diff options
| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@rfrank.net> | 2025-03-20 22:24:42 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@rfrank.net> | 2025-03-20 22:24:42 -0600 |
| commit | 4e00a7ea12a7ff78ea1ccf7f8922f44903f85e44 (patch) | |
| tree | 63901d74823a76463bfcb13bf7bba33ea6c710f4 | |
| parent | aff5b2de12dbf826c6f6abd1dbded654370a1b8c (diff) | |
Added files from 39964.zip (created 2012-06-10)
| -rw-r--r-- | 39964-8.txt | 12712 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 39964-8.zip | bin | 0 -> 251889 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 39964-h.zip | bin | 0 -> 263684 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 39964-h/39964-h.htm | 12899 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 39964.txt | 12712 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 39964.zip | bin | 0 -> 251834 bytes |
6 files changed, 38323 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/39964-8.txt b/39964-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d5c0f60 --- /dev/null +++ b/39964-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12712 @@ +Project Gutenberg's The Positive Outcome of Philosophy, by Joseph Dietzgen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Positive Outcome of Philosophy + The Nature of Human Brain Work. Letters on Logic. + +Author: Joseph Dietzgen + +Translator: Ernst Unterman + +Release Date: June 10, 2012 [EBook #39964] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY *** + + + + +Produced by Odessa Paige Turner, Martin Pettit and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + +THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY + +The Nature of Human Brain Work +Letters on Logic. +The Positive Outcome of Philosophy + +BY +JOSEPH DIETZGEN + +_TRANSLATED BY ERNEST UNTERMANN_ + +WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY DR. ANTON PANNEKOEK +TRANSLATED BY ERNEST UNTERMANN + +EDITED BY EUGENE DIETZGEN AND JOSEPH DIETZGEN, JR. + +CHICAGO +CHARLES H. KERR & COMPANY +1906 + + +COPYRIGHT 1906 +BY EUGENE DIETZGEN + + + + +CONTENTS + + PAGE +INTRODUCTION BY ANTON PANNEKOEK 7 + +THE NATURE OF HUMAN BRAIN WORK + Preface 41 + I. Introduction 47 + II. Pure Reason or the Faculty of Thought in General 61 + III. The Nature of Things 80 + IV. The Practice of Reason in Physical Science 104 + _a_ Cause and Effect 108 + _b_ Matter and Mind 119 + _c_ Force and Matter 124 + V. "Practical Reason" or Morality 133 + _a_ The Wise and Reasonable 133 + _b_ Morality and Right 143 + _c_ The Holy 156 + +LETTERS ON LOGIC + First Letter 177 + Second Letter 181 + Third Letter 186 + Fourth Letter 191 + Fifth Letter 198 + Sixth Letter 205 + Seventh Letter 212 + Eighth Letter 217 + Ninth Letter 225 + Tenth Letter 230 + Eleventh Letter 236 + Twelfth Letter 242 + Thirteenth Letter 248 + Fourteenth Letter 255 + Fifteenth Letter 260 + Sixteenth Letter 265 + Seventeenth Letter 271 + Eighteenth Letter 277 + Nineteenth Letter 283 + Twentieth Letter 289 + Twenty-first Letter 296 + Twenty-second Letter 301 + Twenty-third Letter (a) 307 + Twenty-third Letter (b) 312 + Twenty-fourth Letter 318 + +THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY + Preface 327 + I. Positive Knowledge as a Special Object 333 + II. The Power of Perception Is Kin to the Universe 337 + III. As to How the Intellect Is Limited and Unlimited 342 + IV. The Universality of Nature 348 + V. The Understanding as a Part of the Human Soul 354 + VI. Consciousness Is Endowed With the Faculty of Knowing + as Well as With the Feeling of the Universality + of All Nature 363 + VII. The Relationship or Identity of Spirit and Nature 369 + VIII. Understanding Is Material 376 + IX. The Four Principles of Logic 381 + X. The Function of Understanding on the Religious Field 393 + XI. The Distinction Between Cause and Effect Is only + One of the Means to Facilitate Understanding 401 + XII. Mind and Matter: Which Is Primary, Which Is + Secondary? 409 + XIII. The Extent to Which the Doubts of the Possibility + of Clear and Accurate Understanding Have Been + Overcome 418 + XIV. Continuation of the Discussion on the Difference + Between Doubtful and Evident Understanding 428 + XV. Conclusion 436 + + + + +INTRODUCTION + +THE POSITION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF J. DIETZGEN'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS + +BY DR. ANTON PANNEKOEK + + +In the history of philosophy we see before us the consecutive forms of +the thoughts of the ruling classes of society on life and on the world +at large. This class thought appears after the primitive communism has +given way to a society with class antagonisms, at a stage when the +wealth of the members of the ruling class gave them leisure time and +thus stimulated them to turn their attention to the productions of the +mind. The beginning of this thought is found in classic Greece. But it +assumed its clearest and best developed form when the modern bourgeoisie +had become the ruling class in capitalistic Europe and the thinkers gave +expression to the ideas of this class. The characteristic mark of these +ideas is dualism, that is to say the misunderstood contrast between +thinking and being, between nature and spirit, the result of the mental +unclearness of this class and of its incapacity to see the things of the +world in their true interconnection. This mental state is but the +expression of the division of mankind into classes and of the +uncomprehended nature of social production ever since it became a +production of goods for exchange. + +In times of primitive communism, the conditions of production were clear +and easily understood. Things were produced jointly for use and consumed +in common. Man was master of his mode of production and thus master of +his own fate as far as the superior forces of nature admitted it. Under +such conditions, social ideas could not help being simple and clear. +There being no clash between personal and social interests, men had no +conception of a deep chasm between good and bad. Only the uncontrolled +forces of nature stood like unintelligible and mysterious powers, that +appeared to them either as well meaning or as evil spirits, above these +primitive little societies. + +But with the advent of the production of commodities the picture +changes. Civilized humanity begins to feel itself somewhat relieved from +the hard and ungovernable pressure of fickle natural forces. But now new +demons arise out of social conditions. "No sooner did the producers give +their products away in exchange instead of consuming them as heretofore, +than they lost control of them. They no longer knew what became of their +products, and there was a possibility that these products might some day +be used for the exploitation and oppression of the producers--The +products rule the producers." (Engels) In the production of commodities, +it is not the purpose of the individual producer which is accomplished, +but rather that which the productive forces back of him are aiming at. +Man proposes, but a social power, stronger than himself, disposes; he is +no longer master of his fate. The inter-relations of production become +complicated and difficult to grasp. While it is true that the individual +is the producing unit, yet his individual labor is only a subordinate +part of the whole process of social production, of which he remains a +tool. The fruits of the labor of many are enjoyed by a few individuals. +The social co-operation is concealed behind a violent competitive +struggle of the producers against one another. The interests of the +individuals are at war with those of society. Good, that is to say the +consideration of the common welfare, is opposed to bad, that is to say +the sacrifice of everything to private interests. The passions of men as +well as their mental gifts, after they have been aroused, developed, +trained, strengthened, and refined in this struggle, henceforth become +so many weapons which a superior power turns against their helpless +possessors. + +Such were the impressions out of which thinking men were obliged to +fashion their world-philosophy, while, at the same time, they were +members of the possessing classes and had thus an opportunity to employ +their leisure for a certain self-study, without, however, being in touch +with the source of their impressions, viz., the process of social labor +which alone could have enabled them to see through the social origin of +their ideas. Men of this class, therefore, were led to the assumption +that their ideas emanated from some supernatural and spiritual power or +that they were themselves independent supernatural powers. This dualist +metaphysical mode of thought has gone through various transformations in +the course of time, adapting itself to the evolution of production +beginning with ancient slavery, on through the serfdom of the Middle +Ages and of mediæval commodity production, to modern capitalism. These +successive changes of form are embodied in Grecian philosophy, in the +various phases of the Christian religion, and in the modern systems of +philosophy. + +But we must not regard these systems and religions for what they +generally pass, that is to say, we must not think them to be only +repeated unsuccessful attempts to formulate absolute truth. They are +merely the incarnations of progressive stages of better knowledge +acquired by the human mind about itself and about the universe. It was +the aim of philosophical thought to find satisfaction in understanding. +And as long as understanding could not wholly be gotten by natural +means, there remained always a field for the supernatural and +incomprehensible. But by the painstaking mental work of the deepest +thinkers, the material of science was ceaselessly increased, and the +field of the supernatural and incomprehensible was ever more narrowed. +And this is especially the case since the progress of capitalist +production has promoted the persistent study of nature. For through this +study the human mind was enabled to test its powers by simple, quiet, +persistent and fruitful labor in the search for successive parts of +truth; and thus to rid itself from the overirritation of hopeless quest +after absolute truth. The desire to ascertain the value of these new +truths gave rise to the problems of the theory of understanding. The +attempts to solve these problems form a permanent part of modern systems +of philosophy, which represent a graduated evolution of the theory of +understanding. But the supernatural element in these systems prevented +their perfection. + +Under the impulse of the technical requirements of capitalism, the +evolution of natural sciences became a triumphal march of the human +mind. Nature was subjugated first through the discovery of its laws by +the human mind, and then by the material subordination of the known +forces of nature to the human will in the service of our main object, +the production of the necessaries of life with a minimum expenditure of +energy. But this bright shining light rendered, by contrast, the gloom +which surrounded the phenomena of human society only the darker, and +capitalism in its development still accentuates this contrast, as it +accentuates and thus renders more easily visible and intelligible all +contrasts. While the natural sciences dispensed with all mysterious +secrecy within their narrower domain, the darkness shrouding the origin +of ideas still offered a welcome refuge to the belief in miracles on the +spiritual field. + +Capitalism is now approaching its decline. Socialism is near. And the +vital importance of this transition in human history cannot be stated +more strongly than in the words of Marx and Engels: "This concludes the +primary history of man. He thereby passes definitely out of the animal +kingdom." The social regulation of production makes man fully the master +of his own fate. No longer does any mysterious social power then thwart +his plans or jeopardise his success. Nor does any mysterious natural +force control him henceforth. He is no longer the slave, but the master +of nature. He has investigated its effects, understands them, and +presses them into his service. For the first time in his history he will +then be the ruler of the earth. + +We now see that the many centuries that filled the history of +civilization were a necessary preparation for socialism, a slow struggle +to escape from nature's slavery, a gradual increase of the productivity +of labor, up to the point where the necessaries of life for all may be +obtained almost without exertion. This is the prime merit of capitalism +and its justification, that after so many centuries of hardly +perceptible progress it taught man to conquer nature by a rapid assault. +At the same time it set loose the forces of production and finally +transformed and bared the springs of the productive process to such a +degree that they easily could be perceived and grasped by the human +mind; this was the indispensable condition for the control of this +process. + +As never since the first advent of production of commodities there has +been such a fundamental revolution, it must necessarily be accompanied +by an equally fundamental spiritual revolution. This economic revolution +is the conclusion of the long period of class antagonisms and of +production of commodities; it carries with it the end of the dualist and +supernatural thoughts arising from this source. The mystery of social +processes passes away with this period, and the spiritual expression of +these mysteries must necessarily disappear with it. The slow development +of human thought from ignorance to an ever increased understanding +thereby ends its first chapter. This signifies the completion and +conclusion of philosophy, which is equivalent to saying that philosophy +as such passes out of existence, while its place is taken by the science +of the human mind, a part of natural science. + +A new system of production sheds its light into the minds of men already +before it has fully materialized. The same science which teaches us to +understand and thereby to control the social forces, also unfetters the +mind from the bewitching effects of those forces. It enables him even +now already to emancipate himself from traditional superstitions and +ideas which were formerly the expression of things unknown. We may +anticipate with our mind the coming time. And thus the ideas which will +then dominate are already even now growing within us in a rudimentary +form corresponding to the present actual economic development. By this +means we are even now enabled to overcome the capitalist philosophy in +thought and to soberly and clearly grasp the matter-dependent nature of +our spirit. + +The completion and the end of philosophy need not wait for the +realization of socialist production. The new understanding does not fall +from heaven like a meteor. It develops with the social-economic +development, first imperfectly and imperceptibly, in a few thinkers who +most strongly feel the breath of the approaching time. With the growth +of the science of sociology and with that of its practical application, +the socialist labor movement, the new understanding simultaneously +spreads and gains ground step by step, waging a relentless battle +against the traditional ideas to which the ruling classes are clinging. +This struggle is the mental companion of the social class struggle. + + ************ + +The methods of the new natural science had already been practiced for a +few centuries before the new theory was formulated. It first found vent +in the expression of surprise at the great confidence with which men +assumed to predict certain phenomena and to point out their connections. +Our experience is limited to a few successive observations of the +regularity or coincidence of events. But we attribute to natural laws, +in which are expressed causal relations of phenomena, a general and +necessary applicability which far exceeds our experience. The English +thinker Hume was the first who clearly expressed and formulated the +question--since called the problem of causality--why men always act in +this manner. But as he believed the reason for such action should be +sought in the nature of experience alone, experience being the only +source of knowledge, and as he did not further investigate the special +and distinct part played by the nature of the human mind in this +experiential connection, he could not find any satisfactory answer. + +Kant, who made the first important step toward the solution of this +question, had been trained in the school of rationalism which then +dominated in Germany and which represented an adaptation of mediæval +scholasticism to the requirements of increased knowledge. Starting from +the thesis that things which are logical in the mind must be real in +nature, the rationalists formulated by mere deduction general truths +about god, infinity and immortality. Under the influence of Hume, Kant +became the critic of rationalism and thus the reformer of philosophy. + +The question, how it is that we have knowledge of generally applicable +laws in which we have implicit confidence--such as mathematical theses, +or the maxim that every change has a cause--was answered by Kant in this +way: Experience and science are as much conditioned on properties +inherent in the organization of our mind as on the impressions of the +outer world. The former properties must necessarily be contained in all +experience and science. Therefore everything dependent on this common +mental part of science must be perfectly certain and independent of +special sense impressions. Common to all experience, and inseparable +from it, are the pure sense-conceptions (reine Anschauungsformen), such +as space and time, while the many experiences, in order to succeed in +forming understanding and science, must be connected by the pure +mind-conceptions (reine Verstandesbegriffe), the so-called categories; +among the latter also belongs causality. + +Now Kant explains the necessity and general applicability of the pure +sense and mind conceptions by the fact that they arise from the +organization of our mind. Accordingly, the world appears to the senses +as a succession of phenomena in time and space. Our reason transforms +these phenomena into things which are welded into one aggregate nature +by laws of cause and effect. On the things as they really are in +themselves, in the opinion of Kant, these pure conceptions cannot be +applied. We know nothing of them and can neither perceive nor +reconstruct them by reason, because "in themselves" they are wholly +beyond reason and knowledge. + +The result of this investigation, which was the first valuable +contribution to a scientific theory of understanding and forms, from our +standpoint, the most important part of Kant's philosophy, served him +mainly as a means of answering the following questions: What is the +value of knowledge which exceeds experience? Can we, by mere deduction +through concepts which go beyond experience, arrive at truths? His +answer was: No, and it was a crushing blow to rationalism. We cannot +exceed the boundaries of experience. By experience alone can we arrive +at science. All supposed knowledge about the unlimited and infinite, +about concepts of pure reason, called Ideas by Kant, (as the soul, the +world, and God) is nothing but illusions. The contradictions in which +the human mind becomes involved whenever it applies the categories +outside of experience to such subjects, are manifested in the fruitless +strife between the philosophical systems. Metaphysics as a science is +impossible. + +This did not give the deathblow to rationalism alone, but also to +bourgeois materialism which reigned among the French radical thinkers. +Kant's researches refuted the negative as well as the positive +assertions anent the supernatural and infinite. This cleared the field +for faith, for intuitive conviction. God, freedom and immortality are +concepts the truth of which cannot be proved by reason, like the natural +truths derived from experience. But nevertheless their reality is no +less certain, only it is of a different nature, being subjective and, +therefore, necessarily a matter of personal conviction. The freedom of +the will, for instance, is not a knowledge gained by experience, because +experience never teaches us anything but lack of freedom and dependence +on the laws of nature. But nevertheless freedom of will is a necessary +conviction of every one who feels it in the categorical imperative: Thou +shalt! of every one possessed by a sense of duty and of the knowledge +that he can act accordingly: therefore freedom of will is +unconditionally certain and requires no proof by experience. And from +this premise there follows in same way the assurance of the immortality +of the soul and of the existence of God. It gives the same kind of +certainty to all ideas which were left in a state of uncertainty by the +critique of pure reason. At the same time freedom of will determines the +form of the theory of understanding. In the entire world of phenomena +there was no room for freedom, for these phenomena follow strict rules +of causality, as demanded by the organization of our mind. Therefore it +was necessary to make room for freedom of will somewhere else, and so +"things in themselves," hitherto a phrase without value and meaning, +assumed a higher importance. They were not bound to space, time or +categories, they were free: they formed so to say a second world, the +world of noumena, which stood behind the world of phenomena and which +solved the contradiction between the lawful dependence of things in +nature and between the personal conviction of freedom of will. + +These opinions and reasonings were fully in accord with the conditions +of science and the economic development of Kant's time. The field of +nature was left entirely to the inductive method of science which based +itself on strictly materialist experience and observation, classifying +things systematically in their causal order and excluding all +supernatural interference. But while faith was banished from the natural +sciences forever, it could not be dispensed with. The ignorance as to +the origin of the human will left room for a supernatural ethic. The +attempts of the materialists to exclude the supernatural also from this +field failed. The time had not come as yet for a materialist and natural +ethics, for science was not yet able to demonstrate as an indisputable +truth, founded on experience, in what manner ethical codes and moral +ideas in general had a material origin. + +This state of things shows that the Kantian philosophy is the purest +expression of bourgeois thought, and this is still more emphasized by +the fact that freedom is the center of his system and controls it. +Rising capitalism required freedom for the producers of commodities in +order to expand its productive forces, it required freedom of +competition and freedom of unlimited exploitation. The producers of +commodities should be free from all fetters and restrictions, and +unhampered by any coercion, in order that they could go, under the sole +direction of their own intelligence, into free competition with their +fellow citizens. For this reason, freedom became the slogan of the young +bourgeoisie aspiring to political power, and Kant's doctrine of the free +will, the basis of his ethics, was the echo of the approaching French +Revolution. But freedom was not absolute; it was to be dependent on the +moral law. It was not to be used in the quest for happiness, but in +accord with the moral law, in the service of duty. If the bourgeois +society was to exist, the private interest of the individual must not +be paramount, the welfare of the entire class had to be superior to that +of the individual, and the commandments of this class had to be +recognized as moral laws taking precedence over the quest for happiness. +But for this very reason, these moral laws could never be fully obeyed, +and every one found himself compelled to violate them in his own +interest. Hence the moral law existed only as a code which could never +be fulfilled. And so it stood outside of experience. + +In Kant's ethics the internal antagonism of bourgeois society is +reflected, that antagonism which is the compelling force of the ever +increasing economic development. The foundation of this antagonism is +the antagonism, already mentioned, between the individual and social +character of production that gives rise to omnipotent, but unconceived +social forces ruling the destiny of man. In capitalistic production it +is still intensified by the antithesis of the wealthy ruling class and +the poor producing class that is continuously augmented by those who are +expropriated by competition. This antagonism gives rise to the +contradiction between the aims of men and the results achieved, between +the desire of happiness and the misery of the great mass. It is the +basis of the contradiction between virtue and vice, between freedom and +dependence, between faith and science, between phenomenon and "thing +itself." It is at the bottom of all contradictions and of the entire +pronounced dualism of the Kantian philosophy. These contradictions are +to blame for the downfall of the system, and the work of disintegration +was unavoidable from the moment that the contradictions of the bourgeois +production became apparent, that is to say immediately after the +political victory of the bourgeoisie. The system of Kant could, however, +not be overcome, unless the material origin of morality could be +uncovered. Then these contradictions could be understood and solved by +showing that they were relative and not absolute as they appeared. And +not until then could a materialist ethics, a science of morality, drive +faith from its last retreat. This was at last accomplished by the +discovery of social class struggles and of the nature of capitalist +production, by the pioneer work of Karl Marx. + +The practice of developed capitalism about the middle of the 19th +century directly challenged proletarian thinkers to criticise Kant's +doctrine of practical reason. Bourgeois ethics and freedom manifested +themselves in the form of freedom of exploitation in the interest of the +bourgeoisie, as slavery for the working class. The maintenance of human +dignity appeared in reality as the brutalization and degradation of the +proletarians, and the state founded on justice proved to be nothing but +the class state of the bourgeoisie. And so it was seen that Kant's +sublime ethics, instead of being the basis in all eternity of human +activity in general, was merely the expression of the narrow class +interests of the bourgeoisie. This proletarian criticism was the first +material for a general theory, and once it had been stated, its +correctness was demonstrated more and more by the study of previous +historical events, and these events were thereby shown in their proper +light. It was then understood by this theory that the social classes, +distinguished by their position in the process of production, had +different and antagonistic economic interests, and that each class did +necessarily regard its own interest as good and sacred. These general +class interests were not recognized in their true character but appeared +to men in the guise of superior moral motives; in this form they crowded +the special individual interests into the background, and since the +class interests were generally felt, all the members of the same class +recognized them. Moreover, a ruling class could temporarily compel a +defeated or suppressed class to recognize the class interests of the +rulers as a moral law, so long as the inevitability of the mode of +production in which that class ruled was acknowledged. Owing to the fact +that the nature and significance of the productive process was not +understood, the origin of human motives could not be discovered. They +were not traced back to experience, but simply felt directly and +intuitively. And consequently they were thought to be of a supernatural +origin and eternal duration. + +Not only the moral codes, but also other products of the human mind, +such as religion, science, arts, philosophy, were then understood to be +intimately connected with the actual material conditions of society. The +human mind is influenced in all its products by the entire world outside +of it. And thus the mind is seen to be a part of nature, and the science +of the mind becomes a natural science. The impressions of the outer +world determine the experience of man, his wants determine his will, and +his general wants his moral will. The world around him determines man's +wants and impressions, but these, on the other hand, determine his will +and activity by which he changes the world; this will-directed activity +appears in the process of social production. In this manner man by his +work is a part, a link in the great chain of natural and social +development. + +This conception overturns the foundations of philosophy. Since the human +mind is seen now to be a part of nature and interacts with the rest of +the world according to laws which are more or less known, it is classed +among Kant's phenomena. There is no longer any need of talking about +noumena. Thus they do not longer exist for us. Philosophy then reduces +itself to the theory of experience, to the science of the human mind. It +is at this point that the beginning made by Kant had to be farther +developed. Kant had always separated mind and nature very sharply. But +the understanding that this separation should only be made temporarily +for the purpose of better investigation, and that there is no absolute +difference between matter and mind made it possible to advance the +science of thought processes. However, this could be accomplished only +by a thinker who had fully digested the teachings of socialism. This +problem was solved by Joseph Dietzgen in his work on "THE NATURE OF +HUMAN BRAIN WORK," the first edition of which appeared in 1869, and by +this work he won for himself the name of philosopher of the proletariat. +This problem could be solved only by the help of the dialectic method. +Therefore, the idealist philosophical systems from Kant to Hegel which +consist chiefly in the development of the dialectic method, must be +regarded as the indispensable pioneers and precursors of Dietzgen's +proletarian philosophy. + + ************ + +The philosophy of Kant necessarily broke down on account of its dualism. +It had shown that there is safety only in finite and material +experience, and that the mind becomes involved in contradictions +whenever it ventures beyond that line. The mind's reason calls for +absolute truth which cannot be gotten. Hence the mind is groping in the +dark and critique may perhaps explain why it is in the dark, but it +cannot show the way out. What is called with Kant dialectics is in +reality resignation. True, the mind finds knowledge about things outside +of experience by some other way, viz., by means of its moral +consciousness, but this intuitive knowledge in the form of faith remains +sharply separated from scientific understanding. It was the task of the +philosophical development immediately after Kant, to do away with this +sharp separation, this unreconciled contradiction. This development +ended with Hegel; its result was the understanding that contradiction is +the true nature of everything. But this contradiction cannot be left to +stand undisturbed, it must be solved and still retained in a higher +form, and thus be reconciled. Therefore the world of phenomena cannot be +understood as being at rest. It can be understood only as a thing in +motion, as activity, as a continuous change. Action is always the +reconciliation of contradiction in some higher form, and contradiction +appears in this way as the lever of progressive development. That which +accomplishes this dialectic self-development does not appear in the +idealistic systems as the material world itself, but as the spiritual, +the idea. In Hegel's philosophy, this conception assumes the form of a +comprehensive system outlining the self-development of the Absolute +which is spiritual and is identical with God. The development of this +Absolute takes place in three stages; in its primitive pure spiritual +form it develops out of its undifferentiated being the conceptions of +logic; then it expresses itself in another, an external form, opposite +to itself, as Nature. In nature all forms develop by way of +contradictions which are eliminated by the development of some higher +form. Finally the Absolute awakens to consciousness in nature in the +form of the human mind and reaches thus its third stage, at which the +opposite elements, matter and spirit, are reconciled into a unity. The +human mind evolves in the same way to ever higher stages, until it +arrives, at the end of its development by understanding itself, that is +to say, by knowing intuitively the Absolute. This is what happens +unconsciously in religion. Religion, which in the form of faith must be +satisfied with a modest corner in the system of Kant, appears in the +system of Hegel very proudly as a higher sort of understanding superior +to all other knowledge, as an intuitive knowledge of absolute truth +(God). In philosophy this is done consciously. And the historical +development which finds its conclusion and climax in the Hegelian +philosophy corresponds to the logical development of the human mind. + +Thus Hegel unites all sciences and all parts of the world into one +masterly system in which the revolutionary dialectics, the theory of +evolution, that considers all finite things as perishable and +transitory, is given a conservative conclusion by putting an end to all +further development when the absolute truth is reached. All the +knowledge of that period was assigned to its place somewhere in this +system, on one of the steps of the dialectic development. Many of the +conceptions of the natural sciences of that day, which later on were +found to be erroneous, are there presented as necessary truths resting +on deduction, not on experience. This could give the impression that the +Hegelian philosophy made empirical research superfluous as a source of +concrete truths. This appearance is to blame for the slight recognition +of Hegel among naturalists; in natural sciences, this philosophy +therefore has won much less importance than it deserved and than it +might have won, if its actual significance, which consists in the +harmonious connection between widely separated events and sciences, had +been better understood under its deceptive guise. + +On the abstract sciences the influence of Hegel was greater, and here he +held an exceptionally prominent position in the scientific world of that +time. On one hand, his conception of history as a progressive evolution +in which every imperfect previous condition is regarded as a necessary +phase and preparation for subsequent conditions and thus appears natural +and reasonable, was a great gain for science. On the other hand, his +statements on the philosophy of law and religion met the requirements +and conceptions of his time. In his philosophy of law, the human mind is +taken in that stage in which it steps into reality, having as its +principal characteristic a free will. It is first considered as a single +individual which finds its freedom incorporated in its property. This +personality enters into relations with others like it. Its freedom of +will is thereby expressed in moral laws. By combining all individuals +into one aggregate whole, their contradictory relations are merged into +the social units, viz., the family, the bourgeois society (bürgerliche +Gesellschaft) and the state. There the moral rules are carried from the +inner to the outer reality. As the expressions of a superior, common and +more general will, they stand forth in the generally accepted moral +codes, in the natural laws of bourgeois society and in the authoritative +laws of the state. In the state, the highest form of which is the +monarchy, the mind finds itself at its highest stage of objective +realization as the idea of the state. + +The reactionary character of Hegelian philosophy is not merely a +superficial appearance that rests on the glorification of state and +royalty, thanks to which this philosophy was raised to the position of +Prussian state philosophy after the restauration. It was in its very +essence a product of reaction which in those days represented the only +possible advance after the revolution. This reaction was the first +practical critique of bourgeois society. After this society had been +firmly established, the relative amenities of the old time appeared in a +better light, because the shortcomings of the new society made +themselves soon felt. The bourgeoisie had recoiled before the +consequences of its revolution, when it recognized that the proletariat +was its barrier. It arrested the revolution as soon as its bourgeois +aims had been accomplished, and it was willing to acknowledge again the +mastery of the feudal state and monarchy, provided they would protect it +and serve its interests. The feudal powers that previously had been +overcome by the weight of their own sins and by the unconditional +superiority of the new social order, again lifted their heads when the +new order in its turn gave cause for well founded criticisms. But they +could not keep the revolution in check, unless they recognized it in a +limited degree. They could once more rule over the bourgeoisie, provided +they compromised with it so far as it was inevitable. They could no +longer prevail against capitalism, but they could govern for it. Thus, +by their rule, the imperfectness of capitalism was revealed. + +The theory of restauration, therefore, had to consist first of all of a +thorough critique of the revolutionary bourgeois philosophy. But this +philosophy could not be thrown aside entirely. So far as a critique of +the old order was concerned, the truth of bourgeois philosophy had to be +admitted. On the other hand, the sharp distinction it made between the +falsity of the old and the truth of the new order was found to be beside +the mark. So the correctness of the bourgeois philosophy itself proved +to be relative and limited, like that of a herald of some higher truth +which in its turn would acknowledge that which was temporarily and +partially true in its vanquished precursor. In this way the +contradictions became moments in the evolution of absolute truth, in +this way, furthermore, the dialectics became the main feature and method +of post-Kantian philosophy; and in this way, finally, the theorists of +the reaction were the men who steered philosophy over new courses and +who thereby became the harbingers of socialism. Scepticism and a +critique of all traditional things, yet a careful protection of +endangered faith, had characterized the tendencies of bourgeois thought +during its revolutionary period. In the reactionary stage, the bourgeois +implicitly accepted the belief in absolute truth and cultivated a +self-righteous faith. The practice of Metternich and of the Holy +Alliance corresponded to the theory of Hegelian philosophy. + +The practice of the Prussian police state, which embodied the +shortcomings of capitalism without its advantages and thus represented a +higher degree of reaction, destroyed the Hegelian philosophy, as soon as +the practices of maturing capitalism began to rebel against the fetters +by which reaction endeavored to bind it. Feuerbach returned in his +critique of religion from the fantastical heights of abstraction to +physical man. Marx demonstrated that the reality of bourgeois society +expresses itself in its class antagonisms which herald its imperfectness +and approaching downfall, and he discovered that the actual historical +development rested on the development of the process of material +production. The absolute spirit that was supposed to be embodied in the +constitution of the despotic state before the March revolution now +revealed itself as the narrow bourgeois spirit which regards bourgeois +society as the final aim of all historical development. The Hegelian +statement that all finite things carry within themselves the germ of +their own dissolution came home to his own philosophy, as soon as its +finiteness and limitations had been grasped. Its conservative form was +abandoned, but its revolutionary content, the dialectics, was preserved. +The Hegelian philosophy was finally superseded by dialectic materialism +which declares that absolute truth is realized only in the infinite +progress of society and of scientific understanding. + +This does not imply a wholesale rejection of Hegelian philosophy. It +merely means that the relative validity of that philosophy has been +recognized. The vicissitudes of the absolute spirit in the course of its +self-development are but a fantastical description of the process which +the real human mind experiences in its acquaintance with the world and +its active participation in life. Instead of the evolution of the +absolute idea, the dialectics henceforth becomes the sole correct method +of thought to be employed by the real human mind in the study of the +actual world and for the purpose of understanding social development. +The great and lasting importance of Hegel's philosophy, even for our own +time, is that it is an excellent theory of the human mind and of its +working methods, provided we strip off its transcendental character, and +that it far excels the first laborious contributions of Kant to the +theory of understanding. + +But this quality of the Hegelian philosophy could not be appreciated, +until Dietzgen had created the basis for a dialectic and materialistic +theory of understanding. The indispensable character of dialectic +thought, which is illustrated by the monumental works of Marx and +Engels, has been first demonstrated in a perfectly convincing manner by +Dietzgen's critical analysis of the human force of thinking. It was only +by means of this method of thought--of which he was according to Engels' +testimony an independent discoverer--that he could succeed in completing +the theory of understanding and bringing it to a close for the time +being. + + ************ + +If we refer to the ideas laid down by Dietzgen in this work as "his +philosophy," we say too much, because it does not assume to be a new +system of philosophy. Yet, on the other hand, we should not say enough, +because it would mean that his work is as passing as the systems before +it. It is the merit of Dietzgen to have raised philosophy to the +position of a natural science, the same as Marx did with history. The +human faculty of thought is thereby stripped of its fantastic garb. It +is regarded as a part of nature, and by means of experience a +progressive understanding of its concrete and ever changing historical +nature must be gained. Dietzgen's work refers to itself as a finite and +temporary realization of this aim, just as every new theory in natural +science is a finite and temporary realization of its aims. This +realization must be further improved and perfected by successive +investigations. This is the method of natural science; philosophical +systems, on the contrary, pretended to give absolute truth, that could +not be improved upon. Dietzgen's work is fundamentally different from +these former philosophies, and more than they, because it wishes to be +less. It presents itself as the positive outcome of philosophy toward +which all great thinkers have contributed, seen by the sober eyes of a +socialist and analyzed, recounted and further developed by him. At the +same time, it attributes to previous systems the same character of +partial truths and shows that they were not entirely useless +speculations, but ascending stages of understanding naturally related, +which contain ever more truth and ever less error. Hegel had likewise +entertained this broader view, but with him this development came to a +self-contradictory end in his own system. Dietzgen also calls his own +conception the highest then existing, and its distinctive step in the +evolution is that it for the first time adopts and professes this +natural and scientific view, instead of the supernatural point of view +of the former systems. The new understanding that the human mind is a +common and natural thing is a decisive step in the progressive +investigation of the mind, and this step places Dietzgen at the head of +this evolution. And it is a step which cannot be retraced, because it +signifies a sober awakening after centuries of vain imaginings. Since +this system does not pretend to be absolute truth, but rather a finite +and temporal one, it cannot fall as its predecessors did. It represents +a scientific continuation of former philosophies, just as astronomy is +the continuation of astrology and of the Pythagorean fantasies, and +chemistry the continuation of alchemy. It takes the place that formerly +was held by its unscientific predecessors and has this in common with +them, apart from its essential theory of understanding, that it is the +basis of a new world-philosophy, of a methodical conception of the +universe. + +This modern world-philosophy (Weltanschauung), being a socialist or +proletarian one, takes issue with the bourgeois conceptions; it was +first conceived as a new view of the world, entirely opposite to the +ruling bourgeois conceptions, by Marx and Engels, who developed its +sociological and historical contents; its philosophical basis is here +developed by Dietzgen; its real character is indicated by the terms +dialectic and materialist. By its core, historical materialism, it gains +a wholly new theory of social evolution that forms its chief content. +This theory was for the first time sketched in its main outlines in the +Communist Manifesto, and later on fully developed in a number of other +works and thoroughly vindicated by innumerable facts. It gives us the +scientific assurance that the misery and imperfectness of present +society, which bourgeois philosophy regards as inevitable and natural, +is but a transitory condition, and that man will within measurable time +emancipate himself from the slavery of his material wants by the +regulation of social production. By this certainty socialism is put on +an eminence so far above all bourgeois conceptions that these appear +barbarous in comparison with it. And what is more significant, our +world-philosophy may justly claim to have for the first time thrown the +light of an indisputable science on society and man; combined with the +maturest products of natural sciences it forms a complete science of the +world, making all superstitions superfluous, and thus involving the +theoretical emancipation, that is to say the emancipation of the mind. +The science treating of the human mind forms the essence and foundation +of this theory of society and man, not only because it gives us the +same as the natural sciences a scientific or experience-proven theory of +the function of human thinking, but also, because this theory of +cognition can alone assure us that such sciences are able to furnish us +an adequate picture of the world, and that anything outside of them is +mere fantasy. For this reason we owe to Dietzgen's theory of cognition +the firm foundation of our world-philosophy. + +Its character is primarily materialistic. In contradistinction to the +idealist systems of the most flourishing time of German philosophy which +considered the Mind as the basis of all existence, it starts from +concrete materialist being. Not that it regards mere physical matter as +its basis; it is rather opposed to the crude bourgeois materialism, and +matter to it means everything which exists and furnishes material for +thought, including thoughts and imaginations. Its foundation is the +unity of all concrete being. Thus it assigns to the human mind an equal +place among the other parts of the universe; it shows that the mind is +as closely connected with all the other parts of the universe as those +parts are among themselves; that is to say, the mind exists only as a +part of the entire universe so that its content is only the effect of +the other parts. Thus our philosophy forms the theoretical basis of +historical materialism. While the statement that "the consciousness of +man is determined by his social life" could hitherto at best be regarded +as a generalization of many historical facts and thus seemed imperfect +and open to criticism, capable of improvement by later discoveries, the +same as all other scientific theories, henceforth the complete +dependence of the mind on the rest of the world becomes as impregnable +and immutable a requirement of thought as causality. This signifies the +thorough refutation of the belief in miracles. After having been +banished long ago from the field of natural science, miracles were now +banished from the domain of thought. + +The enlightening effect of this proletarian philosophy consists +furthermore in its opposition to all superstition and its demonstration +of the senselessness of all idol worship. Socialist understanding +accomplished something which the bourgeois reformers could not do, +because they were limited to natural science in a narrow sense and could +not solve the mystery of the mind; for in explaining all the mental, +spiritual phenomena as natural phenomena our proletarian philosophy +furnishes the means for a trenchant critique of Christian faith which +consists in the belief in a supernatural spiritual being. In his +dialectic discussions of mind and matter, finiteness and infinity, god +and the world, Dietzgen has thoroughly clarified the confused mystery +which surrounded these conceptions and has definitely refuted all +transcendental beliefs. And this critique is no less destructive for the +bourgeois idols: Freedom, Right, Spirit, Force, which are shown to be +but fantastic images of abstract conceptions with a limited validity. + +This could be accomplished in no other way than by simultaneously +determining, in its capacity as a theory of understanding, the relation +of the world around us to the image which our mind forms of it. In this +respect Dietzgen completed the work begun by Hume and Kant. As a theory +of understanding, his conceptions are not only the philosophical basis +of historical materialism, but also of all other sciences as well. The +thorough critique directed by Dietzgen against the works of prominent +natural scientists, shows that he was well aware of the importance of +his own work. But, as might be expected, the voice of a socialist +artisan did not penetrate to the lecture hall of the academies. It was +not until much later that similar views appeared among the natural +scientists. And now at last the most prominent theorists of natural +science have adopted the view that explaining signifies nothing else but +simply and completely describing the processes of nature. + +By this theory of understanding Dietzgen has made it plainly perceptible +why the dialectic method is an indispensable auxiliary in the quest for +an explanation of the nature of understanding. The mind is the faculty +of generalization. It forms out of concrete realities, which are a +continuous and unbounded stream in perpetual motion, abstract +conceptions that are essentially rigid, bounded, stable, and +unchangeable. This gives rise to the contradiction that our conceptions +must always adapt themselves to new realities without ever fully +succeeding; the contradiction that they represent the living by what is +dead, the infinite by what is finite, and that they are themselves +finite though partaking of the nature of the infinite. This +contradiction is understood and reconciled by the insight into the +nature of the faculty of understanding, which is simultaneously a +faculty of combination and of distinction, which forms a limited part of +the universe and yet encompasses everything, and it is furthermore +solved by the resulting penetration of the nature of the world. The +world is a unity of the infinitely numerous multitude of phenomena and +comprises within itself all contradictions, makes them relative and +equalizes them. Within its circle there are no absolute opposites. The +mind merely constructs them, because it has not only the faculty of +generalization but also of distinguishing. The practical solution of all +contradictions is the revolutionary practice of infinitely progressing +science which moulds old conceptions into new ones, rejects some, +substitutes others in their place, improves, connects and dissects, +still striving for an always greater unity and an always wider +differentiation. + +By means of this theory of understanding, dialectic materialism also +furnishes the means for the solution of the riddles of the world +(Welträtsel). Not that it solves all these riddles; on the contrary, it +says explicitly that this solution can be but the work of an ever +advancing scientific research. But it solves them in so far as it +deprives them of the character of a mysterious enigma and transforms +them into a practical problem, the solution of which we are approaching +by an infinite progression. Bourgeois thought cannot solve the riddles +of the world. A few years after the first publication of Dietzgen's +work, natural science in the person of Du Bois-Reymond acknowledged its +incapacity by his "Ignorabimus:" "We shall never know." Proletarian +philosophy, in solving the riddle of the human mind, gives us the +assurance that there are no insoluble riddles before us. + +In conclusion, Dietzgen in this work indicates the principles of a new +ethics. Starting with the understanding that the origin of the ideas of +good and bad is found in the needs of man, and designating as really +moral that which is generally useful, he logically discovers that the +essence of modern morality rests in its class interests. At the same +time, a relative justification is accorded to these temporary ethics, +since they are the necessary products of definite social requirements. +The link between man and nature is formed by the process of social +production carried on for the satisfaction of man's material wants. So +long as this link was a fetter, it bound man by a misapprehended +supernatural ethics. But once the process of social labor is understood, +regulated and controlled, then this fetter is dropped and the place of +ethics is taken by a reasonable understanding of the general wants. + + ************ + +The philosophical works of Dietzgen do not seem to have, until now, +exerted any perceptible influence on the socialist movement. While they +may have found many a silent admirer and contributed much toward a +clearing up of their thoughts, yet the importance of his writings for +the theory of our movement has not been realized. But this is not a +matter for great surprise. In the first decade after their publication, +even the economic works of Marx, the value of which was much more +apparent, were little appreciated. The movement developed spontaneously, +and the Marxian theory could exert a useful and determining influence +only by means of the clear foresight of a few leaders. Hence it is no +wonder that the philosophy of the proletariat, which is less easily and +directly applicable than our economics, did not receive much attention. +The political maturity of the German working class, which was farthest +advanced in the theories of the international movement, did not develop +to the point of adopting Marxian theses as party principles, until after +the abolition of the anti-socialist laws. But even then they were for +most of the spokesmen of the party rather concise formulations of a few +practical convictions than the outcome of a thorough scientific training +and understanding. It was no doubt the great expansion of the party and +of its activity which demanded all their powers for its organization and +management, that led the younger intellectuals of the party to devote +themselves to practical work and to neglect the theoretical studies. +This neglect has bitterly avenged itself in the theoretical schisms of +the subsequent years. + +The decrepit condition of capitalism is now evidenced very plainly by +the decay of the bourgeois parties, so that the practical work of the +socialist party is in itself sufficient to attract every one who has an +independent turn of mind and a capacity for deep feeling. But under the +present circumstances, such a transition was not accompanied by a +proletarian world-philosophy acquired by painstaking study. Instead of +such a philosophy, we are confronted by a critique of socialist science +from the bourgeois standpoint. Marxism is measured by the standard of +the immature bourgeois theory of understanding, and the Neokantians, +unconscious of the positive outcome of philosophy of the past century, +are trying to connect socialism with Kantian ethics. Some even speak of +a reconciliation with Christianity and a renunciation of materialism. + +This bourgeois method of thought, which, being anti-dialectic and +anti-materialistic, is opposed to Marxism, has acquired some practical +importance in the socialistic movement of countries where by lack of +economical development the class-consciousness of the workers is +hindered by relics of the narrow-minded views of the class of little +producers--as in France and Italy under the name of reformism. In +Germany where it could not obtain much practical importance it +presented itself mostly as a theoretical struggle against Marxism under +the name of revisionism. It combines bourgeois philosophy and +anti-capitalist disposition and takes the place formerly occupied by +anarchism, and, like anarchism, it again represents in many respects the +little bourgeois tendencies in the fight against capitalism. Under these +circumstances, a closer study of Dietzgen's philosophical works becomes +a necessity. + +Marx has disclosed the nature of the social process of production, and +its fundamental significance as a lever of social development. But he +has not fully explained, by what means the nature of the human mind is +involved in this material process. Owing to the great traditional +influence exerted by bourgeois thought, this weak spot in Marxism is one +of the main reasons for the incomplete and erroneous understanding of +Marxian theories. This shortcoming of Marxism is cured by Dietzgen, who +made the nature of the mind the special object of his investigations. +For this reason, a thorough study of Dietzgen's philosophical writings +is an important and indispensable auxiliary for the understanding of the +fundamental works of Marx and Engels. Dietzgen's work demonstrates that +the proletariat has a mighty weapon not only in proletarian economics, +but also in proletarian philosophy. Let us learn to wield these weapons! + +ANTON PANNEKOEK. + +Leyden, Holland, December, 1902. + + + + +The Nature of Human Brain Work + +A Renewed Critique of Pure and Practical Reason + +BY A MANUAL WORKER + +Translated by Ernest Untermann + + + + +THE NATURE OF HUMAN BRAIN WORK + + + + +PREFACE + + +It may not be amiss here to say a few words to the kind reader and the +unkind critic in regard to the personal relation of the author to the +present work. The first objection which I anticipate will be aimed at my +lack of scientific learning which is shown indirectly rather, between +the lines, than in the work itself. "How dare you," I ask myself, "come +before the public with your statements on a subject, which has been +treated by such heroes of science as Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, +etc., without being thoroughly familiar with all the works of your +famous predecessors?" + +At best, will you not merely repeat what has long since been +accomplished? + +In reply, I wish to say that the seeds sown by philosophy in the soil of +science have long since blossomed and borne fruit. The product of +history develops historically, grows and passes away, in order to live +eternally in another form. The original deed, the original work, is +fertile only in the contact with the conditions and relations of the +time in which it is born. But it finally becomes an empty shell, when it +has yielded its kernel to history. Whatever of a positive nature was +produced by the science of the past, lives no longer in the words of +the author, but has become more than spirit, has become flesh and blood +in present science. In order, e. g., to know the products of physics and +produce something new in its field, it is not necessary to first study +the history of this science, nor derive the hitherto discovered laws +from their fundamental source. On the contrary, historical research +might only be an obstacle to the solution of a definite physical +problem, for concentrated strength will naturally accomplish more than +divided strength. In this sense, I consider my lack of other knowledge +an advantage, because I am thus enabled to devote myself so much more +intensely to my special object. I have striven hard to study this object +and to learn everything which is known about it in my time. The history +of philosophy has in a certain sense been repeated in the development of +my individuality, since I speculated from my earliest youth on the means +of satisfying my longing for a consistent and systematic conception of +the world, and I believe I have finally found this satisfaction in the +inductive understanding of the human faculty of thought. + +Note that it is not the faculty of thought in its various +manifestations, not the different forms of it, but its general form, its +general nature, that satisfied me and that I propose to discuss. My +object is then very plain and circumscribed, indeed it is so simple, +that I had difficulties in showing its nature from different points of +view and was compelled to resort to numerous repetitions. At the same +time, the question concerning the nature of the mind is a popular one, +which is not limited to professional philosophy, but concerns all +sciences. And whatever the history of science has contributed towards +the solution of this question, must be generally alive in the +scientific conceptions of the present. I could well be satisfied with +this source. + +I may, then, confess in spite of my authorship, that I am not a +professor of philosophy, but a mechanic by profession. If any one should +feel justified in telling me: "Shoemaker, stick to your last!" I would +reply to him with Karl Marx: "Your non plus ultra professional wisdom +became enormously foolish from the moment when the watchmaker Watt +invented the steam engine, the barber Arkwright the loom, the jeweler +Fulton the steamship." Without classing myself among these great men, I +can strive to emulate them. Besides, the nature of my object is +especially pertinent to the class, a member of which I have the +pleasure, if not the honor, of being. + +I treat in this work of the faculty of thought as the organ of the +general. The oppressed fourth estate, the working class, is the true +exponent of this organ, the ruling classes being prevented by their +special class interests from recognizing the demands of general reason. +Our first consideration is, of course, the relation of our object to +human conditions. However, so long as conditions are not equalized for +men in general, but vitiated by class interests, our view of things is +influenced by these class limitations. A truly objective understanding +requires a subjective theoretical freedom. Before Copernicus saw the +Earth was moving and the Sun stationary, he had to place himself outside +of his terrestrial standpoint. The faculty of thought, having all +relations for its object, must abstract from all of them in order to +grasp its own real nature. Since we can understand things only by means +of thought, we must abstract from everything in order to understand +thought in general. This task was too difficult, so long as man was +bound to some limited class standpoint. Not until historical development +has proceeded to the point of striving at dissolution of the last +society based on a ruling and a serving class, can prejudices be +overcome to the extent of enabling the faculty of understanding to grasp +the nature of human brain activity in the abstract. It is only a +historical movement aiming at the direct and general liberty of the +masses, the new era of the fourth estate based on much misunderstood +premises, which can dispense with the spirit cult sufficiently to be +enabled to expose the real author of every spook, the "pure" mind. The +man of the fourth estate represents at last the "pure" man. His +interests are no longer mere class interests, but mass interests, +interests of humanity. This indicates that we are now approaching the +end of a development in which the interests of the mass were dependent +on the interests of a ruling class and in which humanity made progress +not so much in spite of as by means of continuous oppression by Jewish +patriarchs, Asiatic conquerors, antique slaveholders, feudal barons, +guildmasters, modern capitalists and even capitalist Cæsars. The class +conditions of the past were inevitable in the general development. Now +this development has arrived at a point where the mass becomes conscious +of itself. Man has hitherto developed by class antagonism. By this means +he has now arrived at the point where he wants to develop himself +consciously. Class antagonisms were _phenomena_ of humanity. The working +class strives to abolish class antagonism in order that humanity itself +may be a _truth_. + +Just as the Reformation was conditioned on the actual environment of the +sixteenth century, so, like the discovery of the electric telegraph, the +research of the theory of human understanding is based on the actual +conditions of the nineteenth century. To this extent the contents of +this little work are not an individual, but a historical product. In +writing it, I feel myself, if I may use this mystic phrase, as a mere +organ of the idea. Only the form of presenting the subject is mine, and +I beg the kind reader to judge it leniently. I ask that the reader may +direct his or her silent or loud objections, not against the form, but +against the substance of my remarks, not to cling to the letter, but to +understand the spirit of my words. + +If I should not succeed in developing the idea, and if my voice should +thus be drowned in the hubbub of our overstocked book market, I am +nevertheless certain that the cause itself will find a more talented +champion. + +JOSEPH DIETZGEN, _Tanner_. + +SIEGBURG, May 15, 1869. + + + + +THE NATURE OF HUMAN BRAIN WORK + + + + +I. + +INTRODUCTION + + +Systematization is the essence and the general expression of the +aggregate activity of science. Science seeks to classify and systematize +the objects of the world for the understanding of our brain. The +scientific understanding of a certain language, e. g., requires an +orderly arrangement of that language in general categories and rules. +The science of agriculture does not simply wish to produce a good crop +of potatoes, but to find a system for the methods of cultivation and +thus to furnish the knowledge by which success in cultivation can be +determined beforehand. The practical result of all theory is to acquaint +us with the system and method of its practice and thus to enable us to +act in this world with a reasonable certainty of success. Experience is, +of course, an indispensable condition for this purpose; but it alone is +not sufficient. Only by means of empirically developed theories, by +science, do we overcome the play of accident. Science gives us the +conscious domination over things and unconditional security in handling +them. + +No one individual can know everything. The capacity of the individual +brain is no more adequate for the knowledge of everything that is +necessary than the skill and strength of the individual's hands are +sufficient to produce all he needs. Faith is indispensable to man, but +only faith in that which others know, not in what they believe. Science +is as much a social matter as material production. "One for all and all +for one." + +But just as there are some wants of the body which every one has to +satisfy by himself, so every one has to know certain scientific facts +which are not the prerogative of any special science. + +This is true of the faculty of human understanding. The knowledge and +study of this theory cannot be left to any particular guild. Lassalle +justly says: "Thinking itself has become a special trade in these days +of division of labor, and it has fallen into the worst hands, those of +our newspaper writers." He thus urges us not to acquiesce in this +appropriation any longer, not to submit any more to the harangues of +public opinion, but to resume thinking for ourselves. We may leave +certain objects of scientific research to professionals, but general +thought is a public matter which every one should be required to attend +to himself. + +If we could place this general work of thinking on a scientific basis, +if we could find a theory of general thought, if we were able to +discover the means by which reason arrives at understanding, if we could +develop a method by which truth is produced scientifically, then we +should acquire for science in general and for our individual faculty of +judgment the same certainty of success which we already possess in +special fields of science. + +Kant says: "If it is not possible to harmonize the various co-operators +on the question of the means by which their common aim is to be +accomplished, then we may safely infer that such a study is not yet on +the secure road of science, but will continue to grope in the dark." + +Now, if we take a look at the sciences, we find that there are many, +especially among the natural sciences, which fulfill the requirements of +Kant, agreeing unanimously and consciously on certain empirical +knowledge and building further understanding on that. "There we know," +as Liebig says, "what is to be called a certain fact, a conclusion, a +rule, a law. We have touchstones for all this, and every one makes use +of them before making known the fruits of his labors. The attempt to +maintain any proposition by lawyer's tricks, or the intention to make +others believe anything that cannot be proven, are immediately wrecked +by the ethics of science." + +Not so in other fields, where concrete and material things are left +behind and abstract, so-called philosophical, matters are taken up, as, +for instance, questions of general conceptions of the world and of life, +of beginning and end, of the semblance and the essence of things, of +cause and effect, of matter and force, of might and right, of wisdom of +life, of morality, religion, and politics. Here we find, instead of +irrefutable proofs, mere "lawyer's tricks," an absence of reliable +knowledge, a mere groping amid contradictory opinions. + +And it is precisely the prominent authorities of natural science who +show by their disagreements on such matters that they are mere tyros in +philosophy. It follows, then, that the socalled ethics of science, the +touchstones of which the boast is made that they never fail in +determining what is knowledge and what is mere conjecture, are based on +a purely instinctive practice, not on a conscious theory of +understanding. Although our time excels in diligent scientific research, +yet the numerous differences among scientists show that they are not +capable of using their knowledge with a predetermined certainty of +success. Otherwise, how could misunderstandings arise? Whoever +understands understanding, cannot misunderstand. It is only the absolute +accuracy of astronomical computations which entitles astronomy to the +name of a science. A man who can figure is at least enabled to test +whether his computation is right or wrong. In the same way, the general +understanding of the process of thought must furnish us with the +touchstone by which we can distinguish between understanding and +misunderstanding, knowledge and conjecture, truth and error, by general +and irrefutable rules. Erring is human, but not scientific. Science +being a human matter, errors may exist eternally, but the understanding +of the process of thought will enable us quite as well to prevent errors +from being offered and accepted as scientific truths as an understanding +of mathematics enables us to eliminate errors from our computations. + +It sounds paradoxical and yet it is true: Whoever knows the general rule +by which error may be distinguished from truth, and knows it as well as +the rule in grammar by which a noun is distinguished from a verb, will +be able to distinguish in both cases with equal certainty. Scientists as +well as scribes have ever embarrassed one another by the question: What +is truth? This question has been an essential object of philosophy for +thousands of years. This question, like philosophy itself, is finally +settled by the understanding of the faculty of human thought. In other +words, the question of what constitutes truth is identical with the +question of the distinction between truth and error. Philosophy is the +science which has been engaged in solving this riddle, and the final +solution of the riddle by the clear understanding of the process of +thought also solves the question of the nature of philosophy. Hence a +short glance at the nature and development of philosophy may well serve +as an introduction to our study. + +As the word philosophy is connected with various meanings, I state at +the outset that I am referring only to socalled speculative philosophy. +I dispense with frequent quotations and notes of the sources of my +knowledge, as anything that I may say in this respect is so well +established that we can afford to discard all scientific by-work. + +If we apply the above-named test of Kant to speculative philosophy it +appears to be more the playground of different opinions than of science. +The philosophical celebrities and classic authorities are not even in +accord on the question: What is philosophy and what is its aim? For this +reason, and in order not to increase the difference by adding my own +opinion, I regard everything as philosophy that calls itself by that +name, and we select from the voluminous literature of philosophy that +which is common and general in all philosophers, without taking any +notice of their special peculiarities. + +By this empirical method we find first of all that philosophy is +originally not a specialized science working with other sciences, but a +generic name for all knowledge, the essence of all science, just as art +is the essence of the various arts. Whoever made knowledge, whoever made +brain work his essential occupation, every thinker without regard to the +contents of his thoughts, was originally a philosopher. + +But when with the progressive increase of human knowledge, the various +departments detached themselves from the mother of all wisdom, +especially since the origin of natural sciences, philosophy became +known, not so much by its content as by its form. All other sciences are +distinguished by their various objects, while philosophy is marked by +its own method. Of course, it also has its object and purpose. It +desires to understand the universal whole, the cosmos. But it is not +this object, this aim, by which philosophy is characterized; it is +rather the manner in which this object is accomplished. + +All other sciences occupy themselves with special things, and if they +consider the universe at all, they do so only in its bearing on the +special objects of their study, the parts of which the universe is +composed. Alexander von Humboldt says in his introduction to his +"Cosmos" that he is limiting himself to an empirical consideration, to a +physical research, which seeks to elucidate the uniformity and unity by +means of the great variety. And all inductive sciences arrive at general +conclusions and conceptions only by way of their occupation with special +and concrete things. For this reason they claim that their conclusions +are based on facts. + +Speculative philosophy proceeds by the opposite method. Thought, the +object of its study, may be some special question, yet it does not +follow this up in the concrete. It rejects as fallacious the evidence of +the senses, the physical experience gained by means of the eye and ear, +hand and brain, and limits itself to "pure" and absolutely abstract +thought, in order to understand thus by the unit of human reason the +multiplicity of the universe. In seeking for an answer to the question: +What is philosophy? which question we are specially discussing just now, +speculative philosophy would not start out from its actual material +form, from its wooden and pigskin volumes, from its great and small +essays, in order to arrive at a conception of its object. On the +contrary, the speculative philosopher turns to introspection and looks +in the depths of his own mind for the true concept of philosophy. And by +this standard he separates the impression of his senses into true or +erroneous. This speculative method has hardly ever dealt in tangible +things, unless we recognize this philosophical method in every +unscientific concept of nature which populated the world with spooks. +The rudiments of scientific speculation occasionally dealt with the +course of the sun and the globe. But since inductive astronomy +cultivates these fields with greater success, speculative philosophy +limits itself entirely to abstract discussions. And in this line of +research as well as in all others it is characterized by the production +of its results out of the idea or the concept. + +For empirical science, for the inductive method, the multiplicity of +experiences is the first basis, and thought the second. Speculative +philosophy, on the other hand, seeks to arrive at scientific truth +without the help of experience. It rejects the socalled transient facts +as a foundation of philosophical understanding, and declares that it +should be absolute, exalted above time and space. Speculative philosophy +does not wish to be scientific physics, but metaphysics. It regards it +as its task to find by "pure" reason, and without the assistance of +experience, a system, a logic, or a theory of science, by which +everything worth knowing is supposed to be reeled off logically and +systematically, in about the same way in which we derive grammatically +the various forms of a word from its root. But the physical sciences +operate on the assumption that our faculty of understanding, to use a +familiar illustration, resembles a piece of soft wax which receives +impressions from outside, or a clean slate on which experience writes +its lines. Speculative philosophy, on the other hand, assumes that +certain ideas are innate and may be dipped and produced from the depths +of the mind by means of thought. + +The difference between speculative and inductive science is that between +fantasy and sound common sense. The latter produces its ideas by means +of the outer world, by the help of experience, while fantasy gets its +product from the depth of the mind, out of itself. But this method of +production is only seemingly one-sided. A thinker can no more think +transcendental thoughts which are beyond the reach of experience, than a +painter can invent transcendental pictures, transcendental forms. Just +as fantasy creates angels by a combination of man and bird, or mermaids +by a composition of woman and fish, so all other products of fantasy, +though seemingly derived out of itself, are in fact only arbitrarily +arranged impressions of the outer world. Reason operates with numbers +and orders, time and measures, and other means of experience, while +fantasy reproduces the experiences without regard to law and in an +arbitrary form. + +The longing for knowledge has been the cause of speculative attempts to +explain the phenomena of life and nature at a time when lack of +experience and observation made inductive understanding impossible. +Experience was then supplemented by speculation. In later times, when +experience had grown, previous speculation was generally recognized as +erroneous. But it nevertheless required thousands of years of repeated +disappointments on one side and numerous brilliant successes of the +inductive method on the other, before these speculative hobbies came +into disfavor. + +Fantasy has certainly a positive power, and speculative intuition, +derived from analogy, very often precedes empirical and inductive +understanding. But we must remain aware of the fact that so much is +assumption and so much actual scientific knowledge. Conscious intuition +stimulates scientific research, while pseudo-science closes the door to +inductive research. The acquisition of the clear understanding of the +distinction between speculation and knowledge is a historical process, +the beginning and end of which coincides with the beginning and end of +speculative philosophy. + +In ancient times, common sense operated in common with fantasy, the +inductive with the speculative method. The discussion of their +differences begins only with the understanding of the numerous +disappointments caused by the still inexperienced judgment which have +prevented an unobstructed view of the question up to modern times. But +instead of attributing these disappointments to lack of understanding, +they were charged to the account of the imperfection of the senses. The +senses were called impostors and material phenomena untrue images. Who +has not heard the lament about the unreliability of the senses? The +misunderstanding of nature and of its phenomena led to a serious rupture +with sense perceptions. The philosophers had deceived themselves and +thought they had been deceived by the senses. In their anger they turned +disdainfully away from the world of sensations. With the same uncritical +faith with which the semblance had hitherto been accepted as truth, now +uncritical doubt rejected the truth of sensations altogether. Research +abandoned nature and experience, and began the work of speculative +philosophy by "pure" thought. + +But no! Science did not permit itself to be entirely led astray from the +path of common sense, from the way of truth of sense perceptions. +Natural science soon stepped into the breach, and its brilliant +successes gained for the inductive method the consciousness of its +fertility, while on the other hand philosophy searched for a system by +which all the great general truths might be opened up without +specialized study, without sense perception and observation, by mere +reason alone. + +Now we have a more than sufficient quantity of such speculative systems. +If we measure them with the aforementioned standard of unanimousness, we +find that philosophy agrees only on its disagreements. In consequence, +the history of speculative philosophy, unlike the history of other +sciences, consists less of a gradual accumulation of knowledge, than of +a series of unsuccessful attempts to solve the general riddles of nature +and life by "pure" thought, without the help of the objects and +experience of the outer world. The most daring attempt in this line, the +most artificial structure of thought, was completed by Hegel in the +beginning of the nineteenth century. To use a common expression, he +became as famous in the world of science as Napoleon I did in the world +of politics. But Hegelian philosophy has not stood the test of time. +Haym, in his work entitled "Hegel and His Time," says of Hegelian +philosophy that "it was pushed aside by the progress of the world and by +living history." + +The outcome of philosophy up to that time, then, was a declaration of +its own impotence. Nevertheless, we do not underestimate the fact that a +work occupying the best brains for thousands of years surely contained +some positive element. And in fact, speculative philosophy has a +history, which is not merely a series of unsuccessful attempts, but also +a living development. However, it is less the object of its study, less +the logical world system, which developed, than its method. + +Every positive science has a material object, a beginning in the outer +world, a premise on which its understanding is based. Every empirical +science has for its fundament some material of the senses, some given +object, on which its understanding is dependent, and thus it becomes +"impure." Speculative philosophy seeks a "pure, absolute," +understanding. It wishes to understand by "pure" reason, without any +material, without any experience. It takes its departure from the +enthusiastic conviction of the superiority of understanding and +knowledge over experience gained by sense perceptions. For this reason +it wishes to leave experience entirely aside in favor of absolutely +"pure" understanding. Its object is truth; not concrete truth, not the +truth of this or that thing, but truth in general, truth "in itself." +The speculative systems seek after an absolute beginning, an indubitably +self-supporting starting point, from which they may determine the +absolutely indubitable. The speculative systems are thus by their own +mentality perfectly complete and selfsufficient systems. Every +speculative system found its end in the subsequent knowledge that its +totality, its selfsufficiency, its absoluteness, was imaginary, that it +could be determined empirically and externally like all other knowledge, +that it was not a philosophical system, but a relative and empirical +attempt at understanding. Speculation finally dissolved into the +knowledge that understanding is by its very nature "impure," that the +organ of philosophy, the faculty of understanding cannot begin its +studies without a given point of departure, that science is not +absolutely superior to experience, but only so far as it can organize +numerous experiences. It followed from these premises that the object of +philosophy can be a general and objective understanding, or "truth in +itself," only in so far as understanding or truth in general can be +derived from given concrete objects. In plain words, speculative +philosophy was reduced to the unphilosophical science of the empirical +faculty of understanding, to the critique of reason. + +Modern conscious speculation takes its departure from the experienced +difference between semblance and truth. It denies all sense phenomena in +order to find truth by thinking, without being deceived by any +semblance. The subsequent philosophers, however, found every time that +the truths of their predecessors, gained by this method, were not what +they pretended to be, but that their positive result consisted simply in +having advanced the science of the thought process to a certain extent. +By denying the actuality of the senses, by endeavoring to separate +thought from all sense perceptions, by isolating it, so to say, from its +sensory cover, speculative philosophy, more than any other science, laid +bare the structure of the mind. The more this philosophy advanced in +time, the more it developed in its historical course, the more +classically and strikingly did this kernel of its work spring into view. +After the repeated creation of giant fantasmagorias, it found its +solution in the positive knowledge that socalled pure philosophical +thought, abstracting from all concrete contents, is nothing but +thoughtless thought, thought without any real object back of it, and +produces mere fantasmagorias. This process of speculative deception and +scientific exposure was continued up to recent times. Finally the +solution of the main question, and the solution of speculation, was +introduced with the following words of Feuerbach: "My philosophy is no +philosophy." + +The long story of speculative work was finally reduced to the +understanding of reason, of the intellect, the mind, to the exposure of +those mysterious operations which we call thinking. + +The secret of the processes by which the truths of understanding are +produced, the ignorance of the fact that every thought requires an +object, a premise, was the cause of the idle speculative wanderings +which we find registered in the history of philosophy. The same secret +is today the cause of those numerous speculative mistakes which we +observe in passing over the words and works of naturalists. Their +knowledge and understanding is far developed, but only so far as it +refers to tangible objects. The moment they touch upon abstract +discussions, they offer "lawyers' proofs" in place of "objective facts." +For although they know intuitively and in a concrete case that this is a +truth, that a conclusion, and that a rule, they do not apply this +knowledge in general with consciousness and theoretical consistency. The +successes of natural science have taught them to operate the instrument +of thought, the mind, instinctively. But they lack the systematic +understanding which operates with conscious and predetermined certainty. +They ignore the outcome of speculative philosophy. + +It will be our task to set forth in a short summary what speculative +philosophy has unconsciously produced of a positive nature by a tedious +process, in other words, to explain the general nature of the thought +process. We shall see that the understanding of this process will +furnish us with the means of solving scientifically the general riddles +of nature and of life. And thus we shall learn how that fundamental and +systematic world conception is developed which was the long coveted goal +of speculative philosophy. + + + + +II + +PURE REASON OR THE FACULTY OF THOUGHT IN GENERAL + + +When speaking of food in general, we may mention fruits, cereals, +vegetables, meat and bread and classify them all, in spite of their +difference, under this one head. In the same way, we use, in this work, +the terms reason, consciousness, intellect, knowledge, discernment, +understanding, as referring to the same general thing. For we are +discussing the general nature of the thought process rather than its +special forms. + +"No intelligent thinker of our day," says a modern physiologist, +"pretends to look for the seat of the intellectual powers in the blood, +as did the ancient Greeks, or in the pineal gland, as was the case in +the middle ages. Instead we have all become convinced that the central +nerve system is the organic center of the intellectual functions of the +brain." Yes, true enough, thinking is a function of the brain and nerve +center, just as writing is a function of the hand. But the study of the +anatomy of the hand can no more solve the question: What is writing? +than the physiological study of the brain can bring us nearer to the +solution of the question: What is thought? With the dissecting knife, we +may kill, but we cannot discover the mind. The understanding that +thought is a product of the brain takes us closer to the solution of +our problem, in as much as it draws it into the bright light of reality +and out of the domain of fantasy in which the ghosts dwell. Mind thereby +loses the character of a transcendental incomprehensible being and +appears as a bodily function. + +Thinking is a function of the brain just as walking is a function of the +legs. We perceive thought and mind just as clearly with our senses as we +do pain and other feelings. Thought is felt by us as a subjective +process taking place inside of us. According to its contents this +process varies every moment and with each person, but according to its +form it is the same everywhere. In other words, in the thought process, +as in all processes, we make a distinction between the special or +concrete and the general or abstract. The general purpose of thought is +understanding. We shall see later that the simplest conception, or any +idea for that matter, is of the same general nature as the most perfect +understanding. + +Thought and understanding cannot be without subjective contents any more +than without an object which suggests individual reflection. Thought is +work, and like every other work it requires an object to which it is +applied. The statements: I do, I work, I think, must be completed by an +answer to the question: What are you doing, working, thinking? + +Every definite idea, all actual thought, is identical with its content, +but not with its object. My desk as a picture in my mind is identical +with my idea of it. But my desk outside of my brain is a separate object +and distinct from my idea. The idea is to be distinguished from thinking +only as a part of the thought process, while the object of my thought +exists as a separate entity. + +We make a distinction between thinking and being. We distinguish between +the object of sense perception and its mental image. Nevertheless the +intangible idea is also material and real. I perceive my idea of a desk +just as plainly as the desk itself. True, if I choose to call only +tangible things material, then ideas are not material. But in that case +the scent of a rose and the heat of a stove are not material. It would +be better to call thoughts sense perceptions. But if it is objected that +this would be an incorrect use of the word, because language +distinguishes material and mental things, then we dispense with the word +material and call thought real. Mind is as real as the tangible table, +as the visible light, as the audible sound. While the idea of these +things is different from the things themselves, yet it has that in +common with them that it is as real as they. Mind is not any more +different from a table, a light, a sound, than these things differ among +themselves. We do not deny that there is a difference. We merely +emphasize that they have the same general nature in common. I hope the +reader will not misunderstand me henceforth, when I call the faculty of +thought a material quality, a phenomenon of sense perception. + +Every perception of the senses is based on some object. In order that +heat may be real, there must be an object, something else which is +heated. The active cannot exist without the passive. The visible cannot +exist without the faculty of sight, nor the faculty of sight without +visible things. So is the faculty of thought a phenomenon, but it can +never exist in itself, it must always be based on some sense +perception. Thought appears, like all other phenomena, in connection +with an object. The function of the brain is no more a "pure" process +than the function of the eye, the scent of a flower, the heat of a +stove, or the touch of a table. The fact that a table may be seen, +heard, or felt, is due as much to its own nature as to that of another +object with which it enters into some relation. + +But while each function is limited by its own separate line of objects, +while the function of the eye serves only for the perception of the +visible, the hand for the tangible, while walking finds an object in the +space it crosses, thought, on the other hand, has everything for its +object. Everything may be the object of understanding. Thought is not +limited to any special object. Every phenomenon may be the object and +the content of thought. More than this, we can only perceive anything +when it becomes the object of our brain activity. Everything is +therefore the object and content of thought. The faculty of thought may +be exerted quite generally on all objects. + +We said a moment ago that everything may be perceived, but we now modify +this to the effect that only perceivable things may be perceived. Only +the knowable can be the object of knowledge, only the thinkable the +object of thought. To this extent the faculty of thought is limited, for +it cannot replace reading, hearing, feeling, and all other innumerable +activities of the world of sensations. We do, indeed, perceive all +objects, but no object may be exhaustively perceived, known, or +understood. In other words, the objects are not wholly dissolved in the +understanding. Seeing requires something that is visible, something +which is, therefore, more than seeing. In the same way, hearing requires +something that can be heard, thinking an object that can be thought of, +something which is more than our thoughts, something still outside of +our consciousness. We shall learn later on how we arrive at the +knowledge that we see, hear, feel, and think of objects, and not merely +of subjective impressions. + +By means of thought we become aware of all things in a twofold manner, +viz., outside in reality and inside in thought, in conception. It is +easy to demonstrate that the things outside are different from the +things in our thoughts. In their actual form, in their real dimensions, +they cannot enter into our heads. Our brain does not assimilate the +things themselves, but only their images, their general outlines. The +imagined tree is only a general object. The real tree is different from +any other. And though I may have a picture of some special tree in my +head, yet the real tree is still as different from its conception as the +special is different from the general. The infinite variety of things, +the innumerable wealth of their properties, has no room in our heads. + +I repeat, then, that we become aware of the outer world in a twofold +way, viz., in a concrete, tangible, manifold form, and in an abstract +form, which is mental and unitary. To our senses the world appears as a +variety of forms. Our brains combine them as a unit. And what is true of +the world, holds good of every one of its parts. A sense-perceived unit +is a nonentity. Even the atom of a drop of water or the atom of any +chemical element, is divisible, so long as it exists at all, and its +parts are different and distinct. A is not B. But the concept, the +faculty of thought, makes of every tangible or sense-perceived part an +abstract whole and conceives of every whole or quantity as a part of the +abstract world unit. In order to understand the things in their +entirety, we must take them practically and theoretically, with body and +mind. With the body we can grasp only the bodily, the tangible, with the +mind only the mental, the thinkable. Things also possess mental quality. +Mind is material and things are mental. Mind and matter are real only in +their inter-relations. + +Can we see the things themselves? No, we see only the effects of things +on our eyes. We do not taste the vinegar, but the relation of the +vinegar to our tongue. The result is the sensation of acidity. The +vinegar is acid only in relation to our tongue. In relation to iron it +acts as a solvent. In the cold it becomes hard, in the heat liquid. It +acts differently on different objects with which it enters into +relations of time and space. Vinegar is a phenomenon, just as all things +are. But it never appears as vinegar by itself. It always appears in +connection with other phenomena. Every phenomenon is a product of a +subject and an object. + +In order that a thought may appear, the brain or the faculty of thought +is not sufficient in itself. It requires, besides, an object which +suggests the thought. From this relative nature of our topic it follows +that in its treatment we cannot confine ourselves "purely" to it. Since +reason, or the faculty of thought, never appears by itself, but always +in connection with other things, we are continually compelled to pass +from the faculty of thought to other things, which are its objects, and +to treat of their connections. + +Just as the sight does not see the tree, but only that which is visible +of the tree, so does the faculty of thought assimilate only the +perceivable image of an object, not the object itself. A thought is a +child begotten by the function of the brain in communion with some +object. In a thought is crystalized on one side the subjective faculty +of thought, and on the other the perceivable nature of an object. Every +function of the mind presupposes some object by which it is caused and +the spiritual image of which it is. Or vice versa, the spiritual content +of the mind is derived from some object which has its own existence and +which is either seen or heard, or smelled, or tasted, or felt, in short, +experienced. + +Referring back to the statement that seeing is limited to the visible +qualities of some object, hearing to its audible qualities, etc., while +the faculty of thought has everything for its object, we now understand +this to mean that all objects have certain innumerable, but concrete, +qualities which are perceptible by our senses, and in addition thereto +the general spiritual quality of being thought of, understood, in short, +of being the object of our faculty of thought. + +This mode of classifying all objects applies also to the faculty of +thought itself. The spirit, or mind, is a bodily function connected with +the senses which appear in various forms. Mind is thought generated at +different times in different brains by different objects through the +instrumentality of the senses. We may choose this mind as the object of +special thought the same as all other things. Considered as an object, +mind is a manysided and sense-perceived fact which in connection with a +special function of the brain generates the general concept of "Mind" as +the content of this special thought process. The object of thought is +distinguished from its contents in the same way in which every object is +distinguished from its mental image. The different kinds of motion +perceived by the help of the senses are the object of a certain thought +process and supply to it the idea of "motion." It is easier to +understand that the mental image of some object perceived by the senses +has a father and a mother, being begotten by our faculty of thought by +means of some sense-perceived object, than it is to grasp the existence +of that trinity which is born when our present thought experiences its +own existence and thus creates a conception of its own self. This has +the appearance of moving around in a circle. The object, the content and +the function of thought apparently coincide. Reason deals with itself, +considers itself as an object and is its own content. But nevertheless +the distinction between an object and its concept, though less evident, +is just as actual as in other cases. It is only the habit of regarding +matter and mind as fundamentally different things which conceals this +truth. The necessity to make a distinction compels us everywhere to +discriminate between the object of sense perception and its mental +concept. We are forced to do the same in the case of the faculty of +thought, and thus we find it necessary to give the name of "Mind" to +this special object of our sense perceptions. Such an ambiguity of terms +cannot be entirely avoided in any science. A reader who does not cling +to words, but rather seeks to grasp the meaning, will easily realize +that the difference between being and thinking applies also to the +faculty of thought, that the fact of understanding is different from the +understanding of understanding. And since the understanding of +understanding is again another fact, it will be permitted to call all +spiritual things facts or sense perceptions. + +Reason, or the faculty of thought, is therefore not a mystical object +which produces the individual thought. On the contrary, it is a fact +that certain individual thoughts are the product of perception gained in +contact with certain objects and that these in connection with a certain +brain operation produce the concept of reason. Reason as well as all +other things of which we become aware has a two-fold existence: one as a +phenomenon or sense-perception, the other as a concept. The concept of +any thing presupposes a certain sense-perception of that thing, and so +does the concept of reason. Since all men think as a matter of fact, +every one has himself perceived reason as a part of reality, as a +phenomenon, sense-perception or fact. + +Our object, reason, by virtue of the fact that it partakes of the nature +of the senses, has the faculty of transforming the speculative method, +which tries to dip understanding out of the depths of the spirit without +the help of sense-perception, into the inductive method, and vice versa +of transforming the inductive method, which desires to arrive at +conclusions, concepts, or understanding exclusively by means of +sense-perception, into the speculative method, by virtue of its +simultaneous spiritual nature. Our problem is to analyze the concept of +thought, or of the faculty of thought, or of reason, of knowing, of +science, by means of thought. + +To produce thoughts and to analyze them is the same thing inasmuch as +both actions are functions of the brain. Both have the same nature. But +they are different to the same extent that instinct differs from +consciousness. Man does not think originally because he wants to, but +because he must. Ideas are produced instinctively, involuntarily. In +order to become fully aware of them, to place them within the grasp of +knowing and willing, we must analyze them. From the experience of +walking, for instance, we derive the idea of walking. To analyze this +idea means to solve the question, what is walking generally considered, +what is the general nature of walking? We may answer: Walking is a +rythmical motion from one place to another, and thus we raise the +instinctive idea to the position of a conscious analyzed idea. An object +is not consciously, theoretically, understood, until it has been +analyzed. In examining what elements constitute the concept of walking, +we find that the general attribute of that experience which we agree in +calling "walking" is a rythmical motion. In actual experience steps may +be long or short, may be taken by two feet or by more, in brief may be +varied. But as a concept walking is simply a rythmical motion, and the +analysis of this concept furnishes us with the conscious understanding +of this fact. The concept of light existed long before science analyzed +it, before it was understood that undulations of the ether form the +elements which constitute the concept of light. Instinctive and +analytical ideas differ in the same way in which the thoughts of every +day life differ from the thoughts of science. + +The analysis of any idea and the theoretical analysis of any object, or +of the thing which suggested the idea, is one and the same. Every idea +corresponds to some real object. Ludwig Feuerbach has demonstrated that +even the concepts of God and immortality are reflections of real objects +which can be perceived by the senses. For the purpose of analyzing such +ideas as animal, light, friendship, man, etc., the phenomena, the +objects, such as animals, friendships, men, and lights, are analyzed. +The object which serves for the analysis of the concept "animal" is no +more any single animal, than the object of the concept "light" is any +single light. These concepts comprise classes, things in general, and +therefore the question, or the analysis, of what constitutes the animal, +the light, friendship, must not deal with any concrete, but with the +abstract elements of the whole class. + +The fact that the analysis of a concept and the analysis of its object +appear as two different things is due to our faculty of being able to +separate things into two parts, viz., into a practical, tangible, +perceptible, concrete thing and into a theoretical mental, thinkable, +general thing. The practical analysis is the premise of the theoretical +analysis. The individually perceptible animals serve us as a basis for +the analysis of the animal concept, the individually experienced +friendships as the basis for the analysis of the concept of friendship. + +Every idea corresponds to an object which may be practically separated +into its component parts. To analyze a concept is equivalent, therefore, +to analyzing a previously experienced object by theoretical means. The +analysis of a concept consists in the understanding of the common or +general faculties of the concrete parts of the analyzed object. That +which is common to the various modes of walking, the rythmical motion, +constitutes the concept of walking, that which is common to the various +manifestations of light constitutes the concept of light. A chemical +factory analyzes objects for the purpose of obtaining chemicals, while +science analyzes them for the purpose of obtaining their concepts. + +The special object of our analysis, the faculty of thought, is likewise +distinguished from its concept. But in order to be able to analyze this +concept, we must analyze the object. It cannot be analyzed chemically, +for not everything is a matter of chemistry, but it may be analyzed +theoretically or scientifically. As we have already stated, the science +of understanding deals with all objects. But all objects which this +science may wish to analyze theoretically, must first be handled +practically. According to their special natures, they must either be +handled in various ways, or carefully inspected, or scrutinized by +intent listening, in short they must be thoroughly experienced in some +way. + +It is a fact of experience that men think. The object or suggestion is +furnished by facts, and we then derive the concept instinctively. Thus, +to analyze the faculty of thought means to find that which is common or +general to the various personal and temporary processes of thought. In +order to follow this study by the methods of natural science, we require +neither physical instruments nor chemical reagents. The sense +perception which is indispensable for every scientific understanding, is +so to say present in this case _a priori_, without further experience. +Every one possesses the object of our study, the fact of thought faculty +and its experience, in the memories of himself or herself. + +We have seen that thought like any other activity as well as its +scientific analysis is everywhere developing the general or abstract out +of particular and concrete sense perceptions. We now express this in the +following words: The common feature of all separate thought-processes +consists in their seeking the general character or unity which is common +to all objects experienced in their manifold variety by sense +perceptions. The general element which is common to the different +animals, or to the different manifestations of light, is that which +constitutes the general animal or light concept. The general is the +nature of all concepts, of all understanding, all science, all thought +processes. Thus we arrive at the understanding that the analysis of the +faculty of thought reveals its nature of finding that which is general +and common to concrete and distinct things. The eye studies the visible, +the ear the audible, and our brain that which is generally conceivable. + +We have seen that thought like any other activity requires an object; +that it is unlimited in the choice of its objects, because all things +may become the objects of thought; that these objects are perceived in +manifold forms by various senses; and that they are transformed into +simple ideas by extricating that which they possess in common, which is +similar, which is general in them. If we apply this experienced +understanding of the general method of thought processes to our special +object, the faculty of thought, we realize that we have thus solved our +problem, because all we were looking for was the general method of the +thought process. + +_If the development of the general out of the concrete constitutes the +general method by which reason arrives at understanding, then we have +fully grasped reason as the faculty of deriving the general out of the +concrete._ + +Thinking is a physical process and it cannot exist or produce anything +without materials any more than any other process of labor. My thought +requires some material which can be thought of. This material is +furnished by the phenomena of nature and life. These are the concrete +things. In claiming that the universe, or all things, may be the object +of thought, we simply mean that the materials of the thought process, +the objects of the mind, are infinite in quantity and quality. The +materials which the universe furnishes for our thought are as infinite +as space, as eternal as time, and as absolutely manifold as the nature +of these two forms of being. The faculty of thought is a universal +faculty in so far as it enters into relations with all things, all +substances, all phenomena, and thus generates thought. But it is not +absolute, since it requires for its existence and action the previous +presence of matter. Matter is the boundary, beyond which the mind cannot +pass. Matter furnishes the background for the illumination of the mind, +but is not consumed in this illumination. Mind is a product of matter, +but matter is more than a product of mind, being perceived also through +the five senses and thus brought to our notice. We call real, objective +products, or "things themselves" only such products as are revealed to +us simultaneously by the senses and the mind. + +Reason is a real thing only in so far as it is perceived by the senses. +The perceptible actions of reason are revealed in the brain of man as +well as in the world outside of it. For are not the effects tangible by +which reason transforms nature and life? We see the successes of science +with our eyes and grasp them with our hands. It is true that science or +reason cannot produce such material effects out of themselves. The world +of sense perceptions, the objects outside of the human brain, must be +given. But what thing is there that has any effects "in itself?" In +order that light may shine, that the sun may warm, and revolve in its +course, there must be space and other things which may be lighted and +warmed and passed. In order that my table may have color, there must be +light and eyes. And everything else which my table is besides, it can be +only in contact with other things. Its being is just as manifold as +those various contacts or relations. In short, the world consists only +in its interrelations. Any thing that is torn out of its relations with +the world ceases to exist. A thing is anything "in itself" only because +it is something for other things, by acting or appearing in connection +with something else. + +If we wish to regard the world in the light of the "thing itself," we +shall easily see that the world "itself" and the world as it appears, +the world of phenomena, differ only in the same way in which the whole +differs from its component parts. The world "itself" is nothing else but +the sum total of its phenomena. The same holds good of that part of the +world phenomena which we call reason, spirit, faculty of thought. +Although we distinguish between the faculty of thought and its phenomena +or manifestations, yet the faculty of thought "itself," or "pure" +reason, exists in reality only in the sum total of its manifestations. +Seeing is the physical existence of the faculty of sight. We possess the +whole only by means of its parts, and we can possess reason, like all +other things, only by the help of its effects, by its various thoughts. +But we repeat that reason does not precede thought in the order of time. +On the contrary thoughts generated by perceptible objects serve as a +basis for the development of the concept of the faculty of thought. Just +as the understanding of the world movements has taught us that the sun +is not revolving around the earth, so the understanding of the thought +process tells us that it is not the faculty of thought which creates +thought, but vice versa, that the concept of this faculty is created out +of a series of concrete thoughts. Hence the faculty of thought +practically exists only as the sum total of our thoughts, just as the +faculty of sight exists only through the sum of the things that we see. + +These thoughts, this practical reason, serve as the material out of +which our brain manufactures the concept of "pure" reason. Reason is +necessarily impure in practice, which means that it must connect itself +with some object. Pure reason, or abstract reason without any special +content, cannot be anything else but the general characteristic of all +concrete reasoning processes. We possess this general nature of reason +in two ways: In an impure state, that is as practical and concrete +phenomenon, consisting of the sum of our real perceptions, and in a pure +state, that is theoretically or abstractly, in the concept. The +phenomenon of reason is distinguished from reason "itself" just as the +real animals are distinguished from the concept of the animal. + +Every actual reasoning process is based on some real object which has +many qualities like all things in nature. The faculty of thought +extracts from this many-sided object those properties which are general +or common with it. A mouse and an elephant, as the objects of our +reasoning activity, lose their differences in the general animal +concept. Such a concept combines many things under one uniform point of +view, it develops one general idea out of many concrete things. Since +understanding is the general or common quality of all reasoning +processes, it follows that reason in general, or the general nature of +the reasoning process, consists in abstracting the general ideal +character from any concrete thing perceptible by the help of the senses. + +Reason being unable to exist without some objects outside of itself, it +is understood that we can perceive "pure" reason, or reason "itself," +only by its practical manifestations. We cannot find reason without +objects outside of it with which it comes in contact and produces +thought, any more than we can find any eyes without light. And the +manifestations of reason are as varied as the objects which supply its +material. It is plain, then, that reason has no separate existence "in +itself," but that on the contrary the concept of reason is formed out of +the material supplied by the senses. + +Mental processes appear only in connection with perceptible phenomena. +These processes are themselves phenomena of sense perception which, in +connection with a brain process, produce the concept of the faculty of +thought "itself." If we analyze this concept, we find that "pure" reason +consists in the activity of producing general ideas out of concrete +materials, which include so-called immaterial thoughts. In other words, +reason may be characterized as an activity which seeks for unity in +every multiplicity and equalizes all contrasts whether it deals with the +many different sides and parts of one or of more objects. All these +different statements describe the same thing in different words, so that +the reader may not cling to the empty word, but grasp the living +concept, the manifold object, in its general nature. + +Reason, we said, exists in a "pure" state as the development of the +general out of the special, of the abstract out of concrete sense +perceptions. This is the whole content of pure reason, of scientific +understanding, of consciousness. And by the terms "pure" and "whole" we +simply indicate that we mean the general content of the various thought +processes, the general form of reason. Apart from this general abstract +form, reason, like all other things, has also its concrete, special, +sense form which we perceive directly through our experience. Hence our +entire process of consciousness consists in the experience of the +senses, that is in the physical process, and its understanding. +Understanding is the general reflection of any object. + +Consciousness, as the Latin root of the word indicates, is the knowledge +of being in existence. It is a form, or a quality, of existence which +differs from other forms of being in that it is aware of its existence. +Quality cannot be explained, but must be experienced. We know by +experience that consciousness includes along with the knowledge of being +in existence the difference and contradiction between subject and +object, thinking and being, between form and content, between phenomenon +and essential thing, between attribute and substance, between the +general and the concrete. This innate contradiction explains the various +terms applied to consciousness, such as the organ of abstraction, the +faculty of generalization or unification, or in contradistinction +thereto the faculty of differentiation. For consciousness generalizes +differences and differentiates generalities. Contradiction is innate in +consciousness, and its nature is so contradictory that it is at the same +time a differentiating, a generalizing, and an understanding nature. +Consciousness generalizes contradiction. It recognizes that all nature, +all being, lives in contradictions, that everything is what it is only +in co-operation with its opposite. Just as visible things are not +visible without the faculty of sight, and vice versa the faculty of +sight cannot see anything but what is visible, so contradiction must be +recognized as something general which pervades all thought and being. +The science of understanding, by generalizing contradiction, solves all +concrete contradictions. + + + + +III + +THE NATURE OF THINGS + + +In so far as the faculty of understanding is a physical object, the +knowledge of its nature is a matter of physical science. But in so far +as we understand all things by the help of this faculty, the science of +understanding becomes metaphysics. Inasmuch as the scientific analysis +of reason reverses the current conception of its nature, this specific +understanding necessarily reverses our entire world philosophy. With the +understanding of the nature of reason, we arrive at the long sought +understanding of the "nature of things." + +We wish to know, understand, conceive, recognize all things in their +very nature, not in their outward appearance. Science seeks to +understand the nature of things, or their true essence, by means of +their manifestations. Every thing has its own special nature, and this +nature is not seen, or felt, or heard, but solely perceived by the +faculty of thought. This faculty explores the nature of all things just +as the eye explores all that is visible in things. Just as the nature of +sight is understood by the theory of vision, so the nature of things in +general is understood by the theory of understanding. + +It is true that it sounds contradictory to say that the nature of a +thing does not appear to the eye, but to the faculty of thought, and at +the same time to imply that the opposite of appearance, nature, should +appear. But we here refer to the nature of a thing as a phenomenon in +the same way in which we referred to the mind as a perception of the +senses, and we shall demonstrate further on that every being is a +phenomenon, and every phenomenon is more or less of an essential thing. + +We have seen that the faculty of thought requires for its vital activity +an object, or raw material. The effect of reasoning is seen in science, +no matter whether we understand the term science in its narrow classical +sense or in its broadest meaning of any kind of knowledge. The phenomena +of sense perception constitute the general object or material of +science. Sense perceptions arise from infinite circulation of matter. +The universe and all things in it consist of transformations of matter +which take place simultaneously and consecutively in space and time. The +universe is in every place and at any time itself, new, and present for +the first time. It arises and passes away, passes and arises under our +very hands. Nothing remains the same, only the infinite change is +constant, and even the change varies. Every particle of time and space +brings new changes. It is true that the materialist believes in the +permanency, eternity, indestructibility of matter. He teaches us that +not the smallest particle of matter has ever been lost in the world, +that matter simply changes its forms eternally, but that its nature +lasts indestructibly through all eternity. And yet, in spite of all +distinctions between matter itself and its perishable form, the +materialist is on the other hand more inclined than any one else to +dwell on the identity of matter and its forms. Inasmuch as the +materialist speaks ironically of formless matter and matterless forms, +in the same breath with perishable forms of imperishable matter, it is +plain that materialism is not informed any more than idealism as to the +relation of content to form, of a phenomenon to the essential nature of +its subject. Where do we find such eternal, imperishable, formless +matter? In the world of sense perceptions we never meet anything but +forms of perishable matter. It is true that there is matter everywhere. +Wherever anything passes away, something new instantly arises. But +nowhere has any homogeneous, unchangeable matter enduring without any +form, ever been discovered. Even a chemically indivisible element is +only a relative unit in its actual existence, and in extension of time +as well as in extension through space it varies simultaneously and +consecutively as much as any organic individual which also changes only +its concrete forms, but remains the same in its general nature from +beginning to end. My body changes continually its fleshy tissue, bones, +and every other particle belonging to it, and yet it always remains the +same. What constitutes, then, this body which is distinguished from its +transient form? It is the sum total, in a generalized way, of all its +varied concrete forms. Eternal and imperishable matter exists in reality +only as the sum total of its perishable forms. The statement that matter +is imperishable cannot mean anything but that there will always and +everywhere be matter. It is just as true to say that matter is +imperishable and merely changes its forms, as it is to say that matter +exists only in its changing forms, that it is matter which changes and +that only the change is eternal. The terms "changeable matter" and +"material change" are after all only different expressions for the same +thing. + +In the practical world of sense perceptions, there is nothing permanent, +nothing homogeneous, nothing beyond nature, nothing like a "thing +itself." Everything is changing, passing, phantomlike, so to say. One +phantom is chased by another. "Nevertheless," says Kant, "things are +also something in themselves," for otherwise we should have the absurd +contradiction that there could be phenomena without things that produce +them. But no! A phenomena is no more and no less different from the +thing which produces it than the stretch of a twenty-mile road is +different from the road itself. Or we may distinguish between a knife +and its blade and handle, but we know that there would be no knife if +there were no blade and no handle. The essential nature of the universe +is change. Phenomena appear, that is all. + +The contradiction between the "thing itself," or its essence, and its +outward appearance is fully solved by a complete critique of reason +which arrives at the understanding that the human faculty of thought may +generalize any number of varied sense perceptions under one uniform +point of view, by singling out the general and equivalent forms and thus +regarding everything it may meet as a concrete part of one and the same +whole. + +In other words, the relative and transient forms perceived by our senses +serve as raw material for our brain activity, which abstracts the +general likeness out of the concrete forms and systematizes or +classifies them for our consciousness. The infinite variety of sense +perceptions passes in review before our subjective mind, and it +constructs out of the multiplicity the unity, out of the parts the +whole, out of the phenomena the essential nature, out of the perishable +the imperishable, out of the attributes the subject. The essence, the +nature of things, the "thing itself" is an ideal, a spiritual +conception. Consciousness knows how to make sums out of different units. +It can take any number of units for its sums. The entire multiplicity of +the universe is theoretically conceived as one unit. On the other hand, +every abstract sum consists in reality of an infinite number of sense +perceptions. Where do we find any indivisible unit outside of our +abstract conceptions? Two halves, four fourths, eight eighths, or an +infinite number of separate parts form the raw material out of which the +mind fashions the mathematical unit. This book, its leaves, its letters, +or their parts, are they units? Where do I begin, where do I stop? In +the same way, I may call a library with many volumes, a house, a farm, +and finally the whole universe, a unit. Is not everything a part, is not +every part a thing? Is the color of a leaf less of a thing than that +leaf itself? Perhaps some would call the color simply an attribute and +the leaf its substance, because there might be a leaf without color, but +no color without a leaf. But as surely as we exhaust a heap of sand by +scattering it, just as surely do we remove all the substance of a leaf +when we take away its attributes one after the other. Color is only the +sum of reactions of leaf, light, and eye, and so is all the rest of the +matter of a leaf an aggregate of interactions. In the same way in which +our reason deprives a leaf of its color attributes and sets it apart as +a "thing itself," may we continue to deprive that leaf of all its other +attributes, and in so doing we finally take away everything that makes +the leaf. Color is in its nature no less a substance than the leaf +itself, and the leaf is no less an attribute than its color. As the +color is an attribute of a leaf, so a leaf is an attribute of a tree, a +tree an attribute of the earth, the earth an attribute of the universe. +The universe is the substance, substance in general, and all other +substances are but its attributes. And this world-substance reveals the +fact that the nature of things, the "thing itself" as distinguished from +its manifestations, is only a concept of the mind. + +In its universal search from the attribute to the substance, from the +relative to the absolute, from the appearance of things to the true +things, the mind finally arrives at the understanding that the substance +is nothing but a sum of attributes collected by brain activity, and that +the mind itself, or reason, is a substantial being which creates +abstract mental units out of a multitude of sense perceptions and +conceives of the universe as an absolute whole, as an independent "thing +itself," by adding all its transient manifestations. In turning away +full of dissatisfaction from attributes, searching restlessly after the +substance, throwing aside phenomena, and forever groping for truth, for +the nature of things, for the "thing itself," and in finally realizing +that this substantial truth is merely the sum of all socalled untruths, +the totality of all phenomena, the mind proves itself to be the creator +of the abstract concept of substance. But it did not create this +concept out of nothing. On the contrary, it generated the concept of a +world substance out of attributes, it derived truth out of +manifestations of things. + +The idealist conception that there is an abstract nature behind +phenomena which materialises itself in them, is refuted by the +understanding that this hidden nature does not dwell in the world +outside of the human mind, but in the brain of man. But since the brain +differentiates between phenomena and their nature, between the concrete +and the general, only by means of sense perception, it cannot be denied +that the distinction between phenomena and their nature is well founded; +only the essential nature of things is not found back of phenomena, but +by means of phenomena. This nature is materially existent and our +faculty of thought is a real and natural one. + +It is true of spiritual things as well as of physical ones, in fact it +is true of all things, metaphysically speaking, that they are what they +are, not "in themselves," not in their abstract nature, but in contact +with other things, in reality. In this sense one might say that things +are not what they seem, but manifest themselves because they are +existent, and they manifest themselves in as many different ways as +there are other things with which they enter into relations of time and +space. But the statement that things are not what they seem requires, in +order to be rightly understood, the modification that whatever manifests +itself, exists in nature, and its existence is limited by its +manifestations. "We cannot perceive heat itself," says a book on physics +written by Professor Koppe, "we merely conclude from its manifestations +that it is present in nature." Thus reasons a naturalist who seeks to +understand a thing by practical and diligent study of its +manifestations, but who seeks refuge in the speculative belief in a +hidden "thing itself" whenever a lack of understanding of the +fundamentals of logic embarrasses him. We, on the contrary, conclude +that there is no such thing as "heat itself," since it cannot be found, +in nature, and we conceive of heat as effects of matter which the human +brain translated into the conception of "heat itself." Because science +was, perhaps, as yet unable to analyse this conception, the professor +says we cannot perceive the natural object which gives rise to this +conception. "Heat itself" is simply composed of the sum total of its +manifold effects, and there is nothing else to it. The faculty of +thought generalizes this variety of effects under the concept of heat in +general. The analysis of this conception, the discovery of the general +character of the various manifestations of heat, is the function of +inductive science. But the conception of heat separated from its effects +is a speculative idea, similar to Lichtenberg's knife without handle and +blade. + +The faculty of thought in touch with sense perceptions produces the +nature of things. But it produces them no more independently of things +outside than do the eye, the ear, or any other sense of man. It is not +the "things themselves" which we see or feel, but their effects on our +eyes, hands, etc. The faculty of reason to generalize different +perceptions of the eye permits us to distinguish between concrete sights +and sight in general. The faculty of thought conceives of any concrete +sight as an object of sight in general. It furthermore distinguishes +between subjective and objective sight perceptions, the latter being +sights which are visible not alone to the individual eye, but to +eyesight in general. Even the visions of a spiritualist, or such +subjective impressions as forked lightning, circles of fire, caused by +excited blood of closed eyes, serve as objects for the critical +consciousness. A glittering object revealed by bright sunlight miles +away is no more and no less tangible in substance, no more and no less +true, than any optical illusion. A man whose ear is tingling hears +something, though it is not the tinkling of bells. Every sense +perception is an object, and every object is a sense perception. The +object of any subjective mind is a passing manifestation, and every +objective perception is but a perishable subject. The object of +observation may exist in a more tangible, less approachable, more +stable, or more general form, but it is not a "thing itself." It may be +perceived not alone by my eyes, but also by those of others, not by the +eyes, but also by the feeling, the hearing, the taste, etc. And it may +be noticed not alone by men, but also by other objects. But nevertheless +it appears only as a manifestation, it is different in different places, +it is not today what it is tomorrow. Every existence is relative, in +touch with other things, and entering into different relations of time +and space with them. + +Every sense perception is an actual and natural object. Truth exists in +the form of natural phenomena, and whatever is, is true. Substance and +attribute are only terms for certain relations. They are not +contradictions, and, as a matter of fact, all contradictions disappear +before our faculty of generalization and differentiation. For this +faculty reconciles all contradictions by finding a general quality in +all differences. Existence, or universal truth, is the general object, +the raw material, of the faculty of thought. This material is of the +utmost variety and supplied by the senses. The senses reveal to us the +substance of the universe in the forms of concrete qualities, in other +words, the nature of perceptible matter is revealed to the faculty of +thought through a variety of concrete forms. It is not perceived as a +general essence, but only through interdependent phenomena. Out of the +interdependence of the sense perceptions with our faculty of thought +there arise quantities, general concepts, things, true perceptions, or +understood truths. + +Essence and truth are two terms for the same thing. Truth, or the +essence and nature of things, is a theoretical concept. As we have seen, +we receive impressions of things in two ways, viz., a sense impression +and a mental impression, the one practical, the other theoretical. +Practice furnishes us with the sense impression, theory with the mental +nature of things. + +Practice is the premise of theory, sense perception the premise of the +nature which is also called the truth. The same truth manifests itself +in practice either simultaneously or consecutively in the same place or +in different places. It exists theoretically as a homogeneous +conception. + +Practice, phenomena, sense perceptions, are absolute qualities, that is +to say they have no quantitative limitation, they are not restricted by +time or space. They are absolute and infinite qualities. The qualities +of a thing are as infinite as its parts. On the other hand, the work of +the faculty of thought, of theory, creates at will an infinite number of +quantities, and it conceives every quality of sense _perceptions_ in the +form of quantities, as the essential nature of things, as truths. Every +conception has a quality of some sense perception for its object. Every +object can be conceived by the faculty of thought only as a quantitative +unit, as true nature, as truth. + +The faculty of thought produces in contact with sense perceptions that +which manifests itself as true nature, as a general truth. A primitive +concept accomplishes this at first only instinctively, while a +scientific concept is a conscious and voluntary repetition of this +primitive act. Scientific understanding wanting to know an object, such +as for instance heat, is not hunting after the phenomena themselves. It +does not aim to see or hear how heat melts iron or wax, how it benefits +in one case or injures in another, how it makes eggs solid or ice +liquid, nor does it concern itself with the difference between the heat +of an animal, of the sun, or of a stove. All these things are from the +point of view of the faculty of understanding, only effects, phenomena, +qualities. It desires to get at the essence, the true nature of things, +it strives to find a general law, a concise scientific extract, of +things seen, heard, and felt. The abstract nature of things cannot be a +tangible object. It is a concept of theory, of science, of the faculty +of thought. The understanding of heat consists in singling out that +which is common to all phenomena of heat, which is essential or true for +all heat. _Practically the nature of heat consists of the sum total of +all its manifestations, theoretically in its concept, scientifically in +the analysis of this concept. To analyze the concept of heat means to +ascertain that which is common to all manifestations of heat._ + +The general nature of the thing is its true nature, the general quality +its true quality. We define rain more truly as being wet than as being +fertilizing, because it gives moisture wherever it falls, while it +fertilizes only under certain circumstances and in certain places. My +true friend is one who is constant and loyal to me all my life under all +circumstances. Of course, we must not believe in any absolute and +unconditional friendship any more than in any absolute and eternal +truth. Perfectly true, perfectly universal, is only the general +existence, the universe, the absolute quantity. But the real world is +absolutely relative, absolutely perishable, an infinity of +manifestations, an infinity of qualities. All truths are simply parts of +this world, partial truths. Semblance and truth flow dialectically into +one another like hard and soft, good and bad, right and wrong, but at +the same time they remain different. Even though I know that there is no +rain which is "fertile in itself," and no friend who is true in an +absolute sense, I may nevertheless refer to a certain rain as fertile in +relation to certain crops, and I may distinguish between my more or less +true friends. + +The universe is the truth. The universe is that which is universal, that +is, things which exist and are perceived. The general mark of truth is +existence, because universal existence is truth. Now, existence is not a +general abstraction, but a reality in the concrete form of sense +perceptions. The world of sense perceptions has its true and perceptible +existence in the passing and manifold manifestations of nature and life. +Therefore all manifestations are recognized as relative truths, all +truths as concrete and temporal manifestations. The manifestation of +practice is considered as a truth in theory, and vice versa, the truth +of theory is manifested in practice. Opposites are mutually relative. +Truth and error differ only comparatively, in volume of degree, like +being and seeming, life and death, light and dark, like all other +opposites in the world. It is a matter of course that all things of this +world are worldly, consequently are of the same matter, the same nature, +the same family, the same quality. In other words, every volume of +perceptible manifestation forms in contact with the human faculty of +thought a being, a truth, a general thing. For our consciousness, every +particle of dust as well as every dust cloud, or any other mass of +material manifestations, is on the one hand an abstract "thing in +itself," and on the other a passing phenomenon of the absolute object, +the universe. Inside of this universe the various manifestations are +systematized or generalized at will and on purpose by means of our mind. +The chemical element is as much a manysided system as the organic cell +or the whole vegetable kingdom. The smallest and the largest being is +divided into individuals, species, families, classes, etc. This +systematization, this generalization, this generation of beings is +continued in an ascending scale up to the infinity of the universe, and +in the descending scale down to the infinity of the parts. In the eyes +of the faculty of thought all qualities become abstract things, all +things relative qualities. + +Every thing, every sense perception, no matter how subjective or +shortlived it may be, is true, is a certain part of truth. In other +words, the truth exists, not only in the general existence, but every +concrete existence has also its own distinct generality or truth. Every +object, whether it be a mere passing idea, or a volatile scent, or some +tangible matter, constitutes a sum of manifold phenomena. The faculty of +thought turns various quantities into one, discerns the equality in +different things, seeks the unity in the multiplicity. Mind and matter +have at least actual existence in common. Organic nature agrees with +inorganic nature in being material. It is true that there are wide +divergences between man, monkey, elephant, and plants attached to the +soil, but even greater differences are reconciled under the term +"organism." However much a stone may differ from a human heart, thinking +reason will discover innumerable similarities in them. They at least +agree in being matter, they are both visible, tangible, and may be +weighed, etc. Their differences are as manifold as their likenesses. +Solomon truly says that there is nothing new under the sun, and Schiller +also says truly that the world grows old and again grows young. What +abstract thing, being, existence, generality is there that is not +manifold in its sense manifestations, and individually different from +all other things? There are no two drops of water alike. I am now in +many respects different from what I was an hour ago, and the likeness +between my brother and myself is only relatively greater than the +likeness between a watch and an oyster. In short, the faculty of thought +is a faculty of absolute generalization, it classes all things without +exception under one head, it comprises and understands everything +uniformly, while sense perceptions show absolutely everything in a +different, new and individual light. + +If we apply this metaphysics[1] to our study, the faculty of thought, +we see that its functions, like all other things, are material +manifestations, which are all equally true. All manifestations of the +mind, all ideas, opinions, errors, partake of a certain truth, all of +them have a kernel of truth. Just as inevitably as a painter derives all +forms of his creation from perceptible objects around him, so are all +ideas, images of true things, theories of true objects. So far as +perceptions are perceptions, it is a matter of course that all +perceptions perceive something. So far as knowledge is knowledge, it +requires no explanation that all knowledge knows something. This follows +from the rule of identity, according to which a equals a, or from the +rule of contradiction, according to which 100 is not 1,000. + +All perceptions are thoughts. One might claim, on the other hand, that +all thoughts are not perceptions. One might define "perceiving" as a +special kind of thought, as real objective thought in distinction from +supposing, believing, or imagining. But it cannot be denied that all +thoughts have a common nature, in spite of their many differences. +Thought is treated in the court of the faculty of thought like all other +things, it is made uniform. No matter how different the thoughts I had +yesterday may be from those I have to-day, no matter how much the +thoughts of different human beings may vary at different times, no +matter how clearly we may distinguish between such thoughts as those +expressed by the terms idea, conception, judgment, conclusion, +impression, etc., they each and all possess the same common and +universal nature, because all of them are manifestations of mind. + +It follows, then, that the difference between true and erroneous +thoughts, between understanding and misunderstanding, like all other +differences, is only relative. A thought "in itself" is neither false +nor true, it is either of these only in relation to some other object. +Thoughts, conceptions, theories, natures, truths, all have this in +common that they belong to some object. We have seen that any object is +a part of the multiplicity of sense perceptions in the world outside of +our brains. After as much of the universal being as constitutes the +object which is to be understood has been defined by some customary term +of language, truth is to be found in the discovery of the general nature +of this perceptible part of being. + +The perceptible parts of being which constitute the things of this world +have not only a semblance and manifestation, but also a true nature +which is given by means of their manifestation. The nature of things is +as infinite in number as the world of sense perceptions is infinitely +divisible in space and time. Every part of any phenomenon has its own +nature, every special phenomenon has its general truth. A phenomenon is +perceived in touch with the senses, while the true or essential nature +of things is perceived in contact with our faculty of thought. In this +way we find ourselves face to face with the necessity of speaking here, +where the nature of things is up for discussion, simultaneously of the +faculty of thought, and on the other hand of dealing with the nature of +things when the faculty of thought is our main subject. + +We said at the outset: The criterion of truth includes the criterion of +reason. Truth, like reason, consists in developing a general concept, +or an abstract theory, from a given sum of sense perceptions. Therefore +it is not abstract truth which is the criterion of true understanding, +but we rather refer to that understanding as being true which produces +the truth, or the general hall-mark of any concrete object. Truth must +be objective, that is to say it must be the truth about some concrete +object. Perceptions cannot be true to themselves, they are true only in +relation to some definite object, and to some outside facts. The work of +understanding consists in the abstraction of the general hall-mark from +concrete objects. The concrete is the measure of the general, the +standard of truth. Whatever is, is true, no matter how much or how +little true it may be. Once we have found existence, its general nature +follows as truth itself. The difference between that which is more or +less general, between being and seeming, between truth and error, is +limited to definite conditions, for it presupposes the relation to some +special object. Whether a perception is true or false will, therefore, +depend not so much on perception as on the scope of the question which +perception tries to solve of its own accord or which it is called upon +to solve by external circumstances. A perfect understanding is possible +only within definite limits. A perfect truth is one which is always +aware of its imperfection. For instance, it is perfectly true that all +bodies have weight only because the concept of "body" has previously +been limited to things which have weight. After reason has assigned the +conception of "body in general" to things of various weights, it is no +longer a matter for surprise to find that bodies must inevitably have +weight. Once it is assumed that the term "bird" was abstracted +exclusively from flying animals, we may be sure that all birds fly, +whether they are in heaven, on earth, or in any other place. And to +explain this we do not require the belief in _a priori_ conceptions +which are supposed to differ from empirical conceptions by their strict +necessity and generality. Truths are valid only under certain +conditions, and under certain conditions errors may be true. It is a +true perception that the sun is shining, provided we understand that the +sky is not covered by clouds. And it is no less true that a straight +stick becomes crooked in flowing water, provided we understand that this +truth is an optical one. _Truth is that which is common or general to +our reasoning faculty within a given circle of sense perceptions. To +call within a definite circle of sense perceptions that which is +exceptional or special the rule or the general, is error._ Error, the +opposite of truth, arises when the faculty of thought, or consciousness, +inadvertently or shortsightedly and without previous experience concedes +to certain phenomena a more general scope than is supported by the +senses, for instance when it hastily attributes to what is in fact only +an optical existence, a supposed plastic existence also. + +The judgment of error is a prejudice. Truth and error, understanding and +misunderstanding, knowing and not knowing, have their common habitation +in the faculty of thought which is the organ of science. Thought at +large is the general expression of experienced facts perceived by the +senses, and it includes errors as well. Error is distinguished from +truth in that the former assigns to any definite fact of which it is a +manifestation, a wider and more general existence than is supported by +sense perceptions and experience. Unwarranted assumption is the nature +of error. A glass bead does not become a counterfeit, until it pretends +to be a genuine pearl. + +Schleiden says of the eye: "When the excited blood expands the veins and +presses on the nerves, we feel it in the fingers as pain, we see it in +the eyes as forked lightning. And thus we obtain the irrefutable proof +that our conceptions are free creations of the mind, that we do not +perceive the external world as it really is, but that its reflex actions +on us simply give rise to a peculiar brain activity, on our part. The +products of this activity are frequently connected with certain +processes of the external world, but frequently they are not. We close +our eyes and we see a circle of light, but there is in reality no +shining body. It is easy to see that this may be a great and dangerous +source of errors of all kinds. From the teasing forms of a misty +moonlight night to the threatening and insanity-producing visions of the +believer in ghosts we meet a series of illusions which are not derived +from any direct processes of external nature, but belong to the field of +the free activity of the mind which is subject to error. It requires +great judgment and wide education, before the mind learns to break away +from all its own errors and to control them. Reading in general seems so +easy, and yet it is a difficult art. It is only by degrees that the mind +learns to understand which of the messages of the nerves may be trusted +and used as a basis for conceptions. The light, if we consider it +entirely by itself, is not clear, not yellow, nor blue nor red. The +light is a movement of a very fine and everywhere diffused substance, +the ether." + +The beautiful world of light and splendor, of color and form, is +supposed not to be a perception of something which really is. "Through +the thick covering of the grape arbor, a ray of sunlight undulates into +the cooling shadows. You think you see the ray of light itself, but what +you really see is nothing but a flock of dust particles." The truth +about light and color is said to be that they are "waves rushing through +ether in restless succession at the rate of 160,000 miles per second." +This true physical nature of light and color is supposed to be so +illusive, that "it required the sharp intellects of the greatest +thinkers to reveal to us this true nature of light. We find that every +one of our senses is susceptible only to definite external influences, +and that the stimulation of different senses produces different +conceptions in our mind. Thus the sense organs are the mediators between +the external soulless world (undulations of the ether), which is +revealed to us by science, and the beautiful world of sense perceptions +in which we find ourselves with our minds." + +Schleiden thus gives an illustration of the fact that there is still a +great deal of embarrassment, even in our times, when the understanding +of these two worlds is under discussion, that there is still much +helpless groping to explain the connection between the world of thought, +of knowledge or science, which is in this case represented by +undulations of the ether, and between the world of our five senses, +represented by the bright and colored lights of the eyes or of reality. +At the same time this illustration shows how queer the traditional +survivals of speculative philosophy sound in the mouth of a modern +scientist. The confused condition of this mode of thought is seen in the +distinction between "an external sense-perceived world of science" and +another one, "in which we find ourselves with our minds." The +distinction between the senses and the mind, between theory and +practice, between the special and the general, between truth and error, +has been noticed by such thinkers, but they have no solution for it. +They know there is something missing, but they do not know where to look +for it, and therefore they are confused. + +The great scientific achievement of the XIXth century consists in the +victory over speculation, over knowledge without sense perception, in +the delivery of the senses from the thraldom of such knowledge, and in +the foundation of empirical investigation. To acknowledge the +theoretical value of this achievement means to come to an understanding +about the source of error. Contrary to a philosophy that tries to +discover truth with the mind, and error with the senses, we seek for +truth with the senses and regard the mind as the source of errors. The +belief in certain messages of the nerves which are alone worthy of +confidence and which can be understood only by degrees without any +specific mark of distinction, is a superstition. Let us have confidence +in all testimonials of the senses. There is nothing false to be +separated from the genuine. The supernatural mind idea is the only +deceiver whenever it undertakes to disregard the sense perceptions, and, +instead of being the interpreter of the senses, tries to enlarge their +statements and repeat what has not been dictated. The eye, in seeing +forked lightning or radiant circles when the blood is excited or a +pressure exerted on it, perceives no more errors than it does in +perceiving any other manifestation of the external world. It is our +faculty of thought which makes a mistake, by regarding without further +inquiry such subjective events as objective bodies. One who sees ghosts +does not commit any mistake, until he claims that his personal +apparition is a general phenomenon, until he prematurely takes something +for an experience which he has not experienced. Error is an offense +against the law of truth which prescribes to our consciousness that it +must remember the limits within which a perception is true, or general. +Error makes out of something special a generality, out of a predicate a +subject, and takes the part for the whole. Error makes _a priori_ +conclusions, while truth, its opposite, arrives at understanding by _a +posteriori_ reasoning. + +_A priori_ and _a posteriori_ understanding are related in the same way +as philosophy and natural science, taking the latter in the widest +meaning of the term, that of science in general. The contrast between +believing and knowing is duplicated in that between philosophy and +natural science. Speculative philosophy, like religion, lives on faith. +The modern world has transformed faith into science. The reactionists in +politics who demand that science retrace its steps desire its return to +faith. The content of faith is acquired without exertion. Faith makes _a +priori_ perceptions, while science arrives at its knowledge by hard _a +posteriori_ study. To give up faith means to give up taking things easy. +And to confine science to _a posteriori_ knowledge means to decorate it +with the characteristic mark of modern times, work. + +It is not a result of scientific study, but merely a freak of +philosophy on the part of Schleiden to deny the reality and truth of +light phenomena, to call them fantasmagoria created by the free play of +the mind. His superstitious belief in philosophical speculation misleads +him into abandoning the scientific method of induction and speaking of +"waves rushing through ether in restless succession at the rate of +160,000 miles per hour" as being the real and true nature of light and +color, in contradistinction to the color phenomena of light. The +perversion of this mode of procedure becomes evident by his referring to +the material world of the eyes as a "creation of the mind" and to the +undulations of the ether, revealed by the "sharp intellect of the +greatest thinkers" as "physical nature." + +The truth of science maintains the same relation to the sense perception +that the general does to the special. Waves of light, the so-called +truth of light and color, represent the "true" nature of light only in +so far as they represent what is common to all light phenomena, whether +they are white, yellow, blue, or any other color. The world of the mind, +or of science finds its raw material, its premise, its proof, its +beginning, and its boundary in sense perception. + +When we have learned that the nature, or the truth, of things is not +back of their phenomena, but can be perceived only by the help of +phenomena, and that it does not exist "in itself," but only in +connection with the faculty of understanding, that the nature is +separated from the phenomena only by thought; and when we see on the +other hand, that the faculty of understanding does not derive +conceptions out of itself, but only out of their relations with some +phenomenon; then this discussion of the "nature of things" is an +evidence that the nature of the faculty of thought is a conception which +we have obtained from its sense manifestations. To understand that the +faculty of thought, although universal in the choice of its objects, is +nevertheless limited in that it requires some object; to recognize that +the true thought process, that is to say the thought with a scientific +result, differs from unscientific thinking by consciously attaching +itself to some external object; to realize that truth, or universality, +is not perceived "in itself," but can be perceived only by means of some +given object; this frequently varied statement reveals the nature of the +faculty of thought. This statement re-appears at the end of every +chapter, because all special truths, all special chapters, serve only to +demonstrate the general chapter of universal truth. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] E. g., this all-embracing physics.--EDITOR. + + + + +IV + +THE PRACTICE OF REASON IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE + + +Although we know that reason is attached to perceptible matter, to +physical objects, so that science can never be anything else but the +science of the physical, still we may, according to the prevailing ideas +and usage of language, separate physics from logic and ethics, and thus +distinguish them as different forms of science. The problem is then to +demonstrate that in physics as well as in logic, as also in ethics, the +general or intellectual perceptions can be practically obtained only on +the basis of concrete perceptible facts. + +This practice of reason, to generate thought from matter, to arrive at +understanding by sense perceptions, to produce the general out of the +concrete, has been universally accepted in physical investigation, but +only in practice. The inductive method is employed, and one is aware of +this fact, but it is not understood that the nature of inductive science +is the nature of science in general, of reason. The process of thought +is misunderstood. Physical science lacks the theory of understanding and +for this reason often falls out of its practical step. The faculty of +thought is still an unknown, mysterious, mystical being for natural +science. Either it confounds the function with the organ, the mind with +the brain, as do the materialists, or it thinks with the idealists that +the faculty of thought is an imperceptible object outside of its field. +We see modern investigators marching toward their goal with firm and +uniform steps, so far as physical matters are concerned. But they +aimlessly grope around in the abstract relations of these things. The +inductive method has been practically adopted by natural science and its +successes have secured a great reputation for it. On the other hand, the +speculative method has become discredited by its failures. There is, +however, no conscious understanding of these various methods of thought. +We see the men of physical research, when they are outside of their +special field, offer lawyer-like speculations in lieu of scientific +facts. While they arrive at the special truths of their chosen fields by +sense perceptions, they still pretend to derive speculative truths out +of the depths of their own minds. + +Listen to the following statements of Alexander von Humboldt, which he +makes in the initial argument of his "Cosmos" in regard to speculation: +"The most important result of physical research by sense perception is +this: that it finds the element of unity in a multitude of forms; that +it grasps all the individual manifestations offered by the discoveries +of recent times, carefully scrutinizes and distinguishes them; yet does +not succumb under their mass; that it fulfills the sublime mission of +the human being, of understanding the nature of things which is hidden +under the cover of phenomena. In this way our aim reaches beyond the +narrow limits of the senses, and we may succeed in grasping the nature +by controlling the raw material of empirical observation through ideas. +In my observations of the scientific treatment of general cosmic +phenomena, I am not deriving unity out of a few fundamental principles +found by speculative reason. My work is the expression of a thoughtful +observation of empirical phenomena seen as one and the same nature. I am +not going to venture into a field which is foreign to me. What I call +physical cosmology does not, therefore, aspire to the rank of a rational +science of nature.... True to the character of my former occupation and +writings, which were devoted to experiments, measurements, and +investigations of facts, I confine myself in this work to empirical +observations. It is the only ground on which I can move with a measure +of security." In the same breath Humboldt says that "without the earnest +desire for the knowledge of concrete facts any great and universal world +philosophy would be merely a castle in the air" and in another place +that "an understanding of the universe by speculative and introspective +reason would represent a still more sublime aim" than understanding by +empirical thought. And on page 68 of volume I. he says: "I am far from +finding fault with endeavors of others the success of which still +remains in doubt, when I have had no practical experience with them." + +Now natural science shares with Humboldt the consciousness that the +practice of reason in physical research consists exclusively in +"perceiving the element of unity in a multitude of forms." But on the +other hand, though it does not always admit its belief in speculative +introspection as frankly as Humboldt does, it nevertheless proves that +it does not fully understand the practice of science and that it +believes in a metaphysical as well as a physical science by using the +speculative method in the treatment of so-called philosophical topics, +in which the element of unity is supposed to be discovered by +introspective reason instead of an analysis of multiform sense +perceptions, and it demonstrates its lack of unity by being unaware of +the unscientific character of disagreements, by believing in a +metaphysical science outside of the physical domain. The relations +between phenomenon and its nature, cause and effect, matter and force, +substance and spirit, are certainly physical ones. But what is there of +unity that science teaches about them? Plainly then, the work of +science, like that of the farmer, has so far been done only practically, +but not scientifically, not with a predetermination of success. +Understanding, that is to say the practice of understanding, is well +applied in science, I readily admit. But the instrument of this +understanding, the faculty of thought, is misunderstood. We find that +natural science, instead of applying this faculty scientifically, simply +experiments with it. What is the reason for this? Natural science has +neglected the critique of reason, the theory of science, logic. + +Just as the handle and the blade of a knife constitute its general +content, so we found that the general content of reason was the +universal, the general "itself." We know that it does not produce this +content out of itself, but out of given objects, and these objects are +the sum of all natural or physical things. The object of reason is, +therefore, an infinite, unlimited, absolute quantity. This infinite +quantity manifests itself in finite quantities. In the treatment of +relatively small quantities of nature the true essence of reason, the +true method of understanding, is well recognized. It remains to be +demonstrated that the great relations of the world, the treatment of +which is still doubtful, are likewise intelligible by the same method. +Cause and effect, mind and matter, matter and force, are such great +world problems, and they are of a physical character. We shall +demonstrate that the most general distinction between reason and its +object furnishes the key to the solution of the great world problems. + + ++(a) Cause and Effect.+ + +"The nature of natural history," says F. W. Bessell, "lies in the fact +that it does not consider phenomena as facts in themselves, but looks +for their causes. The knowledge of nature is thus reduced to the minimum +number of facts." But the causes of the phenomena of nature had been +investigated even before the age of natural history. The characteristic +mark of natural history is not so much that it investigates causes, but +that the causes which it investigates have a peculiar nature and a +particular quality. + +Inductive science has materially changed the conception of causes. It +has retained the term, but uses it in a different sense from that +employed by speculation. The naturalist conceives of causes differently +within his special field and outside of it; here, outside of his +specialty, he frequently indulges in introspective speculation, because +he understands science and its cause in a concrete, but not in a general +way. The unscientific forces are of a supernatural make-up, they are +transcendental spirits, gods, forces, little and big goblins. The +original conception of causes is an anthropomorphic one. In a state of +inexperience, man measures the objective by a subjective standard, +judges the world by himself. Just as he creates things with conscious +intent, so he attributes to nature his human manner, imagines the +existence of an external and creative cause of the phenomena of sense +perception, similar to himself who is the special cause of his own +creations. This subjective mood is to blame for the fact that the +struggle for objective understanding has so long been in vain. The +unscientifically conceived cause is a speculation of the _a priori_ +kind. + +If the term understanding is retained for subjective understanding, then +objective science differs from it in that such a science penetrates to +the causes of its objects not by faith or introspective speculation, but +by experience and induction, not _a priori_, but _a posteriori_. Natural +science looks for causes not outside or back of nature's phenomena, but +within or by means of them. Modern research seeks no external creator of +causes, but rather the immanent system, the method or general mode of +the various phenomena as they are given by succession in time. The +unscientifically conceived cause is a "thing in itself," a little god +who generates his effects independently and hides behind them. The +scientific conception of causes, on the other hand, looks only for the +theory of effects, the general element of phenomena. To investigate a +cause means then to generalize a variety of phenomena, to arrange the +multiplicity of experienced facts under one scientific rule. "The +knowledge of nature is thus reduced to the minimum number of facts." + +The commonplace and inept knowledge differs from the most exalted, +rarest, and newly discovered science in the same way in which a petty +and childish superstition differs from the historical superstition of a +whole period. For this reason we may well choose our illustrations from +our daily circle, instead of looking for them in the so-called higher +regions of a remote science. Human common sense had long practiced the +investigation of causes by inductive and scientific methods, before +science realized that it would have to pursue its higher aims in the +same way. Common sense does arrive at the faith in a mysterious cause of +speculative reason, just like the naturalist, as soon as it leaves the +field of its immediate environment. In order to stand firmly on the +ground of real science, every one requires the understanding of the +manner in which inductive reason investigates its causes. + +To this end let us glance briefly at the outcome of the study of the +nature of reason. We know that the faculty of understanding is not a +"thing in and by itself," because it becomes real only in contact with +some object. But whatever we know of any object, is known not alone +through the object, but also through the faculty of reason. +Consciousness, like all other being, is relative. Understanding is +contact with a variety of objects. To knowledge there is attached +distinction, subject and object, variety in unity. Thus things become +mutual causes and mutual effects. The entire world of phenomena, of +which thought is but a part, a form, is an absolute circle, in which the +beginning and end is everywhere and nowhere, in which everything is at +the same time essence and semblance, cause and effect, general and +concrete. Just as all nature is in the last instance one sole general +unity, in view of which all other unities become a multitude, so this +same nature, or objectivity, or world of sense perceptions, or whatever +else we may call the sum of all phenomena or effects, is the final cause +of all things, compared to which all other causes become effects. But we +must remember that this cause of all causes is only the sum of all +effects, not a transcendental or superior being. Every cause has its +effect, every effect causes something. + +A cause cannot be physically separated from its effect any more than the +visible can be separated from the eye, the taste from the tongue, in +brief the general from the concrete. Nevertheless, the faculty of +thought may separate the one from the other. We must keep in mind that +this separation is a mere formality of thought, although it is a +formality which is necessary in order to be reasonable or conscious, in +order to act scientifically. The practice of understanding, or +scientific practice, derives the concrete from the general, the natural +things from nature. But whoever has been behind the scenes, and has +looked at the faculty of thought at work, knows that, conversely the +general is derived from the concrete, the concept of nature from natural +things. The theory of understanding or science teaches us that the +antecedent is understood by its consequent, the cause by its effect, +while our practical understanding regards the after as a consequence of +the before, the effect as a result of the cause. The faculty of +understanding, the organ of generalization, regards its opposite, the +concrete, as secondary, while the faculty of thought which understands +itself regards it as primary. However, the practice of understanding is +not to be changed by its theory, nor can it be; the theory intends +simply to render the steps of consciousness firm. The scientific farmer +differs from the practical farmer, not because he employs theory and +method, for both do that, but because he understands the theory, while +the practical man theorizes instinctively. + +To continue: From a given multitude of facts, reason generates truth in +general, and out of a succession of forms and transformations it +abstracts the true cause, just as absolute multiplicity is the nature of +space, so absolute variability is the nature of time. Every particle of +time and space is new, original, and has never been there before. The +faculty of thought enables us to find our way through this absolute +medley by abstracting general concepts out of the multitude of things in +space, and tracing the variations of time to general causes. The entire +nature of reason consists in generalizing sense perceptions, in +abstracting the common elements out of concrete things. Whoever does not +fully understand reason by understanding that it is the organ of +generalization forgets that understanding requires an object which must +remain something outside of its conception, since such object cannot be +dissolved by its conception. The being of the reasoning faculty cannot +be understood any more than being in general. Or rather, being is +understood when we take it in its generality. Not being itself, but the +general element of being, is understood by the faculty of thought. + +Let us realize, for instance, the process which takes place when reason +understands something it did not know before. Think of some peculiar, +unexpected and unknown chemical transformation which takes place +suddenly and without apparent cause in some mixture. Assume furthermore +that the same reaction takes place more frequently after that, until +experience demonstrates that this inexplicable change occurs whenever +sunlight touches the mixture. This already constitutes a certain +understanding of the process. Assume furthermore that subsequent +experience teaches us that several other substances have the faculty of +producing the same reaction in connection with sunlight. We have then +arranged the new reaction in line with a number of phenomena of the same +class, that is to say we have enlarged, deepened, completed our +understanding of it still more. And if we finally discover that a +special part of the sunlight unites with a special element of the +mixture and thereby produces this new reaction, we have generalized this +experience, or experienced this generalization, in a "pure" state, in +other words, the theory of this reaction is complete, reason has solved +its problem, and yet it has done nothing more than it did when it +classified the animal and vegetable kingdoms in families, genera, +species, etc. To find the species, the genus, the sex, etc., of anything +means to understand it. + +Reason proceeds in the same way when it investigates the causes of +certain transformations. Causes are, in the last instance, not noticed +and furnished by means of sight, hearing, feeling, not by means of the +sense perceptions. They are rather supplied by the faculty of thought. +It is true, causes are not the "pure" products of the faculty of +thought, but are produced by it in connection with sense perceptions and +their material objects. This raw material gives the objective existence +to the causes produced by the mind. Just as we demand that a truth +should be the truth about some objective phenomenon, so we also demand +that a cause should be real, that it should be the cause of some +objective effect. + +The understanding of any concrete cause is conditioned on the empirical +study of its material, while the understanding of any general cause is +based on the study of the faculty of reason. In the understanding of +concrete causes, the material of study varies, but reason maintains a +constant or general attitude. The cause, as a general cause, is a pure +conception, and it is based on the study of the multiformity of concrete +understandings of causes, or on the multiplied study of concrete causes. +Hence we are compelled to return to the concrete material of the general +concept, to the understanding of concrete causes, if we wish to analyze +the concept of a general cause. + +When a stone falls into the water and causes ripples on the surface, the +stone is no more the cause of the ripples than the liquid condition of +the water. If the stone falls on solid substances, it causes no ripples. +It is the contact of the falling stone with liquid substances which +causes the ripples. The cause is itself an effect, and the effect, the +ripples, become a cause when they carry a piece of cork ashore. But in +either case the cause is based on a mutual effect, on the interaction of +the waves with the light condition of the cork. + +A stone falling into the water is not a cause "in itself," not a cause +in general. We arrive at such a cause only, when the faculty of thought +uses concrete causes for its raw material and constructs out of them +the "pure" concept of the cause in general. A stone falling into the +water is only the cause of the subsequent ripples, and it becomes a +general cause only through the experience that ripples always follow the +falling of a stone into water. + +We call cause that which generally precedes a certain manifestation, and +effect that which generally follows it. We refer to the stone as the +cause of ripples merely because we know that it always causes them when +falling into water. But since ripples sometimes appear without being +preceded by the fall of a stone, ripples have another general cause. So +far as there is anything general in ripples which precedes them, it is +the elasticity of the water itself which is the general cause of +ripples. Circular ripples, which are a special form of ripples, are +generally preceded by the falling of some body into the water, and this +body is then considered as their cause. The cause is always different in +proportion and to the extent of the phenomena under consideration. + +We cannot ascertain causes by mere introspective reasoning, we cannot +derive them out of our head. Matter, materials, sense perceptions are +required for this purpose. A definite cause requires a definite +material, a definite amount of sense perceptions. In the abstract unity +of nature, the variations of matter are represented by the variations of +concrete quantities. Every quantity is given in time before and after a +certain other quantity, as antecedent and subsequent. The general +element of the antecedent is called cause, the general element of the +subsequent, effect. + +When the wind sways a forest, the yielding character of the forest is as +much instrumental in producing this effect as the bending power of the +wind. The cause of a thing is its connection with other things. The fact +that the same wind leaves rocks and walls standing shows that the cause +is not qualitatively different from the effect, but that it is a matter +of aggregate effects. If nevertheless science or knowledge determines +any special fact to be the cause of any change, that is to say of any +succession of phenomena, this cause is no longer regarded as the +external creator, but merely as the general mode, the immanent method of +succession. A definite cause can be ascertained only when we have under +consideration a definite circle, series, or number of changes, the cause +of which is to be determined. And within a definite circle of succeeding +phenomena, that which generally precedes is their cause. + +The wind which sways a forest differs from wind as a general cause only +in that the latter has other general effects, inasmuch as it howls in +one place, stirs up dust in another, or acts in many different ways. In +the special case of the forest, the wind is a cause only in so far as it +precedes the swaying of the trees. But in the case of rocks and walls, +the solidity precedes the wind and is therefore the general cause of +their resistance to the swaying power of the wind. In a still wider +circle of hurricane phenomena, a gentle wind may be regarded as a cause +of the stability of the objects last mentioned. + +The _quantity_ or _number_ of given objects varies the name of their +cause. If a certain company of people return from a walk in a tired +condition, this change of condition is just as much due to the physical +weakness of the people as to the walk. In other words, a manifestation +has in itself no cause which can be separated from it. Everything which +was connected with a phenomenon has contributed toward its appearance. +In the case of the promenaders, the physical constitution of their +bodies has to be considered as well as the physical constitution and +length of the road and duration of the walk. If reason is nevertheless +called upon to determine the special cause of some concrete change, for +instance, of a tired feeling, it is simply a question of determining +which one of the various factors has contributed most to that feeling. +In this case as well as in all others, the work of reason consists in +developing the general from the concrete, that is to say in this case, +singling out from a given number of tired sensations that which +generally precedes the tired feeling. If most of the promenaders or all +of them are found to be tired, the walk will be considered as the cause. +But if only a few are tired, the weak constitution of these people will +be considered as the general cause of their tired condition. + +To use another illustration: If the discharge of a shot frightens some +birds, this effect is due to the combined action of the shot and the +timidity of the birds. If the majority of the birds fly away, the shot +will be considered as the cause. But if the minority fly away, their +timidity will be regarded as the cause. + +Effects are subsequences. Since all things in nature follow other things +and all things have an antecedent and a subsequent, we may call the +natural, the real, the sense perceptions absolute effects, having no +cause unless we find one with our faculty of thought by systematizing +the given material. Causes are mental generalizations of perceptible +changes. The supposed relation of cause and effect is a miracle, a +creation of something out of nothing. For this reason this relation has +been and still is an object of speculative reasoning. The speculative +cause creates its effects. But in reality the effects are the material +out of which the brain, or science, forms its causes. The cause concept +is a product of reason; not of "pure" reason, but of reason married to +the world of sense perceptions. + +If Kant maintains that the statement: "Every change has its cause" is an +_a priori truth_ which we cannot experience because no one can possibly +experience all changes, although every one has the irrefutable feeling +of the correctness of this statement, we know now that this statement +expresses merely the experience that the phenomenon which we call reason +recognizes the uniform element in all multiformity. Or in other words, +we now know that the development of the general element out of the +concrete facts is called reason, thought, or mind. The secure knowledge +that every change has its cause is nothing else but the conviction that +we are thinking human beings. _Cogito, ergo sum._ I think, therefore I +am. We have experienced the nature of our reason instinctively even if +we have not analyzed it scientifically. We are as well aware of the +faculty of our reason to abstract a cause out of every given change, as +we are that every circle is round, that a is equal to a. We know that +the general is the product of reason, and reason produces this general +thing in contact with every given object. And since all objects before +and after a certain other object are temporal changes, it follows that +all changes which we as thinking beings experience must have a general +antecedent, a cause. + +Already the English sceptic Hume felt that true causes are different +from assumed causes. According to him the concept of a cause contains +nothing but the experience of that which generally precedes a certain +phenomenon. Kant rightfully remarks on the other hand that the +conception of cause and effect expresses a far more intimate relation +than that indicated by a loose and accidental succession, and that the +concept of a cause rather comprises that of a certain effect as a +necessity and strict general result. Therefore he claimed that there +must be something _a priori_ in reason which cannot be experienced and +which extends beyond experience. + +We reply to the materialists who deny all autonomy of the mind and hope +to detect causes by experience alone that the general necessity which +presupposes the relation of cause and effect represents an impossible +experience. And we reply to the idealists: Although reason explores +causes which cannot be experienced, this research cannot take place _a +priori_, but only _a posteriori_, only on the basis of empirically given +effects. It is true that the mind alone discovers the imperceptible and +abstract generality, but it does so only within the circle of certain +given sense perceptions. + + ++(b) Matter and Mind.+ + +The understanding of the general dependence of the faculty of thought on +material sense perceptions will restore to objective reality that right +which has long been denied to it by ideas and opinions. Nature with its +varied concrete phenomena which had been crowded out of human +considerations by philosophical and religious imaginings, and which has +been scientifically re-established again on special fields by the +development of natural sciences, gains general theoretical recognition +by the understanding of the functions of the brain. Hitherto natural +science has chosen for its object only special matters, special causes, +special forces, but has remained ignorant in general questions of +so-called natural philosophy regarding the cause of all things, of +matter, of force in general. The actual existence of this ignorance is +revealed by that great contradiction between idealism and materialism +which pervades all works of science like a red thread. + +"May I succeed in this letter in strengthening the conviction that +chemistry as an independent science represents one of the most powerful +means for the higher cultivation of the mind, that its study is useful +not alone for the promotion of the material interests of mankind, but +because it permits a deeper penetration of the wonders of creation, with +which our existence, our welfare, and our development are intimately +connected." + +In these words Liebig expresses the prevalent views which have +accustomed themselves to look upon material and spiritual differences as +absolute opposites. But the untenability of such a distinction is +vaguely felt even by the just quoted advocate of this view, who speaks +of material interests and of a mental penetration which is the condition +for our existence, welfare, and development. But what else does the term +material interests mean but the abstract expression of our existence, +welfare, and development? Are not these the concrete content of our +material interests? Does he not say explicitly that the penetration of +the wonders of creation promotes our material interests? And on the +other hand, does not the promotion of our material interests require a +penetration on our part of the wonders of creation? In what respect are +our material interests different from our mental penetration of things? + +The superior, spiritual, ideal, which Liebig in conformity with the +views of the world of naturalists opposes to our material interests, is +only a special part of those interests. Mental penetration and material +interests differ no more than the circle differs from the square. +Circles and squares are contrasts, but at the same time they are but +different and special classes of form in general. + +It has been the custom, especially since the advent of Christian times, +to speak contemptuously of material, perceptible, fleshly things which +are destroyed by rust and moths. And nowadays people continue on this +conservative track, although their antipathy against perceptible reality +has long disappeared from their minds and actions. The Christian +separation of mind and body has been practically abandoned in the age of +natural science. But the theoretical solution of the contradiction, the +demonstration that the spiritual is material and the material at the +same time spiritual, by which the material interests would be freed from +the stigma of inferiority, has not yet been forthcoming. + +Modern science is natural science. Science is deemed worthy of its name +only in so far as it is natural science. In other words, only that +thought is scientific which consciously has real, perceptible, natural +things for its object. For this reason representatives and friends of +science can not be enemies of nature or of matter. Indeed they are not. +But the very existence of science shows that this nature, this world of +sense perceptions, this matter or substance, does alone and by itself +not satisfy us. Science, or thought, which has material practice or +being for its object, does not strive to reproduce nature in its +integrity, in its entire perceptible substance, for these are already +present. If science were to aim at nothing new, it would be superfluous. +It is entitled to special recognition only to the extent that it carries +a new element into matter. Science is not so much concerned in the +material of its study as in understanding. Of course it is the +understanding of this material which is desired, the understanding of +its general character, of the fixed pole in the succession of phenomena. +That which religion supernaturally separates from the material, which +science opposes to the material as something higher, diviner, more +spiritual, is in reality nothing but the faculty of rising above +multiformity, of proceeding from the concrete to the general. + +The nobler spiritual interests are not absolutely different from the +material interests, they are not qualitatively different. The positive +side of modern idealism does not consist in belittling eating and +drinking, the pleasure in earthly possessions and in intercourse with +the other sex, but rather in pleading for the recognition of other +material enjoyments besides these, as for instance those of the eye, the +ear, of art and science, in short of the whole man. You shall not +indulge in the material revelries of passion, that is to say you shall +not direct your thought one-sidedly to any concrete lust, but rather +consider your entire development, take into account the total general +extension of your existence. The bare materialist principle is +inadequate in that it does not appreciate the difference between the +concrete and the general, because it makes the individual synonymous +with the general. It refuses to recognize the quantitative superiority +of the mind over the world of sense perceptions. Idealism, on the other +hand, forgets the qualitative unity in the quantitative difference. It +is transcendental and makes an absolute difference out of the relative +one. The contradiction between these two camps is due to the +misunderstood relation of our reason to its given object or material. +The idealist regards reason alone as the source of all understanding, +while the materialist looks upon the world of sense perceptions in the +same way. Nothing is required for a solution of this contradiction but +the comprehension of the relative interdependence of these two sources +of understanding. Idealism sees only the difference, materialism sees +only the uniformity of matter and mind, content and form, force and +substance, sense perception and moral interpretation. But all these +distinctions belong to the one common genus which constitutes the +distinction between the special and the general. + +Consistent materialists act like purely practical men without any +science. But, since knowing and thinking are real attributes of man +regardless of his party affiliation, purely practical men do not exist +in reality. Even the merest attempt at practical experiment on the basis +of experienced facts differs only in degree from scientific practice +based on theoretical principles. On the other hand, consistent +idealists are just as impossible as purely practical men. They would +like to have the general without the special, the spirit without matter, +force without substance, science without experience or material, the +absolute without the relative. How can thinkers who search for truth, +being, relative causes, such as naturalists, be idealists? They are so +only outside of their specialties, never inside of them. The modern +mind, the mind of natural science, is immaterial only so far as it +embraces all matters. But men like the astronomer Madler find so little +of the ridiculous in the current expectation of the materially increased +spiritual power after our "emancipation from the bonds of matter," that +he has nothing better to substitute for it and flatters himself with +having defined the "bonds of matter" as material attraction. Truly, so +long as mind is still conceived in the form of a religious ghost, the +expectation of an increased mental power after the emancipation from the +bonds of matter is not so much an object for ridicule as for compassion. +But if we regard mind as the expression of modern science, we offer the +better scientific explanation for the traditional faith. By bonds of +matter we do not mean, in that case, the bond of gravitation, but the +multiplicity of sense perceptions. And matter holds the mind in bondage +only so long as the faculty of thought has not overcome the multiplicity +of things. The emancipation of the mind from the bonds of matter +consists in developing the general element out of the concrete +multiplicity. + + ++(c) Force and Matter.+ + +The reader who has closely followed our main idea, which will be +further illustrated, will anticipate that the question of matter and +force finds its solution in the understanding of the relation between +the general and the special. What is the relation of the concrete to the +abstract? This is the common problem of those who see the active impulse +of the world either in the spiritual force or in the material substance, +who think to find the nature of things, the _non plus ultra_ of science, +in either of these facts. + +Liebig, who is especially fond of straying from his inductive science +into the field of speculative thought, says in an idealist sense: "Force +cannot be seen, we cannot grasp it with our hands; in order to +understand its nature and peculiarities, we must investigate its +effects." And if a materialist replies to him: "Matter is force, force +is matter, no matter without force, no force without matter," it is +plain that either has determined this relation only negatively. In +certain shows, the clown is asked by the manager: "Clown, where have you +been?" "With the others," answers the clown. "And where were the +others?"--"With me." + +In this case we have two answers with the same content, in the other we +have two camps which quarrel with different words about an indisputable +fact. And this dispute is so much more ridiculous because it is taken so +seriously. If the idealist makes a distinction between matter and force, +he does not mean to deny that the real phenomenon of force is +inseparably linked with matter. And if the materialist claims that there +is no matter without force and no force without matter, he does not mean +to deny that matter and force are different, as his opponent claims. + +The dispute exists for a good reason and has its object, but this +object is not revealed in the dispute. It is instinctively kept under +cover by both parties, so that they may not be in a position where they +would have to acknowledge their own ignorance. Each wants to prove to +the other that the other's explanations are inadequate, and both +demonstrate this sufficiently. Büchner admits in the closing statements +of his "Matter and Force" that the empirical material is insufficient to +permit of definite answers to transcendental questions, and that +therefore no positive answer can be given to them. And he furthermore +says that the empirical material "is fully sufficient to answer them +negatively and to do away with hypothesis." This is saying in so many +words that the science of the materialist is adequate for the proof that +his opponent knows nothing. + +The spiritualist or idealist believes in a spiritual, which means in a +ghostlike and inexplicable, nature of force. The materialist thinkers, +on the other hand, are skeptical. A scientific proof of faith or of +skepticism does not exist. The materialist has only this advantage over +his idealist opponent, that he looks for the transcendental, the nature, +the cause, the force, not back of the phenomenon, not outside of matter. +But he remains behind the idealist when he ignores the difference +between matter and force. The materialist dwells on the actual +inseparability of matter and force and does not admit any other reason +for a distinction between the two than "an external reason derived from +the demand of our mind for systematization." Büchner says in "Nature and +Mind," page 66: "Force and matter, separated from one another, are for +me nothing but thoughts, fantasies, ideas without any substance, +hypotheses which do not exist for any healthy study of nature, because +all phenomena of nature are rendered obscure and unintelligible by such +a separation." But if Büchner deals with any special department of +natural science in a productive way, instead of handling phrases of +natural philosophy, his own practice will show him that the separation +of forces from matter is not an "external," but an internal, an imminent +necessity, by which alone we are enabled to elucidate and understand the +phenomena of nature. Although the author of "Force and Matter" chose for +his motto: "Now, what I want is--facts," we assure the reader that this +device is more a thoughtless word than a serious opinion. Materialism is +not so coarse-grained that it wants purely facts. Those facts which +Büchner is looking for are by themselves not specifics for his desires. +The idealist likewise wants such facts. No student of nature wants mere +hypotheses. What all cultivators of the field of science want is not so +much facts as explanations or an understanding of facts. Even the +materialist will not deny that science, the "natural philosophy" of +Büchner not excepted, is more concerned with mental forces than with +bodily matter, that it cares more for force than for matter. The +separation of force and matter is derived from "the demand of our mind +for systematization." Very true! But so does all science emanate from +the demand of our reason for systematization. + +The contradistinction between force and matter is as old as that between +idealism and materialism. The first conciliation between the two was +attempted by imagination which, through the belief in spirits, +suggested a secret nature as the cause of all natural phenomena. Science +has of late expelled many of these special spirits by replacing the +fantastic demons with scientific, or general, explanations. And after we +have succeeded in explaining the demon of "pure" reason, it is not +difficult to expel the special spirit of force by the general +explanation of its nature and thus to reconcile scientifically the +contradiction between spiritualism and materialism. + +In the universe which constitutes the object of science and of the +faculty of reason, both force and matter are unseparated. In the world +of sense perceptions force is matter and matter is force. "Force cannot +be seen." Oh, yes! Seeing itself is pure force. Seeing is as much an +effect of its object as an effect of the eye, and this double effect and +other effects are forces. We do not see the things themselves, but their +effects on our eyes. We see their forces. And force cannot alone be +seen, it can also be heard, smelled, tasted, felt. Who will deny that he +can feel the force of heat, of cold, of gravitation? We have already +quoted the words of Professor Koppe to the effect that we "cannot +perceive heat itself, we merely conclude from its effects that this +force exists in nature." This is saying in other words that we do not +see, hear, or feel the things themselves, but their effects or forces. + +It is just as true to say that we feel matter and not its force as it is +to say that we feel force and not matter. Indeed, both are inseparable +from the object, as we have already remarked. But by means of the +faculty of thought we separate from the simultaneously and successively +occurring phenomena the general and the concrete. For instance, we +abstract the general concept of sight from the various phenomena of our +sight and distinguish it by the name of power of vision from the +concrete objects, or substances, of our eyes. From a multitude of sense +perceptions we develop by means of reason the general element. The +general element of different water phenomena, for instance, is the water +power distinguished from the substance of the water. If levers of +different materials but of the same length have the same power, it is +plain that in this case force is different from matter only in so far as +it represents the general element of various substances. A horse does +not pull without force, and this force does not pull without the horse. +Indeed, in practice the horse is force and force is the horse. But +nevertheless we may distinguish the power of pulling from other +qualities of the horse, or we may refer to the common element in +different services of horses as general horse power, without thereby +starting from any other hypothesis than we do in distinguishing the sun +from the earth. For in reality the sun does not exist without the earth, +nor the earth without the sun. + +The world of sense perceptions is made known to us only by our +consciousness, but consciousness is conditioned on the world of sense +perceptions. Nature is infinitely united or infinitely separated, +according to whether we regard it from the standpoint of consciousness +as an unconditional unit or from the standpoint of sense perceptions as +an unconditional multiplicity. There is truth in both unity and +multiplicity, but it is truth only relatively speaking, under certain +conditions. It matters a great deal whether we look about with the eyes +of the body or with the eyes of the mind. For the eyes of the mind, +matter is force. For the eyes of the body, force is matter. The abstract +matter is force, the concrete force is matter. Matter is represented by +the objects of the hand, of practice, while force is an object of +understanding, of science. + +Science is not limited to the so-called scientific world. It reaches +beyond all classes, it belongs to the full depth and width of life. +Science belongs to thinking humanity in its entirety. And so it is with +the separation of matter and force. Only a stultified fanaticism can +ignore the practical distinction. The miser who accumulates money +without adding any wealth to his life process forgets that the valuable +element of money resides in its force, which is different from, its +substance. He forgets that not mere wealth as such, not the paltry gold +substance, lends a reasonableness to the quest for its possession, but +its spiritual content, its inherent exchange value, which buys the +necessities of life. Every scientific practice, which means every action +carried on with a predetermined success and with understood substances, +proves that the separation of matter and force, though only performed in +thought and existing in thought, is nevertheless not an empty phrase, +not a mere hypothesis, but a very fertile idea. A farmer manuring his +field is handling "pure" manuring force, in so far as it is immaterial +for the abstract conception whether he is handling cow dung, bone dust, +or guano. And in weighing bundles of merchandise, it is not the iron, +copper, stone, etc., which is handled by the pound, but their gravity. + +True, there is no force without matter, no matter without force. +Forceless matter and matterless force are nonentities. If idealist +naturalists believe in an immaterial existence of forces which, so to +say, carry on their goblin-pranks in matter, forces which we cannot see, +cannot perceive by the senses and yet are asked to believe in, then we +say that such men are to that extent that naturists, but mere +speculators, in other words spiritualists. And the word of the +materialists who refer to the intellectual separation of matter and +force as a mere hypothesis, is quite as brainless. + +In order that this separation may be appreciated according to its +merits, in order that our consciousness may neither etherealize force in +a spiritualist sense nor deny it in a materialist sense, and in order to +comprehend it scientifically, we have only to understand the faculty of +thought in general or "in itself," that is to say its abstract form. The +intellect can not operate without some perceptible material. In order to +distinguish between matter and force, these things must exist and be +experienced by sense perception. By means of this experience we refer to +matter as the expression of force and to force as the expression of +matter. The perceptible object which is to be studied is therefore +matter and force in one, and since all objects are in their tangible +reality such matter and force-things, the distinction made by the mind +consists in the general method of brain work, in the derivation of the +general unity, from the special multiplicity in any one and in all given +objects. The distinction between matter and force is summarized in the +universal distinction between the concrete and the abstract. To deny the +value of this distinction is equivalent to denying the value of any and +all distinction, equivalent to ignoring the function of the intellect +altogether. + +If we refer to phenomena of sense perception as forces of matter in +general, then this generalized matter is nothing but an abstract +conception. But if we mean by the term sense perception the various +concrete substances, then the general element which embraces the +differences of things and pervades and controls them is force producing +concrete effects. And whether we say matter or force, the mental which +science is studying, not with its hands, but with its brain, the +so-called essence, nature, cause, ideal, superior or spiritual, is the +generality comprising the special things. + + + + +V + +"PRACTICAL REASON" OR MORALITY + + ++(a) The Wise and Reasonable.+ + +The understanding of the method of science, the understanding of the +mind, is destined to solve all the problems of religion and philosophy, +to explain thoroughly all the great and small riddles, and thus fully to +restore research to its mission of empirically studying details. If we +are aware that it is a law of reason to require some perceptible +material, some cause, for its operation, then the question regarding the +first or general cause becomes superfluous. Human understanding is then +seen to be first and last cause of all concrete causes. If we understand +that it is a law of reason to require for its operation some given +object, some beginning at which to start, then the question of the first +beginning must necessarily become inane. If we understand that reason +derives abstract units out of concrete multiplicities, that it +constructs truth out of phenomena, substance out of attributes, that it +perceives all things as parts of a whole, as individuals of some genus, +as qualities of some object, then the question regarding a "thing +itself," a something which in reality is back of all things, must needs +become irrelevant. In brief, the understanding of the interdependence of +reason reveals the unreasonableness of the demand for independent +reason. + +Now, although the main object of metaphysics, the cause of all causes, +the beginning of all beginnings, the nature of things, causes little +inconvenience to modern science, and even though the needs of the +present have overcome the leaning for speculation, this practical +downfall of speculation does not suffice for the solution of its +problems. So long as the theoretical law is not understood, according to +which reason requires some concrete object for its operation, there is +no hope of abandoning objectless thought, this malpractice of +speculative philosophy, which pretends to generate knowledge without +intercourse with objective reality. Our naturalists demonstrate this +very clearly as soon as they turn from their tangible specialties to +abstract things. The dispute over questions of life's wisdom, of +morality, or the quarrel over the wise, good, right, or bad, reveals +that here is the boundary of scientific agreement. The scientific +explorers of the exact sciences abandon every day their inductive method +when dealing with social problems, and stray off into the regions of +speculative philosophy. Just as in physics they believe in imperceptible +physical truths, in "things themselves," so in social matters they +believe in the reasonable, wise, right, or bad, in the sense of "things +themselves," of absolute phases of life, of unconditional conditions. It +is here where the outcome of our studies, of the critique of pure +reason, must be applied. + +In recognizing that consciousness, the nature of understanding, the +mental activity in its general form, consists in developing general +concepts out of concrete objects, we circumscribe this insight by +stating that reason develops its understanding out of contradictions. +It is the nature of the mind to perceive, in given phenomena of +different dimensions and different duration, the nature of things by +their semblance, and their semblance by their nature; to distinguish in +wants of various degrees the most essential and necessary from the less +pressing; to measure within a certain circle of magnitudes the large by +the small and the small by the large, or in other words to compare the +contrasts of the world with one another, to harmonize them by +explanation. Common parlance instinctively calls understanding judging; +judging requires a certain standard. Just as surely as we cannot +perceive any objects which are "in themselves" great or small, hard or +soft, clear or dark, just as surely as these terms denote certain +relations and require a certain standard by which their relations can be +determined, even so does reason require a certain standard for the +determination of that which is reasonable. + +The fact that we consider certain actions, institutions, conceptions, +maxims of other periods, nations, or persons unreasonable is simply due +to the application of a different standard, because we ignore the +premises, the conditions, which cause another's reason to differ from +our own. Men who differ in their mental estimates, in their +understanding of things, may be likened to the thermometers of Reaumur +and Celsius, one of which designates the boiling point by 80 and the +other by 100. A different standard is the cause of this different +result. On the so-called moral field there is no scientific agreement, +such as we enjoy in some physical matters, because we lack the uniform +standard which natural science has long since found. It is still +attempted to perceive the reasonable, good, right, etc., without +empirical data, by speculative reasoning without experience. Speculation +seeks the cause of all causes, the immeasurable cause; truth "itself," +the unconditional and standardless truth; the unlimited good, the +unboundedly reasonable, etc. The absence of a standard is the essence of +speculation, and its practice is characterized by unlimited +inconsistency and disagreement. If there are followers of certain +positive religions who agree in the matter of morals, they owe this to +the positive standard which certain dogmas, doctrines and commandments +have given them. But if any one tries to perceive things by "pure" +reason, the dependence of this reason on some standard will be +demonstrated by its "impure," that is to say individual, perceptions. + +Sense perception is the standard of truth, or of science in general. The +phenomena of the outside world are the standard of physical truths, and +man with his many wants is the standard of moral truth. The actions of +man are determined by his wants. Thirst teaches him to drink, need to +pray. Wants are regulated in the South by southern conditions, in the +North by northern conditions. Wants rule time and space, nations and +individuals. They induce the savage to hunt and the gourmand to indulge. +Human wants give to reason a standard for judging what is good, right, +bad, reasonable, etc. Whatever satisfies our need is good, the opposite +is bad. The physical feeling of man is the object of moral standards, +the object of "practical reason." The contradictory variety of human +needs is the basis for the contradictory variety of moral standards. +Because a member of a feudal guild prospered in a restricted +competition, and a modern knight of industry in free competition, +because their interests differ, therefore their views differ, and the +one justly considers an institution as unreasonable which the other +regards as reasonable. If the intellect of some person attempts to +define by mere introspection the standard of reasonableness as a general +thing, this person makes himself or herself the standard of humanity. If +reason is credited with the faculty of finding within itself the source +of moral truth, it commits the speculative mistake of attempting to +produce understanding without perceptible objects. The same mistake is +to blame for the idea that man is subordinate to the authority of +reason, for the demand that man submit to the dictates of reason. This +idea transforms man into an attribute of reason, while in reality reason +is an attribute of man. + +The question whether man depends on reason or reason on man is similar +to the one whether the citizen exists for the state or the state for the +citizen. In the last and highest instance, the citizen is the primary +fact and the state is modified according to the requirements of the +citizen. But whenever the dominant interests of the citizenship have +acquired the authority in the state, then the citizen is indeed +dependent on the state. This is saying in so many words that man is +guided in minor matters by more important ones. He sacrifices the less +important, minor, particular things to the great, essential, general +things. He subordinates his desire for more individual indulgence to his +fundamental social needs. It is not pure reason, but the reason of a +weak body or of a limited purse which teaches man to renounce the +pleasures of dissipation for the benefit of the general welfare. The +wants of the senses are the material out of which reason fashions moral +truths. To single out the essential need among different physical needs +of various degrees of intensity or extension, to separate the true from +the individual, to develop general concepts, that is the mission of +reason. The difference between the apparently and the truly reasonable +reduces itself to the difference between the special and the general. + +We recall that reason requires sense perceptions for its existence and +operation, that it needs some object which it can perceive. Existence is +the condition or premise of all understanding. Just as the understanding +of true existence is the function of natural science, so the +understanding of reasonable existence is the function of wisdom. Reason +in general has the mission of understanding things as they are. As +physical science it has to understand what is true, as wisdom, what is +reasonable. And just as true may be translated by general, so reasonable +may be translated by generally appropriate to need. We saw a while ago +that a sense perception is not true "in itself," but only relatively +true, that it is called true or general only in relation to other +perceptions of lesser importance. In the same way, no human action can +be reasonable or appropriate "in itself," it can be reasonable only in +comparison with some other action which attempts to accomplish the same +purpose in a less practicable, that is an impracticable, form. Just as +the true, the general, is conditioned on the relation to some other +object, on a definite quantity of phenomena, on definite limits, so the +reasonable or practicable is based on definite conditions which make it +reasonable or unreasonable. The end in view is the measure of the +practicable. The practicable can be determined only by some definite +object that is wanted. Once this object is known, then that action is +called reasonable which accomplishes it in the fullest, most general +way, and all other actions appear unreasonable compared to it. + +In view of the law which we evolved by our analysis of pure reason and +which showed that all understanding, all thought, is based on some +perceptible object, on some quantity of sense perceptions, it is evident +that everything distinguished by our faculty of distinction is a certain +quantity and that, therefore, all distinctions are only quantitative, +not absolute, only graduated, not irreconcilable. Even the difference +between the reasonable and the unreasonable, or in other words between +that which is momentarily or individually reasonable and that which is +generally reasonable, is merely a quantitative distinction, like all +others, so that the unreasonable may be conditionally reasonable, and +nothing is unreasonable but that which is supposed to be unconditionally +reasonable. + +If we understand that reason requires some perceptible object, some +perceptible standard, then we shall no longer try to understand the +absolutely reasonable, the purely reasonable. We shall then limit +ourselves to look for the reasonable, as for all other things, in +concrete objects. The definite, accurate, certain, uniform result of +some understanding depends on the definite formulation of the task, on +the accurate limitation of the perceptible quantity which is to be +understood. If a certain moment, a certain person, a certain class, a +certain nation are given and at the same time an essential need, a +general and predominating purpose, then the question regarding the +reasonable or suitable is easily answered. It is true that we may also +know something of things which are generally reasonable for mankind in +the aggregate, but in that case our standard must be abstract mankind +instead of some concrete part of it. Science may study the anatomical +structure of some concrete body as well as the general type of the human +body, but this again it can do only when it supplies the faculty of +understanding with general instead of individual material. If science +divides the whole human race into four or five races, by establishing a +certain standard of physiognomy, and later on discovers some individuals +or tribes whose characters are so peculiar and rare that they cannot be +classed under any of the established races, the existence of such +exceptions is not a crime against the physical order of the world, but +merely a proof of the inadequacy of our scientific classification. If, +on the other hand, some conventional mode of thought considers a certain +action as universally reasonable or unreasonable and then encounters +opposition in actual life, convention fancies itself exempt from the +work of understanding and assumes to deny civic rights in the moral +order of the world to its opponents. Instead of realizing the limited +applicability of its rules by the existence of opposing practices, +convention seeks to establish an absolute applicability of its rules by +simply ignoring the cause of the opposition. This is a dogmatic +procedure, a negative practice, which ignores facts on the pretense +that they are irrational, but it is not a positive understanding, not an +intelligent knowledge, such as manifests itself by the conciliation of +contradictions. + +If our study aims to ascertain what is universally human and reasonable, +and if these predicates are given only to actions which are reasonable +and practicable for all men, at all times, and under all conditions, +then such concepts are absolute, indeterminate, and to that extent +meaningless, indefinite generalities. We are stating such universal and +indeterminate, and therefore unimportant and unpractical concepts, when +we say that physically the whole is greater than a part, or that morally +the good is preferable to the bad. The object of reason is that which is +general, but it is the generality of some concrete object. The practice +of reason deals with individual and concrete objects, with the things +which are the opposite of the general, with special and concrete +knowledge. In order to perceive in physics whether we are dealing with a +part or with the whole object, we must handle definite and concrete +objects or phenomena. If we desire to ascertain what is morally +preferable as good or bad, we must start out with a definite quantity of +human needs. Abstract and general reason, with its socalled eternal and +absolute truths, is a phantasmagoria of ignorance which binds the rights +of the individual with crushing chains. Real and true reason is +individual, it cannot produce any other but individual perceptions, and +these perceptions cannot be generalized to any greater extent than the +general material with which they operate. Only that is universally +reasonable which is acknowledged to be so by all reasons. If the reason +of some time, class, or person is referred to as rational, and if some +other time, class or person considers it irrational; if, for instance, +the Russian noble considers serfdom a rational institution and the +English bourgeois the so-called liberty of his wage worker, both of +these institutions are not absolutely rational, but only relatively, +only in a more or less limited circle. + +It is not necessary to state that I do not mean to question the great +importance of our reason by the foregoing remarks. Even though reason +cannot independently, or absolutely, discern the objects of the +speculative introspection, such as the objects of the moral world, the +true, the beautiful, the right, the bad, the reasonable, etc., it +nevertheless is well fitted to distinguish relatively, by means of +concrete sense perceptions, between general and concrete things, between +the object and its manifestation, between fundamental needs and fanciful +appetites. Although we may dispense with the belief in absolute reason +and consequently realize that there can be no absolute peace, still we +may call war an unmitigated evil when comparing it with the peaceful +interests of our time or of our class. Not until we abandon our +fruitless exploring trip after absolute truth, shall we learn to find +that which is true in space and time. It is precisely the consciousness +of the relative applicability of our knowledge which is the strongest +lever of progress. The believers in absolute truth have adopted the +monotonous diagram of "good" men and "rational" institutions as a basis +for their views of life. For this reason they oppose all human and +historical institutions which do not fit into their pattern, but which +reality nevertheless produces without regard to their brains. Absolute +truth is the arch foundation of intolerance. On the other hand tolerance +proceeds from the consciousness of the relative applicability of +"eternal truths." The understanding of pure reason leads to the +realization that the consciousness of the universal interdependence of +reason is the true road toward practical reason. + + ++(b) Morality and Right.