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diff --git a/40273-8.txt b/40273-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 13da87c..0000000 --- a/40273-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4118 +0,0 @@ - THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE - - - - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost -no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it -under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this -eBook or online at http://www.gutenberg.org/license. - - -Title: The Bolsheviki and World Peace - -Author: Leon Trotzky - -Release Date: July 18, 2012 [EBook #40273] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE -*** - - - - -Produced by Al Haines. - - - - -[Illustration: Cover] - - - -[Illustration: Leon Trotzky] - - - - - THE BOLSHEVIKI - AND - WORLD PEACE - - BY LEON TROTZKY - - INTRODUCTION BY LINCOLN STEFFENS - - - - - BONI AND LIVERIGHT - NEW YORK - 1918 - - - - - Copyright - 1918 - Boni & Liveright Inc. - - - - CONTENTS - - -Introduction by Lincoln Steffens -Author's Preface - - - CHAPTER - - I. The Balkan Question - II. Austria-Hungary - III. The War against Czarism - IV. The War against the West - V. The War of Defense - VI. What Have Socialists to do with Capitalist Wars? - VII. The Collapse of the International - VIII. Socialist Opportunism - IX. The Decline of the Revolutionary Spirit - X. Working Class Imperialism - XI. The Revolutionary Epoch - - - - - INTRODUCTION - - -The voice that speaks in this book is the voice of Leon Trotzky, the -Bolshevik Minister of Foreign Affairs for Revolutionary Russia. It is -expressing ideas and views which lighted him on the course of his policy -toward the War, Peace and the Revolution. It throws light, therefore, -on that policy; it helps to an understanding of it, if one wishes to -understand. But that isn't all. The spirit that flames and casts -shadows upon these pages is not only Trotzky's. It is the spirit also of -the Bolsheviki; of the red left of the left wing of the revolutionary -movement of New Russia. It flashed from Petrograd to Vladivostok, in -the first week of the revolt; it burned all along the Russian Front -before Trotzky appeared on the scene. It will smoulder long after he is -gone. It is a hot Fact which has to be picked up and examined, this -spirit. Whether we like it or don't, it is there; in Russia; it is -elsewhere; it is everywhere to-day. It is the spirit of war; class war, -but war. It is in this book. - -Nor is that all. - -The mind in this book--the point of view from which it starts, the views -to which it points--Trotzky's mind is the international mind. We have -heard before of this new intelligence; we have read books, heard -speeches, witnessed acts demonstrative of thoughts and feelings which -are not national, but international; not patriotic, but loyal only to -the lower-class-conscious war aims of the workers of the world. The -class warrior is as familiar a figure to us as the red spirit is of the -red left of revolution. But the voice which utters here the spirit and -the mind, not only of the Russian, but of the world revolution is the -voice of one having authority. - -And Trotzky, in power, has been as red as he is in this book. The -minister of foreign affairs practised in Petrograd what he preached in -Switzerland, where he wrote most of the chapters of his book. And he -practised also what all the other great International Socialist leaders -talked and wrote. - -That's what makes him so hard to understand, him and his party and the -Bolshevik policy. We are accustomed to the sight of Socialists and -Radicals going into office and being "sobered by the responsibilities of -power." French and Italian Socialists in the Liberal ministries of -their countries; British Labor leaders in Parliament in England or in -the governments of their Colonies; and the whole Socialist party in -Germany and Austria (except Liebknecht in prison)--all are examples of -the effect of power upon the International Mind. The phenomenon of -compromise and surrender is so common that many radicals oppose the -taking of any responsible office by any member of their parties; and -some of the extremists are advocating no political action whatsoever, -nothing but industrial, economic or what they call "direct action." -(Our I.W.W.'s don't vote, on principle.) This is anarchism. - -Leon Trotzky is not an anarchist; except in the ignorant sense of the -word as used by educated people. He is a Socialist; an orthodox Marxian -Socialist. But he has seen vividly the danger of political power. The -body of this book was addressed originally to the German and Austrian -Socialists, and it is a reasoned, but indignant reproach of them for -letting their political position and their nationalistic loyalty carry -them away into an undemocratic, patriotic, political policy which -betrayed the weaker nations in their empires, helped break up the Second -(Socialist) International and led the Socialist parties into the support -of the War. - -Clear upon it, Trotzky himself does not illustrate his own thesis. He -not only detests intellectually the secrecy and the sordid wickedness of -the "old diplomacy"; when he came as minister into possession of the -archives of the Russian Foreign Office, he published the secret -treaties. - -That hurt. And so with the idea of a people's peace. All the -democratic world had been talking ever since the war began of a peace -made, not by diplomats in a private room, but by the chosen -representatives of all the peoples meeting in an open congress. The -Bolsheviki worked for that from the moment the Russian Revolution broke; -and they labored for the Stockholm Conference while Paul Milyoukov and -Alexander Kerensky were negotiating with the allied governments. When -the Bolsheviki succeeded to power, Lenine and Trotzky formally -authorized and officially proposed such a congress. Moreover Trotzky -showed that they were willing, if they could, to force the other -countries to accept the people's peace conference. - -This hurt. This hurt so much that the governments united in -extraordinary measures to prevent the event. And when they succeeded, -and it was seen that no people's peace could be made openly and -directly, Trotzky proceeded by another way to get to the same end. He -opened negotiations with the Kaiser's government and allies; arranged an -armistice and agreed tentatively upon terms of peace. - -This act not only hurt; it stunned the world, and no wonder! It was -like a declaration of war against a whole world at war. It was -unbelievable. The only explanation offered was that Trotzky and Lenine -were pro-German or dishonest, or both, and these things were said in -high places; and they were said with conviction, too. Moreover this -conviction colored, if it did not determine, the attitude the Allies -took toward New Russia and the peace proposals Trotzky got from the -German government. Was this assumption of the dishonesty of Trotzky the -only explanation of his act? - -This book shows, as I have said, that Trotzky saw things from the -revolutionary, international point of view, which is not that of his -judges; which is incomprehensible to them. He wrote it after the War -began; he finished the main part of it before the Russian Revolution. It -is his view of the War, its causes and its effects, especially upon -international Socialism and "the" Revolution. These are the things he -holds in his mind all through all these pages: "the" Revolution and -world democracy. Also I have shown that, like the Russians generally, -his mind is literal. The Russians mean what they say, exactly; and -Trotzky not only means, he does what he writes. Putting these -considerations together, we can make a comprehensible statement of the -motive and the purpose of his policy; if we want to comprehend. - -To all the other secretaries of state or of foreign affairs in the -world, the Russian Revolution was an incident, an interruption of the -War. To Minister Trotzky it was the other way around. - -The World War was an incident, an effect, a check of "the" Revolution. -Not the Russian Revolution, you understand. To Trotzky the Russian -Revolution is but one, the first of that series of national revolutions -which together will become the Thing he yearns for and prophesies: the -World Revolution. - -His peace policy therefore is a peace drive directed, not at a separate -peace with the Central Powers; and not even at a general peace, but to -an ending of the War in and by "the" Revolution everywhere. - -Especially in Germany and Austria. He said this. The correspondent of -the London _Daily News_ cabled on January 2, right after the armistice -and the agreement upon peace terms to be offered the Allies, that -"Trotzky is doing his utmost to stimulate a revolution in Germany.... -Our only chance to defeat German designs is to publish terms (from the -Allies) ... to help the democratic movement in Germany." - -Trotzky is not pro-German. He certainly was not when he wrote this -book. He hates here both the Austrian and the German dynasties, and his -ill-will toward the House of Hapsburg is so bitter that it sounds -sometimes as if there were something personal about it. And there is. -He shows a knowledge of and a living sympathy with the small and subject -nations which Austria rules, exploits and mistreats. He blames his -Austrian comrades for their allegiance to a throne which is not merely -undemocratic, but "senile" and tyrannical. That he, the literal -Trotzky, would turn right around and, as the Russian Minister of Foreign -Affairs, do what he had so recently criticized the Austrian Socialists -for doing is unlikely. - -Trotzky is against all the present governments of Europe, and the -"bourgeois system" everywhere in the world. He isn't pro-Allies; he -isn't even pro-Russian. He isn't a patriot at all. He is for a class, -the proletariat, the working people of all countries, and he is for his -class only to get rid of classes and get down or up to--humanity. And -so with his people. - -The Russians have listened to the Socialist propaganda for generations -now. They have learned the chief lessons it has taught: liberty, land, -industrial democracy and the class-war the world over. This War was not -their war; it was the Czar's war; a war of the governments in the -interest of their enemies, the capitalists of their several countries, -who, as Trotzky says, were forcing their states to fight for the right -to exploit other and smaller peoples. So when they overthrew the Czar, -the Russians wanted to drop his war and go into their own, the class -war. Kerensky held them at the front in the name of "the" Revolution; -he would get peace for them by arrangement with the allies. He didn't; -he couldn't; he was dismissed by them. Not by the Bolsheviki, but by the -Russian people who know the three or four things they want: land and -liberty at home; the Revolution and Democracy for all the world. - -I heard a radical assert one day that that was the reason Trotzky could -be such an exception to the rule about radicals in power. He came to the -head of the Russian Revolution when his ideas were the actual demands of -the Russian people and that it was not his strength of character, but -the force of a democratic public opinion in mob power, which made him -stick to his philosophy and carry out his theories and promises. I find -upon inquiry here in New York that while he was living and working as a -journalist on the East Side, he left one paper after another because he -could not conform, to their editorial policies and would not compromise. -He was "stiff-necked," "obstinate," "unreasonable." In other, kinder -words, Trotzky is a strong man, with a definite mind and a purpose of -his own, which he has the will and the nerve to pursue. - -Also, however, Trotzky is a strong man who is ruled by and represents a -very simple-minded people who are acting like him, literally upon the -theory that the people govern now, in Russia; the common people; and -that, since they don't like the War of the Czar, the Kaiser, the Kings -and the Emperors, their government should make peace with the peoples of -the world, a democratic peace against imperialism and capitalism and the -state everywhere, for the establishment in its stead of a free, -world-wide democracy. - -That may be the true explanation of Trotzky's Bolshevik peace policy in -the world crisis of the World War. That is the explanation which is -suggested by this book. - -"Written in extreme haste," he says at the close of his preface, "under -conditions far from favorable to systematic work ... the entire book, -from the first page to the last, was written with the idea of the New -International constantly in mind--the New International which must rise -out of the present world cataclysm, the International of the last -conflict and the final victory." - - -LINCOLN STEFFENS. -New York, January 4th, 1918 - - - - - AUTHOR'S PREFACE - - -The forces of production which capitalism has evolved have outgrown the -limits of nation and state. The national state, the present political -form, is too narrow for the exploitation of these productive forces. -The natural tendency of our economic system, therefore, is to seek to -break through the state boundaries. The whole globe, the land and the -sea, the surface as well as the interior, has become one economic -workshop, the different parts of which are inseparably connected with -each other. This work was accomplished by capitalism. But in -accomplishing it the capitalist states were led to struggle for the -subjection of the world-embracing economic system to the profit -interests of the bourgeoisie of each country. What the politics of -imperialism has demonstrated more than anything else is that the old -national state that was created in the revolutions and the wars of -1789-1815, 1848-1859, 1864-1866, and 1870 has outlived itself, and is -now an intolerable hindrance to economic development. - -The present War is at bottom a revolt of the forces of production -against the political form of nation and state. It means the collapse -of the national state as an independent economic unit. - -The nation must continue to exist as a cultural, ideologic and -psychological fact, but its economic foundation has been pulled from -under its feet. All talk of the present bloody clash being a work of -national defense is either hypocrisy or blindness. On the contrary, the -real, objective significance of the war is the breakdown of the present -national economic centres, and the substitution of a world economy in -its stead. But the way the governments propose to solve this problem of -imperialism is not through the intelligent, organized coöperation of all -of humanity's producers, but through the exploitation of the world's -economic system by the capitalist class of the victorious country; which -country is by this War to be transformed from a great power into the -world power. - -The War proclaims the downfall of the national state. Yet at the same -time it proclaims the downfall of the capitalist system of economy. By -means of the national state capitalism has revolutionized the whole -economic system of the world. It has divided the whole earth among the -oligarchies of the great powers, around which were grouped the -satellites, the small nations, who lived off the rivalry between the -great ones. The future development of world economy on the capitalistic -basis means a ceaseless struggle for new and ever new fields of -capitalist exploitation, which must be obtained from one and the same -source, the earth. The economic rivalry under the banner of militarism -is accompanied by robbery and destruction which violate the elementary -principles of human economy. World production revolts not only against -the confusion produced by national and state divisions but also against -the capitalist economic organization, which has now turned into -barbarous disorganization and chaos. - -The War of 1914 is the most colossal breakdown in history of an economic -system destroyed by its own inherent contradictions. - -All the historical forces whose task it has been to guide the bourgeois -society, to speak in its name and to exploit it, have declared their -historical bankruptcy by the War. They defended capitalism as a system -of human civilization, and the catastrophe born out of that system is -primarily _their_ catastrophe. The first wave of events raised the -national governments and armies to unprecedented heights never attained -before. For the moment the nations rallied around them. But the more -terrible will be the crash of the governments when the people, deafened -by the thunder of the cannon, realize the meaning of the events now -taking place in all their truth and frightfulness. - -The revolutionary reaction of the masses will be all the more powerful -the more prodigious the cataclysm which history is now bringing upon -them. - -Capitalism has created the material conditions of a new Socialist -economic system. Imperialism has led the capitalist nations into -historic chaos. The War of 1914 shows the way out of this chaos by -violently urging the proletariat on to the path of Revolution. - - -For the economic backward countries of Europe the War brings to the fore -problems of a far earlier historic origin--problems of democracy and -national unity. This is in a large measure the case with the peoples of -Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Peninsula. But these historically -belated questions, which were bequeathed to the present epoch as a -heritage from the past, do not alter the fundamental character of the -events. It is not the national aspirations of the Serbs, Poles, -Roumanians or Finns that has mobilized twenty-five million soldiers and -placed them in the battlefields, but the imperialistic interests of the -bourgeoisie of the Great Powers. It is imperialism that has upset -completely the European _status quo_, maintained for forty-five years, -and raised again the old questions which the bourgeois revolution proved -itself powerless to solve. - -Yet in the present epoch it is quite impossible to treat these questions -in and by themselves. They are utterly devoid of an independent -character. The creation of normal relations of national life and -economic development on the Balkan Peninsula is unthinkable if Czarism -and Austria-Hungary are preserved. Czarism is now the indispensable -military reservoir for the financial imperialism of France and the -conservative colonial power of England. Austria-Hungary is the mainstay -of Germany's imperialism. Issuing from the private family clashes -between the national Servian terrorists and the Hapsburg political -police, the War very quickly revealed its true fundamental character--a -struggle of life and death between Germany and England. While the -simpletons and hypocrites prate of the defense of national freedom and -independence, the German-English War is really being waged for the -freedom of the imperialistic exploitation of the peoples of India and -Egypt on the one hand, and for the imperialistic division of the peoples -of the earth on the other. - -Germany began its capitalistic development on a national basis with the -destruction of the continental hegemony of France in the year 1870-1871. -Now that the development of German industry on a national foundation has -transformed Germany into the first capitalistic power of the world, she -finds herself colliding with the hegemony of England in her further -course of development. The complete and unlimited domination of the -European continent seems to Germany the indispensable prerequisite of -the overthrow of her world enemy. The first thing, therefore, that -imperialistic Germany writes in her programme is the creation of a -Middle European League of Nations. Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan -Peninsula and Turkey, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, -Italy, and, if possible, enfeebled France and Spain and Portugal, are to -make one economic and military whole, a Great Germany under the hegemony -of the present German state. - -This programme, which has been thoroughly elaborated by the economists, -political students, jurists and diplomats of German imperialism and -translated into reality by its strategists, is the most striking proof -and most eloquent expression of the fact that capitalism has expanded -beyond the limits of the national state and feels intolerably cramped -within its boundaries. The national Great Power must go and in its -place must step the imperialistic World Power. - -In these historical circumstances the working class, the proletariat, -can have no interest in defending the outlived and antiquated national -"fatherland," which has become the main obstacle to economic -development. The task of the proletariat is to create a far more -powerful fatherland, with far greater power of resistance--_the -republican United States of Europe_, as the foundation of the United -States of the World. - -The only way in which the proletariat can meet the imperialistic -perplexity of capitalism is by opposing to it as a practical programme -of the day the Socialist organization of world economy. - -War is the method by which capitalism, at the climax of its development, -seeks to solve its insoluble contradictions. To this method the -proletariat must oppose its _own_ method, the method of the Social -Revolution. - - -The Balkan question and the question of the overthrow of Czarism, -propounded to us by the Europe of yesterday, can be solved only in a -revolutionary way, in connection with the problem of the United Europe -of to-morrow. The immediate, urgent task of the Russian Social -Democracy, to which the author belongs, is the fight against Czarism. -What Czarism primarily seeks in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans is a -market for its political methods of plunder, robbery and acts of -violence. The Russian bourgeoisie all the way up to its radical -intellectuals has become completely demoralized by the tremendous growth -of industry in the last five years, and it has entered into a bloody -league with the dynasty, which had to secure to the impatient Russian -capitalists their part of the world's booty by new land robberies. -While Czarism stormed and devastated Galicia, and deprived it even of -the rags and tatters of liberty granted to it by the Hapsburgs, while it -dismembered unhappy Persia, and from the corner of the Bosporus strove -to throw the noose around the neck of the Balkan peoples, it left to the -liberalism which it despised the task of concealing its robbery by -sickening declamations over the defense of Belgium and France. The year -1914 spells the complete bankruptcy of Russian liberalism, and makes the -Russian proletariat the sole champion of the war of liberation. It -makes the Russian Revolution definitely an integral part of the Social -Revolution of the European proletariat. - -In our war against Czarism, in which we have never known a "national" -truce, we have never looked for help from Hapsburg or Hohenzollern -militarism, and we are not looking for it now. We have preserved a -sufficiently clear revolutionary vision to know that the idea of -destroying Czarism was utterly repugnant to German imperialism. Czarism -has been its best ally on the Eastern border. It is united to it by -close ties of social structure and historical aims. Yet even if it were -otherwise, even if it could be assumed that, in obedience to the logic -of military operations, it would deal a destructive blow to Czarism, in -defiance of the logic of its own political interests--even in such a -highly improbable case we should refuse to regard the Hohenzollerns not -only as an objective but as a subjective ally. The fate of the Russian -Revolution is so inseparably bound up with the fate of European -Socialism, and we Russian Socialists stand so firmly on the ground of -internationalism, that we cannot, we must not for a moment, entertain -the idea of purchasing the doubtful liberation of Russia by the certain -destruction of the liberty of Belgium and France, and--what is more -important still--thereby inoculating the German and Austrian proletariat -with the virus of imperialism. - -We are united by many ties to the German Social Democracy. We have all -gone through the German Socialist school, and learned lessons from its -successes as well as from its failures. The German Social Democracy was -to us not only _a_ party of the International. It was _the_ Party _par -excellence_. We have always preserved and fortified the fraternal bond -that united us with the Austrian Social Democracy. On the other hand, we -have always taken pride in the fact that we have made our modest -contribution towards winning suffrage in Austria and arousing -revolutionary tendencies in the German working class. It cost more than -one drop of blood to do it. We have unhesitatingly accepted moral and -material support from our older brother who fought for the same ends as -we on the other side of our Western border. - -Yet it is just because of this respect for the past, and still more out -of respect for the future, which ought to unite the working class of -Russia with the working classes of Germany and Austria, that we -indignantly reject the "liberating" aid which German imperialism offers -us in a Krupp munition box, with the blessing, alas! of German -Socialism. And we hope that the indignant protest of Russian Socialism -will be loud enough to be heard in Berlin and in Vienna. - - -The collapse of the Second International is a tragic fact, and it were -blindness or cowardice to close one's eyes to it. The position taken by -the French and by the larger part of English Socialism is as much a part -of this breakdown as the position of the German and Austrian Social -Democracy. If the present work addresses itself chiefly to the German -Social Democracy it is only because the German party was the strongest, -most influential, and in