. Issuing from the -private family clashes between the national -Servian terrorists and the Hapsburg political -police, the War very quickly revealed its true -fundamental character--a struggle of life and -death between Germany and England. While -the simpletons and hypocrites prate of the -defense of national freedom and independence, -the German-English War is really being waged -for the freedom of the imperialistic exploitation -of the peoples of India and Egypt on the one -hand, and for the imperialistic division of the -peoples of the earth on the other.</p> -<p class="pnext">Germany began its capitalistic development -on a national basis with the destruction of the -continental hegemony of France in the year -1870-1871. Now that the development of -German industry on a national foundation has -transformed Germany into the first capitalistic -power of the world, she finds herself colliding -with the hegemony of England in her further -course of development. The complete and -unlimited domination of the European continent -seems to Germany the indispensable prerequisite -of the overthrow of her world enemy. The -first thing, therefore, that imperialistic -Germany writes in her programme is the creation -of a Middle European League of Nations. -Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan -Peninsula and Turkey, Holland, the Scandinavian -countries, Switzerland, Italy, and, if -possible, enfeebled France and Spain and Portugal, -are to make one economic and military -whole, a Great Germany under the hegemony -of the present German state.</p> -<p class="pnext">This programme, which has been thoroughly -elaborated by the economists, political students, -jurists and diplomats of German imperialism -and translated into reality by its strategists, is -the most striking proof and most eloquent -expression of the fact that capitalism has -expanded beyond the limits of the national state -and feels intolerably cramped within its -boundaries. The national Great Power must go and -in its place must step the imperialistic World -Power.</p> -<p class="pnext">In these historical circumstances the working -class, the proletariat, can have no interest in -defending the outlived and antiquated national -"fatherland," which has become the main -obstacle to economic development. The task of -the proletariat is to create a far more powerful -fatherland, with far greater power of -resistance--<em class="italics">the republican United States of -Europe</em>, as the foundation of the United States -of the World.</p> -<p class="pnext">The only way in which the proletariat can -meet the imperialistic perplexity of capitalism -is by opposing to it as a practical programme -of the day the Socialist organization of world -economy.</p> -<p class="pnext">War is the method by which capitalism, at -the climax of its development, seeks to solve -its insoluble contradictions. To this method -the proletariat must oppose its <em class="italics">own</em> method, -the method of the Social Revolution.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The Balkan question and the question of the -overthrow of Czarism, propounded to us by the -Europe of yesterday, can be solved only in a -revolutionary way, in connection with the -problem of the United Europe of to-morrow. The -immediate, urgent task of the Russian Social -Democracy, to which the author belongs, is the -fight against Czarism. What Czarism -primarily seeks in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans -is a market for its political methods of plunder, -robbery and acts of violence. The Russian -bourgeoisie all the way up to its radical -intellectuals has become completely demoralized by -the tremendous growth of industry in the last -five years, and it has entered into a bloody -league with the dynasty, which had to secure to -the impatient Russian capitalists their part of -the world's booty by new land robberies. While -Czarism stormed and devastated Galicia, and -deprived it even of the rags and tatters of -liberty granted to it by the Hapsburgs, while it -dismembered unhappy Persia, and from the -corner of the Bosporus strove to throw the -noose around the neck of the Balkan peoples, -it left to the liberalism which it despised the -task of concealing its robbery by sickening -declamations over the defense of Belgium and -France. The year 1914 spells the complete -bankruptcy of Russian liberalism, and makes -the Russian proletariat the sole champion of -the war of liberation. It makes the Russian -Revolution definitely an integral part of the -Social Revolution of the European proletariat.</p> -<p class="pnext">In our war against Czarism, in which we -have never known a "national" truce, we have -never looked for help from Hapsburg or -Hohenzollern militarism, and we are not looking -for it now. We have preserved a sufficiently -clear revolutionary vision to know that the idea -of destroying Czarism was utterly repugnant -to German imperialism. Czarism has been its -best ally on the Eastern border. It is united to -it by close ties of social structure and historical -aims. Yet even if it were otherwise, even if it -could be assumed that, in obedience to the logic -of military operations, it would deal a -destructive blow to Czarism, in defiance of the logic -of its own political interests--even in such a -highly improbable case we should refuse to -regard the Hohenzollerns not only as an -objective but as a subjective ally. The fate of the -Russian Revolution is so inseparably bound up -with the fate of European Socialism, and we -Russian Socialists stand so firmly on the -ground of internationalism, that we cannot, we -must not for a moment, entertain the idea of -purchasing the doubtful liberation of Russia -by the certain destruction of the liberty of -Belgium and France, and--what is more -important still--thereby inoculating the German and -Austrian proletariat with the virus of -imperialism.</p> -<p class="pnext">We are united by many ties to the German -Social Democracy. We have all gone through -the German Socialist school, and learned -lessons from its successes as well as from its -failures. The German Social Democracy was to -us not only <em class="italics">a</em> party of the International. It -was <em class="italics">the</em> Party <em class="italics">par excellence</em>. We have always -preserved and fortified the fraternal bond that -united us with the Austrian Social Democracy. -On the other hand, we have always taken pride -in the fact that we have made our modest -contribution towards winning suffrage in Austria -and arousing revolutionary tendencies in the -German working class. It cost more than one -drop of blood to do it. We have unhesitatingly -accepted moral and material support from our -older brother who fought for the same ends as -we on the other side of our Western border.</p> -<p class="pnext">Yet it is just because of this respect for the -past, and still more out of respect for the -future, which ought to unite the working class of -Russia with the working classes of Germany -and Austria, that we indignantly reject the -"liberating" aid which German imperialism -offers us in a Krupp munition box, with the -blessing, alas! of German Socialism. And we hope -that the indignant protest of Russian Socialism -will be loud enough to be heard in Berlin and in -Vienna.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The collapse of the Second International is -a tragic fact, and it were blindness or -cowardice to close one's eyes to it. The position -taken by the French and by the larger part of -English Socialism is as much a part of this -breakdown as the position of the German and -Austrian Social Democracy. If the present -work addresses itself chiefly to the German -Social Democracy it is only because the German -party was the strongest, most influential, and -in principle the most basic member of the -Socialist world. Its historic capitulation reveals -most clearly the causes of the downfall of the -Second International. At first glance it may -appear that the social revolutionary prospects -of the future are wholly deceptive. The -insolvency of the old Socialist parties has become -catastrophically apparent. Why should we -have faith in the future of the Socialist -movement? Such skepticism, though natural, -nevertheless leads to quite an erroneous conclusion. -It leaves out of account the good will of -history, just as we have often been too prone to -ignore its ill will, which has now so cruelly -shown itself in the fate that has overcome the -International.</p> -<p class="pnext">The present War signalizes the collapse of -the national states. The Socialist parties of -the epoch now concluded were national parties. -They had become ingrained in the national -states with all the different branches of their -organizations, with all their activities and with -their psychology. In the face of the solemn -declarations at their congresses they rose to -the defense of the conservative state, when -imperialism, grown big on the national soil, began -to demolish the antiquated national barriers. -And in their historic crash the national states -have pulled down with them the national -Socialist parties also.</p> -<p class="pnext">It is not Socialism that has gone down, but -its temporary historical external form. The -revolutionary idea begins its life anew as it -casts off its old rigid shell. This shell is made -up of living human beings, of an entire -generation of Socialists that has become fossilized -in self-abnegating work of agitation and -organization through a period of several decades -of political reaction, and has fallen into the -habits and views of national opportunism or -possibilism. All efforts to save the Second -International on the old basis, by personal -diplomatic methods and mutual concessions, are -quite hopeless. The old mole of history is now -digging its passageways all too well and none -has the power to stop him.</p> -<p class="pnext">As the national states have become a -hindrance to the development of the forces of -production, so the old Socialist parties have -become the main hindrance to the revolutionary -movement of the working class. It was -necessary that they should demonstrate to the full -their extreme backwardness, that they should -discredit their utterly inadequate and narrow -methods, and bring the shame and horror of -national discord upon the proletariat, in order -that the working class might emancipate itself, -through these fearful disillusionments, from -the prejudices and slavish habits of the period -of preparation, and become at last that which -the voice of history is now calling it to be--the -revolutionary class fighting for power.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Second International has not lived in -vain. It has accomplished a huge cultural -work. There has been nothing like it in history -before. It has educated and assembled the -oppressed classes. The proletariat does not now -need to begin at the beginning. It enters on -the new road not with empty hands. The past -epoch has bequeathed to it a rich arsenal of -ideas. It has bequeathed to it the weapons of -criticism. The new epoch will teach the -proletariat to combine the old weapons of criticism -with the new criticism of weapons.</p> -<p class="pnext">This book was written in extreme haste, -under conditions far from favorable to systematic -work. A large part of it is devoted to the old -International which has fallen. But the entire -book, from the first to the last page, was -written with the idea of the New International -constantly in mind, the New International which -must rise up out of the present world cataclysm, -the International of the last conflict and -the final victory.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="left pfirst">LEON TROTZKY.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center pfirst x-large" id="the-balkan-question">THE BOLSHEVIKI AND -WORLD PEACE</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 3em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst">CHAPTER I</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">THE BALKAN QUESTION</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"The War at present being waged against -Russian Czarism and its vassals is dominated -by a great historic idea. The impetus of this -great historic idea consecrates the battlefields -of Poland and of Eastern Russia. The roar -of cannon, the rattling of machine guns, and -the onrush of cavalry, all betoken the -enforcement of the democratic programme for -the liberation of the nations. Had Czarism, -in league with the French capitalistic -powers and in league with an unscrupulous -'nation of shopkeepers,' not succeeded in -suppressing the Revolution of 1905, the present -slaughter of the nations would have been -avoided.</p> -<p class="pnext">"A democratic Russia would never have -consented to wage this unscrupulous and -futile War. The great ideas of freedom and -justice now speak the persuasive language of -the machine gun and the sword, and every -heart susceptible of sympathy with justice -and humanity can only wish that the power -of Czarism may be destroyed once for all, -and that the oppressed Russian nationalities -may again secure the right to decide their -own destinies."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<p class="pfirst">The above quotation is from the <em class="italics">Nepszava</em> -of August 31, 1914, the official organ of the -Socialist party of Hungary. Hungary is the -land whose entire inner life was erected upon -the high-handed oppression of the national -minorities, upon the enslavement of the -laboring classes, upon the official parasitism and -usury of the ruling caste of large landowners. -It is the land in which men like Tisza are -masters of the situation, dyed-in-the-wool -agrarians, with the manners of political bandits. In -a word, Hungary is a country closest of kin -to Czar-ruled Russia.</p> -<p class="pnext">So what is more fitting than that the -<em class="italics">Nepszava</em>, the Socialist organ of Hungary, should -hail with outbursts of enthusiasm the liberating -mission of the German and Austro-Hungarian -armies? Who other than Count Tisza could -have felt the call to "enforce the democratic -programme for the liberation of the nations"? -Who was there to uphold the eternal principles -of law and justice in Europe but the ruling -clique of Budapest, the discredited Panamists? -Would you entrust this mission to the -unscrupulous diplomacy of "perfidious Albion," to -the nation of shopkeepers?</p> -<p class="pnext">Laughter turns away wrath. The tragic -inconsistencies of the policies followed by the -International not only reach their climax in the -articles of the poor Nepszava; they disarm us -by their humor.</p> -<p class="pnext">The present series of events began with the -ultimatum, sent to Servia by Austria-Hungary. -There was not the slightest reason why the -international Social Democracy should take -under its protection the intrigues of the Serbs or -any other of the petty dynasties of the Balkan -Peninsula. They were all endeavoring to hide -their political adventures under the cloak of -national aspirations. We had still less cause -to lash ourselves into a state of moral -indignation because a fanatic young Serb responded to -the cowardly, criminal and wily national -politics of the Vienna and Budapest government -authorities with a bloody assassination.<a class="footnote-reference" href="#id2" id="id1"><sup>1</sup></a></p> -<p class="pnext">Of one thing we have no doubt. In the -dealings between the Danube Monarchy and the -Servian government, the historic right, that is -to say, the right of free development, rests -entirely with Servia, just as Italy was in the right -in the year 1859. Underneath the duel between -the imperial police scoundrels and the terrorists -of Belgrade, there is hidden a far deeper -meaning than merely the greed of the Kareorgoievitches -or the crimes of the Czar's diplomacy. -On one side were the imperialistic claims of a -national state that had lost its vitality, and on -the other side, the strivings of the dismembered -Servian nation to reintegrate itself into a -national whole and become a living vital state.</p> -<p class="pnext">Is it for this that we have sat so long in the -school of Socialism to forget the first three -letters of the democratic alphabet? This absolute -lapse of memory, moreover, made its -appearance only after the fourth of August. Up to -that fatal date the German Marxists showed -that they knew very well what was happening -in Southeastern Europe.</p> -<p class="pnext">On July 3, 1914, after the assassination at -Sarajevo, the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> wrote:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"The bourgeois revolution of the South -Slavs is in full swing, and the shooting at -Sarajevo, however wild and senseless an act -in itself, is as much a chapter of this -revolution as the battles by which the Bulgarians, -Serbs and Montenegrins liberated the -peasants of Macedonia from the yoke of Turkish -feudal exploitation. Is it a wonder that the -South Slavs of Austria-Hungary look with -longing to their racial brothers in the -kingdom of Servia? The Serbs in Servia have -attained the highest goal a people can attain -in the present order of society. They have -attained national independence. Whereas -in Vienna or Budapest they treat every one -bearing the name of Serb or Croatian with -blows and kicks, with court-martial justice -and the gallows.... There are seven and a -half million South Slavs who, as a result of -the victories in the Balkans, have grown -bolder than ever in demanding their political -rights. And if the imperial throne of -Austria continues to resist their impact, it will -topple over and the entire Empire with which -we have coupled our destiny will break to -pieces. For it is in line with historic -evolution that such national revolutions should -march onward to victory."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">If the international Social Democracy -together with its Servian contingent, offered -unyielding resistance to Servia's national claims, -it was certainly not out of any consideration for -the historic rights of Austria-Hungary to -oppress and disintegrate the nationalities living -within her borders; and most certainly not out -of consideration for the liberating mission of -the Hapsburgs. Until August, 1914, no one, -except the black and yellow hirelings of the -press, dared to breathe a word about that. The -Socialists were influenced in their course of -conduct by entirely different motives. First of -all, the proletariat, although by no means -disputing the historic right of Servia to strive for -national unity, could not trust the solution of -this problem to the powers then controlling the -destinies of the Servian kingdom. And in the -second place--and this was for us the deciding -factor--the international Social Democracy -could not sacrifice the peace of Europe to the -national cause of the Serbs, recognizing, as it -did, that, except for a European revolution, -the only way such unity could be achieved was -through a European war.</p> -<p class="pnext">But from the moment Austria-Hungary -carried the question of her own fate and that of -Servia to the battlefield, Socialists could no -longer have the slightest doubt that social and -national progress would be hit much harder in -Southeastern Europe by a Hapsburg victory -than by a Servian victory. To be sure, there -was still no reason for us Socialists to identify -our cause with the aims of the Servian army. -This was the idea that animated the Servian -Socialists, Ljaptchevitch and Katzlerovitch, -when they took the manly stand of voting -against the war credits.<a class="footnote-reference" href="#id4" id="id3"><sup>2</sup></a> But surely we had -still less reason to support the purely dynastic -rights of the Hapsburgs and the imperialistic -interests of the feudal-capitalistic cliques -against the national struggle of the Serbs. At -all events, the Austro-Hungarian Social -Democracy, which now invokes its blessings upon -the sword of the Hapsburgs for the liberation -of the Poles, the Ukrainians, the Finns and -the Russian people, must first of all clarify its -ideas on the Servian question, which it has -gotten so hopelessly muddled.</p> -<p class="pnext">The question at issue, however, is not -confined to the fate of the ten million Serbs. The -clash of the European nations has brought up -the entire Balkan question anew. The Peace -of Bucharest, signed in 1903, has solved neither -the national nor the international problems in -the Near East. It has only intensified the -added confusion resulting from the two -unfinished Balkan Wars, unfinished because of the -complete temporary exhaustion of the nations -participating in it.</p> -<p class="pnext">Roumania had followed in the path of -Austro-Hungarian politics, despite the -Romanesque sympathies of its population, -especially in the cities. This was due not so much -to dynastic causes, to the fact that a -Hohenzollern prince occupied the throne, as to the -imminent danger of a Russian invasion. In -1879 the Russian Czar, as thanks for -Roumania's support in the Russo-Turkish war of -"liberation," cut off a slice of Roumanian -territory, the province of Bessarabia. This -eloquent deed provided a sufficient backing to the -dynastic sympathies of the Hohenzollern in -Bucharest. But the Magyar-Hapsburg clique -succeeded in incensing the Roumanian people -against them by their denationalizing policy in -Transylvania, which has a population of three -million Roumanians as against three-fourths of -a million in the Russian province of Bessarabia; -and they further antagonized them by their -commercial treaties, which were dictated by the -interests of the large Austro-Hungarian -land-owners. So that Roumania's entrance into the -War on the side of the Czar, despite the -courageous and active agitation against participation -in the War on either side, carried on by the -Socialist party under the leadership of my -friends Gherea and Rakowsky, is to be -laid altogether at the door of the ruling class -of Austria-Hungary, who are reaping the -harvest they have sown here as well as elsewhere.</p> -<p class="pnext">But the matter is not disposed of by fixing -the historical responsibility. To-morrow, in a -month, in a year or more the War will bring to -the foreground the whole question of the -destiny of the Balkan peoples and of -Austria-Hungary, and the proletariat will have to have -its answer to this question. European -democracy in the nineteenth century looked with -distrust at the Balkan people's struggle for -independence, because it feared that Russia might -be strengthened at the expense of Turkey. On -this subject Karl Marx wrote in 1853, on the -eve of the Crimean War:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"It may be said that the more firmly -established Servia and the Servian nationality is -the more the direct influence of Russia on the -Turkish Slavs is shoved into the background. -For in order to be able to assert its peculiar -position as a state, Servia had to import its -political institutions, its schools ... from -Western Europe."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">This prophecy has been brilliantly fulfilled -in what has actually happened in Bulgaria, -which was created by Russia as an outpost on -the Balkans. As soon as Bulgaria was fairly -well established as a national state, it developed -a strong anti-Russian party, under the -leadership of Russia's former pupil, Stambulov, and -this party was able to stamp its iron seal upon -the entire foreign policy of the young country. -The whole mechanism of the political parties -in Bulgaria is so constructed as to enable it to -steer between the two European combinations -without being absolutely forced into the -channel of either, unless it chooses to enter it of its -own accord. Roumania went with the -Austro-German alliance, Servia, since 1903, with -Russia, because the one was menaced directly by -Russia, the other by Austria. The more -independent the countries of Southeast Europe are -from Austria-Hungary, the more effectively -they will be able to protect their independence -against Czarism.</p> -<p class="pnext">The balance of power in the Balkans, created -by the Congress of Berlin in 1879, was full of -contradictions. Cut up by artificial -ethnographical boundaries, placed under the control -of imported dynasties from German nurseries, -bound hand and foot by the intrigues of the -Great Powers, the peoples of the Balkans could -not cease their efforts for further national -freedom and unity. The national politics of -independent Bulgaria was naturally directed -towards Macedonia, populated by Bulgarians. -The Berlin Congress had left it under Turkish -rule. On the other hand, Servia had practically -nothing to look for in Turkey with the -exception of the little strip of land, the sandbag -Novy Bazar. Its national interests lay on the -other side of the Austro-Hungarian boundary, -in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia and -Dalmatia. Roumania had no interests in the -south, where it is separated from European -Turkey by Servia and Bulgaria. Roumania's -expansion policy was directed towards the -northwest and east, towards Hungarian -Transylvania and Russian Bessarabia. Finally, the -national expansion of Greece, like that of -Bulgaria, collided with Turkey.