+ + +The nature of our task limits us to the demonstration that pure reason +is a nonentity, that reason is the sum of all acts of individual +understanding, that it deals only seemingly with pure and general, but +in reality with practical, or concrete, perceptions. We have been +discussing that philosophy which pretends to be the science of pure or +absolute understanding. We found its aim to be idle, inasmuch as the +development of speculative philosophy represents a succession of +disappointments, because its unconditional or absolute systems proved to +be limited in space and time. Our presentation of the matter has +revealed the relative character of so-called eternal truths. We +perceived that reason was dependent on sense perceptions, we found that +any truth required definite limits for its determination. As regards +more especially life's wisdom, we saw that the acquired knowledge of +"pure" reason manifested itself in practice by the dependence of the +wise or the rational upon concrete sense perceptions. If we now apply +this theory to morality as such, we must be able to establish harmony +also in this field, where there is some doubt as to what is right and +wrong, by means of the scientific method. + +Pagan morality is different from Christian morality. Feudal morality +differs from modern bourgeois morality as does bravery from solvency. In +brief, we need no detailed illustration to show that different times and +nations have different moralities. We have but to understand that this +change is necessary, a special characteristic of the human race and of +its historical development, and we shall then exchange the belief in +"eternal truths," which every ruling class claims to be identical with +its own selfish laws, for the scientific knowledge that absolute right +is purely a concept which we derive by means of the faculty of thought +from the various successive rights. Right as an absolute concept means +no more and no less than any other general concept, for instance, the +head in general. Every real head is a concrete one and belongs either to +man or to some other animal, it is either long or broad, narrow or wide, +in other words it has special peculiarities. But at the same time, every +concrete head has certain general qualities which are universal in all +heads, for instance the quality of being the superintendent of the body. +Moreover, every head has as many general as individual traits, it is no +more personal than it is common. The faculty of thought abstracts the +general traits from the actual concrete heads and in this way creates +the concept of the absolute head. Just as the absolute head, or _the_ +head, is composed of the general qualities of all heads, so the absolute +right stands merely for the general characters of all rights. Both of +these concepts exist merely as ideas, not as objects. + +Every real right is a concrete right, it is right only under certain +conditions, at definite periods, for this or that nation. "Thou shalt +not kill," is right in peace, but wrong in war; it is right for the +majority of bourgeois society that wishes to see the outbursts of +passion controlled in the interest of its own predominant needs, but +wrong for the savage who has not arrived at the period where a peaceful +and social life is appreciated, and who therefore would consider the +above commandment as an immoral restriction of his liberty. For the love +of life, murder is a detestable abomination, for revenge it is a sweet +satisfaction. In the same way robbery seems right to the robber, wrong +to the robbed. There can be no question of any absolute wrong in such +cases, only of wrong in a relative sense. An action is wrong in a +general sense only in so far as it is generally disliked. Plain robbery +is wrong in the opinion of the great majority today because our +generation takes more interest in bourgeois affairs of commerce and +industry than in the adventures of the knights of the road. + +If there were such a thing as an absolutely right law, dogma, or action, +it would have to serve the welfare of all mankind under all conditions +and at all times. But human welfare is as different as men, +circumstances, and time. What is good for me is bad for another, and the +thing which may be beneficial as a rule may be injurious as an +exception. What promotes some interests in one period may interfere with +them in another. A law which would presume to be absolutely right would +have to be right for every one and at all times. No absolute morality, +no duty, no categorical imperative, no idea of _the_ good, can teach +man what is good, bad, right, or wrong. That is good which corresponds +to our needs, that is bad which is contrary to them. But is there +anything which is absolutely good? Everything and nothing. It is not the +straight timber which is good, nor the crooked. Neither is good, or +either is good, according to whether I need it or not. And since we need +all things, we can see some good in all of them. We are not limited to +any one thing. We are unlimited, universal, and need everything. Our +interests are therefore innumerable, inexpressibly great, and therefore +every law is inadequate, because it always considers only some special +welfare, some special interest. And for this reason no right is right, +or all of them are right, and it is as right to say "Thou shalt not +kill" as it is to say "Thou shalt kill." + +The difference between good needs and bad needs, right wants and wrong +wants, like that between truth and error, reasonable and unreasonable, +finds its conciliation in the difference between the concrete and the +general. Reason cannot discover within itself any positive rights or +absolutely moral codes any more than any other speculative truth. It +cannot estimate how essential or unessential a thing is, or classify the +quantity of concrete and general characters, until it has some +perceptible material to work upon. The understanding of the right, or of +the moral, like all understanding, strives to single out the general +characteristics of its object. But the general is only possible within +certain defined limits, it exists only as the general qualities of some +concrete and determined perceptible object. And if any one tries to +represent some maxim, some law, some right in the light of an absolute +maxim, law or right, he forgets this necessary limitation. Absolute +right is merely a meaningless concept, and it does not assume even a +vague meaning until it is understood to stand for the right of mankind +in general. But morality, or the determination of that which is right, +has a practical purpose. Yet, if we accept the general and unconditional +right of mankind as a moral right, we necessarily miss our practical +aim. An act or a line of action which is universally or everywhere right +requires no law for its enforcement, for it will recommend itself. It is +only the determined and limited law, adapted to certain persons, +classes, nations, times, or circumstances, which has any practical +value, and it is so much more practical the more defined, exact, precise +and the less general it is. + +The most universal and most widely recognized right or need is in its +quality no more rightful, better, or valuable than the most +insignificant right of the moment, than the momentary need of some +individual. Although we know that the sun is hundreds of thousands of +miles in diameter, we are nevertheless free to see it no larger than a +plate. And though we may acknowledge that some moral law is +theoretically or universally good or holy, we are free in practice to +reject it momentarily, in parts, or individually, as bad and useless. +Even the most sacred right of the most universal extent is valid only +within certain definite limits, and within particular limits an +otherwise very great wrong may be a valid right. It is true that there +is an eternal difference between assumed and true interests, between +passion and reason, between essential, predominating, general, +well-founded needs and inclinations, and accidental, subordinate, +special appetites. But this difference is not one of two separated +worlds, a world of the good and a world of the bad. It is not a +positive, general, continuous, absolute difference, but merely a +relative one. Like the difference between beautiful and homely, it +depends on the individuality of the person who distinguishes. That which +is a true and fundamental need in one case, is a secondary, subordinate, +and wrong desire in another. + +_Morality is the aggregate of the most contradictory ethical laws which +serve the common purpose of regulating the conduct of man toward himself +and others in such a way that the future is considered as well as the +present, the one as well as the other, the individual as well as the +genus. The individual man finds himself lacking, inadequate, limited in +many ways. He requires for his complement other people, society, and +must therefore live and let live. The mutual concessions which arise out +of these relative needs are called morality._ + +The inadequacy of the single individual, the need of association, is the +basis and cause of man's consideration for his neighbor, of morality. +Now since the one who feels this need, man, is necessarily an +individual, it follows that his need must likewise be individual and +more or less intensive. And since my neighbors are necessarily different +from me, it requires different considerations to meet their needs. +Concrete man needs a concrete morality. Just as abstract and meaningless +as the concept of mankind in general is that of absolute morality, and +the ethical laws derived from this vague idea are quite as unpractical +and unsuccessful. Man is a living personality, whose welfare and +purpose is embodied within himself, who has between himself and the +world nothing but his needs as a mediator, who owes no allegiance to any +law whatever from the moment that it contravenes his needs. The moral +duty of an individual never exceeds his interests. The only thing which +exceeds those interests is the _material power_ of the generality over +the individuality. + +If we regard it as the function of reason to ascertain that which is +morally right, a uniform scientific result may be produced if we agree +at the outset on the persons, conditions, or limits within which the +universal moral right is to be determined; in other words, we may +accomplish something practical if we drop the idea of absolute right and +search for definite rights applicable to well-defined purposes by +clearly stating our problem. The contradiction in the various standards +of morality, and the many opposing solutions of this contradiction, are +due to a misunderstanding of the problem. To look for right without a +given quantity of sense perceptions, without some definite working +material, is an act of speculative reason which pretends to explore +nature without the use of senses. The attempt to arrive at a positive +determination of morality by pure perception and pure reason is a +manifestation of the philosophical faith in understanding _a priori_. + +"It is true," said Macaulay in his History of England, in speaking of +the rebellion against the lawless and cruel government of James II., +"that to trace the exact boundary between rightful and wrongful +resistance is impossible: but this impossibility arises from the nature +of right and wrong, and is found in every part of ethical science. A +good action is not distinguished from a bad action by marks so plain as +those which distinguish a hexagon from a square. There is a frontier +where virtue and vice fade into each other. Who has ever been able to +define the exact boundary between courage and rashness, between prudence +and cowardice, between frugality and avarice, between liberality and +prodigality? Who has ever been able to say how far mercy to offenders +ought to be carried, and where it ceases to deserve the name of mercy +and becomes a pernicious weakness?" + +It is not the impossibility of accurately determining this limit to +which the nature of the difference between right and wrong, in the sense +of Macaulay, is due. It is rather due to the vague thought which +believes in an unlimited right, in absolute virtues and faults, which +has not risen to the understanding that the terms good, brave, right, +and bad are valid always and everywhere only in relation to some +concrete individual who reasons, and that they have no validity in +themselves. Courage is foolhardiness in the eyes of the cautious, and +caution is cowardice in the opinion of the daring. The revolt against +existing governments is always right in the eyes of the rebels, always +wrong in the opinion of the attacked. No action can be absolutely right +or wrong. + +The same qualities of man are good or bad, according to his needs and +their uses, according to time and place. Here trickery, slyness, and bad +faith prevail, there loyally, frankness and straightforwardness. Here +compassion and charity serve their purpose and promote welfare, there +ruthless and bloody severity. The quantity, the more or less beneficial +effect of a human quality, determines the difference between virtue and +vice. + +Reason can distinguish between right and wrong, virtue and vice, only to +the extent that it can measure the relative quantity of right in any +faculty, rule, or action. No categorical imperative, no ethical code, +can serve as a basis for the real practical right. On the contrary, +ethics finds its justification in the actual righteousness of +perceptible objects. For general reason, frankness is not a better +quality than slyness. Frankness is preferable to slyness only inasmuch +as it is quantitatively, that is to say, more frequently, better, and +more generally appreciated than slyness. It follows that a science of +right can serve as a guide in practice only to the extent that practice +has served as a basis for science. Reason cannot determine the action of +man beforehand, because it can only experience, but not anticipate +reality, because every man, every situation, is new, original, exists +for the first time, and because the possibilities of reason are confined +to understanding _a posteriori_. + +Absolute right, or right in itself, is an imagined right, is a +speculative desire. A scientifically universal right requires certain +definite and perceptible premises which form the basis of the +determination of the general. Science is not a dogmatic infallibility +which may say: This or that is right, because it is so understood. +Science requires for its perceptions some external object. It can +perceive right only if it rightly exists. The universal existence is the +material, premise, condition, and cause of science. + +From the foregoing follows the postulate that morality must be studied +inductively or scientifically, not speculatively by the method of +traditional philosophy. We must not attempt to study absolute, but only +relative rights, only rights based on certain premises, and only this +can be the moral problem of reason. Thus the belief in a moral order of +the world is dissolved in the consciousness of human freedom. The +understanding of reason, of knowledge, of science, includes the +understanding of the limited validity of all ethical maxims. + +Whatever impressed man as salutary, valuable, divine, was exhibited by +him in the tabernacle of faith as the most venerable thing. The Egyptian +worshipped the cat, the Christian venerates the divine providence. So, +when his needs led him to live a well-regulated life, the benefits of +the law inspired him with such a high opinion of its noble origin that +he adopted his own handiwork as a gift of heaven. The invention of the +mouse-trap or other useful appliances pushed the cat out of its exalted +position. Whenever man becomes his own master, takes care of himself, +and provides for himself, then all other providences become useless, and +his own mastership makes all superior tutelage unbearable. Man is a +jealous creature. Ruthlessly he subordinates everything to his own +interests, even God and His commandments. No matter how great or +venerable an authority any code may have acquired by long and faithful +service, as soon as new needs oppose it, they degrade the divine +authority to the ranks of human law and transform ancient right into +modern wrong. The Christian frivolity refused to respect the threat of +physical retribution which the Hebrew had anointed as an authority in +moral questions and revered under the maxim: Eye for eye, tooth for +tooth. The Christian had learned to cherish the blessings of +peacefulness; he carried submissive tolerance into the holy land, and +decorated the vacant tabernacle with the gentle injunction to offer the +left cheek when the right was tired of cuffs. In our times which are +Christian in name, but very anti-Christian in deeds, the long venerated +tolerance has long gone out of use. + +Just as every religion has its own peculiar God, so every time has its +own peculiar right. To this extent, religion and morality are in harmony +with the worship of their sanctum. But they become arrogant upstarts +whenever they assume to exceed their natural boundaries, whenever they +attempt to saddle upon all circumstances, under the pretense of offering +something incomparable, absolute, permanent, that which is divine and +right at certain times and under definite conditions; whenever they +proclaim a successful remedy for their own peculiar disease as a +universal patent medicine for all diseases; whenever they overbearingly +forget their descent. A law is originally dictated by some individual +need, and then mankind with its universal needs is supposed to balance +itself on the thin rope of this one rule. Originally that which is +really good is right, and thereafter only some decreed right is supposed +to be really good. That is the unbearable arrogance. Ordained right is +not satisfied to serve as the right of this time, this nation or +country, this class or caste. It wants to dominate the whole world, +wants to be absolute right, just as if a certain pill could be absolute +medicine, could be good for everything. It is the mission of progress to +repulse this assumption, to pluck this peacock feather out of the tail +of the rooster, by leading mankind on beyond the boundaries prescribed +by ordained law, by extending the world for him, by conquering for his +cramped interests a wider liberty. The migration from Palestine to +Europe where the consumption of pork does not cause leprosy emancipates +our natural freedom from a once divine restriction by making it +irrelevant. But progress does not deprive one God of his shoulder straps +for the purpose of decorating some other God with them. That would +merely be an exchange, not an acquirement. Evolution does not drive the +saints of tradition out of the country; it simply retires them from the +wrongfully occupied field of universality into their peculiar +boundaries. Progress picks up the child and then pours the water out of +the bath tub. Though the cat may have lost its aureole and ceased to be +a God, it does not give up catching mice; and though the Jewish rules +for bodily cleanliness at certain definite times have long been +forgotten, a clean body is still highly respected. The present wealth of +civilization is due only to the economical administration of the +acquirements of the past. Evolution is as much conservative as it is +revolutionary, and it finds as much wrong as right in every law. + +It is true that the believers in absolute duty scent a difference +between moral and legal right. But their self-interested narrowness does +not permit them to realize that every law is originally moral and that +every special morality is gradually reduced to the level of a mere law. +Their understanding reaches into other times and other classes, but does +not reach their own time and class. The laws of the Chinese and +Samoyeds are understood to refer to the peculiar requirements of those +people. But the rules of bourgeois society are supposed to be far more +sublime. Our present day institutions and moral codes are either +regarded as eternal truths of nature or reason, or as permanent oracular +expressions of a pure conscience. Just as if the barbarian did not have +a barbarian reason; as if the Turk did not have a Turkish conscience and +the Hebrew a Hebrew one; as if man could follow the dictates of some +absolute conscience, instead of the conscience being conditioned on the +man. + +Whoever limits the purpose of man to the love and service of God, and to +eternal blessedness hereafter, may devoutly recognize the traditions of +abstract morality as authoritative and guide himself accordingly. But +whoever regards development, education, and blessedness on earth as +man's life purpose, will not think that the questioning of the assumed +superiority of traditional morals is irrelevant. It is only the +consciousness of individual freedom which creates sufficient unconcern +for the rules made by others to permit a brave advance, which +emancipates us from the striving for an illusory absolute ideal, for +some "best world," and which restores us to the definite practical +interests of our time and personality. At the same time we are thus +reconciled with the world as it really is, because we no longer regard +it as the unsuccessful realization of that which ought to be, but rather +as the systematization of that which cannot but be. The world is always +right. Whatever exists, is right and is not fated to be otherwise until +it changes. Wherever there is existence, which is power, there is also +right without any further condition, because it is right in a formative +stage. Weakness has no other right than that of striving for supremacy +and then enforcing a recognition of its long denied needs. The study of +history shows us not only the negative and ridiculous side of the +religions, customs, institutions and ideas of the past, but also their +positive, reasonable and necessary side. It explains to us, for +instance, that the deification of animals was due to an enthusiastic +recognition of their usefulness. And so the study of history shows not +alone the inadequacy of the things of the present, but also demonstrates +that they are the reasonable and necessary conclusions from the premises +of previous stages. + + ++(c) The Holy.+ + +In the well-known statement: The end sanctifies the means, the developed +theory of morality finds its practical expression. This maxim, used in +an ambiguous sense, may stand as a common reproach for us and for the +Jesuits. The defenders of the society of Jesus make efforts to prove +that it is a malignant attempt to discredit their clients. We shall not +try to speak for either party to this dispute, but will devote ourselves +to the subject matter itself, and seek to substantiate the truth and +reasonableness of this maxim, to rehabilitate it in the public opinion. + +It will be sufficient for the refutation of the most general opposition +to understand that end and means are very relative terms, that all +concrete ends are means and all means are ends. There is no more of a +positive difference between great and small, right and wrong, virtue +and vice, than there is between end and means. Considered as something +integral by itself, every action has its own end and its means are the +various moments of which even the shortest action is composed. Every +concrete action is a means in relation to other actions which aim at the +same common effect. But in themselves actions are neither ends nor +means. Nothing is anything by itself. All being is relative. Things are +what they are only within and by their interrelations. Circumstances +alter cases. In so far as every action is accompanied by other actions, +it is a means, and serves a common end which exceeds its own special +end; but inasmuch as every action is complete in itself it is an end +which includes its own means. We eat in order to live; but so far as we +are living while we are eating, we are living in order to eat. As life +to its functions, so the end is related to its means. Just as life is +simply the sum of all life's functions, so the end is the sum of all its +means. The difference between means and end reduces itself to that +between the concrete and the general. And all abstract differences +reduce themselves to this difference, because the faculty of abstraction +or distinction reduces itself to the faculty of distinguishing between +the concrete and the general. But this distinction presupposes the +existence of some material, some given objects, some circle of sense +perceptions by which it manifests itself. If this circle is found in the +field of actions or functions, in other words, if a previously defined +number of different actions is the object of our study, then we refer to +the general character of these objects as the general end and to every +more or less extended part of them, or to every function, as a means. +Whether any definite action is considered as an end or as a means, +depends on the question whether we consider it as a whole in relation to +its own parts, or as a part of some whole in which it is connected with +other parts, with other actions. From a general point of view which has +all human actions for the object of its study, and encompasses them all, +there exists only one end, viz., the human welfare. This welfare is the +end of all ends, is the final end, is the real, true, universal end +compared to which all special ends are but means. + +Now, our claim that the end sanctifies the means can have absolute +validity only in regard to some absolute end. But all concrete ends are +relative and finite. The one and sole absolute end is human welfare, and +it is an end which sanctifies all rules and actions, all means, so long +as they are subservient to it, but which reviles them as soon as they go +their own way without serving it. The human weal is literally and +historically the origin of the holy. That which is hale is holy. At the +same time we must not ignore the fact that the weal, or hale, in +general, the hale which sanctifies all means, is but an abstraction, the +real content of which is as different as are the times, the nations, or +persons which are seeking for their welfare. It must be remembered that +the determination of that which is holy or for the human weal requires +definite conditions, that no action, no means, is holy in itself, that +each one of them is sanctified only by definite relations. It is not +every end which sanctifies the means, but the holy end which sanctifies +its own means. But since every real and concrete end is only relatively +holy, it can sanctify its own means only relatively. + +The opposition against our maxim is not so much directed against it, as +against the wrong application of it. Recognition is denied and the +socalled sanctified ends are accorded only limited means, because there +is lurking in the background the consciousness that these ends have only +a relative holiness. On the other hand our defense of the maxim does not +imply that the various nominally holy means and ends are sanctified +because some authority, some scriptural statement, some reason or +conscience, has declared them to be so, but only in so far as they +answer the common end of all ends, the human welfare. Our maxim of ends +does not at all teach that we should sacrifice love and truths to +sanctified faith, but neither does it demand that we should sacrifice +faith for love and truth. It merely states the fact that, whenever some +superior end has been determined by sense perceptions or circumstances, +all means contrary to that end are unholy, and that on the other hand +means which are generally unholy may become temporarily and individually +sanctioned by their relation to some momentary or individual welfare. +Wherever peacefulness is actually in favor as a sanctified means, war is +unholy. When, on the other hand, man seeks his salvation in war, then +murder and incendiarism are holy means. In other words, our reason +requires for a valid determination of that which is sanctified certain +definite material conditions or facts as premises; it cannot determine +_the_ holy in general, not _a priori_, not philosophically in the old +speculative way, but only in concrete cases, _a posteriori_, only +empirically. + +If we understand that human welfare is the end of all ends, the ideal +of all means; if we furthermore dispense with all special determinations +of this welfare, with all personal ideas of it, and recognize that it is +different under different circumstances, then we understand at the same +time that no means is sanctified beyond the sanctity of its end. No +means, no action, is positively sanctified or makes for human welfare +under all circumstances. According to circumstances and relations one +and the same means may be good or bad. A thing is good only to the +extent that its results are good, only to the extent that there is good +in its end. Lying and cheating are bad only because they result +injuriously for ourselves, because we do not wish to be lied to or +cheated. But whenever a sanctified end is in question, the deceptive +means used in lying and cheating are called tricks of war. If any one is +firmly rooted in the goodness of chastity because he thinks it was +ordained by God, we cannot discuss the matter with him. But if one +honors virtue for the sake of virtue and abhors vice for the sake of +vice, in other words, for their consequences, he admits that he +sacrifices the lust of the flesh to the end of good health. In short, he +admits that the means are sanctified by the end. + +In the Christian conception of the world, the commandments of its +religion are absolutely good for all time, they are considered good +because Christian revelation declares them to be so. This conception +does not know that, for instance, its acme of virtue, the specifically +Christian virtue of abstemiousness, received its value only by contrast +with corrupt heathenish licentiousness, but that it is not a virtue +when compared to reasonable and normal satisfaction of material needs. +It deals with certain means which it calls indiscriminately good without +any relation to their ends, and others which it calls indiscriminately +bad in the same absolute way. And for this reason, it opposes the above +named maxim. + +But modern Christianity, modern civilization, has practically long done +away with this faith. It does indeed call the soul the likeness of God +and the body a putrid food for worms; but its deeds prove that it does +not take its religious phrases seriously. It cares little for the better +part of man and directs all its thoughts and actions toward the +satisfaction of the despised body. It employs science and art, and the +products of all climates, for the glorification of the body, clothing it +sumptuously, feeding it luxuriously, caring for it tenderly, resting it +on soft cushions. Although they speak slightingly of this earthly life +in comparison to the eternal life beyond, yet in practice they cling for +six days of the week to the uninterrupted pleasures of this body, while +heaven is hardly considered worthy of careless attention for more than +one short hour on Sundays. With the same thoughtless inconsistency the +socalled Christian world also attacks our maxim with words, while in +practical life it sanctifies the despised means by the end of its own +welfare, going even so far as to demonstrate its inconsistency in its +own life by subsidizing prostitution with state funds. The fact that the +legislative bodies of our representative states keep down the enemies of +their bourgeois order by courtmartials and exile, that they justify this +course by the proverb, "Do unto others as you would that they should do +unto you," in the interest of "public" welfare, or that they defend +their divorce codes by the plea of individual welfare, proves that the +bourgeoisie also believes in the motto: The end sanctifies the means. +And even though the citizens delegate rights to the state which they +deny to themselves, also our opponents cannot but admit that in so doing +the citizens are simply delegating their own rights to the superior +authority of the state. + +True, whoever employs lying and cheating in the bourgeois world for the +end of gaining wealth, even though he may make it one of his ends to +give to charity, or whoever steals leather, like Saint Chispinus, for +the purpose of making shoes for poor people, does not sanctify his means +by his end, because the end in that case is not sanctified, or only +nominally so, only in general, but not in the concrete case quoted. For +charity is an end of but inferior holiness which must not be more than a +means compared to the main end of maintaining bourgeois society, and +whenever it contravenes this main purpose, charity loses its character +of a good end. And we have already seen that an end which is sanctified +only under certain circumstances cannot sanctify its means beyond them. +The indispensable condition of all good ends is that they must be +subservient to human welfare, and whether this welfare is secured by +Christian or pagan, by feudal or bourgeois means, it always demands that +the things which are considered unessential and of lesser importance +should be subordinated to the essential and necessary things, while in +the above quoted cases the more salutary honesty and bourgeois +respectability would be sacrificed to the less salutary charity. "The +end sanctifies the means" signifies in other words that in ethics as +well as in economics, the profit must justify the investment of the +capital. Again, if we call the forcible conversion of infidels a good +end, and an arbitrary police measure a bad means, this does not prove +anything against the truth of the maxim, but only testifies to its wrong +application. The means is not sanctified in the case, because the end is +not, because a forced conversion is not a good end, but rather an evil +one resulting in hypocrisy, and because such a conversion does not +deserve this name, or because force is a means which is unworthy of this +term. If it is true that a forcible conversion or wooden iron are +senseless ideas, how is it that people will persist in fighting against +universally recognized truths with such inconsistencies, such inane word +plays, such tricks of rhetoric and sophistry? The means of the Jesuits, +sly tricks and intrigues, poison and murder, appear unholy to us only +because the Jesuitic purpose, for instance that of extending the wealth +and influence and glorifying power of the order, is an inferior end +which may make use of the innocent language of the pulpit, but is not an +absolutely sanctified end, no supreme end, to which we would grant means +that would deprive us of some essential end, for instance of our +personal and public safety. Murder and manslaughter are considered +immoral as individual actions because they are not means to accomplish +our main end, because we incline not toward revenge or +blood-thirstiness, nor toward arbitrariness and the wilful dispensation +of justice by some judge, but toward lawful decisions and the more or +less impartial decrees of the state. But do we not explicitly declare in +favor of the maxim "The end sanctifies the means," when we constitute +ourselves into juries and render dangerous criminals powerless by the +rope and the ax of the executioner? + +The same people who boast of having dropped Aristotle, that is to say +the belief in authority, for centuries, and who therefore replaced the +dead traditional truth by living self-gained truth, are found to be +completely at odds with their own development in the above cited cases. +If we listen to the recital of some funny story, which may be told by +even a reliable witness, we nevertheless remain loyal to the principles +of free reason, that is to say we are free to regard as serious and +regrettable any incident which the narrator may consider funny and +ridiculous. People know how to distinguish between a story and the +subjective impression its incidents created on the mind of the narrator, +and which depends more on the personality of the witness than on the +actual facts. But in the matter of good ends and bad means it is +proposed to neglect the distinction between an object and its subjective +end which is otherwise the point of all critique. Such ends as charity, +the conversion of infidels, etc., are thoughtlessly, a priori, called +good and holy, because they once were so under particular conditions, +while now their effect in the cases above cited is just the opposite, +and then people wonder that the unrighteous title carries with it +unrighteous privileges. + +Only that end is worthy of the predicate good or holy in practice which +is itself a means, a servant, of the end of all purposes, of welfare. +Whenever man seeks his welfare in bourgeois life, in production and +commerce of commodities, and in the undisturbed enjoyment of his private +property, he clips his long fingers by the commandment: "Thou shalt not +steal." But wherever, as among the Spartans, war is regarded as the +supreme end and craftiness as a necessary quality of a warrior, there +thieving is used as a means of acquiring craftiness and sanctioned as a +means for the main end. To blame the Spartan for being a warrior instead +of a sedate bourgeois would be to ignore the facts of reality, would be +equivalent to overlooking that our brain is not designed to substitute +imaginary pictures for the actual conditions of the world, but is +organized to understand that a period, a nation, an individual is always +that which it can and must be under given circumstances. + +It is not from mere individual and unpraiseworthy fondness for the +paradox that we subvert current views by defending the maxim "The end +sanctifies the means," but from a consistent application of the science +of philosophy. Philosophy originated out of the belief in a dualist +contrast between God and the world, between body and soul, between the +flesh and the spirit, between brain and senses, between thinking and +being, between the general and the concrete. The conciliation of this +contrast represents the end, or the aggregate result, of philosophical +research. Philosophy found its dissolution in the understanding that the +divine is worldly and the worldly divine, that the soul is related to +the body, the spirit to the flesh, thinking to being, the intellect to +the senses, in the same way in which the unity is related to the +multiplicity or the general to the concrete. Philosophy began with the +erroneous supposition that the one, as the first thing, was the basis +on which developed the two, three, four, and the entire multiplicity of +things by succession. It has now arrived at the understanding that +truth, or reality, turns this supposition upside down, that the reality +with its multiplicity of forms, perceivable by the senses, is the first +and foremost thing out of which the human brain gradually derived the +conception of unity or generality. + +No achievement of science can be compared with the amount of talent and +intellectual energy consumed in harvesting this one little fruit from +the field of speculative philosophy. But neither does any scientific +novelty encounter so many deep-rooted obstacles to its recognition. All +brains unfamiliar with the outcome of philosophy are dominated by the +old belief in the reality of some genuine, true, absolutely universal +panacea, the discovery of which would make all sham, false individual +panaceas impossible. But we, on the other hand, have been taught by the +understanding of the thought process that this coveted panacea is a +product of the brain and that, since it is supposed to be a general and +abstract panacea, it cannot be any real, perceptible, concrete panacea. +In the belief in an absolute difference between true and false welfare, +there is manifested an ignorance of the actual operations of brain work. +Pythagoras made numbers the basis of things. If this Grecian philosopher +could have realized that this basic nature was a thing of the mind, of +the intellect,[2] and that numbers were the basis of reason, the common +or abstract content of all intellectual activity, then we should have +been spared all the disputes which have raged around the various forms +of absolute truth, about "things in themselves." + +Space and time are the general forms of reality, or reality exists in +time and space. Consequently all real welfare must be attached to space +and time, and every welfare which exists in these dimensions must be +real. The different welfares, in so far as their beneficent qualities +are concerned, are to be distinguished only by their height and breadth, +by the quantity of their dimensions, by their numeral relations. Every +welfare, whether true or seeming, is perceived by the senses, by +practices of life, not by abstract reason. But practice assigns the most +contradictory things to different people at different times as means to +their welfare. What is welfare in one place, is disaster in another, and +vice versa. Understanding, or reason, has nothing else to do in the +matter than to number these various welfares as they are made real by +sense perceptions in various persons and times, and degrees of +intensity, in the order in which they appear, and thus to distinguish +the small from the great, the essential from the unessential, the +concrete from the general. Reason cannot dictate to us autocratically in +matters of some absolutely true welfare, it can only indicate the most +frequent, most essential, and most universal welfare in a certain +perceived number of welfares. But it must not be forgotten that the +truth of such an understanding, or enumeration, depends on certain +definite premises. It is therefore a vain endeavor to search for the +true and absolute welfare. This search becomes practical and successful +only when it limits itself to the understanding of a definite amount of +welfare of some particular objects. The general welfare can be found +only within definite boundaries. But the various determinations of +welfare agree in this respect, that they all consider it well to +sacrifice the little for the great, the unessential for the essential, +and not vice versa. In so far as this principle is right, it is also +right for us to employ for the good end of a great welfare some small +means in the shape of a small evil and to endure it, and thus we see +once more that the end sanctifies the means. + +If people were liberal enough to permit every one to go to heaven in his +or her own way, the opponents of our maxim would be easily convinced of +its truth. But instead of doing this, people follow the usual course of +shortsightedness and make their private standpoint a universal one. They +call their own private welfare the only true welfare, and regard the +welfare of other nations, times and conditions a mistake. So does every +school of art declare its own subjective taste to be objective beauty, +ignoring the fact that unity is but a matter of ideas, of thought, while +reality is full of the most varied forms. The real welfare is manifold +and the true welfare but a subjective choice which, like a funny story, +may make an entirely different impression on others, and be a false +welfare. Even though Kant, or Fichte, or some other particular +philosopher, may discuss at length the purpose of mankind and solve the +problem to his full satisfaction and to that of his audience, we +nevertheless have learned enough today to know that one can define one's +own personal idea of the purpose of mankind by means of abstract +speculation, but that one cannot discover any unknown and hidden object +in this way. Thought, or reason, requires some object, and its work is +that of measuring, of criticising. It may distinguish between true and +false welfare, but will also remember that they have their limits, +remember that it is itself personal and that its distinctions are +likewise personal and cannot be generalized beyond the point where +others receive the same impression of the same object. + +Humanity is an idea, while man is always some special person who has his +or her peculiar life in a definite environment and is therefore +subservient to general principles only from motives of self-interest. +The sacrifice of ethics, like that of religion, is only seemingly a +self-denial and serves the ends of reasonable self-interest, an +expenditure with a view to greater gains. A morality worthy of that name +which is not better defined by the term obedience can be exercised only +through the understanding of its worth, of its value for our welfare, of +its usefulness. The variety of political parties is conditioned on the +varieties of the interests concerned, and the difference in the means is +conditioned on the difference in ends. In questions of less importance +even the champions of absolute morality testify to this fact. + +Thiers in his history of the French Revolution tells of a peculiar +situation in the year 1796, when the patriots held the public power and +the royalists carried on a revolutionary propaganda. It was then that +the partisans of the revolution, who should have been the champions of +unlimited liberty, demanded coercive measures, while the opposition, who +secretly cared more for a monarchy than for a republic, voted for +unlimited liberty. "To such an extent are parties governed by their +self-interests," comments Thiers, just as if this were an anomaly +instead of being the natural, necessary and inevitable course of the +world. When, on the other hand, it is a question of the fundamental laws +of bourgeois order, then the moral representatives of the ruling classes +are egotistic enough to deny the connection of their material interests +with these laws and to claim that theirs are eternal, metaphysical world +laws, that the pillars of their special class rule are the eternal +pillars of humanity, and that their own means alone are holy ones and +their end the final end of the universe. + +It is a disastrous deception, a robbing of human liberty, an attempt to +cause the stagnation of the historical development, if any age or class +thus proclaims its own peculiar purposes and means to be for the +absolute welfare of humanity. Morality originally reflects one's +interests just as fashion reflects one's taste, and finally the action +is moulded after the conceived pattern like the coat in dressing. In +this process, force naturally is exerted for the maintenance and +protection of one's own life and those who resist are subdued. Interest +and duty, though perhaps not entirely synonymous, are certainly closely +related. Both of them are merged in the term welfare. Self-interest +represents more nearly the concrete, immediate, tangible welfare, while +duty concerns itself with the more remote and general welfare of the +future also. While self-interest considers the present tangible metallic +welfare of the purse, duty demands that we keep not only a part of +welfare, but all welfare in mind, that we consider the future as well as +the present, that we remember the spiritual welfare as well as the +physical. Duty thinks also of the heart, of social needs, of the +future, of the spiritual weal, in brief of interest in general and urges +us to renounce the superfluous in order to secure and retain the +necessary. Thus your duty is your self-interest and your self-interest +your duty. + +If our ideas are to adapt themselves to truth, or to reality, instead of +reality or truth adapting itself to our notions or thoughts, we must +understand that the mutability of that which is right, holy, moral, is a +natural, necessary and true fact. And we must grant to an individual the +theoretical freedom which cannot be taken from it in practice, we must +admit that it is as free now as it has ever been, that laws must be +adapted to the needs of the social individual and not to the vague, +unreal, and impossible abstractions, such as justice or morality. What +is justice? The embodiment of all that is considered right, an +individual conception, which assumes different forms in different +persons. In reality only individual, definite, concrete rights exist, +and man simply comes along and abstracts from them the idea of justice, +just as he abstracted from different kinds of wood the conception of +wood in general, or from material things the conception of matter. It is +just as far from the truth, to think that material things consist of, or +are by virtue of, abstract matter, although this view is widely spread, +as it is to believe that the moral or bourgeois laws were derived from +the idea of justice. + +The ethical loss caused by our realistic, or if you prefer, +materialistic, conception of morality is not so great as it appears. We +need not fear that through this conception social beings will become +lawless cannibals or hermits. Freedom and lawfulness are closely allied +by the need for association which compels us to permit others to live +together with us. If a man is prevented by his conscience or by other +spiritualistic or bourgeois ethics from committing unlawful +actions--unlawful in the wider meaning of the term--he is either not +exposed to very grave temptations, or he has a nature so tame that the +natural or legal punishments fully suffice to keep him within prescribed +bounds. But where these checks are ineffective, morality is likewise +powerless. If it were otherwise, we should have to assume that morality +exerts in secret the same influence on the faithful which is exerted by +public opinion on the faithless. But we know from actual experience that +there are more pious thieves than infidel robbers. That the world, which +attributes so much value for social welfare to morality by word of +mouth, actually shares this view of ours, is proven by the fact that +bourgeois society gives more attention to the penal code and to the +police than to the influence of morality. + +Moreover, our fight is not directed against morality, not even against +any special form of it, but only against the arrogance which assumes to +stamp some concrete form of morality with the trade mark of absolute +morality. We recognize that morality is eternally sacred, in so far as +it refers to considerations which a man owes to himself and to his +fellowmen in the interest of their common welfare. But the freedom of +the individual demands that each one should be at liberty to determine +the degree of consideration and the manner of giving it expression. +Under these circumstances it is as inevitable that the ruling powers, +classes or majorities should enforce their special needs under the form +of a prescribed right, as it is that a man's shirt should be closer to +his skin than his coat. But it appears to us not merely very +superfluous, but even detrimental to the energies required for the +progress of the future, that some decreed right should be elevated to +the position of absolute right and transformed into an insuperable +barrier to the advance of humanity. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[2] Which was gained by the mind's contact with its sense-perceived +multiplicity of the world.--Editor. + + + + +Letters on Logic + +Especially Democratic-Proletarian Logic + +BY JOSEPH DIETZGEN + +Translated by Ernest Untermann + + + + +Editorial Remark. + +The "Letters on Logic," treating on the same subjects as "The Positive +Outcome of Philosophy," were intended by the author to be replaced by +this subsequent work. + +We publish, however, both these works in hopes that the reader will +pardon the frequent repetitions on account of the additional light that +other parts of the "Letters on Logic" are apt to impart. + + + + +LETTERS ON LOGIC + + + + +FIRST LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +You have now reached the age at which the students go to the university. +There, according to custom, they register first of all for a course in +logic, whether they choose the study of law, medicine, or theology. +Logic is, so to say, the elementary study in all branches of learning. +Now you know, my dear, that school and life are regarded as two separate +things. I should like to call your attention to their connection. We +live also in school, we are schooled also by life. I should like to +consider your trip across the Atlantic ocean as your first venture in +the high school of life, and assume the role of your professor of logic. + +I feel well qualified for this office. Although I am not well up in +Latin and Greek, still I feel competent to guide you to the depths of +logical science better than a German professor trained and installed +according to the most approved pattern. You will admit the possibility +of such a thing. For one who knows little may explain that little with +more ease and efficacy than one who has his head stuffed full of the +prescribed bunch of official wisdom. + +You, my son, have been so fortunate as to enjoy a seven years' course in +a German college. And since your teachers, at your departure, gave you +the highest certificate, I may well consider you as qualified not only +to enter the school of life in the United States, but also to listen +intelligently to my lectures on logic. + +But in order that my well trained pupil may not look down upon his +self-taught teacher, I appeal to the fact that even the man with the +best all-around education will be a tyro in specialties; and that, on +the other hand, ignorance in many things does not exclude the +possibility of knowing more about a certain specialty than science has +heretofore grasped. Now I claim in this case to have acquired a +knowledge of the subject with which I intend to deal here that surpasses +anything I have been able to find in the professional literature. I +mention this, my dear Eugene, with all due modesty, not for the purpose +of throwing a halo around my personality, but in order to give a certain +authority to my office as teacher and to inspire my pupil with +confidence. + +Yes, I value confidence. Although you know me as a democrat who cares +nothing for authority, you shall also learn to know me as a graduate in +dialectics who, though he may empty the bath, still retains his hold on +the child and does not permit it to float off with the water. Children, +and one may say nations in their childhood, cannot do without authority, +and a teacher, whether he instruct children or nations, cannot dispense +with a certain confidence-inspiring air. The pupil must believe in the +wisdom of his teacher, in order that he may approach the master with the +necessary attention and willingness to learn. Later on the understanding +of the subject makes all authority superfluous. Thus a thing so sublime +as authority is subject to the destructive tendencies of time, to the +historical process. + +Hitherto mankind has often been tempted by preconceived notions to +idolize vain things. It has been attempted to shield not only authority +in general, but, what is still worse, this or that throne or altar, +against the attacks of time. The relation between the perishable and the +imperishable has always been subject to much misunderstanding. Now since +logic is that science which aims to set the intellect aright, we shall +have to touch occasionally on the general misconception of time and +eternity. + +The most famous expounders of logic are reproached for their cumbrous +style and their obscure mode of explanation. Even masters of languages +have complained in my hearing about the foreign terms used by that +branch of science, terms which even they could not understand. Much of +the blame for this condition of things may fall on the difficulties of +the subject, which have baffled all elucidation for thousands of years. +Some of the blame also falls on the bad habit of using learned +vernacular. But the greatest fault lies with the mental laziness of the +students. Nothing can be learned without mental exertion. If you are +concerned in your further development, you will recognize the Christian +word as to the curse of work as untrue. Work cannot be descended from +sin, for it is a blessing. You will have experienced in yourself how +elated one feels after successful physical or mental work. + +The things which science yields without exertion can be at most +axiomatic commonplaces. + +I assume that you are quite willing to perform the necessary mental +labor, and I promise you that I shall do my best to make this study easy +for you. I do this so much more readily, as I frankly confess that these +letters to my son are written with the intention of making them +accessible to a wider circle of readers by means of the press. + +Before concluding, let me say a word about my aim of speaking especially +of democratic-proletarian logic. You will think or say: Logic may be a +subject worthy of study, but a special democratic-proletarian logic can +surely treat of nothing but party matters. But just as the special +accomplishments in this or that line, the special advances of this or +that nation, are at the same time general advances, progress of +civilization, so the ideas of proletarian logic are not party ideas, but +conclusions of logic in general. You may reply: Even though the special +thought of a Chinaman may be quite consistent and logical, still we +would not call it Chinese logic. That would be quite true, but it does +not meet my point. + +The thought on which the proletarian demands are based, the idea of the +equality of all human beings, this ultimate proletarian idea, if I may +say so, is fully backed up by the deeper insight into the tortuous +problem of logic. Now, since this idea dominates mankind, it certainly +has more right than any Chinese idea. Furthermore, industrial +development has leveled, simplified, cleared all social conditions to +such an extent that it becomes ever easier to penetrate with sober eyes +into the secrets of logic. Finally, my logic deserves its proletarian +qualification for the reason that it requires for its understanding the +overcoming of all prejudices by which the capitalist world is held +together. + +The cause of the people is not a party matter, but the general object of +all science. + +The people's cause as the ultimate object, and logic as the most +elementary and most abstract science, as ultimate science, are as +intimately connected as plants and botany, or as laws and the legal +profession. So are the interests of democracy and the proletariat +intimately connected. The fact that this has not been well recognized in +the United States so far, is more a proof of the lucky condition of that +country than of the scientific knowledge of its democracy. The spreading +primeval forests and prairies offered innumerable homesteads to the poor +and they obscured the antagonism between capitalists and wage workers, +between capitalist and proletarian democracy. But you still lack the +knowledge of proletarian economics which would enable you to recognize +without a doubt that it is precisely on the republican ground of America +that capitalism makes giant strides and reveals ever more clearly its +twofold task of first enslaving the people for the purpose of freeing +them in due time. + + + + +SECOND LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Having written the first letter by way of introduction, I now am ready +for a gradual approach to my subject. + +Logic aims to instruct the human mind as to its own nature and +processes; it will lay bare the interior working of our mind for our +guidance. The object of the study of logic is thought, its nature, and +its proper classification. + +The human brain performs the function of thinking as involuntarily as +the chest the function of breathing. However, we can, by our will, stop +breathing for a while, and accelerate or retard the breathing movements. +In the same way, the will can control the thoughts. We may choose any +object as the subject matter of our thought, and yet we may quickly +convince ourselves that the power of our will and the freedom of the +mind are not any greater than the freedom of the chest in breathing. + +While logic undertakes to assign the proper position to our brain, still +it has to remember that nature has already assigned that position. + +It is with logic as it is with other sciences. They draw wisdom from the +mysterious source of plain experience. Agriculture, e. g., aims to teach +the farmer how to cultivate the soil; but fields were tilled long before +any agricultural college had begun its lectures. In the same way human +beings think without ever having heard of logic. But by practice they +improve their innate faculty of thought, they make progress, they +gradually learn to make better use of it. Finally, just as the farmer +arrives at the science of agriculture, so the thinker arrives at logic, +acquires a clear consciousness of his faculty of thought and a +professional dexterity in applying it. + +I have two purposes in mind in saying this. Firstly, you must not expect +too much from this science, for you cannot set contrary brains to rights +by any logic. Secondly, you must not think too little of it, by +regarding the matter as mere scholastic word-mongery and useless +hairsplitting. In daily life, as well as in all sciences, we never +operate without the help of thought, but only with it, hence an +understanding of the nature of the processes of thought is of eminent +value. + +Logic has its history like all sciences. Aristotle, whom Marx calls the +"Grecian giant of thought," is universally recognized as its founder. + +After the classic culture of antiquity had been buried by barbarism, the +name of Bacon of Verulam rose with the beginning of modern times as a +philosophical light of the first order. His most famous work is entitled +"Novum Organon." By the new organ he meant a new method of research +which should be founded on experience, instead of the subtleties of the +purely introspective method hitherto in vogue. After him, Descartes, or +Cartesius, as he called himself in literature, wrote his still famous +work, "About Methods." I furthermore recall Immanuel Kant's "Critique of +Reason," Johann Gottlieb Fichte's "Theory of Science," and finally +Hegel, of whom the biographer said that he was as famous in the +scientific world as Napoleon in the political. + +Hegel calls his chief work "Logic," and bases his whole system on the +"dialectic method." You have only to look at the titles of these +philosophical masterpieces in order to recognize that they all treat of +the same subject which we are making our special study, viz., the light +of understanding. The great philosophers of all times have searched for +the true method, the method of truth, for the way in which understanding +and reason arrive at science. + +I merely wish to indicate that this subject has its famous history, but +I do not care to enter more deeply into it. I will not speak of the +oppression and persecution, which was inaugurated by religious +fanaticism. I will not enumerate the various events that led to a +greater and greater light from generation to generation. The attempt to +trace this history would entangle us in many disputed questions and +errors which would only increase the difficulties of this study for the +beginner. + +If a teacher of technology were to instruct you on steam engines and, to +explain their first incomplete invention, trace their further +development historically from improvement to improvement, until he +should arrive at the height of perfection attained in their present day +construction, he would also be advancing on a path, but on a tedious +one. I shall endeavor to show my subject at the outset in the very +clearest light which has ever been thrown on it by the help of the +nations of all times. If I succeed in this, it will be easy in the +future, in the reading of any author, to separate the chaff from the +wheat. + +I can afford to dispense with quotations and proofs from others in +trying to make my case and demonstrating the positive product of social +culture, for we are dealing with the most universal and omnipresent +object,--one which enters into every spoken or written sentence with its +own body. If anybody tells of far off times or wonderful things, he must +quote witnesses. Now, much of what I have to say for my case may sound +wonderful, because it runs counter to the popular prejudice, but the +only witness required to prove the truth of my statements is the clear +brain of my pupil, who has only to examine his own experience without +preconceived notions, in order to find proofs on every hand. + +It is surprising in the first place, that such a near at hand object has +not been understood long ago and that so much still remains to be +explained and to be taught after thousands of years of study. But you +know that just as the small things are often great, and great things +small, so the nearest things are often hidden and the hidden things +nearest. + +I promised you in the first sentences of this letter, dear Eugene, that +I would now pass from introduction to subject matter. But since I have +really continued to move around the outer edge of the subject instead of +entering into its midst, you might become impatient, and so I will +justify my method. It is a peculiarity of this subject matter that it +exposes me to this charge. It is a peculiarity of thought that it never +stays with itself, but always digresses to other things. The thought is +the plank to which I should stick, but it is the nature of this plank +never to stick. Thinking is a thing full of contradictions, a +dialectical secret. + +Now I know that here I am saying something which it is very hard for you +to understand. But look here, has it not always been so? When you began +declining Latin words in the sixth class, you were unable at once to +grasp the full meaning of declension. You knew what you were doing, and +yet you did not entirely understand it. Only after penetrating more +deeply into the construction of the language did the meaning and purpose +of the beginning become clear to you. In the same way, you now must try +to digest as much as you can of what I say, and after you have gone more +deeply into this matter, you will fully understand me from beginning to +end. In taking lessons from an author, on an unknown subject, I have +always followed the method of first getting a superficial view of the +subject, of glancing over its many pages and chapters, in order to +return to the beginning and acquire a thorough knowledge by repeated +study. With the growing familiarity with the subject the ability to +understand it grew, and at the conclusion the thing became clear to me. +This is the only correct method I can recommend to you. + +In conclusion let me say for to-day in passing that the recommendation +of the correct method for studying logic is not only an introduction, +but, as I have already said, the subject matter of science itself. + + + + +THIRD LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +My task of teaching logic requires two things: a logician and a teacher. + +The last named capacity requires that I should clothe the subject in an +attractive way. Permit me, therefore, to combine the didactic style with +that of the story teller, and to relate at this point an episode from a +novel of Gustav zu Putlitz: + +The organist of a certain village is lying on his deathbed. His last +strength has been spent on the previous day in playing a hymn, and after +its conclusion he was carried from the church in an unconscious state. +He had played his masterpiece, but at the same time his last piece. A +despised stage girl had accompanied him with a voice like that of a +nightingale. But neither she nor the organ player had earned any +applause from the stupid villagers. + +The old man looked around in his room, his eyes were first riveted on +his faithful piano, his friend and companion through life. He extended +his hand, but it sank down exhausted. He had not had the intention to +touch the piano anyway. It was only like stretching out one's hand for a +friend far away. Then he looked through the window trying to recollect +what time of the day it was. And when he had taken in the situation, he +turned to the girl kneeling at his feet. + +"Poor child," he began, "you were deeply disappointed yesterday. I felt +very much hurt, when I first heard of it, but after that everything +became clear to me while I heard the music all night, until a short +while ago. Rejoice, my girl, at being reviled, for it is done for the +sake of that sacred music, and it is an ecstasy, a blessing, to be +martyred for one's music which is well worth all injuries. I did not +fare any better all my life, and if I thank God for all the good he has +done me until this hour, I also thank him first and most fervently for +the gift of music which he bestowed on the world, and which he revealed +to me most wonderfully in my most painful hours. + +"For my music I have starved and suffered all my life, and my gain was +delicious, my reward celestial for this poor perishable stake. + +"My father was an organist in a little town of Eastern Frisia. His +father had held the same position in the same church, and, I think, so +did the father of his father follow music for a profession. Music has +been the heirloom of our family for generations. True, it was the only +heirloom, but I have cherished it and held its flag aloft all my life. +When God calls me away, I shall leave nothing behind but that old piano +and the sheet music which I wrote myself, for in all other respects I +have always been poor. I might have done differently, and my wife has +often upbraided me for it, but she does not understand the blessing of +music. I do not blame her for that, for it was not her fault that God +closed her ear to music as he did the ears of many others. Poor people, +how cold and dreary must be their lives when music does not scatter +blossoms in their path and bathe their temples in light. But there will +come a time when their ears will be opened, and God will compensate them +in heaven for what they missed here below. + +"We who love music have tasted a part of eternal bliss here below, for +harmony which dissolves all chords is eternal life and its wings are +fanning us in this terrestrial life---- + +"Do you see, I know it well, and no one besides me, how it is when the +soul prepares to leave the perishable body and enter the song of the +spheres-- + +"You do not understand me, my girl, but do not worry, you also will +understand some day. I will only tell you this much, and it shall be a +consolation to you when the world treats you roughly hereafter. All of +us, whether rich or poor, whether reclining on soft silken cushions or +on hard straw, all of us enter life with the celestial melodies in our +hearts. The beating of time goes with us as long as we are breathing. It +is the beating of the heart in our breast. We may seem to lose the +melody, even the measured step of time seems to become confused by our +passion, but in the blessed hours we always find our melody anew, and +then we feel at home in the path of our life." + +Thus the old organist idolized his music. + +But it is not alone the harmony of music which has such a power over the +mind. The harmony of colors, every art and science, has the same power. +Even the most common craft, and the most prosaic of all prose, the chase +after the dollar, may take possession of a man's soul and prostrate him +in adoration before its idol. True, not every one is so sentimentally +inclined, and even the sentimentalist is so only in especially +sentimental moments. Furthermore it cannot be denied that artists, +inventors, and explorers are worshipping the most worthy and most +adorable objects. And I admit that no great success can be accomplished +without putting your whole soul into some great aim. + +Nevertheless you should know that anything which may take possession of +one's soul shares its sublimity with all other things, and is for this +reason at the same time something ordinary. Without such a dialectic +clarification of our consciousness all adoration is idol worship. + +The actual experience, then, that anything and everything may serve as +an idol should clearly convince you that no one thing, but only the +universe is the true God, is truth and life. + +Now, is this logic or is it theology? + +It is both. At closer range you will notice that all great logicians +occupy themselves a great deal with God and deity, and that on the other +hand all honest theologians are trying to base their faith on some +logical order. Logic is by its whole nature metaphysical.[3] + +There exists a class of logicians who attempt to deny the inevitable +connection between the celestial region and the tangible universe. Some +of them do so from excessive religious delicacy of feeling, in order to +protect the sublime from the disintegrating effects of critique. Others +have such an antipathy against the religious abuses that they do not +wish to hear any more about religion. Both classes adhere to the +so-called formal logic. + +These adherents of formal logic may be compared to a maker of porcelain +dishes who would contend that he was simply paying attention to the form +of his dishes, pots, and vases, but that he did not have anything to do +with the raw material, while it is evident that he is compelled to form +the body in trying to embody forms. These things can be separated by +words only, but not by actions. In the same way as body and form, the +finite and infinite or so-called celestial spheres, the physical and the +metaphysical, are inseparable. + +Logic analyzes thought. But it analyzes thought as it is in reality, and +therefore it unavoidably searches for truth. And whether this truth is +found above or below, or anywhere, is a question which just as +inevitably brings the logician into contact with the theologian. To +think of avoiding such a meeting from considerations of sympathy or +antipathy, would be a rude lack of consideration for science. + +Metaphysical logic which aims to extend its field to eternity, which +looks for logical order even in heaven, and seeks to solve even the +so-called last questions of all knowledge, differs in a distinct way +from formal logic, which selects a restricted field for its research and +confines itself to investigating the logical order of the socalled +physical world. This difference is worthy of your special attention, +because in it there is hidden the kernel of our whole correspondence. + +It is quite a practical method to set a limit for one's investigations, +not to fly into clouds, not to undertake anything that cannot be +accomplished. Yet you must not forget that practical boundaries are not +theoretical boundaries, that they are not invariable boundaries for you, +or for others. Although you cannot fly to heaven and will give up the +idea of flying machines from considerations of practical expediency, yet +you will not wish to deny to man the theoretical freedom of infinite +striving even in the matter of airships, and you will not be so small as +to give up the idea of the capacity for our race for metaphysical, or in +other words, infinite development. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[3] In the sense of: mental and physical world embracing, +all-embracing.--Editor. + + + + +FOURTH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +In my first letter I acquainted you with my purpose, in the second I +lifted the subject on my finger tips, so to say, to show it for a brief +moment; in the third I showed that its color had inevitably a religious +shade. Now, to continue, permit me to introduce another point to your +consideration. + +The great cause of the working class has hitherto always been the beast +of burden of a small and exclusive minority. This is most evident in the +slave states of antiquity, in Egypt, Greece, Rome. Likewise in the +feudal and guild systems of the middle ages the oppression of the mass +of the people is sufficiently apparent. At present this condition of +things is more visible in Eastern Europe, in Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, +Hungary, Eastern Prussia, etc., than in the industrial countries of the +West. In the United States of America it is most obscured, so that there +the people hardly realize their enslaved condition. In America, many of +the upper ten thousand have made their way from the bottom up, and it +happens more frequently than in Europe that the captains of industry +laid their foundation by hard work. The shortsighted observers then +easily forget out of sympathy for the hard beginning that there is +sharper's practice at the end, and they indulge in the idle hope that +every hard working beast of burden might transform itself into a happy +millionaire by thrift and smartness. + +You will probably ask: What has that to do with logic or the art of +reasoning? Patience! You will admit that the emancipation of the nations +from beastly toil, misery and suffering is the highest goal of the human +mind. Nor will you deny that the thought is the most essential +instrument for reaching this high goal. The accomplishments of thought +are visible in the results of civilization. The proletariat of the +present, also that of Russia, Turkey, East Prussia, participates in +these accomplishments of thought. It participates not alone in the sense +that its brains are better educated and cultured, but also that its +food, clothing, and shelter have become more civilized through the +progressive deeds of intellect. + +You see, then, that the people's cause is connected with the faculty of +thought, and the nature of the latter may be illustrated as well by the +example of the development of civilization. The complicated network of +wheels in a watch may also serve to demonstrate the nature of that which +language designates by many names, such as spirit, intellect, faculty of +knowledge, reason, etc. Only it must be remembered that this mysterious +something cannot be shown by itself, but only in connection with other +things, whether they be the history of civilization or a watch. There +will then be no contradiction in finding that the intellectual life +appears more powerful and magnificent through the clockwork of the +history of civilization than through any miniature product of thought. + +In searching for the connection of things, one generally seeks to +recognize the manner or the degree of the connection. But we, in this +case, disregard the question as to how the things of this world are +related to one another and to thought, and we simply make a note of the +fact of the interdependence of thought and being, of nature and mind. +This fact of the universal interconnection of things contradicts the +untrained prejudice. The uncultivated brain nurses the illusion that the +earth, the trees on it, and the clouds and the sun above them are +separate things. But it requires a better training of reason to +understand that the earth, the tree, the clouds, and the sun, can be +what they are only in the universal interconnection. I remember reading +an article from Fichte, in a German school reader, which clearly showed +that the disarrangement of an insignificant object during the process of +thinking causes us to disarrange the whole history of the world in our +thoughts. It is well known that one unfamiliar with political economy +overlooks the fact that the business men not only carry on their trading +for their private benefit, but are also members of the process of social +production. It is overlooked that all labor, aside from being individual +activity, is at the same time an organic part of social labor. And just +as ignorance of economics overlooks the industrial interdependence, so +ignorance of logic overlooks the cosmic interrelations. + +Here is a drop of water. Look how different it is according to the +different things with which it is connected. It cannot be what it is +without a certain temperature. According to changes in temperature, it +will assume either the form of ice or of steam. In fat the drop remains +compact, in salt it divides infinitely, runs downhill in general and +uphill in a loaf of sugar. According to the specific gravity of a +certain fluid, with which it may come into contact, it either floats on +the surface or sinks. Without a connection with the earth, its +temperature and gravitation, this drop and all others would disappear in +the fathomless abyss and have no existence. Thus the forms of things +change according to their connections, and they are what they are only +as parts of the universal interrelation. + +What is true of a drop of water, is true of all things, all forces and +substances, even of our thoughts. The human mind lives and works only in +connection with the rest of the material universe--and the recognition +of the organic unity of all things is the fulcrum of my logic. + +Old line metaphysical logic was so enamored of its object that the +descent, the kinship, and the connection with the common things of this +world seemed too ordinary for the exquisite spirit. That logic was +transcendental, and therefore its chosen object likewise had to be in +touch with a transcendental world. And though it was scientific enough +to regard the tale of the creation of the first soul by the breath of +God as a fable, it was nevertheless so prejudiced in favor of the +extraordinary nature of the intellect that it did not abandon, for +thousands of years, the hope of finding in that intellect a source which +would reveal transcendental matters. Formal logic now entirely discards +this hope of a fantastical world, but at the same time it misunderstands +the natural connection between the spirit and the common world. It +isolates the instrument of thought and leaves the question undecided +whether this instrument has a natural, supernatural, or no connection at +all. It overlooks that just as logic is real, so reality is logical, and +does not see that the back door which leads to illogical heaven by way +of faith deserves the disdain of science. + +Thought, intellect, are really existing, and their existence is a +uniform part of the universal existence. That is the cardinal point of +sober logic. + +The fact that the thoughts are of the same worldly substance as the +other parts of the universe, that they are parts of common nature and +not a transcendental essence, has already been expressed by Cartesius in +the famous words: "_Cogito, ergo sum_," I think, therefore I am. + +The fact of my thinking, says the philosopher, proves my existence. In +order to come to an absolute conviction on the nature of truth and +error, he sets out by doubting everything. And then he says that he +cannot doubt the existence of his thoughts. He thus placed the spirit on +the basis of real life, delivered it of its transcendentalism, and that +constitutes his everlasting merit. + +However, not alone Cartesius, but also your own experience testifies to +the inseparable connection between thinking and being. Have not your +thoughts been connected always and everywhere with some worldly or real +object? If you attempt to isolate thought in order to ponder over it, +you can only do so because that thought has been experienced by you and +therefore was in every instance attached to some worldly object. True, +you have thought of Greek gods, brownies, and mermaids. But you, an +amateur in painting, are familiar enough with that part of the mind +which is called imagination in order to admit that even this eccentric +part of the mind does not only act, and therefore, exist in reality, but +also derives all its products from reality, so that even its most +fantastical vagaries and illusions are still real pictures, reflections +of reality. + +But how is it that I require such a multitude of words in order to state +over and over again that the thought has a real existence and is a +uniform part of the universe? Simply because from time immemorial the +confusion in matters of logic is so great that the human spirit is in +the same breath exalted to heaven, and yet its thoughts regarded as +nothing real, nothing true. This is made plain by the fact that a sharp +distinction is commonly made between that which is real and that which +is only imagined, and this difference is exaggerated to such an extent +that it appears as if the idea, which indeed is only in the brain, has +no real existence at all. + +In order that you may understand the interrelations of the things of the +universe, I must warn you against this exaggeration and prove that the +intellect has a real existence which is connected with the universe or +reality. Botany, which occupies itself with plants, does not only teach +us to divide them into classes, orders, and families, but it also does +more by showing us what place in the entire realm of nature is occupied +by the vegetable kingdom, by pointing out the differences which +distinguish the plants from the inorganic mineral kingdom or the organic +animal kingdom. Formal logic similarly dissects the spirit into its +parts, makes distinctions between conceptions, ideas, judgments, +conclusions, divides these into subdivisions, classifies conceptions +according to species, separates abstract and concrete thought, knows +many varieties of judgments, registers three, four, or more modes of +conclusion. But at the same time this formal logic recoils from touching +on the question as to how the universal spirit is related to the +universe, what role it plays in the general existence, whether it is +part and parcel of nature or transcendental. And yet this is the most +interesting part, the part which logically connects the intellect and +the science of the intellect with all other sciences and things. + +Logic must teach us how to distinguish. It is not a question, however, +of distinguishing sheet iron from gold, or a greyhound from a pug-dog, +for this is done by special lines of knowledge. Logic must rather +enlighten us about that part of the faculty of distinguishing which is +generally required in all branches of knowledge, whereby truth and +error, imagination and reality are recognized. To this end I feel +impelled to advise you not to overlook that even error and imagination +belong to the one infinite and absolutely coherent reality. For the +purpose of distinguishing true imagination from actual reality, it must +be remembered that just as rye bread and cream puffs agree in belonging +to the general category of baker's products, so imagination and truth, +thought and reality, are two different kinds of the same nature. + +To sum up the contents of this letter, let me point out that its +beginning shows the connection of the intellect with the development of +the people, while its conclusion explains the wider connection of the +mind with the universal existence. + + + + +FIFTH LETTER + + +A man not trained in logical thinking is handicapped by the absence of a +monistic method of thought. Monistic is synonymous with systematic, +logical, or uniform. + +If we call a cream puff a tidbit and rye bread a food without +remembering that every food is a tidbit and every tidbit food, and if we +ignore the fact that both of them, in spite of their difference, belong +to the same category and are, therefore, related, then we lack logic. +And logic is lacking whenever the fact is ignored that all things +without exception: substances, forces, or qualities of the world, are +chips of the same block, finite parts of the infinite, which is the only +truth and reality. + +That insects, fishes, birds, and mammals form one and the same animal +kingdom, is an old story which has long been patched up by the logical +instinct. Darwin did not only enrich the natural sciences, but also +perform an invaluable service for logic. In proving how amphibia +developed into birds, he bored a hole into the hitherto fixed order of +classification. He brought motion, life, spirit into the zoological +swamp. + +In case you should not be familiar enough with Darwin's work to +understand my allusions, I will enter a little more deeply into the +matter in a few sentences. The zoologists knew well enough that all +species of animals belonged to the animal kingdom; but this +classification was a mechanical affair. Now the "Origin of Species," +which demonstrates that the zoological classification is not constant +but variable, which outlines the actual transition from one species of +animals to another, reveals at the same time that this alignment of all +animal species in one kingdom is not only a logical mechanism, but also +a fact of actual existence. This classification of all animals from the +minutest to the most gigantic in one kingdom appeared before the time of +Darwin as an order which had been accomplished by thought alone, while +after him it was known as an order of nature. + +What the zoologists did to the animal kingdom, must be done by the +logician to existence in general, to the cosmos. It must be shown that +the whole world, all forms of its existence, including the spirit, are +logically or monistically connected, related, welded together. + +A certain narrow materialism thinks that everything is done and said +when the inter-connection between thought and brain is pointed out. A +good many things may still be discovered by the help of the dissecting +knife, microscope, and experiment; but this does not make the function +of logic superfluous. True, thought and brain are connected, just as +intimately as the brain is related to the blood, the blood with oxygen, +etc.; but moreover thought is connected quite as intimately with all +other things as all physical objects are. + +That the apple is not alone dependent on the stem which attaches it to +the tree, but also on sunshine and rain, that these things are not +one-sidedly but universally connected, this is what logic wants to teach +you particularly in regard to the spirit, the thought. + +If a traveler in Africa had to report a new animal species, he would not +make special mention of the fact of its existence, because that is +obvious. And though he were to relate things about the most abnormal +existence, we should still know that this abnormality is only a +deviation in degree which does not overstep the bounds of existence in +general. But the human intellect is a greater novelty than the most +wonderful animal species of the interior of Africa. + +You know my sharpwitted friend Engländer. When I told him that I was +writing articles on the human mind, he advised me not to bother my head +about it. He said that this was a subject no man knew anything about. +And when the learned Mr. Hinze, whom you also know, wanted to prove the +inevitability of religious faith and the inadequacy of all science, he +always asked the pathetic question: What is consciousness? And he used +to take on an expression, as if he had presented a book with seven +seals. Now I don't want to class the professors of logic with such men. +But it is a fact that the great multitude, among them many scientists, +are quite unfamiliar with the truth that the existence of the blue sky +and of the green trees is a uniform part of the same generality with the +existence of our intellect. + +For this reason it is necessary to prove that the intellect exists in +the same way that all other things do. For it is denied and +misunderstood, not only by those who regard the spirit as a being of a +transcendental nature, but also by those who admit the existence of the +true contents of an ideological concept, but not of thought itself. In +short, the matter is so obscure that I feel sure that you will likewise +be as yet in doubt whether there are not two kinds of ideological +concepts, one of them real, the other unreal. + +For two thousand years logic has proclaimed the sentence that thought is +a form to be filled with real contents. True thought "must coincide with +reality." It is true that there is a germ of sense in this statement, +but it is misunderstood. The central point of logic is overlooked. Every +thought must not only have a real content, but it is also necessary, in +order to distinguish true thoughts or perceptions from untrue, to +realize that thought is always and everywhere a part of reality and +truth, even when it contains the most singular imaginations and errors. + +Just as the domestic cat and the panther are different species of cats +and yet belong to the same genus of cats, so true and false thoughts, in +spite of all their differences, are of the same genus. For truth is so +great that it comprises absolutely everything. Truth, reality, the +world, the all, the infinite and the absolute are synonymous +expressions. A clear conception of truth is indispensable for the +understanding of logic. And in the last analysis it is simply using +different words for the same thing, when I base the quintessence of +logic, its fulcrum, cardinal, salient, or distinctive point on the +spirit intimately united to nature or on the concept of a uniform world, +truth, or reality. I cannot give you a clearer view of truth than by +quoting at this place the famous words of Lessing: "If God were to offer +me the ever active striving for truth in his left hand and truth in his +right hand, I should grasp his left and say: Father, keep truth, it is +for you alone." This statement is somewhat highflown and mystical, and +Lessing was no doubt somewhat embarrassed by mystical thinking. Still +there is a sober truth in these words, which is quite clear and to the +point. + +"Truth itself" is the universe, the infinite and inexhaustible. Every +part of it is a finite part of the infinite and is, therefore, finite +and infinite, perishable and imperishable at the same time. Every part +is a separate part and connected inseparably with the whole. The human +mind, among others, is such a part. + +The universal existence, or truth, is the inexhaustible object of the +human mind. The fact that in the study of logic the human mind has +itself for an object must be explained to the student by pointing out +that in this case the subject and the object are both things like all +other things, in other words, are a part of truth, a part of natural +existence. + +"Truth itself" cannot be wholly conceived by the human brain, but in +parts. For this reason we possess only the ever active striving for +truth; for this reason, furthermore, the conception or knowledge can +never be completely identical with reality, but can be only a part of +it. + +Now permit me to say a few words which do not sound as would those +spoken on the throne of logic, but which are expressed in popular +language. If you conceive some real object, whether a church steeple or +a thimble, then this object exists twice, viz., in reality and in +conception. On the other hand, a certain creation of imagination has +only a simple fantastical existence. Such a popular way of thinking is +undoubtedly correct. It is incorrect only when the fact is universally +ignored that all modes of existence belong to the same genus, the same +as a domestic cat and a panther, so that the existence of a thing in our +brains, and outside of them in the heavens, on earth, and in all places +has a logical meaning only when it is the same existence in spite of all +multiplicity. An existence not partaking of the general nature of all +existence would be an illogical, nonsensical, thing. + +Now, I think you will have no difficulty in understanding me when I say +that a church steeple in imagination and the same church steeple in +reality are not two church steeples, but that imagination and reality +are forms of the same existence. + +Ancient logic ordered a medal and had stamped on its face: The thought +must be identical with the reality. We now stamp on its reverse side: +(1) The thought is itself a part of reality and (2) the reality outside +of thought is too voluminous and cannot enter thought even with its +smallest particle. What good, under these circumstances, is the old +inscription, especially since it does not teach us at all how the +identity between thought and its real object is to be attained, known, +or measured? + +If you, my dear Eugene, should become confused by these statements +instead of enlightened, you should have patience and consider that a +thing which is to be illuminated by logic must, of course, be first +obscure. I believe that I have served you in some way by simply raising +a doubt in your mind as to the soundness of the popular way of speaking +and if I thus have convinced you of the confusion and inadequacy of the +plausible idea of the identity of thought and reality. + +True, a thought must agree with its object just as a portrait should. +But what good will it do a painter to have his special attention called +to this fact? + +Have you ever seen a portrait or a copy that did not agree in some +respect with the original? I am convinced that this has never been your +experience any more than a portrait which was a complete likeness of its +object. Your experience will be sufficiently cultivated to know that it +can always be a question only of a more or less. I would seriously +recommend to you to reflect on the relativeness of all equality, +similarity, and identity. By far the greater part of humanity is in this +respect barbarously thoughtless. It is very difficult to grasp for the +logically untrained brain that two drops of water or twins are only +relatively alike or unlike, just as are man and woman, negro and white +man, and that all existence is just as alike as it is unlike. + +It is with the thinker as it is with the painter. They both search for a +likeness of reality and truth. In painting as in understanding there are +excellent pictures and bad ones. In this respect one may make a +distinction between true and false thoughts, but you must also know that +even the unsuccessful portrait has some likeness, and that even the most +accurate likeness is yet far from being in perfect harmony and identical +with its object. + +Reality, truth, universal nature, stands in the pulpit and preaches: "I +am the Lord, thy God. Thou shalt not make any graven image to worship +it." You must have a far too sublime conception of truth to entertain +the idea that any painter or thinker might encompass it fully within the +limit of a picture, no matter how good a likeness it may be. + +Now, that we have recognized the human mind as a part of actual reality +and truth, we see at the same time that undivided reality, the sum of +all that is, represents absolute truth which comprises everything. In +their capacity of parts of the universe, true and false thoughts, good +and bad men, heaven and hell, and all other things, are all pieces of +the same cloth, bombs of the same caliber. + + + + +SIXTH LETTER + + +My Dear Son: + +After the third letter had acquainted you with the fact that the subject +of logic has a certain religious flavor, the two subsequent letters +endeavored to show that the logical subject is interconnected with the +universal existence of the world, that the faculty of thought is an +inseparable part of actual truth. In the vernacular of theology my last +two letters have represented the human mind as a part of the living true +God. + +Christianity teaches: God is a spirit and who would worship him must +worship in spirit and in truth. + +And logic teaches: The spirit is a part of universal existence. Whoever +worships the spirit, is an idolator, for he worships a part and +misunderstands the whole truth. Truth itself is identical with the +universal existence, with the world, and all things are simply forms, +phenomena, predicates, attributes, passing expressions of it. The +universal existence may be called divine because it is infinite, being +the alpha and omega which comprises all things as special truths. The +intellect is such a limited part among other special parts of divine +truth, and the latter is frequently called world without any bombastic +emphasis. + +Undoubtedly, every science, profession and trade can say the same thing +of its object. The blue sky and the green trees are divine parts. +Everything is interrelated and connected. If that were a good reason for +not making any subdivisions, every part and description would become +endlessly tiresome. + +However, the specialty of logic is the cosmic sum of all truths, because +it aims at a general elucidation of the nature of the human brain. This +purpose is not so well served by an accumulation of other knowledge as +by the general understanding of truth. + +Logic, which seeks to enlighten the mind for the purpose of scientific +thinking, does not so much treat of true conceptions as of the general +and absolute conception of truth which is inseparably linked to the +infinite universal life. + +If you wish to think scientifically, you will first of all strive after +clear ideas. And yet your head may be quite clear in regard to everyday +things, without getting any nearer to general clearness. Nor is such +clearness obtainable by the accumulation of mere special knowledge, for +even if you were to grow in wisdom to the end of your days, nevertheless +the fountain of wisdom, the universe, is inexhaustible and your brain +will remain imperfectly informed or unclear as before. Yea, even the +smallest part of the world is so inexhaustible that the most talented +can never acquire all the knowledge necessary to understand entirely +even the most minute object. The strongest microscope cannot see all +there is to see in a drop of water, and the wisest man can never learn +all there is to shoemaking. + +You can see by all this that the scientific use of our intellect is +furthered by special knowledge only in the corresponding details. For +this reason it does not satisfy us to have some logicians tell us how +many kinds of concepts, judgments and conclusions are contained in our +intellect. These are special details of logic. But the thing of first +importance for the student of logic is the elucidation of the universal +concept of truth, not the accumulation of special truths. + +Special truths enlighten the intellect. But the understanding that all +specialties are connected with one another by one monad or unit which is +truth itself gives us a certain general enlightenment which certainly +does not render any special research unnecessary, or take the place of +it, but which may well serve as the foundation of all research, which +may therefore be called a fundamental assistance. + +I may remark in passing that the understanding of logical science is +rendered especially difficult by the fact that the unpracticed +understands all terms and concepts only in their narrow popular meaning, +while the subject matter leads up continually into the widest fields. + +When I speak of parts of the world, you must not think merely of +geographical parts, but you must think farther until you arrive at the +insight that stars and bricks, matter and force, in short all parts of +the world are world parts. + +The logical difficulty may be principally traced to the lack of +familiarity with the comprehensive categories. It will be clear to you +that thinking and being, phenomenon and truth, etc., are conceptions of +the widest scope. So you may have some difficulty in distinguishing +between concepts of truth, and true concepts. And yet this is the same +as making a distinction between the general class of herbs and its +individual species. The mere intercourse with such comprehensive +concepts as truth, existence, universe, is an excellent school of +intellectual enlightenment. + +Perhaps you may object to the deviation of a science devoted to the +special study of the faculty of thought into such fields as existence or +truth. But a logic confined to an analysis of the faculty of +understanding would be narrow compared to one representing this faculty +of understanding at work in real life. If the science of the eye were to +treat only of the various parts of the eye without considering the +things outside connected with its function, the light, the objects, in +short, the vision of the eye, it would be more an anatomy of the eye +than a general science of the eye. At all events a science which +represents not alone the subjective faculty of vision, but also the +living activity of the eye, the objective field of vision inseparable +from the subjective faculty, is a far more comprehensive instruction, a +higher enlightenment of the human brain. + +In my opinion, logic should not so much treat of the analysis of the +intellectual subject as of the purpose and object of the faculty of +thought, its culture, which is not accomplished by the intellect itself, +but by its connection with the world of truth, its interrelation with +the universal existence. + +What can a logic accomplish which divides thought into analytical and +synthetical thoughts, which speaks of inductive and deductive +understanding and of a dozen other kinds, but which finally declines to +meet the question of the relation of thought and understanding to truth, +and fails to indicate what and where is divine truth and how we may +arrive at it? + +Pilate, the typical sceptic, shrugs his shoulders; the clergymen make a +mystery of divine truth; the natural sciences care only for the true +conceptions, but naught for the concept of truth; and then the special +science of understanding, formal logic, tries to refer its task to +philosophy or world wisdom. + +I have already pointed out that the titles of the principal works on +philosophy indicate that the whole world wisdom turns around the +question: How can our brain be enlightened, how can it arrive at truth? +The naturalists answer that this can be accomplished by special studies, +and they are frequently opposed to philosophical research which makes +general truth its main object, and belittle it. You will readily see +that this is a mistake when you consider that, to illustrate, a machine +or an organism as a whole is still something more than a mere sum of its +parts. + +No matter how well you may know each single part, yet you will not +understand the whole machine or organism by this means alone. The +universe is not an aggregation of unorganized parts, but a living +process which must be understood not only in its parts but also as a +whole. We may pass for the moment the question whether the Milky Way may +be dissolved into stars, and whether the stars may become globes like +our Earth which may develop plants, animals, and intelligent beings. The +thing which is evident is that there is a process of development, that +all nature takes part in this movement, that the universe is a whole +without end, composed of an infinite number of parts; a coming and +going, an eternal transformation, which is always identical with itself +and always the same world. What all this would be without our eyes and +ears and without the intellect by means of which we use eyes and ears, +what the world "in itself" is, that is a senseless and transcendental +speculation. + +The science of logic must deal only with the actual world which is +inseparable from us and from our thoughts. + +This world which we hear, see, smell, in which we live and breathe, is +the world of truth or the true world. That is a fact. Must I prove this? +And how is a fact proven? How do we prove that a peach is a delicious +fruit? One goes and eats it. In the same way, you may now go and enjoy +life, of course in a rational manner, and I am convinced that your own +love of life will tell you that it is proof positive of the truth of the +world, of its actuality. + +But even in the midst of this actual world there is present an +inconsistent element, a human race with a confused logic. This race has +been led by various depressing and saddening circumstances to blacken +the delicious truth of this world and to look for a transcendental truth +in philosophical metaphysics or religious fantasmagorias, both of which +are parts of the same stew. The philosophers of misery who make of the +world of truth a vain shadow and a miserable vale of sorrow must needs +be convinced by logic that the living world is the only true one. + +Well, that is not so difficult. But there is a danger of getting into a +vicious circle of errors, imitating a snake biting its own tail. I have +to prove logically that the world and truth are one and the same thing, +before we have come to an agreement as to what is logical truth or true +logic. Nevertheless, nature has assisted us. The logic of nature is the +true logic by the help of which we can agree. Nothing more is required +than a somewhat trained brain. + +Take two men having a dispute about truth. One of them says it is one +thing, the other that it is something else. So they are arguing about +that which is. This last word is a form of the verb to be. Hence in +arguing whether the remote nebula in the heavens is a brick or a star, a +male or a female, one is always discussing some form of existence. All +disputes turn around forms of existence, but existence itself is an +undisputable truth. + +Have I now still to prove that all existence is of the same category? +Are there any stones that do not belong to the category of stones, or +any kind of wood which is iron? What would become of reason and +language, if such a thing were to be considered? And yet, much that is +being said by opponents is of such a nature. + +If I have succeeded in convincing you that the universe is the truth, +there still remains the special question: What place shall we assign to +fantastic ideas, error, and untruth? If the universe is the truth, then +everything would be true, and hence it seems contradictory that error +and untruth should have a place in truth or in the world. Of this more +anon. I shall only point out in passing that untruth may without any +contradiction belong to truth, just as weeds are a negation of herbs and +still at the same time herbs. + +In conclusion I call your attention to the eminently proletarian +character of the science of truth. It gives to the working class the +logical justification to renounce all clerical and mystic control and to +look for salvation in this same world in which divine truth is living. + + + + +SEVENTH LETTER + + +The philologists distinguish carefully between a science of language and +a science of languages. The latter teaches Egyptian, Assyrian, Hebrew, +Greek, Latin, English, French, etc., while the former treats of the +general characteristics common to all languages, of language itself. + +Philosophical logic stands in the same relation to other sciences. The +latter make us acquainted with special truths, while logic treats of +truth in general. Those overintelligent people who claim that truth is +merely a collective term for many truths do not see the woods for trees. +Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Max Müller, Steinthal, etc., have many +things to say about the science of language of which the linguists with +many languages never dream. + +The science of language, aside from its many amenities, is also burdened +with a difficult problem which it cannot solve without the help of +logic. This problem is the point of differentiation where babbling and +word-mongery cease and intelligent speech begins. For human speech has a +certain meaning, and even the cries of the animals are not without +sense. The sparrows know how to converse together, the rooster calls +his flock together, the dog knows how to announce that a stranger +enters his master's home. Not alone the jokers, but serious thinkers +speak of animal language, of a sign language, and maintain that speech +does not alone consist of words, but also of inarticulate sounds and +gestures. Poets endow even the storm, the thunder and the winds with +speech. We wish to clear this confusion and ascertain what language is +and where it begins. Languages, as is well known, have their beginning +at the Tower of Babel. But in order to get close to language, we must +look for a beginning of things either in God or in logic. + +You know the old question: Which was first, the egg or the hen? But only +a frivolous mind overlooks the serious side of this question and turns +it into a mere joke. The question of beginning and end is an eminently +logical one, and an unequivocal and clear answer to it would bring light +not alone into the science of language, but also into the human brain. + +Let us, therefore, follow up the problem of the "origin of language" a +little farther. When our forefathers dealt with this question, they +thought that a God had given speech to man or some genius had invented +it. They thought of a beginning in time. The modern thinkers speculate +more deeply. They have found out that language is not a fixed thing, but +fluid, and has risen from low beginnings to a great perfection. We can +no more find its temporal beginning by looking backward than we can see +its end by looking ahead. For this reason we no longer look for its +temporal, but for its ideological beginning. (Steinthal.) We should like +to have a fixed mark where we might say: Up to this point that which +resembles speech is only roaring, exclamation, noise, and here is the +beginning of the well articulated sound which deserves the name of +"spoken word." + +But there is still another factor which complicates the question +further. Some say: It is not only the sound, the word, which constitutes +speech, but the connected sentence; there must be sense and reason mixed +with it. And this applies to the speaker and to the listener. Language +presupposes reason. + +Then, again, intellect is not a fixed thing, but a fluid process which +develops in, from, and by speech. So it appears on one side as if the +mind produces language, and on the other, as if language produces the +mind, the reason. Where, then, is the beginning and end, and how can we +bring order into these relations? + +For us, who are studying the mind, not the language, the conclusion +follows that it is not alone the word, but also the sound, the tone, the +gesture, that all things have a meaning and speak a language. We find +mind wherever we penetrate with our mind. Not alone language, but the +world is connected with the mind, with the thought. But the connection +with language may well serve as an illustration by which the connection +of the cosmic mind may be demonstrated and the human brain illuminated. + +Language shares the honor with the mind of being extolled, even in this +sober century, if not to the skies, at least far out of the general +connection of common things. For this reason, we must emphasize in the +case of language as in that of the mind, that they exist, that they are +part and parcel of the universal existence. At this point I wish to give +you a vivid illustration of the unity of all being by pointing out that +it is indubitably established by the existence of one single name which +is sufficient to designate _All_. True, language employs many names for +this unity of the world, but that is a luxury. It is logical and +necessary for the intellect to have _one_ name for the _All_, because +everything is not only infinitely variegated, but also infinitely one, +or a unit. There are many different waters, but all water partakes of +the general nature of water. Unless that nature is present, there is no +water and the name of water does not apply. In the same way there are +many kinds of oil; olive oil, kerosene oil, castor oil, etc., and each +kind has its own subdivisions. But everything that has a common name is +a unit. + +Kindly observe, now, that the names of things form just such circles as +the water does after being struck by a stone. Just as the name water, so +the name oil indicates a ring. Then the name fluid constitutes another +and wider ring which includes both oil and water. Then the name matter +draws a still wider circle and includes solids as well as fluids, and +finally the name being, or _All_, includes mind and matter, all matter +and force, including heaven and hell, in one sole ring, in one unit. + +On the basis of this universal unity, from which it becomes apparent +that high and low, dry and fluid, in short the whole universe is made of +the same substance, any fantastic thinker can prove that human and +animal language is one, for otherwise one could not refer to both of +them as language. He may then justly contend that speech, producing a +sound, is a noise, that speech and noise are one. Speech is sound and +sound speaks. In this way language would have no beginning and no end. +In the last analysis it would be one with all things, and all things +would be one with it. In this way the whole universe would become an +inexplicable, incomprehensible, inexpressible mixture of speech. + +And yet it is an old story that man's insight grows the more he +magnifies a thing. The more excessively we exaggerate a thing, the +plainer become its boundaries. Language indeed requires one single name +for _All_, but it also requires an infinite number of names in order to +specify the parts of _All_. Inasmuch as language claims to be only a +part of existence, this part has to be bounded, and you should in this +connection remember the unlimited freedom of man in drawing such +boundaries. Words are not merely empty words, but names of cosmic parts, +of cosmic rings of undulation. Language, or rather the mind connected +with language, wishes to bound the infinite by the help of language. The +instinctive popular use of language does this in a haphazard way. +Conscious science proceeds in an exact manner. Just as it has determined +on the field of temperature what should be called hot and what warm, so +it is at liberty on the field of sounds to determine where the name of +language begins or ceases. The end of the discussion of language is +therefore this: That which has already been done to horse power has not +yet been done to the concept of language; it has been somewhat fixed by +common usage, but only insufficiently. And so the moral of this tale is +that the things of this world, even mind and language, are connected and +intermingling undulations of the same stream, which has neither +beginning nor end. + +Let me say it once more clearly and without circumlocution: The logic +which I teach and the thought which is its object are parts of the +world, of the infinite, and every part being a piece of the infinite is +likewise infinite. Every part partakes of the nature of the infinite. +Hence you must not expect that I should exhaust my infinite subject. I +confine myself to the logical chapter of "the One and the Many." I +simply wish to make it plain that without any contradiction the whole +multiplicity of existence is of the same nature, and that this oneness +of nature subdivides into manifold forms. The world is interconnected +and this interconnection is subdivided into departments. It adds to the +general enlightenment of the human brain to recognize this in regard to +language, to mind, to all parts of the universe. + +I repeat, then: One may think logically without having attended any +lectures on logic, just as one may raise potatoes without a scientific +knowledge of agriculture. It was possible to invent the thermometer, to +clearly distinguish between sounds and colors, and a hundred other +things, without having explained the faculty of discrimination. But the +most abstract distinctions, such as beginning and end, word and meaning, +body and soul, man and animal, matter and force, truth and error, +presuppose for their explanation a logical explanation of their +interconnection with our intellect. + + + + +EIGHTH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Logic is going through the same experience as economics. The economists +of the capitalist era talk solely of the means and ways by which profit +and surplus value may be increased. They discuss only its relative size, +its increase or decrease. But the thing itself, its origin and descent, +is not discussed. It is passed in silence that profit is extracted from +labor power by paying less for a day's work than is produced by it. The +gentlemen talk only of the "wealth of nations," but not of their +poverty. And though this was due to ignorance in the beginning, it has +later become sheer roguery. + +The formal logicians are as ignorant as they are roguish, when they +persist in discussing the intellect or thought in the traditional manner +as if they were isolated things, while ignoring the necessary connection +of the object of the logical study with the world of experiences. This +interconnection leads to an explanation of truth and error, of sense and +nonsense, of god and idols, and this is very inopportune for the +professors. For this reason this unwelcome problem is handed over to the +mystical departments, to metaphysics and religion, so that these +venerable pillars of official wisdom may continue their services to the +ruling classes. + +I have already stated in my letters that the kernel of my discussion +turns on the distinction between formal and what I call proletarian +logic. The formal logicians treat the intellect as a thing "in itself," +while I express in many different ways the fact that the intellect does +not exist by itself, but is interconnected with all things and with the +universe. + +That intellect has indeed a transcendental leaning, which seeks vent by +trying to exclude now music, now language, now itself, now some other +fetich from the universal interrelation. But the science of the mind +teaches that the brain watching its own activity finds out that all +affirmations and negations, assertions and contradictions, belong to the +one omnipotent world mechanism, which keeps them stored within itself +and which is actually truth and life. Inasmuch as the human brain is of +the same nature as this automatic universal being and interconnected +with it, logic is at the same time religion, metaphysics, and world +wisdom.[4] + +Formal logic teaches that our intellect must keep all things apart, but +does not teach that it must also connect them. This logic is right in +one way and yet does not arrive at the goal of a clear world philosophy, +because it permits the transcendental leaning to exaggerate the +differences and distinctions. It overlooks the paradoxical or +dialectical nature of things which are not only separated but also +connected. What must be understood is that, generally speaking, the +classification of the universe is only a formality. We are, indeed, +justified in distinguishing between above and Below, right and left, +beginning and end, gold and sheet metal, good and bad, but we must also +enlighten ourselves as to how multiplicity can be a unity, the variable +constant, and the constant variable. Formal logic has a wrong name. It +is not formal, but transcendental. It shares the common prejudice that +there are absolutely contradictory things or irreconcilable opposites, +that there are essential differences which have no connection, no bridge +between them, nothing in common. It teaches that contradictions cannot +exist, and contradicts itself by clinging to the belief that there are +irreconcilable contradictions. It teaches that a thing which contradicts +itself is inconceivable, is not true, and thus reveals that it is not +well informed on the formality of contradictions, on the true +conciliation of contradictions, and on universal truth. Gold is not +sheet iron, that is true enough. Whoever calls gold sheet metal or +sheet metal gold, contradicts himself. In the actual world both things +are separated. Yet they are not separated to such extent that gold and +sheet iron do not partake of the same nature, of the nature of all +metal. Gold and sheet iron are unlike metals, but they have the same +metallic likeness. That like things are different and different things +alike, that it is everywhere only a question of the degree of +difference, of formal differences, this is overlooked by "formal" logic +and by all who seek truth in any logical diagram or fetich, instead of +in the eternal, omnipresent existence of the inseparable universe. + +Our logic deals with truth or with the universe, which contains the most +sublime gods and the meanest deviltry, in other words, which contains +everything. In the world truth there is contained error, pretense, lies, +just as death also lives in it. In other words, error, pretense, lies, +death are only phenomena, formalities, passing trifles or things which +are nothing compared to the one thing, that thing of all things, which +is being, truth, life. + +The understanding of the one living world truth is so greatly aggravated +by the so-called contradictions which it contains. We find for instance +that where one thing ends another begins. The end of the one is the +beginning of another. Every beginning is at the same time an end. Both +are contained in one another, and yet in our minds beginning and end are +separated. We find the beginning and the end everywhere and nowhere. Or +look into space. You do not see any boundary, and yet your vision +reaches only a certain distance. Your vision is bounded and yet there is +no boundary to be seen. Or look at life. Death soon arrives, and yet a +closer look shows that death is not really death, for "a new life arises +from the ruins." The world proves to be the eternal life which does not +know death. It is a contradiction to say that death lives, but this +contradiction can be solved by the understanding that the difference +between life and death, however great, is still a formal one, a +difference which like all other differences is reduced to relative +insignificance by the infinite cosmic life. + +There exists a widely diffused school, if this term may be applied to +the unschooled, that preaches patience in the matter of the +systematization of our thoughts or the enlightenment of our intellect, +and though it no longer hopes for a mysterious revelation, yet founds +its faith on natural science which has explained so many things to us +and which is finally supposed to throw light on the "last questions of +all knowledge." But I can easily convince you that the new countries, +plants, animals. Esquimaux, that may be discovered on polar expeditions, +or the inventions which Edison may perhaps make on the field of +electricity, or the experiences which future astronomers may gather in +regard to suns, moons, and comets, while they may add valuable +contributions to science and life, will yet do little toward a correct +general employment of our intellect or to a universal enlightenment of +the human brain. On the other hand, an enlightenment as to the nature +and meaning of contradictions will spread light to the remotest corners +of imagination, into the heavens and eternity, into the existence of the +whole, the unity and difference of all things. + +The most drastic, and perhaps the most instructive, illustration of the +correct meaning of contradictions is given by the contrast between +truth and untruth. These two poles are perhaps more widely separated +than the North Pole and the South Pole, and yet they are as intimately +connected as these two. The commonplace logic will hardly listen to the +demonstration of the unity of such apparently wide opposites as truth +and untruth. Therefore you will pardon me, if I illustrate this example +by others, for instance by the contrast between day and night. Take it +that the day lasts twelve hours and the night likewise. Day and night +are opposites. Where there is day cannot be any night, and yet day and +night constitute one single day of twenty-four hours, in which they both +dwell harmoniously. It is the same with truth and untruth. The world is +the truth, and error, pretense, and lies are embodied in it, are parts +of the actual world, just as night is a part of day without confusing +logic. We may honestly speak of genuine pretense and true lies, without +any contradiction. Just as unreason has still some reason left, so +untruth still lives inevitably in truth, because the latter is +all-embracing, is the universe. + +"Contradictions cannot exist." But confused brains full of +contradictions nevertheless exist. Knives without handles and blades, +two mountains without a valley between them, and other nonsense, exist +as a phrase. There are two kinds of contradictions: Senseless ones and +very sensible ones. Yea, the whole world[5] is an infinite and +inexhaustible contradiction, which contains innumerable sensible +statements and misstatements, which never disappear and yet may be +solved harmoniously by the help of time and reason. + +From this it follows that the formal criteria of truth which are on +everybody's tongue, such as the identity of thought with its object, and +the absence of all contradictions, do not furnish a basis at all for the +analysis of truth and cannot define it, except in an ignorant and +roguish way. + +Since the prophet Daniel scattered ashes in the temple and unmasked the +servants of Baal, other idol worshippers have continued to stimulate the +people to daily sacrifices, in order to steal the victuals at night. +This continual rascality and its repeated exposure has blunted the +desire of the people to serve truth, so that a great many have become +frivolous and indifferent. This rascally logic, not to mention +ignorance, encourages the frivolous and indifferent in their godless +departure from truth. In the pulpit and in the garb of science it +preaches the vanity and inadequacy of research. This is preached not as +a dogma, but as a logical science, and thus the senseless contradiction +is committed of trying to prove truly by the help of the intellect that +the intellect is too limited to grasp the truth and prove it. + +In its historical course logical research once arrived at such a result +in good faith. This happened in the famous "Critique of Reason" of +Immanuel Kant. Our shrewd friends of darkness now seek to utilize the +fame of this work, to which it is entitled on account of its great +contribution toward the elucidation of cosmic truth, for the purpose of +preventing on the strength of it a progress of enlightenment beyond the +standpoint of Kant. + +By the way, Kant has demonstrated that the truth in general is as much a +matter of experience as the brain with which we search for it. He has +shown beyond a doubt that our eyes and ears are inseparably connected +with our mind and with the whole cosmic truth. But the persistent spirit +of transcendentalism, or what is the same thing, the traditional belief +in the transcendental spirit, has led him to grant a mysterious +existence alongside of or above the human mind, alongside of or above +the cosmic truth, to an incomprehensible monster spirit and to a +fantastical hyper-truth. + +The Kantian critique of reason did not understand the universality of +truth. It still affirmed the existence of two worlds and two truths +without any unity. And as it is the curse of the evil deed to generate +more evil, it produced two intellects. (1) The poor little subservient +intellect of man, and (2) the enormous and abnormal intellect of the +_Lord_, who is supposed to understand the incomprehensible and to untie +the most senseless contradictions like so many knots. + +The truth which is the universe, the cosmic or universal truth, will +reveal to you the absurdity of abnormal humility which is contained in +the dualistic doctrine of the two minds. Of course, the philosopher Kant +had a greater intellect than Peter Simple. But nevertheless all +intellects partake of the nature of the general intellect, and no +intellect can step above or below this general nature without losing +sense or reason. One cannot speak of another, higher, faculty of thought +than that acquired by man through experience without dropping from logic +to absurdity. No doubt the animal world possesses something similar to +intellect. No doubt, also, the animal mind may be separated from the +human mind by some special name, for instance "instinct." No doubt, +furthermore, our reason is strengthened by culture from generation to +generation. But that anywhere and at any time there should come into +existence a faculty of thought which would stand outside of the cosmic +interconnection, that is an absurd conception and a senseless thing. +Just as necessarily as all water has one and the same nature, that of +being wet, just so necessarily every intelligence and every thought +partakes of the general nature of thought and must logically be a part, +a particular part, of the one universal and empirical world. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] Religion denotes here as much as conception of the world and +explanation of its last questions; and metaphysics stands here for +everything conceivable, which meaning embraces more than the mere +tangible.--EDITOR. + +[5] When we consider its many parts as such.--EDITOR. + + + + +NINTH LETTER + + +Repetition, my dear Eugene, is the mother of all study. + +Logic aims to teach you the proper use of the intellect, not only in +this or that branch of study, but in the general branch of truth. Its +result is the following precept: In all things always remember the +universal interrelation. + +In order to illustrate this statement a little, let me point out that in +the period of scholasticism thinking was practiced without any +interconnection with the rest of the world, merely by brown study. The +present age of natural sciences then cultivated a better method. But the +method of the natural sciences has not succeeded so far in being applied +to the field of law, morals, politics, psychology, and philosophy, +because the logical understanding of the total interrelation of the +indivisible world truth was lacking, because the concept of truth was +enveloped in darkness, and because the privileged classes have a great +interest in maintaining darkness. + +For this reason, the true method of reasoning still requires many +explanations. The socialist, for instance, is charged with inciting the +people, with promising more than he can keep and with sowing strife in +the hearts of men. Those who make this charge in the commonplace sense, +tear two things, viz., peace and strife, out of their due connection. As +a matter of fact, peace and strife must always dwell together. A nation +whose peace were not intermingled with a certain strife, would be a +nation of sluggards. Thanks to the strife in their breasts, the nations +are progressive and stirring. Motion is the essence of the world, and +national motion is inconceivable without the striving of men. For the +sake of development and culture, nations must always demand more than +they can immediately attain. On the other hand, striving of this sort is +not sufficient. One must not demand more than one can obtain, nor +promise more than one can give. For this reason the logical socialist +must know that even in the future society the trees will not grow into +the clouds, and that the peace for which we hope and strive will always +be mixed with strife. The music of the future, although more harmonious +than the music of the present, will nevertheless be eternally marred by +disharmony. There is nothing perfect in the world, because only the +whole universe is perfect, because the universe alone is perfectness +itself. + +Eternal peace, as the warriors may justly claim, is an illusion, so long +as we think of peace in a transcendental way and as being separated from +strife. But the sons of the war god who would like to continue the +thunder of cannons and the rattle of sabers eternally, are no less the +victims of illusion, if not something worse. Eternal is only war in +peace and peace in war, although that may seem senseless to the +logicians of the old school. Thus even the inevitable war will become +more peaceful and humane in the course of time. The barbarian form of +war, of which the Prussians are masters, is not destined to last +forever, unless we speak of the illogical eternity of the preacher which +opens its doors by leaving the temporal world. In defending the social +war, I wish to have it understood that neither the conceptions nor the +things called war and peace are separated by a Chinese wall. + +Everything is interconnected and interdependent. It is true that strife +and animosities may be exaggerated, and so may peace. But whatever blame +attaches to this, refers only to the exaggeration. It is not the +animosity, but the excessive animosity which deserves censure. By +recognizing the logical interconnection between peace and strife, the +dispute of the parties is rendered saner. There is then no longer a +question of a yawning chasm between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, +but of something about which an agreement is possible, viz., how much +there is of either. + +As peace and war in the human breast, so all variety intermingles in the +cosmic unit. In the novel "_Homo Sum_," by Ebers, the monk Paulus, who +tasted the delights of the preliminary celestial ecstasy when +castigating his body, says: "I truly believe that it is just as +difficult on this globe to find pain without joy as joy without pain." +And Till Eulenspiegel, that type of a practical joker, showed an +understanding of dialectics when he lightened the difficulty of +ascending a mountain by the reflection that the descent on the other +side would be so much easier. Logic is no more senseless in teaching +that all things, even the most opposite, are of the same substance than +it is in showing that night belongs to day and weeds to herbs. + +In order that these petty illustrations may not confuse your mind, it +should be remembered that the essential point is the elucidation of the +great contradiction between mind and matter, between thinking and being, +which includes all petty contradictions. + +In order to think in accordance with logical consistency, you must not +regard a thing as something independent, but consider everything as +fluid particles of the same substance, which is the thing of all things, +the world, the truth, and life. + +Our logic is therefore the science of truth. This truth is neither above +nor below, neither in Jerusalem nor in Jericho, neither in the spirit +nor in the flesh, but everywhere. + +Our logic is the science of understanding. It teaches that you must not +search for understanding by cudgeling your brain, but only in connection +with experience, with the interrelation of things. + +Since man in his experience also meets errors, science was dominated for +centuries by the question whether truth and experience are not two +different things, whether all our experience is only an illusion of our +senses. Cartesius replied to this: "No; the belief in a perfect, true +being cannot admit of such a delusion." By substituting the concept of +truth for the concept of God, we are certain that the world of +experience is not a ghost, but the most actual reality. + +Although the great Kant called the cosmic truth a phenomenon, because he +could not divest his mind of transcendental faith, of the faith in a +transcendental truth, still we know today that all distinctions which +are ever made constitute but a nibbling at the universal unit. As +necessarily as all variety in baking produces bakery wares, just as +necessarily heaven and earth, and everything connected with them, are +parts of the indivisible truth which is also called nature, cosmos, +universe, God, and experience. Language gives to its darling truth many +different pet names, just as a happy mother calls her heart's treasure +by a thousand endearing terms. + +Feuerbach reasons in this fashion: "If God is not a personal being +different from nature and man, then he is an entirely superfluous +being.... The use of the word God which is always combined with the +conception of a separate being, is a disturbing and confusing abuse. Why +do you want to be a theist, if you are a naturalist, or a naturalist if +you are a theist? Away with this contradiction! Where God is confounded +with nature, or nature with God, there is neither God nor nature, but a +mystical amphibious hermaphrodite." + +Feuerbach is right. The name of God is much abused. But truth is also +blasphemed by negation and frivolousness. The sober understanding that +God, truth, nature, are various names for the same thing permits us to +play with them without despairing of the matter. Indeed, this play of +words serves to make the subject clear. + +But logic demands that we recognize truth as the absolute, as the power, +the force, and the glory, which comprises all logical and illogical +distinctions, together with the things to be distinguished, even the +faculty of distinguishing itself. + +Such an understanding of the absolute, such world wisdom, will not make +you conceited, because it makes you conscious of the fact that your +understanding has grasped celestial truth which at the same time is +terrestrial, only in a very general way. You possess nothing but a +definition of truth. And without denying that definitions are valuable +and instructive, I, at the same time, point out that you know very +little about astronomy when you know that it is the science of the +stars. No matter, therefore, how clearly I may have defined truth, we +require for its complete understanding all the details of science, and +that is too much for me, for you, and for any individual human being. + +Just as our vision never exhausts the visible, because the eye sees an +object but does not fully penetrate it, just so can the intellect never +fully understand and fathom the absolute all, the truth, or God. But we +can understand and fathom individual truths, parts of the universal +truth. What understanding grasps is not the truth itself, but yet it is +true understanding. + + + + +TENTH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +My previous lectures instructed you as to the very trivial fact that the +thought is a part of the world. In proceeding from the part to the +whole, I passed logically from the mouth of the river to its source. The +universe is the maternal womb of the intellect as of all things. + +It occurs to me that you or some teacher of logic might accuse my +letters of lack of logic. It may seem that these lectures fail to +present the subject matter in a strictly systematized form. You will, +please, excuse this in part with the fact that they appear in the form +of letters. This form demands that the contents should be logically +arranged and rounded off in each letter. It should furthermore serve as +an excuse for any defect, that my subject is not a finished one, not +perfectly elaborated by others before me. I am here not merely a +lecturer, but also an explorer on a field which, though much +investigated, yet is still rather obscure. + +The conclusion of my last letter explained that the use of the term God +for the universe has much to recommend it and much to disqualify it. But +it is easily apparent that the universe with its absolute qualities is +closely related to that infinite being of whom Jakob Böhme, the +philosophical shoemaker, said: "He is neither the light nor the +darkness, neither love nor anger, but the eternal One.... Hence all +forces are merely one sole force." + +That nothing exists outside of the universe, that everything is +contained in the All, that the All, with all real and imagined beings, +is everything, that it is neither sweet nor sour, neither great nor +small, but just everything and all, this statement is as obvious as the +often and long repeated statement of identity: A equals A. + +The All is omnipotent, omnipresent, all-wise. This last term might be +questioned, since the universe is not a dummy with a monster head and +giant brain. For this very reason it was considered inappropriate to +apply the name of God to the universe, because that creates the +impression of a personal being. The All thinks only by means of human +brains, and for this reason omniscience cannot be anything but common +human knowledge. Of course, you, I, and every other man, are very +limited in our knowledge. But still we may indulge in the hope that the +things which we do not know are known by other men or will be discovered +by future generations, so that the collective human mind will know +everything that is knowable. We cannot see everything that is visible; +there are animals that can see even better than we can. But since even +the most intelligent animal is supposed to lack the highest degree of +intelligence, reason and science, there is no one who knows anything +except the human race. Mankind is omniscient. But since all our science +is derived only from the world, mankind is only the formal bearer of +intelligence, and it belongs to the fountain of all things, to eternal +nature. Our wisdom is the wisdom of nature, is world wisdom. Although +there may be inhabitants of the moon and of other stars who may know +things which are unknown to us, still that is in the first place a mere +speculation of little value, and in the second place universal +omniscience or the omniscient universe would not in the least be +affected thereby. It is a reasonable use of the language to regard human +wisdom as the only and omniscient wisdom, just as all natural and wet +water is called water without any further modification. I believe in the +statement of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things." Whoever +uses a different measure, uses a superhuman, transcendental measure.[6] + +Hence, when I call the cosmic essence of all existence omnipotent, you +will not think of a senseless magic power which forges knives without +handles and blades, nor will you read any transcendental meaning into my +use of the term omniscience. + +Omniscience belongs obviously under the head of logic, because the organ +of science and wisdom is the object of the study of logic. And it must +now be stated that the human mind does not only exceed the animal mind +by far, but is also the _non plus ultra_ of all minds. But it must be +retained that this mind can only be whatever it is in connection with +the divine universe which I may also be permitted to call worldly deity. +This name is fitting because it is a means of understanding that in the +first place no monster mind rules the world, and in the second place the +natural universe is not a mere sum of all things, but truth and life. + +Of course, the identification of the universe with the religious God is +only a comparison, and comparisons are lame. Still we may compare the +sun with an eternal lamp or the moon with a candle, or the German prime +minister with a butler. + +Logic shall teach you that everything which may be distinguished by the +faculty of understanding is of the same kind, everything is of common +clay, but the whole is sublimely elevated above all that is commonplace. +Mere frivolous atheism, as created by the free-thinkers, is not +sufficient. A bare denial of God always creates some other idol worship. +The positive understanding of the divine world truth is an indispensable +requirement for the radical extermination of all idol worship. + +Logic must begin with the sublime, infinite, absolute. All logical, +consistent or interconnected thinking must take its departure from it. +The so-called scientific research after temporal causes, after the egg +from which the chicken was hatched, after the hen from which the egg +came, after the kindred organisms which developed the hen by natural +selection and adaption according to Darwin, this is a very valuable +research without which we can never understand the world process. But +nevertheless, such research must not satisfy the thinking man. Logic +demands from everybody that he or she should search for the highest, for +the cause of all causes. Whoever feels the desire to bring logical order +into his consciousness, must know that the finite and infinite, the +relative and the absolute, the special truths and the one general truth, +are contained in one another. + +Logical thought as demanded by science means nothing but to be aware of +the final cause, the absolute foundation of all thought. This foundation +is the universe, an attribute of which is the external and internal +human head. The thousand year old dispute between the materialists and +the idealists turns on the question whether the spirit is material or +the world spiritual. Our answer is plain and clear: They both belong +together, they together make up the one thing, the thing of all things. +Mind and matter are two attributes of the same substance. They may be +compared the same as fish and flesh, the former being called very +appropriately by some African tribes "water flesh." In this way, matter +and mind are two kinds of meat of a different and yet of the same +nature. + +I remember reading in a satirical paper the question: "What is a +gentleman? Answer: A gentleman is a loafer with money, and a loafer is a +gentleman without money." Just as these two types of men are essentially +alike and differ only in the small matter of money, so you should +remember that there are no essential differences, that all differences +are merely matters of attributes and qualities of the same absolute +world substance. To distinguish correctly and logically, that is the +point which logic is aiming to teach us. To make distinctions is the +function which is also called perceiving, knowing, understanding, +comprehending. When you consider that this function is innate in man, +and that man together with his faculty of understanding is innate in +nature, then you recognize all distinctions and the distinguished +objects as attributes of the undistinguished One, of the absolute, +compared to which all things are only relative things, in other words, +attributes. + +I am endeavoring to make clear to you that logical thinking requires the +awakening of the consciousness of the one supreme general nature. And +you must not think of this sum of all existence in the stupid way in +which people used to think of the animal kingdom before Darwin, but +regard the world as a living organic unit, from which the faculty of +understanding has blossomed the same as all other things. In the logic +of the narrow-minded, all animal species are widely separated, without +any living interconnection, while Darwin has demonstrated the uniform +process, the intermingling life in multiform creation. The illustration +of this famous zoologist of the transition from one species to another +may serve as an example of the logical transitions in the world process, +in which all differences are but undulations. All our classifications +must always remember the undivided basis on which they are resting. + +We have shown that the intellect divides the universal nature, +classifies and analyzes it, and we have learned of the universal nature +that it not only furnishes to the intellect the material for its work, +but also that the world comprises within its general process the +intellectual process, that the intellectual movement is a specialization +of the natural movement. + +The world is not only the object, but also the subject of understanding, +it understands, it dissects its own multiplicity by means of the human +intellect. Our wisdom is world wisdom in a two-fold sense: The world is +that which is being understood, classified, analyzed, and at the same +time it is that which, by the help of our intellect, practices +understanding, classification, etc. When I call the human mind the +cosmic mind, the mind of the supreme being, I wish to have it understood +that there is nothing mysterious about this, that I merely intend to +show that thought or intelligence can only operate in the universal +cosmic interconnection, that it is not an abnormal and transcendental +thing, but a thing like all other things. + +You must not conceive of the spirit as the producer of truth, as a +little god, but only as a means. The true god, the divine truth, has our +intellect for an attribute. The latter does not produce truth, but only +the understanding of truth. It produces only pictures of truth which are +all more or less perfect. Of course, it is not at all immaterial whether +we produce a more or less faithful, a true or a false picture of truth, +but still this is, at present and for us here, a secondary matter. The +main thing is to know that truth, or nature, is far above all pictures, +and still consists of parts, of forms, which together constitute the +whole. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[6] Please note the additional explanation on page 77.--EDITOR. + + + + +ELEVENTH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Johannes Scherr relates in the "Gartenlaube," a German family paper, in +an article entitled "Mahomet and His Work," that insane doctrinarians +are searching for people without religion. This has not succeeded, it is +said, although the spark of religious feeling is glowing very dimly in +peoples that are close to the animal. But nevertheless, he continues, +the expressions of religious feeling mark the boundary line where the +beast ceases and man begins. For just as in the higher stages of +civilization religion means the consciousness of the finite of being one +with the infinite, so in the lower stages of civilization the indefinite +impulse is felt by man to connect his special nature with the universal +nature and bring them into harmony. This is idealism, the idealistic +need. It is obvious that, and why, the people have always and everywhere +sought and found satisfaction for their idealistic longings in religion. +But, adds the shrewd observer, I must remark that I do not refer to the +shifting population when I say "people," for sad to relate, that +population is torn away from all connection with natural conditions. I +refer to the "settled, the permanent, the true people." + +This quotation shows that a champion of the "true people" is in conflict +with true logic. In dividing a population into shifting and settled +people, one should retain as a basis the logical consciousness that all +classes of people are embraced by one class; furthermore, that human, +monkey, ant, and other nations are parts of the one and the same nation; +until finally man and animal, real and imaginary, with all religious and +godless things, are ultimately fused in the world unit and can never be +"torn away from all connection with natural conditions." + +All distinctions must logically be based on the consciousness of the +absolute and universal unity, of the interconnection of all things. For +this reason some pious people, with their God in whom everything is +living and has its being, have more logic than some freethinkers of the +class of Johannes Scherr who have no coherence in their method of +thought. The faithful think more logically than the narrowly skeptical, +for they begin and end with God. But still they cannot think quite +logically, because they cannot establish any logical connection between +their eternally perfect Lord and evil, the devil, disease, misery, sin, +in short all the sufferings and vanities here below. + +The unit of nature, the infinite, is the quintessence of logic. Neither +natural science in the narrow sense of the word, nor metaphysics, nor +formal logic, can give any clue as to the nature of this thing of +things. This can be done only by a science of understanding which +recognizes matter and mind and all opposites and contradictions as +formalities of the universe. How can a man who is out of touch with the +mass of the shifting population feel that he is one with the universe? +Whoever regards any special class as the true people, has no +understanding either of the common people or of the absolute universe. + +Proletarian logic teaches not only the equality of all human beings, but +universal equality. And mark well, this universal equality does not +conflict with variety any more than a variety of pots and jugs conflicts +with the unity of vessels, or the manifold forms of bretzels and rolls +with the unity of bakery ware. + +The enemies of democratic development, in attacking the idea of freedom +and equality, point to the manifoldness of nature, the individual +differences of men, the distinctions between weak and strong, wise and +fools, men and women, and consider it tyranny to attempt to equalize +that which nature has made different. They cannot understand that like +things may be different and different things alike. They are blinded by +their class logic which sees only the differences, but not the unity, +not the transfusion of all classes. + +Class logic teaches that contradictory things cannot exist. According to +it, a thing cannot be genuine and false at the same time. This class +logic has a narrow conception of existence. It has only observed that +there are many different things in nature, but has overlooked the fact +that all these things have also a general nature. We, on the other hand, +recognize that every thing, every person, is a part of the infinite +world and partakes of its general nature, is eternal and perishable, +true and untrue, great and small, one sided and manyfold, in short +contradictory. + +Before and after Socrates, philosophy and religion have searched for the +genuine, right, good, true, and beautiful, but have reached no +harmonious results. But it cannot be denied that in the course of the +centuries the problem has become clearer and clearer. The great names of +Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Cartesius, Spinoza, +Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, are milestones on the highway of this progress. +The evolution is apparent, but the interrelation between the +intellectual and physical, and especially between intellectual and +economic evolution, is much ignored. The bridge between mind and body +was not found, and philosophical evolution has been regarded up to our +day as a purely mental process accomplished by one or two dozen of +famous brains. I wish to point out to you now, that proletarian logic is +the continuation of the preceding research after the genuine, true, +good, and beautiful. It teaches how to conceive of these ideals +logically, and it has not so much proceeded from any one talented +brain, but is rather the product of the entire cosmic process. + +Philosophical brains have developed the science of logical thought only +to the extent that the material development of the world has stimulated +them to do so. You must regard the human brains only as secondary levers +of the universal lever which is not only genuine, true, good, and +beautiful, but truth, goodness, and beauty itself, or the world and the +absolute. + +The understanding of the absolute which is called "good Lord," and then +again "the bad world," in other words the selfsufficient cosmos, is very +inconvenient to the wisdom of the professors, and they are attempting to +assign it to a special study which they call "metaphysics." This +division of labor is not introduced for the purpose of making research +more productive, but of surrounding this study by mysterious darkness. +The professors who lecture to the young people on formal logic set aside +the ancient research after the true, the good, the beautiful, and try to +place these ideals outside of the light of science in order to be able +to preserve them unchanged in the tabernacle of faith. + +This charge may seem unjust, because the learned gentlemen reserved a +corner for the true, the good, and the beautiful in their metaphysical +department. But there is something peculiar about this. The great Kant +has asked the plain question: "Is metaphysics practicable as a science?" +Answer: No! The transcendental truth, etc., sought by metaphysics, and +named God, freedom, immortality in Christian language, cannot be found +by any reason. But being a child of his time, the great philosopher +makes a small concession to the transcendental. + +He teaches: Although transcendental truth cannot be located +scientifically, still the religious faith in its existence is wholesome. +We, in our time, think more soberly about this theory of salvation and +accept the elimination of all transcendentalism from science. While the +spokesmen of the "true people" would like to hide their exalted truth, +freedom, and immortality behind the curtains of temples, we throw the +full daylight of logic on the absolute truth, goodness, and beauty of +the material world. + +Logic as the science of correct thought cannot be restricted to any one +object, it cannot exclude any object, whether terrestrial or heavenly, +from its sphere. The great lights of present day learning do not wish to +subordinate the intellect as the object of the logical department, and +absolute truth as the object of the metaphysical department, to one +another, but to co-ordinate them side by side. + +But two co-ordinated things which are not subordinated to a third higher +thing lack logic, and the brain which is satisfied by such a condition +suffers from disorder. Logical truth must inevitably be a part of +absolute truth, and it is our duty to remove absolute truth from the +field of metaphysics, of transcendentalism, and to transfer it to the +sober world which forms an inseparable unit with the human mind. + +So much for the proletarian duty to continue the research after the +true, the good, and the beautiful which was the object of the +philosophers before and after Socrates. But remember that I am referring +only to the truly good, beautiful, etc., which is contained in the +universal truth of all true specifications. The question of the +ethically good, the esthetically beautiful and the absolutely perfect is +as necessarily contained in the question of the universal truth as red, +blue, and green in the rainbow, of course only in an abstract sense. + +Our logic which has for its object the truth of the universe, is the +science of the understanding of the universe, a science of universal +understanding or conception of the world. It teaches that the +interrelation of all things is truth and life, is the genuine, right, +good, and beautiful. All the sublime moving the heart of man, all the +sweet stirring his breast, is the universal nature or the universe. But +the vexing question still remains: What about the negative, the ugly, +the evil, what about error, pretense, standstill, disease, death, and +the devil? + +True, the world is vain, evil, ugly. But these are merely accidental +phenomena, only forms and appendages of the world. Its eternity, truth, +goodness, beauty, is substantial, existing, positive. Its negative is +like the darkness which serves to make the light more brilliant, so that +it may overcome the dark and shine so much more brightly. + +The spokesmen of the ruling classes are not open for such a sublime +optimism, because they have the pessimistic duty of perpetuating misery +and servitude. + + + + +TWELFTH LETTER + + +Logic, the science of correct thought, demands in the first place true, +or in other words, reasonable thought. Logic deals with reason and +truth. + +These two things have been endowed with a mysterious nature, while they +obviously belong to the entire universe and its tangible nature. Reason +and truth are not separated from the other things, are not things in +themselves. There is no such thing. Philosophers who have looked for +them in the depths of the human brain with their hands over their eyes +and engaged in brown study, were on the wrong road. Proletarian logic +differs from conventional logic in that it does not look for reason and +truth behind the curtains of temples, nor in the brains of the learned, +but it discovers them in the actual interconnection of all things and +processes of nature. + +Preachers, professors, judges, and politicians are the leaders of "the +wise men of Gotham," and since we have all passed our youth among them, +we find it difficult to get rid of their confused logic. + +We owe much of our better insight to the famous philosophers. These men +had many an eccentric notion, but on the whole they were reasonable +fellows who followed the doctrine of the unreliability of the senses and +the faith in the hidden truth and reason more in a theoretical than in a +practical way. In practice they operated with open eyes and ears. Thus +correct logic, although confused by queer notions, has been handed down +to us from generation to generation. Preachers, professors, judges, and +politicians cling to the confused notions, while we take the liberty to +discard them. + +Now we recognize not only that reason and truth are connected with the +world, but also that the universe is the supreme reason and truth, is +that being which religion and philosophy have long been looking for, the +most perfect being, which Plato called the true, good and beautiful, +Kant God, freedom, and immortality, and Hegel the absolute. + +If he is an atheist who denies that perfection can be found in any +individual, then I am an atheist. And if he is a believer in God who has +the faith in the "most perfect being" with which not alone the +theologists, but also Cartesius and Spinoza have occupied themselves so +much, then I am one of the true children of God. + +The abuse of sublime feelings and exalted ideas has filled many hearts +with disgust, so that they care no longer for any unctuous sermons. The +mere flavor of religion is odious to them. Nevertheless I assure you +that we shall never get rid of idol worship, unless we understand the +supreme being, reason or truth, in its true nature. + +"Understand" is a mysterious word. To bring light into the mystery of +understanding by a clear theory of understanding, is an integral part of +the science of thought, of logic. + +Permit me to compare the faculty of understanding with a photographic +apparatus, by the help of which you strive to obtain a picture of the +cosmic truth. Then you will see at a glance that in this way we can +obtain but a dim picture of the whole. The object appears boundless, too +infinitely great and sublime to permit of copying. And yet we can +approach it. Although we cannot get a true picture of universal truth, +yet we can obtain clear pictures of individual truths, in other words, +we can picture the infinite in its parts. By the help of your +intellect, you can grasp the infinite by means of limitation. + +Absolute truth appears to us in relative phenomena. The perfect being is +composed of imperfect parts. A "wise man of Gotham" may regard this as a +senseless contradiction. But we can separate the arms, legs, head, and +trunk from one another, and so separated they will be mere parts of a +corpse, while connected they certainly possess the chance of vitality. +Life is composed of the dead, the most perfect being is composed of +imperfect parts. In the universal truth everything is contained. It is +the perfect being, it includes the whole existence, even the imperfect. +The false, the ugly, the evil, the nasty are involved in the true, the +good, the beautiful. The universal existence is the absolute truth, the +whole is composed of relativities, of parts, of phenomena. Our +understanding, our instrument of thought, is likewise an imperfect part +of the perfect being. Our intellect produces only a dim, imperfect +picture of the absolute, but it reproduces true pictures of its parts, +although pictures only. + +There are good and bad, adequate and inadequate, true and false thoughts +and understanding. But there are no absolutely true thoughts. All our +conceptions and ideas are imperfect pictures of the most perfect being +which is inexhaustible in great things as in small things, as a whole +and in parts. Every part of nature is a natural part of the infinite. + +I repeat: All parts or things of this world have, apart from their +imperfect nature as parts, also the world nature of the absolute being. +They are imperfect perfections. Our intellect is no exception. The human +mind is the only mind having the name of reason, and is the most +perfect reason which can possibly exist. In the same way, the water of +this earth is the non plus ultra of all water. The belief in another and +different mind, in a monster mind, belongs to the same transcendental +category as the belief in a celestial river without the nature of water +flowing around the castle of Zion. Even the most perfect mind is nothing +else, and cannot be anything else, but an imperfect part of the absolute +world being. + +The first thing a student of correct thought has to learn is to +distinguish true thought from false thought, and for this purpose he +must know above all that distinction must not be exaggerated. All +differences can only be relative. The bad and the good pictures belong +to the same family, and all families finally belong to the absolute, are +individuals of the universe. + +For the purpose of distinguishing true thoughts from false, it should be +remembered that the true thought is only a part of the truth, a part +which does not exaggerate its own importance, but subordinates itself to +the absolute. + +The following illustration may explain this. Although astronomy teaches +that the earth revolves daily around its axis and that the sun is +standing still, it nevertheless knows that the fixed state of the sun is +only a relative truth, so that from a higher point of view both the +earth and the sun are revolving. The consciousness of its relative truth +alone makes the statement of the sun's standstill true. Again, when the +farmer sees that the earth is fixed and that the sun is moving every day +from East to West, he is mistaken only so far as he regards his +standpoint as the whole truth, his farmers' knowledge for absolute +knowledge. The knowledge of the absolute alone enables you to +distinguish correctly between truth and error. Whoever sees the sun +turning around the earth with the consciousness that this revolution is +but a partial truth is not in error, but sees truly. The knowledge of +the absolute truth clears up error and instructs us as to the method of +correct thought. This thought makes us apt, humble, and tolerant in +judging. + +The "wisest of men" was very proud of his modesty in knowing that he +knew nothing. His example may well be recommended to-day. Although we +have learned a great deal, we know very little compared to the +inexhaustible fountain of all wisdom, good mother nature. We learn every +day, but we never learn all there is to learn. What was to the credit of +Socrates, was his firm faith in the truth, his conviction of its +existence, and his faith in the mission of the human intellect to search +for truth. + +On the contrary, the sophists confused and disputed everything. They +frivolously flouted all truth and research. This same frivolousness now +relies upon Kant who, misled by the prejudice of his time, removed truth +to a transcendental world and therefore deprecatingly called our actual +world the "world of phenomena." In distinction from him, our logic +teaches that the phenomena of this world without exception are parts of +the one truth, and that the true art of understanding consists in +studying the parts. + +The doctrine of the sophists to the effect that everything may be denied +and disputed has a certain similarity with ours in that we declare that +the universe is the truth and all parts of it true parts, that smoke and +fog, reason and imagination, dreams and realities, subject and object, +are true parts of the world. They are not the whole truth, but still +true. For this reason it is well to call your attention to the +difference between the sophistical and the logical method of thought. +The contemporaries of Socrates are still alive to-day. They are teaching +in the name of God and believe in nothing, while to us truth, every day +naked and sober truth, is sacred. + + + + +THIRTEENTH LETTER + + +In his "Three Books On The Soul," Aristotle discussed at length the +question whether the human soul has five senses or one. The commentator, +J. H. von Kirchmann, the publisher of the "Philosophical Library," +remarks in his footnote 172 that man has six senses. He divides feeling +into pure and active feeling. According to this, the phrase of the five +senses belongs to the old iron the same as that of the four elements. +Now neither you, nor I, nor any reader should worry about the question +whether all sensation may be summed up in the one sense of feeling, +whether there are five senses according to Aristotle, or six according +to Kirchmann, or whether there is even a seventh sense for the +transcendental, the organ of which, as some optimists hope, will +gradually be developed with the growing perfection of man. We are +concerned in this matter only so far as it is connected with the +cardinal question, whether the world is only one thing or a mere +collection of an infinite number of disconnected things; whether the +so-called things are independent subjects and objects, or whether they +are only predicates of the one world subject. + +Looking through the window I see the river, the street, the bridge, +houses, and trees. Everything is a thing in itself and yet is connected +inseparably with all others. The qualities of the world are regarded by +the intellect as subjects; but the intelligent subject should also know +that its actions, its distinguishing and understanding, are formalities, +a formal dismemberment of the absolute, which in spite of all division +always remains the undivided whole. + +In order to master this method of thought, you must understand above all +that the things are only so-called things, but are in reality qualities +of the universe, in other words, relative things or predicates of the +absolute. You will then understand, that our thought has a right to make +one thing as well as six of a chair, its back, its seat, and its four +legs. You will recognize that the five senses of Aristotle are not an +eternal truth, but a classification, which is eternally variable. +Distinguishing means classifying. + +I know very well that I am making a bold statement here, and that it is +not easy to justify it. For this reason you must not expect that I can +make my meaning clear in a few sentences. It is not only the general +prejudice which prevents this by making a most mysterious and miraculous +thing of the intellectual function, but also the fact that this thing is +still very obscure, although it has become clearer and clearer in the +course of time. + +The freethinking pastor Hironymi writes on this point: "The most +prominent naturalists of the present, such as Dubois-Reymond, who are at +the same time thinkers, admit that they do not know what feeling, life, +consciousness, are, and how they arise. And this ignorance is far more +valuable for truth and religion than the alleged knowledge. Let us, +therefore, continue in the devotion with which we have hitherto admired +the universe without understanding it. The higher existence, the +consciousness, has not been explained, it has remained a miracle, the +only lasting, absolute, miracle." + +Thus speaks the preacher who is a know-nothing by nature and makes a +business of admiring and wondering, while we are interested in +understanding and knowing. We wish to fathom the mystery, and hence I +may write still more letters on logic and you may study some more. + +I shall try to demonstrate by a trivial example, how it is that +understanding or distinguishing is based on classification. + +Take it that you awake at early dawn and notice in a corner of your bed +room something uncouth and moving which you cannot clearly distinguish. +To know that a phenomenon appears is not enough because the term +phenomenon applies to everything, natural and unnatural things, good and +evil spirits. Even if you are sufficiently enlightened to know that the +thing in question must be something natural, still this explains very +little, for the term "nature" again means everything. But you understand +or recognize more when you ascertain that the uncouth thing is dead or +alive, wall paper or garment, man or animal. You will notice that in +this intellectual enlightenment it is simply a matter of classification, +of the head under which the mystery should be classed. To classify the +phenomena of truth and life, means to understand, to use the intellect, +to enlighten the brain. + +But we must well consider how far we shall have to go in our +classification in order to find the place in the system which will fully +clarify and determine understanding. Suppose that in the above mentioned +case you have ascertained that the motion is due to a cat, then the +inquiring faculty of understanding has not yet reached the end of its +tether. The next question is then, whether it is your cat or that of +your neighbor, whether it is black, white, or grey, young or old. And +when you finally recognize that it is your tomcat Peter, you must +remember that the subject which understands as well as the object to be +recognized, being parts of the absolute, are absolutely and infinitely +divisible parts, which are never fully understood and never fully +exhausted. + +Please remember that in speaking of something uncouth, we are not so +much concerned in Peter or Tabby, but in the intellect which we desire +to understand so that we may make a correct use of it. And I refer to it +as uncouth merely because its understanding is beset with so many +difficulties. When I compared it in the preceding letter with a +photographic apparatus which should furnish us with pictures, and in +likening it now to an instrument designed to distinguish things by +classification, I warn you not to be confused thereby. Classification is +most essential as a means of producing intellectual pictures. In this +connection I emphasize once more that the faculty of understanding, the +same as other things, is not independent by itself, but can accomplish +something only in the universal interconnection. The understanding that +the phenomenon quoted above belongs to the category of tomcats, and more +especially into the column labeled Peter, would not be any +understanding at all, if you had not become previously acquainted with +the mouse-devouring race and individual in question. Only in connection +with your previous experience is the understanding that this tomcat and +the uncouth motion are one and the same thing, or belong to the same +category, a true understanding. + +Ludwig Feuerbach says: A talented writer is recognized by the fact that +he assumes talent on the part of the reader also and does not chew up +his subject into minute parts like a petty schoolmaster. On the other +hand, it seems to me that it is possible to assume too much, and I +pursued a schoolmasterly course in this case, because the subject is new +to you and still leaves plenty of room for reflection. + +I wanted to show by a commonplace example what I mean by insight and +understanding and how by means of it the unknown and uncouth becomes +known and familiar. True, the understanding in this case was illumined +by previous experience, while you are after new knowledge. You want to +know how enlightenment arises in order to acquire new insight. Now, all +novelty has the dialectic quality of being at the same time something +antiquated. New understanding can be acquired only by the help of old +understanding. In other words, old and new understanding, which I define +here as the faculty of classification, have their existence only in the +total interdependence of the universal existence. + +You must discard the old prejudice that knowledge can be collected like +cents. Although this is well enough, it does not suffice for the purpose +of logical thinking. One science belongs to another, and all of them +together belong to one class with the entire universe. It will be +apparent to you, then, that at the beginning of your young days your +knowledge has not sprouted all at once, but has come out of the unknown. +And what is true of you, is true of the whole human race. In its cradle +it was without intellect. It had, indeed, the germ. But do not beasts, +worms, and sensitive plants have that also? In short, the light of +perception and understanding is nothing new in the radical sense of the +word, but connected with the old and with the world in general, and of +the same kind. All our knowledge must be connected and combined into one +understanding, one system, one realm, and this is the realm of reality, +of truth, of life. + +Systematic classification is the task of logic. The first requirement +for this purpose is the awakened consciousness of the indivisibility of +the universe, of its universal unity. This consciousness is, in other +words, at the same time the recognition of the merely formal +significance of all scientific classification. + +The unity of the universe is true, and is the sole and innate truth. +That this sole world truth is full of differences, is just as absolutely +different as absolutely the same, does no more contradict a reasonable +unity and equality than there is any contradiction in the fact that the +various owls have different faces and still the same owl face. + +Aristotle divided the sense into five parts, anthropologists the race of +man into five races, natural philosophers the space into three +dimensions. It is now a question of showing to you that such a division, +however true and just, is nevertheless far from being truth and justice, +but is merely classification. The fundamental requirement of logic is to +designate scientific classifications as that which they are, viz., +mental operations. It is the business of the intellect to make +classifications. That is its characteristic quality and does not +contradict the indivisible truth in the least. + +Old wiseacres teach that a reasonable man must not contradict himself, +and this is a wise, though very narrow, lesson. Hegel maintains that +everything in the world is reasonable, hence the contradictions are +also. Under this conservative exterior there is hidden a very +revolutionary perception of which the "destructive" minds take advantage +in order to flatly contradict the wiseacres and their stable, dead, +disordered order which cannot stand any contradiction. + +Reason dissolves all contradictions and opposition into harmony by +logical classification. "Everything in its own time and place." If it +does not wish to be called unreason, reason must rise to the +understanding that its opposite is only a formal antagonism. It must +know that God and the world, body and soul, life and death, motion and +rest, and whatever else the dualists may distinguish, are two and yet +one. Then it becomes clear that the conservatives are the real +revolutionaries, because by their senseless adherence to the "good old +order" they drive the proletariat to desperation, until it upsets that +order. On the other hand, the maligned revolutionaries are conservative, +because they subordinate themselves to the world's evolutionary process +which was, is, and will be eternal. + +The red thread winding through all these letters deals with the +following points: The instrument of thought is a thing like all other +common things, a part or attribute of the universe. It belongs +particularly to the general category of being and is an apparatus which +produces a detailed picture of human experience by categorical +classification or distinction. In order to use this apparatus +correctly, one must fully grasp the fact that the world unit is +multiform and that all multiformity is a unit. + +It is the solution of the riddle of the ancient Eleatic philosophy: How +can the one be contained in the many, and the many in one? + + + + +FOURTEENTH LETTER + + +Shoemaking and beet culture are as much sciences as physics, chemistry, +and astronomy. Reading, writing, and reckoning are called elementary +knowledge, and though I do not deny that they have an elementary value +for the culture of the mind, yet I can truly say that I have met +well-informed people who could neither read nor write. I wish to +indicate by this that there are indeed high and low degrees of knowledge +and science, but that such graduations have only a temporary, local, +relative, subjective significance, while in the absolute all things are +the same. + +The scorn with which you may hear some people speak of the night of the +absolute in which all cats are grey and all women beautiful Helenas +shall not prevent us from repeatedly studying the absolute which I have +again and again praised as the main topic of logic. Only remember, +please, that you must not have any mystic idea of it. The absolute is +the sum total of all that was, is, and will be. + +The subjects as well as the objects of all science belong to the +absolute, which is commonly called "world." + +All other sciences have for their object limited parts, relative +matters, while the science of the mind treats of all things, of the +infinite. This is a point to which I refer frequently because it tends +to make my lessons obscure. I am lecturing on the science of the +intellect, but I speak of all things, of the universe, because I am +obliged to demonstrate, not the relation of the mind to shoemaking or +astronomy, but its general interrelations. I have to make plain its +general conduct, and this leads necessarily to the all-embracing +generality, to the absolute. We wish to learn the art of thinking, not +on this or that subject, but the art of general world thought. + +The intellect is a special part, the same as every other scientific or +practical object. But it is that part which is not satisfied with piece +work, which knows that it itself and all special things are attributes +or predicates of the absolute subject, that it itself and all things are +universally interrelated. + +The human mind is sometimes called self-consciousness. But this name is +too limited for such an unlimited thing, for the pathfinder of the +infinite, for your, my, and every other consciousness of the world and +of existence in general. + +For centuries the question has been discussed whether there are innate +ideas hidden in the intellect or whether it may be likened to a blank +paper which experience impregnates with knowledge. This is the question +after the origin and source of understanding. Whence comes reason, where +do we get our ideas, judgments, conclusions? By the help of brown-study +from the interior of our brain, from revelation, or from experience? It +seems to me that you will quickly decide this matter when I ask you to +consider that everything we experience, together with the intellect +going through experiences, is a revelation of the absolute. Everything +we know is experience. We may consider the mind as a sheet of blank +paper, but in order that it may receive writing on its surface this +internal paper is as necessary as the external world which produces the +hand, the pen and the ink for this process of writing. In other words, +all experience originates from the world organism. Not knowledge, but +consciousness, world consciousness, is innate in the intellect. It has +not the consciousness of this or that in itself, but it knows of itself +the general, the existence as such, the absolute. + +The science of the intellect has ever wrestled with one peculiar fact. +It found knowledge which the mind had received from the outside, +so-called empirical knowledge. But it also found knowledge which was +innate, so-called _a priori_ knowledge. That there is always a valley +between two mountains, that gold is not sheet iron, that the part is +smaller than the whole, that the angles of a triangle are together equal +to two right angles, that circles are round, that water is wet, that +fire is hot, etc., these are things of which we know that they are true +in heaven and in hell, and in all time to come, although we have never +been there with our experience. This plainly shows that we harbor a +secret in our brains which the lovers of the mystical seek to exploit by +making believe that their self-interested wisdom of God and high +authority likewise belongs to the eternally innate truths. For this +reason it is especially important for the proletariat to bring the +controversy of the origin and source of understanding to a close. + +Our logic asks: Does wisdom descend mysteriously from the interior of +the human brain, or does it come from the outer world like all +experience? We shall leave its descent from heaven out of the question. + +The answer is: Science, perception, understanding, thought, require +internal and external things, subject and object, brain and world. +Truth is here and truth is there. Truth is so divine that it is +everywhere and absolute. + +But how to explain that wonderful _a priori_ knowledge which exceeds all +experience? For it is a fact that the intellect has not alone the +faculty of knowing things in general, but also that of separating them +into their parts and from one another and to name them. It cuts off +slices, so to say. But not like the butcher who sees everything merely +from the standpoint of his trade. You will remember from your own +experience as well as from my repeated statements that the world is not +a monotonous, but a multiform unit. This confused knot is dissolved and +explained by intellectual separation, by classification. In the absolute +everything is alike and unlike. But the intellect makes abstractions +from the unlike. For instance, in conceiving of the term minerals, we +pass over the distinction between gold and sheet iron. Then, when we +continue the classification by subordinating gold and sheet iron as +separate species to the general term of minerals, we know very well that +gold and sheet iron are different kinds of the same general mineral +nature. We know what the names indicate, and so long as they retain +their meaning, we know that neither in heaven nor in hell can gold be +sheet iron or sheet iron be gold. Water and fire are specialties taken +from the universe and named. Is it a wonder, then, that these names have +a special meaning and that we have the settled conviction that wherever +sense instead of nonsense is master, fire burns, water wets, circles are +round, and the sum of the angles of every triangle is equal to two right +angles? + +These illustrations are commonplace enough, indeed, but it seems to me +that they clearly show the mere formality of the distinction between +innate and experienced knowledge. You will recognize that both of these +kinds of knowledge are different and yet of the same kind, that both are +mixtures of the internal and external. Knowledge _a priori_ ceases to be +a miracle when we understand that it comes out of the same fountain of +experience as _a posteriori_ knowledge, and in either case knowledge is +acquired only by means of the intellect. Hence intellect connected with +the world is the sole source of all wisdom, and external nature as well +as our internal faculty of understanding are parts of the one general +nature, which is the truth and the absolute. + +"Only a gradual, slow, gapless development," says Noiré, "can free the +thinking mind from the philosophical disease of wondering." + +The art of dialectics or logic which teaches that the universe, or the +whole world, is one being, is the science of absolute evolution. "In the +whole constitution of all natural things," writes Lazare Geiger, "there +is hardly anything more miraculous than the way in which the miracle +avoids our glance and continuously withdraws into the distance to escape +observation. In the place of the abrupt and strange things produced by +imagination, reason puts uniformity and transition." + +And we add that the science of reason, or logic, teaches simultaneously +with the unity of the whole world, also that all things are alike +miraculous, or that there is only one miracle, which is existence in +general, the absolute. In other words, everything and nothing is +miraculous. + +In demonstrating that the most different things, such as heat and cold, +and all radical distinctions, are only relative forms of universal +nature, I prove the uninterrupted and matter of fact transition and the +absolute graduality, the fusion, of all things. + +I have tried to establish this proof in regard to the two kinds of +knowledge and illustrated it with commonplace examples, because these +have a popularizing effect. In order to meet the demands of more +exacting minds, I shall presently take up the miracle of causality. The +indubitable statement that everything must have its cause is regarded as +the most miraculous innate knowledge, and is much misused for the +purpose of bringing confusion into logic. + + + + +FIFTEENTH LETTER + + +My Son: + +If on my return from some voyage I were to tell you of all the things I +have _not_ seen, you would justly doubt the order of my senses. Sane +reason demands that the description of unfamiliar things be given in a +positive, not in a negative manner. If that is so, is it not wrong to +proceed negatively by trying to prove in explaining the nature of the +intellect that it is not a miracle and no mysterious charm of wisdom? I +answer: No. For the present, the intellect is still a sort of _ignis +fatuus_ which is magnified into a fiery man. In order to understand the +_ignis fatuus_, it is necessary to remove the fiery man. Logic must show +that human reason is not a miracle, not a mystical receptacle of wisdom. +The negative process is in such a case positively in order. Wherever a +thing is obscured by prejudices, these must first be removed, in order +that room may be made for the bare fact. + +It was the famous Kant who posed the question: "How is _a priori_ +knowledge possible?" How do we arrive at the knowledge of things which +are not accessible to experience? The answer is that the intellect +cannot accomplish such a miracle, and Kant substantiates this in a +long-winded way and with admirable penetration. But he left a nasty hair +in the soup. + +He found that by the help of our reason we can explain only phenomena. +The confusion between truth and phenomena had been handed down to him as +an infirmity of ancient times. He worked diligently on its solution, but +left some work for those coming after him. Originally the study of +supernatural and the profane study of natural things were closely +intermingled. Not until the obvious results of natural science became +known, did thinkers accommodate themselves to the habit of leaving +supernatural things to faith and limiting science to the study of +natural phenomena. Science had so to say passed on to the practical +order of business, not paying any further attention to the contrast +between phenomena and truth. But the logic, which is innate in the human +mind, cannot content itself with the dualistic split between faith and +science. It demands a monistic system and does not desist until the +primeval forests of faith are completely put under cultivation. + +The logical impulse of culture caused Kant to continue what was begun by +Socrates. Philosophy before Socrates searched for truth externally. +While our logic teaches that everything is true, and truth is the +universe, the Ionic philosophers made a sort of fetish out of the +matter. Thales idolized the water as the thing of things, another the +fire, a third numbers. This worship of the fetish was the worship of +truth. The search for understanding starts out with misunderstanding. +From religious to scientific culture, it is a step, not a leap. When +Socrates turned to introspection and started out, with his "Know +thyself," in submitting the prodigy of the human soul to critique, he +made another important step. + +You know that the "wisest of men" was not interested in air and water, +in natural science of the strict order, but rather in the good, the +true, and the beautiful, in the human in the narrower sense, in the +realm of the spirit, in the soul. It was indeed unwise that he was +interested to the verge of idolization, since in consequence of this +interest in a special part, the other, the material part was being +neglected. According to Goethe's statement that one thing is not fit for +all, Socrates did right. He and all philosophical lights after him +studied the intellect. What they missed was the now dawning +understanding that the faculty of thought is not a prodigy but a +special, and at the same time common, part of universal nature. While +these philosophers looked for truth in any one special form of +excellence, you are now invited to look for it in the total +interrelation of things. + +Science has ever endeavored to do away with miracles and prodigies. This +could be accomplished only gradually, and the logicians have, therefore, +remained more or less biased and confused. The great Kant was no +exception. He looked for supreme truth, and for its sake he investigated +the intellect. He is celebrated because he explained so well that this +intellect feels no mission for anything transcendental, and cannot +understand anything but phenomena. Still he permitted something +transcendental to remain. + +Kant is of the opinion that we perceive things as they appear, but not +as they are "in themselves." Nevertheless we should believe that a +mysterious truth is at the bottom of those phenomena, because we should +otherwise arrive at the irreconcilable contradiction that there are +phenomena without anything which could appear. The intellect, he holds, +can operate only on the field of phenomena, and for this reason we +should give up the endless grubbing after the transcendental. But we +should leave one little room in the house of reason, one little chamber +of faith, which points beyond experience up to the point where a +mysterious truth guards God and His commands. + +The subsequent philosophers, especially the Hegelian philosophy, opposed +this separation which assigned to the intellect only the study of +phenomena and to faith the absolute and infinite for veneration. But +they did not yet succeed in completely mastering the matter, they did +not fully arrive at an indubitably clear exposition of the fountain of +understanding and of the unity of truth, so that reaction nowadays can +again sound the retreat after the melody: "Back to Kant." You know that +Lessing complained about the treatment of "a dead dog" accorded to +Spinoza, and Marx added pointedly: "Hegel is more of a dead dog to-day +than Spinoza was at Lessing's time." The enemies of the working class +are the enemies of evolution. They wish to preserve the existing order +of things and the good old time in which they feel at home. For this +reason it is the mission of the proletariat to continue the work of +logic. It is our duty to show clearly that the metaphysical truth which +Kant opposed to the phenomena of nature and could not eliminate from the +intellect, is nothing but just a metaphysical, a fantastically +exaggerated, thing. + +According to our logic, the universe is the truth and everything +partakes of it. That such a truth is logical and such a logic true, is +shown by the interconnection of things, so that this science is +applicable to everything which the sciences respect as reasonable and +true. + +In order to help you in the understanding of the absolute and liberate +your thought from all special miracles, I refer to Kant's critique of +reason. It teaches that our intellect becomes a source of understanding +only in connection with other phenomena of nature. Only his critique +stuck fast in the mysterious fountain of causality. Thus he showed that +he was only a seeker after logic, not its master. The conclusion that +there must be _something_ that does appear where there are phenomena is +certainly correct. But that which Kant was thinking of, something of a +transcendental or metaphysical nature, led him to the radically wrong +conclusion that there must be something different, peculiar, miraculous, +mysterious, wherever there are phenomena. + +The Kantian conclusion that there must be an absolute truth by itself +behind a phenomenon, an absolute truth that exists independent of and +disconnected with such phenomenon, was due to his fetish-like conception +of truth. It is the first requirement for a correct use of the faculty +of logical reasoning to know that truth is the common nature of the +universe. + +That a phenomenon must be based on nature, or an effect on a cause, is a +fact identical with "causality" which I already promised to discuss in +the preceding letter. This same problem may also be expressed in the +words: Where there are predicates, there must be a subject that carries +them. In order to make quite sure that I will not be misunderstood, I +emphasize once more the fact that I am not raising any doubt as to the +correctness of this conclusion, but only to the metaphysical application +of this conclusion after the Kantian manner which consists in making +the same use of it as a clergyman who tries to prove that his theology +is innate in reason. + +Our conception of logic wishes to show that all causes and effects are +matter of the same kind, and that our faculty of reasoning is a matter +of fact thing which brooks no mysteries or metaphysical dreams. + + + + +SIXTEENTH LETTER + + +Now let me illustrate the interconnection of all things, or the +world-unit, by discussing the question of causality. We know that +everything has its cause. We know that this is also true on the Moon or +on Uranus, although we have not acquired this knowledge by experience on +those world bodies. Thus it seemed that the intellect was a mysterious +receptacle containing innate wisdom. The same receptacle also contains, +for instance, the truth that all white horses are white and all black +horses black. We do not know anything about the color of other horses in +other countries, but the color of black and white horses we know even if +we have never seen them in other countries. It is thus apparent that our +intellect is an instrument which reaches beyond experience. For this +reason there would seem to be no telling where the supply of such +miraculous revelations would stop and into what mysterious worlds the +intellect passing beyond the limits of experience would lead us. + +In order that the human intellect may not appear transcendental, in +order to give it its place in the general classification of natural +forces, we must investigate the nature of causality and so-called _a +priori_ knowledge. + +Kindly observe in the first place that a thing is just as wonderful +_after_ it is explained as it was before its explanation. A scientific +explanation of a thing ought not to do away with our admiration, but +only to reduce it to reasonable bounds. The intellect may very well be +regarded as something wonderful, but its wondrous quality should be +reduced to the measure of all things which are none of them any less +wonderful. After you have explained what water is, after you have +learned that it is composed of two chemical elements, after you have +realized all its qualities thoroughly, it still remains a wonderful, +divine, fluid. + +"All things have their causes." What are all things? They are +attributes, qualities of the universe. It is innate in the intellect to +know that the world is _one_ thing, that all things belong, not to any +different thing, but to one and the same subject. The intellect is by +nature the absolute feeling of unity. It knows of itself that everything +is interrelated and that the consciousness of causality is nothing else +but the consciousness of cosmic interrelation. And I maintain that the +innateness of the consciousness of cosmic interrelation in our brain is +explained when we realize that it is an actual thing like all others, a +phenomenon which has the same general nature as every other +phenomenon.[7] + +The fact is undeniable that a certain knowledge is innate in our +consciousness. The only difficulty has been to explain this fact. At +this point I call your attention to the exaggerated notion entertained +in regard to explaining, and understanding, things. By explanations, a +thing is not dissolved, but only classified. + +The hatching of an egg is explained when you perceive that this process +is part and parcel of a whole class of similar processes. If you modify +the exalted idea of the effect of explanations in this sense, you must +realize that the innate consciousness of the general interrelation of +things is natural and intelligible and requires no other explanation +than the humidity of the water, the gravity of bodies, or the color of +black horses. + +Even after it has been explained and understood, the intellect with its +logic remains a wonderful thing. Just as clay is by its nature +untransparent and pliable, or glass transparent and brittle, so +consciousness has its peculiar innate qualities. In this way knowledge +comes to the intellect not only by experience, but it is also a sort of +receptacle full of wisdom. Still this receptacle would no more contain +wisdom without experience than the eye would have impressions without +light. + +In order to straighten out the intricate windings of our subject, I +recapitulate them. We wish to learn the proper use of our intellect, the +conscious application of consciousness. To this end we analyze its +hitherto hidden mystical nature. So long as we exalt this nature +transcendentally to the clouds, we do not acquire its proper use. +Therefore the first paragraph of our lesson reads: The intellect belongs +in the same category with all things of the universe. And the second +paragraph says: If we distinguish two classes of thought radiated by the +human intellect, viz., innate thoughts, such as causality, and on the +other hand thoughts which come through experience, we must remember that +such a distinction is correct only when we realize that in spite of this +classification in two kinds they really belong to the same kind. Innate +and acquired wisdom, though served on two different plates, still are +taken from the same general world dish. + +From this it follows that the science of causality, though applicable +to all the phenomena of the world, does not apply to the universe. If it +is a fact that all wisdom is worldly, then one must not fly outside of +the world with the concept of causality. + +This is the salient point at issue. + +All things are one thing, are interdependent, stand in the relation of +cause and effect toward one another, or of genus and species. To say +that all things have a cause means that they have a mother. The fact +that every mother has a mother finds its final ending in the world +mother or mother world, which is absolute and motherless and contains +all mothers in its womb. + +Causes are mothers, effects are daughters. Every daughter has not only a +mother, grand-mother, and great-grand-mother, but also a father, +grand-father, and great-grand-father. The origin, or the family +relationship, of a daughter is not one-sided, but all-sided. In the same +way all things have not one, but many causes which flow together in the +general cause. + +The intellect which has the innate knowledge that everything has its +cause will accept the teaching that all causes in the world are founded +in the absolute world cause and must return to it. It is the +quintessence of logic not only to ascertain the true nature of the +intellect, but also to elucidate the nature of the universe by the help +of the intellect. + +All things have a mother, but to expect that the world mother should +logically have a mother is to carry logic to extremities and to +misunderstand the intellect and its art of reasoning. + +If you have recognized the faculty of understanding as a part of +existence, you will not wonder at its miraculousness. Existence is +wonderful. Its parts arise one out of the other, out of the universal +interrelations of the one world. They all have their predecessors and +causes. But what is true of the relative parts, is not true of the +absolute whole. + +I am the son of my father and the father of my son. I am at the same +time father and son. In the same way all things are simultaneously cause +and effect. Although father and son are two different persons, still the +capacity of being father and son rest in the same person, and although +cause and effect are to be distinguished as two things, still they are +two relations of the same thing. Persons and things, causes and effects, +are not independent entities, but relative entities, are +interconnections or relations of the absolute. + +The intellect is innate in us, and with it and through it also the +consciousness of being, although it is innate in us only as the teeth of +the child which grow after birth. Everything that we become aware of is +known only as a part of the universe. In so far as this is wonderful, +the consciousness of causality is miraculous. But, in fact, the +knowledge of the causality of all things is innate wisdom the same as +that of the color of all white and black horses. At the same time it +must be observed that every innate knowledge is in part acquired, and +every acquired knowledge in part innate, so that both kinds intermingle +and form one category. + +My whole argument aims to convince you that all things are worldly +things, and their causality is only another name for the same thing, +just as the German _brot_ is called _pain_ in French and _bread_ in +English. Thus we derive the firm conviction that if there is _pain_ in +heaven there will be bread, and if there are things, there will be +causes and effects, or interrelation with the unit of existence. + +The mystery of causality is sometimes expressed by the statement that we +possess the indubitable knowledge which extends beyond all experience +that wherever a change takes place there must have preceded another +change. Indeed, we have the faculty of recognizing the unity in the +infinite multiplicity, and infinite multiplicity in the unity. +Multiplicity, change, motion--who is to split hairs about them, who will +make fine distinctions? The intellect is the photographic organ of the +infinite motion and transformations called the "world." It is and +possesses the consciousness of cosmic changes. Is it a wonder that it +knows that there is interrelation in its things, that no part of the +world, not a particle of its motion and transformations, stands alone by +itself, that everything is connected and mutually dependent in and with +the universe? Because this understanding is in a way innate in the +intellect, therefore it understands that there is nothing but change, +infinitely proceeding transformations. And if it detaches any single +thing from this process, it knows that changes preceded it and changes +will follow. + +In short, we must not marvel at any single part of nature, not even at +the intellect, but admire the whole universe. Then fetishism will at +last end and a true cult, the cult of world truth, can begin. + +The art of thinking, my dear Eugene, is not so easy. For this reason I +keep on warning you against misunderstanding. I do not mean to advise +you with the foregoing against admiring any single part of nature, or of +art, a landscape or a statue. My teaching merely tends to moderate +admiration by the reflection that the whole world is wonderful, that +everything is beautiful, so that nothing ugly remains. The distinction +between beautiful and ugly is only relative. Even when I say that the +true worship of God, the cult of truth, cannot begin until idol worship +ceases, you will appreciate the phrase and will not insinuate that I do +not value the cultivation of science in the past, or that I hate idol +worship to the extent of forgetting what I have emphasized repeatedly, +viz., that idol worship is also worship of God, and error a paving stone +on the way toward truth. The most minute thing is a magnitude. +Everything is true, good, and beautiful, for the universe is absolute +truth, beauty and goodness. I conclude with the words of Fr. von Sallet: + + + A sunny view of world and life + Is balm for brain and heart, + It is with health and beauty rife, + With noblest works of art. + But do not for a moment think + That it is captured in a wink. + The golden harvest does not grow, + Unless the early tempests blow. + And only bitter woe and strain + Will bright and lofty wisdom gain. + + +FOOTNOTE: + +[7] E. g. That of natural existence.