principle the most basic member of the -Socialist world. Its historic capitulation reveals most clearly the -causes of the downfall of the Second International. At first glance it -may appear that the social revolutionary prospects of the future are -wholly deceptive. The insolvency of the old Socialist parties has -become catastrophically apparent. Why should we have faith in the -future of the Socialist movement? Such skepticism, though natural, -nevertheless leads to quite an erroneous conclusion. It leaves out of -account the good will of history, just as we have often been too prone -to ignore its ill will, which has now so cruelly shown itself in the -fate that has overcome the International. - -The present War signalizes the collapse of the national states. The -Socialist parties of the epoch now concluded were national parties. They -had become ingrained in the national states with all the different -branches of their organizations, with all their activities and with -their psychology. In the face of the solemn declarations at their -congresses they rose to the defense of the conservative state, when -imperialism, grown big on the national soil, began to demolish the -antiquated national barriers. And in their historic crash the national -states have pulled down with them the national Socialist parties also. - -It is not Socialism that has gone down, but its temporary historical -external form. The revolutionary idea begins its life anew as it casts -off its old rigid shell. This shell is made up of living human beings, -of an entire generation of Socialists that has become fossilized in -self-abnegating work of agitation and organization through a period of -several decades of political reaction, and has fallen into the habits -and views of national opportunism or possibilism. All efforts to save -the Second International on the old basis, by personal diplomatic -methods and mutual concessions, are quite hopeless. The old mole of -history is now digging its passageways all too well and none has the -power to stop him. - -As the national states have become a hindrance to the development of the -forces of production, so the old Socialist parties have become the main -hindrance to the revolutionary movement of the working class. It was -necessary that they should demonstrate to the full their extreme -backwardness, that they should discredit their utterly inadequate and -narrow methods, and bring the shame and horror of national discord upon -the proletariat, in order that the working class might emancipate -itself, through these fearful disillusionments, from the prejudices and -slavish habits of the period of preparation, and become at last that -which the voice of history is now calling it to be--the revolutionary -class fighting for power. - -The Second International has not lived in vain. It has accomplished a -huge cultural work. There has been nothing like it in history before. -It has educated and assembled the oppressed classes. The proletariat -does not now need to begin at the beginning. It enters on the new road -not with empty hands. The past epoch has bequeathed to it a rich -arsenal of ideas. It has bequeathed to it the weapons of criticism. -The new epoch will teach the proletariat to combine the old weapons of -criticism with the new criticism of weapons. - -This book was written in extreme haste, under conditions far from -favorable to systematic work. A large part of it is devoted to the old -International which has fallen. But the entire book, from the first to -the last page, was written with the idea of the New International -constantly in mind, the New International which must rise up out of the -present world cataclysm, the International of the last conflict and the -final victory. - - -LEON TROTZKY. - - - - - THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE - - - - CHAPTER I - - THE BALKAN QUESTION - - - "The War at present being waged against Russian Czarism and its - vassals is dominated by a great historic idea. The impetus of - this great historic idea consecrates the battlefields of Poland - and of Eastern Russia. The roar of cannon, the rattling of - machine guns, and the onrush of cavalry, all betoken the - enforcement of the democratic programme for the liberation of - the nations. Had Czarism, in league with the French - capitalistic powers and in league with an unscrupulous 'nation - of shopkeepers,' not succeeded in suppressing the Revolution of - 1905, the present slaughter of the nations would have been - avoided. - - "A democratic Russia would never have consented to wage this - unscrupulous and futile War. The great ideas of freedom and - justice now speak the persuasive language of the machine gun and - the sword, and every heart susceptible of sympathy with justice - and humanity can only wish that the power of Czarism may be - destroyed once for all, and that the oppressed Russian - nationalities may again secure the right to decide their own - destinies." - -The above quotation is from the _Nepszava_ of August 31, 1914, the -official organ of the Socialist party of Hungary. Hungary is the land -whose entire inner life was erected upon the high-handed oppression of -the national minorities, upon the enslavement of the laboring classes, -upon the official parasitism and usury of the ruling caste of large -landowners. It is the land in which men like Tisza are masters of the -situation, dyed-in-the-wool agrarians, with the manners of political -bandits. In a word, Hungary is a country closest of kin to Czar-ruled -Russia. - -So what is more fitting than that the _Nepszava_, the Socialist organ of -Hungary, should hail with outbursts of enthusiasm the liberating mission -of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies? Who other than Count Tisza -could have felt the call to "enforce the democratic programme for the -liberation of the nations"? Who was there to uphold the eternal -principles of law and justice in Europe but the ruling clique of -Budapest, the discredited Panamists? Would you entrust this mission to -the unscrupulous diplomacy of "perfidious Albion," to the nation of -shopkeepers? - -Laughter turns away wrath. The tragic inconsistencies of the policies -followed by the International not only reach their climax in the -articles of the poor Nepszava; they disarm us by their humor. - -The present series of events began with the ultimatum, sent to Servia by -Austria-Hungary. There was not the slightest reason why the -international Social Democracy should take under its protection the -intrigues of the Serbs or any other of the petty dynasties of the Balkan -Peninsula. They were all endeavoring to hide their political adventures -under the cloak of national aspirations. We had still less cause to -lash ourselves into a state of moral indignation because a fanatic young -Serb responded to the cowardly, criminal and wily national politics of -the Vienna and Budapest government authorities with a bloody -assassination.[1] - - [1] It is noteworthy that these opportunistic Austrian and German - Socialists are now writhing with moral indignation over the - "treacherous assassination at Sarajevo." And yet they always - sympathized with the Russian terrorists more than we, the Russian - Social Democrats, did, who are opposed on principle to the - terroristic method. Lost in the mist of chauvinism, they can no - longer see that the unfortunate Servian terrorist, Gavrilo - Prinzip, represents precisely the same national principle as the - German terrorist, Sand. Perhaps they will even ask us to transfer - our sympathies from Sand to Kotzebue? Or perhaps these eunuchs - will advise the Swiss to overthrow the monuments erected to the - assassin Tell and replace them with monuments to the Austrian - governor, Gessler, one of the spiritual forerunners of the - murdered archduke? - -Of one thing we have no doubt. In the dealings between the Danube -Monarchy and the Servian government, the historic right, that is to say, -the right of free development, rests entirely with Servia, just as Italy -was in the right in the year 1859. Underneath the duel between the -imperial police scoundrels and the terrorists of Belgrade, there is -hidden a far deeper meaning than merely the greed of the -Kareorgoievitches or the crimes of the Czar's diplomacy. On one side -were the imperialistic claims of a national state that had lost its -vitality, and on the other side, the strivings of the dismembered -Servian nation to reintegrate itself into a national whole and become a -living vital state. - -Is it for this that we have sat so long in the school of Socialism to -forget the first three letters of the democratic alphabet? This -absolute lapse of memory, moreover, made its appearance only after the -fourth of August. Up to that fatal date the German Marxists showed that -they knew very well what was happening in Southeastern Europe. - -On July 3, 1914, after the assassination at Sarajevo, the _Vorwärts_ -wrote: - - - "The bourgeois revolution of the South Slavs is in full swing, - and the shooting at Sarajevo, however wild and senseless an act - in itself, is as much a chapter of this revolution as the - battles by which the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins - liberated the peasants of Macedonia from the yoke of Turkish - feudal exploitation. Is it a wonder that the South Slavs of - Austria-Hungary look with longing to their racial brothers in - the kingdom of Servia? The Serbs in Servia have attained the - highest goal a people can attain in the present order of - society. They have attained national independence. Whereas in - Vienna or Budapest they treat every one bearing the name of Serb - or Croatian with blows and kicks, with court-martial justice and - the gallows.... There are seven and a half million South Slavs - who, as a result of the victories in the Balkans, have grown - bolder than ever in demanding their political rights. And if - the imperial throne of Austria continues to resist their impact, - it will topple over and the entire Empire with which we have - coupled our destiny will break to pieces. For it is in line - with historic evolution that such national revolutions should - march onward to victory." - - -If the international Social Democracy together with its Servian -contingent, offered unyielding resistance to Servia's national claims, -it was certainly not out of any consideration for the historic rights of -Austria-Hungary to oppress and disintegrate the nationalities living -within her borders; and most certainly not out of consideration for the -liberating mission of the Hapsburgs. Until August, 1914, no one, except -the black and yellow hirelings of the press, dared to breathe a word -about that. The Socialists were influenced in their course of conduct -by entirely different motives. First of all, the proletariat, although -by no means disputing the historic right of Servia to strive for -national unity, could not trust the solution of this problem to the -powers then controlling the destinies of the Servian kingdom. And in -the second place--and this was for us the deciding factor--the -international Social Democracy could not sacrifice the peace of Europe -to the national cause of the Serbs, recognizing, as it did, that, except -for a European revolution, the only way such unity could be achieved was -through a European war. - -But from the moment Austria-Hungary carried the question of her own fate -and that of Servia to the battlefield, Socialists could no longer have -the slightest doubt that social and national progress would be hit much -harder in Southeastern Europe by a Hapsburg victory than by a Servian -victory. To be sure, there was still no reason for us Socialists to -identify our cause with the aims of the Servian army. This was the idea -that animated the Servian Socialists, Ljaptchevitch and Katzlerovitch, -when they took the manly stand of voting against the war credits.[2] -But surely we had still less reason to support the purely dynastic -rights of the Hapsburgs and the imperialistic interests of the -feudal-capitalistic cliques against the national struggle of the Serbs. -At all events, the Austro-Hungarian Social Democracy, which now invokes -its blessings upon the sword of the Hapsburgs for the liberation of the -Poles, the Ukrainians, the Finns and the Russian people, must first of -all clarify its ideas on the Servian question, which it has gotten so -hopelessly muddled. - - [2] To appreciate fully this action of the Servian Socialists we must - bear in mind the political situation by which they were - confronted. A group of Servian conspirators had murdered a member - of the Hapsburg family, the mainstay of Austro-Hungarian - clericalism, militarism, and imperialism. Using this as a welcome - pretext, the military party in Vienna sent an ultimatum to Servia, - which, for sheer audacity, has scarcely ever been paralleled in - diplomatic history. In reply, the Servian government made - extraordinary concessions, and suggested that the solution of the - question in dispute be turned over to the Hague tribunal. - Thereupon Austria declared war on Servia. If the idea of a "war of - defense" has any meaning at all, it certainly applied to Servia in - this instance. Nevertheless, our friends, Ljaptchevitch and - Katzlerovitch, unshaken in their conviction of the course of - action that they as Socialists must pursue, refused the government - a vote of confidence. The writer was in Servia at the beginning - of the War. In the Skuptchina, in an atmosphere of indescribable - national enthusiasm, a vote was taken on the war credits. The - voting was by roll-call. Two hundred members had all answered - "Yes." Then in a moment of deathlike silence came the voice of - the Socialist Ljaptchevitch--"No." Every one felt the moral force - of this protest, and the scene has remained indelibly impressed - upon my memory. - -The question at issue, however, is not confined to the fate of the ten -million Serbs. The clash of the European nations has brought up the -entire Balkan question anew. The Peace of Bucharest, signed in 1903, -has solved neither the national nor the international problems in the -Near East. It has only intensified the added confusion resulting from -the two unfinished Balkan Wars, unfinished because of the complete -temporary exhaustion of the nations participating in it. - -Roumania had followed in the path of Austro-Hungarian politics, despite -the Romanesque sympathies of its population, especially in the cities. -This was due not so much to dynastic causes, to the fact that a -Hohenzollern prince occupied the throne, as to the imminent danger of a -Russian invasion. In 1879 the Russian Czar, as thanks for Roumania's -support in the Russo-Turkish war of "liberation," cut off a slice of -Roumanian territory, the province of Bessarabia. This eloquent deed -provided a sufficient backing to the dynastic sympathies of the -Hohenzollern in Bucharest. But the Magyar-Hapsburg clique succeeded in -incensing the Roumanian people against them by their denationalizing -policy in Transylvania, which has a population of three million -Roumanians as against three-fourths of a million in the Russian province -of Bessarabia; and they further antagonized them by their commercial -treaties, which were dictated by the interests of the large -Austro-Hungarian land-owners. So that Roumania's entrance into the War -on the side of the Czar, despite the courageous and active agitation -against participation in the War on either side, carried on by the -Socialist party under the leadership of my friends Gherea and Rakowsky, -is to be laid altogether at the door of the ruling class of -Austria-Hungary, who are reaping the harvest they have sown here as well -as elsewhere. - -But the matter is not disposed of by fixing the historical -responsibility. To-morrow, in a month, in a year or more the War will -bring to the foreground the whole question of the destiny of the Balkan -peoples and of Austria-Hungary, and the proletariat will have to have -its answer to this question. European democracy in the nineteenth -century looked with distrust at the Balkan people's struggle for -independence, because it feared that Russia might be strengthened at the -expense of Turkey. On this subject Karl Marx wrote in 1853, on the eve -of the Crimean War: - - - "It may be said that the more firmly established Servia and the - Servian nationality is the more the direct influence of Russia - on the Turkish Slavs is shoved into the background. For in order - to be able to assert its peculiar position as a state, Servia - had to import its political institutions, its schools ... from - Western Europe." - - -This prophecy has been brilliantly fulfilled in what has actually -happened in Bulgaria, which was created by Russia as an outpost on the -Balkans. As soon as Bulgaria was fairly well established as a national -state, it developed a strong anti-Russian party, under the leadership of -Russia's former pupil, Stambulov, and this party was able to stamp its -iron seal upon the entire foreign policy of the young country. The whole -mechanism of the political parties in Bulgaria is so constructed as to -enable it to steer between the two European combinations without being -absolutely forced into the channel of either, unless it chooses to enter -it of its own accord. Roumania went with the Austro-German alliance, -Servia, since 1903, with Russia, because the one was menaced directly by -Russia, the other by Austria. The more independent the countries of -Southeast Europe are from Austria-Hungary, the more effectively they -will be able to protect their independence against Czarism. - -The balance of power in the Balkans, created by the Congress of Berlin -in 1879, was full of contradictions. Cut up by artificial -ethnographical boundaries, placed under the control of imported -dynasties from German nurseries, bound hand and foot by the intrigues of -the Great Powers, the peoples of the Balkans could not cease their -efforts for further national freedom and unity. The national politics -of independent Bulgaria was naturally directed towards Macedonia, -populated by Bulgarians. The Berlin Congress had left it under Turkish -rule. On the other hand, Servia had practically nothing to look for in -Turkey with the exception of the little strip of land, the sandbag Novy -Bazar. Its national interests lay on the other side of the -Austro-Hungarian boundary, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia and -Dalmatia. Roumania had no interests in the south, where it is separated -from European Turkey by Servia and Bulgaria. Roumania's expansion -policy was directed towards the northwest and east, towards Hungarian -Transylvania and Russian Bessarabia. Finally, the national expansion of -Greece, like that of Bulgaria, collided with Turkey. - -Austro-German politics, aiming at the artificial preservation of -European Turkey, broke down not on account of the diplomatic intrigues -of Russia, although these of course were not lacking. It broke down -because of the inevitable course of evolution. The Balkan Peninsula had -entered on the path of capitalist development, and it was this fact that -raised the question of the self-determination of the Balkan peoples as -national states to the historical issue of the day. - -The Balkan War disposed of European Turkey, and thereby created the -conditions necessary for the solution of the Bulgarian and Greek -questions. But Servia and Roumania, whose national completion could -only be achieved at the expense of Austria-Hungary, found themselves -checked in their efforts at expansion southwards, and were compensated -at the expense of what racially belonged to Bulgaria--Servia in -Macedonia, and Roumania in Dobrudja. This is the meaning of the second -Balkan War and the Peace of Bucharest by which it was concluded. - -The mere existence of Austria-Hungary, this Turkey of Middle Europe, -blocks the way to the natural self-determination of the peoples of the -Southeast. It compels them to keep constantly fighting against each -other, to seek support against each other from the outside, and so makes -them the tool of the political combinations of the Great Powers. It was -only in such chaos that Czaristic diplomacy was enabled to spin the web -of its Balkan politics, the last thread of which was Constantinople. -And only a federation of the Balkan states, both economic and military, -can interpose an invincible barrier to the greed of Czarism. - -Now that European Turkey has been disposed of, it is Austria-Hungary -that stands in the way of a federation of the Balkan states. Roumania, -Bulgaria, and Servia would have found their natural boundaries, and -would have united with Greece and Turkey, on the basis of common -economic interests, into a league of defense. This would finally have -brought peace to the Balkan Peninsula, that witches' cauldron which -periodically threatened Europe with explosions, until it drew it into -the present catastrophe. - -Up to a certain time the Socialists had to reconcile themselves to the -routine way in which the Balkan question was treated by capitalistic -diplomats, who in their conferences and secret agreements stopped up one -hole only to open another, even wider one. So long as this dilatory -method kept postponing the final solution, the Socialist International -could hope that the settlement of the Hapsburg succession would be a -matter not for a European war, but for the European Revolution. But now -that the War has destroyed the equilibrium of the whole of Europe, and -the predatory Powers are seeking to remodel the map of Europe--not on -the basis of national democratic principles, but of military -strength--the Social Democracy must come to a clear comprehension of the -fact that one of the chief obstacles to freedom, peace and progress, in -addition to Czarism and German militarism, is the Hapsburg Monarchy as a -state organization. The crime of the Galician Socialist group under -Daszynski consisted not only in placing the Polish cause above the cause -of Socialism, but also in linking the fate of Poland with the fate of -the Austro-Hungarian armies and the fate of the Hapsburg Monarchy. - -The Socialist proletariat of Europe cannot adopt such a solution of the -question. For us the question of united and independent Poland is on a -par with the question of united and independent Servia. We cannot and -we will not permit the Polish question to be solved by methods which -will perpetuate the chaos at present prevailing in Southeastern Europe, -in fact through the whole of Europe. For us Socialists the independence -of Poland means its independence on both fronts, on the Romanoff front -and on the Hapsburg front. We not only wish the Polish people to be -free from the oppression of Czarism. We wish also that the fate of the -Servian people shall not be dependent upon the Polish nobility in -Galicia. - -For the present we need not consider what the relations of an -independent Poland will be to Bohemia, Hungary and the Balkan -Federation. But it is perfectly clear that a complex of medium-sized and -small states on the Danube and in the Balkan Peninsula will constitute a -far more effective bar to the Czaristic designs on Europe than the weak, -chaotic Austro-Hungarian State, which proves its right to existence only -by its continued attempts upon the peace of Europe. - -In the article of 1853, quoted above, Marx wrote as follows on the -Eastern question: - - - "We have seen that the statesmen of Europe, in their obdurate - stupidity, petrified routine, and hereditary intellectual - indolence, recoil from every attempt at answering the question - of what is to become of Turkey in Europe. The driving force - that favors Russia's advance towards Constantinople is the very - means by which it is thought to keep her away from it, the empty - theory, never carried out, of maintaining the _status quo_. What - is this _status quo_? For the Christian subjects of the Porte - it means nothing else than the perpetuation of their oppression - by Turkey. As long as they are under the yoke of the Turkish - rule, they look upon the head of the Greek Church, the ruler of - 60 million Greek Church Christians, as _their natural protector - and liberator_." - - -What is here said of Turkey now applies in a still greater degree to -Austria-Hungary. The solution of the Balkan question is unthinkable -without the solution of the Austro-Hungarian question, as they are both -comprised in one and the same formula--the Democratic Federation of the -Danube and Balkan Nations. - -"The governments with their old-fashioned diplomacy," wrote Marx, "will -never solve the difficulty. Like the solution of so many other -problems, the Turkish problem, too, is reserved for the European -Revolution." This statement holds just as good to-day as when it was -first written. But for the Revolution to solve the difficulties that -have piled up in the course of centuries, the proletariat must have its -_own_ programme for the solution of the Austro-Hungarian question. And -this programme it must oppose just as strenuously to the Czaristic greed -of conquest as to the cowardly and conservative efforts to maintain the -Austro-Hungarian _status quo_. - - - - - CHAPTER II - - AUSTRIA-HUNGARY - - -Russian Czarism undoubtedly represents a cruder and more barbarian form -of state organization than does the feebler absolutism of -Austria-Hungary, which has been mitigated by the weakness of old age. -But Russian Czarism and the Russian state are by no means identical. -The destruction of Czarism does not mean the disintegration of the -state. On the contrary it means its liberation and its strengthening. -All such assertions, as that it is necessary to push Russia back into -Asia, which found an echo even in certain Social Democratic organs, are -based on a poor knowledge of geography and ethnography. Whatever may be -the fate of various parts of present Russia--Russian Poland, Finland, -the Ukraine or Bessarabia--European Russia will not cease