</p> -<p class="pnext">Austro-German politics, aiming at the -artificial preservation of European Turkey, broke -down not on account of the diplomatic -intrigues of Russia, although these of course -were not lacking. It broke down because of -the inevitable course of evolution. The Balkan -Peninsula had entered on the path of capitalist -development, and it was this fact that raised -the question of the self-determination of the -Balkan peoples as national states to the -historical issue of the day.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Balkan War disposed of European -Turkey, and thereby created the conditions -necessary for the solution of the Bulgarian and -Greek questions. But Servia and Roumania, -whose national completion could only be -achieved at the expense of Austria-Hungary, -found themselves checked in their efforts at -expansion southwards, and were compensated at -the expense of what racially belonged to -Bulgaria--Servia in Macedonia, and Roumania in -Dobrudja. This is the meaning of the second -Balkan War and the Peace of Bucharest by -which it was concluded.</p> -<p class="pnext">The mere existence of Austria-Hungary, -this Turkey of Middle Europe, blocks the way -to the natural self-determination of the -peoples of the Southeast. It compels them to keep -constantly fighting against each other, to seek -support against each other from the outside, -and so makes them the tool of the political -combinations of the Great Powers. It was only in -such chaos that Czaristic diplomacy was -enabled to spin the web of its Balkan politics, the -last thread of which was Constantinople. And -only a federation of the Balkan states, both -economic and military, can interpose an -invincible barrier to the greed of Czarism.</p> -<p class="pnext">Now that European Turkey has been disposed -of, it is Austria-Hungary that stands in -the way of a federation of the Balkan states. -Roumania, Bulgaria, and Servia would have -found their natural boundaries, and would -have united with Greece and Turkey, on the -basis of common economic interests, into a -league of defense. This would finally have -brought peace to the Balkan Peninsula, that -witches' cauldron which periodically threatened -Europe with explosions, until it drew it into -the present catastrophe.</p> -<p class="pnext">Up to a certain time the Socialists had to -reconcile themselves to the routine way in which -the Balkan question was treated by capitalistic -diplomats, who in their conferences and secret -agreements stopped up one hole only to open -another, even wider one. So long as this -dilatory method kept postponing the final -solution, the Socialist International could hope that -the settlement of the Hapsburg succession -would be a matter not for a European war, but -for the European Revolution. But now that -the War has destroyed the equilibrium of the -whole of Europe, and the predatory Powers -are seeking to remodel the map of Europe--not -on the basis of national democratic principles, -but of military strength--the Social -Democracy must come to a clear comprehension -of the fact that one of the chief obstacles to -freedom, peace and progress, in addition to -Czarism and German militarism, is the -Hapsburg Monarchy as a state organization. The -crime of the Galician Socialist group under -Daszynski consisted not only in placing the -Polish cause above the cause of Socialism, but -also in linking the fate of Poland with the fate -of the Austro-Hungarian armies and the fate -of the Hapsburg Monarchy.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Socialist proletariat of Europe cannot -adopt such a solution of the question. For us -the question of united and independent Poland -is on a par with the question of united and -independent Servia. We cannot and we will not -permit the Polish question to be solved by -methods which will perpetuate the chaos at -present prevailing in Southeastern Europe, in -fact through the whole of Europe. For us -Socialists the independence of Poland means -its independence on both fronts, on the -Romanoff front and on the Hapsburg front. We not -only wish the Polish people to be free from the -oppression of Czarism. We wish also that the -fate of the Servian people shall not be -dependent upon the Polish nobility in Galicia.</p> -<p class="pnext">For the present we need not consider what -the relations of an independent Poland will be -to Bohemia, Hungary and the Balkan Federation. -But it is perfectly clear that a complex -of medium-sized and small states on the -Danube and in the Balkan Peninsula will -constitute a far more effective bar to the Czaristic -designs on Europe than the weak, chaotic -Austro-Hungarian State, which proves its right to -existence only by its continued attempts upon -the peace of Europe.</p> -<p class="pnext">In the article of 1853, quoted above, Marx -wrote as follows on the Eastern question:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"We have seen that the statesmen of -Europe, in their obdurate stupidity, petrified -routine, and hereditary intellectual indolence, -recoil from every attempt at answering the -question of what is to become of Turkey in -Europe. The driving force that favors -Russia's advance towards Constantinople is the -very means by which it is thought to keep -her away from it, the empty theory, never -carried out, of maintaining the <em class="italics">status quo</em>. -What is this <em class="italics">status quo</em>? For the Christian -subjects of the Porte it means nothing else -than the perpetuation of their oppression by -Turkey. As long as they are under the yoke -of the Turkish rule, they look upon the head -of the Greek Church, the ruler of 60 million -Greek Church Christians, as <em class="italics">their natural -protector and liberator</em>."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">What is here said of Turkey now applies in -a still greater degree to Austria-Hungary. -The solution of the Balkan question is -unthinkable without the solution of the -Austro-Hungarian question, as they are both -comprised in one and the same formula--the -Democratic Federation of the Danube and Balkan -Nations.</p> -<p class="pnext">"The governments with their old-fashioned -diplomacy," wrote Marx, "will never solve the -difficulty. Like the solution of so many other -problems, the Turkish problem, too, is -reserved for the European Revolution." This -statement holds just as good to-day as when it -was first written. But for the Revolution to -solve the difficulties that have piled up in the -course of centuries, the proletariat must have -its <em class="italics">own</em> programme for the solution of the -Austro-Hungarian question. And this -programme it must oppose just as strenuously to -the Czaristic greed of conquest as to the -cowardly and conservative efforts to maintain the -Austro-Hungarian <em class="italics">status quo</em>.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="austria-hungary">CHAPTER II</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">AUSTRIA-HUNGARY</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">Russian Czarism undoubtedly represents a -cruder and more barbarian form of state -organization than does the feebler absolutism of -Austria-Hungary, which has been mitigated by -the weakness of old age. But Russian -Czarism and the Russian state are by no means -identical. The destruction of Czarism does not -mean the disintegration of the state. On the -contrary it means its liberation and its strengthening. -All such assertions, as that it is necessary -to push Russia back into Asia, which -found an echo even in certain Social -Democratic organs, are based on a poor knowledge of -geography and ethnography. Whatever may -be the fate of various parts of present -Russia--Russian Poland, Finland, the Ukraine or -Bessarabia--European Russia will not cease to -exist as the national territory of a many-millioned -race that has made notable conquests -along the line of cultural development during -the last quarter century.</p> -<p class="pnext">Quite different is the case of Austria-Hungary. -As a state organization it is identical -with the Hapsburg Monarchy. It stands or -falls with the Hapsburgs, just as European -Turkey was identical with the feudal-military -Ottoman caste and fell when that caste fell. A -conglomerate of racial fragments centrifugal -in tendency, yet forced by a dynasty to stick -together, Austria-Hungary presents the most -reactionary picture in the very heart of Europe. -Its continuation after the present European -catastrophe would not only delay the -development of the Danube and Balkan peoples for -more decades to come and make a repetition of -the present War a practical certainty, but it -would also strengthen Czarism politically by -preserving its main source of spiritual nourishment.</p> -<p class="pnext">If the German Social Democracy reconciles -itself to the ruin of France by regarding it as -punishment for France's alliance with Czarism, -then we must ask that the same criterion be -applied to the German-Austrian alliance. And -if the alliance of the two Western democracies -with a despotic Czarism gives the lie to the -French and English press when they represent -the War as one of liberation, then is it not -equally arrogant, if not more so, for the -German Social Democracy to spread the banner of -liberty over the Hohenzollern army, the army -that is fighting not only <em class="italics">against</em> Czarism and -its allies but also <em class="italics">for</em> the entrenchment of the -Hapsburg Monarchy?</p> -<p class="pnext">Austria-Hungary is indispensable to -Germany, to the ruling class in Germany as we -know it. When the ruling Junker class threw -France into the arms of Czarism by the -forceful annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and -systematically embittered the relations with -England by rapidly increasing naval armaments; -when it repulsed all attempts at an understanding -with the Western democracies because such -an understanding would have implied the -democratization of Germany--then this ruling -class saw itself compelled to seek support from -the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a reserve -source of military strength against the enemies -in the East and the West.</p> -<p class="pnext">According to the German point of view the -mission of the Dual Monarchy was to place -Hungarian, Polish, Roumanian, Czech, -Ruthenian, Servian and Italian auxiliaries in the -service of the German military and Junker -policy. The ruling class in Germany had -easily reconciled itself to the expatriation of -ten to twelve millions of Germans, for these -twelve millions formed the kernel around which -the Hapsburgs united a non-German -population of more than forty million. A democratic -federation of independent Danube nations -would have made these peoples useless as allies -of German militarism. Only a monarchy, in -Austria-Hungary, a monarchy enforced by -militarism, would make that country of any -value as an ally to Junker Germany. The -indispensable condition for this alliance, -sanctified by the Nibelungen troth of dynasties, -was the military preparedness of Austria-Hungary, -a condition to be achieved in no other way -than by the mechanical suppression of the -centrifugal national tendencies.</p> -<p class="pnext">Since Austria-Hungary is surrounded on all -sides by states composed of the same races as -are within its own borders, its foreign policy -is necessarily intimately connected with its -internal policy. To keep seven million Serbs -and South Slavs within the frame of its own -military state, Austria-Hungary is compelled -to extinguish the hearthfire that kindles their -political leanings--the independent kingdom -of Servia.</p> -<p class="pnext">Austria's ultimatum to Servia was the -decisive step in this direction. "Austria-Hungary -took this step under the pressure of -necessity," wrote Eduard Bernstein in <em class="italics">Die -Sozialistische Monatshefte</em> (No. 16). To be sure -it was, if political events are considered from -the viewpoint of <em class="italics">dynastic</em> necessity.</p> -<p class="pnext">To defend the Hapsburg policy on the -ground of the low moral standard of the -Belgrade rulers is to close one's eyes to the fact -that the Hapsburgs did make friends with -Servia, but only when Servia was under the -most despicable government that the history of -the unfortunate Balkan Peninsula has known, -that is, when it had at its head an Austrian -agent, Milan. The reckoning with Servia came -so late because the efforts made at self-preservation -were too weak in the enfeebled organism -of the Dual Monarchy. But after the death of -the Archduke, the support and hope of the -Austrian military party--and of Berlin--Austria's -ally gave her a sharp dig in the ribs, -insisting upon a demonstration of firmness and -strength. Not only was Austria's ultimatum -to Servia approved of in advance by the rulers -of Germany, but, according to all information, -it was actually inspired from that quarter. The -evidence is plainly set forth in the very same -White Book which professional and amateur -diplomats offer as a document of the -Hohenzollern love of peace.</p> -<p class="pnext">After defining the aims of Greater Servian -propaganda and the machinations of Czarism -in the Balkans, the White Book states:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"Under such conditions Austria was -forced to the realization that it was not -compatible with the dignity or the self-preservation -of the Monarchy to look on at the doings -across the border and remain passive. The -Imperial Government informed us of this -view and asked for our opinion. We could -sincerely tell our ally that we agreed with -his estimate of the situation and could -assure him that any action he might find -necessary to put an end to the movement in -Servia against the Austrian Monarchy would -meet with our approval. In doing so, we -were well aware of the fact that eventual war -operations on the part of Austria-Hungary -might bring Russia into the field and might, -according to the terms of our alliance, -involve us in a war.</p> -<p class="pnext">"But in view of the vital interests of -Austria-Hungary that were at stake, we could -not advise our ally to show a leniency -incompatible with his dignity, or refuse him our -support in a moment of such grave portent. -We were the less able to do so because our -own interests also were vitally threatened by -the persistent agitation in Servia. If the -Serbs, aided by Russia and France, had -been allowed to go on endangering the -stability of our neighboring Monarchy, this -would have led to the gradual breakdown of -Austria and to the subjection of all the -Slavic races to the Russian rule. And this -in turn would have made the position of the -Germanic race in Central Europe quite -precarious. An Austria morally weakened, -breaking down before the advance of -Russian Pan-Slavism, would not be an ally with -whom we could reckon and on whom we -could depend, as we are obliged to depend, -in the face of the increasingly threatening -attitude of our neighbors to the East and the -West. We therefore left Austria a free -hand in its action against Servia."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The relation of the ruling class in Germany -to the Austro-Servian conflict is here fully and -clearly defined. It is not merely that -Germany was informed by the Austrian Government -of the latter's intentions, not merely that -she approved them, and not merely that she -accepted the consequences of fidelity to an ally. -No, Germany looked on Austria's aggression -as unavoidable, as a saving act for herself, and -actually made it <em class="italics">a condition of the continuance -of the alliance</em>. Otherwise, "Austria would not -be an ally with whom we could reckon."</p> -<p class="pnext">The German Marxists were fully aware of -this state of affairs and of the dangers lurking -in it. On June 29th, a day after the murder of -the Austrian Archduke, the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> wrote -as follows:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"The fate of our nation has been all too -closely knit with that of Austria as a result -of a bungling foreign policy. Our rulers -have made the alliance with Austria the basis -of our entire foreign policy. Yet it becomes -clearer every day that this alliance is a source -of weakness rather than of strength. The -<em class="italics">problem of Austria</em> threatens more and more -to become a <em class="italics">menace to the peace of Europe</em>."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">A month later, when the menace was about -to culminate in the dread actuality of war, on -July 28th, the chief organ of the German -Social Democracy wrote in equally definite terms. -"How shall the German proletariat act in the -face of such a senseless paroxysm?" it asked; -and then gave the answer: "<em class="italics">The German proletariat -is not in the least interested in the -preservation of the Austrian national chaos</em>."</p> -<p class="pnext">Quite the contrary. Democratic Germany is -far more interested in the disruption than in -the preservation of Austria-Hungary. A -disrupted Austria-Hungary would mean a gain -to Germany of an educated population of -twelve million and a capital city of the first -rank, Vienna. Italy would achieve national -completion, and would cease to play the rôle -of the incalculable factor that she always has -been in the Triple Alliance. An independent -Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, and a Balkan -Federation including a Roumania of ten -million inhabitants on the Russian frontier, would -be a mighty bulwark against Czarism. And -most important of all, a democratic Germany -with a population of 75,000,000 Germans could -easily, without the Hohenzollerns and the -ruling Junkers, come to an agreement with -France and England and could isolate -Czarism and condemn its foreign and internal -policies to complete impotence. A policy directed -towards this goal would indeed be a policy of -liberation for the people of Russia as well as -of Austria-Hungary. But such a policy -requires an essential preliminary condition, -namely, that the German people, instead of -entrusting the Hohenzollerns with the -liberation of other nations, should set about -liberating themselves from the Hohenzollerns.</p> -<p class="pnext">The attitude of the German and Austro-Hungarian -Social Democracy in this war is in -blatant contradiction to such aims. At the -present moment it seems convinced of the -necessity of preserving and strengthening the -Hapsburg Monarchy in the interests of -Germany or of the German nation. And it is -absolutely from this anti-democratic viewpoint--which -drives the blush of shame to the cheek of -every internationally minded Socialist--that -the <em class="italics">Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung</em> formulates the -historical meaning of the present War, when it -declares "it is primarily a war [of the Allies] -against the German spirit."</p> -<p class="pnext">"Whether diplomacy has acted wisely, -whether this has had to come, time alone can -decide. Now the fate of the German nation -is at stake! And there can be no hesitation, no -wavering! The German people are one in the -inflexible iron determination not to bend to the -yoke, and neither death nor devil can succeed"--and -so forth and so on. (<em class="italics">Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung</em>, -August 5th.) We will not offend the -political and literary taste of the reader by -continuing this quotation. Nothing is said here -about the mission of liberating other nations. -Here the object of the war is to preserve and -secure "German humanity."</p> -<p class="pnext">The defense of <em class="italics">German</em> culture, <em class="italics">German</em> -soil, <em class="italics">German</em> humanity seems to be the -mission not only of the German army but of the -Austro-Hungarian army as well. Serb must -fight against Serb, Pole against Pole, -Ukranian against Ukranian, for the sake of -"<em class="italics">German</em> humanity." The forty million -non-German nationalities of Austria-Hungary are -considered as simply historical manure for the field -of German culture. That this is not the -standpoint of international Socialism, it is not -necessary to point out. It is not even pure national -democracy in its most elementary form. The -Austro-Hungarian General Staff explains -this "humanity" in its communiqué of -September 18th: "All peoples of our revered -monarchy, as our military oath says, 'against any -enemy no matter whom,' must stand together -as one, vying with one another in courage."</p> -<p class="pnext">The <em class="italics">Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung</em> accepts in its -entirety this Hapsburg-Hohenzollern -viewpoint of the Austro-Hungarian problem as an -unnational military reservoir. It is the same -attitude as the militarists of France have -toward the Senegalese and the Moroccans, and -the English have toward the Hindus. And -when we consider that such opinions are not a -new phenomenon among the German Socialists -of Austria, we have found the main reason why -the Austrian Social Democracy broke up so -miserably into national groups, and thus -reduced its political importance to a minimum.</p> -<p class="pnext">The disintegration of the Austrian Social -Democracy into national parts fighting among -themselves, is one expression of the inadequacy -of Austria as a state organization. At the same -time the attitude of the German-Austrian -Social Democracy proved that it was itself the -sorry victim of this inadequacy, to which it -capitulated spiritually. When it proved itself -impotent to unite the many-raced Austrian -proletariat under the principles of -Internationalism, and finally gave up this task -altogether, the Austro-German Social Democracy -subordinated all Austria-Hungary and even -its own policies to the "Idea" of Prussian -Junker Nationalism. This utter denial of -principles speaks to us in an unprecedented -manner from the pages of the <em class="italics">Wiener -Arbeiter-Zeitung</em>. But if we listen more carefully to -the tones of this hysterical nationalism we -cannot fail to hear a graver voice, the voice of -history telling us that the path of political -progress for Central and Southeastern Europe -leads over the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian -Monarchy.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="the-war-against-czarism">CHAPTER III</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">But how about Czarism? Would not Germany's -and Austria's victory mean the defeat -of Czarism? And would not the beneficent -results of the defeat of Czarism greatly -outbalance the beneficent results of a dismembered -Austria-Hungary?</p> -<p class="pnext">The German and Austrian Social Democrats -lay much stress upon this question in the -arguing they do about the War. The crushing -of a small neutral country, the ruin of France--all -this is justified by the need to fight -Czarism. Haase gives as the reason for voting the -war credits the necessity of "defense against -the danger of Russian despotism." Bernstein -goes back to Marx and Engels and quotes old -texts for his slogan, "Settling with Russia!"</p> -<p class="pnext">Südekum, dissatisfied with the result of his -Italian mission, says that what the Italians are -to blame for is not understanding Czarism. -And when the Social Democrats of Vienna and -Budapest fall in line under the Hapsburg -banner in its "holy war" against the Servians -struggling for their national unity, they -sacrifice their Socialistic honor to the necessity for -fighting Czarism.</p> -<p class="pnext">And the Social Democrats are not alone in -this. The entire bourgeois German press has -no other aims, for the moment, than the -annihilation of the Russian autocracy, which -oppresses the peoples of Russia and menaces the -freedom of Europe.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Imperial Chancellor denounces France -and England as vassals of Russian despotism. -Even the German Major-General von -Morgen, assuredly a true and tried "friend of -liberty and independence," calls on the Poles to -rebel against the despotism of the Czar.</p> -<p class="pnext">But for us who have gone through the school -of historical materialism it would be a disgrace -if we did not perceive the actual relations of the -interests in spite of these phrases, these lies, -this boasting, this foul vulgarity and stupidity.</p> -<p class="pnext">No one can genuinely believe that the -German reactionaries really do cherish such a -hatred of Czarism, and are aiming their blows -against it. On the contrary, after the War -Czarism will be the same to the rulers of -Germany that it was before the War--the most -closely related form of government. Czarism -is indispensable to the Germany of the -Hohenzollerns, for two reasons. In the first place, it -weakens Russia economically, culturally and -militaristically, and so prevents its -development as an imperialistic rival. In the second -place, the existence of Czarism strengthens the -Hohenzollern Monarchy and the Junker -oligarchy, since if there were no Czarism, German -absolutism would face Europe as the last -mainstay of feudal barbarism.</p> -<p class="pnext">German absolutism never has concealed the -interest of blood relationship that it has in the -maintenance of Czarism, which represents the -same social form though in more shameless -ways. Interests, tradition, sympathies draw -the German reactionary element to the side -Czarism. "Russia's sorrow is Germany's -sorrow." At the same time the Hohenzollerns, -behind the back of Czarism, can make a show of -being the bulwark of culture "against barbarism," -and can succeed in fooling their own -people if not the rest of Western Europe.