--EDITOR. + + + + +SEVENTEENTH LETTER. + + +My subject, dear Eugene, is the simplest in the world, but it requires +thorough treatment for all its full understanding. So every letter is in +a way but a repetition of the same argument. "It is remarkable," says +Schopenhauer, "that we find the few main theses of pre-socratic +philosophy repeated innumerable times. Also in the works of modern +thinkers, such as Cartesius, Spinoza, Leibniz, and even Kant, we find +that their few main theses are repeated over and over." + +Now I ask you to consider what I said in my first letters, viz., that +the titles of the principal philosophical works reveal that philosophy +is engaged in the study of logic, in the analysis of the intellect and +the art of its use. You will then recognize that in the very nature of +the subject my presentation of the matter lacks systematization. It has +no real beginning and end, because its object, the intellect, is +interconnected with the whole universe, which is without beginning and +end, which has neither before nor after, neither above nor below. + +You may venture that the relation of the intellect to the universe does +not concern the intellect especially, but is a universal matter. That +would be true. + +But it is easy to show that the art of thinking and wisdom of the world +are identical. And although the universal interrelation of things is +germain to all things and subjects, yet its consideration is a special +task of logic which treats all objects of thought summarily. + +My subject therefore begins everywhere, even though it is a specialty. +Hence I take the liberty to take my departure from any literature which +I happen to study. In the present letter, I deal with "logical +investigations" of the prominent Professor Trendelenburg. His is a bulky +volume, but you need not fear that I shall weary you with its +subtleties. As a rule I read only the preface of philosophical works of +the second and third order, their introduction and perhaps the first few +chapters. Then I am approximately informed as to what I may expect from +them further on. One frequently finds statements which, if they do not +throw new light on the subject, still bring out in bolder relief some of +the accomplishments of historical research in our field. And in order +that the son may not trust to the father alone, which might lead to +distrust, I connect my argument with some statements of Trendelenburg. + +In the preface to the second edition the author complains of the "dull +headache" which the Hegelian intoxication has left in Germany and says: +"Philosophy will not resume its old power until it becomes consistent, +and it will not become consistent until it grows in the same way that +all other sciences do. In other words, it must not take a new departure +in every brain and then quit, but it must approach its problems +historically and develop them. The German prejudice must be abandoned, +according to which the philosophy of the future is supposed to look for +a new principle. This principle has already been found. It consists in +the organic world conception, the fundaments of which are resting in +Plato and Aristotle." + +The Professor is right, but he overlooks that the philosophers, even of +modern times, do not begin "each on his own account," do not have "each +his own principle," or if they have, such a "false originality" is but +the indifferent attribute of historical development which has handed the +object of logic, the true art of thought, from generation to generation +in an ever brighter condition. + +I repeat this emphatically for pedagogic reasons, because I consider it +essential to convince you and the reader that the apparent paradoxes +which I state are the objects of discussion since time immemorial. I +also wish to stimulate you to a study of the master works of philosophy +which show the cheering spectacle, in the persons of the most brilliant +specimens of the human mind, of the onward march of this mind from +darkness to light. + +In order that the wheat contained in this human treasure box may not be +concealed by the tares, I am endeavoring to throw light on the outcome +of the historical development of philosophy, and for this purpose I +continue to discuss the question by taking my departure in this instance +from some further statements of Trendelenburg. + +"It is a peculiarity of philosophical methods of reasoning to recognize +a part in the whole, and it is tacitly assumed that the whole is +descended from a thought which determines the parts. On the other hand, +it is peculiar to empirical methods of analysis to study the parts +without regard to their interrelation, or at best to collect them and +put them together, and it is tacitly assumed that every point is +something peculiar in itself which must be studied apart from all the +rest." + +"The aim of all human understanding is always to solve the miracle of +divine creation by further creative thought. When this task is +undertaken in detail, the detail study forces one on to other things: +for things must go backwards toward their dissolution by the same force +through which they arose out of the depths." + +These sentences state the problem before us. Shall we use the intellect +philosophically, or shall we use it empirically? We are striving to +understand the parts and the whole, and this is identical with the +research after a systematical world philosophy, or with the art of +dialectics. Now we must state in the first place that thinking of any +kind, whether it be philosophical or empirical, is of the same species, +that the same kernel is contained in both forms. Roses are different +flowers from carnations, but the flower nature is in both of them. Thus +the nature of thought is contained in both philosophical and empirical +thinking. The distinction is well enough, but their unity must not be +lost sight of. + +The philosophers, he says, seek to understand the detail by the whole; +the empirical thinkers analyze the details without regard to +interrelations. But both methods of research are different specimens of +the same genus, and both of them are one-sided when their +interconnection is overlooked. The empirical thinker who seeks to +understand the details in their isolation, thinks philosophically, when +he regards his special research as a contribution to the whole, and the +philosopher, who seeks to understand the detail by the whole, thinks +empirically when he rightly regards all details as attributes of the +whole. + +Trendelenburg, then, has expressed his case very obscurely. Both methods +of study, if employed one-sidedly, entirely misconceive the art of +thinking. The philosophers err when they regard the intellect as the +only source of understanding and truth; it is only a part of truth and +must be supplemented by all the rest of the world. On the other hand, +the empirical thinkers err when they look for understanding and truth +exclusively in the outer world, without taking into account the +intellectual instrument by the help of which they lift their treasures. +In fact, such one-sided philosophers exist only in theory; I mean there +are some who imagine that truth could be one-sided. But in practice they +all testify, much against their will, to the inevitable interconnection +of matter and mind, of inside and outside. In the practical use of the +intellect everybody shows that the part operates in the whole, and that +the whole is active in its parts. + +We know _a priori_ that the universe is a whole. The universal existence +can be conceived only as of one kind or nature. The mere thought that +there might be something which does not partake of the nature of the +universe is no thought, because it is a thought without sense or reason. +The whole world is the supreme being, though I grant that we have but a +vague conception of it. We have as yet no detailed, true, conception of +the universe, but it is gradually acquired in the course of science. +Still, our conception will never be perfect because details are +infinitesimal and the absolute being is infinite growth. + +As to details, we know them more or less accurately and yet not +accurately, because even the most minute part of the infinite is +infinite. All science has searched in vain for atoms. What our +understanding knows, has always been nothing but predicates or +attributes of truth, although they are true attributes and are truly +understood by us. + +I emphasize the inadequacy of all modes of thought and of all +understanding in opposition to those who make an idol of science. I +emphasize the truth of all perceptions in opposition to those +knownothings who claim that truth cannot be understood, but can only be +admired and worshipped. Hence it follows for our theory of understanding +that intellect and reason and the art of thought are no independent +treasure boxes which make any revelations to us. They are theoretical +classifications which in practice are operative only in the universal +interconnection of things. Understanding, perceiving, judging, +distinguishing and concluding, etc., are unable to produce any truths. +They can only enlighten and clarify experience by logical classification +and distinction. Because man produces works which are preceded by +planning, therefore the philosophical mode of research has "assumed that +the whole is descended from a thought." But this is an assumption of +human origin, which is shown to be without foundation on closer +analysis. The plans of our works are copies of natural originals and are +"free creations of the mind" only in a limited sense. The artists are +well aware of the natural descent of their thoughts and fictions. To +regard the world as the outcome of thought is a perverse logic. It is +the first condition of rational, proletarian, thought to recognize the +intellect and its products as attributes of the world subject. + + + + +EIGHTEENTH LETTER + + +Just as in political history action and reaction follow one another, +just as periods of economic prosperity are alternated by periods of +depression, so we find in literature a periodical fluctuation between +philosophical and anti-philosophical tendencies. + +After Hegel had for a time thoroughly aroused the spirits, a time of +apathy followed, so that this hero of thought who shortly before had +been almost idolized could be attacked and reviled. For about a decade, +a philosophical breeze has now once more been blowing. The subject of +logic, the theory of understanding, is again the object of universal +attention. This movement is stimulated by important discoveries in +science, such as the heat equivalent of Robert Mayer, the origin of +species by Darwin, etc., and natural science and philosophy may be +compared to two miners who are digging a tunnel, so that sharp ears on +both sides can hear the blows of the hammers and the clanging of the +tools. + +There is much truth in this picture, but it may also lead to +misunderstandings. By the vivisection of frogs and rabbits, by boring +into the brain, physiology will not discover the mind. No microscope, no +telescope, will reveal the nature of reason and truth or the art of +logical discernment. + +Neither will Lazarre Geiger, Max Müller, Steinthal, and Noiré succeed in +philology in solving the "last questions of all knowledge" by the help +of any primitive arch-language. + +At the same time, the value of the co-operation of these gentlemen is +not denied, only I desire to point out that the comparison with the +tunnel is not quite accurate. What Marx said of economic formulas, is +true of logical formulas: "In their analysis neither the microscope nor +chemical reagents are of any service. The power of abstraction must +replace them both." + +The two sciences will finally meet, not because each one of them digs +away in its own one-sided fashion, but because the miners meet after +working hours and exchange their experiences. And the philosophers may +be the dominant party, because they are specialists in logic and +therefore prepared to utilize anything which may serve their purpose, no +matter from what side it comes. The other party, on the other hand, has +its own specialties and promotes the cause of logic in a secondary and +involuntary fashion. + +Natural science has its own monism which is distinguished from +philosophical proletarian monism in that it does not appreciate the +historical outcome of philosophical research. One of the most prominent +representatives of the former is Noiré. He entitles one of his little +works "Monistic Thought," but shows himself on its pages as a very +unclear dualist. He speaks of the "dual nature of causality" and relates +that the mind operates with a different causality than the mere +mechanical one. He calls this other "sensory causality." + +According to him the world has only two attributes: "Motion and +sensation are the only true and objective qualities of the world.... +Motion is the truly objective ... though it is admitted that it gives us +only the phenomenon.... Sensation makes up the internal nature of +things. Every subject, whether man or atom, is endowed with the two +qualities of all beings, viz., motion and sensation." + +Thereupon I have carefully looked for an explanation in Noiré's works, +why he regards the nature of things as composed of an external and an +internal quality, and why sensation should not be regarded as a sort of +motion, but the only reason I could find was the dualistic nature of his +"monistic" reasoning. + +As Schopenhauer provided the whole world with a "will," so Noiré +provides it with "sensation." + +Kant and his "Critical Philosophy" held in their time that our intellect +perceives only the phenomena of nature, while the mystic law of +causality, according to him, points to a hidden being, which cannot be +perceived but must be believed, which we may venerate but must leave +undisturbed by science. Schopenhauer, his brilliant successor, who in +spite of his brilliancy did not materially advance the cause of +philosophy, mystified the problem of causality by his discovery that the +nature of the world is will power. These teachings of Kant and +Schopenhauer are dressed up anew and mixed with the recent discoveries +of science by Noiré. But he entirely ignores the work of Schelling and +Hegel, who by their criticisms have made evident the lack of logic in +the Kantian separation of phenomenon (apparition) from noumenon +(essence), of cause from effect. + +You are familiar with the silly question whether Goethe or Schiller, +Shakespeare or Byron, is the greater poet, and you will not think that I +am trying to elevate Hegel above Kant or Kant above Hegel. They are just +two cogs on the spinning wheel of history. If the second crushes what +the first has cracked, such is the result of their succession. + +Natural science is also a valuable co-operator in the solution of the +world problem, not so much by digging in the logical tunnel itself, or +making amateur excursions into the fields of philosophy or metaphysics, +but because it elucidates and renders tangible the special object of +logic in such far-embracing objects as the unity of natural forces or of +animal species. The scientific presentation of this special object, +however, requires a brain armed with the full equipment of the +historical outcome of philosophy. + +Now you must not believe that I am conceited enough to place my own +little personality on the pedestal as the only true philosopher. I am +too well aware of my shortcomings as a self-educated man. But seeing +that I have striven earnestly and without prejudice since my young days +to understand the high object of my studies, I feel in my heart a +certain confidence in my qualification to deal with it. On the other +hand, I know my lack of that sort of learning which is required in order +to be able to present the scientifically much-courted nature of the +human mind in such a form and with such emphasis as its sublime +character deserves. And if I, nevertheless, come before the public on +various occasions with my tentative works, I offer as an excuse that +hitherto the Messiah has not appeared who will come after me and whose +John the Baptist I should like to be. + +You, my dear Eugene, will take me soberly and reduce my resounding words +to their proper measure, when I, in the intoxication of enthusiasm, flow +over like that now and then. You know that I am no hero worshipper. +Though all research is but the product of individual minds, the mind of +each man is a part of the universal mind which produces science. Now +follows the point which forms the conclusion of all my letters: The +intellect which produces science is indeed a part of man, but still more +a part of the world, it is the universal world intellect, the reason of +the absolute, the absolute reason. + +The study of this intellect at work, not merely in shoemaking, in +anatomy, or in astronomy, but in all fields, in the infinite, of its +life in the absolute, is the means by which the art of logic is +acquired. It is true that the infinite exists only in finite parts, and +you cannot conceive of the infinite directly, you can perceive it only +in its parts. And in perceiving them you must always remember that every +part is an infinite piece of the infinite universe. + +In his "Introduction and Proofs of a Monistic Theory of Understanding," +Noiré, after enumerating the new points contained in his work, adds +sneeringly that he is "not in a position to give any new clews as to the +nature of the absolute." For this very reason I want to denounce his +"Monism" as a shallow piece of work, which offers only the name instead +of the essence. + +The well-known Ernst Hæckel knows a great deal more about this subject. +In a lecture given at the twenty-fifth convention of natural scientists +in Eisenach, he calls the monistic view of nature "a grand pantheistic +one." The essence of all religion, according to him, consists in the +"conviction of a final and unmistakably common cause of all things." And +he continues: "In the admission that with the present day organization +of our brain, we are unable to penetrate to the final cause of all +things, the critical natural philosophy and dogmatic religion agree." +Whether the professor is one of those natural philosophers who regard +the human mind as too narrow for the understanding of the "unmistakably +(hence somewhat understood) common cause of all things," is not quite +clear to me, nor probably to the famous scientist himself. For he adds: +"The more we progress in the understanding of nature, the more we +approach that unattainable final cause." And further on: "The purest +form of monistic faith culminates in the conviction of the unity of God +and nature." + +Now I ask: If nature, God, and absolute truth are one and the same +thing, have we not learned something about the "final cause of all +things?" What necessity is there in that case for speaking in such an +abjectedly humble tone of human understanding, or to assign nothing but +straw and husks to it, in the language of Hegel? + +You see, then, that Hæckel has a higher estimate of absolute nature than +Noiré who does not care to have anything to do with the nature of the +absolute. But my object at this moment is to convince you that neither +the one nor the other of these two, nor natural science, so-called, is +directly digging in the tunnel which will give us light on the question +of the limits of our understanding and the final cause of things. Our +logic, on the other hand, which treats the intellect as a part of +nature, cultivates a natural science that includes the mere empirical +natural science in the same way in which the day of twenty-four hours +includes the day of twelve hours and the night. + +Natural science proper deals mainly with tangible things. Light and +sound, the objects of eye and ear, are still included in its studies. +The objects of smell and taste stand on the dividing line. But the +socalled sciences of the mind, such as grammar and politics, political +economy and history, morals and law, and most decidedly logic, are +entirely excluded. + +Such a limitation is well enough, if we remember that it is purely +formal. However, it must not overlook the bridge which leads from +limited nature to universal, infinite, nature. + +The monism of natural science has a far too narrow view of the universe. +When it says that "all is motion," it says just as little or as much as +Solomon with his "all is vain." Everything is crooked and straight, +everything great and small, everything temporal and eternal, everything +truth and life. But nothing is thus said to show the meaning of +distinction in this world, to explain how rest exists in motion, and +sense in nonsense. + +In order to differentiate logically we must know that everything is +everything, that the universe or absolute is its own cause and the final +cause of all things, which embraces all distinctions, even that of +causality and that between matter and mind. + + + + +NINETEENTH LETTER + + +"Philosophy should not try to be edifying," said Hegel. This means that +religious feeling is far below scientific thought. But there is a +reverse side to this sentence, viz., that thoughts which do not rise to +the edifying interconnection of all things, no matter whether they +remain stuck in some specialty on account of frivolousness or of +narrowmindedness, are far below a wise world philosophy. + +In a former letter I have already emphasized, and I hope to prove it +more convincingly, that the conception of "God," or of the absolute, is +indispensable for a logical world philosophy. + +You know that in my dictionary the gods and divinities of all religions +and denominations are "idols," and justly so, since they are all +manufactured images. Instead of the entire universe, they worship a more +or less unessential part of it. + +The religions show by their idolatry, the sciences frequently by their +little creditable indifference, that they have no conception of the +intellect and its art of reasoning. + +The universe is a familiar conception. Everybody uses it, and there is +apparently little to say about it. But in fact it is the conception of +all conceptions, the being of all beings, the cause of itself which has +no other cause and no other being beside itself. That the whole world is +contained in the universe is so obvious that you may wonder at my waste +of words over such a matter-of-fact thing. But when you consider that +the people have always searched for a world cause outside of the world, +together with a beginning of the world and a transcendental truth, then +you will see that they have not grasped the conception of the world as a +whole, as a universe. And if that is admitted, then the proof that it is +the cause of all causes, the beginning of all beginnings, and the truth +of all truths, is not such a superfluous undertaking. + +Now you may say that it is presumptuous to try to understand the whole +universe at once. This objection is justified in a way, according to the +interpretation of the words. Still I hope that it will be my +justification to declare that it is not a question of understanding the +universe in detail, but only in general, not each and everything in its +differentiation, but only in a summary way. And it is only the edifying +conception of the universe as a whole which will open for you the door +to the understanding of the human mind, of thought, and the art of using +it. We wish to understand _the_ conception; not this or that conception, +but the whole conception, the conception of the whole. You will no +longer indulge in the superstition that the faculty of thought or +understanding is a thing apart from the world's interconnection. I +presume that you have now learned enough about the art of thought to be +sure not to think of anything without its worldwide interrelation. For +so long as one imagines that a piece of wood or a stone is a thing in +itself, without connection with light and air, with Earth, Moon, and +Sun, he has a very barbarian conception of the things of this world. + +I maintain that the understanding of the human faculty of reason and the +art of its use are inseparable from the world concept. And I want this +understood in the sense, that it is not a mistake to distinguish between +the internal mind and the outside world, but that these are merely +formal distinctions of the essentially indivisible and absolute +universe. + +The concept of this true God or divine, because universal, Truth shows +on close analysis that it includes the special truth of the art of +thought as well as all other sciences, and pre-eminently the science of +thought, because this science must not limit itself to any special +thing, but must be world wisdom by its very will and nature. + +To understand the universe, then, means to become aware that this being +of all beings has no beginning, no cause, no truth nor reason outside +and beside itself, but has everything in and by itself. To understand +the universe means to recognize that one is rushing beyond the worldly +infinity into the realm of fantastic transcendentalism and abusing the +intellect, when illogically applying such terms as beginning and end, +cause and effect, being and not being, to the absolute universe. Such an +illogical use of the faculty of thought is well illustrated and rebuked +by the poet who questions and answers: + + + "And when my life has passed away, + What will become of me? + The world has one eternal day, + 'Thereafter' cannot be." + + +In order to acquire the universal sense, you will strive to understand +that the universe includes all relative things, while as a whole it +embodies the absolute or the edifying deity. + +If you would become world-wise, you must learn that the things called +opposites and contradictions have a different meaning than is ordinarily +applied to them by the logic of the idolators. They say that God and the +world, body and soul, truth and error, life and death, etc., are +irreconcilable antipodes; that they exclude one another; that they +cannot be brought under the same roof, but must be kept wide apart by +the laws of eternal reason. But this doctrine of contradiction is merely +narrow dogmatism, which confuses the minds instead of enlightening them. +Certainly, death differs from life, the perishable from the +imperishable, black from white, crooked from straight, large from small. +Who would be silly enough to deny that? But even the apparently most +contradictory and opposite things may be classified under the same +genus, family, or species, as twins in a mother's womb. The same thing +that does not prevent male and female from sitting in the same nest, +does not prevent the most widely different things, in spite of their +separate characters, from being one and the same, from being two pieces +of the same caliber. You are certainly still the same Eugene that you +were as a little baby, and yet you are at the same time another. The +experts in physiology even claim that they can compute how often a man +of sixty has changed his flesh, bones, skin, and hair. Although the old +man is the same individual that he was when first born, yet he never +remained the same. + +You will see by this illustration that all difference is of the same +nature, a general, supreme, universal being, absolute and divine, and +this absolute world being is highly edifying, because it comprises all +other beings and is the Alpha and Omega of all things. + +Is this world-god a mere idea? No, it is the truth and life itself. And +it is very interesting to note that the so-called "ontological proof of +the existence of God" agrees very well with the world truth which I +proclaim in the tabernacle of logic. This proof is originally attributed +to the learned Anselmo of Canterbury. However that may be, it is certain +that Descartes and Spinoza support him with their famous names. They +hold that the "most perfect being" must necessarily have existence, +because otherwise it would not be the most perfect. + +"I understood very well," writes Descartes in the fourth section of his +"Method of Correct Thought," "that in accepting the hypothesis of a +triangle I would have to accept the fact that the sum of its three +angles is equal to two right angles. But nothing convinced me of the +presence of such a triangle, while I found that my conception of the +most perfect being was as inseparably linked to existence as my +conception of a triangle is to the identity of the sum of its angles +with two right angles.... Hence it is certainly as undeniable as any +geometrical proof can be that God exists as this most perfect being." + +This argument appears to me as clear as daylight and ought to convince +you, not of the existence of a transcendental idol, but of the truth of +the absolute and most perfect world being. If you were to remark that +this perfectness is not so very great, considering its many obvious +imperfections, I should ask you not to split hairs and to recognize with +sane senses that these imperfections of the world belong as logically to +the perfect world as the evil desires belong to virtue which becomes +virtue only by the test of overcoming them. The conception of a +perfection which has no imperfections to overcome would be a silly idea. + +Now in conclusion let me say a few words of apology for continually +interchanging the universe and the concept of the universe. I frequently +speak of the idea of a thing as if it were the thing itself. But see +here! Do you not ask on seeing the portrait of some person unknown to +you: Who is this? And do you not interchange the portrait for the person +itself, without difficulty and misunderstanding? The idea stands in the +same relation to the thing, as the portrait to the person it represents. +This remark is directed against that unsound logic which knows only the +separation of the idea from the thing, of reason from its objects, but +does not grasp the mere formality of such a distinction, does not +appreciate the unity of the world, the edifying and supreme truth, the +truth of the supreme being. + +This letter, my dear Eugene, pleads for edification, but only for that +kind of edification which includes the unedifying, whereby edification +is sobered down. If you would give the name of pantheism to this world +philosophy, you should remember that it is not a sentimental and +exalted, but a common sense pantheism, a deification which has the taste +of the godless. + + + + +TWENTIETH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Today I am going to present my case with the precision of a +schoolmaster. + +The concept of white cabbage embraces all white cabbage heads that ever +were and ever will be. + +The concept of cabbage embraces red, white, and many other kinds of +cabbage. The concept of vegetable embraces a still wider range. The +organic field is still more comprehensive. And finally the world concept +embraces everything which we know and don't know, the end of which we +cannot conceive, and which therefore is called infinite. + +When we trace our steps backward over the same reasoning, we find at +once that the universal concept is divided into two parts, viz., the +universe and the conception of it. We thus find the world in the concept +and the concept in the world, so that both of these parts are +interconnected, each is the predicate of the other, and whether we turn +the thing to the right or to the left, the concept is in the world and +the world in the concept. + +Now it is true that the concept, or the faculty of understanding, is the +object of our study rather than the world outside of it. The faculty of +understanding, by the way, is nothing but a collective noun for all +concepts, hence simply another name for concept in general. But what I +eternally repeat is this: We cannot make a concept separated from all +the rest of the world the object of our study, because that would be an +empty abstraction which does not take on any meaning until we connect it +with the world, for instance the special concept of cabbage with +sense-perceived cabbage and so forth. + +The concepts of white cabbage, cabbage in general, vegetables, or +plants, etc., are all of them special concepts and at the same time +general concepts. The one and the other is relative. Compared to the +various species it includes, the general concept of cabbage is abstract, +while compared to the general concept of vegetables it is concrete. And +so it is with all concepts. They are abstract and concrete at the same +time. Only the final concept, the world concept, is neither concrete nor +abstract, but absolute. It is the concept of the absolute, which is +indispensable for an understanding of logic. + +We found a while ago that the absolute world concept consisted of two +parts, viz., the concept and the world. In the same way, the chemists +teach us that water consists of two elements, each of which by itself +does not make any water, while their compound makes pure water. But we +do not need such distant illustrations. My table in its present +composition is something different from what it would be if the same +pieces were put together in some other way and without a plan. + +Therefore the world concept is a far more sublime concept than all the +parts of which it consists. And in order to make this quite clear, I may +honor this compound of the world and its concept by a special name, say +"universe," so as to distinguish it from its component parts. + +Now I declare, without fear of having the word turned in my mouth by any +sophist, that the world embracing the thought, or the universe, is the +absolute which includes everything, while the world and the thought of +it, each by itself, are but classifications or relative things. + +We wish to understand thought, not empty abstract thought, but the +universal world-embracing thought, the thought in a philosophical sense. +This is not mere thought, but living truth, the universe, the absolute, +the supreme being. + +It is with the universe and its parts as it is with a telescope and its +concentric rings. Our intellect is a special ring which gives us a +picture of the whole concentric thing. This photographer, as I have +called it in a former letter, is not the object of our study for its own +sake, nor for the sake of its pictures, but rather for the sake of the +original, of the universe. It is as if somebody were to buy a portrait +of some historically renowned person. No matter how much concerned the +buyer would be with the picture, in the last analysis he is concerned +with that person itself. So it is with the art of understanding the +absolute, with world wisdom, which we study not for the sake of the +wisdom, but of the world itself. + +This lengthy discussion might have been cut short by simply speaking of +the world instead of going to so much trouble on account of the world +concept. But I should then miss my point, which is that the human +intellect is a part of the world, and that the ideological distinction +which separates this intellect from the rest of the world, requires for +the whole an embracing term. + +The absolute concept is the concept of the absolute, of the supreme +being. To it applies all the true, good, and beautiful ever attributed +to God, and it is also that being which lends logic, consistency, and +form to all thought. + +Plato is a philosopher who has thrown a wonderful light on the faculty +of understanding, though he has not fully explained it. In his dialogue +entitled "Gorgias," he makes Socrates say the following: "Does it seem +to you that men want that with which they occupy themselves at any time, +or that for the sake of which they undertake whatever they may be +engaged in? Do those, for instance, who take some medicine prescribed by +the physicians seem to want that which they do ... or to want that for +the sake of which they take medicine, viz., health?... In the same way +those who go on board of ships and trade do not want that which they are +doing; for who would care to go to sea and face danger or conquer +obstacles? That for which they go to sea is that which they want, viz., +to become rich; they are going to sea for the sake of acquiring wealth." + +Plato thus says that the immediate purposes of men are not their real +purposes, but means to an end, means to welfare or for "good." He +therefore continues: "It is in pursuit of good, then, that we go when we +go, because we are after something better, and we stand still for the +sake of the same good." + +Now let us go a step farther than Socrates and Plato. Just as men's +actions are truly done, not for the sake of some immediate purpose, but +of the ulterior, of welfare, and just as their socalled ethical actions +are justified only by the general wellbeing, so all things of the world +are not substantiated by their immediate environment, but by the +infinite universe. It is not the seed planted in the soil which is the +cause of the growing plant, as the farmer thinks, but the Earth, the +Sun, the winds, and the weather, in short, the whole of nature, and that +includes the seed germ. + +If we apply this reasoning to our special object, the faculty of +understanding, we find that it is not a narrowly human, nor a +transcendental, but a universal cosmic faculty. According to Homer, the +immortal gods call things by other names than mortal men. But once you +have grasped the concept of the absolute, you understand the language of +the gods, you understand that the intellect by itself is but a minute +particle, while in the interrelation with the universe it is an absolute +and integral part of the universal absolute. + +All things have a dual nature, all of them are limited parts of the +unlimited, the inexhaustible, the unknowable. Just as all things are +small and great, temporal and eternal, so all of them including the +human mind are knowable and unknowable at the same time. We must not +idolize the faculty of thought nor forget its divine nature. Man should +be humble, but without bowing in doglike submission to a transcendental +spirit, and he should be sustained by the sublime consciousness that his +spirit is the true one, the spirit of universal truth. + +Everything can be seen by eyes, including those of a hawk. Just as the +eye is the instrument of vision, so the intellect is the instrument of +thought. And just as spectacles and glasses are means of assisting the +eye in seeing, so senses, experience, and experiments are means of +assisting the intellect in understanding. With this equipment the +intellect can assimilate everything in its conceptions. It understands +"all," but "all" only in a relative sense. We understand all, just as we +buy everything for money. We can buy only what is for sale. Reason and +sunshine cannot be valued in money. We can see everything with eyes, and +yet not everything. Sounds and smells cannot be seen. Just as everything +is great and small, so everything is knowable and unknowable, according +to the meaning given to "everything" in the language of men or gods. +That word has the dual meaning of applying to any particle and to the +whole universe. So is the human mind universal, but only a universal +specialty. + +Look at that magnificently colored carnation. You see the whole flower, +and yet you do not see all of it. You do not see its scent nor its +weight. In the human language "whole" means a relative whole, which is +at the same time a part. Every particle of the universe is such a dual +thing. But in the language of the gods, which is spoken by philosophy, +only the absolute universe is whole. + +When the subject under discussion is not the intellect, but some other +part of the world, for instance the eyes, the universal concept of the +absolute is not so important, because the faculty of seeing, like the +faculty of wealth, is in little danger of being metaphysically abused. + +One knows that eyes which can see around a corner, or through a block of +iron, or which can perceive the scent of a carnation, are as meaningless +as a white sorrel. Even though our eyes cannot see the invisible, that +does not prevent them from being a universal instrument which can see +everything, that is everything visible. + +If you understand this, you will also see through the miserable wisdom +of the professors which wallows on its belly in the dust and cries with +the faithful: O Lord, O Lord! similarly to Du Bois-Reymond, who cries +out: _Ignorabimus_! It is true that the human mind is an ignoramus in +the sense that it is ever learning, because there is inexhaustible +material in nature. There is also something unknowable in every particle +of nature, just as there is something invisible in every carnation. But +the unknowable in the sense used by those ignorant people who cannot +understand the human mind because they have a transcendental monster in +their mind, such a monstrous unknowable exists only in the imagination +of the idolators to whom the true spirit reveals itself as little as the +spirit of truth. + +Just as surely as we know that there cannot be in heaven any knife +without a blade and a handle, nor any black horses that are white, just +so surely do we know that the faculty of understanding can never and +nowhere be the absolute, but must always be a special faculty. The +concept of understanding, like the concept of a knife, is limited to a +definite instrument. There may be all kinds of knives and intellects, +but nothing exists that has escaped from its own skin or from the +limitation of its own particular concept. + +By this standard you may measure the silly thought of those who speak +transcendentally of an unlimited faculty of understanding. They haven't +any right idea of the mind nor of the universe, of the conceivable nor +of the inconceivable, otherwise they would not speak in such a +nonsensical sense of the "Limits of Understanding." In short, you see +that the relative limitation or absoluteness of reason can only be +understood by means of the concept of the absolute. + + + + +TWENTY-FIRST LETTER + + +The proletarian logic of the working class searches after the supreme +being. The working class knows that it must serve but it wants to know +whom to serve. Shall it be an idol or a king? Where, who, what, is the +supreme being to which everything else is subordinate, which brings +system, consistency, logic, into our thought and actions? The next +question is then: By what road do we arrive at its understanding? Any +transcendental revelation being of no use to us, there are only two ways +open: Reason and experience. + +Now it is a mistake of common logic to regard these two roads as +separate, while, in fact, they are one and the same common road, which +by the help of empirical reason or reasonable experience leads us to the +point where we recognize that the supreme being to which everything is +subordinate, is nothing special, not a part or a particle, but the +universe itself with all its parts. + +We take medicine for the sake of health, we make efforts for the sake of +wealth. But neither health nor wealth are an end in themselves. What +good is health to us, when we have nothing to bite? What good are all +the treasures of Croesus, if health is lacking? Therefore health and +wealth must be combined. Nor is that enough. There is a spirit in us +that drives us farther ahead. There are still other treasures and +requirements, for instance contentment is surely one of them. But the +motive power of the world spirit is so infinite, that it is not +satisfied until it has everything. Everything, then, in other words the +whole world, that is the true end. + +Socrates and his school, to whom I alluded in the preceding letter, +wandered the way of separate reason for the purpose of finding the +supreme being, the true, the good, the beautiful. The platonic dialogues +paint a very magnificent picture of the truth that neither health nor +wealth, neither bravery nor devotion, are "the greatest good," but that +it is mainly a question of the understanding and use to which mankind +put these things. Accordingly they are good or bad, they are but +relative "goods." Love and faith, honesty and veracity, are good enough, +but not _the_ good; they only partake of the good. What is sought is +that which is under all circumstances absolutely good, true, and +beautiful. + +When Socrates asked his disciples to define the good or reasonable, they +enumerated as a rule a series of good and reasonable specialties, while +the master was continually compelled to instruct them, that his research +was not aimed at those objects. They name important virtues, and he +wants to know what absolute virtue is. They name good things, and he is +looking for _the_ good, for pure goodness, while the good things have +the bad quality of being good only under certain circumstances. + +The Socratic school then finds out that only the understanding or the +intellect can find the circumstances under which we may arrive at the +absolute. Understanding, the human mind, philosophy, is to them the +divine. Thus they arrive at their famous "Know thyself," which in their +language means: Hold introspection and rack your brain. But they did not +succeed in thus using the intellect as an oracle. Nor did the Christian +philosophers of later times fare any better with that method, when they +changed the title of the object of their studies and substituted God, +Liberty, and Immortality, for the good, the true, and the beautiful. + +In order to get out of the confusion resulting from the many names given +to the object of logic in the course of history, it must be remembered +that pagan as well as Christian research founded their quest for the +absolute on the innate need of understanding the supreme being which was +to be the pivot of all thought and action. Polytheism had to have a +supreme god, no matter whether his name was Zeus or Jupiter. In +consequence of this longing for unity it was very natural that the place +of the many immortals was finally taken by one eternal father of all. +The philosophers are distinguished from the theologians only in so far +as the former seek for the fulcrum of the world more on real than on +imaginary ground. + +After more than two thousand years of mediation by intermediary links, +ancient philosophy has at last been transformed into modern +democratic-proletarian logic which recognizes that the intellect is an +instrument which leads to the supreme being on condition that it does +not rack the brain but goes outside of itself and consciously connects +itself with the world outside. This connection constitutes the supreme +being, the imperishable, eternal, truth, goodness, beauty, and reason. +All other things only "partake of it," to use Platonic language. + +Although the Socratic school were handicapped by many fantastical +attributes, still they were on the road towards true logic, as neither +health nor wealth, nor any other treasure or virtue satisfied them. They +did not care for true phenomena, but for truth itself. But truth is the +universe, and man must understand that this is the only truth, in order +to be able to use his intellect logically, to be reasonable in the +highest and classical sense of this word. + +All the world speaks of logic and logical thought. But when you, my son, +as a thinking man feel the need of getting out of phraseology and +knowing exactly what words should mean, you will hardly find one book +that will give you sufficient light on the subject of logic. The best +book would be the Bible, perhaps. I mean that, when you inquire after +beginning and end, purpose and destination, in short, after that which +would give you and all things a definite support, when you search for +the vortex around which everything revolves, then the Bible does not +tell you about the beginning of this or that part of history, but speaks +of the absolute beginning and end of all history, of the general purpose +and general destination of all existence. That is what I call logic. + +The free thinkers were not satisfied with religious mythology, they +wanted to bring consistency and logic into their brains by their own +studies. Plato and Aristotle have done good work along this line. So +have the subsequent philosophers, Cartesius, Spinoza, Kant. The main +impediment for all of them was the obstinate prejudice that man could +have reason in his own brain. Of course, that is where he has it, but it +is not reasonable reason. The intellect shut up in the skull has not +wisdom in its keeping, as the ancients thought. Wisdom cannot be +acquired by racking your brain. Hegel is right: Reason is in the brain, +it is in all things, "everything is reasonable." I merely repeat, then, +that the universe is the true reason. + +You will not misunderstand the term "racking your brain." I am not an +opponent of introspective thought, but only desire to call your +attention to the fact that it has led to the wrong habit of separating +thought from sight, hearing, feeling, of divesting the mind of the body. +Just as the Christian looked for salvation outside of the flesh, so the +philosophers looked for reason or understanding outside of the +connection with the rest of the world, outside of experience. It was +especially the research after the nature of the intellect which imagined +it had to creep inside of itself. + +When studying the stars, we look at the heavens; when endeavoring to +enrich our knowledge of plants, we gather flowers. But if we attempt to +understand the mind, we must not rack our brain, nor dissect it with an +anatomical knife. We shall indeed find the brain, but not the mind, not +reason. + +And even the brain is not so easily cut out, as many an overzealous +materialist may think. The student of anatomy who pries into the nature +of the brain substance knows very well that this substance is not +contained in the head of this or that fellow, but must be sought in many +heads before the average brain is found, which differs materially from +that of Peter or Paul. This will show that your brain is not only your +own, but also "partakes" of the universal brain, and you will easily +conclude from this how much less your reason is yours alone. Hegel is +right: Not only men, but everything is reasonable. + +True, the most rotten conditions may be defended by such maxims. Hence +the great logician Hegel has the bad name of having been, not a +philosopher of the people, but a royal state philosopher of Prussia. I +will neither blacken nor whitewash him, nor will I overlook that he left +the great cause in a state of mystical obscurity. But I recognize that +even the worst prejudices, the most perverted morals, laws and +institutions, have their reasonable justification in the times and +conditions of their origin. Such an understanding is immediately +followed by the further insight, that the most reasonable things, +crushed by the wheel of time, will become rotten and unreasonable. In +short, the "good" is not any special institutions, but is found in the +interrelations of the universe. Only the absolute is absolutely good. +And for this reason not only some conservative editors of capitalist +papers, but also the revolutionary authors of the "Communist Manifesto," +are genuine Hegelians. + + + + +TWENTY-SECOND LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Socrates teaches: When we walk, it is not walking, when we stand still, +it is not standing which is our purpose. We always have something +ulterior in view, until finally the general welfare is the true end of +our actions, in other words, the "good." And on closer analysis you will +find that your individual welfare, the socalled egoistic good, is not +enough in itself. + +You are not only related to your father, mother, brothers, sisters, +relatives and friends, but also to your community, state, and finally to +the entire population of the globe. Your welfare is dependent on their +welfare, on the welfare of the whole. + +I know very well that the horizon of the everyday capitalist minds does +not reach farther than they can see from the steeple of their church. +They think according to the bad maxim: The shirt is closer to the skin +than the coat. If I had to choose between the shirt and the coat, I +should prefer to wear the coat without a shirt rather than to run +around in shirt sleeves as the object of universal ridicule. The old man +who plants a tree the fruits of which he will perhaps never see is not +such a capitalist mind, otherwise he would sow seeds that would ripen +during this year's summer. + +At this juncture we must remember that the disciples of Socrates who +looked for the absolute under the name of the "good," were in so far +narrow as they conceived of it only from the moral, specifically human, +standpoint, instead of at the same time considering its cosmic side. +Just as health and wealth belong together, and even these are not +sufficient for human welfare which further requires all social and +political virtues, so the good is not comprised in the interrelations of +all mankind, but passes beyond them and connects itself with the entire +universe. Without the universe man is nothing. He has no eyes without +light, no ears without sound, no morals without physics. Man is not so +much the measure of all things; his more or less intimate connection +with all things is rather the measure of all humanity. Not narrow +morality, but the universe, the supreme being, is the good in the very +highest meaning of the word, is absolute good, right, truth, beauty, and +reason. + +In my preceding letter I spoke of universal reason and said that not +alone men, but also mountains, valleys, forests and fields, and even +fools and knaves were reasonable. Now you are familiar with that +student's song: "What's Coming from the Heights?" and you know that it +makes everything leathern. It speaks of a leathern hill, a leathern +coach-driver, a leathern letter, even father, mother, and sister are of +leather. And I mention this simply for the purpose of showing that I +understand that we cannot call leather reasonable and reasonable +leathern without brewing a mixture of language which is lacking the mark +by which all reasonable language is distinguished from chattering, +howling, and roaring. Language is only reasonable when it classifies the +world and distinguishes things by different names. + +This is easily understood. But it is more difficult to see that those +who use their intellect without logical training exaggerate distinctions +to such an extent that they ignore the connection between them. All +things are not only distinct, but also connected. But logic so far must +be blamed for not rising to the recognition of the interrelation of all +things. The science of understanding frequently treats reason and +experience as if they were two different things without a common nature. +Therefore, I make it a point to insist that there is no experience +without reason and no reason without experience. + +The linguists who dispute about the question whether reason has +developed after language or language after reason agree that both belong +together. One cannot speak without the use of reason, or talk without +sense, because chattering, or babbling, or whatever one may wish to call +it, are everything else but language. On the other hand, there can be no +reason without naming the things of this world, so as to distinguish +between leather and lady, between reason and experience. + +Of course, the idea of a leathern lady is only a youthful prank. Still +it is calculated to illustrate the dialectic transfusion of all names +and things, of all subjects and predicates. It shows indirectly that +according to common sense thought, reason has its home only in the brain +of man, and that this reason is nevertheless unsound when it does not +know and remember that the individual human brain is connected with all +brains, and reasons with the whole world, so that only all existence and +the entire universe is reasonable in the highest meaning of the word. + +In order to be able to use your reason in all research and on all +objects in a reasonable manner, you must know that the whole world has +one nature, even leather and your sister. Apparently there is a wide +gulf between these two, and yet in both of them the same forces are +active, just as a black horse has the same horse nature as a white +horse, so that from this point of view your sister is indeed leathern +and leather sisterly. Such statements sound paradoxical enough, yet I +insist on making them in this extreme manner in order to fully reveal +the absolute oneness of all existence, since it is the indispensable +basis of a reasonable understanding of logic. + +Take one of the questions of the day now agitating the public mind, for +a further illustration. Two tendencies are now observed in the most +radical political movement of the nations. One of them is called +propaganda of the deed. It works in Russia and Ireland with dynamite, +powder, and lead. The other recommends the propaganda of the word, of +the vote, and of lawful agitation. And the difference between these two +is not discussed reasonably with a view to ascertaining for whom, when, +where, and why, this or that propaganda is fitting, but every one tries +to present his relative truth with the fanatical sectarianism of those +who claim absolute truth. But if you have grasped the method of getting +at truth, the true method of using your reasoning faculty, you will take +sides for one thing today and for another thing tomorrow, because you +will understand that all roads are leading toward Rome. And if some of +the comrades outvote you occasionally, you will still value these +antagonists as friends, and if you combat them, even in a war to the +knife, this will still be a relative war, a use of the knife with +reason. + +Our proletarian logic is tolerant, not fanatical. This logic does not +want to be reasonable without passion, nor passionate without reason. It +does not abolish the difference between friend and foe, between truth +and falsehood, between reason and nonsense, but calms the fanaticism +which exaggerates those distinctions. Its fundamental maxim is: There is +only one absolute, the universe. + +Remember well that the conception of a universe which has anything +outside or beside itself is still more senseless, if possible, than the +idea of wooden iron. You thus see that all differences have one common +nature which does not permit a transcendentally wide difference between +things or opinions. Because the universe is the supreme being, therefore +all differences, even those of opinion, are unessential. + +For the purpose of studying logic, I entreat you to pay special +attention to the question of essential differences and to test it by +your own experience which will come to you from day to day. + +By means of our logic we learn the language of the gods. In the +dictionary of this language, there is only one essential being, the +universal or supreme being. On the other hand, the language of the +mortals calls every particle a "being," but such being can be relative +beings only. + +Every ear of a cornfield, every hair of an ox skin, and even every one +of their particles, is such a being. But these relative beings are at +the same time unessential attributes. Thus all differences between the +particles of the world are simultaneously essential and unessential; in +other words, they have a relative existence, they merely partake of the +supreme being, compared to whom they are absolutely unessential. Whether +you are a good or a bad man, whether your country is happy or unhappy, +free or oppressed, is very essential to you or me, but compared with the +great absolute whole it is very unessential. In the universal history +the fate of any single nation has no more significance than one hair on +my head, although none of my hairs is there by mere chance and all of +them have been counted. Hence everything is in its particular and +isolated self an unessential thing, but in the general interrelation +everything is a necessary, reasonable, essential and divine particle. + +And now we come to the moral of it all. The human reason, the special +object of logical research, partakes of the nature of the universe. It +is nothing in itself. As an isolated being, it is wholly void and +incapable of producing any understanding or knowledge. Only in +connection, not merely with the material brain, but with the entire +universe, is the intellect capable of existing and acting. It is not the +mere brain which thinks, but the whole man is required for that purpose; +and not man alone, but the total interrelation with the universe is +necessary for the purpose of thinking. Reason itself reveals no truths. +The truths which are revealed to us by means of reason, are revelations +of the general nature of the absolute universe. + +If you think of reason in this way, then, my son, you are thinking +reasonably, are world-wise, logical, and true. + + + + +TWENTY-THIRD LETTER + + + + +(A) + +Although we know that there is no actual beginning, because we are +living in the universe without beginning and end, still we mortals must +always begin at a certain point. So I have begun one of my retrospects +over the history of my subject with Plato, and at another time I have +ended with Hegel, although before and after them there has been much +philosophical thought. These two names are luminant points which throw +their light over everything which is situated between them. + +The errors of our predecessors are just as useful for the purpose of +illustration as their positive achievements. More even: the errors form +the steps of a ladder which leads toward a universal world philosophy. +We clamber up and down on it, perhaps a little irregularly, but nowadays +the crooked roads of an English park are preferred to the straight +French avenues. + +It was an achievement on the part of the Socratic and Platonic schools +to seek the good not in good specialties, but in general good, as a +"pure" or absolute thing, to search for virtue in general instead of +virtues. But it was a mistake which prevented their success, to +exaggerate the distinction between the special and the general. +According to Plato, the black and white horses canter over terrestrial +pavements, but the horse in general, which is neither brown, black, nor +white, neither as slender as a race horse nor as clumsy as a draft +horse, cantered along in the Platonic "idea," in the ideal mists. +Platonic logic lacked what is taught by our present, or if you prefer, +future proletarian logic, viz., the general understanding of the +interrelation of all things, the truth that in spite of their +individual differences all things belong together as individuals of the +same genus. The logical relation between individual and genus stuck +upside down in the brain of the noble Plato. + +He lived in a time which is similar to our own time in that the world of +the gods of the ancients was in the same state of dissolution in which +the Christian religions are today. Plato was as little satisfied with +Grecian mythology as a basis for a reasonable explanation of the world, +as we are with Christian mythology. He wanted to ascend to the universal +truth, not by way of little traditional stories, but by scientific +philosophy. His intention was good, but his weak flesh wrestled with a +task which required thousands of years for its solution. + +A while ago I said that it was that topsy-turvy view of religion as to +the relation between the special and the general which thwarted Plato. +Let me illustrate a little more in detail in what this religious +topsy-turvydom consisted. + +Here we have wind, the waters of the seas, the rays of the sun, chemical +and physical forces, forces of nature. These are specimens of the +universal force of nature. These specimens were regarded with sober +enough eyes by the Greeks, but the general nature sat high upon Olympus +in the form of Zeus. In the same way, the Greeks were familiar with +beautiful things, but beauty was an unapproachable goddess, Aphrodite. +True, the philosopher no longer believed in the gods, but he was +nevertheless still under the influence of transcendental concepts and +thus he mystified the general under the name of the "idea." The Platonic +ideas, like the gods of the heathen, are mystifications of the general. +Plato furthermore shows himself as a descendant of polytheism in this: +Although he clearly distinguished between virtue and virtuous things, +between beauty and beautiful things, between truth and true things, yet +he did not rise to the understanding that all generalities are +amalgamated and unified in the absolute generality, that, in so far, the +good, the true, and the beautiful are identical. The research for the +absolute did not become monistic until Christian monotheism lent a hand. +You will see from this that religion and philosophy form a common +chapter which has the genus of all genera for its object. Faith is +distinguished from science in that the latter no longer bows to the +dictates of imagination and of its organs, the priests, but seeks to +fathom the object of its studies by the exact use of the intellect. A +partial amalgamation of the two is, therefore, quite natural. + +"When a woman is strong, isn't she strong after the same conception and +the same strength? By the term _same_," says the Platonic Socrates, "I +mean that it makes no difference whether the strength is in the man or +in the woman." + +This quotation, taken from Plato's "Menon," shows that Platonic research +deals with the general, in this case the general concept of strength +which is the _same_ in man or woman, ox or mule, Tom and Jerry. It is +the genus by means of which black and white horses are known as horses, +dogs and monkeys as animals, animals and plants as organisms, and +finally the variations of the whole world as the universe, as the +_same_. Plato has grasped this _same-ness_ in a limited way, for +instance in regard to strength, reason, virtue, etc. But that in an +infinite sense everything is the _same_, that things as well as ideas, +bodies, and souls, are the same, remained for radical proletarian logic +to discover. + +Hand in hand with the narrow Platonic conception of the general went a +narrow theory of understanding or science, a wrong conception of the +intellect and its functions. The Socratic Plato and the Platonic +Socrates both call understanding by the name of "remembering." By +praising understanding, they teach us that we must not believe the +priests, but study by the help of our senses. But, nevertheless, they +still teach a wrong method, a narrow art of thought. + +In "Menon," the object of study is virtue. Socrates does not exactly +pose as a schoolmaster. He knows that he is called the wisest of men, +but explains that this is so, because others have a conceited opinion of +their wisdom, while his wisdom consists in humbly knowing that he knows +nothing. He does not so much try to teach what virtue is, as to +stimulate his disciples to search for it. But his idea of research is +distorted. + +Among the immortal things which he transcendentally separates from +mortal things, he also classifies the soul, "the immortal soul" which +dies and lives again, and has always lived, knows everything, but must +"remember." Thus his research becomes a cudgeling of the brain, an +introspective speculation. He is not looking for understanding by way of +natural science, through the interrelations of the world, but +speculatively through the inside of the human skull. + +In order to make his theory of memory plain, Socrates in "Menon" calls +an ignorant slave and instructs him in the fundamentals of geometry. He +quickly succeeds in getting from the ignorant fellow, who at first gives +wrong answers, the correct statements by recalling the connections of +thought by clever questioning. He thus demonstrates to his satisfaction +that man has wisdom _a priori_ in his head. But the Socratic-Platonic +art of logic has overlooked that such wisdom requires concepts which are +fixed in memory by internal _and_ external interrelations. The socalled +immortal soul with its innate wisdom has troubled the world a good while +thereafter. + +You must not think that I have a poor opinion of Plato, because I +criticize him in this way. On the contrary, I am highly delighted with +his divine and immortal writings. "Honor to Socrates, honor to Plato, +but still more honor to truth." I also assure you that I am a great +admirer of natural science, but nevertheless I should like to show you +that it indulges in narrow reasoning. + +Robert Mayer, the talented discoverer of the equivalent of heat, has +proven that the force of gravitation, of electricity, of steam, of heat, +etc., represents different modes of expression of the same force, of the +force of nature in general. But no, not quite so! He has ascertained the +numerical relation by which the transformations of one force into +another is accomplished. Thus a logical understanding sees that the +various forces and force in general are distinguished in detail but +identical in general. Darwin in his "Origin of Species" has accomplished +a similar demonstration. But neither Mayer nor Darwin have given that +general expression to world unity which is required by the art of logic. +In order to become an adept at this art, you must rise to the +understanding that all forces are various modes of expression of the one +force, all animals and species transformations of animaldom, that on the +moon a part is smaller than the whole, the same as on earth, that there +as well as here fire burns, and that as surely as you have no doubt of +your being, just as surely is there only one being, the infinite, +divine universe which has no other gods beside it, but contains all +forces, materials, and transformations. + +This is an innate science which is the cause of all other science, an +innate science which, indeed, must first be awakened in you by "memory." + +Hence our proletarian logic instructs you not to rack your brain by mere +introspection, as the ancient philosophers used to do, not to call the +senses impostors nor to search for truth without eyes, nose, and ears, +nor on the other hand to start out with the idea of certain natural +scientists who try to see, hear, and smell understanding without the +help of the intellect. + +The mistake committed in making a wrong use of the intellect is a "sin +against the holy ghost." The Socratic-Platonic doctrine of memory is one +extreme side of this sin; the other extreme side is represented by that +modern science which tries to find truth by mere external means and +rejects everything as untrue which is not ponderable or tangible. + +As this letter is more intimately connected with the following one than +is ordinarily the case, I take the liberty to unite them under the same +number and mark them with the letters A and B. + + + + +(B) + +We are still the guests of Plato today, my son, and I should like to +show you that this philosopher, in whose time natural science had barely +developed its first downy feathers, already suspected its stubborn +narrowness, although in a certain sense the Platonic logic was no less +narrow than that of the so-called exact sciences still is to-day, at +least in part. Still Platonic logic had at least the advantage of its +outlook toward the Supreme Being, the absolute, while modern naturalism +is still stuck in the narrow land of specialties. Therefore, I hope that +you will find it interesting to note with me the way in which universal +truth is peeping forth beneath the wings of Platonic speculation. + +"Listen, then, to what I am going to say," remarks Socrates in "Phaedo," +paragraph 45. "In my youth, O Cebes, I had a great interest in natural +science, for it seemed to me a magnificent thing to know the cause of +everything, to learn how everything begins, exists, and passes. A +hundred times I turned to one thing and then to another, reflecting +about these matters by myself. Do animals arise when the hot and the +cold begin to disintegrate, as some claim? Is it the blood, which +enables us to think, or the air or the fire? Or is it none of these, but +rather the brain which produces all perceptions, such as seeing, +hearing, smelling, and does memory and thought then arise by these, and +from thought and memory, when they become adjusted, understanding? And +again, when I considered that all this passes away, and the changes in +heaven and on earth, I finally felt myself poorly qualified for this +whole investigation. Let this be sufficient proof to you: In the things +which formerly were familiar and known to me, I became so doubtful by +this investigation, that I forgot even that which I thought I knew of +many other things, as for instance the question as to how man grows. I +thought that everybody knew that this was caused by eating and drinking. +For when through the food flesh comes to flesh and bone to bone, and in +the same way that which is akin to all the rest of the things which +constitute man, it seemed natural that a small mass would become larger, +and thus a small man grow tall. Does not this appear reasonable to +you?... Consider furthermore this. It seemed enough to me that a man +appeared large when standing by the side of something small, that he +looked taller by one head, and in the same way one horse by the side of +another; or what is still plainer, ten seemed to me more than eight, +because it is more by two, and a thing of two feet longer than that +which measures only one foot, because it exceeds it by one." + +Thereupon Cebes asks: "Well, and what do you think of this now?" + +"I think, by Zeus," says Socrates, "that I am far removed from knowing +the cause of any of these things. I do not even admit that by adding one +to one I obtain two, by such an addition. For I wonder how it is that +each was supposed to be one when by itself, while now, that they have +been added to one another, they have become two. Neither can I convince +myself that if one thing divides a thing in two, that this division is +the cause of it becoming two. For this would be the opposite way of +making two. But when I heard somebody reading something from a book, +written by Anaxagoras as he said, to the effect that it is reason which +had arranged everything and was the cause of everything, I rejoiced at +this cause.... Now if one were to search for the cause of all things, of +their origin, existence and passing, he should only find out what is the +best way to maintain their existence.... Hence it is not meet that man +should care for anything else in regard to himself as well as to all +other things, but for that which is best and most excellent, and then he +would also know the worst about things, for the understanding of both +is the same. Considering this, I was glad to have found a teacher who +knows about the cause of all things, who suited me, I mean Anaxagoras, +and who would now tell me, first whether the earth is round or flat, and +after telling me that, would also explain to me the necessity for it and +the cause, by pointing to the fact that it was better that it should be +so. And when he claimed that the earth was the center of things, I hoped +he would explain why it was better that it should be the center, and +when he had explained that, I was resolved that I would not ask for any +other cause. In the same way I was going to inquire after the cause of +the sun, the moon, and the other stars, etc.... For I did not believe +that after claiming all this to have been arranged by reason, he would +be dragging in any other cause than that of being best to have it just +so. And this wonderful hope I had to abandon, my friends, when I +continued to read and saw that the man accomplished nothing by reason +and adduces no other reasons relating to the arrangement of things, but +quotes air, and water, and ether, and many other astonishing things. + +"And it seemed that it was as if some one said Socrates accomplishes all +things by reason, and then, when he began to enumerate the cause of +everything I do, were to say first that I am sitting here because my +body consists of bones and sinews, and that the bones are hard and are +differentiated by joints, and the sinews so constructed that they can be +extended and shortened, etc. And further, if he tried to name the causes +of our discussion, he would refer to other similar things, such as +sound, and air and hearing, and a thousand and one other things, quite +neglecting the true cause, viz., that it suited the Athenians better to +condemn me, and that it suited me for this reason to stay here and +seemed more just to me to bear patiently the punishment which they have +ordered. For I believe that my bones and sinews would have gone long ago +to the dogs or been carried to the Boeotians, had I not considered it +more just and beautiful to atone to the state than to flee. + +"It is very illogical, then, to name such causes. But if any one were to +say that I should not be able to do what I please without these things +(sinews and bones, and whatever else I may have), he would be right. But +it would be a very thoughtless contention to say that these things are +the cause of my actions, instead of my free choice to do the best. That +would show an inability to distinguish the fact that in all things the +cause is one thing, and another thing that without which the cause could +not be cause. And it seems to me that it is precisely this which some +call by a wrong name in considering it as the cause. For this reason +some put a whirlwind from heaven round the earth and others rest it on +air as they would a wide trough on a footstool." + +So far Socrates, whose words I ask you to read repeatedly and carefully, +though they may look a little old-fashioned. This quotation is somewhat +lengthy, but I thought best not to cut it too short and to present it in +its main outlines. + +This quotation says on the whole the same thing which I have said in my +proceeding letters. According to Socrates, all our thoughts and actions +have a wider and more general purpose, which he calls the "good," so +that we even do evil for the sake of good. A crime always aims at some +particular good. Evil is misunderstood good. Applied to natural science, +this means that it misunderstands the interrelation of all its fine +discoveries. And this charge is true even to-day. Although the natural +interrelations are more and more recognized from day to day, still the +understanding of the absolute inter-connection continues to be +overlooked, especially that of the intellect with material things, or of +the ideal with the real. Natural science teaches after the manner of the +gospel of John: Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob. But it forgets +to teach that all these genitors were not genitors in the last analysis, +but begotten by old Jehovah himself. The uncultivated condition of +Grecian natural sciences may have been ground enough for Socrates to +think little of it. We, on the other hand, have to-day good reasons for +thinking highly of natural science, and for this very reason I take +pains to illustrate by its prominent example in what respect the neglect +of the universal world thought results in a narrow conception of the +world. + +We may well rejoice more lastingly than Socrates when natural science +teaches us how it happens that everything has its origin, life, and end, +because the knowledge of natural science has been far more enriched by +modern experiences than it was at the time of Anaxagoras. Nevertheless +you must not stop learning furthermore from logic that all growing, +coming into existence, living, and passing away is but a change of form. +The causes of natural science are indeed not causes, but effects of the +universe. They are reasonable effects of reason in so far as the latter +is not an isolated part, but interconnected with the universe. To +repeat: Our intellect is not ours, it does not belong to man, but it +together with man belongs to the universe. Reason and the world, the +true, the good, and the beautiful, together with Godhood which you +shall not idolize but understand in the spirit and in the world, in +truth and in reality, are all one thing, one being, and everywhere +eternal and the _same_. + +Socrates shows that he has as yet only a narrow anthropomorphic, not a +cosmic conception of the "best and good" and of reason. He was dominated +by the prejudice which still holds sway over the uncultured believers in +God, that reason is older than all the rest of the world, that it is the +ruling and antecedent creator. Our conception of logic, on the other +hand, teaches that the spirit which we have in our brain is but the +emanation of the world spirit. And this latter must not be conceived as +a nebulous world monster, not as an enormous spirit, but as the actual +universe, which in spite of all change and all variation is eternally +one, true, good, reasonable, real, and supreme. + + + + +TWENTY-FOURTH LETTER + + +The art of thought, my son, for which we are striving, is not pure and +abstract, but connected with practice, a practical theory, a theoretical +practice. It is not a separate and isolated thing, not a "thing in +itself," but is connected with all things; it has a universal +interrelation. Hence our logic, as we have repeatedly stated, is a +philosophy, world wisdom, and metaphysics. I include the latter, because +our logic excludes nothing, not even the transcendental. It teaches that +everything, even transcendentalism, if practiced with consciousness and +the necessary moderation, and at the right time and place, for instance +at the carnival, is a reasonable and sublime pleasure. + +All prominent philosophers were explorers and users of the same art of +thought, of living, of viewing the world, although many of them retired +to the solitude and were ascetics. Can the world be understood in a +hermitage? Yes and no. After you have been traveling and seeing many +lands, it is well to retire and classify the impressions received, and +thus to reflect about a true philosophy of life. In this way, secluded +thought, in the relative meaning of the word, that is, in connection +with observation and experience, with enjoyment and life, is a veritable +savior. Body and soul belong together, and if they are separated, it +must be remembered that such a separation is a mere matter of form, that +they are in fact one thing, attributes of the same being which is +infinitely great, so great that all other beings are but its fringes. + +The art of distinction distinguishes the infinite infinitely with the +consciousness that in reality everything is interrelated without +distinction and is one. + +This truth, and thus absolute truth, is ignored by laymen and +professional authorities alike. The thousand year dualism between body +and soul has been especially instrumental in preventing the +understanding of the universal interrelation. The whole history of +philosophy is but a wrestling with the dualism between matter and mind. +It was only by degrees that it moved towards its monistic goal. + +After the brilliant triple star Socrates-Plato-Aristotle was +extinguished, the philosophical sky was covered with dark clouds. The +heathens stepped from the stage, and Christianity and the dogmas of its +church predominated the logic of men, until at last a new scientific +light arose in the beginning of modern times. It was especially +Cartesius and Spinoza who were most brilliant among the early thinkers +that emancipated their minds slowly and under great difficulties. +Spinoza, of Jewish descent, is especially interesting in his fight +against narrowmindedness and for a universal philosophy. He wrote an +"Essay on the Improvement of the Intellect and on the Way by which it is +best led to a true Understanding of Things." He, as well as we, was +looking for the best way, the true way, the way of truth. He, as well as +we, seeks to study and practice the fundamentals of the art of thought. + +He begins: "After experience has taught me that everything which the +ordinary life offers is vain, and I have seen that everything which I +feared is only good or bad in so far as the mind is moved by it, I +finally resolved to investigate whether there is any true good--whether +there is anything the discovery of which will forever secure continuous +and supreme joy. What is most generally found in life, and what mankind +regards as the highest good, may be reduced to three things, viz., +wealth, honor, and sensual pleasure." + +After Spinoza has then uncovered the shadowy side and the vanity of +these popular ideals, he calls them "unsafe by their very nature," while +he is looking for "permanent good," which is "insecure only as regards +its possession, but not in its nature." + +But how is that to be found? + +"Here I shall say shortly what I mean by true good, and what is at the +same time the highest good. In order to grasp this fully, we must +remember that good or bad are only relative terms, and thus the same +thing may be called good or bad according to its relations, or on the +other hand perfect or imperfect." + +Spinoza, forestalling the object of his research, discovers that the +true, supreme and permanent good is the "understanding of the unity" of +the soul with the entire nature. "This then," he says, "is the goal +which I am coveting." + +"To this end, we must study morals, philosophy, and the education of +boys, and combine with this study the entire science of medicine, +because health materially assists us in reaching our ideal. Neither must +mechanics be neglected, because many difficult things are made easy by +art. Above all we must strive to find a way for the improvement of the +intellect." + +Here we have once more arrived at the pivotal point of our subject, my +dear disciple. Who or what is the intellect, whence does it come from, +whither does it lead? Answer: It is a light which does not shine within +itself, but throws rays outside of itself for the illumination of the +world. For this reason the science which has the faculty of +understanding for its object, though a limited, is at the same time a +universal science, a universal world wisdom. + +But isn't it a contradiction that a special science wants to be general +world wisdom? Is not general wisdom that which comprises all knowledge, +all special science? Must I not know everything in order to be world +wise? And how can any single brain assume to acquire all knowledge, to +know everything? Answer: It is impossible for you to know everything; +but you can rise to the understanding that your special wisdom and that +of all others is a part of universal wisdom and form together a relative +whole which in connection with all the rest of the world constitute the +absolute being. This understanding represents pure logic and is +universal understanding, understanding of the universal being. + +Do not be troubled by the fact that Socrates was looking for virtue and +the "best," or Spinoza for permanent and supreme joy, and that their +wisdom aimed only at the narrow circle of human life, without rising to +the cosmic interrelation. The means and the instrument by the help of +which they strive for their ideal is the intellect. It is quite natural +that intellectual research led to the study of the intellect, to the +"improvement of the intellect," to the "critique of reason," to "logic," +and finally to the understanding that the faculty of thought is an +inseparable part of the monistic whole, of the absolute which lends +support, consistency, reason and sense to all thought. + +On his exploring tour for the improvement of the intellect, Spinoza +picks up a remark which seems to me worthy of closer attention. He says +in so many words: If we are looking for a way to improve the intellect, +is it not necessary for the purpose of finding such a way to first +improve the intellect, in order to be at all able to discern the way +which leads to an improvement of the intellect, and so on without end? +"We must have a hammer to forge the iron, and in order to have a hammer, +it must be made; but for this purpose we need another hammer and other +instruments, and so forth without end. In this way it must not be proven +that men have no power to forge iron. Men have rather accomplished only +the easiest tasks with difficulty and imperfectly by the help of the +natural tools of their bodies. Gradually they accomplished more +difficult things with less labor and better. And thus they slowly +proceeded from the simplest tasks to the instruments." + +I admire in this process of reasoning the brilliant understanding that +the hammer is not such a limited instrument as the untrained human brain +thinks. It thinks that a hammer is not a pair of tongs. But Spinoza says +that the bare fist is a hammer when used for striking, much more a stone +or a club. A pair of tongs used to drive a nail becomes a hammer; a +hammer which I use to draw a nail becomes a pair of tongs. Fist or club, +sense or nonsense, all is one. In other words, things are separated, but +never so far as the fantastical dreamers think. Just as hammer and +tongs, saw and file, are parts of the class of tools, so all things are +parts of the one and absolute universe. Recognize, then, dear Eugene, +that the relative and the absolute are not separated by such a +bridgeless chasm, that the one should be praised to the skies and the +other damned to the lowest pit. Understand that everything is +dialectically interrelated, that the infinite, eternal, divine, can live +only in the finite, special things, and that on the other hand the parts +of the world can exist only in the absolute. In short, raise your +conception to the universal conception, and at the same time, understand +the supreme being in all its parts instead of idolizing it. + + + + +The Positive Outcome of Philosophy + +BY JOSEPH DIETZGEN + +Translated by Ernest Untermann + + + + +THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY + + + + +PREFACE + + +As a father cares for his child, so an author cares for his product. I +may be able to give a little additional zest to the contents of this +work by adding an explanation how I came to write it. + +Although born by my mother in 1828, I did not enter my own world until +"the mad year," 1848. I was learning the trade of my father in my +paternal shop, when I saw in the "Kölnische Zeitung," how the people of +Berlin had overcome the King of Prussia and conquered "liberty." This +"liberty" now became the first object of my musings. The parties of that +period, the disturbers and howlers, made a great deal of fuss about it. +But the more I heard about it, and hence became enthusiastic over it, +the duller, hazier and more indistinct became the meaning of it, so that +it turned things upside down in my head. The psychologists have long +known that enthusiasm for a cause and understanding of that cause are +two different things. Mark, for instance, the zeal displayed by Catholic +peasants in singing their mass, although they do not understand a word +of Latin. + +What is meant by political freedom? What is its beginning, what its end? +Where and how are we to find a positive and definite knowledge of it? In +the parties of the middle, the so-called "constitutionals," as well as +among the bourgeois democrats, there was no end of dissension. Nothing +could be learned there. Among them, as among the Protestants, every one +was a chosen interpreter of the gospel. + +However, the papers of the extremes, that is, the "Neue Preussische" +with its "For God, King and Fatherland," and the "Neue Rheinische," the +organ of "Democracy," gave me a hint that liberty had some sort of a +material basis. During the following years, my life in rural +surroundings gave me leisure to follow this scent. On one side, it was +the work of men like Gerlach, Stahl, and Leo, on the other of Marx and +Engels, that gave me a foothold. + +Though the communists and the ultra-conservatives came to widely +different conclusions, still I felt and read between the lines that both +of these extreme parties based their demands on one fundamental premise. +They knew what they wanted; they both had a definite beginning and end. +And that permitted the assumption that both had a common philosophy. The +Prussian landholding aristocracy based the cross, which they wore as an +emblem on their hats, on the historically acquired royal military power +and on the positive divine revelation of the Bible printed in black and +supported by the ecclesiastical police force dressed in black. And the +Communist point of departure was quite as positive, unquestionable and +material, viz., the growing supremacy of the mass of the people with +their proletarian interests based on the historically acquired +productive power of the working class. The spirit of both of these +hostile camps was descending from the results of philosophy, primarily +from the Hegelian school. Both of them were armed with the +philosophical achievements of the century, which they had not only +mechanically assimilated, but rather continually provided with fresh +food like a living being. + +In the beginning of the fifties, a pamphlet was published by one of the +cross bearers, Stahl, entitled "Against Bunsen." This Bunsen was at the +time the Prussian Embassador at London, a crony of the ruling Prussian +King Frederic William IV., and, apart from this, nothing but a liberal +muddle head who was interested in political and religious tolerance. + +The pamphlet of the cross bearer Stahl attacked this tolerance and +demonstrated valiantly that tolerance could be preached only by a +muddled free lance to whom religion and fatherland were indifferent +conceptions. Religious faith, so far as it is truth, so he said, has a +true power and can transpose mountains. Such a faith could not be +tolerant and indifferent, but must push its propaganda with fire and +sword. + +In the same way in which Stahl defended the interests of the landed +aristocracy, the philosopher Feuerbach spoke in the interest of the +infidel revolutionaries. Both of them were to that extent in accord with +the "Communist Manifesto" that they no longer regarded Liberty as a +phantasmagoria, but as a being of flesh and blood. + +When I had realized this, it dawned upon me that any conception +elucidated by philosophy, in this case the idea of liberty, had this +peculiarity: Liberty is as yet an abstract idea. In order to become +real, it must assume a concrete, special form. + +Political freedom as a glittering generality is a thing of no reality. +Under such fantastic ideal the constitutionalists or the liberals +conceal the liberty of the money bag. Under these circumstances, they +are quite right in demanding German unity with Prussia as a head, or a +republic with a grand duke at the top. The landed aristocracy also are +right in demanding the liberty of that aristocracy. And the Communists +are still more right, for they demand the liberty that will guarantee +bread and butter for the mass of the people and will fully set free all +the forces of production. + +From this experience and conclusion it follows that true liberty and the +highest right are composed of individual liberties and rights, that are +opposed to one another without being inconceivable. It is easy to +proceed from this premise to the rule of thought laid down in this work, +that the brain need not make any excursions into the transcendental in +order to find his way through the contradictions of the real world. + +In this way I passed from politics to philosophy, and from philosophy to +the theory of positive knowledge which I presented to the public in 1869 +in my little work "The Nature of Human Brain Work." Further studies on +the general powers of understanding have added to my special knowledge +of this subject, so that I am now enabled to fill the old wine into a +new bottle instead of publishing a new edition of my old work. + +The science which I present in the following pages is very limited in +its circumference, but all the better founded and important in its +consequences. This, I trust, will be accepted as a sufficient excuse for +the recurring repetition of the same statements in a different form. My +remaining confined to a single point requires no apology. What is left +undone by one, is bequeathed as a problem to others. + +There might be some dispute over the question, how much of this positive +achievement of philosophy is due to the author and to his predecessors. +But that is an interminable task of small concern. No matter who hoisted +the calf out of the well, so long as it is out. Anyway, this whole work +treats of the concatenation and interdependence of things, and this also +throws a bright light on the question of mine and thine. + +J. DIETZGEN. + +CHICAGO, March 30, 1887. + + + + +THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY + + + + +I + +POSITIVE KNOWLEDGE AS A SPECIAL OBJECT + + +That which we call science nowadays was known to our ancestors by a name +which then sounded very respectable and distinguished, but which has in +the meantime acquired a somewhat ludicrous taste, the name of wisdom. +This gradual transition of wisdom into science is a positive achievement +of philosophy which well deserves our attention. + +The term "ancestors" is very indefinite. It comprises people who lived +more than three thousand years ago as well as those who died less than a +hundred years ago. And a wise man was still respected a hundred years +ago, while to-day that title always implies a little ridicule and +disrespect. + +The wisdom of our ancestors is so old that it has not even a date. It +reaches back, the same as the origin of language, to the period when man +developed from the animal world. But if we call a wise man, in the +language of our day, a philosopher, then it is at once plain that wisdom +is descended from the ancient Greeks. This wonderful nation produced the +first philosophers. + +Whether this term indicates a man who loves wisdom or one who loves +science, is of little moment to-day, and there was no such distinction +in ancient times. We remember that it was entirely undecided among the +Greeks whether a mathematician, an astronomer, a physician, an orator, +or a student of the art of living deserved the title of a philosopher. +These professions were not clearly distinguished. They were wrapped up +one in another like the embryo in a mother's womb. While humanity had +still little knowledge, a man might well be wise. But to-day it is +necessary to specialize, to devote one's self to a special science, +because the field of exploration has grown so extended. The philosopher +of to-day is no longer a wise man, but a specialist. + +The stars are the objects of astronomy, the animals of zoology, the +plants of botany. Who and what are now the objects of philosophy? This +may be explained in one word to an expert. But if we try to give +information to the general public, the matter becomes difficult. + +What do I know about the shoe industry, if I know that it produces +shoes? I know something general about it, but I have no knowledge of its +details. It is impossible to give sufficient information on the details +of shoemaking to any one in a few words, not even to an educated person. +Neither is it possible to explain the object of philosophy in such a +way. The object may be stated, but not explained, for it cannot be made +plain and brought home to the understanding in a few words. + +That is the word, understanding. The understanding is the object of +philosophy. + +We must at once call the reader's attention to the ambiguity of this +term. Understanding, knowledge, is the object of all science. That is +nothing special. Every study seeks to enlighten the brain. But +philosophy wishes to be a science and does not desire to relapse into +antiquity by becoming universal wisdom. To say that understanding is the +object of philosophy is to give merely the same reply which Thales, +Pythagoras, or Plato would have given. Has proud philosophy gained +nothing since? What is its positive achievement? That is the question. + +Philosophy to-day still has understanding for its object. But it is no +longer indefinite understanding which tries to embrace everything, but +rather the understanding of the method by which knowledge may be gained. +Philosophy now wishes to learn _how it comes to pass_ that other objects +may be illumined by the mind. To speak plainly, it is no longer the +understanding which seeks to know everything as it did at the time of +Socrates that is now the special study of philosophy, but rather the +mind itself, its method and the perceptive powers of thought and +understanding. + +If this were all, if the world's wise men had done nothing but to at +last find the object of philosophy, it would be a very scanty +achievement. No, the harvest is much richer. The present day theory of +human understanding is a real science, which well deserves to be +popularized. Our ancestors sought understanding after the manner of +Socrates and Plato in the entrails of the human brain, while at the same +time despising the experience outside of it. They hoped to find truth by +cudgeling their brain. "Honor to Socrates, honor to Plato; but still +more honor to Truth!" + +Aristotle showed a little more interest in the outer world. With the +downfall of the old social stage the old philosophy naturally succumbed +also. It did not revive until a few hundred years ago, at the beginning +of modern times. + +A short while ago, Shakespeare attracted much attention, when some one +claimed to have discovered that it was not he who wrote those famous +dramas and tragedies, but his contemporary Bacon of Verulam, Lord +Chancellor of England. Whether Shakespeare keeps his laurels or not, +Bacon's name is still great enough, for it is generally accepted as the +mile stone of modern philosophy. + +One might say that philosophy was asleep from the time of Aristotle to +that of Bacon. At least it produced no remarkable results during that +period, and it cannot be denied that philosophy from ancient Greek days +to the present times moved in a mystic fog which detracted much from its +study in the eyes of educated and honest men. But the philosophers +themselves are less to blame for this than the concealment of the +object. Only after the entire social development has furthered the human +understanding to the point where it can benefit from the light spread by +the various branches of science, does philosophy become conscious of its +special object and able to separate its positive achievements from the +rubbish of the past. + +If we compare the old Grecian wisdom with modern science, the outcome of +philosophy looks insignificant by the side of the achievements of +science. Nevertheless, great as the value of the aggregate product of +science may be, it is composed of individual values, and every one of +its parts is worthy of consideration. The method, the way, the form, in +which the mind arrives at its practical creations is one of these parts. +The mind, on its march from ignorance to its present wealth has not only +gathered a treasury of knowledge, but also improved its methods, so that +the further constructive work of science proceeds faster now. Who will +fail to recognize that material production has accumulated a treasure in +the methods by which it produces to-day, which is by no means of less +value than the accumulated national wealth itself? The positive outcome +of philosophy bears the same relation to the wealth of science. + + + + +II + +THE POWER OF COGNITION IS KIN TO THE UNIVERSE + + +The way of Truth, or the true way, is not musing, but the conscious +connection of our thoughts with the actual life--that is the +quintessence of the teachings of philosophy produced by evolution. But +this is not everything. If I know that a tanner makes leather, I do not +by any means know everything he does, because there still remains the +manner and method of his manipulations. In the same way, the doctrine of +the interrelation of mind and matter, which is the product of the entire +social development, requires a better and more specific substantiation, +so that its true quality as a positive achievement of philosophy, or of +the theory of knowledge may be better understood. If the matter is +represented in this bare manner--it does, indeed, resemble the egg of +Columbus--one does not see why so much should be made of it. But if we +enter into the details that have produced the result, we do not only +learn to better respect the prominent philosophers, but their works also +reveal a rich mine of special and comprehensive knowledge. + +All sciences are closely related, for advances in one branch are +preparations for advances in others. Astronomy is unthinkable without +mathematics and optics. Every science has begun unscientifically, and in +the course of the accumulation of individual knowledge a more or less +exact systematic organization of this knowledge has resulted. No science +has as yet arrived at completeness and perfectness. We have as yet more +the results of experimental effort than accomplished perfection. +Philosophy is no better off in this respect. We rather believe we are +doing something to overcome a deeply rooted prejudice when we state that +philosophy is no worse off than other sciences, so long as we succeed in +ascertaining that it has accomplished positive results and in pointing +them out. + +It is a positive accomplishment of philosophy that mankind to-day has a +clear and unequivocal conception of the necessity of the division of +labor as a means of being successful. Our present day philosophers no +longer make excursions into dreamland in the quest of the True, the +Beautiful, and the Good, as did the ancients. The True, the Beautiful, +and the Good, are nevertheless the objects of all modern science, only, +thanks to evolution, these objects are now sought by special means. And +the clear consciousness of this condition of things is a philosophical +consciousness. + +It is a part of the theory of understanding to know that in order to +accomplish something one must limit oneself to a specialty. That is a +fundamental demand for the use of common sense, which the primitive +musing brain did not realize. Thinking must be done with wide open and +active eyes, with alert senses, not with closed eyes or fixed gaze. This +is a part of logic. We do not deny that men have always done their +thinking by means of the senses. We only claim that they did not do so +from principle, otherwise the old complaint about the unreliability of +the senses as a means of knowledge would not have lived so long. Neither +would the inner man have been so excessively overestimated, nor abstract +thought so much celebrated, just as if it alone were the child of nobler +birth. I do not wish to detract from the merits of the power of +abstraction, but I simply claim that the clay of which Adam was made was +no less divine than the spiritual breath that gave him his life. Nor do +I mean that it is due to philosophy alone that mankind learned not to +strain "understanding" in abstract vaporings, but instead to introduce +the division of labor and to take up the various specialties with open +senses. The technique of understanding is the product of the entire +movement of civilization, and as such a positive accomplishment of +philosophy. The total process of evolution has placed the philosophers +on their feet. + +There is no doubt that up to the present time, philosophy partook more +of the character of a desire and love of science than of world wisdom. +This wisdom does not amount to much, even to-day. This is plainly +demonstrated by the dissensions of the educated and uneducated on all +questions pertaining to wisdom of life. Socrates in the market of +Athens, and Plato in his dialogues, have probably said better things +about the questions: "What is virtue? What is justice? What is moral and +reasonable?" than the professors of philosophy would know how to say +to-day. Kant has well said that the unanimity of the experts is the test +by which one may decide what is a scientific fact and what is mere +dispute. From this it is easy to judge that wisdom of life is still in +a bad way and will have to wait for its scientific transformation. + +We declared understanding itself to be the special object of philosophy +and shall now attempt to outline the results so far obtained by it. + +One of the first requirements for the education of the object of +philosophy is to recall its various names. The understanding, or the +power of knowledge, is also called intelligence, intellect, mind, +spirit, reason, power of cognition, of conception, of distinction, of +imagination, of judgment, and of drawing conclusions. The attempt has +frequently been made to analyze understanding or to dissect it into its +various parts and to specialize them by the help of those names. +Especially logic knows how to give particular explanations of what is +imagination, a conception, a judgment, and a conclusion. It has even +divided these sections into subsections, so that a trained logician +might reproach me with being ignorant for applying various names to +intelligence, because only the common people confound those names and +use them as synonyms, while science has long used them in their proper +order for designating special parts of intelligence. + +To such a reproach, I answer that Aristotle and the subsequent formal +logicians have made some pretty pointed observations and excellent +arrangements in this field. But these proved to be premature or +inadequate, because the observations on which the ancient intellectual +explorers relied were too scanty. This scantiness of the observations +made in regard to intelligence, and by intelligence, has kept the human +race in the mazes of intellectual bondage and by this mysticism has even +prevented the most advanced minds from penetrating deeper into this +obscure question. The history of philosophy is not the history of a +useless struggle, but yet a history of a hard struggle with the +question: What is, what does, of what parts consists, and of what nature +is understanding, intelligence, reason, intellect, etc.? So long as this +question is unsettled, the questioner is entitled to dispense with any +and all sections and subsections of the intellectual object and to +regard the various names as synonymous. + +The main accomplishment in the solution of this question is the ever +clearer and preciser knowledge of our days that the nature of the human +intellect is of the same kind, genus or quality as the whole of nature. +In order that the theory of understanding may be able to elucidate this +point, it must divest itself, more or less, of the character of a +speciality and occupy itself with all of nature, assume the character of +cosmogony. + +It is principally an achievement of philosophy that we now know +definitely and down to the minutest detail that the human mind is a +definite and limited part of the unlimited universe. + +Just as a piece of oak wood has the twofold quality of partaking not +alone, with its oaken nature, of the general nature of wood, but also of +the unlimited generality of all nature, so is the intellect a limited +specialty, which has the quality of being universal as a part of the +universe and of being conscious of its own and of all universality. The +boundless universal cosmic nature is embodied in the intellect, in the +animal as well as in man, the same as it is embodied in the oak wood, in +all other wood, in all matter and force. The worldly monistic nature +which is mortal and immortal, limited and unlimited, special and +general, all in one, is found in everything, and everything is found in +nature--understanding or the power of knowledge is no exception. + +It is this twofold nature of the universe, this being at the same time +limited and unlimited, this reflection of its eternal essence and +eternal truth in changing phenomena, which has rendered its +understanding very difficult for the human mind. This intricate quality +has been represented by religion in the fantastic picture of two worlds, +separating the temporal from the eternal, the limited from the +unlimited, too unreasonably far. But nowadays the indestructibility of +matter and the eternity of material forces is a matter of fact accepted +by natural science. + +The positive outcome of philosophy, then, is the knowledge of the +monistic way in which the seeming duality of the universe is active in +the human understanding. + + + + +III + +AS TO HOW THE INTELLECT IS LIMITED AND UNLIMITED + + +Understanding taught by experience no longer muses about universal +nature, but acquires a knowledge of it by special studies. By degrees +philosophy, first unconsciously and lately clearly and plainly, has +taken up the problem of ascertaining the limits of understanding. + +This philosophical problem first assumed the form of polemics. It became +opposed to the religious dogma which represented the human mind as a +small, subservient, limited and restricted emanation of the unlimited +divine spirit. This terrestrial emanation was regarded as too limited +to understand and find its divine source. The study of the limits of the +understanding has now emancipated itself from this dogma, but not to +such an extent that there is no longer any mysterious obscurity floating +around the understanding and intelligence, and especially around the +question whether the human mind can penetrate only into some things +while others will remain in the unscrutable darkness of faith and +intuition, or whether it may penetrate boldly and without hindrance into +the infinity of the physical and chemical universe. + +We here desire to claim as a positive outcome of philosophy that it has +at last acquired the clear and exact knowledge that a socalled infinite +spirit, in the religious sense, is a fantastic, unscientific conception. +In the natural sense of the word, the human powers of understanding are +universal and yet in spite of their universality they are, quite +naturally, limited. The human understanding has its limits, why should +it not? Only drop the illusion that a dark mystery is concealed beyond +these limits. + +The understanding is a force among others, and everything that is +located alongside of other things is limited and restricted by them. We +can understand everything, but we can also touch, see, hear, feel, and +taste everything. We also have the power of moving about, and other +qualities. One art limits another, and yet each is unlimited in its own +field. The various human powers belong together and constitute together +the human wealth. Be careful not to separate the power of understanding +from other natural powers. In a certain sense it must be separated, +because it is the special object of our study, but it must always be +remembered that such a separation has only a theoretical value. + +Just as our power of vision can see everything, so our understanding can +grasp everything. + +Let us look a little closer at this statement. + +How can we see everything? Not from any single standpoint. In that sense +our powers of vision are limited. But what is not visible in the +distance, becomes so on approaching nearer to it. What one eye cannot +see, that of others can, and what is invisible to the naked eye, is +revealed by the telescope and microscope. Nevertheless the vision +remains limited, even though it may be the sharpest, and armed with the +best artificial means. Even if we regard all the eyes of the past and +future generations of humanity as organs of the universal human vision, +this vision still remains limited. Nevertheless, no one will complain +about the limits of human power, because we cannot see sounds with our +eyes or hear the light with our ears. + +The understanding of man is limited, just as his vision is. The eye can +look through a glass pane, but not through a plate of iron. Yet no one +will call any eye limited, because it cannot see through a block of +metal. These drastic examples are very opportune, because there are +certain wise men who reflectively lay their finger on their nose and +call attention to the limits of our intellect in that sense, just as if +the knowledge gained on earth by scientific means were only a nominal, +not a real, understanding and knowing. The human intellect is thus +degraded to the position of a substitute of some "higher" intellect +which is not discovered, but must be "believed" to exist in the small +head of a fairy or in the large head of an almighty being above the +clouds. Would any one try to make us believe that there is a great and +almighty eye that can look through blocks of metal the same as through +glass? The idea of a spiritual organ with an infinite understanding is +just as senseless. An unlimited single thing, an unlimited single being, +is impossible, unless we regard the whole world, the world without +beginning and without end, the infinite world, as a unit. Within this +world everything is subject to change, but nothing can go beyond its +genus without losing its name and character. There are various kinds of +fire, but none that does not burn, none which has not the general nature +of fire. Neither is there any water without the general nature of water, +nor a spirit that is elevated above the general nature of spirits. In +our days of clear conceptions the tendency toward the transcendental is +mere fantastic vaporing. + +It is not alone unscientific, it is fantastic, to think even afar of a +higher power of thought or understanding than the human one. One might +as well think of a higher horse which runs with eight, sixteen, or +sixteen hundred legs and carries away his rider in a higher air at a +higher speed than that of the wind or the light. + +It is a part of the achievements of philosophy, of correct methods of +thought, of the art of thought or dialectics, to know that we must use +all conceptions, without exception, in a limited, rational, commonplace +way, unless we wish to stray into that region where there are mountains +without valleys and where every theory of understanding loses its mind. + +It is true that all things, including our understanding, may be +improved. Everything develops, why should not our intellects do so? At +the same time we may know _a priori_ that our intellect must remain +limited, of course not limited in the sense of the dunce, just as our +eyes will never become so sharp that they can see through metal blocks. +Every individual has its limited brain, but humanity, so the positive +achievements of philosophy have shown, has an intellect of as universal +a power as any that can be imagined, required, or found, in heaven or on +earth. + +We maintain that philosophy so far has acquired something positive, has +left us a legacy, and that this consists in a clear revelation of the +method of using our intellect in order to produce excellent pictures of +nature and its phenomena. + +For the purpose of making the reader familiar with this method, with +this legacy of philosophy, we must enter more closely into the essence +of the instrument which lifts all the treasures of science. We are +especially interested in the question, whether it is a finite or +infinite and universal instrument with which we go fishing for truth. It +is the custom to belittle the faculties of the human understanding, in +order to keep it under the supremacy of the divine metaphysical augurs. +It is quite easy to see, therefore, that the question of the essence of +our powers of understanding is intimately related to, or even identical +with, the question of how we may be permitted to use them, whether they +should be used only for the investigation of the limited, finite, or +also for the study of the eternal, infinite, and immeasurable. + +We object here to the tendency of belittling the human mind. About a +hundred years ago, the philosopher Kant found it appropriate to draw the +sword against those who played fast and loose with the human mind, +against the socalled metaphysicians. They had made a miraculous thing of +the instrument of thought, a matter for effusions. In order to be able +clearly to state the outcome of philosophy, we must acquaint the reader +with the fact that this instrument of thought, in its way, is one of the +best and most magnificent things in existence, but that, at the same +time, it is bound to its general kind or genus. The human understanding +perceives quite perfectly, but we must not have an exaggerated idea of +its perfection, any more than we would of a perfect eye or ear, that, be +they ever so perfect, cannot see the grass grow or hear the fleas cough. + +God is a spirit, says the bible, and God is infinite. If he is a spirit, +an intellect, such as man, then it would be fair to assume that man's +intellect is also infinite, or even is the divine spirit itself which +has taken up its abode in the human brains. People cudgeled their brains +with such confused conceptions, so long as the object of modern +philosophy, the intellect, was a mystery. Now it is recognized as a +finite, natural phenomenon, an energy or a force which is not the +infinite, though it is, like all other matter and force, a part of the +infinite, eternal, immeasurable. + +Leaving all religious notions aside, the infinite, immeasurable, +eternal, is not personal, but objective; it is no longer referred to as +a masculine, but as a neuter. It may be called by many names, such as +the universe, the cosmos, or the world. In order to understand clearly +that the spirit which we have in our minds, is a finite part of the +world, we must get a little better acquainted with this infinite, +eternal world. Our physical world cannot have any other world beside it, +because it is the universe. Within the universe there are many worlds, +which all of them make out the cosmos, which has neither a beginning nor +an end in time and space. The cosmos reaches across all time and space, +"in heaven and on earth, and everywhere." + +But how do I know what I state in such an offhand manner? Well, the +knowledge of the universe, of the infinite, is given to us partly by +birth and partly by experience. This knowledge is inherent in man just +as language is, viz., in the germ, and experience gives us a proof of +the infinite in a negative way, for we never learn the beginning or the +end of anything. On the contrary, experience has shown us positively +that all socalled beginnings and ends are only interconnections of the +infinite, immeasurable, inexhaustible, and unfathomable universe. +Compared to the wealth of the cosmos the intellect is only a poor +fellow. However, this does not prevent it from being the most perfect +instrument for clearly and plainly reflecting the finite phenomena of +the infinite universe. + + + + +IV + +THE UNIVERSALITY OF NATURE + + +The positive outcome of philosophy concerns itself with specifying the +nature of the human mind. It shows that this special nature of mind does +not occupy an exceptional position, but belongs with the whole of nature +in the same organization. In order to show this, philosophy must not +discuss the human mind as if it were something separate from nature, but +must rather deal with its general nature. And since this general nature +of our intellect is the same of which every other thing partakes, it +follows that nature in general, or the universe, or the cosmos, all of +which is the same thing, are an indispensable object in the special +study of the nature of the human mind. + +We have already said that the experienced understanding of the present +day no longer muses over nature in general in the fantastic and mere +introspective manner as of old, but rather seeks to obtain a knowledge +of it by special study. In so doing we do not forget that the study of +specialties at the same time throws a light on the general relation of +things, of which every species is but a part. + +Since the human mind is a part of the whole of nature, viz., that part +which has the desire and longing to obtain a conception of all the other +parts, and more than that, to understand the interconnection between the +parts and the undivided and infinite whole, it is easy to comprehend the +fact that the philosophers have occupied themselves so much with the +most real and most perfect being. Whether this being was called God, or +substance, or idea, or the absolute, or nature, or matter, all of these +terms cannot prevent us today from approaching infinite nature with +sober senses, in order to gain, by its help, a lifelike picture of the +human intellect, which is not a mystical being, but a reasonable part of +the same nature that lives reasonably and intelligibly in all other +parts of nature. + +The inexperienced powers of distinction which did not understand their +function, magnified the difference between the infinite and its finite +phenomena out of all proportion. Now that we have made the philosophical +experience that the general as well as the special nature of the human +intellect admits only of moderate and bounded distinctions, we arrive at +the conclusion that the immeasurable, all-perfect, and eternal being is +composed of finite, commensurable, imperfect, and transient things in +such a way that the universal being combines in itself all perfections +as well as all imperfections. This contradictory universal being, this +nature to which all contradictory attributes may be simultaneously +assigned, in a certain sense puts the old rule to shame that you cannot +at the same time affirm and deny the predicate of any subject. + +Nature comprises all and is all. Reason and unreason, being and not +being, all these contradictions are contained in it. Outside of it there +are no affirmations and no contradictions. Since the human mind +eternally moves in affirmations and negations, in order to obtain a +clear picture of things, it has an interminable task in understanding +the interminable object. + +Our brain is supposed to solve the contradictions of nature. If it knows +enough about itself to realize that it is not an exception from general +nature, but a natural part of the same whole--although it calls itself +"spirit"--then it also knows and must know that its clearness can differ +but moderately from the general confusion, that the solution of the +problem cannot differ materially from the problem itself. The +contradictions are solved only by reasonable differentiation, only by +the science of understanding which shows that extravagant differences +are nothing but extravagant speculations. The human understanding +inclines to exaggerations in its untrained state, and it is a relic of +untrained habits to differentiate in an absolute manner the spiritual +from the rest of nature, to make a too extravagant distinction between +it and the physical body. It is the merit of philosophy to have given us +a clear doctrine of the use of the intellect, and this doctrine +culminates in the rule not to make exaggerated, but only graduated +distinctions. For this purpose it is necessary to realize that there is +only one being and that all other socalled beings are but minor +expressions of the same general being, which we designate by the name of +nature or universe. + +In consequence of the human bent to exaggeration, the human +understanding has been regarded as a being of a different nature from +that of natural beings which exist outside of the intellect. But it must +be remembered that every part of nature is "another" individual piece of +it, and, furthermore, that every other and different part is really +nothing different but a uniform piece of the same general nature. The +thing is mutual: The general nature exists only in its many individual +parts, and these in their turn exist only in, with and by the general +cosmic being. + +Nature which is divided by the human understanding into East and West, +South and North, and into a hundred thousand other named parts, is yet +an undivided whole of which we may say with certainty that it has as +many innumerable beginnings and ends as it is without beginning and end, +as it is the infinite itself. It is well known that there is nothing new +under the sun. Nothing is created, nothing disappears, and yet there is +a continuous change. + +The brain of man has a right and a left side, a top and a bottom, a +front and a back part, an interior and an exterior. And the innermost of +the brain again has two sides or qualities, a physical and a spiritual. +They are so little divided that the term brain has two meanings, +designating now the physical brain, now its mental functions. In +speaking here exclusively of the mind, we tacitly assume its inseparable +connection with the physical body. + +The material brain and the mental brain are two brains that together +make one. Thus two, three, four, or innumerable things are yet one +thing. The human understanding was endowed by nature with the faculty of +embracing the infinite variety of the universe as a unit, as a single +conception. The unity of nature is as true and real as its multiplicity. +To say that many are one and one many is not nonsense, but simply a +truism which becomes clear when understanding the positive outcome of +philosophy. + +A reader unfamiliar with this our product of philosophy still follows +the habit of regarding the physical body as something different from the +mind. A distinction between these two is quite justified, but this +manner of classification must not be overdone. The reader should +remember that he also is in the habit of regarding such heterogeneous +things as axes, scissors, and knives as children of the same family by +referring to them collectively as cutting tools. The outcome of +philosophy now demands that we apply the same method to the object of +our special study, the human brain. We must henceforth eschew all +effervescent flights of imagination and regard the powers of the human +mind as children of the same family as all other physical powers, whose +immortal mother is the universe. + +The universe is infinite not alone in the matter of time and space, but +also in that of the variety of its products. The human brains which it +produces are likewise internally and externally of an infinite +differentiation, although this does not prevent them from forming a +common group uniform in its way. + +To group the phenomena of nature, the children of the universe, in such +a way by classes, families, and species that they may be easily grasped, +that is the task of the science of understanding, the work and +constitution of the perceiving human brain. To understand simply means +to obtain a general and at the same time a detailed view of the +processes and products of the universe by grouping them in a fashion +similar to that used for the vegetable kingdom by botany and for the +animal kingdom by zoology. It goes without argument that we, the limited +children of the unlimited universe, are able to solve this problem only +in a limited way. + +However, this natural physical limitation of the human understanding +must not be confounded with the abject misery which slavish and +sentimental metaphysics attribute to it. The infinite universe is by no +means niggardly in its gifts to the human understanding. It opens its +whole depths to our intellectual understanding and perception. Our +intellect is a part of the inexhaustible universe and therefore partakes +of its inexhaustible nature. That part of nature which is known by the +name of intellect is limited only to the extent that the part is smaller +than the whole. + + + + +V + +THE UNDERSTANDING AS A PART OF THE HUMAN SOUL + + +The human intellect or understanding, the special object of all +philosophy, is a part, and in our case the most prominent part, of the +human soul. Gustav Theodore Fechner, a forgotten star on the literary +firmament, posed the question of the soul in his time and attempted to +answer it. In so doing he clothed the result of past philosophies in a +peculiar garb which looked fantastic enough at first sight. He regards +the outcome of philosophy merely as an individual product and he is so +full of veneration for the ancient terms, such as _immortal souls_, +_God_, _Christianity_, that he does not care to dismiss them, no matter +how roughly he handles their essence. + +Fechner extends the possession of a soul to human beings, animals, +plants, stones, planets; in short, to the whole world. + +This is simply saying that the human soul is of the same nature as all +the rest of the world, or vice versa, that all natural things have the +same nature as the human soul. Not only animals, but also stones and +planets have something analogous to our human soul. + +Fechner is not fantastic at bottom, and yet how fantastical it sounds to +hear him say: "I went out walking on a spring morning. The fields were +green, the birds were singing, the dew sparkled, the smoke rose toward +the clouds. Here and there a human being stirred. A glory of light was +diffused over it all. It was only a small piece of the Earth. It was +only a short moment of its existence. And yet, as I took all this in +with an ever-widening understanding, I felt not alone the beauty, but +also the truth that it is an angel who is thus passing through the sky +with his rich, fresh and blooming nature, his living face upturned to +the heavens. And I asked myself how it is that man can ever become so +stunted that he sees nothing but a dry clod in the Earth and looks for +angels above and beyond it, never finding them anywhere. But people call +this sentimental dreaming." + +"The Earth is a globe, and what it is besides may be found in the +museums of natural history." Thus writes Fechner. + +Now there can be no objection to comparing the beautiful Earth and the +stars around it with angels, any more than there can be to the lover +calling his sweetheart an angel of God. The Earth, the Moon, and the +stars are according to Fechner's terminology angelic beings with souls; +mediators between man and God. He knows very well that this is nothing +but a matter of analogy and terminology, he is as atheistic as the most +atheistic, but his fondness and reverence for the traditional terms lead +him to attribute a soul to the material world and to give to this great +and infinite soul a divine name. + +If we waive this religious hobby of Fechner's, there still remains his +peculiarity of using words and names in a symbolical sense. It is +nothing but the old poetic way of calling a sweetheart's eyes heavenly +stars and the stars of the blue heavens lovely eyes, which makes a snowy +hill of a woman's breast, a zephyr of the wind, a nymph of a spring of +water, and an erlking of an old willow tree. This poetic license has +filled the whole world with good and evil spirits, mermaids, fairies, +elfs, and goblins. + +This is not a bad way of speaking, so long as we keep in mind, like a +poet, what we are doing and that we are consciously using symbolical +terms. Fechner does this only to a certain extent. A little spleen +remains in his brain. It is this spleen which I intend to deal with in +the proper light, in order to thus demonstrate the outcome of +philosophy. + +Fechner is not aware that his universal soul reflects only one half of +our present outcome of philosophical study. The other half, which +renders an understanding of the whole possible, consists in the +perception that not only are all material things endowed with a soul, +but that all souls, including the human ones, are ordinary things. + +Philosophy has not only deified the world and inspired it with a soul, +but has also secularized God and the souls. This is the whole truth, and +each by itself is only a part. + +Apart from psychology, which treats of the individual human soul, there +has lately arisen a "psychology of nations" which regards the individual +souls as parts of the universal human soul, as individual pieces +constituting an aggregate soul which, decidedly, is more than a simple +aggregation of numbers. The soul of the psychology of nations has the +same relation to the individual souls that modern political economy has +to private economy. Prosperity in general is a different question and +deals with different matters than the amassing of wealth for your +individual pocket. Granted that the national soul is essentially +different from the individual soul, what would be the nature of the +universal animal soul, including the souls of lions, tigers, flies, +elephants, mice, etc.? If we now extend the generalization farther and +include in our psychology the vegetable and the mineral kingdom, the +various world bodies, our solar system, and finally the whole universe, +what else could that signify than a mere rhetorical climax? + +Mere generalization is one-sided and leads to fantastical dreams. By +this method one can transform anything into everything. It is necessary +to supplement generalization by specialization. We wish to have the +elephants separated from the fleas, the mice from the lice, at the same +time never forgetting the unity of the special and the general. This sin +of omission has often been committed by the zoologists in the museums +and the botanists in their plant collections, and philosophical +investigators of the soul like Fechner have drifted into the other +extreme of generalization without specialization. + +The positive outcome of philosophy, then, in its abstract outline, is at +present the doctrine that the general must be conceived in its relation +to its special forms, and these forms in their universal +interconnection, in their qualities as parts of nature in general. True, +such an abstract outline reveals very little. In order to grasp its +concrete significance, we must penetrate into its details, into the +special aspects of this doctrine. + +The title of "Critique of Reason," which Kant gave to his special study, +is at the same time a fitting term for all philosophical research. +Reason, the essential part of the human soul, raises the critique of +reason, the science of philosophy, to the position of the most +essential part of psychology. + +But why do we call this the most essential part? Is not the material +world and its understanding as essential as reason, as intellect, which +bends to the task of exploring this world? Surely, it is, and I do not +use the word essential in this sense. I call the intellect the most +essential part of the soul, and the soul the most essential part of the +world, only in so far as these parts are the special condition of all +scientific study and because the investigation of the general nature of +scientific study is my special object and purpose. Whether I endeavor to +explain the general nature of scientific study, whether I investigate +the intellect or the theory of understanding, it all amounts to the same +thing. + +Let us approach our task once more from the side of Fechner's universal +soul. With his extravagant animation of all things, with his plant, +stone, and star souls, he can help us to prove that the general nature +of that particle of soul which is called reason, intellect, spirit, or +understanding, is not so extraordinarily different from the general +nature of stones or trees as the old time idealists and materialists +were wont to think. + +As I said before, Fechner is a poet, and a poet sees similarities which +a matter-of-fact brain cannot perceive. But at the same time we must +admit that the matter of fact brain which cannot see anything but mere +distinctions is a very poor brain. The philosophers before me have +taught me that a good brain sees the similarities and the differences at +the same time and knows how to discriminate between them. A sober poetry +and the combination of poetic qualities with a comprehensive and +universal levelheadedness and discrimination, these are the marks of a +good head. Still the poorest as well as the most talented brains partake +of the general brain nature, which consists in the understanding that +like and unlike, general and special, are interrelated. The one is never +without the other, but both are always together. + +If the distinction between men and stones is so trifling that a talented +brain like Fechner's can justly speak of them both as being animated, +surely the difference between the body and soul cannot be so great that +there is not the least similarity and community between them. However, +this escaped Fechner's notice. Is not the air or the scent of flowers an +ethereal body? + +Reason is also called understanding, and it is a positive achievement of +philosophy to have arrived at the knowledge that this understanding does +not admit of any exaggerated distinctions. In other words, all things +are so closely related that a good poet may transform anything into +everything. Can natural science do as much? Ah, the gentlemen of that +science are also progressing well. They transform dry substance into +liquid, and liquid into gas; they change gravity into heat and heat into +mechanical power. And they are doing this without forgetting to +discriminate, as happened to our Fechner. + +It is not enough to know that the body has a soul and the soul a body, +not enough to know that everything has a soul. It is also necessary to +discriminate between the peculiarities and details of the human, animal, +plant, and other souls, taking care not to exaggerate their differences +to the extreme of making them senseless. + +We do not intend to follow this theory of a universal soul any further. +Fechner declares himself that "it must be admitted at the outset that +the whole question of a soul is a question of faith."... "Analogy is +not a convincing proof."... "We can no more prove the existence of a +soul than we can disprove it." + +However, from the time of Cartesius it has been an accepted fact in the +world of philosophers that the consciousness of the human soul is the +best proof of its existence. The most positive science in the world is +the empirical self-observation of the thinking soul. This subject is the +most conspicuous object imaginable, and it is the positive outcome of +philosophy to have given an excellent description of the life and +actions of this soul particle called consciousness or understanding. + +If the understanding is a part of the human soul and this soul an +evident and positive part of the universal life, then, clearly, +everything partaking of this life, such as pieces of wood and stones +scattered around, is related to this soul. Individual human souls, +national souls, animal souls, pieces of wood, lumps of stone, world +bodies, are all children of the same common universal nature. But there +are so many children that they must be classified into orders, classes, +families, etc., in order to know them apart. On account of their +likeness, the souls belong together in one class and the bodies in +another, and each requires more detailed classification. Thus we finally +arrive at the class of human souls forming a department by themselves, +because they all have a common general character. + +The manufacturers know that the work of ten laborers produces more and +is of a different quality than the work of a single laborer multiplied +by ten. Likewise the general human soul, or any national soul, expresses +itself differently from the sum of the various individual souls +composing it. More even, the very individual soul differs at various +times and places, so that the individual soul is as manifold as any +national soul. + +"Has the plant a soul? Has the earth a soul? Have they a soul analogous +to that of man? That is the question." Thus asks Fechner. + +Just as my soul of today has something analogous to my soul of +yesterday, so it has also with the soul of my brother, and finally with +the souls of animals, plants, stones, etc., proving that everything is +more or less analogous. A herd of sheep is analogous to yonder flock of +small, white clouds in the sky, and a poet has the license to call those +small clouds little sheep. In the same way Fechner is justified in +propounding his theory of a universal soul. + +Is it not necessary, however, to make a distinction between poetry and +truth? My brother's soul and my own are souls in the true sense of the +word, but the souls of stones--they are only so figuratively speaking. + +At this point I want to call the reader's attention to the fact that we +must not pass lightly over the valuation of the difference between the +true and the figurative sense of a word. + +Words are names which do not, and cannot, have any other function than +that of symbolic illustration. My soul, yours, or any other, are only +in conception the same souls. + +When I say that John Flathead has the same soul as you and I, my +intention is simply to indicate that he has something which is common to +you and me and to all men. His soul is made in the image of our souls. +But where shall we draw the line in this comparison of images? What is +not an image in the abstract, and what is more than an image in the +concrete? + +Truth and fiction are not totally different. The poet speaks the truth +and true understanding partakes largely of the nature of poetry. + +Philosophy has truly perceived the nature of the soul, and especially +that part of it with which we are dealing, that is, reason or +understanding. This instrument has the function of furnishing to our +head a picture of the processes of the world outside of it, to describe +everything that is around us and to analyze the universe, itself a +phenomenon, with all its phenomena as a process of infinite variety in +time and space. + +If this could be accomplished with the theory of a universal soul, then +Fechner would be the greatest philosopher that ever was. But he lacks +the understanding that the intellect which has to combine all things +within a general wrapper, must also consider the other side of the +question, that of specification. That, of course, cannot be achieved by +any philosopher. It must be the work of all science, and philosophy as a +doctrine of science must acknowledge that. + + + + +VI + +CONSCIOUSNESS IS ENDOWED WITH THE FACULTY OF KNOWING AS WELL AS WITH THE +FEELING OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF ALL NATURE + + +In the historical course of philosophy, there has been much discussion +as to where our knowledge comes from, whether any of it, or how much of +it, is innate, and how much acquired by experience. Without any innate +faculties no knowledge could have been gathered with any amount of +experience, and without any experience even the best faculties would +remain barren. The results of science in all departments are due to the +interaction of subject and object. + +There could be no subjective faculty of vision unless there were +something objective to be seen. The possession of a faculty of vision +carries with it the practical performance of seeing. One cannot have the +faculty of vision without seeing things. Of course, the two may be +separated, but only in theory, not in practice, and this theoretical +separation must be accompanied by the recollection that the separated +faculty is only a conception derived from the practical function. +Faculty and function are combined and belong together. + +Man does not acquire consciousness, the faculty of understanding, until +he knows something, and his power grows with the performance of this +function. + +The reader will remember that we have mentioned as an achievement of +philosophy the understanding of the fact that we must not make any +exaggerated distinctions. Hence we must not make any such distinction +between the innate faculty of understanding and the acquired knowledge. + +It is an established universal rule that the human intellect knows of no +absolute separation of any two things, although it is free to separate +the universe into its parts for the purpose of understanding. + +Now, if I claim that the conception of the universe is innate in us, the +reader must not conclude that I believe in the old prejudice of the +human intellect being like a receptacle filled with ideas of the true, +the beautiful, the good, and so forth. No, the intellect can create its +ideas and concepts only by self-production and the world around it must +furnish the materials for this purpose. But such a production +presupposes an innate faculty. Consciousness, the knowledge of being, +must be present, before any special knowledge can be acquired. +Consciousness signifies the knowledge of being. It means having at least +a faint inkling of the fact that being is _The_ universal idea. Being is +everything; it is the essence of everything. Without it there cannot be +anything, because it is the universe, the infinite. + +Consciousness is in itself the consciousness of the infinite. The innate +consciousness of man is the knowledge of infinite existence. When I know +that I exist, then I know myself as a part of existence. That this +existence, this world, of which I am but a particle with all others, +must be an infinite world, does indeed not dawn on me until I begin to +analyze the conception of being with an experienced instrument of +thought. The reader, in undertaking this work with such an instrument, +will at once discover that the conception of the infinite is innate to +his consciousness,[8] and that no faculty of conception is possible +without this conception. The faculty of conception, understanding, +thought, means above all the faculty of grasping the universal concept. +The intellect cannot have any conception which is not more or less +clearly or faintly based on the concept of the universe. _Cogito, ergo +sum._ I think, therefore, I am. Whatever I imagine is there, at least in +imagination. Of course, the imagined and the real thing are different, +yet this difference does not exceed the limits of the universal +existence. Creatures of fiction and real creatures are not so radically +different that they would not all of them fit into the general gender of +being. The manner, the form of being, are different. Goblins exist in +fiction and Polish Jews exist in a tangible form, but they both exist. +The general existence comprises the body and the soul, fiction and +truth, goblins and Polish Jews. + +It is no more inconceivable that the faculty of universal understanding +should be innate in us than that circles come into this world round, two +mountains have a valley between them, water is liquid and fire burns. +All things have a certain composition in themselves, they are born with +it. Does that require any explanation? The flowers which gradually grow +on plants, the powers and wisdom that grow in men in the course of +years, are no more easily explained than such innate faculties, and the +latter are no more wonderful than those acquired later. The best +explanation cannot deprive the wonders of nature of their natural +marvelousness. It is a mistake to assume that the faculty of +explanation which is located in the human brain, is a destroyer of the +belief in natural marvels. Philosophy which makes this faculty of +explanation and the nature of its explanations the object of its special +study gives us a new and much better understanding of this old miracle +maker. It destroys the belief in metaphysical miracles by showing that +physical nature is so universal that it absolutely excludes every other +form of existence than the natural one from this world of wonders. + +I and many of my readers find in our brains the actual consciousness +that this general nature of which the intellect is a part is an infinite +nature. I call this consciousness innate, although it is acquired. The +point that I wish to impress on the reader is that the difference +generally made between innate and acquired qualities is not so +extraordinary that the innate need not to be acquired and the acquired +does not presuppose something innate. The one contradicts the other only +in those brains who do not understand the positive outcome of +philosophy. Such thinkers do not know how to make reasonable +distinctions and exaggerate in consequence. They have not grasped the +conciliation of all differences and contradictions in universal nature +by which all contradictions are solved. + +Philosophy has endeavored to understand the intellect. In demonstrating +the positive outcome of philosophy, we must explain that philosophical +understanding as well as any other does not rise out of the isolated +faculty of understanding, but out of the universal nature. The womb of +our knowledge and understanding must not be sought in the human brain, +but in all nature which is not only called the universe, but is +actually universal. In order to prove this latter assertion, I refer to +the fact that this conception, this consciousness of the infinite in the +developed intellect, is in a manner innate. If the reader wishes to +object to my indiscriminately mixing the innate faculty with the +acquired understanding, I beg him to consider that I am endeavoring to +prove that any and all distinction made by the intellect refers in +reality to the inseparable parts of the one undivided universe. From +this it follows that the admired and mysterious intellect is not a +miracle, or at least no greater marvel than any other part of the +general marvel which is identical with the infinitely wonderful general +nature. + +Some people love to represent consciousness as something supernatural, +to draw an unduly sharp line of separation between thinking and being, +thought and reality. But philosophy, which occupies itself particularly +with consciousness, has ascertained that such a sharp contrast is +unwarranted, not in harmony with the reality, and not a faithful +likeness of reality and truth. + +In order to understand what philosophy has accomplished in the way of +insight into the function of the discriminating intellect, we must never +lose sight of the fact that there is only a moderate distinction of +degree between purely imaginary things and socalled real things. + +Neither the natural condition of our faculty of thought, nor the +universality of general nature, permit of an exaggerated distinction +between the reality of creations of imagination and of really tangible +things. At the same time the exigencies of science demand clear +illustrations and so we must distinguish between these two kinds of +reality. It is true that in common usage the mere thought and the purely +imaginary things are set apart from nature and reality as something +different and antagonistic. Yet the rules of language heretofore in +vogue cannot prevent the spread of the additional knowledge that the +universe, or general nature, is so unlimited that it can establish a +conciliation between these limited antagonisms. The cat and the dog, for +instance, are pronounced enemies, but nevertheless zoology recognizes +them as being legitimate domestic companions. + +Human consciousness is, in the first place, individual. Every human +individual has its own. But the peculiarity of my consciousness, of +yours, and that of others, is that of being not alone the consciousness +of the individual in question, but also the general consciousness of the +universe, at least that is its possibility and mission. Not every +individual is conscious of the universality of general nature, otherwise +there would be none of that distracting dualism. Nor would there be any +necessity for volumes and volumes of philosophy to teach us that a +limit, a thing, or a world outside of the universal, is a nonsensical +idea, an idea which is contrary to sense and reason. We may well say, +for this reason, that our consciousness, our intellect, is only in a +manner of speaking our own, while it is in fact a consciousness, an +intellect belonging to universal nature. + +It can no more be denied that our consciousness is an attribute of the +infinite universe than it can be denied that the sun, the moon and the +stars are. Since this intellectual faculty belongs to the infinite and +is its child, we must not wonder that this universal faculty of thought +is born with the capability of grasping the conception of a universe. +And whoever does no longer wonder at this, must find it explicable, must +realize that the fact of universal consciousness is thus explained. + +To explain the mysterious may be regarded as the whole function of +understanding, of intellect. If we succeed in divesting of its mysteries +the fact that the concept of an infinite universe is found in the +limited human mind, we have then explained this fact itself and +substantiated our contention that the things around us are explained by +their accurate reflection in our brain. + +We summarize the nature of consciousness, its actions, life, and aims in +these words: It is the science of infinite being; it seeks to obtain an +accurate conception of this being and to explain its marvelousness. But +we have by no means exhausted its life and aims in these words. With all +the power of language, we can convey but a vague idea of the immensity +of the object under discussion. Whoever desires to know more about it, +must work for his own progress by observation and study. This much may +be safely said: This question is no more mysterious than any other part +of the general mystery. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] E. g., given with his consciousness.--EDITOR. + + + + +VII + +THE RELATIONSHIP OR IDENTITY OF SPIRIT AND NATURE + + +"There is a natural law of analogy which explains that all things +belonging to the universe are members of the same family, that they are +related to one another by bonds which permit of the greatest variety in +individual differences and are not nullified even by the distance +between extremes." If we grasp the meaning of these words in their full +bearing, we recognize the outcome of philosophy up to date. They teach +us how to use our intellect in order to obtain an accurate picture of +the universe. + +The intellect is also called by the name of faculty of discrimination. +If in the science of the powers of this faculty we place ourselves on +the standpoint of present-day natural knowledge, we possess the clear +and plain insight that there are no exaggerated distinctions, no +unrelated extremes, in the universe. The infinite is related to the +finite. For all developed and perishable things are the direct offspring +of the imperishable, of the eternal universe. General nature and its +special parts are inseparably interlaced. There is nothing among all +that has a name which is fundamentally different from other things known +by name. + +There will hardly be any objection against these sentences, until we +proceed to draw their last consequences. If all things are related and +without exception children of the universe, it follows that mind and +matter must also be two yards of cloth from the same piece. Hence the +difference between human understanding and other natural human faculties +must not be magnified into that of irreconcilable extremes. + +In order to become accustomed to scientific distinctions, the reader +should consider that a man can remain under the sway of a belief in +ghosts only so long as he ignores the relationship of all existing +things. He believes in real ghosts whose reality is supposed to be +radically different from his own. Such a distinction is exaggerated and +illogical, and whoever believes in it does not know how to discriminate +scientifically and has not the full use of his critical faculties. + +Just as common parlance opposes art to nature and then forgets that art +is a part of nature, similarly as night is a part of day, so the +language of the believer in ghosts does not know that reason and wood, +mind and matter, in spite of all their differences, are two parts of the +same whole, two expressions of the same universal reality. Everything is +real and true, because in the last instance the universe is all, is the +only truth and reality. So I call it a slip of the tongue to speak of +natural nature as opposed to natural art or artificial nature, of +imaginary reality as distinct from real reality. There ought to be a +different name for the day of twelve hours than for the day of +twenty-four hours, so that it might be better understood that day and +night are not fundamentally different, but two prongs of the same fork. + +Just as the faculty of thinking is innate in the child, and grows with +its development, so mankind's faculty of thought grows and has hitherto +expressed itself in a language which gave only instinctive conceptions +of the composition of the human brain and of its functions. The +construction of languages explains in a way the condition of the human +mind which had only inadequate knowledge of itself so far. Those +shortcomings of speech which I called slips of the tongue were not +understood until sufficient progress had been made in the explanation of +the process of thinking, and now these same shortcomings offer an +excellent means of representing and demonstrating the results of +enlightenment. + +The mind is to give to man a picture of the world, the language is the +brush of the mind. It paints by its construction the universal +relationship of all things referred to in the beginning of this chapter, +and it does so in the following manner: It gives to each thing not only +its own name, but also adds to it another indicating its family, and +another indicating its race, another for the species, the genus, and +finally a general name which proclaims that all things are parts of the +one indivisible unit which is called world, existence, universe, cosmos. + +This diagrammatic construction of language furnishes us with an +illustration of the graduated relationship of things and of the way in +which the human race arrives at its knowledge, its perceptions or +pictures. + +We said that philosophy is that endeavor which seeks to throw light on +the process of human thought. This work has been rendered very difficult +by the unavoidable misunderstanding of the universal relationship just +mentioned. The transcendentalists insist above all that the process of +thinking and its product, thought, should not be classed among ordinary +physics, not as a part of physical nature, but as the creature of +another nature which carries the mysterious name of metaphysics. That +such a nature and such a science is neither possible nor real is proven +by the construction of language which normally describes everything as +being closely related and corroborates this by its abnormal shortcomings +which we called slips of the tongue. + +The shortcomings of language which demonstrate the positive outcome of +philosophy consist in occasionally giving insufficiently significant +names to things belonging to a group in which the distinction between +individuals, species, genera, and families is not clearly defined. It is +not discernible, for instance, whether the term "cat" applies to a +domestic cat or to a tiger, because that term is used for a large class +of animals of which the domestic cat is the arch-type. + +But it may be that this illustration is not well chosen for the purpose +of demonstrating that slip of the tongue which is supposed to give us an +exact appreciation of the positive outcome of philosophy. Let us find +another and better illustration which will be a transition from the +inadequate to the adequate and thus throw so much more light on the +obscurities of language. + +Another and better example of the inadequacies of language is the +distinction between fish and meat. In this case, we entirely lack a +general term for meat, one kind of which is furnished by aquatic animals +and the other by terrestrial animals. + +Now let the reader apply this shortcoming of language to the distinction +between physics and metaphysics, or between thought and reality. We lack +a term which will fully indicate the relation between these two. +Thoughts are indeed real things. True, there is a difference whether I +have one hundred dollars in imagination or in reality in my pocket. +Still we must not exaggerate this difference into something +transcendental. Painted money or imagined money are in a way also real, +that is in imagination. In other words, language lacks a term which will +clearly express the different realities within the compass of the unit. + +The understanding of these peculiarities of language is calculated to +promote the insight and enlightenment in regard to that secret lamp +which man is carrying in his brain and with which he lights up the +things of this world. The cultivation of the theory of understanding, +the critique of reason, has an elementary significance for the +elucidation of all things. This is not saying that philosophy, that +special science with which we are here dealing, is a universal science +in the sense in which antiquity conceived of it. But it is universal +nevertheless in the sense in which the alphabet and other primary topics +are universal. Every one must use his brains and should therefore take +pains to understand its processes. Though the knowledge of these does +not make other efforts unnecessary, still it explains many ideas, it +elucidates the nature of thinking which every one is doing and which is +frequently used in a more ruthless manner than a dog would treat a rag. + +The inertia which has prevented the one-sided idealists on the one hand +and the one-sided materialists on the other from coming to a peaceful +understanding may be traced to one of those slips of the tongue. We lack +the right terms for designating the relationship between spiritual +phenomena, such as our ideas, conceptions, judgments and conclusions and +many other things on one side and the tangible, ponderable, +commensurable things on the other. True, the reason for this lack of +terms is the absence of understanding, and for this reason the dispute +is not one of mere words, although it can be allayed only by an +improvement of our terminology. + +Büchner, in his well-known work on "_Force and Matter_," likewise +overlooks this point, the same as all prior materialists, because they +are as onesidedly insistent on their _matter_ as the idealists are on +their _idea_. Quarrel and strife mean confusion, only peace will bring +light. The contrast between matter and mind finds its conciliation in +the positive outcome of philosophy which teaches that all distinctions +must be reasonable, because neither our instrument of thought nor the +rest of nature justify any exaggerated distinctions. In order to +elucidate the moot question, nothing is required but the insight that +ideas which nature develops in the human brain are materials for the +work of our understanding, though not materials for the work of our +hands. Philosophy has made material efforts to grasp the understanding +and its conceptions and is still making them in the same way in which +chemistry is working for the understanding of substances and physics for +the understanding of forces. + +Substances, forces, ideas, conceptions, judgments, conclusions, +knowledge and perceptions, according to the positive outcome of +philosophy, must be regarded as differences or varieties of the same +monistic genus. The differentiation of things no more contradicts their +unity than their unity contradicts their differentiation. Darwin +expanded the conception of "species" and thus contributed to a better +understanding of zoology. Philosophy expands the conception of species +still far beyond the Darwinian definition in teaching us to consider the +species as little generalities and the largest genus, the absolute or +the cosmos as the all in one, the all-embracing species. + +In order to closely connect the worm and the elephant, the lowest and +the highest animal, the vegetable and the animal kingdom, the inorganic +and the organic, as members of the same species or genus in a reasonable +way, we must keep account of the gradations in nature, the transitions, +the connecting links and connecting ideas. Embryology, which shows that +the life of the highest animal develops through the stages of the animal +genus, has greatly promoted the understanding of the common nature of +all animals. + +"The continuity in the natural gradation of things is perfect, because +there are no gradations which are not represented, because there are no +differences between the various grades which nature does not fill by an +intermediary form.... There is no abrupt difference in nature, no +metaphysical jump, no vacuum, no gap in the order of the world," says a +well-known author of our times whose name I shall not mention, because I +wish to base my argument on the acknowledged facts rather than on names +of authorities. + +What Darwin taught us in relation to animal life, viz., that there are +no fundamental differences between species, that is taught by philosophy +in regard to the universe. The understanding of the latter is rendered +difficult by the habit of making a transcendental distinction between +matter and mind. + + + + +VIII + +UNDERSTANDING IS MATERIAL + + +Whether we say that philosophy has the understanding for the object of +its study, or whether we say that philosophy investigates the method of +utilizing subjective understanding in order to arrive at genuine, +correct, excellent, objective knowledge, that is only a matter of using +different terms for the same process. It makes no difference whether we +designate the object of our special science as a thing or as a process. +It is much more essential to understand that the distinction between the +thing and its action is in this instance of little consequence. + +According to modern natural science all existence is resolved into +motion. It is well known now that even rocks do not stand still, but are +continuously active, growing and decaying. + +The understanding, the intellect, is an active object, or an objective +action, the same as sunshine, the flow of waters, growing of trees, +disintegration of rocks, or any other natural phenomenon. Also the +understanding, the thinking which takes place consciously or +unconsciously in the human brain, is a phenomenon of as indubitable +actuality as the most material of them. It cannot in the least shake our +contention of the materially perceptible nature of intellectual activity +that we become aware of this activity by an internal, not by an +external, sense. Whether a stone is externally perceptible or thought +internally, what difference does this slight distinction make in the +incontestable fact that both perceptions are of equal material, natural +and sense-perceptible kind? Why should not the action of the brain +belong in the same category as the action of the heart? And though the +movement of the heart be internal and that of the tongue of the +nightingale external, what is to prevent us from considering these two +movements from the higher viewpoint of natural or material processes? +If the function of the heart may be referred to as material, why not the +function of the brain? True, the present usages of language are in +conflict with this mode of thought. But it must be remembered that every +science comes into conflict with usages of language by progressive +development. The discovery of every new thing in plant and animal life +compels the discoverer to invent a new term or change the meaning of an +old one. The term material has not had a well defined, but rather an +indefinite meaning so far. Now, since it is necessary, in order to +understand the function of the brain to remove it from the class of +transcendental or metaphysical conceptions and assign to it a place +among the material things, the question arises: What will be the most +appropriate term for it? The material and the spiritual are both two +species of the same genus. How are we to designate the species, how the +genus? For the sake of complete clearness, we require three different +names, one for each species and a common general name. But since we are +much less concerned about the name than about the understanding of these +facts which cannot be well explained without terms, we do not insist +dogmatically on calling the understanding material. It is sufficient to +point out that the function of the heart and of the brain both belong to +the same class, no matter whether this class be called material, real, +physical, or what not. So long as language has not established a +definite meaning for these terms, all of them serve equally well and are +equally deceptive. + +The positive outcome of philosophy which culminates in placing the +theory of understanding in the same class with all other theories, +cannot be easily demonstrated on account of a natural confusion of +thought which arises from an equally natural confusion of language. In +the special department of handicraft as well as in that of scientific +brain work the terminology is well systematized, while in the general +affairs of life and science there is a confusion which is as great in +the matter of conceptions as in that of applying the terms by which +those awkward conceptions are expressed. + +Wherever understanding is clear, there the language is also clear. The +man who does not understand shoemaking does not understand its +terminology. This is not saying that the understanding of a trade and +the understanding of its terminology are identical, but only indicating +their actual connection. + +If the reader has had a glimpse of the enormity of the work of more than +two thousand years of philosophy in order to state what little we know +today of its achievement in the science of understanding, he will not be +very much surprised at the difficulties we here meet with in finding +terms for its demonstration. + +The function of the brain is as material as that of the heart. The heart +and its function are two things, but they are dependent one upon the +other so that one cannot exist without the other. The function may +partly be felt. We feel the heart beating, the brain working. The +working of the heart may even be felt by touch, which is not the case +with the working of the brain. But it would be a mistake to imagine that +our knowledge of the function of the heart is exhausted by our +perception of it through the touch. Once we have overcome the habit of +making exaggerated distinctions between things, and have learned to +consider the differences of things as well as their interconnection, we +can easily understand that the science of the function of the heart is +an infinite science which is connected with all others. The heart cannot +work without the blood, the blood cannot exist without food, and this is +connected with the air, the plants, the animals, the sun, and the moon. + +The function of the brain and its product, the understanding, is +likewise inseparable from the universal interdependence of things. The +health of the blood which is produced by the action of the heart is no +more and no less a material phenomenon than the total knowledge of +science which appears as a product of brain life. + +Although we represent the doctrine of the material nature of +understanding as the positive outcome of philosophy, this is not +proclaiming the victory of that narrow materialism which has been +spreading itself particularly since the eighteenth century. On the +contrary, this mechanical materialism wholly misunderstands the nature +of the problem. It teaches that the faculty of thought is a function of +the brain, the brain is the object of study and its function, the +faculty of thought, is fully explained as a brain quality or function. +This materialism is enamored of mechanics, idolizes it, does not regard +it as a part of the world, but as the sole substance which comprises the +whole universe. Because it misunderstands the relation of thing and +function, of subject and predicate, it has no inkling of the fact that +this relation which it handles in such a matter-of-fact way, but not at +all scientifically, may be an object worthy of study. The materialist +of the old school is too horny-handed to consider the function or +quality of understanding as an object worthy of a separate scientific +department. We, on the other hand, follow the suggestion of Spinoza, who +required of the philosophers that they should consider everything in the +light of eternity. In so doing we find that the tangible things, such as +the brain, are qualities of nature, and that in the same way the +socalled functions are natural things, substantial parts of the +universe. + +Not only tangible objects are "things," but also the rays of the sun and +the scent of flowers belong to this category, and perceptions are no +exception to the rule. But all these "things" are only relative things, +since they are qualities of the one and absolute which is the only +thing, the "thing itself," well known to every one by the name of the +universe, or cosmos. + + + + +IX + +THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC + + +Since this work wishes to demonstrate the positive outcome of +philosophy, the reader may ask the author what are his proofs that +instead of the quintessence of thousands of years of philosophical work +he is not offered the elaboration of any individual philosopher, or even +that of the author himself. + +In reply I wish to say that my work would be rendered uselessly +voluminous by quotations from the works of the most prominent +philosophical writers, without proving anything, since the words of one +often contradict those of another. + +What is said by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel, in one place of any +of their works, is at least considerably modified, if not contradicted, +in another place of the same work. It is of little consequence, how and +by whose help I have arrived at the positive outcome of philosophy as +here rendered. Whether it is the actual outcome or not can be judged +only by the expert, and every opinion is necessarily very subjective. + +Under the circumstances I, as author, claim that my opinion is worth as +much as any other, and the reader may therefore accept my assurance. As +to the further value of that which I offer, it is a peculiarity of the +subject under discussion that every reader carries it and its +experiences within himself and may, without consulting any other author, +at once draw his own conclusions about my views, provided he has +acquired the necessary training in thought. What a traveler tells us +about the interior of Africa must either be believed to the letter or +verified by the accounts of other travelers. But what I say about logic +will, I hope, find its corroboration in the logic of every reading +brain. + +The theory of understanding which has become the special object of +philosophy, is nothing else, and cannot be anything else, but expanded +logic. Many practical rules and laws of this department are known and +recognized since the time of Aristotle. But the question whether there +is one world or two, a natural and unnatural, or supernatural as it is +called with preference, that is the point which has given much trouble +to philosophy and which will influence the health of logic so long as +it is undecided. + +Dr. Friedrich Dittes, director of the institute of pedagogy in Vienna, +has published a _School of Pedagogy_, several editions of which have +appeared, in which he gives much attention to logic. Dittes is a +prominent pedagogue, well known through his writings. He confines +himself in his _School_ to teaching only that which is well established +and accepted without a doubt. As a practical man who addresses himself +mainly to teachers of primary grades, he would not place himself on the +pinnacle of the outcome of philosophy, even if he could. He must confine +himself to that which is well established, which is far removed from the +disputes of the day. But it may here serve as a whetstone by the help of +which we may give to the positive product of philosophy its latest and +greatest sharpness. + +He writes right in the beginning of the first part: "Our ideas are as +manifold as the objects to which they refer. Several things may have +many or few, or at least one quality, in common. Still they may also be +totally different." + +This last point, viz., that there may be things which are "totally" +different from one another, is the one which is decidedly rejected by +that science which has risen to the eminence of the positive acquisition +of philosophy. There can be no natural things which are "totally" +different from one another, because they must all of them have in common +the quality of being natural. + +It sounds very commonplace to say that there are no unnatural things in +nature. Since the last witch was burnt, everybody is sufficiently +enlightened to know that. But the logical conclusions of natural monism +have not yet been drawn. True, natural science, properly socalled, is +busily engaged in arriving at them. But so much more strife is there in +the "science of mind" and there is no other remedy but a well founded +theory of understanding which teaches that nature is not alone absolute +nature, but also the nature of the absolute. From this doctrine it +necessarily follows that all things are not individually independent, +but related by sex, dependent children, "predicates" of the monistic +unity of the world. + +"The arch fountain of the human spirit," says Dittes, "is perception.... +Whether perception as such discloses to us the true nature of things, or +whether it makes us familiar only with their phenomena, this is not to +be discussed by logic." The practical pedagogue who confines himself to +the education of children's brains or who wishes at most to influence +such teachers as educate children's brains, is quite right in being +satisfied with the old traditional Aristotlean logic. But in the school +of the human race, this logic has not been sufficient. For this reason +the philosophers have broached the question whether perception, "the +arch fountain of the human spirit," is a true or a deceptive fountain. +The product of the philosophical investigation which we here offer +amounts to the declaration that the logicians are greatly mistaken about +the "arch fountain." It is a cardinal error of ancient logic to regard +perception as the ultimate source from which the human mind dips its +knowledge. It is nature which is the ultimate source, and our perception +is but the mediator of understanding. And its product, recognized +truth, is not truth itself, but merely a formal picture of it. Universal +nature is the arch fountain, is the eternal and imperishable truth +itself, and our perception, like every other part of universal +existence, is only an attribute, a particle of absolute nature. The +human mind, with whose nature logic is dealing, is no more an +independent thing than any other, but simply a phenomenon, a reflex or +predicate of nature. + +To confound true perceptions or perceived truths with general truth, +with the _non plus ultra_ of all truths, is equivalent to regarding a +sparrow as _the_ bird in general, or a period of civilization as +civilization itself, which would mean the closing of the door to all +further development. + +Modern philosophy, beginning with Bacon of Verulam and closing with +Hegel, carries on a constant struggle with the Aristotlean logic. The +product of this struggle, the outcome of philosophy, does not deny the +old rules of traditional logic, but adds a new and decidedly higher +circle of logical perception to the former ones. For the sake of better +understanding it may be well to give to this circle a special title, the +special name of "theory of understanding," which is sometimes called +"dialectics." + +In order to demonstrate the essential contents of this philosophical +product by an investigation of the fundamental laws of traditional logic +and to explain it thereby, I refer once more to the teacher of +elementary logic, Dittes. + +Under the caption of "Principles of Judgment" he teaches: "Since +judging, like all thinking, aims at the perception of truth, the rules +have been sought after by which this purpose might be accomplished. As +universally applicable rules, as principles or laws of thought, the +following four have been named: + + + (1) The law of uniformity (identity). + + (2) The law of contradiction. + + (3) The law of the excluded third. + + (4) The law of adequate cause." + + +So much scholastic talk has been indulged in over these four +"principles," that I can hardly bring myself to discuss them further. +But since my purpose, the demonstration of the positive outcome of +philosophy, consists in throwing a new light on the logic contained in +these four so-called principles or laws, I am compelled to lay bare +their inmost kernel. + +The first principle, then, declares that A is A, or to speak +mathematically, every quantity is equal to itself. In plain English: a +thing is what it is; no thing is what it is not. "Characters which are +excluded by any conception must not be attributed to it." The square is +excluded from the conception of a circle, therefore the predicate +"square" must not be given to a circle. For the same reason a straight +line must not be crooked, and a lie must not be true. + +Now this so-called law of thought may be well enough for household use, +where nothing but known quantities are under consideration. A thing is +what it is. Right is not left and one hundred is not one thousand. +Whoever is named Peter or Paul remains Peter or Paul all his life. This, +I say, is all right for household use. + +But when we consider matters from the wider point of view of cosmic +universal life, then this famous law of thought proves to be nothing but +an expedient in logic which is not adequate to the nature of things, but +merely a means of mutual understanding for us human beings. Hence the +left bank of the Rhine is not the right, because we have agreed that in +naming the banks of a river we will turn our backs to the source and our +faces to the mouth of the river and then designate the banks as right +and left. Such a way of distinguishing, thinking, and judging is good +and practical, so long as this narrow standpoint is accompanied by the +consciousness of its narrowness. Hitherto this has not been the case. +This determined logic has overlooked that the perception which is +produced by its rules is not truth, not the real world, but only gives +an ideal, more or less accurate, reflection of it. Peter and Paul, who +according to the law of identity are the same all their lives, are in +fact different fellows every minute and every day of their lives, and +all things of this world are, like those two, not constant, but very +variable quantities. The mathematical points, the straight lines, the +round circles, are ideals. In reality every point has a certain +dimension, every straight line, when seen through a magnifying glass, is +full of many crooked turns, and even the roundest circle, according to +the mathematicians, consists of an infinite number of straight lines. + +The traditional logic, then, declares with its law of identity, or in +the words of Dittes "law of uniformity," that Peter and Paul are the +same fellows from beginning to end, or that the western mountains remain +the same western mountains so long as they exist. The product of modern +philosophy, on the other hand, declares that the identity of people, +woods, and rocks is inseparably linked to their opposite, their +incessant transformation. The old school logic treats things, the +objects of perception, like stereotyped moulds, while the +philosophically expanded logic considers such treatment adequate for +household use only. The logical household use of stereotyped +conceptions extends, and should extend, to all of science. The +consideration of things as remaining "the same" is indispensable, and +yet it is very salubrious to know and remember that the things are not +only the same permanent and stereotyped, but at the same time variable +and in flow. That is a contradiction, but not a senseless one. This +contradiction has confused the minds and given much trouble to the +philosophers. The solution of this problem, the elucidation of this +simple fact, is the positive product of philosophy. + +I have just declared that logic so far did not know that the perception +produced by its principles does not offer us truth itself, but only a +more or less accurate picture of it. I have furthermore contended that +the positive outcome of philosophy has materially added to the clearness +of the portrait of the human mind. Logic claims to be "the doctrine of +the forms and laws of thought." Dialectics, the product of philosophy, +aims to be the same, and its first paragraph declares: Not thought +produces truth, but being, of which thought is only that part which is +engaged in securing a picture of truth. The fact resulting from this +statement may easily confuse the reader, viz., that the philosophy which +has been bequeathed to us by logical dialectics, or dialectic logic, +must explain not alone thought, but also the original of which thought +is a reflex. + +While, therefore, traditional logic teaches in its first law that all +things are equal to themselves, the new dialectics teaches not only that +things are equal to themselves and identical from start to finish, but +also that these same things have the contradictory quality of being the +same and yet widely variable. If it is a law of thought that we gain as +accurate as possible a conception of things by the help of thought, it +is at the same time a law of thought that all things, processes, and +proceedings are not things but resemble the color of that silk which, +although equal to itself and identical throughout, still plays from one +color into another. The things of which the thinking thing or human +intellect is one are so far from being one and the same from beginning +to end that they are in truth and fact without beginning and end. And as +phenomena of nature, as parts of infinite nature, they only seem to have +a beginning and end, while they are in reality but natural +transformations arising temporarily from the infinite and returning into +it after a while. + +Natural truth or true nature, without beginning and end, is so +contradictory that it only expresses itself by shifting phenomena which +are nevertheless quite true. To old line logic this contradiction +appears senseless. It insists on its first, second, and third law, on +its identity, its law of contradiction and excluded third, which must be +either straight or crooked, cold or warm, and excludes all intermediary +conceptions. And in a way it is right. For every-day use it is all right +to deal in this summary fashion with thoughts and words. But it is at +the same time judicious to learn from the positive outcome of philosophy +that in reality and truth things do not come to pass so ideally. The +logical laws think quite correctly of thoughts and their forms and +applications. But they do not exhaust thinking and its thoughts. They +overlook the consciousness of the inexhaustibleness of all natural +creations, of which the object of logic, human understanding, is a part. +This object did not fall from heaven, but is a finite part of the +infinite which actually has the contradictory quality of possessing in +and with its logical nature that universal nature which is superior to +all logic. + +From this critique of the three first "fundamental laws of logic" it is +apparent that the human understanding is not only everywhere identical, +but also different in each individual and has a historical development. +We are, of course, logically entitled to consider this faculty like all +others by itself and give it a birthday. Wherever man begins, there +understanding, the faculty of thought, begins. But we are +philosophically and dialectically no less entitled, and it is even our +duty, to know that the faculty of understanding, the same as its human +bearer, has no beginning, in spite of the fact that we ascribe a +beginning to them. When we trace the historical development of these +two, of man and understanding, backward to their origin, we arrive at a +transition to the animal and see their special nature merging into +general nature. The same is found in tracing the development of the +individual mind. Where does consciousness begin in the child? Before, +at, or after birth? Consciousness arises from its opposite, +unconsciousness, and returns to it. In consequence we regard the +unconscious as the substance and the conscious as its predicate or +attribute. And the fixed conceptions which we make for ourselves of the +units or phenomena of the natural substance are recognized by us as +necessary means in explaining nature, but at the same time it is +necessary to learn from dialectics that all fixed conceptions are +floating in a liquid element. The infinite substance of nature is a very +mobile element, in which all fixed things appear and sink, thus being +temporarily fixed and yet not fixed. + +Now let us briefly review the fourth fundamental law of logic, according +to which everything must have an adequate cause. This law is likewise +very well worthy of attention, yet it is very inadequate, because the +question what should be our conception of the world and what is the +constitution of the most highly developed thinking faculty of the world +requires the answer: the world, in which everything has its adequate +cause, is nevertheless, including consciousness and the faculty of +thought, without beginning, end, and cause, that is, a thing justified +in itself and by itself. The law of the adequate cause applies only to +pictures made by the human mind. In our logical pictures of the world +everything must have its adequate cause. But the original, the universal +cosmos, has no cause, it is its own cause and effect. To understand that +all causes rest on the causeless is an important dialectic knowledge +which first throws the requisite light on the law of the necessity of an +adequate cause. + +Formally everything must have its cause. But really everything has not +only one cause, but innumerable causes. Not alone father and mother are +the cause of my existence, but also the grand parents and great grand +parents, together with the air they breathed, the food they ate, the +earth on which they walked, the sun which warmed the earth, etc. Not a +thing, not a process, not a change is the adequate cause of another, but +everything is rather caused by the universe which is absolute. + +When philosophy began its career with the intention of understanding the +world, it soon discovered that this purpose could be accomplished only +by special study. When it chose understanding, or the faculty of +thought, as the special object of its study, it separated its specific +object too far from the general existence. Its logic, in opposing +thought to the rest of existence, forgot the interconnection of the +opposites, forgot that thought is a form, a species, an individuality +which belongs to the genus of existence, the same as fish to the genus +of meat, night to the genus of day, art to nature, word to action, and +death to life. It does not attempt to explore the essence of thought for +its own sake, but for the purpose of discovering the rules of exploring +and thinking correctly. It could not very well arrive at those coveted +rules, so long as it idealized truth transcendentally and elevated it +far above the phenomena. All phenomena of nature are true parts of +truth. Even error and lies are not opposed to truth in that exaggerated +sense in which the old style logic represents them, which teaches that +two contradictory predicates must not be simultaneously applied to the +same subject, that any one subject is either true or false, and that any +third alternative is out of the question. Such statements are due to an +entire misconception of truth. Truth is the absolute, universal sum of +all existing things, of all phenomena of the past, present, and future. +Truth is the real universe from which errors and lies are not excluded. +In so far as stray thoughts, giants and brownies, lies and errors are +really existing, though only in the imagination of men, to that extent +they are true. They belong to the sum of all phenomena, but they are not +the whole truth, not the infinite sum. And even the most positive +knowledge is nothing but an excellent picture of a certain part. The +pictures in our minds have this in common with their originals that they +are true. All errors and lies are true errors and true lies, hence are +not so far removed from truth that one should belong to heaven and the +other to eternal damnation. Let us remain human. + +Since old line logic with its four principles was too narrowminded, its +development had to produce that dialectics which is the positive +outcome of philosophy. This science of thought so expanded regards the +universe as the truly universal or infinite, in which all contradictions +slumber as in the womb of conciliation. Whether the new logic shall have +the same name as the old, or assume the separate title of theory of +understanding or dialectics, is simply a question of terms which must be +decided by considerations of expediency. + + + + +X + +THE FUNCTION OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE RELIGIOUS FIELD + + +We took our departure from the fact that philosophy is searching for +"understanding." The first and principal acquisition of philosophy was +the perception that its object is not to be found in a transcendental +generality. Whoever wishes to obtain understanding, must confine himself +to something special, without, however, through this limitation losing +sight of all measure and aim to such an extent that he forgets the +infinite generality. + +A modern psychologist who occupies himself with "Thoughts on +Enlightenment," which topic is evidently related to ours, says: "Real +and genuine enlightenment can proceed only from religious motives." +Expressed in our language, this would mean: Every genuine understanding, +every true conception or knowledge, must be based on the clear +consciousness that the infinite universe is the arch fundament of all +things. + +Understanding and true enlightenment are identical. "It is true," say +the "Thoughts on Enlightenment," "that all enlightenment takes the form +of struggles on account of the nature of him who is to be enlightened +and of the object about which he is to be informed. But it is a struggle +for religion, not against it." The author, Professor Lazarus, says in +his preface that he does not wish the reader to base his opinion on any +single detached sentence. "Every single sentence," he says, "may be +tested as to its value, but the whole of my views on religion and +enlightenment cannot be recognized from any single one of them." + +As this wish is entirely justified and as our position is somewhat +supported by his psychological treatment of enlightenment, we shall +comply with his wish and seek to grasp the meaning of his statements on +the religious nature of enlightenment in their entirety, not as isolated +sentences. + +We even go a step farther than Professor Lazarus, by extending to +understanding what he says about enlightenment, viz., that genuine +knowledge and enlightenment must, so to say, take their departure from +religious motives. But we differ a little as to what motives are +religious. Lazarus refers, so far as I can see, to ideas and the ideal, +while we, thanks to the positive outcome of philosophy, understand the +terms _religion_ and _religious_ to refer to the universal +interdependence of things. + +Obviously the dividing line between heat and cold is drawn by the human +mind. The point selected for this purpose is the freezing point of +water. One might just as well have selected any other point. Evidently +the dividing line between that which is religious and that which is +irreligious is as indeterminate as that between hot and cold. Neither +any university nor any usage of language can decide that, nor is the +pope a scientific authority in the matter. + +It is mainly due to the socalled historical school that a thing is +considered not alone by its present condition, but by its origin and +decline. What, then, is religion and religious? The fetish cult, the +animal cult, the cult of the ideal and spiritual creator, or the cult of +the real human mind? Where are we to begin and where to end? If the +ancient Germans regarded the great oak as sacred and religious, why +should not art and science become religious among the modern Germans? In +this sense, Lazarus is correct. The "enlightenment" which was headed in +France by Voltaire and the encyclopedists, in Germany by Lessing and +Kant, the "enlightenment" which came as a struggle for reason and +against religion, was then in fact a struggle for religion, not against +it. By this means one may make everything out of anything. But this has +to be learned first in order to recognize how our mind ought to be +adjusted, so that it may perceive that not only everything is +everything, but that each thing also has its own place. + +We wish to become clear in our minds how it is possible, and +reconcilable with sound conception, that such an anti-religious struggle +as that carried on during that period of "enlightenment" can +nevertheless be a struggle for and in the interest of religion. We wish +to find out how one may abolish religion and at the same time maintain +it. + +This is easily understood, if we remember the repeatedly quoted +dialectic rule according to which our understanding must never +exaggerate the distinctions between two things. We must not too widely +separate the religious from the secular field. Of course, the religious +field is in heaven, while the secular is naturally in the profane +universe. Having become aware that even religious imagination, together +with its heaven and spirit creator, are profane conceptions in spite of +their alleged transcendentalism, we find religion in the secular field, +and thus this field has in a way become religious. The religious and the +profane infinite have something in common, at least this that the +indefinite religious name may also be applied to the secular or profane +infinity. + +"All culture, every condition of humanity or of a nation, has its roots +as well as its bounds in history," says our Professor of psychology. +Should not religion, which according to the words of a German emperor +"must be preserved for the people," also have its bounds in history? Or +does it belong to the infinite and must it exist forever? In order to +free history of its bounds, it is necessary to avail ourselves of the +positive outcome of philosophy and to demonstrate that nothing is +infinite but the infinite itself, which has the double nature of being +infinite and inseparable from the finite phenomena of nature. The whole +of nature is eternal, but none of its individual phenomena is, although +even the imperishable whole is composed of perishable parts. + +The relation of the constant whole of nature to its variable parts, the +relation of the general to the specialties composing it, includes, if we +fully grasp it, a perfect conception of the human mind as well as of the +understanding and enlightenment which it acquires. This mind cannot +enlighten itself as to its special nature without observing how it came +to enlighten itself as to the nature of other specialties. We then find +that it has likewise enlightened itself on religious phenomena by +recognizing them as a part, as a variation, of the general phenomenon of +the constant, eternal, natural universe. Hence secular nature, which is +at the same time eternal and temporal, is the mother of religious +nature. Of course, the child partakes of the nature of the mother. +Religion, historically considered, arises from nature, but the +determination of the date of the beginning of this specialty is left as +much to the choice of man as that of the point where the cold and the +warm meet. The general movement of nature, from which arise its +specialties, proceeds in infinite time. Its transformations are so +gradual that every determined point constitutes an arbitrary act which +is at the same time arbitrary and necessary; necessary for the human +being who wishes to gain a conception of it. A perfect conception of +religion, therefore, goes right to the center of the question, to the +point where the religious specialty reaches a characteristic stage, to +its freezing point, so to say. From this standpoint, heat and cold may +be sharply defined; likewise religion. If we say, for instance, that +religion is the conception of a supernatural spirit who rules nature, +and the reader thinks this definition somewhat appropriate, the simple +demonstration of the achievements of philosophy in the field of +understanding or dialectics proves that this religious conception is +untenable in this world of the human mind which knows how to obtain a +logical picture of its experiences. + +To desire to preserve religion for the people as a sharply defined and +finite thing is contrary to all logic and equivalent to swimming against +the tide. On the other hand, it is equally illogical to identify +religion after the manner of Lazarus with the conception of natural +infinity or infinite nature, because that promotes mental haziness. + +The laws of thought obtained by philosophical research give us +considerable enlightenment about the infinite material process, the +nature of which is sublime enough to be worthy of religious devotion, +and yet special and matter-of-fact enough to wash the dim eyes with +natural clearness. + +We have already seen in preceding chapters that we must first define our +standpoint before we can decide which is the right or left bank of a +river. So it is also in the matter of abolishing and maintaining +religion for the people. It can be done the moment we extend the +discussion to the realm of infinity. The conception of infinity, called +substance by Spinoza, monad by Leibniz, thing itself by Kant, the +absolute by Hegel, is indeed necessary in order to explain anything, not +only by the fourth root, but by the infinite root of the adequate +reason. To that extent we are agreed that enlightenment, or +understanding as we say, is not alone a struggle against religion, but +also for it. In the theory of understanding acquired by philosophy, +there is contained a decisive repeal of religion. Nevertheless we say +with Lazarus: "The power of enlightenment and its aim are not expressed +in negation, not in that which is not believed, but in that which is +believed, venerated, and preserved." And yet every enlightening +perception, every understanding resulting from enlightenment, is a +negation. In seeking enlightenment, for instance, on understanding, it +is necessary, in order to prove that it is a natural phenomenon, to deny +the religious element in so far as it assumes the existence of a divine +chief spirit whose secondary copy the human spirit is supposed to be. +Or, in order to gain enlightenment on the nature of the universe, in +order to realize that it is a truly universal universe, we are compelled +to deny the existence of every "higher" world, including the religious. +But if we desire to become enlightened as to how it is that religion +may not alone be denied, but also preserved, we must transfer its origin +from an illogical other world into the natural and logical universe. +Thus religion becomes natural and nature religious. + +If worship is confined to the idolization of the sun or the cat, every +one realizes the temporality of the matter. And if we restrict worship +to the adoration of the great omnipotent spirit, every one realizes the +temporality of this adoration who has acquired an accurate conception of +the small human spirit. If, on the other hand, we extend religious +worship to everything which has ever been venerated, or will ever be +venerated, by human beings, in other words, if we extend the conception +of religion to the entire universe, then it assumes a very far-reaching +significance. + +This is the essence of enlightenment on religion: That we may at will +expand or contract our conceptions, that all things are alike to the +extent of representing only one nature, that all fantastical ideas, all +good and evil spirits and ghosts, no matter how "supernaturally" +conceived, are all natural. + +The essential thing in the enlightenment acquired by philosophical study +is the appreciation of the fact that understanding, enlightenment, +science, etc., are not cultivated for their own sake, but must serve the +purpose of human development, the material interests of which demand a +correct mental picture of the natural processes. + +We have chosen the religious idea for discussion in this chapter so that +it may serve as a means of illustrating the nature of thought in +general. We regard it as the merit of philosophy to have unveiled this +nature. + +Professor Lazarus is quite a pleasing companion. He is a fine thinker, +saturated with the teachings of the philosophers, not overfond of any +particular school, and only about two hands' breadth removed from our +position. But this is just enough to demonstrate by his shortcomings the +advantages of our position which proves that the part of the human soul +performing the work of thinking is understood by us at least two hands' +breadth better than by this prominent psychologist. + +"The function of enlightenment is to recognize that no phenomenon can be +an effect which has not another phenomenon as its cause, and to search +for the sole cause of every effect, noting all its parts and their +consecutive divisions." + +These words describe the mental work performed by the human brain fairly +well, but still they require a little addition, to the effect that the +mental work is no exception from any other phenomena, all of which have +not alone their special, but also one general cause. The cause of all +causes, of which religion is making an idol, must be profaned, so to +speak, by the cult of science, so that the above definition of Lazarus +regarding enlightenment would read as follows: The sole and true cause +of all effects is the universe, or the general interdependence of all +things. But this is not by far the full scope of enlightenment. It is +further necessary, as Lazarus well says, to note "all its parts and +their consecutive divisions." We further add: The universal cause must +be understood not alone in its consecutive parts, but also in its +co-ordinate parts. It is only then that understanding, enlightenment, +become perfect. We then find that after all the relation between cause +and effect, or the relation between the universal truth and its natural +phenomena, is not a very trenchant one, but a relative one. + +"Enlightenment advances in various, in all, fields of mental life. +Religious enlightenment has long been recognized as the most essential, +justly so, and for many reasons, the chief of them being that religious +enlightenment is the most important and hence the most bitterly +contested." + +Thus religious enlightenment is a part of universal, cosmic, +enlightenment. It is a confusing expression to say that it is confined +to "all fields of mental life." We believe to be shedding more light on +the question by saying that there is enlightenment in all fields, not +alone in the mental, but also in the cosmic, which unites both the +material and mental. To classify this field, that is the exhaustive task +of our understanding, that its exhaustive definition. + + + + +XI + +THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT IS ONE OF THE MEANS OF +UNDERSTANDING + + +The processes of the human mind and their subjective composition cannot +be analyzed in a _pure_ state and without regard to their objective +effects any more than handiwork can be explained without the raw +material to be handled and the products derived therefrom, any more than +any work can be described in a _pure_ state without regard to the +product. + +That is the sad defect of old time logic which is an obstacle to its +further advance: it literally tears things out of their connections and +forgets the necessity of interdependence over the need of special study. + +The instrument which produces thought and knowledge in the human brain +is not an isolated thing, nor an isolated quality. It is connected not +only with the brain and the nervous system, but also with all qualities +of the soul. True, thinking is different from feeling, but it is +nevertheless a feeling the same as gladness and sorrow. Thought is +called incomprehensible and the heart unfathomable. It is the function +of science, of thinking and thought, to fathom and comprehend what as +yet is not fathomed and not comprehended. + +Just as thinking and understanding are parts of the human soul, so the +latter is a part of physical and intellectual man. Together with the +physical development of man, of the species as well as of the +individual, the soul also develops and with it that part which is the +special object of the theory of understanding, viz., thought and +thinking. Not alone does physical development produce intellectual +development, but, vice versa, the understanding reacts on the physical +world. The one is not merely a cause, nor the other merely an effect. +This obsolete distinction does not suffice for the full understanding of +their interrelations. We pay a tribute to the "thoughts on +enlightenment" of Professor Lazarus quoted in the previous chapter by +acknowledging that they throw so much light on a certain point that +little more than the dot over the "i" is required in order to clear up a +bad misunderstanding about the relation of cause and effect. + +Since the time of Aristotle this relation has been called a category. We +have already noted the statement which characterizes the age of +enlightenment as one in which the causal category, or let us say the +distinction between cause and effect, became the dominant issue. Other +periods live with their understanding, with their thoughts, in other +categories. Though the ancient Greeks knew the distinction between +cause and effect, yet it was far from being the dominant point of view +in their search after scientific understanding. Instead of regarding, as +we do today, everything as effects which were produced by preceding +causes, they saw in every process, in every phenomenon, a means which +had a purpose. The category of means and purpose dominated the Greeks. +Socrates admired the knowledge of nature displayed by Anaxagoras, the +stories he could tell of sun, moon, and stars. But as Anaxagoras had +omitted to disclose the _reasonable purpose_ of the processes of nature, +Socrates did not think much of such a natural science. At that period +the means and the purpose were the measure of reason, the handle of the +mind, the category of understanding; today causes and effects have taken +their places. + +Between the golden age of Greece and the era of modern science, the +socalled night of the Middle Ages, the epoch of superstition, extends. +If then you started out on a voyage and first met an old woman, it meant +misfortune for you. Wallenstein cast the horoscope before he directed +his troops. "Understanding" was gathered from the flight of a bird, the +cry of an animal, the constellations of stars, the meeting with an old +woman. The category of that period was the _sign_ and its +_consequences_. + +And according to Lazarus, these things were believed by brains which +were by no means dull. "I refer to a name which fills us all with +veneration: Kepler believed in astrology, in the _category of the sign +and its consequence_, together with the thinkers of the thousand years +before him and of his own century. Astrology was a science for many +centuries, promoted together with astronomy ... and by the same people." + +The peculiar thing in this statement is the reference to the category +of sign and consequence as a _science_. This category has no longer a +place in modern science. + +May not our modern viewpoint, the category in which our present day +science thinks, the category of cause and effect, be equally transitory? + +The ancients have accomplished lasting scientific results in spite of +their "purposes." Mediæval superstition with its "signs," its astrology +and alchemy, has likewise bequeathed to us a few valuable scientific +products. And, on the other hand, even the greatest partisans of modern +science do not deny that it is marred by various adventurous vagaries. + +The categories of means and purposes, of signs and consequences, are +still in vogue today and will be preserved together with that of causes +and effects. The knowledge that this latter category is likewise but a +historical one and exerts but temporarily a dominating influence on +science belongs to the positive outcome of philosophy, and Professor +Lazarus, with all his advanced standpoint, has remained behind this +result by about a yard. + +Kindly note that it is not the extinction of the relation between cause +and effect which we predict, but merely that of its dominance. + +Whoever skips lightly over the current of life, will be greatly shocked +when reading that we place the fundamental pillar of all perception, the +category of cause and effect, in the same passing boat in which the +prophets and astrologers rode. One is very prone to belittle the faith +of others by the name of "superstition" and honor one's own superstition +by the title of "science." + +Once we have grasped the fact that our intellect has no other purpose +than that of tracing a human picture of cosmic processes, and that its +penetration of the interior of nature, its understanding, explaining, +perceiving, knowing, etc., is nothing else, and cannot be anything else, +that moment it loses its mysterious, transcendental metaphysical +character. We also understand then, that the great spirit above the +clouds who is supposed to create the world out of nothing, could very +well serve the mind as a means of explaining things. And it is the same +with the category of cause and effect, which is a splendid means of +assisting explanation, but still will not suffice for the requirements +of all time to come. + +The perception that the great spirit above the clouds is a free +invention of the small human mind has become so widely spread that we +may well pass on over it to other things. + +Among the questions now on the order of business is the one whether the +"causes" with which modern science operates so widely are not in a way +creators in miniature which produce their effects in a sleight-of-hand +way. And this erroneous notion is, indeed, the current conception. + +If a stone falls into the water, it is the cause of the undulations, but +not their creator. It is only a co-operator, for the liquid and elastic +qualities of the water also act as a cause. If the stone falls into +butter, it creates at best but one undulation, and if this stony creator +falls on the hard ground, it is all up with the creation of undulations. +This shows that causes are not creators, but rather effects which are +not effected, but effect themselves. + +The category of cause and effect is a good help in explanation, so long +as it is accompanied by the philosophical consciousness that the whole +of nature is an infinite sea of transformations, which are not created +by one great or many small creators, but which create themselves. + +A well-known philosophical author expresses himself in the following +manner: "During the first weeks of its existence, the child has no +perception either of the world without, or of its own body, or of its +soul. Hence its feeling is not accompanied by the consciousness of an +interaction between these three factors. It does not suspect its +causes." We see that soul, body, and outer world are called the three +factors of feeling. Now note how each one of these three causes or +factors is, so to say, the store house of innumerable factors or causes, +all of which cause the feeling of the child. The soul consists of many +soul parts, the body of many bodily parts, and the outer world consists +of so many parts that it would consist of ten times more parts, if there +were any more than innumerable. + +There is no doubt that the child's feeling, or any other, does not exist +independently, but is dependent on the soul, the body, and the outer +world. This constitutes the indubitable interrelation of all things. In +the winding processes of the self-agitated universe, the category of +cause and effect serves as a means of enlightenment, by giving our mind +its help in the systematization of processes. If the drop of a stone +precedes, the undulations of the water follow; if soul, body, and outer +world are present, feeling follows. + +The positive outcome of philosophy does not reject the services of the +category of cause and effect. It only rejects the mystical element in +that category in which many people, even among those with a "scientific +education," still believe. There is no witchcraft in this matter, but +simply a mechanical systematization and classification of natural +phenomena in the order of their appearance. So long as water remains +water and retains its liquid and elastic properties, and so long as a +stone is a stone, a ponderous fellow striking the water heavily, just +so long will the splash of the stone be surely and inevitably followed +by undulations of the water. So long as soul, body, and outer world +retain their known properties, they will with unfailing precision +produce feeling. It is no more surprising that we can affirm this on the +strength of our experience than that we have a category of cause and +effect. There exists nothing extraordinary but the condition of things, +and in this respect all things are alike, so that human understanding, +cause and effect, or any other category, are no more extraordinary than +any other condition. The only wonder is the universe, but this, being a +universal wonder, is at the same time trivial, for nothing is so +familiar as that which is common to all. + +By the help of the viewpoint of cause and effect, man throws light on +the phenomena of nature. Cause and effect serve to enlighten us about +the world. + +The way, the method, by which this enlightenment is produced, is the +special object of our study. We do not deny that cause and effect serve +us as a means, but only as one of many. We honor the category of cause +and effect far too much when we regard it as _the_ panacea. We have seen +that formerly other viewpoints served the same purpose and still others +exist today, some of which have a prospect of being valued more highly +in the future than cause and effect. This category serves very well for +the explanation of processes which follow one another. But there are +other phenomena which occur side by side, and these must also be +elucidated. For such a purpose, the category of genus and species is +quite as serviceable. Haeckel speaks somewhat slightingly of "museum +zoologists and herbarium botanists," because they merely classify +animals and plants according to genera and species. The modern +zoologists and botanists do not simply consider the multiplicity of +animals and plants which exist simultaneously, but also the +chronological order of the changes and transformations, and in this way +they have gained much more of a life-picture of the zoological and +botanical world, a picture not alone of its being, but also of its +growing, of arising and declining. Undoubtedly the knowledge of the +museum zoologists and herbarium botanists was meager, narrow, +mechanical, and modern science offers a far better portrait of truth and +life. Still this is no reason for overestimating the value of analysis +by cause and effect. This method supplements the category of genus and +species. It assists in enlightening, it helps in the process of thought, +but it does not render other forms of thought superfluous. + +It is essential for the theory of understanding, to recognize the +special forms of thought of old and new times as peculiarities which +have a common nature. This common nature of the process of thought, +understanding, enlightenment, is a part of the universal world process, +and not greatly different from it. + +The conception of a cause partly explains the phenomena of the universe; +but so does the conception of a purpose and of a species, in fact, so do +all conceptions. + +In the universe all parts are causes, all of them caused, produced, +created, and yet there is no creator, no producer, no cause. The general +produces the special, and the latter in turn produces by reaction the +general. + +The category of the general and the special, of the universe and its +parts, contains all other categories in the germ. In order to explain +the process of thought, we must explain it as a part of the universal +process. It has not caused the creation of the world, neither in a +theological nor in an idealist sense, nor is it a mere effect of the +brain substance, as the materialists of the eighteenth century +represented it. The process of thought and its understanding is a +peculiarity of the universal cosmos. The relation of the general to the +special is the clear and typical category underlying all other +categories. + +One might also apply other names to this category, for instance, the one +and the many; the essence and the form; the substance and its +attributes; truth and its phenomena, etc. However, a name is but a +breath and a sound; understanding and comprehension are what we want in +the first place. + + + + +XII + +MIND AND MATTER: WHICH IS PRIMARY, WHICH SECONDARY? + + +It is the merit of the philosophical outcome to have delivered the +process of understanding from its mystic elements. So long as cause and +effect are not recognized as a form of thought belonging to the same +species with many other forms of thought, all of which serve the common +purpose of illuminating the cosmic processes for the human mind by a +symbolized picture composed of various conceptions, just so long will +something mysterious adhere to the category of cause and effect. + +Philosophy is particularly engaged in illuminating the understanding. It +has learned enough of its specialty to know that it is a part of the +universe performing the special function of arranging the world of +phenomena and its smaller circles according to relations of +consanguinity and chronology. Such an arrangement presents a scientific +picture of the world. The well-known diagram of conceptions used by +logicians, consisting of a large circle symbolizing the general, inside +of which smaller circles crossing and encircling one another represent +the specialties, is a fitting aid in explaining the method by which the +faculty of understanding arrives at its scientific results. Science in +general is the sum of all special kinds of knowledge, differing from +them in no greater degree than the human body from the various organs of +which it is composed. A bodily organ can no more exist outside of the +body than any particular knowledge can exist outside of the generality +of all sciences. No metaphysics is possible under this condition. + +As surely as we know that two mountains cannot be without a valley +between them, just so surely do we know that nothing in heaven, on +earth, or in any other place can lie outside of the general circle of +things. Outside of the worldly world there can be no other little world. +A logically constituted human mind cannot think differently. And it is +likewise impossible to discover such an outside world by the help of and +within the limits of experience, because thought is inseparable from +experience and there can be no experience without thought. A man who has +a head upon his shoulders--and there can be no man without a +head--cannot experience any unworldly metaphysical world. The faculty of +experience, which includes the faculty of understanding or perception, +is merely empirical. Our settled conviction of the unity of the universe +is an inborn logic. The unity of the world is the supreme and most +universal category. A closer look at it at once reveals the fact that it +carries its opposite, the infinite multiplicity, under its heart or in +its womb. The general is pregnant with specialties. + +This is a comparison, and comparisons limp. A mother has other qualities +beside that of motherhood, while the universe, or the absolute +generality, is nothing but the bearer, the cause, of all special and +separate things. It is "pure" motherhood which can no more be without +children than the children without a mother. In this way, no cause can +be without effects. A cause without an effect--let us dismiss it. The +child is as much a cause in motherhood as it is its effect and product. +In the same way the universe has never been, and could not be conceived, +without the many special children which it carries in its womb. + +If thought wishes to make for itself a picture, a conception of the +cause of all causes, it must necessarily take cognizance of the effects. +Thought may very well separate one from the other, but cannot think +correctly without the consciousness that its separating and +distinguishing is only a formality. Imagining, conceiving, knowing, +perceiving, are so many formalities.[9] + +But philosophy took its departure from the opposite, the wrong, view. It +regarded perceiving, understanding, as the main thing. It did not use +science as a formality, as something secondary, as something serving a +nature, a cause, a purpose, a higher reason, but it started with the +illogical and irrelevant assumption that the specialty of mind, +understanding, conceiving, judging, distinguishing, is the primary, +supreme, self-constituted cause and purpose, instead of being an element +in logic. Even in Hegel's logic, which, by the way, has given us much +light on the process of thought, this confounding of the original with +the copy is the cause of an almost impenetrable mysticism. + +Not nature, but science is to those idealist philosophers the source of +truth. The "true idea" surpassed everything with them. This "idea" is +forced by Hegel to roll about, and wind, and twist as if it were not a +natural child, but a metaphysical dragon. But we cannot deny that in +these twistings and windings of the Hegelian dragon the condition of the +mind is exposed in all its peculiarities and nakedness. + +According to Hegel's theosophical opinion I do not become aware of my +friend in material intercourse and bodily touch. Hegel's mark of a true +friend is not that he proves true in life, but that he corresponds "to +his idea." The "idea" of true friendship is for the idealist the measure +of friendly truth, just as Plato measures the ideal or true condition of +states and cooking pots of this valley of sorrows by the standard of an +"idea" of the state, or an "idea" of the cooking pot, supposed to be +derived from some other world. + +It is surely a valuable gift of nature that the human mind can form its +ideals. But it is a gift that has also caused much trouble and which +requires for its higher development the clear understanding that ideals +are constructed out of real materials. Without this understanding the +human race will never succeed in making a reasonable use of its ideal +faculty. The beautiful ideal of true friendship may stimulate us to +emulation. But the knowledge that it is nothing but an ideal which in +reality is always mixed with a little falseness serves as no mean +antidote against sentimental transcendentalism. And the same holds true +of truth, liberty, justice, equality, brotherhood, etc. + +The striving after an ideal is very good, but it does no harm to be +conscious of the fact and clearly see that any ideal can never be +realized without some admixture of its opposite. What is it that Lessing +says? "If God were to offer me the search for truth in his left hand, +and truth in his right, I should grasp his left hand and say: Father, +keep truth, it is for you alone." + +It has not been the task of philosophy to give us a true mind picture of +the world. This it cannot do, this cannot be done by any scientific +specialty. It may be done by the totality of sciences, and even by them +only approximately. Even with them striving is a higher truth and of +higher value than knowing. I repeat, then: It is not the particular task +of philosophy to furnish a true picture of the world, but rather to +investigate the method by which the human mind arrives at its world +pictures. That is its work, and it is the object of this book to sketch +its outline. + +A sketch is in itself an inexact piece of work. I may be blamed for +jumbling together such terms as world, cosmos, universe, nature, or such +others as ideas, judgment, conclusion, thought, mind, intellect, etc., +and for using them as synonyms when many of them have already been +assigned their fixed meaning in the classification of science. But this +is the point which I emphasize, that the method of science, of thought, +has the twofold nature of making fixed terms and still remaining +pliable. + +Science not only defines what this or that is, but also how it moves, +how it originates, passes away, and still remains; how it is fixed and +yet at the same time moving. The real being of which science treats, +viz., the universe, is not alone present, but also past and future, and +it is not alone this or that, but it is everything. Even nothing is +something belonging to the aggregate life. + +This dialectic statement is rather incomprehensible to the +unphilosophical brain. Nothing and something are conceptions so widely +diverging from one another in the unphilosophical mind that they seem +far more apart than heavenly bliss is supposed to be separated from +earthly misery, according to the declarations of clergymen. Clergymen +are transcendental logicians, and it is likewise transcendental to +regard nothing as an absolute nothing. It cannot be denied that it is at +least a conception or a term. Therefore, whether little or much, it is +something. We cannot get out of existence, out of the universe, any more +than Münchhausen can pull himself out of a swamp by his pigtail. + +There can be no absolute nothing, because the absolute is synonymous +with the universe, and everything else is relative. So it is also with +nothing. It simply has the significance of not being the main thing. To +say: This is nothing means it is not that which is essential at this +time and place. This man is nothing simply means that he is not a man +out of the ordinary, and it does not at all signify that he is nothing +at all. + +The category of being and not being, like all categories,[10] which +appear as something fixed to the sound but ill-informed mind, is really +something shifting. Its poles fuse and flow into one another, its +differences are not perfectly radical. These categories give us an +illustration of the mobile universe, which is a unit composed of its +opposite, multiplicity. + +The positive outcome of philosophy has for its climax the understanding +that the world is multifarious, and that this multiplicity is uniform in +possessing the universal nature in common. The sciences must represent +these objects in such a contradictory way, because all things live in +reality in this contradiction. What the museum zoologists and the +herbarium botanists have accomplished on the field of zoology and botany +in the category of space, has been accepted by the Darwinians with the +addition of the variety of those subjects in the category of time. +Either class of scientists categorizes, classifies, systematizes. The +chemists do the same with substances and forces, and so does Hegel with +his categories of being and not being, quantity and quality, substance +and attribute, thing and quality, cause and effect, etc. He makes all +things flow into one another, rise, pass, move, and he is right in doing +so. Everything moves and belongs together. + +But that which Hegel missed and which is added by us consists in the +further perception that the flow and the variability of the categories +just quoted is only an illustration of the necessary variability and +interaction of all thoughts and conceptions, which are, and must be, +nothing but illustrations and reflexes of the universal life. + +However, the idealist philosophers who have all of them contributed +materially toward this ultimate special knowledge, are still more or +less under the mistaken impression that the process of thinking is the +true process and the true original, and that the true original, nature +or the material universe, is only a secondary phenomenon. We now insist +on having it understood that the cosmic interaction of phenomena, the +universal living world, is the truth and life. + +Is the world a concept? Is it an idea? It may be conceived and grasped +by the mind, but it does and is more than that. It surpasses our +understanding in the past, the present, and the future. It is infinite +in quantity and quality. How do we know that? We say in the same breath +that we do not know everything which is passing, has passed, and will +pass in the world; we do not understand the whole, and yet we claim to +have fully understood that this whole universe is not a mere idea, but +something absolute, something more than a conception or an intuitive +knowledge, something real and true, something infinite. How do we solve +this contradiction? + +The science of the limitation of the individual and of the collective +human intellect is identical with the universal concept; in other words, +it is innate in the human intellect to know that it is a limited part of +the absolute universe. This intellectual faculty of ours is no less +natural and aboriginal than the faculty of trees to become green in +summer and that of the spiders to spread their nets. Although the +intellect is a limited part of the unlimited and aware of this fact, yet +its faculty of knowing, understanding, judging, is a universal one. No +intellect is possible or conceivable which can do more than the +instrument of thought given by nature to the human race. We may indeed +conceive of a mental giant. But when we take a closer look, every one +will perceive that this mental giant cannot get outside of the +traditional race of thinkers, unless he is supposed to be the creature +of imagination. + +Thinking, knowing, understanding, are universal. I can perceive all +things in about the same way that I can see all cobble stones. I can see +them all, but I cannot see everything that they are composed of, I +cannot see, for instance, that they are heavy and ponderable. In the +same way all things may be perceived, but not everything that belongs +to them. They do not dissolve in understanding, in other words, +understanding is only a part of the universe, all of which may be +perceived, but the understanding of which is not the whole, since our +intellect is but a part of the universe. + +Everything may be understood, but understanding is not everything. Every +pug-dog is a dog, but every dog is not a pug-dog. The conflict of +idealism and materialism rests on this same conflict between genus and +subordinate species. The idealist incarnate contends that all things are +ideas, while we strive to make him see that ideal things and material +things are two species of the same genus, and that they should be given +a common family or general name beside their special name, on account of +their common nature and for the purpose of a sound logic. Wherever this +understanding has been acquired, the quarrel between idealists and +materialists appears in the light of a mere bandying of words. + +Everything is large, everything is small, everything extended through +space and time, everything cause and everything effect, everything a +whole and a part, because everything is the essence of everything, +because everything is contained in the all, everything related, +everything connected, everything interdependent. The conception of all +as the absolute, the content of which consists of innumerable +relativities, the concept of the all as the universal truth which +reflects many phenomena, that is the basis of the science of +understanding. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[9] A By means of which we picture and explain the monistic +interrelation of all things, called universe, nature and +cosmos.--EDITOR. + +[10] That is, like all categories that are subdivisions of the absolute +being, of general existence, pertaining only to the phenomena or +specialties which, however, in their entirety constitute the absolute +being or monistic nature.--EDITOR. + + + + +XIII + +THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE DOUBTS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CLEAR AND ACCURATE +UNDERSTANDING HAVE BEEN OVERCOME + + +A contemporaneous professor of philosophy, Kuno Fischer, of Jena, says: +"The problem of modern philosophy is the understanding of things." But +this problem does not occupy modern philosophy alone; it was also +considered by ancient philosophy. Even more, it belongs to the whole +world. All the world, I mean the whole human world, and especially the +sciences, search after understanding. I do not say this for the purpose +of setting the Professor right, for I acknowledge that he is a fairly +deserving philosopher. If I cared to go through his works, I should +surely find other passages which state the problem of philosophy more +accurately and concretely, to the effect that philosophy does not strive +merely for the indefinite "understanding of things," but rather for the +special understanding of that particular thing which bears the name of +"understanding." Philosophy at the climax of its development seeks to +understand "understanding." It has seriously attempted the solution of +this problem so long as men think, so far as our historical records go. + +After that which we have already said about the beginning and the end of +things and about their immortality, it will be easily understood that +the thing called understanding has no more historical beginning than all +the rest. The known grows out of the unknown, the conscious out of the +unconscious. Our modern consciousness, though agreeably cultivated, is +still an undeveloped, unconscious consciousness. Nevertheless, +development has gone far enough to make it plain that understanding is +anti-religious. Especially the understanding of understanding, the +outcome of positive philosophy, has a pronounced anti-religious, and to +that extent "destructive," tendency. But one should not have an +exaggerated idea of this destruction. Here, under this sun, nothing is +destroyed without leaving the basis for the growth of new life from the +ruins. It belongs to the conception of the universe to understand that +it is the main conception required for the conception of conception, for +the understanding of understanding. + +The history of philosophy begins with the decay of heathen religion, and +the history of modern philosophy with the decay of Christian religion. +Since religion must be preserved for the people according to the +official declarations of the rulers, the official professors are not +clear and accurate expounders of the positive outcome of philosophy. No +matter how great the work of Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel may be, +yet the followers of Kant and Hegel have no freedom of research, and +Kuno Fischer, although very close to the root of the subject, is +nevertheless doomed to remain in the mystification of the function of +conceiving and of understanding. His profession clouds his judgment. + +"Nature," says this professor, "is regarded as the first object of +understanding, as the principle from which everything else follows. In +this respect modern philosophy is naturalistic. It is taken for granted +that nature can be understood, or that the possibility of understanding +things is given. Modern philosophy makes this assumption +dogmatically.... The Kantian philosophy, on the other hand, assumes a +critical, not a dogmatic, attitude toward the possibility of +understanding." (System of Logic and Metaphysics, by Kuno Fischer, +second edition, pages 104 and 109.) In this latter, critical, stage, +the subject is kept rather hot by the professors of philosophy. The +critics are still engaged in exclaiming: Be amazed, oh world! How is +understanding possible? + +In the first place, there is nothing to be amazed at. Why is not the +"naturalistic" philosopher consistent by recognizing his special object, +understanding, as a natural object? + +The "supposition" that an understanding of things is possible, is +neither a supposition nor anything "dogmatic." + +The philosophers should abandon their old hobby of trying to prove +anything by syllogisms. Nowadays, a case is not substantiated by words, +but by facts, by deeds. The sciences are sufficiently equipped, and thus +the "possibility of understanding" is demonstrated beyond a doubt. + +"But," say the critics who are so wise that they hear the grass growing, +"are those perceptions which are produced by the exact sciences really +perceptions? Are they not simply substitutes? Those sciences recognize +only the phenomena of things; but where is the understanding which +perceives the truth?" + +We shall offer it to them. You are naturalists. Well, then, nature is +the truth. Or are you spiritualists who make a metaphysical distinction +between the truth and the phenomenon? To understand means to distinguish +and judge. The semblance must be distinguished from the truth, but not +in an excessive manner. It must be remembered that even the most evil +semblance is a natural phenomenon, and the sublimest truth is only +revealed by phenomena, just because it is natural. + +But the old logic cannot stand any contradictions. Semblance and truth +are contradictions for it and they cannot be reconciled by it. But the +irreconcilable simply consists in entertaining, in this monistic world, +thoughts which are supposed to be totally different. Hence old style +logic lacks entirely the mediating manner of thought which does not +elevate understanding and its faculty of thought to the skies, but is +satisfied to regard it as a very valuable, but still natural, quality. + +The old logic could not construct any valid rules of thought, because it +thought too transcendentally of thinking itself. It was not satisfied +that thought is only a faculty, a mode of doing, a part of true nature, +but the nature of truth was spiritualized by it into a transcendental +being. Instead of grasping the conception of spirit with blood and +flesh, it tries to dissolve blood and flesh into ideas. That would be +well enough, if such a solution of the riddles were meant to have no +other significance than that of symbols. + +The old logic contains long chapters about the proofs of truth. It is +supposed to be "identical" with the idea and to be proven by ideas. This +would be all right, if we remained conscious of the secondary relation +in which the idea and understanding stand to truth. But old line logic +is not conscious of this relation. On the contrary. Its consciousness +distorts that relation. It elevates the mind to the first place and +relegates blood and flesh to the last. + +"The necessity of a conception is proven by the impossibility of its +opposite. An idea is contradicted by proving its impossibility. This +impossibility is demonstrated when it can be proven that a thing is at +the same time A and not-A, or when it can be shown that a thing is +neither A nor not-A. The first mode of proof is called _antinomy_, the +second, _dilemma_." + +In this representation of the logical proof much is said of the "thing," +for instance this: A thing cannot be at the same time straight and +crooked, true and untrue, light and dark. The excellence of this +doctrine is easily apparent, because it is overlooked that the concept +"thing" is not a fixed, but a variable one. If a straight line is a +thing, and a crooked line another thing, and if these two things are +held to be opposed to one another, then the above logic is the most +justified in the world. But who claims that there are not many straight +lines which are crooked at one end, which run straight on for a certain +distance and then turn? Who will define to us what a line is? A line may +be composed of 10, 20, 30, etc., parts, and each part is a line. + +Before anything to the point can be said about the logical laws, it is +necessary to say above all how it stands with the relation of the whole +to its parts, of the universe to its subdivisions. The old theological +question of God and his creatures, the old metaphysical question of the +unity and the multiplicity, of truth and its phenomena, reason and +consequence, etc., in one word, the question of metaphysical categories +must be solved and settled before the definition of the minor factors of +understanding, the questions of formal logic, can be attempted. + +What is a "thing?" A clergyman would answer: Only God is something, +everything else is nothing! And we say: Only the universe is something, +and everything in it consists of vacillating, changing, precarious, +varicolored, fluid, variable phenomena or relativities. + +In our times, up to which the theologians have speculated so much and +contributed so little to understanding, one can hardly touch on the God +concept without annoying the reader. Yet it is very essential for a +thorough understanding of the human mind to point out that the God +concept and the universe concept are analogous concepts. Not in vain +have the first minds of modern philosophy, such as Cartesius, Spinoza, +Leibniz, occupied themselves so closely with the God concept. They +invented the socalled ontological proof of the existence of God. This +proof if applied to the universe, testifies to its divinity. A +metaphysical cloud pusher as well as the physical cosmos are +fundamentally concepts of the most perfect being. It makes little +difference whether we say that the concept of the universe, or of the +cosmos, or of the most perfect being is innate in man. If this concept +were not existing, it would lack the main thing required for its +perfection. Hence the most perfect being must exist. And it does. It is +the universe, and everything belongs to its existence. Nothing is +excluded from it, least of all understanding. The latter is, therefore, +not only possible, but a fact, which is proven by the very concept of +the most perfect being. + +This ought to be sufficient to help us over the doubts of the critics, +especially over Kantian criticism, or rather dualism. Kant did not care +to accept the dogma of the possibility of understanding without +examination; he wished to investigate first. He then discovered that we +may understand correctly, provided we remain with our understanding on +the field of common experience; in other words, in the physical +universe, and refrain from digressing into the metaphysical heaven. But +he did not understand that the metaphysical heaven against which he +warns us would be an obsolete standpoint in our days. + +He still permits that transcendental possibility to remain and while he +warns us not to stray into it with our understanding he omits to tell us +to also keep away from it with our intuition. Kant struggles about +between the "thing as phenomenon" and the "thing itself." The former is +material and may be understood, the latter is supernatural and may be +believed or divined. With this doctrine, he again made understanding, +the object of modern philosophy, problematical, thus inviting us to +investigate further. + +This we have done, and it is now the positive outcome of philosophy to +know clearly and definitely and understand that understanding is not +only a part of this world of phenomena, but a true part of the general +truth, beside which there is no other truth, and which is the most +perfect being. + +Philosophy took its departure from confused wrangling about that which +is and that which is not, especially from the religious disappointments +met by the Greek nation when its world of deities dissolved into +phantasms. Humanity demands a positive, strong, unequivocal, reliable +understanding. Now, in this world of ours, the solid is so mixed with +the fluid, the imperishable with the perishable, that a total separation +is impossible. Nevertheless our intellect catches itself continually +making separations and distinctions. Should not that appear mysterious +to it? The necessary and natural result was the problem of the theory of +understanding, the special question of philosophy: Which is the way to +an indubitably clear and positive understanding? + +The summit of Grecian philosophy bears the name of Aristotle. He was a +practical man who did not like to stray into the distance when he could +find good things near by, and he did not concern himself about the +descent of understanding. Its platonic origin from an ideal world went +instinctively against his grain. He, therefore, took hold of the +question at the nearest end and analyzed the positive knowledge +available at that time. But since Grecian science and the knowledge of +Aristotlean times were rather slim, his attempt to demonstrate logic +did not produce any decisive results. But it had been discovered that it +was possible to make positive deductions from fixed premises. + +Aristotle clung to this. He showed clearly and definitely, excellently +and substantially, how logical deductions should be made in order to +arrive at positive understanding. All dogs are watchful. My pug-dog is a +dog, therefore it is watchful. What can be more evident? Why, then, +speculate about God, freedom, and immortality, when indubitable +knowledge may be obtained by the formal method of exact deductions? + +But Aristotle had overlooked something, or, being a practical man, +perhaps overlooked it intentionally. The premise from which he deducted +the watchfulness of dogs in general, was handed down by tradition and +had been accepted on faith. But was it founded on fact? Could there not +be some dogs who lacked the quality of watchfulness, and might not our +pug-dog be very unreliable, in spite of all exact deductions? In the +case of the pug-dog this would not be of very great moment. But what +about the question of the beginning and end of the world, or the +question of the existence of God? The Grecian gods had been outgrown by +Aristotle. + +The history of logic, and of philosophy in general, is interrupted by +Christianity and by the decline of the antique world, until the +reformation opens a new era. The Catholic church had, in its own way, +thoroughly settled the great questions of the true nature of things, of +beginning and end, reason and consequence. But when it, and with it +Christianity, began to disintegrate, disbelief once more posed in the +brains of the philosophers the old question: How do we obtain reliable +and true understanding? Reliability and truth were at that time still +identical. + +Bacon and Descartes are the men who started the investigation. Both of +them were disgusted with Aristotle and with his formal logic, +particularly with the subtleties of scholasticism. It did not satisfy +this new epoch to found positive understanding on traditional +contentions and exact deductions therefrom. It is a radical epoch and, +therefore, epoch-making. The new philosophers have the aim of +unequivocal understanding in common with the ancient philosophers. Bacon +still connects himself with the stock in trade of the past. His +historian says of him that one should not reiterate that Bacon took his +departure from experience, for this means nothing or nothing more than +that Columbus was a mariner while the main thing is that he discovered +America.... He wanted to find a new logic corresponding to the new +life.... The inventive human mind has created the new time, the compass, +the powder, the art of typography.... He wanted a new logic which +corresponded to the spirit of invention. He, the philosopher of +invention, was Lord Chancellor of England, was a man of the world. Not +only himself, but also his science, was too ambitious, too full of +energy, too world-embracing, for him to bury himself in solitude. That +is a glory for a philosopher, but at the same time an obstacle for his +special task, for the new logic. He recognized the import of his task +only in its general outlines. But his contemporary and successor +Descartes approached the matter more radically and pointedly. + +Although in recent times the human mind had demonstrated its positive +faculty of understanding in natural sciences, especially by inventions, +still it was prejudiced by religious improbabilities in its great +premises dealing with the essence of things and men, with the "good, +true, and beautiful," as the ancients called it. In order to end his +doubts, Descartes elevates radical doubt to the position of a principle +and of a starting point for all understanding. Then he cannot doubt that +he is at least searching for truth. He who does not believe in any +understanding, any science, any inventions, cannot doubt at all events +that the impulse for understanding is there. It, at least, is +undeniable. _Cogito, ergo sum_--I think, therefore I am--that is a +premise which cannot be shaken. The rest, thinks Descartes, may be +deducted by Aristotlean methods. + +With this thought, the philosopher of modern times relapsed into the old +error that anything positively true could be ascertained with logical +formulas. His consciousness of the thoughts stirring in his brain, I +might say his flesh and blood, convinced him by matter-of-fact evidence +of the reality of their existence. + +This fact had hitherto been misunderstood. It is claimed that Descartes +could convince himself only of the existence of his soul, of his +thought, by evidence. No, my feeling, my sight, my hearing, etc., are +just as evident to me as my thinking, and simultaneously with sight and +hearing that which is heard and seen. The separation of subject and +object can and must be merely a formality. + +The Descartian thesis has been distorted into the statement that nothing +is evident to man but his own subjective conception. And the ideology +has been carried to the extreme of calling the whole world an idea, a +phantasmagoria. True, Descartes needed God in order to be sure that his +conceptions did not cheat him. + +In order to prove that we no longer need such extravagant means in our +times, I shall devote another chapter to this subject. + + + + +XIV + +CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DOUBTFUL AND +EVIDENT UNDERSTANDING + + +Let us divide the history of civilization into two periods. In the +first, the less civilized period, the doubtful perceptions predominate, +in the second period the evident ones. Our special investigation of the +correct way of evident understanding began in the first period in which +the doubtful perceptions, commonly called errors, predominated. In this +period, the gods rule in heaven and imagination on earth. + +To get rid of errors meant originally to lose gods and heaven. The ideal +world was the cause of metaphysics. Metaphysics which drew the +investigation of the supernatural into the circle of its activity, did +so for the purpose of enlightening the human mind. Thus its problem was +from the outset of a twofold nature. It desires to throw light on the +natural process of thought, which was temporarily unbalanced by a bent +for the supernatural, and for this reason it first loses itself in the +clouds. + +While human reason has now become soberer, the meaning of the term +"metaphysics" has also been sobered down. Our contemporaneous +metaphysicians speak no longer of such transcendental things as the +ancients did. Present day metaphysics occupies itself with such abstract +ideas as the thing and nothing, being and coming into being, matter and +force, truth and error. + +Particularly the investigation of doubtful, erroneous, and evident or +true understanding, which we here discuss, is a part of metaphysics. + +The term metaphysics, then, has a double meaning, one of them +transcendental and extravagant, the other natural and within sober +limits. Our sober task of demonstrating the positive outcome of +philosophy that acquired sober methods in dealing with understanding +also compels us to face transcendental metaphysics, which sobers down in +the course of time and develops into its opposite, into pure, bare, +naked physics. + +The divine has become human, the transcendental sober, and so +understanding grows ever more unequivocal and evident in the progress of +history. + +In order to become clear on the problem of understanding, we must cease +to turn our eyes to any one individual opinion, thought, knowledge, or +perception. We must rather consider the process of understanding in its +entirety. We then notice the development from doubt to evidence, from +errors to true understanding. At the same time we become aware how +unwise it was to entertain such an exaggerated idea of the contrast +between truth and error. + +Whoever searches for true and evident understanding will not find it in +Jerusalem, nor in Jericho, nor in the spirit; not in any single thing, +but in the universe. There the known emerges from the unknown so +gradually that no beginning can be traced. Understanding comes into +being and grows, is partly erroneous and partly accurate, becomes more +and more evident. But there is never an absolutely true understanding +any more than there can be an absolutely faulty one. Only the universe, +but not any single thing, is absolute, imperishable, and impregnable. + +In order to accurately define understanding, we must separate it from +misunderstanding, but not too far, not excessively, otherwise the thing +becomes extravagant. The limited formal logic teaches, indeed, that the +same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, affirmation +and denial being contradictions. But such a logic is very narrow. Herbs +are not weeds. Weeds are the negation of herbs, and still weeds are +herbs. An erroneous understanding is a negation of a true understanding, +error is not truth, and still it exists in truth. There is no absolute +error any more than perceptions are the truth itself. All perceptions +are and remain nothing but symbols or reflections of truth. + +We do not wish to confound error with truth and make a stew of them, but +rather understand them both. The mixing is done by the man who opposes +them as irreconcilable contradictions. Let us first note the mistake +committed in so doing. By so opposing error and truth something is done +which is not intended, not known. The intention is to confront the +erroneous understanding with truth. For this purpose, error is assumed +to be the same as erroneous understanding, which may be admitted; but +true understanding and truth are two different things and must be kept +separate, if we wish to arrive at clear and unmistakable results. If we +formulate the question in this way: How do erroneous and true +understanding differ, we are nearer to the desired clarity by two solar +distances. We then find that error and understanding do not exclude one +another, but are two species of the same genus, two individuals of the +same family. + +Two times two is not alone four; this is only a part of the truth; it is +also four times one, or eight times one-half, or one plus three, or +sixteen times one-quarter, etc. The man who first observed that the sun +circled around the earth once a day, committed a mistake, yet he made a +true perception. The apparent circulation of the sun in twenty-four +hours around the earth is a substantial part of the understanding which +illumines the relation of the motion of the sun and of the earth. No +truth is merely simple, but it is at the same time composed of an +infinite number of partial truths. The semblance must not be +contradictorily separated from truth, in an extravagant sense, but is +part of truth, just as all errors contribute toward true understanding. +In so far as all perceptions are limited, they are errors, partial +truths. True understanding requires above all the backing of the +conscious recognition that it is a limited part of the unlimited +universe. + +The cosmic relation of the whole to its parts, of the general to the +special, must be considered in order to get a clear conception of the +nature of the human understanding. + +Understanding or knowledge, thinking, perceiving, reasoning, must, for +the purpose of investigation, not be excessively separated from other +phenomena. In a way, every object which is chosen for special study is +isolated. In saying, "in a way," I mean that the separation of the +objects of study from other world objects must be consciously moderate, +not exaggerated. The separation of the intellect from other objects or +subjects when investigating them, must be accompanied by the recognition +that such a separation is not excessive, but only formal. In separating +a board, for the purpose of studying its condition, from other boards or +things and finding that it is black, I must still remember that this +board is black only on account of its interdependence with the whole +world process; that the blackness which it possesses is not of its own +making, but that light, and eyes, and the whole cosmic connection belong +to it. In this way every special perception becomes a proportionate part +in the chain of universal perceptions, and this again a proportionate +part of the universal life. + +That this evident universal life is not a mere semblance, not a ghost, +not a baseless imagination, but the truth, is made evident to the +thinking man by his consciousness, reason, common sense. True, he has +been deceived by them, sometimes. But it requires no logic, no +syllogistic proof, to know that they are telling the truth in this +respect. + +It is nevertheless important to give this proof, because by it the +peculiar nature of our intellect is revealed, of the object the study of +which is the special concern of philosophy. + +This proof, that the universe is the universal truth, was first +attempted by philosophy in an indirect way, by casting about in vain for +a metaphysical truth. + +The philosopher Kant was no doubt the thinker who confined the use of +understanding most strictly to the domain of experience. Now, if we +recognize that this field is universal, we become aware that the assumed +Kantian limitation is not a limitation at all. The human mind is a +universal instrument, the special productions of which all belong to +general truth. Though we make a distinction between the doubtful and the +positive, the outcome of philosophy teaches us that it must be no +excessive distinction, but must be backed up by the consciousness that +all evidence is composed of probabilities, of phenomena of truth, of +parts of truth. + +The thinking understanding--this is the result of philosophy--is no more +evident than anything else and derives its existence not from itself, +but from the universal life. This universal life from which thought +derives its perceptions, from which understanding derives its +enlightenment, does not only exist as a general thing, but also in the +form of infinitely varied individualities. And generalization, the +relation of things, their number and extension, are no more, and no +less, infinite than individualization and specialization. Every tree in +the forest, every grain of a pile of sand, are individual, separate, +distinct. Every particle of every grain of sand is distinctly +individual. And the infinite individualization of nature goes so far +that, just as the human individual is different every day, every hour, +every moment, so is the individual grain of sand, even though its +transformations were not to become noticeable until after thousands of +years, by accumulated changes. By classifying this contradictory, +infinitely general and infinitely individual nature in groups according +to time and space, in classes, genera, families, species, orders, and +other subdivisions, we are discerning and understanding. + +In the universe, every group is an individual and every individual is a +group. The uniformity of nature is not greater than its variety. Both of +them are infinite. We distinguish between time and space. Every moment +is composed of little moments. The smallest division of time cannot be +denominated any more than the largest, just because there is no smallest +and no largest in the universe, neither in time nor in space. Atoms are +groups. As smallest parts they exist only in our thoughts and thus give +excellent service in chemistry. The consciousness that they are not +tangible, but only mental things, does not detract from their +usefulness, but heightens it still more. + +It is the nature of human intelligence to divide, classify, group. We +divide the world into four cardinal points; we also divide it into two +kingdoms, the kingdom of the mind and the kingdom of nature; the latter +we again subdivide into the organic and the inorganic, or perhaps into +the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. In short, science seeks to +illumine the universe by division. The question then arises: Which is +the genuine and true division? Where does the variety of science, its +undecided vacillation end, and when does understanding become stable? + +The reader should remember that the things, the objects of +understanding, are not fixed, but also variable objects, and that the +whole universe is moving, progressing; that especially the human mind +becomes more and more affluent from century to century, from year to +year, and that for this reason science is not alone compelled to fix +things, but also to remain in flow. The fixed and the fluid are not so +widely separated in science any more, that the evidence could not be +evident and yet at the same time a little doubtful. + +Man and his understanding are progressive, and for this reason he must +progress by experience in his classifications, conceptions, and +sciences. + +The fixed, impregnable, socalled apodictical facts are nothing but +tautologies, if seen at close range. After it has become common usage to +call only heavy and tangible things bodies, it is an apodictical fact +that all bodies are heavy and tangible. If the conceptions of vapor, +water and ice are restricted by common usage and by science to the three +stages of aggregation of the same substance, then we need not wonder at +our firm assurance that the water will always remain fluid in all time +to come, also above the stars. This signifies nothing more than that we +conceive of the things as solid which we call solid, and of those as +fluid which we call fluid, but it does not change the fact that our +faculty of understanding or perceiving gives us only an approximate +picture of natural processes, in which the solid and the fluid are +neither wholly opposed nor different, but where the positive and the +negative gradually flow into one another. + +The philosophers produced a very good conception of understanding by +developing the concept of truth step by step and finally coming to quite +exact results. But this "quite exact" must only be accepted in a +reasonable sense, not in an extravagant one. Truth as the infinite, as +the sum total of all things and qualities, is "in itself" quite right, +but it cannot be accurately reproduced, not even by means of the mind, +of reason, or understanding. The means is smaller than the purpose, is +subordinate to purpose. So is our faculty of understanding only a +subordinate servant of truth, of the universe. The latter is absolutely +evident, true, indubitable, and positive. It does not vitiate the +sublimity of this world in the least that it is veiled by appearances, +by error, by untruth. On the contrary. Without sin there is no virtue, +and without error there is no understanding, no truth. The negative, the +weakness, the sin and error, are overcome, and thereby truth shines in +full splendor. The universe, the general truth, is a progressive thing. +It is absolute, but not at any fixed time or place, but only in the +combined unity of all time and space. + +It is sometimes said that this is too much for our intellect, that we +cannot understand this. It is true that we cannot squeeze this into any +of our categories, of our fundamental conceptions, unless we place the +category of illimited and indeterminable and infinite truth at the +beginning of them. If that is not quite clear and plain, it should +serve to teach us that the category of clear and plain human +understanding is destined to recognize its function as a subordinate +factor of nature. + +Such an understanding of understanding, such a higher consciousness +standing ever behind us, promotes a meek pride or a proud meekness which +is well distinguished from the mental poverty of theologians, from the +transcendental distinction between God and the world, between creator +and creature. To us the perishable soul is not a narrow-minded servant +for whom the plans of the imperishable monster soul are +incomprehensible. A philosophically educated and self-understanding mind +is a part of absolute nature. This mind is not only a limited human +mind, but the mind of the infinite eternal, omnipotent universe from +which it derived the faculty of knowing everything knowable. But when +this mind demands the ability to absolutely know everything, it demands +that knowledge should be everything, it becomes transcendental and +insolent, it misconceives the relation of science to infinity. The +latter is more than science, it is the object of science. + + + + +XV + +CONCLUSION + + +The philosopher Herbart declares: "If the meaning of a word were +determined by the use to which it is put by this or that person, then +the term _metaphysics_ would be ambiguous and scarcely comprehensible. +If one wishes to know what meaning of this term has been handed down to +us by tradition, he should read the ancient metaphysicians and their +followers, from Aristotle to Wolff and his school. It will then be found +that the concepts of being, of its quality, of cause and effect, of +space and time, have been the objects of this science everywhere ... +that it has been attempted to analyze them logically and that this has +led to all sorts of disputes. These disputes ... determined the concept +of metaphysics." + +Such a declaration is right enough to furnish, by the help of a little +criticism on our part, a sketch of the positive outcome of philosophy. + +Metaphysics has always been the principal part of philosophy. In the +first sentence of his "Handbook for the Elements of Philosophy," Herbart +defines philosophy as the "analysis of ideas." According to this, +metaphysics would have to analyze the special ideas of being, etc. Now +it must be remembered that the idea of being is not so much a special +concept as the general idea which comprises all ideas and all things. +Everything belongs to being, and to understand that is too much for +metaphysics. Hence it came into difficulties. Now our authority has just +explained to us that the concept of metaphysics was not so much +determined by the work it accomplished as by disputes. It did not work, +but only made the logical attempt to analyze the concept of being. In so +doing it led to disputes and did not distinguish itself very much as a +science. The latter, Kant has told us in his preface to his "Critique of +Pure Reason," is recognized by its agreements, not by its disputes. + +The metaphysical disputes were overcome by philosophic science, which is +the study of ideas or understanding, by arriving at a clear and plain +theory of understanding, the demonstration of which I have here +attempted. + +The faculty of understanding had been transmitted to us by our +superstitious ancestors as a thing of another world. But the illusion of +another world is a metaphysical one and led to disputes about the idea +of being. + +The positive outcome of philosophy assures us and demonstrates that +there is only one world, that this world is the essence of all being, +that there are many modes of being, but that they all belong to the same +common nature. Thus philosophy has unified the concept of being and +overcome metaphysics and its disputes. + +Universal being has only one quality, the natural one of general +existence. At the same time this quality is the essence of all special +qualities. Just as the concept of herbs includes all herbs, even weeds, +so the concept of being comprises not only that which is, but also that +which is not, which was once upon a time and which will be in the +future. + +To free the concept of being from its metaphysical disputes, is a very +difficult thing for those who attribute an extravagant meaning to the +first principle of logic which says: "Any subject can have only one of +two radically different predicates, because it cannot be at the same +time A and not-A." + +All previous science of understanding has really revolved around this +statement. It is based on something plausible, but still more on +misunderstanding. Only when we have become aware of what has finally +been the outcome of the science of understanding, only when this +statement is backed up by the positive product of philosophy, does this +stubbornly maintained and much contested statement receive a lasting +value by its just modification. + +In the first place, a "subject" is not a fixed, but a variable concept. +In the last analysis, as we have sufficiently explained in this work, +there is only one sole universal subject which is nowhere radically +different. + +The first principle of the old and tried Aristotlean logic tells us that +a man, a subject, who is lame cannot move about with alacrity. But I +have a friend who was totally lame and who today jumps about briskly; +there is no contradiction in this. But if I tell another man about my +lame friend and in the course of my story have this lame subject all of +a sudden jumping over chairs and tables, then such a thing is +_inconceivable_ and I contradict myself. Such a contradiction is a +violation of all logic, but not because agility and lameness are totally +different predicates which cannot be attributed to the same subject, nor +because the contradiction cannot exist. Being is full of contradictions, +but they are not simultaneous or without mediation. A logical speech or +story must not forget to mediate. By mediation, all contradictions are +solved. And this is the outcome of philosophy. + +In discordant metaphysics, being and not being are irreconcilable and +mutually exclusive contradictions. Metaphysics is in doubt whether this +common existence is real or only apparent, or whether there is not +somewhere in a heaven above the clouds an entirely different life. But +philosophy is now fully aware that even the most fictitious being is so +positively real that any negation which appearances may attribute to it +is outclassed by affirmation to the utter discomfiture of the former. +Being and its affirmation is absolute, negation and not being are only +relative. Being is everywhere and always dominant, so that there is no +non-existence. Though we may say that this or that is nothing, yet we +must remain conscious that anything we may call nothing is still +something very positive. There cannot be any ignorance which does not at +least know a little. There is no evil which cannot be transformed into +good. The things that have been, will be, and are, all of them are. +There is no non-existence. It is at least a word, though it does not +convey any meaning. The world and our language are of so positive a +character that even a meaningless word still means something. Nothing +cannot be expressed. + +The superstition of another "true" world which floats above this world +of phenomena or is secretly hidden behind it has so vitiated logic that +it is now difficult to remove the discordant metaphysical "concept of +being" from the human mind. The belief in something absolutely different +will not easily disappear. It is especially difficult to demonstrate +that conceived things are of the same nature as real things, that both +of them really belong to true nature. + +Conceived things are pictures, real pictures, pictures of reality. All +the limbs of an imaginary dragon are copied from nature. Such creations +of imagination are distinguished from truths only by their fanciful +composition. To connect nature and human life according to the given +order, that is the whole function of understanding. Knowing, thinking, +understanding, explaining, has not, and cannot have, any other function +but that of describing the processes of experience by division or +classification. The famous scientist Haeckel may call this +contemptuously "museum zoology" and "herbarium botany," but he simply +shows that he has not grasped the secret of the intellect, but still +wonders at it in a metaphysical way, the same as his predecessors. + +What Darwin ascertained about the "origin of species" and about the +transitions and evolutions in organic life is a very valuable expansion +of museum zoology. Whoever expects anything else from the nature of +intellectual faculties, shows that he is not familiar with the outcome +of philosophy, that he has not emancipated himself from the vain +wondering and its accompanying edification, which the wonder of human +intelligence caused to primitive ignorance. + +Understanding has hitherto been in error about itself and was, +therefore, inadequately equipped for the task of giving a true account +of its relatives, of the phenomena of nature and life. Nevertheless it +has acquired training in the course of culture and has progressively +accomplished better things. Its errors have never been valueless, and +its truths will never be sufficient. That this is so, is not due to the +defective condition of our intelligence, but to the inexhaustibleness of +being, the indescribable wealth of nature. + +The self-conscious, philosophically trained understanding and +intelligence has now the means of knowing that the accuracy of all +investigation is limited, that for this reason all its future results +will be affected by error. But a science which is backed up by such an +enlightened understanding, is reconciled to its limitations and +transforms them into a hall of glory. Self-conscious limitation is aware +of its partnership in the absolute perfection of the universe. + +The self-conscious intellect improved by the positive product of +philosophy knows that it can understand, describe, the whole world in a +natural, sensible way. There is nothing that can resist it. But in the +sense of a transcendental metaphysics, our understanding is not worthy +of that name. In return, this metaphysics is pure vagary in the eyes of +critical reason. + +Taking its departure from fantastical ideals, from contradictions, +especially between being and not being, metaphysics has gradually +transformed itself in the course of civilization and become philosophy, +which in its turn has progressed step by step the same as all other +science. + +Philosophy was at first impelled by the nebulous desire for universal +world wisdom and has finally assumed the form of a lucid special +investigation of the theory of understanding. + +This theory is part, and the most essential part at that, of psychology +or the science of the soul. Modern psychologists have at least divined, +if not recognized, that the human soul is not a metaphysical thing, but +a phenomenon. Like Professor Haeckel, they also complain about the dead +classification in their specialty. The human soul is presented to them +as a multitude of _faculties_. There is the faculty of understanding, of +feeling, of perceiving, etc., without number and end. But how is life +infused into them? Where is the consistent connection? + +There is, for instance, the conception and feeling of beauty in the +human soul. The beautiful again is divided into the artistically +beautiful and the ethically beautiful, and each of these into other +subdivisions. There is beside the beautiful also the pretty, the +charming, the graceful, the dignified, the noble, the solemn, the +splendid, the pathetic, the touching. Psychology also treats of the +ridiculous, of the joke, the wit, the satire, the irony, the humor, of a +thousand subtleties and distinctions, the ideological separation of +which it attempts just as do botany, zoology, and every other science in +their field. + +To all of them, being is the object of study. What is the use of +metaphysics under these circumstances? Only because it had in mind a +different being, a transcendental one, could it induce Kant to sum up +all his studies in the question: How is metaphysics possible as a +science? + +It is the merit of philosophy to have demonstrated that metaphysics is +possible only as fantastical speculation. + +It is the business of metaphysics to treat being transcendentally. It is +the business of special sciences to classify being after the manner of +herbarium botany. Classical order is already present in the vegetable +kingdom, otherwise no specialist in botany could classify it. + +But the objective arrangement of the vegetable kingdom in infinitely +more multiform than the subjective arrangement of botany. The latter is +always excellent, if it corresponds to the scientific progress of its +period. Whoever is looking for absolute botany or psychology, or for any +other absolute science, misunderstands the universally natural character +of the absolute as well as the relative special character of the human +faculty of understanding. + +Philosophy familiar with its historical achievement understands being as +the infinite material of life and science which is taken up by the +special sciences and classified by them. It teaches the specialists to +remember throughout all their classifications according to departments +and concepts that all specialties are connected by life and not so +separated in life as they are in science, but that they are flowing and +passing into one another. + +Thus our science of understanding finally culminates in the rule: Thou +shalt sharply divide and subdivide and farther subdivide to the utmost +the universal concept, the concept of the universe, but thou shalt be +backed up by the consciousness that this mental classification is a +formality by which man seeks for the sake of his information to register +and to place his experience; thou shalt furthermore remain aware of thy +liberty to progressively improve the experience acquired by thyself in +the course of time, by modifying thy classification. + +Things are ideas, ideas are names, and things, ideas, and names are +subject to continuous perfection. + +Stable motion and mobile stability constitute the reconciling +contradiction which enables us to reconcile all contradictions. + + +THE END + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Positive Outcome of Philosophy, by +Joseph Dietzgen + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY *** + +***** This file should be named 39964-8.txt or 39964-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/9/9/6/39964/ + +Produced by Odessa Paige Turner, Martin Pettit and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at + www.gutenberg.org/license. + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 +North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email +contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the +Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/39964-8.zip b/39964-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7dd50b --- /dev/null +++ b/39964-8.zip diff --git a/39964-h.zip b/39964-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f408d7c --- /dev/null +++ b/39964-h.zip diff --git a/39964-h/39964-h.htm b/39964-h/39964-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..204bed6 --- /dev/null +++ b/39964-h/39964-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,12899 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Positive Outcome of Philosophy, by Joseph Dietzgen. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + + p.bold {text-align: center; font-weight: bold;} + p.bold2 {text-align: center; font-weight: bold; font-size: 150%;} + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + } + h1 span, h2 span { display: block; text-align: center; } + #id1 { font-size: smaller } + + hr { width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + + body{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + + hr.smler { width: 10%; } + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; padding: 5px; border-collapse: collapse; border: none; text-align: right;} + + .pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; + text-indent: 0px; + } /* page numbers */ + + .center {text-align: center;} + .smaller {font-size: smaller;} + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + .s2 {display: inline; margin-left: 2em;} + .right {text-align: right;} + .left {text-align: left;} + .tbrk {margin-bottom: 1em;} + .fnanchor { font-size: .8em; text-decoration: none;} + + .poem {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; text-align: left;} + .poem br {display: none;} + .poem .stanza {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + .poem div {display: block; margin: 0; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .poem div.i1 {display: block; margin-left: 1em;} + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +Project Gutenberg's The Positive Outcome of Philosophy, by Joseph Dietzgen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Positive Outcome of Philosophy + The Nature of Human Brain Work. Letters on Logic. + +Author: Joseph Dietzgen + +Translator: Ernst Unterman + +Release Date: June 10, 2012 [EBook #39964] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY *** + + + + +Produced by Odessa Paige Turner, Martin Pettit and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> + +<h1><span>THE POSITIVE OUTCOME<br />OF PHILOSOPHY<br /><br /><span class='smaller'>The Nature of Human Brain Work<br /> +Letters on Logic. The Positive<br />Outcome of Philosophy</span></span><br /> <span id="id1">BY</span> <span>JOSEPH DIETZGEN</span></h1> + +<p class="tbrk"> </p> + +<p class="bold"><i>TRANSLATED BY ERNEST UNTERMANN</i></p> + +<p class="tbrk"> </p> + +<p class="bold">WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY DR. ANTON PANNEKOEK<br />TRANSLATED BY ERNEST UNTERMANN</p> + +<hr class="smler" /> + +<p class="bold"><span class="smcap">Edited by Eugene Dietzgen and Joseph Dietzgen, Jr.</span></p> + +<hr class="smler" /> + +<p class="bold">CHICAGO<br />CHARLES H. KERR & COMPANY<br />1906</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Copyright 1906<br />By Eugene Dietzgen</span></p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>CONTENTS</span></h2> + +<hr class="smler" /> + +<table summary="CONTENTS"> + <tr> + <td colspan="2"></td> + <td><span class="smaller">PAGE</span></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="left"><span class="smcap">Introduction by Anton Pannekoek</span></td> + <td><a href="#Page_7">7</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="left"><span class="smcap">The Nature of Human Brain Work</span></td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Preface</td> + <td><a href="#Page_41">41</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">I. Introduction</td> + <td><a href="#Page_47">47</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">II. Pure Reason or the Faculty of Thought in General</td> + <td><a href="#Page_61">61</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">III. The Nature of Things</td> + <td><a href="#Page_80">80</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">IV. The Practice of Reason in Physical Science</td> + <td><a href="#Page_104">104</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span><i>a</i> Cause and Effect</td> + <td><a href="#Page_108">108</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span><i>b</i> Matter and Mind</td> + <td><a href="#Page_119">119</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span><i>c</i> Force and Matter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_124">124</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">V. "Practical Reason" or Morality</td> + <td><a href="#Page_133">133</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span><i>a</i> The Wise and Reasonable</td> + <td><a href="#Page_133">133</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span><i>b</i> Morality and Right</td> + <td><a href="#Page_143">143</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span><i>c</i> The Holy</td> + <td><a href="#Page_156">156</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="left"><span class="smcap">Letters on Logic</span></td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">First Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Second Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_181">181</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Third Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_186">186</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Fourth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_191">191</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Fifth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_198">198</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Sixth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_205">205</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Seventh Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_212">212</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Eighth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Ninth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_225">225</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Tenth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_230">230</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Eleventh Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_236">236</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Twelfth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_242">242</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Thirteenth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_248">248</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Fourteenth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_255">255</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Fifteenth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_260">260</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Sixteenth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_265">265</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Seventeenth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_271">271</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Eighteenth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_277">277</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a></span>Nineteenth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_283">283</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Twentieth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_289">289</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Twenty-first Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_296">296</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Twenty-second Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_301">301</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Twenty-third Letter (a)</td> + <td><a href="#Page_307">307</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Twenty-third Letter (b)</td> + <td><a href="#Page_312">312</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Twenty-fourth Letter</td> + <td><a href="#Page_318">318</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td colspan="2" class="left"><span class="smcap">The Positive Outcome of Philosophy</span></td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">Preface</td> + <td><a href="#Page_327">327</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">I. Positive Knowledge as a Special Object</td> + <td><a href="#Page_333">333</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">II. The Power of Perception Is Kin to the Universe</td> + <td><a href="#Page_337">337</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">III. As to How the Intellect Is Limited and Unlimited</td> + <td><a href="#Page_342">342</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">IV. The Universality of Nature</td> + <td><a href="#Page_348">348</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">V. The Understanding as a Part of the Human Soul</td> + <td><a href="#Page_354">354</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">VI. Consciousness Is Endowed With the Faculty of Knowing</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span>as Well as With the Feeling of the Universality</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span>of All Nature</td> + <td style="vertical-align: bottom"><a href="#Page_363">363</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">VII. The Relationship or Identity of Spirit and Nature</td> + <td><a href="#Page_369">369</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">VIII. Understanding Is Material</td> + <td><a href="#Page_376">376</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">IX. The Four Principles of Logic</td> + <td><a href="#Page_381">381</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">X. The Function of Understanding on the Religious Field</td> + <td><a href="#Page_393">393</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">XI. The Distinction Between Cause and Effect Is only</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span>One of the Means to Facilitate Understanding</td> + <td style="vertical-align: bottom"><a href="#Page_401">401</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">XII. Mind and Matter: Which Is Primary, Which Is</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span>Secondary?</td> + <td style="vertical-align: bottom"><a href="#Page_409">409</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">XIII. The Extent to Which the Doubts of the Possibility</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span>of Clear and Accurate Understanding Have Been</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span>Overcome</td> + <td style="vertical-align: bottom"><a href="#Page_418">418</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">XIV. Continuation of the Discussion on the Difference</td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left"><span class="s2"> </span>Between Doubtful and Evident Understanding</td> + <td style="vertical-align: bottom"><a href="#Page_428">428</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><span class="s2"> </span></td> + <td class="left">XV. Conclusion</td> + <td><a href="#Page_436">436</a></td> + </tr> +</table> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>INTRODUCTION</span></h2> + +<hr class="smler" /> + +<p class="bold">THE POSITION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF J. DIETZGEN'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS</p> + +<p class="bold">BY</p> + +<p class="bold"><span class="smcap">Dr. Anton Pannekoek</span></p> + +<p>In the history of philosophy we see before us the consecutive forms of +the thoughts of the ruling classes of society on life and on the world +at large. This class thought appears after the primitive communism has +given way to a society with class antagonisms, at a stage when the +wealth of the members of the ruling class gave them leisure time and +thus stimulated them to turn their attention to the productions of the +mind. The beginning of this thought is found in classic Greece. But it +assumed its clearest and best developed form when the modern bourgeoisie +had become the ruling class in capitalistic Europe and the thinkers gave +expression to the ideas of this class. The characteristic mark of these +ideas is dualism, that is to say the misunderstood contrast between +thinking and being, between nature and spirit, the result of the mental +unclearness of this class and of its incapacity to see the things of the +world in their true interconnection. This mental state is but the +expression of the division of mankind into classes and of the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span>uncomprehended nature of social production ever since it became a +production of goods for exchange.</p> + +<p>In times of primitive communism, the conditions of production were clear +and easily understood. Things were produced jointly for use and consumed +in common. Man was master of his mode of production and thus master of +his own fate as far as the superior forces of nature admitted it. Under +such conditions, social ideas could not help being simple and clear. +There being no clash between personal and social interests, men had no +conception of a deep chasm between good and bad. Only the uncontrolled +forces of nature stood like unintelligible and mysterious powers, that +appeared to them either as well meaning or as evil spirits, above these +primitive little societies.</p> + +<p>But with the advent of the production of commodities the picture +changes. Civilized humanity begins to feel itself somewhat relieved from +the hard and ungovernable pressure of fickle natural forces. But now new +demons arise out of social conditions. "No sooner did the producers give +their products away in exchange instead of consuming them as heretofore, +than they lost control of them. They no longer knew what became of their +products, and there was a possibility that these products might some day +be used for the exploitation and oppression of the producers—The +products rule the producers." (Engels) In the production of commodities, +it is not the purpose of the individual producer which is accomplished, +but rather that which the productive forces back of him are aiming at. +Man proposes, but a social power, stronger than himself, disposes; he is +no longer master of his fate. The inter-relations of production become +complicated and difficult to grasp. While it is true that the individual +is the producing unit, yet his individual labor is only a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span>subordinate +part of the whole process of social production, of which he remains a +tool. The fruits of the labor of many are enjoyed by a few individuals. +The social co-operation is concealed behind a violent competitive +struggle of the producers against one another. The interests of the +individuals are at war with those of society. Good, that is to say the +consideration of the common welfare, is opposed to bad, that is to say +the sacrifice of everything to private interests. The passions of men as +well as their mental gifts, after they have been aroused, developed, +trained, strengthened, and refined in this struggle, henceforth become +so many weapons which a superior power turns against their helpless +possessors.</p> + +<p>Such were the impressions out of which thinking men were obliged to +fashion their world-philosophy, while, at the same time, they were +members of the possessing classes and had thus an opportunity to employ +their leisure for a certain self-study, without, however, being in touch +with the source of their impressions, viz., the process of social labor +which alone could have enabled them to see through the social origin of +their ideas. Men of this class, therefore, were led to the assumption +that their ideas emanated from some supernatural and spiritual power or +that they were themselves independent supernatural powers. This dualist +metaphysical mode of thought has gone through various transformations in +the course of time, adapting itself to the evolution of production +beginning with ancient slavery, on through the serfdom of the Middle +Ages and of mediæval commodity production, to modern capitalism. These +successive changes of form are embodied in Grecian philosophy, in the +various phases of the Christian religion, and in the modern systems of +philosophy.</p> + +<p>But we must not regard these systems and religions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> for what they +generally pass, that is to say, we must not think them to be only +repeated unsuccessful attempts to formulate absolute truth. They are +merely the incarnations of progressive stages of better knowledge +acquired by the human mind about itself and about the universe. It was +the aim of philosophical thought to find satisfaction in understanding. +And as long as understanding could not wholly be gotten by natural +means, there remained always a field for the supernatural and +incomprehensible. But by the painstaking mental work of the deepest +thinkers, the material of science was ceaselessly increased, and the +field of the supernatural and incomprehensible was ever more narrowed. +And this is especially the case since the progress of capitalist +production has promoted the persistent study of nature. For through this +study the human mind was enabled to test its powers by simple, quiet, +persistent and fruitful labor in the search for successive parts of +truth; and thus to rid itself from the overirritation of hopeless quest +after absolute truth. The desire to ascertain the value of these new +truths gave rise to the problems of the theory of understanding. The +attempts to solve these problems form a permanent part of modern systems +of philosophy, which represent a graduated evolution of the theory of +understanding. But the supernatural element in these systems prevented +their perfection.</p> + +<p>Under the impulse of the technical requirements of capitalism, the +evolution of natural sciences became a triumphal march of the human +mind. Nature was subjugated first through the discovery of its laws by +the human mind, and then by the material subordination of the known +forces of nature to the human will in the service of our main object, +the production of the necessaries of life with a minimum expenditure of +energy. But this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> bright shining light rendered, by contrast, the gloom +which surrounded the phenomena of human society only the darker, and +capitalism in its development still accentuates this contrast, as it +accentuates and thus renders more easily visible and intelligible all +contrasts. While the natural sciences dispensed with all mysterious +secrecy within their narrower domain, the darkness shrouding the origin +of ideas still offered a welcome refuge to the belief in miracles on the +spiritual field.</p> + +<p>Capitalism is now approaching its decline. Socialism is near. And the +vital importance of this transition in human history cannot be stated +more strongly than in the words of Marx and Engels: "This concludes the +primary history of man. He thereby passes definitely out of the animal +kingdom." The social regulation of production makes man fully the master +of his own fate. No longer does any mysterious social power then thwart +his plans or jeopardise his success. Nor does any mysterious natural +force control him henceforth. He is no longer the slave, but the master +of nature. He has investigated its effects, understands them, and +presses them into his service. For the first time in his history he will +then be the ruler of the earth.</p> + +<p>We now see that the many centuries that filled the history of +civilization were a necessary preparation for socialism, a slow struggle +to escape from nature's slavery, a gradual increase of the productivity +of labor, up to the point where the necessaries of life for all may be +obtained almost without exertion. This is the prime merit of capitalism +and its justification, that after so many centuries of hardly +perceptible progress it taught man to conquer nature by a rapid assault. +At the same time it set loose the forces of production and finally +transformed and bared the springs of the productive process to such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> a +degree that they easily could be perceived and grasped by the human +mind; this was the indispensable condition for the control of this +process.</p> + +<p>As never since the first advent of production of commodities there has +been such a fundamental revolution, it must necessarily be accompanied +by an equally fundamental spiritual revolution. This economic revolution +is the conclusion of the long period of class antagonisms and of +production of commodities; it carries with it the end of the dualist and +supernatural thoughts arising from this source. The mystery of social +processes passes away with this period, and the spiritual expression of +these mysteries must necessarily disappear with it. The slow development +of human thought from ignorance to an ever increased understanding +thereby ends its first chapter. This signifies the completion and +conclusion of philosophy, which is equivalent to saying that philosophy +as such passes out of existence, while its place is taken by the science +of the human mind, a part of natural science.</p> + +<p>A new system of production sheds its light into the minds of men already +before it has fully materialized. The same science which teaches us to +understand and thereby to control the social forces, also unfetters the +mind from the bewitching effects of those forces. It enables him even +now already to emancipate himself from traditional superstitions and +ideas which were formerly the expression of things unknown. We may +anticipate with our mind the coming time. And thus the ideas which will +then dominate are already even now growing within us in a rudimentary +form corresponding to the present actual economic development. By this +means we are even now enabled to overcome the capitalist philosophy in +thought and to soberly and clearly grasp the matter-dependent nature of +our spirit.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p><p>The completion and the end of philosophy need not wait for the +realization of socialist production. The new understanding does not fall +from heaven like a meteor. It develops with the social-economic +development, first imperfectly and imperceptibly, in a few thinkers who +most strongly feel the breath of the approaching time. With the growth +of the science of sociology and with that of its practical application, +the socialist labor movement, the new understanding simultaneously +spreads and gains ground step by step, waging a relentless battle +against the traditional ideas to which the ruling classes are clinging. +This struggle is the mental companion of the social class struggle.</p> + +<p class="center">************</p> + +<p>The methods of the new natural science had already been practiced for a +few centuries before the new theory was formulated. It first found vent +in the expression of surprise at the great confidence with which men +assumed to predict certain phenomena and to point out their connections. +Our experience is limited to a few successive observations of the +regularity or coincidence of events. But we attribute to natural laws, +in which are expressed causal relations of phenomena, a general and +necessary applicability which far exceeds our experience. The English +thinker Hume was the first who clearly expressed and formulated the +question—since called the problem of causality—why men always act in +this manner. But as he believed the reason for such action should be +sought in the nature of experience alone, experience being the only +source of knowledge, and as he did not further investigate the special +and distinct part played by the nature of the human mind in this +experiential connection, he could not find any satisfactory answer.</p> + +<p>Kant, who made the first important step toward the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> solution of this +question, had been trained in the school of rationalism which then +dominated in Germany and which represented an adaptation of mediæval +scholasticism to the requirements of increased knowledge. Starting from +the thesis that things which are logical in the mind must be real in +nature, the rationalists formulated by mere deduction general truths +about god, infinity and immortality. Under the influence of Hume, Kant +became the critic of rationalism and thus the reformer of philosophy.</p> + +<p>The question, how it is that we have knowledge of generally applicable +laws in which we have implicit confidence—such as mathematical theses, +or the maxim that every change has a cause—was answered by Kant in this +way: Experience and science are as much conditioned on properties +inherent in the organization of our mind as on the impressions of the +outer world. The former properties must necessarily be contained in all +experience and science. Therefore everything dependent on this common +mental part of science must be perfectly certain and independent of +special sense impressions. Common to all experience, and inseparable +from it, are the pure sense-conceptions (reine Anschauungsformen), such +as space and time, while the many experiences, in order to succeed in +forming understanding and science, must be connected by the pure +mind-conceptions (reine Verstandesbegriffe), the so-called categories; +among the latter also belongs causality.</p> + +<p>Now Kant explains the necessity and general applicability of the pure +sense and mind conceptions by the fact that they arise from the +organization of our mind. Accordingly, the world appears to the senses +as a succession of phenomena in time and space. Our reason transforms +these phenomena into things which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> are welded into one aggregate nature +by laws of cause and effect. On the things as they really are in +themselves, in the opinion of Kant, these pure conceptions cannot be +applied. We know nothing of them and can neither perceive nor +reconstruct them by reason, because "in themselves" they are wholly +beyond reason and knowledge.</p> + +<p>The result of this investigation, which was the first valuable +contribution to a scientific theory of understanding and forms, from our +standpoint, the most important part of Kant's philosophy, served him +mainly as a means of answering the following questions: What is the +value of knowledge which exceeds experience? Can we, by mere deduction +through concepts which go beyond experience, arrive at truths? His +answer was: No, and it was a crushing blow to rationalism. We cannot +exceed the boundaries of experience. By experience alone can we arrive +at science. All supposed knowledge about the unlimited and infinite, +about concepts of pure reason, called Ideas by Kant, (as the soul, the +world, and God) is nothing but illusions. The contradictions in which +the human mind becomes involved whenever it applies the categories +outside of experience to such subjects, are manifested in the fruitless +strife between the philosophical systems. Metaphysics as a science is +impossible.</p> + +<p>This did not give the deathblow to rationalism alone, but also to +bourgeois materialism which reigned among the French radical thinkers. +Kant's researches refuted the negative as well as the positive +assertions anent the supernatural and infinite. This cleared the field +for faith, for intuitive conviction. God, freedom and immortality are +concepts the truth of which cannot be proved by reason, like the natural +truths derived from experience.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> But nevertheless their reality is no +less certain, only it is of a different nature, being subjective and, +therefore, necessarily a matter of personal conviction. The freedom of +the will, for instance, is not a knowledge gained by experience, because +experience never teaches us anything but lack of freedom and dependence +on the laws of nature. But nevertheless freedom of will is a necessary +conviction of every one who feels it in the categorical imperative: Thou +shalt! of every one possessed by a sense of duty and of the knowledge +that he can act accordingly: therefore freedom of will is +unconditionally certain and requires no proof by experience. And from +this premise there follows in same way the assurance of the immortality +of the soul and of the existence of God. It gives the same kind of +certainty to all ideas which were left in a state of uncertainty by the +critique of pure reason. At the same time freedom of will determines the +form of the theory of understanding. In the entire world of phenomena +there was no room for freedom, for these phenomena follow strict rules +of causality, as demanded by the organization of our mind. Therefore it +was necessary to make room for freedom of will somewhere else, and so +"things in themselves," hitherto a phrase without value and meaning, +assumed a higher importance. They were not bound to space, time or +categories, they were free: they formed so to say a second world, the +world of noumena, which stood behind the world of phenomena and which +solved the contradiction between the lawful dependence of things in +nature and between the personal conviction of freedom of will.</p> + +<p>These opinions and reasonings were fully in accord with the conditions +of science and the economic development of Kant's time. The field of +nature was left<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> entirely to the inductive method of science which based +itself on strictly materialist experience and observation, classifying +things systematically in their causal order and excluding all +supernatural interference. But while faith was banished from the natural +sciences forever, it could not be dispensed with. The ignorance as to +the origin of the human will left room for a supernatural ethic. The +attempts of the materialists to exclude the supernatural also from this +field failed. The time had not come as yet for a materialist and natural +ethics, for science was not yet able to demonstrate as an indisputable +truth, founded on experience, in what manner ethical codes and moral +ideas in general had a material origin.</p> + +<p>This state of things shows that the Kantian philosophy is the purest +expression of bourgeois thought, and this is still more emphasized by +the fact that freedom is the center of his system and controls it. +Rising capitalism required freedom for the producers of commodities in +order to expand its productive forces, it required freedom of +competition and freedom of unlimited exploitation. The producers of +commodities should be free from all fetters and restrictions, and +unhampered by any coercion, in order that they could go, under the sole +direction of their own intelligence, into free competition with their +fellow citizens. For this reason, freedom became the slogan of the young +bourgeoisie aspiring to political power, and Kant's doctrine of the free +will, the basis of his ethics, was the echo of the approaching French +Revolution. But freedom was not absolute; it was to be dependent on the +moral law. It was not to be used in the quest for happiness, but in +accord with the moral law, in the service of duty. If the bourgeois +society was to exist, the private interest of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span>individual must not +be paramount, the welfare of the entire class had to be superior to that +of the individual, and the commandments of this class had to be +recognized as moral laws taking precedence over the quest for happiness. +But for this very reason, these moral laws could never be fully obeyed, +and every one found himself compelled to violate them in his own +interest. Hence the moral law existed only as a code which could never +be fulfilled. And so it stood outside of experience.</p> + +<p>In Kant's ethics the internal antagonism of bourgeois society is +reflected, that antagonism which is the compelling force of the ever +increasing economic development. The foundation of this antagonism is +the antagonism, already mentioned, between the individual and social +character of production that gives rise to omnipotent, but unconceived +social forces ruling the destiny of man. In capitalistic production it +is still intensified by the antithesis of the wealthy ruling class and +the poor producing class that is continuously augmented by those who are +expropriated by competition. This antagonism gives rise to the +contradiction between the aims of men and the results achieved, between +the desire of happiness and the misery of the great mass. It is the +basis of the contradiction between virtue and vice, between freedom and +dependence, between faith and science, between phenomenon and "thing +itself." It is at the bottom of all contradictions and of the entire +pronounced dualism of the Kantian philosophy. These contradictions are +to blame for the downfall of the system, and the work of disintegration +was unavoidable from the moment that the contradictions of the bourgeois +production became apparent, that is to say immediately after the +political victory of the bourgeoisie. The system of Kant could, however, +not be overcome,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> unless the material origin of morality could be +uncovered. Then these contradictions could be understood and solved by +showing that they were relative and not absolute as they appeared. And +not until then could a materialist ethics, a science of morality, drive +faith from its last retreat. This was at last accomplished by the +discovery of social class struggles and of the nature of capitalist +production, by the pioneer work of Karl Marx.</p> + +<p>The practice of developed capitalism about the middle of the 19th +century directly challenged proletarian thinkers to criticise Kant's +doctrine of practical reason. Bourgeois ethics and freedom manifested +themselves in the form of freedom of exploitation in the interest of the +bourgeoisie, as slavery for the working class. The maintenance of human +dignity appeared in reality as the brutalization and degradation of the +proletarians, and the state founded on justice proved to be nothing but +the class state of the bourgeoisie. And so it was seen that Kant's +sublime ethics, instead of being the basis in all eternity of human +activity in general, was merely the expression of the narrow class +interests of the bourgeoisie. This proletarian criticism was the first +material for a general theory, and once it had been stated, its +correctness was demonstrated more and more by the study of previous +historical events, and these events were thereby shown in their proper +light. It was then understood by this theory that the social classes, +distinguished by their position in the process of production, had +different and antagonistic economic interests, and that each class did +necessarily regard its own interest as good and sacred. These general +class interests were not recognized in their true character but appeared +to men in the guise of superior moral motives; in this form they crowded +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> special individual interests into the background, and since the +class interests were generally felt, all the members of the same class +recognized them. Moreover, a ruling class could temporarily compel a +defeated or suppressed class to recognize the class interests of the +rulers as a moral law, so long as the inevitability of the mode of +production in which that class ruled was acknowledged. Owing to the fact +that the nature and significance of the productive process was not +understood, the origin of human motives could not be discovered. They +were not traced back to experience, but simply felt directly and +intuitively. And consequently they were thought to be of a supernatural +origin and eternal duration.</p> + +<p>Not only the moral codes, but also other products of the human mind, +such as religion, science, arts, philosophy, were then understood to be +intimately connected with the actual material conditions of society. The +human mind is influenced in all its products by the entire world outside +of it. And thus the mind is seen to be a part of nature, and the science +of the mind becomes a natural science. The impressions of the outer +world determine the experience of man, his wants determine his will, and +his general wants his moral will. The world around him determines man's +wants and impressions, but these, on the other hand, determine his will +and activity by which he changes the world; this will-directed activity +appears in the process of social production. In this manner man by his +work is a part, a link in the great chain of natural and social +development.</p> + +<p>This conception overturns the foundations of philosophy. Since the human +mind is seen now to be a part of nature and interacts with the rest of +the world according to laws which are more or less known, it is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> classed +among Kant's phenomena. There is no longer any need of talking about +noumena. Thus they do not longer exist for us. Philosophy then reduces +itself to the theory of experience, to the science of the human mind. It +is at this point that the beginning made by Kant had to be farther +developed. Kant had always separated mind and nature very sharply. But +the understanding that this separation should only be made temporarily +for the purpose of better investigation, and that there is no absolute +difference between matter and mind made it possible to advance the +science of thought processes. However, this could be accomplished only +by a thinker who had fully digested the teachings of socialism. This +problem was solved by Joseph Dietzgen in his work on "THE NATURE OF +HUMAN BRAIN WORK," the first edition of which appeared in 1869, and by +this work he won for himself the name of philosopher of the proletariat. +This problem could be solved only by the help of the dialectic method. +Therefore, the idealist philosophical systems from Kant to Hegel which +consist chiefly in the development of the dialectic method, must be +regarded as the indispensable pioneers and precursors of Dietzgen's +proletarian philosophy.</p> + +<p class="center">************</p> + +<p>The philosophy of Kant necessarily broke down on account of its dualism. +It had shown that there is safety only in finite and material +experience, and that the mind becomes involved in contradictions +whenever it ventures beyond that line. The mind's reason calls for +absolute truth which cannot be gotten. Hence the mind is groping in the +dark and critique may perhaps explain why it is in the dark, but it +cannot show the way out. What is called with Kant dialectics is in +reality resignation. True, the mind finds knowledge about things outside +of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span>experience by some other way, viz., by means of its moral +consciousness, but this intuitive knowledge in the form of faith remains +sharply separated from scientific understanding. It was the task of the +philosophical development immediately after Kant, to do away with this +sharp separation, this unreconciled contradiction. This development +ended with Hegel; its result was the understanding that contradiction is +the true nature of everything. But this contradiction cannot be left to +stand undisturbed, it must be solved and still retained in a higher +form, and thus be reconciled. Therefore the world of phenomena cannot be +understood as being at rest. It can be understood only as a thing in +motion, as activity, as a continuous change. Action is always the +reconciliation of contradiction in some higher form, and contradiction +appears in this way as the lever of progressive development. That which +accomplishes this dialectic self-development does not appear in the +idealistic systems as the material world itself, but as the spiritual, +the idea. In Hegel's philosophy, this conception assumes the form of a +comprehensive system outlining the self-development of the Absolute +which is spiritual and is identical with God. The development of this +Absolute takes place in three stages; in its primitive pure spiritual +form it develops out of its undifferentiated being the conceptions of +logic; then it expresses itself in another, an external form, opposite +to itself, as Nature. In nature all forms develop by way of +contradictions which are eliminated by the development of some higher +form. Finally the Absolute awakens to consciousness in nature in the +form of the human mind and reaches thus its third stage, at which the +opposite elements, matter and spirit, are reconciled into a unity. The +human mind evolves in the same way to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> ever higher stages, until it +arrives, at the end of its development by understanding itself, that is +to say, by knowing intuitively the Absolute. This is what happens +unconsciously in religion. Religion, which in the form of faith must be +satisfied with a modest corner in the system of Kant, appears in the +system of Hegel very proudly as a higher sort of understanding superior +to all other knowledge, as an intuitive knowledge of absolute truth +(God). In philosophy this is done consciously. And the historical +development which finds its conclusion and climax in the Hegelian +philosophy corresponds to the logical development of the human mind.</p> + +<p>Thus Hegel unites all sciences and all parts of the world into one +masterly system in which the revolutionary dialectics, the theory of +evolution, that considers all finite things as perishable and +transitory, is given a conservative conclusion by putting an end to all +further development when the absolute truth is reached. All the +knowledge of that period was assigned to its place somewhere in this +system, on one of the steps of the dialectic development. Many of the +conceptions of the natural sciences of that day, which later on were +found to be erroneous, are there presented as necessary truths resting +on deduction, not on experience. This could give the impression that the +Hegelian philosophy made empirical research superfluous as a source of +concrete truths. This appearance is to blame for the slight recognition +of Hegel among naturalists; in natural sciences, this philosophy +therefore has won much less importance than it deserved and than it +might have won, if its actual significance, which consists in the +harmonious connection between widely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> separated events and sciences, had +been better understood under its deceptive guise.</p> + +<p>On the abstract sciences the influence of Hegel was greater, and here he +held an exceptionally prominent position in the scientific world of that +time. On one hand, his conception of history as a progressive evolution +in which every imperfect previous condition is regarded as a necessary +phase and preparation for subsequent conditions and thus appears natural +and reasonable, was a great gain for science. On the other hand, his +statements on the philosophy of law and religion met the requirements +and conceptions of his time. In his philosophy of law, the human mind is +taken in that stage in which it steps into reality, having as its +principal characteristic a free will. It is first considered as a single +individual which finds its freedom incorporated in its property. This +personality enters into relations with others like it. Its freedom of +will is thereby expressed in moral laws. By combining all individuals +into one aggregate whole, their contradictory relations are merged into +the social units, viz., the family, the bourgeois society (bürgerliche +Gesellschaft) and the state. There the moral rules are carried from the +inner to the outer reality. As the expressions of a superior, common and +more general will, they stand forth in the generally accepted moral +codes, in the natural laws of bourgeois society and in the authoritative +laws of the state. In the state, the highest form of which is the +monarchy, the mind finds itself at its highest stage of objective +realization as the idea of the state.</p> + +<p>The reactionary character of Hegelian philosophy is not merely a +superficial appearance that rests on the glorification of state and +royalty, thanks to which this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> philosophy was raised to the position of +Prussian state philosophy after the restauration. It was in its very +essence a product of reaction which in those days represented the only +possible advance after the revolution. This reaction was the first +practical critique of bourgeois society. After this society had been +firmly established, the relative amenities of the old time appeared in a +better light, because the shortcomings of the new society made +themselves soon felt. The bourgeoisie had recoiled before the +consequences of its revolution, when it recognized that the proletariat +was its barrier. It arrested the revolution as soon as its bourgeois +aims had been accomplished, and it was willing to acknowledge again the +mastery of the feudal state and monarchy, provided they would protect it +and serve its interests. The feudal powers that previously had been +overcome by the weight of their own sins and by the unconditional +superiority of the new social order, again lifted their heads when the +new order in its turn gave cause for well founded criticisms. But they +could not keep the revolution in check, unless they recognized it in a +limited degree. They could once more rule over the bourgeoisie, provided +they compromised with it so far as it was inevitable. They could no +longer prevail against capitalism, but they could govern for it. Thus, +by their rule, the imperfectness of capitalism was revealed.</p> + +<p>The theory of restauration, therefore, had to consist first of all of a +thorough critique of the revolutionary bourgeois philosophy. But this +philosophy could not be thrown aside entirely. So far as a critique of +the old order was concerned, the truth of bourgeois philosophy had to be +admitted. On the other<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> hand, the sharp distinction it made between the +falsity of the old and the truth of the new order was found to be beside +the mark. So the correctness of the bourgeois philosophy itself proved +to be relative and limited, like that of a herald of some higher truth +which in its turn would acknowledge that which was temporarily and +partially true in its vanquished precursor. In this way the +contradictions became moments in the evolution of absolute truth, in +this way, furthermore, the dialectics became the main feature and method +of post-Kantian philosophy; and in this way, finally, the theorists of +the reaction were the men who steered philosophy over new courses and +who thereby became the harbingers of socialism. Scepticism and a +critique of all traditional things, yet a careful protection of +endangered faith, had characterized the tendencies of bourgeois thought +during its revolutionary period. In the reactionary stage, the bourgeois +implicitly accepted the belief in absolute truth and cultivated a +self-righteous faith. The practice of Metternich and of the Holy +Alliance corresponded to the theory of Hegelian philosophy.</p> + +<p>The practice of the Prussian police state, which embodied the +shortcomings of capitalism without its advantages and thus represented a +higher degree of reaction, destroyed the Hegelian philosophy, as soon as +the practices of maturing capitalism began to rebel against the fetters +by which reaction endeavored to bind it. Feuerbach returned in his +critique of religion from the fantastical heights of abstraction to +physical man. Marx demonstrated that the reality of bourgeois society +expresses itself in its class antagonisms which herald its imperfectness +and approaching downfall, and he discovered that the actual historical +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span>development rested on the development of the process of material +production. The absolute spirit that was supposed to be embodied in the +constitution of the despotic state before the March revolution now +revealed itself as the narrow bourgeois spirit which regards bourgeois +society as the final aim of all historical development. The Hegelian +statement that all finite things carry within themselves the germ of +their own dissolution came home to his own philosophy, as soon as its +finiteness and limitations had been grasped. Its conservative form was +abandoned, but its revolutionary content, the dialectics, was preserved. +The Hegelian philosophy was finally superseded by dialectic materialism +which declares that absolute truth is realized only in the infinite +progress of society and of scientific understanding.</p> + +<p>This does not imply a wholesale rejection of Hegelian philosophy. It +merely means that the relative validity of that philosophy has been +recognized. The vicissitudes of the absolute spirit in the course of its +self-development are but a fantastical description of the process which +the real human mind experiences in its acquaintance with the world and +its active participation in life. Instead of the evolution of the +absolute idea, the dialectics henceforth becomes the sole correct method +of thought to be employed by the real human mind in the study of the +actual world and for the purpose of understanding social development. +The great and lasting importance of Hegel's philosophy, even for our own +time, is that it is an excellent theory of the human mind and of its +working methods, provided we strip off its transcendental character, and +that it far excels the first laborious contributions of Kant to the +theory of understanding.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span></p><p>But this quality of the Hegelian philosophy could not be appreciated, +until Dietzgen had created the basis for a dialectic and materialistic +theory of understanding. The indispensable character of dialectic +thought, which is illustrated by the monumental works of Marx and +Engels, has been first demonstrated in a perfectly convincing manner by +Dietzgen's critical analysis of the human force of thinking. It was only +by means of this method of thought—of which he was according to Engels' +testimony an independent discoverer—that he could succeed in completing +the theory of understanding and bringing it to a close for the time +being.</p> + +<p class="center">************</p> + +<p>If we refer to the ideas laid down by Dietzgen in this work as "his +philosophy," we say too much, because it does not assume to be a new +system of philosophy. Yet, on the other hand, we should not say enough, +because it would mean that his work is as passing as the systems before +it. It is the merit of Dietzgen to have raised philosophy to the +position of a natural science, the same as Marx did with history. The +human faculty of thought is thereby stripped of its fantastic garb. It +is regarded as a part of nature, and by means of experience a +progressive understanding of its concrete and ever changing historical +nature must be gained. Dietzgen's work refers to itself as a finite and +temporary realization of this aim, just as every new theory in natural +science is a finite and temporary realization of its aims. This +realization must be further improved and perfected by successive +investigations. This is the method of natural science; philosophical +systems, on the contrary, pretended to give absolute truth, that could +not be improved upon.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> Dietzgen's work is fundamentally different from +these former philosophies, and more than they, because it wishes to be +less. It presents itself as the positive outcome of philosophy toward +which all great thinkers have contributed, seen by the sober eyes of a +socialist and analyzed, recounted and further developed by him. At the +same time, it attributes to previous systems the same character of +partial truths and shows that they were not entirely useless +speculations, but ascending stages of understanding naturally related, +which contain ever more truth and ever less error. Hegel had likewise +entertained this broader view, but with him this development came to a +self-contradictory end in his own system. Dietzgen also calls his own +conception the highest then existing, and its distinctive step in the +evolution is that it for the first time adopts and professes this +natural and scientific view, instead of the supernatural point of view +of the former systems. The new understanding that the human mind is a +common and natural thing is a decisive step in the progressive +investigation of the mind, and this step places Dietzgen at the head of +this evolution. And it is a step which cannot be retraced, because it +signifies a sober awakening after centuries of vain imaginings. Since +this system does not pretend to be absolute truth, but rather a finite +and temporal one, it cannot fall as its predecessors did. It represents +a scientific continuation of former philosophies, just as astronomy is +the continuation of astrology and of the Pythagorean fantasies, and +chemistry the continuation of alchemy. It takes the place that formerly +was held by its unscientific predecessors and has this in common with +them, apart from its essential theory of understanding, that it is the +basis of a new <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span>world-philosophy, of a methodical conception of the +universe.</p> + +<p>This modern world-philosophy (Weltanschauung), being a socialist or +proletarian one, takes issue with the bourgeois conceptions; it was +first conceived as a new view of the world, entirely opposite to the +ruling bourgeois conceptions, by Marx and Engels, who developed its +sociological and historical contents; its philosophical basis is here +developed by Dietzgen; its real character is indicated by the terms +dialectic and materialist. By its core, historical materialism, it gains +a wholly new theory of social evolution that forms its chief content. +This theory was for the first time sketched in its main outlines in the +Communist Manifesto, and later on fully developed in a number of other +works and thoroughly vindicated by innumerable facts. It gives us the +scientific assurance that the misery and imperfectness of present +society, which bourgeois philosophy regards as inevitable and natural, +is but a transitory condition, and that man will within measurable time +emancipate himself from the slavery of his material wants by the +regulation of social production. By this certainty socialism is put on +an eminence so far above all bourgeois conceptions that these appear +barbarous in comparison with it. And what is more significant, our +world-philosophy may justly claim to have for the first time thrown the +light of an indisputable science on society and man; combined with the +maturest products of natural sciences it forms a complete science of the +world, making all superstitions superfluous, and thus involving the +theoretical emancipation, that is to say the emancipation of the mind. +The science treating of the human mind forms the essence and foundation +of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> this theory of society and man, not only because it gives us the +same as the natural sciences a scientific or experience-proven theory of +the function of human thinking, but also, because this theory of +cognition can alone assure us that such sciences are able to furnish us +an adequate picture of the world, and that anything outside of them is +mere fantasy. For this reason we owe to Dietzgen's theory of cognition +the firm foundation of our world-philosophy.</p> + +<p>Its character is primarily materialistic. In contradistinction to the +idealist systems of the most flourishing time of German philosophy which +considered the Mind as the basis of all existence, it starts from +concrete materialist being. Not that it regards mere physical matter as +its basis; it is rather opposed to the crude bourgeois materialism, and +matter to it means everything which exists and furnishes material for +thought, including thoughts and imaginations. Its foundation is the +unity of all concrete being. Thus it assigns to the human mind an equal +place among the other parts of the universe; it shows that the mind is +as closely connected with all the other parts of the universe as those +parts are among themselves; that is to say, the mind exists only as a +part of the entire universe so that its content is only the effect of +the other parts. Thus our philosophy forms the theoretical basis of +historical materialism. While the statement that "the consciousness of +man is determined by his social life" could hitherto at best be regarded +as a generalization of many historical facts and thus seemed imperfect +and open to criticism, capable of improvement by later discoveries, the +same as all other scientific theories, henceforth the complete +dependence of the mind on the rest of the world becomes as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span>impregnable +and immutable a requirement of thought as causality. This signifies the +thorough refutation of the belief in miracles. After having been +banished long ago from the field of natural science, miracles were now +banished from the domain of thought.</p> + +<p>The enlightening effect of this proletarian philosophy consists +furthermore in its opposition to all superstition and its demonstration +of the senselessness of all idol worship. Socialist understanding +accomplished something which the bourgeois reformers could not do, +because they were limited to natural science in a narrow sense and could +not solve the mystery of the mind; for in explaining all the mental, +spiritual phenomena as natural phenomena our proletarian philosophy +furnishes the means for a trenchant critique of Christian faith which +consists in the belief in a supernatural spiritual being. In his +dialectic discussions of mind and matter, finiteness and infinity, god +and the world, Dietzgen has thoroughly clarified the confused mystery +which surrounded these conceptions and has definitely refuted all +transcendental beliefs. And this critique is no less destructive for the +bourgeois idols: Freedom, Right, Spirit, Force, which are shown to be +but fantastic images of abstract conceptions with a limited validity.</p> + +<p>This could be accomplished in no other way than by simultaneously +determining, in its capacity as a theory of understanding, the relation +of the world around us to the image which our mind forms of it. In this +respect Dietzgen completed the work begun by Hume and Kant. As a theory +of understanding, his conceptions are not only the philosophical basis +of historical materialism, but also of all other sciences as well. The +thorough critique directed by Dietzgen<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> against the works of prominent +natural scientists, shows that he was well aware of the importance of +his own work. But, as might be expected, the voice of a socialist +artisan did not penetrate to the lecture hall of the academies. It was +not until much later that similar views appeared among the natural +scientists. And now at last the most prominent theorists of natural +science have adopted the view that explaining signifies nothing else but +simply and completely describing the processes of nature.</p> + +<p>By this theory of understanding Dietzgen has made it plainly perceptible +why the dialectic method is an indispensable auxiliary in the quest for +an explanation of the nature of understanding. The mind is the faculty +of generalization. It forms out of concrete realities, which are a +continuous and unbounded stream in perpetual motion, abstract +conceptions that are essentially rigid, bounded, stable, and +unchangeable. This gives rise to the contradiction that our conceptions +must always adapt themselves to new realities without ever fully +succeeding; the contradiction that they represent the living by what is +dead, the infinite by what is finite, and that they are themselves +finite though partaking of the nature of the infinite. This +contradiction is understood and reconciled by the insight into the +nature of the faculty of understanding, which is simultaneously a +faculty of combination and of distinction, which forms a limited part of +the universe and yet encompasses everything, and it is furthermore +solved by the resulting penetration of the nature of the world. The +world is a unity of the infinitely numerous multitude of phenomena and +comprises within itself all contradictions, makes them relative and +equalizes them. Within its circle there are no <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span>absolute opposites. The +mind merely constructs them, because it has not only the faculty of +generalization but also of distinguishing. The practical solution of all +contradictions is the revolutionary practice of infinitely progressing +science which moulds old conceptions into new ones, rejects some, +substitutes others in their place, improves, connects and dissects, +still striving for an always greater unity and an always wider +differentiation.</p> + +<p>By means of this theory of understanding, dialectic materialism also +furnishes the means for the solution of the riddles of the world +(Welträtsel). Not that it solves all these riddles; on the contrary, it +says explicitly that this solution can be but the work of an ever +advancing scientific research. But it solves them in so far as it +deprives them of the character of a mysterious enigma and transforms +them into a practical problem, the solution of which we are approaching +by an infinite progression. Bourgeois thought cannot solve the riddles +of the world. A few years after the first publication of Dietzgen's +work, natural science in the person of Du Bois-Reymond acknowledged its +incapacity by his "Ignorabimus:" "We shall never know." Proletarian +philosophy, in solving the riddle of the human mind, gives us the +assurance that there are no insoluble riddles before us.</p> + +<p>In conclusion, Dietzgen in this work indicates the principles of a new +ethics. Starting with the understanding that the origin of the ideas of +good and bad is found in the needs of man, and designating as really +moral that which is generally useful, he logically discovers that the +essence of modern morality rests in its class interests. At the same +time, a relative justification is accorded to these temporary ethics, +since<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> they are the necessary products of definite social requirements. +The link between man and nature is formed by the process of social +production carried on for the satisfaction of man's material wants. So +long as this link was a fetter, it bound man by a misapprehended +supernatural ethics. But once the process of social labor is understood, +regulated and controlled, then this fetter is dropped and the place of +ethics is taken by a reasonable understanding of the general wants.</p> + +<p class="center">************</p> + +<p>The philosophical works of Dietzgen do not seem to have, until now, +exerted any perceptible influence on the socialist movement. While they +may have found many a silent admirer and contributed much toward a +clearing up of their thoughts, yet the importance of his writings for +the theory of our movement has not been realized. But this is not a +matter for great surprise. In the first decade after their publication, +even the economic works of Marx, the value of which was much more +apparent, were little appreciated. The movement developed spontaneously, +and the Marxian theory could exert a useful and determining influence +only by means of the clear foresight of a few leaders. Hence it is no +wonder that the philosophy of the proletariat, which is less easily and +directly applicable than our economics, did not receive much attention. +The political maturity of the German working class, which was farthest +advanced in the theories of the international movement, did not develop +to the point of adopting Marxian theses as party principles, until after +the abolition of the anti-socialist laws. But even then they were for +most of the spokesmen of the party rather concise formulations<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> of a few +practical convictions than the outcome of a thorough scientific training +and understanding. It was no doubt the great expansion of the party and +of its activity which demanded all their powers for its organization and +management, that led the younger intellectuals of the party to devote +themselves to practical work and to neglect the theoretical studies. +This neglect has bitterly avenged itself in the theoretical schisms of +the subsequent years.</p> + +<p>The decrepit condition of capitalism is now evidenced very plainly by +the decay of the bourgeois parties, so that the practical work of the +socialist party is in itself sufficient to attract every one who has an +independent turn of mind and a capacity for deep feeling. But under the +present circumstances, such a transition was not accompanied by a +proletarian world-philosophy acquired by painstaking study. Instead of +such a philosophy, we are confronted by a critique of socialist science +from the bourgeois standpoint. Marxism is measured by the standard of +the immature bourgeois theory of understanding, and the Neokantians, +unconscious of the positive outcome of philosophy of the past century, +are trying to connect socialism with Kantian ethics. Some even speak of +a reconciliation with Christianity and a renunciation of materialism.</p> + +<p>This bourgeois method of thought, which, being anti-dialectic and +anti-materialistic, is opposed to Marxism, has acquired some practical +importance in the socialistic movement of countries where by lack of +economical development the class-consciousness of the workers is +hindered by relics of the narrow-minded views of the class of little +producers—as in France and Italy under the name of reformism. In +Germany<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> where it could not obtain much practical importance it +presented itself mostly as a theoretical struggle against Marxism under +the name of revisionism. It combines bourgeois philosophy and +anti-capitalist disposition and takes the place formerly occupied by +anarchism, and, like anarchism, it again represents in many respects the +little bourgeois tendencies in the fight against capitalism. Under these +circumstances, a closer study of Dietzgen's philosophical works becomes +a necessity.</p> + +<p>Marx has disclosed the nature of the social process of production, and +its fundamental significance as a lever of social development. But he +has not fully explained, by what means the nature of the human mind is +involved in this material process. Owing to the great traditional +influence exerted by bourgeois thought, this weak spot in Marxism is one +of the main reasons for the incomplete and erroneous understanding of +Marxian theories. This shortcoming of Marxism is cured by Dietzgen, who +made the nature of the mind the special object of his investigations. +For this reason, a thorough study of Dietzgen's philosophical writings +is an important and indispensable auxiliary for the understanding of the +fundamental works of Marx and Engels. Dietzgen's work demonstrates that +the proletariat has a mighty weapon not only in proletarian economics, +but also in proletarian philosophy. Let us learn to wield these weapons!</p> + +<p class="right">ANTON PANNEKOEK.</p> + +<p>Leyden, Holland, December, 1902.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>The Nature of Human Brain Work</span></h2> + +<p class="bold">A Renewed Critique of Pure and<br />Practical Reason</p> + +<p class="bold">BY A MANUAL WORKER</p> + +<p class="bold">Translated by Ernest Untermann</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span></p> + +<p class="bold2">THE NATURE OF HUMAN<br />BRAIN WORK</p> + +<h2><span>PREFACE</span></h2> + +<p>It may not be amiss here to say a few words to the kind reader and the +unkind critic in regard to the personal relation of the author to the +present work. The first objection which I anticipate will be aimed at my +lack of scientific learning which is shown indirectly rather, between +the lines, than in the work itself. "How dare you," I ask myself, "come +before the public with your statements on a subject, which has been +treated by such heroes of science as Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, +etc., without being thoroughly familiar with all the works of your +famous predecessors?"</p> + +<p>At best, will you not merely repeat what has long since been +accomplished?</p> + +<p>In reply, I wish to say that the seeds sown by philosophy in the soil of +science have long since blossomed and borne fruit. The product of +history develops historically, grows and passes away, in order to live +eternally in another form. The original deed, the original work, is +fertile only in the contact with the conditions and relations of the +time in which it is born. But it finally becomes an empty shell, when it +has yielded its kernel to history. Whatever of a positive nature was +produced by the science of the past, lives<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> no longer in the words of +the author, but has become more than spirit, has become flesh and blood +in present science. In order, e. g., to know the products of physics and +produce something new in its field, it is not necessary to first study +the history of this science, nor derive the hitherto discovered laws +from their fundamental source. On the contrary, historical research +might only be an obstacle to the solution of a definite physical +problem, for concentrated strength will naturally accomplish more than +divided strength. In this sense, I consider my lack of other knowledge +an advantage, because I am thus enabled to devote myself so much more +intensely to my special object. I have striven hard to study this object +and to learn everything which is known about it in my time. The history +of philosophy has in a certain sense been repeated in the development of +my individuality, since I speculated from my earliest youth on the means +of satisfying my longing for a consistent and systematic conception of +the world, and I believe I have finally found this satisfaction in the +inductive understanding of the human faculty of thought.</p> + +<p>Note that it is not the faculty of thought in its various +manifestations, not the different forms of it, but its general form, its +general nature, that satisfied me and that I propose to discuss. My +object is then very plain and circumscribed, indeed it is so simple, +that I had difficulties in showing its nature from different points of +view and was compelled to resort to numerous repetitions. At the same +time, the question concerning the nature of the mind is a popular one, +which is not limited to professional philosophy, but concerns all +sciences. And whatever the history of science has contributed towards +the solution of this question, must<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> be generally alive in the +scientific conceptions of the present. I could well be satisfied with +this source.</p> + +<p>I may, then, confess in spite of my authorship, that I am not a +professor of philosophy, but a mechanic by profession. If any one should +feel justified in telling me: "Shoemaker, stick to your last!" I would +reply to him with Karl Marx: "Your non plus ultra professional wisdom +became enormously foolish from the moment when the watchmaker Watt +invented the steam engine, the barber Arkwright the loom, the jeweler +Fulton the steamship." Without classing myself among these great men, I +can strive to emulate them. Besides, the nature of my object is +especially pertinent to the class, a member of which I have the +pleasure, if not the honor, of being.</p> + +<p>I treat in this work of the faculty of thought as the organ of the +general. The oppressed fourth estate, the working class, is the true +exponent of this organ, the ruling classes being prevented by their +special class interests from recognizing the demands of general reason. +Our first consideration is, of course, the relation of our object to +human conditions. However, so long as conditions are not equalized for +men in general, but vitiated by class interests, our view of things is +influenced by these class limitations. A truly objective understanding +requires a subjective theoretical freedom. Before Copernicus saw the +Earth was moving and the Sun stationary, he had to place himself outside +of his terrestrial standpoint. The faculty of thought, having all +relations for its object, must abstract from all of them in order to +grasp its own real nature. Since we can understand things only by means +of thought, we must abstract from everything in order to understand +thought in general. This<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> task was too difficult, so long as man was +bound to some limited class standpoint. Not until historical development +has proceeded to the point of striving at dissolution of the last +society based on a ruling and a serving class, can prejudices be +overcome to the extent of enabling the faculty of understanding to grasp +the nature of human brain activity in the abstract. It is only a +historical movement aiming at the direct and general liberty of the +masses, the new era of the fourth estate based on much misunderstood +premises, which can dispense with the spirit cult sufficiently to be +enabled to expose the real author of every spook, the "pure" mind. The +man of the fourth estate represents at last the "pure" man. His +interests are no longer mere class interests, but mass interests, +interests of humanity. This indicates that we are now approaching the +end of a development in which the interests of the mass were dependent +on the interests of a ruling class and in which humanity made progress +not so much in spite of as by means of continuous oppression by Jewish +patriarchs, Asiatic conquerors, antique slaveholders, feudal barons, +guildmasters, modern capitalists and even capitalist Cæsars. The class +conditions of the past were inevitable in the general development. Now +this development has arrived at a point where the mass becomes conscious +of itself. Man has hitherto developed by class antagonism. By this means +he has now arrived at the point where he wants to develop himself +consciously. Class antagonisms were <i>phenomena</i> of humanity. The working +class strives to abolish class antagonism in order that humanity itself +may be a <i>truth</i>.</p> + +<p>Just as the Reformation was conditioned on the actual environment of the +sixteenth century, so, like the discovery of the electric telegraph, the +research of the theory<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> of human understanding is based on the actual +conditions of the nineteenth century. To this extent the contents of +this little work are not an individual, but a historical product. In +writing it, I feel myself, if I may use this mystic phrase, as a mere +organ of the idea. Only the form of presenting the subject is mine, and +I beg the kind reader to judge it leniently. I ask that the reader may +direct his or her silent or loud objections, not against the form, but +against the substance of my remarks, not to cling to the letter, but to +understand the spirit of my words.</p> + +<p>If I should not succeed in developing the idea, and if my voice should +thus be drowned in the hubbub of our overstocked book market, I am +nevertheless certain that the cause itself will find a more talented +champion.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Joseph Dietzgen</span>, <i>Tanner</i>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Siegburg</span>, May 15, 1869.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span></p> + +<p class="bold2">THE NATURE OF HUMAN<br />BRAIN WORK</p> + +<h2><span>I.</span> <span class="smaller">INTRODUCTION</span></h2> + +<p>Systematization is the essence and the general expression of the +aggregate activity of science. Science seeks to classify and systematize +the objects of the world for the understanding of our brain. The +scientific understanding of a certain language, e. g., requires an +orderly arrangement of that language in general categories and rules. +The science of agriculture does not simply wish to produce a good crop +of potatoes, but to find a system for the methods of cultivation and +thus to furnish the knowledge by which success in cultivation can be +determined beforehand. The practical result of all theory is to acquaint +us with the system and method of its practice and thus to enable us to +act in this world with a reasonable certainty of success. Experience is, +of course, an indispensable condition for this purpose; but it alone is +not sufficient. Only by means of empirically developed theories, by +science, do we overcome the play of accident. Science gives us the +conscious domination over things and unconditional security in handling them.</p> + +<p>No one individual can know everything. The capacity of the individual +brain is no more adequate for the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> knowledge of everything that is +necessary than the skill and strength of the individual's hands are +sufficient to produce all he needs. Faith is indispensable to man, but +only faith in that which others know, not in what they believe. Science +is as much a social matter as material production. "One for all and all for one."</p> + +<p>But just as there are some wants of the body which every one has to +satisfy by himself, so every one has to know certain scientific facts +which are not the prerogative of any special science.</p> + +<p>This is true of the faculty of human understanding. The knowledge and +study of this theory cannot be left to any particular guild. Lassalle +justly says: "Thinking itself has become a special trade in these days +of division of labor, and it has fallen into the worst hands, those of +our newspaper writers." He thus urges us not to acquiesce in this +appropriation any longer, not to submit any more to the harangues of +public opinion, but to resume thinking for ourselves. We may leave +certain objects of scientific research to professionals, but general +thought is a public matter which every one should be required to attend +to himself.</p> + +<p>If we could place this general work of thinking on a scientific basis, +if we could find a theory of general thought, if we were able to +discover the means by which reason arrives at understanding, if we could +develop a method by which truth is produced scientifically, then we +should acquire for science in general and for our individual faculty of +judgment the same certainty of success which we already possess in +special fields of science.</p> + +<p>Kant says: "If it is not possible to harmonize the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> various co-operators +on the question of the means by which their common aim is to be +accomplished, then we may safely infer that such a study is not yet on +the secure road of science, but will continue to grope in the dark."</p> + +<p>Now, if we take a look at the sciences, we find that there are many, +especially among the natural sciences, which fulfill the requirements of +Kant, agreeing unanimously and consciously on certain empirical +knowledge and building further understanding on that. "There we know," +as Liebig says, "what is to be called a certain fact, a conclusion, a +rule, a law. We have touchstones for all this, and every one makes use +of them before making known the fruits of his labors. The attempt to +maintain any proposition by lawyer's tricks, or the intention to make +others believe anything that cannot be proven, are immediately wrecked +by the ethics of science."</p> + +<p>Not so in other fields, where concrete and material things are left +behind and abstract, so-called philosophical, matters are taken up, as, +for instance, questions of general conceptions of the world and of life, +of beginning and end, of the semblance and the essence of things, of +cause and effect, of matter and force, of might and right, of wisdom of +life, of morality, religion, and politics. Here we find, instead of +irrefutable proofs, mere "lawyer's tricks," an absence of reliable +knowledge, a mere groping amid contradictory opinions.</p> + +<p>And it is precisely the prominent authorities of natural science who +show by their disagreements on such matters that they are mere tyros in +philosophy. It follows, then, that the socalled ethics of science, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> +touchstones of which the boast is made that they never fail in +determining what is knowledge and what is mere conjecture, are based on +a purely instinctive practice, not on a conscious theory of +understanding. Although our time excels in diligent scientific research, +yet the numerous differences among scientists show that they are not +capable of using their knowledge with a predetermined certainty of +success. Otherwise, how could misunderstandings arise? Whoever +understands understanding, cannot misunderstand. It is only the absolute +accuracy of astronomical computations which entitles astronomy to the +name of a science. A man who can figure is at least enabled to test +whether his computation is right or wrong. In the same way, the general +understanding of the process of thought must furnish us with the +touchstone by which we can distinguish between understanding and +misunderstanding, knowledge and conjecture, truth and error, by general +and irrefutable rules. Erring is human, but not scientific. Science +being a human matter, errors may exist eternally, but the understanding +of the process of thought will enable us quite as well to prevent errors +from being offered and accepted as scientific truths as an understanding +of mathematics enables us to eliminate errors from our computations.</p> + +<p>It sounds paradoxical and yet it is true: Whoever knows the general rule +by which error may be distinguished from truth, and knows it as well as +the rule in grammar by which a noun is distinguished from a verb, will +be able to distinguish in both cases with equal certainty. Scientists as +well as scribes have ever embarrassed one another by the question:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> What +is truth? This question has been an essential object of philosophy for +thousands of years. This question, like philosophy itself, is finally +settled by the understanding of the faculty of human thought. In other +words, the question of what constitutes truth is identical with the +question of the distinction between truth and error. Philosophy is the +science which has been engaged in solving this riddle, and the final +solution of the riddle by the clear understanding of the process of +thought also solves the question of the nature of philosophy. Hence a +short glance at the nature and development of philosophy may well serve +as an introduction to our study.</p> + +<p>As the word philosophy is connected with various meanings, I state at +the outset that I am referring only to socalled speculative philosophy. +I dispense with frequent quotations and notes of the sources of my +knowledge, as anything that I may say in this respect is so well +established that we can afford to discard all scientific by-work.</p> + +<p>If we apply the above-named test of Kant to speculative philosophy it +appears to be more the playground of different opinions than of science. +The philosophical celebrities and classic authorities are not even in +accord on the question: What is philosophy and what is its aim? For this +reason, and in order not to increase the difference by adding my own +opinion, I regard everything as philosophy that calls itself by that +name, and we select from the voluminous literature of philosophy that +which is common and general in all philosophers, without taking any +notice of their special peculiarities.</p> + +<p>By this empirical method we find first of all that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> philosophy is +originally not a specialized science working with other sciences, but a +generic name for all knowledge, the essence of all science, just as art +is the essence of the various arts. Whoever made knowledge, whoever made +brain work his essential occupation, every thinker without regard to the +contents of his thoughts, was originally a philosopher.</p> + +<p>But when with the progressive increase of human knowledge, the various +departments detached themselves from the mother of all wisdom, +especially since the origin of natural sciences, philosophy became +known, not so much by its content as by its form. All other sciences are +distinguished by their various objects, while philosophy is marked by +its own method. Of course, it also has its object and purpose. It +desires to understand the universal whole, the cosmos. But it is not +this object, this aim, by which philosophy is characterized; it is +rather the manner in which this object is accomplished.</p> + +<p>All other sciences occupy themselves with special things, and if they +consider the universe at all, they do so only in its bearing on the +special objects of their study, the parts of which the universe is +composed. Alexander von Humboldt says in his introduction to his +"Cosmos" that he is limiting himself to an empirical consideration, to a +physical research, which seeks to elucidate the uniformity and unity by +means of the great variety. And all inductive sciences arrive at general +conclusions and conceptions only by way of their occupation with special +and concrete things. For this reason they claim that their conclusions +are based on facts.</p> + +<p>Speculative philosophy proceeds by the opposite<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> method. Thought, the +object of its study, may be some special question, yet it does not +follow this up in the concrete. It rejects as fallacious the evidence of +the senses, the physical experience gained by means of the eye and ear, +hand and brain, and limits itself to "pure" and absolutely abstract +thought, in order to understand thus by the unit of human reason the +multiplicity of the universe. In seeking for an answer to the question: +What is philosophy? which question we are specially discussing just now, +speculative philosophy would not start out from its actual material +form, from its wooden and pigskin volumes, from its great and small +essays, in order to arrive at a conception of its object. On the +contrary, the speculative philosopher turns to introspection and looks +in the depths of his own mind for the true concept of philosophy. And by +this standard he separates the impression of his senses into true or +erroneous. This speculative method has hardly ever dealt in tangible +things, unless we recognize this philosophical method in every +unscientific concept of nature which populated the world with spooks. +The rudiments of scientific speculation occasionally dealt with the +course of the sun and the globe. But since inductive astronomy +cultivates these fields with greater success, speculative philosophy +limits itself entirely to abstract discussions. And in this line of +research as well as in all others it is characterized by the production +of its results out of the idea or the concept.</p> + +<p>For empirical science, for the inductive method, the multiplicity of +experiences is the first basis, and thought the second. Speculative +philosophy, on the other hand, seeks to arrive at scientific truth +without<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> the help of experience. It rejects the socalled transient facts +as a foundation of philosophical understanding, and declares that it +should be absolute, exalted above time and space. Speculative philosophy +does not wish to be scientific physics, but metaphysics. It regards it +as its task to find by "pure" reason, and without the assistance of +experience, a system, a logic, or a theory of science, by which +everything worth knowing is supposed to be reeled off logically and +systematically, in about the same way in which we derive grammatically +the various forms of a word from its root. But the physical sciences +operate on the assumption that our faculty of understanding, to use a +familiar illustration, resembles a piece of soft wax which receives +impressions from outside, or a clean slate on which experience writes +its lines. Speculative philosophy, on the other hand, assumes that +certain ideas are innate and may be dipped and produced from the depths +of the mind by means of thought.</p> + +<p>The difference between speculative and inductive science is that between +fantasy and sound common sense. The latter produces its ideas by means +of the outer world, by the help of experience, while fantasy gets its +product from the depth of the mind, out of itself. But this method of +production is only seemingly one-sided. A thinker can no more think +transcendental thoughts which are beyond the reach of experience, than a +painter can invent transcendental pictures, transcendental forms. Just +as fantasy creates angels by a combination of man and bird, or mermaids +by a composition of woman and fish, so all other products of fantasy, +though seemingly derived out of itself, are in fact only arbitrarily +arranged impressions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> of the outer world. Reason operates with numbers +and orders, time and measures, and other means of experience, while +fantasy reproduces the experiences without regard to law and in an +arbitrary form.</p> + +<p>The longing for knowledge has been the cause of speculative attempts to +explain the phenomena of life and nature at a time when lack of +experience and observation made inductive understanding impossible. +Experience was then supplemented by speculation. In later times, when +experience had grown, previous speculation was generally recognized as +erroneous. But it nevertheless required thousands of years of repeated +disappointments on one side and numerous brilliant successes of the +inductive method on the other, before these speculative hobbies came +into disfavor.</p> + +<p>Fantasy has certainly a positive power, and speculative intuition, +derived from analogy, very often precedes empirical and inductive +understanding. But we must remain aware of the fact that so much is +assumption and so much actual scientific knowledge. Conscious intuition +stimulates scientific research, while pseudo-science closes the door to +inductive research. The acquisition of the clear understanding of the +distinction between speculation and knowledge is a historical process, +the beginning and end of which coincides with the beginning and end of +speculative philosophy.</p> + +<p>In ancient times, common sense operated in common with fantasy, the +inductive with the speculative method. The discussion of their +differences begins only with the understanding of the numerous +disappointments caused by the still inexperienced judgment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> which have +prevented an unobstructed view of the question up to modern times. But +instead of attributing these disappointments to lack of understanding, +they were charged to the account of the imperfection of the senses. The +senses were called impostors and material phenomena untrue images. Who +has not heard the lament about the unreliability of the senses? The +misunderstanding of nature and of its phenomena led to a serious rupture +with sense perceptions. The philosophers had deceived themselves and +thought they had been deceived by the senses. In their anger they turned +disdainfully away from the world of sensations. With the same uncritical +faith with which the semblance had hitherto been accepted as truth, now +uncritical doubt rejected the truth of sensations altogether. Research +abandoned nature and experience, and began the work of speculative +philosophy by "pure" thought.</p> + +<p>But no! Science did not permit itself to be entirely led astray from the +path of common sense, from the way of truth of sense perceptions. +Natural science soon stepped into the breach, and its brilliant +successes gained for the inductive method the consciousness of its +fertility, while on the other hand philosophy searched for a system by +which all the great general truths might be opened up without +specialized study, without sense perception and observation, by mere +reason alone.</p> + +<p>Now we have a more than sufficient quantity of such speculative systems. +If we measure them with the aforementioned standard of unanimousness, we +find that philosophy agrees only on its disagreements. In consequence, +the history of speculative philosophy,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> unlike the history of other +sciences, consists less of a gradual accumulation of knowledge, than of +a series of unsuccessful attempts to solve the general riddles of nature +and life by "pure" thought, without the help of the objects and +experience of the outer world. The most daring attempt in this line, the +most artificial structure of thought, was completed by Hegel in the +beginning of the nineteenth century. To use a common expression, he +became as famous in the world of science as Napoleon I did in the world +of politics. But Hegelian philosophy has not stood the test of time. +Haym, in his work entitled "Hegel and His Time," says of Hegelian +philosophy that "it was pushed aside by the progress of the world and by +living history."</p> + +<p>The outcome of philosophy up to that time, then, was a declaration of +its own impotence. Nevertheless, we do not underestimate the fact that a +work occupying the best brains for thousands of years surely contained +some positive element. And in fact, speculative philosophy has a +history, which is not merely a series of unsuccessful attempts, but also +a living development. However, it is less the object of its study, less +the logical world system, which developed, than its method.</p> + +<p>Every positive science has a material object, a beginning in the outer +world, a premise on which its understanding is based. Every empirical +science has for its fundament some material of the senses, some given +object, on which its understanding is dependent, and thus it becomes +"impure." Speculative philosophy seeks a "pure, absolute," +understanding. It wishes to understand by "pure" reason, without any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> +material, without any experience. It takes its departure from the +enthusiastic conviction of the superiority of understanding and +knowledge over experience gained by sense perceptions. For this reason +it wishes to leave experience entirely aside in favor of absolutely +"pure" understanding. Its object is truth; not concrete truth, not the +truth of this or that thing, but truth in general, truth "in itself." +The speculative systems seek after an absolute beginning, an indubitably +self-supporting starting point, from which they may determine the +absolutely indubitable. The speculative systems are thus by their own +mentality perfectly complete and selfsufficient systems. Every +speculative system found its end in the subsequent knowledge that its +totality, its selfsufficiency, its absoluteness, was imaginary, that it +could be determined empirically and externally like all other knowledge, +that it was not a philosophical system, but a relative and empirical +attempt at understanding. Speculation finally dissolved into the +knowledge that understanding is by its very nature "impure," that the +organ of philosophy, the faculty of understanding cannot begin its +studies without a given point of departure, that science is not +absolutely superior to experience, but only so far as it can organize +numerous experiences. It followed from these premises that the object of +philosophy can be a general and objective understanding, or "truth in +itself," only in so far as understanding or truth in general can be +derived from given concrete objects. In plain words, speculative +philosophy was reduced to the unphilosophical science of the empirical +faculty of understanding, to the critique of reason.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span></p><p>Modern conscious speculation takes its departure from the experienced +difference between semblance and truth. It denies all sense phenomena in +order to find truth by thinking, without being deceived by any +semblance. The subsequent philosophers, however, found every time that +the truths of their predecessors, gained by this method, were not what +they pretended to be, but that their positive result consisted simply in +having advanced the science of the thought process to a certain extent. +By denying the actuality of the senses, by endeavoring to separate +thought from all sense perceptions, by isolating it, so to say, from its +sensory cover, speculative philosophy, more than any other science, laid +bare the structure of the mind. The more this philosophy advanced in +time, the more it developed in its historical course, the more +classically and strikingly did this kernel of its work spring into view. +After the repeated creation of giant fantasmagorias, it found its +solution in the positive knowledge that socalled pure philosophical +thought, abstracting from all concrete contents, is nothing but +thoughtless thought, thought without any real object back of it, and +produces mere fantasmagorias. This process of speculative deception and +scientific exposure was continued up to recent times. Finally the +solution of the main question, and the solution of speculation, was +introduced with the following words of Feuerbach: "My philosophy is no +philosophy."</p> + +<p>The long story of speculative work was finally reduced to the +understanding of reason, of the intellect, the mind, to the exposure of +those mysterious operations which we call thinking.</p> + +<p>The secret of the processes by which the truths of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> understanding are +produced, the ignorance of the fact that every thought requires an +object, a premise, was the cause of the idle speculative wanderings +which we find registered in the history of philosophy. The same secret +is today the cause of those numerous speculative mistakes which we +observe in passing over the words and works of naturalists. Their +knowledge and understanding is far developed, but only so far as it +refers to tangible objects. The moment they touch upon abstract +discussions, they offer "lawyers' proofs" in place of "objective facts." +For although they know intuitively and in a concrete case that this is a +truth, that a conclusion, and that a rule, they do not apply this +knowledge in general with consciousness and theoretical consistency. The +successes of natural science have taught them to operate the instrument +of thought, the mind, instinctively. But they lack the systematic +understanding which operates with conscious and predetermined certainty. +They ignore the outcome of speculative philosophy.</p> + +<p>It will be our task to set forth in a short summary what speculative +philosophy has unconsciously produced of a positive nature by a tedious +process, in other words, to explain the general nature of the thought +process. We shall see that the understanding of this process will +furnish us with the means of solving scientifically the general riddles +of nature and of life. And thus we shall learn how that fundamental and +systematic world conception is developed which was the long coveted goal +of speculative philosophy.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>II</span> <span class="smaller">PURE REASON OR THE FACULTY OF THOUGHT IN GENERAL</span></h2> + +<p>When speaking of food in general, we may mention fruits, cereals, +vegetables, meat and bread and classify them all, in spite of their +difference, under this one head. In the same way, we use, in this work, +the terms reason, consciousness, intellect, knowledge, discernment, +understanding, as referring to the same general thing. For we are +discussing the general nature of the thought process rather than its +special forms.</p> + +<p>"No intelligent thinker of our day," says a modern physiologist, +"pretends to look for the seat of the intellectual powers in the blood, +as did the ancient Greeks, or in the pineal gland, as was the case in +the middle ages. Instead we have all become convinced that the central +nerve system is the organic center of the intellectual functions of the +brain." Yes, true enough, thinking is a function of the brain and nerve +center, just as writing is a function of the hand. But the study of the +anatomy of the hand can no more solve the question: What is writing? +than the physiological study of the brain can bring us nearer to the +solution of the question: What is thought? With the dissecting knife, we +may kill, but we cannot discover the mind. The understanding that +thought is a product of the brain takes us closer to the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span>solution of +our problem, in as much as it draws it into the bright light of reality +and out of the domain of fantasy in which the ghosts dwell. Mind thereby +loses the character of a transcendental incomprehensible being and +appears as a bodily function.</p> + +<p>Thinking is a function of the brain just as walking is a function of the +legs. We perceive thought and mind just as clearly with our senses as we +do pain and other feelings. Thought is felt by us as a subjective +process taking place inside of us. According to its contents this +process varies every moment and with each person, but according to its +form it is the same everywhere. In other words, in the thought process, +as in all processes, we make a distinction between the special or +concrete and the general or abstract. The general purpose of thought is +understanding. We shall see later that the simplest conception, or any +idea for that matter, is of the same general nature as the most perfect +understanding.</p> + +<p>Thought and understanding cannot be without subjective contents any more +than without an object which suggests individual reflection. Thought is +work, and like every other work it requires an object to which it is +applied. The statements: I do, I work, I think, must be completed by an +answer to the question: What are you doing, working, thinking?</p> + +<p>Every definite idea, all actual thought, is identical with its content, +but not with its object. My desk as a picture in my mind is identical +with my idea of it. But my desk outside of my brain is a separate object +and distinct from my idea. The idea is to be distinguished from thinking +only as a part of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> thought process, while the object of my thought +exists as a separate entity.</p> + +<p>We make a distinction between thinking and being. We distinguish between +the object of sense perception and its mental image. Nevertheless the +intangible idea is also material and real. I perceive my idea of a desk +just as plainly as the desk itself. True, if I choose to call only +tangible things material, then ideas are not material. But in that case +the scent of a rose and the heat of a stove are not material. It would +be better to call thoughts sense perceptions. But if it is objected that +this would be an incorrect use of the word, because language +distinguishes material and mental things, then we dispense with the word +material and call thought real. Mind is as real as the tangible table, +as the visible light, as the audible sound. While the idea of these +things is different from the things themselves, yet it has that in +common with them that it is as real as they. Mind is not any more +different from a table, a light, a sound, than these things differ among +themselves. We do not deny that there is a difference. We merely +emphasize that they have the same general nature in common. I hope the +reader will not misunderstand me henceforth, when I call the faculty of +thought a material quality, a phenomenon of sense perception.</p> + +<p>Every perception of the senses is based on some object. In order that +heat may be real, there must be an object, something else which is +heated. The active cannot exist without the passive. The visible cannot +exist without the faculty of sight, nor the faculty of sight without +visible things. So is the faculty of thought a phenomenon, but it can +never exist in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span>itself, it must always be based on some sense +perception. Thought appears, like all other phenomena, in connection +with an object. The function of the brain is no more a "pure" process +than the function of the eye, the scent of a flower, the heat of a +stove, or the touch of a table. The fact that a table may be seen, +heard, or felt, is due as much to its own nature as to that of another +object with which it enters into some relation.</p> + +<p>But while each function is limited by its own separate line of objects, +while the function of the eye serves only for the perception of the +visible, the hand for the tangible, while walking finds an object in the +space it crosses, thought, on the other hand, has everything for its +object. Everything may be the object of understanding. Thought is not +limited to any special object. Every phenomenon may be the object and +the content of thought. More than this, we can only perceive anything +when it becomes the object of our brain activity. Everything is +therefore the object and content of thought. The faculty of thought may +be exerted quite generally on all objects.</p> + +<p>We said a moment ago that everything may be perceived, but we now modify +this to the effect that only perceivable things may be perceived. Only +the knowable can be the object of knowledge, only the thinkable the +object of thought. To this extent the faculty of thought is limited, for +it cannot replace reading, hearing, feeling, and all other innumerable +activities of the world of sensations. We do, indeed, perceive all +objects, but no object may be exhaustively perceived, known, or +understood. In other words, the objects are not wholly dissolved in the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span>understanding. Seeing requires something that is visible, something +which is, therefore, more than seeing. In the same way, hearing requires +something that can be heard, thinking an object that can be thought of, +something which is more than our thoughts, something still outside of +our consciousness. We shall learn later on how we arrive at the +knowledge that we see, hear, feel, and think of objects, and not merely +of subjective impressions.</p> + +<p>By means of thought we become aware of all things in a twofold manner, +viz., outside in reality and inside in thought, in conception. It is +easy to demonstrate that the things outside are different from the +things in our thoughts. In their actual form, in their real dimensions, +they cannot enter into our heads. Our brain does not assimilate the +things themselves, but only their images, their general outlines. The +imagined tree is only a general object. The real tree is different from +any other. And though I may have a picture of some special tree in my +head, yet the real tree is still as different from its conception as the +special is different from the general. The infinite variety of things, +the innumerable wealth of their properties, has no room in our heads.</p> + +<p>I repeat, then, that we become aware of the outer world in a twofold +way, viz., in a concrete, tangible, manifold form, and in an abstract +form, which is mental and unitary. To our senses the world appears as a +variety of forms. Our brains combine them as a unit. And what is true of +the world, holds good of every one of its parts. A sense-perceived unit +is a nonentity. Even the atom of a drop of water or the atom of any +chemical element, is divisible, so long as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> it exists at all, and its +parts are different and distinct. A is not B. But the concept, the +faculty of thought, makes of every tangible or sense-perceived part an +abstract whole and conceives of every whole or quantity as a part of the +abstract world unit. In order to understand the things in their +entirety, we must take them practically and theoretically, with body and +mind. With the body we can grasp only the bodily, the tangible, with the +mind only the mental, the thinkable. Things also possess mental quality. +Mind is material and things are mental. Mind and matter are real only in +their inter-relations.</p> + +<p>Can we see the things themselves? No, we see only the effects of things +on our eyes. We do not taste the vinegar, but the relation of the +vinegar to our tongue. The result is the sensation of acidity. The +vinegar is acid only in relation to our tongue. In relation to iron it +acts as a solvent. In the cold it becomes hard, in the heat liquid. It +acts differently on different objects with which it enters into +relations of time and space. Vinegar is a phenomenon, just as all things +are. But it never appears as vinegar by itself. It always appears in +connection with other phenomena. Every phenomenon is a product of a +subject and an object.</p> + +<p>In order that a thought may appear, the brain or the faculty of thought +is not sufficient in itself. It requires, besides, an object which +suggests the thought. From this relative nature of our topic it follows +that in its treatment we cannot confine ourselves "purely" to it. Since +reason, or the faculty of thought, never appears by itself, but always +in connection with other things, we are continually compelled to pass +from the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> faculty of thought to other things, which are its objects, and +to treat of their connections.</p> + +<p>Just as the sight does not see the tree, but only that which is visible +of the tree, so does the faculty of thought assimilate only the +perceivable image of an object, not the object itself. A thought is a +child begotten by the function of the brain in communion with some +object. In a thought is crystalized on one side the subjective faculty +of thought, and on the other the perceivable nature of an object. Every +function of the mind presupposes some object by which it is caused and +the spiritual image of which it is. Or vice versa, the spiritual content +of the mind is derived from some object which has its own existence and +which is either seen or heard, or smelled, or tasted, or felt, in short, +experienced.</p> + +<p>Referring back to the statement that seeing is limited to the visible +qualities of some object, hearing to its audible qualities, etc., while +the faculty of thought has everything for its object, we now understand +this to mean that all objects have certain innumerable, but concrete, +qualities which are perceptible by our senses, and in addition thereto +the general spiritual quality of being thought of, understood, in short, +of being the object of our faculty of thought.</p> + +<p>This mode of classifying all objects applies also to the faculty of +thought itself. The spirit, or mind, is a bodily function connected with +the senses which appear in various forms. Mind is thought generated at +different times in different brains by different objects through the +instrumentality of the senses. We may choose this mind as the object of +special thought the same as all other things. Considered as an object,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> +mind is a manysided and sense-perceived fact which in connection with a +special function of the brain generates the general concept of "Mind" as +the content of this special thought process. The object of thought is +distinguished from its contents in the same way in which every object is +distinguished from its mental image. The different kinds of motion +perceived by the help of the senses are the object of a certain thought +process and supply to it the idea of "motion." It is easier to +understand that the mental image of some object perceived by the senses +has a father and a mother, being begotten by our faculty of thought by +means of some sense-perceived object, than it is to grasp the existence +of that trinity which is born when our present thought experiences its +own existence and thus creates a conception of its own self. This has +the appearance of moving around in a circle. The object, the content and +the function of thought apparently coincide. Reason deals with itself, +considers itself as an object and is its own content. But nevertheless +the distinction between an object and its concept, though less evident, +is just as actual as in other cases. It is only the habit of regarding +matter and mind as fundamentally different things which conceals this +truth. The necessity to make a distinction compels us everywhere to +discriminate between the object of sense perception and its mental +concept. We are forced to do the same in the case of the faculty of +thought, and thus we find it necessary to give the name of "Mind" to +this special object of our sense perceptions. Such an ambiguity of terms +cannot be entirely avoided in any science. A reader who does not cling +to words, but rather seeks to grasp the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span>meaning, will easily realize +that the difference between being and thinking applies also to the +faculty of thought, that the fact of understanding is different from the +understanding of understanding. And since the understanding of +understanding is again another fact, it will be permitted to call all +spiritual things facts or sense perceptions.</p> + +<p>Reason, or the faculty of thought, is therefore not a mystical object +which produces the individual thought. On the contrary, it is a fact +that certain individual thoughts are the product of perception gained in +contact with certain objects and that these in connection with a certain +brain operation produce the concept of reason. Reason as well as all +other things of which we become aware has a two-fold existence: one as a +phenomenon or sense-perception, the other as a concept. The concept of +any thing presupposes a certain sense-perception of that thing, and so +does the concept of reason. Since all men think as a matter of fact, +every one has himself perceived reason as a part of reality, as a +phenomenon, sense-perception or fact.</p> + +<p>Our object, reason, by virtue of the fact that it partakes of the nature +of the senses, has the faculty of transforming the speculative method, +which tries to dip understanding out of the depths of the spirit without +the help of sense-perception, into the inductive method, and vice versa +of transforming the inductive method, which desires to arrive at +conclusions, concepts, or understanding exclusively by means of +sense-perception, into the speculative method, by virtue of its +simultaneous spiritual nature. Our problem is to analyze the concept of +thought, or of the faculty of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> thought, or of reason, of knowing, of +science, by means of thought.</p> + +<p>To produce thoughts and to analyze them is the same thing inasmuch as +both actions are functions of the brain. Both have the same nature. But +they are different to the same extent that instinct differs from +consciousness. Man does not think originally because he wants to, but +because he must. Ideas are produced instinctively, involuntarily. In +order to become fully aware of them, to place them within the grasp of +knowing and willing, we must analyze them. From the experience of +walking, for instance, we derive the idea of walking. To analyze this +idea means to solve the question, what is walking generally considered, +what is the general nature of walking? We may answer: Walking is a +rythmical motion from one place to another, and thus we raise the +instinctive idea to the position of a conscious analyzed idea. An object +is not consciously, theoretically, understood, until it has been +analyzed. In examining what elements constitute the concept of walking, +we find that the general attribute of that experience which we agree in +calling "walking" is a rythmical motion. In actual experience steps may +be long or short, may be taken by two feet or by more, in brief may be +varied. But as a concept walking is simply a rythmical motion, and the +analysis of this concept furnishes us with the conscious understanding +of this fact. The concept of light existed long before science analyzed +it, before it was understood that undulations of the ether form the +elements which constitute the concept of light. Instinctive and +analytical ideas differ in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> same way in which the thoughts of every +day life differ from the thoughts of science.</p> + +<p>The analysis of any idea and the theoretical analysis of any object, or +of the thing which suggested the idea, is one and the same. Every idea +corresponds to some real object. Ludwig Feuerbach has demonstrated that +even the concepts of God and immortality are reflections of real objects +which can be perceived by the senses. For the purpose of analyzing such +ideas as animal, light, friendship, man, etc., the phenomena, the +objects, such as animals, friendships, men, and lights, are analyzed. +The object which serves for the analysis of the concept "animal" is no +more any single animal, than the object of the concept "light" is any +single light. These concepts comprise classes, things in general, and +therefore the question, or the analysis, of what constitutes the animal, +the light, friendship, must not deal with any concrete, but with the +abstract elements of the whole class.</p> + +<p>The fact that the analysis of a concept and the analysis of its object +appear as two different things is due to our faculty of being able to +separate things into two parts, viz., into a practical, tangible, +perceptible, concrete thing and into a theoretical mental, thinkable, +general thing. The practical analysis is the premise of the theoretical +analysis. The individually perceptible animals serve us as a basis for +the analysis of the animal concept, the individually experienced +friendships as the basis for the analysis of the concept of friendship.</p> + +<p>Every idea corresponds to an object which may be practically separated +into its component parts. To analyze a concept is equivalent, therefore, +to analyzing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> a previously experienced object by theoretical means. The +analysis of a concept consists in the understanding of the common or +general faculties of the concrete parts of the analyzed object. That +which is common to the various modes of walking, the rythmical motion, +constitutes the concept of walking, that which is common to the various +manifestations of light constitutes the concept of light. A chemical +factory analyzes objects for the purpose of obtaining chemicals, while +science analyzes them for the purpose of obtaining their concepts.</p> + +<p>The special object of our analysis, the faculty of thought, is likewise +distinguished from its concept. But in order to be able to analyze this +concept, we must analyze the object. It cannot be analyzed chemically, +for not everything is a matter of chemistry, but it may be analyzed +theoretically or scientifically. As we have already stated, the science +of understanding deals with all objects. But all objects which this +science may wish to analyze theoretically, must first be handled +practically. According to their special natures, they must either be +handled in various ways, or carefully inspected, or scrutinized by +intent listening, in short they must be thoroughly experienced in some +way.</p> + +<p>It is a fact of experience that men think. The object or suggestion is +furnished by facts, and we then derive the concept instinctively. Thus, +to analyze the faculty of thought means to find that which is common or +general to the various personal and temporary processes of thought. In +order to follow this study by the methods of natural science, we require +neither physical instruments nor chemical <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span>reagents. The sense +perception which is indispensable for every scientific understanding, is +so to say present in this case <i>a priori</i>, without further experience. +Every one possesses the object of our study, the fact of thought faculty +and its experience, in the memories of himself or herself.</p> + +<p>We have seen that thought like any other activity as well as its +scientific analysis is everywhere developing the general or abstract out +of particular and concrete sense perceptions. We now express this in the +following words: The common feature of all separate thought-processes +consists in their seeking the general character or unity which is common +to all objects experienced in their manifold variety by sense +perceptions. The general element which is common to the different +animals, or to the different manifestations of light, is that which +constitutes the general animal or light concept. The general is the +nature of all concepts, of all understanding, all science, all thought +processes. Thus we arrive at the understanding that the analysis of the +faculty of thought reveals its nature of finding that which is general +and common to concrete and distinct things. The eye studies the visible, +the ear the audible, and our brain that which is generally conceivable.</p> + +<p>We have seen that thought like any other activity requires an object; +that it is unlimited in the choice of its objects, because all things +may become the objects of thought; that these objects are perceived in +manifold forms by various senses; and that they are transformed into +simple ideas by extricating that which they possess in common, which is +similar, which is general in them. If we apply this <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span>experienced +understanding of the general method of thought processes to our special +object, the faculty of thought, we realize that we have thus solved our +problem, because all we were looking for was the general method of the +thought process.</p> + +<p><i>If the development of the general out of the concrete constitutes the +general method by which reason arrives at understanding, then we have +fully grasped reason as the faculty of deriving the general out of the +concrete.</i></p> + +<p>Thinking is a physical process and it cannot exist or produce anything +without materials any more than any other process of labor. My thought +requires some material which can be thought of. This material is +furnished by the phenomena of nature and life. These are the concrete +things. In claiming that the universe, or all things, may be the object +of thought, we simply mean that the materials of the thought process, +the objects of the mind, are infinite in quantity and quality. The +materials which the universe furnishes for our thought are as infinite +as space, as eternal as time, and as absolutely manifold as the nature +of these two forms of being. The faculty of thought is a universal +faculty in so far as it enters into relations with all things, all +substances, all phenomena, and thus generates thought. But it is not +absolute, since it requires for its existence and action the previous +presence of matter. Matter is the boundary, beyond which the mind cannot +pass. Matter furnishes the background for the illumination of the mind, +but is not consumed in this illumination. Mind is a product of matter, +but matter is more than a product of mind, being perceived also through +the five senses and thus brought to our notice. We call<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> real, objective +products, or "things themselves" only such products as are revealed to +us simultaneously by the senses and the mind.</p> + +<p>Reason is a real thing only in so far as it is perceived by the senses. +The perceptible actions of reason are revealed in the brain of man as +well as in the world outside of it. For are not the effects tangible by +which reason transforms nature and life? We see the successes of science +with our eyes and grasp them with our hands. It is true that science or +reason cannot produce such material effects out of themselves. The world +of sense perceptions, the objects outside of the human brain, must be +given. But what thing is there that has any effects "in itself?" In +order that light may shine, that the sun may warm, and revolve in its +course, there must be space and other things which may be lighted and +warmed and passed. In order that my table may have color, there must be +light and eyes. And everything else which my table is besides, it can be +only in contact with other things. Its being is just as manifold as +those various contacts or relations. In short, the world consists only +in its interrelations. Any thing that is torn out of its relations with +the world ceases to exist. A thing is anything "in itself" only because +it is something for other things, by acting or appearing in connection +with something else.</p> + +<p>If we wish to regard the world in the light of the "thing itself," we +shall easily see that the world "itself" and the world as it appears, +the world of phenomena, differ only in the same way in which the whole +differs from its component parts. The world "itself" is nothing else but +the sum total of its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>phenomena. The same holds good of that part of the +world phenomena which we call reason, spirit, faculty of thought. +Although we distinguish between the faculty of thought and its phenomena +or manifestations, yet the faculty of thought "itself," or "pure" +reason, exists in reality only in the sum total of its manifestations. +Seeing is the physical existence of the faculty of sight. We possess the +whole only by means of its parts, and we can possess reason, like all +other things, only by the help of its effects, by its various thoughts. +But we repeat that reason does not precede thought in the order of time. +On the contrary thoughts generated by perceptible objects serve as a +basis for the development of the concept of the faculty of thought. Just +as the understanding of the world movements has taught us that the sun +is not revolving around the earth, so the understanding of the thought +process tells us that it is not the faculty of thought which creates +thought, but vice versa, that the concept of this faculty is created out +of a series of concrete thoughts. Hence the faculty of thought +practically exists only as the sum total of our thoughts, just as the +faculty of sight exists only through the sum of the things that we see.</p> + +<p>These thoughts, this practical reason, serve as the material out of +which our brain manufactures the concept of "pure" reason. Reason is +necessarily impure in practice, which means that it must connect itself +with some object. Pure reason, or abstract reason without any special +content, cannot be anything else but the general characteristic of all +concrete reasoning processes. We possess this general nature of reason +in two ways: In an impure state,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> that is as practical and concrete +phenomenon, consisting of the sum of our real perceptions, and in a pure +state, that is theoretically or abstractly, in the concept. The +phenomenon of reason is distinguished from reason "itself" just as the +real animals are distinguished from the concept of the animal.</p> + +<p>Every actual reasoning process is based on some real object which has +many qualities like all things in nature. The faculty of thought +extracts from this many-sided object those properties which are general +or common with it. A mouse and an elephant, as the objects of our +reasoning activity, lose their differences in the general animal +concept. Such a concept combines many things under one uniform point of +view, it develops one general idea out of many concrete things. Since +understanding is the general or common quality of all reasoning +processes, it follows that reason in general, or the general nature of +the reasoning process, consists in abstracting the general ideal +character from any concrete thing perceptible by the help of the senses.</p> + +<p>Reason being unable to exist without some objects outside of itself, it +is understood that we can perceive "pure" reason, or reason "itself," +only by its practical manifestations. We cannot find reason without +objects outside of it with which it comes in contact and produces +thought, any more than we can find any eyes without light. And the +manifestations of reason are as varied as the objects which supply its +material. It is plain, then, that reason has no separate existence "in +itself," but that on the contrary the concept of reason is formed out of +the material supplied by the senses.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span></p><p>Mental processes appear only in connection with perceptible phenomena. +These processes are themselves phenomena of sense perception which, in +connection with a brain process, produce the concept of the faculty of +thought "itself." If we analyze this concept, we find that "pure" reason +consists in the activity of producing general ideas out of concrete +materials, which include so-called immaterial thoughts. In other words, +reason may be characterized as an activity which seeks for unity in +every multiplicity and equalizes all contrasts whether it deals with the +many different sides and parts of one or of more objects. All these +different statements describe the same thing in different words, so that +the reader may not cling to the empty word, but grasp the living +concept, the manifold object, in its general nature.</p> + +<p>Reason, we said, exists in a "pure" state as the development of the +general out of the special, of the abstract out of concrete sense +perceptions. This is the whole content of pure reason, of scientific +understanding, of consciousness. And by the terms "pure" and "whole" we +simply indicate that we mean the general content of the various thought +processes, the general form of reason. Apart from this general abstract +form, reason, like all other things, has also its concrete, special, +sense form which we perceive directly through our experience. Hence our +entire process of consciousness consists in the experience of the +senses, that is in the physical process, and its understanding. +Understanding is the general reflection of any object.</p> + +<p>Consciousness, as the Latin root of the word indicates, is the knowledge +of being in existence. It is a form, or a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> quality, of existence which +differs from other forms of being in that it is aware of its existence. +Quality cannot be explained, but must be experienced. We know by +experience that consciousness includes along with the knowledge of being +in existence the difference and contradiction between subject and +object, thinking and being, between form and content, between phenomenon +and essential thing, between attribute and substance, between the +general and the concrete. This innate contradiction explains the various +terms applied to consciousness, such as the organ of abstraction, the +faculty of generalization or unification, or in contradistinction +thereto the faculty of differentiation. For consciousness generalizes +differences and differentiates generalities. Contradiction is innate in +consciousness, and its nature is so contradictory that it is at the same +time a differentiating, a generalizing, and an understanding nature. +Consciousness generalizes contradiction. It recognizes that all nature, +all being, lives in contradictions, that everything is what it is only +in co-operation with its opposite. Just as visible things are not +visible without the faculty of sight, and vice versa the faculty of +sight cannot see anything but what is visible, so contradiction must be +recognized as something general which pervades all thought and being. +The science of understanding, by generalizing contradiction, solves all +concrete contradictions.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>III</span> <span class="smaller">THE NATURE OF THINGS</span></h2> + +<p>In so far as the faculty of understanding is a physical object, the +knowledge of its nature is a matter of physical science. But in so far +as we understand all things by the help of this faculty, the science of +understanding becomes metaphysics. Inasmuch as the scientific analysis +of reason reverses the current conception of its nature, this specific +understanding necessarily reverses our entire world philosophy. With the +understanding of the nature of reason, we arrive at the long sought +understanding of the "nature of things."</p> + +<p>We wish to know, understand, conceive, recognize all things in their +very nature, not in their outward appearance. Science seeks to +understand the nature of things, or their true essence, by means of +their manifestations. Every thing has its own special nature, and this +nature is not seen, or felt, or heard, but solely perceived by the +faculty of thought. This faculty explores the nature of all things just +as the eye explores all that is visible in things. Just as the nature of +sight is understood by the theory of vision, so the nature of things in +general is understood by the theory of understanding.</p> + +<p>It is true that it sounds contradictory to say that the nature of a +thing does not appear to the eye, but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> to the faculty of thought, and at +the same time to imply that the opposite of appearance, nature, should +appear. But we here refer to the nature of a thing as a phenomenon in +the same way in which we referred to the mind as a perception of the +senses, and we shall demonstrate further on that every being is a +phenomenon, and every phenomenon is more or less of an essential thing.</p> + +<p>We have seen that the faculty of thought requires for its vital activity +an object, or raw material. The effect of reasoning is seen in science, +no matter whether we understand the term science in its narrow classical +sense or in its broadest meaning of any kind of knowledge. The phenomena +of sense perception constitute the general object or material of +science. Sense perceptions arise from infinite circulation of matter. +The universe and all things in it consist of transformations of matter +which take place simultaneously and consecutively in space and time. The +universe is in every place and at any time itself, new, and present for +the first time. It arises and passes away, passes and arises under our +very hands. Nothing remains the same, only the infinite change is +constant, and even the change varies. Every particle of time and space +brings new changes. It is true that the materialist believes in the +permanency, eternity, indestructibility of matter. He teaches us that +not the smallest particle of matter has ever been lost in the world, +that matter simply changes its forms eternally, but that its nature +lasts indestructibly through all eternity. And yet, in spite of all +distinctions between matter itself and its perishable form, the +materialist is on the other hand more<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> inclined than any one else to +dwell on the identity of matter and its forms. Inasmuch as the +materialist speaks ironically of formless matter and matterless forms, +in the same breath with perishable forms of imperishable matter, it is +plain that materialism is not informed any more than idealism as to the +relation of content to form, of a phenomenon to the essential nature of +its subject. Where do we find such eternal, imperishable, formless +matter? In the world of sense perceptions we never meet anything but +forms of perishable matter. It is true that there is matter everywhere. +Wherever anything passes away, something new instantly arises. But +nowhere has any homogeneous, unchangeable matter enduring without any +form, ever been discovered. Even a chemically indivisible element is +only a relative unit in its actual existence, and in extension of time +as well as in extension through space it varies simultaneously and +consecutively as much as any organic individual which also changes only +its concrete forms, but remains the same in its general nature from +beginning to end. My body changes continually its fleshy tissue, bones, +and every other particle belonging to it, and yet it always remains the +same. What constitutes, then, this body which is distinguished from its +transient form? It is the sum total, in a generalized way, of all its +varied concrete forms. Eternal and imperishable matter exists in reality +only as the sum total of its perishable forms. The statement that matter +is imperishable cannot mean anything but that there will always and +everywhere be matter. It is just as true to say that matter is +imperishable and merely changes its forms, as it is to say that matter<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> +exists only in its changing forms, that it is matter which changes and +that only the change is eternal. The terms "changeable matter" and +"material change" are after all only different expressions for the same +thing.</p> + +<p>In the practical world of sense perceptions, there is nothing permanent, +nothing homogeneous, nothing beyond nature, nothing like a "thing +itself." Everything is changing, passing, phantomlike, so to say. One +phantom is chased by another. "Nevertheless," says Kant, "things are +also something in themselves," for otherwise we should have the absurd +contradiction that there could be phenomena without things that produce +them. But no! A phenomena is no more and no less different from the +thing which produces it than the stretch of a twenty-mile road is +different from the road itself. Or we may distinguish between a knife +and its blade and handle, but we know that there would be no knife if +there were no blade and no handle. The essential nature of the universe +is change. Phenomena appear, that is all.</p> + +<p>The contradiction between the "thing itself," or its essence, and its +outward appearance is fully solved by a complete critique of reason +which arrives at the understanding that the human faculty of thought may +generalize any number of varied sense perceptions under one uniform +point of view, by singling out the general and equivalent forms and thus +regarding everything it may meet as a concrete part of one and the same +whole.</p> + +<p>In other words, the relative and transient forms perceived by our senses +serve as raw material for our brain activity, which abstracts the +general likeness out<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> of the concrete forms and systematizes or +classifies them for our consciousness. The infinite variety of sense +perceptions passes in review before our subjective mind, and it +constructs out of the multiplicity the unity, out of the parts the +whole, out of the phenomena the essential nature, out of the perishable +the imperishable, out of the attributes the subject. The essence, the +nature of things, the "thing itself" is an ideal, a spiritual +conception. Consciousness knows how to make sums out of different units. +It can take any number of units for its sums. The entire multiplicity of +the universe is theoretically conceived as one unit. On the other hand, +every abstract sum consists in reality of an infinite number of sense +perceptions. Where do we find any indivisible unit outside of our +abstract conceptions? Two halves, four fourths, eight eighths, or an +infinite number of separate parts form the raw material out of which the +mind fashions the mathematical unit. This book, its leaves, its letters, +or their parts, are they units? Where do I begin, where do I stop? In +the same way, I may call a library with many volumes, a house, a farm, +and finally the whole universe, a unit. Is not everything a part, is not +every part a thing? Is the color of a leaf less of a thing than that +leaf itself? Perhaps some would call the color simply an attribute and +the leaf its substance, because there might be a leaf without color, but +no color without a leaf. But as surely as we exhaust a heap of sand by +scattering it, just as surely do we remove all the substance of a leaf +when we take away its attributes one after the other. Color is only the +sum of reactions of leaf, light, and eye, and so is all the rest of the +matter of a leaf an aggregate of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> interactions. In the same way in which +our reason deprives a leaf of its color attributes and sets it apart as +a "thing itself," may we continue to deprive that leaf of all its other +attributes, and in so doing we finally take away everything that makes +the leaf. Color is in its nature no less a substance than the leaf +itself, and the leaf is no less an attribute than its color. As the +color is an attribute of a leaf, so a leaf is an attribute of a tree, a +tree an attribute of the earth, the earth an attribute of the universe. +The universe is the substance, substance in general, and all other +substances are but its attributes. And this world-substance reveals the +fact that the nature of things, the "thing itself" as distinguished from +its manifestations, is only a concept of the mind.</p> + +<p>In its universal search from the attribute to the substance, from the +relative to the absolute, from the appearance of things to the true +things, the mind finally arrives at the understanding that the substance +is nothing but a sum of attributes collected by brain activity, and that +the mind itself, or reason, is a substantial being which creates +abstract mental units out of a multitude of sense perceptions and +conceives of the universe as an absolute whole, as an independent "thing +itself," by adding all its transient manifestations. In turning away +full of dissatisfaction from attributes, searching restlessly after the +substance, throwing aside phenomena, and forever groping for truth, for +the nature of things, for the "thing itself," and in finally realizing +that this substantial truth is merely the sum of all socalled untruths, +the totality of all phenomena, the mind proves itself to be the creator +of the abstract concept of substance. But it did not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> create this +concept out of nothing. On the contrary, it generated the concept of a +world substance out of attributes, it derived truth out of +manifestations of things.</p> + +<p>The idealist conception that there is an abstract nature behind +phenomena which materialises itself in them, is refuted by the +understanding that this hidden nature does not dwell in the world +outside of the human mind, but in the brain of man. But since the brain +differentiates between phenomena and their nature, between the concrete +and the general, only by means of sense perception, it cannot be denied +that the distinction between phenomena and their nature is well founded; +only the essential nature of things is not found back of phenomena, but +by means of phenomena. This nature is materially existent and our +faculty of thought is a real and natural one.</p> + +<p>It is true of spiritual things as well as of physical ones, in fact it +is true of all things, metaphysically speaking, that they are what they +are, not "in themselves," not in their abstract nature, but in contact +with other things, in reality. In this sense one might say that things +are not what they seem, but manifest themselves because they are +existent, and they manifest themselves in as many different ways as +there are other things with which they enter into relations of time and +space. But the statement that things are not what they seem requires, in +order to be rightly understood, the modification that whatever manifests +itself, exists in nature, and its existence is limited by its +manifestations. "We cannot perceive heat itself," says a book on physics +written by Professor Koppe, "we merely conclude from its manifestations +that it is present in nature." Thus reasons a naturalist who<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> seeks to +understand a thing by practical and diligent study of its +manifestations, but who seeks refuge in the speculative belief in a +hidden "thing itself" whenever a lack of understanding of the +fundamentals of logic embarrasses him. We, on the contrary, conclude +that there is no such thing as "heat itself," since it cannot be found, +in nature, and we conceive of heat as effects of matter which the human +brain translated into the conception of "heat itself." Because science +was, perhaps, as yet unable to analyse this conception, the professor +says we cannot perceive the natural object which gives rise to this +conception. "Heat itself" is simply composed of the sum total of its +manifold effects, and there is nothing else to it. The faculty of +thought generalizes this variety of effects under the concept of heat in +general. The analysis of this conception, the discovery of the general +character of the various manifestations of heat, is the function of +inductive science. But the conception of heat separated from its effects +is a speculative idea, similar to Lichtenberg's knife without handle and +blade.</p> + +<p>The faculty of thought in touch with sense perceptions produces the +nature of things. But it produces them no more independently of things +outside than do the eye, the ear, or any other sense of man. It is not +the "things themselves" which we see or feel, but their effects on our +eyes, hands, etc. The faculty of reason to generalize different +perceptions of the eye permits us to distinguish between concrete sights +and sight in general. The faculty of thought conceives of any concrete +sight as an object of sight in general. It furthermore distinguishes +between subjective and objective sight perceptions, the latter being +sights which are <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span>visible not alone to the individual eye, but to +eyesight in general. Even the visions of a spiritualist, or such +subjective impressions as forked lightning, circles of fire, caused by +excited blood of closed eyes, serve as objects for the critical +consciousness. A glittering object revealed by bright sunlight miles +away is no more and no less tangible in substance, no more and no less +true, than any optical illusion. A man whose ear is tingling hears +something, though it is not the tinkling of bells. Every sense +perception is an object, and every object is a sense perception. The +object of any subjective mind is a passing manifestation, and every +objective perception is but a perishable subject. The object of +observation may exist in a more tangible, less approachable, more +stable, or more general form, but it is not a "thing itself." It may be +perceived not alone by my eyes, but also by those of others, not by the +eyes, but also by the feeling, the hearing, the taste, etc. And it may +be noticed not alone by men, but also by other objects. But nevertheless +it appears only as a manifestation, it is different in different places, +it is not today what it is tomorrow. Every existence is relative, in +touch with other things, and entering into different relations of time +and space with them.</p> + +<p>Every sense perception is an actual and natural object. Truth exists in +the form of natural phenomena, and whatever is, is true. Substance and +attribute are only terms for certain relations. They are not +contradictions, and, as a matter of fact, all contradictions disappear +before our faculty of generalization and differentiation. For this +faculty reconciles all contradictions by finding a general quality in +all differences. Existence, or universal truth, is the general object, +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> raw material, of the faculty of thought. This material is of the +utmost variety and supplied by the senses. The senses reveal to us the +substance of the universe in the forms of concrete qualities, in other +words, the nature of perceptible matter is revealed to the faculty of +thought through a variety of concrete forms. It is not perceived as a +general essence, but only through interdependent phenomena. Out of the +interdependence of the sense perceptions with our faculty of thought +there arise quantities, general concepts, things, true perceptions, or +understood truths.</p> + +<p>Essence and truth are two terms for the same thing. Truth, or the +essence and nature of things, is a theoretical concept. As we have seen, +we receive impressions of things in two ways, viz., a sense impression +and a mental impression, the one practical, the other theoretical. +Practice furnishes us with the sense impression, theory with the mental +nature of things.</p> + +<p>Practice is the premise of theory, sense perception the premise of the +nature which is also called the truth. The same truth manifests itself +in practice either simultaneously or consecutively in the same place or +in different places. It exists theoretically as a homogeneous +conception.</p> + +<p>Practice, phenomena, sense perceptions, are absolute qualities, that is +to say they have no quantitative limitation, they are not restricted by +time or space. They are absolute and infinite qualities. The qualities +of a thing are as infinite as its parts. On the other hand, the work of +the faculty of thought, of theory, creates at will an infinite number of +quantities, and it conceives every quality of sense <i>perceptions</i> in the +form of quantities, as the essential nature of things, as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> truths. Every +conception has a quality of some sense perception for its object. Every +object can be conceived by the faculty of thought only as a quantitative +unit, as true nature, as truth.</p> + +<p>The faculty of thought produces in contact with sense perceptions that +which manifests itself as true nature, as a general truth. A primitive +concept accomplishes this at first only instinctively, while a +scientific concept is a conscious and voluntary repetition of this +primitive act. Scientific understanding wanting to know an object, such +as for instance heat, is not hunting after the phenomena themselves. It +does not aim to see or hear how heat melts iron or wax, how it benefits +in one case or injures in another, how it makes eggs solid or ice +liquid, nor does it concern itself with the difference between the heat +of an animal, of the sun, or of a stove. All these things are from the +point of view of the faculty of understanding, only effects, phenomena, +qualities. It desires to get at the essence, the true nature of things, +it strives to find a general law, a concise scientific extract, of +things seen, heard, and felt. The abstract nature of things cannot be a +tangible object. It is a concept of theory, of science, of the faculty +of thought. The understanding of heat consists in singling out that +which is common to all phenomena of heat, which is essential or true for +all heat. <i>Practically the nature of heat consists of the sum total of +all its manifestations, theoretically in its concept, scientifically in +the analysis of this concept. To analyze the concept of heat means to +ascertain that which is common to all manifestations of heat.</i></p> + +<p>The general nature of the thing is its true nature,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> the general quality +its true quality. We define rain more truly as being wet than as being +fertilizing, because it gives moisture wherever it falls, while it +fertilizes only under certain circumstances and in certain places. My +true friend is one who is constant and loyal to me all my life under all +circumstances. Of course, we must not believe in any absolute and +unconditional friendship any more than in any absolute and eternal +truth. Perfectly true, perfectly universal, is only the general +existence, the universe, the absolute quantity. But the real world is +absolutely relative, absolutely perishable, an infinity of +manifestations, an infinity of qualities. All truths are simply parts of +this world, partial truths. Semblance and truth flow dialectically into +one another like hard and soft, good and bad, right and wrong, but at +the same time they remain different. Even though I know that there is no +rain which is "fertile in itself," and no friend who is true in an +absolute sense, I may nevertheless refer to a certain rain as fertile in +relation to certain crops, and I may distinguish between my more or less +true friends.</p> + +<p>The universe is the truth. The universe is that which is universal, that +is, things which exist and are perceived. The general mark of truth is +existence, because universal existence is truth. Now, existence is not a +general abstraction, but a reality in the concrete form of sense +perceptions. The world of sense perceptions has its true and perceptible +existence in the passing and manifold manifestations of nature and life. +Therefore all manifestations are recognized as relative truths, all +truths as concrete and temporal manifestations. The manifestation of +practice is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span>considered as a truth in theory, and vice versa, the truth +of theory is manifested in practice. Opposites are mutually relative. +Truth and error differ only comparatively, in volume of degree, like +being and seeming, life and death, light and dark, like all other +opposites in the world. It is a matter of course that all things of this +world are worldly, consequently are of the same matter, the same nature, +the same family, the same quality. In other words, every volume of +perceptible manifestation forms in contact with the human faculty of +thought a being, a truth, a general thing. For our consciousness, every +particle of dust as well as every dust cloud, or any other mass of +material manifestations, is on the one hand an abstract "thing in +itself," and on the other a passing phenomenon of the absolute object, +the universe. Inside of this universe the various manifestations are +systematized or generalized at will and on purpose by means of our mind. +The chemical element is as much a manysided system as the organic cell +or the whole vegetable kingdom. The smallest and the largest being is +divided into individuals, species, families, classes, etc. This +systematization, this generalization, this generation of beings is +continued in an ascending scale up to the infinity of the universe, and +in the descending scale down to the infinity of the parts. In the eyes +of the faculty of thought all qualities become abstract things, all +things relative qualities.</p> + +<p>Every thing, every sense perception, no matter how subjective or +shortlived it may be, is true, is a certain part of truth. In other +words, the truth exists, not only in the general existence, but every +concrete existence has also its own distinct generality or truth. Every<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> +object, whether it be a mere passing idea, or a volatile scent, or some +tangible matter, constitutes a sum of manifold phenomena. The faculty of +thought turns various quantities into one, discerns the equality in +different things, seeks the unity in the multiplicity. Mind and matter +have at least actual existence in common. Organic nature agrees with +inorganic nature in being material. It is true that there are wide +divergences between man, monkey, elephant, and plants attached to the +soil, but even greater differences are reconciled under the term +"organism." However much a stone may differ from a human heart, thinking +reason will discover innumerable similarities in them. They at least +agree in being matter, they are both visible, tangible, and may be +weighed, etc. Their differences are as manifold as their likenesses. +Solomon truly says that there is nothing new under the sun, and Schiller +also says truly that the world grows old and again grows young. What +abstract thing, being, existence, generality is there that is not +manifold in its sense manifestations, and individually different from +all other things? There are no two drops of water alike. I am now in +many respects different from what I was an hour ago, and the likeness +between my brother and myself is only relatively greater than the +likeness between a watch and an oyster. In short, the faculty of thought +is a faculty of absolute generalization, it classes all things without +exception under one head, it comprises and understands everything +uniformly, while sense perceptions show absolutely everything in a +different, new and individual light.</p> + +<p>If we apply this metaphysics<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> to our study, the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span>faculty of thought, +we see that its functions, like all other things, are material +manifestations, which are all equally true. All manifestations of the +mind, all ideas, opinions, errors, partake of a certain truth, all of +them have a kernel of truth. Just as inevitably as a painter derives all +forms of his creation from perceptible objects around him, so are all +ideas, images of true things, theories of true objects. So far as +perceptions are perceptions, it is a matter of course that all +perceptions perceive something. So far as knowledge is knowledge, it +requires no explanation that all knowledge knows something. This follows +from the rule of identity, according to which a equals a, or from the +rule of contradiction, according to which 100 is not 1,000.</p> + +<p>All perceptions are thoughts. One might claim, on the other hand, that +all thoughts are not perceptions. One might define "perceiving" as a +special kind of thought, as real objective thought in distinction from +supposing, believing, or imagining. But it cannot be denied that all +thoughts have a common nature, in spite of their many differences. +Thought is treated in the court of the faculty of thought like all other +things, it is made uniform. No matter how different the thoughts I had +yesterday may be from those I have to-day, no matter how much the +thoughts of different human beings may vary at different times, no +matter how clearly we may distinguish between such thoughts as those +expressed by the terms idea, conception, judgment, conclusion, +impression, etc., they each and all possess the same common and +universal nature, because all of them are manifestations of mind.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span></p><p>It follows, then, that the difference between true and erroneous +thoughts, between understanding and misunderstanding, like all other +differences, is only relative. A thought "in itself" is neither false +nor true, it is either of these only in relation to some other object. +Thoughts, conceptions, theories, natures, truths, all have this in +common that they belong to some object. We have seen that any object is +a part of the multiplicity of sense perceptions in the world outside of +our brains. After as much of the universal being as constitutes the +object which is to be understood has been defined by some customary term +of language, truth is to be found in the discovery of the general nature +of this perceptible part of being.</p> + +<p>The perceptible parts of being which constitute the things of this world +have not only a semblance and manifestation, but also a true nature +which is given by means of their manifestation. The nature of things is +as infinite in number as the world of sense perceptions is infinitely +divisible in space and time. Every part of any phenomenon has its own +nature, every special phenomenon has its general truth. A phenomenon is +perceived in touch with the senses, while the true or essential nature +of things is perceived in contact with our faculty of thought. In this +way we find ourselves face to face with the necessity of speaking here, +where the nature of things is up for discussion, simultaneously of the +faculty of thought, and on the other hand of dealing with the nature of +things when the faculty of thought is our main subject.</p> + +<p>We said at the outset: The criterion of truth includes the criterion of +reason. Truth, like reason,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> consists in developing a general concept, +or an abstract theory, from a given sum of sense perceptions. Therefore +it is not abstract truth which is the criterion of true understanding, +but we rather refer to that understanding as being true which produces +the truth, or the general hall-mark of any concrete object. Truth must +be objective, that is to say it must be the truth about some concrete +object. Perceptions cannot be true to themselves, they are true only in +relation to some definite object, and to some outside facts. The work of +understanding consists in the abstraction of the general hall-mark from +concrete objects. The concrete is the measure of the general, the +standard of truth. Whatever is, is true, no matter how much or how +little true it may be. Once we have found existence, its general nature +follows as truth itself. The difference between that which is more or +less general, between being and seeming, between truth and error, is +limited to definite conditions, for it presupposes the relation to some +special object. Whether a perception is true or false will, therefore, +depend not so much on perception as on the scope of the question which +perception tries to solve of its own accord or which it is called upon +to solve by external circumstances. A perfect understanding is possible +only within definite limits. A perfect truth is one which is always +aware of its imperfection. For instance, it is perfectly true that all +bodies have weight only because the concept of "body" has previously +been limited to things which have weight. After reason has assigned the +conception of "body in general" to things of various weights, it is no +longer a matter for surprise to find that bodies must inevitably have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> +weight. Once it is assumed that the term "bird" was abstracted +exclusively from flying animals, we may be sure that all birds fly, +whether they are in heaven, on earth, or in any other place. And to +explain this we do not require the belief in <i>a priori</i> conceptions +which are supposed to differ from empirical conceptions by their strict +necessity and generality. Truths are valid only under certain +conditions, and under certain conditions errors may be true. It is a +true perception that the sun is shining, provided we understand that the +sky is not covered by clouds. And it is no less true that a straight +stick becomes crooked in flowing water, provided we understand that this +truth is an optical one. <i>Truth is that which is common or general to +our reasoning faculty within a given circle of sense perceptions. To +call within a definite circle of sense perceptions that which is +exceptional or special the rule or the general, is error.</i> Error, the +opposite of truth, arises when the faculty of thought, or consciousness, +inadvertently or shortsightedly and without previous experience concedes +to certain phenomena a more general scope than is supported by the +senses, for instance when it hastily attributes to what is in fact only +an optical existence, a supposed plastic existence also.</p> + +<p>The judgment of error is a prejudice. Truth and error, understanding and +misunderstanding, knowing and not knowing, have their common habitation +in the faculty of thought which is the organ of science. Thought at +large is the general expression of experienced facts perceived by the +senses, and it includes errors as well. Error is distinguished from +truth in that the former assigns to any definite fact of which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> it is a +manifestation, a wider and more general existence than is supported by +sense perceptions and experience. Unwarranted assumption is the nature +of error. A glass bead does not become a counterfeit, until it pretends +to be a genuine pearl.</p> + +<p>Schleiden says of the eye: "When the excited blood expands the veins and +presses on the nerves, we feel it in the fingers as pain, we see it in +the eyes as forked lightning. And thus we obtain the irrefutable proof +that our conceptions are free creations of the mind, that we do not +perceive the external world as it really is, but that its reflex actions +on us simply give rise to a peculiar brain activity, on our part. The +products of this activity are frequently connected with certain +processes of the external world, but frequently they are not. We close +our eyes and we see a circle of light, but there is in reality no +shining body. It is easy to see that this may be a great and dangerous +source of errors of all kinds. From the teasing forms of a misty +moonlight night to the threatening and insanity-producing visions of the +believer in ghosts we meet a series of illusions which are not derived +from any direct processes of external nature, but belong to the field of +the free activity of the mind which is subject to error. It requires +great judgment and wide education, before the mind learns to break away +from all its own errors and to control them. Reading in general seems so +easy, and yet it is a difficult art. It is only by degrees that the mind +learns to understand which of the messages of the nerves may be trusted +and used as a basis for conceptions. The light, if we consider it +entirely by itself, is not clear, not yellow, nor blue nor red. The +light is a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> movement of a very fine and everywhere diffused substance, +the ether."</p> + +<p>The beautiful world of light and splendor, of color and form, is +supposed not to be a perception of something which really is. "Through +the thick covering of the grape arbor, a ray of sunlight undulates into +the cooling shadows. You think you see the ray of light itself, but what +you really see is nothing but a flock of dust particles." The truth +about light and color is said to be that they are "waves rushing through +ether in restless succession at the rate of 160,000 miles per second." +This true physical nature of light and color is supposed to be so +illusive, that "it required the sharp intellects of the greatest +thinkers to reveal to us this true nature of light. We find that every +one of our senses is susceptible only to definite external influences, +and that the stimulation of different senses produces different +conceptions in our mind. Thus the sense organs are the mediators between +the external soulless world (undulations of the ether), which is +revealed to us by science, and the beautiful world of sense perceptions +in which we find ourselves with our minds."</p> + +<p>Schleiden thus gives an illustration of the fact that there is still a +great deal of embarrassment, even in our times, when the understanding +of these two worlds is under discussion, that there is still much +helpless groping to explain the connection between the world of thought, +of knowledge or science, which is in this case represented by +undulations of the ether, and between the world of our five senses, +represented by the bright and colored lights of the eyes or of reality. +At the same time this illustration shows how<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> queer the traditional +survivals of speculative philosophy sound in the mouth of a modern +scientist. The confused condition of this mode of thought is seen in the +distinction between "an external sense-perceived world of science" and +another one, "in which we find ourselves with our minds." The +distinction between the senses and the mind, between theory and +practice, between the special and the general, between truth and error, +has been noticed by such thinkers, but they have no solution for it. +They know there is something missing, but they do not know where to look +for it, and therefore they are confused.</p> + +<p>The great scientific achievement of the XIXth century consists in the +victory over speculation, over knowledge without sense perception, in +the delivery of the senses from the thraldom of such knowledge, and in +the foundation of empirical investigation. To acknowledge the +theoretical value of this achievement means to come to an understanding +about the source of error. Contrary to a philosophy that tries to +discover truth with the mind, and error with the senses, we seek for +truth with the senses and regard the mind as the source of errors. The +belief in certain messages of the nerves which are alone worthy of +confidence and which can be understood only by degrees without any +specific mark of distinction, is a superstition. Let us have confidence +in all testimonials of the senses. There is nothing false to be +separated from the genuine. The supernatural mind idea is the only +deceiver whenever it undertakes to disregard the sense perceptions, and, +instead of being the interpreter of the senses, tries to enlarge their +statements and repeat what has not been dictated. The eye, in seeing +forked<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> lightning or radiant circles when the blood is excited or a +pressure exerted on it, perceives no more errors than it does in +perceiving any other manifestation of the external world. It is our +faculty of thought which makes a mistake, by regarding without further +inquiry such subjective events as objective bodies. One who sees ghosts +does not commit any mistake, until he claims that his personal +apparition is a general phenomenon, until he prematurely takes something +for an experience which he has not experienced. Error is an offense +against the law of truth which prescribes to our consciousness that it +must remember the limits within which a perception is true, or general. +Error makes out of something special a generality, out of a predicate a +subject, and takes the part for the whole. Error makes <i>a priori</i> +conclusions, while truth, its opposite, arrives at understanding by <i>a +posteriori</i> reasoning.</p> + +<p><i>A priori</i> and <i>a posteriori</i> understanding are related in the same way +as philosophy and natural science, taking the latter in the widest +meaning of the term, that of science in general. The contrast between +believing and knowing is duplicated in that between philosophy and +natural science. Speculative philosophy, like religion, lives on faith. +The modern world has transformed faith into science. The reactionists in +politics who demand that science retrace its steps desire its return to +faith. The content of faith is acquired without exertion. Faith makes <i>a +priori</i> perceptions, while science arrives at its knowledge by hard <i>a +posteriori</i> study. To give up faith means to give up taking things easy. +And to confine science to <i>a posteriori</i> knowledge means to decorate it +with the characteristic mark of modern times, work.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span></p><p>It is not a result of scientific study, but merely a freak of +philosophy on the part of Schleiden to deny the reality and truth of +light phenomena, to call them fantasmagoria created by the free play of +the mind. His superstitious belief in philosophical speculation misleads +him into abandoning the scientific method of induction and speaking of +"waves rushing through ether in restless succession at the rate of +160,000 miles per hour" as being the real and true nature of light and +color, in contradistinction to the color phenomena of light. The +perversion of this mode of procedure becomes evident by his referring to +the material world of the eyes as a "creation of the mind" and to the +undulations of the ether, revealed by the "sharp intellect of the +greatest thinkers" as "physical nature."</p> + +<p>The truth of science maintains the same relation to the sense perception +that the general does to the special. Waves of light, the so-called +truth of light and color, represent the "true" nature of light only in +so far as they represent what is common to all light phenomena, whether +they are white, yellow, blue, or any other color. The world of the mind, +or of science finds its raw material, its premise, its proof, its +beginning, and its boundary in sense perception.</p> + +<p>When we have learned that the nature, or the truth, of things is not +back of their phenomena, but can be perceived only by the help of +phenomena, and that it does not exist "in itself," but only in +connection with the faculty of understanding, that the nature is +separated from the phenomena only by thought; and when we see on the +other hand, that the faculty of understanding does not derive +conceptions out of itself, but only out of their relations with some +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span>phenomenon; then this discussion of the "nature of things" is an +evidence that the nature of the faculty of thought is a conception which +we have obtained from its sense manifestations. To understand that the +faculty of thought, although universal in the choice of its objects, is +nevertheless limited in that it requires some object; to recognize that +the true thought process, that is to say the thought with a scientific +result, differs from unscientific thinking by consciously attaching +itself to some external object; to realize that truth, or universality, +is not perceived "in itself," but can be perceived only by means of some +given object; this frequently varied statement reveals the nature of the +faculty of thought. This statement re-appears at the end of every +chapter, because all special truths, all special chapters, serve only to +demonstrate the general chapter of universal truth.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> E. g., this all-embracing physics.—<span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>IV</span> <span class="smaller">THE PRACTICE OF REASON IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE</span></h2> + +<p>Although we know that reason is attached to perceptible matter, to +physical objects, so that science can never be anything else but the +science of the physical, still we may, according to the prevailing ideas +and usage of language, separate physics from logic and ethics, and thus +distinguish them as different forms of science. The problem is then to +demonstrate that in physics as well as in logic, as also in ethics, the +general or intellectual perceptions can be practically obtained only on +the basis of concrete perceptible facts.</p> + +<p>This practice of reason, to generate thought from matter, to arrive at +understanding by sense perceptions, to produce the general out of the +concrete, has been universally accepted in physical investigation, but +only in practice. The inductive method is employed, and one is aware of +this fact, but it is not understood that the nature of inductive science +is the nature of science in general, of reason. The process of thought +is misunderstood. Physical science lacks the theory of understanding and +for this reason often falls out of its practical step. The faculty of +thought is still an unknown, mysterious, mystical being for natural +science. Either it confounds the function with the organ, the mind with +the brain, as do the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span>materialists, or it thinks with the idealists that +the faculty of thought is an imperceptible object outside of its field. +We see modern investigators marching toward their goal with firm and +uniform steps, so far as physical matters are concerned. But they +aimlessly grope around in the abstract relations of these things. The +inductive method has been practically adopted by natural science and its +successes have secured a great reputation for it. On the other hand, the +speculative method has become discredited by its failures. There is, +however, no conscious understanding of these various methods of thought. +We see the men of physical research, when they are outside of their +special field, offer lawyer-like speculations in lieu of scientific +facts. While they arrive at the special truths of their chosen fields by +sense perceptions, they still pretend to derive speculative truths out +of the depths of their own minds.</p> + +<p>Listen to the following statements of Alexander von Humboldt, which he +makes in the initial argument of his "Cosmos" in regard to speculation: +"The most important result of physical research by sense perception is +this: that it finds the element of unity in a multitude of forms; that +it grasps all the individual manifestations offered by the discoveries +of recent times, carefully scrutinizes and distinguishes them; yet does +not succumb under their mass; that it fulfills the sublime mission of +the human being, of understanding the nature of things which is hidden +under the cover of phenomena. In this way our aim reaches beyond the +narrow limits of the senses, and we may succeed in grasping the nature +by controlling the raw material of empirical observation through<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> ideas. +In my observations of the scientific treatment of general cosmic +phenomena, I am not deriving unity out of a few fundamental principles +found by speculative reason. My work is the expression of a thoughtful +observation of empirical phenomena seen as one and the same nature. I am +not going to venture into a field which is foreign to me. What I call +physical cosmology does not, therefore, aspire to the rank of a rational +science of nature.... True to the character of my former occupation and +writings, which were devoted to experiments, measurements, and +investigations of facts, I confine myself in this work to empirical +observations. It is the only ground on which I can move with a measure +of security." In the same breath Humboldt says that "without the earnest +desire for the knowledge of concrete facts any great and universal world +philosophy would be merely a castle in the air" and in another place +that "an understanding of the universe by speculative and introspective +reason would represent a still more sublime aim" than understanding by +empirical thought. And on page 68 of volume I. he says: "I am far from +finding fault with endeavors of others the success of which still +remains in doubt, when I have had no practical experience with them."</p> + +<p>Now natural science shares with Humboldt the consciousness that the +practice of reason in physical research consists exclusively in +"perceiving the element of unity in a multitude of forms." But on the +other hand, though it does not always admit its belief in speculative +introspection as frankly as Humboldt does, it nevertheless proves that +it does not fully understand the practice of science and that it +believes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> in a metaphysical as well as a physical science by using the +speculative method in the treatment of so-called philosophical topics, +in which the element of unity is supposed to be discovered by +introspective reason instead of an analysis of multiform sense +perceptions, and it demonstrates its lack of unity by being unaware of +the unscientific character of disagreements, by believing in a +metaphysical science outside of the physical domain. The relations +between phenomenon and its nature, cause and effect, matter and force, +substance and spirit, are certainly physical ones. But what is there of +unity that science teaches about them? Plainly then, the work of +science, like that of the farmer, has so far been done only practically, +but not scientifically, not with a predetermination of success. +Understanding, that is to say the practice of understanding, is well +applied in science, I readily admit. But the instrument of this +understanding, the faculty of thought, is misunderstood. We find that +natural science, instead of applying this faculty scientifically, simply +experiments with it. What is the reason for this? Natural science has +neglected the critique of reason, the theory of science, logic.</p> + +<p>Just as the handle and the blade of a knife constitute its general +content, so we found that the general content of reason was the +universal, the general "itself." We know that it does not produce this +content out of itself, but out of given objects, and these objects are +the sum of all natural or physical things. The object of reason is, +therefore, an infinite, unlimited, absolute quantity. This infinite +quantity manifests itself in finite quantities. In the treatment of +relatively small quantities of nature the true essence of reason,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> the +true method of understanding, is well recognized. It remains to be +demonstrated that the great relations of the world, the treatment of +which is still doubtful, are likewise intelligible by the same method. +Cause and effect, mind and matter, matter and force, are such great +world problems, and they are of a physical character. We shall +demonstrate that the most general distinction between reason and its +object furnishes the key to the solution of the great world problems.</p> + +<p><b>(a) Cause and Effect.</b></p> + +<p>"The nature of natural history," says F. W. Bessell, "lies in the fact +that it does not consider phenomena as facts in themselves, but looks +for their causes. The knowledge of nature is thus reduced to the minimum +number of facts." But the causes of the phenomena of nature had been +investigated even before the age of natural history. The characteristic +mark of natural history is not so much that it investigates causes, but +that the causes which it investigates have a peculiar nature and a +particular quality.</p> + +<p>Inductive science has materially changed the conception of causes. It +has retained the term, but uses it in a different sense from that +employed by speculation. The naturalist conceives of causes differently +within his special field and outside of it; here, outside of his +specialty, he frequently indulges in introspective speculation, because +he understands science and its cause in a concrete, but not in a general +way. The unscientific forces are of a supernatural make-up, they are +transcendental spirits, gods, forces, little and big goblins. The +original conception of causes is an anthropomorphic one. In a state of +inexperience, man measures the objective<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> by a subjective standard, +judges the world by himself. Just as he creates things with conscious +intent, so he attributes to nature his human manner, imagines the +existence of an external and creative cause of the phenomena of sense +perception, similar to himself who is the special cause of his own +creations. This subjective mood is to blame for the fact that the +struggle for objective understanding has so long been in vain. The +unscientifically conceived cause is a speculation of the <i>a priori</i> +kind.</p> + +<p>If the term understanding is retained for subjective understanding, then +objective science differs from it in that such a science penetrates to +the causes of its objects not by faith or introspective speculation, but +by experience and induction, not <i>a priori</i>, but <i>a posteriori</i>. Natural +science looks for causes not outside or back of nature's phenomena, but +within or by means of them. Modern research seeks no external creator of +causes, but rather the immanent system, the method or general mode of +the various phenomena as they are given by succession in time. The +unscientifically conceived cause is a "thing in itself," a little god +who generates his effects independently and hides behind them. The +scientific conception of causes, on the other hand, looks only for the +theory of effects, the general element of phenomena. To investigate a +cause means then to generalize a variety of phenomena, to arrange the +multiplicity of experienced facts under one scientific rule. "The +knowledge of nature is thus reduced to the minimum number of facts."</p> + +<p>The commonplace and inept knowledge differs from the most exalted, +rarest, and newly discovered science in the same way in which a petty +and childish<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> superstition differs from the historical superstition of a +whole period. For this reason we may well choose our illustrations from +our daily circle, instead of looking for them in the so-called higher +regions of a remote science. Human common sense had long practiced the +investigation of causes by inductive and scientific methods, before +science realized that it would have to pursue its higher aims in the +same way. Common sense does arrive at the faith in a mysterious cause of +speculative reason, just like the naturalist, as soon as it leaves the +field of its immediate environment. In order to stand firmly on the +ground of real science, every one requires the understanding of the +manner in which inductive reason investigates its causes.</p> + +<p>To this end let us glance briefly at the outcome of the study of the +nature of reason. We know that the faculty of understanding is not a +"thing in and by itself," because it becomes real only in contact with +some object. But whatever we know of any object, is known not alone +through the object, but also through the faculty of reason. +Consciousness, like all other being, is relative. Understanding is +contact with a variety of objects. To knowledge there is attached +distinction, subject and object, variety in unity. Thus things become +mutual causes and mutual effects. The entire world of phenomena, of +which thought is but a part, a form, is an absolute circle, in which the +beginning and end is everywhere and nowhere, in which everything is at +the same time essence and semblance, cause and effect, general and +concrete. Just as all nature is in the last instance one sole general +unity, in view of which all other<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> unities become a multitude, so this +same nature, or objectivity, or world of sense perceptions, or whatever +else we may call the sum of all phenomena or effects, is the final cause +of all things, compared to which all other causes become effects. But we +must remember that this cause of all causes is only the sum of all +effects, not a transcendental or superior being. Every cause has its +effect, every effect causes something.</p> + +<p>A cause cannot be physically separated from its effect any more than the +visible can be separated from the eye, the taste from the tongue, in +brief the general from the concrete. Nevertheless, the faculty of +thought may separate the one from the other. We must keep in mind that +this separation is a mere formality of thought, although it is a +formality which is necessary in order to be reasonable or conscious, in +order to act scientifically. The practice of understanding, or +scientific practice, derives the concrete from the general, the natural +things from nature. But whoever has been behind the scenes, and has +looked at the faculty of thought at work, knows that, conversely the +general is derived from the concrete, the concept of nature from natural +things. The theory of understanding or science teaches us that the +antecedent is understood by its consequent, the cause by its effect, +while our practical understanding regards the after as a consequence of +the before, the effect as a result of the cause. The faculty of +understanding, the organ of generalization, regards its opposite, the +concrete, as secondary, while the faculty of thought which understands +itself regards it as primary. However, the practice of understanding is +not to be changed by its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> theory, nor can it be; the theory intends +simply to render the steps of consciousness firm. The scientific farmer +differs from the practical farmer, not because he employs theory and +method, for both do that, but because he understands the theory, while +the practical man theorizes instinctively.</p> + +<p>To continue: From a given multitude of facts, reason generates truth in +general, and out of a succession of forms and transformations it +abstracts the true cause, just as absolute multiplicity is the nature of +space, so absolute variability is the nature of time. Every particle of +time and space is new, original, and has never been there before. The +faculty of thought enables us to find our way through this absolute +medley by abstracting general concepts out of the multitude of things in +space, and tracing the variations of time to general causes. The entire +nature of reason consists in generalizing sense perceptions, in +abstracting the common elements out of concrete things. Whoever does not +fully understand reason by understanding that it is the organ of +generalization forgets that understanding requires an object which must +remain something outside of its conception, since such object cannot be +dissolved by its conception. The being of the reasoning faculty cannot +be understood any more than being in general. Or rather, being is +understood when we take it in its generality. Not being itself, but the +general element of being, is understood by the faculty of thought.</p> + +<p>Let us realize, for instance, the process which takes place when reason +understands something it did not know before. Think of some peculiar, +unexpected and unknown chemical transformation which takes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> place +suddenly and without apparent cause in some mixture. Assume furthermore +that the same reaction takes place more frequently after that, until +experience demonstrates that this inexplicable change occurs whenever +sunlight touches the mixture. This already constitutes a certain +understanding of the process. Assume furthermore that subsequent +experience teaches us that several other substances have the faculty of +producing the same reaction in connection with sunlight. We have then +arranged the new reaction in line with a number of phenomena of the same +class, that is to say we have enlarged, deepened, completed our +understanding of it still more. And if we finally discover that a +special part of the sunlight unites with a special element of the +mixture and thereby produces this new reaction, we have generalized this +experience, or experienced this generalization, in a "pure" state, in +other words, the theory of this reaction is complete, reason has solved +its problem, and yet it has done nothing more than it did when it +classified the animal and vegetable kingdoms in families, genera, +species, etc. To find the species, the genus, the sex, etc., of anything +means to understand it.</p> + +<p>Reason proceeds in the same way when it investigates the causes of +certain transformations. Causes are, in the last instance, not noticed +and furnished by means of sight, hearing, feeling, not by means of the +sense perceptions. They are rather supplied by the faculty of thought. +It is true, causes are not the "pure" products of the faculty of +thought, but are produced by it in connection with sense perceptions and +their material objects. This raw material gives<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> the objective existence +to the causes produced by the mind. Just as we demand that a truth +should be the truth about some objective phenomenon, so we also demand +that a cause should be real, that it should be the cause of some +objective effect.</p> + +<p>The understanding of any concrete cause is conditioned on the empirical +study of its material, while the understanding of any general cause is +based on the study of the faculty of reason. In the understanding of +concrete causes, the material of study varies, but reason maintains a +constant or general attitude. The cause, as a general cause, is a pure +conception, and it is based on the study of the multiformity of concrete +understandings of causes, or on the multiplied study of concrete causes. +Hence we are compelled to return to the concrete material of the general +concept, to the understanding of concrete causes, if we wish to analyze +the concept of a general cause.</p> + +<p>When a stone falls into the water and causes ripples on the surface, the +stone is no more the cause of the ripples than the liquid condition of +the water. If the stone falls on solid substances, it causes no ripples. +It is the contact of the falling stone with liquid substances which +causes the ripples. The cause is itself an effect, and the effect, the +ripples, become a cause when they carry a piece of cork ashore. But in +either case the cause is based on a mutual effect, on the interaction of +the waves with the light condition of the cork.</p> + +<p>A stone falling into the water is not a cause "in itself," not a cause +in general. We arrive at such a cause only, when the faculty of thought +uses concrete causes for its raw material and constructs out of them<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> +the "pure" concept of the cause in general. A stone falling into the +water is only the cause of the subsequent ripples, and it becomes a +general cause only through the experience that ripples always follow the +falling of a stone into water.</p> + +<p>We call cause that which generally precedes a certain manifestation, and +effect that which generally follows it. We refer to the stone as the +cause of ripples merely because we know that it always causes them when +falling into water. But since ripples sometimes appear without being +preceded by the fall of a stone, ripples have another general cause. So +far as there is anything general in ripples which precedes them, it is +the elasticity of the water itself which is the general cause of +ripples. Circular ripples, which are a special form of ripples, are +generally preceded by the falling of some body into the water, and this +body is then considered as their cause. The cause is always different in +proportion and to the extent of the phenomena under consideration.</p> + +<p>We cannot ascertain causes by mere introspective reasoning, we cannot +derive them out of our head. Matter, materials, sense perceptions are +required for this purpose. A definite cause requires a definite +material, a definite amount of sense perceptions. In the abstract unity +of nature, the variations of matter are represented by the variations of +concrete quantities. Every quantity is given in time before and after a +certain other quantity, as antecedent and subsequent. The general +element of the antecedent is called cause, the general element of the +subsequent, effect.</p> + +<p>When the wind sways a forest, the yielding character of the forest is as +much instrumental in producing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> this effect as the bending power of the +wind. The cause of a thing is its connection with other things. The fact +that the same wind leaves rocks and walls standing shows that the cause +is not qualitatively different from the effect, but that it is a matter +of aggregate effects. If nevertheless science or knowledge determines +any special fact to be the cause of any change, that is to say of any +succession of phenomena, this cause is no longer regarded as the +external creator, but merely as the general mode, the immanent method of +succession. A definite cause can be ascertained only when we have under +consideration a definite circle, series, or number of changes, the cause +of which is to be determined. And within a definite circle of succeeding +phenomena, that which generally precedes is their cause.</p> + +<p>The wind which sways a forest differs from wind as a general cause only +in that the latter has other general effects, inasmuch as it howls in +one place, stirs up dust in another, or acts in many different ways. In +the special case of the forest, the wind is a cause only in so far as it +precedes the swaying of the trees. But in the case of rocks and walls, +the solidity precedes the wind and is therefore the general cause of +their resistance to the swaying power of the wind. In a still wider +circle of hurricane phenomena, a gentle wind may be regarded as a cause +of the stability of the objects last mentioned.</p> + +<p>The <i>quantity</i> or <i>number</i> of given objects varies the name of their +cause. If a certain company of people return from a walk in a tired +condition, this change of condition is just as much due to the physical +weakness of the people as to the walk. In other words,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> a manifestation +has in itself no cause which can be separated from it. Everything which +was connected with a phenomenon has contributed toward its appearance. +In the case of the promenaders, the physical constitution of their +bodies has to be considered as well as the physical constitution and +length of the road and duration of the walk. If reason is nevertheless +called upon to determine the special cause of some concrete change, for +instance, of a tired feeling, it is simply a question of determining +which one of the various factors has contributed most to that feeling. +In this case as well as in all others, the work of reason consists in +developing the general from the concrete, that is to say in this case, +singling out from a given number of tired sensations that which +generally precedes the tired feeling. If most of the promenaders or all +of them are found to be tired, the walk will be considered as the cause. +But if only a few are tired, the weak constitution of these people will +be considered as the general cause of their tired condition.</p> + +<p>To use another illustration: If the discharge of a shot frightens some +birds, this effect is due to the combined action of the shot and the +timidity of the birds. If the majority of the birds fly away, the shot +will be considered as the cause. But if the minority fly away, their +timidity will be regarded as the cause.</p> + +<p>Effects are subsequences. Since all things in nature follow other things +and all things have an antecedent and a subsequent, we may call the +natural, the real, the sense perceptions absolute effects, having no +cause unless we find one with our faculty of thought by systematizing +the given material. Causes are mental generalizations of perceptible +changes. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span>supposed relation of cause and effect is a miracle, a +creation of something out of nothing. For this reason this relation has +been and still is an object of speculative reasoning. The speculative +cause creates its effects. But in reality the effects are the material +out of which the brain, or science, forms its causes. The cause concept +is a product of reason; not of "pure" reason, but of reason married to +the world of sense perceptions.</p> + +<p>If Kant maintains that the statement: "Every change has its cause" is an +<i>a priori truth</i> which we cannot experience because no one can possibly +experience all changes, although every one has the irrefutable feeling +of the correctness of this statement, we know now that this statement +expresses merely the experience that the phenomenon which we call reason +recognizes the uniform element in all multiformity. Or in other words, +we now know that the development of the general element out of the +concrete facts is called reason, thought, or mind. The secure knowledge +that every change has its cause is nothing else but the conviction that +we are thinking human beings. <i>Cogito, ergo sum.</i> I think, therefore I +am. We have experienced the nature of our reason instinctively even if +we have not analyzed it scientifically. We are as well aware of the +faculty of our reason to abstract a cause out of every given change, as +we are that every circle is round, that a is equal to a. We know that +the general is the product of reason, and reason produces this general +thing in contact with every given object. And since all objects before +and after a certain other object are temporal changes, it follows that +all changes which we as thinking beings experience must have a general +antecedent, a cause.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span></p><p>Already the English sceptic Hume felt that true causes are different +from assumed causes. According to him the concept of a cause contains +nothing but the experience of that which generally precedes a certain +phenomenon. Kant rightfully remarks on the other hand that the +conception of cause and effect expresses a far more intimate relation +than that indicated by a loose and accidental succession, and that the +concept of a cause rather comprises that of a certain effect as a +necessity and strict general result. Therefore he claimed that there +must be something <i>a priori</i> in reason which cannot be experienced and +which extends beyond experience.</p> + +<p>We reply to the materialists who deny all autonomy of the mind and hope +to detect causes by experience alone that the general necessity which +presupposes the relation of cause and effect represents an impossible +experience. And we reply to the idealists: Although reason explores +causes which cannot be experienced, this research cannot take place <i>a +priori</i>, but only <i>a posteriori</i>, only on the basis of empirically given +effects. It is true that the mind alone discovers the imperceptible and +abstract generality, but it does so only within the circle of certain +given sense perceptions.</p> + +<p><b>(b) Matter and Mind.</b></p> + +<p>The understanding of the general dependence of the faculty of thought on +material sense perceptions will restore to objective reality that right +which has long been denied to it by ideas and opinions. Nature with its +varied concrete phenomena which had been crowded out of human +considerations by <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span>philosophical and religious imaginings, and which has +been scientifically re-established again on special fields by the +development of natural sciences, gains general theoretical recognition +by the understanding of the functions of the brain. Hitherto natural +science has chosen for its object only special matters, special causes, +special forces, but has remained ignorant in general questions of +so-called natural philosophy regarding the cause of all things, of +matter, of force in general. The actual existence of this ignorance is +revealed by that great contradiction between idealism and materialism +which pervades all works of science like a red thread.</p> + +<p>"May I succeed in this letter in strengthening the conviction that +chemistry as an independent science represents one of the most powerful +means for the higher cultivation of the mind, that its study is useful +not alone for the promotion of the material interests of mankind, but +because it permits a deeper penetration of the wonders of creation, with +which our existence, our welfare, and our development are intimately +connected."</p> + +<p>In these words Liebig expresses the prevalent views which have +accustomed themselves to look upon material and spiritual differences as +absolute opposites. But the untenability of such a distinction is +vaguely felt even by the just quoted advocate of this view, who speaks +of material interests and of a mental penetration which is the condition +for our existence, welfare, and development. But what else does the term +material interests mean but the abstract expression of our existence, +welfare, and development? Are not these the concrete content of our +material interests?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> Does he not say explicitly that the penetration of +the wonders of creation promotes our material interests? And on the +other hand, does not the promotion of our material interests require a +penetration on our part of the wonders of creation? In what respect are +our material interests different from our mental penetration of things?</p> + +<p>The superior, spiritual, ideal, which Liebig in conformity with the +views of the world of naturalists opposes to our material interests, is +only a special part of those interests. Mental penetration and material +interests differ no more than the circle differs from the square. +Circles and squares are contrasts, but at the same time they are but +different and special classes of form in general.</p> + +<p>It has been the custom, especially since the advent of Christian times, +to speak contemptuously of material, perceptible, fleshly things which +are destroyed by rust and moths. And nowadays people continue on this +conservative track, although their antipathy against perceptible reality +has long disappeared from their minds and actions. The Christian +separation of mind and body has been practically abandoned in the age of +natural science. But the theoretical solution of the contradiction, the +demonstration that the spiritual is material and the material at the +same time spiritual, by which the material interests would be freed from +the stigma of inferiority, has not yet been forthcoming.</p> + +<p>Modern science is natural science. Science is deemed worthy of its name +only in so far as it is natural science. In other words, only that +thought is scientific which consciously has real, perceptible, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span>natural +things for its object. For this reason representatives and friends of +science can not be enemies of nature or of matter. Indeed they are not. +But the very existence of science shows that this nature, this world of +sense perceptions, this matter or substance, does alone and by itself +not satisfy us. Science, or thought, which has material practice or +being for its object, does not strive to reproduce nature in its +integrity, in its entire perceptible substance, for these are already +present. If science were to aim at nothing new, it would be superfluous. +It is entitled to special recognition only to the extent that it carries +a new element into matter. Science is not so much concerned in the +material of its study as in understanding. Of course it is the +understanding of this material which is desired, the understanding of +its general character, of the fixed pole in the succession of phenomena. +That which religion supernaturally separates from the material, which +science opposes to the material as something higher, diviner, more +spiritual, is in reality nothing but the faculty of rising above +multiformity, of proceeding from the concrete to the general.</p> + +<p>The nobler spiritual interests are not absolutely different from the +material interests, they are not qualitatively different. The positive +side of modern idealism does not consist in belittling eating and +drinking, the pleasure in earthly possessions and in intercourse with +the other sex, but rather in pleading for the recognition of other +material enjoyments besides these, as for instance those of the eye, the +ear, of art and science, in short of the whole man. You shall not +indulge in the material revelries of passion, that is to say you shall +not direct your thought one-sidedly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> to any concrete lust, but rather +consider your entire development, take into account the total general +extension of your existence. The bare materialist principle is +inadequate in that it does not appreciate the difference between the +concrete and the general, because it makes the individual synonymous +with the general. It refuses to recognize the quantitative superiority +of the mind over the world of sense perceptions. Idealism, on the other +hand, forgets the qualitative unity in the quantitative difference. It +is transcendental and makes an absolute difference out of the relative +one. The contradiction between these two camps is due to the +misunderstood relation of our reason to its given object or material. +The idealist regards reason alone as the source of all understanding, +while the materialist looks upon the world of sense perceptions in the +same way. Nothing is required for a solution of this contradiction but +the comprehension of the relative interdependence of these two sources +of understanding. Idealism sees only the difference, materialism sees +only the uniformity of matter and mind, content and form, force and +substance, sense perception and moral interpretation. But all these +distinctions belong to the one common genus which constitutes the +distinction between the special and the general.</p> + +<p>Consistent materialists act like purely practical men without any +science. But, since knowing and thinking are real attributes of man +regardless of his party affiliation, purely practical men do not exist +in reality. Even the merest attempt at practical experiment on the basis +of experienced facts differs only in degree from scientific practice +based on theoretical principles. On<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> the other hand, consistent +idealists are just as impossible as purely practical men. They would +like to have the general without the special, the spirit without matter, +force without substance, science without experience or material, the +absolute without the relative. How can thinkers who search for truth, +being, relative causes, such as naturalists, be idealists? They are so +only outside of their specialties, never inside of them. The modern +mind, the mind of natural science, is immaterial only so far as it +embraces all matters. But men like the astronomer Madler find so little +of the ridiculous in the current expectation of the materially increased +spiritual power after our "emancipation from the bonds of matter," that +he has nothing better to substitute for it and flatters himself with +having defined the "bonds of matter" as material attraction. Truly, so +long as mind is still conceived in the form of a religious ghost, the +expectation of an increased mental power after the emancipation from the +bonds of matter is not so much an object for ridicule as for compassion. +But if we regard mind as the expression of modern science, we offer the +better scientific explanation for the traditional faith. By bonds of +matter we do not mean, in that case, the bond of gravitation, but the +multiplicity of sense perceptions. And matter holds the mind in bondage +only so long as the faculty of thought has not overcome the multiplicity +of things. The emancipation of the mind from the bonds of matter +consists in developing the general element out of the concrete +multiplicity.</p> + +<p><b>(c) Force and Matter.</b></p> + +<p>The reader who has closely followed our main idea,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> which will be +further illustrated, will anticipate that the question of matter and +force finds its solution in the understanding of the relation between +the general and the special. What is the relation of the concrete to the +abstract? This is the common problem of those who see the active impulse +of the world either in the spiritual force or in the material substance, +who think to find the nature of things, the <i>non plus ultra</i> of science, +in either of these facts.</p> + +<p>Liebig, who is especially fond of straying from his inductive science +into the field of speculative thought, says in an idealist sense: "Force +cannot be seen, we cannot grasp it with our hands; in order to +understand its nature and peculiarities, we must investigate its +effects." And if a materialist replies to him: "Matter is force, force +is matter, no matter without force, no force without matter," it is +plain that either has determined this relation only negatively. In +certain shows, the clown is asked by the manager: "Clown, where have you +been?" "With the others," answers the clown. "And where were the +others?"—"With me."</p> + +<p>In this case we have two answers with the same content, in the other we +have two camps which quarrel with different words about an indisputable +fact. And this dispute is so much more ridiculous because it is taken so +seriously. If the idealist makes a distinction between matter and force, +he does not mean to deny that the real phenomenon of force is +inseparably linked with matter. And if the materialist claims that there +is no matter without force and no force without matter, he does not mean +to deny that matter and force are different, as his opponent claims.