to exist as -the national territory of a many-millioned race that has made notable -conquests along the line of cultural development during the last quarter -century. - -Quite different is the case of Austria-Hungary. As a state organization -it is identical with the Hapsburg Monarchy. It stands or falls with the -Hapsburgs, just as European Turkey was identical with the -feudal-military Ottoman caste and fell when that caste fell. A -conglomerate of racial fragments centrifugal in tendency, yet forced by -a dynasty to stick together, Austria-Hungary presents the most -reactionary picture in the very heart of Europe. Its continuation after -the present European catastrophe would not only delay the development of -the Danube and Balkan peoples for more decades to come and make a -repetition of the present War a practical certainty, but it would also -strengthen Czarism politically by preserving its main source of -spiritual nourishment. - -If the German Social Democracy reconciles itself to the ruin of France -by regarding it as punishment for France's alliance with Czarism, then -we must ask that the same criterion be applied to the German-Austrian -alliance. And if the alliance of the two Western democracies with a -despotic Czarism gives the lie to the French and English press when they -represent the War as one of liberation, then is it not equally arrogant, -if not more so, for the German Social Democracy to spread the banner of -liberty over the Hohenzollern army, the army that is fighting not only -_against_ Czarism and its allies but also _for_ the entrenchment of the -Hapsburg Monarchy? - -Austria-Hungary is indispensable to Germany, to the ruling class in -Germany as we know it. When the ruling Junker class threw France into -the arms of Czarism by the forceful annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and -systematically embittered the relations with England by rapidly -increasing naval armaments; when it repulsed all attempts at an -understanding with the Western democracies because such an understanding -would have implied the democratization of Germany--then this ruling -class saw itself compelled to seek support from the Austro-Hungarian -Monarchy as a reserve source of military strength against the enemies in -the East and the West. - -According to the German point of view the mission of the Dual Monarchy -was to place Hungarian, Polish, Roumanian, Czech, Ruthenian, Servian and -Italian auxiliaries in the service of the German military and Junker -policy. The ruling class in Germany had easily reconciled itself to the -expatriation of ten to twelve millions of Germans, for these twelve -millions formed the kernel around which the Hapsburgs united a -non-German population of more than forty million. A democratic -federation of independent Danube nations would have made these peoples -useless as allies of German militarism. Only a monarchy, in -Austria-Hungary, a monarchy enforced by militarism, would make that -country of any value as an ally to Junker Germany. The indispensable -condition for this alliance, sanctified by the Nibelungen troth of -dynasties, was the military preparedness of Austria-Hungary, a condition -to be achieved in no other way than by the mechanical suppression of the -centrifugal national tendencies. - -Since Austria-Hungary is surrounded on all sides by states composed of -the same races as are within its own borders, its foreign policy is -necessarily intimately connected with its internal policy. To keep -seven million Serbs and South Slavs within the frame of its own military -state, Austria-Hungary is compelled to extinguish the hearthfire that -kindles their political leanings--the independent kingdom of Servia. - -Austria's ultimatum to Servia was the decisive step in this direction. -"Austria-Hungary took this step under the pressure of necessity," wrote -Eduard Bernstein in _Die Sozialistische Monatshefte_ (No. 16). To be -sure it was, if political events are considered from the viewpoint of -_dynastic_ necessity. - -To defend the Hapsburg policy on the ground of the low moral standard of -the Belgrade rulers is to close one's eyes to the fact that the -Hapsburgs did make friends with Servia, but only when Servia was under -the most despicable government that the history of the unfortunate -Balkan Peninsula has known, that is, when it had at its head an Austrian -agent, Milan. The reckoning with Servia came so late because the -efforts made at self-preservation were too weak in the enfeebled -organism of the Dual Monarchy. But after the death of the Archduke, the -support and hope of the Austrian military party--and of -Berlin--Austria's ally gave her a sharp dig in the ribs, insisting upon -a demonstration of firmness and strength. Not only was Austria's -ultimatum to Servia approved of in advance by the rulers of Germany, -but, according to all information, it was actually inspired from that -quarter. The evidence is plainly set forth in the very same White Book -which professional and amateur diplomats offer as a document of the -Hohenzollern love of peace. - -After defining the aims of Greater Servian propaganda and the -machinations of Czarism in the Balkans, the White Book states: - - - "Under such conditions Austria was forced to the realization - that it was not compatible with the dignity or the - self-preservation of the Monarchy to look on at the doings - across the border and remain passive. The Imperial Government - informed us of this view and asked for our opinion. We could - sincerely tell our ally that we agreed with his estimate of the - situation and could assure him that any action he might find - necessary to put an end to the movement in Servia against the - Austrian Monarchy would meet with our approval. In doing so, we - were well aware of the fact that eventual war operations on the - part of Austria-Hungary might bring Russia into the field and - might, according to the terms of our alliance, involve us in a - war. - - "But in view of the vital interests of Austria-Hungary that were - at stake, we could not advise our ally to show a leniency - incompatible with his dignity, or refuse him our support in a - moment of such grave portent. We were the less able to do so - because our own interests also were vitally threatened by the - persistent agitation in Servia. If the Serbs, aided by Russia - and France, had been allowed to go on endangering the stability - of our neighboring Monarchy, this would have led to the gradual - breakdown of Austria and to the subjection of all the Slavic - races to the Russian rule. And this in turn would have made the - position of the Germanic race in Central Europe quite - precarious. An Austria morally weakened, breaking down before - the advance of Russian Pan-Slavism, would not be an ally with - whom we could reckon and on whom we could depend, as we are - obliged to depend, in the face of the increasingly threatening - attitude of our neighbors to the East and the West. We - therefore left Austria a free hand in its action against - Servia." - - -The relation of the ruling class in Germany to the Austro-Servian -conflict is here fully and clearly defined. It is not merely that -Germany was informed by the Austrian Government of the latter's -intentions, not merely that she approved them, and not merely that she -accepted the consequences of fidelity to an ally. No, Germany looked on -Austria's aggression as unavoidable, as a saving act for herself, and -actually made it _a condition of the continuance of the alliance_. -Otherwise, "Austria would not be an ally with whom we could reckon." - -The German Marxists were fully aware of this state of affairs and of the -dangers lurking in it. On June 29th, a day after the murder of the -Austrian Archduke, the _Vorwärts_ wrote as follows: - - - "The fate of our nation has been all too closely knit with that - of Austria as a result of a bungling foreign policy. Our rulers - have made the alliance with Austria the basis of our entire - foreign policy. Yet it becomes clearer every day that this - alliance is a source of weakness rather than of strength. The - _problem of Austria_ threatens more and more to become a _menace - to the peace of Europe_." - - -A month later, when the menace was about to culminate in the dread -actuality of war, on July 28th, the chief organ of the German Social -Democracy wrote in equally definite terms. "How shall the German -proletariat act in the face of such a senseless paroxysm?" it asked; and -then gave the answer: "_The German proletariat is not in the least -interested in the preservation of the Austrian national chaos_." - -Quite the contrary. Democratic Germany is far more interested in the -disruption than in the preservation of Austria-Hungary. A disrupted -Austria-Hungary would mean a gain to Germany of an educated population -of twelve million and a capital city of the first rank, Vienna. Italy -would achieve national completion, and would cease to play the rôle of -the incalculable factor that she always has been in the Triple Alliance. -An independent Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, and a Balkan Federation -including a Roumania of ten million inhabitants on the Russian frontier, -would be a mighty bulwark against Czarism. And most important of all, a -democratic Germany with a population of 75,000,000 Germans could easily, -without the Hohenzollerns and the ruling Junkers, come to an agreement -with France and England and could isolate Czarism and condemn its -foreign and internal policies to complete impotence. A policy directed -towards this goal would indeed be a policy of liberation for the people -of Russia as well as of Austria-Hungary. But such a policy requires an -essential preliminary condition, namely, that the German people, instead -of entrusting the Hohenzollerns with the liberation of other nations, -should set about liberating themselves from the Hohenzollerns. - -The attitude of the German and Austro-Hungarian Social Democracy in this -war is in blatant contradiction to such aims. At the present moment it -seems convinced of the necessity of preserving and strengthening the -Hapsburg Monarchy in the interests of Germany or of the German nation. -And it is absolutely from this anti-democratic viewpoint--which drives -the blush of shame to the cheek of every internationally minded -Socialist--that the _Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung_ formulates the historical -meaning of the present War, when it declares "it is primarily a war [of -the Allies] against the German spirit." - -"Whether diplomacy has acted wisely, whether this has had to come, time -alone can decide. Now the fate of the German nation is at stake! And -there can be no hesitation, no wavering! The German people are one in -the inflexible iron determination not to bend to the yoke, and neither -death nor devil can succeed"--and so forth and so on. (_Wiener -Arbeiter-Zeitung_, August 5th.) We will not offend the political and -literary taste of the reader by continuing this quotation. Nothing is -said here about the mission of liberating other nations. Here the object -of the war is to preserve and secure "German humanity." - -The defense of _German_ culture, _German_ soil, _German_ humanity seems -to be the mission not only of the German army but of the -Austro-Hungarian army as well. Serb must fight against Serb, Pole -against Pole, Ukranian against Ukranian, for the sake of "_German_ -humanity." The forty million non-German nationalities of -Austria-Hungary are considered as simply historical manure for the field -of German culture. That this is not the standpoint of international -Socialism, it is not necessary to point out. It is not even pure -national democracy in its most elementary form. The Austro-Hungarian -General Staff explains this "humanity" in its communiqué of September -18th: "All peoples of our revered monarchy, as our military oath says, -'against any enemy no matter whom,' must stand together as one, vying -with one another in courage." - -The _Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung_ accepts in its entirety this -Hapsburg-Hohenzollern viewpoint of the Austro-Hungarian problem as an -unnational military reservoir. It is the same attitude as the -militarists of France have toward the Senegalese and the Moroccans, and -the English have toward the Hindus. And when we consider that such -opinions are not a new phenomenon among the German Socialists of -Austria, we have found the main reason why the Austrian Social Democracy -broke up so miserably into national groups, and thus reduced its -political importance to a minimum. - -The disintegration of the Austrian Social Democracy into national parts -fighting among themselves, is one expression of the inadequacy of -Austria as a state organization. At the same time the attitude of the -German-Austrian Social Democracy proved that it was itself the sorry -victim of this inadequacy, to which it capitulated spiritually. When it -proved itself impotent to unite the many-raced Austrian proletariat -under the principles of Internationalism, and finally gave up this task -altogether, the Austro-German Social Democracy subordinated all -Austria-Hungary and even its own policies to the "Idea" of Prussian -Junker Nationalism. This utter denial of principles speaks to us in an -unprecedented manner from the pages of the _Wiener Arbeiter-Zeitung_. -But if we listen more carefully to the tones of this hysterical -nationalism we cannot fail to hear a graver voice, the voice of history -telling us that the path of political progress for Central and -Southeastern Europe leads over the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian -Monarchy. - - - - - CHAPTER III - - THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM - - -But how about Czarism? Would not Germany's and Austria's victory mean -the defeat of Czarism? And would not the beneficent results of the -defeat of Czarism greatly outbalance the beneficent results of a -dismembered Austria-Hungary? - -The German and Austrian Social Democrats lay much stress upon this -question in the arguing they do about the War. The crushing of a small -neutral country, the ruin of France--all this is justified by the need -to fight Czarism. Haase gives as the reason for voting the war credits -the necessity of "defense against the danger of Russian despotism." -Bernstein goes back to Marx and Engels and quotes old texts for his -slogan, "Settling with Russia!" - -Südekum, dissatisfied with the result of his Italian mission, says that -what the Italians are to blame for is not understanding Czarism. And -when the Social Democrats of Vienna and Budapest fall in line under the -Hapsburg banner in its "holy war" against the Servians struggling for -their national unity, they sacrifice their Socialistic honor to the -necessity for fighting Czarism. - -And the Social Democrats are not alone in this. The entire bourgeois -German press has no other aims, for the moment, than the annihilation of -the Russian autocracy, which oppresses the peoples of Russia and menaces -the freedom of Europe. - -The Imperial Chancellor denounces France and England as vassals of -Russian despotism. Even the German Major-General von Morgen, assuredly a -true and tried "friend of liberty and independence," calls on the Poles -to rebel against the despotism of the Czar. - -But for us who have gone through the school of historical materialism it -would be a disgrace if we did not perceive the actual relations of the -interests in spite of these phrases, these lies, this boasting, this -foul vulgarity and stupidity. - -No one can genuinely believe that the German reactionaries really do -cherish such a hatred of Czarism, and are aiming their blows against it. -On the contrary, after the War Czarism will be the same to the rulers of -Germany that it was before the War--the most closely related form of -government. Czarism is indispensable to the Germany of the -Hohenzollerns, for two reasons. In the first place, it weakens Russia -economically, culturally and militaristically, and so prevents its -development as an imperialistic rival. In the second place, the -existence of Czarism strengthens the Hohenzollern Monarchy and the -Junker oligarchy, since if there were no Czarism, German absolutism -would face Europe as the last mainstay of feudal barbarism. - -German absolutism never has concealed the interest of blood relationship -that it has in the maintenance of Czarism, which represents the same -social form though in more shameless ways. Interests, tradition, -sympathies draw the German reactionary element to the side Czarism. -"Russia's sorrow is Germany's sorrow." At the same time the -Hohenzollerns, behind the back of Czarism, can make a show of being the -bulwark of culture "against barbarism," and can succeed in fooling their -own people if not the rest of Western Europe. - -"With sincere sorrow I see a friendship broken that Germany has kept -faithfully," said William II. in his speech upon the declaration of war, -referring neither to France nor to England, but to Russia, or rather, to -the Russian dynasty, in accordance with the Hohenzollern's Russian -religion, as Marx would have said. - -We are told that Germany's political plan is to create, on the one hand, -a basis of rapprochement with France and England by a victory over those -countries, and, on the other hand, to utilize a strategic victory over -France in order to crush Russian despotism. - -The German Social Democrats must either have inspired William and his -chancellor with this plan, or else must have ascribed this plan to -William and his chancellor. - -As a matter of fact, however, the political plans of the German -reactionaries are of exactly the opposite character, must necessarily be -of the opposite character. - -For the present we will leave open the question of whether the -destructive blow at France was dictated by strategic considerations, and -whether "strategy" sanctioned defensive tactics on the Western front. -But one thing is certain, that not to see that the policy of the Junkers -required the ruin of France, is to prove that one has a reason for -keeping one's eyes closed. France--France is the enemy! - -Eduard Bernstein, who is sincerely trying to justify the political stand -taken by the German Social Democracy, draws the following conclusions: -Were Germany under a democratic rule, there would be no doubt as to how -to settle accounts with Czarism. A democratic Germany would conduct a -revolutionary war on the East. It would call on the nations oppressed -by Russia to resist the tyrant and would give them the means wherewith -to wage a powerful fight for freedom. [Quite right!] However, Germany -is not a democracy, and therefore it would be a utopian dream [Exactly!] -to expect any such policy with all its consequences from Germany as she -is. (_Vorwärts_, August 28.) Very well then! But right here Bernstein -suddenly breaks off his analysis of the actual German policy "with all -its consequences." After showing up the blatant contradiction in the -position of the German Social Democracy, he closes with the unexpected -hope that a reactionary Germany may accomplish what none but a -revolutionary Germany could accomplish. _Credo quid absurdum_. - -Nevertheless, it might be said in opposition to this that while the -ruling class in Germany has naturally no interest in fighting Czarism, -still Russia is now Germany's enemy, and, quite independently of the -will of the Hohenzollerns, the victory of Germany over Russia might -result in the great weakening, if not the complete overthrow of Czarism. -Long live Hindenburg, the great unconscious instrument of the Russian -Revolution, we might cry along with the Chemnitz _Volksstimme_. Long -live the Prussian Crown Prince--also a quite unconscious instrument. -Long live the Sultan of Turkey who is now serving in the cause of the -Revolution by bombarding the Russian cities around the Black Sea. Happy -Russian Revolution--how quickly the ranks of her army are growing! - -However, let us see if there is not something really to be said on this -side of the question. Is it not possible that the defeat of Czarism -might actually aid the cause of the Revolution? - -As to such a _possibility_, there is nothing to be said against it. The -Mikado and his Samurai were not in the least interested in freeing -Russia, yet the Russo-Japanese War gave a powerful impetus to the -revolutionary events that followed. - -Consequently similar results may be expected from the German-Russian -War. - -But to place the right political estimate upon these historical -possibilities we must take the following circumstances into -consideration. - -Those who believe that the Russo-Japanese War brought on the Revolution -neither know nor understand historical events and their relations. The -war merely hastened the outbreak of the Revolution; but for that very -reason it also weakened it. For had the Revolution developed as a -result of the organic growth of inner forces, it would have come later, -but would have been far stronger and more systematic. Therefore, -revolution has no real interest in war. This is the first -consideration. And the second thing is, that while the Russo-Japanese -War weakened Czarism, it strengthened Japanese militarism. The same -considerations apply in a still higher degree to the present -German-Russian War. - -In the course of 1912-1914 Russia's enormous industrial development once -for all pulled the country out of its state of counter-revolutionary -depression. - -The growth of the revolutionary movement on the foundation of the -economic and political condition of the laboring masses, the growth of -opposition in broad strata of the population, led to a new period of -storm and stress. But in contrast to the years 1902-1905, this movement -developed in a far more conscious, systematic manner, and, what is more, -was based on a far broader social foundation. It needed time to mature, -but it did not need the lances of the Prussian Samurai. On the -contrary, the Prussian Samurai gave the Czar the opportunity of playing -the rôle of defender of the Serbs, the Belgians and the French. - -If we presuppose a catastrophal Russian defeat, the war _may_ bring a -quicker outbreak of the Revolution, but at the cost of its inner -weakness. And if the Revolution should even gain the upper hand under -such circumstances, then the bayonets of the Hohenzollern armies would -be turned on the Revolution. Such a prospect can hardly fail to -paralyze Russia's revolutionary forces; for it is impossible to deny the -fact that the party of the German proletariat stands behind the -Hohenzollern bayonets. But this is only one side of the question. The -defeat of Russia necessarily presupposes decisive victories by Germany -and Austria on the other battlefields, and this would mean the enforced -preservation of the national-political chaos in Central and Southeastern -Europe and the unlimited mastery of German militarism in all Europe. - -An enforced disarmament for France, billions in indemnities, enforced -tariff walls around the conquered nations, and an enforced commercial -treaty with Russia, all this in conjunction would make German -imperialism master of the situation for many decades. - -Germany's new policy, which began with the capitulation of the party of -the proletariat to nationalistic militarism, would be strengthened for -years to come. The German working class would feed itself, materially -and spiritually, on the crumbs from the table of victorious imperialism, -while the cause of the Social Revolution would have received a mortal -blow. - -That in such circumstances a Russian revolution, even if temporarily -successful, would be an historical miscarriage, needs no further proof. - -Consequently, this present battling of the nations under the yoke of -militarism laid upon them by the capitalistic classes contains within -itself monstrous contrasts which neither the War itself nor the -governments directing it can solve in any way to the interest of future -historical development. The Social Democrats could not, and can not -now, combine their aims with any of the historical possibilities of this -War, that is, with either the victory of the Triple Alliance or the -victory of the Entente. - -The German Social Democracy was once well aware of this. The _Vorwärts_ -in its issue of July 28, discussing the very question of the war against -Czarism, said: - - - "But if it is not possible to localize the trouble, if Russia - should step into the field? What should our attitude toward - Czarism be then? Herein lies the great difficulty of the - situation. Has not the moment come to strike a death blow at - Czarism? If German troops cross the Russian frontier, will that - not mean the victory of the Russian Revolution?" - - -And the _Vorwärts_ comes to the following conclusion: - - - "Are we so sure that it _will_ mean victory to the Russian - Revolution if German troops cross the Russian frontier? It may - readily bring the collapse of Czarism, but will not the German - armies fight a revolutionary Russia with even greater energy, - with a keener desire for victory, than they do the absolutistic - Russia?" - - -More than this. On August 3, on the eve of the historical session of -the Reichstag, the _Vorwärts_ wrote in an article entitled "The War upon -Czarism": - - - "While the conservative press is accusing the strongest party in - the Empire of high treason, to the rejoicing of other countries, - there are other elements endeavoring to prove to the Social - Democracy that the impending war is really an old Social - Democratic demand. War against Russia, war upon the - blood-stained and faithless Czarism--this last is a recent - phrase of the press which once kissed the knout--isn't this what - Social Democracy has been asking for from the beginning? ... - - "These are literally the arguments used by one portion of the - bourgeois press, in fact the more intelligent portion, and it - only goes to show what importance is attached to the opinion of - that part of the German people which stands behind the Social - Democracy. The slogan no longer is 'Russia's sorrow is Germany's - sorrow.' Now it is 'Down with Czarism!' But since the days - when the leaders of the Social Democracy referred to [Bebel, - Lassalle, Engels, Marx] demanded a democratic war against - Russia, Russia has quite ceased to be the mere palladium of - reaction. Russia is also the seat of revolution. The overthrow - of Czarism is now the task of all the Russian people, especially - the Russian proletariat, and it is just the last weeks that have - shown how vigorously this very working class in Russia is - attacking the task that history has laid upon it.... And all - the nationalistic attempts of the 'True Russians' to turn the - hatred of the masses away from Czarism and arouse a reactionary - hatred against foreign countries, particularly Germany, have - failed so far. The Russian proletariat knows too well that its - enemy is not beyond the border but within its own land. Nothing - was more distasteful to these nationalistic agitators, the True - Russians and Pan-Slavists, than the news of the great peace - demonstration of the German Social Democracy. Oh, how they - would have rejoiced had the contrary been the case, had they - been able to say to the Russian proletariat, 'There, you see, - the German Social Democrats stand at the head of those who are - inciting the war against Russia!' And the Little Father in St. - Petersburg would also have breathed a sigh of relief and said, - 'That is the news I wanted to hear. Now the backbone of my most - dangerous enemy, the Russian Revolution, is broken. The - international solidarity of the proletariat is torn. Now I can - unchain the beast of nationalism. I am saved!" - - -Thus wrote the _Vorwärts_ after Germany had already declared war on -Russia. - -These words characterize the honest manly stand of the proletariat -against a belligerent jingoism. The _Vorwärts_ clearly understood and -cleverly stigmatized the base hypocrisy of the knout-loving ruling class -of Germany, which suddenly became conscious of its mission to free -Russia from Czarism. The _Vorwärts_ warned the German working class of -the political extortion that the bourgeois press would practise on their -revolutionary conscience. "Do not believe these friends of the knout," -the _Vorwärts_ said to the German proletariat. "They are hungry for your -souls, and hide their imperialistic designs behind liberal-sounding -phrases. They are deceiving you--you, the cannon-fodder with souls that -they need. If they succeed in winning you over, they will only be -helping Czarism by dealing the Russian Revolution a fearful moral blow. -And if, in spite of this, the Russian Revolution should raise its head, -these very people will help Czarism to crush it." - -That is the sense of what the _Vorwärts_ preached to the working class -up to the 4th of August. - -And exactly three weeks later the same _Vorwärts_ wrote: - - -"Liberation from Muscovitism (?), freedom and independence for Poland -and Finland, free development for the great Russian people themselves, -dissolution of the unnatural alliance between two cultural nations and -Czaristic barbarism--these were the aims that inspired the German people -and made them ready for any sacrifice," - - -and inspired also the German Social Democracy and its chief organ. - -What happened in those three weeks to cause the _Vorwärts_ to repudiate -its original standpoint? - -What happened? Nothing of importance. The German armies strangled -neutral Belgium, burned down a number of Belgian towns, destroyed -Louvain, the inhabitants of which had been so criminally audacious as to -fire at the armed invaders when they themselves wore no helmets and -waving feathers.