</p> -<p class="pnext">"With sincere sorrow I see a friendship -broken that Germany has kept faithfully," -said William II. in his speech upon the -declaration of war, referring neither to France -nor to England, but to Russia, or rather, to -the Russian dynasty, in accordance with the -Hohenzollern's Russian religion, as Marx -would have said.</p> -<p class="pnext">We are told that Germany's political plan -is to create, on the one hand, a basis of -rapprochement with France and England by a -victory over those countries, and, on the other -hand, to utilize a strategic victory over France -in order to crush Russian despotism.</p> -<p class="pnext">The German Social Democrats must either -have inspired William and his chancellor with -this plan, or else must have ascribed this plan -to William and his chancellor.</p> -<p class="pnext">As a matter of fact, however, the political -plans of the German reactionaries are of -exactly the opposite character, must necessarily -be of the opposite character.</p> -<p class="pnext">For the present we will leave open the -question of whether the destructive blow at France -was dictated by strategic considerations, and -whether "strategy" sanctioned defensive tactics -on the Western front. But one thing is -certain, that not to see that the policy of the -Junkers required the ruin of France, is to prove -that one has a reason for keeping one's eyes -closed. France--France is the enemy!</p> -<p class="pnext">Eduard Bernstein, who is sincerely trying to -justify the political stand taken by the German -Social Democracy, draws the following -conclusions: Were Germany under a democratic -rule, there would be no doubt as to how to -settle accounts with Czarism. A democratic -Germany would conduct a revolutionary war on -the East. It would call on the nations -oppressed by Russia to resist the tyrant and -would give them the means wherewith to wage -a powerful fight for freedom. [Quite -right!] However, Germany is not a democracy, and -therefore it would be a utopian dream -[Exactly!] to expect any such policy with all its -consequences from Germany as she is. -(<em class="italics">Vorwärts</em>, August 28.) Very well then! But -right here Bernstein suddenly breaks off his -analysis of the actual German policy "with all -its consequences." After showing up the -blatant contradiction in the position of the -German Social Democracy, he closes with the -unexpected hope that a reactionary Germany -may accomplish what none but a revolutionary -Germany could accomplish. <em class="italics">Credo quid absurdum</em>.</p> -<p class="pnext">Nevertheless, it might be said in opposition -to this that while the ruling class in Germany -has naturally no interest in fighting Czarism, -still Russia is now Germany's enemy, and, -quite independently of the will of the -Hohenzollerns, the victory of Germany over Russia -might result in the great weakening, if not the -complete overthrow of Czarism. Long live -Hindenburg, the great unconscious instrument -of the Russian Revolution, we might cry along -with the Chemnitz <em class="italics">Volksstimme</em>. Long live -the Prussian Crown Prince--also a quite -unconscious instrument. Long live the Sultan -of Turkey who is now serving in the cause of -the Revolution by bombarding the Russian -cities around the Black Sea. Happy Russian -Revolution--how quickly the ranks of her -army are growing!</p> -<p class="pnext">However, let us see if there is not something -really to be said on this side of the question. -Is it not possible that the defeat of Czarism -might actually aid the cause of the Revolution?</p> -<p class="pnext">As to such a <em class="italics">possibility</em>, there is nothing to -be said against it. The Mikado and his -Samurai were not in the least interested in freeing -Russia, yet the Russo-Japanese War gave a -powerful impetus to the revolutionary events -that followed.</p> -<p class="pnext">Consequently similar results may be -expected from the German-Russian War.</p> -<p class="pnext">But to place the right political estimate upon -these historical possibilities we must take the -following circumstances into consideration.</p> -<p class="pnext">Those who believe that the Russo-Japanese -War brought on the Revolution neither know -nor understand historical events and their -relations. The war merely hastened the -outbreak of the Revolution; but for that very -reason it also weakened it. For had the -Revolution developed as a result of the organic growth -of inner forces, it would have come later, but -would have been far stronger and more -systematic. Therefore, revolution has no real -interest in war. This is the first consideration. -And the second thing is, that while the -Russo-Japanese War weakened Czarism, it strengthened -Japanese militarism. The same considerations -apply in a still higher degree to the -present German-Russian War.</p> -<p class="pnext">In the course of 1912-1914 Russia's -enormous industrial development once for all -pulled the country out of its state of -counter-revolutionary depression.</p> -<p class="pnext">The growth of the revolutionary movement -on the foundation of the economic and political -condition of the laboring masses, the growth of -opposition in broad strata of the population, -led to a new period of storm and stress. But in -contrast to the years 1902-1905, this movement -developed in a far more conscious, systematic -manner, and, what is more, was based on a far -broader social foundation. It needed time to -mature, but it did not need the lances of the -Prussian Samurai. On the contrary, the -Prussian Samurai gave the Czar the opportunity of -playing the rôle of defender of the Serbs, the -Belgians and the French.</p> -<p class="pnext">If we presuppose a catastrophal Russian -defeat, the war <em class="italics">may</em> bring a quicker outbreak of -the Revolution, but at the cost of its inner -weakness. And if the Revolution should even gain -the upper hand under such circumstances, then -the bayonets of the Hohenzollern armies would -be turned on the Revolution. Such a prospect -can hardly fail to paralyze Russia's revolutionary -forces; for it is impossible to deny the fact -that the party of the German proletariat stands -behind the Hohenzollern bayonets. But this -is only one side of the question. The defeat of -Russia necessarily presupposes decisive -victories by Germany and Austria on the other -battlefields, and this would mean the enforced -preservation of the national-political chaos in -Central and Southeastern Europe and the -unlimited mastery of German militarism in all -Europe.</p> -<p class="pnext">An enforced disarmament for France, -billions in indemnities, enforced tariff walls -around the conquered nations, and an enforced -commercial treaty with Russia, all this in -conjunction would make German imperialism -master of the situation for many decades.</p> -<p class="pnext">Germany's new policy, which began with the -capitulation of the party of the proletariat to -nationalistic militarism, would be strengthened -for years to come. The German working -class would feed itself, materially and -spiritually, on the crumbs from the table of -victorious imperialism, while the cause of the -Social Revolution would have received a mortal -blow.</p> -<p class="pnext">That in such circumstances a Russian revolution, -even if temporarily successful, would be -an historical miscarriage, needs no further -proof.</p> -<p class="pnext">Consequently, this present battling of the -nations under the yoke of militarism laid upon -them by the capitalistic classes contains within -itself monstrous contrasts which neither the -War itself nor the governments directing it -can solve in any way to the interest of future -historical development. The Social Democrats -could not, and can not now, combine their -aims with any of the historical possibilities of -this War, that is, with either the victory of the -Triple Alliance or the victory of the Entente.</p> -<p class="pnext">The German Social Democracy was once -well aware of this. The <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> in its issue -of July 28, discussing the very question of the -war against Czarism, said:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"But if it is not possible to localize the -trouble, if Russia should step into the field? -What should our attitude toward Czarism -be then? Herein lies the great difficulty of -the situation. Has not the moment come -to strike a death blow at Czarism? If -German troops cross the Russian frontier, will -that not mean the victory of the Russian -Revolution?"</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">And the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> comes to the following -conclusion:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"Are we so sure that it <em class="italics">will</em> mean victory -to the Russian Revolution if German troops -cross the Russian frontier? It may readily -bring the collapse of Czarism, but will not -the German armies fight a revolutionary -Russia with even greater energy, with a -keener desire for victory, than they do the -absolutistic Russia?"</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">More than this. On August 3, on the eve of -the historical session of the Reichstag, the -<em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> wrote in an article entitled "The War -upon Czarism":</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"While the conservative press is accusing -the strongest party in the Empire of high -treason, to the rejoicing of other countries, -there are other elements endeavoring to -prove to the Social Democracy that the -impending war is really an old Social -Democratic demand. War against Russia, war -upon the blood-stained and faithless -Czarism--this last is a recent phrase of the press -which once kissed the knout--isn't this what -Social Democracy has been asking for from -the beginning? ...</p> -<p class="pnext">"These are literally the arguments used -by one portion of the bourgeois press, in fact -the more intelligent portion, and it only goes -to show what importance is attached to the -opinion of that part of the German people -which stands behind the Social Democracy. -The slogan no longer is 'Russia's sorrow is -Germany's sorrow.' Now it is 'Down with -Czarism!' But since the days when the -leaders of the Social Democracy referred to -[Bebel, Lassalle, Engels, Marx] demanded -a democratic war against Russia, Russia has -quite ceased to be the mere palladium of -reaction. Russia is also the seat of revolution. -The overthrow of Czarism is now the task of -all the Russian people, especially the -Russian proletariat, and it is just the last weeks -that have shown how vigorously this very -working class in Russia is attacking the task -that history has laid upon it.... And all -the nationalistic attempts of the 'True -Russians' to turn the hatred of the masses away -from Czarism and arouse a reactionary -hatred against foreign countries, particularly -Germany, have failed so far. The Russian -proletariat knows too well that its enemy is -not beyond the border but within its own -land. Nothing was more distasteful to these -nationalistic agitators, the True Russians -and Pan-Slavists, than the news of the great -peace demonstration of the German Social -Democracy. Oh, how they would have -rejoiced had the contrary been the case, had -they been able to say to the Russian -proletariat, 'There, you see, the German Social -Democrats stand at the head of those who -are inciting the war against Russia!' And -the Little Father in St. Petersburg would -also have breathed a sigh of relief and said, -'That is the news I wanted to hear. Now -the backbone of my most dangerous enemy, -the Russian Revolution, is broken. The -international solidarity of the proletariat is -torn. Now I can unchain the beast of -nationalism. I am saved!"</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">Thus wrote the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> after Germany -had already declared war on Russia.</p> -<p class="pnext">These words characterize the honest manly -stand of the proletariat against a belligerent -jingoism. The <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> clearly understood -and cleverly stigmatized the base hypocrisy of -the knout-loving ruling class of Germany, -which suddenly became conscious of its mission -to free Russia from Czarism. The <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> -warned the German working class of the -political extortion that the bourgeois press would -practise on their revolutionary conscience. -"Do not believe these friends of the knout," -the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> said to the German proletariat. -"They are hungry for your souls, and hide their -imperialistic designs behind liberal-sounding -phrases. They are deceiving you--you, the -cannon-fodder with souls that they need. If -they succeed in winning you over, they will -only be helping Czarism by dealing the -Russian Revolution a fearful moral blow. And if, -in spite of this, the Russian Revolution should -raise its head, these very people will help -Czarism to crush it."</p> -<p class="pnext">That is the sense of what the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> -preached to the working class up to the 4th of -August.</p> -<p class="pnext">And exactly three weeks later the same -<em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> wrote:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">"Liberation from Muscovitism (?), -freedom and independence for Poland and -Finland, free development for the great Russian -people themselves, dissolution of the -unnatural alliance between two cultural nations -and Czaristic barbarism--these were the -aims that inspired the German people and -made them ready for any sacrifice,"</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">and inspired also the German Social -Democracy and its chief organ.</p> -<p class="pnext">What happened in those three weeks to cause -the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> to repudiate its original standpoint?</p> -<p class="pnext">What happened? Nothing of importance. -The German armies strangled neutral -Belgium, burned down a number of Belgian towns, -destroyed Louvain, the inhabitants of which -had been so criminally audacious as to fire at -the armed invaders when they themselves wore -no helmets and waving feathers.<a class="footnote-reference" href="#id6" id="id5"><sup>3</sup></a> In those -three weeks the German armies carried death -and destruction into French territory, and the -troops of their ally, Austria-Hungary, -pounded the love of the Hapsburg Monarchy -into the Serbs on the Save and the Drina. -These are the facts that apparently convinced -the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> that the Hohenzollerns were -waging the war of liberation of the nations.</p> -<p class="pnext">Neutral Belgium was crushed, and the Social -Democrats remained silent. And Richard -Fischer was sent to Switzerland as special -envoy of the Party to explain to the people of a -neutral country that the violation of Belgian -neutrality and the ruin of a small nation were -a perfectly natural phenomenon. Why so -much excitement? Any other European -government, in Germany's place, would have -acted in the same way. It was just at this time -that the German Social Democracy not only -reconciled itself to the War as a work of real -or supposed national defense, but even -surrounded the Hohenzollern-Hapsburg armies -with the halo of an offensive campaign for -freedom. What an unprecedented fall for a party -that for fifty years had taught the German -working class to look upon the German -Government as the foe of liberty and democracy!</p> -<p class="pnext">In the meantime every day of the War -discloses the danger to Europe that the Marxists -should have foreseen at once. The chief blows -of the German government were not aimed at -the East, but at the West, at Belgium, France -and England. Even if we accept the -improbable premise that nothing but strategic -necessity determined this plan of campaign, the -logical political outcome of this strategy remains -with all its consequences, that is, the necessity -for a full and definite defeat of Belgium, -France and the English land forces, so that -Germany's hands might be free to deal with -Russia. Wasn't it perfectly clear that what -was at first represented as a temporary -measure of strategic necessity in order to soothe the -German Social Democracy, would become an -end in itself through the force of events? The -more stubborn the resistance made by France, -whose duty it has actually become to defend -its territory and its independence against the -German attack, the more certainly will the -German armies be held on the Western front; -and the more exhausted Germany is on the -Western front, the less strength and -inclination will remain for her supposedly main task, -the task with which the Social Democracy -credited her, the "settling with Russia." And then -history will witness an "honorable" peace -between the two most reactionary powers of -Europe, between Nicholas, to whom fate -granted cheap victories over the Hapsburg -Monarchy,<a class="footnote-reference" href="#id8" id="id7"><sup>4</sup></a> rotten to its core, and William, -who had his "settling," but with Belgium, not -with Russia.</p> -<p class="pnext">The alliance between Hohenzollern and -Romanoff--after the exhaustion and -degradation of the Western nations--will mean a -period of the darkest reaction in Europe and -the whole world.</p> -<p class="pnext">The German Social Democracy by its -present policy smooths the way for this awful -danger. And the danger will become an -actuality unless the European proletariat interferes -and enters as a revolutionary factor into the -plans of the dynasties and the capitalistic governments.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="the-war-against-the-west">CHAPTER IV</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">On his return from his diplomatic trip to -Italy, Dr. Südekum wrote in the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> -that the Italian comrades did not sufficiently -comprehend the nature of Czarism. We agree -with Dr. Südekum that a German can more -easily understand the nature of Czarism as he -experiences daily, in his own person, the -nature of Prussian-German absolutism. The two -"natures" are very closely akin to each other.</p> -<p class="pnext">German absolutism represents a -feudal-monarchical organization, resting upon a -mighty capitalist foundation, which the -development of the last half-century has erected for -it. The strength of the German army, as we -have learned to know it anew in its present -bloody work, consists not alone in the great -material and technical resources of the nation, -and in the intelligence and precision of the -workman-soldier, who had been drilled in the -school of industry and his own class organizations. -It has its foundation also in its Junker -officer caste, with its master class traditions, its -oppression of those who are below and its -subordination to those who are above. The -German army, like the German state, is a -feudal-monarchical organization with inexhaustible -capitalistic resources. The bourgeois -scribblers may chatter all they want about the -supremacy of the German, the man of duty, over -the Frenchman, the man of pleasure; the real -difference lies not in the racial qualities, but -in the social and political conditions. The -standing army, that closed corporation, that -self-sufficing state within the state, remains, -despite universal military service, a caste -organization that in order to thrive must have -artificial distinctions of rank and a monarchical -top to crown the commanding hierarchy.</p> -<p class="pnext">In his work, "The New Army," Jaurès -showed that the only army France could have -is an army of defense built on the plan of -arming every citizen, that is, a democratic army, a -<em class="italics">militia</em>. The bourgeois French Republic is -now paying the penalty for having made her -army a counterpoise to her democratic state -organization. She created, in Jaurès' words, -"a bastard régime in which antiquated forms -clashed with newly developing forms and -neutralized each other." This incongruity between -the standing army and the republican régime is -the fundamental weakness of the French -military system.</p> -<p class="pnext">The reverse is true of Germany. Germany's -barbarian retrograde political system gives her -a great military supremacy. The German -bourgeoisie may grumble now and then when -the pretorian caste spirit of the officers' corps -leads to outbreaks like that of Zabern. They -may make wry faces at the Crown Prince and -his slogan, "Give it to them! Give it to -them!" The German Social Democracy may inveigh -ever so sharply against the systematic personal -ill-treatment of the German soldier which has -caused proportionately double the number of -suicides in the German barracks of that in any -other country. But for all that, the fact that -the German bourgeoisie has absolutely no -political character and that the German Socialist -party has failed to inspire the proletariat with -the revolutionary spirit has enabled the ruling -class to erect the gigantic structure of -militarism, and so place the efficient and intelligent -German workmen under the command of the -Zabern heroes and their slogan, "Give it to them!"</p> -<p class="pnext">Professor Hans Delbrück seeks the source -of Germany's military strength in the ancient -model of the Teutoburgerwald, and he is -perfectly justified.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"The oldest Germanic system of warfare," -he writes, "was based on the retinue of -princes, a body of specially selected warriors, -and the mass of fighters comprising the -entire nation. This is the system we have -to-day also. How vastly different are the -methods of fighting now from those of our -ancestors in the Teutoburgerwald! We have -the technical marvels of modern machine -guns. We have the wonderful organization -of immense masses of troops. And yet, our -military system is at bottom the same. The -martial spirit is raised to its highest power, -developed to its utmost in a body which once -was small but now numbers many thousands, -a body giving fealty to their War Lord, and -by him, as by the princes of old, regarded as -his comrades; and under their leadership the -whole people, educated by them and -disciplined by them. <em class="italics">Here we have the secret of -the warlike character of the German nation</em>."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The French Major, Driant, looks on at the -German Kaiser in his White Cuirassier's -uniform, undoubtedly the most imposing military -uniform in the world, and republican by -constraint that he is, his heart is filled with a lover's -jealousy. And how the Kaiser spends his time -"in the midst of his army, that true family of -the Hohenzollerns!" The Major is fascinated.</p> -<p class="pnext">The feudal caste, whose hour of political and -moral decay had struck long ago, found its -connection with the nation once more in the -fertile soil of imperialism. And this connection -with the nation has taken such deep root that -the prophecies of Major Driant, written -several years ago, have actually come -true--prophecies that until now could only have -appeared as either the poisonous promptings of -a secret Bonapartist, or the drivellings of a -lunatic.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"The Kaiser," he wrote, "is the -Commander in Chief ... and behind him stands -the entire working class of Germany as one -man.... Bebel's Social Democrats are in -the ranks, their fingers on the trigger, and -they too think only of the welfare of the -Fatherland. The ten-billion war indemnity -that France will have to pay will be a greater -help to them than the Socialist chimeras on -which they fed the day before."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">Yes, and now they are writing of this future -indemnity even in some <em class="italics">Social Democratic (!)</em> -papers, with open rowdy insolence--an indemnity, -however, not of ten billions, but of twenty -or thirty billions.</p> -<p class="pnext">Germany's victory over France--a deplorable -strategic necessity, according to the -German Social Democrats--would mean not only -the defeat of France's standing army; it would -mean primarily the victory of the feudal-monarchical -state over the democratic-republican state.</p> -<p class="pnext">For the ancient race of Hindenburgs, -Moltkes and Klucks, hereditary specialists in -mass-murder, are just as indispensable a -condition of German victory as are the 42 -centimeter guns, the last word in human technical -skill.</p> -<p class="pnext">The entire capitalist press is already talking -of the unshakable stability of the German -Monarchy, strengthened by the war. And -German professors, the same who proclaimed -Hindenburg a doctor of All the Sciences, are -already declaring that political slavery is a -higher form of social life.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"The democratic republics, and the so-called -monarchies that are under subjection -to a parliamentary régime, and all the other -beautiful things that were so extolled--what -little capacity they have shown to stand the -storm!"