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p><p>The dispute exists for a good reason and has its object, but this +object is not revealed in the dispute. It is instinctively kept under +cover by both parties, so that they may not be in a position where they +would have to acknowledge their own ignorance. Each wants to prove to +the other that the other's explanations are inadequate, and both +demonstrate this sufficiently. Büchner admits in the closing statements +of his "Matter and Force" that the empirical material is insufficient to +permit of definite answers to transcendental questions, and that +therefore no positive answer can be given to them. And he furthermore +says that the empirical material "is fully sufficient to answer them +negatively and to do away with hypothesis." This is saying in so many +words that the science of the materialist is adequate for the proof that +his opponent knows nothing.</p> + +<p>The spiritualist or idealist believes in a spiritual, which means in a +ghostlike and inexplicable, nature of force. The materialist thinkers, +on the other hand, are skeptical. A scientific proof of faith or of +skepticism does not exist. The materialist has only this advantage over +his idealist opponent, that he looks for the transcendental, the nature, +the cause, the force, not back of the phenomenon, not outside of matter. +But he remains behind the idealist when he ignores the difference +between matter and force. The materialist dwells on the actual +inseparability of matter and force and does not admit any other reason +for a distinction between the two than "an external reason derived from +the demand of our mind for systematization." Büchner says in "Nature and +Mind," page 66: "Force and matter, separated from one another, are for +me<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> nothing but thoughts, fantasies, ideas without any substance, +hypotheses which do not exist for any healthy study of nature, because +all phenomena of nature are rendered obscure and unintelligible by such +a separation." But if Büchner deals with any special department of +natural science in a productive way, instead of handling phrases of +natural philosophy, his own practice will show him that the separation +of forces from matter is not an "external," but an internal, an imminent +necessity, by which alone we are enabled to elucidate and understand the +phenomena of nature. Although the author of "Force and Matter" chose for +his motto: "Now, what I want is—facts," we assure the reader that this +device is more a thoughtless word than a serious opinion. Materialism is +not so coarse-grained that it wants purely facts. Those facts which +Büchner is looking for are by themselves not specifics for his desires. +The idealist likewise wants such facts. No student of nature wants mere +hypotheses. What all cultivators of the field of science want is not so +much facts as explanations or an understanding of facts. Even the +materialist will not deny that science, the "natural philosophy" of +Büchner not excepted, is more concerned with mental forces than with +bodily matter, that it cares more for force than for matter. The +separation of force and matter is derived from "the demand of our mind +for systematization." Very true! But so does all science emanate from +the demand of our reason for systematization.</p> + +<p>The contradistinction between force and matter is as old as that between +idealism and materialism. The first conciliation between the two was +attempted by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> imagination which, through the belief in spirits, +suggested a secret nature as the cause of all natural phenomena. Science +has of late expelled many of these special spirits by replacing the +fantastic demons with scientific, or general, explanations. And after we +have succeeded in explaining the demon of "pure" reason, it is not +difficult to expel the special spirit of force by the general +explanation of its nature and thus to reconcile scientifically the +contradiction between spiritualism and materialism.</p> + +<p>In the universe which constitutes the object of science and of the +faculty of reason, both force and matter are unseparated. In the world +of sense perceptions force is matter and matter is force. "Force cannot +be seen." Oh, yes! Seeing itself is pure force. Seeing is as much an +effect of its object as an effect of the eye, and this double effect and +other effects are forces. We do not see the things themselves, but their +effects on our eyes. We see their forces. And force cannot alone be +seen, it can also be heard, smelled, tasted, felt. Who will deny that he +can feel the force of heat, of cold, of gravitation? We have already +quoted the words of Professor Koppe to the effect that we "cannot +perceive heat itself, we merely conclude from its effects that this +force exists in nature." This is saying in other words that we do not +see, hear, or feel the things themselves, but their effects or forces.</p> + +<p>It is just as true to say that we feel matter and not its force as it is +to say that we feel force and not matter. Indeed, both are inseparable +from the object, as we have already remarked. But by means of the +faculty of thought we separate from the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span>simultaneously and successively +occurring phenomena the general and the concrete. For instance, we +abstract the general concept of sight from the various phenomena of our +sight and distinguish it by the name of power of vision from the +concrete objects, or substances, of our eyes. From a multitude of sense +perceptions we develop by means of reason the general element. The +general element of different water phenomena, for instance, is the water +power distinguished from the substance of the water. If levers of +different materials but of the same length have the same power, it is +plain that in this case force is different from matter only in so far as +it represents the general element of various substances. A horse does +not pull without force, and this force does not pull without the horse. +Indeed, in practice the horse is force and force is the horse. But +nevertheless we may distinguish the power of pulling from other +qualities of the horse, or we may refer to the common element in +different services of horses as general horse power, without thereby +starting from any other hypothesis than we do in distinguishing the sun +from the earth. For in reality the sun does not exist without the earth, +nor the earth without the sun.</p> + +<p>The world of sense perceptions is made known to us only by our +consciousness, but consciousness is conditioned on the world of sense +perceptions. Nature is infinitely united or infinitely separated, +according to whether we regard it from the standpoint of consciousness +as an unconditional unit or from the standpoint of sense perceptions as +an unconditional multiplicity. There is truth in both unity and +multiplicity, but it is truth only relatively speaking, under certain +conditions. It matters a great deal whether we look<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> about with the eyes +of the body or with the eyes of the mind. For the eyes of the mind, +matter is force. For the eyes of the body, force is matter. The abstract +matter is force, the concrete force is matter. Matter is represented by +the objects of the hand, of practice, while force is an object of +understanding, of science.</p> + +<p>Science is not limited to the so-called scientific world. It reaches +beyond all classes, it belongs to the full depth and width of life. +Science belongs to thinking humanity in its entirety. And so it is with +the separation of matter and force. Only a stultified fanaticism can +ignore the practical distinction. The miser who accumulates money +without adding any wealth to his life process forgets that the valuable +element of money resides in its force, which is different from, its +substance. He forgets that not mere wealth as such, not the paltry gold +substance, lends a reasonableness to the quest for its possession, but +its spiritual content, its inherent exchange value, which buys the +necessities of life. Every scientific practice, which means every action +carried on with a predetermined success and with understood substances, +proves that the separation of matter and force, though only performed in +thought and existing in thought, is nevertheless not an empty phrase, +not a mere hypothesis, but a very fertile idea. A farmer manuring his +field is handling "pure" manuring force, in so far as it is immaterial +for the abstract conception whether he is handling cow dung, bone dust, +or guano. And in weighing bundles of merchandise, it is not the iron, +copper, stone, etc., which is handled by the pound, but their gravity.</p> + +<p>True, there is no force without matter, no matter without force. +Forceless matter and matterless force<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> are nonentities. If idealist +naturalists believe in an immaterial existence of forces which, so to +say, carry on their goblin-pranks in matter, forces which we cannot see, +cannot perceive by the senses and yet are asked to believe in, then we +say that such men are to that extent that naturists, but mere +speculators, in other words spiritualists. And the word of the +materialists who refer to the intellectual separation of matter and +force as a mere hypothesis, is quite as brainless.</p> + +<p>In order that this separation may be appreciated according to its +merits, in order that our consciousness may neither etherealize force in +a spiritualist sense nor deny it in a materialist sense, and in order to +comprehend it scientifically, we have only to understand the faculty of +thought in general or "in itself," that is to say its abstract form. The +intellect can not operate without some perceptible material. In order to +distinguish between matter and force, these things must exist and be +experienced by sense perception. By means of this experience we refer to +matter as the expression of force and to force as the expression of +matter. The perceptible object which is to be studied is therefore +matter and force in one, and since all objects are in their tangible +reality such matter and force-things, the distinction made by the mind +consists in the general method of brain work, in the derivation of the +general unity, from the special multiplicity in any one and in all given +objects. The distinction between matter and force is summarized in the +universal distinction between the concrete and the abstract. To deny the +value of this distinction is equivalent to denying the value of any and +all distinction, equivalent to ignoring the function of the intellect +altogether.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span></p><p>If we refer to phenomena of sense perception as forces of matter in +general, then this generalized matter is nothing but an abstract +conception. But if we mean by the term sense perception the various +concrete substances, then the general element which embraces the +differences of things and pervades and controls them is force producing +concrete effects. And whether we say matter or force, the mental which +science is studying, not with its hands, but with its brain, the +so-called essence, nature, cause, ideal, superior or spiritual, is the +generality comprising the special things.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>V</span> <span class="smaller">"PRACTICAL REASON" OR MORALITY</span></h2> + +<p><b>(a) The Wise and Reasonable.</b></p> + +<p>The understanding of the method of science, the understanding of the +mind, is destined to solve all the problems of religion and philosophy, +to explain thoroughly all the great and small riddles, and thus fully to +restore research to its mission of empirically studying details. If we +are aware that it is a law of reason to require some perceptible +material, some cause, for its operation, then the question regarding the +first or general cause becomes superfluous. Human understanding is then +seen to be first and last cause of all concrete causes. If we understand +that it is a law of reason to require for its operation some given +object, some beginning at which to start, then the question of the first +beginning must necessarily become inane. If we understand that reason +derives abstract units out of concrete multiplicities, that it +constructs truth out of phenomena, substance out of attributes, that it +perceives all things as parts of a whole, as individuals of some genus, +as qualities of some object, then the question regarding a "thing +itself," a something which in reality is back of all things, must needs +become irrelevant. In brief, the understanding of the interdependence of +reason reveals the unreasonableness of the demand for independent reason.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span></p><p>Now, although the main object of metaphysics, the cause of all causes, +the beginning of all beginnings, the nature of things, causes little +inconvenience to modern science, and even though the needs of the +present have overcome the leaning for speculation, this practical +downfall of speculation does not suffice for the solution of its +problems. So long as the theoretical law is not understood, according to +which reason requires some concrete object for its operation, there is +no hope of abandoning objectless thought, this malpractice of +speculative philosophy, which pretends to generate knowledge without +intercourse with objective reality. Our naturalists demonstrate this +very clearly as soon as they turn from their tangible specialties to +abstract things. The dispute over questions of life's wisdom, of +morality, or the quarrel over the wise, good, right, or bad, reveals +that here is the boundary of scientific agreement. The scientific +explorers of the exact sciences abandon every day their inductive method +when dealing with social problems, and stray off into the regions of +speculative philosophy. Just as in physics they believe in imperceptible +physical truths, in "things themselves," so in social matters they +believe in the reasonable, wise, right, or bad, in the sense of "things +themselves," of absolute phases of life, of unconditional conditions. It +is here where the outcome of our studies, of the critique of pure +reason, must be applied.</p> + +<p>In recognizing that consciousness, the nature of understanding, the +mental activity in its general form, consists in developing general +concepts out of concrete objects, we circumscribe this insight by +stating that reason develops its understanding out of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span>contradictions. +It is the nature of the mind to perceive, in given phenomena of +different dimensions and different duration, the nature of things by +their semblance, and their semblance by their nature; to distinguish in +wants of various degrees the most essential and necessary from the less +pressing; to measure within a certain circle of magnitudes the large by +the small and the small by the large, or in other words to compare the +contrasts of the world with one another, to harmonize them by +explanation. Common parlance instinctively calls understanding judging; +judging requires a certain standard. Just as surely as we cannot +perceive any objects which are "in themselves" great or small, hard or +soft, clear or dark, just as surely as these terms denote certain +relations and require a certain standard by which their relations can be +determined, even so does reason require a certain standard for the +determination of that which is reasonable.</p> + +<p>The fact that we consider certain actions, institutions, conceptions, +maxims of other periods, nations, or persons unreasonable is simply due +to the application of a different standard, because we ignore the +premises, the conditions, which cause another's reason to differ from +our own. Men who differ in their mental estimates, in their +understanding of things, may be likened to the thermometers of Reaumur +and Celsius, one of which designates the boiling point by 80 and the +other by 100. A different standard is the cause of this different +result. On the so-called moral field there is no scientific agreement, +such as we enjoy in some physical matters, because we lack the uniform +standard which natural science has long since found. It is still +attempted to perceive the reasonable, good,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> right, etc., without +empirical data, by speculative reasoning without experience. Speculation +seeks the cause of all causes, the immeasurable cause; truth "itself," +the unconditional and standardless truth; the unlimited good, the +unboundedly reasonable, etc. The absence of a standard is the essence of +speculation, and its practice is characterized by unlimited +inconsistency and disagreement. If there are followers of certain +positive religions who agree in the matter of morals, they owe this to +the positive standard which certain dogmas, doctrines and commandments +have given them. But if any one tries to perceive things by "pure" +reason, the dependence of this reason on some standard will be +demonstrated by its "impure," that is to say individual, perceptions.</p> + +<p>Sense perception is the standard of truth, or of science in general. The +phenomena of the outside world are the standard of physical truths, and +man with his many wants is the standard of moral truth. The actions of +man are determined by his wants. Thirst teaches him to drink, need to +pray. Wants are regulated in the South by southern conditions, in the +North by northern conditions. Wants rule time and space, nations and +individuals. They induce the savage to hunt and the gourmand to indulge. +Human wants give to reason a standard for judging what is good, right, +bad, reasonable, etc. Whatever satisfies our need is good, the opposite +is bad. The physical feeling of man is the object of moral standards, +the object of "practical reason." The contradictory variety of human +needs is the basis for the contradictory variety of moral standards. +Because a member of a feudal guild prospered in a restricted +competition,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> and a modern knight of industry in free competition, +because their interests differ, therefore their views differ, and the +one justly considers an institution as unreasonable which the other +regards as reasonable. If the intellect of some person attempts to +define by mere introspection the standard of reasonableness as a general +thing, this person makes himself or herself the standard of humanity. If +reason is credited with the faculty of finding within itself the source +of moral truth, it commits the speculative mistake of attempting to +produce understanding without perceptible objects. The same mistake is +to blame for the idea that man is subordinate to the authority of +reason, for the demand that man submit to the dictates of reason. This +idea transforms man into an attribute of reason, while in reality reason +is an attribute of man.</p> + +<p>The question whether man depends on reason or reason on man is similar +to the one whether the citizen exists for the state or the state for the +citizen. In the last and highest instance, the citizen is the primary +fact and the state is modified according to the requirements of the +citizen. But whenever the dominant interests of the citizenship have +acquired the authority in the state, then the citizen is indeed +dependent on the state. This is saying in so many words that man is +guided in minor matters by more important ones. He sacrifices the less +important, minor, particular things to the great, essential, general +things. He subordinates his desire for more individual indulgence to his +fundamental social needs. It is not pure reason, but the reason of a +weak body or of a limited purse which teaches man to renounce the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> +pleasures of dissipation for the benefit of the general welfare. The +wants of the senses are the material out of which reason fashions moral +truths. To single out the essential need among different physical needs +of various degrees of intensity or extension, to separate the true from +the individual, to develop general concepts, that is the mission of +reason. The difference between the apparently and the truly reasonable +reduces itself to the difference between the special and the general.</p> + +<p>We recall that reason requires sense perceptions for its existence and +operation, that it needs some object which it can perceive. Existence is +the condition or premise of all understanding. Just as the understanding +of true existence is the function of natural science, so the +understanding of reasonable existence is the function of wisdom. Reason +in general has the mission of understanding things as they are. As +physical science it has to understand what is true, as wisdom, what is +reasonable. And just as true may be translated by general, so reasonable +may be translated by generally appropriate to need. We saw a while ago +that a sense perception is not true "in itself," but only relatively +true, that it is called true or general only in relation to other +perceptions of lesser importance. In the same way, no human action can +be reasonable or appropriate "in itself," it can be reasonable only in +comparison with some other action which attempts to accomplish the same +purpose in a less practicable, that is an impracticable, form. Just as +the true, the general, is conditioned on the relation to some other +object, on a definite quantity of phenomena, on definite limits, so the +reasonable or practicable<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> is based on definite conditions which make it +reasonable or unreasonable. The end in view is the measure of the +practicable. The practicable can be determined only by some definite +object that is wanted. Once this object is known, then that action is +called reasonable which accomplishes it in the fullest, most general +way, and all other actions appear unreasonable compared to it.</p> + +<p>In view of the law which we evolved by our analysis of pure reason and +which showed that all understanding, all thought, is based on some +perceptible object, on some quantity of sense perceptions, it is evident +that everything distinguished by our faculty of distinction is a certain +quantity and that, therefore, all distinctions are only quantitative, +not absolute, only graduated, not irreconcilable. Even the difference +between the reasonable and the unreasonable, or in other words between +that which is momentarily or individually reasonable and that which is +generally reasonable, is merely a quantitative distinction, like all +others, so that the unreasonable may be conditionally reasonable, and +nothing is unreasonable but that which is supposed to be unconditionally +reasonable.</p> + +<p>If we understand that reason requires some perceptible object, some +perceptible standard, then we shall no longer try to understand the +absolutely reasonable, the purely reasonable. We shall then limit +ourselves to look for the reasonable, as for all other things, in +concrete objects. The definite, accurate, certain, uniform result of +some understanding depends on the definite formulation of the task, on +the accurate limitation of the perceptible quantity which is to be +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span>understood. If a certain moment, a certain person, a certain class, a +certain nation are given and at the same time an essential need, a +general and predominating purpose, then the question regarding the +reasonable or suitable is easily answered. It is true that we may also +know something of things which are generally reasonable for mankind in +the aggregate, but in that case our standard must be abstract mankind +instead of some concrete part of it. Science may study the anatomical +structure of some concrete body as well as the general type of the human +body, but this again it can do only when it supplies the faculty of +understanding with general instead of individual material. If science +divides the whole human race into four or five races, by establishing a +certain standard of physiognomy, and later on discovers some individuals +or tribes whose characters are so peculiar and rare that they cannot be +classed under any of the established races, the existence of such +exceptions is not a crime against the physical order of the world, but +merely a proof of the inadequacy of our scientific classification. If, +on the other hand, some conventional mode of thought considers a certain +action as universally reasonable or unreasonable and then encounters +opposition in actual life, convention fancies itself exempt from the +work of understanding and assumes to deny civic rights in the moral +order of the world to its opponents. Instead of realizing the limited +applicability of its rules by the existence of opposing practices, +convention seeks to establish an absolute applicability of its rules by +simply ignoring the cause of the opposition. This is a dogmatic +procedure, a negative practice, which ignores facts on the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> pretense +that they are irrational, but it is not a positive understanding, not an +intelligent knowledge, such as manifests itself by the conciliation of +contradictions.</p> + +<p>If our study aims to ascertain what is universally human and reasonable, +and if these predicates are given only to actions which are reasonable +and practicable for all men, at all times, and under all conditions, +then such concepts are absolute, indeterminate, and to that extent +meaningless, indefinite generalities. We are stating such universal and +indeterminate, and therefore unimportant and unpractical concepts, when +we say that physically the whole is greater than a part, or that morally +the good is preferable to the bad. The object of reason is that which is +general, but it is the generality of some concrete object. The practice +of reason deals with individual and concrete objects, with the things +which are the opposite of the general, with special and concrete +knowledge. In order to perceive in physics whether we are dealing with a +part or with the whole object, we must handle definite and concrete +objects or phenomena. If we desire to ascertain what is morally +preferable as good or bad, we must start out with a definite quantity of +human needs. Abstract and general reason, with its socalled eternal and +absolute truths, is a phantasmagoria of ignorance which binds the rights +of the individual with crushing chains. Real and true reason is +individual, it cannot produce any other but individual perceptions, and +these perceptions cannot be generalized to any greater extent than the +general material with which they operate. Only that is universally +reasonable which is acknowledged to be so by all<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> reasons. If the reason +of some time, class, or person is referred to as rational, and if some +other time, class or person considers it irrational; if, for instance, +the Russian noble considers serfdom a rational institution and the +English bourgeois the so-called liberty of his wage worker, both of +these institutions are not absolutely rational, but only relatively, +only in a more or less limited circle.</p> + +<p>It is not necessary to state that I do not mean to question the great +importance of our reason by the foregoing remarks. Even though reason +cannot independently, or absolutely, discern the objects of the +speculative introspection, such as the objects of the moral world, the +true, the beautiful, the right, the bad, the reasonable, etc., it +nevertheless is well fitted to distinguish relatively, by means of +concrete sense perceptions, between general and concrete things, between +the object and its manifestation, between fundamental needs and fanciful +appetites. Although we may dispense with the belief in absolute reason +and consequently realize that there can be no absolute peace, still we +may call war an unmitigated evil when comparing it with the peaceful +interests of our time or of our class. Not until we abandon our +fruitless exploring trip after absolute truth, shall we learn to find +that which is true in space and time. It is precisely the consciousness +of the relative applicability of our knowledge which is the strongest +lever of progress. The believers in absolute truth have adopted the +monotonous diagram of "good" men and "rational" institutions as a basis +for their views of life. For this reason they oppose all human and +historical institutions which do not fit into their pattern, but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> which +reality nevertheless produces without regard to their brains. Absolute +truth is the arch foundation of intolerance. On the other hand tolerance +proceeds from the consciousness of the relative applicability of +"eternal truths." The understanding of pure reason leads to the +realization that the consciousness of the universal interdependence of +reason is the true road toward practical reason.</p> + +<p><b>(b) Morality and Right.</b></p> + +<p>The nature of our task limits us to the demonstration that pure reason +is a nonentity, that reason is the sum of all acts of individual +understanding, that it deals only seemingly with pure and general, but +in reality with practical, or concrete, perceptions. We have been +discussing that philosophy which pretends to be the science of pure or +absolute understanding. We found its aim to be idle, inasmuch as the +development of speculative philosophy represents a succession of +disappointments, because its unconditional or absolute systems proved to +be limited in space and time. Our presentation of the matter has +revealed the relative character of so-called eternal truths. We +perceived that reason was dependent on sense perceptions, we found that +any truth required definite limits for its determination. As regards +more especially life's wisdom, we saw that the acquired knowledge of +"pure" reason manifested itself in practice by the dependence of the +wise or the rational upon concrete sense perceptions. If we now apply +this theory to morality as such, we must be able to establish harmony +also in this field, where there is some doubt as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> to what is right and +wrong, by means of the scientific method.</p> + +<p>Pagan morality is different from Christian morality. Feudal morality +differs from modern bourgeois morality as does bravery from solvency. In +brief, we need no detailed illustration to show that different times and +nations have different moralities. We have but to understand that this +change is necessary, a special characteristic of the human race and of +its historical development, and we shall then exchange the belief in +"eternal truths," which every ruling class claims to be identical with +its own selfish laws, for the scientific knowledge that absolute right +is purely a concept which we derive by means of the faculty of thought +from the various successive rights. Right as an absolute concept means +no more and no less than any other general concept, for instance, the +head in general. Every real head is a concrete one and belongs either to +man or to some other animal, it is either long or broad, narrow or wide, +in other words it has special peculiarities. But at the same time, every +concrete head has certain general qualities which are universal in all +heads, for instance the quality of being the superintendent of the body. +Moreover, every head has as many general as individual traits, it is no +more personal than it is common. The faculty of thought abstracts the +general traits from the actual concrete heads and in this way creates +the concept of the absolute head. Just as the absolute head, or <i>the</i> +head, is composed of the general qualities of all heads, so the absolute +right stands merely for the general characters of all rights. Both of +these concepts exist merely as ideas, not as objects.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span></p><p>Every real right is a concrete right, it is right only under certain +conditions, at definite periods, for this or that nation. "Thou shalt +not kill," is right in peace, but wrong in war; it is right for the +majority of bourgeois society that wishes to see the outbursts of +passion controlled in the interest of its own predominant needs, but +wrong for the savage who has not arrived at the period where a peaceful +and social life is appreciated, and who therefore would consider the +above commandment as an immoral restriction of his liberty. For the love +of life, murder is a detestable abomination, for revenge it is a sweet +satisfaction. In the same way robbery seems right to the robber, wrong +to the robbed. There can be no question of any absolute wrong in such +cases, only of wrong in a relative sense. An action is wrong in a +general sense only in so far as it is generally disliked. Plain robbery +is wrong in the opinion of the great majority today because our +generation takes more interest in bourgeois affairs of commerce and +industry than in the adventures of the knights of the road.</p> + +<p>If there were such a thing as an absolutely right law, dogma, or action, +it would have to serve the welfare of all mankind under all conditions +and at all times. But human welfare is as different as men, +circumstances, and time. What is good for me is bad for another, and the +thing which may be beneficial as a rule may be injurious as an +exception. What promotes some interests in one period may interfere with +them in another. A law which would presume to be absolutely right would +have to be right for every one and at all times. No absolute morality, +no duty, no categorical imperative, no idea of <i>the</i> good, can teach<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> +man what is good, bad, right, or wrong. That is good which corresponds +to our needs, that is bad which is contrary to them. But is there +anything which is absolutely good? Everything and nothing. It is not the +straight timber which is good, nor the crooked. Neither is good, or +either is good, according to whether I need it or not. And since we need +all things, we can see some good in all of them. We are not limited to +any one thing. We are unlimited, universal, and need everything. Our +interests are therefore innumerable, inexpressibly great, and therefore +every law is inadequate, because it always considers only some special +welfare, some special interest. And for this reason no right is right, +or all of them are right, and it is as right to say "Thou shalt not +kill" as it is to say "Thou shalt kill."</p> + +<p>The difference between good needs and bad needs, right wants and wrong +wants, like that between truth and error, reasonable and unreasonable, +finds its conciliation in the difference between the concrete and the +general. Reason cannot discover within itself any positive rights or +absolutely moral codes any more than any other speculative truth. It +cannot estimate how essential or unessential a thing is, or classify the +quantity of concrete and general characters, until it has some +perceptible material to work upon. The understanding of the right, or of +the moral, like all understanding, strives to single out the general +characteristics of its object. But the general is only possible within +certain defined limits, it exists only as the general qualities of some +concrete and determined perceptible object. And if any one tries to +represent some maxim, some law, some right in the light of an<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> absolute +maxim, law or right, he forgets this necessary limitation. Absolute +right is merely a meaningless concept, and it does not assume even a +vague meaning until it is understood to stand for the right of mankind +in general. But morality, or the determination of that which is right, +has a practical purpose. Yet, if we accept the general and unconditional +right of mankind as a moral right, we necessarily miss our practical +aim. An act or a line of action which is universally or everywhere right +requires no law for its enforcement, for it will recommend itself. It is +only the determined and limited law, adapted to certain persons, +classes, nations, times, or circumstances, which has any practical +value, and it is so much more practical the more defined, exact, precise +and the less general it is.</p> + +<p>The most universal and most widely recognized right or need is in its +quality no more rightful, better, or valuable than the most +insignificant right of the moment, than the momentary need of some +individual. Although we know that the sun is hundreds of thousands of +miles in diameter, we are nevertheless free to see it no larger than a +plate. And though we may acknowledge that some moral law is +theoretically or universally good or holy, we are free in practice to +reject it momentarily, in parts, or individually, as bad and useless. +Even the most sacred right of the most universal extent is valid only +within certain definite limits, and within particular limits an +otherwise very great wrong may be a valid right. It is true that there +is an eternal difference between assumed and true interests, between +passion and reason, between essential, predominating, general, +well-founded needs<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> and inclinations, and accidental, subordinate, +special appetites. But this difference is not one of two separated +worlds, a world of the good and a world of the bad. It is not a +positive, general, continuous, absolute difference, but merely a +relative one. Like the difference between beautiful and homely, it +depends on the individuality of the person who distinguishes. That which +is a true and fundamental need in one case, is a secondary, subordinate, +and wrong desire in another.</p> + +<p><i>Morality is the aggregate of the most contradictory ethical laws which +serve the common purpose of regulating the conduct of man toward himself +and others in such a way that the future is considered as well as the +present, the one as well as the other, the individual as well as the +genus. The individual man finds himself lacking, inadequate, limited in +many ways. He requires for his complement other people, society, and +must therefore live and let live. The mutual concessions which arise out +of these relative needs are called morality.</i></p> + +<p>The inadequacy of the single individual, the need of association, is the +basis and cause of man's consideration for his neighbor, of morality. +Now since the one who feels this need, man, is necessarily an +individual, it follows that his need must likewise be individual and +more or less intensive. And since my neighbors are necessarily different +from me, it requires different considerations to meet their needs. +Concrete man needs a concrete morality. Just as abstract and meaningless +as the concept of mankind in general is that of absolute morality, and +the ethical laws derived from this vague idea are quite as unpractical +and unsuccessful. Man is a living personality, whose welfare<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> and +purpose is embodied within himself, who has between himself and the +world nothing but his needs as a mediator, who owes no allegiance to any +law whatever from the moment that it contravenes his needs. The moral +duty of an individual never exceeds his interests. The only thing which +exceeds those interests is the <i>material power</i> of the generality over +the individuality.</p> + +<p>If we regard it as the function of reason to ascertain that which is +morally right, a uniform scientific result may be produced if we agree +at the outset on the persons, conditions, or limits within which the +universal moral right is to be determined; in other words, we may +accomplish something practical if we drop the idea of absolute right and +search for definite rights applicable to well-defined purposes by +clearly stating our problem. The contradiction in the various standards +of morality, and the many opposing solutions of this contradiction, are +due to a misunderstanding of the problem. To look for right without a +given quantity of sense perceptions, without some definite working +material, is an act of speculative reason which pretends to explore +nature without the use of senses. The attempt to arrive at a positive +determination of morality by pure perception and pure reason is a +manifestation of the philosophical faith in understanding <i>a priori</i>.</p> + +<p>"It is true," said Macaulay in his History of England, in speaking of +the rebellion against the lawless and cruel government of James II., +"that to trace the exact boundary between rightful and wrongful +resistance is impossible: but this impossibility arises from the nature +of right and wrong, and is found in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> every part of ethical science. A +good action is not distinguished from a bad action by marks so plain as +those which distinguish a hexagon from a square. There is a frontier +where virtue and vice fade into each other. Who has ever been able to +define the exact boundary between courage and rashness, between prudence +and cowardice, between frugality and avarice, between liberality and +prodigality? Who has ever been able to say how far mercy to offenders +ought to be carried, and where it ceases to deserve the name of mercy +and becomes a pernicious weakness?"</p> + +<p>It is not the impossibility of accurately determining this limit to +which the nature of the difference between right and wrong, in the sense +of Macaulay, is due. It is rather due to the vague thought which +believes in an unlimited right, in absolute virtues and faults, which +has not risen to the understanding that the terms good, brave, right, +and bad are valid always and everywhere only in relation to some +concrete individual who reasons, and that they have no validity in +themselves. Courage is foolhardiness in the eyes of the cautious, and +caution is cowardice in the opinion of the daring. The revolt against +existing governments is always right in the eyes of the rebels, always +wrong in the opinion of the attacked. No action can be absolutely right +or wrong.</p> + +<p>The same qualities of man are good or bad, according to his needs and +their uses, according to time and place. Here trickery, slyness, and bad +faith prevail, there loyally, frankness and straightforwardness. Here +compassion and charity serve their purpose and promote welfare, there +ruthless and bloody severity. The quantity, the more or less beneficial +effect of a human<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> quality, determines the difference between virtue and +vice.</p> + +<p>Reason can distinguish between right and wrong, virtue and vice, only to +the extent that it can measure the relative quantity of right in any +faculty, rule, or action. No categorical imperative, no ethical code, +can serve as a basis for the real practical right. On the contrary, +ethics finds its justification in the actual righteousness of +perceptible objects. For general reason, frankness is not a better +quality than slyness. Frankness is preferable to slyness only inasmuch +as it is quantitatively, that is to say, more frequently, better, and +more generally appreciated than slyness. It follows that a science of +right can serve as a guide in practice only to the extent that practice +has served as a basis for science. Reason cannot determine the action of +man beforehand, because it can only experience, but not anticipate +reality, because every man, every situation, is new, original, exists +for the first time, and because the possibilities of reason are confined +to understanding <i>a posteriori</i>.</p> + +<p>Absolute right, or right in itself, is an imagined right, is a +speculative desire. A scientifically universal right requires certain +definite and perceptible premises which form the basis of the +determination of the general. Science is not a dogmatic infallibility +which may say: This or that is right, because it is so understood. +Science requires for its perceptions some external object. It can +perceive right only if it rightly exists. The universal existence is the +material, premise, condition, and cause of science.</p> + +<p>From the foregoing follows the postulate that morality must be studied +inductively or scientifically, not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> speculatively by the method of +traditional philosophy. We must not attempt to study absolute, but only +relative rights, only rights based on certain premises, and only this +can be the moral problem of reason. Thus the belief in a moral order of +the world is dissolved in the consciousness of human freedom. The +understanding of reason, of knowledge, of science, includes the +understanding of the limited validity of all ethical maxims.</p> + +<p>Whatever impressed man as salutary, valuable, divine, was exhibited by +him in the tabernacle of faith as the most venerable thing. The Egyptian +worshipped the cat, the Christian venerates the divine providence. So, +when his needs led him to live a well-regulated life, the benefits of +the law inspired him with such a high opinion of its noble origin that +he adopted his own handiwork as a gift of heaven. The invention of the +mouse-trap or other useful appliances pushed the cat out of its exalted +position. Whenever man becomes his own master, takes care of himself, +and provides for himself, then all other providences become useless, and +his own mastership makes all superior tutelage unbearable. Man is a +jealous creature. Ruthlessly he subordinates everything to his own +interests, even God and His commandments. No matter how great or +venerable an authority any code may have acquired by long and faithful +service, as soon as new needs oppose it, they degrade the divine +authority to the ranks of human law and transform ancient right into +modern wrong. The Christian frivolity refused to respect the threat of +physical retribution which the Hebrew had anointed as an authority in +moral questions and revered<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> under the maxim: Eye for eye, tooth for +tooth. The Christian had learned to cherish the blessings of +peacefulness; he carried submissive tolerance into the holy land, and +decorated the vacant tabernacle with the gentle injunction to offer the +left cheek when the right was tired of cuffs. In our times which are +Christian in name, but very anti-Christian in deeds, the long venerated +tolerance has long gone out of use.</p> + +<p>Just as every religion has its own peculiar God, so every time has its +own peculiar right. To this extent, religion and morality are in harmony +with the worship of their sanctum. But they become arrogant upstarts +whenever they assume to exceed their natural boundaries, whenever they +attempt to saddle upon all circumstances, under the pretense of offering +something incomparable, absolute, permanent, that which is divine and +right at certain times and under definite conditions; whenever they +proclaim a successful remedy for their own peculiar disease as a +universal patent medicine for all diseases; whenever they overbearingly +forget their descent. A law is originally dictated by some individual +need, and then mankind with its universal needs is supposed to balance +itself on the thin rope of this one rule. Originally that which is +really good is right, and thereafter only some decreed right is supposed +to be really good. That is the unbearable arrogance. Ordained right is +not satisfied to serve as the right of this time, this nation or +country, this class or caste. It wants to dominate the whole world, +wants to be absolute right, just as if a certain pill could be absolute +medicine, could be good for everything. It is the mission of progress to +repulse this assumption, to pluck this peacock feather<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> out of the tail +of the rooster, by leading mankind on beyond the boundaries prescribed +by ordained law, by extending the world for him, by conquering for his +cramped interests a wider liberty. The migration from Palestine to +Europe where the consumption of pork does not cause leprosy emancipates +our natural freedom from a once divine restriction by making it +irrelevant. But progress does not deprive one God of his shoulder straps +for the purpose of decorating some other God with them. That would +merely be an exchange, not an acquirement. Evolution does not drive the +saints of tradition out of the country; it simply retires them from the +wrongfully occupied field of universality into their peculiar +boundaries. Progress picks up the child and then pours the water out of +the bath tub. Though the cat may have lost its aureole and ceased to be +a God, it does not give up catching mice; and though the Jewish rules +for bodily cleanliness at certain definite times have long been +forgotten, a clean body is still highly respected. The present wealth of +civilization is due only to the economical administration of the +acquirements of the past. Evolution is as much conservative as it is +revolutionary, and it finds as much wrong as right in every law.</p> + +<p>It is true that the believers in absolute duty scent a difference +between moral and legal right. But their self-interested narrowness does +not permit them to realize that every law is originally moral and that +every special morality is gradually reduced to the level of a mere law. +Their understanding reaches into other times and other classes, but does +not reach their own time and class. The laws of the Chinese<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> and +Samoyeds are understood to refer to the peculiar requirements of those +people. But the rules of bourgeois society are supposed to be far more +sublime. Our present day institutions and moral codes are either +regarded as eternal truths of nature or reason, or as permanent oracular +expressions of a pure conscience. Just as if the barbarian did not have +a barbarian reason; as if the Turk did not have a Turkish conscience and +the Hebrew a Hebrew one; as if man could follow the dictates of some +absolute conscience, instead of the conscience being conditioned on the +man.</p> + +<p>Whoever limits the purpose of man to the love and service of God, and to +eternal blessedness hereafter, may devoutly recognize the traditions of +abstract morality as authoritative and guide himself accordingly. But +whoever regards development, education, and blessedness on earth as +man's life purpose, will not think that the questioning of the assumed +superiority of traditional morals is irrelevant. It is only the +consciousness of individual freedom which creates sufficient unconcern +for the rules made by others to permit a brave advance, which +emancipates us from the striving for an illusory absolute ideal, for +some "best world," and which restores us to the definite practical +interests of our time and personality. At the same time we are thus +reconciled with the world as it really is, because we no longer regard +it as the unsuccessful realization of that which ought to be, but rather +as the systematization of that which cannot but be. The world is always +right. Whatever exists, is right and is not fated to be otherwise until +it changes. Wherever there is existence,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> which is power, there is also +right without any further condition, because it is right in a formative +stage. Weakness has no other right than that of striving for supremacy +and then enforcing a recognition of its long denied needs. The study of +history shows us not only the negative and ridiculous side of the +religions, customs, institutions and ideas of the past, but also their +positive, reasonable and necessary side. It explains to us, for +instance, that the deification of animals was due to an enthusiastic +recognition of their usefulness. And so the study of history shows not +alone the inadequacy of the things of the present, but also demonstrates +that they are the reasonable and necessary conclusions from the premises +of previous stages.</p> + +<p><b>(c) The Holy.</b></p> + +<p>In the well-known statement: The end sanctifies the means, the developed +theory of morality finds its practical expression. This maxim, used in +an ambiguous sense, may stand as a common reproach for us and for the +Jesuits. The defenders of the society of Jesus make efforts to prove +that it is a malignant attempt to discredit their clients. We shall not +try to speak for either party to this dispute, but will devote ourselves +to the subject matter itself, and seek to substantiate the truth and +reasonableness of this maxim, to rehabilitate it in the public opinion.</p> + +<p>It will be sufficient for the refutation of the most general opposition +to understand that end and means are very relative terms, that all +concrete ends are means and all means are ends. There is no more of a +positive difference between great and small, right<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> and wrong, virtue +and vice, than there is between end and means. Considered as something +integral by itself, every action has its own end and its means are the +various moments of which even the shortest action is composed. Every +concrete action is a means in relation to other actions which aim at the +same common effect. But in themselves actions are neither ends nor +means. Nothing is anything by itself. All being is relative. Things are +what they are only within and by their interrelations. Circumstances +alter cases. In so far as every action is accompanied by other actions, +it is a means, and serves a common end which exceeds its own special +end; but inasmuch as every action is complete in itself it is an end +which includes its own means. We eat in order to live; but so far as we +are living while we are eating, we are living in order to eat. As life +to its functions, so the end is related to its means. Just as life is +simply the sum of all life's functions, so the end is the sum of all its +means. The difference between means and end reduces itself to that +between the concrete and the general. And all abstract differences +reduce themselves to this difference, because the faculty of abstraction +or distinction reduces itself to the faculty of distinguishing between +the concrete and the general. But this distinction presupposes the +existence of some material, some given objects, some circle of sense +perceptions by which it manifests itself. If this circle is found in the +field of actions or functions, in other words, if a previously defined +number of different actions is the object of our study, then we refer to +the general character of these objects as the general end and to every +more or less extended part of them, or to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> every function, as a means. +Whether any definite action is considered as an end or as a means, +depends on the question whether we consider it as a whole in relation to +its own parts, or as a part of some whole in which it is connected with +other parts, with other actions. From a general point of view which has +all human actions for the object of its study, and encompasses them all, +there exists only one end, viz., the human welfare. This welfare is the +end of all ends, is the final end, is the real, true, universal end +compared to which all special ends are but means.</p> + +<p>Now, our claim that the end sanctifies the means can have absolute +validity only in regard to some absolute end. But all concrete ends are +relative and finite. The one and sole absolute end is human welfare, and +it is an end which sanctifies all rules and actions, all means, so long +as they are subservient to it, but which reviles them as soon as they go +their own way without serving it. The human weal is literally and +historically the origin of the holy. That which is hale is holy. At the +same time we must not ignore the fact that the weal, or hale, in +general, the hale which sanctifies all means, is but an abstraction, the +real content of which is as different as are the times, the nations, or +persons which are seeking for their welfare. It must be remembered that +the determination of that which is holy or for the human weal requires +definite conditions, that no action, no means, is holy in itself, that +each one of them is sanctified only by definite relations. It is not +every end which sanctifies the means, but the holy end which sanctifies +its own means. But since every real and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> concrete end is only relatively +holy, it can sanctify its own means only relatively.</p> + +<p>The opposition against our maxim is not so much directed against it, as +against the wrong application of it. Recognition is denied and the +socalled sanctified ends are accorded only limited means, because there +is lurking in the background the consciousness that these ends have only +a relative holiness. On the other hand our defense of the maxim does not +imply that the various nominally holy means and ends are sanctified +because some authority, some scriptural statement, some reason or +conscience, has declared them to be so, but only in so far as they +answer the common end of all ends, the human welfare. Our maxim of ends +does not at all teach that we should sacrifice love and truths to +sanctified faith, but neither does it demand that we should sacrifice +faith for love and truth. It merely states the fact that, whenever some +superior end has been determined by sense perceptions or circumstances, +all means contrary to that end are unholy, and that on the other hand +means which are generally unholy may become temporarily and individually +sanctioned by their relation to some momentary or individual welfare. +Wherever peacefulness is actually in favor as a sanctified means, war is +unholy. When, on the other hand, man seeks his salvation in war, then +murder and incendiarism are holy means. In other words, our reason +requires for a valid determination of that which is sanctified certain +definite material conditions or facts as premises; it cannot determine +<i>the</i> holy in general, not <i>a priori</i>, not philosophically in the old +speculative way, but only in concrete cases, <i>a posteriori</i>, only +empirically.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span></p><p>If we understand that human welfare is the end of all ends, the ideal +of all means; if we furthermore dispense with all special determinations +of this welfare, with all personal ideas of it, and recognize that it is +different under different circumstances, then we understand at the same +time that no means is sanctified beyond the sanctity of its end. No +means, no action, is positively sanctified or makes for human welfare +under all circumstances. According to circumstances and relations one +and the same means may be good or bad. A thing is good only to the +extent that its results are good, only to the extent that there is good +in its end. Lying and cheating are bad only because they result +injuriously for ourselves, because we do not wish to be lied to or +cheated. But whenever a sanctified end is in question, the deceptive +means used in lying and cheating are called tricks of war. If any one is +firmly rooted in the goodness of chastity because he thinks it was +ordained by God, we cannot discuss the matter with him. But if one +honors virtue for the sake of virtue and abhors vice for the sake of +vice, in other words, for their consequences, he admits that he +sacrifices the lust of the flesh to the end of good health. In short, he +admits that the means are sanctified by the end.</p> + +<p>In the Christian conception of the world, the commandments of its +religion are absolutely good for all time, they are considered good +because Christian revelation declares them to be so. This conception +does not know that, for instance, its acme of virtue, the specifically +Christian virtue of abstemiousness, received its value only by contrast +with corrupt <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span>heathenish licentiousness, but that it is not a virtue +when compared to reasonable and normal satisfaction of material needs. +It deals with certain means which it calls indiscriminately good without +any relation to their ends, and others which it calls indiscriminately +bad in the same absolute way. And for this reason, it opposes the above +named maxim.</p> + +<p>But modern Christianity, modern civilization, has practically long done +away with this faith. It does indeed call the soul the likeness of God +and the body a putrid food for worms; but its deeds prove that it does +not take its religious phrases seriously. It cares little for the better +part of man and directs all its thoughts and actions toward the +satisfaction of the despised body. It employs science and art, and the +products of all climates, for the glorification of the body, clothing it +sumptuously, feeding it luxuriously, caring for it tenderly, resting it +on soft cushions. Although they speak slightingly of this earthly life +in comparison to the eternal life beyond, yet in practice they cling for +six days of the week to the uninterrupted pleasures of this body, while +heaven is hardly considered worthy of careless attention for more than +one short hour on Sundays. With the same thoughtless inconsistency the +socalled Christian world also attacks our maxim with words, while in +practical life it sanctifies the despised means by the end of its own +welfare, going even so far as to demonstrate its inconsistency in its +own life by subsidizing prostitution with state funds. The fact that the +legislative bodies of our representative states keep down the enemies of +their bourgeois order by courtmartials and exile, that they justify this +course by the proverb, "Do unto others as you would<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> that they should do +unto you," in the interest of "public" welfare, or that they defend +their divorce codes by the plea of individual welfare, proves that the +bourgeoisie also believes in the motto: The end sanctifies the means. +And even though the citizens delegate rights to the state which they +deny to themselves, also our opponents cannot but admit that in so doing +the citizens are simply delegating their own rights to the superior +authority of the state.</p> + +<p>True, whoever employs lying and cheating in the bourgeois world for the +end of gaining wealth, even though he may make it one of his ends to +give to charity, or whoever steals leather, like Saint Chispinus, for +the purpose of making shoes for poor people, does not sanctify his means +by his end, because the end in that case is not sanctified, or only +nominally so, only in general, but not in the concrete case quoted. For +charity is an end of but inferior holiness which must not be more than a +means compared to the main end of maintaining bourgeois society, and +whenever it contravenes this main purpose, charity loses its character +of a good end. And we have already seen that an end which is sanctified +only under certain circumstances cannot sanctify its means beyond them. +The indispensable condition of all good ends is that they must be +subservient to human welfare, and whether this welfare is secured by +Christian or pagan, by feudal or bourgeois means, it always demands that +the things which are considered unessential and of lesser importance +should be subordinated to the essential and necessary things, while in +the above quoted cases the more salutary honesty and bourgeois +respectability would be sacrificed to the less salutary charity.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> "The +end sanctifies the means" signifies in other words that in ethics as +well as in economics, the profit must justify the investment of the +capital. Again, if we call the forcible conversion of infidels a good +end, and an arbitrary police measure a bad means, this does not prove +anything against the truth of the maxim, but only testifies to its wrong +application. The means is not sanctified in the case, because the end is +not, because a forced conversion is not a good end, but rather an evil +one resulting in hypocrisy, and because such a conversion does not +deserve this name, or because force is a means which is unworthy of this +term. If it is true that a forcible conversion or wooden iron are +senseless ideas, how is it that people will persist in fighting against +universally recognized truths with such inconsistencies, such inane word +plays, such tricks of rhetoric and sophistry? The means of the Jesuits, +sly tricks and intrigues, poison and murder, appear unholy to us only +because the Jesuitic purpose, for instance that of extending the wealth +and influence and glorifying power of the order, is an inferior end +which may make use of the innocent language of the pulpit, but is not an +absolutely sanctified end, no supreme end, to which we would grant means +that would deprive us of some essential end, for instance of our +personal and public safety. Murder and manslaughter are considered +immoral as individual actions because they are not means to accomplish +our main end, because we incline not toward revenge or +blood-thirstiness, nor toward arbitrariness and the wilful dispensation +of justice by some judge, but toward lawful decisions and the more or +less impartial decrees of the state. But do we not explicitly declare in +favor<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> of the maxim "The end sanctifies the means," when we constitute +ourselves into juries and render dangerous criminals powerless by the +rope and the ax of the executioner?</p> + +<p>The same people who boast of having dropped Aristotle, that is to say +the belief in authority, for centuries, and who therefore replaced the +dead traditional truth by living self-gained truth, are found to be +completely at odds with their own development in the above cited cases. +If we listen to the recital of some funny story, which may be told by +even a reliable witness, we nevertheless remain loyal to the principles +of free reason, that is to say we are free to regard as serious and +regrettable any incident which the narrator may consider funny and +ridiculous. People know how to distinguish between a story and the +subjective impression its incidents created on the mind of the narrator, +and which depends more on the personality of the witness than on the +actual facts. But in the matter of good ends and bad means it is +proposed to neglect the distinction between an object and its subjective +end which is otherwise the point of all critique. Such ends as charity, +the conversion of infidels, etc., are thoughtlessly, a priori, called +good and holy, because they once were so under particular conditions, +while now their effect in the cases above cited is just the opposite, +and then people wonder that the unrighteous title carries with it +unrighteous privileges.</p> + +<p>Only that end is worthy of the predicate good or holy in practice which +is itself a means, a servant, of the end of all purposes, of welfare. +Whenever man seeks his welfare in bourgeois life, in production and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> +commerce of commodities, and in the undisturbed enjoyment of his private +property, he clips his long fingers by the commandment: "Thou shalt not +steal." But wherever, as among the Spartans, war is regarded as the +supreme end and craftiness as a necessary quality of a warrior, there +thieving is used as a means of acquiring craftiness and sanctioned as a +means for the main end. To blame the Spartan for being a warrior instead +of a sedate bourgeois would be to ignore the facts of reality, would be +equivalent to overlooking that our brain is not designed to substitute +imaginary pictures for the actual conditions of the world, but is +organized to understand that a period, a nation, an individual is always +that which it can and must be under given circumstances.</p> + +<p>It is not from mere individual and unpraiseworthy fondness for the +paradox that we subvert current views by defending the maxim "The end +sanctifies the means," but from a consistent application of the science +of philosophy. Philosophy originated out of the belief in a dualist +contrast between God and the world, between body and soul, between the +flesh and the spirit, between brain and senses, between thinking and +being, between the general and the concrete. The conciliation of this +contrast represents the end, or the aggregate result, of philosophical +research. Philosophy found its dissolution in the understanding that the +divine is worldly and the worldly divine, that the soul is related to +the body, the spirit to the flesh, thinking to being, the intellect to +the senses, in the same way in which the unity is related to the +multiplicity or the general to the concrete. Philosophy began with the +erroneous supposition that the one, as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> the first thing, was the basis +on which developed the two, three, four, and the entire multiplicity of +things by succession. It has now arrived at the understanding that +truth, or reality, turns this supposition upside down, that the reality +with its multiplicity of forms, perceivable by the senses, is the first +and foremost thing out of which the human brain gradually derived the +conception of unity or generality.</p> + +<p>No achievement of science can be compared with the amount of talent and +intellectual energy consumed in harvesting this one little fruit from +the field of speculative philosophy. But neither does any scientific +novelty encounter so many deep-rooted obstacles to its recognition. All +brains unfamiliar with the outcome of philosophy are dominated by the +old belief in the reality of some genuine, true, absolutely universal +panacea, the discovery of which would make all sham, false individual +panaceas impossible. But we, on the other hand, have been taught by the +understanding of the thought process that this coveted panacea is a +product of the brain and that, since it is supposed to be a general and +abstract panacea, it cannot be any real, perceptible, concrete panacea. +In the belief in an absolute difference between true and false welfare, +there is manifested an ignorance of the actual operations of brain work. +Pythagoras made numbers the basis of things. If this Grecian philosopher +could have realized that this basic nature was a thing of the mind, of +the intellect,<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> and that numbers were the basis of reason, the common +or abstract content of all intellectual activity, then we should have +been spared all the disputes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> which have raged around the various forms +of absolute truth, about "things in themselves."</p> + +<p>Space and time are the general forms of reality, or reality exists in +time and space. Consequently all real welfare must be attached to space +and time, and every welfare which exists in these dimensions must be +real. The different welfares, in so far as their beneficent qualities +are concerned, are to be distinguished only by their height and breadth, +by the quantity of their dimensions, by their numeral relations. Every +welfare, whether true or seeming, is perceived by the senses, by +practices of life, not by abstract reason. But practice assigns the most +contradictory things to different people at different times as means to +their welfare. What is welfare in one place, is disaster in another, and +vice versa. Understanding, or reason, has nothing else to do in the +matter than to number these various welfares as they are made real by +sense perceptions in various persons and times, and degrees of +intensity, in the order in which they appear, and thus to distinguish +the small from the great, the essential from the unessential, the +concrete from the general. Reason cannot dictate to us autocratically in +matters of some absolutely true welfare, it can only indicate the most +frequent, most essential, and most universal welfare in a certain +perceived number of welfares. But it must not be forgotten that the +truth of such an understanding, or enumeration, depends on certain +definite premises. It is therefore a vain endeavor to search for the +true and absolute welfare. This search becomes practical and successful +only when it limits itself to the understanding of a definite amount of +welfare of some <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span>particular objects. The general welfare can be found +only within definite boundaries. But the various determinations of +welfare agree in this respect, that they all consider it well to +sacrifice the little for the great, the unessential for the essential, +and not vice versa. In so far as this principle is right, it is also +right for us to employ for the good end of a great welfare some small +means in the shape of a small evil and to endure it, and thus we see +once more that the end sanctifies the means.</p> + +<p>If people were liberal enough to permit every one to go to heaven in his +or her own way, the opponents of our maxim would be easily convinced of +its truth. But instead of doing this, people follow the usual course of +shortsightedness and make their private standpoint a universal one. They +call their own private welfare the only true welfare, and regard the +welfare of other nations, times and conditions a mistake. So does every +school of art declare its own subjective taste to be objective beauty, +ignoring the fact that unity is but a matter of ideas, of thought, while +reality is full of the most varied forms. The real welfare is manifold +and the true welfare but a subjective choice which, like a funny story, +may make an entirely different impression on others, and be a false +welfare. Even though Kant, or Fichte, or some other particular +philosopher, may discuss at length the purpose of mankind and solve the +problem to his full satisfaction and to that of his audience, we +nevertheless have learned enough today to know that one can define one's +own personal idea of the purpose of mankind by means of abstract +speculation, but that one cannot discover any unknown and hidden object +in this way. Thought, or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> reason, requires some object, and its work is +that of measuring, of criticising. It may distinguish between true and +false welfare, but will also remember that they have their limits, +remember that it is itself personal and that its distinctions are +likewise personal and cannot be generalized beyond the point where +others receive the same impression of the same object.</p> + +<p>Humanity is an idea, while man is always some special person who has his +or her peculiar life in a definite environment and is therefore +subservient to general principles only from motives of self-interest. +The sacrifice of ethics, like that of religion, is only seemingly a +self-denial and serves the ends of reasonable self-interest, an +expenditure with a view to greater gains. A morality worthy of that name +which is not better defined by the term obedience can be exercised only +through the understanding of its worth, of its value for our welfare, of +its usefulness. The variety of political parties is conditioned on the +varieties of the interests concerned, and the difference in the means is +conditioned on the difference in ends. In questions of less importance +even the champions of absolute morality testify to this fact.</p> + +<p>Thiers in his history of the French Revolution tells of a peculiar +situation in the year 1796, when the patriots held the public power and +the royalists carried on a revolutionary propaganda. It was then that +the partisans of the revolution, who should have been the champions of +unlimited liberty, demanded coercive measures, while the opposition, who +secretly cared more for a monarchy than for a republic, voted for +unlimited liberty. "To such an extent are parties governed by their +self-interests," comments Thiers,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> just as if this were an anomaly +instead of being the natural, necessary and inevitable course of the +world. When, on the other hand, it is a question of the fundamental laws +of bourgeois order, then the moral representatives of the ruling classes +are egotistic enough to deny the connection of their material interests +with these laws and to claim that theirs are eternal, metaphysical world +laws, that the pillars of their special class rule are the eternal +pillars of humanity, and that their own means alone are holy ones and +their end the final end of the universe.</p> + +<p>It is a disastrous deception, a robbing of human liberty, an attempt to +cause the stagnation of the historical development, if any age or class +thus proclaims its own peculiar purposes and means to be for the +absolute welfare of humanity. Morality originally reflects one's +interests just as fashion reflects one's taste, and finally the action +is moulded after the conceived pattern like the coat in dressing. In +this process, force naturally is exerted for the maintenance and +protection of one's own life and those who resist are subdued. Interest +and duty, though perhaps not entirely synonymous, are certainly closely +related. Both of them are merged in the term welfare. Self-interest +represents more nearly the concrete, immediate, tangible welfare, while +duty concerns itself with the more remote and general welfare of the +future also. While self-interest considers the present tangible metallic +welfare of the purse, duty demands that we keep not only a part of +welfare, but all welfare in mind, that we consider the future as well as +the present, that we remember the spiritual welfare as well as the +physical. Duty thinks also of the heart, of social needs, of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> +future, of the spiritual weal, in brief of interest in general and urges +us to renounce the superfluous in order to secure and retain the +necessary. Thus your duty is your self-interest and your self-interest +your duty.</p> + +<p>If our ideas are to adapt themselves to truth, or to reality, instead of +reality or truth adapting itself to our notions or thoughts, we must +understand that the mutability of that which is right, holy, moral, is a +natural, necessary and true fact. And we must grant to an individual the +theoretical freedom which cannot be taken from it in practice, we must +admit that it is as free now as it has ever been, that laws must be +adapted to the needs of the social individual and not to the vague, +unreal, and impossible abstractions, such as justice or morality. What +is justice? The embodiment of all that is considered right, an +individual conception, which assumes different forms in different +persons. In reality only individual, definite, concrete rights exist, +and man simply comes along and abstracts from them the idea of justice, +just as he abstracted from different kinds of wood the conception of +wood in general, or from material things the conception of matter. It is +just as far from the truth, to think that material things consist of, or +are by virtue of, abstract matter, although this view is widely spread, +as it is to believe that the moral or bourgeois laws were derived from +the idea of justice.</p> + +<p>The ethical loss caused by our realistic, or if you prefer, +materialistic, conception of morality is not so great as it appears. We +need not fear that through this conception social beings will become +lawless cannibals or hermits. Freedom and lawfulness are closely allied +by the need for association which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span>compels us to permit others to live +together with us. If a man is prevented by his conscience or by other +spiritualistic or bourgeois ethics from committing unlawful +actions—unlawful in the wider meaning of the term—he is either not +exposed to very grave temptations, or he has a nature so tame that the +natural or legal punishments fully suffice to keep him within prescribed +bounds. But where these checks are ineffective, morality is likewise +powerless. If it were otherwise, we should have to assume that morality +exerts in secret the same influence on the faithful which is exerted by +public opinion on the faithless. But we know from actual experience that +there are more pious thieves than infidel robbers. That the world, which +attributes so much value for social welfare to morality by word of +mouth, actually shares this view of ours, is proven by the fact that +bourgeois society gives more attention to the penal code and to the +police than to the influence of morality.</p> + +<p>Moreover, our fight is not directed against morality, not even against +any special form of it, but only against the arrogance which assumes to +stamp some concrete form of morality with the trade mark of absolute +morality. We recognize that morality is eternally sacred, in so far as +it refers to considerations which a man owes to himself and to his +fellowmen in the interest of their common welfare. But the freedom of +the individual demands that each one should be at liberty to determine +the degree of consideration and the manner of giving it expression. +Under these circumstances it is as inevitable that the ruling powers, +classes or majorities should enforce their special needs under the form +of a prescribed right, as it is that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> a man's shirt should be closer to +his skin than his coat. But it appears to us not merely very +superfluous, but even detrimental to the energies required for the +progress of the future, that some decreed right should be elevated to +the position of absolute right and transformed into an insuperable +barrier to the advance of humanity.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Which was gained by the mind's contact with its +sense-perceived multiplicity of the world.—Editor.</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>Letters on Logic</span></h2> + +<p class="bold">Especially Democratic-Proletarian Logic</p> + +<p class="bold">BY JOSEPH DIETZGEN</p> + +<p class="bold">Translated by Ernest Untermann</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span></p> + +<p><b>Editorial Remark.</b></p> + +<p>The "Letters on Logic," treating on the same subjects as "The Positive +Outcome of Philosophy," were intended by the author to be replaced by +this subsequent work.</p> + +<p>We publish, however, both these works in hopes that the reader will +pardon the frequent repetitions on account of the additional light that +other parts of the "Letters on Logic" are apt to impart.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span></p> + +<p class="bold2">LETTERS ON LOGIC</p> + +<h2><span>FIRST LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Dear Eugene:</p> + +<p>You have now reached the age at which the students go to the university. +There, according to custom, they register first of all for a course in +logic, whether they choose the study of law, medicine, or theology. +Logic is, so to say, the elementary study in all branches of learning. +Now you know, my dear, that school and life are regarded as two separate +things. I should like to call your attention to their connection. We +live also in school, we are schooled also by life. I should like to +consider your trip across the Atlantic ocean as your first venture in +the high school of life, and assume the role of your professor of logic.</p> + +<p>I feel well qualified for this office. Although I am not well up in +Latin and Greek, still I feel competent to guide you to the depths of +logical science better than a German professor trained and installed +according to the most approved pattern. You will admit the possibility +of such a thing. For one who knows little may explain that little with +more ease and efficacy than one who has his head stuffed full of the +prescribed bunch of official wisdom.</p> + +<p>You, my son, have been so fortunate as to enjoy a seven years' course in +a German college. And since<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> your teachers, at your departure, gave you +the highest certificate, I may well consider you as qualified not only +to enter the school of life in the United States, but also to listen +intelligently to my lectures on logic.</p> + +<p>But in order that my well trained pupil may not look down upon his +self-taught teacher, I appeal to the fact that even the man with the +best all-around education will be a tyro in specialties; and that, on +the other hand, ignorance in many things does not exclude the +possibility of knowing more about a certain specialty than science has +heretofore grasped. Now I claim in this case to have acquired a +knowledge of the subject with which I intend to deal here that surpasses +anything I have been able to find in the professional literature. I +mention this, my dear Eugene, with all due modesty, not for the purpose +of throwing a halo around my personality, but in order to give a certain +authority to my office as teacher and to inspire my pupil with +confidence.</p> + +<p>Yes, I value confidence. Although you know me as a democrat who cares +nothing for authority, you shall also learn to know me as a graduate in +dialectics who, though he may empty the bath, still retains his hold on +the child and does not permit it to float off with the water. Children, +and one may say nations in their childhood, cannot do without authority, +and a teacher, whether he instruct children or nations, cannot dispense +with a certain confidence-inspiring air. The pupil must believe in the +wisdom of his teacher, in order that he may approach the master with the +necessary attention and willingness to learn. Later on the understanding +of the subject makes all authority superfluous. Thus a thing so sublime +as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span>authority is subject to the destructive tendencies of time, to the +historical process.</p> + +<p>Hitherto mankind has often been tempted by preconceived notions to +idolize vain things. It has been attempted to shield not only authority +in general, but, what is still worse, this or that throne or altar, +against the attacks of time. The relation between the perishable and the +imperishable has always been subject to much misunderstanding. Now since +logic is that science which aims to set the intellect aright, we shall +have to touch occasionally on the general misconception of time and +eternity.</p> + +<p>The most famous expounders of logic are reproached for their cumbrous +style and their obscure mode of explanation. Even masters of languages +have complained in my hearing about the foreign terms used by that +branch of science, terms which even they could not understand. Much of +the blame for this condition of things may fall on the difficulties of +the subject, which have baffled all elucidation for thousands of years. +Some of the blame also falls on the bad habit of using learned +vernacular. But the greatest fault lies with the mental laziness of the +students. Nothing can be learned without mental exertion. If you are +concerned in your further development, you will recognize the Christian +word as to the curse of work as untrue. Work cannot be descended from +sin, for it is a blessing. You will have experienced in yourself how +elated one feels after successful physical or mental work.</p> + +<p>The things which science yields without exertion can be at most +axiomatic commonplaces.</p> + +<p>I assume that you are quite willing to perform the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> necessary mental +labor, and I promise you that I shall do my best to make this study easy +for you. I do this so much more readily, as I frankly confess that these +letters to my son are written with the intention of making them +accessible to a wider circle of readers by means of the press.</p> + +<p>Before concluding, let me say a word about my aim of speaking especially +of democratic-proletarian logic. You will think or say: Logic may be a +subject worthy of study, but a special democratic-proletarian logic can +surely treat of nothing but party matters. But just as the special +accomplishments in this or that line, the special advances of this or +that nation, are at the same time general advances, progress of +civilization, so the ideas of proletarian logic are not party ideas, but +conclusions of logic in general. You may reply: Even though the special +thought of a Chinaman may be quite consistent and logical, still we +would not call it Chinese logic. That would be quite true, but it does +not meet my point.</p> + +<p>The thought on which the proletarian demands are based, the idea of the +equality of all human beings, this ultimate proletarian idea, if I may +say so, is fully backed up by the deeper insight into the tortuous +problem of logic. Now, since this idea dominates mankind, it certainly +has more right than any Chinese idea. Furthermore, industrial +development has leveled, simplified, cleared all social conditions to +such an extent that it becomes ever easier to penetrate with sober eyes +into the secrets of logic. Finally, my logic deserves its proletarian +qualification for the reason that it requires for its understanding the +overcoming<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> of all prejudices by which the capitalist world is held +together.</p> + +<p>The cause of the people is not a party matter, but the general object of +all science.</p> + +<p>The people's cause as the ultimate object, and logic as the most +elementary and most abstract science, as ultimate science, are as +intimately connected as plants and botany, or as laws and the legal +profession. So are the interests of democracy and the proletariat +intimately connected. The fact that this has not been well recognized in +the United States so far, is more a proof of the lucky condition of that +country than of the scientific knowledge of its democracy. The spreading +primeval forests and prairies offered innumerable homesteads to the poor +and they obscured the antagonism between capitalists and wage workers, +between capitalist and proletarian democracy. But you still lack the +knowledge of proletarian economics which would enable you to recognize +without a doubt that it is precisely on the republican ground of America +that capitalism makes giant strides and reveals ever more clearly its +twofold task of first enslaving the people for the purpose of freeing +them in due time.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>SECOND LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Dear Eugene:</p> + +<p>Having written the first letter by way of introduction, I now am ready +for a gradual approach to my subject.</p> + +<p>Logic aims to instruct the human mind as to its own nature and +processes; it will lay bare the interior working of our mind for our +guidance. The object of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> the study of logic is thought, its nature, and +its proper classification.</p> + +<p>The human brain performs the function of thinking as involuntarily as +the chest the function of breathing. However, we can, by our will, stop +breathing for a while, and accelerate or retard the breathing movements. +In the same way, the will can control the thoughts. We may choose any +object as the subject matter of our thought, and yet we may quickly +convince ourselves that the power of our will and the freedom of the +mind are not any greater than the freedom of the chest in breathing.</p> + +<p>While logic undertakes to assign the proper position to our brain, still +it has to remember that nature has already assigned that position.</p> + +<p>It is with logic as it is with other sciences. They draw wisdom from the +mysterious source of plain experience. Agriculture, e. g., aims to teach +the farmer how to cultivate the soil; but fields were tilled long before +any agricultural college had begun its lectures. In the same way human +beings think without ever having heard of logic. But by practice they +improve their innate faculty of thought, they make progress, they +gradually learn to make better use of it. Finally, just as the farmer +arrives at the science of agriculture, so the thinker arrives at logic, +acquires a clear consciousness of his faculty of thought and a +professional dexterity in applying it.</p> + +<p>I have two purposes in mind in saying this. Firstly, you must not expect +too much from this science, for you cannot set contrary brains to rights +by any logic. Secondly, you must not think too little of it, by +regarding the matter as mere scholastic <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span>word-mongery and useless +hairsplitting. In daily life, as well as in all sciences, we never +operate without the help of thought, but only with it, hence an +understanding of the nature of the processes of thought is of eminent value.</p> + +<p>Logic has its history like all sciences. Aristotle, whom Marx calls the +"Grecian giant of thought," is universally recognized as its founder.</p> + +<p>After the classic culture of antiquity had been buried by barbarism, the +name of Bacon of Verulam rose with the beginning of modern times as a +philosophical light of the first order. His most famous work is entitled +"Novum Organon." By the new organ he meant a new method of research +which should be founded on experience, instead of the subtleties of the +purely introspective method hitherto in vogue. After him, Descartes, or +Cartesius, as he called himself in literature, wrote his still famous +work, "About Methods." I furthermore recall Immanuel Kant's "Critique of +Reason," Johann Gottlieb Fichte's "Theory of Science," and finally +Hegel, of whom the biographer said that he was as famous in the +scientific world as Napoleon in the political.</p> + +<p>Hegel calls his chief work "Logic," and bases his whole system on the +"dialectic method." You have only to look at the titles of these +philosophical masterpieces in order to recognize that they all treat of +the same subject which we are making our special study, viz., the light +of understanding. The great philosophers of all times have searched for +the true method, the method of truth, for the way in which understanding +and reason arrive at science.</p> + +<p>I merely wish to indicate that this subject has its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> famous history, but +I do not care to enter more deeply into it. I will not speak of the +oppression and persecution, which was inaugurated by religious +fanaticism. I will not enumerate the various events that led to a +greater and greater light from generation to generation. The attempt to +trace this history would entangle us in many disputed questions and +errors which would only increase the difficulties of this study for the beginner.</p> + +<p>If a teacher of technology were to instruct you on steam engines and, to +explain their first incomplete invention, trace their further +development historically from improvement to improvement, until he +should arrive at the height of perfection attained in their present day +construction, he would also be advancing on a path, but on a tedious +one. I shall endeavor to show my subject at the outset in the very +clearest light which has ever been thrown on it by the help of the +nations of all times. If I succeed in this, it will be easy in the +future, in the reading of any author, to separate the chaff from the wheat.</p> + +<p>I can afford to dispense with quotations and proofs from others in +trying to make my case and demonstrating the positive product of social +culture, for we are dealing with the most universal and omnipresent +object,—one which enters into every spoken or written sentence with its +own body. If anybody tells of far off times or wonderful things, he must +quote witnesses. Now, much of what I have to say for my case may sound +wonderful, because it runs counter to the popular prejudice, but the +only witness required to prove the truth of my statements is the clear +brain of my pupil, who has only to examine his own experience<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> without +preconceived notions, in order to find proofs on every hand.</p> + +<p>It is surprising in the first place, that such a near at hand object has +not been understood long ago and that so much still remains to be +explained and to be taught after thousands of years of study. But you +know that just as the small things are often great, and great things +small, so the nearest things are often hidden and the hidden things nearest.</p> + +<p>I promised you in the first sentences of this letter, dear Eugene, that +I would now pass from introduction to subject matter. But since I have +really continued to move around the outer edge of the subject instead of +entering into its midst, you might become impatient, and so I will +justify my method. It is a peculiarity of this subject matter that it +exposes me to this charge. It is a peculiarity of thought that it never +stays with itself, but always digresses to other things. The thought is +the plank to which I should stick, but it is the nature of this plank +never to stick. Thinking is a thing full of contradictions, a +dialectical secret.</p> + +<p>Now I know that here I am saying something which it is very hard for you +to understand. But look here, has it not always been so? When you began +declining Latin words in the sixth class, you were unable at once to +grasp the full meaning of declension. You knew what you were doing, and +yet you did not entirely understand it. Only after penetrating more +deeply into the construction of the language did the meaning and purpose +of the beginning become clear to you. In the same way, you now must try +to digest as much as you can of what I say, and after you have gone more +deeply into this matter, you will fully<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> understand me from beginning to +end. In taking lessons from an author, on an unknown subject, I have +always followed the method of first getting a superficial view of the +subject, of glancing over its many pages and chapters, in order to +return to the beginning and acquire a thorough knowledge by repeated +study. With the growing familiarity with the subject the ability to +understand it grew, and at the conclusion the thing became clear to me. +This is the only correct method I can recommend to you.</p> + +<p>In conclusion let me say for to-day in passing that the recommendation +of the correct method for studying logic is not only an introduction, +but, as I have already said, the subject matter of science itself.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>THIRD LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Dear Eugene:</p> + +<p>My task of teaching logic requires two things: a logician and a teacher.</p> + +<p>The last named capacity requires that I should clothe the subject in an +attractive way. Permit me, therefore, to combine the didactic style with +that of the story teller, and to relate at this point an episode from a +novel of Gustav zu Putlitz:</p> + +<p>The organist of a certain village is lying on his deathbed. His last +strength has been spent on the previous day in playing a hymn, and after +its conclusion he was carried from the church in an unconscious state. +He had played his masterpiece, but at the same time his last piece. A +despised stage girl had <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span>accompanied him with a voice like that of a +nightingale. But neither she nor the organ player had earned any +applause from the stupid villagers.</p> + +<p>The old man looked around in his room, his eyes were first riveted on +his faithful piano, his friend and companion through life. He extended +his hand, but it sank down exhausted. He had not had the intention to +touch the piano anyway. It was only like stretching out one's hand for a +friend far away. Then he looked through the window trying to recollect +what time of the day it was. And when he had taken in the situation, he +turned to the girl kneeling at his feet.</p> + +<p>"Poor child," he began, "you were deeply disappointed yesterday. I felt +very much hurt, when I first heard of it, but after that everything +became clear to me while I heard the music all night, until a short +while ago. Rejoice, my girl, at being reviled, for it is done for the +sake of that sacred music, and it is an ecstasy, a blessing, to be +martyred for one's music which is well worth all injuries. I did not +fare any better all my life, and if I thank God for all the good he has +done me until this hour, I also thank him first and most fervently for +the gift of music which he bestowed on the world, and which he revealed +to me most wonderfully in my most painful hours.</p> + +<p>"For my music I have starved and suffered all my life, and my gain was +delicious, my reward celestial for this poor perishable stake.</p> + +<p>"My father was an organist in a little town of Eastern Frisia. His +father had held the same position in the same church, and, I think, so +did the father of his father follow music for a profession. Music has +been<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span> the heirloom of our family for generations. True, it was the only +heirloom, but I have cherished it and held its flag aloft all my life. +When God calls me away, I shall leave nothing behind but that old piano +and the sheet music which I wrote myself, for in all other respects I +have always been poor. I might have done differently, and my wife has +often upbraided me for it, but she does not understand the blessing of +music. I do not blame her for that, for it was not her fault that God +closed her ear to music as he did the ears of many others. Poor people, +how cold and dreary must be their lives when music does not scatter +blossoms in their path and bathe their temples in light. But there will +come a time when their ears will be opened, and God will compensate them +in heaven for what they missed here below.</p> + +<p>"We who love music have tasted a part of eternal bliss here below, for +harmony which dissolves all chords is eternal life and its wings are +fanning us in this terrestrial life——</p> + +<p>"Do you see, I know it well, and no one besides me, how it is when the +soul prepares to leave the perishable body and enter the song of the +spheres—</p> + +<p>"You do not understand me, my girl, but do not worry, you also will +understand some day. I will only tell you this much, and it shall be a +consolation to you when the world treats you roughly hereafter. All of +us, whether rich or poor, whether reclining on soft silken cushions or +on hard straw, all of us enter life with the celestial melodies in our +hearts. The beating of time goes with us as long as we are breathing. It +is the beating of the heart in our breast. We may seem to lose the +melody, even the measured step of time<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span> seems to become confused by our +passion, but in the blessed hours we always find our melody anew, and +then we feel at home in the path of our life."</p> + +<p>Thus the old organist idolized his music.</p> + +<p>But it is not alone the harmony of music which has such a power over the +mind. The harmony of colors, every art and science, has the same power. +Even the most common craft, and the most prosaic of all prose, the chase +after the dollar, may take possession of a man's soul and prostrate him +in adoration before its idol. True, not every one is so sentimentally +inclined, and even the sentimentalist is so only in especially +sentimental moments. Furthermore it cannot be denied that artists, +inventors, and explorers are worshipping the most worthy and most +adorable objects. And I admit that no great success can be accomplished +without putting your whole soul into some great aim.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless you should know that anything which may take possession of +one's soul shares its sublimity with all other things, and is for this +reason at the same time something ordinary. Without such a dialectic +clarification of our consciousness all adoration is idol worship.</p> + +<p>The actual experience, then, that anything and everything may serve as +an idol should clearly convince you that no one thing, but only the +universe is the true God, is truth and life.</p> + +<p>Now, is this logic or is it theology?</p> + +<p>It is both. At closer range you will notice that all great logicians +occupy themselves a great deal with God and deity, and that on the other +hand all honest<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> theologians are trying to base their faith on some +logical order. Logic is by its whole nature metaphysical.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + +<p>There exists a class of logicians who attempt to deny the inevitable +connection between the celestial region and the tangible universe. Some +of them do so from excessive religious delicacy of feeling, in order to +protect the sublime from the disintegrating effects of critique. Others +have such an antipathy against the religious abuses that they do not +wish to hear any more about religion. Both classes adhere to the +so-called formal logic.</p> + +<p>These adherents of formal logic may be compared to a maker of porcelain +dishes who would contend that he was simply paying attention to the form +of his dishes, pots, and vases, but that he did not have anything to do +with the raw material, while it is evident that he is compelled to form +the body in trying to embody forms. These things can be separated by +words only, but not by actions. In the same way as body and form, the +finite and infinite or so-called celestial spheres, the physical and the +metaphysical, are inseparable.</p> + +<p>Logic analyzes thought. But it analyzes thought as it is in reality, and +therefore it unavoidably searches for truth. And whether this truth is +found above or below, or anywhere, is a question which just as +inevitably brings the logician into contact with the theologian. To +think of avoiding such a meeting from considerations of sympathy or +antipathy, would be a rude lack of consideration for science.</p> + +<p>Metaphysical logic which aims to extend its field<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> to eternity, which +looks for logical order even in heaven, and seeks to solve even the +so-called last questions of all knowledge, differs in a distinct way +from formal logic, which selects a restricted field for its research and +confines itself to investigating the logical order of the socalled +physical world. This difference is worthy of your special attention, +because in it there is hidden the kernel of our whole correspondence.</p> + +<p>It is quite a practical method to set a limit for one's investigations, +not to fly into clouds, not to undertake anything that cannot be +accomplished. Yet you must not forget that practical boundaries are not +theoretical boundaries, that they are not invariable boundaries for you, +or for others. Although you cannot fly to heaven and will give up the +idea of flying machines from considerations of practical expediency, yet +you will not wish to deny to man the theoretical freedom of infinite +striving even in the matter of airships, and you will not be so small as +to give up the idea of the capacity for our race for metaphysical, or in +other words, infinite development.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In the sense of: mental and physical world embracing, +all-embracing.—Editor.</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>FOURTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Dear Eugene:</p> + +<p>In my first letter I acquainted you with my purpose, in the second I +lifted the subject on my finger tips, so to say, to show it for a brief +moment; in the third I showed that its color had inevitably a religious +shade. Now, to continue, permit me to introduce another point to your +consideration.</p> + +<p>The great cause of the working class has hitherto<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span> always been the beast +of burden of a small and exclusive minority. This is most evident in the +slave states of antiquity, in Egypt, Greece, Rome. Likewise in the +feudal and guild systems of the middle ages the oppression of the mass +of the people is sufficiently apparent. At present this condition of +things is more visible in Eastern Europe, in Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, +Hungary, Eastern Prussia, etc., than in the industrial countries of the +West. In the United States of America it is most obscured, so that there +the people hardly realize their enslaved condition. In America, many of +the upper ten thousand have made their way from the bottom up, and it +happens more frequently than in Europe that the captains of industry +laid their foundation by hard work. The shortsighted observers then +easily forget out of sympathy for the hard beginning that there is +sharper's practice at the end, and they indulge in the idle hope that +every hard working beast of burden might transform itself into a happy +millionaire by thrift and smartness.</p> + +<p>You will probably ask: What has that to do with logic or the art of +reasoning? Patience! You will admit that the emancipation of the nations +from beastly toil, misery and suffering is the highest goal of the human +mind. Nor will you deny that the thought is the most essential +instrument for reaching this high goal. The accomplishments of thought +are visible in the results of civilization. The proletariat of the +present, also that of Russia, Turkey, East Prussia, participates in +these accomplishments of thought. It participates not alone in the sense +that its brains are better educated and cultured, but also that its +food, clothing, and shelter have become more civilized through the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> +progressive deeds of intellect.</p> + +<p>You see, then, that the people's cause is connected with the faculty of +thought, and the nature of the latter may be illustrated as well by the +example of the development of civilization. The complicated network of +wheels in a watch may also serve to demonstrate the nature of that which +language designates by many names, such as spirit, intellect, faculty of +knowledge, reason, etc. Only it must be remembered that this mysterious +something cannot be shown by itself, but only in connection with other +things, whether they be the history of civilization or a watch. There +will then be no contradiction in finding that the intellectual life +appears more powerful and magnificent through the clockwork of the +history of civilization than through any miniature product of thought.</p> + +<p>In searching for the connection of things, one generally seeks to +recognize the manner or the degree of the connection. But we, in this +case, disregard the question as to how the things of this world are +related to one another and to thought, and we simply make a note of the +fact of the interdependence of thought and being, of nature and mind. +This fact of the universal interconnection of things contradicts the +untrained prejudice. The uncultivated brain nurses the illusion that the +earth, the trees on it, and the clouds and the sun above them are +separate things. But it requires a better training of reason to +understand that the earth, the tree, the clouds, and the sun, can be +what they are only in the universal interconnection. I remember reading +an article from Fichte, in a German school reader, which clearly showed +that the disarrangement of an insignificant object during the process of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span>thinking causes us to disarrange the whole history of the world in our +thoughts. It is well known that one unfamiliar with political economy +overlooks the fact that the business men not only carry on their trading +for their private benefit, but are also members of the process of social +production. It is overlooked that all labor, aside from being individual +activity, is at the same time an organic part of social labor. And just +as ignorance of economics overlooks the industrial interdependence, so +ignorance of logic overlooks the cosmic interrelations.</p> + +<p>Here is a drop of water. Look how different it is according to the +different things with which it is connected. It cannot be what it is +without a certain temperature. According to changes in temperature, it +will assume either the form of ice or of steam. In fat the drop remains +compact, in salt it divides infinitely, runs downhill in general and +uphill in a loaf of sugar. According to the specific gravity of a +certain fluid, with which it may come into contact, it either floats on +the surface or sinks. Without a connection with the earth, its +temperature and gravitation, this drop and all others would disappear in +the fathomless abyss and have no existence. Thus the forms of things +change according to their connections, and they are what they are only +as parts of the universal interrelation.</p> + +<p>What is true of a drop of water, is true of all things, all forces and +substances, even of our thoughts. The human mind lives and works only in +connection with the rest of the material universe—and the recognition +of the organic unity of all things is the fulcrum of my logic.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span></p><p>Old line metaphysical logic was so enamored of its object that the +descent, the kinship, and the connection with the common things of this +world seemed too ordinary for the exquisite spirit. That logic was +transcendental, and therefore its chosen object likewise had to be in +touch with a transcendental world. And though it was scientific enough +to regard the tale of the creation of the first soul by the breath of +God as a fable, it was nevertheless so prejudiced in favor of the +extraordinary nature of the intellect that it did not abandon, for +thousands of years, the hope of finding in that intellect a source which +would reveal transcendental matters. Formal logic now entirely discards +this hope of a fantastical world, but at the same time it misunderstands +the natural connection between the spirit and the common world. It +isolates the instrument of thought and leaves the question undecided +whether this instrument has a natural, supernatural, or no connection at +all. It overlooks that just as logic is real, so reality is logical, and +does not see that the back door which leads to illogical heaven by way +of faith deserves the disdain of science.</p> + +<p>Thought, intellect, are really existing, and their existence is a +uniform part of the universal existence. That is the cardinal point of +sober logic.</p> + +<p>The fact that the thoughts are of the same worldly substance as the +other parts of the universe, that they are parts of common nature and +not a transcendental essence, has already been expressed by Cartesius in +the famous words: "<i>Cogito, ergo sum</i>," I think, therefore I am.</p> + +<p>The fact of my thinking, says the philosopher, proves my existence. In +order to come to an absolute<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span> conviction on the nature of truth and +error, he sets out by doubting everything. And then he says that he +cannot doubt the existence of his thoughts. He thus placed the spirit on +the basis of real life, delivered it of its transcendentalism, and that +constitutes his everlasting merit.</p> + +<p>However, not alone Cartesius, but also your own experience testifies to +the inseparable connection between thinking and being. Have not your +thoughts been connected always and everywhere with some worldly or real +object? If you attempt to isolate thought in order to ponder over it, +you can only do so because that thought has been experienced by you and +therefore was in every instance attached to some worldly object. True, +you have thought of Greek gods, brownies, and mermaids. But you, an +amateur in painting, are familiar enough with that part of the mind +which is called imagination in order to admit that even this eccentric +part of the mind does not only act, and therefore, exist in reality, but +also derives all its products from reality, so that even its most +fantastical vagaries and illusions are still real pictures, reflections +of reality.</p> + +<p>But how is it that I require such a multitude of words in order to state +over and over again that the thought has a real existence and is a +uniform part of the universe? Simply because from time immemorial the +confusion in matters of logic is so great that the human spirit is in +the same breath exalted to heaven, and yet its thoughts regarded as +nothing real, nothing true. This is made plain by the fact that a sharp +distinction is commonly made between that which is real and that which +is only imagined, and this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span> difference is exaggerated to such an extent +that it appears as if the idea, which indeed is only in the brain, has +no real existence at all.</p> + +<p>In order that you may understand the interrelations of the things of the +universe, I must warn you against this exaggeration and prove that the +intellect has a real existence which is connected with the universe or +reality. Botany, which occupies itself with plants, does not only teach +us to divide them into classes, orders, and families, but it also does +more by showing us what place in the entire realm of nature is occupied +by the vegetable kingdom, by pointing out the differences which +distinguish the plants from the inorganic mineral kingdom or the organic +animal kingdom. Formal logic similarly dissects the spirit into its +parts, makes distinctions between conceptions, ideas, judgments, +conclusions, divides these into subdivisions, classifies conceptions +according to species, separates abstract and concrete thought, knows +many varieties of judgments, registers three, four, or more modes of +conclusion. But at the same time this formal logic recoils from touching +on the question as to how the universal spirit is related to the +universe, what role it plays in the general existence, whether it is +part and parcel of nature or transcendental. And yet this is the most +interesting part, the part which logically connects the intellect and +the science of the intellect with all other sciences and things.</p> + +<p>Logic must teach us how to distinguish. It is not a question, however, +of distinguishing sheet iron from gold, or a greyhound from a pug-dog, +for this is done by special lines of knowledge. Logic must rather +enlighten us about that part of the faculty of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span>distinguishing which is +generally required in all branches of knowledge, whereby truth and +error, imagination and reality are recognized. To this end I feel +impelled to advise you not to overlook that even error and imagination +belong to the one infinite and absolutely coherent reality. For the +purpose of distinguishing true imagination from actual reality, it must +be remembered that just as rye bread and cream puffs agree in belonging +to the general category of baker's products, so imagination and truth, +thought and reality, are two different kinds of the same nature.</p> + +<p>To sum up the contents of this letter, let me point out that its +beginning shows the connection of the intellect with the development of +the people, while its conclusion explains the wider connection of the +mind with the universal existence.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>FIFTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>A man not trained in logical thinking is handicapped by the absence of a +monistic method of thought. Monistic is synonymous with systematic, +logical, or uniform.</p> + +<p>If we call a cream puff a tidbit and rye bread a food without +remembering that every food is a tidbit and every tidbit food, and if we +ignore the fact that both of them, in spite of their difference, belong +to the same category and are, therefore, related, then we lack logic. +And logic is lacking whenever the fact is ignored that all things +without exception: substances, forces, or qualities of the world, are +chips of the same block, finite parts of the infinite, which is the only +truth and reality.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span></p><p>That insects, fishes, birds, and mammals form one and the same animal +kingdom, is an old story which has long been patched up by the logical +instinct. Darwin did not only enrich the natural sciences, but also +perform an invaluable service for logic. In proving how amphibia +developed into birds, he bored a hole into the hitherto fixed order of +classification. He brought motion, life, spirit into the zoological +swamp.</p> + +<p>In case you should not be familiar enough with Darwin's work to +understand my allusions, I will enter a little more deeply into the +matter in a few sentences. The zoologists knew well enough that all +species of animals belonged to the animal kingdom; but this +classification was a mechanical affair. Now the "Origin of Species," +which demonstrates that the zoological classification is not constant +but variable, which outlines the actual transition from one species of +animals to another, reveals at the same time that this alignment of all +animal species in one kingdom is not only a logical mechanism, but also +a fact of actual existence. This classification of all animals from the +minutest to the most gigantic in one kingdom appeared before the time of +Darwin as an order which had been accomplished by thought alone, while +after him it was known as an order of nature.</p> + +<p>What the zoologists did to the animal kingdom, must be done by the +logician to existence in general, to the cosmos. It must be shown that +the whole world, all forms of its existence, including the spirit, are +logically or monistically connected, related, welded together.</p> + +<p>A certain narrow materialism thinks that everything is done and said +when the inter-connection between thought and brain is pointed out. A +good many things<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> may still be discovered by the help of the dissecting +knife, microscope, and experiment; but this does not make the function +of logic superfluous. True, thought and brain are connected, just as +intimately as the brain is related to the blood, the blood with oxygen, +etc.; but moreover thought is connected quite as intimately with all +other things as all physical objects are.</p> + +<p>That the apple is not alone dependent on the stem which attaches it to +the tree, but also on sunshine and rain, that these things are not +one-sidedly but universally connected, this is what logic wants to teach +you particularly in regard to the spirit, the thought.</p> + +<p>If a traveler in Africa had to report a new animal species, he would not +make special mention of the fact of its existence, because that is +obvious. And though he were to relate things about the most abnormal +existence, we should still know that this abnormality is only a +deviation in degree which does not overstep the bounds of existence in +general. But the human intellect is a greater novelty than the most +wonderful animal species of the interior of Africa.</p> + +<p>You know my sharpwitted friend Engländer. When I told him that I was +writing articles on the human mind, he advised me not to bother my head +about it. He said that this was a subject no man knew anything about. +And when the learned Mr. Hinze, whom you also know, wanted to prove the +inevitability of religious faith and the inadequacy of all science, he +always asked the pathetic question: What is consciousness? And he used +to take on an expression, as if he had presented a book with seven +seals. Now I don't want to class the professors of logic with such men. +But it is a fact that the great multitude, among them many scientists, +are quite<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> unfamiliar with the truth that the existence of the blue sky +and of the green trees is a uniform part of the same generality with the +existence of our intellect.</p> + +<p>For this reason it is necessary to prove that the intellect exists in +the same way that all other things do. For it is denied and +misunderstood, not only by those who regard the spirit as a being of a +transcendental nature, but also by those who admit the existence of the +true contents of an ideological concept, but not of thought itself. In +short, the matter is so obscure that I feel sure that you will likewise +be as yet in doubt whether there are not two kinds of ideological +concepts, one of them real, the other unreal.</p> + +<p>For two thousand years logic has proclaimed the sentence that thought is +a form to be filled with real contents. True thought "must coincide with +reality." It is true that there is a germ of sense in this statement, +but it is misunderstood. The central point of logic is overlooked. Every +thought must not only have a real content, but it is also necessary, in +order to distinguish true thoughts or perceptions from untrue, to +realize that thought is always and everywhere a part of reality and +truth, even when it contains the most singular imaginations and errors.</p> + +<p>Just as the domestic cat and the panther are different species of cats +and yet belong to the same genus of cats, so true and false thoughts, in +spite of all their differences, are of the same genus. For truth is so +great that it comprises absolutely everything. Truth, reality, the +world, the all, the infinite and the absolute are synonymous +expressions. A clear conception of truth is indispensable for the +understanding of logic. And in the last analysis it is simply using +different<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> words for the same thing, when I base the quintessence of +logic, its fulcrum, cardinal, salient, or distinctive point on the +spirit intimately united to nature or on the concept of a uniform world, +truth, or reality. I cannot give you a clearer view of truth than by +quoting at this place the famous words of Lessing: "If God were to offer +me the ever active striving for truth in his left hand and truth in his +right hand, I should grasp his left and say: Father, keep truth, it is +for you alone." This statement is somewhat highflown and mystical, and +Lessing was no doubt somewhat embarrassed by mystical thinking. Still +there is a sober truth in these words, which is quite clear and to the point.</p> + +<p>"Truth itself" is the universe, the infinite and inexhaustible. Every +part of it is a finite part of the infinite and is, therefore, finite +and infinite, perishable and imperishable at the same time. Every part +is a separate part and connected inseparably with the whole. The human +mind, among others, is such a part.</p> + +<p>The universal existence, or truth, is the inexhaustible object of the +human mind. The fact that in the study of logic the human mind has +itself for an object must be explained to the student by pointing out +that in this case the subject and the object are both things like all +other things, in other words, are a part of truth, a part of natural existence.</p> + +<p>"Truth itself" cannot be wholly conceived by the human brain, but in +parts. For this reason we possess only the ever active striving for +truth; for this reason, furthermore, the conception or knowledge can +never be completely identical with reality, but can be only a part of it.</p> + +<p>Now permit me to say a few words which do not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> sound as would those +spoken on the throne of logic, but which are expressed in popular +language. If you conceive some real object, whether a church steeple or +a thimble, then this object exists twice, viz., in reality and in +conception. On the other hand, a certain creation of imagination has +only a simple fantastical existence. Such a popular way of thinking is +undoubtedly correct. It is incorrect only when the fact is universally +ignored that all modes of existence belong to the same genus, the same +as a domestic cat and a panther, so that the existence of a thing in our +brains, and outside of them in the heavens, on earth, and in all places +has a logical meaning only when it is the same existence in spite of all +multiplicity. An existence not partaking of the general nature of all +existence would be an illogical, nonsensical, thing.</p> + +<p>Now, I think you will have no difficulty in understanding me when I say +that a church steeple in imagination and the same church steeple in +reality are not two church steeples, but that imagination and reality +are forms of the same existence.</p> + +<p>Ancient logic ordered a medal and had stamped on its face: The thought +must be identical with the reality. We now stamp on its reverse side: +(1) The thought is itself a part of reality and (2) the reality outside +of thought is too voluminous and cannot enter thought even with its +smallest particle. What good, under these circumstances, is the old +inscription, especially since it does not teach us at all how the +identity between thought and its real object is to be attained, known, +or measured?</p> + +<p>If you, my dear Eugene, should become confused by these statements +instead of enlightened, you should have patience and consider that a +thing which is to be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span>illuminated by logic must, of course, be first +obscure. I believe that I have served you in some way by simply raising +a doubt in your mind as to the soundness of the popular way of speaking +and if I thus have convinced you of the confusion and inadequacy of the +plausible idea of the identity of thought and reality.</p> + +<p>True, a thought must agree with its object just as a portrait should. +But what good will it do a painter to have his special attention called +to this fact?</p> + +<p>Have you ever seen a portrait or a copy that did not agree in some +respect with the original? I am convinced that this has never been your +experience any more than a portrait which was a complete likeness of its +object. Your experience will be sufficiently cultivated to know that it +can always be a question only of a more or less. I would seriously +recommend to you to reflect on the relativeness of all equality, +similarity, and identity. By far the greater part of humanity is in this +respect barbarously thoughtless. It is very difficult to grasp for the +logically untrained brain that two drops of water or twins are only +relatively alike or unlike, just as are man and woman, negro and white +man, and that all existence is just as alike as it is unlike.</p> + +<p>It is with the thinker as it is with the painter. They both search for a +likeness of reality and truth. In painting as in understanding there are +excellent pictures and bad ones. In this respect one may make a +distinction between true and false thoughts, but you must also know that +even the unsuccessful portrait has some likeness, and that even the most +accurate likeness is yet far from being in perfect harmony and identical +with its object.</p> + +<p>Reality, truth, universal nature, stands in the pulpit<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span> and preaches: "I +am the Lord, thy God. Thou shalt not make any graven image to worship +it." You must have a far too sublime conception of truth to entertain +the idea that any painter or thinker might encompass it fully within the +limit of a picture, no matter how good a likeness it may be.</p> + +<p>Now, that we have recognized the human mind as a part of actual reality +and truth, we see at the same time that undivided reality, the sum of +all that is, represents absolute truth which comprises everything. In +their capacity of parts of the universe, true and false thoughts, good +and bad men, heaven and hell, and all other things, are all pieces of +the same cloth, bombs of the same caliber.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>SIXTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>My Dear Son:</p> + +<p>After the third letter had acquainted you with the fact that the subject +of logic has a certain religious flavor, the two subsequent letters +endeavored to show that the logical subject is interconnected with the +universal existence of the world, that the faculty of thought is an +inseparable part of actual truth. In the vernacular of theology my last +two letters have represented the human mind as a part of the living true +God.</p> + +<p>Christianity teaches: God is a spirit and who would worship him must +worship in spirit and in truth.</p> + +<p>And logic teaches: The spirit is a part of universal existence. Whoever +worships the spirit, is an idolator, for he worships a part and +misunderstands the whole truth. Truth itself is identical with the +universal existence, with the world, and all things are simply forms,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> +phenomena, predicates, attributes, passing expressions of it. The +universal existence may be called divine because it is infinite, being +the alpha and omega which comprises all things as special truths. The +intellect is such a limited part among other special parts of divine +truth, and the latter is frequently called world without any bombastic +emphasis.</p> + +<p>Undoubtedly, every science, profession and trade can say the same thing +of its object. The blue sky and the green trees are divine parts. +Everything is interrelated and connected. If that were a good reason for +not making any subdivisions, every part and description would become +endlessly tiresome.</p> + +<p>However, the specialty of logic is the cosmic sum of all truths, because +it aims at a general elucidation of the nature of the human brain. This +purpose is not so well served by an accumulation of other knowledge as +by the general understanding of truth.</p> + +<p>Logic, which seeks to enlighten the mind for the purpose of scientific +thinking, does not so much treat of true conceptions as of the general +and absolute conception of truth which is inseparably linked to the +infinite universal life.</p> + +<p>If you wish to think scientifically, you will first of all strive after +clear ideas. And yet your head may be quite clear in regard to everyday +things, without getting any nearer to general clearness. Nor is such +clearness obtainable by the accumulation of mere special knowledge, for +even if you were to grow in wisdom to the end of your days, nevertheless +the fountain of wisdom, the universe, is inexhaustible and your brain +will remain imperfectly informed or unclear as before. Yea, even the +smallest part of the world is so inexhaustible that the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> most talented +can never acquire all the knowledge necessary to understand entirely +even the most minute object. The strongest microscope cannot see all +there is to see in a drop of water, and the wisest man can never learn +all there is to shoemaking.</p> + +<p>You can see by all this that the scientific use of our intellect is +furthered by special knowledge only in the corresponding details. For +this reason it does not satisfy us to have some logicians tell us how +many kinds of concepts, judgments and conclusions are contained in our +intellect. These are special details of logic. But the thing of first +importance for the student of logic is the elucidation of the universal +concept of truth, not the accumulation of special truths.</p> + +<p>Special truths enlighten the intellect. But the understanding that all +specialties are connected with one another by one monad or unit which is +truth itself gives us a certain general enlightenment which certainly +does not render any special research unnecessary, or take the place of +it, but which may well serve as the foundation of all research, which +may therefore be called a fundamental assistance.</p> + +<p>I may remark in passing that the understanding of logical science is +rendered especially difficult by the fact that the unpracticed +understands all terms and concepts only in their narrow popular meaning, +while the subject matter leads up continually into the widest fields.</p> + +<p>When I speak of parts of the world, you must not think merely of +geographical parts, but you must think farther until you arrive at the +insight that stars and bricks, matter and force, in short all parts of +the world are world parts.</p> + +<p>The logical difficulty may be principally traced to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> lack of +familiarity with the comprehensive categories. It will be clear to you +that thinking and being, phenomenon and truth, etc., are conceptions of +the widest scope. So you may have some difficulty in distinguishing +between concepts of truth, and true concepts. And yet this is the same +as making a distinction between the general class of herbs and its +individual species. The mere intercourse with such comprehensive +concepts as truth, existence, universe, is an excellent school of +intellectual enlightenment.</p> + +<p>Perhaps you may object to the deviation of a science devoted to the +special study of the faculty of thought into such fields as existence or +truth. But a logic confined to an analysis of the faculty of +understanding would be narrow compared to one representing this faculty +of understanding at work in real life. If the science of the eye were to +treat only of the various parts of the eye without considering the +things outside connected with its function, the light, the objects, in +short, the vision of the eye, it would be more an anatomy of the eye +than a general science of the eye. At all events a science which +represents not alone the subjective faculty of vision, but also the +living activity of the eye, the objective field of vision inseparable +from the subjective faculty, is a far more comprehensive instruction, a +higher enlightenment of the human brain.</p> + +<p>In my opinion, logic should not so much treat of the analysis of the +intellectual subject as of the purpose and object of the faculty of +thought, its culture, which is not accomplished by the intellect itself, +but by its connection with the world of truth, its interrelation with +the universal existence.</p> + +<p>What can a logic accomplish which divides thought<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span> into analytical and +synthetical thoughts, which speaks of inductive and deductive +understanding and of a dozen other kinds, but which finally declines to +meet the question of the relation of thought and understanding to truth, +and fails to indicate what and where is divine truth and how we may +arrive at it?</p> + +<p>Pilate, the typical sceptic, shrugs his shoulders; the clergymen make a +mystery of divine truth; the natural sciences care only for the true +conceptions, but naught for the concept of truth; and then the special +science of understanding, formal logic, tries to refer its task to +philosophy or world wisdom.</p> + +<p>I have already pointed out that the titles of the principal works on +philosophy indicate that the whole world wisdom turns around the +question: How can our brain be enlightened, how can it arrive at truth? +The naturalists answer that this can be accomplished by special studies, +and they are frequently opposed to philosophical research which makes +general truth its main object, and belittle it. You will readily see +that this is a mistake when you consider that, to illustrate, a machine +or an organism as a whole is still something more than a mere sum of its +parts.</p> + +<p>No matter how well you may know each single part, yet you will not +understand the whole machine or organism by this means alone. The +universe is not an aggregation of unorganized parts, but a living +process which must be understood not only in its parts but also as a +whole. We may pass for the moment the question whether the Milky Way may +be dissolved into stars, and whether the stars may become globes like +our Earth which may develop plants, animals, and intelligent beings. The +thing which is evident is that there is a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span>process of development, that +all nature takes part in this movement, that the universe is a whole +without end, composed of an infinite number of parts; a coming and +going, an eternal transformation, which is always identical with itself +and always the same world. What all this would be without our eyes and +ears and without the intellect by means of which we use eyes and ears, +what the world "in itself" is, that is a senseless and transcendental +speculation.</p> + +<p>The science of logic must deal only with the actual world which is +inseparable from us and from our thoughts.</p> + +<p>This world which we hear, see, smell, in which we live and breathe, is +the world of truth or the true world. That is a fact. Must I prove this? +And how is a fact proven? How do we prove that a peach is a delicious +fruit? One goes and eats it. In the same way, you may now go and enjoy +life, of course in a rational manner, and I am convinced that your own +love of life will tell you that it is proof positive of the truth of the +world, of its actuality.</p> + +<p>But even in the midst of this actual world there is present an +inconsistent element, a human race with a confused logic. This race has +been led by various depressing and saddening circumstances to blacken +the delicious truth of this world and to look for a transcendental truth +in philosophical metaphysics or religious fantasmagorias, both of which +are parts of the same stew. The philosophers of misery who make of the +world of truth a vain shadow and a miserable vale of sorrow must needs +be convinced by logic that the living world is the only true one.</p> + +<p>Well, that is not so difficult. But there is a danger<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span> of getting into a +vicious circle of errors, imitating a snake biting its own tail. I have +to prove logically that the world and truth are one and the same thing, +before we have come to an agreement as to what is logical truth or true +logic. Nevertheless, nature has assisted us. The logic of nature is the +true logic by the help of which we can agree. Nothing more is required +than a somewhat trained brain.</p> + +<p>Take two men having a dispute about truth. One of them says it is one +thing, the other that it is something else. So they are arguing about +that which is. This last word is a form of the verb to be. Hence in +arguing whether the remote nebula in the heavens is a brick or a star, a +male or a female, one is always discussing some form of existence. All +disputes turn around forms of existence, but existence itself is an +undisputable truth.</p> + +<p>Have I now still to prove that all existence is of the same category? +Are there any stones that do not belong to the category of stones, or +any kind of wood which is iron? What would become of reason and +language, if such a thing were to be considered? And yet, much that is +being said by opponents is of such a nature.</p> + +<p>If I have succeeded in convincing you that the universe is the truth, +there still remains the special question: What place shall we assign to +fantastic ideas, error, and untruth? If the universe is the truth, then +everything would be true, and hence it seems contradictory that error +and untruth should have a place in truth or in the world. Of this more +anon. I shall only point out in passing that untruth may without any +contradiction belong to truth, just as weeds are a negation of herbs and +still at the same time herbs.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span></p><p>In conclusion I call your attention to the eminently proletarian +character of the science of truth. It gives to the working class the +logical justification to renounce all clerical and mystic control and to +look for salvation in this same world in which divine truth is living.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>SEVENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>The philologists distinguish carefully between a science of language and +a science of languages. The latter teaches Egyptian, Assyrian, Hebrew, +Greek, Latin, English, French, etc., while the former treats of the +general characteristics common to all languages, of language itself.</p> + +<p>Philosophical logic stands in the same relation to other sciences. The +latter make us acquainted with special truths, while logic treats of +truth in general. Those overintelligent people who claim that truth is +merely a collective term for many truths do not see the woods for trees. +Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Max Müller, Steinthal, etc., have many +things to say about the science of language of which the linguists with +many languages never dream.</p> + +<p>The science of language, aside from its many amenities, is also burdened +with a difficult problem which it cannot solve without the help of +logic. This problem is the point of differentiation where babbling and +word-mongery cease and intelligent speech begins. For human speech has a +certain meaning, and even the cries of the animals are not without +sense. The sparrows know how to converse together, the rooster calls +his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span> flock together, the dog knows how to announce that a stranger +enters his master's home. Not alone the jokers, but serious thinkers +speak of animal language, of a sign language, and maintain that speech +does not alone consist of words, but also of inarticulate sounds and +gestures. Poets endow even the storm, the thunder and the winds with +speech. We wish to clear this confusion and ascertain what language is +and where it begins. Languages, as is well known, have their beginning +at the Tower of Babel. But in order to get close to language, we must +look for a beginning of things either in God or in logic.</p> + +<p>You know the old question: Which was first, the egg or the hen? But only +a frivolous mind overlooks the serious side of this question and turns +it into a mere joke. The question of beginning and end is an eminently +logical one, and an unequivocal and clear answer to it would bring light +not alone into the science of language, but also into the human brain.</p> + +<p>Let us, therefore, follow up the problem of the "origin of language" a +little farther. When our forefathers dealt with this question, they +thought that a God had given speech to man or some genius had invented +it. They thought of a beginning in time. The modern thinkers speculate +more deeply. They have found out that language is not a fixed thing, but +fluid, and has risen from low beginnings to a great perfection. We can +no more find its temporal beginning by looking backward than we can see +its end by looking ahead. For this reason we no longer look for its +temporal, but for its ideological beginning. (Steinthal.) We should like +to have a fixed mark where we might say: Up to this point that which +resembles speech is only roaring, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span>exclamation, noise, and here is the +beginning of the well articulated sound which deserves the name of +"spoken word."</p> + +<p>But there is still another factor which complicates the question +further. Some say: It is not only the sound, the word, which constitutes +speech, but the connected sentence; there must be sense and reason mixed +with it. And this applies to the speaker and to the listener. Language +presupposes reason.</p> + +<p>Then, again, intellect is not a fixed thing, but a fluid process which +develops in, from, and by speech. So it appears on one side as if the +mind produces language, and on the other, as if language produces the +mind, the reason. Where, then, is the beginning and end, and how can we +bring order into these relations?</p> + +<p>For us, who are studying the mind, not the language, the conclusion +follows that it is not alone the word, but also the sound, the tone, the +gesture, that all things have a meaning and speak a language. We find +mind wherever we penetrate with our mind. Not alone language, but the +world is connected with the mind, with the thought. But the connection +with language may well serve as an illustration by which the connection +of the cosmic mind may be demonstrated and the human brain illuminated.</p> + +<p>Language shares the honor with the mind of being extolled, even in this +sober century, if not to the skies, at least far out of the general +connection of common things. For this reason, we must emphasize in the +case of language as in that of the mind, that they exist, that they are +part and parcel of the universal existence. At this point I wish to give +you a vivid illustration of the unity of all being by pointing out that +it is indubitably<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span> established by the existence of one single name which +is sufficient to designate <i>All</i>. True, language employs many names for +this unity of the world, but that is a luxury. It is logical and +necessary for the intellect to have <i>one</i> name for the <i>All</i>, because +everything is not only infinitely variegated, but also infinitely one, +or a unit. There are many different waters, but all water partakes of +the general nature of water. Unless that nature is present, there is no +water and the name of water does not apply. In the same way there are +many kinds of oil; olive oil, kerosene oil, castor oil, etc., and each +kind has its own subdivisions. But everything that has a common name is +a unit.</p> + +<p>Kindly observe, now, that the names of things form just such circles as +the water does after being struck by a stone. Just as the name water, so +the name oil indicates a ring. Then the name fluid constitutes another +and wider ring which includes both oil and water. Then the name matter +draws a still wider circle and includes solids as well as fluids, and +finally the name being, or <i>All</i>, includes mind and matter, all matter +and force, including heaven and hell, in one sole ring, in one unit.</p> + +<p>On the basis of this universal unity, from which it becomes apparent +that high and low, dry and fluid, in short the whole universe is made of +the same substance, any fantastic thinker can prove that human and +animal language is one, for otherwise one could not refer to both of +them as language. He may then justly contend that speech, producing a +sound, is a noise, that speech and noise are one. Speech is sound and +sound speaks. In this way language would have no beginning and no end. +In the last analysis it would be one with all things, and all things +would be one with it. In this way the whole<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span> universe would become an +inexplicable, incomprehensible, inexpressible mixture of speech.</p> + +<p>And yet it is an old story that man's insight grows the more he +magnifies a thing. The more excessively we exaggerate a thing, the +plainer become its boundaries. Language indeed requires one single name +for <i>All</i>, but it also requires an infinite number of names in order to +specify the parts of <i>All</i>. Inasmuch as language claims to be only a +part of existence, this part has to be bounded, and you should in this +connection remember the unlimited freedom of man in drawing such +boundaries. Words are not merely empty words, but names of cosmic parts, +of cosmic rings of undulation. Language, or rather the mind connected +with language, wishes to bound the infinite by the help of language. The +instinctive popular use of language does this in a haphazard way. +Conscious science proceeds in an exact manner. Just as it has determined +on the field of temperature what should be called hot and what warm, so +it is at liberty on the field of sounds to determine where the name of +language begins or ceases. The end of the discussion of language is +therefore this: That which has already been done to horse power has not +yet been done to the concept of language; it has been somewhat fixed by +common usage, but only insufficiently. And so the moral of this tale is +that the things of this world, even mind and language, are connected and +intermingling undulations of the same stream, which has neither +beginning nor end.</p> + +<p>Let me say it once more clearly and without circumlocution: The logic +which I teach and the thought which is its object are parts of the +world, of the infinite, and every part being a piece of the infinite is +likewise<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span> infinite. Every part partakes of the nature of the infinite. +Hence you must not expect that I should exhaust my infinite subject. I +confine myself to the logical chapter of "the One and the Many." I +simply wish to make it plain that without any contradiction the whole +multiplicity of existence is of the same nature, and that this oneness +of nature subdivides into manifold forms. The world is interconnected +and this interconnection is subdivided into departments. It adds to the +general enlightenment of the human brain to recognize this in regard to +language, to mind, to all parts of the universe.</p> + +<p>I repeat, then: One may think logically without having attended any +lectures on logic, just as one may raise potatoes without a scientific +knowledge of agriculture. It was possible to invent the thermometer, to +clearly distinguish between sounds and colors, and a hundred other +things, without having explained the faculty of discrimination. But the +most abstract distinctions, such as beginning and end, word and meaning, +body and soul, man and animal, matter and force, truth and error, +presuppose for their explanation a logical explanation of their +interconnection with our intellect.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>EIGHTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Dear Eugene:</p> + +<p>Logic is going through the same experience as economics. The economists +of the capitalist era talk solely of the means and ways by which profit +and surplus value may be increased. They discuss only its relative size, +its increase or decrease. But the thing itself, its origin and descent, +is not discussed. It is passed in silence that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span> profit is extracted from +labor power by paying less for a day's work than is produced by it. The +gentlemen talk only of the "wealth of nations," but not of their +poverty. And though this was due to ignorance in the beginning, it has +later become sheer roguery.</p> + +<p>The formal logicians are as ignorant as they are roguish, when they +persist in discussing the intellect or thought in the traditional manner +as if they were isolated things, while ignoring the necessary connection +of the object of the logical study with the world of experiences. This +interconnection leads to an explanation of truth and error, of sense and +nonsense, of god and idols, and this is very inopportune for the +professors. For this reason this unwelcome problem is handed over to the +mystical departments, to metaphysics and religion, so that these +venerable pillars of official wisdom may continue their services to the +ruling classes.</p> + +<p>I have already stated in my letters that the kernel of my discussion +turns on the distinction between formal and what I call proletarian +logic. The formal logicians treat the intellect as a thing "in itself," +while I express in many different ways the fact that the intellect does +not exist by itself, but is interconnected with all things and with the +universe.</p> + +<p>That intellect has indeed a transcendental leaning, which seeks vent by +trying to exclude now music, now language, now itself, now some other +fetich from the universal interrelation. But the science of the mind +teaches that the brain watching its own activity finds out that all +affirmations and negations, assertions and contradictions, belong to the +one omnipotent world mechanism, which keeps them stored within itself +and which is actually truth and life. Inasmuch as the human<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span> brain is of +the same nature as this automatic universal being and interconnected +with it, logic is at the same time religion, metaphysics, and world +wisdom.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> + +<p>Formal logic teaches that our intellect must keep all things apart, but +does not teach that it must also connect them. This logic is right in +one way and yet does not arrive at the goal of a clear world philosophy, +because it permits the transcendental leaning to exaggerate the +differences and distinctions. It overlooks the paradoxical or +dialectical nature of things which are not only separated but also +connected. What must be understood is that, generally speaking, the +classification of the universe is only a formality. We are, indeed, +justified in distinguishing between above and Below, right and left, +beginning and end, gold and sheet metal, good and bad, but we must also +enlighten ourselves as to how multiplicity can be a unity, the variable +constant, and the constant variable. Formal logic has a wrong name. It +is not formal, but transcendental. It shares the common prejudice that +there are absolutely contradictory things or irreconcilable opposites, +that there are essential differences which have no connection, no bridge +between them, nothing in common. It teaches that contradictions cannot +exist, and contradicts itself by clinging to the belief that there are +irreconcilable contradictions. It teaches that a thing which contradicts +itself is inconceivable, is not true, and thus reveals that it is not +well informed on the formality of contradictions, on the true +conciliation of contradictions, and on universal truth. Gold is not +sheet iron, that is true enough. Whoever<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span> calls gold sheet metal or +sheet metal gold, contradicts himself. In the actual world both things +are separated. Yet they are not separated to such extent that gold and +sheet iron do not partake of the same nature, of the nature of all +metal. Gold and sheet iron are unlike metals, but they have the same +metallic likeness. That like things are different and different things +alike, that it is everywhere only a question of the degree of +difference, of formal differences, this is overlooked by "formal" logic +and by all who seek truth in any logical diagram or fetich, instead of +in the eternal, omnipresent existence of the inseparable universe.</p> + +<p>Our logic deals with truth or with the universe, which contains the most +sublime gods and the meanest deviltry, in other words, which contains +everything. In the world truth there is contained error, pretense, lies, +just as death also lives in it. In other words, error, pretense, lies, +death are only phenomena, formalities, passing trifles or things which +are nothing compared to the one thing, that thing of all things, which +is being, truth, life.</p> + +<p>The understanding of the one living world truth is so greatly aggravated +by the so-called contradictions which it contains. We find for instance +that where one thing ends another begins. The end of the one is the +beginning of another. Every beginning is at the same time an end. Both +are contained in one another, and yet in our minds beginning and end are +separated. We find the beginning and the end everywhere and nowhere. Or +look into space. You do not see any boundary, and yet your vision +reaches only a certain distance. Your vision is bounded and yet there is +no boundary to be seen. Or look at life. Death soon arrives, and yet a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span> +closer look shows that death is not really death, for "a new life arises +from the ruins." The world proves to be the eternal life which does not +know death. It is a contradiction to say that death lives, but this +contradiction can be solved by the understanding that the difference +between life and death, however great, is still a formal one, a +difference which like all other differences is reduced to relative +insignificance by the infinite cosmic life.</p> + +<p>There exists a widely diffused school, if this term may be applied to +the unschooled, that preaches patience in the matter of the +systematization of our thoughts or the enlightenment of our intellect, +and though it no longer hopes for a mysterious revelation, yet founds +its faith on natural science which has explained so many things to us +and which is finally supposed to throw light on the "last questions of +all knowledge." But I can easily convince you that the new countries, +plants, animals. Esquimaux, that may be discovered on polar expeditions, +or the inventions which Edison may perhaps make on the field of +electricity, or the experiences which future astronomers may gather in +regard to suns, moons, and comets, while they may add valuable +contributions to science and life, will yet do little toward a correct +general employment of our intellect or to a universal enlightenment of +the human brain. On the other hand, an enlightenment as to the nature +and meaning of contradictions will spread light to the remotest corners +of imagination, into the heavens and eternity, into the existence of the +whole, the unity and difference of all things.</p> + +<p>The most drastic, and perhaps the most instructive, illustration of the +correct meaning of contradictions is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span> given by the contrast between +truth and untruth. These two poles are perhaps more widely separated +than the North Pole and the South Pole, and yet they are as intimately +connected as these two. The commonplace logic will hardly listen to the +demonstration of the unity of such apparently wide opposites as truth +and untruth. Therefore you will pardon me, if I illustrate this example +by others, for instance by the contrast between day and night. Take it +that the day lasts twelve hours and the night likewise. Day and night +are opposites. Where there is day cannot be any night, and yet day and +night constitute one single day of twenty-four hours, in which they both +dwell harmoniously. It is the same with truth and untruth. The world is +the truth, and error, pretense, and lies are embodied in it, are parts +of the actual world, just as night is a part of day without confusing +logic. We may honestly speak of genuine pretense and true lies, without +any contradiction. Just as unreason has still some reason left, so +untruth still lives inevitably in truth, because the latter is +all-embracing, is the universe.</p> + +<p>"Contradictions cannot exist." But confused brains full of +contradictions nevertheless exist. Knives without handles and blades, +two mountains without a valley between them, and other nonsense, exist +as a phrase. There are two kinds of contradictions: Senseless ones and +very sensible ones. Yea, the whole world<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> is an infinite and +inexhaustible contradiction, which contains innumerable sensible +statements and misstatements, which never disappear and yet may be +solved harmoniously by the help of time and reason.</p> + +<p>From this it follows that the formal criteria of truth<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span> which are on +everybody's tongue, such as the identity of thought with its object, and +the absence of all contradictions, do not furnish a basis at all for the +analysis of truth and cannot define it, except in an ignorant and +roguish way.</p> + +<p>Since the prophet Daniel scattered ashes in the temple and unmasked the +servants of Baal, other idol worshippers have continued to stimulate the +people to daily sacrifices, in order to steal the victuals at night. +This continual rascality and its repeated exposure has blunted the +desire of the people to serve truth, so that a great many have become +frivolous and indifferent. This rascally logic, not to mention +ignorance, encourages the frivolous and indifferent in their godless +departure from truth. In the pulpit and in the garb of science it +preaches the vanity and inadequacy of research. This is preached not as +a dogma, but as a logical science, and thus the senseless contradiction +is committed of trying to prove truly by the help of the intellect that +the intellect is too limited to grasp the truth and prove it.</p> + +<p>In its historical course logical research once arrived at such a result +in good faith. This happened in the famous "Critique of Reason" of +Immanuel Kant. Our shrewd friends of darkness now seek to utilize the +fame of this work, to which it is entitled on account of its great +contribution toward the elucidation of cosmic truth, for the purpose of +preventing on the strength of it a progress of enlightenment beyond the +standpoint of Kant.</p> + +<p>By the way, Kant has demonstrated that the truth in general is as much a +matter of experience as the brain with which we search for it. He has +shown beyond a doubt that our eyes and ears are inseparably connected<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> +with our mind and with the whole cosmic truth. But the persistent spirit +of transcendentalism, or what is the same thing, the traditional belief +in the transcendental spirit, has led him to grant a mysterious +existence alongside of or above the human mind, alongside of or above +the cosmic truth, to an incomprehensible monster spirit and to a +fantastical hyper-truth.</p> + +<p>The Kantian critique of reason did not understand the universality of +truth. It still affirmed the existence of two worlds and two truths +without any unity. And as it is the curse of the evil deed to generate +more evil, it produced two intellects. (1) The poor little subservient +intellect of man, and (2) the enormous and abnormal intellect of the +<i>Lord</i>, who is supposed to understand the incomprehensible and to untie +the most senseless contradictions like so many knots.</p> + +<p>The truth which is the universe, the cosmic or universal truth, will +reveal to you the absurdity of abnormal humility which is contained in +the dualistic doctrine of the two minds. Of course, the philosopher Kant +had a greater intellect than Peter Simple. But nevertheless all +intellects partake of the nature of the general intellect, and no +intellect can step above or below this general nature without losing +sense or reason. One cannot speak of another, higher, faculty of thought +than that acquired by man through experience without dropping from logic +to absurdity. No doubt the animal world possesses something similar to +intellect. No doubt, also, the animal mind may be separated from the +human mind by some special name, for instance "instinct." No doubt, +furthermore, our reason is strengthened by culture from generation to +generation. But that anywhere and at any time there should come into +existence a faculty of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span> thought which would stand outside of the cosmic +interconnection, that is an absurd conception and a senseless thing. +Just as necessarily as all water has one and the same nature, that of +being wet, just so necessarily every intelligence and every thought +partakes of the general nature of thought and must logically be a part, +a particular part, of the one universal and empirical world.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Religion denotes here as much as conception of the world +and explanation of its last questions; and metaphysics stands here for +everything conceivable, which meaning embraces more than the mere +tangible.—<span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> When we consider its many parts as such.—Editor.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>NINTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Repetition, my dear Eugene, is the mother of all study.</p> + +<p>Logic aims to teach you the proper use of the intellect, not only in +this or that branch of study, but in the general branch of truth. Its +result is the following precept: In all things always remember the +universal interrelation.</p> + +<p>In order to illustrate this statement a little, let me point out that in +the period of scholasticism thinking was practiced without any +interconnection with the rest of the world, merely by brown study. The +present age of natural sciences then cultivated a better method. But the +method of the natural sciences has not succeeded so far in being applied +to the field of law, morals, politics, psychology, and philosophy, +because the logical understanding of the total interrelation of the +indivisible world truth was lacking, because the concept of truth was +enveloped in darkness, and because the privileged classes have a great +interest in maintaining darkness.</p> + +<p>For this reason, the true method of reasoning still requires many +explanations. The socialist, for instance, is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span> charged with inciting the +people, with promising more than he can keep and with sowing strife in +the hearts of men. Those who make this charge in the commonplace sense, +tear two things, viz., peace and strife, out of their due connection. As +a matter of fact, peace and strife must always dwell together. A nation +whose peace were not intermingled with a certain strife, would be a +nation of sluggards. Thanks to the strife in their breasts, the nations +are progressive and stirring. Motion is the essence of the world, and +national motion is inconceivable without the striving of men. For the +sake of development and culture, nations must always demand more than +they can immediately attain. On the other hand, striving of this sort is +not sufficient. One must not demand more than one can obtain, nor +promise more than one can give. For this reason the logical socialist +must know that even in the future society the trees will not grow into +the clouds, and that the peace for which we hope and strive will always +be mixed with strife. The music of the future, although more harmonious +than the music of the present, will nevertheless be eternally marred by +disharmony. There is nothing perfect in the world, because only the +whole universe is perfect, because the universe alone is perfectness itself.</p> + +<p>Eternal peace, as the warriors may justly claim, is an illusion, so long +as we think of peace in a transcendental way and as being separated from +strife. But the sons of the war god who would like to continue the +thunder of cannons and the rattle of sabers eternally, are no less the +victims of illusion, if not something worse. Eternal is only war in +peace and peace in war, although that may seem senseless to the +logicians of the old school. Thus even the inevitable war will become +more peaceful<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span> and humane in the course of time. The barbarian form of +war, of which the Prussians are masters, is not destined to last +forever, unless we speak of the illogical eternity of the preacher which +opens its doors by leaving the temporal world. In defending the social +war, I wish to have it understood that neither the conceptions nor the +things called war and peace are separated by a Chinese wall.</p> + +<p>Everything is interconnected and interdependent. It is true that strife +and animosities may be exaggerated, and so may peace. But whatever blame +attaches to this, refers only to the exaggeration. It is not the +animosity, but the excessive animosity which deserves censure. By +recognizing the logical interconnection between peace and strife, the +dispute of the parties is rendered saner. There is then no longer a +question of a yawning chasm between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, +but of something about which an agreement is possible, viz., how much +there is of either.</p> + +<p>As peace and war in the human breast, so all variety intermingles in the +cosmic unit. In the novel "<i>Homo Sum</i>," by Ebers, the monk Paulus, who +tasted the delights of the preliminary celestial ecstasy when +castigating his body, says: "I truly believe that it is just as +difficult on this globe to find pain without joy as joy without pain." +And Till Eulenspiegel, that type of a practical joker, showed an +understanding of dialectics when he lightened the difficulty of +ascending a mountain by the reflection that the descent on the other +side would be so much easier. Logic is no more senseless in teaching +that all things, even the most opposite, are of the same substance than +it is in showing that night belongs to day and weeds to herbs.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span></p><p>In order that these petty illustrations may not confuse your mind, it +should be remembered that the essential point is the elucidation of the +great contradiction between mind and matter, between thinking and being, +which includes all petty contradictions.</p> + +<p>In order to think in accordance with logical consistency, you must not +regard a thing as something independent, but consider everything as +fluid particles of the same substance, which is the thing of all things, +the world, the truth, and life.</p> + +<p>Our logic is therefore the science of truth. This truth is neither above +nor below, neither in Jerusalem nor in Jericho, neither in the spirit +nor in the flesh, but everywhere.</p> + +<p>Our logic is the science of understanding. It teaches that you must not +search for understanding by cudgeling your brain, but only in connection +with experience, with the interrelation of things.</p> + +<p>Since man in his experience also meets errors, science was dominated for +centuries by the question whether truth and experience are not two +different things, whether all our experience is only an illusion of our +senses. Cartesius replied to this: "No; the belief in a perfect, true +being cannot admit of such a delusion." By substituting the concept of +truth for the concept of God, we are certain that the world of +experience is not a ghost, but the most actual reality.</p> + +<p>Although the great Kant called the cosmic truth a phenomenon, because he +could not divest his mind of transcendental faith, of the faith in a +transcendental truth, still we know today that all distinctions which +are ever made constitute but a nibbling at the universal unit. As +necessarily as all variety in baking produces bakery<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span> wares, just as +necessarily heaven and earth, and everything connected with them, are +parts of the indivisible truth which is also called nature, cosmos, +universe, God, and experience. Language gives to its darling truth many +different pet names, just as a happy mother calls her heart's treasure +by a thousand endearing terms.</p> + +<p>Feuerbach reasons in this fashion: "If God is not a personal being +different from nature and man, then he is an entirely superfluous +being.... The use of the word God which is always combined with the +conception of a separate being, is a disturbing and confusing abuse. Why +do you want to be a theist, if you are a naturalist, or a naturalist if +you are a theist? Away with this contradiction! Where God is confounded +with nature, or nature with God, there is neither God nor nature, but a +mystical amphibious hermaphrodite."</p> + +<p>Feuerbach is right. The name of God is much abused. But truth is also +blasphemed by negation and frivolousness. The sober understanding that +God, truth, nature, are various names for the same thing permits us to +play with them without despairing of the matter. Indeed, this play of +words serves to make the subject clear.</p> + +<p>But logic demands that we recognize truth as the absolute, as the power, +the force, and the glory, which comprises all logical and illogical +distinctions, together with the things to be distinguished, even the +faculty of distinguishing itself.</p> + +<p>Such an understanding of the absolute, such world wisdom, will not make +you conceited, because it makes you conscious of the fact that your +understanding has grasped celestial truth which at the same time is +terrestrial, only in a very general way. You possess <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span>nothing but a +definition of truth. And without denying that definitions are valuable +and instructive, I, at the same time, point out that you know very +little about astronomy when you know that it is the science of the +stars. No matter, therefore, how clearly I may have defined truth, we +require for its complete understanding all the details of science, and +that is too much for me, for you, and for any individual human being.</p> + +<p>Just as our vision never exhausts the visible, because the eye sees an +object but does not fully penetrate it, just so can the intellect never +fully understand and fathom the absolute all, the truth, or God. But we +can understand and fathom individual truths, parts of the universal +truth. What understanding grasps is not the truth itself, but yet it is +true understanding.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>TENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Dear Eugene:</p> + +<p>My previous lectures instructed you as to the very trivial fact that the +thought is a part of the world. In proceeding from the part to the +whole, I passed logically from the mouth of the river to its source. The +universe is the maternal womb of the intellect as of all things.</p> + +<p>It occurs to me that you or some teacher of logic might accuse my +letters of lack of logic. It may seem that these lectures fail to +present the subject matter in a strictly systematized form. You will, +please, excuse this in part with the fact that they appear in the form +of letters. This form demands that the contents should be logically +arranged and rounded off in each letter. It should furthermore serve as +an excuse for any defect,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span> that my subject is not a finished one, not +perfectly elaborated by others before me. I am here not merely a +lecturer, but also an explorer on a field which, though much +investigated, yet is still rather obscure.</p> + +<p>The conclusion of my last letter explained that the use of the term God +for the universe has much to recommend it and much to disqualify it. But +it is easily apparent that the universe with its absolute qualities is +closely related to that infinite being of whom Jakob Böhme, the +philosophical shoemaker, said: "He is neither the light nor the +darkness, neither love nor anger, but the eternal One.... Hence all +forces are merely one sole force."</p> + +<p>That nothing exists outside of the universe, that everything is +contained in the All, that the All, with all real and imagined beings, +is everything, that it is neither sweet nor sour, neither great nor +small, but just everything and all, this statement is as obvious as the +often and long repeated statement of identity: A equals A.</p> + +<p>The All is omnipotent, omnipresent, all-wise. This last term might be +questioned, since the universe is not a dummy with a monster head and +giant brain. For this very reason it was considered inappropriate to +apply the name of God to the universe, because that creates the +impression of a personal being. The All thinks only by means of human +brains, and for this reason omniscience cannot be anything but common +human knowledge. Of course, you, I, and every other man, are very +limited in our knowledge. But still we may indulge in the hope that the +things which we do not know are known by other men or will be discovered +by future generations, so that the collective human mind will know +everything that is knowable. We cannot see everything<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span> that is visible; +there are animals that can see even better than we can. But since even +the most intelligent animal is supposed to lack the highest degree of +intelligence, reason and science, there is no one who knows anything +except the human race. Mankind is omniscient. But since all our science +is derived only from the world, mankind is only the formal bearer of +intelligence, and it belongs to the fountain of all things, to eternal +nature. Our wisdom is the wisdom of nature, is world wisdom. Although +there may be inhabitants of the moon and of other stars who may know +things which are unknown to us, still that is in the first place a mere +speculation of little value, and in the second place universal +omniscience or the omniscient universe would not in the least be +affected thereby. It is a reasonable use of the language to regard human +wisdom as the only and omniscient wisdom, just as all natural and wet +water is called water without any further modification. I believe in the +statement of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things." Whoever +uses a different measure, uses a superhuman, transcendental measure.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> + +<p>Hence, when I call the cosmic essence of all existence omnipotent, you +will not think of a senseless magic power which forges knives without +handles and blades, nor will you read any transcendental meaning into my +use of the term omniscience.</p> + +<p>Omniscience belongs obviously under the head of logic, because the organ +of science and wisdom is the object of the study of logic. And it must +now be stated that the human mind does not only exceed the animal mind +by far, but is also the <i>non plus ultra</i> of all minds. But it must be +retained that this mind can only be whatever<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span> it is in connection with +the divine universe which I may also be permitted to call worldly deity. +This name is fitting because it is a means of understanding that in the +first place no monster mind rules the world, and in the second place the +natural universe is not a mere sum of all things, but truth and life.</p> + +<p>Of course, the identification of the universe with the religious God is +only a comparison, and comparisons are lame. Still we may compare the +sun with an eternal lamp or the moon with a candle, or the German prime +minister with a butler.</p> + +<p>Logic shall teach you that everything which may be distinguished by the +faculty of understanding is of the same kind, everything is of common +clay, but the whole is sublimely elevated above all that is commonplace. +Mere frivolous atheism, as created by the free-thinkers, is not +sufficient. A bare denial of God always creates some other idol worship. +The positive understanding of the divine world truth is an indispensable +requirement for the radical extermination of all idol worship.</p> + +<p>Logic must begin with the sublime, infinite, absolute. All logical, +consistent or interconnected thinking must take its departure from it. +The so-called scientific research after temporal causes, after the egg +from which the chicken was hatched, after the hen from which the egg +came, after the kindred organisms which developed the hen by natural +selection and adaption according to Darwin, this is a very valuable +research without which we can never understand the world process. But +nevertheless, such research must not satisfy the thinking man. Logic +demands from everybody that he or she should search for the highest, for +the cause of all causes. Whoever feels the desire to bring logical order +into his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span>consciousness, must know that the finite and infinite, the +relative and the absolute, the special truths and the one general truth, +are contained in one another.</p> + +<p>Logical thought as demanded by science means nothing but to be aware of +the final cause, the absolute foundation of all thought. This foundation +is the universe, an attribute of which is the external and internal +human head. The thousand year old dispute between the materialists and +the idealists turns on the question whether the spirit is material or +the world spiritual. Our answer is plain and clear: They both belong +together, they together make up the one thing, the thing of all things. +Mind and matter are two attributes of the same substance. They may be +compared the same as fish and flesh, the former being called very +appropriately by some African tribes "water flesh." In this way, matter +and mind are two kinds of meat of a different and yet of the same +nature.</p> + +<p>I remember reading in a satirical paper the question: "What is a +gentleman? Answer: A gentleman is a loafer with money, and a loafer is a +gentleman without money." Just as these two types of men are essentially +alike and differ only in the small matter of money, so you should +remember that there are no essential differences, that all differences +are merely matters of attributes and qualities of the same absolute +world substance. To distinguish correctly and logically, that is the +point which logic is aiming to teach us. To make distinctions is the +function which is also called perceiving, knowing, understanding, +comprehending. When you consider that this function is innate in man, +and that man together with his faculty of understanding is innate in +nature, then you recognize all distinctions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span> and the distinguished +objects as attributes of the undistinguished One, of the absolute, +compared to which all things are only relative things, in other words, +attributes.</p> + +<p>I am endeavoring to make clear to you that logical thinking requires the +awakening of the consciousness of the one supreme general nature. And +you must not think of this sum of all existence in the stupid way in +which people used to think of the animal kingdom before Darwin, but +regard the world as a living organic unit, from which the faculty of +understanding has blossomed the same as all other things. In the logic +of the narrow-minded, all animal species are widely separated, without +any living interconnection, while Darwin has demonstrated the uniform +process, the intermingling life in multiform creation. The illustration +of this famous zoologist of the transition from one species to another +may serve as an example of the logical transitions in the world process, +in which all differences are but undulations. All our classifications +must always remember the undivided basis on which they are resting.</p> + +<p>We have shown that the intellect divides the universal nature, +classifies and analyzes it, and we have learned of the universal nature +that it not only furnishes to the intellect the material for its work, +but also that the world comprises within its general process the +intellectual process, that the intellectual movement is a specialization +of the natural movement.</p> + +<p>The world is not only the object, but also the subject of understanding, +it understands, it dissects its own multiplicity by means of the human +intellect. Our wisdom is world wisdom in a two-fold sense: The world is +that which is being understood, classified, analyzed, and at the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span> same +time it is that which, by the help of our intellect, practices +understanding, classification, etc. When I call the human mind the +cosmic mind, the mind of the supreme being, I wish to have it understood +that there is nothing mysterious about this, that I merely intend to +show that thought or intelligence can only operate in the universal +cosmic interconnection, that it is not an abnormal and transcendental +thing, but a thing like all other things.</p> + +<p>You must not conceive of the spirit as the producer of truth, as a +little god, but only as a means. The true god, the divine truth, has our +intellect for an attribute. The latter does not produce truth, but only +the understanding of truth. It produces only pictures of truth which are +all more or less perfect. Of course, it is not at all immaterial whether +we produce a more or less faithful, a true or a false picture of truth, +but still this is, at present and for us here, a secondary matter. The +main thing is to know that truth, or nature, is far above all pictures, +and still consists of parts, of forms, which together constitute the +whole.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> Please note the additional explanation on page +77.—<span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>ELEVENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Dear Eugene:</p> + +<p>Johannes Scherr relates in the "Gartenlaube," a German family paper, in +an article entitled "Mahomet and His Work," that insane doctrinarians +are searching for people without religion. This has not succeeded, it is +said, although the spark of religious feeling is glowing very dimly in +peoples that are close to the animal. But nevertheless, he continues, +the expressions of religious feeling mark the boundary line where the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span> +beast ceases and man begins. For just as in the higher stages of +civilization religion means the consciousness of the finite of being one +with the infinite, so in the lower stages of civilization the indefinite +impulse is felt by man to connect his special nature with the universal +nature and bring them into harmony. This is idealism, the idealistic +need. It is obvious that, and why, the people have always and everywhere +sought and found satisfaction for their idealistic longings in religion. +But, adds the shrewd observer, I must remark that I do not refer to the +shifting population when I say "people," for sad to relate, that +population is torn away from all connection with natural conditions. I +refer to the "settled, the permanent, the true people."</p> + +<p>This quotation shows that a champion of the "true people" is in conflict +with true logic. In dividing a population into shifting and settled +people, one should retain as a basis the logical consciousness that all +classes of people are embraced by one class; furthermore, that human, +monkey, ant, and other nations are parts of the one and the same nation; +until finally man and animal, real and imaginary, with all religious and +godless things, are ultimately fused in the world unit and can never be +"torn away from all connection with natural conditions."</p> + +<p>All distinctions must logically be based on the consciousness of the +absolute and universal unity, of the interconnection of all things. For +this reason some pious people, with their God in whom everything is +living and has its being, have more logic than some freethinkers of the +class of Johannes Scherr who have no coherence in their method of +thought. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span>faithful think more logically than the narrowly skeptical, +for they begin and end with God. But still they cannot think quite +logically, because they cannot establish any logical connection between +their eternally perfect Lord and evil, the devil, disease, misery, sin, +in short all the sufferings and vanities here below.</p> + +<p>The unit of nature, the infinite, is the quintessence of logic. Neither +natural science in the narrow sense of the word, nor metaphysics, nor +formal logic, can give any clue as to the nature of this thing of +things. This can be done only by a science of understanding which +recognizes matter and mind and all opposites and contradictions as +formalities of the universe. How can a man who is out of touch with the +mass of the shifting population feel that he is one with the universe? +Whoever regards any special class as the true people, has no +understanding either of the common people or of the absolute universe.</p> + +<p>Proletarian logic teaches not only the equality of all human beings, but +universal equality. And mark well, this universal equality does not +conflict with variety any more than a variety of pots and jugs conflicts +with the unity of vessels, or the manifold forms of bretzels and rolls +with the unity of bakery ware.</p> + +<p>The enemies of democratic development, in attacking the idea of freedom +and equality, point to the manifoldness of nature, the individual +differences of men, the distinctions between weak and strong, wise and +fools, men and women, and consider it tyranny to attempt to equalize +that which nature has made different. They cannot understand that like +things may be different and different things alike. They are blinded by +their class logic which sees only the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span>differences, but not the unity, +not the transfusion of all classes.</p> + +<p>Class logic teaches that contradictory things cannot exist. According to +it, a thing cannot be genuine and false at the same time. This class +logic has a narrow conception of existence. It has only observed that +there are many different things in nature, but has overlooked the fact +that all these things have also a general nature. We, on the other hand, +recognize that every thing, every person, is a part of the infinite +world and partakes of its general nature, is eternal and perishable, +true and untrue, great and small, one sided and manyfold, in short +contradictory.</p> + +<p>Before and after Socrates, philosophy and religion have searched for the +genuine, right, good, true, and beautiful, but have reached no +harmonious results. But it cannot be denied that in the course of the +centuries the problem has become clearer and clearer. The great names of +Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Cartesius, Spinoza, +Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, are milestones on the highway of this progress. +The evolution is apparent, but the interrelation between the +intellectual and physical, and especially between intellectual and +economic evolution, is much ignored. The bridge between mind and body +was not found, and philosophical evolution has been regarded up to our +day as a purely mental process accomplished by one or two dozen of +famous brains. I wish to point out to you now, that proletarian logic is +the continuation of the preceding research after the genuine, true, +good, and beautiful. It teaches how to conceive of these ideals +logically, and it has not so much proceeded from any one<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span> talented +brain, but is rather the product of the entire cosmic process.</p> + +<p>Philosophical brains have developed the science of logical thought only +to the extent that the material development of the world has stimulated +them to do so. You must regard the human brains only as secondary levers +of the universal lever which is not only genuine, true, good, and +beautiful, but truth, goodness, and beauty itself, or the world and the +absolute.</p> + +<p>The understanding of the absolute which is called "good Lord," and then +again "the bad world," in other words the selfsufficient cosmos, is very +inconvenient to the wisdom of the professors, and they are attempting to +assign it to a special study which they call "metaphysics." This +division of labor is not introduced for the purpose of making research +more productive, but of surrounding this study by mysterious darkness. +The professors who lecture to the young people on formal logic set aside +the ancient research after the true, the good, the beautiful, and try to +place these ideals outside of the light of science in order to be able +to preserve them unchanged in the tabernacle of faith.</p> + +<p>This charge may seem unjust, because the learned gentlemen reserved a +corner for the true, the good, and the beautiful in their metaphysical +department. But there is something peculiar about this. The great Kant +has asked the plain question: "Is metaphysics practicable as a science?" +Answer: No! The transcendental truth, etc., sought by metaphysics, and +named God, freedom, immortality in Christian language, cannot be found +by any reason. But being a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span> child of his time, the great philosopher +makes a small concession to the transcendental.</p> + +<p>He teaches: Although transcendental truth cannot be located +scientifically, still the religious faith in its existence is wholesome. +We, in our time, think more soberly about this theory of salvation and +accept the elimination of all transcendentalism from science. While the +spokesmen of the "true people" would like to hide their exalted truth, +freedom, and immortality behind the curtains of temples, we throw the +full daylight of logic on the absolute truth, goodness, and beauty of +the material world.</p> + +<p>Logic as the science of correct thought cannot be restricted to any one +object, it cannot exclude any object, whether terrestrial or heavenly, +from its sphere. The great lights of present day learning do not wish to +subordinate the intellect as the object of the logical department, and +absolute truth as the object of the metaphysical department, to one +another, but to co-ordinate them side by side.</p> + +<p>But two co-ordinated things which are not subordinated to a third higher +thing lack logic, and the brain which is satisfied by such a condition +suffers from disorder. Logical truth must inevitably be a part of +absolute truth, and it is our duty to remove absolute truth from the +field of metaphysics, of transcendentalism, and to transfer it to the +sober world which forms an inseparable unit with the human mind.</p> + +<p>So much for the proletarian duty to continue the research after the +true, the good, and the beautiful which was the object of the +philosophers before and after Socrates. But remember that I am referring +only to the truly good, beautiful, etc., which is contained in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span> the +universal truth of all true specifications. The question of the +ethically good, the esthetically beautiful and the absolutely perfect is +as necessarily contained in the question of the universal truth as red, +blue, and green in the rainbow, of course only in an abstract sense.</p> + +<p>Our logic which has for its object the truth of the universe, is the +science of the understanding of the universe, a science of universal +understanding or conception of the world. It teaches that the +interrelation of all things is truth and life, is the genuine, right, +good, and beautiful. All the sublime moving the heart of man, all the +sweet stirring his breast, is the universal nature or the universe. But +the vexing question still remains: What about the negative, the ugly, +the evil, what about error, pretense, standstill, disease, death, and +the devil?</p> + +<p>True, the world is vain, evil, ugly. But these are merely accidental +phenomena, only forms and appendages of the world. Its eternity, truth, +goodness, beauty, is substantial, existing, positive. Its negative is +like the darkness which serves to make the light more brilliant, so that +it may overcome the dark and shine so much more brightly.</p> + +<p>The spokesmen of the ruling classes are not open for such a sublime +optimism, because they have the pessimistic duty of perpetuating misery +and servitude.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>TWELFTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Logic, the science of correct thought, demands in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span> the first place true, +or in other words, reasonable thought. Logic deals with reason and truth.</p> + +<p>These two things have been endowed with a mysterious nature, while they +obviously belong to the entire universe and its tangible nature. Reason +and truth are not separated from the other things, are not things in +themselves. There is no such thing. Philosophers who have looked for +them in the depths of the human brain with their hands over their eyes +and engaged in brown study, were on the wrong road. Proletarian logic +differs from conventional logic in that it does not look for reason and +truth behind the curtains of temples, nor in the brains of the learned, +but it discovers them in the actual interconnection of all things and +processes of nature.</p> + +<p>Preachers, professors, judges, and politicians are the leaders of "the +wise men of Gotham," and since we have all passed our youth among them, +we find it difficult to get rid of their confused logic.</p> + +<p>We owe much of our better insight to the famous philosophers. These men +had many an eccentric notion, but on the whole they were reasonable +fellows who followed the doctrine of the unreliability of the senses and +the faith in the hidden truth and reason more in a theoretical than in a +practical way. In practice they operated with open eyes and ears. Thus +correct logic, although confused by queer notions, has been handed down +to us from generation to generation. Preachers, professors, judges, and +politicians cling to the confused notions, while we take the liberty to +discard them.</p> + +<p>Now we recognize not only that reason and truth are connected with the +world, but also that the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span>universe is the supreme reason and truth, is +that being which religion and philosophy have long been looking for, the +most perfect being, which Plato called the true, good and beautiful, +Kant God, freedom, and immortality, and Hegel the absolute.</p> + +<p>If he is an atheist who denies that perfection can be found in any +individual, then I am an atheist. And if he is a believer in God who has +the faith in the "most perfect being" with which not alone the +theologists, but also Cartesius and Spinoza have occupied themselves so +much, then I am one of the true children of God.</p> + +<p>The abuse of sublime feelings and exalted ideas has filled many hearts +with disgust, so that they care no longer for any unctuous sermons. The +mere flavor of religion is odious to them. Nevertheless I assure you +that we shall never get rid of idol worship, unless we understand the +supreme being, reason or truth, in its true nature.</p> + +<p>"Understand" is a mysterious word. To bring light into the mystery of +understanding by a clear theory of understanding, is an integral part of +the science of thought, of logic.</p> + +<p>Permit me to compare the faculty of understanding with a photographic +apparatus, by the help of which you strive to obtain a picture of the +cosmic truth. Then you will see at a glance that in this way we can +obtain but a dim picture of the whole. The object appears boundless, too +infinitely great and sublime to permit of copying. And yet we can +approach it. Although we cannot get a true picture of universal truth, +yet we can obtain clear pictures of individual truths, in other words, +we can picture the infinite in its<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span> parts. By the help of your +intellect, you can grasp the infinite by means of limitation.</p> + +<p>Absolute truth appears to us in relative phenomena. The perfect being is +composed of imperfect parts. A "wise man of Gotham" may regard this as a +senseless contradiction. But we can separate the arms, legs, head, and +trunk from one another, and so separated they will be mere parts of a +corpse, while connected they certainly possess the chance of vitality. +Life is composed of the dead, the most perfect being is composed of +imperfect parts. In the universal truth everything is contained. It is +the perfect being, it includes the whole existence, even the imperfect. +The false, the ugly, the evil, the nasty are involved in the true, the +good, the beautiful. The universal existence is the absolute truth, the +whole is composed of relativities, of parts, of phenomena. Our +understanding, our instrument of thought, is likewise an imperfect part +of the perfect being. Our intellect produces only a dim, imperfect +picture of the absolute, but it reproduces true pictures of its parts, +although pictures only.</p> + +<p>There are good and bad, adequate and inadequate, true and false thoughts +and understanding. But there are no absolutely true thoughts. All our +conceptions and ideas are imperfect pictures of the most perfect being +which is inexhaustible in great things as in small things, as a whole +and in parts. Every part of nature is a natural part of the infinite.</p> + +<p>I repeat: All parts or things of this world have, apart from their +imperfect nature as parts, also the world nature of the absolute being. +They are imperfect perfections. Our intellect is no exception. The human +mind is the only mind having the name of reason, and is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span> the most +perfect reason which can possibly exist. In the same way, the water of +this earth is the non plus ultra of all water. The belief in another and +different mind, in a monster mind, belongs to the same transcendental +category as the belief in a celestial river without the nature of water +flowing around the castle of Zion. Even the most perfect mind is nothing +else, and cannot be anything else, but an imperfect part of the absolute +world being.</p> + +<p>The first thing a student of correct thought has to learn is to +distinguish true thought from false thought, and for this purpose he +must know above all that distinction must not be exaggerated. All +differences can only be relative. The bad and the good pictures belong +to the same family, and all families finally belong to the absolute, are +individuals of the universe.</p> + +<p>For the purpose of distinguishing true thoughts from false, it should be +remembered that the true thought is only a part of the truth, a part +which does not exaggerate its own importance, but subordinates itself to +the absolute.</p> + +<p>The following illustration may explain this. Although astronomy teaches +that the earth revolves daily around its axis and that the sun is +standing still, it nevertheless knows that the fixed state of the sun is +only a relative truth, so that from a higher point of view both the +earth and the sun are revolving. The consciousness of its relative truth +alone makes the statement of the sun's standstill true. Again, when the +farmer sees that the earth is fixed and that the sun is moving every day +from East to West, he is mistaken only so far as he regards his +standpoint as the whole truth, his farmers' knowledge for absolute +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span>knowledge. The knowledge of the absolute alone enables you to +distinguish correctly between truth and error. Whoever sees the sun +turning around the earth with the consciousness that this revolution is +but a partial truth is not in error, but sees truly. The knowledge of +the absolute truth clears up error and instructs us as to the method of +correct thought. This thought makes us apt, humble, and tolerant in +judging.</p> + +<p>The "wisest of men" was very proud of his modesty in knowing that he +knew nothing. His example may well be recommended to-day. Although we +have learned a great deal, we know very little compared to the +inexhaustible fountain of all wisdom, good mother nature. We learn every +day, but we never learn all there is to learn. What was to the credit of +Socrates, was his firm faith in the truth, his conviction of its +existence, and his faith in the mission of the human intellect to search +for truth.</p> + +<p>On the contrary, the sophists confused and disputed everything. They +frivolously flouted all truth and research. This same frivolousness now +relies upon Kant who, misled by the prejudice of his time, removed truth +to a transcendental world and therefore deprecatingly called our actual +world the "world of phenomena." In distinction from him, our logic +teaches that the phenomena of this world without exception are parts of +the one truth, and that the true art of understanding consists in +studying the parts.</p> + +<p>The doctrine of the sophists to the effect that everything may be denied +and disputed has a certain similarity with ours in that we declare that +the universe is the truth and all parts of it true parts, that smoke and +fog, reason and imagination, dreams and realities, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span>subject and object, +are true parts of the world. They are not the whole truth, but still +true. For this reason it is well to call your attention to the +difference between the sophistical and the logical method of thought. +The contemporaries of Socrates are still alive to-day. They are teaching +in the name of God and believe in nothing, while to us truth, every day +naked and sober truth, is sacred.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>THIRTEENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>In his "Three Books On The Soul," Aristotle discussed at length the +question whether the human soul has five senses or one. The commentator, +J. H. von Kirchmann, the publisher of the "Philosophical Library," +remarks in his footnote 172 that man has six senses. He divides feeling +into pure and active feeling. According to this, the phrase of the five +senses belongs to the old iron the same as that of the four elements. +Now neither you, nor I, nor any reader should worry about the question +whether all sensation may be summed up in the one sense of feeling, +whether there are five senses according to Aristotle, or six according +to Kirchmann, or whether there is even a seventh sense for the +transcendental, the organ of which, as some optimists hope, will +gradually be developed with the growing perfection of man. We are +concerned in this matter only so far as it is connected with the +cardinal question, whether the world is only one thing or a mere +collection of an infinite number of disconnected things; whether the +so-called things are independent subjects<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span> and objects, or whether they +are only predicates of the one world subject.</p> + +<p>Looking through the window I see the river, the street, the bridge, +houses, and trees. Everything is a thing in itself and yet is connected +inseparably with all others. The qualities of the world are regarded by +the intellect as subjects; but the intelligent subject should also know +that its actions, its distinguishing and understanding, are formalities, +a formal dismemberment of the absolute, which in spite of all division +always remains the undivided whole.</p> + +<p>In order to master this method of thought, you must understand above all +that the things are only so-called things, but are in reality qualities +of the universe, in other words, relative things or predicates of the +absolute. You will then understand, that our thought has a right to make +one thing as well as six of a chair, its back, its seat, and its four +legs. You will recognize that the five senses of Aristotle are not an +eternal truth, but a classification, which is eternally variable. +Distinguishing means classifying.</p> + +<p>I know very well that I am making a bold statement here, and that it is +not easy to justify it. For this reason you must not expect that I can +make my meaning clear in a few sentences. It is not only the general +prejudice which prevents this by making a most mysterious and miraculous +thing of the intellectual function, but also the fact that this thing is +still very obscure, although it has become clearer and clearer in the +course of time.</p> + +<p>The freethinking pastor Hironymi writes on this point: "The most +prominent naturalists of the present, such as Dubois-Reymond, who are at +the same time<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span> thinkers, admit that they do not know what feeling, life, +consciousness, are, and how they arise. And this ignorance is far more +valuable for truth and religion than the alleged knowledge. Let us, +therefore, continue in the devotion with which we have hitherto admired +the universe without understanding it. The higher existence, the +consciousness, has not been explained, it has remained a miracle, the +only lasting, absolute, miracle."</p> + +<p>Thus speaks the preacher who is a know-nothing by nature and makes a +business of admiring and wondering, while we are interested in +understanding and knowing. We wish to fathom the mystery, and hence I +may write still more letters on logic and you may study some more.</p> + +<p>I shall try to demonstrate by a trivial example, how it is that +understanding or distinguishing is based on classification.</p> + +<p>Take it that you awake at early dawn and notice in a corner of your bed +room something uncouth and moving which you cannot clearly distinguish. +To know that a phenomenon appears is not enough because the term +phenomenon applies to everything, natural and unnatural things, good and +evil spirits. Even if you are sufficiently enlightened to know that the +thing in question must be something natural, still this explains very +little, for the term "nature" again means everything. But you understand +or recognize more when you ascertain that the uncouth thing is dead or +alive, wall paper or garment, man or animal. You will notice that in +this intellectual enlightenment it is simply a matter of classification, +of the head under which the mystery should be classed. To classify the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span> +phenomena of truth and life, means to understand, to use the intellect, +to enlighten the brain.</p> + +<p>But we must well consider how far we shall have to go in our +classification in order to find the place in the system which will fully +clarify and determine understanding. Suppose that in the above mentioned +case you have ascertained that the motion is due to a cat, then the +inquiring faculty of understanding has not yet reached the end of its +tether. The next question is then, whether it is your cat or that of +your neighbor, whether it is black, white, or grey, young or old. And +when you finally recognize that it is your tomcat Peter, you must +remember that the subject which understands as well as the object to be +recognized, being parts of the absolute, are absolutely and infinitely +divisible parts, which are never fully understood and never fully exhausted.</p> + +<p>Please remember that in speaking of something uncouth, we are not so +much concerned in Peter or Tabby, but in the intellect which we desire +to understand so that we may make a correct use of it. And I refer to it +as uncouth merely because its understanding is beset with so many +difficulties. When I compared it in the preceding letter with a +photographic apparatus which should furnish us with pictures, and in +likening it now to an instrument designed to distinguish things by +classification, I warn you not to be confused thereby. Classification is +most essential as a means of producing intellectual pictures. In this +connection I emphasize once more that the faculty of understanding, the +same as other things, is not independent by itself, but can accomplish +something only in the universal interconnection. The understanding that +the phenomenon quoted above belongs to the category of tomcats, and more +especially into the column labeled<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span> Peter, would not be any +understanding at all, if you had not become previously acquainted with +the mouse-devouring race and individual in question. Only in connection +with your previous experience is the understanding that this tomcat and +the uncouth motion are one and the same thing, or belong to the same +category, a true understanding.</p> + +<p>Ludwig Feuerbach says: A talented writer is recognized by the fact that +he assumes talent on the part of the reader also and does not chew up +his subject into minute parts like a petty schoolmaster. On the other +hand, it seems to me that it is possible to assume too much, and I +pursued a schoolmasterly course in this case, because the subject is new +to you and still leaves plenty of room for reflection.</p> + +<p>I wanted to show by a commonplace example what I mean by insight and +understanding and how by means of it the unknown and uncouth becomes +known and familiar. True, the understanding in this case was illumined +by previous experience, while you are after new knowledge. You want to +know how enlightenment arises in order to acquire new insight. Now, all +novelty has the dialectic quality of being at the same time something +antiquated. New understanding can be acquired only by the help of old +understanding. In other words, old and new understanding, which I define +here as the faculty of classification, have their existence only in the +total interdependence of the universal existence.</p> + +<p>You must discard the old prejudice that knowledge can be collected like +cents. Although this is well enough, it does not suffice for the purpose +of logical thinking. One science belongs to another, and all of them +together belong to one class with the entire universe. It will be +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span>apparent to you, then, that at the beginning of your young days your +knowledge has not sprouted all at once, but has come out of the unknown. +And what is true of you, is true of the whole human race. In its cradle +it was without intellect. It had, indeed, the germ. But do not beasts, +worms, and sensitive plants have that also? In short, the light of +perception and understanding is nothing new in the radical sense of the +word, but connected with the old and with the world in general, and of +the same kind. All our knowledge must be connected and combined into one +understanding, one system, one realm, and this is the realm of reality, +of truth, of life.</p> + +<p>Systematic classification is the task of logic. The first requirement +for this purpose is the awakened consciousness of the indivisibility of +the universe, of its universal unity. This consciousness is, in other +words, at the same time the recognition of the merely formal +significance of all scientific classification.</p> + +<p>The unity of the universe is true, and is the sole and innate truth. +That this sole world truth is full of differences, is just as absolutely +different as absolutely the same, does no more contradict a reasonable +unity and equality than there is any contradiction in the fact that the +various owls have different faces and still the same owl face.</p> + +<p>Aristotle divided the sense into five parts, anthropologists the race of +man into five races, natural philosophers the space into three +dimensions. It is now a question of showing to you that such a division, +however true and just, is nevertheless far from being truth and justice, +but is merely classification. The fundamental requirement of logic is to +designate scientific classifications as that which they are, viz., +mental operations. It is the business of the intellect to make +classifications. That is its characteristic<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span> quality and does not +contradict the indivisible truth in the least.</p> + +<p>Old wiseacres teach that a reasonable man must not contradict himself, +and this is a wise, though very narrow, lesson. Hegel maintains that +everything in the world is reasonable, hence the contradictions are +also. Under this conservative exterior there is hidden a very +revolutionary perception of which the "destructive" minds take advantage +in order to flatly contradict the wiseacres and their stable, dead, +disordered order which cannot stand any contradiction.</p> + +<p>Reason dissolves all contradictions and opposition into harmony by +logical classification. "Everything in its own time and place." If it +does not wish to be called unreason, reason must rise to the +understanding that its opposite is only a formal antagonism. It must +know that God and the world, body and soul, life and death, motion and +rest, and whatever else the dualists may distinguish, are two and yet +one. Then it becomes clear that the conservatives are the real +revolutionaries, because by their senseless adherence to the "good old +order" they drive the proletariat to desperation, until it upsets that +order. On the other hand, the maligned revolutionaries are conservative, +because they subordinate themselves to the world's evolutionary process +which was, is, and will be eternal.</p> + +<p>The red thread winding through all these letters deals with the +following points: The instrument of thought is a thing like all other +common things, a part or attribute of the universe. It belongs +particularly to the general category of being and is an apparatus which +produces a detailed picture of human experience by categorical +classification or distinction. In order to use this apparatus +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span>correctly, one must fully grasp the fact that the world unit is +multiform and that all multiformity is a unit.</p> + +<p>It is the solution of the riddle of the ancient Eleatic philosophy: How +can the one be contained in the many, and the many in one?</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>FOURTEENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Shoemaking and beet culture are as much sciences as physics, chemistry, +and astronomy. Reading, writing, and reckoning are called elementary +knowledge, and though I do not deny that they have an elementary value +for the culture of the mind, yet I can truly say that I have met +well-informed people who could neither read nor write. I wish to +indicate by this that there are indeed high and low degrees of knowledge +and science, but that such graduations have only a temporary, local, +relative, subjective significance, while in the absolute all things are +the same.</p> + +<p>The scorn with which you may hear some people speak of the night of the +absolute in which all cats are grey and all women beautiful Helenas +shall not prevent us from repeatedly studying the absolute which I have +again and again praised as the main topic of logic. Only remember, +please, that you must not have any mystic idea of it. The absolute is +the sum total of all that was, is, and will be.</p> + +<p>The subjects as well as the objects of all science belong to the +absolute, which is commonly called "world."</p> + +<p>All other sciences have for their object limited parts, relative +matters, while the science of the mind treats of all things, of the +infinite. This is a point to which I refer<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span> frequently because it tends +to make my lessons obscure. I am lecturing on the science of the +intellect, but I speak of all things, of the universe, because I am +obliged to demonstrate, not the relation of the mind to shoemaking or +astronomy, but its general interrelations. I have to make plain its +general conduct, and this leads necessarily to the all-embracing +generality, to the absolute. We wish to learn the art of thinking, not +on this or that subject, but the art of general world thought.</p> + +<p>The intellect is a special part, the same as every other scientific or +practical object. But it is that part which is not satisfied with piece +work, which knows that it itself and all special things are attributes +or predicates of the absolute subject, that it itself and all things are +universally interrelated.</p> + +<p>The human mind is sometimes called self-consciousness. But this name is +too limited for such an unlimited thing, for the pathfinder of the +infinite, for your, my, and every other consciousness of the world and +of existence in general.</p> + +<p>For centuries the question has been discussed whether there are innate +ideas hidden in the intellect or whether it may be likened to a blank +paper which experience impregnates with knowledge. This is the question +after the origin and source of understanding. Whence comes reason, where +do we get our ideas, judgments, conclusions? By the help of brown-study +from the interior of our brain, from revelation, or from experience? It +seems to me that you will quickly decide this matter when I ask you to +consider that everything we experience, together with the intellect +going through experiences, is a revelation of the absolute. Everything +we know is experience. We may consider the mind as a sheet of blank +paper, but in order<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span> that it may receive writing on its surface this +internal paper is as necessary as the external world which produces the +hand, the pen and the ink for this process of writing. In other words, +all experience originates from the world organism. Not knowledge, but +consciousness, world consciousness, is innate in the intellect. It has +not the consciousness of this or that in itself, but it knows of itself +the general, the existence as such, the absolute.</p> + +<p>The science of the intellect has ever wrestled with one peculiar fact. +It found knowledge which the mind had received from the outside, +so-called empirical knowledge. But it also found knowledge which was +innate, so-called <i>a priori</i> knowledge. That there is always a valley +between two mountains, that gold is not sheet iron, that the part is +smaller than the whole, that the angles of a triangle are together equal +to two right angles, that circles are round, that water is wet, that +fire is hot, etc., these are things of which we know that they are true +in heaven and in hell, and in all time to come, although we have never +been there with our experience. This plainly shows that we harbor a +secret in our brains which the lovers of the mystical seek to exploit by +making believe that their self-interested wisdom of God and high +authority likewise belongs to the eternally innate truths. For this +reason it is especially important for the proletariat to bring the +controversy of the origin and source of understanding to a close.</p> + +<p>Our logic asks: Does wisdom descend mysteriously from the interior of +the human brain, or does it come from the outer world like all +experience? We shall leave its descent from heaven out of the question.</p> + +<p>The answer is: Science, perception, understanding, thought, require +internal and external things, subject and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span> object, brain and world. +Truth is here and truth is there. Truth is so divine that it is +everywhere and absolute.</p> + +<p>But how to explain that wonderful <i>a priori</i> knowledge which exceeds all +experience? For it is a fact that the intellect has not alone the +faculty of knowing things in general, but also that of separating them +into their parts and from one another and to name them. It cuts off +slices, so to say. But not like the butcher who sees everything merely +from the standpoint of his trade. You will remember from your own +experience as well as from my repeated statements that the world is not +a monotonous, but a multiform unit. This confused knot is dissolved and +explained by intellectual separation, by classification. In the absolute +everything is alike and unlike. But the intellect makes abstractions +from the unlike. For instance, in conceiving of the term minerals, we +pass over the distinction between gold and sheet iron. Then, when we +continue the classification by subordinating gold and sheet iron as +separate species to the general term of minerals, we know very well that +gold and sheet iron are different kinds of the same general mineral +nature. We know what the names indicate, and so long as they retain +their meaning, we know that neither in heaven nor in hell can gold be +sheet iron or sheet iron be gold. Water and fire are specialties taken +from the universe and named. Is it a wonder, then, that these names have +a special meaning and that we have the settled conviction that wherever +sense instead of nonsense is master, fire burns, water wets, circles are +round, and the sum of the angles of every triangle is equal to two right angles?</p> + +<p>These illustrations are commonplace enough, indeed, but it seems to me +that they clearly show the mere formality of the distinction between +innate and experienced<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span> knowledge. You will recognize that both of these +kinds of knowledge are different and yet of the same kind, that both are +mixtures of the internal and external. Knowledge <i>a priori</i> ceases to be +a miracle when we understand that it comes out of the same fountain of +experience as <i>a posteriori</i> knowledge, and in either case knowledge is +acquired only by means of the intellect. Hence intellect connected with +the world is the sole source of all wisdom, and external nature as well +as our internal faculty of understanding are parts of the one general +nature, which is the truth and the absolute.</p> + +<p>"Only a gradual, slow, gapless development," says Noiré, "can free the +thinking mind from the philosophical disease of wondering."</p> + +<p>The art of dialectics or logic which teaches that the universe, or the +whole world, is one being, is the science of absolute evolution. "In the +whole constitution of all natural things," writes Lazare Geiger, "there +is hardly anything more miraculous than the way in which the miracle +avoids our glance and continuously withdraws into the distance to escape +observation. In the place of the abrupt and strange things produced by +imagination, reason puts uniformity and transition."</p> + +<p>And we add that the science of reason, or logic, teaches simultaneously +with the unity of the whole world, also that all things are alike +miraculous, or that there is only one miracle, which is existence in +general, the absolute. In other words, everything and nothing is miraculous.</p> + +<p>In demonstrating that the most different things, such as heat and cold, +and all radical distinctions, are only relative forms of universal +nature, I prove the uninterrupted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span> and matter of fact transition and the +absolute graduality, the fusion, of all things.</p> + +<p>I have tried to establish this proof in regard to the two kinds of +knowledge and illustrated it with commonplace examples, because these +have a popularizing effect. In order to meet the demands of more +exacting minds, I shall presently take up the miracle of causality. The +indubitable statement that everything must have its cause is regarded as +the most miraculous innate knowledge, and is much misused for the +purpose of bringing confusion into logic.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>FIFTEENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>My Son:</p> + +<p>If on my return from some voyage I were to tell you of all the things I +have <i>not</i> seen, you would justly doubt the order of my senses. Sane +reason demands that the description of unfamiliar things be given in a +positive, not in a negative manner. If that is so, is it not wrong to +proceed negatively by trying to prove in explaining the nature of the +intellect that it is not a miracle and no mysterious charm of wisdom? I +answer: No. For the present, the intellect is still a sort of <i>ignis +fatuus</i> which is magnified into a fiery man. In order to understand the +<i>ignis fatuus</i>, it is necessary to remove the fiery man. Logic must show +that human reason is not a miracle, not a mystical receptacle of wisdom. +The negative process is in such a case positively in order. Wherever a +thing is obscured by prejudices, these must first be removed, in order +that room may be made for the bare fact.</p> + +<p>It was the famous Kant who posed the question: "How is <i>a priori</i> +knowledge possible?" How do we <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span>arrive at the knowledge of things which +are not accessible to experience? The answer is that the intellect +cannot accomplish such a miracle, and Kant substantiates this in a +long-winded way and with admirable penetration. But he left a nasty hair +in the soup.</p> + +<p>He found that by the help of our reason we can explain only phenomena. +The confusion between truth and phenomena had been handed down to him as +an infirmity of ancient times. He worked diligently on its solution, but +left some work for those coming after him. Originally the study of +supernatural and the profane study of natural things were closely +intermingled. Not until the obvious results of natural science became +known, did thinkers accommodate themselves to the habit of leaving +supernatural things to faith and limiting science to the study of +natural phenomena. Science had so to say passed on to the practical +order of business, not paying any further attention to the contrast +between phenomena and truth. But the logic, which is innate in the human +mind, cannot content itself with the dualistic split between faith and +science. It demands a monistic system and does not desist until the +primeval forests of faith are completely put under cultivation.</p> + +<p>The logical impulse of culture caused Kant to continue what was begun by +Socrates. Philosophy before Socrates searched for truth externally. +While our logic teaches that everything is true, and truth is the +universe, the Ionic philosophers made a sort of fetish out of the +matter. Thales idolized the water as the thing of things, another the +fire, a third numbers. This worship of the fetish was the worship of +truth. The search for understanding starts out with misunderstanding. +From religious to scientific culture, it is a step, not a leap. When<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span> +Socrates turned to introspection and started out, with his "Know +thyself," in submitting the prodigy of the human soul to critique, he +made another important step.