[3] In those three weeks the German armies carried -death and destruction into French territory, and the troops of their -ally, Austria-Hungary, pounded the love of the Hapsburg Monarchy into -the Serbs on the Save and the Drina. These are the facts that apparently -convinced the _Vorwärts_ that the Hohenzollerns were waging the war of -liberation of the nations. - - [3] "How characteristically Prussian," wrote Marx to Engels, "to - declare that no man may defend his 'fatherland' except in - uniform!" - -Neutral Belgium was crushed, and the Social Democrats remained silent. -And Richard Fischer was sent to Switzerland as special envoy of the -Party to explain to the people of a neutral country that the violation -of Belgian neutrality and the ruin of a small nation were a perfectly -natural phenomenon. Why so much excitement? Any other European -government, in Germany's place, would have acted in the same way. It -was just at this time that the German Social Democracy not only -reconciled itself to the War as a work of real or supposed national -defense, but even surrounded the Hohenzollern-Hapsburg armies with the -halo of an offensive campaign for freedom. What an unprecedented fall -for a party that for fifty years had taught the German working class to -look upon the German Government as the foe of liberty and democracy! - -In the meantime every day of the War discloses the danger to Europe that -the Marxists should have foreseen at once. The chief blows of the -German government were not aimed at the East, but at the West, at -Belgium, France and England. Even if we accept the improbable premise -that nothing but strategic necessity determined this plan of campaign, -the logical political outcome of this strategy remains with all its -consequences, that is, the necessity for a full and definite defeat of -Belgium, France and the English land forces, so that Germany's hands -might be free to deal with Russia. Wasn't it perfectly clear that what -was at first represented as a temporary measure of strategic necessity -in order to soothe the German Social Democracy, would become an end in -itself through the force of events? The more stubborn the resistance -made by France, whose duty it has actually become to defend its -territory and its independence against the German attack, the more -certainly will the German armies be held on the Western front; and the -more exhausted Germany is on the Western front, the less strength and -inclination will remain for her supposedly main task, the task with -which the Social Democracy credited her, the "settling with Russia." -And then history will witness an "honorable" peace between the two most -reactionary powers of Europe, between Nicholas, to whom fate granted -cheap victories over the Hapsburg Monarchy,[4] rotten to its core, and -William, who had his "settling," but with Belgium, not with Russia. - - [4] "Russian diplomacy is interested only in such wars," wrote Engels - in 1890, "as force her allies to bear the chief burden of raising - troops and suffering invasion, and leave to the Russian troops - only the work of reserves. Czarism makes war on its own account - only on decidedly weaker nations, such as Sweden, Turkey and - Persia." Austria-Hungary must now be placed in the same class as - Turkey and Persia. - -The alliance between Hohenzollern and Romanoff--after the exhaustion and -degradation of the Western nations--will mean a period of the darkest -reaction in Europe and the whole world. - -The German Social Democracy by its present policy smooths the way for -this awful danger. And the danger will become an actuality unless the -European proletariat interferes and enters as a revolutionary factor -into the plans of the dynasties and the capitalistic governments. - - - - - CHAPTER IV - - THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST - - -On his return from his diplomatic trip to Italy, Dr. Südekum wrote in -the _Vorwärts_ that the Italian comrades did not sufficiently comprehend -the nature of Czarism. We agree with Dr. Südekum that a German can more -easily understand the nature of Czarism as he experiences daily, in his -own person, the nature of Prussian-German absolutism. The two "natures" -are very closely akin to each other. - -German absolutism represents a feudal-monarchical organization, resting -upon a mighty capitalist foundation, which the development of the last -half-century has erected for it. The strength of the German army, as we -have learned to know it anew in its present bloody work, consists not -alone in the great material and technical resources of the nation, and -in the intelligence and precision of the workman-soldier, who had been -drilled in the school of industry and his own class organizations. It -has its foundation also in its Junker officer caste, with its master -class traditions, its oppression of those who are below and its -subordination to those who are above. The German army, like the German -state, is a feudal-monarchical organization with inexhaustible -capitalistic resources. The bourgeois scribblers may chatter all they -want about the supremacy of the German, the man of duty, over the -Frenchman, the man of pleasure; the real difference lies not in the -racial qualities, but in the social and political conditions. The -standing army, that closed corporation, that self-sufficing state within -the state, remains, despite universal military service, a caste -organization that in order to thrive must have artificial distinctions -of rank and a monarchical top to crown the commanding hierarchy. - -In his work, "The New Army," Jaurès showed that the only army France -could have is an army of defense built on the plan of arming every -citizen, that is, a democratic army, a _militia_. The bourgeois French -Republic is now paying the penalty for having made her army a -counterpoise to her democratic state organization. She created, in -Jaurès' words, "a bastard régime in which antiquated forms clashed with -newly developing forms and neutralized each other." This incongruity -between the standing army and the republican régime is the fundamental -weakness of the French military system. - -The reverse is true of Germany. Germany's barbarian retrograde -political system gives her a great military supremacy. The German -bourgeoisie may grumble now and then when the pretorian caste spirit of -the officers' corps leads to outbreaks like that of Zabern. They may -make wry faces at the Crown Prince and his slogan, "Give it to them! -Give it to them!" The German Social Democracy may inveigh ever so -sharply against the systematic personal ill-treatment of the German -soldier which has caused proportionately double the number of suicides -in the German barracks of that in any other country. But for all that, -the fact that the German bourgeoisie has absolutely no political -character and that the German Socialist party has failed to inspire the -proletariat with the revolutionary spirit has enabled the ruling class -to erect the gigantic structure of militarism, and so place the -efficient and intelligent German workmen under the command of the Zabern -heroes and their slogan, "Give it to them!" - -Professor Hans Delbrück seeks the source of Germany's military strength -in the ancient model of the Teutoburgerwald, and he is perfectly -justified. - - - "The oldest Germanic system of warfare," he writes, "was based - on the retinue of princes, a body of specially selected - warriors, and the mass of fighters comprising the entire nation. - This is the system we have to-day also. How vastly different - are the methods of fighting now from those of our ancestors in - the Teutoburgerwald! We have the technical marvels of modern - machine guns. We have the wonderful organization of immense - masses of troops. And yet, our military system is at bottom the - same. The martial spirit is raised to its highest power, - developed to its utmost in a body which once was small but now - numbers many thousands, a body giving fealty to their War Lord, - and by him, as by the princes of old, regarded as his comrades; - and under their leadership the whole people, educated by them - and disciplined by them. _Here we have the secret of the - warlike character of the German nation_." - - -The French Major, Driant, looks on at the German Kaiser in his White -Cuirassier's uniform, undoubtedly the most imposing military uniform in -the world, and republican by constraint that he is, his heart is filled -with a lover's jealousy. And how the Kaiser spends his time "in the -midst of his army, that true family of the Hohenzollerns!" The Major is -fascinated. - -The feudal caste, whose hour of political and moral decay had struck -long ago, found its connection with the nation once more in the fertile -soil of imperialism. And this connection with the nation has taken such -deep root that the prophecies of Major Driant, written several years -ago, have actually come true--prophecies that until now could only have -appeared as either the poisonous promptings of a secret Bonapartist, or -the drivellings of a lunatic. - - - "The Kaiser," he wrote, "is the Commander in Chief ... and - behind him stands the entire working class of Germany as one - man.... Bebel's Social Democrats are in the ranks, their - fingers on the trigger, and they too think only of the welfare - of the Fatherland. The ten-billion war indemnity that France - will have to pay will be a greater help to them than the - Socialist chimeras on which they fed the day before." - - -Yes, and now they are writing of this future indemnity even in some -_Social Democratic (!)_ papers, with open rowdy insolence--an indemnity, -however, not of ten billions, but of twenty or thirty billions. - -Germany's victory over France--a deplorable strategic necessity, -according to the German Social Democrats--would mean not only the defeat -of France's standing army; it would mean primarily the victory of the -feudal-monarchical state over the democratic-republican state. - -For the ancient race of Hindenburgs, Moltkes and Klucks, hereditary -specialists in mass-murder, are just as indispensable a condition of -German victory as are the 42 centimeter guns, the last word in human -technical skill. - -The entire capitalist press is already talking of the unshakable -stability of the German Monarchy, strengthened by the war. And German -professors, the same who proclaimed Hindenburg a doctor of All the -Sciences, are already declaring that political slavery is a higher form -of social life. - - - "The democratic republics, and the so-called monarchies that are - under subjection to a parliamentary régime, and all the other - beautiful things that were so extolled--what little capacity - they have shown to stand the storm!" - - -These are the things that the German professors are writing now. - -It is shameful and humiliating enough to read the expressions of the -French Socialists, who had proved themselves too weak to break the -alliance of France with Russia or even to prevent the return to -three-years' military service, but who, when the War began, nevertheless -donned their red trousers and set out to free Germany. But we are -seized with a feeling of unspeakable indignation on reading the German -Socialist party press, which in the language of exalted slaves extols -the brave heroic caste of hereditary oppressors for their armed exploits -on French territory. - -On August 15, 1870, when the victorious German armies were approaching -Paris, Engels wrote in a letter to Marx, after describing the confused -condition of the French defense: - - - "Nevertheless, a revolutionary government, if it comes soon, - need not despair. But it must leave Paris to its fate, and - continue to carry on the war from the south. It is then still - possible that such a government may hold out until arms and - ammunition are bought and a new army organized with which the - enemy can be gradually pushed back to the frontier. That would - be the right ending to the war--for both countries to - demonstrate that they cannot be conquered." - - -And yet there are people who shout like drunken helots, "On to Paris." -And in doing so they have the impudence to invoke the names of Marx and -Engels. In what measure are they superior to the thrice despised -Russian liberals who crawled on their bellies before his Excellency, the -military Commander, who introduced the Russian knout into East Galicia. -It is cowardly arrogance--this talk of the purely "strategic" character -of the War on the Western front. Who takes any account of it? Certainly -not the German ruling classes. They speak the language of conviction -and of main force. They call things by their right names. They know -what they want and they know how to fight for it. - -The Social Democrats tell us that the War is being waged for the cause -of national independence. "That is not true," retorted Herr Arthur Dix. - - - "Just as the high politics of the last century," wrote Dix, - "owed its specially marked character to the _National Idea_, so - the political-world events of this century stand under the - emblem of the _Imperialistic Idea_. The imperialistic idea that - is destined to give the impetus, the scope and the goal to the - striving for power of the great (_Der Weltwirtschaftskrieg_, - 1914, p. 3). - - "It shows gratifying sagacity," says the same Herr Arthur Dix, - "on the part of those who had charge of the military - preparations of the War, that the advance of our armies against - France and Russia in the very first stage of the War took place - precisely where it was most important to keep valuable German - mineral wealth free from foreign invasion, and to occupy such - portions of the enemy's territory as would supplement our own - underground resources" (Ibid., p. 38). - - -The "strategy," of which the Socialists now speak in devout whispers, -really begins its activities with the robbery of mineral wealth. - -The Social Democrats tell us that the War is a war of defense. But Herr -Georg Irmer says clearly and distinctly: - - - "People ought not to be talking as though the German nation had - come too late for rivalry for world economy and world - dominion,--that the world has already been divided. Has not the - earth been divided over and over again in all epochs of - history?" (_Los vom englischen Weltjoch_, 1914, p. 42.) - - -The Socialists try to comfort us by telling us that Belgium has only -been temporarily crushed and that the Germans will soon vacate their -Belgian quarters. But Herr Arthur Dix, who knows very well what he -wants, and who has the right and the power to want it, writes that what -England fears most, and expressly so, is that _Germany should have an -outlet to the Atlantic Ocean_. - -"For this very reason," he continues, "we must neither _let Belgium go -out of our hands_, nor must we fail to make sure that the coast line -from Ostende to the Somme shall not again fall into the hands of any -state which may become a political vassal of England. We must see to it -that in some form or other _German influence_ is securely established -there." - -In the endless battles between Ostende and Dunkirk, sacred "strategy" is -now carrying out this programme of the Berlin stock exchange, also. - -The Socialists tell us that the War between France and Germany is merely -a brief prelude to a lasting alliance between those countries. But here, -too, Herr Arthur Dix shows Germany's cards. According to him, "there is -but one answer: _to seek to destroy the English world trade, and to deal -deadly blows at English national economy_." - -"The aim for the foreign policy of the German Empire for the next -decades is clearly indicated," Professor Franz von Liszt announces. -"'Protection against England,' that must be our slogan" (_Ein -mitteleuropäischer Staatenverband_, 1914, p. 24). - - - "We must crush the most treacherous and malicious of our foes," - cries a third. "We must break the tyranny which England - exercises over the sea with base self-seeking and shameless - contempt of justice and right." - - -The War is directed not against Czarism, but primarily against England's -supremacy on the sea. - - - "It may be said," Professor Schiehmann confesses, "that no - success of ours has given us such joy as the defeat of the - English at Maubeuge and St. Quentin on August 28." - - -The German Social Democrats tell us that the chief object of the War is -the "settlement with Russia." But plain, straightforward Herr Rudolf -Theuden wants to give Galicia to Russia with North Persia thrown in. -Then Russia "would have got enough to be satisfied for many decades to -come. We may even make her our friend by it." - -"What ought the War to bring us?" asks Theuden, and then he answers: - - - "_The chief payment must be made us by France_.... France must - give us Belfort, that part of Lorraine which borders on the - Moselle, and, in case of stubborn resistance, that part as well - which borders on the Maas. If we make the Maas and the Moselle - German boundaries, the French will some day perhaps wean - themselves away from the idea of making the Rhine a French - boundary." - - -The bourgeois politicians and professors tell us that England is the -chief enemy; that Belgium and France are the gateway to the Atlantic -Ocean; that the hope of a Russian indemnity is only a Utopian dream, -anyway; that Russia would be more useful as friend than as foe; that -France will have to pay in land and in gold--and the _Vorwärts_ exhorts -the German workers to "hold out until the decisive victory is ours." - -And yet the _Vorwärts_ tells us that the War is being waged for the -independence of the German nation, and for the liberation of the Russian -people. What does this mean? Of course we must not look for ideas, -logic and truth where they do not exist. This is simply a case of an -ulcer of slavish sentiments bursting open and foul pus crawling over the -pages of the workingmen's press. It is clear that the oppressed class -which proceeds too slowly and inertly on its way toward freedom must in -the final hour drag all its hopes and promises through mire and blood, -before there arises in its soul the pure, unimpeachable voice--the voice -of revolutionary honor. - - - - - CHAPTER V - - THE WAR OF DEFENSE - - - "The thing for us to do now is to avert this danger [Russian - despotism], and to secure the culture and the independence of - our land. Thus we will make good our word, and do what we have - always said we would. In the hour of danger we will not leave - our Fatherland in the lurch.... Guided by these principles we - vote for the war credits." - - -This was the declaration of the German Social Democratic fraction, read -by Haase in the Reichstag session of August 4. - -Here only the defense of the fatherland is mentioned. Not a word is -said of the "liberating" mission of this War in behalf of the peoples of -Russia, which was later sung in every key by the Social Democratic -press. The logic of the Socialist press, however, did not keep pace -with its patriotism. For while it made desperate efforts to represent -the War as one of pure defense, to secure the safety of Germany's -possessions, it at the same time pictured it as a revolutionary -offensive war for the liberation of Russia and of Europe from Czarism. - -We have already shown clearly enough why the peoples of Russia had every -reason to decline with thanks the assistance offered them at the point -of the Hohenzollern bayonets. But how about the "defensive" character of -the War? - -What surprises us even more than what is said in the declaration of the -Social Democracy is what it conceals and leaves unsaid. After Hollweg -had already announced in the Reichstag the accomplished violation of the -neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg as a means of attacking France, -Haase does not mention this fact in a single word. This silence is so -monstrous that one is tempted to read the declaration a second and a -third time. But in vain. The declaration is written as though such -countries as Belgium, France and England had never existed on the -political map of the German Social Democracy. - -But facts do not cease to be facts simply because political parties shut -their eyes to them. And every member of the International has the right -to ask this question of Comrade Haase, "What portion of the five -billions voted by the Social Democratic fraction was meant for the -destruction of Belgium?" It is quite possible that in order to protect -the German fatherland from Russian despotism it was inevitable that the -Belgian fatherland should be crushed. But why did the Social Democratic -fraction keep silent on this point? - -The reason is clear. The English Liberal government, in its effort to -make the War popular with the masses, made its plea exclusively on the -ground of the necessity of protecting the independence of Belgium and -the integrity of France, but utterly ignored its alliance with Russian -Czarism. In like manner, and from the same motives, the German Social -Democracy speaks to the masses only about the war against Czarism, but -does not mention even by name Belgium, France and England. All this is -of course not exactly flattering to the international reputation of -Czarism. Yet it is quite distressing that the German Social Democracy -should sacrifice its own good name to the call to arms against Czarism. -Lassalle said that every great political action should begin with a -statement of things as they are. Then why does the defense of the -Fatherland begin with an abashed silence as to things as they are? Or -did the German Social Democracy perhaps think that this was not a "big -political action"? - -Anyway, the defense of the Fatherland is a very broad and very elastic -conception. The world catastrophe began with Austria's ultimatum to -Serbia. Austria, naturally, was guided solely by the need of defending -her borders from her uneasy neighbor. Austria's prop was Germany. And -Germany, in turn, as we already know, was prompted by the need to secure -her own state. "It would be senseless to believe," writes Ludwig -Quessel on this point, "that one wall could be torn away from this -extremely complex structure (Europe) without endangering the security of -the whole