</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">These are the things that the German -professors are writing now.</p> -<p class="pnext">It is shameful and humiliating enough to -read the expressions of the French Socialists, -who had proved themselves too weak to break -the alliance of France with Russia or even to -prevent the return to three-years' military -service, but who, when the War began, nevertheless -donned their red trousers and set out to -free Germany. But we are seized with a -feeling of unspeakable indignation on reading the -German Socialist party press, which in the -language of exalted slaves extols the brave heroic -caste of hereditary oppressors for their armed -exploits on French territory.</p> -<p class="pnext">On August 15, 1870, when the victorious -German armies were approaching Paris, -Engels wrote in a letter to Marx, after describing -the confused condition of the French defense:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"Nevertheless, a revolutionary government, -if it comes soon, need not despair. But -it must leave Paris to its fate, and continue -to carry on the war from the south. It is -then still possible that such a government -may hold out until arms and ammunition -are bought and a new army organized with -which the enemy can be gradually pushed -back to the frontier. That would be the -right ending to the war--for both countries -to demonstrate that they cannot be conquered."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">And yet there are people who shout like -drunken helots, "On to Paris." And in doing -so they have the impudence to invoke the names -of Marx and Engels. In what measure are -they superior to the thrice despised Russian -liberals who crawled on their bellies before his -Excellency, the military Commander, who -introduced the Russian knout into East Galicia. -It is cowardly arrogance--this talk of the -purely "strategic" character of the War on the -Western front. Who takes any account of it? -Certainly not the German ruling classes. They -speak the language of conviction and of main -force. They call things by their right names. -They know what they want and they know how -to fight for it.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Social Democrats tell us that the War -is being waged for the cause of national -independence. "That is not true," retorted Herr -Arthur Dix.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"Just as the high politics of the last -century," wrote Dix, "owed its specially marked -character to the <em class="italics">National Idea</em>, so the -political-world events of this century stand under -the emblem of the <em class="italics">Imperialistic Idea</em>. The -imperialistic idea that is destined to give the -impetus, the scope and the goal to the -striving for power of the great (<em class="italics">Der -Weltwirtschaftskrieg</em>, 1914, p. 3).</p> -<p class="pnext">"It shows gratifying sagacity," says the -same Herr Arthur Dix, "on the part of -those who had charge of the military -preparations of the War, that the advance of our -armies against France and Russia in the -very first stage of the War took place -precisely where it was most important to keep -valuable German mineral wealth free from -foreign invasion, and to occupy such -portions of the enemy's territory as would -supplement our own underground resources" -(Ibid., p. 38).</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The "strategy," of which the Socialists now -speak in devout whispers, really begins its -activities with the robbery of mineral wealth.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Social Democrats tell us that the War -is a war of defense. But Herr Georg Irmer -says clearly and distinctly:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"People ought not to be talking as though -the German nation had come too late for -rivalry for world economy and world -dominion,--that the world has already been -divided. Has not the earth been divided over -and over again in all epochs of history?" -(<em class="italics">Los vom englischen Weltjoch</em>, 1914, p. 42.)</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The Socialists try to comfort us by telling -us that Belgium has only been temporarily -crushed and that the Germans will soon vacate -their Belgian quarters. But Herr Arthur Dix, -who knows very well what he wants, and who -has the right and the power to want it, writes -that what England fears most, and expressly -so, is that <em class="italics">Germany should have an outlet to -the Atlantic Ocean</em>.</p> -<p class="pnext">"For this very reason," he continues, "we -must neither <em class="italics">let Belgium go out of our hands</em>, -nor must we fail to make sure that the coast line -from Ostende to the Somme shall not again fall -into the hands of any state which may become a -political vassal of England. We must see to -it that in some form or other <em class="italics">German influence</em> -is securely established there."</p> -<p class="pnext">In the endless battles between Ostende and -Dunkirk, sacred "strategy" is now carrying -out this programme of the Berlin stock -exchange, also.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Socialists tell us that the War between -France and Germany is merely a brief prelude -to a lasting alliance between those countries. -But here, too, Herr Arthur Dix shows -Germany's cards. According to him, "there is but -one answer: <em class="italics">to seek to destroy the English -world trade, and to deal deadly blows at -English national economy</em>."</p> -<p class="pnext">"The aim for the foreign policy of the -German Empire for the next decades is clearly -indicated," Professor Franz von Liszt -announces. "'Protection against England,' that -must be our slogan" (<em class="italics">Ein mitteleuropäischer -Staatenverband</em>, 1914, p. 24).</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"We must crush the most treacherous and -malicious of our foes," cries a third. "We -must break the tyranny which England -exercises over the sea with base self-seeking and -shameless contempt of justice and right."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The War is directed not against Czarism, -but primarily against England's supremacy on -the sea.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"It may be said," Professor Schiehmann -confesses, "that no success of ours has given -us such joy as the defeat of the English at -Maubeuge and St. Quentin on August 28."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The German Social Democrats tell us that -the chief object of the War is the "settlement -with Russia." But plain, straightforward -Herr Rudolf Theuden wants to give Galicia to -Russia with North Persia thrown in. Then -Russia "would have got enough to be satisfied -for many decades to come. We may even make -her our friend by it."</p> -<p class="pnext">"What ought the War to bring us?" asks -Theuden, and then he answers:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"<em class="italics">The chief payment must be made us by -France</em>.... France must give us Belfort, -that part of Lorraine which borders on the -Moselle, and, in case of stubborn resistance, -that part as well which borders on the Maas. -If we make the Maas and the Moselle -German boundaries, the French will some day -perhaps wean themselves away from the idea -of making the Rhine a French boundary."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The bourgeois politicians and professors tell -us that England is the chief enemy; that -Belgium and France are the gateway to the -Atlantic Ocean; that the hope of a Russian -indemnity is only a Utopian dream, anyway; that -Russia would be more useful as friend than as -foe; that France will have to pay in land -and in gold--and the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> exhorts the -German workers to "hold out until the decisive -victory is ours."</p> -<p class="pnext">And yet the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> tells us that the War -is being waged for the independence of the -German nation, and for the liberation of the -Russian people. What does this mean? Of -course we must not look for ideas, logic and -truth where they do not exist. This is simply -a case of an ulcer of slavish sentiments -bursting open and foul pus crawling over the pages -of the workingmen's press. It is clear that the -oppressed class which proceeds too slowly and -inertly on its way toward freedom must in the -final hour drag all its hopes and promises -through mire and blood, before there arises -in its soul the pure, unimpeachable voice--the -voice of revolutionary honor.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="the-war-of-defense">CHAPTER V</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">THE WAR OF DEFENSE</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"The thing for us to do now is to avert -this danger [Russian despotism], and to -secure the culture and the independence of our -land. Thus we will make good our word, -and do what we have always said we would. -In the hour of danger we will not leave our -Fatherland in the lurch.... Guided by -these principles we vote for the war credits."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">This was the declaration of the German Social -Democratic fraction, read by Haase in the -Reichstag session of August 4.</p> -<p class="pnext">Here only the defense of the fatherland is -mentioned. Not a word is said of the -"liberating" mission of this War in behalf of the -peoples of Russia, which was later sung in every -key by the Social Democratic press. The logic -of the Socialist press, however, did not keep -pace with its patriotism. For while it made -desperate efforts to represent the War as one -of pure defense, to secure the safety of -Germany's possessions, it at the same time pictured -it as a revolutionary offensive war for the -liberation of Russia and of Europe from Czarism.</p> -<p class="pnext">We have already shown clearly enough why -the peoples of Russia had every reason to -decline with thanks the assistance offered them -at the point of the Hohenzollern bayonets. -But how about the "defensive" character of -the War?</p> -<p class="pnext">What surprises us even more than what is -said in the declaration of the Social Democracy -is what it conceals and leaves unsaid. After -Hollweg had already announced in the Reichstag -the accomplished violation of the neutrality -of Belgium and Luxemburg as a means of -attacking France, Haase does not mention this -fact in a single word. This silence is so -monstrous that one is tempted to read the -declaration a second and a third time. But in vain. -The declaration is written as though such -countries as Belgium, France and England had -never existed on the political map of the -German Social Democracy.</p> -<p class="pnext">But facts do not cease to be facts simply -because political parties shut their eyes to them. -And every member of the International has the -right to ask this question of Comrade Haase, -"What portion of the five billions voted by the -Social Democratic fraction was meant for the -destruction of Belgium?" It is quite possible -that in order to protect the German fatherland -from Russian despotism it was inevitable -that the Belgian fatherland should be crushed. -But why did the Social Democratic fraction -keep silent on this point?</p> -<p class="pnext">The reason is clear. The English Liberal -government, in its effort to make the War -popular with the masses, made its plea -exclusively on the ground of the necessity of -protecting the independence of Belgium and the -integrity of France, but utterly ignored its -alliance with Russian Czarism. In like manner, -and from the same motives, the German Social -Democracy speaks to the masses only about -the war against Czarism, but does not mention -even by name Belgium, France and England. -All this is of course not exactly flattering to -the international reputation of Czarism. Yet -it is quite distressing that the German Social -Democracy should sacrifice its own good name -to the call to arms against Czarism. Lassalle -said that every great political action -should begin with a statement of things as they -are. Then why does the defense of the Fatherland -begin with an abashed silence as to things -as they are? Or did the German Social -Democracy perhaps think that this was not a "big -political action"?</p> -<p class="pnext">Anyway, the defense of the Fatherland is a -very broad and very elastic conception. The -world catastrophe began with Austria's -ultimatum to Serbia. Austria, naturally, was -guided solely by the need of defending her -borders from her uneasy neighbor. Austria's prop -was Germany. And Germany, in turn, as we -already know, was prompted by the need to -secure her own state. "It would be senseless -to believe," writes Ludwig Quessel on this -point, "that one wall could be torn away from -this extremely complex structure (Europe) -without endangering the security of the whole -edifice."</p> -<p class="pnext">Germany opened her "Defensive War" with -an attack upon Belgium, the violation of -Belgium's neutrality being allegedly only a -means of breaking through to France along -the line of least resistance. The military -defeat of France also was to appear only as a -strategic episode in the defense of the Fatherland.</p> -<p class="pnext">To some German patriots this construction -of things did not seem quite plausible, and -they had good grounds for disbelieving it. -They suspected a motive which squared far -better with the reality. Russia, entering upon -a new era of military preparation, would be a -far greater menace to Germany in two or three -years than she was then. And France during -that time would have completely carried out -her three-year army reform. Is it not clear, -then, that an intelligent self-defense demanded -that Germany should not wait for the attack -of her enemies but should anticipate them by -two years and take the offensive at once? And -isn't it clear, too, that such an offensive war, -deliberately provoked by Germany and Austria, -is in reality a preventive war of defense?</p> -<p class="pnext">Not infrequently these two points of view -are combined in a single argument. Granted -that there is some slight contradiction between -them. The one declares that Germany did not -want the War now and that it was forced upon -her by the Triple Entente, while the other -implies that war was disadvantageous to the -Entente now and that for that very reason -Germany had taken the initiative to bring on the -War at this time. But what if there is this -contradiction? It is lightly and easily glossed -over and reconciled in the saving concept of a -war of defense.</p> -<p class="pnext">But the belligerents on the other side -disputed this advantageous position of being on -the defensive, which Germany sought to -assume, and did it successfully. France could -not permit the defeat of Russia on the ground -of her own self-defense. England gave as the -motive for her interference the immediate -danger to the British Islands which a strengthening -of Germany's position at the mouth of the -Channel would mean. Finally, Russia, too, -spoke only of self-defense. It is true that no -one threatened Russian territory. But -national possessions, mark you, do not consist -merely in territory, but in other, intangible, -factors as well, among them, the influence over -weaker states. Servia "belongs" in the sphere -of Russian influence and serves the purpose of -maintaining the so-called balance of power in -the Balkans, not only the balance of power -between the Balkan States but also between -Russian and Austrian influence. A successful -Austrian attack on Servia threatened to disturb -this balance of power in Austria's favor, and -therefore meant an indirect attack upon -Russia. Sasonov undoubtedly found his strongest -argument in Quessel's words: "It would be -senseless to believe that one wall could be torn -away from the extremely complex structure -(Europe) without endangering the security of -the entire edifice."</p> -<p class="pnext">It is superfluous to add that Servia and -Montenegro, Belgium and Luxemburg, could -also produce some proofs of the defensive -character of their policies. Thus, all the countries -were on the defensive, none was the aggressor. -But if that is so, then what sense is there -in opposing the claims of defensive and -offensive war to each other? The standards applied -in such cases differ greatly, and are not -frequently quite incommensurable.</p> -<p class="pnext">What is of fundamental importance to us -Socialists is the question of the <em class="italics">historical</em> rôle -of the War. Is the War calculated to -effectively promote the productive forces and the -state organizations, and to accelerate the -concentration of the working class forces? Or is -the reverse true, will it hinder in this? This -materialistic evaluation of wars stands above -all formal or external considerations, and in -its nature has no relation to the question of -defense or aggression. And yet sometimes these -formal expressions about a war designate with -more or less truth the actual significance of the -war. When Engels said that the Germans -were on the defensive in 1870, he had least of -all the immediate political and diplomatic -circumstances in mind. The determining fact for -him was that in that war Germany was fighting -for her right to national unity, which was a -necessary condition for the economic -development of the country and the Socialist -consolidation of the proletariat. In the same sense -the Christian peoples of the Balkans waged a -war of defense against Turkey, fighting for -their right to independent national -development against the foreign rule.</p> -<p class="pnext">The question of the immediate international -political conditions leading to a war is -independent of the value the war possesses from the -<em class="italics">historico-materialistic</em> point of view. The -German war against the Bonapartist Monarchy -was historically unavoidable. In that war the -right of development was on the German side. -Yet those historical tendencies did not, in -themselves, predetermine the question as to which -party was interested in provoking the war just -in the year 1870. We know now very well that -international politics and military considerations -induced Bismarck to take the actual -initiative in the war. It might have happened -just the other way, however. With greater -foresight and energy, the government of -Napoleon III could have anticipated Bismarck, -and begun the war a few years earlier. That -would have radically changed the immediate -political aspect of events, but it would have -made no difference in the historic estimate of -the war.</p> -<p class="pnext">Third in order is the factor of diplomacy. -Diplomacy here has a two-fold task to perform. -First, it must bring about war at the moment -most favorable for its own country from the -international as well as the military standpoint. -Second, it must employ methods which throw -the burden of responsibility for the bloody -conflict, in public opinion, on the enemy -government. The exposure of diplomatic trickery, -cheating and knavery is one of the most -important functions of Socialist political -agitation. But no matter to what extent we -succeed in this at the crucial juncture, it is clear -that the net of diplomatic intrigues in themselves -signifies nothing either as regards the -historic rôle of the war or its real initiators. -Bismarck's clever manoeuvres forced Napoleon -III to declare war on Prussia, although the -actual initiative came from the German side.</p> -<p class="pnext">Next follows the purely military aspect. The -<em class="italics">strategic</em> plan of operations can be calculated -chiefly for defense or attack, regardless of -which side declared the war and under what -conditions. Finally, the first tactics followed -in the carrying out of the strategic plan not -infrequently plays a great part in estimating the -war as a war of defense or of aggression.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"It is a good thing," wrote Engels to -Marx on July 31, 1870, "that the French -attacked first on German soil. If the Germans -repel the invasion and follow it up by -invading French territory, then it will certainly -not produce the same impression as if the -Germans had marched into France without -a previous invasion. In this way the war -remains, on the French side, more Bonapartistic."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">Thus we see by the classic example of the -Franco-Prussian War that the standards for -judging whether a war is defensive or -aggressive are full of contradictions when two -nations clash. Then how much more so are they -when it is a clash of several nations. If we -unroll the tangle from the beginning, we -arrive at the following connection between the -elements of attack and defense. The first -<em class="italics">tactical</em> move of the French should--at least in -Engels' opinion--make the people feel that the -responsibility of attack rested with the French. -And yet the entire <em class="italics">strategic</em> plan of the -Germans had an absolutely aggressive character. -The <em class="italics">diplomatic</em> moves of Bismarck forced -Bonaparte to declare war against his will and thus -appear as the disturber of the peace of Europe, -while the military-political initiative in the war -came from the Prussian government. These -circumstances are by no means of slight importance -for the <em class="italics">historical</em> estimate of the war, but -they are not at all exhaustive.</p> -<p class="pnext">One of the causes of this war was the -growing ambition of the Germans for national -self-determination, which conflicted with the -dynastic pretensions of the French Monarchy. But -this national "war of defense" led to the -annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and so in its -second stage turned into a dynastic war of conquest.</p> -<p class="pnext">The correspondence between Marx and -Engels shows that they were guided chiefly by -historical considerations in their attitude towards -the War of 1870. To them, of course, it was -by no means a matter of indifference as to -who conducted the war and how it was -conducted. "Who would have thought it -possible," Marx writes bitterly, "that twenty-two -years after 1848 a nationalist war in Germany -could have been given such theoretical -expression." Yet what was of decisive significance to -Marx and Engels was the objective consequences -of the war. "If the Prussians triumph, -it will mean the centralization of the state -power--useful to the centralization of the -German working-class."</p> -<p class="pnext">Liebknecht and Bebel, starting with the -same historical estimate of the war, were -directly forced to take a political position -toward it. It was by no means in opposition to -the views of Marx and Engels, but, on the -contrary, with their perfect acquiescence that -Liebknecht and Bebel refused, in the Reichstag, -to take any responsibility for this War. The -statement they handed in read:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"We cannot grant the war appropriations -that the Reichstag is asked to make because -that would be a vote of confidence in the -Prussian government.... As opponents -on principle of every dynastic war, as Social -Republicians and members of the International -Labor Association, which, without -distinction of nationality, fights all oppressors -and endeavors to unite all the oppressed in -one great brotherhood, we cannot declare -ourselves either directly or indirectly in -favor of the present war."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">Schweitzer acted differently. He took the -historical estimate of the war as a direct guide -for his tactics--one of the most dangerous of -fallacies!--and in voting the war credits gave -a vote of confidence to the policy of Bismarck. -And this in spite of the fact that it was -necessary, if the centralization of state power -arising out of the War was to turn out of use to -the Social Democratic cause, that the -working-class should from the very beginning oppose -the dynastic-Junker centralization with their -own class-centralization filled with -revolutionary distrust of the rulers.</p> -<p class="pnext">Schweitzer's political attitude invalidated -the very consequences of the War that had -induced him to give a vote of confidence to the -makers of the War.</p> -<p class="pnext">Forty years later, drawing up the balance -sheet of his life-work, Bebel wrote:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"The attitude that Liebknecht and I took -at the outbreak and during the continuance -of the war has for years been a subject of -discussion and violent attack, at first even -in the Party; but only for a short time. -Then they acknowledged that we had been -right. I confess that I do not in any way -regret our attitude, and if at the outbreak of -the War we had known what we learned -within the next few years from the official -and unofficial disclosures, our attitude from -the very start would have been still harsher. -We would not merely have abstained, as we -did, from voting the first war credits, we -would have voted <em class="italics">against</em> them." (<em class="italics">Autobiography</em>, -Part II, p. 167.)</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">If we compare the Liebknecht-Bebel statement -of 1870 with Haase's declaration in 1914, -we must conclude that Bebel was mistaken -when he said, "Then they acknowledged that -we had been right." For the vote of August 4 -was eminently a condemnation of Bebel's -policy forty-four years earlier, since in Haase's -phraseology, Bebel had then left the -Fatherland in the lurch in the hour of danger.