</p> + +<p>You know that the "wisest of men" was not interested in air and water, +in natural science of the strict order, but rather in the good, the +true, and the beautiful, in the human in the narrower sense, in the +realm of the spirit, in the soul. It was indeed unwise that he was +interested to the verge of idolization, since in consequence of this +interest in a special part, the other, the material part was being +neglected. According to Goethe's statement that one thing is not fit for +all, Socrates did right. He and all philosophical lights after him +studied the intellect. What they missed was the now dawning +understanding that the faculty of thought is not a prodigy but a +special, and at the same time common, part of universal nature. While +these philosophers looked for truth in any one special form of +excellence, you are now invited to look for it in the total +interrelation of things.</p> + +<p>Science has ever endeavored to do away with miracles and prodigies. This +could be accomplished only gradually, and the logicians have, therefore, +remained more or less biased and confused. The great Kant was no +exception. He looked for supreme truth, and for its sake he investigated +the intellect. He is celebrated because he explained so well that this +intellect feels no mission for anything transcendental, and cannot +understand anything but phenomena. Still he permitted something +transcendental to remain.</p> + +<p>Kant is of the opinion that we perceive things as they appear, but not +as they are "in themselves." Nevertheless we should believe that a +mysterious truth is at the bottom of those phenomena, because we should +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span>otherwise arrive at the irreconcilable contradiction that there are +phenomena without anything which could appear. The intellect, he holds, +can operate only on the field of phenomena, and for this reason we +should give up the endless grubbing after the transcendental. But we +should leave one little room in the house of reason, one little chamber +of faith, which points beyond experience up to the point where a +mysterious truth guards God and His commands.</p> + +<p>The subsequent philosophers, especially the Hegelian philosophy, opposed +this separation which assigned to the intellect only the study of +phenomena and to faith the absolute and infinite for veneration. But +they did not yet succeed in completely mastering the matter, they did +not fully arrive at an indubitably clear exposition of the fountain of +understanding and of the unity of truth, so that reaction nowadays can +again sound the retreat after the melody: "Back to Kant." You know that +Lessing complained about the treatment of "a dead dog" accorded to +Spinoza, and Marx added pointedly: "Hegel is more of a dead dog to-day +than Spinoza was at Lessing's time." The enemies of the working class +are the enemies of evolution. They wish to preserve the existing order +of things and the good old time in which they feel at home. For this +reason it is the mission of the proletariat to continue the work of +logic. It is our duty to show clearly that the metaphysical truth which +Kant opposed to the phenomena of nature and could not eliminate from the +intellect, is nothing but just a metaphysical, a fantastically +exaggerated, thing.</p> + +<p>According to our logic, the universe is the truth and everything +partakes of it. That such a truth is logical and such a logic true, is +shown by the interconnection of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span> things, so that this science is +applicable to everything which the sciences respect as reasonable and true.</p> + +<p>In order to help you in the understanding of the absolute and liberate +your thought from all special miracles, I refer to Kant's critique of +reason. It teaches that our intellect becomes a source of understanding +only in connection with other phenomena of nature. Only his critique +stuck fast in the mysterious fountain of causality. Thus he showed that +he was only a seeker after logic, not its master. The conclusion that +there must be <i>something</i> that does appear where there are phenomena is +certainly correct. But that which Kant was thinking of, something of a +transcendental or metaphysical nature, led him to the radically wrong +conclusion that there must be something different, peculiar, miraculous, +mysterious, wherever there are phenomena.</p> + +<p>The Kantian conclusion that there must be an absolute truth by itself +behind a phenomenon, an absolute truth that exists independent of and +disconnected with such phenomenon, was due to his fetish-like conception +of truth. It is the first requirement for a correct use of the faculty +of logical reasoning to know that truth is the common nature of the +universe.</p> + +<p>That a phenomenon must be based on nature, or an effect on a cause, is a +fact identical with "causality" which I already promised to discuss in +the preceding letter. This same problem may also be expressed in the +words: Where there are predicates, there must be a subject that carries +them. In order to make quite sure that I will not be misunderstood, I +emphasize once more the fact that I am not raising any doubt as to the +correctness of this conclusion, but only to the metaphysical application +of this conclusion after the Kantian manner which consists<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span> in making +the same use of it as a clergyman who tries to prove that his theology +is innate in reason.</p> + +<p>Our conception of logic wishes to show that all causes and effects are +matter of the same kind, and that our faculty of reasoning is a matter +of fact thing which brooks no mysteries or metaphysical dreams.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>SIXTEENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Now let me illustrate the interconnection of all things, or the +world-unit, by discussing the question of causality. We know that +everything has its cause. We know that this is also true on the Moon or +on Uranus, although we have not acquired this knowledge by experience on +those world bodies. Thus it seemed that the intellect was a mysterious +receptacle containing innate wisdom. The same receptacle also contains, +for instance, the truth that all white horses are white and all black +horses black. We do not know anything about the color of other horses in +other countries, but the color of black and white horses we know even if +we have never seen them in other countries. It is thus apparent that our +intellect is an instrument which reaches beyond experience. For this +reason there would seem to be no telling where the supply of such +miraculous revelations would stop and into what mysterious worlds the +intellect passing beyond the limits of experience would lead us.</p> + +<p>In order that the human intellect may not appear transcendental, in +order to give it its place in the general classification of natural +forces, we must investigate the nature of causality and so-called <i>a +priori</i> knowledge.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span></p><p>Kindly observe in the first place that a thing is just as wonderful +<i>after</i> it is explained as it was before its explanation. A scientific +explanation of a thing ought not to do away with our admiration, but +only to reduce it to reasonable bounds. The intellect may very well be +regarded as something wonderful, but its wondrous quality should be +reduced to the measure of all things which are none of them any less +wonderful. After you have explained what water is, after you have +learned that it is composed of two chemical elements, after you have +realized all its qualities thoroughly, it still remains a wonderful, +divine, fluid.</p> + +<p>"All things have their causes." What are all things? They are +attributes, qualities of the universe. It is innate in the intellect to +know that the world is <i>one</i> thing, that all things belong, not to any +different thing, but to one and the same subject. The intellect is by +nature the absolute feeling of unity. It knows of itself that everything +is interrelated and that the consciousness of causality is nothing else +but the consciousness of cosmic interrelation. And I maintain that the +innateness of the consciousness of cosmic interrelation in our brain is +explained when we realize that it is an actual thing like all others, a +phenomenon which has the same general nature as every other +phenomenon.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> + +<p>The fact is undeniable that a certain knowledge is innate in our +consciousness. The only difficulty has been to explain this fact. At +this point I call your attention to the exaggerated notion entertained +in regard to explaining, and understanding, things. By explanations, a +thing is not dissolved, but only classified.</p> + +<p>The hatching of an egg is explained when you <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span>perceive that this process +is part and parcel of a whole class of similar processes. If you modify +the exalted idea of the effect of explanations in this sense, you must +realize that the innate consciousness of the general interrelation of +things is natural and intelligible and requires no other explanation +than the humidity of the water, the gravity of bodies, or the color of +black horses.</p> + +<p>Even after it has been explained and understood, the intellect with its +logic remains a wonderful thing. Just as clay is by its nature +untransparent and pliable, or glass transparent and brittle, so +consciousness has its peculiar innate qualities. In this way knowledge +comes to the intellect not only by experience, but it is also a sort of +receptacle full of wisdom. Still this receptacle would no more contain +wisdom without experience than the eye would have impressions without +light.</p> + +<p>In order to straighten out the intricate windings of our subject, I +recapitulate them. We wish to learn the proper use of our intellect, the +conscious application of consciousness. To this end we analyze its +hitherto hidden mystical nature. So long as we exalt this nature +transcendentally to the clouds, we do not acquire its proper use. +Therefore the first paragraph of our lesson reads: The intellect belongs +in the same category with all things of the universe. And the second +paragraph says: If we distinguish two classes of thought radiated by the +human intellect, viz., innate thoughts, such as causality, and on the +other hand thoughts which come through experience, we must remember that +such a distinction is correct only when we realize that in spite of this +classification in two kinds they really belong to the same kind. Innate +and acquired wisdom, though served on two different plates, still are +taken from the same general world dish.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span></p><p>From this it follows that the science of causality, though applicable +to all the phenomena of the world, does not apply to the universe. If it +is a fact that all wisdom is worldly, then one must not fly outside of +the world with the concept of causality.</p> + +<p>This is the salient point at issue.</p> + +<p>All things are one thing, are interdependent, stand in the relation of +cause and effect toward one another, or of genus and species. To say +that all things have a cause means that they have a mother. The fact +that every mother has a mother finds its final ending in the world +mother or mother world, which is absolute and motherless and contains +all mothers in its womb.</p> + +<p>Causes are mothers, effects are daughters. Every daughter has not only a +mother, grand-mother, and great-grand-mother, but also a father, +grand-father, and great-grand-father. The origin, or the family +relationship, of a daughter is not one-sided, but all-sided. In the same +way all things have not one, but many causes which flow together in the +general cause.</p> + +<p>The intellect which has the innate knowledge that everything has its +cause will accept the teaching that all causes in the world are founded +in the absolute world cause and must return to it. It is the +quintessence of logic not only to ascertain the true nature of the +intellect, but also to elucidate the nature of the universe by the help +of the intellect.</p> + +<p>All things have a mother, but to expect that the world mother should +logically have a mother is to carry logic to extremities and to +misunderstand the intellect and its art of reasoning.</p> + +<p>If you have recognized the faculty of understanding as a part of +existence, you will not wonder at its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span>miraculousness. Existence is +wonderful. Its parts arise one out of the other, out of the universal +interrelations of the one world. They all have their predecessors and +causes. But what is true of the relative parts, is not true of the +absolute whole.</p> + +<p>I am the son of my father and the father of my son. I am at the same +time father and son. In the same way all things are simultaneously cause +and effect. Although father and son are two different persons, still the +capacity of being father and son rest in the same person, and although +cause and effect are to be distinguished as two things, still they are +two relations of the same thing. Persons and things, causes and effects, +are not independent entities, but relative entities, are +interconnections or relations of the absolute.</p> + +<p>The intellect is innate in us, and with it and through it also the +consciousness of being, although it is innate in us only as the teeth of +the child which grow after birth. Everything that we become aware of is +known only as a part of the universe. In so far as this is wonderful, +the consciousness of causality is miraculous. But, in fact, the +knowledge of the causality of all things is innate wisdom the same as +that of the color of all white and black horses. At the same time it +must be observed that every innate knowledge is in part acquired, and +every acquired knowledge in part innate, so that both kinds intermingle +and form one category.</p> + +<p>My whole argument aims to convince you that all things are worldly +things, and their causality is only another name for the same thing, +just as the German <i>brot</i> is called <i>pain</i> in French and <i>bread</i> in +English. Thus we derive the firm conviction that if there is <i>pain</i> in +heaven there will be bread, and if there are things, there will be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span> +causes and effects, or interrelation with the unit of existence.</p> + +<p>The mystery of causality is sometimes expressed by the statement that we +possess the indubitable knowledge which extends beyond all experience +that wherever a change takes place there must have preceded another +change. Indeed, we have the faculty of recognizing the unity in the +infinite multiplicity, and infinite multiplicity in the unity. +Multiplicity, change, motion—who is to split hairs about them, who will +make fine distinctions? The intellect is the photographic organ of the +infinite motion and transformations called the "world." It is and +possesses the consciousness of cosmic changes. Is it a wonder that it +knows that there is interrelation in its things, that no part of the +world, not a particle of its motion and transformations, stands alone by +itself, that everything is connected and mutually dependent in and with +the universe? Because this understanding is in a way innate in the +intellect, therefore it understands that there is nothing but change, +infinitely proceeding transformations. And if it detaches any single +thing from this process, it knows that changes preceded it and changes +will follow.</p> + +<p>In short, we must not marvel at any single part of nature, not even at +the intellect, but admire the whole universe. Then fetishism will at +last end and a true cult, the cult of world truth, can begin.</p> + +<p>The art of thinking, my dear Eugene, is not so easy. For this reason I +keep on warning you against misunderstanding. I do not mean to advise +you with the foregoing against admiring any single part of nature, or of +art, a landscape or a statue. My teaching merely tends to moderate +admiration by the reflection that the whole<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span> world is wonderful, that +everything is beautiful, so that nothing ugly remains. The distinction +between beautiful and ugly is only relative. Even when I say that the +true worship of God, the cult of truth, cannot begin until idol worship +ceases, you will appreciate the phrase and will not insinuate that I do +not value the cultivation of science in the past, or that I hate idol +worship to the extent of forgetting what I have emphasized repeatedly, +viz., that idol worship is also worship of God, and error a paving stone +on the way toward truth. The most minute thing is a magnitude. +Everything is true, good, and beautiful, for the universe is absolute +truth, beauty and goodness. I conclude with the words of Fr. von Sallet:</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<div>A sunny view of world and life</div> +<div class="i1">Is balm for brain and heart,</div> +<div>It is with health and beauty rife,</div> +<div class="i1">With noblest works of art.</div> +<div>But do not for a moment think</div> +<div>That it is captured in a wink.</div> +<div>The golden harvest does not grow,</div> +<div>Unless the early tempests blow.</div> +<div>And only bitter woe and strain</div> +<div>Will bright and lofty wisdom gain.</div> +</div></div> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> E. g. That of natural existence.—<span class="smcap">Editor</span>.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>SEVENTEENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>My subject, dear Eugene, is the simplest in the world, but it requires +thorough treatment for all its full understanding. So every letter is in +a way but a repetition of the same argument. "It is remarkable," says +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span>Schopenhauer, "that we find the few main theses of pre-socratic +philosophy repeated innumerable times. Also in the works of modern +thinkers, such as Cartesius, Spinoza, Leibniz, and even Kant, we find +that their few main theses are repeated over and over."</p> + +<p>Now I ask you to consider what I said in my first letters, viz., that +the titles of the principal philosophical works reveal that philosophy +is engaged in the study of logic, in the analysis of the intellect and +the art of its use. You will then recognize that in the very nature of +the subject my presentation of the matter lacks systematization. It has +no real beginning and end, because its object, the intellect, is +interconnected with the whole universe, which is without beginning and +end, which has neither before nor after, neither above nor below.</p> + +<p>You may venture that the relation of the intellect to the universe does +not concern the intellect especially, but is a universal matter. That +would be true.</p> + +<p>But it is easy to show that the art of thinking and wisdom of the world +are identical. And although the universal interrelation of things is +germain to all things and subjects, yet its consideration is a special +task of logic which treats all objects of thought summarily.</p> + +<p>My subject therefore begins everywhere, even though it is a specialty. +Hence I take the liberty to take my departure from any literature which +I happen to study. In the present letter, I deal with "logical +investigations" of the prominent Professor Trendelenburg. His is a bulky +volume, but you need not fear that I shall weary you with its +subtleties. As a rule I read only the preface of philosophical works of +the second and third order, their introduction and perhaps the first few +chapters. Then I am approximately<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span> informed as to what I may expect from +them further on. One frequently finds statements which, if they do not +throw new light on the subject, still bring out in bolder relief some of +the accomplishments of historical research in our field. And in order +that the son may not trust to the father alone, which might lead to +distrust, I connect my argument with some statements of Trendelenburg.</p> + +<p>In the preface to the second edition the author complains of the "dull +headache" which the Hegelian intoxication has left in Germany and says: +"Philosophy will not resume its old power until it becomes consistent, +and it will not become consistent until it grows in the same way that +all other sciences do. In other words, it must not take a new departure +in every brain and then quit, but it must approach its problems +historically and develop them. The German prejudice must be abandoned, +according to which the philosophy of the future is supposed to look for +a new principle. This principle has already been found. It consists in +the organic world conception, the fundaments of which are resting in +Plato and Aristotle."</p> + +<p>The Professor is right, but he overlooks that the philosophers, even of +modern times, do not begin "each on his own account," do not have "each +his own principle," or if they have, such a "false originality" is but +the indifferent attribute of historical development which has handed the +object of logic, the true art of thought, from generation to generation +in an ever brighter condition.</p> + +<p>I repeat this emphatically for pedagogic reasons, because I consider it +essential to convince you and the reader that the apparent paradoxes +which I state are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span> the objects of discussion since time immemorial. I +also wish to stimulate you to a study of the master works of philosophy +which show the cheering spectacle, in the persons of the most brilliant +specimens of the human mind, of the onward march of this mind from +darkness to light.</p> + +<p>In order that the wheat contained in this human treasure box may not be +concealed by the tares, I am endeavoring to throw light on the outcome +of the historical development of philosophy, and for this purpose I +continue to discuss the question by taking my departure in this instance +from some further statements of Trendelenburg.</p> + +<p>"It is a peculiarity of philosophical methods of reasoning to recognize +a part in the whole, and it is tacitly assumed that the whole is +descended from a thought which determines the parts. On the other hand, +it is peculiar to empirical methods of analysis to study the parts +without regard to their interrelation, or at best to collect them and +put them together, and it is tacitly assumed that every point is +something peculiar in itself which must be studied apart from all the rest."</p> + +<p>"The aim of all human understanding is always to solve the miracle of +divine creation by further creative thought. When this task is +undertaken in detail, the detail study forces one on to other things: +for things must go backwards toward their dissolution by the same force +through which they arose out of the depths."</p> + +<p>These sentences state the problem before us. Shall we use the intellect +philosophically, or shall we use it empirically? We are striving to +understand the parts and the whole, and this is identical with the +research after a systematical world philosophy, or with the art of +dialectics.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> Now we must state in the first place that thinking of any +kind, whether it be philosophical or empirical, is of the same species, +that the same kernel is contained in both forms. Roses are different +flowers from carnations, but the flower nature is in both of them. Thus +the nature of thought is contained in both philosophical and empirical +thinking. The distinction is well enough, but their unity must not be +lost sight of.</p> + +<p>The philosophers, he says, seek to understand the detail by the whole; +the empirical thinkers analyze the details without regard to +interrelations. But both methods of research are different specimens of +the same genus, and both of them are one-sided when their +interconnection is overlooked. The empirical thinker who seeks to +understand the details in their isolation, thinks philosophically, when +he regards his special research as a contribution to the whole, and the +philosopher, who seeks to understand the detail by the whole, thinks +empirically when he rightly regards all details as attributes of the whole.</p> + +<p>Trendelenburg, then, has expressed his case very obscurely. Both methods +of study, if employed one-sidedly, entirely misconceive the art of +thinking. The philosophers err when they regard the intellect as the +only source of understanding and truth; it is only a part of truth and +must be supplemented by all the rest of the world. On the other hand, +the empirical thinkers err when they look for understanding and truth +exclusively in the outer world, without taking into account the +intellectual instrument by the help of which they lift their treasures. +In fact, such one-sided philosophers exist only in theory; I mean there +are some who imagine that truth could be one-sided. But in practice they +all testify, much against their will, to the inevitable interconnection +of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span>matter and mind, of inside and outside. In the practical use of the +intellect everybody shows that the part operates in the whole, and that +the whole is active in its parts.</p> + +<p>We know <i>a priori</i> that the universe is a whole. The universal existence +can be conceived only as of one kind or nature. The mere thought that +there might be something which does not partake of the nature of the +universe is no thought, because it is a thought without sense or reason. +The whole world is the supreme being, though I grant that we have but a +vague conception of it. We have as yet no detailed, true, conception of +the universe, but it is gradually acquired in the course of science. +Still, our conception will never be perfect because details are +infinitesimal and the absolute being is infinite growth.</p> + +<p>As to details, we know them more or less accurately and yet not +accurately, because even the most minute part of the infinite is +infinite. All science has searched in vain for atoms. What our +understanding knows, has always been nothing but predicates or +attributes of truth, although they are true attributes and are truly +understood by us.</p> + +<p>I emphasize the inadequacy of all modes of thought and of all +understanding in opposition to those who make an idol of science. I +emphasize the truth of all perceptions in opposition to those +knownothings who claim that truth cannot be understood, but can only be +admired and worshipped. Hence it follows for our theory of understanding +that intellect and reason and the art of thought are no independent +treasure boxes which make any revelations to us. They are theoretical +classifications which in practice are operative only in the universal +interconnection of things. Understanding, perceiving, judging, +distinguishing and concluding, etc., are unable to produce any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span> truths. +They can only enlighten and clarify experience by logical classification +and distinction. Because man produces works which are preceded by +planning, therefore the philosophical mode of research has "assumed that +the whole is descended from a thought." But this is an assumption of +human origin, which is shown to be without foundation on closer +analysis. The plans of our works are copies of natural originals and are +"free creations of the mind" only in a limited sense. The artists are +well aware of the natural descent of their thoughts and fictions. To +regard the world as the outcome of thought is a perverse logic. It is +the first condition of rational, proletarian, thought to recognize the +intellect and its products as attributes of the world subject.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>EIGHTEENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Just as in political history action and reaction follow one another, +just as periods of economic prosperity are alternated by periods of +depression, so we find in literature a periodical fluctuation between +philosophical and anti-philosophical tendencies.</p> + +<p>After Hegel had for a time thoroughly aroused the spirits, a time of +apathy followed, so that this hero of thought who shortly before had +been almost idolized could be attacked and reviled. For about a decade, +a philosophical breeze has now once more been blowing. The subject of +logic, the theory of understanding, is again the object of universal +attention. This movement is stimulated by important discoveries in +science, such as the heat equivalent of Robert Mayer, the origin of +species by <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span>Darwin, etc., and natural science and philosophy may be +compared to two miners who are digging a tunnel, so that sharp ears on +both sides can hear the blows of the hammers and the clanging of the +tools.</p> + +<p>There is much truth in this picture, but it may also lead to +misunderstandings. By the vivisection of frogs and rabbits, by boring +into the brain, physiology will not discover the mind. No microscope, no +telescope, will reveal the nature of reason and truth or the art of +logical discernment.</p> + +<p>Neither will Lazarre Geiger, Max Müller, Steinthal, and Noiré succeed in +philology in solving the "last questions of all knowledge" by the help +of any primitive arch-language.</p> + +<p>At the same time, the value of the co-operation of these gentlemen is +not denied, only I desire to point out that the comparison with the +tunnel is not quite accurate. What Marx said of economic formulas, is +true of logical formulas: "In their analysis neither the microscope nor +chemical reagents are of any service. The power of abstraction must +replace them both."</p> + +<p>The two sciences will finally meet, not because each one of them digs +away in its own one-sided fashion, but because the miners meet after +working hours and exchange their experiences. And the philosophers may +be the dominant party, because they are specialists in logic and +therefore prepared to utilize anything which may serve their purpose, no +matter from what side it comes. The other party, on the other hand, has +its own specialties and promotes the cause of logic in a secondary and +involuntary fashion.</p> + +<p>Natural science has its own monism which is distinguished from +philosophical proletarian monism in that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span> it does not appreciate the +historical outcome of philosophical research. One of the most prominent +representatives of the former is Noiré. He entitles one of his little +works "Monistic Thought," but shows himself on its pages as a very +unclear dualist. He speaks of the "dual nature of causality" and relates +that the mind operates with a different causality than the mere +mechanical one. He calls this other "sensory causality."</p> + +<p>According to him the world has only two attributes: "Motion and +sensation are the only true and objective qualities of the world.... +Motion is the truly objective ... though it is admitted that it gives us +only the phenomenon.... Sensation makes up the internal nature of +things. Every subject, whether man or atom, is endowed with the two +qualities of all beings, viz., motion and sensation."</p> + +<p>Thereupon I have carefully looked for an explanation in Noiré's works, +why he regards the nature of things as composed of an external and an +internal quality, and why sensation should not be regarded as a sort of +motion, but the only reason I could find was the dualistic nature of his +"monistic" reasoning.</p> + +<p>As Schopenhauer provided the whole world with a "will," so Noiré +provides it with "sensation."</p> + +<p>Kant and his "Critical Philosophy" held in their time that our intellect +perceives only the phenomena of nature, while the mystic law of +causality, according to him, points to a hidden being, which cannot be +perceived but must be believed, which we may venerate but must leave +undisturbed by science. Schopenhauer, his brilliant successor, who in +spite of his brilliancy did not materially advance the cause of +philosophy, mystified the problem of causality by his discovery that the +nature of the world is will power.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span> These teachings of Kant and +Schopenhauer are dressed up anew and mixed with the recent discoveries +of science by Noiré. But he entirely ignores the work of Schelling and +Hegel, who by their criticisms have made evident the lack of logic in +the Kantian separation of phenomenon (apparition) from noumenon +(essence), of cause from effect.</p> + +<p>You are familiar with the silly question whether Goethe or Schiller, +Shakespeare or Byron, is the greater poet, and you will not think that I +am trying to elevate Hegel above Kant or Kant above Hegel. They are just +two cogs on the spinning wheel of history. If the second crushes what +the first has cracked, such is the result of their succession.</p> + +<p>Natural science is also a valuable co-operator in the solution of the +world problem, not so much by digging in the logical tunnel itself, or +making amateur excursions into the fields of philosophy or metaphysics, +but because it elucidates and renders tangible the special object of +logic in such far-embracing objects as the unity of natural forces or of +animal species. The scientific presentation of this special object, +however, requires a brain armed with the full equipment of the +historical outcome of philosophy.</p> + +<p>Now you must not believe that I am conceited enough to place my own +little personality on the pedestal as the only true philosopher. I am +too well aware of my shortcomings as a self-educated man. But seeing +that I have striven earnestly and without prejudice since my young days +to understand the high object of my studies, I feel in my heart a +certain confidence in my qualification to deal with it. On the other +hand, I know my lack of that sort of learning which is required in order +to be able to present the scientifically much-courted nature of the +human mind<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span> in such a form and with such emphasis as its sublime +character deserves. And if I, nevertheless, come before the public on +various occasions with my tentative works, I offer as an excuse that +hitherto the Messiah has not appeared who will come after me and whose +John the Baptist I should like to be.</p> + +<p>You, my dear Eugene, will take me soberly and reduce my resounding words +to their proper measure, when I, in the intoxication of enthusiasm, flow +over like that now and then. You know that I am no hero worshipper. +Though all research is but the product of individual minds, the mind of +each man is a part of the universal mind which produces science. Now +follows the point which forms the conclusion of all my letters: The +intellect which produces science is indeed a part of man, but still more +a part of the world, it is the universal world intellect, the reason of +the absolute, the absolute reason.</p> + +<p>The study of this intellect at work, not merely in shoemaking, in +anatomy, or in astronomy, but in all fields, in the infinite, of its +life in the absolute, is the means by which the art of logic is +acquired. It is true that the infinite exists only in finite parts, and +you cannot conceive of the infinite directly, you can perceive it only +in its parts. And in perceiving them you must always remember that every +part is an infinite piece of the infinite universe.</p> + +<p>In his "Introduction and Proofs of a Monistic Theory of Understanding," +Noiré, after enumerating the new points contained in his work, adds +sneeringly that he is "not in a position to give any new clews as to the +nature of the absolute." For this very reason I want to denounce his +"Monism" as a shallow piece of work, which offers only the name instead +of the essence.</p> + +<p>The well-known Ernst Hæckel knows a great deal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span> more about this subject. +In a lecture given at the twenty-fifth convention of natural scientists +in Eisenach, he calls the monistic view of nature "a grand pantheistic +one." The essence of all religion, according to him, consists in the +"conviction of a final and unmistakably common cause of all things." And +he continues: "In the admission that with the present day organization +of our brain, we are unable to penetrate to the final cause of all +things, the critical natural philosophy and dogmatic religion agree." +Whether the professor is one of those natural philosophers who regard +the human mind as too narrow for the understanding of the "unmistakably +(hence somewhat understood) common cause of all things," is not quite +clear to me, nor probably to the famous scientist himself. For he adds: +"The more we progress in the understanding of nature, the more we +approach that unattainable final cause." And further on: "The purest +form of monistic faith culminates in the conviction of the unity of God +and nature."</p> + +<p>Now I ask: If nature, God, and absolute truth are one and the same +thing, have we not learned something about the "final cause of all +things?" What necessity is there in that case for speaking in such an +abjectedly humble tone of human understanding, or to assign nothing but +straw and husks to it, in the language of Hegel?</p> + +<p>You see, then, that Hæckel has a higher estimate of absolute nature than +Noiré who does not care to have anything to do with the nature of the +absolute. But my object at this moment is to convince you that neither +the one nor the other of these two, nor natural science, so-called, is +directly digging in the tunnel which will give us light on the question +of the limits of our understanding and the final cause of things. Our +logic, on the other<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span> hand, which treats the intellect as a part of +nature, cultivates a natural science that includes the mere empirical +natural science in the same way in which the day of twenty-four hours +includes the day of twelve hours and the night.</p> + +<p>Natural science proper deals mainly with tangible things. Light and +sound, the objects of eye and ear, are still included in its studies. +The objects of smell and taste stand on the dividing line. But the +socalled sciences of the mind, such as grammar and politics, political +economy and history, morals and law, and most decidedly logic, are +entirely excluded.</p> + +<p>Such a limitation is well enough, if we remember that it is purely +formal. However, it must not overlook the bridge which leads from +limited nature to universal, infinite, nature.</p> + +<p>The monism of natural science has a far too narrow view of the universe. +When it says that "all is motion," it says just as little or as much as +Solomon with his "all is vain." Everything is crooked and straight, +everything great and small, everything temporal and eternal, everything +truth and life. But nothing is thus said to show the meaning of +distinction in this world, to explain how rest exists in motion, and +sense in nonsense.</p> + +<p>In order to differentiate logically we must know that everything is +everything, that the universe or absolute is its own cause and the final +cause of all things, which embraces all distinctions, even that of +causality and that between matter and mind.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>NINETEENTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>"Philosophy should not try to be edifying," said<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span> Hegel. This means that +religious feeling is far below scientific thought. But there is a +reverse side to this sentence, viz., that thoughts which do not rise to +the edifying interconnection of all things, no matter whether they +remain stuck in some specialty on account of frivolousness or of +narrowmindedness, are far below a wise world philosophy.</p> + +<p>In a former letter I have already emphasized, and I hope to prove it +more convincingly, that the conception of "God," or of the absolute, is +indispensable for a logical world philosophy.</p> + +<p>You know that in my dictionary the gods and divinities of all religions +and denominations are "idols," and justly so, since they are all +manufactured images. Instead of the entire universe, they worship a more +or less unessential part of it.</p> + +<p>The religions show by their idolatry, the sciences frequently by their +little creditable indifference, that they have no conception of the +intellect and its art of reasoning.</p> + +<p>The universe is a familiar conception. Everybody uses it, and there is +apparently little to say about it. But in fact it is the conception of +all conceptions, the being of all beings, the cause of itself which has +no other cause and no other being beside itself. That the whole world is +contained in the universe is so obvious that you may wonder at my waste +of words over such a matter-of-fact thing. But when you consider that +the people have always searched for a world cause outside of the world, +together with a beginning of the world and a transcendental truth, then +you will see that they have not grasped the conception of the world as a +whole, as a universe. And if that is admitted, then the proof that it is +the cause<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span> of all causes, the beginning of all beginnings, and the truth +of all truths, is not such a superfluous undertaking.</p> + +<p>Now you may say that it is presumptuous to try to understand the whole +universe at once. This objection is justified in a way, according to the +interpretation of the words. Still I hope that it will be my +justification to declare that it is not a question of understanding the +universe in detail, but only in general, not each and everything in its +differentiation, but only in a summary way. And it is only the edifying +conception of the universe as a whole which will open for you the door +to the understanding of the human mind, of thought, and the art of using +it. We wish to understand <i>the</i> conception; not this or that conception, +but the whole conception, the conception of the whole. You will no +longer indulge in the superstition that the faculty of thought or +understanding is a thing apart from the world's interconnection. I +presume that you have now learned enough about the art of thought to be +sure not to think of anything without its worldwide interrelation. For +so long as one imagines that a piece of wood or a stone is a thing in +itself, without connection with light and air, with Earth, Moon, and +Sun, he has a very barbarian conception of the things of this world.</p> + +<p>I maintain that the understanding of the human faculty of reason and the +art of its use are inseparable from the world concept. And I want this +understood in the sense, that it is not a mistake to distinguish between +the internal mind and the outside world, but that these are merely +formal distinctions of the essentially indivisible and absolute universe.</p> + +<p>The concept of this true God or divine, because universal, Truth shows +on close analysis that it includes the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span> special truth of the art of +thought as well as all other sciences, and pre-eminently the science of +thought, because this science must not limit itself to any special +thing, but must be world wisdom by its very will and nature.</p> + +<p>To understand the universe, then, means to become aware that this being +of all beings has no beginning, no cause, no truth nor reason outside +and beside itself, but has everything in and by itself. To understand +the universe means to recognize that one is rushing beyond the worldly +infinity into the realm of fantastic transcendentalism and abusing the +intellect, when illogically applying such terms as beginning and end, +cause and effect, being and not being, to the absolute universe. Such an +illogical use of the faculty of thought is well illustrated and rebuked +by the poet who questions and answers:</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<div>"And when my life has passed away,</div> +<div class="i1">What will become of me?</div> +<div>The world has one eternal day,</div> +<div class="i1">'Thereafter' cannot be."</div> +</div></div> + +<p>In order to acquire the universal sense, you will strive to understand +that the universe includes all relative things, while as a whole it +embodies the absolute or the edifying deity.</p> + +<p>If you would become world-wise, you must learn that the things called +opposites and contradictions have a different meaning than is ordinarily +applied to them by the logic of the idolators. They say that God and the +world, body and soul, truth and error, life and death, etc., are +irreconcilable antipodes; that they exclude one another; that they +cannot be brought under the same roof, but<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span> must be kept wide apart by +the laws of eternal reason. But this doctrine of contradiction is merely +narrow dogmatism, which confuses the minds instead of enlightening them. +Certainly, death differs from life, the perishable from the +imperishable, black from white, crooked from straight, large from small. +Who would be silly enough to deny that? But even the apparently most +contradictory and opposite things may be classified under the same +genus, family, or species, as twins in a mother's womb. The same thing +that does not prevent male and female from sitting in the same nest, +does not prevent the most widely different things, in spite of their +separate characters, from being one and the same, from being two pieces +of the same caliber. You are certainly still the same Eugene that you +were as a little baby, and yet you are at the same time another. The +experts in physiology even claim that they can compute how often a man +of sixty has changed his flesh, bones, skin, and hair. Although the old +man is the same individual that he was when first born, yet he never +remained the same.</p> + +<p>You will see by this illustration that all difference is of the same +nature, a general, supreme, universal being, absolute and divine, and +this absolute world being is highly edifying, because it comprises all +other beings and is the Alpha and Omega of all things.</p> + +<p>Is this world-god a mere idea? No, it is the truth and life itself. And +it is very interesting to note that the so-called "ontological proof of +the existence of God" agrees very well with the world truth which I +proclaim in the tabernacle of logic. This proof is originally attributed +to the learned Anselmo of Canterbury. However that may be, it is certain +that Descartes and Spinoza support him with their famous names. They +hold that the "most <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span>perfect being" must necessarily have existence, +because otherwise it would not be the most perfect.</p> + +<p>"I understood very well," writes Descartes in the fourth section of his +"Method of Correct Thought," "that in accepting the hypothesis of a +triangle I would have to accept the fact that the sum of its three +angles is equal to two right angles. But nothing convinced me of the +presence of such a triangle, while I found that my conception of the +most perfect being was as inseparably linked to existence as my +conception of a triangle is to the identity of the sum of its angles +with two right angles.... Hence it is certainly as undeniable as any +geometrical proof can be that God exists as this most perfect being."</p> + +<p>This argument appears to me as clear as daylight and ought to convince +you, not of the existence of a transcendental idol, but of the truth of +the absolute and most perfect world being. If you were to remark that +this perfectness is not so very great, considering its many obvious +imperfections, I should ask you not to split hairs and to recognize with +sane senses that these imperfections of the world belong as logically to +the perfect world as the evil desires belong to virtue which becomes +virtue only by the test of overcoming them. The conception of a +perfection which has no imperfections to overcome would be a silly idea.</p> + +<p>Now in conclusion let me say a few words of apology for continually +interchanging the universe and the concept of the universe. I frequently +speak of the idea of a thing as if it were the thing itself. But see +here! Do you not ask on seeing the portrait of some person unknown to +you: Who is this? And do you not interchange the portrait for the person +itself, without difficulty and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span>misunderstanding? The idea stands in the +same relation to the thing, as the portrait to the person it represents. +This remark is directed against that unsound logic which knows only the +separation of the idea from the thing, of reason from its objects, but +does not grasp the mere formality of such a distinction, does not +appreciate the unity of the world, the edifying and supreme truth, the +truth of the supreme being.</p> + +<p>This letter, my dear Eugene, pleads for edification, but only for that +kind of edification which includes the unedifying, whereby edification +is sobered down. If you would give the name of pantheism to this world +philosophy, you should remember that it is not a sentimental and +exalted, but a common sense pantheism, a deification which has the taste +of the godless.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>TWENTIETH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Dear Eugene:</p> + +<p>Today I am going to present my case with the precision of a +schoolmaster.</p> + +<p>The concept of white cabbage embraces all white cabbage heads that ever +were and ever will be.</p> + +<p>The concept of cabbage embraces red, white, and many other kinds of +cabbage. The concept of vegetable embraces a still wider range. The +organic field is still more comprehensive. And finally the world concept +embraces everything which we know and don't know, the end of which we +cannot conceive, and which therefore is called infinite.</p> + +<p>When we trace our steps backward over the same reasoning, we find at +once that the universal concept is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span> divided into two parts, viz., the +universe and the conception of it. We thus find the world in the concept +and the concept in the world, so that both of these parts are +interconnected, each is the predicate of the other, and whether we turn +the thing to the right or to the left, the concept is in the world and +the world in the concept.</p> + +<p>Now it is true that the concept, or the faculty of understanding, is the +object of our study rather than the world outside of it. The faculty of +understanding, by the way, is nothing but a collective noun for all +concepts, hence simply another name for concept in general. But what I +eternally repeat is this: We cannot make a concept separated from all +the rest of the world the object of our study, because that would be an +empty abstraction which does not take on any meaning until we connect it +with the world, for instance the special concept of cabbage with +sense-perceived cabbage and so forth.</p> + +<p>The concepts of white cabbage, cabbage in general, vegetables, or +plants, etc., are all of them special concepts and at the same time +general concepts. The one and the other is relative. Compared to the +various species it includes, the general concept of cabbage is abstract, +while compared to the general concept of vegetables it is concrete. And +so it is with all concepts. They are abstract and concrete at the same +time. Only the final concept, the world concept, is neither concrete nor +abstract, but absolute. It is the concept of the absolute, which is +indispensable for an understanding of logic.</p> + +<p>We found a while ago that the absolute world concept consisted of two +parts, viz., the concept and the world. In the same way, the chemists +teach us that water consists of two elements, each of which by itself +does not make any water, while their compound makes pure water. But<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span> we +do not need such distant illustrations. My table in its present +composition is something different from what it would be if the same +pieces were put together in some other way and without a plan.</p> + +<p>Therefore the world concept is a far more sublime concept than all the +parts of which it consists. And in order to make this quite clear, I may +honor this compound of the world and its concept by a special name, say +"universe," so as to distinguish it from its component parts.</p> + +<p>Now I declare, without fear of having the word turned in my mouth by any +sophist, that the world embracing the thought, or the universe, is the +absolute which includes everything, while the world and the thought of +it, each by itself, are but classifications or relative things.</p> + +<p>We wish to understand thought, not empty abstract thought, but the +universal world-embracing thought, the thought in a philosophical sense. +This is not mere thought, but living truth, the universe, the absolute, +the supreme being.</p> + +<p>It is with the universe and its parts as it is with a telescope and its +concentric rings. Our intellect is a special ring which gives us a +picture of the whole concentric thing. This photographer, as I have +called it in a former letter, is not the object of our study for its own +sake, nor for the sake of its pictures, but rather for the sake of the +original, of the universe. It is as if somebody were to buy a portrait +of some historically renowned person. No matter how much concerned the +buyer would be with the picture, in the last analysis he is concerned +with that person itself. So it is with the art of understanding the +absolute, with world wisdom, which we study not for the sake of the +wisdom, but of the world itself.</p> + +<p>This lengthy discussion might have been cut short by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span> simply speaking of +the world instead of going to so much trouble on account of the world +concept. But I should then miss my point, which is that the human +intellect is a part of the world, and that the ideological distinction +which separates this intellect from the rest of the world, requires for +the whole an embracing term.</p> + +<p>The absolute concept is the concept of the absolute, of the supreme +being. To it applies all the true, good, and beautiful ever attributed +to God, and it is also that being which lends logic, consistency, and +form to all thought.</p> + +<p>Plato is a philosopher who has thrown a wonderful light on the faculty +of understanding, though he has not fully explained it. In his dialogue +entitled "Gorgias," he makes Socrates say the following: "Does it seem +to you that men want that with which they occupy themselves at any time, +or that for the sake of which they undertake whatever they may be +engaged in? Do those, for instance, who take some medicine prescribed by +the physicians seem to want that which they do ... or to want that for +the sake of which they take medicine, viz., health?... In the same way +those who go on board of ships and trade do not want that which they are +doing; for who would care to go to sea and face danger or conquer +obstacles? That for which they go to sea is that which they want, viz., +to become rich; they are going to sea for the sake of acquiring wealth."</p> + +<p>Plato thus says that the immediate purposes of men are not their real +purposes, but means to an end, means to welfare or for "good." He +therefore continues: "It is in pursuit of good, then, that we go when we +go, because we are after something better, and we stand still for the +sake of the same good."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span></p><p>Now let us go a step farther than Socrates and Plato. Just as men's +actions are truly done, not for the sake of some immediate purpose, but +of the ulterior, of welfare, and just as their socalled ethical actions +are justified only by the general wellbeing, so all things of the world +are not substantiated by their immediate environment, but by the +infinite universe. It is not the seed planted in the soil which is the +cause of the growing plant, as the farmer thinks, but the Earth, the +Sun, the winds, and the weather, in short, the whole of nature, and that +includes the seed germ.</p> + +<p>If we apply this reasoning to our special object, the faculty of +understanding, we find that it is not a narrowly human, nor a +transcendental, but a universal cosmic faculty. According to Homer, the +immortal gods call things by other names than mortal men. But once you +have grasped the concept of the absolute, you understand the language of +the gods, you understand that the intellect by itself is but a minute +particle, while in the interrelation with the universe it is an absolute +and integral part of the universal absolute.</p> + +<p>All things have a dual nature, all of them are limited parts of the +unlimited, the inexhaustible, the unknowable. Just as all things are +small and great, temporal and eternal, so all of them including the +human mind are knowable and unknowable at the same time. We must not +idolize the faculty of thought nor forget its divine nature. Man should +be humble, but without bowing in doglike submission to a transcendental +spirit, and he should be sustained by the sublime consciousness that his +spirit is the true one, the spirit of universal truth.</p> + +<p>Everything can be seen by eyes, including those of a hawk. Just as the +eye is the instrument of vision, so the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> intellect is the instrument of +thought. And just as spectacles and glasses are means of assisting the +eye in seeing, so senses, experience, and experiments are means of +assisting the intellect in understanding. With this equipment the +intellect can assimilate everything in its conceptions. It understands +"all," but "all" only in a relative sense. We understand all, just as we +buy everything for money. We can buy only what is for sale. Reason and +sunshine cannot be valued in money. We can see everything with eyes, and +yet not everything. Sounds and smells cannot be seen. Just as everything +is great and small, so everything is knowable and unknowable, according +to the meaning given to "everything" in the language of men or gods. +That word has the dual meaning of applying to any particle and to the +whole universe. So is the human mind universal, but only a universal +specialty.</p> + +<p>Look at that magnificently colored carnation. You see the whole flower, +and yet you do not see all of it. You do not see its scent nor its +weight. In the human language "whole" means a relative whole, which is +at the same time a part. Every particle of the universe is such a dual +thing. But in the language of the gods, which is spoken by philosophy, +only the absolute universe is whole.</p> + +<p>When the subject under discussion is not the intellect, but some other +part of the world, for instance the eyes, the universal concept of the +absolute is not so important, because the faculty of seeing, like the +faculty of wealth, is in little danger of being metaphysically abused.</p> + +<p>One knows that eyes which can see around a corner, or through a block of +iron, or which can perceive the scent of a carnation, are as meaningless +as a white sorrel. Even though our eyes cannot see the invisible, that +does not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span> prevent them from being a universal instrument which can see +everything, that is everything visible.</p> + +<p>If you understand this, you will also see through the miserable wisdom +of the professors which wallows on its belly in the dust and cries with +the faithful: O Lord, O Lord! similarly to Du Bois-Reymond, who cries +out: <i>Ignorabimus</i>! It is true that the human mind is an ignoramus in +the sense that it is ever learning, because there is inexhaustible +material in nature. There is also something unknowable in every particle +of nature, just as there is something invisible in every carnation. But +the unknowable in the sense used by those ignorant people who cannot +understand the human mind because they have a transcendental monster in +their mind, such a monstrous unknowable exists only in the imagination +of the idolators to whom the true spirit reveals itself as little as the +spirit of truth.</p> + +<p>Just as surely as we know that there cannot be in heaven any knife +without a blade and a handle, nor any black horses that are white, just +so surely do we know that the faculty of understanding can never and +nowhere be the absolute, but must always be a special faculty. The +concept of understanding, like the concept of a knife, is limited to a +definite instrument. There may be all kinds of knives and intellects, +but nothing exists that has escaped from its own skin or from the +limitation of its own particular concept.</p> + +<p>By this standard you may measure the silly thought of those who speak +transcendentally of an unlimited faculty of understanding. They haven't +any right idea of the mind nor of the universe, of the conceivable nor +of the inconceivable, otherwise they would not speak in such a +nonsensical sense of the "Limits of Understanding." In<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span> short, you see +that the relative limitation or absoluteness of reason can only be +understood by means of the concept of the absolute.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>TWENTY-FIRST LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>The proletarian logic of the working class searches after the supreme +being. The working class knows that it must serve but it wants to know +whom to serve. Shall it be an idol or a king? Where, who, what, is the +supreme being to which everything else is subordinate, which brings +system, consistency, logic, into our thought and actions? The next +question is then: By what road do we arrive at its understanding? Any +transcendental revelation being of no use to us, there are only two ways +open: Reason and experience.</p> + +<p>Now it is a mistake of common logic to regard these two roads as +separate, while, in fact, they are one and the same common road, which +by the help of empirical reason or reasonable experience leads us to the +point where we recognize that the supreme being to which everything is +subordinate, is nothing special, not a part or a particle, but the +universe itself with all its parts.</p> + +<p>We take medicine for the sake of health, we make efforts for the sake of +wealth. But neither health nor wealth are an end in themselves. What +good is health to us, when we have nothing to bite? What good are all +the treasures of Crœsus, if health is lacking? Therefore health and +wealth must be combined. Nor is that enough. There is a spirit in us +that drives us farther ahead. There are still other treasures and +requirements, for instance contentment is surely one of them. But the +motive power<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span> of the world spirit is so infinite, that it is not +satisfied until it has everything. Everything, then, in other words the +whole world, that is the true end.</p> + +<p>Socrates and his school, to whom I alluded in the preceding letter, +wandered the way of separate reason for the purpose of finding the +supreme being, the true, the good, the beautiful. The platonic dialogues +paint a very magnificent picture of the truth that neither health nor +wealth, neither bravery nor devotion, are "the greatest good," but that +it is mainly a question of the understanding and use to which mankind +put these things. Accordingly they are good or bad, they are but +relative "goods." Love and faith, honesty and veracity, are good enough, +but not <i>the</i> good; they only partake of the good. What is sought is +that which is under all circumstances absolutely good, true, and +beautiful.</p> + +<p>When Socrates asked his disciples to define the good or reasonable, they +enumerated as a rule a series of good and reasonable specialties, while +the master was continually compelled to instruct them, that his research +was not aimed at those objects. They name important virtues, and he +wants to know what absolute virtue is. They name good things, and he is +looking for <i>the</i> good, for pure goodness, while the good things have +the bad quality of being good only under certain circumstances.</p> + +<p>The Socratic school then finds out that only the understanding or the +intellect can find the circumstances under which we may arrive at the +absolute. Understanding, the human mind, philosophy, is to them the +divine. Thus they arrive at their famous "Know thyself," which in their +language means: Hold introspection and rack your brain. But they did not +succeed in thus using the intellect as an oracle. Nor did the Christian +philosophers of later times<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span> fare any better with that method, when they +changed the title of the object of their studies and substituted God, +Liberty, and Immortality, for the good, the true, and the beautiful.</p> + +<p>In order to get out of the confusion resulting from the many names given +to the object of logic in the course of history, it must be remembered +that pagan as well as Christian research founded their quest for the +absolute on the innate need of understanding the supreme being which was +to be the pivot of all thought and action. Polytheism had to have a +supreme god, no matter whether his name was Zeus or Jupiter. In +consequence of this longing for unity it was very natural that the place +of the many immortals was finally taken by one eternal father of all. +The philosophers are distinguished from the theologians only in so far +as the former seek for the fulcrum of the world more on real than on +imaginary ground.</p> + +<p>After more than two thousand years of mediation by intermediary links, +ancient philosophy has at last been transformed into modern +democratic-proletarian logic which recognizes that the intellect is an +instrument which leads to the supreme being on condition that it does +not rack the brain but goes outside of itself and consciously connects +itself with the world outside. This connection constitutes the supreme +being, the imperishable, eternal, truth, goodness, beauty, and reason. +All other things only "partake of it," to use Platonic language.</p> + +<p>Although the Socratic school were handicapped by many fantastical +attributes, still they were on the road towards true logic, as neither +health nor wealth, nor any other treasure or virtue satisfied them. They +did not care for true phenomena, but for truth itself. But truth is the +universe, and man must understand that this is the only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span> truth, in order +to be able to use his intellect logically, to be reasonable in the +highest and classical sense of this word.</p> + +<p>All the world speaks of logic and logical thought. But when you, my son, +as a thinking man feel the need of getting out of phraseology and +knowing exactly what words should mean, you will hardly find one book +that will give you sufficient light on the subject of logic. The best +book would be the Bible, perhaps. I mean that, when you inquire after +beginning and end, purpose and destination, in short, after that which +would give you and all things a definite support, when you search for +the vortex around which everything revolves, then the Bible does not +tell you about the beginning of this or that part of history, but speaks +of the absolute beginning and end of all history, of the general purpose +and general destination of all existence. That is what I call logic.</p> + +<p>The free thinkers were not satisfied with religious mythology, they +wanted to bring consistency and logic into their brains by their own +studies. Plato and Aristotle have done good work along this line. So +have the subsequent philosophers, Cartesius, Spinoza, Kant. The main +impediment for all of them was the obstinate prejudice that man could +have reason in his own brain. Of course, that is where he has it, but it +is not reasonable reason. The intellect shut up in the skull has not +wisdom in its keeping, as the ancients thought. Wisdom cannot be +acquired by racking your brain. Hegel is right: Reason is in the brain, +it is in all things, "everything is reasonable." I merely repeat, then, +that the universe is the true reason.</p> + +<p>You will not misunderstand the term "racking your brain." I am not an +opponent of introspective thought,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span> but only desire to call your +attention to the fact that it has led to the wrong habit of separating +thought from sight, hearing, feeling, of divesting the mind of the body. +Just as the Christian looked for salvation outside of the flesh, so the +philosophers looked for reason or understanding outside of the +connection with the rest of the world, outside of experience. It was +especially the research after the nature of the intellect which imagined +it had to creep inside of itself.</p> + +<p>When studying the stars, we look at the heavens; when endeavoring to +enrich our knowledge of plants, we gather flowers. But if we attempt to +understand the mind, we must not rack our brain, nor dissect it with an +anatomical knife. We shall indeed find the brain, but not the mind, not +reason.</p> + +<p>And even the brain is not so easily cut out, as many an overzealous +materialist may think. The student of anatomy who pries into the nature +of the brain substance knows very well that this substance is not +contained in the head of this or that fellow, but must be sought in many +heads before the average brain is found, which differs materially from +that of Peter or Paul. This will show that your brain is not only your +own, but also "partakes" of the universal brain, and you will easily +conclude from this how much less your reason is yours alone. Hegel is +right: Not only men, but everything is reasonable.</p> + +<p>True, the most rotten conditions may be defended by such maxims. Hence +the great logician Hegel has the bad name of having been, not a +philosopher of the people, but a royal state philosopher of Prussia. I +will neither blacken nor whitewash him, nor will I overlook that he left +the great cause in a state of mystical obscurity. But I recognize that +even the worst prejudices, the most <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span>perverted morals, laws and +institutions, have their reasonable justification in the times and +conditions of their origin. Such an understanding is immediately +followed by the further insight, that the most reasonable things, +crushed by the wheel of time, will become rotten and unreasonable. In +short, the "good" is not any special institutions, but is found in the +interrelations of the universe. Only the absolute is absolutely good. +And for this reason not only some conservative editors of capitalist +papers, but also the revolutionary authors of the "Communist Manifesto," +are genuine Hegelians.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>TWENTY-SECOND LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>Dear Eugene:</p> + +<p>Socrates teaches: When we walk, it is not walking, when we stand still, +it is not standing which is our purpose. We always have something +ulterior in view, until finally the general welfare is the true end of +our actions, in other words, the "good." And on closer analysis you will +find that your individual welfare, the socalled egoistic good, is not +enough in itself.</p> + +<p>You are not only related to your father, mother, brothers, sisters, +relatives and friends, but also to your community, state, and finally to +the entire population of the globe. Your welfare is dependent on their +welfare, on the welfare of the whole.</p> + +<p>I know very well that the horizon of the everyday capitalist minds does +not reach farther than they can see from the steeple of their church. +They think according to the bad maxim: The shirt is closer to the skin +than the coat. If I had to choose between the shirt and the coat, I +should<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span> prefer to wear the coat without a shirt rather than to run +around in shirt sleeves as the object of universal ridicule. The old man +who plants a tree the fruits of which he will perhaps never see is not +such a capitalist mind, otherwise he would sow seeds that would ripen +during this year's summer.</p> + +<p>At this juncture we must remember that the disciples of Socrates who +looked for the absolute under the name of the "good," were in so far +narrow as they conceived of it only from the moral, specifically human, +standpoint, instead of at the same time considering its cosmic side. +Just as health and wealth belong together, and even these are not +sufficient for human welfare which further requires all social and +political virtues, so the good is not comprised in the interrelations of +all mankind, but passes beyond them and connects itself with the entire +universe. Without the universe man is nothing. He has no eyes without +light, no ears without sound, no morals without physics. Man is not so +much the measure of all things; his more or less intimate connection +with all things is rather the measure of all humanity. Not narrow +morality, but the universe, the supreme being, is the good in the very +highest meaning of the word, is absolute good, right, truth, beauty, and +reason.</p> + +<p>In my preceding letter I spoke of universal reason and said that not +alone men, but also mountains, valleys, forests and fields, and even +fools and knaves were reasonable. Now you are familiar with that +student's song: "What's Coming from the Heights?" and you know that it +makes everything leathern. It speaks of a leathern hill, a leathern +coach-driver, a leathern letter, even father, mother, and sister are of +leather. And I mention this simply for the purpose of showing that I +understand that we cannot call<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span> leather reasonable and reasonable +leathern without brewing a mixture of language which is lacking the mark +by which all reasonable language is distinguished from chattering, +howling, and roaring. Language is only reasonable when it classifies the +world and distinguishes things by different names.</p> + +<p>This is easily understood. But it is more difficult to see that those +who use their intellect without logical training exaggerate distinctions +to such an extent that they ignore the connection between them. All +things are not only distinct, but also connected. But logic so far must +be blamed for not rising to the recognition of the interrelation of all +things. The science of understanding frequently treats reason and +experience as if they were two different things without a common nature. +Therefore, I make it a point to insist that there is no experience +without reason and no reason without experience.</p> + +<p>The linguists who dispute about the question whether reason has +developed after language or language after reason agree that both belong +together. One cannot speak without the use of reason, or talk without +sense, because chattering, or babbling, or whatever one may wish to call +it, are everything else but language. On the other hand, there can be no +reason without naming the things of this world, so as to distinguish +between leather and lady, between reason and experience.</p> + +<p>Of course, the idea of a leathern lady is only a youthful prank. Still +it is calculated to illustrate the dialectic transfusion of all names +and things, of all subjects and predicates. It shows indirectly that +according to common sense thought, reason has its home only in the brain +of man, and that this reason is nevertheless unsound when it does not +know and remember that the individual human<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span> brain is connected with all +brains, and reasons with the whole world, so that only all existence and +the entire universe is reasonable in the highest meaning of the word.</p> + +<p>In order to be able to use your reason in all research and on all +objects in a reasonable manner, you must know that the whole world has +one nature, even leather and your sister. Apparently there is a wide +gulf between these two, and yet in both of them the same forces are +active, just as a black horse has the same horse nature as a white +horse, so that from this point of view your sister is indeed leathern +and leather sisterly. Such statements sound paradoxical enough, yet I +insist on making them in this extreme manner in order to fully reveal +the absolute oneness of all existence, since it is the indispensable +basis of a reasonable understanding of logic.</p> + +<p>Take one of the questions of the day now agitating the public mind, for +a further illustration. Two tendencies are now observed in the most +radical political movement of the nations. One of them is called +propaganda of the deed. It works in Russia and Ireland with dynamite, +powder, and lead. The other recommends the propaganda of the word, of +the vote, and of lawful agitation. And the difference between these two +is not discussed reasonably with a view to ascertaining for whom, when, +where, and why, this or that propaganda is fitting, but every one tries +to present his relative truth with the fanatical sectarianism of those +who claim absolute truth. But if you have grasped the method of getting +at truth, the true method of using your reasoning faculty, you will take +sides for one thing today and for another thing tomorrow, because you +will understand that all roads are leading toward Rome. And if some of +the comrades outvote you occasionally, you will still value these +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span>antagonists as friends, and if you combat them, even in a war to the +knife, this will still be a relative war, a use of the knife with +reason.</p> + +<p>Our proletarian logic is tolerant, not fanatical. This logic does not +want to be reasonable without passion, nor passionate without reason. It +does not abolish the difference between friend and foe, between truth +and falsehood, between reason and nonsense, but calms the fanaticism +which exaggerates those distinctions. Its fundamental maxim is: There is +only one absolute, the universe.</p> + +<p>Remember well that the conception of a universe which has anything +outside or beside itself is still more senseless, if possible, than the +idea of wooden iron. You thus see that all differences have one common +nature which does not permit a transcendentally wide difference between +things or opinions. Because the universe is the supreme being, therefore +all differences, even those of opinion, are unessential.</p> + +<p>For the purpose of studying logic, I entreat you to pay special +attention to the question of essential differences and to test it by +your own experience which will come to you from day to day.</p> + +<p>By means of our logic we learn the language of the gods. In the +dictionary of this language, there is only one essential being, the +universal or supreme being. On the other hand, the language of the +mortals calls every particle a "being," but such being can be relative +beings only.</p> + +<p>Every ear of a cornfield, every hair of an ox skin, and even every one +of their particles, is such a being. But these relative beings are at +the same time unessential attributes. Thus all differences between the +particles of the world are simultaneously essential and unessential; in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span> +other words, they have a relative existence, they merely partake of the +supreme being, compared to whom they are absolutely unessential. Whether +you are a good or a bad man, whether your country is happy or unhappy, +free or oppressed, is very essential to you or me, but compared with the +great absolute whole it is very unessential. In the universal history +the fate of any single nation has no more significance than one hair on +my head, although none of my hairs is there by mere chance and all of +them have been counted. Hence everything is in its particular and +isolated self an unessential thing, but in the general interrelation +everything is a necessary, reasonable, essential and divine particle.</p> + +<p>And now we come to the moral of it all. The human reason, the special +object of logical research, partakes of the nature of the universe. It +is nothing in itself. As an isolated being, it is wholly void and +incapable of producing any understanding or knowledge. Only in +connection, not merely with the material brain, but with the entire +universe, is the intellect capable of existing and acting. It is not the +mere brain which thinks, but the whole man is required for that purpose; +and not man alone, but the total interrelation with the universe is +necessary for the purpose of thinking. Reason itself reveals no truths. +The truths which are revealed to us by means of reason, are revelations +of the general nature of the absolute universe.</p> + +<p>If you think of reason in this way, then, my son, you are thinking +reasonably, are world-wise, logical, and true.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>TWENTY-THIRD LETTER</span><br /> <span class="smaller">(A)</span></h2> + +<p>Although we know that there is no actual beginning, because we are +living in the universe without beginning and end, still we mortals must +always begin at a certain point. So I have begun one of my retrospects +over the history of my subject with Plato, and at another time I have +ended with Hegel, although before and after them there has been much +philosophical thought. These two names are luminant points which throw +their light over everything which is situated between them.</p> + +<p>The errors of our predecessors are just as useful for the purpose of +illustration as their positive achievements. More even: the errors form +the steps of a ladder which leads toward a universal world philosophy. +We clamber up and down on it, perhaps a little irregularly, but nowadays +the crooked roads of an English park are preferred to the straight +French avenues.</p> + +<p>It was an achievement on the part of the Socratic and Platonic schools +to seek the good not in good specialties, but in general good, as a +"pure" or absolute thing, to search for virtue in general instead of +virtues. But it was a mistake which prevented their success, to +exaggerate the distinction between the special and the general. +According to Plato, the black and white horses canter over terrestrial +pavements, but the horse in general, which is neither brown, black, nor +white, neither as slender as a race horse nor as clumsy as a draft +horse, cantered along in the Platonic "idea," in the ideal mists. +Platonic logic lacked what is taught by our present, or if you prefer, +future proletarian logic, viz., the general understanding of the +interrelation of all things, the truth that in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span> spite of their +individual differences all things belong together as individuals of the +same genus. The logical relation between individual and genus stuck +upside down in the brain of the noble Plato.</p> + +<p>He lived in a time which is similar to our own time in that the world of +the gods of the ancients was in the same state of dissolution in which +the Christian religions are today. Plato was as little satisfied with +Grecian mythology as a basis for a reasonable explanation of the world, +as we are with Christian mythology. He wanted to ascend to the universal +truth, not by way of little traditional stories, but by scientific +philosophy. His intention was good, but his weak flesh wrestled with a +task which required thousands of years for its solution.</p> + +<p>A while ago I said that it was that topsy-turvy view of religion as to +the relation between the special and the general which thwarted Plato. +Let me illustrate a little more in detail in what this religious +topsy-turvydom consisted.</p> + +<p>Here we have wind, the waters of the seas, the rays of the sun, chemical +and physical forces, forces of nature. These are specimens of the +universal force of nature. These specimens were regarded with sober +enough eyes by the Greeks, but the general nature sat high upon Olympus +in the form of Zeus. In the same way, the Greeks were familiar with +beautiful things, but beauty was an unapproachable goddess, Aphrodite. +True, the philosopher no longer believed in the gods, but he was +nevertheless still under the influence of transcendental concepts and +thus he mystified the general under the name of the "idea." The Platonic +ideas, like the gods of the heathen, are mystifications of the general. +Plato furthermore shows himself as a descendant of polytheism in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span> this: +Although he clearly distinguished between virtue and virtuous things, +between beauty and beautiful things, between truth and true things, yet +he did not rise to the understanding that all generalities are +amalgamated and unified in the absolute generality, that, in so far, the +good, the true, and the beautiful are identical. The research for the +absolute did not become monistic until Christian monotheism lent a hand. +You will see from this that religion and philosophy form a common +chapter which has the genus of all genera for its object. Faith is +distinguished from science in that the latter no longer bows to the +dictates of imagination and of its organs, the priests, but seeks to +fathom the object of its studies by the exact use of the intellect. A +partial amalgamation of the two is, therefore, quite natural.</p> + +<p>"When a woman is strong, isn't she strong after the same conception and +the same strength? By the term <i>same</i>," says the Platonic Socrates, "I +mean that it makes no difference whether the strength is in the man or +in the woman."</p> + +<p>This quotation, taken from Plato's "Menon," shows that Platonic research +deals with the general, in this case the general concept of strength +which is the <i>same</i> in man or woman, ox or mule, Tom and Jerry. It is +the genus by means of which black and white horses are known as horses, +dogs and monkeys as animals, animals and plants as organisms, and +finally the variations of the whole world as the universe, as the +<i>same</i>. Plato has grasped this <i>same-ness</i> in a limited way, for +instance in regard to strength, reason, virtue, etc. But that in an +infinite sense everything is the <i>same</i>, that things as well as ideas, +bodies, and souls, are the same, remained for radical proletarian logic +to discover.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span></p><p>Hand in hand with the narrow Platonic conception of the general went a +narrow theory of understanding or science, a wrong conception of the +intellect and its functions. The Socratic Plato and the Platonic +Socrates both call understanding by the name of "remembering." By +praising understanding, they teach us that we must not believe the +priests, but study by the help of our senses. But, nevertheless, they +still teach a wrong method, a narrow art of thought.</p> + +<p>In "Menon," the object of study is virtue. Socrates does not exactly +pose as a schoolmaster. He knows that he is called the wisest of men, +but explains that this is so, because others have a conceited opinion of +their wisdom, while his wisdom consists in humbly knowing that he knows +nothing. He does not so much try to teach what virtue is, as to +stimulate his disciples to search for it. But his idea of research is +distorted.</p> + +<p>Among the immortal things which he transcendentally separates from +mortal things, he also classifies the soul, "the immortal soul" which +dies and lives again, and has always lived, knows everything, but must +"remember." Thus his research becomes a cudgeling of the brain, an +introspective speculation. He is not looking for understanding by way of +natural science, through the interrelations of the world, but +speculatively through the inside of the human skull.</p> + +<p>In order to make his theory of memory plain, Socrates in "Menon" calls +an ignorant slave and instructs him in the fundamentals of geometry. He +quickly succeeds in getting from the ignorant fellow, who at first gives +wrong answers, the correct statements by recalling the connections of +thought by clever questioning. He thus demonstrates to his satisfaction +that man has wisdom <i>a priori</i><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span> in his head. But the Socratic-Platonic +art of logic has overlooked that such wisdom requires concepts which are +fixed in memory by internal <i>and</i> external interrelations. The socalled +immortal soul with its innate wisdom has troubled the world a good while +thereafter.</p> + +<p>You must not think that I have a poor opinion of Plato, because I +criticize him in this way. On the contrary, I am highly delighted with +his divine and immortal writings. "Honor to Socrates, honor to Plato, +but still more honor to truth." I also assure you that I am a great +admirer of natural science, but nevertheless I should like to show you +that it indulges in narrow reasoning.</p> + +<p>Robert Mayer, the talented discoverer of the equivalent of heat, has +proven that the force of gravitation, of electricity, of steam, of heat, +etc., represents different modes of expression of the same force, of the +force of nature in general. But no, not quite so! He has ascertained the +numerical relation by which the transformations of one force into +another is accomplished. Thus a logical understanding sees that the +various forces and force in general are distinguished in detail but +identical in general. Darwin in his "Origin of Species" has accomplished +a similar demonstration. But neither Mayer nor Darwin have given that +general expression to world unity which is required by the art of logic. +In order to become an adept at this art, you must rise to the +understanding that all forces are various modes of expression of the one +force, all animals and species transformations of animaldom, that on the +moon a part is smaller than the whole, the same as on earth, that there +as well as here fire burns, and that as surely as you have no doubt of +your being, just as surely is there only one being, the infinite, +divine<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span> universe which has no other gods beside it, but contains all +forces, materials, and transformations.</p> + +<p>This is an innate science which is the cause of all other science, an +innate science which, indeed, must first be awakened in you by "memory."</p> + +<p>Hence our proletarian logic instructs you not to rack your brain by mere +introspection, as the ancient philosophers used to do, not to call the +senses impostors nor to search for truth without eyes, nose, and ears, +nor on the other hand to start out with the idea of certain natural +scientists who try to see, hear, and smell understanding without the +help of the intellect.</p> + +<p>The mistake committed in making a wrong use of the intellect is a "sin +against the holy ghost." The Socratic-Platonic doctrine of memory is one +extreme side of this sin; the other extreme side is represented by that +modern science which tries to find truth by mere external means and +rejects everything as untrue which is not ponderable or tangible.</p> + +<p>As this letter is more intimately connected with the following one than +is ordinarily the case, I take the liberty to unite them under the same +number and mark them with the letters A and B.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>(B)</span></h2> + +<p>We are still the guests of Plato today, my son, and I should like to +show you that this philosopher, in whose time natural science had barely +developed its first downy feathers, already suspected its stubborn +narrowness, although in a certain sense the Platonic logic was no less<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span> +narrow than that of the so-called exact sciences still is to-day, at +least in part. Still Platonic logic had at least the advantage of its +outlook toward the Supreme Being, the absolute, while modern naturalism +is still stuck in the narrow land of specialties. Therefore, I hope that +you will find it interesting to note with me the way in which universal +truth is peeping forth beneath the wings of Platonic speculation.</p> + +<p>"Listen, then, to what I am going to say," remarks Socrates in "Phaedo," +paragraph 45. "In my youth, O Cebes, I had a great interest in natural +science, for it seemed to me a magnificent thing to know the cause of +everything, to learn how everything begins, exists, and passes. A +hundred times I turned to one thing and then to another, reflecting +about these matters by myself. Do animals arise when the hot and the +cold begin to disintegrate, as some claim? Is it the blood, which +enables us to think, or the air or the fire? Or is it none of these, but +rather the brain which produces all perceptions, such as seeing, +hearing, smelling, and does memory and thought then arise by these, and +from thought and memory, when they become adjusted, understanding? And +again, when I considered that all this passes away, and the changes in +heaven and on earth, I finally felt myself poorly qualified for this +whole investigation. Let this be sufficient proof to you: In the things +which formerly were familiar and known to me, I became so doubtful by +this investigation, that I forgot even that which I thought I knew of +many other things, as for instance the question as to how man grows. I +thought that everybody knew that this was caused by eating and drinking. +For when through the food flesh comes to flesh and bone to bone, and in +the same way that which is akin to all the rest of the things which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span> +constitute man, it seemed natural that a small mass would become larger, +and thus a small man grow tall. Does not this appear reasonable to +you?... Consider furthermore this. It seemed enough to me that a man +appeared large when standing by the side of something small, that he +looked taller by one head, and in the same way one horse by the side of +another; or what is still plainer, ten seemed to me more than eight, +because it is more by two, and a thing of two feet longer than that +which measures only one foot, because it exceeds it by one."</p> + +<p>Thereupon Cebes asks: "Well, and what do you think of this now?"</p> + +<p>"I think, by Zeus," says Socrates, "that I am far removed from knowing +the cause of any of these things. I do not even admit that by adding one +to one I obtain two, by such an addition. For I wonder how it is that +each was supposed to be one when by itself, while now, that they have +been added to one another, they have become two. Neither can I convince +myself that if one thing divides a thing in two, that this division is +the cause of it becoming two. For this would be the opposite way of +making two. But when I heard somebody reading something from a book, +written by Anaxagoras as he said, to the effect that it is reason which +had arranged everything and was the cause of everything, I rejoiced at +this cause.... Now if one were to search for the cause of all things, of +their origin, existence and passing, he should only find out what is the +best way to maintain their existence.... Hence it is not meet that man +should care for anything else in regard to himself as well as to all +other things, but for that which is best and most excellent, and then he +would also know the worst about<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span> things, for the understanding of both +is the same. Considering this, I was glad to have found a teacher who +knows about the cause of all things, who suited me, I mean Anaxagoras, +and who would now tell me, first whether the earth is round or flat, and +after telling me that, would also explain to me the necessity for it and +the cause, by pointing to the fact that it was better that it should be +so. And when he claimed that the earth was the center of things, I hoped +he would explain why it was better that it should be the center, and +when he had explained that, I was resolved that I would not ask for any +other cause. In the same way I was going to inquire after the cause of +the sun, the moon, and the other stars, etc.... For I did not believe +that after claiming all this to have been arranged by reason, he would +be dragging in any other cause than that of being best to have it just +so. And this wonderful hope I had to abandon, my friends, when I +continued to read and saw that the man accomplished nothing by reason +and adduces no other reasons relating to the arrangement of things, but +quotes air, and water, and ether, and many other astonishing things.</p> + +<p>"And it seemed that it was as if some one said Socrates accomplishes all +things by reason, and then, when he began to enumerate the cause of +everything I do, were to say first that I am sitting here because my +body consists of bones and sinews, and that the bones are hard and are +differentiated by joints, and the sinews so constructed that they can be +extended and shortened, etc. And further, if he tried to name the causes +of our discussion, he would refer to other similar things, such as +sound, and air and hearing, and a thousand and one other things, quite +neglecting the true cause, viz., that it suited<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> the Athenians better to +condemn me, and that it suited me for this reason to stay here and +seemed more just to me to bear patiently the punishment which they have +ordered. For I believe that my bones and sinews would have gone long ago +to the dogs or been carried to the Boeotians, had I not considered it +more just and beautiful to atone to the state than to flee.</p> + +<p>"It is very illogical, then, to name such causes. But if any one were to +say that I should not be able to do what I please without these things +(sinews and bones, and whatever else I may have), he would be right. But +it would be a very thoughtless contention to say that these things are +the cause of my actions, instead of my free choice to do the best. That +would show an inability to distinguish the fact that in all things the +cause is one thing, and another thing that without which the cause could +not be cause. And it seems to me that it is precisely this which some +call by a wrong name in considering it as the cause. For this reason +some put a whirlwind from heaven round the earth and others rest it on +air as they would a wide trough on a footstool."</p> + +<p>So far Socrates, whose words I ask you to read repeatedly and carefully, +though they may look a little old-fashioned. This quotation is somewhat +lengthy, but I thought best not to cut it too short and to present it in +its main outlines.</p> + +<p>This quotation says on the whole the same thing which I have said in my +proceeding letters. According to Socrates, all our thoughts and actions +have a wider and more general purpose, which he calls the "good," so +that we even do evil for the sake of good. A crime always aims at some +particular good. Evil is misunderstood good. Applied to natural science, +this means<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span> that it misunderstands the interrelation of all its fine +discoveries. And this charge is true even to-day. Although the natural +interrelations are more and more recognized from day to day, still the +understanding of the absolute inter-connection continues to be +overlooked, especially that of the intellect with material things, or of +the ideal with the real. Natural science teaches after the manner of the +gospel of John: Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob. But it forgets +to teach that all these genitors were not genitors in the last analysis, +but begotten by old Jehovah himself. The uncultivated condition of +Grecian natural sciences may have been ground enough for Socrates to +think little of it. We, on the other hand, have to-day good reasons for +thinking highly of natural science, and for this very reason I take +pains to illustrate by its prominent example in what respect the neglect +of the universal world thought results in a narrow conception of the +world.</p> + +<p>We may well rejoice more lastingly than Socrates when natural science +teaches us how it happens that everything has its origin, life, and end, +because the knowledge of natural science has been far more enriched by +modern experiences than it was at the time of Anaxagoras. Nevertheless +you must not stop learning furthermore from logic that all growing, +coming into existence, living, and passing away is but a change of form. +The causes of natural science are indeed not causes, but effects of the +universe. They are reasonable effects of reason in so far as the latter +is not an isolated part, but interconnected with the universe. To +repeat: Our intellect is not ours, it does not belong to man, but it +together with man belongs to the universe. Reason and the world, the +true, the good, and the beautiful, together<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> with Godhood which you +shall not idolize but understand in the spirit and in the world, in +truth and in reality, are all one thing, one being, and everywhere +eternal and the <i>same</i>.</p> + +<p>Socrates shows that he has as yet only a narrow anthropomorphic, not a +cosmic conception of the "best and good" and of reason. He was dominated +by the prejudice which still holds sway over the uncultured believers in +God, that reason is older than all the rest of the world, that it is the +ruling and antecedent creator. Our conception of logic, on the other +hand, teaches that the spirit which we have in our brain is but the +emanation of the world spirit. And this latter must not be conceived as +a nebulous world monster, not as an enormous spirit, but as the actual +universe, which in spite of all change and all variation is eternally +one, true, good, reasonable, real, and supreme.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>TWENTY-FOURTH LETTER</span></h2> + +<p>The art of thought, my son, for which we are striving, is not pure and +abstract, but connected with practice, a practical theory, a theoretical +practice. It is not a separate and isolated thing, not a "thing in +itself," but is connected with all things; it has a universal +interrelation. Hence our logic, as we have repeatedly stated, is a +philosophy, world wisdom, and metaphysics. I include the latter, because +our logic excludes nothing, not even the transcendental. It teaches that +everything, even transcendentalism, if practiced with consciousness and +the necessary moderation, and at the right time and place,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span> for instance +at the carnival, is a reasonable and sublime pleasure.</p> + +<p>All prominent philosophers were explorers and users of the same art of +thought, of living, of viewing the world, although many of them retired +to the solitude and were ascetics. Can the world be understood in a +hermitage? Yes and no. After you have been traveling and seeing many +lands, it is well to retire and classify the impressions received, and +thus to reflect about a true philosophy of life. In this way, secluded +thought, in the relative meaning of the word, that is, in connection +with observation and experience, with enjoyment and life, is a veritable +savior. Body and soul belong together, and if they are separated, it +must be remembered that such a separation is a mere matter of form, that +they are in fact one thing, attributes of the same being which is +infinitely great, so great that all other beings are but its fringes.</p> + +<p>The art of distinction distinguishes the infinite infinitely with the +consciousness that in reality everything is interrelated without +distinction and is one.</p> + +<p>This truth, and thus absolute truth, is ignored by laymen and +professional authorities alike. The thousand year dualism between body +and soul has been especially instrumental in preventing the +understanding of the universal interrelation. The whole history of +philosophy is but a wrestling with the dualism between matter and mind. +It was only by degrees that it moved towards its monistic goal.</p> + +<p>After the brilliant triple star Socrates-Plato-Aristotle was +extinguished, the philosophical sky was covered with dark clouds. The +heathens stepped from the stage, and Christianity and the dogmas of its +church <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span>predominated the logic of men, until at last a new scientific +light arose in the beginning of modern times. It was especially +Cartesius and Spinoza who were most brilliant among the early thinkers +that emancipated their minds slowly and under great difficulties. +Spinoza, of Jewish descent, is especially interesting in his fight +against narrowmindedness and for a universal philosophy. He wrote an +"Essay on the Improvement of the Intellect and on the Way by which it is +best led to a true Understanding of Things." He, as well as we, was +looking for the best way, the true way, the way of truth. He, as well as +we, seeks to study and practice the fundamentals of the art of thought.</p> + +<p>He begins: "After experience has taught me that everything which the +ordinary life offers is vain, and I have seen that everything which I +feared is only good or bad in so far as the mind is moved by it, I +finally resolved to investigate whether there is any true good—whether +there is anything the discovery of which will forever secure continuous +and supreme joy. What is most generally found in life, and what mankind +regards as the highest good, may be reduced to three things, viz., +wealth, honor, and sensual pleasure."</p> + +<p>After Spinoza has then uncovered the shadowy side and the vanity of +these popular ideals, he calls them "unsafe by their very nature," while +he is looking for "permanent good," which is "insecure only as regards +its possession, but not in its nature."</p> + +<p>But how is that to be found?</p> + +<p>"Here I shall say shortly what I mean by true good, and what is at the +same time the highest good. In order to grasp this fully, we must +remember that good or bad are only relative terms, and thus the same +thing may be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> called good or bad according to its relations, or on the +other hand perfect or imperfect."</p> + +<p>Spinoza, forestalling the object of his research, discovers that the +true, supreme and permanent good is the "understanding of the unity" of +the soul with the entire nature. "This then," he says, "is the goal +which I am coveting."</p> + +<p>"To this end, we must study morals, philosophy, and the education of +boys, and combine with this study the entire science of medicine, +because health materially assists us in reaching our ideal. Neither must +mechanics be neglected, because many difficult things are made easy by +art. Above all we must strive to find a way for the improvement of the +intellect."</p> + +<p>Here we have once more arrived at the pivotal point of our subject, my +dear disciple. Who or what is the intellect, whence does it come from, +whither does it lead? Answer: It is a light which does not shine within +itself, but throws rays outside of itself for the illumination of the +world. For this reason the science which has the faculty of +understanding for its object, though a limited, is at the same time a +universal science, a universal world wisdom.</p> + +<p>But isn't it a contradiction that a special science wants to be general +world wisdom? Is not general wisdom that which comprises all knowledge, +all special science? Must I not know everything in order to be world +wise? And how can any single brain assume to acquire all knowledge, to +know everything? Answer: It is impossible for you to know everything; +but you can rise to the understanding that your special wisdom and that +of all others is a part of universal wisdom and form together a relative +whole which in connection with all the rest of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span> world constitute the +absolute being. This understanding represents pure logic and is +universal understanding, understanding of the universal being.</p> + +<p>Do not be troubled by the fact that Socrates was looking for virtue and +the "best," or Spinoza for permanent and supreme joy, and that their +wisdom aimed only at the narrow circle of human life, without rising to +the cosmic interrelation. The means and the instrument by the help of +which they strive for their ideal is the intellect. It is quite natural +that intellectual research led to the study of the intellect, to the +"improvement of the intellect," to the "critique of reason," to "logic," +and finally to the understanding that the faculty of thought is an +inseparable part of the monistic whole, of the absolute which lends +support, consistency, reason and sense to all thought.</p> + +<p>On his exploring tour for the improvement of the intellect, Spinoza +picks up a remark which seems to me worthy of closer attention. He says +in so many words: If we are looking for a way to improve the intellect, +is it not necessary for the purpose of finding such a way to first +improve the intellect, in order to be at all able to discern the way +which leads to an improvement of the intellect, and so on without end? +"We must have a hammer to forge the iron, and in order to have a hammer, +it must be made; but for this purpose we need another hammer and other +instruments, and so forth without end. In this way it must not be proven +that men have no power to forge iron. Men have rather accomplished only +the easiest tasks with difficulty and imperfectly by the help of the +natural tools of their bodies. Gradually they accomplished more +difficult things with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span> less labor and better. And thus they slowly +proceeded from the simplest tasks to the instruments."</p> + +<p>I admire in this process of reasoning the brilliant understanding that +the hammer is not such a limited instrument as the untrained human brain +thinks. It thinks that a hammer is not a pair of tongs. But Spinoza says +that the bare fist is a hammer when used for striking, much more a stone +or a club. A pair of tongs used to drive a nail becomes a hammer; a +hammer which I use to draw a nail becomes a pair of tongs. Fist or club, +sense or nonsense, all is one. In other words, things are separated, but +never so far as the fantastical dreamers think. Just as hammer and +tongs, saw and file, are parts of the class of tools, so all things are +parts of the one and absolute universe. Recognize, then, dear Eugene, +that the relative and the absolute are not separated by such a +bridgeless chasm, that the one should be praised to the skies and the +other damned to the lowest pit. Understand that everything is +dialectically interrelated, that the infinite, eternal, divine, can live +only in the finite, special things, and that on the other hand the parts +of the world can exist only in the absolute. In short, raise your +conception to the universal conception, and at the same time, understand +the supreme being in all its parts instead of idolizing it.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>The Positive Outcome of Philosophy</span></h2> + +<p class="bold">BY JOSEPH DIETZGEN</p> + +<p class="bold">Translated by Ernest Untermann</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span></p> + +<p class="bold2">THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY</p> + +<h2><span>PREFACE</span></h2> + +<p>As a father cares for his child, so an author cares for his product. I +may be able to give a little additional zest to the contents of this +work by adding an explanation how I came to write it.</p> + +<p>Although born by my mother in 1828, I did not enter my own world until +"the mad year," 1848. I was learning the trade of my father in my +paternal shop, when I saw in the "Kölnische Zeitung," how the people of +Berlin had overcome the King of Prussia and conquered "liberty." This +"liberty" now became the first object of my musings. The parties of that +period, the disturbers and howlers, made a great deal of fuss about it. +But the more I heard about it, and hence became enthusiastic over it, +the duller, hazier and more indistinct became the meaning of it, so that +it turned things upside down in my head. The psychologists have long +known that enthusiasm for a cause and understanding of that cause are +two different things. Mark, for instance, the zeal displayed by Catholic +peasants in singing their mass, although they do not understand a word +of Latin.</p> + +<p>What is meant by political freedom? What is its beginning, what its end? +Where and how are we to find a positive and definite knowledge of it? In +the parties of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span> the middle, the so-called "constitutionals," as well as +among the bourgeois democrats, there was no end of dissension. Nothing +could be learned there. Among them, as among the Protestants, every one +was a chosen interpreter of the gospel.</p> + +<p>However, the papers of the extremes, that is, the "Neue Preussische" +with its "For God, King and Fatherland," and the "Neue Rheinische," the +organ of "Democracy," gave me a hint that liberty had some sort of a +material basis. During the following years, my life in rural +surroundings gave me leisure to follow this scent. On one side, it was +the work of men like Gerlach, Stahl, and Leo, on the other of Marx and +Engels, that gave me a foothold.</p> + +<p>Though the communists and the ultra-conservatives came to widely +different conclusions, still I felt and read between the lines that both +of these extreme parties based their demands on one fundamental premise. +They knew what they wanted; they both had a definite beginning and end. +And that permitted the assumption that both had a common philosophy. The +Prussian landholding aristocracy based the cross, which they wore as an +emblem on their hats, on the historically acquired royal military power +and on the positive divine revelation of the Bible printed in black and +supported by the ecclesiastical police force dressed in black. And the +Communist point of departure was quite as positive, unquestionable and +material, viz., the growing supremacy of the mass of the people with +their proletarian interests based on the historically acquired +productive power of the working class. The spirit of both of these +hostile camps was descending from the results of philosophy, primarily +from the Hegelian school. Both of them were armed with the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> +philosophical achievements of the century, which they had not only +mechanically assimilated, but rather continually provided with fresh +food like a living being.</p> + +<p>In the beginning of the fifties, a pamphlet was published by one of the +cross bearers, Stahl, entitled "Against Bunsen." This Bunsen was at the +time the Prussian Embassador at London, a crony of the ruling Prussian +King Frederic William IV., and, apart from this, nothing but a liberal +muddle head who was interested in political and religious tolerance.</p> + +<p>The pamphlet of the cross bearer Stahl attacked this tolerance and +demonstrated valiantly that tolerance could be preached only by a +muddled free lance to whom religion and fatherland were indifferent +conceptions. Religious faith, so far as it is truth, so he said, has a +true power and can transpose mountains. Such a faith could not be +tolerant and indifferent, but must push its propaganda with fire and sword.</p> + +<p>In the same way in which Stahl defended the interests of the landed +aristocracy, the philosopher Feuerbach spoke in the interest of the +infidel revolutionaries. Both of them were to that extent in accord with +the "Communist Manifesto" that they no longer regarded Liberty as a +phantasmagoria, but as a being of flesh and blood.</p> + +<p>When I had realized this, it dawned upon me that any conception +elucidated by philosophy, in this case the idea of liberty, had this +peculiarity: Liberty is as yet an abstract idea. In order to become +real, it must assume a concrete, special form.</p> + +<p>Political freedom as a glittering generality is a thing of no reality. +Under such fantastic ideal the constitutionalists or the liberals +conceal the liberty of the money bag. Under these circumstances, they +are quite right in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span> demanding German unity with Prussia as a head, or a +republic with a grand duke at the top. The landed aristocracy also are +right in demanding the liberty of that aristocracy. And the Communists +are still more right, for they demand the liberty that will guarantee +bread and butter for the mass of the people and will fully set free all +the forces of production.</p> + +<p>From this experience and conclusion it follows that true liberty and the +highest right are composed of individual liberties and rights, that are +opposed to one another without being inconceivable. It is easy to +proceed from this premise to the rule of thought laid down in this work, +that the brain need not make any excursions into the transcendental in +order to find his way through the contradictions of the real world.</p> + +<p>In this way I passed from politics to philosophy, and from philosophy to +the theory of positive knowledge which I presented to the public in 1869 +in my little work "The Nature of Human Brain Work." Further studies on +the general powers of understanding have added to my special knowledge +of this subject, so that I am now enabled to fill the old wine into a +new bottle instead of publishing a new edition of my old work.</p> + +<p>The science which I present in the following pages is very limited in +its circumference, but all the better founded and important in its +consequences. This, I trust, will be accepted as a sufficient excuse for +the recurring repetition of the same statements in a different form. My +remaining confined to a single point requires no apology. What is left +undone by one, is bequeathed as a problem to others.</p> + +<p>There might be some dispute over the question, how much of this positive +achievement of philosophy is due<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> to the author and to his predecessors. +But that is an interminable task of small concern. No matter who hoisted +the calf out of the well, so long as it is out. Anyway, this whole work +treats of the concatenation and interdependence of things, and this also +throws a bright light on the question of mine and thine.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">J. Dietzgen</span>.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Chicago</span>, March 30, 1887.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span></p> + +<p class="bold2">THE POSITIVE OUTCOME<br />OF PHILOSOPHY</p> + +<h2><span>I</span> <span class="smaller">POSITIVE KNOWLEDGE AS A SPECIAL OBJECT</span></h2> + +<p>That which we call science nowadays was known to our ancestors by a name +which then sounded very respectable and distinguished, but which has in +the meantime acquired a somewhat ludicrous taste, the name of wisdom. +This gradual transition of wisdom into science is a positive achievement +of philosophy which well deserves our attention.</p> + +<p>The term "ancestors" is very indefinite. It comprises people who lived +more than three thousand years ago as well as those who died less than a +hundred years ago. And a wise man was still respected a hundred years +ago, while to-day that title always implies a little ridicule and disrespect.</p> + +<p>The wisdom of our ancestors is so old that it has not even a date. It +reaches back, the same as the origin of language, to the period when man +developed from the animal world. But if we call a wise man, in the +language of our day, a philosopher, then it is at once plain that wisdom +is descended from the ancient Greeks. This wonderful nation produced the +first philosophers.</p> + +<p>Whether this term indicates a man who loves wisdom or one who loves +science, is of little moment to-day, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span> there was no such distinction +in ancient times. We remember that it was entirely undecided among the +Greeks whether a mathematician, an astronomer, a physician, an orator, +or a student of the art of living deserved the title of a philosopher. +These professions were not clearly distinguished. They were wrapped up +one in another like the embryo in a mother's womb. While humanity had +still little knowledge, a man might well be wise. But to-day it is +necessary to specialize, to devote one's self to a special science, +because the field of exploration has grown so extended. The philosopher +of to-day is no longer a wise man, but a specialist.</p> + +<p>The stars are the objects of astronomy, the animals of zoology, the +plants of botany. Who and what are now the objects of philosophy? This +may be explained in one word to an expert. But if we try to give +information to the general public, the matter becomes difficult.</p> + +<p>What do I know about the shoe industry, if I know that it produces +shoes? I know something general about it, but I have no knowledge of its +details. It is impossible to give sufficient information on the details +of shoemaking to any one in a few words, not even to an educated person. +Neither is it possible to explain the object of philosophy in such a +way. The object may be stated, but not explained, for it cannot be made +plain and brought home to the understanding in a few words.</p> + +<p>That is the word, understanding. The understanding is the object of philosophy.</p> + +<p>We must at once call the reader's attention to the ambiguity of this +term. Understanding, knowledge, is the object of all science. That is +nothing special. Every study seeks to enlighten the brain. But +philosophy wishes to be a science and does not desire to relapse into<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> +antiquity by becoming universal wisdom. To say that understanding is the +object of philosophy is to give merely the same reply which Thales, +Pythagoras, or Plato would have given. Has proud philosophy gained +nothing since? What is its positive achievement? That is the question.</p> + +<p>Philosophy to-day still has understanding for its object. But it is no +longer indefinite understanding which tries to embrace everything, but +rather the understanding of the method by which knowledge may be gained. +Philosophy now wishes to learn <i>how it comes to pass</i> that other objects +may be illumined by the mind. To speak plainly, it is no longer the +understanding which seeks to know everything as it did at the time of +Socrates that is now the special study of philosophy, but rather the +mind itself, its method and the perceptive powers of thought and +understanding.</p> + +<p>If this were all, if the world's wise men had done nothing but to at +last find the object of philosophy, it would be a very scanty +achievement. No, the harvest is much richer. The present day theory of +human understanding is a real science, which well deserves to be +popularized. Our ancestors sought understanding after the manner of +Socrates and Plato in the entrails of the human brain, while at the same +time despising the experience outside of it. They hoped to find truth by +cudgeling their brain. "Honor to Socrates, honor to Plato; but still +more honor to Truth!"</p> + +<p>Aristotle showed a little more interest in the outer world. With the +downfall of the old social stage the old philosophy naturally succumbed +also. It did not revive until a few hundred years ago, at the beginning +of modern times.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span></p><p>A short while ago, Shakespeare attracted much attention, when some one +claimed to have discovered that it was not he who wrote those famous +dramas and tragedies, but his contemporary Bacon of Verulam, Lord +Chancellor of England. Whether Shakespeare keeps his laurels or not, +Bacon's name is still great enough, for it is generally accepted as the +mile stone of modern philosophy.</p> + +<p>One might say that philosophy was asleep from the time of Aristotle to +that of Bacon. At least it produced no remarkable results during that +period, and it cannot be denied that philosophy from ancient Greek days +to the present times moved in a mystic fog which detracted much from its +study in the eyes of educated and honest men. But the philosophers +themselves are less to blame for this than the concealment of the +object. Only after the entire social development has furthered the human +understanding to the point where it can benefit from the light spread by +the various branches of science, does philosophy become conscious of its +special object and able to separate its positive achievements from the +rubbish of the past.</p> + +<p>If we compare the old Grecian wisdom with modern science, the outcome of +philosophy looks insignificant by the side of the achievements of +science. Nevertheless, great as the value of the aggregate product of +science may be, it is composed of individual values, and every one of +its parts is worthy of consideration. The method, the way, the form, in +which the mind arrives at its practical creations is one of these parts. +The mind, on its march from ignorance to its present wealth has not only +gathered a treasury of knowledge, but also improved its methods, so that +the further constructive work of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span>science proceeds faster now. Who will +fail to recognize that material production has accumulated a treasure in +the methods by which it produces to-day, which is by no means of less +value than the accumulated national wealth itself? The positive outcome +of philosophy bears the same relation to the wealth of science.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>II</span> <span class="smaller">THE POWER OF COGNITION IS KIN TO THE UNIVERSE</span></h2> + +<p>The way of Truth, or the true way, is not musing, but the conscious +connection of our thoughts with the actual life—that is the +quintessence of the teachings of philosophy produced by evolution. But +this is not everything. If I know that a tanner makes leather, I do not +by any means know everything he does, because there still remains the +manner and method of his manipulations. In the same way, the doctrine of +the interrelation of mind and matter, which is the product of the entire +social development, requires a better and more specific substantiation, +so that its true quality as a positive achievement of philosophy, or of +the theory of knowledge may be better understood. If the matter is +represented in this bare manner—it does, indeed, resemble the egg of +Columbus—one does not see why so much should be made of it. But if we +enter into the details that have produced the result, we do not only +learn to better respect the prominent philosophers, but their works also +reveal a rich mine of special and comprehensive knowledge.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span></p><p>All sciences are closely related, for advances in one branch are +preparations for advances in others. Astronomy is unthinkable without +mathematics and optics. Every science has begun unscientifically, and in +the course of the accumulation of individual knowledge a more or less +exact systematic organization of this knowledge has resulted. No science +has as yet arrived at completeness and perfectness. We have as yet more +the results of experimental effort than accomplished perfection. +Philosophy is no better off in this respect. We rather believe we are +doing something to overcome a deeply rooted prejudice when we state that +philosophy is no worse off than other sciences, so long as we succeed in +ascertaining that it has accomplished positive results and in pointing +them out.</p> + +<p>It is a positive accomplishment of philosophy that mankind to-day has a +clear and unequivocal conception of the necessity of the division of +labor as a means of being successful. Our present day philosophers no +longer make excursions into dreamland in the quest of the True, the +Beautiful, and the Good, as did the ancients. The True, the Beautiful, +and the Good, are nevertheless the objects of all modern science, only, +thanks to evolution, these objects are now sought by special means. And +the clear consciousness of this condition of things is a philosophical +consciousness.</p> + +<p>It is a part of the theory of understanding to know that in order to +accomplish something one must limit oneself to a specialty. That is a +fundamental demand for the use of common sense, which the primitive +musing brain did not realize. Thinking must be done with wide open and +active eyes, with alert senses, not with closed eyes or fixed gaze. This +is a part of logic. We do not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span> deny that men have always done their +thinking by means of the senses. We only claim that they did not do so +from principle, otherwise the old complaint about the unreliability of +the senses as a means of knowledge would not have lived so long. Neither +would the inner man have been so excessively overestimated, nor abstract +thought so much celebrated, just as if it alone were the child of nobler +birth. I do not wish to detract from the merits of the power of +abstraction, but I simply claim that the clay of which Adam was made was +no less divine than the spiritual breath that gave him his life. Nor do +I mean that it is due to philosophy alone that mankind learned not to +strain "understanding" in abstract vaporings, but instead to introduce +the division of labor and to take up the various specialties with open +senses. The technique of understanding is the product of the entire +movement of civilization, and as such a positive accomplishment of +philosophy. The total process of evolution has placed the philosophers +on their feet.</p> + +<p>There is no doubt that up to the present time, philosophy partook more +of the character of a desire and love of science than of world wisdom. +This wisdom does not amount to much, even to-day. This is plainly +demonstrated by the dissensions of the educated and uneducated on all +questions pertaining to wisdom of life. Socrates in the market of +Athens, and Plato in his dialogues, have probably said better things +about the questions: "What is virtue? What is justice? What is moral and +reasonable?" than the professors of philosophy would know how to say +to-day. Kant has well said that the unanimity of the experts is the test +by which one may decide what is a scientific fact and what is mere +dispute. From this it is easy to judge that wisdom of life is still<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span> in +a bad way and will have to wait for its scientific transformation.</p> + +<p>We declared understanding itself to be the special object of philosophy +and shall now attempt to outline the results so far obtained by it.</p> + +<p>One of the first requirements for the education of the object of +philosophy is to recall its various names. The understanding, or the +power of knowledge, is also called intelligence, intellect, mind, +spirit, reason, power of cognition, of conception, of distinction, of +imagination, of judgment, and of drawing conclusions. The attempt has +frequently been made to analyze understanding or to dissect it into its +various parts and to specialize them by the help of those names. +Especially logic knows how to give particular explanations of what is +imagination, a conception, a judgment, and a conclusion. It has even +divided these sections into subsections, so that a trained logician +might reproach me with being ignorant for applying various names to +intelligence, because only the common people confound those names and +use them as synonyms, while science has long used them in their proper +order for designating special parts of intelligence.</p> + +<p>To such a reproach, I answer that Aristotle and the subsequent formal +logicians have made some pretty pointed observations and excellent +arrangements in this field. But these proved to be premature or +inadequate, because the observations on which the ancient intellectual +explorers relied were too scanty. This scantiness of the observations +made in regard to intelligence, and by intelligence, has kept the human +race in the mazes of intellectual bondage and by this mysticism has even +prevented the most advanced minds from penetrating deeper into this +obscure question. The history of philosophy is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span> not the history of a +useless struggle, but yet a history of a hard struggle with the +question: What is, what does, of what parts consists, and of what nature +is understanding, intelligence, reason, intellect, etc.? So long as this +question is unsettled, the questioner is entitled to dispense with any +and all sections and subsections of the intellectual object and to +regard the various names as synonymous.</p> + +<p>The main accomplishment in the solution of this question is the ever +clearer and preciser knowledge of our days that the nature of the human +intellect is of the same kind, genus or quality as the whole of nature. +In order that the theory of understanding may be able to elucidate this +point, it must divest itself, more or less, of the character of a +speciality and occupy itself with all of nature, assume the character of +cosmogony.</p> + +<p>It is principally an achievement of philosophy that we now know +definitely and down to the minutest detail that the human mind is a +definite and limited part of the unlimited universe.</p> + +<p>Just as a piece of oak wood has the twofold quality of partaking not +alone, with its oaken nature, of the general nature of wood, but also of +the unlimited generality of all nature, so is the intellect a limited +specialty, which has the quality of being universal as a part of the +universe and of being conscious of its own and of all universality. The +boundless universal cosmic nature is embodied in the intellect, in the +animal as well as in man, the same as it is embodied in the oak wood, in +all other wood, in all matter and force. The worldly monistic nature +which is mortal and immortal, limited and unlimited, special and +general, all in one, is found in everything, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span>everything is found in +nature—understanding or the power of knowledge is no exception.</p> + +<p>It is this twofold nature of the universe, this being at the same time +limited and unlimited, this reflection of its eternal essence and +eternal truth in changing phenomena, which has rendered its +understanding very difficult for the human mind. This intricate quality +has been represented by religion in the fantastic picture of two worlds, +separating the temporal from the eternal, the limited from the +unlimited, too unreasonably far. But nowadays the indestructibility of +matter and the eternity of material forces is a matter of fact accepted +by natural science.</p> + +<p>The positive outcome of philosophy, then, is the knowledge of the +monistic way in which the seeming duality of the universe is active in +the human understanding.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>III</span> <span class="smaller">AS TO HOW THE INTELLECT IS LIMITED AND UNLIMITED</span></h2> + +<p>Understanding taught by experience no longer muses about universal +nature, but acquires a knowledge of it by special studies. By degrees +philosophy, first unconsciously and lately clearly and plainly, has +taken up the problem of ascertaining the limits of understanding.</p> + +<p>This philosophical problem first assumed the form of polemics. It became +opposed to the religious dogma which represented the human mind as a +small, subservient, limited and restricted emanation of the unlimited +divine spirit. This terrestrial emanation was regarded<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span> as too limited +to understand and find its divine source. The study of the limits of the +understanding has now emancipated itself from this dogma, but not to +such an extent that there is no longer any mysterious obscurity floating +around the understanding and intelligence, and especially around the +question whether the human mind can penetrate only into some things +while others will remain in the unscrutable darkness of faith and +intuition, or whether it may penetrate boldly and without hindrance into +the infinity of the physical and chemical universe.</p> + +<p>We here desire to claim as a positive outcome of philosophy that it has +at last acquired the clear and exact knowledge that a socalled infinite +spirit, in the religious sense, is a fantastic, unscientific conception. +In the natural sense of the word, the human powers of understanding are +universal and yet in spite of their universality they are, quite +naturally, limited. The human understanding has its limits, why should +it not? Only drop the illusion that a dark mystery is concealed beyond +these limits.</p> + +<p>The understanding is a force among others, and everything that is +located alongside of other things is limited and restricted by them. We +can understand everything, but we can also touch, see, hear, feel, and +taste everything. We also have the power of moving about, and other +qualities. One art limits another, and yet each is unlimited in its own +field. The various human powers belong together and constitute together +the human wealth. Be careful not to separate the power of understanding +from other natural powers. In a certain sense it must be separated, +because it is the special object of our study, but it must always be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> +remembered that such a separation has only a theoretical value.</p> + +<p>Just as our power of vision can see everything, so our understanding can +grasp everything.</p> + +<p>Let us look a little closer at this statement.</p> + +<p>How can we see everything? Not from any single standpoint. In that sense +our powers of vision are limited. But what is not visible in the +distance, becomes so on approaching nearer to it. What one eye cannot +see, that of others can, and what is invisible to the naked eye, is +revealed by the telescope and microscope. Nevertheless the vision +remains limited, even though it may be the sharpest, and armed with the +best artificial means. Even if we regard all the eyes of the past and +future generations of humanity as organs of the universal human vision, +this vision still remains limited. Nevertheless, no one will complain +about the limits of human power, because we cannot see sounds with our +eyes or hear the light with our ears.</p> + +<p>The understanding of man is limited, just as his vision is. The eye can +look through a glass pane, but not through a plate of iron. Yet no one +will call any eye limited, because it cannot see through a block of +metal. These drastic examples are very opportune, because there are +certain wise men who reflectively lay their finger on their nose and +call attention to the limits of our intellect in that sense, just as if +the knowledge gained on earth by scientific means were only a nominal, +not a real, understanding and knowing. The human intellect is thus +degraded to the position of a substitute of some "higher" intellect +which is not discovered, but must be "believed" to exist in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> the small +head of a fairy or in the large head of an almighty being above the +clouds. Would any one try to make us believe that there is a great and +almighty eye that can look through blocks of metal the same as through +glass? The idea of a spiritual organ with an infinite understanding is +just as senseless. An unlimited single thing, an unlimited single being, +is impossible, unless we regard the whole world, the world without +beginning and without end, the infinite world, as a unit. Within this +world everything is subject to change, but nothing can go beyond its +genus without losing its name and character. There are various kinds of +fire, but none that does not burn, none which has not the general nature +of fire. Neither is there any water without the general nature of water, +nor a spirit that is elevated above the general nature of spirits. In +our days of clear conceptions the tendency toward the transcendental is +mere fantastic vaporing.</p> + +<p>It is not alone unscientific, it is fantastic, to think even afar of a +higher power of thought or understanding than the human one. One might +as well think of a higher horse which runs with eight, sixteen, or +sixteen hundred legs and carries away his rider in a higher air at a +higher speed than that of the wind or the light.</p> + +<p>It is a part of the achievements of philosophy, of correct methods of +thought, of the art of thought or dialectics, to know that we must use +all conceptions, without exception, in a limited, rational, commonplace +way, unless we wish to stray into that region where there are mountains +without valleys and where every theory of understanding loses its mind.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span></p><p>It is true that all things, including our understanding, may be +improved. Everything develops, why should not our intellects do so? At +the same time we may know <i>a priori</i> that our intellect must remain +limited, of course not limited in the sense of the dunce, just as our +eyes will never become so sharp that they can see through metal blocks. +Every individual has its limited brain, but humanity, so the positive +achievements of philosophy have shown, has an intellect of as universal +a power as any that can be imagined, required, or found, in heaven or on earth.</p> + +<p>We maintain that philosophy so far has acquired something positive, has +left us a legacy, and that this consists in a clear revelation of the +method of using our intellect in order to produce excellent pictures of +nature and its phenomena.</p> + +<p>For the purpose of making the reader familiar with this method, with +this legacy of philosophy, we must enter more closely into the essence +of the instrument which lifts all the treasures of science. We are +especially interested in the question, whether it is a finite or +infinite and universal instrument with which we go fishing for truth. It +is the custom to belittle the faculties of the human understanding, in +order to keep it under the supremacy of the divine metaphysical augurs. +It is quite easy to see, therefore, that the question of the essence of +our powers of understanding is intimately related to, or even identical +with, the question of how we may be permitted to use them, whether they +should be used only for the investigation of the limited, finite, or +also for the study of the eternal, infinite, and immeasurable.</p> + +<p>We object here to the tendency of belittling the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> human mind. About a +hundred years ago, the philosopher Kant found it appropriate to draw the +sword against those who played fast and loose with the human mind, +against the socalled metaphysicians. They had made a miraculous thing of +the instrument of thought, a matter for effusions. In order to be able +clearly to state the outcome of philosophy, we must acquaint the reader +with the fact that this instrument of thought, in its way, is one of the +best and most magnificent things in existence, but that, at the same +time, it is bound to its general kind or genus. The human understanding +perceives quite perfectly, but we must not have an exaggerated idea of +its perfection, any more than we would of a perfect eye or ear, that, be +they ever so perfect, cannot see the grass grow or hear the fleas cough.</p> + +<p>God is a spirit, says the bible, and God is infinite. If he is a spirit, +an intellect, such as man, then it would be fair to assume that man's +intellect is also infinite, or even is the divine spirit itself which +has taken up its abode in the human brains. People cudgeled their brains +with such confused conceptions, so long as the object of modern +philosophy, the intellect, was a mystery. Now it is recognized as a +finite, natural phenomenon, an energy or a force which is not the +infinite, though it is, like all other matter and force, a part of the +infinite, eternal, immeasurable.</p> + +<p>Leaving all religious notions aside, the infinite, immeasurable, +eternal, is not personal, but objective; it is no longer referred to as +a masculine, but as a neuter. It may be called by many names, such as +the universe, the cosmos, or the world. In order to understand clearly +that the spirit which we have in our minds, is a finite part of the +world, we must get a little better<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span> acquainted with this infinite, +eternal world. Our physical world cannot have any other world beside it, +because it is the universe. Within the universe there are many worlds, +which all of them make out the cosmos, which has neither a beginning nor +an end in time and space. The cosmos reaches across all time and space, +"in heaven and on earth, and everywhere."</p> + +<p>But how do I know what I state in such an offhand manner? Well, the +knowledge of the universe, of the infinite, is given to us partly by +birth and partly by experience. This knowledge is inherent in man just +as language is, viz., in the germ, and experience gives us a proof of +the infinite in a negative way, for we never learn the beginning or the +end of anything. On the contrary, experience has shown us positively +that all socalled beginnings and ends are only interconnections of the +infinite, immeasurable, inexhaustible, and unfathomable universe. +Compared to the wealth of the cosmos the intellect is only a poor +fellow. However, this does not prevent it from being the most perfect +instrument for clearly and plainly reflecting the finite phenomena of +the infinite universe.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>IV</span> <span class="smaller">THE UNIVERSALITY OF NATURE</span></h2> + +<p>The positive outcome of philosophy concerns itself with specifying the +nature of the human mind. It shows that this special nature of mind does +not occupy an exceptional position, but belongs with the whole of nature +in the same organization. In order to show<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span> this, philosophy must not +discuss the human mind as if it were something separate from nature, but +must rather deal with its general nature. And since this general nature +of our intellect is the same of which every other thing partakes, it +follows that nature in general, or the universe, or the cosmos, all of +which is the same thing, are an indispensable object in the special +study of the nature of the human mind.</p> + +<p>We have already said that the experienced understanding of the present +day no longer muses over nature in general in the fantastic and mere +introspective manner as of old, but rather seeks to obtain a knowledge +of it by special study. In so doing we do not forget that the study of +specialties at the same time throws a light on the general relation of +things, of which every species is but a part.</p> + +<p>Since the human mind is a part of the whole of nature, viz., that part +which has the desire and longing to obtain a conception of all the other +parts, and more than that, to understand the interconnection between the +parts and the undivided and infinite whole, it is easy to comprehend the +fact that the philosophers have occupied themselves so much with the +most real and most perfect being. Whether this being was called God, or +substance, or idea, or the absolute, or nature, or matter, all of these +terms cannot prevent us today from approaching infinite nature with +sober senses, in order to gain, by its help, a lifelike picture of the +human intellect, which is not a mystical being, but a reasonable part of +the same nature that lives reasonably and intelligibly in all other +parts of nature.</p> + +<p>The inexperienced powers of distinction which did not understand their +function, magnified the difference<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span> between the infinite and its finite +phenomena out of all proportion. Now that we have made the philosophical +experience that the general as well as the special nature of the human +intellect admits only of moderate and bounded distinctions, we arrive at +the conclusion that the immeasurable, all-perfect, and eternal being is +composed of finite, commensurable, imperfect, and transient things in +such a way that the universal being combines in itself all perfections +as well as all imperfections. This contradictory universal being, this +nature to which all contradictory attributes may be simultaneously +assigned, in a certain sense puts the old rule to shame that you cannot +at the same time affirm and deny the predicate of any subject.</p> + +<p>Nature comprises all and is all. Reason and unreason, being and not +being, all these contradictions are contained in it. Outside of it there +are no affirmations and no contradictions. Since the human mind +eternally moves in affirmations and negations, in order to obtain a +clear picture of things, it has an interminable task in understanding +the interminable object.</p> + +<p>Our brain is supposed to solve the contradictions of nature. If it knows +enough about itself to realize that it is not an exception from general +nature, but a natural part of the same whole—although it calls itself +"spirit"—then it also knows and must know that its clearness can differ +but moderately from the general confusion, that the solution of the +problem cannot differ materially from the problem itself. The +contradictions are solved only by reasonable differentiation, only by +the science of understanding which shows that extravagant differences +are nothing but extravagant<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> speculations. The human understanding +inclines to exaggerations in its untrained state, and it is a relic of +untrained habits to differentiate in an absolute manner the spiritual +from the rest of nature, to make a too extravagant distinction between +it and the physical body. It is the merit of philosophy to have given us +a clear doctrine of the use of the intellect, and this doctrine +culminates in the rule not to make exaggerated, but only graduated +distinctions. For this purpose it is necessary to realize that there is +only one being and that all other socalled beings are but minor +expressions of the same general being, which we designate by the name of +nature or universe.</p> + +<p>In consequence of the human bent to exaggeration, the human +understanding has been regarded as a being of a different nature from +that of natural beings which exist outside of the intellect. But it must +be remembered that every part of nature is "another" individual piece of +it, and, furthermore, that every other and different part is really +nothing different but a uniform piece of the same general nature. The +thing is mutual: The general nature exists only in its many individual +parts, and these in their turn exist only in, with and by the general +cosmic being.</p> + +<p>Nature which is divided by the human understanding into East and West, +South and North, and into a hundred thousand other named parts, is yet +an undivided whole of which we may say with certainty that it has as +many innumerable beginnings and ends as it is without beginning and end, +as it is the infinite itself. It is well known that there is nothing new +under the sun. Nothing is created, nothing disappears, and yet there is +a continuous change.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span></p><p>The brain of man has a right and a left side, a top and a bottom, a +front and a back part, an interior and an exterior. And the innermost of +the brain again has two sides or qualities, a physical and a spiritual. +They are so little divided that the term brain has two meanings, +designating now the physical brain, now its mental functions. In +speaking here exclusively of the mind, we tacitly assume its inseparable +connection with the physical body.</p> + +<p>The material brain and the mental brain are two brains that together +make one. Thus two, three, four, or innumerable things are yet one +thing. The human understanding was endowed by nature with the faculty of +embracing the infinite variety of the universe as a unit, as a single +conception. The unity of nature is as true and real as its multiplicity. +To say that many are one and one many is not nonsense, but simply a +truism which becomes clear when understanding the positive outcome of +philosophy.</p> + +<p>A reader unfamiliar with this our product of philosophy still follows +the habit of regarding the physical body as something different from the +mind. A distinction between these two is quite justified, but this +manner of classification must not be overdone. The reader should +remember that he also is in the habit of regarding such heterogeneous +things as axes, scissors, and knives as children of the same family by +referring to them collectively as cutting tools. The outcome of +philosophy now demands that we apply the same method to the object of +our special study, the human brain. We must henceforth eschew all +effervescent flights of imagination and regard the powers of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">[Pg 353]</a></span> human +mind as children of the same family as all other physical powers, whose +immortal mother is the universe.</p> + +<p>The universe is infinite not alone in the matter of time and space, but +also in that of the variety of its products. The human brains which it +produces are likewise internally and externally of an infinite +differentiation, although this does not prevent them from forming a +common group uniform in its way.</p> + +<p>To group the phenomena of nature, the children of the universe, in such +a way by classes, families, and species that they may be easily grasped, +that is the task of the science of understanding, the work and +constitution of the perceiving human brain. To understand simply means +to obtain a general and at the same time a detailed view of the +processes and products of the universe by grouping them in a fashion +similar to that used for the vegetable kingdom by botany and for the +animal kingdom by zoology. It goes without argument that we, the limited +children of the unlimited universe, are able to solve this problem only +in a limited way.</p> + +<p>However, this natural physical limitation of the human understanding +must not be confounded with the abject misery which slavish and +sentimental metaphysics attribute to it. The infinite universe is by no +means niggardly in its gifts to the human understanding. It opens its +whole depths to our intellectual understanding and perception. Our +intellect is a part of the inexhaustible universe and therefore partakes +of its inexhaustible nature. That part of nature which is known by the +name of intellect is limited only to the extent that the part is smaller +than the whole.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">[Pg 354]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>V</span> <span class="smaller">THE UNDERSTANDING AS A PART OF THE HUMAN SOUL</span></h2> + +<p>The human intellect or understanding, the special object of all +philosophy, is a part, and in our case the most prominent part, of the +human soul. Gustav Theodore Fechner, a forgotten star on the literary +firmament, posed the question of the soul in his time and attempted to +answer it. In so doing he clothed the result of past philosophies in a +peculiar garb which looked fantastic enough at first sight. He regards +the outcome of philosophy merely as an individual product and he is so +full of veneration for the ancient terms, such as <i>immortal souls</i>, +<i>God</i>, <i>Christianity</i>, that he does not care to dismiss them, no matter +how roughly he handles their essence.</p> + +<p>Fechner extends the possession of a soul to human beings, animals, +plants, stones, planets; in short, to the whole world.</p> + +<p>This is simply saying that the human soul is of the same nature as all +the rest of the world, or vice versa, that all natural things have the +same nature as the human soul. Not only animals, but also stones and +planets have something analogous to our human soul.</p> + +<p>Fechner is not fantastic at bottom, and yet how fantastical it sounds to +hear him say: "I went out walking on a spring morning. The fields were +green, the birds were singing, the dew sparkled, the smoke rose toward +the clouds. Here and there a human being stirred. A glory of light was +diffused over it all. It was only a small piece of the Earth. It was +only<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">[Pg 355]</a></span> a short moment of its existence. And yet, as I took all this in +with an ever-widening understanding, I felt not alone the beauty, but +also the truth that it is an angel who is thus passing through the sky +with his rich, fresh and blooming nature, his living face upturned to +the heavens. And I asked myself how it is that man can ever become so +stunted that he sees nothing but a dry clod in the Earth and looks for +angels above and beyond it, never finding them anywhere. But people call +this sentimental dreaming."</p> + +<p>"The Earth is a globe, and what it is besides may be found in the +museums of natural history." Thus writes Fechner.</p> + +<p>Now there can be no objection to comparing the beautiful Earth and the +stars around it with angels, any more than there can be to the lover +calling his sweetheart an angel of God. The Earth, the Moon, and the +stars are according to Fechner's terminology angelic beings with souls; +mediators between man and God. He knows very well that this is nothing +but a matter of analogy and terminology, he is as atheistic as the most +atheistic, but his fondness and reverence for the traditional terms lead +him to attribute a soul to the material world and to give to this great +and infinite soul a divine name.</p> + +<p>If we waive this religious hobby of Fechner's, there still remains his +peculiarity of using words and names in a symbolical sense. It is +nothing but the old poetic way of calling a sweetheart's eyes heavenly +stars and the stars of the blue heavens lovely eyes, which makes a snowy +hill of a woman's breast, a zephyr of the wind, a nymph of a spring of +water, and an erlking of an old willow tree. This poetic license has +filled the whole<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">[Pg 356]</a></span> world with good and evil spirits, mermaids, fairies, +elfs, and goblins.</p> + +<p>This is not a bad way of speaking, so long as we keep in mind, like a +poet, what we are doing and that we are consciously using symbolical +terms. Fechner does this only to a certain extent. A little spleen +remains in his brain. It is this spleen which I intend to deal with in +the proper light, in order to thus demonstrate the outcome of +philosophy.</p> + +<p>Fechner is not aware that his universal soul reflects only one half of +our present outcome of philosophical study. The other half, which +renders an understanding of the whole possible, consists in the +perception that not only are all material things endowed with a soul, +but that all souls, including the human ones, are ordinary things.</p> + +<p>Philosophy has not only deified the world and inspired it with a soul, +but has also secularized God and the souls. This is the whole truth, and +each by itself is only a part.</p> + +<p>Apart from psychology, which treats of the individual human soul, there +has lately arisen a "psychology of nations" which regards the individual +souls as parts of the universal human soul, as individual pieces +constituting an aggregate soul which, decidedly, is more than a simple +aggregation of numbers. The soul of the psychology of nations has the +same relation to the individual souls that modern political economy has +to private economy. Prosperity in general is a different question and +deals with different matters than the amassing of wealth for your +individual pocket. Granted that the national soul is essentially +different from the individual soul, what would be the nature of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">[Pg 357]</a></span> the +universal animal soul, including the souls of lions, tigers, flies, +elephants, mice, etc.? If we now extend the generalization farther and +include in our psychology the vegetable and the mineral kingdom, the +various world bodies, our solar system, and finally the whole universe, +what else could that signify than a mere rhetorical climax?</p> + +<p>Mere generalization is one-sided and leads to fantastical dreams. By +this method one can transform anything into everything. It is necessary +to supplement generalization by specialization. We wish to have the +elephants separated from the fleas, the mice from the lice, at the same +time never forgetting the unity of the special and the general. This sin +of omission has often been committed by the zoologists in the museums +and the botanists in their plant collections, and philosophical +investigators of the soul like Fechner have drifted into the other +extreme of generalization without specialization.</p> + +<p>The positive outcome of philosophy, then, in its abstract outline, is at +present the doctrine that the general must be conceived in its relation +to its special forms, and these forms in their universal +interconnection, in their qualities as parts of nature in general. True, +such an abstract outline reveals very little. In order to grasp its +concrete significance, we must penetrate into its details, into the +special aspects of this doctrine.</p> + +<p>The title of "Critique of Reason," which Kant gave to his special study, +is at the same time a fitting term for all philosophical research. +Reason, the essential part of the human soul, raises the critique of +reason,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">[Pg 358]</a></span> the science of philosophy, to the position of the most +essential part of psychology.</p> + +<p>But why do we call this the most essential part? Is not the material +world and its understanding as essential as reason, as intellect, which +bends to the task of exploring this world? Surely, it is, and I do not +use the word essential in this sense. I call the intellect the most +essential part of the soul, and the soul the most essential part of the +world, only in so far as these parts are the special condition of all +scientific study and because the investigation of the general nature of +scientific study is my special object and purpose. Whether I endeavor to +explain the general nature of scientific study, whether I investigate +the intellect or the theory of understanding, it all amounts to the same +thing.</p> + +<p>Let us approach our task once more from the side of Fechner's universal +soul. With his extravagant animation of all things, with his plant, +stone, and star souls, he can help us to prove that the general nature +of that particle of soul which is called reason, intellect, spirit, or +understanding, is not so extraordinarily different from the general +nature of stones or trees as the old time idealists and materialists +were wont to think.</p> + +<p>As I said before, Fechner is a poet, and a poet sees similarities which +a matter-of-fact brain cannot perceive. But at the same time we must +admit that the matter of fact brain which cannot see anything but mere +distinctions is a very poor brain. The philosophers before me have +taught me that a good brain sees the similarities and the differences at +the same time and knows how to discriminate between them. A sober poetry +and the combination of poetic qualities<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">[Pg 359]</a></span> with a comprehensive and +universal levelheadedness and discrimination, these are the marks of a +good head. Still the poorest as well as the most talented brains partake +of the general brain nature, which consists in the understanding that +like and unlike, general and special, are interrelated. The one is never +without the other, but both are always together.</p> + +<p>If the distinction between men and stones is so trifling that a talented +brain like Fechner's can justly speak of them both as being animated, +surely the difference between the body and soul cannot be so great that +there is not the least similarity and community between them. However, +this escaped Fechner's notice. Is not the air or the scent of flowers an +ethereal body?</p> + +<p>Reason is also called understanding, and it is a positive achievement of +philosophy to have arrived at the knowledge that this understanding does +not admit of any exaggerated distinctions. In other words, all things +are so closely related that a good poet may transform anything into +everything. Can natural science do as much? Ah, the gentlemen of that +science are also progressing well. They transform dry substance into +liquid, and liquid into gas; they change gravity into heat and heat into +mechanical power. And they are doing this without forgetting to +discriminate, as happened to our Fechner.</p> + +<p>It is not enough to know that the body has a soul and the soul a body, +not enough to know that everything has a soul. It is also necessary to +discriminate between the peculiarities and details of the human, animal, +plant, and other souls, taking care not to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">[Pg 360]</a></span>exaggerate their differences +to the extreme of making them senseless.</p> + +<p>We do not intend to follow this theory of a universal soul any further. +Fechner declares himself that "it must be admitted at the outset that +the whole question of a soul is a question of faith."... "Analogy is +not a convincing proof."... "We can no more prove the existence of a +soul than we can disprove it."</p> + +<p>However, from the time of Cartesius it has been an accepted fact in the +world of philosophers that the consciousness of the human soul is the +best proof of its existence. The most positive science in the world is +the empirical self-observation of the thinking soul. This subject is the +most conspicuous object imaginable, and it is the positive outcome of +philosophy to have given an excellent description of the life and +actions of this soul particle called consciousness or understanding.</p> + +<p>If the understanding is a part of the human soul and this soul an +evident and positive part of the universal life, then, clearly, +everything partaking of this life, such as pieces of wood and stones +scattered around, is related to this soul. Individual human souls, +national souls, animal souls, pieces of wood, lumps of stone, world +bodies, are all children of the same common universal nature. But there +are so many children that they must be classified into orders, classes, +families, etc., in order to know them apart. On account of their +likeness, the souls belong together in one class and the bodies in +another, and each requires more detailed classification. Thus we finally +arrive at the class of human souls forming a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">[Pg 361]</a></span>department by themselves, +because they all have a common general character.</p> + +<p>The manufacturers know that the work of ten laborers produces more and +is of a different quality than the work of a single laborer multiplied +by ten. Likewise the general human soul, or any national soul, expresses +itself differently from the sum of the various individual souls +composing it. More even, the very individual soul differs at various +times and places, so that the individual soul is as manifold as any +national soul.</p> + +<p>"Has the plant a soul? Has the earth a soul? Have they a soul analogous +to that of man? That is the question." Thus asks Fechner.</p> + +<p>Just as my soul of today has something analogous to my soul of +yesterday, so it has also with the soul of my brother, and finally with +the souls of animals, plants, stones, etc., proving that everything is +more or less analogous. A herd of sheep is analogous to yonder flock of +small, white clouds in the sky, and a poet has the license to call those +small clouds little sheep. In the same way Fechner is justified in +propounding his theory of a universal soul.</p> + +<p>Is it not necessary, however, to make a distinction between poetry and +truth? My brother's soul and my own are souls in the true sense of the +word, but the souls of stones—they are only so figuratively speaking.</p> + +<p>At this point I want to call the reader's attention to the fact that we +must not pass lightly over the valuation of the difference between the +true and the figurative sense of a word.</p> + +<p>Words are names which do not, and cannot, have any other function than +that of symbolic illustration.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">[Pg 362]</a></span> My soul, yours, or any other, are only +in conception the same souls.</p> + +<p>When I say that John Flathead has the same soul as you and I, my +intention is simply to indicate that he has something which is common to +you and me and to all men. His soul is made in the image of our souls. +But where shall we draw the line in this comparison of images? What is +not an image in the abstract, and what is more than an image in the +concrete?</p> + +<p>Truth and fiction are not totally different. The poet speaks the truth +and true understanding partakes largely of the nature of poetry.</p> + +<p>Philosophy has truly perceived the nature of the soul, and especially +that part of it with which we are dealing, that is, reason or +understanding. This instrument has the function of furnishing to our +head a picture of the processes of the world outside of it, to describe +everything that is around us and to analyze the universe, itself a +phenomenon, with all its phenomena as a process of infinite variety in +time and space.</p> + +<p>If this could be accomplished with the theory of a universal soul, then +Fechner would be the greatest philosopher that ever was. But he lacks +the understanding that the intellect which has to combine all things +within a general wrapper, must also consider the other side of the +question, that of specification. That, of course, cannot be achieved by +any philosopher. It must be the work of all science, and philosophy as a +doctrine of science must acknowledge that.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">[Pg 363]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>VI</span> <span class="smaller">CONSCIOUSNESS IS ENDOWED WITH THE FACULTY OF KNOWING AS WELL AS WITH THE +FEELING OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF ALL NATURE</span></h2> + +<p>In the historical course of philosophy, there has been much discussion +as to where our knowledge comes from, whether any of it, or how much of +it, is innate, and how much acquired by experience. Without any innate +faculties no knowledge could have been gathered with any amount of +experience, and without any experience even the best faculties would +remain barren. The results of science in all departments are due to the +interaction of subject and object.</p> + +<p>There could be no subjective faculty of vision unless there were +something objective to be seen. The possession of a faculty of vision +carries with it the practical performance of seeing. One cannot have the +faculty of vision without seeing things. Of course, the two may be +separated, but only in theory, not in practice, and this theoretical +separation must be accompanied by the recollection that the separated +faculty is only a conception derived from the practical function. +Faculty and function are combined and belong together.</p> + +<p>Man does not acquire consciousness, the faculty of understanding, until +he knows something, and his power grows with the performance of this function.</p> + +<p>The reader will remember that we have mentioned as an achievement of +philosophy the understanding of the fact that we must not make any +exaggerated distinctions. Hence we must not make any such <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">[Pg 364]</a></span>distinction +between the innate faculty of understanding and the acquired knowledge.</p> + +<p>It is an established universal rule that the human intellect knows of no +absolute separation of any two things, although it is free to separate +the universe into its parts for the purpose of understanding.</p> + +<p>Now, if I claim that the conception of the universe is innate in us, the +reader must not conclude that I believe in the old prejudice of the +human intellect being like a receptacle filled with ideas of the true, +the beautiful, the good, and so forth. No, the intellect can create its +ideas and concepts only by self-production and the world around it must +furnish the materials for this purpose. But such a production +presupposes an innate faculty. Consciousness, the knowledge of being, +must be present, before any special knowledge can be acquired. +Consciousness signifies the knowledge of being. It means having at least +a faint inkling of the fact that being is <i>The</i> universal idea. Being is +everything; it is the essence of everything. Without it there cannot be +anything, because it is the universe, the infinite.</p> + +<p>Consciousness is in itself the consciousness of the infinite. The innate +consciousness of man is the knowledge of infinite existence. When I know +that I exist, then I know myself as a part of existence. That this +existence, this world, of which I am but a particle with all others, +must be an infinite world, does indeed not dawn on me until I begin to +analyze the conception of being with an experienced instrument of +thought. The reader, in undertaking this work with such an instrument, +will at once discover that the conception of the infinite is innate to +his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">[Pg 365]</a></span>consciousness,<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> and that no faculty of conception is possible +without this conception. The faculty of conception, understanding, +thought, means above all the faculty of grasping the universal concept. +The intellect cannot have any conception which is not more or less +clearly or faintly based on the concept of the universe. <i>Cogito, ergo +sum.</i> I think, therefore, I am. Whatever I imagine is there, at least in +imagination. Of course, the imagined and the real thing are different, +yet this difference does not exceed the limits of the universal +existence. Creatures of fiction and real creatures are not so radically +different that they would not all of them fit into the general gender of +being. The manner, the form of being, are different. Goblins exist in +fiction and Polish Jews exist in a tangible form, but they both exist. +The general existence comprises the body and the soul, fiction and +truth, goblins and Polish Jews.</p> + +<p>It is no more inconceivable that the faculty of universal understanding +should be innate in us than that circles come into this world round, two +mountains have a valley between them, water is liquid and fire burns. +All things have a certain composition in themselves, they are born with +it. Does that require any explanation? The flowers which gradually grow +on plants, the powers and wisdom that grow in men in the course of +years, are no more easily explained than such innate faculties, and the +latter are no more wonderful than those acquired later. The best +explanation cannot deprive the wonders of nature of their natural +marvelousness. It is a mistake to assume that the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">[Pg 366]</a></span> faculty of +explanation which is located in the human brain, is a destroyer of the +belief in natural marvels. Philosophy which makes this faculty of +explanation and the nature of its explanations the object of its special +study gives us a new and much better understanding of this old miracle +maker. It destroys the belief in metaphysical miracles by showing that +physical nature is so universal that it absolutely excludes every other +form of existence than the natural one from this world of wonders.</p> + +<p>I and many of my readers find in our brains the actual consciousness +that this general nature of which the intellect is a part is an infinite +nature. I call this consciousness innate, although it is acquired. The +point that I wish to impress on the reader is that the difference +generally made between innate and acquired qualities is not so +extraordinary that the innate need not to be acquired and the acquired +does not presuppose something innate. The one contradicts the other only +in those brains who do not understand the positive outcome of +philosophy. Such thinkers do not know how to make reasonable +distinctions and exaggerate in consequence. They have not grasped the +conciliation of all differences and contradictions in universal nature +by which all contradictions are solved.</p> + +<p>Philosophy has endeavored to understand the intellect. In demonstrating +the positive outcome of philosophy, we must explain that philosophical +understanding as well as any other does not rise out of the isolated +faculty of understanding, but out of the universal nature. The womb of +our knowledge and understanding must not be sought in the human brain, +but in all nature which is not only called the universe,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">[Pg 367]</a></span> but is +actually universal. In order to prove this latter assertion, I refer to +the fact that this conception, this consciousness of the infinite in the +developed intellect, is in a manner innate. If the reader wishes to +object to my indiscriminately mixing the innate faculty with the +acquired understanding, I beg him to consider that I am endeavoring to +prove that any and all distinction made by the intellect refers in +reality to the inseparable parts of the one undivided universe. From +this it follows that the admired and mysterious intellect is not a +miracle, or at least no greater marvel than any other part of the +general marvel which is identical with the infinitely wonderful general nature.</p> + +<p>Some people love to represent consciousness as something supernatural, +to draw an unduly sharp line of separation between thinking and being, +thought and reality. But philosophy, which occupies itself particularly +with consciousness, has ascertained that such a sharp contrast is +unwarranted, not in harmony with the reality, and not a faithful +likeness of reality and truth.</p> + +<p>In order to understand what philosophy has accomplished in the way of +insight into the function of the discriminating intellect, we must never +lose sight of the fact that there is only a moderate distinction of +degree between purely imaginary things and socalled real things.</p> + +<p>Neither the natural condition of our faculty of thought, nor the +universality of general nature, permit of an exaggerated distinction +between the reality of creations of imagination and of really tangible +things. At the same time the exigencies of science demand clear +illustrations and so we must distinguish between<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">[Pg 368]</a></span> these two kinds of +reality. It is true that in common usage the mere thought and the purely +imaginary things are set apart from nature and reality as something +different and antagonistic. Yet the rules of language heretofore in +vogue cannot prevent the spread of the additional knowledge that the +universe, or general nature, is so unlimited that it can establish a +conciliation between these limited antagonisms. The cat and the dog, for +instance, are pronounced enemies, but nevertheless zoology recognizes +them as being legitimate domestic companions.</p> + +<p>Human consciousness is, in the first place, individual. Every human +individual has its own. But the peculiarity of my consciousness, of +yours, and that of others, is that of being not alone the consciousness +of the individual in question, but also the general consciousness of the +universe, at least that is its possibility and mission. Not every +individual is conscious of the universality of general nature, otherwise +there would be none of that distracting dualism. Nor would there be any +necessity for volumes and volumes of philosophy to teach us that a +limit, a thing, or a world outside of the universal, is a nonsensical +idea, an idea which is contrary to sense and reason. We may well say, +for this reason, that our consciousness, our intellect, is only in a +manner of speaking our own, while it is in fact a consciousness, an +intellect belonging to universal nature.</p> + +<p>It can no more be denied that our consciousness is an attribute of the +infinite universe than it can be denied that the sun, the moon and the +stars are. Since this intellectual faculty belongs to the infinite and +is its child, we must not wonder that this universal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">[Pg 369]</a></span> faculty of thought +is born with the capability of grasping the conception of a universe. +And whoever does no longer wonder at this, must find it explicable, must +realize that the fact of universal consciousness is thus explained.</p> + +<p>To explain the mysterious may be regarded as the whole function of +understanding, of intellect. If we succeed in divesting of its mysteries +the fact that the concept of an infinite universe is found in the +limited human mind, we have then explained this fact itself and +substantiated our contention that the things around us are explained by +their accurate reflection in our brain.</p> + +<p>We summarize the nature of consciousness, its actions, life, and aims in +these words: It is the science of infinite being; it seeks to obtain an +accurate conception of this being and to explain its marvelousness. But +we have by no means exhausted its life and aims in these words. With all +the power of language, we can convey but a vague idea of the immensity +of the object under discussion. Whoever desires to know more about it, +must work for his own progress by observation and study. This much may +be safely said: This question is no more mysterious than any other part +of the general mystery.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> E. g., given with his consciousness.—<span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>VII</span> <span class="smaller">THE RELATIONSHIP OR IDENTITY OF SPIRIT AND NATURE</span></h2> + +<p>"There is a natural law of analogy which explains that all things +belonging to the universe are members of the same family, that they are +related to one another<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">[Pg 370]</a></span> by bonds which permit of the greatest variety in +individual differences and are not nullified even by the distance +between extremes." If we grasp the meaning of these words in their full +bearing, we recognize the outcome of philosophy up to date. They teach +us how to use our intellect in order to obtain an accurate picture of +the universe.</p> + +<p>The intellect is also called by the name of faculty of discrimination. +If in the science of the powers of this faculty we place ourselves on +the standpoint of present-day natural knowledge, we possess the clear +and plain insight that there are no exaggerated distinctions, no +unrelated extremes, in the universe. The infinite is related to the +finite. For all developed and perishable things are the direct offspring +of the imperishable, of the eternal universe. General nature and its +special parts are inseparably interlaced. There is nothing among all +that has a name which is fundamentally different from other things known by name.</p> + +<p>There will hardly be any objection against these sentences, until we +proceed to draw their last consequences. If all things are related and +without exception children of the universe, it follows that mind and +matter must also be two yards of cloth from the same piece. Hence the +difference between human understanding and other natural human faculties +must not be magnified into that of irreconcilable extremes.</p> + +<p>In order to become accustomed to scientific distinctions, the reader +should consider that a man can remain under the sway of a belief in +ghosts only so long as he ignores the relationship of all existing +things. He believes in real ghosts whose reality is supposed to be +radically different from his own. Such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">[Pg 371]</a></span> a distinction is exaggerated and +illogical, and whoever believes in it does not know how to discriminate +scientifically and has not the full use of his critical faculties.</p> + +<p>Just as common parlance opposes art to nature and then forgets that art +is a part of nature, similarly as night is a part of day, so the +language of the believer in ghosts does not know that reason and wood, +mind and matter, in spite of all their differences, are two parts of the +same whole, two expressions of the same universal reality. Everything is +real and true, because in the last instance the universe is all, is the +only truth and reality. So I call it a slip of the tongue to speak of +natural nature as opposed to natural art or artificial nature, of +imaginary reality as distinct from real reality. There ought to be a +different name for the day of twelve hours than for the day of +twenty-four hours, so that it might be better understood that day and +night are not fundamentally different, but two prongs of the same fork.</p> + +<p>Just as the faculty of thinking is innate in the child, and grows with +its development, so mankind's faculty of thought grows and has hitherto +expressed itself in a language which gave only instinctive conceptions +of the composition of the human brain and of its functions. The +construction of languages explains in a way the condition of the human +mind which had only inadequate knowledge of itself so far. Those +shortcomings of speech which I called slips of the tongue were not +understood until sufficient progress had been made in the explanation of +the process of thinking, and now these same shortcomings offer an +excellent means of representing and demonstrating the results of enlightenment.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">[Pg 372]</a></span></p><p>The mind is to give to man a picture of the world, the language is the +brush of the mind. It paints by its construction the universal +relationship of all things referred to in the beginning of this chapter, +and it does so in the following manner: It gives to each thing not only +its own name, but also adds to it another indicating its family, and +another indicating its race, another for the species, the genus, and +finally a general name which proclaims that all things are parts of the +one indivisible unit which is called world, existence, universe, cosmos.</p> + +<p>This diagrammatic construction of language furnishes us with an +illustration of the graduated relationship of things and of the way in +which the human race arrives at its knowledge, its perceptions or pictures.</p> + +<p>We said that philosophy is that endeavor which seeks to throw light on +the process of human thought. This work has been rendered very difficult +by the unavoidable misunderstanding of the universal relationship just +mentioned. The transcendentalists insist above all that the process of +thinking and its product, thought, should not be classed among ordinary +physics, not as a part of physical nature, but as the creature of +another nature which carries the mysterious name of metaphysics. That +such a nature and such a science is neither possible nor real is proven +by the construction of language which normally describes everything as +being closely related and corroborates this by its abnormal shortcomings +which we called slips of the tongue.</p> + +<p>The shortcomings of language which demonstrate the positive outcome of +philosophy consist in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">[Pg 373]</a></span>occasionally giving insufficiently significant +names to things belonging to a group in which the distinction between +individuals, species, genera, and families is not clearly defined. It is +not discernible, for instance, whether the term "cat" applies to a +domestic cat or to a tiger, because that term is used for a large class +of animals of which the domestic cat is the arch-type.</p> + +<p>But it may be that this illustration is not well chosen for the purpose +of demonstrating that slip of the tongue which is supposed to give us an +exact appreciation of the positive outcome of philosophy. Let us find +another and better illustration which will be a transition from the +inadequate to the adequate and thus throw so much more light on the +obscurities of language.</p> + +<p>Another and better example of the inadequacies of language is the +distinction between fish and meat. In this case, we entirely lack a +general term for meat, one kind of which is furnished by aquatic animals +and the other by terrestrial animals.</p> + +<p>Now let the reader apply this shortcoming of language to the distinction +between physics and metaphysics, or between thought and reality. We lack +a term which will fully indicate the relation between these two. +Thoughts are indeed real things. True, there is a difference whether I +have one hundred dollars in imagination or in reality in my pocket. +Still we must not exaggerate this difference into something +transcendental. Painted money or imagined money are in a way also real, +that is in imagination. In other words, language lacks a term which will +clearly express the different realities within the compass of the unit.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">[Pg 374]</a></span></p><p>The understanding of these peculiarities of language is calculated to +promote the insight and enlightenment in regard to that secret lamp +which man is carrying in his brain and with which he lights up the +things of this world. The cultivation of the theory of understanding, +the critique of reason, has an elementary significance for the +elucidation of all things. This is not saying that philosophy, that +special science with which we are here dealing, is a universal science +in the sense in which antiquity conceived of it. But it is universal +nevertheless in the sense in which the alphabet and other primary topics +are universal. Every one must use his brains and should therefore take +pains to understand its processes. Though the knowledge of these does +not make other efforts unnecessary, still it explains many ideas, it +elucidates the nature of thinking which every one is doing and which is +frequently used in a more ruthless manner than a dog would treat a rag.</p> + +<p>The inertia which has prevented the one-sided idealists on the one hand +and the one-sided materialists on the other from coming to a peaceful +understanding may be traced to one of those slips of the tongue. We lack +the right terms for designating the relationship between spiritual +phenomena, such as our ideas, conceptions, judgments and conclusions and +many other things on one side and the tangible, ponderable, +commensurable things on the other. True, the reason for this lack of +terms is the absence of understanding, and for this reason the dispute +is not one of mere words, although it can be allayed only by an +improvement of our terminology.</p> + +<p>Büchner, in his well-known work on <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">[Pg 375]</a></span>"<i>Force and Matter</i>," likewise +overlooks this point, the same as all prior materialists, because they +are as onesidedly insistent on their <i>matter</i> as the idealists are on +their <i>idea</i>. Quarrel and strife mean confusion, only peace will bring +light. The contrast between matter and mind finds its conciliation in +the positive outcome of philosophy which teaches that all distinctions +must be reasonable, because neither our instrument of thought nor the +rest of nature justify any exaggerated distinctions. In order to +elucidate the moot question, nothing is required but the insight that +ideas which nature develops in the human brain are materials for the +work of our understanding, though not materials for the work of our +hands. Philosophy has made material efforts to grasp the understanding +and its conceptions and is still making them in the same way in which +chemistry is working for the understanding of substances and physics for +the understanding of forces.</p> + +<p>Substances, forces, ideas, conceptions, judgments, conclusions, +knowledge and perceptions, according to the positive outcome of +philosophy, must be regarded as differences or varieties of the same +monistic genus. The differentiation of things no more contradicts their +unity than their unity contradicts their differentiation. Darwin +expanded the conception of "species" and thus contributed to a better +understanding of zoology. Philosophy expands the conception of species +still far beyond the Darwinian definition in teaching us to consider the +species as little generalities and the largest genus, the absolute or +the cosmos as the all in one, the all-embracing species.</p> + +<p>In order to closely connect the worm and the elephant, the lowest and +the highest animal, the vegetable<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">[Pg 376]</a></span> and the animal kingdom, the inorganic +and the organic, as members of the same species or genus in a reasonable +way, we must keep account of the gradations in nature, the transitions, +the connecting links and connecting ideas. Embryology, which shows that +the life of the highest animal develops through the stages of the animal +genus, has greatly promoted the understanding of the common nature of +all animals.</p> + +<p>"The continuity in the natural gradation of things is perfect, because +there are no gradations which are not represented, because there are no +differences between the various grades which nature does not fill by an +intermediary form.... There is no abrupt difference in nature, no +metaphysical jump, no vacuum, no gap in the order of the world," says a +well-known author of our times whose name I shall not mention, because I +wish to base my argument on the acknowledged facts rather than on names +of authorities.</p> + +<p>What Darwin taught us in relation to animal life, viz., that there are +no fundamental differences between species, that is taught by philosophy +in regard to the universe. The understanding of the latter is rendered +difficult by the habit of making a transcendental distinction between +matter and mind.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>VIII</span> <span class="smaller">UNDERSTANDING IS MATERIAL</span></h2> + +<p>Whether we say that philosophy has the understanding for the object of +its study, or whether we<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">[Pg 377]</a></span> say that philosophy investigates the method of +utilizing subjective understanding in order to arrive at genuine, +correct, excellent, objective knowledge, that is only a matter of using +different terms for the same process. It makes no difference whether we +designate the object of our special science as a thing or as a process. +It is much more essential to understand that the distinction between the +thing and its action is in this instance of little consequence.</p> + +<p>According to modern natural science all existence is resolved into +motion. It is well known now that even rocks do not stand still, but are +continuously active, growing and decaying.</p> + +<p>The understanding, the intellect, is an active object, or an objective +action, the same as sunshine, the flow of waters, growing of trees, +disintegration of rocks, or any other natural phenomenon. Also the +understanding, the thinking which takes place consciously or +unconsciously in the human brain, is a phenomenon of as indubitable +actuality as the most material of them. It cannot in the least shake our +contention of the materially perceptible nature of intellectual activity +that we become aware of this activity by an internal, not by an +external, sense. Whether a stone is externally perceptible or thought +internally, what difference does this slight distinction make in the +incontestable fact that both perceptions are of equal material, natural +and sense-perceptible kind? Why should not the action of the brain +belong in the same category as the action of the heart? And though the +movement of the heart be internal and that of the tongue of the +nightingale external, what is to prevent us from considering these two +movements from the higher <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">[Pg 378]</a></span>viewpoint of natural or material processes? +If the function of the heart may be referred to as material, why not the +function of the brain? True, the present usages of language are in +conflict with this mode of thought. But it must be remembered that every +science comes into conflict with usages of language by progressive +development. The discovery of every new thing in plant and animal life +compels the discoverer to invent a new term or change the meaning of an +old one. The term material has not had a well defined, but rather an +indefinite meaning so far. Now, since it is necessary, in order to +understand the function of the brain to remove it from the class of +transcendental or metaphysical conceptions and assign to it a place +among the material things, the question arises: What will be the most +appropriate term for it? The material and the spiritual are both two +species of the same genus. How are we to designate the species, how the +genus? For the sake of complete clearness, we require three different +names, one for each species and a common general name. But since we are +much less concerned about the name than about the understanding of these +facts which cannot be well explained without terms, we do not insist +dogmatically on calling the understanding material. It is sufficient to +point out that the function of the heart and of the brain both belong to +the same class, no matter whether this class be called material, real, +physical, or what not. So long as language has not established a +definite meaning for these terms, all of them serve equally well and are +equally deceptive.</p> + +<p>The positive outcome of philosophy which culminates in placing the +theory of understanding in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">[Pg 379]</a></span> same class with all other theories, +cannot be easily demonstrated on account of a natural confusion of +thought which arises from an equally natural confusion of language. In +the special department of handicraft as well as in that of scientific +brain work the terminology is well systematized, while in the general +affairs of life and science there is a confusion which is as great in +the matter of conceptions as in that of applying the terms by which +those awkward conceptions are expressed.</p> + +<p>Wherever understanding is clear, there the language is also clear. The +man who does not understand shoemaking does not understand its +terminology. This is not saying that the understanding of a trade and +the understanding of its terminology are identical, but only indicating +their actual connection.</p> + +<p>If the reader has had a glimpse of the enormity of the work of more than +two thousand years of philosophy in order to state what little we know +today of its achievement in the science of understanding, he will not be +very much surprised at the difficulties we here meet with in finding +terms for its demonstration.</p> + +<p>The function of the brain is as material as that of the heart. The heart +and its function are two things, but they are dependent one upon the +other so that one cannot exist without the other. The function may +partly be felt. We feel the heart beating, the brain working. The +working of the heart may even be felt by touch, which is not the case +with the working of the brain. But it would be a mistake to imagine that +our knowledge of the function of the heart is exhausted by our +perception of it through the touch. Once we have overcome the habit of +making exaggerated distinctions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">[Pg 380]</a></span> between things, and have learned to +consider the differences of things as well as their interconnection, we +can easily understand that the science of the function of the heart is +an infinite science which is connected with all others. The heart cannot +work without the blood, the blood cannot exist without food, and this is +connected with the air, the plants, the animals, the sun, and the moon.</p> + +<p>The function of the brain and its product, the understanding, is +likewise inseparable from the universal interdependence of things. The +health of the blood which is produced by the action of the heart is no +more and no less a material phenomenon than the total knowledge of +science which appears as a product of brain life.</p> + +<p>Although we represent the doctrine of the material nature of +understanding as the positive outcome of philosophy, this is not +proclaiming the victory of that narrow materialism which has been +spreading itself particularly since the eighteenth century. On the +contrary, this mechanical materialism wholly misunderstands the nature +of the problem. It teaches that the faculty of thought is a function of +the brain, the brain is the object of study and its function, the +faculty of thought, is fully explained as a brain quality or function. +This materialism is enamored of mechanics, idolizes it, does not regard +it as a part of the world, but as the sole substance which comprises the +whole universe. Because it misunderstands the relation of thing and +function, of subject and predicate, it has no inkling of the fact that +this relation which it handles in such a matter-of-fact way, but not at +all scientifically, may be an object worthy of study. The materialist +of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">[Pg 381]</a></span> the old school is too horny-handed to consider the function or +quality of understanding as an object worthy of a separate scientific +department. We, on the other hand, follow the suggestion of Spinoza, who +required of the philosophers that they should consider everything in the +light of eternity. In so doing we find that the tangible things, such as +the brain, are qualities of nature, and that in the same way the +socalled functions are natural things, substantial parts of the +universe.</p> + +<p>Not only tangible objects are "things," but also the rays of the sun and +the scent of flowers belong to this category, and perceptions are no +exception to the rule. But all these "things" are only relative things, +since they are qualities of the one and absolute which is the only +thing, the "thing itself," well known to every one by the name of the +universe, or cosmos.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>IX</span> <span class="smaller">THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC</span></h2> + +<p>Since this work wishes to demonstrate the positive outcome of +philosophy, the reader may ask the author what are his proofs that +instead of the quintessence of thousands of years of philosophical work +he is not offered the elaboration of any individual philosopher, or even +that of the author himself.</p> + +<p>In reply I wish to say that my work would be rendered uselessly +voluminous by quotations from the works of the most prominent +philosophical writers,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">[Pg 382]</a></span> without proving anything, since the words of one +often contradict those of another.</p> + +<p>What is said by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel, in one place of any +of their works, is at least considerably modified, if not contradicted, +in another place of the same work. It is of little consequence, how and +by whose help I have arrived at the positive outcome of philosophy as +here rendered. Whether it is the actual outcome or not can be judged +only by the expert, and every opinion is necessarily very subjective.</p> + +<p>Under the circumstances I, as author, claim that my opinion is worth as +much as any other, and the reader may therefore accept my assurance. As +to the further value of that which I offer, it is a peculiarity of the +subject under discussion that every reader carries it and its +experiences within himself and may, without consulting any other author, +at once draw his own conclusions about my views, provided he has +acquired the necessary training in thought. What a traveler tells us +about the interior of Africa must either be believed to the letter or +verified by the accounts of other travelers. But what I say about logic +will, I hope, find its corroboration in the logic of every reading +brain.</p> + +<p>The theory of understanding which has become the special object of +philosophy, is nothing else, and cannot be anything else, but expanded +logic. Many practical rules and laws of this department are known and +recognized since the time of Aristotle. But the question whether there +is one world or two, a natural and unnatural, or supernatural as it is +called with preference, that is the point which has given much trouble +to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">[Pg 383]</a></span> philosophy and which will influence the health of logic so long as +it is undecided.</p> + +<p>Dr. Friedrich Dittes, director of the institute of pedagogy in Vienna, +has published a <i>School of Pedagogy</i>, several editions of which have +appeared, in which he gives much attention to logic. Dittes is a +prominent pedagogue, well known through his writings. He confines +himself in his <i>School</i> to teaching only that which is well established +and accepted without a doubt. As a practical man who addresses himself +mainly to teachers of primary grades, he would not place himself on the +pinnacle of the outcome of philosophy, even if he could. He must confine +himself to that which is well established, which is far removed from the +disputes of the day. But it may here serve as a whetstone by the help of +which we may give to the positive product of philosophy its latest and +greatest sharpness.</p> + +<p>He writes right in the beginning of the first part: "Our ideas are as +manifold as the objects to which they refer. Several things may have +many or few, or at least one quality, in common. Still they may also be +totally different."</p> + +<p>This last point, viz., that there may be things which are "totally" +different from one another, is the one which is decidedly rejected by +that science which has risen to the eminence of the positive acquisition +of philosophy. There can be no natural things which are "totally" +different from one another, because they must all of them have in common +the quality of being natural.</p> + +<p>It sounds very commonplace to say that there are no unnatural things in +nature. Since the last witch<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">[Pg 384]</a></span> was burnt, everybody is sufficiently +enlightened to know that. But the logical conclusions of natural monism +have not yet been drawn. True, natural science, properly socalled, is +busily engaged in arriving at them. But so much more strife is there in +the "science of mind" and there is no other remedy but a well founded +theory of understanding which teaches that nature is not alone absolute +nature, but also the nature of the absolute. From this doctrine it +necessarily follows that all things are not individually independent, +but related by sex, dependent children, "predicates" of the monistic +unity of the world.</p> + +<p>"The arch fountain of the human spirit," says Dittes, "is perception.... +Whether perception as such discloses to us the true nature of things, or +whether it makes us familiar only with their phenomena, this is not to +be discussed by logic." The practical pedagogue who confines himself to +the education of children's brains or who wishes at most to influence +such teachers as educate children's brains, is quite right in being +satisfied with the old traditional Aristotlean logic. But in the school +of the human race, this logic has not been sufficient. For this reason +the philosophers have broached the question whether perception, "the +arch fountain of the human spirit," is a true or a deceptive fountain. +The product of the philosophical investigation which we here offer +amounts to the declaration that the logicians are greatly mistaken about +the "arch fountain." It is a cardinal error of ancient logic to regard +perception as the ultimate source from which the human mind dips its +knowledge. It is nature which is the ultimate source, and our perception +is but the mediator of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">[Pg 385]</a></span>understanding. And its product, recognized +truth, is not truth itself, but merely a formal picture of it. Universal +nature is the arch fountain, is the eternal and imperishable truth +itself, and our perception, like every other part of universal +existence, is only an attribute, a particle of absolute nature. The +human mind, with whose nature logic is dealing, is no more an +independent thing than any other, but simply a phenomenon, a reflex or +predicate of nature.</p> + +<p>To confound true perceptions or perceived truths with general truth, +with the <i>non plus ultra</i> of all truths, is equivalent to regarding a +sparrow as <i>the</i> bird in general, or a period of civilization as +civilization itself, which would mean the closing of the door to all +further development.</p> + +<p>Modern philosophy, beginning with Bacon of Verulam and closing with +Hegel, carries on a constant struggle with the Aristotlean logic. The +product of this struggle, the outcome of philosophy, does not deny the +old rules of traditional logic, but adds a new and decidedly higher +circle of logical perception to the former ones. For the sake of better +understanding it may be well to give to this circle a special title, the +special name of "theory of understanding," which is sometimes called +"dialectics."</p> + +<p>In order to demonstrate the essential contents of this philosophical +product by an investigation of the fundamental laws of traditional logic +and to explain it thereby, I refer once more to the teacher of +elementary logic, Dittes.</p> + +<p>Under the caption of "Principles of Judgment" he teaches: "Since +judging, like all thinking, aims at the perception of truth, the rules +have been sought after<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">[Pg 386]</a></span> by which this purpose might be accomplished. As +universally applicable rules, as principles or laws of thought, the +following four have been named:</p> + +<blockquote><p>(1) The law of uniformity (identity).</p> + +<p>(2) The law of contradiction.</p> + +<p>(3) The law of the excluded third.</p> + +<p>(4) The law of adequate cause."</p></blockquote> + +<p>So much scholastic talk has been indulged in over these four +"principles," that I can hardly bring myself to discuss them further. +But since my purpose, the demonstration of the positive outcome of +philosophy, consists in throwing a new light on the logic contained in +these four so-called principles or laws, I am compelled to lay bare +their inmost kernel.</p> + +<p>The first principle, then, declares that A is A, or to speak +mathematically, every quantity is equal to itself. In plain English: a +thing is what it is; no thing is what it is not. "Characters which are +excluded by any conception must not be attributed to it." The square is +excluded from the conception of a circle, therefore the predicate +"square" must not be given to a circle. For the same reason a straight +line must not be crooked, and a lie must not be true.</p> + +<p>Now this so-called law of thought may be well enough for household use, +where nothing but known quantities are under consideration. A thing is +what it is. Right is not left and one hundred is not one thousand. +Whoever is named Peter or Paul remains Peter or Paul all his life. This, +I say, is all right for household use.</p> + +<p>But when we consider matters from the wider point of view of cosmic +universal life, then this famous law of thought proves to be nothing but +an expedient in logic which is not adequate to the nature of things, but +merely a means of mutual understanding for us human beings.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">[Pg 387]</a></span> Hence the +left bank of the Rhine is not the right, because we have agreed that in +naming the banks of a river we will turn our backs to the source and our +faces to the mouth of the river and then designate the banks as right +and left. Such a way of distinguishing, thinking, and judging is good +and practical, so long as this narrow standpoint is accompanied by the +consciousness of its narrowness. Hitherto this has not been the case. +This determined logic has overlooked that the perception which is +produced by its rules is not truth, not the real world, but only gives +an ideal, more or less accurate, reflection of it. Peter and Paul, who +according to the law of identity are the same all their lives, are in +fact different fellows every minute and every day of their lives, and +all things of this world are, like those two, not constant, but very +variable quantities. The mathematical points, the straight lines, the +round circles, are ideals. In reality every point has a certain +dimension, every straight line, when seen through a magnifying glass, is +full of many crooked turns, and even the roundest circle, according to +the mathematicians, consists of an infinite number of straight lines.</p> + +<p>The traditional logic, then, declares with its law of identity, or in +the words of Dittes "law of uniformity," that Peter and Paul are the +same fellows from beginning to end, or that the western mountains remain +the same western mountains so long as they exist. The product of modern +philosophy, on the other hand, declares that the identity of people, +woods, and rocks is inseparably linked to their opposite, their +incessant transformation. The old school logic treats things, the +objects of perception, like stereotyped moulds, while the +philosophically expanded logic considers such treatment adequate for +household<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">[Pg 388]</a></span> use only. The logical household use of stereotyped +conceptions extends, and should extend, to all of science. The +consideration of things as remaining "the same" is indispensable, and +yet it is very salubrious to know and remember that the things are not +only the same permanent and stereotyped, but at the same time variable +and in flow. That is a contradiction, but not a senseless one. This +contradiction has confused the minds and given much trouble to the +philosophers. The solution of this problem, the elucidation of this +simple fact, is the positive product of philosophy.</p> + +<p>I have just declared that logic so far did not know that the perception +produced by its principles does not offer us truth itself, but only a +more or less accurate picture of it. I have furthermore contended that +the positive outcome of philosophy has materially added to the clearness +of the portrait of the human mind. Logic claims to be "the doctrine of +the forms and laws of thought." Dialectics, the product of philosophy, +aims to be the same, and its first paragraph declares: Not thought +produces truth, but being, of which thought is only that part which is +engaged in securing a picture of truth. The fact resulting from this +statement may easily confuse the reader, viz., that the philosophy which +has been bequeathed to us by logical dialectics, or dialectic logic, +must explain not alone thought, but also the original of which thought +is a reflex.</p> + +<p>While, therefore, traditional logic teaches in its first law that all +things are equal to themselves, the new dialectics teaches not only that +things are equal to themselves and identical from start to finish, but +also that these same things have the contradictory quality of being the +same and yet widely variable. If it is a law of thought<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">[Pg 389]</a></span> that we gain as +accurate as possible a conception of things by the help of thought, it +is at the same time a law of thought that all things, processes, and +proceedings are not things but resemble the color of that silk which, +although equal to itself and identical throughout, still plays from one +color into another. The things of which the thinking thing or human +intellect is one are so far from being one and the same from beginning +to end that they are in truth and fact without beginning and end. And as +phenomena of nature, as parts of infinite nature, they only seem to have +a beginning and end, while they are in reality but natural +transformations arising temporarily from the infinite and returning into +it after a while.</p> + +<p>Natural truth or true nature, without beginning and end, is so +contradictory that it only expresses itself by shifting phenomena which +are nevertheless quite true. To old line logic this contradiction +appears senseless. It insists on its first, second, and third law, on +its identity, its law of contradiction and excluded third, which must be +either straight or crooked, cold or warm, and excludes all intermediary +conceptions. And in a way it is right. For every-day use it is all right +to deal in this summary fashion with thoughts and words. But it is at +the same time judicious to learn from the positive outcome of philosophy +that in reality and truth things do not come to pass so ideally. The +logical laws think quite correctly of thoughts and their forms and +applications. But they do not exhaust thinking and its thoughts. They +overlook the consciousness of the inexhaustibleness of all natural +creations, of which the object of logic, human understanding, is a part. +This object did not fall from heaven, but is a finite part of the +infinite which actually has the contradictory quality of possessing in +and with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">[Pg 390]</a></span> its logical nature that universal nature which is superior to +all logic.</p> + +<p>From this critique of the three first "fundamental laws of logic" it is +apparent that the human understanding is not only everywhere identical, +but also different in each individual and has a historical development. +We are, of course, logically entitled to consider this faculty like all +others by itself and give it a birthday. Wherever man begins, there +understanding, the faculty of thought, begins. But we are +philosophically and dialectically no less entitled, and it is even our +duty, to know that the faculty of understanding, the same as its human +bearer, has no beginning, in spite of the fact that we ascribe a +beginning to them. When we trace the historical development of these +two, of man and understanding, backward to their origin, we arrive at a +transition to the animal and see their special nature merging into +general nature. The same is found in tracing the development of the +individual mind. Where does consciousness begin in the child? Before, +at, or after birth? Consciousness arises from its opposite, +unconsciousness, and returns to it. In consequence we regard the +unconscious as the substance and the conscious as its predicate or +attribute. And the fixed conceptions which we make for ourselves of the +units or phenomena of the natural substance are recognized by us as +necessary means in explaining nature, but at the same time it is +necessary to learn from dialectics that all fixed conceptions are +floating in a liquid element. The infinite substance of nature is a very +mobile element, in which all fixed things appear and sink, thus being +temporarily fixed and yet not fixed.</p> + +<p>Now let us briefly review the fourth fundamental law of logic, according +to which everything must have an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">[Pg 391]</a></span>adequate cause. This law is likewise +very well worthy of attention, yet it is very inadequate, because the +question what should be our conception of the world and what is the +constitution of the most highly developed thinking faculty of the world +requires the answer: the world, in which everything has its adequate +cause, is nevertheless, including consciousness and the faculty of +thought, without beginning, end, and cause, that is, a thing justified +in itself and by itself. The law of the adequate cause applies only to +pictures made by the human mind. In our logical pictures of the world +everything must have its adequate cause. But the original, the universal +cosmos, has no cause, it is its own cause and effect. To understand that +all causes rest on the causeless is an important dialectic knowledge +which first throws the requisite light on the law of the necessity of an +adequate cause.</p> + +<p>Formally everything must have its cause. But really everything has not +only one cause, but innumerable causes. Not alone father and mother are +the cause of my existence, but also the grand parents and great grand +parents, together with the air they breathed, the food they ate, the +earth on which they walked, the sun which warmed the earth, etc. Not a +thing, not a process, not a change is the adequate cause of another, but +everything is rather caused by the universe which is absolute.</p> + +<p>When philosophy began its career with the intention of understanding the +world, it soon discovered that this purpose could be accomplished only +by special study. When it chose understanding, or the faculty of +thought, as the special object of its study, it separated its specific +object too far from the general existence. Its logic, in opposing +thought to the rest of existence, forgot the interconnection of the +opposites, forgot that thought is a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">[Pg 392]</a></span> form, a species, an individuality +which belongs to the genus of existence, the same as fish to the genus +of meat, night to the genus of day, art to nature, word to action, and +death to life. It does not attempt to explore the essence of thought for +its own sake, but for the purpose of discovering the rules of exploring +and thinking correctly. It could not very well arrive at those coveted +rules, so long as it idealized truth transcendentally and elevated it +far above the phenomena. All phenomena of nature are true parts of +truth. Even error and lies are not opposed to truth in that exaggerated +sense in which the old style logic represents them, which teaches that +two contradictory predicates must not be simultaneously applied to the +same subject, that any one subject is either true or false, and that any +third alternative is out of the question. Such statements are due to an +entire misconception of truth. Truth is the absolute, universal sum of +all existing things, of all phenomena of the past, present, and future. +Truth is the real universe from which errors and lies are not excluded. +In so far as stray thoughts, giants and brownies, lies and errors are +really existing, though only in the imagination of men, to that extent +they are true. They belong to the sum of all phenomena, but they are not +the whole truth, not the infinite sum. And even the most positive +knowledge is nothing but an excellent picture of a certain part. The +pictures in our minds have this in common with their originals that they +are true. All errors and lies are true errors and true lies, hence are +not so far removed from truth that one should belong to heaven and the +other to eternal damnation. Let us remain human.</p> + +<p>Since old line logic with its four principles was too narrowminded, its +development had to produce that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">[Pg 393]</a></span>dialectics which is the positive +outcome of philosophy. This science of thought so expanded regards the +universe as the truly universal or infinite, in which all contradictions +slumber as in the womb of conciliation. Whether the new logic shall have +the same name as the old, or assume the separate title of theory of +understanding or dialectics, is simply a question of terms which must be +decided by considerations of expediency.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>X</span> <span class="smaller">THE FUNCTION OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE RELIGIOUS FIELD</span></h2> + +<p>We took our departure from the fact that philosophy is searching for +"understanding." The first and principal acquisition of philosophy was +the perception that its object is not to be found in a transcendental +generality. Whoever wishes to obtain understanding, must confine himself +to something special, without, however, through this limitation losing +sight of all measure and aim to such an extent that he forgets the +infinite generality.</p> + +<p>A modern psychologist who occupies himself with "Thoughts on +Enlightenment," which topic is evidently related to ours, says: "Real +and genuine enlightenment can proceed only from religious motives." +Expressed in our language, this would mean: Every genuine understanding, +every true conception or knowledge, must be based on the clear +consciousness that the infinite universe is the arch fundament of all things.</p> + +<p>Understanding and true enlightenment are identical.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">[Pg 394]</a></span> "It is true," say +the "Thoughts on Enlightenment," "that all enlightenment takes the form +of struggles on account of the nature of him who is to be enlightened +and of the object about which he is to be informed. But it is a struggle +for religion, not against it." The author, Professor Lazarus, says in +his preface that he does not wish the reader to base his opinion on any +single detached sentence. "Every single sentence," he says, "may be +tested as to its value, but the whole of my views on religion and +enlightenment cannot be recognized from any single one of them."</p> + +<p>As this wish is entirely justified and as our position is somewhat +supported by his psychological treatment of enlightenment, we shall +comply with his wish and seek to grasp the meaning of his statements on +the religious nature of enlightenment in their entirety, not as isolated sentences.</p> + +<p>We even go a step farther than Professor Lazarus, by extending to +understanding what he says about enlightenment, viz., that genuine +knowledge and enlightenment must, so to say, take their departure from +religious motives. But we differ a little as to what motives are +religious. Lazarus refers, so far as I can see, to ideas and the ideal, +while we, thanks to the positive outcome of philosophy, understand the +terms <i>religion</i> and <i>religious</i> to refer to the universal +interdependence of things.</p> + +<p>Obviously the dividing line between heat and cold is drawn by the human +mind. The point selected for this purpose is the freezing point of +water. One might just as well have selected any other point. Evidently +the dividing line between that which is religious and that which is +irreligious is as indeterminate as that between hot and cold. Neither +any university nor any usage of language<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">[Pg 395]</a></span> can decide that, nor is the +pope a scientific authority in the matter.</p> + +<p>It is mainly due to the socalled historical school that a thing is +considered not alone by its present condition, but by its origin and +decline. What, then, is religion and religious? The fetish cult, the +animal cult, the cult of the ideal and spiritual creator, or the cult of +the real human mind? Where are we to begin and where to end? If the +ancient Germans regarded the great oak as sacred and religious, why +should not art and science become religious among the modern Germans? In +this sense, Lazarus is correct. The "enlightenment" which was headed in +France by Voltaire and the encyclopedists, in Germany by Lessing and +Kant, the "enlightenment" which came as a struggle for reason and +against religion, was then in fact a struggle for religion, not against +it. By this means one may make everything out of anything. But this has +to be learned first in order to recognize how our mind ought to be +adjusted, so that it may perceive that not only everything is +everything, but that each thing also has its own place.</p> + +<p>We wish to become clear in our minds how it is possible, and +reconcilable with sound conception, that such an anti-religious struggle +as that carried on during that period of "enlightenment" can +nevertheless be a struggle for and in the interest of religion. We wish +to find out how one may abolish religion and at the same time maintain it.</p> + +<p>This is easily understood, if we remember the repeatedly quoted +dialectic rule according to which our understanding must never +exaggerate the distinctions between two things. We must not too widely +separate the religious from the secular field. Of course, the religious +field<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">[Pg 396]</a></span> is in heaven, while the secular is naturally in the profane +universe. Having become aware that even religious imagination, together +with its heaven and spirit creator, are profane conceptions in spite of +their alleged transcendentalism, we find religion in the secular field, +and thus this field has in a way become religious. The religious and the +profane infinite have something in common, at least this that the +indefinite religious name may also be applied to the secular or profane infinity.</p> + +<p>"All culture, every condition of humanity or of a nation, has its roots +as well as its bounds in history," says our Professor of psychology. +Should not religion, which according to the words of a German emperor +"must be preserved for the people," also have its bounds in history? Or +does it belong to the infinite and must it exist forever? In order to +free history of its bounds, it is necessary to avail ourselves of the +positive outcome of philosophy and to demonstrate that nothing is +infinite but the infinite itself, which has the double nature of being +infinite and inseparable from the finite phenomena of nature. The whole +of nature is eternal, but none of its individual phenomena is, although +even the imperishable whole is composed of perishable parts.</p> + +<p>The relation of the constant whole of nature to its variable parts, the +relation of the general to the specialties composing it, includes, if we +fully grasp it, a perfect conception of the human mind as well as of the +understanding and enlightenment which it acquires. This mind cannot +enlighten itself as to its special nature without observing how it came +to enlighten itself as to the nature of other specialties. We then find +that it has likewise enlightened itself on religious phenomena by +recognizing them as a part, as a variation, of the general phenomenon of +the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">[Pg 397]</a></span>constant, eternal, natural universe. Hence secular nature, which is +at the same time eternal and temporal, is the mother of religious +nature. Of course, the child partakes of the nature of the mother. +Religion, historically considered, arises from nature, but the +determination of the date of the beginning of this specialty is left as +much to the choice of man as that of the point where the cold and the +warm meet. The general movement of nature, from which arise its +specialties, proceeds in infinite time. Its transformations are so +gradual that every determined point constitutes an arbitrary act which +is at the same time arbitrary and necessary; necessary for the human +being who wishes to gain a conception of it. A perfect conception of +religion, therefore, goes right to the center of the question, to the +point where the religious specialty reaches a characteristic stage, to +its freezing point, so to say. From this standpoint, heat and cold may +be sharply defined; likewise religion. If we say, for instance, that +religion is the conception of a supernatural spirit who rules nature, +and the reader thinks this definition somewhat appropriate, the simple +demonstration of the achievements of philosophy in the field of +understanding or dialectics proves that this religious conception is +untenable in this world of the human mind which knows how to obtain a +logical picture of its experiences.</p> + +<p>To desire to preserve religion for the people as a sharply defined and +finite thing is contrary to all logic and equivalent to swimming against +the tide. On the other hand, it is equally illogical to identify +religion after the manner of Lazarus with the conception of natural +infinity or infinite nature, because that promotes mental haziness.</p> + +<p>The laws of thought obtained by philosophical research give us +considerable enlightenment about the infinite<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">[Pg 398]</a></span> material process, the +nature of which is sublime enough to be worthy of religious devotion, +and yet special and matter-of-fact enough to wash the dim eyes with +natural clearness.