edifice." - -Germany opened her "Defensive War" with an attack upon Belgium, the -violation of Belgium's neutrality being allegedly only a means of -breaking through to France along the line of least resistance. The -military defeat of France also was to appear only as a strategic episode -in the defense of the Fatherland. - -To some German patriots this construction of things did not seem quite -plausible, and they had good grounds for disbelieving it. They suspected -a motive which squared far better with the reality. Russia, entering -upon a new era of military preparation, would be a far greater menace to -Germany in two or three years than she was then. And France during that -time would have completely carried out her three-year army reform. Is -it not clear, then, that an intelligent self-defense demanded that -Germany should not wait for the attack of her enemies but should -anticipate them by two years and take the offensive at once? And isn't -it clear, too, that such an offensive war, deliberately provoked by -Germany and Austria, is in reality a preventive war of defense? - -Not infrequently these two points of view are combined in a single -argument. Granted that there is some slight contradiction between them. -The one declares that Germany did not want the War now and that it was -forced upon her by the Triple Entente, while the other implies that war -was disadvantageous to the Entente now and that for that very reason -Germany had taken the initiative to bring on the War at this time. But -what if there is this contradiction? It is lightly and easily glossed -over and reconciled in the saving concept of a war of defense. - -But the belligerents on the other side disputed this advantageous -position of being on the defensive, which Germany sought to assume, and -did it successfully. France could not permit the defeat of Russia on -the ground of her own self-defense. England gave as the motive for her -interference the immediate danger to the British Islands which a -strengthening of Germany's position at the mouth of the Channel would -mean. Finally, Russia, too, spoke only of self-defense. It is true -that no one threatened Russian territory. But national possessions, -mark you, do not consist merely in territory, but in other, intangible, -factors as well, among them, the influence over weaker states. Servia -"belongs" in the sphere of Russian influence and serves the purpose of -maintaining the so-called balance of power in the Balkans, not only the -balance of power between the Balkan States but also between Russian and -Austrian influence. A successful Austrian attack on Servia threatened -to disturb this balance of power in Austria's favor, and therefore meant -an indirect attack upon Russia. Sasonov undoubtedly found his strongest -argument in Quessel's words: "It would be senseless to believe that one -wall could be torn away from the extremely complex structure (Europe) -without endangering the security of the entire edifice." - -It is superfluous to add that Servia and Montenegro, Belgium and -Luxemburg, could also produce some proofs of the defensive character of -their policies. Thus, all the countries were on the defensive, none was -the aggressor. But if that is so, then what sense is there in opposing -the claims of defensive and offensive war to each other? The standards -applied in such cases differ greatly, and are not frequently quite -incommensurable. - -What is of fundamental importance to us Socialists is the question of -the _historical_ rôle of the War. Is the War calculated to effectively -promote the productive forces and the state organizations, and to -accelerate the concentration of the working class forces? Or is the -reverse true, will it hinder in this? This materialistic evaluation of -wars stands above all formal or external considerations, and in its -nature has no relation to the question of defense or aggression. And -yet sometimes these formal expressions about a war designate with more -or less truth the actual significance of the war. When Engels said that -the Germans were on the defensive in 1870, he had least of all the -immediate political and diplomatic circumstances in mind. The -determining fact for him was that in that war Germany was fighting for -her right to national unity, which was a necessary condition for the -economic development of the country and the Socialist consolidation of -the proletariat. In the same sense the Christian peoples of the Balkans -waged a war of defense against Turkey, fighting for their right to -independent national development against the foreign rule. - -The question of the immediate international political conditions leading -to a war is independent of the value the war possesses from the -_historico-materialistic_ point of view. The German war against the -Bonapartist Monarchy was historically unavoidable. In that war the -right of development was on the German side. Yet those historical -tendencies did not, in themselves, predetermine the question as to which -party was interested in provoking the war just in the year 1870. We -know now very well that international politics and military -considerations induced Bismarck to take the actual initiative in the -war. It might have happened just the other way, however. With greater -foresight and energy, the government of Napoleon III could have -anticipated Bismarck, and begun the war a few years earlier. That would -have radically changed the immediate political aspect of events, but it -would have made no difference in the historic estimate of the war. - -Third in order is the factor of diplomacy. Diplomacy here has a two-fold -task to perform. First, it must bring about war at the moment most -favorable for its own country from the international as well as the -military standpoint. Second, it must employ methods which throw the -burden of responsibility for the bloody conflict, in public opinion, on -the enemy government. The exposure of diplomatic trickery, cheating and -knavery is one of the most important functions of Socialist political -agitation. But no matter to what extent we succeed in this at the -crucial juncture, it is clear that the net of diplomatic intrigues in -themselves signifies nothing either as regards the historic rôle of the -war or its real initiators. Bismarck's clever manoeuvres forced Napoleon -III to declare war on Prussia, although the actual initiative came from -the German side. - -Next follows the purely military aspect. The _strategic_ plan of -operations can be calculated chiefly for defense or attack, regardless -of which side declared the war and under what conditions. Finally, the -first tactics followed in the carrying out of the strategic plan not -infrequently plays a great part in estimating the war as a war of -defense or of aggression. - - - "It is a good thing," wrote Engels to Marx on July 31, 1870, - "that the French attacked first on German soil. If the Germans - repel the invasion and follow it up by invading French - territory, then it will certainly not produce the same - impression as if the Germans had marched into France without a - previous invasion. In this way the war remains, on the French - side, more Bonapartistic." - - -Thus we see by the classic example of the Franco-Prussian War that the -standards for judging whether a war is defensive or aggressive are full -of contradictions when two nations clash. Then how much more so are -they when it is a clash of several nations. If we unroll the tangle -from the beginning, we arrive at the following connection between the -elements of attack and defense. The first _tactical_ move of the French -should--at least in Engels' opinion--make the people feel that the -responsibility of attack rested with the French. And yet the entire -_strategic_ plan of the Germans had an absolutely aggressive character. -The _diplomatic_ moves of Bismarck forced Bonaparte to declare war -against his will and thus appear as the disturber of the peace of -Europe, while the military-political initiative in the war came from the -Prussian government. These circumstances are by no means of slight -importance for the _historical_ estimate of the war, but they are not at -all exhaustive. - -One of the causes of this war was the growing ambition of the Germans -for national self-determination, which conflicted with the dynastic -pretensions of the French Monarchy. But this national "war of defense" -led to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and so in its second stage -turned into a dynastic war of conquest. - -The correspondence between Marx and Engels shows that they were guided -chiefly by historical considerations in their attitude towards the War -of 1870. To them, of course, it was by no means a matter of -indifference as to who conducted the war and how it was conducted. "Who -would have thought it possible," Marx writes bitterly, "that twenty-two -years after 1848 a nationalist war in Germany could have been given such -theoretical expression." Yet what was of decisive significance to Marx -and Engels was the objective consequences of the war. "If the Prussians -triumph, it will mean the centralization of the state power--useful to -the centralization of the German working-class." - -Liebknecht and Bebel, starting with the same historical estimate of the -war, were directly forced to take a political position toward it. It -was by no means in opposition to the views of Marx and Engels, but, on -the contrary, with their perfect acquiescence that Liebknecht and Bebel -refused, in the Reichstag, to take any responsibility for this War. The -statement they handed in read: - - - "We cannot grant the war appropriations that the Reichstag is - asked to make because that would be a vote of confidence in the - Prussian government.... As opponents on principle of every - dynastic war, as Social Republicians and members of the - International Labor Association, which, without distinction of - nationality, fights all oppressors and endeavors to unite all - the oppressed in one great brotherhood, we cannot declare - ourselves either directly or indirectly in favor of the present - war." - - -Schweitzer acted differently. He took the historical estimate of the -war as a direct guide for his tactics--one of the most dangerous of -fallacies!--and in voting the war credits gave a vote of confidence to -the policy of Bismarck. And this in spite of the fact that it was -necessary, if the centralization of state power arising out of the War -was to turn out of use to the Social Democratic cause, that the -working-class should from the very beginning oppose the dynastic-Junker -centralization with their own class-centralization filled with -revolutionary distrust of the rulers. - -Schweitzer's political attitude invalidated the very consequences of the -War that had induced him to give a vote of confidence to the makers of -the War. - -Forty years later, drawing up the balance sheet of his life-work, Bebel -wrote: - - - "The attitude that Liebknecht and I took at the outbreak and - during the continuance of the war has for years been a subject - of discussion and violent attack, at first even in the Party; - but only for a short time. Then they acknowledged that we had - been right. I confess that I do not in any way regret our - attitude, and if at the outbreak of the War we had known what we - learned within the next few years from the official and - unofficial disclosures, our attitude from the very start would - have been still harsher. We would not merely have abstained, as - we did, from voting the first war credits, we would have voted - _against_ them." (_Autobiography_, Part II, p. 167.) - - -If we compare the Liebknecht-Bebel statement of 1870 with Haase's -declaration in 1914, we must conclude that Bebel was mistaken when he -said, "Then they acknowledged that we had been right." For the vote of -August 4 was eminently a condemnation of Bebel's policy forty-four years -earlier, since in Haase's phraseology, Bebel had then left the -Fatherland in the lurch in the hour of danger. - -What political causes and considerations have led the party of the -German proletariat to abandon its glorious traditions? Not a single -weighty reason has been given so far. All the arguments adduced are -full of contradictions. They are like diplomatic communiqués which are -written to justify an already accomplished act. The leader writer of -_Die Neue Zeit_ writes--with the blessing of Comrade Kautsky--that -Germany's position towards Czarism is the same as it was towards -Bonapartism in 1870! He even quotes from a letter of Engels: "All -classes of the German people realized that it was a question, first of -all, of national existence, and so they fell in line at once." For the -same reason, we are told, the German Social Democracy has fallen into -line now. It is a question of national existence. "Substitute Czarism -for Bonapartism, and Engels' words are true to-day." And yet the fact -remains, in all its force, that Bebel and Liebknecht demonstratively -refused to vote either money or confidence to the government in 1870. -Does it not hold just as well, then, if we "substitute Czarism for -Bonapartism"? To this question no answer has been vouchsafed. - -But what did Engels really write in his letter concerning the tactics of -the labor party? - -"It does not seem possible to me that under such circumstances a German -political party can preach _total obstruction_, and place all sorts of -minor considerations above the main issue." _Total obstruction!_--But -there is a wide gap between total obstruction and the total capitulation -of a political party. And it was this gap that divided the positions -between Bebel and Schweitzer in 1870. Marx and Engels were with Bebel -against Schweitzer. Comrade Kautsky might have informed his leader -writer, Hermann Wendel, of this fact. And it is nothing but defamation -of the dead for _Simplicissimus_ now to reconcile the shades of Bebel -and Bismarck in Heaven. If _Simplicissimus_ and Wendel have the right -to awaken anybody from his sleep in the grave for the endorsement of the -present tactics of the German Social Democracy, then it is not Bebel, -but Schweitzer. It is the shade of Schweitzer that now oppresses the -political party of the German proletariat. - - -But the very analogy between the Franco-Prussian War and the present War -is superficial and misleading in the extreme. Let us set aside all the -international relations. Let us forget that the War meant first of all -the destruction of Belgium, and that Germany's main force was hurled not -against Czarism but republican France. Let us forget that the starting -point of the War was the crushing of Servia, and that one of its aims -was the strengthening and consolidation of the arch-reactionary state, -Austria-Hungary. We will not dwell on the fact that the attitude of the -German Social Democracy dealt a hard blow at the Russian Revolution, -which in the two years before the War had again flared up in such a -tempest. We will close our eyes to all these facts, just as the German -Social Democracy did on August 4th, when it did not see that there was a -Belgium in the world, a France, England, Servia, or Austria-Hungary. We -will grant only the existence of Germany. - -In 1870 it was quite easy to estimate the historical significance of the -war. "If the Prussians win, the centralization of state power will -further the centralization of the German working class." And now? What -would be the result for the German working class of a Prussian victory -now? - -The only territorial expansion which the German working class could -welcome, because it would complete the national unity, is a union of -German Austria with Germany. Any other expansion of the German -fatherland means another step towards the transformation of Germany from -a national state to a state of nationalities, and the consequent -introduction of all those conditions which render more difficult the -class struggle of the proletariat. - -Ludwig Frank hoped--and he expressed this hope in the language of a -belated Lassallian--that later, after a victorious war, he would devote -himself to the work of the "internal building up" of the state. There -is no doubt that Germany will need this "internal building up" after a -victory no less than before the War. But will a victory make this work -easier? There is nothing in Germany's historical experiences any more -than in those of any other country to justify such a hope. - - - "We regarded the doings of the rulers of Germany [after the - victories of 1870] as a matter of course," says Bebel in his - _Autobiography_. "It was merely an illusion of the Party - Executive to believe that a more liberal spirit would prevail in - the new order. And this more liberal régime was to be granted by - the same man who had till then shown himself the greatest enemy, - I will not say of democratic development, but even of every - liberal tendency, and who now as victor planted the heel of his - Cuirassier boot on the neck of the new Empire." (Vol. II, p. - 188.) - - -There is absolutely no reason to expect different results now from a -victory from above. On the contrary. In 1870 Prussian Junkerdom had -first to adapt itself to the new imperial order. It could not feel -secure in the saddle all at once. It was eight years after the victory -over France that the anti-Socialist laws were passed. In forty-four -years Prussian Junkerdom has become the imperial Junkerdom. And if, -after half a century of the most intense class struggle, Junkerdom -should appear at the head of the victorious nation, then we need not -doubt that it would not have felt the need of Ludwig Frank's services -for the internal building up of the state had he returned safe from the -fields of German victories. - -But far more important than the strengthening of the class position of -the rulers is the influence a German victory would have upon the -proletariat itself. The war grew out of imperialistic antagonisms -between the capitalist states, and the victory of Germany, as stated -above, can produce only one result--territorial acquisitions at the -expense of Belgium, France and Russia, commercial treaties forced upon -her enemies, and new colonies. The class struggle of the proletariat -would then be placed upon the basis of the imperialistic hegemony of -Germany, the working class would be interested in the maintenance and -development of this hegemony, and revolutionary Socialism would for a -long time be condemned to the rôle of a propagandist sect. - -Marx was right when in 1870 he foresaw, as a result of the German -victories, a rapid development for the German labor movement under the -banner of scientific Socialism. But now the international conditions -point to the very opposite prognosis. Germany's victory would mean the -taking of the edge off the revolutionary movement, its theoretic -shallowing, and the dying out of the Marxist ideas. - - - - - CHAPTER VI - - WHAT HAVE SOCIALISTS TO DO WITH CAPITALIST WARS? - - -But the German Social Democracy, we shall be told, does not want -victory. Our answer must be in the first place that this is not true. -What the German Social Democracy wants is told by its press. With two -or three exceptions Socialist papers daily point out to the German -workingman that a victory of the German arms is _his_ victory. The -capture of Maubeuge, the sinking of three English warships, or the fall -of Antwerp aroused in the Social Democratic press the same feelings that -otherwise are excited by the gain of a new election district or a -victory in a wage dispute. We must not lose sight of the fact that the -German labor press, the Party press as well as the trade union papers, -is now a powerful mechanism that in place of the education of the -people's will for the class struggle has substituted the education of -the people's will for military victories. I have not in mind the ugly -chauvinistic excesses of individual organs, but the underlying sentiment -of the overwhelming majority of the Social Democratic papers. The -signal for this attitude seems to have been given by the vote of the -fraction on August 4th. - -But the fraction wasn't thinking of a German victory. It made it its -task only to avert the danger threatening from the outside, to defend -the Fatherland. That was all. - -And here we come back to the question of wars of defense and wars of -aggression. The German press, including the Social Democratic organs, -does not cease to repeat that it is Germany of all countries that finds -itself on the defensive in this War. We have already discussed the -standards for determining the difference between a war of aggression and -a war of defense. These standards are numerous and contradictory. Yet -in the present case they testify unanimously that Germany's military -acts cannot possibly be construed as the acts of a war of defense. But -this has absolutely no influence upon the tactics of the Social -Democracy. - -From a _historical_ standpoint the new German imperialism is, as we -already know, absolutely aggressive. Urged onward by the feverish -development of the national industry, German imperialism disturbs the -old balance of power between the states and plays the first violin in -the race for armaments. - -And from the _standpoint of world politics_ the present moment seemed to -be most favorable for Germany to deal her rivals a crushing blow--which -however does not lessen the guilt of Germany's enemies by one iota. - -The _diplomatic_ view of events leaves no doubt concerning the leading -part that Germany played in Austria's provocative action in Servia. The -fact that Czarist diplomacy was, as usual, still more disgraceful, does -not alter the case. - -From the standpoint of _strategy_ the entire German campaign was based -on a monstrous offensive. - -And finally from the standpoint of _tactics_, the first move of the -German army was the violation of Belgian neutrality. - -If all this is defense, then what is attack? But even if we assume that -events as pictured in the language of diplomacy admit of other -interpretations--although the first two pages of the White Book are very -clear as to this meaning--has the revolutionary party of the working -class no other standards for determining its policy than the documents -presented by a government that has the greatest interest in deceiving -it? - - - "Bismarck duped the whole world," says Bebel, "and knew how to - make people believe that it was Napoleon who provoked the war, - while he himself, the peace-loving Bismarck, found himself and - his policy in the position of being attacked. - - "The events preceding the war were so misleading that France's - complete unpreparedness for the war that she herself declared - was generally overlooked, while in Germany, which appeared to be - the one attacked, preparations for war had been completed down - to the very last wagon-nail, and mobilization moved with the - precision of clockwork." (_Autobiography_, Vol. III, pages - 167-168.) - - -After such an historical precedent one might expect more critical -caution from the Social Democracy. - -It is quite true that Bebel more than once repeated his assertion that -in case of an attack on Germany the Social Democracy would defend its -Fatherland. At the convention held at Essen, Kautsky answered him: - - - "In my opinion we cannot promise positively to share the - government's war enthusiasm every time we are convinced that the - country is threatened by attack. Bebel thinks we are much - further advanced than we were in 1870 and that we are now able - to decide in every instance whether the war which threatens is - really one of aggression or not. I should not like to take this - responsibility upon myself. I should not like to undertake to - guarantee that we could make a correct decision in every - instance, that we shall always know whether a government is - deceiving us, or whether it is not actually representing the - interests of the nation against a war of attack.... Yesterday - it was the German government that took the aggressive, to-morrow - it will be the French government, and we cannot know if the day - after it may not be the English government. The governments are - constantly taking turns. As a matter of fact what we are - concerned with in case of war is not a national, but an - international question. For a war between great powers will - become a world war and will affect the whole of Europe, not two - countries alone. Some day the German government might make the - German proletariat believe they were being attacked; the French - government might do the same with its subjects, and then we - should have a war in which the French and German working men - would follow their respective governments with equal enthusiasm, - and murder each other and cut each other's throats. Such a - contingency must be avoided, and it will be avoided if we do not - adopt the criterion of the aggressive or defensive war, but that - of the interests of the proletariat, which at the same time are - international interests.... Fortunately, it is a misconception - to assume that the German Social Democracy in case of war wanted - to judge by national and not by international considerations, - and felt itself to be first a German and then a proletariat - party." - - -With splendid clearness Kautsky in this speech reveals the terrible -dangers--now a still more terrible actuality--that are latent in the -endeavor to make the position of the Social Democracy dependent upon an -indefinite and contradictory formal estimate of whether a war is one of -defense or one of aggression. Bebel in his reply said nothing of -importance; and his point of view seemed quite inexplicable, especially -after his own experiences of the year 1870. - -Nevertheless, in spite of its theoretical inadequacy, Bebel's position -had a quite definite political meaning. Those imperialistic tendencies -which the danger of war begat excluded the possibility for the Social -Democracy's expecting salvation from the victory of