</p> -<p class="pnext">What political causes and considerations -have led the party of the German proletariat -to abandon its glorious traditions? Not a -single weighty reason has been given so far. All -the arguments adduced are full of contradictions. -They are like diplomatic communiqués -which are written to justify an already -accomplished act. The leader writer of <em class="italics">Die Neue -Zeit</em> writes--with the blessing of Comrade -Kautsky--that Germany's position towards -Czarism is the same as it was towards -Bonapartism in 1870! He even quotes from a letter -of Engels: "All classes of the German -people realized that it was a question, first of all, -of national existence, and so they fell in line at -once." For the same reason, we are told, the -German Social Democracy has fallen into line -now. It is a question of national existence. -"Substitute Czarism for Bonapartism, and -Engels' words are true to-day." And yet the -fact remains, in all its force, that Bebel and -Liebknecht demonstratively refused to vote -either money or confidence to the government -in 1870. Does it not hold just as well, then, -if we "substitute Czarism for Bonapartism"? -To this question no answer has been vouchsafed.</p> -<p class="pnext">But what did Engels really write in his -letter concerning the tactics of the labor party?</p> -<p class="pnext">"It does not seem possible to me that under -such circumstances a German political party -can preach <em class="italics">total obstruction</em>, and place all sorts -of minor considerations above the main issue." <em class="italics">Total -obstruction!</em>--But there is a wide gap -between total obstruction and the total capitulation -of a political party. And it was this gap -that divided the positions between Bebel and -Schweitzer in 1870. Marx and Engels were -with Bebel against Schweitzer. Comrade -Kautsky might have informed his leader -writer, Hermann Wendel, of this fact. And -it is nothing but defamation of the dead for -<em class="italics">Simplicissimus</em> now to reconcile the shades of -Bebel and Bismarck in Heaven. If <em class="italics">Simplicissimus</em> -and Wendel have the right to awaken -anybody from his sleep in the grave for the -endorsement of the present tactics of the German -Social Democracy, then it is not Bebel, but -Schweitzer. It is the shade of Schweitzer that -now oppresses the political party of the -German proletariat.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">But the very analogy between the Franco-Prussian -War and the present War is superficial -and misleading in the extreme. Let us -set aside all the international relations. Let us -forget that the War meant first of all the -destruction of Belgium, and that Germany's main -force was hurled not against Czarism but -republican France. Let us forget that the -starting point of the War was the crushing of -Servia, and that one of its aims was the -strengthening and consolidation of the arch-reactionary -state, Austria-Hungary. We will not dwell -on the fact that the attitude of the German -Social Democracy dealt a hard blow at the -Russian Revolution, which in the two years -before the War had again flared up in such a -tempest. We will close our eyes to all these -facts, just as the German Social Democracy -did on August 4th, when it did not see that -there was a Belgium in the world, a France, -England, Servia, or Austria-Hungary. We -will grant only the existence of Germany.</p> -<p class="pnext">In 1870 it was quite easy to estimate the -historical significance of the war. "If the -Prussians win, the centralization of state power will -further the centralization of the German -working class." And now? What would be the -result for the German working class of a -Prussian victory now?</p> -<p class="pnext">The only territorial expansion which the -German working class could welcome, because -it would complete the national unity, is a union -of German Austria with Germany. Any other -expansion of the German fatherland means -another step towards the transformation of -Germany from a national state to a state of -nationalities, and the consequent introduction -of all those conditions which render more -difficult the class struggle of the proletariat.</p> -<p class="pnext">Ludwig Frank hoped--and he expressed -this hope in the language of a belated -Lassallian--that later, after a victorious war, he -would devote himself to the work of the -"internal building up" of the state. There is no -doubt that Germany will need this "internal -building up" after a victory no less than before -the War. But will a victory make this work -easier? There is nothing in Germany's historical -experiences any more than in those of any -other country to justify such a hope.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"We regarded the doings of the rulers of -Germany [after the victories of 1870] as a -matter of course," says Bebel in his -<em class="italics">Autobiography</em>. "It was merely an illusion of the -Party Executive to believe that a more -liberal spirit would prevail in the new order. -And this more liberal régime was to be -granted by the same man who had till then -shown himself the greatest enemy, I will not -say of democratic development, but even of -every liberal tendency, and who now as -victor planted the heel of his Cuirassier boot on -the neck of the new Empire." (Vol. II, p. 188.)</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">There is absolutely no reason to expect -different results now from a victory from above. -On the contrary. In 1870 Prussian Junkerdom -had first to adapt itself to the new -imperial order. It could not feel secure in -the saddle all at once. It was eight years after -the victory over France that the anti-Socialist -laws were passed. In forty-four -years Prussian Junkerdom has become the -imperial Junkerdom. And if, after half a -century of the most intense class struggle, -Junkerdom should appear at the head of the -victorious nation, then we need not doubt that it -would not have felt the need of Ludwig -Frank's services for the internal building up of -the state had he returned safe from the fields -of German victories.</p> -<p class="pnext">But far more important than the strengthening -of the class position of the rulers is the -influence a German victory would have upon -the proletariat itself. The war grew out of -imperialistic antagonisms between the capitalist -states, and the victory of Germany, as stated -above, can produce only one result--territorial -acquisitions at the expense of Belgium, France -and Russia, commercial treaties forced upon -her enemies, and new colonies. The class -struggle of the proletariat would then be placed -upon the basis of the imperialistic hegemony -of Germany, the working class would be -interested in the maintenance and development of -this hegemony, and revolutionary Socialism -would for a long time be condemned to the rôle -of a propagandist sect.</p> -<p class="pnext">Marx was right when in 1870 he foresaw, as -a result of the German victories, a rapid -development for the German labor movement -under the banner of scientific Socialism. But -now the international conditions point to the -very opposite prognosis. Germany's victory -would mean the taking of the edge off the -revolutionary movement, its theoretic shallowing, -and the dying out of the Marxist ideas.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="what-have-socialists-to-do-with-capitalist-wars">CHAPTER VI</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">WHAT HAVE SOCIALISTS TO DO WITH CAPITALIST WARS?</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">But the German Social Democracy, we shall -be told, does not want victory. Our answer -must be in the first place that this is not true. -What the German Social Democracy wants is -told by its press. With two or three -exceptions Socialist papers daily point out to the -German workingman that a victory of the -German arms is <em class="italics">his</em> victory. The capture of -Maubeuge, the sinking of three English warships, or -the fall of Antwerp aroused in the Social -Democratic press the same feelings that otherwise -are excited by the gain of a new election -district or a victory in a wage dispute. We must -not lose sight of the fact that the German labor -press, the Party press as well as the trade union -papers, is now a powerful mechanism that in -place of the education of the people's will for -the class struggle has substituted the education -of the people's will for military victories. I -have not in mind the ugly chauvinistic excesses -of individual organs, but the underlying -sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the -Social Democratic papers. The signal for this -attitude seems to have been given by the vote -of the fraction on August 4th.</p> -<p class="pnext">But the fraction wasn't thinking of a -German victory. It made it its task only to avert -the danger threatening from the outside, to -defend the Fatherland. That was all.</p> -<p class="pnext">And here we come back to the question of -wars of defense and wars of aggression. The -German press, including the Social Democratic -organs, does not cease to repeat that it -is Germany of all countries that finds itself on -the defensive in this War. We have already -discussed the standards for determining the -difference between a war of aggression and a -war of defense. These standards are -numerous and contradictory. Yet in the present case -they testify unanimously that Germany's -military acts cannot possibly be construed as the -acts of a war of defense. But this has -absolutely no influence upon the tactics of the -Social Democracy.</p> -<p class="pnext">From a <em class="italics">historical</em> standpoint the new -German imperialism is, as we already know, -absolutely aggressive. Urged onward by the -feverish development of the national industry, -German imperialism disturbs the old balance of -power between the states and plays the first -violin in the race for armaments.</p> -<p class="pnext">And from the <em class="italics">standpoint of world politics</em> -the present moment seemed to be most favorable -for Germany to deal her rivals a crushing -blow--which however does not lessen the guilt -of Germany's enemies by one iota.</p> -<p class="pnext">The <em class="italics">diplomatic</em> view of events leaves no -doubt concerning the leading part that -Germany played in Austria's provocative action -in Servia. The fact that Czarist diplomacy -was, as usual, still more disgraceful, does not -alter the case.</p> -<p class="pnext">From the standpoint of <em class="italics">strategy</em> the entire -German campaign was based on a monstrous -offensive.</p> -<p class="pnext">And finally from the standpoint of <em class="italics">tactics</em>, -the first move of the German army was the -violation of Belgian neutrality.</p> -<p class="pnext">If all this is defense, then what is attack? -But even if we assume that events as pictured -in the language of diplomacy admit of other -interpretations--although the first two pages -of the White Book are very clear as to this -meaning--has the revolutionary party of the -working class no other standards for determining -its policy than the documents presented by -a government that has the greatest interest in -deceiving it?</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"Bismarck duped the whole world," says -Bebel, "and knew how to make people -believe that it was Napoleon who provoked -the war, while he himself, the peace-loving -Bismarck, found himself and his policy in -the position of being attacked.</p> -<p class="pnext">"The events preceding the war were so -misleading that France's complete -unpreparedness for the war that she herself -declared was generally overlooked, while in -Germany, which appeared to be the one -attacked, preparations for war had been -completed down to the very last wagon-nail, and -mobilization moved with the precision of -clockwork." (<em class="italics">Autobiography</em>, Vol. III, -pages 167-168.)</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">After such an historical precedent one might -expect more critical caution from the Social -Democracy.</p> -<p class="pnext">It is quite true that Bebel more than once -repeated his assertion that in case of an attack -on Germany the Social Democracy would -defend its Fatherland. At the convention held at -Essen, Kautsky answered him:</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"In my opinion we cannot promise -positively to share the government's war -enthusiasm every time we are convinced that the -country is threatened by attack. Bebel -thinks we are much further advanced than -we were in 1870 and that we are now able to -decide in every instance whether the war -which threatens is really one of aggression -or not. I should not like to take this -responsibility upon myself. I should not like to -undertake to guarantee that we could make -a correct decision in every instance, that we -shall always know whether a government is -deceiving us, or whether it is not actually -representing the interests of the nation -against a war of attack.... Yesterday it -was the German government that took the -aggressive, to-morrow it will be the French -government, and we cannot know if the day -after it may not be the English government. -The governments are constantly taking -turns. As a matter of fact what we are -concerned with in case of war is not a national, -but an international question. For a war -between great powers will become a world -war and will affect the whole of Europe, not -two countries alone. Some day the German -government might make the German -proletariat believe they were being attacked; the -French government might do the same with -its subjects, and then we should have a war -in which the French and German working -men would follow their respective -governments with equal enthusiasm, and murder -each other and cut each other's throats. -Such a contingency must be avoided, and it -will be avoided if we do not adopt the -criterion of the aggressive or defensive war, -but that of the interests of the proletariat, -which at the same time are international -interests.... Fortunately, it is a -misconception to assume that the German Social -Democracy in case of war wanted to judge -by national and not by international considerations, -and felt itself to be first a German -and then a proletariat party."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">With splendid clearness Kautsky in this -speech reveals the terrible dangers--now a still -more terrible actuality--that are latent in the -endeavor to make the position of the Social -Democracy dependent upon an indefinite and -contradictory formal estimate of whether a war -is one of defense or one of aggression. Bebel -in his reply said nothing of importance; and -his point of view seemed quite inexplicable, -especially after his own experiences of the year 1870.</p> -<p class="pnext">Nevertheless, in spite of its theoretical -inadequacy, Bebel's position had a quite definite -political meaning. Those imperialistic -tendencies which the danger of war begat excluded -the possibility for the Social Democracy's -expecting salvation from the victory of either of -the warring parties. For that very reason its -entire attention was directed to the preventing -of war, and the principal task was to keep the -governments worried about the results of a war.</p> -<p class="pnext">"The Social Democracy," said Bebel, "will -oppose any government which takes the -initiative in war." He meant this as a threat -to William II.'s government. "Don't reckon -upon us if some day you decide to utilize your -cannon and your battleships." Then he turned -to Petrograd and London: "They had better -take care not to attack Germany in a miscalculation -of weakness from within on account of -the obstructionist policies of the powerful -German Social Democracy."</p> -<p class="pnext">Without being a political doctrine, Bebel's -conception was a political threat, and a threat -directed simultaneously at two fronts, the -internal front and the foreign front. His one -obstinate answer to all historical and logical -objections was: "We'll find the way to expose -any government that takes the first step -towards war. We are clever enough for that."</p> -<p class="pnext">This threatening attitude of not only the -German Social Democracy but also of the -International Party was not without results. -The various governments actually did make -every effort to postpone the outbreak of the -War. But that is not all. The rulers and the -diplomats were doubly attentive now to -adapting their moves to the pacifist psychology of -the masses. They whispered with the Socialist -leaders, nosed about in the office of the -International, and so created a sentiment which -made it possible for Jaurès and Haase to -declare at Brussels, a few days before the -outbreak of the War, that their particular -governments had no other object than the preservation -of peace. And when the storm broke -loose, the Social Democracy of every country -looked for the guilty party--on the other side -of the border. Bebel's utterance, which had -played a definite part as a threat, lost all -meaning the instant the first shots were fired at the -frontiers. That terrible thing took place which -Kautsky had prophesied.</p> -<p class="pnext">What at first glance appears the most -surprising thing about it all is, that the Social -Democracy had not really felt the need for a -political criterion. In the catastrophe that has -occurred to the International the arguments -have been notable for their superficiality. They -contradicted each other, shifted ground, and -were of only secondary significance--the gist -of the matter being that the <em class="italics">fatherland must be -defended</em>. Apart from considerations of the -historical outcome of the War, apart from -considerations of democracy and the class -struggle, the fatherland that has come down to us -historically must be defended. And defended -not because our government wanted peace and -was "perfidiously attacked," as the international -penny-a-liners put it, but because apart -from the conditions or the ways in which it was -provoked, apart from who was right and who -was wrong, war, once it breaks out, subjects -every belligerent to the danger of invasion and -conquest. Theoretical, political, diplomatic -and military considerations fall into ruins as in -an earthquake, a conflagration or a flood. The -government with its army is elevated to the -position of the one power that can protect and -save its people. The large masses of the -people in actuality return to a pre-political -condition. This feeling of the masses, this elemental -reflex of the catastrophe, need not be criticized -in so far as it is only a temporary feeling. But -it is quite a different matter in the case of the -attitude of the Social Democracy, the -responsible political representative of the masses. -The political organizations of the possessing -classes and especially the power of the -government itself did not simply float with the stream. -They instantly set to work most intensively -and in very varied ways to heighten this -unpolitical sentiment and to unite the masses -around the army and the government. The -Social Democracy not only did not become -equally active in the opposite direction, but -from the very first moment surrendered to the -policy of the government and to the elemental -feeling of the masses. And instead of arming -these masses with the weapons of criticism and -distrust, if only passive criticism and distrust, -it itself by its whole attitude hastened the -people along the road to this pre-political -condition. It renounced its traditions and political -pledges of fifty years with a conspicuous readiness -that was least of all calculated to inspire -the rulers with respect.</p> -<p class="pnext">Bethmann-Hollweg announced that the -German government was in absolute agreement -with the German people, and after the -avowal of the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em>, in view of the position -taken by the Social Democracy, he had a -perfect right to say so. But he had still another -right. If conditions had not induced him to -postpone political polemics to a more favorable -moment, he might have said at the Reichstag -session of August 4th, addressing the -representatives of the Socialist proletariat: -"To-day you agree with us in recognizing the -danger threatening our Fatherland, and you join -us in trying to avert the danger by arms. But -this danger has not grown up since yesterday. -You must previously have known of the existence -and the tendencies of Czarism, and you -knew that we had other enemies besides. So -by what right did you attack us when we built -up our army and our navy? By what right -did you refuse to vote for military appropriations -year after year? Was it by the right of -treason or the right of blindness? If in spite -of you we had not built up our army, we should -now be helpless in the face of this Russian -menace that has brought you to your senses, -too. No appropriations granted now could -enable us to make up for what we would have -lost. We should now be without arms, without -cannons, without fortifications. Your voting -to-day in favor of the war credit of five billion -is an admission that your annual refusal of the -budget was only an empty demonstration, and, -worse than that, was political demagogy. For -as soon as you came up for a serious historical -examination, you denied your entire past!"</p> -<p class="pnext">That is what the German Chancellor could -have said, and this time his speech would have -carried conviction. And what could Haase -have replied?</p> -<p class="pnext">"We never took a stand for Germany's -disarmament in the face of dangers from without. -Such peace rubbish was never in our thoughts. -As long as international contradictions create -out of themselves the danger of war, we want -Germany to be safe against foreign invasion -and servitude. What we are trying for is a -military organization which cannot--as can an -artificially trained organization--be made to -serve for class exploitation at home and for -imperialistic adventures abroad, but will be -invincible in national defense. We want a militia. -We cannot trust you with the work of national -defense. You have made the army a school of -reactionary training. You have drilled your -corps of officers in the hatred of the most -important class of modern society, the proletariat. -You are capable of risking millions of lives, -not for the real interests of the people, but for -the selfish interests of the ruling minority, -which you veil with the names of national ideals -and state prestige. We do not trust you, and -that is why we have declared year after year, -'Not a single man or a single penny for this -class government!''</p> -<p class="pnext">"But five billions!" voices from both the -right and the left might interrupt.</p> -<p class="pnext">"Unfortunately we are now left no choice. -We have no army except the one created by the -present masters of Germany, and the enemy -stands without our gates. We cannot on the -instant replace William II.'s army by a -people's militia, and once this is so, we cannot -refuse food, clothing and materials of war to the -army that is defending us, no matter how it -may be constituted. We are neither repudiating -our past nor renouncing our future. We -are forced to vote for the war credits."</p> -<p class="pnext">That would have been about the most -convincing thing that Haase could have said.</p> -<p class="pnext">Yet, even though such considerations might -give an explanation of why the Socialist -workers as <em class="italics">citizens</em> did not obstruct the military -organization, but simply fulfilled the duty of -citizenship forced upon them by circumstances, -we should still be waiting in vain for an answer -to the principal question: Why did the Social -Democracy, as the political organization of a -class that has been denied a share in the -government, as the implacable enemy of bourgeois -society, as the republican party, as a branch of -the International--why did it take upon itself -the responsibility for acts undertaken by its -irreconcilable class enemies?</p> -<p class="pnext">If it is impossible for us immediately to -replace the Hohenzollern army with a militia, -that does not mean that we must now take upon -ourselves the responsibility for the doings of -that army. If in times of peaceful normal -state-housekeeping we wage war against the -monarchy, the bourgeoisie and militarism, and -are under obligations to the masses to carry on -that war with the whole weight of our -authority, then we commit the greatest crime against -our future when we put this authority at the -disposal of the monarchy, the bourgeoisie and -militarism at the very moment when these -break out into the terrible, anti-social and -barbaric methods of war.</p> -<p class="pnext">Neither the nation nor the state can escape -the obligation of defense. But when we refuse -the rulers our confidence we by no means rob -the bourgeois state of its weapons or its means -of defense and even of attack--as long as we -are not strong enough to wrest its power from -its hands. In war as in peace, we are a party -of opposition, not a party of power. In that -way we can also most surely serve that part of -our task which war outlines so sharply, the -work of national independence. The Social -Democracy cannot let the fate of any nation, -whether its own or another nation, depend upon -military successes. In throwing upon the -capitalist state the responsibility for the method -by which it protects its independence, that is, -the violation of the independence of other -states, the Social Democracy lays the -cornerstone of true national independence in the -consciousness of the masses of all nations. By -preserving and developing the international -solidarity of the workers, we secure the -independence of the nation--and make it -independent of the calibre of cannons.</p> -<p class="pnext">If Czarism is a danger to Germany's -independence, there is only one way that promises -success in warding off this danger, and that -way lies with us--the solidarity of the working -masses of Germany and Russia. But such -solidarity would undermine the policy that -William II. explained in saying that the entire -German people stood behind him. What -should we Russian Socialists say to the Russian -workingmen in face of the fact that the bullets -the German workers are shooting at them bear -the political and moral seal of the German -Social Democracy? "We cannot make our policy -for Russia, we make it for Germany," was the -answer given me by one of the most respected -functionaries of the German party when I put -this question to him. And at that moment I -felt with particularly painful clearness what a -blow had been struck at the International from -within.</p> -<p class="pnext">The situation, it is plain, is not improved if -the Socialist parties of <em class="italics">both</em> warring countries -throw in their fate with the fate of their -governments, as in Germany and France. No -outside power, no confiscation or destruction of -Socialist property, no arrests and imprisonments -could have dealt such a blow to the -International as it struck itself with its own hands -in surrendering to the Moloch of state just when -he began to talk in terms of blood and iron.</p> -<div class="center transition"> -<p class="pfirst">――――</p> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">In his speech at the convention at Essen -Kautsky drew a terrifying picture of brother -rising against brother in the name of a "war of -defense"--as an argument, by no means as an -actual possibility. Now that this picture has -become a bloody actuality, Kautsky endeavors -to reconcile us to it. He beholds no collapse of -the International.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"The difference between the German and -the French Socialists is not to be found in -their standards of judgment, nor in their -fundamental point of view, but merely in the -difference of their interpretation of the -present situation, which, in its turn, is -conditioned by the <em class="italics">difference in their geographical -position</em> [!]. Therefore, this difference can -scarcely be overcome while the war lasts. -Nevertheless it is not a difference of -principle, but one arising out of a particular -situation, and so it need not last after that -situation has ceased to exist." (<em class="italics">Neue Zeit</em>, 337, -p. 3.)</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">When Guèsde and Sembat appear as aides -to Poincaré, Delcassé and Briand, and as -opponents to Bethmann-Hollweg; when the -French and German workingmen cut each -other's throats and are not doing so as enforced -citizens of the bourgeois republic and the -Hohenzollern Monarchy, but as Socialists -performing their duty under the spiritual leadership -of their parties, this is not a collapse of the -International. The "standard of judgment" -is one and the same for the German Socialist -cutting a Frenchman's throat as for the -French Socialist cutting a German's throat. -If Ludwig Frank takes up his gun, not to -proclaim the "difference of principle" to the -French Socialists, but to shoot them in all -agreement of principle; and if Ludwig Frank -should himself fall by a French bullet--fired -possibly by a comrade--that is no detriment to -"standards" they have in common. It is -merely a consequence of the "difference in their -geographical position." Truly, it is bitter to -read such lines, but doubly bitter when they -come from Kautsky's pen.</p> -<p class="pnext">The International was opposed to the war.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"If, in spite of the efforts of the Social -Democracy, we should have war," says -Kautsky, "then every nation must save its -skin as best it can. This means for the Social -Democracy of every country the same right -and the same duty to participate in its -country's defense, and none of them may make of -this a cause for casting reproaches [!] at each -other." (<em class="italics">Neue Zeit</em>, 337, p. 7.)</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">Of such sort is this common standard to save -one's own skin, to break one another's skulls -in self-defense, and not to "reproach" one -another for doing so.</p> -<p class="pnext">But will the question be answered by the -<em class="italics">agreement</em> in the standard of judgment? Will -it not rather be answered by the <em class="italics">quality</em> of this -common standard of judgment? Among -Bethmann-Hollweg, Sasonov, Grey and -Delcassé you also find agreement in their -standards. Nor is there any difference of principle -between them either. They least of all have -any right to cast reproaches at each other. -Their conduct simply springs from "a -difference in their geographical position." Had -Bethmann-Hollweg been an English minister, -he would have acted exactly as did Sir Edward -Grey. Their standards are as like each other -as their cannon, which differ in nothing but -their calibre. But the question for us is, can -we adopt <em class="italics">their</em> standards for <em class="italics">our own</em>?</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"Fortunately, it is a misconception to -assume that the German Social Democracy in -case of war wanted to judge by national and -not by international considerations, and felt -itself to be first a German and then a -proletariat party."</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">So said Kautsky in Essen. And now when -the national point of view has taken hold of all -the workingmen's parties of the International -in place of the international point of view that -they held in common, Kautsky not only -reconciles himself to this "misconception," but even -tries to find in it agreement of standards and -a guarantee of the rebirth of the International.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<!-- --> -<blockquote> -<div> -<p class="pfirst">"In every national state the working class -must also devote its entire energy to keeping -intact the independence and the integrity of -the national territory. This is an essential of -democracy, that basis necessary to the struggle -and the final victory of the proletariat." -(<em class="italics">Neue Zeit</em>, 337, p. 4.)</p> -</div> -</blockquote> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">But if this is the case, how about the -Austrian Social Democracy? Must it, too, devote -its entire energy to the preservation of the -non-national and anti-national Austro-Hungarian -Monarchy? And the German Social Democracy? -By amalgamating itself politically with -the German army, it not only helps to preserve -the Austro-Hungarian national chaos, but also -facilitates the destruction of Germany's -national unity. <em class="italics">National unity is endangered not -only by defeat but also by victory</em>.</p> -<p class="pnext">From the standpoint of the European -proletariat it is equally harmful whether a slice -of French territory is gobbled up by Germany, -or whether France gobbles up a slice of -German territory. Moreover the preservation of -the European <em class="italics">status quo</em> is not a thing at all for -our platform. The political map of Europe -has been drawn by the point of the bayonet, -at every frontier passing over the living bodies -of the nations. If the Social Democracy -assists its national (or anti-national) governments -with all its energy, it is again leaving it -to the power and intelligence of the bayonet to -correct the map of Europe. And in tearing -the International to pieces, the Social -Democracy destroys the one power that is capable of -setting up a programme of national independence -and democracy in opposition to the -activity of the bayonet, and of carrying out this -programme in a greater or less degree, quite -independently of which of the national -bayonets is crowned with victory.</p> -<p class="pnext">The experience of old is confirmed once -again. If the Social Democracy sets national -duties above its class duties, it commits the -greatest crime not only against Socialism, but -also against the interest of the nation as rightly -and broadly understood.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="the-collapse-of-the-international">CHAPTER VII</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">THE COLLAPSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">At their Convention in Paris two weeks -before the outbreak of the catastrophe, the -French Socialists insisted on pledging all -branches of the International to revolutionary -action in case of a mobilization. They were -thinking chiefly of the German Social -Democracy. The radicalism of the French Socialists -in matters of foreign policy was rooted not so -much in international as national interests. -The events of the War have now definitely -confirmed what was clear to many then. What -the French Socialist Party desired from the -sister party in Germany was a certain -guarantee for the inviolability of France. They -believed that only by thus insuring themselves -with the German proletariat could they finally -free their own hands for a decisive conflict with -national militarism.</p> -<p class="pnext">The German Social Democracy, for their -part, flatly refused to make any such pledge. -Bebel showed that if the Socialist parties signed -the French resolution, that would not -necessarily enable them to keep their pledge when -the decisive moment came. Now there is little -room for doubt that Bebel was right. As -events have repeatedly proved, a period of -mobilization almost completely cripples the -Socialist Party, or at least precludes the -possibility of decisive moves. Once mobilization is -declared, the Social Democracy finds itself face -to face with the concentrated power of the -Government, which is supported by a powerful -military apparatus that is ready to crush all -obstacles in its path and has the unqualified -co-operation of all bourgeois parties and institutions.</p> -<p class="pnext">And of no less importance is the fact that -mobilization wakes up and brings to their feet -those elements of the people whose social -significance is slight and who play little or no -political part in times of peace. Hundreds of -thousands, nay millions of petty hand-workers, -of hobo-proletarians (the riff-raff of the -workers), of small farmers and agricultural -laborers are drawn into the ranks of the army and -put into a uniform, in which each one of these -men stands for just as much as the class-conscious -workingman. They and their families -are forcibly torn from their dull unthinking -indifference and given an interest in the fate of -their country. Mobilization and the declaration -of war awaken fresh expectations in these -circles whom our agitation practically does not -reach and whom, under ordinary circumstances, -it will never enlist. Confused hopes of a -change in present conditions, of a change for -the better, fill the hearts of these masses -dragged out of the apathy of misery and -servitude. The same thing happens as at the -beginning of a revolution, but with one all-important -difference. A revolution links these newly -aroused elements with the revolutionary class, -but war links them--with the government and -the army! In the one case all the unsatisfied -needs, all the accumulated suffering, all the -hopes and longings find their expression in -revolutionary enthusiasm; in the other case -these same social emotions temporarily take -the form of patriotic intoxication. Wide -circles of the working class, even among those -touched with Socialism, are carried along in -the same current. The advance guard of the -Social Democracy feels it is in the minority; -its organizations, in order to complete the -organization of the army, are wrecked. Under -such conditions there can be no thought of a -revolutionary move on the part of the Party. -And all this is quite independent of whether -the people look upon a particular war with -favor or disfavor. In spite of the colonial -character of the Russo-Japanese war and -its unpopularity in Russia, the first half -year of it nearly smothered the revolutionary -movement. Consequently it is quite clear that, -with the best intentions in the world, the -Socialist parties cannot pledge themselves to -obstructionist action at the time of mobilization, -at a time, that is, when Socialism is more than -ever politically isolated.</p> -<p class="pnext">And therefore there is nothing particularly -unexpected or discouraging in the fact that the -working-class parties did not oppose military -mobilization with their own revolutionary -mobilization. Had the Socialists limited -themselves to expressing condemnation of the -present war, had they declined all responsibility -for it and refused the vote of confidence in -their governments as well as the vote for the -war credits, they would have done their duty at -the time. They would have taken up a -position of waiting, the oppositional character of -which would have been perfectly clear to the -government as well as to the people. Further -action would have been determined by the -march of events and by those changes which -the events of a war must produce on the -people's consciousness. The ties binding the -International together would have been -preserved, the banner of Socialism would have -been unstained. Although weakened for the -moment, the Social Democracy would have -preserved a free hand for a decisive interference -in affairs as soon as the change in the -feelings of the working masses came about. -And it is safe to assert that whatever influence -the Social Democracy might have lost by such -an attitude at the beginning of the war, would -have been won several times over once the -inevitable turn in public sentiment had come about.</p> -<p class="pnext">But if this did not happen, if the signal for -war mobilization was also the signal for the fall -of the International, if the national labor -parties fell in line with their governments and the -armies without a single protest, then there must -be deep causes for it common to the entire -International. It would be futile to seek these -causes in the mistakes of individuals, in the -narrowness of leaders and party committees. -They must be sought in the conditions of the -epoch in which the Socialist International first -came into being and developed. Not that the -unreliability of the leaders or the bewildered -incompetence of the Executive Committees -should ever be justified. By no means. But -these are not fundamental factors. These must -be sought in the historical conditions of an -entire epoch. For it is not a question--and we -must be very straightforward with ourselves -about this--of any particular mistake, not of -any opportunist steps, not of any awkward -statements in the various parliaments, not of -the vote for the budget cast by the Social -Democrats of the Grand Duchy of Baden, not of -individual experiments of French ministerialism, -not of the making or unmaking of this or -that Socialist's career. It is nothing less than -the complete failure of the International in the -most responsible historical epoch, for which all -the previous achievements of Socialism can be -considered merely as a preparation.</p> -<p class="pnext">A review of historical events will reveal a -number of facts and symptoms that should -have aroused disquiet as to the depth and -solidity of Internationalism in the labor movement.</p> -<p class="pnext">I am not referring to the Austrian Social -Democracy. In vain did the Russian and -Servian Socialists look for clippings from articles -on world politics in the <em class="italics">Wiener Arbeiter -Zeitung</em> that they could use for Russian and -Servian workingmen without having to blush for -the International. One of the most striking -tendencies of this journal always was the -defense of Austro-German imperialism not only -against the outside enemy but also against the -internal enemy--and the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> was one of -the internal enemies. There is no irony in -saying that in the present crisis of the -International the <em class="italics">Wiener Arbeiter Zeitung</em> remained -truest to its past.</p> -<p class="pnext">French Socialism reveals two extremes--an -ardent patriotism, on the one hand, not free -from enmity of Germany; on the other hand, -the most vivid anti-patriotism of the Hervé -type, which, as experience teaches, readily -turns into the very opposite.</p> -<p class="pnext">As for England, Hyndman's Tory-tinged -patriotism, supplementing his sectarian -radicalism, has often caused the International -political difficulties.</p> -<p class="pnext">It was in a far less degree that nationalistic -symptoms could be detected in the German -Social Democracy. To be sure, the opportunism -of the South Germans grew up out of the soil -of particularism, which was German -nationalism in octavo form. But the South Germans -were rightly considered the politically -unimportant rearguard of the Party. Bebel's -promise to shoulder his gun in case of danger -did not meet with a single-hearted reception. -And when Noske repeated Bebel's expression, -he was sharply attacked in the Party press. -On the whole the German Social Democracy -adhered more strictly to the line of internationalism -than any other of the old Socialist -parties. But for that very reason it made the -sharpest break with its past. To judge by the -formal announcements of the Party and the -articles in the Socialist press, there is no -connection between the Yesterday and To-day of -German Socialism.</p> -<p class="pnext">But it is clear that such a catastrophe could -not have occurred had not the conditions for it -been prepared in previous times. The fact that -two young parties, the Russian and the -Servian, remained true to their international -duties is by no means a confirmation of the -Philistine philosophy, according to which -loyalty to principle is a natural expression of -immaturity. Yet this fact leads us to seek the -causes of the collapse of the Second International -in the very conditions of its development -that least influenced its younger members.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="socialist-opportunism">CHAPTER VIII</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISM</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">The Communist Manifesto, written in 1847, -closes with the words: "Workingmen of all -countries, unite!" But this battle cry came too -early to become a living actuality at once. The -historical order of the day just then was the -middle class revolution of 1848. And in this -revolution the part that fell to the authors of -the Manifesto themselves was not that of leaders -of an international proletariat, but of fighters -on the extreme left of the national Democracy.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Revolution of 1848 did not solve a -single one of the national problems; it merely -revealed them. The counter-revolution, along -with the great industrial development that then -took place, broke off the thread of the -revolutionary movement. Another century of peace -went by until recently the antagonisms that -had not been removed by the Revolution -demanded the intervention of the sword. This -time it was not the sword of the Revolution, -fallen from the hands of the middle class, but -the militaristic sword of war drawn from a -dynastic scabbard. The wars of 1859, 1864, -1866, and 1870 created a new Italy and a new -Germany. The feudal caste fulfilled, in their -own way, the heritage of the Revolution of -1848. The political bankruptcy of the middle -class, which expressed itself in this historic -interchange of rôles, became a direct stimulus to -an independent proletarian movement based -on the rapid development of capitalism.</p> -<p class="pnext">In 1863 Lassalle founded the first political -labor union in Germany. In 1864 the first -International was formed in London under the -guidance of Karl Marx. The closing watch-word -of the Manifesto was taken up and used -in the first circular issued by the International -Association of Workingmen. It is most -characteristic for the tendencies of the modern -Labor Movement that its first organization had -an international character. Nevertheless this -organization was an anticipation of the future -needs of the movement rather than a real -steering instrument in the class-struggle. There -was still a wide gulf between the ultimate goal -of the International, the communistic revolution, -and its immediate activities, which took -the form mainly of international co-operation -in the chaotic strike movements of the laborers -in various countries. Even the founders of the -International hoped that the revolutionary -march of events would very soon overcome the -contradiction between ideology and practice. -While the General Council was giving money -to aid groups of strikers in England and on the -Continent, it was at the same time making -classic attempts to harmonize the conduct of -the workers in all countries in the field of world -politics.</p> -<p class="pnext">But these endeavors did not as yet have a -sufficient material foundation. The activity -of the First International coincided with that -period of wars which opened the way for -capitalistic development in Europe and North -America. In spite of its doctrinal and -educational importance, the attempts of the -International to mingle in world politics must all the -more clearly have shown the advanced -workingmen of all countries their impotence as -against the national class state. The Paris -Commune, flaring up out of the war, was the -culmination of the First International. Just -as the Communist Manifesto was the theoretical -anticipation of the modern labor movement, -and the First International was the practical -anticipation of the labor associations of the -world, so the Paris Commune was the revolutionary -anticipation of the dictatorship of the -proletariat.</p> -<p class="pnext">But only an anticipation, nothing more. -And for that very reason it was clear that it is -impossible for the proletariat to overthrow the -machinery of state and reconstruct society by -nothing but revolutionary improvisations. -National states that emerged from the -wars created the one real foundation for this -historical work, the national foundation. -Therefore, the proletariat must go through the -school of self-education.</p> -<p class="pnext">The First International fulfilled its mission -of a nursery for the National Socialist -Parties. After the Franco-Prussian War and the -Paris Commune, the International dragged -along a moribund existence for a few years -more and in 1872 was transplanted to America, -to which various religious, social and other -experiments had often wandered before, to die there.</p> -<p class="pnext">Then began the period of prodigious capitalistic -development, on the foundation of the -national state. For the Labor Movement this -was the period of the gradual gathering of -strength, of the development of organization, -and of political possibilism.</p> -<p class="pnext">In England the stormy period of Chartism, -that revolutionary awakening of the English -proletariat, had completely exhausted itself ten -years before the birth of the First -International. The repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) -and the subsequent industrial prosperity that -made England the workshop of the world; the -establishment of the ten-hour working day -(1847), the increase of emigration from -Ireland to America, and the enfranchisement of -the workers in the cities (1867), all these -circumstances, which considerably improved the -lot of the upper strata of the proletariat, led -the class movement in England into the -peaceful waters of trade unionism and its -supplemental liberal labor policies.</p> -<p class="pnext">The period of possibilism, that is, of the -conscious, systematic adaptation to the economic, -legal, and state forms of national capitalism -began for the English proletariat, the oldest -of the brothers, even before the birth of the -International, and twenty years earlier than -for the continental proletariat. If nevertheless -the big English unions joined the International -at first, it was only because it afforded -them protection against the importation of -strike breakers in wage disputes.</p> -<p class="pnext">The French labor movement recovered but -slowly from the loss of blood in the Commune, -on the soil of a retarded industrial growth, and -in a nationalistic atmosphere of the most -noxious greed for "revenge." Wavering between -an anarchistic "denial" of the state and a -vulgar-democratic capitulation to it, the French -proletarian movement developed by -adaptation to the social and political framework of -the bourgeois republic.</p> -<p class="pnext">As Marx had already foreseen in 1870, the -center of gravity of the Socialist movement -shifted to Germany.