either of the -warring parties. For that very reason its entire attention was directed -to the preventing of war, and the principal task was to keep the -governments worried about the results of a war. - -"The Social Democracy," said Bebel, "will oppose any government which -takes the initiative in war." He meant this as a threat to William -II.'s government. "Don't reckon upon us if some day you decide to -utilize your cannon and your battleships." Then he turned to Petrograd -and London: "They had better take care not to attack Germany in a -miscalculation of weakness from within on account of the obstructionist -policies of the powerful German Social Democracy." - -Without being a political doctrine, Bebel's conception was a political -threat, and a threat directed simultaneously at two fronts, the internal -front and the foreign front. His one obstinate answer to all historical -and logical objections was: "We'll find the way to expose any government -that takes the first step towards war. We are clever enough for that." - -This threatening attitude of not only the German Social Democracy but -also of the International Party was not without results. The various -governments actually did make every effort to postpone the outbreak of -the War. But that is not all. The rulers and the diplomats were doubly -attentive now to adapting their moves to the pacifist psychology of the -masses. They whispered with the Socialist leaders, nosed about in the -office of the International, and so created a sentiment which made it -possible for Jaurès and Haase to declare at Brussels, a few days before -the outbreak of the War, that their particular governments had no other -object than the preservation of peace. And when the storm broke loose, -the Social Democracy of every country looked for the guilty party--on -the other side of the border. Bebel's utterance, which had played a -definite part as a threat, lost all meaning the instant the first shots -were fired at the frontiers. That terrible thing took place which -Kautsky had prophesied. - -What at first glance appears the most surprising thing about it all is, -that the Social Democracy had not really felt the need for a political -criterion. In the catastrophe that has occurred to the International -the arguments have been notable for their superficiality. They -contradicted each other, shifted ground, and were of only secondary -significance--the gist of the matter being that the _fatherland must be -defended_. Apart from considerations of the historical outcome of the -War, apart from considerations of democracy and the class struggle, the -fatherland that has come down to us historically must be defended. And -defended not because our government wanted peace and was "perfidiously -attacked," as the international penny-a-liners put it, but because apart -from the conditions or the ways in which it was provoked, apart from who -was right and who was wrong, war, once it breaks out, subjects every -belligerent to the danger of invasion and conquest. Theoretical, -political, diplomatic and military considerations fall into ruins as in -an earthquake, a conflagration or a flood. The government with its army -is elevated to the position of the one power that can protect and save -its people. The large masses of the people in actuality return to a -pre-political condition. This feeling of the masses, this elemental -reflex of the catastrophe, need not be criticized in so far as it is -only a temporary feeling. But it is quite a different matter in the -case of the attitude of the Social Democracy, the responsible political -representative of the masses. The political organizations of the -possessing classes and especially the power of the government itself did -not simply float with the stream. They instantly set to work most -intensively and in very varied ways to heighten this unpolitical -sentiment and to unite the masses around the army and the government. -The Social Democracy not only did not become equally active in the -opposite direction, but from the very first moment surrendered to the -policy of the government and to the elemental feeling of the masses. -And instead of arming these masses with the weapons of criticism and -distrust, if only passive criticism and distrust, it itself by its whole -attitude hastened the people along the road to this pre-political -condition. It renounced its traditions and political pledges of fifty -years with a conspicuous readiness that was least of all calculated to -inspire the rulers with respect. - -Bethmann-Hollweg announced that the German government was in absolute -agreement with the German people, and after the avowal of the -_Vorwärts_, in view of the position taken by the Social Democracy, he -had a perfect right to say so. But he had still another right. If -conditions had not induced him to postpone political polemics to a more -favorable moment, he might have said at the Reichstag session of August -4th, addressing the representatives of the Socialist proletariat: -"To-day you agree with us in recognizing the danger threatening our -Fatherland, and you join us in trying to avert the danger by arms. But -this danger has not grown up since yesterday. You must previously have -known of the existence and the tendencies of Czarism, and you knew that -we had other enemies besides. So by what right did you attack us when -we built up our army and our navy? By what right did you refuse to vote -for military appropriations year after year? Was it by the right of -treason or the right of blindness? If in spite of you we had not built -up our army, we should now be helpless in the face of this Russian -menace that has brought you to your senses, too. No appropriations -granted now could enable us to make up for what we would have lost. We -should now be without arms, without cannons, without fortifications. -Your voting to-day in favor of the war credit of five billion is an -admission that your annual refusal of the budget was only an empty -demonstration, and, worse than that, was political demagogy. For as -soon as you came up for a serious historical examination, you denied -your entire past!" - -That is what the German Chancellor could have said, and this time his -speech would have carried conviction. And what could Haase have -replied? - -"We never took a stand for Germany's disarmament in the face of dangers -from without. Such peace rubbish was never in our thoughts. As long as -international contradictions create out of themselves the danger of war, -we want Germany to be safe against foreign invasion and servitude. What -we are trying for is a military organization which cannot--as can an -artificially trained organization--be made to serve for class -exploitation at home and for imperialistic adventures abroad, but will -be invincible in national defense. We want a militia. We cannot trust -you with the work of national defense. You have made the army a school -of reactionary training. You have drilled your corps of officers in the -hatred of the most important class of modern society, the proletariat. -You are capable of risking millions of lives, not for the real interests -of the people, but for the selfish interests of the ruling minority, -which you veil with the names of national ideals and state prestige. We -do not trust you, and that is why we have declared year after year, 'Not -a single man or a single penny for this class government!'' - -"But five billions!" voices from both the right and the left might -interrupt. - -"Unfortunately we are now left no choice. We have no army except the one -created by the present masters of Germany, and the enemy stands without -our gates. We cannot on the instant replace William II.'s army by a -people's militia, and once this is so, we cannot refuse food, clothing -and materials of war to the army that is defending us, no matter how it -may be constituted. We are neither repudiating our past nor renouncing -our future. We are forced to vote for the war credits." - -That would have been about the most convincing thing that Haase could -have said. - -Yet, even though such considerations might give an explanation of why -the Socialist workers as _citizens_ did not obstruct the military -organization, but simply fulfilled the duty of citizenship forced upon -them by circumstances, we should still be waiting in vain for an answer -to the principal question: Why did the Social Democracy, as the -political organization of a class that has been denied a share in the -government, as the implacable enemy of bourgeois society, as the -republican party, as a branch of the International--why did it take upon -itself the responsibility for acts undertaken by its irreconcilable -class enemies? - -If it is impossible for us immediately to replace the Hohenzollern army -with a militia, that does not mean that we must now take upon ourselves -the responsibility for the doings of that army. If in times of peaceful -normal state-housekeeping we wage war against the monarchy, the -bourgeoisie and militarism, and are under obligations to the masses to -carry on that war with the whole weight of our authority, then we commit -the greatest crime against our future when we put this authority at the -disposal of the monarchy, the bourgeoisie and militarism at the very -moment when these break out into the terrible, anti-social and barbaric -methods of war. - -Neither the nation nor the state can escape the obligation of defense. -But when we refuse the rulers our confidence we by no means rob the -bourgeois state of its weapons or its means of defense and even of -attack--as long as we are not strong enough to wrest its power from its -hands. In war as in peace, we are a party of opposition, not a party of -power. In that way we can also most surely serve that part of our task -which war outlines so sharply, the work of national independence. The -Social Democracy cannot let the fate of any nation, whether its own or -another nation, depend upon military successes. In throwing upon the -capitalist state the responsibility for the method by which it protects -its independence, that is, the violation of the independence of other -states, the Social Democracy lays the cornerstone of true national -independence in the consciousness of the masses of all nations. By -preserving and developing the international solidarity of the workers, -we secure the independence of the nation--and make it independent of the -calibre of cannons. - -If Czarism is a danger to Germany's independence, there is only one way -that promises success in warding off this danger, and that way lies with -us--the solidarity of the working masses of Germany and Russia. But -such solidarity would undermine the policy that William II. explained in -saying that the entire German people stood behind him. What should we -Russian Socialists say to the Russian workingmen in face of the fact -that the bullets the German workers are shooting at them bear the -political and moral seal of the German Social Democracy? "We cannot -make our policy for Russia, we make it for Germany," was the answer -given me by one of the most respected functionaries of the German party -when I put this question to him. And at that moment I felt with -particularly painful clearness what a blow had been struck at the -International from within. - -The situation, it is plain, is not improved if the Socialist parties of -_both_ warring countries throw in their fate with the fate of their -governments, as in Germany and France. No outside power, no -confiscation or destruction of Socialist property, no arrests and -imprisonments could have dealt such a blow to the International as it -struck itself with its own hands in surrendering to the Moloch of state -just when he began to talk in terms of blood and iron. - - ---- - -In his speech at the convention at Essen Kautsky drew a terrifying -picture of brother rising against brother in the name of a "war of -defense"--as an argument, by no means as an actual possibility. Now -that this picture has become a bloody actuality, Kautsky endeavors to -reconcile us to it. He beholds no collapse of the International. - - - "The difference between the German and the French Socialists is - not to be found in their standards of judgment, nor in their - fundamental point of view, but merely in the difference of their - interpretation of the present situation, which, in its turn, is - conditioned by the _difference in their geographical position_ - [!]. Therefore, this difference can scarcely be overcome while - the war lasts. Nevertheless it is not a difference of principle, - but one arising out of a particular situation, and so it need - not last after that situation has ceased to exist." (_Neue - Zeit_, 337, p. 3.) - - -When Guèsde and Sembat appear as aides to Poincaré, Delcassé and Briand, -and as opponents to Bethmann-Hollweg; when the French and German -workingmen cut each other's throats and are not doing so as enforced -citizens of the bourgeois republic and the Hohenzollern Monarchy, but as -Socialists performing their duty under the spiritual leadership of their -parties, this is not a collapse of the International. The "standard of -judgment" is one and the same for the German Socialist cutting a -Frenchman's throat as for the French Socialist cutting a German's -throat. If Ludwig Frank takes up his gun, not to proclaim the -"difference of principle" to the French Socialists, but to shoot them in -all agreement of principle; and if Ludwig Frank should himself fall by a -French bullet--fired possibly by a comrade--that is no detriment to -"standards" they have in common. It is merely a consequence of the -"difference in their geographical position." Truly, it is bitter to -read such lines, but doubly bitter when they come from Kautsky's pen. - -The International was opposed to the war. - - - "If, in spite of the efforts of the Social Democracy, we should - have war," says Kautsky, "then every nation must save its skin - as best it can. This means for the Social Democracy of every - country the same right and the same duty to participate in its - country's defense, and none of them may make of this a cause for - casting reproaches [!] at each other." (_Neue Zeit_, 337, p. - 7.) - - -Of such sort is this common standard to save one's own skin, to break -one another's skulls in self-defense, and not to "reproach" one another -for doing so. - -But will the question be answered by the _agreement_ in the standard of -judgment? Will it not rather be answered by the _quality_ of this -common standard of judgment? Among Bethmann-Hollweg, Sasonov, Grey and -Delcassé you also find agreement in their standards. Nor is there any -difference of principle between them either. They least of all have any -right to cast reproaches at each other. Their conduct simply springs -from "a difference in their geographical position." Had -Bethmann-Hollweg been an English minister, he would have acted exactly -as did Sir Edward Grey. Their standards are as like each other as their -cannon, which differ in nothing but their calibre. But the question for -us is, can we adopt _their_ standards for _our own_? - - - "Fortunately, it is a misconception to assume that the German - Social Democracy in case of war wanted to judge by national and - not by international considerations, and felt itself to be first - a German and then a proletariat party." - - -So said Kautsky in Essen. And now when the national point of view has -taken hold of all the workingmen's parties of the International in place -of the international point of view that they held in common, Kautsky not -only reconciles himself to this "misconception," but even tries to find -in it agreement of standards and a guarantee of the rebirth of the -International. - - - "In every national state the working class must also devote its - entire energy to keeping intact the independence and the - integrity of the national territory. This is an essential of - democracy, that basis necessary to the struggle and the final - victory of the proletariat." (_Neue Zeit_, 337, p. 4.) - - -But if this is the case, how about the Austrian Social Democracy? Must -it, too, devote its entire energy to the preservation of the -non-national and anti-national Austro-Hungarian Monarchy? And the -German Social Democracy? By amalgamating itself politically with the -German army, it not only helps to preserve the Austro-Hungarian national -chaos, but also facilitates the destruction of Germany's national unity. -_National unity is endangered not only by defeat but also by victory_. - -From the standpoint of the European proletariat it is equally harmful -whether a slice of French territory is gobbled up by Germany, or whether -France gobbles up a slice of German territory. Moreover the -preservation of the European _status quo_ is not a thing at all for our -platform. The political map of Europe has been drawn by the point of -the bayonet, at every frontier passing over the living bodies of the -nations. If the Social Democracy assists its national (or -anti-national) governments with all its energy, it is again leaving it -to the power and intelligence of the bayonet to correct the map of -Europe. And in tearing the International to pieces, the Social -Democracy destroys the one power that is capable of setting up a -programme of national independence and democracy in opposition to the -activity of the bayonet, and of carrying out this programme in a greater -or less degree, quite independently of which of the national bayonets is -crowned with victory. - -The experience of old is confirmed once again. If the Social Democracy -sets national duties above its class duties, it commits the greatest -crime not only against Socialism, but also against the interest of the -nation as rightly and broadly understood. - - - - - CHAPTER VII - - THE COLLAPSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL - - -At their Convention in Paris two weeks before the outbreak of the -catastrophe, the French Socialists insisted on pledging all branches of -the International to revolutionary action in case of a mobilization. -They were thinking chiefly of the German Social Democracy. The -radicalism of the French Socialists in matters of foreign policy was -rooted not so much in international as national interests. The events of -the War have now definitely confirmed what was clear to many then. What -the French Socialist Party desired from the sister party in Germany was -a certain guarantee for the inviolability of France. They believed that -only by thus insuring themselves with the German proletariat could they -finally free their own hands for a decisive conflict with national -militarism. - -The German Social Democracy, for their part, flatly refused to make any -such pledge. Bebel showed that if the Socialist parties signed the -French resolution, that would not necessarily enable them to keep their -pledge when the decisive moment came. Now there is little room for -doubt that Bebel was right. As events have repeatedly proved, a period -of mobilization almost completely cripples the Socialist Party, or at -least precludes the possibility of decisive moves. Once mobilization is -declared, the Social Democracy finds itself face to face with the -concentrated power of the Government, which is supported by a powerful -military apparatus that is ready to crush all obstacles in its path and -has the unqualified co-operation of all bourgeois parties and -institutions. - -And of no less importance is the fact that mobilization wakes up and -brings to their feet those elements of the people whose social -significance is slight and who play little or no political part in times -of peace. Hundreds of thousands, nay millions of petty hand-workers, of -hobo-proletarians (the riff-raff of the workers), of small farmers and -agricultural laborers are drawn into the ranks of the army and put into -a uniform, in which each one of these men stands for just as much as the -class-conscious workingman. They and their families are forcibly torn -from their dull unthinking indifference and given an interest in the -fate of their country. Mobilization and the declaration of war awaken -fresh expectations in these circles whom our agitation practically does -not reach and whom, under ordinary circumstances, it will never enlist. -Confused hopes of a change in present conditions, of a change for the -better, fill the hearts of these masses dragged out of the apathy of -misery and servitude. The same thing happens as at the beginning of a -revolution, but with one all-important difference. A revolution links -these newly aroused elements with the revolutionary class, but war links -them--with the government and the army! In the one case all the -unsatisfied needs, all the accumulated suffering, all the hopes and -longings find their expression in revolutionary enthusiasm; in the other -case these same social emotions temporarily take the form of patriotic -intoxication. Wide circles of the working class, even among those -touched with Socialism, are carried along in the same current. The -advance guard of the Social Democracy feels it is in the minority; its -organizations, in order to complete the organization of the army, are -wrecked. Under such conditions there can be no thought of a -revolutionary move on the part of the Party. And all this is quite -independent of whether the people look upon a particular war with favor -or disfavor. In spite of the colonial character of the Russo-Japanese -war and its unpopularity in Russia, the first half year of it nearly -smothered the revolutionary movement. Consequently it is quite clear -that, with the best intentions in the world, the Socialist parties -cannot pledge themselves to obstructionist action at the time of -mobilization, at a time, that is, when Socialism is more than ever -politically isolated. - -And therefore there is nothing particularly unexpected or discouraging -in the fact that the working-class parties did not oppose military -mobilization with their own revolutionary mobilization. Had the -Socialists limited themselves to expressing condemnation of the present -war, had they declined all responsibility for it and refused the vote of -confidence in their governments as well as the vote for the war credits, -they would have done their duty at the time. They would have taken up a -position of waiting, the oppositional character of which would have been -perfectly clear to the government as well as to the people. Further -action would have been determined by the march of events and by those -changes which the events of a war must produce on the people's -consciousness. The ties binding the International together would have -been preserved, the banner of Socialism would have been unstained. -Although weakened for the moment, the Social Democracy would have -preserved a free hand for a decisive interference in affairs as soon as -the change in the feelings of the working masses came about. And it is -safe to assert that whatever influence the Social Democracy might have -lost by such an attitude at the beginning of the war, would have been -won several times over once the inevitable turn in public sentiment had -come about. - -But if this did not happen, if the signal for war mobilization was also -the signal for the fall of the International, if the national labor -parties fell in line with their governments and the armies without a -single protest, then there must be deep causes for it common to the -entire International. It would be futile to seek these causes in the -mistakes of individuals, in the narrowness of leaders and party -committees. They must be sought in the conditions of the epoch in which -the Socialist International first came into being and developed. Not -that the unreliability of the leaders or the bewildered incompetence of -the Executive Committees should ever be justified. By no means. But -these are not fundamental factors. These must be sought in the -historical conditions of an entire epoch. For it is not a question--and -we must be very straightforward with ourselves about this--of any -particular mistake, not of any opportunist steps, not of any awkward -statements in the various parliaments, not of the vote for the budget -cast by the Social Democrats of the Grand Duchy of Baden, not of -individual experiments of French ministerialism, not of the making or -unmaking of this or that Socialist's career. It is nothing less than -the complete failure of the International in the most responsible -historical epoch, for which all the previous achievements of Socialism -can be considered merely as a preparation. - -A review of historical events will reveal a number of facts and symptoms -that should have aroused disquiet as to the depth and solidity of -Internationalism in the labor movement. - -I am not referring to the Austrian Social Democracy. In vain did the -Russian and Servian Socialists look for clippings from articles on world -politics in the _Wiener Arbeiter Zeitung_ that they could use for -Russian and Servian workingmen without having to blush for the -International. One of the most striking tendencies of this journal -always was the defense of Austro-German imperialism not only against the -outside enemy but also against the internal enemy--and the _Vorwärts_ -was one of the internal enemies. There is no irony in saying that in -the present crisis of the International the _Wiener Arbeiter Zeitung_ -remained truest to its past. - -French Socialism reveals two extremes--an ardent patriotism, on the one -hand, not free from enmity of Germany; on the other hand, the most vivid -anti-patriotism of the Hervé type, which, as experience teaches, readily -turns into the very opposite. - -As for England, Hyndman's Tory-tinged patriotism, supplementing his -sectarian radicalism, has often caused the International political -difficulties. - -It was in a far less degree that nationalistic symptoms could be -detected in the German Social Democracy. To be sure, the opportunism of -the South Germans grew up