</p> -<p class="pnext">After the Franco-Prussian War, united -Germany entered upon an era similar to the -one England had passed through in the twenty -years previous: an era of capitalistic -prosperity, of democratic suffrage, of a higher standard -of living for the upper strata of the proletariat.</p> -<p class="pnext">Theoretically the German labor movement -marched under the banner of Marxism. Still -in its dependence on the conditions of the -period, Marxism became for the German -proletariat not the algebraic formula of the -revolution that it was at the beginning, but the -theoretic method for adaptation to a -national-capitalistic state crowned with the Prussian -helmet. Capitalism, which had achieved a -temporary equilibrium, continually revolutionized -the economic foundation of national life. To -preserve the power that had resulted from the -Franco-Prussian War, it was necessary to -increase the standing army. The middle class -had ceded all its <em class="italics">political</em> positions to the -feudal monarchy, but had intrenched itself all -the more energetically in its <em class="italics">economic</em> positions -under the protection of the militaristic police -state. The main currents of the last period, -covering forty-five years, are: victorious -capitalism, militarism erected on a capitalist -foundation, a political reaction resulting from the -intergrowth of feudal and capitalist classes--a -revolutionizing of the economic life, and a -complete abandonment of revolutionary methods -and traditions in political life. The entire -activity of the German Social Democracy was -directed towards the awakening of the -backward workers, through a systematic fight for -their most immediate needs--the gathering of -strength, the increase of membership, the filling -of the treasury, the development of the press, -the conquest of all the positions that presented -themselves, their utilization and expansion. -This was the great historical work of the -awakening and educating of the "unhistorical" class.</p> -<p class="pnext">The great centralized trade unions of -Germany developed in direct dependence upon the -development of national industry, adapting -themselves to its successes in the home and the -foreign markets, and controlling the prices of -raw materials and manufactured products. -Localized in political districts to adapt itself to -the election laws and stretching feelers in all -cities and rural communities, the Social -Democracy built up the unique structure of the -political organization of the German -proletariat with its many-branched bureaucratic -hierarchy, its one million dues-paying -members, its four million voters, ninety-one daily -papers and sixty-five Party printing presses. -This whole many-sided activity, of immeasurable -historical importance, was permeated -through and through with the spirit of possibilism.</p> -<p class="pnext">In forty-five years history did not offer the -German proletariat a single opportunity to -remove an obstacle by a stormy attack, or to -capture any hostile position in a revolutionary -advance. As a result of the mutual relation of -social forces, it was forced to avoid obstacles or -adapt itself to them. In this, Marxism as a -theory was a valuable tool for political guidance, -but it could not change the opportunist character -of the class movement, which in essence was -at that time alike in England, France and -Germany. For all the undisputed superiority of -the German organization, the tactics of the -unions were very much the same in Berlin and -London. Their chief achievement was the system -of tariff treaties. In the political field the -difference was much greater and deeper. -While the English proletariat were marching -under the banner of Liberalism, the German -workers formed an independent party with a -Socialist platform. Yet this difference does not -go nearly as deep in politics as it does in -ideologic forms, and the forms of organization.</p> -<p class="pnext">Through the pressure that English labor -exerted on the Liberal Party it achieved certain -limited political victories, the extension of -suffrage, freedom to unionize, and social -legislation. The same was preserved or improved by -the German proletariat through its independent -party, which it was obliged to form because -of the speedy capitulation of German liberalism. -And yet this party, while in <em class="italics">principle</em> -fighting the fight for political power, was -compelled in actual practice to adapt itself to the -ruling power, to protect the labor movement -against the blows of this power, and to achieve -a few reforms. In other words: on account of -the difference in historical traditions and -political conditions, the English proletariat adapted -itself to the capitalist state through the -medium of the Liberal Party; while the German -proletariat was forced to form a party of its -own to achieve the very same political ends. -And the political struggle of the German -proletariat in this entire period had the same -opportunist character limited by historical -conditions as did that of the English proletariat.</p> -<p class="pnext">The similarity of these two phenomena so -different in their forms comes out most clearly -in the final results at the close of the period. -The English proletariat in the struggle to meet -its daily issues was forced to form an -independent party of its own, without, however, -breaking with its liberal traditions; and the -party of the German proletariat, when the -War forced upon it the necessity of a decisive -choice, gave an answer in the spirit of the -national-liberal traditions of the English labor -party.</p> -<p class="pnext">Marxism, of course, was not merely something -accidental or insignificant in the German -labor movement. Yet there would be no basis -for deducing the social-revolutionary character -of the Party from its official Marxist ideology.</p> -<p class="pnext">Ideology is an important, but not a decisive -factor in politics. Its rôle is that of waiting on -politics. That deep-seated contradiction, -which was inherent in the awakening -revolutionary class on account of its relation to the -feudal-reactionary state, demanded an -irreconcilable ideology which would bring the whole -movement under the banner of social -revolutionary aims. Since historical conditions -forced opportunist tactics, the irreconcilability -of the proletarian class found expression in the -revolutionary formulas of Marxism. Theoretically, -Marxism reconciled with perfect success -the contradiction between reform and -revolution. Yet the process of historical -development is something far more involved than -theorizing in the realm of pure thought. The -fact that the class which was revolutionary in -its tendencies was forced for several decades -to adapt itself to the monarchical police state, -based on the tremendous capitalistic -development of the country, in the course of which -adaptation an organization of a million -members was built up and a labor bureaucracy -which led the entire movement was educated--this -fact does not cease to exist and does not -lose its weighty significance because Marxism -anticipated the revolutionary character of the -future movement. Only the most naïve ideology -could give the same place to this forecast -that it does to the political actualities of the -German labor movement.</p> -<p class="pnext">The German Revisionists were influenced in -their conduct by the contradiction between the -reform practice of the Party and its -revolutionary theories. They did not understand that -this contradiction is conditioned by temporary, -even if long-lasting circumstances and that it -can only be overcome by further social -development. To them it was a logical contradiction. -The mistake of the Revisionists was not that -they confirmed the reformistic character of the -Party's tactics in the past, but that they wanted -to perpetuate reformism theoretically and -make it the only method of the proletarian class -struggle. Thus, the Revisionists failed to take -into account the objective tendencies of -capitalistic development, which by deepening class -distinctions must lead to the social revolution -as the one way to the emancipation of the -proletariat. Marxism emerged from this theoretical -dispute as the victor all along the line. But -revisionism, although defeated on the field of -theory, continued to live, drawing sustenance -from the actual conduct and the psychology of -the whole movement. The critical refutation -of revisionism as a theory by no means signified -its defeat tactically and psychologically. The -parliamentarians, the unionists, the comrades -continued to live and to work in the atmosphere -of general opportunism, of practical specializing -and of nationalistic narrowness. Reformism -made its impress even upon the mind of -August Bebel, the greatest representative of -this period.</p> -<p class="pnext">The spirit of opportunism must have taken -a particularly strong hold on the generation -that came into the party in the eighties, in the -time of Bismarck's anti-Socialist laws and of -oppressive reaction all over Europe. Lacking -the apostolic zeal of the generation that was -connected with the First International, hindered -in its first steps by the power of victorious -imperialism, forced to adapt itself to the -traps and snares of the anti-Socialist laws, this -generation grew up in the spirit of moderation -and constitutional distrust of revolution. They -are now men of fifty to sixty years old, and -they are the very ones who are now at the head -of the unions and the political organizations. -Reformism is their political psychology, if not -also their doctrine. The gradual growing into -Socialism--that is the basis of Revisionism--proved -to be the most miserable Utopian dream -in face of the facts of capitalistic development. -But the gradual political growth of the Social -Democracy into the mechanism of the national -state has turned out to be a tragic actuality--for -the entire race.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Russian Revolution was the first great -event to bring a fresh whiff into the stale -atmosphere of Europe in the thirty-five years -since the Paris Commune. The rapid -development of the Russian working class and the -unexpected strength of their concentrated -revolutionary activity made a great impression on -the entire civilized world and gave an impetus -everywhere to the sharpening of political -differences. In England the Russian Revolution -hastened the formation of an independent labor -party. In Austria, thanks to special -circumstances, it led to universal manhood suffrage. -In France the echo of the Russian Revolution -took the form of Syndicalism, which gave -expression, in inadequate practical and theoretical -form, to the awakened revolutionary -tendencies of the French proletariat. And in -Germany the influence of the Russian Revolution -showed itself in the strengthening of the young -Left wing of the Party, in the rapprochement -of the leading Center to it, and in the isolation -of Revisionism. The question of the Prussian -franchise, this key to the political position of -Junkerdom, took on a keener edge. And the -Party adopted in principle the revolutionary -method of the general strike. But all this -external shaping up proved inadequate to shove -the Party on to the road of the political -offensive. In accordance with the Party -tradition, the turn toward radicalism found -expression in discussions and the adoption of -resolutions. That was as far as it ever went.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="the-decline-of-the-revolutionary-spirit">CHAPTER IX</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">THE DECLINE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">Six or seven years ago a political ebb-tide -everywhere followed upon the revolutionary -flood-tide. In Russia the counter-revolution -triumphed and began a period of decay for the -Russian proletariat both in politics and in the -strength of their own organizations. In -Austria the thread of achievements started by the -working class broke off, social insurance -legislation rotted in the government offices, -nationalist conflicts began again with renewed vigor -in the arena of universal manhood suffrage, -weakening and dividing the Social Democracy. -In England, the Labor Party, after separating -from the Liberal Party, entered into the closest -association with it again. In France the -Syndicalists passed over to reformist positions. -Gustav Hervé changed to the opposite of -himself in the shortest time. And in the German -Social Democracy the Revisionists lifted their -heads, encouraged by history's having given -them such a revenge. The South Germans -perpetrated their demonstrative vote for the -budget. The Marxists were compelled to -change from offensive to defensive tactics. The -efforts of the Left wing to draw the Party -into a more active policy were unsuccessful. -The dominating Center swung more and more -towards the Right, isolating the radicals. -Conservatism, recovering from the blows it -received in 1905, triumphed all along the line.</p> -<p class="pnext">In default of revolutionary activity as well -as the possibility for reformist work, the Party -spent its entire energy on building up the -organization, on gaining new members for the -unions and for the Party, on starting new -papers and getting new subscribers. Condemned -for decades to a policy of opportunist waiting, -the Party took up the cult of organization as -an end in itself. Never was the spirit of inertia -produced by mere routine work so strong in the -German Social Democracy as in the years -immediately preceding the great catastrophe. -And there can be no doubt that the question of -the preservation of the organizations, -treasuries, People's Houses and printing presses -played a mighty important part in the position -taken by the fraction in the Reichstag towards -the War. "Had we done anything else we -would have brought ruin upon our organization -and our presses" was the first argument I heard -from a leading German comrade.</p> -<p class="pnext">And how characteristic it is of the opportunistic -psychology induced by mere organization -work, that out of ninety-one Social -Democratic papers not one found it possible to -protest against the violation of Belgium. Not one! -After the repeal of the anti-Socialist laws, the -Party hesitated long before starting its own -printing presses, lest these might be confiscated -by the government in the event of great -happenings. And now that it has its own presses, -the Party hierarchy fears every decisive step -so as not to afford opportunity for confiscation.</p> -<p class="pnext">Most eloquent of all is the incident of the -<em class="italics">Verwärts</em> which begged for permission to -continue to exist--on the basis of a new -programme indefinitely suspending the class -conflict. Every friend of the German Social -Democracy had a sense of profound pain when he -received his issue of the central organ with its -humiliating "By Order of Army -Headquarters." Had the <em class="italics">Verwärts</em> remained under -interdiction, that would have been an important -political fact to which the Party later could -have referred with pride. At any rate that -would have been far more honorable than to -continue to exist with the imprint of the -general's boots on its forehead.</p> -<p class="pnext">But higher than all considerations of policy -and the dignity of the Party stood considerations -of membership, printing presses, organization. -And so the <em class="italics">Verwärts</em> now lives as two-paged -evidence of the unlimited brutality of -Junkerdom in Berlin and in Louvain, and of -the unlimited opportunism of the German -Social Democracy.</p> -<p class="pnext">The Right wing stood more by its principles, -which resulted from political considerations. -Wolfgang Heine crassly formulated these -principles of German Reformism in an absurd -discussion as to whether the Social Democrats -should leave the hall of the Reichstag when the -members rose to cheer the Emperor's name, or -whether they should merely keep their seats. -"The creation of a republic in the German -Empire is now and for some time to come out of -the range of all possibility, so that it is not -really a matter for our present policy." The -practical results still not yet achieved may be -reached, but only through co-operation with -the liberal bourgeoisie. "For that reason, not -because I am a stickler for form, I have -called attention to the fact that parliamentary -co-operation will be rendered difficult by -demonstrations that needlessly <em class="italics">hurt the feelings</em> -of the majority of the House."</p> -<p class="pnext">But if a simple infringement of monarchical -etiquette was enough to destroy the hope of -reformist co-operation with the liberal middle -class, then certainly the break with the -bourgeois "nation" in the moment of national -"danger" would have hindered, for years to come, -not only all desired reforms, but also all -reformist desires. That attitude that was -dictated to the routinists of the Party center by -sheer anxiety over the preservation of the -organization was supplemented among the -Revisionists by political considerations. Their -standpoint proved in every respect to be more -comprehensive and won the victory all over. -The entire Party press is now industriously -acclaiming what it once heaped scorn upon, that -the present patriotic attitude of the working -class will win for them, after the war, the good -will of the possessing classes for bringing about -reforms.</p> -<p class="pnext">Therefore, the German Social Democracy -did not feel itself, under the stress of these -great events, a revolutionary power with -tasks far exceeding the question of widening -the state's boundaries, a power that does not -lose itself for an instant in the nationalistic -whirl, but calmly awaits the favorable moment -for joining with the other branches of the -International in a purposeful interference in the -course of events. No, instead of that the -German Social Democracy felt itself to be a sort of -cumbersome train threatened by hostile -cavalry. For that reason it subordinated the -entire future of the International to the quite -extraneous question of the defense of the -frontiers of the class state--because it felt itself -first and foremost to be a conservative state -within the state.</p> -<p class="pnext">"Look at Belgium!" cries the <em class="italics">Verwärts</em> to -encourage the workmen-soldiers. The -People's Houses there have been changed into -army hospitals, the newspapers suppressed, all -Party life crushed out.<a class="footnote-reference" href="#id10" id="id9"><sup>5</sup></a> And therefore hold -out until the end, "until the decisive victory is -ours." In other words, keep on destroying, let -the work of your own hands be a terrifying -lesson to you. "Look at Belgium," and out of -this terror draw courage for renewed destruction.</p> -<p class="pnext">What has just been said refers not to the -German Social Democracy alone, but also to -all the older branches of the International that -have lived through the history of the last half -century.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="working-class-imperialism">CHAPTER X</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">WORKING CLASS IMPERIALISM</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">There is one factor in the collapse of the -Second International that is still unclarified. -It dwells at the heart of all the events that the -Party has passed through.</p> -<p class="pnext">The dependence of the proletarian class -movement, particularly in its economic -conflicts, upon the scope and the successes of the -imperialistic policy of the state is a question -which, as far as I know, has never been -discussed in the Socialist press. Nor can I -attempt to solve it in the short space of this work. -So what I shall say on this point will -necessarily be in the nature of a brief review.</p> -<p class="pnext">The proletariat is deeply interested in the -development of the forces of production. The -national state created in Europe by the -revolutions and wars of the years 1789 to 1870 was -the basic type of the economic evolution of the -past period. The proletariat contributed by -its entire conscious policy to the development -of the forces of production on a national -foundation. It supported the bourgeoisie in its -conflicts with alien enemies for national -liberation; also in its conflicts with the monarchy, -with feudalism and the church for political -democracy. And in the measure in which the -bourgeois turned to "law and order," that is, -became reactionary, the proletariat assumed -the historical task it left uncompleted. In -championing a policy of peace, culture and -democracy, as against the bourgeoisie, it -contributed to the enlargement of the national -market, and so gave an impetus to the development -of the forces of production.</p> -<p class="pnext">The proletariat had an equal economic -interest in the democratizing and the cultural -progress of all other countries in their relation of -buyer or seller to its own country. In this -resided the most important guarantee for the -international solidarity of the proletariat both -in so far as final aims and daily policies are -concerned. The struggle against the remnants of -feudal barbarism, against the boundless -demands of militarism, against agrarian duties -and indirect taxes was the main object of -working-class politics and served, directly and -indirectly, to help develop the forces of production. -That is the very reason why the great majority -of organized labor joined political forces with -the Social Democracy. Every hindrance to -the development of the forces of production -touches the trade unions most closely.</p> -<p class="pnext">As capitalism passed from a national to an -international-imperialistic ground, national -production, and with it the economic struggle -of the proletariat, came into direct dependence -on those conditions of the world-market which -are secured by dreadnaughts and cannon. In -other words, in contradiction of the fundamental -interests of the proletariat taken in their -wide historic extent, the immediate trade -interests of various strata of the proletariat proved -to have a direct dependence upon the successes -or the failures of the foreign policies of the -governments.</p> -<p class="pnext">England long before the other countries -placed her capitalistic development on the basis -of predatory imperialism, and she interested -the upper strata of the proletariat in her world -dominion. In championing its own class -interests, the English proletariat limited itself to -exercising pressure on the bourgeois parties -which granted it a share in the capitalistic -exploitation of other countries. It did not begin -an independent policy until England began to -lose her position in the world market, pushed -aside, among others, by her main rival, Germany.</p> -<p class="pnext">But with Germany's growth to industrial -world-importance, grew the dependence of -broad strata of the German proletariat on -German imperialism, not materially alone but also -ideally. The <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> wrote on August 11th -that the German workingmen, "counted among -the politically intelligent, to whom we have -preached the dangers of imperialism for years -(although <em class="italics">with very little success</em>, we must -confess)" scold at Italian neutrality like the -extremest chauvinists. But that did not prevent -the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> from feeding the German -workingmen on "national" and "democratic" -arguments in justification of the bloody work of -imperialism. (Some writers' backbones are as -flexible as their pens.)</p> -<p class="pnext">However, all this does not alter facts. When -the decisive moment came, there seemed to be -no irreconcilable enmity to imperialistic policies -in the consciousness of the German workingmen. -On the contrary, they seemed to listen -readily to imperialist whisperings veiled in -national and democratic phraseology. This is not -the first time that Socialistic imperialism -reveals itself in the German Social Democracy. -Suffice it to recall the fact that at the -International Congress in Stuttgart it was the -majority of the German delegates, notably the trade -unionists, who voted against the Marxist -resolution on the colonial policy. The occurrence -made a sensation at the time, but its true -significance comes out more clearly in the light of -present events. Just now the trade union press -is linking the cause of the German working -class to the work of the Hohenzollern army -with more consciousness and matter-of-factness -than do the political organs.</p> -<p class="pnext">As long as capitalism remained on a national -basis, the proletariat could not refrain from -co-operation in democratizing the political -relations and in developing the forces of -production through its parliamentary, communal and -other activities. The attempts of the anarchists -to set up a formal revolutionary agitation in -opposition to the political fights of the Social -Democracy condemned them to isolation and -gradual extinction. But when the capitalist -states overstep their national form to become -imperialistic world powers, the proletariat -cannot oppose this new imperialism. And the -reason is the so-called minimal programme which -fashioned its policy upon the framework of the -national state. When its main concern is for -tariff treaties and social legislation, the -proletariat is incapable of expending the same -energy in fighting imperialism that it did in -fighting feudalism. By applying its old methods -of the class struggle--the constant adaptation -to the movements of the markets--to the -changed conditions produced by imperialism, it -itself falls into material and ideological -dependence on imperialism.