out of the soil of particularism, which was -German nationalism in octavo form. But the South Germans were rightly -considered the politically unimportant rearguard of the Party. Bebel's -promise to shoulder his gun in case of danger did not meet with a -single-hearted reception. And when Noske repeated Bebel's expression, he -was sharply attacked in the Party press. On the whole the German Social -Democracy adhered more strictly to the line of internationalism than any -other of the old Socialist parties. But for that very reason it made -the sharpest break with its past. To judge by the formal announcements -of the Party and the articles in the Socialist press, there is no -connection between the Yesterday and To-day of German Socialism. - -But it is clear that such a catastrophe could not have occurred had not -the conditions for it been prepared in previous times. The fact that -two young parties, the Russian and the Servian, remained true to their -international duties is by no means a confirmation of the Philistine -philosophy, according to which loyalty to principle is a natural -expression of immaturity. Yet this fact leads us to seek the causes of -the collapse of the Second International in the very conditions of its -development that least influenced its younger members. - - - - - CHAPTER VIII - - SOCIALIST OPPORTUNISM - - -The Communist Manifesto, written in 1847, closes with the words: -"Workingmen of all countries, unite!" But this battle cry came too -early to become a living actuality at once. The historical order of the -day just then was the middle class revolution of 1848. And in this -revolution the part that fell to the authors of the Manifesto themselves -was not that of leaders of an international proletariat, but of fighters -on the extreme left of the national Democracy. - -The Revolution of 1848 did not solve a single one of the national -problems; it merely revealed them. The counter-revolution, along with -the great industrial development that then took place, broke off the -thread of the revolutionary movement. Another century of peace went by -until recently the antagonisms that had not been removed by the -Revolution demanded the intervention of the sword. This time it was not -the sword of the Revolution, fallen from the hands of the middle class, -but the militaristic sword of war drawn from a dynastic scabbard. The -wars of 1859, 1864, 1866, and 1870 created a new Italy and a new -Germany. The feudal caste fulfilled, in their own way, the heritage of -the Revolution of 1848. The political bankruptcy of the middle class, -which expressed itself in this historic interchange of rôles, became a -direct stimulus to an independent proletarian movement based on the -rapid development of capitalism. - -In 1863 Lassalle founded the first political labor union in Germany. In -1864 the first International was formed in London under the guidance of -Karl Marx. The closing watch-word of the Manifesto was taken up and -used in the first circular issued by the International Association of -Workingmen. It is most characteristic for the tendencies of the modern -Labor Movement that its first organization had an international -character. Nevertheless this organization was an anticipation of the -future needs of the movement rather than a real steering instrument in -the class-struggle. There was still a wide gulf between the ultimate -goal of the International, the communistic revolution, and its immediate -activities, which took the form mainly of international co-operation in -the chaotic strike movements of the laborers in various countries. Even -the founders of the International hoped that the revolutionary march of -events would very soon overcome the contradiction between ideology and -practice. While the General Council was giving money to aid groups of -strikers in England and on the Continent, it was at the same time making -classic attempts to harmonize the conduct of the workers in all -countries in the field of world politics. - -But these endeavors did not as yet have a sufficient material -foundation. The activity of the First International coincided with that -period of wars which opened the way for capitalistic development in -Europe and North America. In spite of its doctrinal and educational -importance, the attempts of the International to mingle in world -politics must all the more clearly have shown the advanced workingmen of -all countries their impotence as against the national class state. The -Paris Commune, flaring up out of the war, was the culmination of the -First International. Just as the Communist Manifesto was the -theoretical anticipation of the modern labor movement, and the First -International was the practical anticipation of the labor associations -of the world, so the Paris Commune was the revolutionary anticipation of -the dictatorship of the proletariat. - -But only an anticipation, nothing more. And for that very reason it was -clear that it is impossible for the proletariat to overthrow the -machinery of state and reconstruct society by nothing but revolutionary -improvisations. National states that emerged from the wars created the -one real foundation for this historical work, the national foundation. -Therefore, the proletariat must go through the school of self-education. - -The First International fulfilled its mission of a nursery for the -National Socialist Parties. After the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris -Commune, the International dragged along a moribund existence for a few -years more and in 1872 was transplanted to America, to which various -religious, social and other experiments had often wandered before, to -die there. - -Then began the period of prodigious capitalistic development, on the -foundation of the national state. For the Labor Movement this was the -period of the gradual gathering of strength, of the development of -organization, and of political possibilism. - -In England the stormy period of Chartism, that revolutionary awakening -of the English proletariat, had completely exhausted itself ten years -before the birth of the First International. The repeal of the Corn -Laws (1846) and the subsequent industrial prosperity that made England -the workshop of the world; the establishment of the ten-hour working day -(1847), the increase of emigration from Ireland to America, and the -enfranchisement of the workers in the cities (1867), all these -circumstances, which considerably improved the lot of the upper strata -of the proletariat, led the class movement in England into the peaceful -waters of trade unionism and its supplemental liberal labor policies. - -The period of possibilism, that is, of the conscious, systematic -adaptation to the economic, legal, and state forms of national -capitalism began for the English proletariat, the oldest of the -brothers, even before the birth of the International, and twenty years -earlier than for the continental proletariat. If nevertheless the big -English unions joined the International at first, it was only because it -afforded them protection against the importation of strike breakers in -wage disputes. - -The French labor movement recovered but slowly from the loss of blood in -the Commune, on the soil of a retarded industrial growth, and in a -nationalistic atmosphere of the most noxious greed for "revenge." -Wavering between an anarchistic "denial" of the state and a -vulgar-democratic capitulation to it, the French proletarian movement -developed by adaptation to the social and political framework of the -bourgeois republic. - -As Marx had already foreseen in 1870, the center of gravity of the -Socialist movement shifted to Germany. - -After the Franco-Prussian War, united Germany entered upon an era -similar to the one England had passed through in the twenty years -previous: an era of capitalistic prosperity, of democratic suffrage, of -a higher standard of living for the upper strata of the proletariat. - -Theoretically the German labor movement marched under the banner of -Marxism. Still in its dependence on the conditions of the period, -Marxism became for the German proletariat not the algebraic formula of -the revolution that it was at the beginning, but the theoretic method -for adaptation to a national-capitalistic state crowned with the -Prussian helmet. Capitalism, which had achieved a temporary -equilibrium, continually revolutionized the economic foundation of -national life. To preserve the power that had resulted from the -Franco-Prussian War, it was necessary to increase the standing army. -The middle class had ceded all its _political_ positions to the feudal -monarchy, but had intrenched itself all the more energetically in its -_economic_ positions under the protection of the militaristic police -state. The main currents of the last period, covering forty-five years, -are: victorious capitalism, militarism erected on a capitalist -foundation, a political reaction resulting from the intergrowth of -feudal and capitalist classes--a revolutionizing of the economic life, -and a complete abandonment of revolutionary methods and traditions in -political life. The entire activity of the German Social Democracy was -directed towards the awakening of the backward workers, through a -systematic fight for their most immediate needs--the gathering of -strength, the increase of membership, the filling of the treasury, the -development of the press, the conquest of all the positions that -presented themselves, their utilization and expansion. This was the -great historical work of the awakening and educating of the -"unhistorical" class. - -The great centralized trade unions of Germany developed in direct -dependence upon the development of national industry, adapting -themselves to its successes in the home and the foreign markets, and -controlling the prices of raw materials and manufactured products. -Localized in political districts to adapt itself to the election laws -and stretching feelers in all cities and rural communities, the Social -Democracy built up the unique structure of the political organization of -the German proletariat with its many-branched bureaucratic hierarchy, -its one million dues-paying members, its four million voters, ninety-one -daily papers and sixty-five Party printing presses. This whole -many-sided activity, of immeasurable historical importance, was -permeated through and through with the spirit of possibilism. - -In forty-five years history did not offer the German proletariat a -single opportunity to remove an obstacle by a stormy attack, or to -capture any hostile position in a revolutionary advance. As a result of -the mutual relation of social forces, it was forced to avoid obstacles -or adapt itself to them. In this, Marxism as a theory was a valuable -tool for political guidance, but it could not change the opportunist -character of the class movement, which in essence was at that time alike -in England, France and Germany. For all the undisputed superiority of -the German organization, the tactics of the unions were very much the -same in Berlin and London. Their chief achievement was the system of -tariff treaties. In the political field the difference was much greater -and deeper. While the English proletariat were marching under the banner -of Liberalism, the German workers formed an independent party with a -Socialist platform. Yet this difference does not go nearly as deep in -politics as it does in ideologic forms, and the forms of organization. - -Through the pressure that English labor exerted on the Liberal Party it -achieved certain limited political victories, the extension of suffrage, -freedom to unionize, and social legislation. The same was preserved or -improved by the German proletariat through its independent party, which -it was obliged to form because of the speedy capitulation of German -liberalism. And yet this party, while in _principle_ fighting the fight -for political power, was compelled in actual practice to adapt itself to -the ruling power, to protect the labor movement against the blows of -this power, and to achieve a few reforms. In other words: on account of -the difference in historical traditions and political conditions, the -English proletariat adapted itself to the capitalist state through the -medium of the Liberal Party; while the German proletariat was forced to -form a party of its own to achieve the very same political ends. And the -political struggle of the German proletariat in this entire period had -the same opportunist character limited by historical conditions as did -that of the English proletariat. - -The similarity of these two phenomena so different in their forms comes -out most clearly in the final results at the close of the period. The -English proletariat in the struggle to meet its daily issues was forced -to form an independent party of its own, without, however, breaking with -its liberal traditions; and the party of the German proletariat, when -the War forced upon it the necessity of a decisive choice, gave an -answer in the spirit of the national-liberal traditions of the English -labor party. - -Marxism, of course, was not merely something accidental or insignificant -in the German labor movement. Yet there would be no basis for deducing -the social-revolutionary character of the Party from its official -Marxist ideology. - -Ideology is an important, but not a decisive factor in politics. Its -rôle is that of waiting on politics. That deep-seated contradiction, -which was inherent in the awakening revolutionary class on account of -its relation to the feudal-reactionary state, demanded an irreconcilable -ideology which would bring the whole movement under the banner of social -revolutionary aims. Since historical conditions forced opportunist -tactics, the irreconcilability of the proletarian class found expression -in the revolutionary formulas of Marxism. Theoretically, Marxism -reconciled with perfect success the contradiction between reform and -revolution. Yet the process of historical development is something far -more involved than theorizing in the realm of pure thought. The fact -that the class which was revolutionary in its tendencies was forced for -several decades to adapt itself to the monarchical police state, based -on the tremendous capitalistic development of the country, in the course -of which adaptation an organization of a million members was built up -and a labor bureaucracy which led the entire movement was educated--this -fact does not cease to exist and does not lose its weighty significance -because Marxism anticipated the revolutionary character of the future -movement. Only the most naïve ideology could give the same place to -this forecast that it does to the political actualities of the German -labor movement. - -The German Revisionists were influenced in their conduct by the -contradiction between the reform practice of the Party and its -revolutionary theories. They did not understand that this contradiction -is conditioned by temporary, even if long-lasting circumstances and that -it can only be overcome by further social development. To them it was a -logical contradiction. The mistake of the Revisionists was not that they -confirmed the reformistic character of the Party's tactics in the past, -but that they wanted to perpetuate reformism theoretically and make it -the only method of the proletarian class struggle. Thus, the -Revisionists failed to take into account the objective tendencies of -capitalistic development, which by deepening class distinctions must -lead to the social revolution as the one way to the emancipation of the -proletariat. Marxism emerged from this theoretical dispute as the -victor all along the line. But revisionism, although defeated on the -field of theory, continued to live, drawing sustenance from the actual -conduct and the psychology of the whole movement. The critical -refutation of revisionism as a theory by no means signified its defeat -tactically and psychologically. The parliamentarians, the unionists, -the comrades continued to live and to work in the atmosphere of general -opportunism, of practical specializing and of nationalistic narrowness. -Reformism made its impress even upon the mind of August Bebel, the -greatest representative of this period. - -The spirit of opportunism must have taken a particularly strong hold on -the generation that came into the party in the eighties, in the time of -Bismarck's anti-Socialist laws and of oppressive reaction all over -Europe. Lacking the apostolic zeal of the generation that was connected -with the First International, hindered in its first steps by the power -of victorious imperialism, forced to adapt itself to the traps and -snares of the anti-Socialist laws, this generation grew up in the spirit -of moderation and constitutional distrust of revolution. They are now -men of fifty to sixty years old, and they are the very ones who are now -at the head of the unions and the political organizations. Reformism is -their political psychology, if not also their doctrine. The gradual -growing into Socialism--that is the basis of Revisionism--proved to be -the most miserable Utopian dream in face of the facts of capitalistic -development. But the gradual political growth of the Social Democracy -into the mechanism of the national state has turned out to be a tragic -actuality--for the entire race. - -The Russian Revolution was the first great event to bring a fresh whiff -into the stale atmosphere of Europe in the thirty-five years since the -Paris Commune. The rapid development of the Russian working class and -the unexpected strength of their concentrated revolutionary activity -made a great impression on the entire civilized world and gave an -impetus everywhere to the sharpening of political differences. In -England the Russian Revolution hastened the formation of an independent -labor party. In Austria, thanks to special circumstances, it led to -universal manhood suffrage. In France the echo of the Russian Revolution -took the form of Syndicalism, which gave expression, in inadequate -practical and theoretical form, to the awakened revolutionary tendencies -of the French proletariat. And in Germany the influence of the Russian -Revolution showed itself in the strengthening of the young Left wing of -the Party, in the rapprochement of the leading Center to it, and in the -isolation of Revisionism. The question of the Prussian franchise, this -key to the political position of Junkerdom, took on a keener edge. And -the Party adopted in principle the revolutionary method of the general -strike. But all this external shaping up proved inadequate to shove the -Party on to the road of the political offensive. In accordance with the -Party tradition, the turn toward radicalism found expression in -discussions and the adoption of resolutions. That was as far as it ever -went. - - - - - CHAPTER IX - - THE DECLINE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT - - -Six or seven years ago a political ebb-tide everywhere followed upon the -revolutionary flood-tide. In Russia the counter-revolution triumphed -and began a period of decay for the Russian proletariat both in politics -and in the strength of their own organizations. In Austria the thread -of achievements started by the working class broke off, social insurance -legislation rotted in the government offices, nationalist conflicts -began again with renewed vigor in the arena of universal manhood -suffrage, weakening and dividing the Social Democracy. In England, the -Labor Party, after separating from the Liberal Party, entered into the -closest association with it again. In France the Syndicalists passed -over to reformist positions. Gustav Hervé changed to the opposite of -himself in the shortest time. And in the German Social Democracy the -Revisionists lifted their heads, encouraged by history's having given -them such a revenge. The South Germans perpetrated their demonstrative -vote for the budget. The Marxists were compelled to change from -offensive to defensive tactics. The efforts of the Left wing to draw -the Party into a more active policy were unsuccessful. The dominating -Center swung more and more towards the Right, isolating the radicals. -Conservatism, recovering from the blows it received in 1905, triumphed -all along the line. - -In default of revolutionary activity as well as the possibility for -reformist work, the Party spent its entire energy on building up the -organization, on gaining new members for the unions and for the Party, -on starting new papers and getting new subscribers. Condemned for -decades to a policy of opportunist waiting, the Party took up the cult -of organization as an end in itself. Never was the spirit of inertia -produced by mere routine work so strong in the German Social Democracy -as in the years immediately preceding the great catastrophe. And there -can be no doubt that the question of the preservation of the -organizations, treasuries, People's Houses and printing presses played a -mighty important part in the position taken by the fraction in the -Reichstag towards the War. "Had we done anything else we would have -brought ruin upon our organization and our presses" was the first -argument I heard from a leading German comrade. - -And how characteristic it is of the opportunistic psychology induced by -mere organization work, that out of ninety-one Social Democratic papers -not one found it possible to protest against the violation of Belgium. -Not one! After the repeal of the anti-Socialist laws, the Party -hesitated long before starting its own printing presses, lest these -might be confiscated by the government in the event of great happenings. -And now that it has its own presses, the Party hierarchy fears every -decisive step so as not to afford opportunity for confiscation. - -Most eloquent of all is the incident of the _Verwärts_ which begged for -permission to continue to exist--on the basis of a new programme -indefinitely suspending the class conflict. Every friend of the German -Social Democracy had a sense of profound pain when he received his issue -of the central organ with its humiliating "By Order of Army -Headquarters." Had the _Verwärts_ remained under interdiction, that -would have been an important political fact to which the Party later -could have referred with pride. At any rate that would have been far -more honorable than to continue to exist with the imprint of the -general's boots on its forehead. - -But higher than all considerations of policy and the dignity of the -Party stood considerations of membership, printing presses, -organization. And so the _Verwärts_ now lives as two-paged evidence of -the unlimited brutality of Junkerdom in Berlin and in Louvain, and of -the unlimited opportunism of the German Social Democracy. - -The Right wing stood more by its principles, which resulted from -political considerations. Wolfgang Heine crassly formulated these -principles of German Reformism in an absurd discussion as to whether the -Social Democrats should leave the hall of the Reichstag when the members -rose to cheer the Emperor's name, or whether they should merely keep -their seats. "The creation of a republic in the German Empire is now and -for some time to come out of the range of all possibility, so that it is -not really a matter for our present policy." The practical results -still not yet achieved may be reached, but only through co-operation -with the liberal bourgeoisie. "For that reason, not because I am a -stickler for form, I have called attention to the fact that -parliamentary co-operation will be rendered difficult by demonstrations -that needlessly _hurt the feelings_ of the majority of the House." - -But if a simple infringement of monarchical etiquette was enough to -destroy the hope of reformist co-operation with the liberal middle -class, then certainly the break with the bourgeois "nation" in the -moment of national "danger" would have hindered, for years to come, not -only all desired reforms, but also all reformist desires. That attitude -that was dictated to the routinists of the Party center by sheer anxiety -over the preservation of the organization was supplemented among the -Revisionists by political considerations. Their standpoint proved in -every respect to be more comprehensive and won the victory all over. The -entire Party press is now industriously acclaiming what it once heaped -scorn upon, that the present patriotic attitude of the working class -will win for them, after the war, the good will of the possessing -classes for bringing about reforms. - -Therefore, the German Social Democracy did not feel itself, under the -stress of these great events, a revolutionary power with tasks far -exceeding the question of widening the state's boundaries, a power that -does not lose itself for an instant in the nationalistic whirl, but -calmly awaits the favorable moment for joining with the other branches -of the International in a purposeful interference in the course of -events. No, instead of that the German Social Democracy felt itself to -be a sort of cumbersome train threatened by hostile cavalry. For that -reason it subordinated the entire future of the International to the -quite extraneous question of the defense of the frontiers of the class -state--because it felt itself first and foremost to be a conservative -state within the state. - -"Look at Belgium!" cries the _Verwärts_ to encourage the -workmen-soldiers. The People's Houses there have been changed into army -hospitals, the newspapers suppressed, all Party life crushed out.[5] -And therefore hold out until the end, "until the decisive victory is -ours." In other words, keep on destroying, let the work of your own -hands be a terrifying lesson to you. "Look at Belgium," and out of this -terror draw courage for renewed destruction. - - [5] A sentimental correspondent of the _Vorwärts_ writes that he was - looking for Belgian comrades in the _Maison du Peuple_ and found a - German army hospital there. And what did the _Vorwärts_ - correspondent want of his Belgian comrades? "_To win them to the - cause of the German people_--just when Brussels itself had been - won 'for the cause of the German people!'" - -What has just been said refers not to the German Social Democracy alone, -but also to all the older branches of the International that have lived -through the history of the last half century. - - - - - CHAPTER X - - WORKING CLASS IMPERIALISM - - -There is one factor in the collapse of the Second International that is -still unclarified. It dwells at the heart of all the events that the -Party has passed through. - -The dependence of the proletarian class movement, particularly in its -economic conflicts, upon the scope and the successes of the -imperialistic policy of the state is a question which, as far as I know, -has never been discussed in the Socialist press. Nor can I attempt to -solve it in the short space of this work. So what I shall say on this -point will necessarily be in the nature of a brief review. - -The proletariat is deeply interested in the development of the forces of -production. The national state created in Europe by the revolutions and -wars of the years 1789 to 1870 was the basic type of the economic -evolution of the past period. The proletariat contributed by its entire -conscious policy to the development of the forces of production on a -national foundation. It supported the bourgeoisie in its conflicts with -alien enemies for national liberation; also in its conflicts with the -monarchy, with feudalism and the church for political democracy. And in -the measure in which the bourgeois turned to "law and order," that is, -became reactionary, the proletariat assumed the historical task it left -uncompleted. In championing a policy of peace, culture and democracy, -as against the bourgeoisie, it contributed to the enlargement of the -national market, and so gave an impetus to the development of the forces -of production. - -The proletariat had an equal economic interest in the democratizing and -the cultural progress of all other countries in their relation of buyer -or seller to its own country. In this resided the most important -guarantee for the international solidarity of the proletariat both in so -far as final aims and daily policies are concerned. The struggle -against the remnants of feudal barbarism, against the boundless demands -of militarism, against agrarian duties and indirect taxes was the main -object of working-class politics and served, directly and indirectly, to -help develop the forces of production. That is the very reason why the -great majority of organized labor joined political forces with the -Social Democracy. Every hindrance to the development of the forces of -production touches the trade unions most closely. - -As capitalism passed from a national to an international-imperialistic -ground, national production, and with it the economic struggle of the -proletariat, came into direct dependence on those conditions of the -world-market which are secured by dreadnaughts and cannon. In other -words, in contradiction of the fundamental interests of the proletariat -taken in their wide historic extent, the immediate trade interests of -various strata of the proletariat proved to have a direct dependence -upon the successes or the failures of the foreign policies of the -governments. - -England long before the other countries placed her capitalistic -development on the basis of predatory imperialism, and she interested -the upper strata of the proletariat in her world dominion. In -championing its own class interests, the English proletariat limited -itself to exercising pressure on the bourgeois parties which granted it -a share in the capitalistic exploitation of other countries. It did not -begin an independent policy until England began to lose her position in -the world market, pushed aside, among others, by her main rival, -Germany. - -But with Germany's growth to industrial world-importance, grew the -dependence of broad strata of the German proletariat on German -imperialism, not materially alone but also ideally. The _Vorwärts_ -wrote on August 11th that the German workingmen, "counted among the -politically intelligent, to whom we have preached the dangers of -imperialism for years (although _with very little success_, we must -confess)" scold at Italian neutrality like the extremest chauvinists. -But that did not prevent the _Vorwärts_ from feeding the German -workingmen on "national" and "democratic" arguments in justification of -the bloody work of imperialism. (Some writers' backbones are as -flexible as their pens.) - -However, all this does not alter facts. When the decisive moment came, -there seemed to be no irreconcilable enmity to imperialistic policies in -the consciousness of the German workingmen. On the contrary, they seemed -to listen readily to imperialist whisperings veiled in national and -democratic phraseology. This is not the first time that Socialistic -imperialism reveals itself in the German Social Democracy. Suffice it to -recall the fact that at the International Congress in Stuttgart it was -the majority of the German delegates, notably the trade unionists, who -voted against the Marxist resolution on the colonial policy. The -occurrence made a sensation at the time, but its true significance comes -out more clearly in the light of present events. Just now the trade -union press is linking the cause of the German working class to the work -of the Hohenzollern army with more consciousness and matter-of-factness -than do the political organs. - -As long as capitalism remained on a national basis, the proletariat -could not refrain from co-operation in democratizing the political -relations and in developing the forces of production through its -parliamentary, communal and other activities. The attempts of the -anarchists to set up a formal revolutionary agitation in opposition to -the political fights of the Social Democracy condemned them to isolation -and gradual extinction. But when the capitalist states overstep their -national form to become imperialistic world powers, the proletariat -cannot oppose this new imperialism. And the reason is the so-called -minimal programme which fashioned its policy upon the framework of the -national state. When its main concern is for tariff treaties and social -legislation, the proletariat is incapable of expending the same energy -in fighting imperialism that it did in fighting feudalism. By applying -its old methods of the class struggle--the constant adaptation to the -movements of the markets--to the changed conditions produced by -imperialism, it itself falls into material and ideological dependence on -imperialism. - -The only way the proletariat can pit its revolutionary force against -imperialism is under the banner of Socialism. The working class is -powerless against imperialism as long as its great organizations stand -by their old opportunist tactics. The working class will be -all-powerful against imperialism when it takes to the battlefield of -Social Revolution. - -The methods of national parliamentary opposition not only fail to -produce objective results, but the laboring masses lose all interest in -them because they find that their earnings and their very existence are -not affected by what is done in parliament. Behind the backs of the -parliamentarians imperialism wins its successes in the world market. - -The methods of national-parliamentary opposition not only fail to -produce practical results, but also cease to make an appeal to the -laboring masses, because the workers find that, behind the backs of the -parliamentarians, imperialism, by armed force, reduces the wages and the -very lives of the workers to ever greater dependence on its successes in -the world market. - -It was clear to every thinking Socialist that the only way the -proletariat could be made to pass from opportunism to Revolution was not -by agitation, but by a historical upheaval. But no one foresaw that -history would preface this inevitable change of tactics by such a -catastrophal collapse of the International. History works with titanic -relentlessness. What is the Rheims Cathedral to History? And what a -few hundred or thousand political reputations? And what the life or -death of hundreds of thousands or of millions? - -The proletariat has remained too long in the preparatory school, much -longer than its great pioneer fighters thought it would. History took -her broom in hand, swept the International of the epigone apart in all -directions and led the slow-moving millions into the field where their -last illusions are being washed away in blood. A terrible experiment! -On its result perhaps hangs the fate of European civilization. - - - - - CHAPTER XI - - THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH - - -At the close of the last century a heated controversy arose in Germany -over the question, What effect does the industrialization of a country -produce upon its military power? The reactionary agrarian politicians -and writers, like Sehring, Karl Ballod, Georg Hansen and others, argued -that the rapid increase of the city populations at the expense of the -rural districts positively undermined the foundation of the Empire's -military power, and they of course drew from it their patriotic -inferences in the spirit of agrarian protectionism. On the other hand -Lujo Brentano and his school championed an exactly opposite point of -view. They pointed out that economic industrialism not only opened up -new financial and technical resources, but also developed in the -proletariat the vital force capable of making effective use of all the -new means of defense and attack. He quotes authoritative opinions to -show that even in the earlier experiences of 1870-71 "the regiments from -the preponderantly industrial district of Westphalia were among the very -best." And he explains this fact quite correctly by the far greater -ability of the industrial worker to find his bearings in new conditions -and to adjust himself to them. Now which side is right? The present War -proves that Germany, which has made the greatest progress along -capitalistic lines, was able to develop the highest military power. And -likewise in regard to all the countries drawn into it the War proves -what colossal and yet competent energy the working class develops in its -warlike activities. It is not the passive horde-like heroism of the -peasant masses, welded together by fatalistic submissiveness and -religious superstition. It is the individualized spirit of sacrifice, -born of inner impulse, ranging itself under the banner of the Idea. - -But the Idea under whose banner the armed proletariat now stands, is the -Idea of war-crafty nationalism, the deadly enemy of the true interests -of the workers. The ruling class showed themselves strong enough to -force their Idea upon the proletariat, and the proletariat, in the -consciousness of what they were doing, put their intelligence, their -enthusiasm and their courage at the service of their class-foes. In this -fact is sealed the terrible defeat of Socialism. But it also opens up -all possibilities for a final victory of Socialism. There can be no -doubt that a class which is capable of displaying such steadfastness and -self-sacrifice in a war it considers a "just" one, will be still more -capable of developing these qualities when the march of events will give -it tasks really worthy of the historical mission of this class. - -The epoch of the awakening, the enlightenment and the organization of -the working-class revealed that it has tremendous resources of -revolutionary energy which found no adequate employment in the daily -struggle. The Social Democracy summoned the upper strata of the -proletariat into the field, but it also checked their revolutionary -energy by adopting the tactics it was obliged to adopt, the tactics of -_waiting_, the strategy of letting your opponent exhaust himself. The -character of this period was so dull and reactionary that it did not -allow the Social Democracy the opportunity to give the proletariat tasks -that would have engaged their whole spirit of sacrifice. - -Imperialism is now giving them such tasks. And imperialism attained its -object by pushing the proletariat into a position of "national defense," -which, to the workers, meant the defense of all their hands had created, -not only the immense wealth of the nation, but also their own -class-organizations, their treasuries, their press, in short, everything -they had unwearyingly, painfully struggled for and attained in the -course of several decades. Imperialism violently threw society off its -balance, destroyed the sluice-gates built by the Social Democracy to -regulate the current of proletarian revolutionary energy, and guided -this current into its _own_ bed. - -But this terrific historical experiment, which at one blow broke the -back of the Socialist International, carries a deadly danger for -bourgeois society itself. The hammer is wrenched out of the worker's -hand and a gun put into his hand instead. And the worker, who has been -tied down by the machinery of the capitalist system, is suddenly torn -from his usual setting and taught to place the aims of society above -happiness at home and even life itself. - -With the weapon in his hand that he himself has forged, the worker is -put in a position where the political destiny of the state is directly -dependent upon him. Those who exploited and scorned him in normal -times, flatter him now and toady to him. At the same time he comes into -intimate contact with the cannon, which Lassalle calls one of the most -important ingredients of all constitutions. He crosses the border, -takes part in forceful requisitions, and helps in the passing of cities -from one party to another. Changes are taking place such as the present -generation has never before seen. - -Even though the vanguard of the working-class knew in theory that Might -is the mother of Right, still their political thinking was completely -permeated by the spirit of opportunism, of adaptation to bourgeois -legalism. Now they are learning from the teachings of facts to despise -this legalism and tear it down. Now dynamic forces are replacing the -static forces in their psychology. The great guns are hammering into -their heads the idea that if it is impossible to get around an obstacle, -it is possible to destroy it. Almost the entire adult male population -is going through this school of war, so terrible in its realism, a -school which is forming a new human type. Iron necessity is now shaking -its fist at all the rules of bourgeois society, at its laws, its -morality, its religion. "Necessity knows no law," said the German -Chancellor on August 4th. Monarchs walk about in public places calling -each other liars in the language of market-women; governments repudiate -their solemnly acknowledged obligations, and the national church ties -its God to the national cannon like a criminal condemned to hard labor. -Is it not clear that all these circumstances must bring about a profound -change in the mental attitude of the working-class, curing them -radically of the hypnosis of legality in which a period of political -stagnation expresses itself? - -The possessing classes, to their consternation, will soon have to -recognize this change. A working-class that has been through the school -of war will feel the need of using the language of force as soon as the -first serious obstacle faces them within their own country. "Necessity -knows no law" the workers will cry when the attempt is made to hold them -back at the command of bourgeois law. And poverty, the terrible poverty -that prevails during this war and will continue after its close, will be -of a sort to force the masses to violate many a bourgeois law. The -general economic exhaustion in Europe will affect the proletariat most -immediately and most severely. The state's material resources will be -depleted by the war, and the possibility of satisfying the demands of -the working-masses will be very limited. This must lead to profound -political conflicts, which, ever-widening and deepening, may take on the -character of a social revolution, the course and outcome of which no -one, of course, can now foresee. - -On the other hand, the War with its armies of millions, and its hellish -weapons of destruction can exhaust not only society's resources but also -the moral forces of the proletariat. If it does not meet inner -resistance, this War may last for several years more, with changing -fortunes on both sides, until the chief belligerents are completely -exhausted. But then the whole fighting energy of the international -proletariat, brought to the surface by the bloody conspiracy of -imperialism, will be completely consumed in the horrible work of mutual -annihilation. The outcome would be that our entire civilization would -be set back by many decades. A peace resulting not from the will of the -awakened peoples but from the mutual exhaustion of the belligerents, -would be like the peace with which the Balkan War was concluded; it -would be a Bucharest Peace extended to the whole of Europe. - -Such a peace would seek to patch up anew the contradictions, antagonisms -and deficiencies that have led to the present War. And with many other -things, the Socialist work of two generations would vanish in a sea of -blood without leaving a trace behind. - -Which of the two prospects is the more probable? This cannot possibly -be theoretically determined in advance. The issue depends entirely upon -the activity of the vital forces of society--above all upon the -revolutionary Social Democracy. - -"_Immediate cessation of the War_" is the watchword under which the -Social Democracy can reassemble its scattered ranks, both within the -national parties, and in the whole International. The proletariat -cannot make its will to peace dependent upon the strategic -considerations of the general staffs. On the contrary, it must oppose -its desire for peace to these military considerations. What the warring -governments call a struggle for national self-preservation is in reality -a mutual national annihilation. Real national self-defense now consists -in the struggle for peace. - -Such a struggle for peace means for us not only a fight to save -humanity's material and cultural possessions from further insane -destruction. It is for us primarily a fight to preserve the -revolutionary energy of the proletariat. - -To assemble the ranks of the proletariat in a fight for peace means -again to place the forces of revolutionary Socialism against raging, -tearing imperialism on the whole front. - -The conditions upon which peace should be concluded--the peace of the -peoples themselves, and not the reconciliation of the diplomats--must be -the same for the whole International. - -NO CONTRIBUTIONS. -THE RIGHT OF EVERY NATION -TO SELF-DETERMINATION. -THE UNITED STATES OF -EUROPE--WITHOUT MONARCHIES, -WITHOUT STANDING ARMIES, -WITHOUT RULING FEUDAL -CASTES, WITHOUT SECRET DIPLOMACY. - -The peace agitation, which must be conducted simultaneously with all the -means now at the disposal of the Social Democracy as well as those -which, with a good will, it could acquire, will not only tear the -workers out of their nationalistic hypnosis; it will also do the saving -work of inner purification in the present official parties of the -proletariat. The national Revisionists and the Socialist patriots in -the Second International, who have been exploiting the influence that -Socialism has acquired over the working masses for national militaristic -aims, must be thrust back into the camp of the enemies of the working -class by uncompromising revolutionary agitation for peace. - -The revolutionary Social Democracy need not fear that it will be -isolated, now less than ever. The War is making the most terrible -agitation against itself. Every day that the War lasts will bring new -masses of people to our banner, if it is an honest banner of peace and -democracy. The surest way by which the Social Democracy can isolate the -militaristic reaction in Europe and force it to take the offensive is by -the slogan of Peace. - - ---- - -We revolutionary Marxists have no cause for despair. The epoch into -which we are now entering will be _our_ epoch. Marxism is not defeated. -On the contrary: the roar of the cannon in every quarter of Europe -heralds the theoretical victory of Marxism. What is left now of the -hopes for a "peaceful" development, for a mitigation of capitalist class -contrasts, for a regular systematic growth into Socialism? - -The Reformists on principle, who hoped to solve the social question by -the way of tariff treaties, consumers' leagues, and the parliamentary -co-operation of the Social Democracy with the bourgeois parties, are now -all resting their hopes on the victory of the "national" arms. They are -expecting the possessing classes to show greater willingness to meet the -needs of the proletariat because it has proved its patriotism. - -This expectation would be positively foolish if there were not hidden -behind it another, far less "idealistic" hope--that a military victory -would create for the bourgeoisie a broader imperialistic field for -enriching itself at the expense of the bourgeoisie of other countries, -and would enable it to share some of the booty with its own proletariat -at the expense of the proletariat of other countries. _Socialist -reformism has actually turned into Socialist imperialism_. - -We have witnessed with our own eyes the pathetic bankruptcy of the hopes -of a peaceful growth of proletarian well-being. The Reformists, -contrary to their own doctrine, were forced to resort to violence in -order to find their way out of the political _cul-de-sac_--and not the -violence of the peoples against the ruling classes, but the military -violence of the ruling classes against other nations. Since 1848 the -German bourgeoisie has renounced revolutionary methods for solving its -problems. They left it to the feudal class to solve their own bourgeois -questions by the method of war. Social development confronted the -proletariat with the problem of revolution. Evading revolution, the -Reformists were forced to go through the same process of historical -decline as the liberal bourgeoisie. The Reformists also left it to -their ruling classes, that is the same feudal caste, to solve the -proletarian problem by the method of war. But this ends the analogy. - -The creation of national states did really solve the bourgeois problem -for a long period, and the long series of colonial wars coming after -1871 finished off the period by broadening the arena of the development -of the capitalistic forces. The period of colonial wars carried on by -the national states led to the present War of the national states--for -colonies. After all the backward portions of the earth had been divided -among the capitalist states, there was nothing left for these states -except to grab the colonies from each other. - -"People ought not to talk," says George Irmer, "as though it were -self-evident that the German Empire has come too late for rivalry for -world economy and world markets, that the world has already been -divided. Has not the earth been divided over and over again in all -epochs of history?" - -But a re-division of colonies among the capitalist countries does not -enlarge the foundation of capitalist development. One country's gain -means another country's loss. Accordingly a temporary mitigation of -class-conflicts in Germany could only be achieved by an extreme -intensification of the class-struggle in France and in England, and -_vice versa_. An additional factor of decisive importance is the -capitalist awakening in the colonies themselves, to which the present -War must give a mighty impetus. Whatever the outcome of this War, the -imperialistic basis for European capitalism will not be broadened, but -narrowed. The War, therefore, does not solve the labor question on an -imperialistic basis, but, on the contrary, it intensifies it, putting -this alternative to the capitalist world: _Permanent War or Revolution_. - -If the War got beyond the control of the Second International, its -immediate consequences will get beyond the control of the bourgeoisie of -the entire world. We revolutionary Socialists did not want the War. -_But we do not fear it_. We do not give in to despair over the fact -that the War broke up the International. History had already disposed of -the International. - -The revolutionary epoch will create new forms of organization out of the -inexhaustible resources of proletarian Socialism, new forms that will be -equal to the greatness of the new tasks. To this work we will apply -ourselves at once, amid the mad roaring of the machine-guns, the -crashing of cathedrals, and the patriotic howling of the capitalist -jackals. We will keep our clear minds amid this hellish death music, -our undimmed vision. We feel ourselves to be the only creative force of -the future. Already there are many of us, more than it may seem. -To-morrow there will be more of us than to-day. And the day after -to-morrow, millions will rise up under our banner, millions who even -now, sixty-seven years after the Communist Manifesto, have nothing to -lose but their chains. - - - - - - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE -*** - - - - -A Word from Project Gutenberg - - -We will update this book if we find any errors. - -This book can be found under: http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40273 - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no one -owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and -you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission -and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the -General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and -distributing Project Gutenberg(tm) electronic works to protect the -Project Gutenberg(tm) concept and trademark. 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