</p> -<p class="pnext">The only way the proletariat can pit its -revolutionary force against imperialism is under the -banner of Socialism. The working class is -powerless against imperialism as long as its -great organizations stand by their old -opportunist tactics. The working class will be -all-powerful against imperialism when it takes to -the battlefield of Social Revolution.</p> -<p class="pnext">The methods of national parliamentary -opposition not only fail to produce objective -results, but the laboring masses lose all interest in -them because they find that their earnings and -their very existence are not affected by what -is done in parliament. Behind the backs of -the parliamentarians imperialism wins its -successes in the world market.</p> -<p class="pnext">The methods of national-parliamentary -opposition not only fail to produce practical -results, but also cease to make an appeal to the -laboring masses, because the workers find that, -behind the backs of the parliamentarians, -imperialism, by armed force, reduces the wages -and the very lives of the workers to ever greater -dependence on its successes in the world market.</p> -<p class="pnext">It was clear to every thinking Socialist that -the only way the proletariat could be made to -pass from opportunism to Revolution was not -by agitation, but by a historical upheaval. But -no one foresaw that history would preface this -inevitable change of tactics by such a catastrophal -collapse of the International. History -works with titanic relentlessness. What is the -Rheims Cathedral to History? And what a -few hundred or thousand political reputations? -And what the life or death of hundreds of -thousands or of millions?</p> -<p class="pnext">The proletariat has remained too long in the -preparatory school, much longer than its great -pioneer fighters thought it would. History -took her broom in hand, swept the International -of the epigone apart in all directions -and led the slow-moving millions into the field -where their last illusions are being washed away -in blood. A terrible experiment! On its -result perhaps hangs the fate of European civilization.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<p class="center large pfirst" id="the-revolutionary-epoch">CHAPTER XI</p> -<p class="center medium pnext">THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 2em"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">At the close of the last century a heated -controversy arose in Germany over the question, -What effect does the industrialization of -a country produce upon its military power? -The reactionary agrarian politicians and -writers, like Sehring, Karl Ballod, Georg -Hansen and others, argued that the rapid increase -of the city populations at the expense of the -rural districts positively undermined the -foundation of the Empire's military power, and -they of course drew from it their patriotic -inferences in the spirit of agrarian protectionism. -On the other hand Lujo Brentano and his -school championed an exactly opposite point of -view. They pointed out that economic -industrialism not only opened up new financial and -technical resources, but also developed in the -proletariat the vital force capable of making -effective use of all the new means of defense and -attack. He quotes authoritative opinions to -show that even in the earlier experiences of -1870-71 "the regiments from the preponderantly -industrial district of Westphalia were -among the very best." And he explains this -fact quite correctly by the far greater ability -of the industrial worker to find his bearings in -new conditions and to adjust himself to them. -Now which side is right? The present War -proves that Germany, which has made the -greatest progress along capitalistic lines, was -able to develop the highest military power. -And likewise in regard to all the countries -drawn into it the War proves what colossal and -yet competent energy the working class -develops in its warlike activities. It is not the -passive horde-like heroism of the peasant -masses, welded together by fatalistic -submissiveness and religious superstition. It is the -individualized spirit of sacrifice, born of inner -impulse, ranging itself under the banner of the -Idea.</p> -<p class="pnext">But the Idea under whose banner the armed -proletariat now stands, is the Idea of -war-crafty nationalism, the deadly enemy of the -true interests of the workers. The ruling class -showed themselves strong enough to force their -Idea upon the proletariat, and the proletariat, -in the consciousness of what they were doing, -put their intelligence, their enthusiasm and -their courage at the service of their class-foes. -In this fact is sealed the terrible defeat of -Socialism. But it also opens up all possibilities -for a final victory of Socialism. There can be -no doubt that a class which is capable of -displaying such steadfastness and self-sacrifice in -a war it considers a "just" one, will be still -more capable of developing these qualities when -the march of events will give it tasks really -worthy of the historical mission of this class.</p> -<p class="pnext">The epoch of the awakening, the enlightenment -and the organization of the working-class -revealed that it has tremendous resources of -revolutionary energy which found no -adequate employment in the daily struggle. The -Social Democracy summoned the upper strata -of the proletariat into the field, but it also -checked their revolutionary energy by -adopting the tactics it was obliged to adopt, the -tactics of <em class="italics">waiting</em>, the strategy of letting your -opponent exhaust himself. The character of this -period was so dull and reactionary that it did -not allow the Social Democracy the opportunity -to give the proletariat tasks that would -have engaged their whole spirit of sacrifice.</p> -<p class="pnext">Imperialism is now giving them such tasks. -And imperialism attained its object by pushing -the proletariat into a position of "national -defense," which, to the workers, meant the defense -of all their hands had created, not only the -immense wealth of the nation, but also their own -class-organizations, their treasuries, their press, -in short, everything they had unwearyingly, -painfully struggled for and attained in the -course of several decades. Imperialism -violently threw society off its balance, destroyed -the sluice-gates built by the Social Democracy -to regulate the current of proletarian revolutionary -energy, and guided this current into its -<em class="italics">own</em> bed.</p> -<p class="pnext">But this terrific historical experiment, which -at one blow broke the back of the Socialist -International, carries a deadly danger for -bourgeois society itself. The hammer is wrenched -out of the worker's hand and a gun put into -his hand instead. And the worker, who has -been tied down by the machinery of the capitalist -system, is suddenly torn from his usual -setting and taught to place the aims of society -above happiness at home and even life itself.</p> -<p class="pnext">With the weapon in his hand that he himself -has forged, the worker is put in a position -where the political destiny of the state is -directly dependent upon him. Those who -exploited and scorned him in normal times, -flatter him now and toady to him. At the same -time he comes into intimate contact with the -cannon, which Lassalle calls one of the most -important ingredients of all constitutions. He -crosses the border, takes part in forceful -requisitions, and helps in the passing of cities -from one party to another. Changes are taking -place such as the present generation has never -before seen.</p> -<p class="pnext">Even though the vanguard of the working-class -knew in theory that Might is the mother -of Right, still their political thinking was -completely permeated by the spirit of opportunism, -of adaptation to bourgeois legalism. Now -they are learning from the teachings of facts -to despise this legalism and tear it down. Now -dynamic forces are replacing the static -forces in their psychology. The great guns are -hammering into their heads the idea that if it -is impossible to get around an obstacle, it is -possible to destroy it. Almost the entire adult -male population is going through this school -of war, so terrible in its realism, a school which -is forming a new human type. Iron necessity -is now shaking its fist at all the rules of -bourgeois society, at its laws, its morality, its -religion. "Necessity knows no law," said the -German Chancellor on August 4th. Monarchs -walk about in public places calling each other -liars in the language of market-women; -governments repudiate their solemnly acknowledged -obligations, and the national church ties -its God to the national cannon like a criminal -condemned to hard labor. Is it not clear that -all these circumstances must bring about a -profound change in the mental attitude of the -working-class, curing them radically of the -hypnosis of legality in which a period of -political stagnation expresses itself?</p> -<p class="pnext">The possessing classes, to their consternation, -will soon have to recognize this change. A -working-class that has been through the school -of war will feel the need of using the language -of force as soon as the first serious obstacle -faces them within their own country. "Necessity -knows no law" the workers will cry when -the attempt is made to hold them back at the -command of bourgeois law. And poverty, the -terrible poverty that prevails during this war -and will continue after its close, will be of a -sort to force the masses to violate many a -bourgeois law. The general economic exhaustion -in Europe will affect the proletariat most -immediately and most severely. The state's -material resources will be depleted by the war, -and the possibility of satisfying the demands -of the working-masses will be very limited. -This must lead to profound political conflicts, -which, ever-widening and deepening, may take -on the character of a social revolution, the -course and outcome of which no one, of course, -can now foresee.</p> -<p class="pnext">On the other hand, the War with its armies -of millions, and its hellish weapons of -destruction can exhaust not only society's resources -but also the moral forces of the proletariat. If -it does not meet inner resistance, this War may -last for several years more, with changing -fortunes on both sides, until the chief belligerents -are completely exhausted. But then the whole -fighting energy of the international proletariat, -brought to the surface by the bloody -conspiracy of imperialism, will be completely -consumed in the horrible work of mutual -annihilation. The outcome would be that our entire -civilization would be set back by many decades. -A peace resulting not from the will of the -awakened peoples but from the mutual exhaustion -of the belligerents, would be like the peace -with which the Balkan War was concluded; it -would be a Bucharest Peace extended to the -whole of Europe.</p> -<p class="pnext">Such a peace would seek to patch up anew -the contradictions, antagonisms and deficiencies -that have led to the present War. And with -many other things, the Socialist work of two -generations would vanish in a sea of blood -without leaving a trace behind.</p> -<p class="pnext">Which of the two prospects is the more -probable? This cannot possibly be theoretically -determined in advance. The issue depends -entirely upon the activity of the vital forces of -society--above all upon the revolutionary -Social Democracy.</p> -<p class="pnext">"<em class="italics">Immediate cessation of the War</em>" is the -watchword under which the Social Democracy -can reassemble its scattered ranks, both within -the national parties, and in the whole -International. The proletariat cannot make its will -to peace dependent upon the strategic -considerations of the general staffs. On the contrary, -it must oppose its desire for peace to these -military considerations. What the warring -governments call a struggle for national -self-preservation is in reality a mutual national -annihilation. Real national self-defense now -consists in the struggle for peace.</p> -<p class="pnext">Such a struggle for peace means for us not -only a fight to save humanity's material and -cultural possessions from further insane -destruction. It is for us primarily a fight to -preserve the revolutionary energy of the proletariat.</p> -<p class="pnext">To assemble the ranks of the proletariat in -a fight for peace means again to place the -forces of revolutionary Socialism against -raging, tearing imperialism on the whole front.</p> -<p class="pnext">The conditions upon which peace should be -concluded--the peace of the peoples themselves, -and not the reconciliation of the -diplomats--must be the same for the whole -International.</p> -<p class="left pnext white-space-pre-line">NO CONTRIBUTIONS.<br /> -THE RIGHT OF EVERY NATION<br /> -TO SELF-DETERMINATION.<br /> -THE UNITED STATES OF<br /> -EUROPE--WITHOUT MONARCHIES,<br /> -WITHOUT STANDING ARMIES,<br /> -WITHOUT RULING FEUDAL<br /> -CASTES, WITHOUT SECRET DIPLOMACY.</p> -<p class="pnext">The peace agitation, which must be -conducted simultaneously with all the means now -at the disposal of the Social Democracy as -well as those which, with a good will, it could -acquire, will not only tear the workers out of -their nationalistic hypnosis; it will also do the -saving work of inner purification in the -present official parties of the proletariat. The -national Revisionists and the Socialist patriots in -the Second International, who have been -exploiting the influence that Socialism has -acquired over the working masses for national -militaristic aims, must be thrust back into the -camp of the enemies of the working class by -uncompromising revolutionary agitation for peace.</p> -<p class="pnext">The revolutionary Social Democracy need -not fear that it will be isolated, now less than -ever. The War is making the most terrible -agitation against itself. Every day that the -War lasts will bring new masses of people to -our banner, if it is an honest banner of peace -and democracy. The surest way by which the -Social Democracy can isolate the militaristic -reaction in Europe and force it to take the -offensive is by the slogan of Peace.</p> -<div class="center transition"> -<p class="pfirst">――――</p> -</div> -<p class="pfirst">We revolutionary Marxists have no cause -for despair. The epoch into which we are now -entering will be <em class="italics">our</em> epoch. Marxism is not -defeated. On the contrary: the roar of the -cannon in every quarter of Europe heralds the -theoretical victory of Marxism. What is left -now of the hopes for a "peaceful" development, -for a mitigation of capitalist class contrasts, -for a regular systematic growth into Socialism?</p> -<p class="pnext">The Reformists on principle, who hoped to -solve the social question by the way of tariff -treaties, consumers' leagues, and the parliamentary -co-operation of the Social Democracy with -the bourgeois parties, are now all resting their -hopes on the victory of the "national" arms. -They are expecting the possessing classes to -show greater willingness to meet the needs of -the proletariat because it has proved its patriotism.</p> -<p class="pnext">This expectation would be positively foolish -if there were not hidden behind it another, far -less "idealistic" hope--that a military victory -would create for the bourgeoisie a broader -imperialistic field for enriching itself at the -expense of the bourgeoisie of other countries, and -would enable it to share some of the booty with -its own proletariat at the expense of the -proletariat of other countries. <em class="italics">Socialist reformism -has actually turned into Socialist imperialism</em>.</p> -<p class="pnext">We have witnessed with our own eyes the -pathetic bankruptcy of the hopes of a peaceful -growth of proletarian well-being. The Reformists, -contrary to their own doctrine, were forced -to resort to violence in order to find their way -out of the political <em class="italics">cul-de-sac</em>--and not the -violence of the peoples against the ruling classes, -but the military violence of the ruling classes -against other nations. Since 1848 the -German bourgeoisie has renounced revolutionary -methods for solving its problems. They left it -to the feudal class to solve their own bourgeois -questions by the method of war. Social -development confronted the proletariat with the -problem of revolution. Evading revolution, -the Reformists were forced to go through the -same process of historical decline as the liberal -bourgeoisie. The Reformists also left it to -their ruling classes, that is the same feudal -caste, to solve the proletarian problem by the -method of war. But this ends the analogy.</p> -<p class="pnext">The creation of national states did really -solve the bourgeois problem for a long period, -and the long series of colonial wars coming -after 1871 finished off the period by broadening -the arena of the development of the -capitalistic forces. The period of colonial wars -carried on by the national states led to the present -War of the national states--for colonies. After -all the backward portions of the earth had been -divided among the capitalist states, there was -nothing left for these states except to grab the -colonies from each other.</p> -<p class="pnext">"People ought not to talk," says George -Irmer, "as though it were self-evident that the -German Empire has come too late for rivalry -for world economy and world markets, that the -world has already been divided. Has not the -earth been divided over and over again in all -epochs of history?"</p> -<p class="pnext">But a re-division of colonies among the -capitalist countries does not enlarge the foundation -of capitalist development. One country's gain -means another country's loss. Accordingly a -temporary mitigation of class-conflicts in -Germany could only be achieved by an extreme -intensification of the class-struggle in France and -in England, and <em class="italics">vice versa</em>. An additional -factor of decisive importance is the capitalist -awakening in the colonies themselves, to which -the present War must give a mighty impetus. -Whatever the outcome of this War, the -imperialistic basis for European capitalism will not -be broadened, but narrowed. The War, -therefore, does not solve the labor question on an -imperialistic basis, but, on the contrary, it -intensifies it, putting this alternative to the -capitalist world: <em class="italics">Permanent War or Revolution</em>.</p> -<p class="pnext">If the War got beyond the control of the -Second International, its immediate -consequences will get beyond the control of the -bourgeoisie of the entire world. We revolutionary -Socialists did not want the War. <em class="italics">But we do -not fear it</em>. We do not give in to despair over -the fact that the War broke up the International. -History had already disposed of the -International.</p> -<p class="pnext">The revolutionary epoch will create new -forms of organization out of the inexhaustible -resources of proletarian Socialism, new forms -that will be equal to the greatness of the new -tasks. To this work we will apply ourselves -at once, amid the mad roaring of the -machine-guns, the crashing of cathedrals, and the -patriotic howling of the capitalist jackals. We -will keep our clear minds amid this hellish death -music, our undimmed vision. We feel -ourselves to be the only creative force of the -future. Already there are many of us, more than -it may seem. To-morrow there will be more of -us than to-day. And the day after to-morrow, -millions will rise up under our banner, millions -who even now, sixty-seven years after the -Communist Manifesto, have nothing to lose but -their chains.</p> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 4em"> -</div> -<div class="container footnotes smaller"> -<table class="docutils footnote-group" frame="void" rules="none"> -<colgroup><col class="label" /><col /></colgroup> -<tbody valign="top"> -<tr class="footnote" id="id2"> -<td class="label"><a class="fn-backref" href="#id1">[1]</a></td><td><p class="first last pfirst">It is noteworthy that these opportunistic Austrian and -German Socialists are now writhing with moral indignation over -the "treacherous assassination at Sarajevo." And yet they -always sympathized with the Russian terrorists more than we, -the Russian Social Democrats, did, who are opposed on principle -to the terroristic method. Lost in the mist of chauvinism, -they can no longer see that the unfortunate Servian terrorist, -Gavrilo Prinzip, represents precisely the same national -principle as the German terrorist, Sand. Perhaps they will even -ask us to transfer our sympathies from Sand to Kotzebue? Or -perhaps these eunuchs will advise the Swiss to overthrow the -monuments erected to the assassin Tell and replace them with -monuments to the Austrian governor, Gessler, one of the -spiritual forerunners of the murdered archduke?</p> -</td></tr> -<tr class="footnote" id="id4"> -<td class="label"><a class="fn-backref" href="#id3">[2]</a></td><td><p class="first last pfirst">To appreciate fully this action of the Servian Socialists we -must bear in mind the political situation by which they were -confronted. A group of Servian conspirators had murdered a -member of the Hapsburg family, the mainstay of Austro-Hungarian -clericalism, militarism, and imperialism. Using this as -a welcome pretext, the military party in Vienna sent an -ultimatum to Servia, which, for sheer audacity, has scarcely ever -been paralleled in diplomatic history. In reply, the Servian -government made extraordinary concessions, and suggested that -the solution of the question in dispute be turned over to the -Hague tribunal. Thereupon Austria declared war on Servia. -If the idea of a "war of defense" has any meaning at all, it -certainly applied to Servia in this instance. Nevertheless, our -friends, Ljaptchevitch and Katzlerovitch, unshaken in their -conviction of the course of action that they as Socialists must -pursue, refused the government a vote of confidence. The -writer was in Servia at the beginning of the War. In the -Skuptchina, in an atmosphere of indescribable national -enthusiasm, a vote was taken on the war credits. The voting was -by roll-call. Two hundred members had all answered "Yes." Then -in a moment of deathlike silence came the voice of the -Socialist Ljaptchevitch--"No." Every one felt the moral force -of this protest, and the scene has remained indelibly impressed -upon my memory.</p> -</td></tr> -<tr class="footnote" id="id6"> -<td class="label"><a class="fn-backref" href="#id5">[3]</a></td><td><p class="first last pfirst">"How characteristically Prussian," wrote Marx to Engels, -"to declare that no man may defend his 'fatherland' except in -uniform!"</p> -</td></tr> -<tr class="footnote" id="id8"> -<td class="label"><a class="fn-backref" href="#id7">[4]</a></td><td><p class="first last pfirst">"Russian diplomacy is interested only in such wars," wrote -Engels in 1890, "as force her allies to bear the chief burden of -raising troops and suffering invasion, and leave to the Russian -troops only the work of reserves. Czarism makes war on its -own account only on decidedly weaker nations, such as Sweden, -Turkey and Persia." Austria-Hungary must now be placed in -the same class as Turkey and Persia.</p> -</td></tr> -<tr class="footnote" id="id10"> -<td class="label"><a class="fn-backref" href="#id9">[5]</a></td><td><p class="first last pfirst">A sentimental correspondent of the <em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> writes that he -was looking for Belgian comrades in the <em class="italics">Maison du Peuple</em> and -found a German army hospital there. And what did the -<em class="italics">Vorwärts</em> correspondent want of his Belgian comrades? "<em class="italics">To win -them to the cause of the German people</em>--just when Brussels -itself had been won 'for the cause of the German people!'"</p> -</td></tr> -</tbody> -</table> -</div> -<div class="vspace" style="height: 6em"> -</div> -<!-- -*- encoding: utf-8 -*- --> -<div class="backmatter"> -</div> -<p class="pfirst" id="pg-end-line">*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK <span>THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE</span> ***</p> -<div class="cleardoublepage"> -</div> -<div class="language-en level-2 pgfooter section" id="a-word-from-project-gutenberg" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> -<span id="pg-footer"></span><h2 class="level-2 pfirst section-title title">A Word from Project Gutenberg</h2> -<p class="pfirst">We will update this book if we find any errors.</p> -<p class="pnext">This book can be found under: <a class="reference external" href="http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40273"><span>http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40273</span></a></p> -<p class="pnext">Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no one -owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and -you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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