</p> + +<p>We have already seen in preceding chapters that we must first define our +standpoint before we can decide which is the right or left bank of a +river. So it is also in the matter of abolishing and maintaining +religion for the people. It can be done the moment we extend the +discussion to the realm of infinity. The conception of infinity, called +substance by Spinoza, monad by Leibniz, thing itself by Kant, the +absolute by Hegel, is indeed necessary in order to explain anything, not +only by the fourth root, but by the infinite root of the adequate +reason. To that extent we are agreed that enlightenment, or +understanding as we say, is not alone a struggle against religion, but +also for it. In the theory of understanding acquired by philosophy, +there is contained a decisive repeal of religion. Nevertheless we say +with Lazarus: "The power of enlightenment and its aim are not expressed +in negation, not in that which is not believed, but in that which is +believed, venerated, and preserved." And yet every enlightening +perception, every understanding resulting from enlightenment, is a +negation. In seeking enlightenment, for instance, on understanding, it +is necessary, in order to prove that it is a natural phenomenon, to deny +the religious element in so far as it assumes the existence of a divine +chief spirit whose secondary copy the human spirit is supposed to be. +Or, in order to gain enlightenment on the nature of the universe, in +order to realize that it is a truly universal universe, we are compelled +to deny the existence of every "higher" world, including the religious. +But if we desire to become enlightened as to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">[Pg 399]</a></span> how it is that religion +may not alone be denied, but also preserved, we must transfer its origin +from an illogical other world into the natural and logical universe. +Thus religion becomes natural and nature religious.</p> + +<p>If worship is confined to the idolization of the sun or the cat, every +one realizes the temporality of the matter. And if we restrict worship +to the adoration of the great omnipotent spirit, every one realizes the +temporality of this adoration who has acquired an accurate conception of +the small human spirit. If, on the other hand, we extend religious +worship to everything which has ever been venerated, or will ever be +venerated, by human beings, in other words, if we extend the conception +of religion to the entire universe, then it assumes a very far-reaching +significance.</p> + +<p>This is the essence of enlightenment on religion: That we may at will +expand or contract our conceptions, that all things are alike to the +extent of representing only one nature, that all fantastical ideas, all +good and evil spirits and ghosts, no matter how "supernaturally" +conceived, are all natural.</p> + +<p>The essential thing in the enlightenment acquired by philosophical study +is the appreciation of the fact that understanding, enlightenment, +science, etc., are not cultivated for their own sake, but must serve the +purpose of human development, the material interests of which demand a +correct mental picture of the natural processes.</p> + +<p>We have chosen the religious idea for discussion in this chapter so that +it may serve as a means of illustrating the nature of thought in +general. We regard it as the merit of philosophy to have unveiled this nature.</p> + +<p>Professor Lazarus is quite a pleasing companion. He is a fine thinker, +saturated with the teachings of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">[Pg 400]</a></span>philosophers, not overfond of any +particular school, and only about two hands' breadth removed from our +position. But this is just enough to demonstrate by his shortcomings the +advantages of our position which proves that the part of the human soul +performing the work of thinking is understood by us at least two hands' +breadth better than by this prominent psychologist.</p> + +<p>"The function of enlightenment is to recognize that no phenomenon can be +an effect which has not another phenomenon as its cause, and to search +for the sole cause of every effect, noting all its parts and their +consecutive divisions."</p> + +<p>These words describe the mental work performed by the human brain fairly +well, but still they require a little addition, to the effect that the +mental work is no exception from any other phenomena, all of which have +not alone their special, but also one general cause. The cause of all +causes, of which religion is making an idol, must be profaned, so to +speak, by the cult of science, so that the above definition of Lazarus +regarding enlightenment would read as follows: The sole and true cause +of all effects is the universe, or the general interdependence of all +things. But this is not by far the full scope of enlightenment. It is +further necessary, as Lazarus well says, to note "all its parts and +their consecutive divisions." We further add: The universal cause must +be understood not alone in its consecutive parts, but also in its +co-ordinate parts. It is only then that understanding, enlightenment, +become perfect. We then find that after all the relation between cause +and effect, or the relation between the universal truth and its natural +phenomena, is not a very trenchant one, but a relative one.</p> + +<p>"Enlightenment advances in various, in all, fields of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">[Pg 401]</a></span> mental life. +Religious enlightenment has long been recognized as the most essential, +justly so, and for many reasons, the chief of them being that religious +enlightenment is the most important and hence the most bitterly contested."</p> + +<p>Thus religious enlightenment is a part of universal, cosmic, +enlightenment. It is a confusing expression to say that it is confined +to "all fields of mental life." We believe to be shedding more light on +the question by saying that there is enlightenment in all fields, not +alone in the mental, but also in the cosmic, which unites both the +material and mental. To classify this field, that is the exhaustive task +of our understanding, that its exhaustive definition.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>XI</span> <span class="smaller">THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT IS ONE OF THE MEANS OF +UNDERSTANDING</span></h2> + +<p>The processes of the human mind and their subjective composition cannot +be analyzed in a <i>pure</i> state and without regard to their objective +effects any more than handiwork can be explained without the raw +material to be handled and the products derived therefrom, any more than +any work can be described in a <i>pure</i> state without regard to the product.</p> + +<p>That is the sad defect of old time logic which is an obstacle to its +further advance: it literally tears things out of their connections and +forgets the necessity of interdependence over the need of special study.</p> + +<p>The instrument which produces thought and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">[Pg 402]</a></span>knowledge in the human brain +is not an isolated thing, nor an isolated quality. It is connected not +only with the brain and the nervous system, but also with all qualities +of the soul. True, thinking is different from feeling, but it is +nevertheless a feeling the same as gladness and sorrow. Thought is +called incomprehensible and the heart unfathomable. It is the function +of science, of thinking and thought, to fathom and comprehend what as +yet is not fathomed and not comprehended.</p> + +<p>Just as thinking and understanding are parts of the human soul, so the +latter is a part of physical and intellectual man. Together with the +physical development of man, of the species as well as of the +individual, the soul also develops and with it that part which is the +special object of the theory of understanding, viz., thought and +thinking. Not alone does physical development produce intellectual +development, but, vice versa, the understanding reacts on the physical +world. The one is not merely a cause, nor the other merely an effect. +This obsolete distinction does not suffice for the full understanding of +their interrelations. We pay a tribute to the "thoughts on +enlightenment" of Professor Lazarus quoted in the previous chapter by +acknowledging that they throw so much light on a certain point that +little more than the dot over the "i" is required in order to clear up a +bad misunderstanding about the relation of cause and effect.</p> + +<p>Since the time of Aristotle this relation has been called a category. We +have already noted the statement which characterizes the age of +enlightenment as one in which the causal category, or let us say the +distinction between cause and effect, became the dominant issue. Other +periods live with their understanding, with their thoughts, in other +categories. Though the ancient Greeks knew the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">[Pg 403]</a></span>distinction between +cause and effect, yet it was far from being the dominant point of view +in their search after scientific understanding. Instead of regarding, as +we do today, everything as effects which were produced by preceding +causes, they saw in every process, in every phenomenon, a means which +had a purpose. The category of means and purpose dominated the Greeks. +Socrates admired the knowledge of nature displayed by Anaxagoras, the +stories he could tell of sun, moon, and stars. But as Anaxagoras had +omitted to disclose the <i>reasonable purpose</i> of the processes of nature, +Socrates did not think much of such a natural science. At that period +the means and the purpose were the measure of reason, the handle of the +mind, the category of understanding; today causes and effects have taken +their places.</p> + +<p>Between the golden age of Greece and the era of modern science, the +socalled night of the Middle Ages, the epoch of superstition, extends. +If then you started out on a voyage and first met an old woman, it meant +misfortune for you. Wallenstein cast the horoscope before he directed +his troops. "Understanding" was gathered from the flight of a bird, the +cry of an animal, the constellations of stars, the meeting with an old +woman. The category of that period was the <i>sign</i> and its +<i>consequences</i>.</p> + +<p>And according to Lazarus, these things were believed by brains which +were by no means dull. "I refer to a name which fills us all with +veneration: Kepler believed in astrology, in the <i>category of the sign +and its consequence</i>, together with the thinkers of the thousand years +before him and of his own century. Astrology was a science for many +centuries, promoted together with astronomy ... and by the same people."</p> + +<p>The peculiar thing in this statement is the reference to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">[Pg 404]</a></span> the category +of sign and consequence as a <i>science</i>. This category has no longer a +place in modern science.</p> + +<p>May not our modern viewpoint, the category in which our present day +science thinks, the category of cause and effect, be equally transitory?</p> + +<p>The ancients have accomplished lasting scientific results in spite of +their "purposes." Mediæval superstition with its "signs," its astrology +and alchemy, has likewise bequeathed to us a few valuable scientific +products. And, on the other hand, even the greatest partisans of modern +science do not deny that it is marred by various adventurous vagaries.</p> + +<p>The categories of means and purposes, of signs and consequences, are +still in vogue today and will be preserved together with that of causes +and effects. The knowledge that this latter category is likewise but a +historical one and exerts but temporarily a dominating influence on +science belongs to the positive outcome of philosophy, and Professor +Lazarus, with all his advanced standpoint, has remained behind this +result by about a yard.</p> + +<p>Kindly note that it is not the extinction of the relation between cause +and effect which we predict, but merely that of its dominance.</p> + +<p>Whoever skips lightly over the current of life, will be greatly shocked +when reading that we place the fundamental pillar of all perception, the +category of cause and effect, in the same passing boat in which the +prophets and astrologers rode. One is very prone to belittle the faith +of others by the name of "superstition" and honor one's own superstition +by the title of "science."</p> + +<p>Once we have grasped the fact that our intellect has no other purpose +than that of tracing a human picture of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">[Pg 405]</a></span> cosmic processes, and that its +penetration of the interior of nature, its understanding, explaining, +perceiving, knowing, etc., is nothing else, and cannot be anything else, +that moment it loses its mysterious, transcendental metaphysical +character. We also understand then, that the great spirit above the +clouds who is supposed to create the world out of nothing, could very +well serve the mind as a means of explaining things. And it is the same +with the category of cause and effect, which is a splendid means of +assisting explanation, but still will not suffice for the requirements +of all time to come.</p> + +<p>The perception that the great spirit above the clouds is a free +invention of the small human mind has become so widely spread that we +may well pass on over it to other things.</p> + +<p>Among the questions now on the order of business is the one whether the +"causes" with which modern science operates so widely are not in a way +creators in miniature which produce their effects in a sleight-of-hand +way. And this erroneous notion is, indeed, the current conception.</p> + +<p>If a stone falls into the water, it is the cause of the undulations, but +not their creator. It is only a co-operator, for the liquid and elastic +qualities of the water also act as a cause. If the stone falls into +butter, it creates at best but one undulation, and if this stony creator +falls on the hard ground, it is all up with the creation of undulations. +This shows that causes are not creators, but rather effects which are +not effected, but effect themselves.</p> + +<p>The category of cause and effect is a good help in explanation, so long +as it is accompanied by the philosophical consciousness that the whole +of nature is an infinite sea of transformations, which are not created +by one great or many small creators, but which create themselves.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">[Pg 406]</a></span></p><p>A well-known philosophical author expresses himself in the following +manner: "During the first weeks of its existence, the child has no +perception either of the world without, or of its own body, or of its +soul. Hence its feeling is not accompanied by the consciousness of an +interaction between these three factors. It does not suspect its +causes." We see that soul, body, and outer world are called the three +factors of feeling. Now note how each one of these three causes or +factors is, so to say, the store house of innumerable factors or causes, +all of which cause the feeling of the child. The soul consists of many +soul parts, the body of many bodily parts, and the outer world consists +of so many parts that it would consist of ten times more parts, if there +were any more than innumerable.</p> + +<p>There is no doubt that the child's feeling, or any other, does not exist +independently, but is dependent on the soul, the body, and the outer +world. This constitutes the indubitable interrelation of all things. In +the winding processes of the self-agitated universe, the category of +cause and effect serves as a means of enlightenment, by giving our mind +its help in the systematization of processes. If the drop of a stone +precedes, the undulations of the water follow; if soul, body, and outer +world are present, feeling follows.</p> + +<p>The positive outcome of philosophy does not reject the services of the +category of cause and effect. It only rejects the mystical element in +that category in which many people, even among those with a "scientific +education," still believe. There is no witchcraft in this matter, but +simply a mechanical systematization and classification of natural +phenomena in the order of their appearance. So long as water remains +water and retains its liquid and elastic properties, and so long as a +stone is a stone, a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">[Pg 407]</a></span>ponderous fellow striking the water heavily, just +so long will the splash of the stone be surely and inevitably followed +by undulations of the water. So long as soul, body, and outer world +retain their known properties, they will with unfailing precision +produce feeling. It is no more surprising that we can affirm this on the +strength of our experience than that we have a category of cause and +effect. There exists nothing extraordinary but the condition of things, +and in this respect all things are alike, so that human understanding, +cause and effect, or any other category, are no more extraordinary than +any other condition. The only wonder is the universe, but this, being a +universal wonder, is at the same time trivial, for nothing is so +familiar as that which is common to all.</p> + +<p>By the help of the viewpoint of cause and effect, man throws light on +the phenomena of nature. Cause and effect serve to enlighten us about +the world.</p> + +<p>The way, the method, by which this enlightenment is produced, is the +special object of our study. We do not deny that cause and effect serve +us as a means, but only as one of many. We honor the category of cause +and effect far too much when we regard it as <i>the</i> panacea. We have seen +that formerly other viewpoints served the same purpose and still others +exist today, some of which have a prospect of being valued more highly +in the future than cause and effect. This category serves very well for +the explanation of processes which follow one another. But there are +other phenomena which occur side by side, and these must also be +elucidated. For such a purpose, the category of genus and species is +quite as serviceable. Haeckel speaks somewhat slightingly of "museum +zoologists and herbarium botanists," because they merely classify +animals and plants according to genera and species. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">[Pg 408]</a></span> modern +zoologists and botanists do not simply consider the multiplicity of +animals and plants which exist simultaneously, but also the +chronological order of the changes and transformations, and in this way +they have gained much more of a life-picture of the zoological and +botanical world, a picture not alone of its being, but also of its +growing, of arising and declining. Undoubtedly the knowledge of the +museum zoologists and herbarium botanists was meager, narrow, +mechanical, and modern science offers a far better portrait of truth and +life. Still this is no reason for overestimating the value of analysis +by cause and effect. This method supplements the category of genus and +species. It assists in enlightening, it helps in the process of thought, +but it does not render other forms of thought superfluous.</p> + +<p>It is essential for the theory of understanding, to recognize the +special forms of thought of old and new times as peculiarities which +have a common nature. This common nature of the process of thought, +understanding, enlightenment, is a part of the universal world process, +and not greatly different from it.</p> + +<p>The conception of a cause partly explains the phenomena of the universe; +but so does the conception of a purpose and of a species, in fact, so do +all conceptions.</p> + +<p>In the universe all parts are causes, all of them caused, produced, +created, and yet there is no creator, no producer, no cause. The general +produces the special, and the latter in turn produces by reaction the general.</p> + +<p>The category of the general and the special, of the universe and its +parts, contains all other categories in the germ. In order to explain +the process of thought, we must explain it as a part of the universal +process. It has not caused the creation of the world, neither in a +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_409" id="Page_409">[Pg 409]</a></span>theological nor in an idealist sense, nor is it a mere effect of the +brain substance, as the materialists of the eighteenth century +represented it. The process of thought and its understanding is a +peculiarity of the universal cosmos. The relation of the general to the +special is the clear and typical category underlying all other categories.</p> + +<p>One might also apply other names to this category, for instance, the one +and the many; the essence and the form; the substance and its +attributes; truth and its phenomena, etc. However, a name is but a +breath and a sound; understanding and comprehension are what we want in +the first place.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>XII</span> <span class="smaller">MIND AND MATTER: WHICH IS PRIMARY, WHICH SECONDARY?</span></h2> + +<p>It is the merit of the philosophical outcome to have delivered the +process of understanding from its mystic elements. So long as cause and +effect are not recognized as a form of thought belonging to the same +species with many other forms of thought, all of which serve the common +purpose of illuminating the cosmic processes for the human mind by a +symbolized picture composed of various conceptions, just so long will +something mysterious adhere to the category of cause and effect.</p> + +<p>Philosophy is particularly engaged in illuminating the understanding. It +has learned enough of its specialty to know that it is a part of the +universe performing the special function of arranging the world of +phenomena and its smaller circles according to relations of +consanguinity<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_410" id="Page_410">[Pg 410]</a></span> and chronology. Such an arrangement presents a scientific +picture of the world. The well-known diagram of conceptions used by +logicians, consisting of a large circle symbolizing the general, inside +of which smaller circles crossing and encircling one another represent +the specialties, is a fitting aid in explaining the method by which the +faculty of understanding arrives at its scientific results. Science in +general is the sum of all special kinds of knowledge, differing from +them in no greater degree than the human body from the various organs of +which it is composed. A bodily organ can no more exist outside of the +body than any particular knowledge can exist outside of the generality +of all sciences. No metaphysics is possible under this condition.</p> + +<p>As surely as we know that two mountains cannot be without a valley +between them, just so surely do we know that nothing in heaven, on +earth, or in any other place can lie outside of the general circle of +things. Outside of the worldly world there can be no other little world. +A logically constituted human mind cannot think differently. And it is +likewise impossible to discover such an outside world by the help of and +within the limits of experience, because thought is inseparable from +experience and there can be no experience without thought. A man who has +a head upon his shoulders—and there can be no man without a +head—cannot experience any unworldly metaphysical world. The faculty of +experience, which includes the faculty of understanding or perception, +is merely empirical. Our settled conviction of the unity of the universe +is an inborn logic. The unity of the world is the supreme and most +universal category. A closer look at it at once reveals the fact that it +carries its opposite, the infinite <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_411" id="Page_411">[Pg 411]</a></span>multiplicity, under its heart or in +its womb. The general is pregnant with specialties.</p> + +<p>This is a comparison, and comparisons limp. A mother has other qualities +beside that of motherhood, while the universe, or the absolute +generality, is nothing but the bearer, the cause, of all special and +separate things. It is "pure" motherhood which can no more be without +children than the children without a mother. In this way, no cause can +be without effects. A cause without an effect—let us dismiss it. The +child is as much a cause in motherhood as it is its effect and product. +In the same way the universe has never been, and could not be conceived, +without the many special children which it carries in its womb.</p> + +<p>If thought wishes to make for itself a picture, a conception of the +cause of all causes, it must necessarily take cognizance of the effects. +Thought may very well separate one from the other, but cannot think +correctly without the consciousness that its separating and +distinguishing is only a formality. Imagining, conceiving, knowing, +perceiving, are so many formalities.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> + +<p>But philosophy took its departure from the opposite, the wrong, view. It +regarded perceiving, understanding, as the main thing. It did not use +science as a formality, as something secondary, as something serving a +nature, a cause, a purpose, a higher reason, but it started with the +illogical and irrelevant assumption that the specialty of mind, +understanding, conceiving, judging, distinguishing, is the primary, +supreme, self-constituted cause and purpose, instead of being an element +in logic. Even in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_412" id="Page_412">[Pg 412]</a></span> Hegel's logic, which, by the way, has given us much +light on the process of thought, this confounding of the original with +the copy is the cause of an almost impenetrable mysticism.</p> + +<p>Not nature, but science is to those idealist philosophers the source of +truth. The "true idea" surpassed everything with them. This "idea" is +forced by Hegel to roll about, and wind, and twist as if it were not a +natural child, but a metaphysical dragon. But we cannot deny that in +these twistings and windings of the Hegelian dragon the condition of the +mind is exposed in all its peculiarities and nakedness.</p> + +<p>According to Hegel's theosophical opinion I do not become aware of my +friend in material intercourse and bodily touch. Hegel's mark of a true +friend is not that he proves true in life, but that he corresponds "to +his idea." The "idea" of true friendship is for the idealist the measure +of friendly truth, just as Plato measures the ideal or true condition of +states and cooking pots of this valley of sorrows by the standard of an +"idea" of the state, or an "idea" of the cooking pot, supposed to be +derived from some other world.</p> + +<p>It is surely a valuable gift of nature that the human mind can form its +ideals. But it is a gift that has also caused much trouble and which +requires for its higher development the clear understanding that ideals +are constructed out of real materials. Without this understanding the +human race will never succeed in making a reasonable use of its ideal +faculty. The beautiful ideal of true friendship may stimulate us to +emulation. But the knowledge that it is nothing but an ideal which in +reality is always mixed with a little falseness serves as no mean +antidote against sentimental transcendentalism. And the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_413" id="Page_413">[Pg 413]</a></span> same holds true +of truth, liberty, justice, equality, brotherhood, etc.</p> + +<p>The striving after an ideal is very good, but it does no harm to be +conscious of the fact and clearly see that any ideal can never be +realized without some admixture of its opposite. What is it that Lessing +says? "If God were to offer me the search for truth in his left hand, +and truth in his right, I should grasp his left hand and say: Father, +keep truth, it is for you alone."</p> + +<p>It has not been the task of philosophy to give us a true mind picture of +the world. This it cannot do, this cannot be done by any scientific +specialty. It may be done by the totality of sciences, and even by them +only approximately. Even with them striving is a higher truth and of +higher value than knowing. I repeat, then: It is not the particular task +of philosophy to furnish a true picture of the world, but rather to +investigate the method by which the human mind arrives at its world +pictures. That is its work, and it is the object of this book to sketch +its outline.</p> + +<p>A sketch is in itself an inexact piece of work. I may be blamed for +jumbling together such terms as world, cosmos, universe, nature, or such +others as ideas, judgment, conclusion, thought, mind, intellect, etc., +and for using them as synonyms when many of them have already been +assigned their fixed meaning in the classification of science. But this +is the point which I emphasize, that the method of science, of thought, +has the twofold nature of making fixed terms and still remaining pliable.</p> + +<p>Science not only defines what this or that is, but also how it moves, +how it originates, passes away, and still remains; how it is fixed and +yet at the same time moving. The real being of which science treats, +viz., the universe, is not alone present, but also past and future, and +it is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_414" id="Page_414">[Pg 414]</a></span> not alone this or that, but it is everything. Even nothing is +something belonging to the aggregate life.</p> + +<p>This dialectic statement is rather incomprehensible to the +unphilosophical brain. Nothing and something are conceptions so widely +diverging from one another in the unphilosophical mind that they seem +far more apart than heavenly bliss is supposed to be separated from +earthly misery, according to the declarations of clergymen. Clergymen +are transcendental logicians, and it is likewise transcendental to +regard nothing as an absolute nothing. It cannot be denied that it is at +least a conception or a term. Therefore, whether little or much, it is +something. We cannot get out of existence, out of the universe, any more +than Münchhausen can pull himself out of a swamp by his pigtail.</p> + +<p>There can be no absolute nothing, because the absolute is synonymous +with the universe, and everything else is relative. So it is also with +nothing. It simply has the significance of not being the main thing. To +say: This is nothing means it is not that which is essential at this +time and place. This man is nothing simply means that he is not a man +out of the ordinary, and it does not at all signify that he is nothing at all.</p> + +<p>The category of being and not being, like all categories,<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> which +appear as something fixed to the sound but ill-informed mind, is really +something shifting. Its poles fuse and flow into one another, its +differences are not perfectly radical. These categories give us an +illustration of the mobile universe, which is a unit composed of its +opposite, multiplicity.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_415" id="Page_415">[Pg 415]</a></span></p><p>The positive outcome of philosophy has for its climax the understanding +that the world is multifarious, and that this multiplicity is uniform in +possessing the universal nature in common. The sciences must represent +these objects in such a contradictory way, because all things live in +reality in this contradiction. What the museum zoologists and the +herbarium botanists have accomplished on the field of zoology and botany +in the category of space, has been accepted by the Darwinians with the +addition of the variety of those subjects in the category of time. +Either class of scientists categorizes, classifies, systematizes. The +chemists do the same with substances and forces, and so does Hegel with +his categories of being and not being, quantity and quality, substance +and attribute, thing and quality, cause and effect, etc. He makes all +things flow into one another, rise, pass, move, and he is right in doing +so. Everything moves and belongs together.</p> + +<p>But that which Hegel missed and which is added by us consists in the +further perception that the flow and the variability of the categories +just quoted is only an illustration of the necessary variability and +interaction of all thoughts and conceptions, which are, and must be, +nothing but illustrations and reflexes of the universal life.</p> + +<p>However, the idealist philosophers who have all of them contributed +materially toward this ultimate special knowledge, are still more or +less under the mistaken impression that the process of thinking is the +true process and the true original, and that the true original, nature +or the material universe, is only a secondary phenomenon. We now insist +on having it understood that the cosmic interaction of phenomena, the +universal living world, is the truth and life.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_416" id="Page_416">[Pg 416]</a></span></p><p>Is the world a concept? Is it an idea? It may be conceived and grasped +by the mind, but it does and is more than that. It surpasses our +understanding in the past, the present, and the future. It is infinite +in quantity and quality. How do we know that? We say in the same breath +that we do not know everything which is passing, has passed, and will +pass in the world; we do not understand the whole, and yet we claim to +have fully understood that this whole universe is not a mere idea, but +something absolute, something more than a conception or an intuitive +knowledge, something real and true, something infinite. How do we solve +this contradiction?</p> + +<p>The science of the limitation of the individual and of the collective +human intellect is identical with the universal concept; in other words, +it is innate in the human intellect to know that it is a limited part of +the absolute universe. This intellectual faculty of ours is no less +natural and aboriginal than the faculty of trees to become green in +summer and that of the spiders to spread their nets. Although the +intellect is a limited part of the unlimited and aware of this fact, yet +its faculty of knowing, understanding, judging, is a universal one. No +intellect is possible or conceivable which can do more than the +instrument of thought given by nature to the human race. We may indeed +conceive of a mental giant. But when we take a closer look, every one +will perceive that this mental giant cannot get outside of the +traditional race of thinkers, unless he is supposed to be the creature +of imagination.</p> + +<p>Thinking, knowing, understanding, are universal. I can perceive all +things in about the same way that I can see all cobble stones. I can see +them all, but I cannot see everything that they are composed of, I +cannot see, for instance, that they are heavy and ponderable. In the +same<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_417" id="Page_417">[Pg 417]</a></span> way all things may be perceived, but not everything that belongs +to them. They do not dissolve in understanding, in other words, +understanding is only a part of the universe, all of which may be +perceived, but the understanding of which is not the whole, since our +intellect is but a part of the universe.</p> + +<p>Everything may be understood, but understanding is not everything. Every +pug-dog is a dog, but every dog is not a pug-dog. The conflict of +idealism and materialism rests on this same conflict between genus and +subordinate species. The idealist incarnate contends that all things are +ideas, while we strive to make him see that ideal things and material +things are two species of the same genus, and that they should be given +a common family or general name beside their special name, on account of +their common nature and for the purpose of a sound logic. Wherever this +understanding has been acquired, the quarrel between idealists and +materialists appears in the light of a mere bandying of words.</p> + +<p>Everything is large, everything is small, everything extended through +space and time, everything cause and everything effect, everything a +whole and a part, because everything is the essence of everything, +because everything is contained in the all, everything related, +everything connected, everything interdependent. The conception of all +as the absolute, the content of which consists of innumerable +relativities, the concept of the all as the universal truth which +reflects many phenomena, that is the basis of the science of +understanding.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> A By means of which we picture and explain the monistic +interrelation of all things, called universe, nature and +cosmos.—<span class="smcap">Editor.</span></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> That is, like all categories that are subdivisions of the +absolute being, of general existence, pertaining only to the phenomena +or specialties which, however, in their entirety constitute the absolute +being or monistic nature.—<span class="smcap">Editor</span>.</p></div></div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_418" id="Page_418">[Pg 418]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>XIII</span> <span class="smaller">THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE DOUBTS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CLEAR AND ACCURATE +UNDERSTANDING HAVE BEEN OVERCOME</span></h2> + +<p>A contemporaneous professor of philosophy, Kuno Fischer, of Jena, says: +"The problem of modern philosophy is the understanding of things." But +this problem does not occupy modern philosophy alone; it was also +considered by ancient philosophy. Even more, it belongs to the whole +world. All the world, I mean the whole human world, and especially the +sciences, search after understanding. I do not say this for the purpose +of setting the Professor right, for I acknowledge that he is a fairly +deserving philosopher. If I cared to go through his works, I should +surely find other passages which state the problem of philosophy more +accurately and concretely, to the effect that philosophy does not strive +merely for the indefinite "understanding of things," but rather for the +special understanding of that particular thing which bears the name of +"understanding." Philosophy at the climax of its development seeks to +understand "understanding." It has seriously attempted the solution of +this problem so long as men think, so far as our historical records go.</p> + +<p>After that which we have already said about the beginning and the end of +things and about their immortality, it will be easily understood that +the thing called understanding has no more historical beginning than all +the rest. The known grows out of the unknown, the conscious out of the +unconscious. Our modern consciousness, though agreeably cultivated, is +still an undeveloped, unconscious consciousness. Nevertheless, +development has gone far enough to make it plain that understanding<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_419" id="Page_419">[Pg 419]</a></span> is +anti-religious. Especially the understanding of understanding, the +outcome of positive philosophy, has a pronounced anti-religious, and to +that extent "destructive," tendency. But one should not have an +exaggerated idea of this destruction. Here, under this sun, nothing is +destroyed without leaving the basis for the growth of new life from the +ruins. It belongs to the conception of the universe to understand that +it is the main conception required for the conception of conception, for +the understanding of understanding.</p> + +<p>The history of philosophy begins with the decay of heathen religion, and +the history of modern philosophy with the decay of Christian religion. +Since religion must be preserved for the people according to the +official declarations of the rulers, the official professors are not +clear and accurate expounders of the positive outcome of philosophy. No +matter how great the work of Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel may be, +yet the followers of Kant and Hegel have no freedom of research, and +Kuno Fischer, although very close to the root of the subject, is +nevertheless doomed to remain in the mystification of the function of +conceiving and of understanding. His profession clouds his judgment.</p> + +<p>"Nature," says this professor, "is regarded as the first object of +understanding, as the principle from which everything else follows. In +this respect modern philosophy is naturalistic. It is taken for granted +that nature can be understood, or that the possibility of understanding +things is given. Modern philosophy makes this assumption +dogmatically.... The Kantian philosophy, on the other hand, assumes a +critical, not a dogmatic, attitude toward the possibility of +understanding." (System of Logic and Metaphysics, by Kuno Fischer, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_420" id="Page_420">[Pg 420]</a></span>second edition, pages 104 and 109.) In this latter, critical, stage, +the subject is kept rather hot by the professors of philosophy. The +critics are still engaged in exclaiming: Be amazed, oh world! How is +understanding possible?</p> + +<p>In the first place, there is nothing to be amazed at. Why is not the +"naturalistic" philosopher consistent by recognizing his special object, +understanding, as a natural object?</p> + +<p>The "supposition" that an understanding of things is possible, is +neither a supposition nor anything "dogmatic."</p> + +<p>The philosophers should abandon their old hobby of trying to prove +anything by syllogisms. Nowadays, a case is not substantiated by words, +but by facts, by deeds. The sciences are sufficiently equipped, and thus +the "possibility of understanding" is demonstrated beyond a doubt.</p> + +<p>"But," say the critics who are so wise that they hear the grass growing, +"are those perceptions which are produced by the exact sciences really +perceptions? Are they not simply substitutes? Those sciences recognize +only the phenomena of things; but where is the understanding which +perceives the truth?"</p> + +<p>We shall offer it to them. You are naturalists. Well, then, nature is +the truth. Or are you spiritualists who make a metaphysical distinction +between the truth and the phenomenon? To understand means to distinguish +and judge. The semblance must be distinguished from the truth, but not +in an excessive manner. It must be remembered that even the most evil +semblance is a natural phenomenon, and the sublimest truth is only +revealed by phenomena, just because it is natural.</p> + +<p>But the old logic cannot stand any contradictions. Semblance and truth +are contradictions for it and they cannot be reconciled by it. But the +irreconcilable simply<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_421" id="Page_421">[Pg 421]</a></span> consists in entertaining, in this monistic world, +thoughts which are supposed to be totally different. Hence old style +logic lacks entirely the mediating manner of thought which does not +elevate understanding and its faculty of thought to the skies, but is +satisfied to regard it as a very valuable, but still natural, quality.</p> + +<p>The old logic could not construct any valid rules of thought, because it +thought too transcendentally of thinking itself. It was not satisfied +that thought is only a faculty, a mode of doing, a part of true nature, +but the nature of truth was spiritualized by it into a transcendental +being. Instead of grasping the conception of spirit with blood and +flesh, it tries to dissolve blood and flesh into ideas. That would be +well enough, if such a solution of the riddles were meant to have no +other significance than that of symbols.</p> + +<p>The old logic contains long chapters about the proofs of truth. It is +supposed to be "identical" with the idea and to be proven by ideas. This +would be all right, if we remained conscious of the secondary relation +in which the idea and understanding stand to truth. But old line logic +is not conscious of this relation. On the contrary. Its consciousness +distorts that relation. It elevates the mind to the first place and +relegates blood and flesh to the last.</p> + +<p>"The necessity of a conception is proven by the impossibility of its +opposite. An idea is contradicted by proving its impossibility. This +impossibility is demonstrated when it can be proven that a thing is at +the same time A and not-A, or when it can be shown that a thing is +neither A nor not-A. The first mode of proof is called <i>antinomy</i>, the +second, <i>dilemma</i>."</p> + +<p>In this representation of the logical proof much is said of the "thing," +for instance this: A thing cannot be at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_422" id="Page_422">[Pg 422]</a></span> the same time straight and +crooked, true and untrue, light and dark. The excellence of this +doctrine is easily apparent, because it is overlooked that the concept +"thing" is not a fixed, but a variable one. If a straight line is a +thing, and a crooked line another thing, and if these two things are +held to be opposed to one another, then the above logic is the most +justified in the world. But who claims that there are not many straight +lines which are crooked at one end, which run straight on for a certain +distance and then turn? Who will define to us what a line is? A line may +be composed of 10, 20, 30, etc., parts, and each part is a line.</p> + +<p>Before anything to the point can be said about the logical laws, it is +necessary to say above all how it stands with the relation of the whole +to its parts, of the universe to its subdivisions. The old theological +question of God and his creatures, the old metaphysical question of the +unity and the multiplicity, of truth and its phenomena, reason and +consequence, etc., in one word, the question of metaphysical categories +must be solved and settled before the definition of the minor factors of +understanding, the questions of formal logic, can be attempted.</p> + +<p>What is a "thing?" A clergyman would answer: Only God is something, +everything else is nothing! And we say: Only the universe is something, +and everything in it consists of vacillating, changing, precarious, +varicolored, fluid, variable phenomena or relativities.</p> + +<p>In our times, up to which the theologians have speculated so much and +contributed so little to understanding, one can hardly touch on the God +concept without annoying the reader. Yet it is very essential for a +thorough understanding of the human mind to point out that the God +concept and the universe concept are analogous <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_423" id="Page_423">[Pg 423]</a></span>concepts. Not in vain +have the first minds of modern philosophy, such as Cartesius, Spinoza, +Leibniz, occupied themselves so closely with the God concept. They +invented the socalled ontological proof of the existence of God. This +proof if applied to the universe, testifies to its divinity. A +metaphysical cloud pusher as well as the physical cosmos are +fundamentally concepts of the most perfect being. It makes little +difference whether we say that the concept of the universe, or of the +cosmos, or of the most perfect being is innate in man. If this concept +were not existing, it would lack the main thing required for its +perfection. Hence the most perfect being must exist. And it does. It is +the universe, and everything belongs to its existence. Nothing is +excluded from it, least of all understanding. The latter is, therefore, +not only possible, but a fact, which is proven by the very concept of +the most perfect being.</p> + +<p>This ought to be sufficient to help us over the doubts of the critics, +especially over Kantian criticism, or rather dualism. Kant did not care +to accept the dogma of the possibility of understanding without +examination; he wished to investigate first. He then discovered that we +may understand correctly, provided we remain with our understanding on +the field of common experience; in other words, in the physical +universe, and refrain from digressing into the metaphysical heaven. But +he did not understand that the metaphysical heaven against which he +warns us would be an obsolete standpoint in our days.</p> + +<p>He still permits that transcendental possibility to remain and while he +warns us not to stray into it with our understanding he omits to tell us +to also keep away from it with our intuition. Kant struggles about +between the "thing as phenomenon" and the "thing itself." The former is +material and may be understood, the latter is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_424" id="Page_424">[Pg 424]</a></span> supernatural and may be +believed or divined. With this doctrine, he again made understanding, +the object of modern philosophy, problematical, thus inviting us to +investigate further.</p> + +<p>This we have done, and it is now the positive outcome of philosophy to +know clearly and definitely and understand that understanding is not +only a part of this world of phenomena, but a true part of the general +truth, beside which there is no other truth, and which is the most +perfect being.</p> + +<p>Philosophy took its departure from confused wrangling about that which +is and that which is not, especially from the religious disappointments +met by the Greek nation when its world of deities dissolved into +phantasms. Humanity demands a positive, strong, unequivocal, reliable +understanding. Now, in this world of ours, the solid is so mixed with +the fluid, the imperishable with the perishable, that a total separation +is impossible. Nevertheless our intellect catches itself continually +making separations and distinctions. Should not that appear mysterious +to it? The necessary and natural result was the problem of the theory of +understanding, the special question of philosophy: Which is the way to +an indubitably clear and positive understanding?</p> + +<p>The summit of Grecian philosophy bears the name of Aristotle. He was a +practical man who did not like to stray into the distance when he could +find good things near by, and he did not concern himself about the +descent of understanding. Its platonic origin from an ideal world went +instinctively against his grain. He, therefore, took hold of the +question at the nearest end and analyzed the positive knowledge +available at that time. But since Grecian science and the knowledge of +Aristotlean times<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_425" id="Page_425">[Pg 425]</a></span> were rather slim, his attempt to demonstrate logic +did not produce any decisive results. But it had been discovered that it +was possible to make positive deductions from fixed premises.</p> + +<p>Aristotle clung to this. He showed clearly and definitely, excellently +and substantially, how logical deductions should be made in order to +arrive at positive understanding. All dogs are watchful. My pug-dog is a +dog, therefore it is watchful. What can be more evident? Why, then, +speculate about God, freedom, and immortality, when indubitable +knowledge may be obtained by the formal method of exact deductions?</p> + +<p>But Aristotle had overlooked something, or, being a practical man, +perhaps overlooked it intentionally. The premise from which he deducted +the watchfulness of dogs in general, was handed down by tradition and +had been accepted on faith. But was it founded on fact? Could there not +be some dogs who lacked the quality of watchfulness, and might not our +pug-dog be very unreliable, in spite of all exact deductions? In the +case of the pug-dog this would not be of very great moment. But what +about the question of the beginning and end of the world, or the +question of the existence of God? The Grecian gods had been outgrown by +Aristotle.</p> + +<p>The history of logic, and of philosophy in general, is interrupted by +Christianity and by the decline of the antique world, until the +reformation opens a new era. The Catholic church had, in its own way, +thoroughly settled the great questions of the true nature of things, of +beginning and end, reason and consequence. But when it, and with it +Christianity, began to disintegrate, disbelief once more posed in the +brains of the philosophers the old question: How do we obtain reliable +and true <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_426" id="Page_426">[Pg 426]</a></span>understanding? Reliability and truth were at that time still +identical.</p> + +<p>Bacon and Descartes are the men who started the investigation. Both of +them were disgusted with Aristotle and with his formal logic, +particularly with the subtleties of scholasticism. It did not satisfy +this new epoch to found positive understanding on traditional +contentions and exact deductions therefrom. It is a radical epoch and, +therefore, epoch-making. The new philosophers have the aim of +unequivocal understanding in common with the ancient philosophers. Bacon +still connects himself with the stock in trade of the past. His +historian says of him that one should not reiterate that Bacon took his +departure from experience, for this means nothing or nothing more than +that Columbus was a mariner while the main thing is that he discovered +America.... He wanted to find a new logic corresponding to the new +life.... The inventive human mind has created the new time, the compass, +the powder, the art of typography.... He wanted a new logic which +corresponded to the spirit of invention. He, the philosopher of +invention, was Lord Chancellor of England, was a man of the world. Not +only himself, but also his science, was too ambitious, too full of +energy, too world-embracing, for him to bury himself in solitude. That +is a glory for a philosopher, but at the same time an obstacle for his +special task, for the new logic. He recognized the import of his task +only in its general outlines. But his contemporary and successor +Descartes approached the matter more radically and pointedly.</p> + +<p>Although in recent times the human mind had demonstrated its positive +faculty of understanding in natural sciences, especially by inventions, +still it was prejudiced by religious improbabilities in its great +premises dealing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_427" id="Page_427">[Pg 427]</a></span> with the essence of things and men, with the "good, +true, and beautiful," as the ancients called it. In order to end his +doubts, Descartes elevates radical doubt to the position of a principle +and of a starting point for all understanding. Then he cannot doubt that +he is at least searching for truth. He who does not believe in any +understanding, any science, any inventions, cannot doubt at all events +that the impulse for understanding is there. It, at least, is +undeniable. <i>Cogito, ergo sum</i>—I think, therefore I am—that is a +premise which cannot be shaken. The rest, thinks Descartes, may be +deducted by Aristotlean methods.</p> + +<p>With this thought, the philosopher of modern times relapsed into the old +error that anything positively true could be ascertained with logical +formulas. His consciousness of the thoughts stirring in his brain, I +might say his flesh and blood, convinced him by matter-of-fact evidence +of the reality of their existence.</p> + +<p>This fact had hitherto been misunderstood. It is claimed that Descartes +could convince himself only of the existence of his soul, of his +thought, by evidence. No, my feeling, my sight, my hearing, etc., are +just as evident to me as my thinking, and simultaneously with sight and +hearing that which is heard and seen. The separation of subject and +object can and must be merely a formality.</p> + +<p>The Descartian thesis has been distorted into the statement that nothing +is evident to man but his own subjective conception. And the ideology +has been carried to the extreme of calling the whole world an idea, a +phantasmagoria. True, Descartes needed God in order to be sure that his +conceptions did not cheat him.</p> + +<p>In order to prove that we no longer need such extravagant means in our +times, I shall devote another chapter to this subject.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_428" id="Page_428">[Pg 428]</a></span></p> + +<h2><span>XIV</span> <span class="smaller">CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DOUBTFUL AND +EVIDENT UNDERSTANDING</span></h2> + +<p>Let us divide the history of civilization into two periods. In the +first, the less civilized period, the doubtful perceptions predominate, +in the second period the evident ones. Our special investigation of the +correct way of evident understanding began in the first period in which +the doubtful perceptions, commonly called errors, predominated. In this +period, the gods rule in heaven and imagination on earth.</p> + +<p>To get rid of errors meant originally to lose gods and heaven. The ideal +world was the cause of metaphysics. Metaphysics which drew the +investigation of the supernatural into the circle of its activity, did +so for the purpose of enlightening the human mind. Thus its problem was +from the outset of a twofold nature. It desires to throw light on the +natural process of thought, which was temporarily unbalanced by a bent +for the supernatural, and for this reason it first loses itself in the clouds.</p> + +<p>While human reason has now become soberer, the meaning of the term +"metaphysics" has also been sobered down. Our contemporaneous +metaphysicians speak no longer of such transcendental things as the +ancients did. Present day metaphysics occupies itself with such abstract +ideas as the thing and nothing, being and coming into being, matter and +force, truth and error.</p> + +<p>Particularly the investigation of doubtful, erroneous, and evident or +true understanding, which we here discuss, is a part of metaphysics.</p> + +<p>The term metaphysics, then, has a double meaning,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_429" id="Page_429">[Pg 429]</a></span> one of them +transcendental and extravagant, the other natural and within sober +limits. Our sober task of demonstrating the positive outcome of +philosophy that acquired sober methods in dealing with understanding +also compels us to face transcendental metaphysics, which sobers down in +the course of time and develops into its opposite, into pure, bare, +naked physics.</p> + +<p>The divine has become human, the transcendental sober, and so +understanding grows ever more unequivocal and evident in the progress of history.</p> + +<p>In order to become clear on the problem of understanding, we must cease +to turn our eyes to any one individual opinion, thought, knowledge, or +perception. We must rather consider the process of understanding in its +entirety. We then notice the development from doubt to evidence, from +errors to true understanding. At the same time we become aware how +unwise it was to entertain such an exaggerated idea of the contrast +between truth and error.</p> + +<p>Whoever searches for true and evident understanding will not find it in +Jerusalem, nor in Jericho, nor in the spirit; not in any single thing, +but in the universe. There the known emerges from the unknown so +gradually that no beginning can be traced. Understanding comes into +being and grows, is partly erroneous and partly accurate, becomes more +and more evident. But there is never an absolutely true understanding +any more than there can be an absolutely faulty one. Only the universe, +but not any single thing, is absolute, imperishable, and impregnable.</p> + +<p>In order to accurately define understanding, we must separate it from +misunderstanding, but not too far, not excessively, otherwise the thing +becomes extravagant. The limited formal logic teaches, indeed, that the +same<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_430" id="Page_430">[Pg 430]</a></span> thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, affirmation +and denial being contradictions. But such a logic is very narrow. Herbs +are not weeds. Weeds are the negation of herbs, and still weeds are +herbs. An erroneous understanding is a negation of a true understanding, +error is not truth, and still it exists in truth. There is no absolute +error any more than perceptions are the truth itself. All perceptions +are and remain nothing but symbols or reflections of truth.</p> + +<p>We do not wish to confound error with truth and make a stew of them, but +rather understand them both. The mixing is done by the man who opposes +them as irreconcilable contradictions. Let us first note the mistake +committed in so doing. By so opposing error and truth something is done +which is not intended, not known. The intention is to confront the +erroneous understanding with truth. For this purpose, error is assumed +to be the same as erroneous understanding, which may be admitted; but +true understanding and truth are two different things and must be kept +separate, if we wish to arrive at clear and unmistakable results. If we +formulate the question in this way: How do erroneous and true +understanding differ, we are nearer to the desired clarity by two solar +distances. We then find that error and understanding do not exclude one +another, but are two species of the same genus, two individuals of the +same family.</p> + +<p>Two times two is not alone four; this is only a part of the truth; it is +also four times one, or eight times one-half, or one plus three, or +sixteen times one-quarter, etc. The man who first observed that the sun +circled around the earth once a day, committed a mistake, yet he made a +true perception. The apparent circulation of the sun in twenty-four +hours around the earth is a substantial part<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_431" id="Page_431">[Pg 431]</a></span> of the understanding which +illumines the relation of the motion of the sun and of the earth. No +truth is merely simple, but it is at the same time composed of an +infinite number of partial truths. The semblance must not be +contradictorily separated from truth, in an extravagant sense, but is +part of truth, just as all errors contribute toward true understanding. +In so far as all perceptions are limited, they are errors, partial +truths. True understanding requires above all the backing of the +conscious recognition that it is a limited part of the unlimited universe.</p> + +<p>The cosmic relation of the whole to its parts, of the general to the +special, must be considered in order to get a clear conception of the +nature of the human understanding.</p> + +<p>Understanding or knowledge, thinking, perceiving, reasoning, must, for +the purpose of investigation, not be excessively separated from other +phenomena. In a way, every object which is chosen for special study is +isolated. In saying, "in a way," I mean that the separation of the +objects of study from other world objects must be consciously moderate, +not exaggerated. The separation of the intellect from other objects or +subjects when investigating them, must be accompanied by the recognition +that such a separation is not excessive, but only formal. In separating +a board, for the purpose of studying its condition, from other boards or +things and finding that it is black, I must still remember that this +board is black only on account of its interdependence with the whole +world process; that the blackness which it possesses is not of its own +making, but that light, and eyes, and the whole cosmic connection belong +to it. In this way every special perception becomes a proportionate part +in the chain of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_432" id="Page_432">[Pg 432]</a></span> universal perceptions, and this again a proportionate +part of the universal life.</p> + +<p>That this evident universal life is not a mere semblance, not a ghost, +not a baseless imagination, but the truth, is made evident to the +thinking man by his consciousness, reason, common sense. True, he has +been deceived by them, sometimes. But it requires no logic, no +syllogistic proof, to know that they are telling the truth in this respect.</p> + +<p>It is nevertheless important to give this proof, because by it the +peculiar nature of our intellect is revealed, of the object the study of +which is the special concern of philosophy.</p> + +<p>This proof, that the universe is the universal truth, was first +attempted by philosophy in an indirect way, by casting about in vain for +a metaphysical truth.</p> + +<p>The philosopher Kant was no doubt the thinker who confined the use of +understanding most strictly to the domain of experience. Now, if we +recognize that this field is universal, we become aware that the assumed +Kantian limitation is not a limitation at all. The human mind is a +universal instrument, the special productions of which all belong to +general truth. Though we make a distinction between the doubtful and the +positive, the outcome of philosophy teaches us that it must be no +excessive distinction, but must be backed up by the consciousness that +all evidence is composed of probabilities, of phenomena of truth, of +parts of truth.</p> + +<p>The thinking understanding—this is the result of philosophy—is no more +evident than anything else and derives its existence not from itself, +but from the universal life. This universal life from which thought +derives its perceptions, from which understanding derives its +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_433" id="Page_433">[Pg 433]</a></span>enlightenment, does not only exist as a general thing, but also in the +form of infinitely varied individualities. And generalization, the +relation of things, their number and extension, are no more, and no +less, infinite than individualization and specialization. Every tree in +the forest, every grain of a pile of sand, are individual, separate, +distinct. Every particle of every grain of sand is distinctly +individual. And the infinite individualization of nature goes so far +that, just as the human individual is different every day, every hour, +every moment, so is the individual grain of sand, even though its +transformations were not to become noticeable until after thousands of +years, by accumulated changes. By classifying this contradictory, +infinitely general and infinitely individual nature in groups according +to time and space, in classes, genera, families, species, orders, and +other subdivisions, we are discerning and understanding.</p> + +<p>In the universe, every group is an individual and every individual is a +group. The uniformity of nature is not greater than its variety. Both of +them are infinite. We distinguish between time and space. Every moment +is composed of little moments. The smallest division of time cannot be +denominated any more than the largest, just because there is no smallest +and no largest in the universe, neither in time nor in space. Atoms are +groups. As smallest parts they exist only in our thoughts and thus give +excellent service in chemistry. The consciousness that they are not +tangible, but only mental things, does not detract from their +usefulness, but heightens it still more.</p> + +<p>It is the nature of human intelligence to divide, classify, group. We +divide the world into four cardinal points; we also divide it into two +kingdoms, the kingdom<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_434" id="Page_434">[Pg 434]</a></span> of the mind and the kingdom of nature; the latter +we again subdivide into the organic and the inorganic, or perhaps into +the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. In short, science seeks to +illumine the universe by division. The question then arises: Which is +the genuine and true division? Where does the variety of science, its +undecided vacillation end, and when does understanding become stable?</p> + +<p>The reader should remember that the things, the objects of +understanding, are not fixed, but also variable objects, and that the +whole universe is moving, progressing; that especially the human mind +becomes more and more affluent from century to century, from year to +year, and that for this reason science is not alone compelled to fix +things, but also to remain in flow. The fixed and the fluid are not so +widely separated in science any more, that the evidence could not be +evident and yet at the same time a little doubtful.</p> + +<p>Man and his understanding are progressive, and for this reason he must +progress by experience in his classifications, conceptions, and +sciences.</p> + +<p>The fixed, impregnable, socalled apodictical facts are nothing but +tautologies, if seen at close range. After it has become common usage to +call only heavy and tangible things bodies, it is an apodictical fact +that all bodies are heavy and tangible. If the conceptions of vapor, +water and ice are restricted by common usage and by science to the three +stages of aggregation of the same substance, then we need not wonder at +our firm assurance that the water will always remain fluid in all time +to come, also above the stars. This signifies nothing more than that we +conceive of the things as solid which we call solid, and of those as +fluid which we call fluid,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_435" id="Page_435">[Pg 435]</a></span> but it does not change the fact that our +faculty of understanding or perceiving gives us only an approximate +picture of natural processes, in which the solid and the fluid are +neither wholly opposed nor different, but where the positive and the +negative gradually flow into one another.</p> + +<p>The philosophers produced a very good conception of understanding by +developing the concept of truth step by step and finally coming to quite +exact results. But this "quite exact" must only be accepted in a +reasonable sense, not in an extravagant one. Truth as the infinite, as +the sum total of all things and qualities, is "in itself" quite right, +but it cannot be accurately reproduced, not even by means of the mind, +of reason, or understanding. The means is smaller than the purpose, is +subordinate to purpose. So is our faculty of understanding only a +subordinate servant of truth, of the universe. The latter is absolutely +evident, true, indubitable, and positive. It does not vitiate the +sublimity of this world in the least that it is veiled by appearances, +by error, by untruth. On the contrary. Without sin there is no virtue, +and without error there is no understanding, no truth. The negative, the +weakness, the sin and error, are overcome, and thereby truth shines in +full splendor. The universe, the general truth, is a progressive thing. +It is absolute, but not at any fixed time or place, but only in the +combined unity of all time and space.</p> + +<p>It is sometimes said that this is too much for our intellect, that we +cannot understand this. It is true that we cannot squeeze this into any +of our categories, of our fundamental conceptions, unless we place the +category of illimited and indeterminable and infinite truth at the +beginning of them. If that is not quite clear and plain, it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_436" id="Page_436">[Pg 436]</a></span> should +serve to teach us that the category of clear and plain human +understanding is destined to recognize its function as a subordinate +factor of nature.</p> + +<p>Such an understanding of understanding, such a higher consciousness +standing ever behind us, promotes a meek pride or a proud meekness which +is well distinguished from the mental poverty of theologians, from the +transcendental distinction between God and the world, between creator +and creature. To us the perishable soul is not a narrow-minded servant +for whom the plans of the imperishable monster soul are +incomprehensible. A philosophically educated and self-understanding mind +is a part of absolute nature. This mind is not only a limited human +mind, but the mind of the infinite eternal, omnipotent universe from +which it derived the faculty of knowing everything knowable. But when +this mind demands the ability to absolutely know everything, it demands +that knowledge should be everything, it becomes transcendental and +insolent, it misconceives the relation of science to infinity. The +latter is more than science, it is the object of science.</p> + +<hr /> + +<h2><span>XV</span> <span class="smaller">CONCLUSION</span></h2> + +<p>The philosopher Herbart declares: "If the meaning of a word were +determined by the use to which it is put by this or that person, then +the term <i>metaphysics</i> would be ambiguous and scarcely comprehensible. +If one wishes to know what meaning of this term has been<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_437" id="Page_437">[Pg 437]</a></span> handed down to +us by tradition, he should read the ancient metaphysicians and their +followers, from Aristotle to Wolff and his school. It will then be found +that the concepts of being, of its quality, of cause and effect, of +space and time, have been the objects of this science everywhere ... +that it has been attempted to analyze them logically and that this has +led to all sorts of disputes. These disputes ... determined the concept +of metaphysics."</p> + +<p>Such a declaration is right enough to furnish, by the help of a little +criticism on our part, a sketch of the positive outcome of philosophy.</p> + +<p>Metaphysics has always been the principal part of philosophy. In the +first sentence of his "Handbook for the Elements of Philosophy," Herbart +defines philosophy as the "analysis of ideas." According to this, +metaphysics would have to analyze the special ideas of being, etc. Now +it must be remembered that the idea of being is not so much a special +concept as the general idea which comprises all ideas and all things. +Everything belongs to being, and to understand that is too much for +metaphysics. Hence it came into difficulties. Now our authority has just +explained to us that the concept of metaphysics was not so much +determined by the work it accomplished as by disputes. It did not work, +but only made the logical attempt to analyze the concept of being. In so +doing it led to disputes and did not distinguish itself very much as a +science. The latter, Kant has told us in his preface to his "Critique of +Pure Reason," is recognized by its agreements, not by its disputes.</p> + +<p>The metaphysical disputes were overcome by philosophic science, which is +the study of ideas or understanding, by arriving at a clear and plain +theory of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_438" id="Page_438">[Pg 438]</a></span>understanding, the demonstration of which I have here +attempted.</p> + +<p>The faculty of understanding had been transmitted to us by our +superstitious ancestors as a thing of another world. But the illusion of +another world is a metaphysical one and led to disputes about the idea +of being.</p> + +<p>The positive outcome of philosophy assures us and demonstrates that +there is only one world, that this world is the essence of all being, +that there are many modes of being, but that they all belong to the same +common nature. Thus philosophy has unified the concept of being and +overcome metaphysics and its disputes.</p> + +<p>Universal being has only one quality, the natural one of general +existence. At the same time this quality is the essence of all special +qualities. Just as the concept of herbs includes all herbs, even weeds, +so the concept of being comprises not only that which is, but also that +which is not, which was once upon a time and which will be in the future.</p> + +<p>To free the concept of being from its metaphysical disputes, is a very +difficult thing for those who attribute an extravagant meaning to the +first principle of logic which says: "Any subject can have only one of +two radically different predicates, because it cannot be at the same +time A and not-A."</p> + +<p>All previous science of understanding has really revolved around this +statement. It is based on something plausible, but still more on +misunderstanding. Only when we have become aware of what has finally +been the outcome of the science of understanding, only when this +statement is backed up by the positive product of philosophy, does this +stubbornly maintained and much contested statement receive a lasting +value by its just modification.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_439" id="Page_439">[Pg 439]</a></span></p><p>In the first place, a "subject" is not a fixed, but a variable concept. +In the last analysis, as we have sufficiently explained in this work, +there is only one sole universal subject which is nowhere radically +different.</p> + +<p>The first principle of the old and tried Aristotlean logic tells us that +a man, a subject, who is lame cannot move about with alacrity. But I +have a friend who was totally lame and who today jumps about briskly; +there is no contradiction in this. But if I tell another man about my +lame friend and in the course of my story have this lame subject all of +a sudden jumping over chairs and tables, then such a thing is +<i>inconceivable</i> and I contradict myself. Such a contradiction is a +violation of all logic, but not because agility and lameness are totally +different predicates which cannot be attributed to the same subject, nor +because the contradiction cannot exist. Being is full of contradictions, +but they are not simultaneous or without mediation. A logical speech or +story must not forget to mediate. By mediation, all contradictions are +solved. And this is the outcome of philosophy.</p> + +<p>In discordant metaphysics, being and not being are irreconcilable and +mutually exclusive contradictions. Metaphysics is in doubt whether this +common existence is real or only apparent, or whether there is not +somewhere in a heaven above the clouds an entirely different life. But +philosophy is now fully aware that even the most fictitious being is so +positively real that any negation which appearances may attribute to it +is outclassed by affirmation to the utter discomfiture of the former. +Being and its affirmation is absolute, negation and not being are only +relative. Being is everywhere and always dominant, so that there is no +non-existence. Though we may say that this or that is nothing, yet we +must remain<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_440" id="Page_440">[Pg 440]</a></span> conscious that anything we may call nothing is still +something very positive. There cannot be any ignorance which does not at +least know a little. There is no evil which cannot be transformed into +good. The things that have been, will be, and are, all of them are. +There is no non-existence. It is at least a word, though it does not +convey any meaning. The world and our language are of so positive a +character that even a meaningless word still means something. Nothing +cannot be expressed.</p> + +<p>The superstition of another "true" world which floats above this world +of phenomena or is secretly hidden behind it has so vitiated logic that +it is now difficult to remove the discordant metaphysical "concept of +being" from the human mind. The belief in something absolutely different +will not easily disappear. It is especially difficult to demonstrate +that conceived things are of the same nature as real things, that both +of them really belong to true nature.</p> + +<p>Conceived things are pictures, real pictures, pictures of reality. All +the limbs of an imaginary dragon are copied from nature. Such creations +of imagination are distinguished from truths only by their fanciful +composition. To connect nature and human life according to the given +order, that is the whole function of understanding. Knowing, thinking, +understanding, explaining, has not, and cannot have, any other function +but that of describing the processes of experience by division or +classification. The famous scientist Haeckel may call this +contemptuously "museum zoology" and "herbarium botany," but he simply +shows that he has not grasped the secret of the intellect, but still +wonders at it in a metaphysical way, the same as his predecessors.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_441" id="Page_441">[Pg 441]</a></span></p><p>What Darwin ascertained about the "origin of species" and about the +transitions and evolutions in organic life is a very valuable expansion +of museum zoology. Whoever expects anything else from the nature of +intellectual faculties, shows that he is not familiar with the outcome +of philosophy, that he has not emancipated himself from the vain +wondering and its accompanying edification, which the wonder of human +intelligence caused to primitive ignorance.</p> + +<p>Understanding has hitherto been in error about itself and was, +therefore, inadequately equipped for the task of giving a true account +of its relatives, of the phenomena of nature and life. Nevertheless it +has acquired training in the course of culture and has progressively +accomplished better things. Its errors have never been valueless, and +its truths will never be sufficient. That this is so, is not due to the +defective condition of our intelligence, but to the inexhaustibleness of +being, the indescribable wealth of nature.</p> + +<p>The self-conscious, philosophically trained understanding and +intelligence has now the means of knowing that the accuracy of all +investigation is limited, that for this reason all its future results +will be affected by error. But a science which is backed up by such an +enlightened understanding, is reconciled to its limitations and +transforms them into a hall of glory. Self-conscious limitation is aware +of its partnership in the absolute perfection of the universe.</p> + +<p>The self-conscious intellect improved by the positive product of +philosophy knows that it can understand, describe, the whole world in a +natural, sensible way. There is nothing that can resist it. But in the +sense of a transcendental metaphysics, our understanding is not worthy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_442" id="Page_442">[Pg 442]</a></span> +of that name. In return, this metaphysics is pure vagary in the eyes of +critical reason.</p> + +<p>Taking its departure from fantastical ideals, from contradictions, +especially between being and not being, metaphysics has gradually +transformed itself in the course of civilization and become philosophy, +which in its turn has progressed step by step the same as all other science.</p> + +<p>Philosophy was at first impelled by the nebulous desire for universal +world wisdom and has finally assumed the form of a lucid special +investigation of the theory of understanding.</p> + +<p>This theory is part, and the most essential part at that, of psychology +or the science of the soul. Modern psychologists have at least divined, +if not recognized, that the human soul is not a metaphysical thing, but +a phenomenon. Like Professor Haeckel, they also complain about the dead +classification in their specialty. The human soul is presented to them +as a multitude of <i>faculties</i>. There is the faculty of understanding, of +feeling, of perceiving, etc., without number and end. But how is life +infused into them? Where is the consistent connection?</p> + +<p>There is, for instance, the conception and feeling of beauty in the +human soul. The beautiful again is divided into the artistically +beautiful and the ethically beautiful, and each of these into other +subdivisions. There is beside the beautiful also the pretty, the +charming, the graceful, the dignified, the noble, the solemn, the +splendid, the pathetic, the touching. Psychology also treats of the +ridiculous, of the joke, the wit, the satire, the irony, the humor, of a +thousand subtleties and distinctions, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_443" id="Page_443">[Pg 443]</a></span> ideological separation of +which it attempts just as do botany, zoology, and every other science in +their field.</p> + +<p>To all of them, being is the object of study. What is the use of +metaphysics under these circumstances? Only because it had in mind a +different being, a transcendental one, could it induce Kant to sum up +all his studies in the question: How is metaphysics possible as a science?</p> + +<p>It is the merit of philosophy to have demonstrated that metaphysics is +possible only as fantastical speculation.</p> + +<p>It is the business of metaphysics to treat being transcendentally. It is +the business of special sciences to classify being after the manner of +herbarium botany. Classical order is already present in the vegetable +kingdom, otherwise no specialist in botany could classify it.</p> + +<p>But the objective arrangement of the vegetable kingdom in infinitely +more multiform than the subjective arrangement of botany. The latter is +always excellent, if it corresponds to the scientific progress of its +period. Whoever is looking for absolute botany or psychology, or for any +other absolute science, misunderstands the universally natural character +of the absolute as well as the relative special character of the human +faculty of understanding.</p> + +<p>Philosophy familiar with its historical achievement understands being as +the infinite material of life and science which is taken up by the +special sciences and classified by them. It teaches the specialists to +remember throughout all their classifications according to departments +and concepts that all specialties are connected by life and not so +separated in life as they are in science, but that they are flowing and +passing into one another.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_444" id="Page_444">[Pg 444]</a></span></p><p>Thus our science of understanding finally culminates in the rule: Thou +shalt sharply divide and subdivide and farther subdivide to the utmost +the universal concept, the concept of the universe, but thou shalt be +backed up by the consciousness that this mental classification is a +formality by which man seeks for the sake of his information to register +and to place his experience; thou shalt furthermore remain aware of thy +liberty to progressively improve the experience acquired by thyself in +the course of time, by modifying thy classification.</p> + +<p>Things are ideas, ideas are names, and things, ideas, and names are +subject to continuous perfection.</p> + +<p>Stable motion and mobile stability constitute the reconciling +contradiction which enables us to reconcile all contradictions.</p> + +<p class="tbrk"> </p> + +<p class="bold">THE END</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Positive Outcome of Philosophy, by +Joseph Dietzgen + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY *** + +***** This file should be named 39964-h.htm or 39964-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/9/9/6/39964/ + +Produced by Odessa Paige Turner, Martin Pettit and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at + www.gutenberg.org/license. + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 +North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email +contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the +Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + + +</pre> + +</body> +</html> diff --git a/39964.txt b/39964.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26d9367 --- /dev/null +++ b/39964.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12712 @@ +Project Gutenberg's The Positive Outcome of Philosophy, by Joseph Dietzgen + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Positive Outcome of Philosophy + The Nature of Human Brain Work. Letters on Logic. + +Author: Joseph Dietzgen + +Translator: Ernst Unterman + +Release Date: June 10, 2012 [EBook #39964] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY *** + + + + +Produced by Odessa Paige Turner, Martin Pettit and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + + + + + +THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY + +The Nature of Human Brain Work +Letters on Logic. +The Positive Outcome of Philosophy + +BY +JOSEPH DIETZGEN + +_TRANSLATED BY ERNEST UNTERMANN_ + +WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY DR. ANTON PANNEKOEK +TRANSLATED BY ERNEST UNTERMANN + +EDITED BY EUGENE DIETZGEN AND JOSEPH DIETZGEN, JR. + +CHICAGO +CHARLES H. KERR & COMPANY +1906 + + +COPYRIGHT 1906 +BY EUGENE DIETZGEN + + + + +CONTENTS + + PAGE +INTRODUCTION BY ANTON PANNEKOEK 7 + +THE NATURE OF HUMAN BRAIN WORK + Preface 41 + I. Introduction 47 + II. Pure Reason or the Faculty of Thought in General 61 + III. The Nature of Things 80 + IV. The Practice of Reason in Physical Science 104 + _a_ Cause and Effect 108 + _b_ Matter and Mind 119 + _c_ Force and Matter 124 + V. "Practical Reason" or Morality 133 + _a_ The Wise and Reasonable 133 + _b_ Morality and Right 143 + _c_ The Holy 156 + +LETTERS ON LOGIC + First Letter 177 + Second Letter 181 + Third Letter 186 + Fourth Letter 191 + Fifth Letter 198 + Sixth Letter 205 + Seventh Letter 212 + Eighth Letter 217 + Ninth Letter 225 + Tenth Letter 230 + Eleventh Letter 236 + Twelfth Letter 242 + Thirteenth Letter 248 + Fourteenth Letter 255 + Fifteenth Letter 260 + Sixteenth Letter 265 + Seventeenth Letter 271 + Eighteenth Letter 277 + Nineteenth Letter 283 + Twentieth Letter 289 + Twenty-first Letter 296 + Twenty-second Letter 301 + Twenty-third Letter (a) 307 + Twenty-third Letter (b) 312 + Twenty-fourth Letter 318 + +THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY + Preface 327 + I. Positive Knowledge as a Special Object 333 + II. The Power of Perception Is Kin to the Universe 337 + III. As to How the Intellect Is Limited and Unlimited 342 + IV. The Universality of Nature 348 + V. The Understanding as a Part of the Human Soul 354 + VI. Consciousness Is Endowed With the Faculty of Knowing + as Well as With the Feeling of the Universality + of All Nature 363 + VII. The Relationship or Identity of Spirit and Nature 369 + VIII. Understanding Is Material 376 + IX. The Four Principles of Logic 381 + X. The Function of Understanding on the Religious Field 393 + XI. The Distinction Between Cause and Effect Is only + One of the Means to Facilitate Understanding 401 + XII. Mind and Matter: Which Is Primary, Which Is + Secondary? 409 + XIII. The Extent to Which the Doubts of the Possibility + of Clear and Accurate Understanding Have Been + Overcome 418 + XIV. Continuation of the Discussion on the Difference + Between Doubtful and Evident Understanding 428 + XV. Conclusion 436 + + + + +INTRODUCTION + +THE POSITION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF J. DIETZGEN'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS + +BY DR. ANTON PANNEKOEK + + +In the history of philosophy we see before us the consecutive forms of +the thoughts of the ruling classes of society on life and on the world +at large. This class thought appears after the primitive communism has +given way to a society with class antagonisms, at a stage when the +wealth of the members of the ruling class gave them leisure time and +thus stimulated them to turn their attention to the productions of the +mind. The beginning of this thought is found in classic Greece. But it +assumed its clearest and best developed form when the modern bourgeoisie +had become the ruling class in capitalistic Europe and the thinkers gave +expression to the ideas of this class. The characteristic mark of these +ideas is dualism, that is to say the misunderstood contrast between +thinking and being, between nature and spirit, the result of the mental +unclearness of this class and of its incapacity to see the things of the +world in their true interconnection. This mental state is but the +expression of the division of mankind into classes and of the +uncomprehended nature of social production ever since it became a +production of goods for exchange. + +In times of primitive communism, the conditions of production were clear +and easily understood. Things were produced jointly for use and consumed +in common. Man was master of his mode of production and thus master of +his own fate as far as the superior forces of nature admitted it. Under +such conditions, social ideas could not help being simple and clear. +There being no clash between personal and social interests, men had no +conception of a deep chasm between good and bad. Only the uncontrolled +forces of nature stood like unintelligible and mysterious powers, that +appeared to them either as well meaning or as evil spirits, above these +primitive little societies. + +But with the advent of the production of commodities the picture +changes. Civilized humanity begins to feel itself somewhat relieved from +the hard and ungovernable pressure of fickle natural forces. But now new +demons arise out of social conditions. "No sooner did the producers give +their products away in exchange instead of consuming them as heretofore, +than they lost control of them. They no longer knew what became of their +products, and there was a possibility that these products might some day +be used for the exploitation and oppression of the producers--The +products rule the producers." (Engels) In the production of commodities, +it is not the purpose of the individual producer which is accomplished, +but rather that which the productive forces back of him are aiming at. +Man proposes, but a social power, stronger than himself, disposes; he is +no longer master of his fate. The inter-relations of production become +complicated and difficult to grasp. While it is true that the individual +is the producing unit, yet his individual labor is only a subordinate +part of the whole process of social production, of which he remains a +tool. The fruits of the labor of many are enjoyed by a few individuals. +The social co-operation is concealed behind a violent competitive +struggle of the producers against one another. The interests of the +individuals are at war with those of society. Good, that is to say the +consideration of the common welfare, is opposed to bad, that is to say +the sacrifice of everything to private interests. The passions of men as +well as their mental gifts, after they have been aroused, developed, +trained, strengthened, and refined in this struggle, henceforth become +so many weapons which a superior power turns against their helpless +possessors. + +Such were the impressions out of which thinking men were obliged to +fashion their world-philosophy, while, at the same time, they were +members of the possessing classes and had thus an opportunity to employ +their leisure for a certain self-study, without, however, being in touch +with the source of their impressions, viz., the process of social labor +which alone could have enabled them to see through the social origin of +their ideas. Men of this class, therefore, were led to the assumption +that their ideas emanated from some supernatural and spiritual power or +that they were themselves independent supernatural powers. This dualist +metaphysical mode of thought has gone through various transformations in +the course of time, adapting itself to the evolution of production +beginning with ancient slavery, on through the serfdom of the Middle +Ages and of mediaeval commodity production, to modern capitalism. These +successive changes of form are embodied in Grecian philosophy, in the +various phases of the Christian religion, and in the modern systems of +philosophy. + +But we must not regard these systems and religions for what they +generally pass, that is to say, we must not think them to be only +repeated unsuccessful attempts to formulate absolute truth. They are +merely the incarnations of progressive stages of better knowledge +acquired by the human mind about itself and about the universe. It was +the aim of philosophical thought to find satisfaction in understanding. +And as long as understanding could not wholly be gotten by natural +means, there remained always a field for the supernatural and +incomprehensible. But by the painstaking mental work of the deepest +thinkers, the material of science was ceaselessly increased, and the +field of the supernatural and incomprehensible was ever more narrowed. +And this is especially the case since the progress of capitalist +production has promoted the persistent study of nature. For through this +study the human mind was enabled to test its powers by simple, quiet, +persistent and fruitful labor in the search for successive parts of +truth; and thus to rid itself from the overirritation of hopeless quest +after absolute truth. The desire to ascertain the value of these new +truths gave rise to the problems of the theory of understanding. The +attempts to solve these problems form a permanent part of modern systems +of philosophy, which represent a graduated evolution of the theory of +understanding. But the supernatural element in these systems prevented +their perfection. + +Under the impulse of the technical requirements of capitalism, the +evolution of natural sciences became a triumphal march of the human +mind. Nature was subjugated first through the discovery of its laws by +the human mind, and then by the material subordination of the known +forces of nature to the human will in the service of our main object, +the production of the necessaries of life with a minimum expenditure of +energy. But this bright shining light rendered, by contrast, the gloom +which surrounded the phenomena of human society only the darker, and +capitalism in its development still accentuates this contrast, as it +accentuates and thus renders more easily visible and intelligible all +contrasts. While the natural sciences dispensed with all mysterious +secrecy within their narrower domain, the darkness shrouding the origin +of ideas still offered a welcome refuge to the belief in miracles on the +spiritual field. + +Capitalism is now approaching its decline. Socialism is near. And the +vital importance of this transition in human history cannot be stated +more strongly than in the words of Marx and Engels: "This concludes the +primary history of man. He thereby passes definitely out of the animal +kingdom." The social regulation of production makes man fully the master +of his own fate. No longer does any mysterious social power then thwart +his plans or jeopardise his success. Nor does any mysterious natural +force control him henceforth. He is no longer the slave, but the master +of nature. He has investigated its effects, understands them, and +presses them into his service. For the first time in his history he will +then be the ruler of the earth. + +We now see that the many centuries that filled the history of +civilization were a necessary preparation for socialism, a slow struggle +to escape from nature's slavery, a gradual increase of the productivity +of labor, up to the point where the necessaries of life for all may be +obtained almost without exertion. This is the prime merit of capitalism +and its justification, that after so many centuries of hardly +perceptible progress it taught man to conquer nature by a rapid assault. +At the same time it set loose the forces of production and finally +transformed and bared the springs of the productive process to such a +degree that they easily could be perceived and grasped by the human +mind; this was the indispensable condition for the control of this +process. + +As never since the first advent of production of commodities there has +been such a fundamental revolution, it must necessarily be accompanied +by an equally fundamental spiritual revolution. This economic revolution +is the conclusion of the long period of class antagonisms and of +production of commodities; it carries with it the end of the dualist and +supernatural thoughts arising from this source. The mystery of social +processes passes away with this period, and the spiritual expression of +these mysteries must necessarily disappear with it. The slow development +of human thought from ignorance to an ever increased understanding +thereby ends its first chapter. This signifies the completion and +conclusion of philosophy, which is equivalent to saying that philosophy +as such passes out of existence, while its place is taken by the science +of the human mind, a part of natural science. + +A new system of production sheds its light into the minds of men already +before it has fully materialized. The same science which teaches us to +understand and thereby to control the social forces, also unfetters the +mind from the bewitching effects of those forces. It enables him even +now already to emancipate himself from traditional superstitions and +ideas which were formerly the expression of things unknown. We may +anticipate with our mind the coming time. And thus the ideas which will +then dominate are already even now growing within us in a rudimentary +form corresponding to the present actual economic development. By this +means we are even now enabled to overcome the capitalist philosophy in +thought and to soberly and clearly grasp the matter-dependent nature of +our spirit. + +The completion and the end of philosophy need not wait for the +realization of socialist production. The new understanding does not fall +from heaven like a meteor. It develops with the social-economic +development, first imperfectly and imperceptibly, in a few thinkers who +most strongly feel the breath of the approaching time. With the growth +of the science of sociology and with that of its practical application, +the socialist labor movement, the new understanding simultaneously +spreads and gains ground step by step, waging a relentless battle +against the traditional ideas to which the ruling classes are clinging. +This struggle is the mental companion of the social class struggle. + + ************ + +The methods of the new natural science had already been practiced for a +few centuries before the new theory was formulated. It first found vent +in the expression of surprise at the great confidence with which men +assumed to predict certain phenomena and to point out their connections. +Our experience is limited to a few successive observations of the +regularity or coincidence of events. But we attribute to natural laws, +in which are expressed causal relations of phenomena, a general and +necessary applicability which far exceeds our experience. The English +thinker Hume was the first who clearly expressed and formulated the +question--since called the problem of causality--why men always act in +this manner. But as he believed the reason for such action should be +sought in the nature of experience alone, experience being the only +source of knowledge, and as he did not further investigate the special +and distinct part played by the nature of the human mind in this +experiential connection, he could not find any satisfactory answer. + +Kant, who made the first important step toward the solution of this +question, had been trained in the school of rationalism which then +dominated in Germany and which represented an adaptation of mediaeval +scholasticism to the requirements of increased knowledge. Starting from +the thesis that things which are logical in the mind must be real in +nature, the rationalists formulated by mere deduction general truths +about god, infinity and immortality. Under the influence of Hume, Kant +became the critic of rationalism and thus the reformer of philosophy. + +The question, how it is that we have knowledge of generally applicable +laws in which we have implicit confidence--such as mathematical theses, +or the maxim that every change has a cause--was answered by Kant in this +way: Experience and science are as much conditioned on properties +inherent in the organization of our mind as on the impressions of the +outer world. The former properties must necessarily be contained in all +experience and science. Therefore everything dependent on this common +mental part of science must be perfectly certain and independent of +special sense impressions. Common to all experience, and inseparable +from it, are the pure sense-conceptions (reine Anschauungsformen), such +as space and time, while the many experiences, in order to succeed in +forming understanding and science, must be connected by the pure +mind-conceptions (reine Verstandesbegriffe), the so-called categories; +among the latter also belongs causality. + +Now Kant explains the necessity and general applicability of the pure +sense and mind conceptions by the fact that they arise from the +organization of our mind. Accordingly, the world appears to the senses +as a succession of phenomena in time and space. Our reason transforms +these phenomena into things which are welded into one aggregate nature +by laws of cause and effect. On the things as they really are in +themselves, in the opinion of Kant, these pure conceptions cannot be +applied. We know nothing of them and can neither perceive nor +reconstruct them by reason, because "in themselves" they are wholly +beyond reason and knowledge. + +The result of this investigation, which was the first valuable +contribution to a scientific theory of understanding and forms, from our +standpoint, the most important part of Kant's philosophy, served him +mainly as a means of answering the following questions: What is the +value of knowledge which exceeds experience? Can we, by mere deduction +through concepts which go beyond experience, arrive at truths? His +answer was: No, and it was a crushing blow to rationalism. We cannot +exceed the boundaries of experience. By experience alone can we arrive +at science. All supposed knowledge about the unlimited and infinite, +about concepts of pure reason, called Ideas by Kant, (as the soul, the +world, and God) is nothing but illusions. The contradictions in which +the human mind becomes involved whenever it applies the categories +outside of experience to such subjects, are manifested in the fruitless +strife between the philosophical systems. Metaphysics as a science is +impossible. + +This did not give the deathblow to rationalism alone, but also to +bourgeois materialism which reigned among the French radical thinkers. +Kant's researches refuted the negative as well as the positive +assertions anent the supernatural and infinite. This cleared the field +for faith, for intuitive conviction. God, freedom and immortality are +concepts the truth of which cannot be proved by reason, like the natural +truths derived from experience. But nevertheless their reality is no +less certain, only it is of a different nature, being subjective and, +therefore, necessarily a matter of personal conviction. The freedom of +the will, for instance, is not a knowledge gained by experience, because +experience never teaches us anything but lack of freedom and dependence +on the laws of nature. But nevertheless freedom of will is a necessary +conviction of every one who feels it in the categorical imperative: Thou +shalt! of every one possessed by a sense of duty and of the knowledge +that he can act accordingly: therefore freedom of will is +unconditionally certain and requires no proof by experience. And from +this premise there follows in same way the assurance of the immortality +of the soul and of the existence of God. It gives the same kind of +certainty to all ideas which were left in a state of uncertainty by the +critique of pure reason. At the same time freedom of will determines the +form of the theory of understanding. In the entire world of phenomena +there was no room for freedom, for these phenomena follow strict rules +of causality, as demanded by the organization of our mind. Therefore it +was necessary to make room for freedom of will somewhere else, and so +"things in themselves," hitherto a phrase without value and meaning, +assumed a higher importance. They were not bound to space, time or +categories, they were free: they formed so to say a second world, the +world of noumena, which stood behind the world of phenomena and which +solved the contradiction between the lawful dependence of things in +nature and between the personal conviction of freedom of will. + +These opinions and reasonings were fully in accord with the conditions +of science and the economic development of Kant's time. The field of +nature was left entirely to the inductive method of science which based +itself on strictly materialist experience and observation, classifying +things systematically in their causal order and excluding all +supernatural interference. But while faith was banished from the natural +sciences forever, it could not be dispensed with. The ignorance as to +the origin of the human will left room for a supernatural ethic. The +attempts of the materialists to exclude the supernatural also from this +field failed. The time had not come as yet for a materialist and natural +ethics, for science was not yet able to demonstrate as an indisputable +truth, founded on experience, in what manner ethical codes and moral +ideas in general had a material origin. + +This state of things shows that the Kantian philosophy is the purest +expression of bourgeois thought, and this is still more emphasized by +the fact that freedom is the center of his system and controls it. +Rising capitalism required freedom for the producers of commodities in +order to expand its productive forces, it required freedom of +competition and freedom of unlimited exploitation. The producers of +commodities should be free from all fetters and restrictions, and +unhampered by any coercion, in order that they could go, under the sole +direction of their own intelligence, into free competition with their +fellow citizens. For this reason, freedom became the slogan of the young +bourgeoisie aspiring to political power, and Kant's doctrine of the free +will, the basis of his ethics, was the echo of the approaching French +Revolution. But freedom was not absolute; it was to be dependent on the +moral law. It was not to be used in the quest for happiness, but in +accord with the moral law, in the service of duty. If the bourgeois +society was to exist, the private interest of the individual must not +be paramount, the welfare of the entire class had to be superior to that +of the individual, and the commandments of this class had to be +recognized as moral laws taking precedence over the quest for happiness. +But for this very reason, these moral laws could never be fully obeyed, +and every one found himself compelled to violate them in his own +interest. Hence the moral law existed only as a code which could never +be fulfilled. And so it stood outside of experience. + +In Kant's ethics the internal antagonism of bourgeois society is +reflected, that antagonism which is the compelling force of the ever +increasing economic development. The foundation of this antagonism is +the antagonism, already mentioned, between the individual and social +character of production that gives rise to omnipotent, but unconceived +social forces ruling the destiny of man. In capitalistic production it +is still intensified by the antithesis of the wealthy ruling class and +the poor producing class that is continuously augmented by those who are +expropriated by competition. This antagonism gives rise to the +contradiction between the aims of men and the results achieved, between +the desire of happiness and the misery of the great mass. It is the +basis of the contradiction between virtue and vice, between freedom and +dependence, between faith and science, between phenomenon and "thing +itself." It is at the bottom of all contradictions and of the entire +pronounced dualism of the Kantian philosophy. These contradictions are +to blame for the downfall of the system, and the work of disintegration +was unavoidable from the moment that the contradictions of the bourgeois +production became apparent, that is to say immediately after the +political victory of the bourgeoisie. The system of Kant could, however, +not be overcome, unless the material origin of morality could be +uncovered. Then these contradictions could be understood and solved by +showing that they were relative and not absolute as they appeared. And +not until then could a materialist ethics, a science of morality, drive +faith from its last retreat. This was at last accomplished by the +discovery of social class struggles and of the nature of capitalist +production, by the pioneer work of Karl Marx. + +The practice of developed capitalism about the middle of the 19th +century directly challenged proletarian thinkers to criticise Kant's +doctrine of practical reason. Bourgeois ethics and freedom manifested +themselves in the form of freedom of exploitation in the interest of the +bourgeoisie, as slavery for the working class. The maintenance of human +dignity appeared in reality as the brutalization and degradation of the +proletarians, and the state founded on justice proved to be nothing but +the class state of the bourgeoisie. And so it was seen that Kant's +sublime ethics, instead of being the basis in all eternity of human +activity in general, was merely the expression of the narrow class +interests of the bourgeoisie. This proletarian criticism was the first +material for a general theory, and once it had been stated, its +correctness was demonstrated more and more by the study of previous +historical events, and these events were thereby shown in their proper +light. It was then understood by this theory that the social classes, +distinguished by their position in the process of production, had +different and antagonistic economic interests, and that each class did +necessarily regard its own interest as good and sacred. These general +class interests were not recognized in their true character but appeared +to men in the guise of superior moral motives; in this form they crowded +the special individual interests into the background, and since the +class interests were generally felt, all the members of the same class +recognized them. Moreover, a ruling class could temporarily compel a +defeated or suppressed class to recognize the class interests of the +rulers as a moral law, so long as the inevitability of the mode of +production in which that class ruled was acknowledged. Owing to the fact +that the nature and significance of the productive process was not +understood, the origin of human motives could not be discovered. They +were not traced back to experience, but simply felt directly and +intuitively. And consequently they were thought to be of a supernatural +origin and eternal duration. + +Not only the moral codes, but also other products of the human mind, +such as religion, science, arts, philosophy, were then understood to be +intimately connected with the actual material conditions of society. The +human mind is influenced in all its products by the entire world outside +of it. And thus the mind is seen to be a part of nature, and the science +of the mind becomes a natural science. The impressions of the outer +world determine the experience of man, his wants determine his will, and +his general wants his moral will. The world around him determines man's +wants and impressions, but these, on the other hand, determine his will +and activity by which he changes the world; this will-directed activity +appears in the process of social production. In this manner man by his +work is a part, a link in the great chain of natural and social +development. + +This conception overturns the foundations of philosophy. Since the human +mind is seen now to be a part of nature and interacts with the rest of +the world according to laws which are more or less known, it is classed +among Kant's phenomena. There is no longer any need of talking about +noumena. Thus they do not longer exist for us. Philosophy then reduces +itself to the theory of experience, to the science of the human mind. It +is at this point that the beginning made by Kant had to be farther +developed. Kant had always separated mind and nature very sharply. But +the understanding that this separation should only be made temporarily +for the purpose of better investigation, and that there is no absolute +difference between matter and mind made it possible to advance the +science of thought processes. However, this could be accomplished only +by a thinker who had fully digested the teachings of socialism. This +problem was solved by Joseph Dietzgen in his work on "THE NATURE OF +HUMAN BRAIN WORK," the first edition of which appeared in 1869, and by +this work he won for himself the name of philosopher of the proletariat. +This problem could be solved only by the help of the dialectic method. +Therefore, the idealist philosophical systems from Kant to Hegel which +consist chiefly in the development of the dialectic method, must be +regarded as the indispensable pioneers and precursors of Dietzgen's +proletarian philosophy. + + ************ + +The philosophy of Kant necessarily broke down on account of its dualism. +It had shown that there is safety only in finite and material +experience, and that the mind becomes involved in contradictions +whenever it ventures beyond that line. The mind's reason calls for +absolute truth which cannot be gotten. Hence the mind is groping in the +dark and critique may perhaps explain why it is in the dark, but it +cannot show the way out. What is called with Kant dialectics is in +reality resignation. True, the mind finds knowledge about things outside +of experience by some other way, viz., by means of its moral +consciousness, but this intuitive knowledge in the form of faith remains +sharply separated from scientific understanding. It was the task of the +philosophical development immediately after Kant, to do away with this +sharp separation, this unreconciled contradiction. This development +ended with Hegel; its result was the understanding that contradiction is +the true nature of everything. But this contradiction cannot be left to +stand undisturbed, it must be solved and still retained in a higher +form, and thus be reconciled. Therefore the world of phenomena cannot be +understood as being at rest. It can be understood only as a thing in +motion, as activity, as a continuous change. Action is always the +reconciliation of contradiction in some higher form, and contradiction +appears in this way as the lever of progressive development. That which +accomplishes this dialectic self-development does not appear in the +idealistic systems as the material world itself, but as the spiritual, +the idea. In Hegel's philosophy, this conception assumes the form of a +comprehensive system outlining the self-development of the Absolute +which is spiritual and is identical with God. The development of this +Absolute takes place in three stages; in its primitive pure spiritual +form it develops out of its undifferentiated being the conceptions of +logic; then it expresses itself in another, an external form, opposite +to itself, as Nature. In nature all forms develop by way of +contradictions which are eliminated by the development of some higher +form. Finally the Absolute awakens to consciousness in nature in the +form of the human mind and reaches thus its third stage, at which the +opposite elements, matter and spirit, are reconciled into a unity. The +human mind evolves in the same way to ever higher stages, until it +arrives, at the end of its development by understanding itself, that is +to say, by knowing intuitively the Absolute. This is what happens +unconsciously in religion. Religion, which in the form of faith must be +satisfied with a modest corner in the system of Kant, appears in the +system of Hegel very proudly as a higher sort of understanding superior +to all other knowledge, as an intuitive knowledge of absolute truth +(God). In philosophy this is done consciously. And the historical +development which finds its conclusion and climax in the Hegelian +philosophy corresponds to the logical development of the human mind. + +Thus Hegel unites all sciences and all parts of the world into one +masterly system in which the revolutionary dialectics, the theory of +evolution, that considers all finite things as perishable and +transitory, is given a conservative conclusion by putting an end to all +further development when the absolute truth is reached. All the +knowledge of that period was assigned to its place somewhere in this +system, on one of the steps of the dialectic development. Many of the +conceptions of the natural sciences of that day, which later on were +found to be erroneous, are there presented as necessary truths resting +on deduction, not on experience. This could give the impression that the +Hegelian philosophy made empirical research superfluous as a source of +concrete truths. This appearance is to blame for the slight recognition +of Hegel among naturalists; in natural sciences, this philosophy +therefore has won much less importance than it deserved and than it +might have won, if its actual significance, which consists in the +harmonious connection between widely separated events and sciences, had +been better understood under its deceptive guise. + +On the abstract sciences the influence of Hegel was greater, and here he +held an exceptionally prominent position in the scientific world of that +time. On one hand, his conception of history as a progressive evolution +in which every imperfect previous condition is regarded as a necessary +phase and preparation for subsequent conditions and thus appears natural +and reasonable, was a great gain for science. On the other hand, his +statements on the philosophy of law and religion met the requirements +and conceptions of his time. In his philosophy of law, the human mind is +taken in that stage in which it steps into reality, having as its +principal characteristic a free will. It is first considered as a single +individual which finds its freedom incorporated in its property. This +personality enters into relations with others like it. Its freedom of +will is thereby expressed in moral laws. By combining all individuals +into one aggregate whole, their contradictory relations are merged into +the social units, viz., the family, the bourgeois society (buergerliche +Gesellschaft) and the state. There the moral rules are carried from the +inner to the outer reality. As the expressions of a superior, common and +more general will, they stand forth in the generally accepted moral +codes, in the natural laws of bourgeois society and in the authoritative +laws of the state. In the state, the highest form of which is the +monarchy, the mind finds itself at its highest stage of objective +realization as the idea of the state. + +The reactionary character of Hegelian philosophy is not merely a +superficial appearance that rests on the glorification of state and +royalty, thanks to which this philosophy was raised to the position of +Prussian state philosophy after the restauration. It was in its very +essence a product of reaction which in those days represented the only +possible advance after the revolution. This reaction was the first +practical critique of bourgeois society. After this society had been +firmly established, the relative amenities of the old time appeared in a +better light, because the shortcomings of the new society made +themselves soon felt. The bourgeoisie had recoiled before the +consequences of its revolution, when it recognized that the proletariat +was its barrier. It arrested the revolution as soon as its bourgeois +aims had been accomplished, and it was willing to acknowledge again the +mastery of the feudal state and monarchy, provided they would protect it +and serve its interests. The feudal powers that previously had been +overcome by the weight of their own sins and by the unconditional +superiority of the new social order, again lifted their heads when the +new order in its turn gave cause for well founded criticisms. But they +could not keep the revolution in check, unless they recognized it in a +limited degree. They could once more rule over the bourgeoisie, provided +they compromised with it so far as it was inevitable. They could no +longer prevail against capitalism, but they could govern for it. Thus, +by their rule, the imperfectness of capitalism was revealed. + +The theory of restauration, therefore, had to consist first of all of a +thorough critique of the revolutionary bourgeois philosophy. But this +philosophy could not be thrown aside entirely. So far as a critique of +the old order was concerned, the truth of bourgeois philosophy had to be +admitted. On the other hand, the sharp distinction it made between the +falsity of the old and the truth of the new order was found to be beside +the mark. So the correctness of the bourgeois philosophy itself proved +to be relative and limited, like that of a herald of some higher truth +which in its turn would acknowledge that which was temporarily and +partially true in its vanquished precursor. In this way the +contradictions became moments in the evolution of absolute truth, in +this way, furthermore, the dialectics became the main feature and method +of post-Kantian philosophy; and in this way, finally, the theorists of +the reaction were the men who steered philosophy over new courses and +who thereby became the harbingers of socialism. Scepticism and a +critique of all traditional things, yet a careful protection of +endangered faith, had characterized the tendencies of bourgeois thought +during its revolutionary period. In the reactionary stage, the bourgeois +implicitly accepted the belief in absolute truth and cultivated a +self-righteous faith. The practice of Metternich and of the Holy +Alliance corresponded to the theory of Hegelian philosophy. + +The practice of the Prussian police state, which embodied the +shortcomings of capitalism without its advantages and thus represented a +higher degree of reaction, destroyed the Hegelian philosophy, as soon as +the practices of maturing capitalism began to rebel against the fetters +by which reaction endeavored to bind it. Feuerbach returned in his +critique of religion from the fantastical heights of abstraction to +physical man. Marx demonstrated that the reality of bourgeois society +expresses itself in its class antagonisms which herald its imperfectness +and approaching downfall, and he discovered that the actual historical +development rested on the development of the process of material +production. The absolute spirit that was supposed to be embodied in the +constitution of the despotic state before the March revolution now +revealed itself as the narrow bourgeois spirit which regards bourgeois +society as the final aim of all historical development. The Hegelian +statement that all finite things carry within themselves the germ of +their own dissolution came home to his own philosophy, as soon as its +finiteness and limitations had been grasped. Its conservative form was +abandoned, but its revolutionary content, the dialectics, was preserved. +The Hegelian philosophy was finally superseded by dialectic materialism +which declares that absolute truth is realized only in the infinite +progress of society and of scientific understanding. + +This does not imply a wholesale rejection of Hegelian philosophy. It +merely means that the relative validity of that philosophy has been +recognized. The vicissitudes of the absolute spirit in the course of its +self-development are but a fantastical description of the process which +the real human mind experiences in its acquaintance with the world and +its active participation in life. Instead of the evolution of the +absolute idea, the dialectics henceforth becomes the sole correct method +of thought to be employed by the real human mind in the study of the +actual world and for the purpose of understanding social development. +The great and lasting importance of Hegel's philosophy, even for our own +time, is that it is an excellent theory of the human mind and of its +working methods, provided we strip off its transcendental character, and +that it far excels the first laborious contributions of Kant to the +theory of understanding. + +But this quality of the Hegelian philosophy could not be appreciated, +until Dietzgen had created the basis for a dialectic and materialistic +theory of understanding. The indispensable character of dialectic +thought, which is illustrated by the monumental works of Marx and +Engels, has been first demonstrated in a perfectly convincing manner by +Dietzgen's critical analysis of the human force of thinking. It was only +by means of this method of thought--of which he was according to Engels' +testimony an independent discoverer--that he could succeed in completing +the theory of understanding and bringing it to a close for the time +being. + + ************ + +If we refer to the ideas laid down by Dietzgen in this work as "his +philosophy," we say too much, because it does not assume to be a new +system of philosophy. Yet, on the other hand, we should not say enough, +because it would mean that his work is as passing as the systems before +it. It is the merit of Dietzgen to have raised philosophy to the +position of a natural science, the same as Marx did with history. The +human faculty of thought is thereby stripped of its fantastic garb. It +is regarded as a part of nature, and by means of experience a +progressive understanding of its concrete and ever changing historical +nature must be gained. Dietzgen's work refers to itself as a finite and +temporary realization of this aim, just as every new theory in natural +science is a finite and temporary realization of its aims. This +realization must be further improved and perfected by successive +investigations. This is the method of natural science; philosophical +systems, on the contrary, pretended to give absolute truth, that could +not be improved upon. Dietzgen's work is fundamentally different from +these former philosophies, and more than they, because it wishes to be +less. It presents itself as the positive outcome of philosophy toward +which all great thinkers have contributed, seen by the sober eyes of a +socialist and analyzed, recounted and further developed by him. At the +same time, it attributes to previous systems the same character of +partial truths and shows that they were not entirely useless +speculations, but ascending stages of understanding naturally related, +which contain ever more truth and ever less error. Hegel had likewise +entertained this broader view, but with him this development came to a +self-contradictory end in his own system. Dietzgen also calls his own +conception the highest then existing, and its distinctive step in the +evolution is that it for the first time adopts and professes this +natural and scientific view, instead of the supernatural point of view +of the former systems. The new understanding that the human mind is a +common and natural thing is a decisive step in the progressive +investigation of the mind, and this step places Dietzgen at the head of +this evolution. And it is a step which cannot be retraced, because it +signifies a sober awakening after centuries of vain imaginings. Since +this system does not pretend to be absolute truth, but rather a finite +and temporal one, it cannot fall as its predecessors did. It represents +a scientific continuation of former philosophies, just as astronomy is +the continuation of astrology and of the Pythagorean fantasies, and +chemistry the continuation of alchemy. It takes the place that formerly +was held by its unscientific predecessors and has this in common with +them, apart from its essential theory of understanding, that it is the +basis of a new world-philosophy, of a methodical conception of the +universe. + +This modern world-philosophy (Weltanschauung), being a socialist or +proletarian one, takes issue with the bourgeois conceptions; it was +first conceived as a new view of the world, entirely opposite to the +ruling bourgeois conceptions, by Marx and Engels, who developed its +sociological and historical contents; its philosophical basis is here +developed by Dietzgen; its real character is indicated by the terms +dialectic and materialist. By its core, historical materialism, it gains +a wholly new theory of social evolution that forms its chief content. +This theory was for the first time sketched in its main outlines in the +Communist Manifesto, and later on fully developed in a number of other +works and thoroughly vindicated by innumerable facts. It gives us the +scientific assurance that the misery and imperfectness of present +society, which bourgeois philosophy regards as inevitable and natural, +is but a transitory condition, and that man will within measurable time +emancipate himself from the slavery of his material wants by the +regulation of social production. By this certainty socialism is put on +an eminence so far above all bourgeois conceptions that these appear +barbarous in comparison with it. And what is more significant, our +world-philosophy may justly claim to have for the first time thrown the +light of an indisputable science on society and man; combined with the +maturest products of natural sciences it forms a complete science of the +world, making all superstitions superfluous, and thus involving the +theoretical emancipation, that is to say the emancipation of the mind. +The science treating of the human mind forms the essence and foundation +of this theory of society and man, not only because it gives us the +same as the natural sciences a scientific or experience-proven theory of +the function of human thinking, but also, because this theory of +cognition can alone assure us that such sciences are able to furnish us +an adequate picture of the world, and that anything outside of them is +mere fantasy. For this reason we owe to Dietzgen's theory of cognition +the firm foundation of our world-philosophy. + +Its character is primarily materialistic. In contradistinction to the +idealist systems of the most flourishing time of German philosophy which +considered the Mind as the basis of all existence, it starts from +concrete materialist being. Not that it regards mere physical matter as +its basis; it is rather opposed to the crude bourgeois materialism, and +matter to it means everything which exists and furnishes material for +thought, including thoughts and imaginations. Its foundation is the +unity of all concrete being. Thus it assigns to the human mind an equal +place among the other parts of the universe; it shows that the mind is +as closely connected with all the other parts of the universe as those +parts are among themselves; that is to say, the mind exists only as a +part of the entire universe so that its content is only the effect of +the other parts. Thus our philosophy forms the theoretical basis of +historical materialism. While the statement that "the consciousness of +man is determined by his social life" could hitherto at best be regarded +as a generalization of many historical facts and thus seemed imperfect +and open to criticism, capable of improvement by later discoveries, the +same as all other scientific theories, henceforth the complete +dependence of the mind on the rest of the world becomes as impregnable +and immutable a requirement of thought as causality. This signifies the +thorough refutation of the belief in miracles. After having been +banished long ago from the field of natural science, miracles were now +banished from the domain of thought. + +The enlightening effect of this proletarian philosophy consists +furthermore in its opposition to all superstition and its demonstration +of the senselessness of all idol worship. Socialist understanding +accomplished something which the bourgeois reformers could not do, +because they were limited to natural science in a narrow sense and could +not solve the mystery of the mind; for in explaining all the mental, +spiritual phenomena as natural phenomena our proletarian philosophy +furnishes the means for a trenchant critique of Christian faith which +consists in the belief in a supernatural spiritual being. In his +dialectic discussions of mind and matter, finiteness and infinity, god +and the world, Dietzgen has thoroughly clarified the confused mystery +which surrounded these conceptions and has definitely refuted all +transcendental beliefs. And this critique is no less destructive for the +bourgeois idols: Freedom, Right, Spirit, Force, which are shown to be +but fantastic images of abstract conceptions with a limited validity. + +This could be accomplished in no other way than by simultaneously +determining, in its capacity as a theory of understanding, the relation +of the world around us to the image which our mind forms of it. In this +respect Dietzgen completed the work begun by Hume and Kant. As a theory +of understanding, his conceptions are not only the philosophical basis +of historical materialism, but also of all other sciences as well. The +thorough critique directed by Dietzgen against the works of prominent +natural scientists, shows that he was well aware of the importance of +his own work. But, as might be expected, the voice of a socialist +artisan did not penetrate to the lecture hall of the academies. It was +not until much later that similar views appeared among the natural +scientists. And now at last the most prominent theorists of natural +science have adopted the view that explaining signifies nothing else but +simply and completely describing the processes of nature. + +By this theory of understanding Dietzgen has made it plainly perceptible +why the dialectic method is an indispensable auxiliary in the quest for +an explanation of the nature of understanding. The mind is the faculty +of generalization. It forms out of concrete realities, which are a +continuous and unbounded stream in perpetual motion, abstract +conceptions that are essentially rigid, bounded, stable, and +unchangeable. This gives rise to the contradiction that our conceptions +must always adapt themselves to new realities without ever fully +succeeding; the contradiction that they represent the living by what is +dead, the infinite by what is finite, and that they are themselves +finite though partaking of the nature of the infinite. This +contradiction is understood and reconciled by the insight into the +nature of the faculty of understanding, which is simultaneously a +faculty of combination and of distinction, which forms a limited part of +the universe and yet encompasses everything, and it is furthermore +solved by the resulting penetration of the nature of the world. The +world is a unity of the infinitely numerous multitude of phenomena and +comprises within itself all contradictions, makes them relative and +equalizes them. Within its circle there are no absolute opposites. The +mind merely constructs them, because it has not only the faculty of +generalization but also of distinguishing. The practical solution of all +contradictions is the revolutionary practice of infinitely progressing +science which moulds old conceptions into new ones, rejects some, +substitutes others in their place, improves, connects and dissects, +still striving for an always greater unity and an always wider +differentiation. + +By means of this theory of understanding, dialectic materialism also +furnishes the means for the solution of the riddles of the world +(Weltraetsel). Not that it solves all these riddles; on the contrary, it +says explicitly that this solution can be but the work of an ever +advancing scientific research. But it solves them in so far as it +deprives them of the character of a mysterious enigma and transforms +them into a practical problem, the solution of which we are approaching +by an infinite progression. Bourgeois thought cannot solve the riddles +of the world. A few years after the first publication of Dietzgen's +work, natural science in the person of Du Bois-Reymond acknowledged its +incapacity by his "Ignorabimus:" "We shall never know." Proletarian +philosophy, in solving the riddle of the human mind, gives us the +assurance that there are no insoluble riddles before us. + +In conclusion, Dietzgen in this work indicates the principles of a new +ethics. Starting with the understanding that the origin of the ideas of +good and bad is found in the needs of man, and designating as really +moral that which is generally useful, he logically discovers that the +essence of modern morality rests in its class interests. At the same +time, a relative justification is accorded to these temporary ethics, +since they are the necessary products of definite social requirements. +The link between man and nature is formed by the process of social +production carried on for the satisfaction of man's material wants. So +long as this link was a fetter, it bound man by a misapprehended +supernatural ethics. But once the process of social labor is understood, +regulated and controlled, then this fetter is dropped and the place of +ethics is taken by a reasonable understanding of the general wants. + + ************ + +The philosophical works of Dietzgen do not seem to have, until now, +exerted any perceptible influence on the socialist movement. While they +may have found many a silent admirer and contributed much toward a +clearing up of their thoughts, yet the importance of his writings for +the theory of our movement has not been realized. But this is not a +matter for great surprise. In the first decade after their publication, +even the economic works of Marx, the value of which was much more +apparent, were little appreciated. The movement developed spontaneously, +and the Marxian theory could exert a useful and determining influence +only by means of the clear foresight of a few leaders. Hence it is no +wonder that the philosophy of the proletariat, which is less easily and +directly applicable than our economics, did not receive much attention. +The political maturity of the German working class, which was farthest +advanced in the theories of the international movement, did not develop +to the point of adopting Marxian theses as party principles, until after +the abolition of the anti-socialist laws. But even then they were for +most of the spokesmen of the party rather concise formulations of a few +practical convictions than the outcome of a thorough scientific training +and understanding. It was no doubt the great expansion of the party and +of its activity which demanded all their powers for its organization and +management, that led the younger intellectuals of the party to devote +themselves to practical work and to neglect the theoretical studies. +This neglect has bitterly avenged itself in the theoretical schisms of +the subsequent years. + +The decrepit condition of capitalism is now evidenced very plainly by +the decay of the bourgeois parties, so that the practical work of the +socialist party is in itself sufficient to attract every one who has an +independent turn of mind and a capacity for deep feeling. But under the +present circumstances, such a transition was not accompanied by a +proletarian world-philosophy acquired by painstaking study. Instead of +such a philosophy, we are confronted by a critique of socialist science +from the bourgeois standpoint. Marxism is measured by the standard of +the immature bourgeois theory of understanding, and the Neokantians, +unconscious of the positive outcome of philosophy of the past century, +are trying to connect socialism with Kantian ethics. Some even speak of +a reconciliation with Christianity and a renunciation of materialism. + +This bourgeois method of thought, which, being anti-dialectic and +anti-materialistic, is opposed to Marxism, has acquired some practical +importance in the socialistic movement of countries where by lack of +economical development the class-consciousness of the workers is +hindered by relics of the narrow-minded views of the class of little +producers--as in France and Italy under the name of reformism. In +Germany where it could not obtain much practical importance it +presented itself mostly as a theoretical struggle against Marxism under +the name of revisionism. It combines bourgeois philosophy and +anti-capitalist disposition and takes the place formerly occupied by +anarchism, and, like anarchism, it again represents in many respects the +little bourgeois tendencies in the fight against capitalism. Under these +circumstances, a closer study of Dietzgen's philosophical works becomes +a necessity. + +Marx has disclosed the nature of the social process of production, and +its fundamental significance as a lever of social development. But he +has not fully explained, by what means the nature of the human mind is +involved in this material process. Owing to the great traditional +influence exerted by bourgeois thought, this weak spot in Marxism is one +of the main reasons for the incomplete and erroneous understanding of +Marxian theories. This shortcoming of Marxism is cured by Dietzgen, who +made the nature of the mind the special object of his investigations. +For this reason, a thorough study of Dietzgen's philosophical writings +is an important and indispensable auxiliary for the understanding of the +fundamental works of Marx and Engels. Dietzgen's work demonstrates that +the proletariat has a mighty weapon not only in proletarian economics, +but also in proletarian philosophy. Let us learn to wield these weapons! + +ANTON PANNEKOEK. + +Leyden, Holland, December, 1902. + + + + +The Nature of Human Brain Work + +A Renewed Critique of Pure and Practical Reason + +BY A MANUAL WORKER + +Translated by Ernest Untermann + + + + +THE NATURE OF HUMAN BRAIN WORK + + + + +PREFACE + + +It may not be amiss here to say a few words to the kind reader and the +unkind critic in regard to the personal relation of the author to the +present work. The first objection which I anticipate will be aimed at my +lack of scientific learning which is shown indirectly rather, between +the lines, than in the work itself. "How dare you," I ask myself, "come +before the public with your statements on a subject, which has been +treated by such heroes of science as Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, +etc., without being thoroughly familiar with all the works of your +famous predecessors?" + +At best, will you not merely repeat what has long since been +accomplished? + +In reply, I wish to say that the seeds sown by philosophy in the soil of +science have long since blossomed and borne fruit. The product of +history develops historically, grows and passes away, in order to live +eternally in another form. The original deed, the original work, is +fertile only in the contact with the conditions and relations of the +time in which it is born. But it finally becomes an empty shell, when it +has yielded its kernel to history. Whatever of a positive nature was +produced by the science of the past, lives no longer in the words of +the author, but has become more than spirit, has become flesh and blood +in present science. In order, e. g., to know the products of physics and +produce something new in its field, it is not necessary to first study +the history of this science, nor derive the hitherto discovered laws +from their fundamental source. On the contrary, historical research +might only be an obstacle to the solution of a definite physical +problem, for concentrated strength will naturally accomplish more than +divided strength. In this sense, I consider my lack of other knowledge +an advantage, because I am thus enabled to devote myself so much more +intensely to my special object. I have striven hard to study this object +and to learn everything which is known about it in my time. The history +of philosophy has in a certain sense been repeated in the development of +my individuality, since I speculated from my earliest youth on the means +of satisfying my longing for a consistent and systematic conception of +the world, and I believe I have finally found this satisfaction in the +inductive understanding of the human faculty of thought. + +Note that it is not the faculty of thought in its various +manifestations, not the different forms of it, but its general form, its +general nature, that satisfied me and that I propose to discuss. My +object is then very plain and circumscribed, indeed it is so simple, +that I had difficulties in showing its nature from different points of +view and was compelled to resort to numerous repetitions. At the same +time, the question concerning the nature of the mind is a popular one, +which is not limited to professional philosophy, but concerns all +sciences. And whatever the history of science has contributed towards +the solution of this question, must be generally alive in the +scientific conceptions of the present. I could well be satisfied with +this source. + +I may, then, confess in spite of my authorship, that I am not a +professor of philosophy, but a mechanic by profession. If any one should +feel justified in telling me: "Shoemaker, stick to your last!" I would +reply to him with Karl Marx: "Your non plus ultra professional wisdom +became enormously foolish from the moment when the watchmaker Watt +invented the steam engine, the barber Arkwright the loom, the jeweler +Fulton the steamship." Without classing myself among these great men, I +can strive to emulate them. Besides, the nature of my object is +especially pertinent to the class, a member of which I have the +pleasure, if not the honor, of being. + +I treat in this work of the faculty of thought as the organ of the +general. The oppressed fourth estate, the working class, is the true +exponent of this organ, the ruling classes being prevented by their +special class interests from recognizing the demands of general reason. +Our first consideration is, of course, the relation of our object to +human conditions. However, so long as conditions are not equalized for +men in general, but vitiated by class interests, our view of things is +influenced by these class limitations. A truly objective understanding +requires a subjective theoretical freedom. Before Copernicus saw the +Earth was moving and the Sun stationary, he had to place himself outside +of his terrestrial standpoint. The faculty of thought, having all +relations for its object, must abstract from all of them in order to +grasp its own real nature. Since we can understand things only by means +of thought, we must abstract from everything in order to understand +thought in general. This task was too difficult, so long as man was +bound to some limited class standpoint. Not until historical development +has proceeded to the point of striving at dissolution of the last +society based on a ruling and a serving class, can prejudices be +overcome to the extent of enabling the faculty of understanding to grasp +the nature of human brain activity in the abstract. It is only a +historical movement aiming at the direct and general liberty of the +masses, the new era of the fourth estate based on much misunderstood +premises, which can dispense with the spirit cult sufficiently to be +enabled to expose the real author of every spook, the "pure" mind. The +man of the fourth estate represents at last the "pure" man. His +interests are no longer mere class interests, but mass interests, +interests of humanity. This indicates that we are now approaching the +end of a development in which the interests of the mass were dependent +on the interests of a ruling class and in which humanity made progress +not so much in spite of as by means of continuous oppression by Jewish +patriarchs, Asiatic conquerors, antique slaveholders, feudal barons, +guildmasters, modern capitalists and even capitalist Caesars. The class +conditions of the past were inevitable in the general development. Now +this development has arrived at a point where the mass becomes conscious +of itself. Man has hitherto developed by class antagonism. By this means +he has now arrived at the point where he wants to develop himself +consciously. Class antagonisms were _phenomena_ of humanity. The working +class strives to abolish class antagonism in order that humanity itself +may be a _truth_. + +Just as the Reformation was conditioned on the actual environment of the +sixteenth century, so, like the discovery of the electric telegraph, the +research of the theory of human understanding is based on the actual +conditions of the nineteenth century. To this extent the contents of +this little work are not an individual, but a historical product. In +writing it, I feel myself, if I may use this mystic phrase, as a mere +organ of the idea. Only the form of presenting the subject is mine, and +I beg the kind reader to judge it leniently. I ask that the reader may +direct his or her silent or loud objections, not against the form, but +against the substance of my remarks, not to cling to the letter, but to +understand the spirit of my words. + +If I should not succeed in developing the idea, and if my voice should +thus be drowned in the hubbub of our overstocked book market, I am +nevertheless certain that the cause itself will find a more talented +champion. + +JOSEPH DIETZGEN, _Tanner_. + +SIEGBURG, May 15, 1869. + + + + +THE NATURE OF HUMAN BRAIN WORK + + + + +I. + +INTRODUCTION + + +Systematization is the essence and the general expression of the +aggregate activity of science. Science seeks to classify and systematize +the objects of the world for the understanding of our brain. The +scientific understanding of a certain language, e. g., requires an +orderly arrangement of that language in general categories and rules. +The science of agriculture does not simply wish to produce a good crop +of potatoes, but to find a system for the methods of cultivation and +thus to furnish the knowledge by which success in cultivation can be +determined beforehand. The practical result of all theory is to acquaint +us with the system and method of its practice and thus to enable us to +act in this world with a reasonable certainty of success. Experience is, +of course, an indispensable condition for this purpose; but it alone is +not sufficient. Only by means of empirically developed theories, by +science, do we overcome the play of accident. Science gives us the +conscious domination over things and unconditional security in handling +them. + +No one individual can know everything. The capacity of the individual +brain is no more adequate for the knowledge of everything that is +necessary than the skill and strength of the individual's hands are +sufficient to produce all he needs. Faith is indispensable to man, but +only faith in that which others know, not in what they believe. Science +is as much a social matter as material production. "One for all and all +for one." + +But just as there are some wants of the body which every one has to +satisfy by himself, so every one has to know certain scientific facts +which are not the prerogative of any special science. + +This is true of the faculty of human understanding. The knowledge and +study of this theory cannot be left to any particular guild. Lassalle +justly says: "Thinking itself has become a special trade in these days +of division of labor, and it has fallen into the worst hands, those of +our newspaper writers." He thus urges us not to acquiesce in this +appropriation any longer, not to submit any more to the harangues of +public opinion, but to resume thinking for ourselves. We may leave +certain objects of scientific research to professionals, but general +thought is a public matter which every one should be required to attend +to himself. + +If we could place this general work of thinking on a scientific basis, +if we could find a theory of general thought, if we were able to +discover the means by which reason arrives at understanding, if we could +develop a method by which truth is produced scientifically, then we +should acquire for science in general and for our individual faculty of +judgment the same certainty of success which we already possess in +special fields of science. + +Kant says: "If it is not possible to harmonize the various co-operators +on the question of the means by which their common aim is to be +accomplished, then we may safely infer that such a study is not yet on +the secure road of science, but will continue to grope in the dark." + +Now, if we take a look at the sciences, we find that there are many, +especially among the natural sciences, which fulfill the requirements of +Kant, agreeing unanimously and consciously on certain empirical +knowledge and building further understanding on that. "There we know," +as Liebig says, "what is to be called a certain fact, a conclusion, a +rule, a law. We have touchstones for all this, and every one makes use +of them before making known the fruits of his labors. The attempt to +maintain any proposition by lawyer's tricks, or the intention to make +others believe anything that cannot be proven, are immediately wrecked +by the ethics of science." + +Not so in other fields, where concrete and material things are left +behind and abstract, so-called philosophical, matters are taken up, as, +for instance, questions of general conceptions of the world and of life, +of beginning and end, of the semblance and the essence of things, of +cause and effect, of matter and force, of might and right, of wisdom of +life, of morality, religion, and politics. Here we find, instead of +irrefutable proofs, mere "lawyer's tricks," an absence of reliable +knowledge, a mere groping amid contradictory opinions. + +And it is precisely the prominent authorities of natural science who +show by their disagreements on such matters that they are mere tyros in +philosophy. It follows, then, that the socalled ethics of science, the +touchstones of which the boast is made that they never fail in +determining what is knowledge and what is mere conjecture, are based on +a purely instinctive practice, not on a conscious theory of +understanding. Although our time excels in diligent scientific research, +yet the numerous differences among scientists show that they are not +capable of using their knowledge with a predetermined certainty of +success. Otherwise, how could misunderstandings arise? Whoever +understands understanding, cannot misunderstand. It is only the absolute +accuracy of astronomical computations which entitles astronomy to the +name of a science. A man who can figure is at least enabled to test +whether his computation is right or wrong. In the same way, the general +understanding of the process of thought must furnish us with the +touchstone by which we can distinguish between understanding and +misunderstanding, knowledge and conjecture, truth and error, by general +and irrefutable rules. Erring is human, but not scientific. Science +being a human matter, errors may exist eternally, but the understanding +of the process of thought will enable us quite as well to prevent errors +from being offered and accepted as scientific truths as an understanding +of mathematics enables us to eliminate errors from our computations. + +It sounds paradoxical and yet it is true: Whoever knows the general rule +by which error may be distinguished from truth, and knows it as well as +the rule in grammar by which a noun is distinguished from a verb, will +be able to distinguish in both cases with equal certainty. Scientists as +well as scribes have ever embarrassed one another by the question: What +is truth? This question has been an essential object of philosophy for +thousands of years. This question, like philosophy itself, is finally +settled by the understanding of the faculty of human thought. In other +words, the question of what constitutes truth is identical with the +question of the distinction between truth and error. Philosophy is the +science which has been engaged in solving this riddle, and the final +solution of the riddle by the clear understanding of the process of +thought also solves the question of the nature of philosophy. Hence a +short glance at the nature and development of philosophy may well serve +as an introduction to our study. + +As the word philosophy is connected with various meanings, I state at +the outset that I am referring only to socalled speculative philosophy. +I dispense with frequent quotations and notes of the sources of my +knowledge, as anything that I may say in this respect is so well +established that we can afford to discard all scientific by-work. + +If we apply the above-named test of Kant to speculative philosophy it +appears to be more the playground of different opinions than of science. +The philosophical celebrities and classic authorities are not even in +accord on the question: What is philosophy and what is its aim? For this +reason, and in order not to increase the difference by adding my own +opinion, I regard everything as philosophy that calls itself by that +name, and we select from the voluminous literature of philosophy that +which is common and general in all philosophers, without taking any +notice of their special peculiarities. + +By this empirical method we find first of all that philosophy is +originally not a specialized science working with other sciences, but a +generic name for all knowledge, the essence of all science, just as art +is the essence of the various arts. Whoever made knowledge, whoever made +brain work his essential occupation, every thinker without regard to the +contents of his thoughts, was originally a philosopher. + +But when with the progressive increase of human knowledge, the various +departments detached themselves from the mother of all wisdom, +especially since the origin of natural sciences, philosophy became +known, not so much by its content as by its form. All other sciences are +distinguished by their various objects, while philosophy is marked by +its own method. Of course, it also has its object and purpose. It +desires to understand the universal whole, the cosmos. But it is not +this object, this aim, by which philosophy is characterized; it is +rather the manner in which this object is accomplished. + +All other sciences occupy themselves with special things, and if they +consider the universe at all, they do so only in its bearing on the +special objects of their study, the parts of which the universe is +composed. Alexander von Humboldt says in his introduction to his +"Cosmos" that he is limiting himself to an empirical consideration, to a +physical research, which seeks to elucidate the uniformity and unity by +means of the great variety. And all inductive sciences arrive at general +conclusions and conceptions only by way of their occupation with special +and concrete things. For this reason they claim that their conclusions +are based on facts. + +Speculative philosophy proceeds by the opposite method. Thought, the +object of its study, may be some special question, yet it does not +follow this up in the concrete. It rejects as fallacious the evidence of +the senses, the physical experience gained by means of the eye and ear, +hand and brain, and limits itself to "pure" and absolutely abstract +thought, in order to understand thus by the unit of human reason the +multiplicity of the universe. In seeking for an answer to the question: +What is philosophy? which question we are specially discussing just now, +speculative philosophy would not start out from its actual material +form, from its wooden and pigskin volumes, from its great and small +essays, in order to arrive at a conception of its object. On the +contrary, the speculative philosopher turns to introspection and looks +in the depths of his own mind for the true concept of philosophy. And by +this standard he separates the impression of his senses into true or +erroneous. This speculative method has hardly ever dealt in tangible +things, unless we recognize this philosophical method in every +unscientific concept of nature which populated the world with spooks. +The rudiments of scientific speculation occasionally dealt with the +course of the sun and the globe. But since inductive astronomy +cultivates these fields with greater success, speculative philosophy +limits itself entirely to abstract discussions. And in this line of +research as well as in all others it is characterized by the production +of its results out of the idea or the concept. + +For empirical science, for the inductive method, the multiplicity of +experiences is the first basis, and thought the second. Speculative +philosophy, on the other hand, seeks to arrive at scientific truth +without the help of experience. It rejects the socalled transient facts +as a foundation of philosophical understanding, and declares that it +should be absolute, exalted above time and space. Speculative philosophy +does not wish to be scientific physics, but metaphysics. It regards it +as its task to find by "pure" reason, and without the assistance of +experience, a system, a logic, or a theory of science, by which +everything worth knowing is supposed to be reeled off logically and +systematically, in about the same way in which we derive grammatically +the various forms of a word from its root. But the physical sciences +operate on the assumption that our faculty of understanding, to use a +familiar illustration, resembles a piece of soft wax which receives +impressions from outside, or a clean slate on which experience writes +its lines. Speculative philosophy, on the other hand, assumes that +certain ideas are innate and may be dipped and produced from the depths +of the mind by means of thought. + +The difference between speculative and inductive science is that between +fantasy and sound common sense. The latter produces its ideas by means +of the outer world, by the help of experience, while fantasy gets its +product from the depth of the mind, out of itself. But this method of +production is only seemingly one-sided. A thinker can no more think +transcendental thoughts which are beyond the reach of experience, than a +painter can invent transcendental pictures, transcendental forms. Just +as fantasy creates angels by a combination of man and bird, or mermaids +by a composition of woman and fish, so all other products of fantasy, +though seemingly derived out of itself, are in fact only arbitrarily +arranged impressions of the outer world. Reason operates with numbers +and orders, time and measures, and other means of experience, while +fantasy reproduces the experiences without regard to law and in an +arbitrary form. + +The longing for knowledge has been the cause of speculative attempts to +explain the phenomena of life and nature at a time when lack of +experience and observation made inductive understanding impossible. +Experience was then supplemented by speculation. In later times, when +experience had grown, previous speculation was generally recognized as +erroneous. But it nevertheless required thousands of years of repeated +disappointments on one side and numerous brilliant successes of the +inductive method on the other, before these speculative hobbies came +into disfavor. + +Fantasy has certainly a positive power, and speculative intuition, +derived from analogy, very often precedes empirical and inductive +understanding. But we must remain aware of the fact that so much is +assumption and so much actual scientific knowledge. Conscious intuition +stimulates scientific research, while pseudo-science closes the door to +inductive research. The acquisition of the clear understanding of the +distinction between speculation and knowledge is a historical process, +the beginning and end of which coincides with the beginning and end of +speculative philosophy. + +In ancient times, common sense operated in common with fantasy, the +inductive with the speculative method. The discussion of their +differences begins only with the understanding of the numerous +disappointments caused by the still inexperienced judgment which have +prevented an unobstructed view of the question up to modern times. But +instead of attributing these disappointments to lack of understanding, +they were charged to the account of the imperfection of the senses. The +senses were called impostors and material phenomena untrue images. Who +has not heard the lament about the unreliability of the senses? The +misunderstanding of nature and of its phenomena led to a serious rupture +with sense perceptions. The philosophers had deceived themselves and +thought they had been deceived by the senses. In their anger they turned +disdainfully away from the world of sensations. With the same uncritical +faith with which the semblance had hitherto been accepted as truth, now +uncritical doubt rejected the truth of sensations altogether. Research +abandoned nature and experience, and began the work of speculative +philosophy by "pure" thought. + +But no! Science did not permit itself to be entirely led astray from the +path of common sense, from the way of truth of sense perceptions. +Natural science soon stepped into the breach, and its brilliant +successes gained for the inductive method the consciousness of its +fertility, while on the other hand philosophy searched for a system by +which all the great general truths might be opened up without +specialized study, without sense perception and observation, by mere +reason alone. + +Now we have a more than sufficient quantity of such speculative systems. +If we measure them with the aforementioned standard of unanimousness, we +find that philosophy agrees only on its disagreements. In consequence, +the history of speculative philosophy, unlike the history of other +sciences, consists less of a gradual accumulation of knowledge, than of +a series of unsuccessful attempts to solve the general riddles of nature +and life by "pure" thought, without the help of the objects and +experience of the outer world. The most daring attempt in this line, the +most artificial structure of thought, was completed by Hegel in the +beginning of the nineteenth century. To use a common expression, he +became as famous in the world of science as Napoleon I did in the world +of politics. But Hegelian philosophy has not stood the test of time. +Haym, in his work entitled "Hegel and His Time," says of Hegelian +philosophy that "it was pushed aside by the progress of the world and by +living history." + +The outcome of philosophy up to that time, then, was a declaration of +its own impotence. Nevertheless, we do not underestimate the fact that a +work occupying the best brains for thousands of years surely contained +some positive element. And in fact, speculative philosophy has a +history, which is not merely a series of unsuccessful attempts, but also +a living development. However, it is less the object of its study, less +the logical world system, which developed, than its method. + +Every positive science has a material object, a beginning in the outer +world, a premise on which its understanding is based. Every empirical +science has for its fundament some material of the senses, some given +object, on which its understanding is dependent, and thus it becomes +"impure." Speculative philosophy seeks a "pure, absolute," +understanding. It wishes to understand by "pure" reason, without any +material, without any experience. It takes its departure from the +enthusiastic conviction of the superiority of understanding and +knowledge over experience gained by sense perceptions. For this reason +it wishes to leave experience entirely aside in favor of absolutely +"pure" understanding. Its object is truth; not concrete truth, not the +truth of this or that thing, but truth in general, truth "in itself." +The speculative systems seek after an absolute beginning, an indubitably +self-supporting starting point, from which they may determine the +absolutely indubitable. The speculative systems are thus by their own +mentality perfectly complete and selfsufficient systems. Every +speculative system found its end in the subsequent knowledge that its +totality, its selfsufficiency, its absoluteness, was imaginary, that it +could be determined empirically and externally like all other knowledge, +that it was not a philosophical system, but a relative and empirical +attempt at understanding. Speculation finally dissolved into the +knowledge that understanding is by its very nature "impure," that the +organ of philosophy, the faculty of understanding cannot begin its +studies without a given point of departure, that science is not +absolutely superior to experience, but only so far as it can organize +numerous experiences. It followed from these premises that the object of +philosophy can be a general and objective understanding, or "truth in +itself," only in so far as understanding or truth in general can be +derived from given concrete objects. In plain words, speculative +philosophy was reduced to the unphilosophical science of the empirical +faculty of understanding, to the critique of reason. + +Modern conscious speculation takes its departure from the experienced +difference between semblance and truth. It denies all sense phenomena in +order to find truth by thinking, without being deceived by any +semblance. The subsequent philosophers, however, found every time that +the truths of their predecessors, gained by this method, were not what +they pretended to be, but that their positive result consisted simply in +having advanced the science of the thought process to a certain extent. +By denying the actuality of the senses, by endeavoring to separate +thought from all sense perceptions, by isolating it, so to say, from its +sensory cover, speculative philosophy, more than any other science, laid +bare the structure of the mind. The more this philosophy advanced in +time, the more it developed in its historical course, the more +classically and strikingly did this kernel of its work spring into view. +After the repeated creation of giant fantasmagorias, it found its +solution in the positive knowledge that socalled pure philosophical +thought, abstracting from all concrete contents, is nothing but +thoughtless thought, thought without any real object back of it, and +produces mere fantasmagorias. This process of speculative deception and +scientific exposure was continued up to recent times. Finally the +solution of the main question, and the solution of speculation, was +introduced with the following words of Feuerbach: "My philosophy is no +philosophy." + +The long story of speculative work was finally reduced to the +understanding of reason, of the intellect, the mind, to the exposure of +those mysterious operations which we call thinking. + +The secret of the processes by which the truths of understanding are +produced, the ignorance of the fact that every thought requires an +object, a premise, was the cause of the idle speculative wanderings +which we find registered in the history of philosophy. The same secret +is today the cause of those numerous speculative mistakes which we +observe in passing over the words and works of naturalists. Their +knowledge and understanding is far developed, but only so far as it +refers to tangible objects. The moment they touch upon abstract +discussions, they offer "lawyers' proofs" in place of "objective facts." +For although they know intuitively and in a concrete case that this is a +truth, that a conclusion, and that a rule, they do not apply this +knowledge in general with consciousness and theoretical consistency. The +successes of natural science have taught them to operate the instrument +of thought, the mind, instinctively. But they lack the systematic +understanding which operates with conscious and predetermined certainty. +They ignore the outcome of speculative philosophy. + +It will be our task to set forth in a short summary what speculative +philosophy has unconsciously produced of a positive nature by a tedious +process, in other words, to explain the general nature of the thought +process. We shall see that the understanding of this process will +furnish us with the means of solving scientifically the general riddles +of nature and of life. And thus we shall learn how that fundamental and +systematic world conception is developed which was the long coveted goal +of speculative philosophy. + + + + +II + +PURE REASON OR THE FACULTY OF THOUGHT IN GENERAL + + +When speaking of food in general, we may mention fruits, cereals, +vegetables, meat and bread and classify them all, in spite of their +difference, under this one head. In the same way, we use, in this work, +the terms reason, consciousness, intellect, knowledge, discernment, +understanding, as referring to the same general thing. For we are +discussing the general nature of the thought process rather than its +special forms. + +"No intelligent thinker of our day," says a modern physiologist, +"pretends to look for the seat of the intellectual powers in the blood, +as did the ancient Greeks, or in the pineal gland, as was the case in +the middle ages. Instead we have all become convinced that the central +nerve system is the organic center of the intellectual functions of the +brain." Yes, true enough, thinking is a function of the brain and nerve +center, just as writing is a function of the hand. But the study of the +anatomy of the hand can no more solve the question: What is writing? +than the physiological study of the brain can bring us nearer to the +solution of the question: What is thought? With the dissecting knife, we +may kill, but we cannot discover the mind. The understanding that +thought is a product of the brain takes us closer to the solution of +our problem, in as much as it draws it into the bright light of reality +and out of the domain of fantasy in which the ghosts dwell. Mind thereby +loses the character of a transcendental incomprehensible being and +appears as a bodily function. + +Thinking is a function of the brain just as walking is a function of the +legs. We perceive thought and mind just as clearly with our senses as we +do pain and other feelings. Thought is felt by us as a subjective +process taking place inside of us. According to its contents this +process varies every moment and with each person, but according to its +form it is the same everywhere. In other words, in the thought process, +as in all processes, we make a distinction between the special or +concrete and the general or abstract. The general purpose of thought is +understanding. We shall see later that the simplest conception, or any +idea for that matter, is of the same general nature as the most perfect +understanding. + +Thought and understanding cannot be without subjective contents any more +than without an object which suggests individual reflection. Thought is +work, and like every other work it requires an object to which it is +applied. The statements: I do, I work, I think, must be completed by an +answer to the question: What are you doing, working, thinking? + +Every definite idea, all actual thought, is identical with its content, +but not with its object. My desk as a picture in my mind is identical +with my idea of it. But my desk outside of my brain is a separate object +and distinct from my idea. The idea is to be distinguished from thinking +only as a part of the thought process, while the object of my thought +exists as a separate entity. + +We make a distinction between thinking and being. We distinguish between +the object of sense perception and its mental image. Nevertheless the +intangible idea is also material and real. I perceive my idea of a desk +just as plainly as the desk itself. True, if I choose to call only +tangible things material, then ideas are not material. But in that case +the scent of a rose and the heat of a stove are not material. It would +be better to call thoughts sense perceptions. But if it is objected that +this would be an incorrect use of the word, because language +distinguishes material and mental things, then we dispense with the word +material and call thought real. Mind is as real as the tangible table, +as the visible light, as the audible sound. While the idea of these +things is different from the things themselves, yet it has that in +common with them that it is as real as they. Mind is not any more +different from a table, a light, a sound, than these things differ among +themselves. We do not deny that there is a difference. We merely +emphasize that they have the same general nature in common. I hope the +reader will not misunderstand me henceforth, when I call the faculty of +thought a material quality, a phenomenon of sense perception. + +Every perception of the senses is based on some object. In order that +heat may be real, there must be an object, something else which is +heated. The active cannot exist without the passive. The visible cannot +exist without the faculty of sight, nor the faculty of sight without +visible things. So is the faculty of thought a phenomenon, but it can +never exist in itself, it must always be based on some sense +perception. Thought appears, like all other phenomena, in connection +with an object. The function of the brain is no more a "pure" process +than the function of the eye, the scent of a flower, the heat of a +stove, or the touch of a table. The fact that a table may be seen, +heard, or felt, is due as much to its own nature as to that of another +object with which it enters into some relation. + +But while each function is limited by its own separate line of objects, +while the function of the eye serves only for the perception of the +visible, the hand for the tangible, while walking finds an object in the +space it crosses, thought, on the other hand, has everything for its +object. Everything may be the object of understanding. Thought is not +limited to any special object. Every phenomenon may be the object and +the content of thought. More than this, we can only perceive anything +when it becomes the object of our brain activity. Everything is +therefore the object and content of thought. The faculty of thought may +be exerted quite generally on all objects. + +We said a moment ago that everything may be perceived, but we now modify +this to the effect that only perceivable things may be perceived. Only +the knowable can be the object of knowledge, only the thinkable the +object of thought. To this extent the faculty of thought is limited, for +it cannot replace reading, hearing, feeling, and all other innumerable +activities of the world of sensations. We do, indeed, perceive all +objects, but no object may be exhaustively perceived, known, or +understood. In other words, the objects are not wholly dissolved in the +understanding. Seeing requires something that is visible, something +which is, therefore, more than seeing. In the same way, hearing requires +something that can be heard, thinking an object that can be thought of, +something which is more than our thoughts, something still outside of +our consciousness. We shall learn later on how we arrive at the +knowledge that we see, hear, feel, and think of objects, and not merely +of subjective impressions. + +By means of thought we become aware of all things in a twofold manner, +viz., outside in reality and inside in thought, in conception. It is +easy to demonstrate that the things outside are different from the +things in our thoughts. In their actual form, in their real dimensions, +they cannot enter into our heads. Our brain does not assimilate the +things themselves, but only their images, their general outlines. The +imagined tree is only a general object. The real tree is different from +any other. And though I may have a picture of some special tree in my +head, yet the real tree is still as different from its conception as the +special is different from the general. The infinite variety of things, +the innumerable wealth of their properties, has no room in our heads. + +I repeat, then, that we become aware of the outer world in a twofold +way, viz., in a concrete, tangible, manifold form, and in an abstract +form, which is mental and unitary. To our senses the world appears as a +variety of forms. Our brains combine them as a unit. And what is true of +the world, holds good of every one of its parts. A sense-perceived unit +is a nonentity. Even the atom of a drop of water or the atom of any +chemical element, is divisible, so long as it exists at all, and its +parts are different and distinct. A is not B. But the concept, the +faculty of thought, makes of every tangible or sense-perceived part an +abstract whole and conceives of every whole or quantity as a part of the +abstract world unit. In order to understand the things in their +entirety, we must take them practically and theoretically, with body and +mind. With the body we can grasp only the bodily, the tangible, with the +mind only the mental, the thinkable. Things also possess mental quality. +Mind is material and things are mental. Mind and matter are real only in +their inter-relations. + +Can we see the things themselves? No, we see only the effects of things +on our eyes. We do not taste the vinegar, but the relation of the +vinegar to our tongue. The result is the sensation of acidity. The +vinegar is acid only in relation to our tongue. In relation to iron it +acts as a solvent. In the cold it becomes hard, in the heat liquid. It +acts differently on different objects with which it enters into +relations of time and space. Vinegar is a phenomenon, just as all things +are. But it never appears as vinegar by itself. It always appears in +connection with other phenomena. Every phenomenon is a product of a +subject and an object. + +In order that a thought may appear, the brain or the faculty of thought +is not sufficient in itself. It requires, besides, an object which +suggests the thought. From this relative nature of our topic it follows +that in its treatment we cannot confine ourselves "purely" to it. Since +reason, or the faculty of thought, never appears by itself, but always +in connection with other things, we are continually compelled to pass +from the faculty of thought to other things, which are its objects, and +to treat of their connections. + +Just as the sight does not see the tree, but only that which is visible +of the tree, so does the faculty of thought assimilate only the +perceivable image of an object, not the object itself. A thought is a +child begotten by the function of the brain in communion with some +object. In a thought is crystalized on one side the subjective faculty +of thought, and on the other the perceivable nature of an object. Every +function of the mind presupposes some object by which it is caused and +the spiritual image of which it is. Or vice versa, the spiritual content +of the mind is derived from some object which has its own existence and +which is either seen or heard, or smelled, or tasted, or felt, in short, +experienced. + +Referring back to the statement that seeing is limited to the visible +qualities of some object, hearing to its audible qualities, etc., while +the faculty of thought has everything for its object, we now understand +this to mean that all objects have certain innumerable, but concrete, +qualities which are perceptible by our senses, and in addition thereto +the general spiritual quality of being thought of, understood, in short, +of being the object of our faculty of thought. + +This mode of classifying all objects applies also to the faculty of +thought itself. The spirit, or mind, is a bodily function connected with +the senses which appear in various forms. Mind is thought generated at +different times in different brains by different objects through the +instrumentality of the senses. We may choose this mind as the object of +special thought the same as all other things. Considered as an object, +mind is a manysided and sense-perceived fact which in connection with a +special function of the brain generates the general concept of "Mind" as +the content of this special thought process. The object of thought is +distinguished from its contents in the same way in which every object is +distinguished from its mental image. The different kinds of motion +perceived by the help of the senses are the object of a certain thought +process and supply to it the idea of "motion." It is easier to +understand that the mental image of some object perceived by the senses +has a father and a mother, being begotten by our faculty of thought by +means of some sense-perceived object, than it is to grasp the existence +of that trinity which is born when our present thought experiences its +own existence and thus creates a conception of its own self. This has +the appearance of moving around in a circle. The object, the content and +the function of thought apparently coincide. Reason deals with itself, +considers itself as an object and is its own content. But nevertheless +the distinction between an object and its concept, though less evident, +is just as actual as in other cases. It is only the habit of regarding +matter and mind as fundamentally different things which conceals this +truth. The necessity to make a distinction compels us everywhere to +discriminate between the object of sense perception and its mental +concept. We are forced to do the same in the case of the faculty of +thought, and thus we find it necessary to give the name of "Mind" to +this special object of our sense perceptions. Such an ambiguity of terms +cannot be entirely avoided in any science. A reader who does not cling +to words, but rather seeks to grasp the meaning, will easily realize +that the difference between being and thinking applies also to the +faculty of thought, that the fact of understanding is different from the +understanding of understanding. And since the understanding of +understanding is again another fact, it will be permitted to call all +spiritual things facts or sense perceptions. + +Reason, or the faculty of thought, is therefore not a mystical object +which produces the individual thought. On the contrary, it is a fact +that certain individual thoughts are the product of perception gained in +contact with certain objects and that these in connection with a certain +brain operation produce the concept of reason. Reason as well as all +other things of which we become aware has a two-fold existence: one as a +phenomenon or sense-perception, the other as a concept. The concept of +any thing presupposes a certain sense-perception of that thing, and so +does the concept of reason. Since all men think as a matter of fact, +every one has himself perceived reason as a part of reality, as a +phenomenon, sense-perception or fact. + +Our object, reason, by virtue of the fact that it partakes of the nature +of the senses, has the faculty of transforming the speculative method, +which tries to dip understanding out of the depths of the spirit without +the help of sense-perception, into the inductive method, and vice versa +of transforming the inductive method, which desires to arrive at +conclusions, concepts, or understanding exclusively by means of +sense-perception, into the speculative method, by virtue of its +simultaneous spiritual nature. Our problem is to analyze the concept of +thought, or of the faculty of thought, or of reason, of knowing, of +science, by means of thought. + +To produce thoughts and to analyze them is the same thing inasmuch as +both actions are functions of the brain. Both have the same nature. But +they are different to the same extent that instinct differs from +consciousness. Man does not think originally because he wants to, but +because he must. Ideas are produced instinctively, involuntarily. In +order to become fully aware of them, to place them within the grasp of +knowing and willing, we must analyze them. From the experience of +walking, for instance, we derive the idea of walking. To analyze this +idea means to solve the question, what is walking generally considered, +what is the general nature of walking? We may answer: Walking is a +rythmical motion from one place to another, and thus we raise the +instinctive idea to the position of a conscious analyzed idea. An object +is not consciously, theoretically, understood, until it has been +analyzed. In examining what elements constitute the concept of walking, +we find that the general attribute of that experience which we agree in +calling "walking" is a rythmical motion. In actual experience steps may +be long or short, may be taken by two feet or by more, in brief may be +varied. But as a concept walking is simply a rythmical motion, and the +analysis of this concept furnishes us with the conscious understanding +of this fact. The concept of light existed long before science analyzed +it, before it was understood that undulations of the ether form the +elements which constitute the concept of light. Instinctive and +analytical ideas differ in the same way in which the thoughts of every +day life differ from the thoughts of science. + +The analysis of any idea and the theoretical analysis of any object, or +of the thing which suggested the idea, is one and the same. Every idea +corresponds to some real object. Ludwig Feuerbach has demonstrated that +even the concepts of God and immortality are reflections of real objects +which can be perceived by the senses. For the purpose of analyzing such +ideas as animal, light, friendship, man, etc., the phenomena, the +objects, such as animals, friendships, men, and lights, are analyzed. +The object which serves for the analysis of the concept "animal" is no +more any single animal, than the object of the concept "light" is any +single light. These concepts comprise classes, things in general, and +therefore the question, or the analysis, of what constitutes the animal, +the light, friendship, must not deal with any concrete, but with the +abstract elements of the whole class. + +The fact that the analysis of a concept and the analysis of its object +appear as two different things is due to our faculty of being able to +separate things into two parts, viz., into a practical, tangible, +perceptible, concrete thing and into a theoretical mental, thinkable, +general thing. The practical analysis is the premise of the theoretical +analysis. The individually perceptible animals serve us as a basis for +the analysis of the animal concept, the individually experienced +friendships as the basis for the analysis of the concept of friendship. + +Every idea corresponds to an object which may be practically separated +into its component parts. To analyze a concept is equivalent, therefore, +to analyzing a previously experienced object by theoretical means. The +analysis of a concept consists in the understanding of the common or +general faculties of the concrete parts of the analyzed object. That +which is common to the various modes of walking, the rythmical motion, +constitutes the concept of walking, that which is common to the various +manifestations of light constitutes the concept of light. A chemical +factory analyzes objects for the purpose of obtaining chemicals, while +science analyzes them for the purpose of obtaining their concepts. + +The special object of our analysis, the faculty of thought, is likewise +distinguished from its concept. But in order to be able to analyze this +concept, we must analyze the object. It cannot be analyzed chemically, +for not everything is a matter of chemistry, but it may be analyzed +theoretically or scientifically. As we have already stated, the science +of understanding deals with all objects. But all objects which this +science may wish to analyze theoretically, must first be handled +practically. According to their special natures, they must either be +handled in various ways, or carefully inspected, or scrutinized by +intent listening, in short they must be thoroughly experienced in some +way. + +It is a fact of experience that men think. The object or suggestion is +furnished by facts, and we then derive the concept instinctively. Thus, +to analyze the faculty of thought means to find that which is common or +general to the various personal and temporary processes of thought. In +order to follow this study by the methods of natural science, we require +neither physical instruments nor chemical reagents. The sense +perception which is indispensable for every scientific understanding, is +so to say present in this case _a priori_, without further experience. +Every one possesses the object of our study, the fact of thought faculty +and its experience, in the memories of himself or herself. + +We have seen that thought like any other activity as well as its +scientific analysis is everywhere developing the general or abstract out +of particular and concrete sense perceptions. We now express this in the +following words: The common feature of all separate thought-processes +consists in their seeking the general character or unity which is common +to all objects experienced in their manifold variety by sense +perceptions. The general element which is common to the different +animals, or to the different manifestations of light, is that which +constitutes the general animal or light concept. The general is the +nature of all concepts, of all understanding, all science, all thought +processes. Thus we arrive at the understanding that the analysis of the +faculty of thought reveals its nature of finding that which is general +and common to concrete and distinct things. The eye studies the visible, +the ear the audible, and our brain that which is generally conceivable. + +We have seen that thought like any other activity requires an object; +that it is unlimited in the choice of its objects, because all things +may become the objects of thought; that these objects are perceived in +manifold forms by various senses; and that they are transformed into +simple ideas by extricating that which they possess in common, which is +similar, which is general in them. If we apply this experienced +understanding of the general method of thought processes to our special +object, the faculty of thought, we realize that we have thus solved our +problem, because all we were looking for was the general method of the +thought process. + +_If the development of the general out of the concrete constitutes the +general method by which reason arrives at understanding, then we have +fully grasped reason as the faculty of deriving the general out of the +concrete._ + +Thinking is a physical process and it cannot exist or produce anything +without materials any more than any other process of labor. My thought +requires some material which can be thought of. This material is +furnished by the phenomena of nature and life. These are the concrete +things. In claiming that the universe, or all things, may be the object +of thought, we simply mean that the materials of the thought process, +the objects of the mind, are infinite in quantity and quality. The +materials which the universe furnishes for our thought are as infinite +as space, as eternal as time, and as absolutely manifold as the nature +of these two forms of being. The faculty of thought is a universal +faculty in so far as it enters into relations with all things, all +substances, all phenomena, and thus generates thought. But it is not +absolute, since it requires for its existence and action the previous +presence of matter. Matter is the boundary, beyond which the mind cannot +pass. Matter furnishes the background for the illumination of the mind, +but is not consumed in this illumination. Mind is a product of matter, +but matter is more than a product of mind, being perceived also through +the five senses and thus brought to our notice. We call real, objective +products, or "things themselves" only such products as are revealed to +us simultaneously by the senses and the mind. + +Reason is a real thing only in so far as it is perceived by the senses. +The perceptible actions of reason are revealed in the brain of man as +well as in the world outside of it. For are not the effects tangible by +which reason transforms nature and life? We see the successes of science +with our eyes and grasp them with our hands. It is true that science or +reason cannot produce such material effects out of themselves. The world +of sense perceptions, the objects outside of the human brain, must be +given. But what thing is there that has any effects "in itself?" In +order that light may shine, that the sun may warm, and revolve in its +course, there must be space and other things which may be lighted and +warmed and passed. In order that my table may have color, there must be +light and eyes. And everything else which my table is besides, it can be +only in contact with other things. Its being is just as manifold as +those various contacts or relations. In short, the world consists only +in its interrelations. Any thing that is torn out of its relations with +the world ceases to exist. A thing is anything "in itself" only because +it is something for other things, by acting or appearing in connection +with something else. + +If we wish to regard the world in the light of the "thing itself," we +shall easily see that the world "itself" and the world as it appears, +the world of phenomena, differ only in the same way in which the whole +differs from its component parts. The world "itself" is nothing else but +the sum total of its phenomena. The same holds good of that part of the +world phenomena which we call reason, spirit, faculty of thought. +Although we distinguish between the faculty of thought and its phenomena +or manifestations, yet the faculty of thought "itself," or "pure" +reason, exists in reality only in the sum total of its manifestations. +Seeing is the physical existence of the faculty of sight. We possess the +whole only by means of its parts, and we can possess reason, like all +other things, only by the help of its effects, by its various thoughts. +But we repeat that reason does not precede thought in the order of time. +On the contrary thoughts generated by perceptible objects serve as a +basis for the development of the concept of the faculty of thought. Just +as the understanding of the world movements has taught us that the sun +is not revolving around the earth, so the understanding of the thought +process tells us that it is not the faculty of thought which creates +thought, but vice versa, that the concept of this faculty is created out +of a series of concrete thoughts. Hence the faculty of thought +practically exists only as the sum total of our thoughts, just as the +faculty of sight exists only through the sum of the things that we see. + +These thoughts, this practical reason, serve as the material out of +which our brain manufactures the concept of "pure" reason. Reason is +necessarily impure in practice, which means that it must connect itself +with some object. Pure reason, or abstract reason without any special +content, cannot be anything else but the general characteristic of all +concrete reasoning processes. We possess this general nature of reason +in two ways: In an impure state, that is as practical and concrete +phenomenon, consisting of the sum of our real perceptions, and in a pure +state, that is theoretically or abstractly, in the concept. The +phenomenon of reason is distinguished from reason "itself" just as the +real animals are distinguished from the concept of the animal. + +Every actual reasoning process is based on some real object which has +many qualities like all things in nature. The faculty of thought +extracts from this many-sided object those properties which are general +or common with it. A mouse and an elephant, as the objects of our +reasoning activity, lose their differences in the general animal +concept. Such a concept combines many things under one uniform point of +view, it develops one general idea out of many concrete things. Since +understanding is the general or common quality of all reasoning +processes, it follows that reason in general, or the general nature of +the reasoning process, consists in abstracting the general ideal +character from any concrete thing perceptible by the help of the senses. + +Reason being unable to exist without some objects outside of itself, it +is understood that we can perceive "pure" reason, or reason "itself," +only by its practical manifestations. We cannot find reason without +objects outside of it with which it comes in contact and produces +thought, any more than we can find any eyes without light. And the +manifestations of reason are as varied as the objects which supply its +material. It is plain, then, that reason has no separate existence "in +itself," but that on the contrary the concept of reason is formed out of +the material supplied by the senses. + +Mental processes appear only in connection with perceptible phenomena. +These processes are themselves phenomena of sense perception which, in +connection with a brain process, produce the concept of the faculty of +thought "itself." If we analyze this concept, we find that "pure" reason +consists in the activity of producing general ideas out of concrete +materials, which include so-called immaterial thoughts. In other words, +reason may be characterized as an activity which seeks for unity in +every multiplicity and equalizes all contrasts whether it deals with the +many different sides and parts of one or of more objects. All these +different statements describe the same thing in different words, so that +the reader may not cling to the empty word, but grasp the living +concept, the manifold object, in its general nature. + +Reason, we said, exists in a "pure" state as the development of the +general out of the special, of the abstract out of concrete sense +perceptions. This is the whole content of pure reason, of scientific +understanding, of consciousness. And by the terms "pure" and "whole" we +simply indicate that we mean the general content of the various thought +processes, the general form of reason. Apart from this general abstract +form, reason, like all other things, has also its concrete, special, +sense form which we perceive directly through our experience. Hence our +entire process of consciousness consists in the experience of the +senses, that is in the physical process, and its understanding. +Understanding is the general reflection of any object. + +Consciousness, as the Latin root of the word indicates, is the knowledge +of being in existence. It is a form, or a quality, of existence which +differs from other forms of being in that it is aware of its existence. +Quality cannot be explained, but must be experienced. We know by +experience that consciousness includes along with the knowledge of being +in existence the difference and contradiction between subject and +object, thinking and being, between form and content, between phenomenon +and essential thing, between attribute and substance, between the +general and the concrete. This innate contradiction explains the various +terms applied to consciousness, such as the organ of abstraction, the +faculty of generalization or unification, or in contradistinction +thereto the faculty of differentiation. For consciousness generalizes +differences and differentiates generalities. Contradiction is innate in +consciousness, and its nature is so contradictory that it is at the same +time a differentiating, a generalizing, and an understanding nature. +Consciousness generalizes contradiction. It recognizes that all nature, +all being, lives in contradictions, that everything is what it is only +in co-operation with its opposite. Just as visible things are not +visible without the faculty of sight, and vice versa the faculty of +sight cannot see anything but what is visible, so contradiction must be +recognized as something general which pervades all thought and being. +The science of understanding, by generalizing contradiction, solves all +concrete contradictions. + + + + +III + +THE NATURE OF THINGS + + +In so far as the faculty of understanding is a physical object, the +knowledge of its nature is a matter of physical science. But in so far +as we understand all things by the help of this faculty, the science of +understanding becomes metaphysics. Inasmuch as the scientific analysis +of reason reverses the current conception of its nature, this specific +understanding necessarily reverses our entire world philosophy. With the +understanding of the nature of reason, we arrive at the long sought +understanding of the "nature of things." + +We wish to know, understand, conceive, recognize all things in their +very nature, not in their outward appearance. Science seeks to +understand the nature of things, or their true essence, by means of +their manifestations. Every thing has its own special nature, and this +nature is not seen, or felt, or heard, but solely perceived by the +faculty of thought. This faculty explores the nature of all things just +as the eye explores all that is visible in things. Just as the nature of +sight is understood by the theory of vision, so the nature of things in +general is understood by the theory of understanding. + +It is true that it sounds contradictory to say that the nature of a +thing does not appear to the eye, but to the faculty of thought, and at +the same time to imply that the opposite of appearance, nature, should +appear. But we here refer to the nature of a thing as a phenomenon in +the same way in which we referred to the mind as a perception of the +senses, and we shall demonstrate further on that every being is a +phenomenon, and every phenomenon is more or less of an essential thing. + +We have seen that the faculty of thought requires for its vital activity +an object, or raw material. The effect of reasoning is seen in science, +no matter whether we understand the term science in its narrow classical +sense or in its broadest meaning of any kind of knowledge. The phenomena +of sense perception constitute the general object or material of +science. Sense perceptions arise from infinite circulation of matter. +The universe and all things in it consist of transformations of matter +which take place simultaneously and consecutively in space and time. The +universe is in every place and at any time itself, new, and present for +the first time. It arises and passes away, passes and arises under our +very hands. Nothing remains the same, only the infinite change is +constant, and even the change varies. Every particle of time and space +brings new changes. It is true that the materialist believes in the +permanency, eternity, indestructibility of matter. He teaches us that +not the smallest particle of matter has ever been lost in the world, +that matter simply changes its forms eternally, but that its nature +lasts indestructibly through all eternity. And yet, in spite of all +distinctions between matter itself and its perishable form, the +materialist is on the other hand more inclined than any one else to +dwell on the identity of matter and its forms. Inasmuch as the +materialist speaks ironically of formless matter and matterless forms, +in the same breath with perishable forms of imperishable matter, it is +plain that materialism is not informed any more than idealism as to the +relation of content to form, of a phenomenon to the essential nature of +its subject. Where do we find such eternal, imperishable, formless +matter? In the world of sense perceptions we never meet anything but +forms of perishable matter. It is true that there is matter everywhere. +Wherever anything passes away, something new instantly arises. But +nowhere has any homogeneous, unchangeable matter enduring without any +form, ever been discovered. Even a chemically indivisible element is +only a relative unit in its actual existence, and in extension of time +as well as in extension through space it varies simultaneously and +consecutively as much as any organic individual which also changes only +its concrete forms, but remains the same in its general nature from +beginning to end. My body changes continually its fleshy tissue, bones, +and every other particle belonging to it, and yet it always remains the +same. What constitutes, then, this body which is distinguished from its +transient form? It is the sum total, in a generalized way, of all its +varied concrete forms. Eternal and imperishable matter exists in reality +only as the sum total of its perishable forms. The statement that matter +is imperishable cannot mean anything but that there will always and +everywhere be matter. It is just as true to say that matter is +imperishable and merely changes its forms, as it is to say that matter +exists only in its changing forms, that it is matter which changes and +that only the change is eternal. The terms "changeable matter" and +"material change" are after all only different expressions for the same +thing. + +In the practical world of sense perceptions, there is nothing permanent, +nothing homogeneous, nothing beyond nature, nothing like a "thing +itself." Everything is changing, passing, phantomlike, so to say. One +phantom is chased by another. "Nevertheless," says Kant, "things are +also something in themselves," for otherwise we should have the absurd +contradiction that there could be phenomena without things that produce +them. But no! A phenomena is no more and no less different from the +thing which produces it than the stretch of a twenty-mile road is +different from the road itself. Or we may distinguish between a knife +and its blade and handle, but we know that there would be no knife if +there were no blade and no handle. The essential nature of the universe +is change. Phenomena appear, that is all. + +The contradiction between the "thing itself," or its essence, and its +outward appearance is fully solved by a complete critique of reason +which arrives at the understanding that the human faculty of thought may +generalize any number of varied sense perceptions under one uniform +point of view, by singling out the general and equivalent forms and thus +regarding everything it may meet as a concrete part of one and the same +whole. + +In other words, the relative and transient forms perceived by our senses +serve as raw material for our brain activity, which abstracts the +general likeness out of the concrete forms and systematizes or +classifies them for our consciousness. The infinite variety of sense +perceptions passes in review before our subjective mind, and it +constructs out of the multiplicity the unity, out of the parts the +whole, out of the phenomena the essential nature, out of the perishable +the imperishable, out of the attributes the subject. The essence, the +nature of things, the "thing itself" is an ideal, a spiritual +conception. Consciousness knows how to make sums out of different units. +It can take any number of units for its sums. The entire multiplicity of +the universe is theoretically conceived as one unit. On the other hand, +every abstract sum consists in reality of an infinite number of sense +perceptions. Where do we find any indivisible unit outside of our +abstract conceptions? Two halves, four fourths, eight eighths, or an +infinite number of separate parts form the raw material out of which the +mind fashions the mathematical unit. This book, its leaves, its letters, +or their parts, are they units? Where do I begin, where do I stop? In +the same way, I may call a library with many volumes, a house, a farm, +and finally the whole universe, a unit. Is not everything a part, is not +every part a thing? Is the color of a leaf less of a thing than that +leaf itself? Perhaps some would call the color simply an attribute and +the leaf its substance, because there might be a leaf without color, but +no color without a leaf. But as surely as we exhaust a heap of sand by +scattering it, just as surely do we remove all the substance of a leaf +when we take away its attributes one after the other. Color is only the +sum of reactions of leaf, light, and eye, and so is all the rest of the +matter of a leaf an aggregate of interactions. In the same way in which +our reason deprives a leaf of its color attributes and sets it apart as +a "thing itself," may we continue to deprive that leaf of all its other +attributes, and in so doing we finally take away everything that makes +the leaf. Color is in its nature no less a substance than the leaf +itself, and the leaf is no less an attribute than its color. As the +color is an attribute of a leaf, so a leaf is an attribute of a tree, a +tree an attribute of the earth, the earth an attribute of the universe. +The universe is the substance, substance in general, and all other +substances are but its attributes. And this world-substance reveals the +fact that the nature of things, the "thing itself" as distinguished from +its manifestations, is only a concept of the mind. + +In its universal search from the attribute to the substance, from the +relative to the absolute, from the appearance of things to the true +things, the mind finally arrives at the understanding that the substance +is nothing but a sum of attributes collected by brain activity, and that +the mind itself, or reason, is a substantial being which creates +abstract mental units out of a multitude of sense perceptions and +conceives of the universe as an absolute whole, as an independent "thing +itself," by adding all its transient manifestations. In turning away +full of dissatisfaction from attributes, searching restlessly after the +substance, throwing aside phenomena, and forever groping for truth, for +the nature of things, for the "thing itself," and in finally realizing +that this substantial truth is merely the sum of all socalled untruths, +the totality of all phenomena, the mind proves itself to be the creator +of the abstract concept of substance. But it did not create this +concept out of nothing. On the contrary, it generated the concept of a +world substance out of attributes, it derived truth out of +manifestations of things. + +The idealist conception that there is an abstract nature behind +phenomena which materialises itself in them, is refuted by the +understanding that this hidden nature does not dwell in the world +outside of the human mind, but in the brain of man. But since the brain +differentiates between phenomena and their nature, between the concrete +and the general, only by means of sense perception, it cannot be denied +that the distinction between phenomena and their nature is well founded; +only the essential nature of things is not found back of phenomena, but +by means of phenomena. This nature is materially existent and our +faculty of thought is a real and natural one. + +It is true of spiritual things as well as of physical ones, in fact it +is true of all things, metaphysically speaking, that they are what they +are, not "in themselves," not in their abstract nature, but in contact +with other things, in reality. In this sense one might say that things +are not what they seem, but manifest themselves because they are +existent, and they manifest themselves in as many different ways as +there are other things with which they enter into relations of time and +space. But the statement that things are not what they seem requires, in +order to be rightly understood, the modification that whatever manifests +itself, exists in nature, and its existence is limited by its +manifestations. "We cannot perceive heat itself," says a book on physics +written by Professor Koppe, "we merely conclude from its manifestations +that it is present in nature." Thus reasons a naturalist who seeks to +understand a thing by practical and diligent study of its +manifestations, but who seeks refuge in the speculative belief in a +hidden "thing itself" whenever a lack of understanding of the +fundamentals of logic embarrasses him. We, on the contrary, conclude +that there is no such thing as "heat itself," since it cannot be found, +in nature, and we conceive of heat as effects of matter which the human +brain translated into the conception of "heat itself." Because science +was, perhaps, as yet unable to analyse this conception, the professor +says we cannot perceive the natural object which gives rise to this +conception. "Heat itself" is simply composed of the sum total of its +manifold effects, and there is nothing else to it. The faculty of +thought generalizes this variety of effects under the concept of heat in +general. The analysis of this conception, the discovery of the general +character of the various manifestations of heat, is the function of +inductive science. But the conception of heat separated from its effects +is a speculative idea, similar to Lichtenberg's knife without handle and +blade. + +The faculty of thought in touch with sense perceptions produces the +nature of things. But it produces them no more independently of things +outside than do the eye, the ear, or any other sense of man. It is not +the "things themselves" which we see or feel, but their effects on our +eyes, hands, etc. The faculty of reason to generalize different +perceptions of the eye permits us to distinguish between concrete sights +and sight in general. The faculty of thought conceives of any concrete +sight as an object of sight in general. It furthermore distinguishes +between subjective and objective sight perceptions, the latter being +sights which are visible not alone to the individual eye, but to +eyesight in general. Even the visions of a spiritualist, or such +subjective impressions as forked lightning, circles of fire, caused by +excited blood of closed eyes, serve as objects for the critical +consciousness. A glittering object revealed by bright sunlight miles +away is no more and no less tangible in substance, no more and no less +true, than any optical illusion. A man whose ear is tingling hears +something, though it is not the tinkling of bells. Every sense +perception is an object, and every object is a sense perception. The +object of any subjective mind is a passing manifestation, and every +objective perception is but a perishable subject. The object of +observation may exist in a more tangible, less approachable, more +stable, or more general form, but it is not a "thing itself." It may be +perceived not alone by my eyes, but also by those of others, not by the +eyes, but also by the feeling, the hearing, the taste, etc. And it may +be noticed not alone by men, but also by other objects. But nevertheless +it appears only as a manifestation, it is different in different places, +it is not today what it is tomorrow. Every existence is relative, in +touch with other things, and entering into different relations of time +and space with them. + +Every sense perception is an actual and natural object. Truth exists in +the form of natural phenomena, and whatever is, is true. Substance and +attribute are only terms for certain relations. They are not +contradictions, and, as a matter of fact, all contradictions disappear +before our faculty of generalization and differentiation. For this +faculty reconciles all contradictions by finding a general quality in +all differences. Existence, or universal truth, is the general object, +the raw material, of the faculty of thought. This material is of the +utmost variety and supplied by the senses. The senses reveal to us the +substance of the universe in the forms of concrete qualities, in other +words, the nature of perceptible matter is revealed to the faculty of +thought through a variety of concrete forms. It is not perceived as a +general essence, but only through interdependent phenomena. Out of the +interdependence of the sense perceptions with our faculty of thought +there arise quantities, general concepts, things, true perceptions, or +understood truths. + +Essence and truth are two terms for the same thing. Truth, or the +essence and nature of things, is a theoretical concept. As we have seen, +we receive impressions of things in two ways, viz., a sense impression +and a mental impression, the one practical, the other theoretical. +Practice furnishes us with the sense impression, theory with the mental +nature of things. + +Practice is the premise of theory, sense perception the premise of the +nature which is also called the truth. The same truth manifests itself +in practice either simultaneously or consecutively in the same place or +in different places. It exists theoretically as a homogeneous +conception. + +Practice, phenomena, sense perceptions, are absolute qualities, that is +to say they have no quantitative limitation, they are not restricted by +time or space. They are absolute and infinite qualities. The qualities +of a thing are as infinite as its parts. On the other hand, the work of +the faculty of thought, of theory, creates at will an infinite number of +quantities, and it conceives every quality of sense _perceptions_ in the +form of quantities, as the essential nature of things, as truths. Every +conception has a quality of some sense perception for its object. Every +object can be conceived by the faculty of thought only as a quantitative +unit, as true nature, as truth. + +The faculty of thought produces in contact with sense perceptions that +which manifests itself as true nature, as a general truth. A primitive +concept accomplishes this at first only instinctively, while a +scientific concept is a conscious and voluntary repetition of this +primitive act. Scientific understanding wanting to know an object, such +as for instance heat, is not hunting after the phenomena themselves. It +does not aim to see or hear how heat melts iron or wax, how it benefits +in one case or injures in another, how it makes eggs solid or ice +liquid, nor does it concern itself with the difference between the heat +of an animal, of the sun, or of a stove. All these things are from the +point of view of the faculty of understanding, only effects, phenomena, +qualities. It desires to get at the essence, the true nature of things, +it strives to find a general law, a concise scientific extract, of +things seen, heard, and felt. The abstract nature of things cannot be a +tangible object. It is a concept of theory, of science, of the faculty +of thought. The understanding of heat consists in singling out that +which is common to all phenomena of heat, which is essential or true for +all heat. _Practically the nature of heat consists of the sum total of +all its manifestations, theoretically in its concept, scientifically in +the analysis of this concept. To analyze the concept of heat means to +ascertain that which is common to all manifestations of heat._ + +The general nature of the thing is its true nature, the general quality +its true quality. We define rain more truly as being wet than as being +fertilizing, because it gives moisture wherever it falls, while it +fertilizes only under certain circumstances and in certain places. My +true friend is one who is constant and loyal to me all my life under all +circumstances. Of course, we must not believe in any absolute and +unconditional friendship any more than in any absolute and eternal +truth. Perfectly true, perfectly universal, is only the general +existence, the universe, the absolute quantity. But the real world is +absolutely relative, absolutely perishable, an infinity of +manifestations, an infinity of qualities. All truths are simply parts of +this world, partial truths. Semblance and truth flow dialectically into +one another like hard and soft, good and bad, right and wrong, but at +the same time they remain different. Even though I know that there is no +rain which is "fertile in itself," and no friend who is true in an +absolute sense, I may nevertheless refer to a certain rain as fertile in +relation to certain crops, and I may distinguish between my more or less +true friends. + +The universe is the truth. The universe is that which is universal, that +is, things which exist and are perceived. The general mark of truth is +existence, because universal existence is truth. Now, existence is not a +general abstraction, but a reality in the concrete form of sense +perceptions. The world of sense perceptions has its true and perceptible +existence in the passing and manifold manifestations of nature and life. +Therefore all manifestations are recognized as relative truths, all +truths as concrete and temporal manifestations. The manifestation of +practice is considered as a truth in theory, and vice versa, the truth +of theory is manifested in practice. Opposites are mutually relative. +Truth and error differ only comparatively, in volume of degree, like +being and seeming, life and death, light and dark, like all other +opposites in the world. It is a matter of course that all things of this +world are worldly, consequently are of the same matter, the same nature, +the same family, the same quality. In other words, every volume of +perceptible manifestation forms in contact with the human faculty of +thought a being, a truth, a general thing. For our consciousness, every +particle of dust as well as every dust cloud, or any other mass of +material manifestations, is on the one hand an abstract "thing in +itself," and on the other a passing phenomenon of the absolute object, +the universe. Inside of this universe the various manifestations are +systematized or generalized at will and on purpose by means of our mind. +The chemical element is as much a manysided system as the organic cell +or the whole vegetable kingdom. The smallest and the largest being is +divided into individuals, species, families, classes, etc. This +systematization, this generalization, this generation of beings is +continued in an ascending scale up to the infinity of the universe, and +in the descending scale down to the infinity of the parts. In the eyes +of the faculty of thought all qualities become abstract things, all +things relative qualities. + +Every thing, every sense perception, no matter how subjective or +shortlived it may be, is true, is a certain part of truth. In other +words, the truth exists, not only in the general existence, but every +concrete existence has also its own distinct generality or truth. Every +object, whether it be a mere passing idea, or a volatile scent, or some +tangible matter, constitutes a sum of manifold phenomena. The faculty of +thought turns various quantities into one, discerns the equality in +different things, seeks the unity in the multiplicity. Mind and matter +have at least actual existence in common. Organic nature agrees with +inorganic nature in being material. It is true that there are wide +divergences between man, monkey, elephant, and plants attached to the +soil, but even greater differences are reconciled under the term +"organism." However much a stone may differ from a human heart, thinking +reason will discover innumerable similarities in them. They at least +agree in being matter, they are both visible, tangible, and may be +weighed, etc. Their differences are as manifold as their likenesses. +Solomon truly says that there is nothing new under the sun, and Schiller +also says truly that the world grows old and again grows young. What +abstract thing, being, existence, generality is there that is not +manifold in its sense manifestations, and individually different from +all other things? There are no two drops of water alike. I am now in +many respects different from what I was an hour ago, and the likeness +between my brother and myself is only relatively greater than the +likeness between a watch and an oyster. In short, the faculty of thought +is a faculty of absolute generalization, it classes all things without +exception under one head, it comprises and understands everything +uniformly, while sense perceptions show absolutely everything in a +different, new and individual light. + +If we apply this metaphysics[1] to our study, the faculty of thought, +we see that its functions, like all other things, are material +manifestations, which are all equally true. All manifestations of the +mind, all ideas, opinions, errors, partake of a certain truth, all of +them have a kernel of truth. Just as inevitably as a painter derives all +forms of his creation from perceptible objects around him, so are all +ideas, images of true things, theories of true objects. So far as +perceptions are perceptions, it is a matter of course that all +perceptions perceive something. So far as knowledge is knowledge, it +requires no explanation that all knowledge knows something. This follows +from the rule of identity, according to which a equals a, or from the +rule of contradiction, according to which 100 is not 1,000. + +All perceptions are thoughts. One might claim, on the other hand, that +all thoughts are not perceptions. One might define "perceiving" as a +special kind of thought, as real objective thought in distinction from +supposing, believing, or imagining. But it cannot be denied that all +thoughts have a common nature, in spite of their many differences. +Thought is treated in the court of the faculty of thought like all other +things, it is made uniform. No matter how different the thoughts I had +yesterday may be from those I have to-day, no matter how much the +thoughts of different human beings may vary at different times, no +matter how clearly we may distinguish between such thoughts as those +expressed by the terms idea, conception, judgment, conclusion, +impression, etc., they each and all possess the same common and +universal nature, because all of them are manifestations of mind. + +It follows, then, that the difference between true and erroneous +thoughts, between understanding and misunderstanding, like all other +differences, is only relative. A thought "in itself" is neither false +nor true, it is either of these only in relation to some other object. +Thoughts, conceptions, theories, natures, truths, all have this in +common that they belong to some object. We have seen that any object is +a part of the multiplicity of sense perceptions in the world outside of +our brains. After as much of the universal being as constitutes the +object which is to be understood has been defined by some customary term +of language, truth is to be found in the discovery of the general nature +of this perceptible part of being. + +The perceptible parts of being which constitute the things of this world +have not only a semblance and manifestation, but also a true nature +which is given by means of their manifestation. The nature of things is +as infinite in number as the world of sense perceptions is infinitely +divisible in space and time. Every part of any phenomenon has its own +nature, every special phenomenon has its general truth. A phenomenon is +perceived in touch with the senses, while the true or essential nature +of things is perceived in contact with our faculty of thought. In this +way we find ourselves face to face with the necessity of speaking here, +where the nature of things is up for discussion, simultaneously of the +faculty of thought, and on the other hand of dealing with the nature of +things when the faculty of thought is our main subject. + +We said at the outset: The criterion of truth includes the criterion of +reason. Truth, like reason, consists in developing a general concept, +or an abstract theory, from a given sum of sense perceptions. Therefore +it is not abstract truth which is the criterion of true understanding, +but we rather refer to that understanding as being true which produces +the truth, or the general hall-mark of any concrete object. Truth must +be objective, that is to say it must be the truth about some concrete +object. Perceptions cannot be true to themselves, they are true only in +relation to some definite object, and to some outside facts. The work of +understanding consists in the abstraction of the general hall-mark from +concrete objects. The concrete is the measure of the general, the +standard of truth. Whatever is, is true, no matter how much or how +little true it may be. Once we have found existence, its general nature +follows as truth itself. The difference between that which is more or +less general, between being and seeming, between truth and error, is +limited to definite conditions, for it presupposes the relation to some +special object. Whether a perception is true or false will, therefore, +depend not so much on perception as on the scope of the question which +perception tries to solve of its own accord or which it is called upon +to solve by external circumstances. A perfect understanding is possible +only within definite limits. A perfect truth is one which is always +aware of its imperfection. For instance, it is perfectly true that all +bodies have weight only because the concept of "body" has previously +been limited to things which have weight. After reason has assigned the +conception of "body in general" to things of various weights, it is no +longer a matter for surprise to find that bodies must inevitably have +weight. Once it is assumed that the term "bird" was abstracted +exclusively from flying animals, we may be sure that all birds fly, +whether they are in heaven, on earth, or in any other place. And to +explain this we do not require the belief in _a priori_ conceptions +which are supposed to differ from empirical conceptions by their strict +necessity and generality. Truths are valid only under certain +conditions, and under certain conditions errors may be true. It is a +true perception that the sun is shining, provided we understand that the +sky is not covered by clouds. And it is no less true that a straight +stick becomes crooked in flowing water, provided we understand that this +truth is an optical one. _Truth is that which is common or general to +our reasoning faculty within a given circle of sense perceptions. To +call within a definite circle of sense perceptions that which is +exceptional or special the rule or the general, is error._ Error, the +opposite of truth, arises when the faculty of thought, or consciousness, +inadvertently or shortsightedly and without previous experience concedes +to certain phenomena a more general scope than is supported by the +senses, for instance when it hastily attributes to what is in fact only +an optical existence, a supposed plastic existence also. + +The judgment of error is a prejudice. Truth and error, understanding and +misunderstanding, knowing and not knowing, have their common habitation +in the faculty of thought which is the organ of science. Thought at +large is the general expression of experienced facts perceived by the +senses, and it includes errors as well. Error is distinguished from +truth in that the former assigns to any definite fact of which it is a +manifestation, a wider and more general existence than is supported by +sense perceptions and experience. Unwarranted assumption is the nature +of error. A glass bead does not become a counterfeit, until it pretends +to be a genuine pearl. + +Schleiden says of the eye: "When the excited blood expands the veins and +presses on the nerves, we feel it in the fingers as pain, we see it in +the eyes as forked lightning. And thus we obtain the irrefutable proof +that our conceptions are free creations of the mind, that we do not +perceive the external world as it really is, but that its reflex actions +on us simply give rise to a peculiar brain activity, on our part. The +products of this activity are frequently connected with certain +processes of the external world, but frequently they are not. We close +our eyes and we see a circle of light, but there is in reality no +shining body. It is easy to see that this may be a great and dangerous +source of errors of all kinds. From the teasing forms of a misty +moonlight night to the threatening and insanity-producing visions of the +believer in ghosts we meet a series of illusions which are not derived +from any direct processes of external nature, but belong to the field of +the free activity of the mind which is subject to error. It requires +great judgment and wide education, before the mind learns to break away +from all its own errors and to control them. Reading in general seems so +easy, and yet it is a difficult art. It is only by degrees that the mind +learns to understand which of the messages of the nerves may be trusted +and used as a basis for conceptions. The light, if we consider it +entirely by itself, is not clear, not yellow, nor blue nor red. The +light is a movement of a very fine and everywhere diffused substance, +the ether." + +The beautiful world of light and splendor, of color and form, is +supposed not to be a perception of something which really is. "Through +the thick covering of the grape arbor, a ray of sunlight undulates into +the cooling shadows. You think you see the ray of light itself, but what +you really see is nothing but a flock of dust particles." The truth +about light and color is said to be that they are "waves rushing through +ether in restless succession at the rate of 160,000 miles per second." +This true physical nature of light and color is supposed to be so +illusive, that "it required the sharp intellects of the greatest +thinkers to reveal to us this true nature of light. We find that every +one of our senses is susceptible only to definite external influences, +and that the stimulation of different senses produces different +conceptions in our mind. Thus the sense organs are the mediators between +the external soulless world (undulations of the ether), which is +revealed to us by science, and the beautiful world of sense perceptions +in which we find ourselves with our minds." + +Schleiden thus gives an illustration of the fact that there is still a +great deal of embarrassment, even in our times, when the understanding +of these two worlds is under discussion, that there is still much +helpless groping to explain the connection between the world of thought, +of knowledge or science, which is in this case represented by +undulations of the ether, and between the world of our five senses, +represented by the bright and colored lights of the eyes or of reality. +At the same time this illustration shows how queer the traditional +survivals of speculative philosophy sound in the mouth of a modern +scientist. The confused condition of this mode of thought is seen in the +distinction between "an external sense-perceived world of science" and +another one, "in which we find ourselves with our minds." The +distinction between the senses and the mind, between theory and +practice, between the special and the general, between truth and error, +has been noticed by such thinkers, but they have no solution for it. +They know there is something missing, but they do not know where to look +for it, and therefore they are confused. + +The great scientific achievement of the XIXth century consists in the +victory over speculation, over knowledge without sense perception, in +the delivery of the senses from the thraldom of such knowledge, and in +the foundation of empirical investigation. To acknowledge the +theoretical value of this achievement means to come to an understanding +about the source of error. Contrary to a philosophy that tries to +discover truth with the mind, and error with the senses, we seek for +truth with the senses and regard the mind as the source of errors. The +belief in certain messages of the nerves which are alone worthy of +confidence and which can be understood only by degrees without any +specific mark of distinction, is a superstition. Let us have confidence +in all testimonials of the senses. There is nothing false to be +separated from the genuine. The supernatural mind idea is the only +deceiver whenever it undertakes to disregard the sense perceptions, and, +instead of being the interpreter of the senses, tries to enlarge their +statements and repeat what has not been dictated. The eye, in seeing +forked lightning or radiant circles when the blood is excited or a +pressure exerted on it, perceives no more errors than it does in +perceiving any other manifestation of the external world. It is our +faculty of thought which makes a mistake, by regarding without further +inquiry such subjective events as objective bodies. One who sees ghosts +does not commit any mistake, until he claims that his personal +apparition is a general phenomenon, until he prematurely takes something +for an experience which he has not experienced. Error is an offense +against the law of truth which prescribes to our consciousness that it +must remember the limits within which a perception is true, or general. +Error makes out of something special a generality, out of a predicate a +subject, and takes the part for the whole. Error makes _a priori_ +conclusions, while truth, its opposite, arrives at understanding by _a +posteriori_ reasoning. + +_A priori_ and _a posteriori_ understanding are related in the same way +as philosophy and natural science, taking the latter in the widest +meaning of the term, that of science in general. The contrast between +believing and knowing is duplicated in that between philosophy and +natural science. Speculative philosophy, like religion, lives on faith. +The modern world has transformed faith into science. The reactionists in +politics who demand that science retrace its steps desire its return to +faith. The content of faith is acquired without exertion. Faith makes _a +priori_ perceptions, while science arrives at its knowledge by hard _a +posteriori_ study. To give up faith means to give up taking things easy. +And to confine science to _a posteriori_ knowledge means to decorate it +with the characteristic mark of modern times, work. + +It is not a result of scientific study, but merely a freak of +philosophy on the part of Schleiden to deny the reality and truth of +light phenomena, to call them fantasmagoria created by the free play of +the mind. His superstitious belief in philosophical speculation misleads +him into abandoning the scientific method of induction and speaking of +"waves rushing through ether in restless succession at the rate of +160,000 miles per hour" as being the real and true nature of light and +color, in contradistinction to the color phenomena of light. The +perversion of this mode of procedure becomes evident by his referring to +the material world of the eyes as a "creation of the mind" and to the +undulations of the ether, revealed by the "sharp intellect of the +greatest thinkers" as "physical nature." + +The truth of science maintains the same relation to the sense perception +that the general does to the special. Waves of light, the so-called +truth of light and color, represent the "true" nature of light only in +so far as they represent what is common to all light phenomena, whether +they are white, yellow, blue, or any other color. The world of the mind, +or of science finds its raw material, its premise, its proof, its +beginning, and its boundary in sense perception. + +When we have learned that the nature, or the truth, of things is not +back of their phenomena, but can be perceived only by the help of +phenomena, and that it does not exist "in itself," but only in +connection with the faculty of understanding, that the nature is +separated from the phenomena only by thought; and when we see on the +other hand, that the faculty of understanding does not derive +conceptions out of itself, but only out of their relations with some +phenomenon; then this discussion of the "nature of things" is an +evidence that the nature of the faculty of thought is a conception which +we have obtained from its sense manifestations. To understand that the +faculty of thought, although universal in the choice of its objects, is +nevertheless limited in that it requires some object; to recognize that +the true thought process, that is to say the thought with a scientific +result, differs from unscientific thinking by consciously attaching +itself to some external object; to realize that truth, or universality, +is not perceived "in itself," but can be perceived only by means of some +given object; this frequently varied statement reveals the nature of the +faculty of thought. This statement re-appears at the end of every +chapter, because all special truths, all special chapters, serve only to +demonstrate the general chapter of universal truth. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] E. g., this all-embracing physics.--EDITOR. + + + + +IV + +THE PRACTICE OF REASON IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE + + +Although we know that reason is attached to perceptible matter, to +physical objects, so that science can never be anything else but the +science of the physical, still we may, according to the prevailing ideas +and usage of language, separate physics from logic and ethics, and thus +distinguish them as different forms of science. The problem is then to +demonstrate that in physics as well as in logic, as also in ethics, the +general or intellectual perceptions can be practically obtained only on +the basis of concrete perceptible facts. + +This practice of reason, to generate thought from matter, to arrive at +understanding by sense perceptions, to produce the general out of the +concrete, has been universally accepted in physical investigation, but +only in practice. The inductive method is employed, and one is aware of +this fact, but it is not understood that the nature of inductive science +is the nature of science in general, of reason. The process of thought +is misunderstood. Physical science lacks the theory of understanding and +for this reason often falls out of its practical step. The faculty of +thought is still an unknown, mysterious, mystical being for natural +science. Either it confounds the function with the organ, the mind with +the brain, as do the materialists, or it thinks with the idealists that +the faculty of thought is an imperceptible object outside of its field. +We see modern investigators marching toward their goal with firm and +uniform steps, so far as physical matters are concerned. But they +aimlessly grope around in the abstract relations of these things. The +inductive method has been practically adopted by natural science and its +successes have secured a great reputation for it. On the other hand, the +speculative method has become discredited by its failures. There is, +however, no conscious understanding of these various methods of thought. +We see the men of physical research, when they are outside of their +special field, offer lawyer-like speculations in lieu of scientific +facts. While they arrive at the special truths of their chosen fields by +sense perceptions, they still pretend to derive speculative truths out +of the depths of their own minds. + +Listen to the following statements of Alexander von Humboldt, which he +makes in the initial argument of his "Cosmos" in regard to speculation: +"The most important result of physical research by sense perception is +this: that it finds the element of unity in a multitude of forms; that +it grasps all the individual manifestations offered by the discoveries +of recent times, carefully scrutinizes and distinguishes them; yet does +not succumb under their mass; that it fulfills the sublime mission of +the human being, of understanding the nature of things which is hidden +under the cover of phenomena. In this way our aim reaches beyond the +narrow limits of the senses, and we may succeed in grasping the nature +by controlling the raw material of empirical observation through ideas. +In my observations of the scientific treatment of general cosmic +phenomena, I am not deriving unity out of a few fundamental principles +found by speculative reason. My work is the expression of a thoughtful +observation of empirical phenomena seen as one and the same nature. I am +not going to venture into a field which is foreign to me. What I call +physical cosmology does not, therefore, aspire to the rank of a rational +science of nature.... True to the character of my former occupation and +writings, which were devoted to experiments, measurements, and +investigations of facts, I confine myself in this work to empirical +observations. It is the only ground on which I can move with a measure +of security." In the same breath Humboldt says that "without the earnest +desire for the knowledge of concrete facts any great and universal world +philosophy would be merely a castle in the air" and in another place +that "an understanding of the universe by speculative and introspective +reason would represent a still more sublime aim" than understanding by +empirical thought. And on page 68 of volume I. he says: "I am far from +finding fault with endeavors of others the success of which still +remains in doubt, when I have had no practical experience with them." + +Now natural science shares with Humboldt the consciousness that the +practice of reason in physical research consists exclusively in +"perceiving the element of unity in a multitude of forms." But on the +other hand, though it does not always admit its belief in speculative +introspection as frankly as Humboldt does, it nevertheless proves that +it does not fully understand the practice of science and that it +believes in a metaphysical as well as a physical science by using the +speculative method in the treatment of so-called philosophical topics, +in which the element of unity is supposed to be discovered by +introspective reason instead of an analysis of multiform sense +perceptions, and it demonstrates its lack of unity by being unaware of +the unscientific character of disagreements, by believing in a +metaphysical science outside of the physical domain. The relations +between phenomenon and its nature, cause and effect, matter and force, +substance and spirit, are certainly physical ones. But what is there of +unity that science teaches about them? Plainly then, the work of +science, like that of the farmer, has so far been done only practically, +but not scientifically, not with a predetermination of success. +Understanding, that is to say the practice of understanding, is well +applied in science, I readily admit. But the instrument of this +understanding, the faculty of thought, is misunderstood. We find that +natural science, instead of applying this faculty scientifically, simply +experiments with it. What is the reason for this? Natural science has +neglected the critique of reason, the theory of science, logic. + +Just as the handle and the blade of a knife constitute its general +content, so we found that the general content of reason was the +universal, the general "itself." We know that it does not produce this +content out of itself, but out of given objects, and these objects are +the sum of all natural or physical things. The object of reason is, +therefore, an infinite, unlimited, absolute quantity. This infinite +quantity manifests itself in finite quantities. In the treatment of +relatively small quantities of nature the true essence of reason, the +true method of understanding, is well recognized. It remains to be +demonstrated that the great relations of the world, the treatment of +which is still doubtful, are likewise intelligible by the same method. +Cause and effect, mind and matter, matter and force, are such great +world problems, and they are of a physical character. We shall +demonstrate that the most general distinction between reason and its +object furnishes the key to the solution of the great world problems. + + ++(a) Cause and Effect.+ + +"The nature of natural history," says F. W. Bessell, "lies in the fact +that it does not consider phenomena as facts in themselves, but looks +for their causes. The knowledge of nature is thus reduced to the minimum +number of facts." But the causes of the phenomena of nature had been +investigated even before the age of natural history. The characteristic +mark of natural history is not so much that it investigates causes, but +that the causes which it investigates have a peculiar nature and a +particular quality. + +Inductive science has materially changed the conception of causes. It +has retained the term, but uses it in a different sense from that +employed by speculation. The naturalist conceives of causes differently +within his special field and outside of it; here, outside of his +specialty, he frequently indulges in introspective speculation, because +he understands science and its cause in a concrete, but not in a general +way. The unscientific forces are of a supernatural make-up, they are +transcendental spirits, gods, forces, little and big goblins. The +original conception of causes is an anthropomorphic one. In a state of +inexperience, man measures the objective by a subjective standard, +judges the world by himself. Just as he creates things with conscious +intent, so he attributes to nature his human manner, imagines the +existence of an external and creative cause of the phenomena of sense +perception, similar to himself who is the special cause of his own +creations. This subjective mood is to blame for the fact that the +struggle for objective understanding has so long been in vain. The +unscientifically conceived cause is a speculation of the _a priori_ +kind. + +If the term understanding is retained for subjective understanding, then +objective science differs from it in that such a science penetrates to +the causes of its objects not by faith or introspective speculation, but +by experience and induction, not _a priori_, but _a posteriori_. Natural +science looks for causes not outside or back of nature's phenomena, but +within or by means of them. Modern research seeks no external creator of +causes, but rather the immanent system, the method or general mode of +the various phenomena as they are given by succession in time. The +unscientifically conceived cause is a "thing in itself," a little god +who generates his effects independently and hides behind them. The +scientific conception of causes, on the other hand, looks only for the +theory of effects, the general element of phenomena. To investigate a +cause means then to generalize a variety of phenomena, to arrange the +multiplicity of experienced facts under one scientific rule. "The +knowledge of nature is thus reduced to the minimum number of facts." + +The commonplace and inept knowledge differs from the most exalted, +rarest, and newly discovered science in the same way in which a petty +and childish superstition differs from the historical superstition of a +whole period. For this reason we may well choose our illustrations from +our daily circle, instead of looking for them in the so-called higher +regions of a remote science. Human common sense had long practiced the +investigation of causes by inductive and scientific methods, before +science realized that it would have to pursue its higher aims in the +same way. Common sense does arrive at the faith in a mysterious cause of +speculative reason, just like the naturalist, as soon as it leaves the +field of its immediate environment. In order to stand firmly on the +ground of real science, every one requires the understanding of the +manner in which inductive reason investigates its causes. + +To this end let us glance briefly at the outcome of the study of the +nature of reason. We know that the faculty of understanding is not a +"thing in and by itself," because it becomes real only in contact with +some object. But whatever we know of any object, is known not alone +through the object, but also through the faculty of reason. +Consciousness, like all other being, is relative. Understanding is +contact with a variety of objects. To knowledge there is attached +distinction, subject and object, variety in unity. Thus things become +mutual causes and mutual effects. The entire world of phenomena, of +which thought is but a part, a form, is an absolute circle, in which the +beginning and end is everywhere and nowhere, in which everything is at +the same time essence and semblance, cause and effect, general and +concrete. Just as all nature is in the last instance one sole general +unity, in view of which all other unities become a multitude, so this +same nature, or objectivity, or world of sense perceptions, or whatever +else we may call the sum of all phenomena or effects, is the final cause +of all things, compared to which all other causes become effects. But we +must remember that this cause of all causes is only the sum of all +effects, not a transcendental or superior being. Every cause has its +effect, every effect causes something. + +A cause cannot be physically separated from its effect any more than the +visible can be separated from the eye, the taste from the tongue, in +brief the general from the concrete. Nevertheless, the faculty of +thought may separate the one from the other. We must keep in mind that +this separation is a mere formality of thought, although it is a +formality which is necessary in order to be reasonable or conscious, in +order to act scientifically. The practice of understanding, or +scientific practice, derives the concrete from the general, the natural +things from nature. But whoever has been behind the scenes, and has +looked at the faculty of thought at work, knows that, conversely the +general is derived from the concrete, the concept of nature from natural +things. The theory of understanding or science teaches us that the +antecedent is understood by its consequent, the cause by its effect, +while our practical understanding regards the after as a consequence of +the before, the effect as a result of the cause. The faculty of +understanding, the organ of generalization, regards its opposite, the +concrete, as secondary, while the faculty of thought which understands +itself regards it as primary. However, the practice of understanding is +not to be changed by its theory, nor can it be; the theory intends +simply to render the steps of consciousness firm. The scientific farmer +differs from the practical farmer, not because he employs theory and +method, for both do that, but because he understands the theory, while +the practical man theorizes instinctively. + +To continue: From a given multitude of facts, reason generates truth in +general, and out of a succession of forms and transformations it +abstracts the true cause, just as absolute multiplicity is the nature of +space, so absolute variability is the nature of time. Every particle of +time and space is new, original, and has never been there before. The +faculty of thought enables us to find our way through this absolute +medley by abstracting general concepts out of the multitude of things in +space, and tracing the variations of time to general causes. The entire +nature of reason consists in generalizing sense perceptions, in +abstracting the common elements out of concrete things. Whoever does not +fully understand reason by understanding that it is the organ of +generalization forgets that understanding requires an object which must +remain something outside of its conception, since such object cannot be +dissolved by its conception. The being of the reasoning faculty cannot +be understood any more than being in general. Or rather, being is +understood when we take it in its generality. Not being itself, but the +general element of being, is understood by the faculty of thought. + +Let us realize, for instance, the process which takes place when reason +understands something it did not know before. Think of some peculiar, +unexpected and unknown chemical transformation which takes place +suddenly and without apparent cause in some mixture. Assume furthermore +that the same reaction takes place more frequently after that, until +experience demonstrates that this inexplicable change occurs whenever +sunlight touches the mixture. This already constitutes a certain +understanding of the process. Assume furthermore that subsequent +experience teaches us that several other substances have the faculty of +producing the same reaction in connection with sunlight. We have then +arranged the new reaction in line with a number of phenomena of the same +class, that is to say we have enlarged, deepened, completed our +understanding of it still more. And if we finally discover that a +special part of the sunlight unites with a special element of the +mixture and thereby produces this new reaction, we have generalized this +experience, or experienced this generalization, in a "pure" state, in +other words, the theory of this reaction is complete, reason has solved +its problem, and yet it has done nothing more than it did when it +classified the animal and vegetable kingdoms in families, genera, +species, etc. To find the species, the genus, the sex, etc., of anything +means to understand it. + +Reason proceeds in the same way when it investigates the causes of +certain transformations. Causes are, in the last instance, not noticed +and furnished by means of sight, hearing, feeling, not by means of the +sense perceptions. They are rather supplied by the faculty of thought. +It is true, causes are not the "pure" products of the faculty of +thought, but are produced by it in connection with sense perceptions and +their material objects. This raw material gives the objective existence +to the causes produced by the mind. Just as we demand that a truth +should be the truth about some objective phenomenon, so we also demand +that a cause should be real, that it should be the cause of some +objective effect. + +The understanding of any concrete cause is conditioned on the empirical +study of its material, while the understanding of any general cause is +based on the study of the faculty of reason. In the understanding of +concrete causes, the material of study varies, but reason maintains a +constant or general attitude. The cause, as a general cause, is a pure +conception, and it is based on the study of the multiformity of concrete +understandings of causes, or on the multiplied study of concrete causes. +Hence we are compelled to return to the concrete material of the general +concept, to the understanding of concrete causes, if we wish to analyze +the concept of a general cause. + +When a stone falls into the water and causes ripples on the surface, the +stone is no more the cause of the ripples than the liquid condition of +the water. If the stone falls on solid substances, it causes no ripples. +It is the contact of the falling stone with liquid substances which +causes the ripples. The cause is itself an effect, and the effect, the +ripples, become a cause when they carry a piece of cork ashore. But in +either case the cause is based on a mutual effect, on the interaction of +the waves with the light condition of the cork. + +A stone falling into the water is not a cause "in itself," not a cause +in general. We arrive at such a cause only, when the faculty of thought +uses concrete causes for its raw material and constructs out of them +the "pure" concept of the cause in general. A stone falling into the +water is only the cause of the subsequent ripples, and it becomes a +general cause only through the experience that ripples always follow the +falling of a stone into water. + +We call cause that which generally precedes a certain manifestation, and +effect that which generally follows it. We refer to the stone as the +cause of ripples merely because we know that it always causes them when +falling into water. But since ripples sometimes appear without being +preceded by the fall of a stone, ripples have another general cause. So +far as there is anything general in ripples which precedes them, it is +the elasticity of the water itself which is the general cause of +ripples. Circular ripples, which are a special form of ripples, are +generally preceded by the falling of some body into the water, and this +body is then considered as their cause. The cause is always different in +proportion and to the extent of the phenomena under consideration. + +We cannot ascertain causes by mere introspective reasoning, we cannot +derive them out of our head. Matter, materials, sense perceptions are +required for this purpose. A definite cause requires a definite +material, a definite amount of sense perceptions. In the abstract unity +of nature, the variations of matter are represented by the variations of +concrete quantities. Every quantity is given in time before and after a +certain other quantity, as antecedent and subsequent. The general +element of the antecedent is called cause, the general element of the +subsequent, effect. + +When the wind sways a forest, the yielding character of the forest is as +much instrumental in producing this effect as the bending power of the +wind. The cause of a thing is its connection with other things. The fact +that the same wind leaves rocks and walls standing shows that the cause +is not qualitatively different from the effect, but that it is a matter +of aggregate effects. If nevertheless science or knowledge determines +any special fact to be the cause of any change, that is to say of any +succession of phenomena, this cause is no longer regarded as the +external creator, but merely as the general mode, the immanent method of +succession. A definite cause can be ascertained only when we have under +consideration a definite circle, series, or number of changes, the cause +of which is to be determined. And within a definite circle of succeeding +phenomena, that which generally precedes is their cause. + +The wind which sways a forest differs from wind as a general cause only +in that the latter has other general effects, inasmuch as it howls in +one place, stirs up dust in another, or acts in many different ways. In +the special case of the forest, the wind is a cause only in so far as it +precedes the swaying of the trees. But in the case of rocks and walls, +the solidity precedes the wind and is therefore the general cause of +their resistance to the swaying power of the wind. In a still wider +circle of hurricane phenomena, a gentle wind may be regarded as a cause +of the stability of the objects last mentioned. + +The _quantity_ or _number_ of given objects varies the name of their +cause. If a certain company of people return from a walk in a tired +condition, this change of condition is just as much due to the physical +weakness of the people as to the walk. In other words, a manifestation +has in itself no cause which can be separated from it. Everything which +was connected with a phenomenon has contributed toward its appearance. +In the case of the promenaders, the physical constitution of their +bodies has to be considered as well as the physical constitution and +length of the road and duration of the walk. If reason is nevertheless +called upon to determine the special cause of some concrete change, for +instance, of a tired feeling, it is simply a question of determining +which one of the various factors has contributed most to that feeling. +In this case as well as in all others, the work of reason consists in +developing the general from the concrete, that is to say in this case, +singling out from a given number of tired sensations that which +generally precedes the tired feeling. If most of the promenaders or all +of them are found to be tired, the walk will be considered as the cause. +But if only a few are tired, the weak constitution of these people will +be considered as the general cause of their tired condition. + +To use another illustration: If the discharge of a shot frightens some +birds, this effect is due to the combined action of the shot and the +timidity of the birds. If the majority of the birds fly away, the shot +will be considered as the cause. But if the minority fly away, their +timidity will be regarded as the cause. + +Effects are subsequences. Since all things in nature follow other things +and all things have an antecedent and a subsequent, we may call the +natural, the real, the sense perceptions absolute effects, having no +cause unless we find one with our faculty of thought by systematizing +the given material. Causes are mental generalizations of perceptible +changes. The supposed relation of cause and effect is a miracle, a +creation of something out of nothing. For this reason this relation has +been and still is an object of speculative reasoning. The speculative +cause creates its effects. But in reality the effects are the material +out of which the brain, or science, forms its causes. The cause concept +is a product of reason; not of "pure" reason, but of reason married to +the world of sense perceptions. + +If Kant maintains that the statement: "Every change has its cause" is an +_a priori truth_ which we cannot experience because no one can possibly +experience all changes, although every one has the irrefutable feeling +of the correctness of this statement, we know now that this statement +expresses merely the experience that the phenomenon which we call reason +recognizes the uniform element in all multiformity. Or in other words, +we now know that the development of the general element out of the +concrete facts is called reason, thought, or mind. The secure knowledge +that every change has its cause is nothing else but the conviction that +we are thinking human beings. _Cogito, ergo sum._ I think, therefore I +am. We have experienced the nature of our reason instinctively even if +we have not analyzed it scientifically. We are as well aware of the +faculty of our reason to abstract a cause out of every given change, as +we are that every circle is round, that a is equal to a. We know that +the general is the product of reason, and reason produces this general +thing in contact with every given object. And since all objects before +and after a certain other object are temporal changes, it follows that +all changes which we as thinking beings experience must have a general +antecedent, a cause. + +Already the English sceptic Hume felt that true causes are different +from assumed causes. According to him the concept of a cause contains +nothing but the experience of that which generally precedes a certain +phenomenon. Kant rightfully remarks on the other hand that the +conception of cause and effect expresses a far more intimate relation +than that indicated by a loose and accidental succession, and that the +concept of a cause rather comprises that of a certain effect as a +necessity and strict general result. Therefore he claimed that there +must be something _a priori_ in reason which cannot be experienced and +which extends beyond experience. + +We reply to the materialists who deny all autonomy of the mind and hope +to detect causes by experience alone that the general necessity which +presupposes the relation of cause and effect represents an impossible +experience. And we reply to the idealists: Although reason explores +causes which cannot be experienced, this research cannot take place _a +priori_, but only _a posteriori_, only on the basis of empirically given +effects. It is true that the mind alone discovers the imperceptible and +abstract generality, but it does so only within the circle of certain +given sense perceptions. + + ++(b) Matter and Mind.+ + +The understanding of the general dependence of the faculty of thought on +material sense perceptions will restore to objective reality that right +which has long been denied to it by ideas and opinions. Nature with its +varied concrete phenomena which had been crowded out of human +considerations by philosophical and religious imaginings, and which has +been scientifically re-established again on special fields by the +development of natural sciences, gains general theoretical recognition +by the understanding of the functions of the brain. Hitherto natural +science has chosen for its object only special matters, special causes, +special forces, but has remained ignorant in general questions of +so-called natural philosophy regarding the cause of all things, of +matter, of force in general. The actual existence of this ignorance is +revealed by that great contradiction between idealism and materialism +which pervades all works of science like a red thread. + +"May I succeed in this letter in strengthening the conviction that +chemistry as an independent science represents one of the most powerful +means for the higher cultivation of the mind, that its study is useful +not alone for the promotion of the material interests of mankind, but +because it permits a deeper penetration of the wonders of creation, with +which our existence, our welfare, and our development are intimately +connected." + +In these words Liebig expresses the prevalent views which have +accustomed themselves to look upon material and spiritual differences as +absolute opposites. But the untenability of such a distinction is +vaguely felt even by the just quoted advocate of this view, who speaks +of material interests and of a mental penetration which is the condition +for our existence, welfare, and development. But what else does the term +material interests mean but the abstract expression of our existence, +welfare, and development? Are not these the concrete content of our +material interests? Does he not say explicitly that the penetration of +the wonders of creation promotes our material interests? And on the +other hand, does not the promotion of our material interests require a +penetration on our part of the wonders of creation? In what respect are +our material interests different from our mental penetration of things? + +The superior, spiritual, ideal, which Liebig in conformity with the +views of the world of naturalists opposes to our material interests, is +only a special part of those interests. Mental penetration and material +interests differ no more than the circle differs from the square. +Circles and squares are contrasts, but at the same time they are but +different and special classes of form in general. + +It has been the custom, especially since the advent of Christian times, +to speak contemptuously of material, perceptible, fleshly things which +are destroyed by rust and moths. And nowadays people continue on this +conservative track, although their antipathy against perceptible reality +has long disappeared from their minds and actions. The Christian +separation of mind and body has been practically abandoned in the age of +natural science. But the theoretical solution of the contradiction, the +demonstration that the spiritual is material and the material at the +same time spiritual, by which the material interests would be freed from +the stigma of inferiority, has not yet been forthcoming. + +Modern science is natural science. Science is deemed worthy of its name +only in so far as it is natural science. In other words, only that +thought is scientific which consciously has real, perceptible, natural +things for its object. For this reason representatives and friends of +science can not be enemies of nature or of matter. Indeed they are not. +But the very existence of science shows that this nature, this world of +sense perceptions, this matter or substance, does alone and by itself +not satisfy us. Science, or thought, which has material practice or +being for its object, does not strive to reproduce nature in its +integrity, in its entire perceptible substance, for these are already +present. If science were to aim at nothing new, it would be superfluous. +It is entitled to special recognition only to the extent that it carries +a new element into matter. Science is not so much concerned in the +material of its study as in understanding. Of course it is the +understanding of this material which is desired, the understanding of +its general character, of the fixed pole in the succession of phenomena. +That which religion supernaturally separates from the material, which +science opposes to the material as something higher, diviner, more +spiritual, is in reality nothing but the faculty of rising above +multiformity, of proceeding from the concrete to the general. + +The nobler spiritual interests are not absolutely different from the +material interests, they are not qualitatively different. The positive +side of modern idealism does not consist in belittling eating and +drinking, the pleasure in earthly possessions and in intercourse with +the other sex, but rather in pleading for the recognition of other +material enjoyments besides these, as for instance those of the eye, the +ear, of art and science, in short of the whole man. You shall not +indulge in the material revelries of passion, that is to say you shall +not direct your thought one-sidedly to any concrete lust, but rather +consider your entire development, take into account the total general +extension of your existence. The bare materialist principle is +inadequate in that it does not appreciate the difference between the +concrete and the general, because it makes the individual synonymous +with the general. It refuses to recognize the quantitative superiority +of the mind over the world of sense perceptions. Idealism, on the other +hand, forgets the qualitative unity in the quantitative difference. It +is transcendental and makes an absolute difference out of the relative +one. The contradiction between these two camps is due to the +misunderstood relation of our reason to its given object or material. +The idealist regards reason alone as the source of all understanding, +while the materialist looks upon the world of sense perceptions in the +same way. Nothing is required for a solution of this contradiction but +the comprehension of the relative interdependence of these two sources +of understanding. Idealism sees only the difference, materialism sees +only the uniformity of matter and mind, content and form, force and +substance, sense perception and moral interpretation. But all these +distinctions belong to the one common genus which constitutes the +distinction between the special and the general. + +Consistent materialists act like purely practical men without any +science. But, since knowing and thinking are real attributes of man +regardless of his party affiliation, purely practical men do not exist +in reality. Even the merest attempt at practical experiment on the basis +of experienced facts differs only in degree from scientific practice +based on theoretical principles. On the other hand, consistent +idealists are just as impossible as purely practical men. They would +like to have the general without the special, the spirit without matter, +force without substance, science without experience or material, the +absolute without the relative. How can thinkers who search for truth, +being, relative causes, such as naturalists, be idealists? They are so +only outside of their specialties, never inside of them. The modern +mind, the mind of natural science, is immaterial only so far as it +embraces all matters. But men like the astronomer Madler find so little +of the ridiculous in the current expectation of the materially increased +spiritual power after our "emancipation from the bonds of matter," that +he has nothing better to substitute for it and flatters himself with +having defined the "bonds of matter" as material attraction. Truly, so +long as mind is still conceived in the form of a religious ghost, the +expectation of an increased mental power after the emancipation from the +bonds of matter is not so much an object for ridicule as for compassion. +But if we regard mind as the expression of modern science, we offer the +better scientific explanation for the traditional faith. By bonds of +matter we do not mean, in that case, the bond of gravitation, but the +multiplicity of sense perceptions. And matter holds the mind in bondage +only so long as the faculty of thought has not overcome the multiplicity +of things. The emancipation of the mind from the bonds of matter +consists in developing the general element out of the concrete +multiplicity. + + ++(c) Force and Matter.+ + +The reader who has closely followed our main idea, which will be +further illustrated, will anticipate that the question of matter and +force finds its solution in the understanding of the relation between +the general and the special. What is the relation of the concrete to the +abstract? This is the common problem of those who see the active impulse +of the world either in the spiritual force or in the material substance, +who think to find the nature of things, the _non plus ultra_ of science, +in either of these facts. + +Liebig, who is especially fond of straying from his inductive science +into the field of speculative thought, says in an idealist sense: "Force +cannot be seen, we cannot grasp it with our hands; in order to +understand its nature and peculiarities, we must investigate its +effects." And if a materialist replies to him: "Matter is force, force +is matter, no matter without force, no force without matter," it is +plain that either has determined this relation only negatively. In +certain shows, the clown is asked by the manager: "Clown, where have you +been?" "With the others," answers the clown. "And where were the +others?"--"With me." + +In this case we have two answers with the same content, in the other we +have two camps which quarrel with different words about an indisputable +fact. And this dispute is so much more ridiculous because it is taken so +seriously. If the idealist makes a distinction between matter and force, +he does not mean to deny that the real phenomenon of force is +inseparably linked with matter. And if the materialist claims that there +is no matter without force and no force without matter, he does not mean +to deny that matter and force are different, as his opponent claims. + +The dispute exists for a good reason and has its object, but this +object is not revealed in the dispute. It is instinctively kept under +cover by both parties, so that they may not be in a position where they +would have to acknowledge their own ignorance. Each wants to prove to +the other that the other's explanations are inadequate, and both +demonstrate this sufficiently. Buechner admits in the closing statements +of his "Matter and Force" that the empirical material is insufficient to +permit of definite answers to transcendental questions, and that +therefore no positive answer can be given to them. And he furthermore +says that the empirical material "is fully sufficient to answer them +negatively and to do away with hypothesis." This is saying in so many +words that the science of the materialist is adequate for the proof that +his opponent knows nothing. + +The spiritualist or idealist believes in a spiritual, which means in a +ghostlike and inexplicable, nature of force. The materialist thinkers, +on the other hand, are skeptical. A scientific proof of faith or of +skepticism does not exist. The materialist has only this advantage over +his idealist opponent, that he looks for the transcendental, the nature, +the cause, the force, not back of the phenomenon, not outside of matter. +But he remains behind the idealist when he ignores the difference +between matter and force. The materialist dwells on the actual +inseparability of matter and force and does not admit any other reason +for a distinction between the two than "an external reason derived from +the demand of our mind for systematization." Buechner says in "Nature and +Mind," page 66: "Force and matter, separated from one another, are for +me nothing but thoughts, fantasies, ideas without any substance, +hypotheses which do not exist for any healthy study of nature, because +all phenomena of nature are rendered obscure and unintelligible by such +a separation." But if Buechner deals with any special department of +natural science in a productive way, instead of handling phrases of +natural philosophy, his own practice will show him that the separation +of forces from matter is not an "external," but an internal, an imminent +necessity, by which alone we are enabled to elucidate and understand the +phenomena of nature. Although the author of "Force and Matter" chose for +his motto: "Now, what I want is--facts," we assure the reader that this +device is more a thoughtless word than a serious opinion. Materialism is +not so coarse-grained that it wants purely facts. Those facts which +Buechner is looking for are by themselves not specifics for his desires. +The idealist likewise wants such facts. No student of nature wants mere +hypotheses. What all cultivators of the field of science want is not so +much facts as explanations or an understanding of facts. Even the +materialist will not deny that science, the "natural philosophy" of +Buechner not excepted, is more concerned with mental forces than with +bodily matter, that it cares more for force than for matter. The +separation of force and matter is derived from "the demand of our mind +for systematization." Very true! But so does all science emanate from +the demand of our reason for systematization. + +The contradistinction between force and matter is as old as that between +idealism and materialism. The first conciliation between the two was +attempted by imagination which, through the belief in spirits, +suggested a secret nature as the cause of all natural phenomena. Science +has of late expelled many of these special spirits by replacing the +fantastic demons with scientific, or general, explanations. And after we +have succeeded in explaining the demon of "pure" reason, it is not +difficult to expel the special spirit of force by the general +explanation of its nature and thus to reconcile scientifically the +contradiction between spiritualism and materialism. + +In the universe which constitutes the object of science and of the +faculty of reason, both force and matter are unseparated. In the world +of sense perceptions force is matter and matter is force. "Force cannot +be seen." Oh, yes! Seeing itself is pure force. Seeing is as much an +effect of its object as an effect of the eye, and this double effect and +other effects are forces. We do not see the things themselves, but their +effects on our eyes. We see their forces. And force cannot alone be +seen, it can also be heard, smelled, tasted, felt. Who will deny that he +can feel the force of heat, of cold, of gravitation? We have already +quoted the words of Professor Koppe to the effect that we "cannot +perceive heat itself, we merely conclude from its effects that this +force exists in nature." This is saying in other words that we do not +see, hear, or feel the things themselves, but their effects or forces. + +It is just as true to say that we feel matter and not its force as it is +to say that we feel force and not matter. Indeed, both are inseparable +from the object, as we have already remarked. But by means of the +faculty of thought we separate from the simultaneously and successively +occurring phenomena the general and the concrete. For instance, we +abstract the general concept of sight from the various phenomena of our +sight and distinguish it by the name of power of vision from the +concrete objects, or substances, of our eyes. From a multitude of sense +perceptions we develop by means of reason the general element. The +general element of different water phenomena, for instance, is the water +power distinguished from the substance of the water. If levers of +different materials but of the same length have the same power, it is +plain that in this case force is different from matter only in so far as +it represents the general element of various substances. A horse does +not pull without force, and this force does not pull without the horse. +Indeed, in practice the horse is force and force is the horse. But +nevertheless we may distinguish the power of pulling from other +qualities of the horse, or we may refer to the common element in +different services of horses as general horse power, without thereby +starting from any other hypothesis than we do in distinguishing the sun +from the earth. For in reality the sun does not exist without the earth, +nor the earth without the sun. + +The world of sense perceptions is made known to us only by our +consciousness, but consciousness is conditioned on the world of sense +perceptions. Nature is infinitely united or infinitely separated, +according to whether we regard it from the standpoint of consciousness +as an unconditional unit or from the standpoint of sense perceptions as +an unconditional multiplicity. There is truth in both unity and +multiplicity, but it is truth only relatively speaking, under certain +conditions. It matters a great deal whether we look about with the eyes +of the body or with the eyes of the mind. For the eyes of the mind, +matter is force. For the eyes of the body, force is matter. The abstract +matter is force, the concrete force is matter. Matter is represented by +the objects of the hand, of practice, while force is an object of +understanding, of science. + +Science is not limited to the so-called scientific world. It reaches +beyond all classes, it belongs to the full depth and width of life. +Science belongs to thinking humanity in its entirety. And so it is with +the separation of matter and force. Only a stultified fanaticism can +ignore the practical distinction. The miser who accumulates money +without adding any wealth to his life process forgets that the valuable +element of money resides in its force, which is different from, its +substance. He forgets that not mere wealth as such, not the paltry gold +substance, lends a reasonableness to the quest for its possession, but +its spiritual content, its inherent exchange value, which buys the +necessities of life. Every scientific practice, which means every action +carried on with a predetermined success and with understood substances, +proves that the separation of matter and force, though only performed in +thought and existing in thought, is nevertheless not an empty phrase, +not a mere hypothesis, but a very fertile idea. A farmer manuring his +field is handling "pure" manuring force, in so far as it is immaterial +for the abstract conception whether he is handling cow dung, bone dust, +or guano. And in weighing bundles of merchandise, it is not the iron, +copper, stone, etc., which is handled by the pound, but their gravity. + +True, there is no force without matter, no matter without force. +Forceless matter and matterless force are nonentities. If idealist +naturalists believe in an immaterial existence of forces which, so to +say, carry on their goblin-pranks in matter, forces which we cannot see, +cannot perceive by the senses and yet are asked to believe in, then we +say that such men are to that extent that naturists, but mere +speculators, in other words spiritualists. And the word of the +materialists who refer to the intellectual separation of matter and +force as a mere hypothesis, is quite as brainless. + +In order that this separation may be appreciated according to its +merits, in order that our consciousness may neither etherealize force in +a spiritualist sense nor deny it in a materialist sense, and in order to +comprehend it scientifically, we have only to understand the faculty of +thought in general or "in itself," that is to say its abstract form. The +intellect can not operate without some perceptible material. In order to +distinguish between matter and force, these things must exist and be +experienced by sense perception. By means of this experience we refer to +matter as the expression of force and to force as the expression of +matter. The perceptible object which is to be studied is therefore +matter and force in one, and since all objects are in their tangible +reality such matter and force-things, the distinction made by the mind +consists in the general method of brain work, in the derivation of the +general unity, from the special multiplicity in any one and in all given +objects. The distinction between matter and force is summarized in the +universal distinction between the concrete and the abstract. To deny the +value of this distinction is equivalent to denying the value of any and +all distinction, equivalent to ignoring the function of the intellect +altogether. + +If we refer to phenomena of sense perception as forces of matter in +general, then this generalized matter is nothing but an abstract +conception. But if we mean by the term sense perception the various +concrete substances, then the general element which embraces the +differences of things and pervades and controls them is force producing +concrete effects. And whether we say matter or force, the mental which +science is studying, not with its hands, but with its brain, the +so-called essence, nature, cause, ideal, superior or spiritual, is the +generality comprising the special things. + + + + +V + +"PRACTICAL REASON" OR MORALITY + + ++(a) The Wise and Reasonable.+ + +The understanding of the method of science, the understanding of the +mind, is destined to solve all the problems of religion and philosophy, +to explain thoroughly all the great and small riddles, and thus fully to +restore research to its mission of empirically studying details. If we +are aware that it is a law of reason to require some perceptible +material, some cause, for its operation, then the question regarding the +first or general cause becomes superfluous. Human understanding is then +seen to be first and last cause of all concrete causes. If we understand +that it is a law of reason to require for its operation some given +object, some beginning at which to start, then the question of the first +beginning must necessarily become inane. If we understand that reason +derives abstract units out of concrete multiplicities, that it +constructs truth out of phenomena, substance out of attributes, that it +perceives all things as parts of a whole, as individuals of some genus, +as qualities of some object, then the question regarding a "thing +itself," a something which in reality is back of all things, must needs +become irrelevant. In brief, the understanding of the interdependence of +reason reveals the unreasonableness of the demand for independent +reason. + +Now, although the main object of metaphysics, the cause of all causes, +the beginning of all beginnings, the nature of things, causes little +inconvenience to modern science, and even though the needs of the +present have overcome the leaning for speculation, this practical +downfall of speculation does not suffice for the solution of its +problems. So long as the theoretical law is not understood, according to +which reason requires some concrete object for its operation, there is +no hope of abandoning objectless thought, this malpractice of +speculative philosophy, which pretends to generate knowledge without +intercourse with objective reality. Our naturalists demonstrate this +very clearly as soon as they turn from their tangible specialties to +abstract things. The dispute over questions of life's wisdom, of +morality, or the quarrel over the wise, good, right, or bad, reveals +that here is the boundary of scientific agreement. The scientific +explorers of the exact sciences abandon every day their inductive method +when dealing with social problems, and stray off into the regions of +speculative philosophy. Just as in physics they believe in imperceptible +physical truths, in "things themselves," so in social matters they +believe in the reasonable, wise, right, or bad, in the sense of "things +themselves," of absolute phases of life, of unconditional conditions. It +is here where the outcome of our studies, of the critique of pure +reason, must be applied. + +In recognizing that consciousness, the nature of understanding, the +mental activity in its general form, consists in developing general +concepts out of concrete objects, we circumscribe this insight by +stating that reason develops its understanding out of contradictions. +It is the nature of the mind to perceive, in given phenomena of +different dimensions and different duration, the nature of things by +their semblance, and their semblance by their nature; to distinguish in +wants of various degrees the most essential and necessary from the less +pressing; to measure within a certain circle of magnitudes the large by +the small and the small by the large, or in other words to compare the +contrasts of the world with one another, to harmonize them by +explanation. Common parlance instinctively calls understanding judging; +judging requires a certain standard. Just as surely as we cannot +perceive any objects which are "in themselves" great or small, hard or +soft, clear or dark, just as surely as these terms denote certain +relations and require a certain standard by which their relations can be +determined, even so does reason require a certain standard for the +determination of that which is reasonable. + +The fact that we consider certain actions, institutions, conceptions, +maxims of other periods, nations, or persons unreasonable is simply due +to the application of a different standard, because we ignore the +premises, the conditions, which cause another's reason to differ from +our own. Men who differ in their mental estimates, in their +understanding of things, may be likened to the thermometers of Reaumur +and Celsius, one of which designates the boiling point by 80 and the +other by 100. A different standard is the cause of this different +result. On the so-called moral field there is no scientific agreement, +such as we enjoy in some physical matters, because we lack the uniform +standard which natural science has long since found. It is still +attempted to perceive the reasonable, good, right, etc., without +empirical data, by speculative reasoning without experience. Speculation +seeks the cause of all causes, the immeasurable cause; truth "itself," +the unconditional and standardless truth; the unlimited good, the +unboundedly reasonable, etc. The absence of a standard is the essence of +speculation, and its practice is characterized by unlimited +inconsistency and disagreement. If there are followers of certain +positive religions who agree in the matter of morals, they owe this to +the positive standard which certain dogmas, doctrines and commandments +have given them. But if any one tries to perceive things by "pure" +reason, the dependence of this reason on some standard will be +demonstrated by its "impure," that is to say individual, perceptions. + +Sense perception is the standard of truth, or of science in general. The +phenomena of the outside world are the standard of physical truths, and +man with his many wants is the standard of moral truth. The actions of +man are determined by his wants. Thirst teaches him to drink, need to +pray. Wants are regulated in the South by southern conditions, in the +North by northern conditions. Wants rule time and space, nations and +individuals. They induce the savage to hunt and the gourmand to indulge. +Human wants give to reason a standard for judging what is good, right, +bad, reasonable, etc. Whatever satisfies our need is good, the opposite +is bad. The physical feeling of man is the object of moral standards, +the object of "practical reason." The contradictory variety of human +needs is the basis for the contradictory variety of moral standards. +Because a member of a feudal guild prospered in a restricted +competition, and a modern knight of industry in free competition, +because their interests differ, therefore their views differ, and the +one justly considers an institution as unreasonable which the other +regards as reasonable. If the intellect of some person attempts to +define by mere introspection the standard of reasonableness as a general +thing, this person makes himself or herself the standard of humanity. If +reason is credited with the faculty of finding within itself the source +of moral truth, it commits the speculative mistake of attempting to +produce understanding without perceptible objects. The same mistake is +to blame for the idea that man is subordinate to the authority of +reason, for the demand that man submit to the dictates of reason. This +idea transforms man into an attribute of reason, while in reality reason +is an attribute of man. + +The question whether man depends on reason or reason on man is similar +to the one whether the citizen exists for the state or the state for the +citizen. In the last and highest instance, the citizen is the primary +fact and the state is modified according to the requirements of the +citizen. But whenever the dominant interests of the citizenship have +acquired the authority in the state, then the citizen is indeed +dependent on the state. This is saying in so many words that man is +guided in minor matters by more important ones. He sacrifices the less +important, minor, particular things to the great, essential, general +things. He subordinates his desire for more individual indulgence to his +fundamental social needs. It is not pure reason, but the reason of a +weak body or of a limited purse which teaches man to renounce the +pleasures of dissipation for the benefit of the general welfare. The +wants of the senses are the material out of which reason fashions moral +truths. To single out the essential need among different physical needs +of various degrees of intensity or extension, to separate the true from +the individual, to develop general concepts, that is the mission of +reason. The difference between the apparently and the truly reasonable +reduces itself to the difference between the special and the general. + +We recall that reason requires sense perceptions for its existence and +operation, that it needs some object which it can perceive. Existence is +the condition or premise of all understanding. Just as the understanding +of true existence is the function of natural science, so the +understanding of reasonable existence is the function of wisdom. Reason +in general has the mission of understanding things as they are. As +physical science it has to understand what is true, as wisdom, what is +reasonable. And just as true may be translated by general, so reasonable +may be translated by generally appropriate to need. We saw a while ago +that a sense perception is not true "in itself," but only relatively +true, that it is called true or general only in relation to other +perceptions of lesser importance. In the same way, no human action can +be reasonable or appropriate "in itself," it can be reasonable only in +comparison with some other action which attempts to accomplish the same +purpose in a less practicable, that is an impracticable, form. Just as +the true, the general, is conditioned on the relation to some other +object, on a definite quantity of phenomena, on definite limits, so the +reasonable or practicable is based on definite conditions which make it +reasonable or unreasonable. The end in view is the measure of the +practicable. The practicable can be determined only by some definite +object that is wanted. Once this object is known, then that action is +called reasonable which accomplishes it in the fullest, most general +way, and all other actions appear unreasonable compared to it. + +In view of the law which we evolved by our analysis of pure reason and +which showed that all understanding, all thought, is based on some +perceptible object, on some quantity of sense perceptions, it is evident +that everything distinguished by our faculty of distinction is a certain +quantity and that, therefore, all distinctions are only quantitative, +not absolute, only graduated, not irreconcilable. Even the difference +between the reasonable and the unreasonable, or in other words between +that which is momentarily or individually reasonable and that which is +generally reasonable, is merely a quantitative distinction, like all +others, so that the unreasonable may be conditionally reasonable, and +nothing is unreasonable but that which is supposed to be unconditionally +reasonable. + +If we understand that reason requires some perceptible object, some +perceptible standard, then we shall no longer try to understand the +absolutely reasonable, the purely reasonable. We shall then limit +ourselves to look for the reasonable, as for all other things, in +concrete objects. The definite, accurate, certain, uniform result of +some understanding depends on the definite formulation of the task, on +the accurate limitation of the perceptible quantity which is to be +understood. If a certain moment, a certain person, a certain class, a +certain nation are given and at the same time an essential need, a +general and predominating purpose, then the question regarding the +reasonable or suitable is easily answered. It is true that we may also +know something of things which are generally reasonable for mankind in +the aggregate, but in that case our standard must be abstract mankind +instead of some concrete part of it. Science may study the anatomical +structure of some concrete body as well as the general type of the human +body, but this again it can do only when it supplies the faculty of +understanding with general instead of individual material. If science +divides the whole human race into four or five races, by establishing a +certain standard of physiognomy, and later on discovers some individuals +or tribes whose characters are so peculiar and rare that they cannot be +classed under any of the established races, the existence of such +exceptions is not a crime against the physical order of the world, but +merely a proof of the inadequacy of our scientific classification. If, +on the other hand, some conventional mode of thought considers a certain +action as universally reasonable or unreasonable and then encounters +opposition in actual life, convention fancies itself exempt from the +work of understanding and assumes to deny civic rights in the moral +order of the world to its opponents. Instead of realizing the limited +applicability of its rules by the existence of opposing practices, +convention seeks to establish an absolute applicability of its rules by +simply ignoring the cause of the opposition. This is a dogmatic +procedure, a negative practice, which ignores facts on the pretense +that they are irrational, but it is not a positive understanding, not an +intelligent knowledge, such as manifests itself by the conciliation of +contradictions. + +If our study aims to ascertain what is universally human and reasonable, +and if these predicates are given only to actions which are reasonable +and practicable for all men, at all times, and under all conditions, +then such concepts are absolute, indeterminate, and to that extent +meaningless, indefinite generalities. We are stating such universal and +indeterminate, and therefore unimportant and unpractical concepts, when +we say that physically the whole is greater than a part, or that morally +the good is preferable to the bad. The object of reason is that which is +general, but it is the generality of some concrete object. The practice +of reason deals with individual and concrete objects, with the things +which are the opposite of the general, with special and concrete +knowledge. In order to perceive in physics whether we are dealing with a +part or with the whole object, we must handle definite and concrete +objects or phenomena. If we desire to ascertain what is morally +preferable as good or bad, we must start out with a definite quantity of +human needs. Abstract and general reason, with its socalled eternal and +absolute truths, is a phantasmagoria of ignorance which binds the rights +of the individual with crushing chains. Real and true reason is +individual, it cannot produce any other but individual perceptions, and +these perceptions cannot be generalized to any greater extent than the +general material with which they operate. Only that is universally +reasonable which is acknowledged to be so by all reasons. If the reason +of some time, class, or person is referred to as rational, and if some +other time, class or person considers it irrational; if, for instance, +the Russian noble considers serfdom a rational institution and the +English bourgeois the so-called liberty of his wage worker, both of +these institutions are not absolutely rational, but only relatively, +only in a more or less limited circle. + +It is not necessary to state that I do not mean to question the great +importance of our reason by the foregoing remarks. Even though reason +cannot independently, or absolutely, discern the objects of the +speculative introspection, such as the objects of the moral world, the +true, the beautiful, the right, the bad, the reasonable, etc., it +nevertheless is well fitted to distinguish relatively, by means of +concrete sense perceptions, between general and concrete things, between +the object and its manifestation, between fundamental needs and fanciful +appetites. Although we may dispense with the belief in absolute reason +and consequently realize that there can be no absolute peace, still we +may call war an unmitigated evil when comparing it with the peaceful +interests of our time or of our class. Not until we abandon our +fruitless exploring trip after absolute truth, shall we learn to find +that which is true in space and time. It is precisely the consciousness +of the relative applicability of our knowledge which is the strongest +lever of progress. The believers in absolute truth have adopted the +monotonous diagram of "good" men and "rational" institutions as a basis +for their views of life. For this reason they oppose all human and +historical institutions which do not fit into their pattern, but which +reality nevertheless produces without regard to their brains. Absolute +truth is the arch foundation of intolerance. On the other hand tolerance +proceeds from the consciousness of the relative applicability of +"eternal truths." The understanding of pure reason leads to the +realization that the consciousness of the universal interdependence of +reason is the true road toward practical reason. + + ++(b) Morality and Right.+ + +The nature of our task limits us to the demonstration that pure reason +is a nonentity, that reason is the sum of all acts of individual +understanding, that it deals only seemingly with pure and general, but +in reality with practical, or concrete, perceptions. We have been +discussing that philosophy which pretends to be the science of pure or +absolute understanding. We found its aim to be idle, inasmuch as the +development of speculative philosophy represents a succession of +disappointments, because its unconditional or absolute systems proved to +be limited in space and time. Our presentation of the matter has +revealed the relative character of so-called eternal truths. We +perceived that reason was dependent on sense perceptions, we found that +any truth required definite limits for its determination. As regards +more especially life's wisdom, we saw that the acquired knowledge of +"pure" reason manifested itself in practice by the dependence of the +wise or the rational upon concrete sense perceptions. If we now apply +this theory to morality as such, we must be able to establish harmony +also in this field, where there is some doubt as to what is right and +wrong, by means of the scientific method. + +Pagan morality is different from Christian morality. Feudal morality +differs from modern bourgeois morality as does bravery from solvency. In +brief, we need no detailed illustration to show that different times and +nations have different moralities. We have but to understand that this +change is necessary, a special characteristic of the human race and of +its historical development, and we shall then exchange the belief in +"eternal truths," which every ruling class claims to be identical with +its own selfish laws, for the scientific knowledge that absolute right +is purely a concept which we derive by means of the faculty of thought +from the various successive rights. Right as an absolute concept means +no more and no less than any other general concept, for instance, the +head in general. Every real head is a concrete one and belongs either to +man or to some other animal, it is either long or broad, narrow or wide, +in other words it has special peculiarities. But at the same time, every +concrete head has certain general qualities which are universal in all +heads, for instance the quality of being the superintendent of the body. +Moreover, every head has as many general as individual traits, it is no +more personal than it is common. The faculty of thought abstracts the +general traits from the actual concrete heads and in this way creates +the concept of the absolute head. Just as the absolute head, or _the_ +head, is composed of the general qualities of all heads, so the absolute +right stands merely for the general characters of all rights. Both of +these concepts exist merely as ideas, not as objects. + +Every real right is a concrete right, it is right only under certain +conditions, at definite periods, for this or that nation. "Thou shalt +not kill," is right in peace, but wrong in war; it is right for the +majority of bourgeois society that wishes to see the outbursts of +passion controlled in the interest of its own predominant needs, but +wrong for the savage who has not arrived at the period where a peaceful +and social life is appreciated, and who therefore would consider the +above commandment as an immoral restriction of his liberty. For the love +of life, murder is a detestable abomination, for revenge it is a sweet +satisfaction. In the same way robbery seems right to the robber, wrong +to the robbed. There can be no question of any absolute wrong in such +cases, only of wrong in a relative sense. An action is wrong in a +general sense only in so far as it is generally disliked. Plain robbery +is wrong in the opinion of the great majority today because our +generation takes more interest in bourgeois affairs of commerce and +industry than in the adventures of the knights of the road. + +If there were such a thing as an absolutely right law, dogma, or action, +it would have to serve the welfare of all mankind under all conditions +and at all times. But human welfare is as different as men, +circumstances, and time. What is good for me is bad for another, and the +thing which may be beneficial as a rule may be injurious as an +exception. What promotes some interests in one period may interfere with +them in another. A law which would presume to be absolutely right would +have to be right for every one and at all times. No absolute morality, +no duty, no categorical imperative, no idea of _the_ good, can teach +man what is good, bad, right, or wrong. That is good which corresponds +to our needs, that is bad which is contrary to them. But is there +anything which is absolutely good? Everything and nothing. It is not the +straight timber which is good, nor the crooked. Neither is good, or +either is good, according to whether I need it or not. And since we need +all things, we can see some good in all of them. We are not limited to +any one thing. We are unlimited, universal, and need everything. Our +interests are therefore innumerable, inexpressibly great, and therefore +every law is inadequate, because it always considers only some special +welfare, some special interest. And for this reason no right is right, +or all of them are right, and it is as right to say "Thou shalt not +kill" as it is to say "Thou shalt kill." + +The difference between good needs and bad needs, right wants and wrong +wants, like that between truth and error, reasonable and unreasonable, +finds its conciliation in the difference between the concrete and the +general. Reason cannot discover within itself any positive rights or +absolutely moral codes any more than any other speculative truth. It +cannot estimate how essential or unessential a thing is, or classify the +quantity of concrete and general characters, until it has some +perceptible material to work upon. The understanding of the right, or of +the moral, like all understanding, strives to single out the general +characteristics of its object. But the general is only possible within +certain defined limits, it exists only as the general qualities of some +concrete and determined perceptible object. And if any one tries to +represent some maxim, some law, some right in the light of an absolute +maxim, law or right, he forgets this necessary limitation. Absolute +right is merely a meaningless concept, and it does not assume even a +vague meaning until it is understood to stand for the right of mankind +in general. But morality, or the determination of that which is right, +has a practical purpose. Yet, if we accept the general and unconditional +right of mankind as a moral right, we necessarily miss our practical +aim. An act or a line of action which is universally or everywhere right +requires no law for its enforcement, for it will recommend itself. It is +only the determined and limited law, adapted to certain persons, +classes, nations, times, or circumstances, which has any practical +value, and it is so much more practical the more defined, exact, precise +and the less general it is. + +The most universal and most widely recognized right or need is in its +quality no more rightful, better, or valuable than the most +insignificant right of the moment, than the momentary need of some +individual. Although we know that the sun is hundreds of thousands of +miles in diameter, we are nevertheless free to see it no larger than a +plate. And though we may acknowledge that some moral law is +theoretically or universally good or holy, we are free in practice to +reject it momentarily, in parts, or individually, as bad and useless. +Even the most sacred right of the most universal extent is valid only +within certain definite limits, and within particular limits an +otherwise very great wrong may be a valid right. It is true that there +is an eternal difference between assumed and true interests, between +passion and reason, between essential, predominating, general, +well-founded needs and inclinations, and accidental, subordinate, +special appetites. But this difference is not one of two separated +worlds, a world of the good and a world of the bad. It is not a +positive, general, continuous, absolute difference, but merely a +relative one. Like the difference between beautiful and homely, it +depends on the individuality of the person who distinguishes. That which +is a true and fundamental need in one case, is a secondary, subordinate, +and wrong desire in another. + +_Morality is the aggregate of the most contradictory ethical laws which +serve the common purpose of regulating the conduct of man toward himself +and others in such a way that the future is considered as well as the +present, the one as well as the other, the individual as well as the +genus. The individual man finds himself lacking, inadequate, limited in +many ways. He requires for his complement other people, society, and +must therefore live and let live. The mutual concessions which arise out +of these relative needs are called morality._ + +The inadequacy of the single individual, the need of association, is the +basis and cause of man's consideration for his neighbor, of morality. +Now since the one who feels this need, man, is necessarily an +individual, it follows that his need must likewise be individual and +more or less intensive. And since my neighbors are necessarily different +from me, it requires different considerations to meet their needs. +Concrete man needs a concrete morality. Just as abstract and meaningless +as the concept of mankind in general is that of absolute morality, and +the ethical laws derived from this vague idea are quite as unpractical +and unsuccessful. Man is a living personality, whose welfare and +purpose is embodied within himself, who has between himself and the +world nothing but his needs as a mediator, who owes no allegiance to any +law whatever from the moment that it contravenes his needs. The moral +duty of an individual never exceeds his interests. The only thing which +exceeds those interests is the _material power_ of the generality over +the individuality. + +If we regard it as the function of reason to ascertain that which is +morally right, a uniform scientific result may be produced if we agree +at the outset on the persons, conditions, or limits within which the +universal moral right is to be determined; in other words, we may +accomplish something practical if we drop the idea of absolute right and +search for definite rights applicable to well-defined purposes by +clearly stating our problem. The contradiction in the various standards +of morality, and the many opposing solutions of this contradiction, are +due to a misunderstanding of the problem. To look for right without a +given quantity of sense perceptions, without some definite working +material, is an act of speculative reason which pretends to explore +nature without the use of senses. The attempt to arrive at a positive +determination of morality by pure perception and pure reason is a +manifestation of the philosophical faith in understanding _a priori_. + +"It is true," said Macaulay in his History of England, in speaking of +the rebellion against the lawless and cruel government of James II., +"that to trace the exact boundary between rightful and wrongful +resistance is impossible: but this impossibility arises from the nature +of right and wrong, and is found in every part of ethical science. A +good action is not distinguished from a bad action by marks so plain as +those which distinguish a hexagon from a square. There is a frontier +where virtue and vice fade into each other. Who has ever been able to +define the exact boundary between courage and rashness, between prudence +and cowardice, between frugality and avarice, between liberality and +prodigality? Who has ever been able to say how far mercy to offenders +ought to be carried, and where it ceases to deserve the name of mercy +and becomes a pernicious weakness?" + +It is not the impossibility of accurately determining this limit to +which the nature of the difference between right and wrong, in the sense +of Macaulay, is due. It is rather due to the vague thought which +believes in an unlimited right, in absolute virtues and faults, which +has not risen to the understanding that the terms good, brave, right, +and bad are valid always and everywhere only in relation to some +concrete individual who reasons, and that they have no validity in +themselves. Courage is foolhardiness in the eyes of the cautious, and +caution is cowardice in the opinion of the daring. The revolt against +existing governments is always right in the eyes of the rebels, always +wrong in the opinion of the attacked. No action can be absolutely right +or wrong. + +The same qualities of man are good or bad, according to his needs and +their uses, according to time and place. Here trickery, slyness, and bad +faith prevail, there loyally, frankness and straightforwardness. Here +compassion and charity serve their purpose and promote welfare, there +ruthless and bloody severity. The quantity, the more or less beneficial +effect of a human quality, determines the difference between virtue and +vice. + +Reason can distinguish between right and wrong, virtue and vice, only to +the extent that it can measure the relative quantity of right in any +faculty, rule, or action. No categorical imperative, no ethical code, +can serve as a basis for the real practical right. On the contrary, +ethics finds its justification in the actual righteousness of +perceptible objects. For general reason, frankness is not a better +quality than slyness. Frankness is preferable to slyness only inasmuch +as it is quantitatively, that is to say, more frequently, better, and +more generally appreciated than slyness. It follows that a science of +right can serve as a guide in practice only to the extent that practice +has served as a basis for science. Reason cannot determine the action of +man beforehand, because it can only experience, but not anticipate +reality, because every man, every situation, is new, original, exists +for the first time, and because the possibilities of reason are confined +to understanding _a posteriori_. + +Absolute right, or right in itself, is an imagined right, is a +speculative desire. A scientifically universal right requires certain +definite and perceptible premises which form the basis of the +determination of the general. Science is not a dogmatic infallibility +which may say: This or that is right, because it is so understood. +Science requires for its perceptions some external object. It can +perceive right only if it rightly exists. The universal existence is the +material, premise, condition, and cause of science. + +From the foregoing follows the postulate that morality must be studied +inductively or scientifically, not speculatively by the method of +traditional philosophy. We must not attempt to study absolute, but only +relative rights, only rights based on certain premises, and only this +can be the moral problem of reason. Thus the belief in a moral order of +the world is dissolved in the consciousness of human freedom. The +understanding of reason, of knowledge, of science, includes the +understanding of the limited validity of all ethical maxims. + +Whatever impressed man as salutary, valuable, divine, was exhibited by +him in the tabernacle of faith as the most venerable thing. The Egyptian +worshipped the cat, the Christian venerates the divine providence. So, +when his needs led him to live a well-regulated life, the benefits of +the law inspired him with such a high opinion of its noble origin that +he adopted his own handiwork as a gift of heaven. The invention of the +mouse-trap or other useful appliances pushed the cat out of its exalted +position. Whenever man becomes his own master, takes care of himself, +and provides for himself, then all other providences become useless, and +his own mastership makes all superior tutelage unbearable. Man is a +jealous creature. Ruthlessly he subordinates everything to his own +interests, even God and His commandments. No matter how great or +venerable an authority any code may have acquired by long and faithful +service, as soon as new needs oppose it, they degrade the divine +authority to the ranks of human law and transform ancient right into +modern wrong. The Christian frivolity refused to respect the threat of +physical retribution which the Hebrew had anointed as an authority in +moral questions and revered under the maxim: Eye for eye, tooth for +tooth. The Christian had learned to cherish the blessings of +peacefulness; he carried submissive tolerance into the holy land, and +decorated the vacant tabernacle with the gentle injunction to offer the +left cheek when the right was tired of cuffs. In our times which are +Christian in name, but very anti-Christian in deeds, the long venerated +tolerance has long gone out of use. + +Just as every religion has its own peculiar God, so every time has its +own peculiar right. To this extent, religion and morality are in harmony +with the worship of their sanctum. But they become arrogant upstarts +whenever they assume to exceed their natural boundaries, whenever they +attempt to saddle upon all circumstances, under the pretense of offering +something incomparable, absolute, permanent, that which is divine and +right at certain times and under definite conditions; whenever they +proclaim a successful remedy for their own peculiar disease as a +universal patent medicine for all diseases; whenever they overbearingly +forget their descent. A law is originally dictated by some individual +need, and then mankind with its universal needs is supposed to balance +itself on the thin rope of this one rule. Originally that which is +really good is right, and thereafter only some decreed right is supposed +to be really good. That is the unbearable arrogance. Ordained right is +not satisfied to serve as the right of this time, this nation or +country, this class or caste. It wants to dominate the whole world, +wants to be absolute right, just as if a certain pill could be absolute +medicine, could be good for everything. It is the mission of progress to +repulse this assumption, to pluck this peacock feather out of the tail +of the rooster, by leading mankind on beyond the boundaries prescribed +by ordained law, by extending the world for him, by conquering for his +cramped interests a wider liberty. The migration from Palestine to +Europe where the consumption of pork does not cause leprosy emancipates +our natural freedom from a once divine restriction by making it +irrelevant. But progress does not deprive one God of his shoulder straps +for the purpose of decorating some other God with them. That would +merely be an exchange, not an acquirement. Evolution does not drive the +saints of tradition out of the country; it simply retires them from the +wrongfully occupied field of universality into their peculiar +boundaries. Progress picks up the child and then pours the water out of +the bath tub. Though the cat may have lost its aureole and ceased to be +a God, it does not give up catching mice; and though the Jewish rules +for bodily cleanliness at certain definite times have long been +forgotten, a clean body is still highly respected. The present wealth of +civilization is due only to the economical administration of the +acquirements of the past. Evolution is as much conservative as it is +revolutionary, and it finds as much wrong as right in every law. + +It is true that the believers in absolute duty scent a difference +between moral and legal right. But their self-interested narrowness does +not permit them to realize that every law is originally moral and that +every special morality is gradually reduced to the level of a mere law. +Their understanding reaches into other times and other classes, but does +not reach their own time and class. The laws of the Chinese and +Samoyeds are understood to refer to the peculiar requirements of those +people. But the rules of bourgeois society are supposed to be far more +sublime. Our present day institutions and moral codes are either +regarded as eternal truths of nature or reason, or as permanent oracular +expressions of a pure conscience. Just as if the barbarian did not have +a barbarian reason; as if the Turk did not have a Turkish conscience and +the Hebrew a Hebrew one; as if man could follow the dictates of some +absolute conscience, instead of the conscience being conditioned on the +man. + +Whoever limits the purpose of man to the love and service of God, and to +eternal blessedness hereafter, may devoutly recognize the traditions of +abstract morality as authoritative and guide himself accordingly. But +whoever regards development, education, and blessedness on earth as +man's life purpose, will not think that the questioning of the assumed +superiority of traditional morals is irrelevant. It is only the +consciousness of individual freedom which creates sufficient unconcern +for the rules made by others to permit a brave advance, which +emancipates us from the striving for an illusory absolute ideal, for +some "best world," and which restores us to the definite practical +interests of our time and personality. At the same time we are thus +reconciled with the world as it really is, because we no longer regard +it as the unsuccessful realization of that which ought to be, but rather +as the systematization of that which cannot but be. The world is always +right. Whatever exists, is right and is not fated to be otherwise until +it changes. Wherever there is existence, which is power, there is also +right without any further condition, because it is right in a formative +stage. Weakness has no other right than that of striving for supremacy +and then enforcing a recognition of its long denied needs. The study of +history shows us not only the negative and ridiculous side of the +religions, customs, institutions and ideas of the past, but also their +positive, reasonable and necessary side. It explains to us, for +instance, that the deification of animals was due to an enthusiastic +recognition of their usefulness. And so the study of history shows not +alone the inadequacy of the things of the present, but also demonstrates +that they are the reasonable and necessary conclusions from the premises +of previous stages. + + ++(c) The Holy.+ + +In the well-known statement: The end sanctifies the means, the developed +theory of morality finds its practical expression. This maxim, used in +an ambiguous sense, may stand as a common reproach for us and for the +Jesuits. The defenders of the society of Jesus make efforts to prove +that it is a malignant attempt to discredit their clients. We shall not +try to speak for either party to this dispute, but will devote ourselves +to the subject matter itself, and seek to substantiate the truth and +reasonableness of this maxim, to rehabilitate it in the public opinion. + +It will be sufficient for the refutation of the most general opposition +to understand that end and means are very relative terms, that all +concrete ends are means and all means are ends. There is no more of a +positive difference between great and small, right and wrong, virtue +and vice, than there is between end and means. Considered as something +integral by itself, every action has its own end and its means are the +various moments of which even the shortest action is composed. Every +concrete action is a means in relation to other actions which aim at the +same common effect. But in themselves actions are neither ends nor +means. Nothing is anything by itself. All being is relative. Things are +what they are only within and by their interrelations. Circumstances +alter cases. In so far as every action is accompanied by other actions, +it is a means, and serves a common end which exceeds its own special +end; but inasmuch as every action is complete in itself it is an end +which includes its own means. We eat in order to live; but so far as we +are living while we are eating, we are living in order to eat. As life +to its functions, so the end is related to its means. Just as life is +simply the sum of all life's functions, so the end is the sum of all its +means. The difference between means and end reduces itself to that +between the concrete and the general. And all abstract differences +reduce themselves to this difference, because the faculty of abstraction +or distinction reduces itself to the faculty of distinguishing between +the concrete and the general. But this distinction presupposes the +existence of some material, some given objects, some circle of sense +perceptions by which it manifests itself. If this circle is found in the +field of actions or functions, in other words, if a previously defined +number of different actions is the object of our study, then we refer to +the general character of these objects as the general end and to every +more or less extended part of them, or to every function, as a means. +Whether any definite action is considered as an end or as a means, +depends on the question whether we consider it as a whole in relation to +its own parts, or as a part of some whole in which it is connected with +other parts, with other actions. From a general point of view which has +all human actions for the object of its study, and encompasses them all, +there exists only one end, viz., the human welfare. This welfare is the +end of all ends, is the final end, is the real, true, universal end +compared to which all special ends are but means. + +Now, our claim that the end sanctifies the means can have absolute +validity only in regard to some absolute end. But all concrete ends are +relative and finite. The one and sole absolute end is human welfare, and +it is an end which sanctifies all rules and actions, all means, so long +as they are subservient to it, but which reviles them as soon as they go +their own way without serving it. The human weal is literally and +historically the origin of the holy. That which is hale is holy. At the +same time we must not ignore the fact that the weal, or hale, in +general, the hale which sanctifies all means, is but an abstraction, the +real content of which is as different as are the times, the nations, or +persons which are seeking for their welfare. It must be remembered that +the determination of that which is holy or for the human weal requires +definite conditions, that no action, no means, is holy in itself, that +each one of them is sanctified only by definite relations. It is not +every end which sanctifies the means, but the holy end which sanctifies +its own means. But since every real and concrete end is only relatively +holy, it can sanctify its own means only relatively. + +The opposition against our maxim is not so much directed against it, as +against the wrong application of it. Recognition is denied and the +socalled sanctified ends are accorded only limited means, because there +is lurking in the background the consciousness that these ends have only +a relative holiness. On the other hand our defense of the maxim does not +imply that the various nominally holy means and ends are sanctified +because some authority, some scriptural statement, some reason or +conscience, has declared them to be so, but only in so far as they +answer the common end of all ends, the human welfare. Our maxim of ends +does not at all teach that we should sacrifice love and truths to +sanctified faith, but neither does it demand that we should sacrifice +faith for love and truth. It merely states the fact that, whenever some +superior end has been determined by sense perceptions or circumstances, +all means contrary to that end are unholy, and that on the other hand +means which are generally unholy may become temporarily and individually +sanctioned by their relation to some momentary or individual welfare. +Wherever peacefulness is actually in favor as a sanctified means, war is +unholy. When, on the other hand, man seeks his salvation in war, then +murder and incendiarism are holy means. In other words, our reason +requires for a valid determination of that which is sanctified certain +definite material conditions or facts as premises; it cannot determine +_the_ holy in general, not _a priori_, not philosophically in the old +speculative way, but only in concrete cases, _a posteriori_, only +empirically. + +If we understand that human welfare is the end of all ends, the ideal +of all means; if we furthermore dispense with all special determinations +of this welfare, with all personal ideas of it, and recognize that it is +different under different circumstances, then we understand at the same +time that no means is sanctified beyond the sanctity of its end. No +means, no action, is positively sanctified or makes for human welfare +under all circumstances. According to circumstances and relations one +and the same means may be good or bad. A thing is good only to the +extent that its results are good, only to the extent that there is good +in its end. Lying and cheating are bad only because they result +injuriously for ourselves, because we do not wish to be lied to or +cheated. But whenever a sanctified end is in question, the deceptive +means used in lying and cheating are called tricks of war. If any one is +firmly rooted in the goodness of chastity because he thinks it was +ordained by God, we cannot discuss the matter with him. But if one +honors virtue for the sake of virtue and abhors vice for the sake of +vice, in other words, for their consequences, he admits that he +sacrifices the lust of the flesh to the end of good health. In short, he +admits that the means are sanctified by the end. + +In the Christian conception of the world, the commandments of its +religion are absolutely good for all time, they are considered good +because Christian revelation declares them to be so. This conception +does not know that, for instance, its acme of virtue, the specifically +Christian virtue of abstemiousness, received its value only by contrast +with corrupt heathenish licentiousness, but that it is not a virtue +when compared to reasonable and normal satisfaction of material needs. +It deals with certain means which it calls indiscriminately good without +any relation to their ends, and others which it calls indiscriminately +bad in the same absolute way. And for this reason, it opposes the above +named maxim. + +But modern Christianity, modern civilization, has practically long done +away with this faith. It does indeed call the soul the likeness of God +and the body a putrid food for worms; but its deeds prove that it does +not take its religious phrases seriously. It cares little for the better +part of man and directs all its thoughts and actions toward the +satisfaction of the despised body. It employs science and art, and the +products of all climates, for the glorification of the body, clothing it +sumptuously, feeding it luxuriously, caring for it tenderly, resting it +on soft cushions. Although they speak slightingly of this earthly life +in comparison to the eternal life beyond, yet in practice they cling for +six days of the week to the uninterrupted pleasures of this body, while +heaven is hardly considered worthy of careless attention for more than +one short hour on Sundays. With the same thoughtless inconsistency the +socalled Christian world also attacks our maxim with words, while in +practical life it sanctifies the despised means by the end of its own +welfare, going even so far as to demonstrate its inconsistency in its +own life by subsidizing prostitution with state funds. The fact that the +legislative bodies of our representative states keep down the enemies of +their bourgeois order by courtmartials and exile, that they justify this +course by the proverb, "Do unto others as you would that they should do +unto you," in the interest of "public" welfare, or that they defend +their divorce codes by the plea of individual welfare, proves that the +bourgeoisie also believes in the motto: The end sanctifies the means. +And even though the citizens delegate rights to the state which they +deny to themselves, also our opponents cannot but admit that in so doing +the citizens are simply delegating their own rights to the superior +authority of the state. + +True, whoever employs lying and cheating in the bourgeois world for the +end of gaining wealth, even though he may make it one of his ends to +give to charity, or whoever steals leather, like Saint Chispinus, for +the purpose of making shoes for poor people, does not sanctify his means +by his end, because the end in that case is not sanctified, or only +nominally so, only in general, but not in the concrete case quoted. For +charity is an end of but inferior holiness which must not be more than a +means compared to the main end of maintaining bourgeois society, and +whenever it contravenes this main purpose, charity loses its character +of a good end. And we have already seen that an end which is sanctified +only under certain circumstances cannot sanctify its means beyond them. +The indispensable condition of all good ends is that they must be +subservient to human welfare, and whether this welfare is secured by +Christian or pagan, by feudal or bourgeois means, it always demands that +the things which are considered unessential and of lesser importance +should be subordinated to the essential and necessary things, while in +the above quoted cases the more salutary honesty and bourgeois +respectability would be sacrificed to the less salutary charity. "The +end sanctifies the means" signifies in other words that in ethics as +well as in economics, the profit must justify the investment of the +capital. Again, if we call the forcible conversion of infidels a good +end, and an arbitrary police measure a bad means, this does not prove +anything against the truth of the maxim, but only testifies to its wrong +application. The means is not sanctified in the case, because the end is +not, because a forced conversion is not a good end, but rather an evil +one resulting in hypocrisy, and because such a conversion does not +deserve this name, or because force is a means which is unworthy of this +term. If it is true that a forcible conversion or wooden iron are +senseless ideas, how is it that people will persist in fighting against +universally recognized truths with such inconsistencies, such inane word +plays, such tricks of rhetoric and sophistry? The means of the Jesuits, +sly tricks and intrigues, poison and murder, appear unholy to us only +because the Jesuitic purpose, for instance that of extending the wealth +and influence and glorifying power of the order, is an inferior end +which may make use of the innocent language of the pulpit, but is not an +absolutely sanctified end, no supreme end, to which we would grant means +that would deprive us of some essential end, for instance of our +personal and public safety. Murder and manslaughter are considered +immoral as individual actions because they are not means to accomplish +our main end, because we incline not toward revenge or +blood-thirstiness, nor toward arbitrariness and the wilful dispensation +of justice by some judge, but toward lawful decisions and the more or +less impartial decrees of the state. But do we not explicitly declare in +favor of the maxim "The end sanctifies the means," when we constitute +ourselves into juries and render dangerous criminals powerless by the +rope and the ax of the executioner? + +The same people who boast of having dropped Aristotle, that is to say +the belief in authority, for centuries, and who therefore replaced the +dead traditional truth by living self-gained truth, are found to be +completely at odds with their own development in the above cited cases. +If we listen to the recital of some funny story, which may be told by +even a reliable witness, we nevertheless remain loyal to the principles +of free reason, that is to say we are free to regard as serious and +regrettable any incident which the narrator may consider funny and +ridiculous. People know how to distinguish between a story and the +subjective impression its incidents created on the mind of the narrator, +and which depends more on the personality of the witness than on the +actual facts. But in the matter of good ends and bad means it is +proposed to neglect the distinction between an object and its subjective +end which is otherwise the point of all critique. Such ends as charity, +the conversion of infidels, etc., are thoughtlessly, a priori, called +good and holy, because they once were so under particular conditions, +while now their effect in the cases above cited is just the opposite, +and then people wonder that the unrighteous title carries with it +unrighteous privileges. + +Only that end is worthy of the predicate good or holy in practice which +is itself a means, a servant, of the end of all purposes, of welfare. +Whenever man seeks his welfare in bourgeois life, in production and +commerce of commodities, and in the undisturbed enjoyment of his private +property, he clips his long fingers by the commandment: "Thou shalt not +steal." But wherever, as among the Spartans, war is regarded as the +supreme end and craftiness as a necessary quality of a warrior, there +thieving is used as a means of acquiring craftiness and sanctioned as a +means for the main end. To blame the Spartan for being a warrior instead +of a sedate bourgeois would be to ignore the facts of reality, would be +equivalent to overlooking that our brain is not designed to substitute +imaginary pictures for the actual conditions of the world, but is +organized to understand that a period, a nation, an individual is always +that which it can and must be under given circumstances. + +It is not from mere individual and unpraiseworthy fondness for the +paradox that we subvert current views by defending the maxim "The end +sanctifies the means," but from a consistent application of the science +of philosophy. Philosophy originated out of the belief in a dualist +contrast between God and the world, between body and soul, between the +flesh and the spirit, between brain and senses, between thinking and +being, between the general and the concrete. The conciliation of this +contrast represents the end, or the aggregate result, of philosophical +research. Philosophy found its dissolution in the understanding that the +divine is worldly and the worldly divine, that the soul is related to +the body, the spirit to the flesh, thinking to being, the intellect to +the senses, in the same way in which the unity is related to the +multiplicity or the general to the concrete. Philosophy began with the +erroneous supposition that the one, as the first thing, was the basis +on which developed the two, three, four, and the entire multiplicity of +things by succession. It has now arrived at the understanding that +truth, or reality, turns this supposition upside down, that the reality +with its multiplicity of forms, perceivable by the senses, is the first +and foremost thing out of which the human brain gradually derived the +conception of unity or generality. + +No achievement of science can be compared with the amount of talent and +intellectual energy consumed in harvesting this one little fruit from +the field of speculative philosophy. But neither does any scientific +novelty encounter so many deep-rooted obstacles to its recognition. All +brains unfamiliar with the outcome of philosophy are dominated by the +old belief in the reality of some genuine, true, absolutely universal +panacea, the discovery of which would make all sham, false individual +panaceas impossible. But we, on the other hand, have been taught by the +understanding of the thought process that this coveted panacea is a +product of the brain and that, since it is supposed to be a general and +abstract panacea, it cannot be any real, perceptible, concrete panacea. +In the belief in an absolute difference between true and false welfare, +there is manifested an ignorance of the actual operations of brain work. +Pythagoras made numbers the basis of things. If this Grecian philosopher +could have realized that this basic nature was a thing of the mind, of +the intellect,[2] and that numbers were the basis of reason, the common +or abstract content of all intellectual activity, then we should have +been spared all the disputes which have raged around the various forms +of absolute truth, about "things in themselves." + +Space and time are the general forms of reality, or reality exists in +time and space. Consequently all real welfare must be attached to space +and time, and every welfare which exists in these dimensions must be +real. The different welfares, in so far as their beneficent qualities +are concerned, are to be distinguished only by their height and breadth, +by the quantity of their dimensions, by their numeral relations. Every +welfare, whether true or seeming, is perceived by the senses, by +practices of life, not by abstract reason. But practice assigns the most +contradictory things to different people at different times as means to +their welfare. What is welfare in one place, is disaster in another, and +vice versa. Understanding, or reason, has nothing else to do in the +matter than to number these various welfares as they are made real by +sense perceptions in various persons and times, and degrees of +intensity, in the order in which they appear, and thus to distinguish +the small from the great, the essential from the unessential, the +concrete from the general. Reason cannot dictate to us autocratically in +matters of some absolutely true welfare, it can only indicate the most +frequent, most essential, and most universal welfare in a certain +perceived number of welfares. But it must not be forgotten that the +truth of such an understanding, or enumeration, depends on certain +definite premises. It is therefore a vain endeavor to search for the +true and absolute welfare. This search becomes practical and successful +only when it limits itself to the understanding of a definite amount of +welfare of some particular objects. The general welfare can be found +only within definite boundaries. But the various determinations of +welfare agree in this respect, that they all consider it well to +sacrifice the little for the great, the unessential for the essential, +and not vice versa. In so far as this principle is right, it is also +right for us to employ for the good end of a great welfare some small +means in the shape of a small evil and to endure it, and thus we see +once more that the end sanctifies the means. + +If people were liberal enough to permit every one to go to heaven in his +or her own way, the opponents of our maxim would be easily convinced of +its truth. But instead of doing this, people follow the usual course of +shortsightedness and make their private standpoint a universal one. They +call their own private welfare the only true welfare, and regard the +welfare of other nations, times and conditions a mistake. So does every +school of art declare its own subjective taste to be objective beauty, +ignoring the fact that unity is but a matter of ideas, of thought, while +reality is full of the most varied forms. The real welfare is manifold +and the true welfare but a subjective choice which, like a funny story, +may make an entirely different impression on others, and be a false +welfare. Even though Kant, or Fichte, or some other particular +philosopher, may discuss at length the purpose of mankind and solve the +problem to his full satisfaction and to that of his audience, we +nevertheless have learned enough today to know that one can define one's +own personal idea of the purpose of mankind by means of abstract +speculation, but that one cannot discover any unknown and hidden object +in this way. Thought, or reason, requires some object, and its work is +that of measuring, of criticising. It may distinguish between true and +false welfare, but will also remember that they have their limits, +remember that it is itself personal and that its distinctions are +likewise personal and cannot be generalized beyond the point where +others receive the same impression of the same object. + +Humanity is an idea, while man is always some special person who has his +or her peculiar life in a definite environment and is therefore +subservient to general principles only from motives of self-interest. +The sacrifice of ethics, like that of religion, is only seemingly a +self-denial and serves the ends of reasonable self-interest, an +expenditure with a view to greater gains. A morality worthy of that name +which is not better defined by the term obedience can be exercised only +through the understanding of its worth, of its value for our welfare, of +its usefulness. The variety of political parties is conditioned on the +varieties of the interests concerned, and the difference in the means is +conditioned on the difference in ends. In questions of less importance +even the champions of absolute morality testify to this fact. + +Thiers in his history of the French Revolution tells of a peculiar +situation in the year 1796, when the patriots held the public power and +the royalists carried on a revolutionary propaganda. It was then that +the partisans of the revolution, who should have been the champions of +unlimited liberty, demanded coercive measures, while the opposition, who +secretly cared more for a monarchy than for a republic, voted for +unlimited liberty. "To such an extent are parties governed by their +self-interests," comments Thiers, just as if this were an anomaly +instead of being the natural, necessary and inevitable course of the +world. When, on the other hand, it is a question of the fundamental laws +of bourgeois order, then the moral representatives of the ruling classes +are egotistic enough to deny the connection of their material interests +with these laws and to claim that theirs are eternal, metaphysical world +laws, that the pillars of their special class rule are the eternal +pillars of humanity, and that their own means alone are holy ones and +their end the final end of the universe. + +It is a disastrous deception, a robbing of human liberty, an attempt to +cause the stagnation of the historical development, if any age or class +thus proclaims its own peculiar purposes and means to be for the +absolute welfare of humanity. Morality originally reflects one's +interests just as fashion reflects one's taste, and finally the action +is moulded after the conceived pattern like the coat in dressing. In +this process, force naturally is exerted for the maintenance and +protection of one's own life and those who resist are subdued. Interest +and duty, though perhaps not entirely synonymous, are certainly closely +related. Both of them are merged in the term welfare. Self-interest +represents more nearly the concrete, immediate, tangible welfare, while +duty concerns itself with the more remote and general welfare of the +future also. While self-interest considers the present tangible metallic +welfare of the purse, duty demands that we keep not only a part of +welfare, but all welfare in mind, that we consider the future as well as +the present, that we remember the spiritual welfare as well as the +physical. Duty thinks also of the heart, of social needs, of the +future, of the spiritual weal, in brief of interest in general and urges +us to renounce the superfluous in order to secure and retain the +necessary. Thus your duty is your self-interest and your self-interest +your duty. + +If our ideas are to adapt themselves to truth, or to reality, instead of +reality or truth adapting itself to our notions or thoughts, we must +understand that the mutability of that which is right, holy, moral, is a +natural, necessary and true fact. And we must grant to an individual the +theoretical freedom which cannot be taken from it in practice, we must +admit that it is as free now as it has ever been, that laws must be +adapted to the needs of the social individual and not to the vague, +unreal, and impossible abstractions, such as justice or morality. What +is justice? The embodiment of all that is considered right, an +individual conception, which assumes different forms in different +persons. In reality only individual, definite, concrete rights exist, +and man simply comes along and abstracts from them the idea of justice, +just as he abstracted from different kinds of wood the conception of +wood in general, or from material things the conception of matter. It is +just as far from the truth, to think that material things consist of, or +are by virtue of, abstract matter, although this view is widely spread, +as it is to believe that the moral or bourgeois laws were derived from +the idea of justice. + +The ethical loss caused by our realistic, or if you prefer, +materialistic, conception of morality is not so great as it appears. We +need not fear that through this conception social beings will become +lawless cannibals or hermits. Freedom and lawfulness are closely allied +by the need for association which compels us to permit others to live +together with us. If a man is prevented by his conscience or by other +spiritualistic or bourgeois ethics from committing unlawful +actions--unlawful in the wider meaning of the term--he is either not +exposed to very grave temptations, or he has a nature so tame that the +natural or legal punishments fully suffice to keep him within prescribed +bounds. But where these checks are ineffective, morality is likewise +powerless. If it were otherwise, we should have to assume that morality +exerts in secret the same influence on the faithful which is exerted by +public opinion on the faithless. But we know from actual experience that +there are more pious thieves than infidel robbers. That the world, which +attributes so much value for social welfare to morality by word of +mouth, actually shares this view of ours, is proven by the fact that +bourgeois society gives more attention to the penal code and to the +police than to the influence of morality. + +Moreover, our fight is not directed against morality, not even against +any special form of it, but only against the arrogance which assumes to +stamp some concrete form of morality with the trade mark of absolute +morality. We recognize that morality is eternally sacred, in so far as +it refers to considerations which a man owes to himself and to his +fellowmen in the interest of their common welfare. But the freedom of +the individual demands that each one should be at liberty to determine +the degree of consideration and the manner of giving it expression. +Under these circumstances it is as inevitable that the ruling powers, +classes or majorities should enforce their special needs under the form +of a prescribed right, as it is that a man's shirt should be closer to +his skin than his coat. But it appears to us not merely very +superfluous, but even detrimental to the energies required for the +progress of the future, that some decreed right should be elevated to +the position of absolute right and transformed into an insuperable +barrier to the advance of humanity. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[2] Which was gained by the mind's contact with its sense-perceived +multiplicity of the world.--Editor. + + + + +Letters on Logic + +Especially Democratic-Proletarian Logic + +BY JOSEPH DIETZGEN + +Translated by Ernest Untermann + + + + +Editorial Remark. + +The "Letters on Logic," treating on the same subjects as "The Positive +Outcome of Philosophy," were intended by the author to be replaced by +this subsequent work. + +We publish, however, both these works in hopes that the reader will +pardon the frequent repetitions on account of the additional light that +other parts of the "Letters on Logic" are apt to impart. + + + + +LETTERS ON LOGIC + + + + +FIRST LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +You have now reached the age at which the students go to the university. +There, according to custom, they register first of all for a course in +logic, whether they choose the study of law, medicine, or theology. +Logic is, so to say, the elementary study in all branches of learning. +Now you know, my dear, that school and life are regarded as two separate +things. I should like to call your attention to their connection. We +live also in school, we are schooled also by life. I should like to +consider your trip across the Atlantic ocean as your first venture in +the high school of life, and assume the role of your professor of logic. + +I feel well qualified for this office. Although I am not well up in +Latin and Greek, still I feel competent to guide you to the depths of +logical science better than a German professor trained and installed +according to the most approved pattern. You will admit the possibility +of such a thing. For one who knows little may explain that little with +more ease and efficacy than one who has his head stuffed full of the +prescribed bunch of official wisdom. + +You, my son, have been so fortunate as to enjoy a seven years' course in +a German college. And since your teachers, at your departure, gave you +the highest certificate, I may well consider you as qualified not only +to enter the school of life in the United States, but also to listen +intelligently to my lectures on logic. + +But in order that my well trained pupil may not look down upon his +self-taught teacher, I appeal to the fact that even the man with the +best all-around education will be a tyro in specialties; and that, on +the other hand, ignorance in many things does not exclude the +possibility of knowing more about a certain specialty than science has +heretofore grasped. Now I claim in this case to have acquired a +knowledge of the subject with which I intend to deal here that surpasses +anything I have been able to find in the professional literature. I +mention this, my dear Eugene, with all due modesty, not for the purpose +of throwing a halo around my personality, but in order to give a certain +authority to my office as teacher and to inspire my pupil with +confidence. + +Yes, I value confidence. Although you know me as a democrat who cares +nothing for authority, you shall also learn to know me as a graduate in +dialectics who, though he may empty the bath, still retains his hold on +the child and does not permit it to float off with the water. Children, +and one may say nations in their childhood, cannot do without authority, +and a teacher, whether he instruct children or nations, cannot dispense +with a certain confidence-inspiring air. The pupil must believe in the +wisdom of his teacher, in order that he may approach the master with the +necessary attention and willingness to learn. Later on the understanding +of the subject makes all authority superfluous. Thus a thing so sublime +as authority is subject to the destructive tendencies of time, to the +historical process. + +Hitherto mankind has often been tempted by preconceived notions to +idolize vain things. It has been attempted to shield not only authority +in general, but, what is still worse, this or that throne or altar, +against the attacks of time. The relation between the perishable and the +imperishable has always been subject to much misunderstanding. Now since +logic is that science which aims to set the intellect aright, we shall +have to touch occasionally on the general misconception of time and +eternity. + +The most famous expounders of logic are reproached for their cumbrous +style and their obscure mode of explanation. Even masters of languages +have complained in my hearing about the foreign terms used by that +branch of science, terms which even they could not understand. Much of +the blame for this condition of things may fall on the difficulties of +the subject, which have baffled all elucidation for thousands of years. +Some of the blame also falls on the bad habit of using learned +vernacular. But the greatest fault lies with the mental laziness of the +students. Nothing can be learned without mental exertion. If you are +concerned in your further development, you will recognize the Christian +word as to the curse of work as untrue. Work cannot be descended from +sin, for it is a blessing. You will have experienced in yourself how +elated one feels after successful physical or mental work. + +The things which science yields without exertion can be at most +axiomatic commonplaces. + +I assume that you are quite willing to perform the necessary mental +labor, and I promise you that I shall do my best to make this study easy +for you. I do this so much more readily, as I frankly confess that these +letters to my son are written with the intention of making them +accessible to a wider circle of readers by means of the press. + +Before concluding, let me say a word about my aim of speaking especially +of democratic-proletarian logic. You will think or say: Logic may be a +subject worthy of study, but a special democratic-proletarian logic can +surely treat of nothing but party matters. But just as the special +accomplishments in this or that line, the special advances of this or +that nation, are at the same time general advances, progress of +civilization, so the ideas of proletarian logic are not party ideas, but +conclusions of logic in general. You may reply: Even though the special +thought of a Chinaman may be quite consistent and logical, still we +would not call it Chinese logic. That would be quite true, but it does +not meet my point. + +The thought on which the proletarian demands are based, the idea of the +equality of all human beings, this ultimate proletarian idea, if I may +say so, is fully backed up by the deeper insight into the tortuous +problem of logic. Now, since this idea dominates mankind, it certainly +has more right than any Chinese idea. Furthermore, industrial +development has leveled, simplified, cleared all social conditions to +such an extent that it becomes ever easier to penetrate with sober eyes +into the secrets of logic. Finally, my logic deserves its proletarian +qualification for the reason that it requires for its understanding the +overcoming of all prejudices by which the capitalist world is held +together. + +The cause of the people is not a party matter, but the general object of +all science. + +The people's cause as the ultimate object, and logic as the most +elementary and most abstract science, as ultimate science, are as +intimately connected as plants and botany, or as laws and the legal +profession. So are the interests of democracy and the proletariat +intimately connected. The fact that this has not been well recognized in +the United States so far, is more a proof of the lucky condition of that +country than of the scientific knowledge of its democracy. The spreading +primeval forests and prairies offered innumerable homesteads to the poor +and they obscured the antagonism between capitalists and wage workers, +between capitalist and proletarian democracy. But you still lack the +knowledge of proletarian economics which would enable you to recognize +without a doubt that it is precisely on the republican ground of America +that capitalism makes giant strides and reveals ever more clearly its +twofold task of first enslaving the people for the purpose of freeing +them in due time. + + + + +SECOND LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Having written the first letter by way of introduction, I now am ready +for a gradual approach to my subject. + +Logic aims to instruct the human mind as to its own nature and +processes; it will lay bare the interior working of our mind for our +guidance. The object of the study of logic is thought, its nature, and +its proper classification. + +The human brain performs the function of thinking as involuntarily as +the chest the function of breathing. However, we can, by our will, stop +breathing for a while, and accelerate or retard the breathing movements. +In the same way, the will can control the thoughts. We may choose any +object as the subject matter of our thought, and yet we may quickly +convince ourselves that the power of our will and the freedom of the +mind are not any greater than the freedom of the chest in breathing. + +While logic undertakes to assign the proper position to our brain, still +it has to remember that nature has already assigned that position. + +It is with logic as it is with other sciences. They draw wisdom from the +mysterious source of plain experience. Agriculture, e. g., aims to teach +the farmer how to cultivate the soil; but fields were tilled long before +any agricultural college had begun its lectures. In the same way human +beings think without ever having heard of logic. But by practice they +improve their innate faculty of thought, they make progress, they +gradually learn to make better use of it. Finally, just as the farmer +arrives at the science of agriculture, so the thinker arrives at logic, +acquires a clear consciousness of his faculty of thought and a +professional dexterity in applying it. + +I have two purposes in mind in saying this. Firstly, you must not expect +too much from this science, for you cannot set contrary brains to rights +by any logic. Secondly, you must not think too little of it, by +regarding the matter as mere scholastic word-mongery and useless +hairsplitting. In daily life, as well as in all sciences, we never +operate without the help of thought, but only with it, hence an +understanding of the nature of the processes of thought is of eminent +value. + +Logic has its history like all sciences. Aristotle, whom Marx calls the +"Grecian giant of thought," is universally recognized as its founder. + +After the classic culture of antiquity had been buried by barbarism, the +name of Bacon of Verulam rose with the beginning of modern times as a +philosophical light of the first order. His most famous work is entitled +"Novum Organon." By the new organ he meant a new method of research +which should be founded on experience, instead of the subtleties of the +purely introspective method hitherto in vogue. After him, Descartes, or +Cartesius, as he called himself in literature, wrote his still famous +work, "About Methods." I furthermore recall Immanuel Kant's "Critique of +Reason," Johann Gottlieb Fichte's "Theory of Science," and finally +Hegel, of whom the biographer said that he was as famous in the +scientific world as Napoleon in the political. + +Hegel calls his chief work "Logic," and bases his whole system on the +"dialectic method." You have only to look at the titles of these +philosophical masterpieces in order to recognize that they all treat of +the same subject which we are making our special study, viz., the light +of understanding. The great philosophers of all times have searched for +the true method, the method of truth, for the way in which understanding +and reason arrive at science. + +I merely wish to indicate that this subject has its famous history, but +I do not care to enter more deeply into it. I will not speak of the +oppression and persecution, which was inaugurated by religious +fanaticism. I will not enumerate the various events that led to a +greater and greater light from generation to generation. The attempt to +trace this history would entangle us in many disputed questions and +errors which would only increase the difficulties of this study for the +beginner. + +If a teacher of technology were to instruct you on steam engines and, to +explain their first incomplete invention, trace their further +development historically from improvement to improvement, until he +should arrive at the height of perfection attained in their present day +construction, he would also be advancing on a path, but on a tedious +one. I shall endeavor to show my subject at the outset in the very +clearest light which has ever been thrown on it by the help of the +nations of all times. If I succeed in this, it will be easy in the +future, in the reading of any author, to separate the chaff from the +wheat. + +I can afford to dispense with quotations and proofs from others in +trying to make my case and demonstrating the positive product of social +culture, for we are dealing with the most universal and omnipresent +object,--one which enters into every spoken or written sentence with its +own body. If anybody tells of far off times or wonderful things, he must +quote witnesses. Now, much of what I have to say for my case may sound +wonderful, because it runs counter to the popular prejudice, but the +only witness required to prove the truth of my statements is the clear +brain of my pupil, who has only to examine his own experience without +preconceived notions, in order to find proofs on every hand. + +It is surprising in the first place, that such a near at hand object has +not been understood long ago and that so much still remains to be +explained and to be taught after thousands of years of study. But you +know that just as the small things are often great, and great things +small, so the nearest things are often hidden and the hidden things +nearest. + +I promised you in the first sentences of this letter, dear Eugene, that +I would now pass from introduction to subject matter. But since I have +really continued to move around the outer edge of the subject instead of +entering into its midst, you might become impatient, and so I will +justify my method. It is a peculiarity of this subject matter that it +exposes me to this charge. It is a peculiarity of thought that it never +stays with itself, but always digresses to other things. The thought is +the plank to which I should stick, but it is the nature of this plank +never to stick. Thinking is a thing full of contradictions, a +dialectical secret. + +Now I know that here I am saying something which it is very hard for you +to understand. But look here, has it not always been so? When you began +declining Latin words in the sixth class, you were unable at once to +grasp the full meaning of declension. You knew what you were doing, and +yet you did not entirely understand it. Only after penetrating more +deeply into the construction of the language did the meaning and purpose +of the beginning become clear to you. In the same way, you now must try +to digest as much as you can of what I say, and after you have gone more +deeply into this matter, you will fully understand me from beginning to +end. In taking lessons from an author, on an unknown subject, I have +always followed the method of first getting a superficial view of the +subject, of glancing over its many pages and chapters, in order to +return to the beginning and acquire a thorough knowledge by repeated +study. With the growing familiarity with the subject the ability to +understand it grew, and at the conclusion the thing became clear to me. +This is the only correct method I can recommend to you. + +In conclusion let me say for to-day in passing that the recommendation +of the correct method for studying logic is not only an introduction, +but, as I have already said, the subject matter of science itself. + + + + +THIRD LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +My task of teaching logic requires two things: a logician and a teacher. + +The last named capacity requires that I should clothe the subject in an +attractive way. Permit me, therefore, to combine the didactic style with +that of the story teller, and to relate at this point an episode from a +novel of Gustav zu Putlitz: + +The organist of a certain village is lying on his deathbed. His last +strength has been spent on the previous day in playing a hymn, and after +its conclusion he was carried from the church in an unconscious state. +He had played his masterpiece, but at the same time his last piece. A +despised stage girl had accompanied him with a voice like that of a +nightingale. But neither she nor the organ player had earned any +applause from the stupid villagers. + +The old man looked around in his room, his eyes were first riveted on +his faithful piano, his friend and companion through life. He extended +his hand, but it sank down exhausted. He had not had the intention to +touch the piano anyway. It was only like stretching out one's hand for a +friend far away. Then he looked through the window trying to recollect +what time of the day it was. And when he had taken in the situation, he +turned to the girl kneeling at his feet. + +"Poor child," he began, "you were deeply disappointed yesterday. I felt +very much hurt, when I first heard of it, but after that everything +became clear to me while I heard the music all night, until a short +while ago. Rejoice, my girl, at being reviled, for it is done for the +sake of that sacred music, and it is an ecstasy, a blessing, to be +martyred for one's music which is well worth all injuries. I did not +fare any better all my life, and if I thank God for all the good he has +done me until this hour, I also thank him first and most fervently for +the gift of music which he bestowed on the world, and which he revealed +to me most wonderfully in my most painful hours. + +"For my music I have starved and suffered all my life, and my gain was +delicious, my reward celestial for this poor perishable stake. + +"My father was an organist in a little town of Eastern Frisia. His +father had held the same position in the same church, and, I think, so +did the father of his father follow music for a profession. Music has +been the heirloom of our family for generations. True, it was the only +heirloom, but I have cherished it and held its flag aloft all my life. +When God calls me away, I shall leave nothing behind but that old piano +and the sheet music which I wrote myself, for in all other respects I +have always been poor. I might have done differently, and my wife has +often upbraided me for it, but she does not understand the blessing of +music. I do not blame her for that, for it was not her fault that God +closed her ear to music as he did the ears of many others. Poor people, +how cold and dreary must be their lives when music does not scatter +blossoms in their path and bathe their temples in light. But there will +come a time when their ears will be opened, and God will compensate them +in heaven for what they missed here below. + +"We who love music have tasted a part of eternal bliss here below, for +harmony which dissolves all chords is eternal life and its wings are +fanning us in this terrestrial life---- + +"Do you see, I know it well, and no one besides me, how it is when the +soul prepares to leave the perishable body and enter the song of the +spheres-- + +"You do not understand me, my girl, but do not worry, you also will +understand some day. I will only tell you this much, and it shall be a +consolation to you when the world treats you roughly hereafter. All of +us, whether rich or poor, whether reclining on soft silken cushions or +on hard straw, all of us enter life with the celestial melodies in our +hearts. The beating of time goes with us as long as we are breathing. It +is the beating of the heart in our breast. We may seem to lose the +melody, even the measured step of time seems to become confused by our +passion, but in the blessed hours we always find our melody anew, and +then we feel at home in the path of our life." + +Thus the old organist idolized his music. + +But it is not alone the harmony of music which has such a power over the +mind. The harmony of colors, every art and science, has the same power. +Even the most common craft, and the most prosaic of all prose, the chase +after the dollar, may take possession of a man's soul and prostrate him +in adoration before its idol. True, not every one is so sentimentally +inclined, and even the sentimentalist is so only in especially +sentimental moments. Furthermore it cannot be denied that artists, +inventors, and explorers are worshipping the most worthy and most +adorable objects. And I admit that no great success can be accomplished +without putting your whole soul into some great aim. + +Nevertheless you should know that anything which may take possession of +one's soul shares its sublimity with all other things, and is for this +reason at the same time something ordinary. Without such a dialectic +clarification of our consciousness all adoration is idol worship. + +The actual experience, then, that anything and everything may serve as +an idol should clearly convince you that no one thing, but only the +universe is the true God, is truth and life. + +Now, is this logic or is it theology? + +It is both. At closer range you will notice that all great logicians +occupy themselves a great deal with God and deity, and that on the other +hand all honest theologians are trying to base their faith on some +logical order. Logic is by its whole nature metaphysical.[3] + +There exists a class of logicians who attempt to deny the inevitable +connection between the celestial region and the tangible universe. Some +of them do so from excessive religious delicacy of feeling, in order to +protect the sublime from the disintegrating effects of critique. Others +have such an antipathy against the religious abuses that they do not +wish to hear any more about religion. Both classes adhere to the +so-called formal logic. + +These adherents of formal logic may be compared to a maker of porcelain +dishes who would contend that he was simply paying attention to the form +of his dishes, pots, and vases, but that he did not have anything to do +with the raw material, while it is evident that he is compelled to form +the body in trying to embody forms. These things can be separated by +words only, but not by actions. In the same way as body and form, the +finite and infinite or so-called celestial spheres, the physical and the +metaphysical, are inseparable. + +Logic analyzes thought. But it analyzes thought as it is in reality, and +therefore it unavoidably searches for truth. And whether this truth is +found above or below, or anywhere, is a question which just as +inevitably brings the logician into contact with the theologian. To +think of avoiding such a meeting from considerations of sympathy or +antipathy, would be a rude lack of consideration for science. + +Metaphysical logic which aims to extend its field to eternity, which +looks for logical order even in heaven, and seeks to solve even the +so-called last questions of all knowledge, differs in a distinct way +from formal logic, which selects a restricted field for its research and +confines itself to investigating the logical order of the socalled +physical world. This difference is worthy of your special attention, +because in it there is hidden the kernel of our whole correspondence. + +It is quite a practical method to set a limit for one's investigations, +not to fly into clouds, not to undertake anything that cannot be +accomplished. Yet you must not forget that practical boundaries are not +theoretical boundaries, that they are not invariable boundaries for you, +or for others. Although you cannot fly to heaven and will give up the +idea of flying machines from considerations of practical expediency, yet +you will not wish to deny to man the theoretical freedom of infinite +striving even in the matter of airships, and you will not be so small as +to give up the idea of the capacity for our race for metaphysical, or in +other words, infinite development. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[3] In the sense of: mental and physical world embracing, +all-embracing.--Editor. + + + + +FOURTH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +In my first letter I acquainted you with my purpose, in the second I +lifted the subject on my finger tips, so to say, to show it for a brief +moment; in the third I showed that its color had inevitably a religious +shade. Now, to continue, permit me to introduce another point to your +consideration. + +The great cause of the working class has hitherto always been the beast +of burden of a small and exclusive minority. This is most evident in the +slave states of antiquity, in Egypt, Greece, Rome. Likewise in the +feudal and guild systems of the middle ages the oppression of the mass +of the people is sufficiently apparent. At present this condition of +things is more visible in Eastern Europe, in Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, +Hungary, Eastern Prussia, etc., than in the industrial countries of the +West. In the United States of America it is most obscured, so that there +the people hardly realize their enslaved condition. In America, many of +the upper ten thousand have made their way from the bottom up, and it +happens more frequently than in Europe that the captains of industry +laid their foundation by hard work. The shortsighted observers then +easily forget out of sympathy for the hard beginning that there is +sharper's practice at the end, and they indulge in the idle hope that +every hard working beast of burden might transform itself into a happy +millionaire by thrift and smartness. + +You will probably ask: What has that to do with logic or the art of +reasoning? Patience! You will admit that the emancipation of the nations +from beastly toil, misery and suffering is the highest goal of the human +mind. Nor will you deny that the thought is the most essential +instrument for reaching this high goal. The accomplishments of thought +are visible in the results of civilization. The proletariat of the +present, also that of Russia, Turkey, East Prussia, participates in +these accomplishments of thought. It participates not alone in the sense +that its brains are better educated and cultured, but also that its +food, clothing, and shelter have become more civilized through the +progressive deeds of intellect. + +You see, then, that the people's cause is connected with the faculty of +thought, and the nature of the latter may be illustrated as well by the +example of the development of civilization. The complicated network of +wheels in a watch may also serve to demonstrate the nature of that which +language designates by many names, such as spirit, intellect, faculty of +knowledge, reason, etc. Only it must be remembered that this mysterious +something cannot be shown by itself, but only in connection with other +things, whether they be the history of civilization or a watch. There +will then be no contradiction in finding that the intellectual life +appears more powerful and magnificent through the clockwork of the +history of civilization than through any miniature product of thought. + +In searching for the connection of things, one generally seeks to +recognize the manner or the degree of the connection. But we, in this +case, disregard the question as to how the things of this world are +related to one another and to thought, and we simply make a note of the +fact of the interdependence of thought and being, of nature and mind. +This fact of the universal interconnection of things contradicts the +untrained prejudice. The uncultivated brain nurses the illusion that the +earth, the trees on it, and the clouds and the sun above them are +separate things. But it requires a better training of reason to +understand that the earth, the tree, the clouds, and the sun, can be +what they are only in the universal interconnection. I remember reading +an article from Fichte, in a German school reader, which clearly showed +that the disarrangement of an insignificant object during the process of +thinking causes us to disarrange the whole history of the world in our +thoughts. It is well known that one unfamiliar with political economy +overlooks the fact that the business men not only carry on their trading +for their private benefit, but are also members of the process of social +production. It is overlooked that all labor, aside from being individual +activity, is at the same time an organic part of social labor. And just +as ignorance of economics overlooks the industrial interdependence, so +ignorance of logic overlooks the cosmic interrelations. + +Here is a drop of water. Look how different it is according to the +different things with which it is connected. It cannot be what it is +without a certain temperature. According to changes in temperature, it +will assume either the form of ice or of steam. In fat the drop remains +compact, in salt it divides infinitely, runs downhill in general and +uphill in a loaf of sugar. According to the specific gravity of a +certain fluid, with which it may come into contact, it either floats on +the surface or sinks. Without a connection with the earth, its +temperature and gravitation, this drop and all others would disappear in +the fathomless abyss and have no existence. Thus the forms of things +change according to their connections, and they are what they are only +as parts of the universal interrelation. + +What is true of a drop of water, is true of all things, all forces and +substances, even of our thoughts. The human mind lives and works only in +connection with the rest of the material universe--and the recognition +of the organic unity of all things is the fulcrum of my logic. + +Old line metaphysical logic was so enamored of its object that the +descent, the kinship, and the connection with the common things of this +world seemed too ordinary for the exquisite spirit. That logic was +transcendental, and therefore its chosen object likewise had to be in +touch with a transcendental world. And though it was scientific enough +to regard the tale of the creation of the first soul by the breath of +God as a fable, it was nevertheless so prejudiced in favor of the +extraordinary nature of the intellect that it did not abandon, for +thousands of years, the hope of finding in that intellect a source which +would reveal transcendental matters. Formal logic now entirely discards +this hope of a fantastical world, but at the same time it misunderstands +the natural connection between the spirit and the common world. It +isolates the instrument of thought and leaves the question undecided +whether this instrument has a natural, supernatural, or no connection at +all. It overlooks that just as logic is real, so reality is logical, and +does not see that the back door which leads to illogical heaven by way +of faith deserves the disdain of science. + +Thought, intellect, are really existing, and their existence is a +uniform part of the universal existence. That is the cardinal point of +sober logic. + +The fact that the thoughts are of the same worldly substance as the +other parts of the universe, that they are parts of common nature and +not a transcendental essence, has already been expressed by Cartesius in +the famous words: "_Cogito, ergo sum_," I think, therefore I am. + +The fact of my thinking, says the philosopher, proves my existence. In +order to come to an absolute conviction on the nature of truth and +error, he sets out by doubting everything. And then he says that he +cannot doubt the existence of his thoughts. He thus placed the spirit on +the basis of real life, delivered it of its transcendentalism, and that +constitutes his everlasting merit. + +However, not alone Cartesius, but also your own experience testifies to +the inseparable connection between thinking and being. Have not your +thoughts been connected always and everywhere with some worldly or real +object? If you attempt to isolate thought in order to ponder over it, +you can only do so because that thought has been experienced by you and +therefore was in every instance attached to some worldly object. True, +you have thought of Greek gods, brownies, and mermaids. But you, an +amateur in painting, are familiar enough with that part of the mind +which is called imagination in order to admit that even this eccentric +part of the mind does not only act, and therefore, exist in reality, but +also derives all its products from reality, so that even its most +fantastical vagaries and illusions are still real pictures, reflections +of reality. + +But how is it that I require such a multitude of words in order to state +over and over again that the thought has a real existence and is a +uniform part of the universe? Simply because from time immemorial the +confusion in matters of logic is so great that the human spirit is in +the same breath exalted to heaven, and yet its thoughts regarded as +nothing real, nothing true. This is made plain by the fact that a sharp +distinction is commonly made between that which is real and that which +is only imagined, and this difference is exaggerated to such an extent +that it appears as if the idea, which indeed is only in the brain, has +no real existence at all. + +In order that you may understand the interrelations of the things of the +universe, I must warn you against this exaggeration and prove that the +intellect has a real existence which is connected with the universe or +reality. Botany, which occupies itself with plants, does not only teach +us to divide them into classes, orders, and families, but it also does +more by showing us what place in the entire realm of nature is occupied +by the vegetable kingdom, by pointing out the differences which +distinguish the plants from the inorganic mineral kingdom or the organic +animal kingdom. Formal logic similarly dissects the spirit into its +parts, makes distinctions between conceptions, ideas, judgments, +conclusions, divides these into subdivisions, classifies conceptions +according to species, separates abstract and concrete thought, knows +many varieties of judgments, registers three, four, or more modes of +conclusion. But at the same time this formal logic recoils from touching +on the question as to how the universal spirit is related to the +universe, what role it plays in the general existence, whether it is +part and parcel of nature or transcendental. And yet this is the most +interesting part, the part which logically connects the intellect and +the science of the intellect with all other sciences and things. + +Logic must teach us how to distinguish. It is not a question, however, +of distinguishing sheet iron from gold, or a greyhound from a pug-dog, +for this is done by special lines of knowledge. Logic must rather +enlighten us about that part of the faculty of distinguishing which is +generally required in all branches of knowledge, whereby truth and +error, imagination and reality are recognized. To this end I feel +impelled to advise you not to overlook that even error and imagination +belong to the one infinite and absolutely coherent reality. For the +purpose of distinguishing true imagination from actual reality, it must +be remembered that just as rye bread and cream puffs agree in belonging +to the general category of baker's products, so imagination and truth, +thought and reality, are two different kinds of the same nature. + +To sum up the contents of this letter, let me point out that its +beginning shows the connection of the intellect with the development of +the people, while its conclusion explains the wider connection of the +mind with the universal existence. + + + + +FIFTH LETTER + + +A man not trained in logical thinking is handicapped by the absence of a +monistic method of thought. Monistic is synonymous with systematic, +logical, or uniform. + +If we call a cream puff a tidbit and rye bread a food without +remembering that every food is a tidbit and every tidbit food, and if we +ignore the fact that both of them, in spite of their difference, belong +to the same category and are, therefore, related, then we lack logic. +And logic is lacking whenever the fact is ignored that all things +without exception: substances, forces, or qualities of the world, are +chips of the same block, finite parts of the infinite, which is the only +truth and reality. + +That insects, fishes, birds, and mammals form one and the same animal +kingdom, is an old story which has long been patched up by the logical +instinct. Darwin did not only enrich the natural sciences, but also +perform an invaluable service for logic. In proving how amphibia +developed into birds, he bored a hole into the hitherto fixed order of +classification. He brought motion, life, spirit into the zoological +swamp. + +In case you should not be familiar enough with Darwin's work to +understand my allusions, I will enter a little more deeply into the +matter in a few sentences. The zoologists knew well enough that all +species of animals belonged to the animal kingdom; but this +classification was a mechanical affair. Now the "Origin of Species," +which demonstrates that the zoological classification is not constant +but variable, which outlines the actual transition from one species of +animals to another, reveals at the same time that this alignment of all +animal species in one kingdom is not only a logical mechanism, but also +a fact of actual existence. This classification of all animals from the +minutest to the most gigantic in one kingdom appeared before the time of +Darwin as an order which had been accomplished by thought alone, while +after him it was known as an order of nature. + +What the zoologists did to the animal kingdom, must be done by the +logician to existence in general, to the cosmos. It must be shown that +the whole world, all forms of its existence, including the spirit, are +logically or monistically connected, related, welded together. + +A certain narrow materialism thinks that everything is done and said +when the inter-connection between thought and brain is pointed out. A +good many things may still be discovered by the help of the dissecting +knife, microscope, and experiment; but this does not make the function +of logic superfluous. True, thought and brain are connected, just as +intimately as the brain is related to the blood, the blood with oxygen, +etc.; but moreover thought is connected quite as intimately with all +other things as all physical objects are. + +That the apple is not alone dependent on the stem which attaches it to +the tree, but also on sunshine and rain, that these things are not +one-sidedly but universally connected, this is what logic wants to teach +you particularly in regard to the spirit, the thought. + +If a traveler in Africa had to report a new animal species, he would not +make special mention of the fact of its existence, because that is +obvious. And though he were to relate things about the most abnormal +existence, we should still know that this abnormality is only a +deviation in degree which does not overstep the bounds of existence in +general. But the human intellect is a greater novelty than the most +wonderful animal species of the interior of Africa. + +You know my sharpwitted friend Englaender. When I told him that I was +writing articles on the human mind, he advised me not to bother my head +about it. He said that this was a subject no man knew anything about. +And when the learned Mr. Hinze, whom you also know, wanted to prove the +inevitability of religious faith and the inadequacy of all science, he +always asked the pathetic question: What is consciousness? And he used +to take on an expression, as if he had presented a book with seven +seals. Now I don't want to class the professors of logic with such men. +But it is a fact that the great multitude, among them many scientists, +are quite unfamiliar with the truth that the existence of the blue sky +and of the green trees is a uniform part of the same generality with the +existence of our intellect. + +For this reason it is necessary to prove that the intellect exists in +the same way that all other things do. For it is denied and +misunderstood, not only by those who regard the spirit as a being of a +transcendental nature, but also by those who admit the existence of the +true contents of an ideological concept, but not of thought itself. In +short, the matter is so obscure that I feel sure that you will likewise +be as yet in doubt whether there are not two kinds of ideological +concepts, one of them real, the other unreal. + +For two thousand years logic has proclaimed the sentence that thought is +a form to be filled with real contents. True thought "must coincide with +reality." It is true that there is a germ of sense in this statement, +but it is misunderstood. The central point of logic is overlooked. Every +thought must not only have a real content, but it is also necessary, in +order to distinguish true thoughts or perceptions from untrue, to +realize that thought is always and everywhere a part of reality and +truth, even when it contains the most singular imaginations and errors. + +Just as the domestic cat and the panther are different species of cats +and yet belong to the same genus of cats, so true and false thoughts, in +spite of all their differences, are of the same genus. For truth is so +great that it comprises absolutely everything. Truth, reality, the +world, the all, the infinite and the absolute are synonymous +expressions. A clear conception of truth is indispensable for the +understanding of logic. And in the last analysis it is simply using +different words for the same thing, when I base the quintessence of +logic, its fulcrum, cardinal, salient, or distinctive point on the +spirit intimately united to nature or on the concept of a uniform world, +truth, or reality. I cannot give you a clearer view of truth than by +quoting at this place the famous words of Lessing: "If God were to offer +me the ever active striving for truth in his left hand and truth in his +right hand, I should grasp his left and say: Father, keep truth, it is +for you alone." This statement is somewhat highflown and mystical, and +Lessing was no doubt somewhat embarrassed by mystical thinking. Still +there is a sober truth in these words, which is quite clear and to the +point. + +"Truth itself" is the universe, the infinite and inexhaustible. Every +part of it is a finite part of the infinite and is, therefore, finite +and infinite, perishable and imperishable at the same time. Every part +is a separate part and connected inseparably with the whole. The human +mind, among others, is such a part. + +The universal existence, or truth, is the inexhaustible object of the +human mind. The fact that in the study of logic the human mind has +itself for an object must be explained to the student by pointing out +that in this case the subject and the object are both things like all +other things, in other words, are a part of truth, a part of natural +existence. + +"Truth itself" cannot be wholly conceived by the human brain, but in +parts. For this reason we possess only the ever active striving for +truth; for this reason, furthermore, the conception or knowledge can +never be completely identical with reality, but can be only a part of +it. + +Now permit me to say a few words which do not sound as would those +spoken on the throne of logic, but which are expressed in popular +language. If you conceive some real object, whether a church steeple or +a thimble, then this object exists twice, viz., in reality and in +conception. On the other hand, a certain creation of imagination has +only a simple fantastical existence. Such a popular way of thinking is +undoubtedly correct. It is incorrect only when the fact is universally +ignored that all modes of existence belong to the same genus, the same +as a domestic cat and a panther, so that the existence of a thing in our +brains, and outside of them in the heavens, on earth, and in all places +has a logical meaning only when it is the same existence in spite of all +multiplicity. An existence not partaking of the general nature of all +existence would be an illogical, nonsensical, thing. + +Now, I think you will have no difficulty in understanding me when I say +that a church steeple in imagination and the same church steeple in +reality are not two church steeples, but that imagination and reality +are forms of the same existence. + +Ancient logic ordered a medal and had stamped on its face: The thought +must be identical with the reality. We now stamp on its reverse side: +(1) The thought is itself a part of reality and (2) the reality outside +of thought is too voluminous and cannot enter thought even with its +smallest particle. What good, under these circumstances, is the old +inscription, especially since it does not teach us at all how the +identity between thought and its real object is to be attained, known, +or measured? + +If you, my dear Eugene, should become confused by these statements +instead of enlightened, you should have patience and consider that a +thing which is to be illuminated by logic must, of course, be first +obscure. I believe that I have served you in some way by simply raising +a doubt in your mind as to the soundness of the popular way of speaking +and if I thus have convinced you of the confusion and inadequacy of the +plausible idea of the identity of thought and reality. + +True, a thought must agree with its object just as a portrait should. +But what good will it do a painter to have his special attention called +to this fact? + +Have you ever seen a portrait or a copy that did not agree in some +respect with the original? I am convinced that this has never been your +experience any more than a portrait which was a complete likeness of its +object. Your experience will be sufficiently cultivated to know that it +can always be a question only of a more or less. I would seriously +recommend to you to reflect on the relativeness of all equality, +similarity, and identity. By far the greater part of humanity is in this +respect barbarously thoughtless. It is very difficult to grasp for the +logically untrained brain that two drops of water or twins are only +relatively alike or unlike, just as are man and woman, negro and white +man, and that all existence is just as alike as it is unlike. + +It is with the thinker as it is with the painter. They both search for a +likeness of reality and truth. In painting as in understanding there are +excellent pictures and bad ones. In this respect one may make a +distinction between true and false thoughts, but you must also know that +even the unsuccessful portrait has some likeness, and that even the most +accurate likeness is yet far from being in perfect harmony and identical +with its object. + +Reality, truth, universal nature, stands in the pulpit and preaches: "I +am the Lord, thy God. Thou shalt not make any graven image to worship +it." You must have a far too sublime conception of truth to entertain +the idea that any painter or thinker might encompass it fully within the +limit of a picture, no matter how good a likeness it may be. + +Now, that we have recognized the human mind as a part of actual reality +and truth, we see at the same time that undivided reality, the sum of +all that is, represents absolute truth which comprises everything. In +their capacity of parts of the universe, true and false thoughts, good +and bad men, heaven and hell, and all other things, are all pieces of +the same cloth, bombs of the same caliber. + + + + +SIXTH LETTER + + +My Dear Son: + +After the third letter had acquainted you with the fact that the subject +of logic has a certain religious flavor, the two subsequent letters +endeavored to show that the logical subject is interconnected with the +universal existence of the world, that the faculty of thought is an +inseparable part of actual truth. In the vernacular of theology my last +two letters have represented the human mind as a part of the living true +God. + +Christianity teaches: God is a spirit and who would worship him must +worship in spirit and in truth. + +And logic teaches: The spirit is a part of universal existence. Whoever +worships the spirit, is an idolator, for he worships a part and +misunderstands the whole truth. Truth itself is identical with the +universal existence, with the world, and all things are simply forms, +phenomena, predicates, attributes, passing expressions of it. The +universal existence may be called divine because it is infinite, being +the alpha and omega which comprises all things as special truths. The +intellect is such a limited part among other special parts of divine +truth, and the latter is frequently called world without any bombastic +emphasis. + +Undoubtedly, every science, profession and trade can say the same thing +of its object. The blue sky and the green trees are divine parts. +Everything is interrelated and connected. If that were a good reason for +not making any subdivisions, every part and description would become +endlessly tiresome. + +However, the specialty of logic is the cosmic sum of all truths, because +it aims at a general elucidation of the nature of the human brain. This +purpose is not so well served by an accumulation of other knowledge as +by the general understanding of truth. + +Logic, which seeks to enlighten the mind for the purpose of scientific +thinking, does not so much treat of true conceptions as of the general +and absolute conception of truth which is inseparably linked to the +infinite universal life. + +If you wish to think scientifically, you will first of all strive after +clear ideas. And yet your head may be quite clear in regard to everyday +things, without getting any nearer to general clearness. Nor is such +clearness obtainable by the accumulation of mere special knowledge, for +even if you were to grow in wisdom to the end of your days, nevertheless +the fountain of wisdom, the universe, is inexhaustible and your brain +will remain imperfectly informed or unclear as before. Yea, even the +smallest part of the world is so inexhaustible that the most talented +can never acquire all the knowledge necessary to understand entirely +even the most minute object. The strongest microscope cannot see all +there is to see in a drop of water, and the wisest man can never learn +all there is to shoemaking. + +You can see by all this that the scientific use of our intellect is +furthered by special knowledge only in the corresponding details. For +this reason it does not satisfy us to have some logicians tell us how +many kinds of concepts, judgments and conclusions are contained in our +intellect. These are special details of logic. But the thing of first +importance for the student of logic is the elucidation of the universal +concept of truth, not the accumulation of special truths. + +Special truths enlighten the intellect. But the understanding that all +specialties are connected with one another by one monad or unit which is +truth itself gives us a certain general enlightenment which certainly +does not render any special research unnecessary, or take the place of +it, but which may well serve as the foundation of all research, which +may therefore be called a fundamental assistance. + +I may remark in passing that the understanding of logical science is +rendered especially difficult by the fact that the unpracticed +understands all terms and concepts only in their narrow popular meaning, +while the subject matter leads up continually into the widest fields. + +When I speak of parts of the world, you must not think merely of +geographical parts, but you must think farther until you arrive at the +insight that stars and bricks, matter and force, in short all parts of +the world are world parts. + +The logical difficulty may be principally traced to the lack of +familiarity with the comprehensive categories. It will be clear to you +that thinking and being, phenomenon and truth, etc., are conceptions of +the widest scope. So you may have some difficulty in distinguishing +between concepts of truth, and true concepts. And yet this is the same +as making a distinction between the general class of herbs and its +individual species. The mere intercourse with such comprehensive +concepts as truth, existence, universe, is an excellent school of +intellectual enlightenment. + +Perhaps you may object to the deviation of a science devoted to the +special study of the faculty of thought into such fields as existence or +truth. But a logic confined to an analysis of the faculty of +understanding would be narrow compared to one representing this faculty +of understanding at work in real life. If the science of the eye were to +treat only of the various parts of the eye without considering the +things outside connected with its function, the light, the objects, in +short, the vision of the eye, it would be more an anatomy of the eye +than a general science of the eye. At all events a science which +represents not alone the subjective faculty of vision, but also the +living activity of the eye, the objective field of vision inseparable +from the subjective faculty, is a far more comprehensive instruction, a +higher enlightenment of the human brain. + +In my opinion, logic should not so much treat of the analysis of the +intellectual subject as of the purpose and object of the faculty of +thought, its culture, which is not accomplished by the intellect itself, +but by its connection with the world of truth, its interrelation with +the universal existence. + +What can a logic accomplish which divides thought into analytical and +synthetical thoughts, which speaks of inductive and deductive +understanding and of a dozen other kinds, but which finally declines to +meet the question of the relation of thought and understanding to truth, +and fails to indicate what and where is divine truth and how we may +arrive at it? + +Pilate, the typical sceptic, shrugs his shoulders; the clergymen make a +mystery of divine truth; the natural sciences care only for the true +conceptions, but naught for the concept of truth; and then the special +science of understanding, formal logic, tries to refer its task to +philosophy or world wisdom. + +I have already pointed out that the titles of the principal works on +philosophy indicate that the whole world wisdom turns around the +question: How can our brain be enlightened, how can it arrive at truth? +The naturalists answer that this can be accomplished by special studies, +and they are frequently opposed to philosophical research which makes +general truth its main object, and belittle it. You will readily see +that this is a mistake when you consider that, to illustrate, a machine +or an organism as a whole is still something more than a mere sum of its +parts. + +No matter how well you may know each single part, yet you will not +understand the whole machine or organism by this means alone. The +universe is not an aggregation of unorganized parts, but a living +process which must be understood not only in its parts but also as a +whole. We may pass for the moment the question whether the Milky Way may +be dissolved into stars, and whether the stars may become globes like +our Earth which may develop plants, animals, and intelligent beings. The +thing which is evident is that there is a process of development, that +all nature takes part in this movement, that the universe is a whole +without end, composed of an infinite number of parts; a coming and +going, an eternal transformation, which is always identical with itself +and always the same world. What all this would be without our eyes and +ears and without the intellect by means of which we use eyes and ears, +what the world "in itself" is, that is a senseless and transcendental +speculation. + +The science of logic must deal only with the actual world which is +inseparable from us and from our thoughts. + +This world which we hear, see, smell, in which we live and breathe, is +the world of truth or the true world. That is a fact. Must I prove this? +And how is a fact proven? How do we prove that a peach is a delicious +fruit? One goes and eats it. In the same way, you may now go and enjoy +life, of course in a rational manner, and I am convinced that your own +love of life will tell you that it is proof positive of the truth of the +world, of its actuality. + +But even in the midst of this actual world there is present an +inconsistent element, a human race with a confused logic. This race has +been led by various depressing and saddening circumstances to blacken +the delicious truth of this world and to look for a transcendental truth +in philosophical metaphysics or religious fantasmagorias, both of which +are parts of the same stew. The philosophers of misery who make of the +world of truth a vain shadow and a miserable vale of sorrow must needs +be convinced by logic that the living world is the only true one. + +Well, that is not so difficult. But there is a danger of getting into a +vicious circle of errors, imitating a snake biting its own tail. I have +to prove logically that the world and truth are one and the same thing, +before we have come to an agreement as to what is logical truth or true +logic. Nevertheless, nature has assisted us. The logic of nature is the +true logic by the help of which we can agree. Nothing more is required +than a somewhat trained brain. + +Take two men having a dispute about truth. One of them says it is one +thing, the other that it is something else. So they are arguing about +that which is. This last word is a form of the verb to be. Hence in +arguing whether the remote nebula in the heavens is a brick or a star, a +male or a female, one is always discussing some form of existence. All +disputes turn around forms of existence, but existence itself is an +undisputable truth. + +Have I now still to prove that all existence is of the same category? +Are there any stones that do not belong to the category of stones, or +any kind of wood which is iron? What would become of reason and +language, if such a thing were to be considered? And yet, much that is +being said by opponents is of such a nature. + +If I have succeeded in convincing you that the universe is the truth, +there still remains the special question: What place shall we assign to +fantastic ideas, error, and untruth? If the universe is the truth, then +everything would be true, and hence it seems contradictory that error +and untruth should have a place in truth or in the world. Of this more +anon. I shall only point out in passing that untruth may without any +contradiction belong to truth, just as weeds are a negation of herbs and +still at the same time herbs. + +In conclusion I call your attention to the eminently proletarian +character of the science of truth. It gives to the working class the +logical justification to renounce all clerical and mystic control and to +look for salvation in this same world in which divine truth is living. + + + + +SEVENTH LETTER + + +The philologists distinguish carefully between a science of language and +a science of languages. The latter teaches Egyptian, Assyrian, Hebrew, +Greek, Latin, English, French, etc., while the former treats of the +general characteristics common to all languages, of language itself. + +Philosophical logic stands in the same relation to other sciences. The +latter make us acquainted with special truths, while logic treats of +truth in general. Those overintelligent people who claim that truth is +merely a collective term for many truths do not see the woods for trees. +Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Max Mueller, Steinthal, etc., have many +things to say about the science of language of which the linguists with +many languages never dream. + +The science of language, aside from its many amenities, is also burdened +with a difficult problem which it cannot solve without the help of +logic. This problem is the point of differentiation where babbling and +word-mongery cease and intelligent speech begins. For human speech has a +certain meaning, and even the cries of the animals are not without +sense. The sparrows know how to converse together, the rooster calls +his flock together, the dog knows how to announce that a stranger +enters his master's home. Not alone the jokers, but serious thinkers +speak of animal language, of a sign language, and maintain that speech +does not alone consist of words, but also of inarticulate sounds and +gestures. Poets endow even the storm, the thunder and the winds with +speech. We wish to clear this confusion and ascertain what language is +and where it begins. Languages, as is well known, have their beginning +at the Tower of Babel. But in order to get close to language, we must +look for a beginning of things either in God or in logic. + +You know the old question: Which was first, the egg or the hen? But only +a frivolous mind overlooks the serious side of this question and turns +it into a mere joke. The question of beginning and end is an eminently +logical one, and an unequivocal and clear answer to it would bring light +not alone into the science of language, but also into the human brain. + +Let us, therefore, follow up the problem of the "origin of language" a +little farther. When our forefathers dealt with this question, they +thought that a God had given speech to man or some genius had invented +it. They thought of a beginning in time. The modern thinkers speculate +more deeply. They have found out that language is not a fixed thing, but +fluid, and has risen from low beginnings to a great perfection. We can +no more find its temporal beginning by looking backward than we can see +its end by looking ahead. For this reason we no longer look for its +temporal, but for its ideological beginning. (Steinthal.) We should like +to have a fixed mark where we might say: Up to this point that which +resembles speech is only roaring, exclamation, noise, and here is the +beginning of the well articulated sound which deserves the name of +"spoken word." + +But there is still another factor which complicates the question +further. Some say: It is not only the sound, the word, which constitutes +speech, but the connected sentence; there must be sense and reason mixed +with it. And this applies to the speaker and to the listener. Language +presupposes reason. + +Then, again, intellect is not a fixed thing, but a fluid process which +develops in, from, and by speech. So it appears on one side as if the +mind produces language, and on the other, as if language produces the +mind, the reason. Where, then, is the beginning and end, and how can we +bring order into these relations? + +For us, who are studying the mind, not the language, the conclusion +follows that it is not alone the word, but also the sound, the tone, the +gesture, that all things have a meaning and speak a language. We find +mind wherever we penetrate with our mind. Not alone language, but the +world is connected with the mind, with the thought. But the connection +with language may well serve as an illustration by which the connection +of the cosmic mind may be demonstrated and the human brain illuminated. + +Language shares the honor with the mind of being extolled, even in this +sober century, if not to the skies, at least far out of the general +connection of common things. For this reason, we must emphasize in the +case of language as in that of the mind, that they exist, that they are +part and parcel of the universal existence. At this point I wish to give +you a vivid illustration of the unity of all being by pointing out that +it is indubitably established by the existence of one single name which +is sufficient to designate _All_. True, language employs many names for +this unity of the world, but that is a luxury. It is logical and +necessary for the intellect to have _one_ name for the _All_, because +everything is not only infinitely variegated, but also infinitely one, +or a unit. There are many different waters, but all water partakes of +the general nature of water. Unless that nature is present, there is no +water and the name of water does not apply. In the same way there are +many kinds of oil; olive oil, kerosene oil, castor oil, etc., and each +kind has its own subdivisions. But everything that has a common name is +a unit. + +Kindly observe, now, that the names of things form just such circles as +the water does after being struck by a stone. Just as the name water, so +the name oil indicates a ring. Then the name fluid constitutes another +and wider ring which includes both oil and water. Then the name matter +draws a still wider circle and includes solids as well as fluids, and +finally the name being, or _All_, includes mind and matter, all matter +and force, including heaven and hell, in one sole ring, in one unit. + +On the basis of this universal unity, from which it becomes apparent +that high and low, dry and fluid, in short the whole universe is made of +the same substance, any fantastic thinker can prove that human and +animal language is one, for otherwise one could not refer to both of +them as language. He may then justly contend that speech, producing a +sound, is a noise, that speech and noise are one. Speech is sound and +sound speaks. In this way language would have no beginning and no end. +In the last analysis it would be one with all things, and all things +would be one with it. In this way the whole universe would become an +inexplicable, incomprehensible, inexpressible mixture of speech. + +And yet it is an old story that man's insight grows the more he +magnifies a thing. The more excessively we exaggerate a thing, the +plainer become its boundaries. Language indeed requires one single name +for _All_, but it also requires an infinite number of names in order to +specify the parts of _All_. Inasmuch as language claims to be only a +part of existence, this part has to be bounded, and you should in this +connection remember the unlimited freedom of man in drawing such +boundaries. Words are not merely empty words, but names of cosmic parts, +of cosmic rings of undulation. Language, or rather the mind connected +with language, wishes to bound the infinite by the help of language. The +instinctive popular use of language does this in a haphazard way. +Conscious science proceeds in an exact manner. Just as it has determined +on the field of temperature what should be called hot and what warm, so +it is at liberty on the field of sounds to determine where the name of +language begins or ceases. The end of the discussion of language is +therefore this: That which has already been done to horse power has not +yet been done to the concept of language; it has been somewhat fixed by +common usage, but only insufficiently. And so the moral of this tale is +that the things of this world, even mind and language, are connected and +intermingling undulations of the same stream, which has neither +beginning nor end. + +Let me say it once more clearly and without circumlocution: The logic +which I teach and the thought which is its object are parts of the +world, of the infinite, and every part being a piece of the infinite is +likewise infinite. Every part partakes of the nature of the infinite. +Hence you must not expect that I should exhaust my infinite subject. I +confine myself to the logical chapter of "the One and the Many." I +simply wish to make it plain that without any contradiction the whole +multiplicity of existence is of the same nature, and that this oneness +of nature subdivides into manifold forms. The world is interconnected +and this interconnection is subdivided into departments. It adds to the +general enlightenment of the human brain to recognize this in regard to +language, to mind, to all parts of the universe. + +I repeat, then: One may think logically without having attended any +lectures on logic, just as one may raise potatoes without a scientific +knowledge of agriculture. It was possible to invent the thermometer, to +clearly distinguish between sounds and colors, and a hundred other +things, without having explained the faculty of discrimination. But the +most abstract distinctions, such as beginning and end, word and meaning, +body and soul, man and animal, matter and force, truth and error, +presuppose for their explanation a logical explanation of their +interconnection with our intellect. + + + + +EIGHTH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Logic is going through the same experience as economics. The economists +of the capitalist era talk solely of the means and ways by which profit +and surplus value may be increased. They discuss only its relative size, +its increase or decrease. But the thing itself, its origin and descent, +is not discussed. It is passed in silence that profit is extracted from +labor power by paying less for a day's work than is produced by it. The +gentlemen talk only of the "wealth of nations," but not of their +poverty. And though this was due to ignorance in the beginning, it has +later become sheer roguery. + +The formal logicians are as ignorant as they are roguish, when they +persist in discussing the intellect or thought in the traditional manner +as if they were isolated things, while ignoring the necessary connection +of the object of the logical study with the world of experiences. This +interconnection leads to an explanation of truth and error, of sense and +nonsense, of god and idols, and this is very inopportune for the +professors. For this reason this unwelcome problem is handed over to the +mystical departments, to metaphysics and religion, so that these +venerable pillars of official wisdom may continue their services to the +ruling classes. + +I have already stated in my letters that the kernel of my discussion +turns on the distinction between formal and what I call proletarian +logic. The formal logicians treat the intellect as a thing "in itself," +while I express in many different ways the fact that the intellect does +not exist by itself, but is interconnected with all things and with the +universe. + +That intellect has indeed a transcendental leaning, which seeks vent by +trying to exclude now music, now language, now itself, now some other +fetich from the universal interrelation. But the science of the mind +teaches that the brain watching its own activity finds out that all +affirmations and negations, assertions and contradictions, belong to the +one omnipotent world mechanism, which keeps them stored within itself +and which is actually truth and life. Inasmuch as the human brain is of +the same nature as this automatic universal being and interconnected +with it, logic is at the same time religion, metaphysics, and world +wisdom.[4] + +Formal logic teaches that our intellect must keep all things apart, but +does not teach that it must also connect them. This logic is right in +one way and yet does not arrive at the goal of a clear world philosophy, +because it permits the transcendental leaning to exaggerate the +differences and distinctions. It overlooks the paradoxical or +dialectical nature of things which are not only separated but also +connected. What must be understood is that, generally speaking, the +classification of the universe is only a formality. We are, indeed, +justified in distinguishing between above and Below, right and left, +beginning and end, gold and sheet metal, good and bad, but we must also +enlighten ourselves as to how multiplicity can be a unity, the variable +constant, and the constant variable. Formal logic has a wrong name. It +is not formal, but transcendental. It shares the common prejudice that +there are absolutely contradictory things or irreconcilable opposites, +that there are essential differences which have no connection, no bridge +between them, nothing in common. It teaches that contradictions cannot +exist, and contradicts itself by clinging to the belief that there are +irreconcilable contradictions. It teaches that a thing which contradicts +itself is inconceivable, is not true, and thus reveals that it is not +well informed on the formality of contradictions, on the true +conciliation of contradictions, and on universal truth. Gold is not +sheet iron, that is true enough. Whoever calls gold sheet metal or +sheet metal gold, contradicts himself. In the actual world both things +are separated. Yet they are not separated to such extent that gold and +sheet iron do not partake of the same nature, of the nature of all +metal. Gold and sheet iron are unlike metals, but they have the same +metallic likeness. That like things are different and different things +alike, that it is everywhere only a question of the degree of +difference, of formal differences, this is overlooked by "formal" logic +and by all who seek truth in any logical diagram or fetich, instead of +in the eternal, omnipresent existence of the inseparable universe. + +Our logic deals with truth or with the universe, which contains the most +sublime gods and the meanest deviltry, in other words, which contains +everything. In the world truth there is contained error, pretense, lies, +just as death also lives in it. In other words, error, pretense, lies, +death are only phenomena, formalities, passing trifles or things which +are nothing compared to the one thing, that thing of all things, which +is being, truth, life. + +The understanding of the one living world truth is so greatly aggravated +by the so-called contradictions which it contains. We find for instance +that where one thing ends another begins. The end of the one is the +beginning of another. Every beginning is at the same time an end. Both +are contained in one another, and yet in our minds beginning and end are +separated. We find the beginning and the end everywhere and nowhere. Or +look into space. You do not see any boundary, and yet your vision +reaches only a certain distance. Your vision is bounded and yet there is +no boundary to be seen. Or look at life. Death soon arrives, and yet a +closer look shows that death is not really death, for "a new life arises +from the ruins." The world proves to be the eternal life which does not +know death. It is a contradiction to say that death lives, but this +contradiction can be solved by the understanding that the difference +between life and death, however great, is still a formal one, a +difference which like all other differences is reduced to relative +insignificance by the infinite cosmic life. + +There exists a widely diffused school, if this term may be applied to +the unschooled, that preaches patience in the matter of the +systematization of our thoughts or the enlightenment of our intellect, +and though it no longer hopes for a mysterious revelation, yet founds +its faith on natural science which has explained so many things to us +and which is finally supposed to throw light on the "last questions of +all knowledge." But I can easily convince you that the new countries, +plants, animals. Esquimaux, that may be discovered on polar expeditions, +or the inventions which Edison may perhaps make on the field of +electricity, or the experiences which future astronomers may gather in +regard to suns, moons, and comets, while they may add valuable +contributions to science and life, will yet do little toward a correct +general employment of our intellect or to a universal enlightenment of +the human brain. On the other hand, an enlightenment as to the nature +and meaning of contradictions will spread light to the remotest corners +of imagination, into the heavens and eternity, into the existence of the +whole, the unity and difference of all things. + +The most drastic, and perhaps the most instructive, illustration of the +correct meaning of contradictions is given by the contrast between +truth and untruth. These two poles are perhaps more widely separated +than the North Pole and the South Pole, and yet they are as intimately +connected as these two. The commonplace logic will hardly listen to the +demonstration of the unity of such apparently wide opposites as truth +and untruth. Therefore you will pardon me, if I illustrate this example +by others, for instance by the contrast between day and night. Take it +that the day lasts twelve hours and the night likewise. Day and night +are opposites. Where there is day cannot be any night, and yet day and +night constitute one single day of twenty-four hours, in which they both +dwell harmoniously. It is the same with truth and untruth. The world is +the truth, and error, pretense, and lies are embodied in it, are parts +of the actual world, just as night is a part of day without confusing +logic. We may honestly speak of genuine pretense and true lies, without +any contradiction. Just as unreason has still some reason left, so +untruth still lives inevitably in truth, because the latter is +all-embracing, is the universe. + +"Contradictions cannot exist." But confused brains full of +contradictions nevertheless exist. Knives without handles and blades, +two mountains without a valley between them, and other nonsense, exist +as a phrase. There are two kinds of contradictions: Senseless ones and +very sensible ones. Yea, the whole world[5] is an infinite and +inexhaustible contradiction, which contains innumerable sensible +statements and misstatements, which never disappear and yet may be +solved harmoniously by the help of time and reason. + +From this it follows that the formal criteria of truth which are on +everybody's tongue, such as the identity of thought with its object, and +the absence of all contradictions, do not furnish a basis at all for the +analysis of truth and cannot define it, except in an ignorant and +roguish way. + +Since the prophet Daniel scattered ashes in the temple and unmasked the +servants of Baal, other idol worshippers have continued to stimulate the +people to daily sacrifices, in order to steal the victuals at night. +This continual rascality and its repeated exposure has blunted the +desire of the people to serve truth, so that a great many have become +frivolous and indifferent. This rascally logic, not to mention +ignorance, encourages the frivolous and indifferent in their godless +departure from truth. In the pulpit and in the garb of science it +preaches the vanity and inadequacy of research. This is preached not as +a dogma, but as a logical science, and thus the senseless contradiction +is committed of trying to prove truly by the help of the intellect that +the intellect is too limited to grasp the truth and prove it. + +In its historical course logical research once arrived at such a result +in good faith. This happened in the famous "Critique of Reason" of +Immanuel Kant. Our shrewd friends of darkness now seek to utilize the +fame of this work, to which it is entitled on account of its great +contribution toward the elucidation of cosmic truth, for the purpose of +preventing on the strength of it a progress of enlightenment beyond the +standpoint of Kant. + +By the way, Kant has demonstrated that the truth in general is as much a +matter of experience as the brain with which we search for it. He has +shown beyond a doubt that our eyes and ears are inseparably connected +with our mind and with the whole cosmic truth. But the persistent spirit +of transcendentalism, or what is the same thing, the traditional belief +in the transcendental spirit, has led him to grant a mysterious +existence alongside of or above the human mind, alongside of or above +the cosmic truth, to an incomprehensible monster spirit and to a +fantastical hyper-truth. + +The Kantian critique of reason did not understand the universality of +truth. It still affirmed the existence of two worlds and two truths +without any unity. And as it is the curse of the evil deed to generate +more evil, it produced two intellects. (1) The poor little subservient +intellect of man, and (2) the enormous and abnormal intellect of the +_Lord_, who is supposed to understand the incomprehensible and to untie +the most senseless contradictions like so many knots. + +The truth which is the universe, the cosmic or universal truth, will +reveal to you the absurdity of abnormal humility which is contained in +the dualistic doctrine of the two minds. Of course, the philosopher Kant +had a greater intellect than Peter Simple. But nevertheless all +intellects partake of the nature of the general intellect, and no +intellect can step above or below this general nature without losing +sense or reason. One cannot speak of another, higher, faculty of thought +than that acquired by man through experience without dropping from logic +to absurdity. No doubt the animal world possesses something similar to +intellect. No doubt, also, the animal mind may be separated from the +human mind by some special name, for instance "instinct." No doubt, +furthermore, our reason is strengthened by culture from generation to +generation. But that anywhere and at any time there should come into +existence a faculty of thought which would stand outside of the cosmic +interconnection, that is an absurd conception and a senseless thing. +Just as necessarily as all water has one and the same nature, that of +being wet, just so necessarily every intelligence and every thought +partakes of the general nature of thought and must logically be a part, +a particular part, of the one universal and empirical world. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] Religion denotes here as much as conception of the world and +explanation of its last questions; and metaphysics stands here for +everything conceivable, which meaning embraces more than the mere +tangible.--EDITOR. + +[5] When we consider its many parts as such.--EDITOR. + + + + +NINTH LETTER + + +Repetition, my dear Eugene, is the mother of all study. + +Logic aims to teach you the proper use of the intellect, not only in +this or that branch of study, but in the general branch of truth. Its +result is the following precept: In all things always remember the +universal interrelation. + +In order to illustrate this statement a little, let me point out that in +the period of scholasticism thinking was practiced without any +interconnection with the rest of the world, merely by brown study. The +present age of natural sciences then cultivated a better method. But the +method of the natural sciences has not succeeded so far in being applied +to the field of law, morals, politics, psychology, and philosophy, +because the logical understanding of the total interrelation of the +indivisible world truth was lacking, because the concept of truth was +enveloped in darkness, and because the privileged classes have a great +interest in maintaining darkness. + +For this reason, the true method of reasoning still requires many +explanations. The socialist, for instance, is charged with inciting the +people, with promising more than he can keep and with sowing strife in +the hearts of men. Those who make this charge in the commonplace sense, +tear two things, viz., peace and strife, out of their due connection. As +a matter of fact, peace and strife must always dwell together. A nation +whose peace were not intermingled with a certain strife, would be a +nation of sluggards. Thanks to the strife in their breasts, the nations +are progressive and stirring. Motion is the essence of the world, and +national motion is inconceivable without the striving of men. For the +sake of development and culture, nations must always demand more than +they can immediately attain. On the other hand, striving of this sort is +not sufficient. One must not demand more than one can obtain, nor +promise more than one can give. For this reason the logical socialist +must know that even in the future society the trees will not grow into +the clouds, and that the peace for which we hope and strive will always +be mixed with strife. The music of the future, although more harmonious +than the music of the present, will nevertheless be eternally marred by +disharmony. There is nothing perfect in the world, because only the +whole universe is perfect, because the universe alone is perfectness +itself. + +Eternal peace, as the warriors may justly claim, is an illusion, so long +as we think of peace in a transcendental way and as being separated from +strife. But the sons of the war god who would like to continue the +thunder of cannons and the rattle of sabers eternally, are no less the +victims of illusion, if not something worse. Eternal is only war in +peace and peace in war, although that may seem senseless to the +logicians of the old school. Thus even the inevitable war will become +more peaceful and humane in the course of time. The barbarian form of +war, of which the Prussians are masters, is not destined to last +forever, unless we speak of the illogical eternity of the preacher which +opens its doors by leaving the temporal world. In defending the social +war, I wish to have it understood that neither the conceptions nor the +things called war and peace are separated by a Chinese wall. + +Everything is interconnected and interdependent. It is true that strife +and animosities may be exaggerated, and so may peace. But whatever blame +attaches to this, refers only to the exaggeration. It is not the +animosity, but the excessive animosity which deserves censure. By +recognizing the logical interconnection between peace and strife, the +dispute of the parties is rendered saner. There is then no longer a +question of a yawning chasm between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, +but of something about which an agreement is possible, viz., how much +there is of either. + +As peace and war in the human breast, so all variety intermingles in the +cosmic unit. In the novel "_Homo Sum_," by Ebers, the monk Paulus, who +tasted the delights of the preliminary celestial ecstasy when +castigating his body, says: "I truly believe that it is just as +difficult on this globe to find pain without joy as joy without pain." +And Till Eulenspiegel, that type of a practical joker, showed an +understanding of dialectics when he lightened the difficulty of +ascending a mountain by the reflection that the descent on the other +side would be so much easier. Logic is no more senseless in teaching +that all things, even the most opposite, are of the same substance than +it is in showing that night belongs to day and weeds to herbs. + +In order that these petty illustrations may not confuse your mind, it +should be remembered that the essential point is the elucidation of the +great contradiction between mind and matter, between thinking and being, +which includes all petty contradictions. + +In order to think in accordance with logical consistency, you must not +regard a thing as something independent, but consider everything as +fluid particles of the same substance, which is the thing of all things, +the world, the truth, and life. + +Our logic is therefore the science of truth. This truth is neither above +nor below, neither in Jerusalem nor in Jericho, neither in the spirit +nor in the flesh, but everywhere. + +Our logic is the science of understanding. It teaches that you must not +search for understanding by cudgeling your brain, but only in connection +with experience, with the interrelation of things. + +Since man in his experience also meets errors, science was dominated for +centuries by the question whether truth and experience are not two +different things, whether all our experience is only an illusion of our +senses. Cartesius replied to this: "No; the belief in a perfect, true +being cannot admit of such a delusion." By substituting the concept of +truth for the concept of God, we are certain that the world of +experience is not a ghost, but the most actual reality. + +Although the great Kant called the cosmic truth a phenomenon, because he +could not divest his mind of transcendental faith, of the faith in a +transcendental truth, still we know today that all distinctions which +are ever made constitute but a nibbling at the universal unit. As +necessarily as all variety in baking produces bakery wares, just as +necessarily heaven and earth, and everything connected with them, are +parts of the indivisible truth which is also called nature, cosmos, +universe, God, and experience. Language gives to its darling truth many +different pet names, just as a happy mother calls her heart's treasure +by a thousand endearing terms. + +Feuerbach reasons in this fashion: "If God is not a personal being +different from nature and man, then he is an entirely superfluous +being.... The use of the word God which is always combined with the +conception of a separate being, is a disturbing and confusing abuse. Why +do you want to be a theist, if you are a naturalist, or a naturalist if +you are a theist? Away with this contradiction! Where God is confounded +with nature, or nature with God, there is neither God nor nature, but a +mystical amphibious hermaphrodite." + +Feuerbach is right. The name of God is much abused. But truth is also +blasphemed by negation and frivolousness. The sober understanding that +God, truth, nature, are various names for the same thing permits us to +play with them without despairing of the matter. Indeed, this play of +words serves to make the subject clear. + +But logic demands that we recognize truth as the absolute, as the power, +the force, and the glory, which comprises all logical and illogical +distinctions, together with the things to be distinguished, even the +faculty of distinguishing itself. + +Such an understanding of the absolute, such world wisdom, will not make +you conceited, because it makes you conscious of the fact that your +understanding has grasped celestial truth which at the same time is +terrestrial, only in a very general way. You possess nothing but a +definition of truth. And without denying that definitions are valuable +and instructive, I, at the same time, point out that you know very +little about astronomy when you know that it is the science of the +stars. No matter, therefore, how clearly I may have defined truth, we +require for its complete understanding all the details of science, and +that is too much for me, for you, and for any individual human being. + +Just as our vision never exhausts the visible, because the eye sees an +object but does not fully penetrate it, just so can the intellect never +fully understand and fathom the absolute all, the truth, or God. But we +can understand and fathom individual truths, parts of the universal +truth. What understanding grasps is not the truth itself, but yet it is +true understanding. + + + + +TENTH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +My previous lectures instructed you as to the very trivial fact that the +thought is a part of the world. In proceeding from the part to the +whole, I passed logically from the mouth of the river to its source. The +universe is the maternal womb of the intellect as of all things. + +It occurs to me that you or some teacher of logic might accuse my +letters of lack of logic. It may seem that these lectures fail to +present the subject matter in a strictly systematized form. You will, +please, excuse this in part with the fact that they appear in the form +of letters. This form demands that the contents should be logically +arranged and rounded off in each letter. It should furthermore serve as +an excuse for any defect, that my subject is not a finished one, not +perfectly elaborated by others before me. I am here not merely a +lecturer, but also an explorer on a field which, though much +investigated, yet is still rather obscure. + +The conclusion of my last letter explained that the use of the term God +for the universe has much to recommend it and much to disqualify it. But +it is easily apparent that the universe with its absolute qualities is +closely related to that infinite being of whom Jakob Boehme, the +philosophical shoemaker, said: "He is neither the light nor the +darkness, neither love nor anger, but the eternal One.... Hence all +forces are merely one sole force." + +That nothing exists outside of the universe, that everything is +contained in the All, that the All, with all real and imagined beings, +is everything, that it is neither sweet nor sour, neither great nor +small, but just everything and all, this statement is as obvious as the +often and long repeated statement of identity: A equals A. + +The All is omnipotent, omnipresent, all-wise. This last term might be +questioned, since the universe is not a dummy with a monster head and +giant brain. For this very reason it was considered inappropriate to +apply the name of God to the universe, because that creates the +impression of a personal being. The All thinks only by means of human +brains, and for this reason omniscience cannot be anything but common +human knowledge. Of course, you, I, and every other man, are very +limited in our knowledge. But still we may indulge in the hope that the +things which we do not know are known by other men or will be discovered +by future generations, so that the collective human mind will know +everything that is knowable. We cannot see everything that is visible; +there are animals that can see even better than we can. But since even +the most intelligent animal is supposed to lack the highest degree of +intelligence, reason and science, there is no one who knows anything +except the human race. Mankind is omniscient. But since all our science +is derived only from the world, mankind is only the formal bearer of +intelligence, and it belongs to the fountain of all things, to eternal +nature. Our wisdom is the wisdom of nature, is world wisdom. Although +there may be inhabitants of the moon and of other stars who may know +things which are unknown to us, still that is in the first place a mere +speculation of little value, and in the second place universal +omniscience or the omniscient universe would not in the least be +affected thereby. It is a reasonable use of the language to regard human +wisdom as the only and omniscient wisdom, just as all natural and wet +water is called water without any further modification. I believe in the +statement of Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things." Whoever +uses a different measure, uses a superhuman, transcendental measure.[6] + +Hence, when I call the cosmic essence of all existence omnipotent, you +will not think of a senseless magic power which forges knives without +handles and blades, nor will you read any transcendental meaning into my +use of the term omniscience. + +Omniscience belongs obviously under the head of logic, because the organ +of science and wisdom is the object of the study of logic. And it must +now be stated that the human mind does not only exceed the animal mind +by far, but is also the _non plus ultra_ of all minds. But it must be +retained that this mind can only be whatever it is in connection with +the divine universe which I may also be permitted to call worldly deity. +This name is fitting because it is a means of understanding that in the +first place no monster mind rules the world, and in the second place the +natural universe is not a mere sum of all things, but truth and life. + +Of course, the identification of the universe with the religious God is +only a comparison, and comparisons are lame. Still we may compare the +sun with an eternal lamp or the moon with a candle, or the German prime +minister with a butler. + +Logic shall teach you that everything which may be distinguished by the +faculty of understanding is of the same kind, everything is of common +clay, but the whole is sublimely elevated above all that is commonplace. +Mere frivolous atheism, as created by the free-thinkers, is not +sufficient. A bare denial of God always creates some other idol worship. +The positive understanding of the divine world truth is an indispensable +requirement for the radical extermination of all idol worship. + +Logic must begin with the sublime, infinite, absolute. All logical, +consistent or interconnected thinking must take its departure from it. +The so-called scientific research after temporal causes, after the egg +from which the chicken was hatched, after the hen from which the egg +came, after the kindred organisms which developed the hen by natural +selection and adaption according to Darwin, this is a very valuable +research without which we can never understand the world process. But +nevertheless, such research must not satisfy the thinking man. Logic +demands from everybody that he or she should search for the highest, for +the cause of all causes. Whoever feels the desire to bring logical order +into his consciousness, must know that the finite and infinite, the +relative and the absolute, the special truths and the one general truth, +are contained in one another. + +Logical thought as demanded by science means nothing but to be aware of +the final cause, the absolute foundation of all thought. This foundation +is the universe, an attribute of which is the external and internal +human head. The thousand year old dispute between the materialists and +the idealists turns on the question whether the spirit is material or +the world spiritual. Our answer is plain and clear: They both belong +together, they together make up the one thing, the thing of all things. +Mind and matter are two attributes of the same substance. They may be +compared the same as fish and flesh, the former being called very +appropriately by some African tribes "water flesh." In this way, matter +and mind are two kinds of meat of a different and yet of the same +nature. + +I remember reading in a satirical paper the question: "What is a +gentleman? Answer: A gentleman is a loafer with money, and a loafer is a +gentleman without money." Just as these two types of men are essentially +alike and differ only in the small matter of money, so you should +remember that there are no essential differences, that all differences +are merely matters of attributes and qualities of the same absolute +world substance. To distinguish correctly and logically, that is the +point which logic is aiming to teach us. To make distinctions is the +function which is also called perceiving, knowing, understanding, +comprehending. When you consider that this function is innate in man, +and that man together with his faculty of understanding is innate in +nature, then you recognize all distinctions and the distinguished +objects as attributes of the undistinguished One, of the absolute, +compared to which all things are only relative things, in other words, +attributes. + +I am endeavoring to make clear to you that logical thinking requires the +awakening of the consciousness of the one supreme general nature. And +you must not think of this sum of all existence in the stupid way in +which people used to think of the animal kingdom before Darwin, but +regard the world as a living organic unit, from which the faculty of +understanding has blossomed the same as all other things. In the logic +of the narrow-minded, all animal species are widely separated, without +any living interconnection, while Darwin has demonstrated the uniform +process, the intermingling life in multiform creation. The illustration +of this famous zoologist of the transition from one species to another +may serve as an example of the logical transitions in the world process, +in which all differences are but undulations. All our classifications +must always remember the undivided basis on which they are resting. + +We have shown that the intellect divides the universal nature, +classifies and analyzes it, and we have learned of the universal nature +that it not only furnishes to the intellect the material for its work, +but also that the world comprises within its general process the +intellectual process, that the intellectual movement is a specialization +of the natural movement. + +The world is not only the object, but also the subject of understanding, +it understands, it dissects its own multiplicity by means of the human +intellect. Our wisdom is world wisdom in a two-fold sense: The world is +that which is being understood, classified, analyzed, and at the same +time it is that which, by the help of our intellect, practices +understanding, classification, etc. When I call the human mind the +cosmic mind, the mind of the supreme being, I wish to have it understood +that there is nothing mysterious about this, that I merely intend to +show that thought or intelligence can only operate in the universal +cosmic interconnection, that it is not an abnormal and transcendental +thing, but a thing like all other things. + +You must not conceive of the spirit as the producer of truth, as a +little god, but only as a means. The true god, the divine truth, has our +intellect for an attribute. The latter does not produce truth, but only +the understanding of truth. It produces only pictures of truth which are +all more or less perfect. Of course, it is not at all immaterial whether +we produce a more or less faithful, a true or a false picture of truth, +but still this is, at present and for us here, a secondary matter. The +main thing is to know that truth, or nature, is far above all pictures, +and still consists of parts, of forms, which together constitute the +whole. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[6] Please note the additional explanation on page 77.--EDITOR. + + + + +ELEVENTH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Johannes Scherr relates in the "Gartenlaube," a German family paper, in +an article entitled "Mahomet and His Work," that insane doctrinarians +are searching for people without religion. This has not succeeded, it is +said, although the spark of religious feeling is glowing very dimly in +peoples that are close to the animal. But nevertheless, he continues, +the expressions of religious feeling mark the boundary line where the +beast ceases and man begins. For just as in the higher stages of +civilization religion means the consciousness of the finite of being one +with the infinite, so in the lower stages of civilization the indefinite +impulse is felt by man to connect his special nature with the universal +nature and bring them into harmony. This is idealism, the idealistic +need. It is obvious that, and why, the people have always and everywhere +sought and found satisfaction for their idealistic longings in religion. +But, adds the shrewd observer, I must remark that I do not refer to the +shifting population when I say "people," for sad to relate, that +population is torn away from all connection with natural conditions. I +refer to the "settled, the permanent, the true people." + +This quotation shows that a champion of the "true people" is in conflict +with true logic. In dividing a population into shifting and settled +people, one should retain as a basis the logical consciousness that all +classes of people are embraced by one class; furthermore, that human, +monkey, ant, and other nations are parts of the one and the same nation; +until finally man and animal, real and imaginary, with all religious and +godless things, are ultimately fused in the world unit and can never be +"torn away from all connection with natural conditions." + +All distinctions must logically be based on the consciousness of the +absolute and universal unity, of the interconnection of all things. For +this reason some pious people, with their God in whom everything is +living and has its being, have more logic than some freethinkers of the +class of Johannes Scherr who have no coherence in their method of +thought. The faithful think more logically than the narrowly skeptical, +for they begin and end with God. But still they cannot think quite +logically, because they cannot establish any logical connection between +their eternally perfect Lord and evil, the devil, disease, misery, sin, +in short all the sufferings and vanities here below. + +The unit of nature, the infinite, is the quintessence of logic. Neither +natural science in the narrow sense of the word, nor metaphysics, nor +formal logic, can give any clue as to the nature of this thing of +things. This can be done only by a science of understanding which +recognizes matter and mind and all opposites and contradictions as +formalities of the universe. How can a man who is out of touch with the +mass of the shifting population feel that he is one with the universe? +Whoever regards any special class as the true people, has no +understanding either of the common people or of the absolute universe. + +Proletarian logic teaches not only the equality of all human beings, but +universal equality. And mark well, this universal equality does not +conflict with variety any more than a variety of pots and jugs conflicts +with the unity of vessels, or the manifold forms of bretzels and rolls +with the unity of bakery ware. + +The enemies of democratic development, in attacking the idea of freedom +and equality, point to the manifoldness of nature, the individual +differences of men, the distinctions between weak and strong, wise and +fools, men and women, and consider it tyranny to attempt to equalize +that which nature has made different. They cannot understand that like +things may be different and different things alike. They are blinded by +their class logic which sees only the differences, but not the unity, +not the transfusion of all classes. + +Class logic teaches that contradictory things cannot exist. According to +it, a thing cannot be genuine and false at the same time. This class +logic has a narrow conception of existence. It has only observed that +there are many different things in nature, but has overlooked the fact +that all these things have also a general nature. We, on the other hand, +recognize that every thing, every person, is a part of the infinite +world and partakes of its general nature, is eternal and perishable, +true and untrue, great and small, one sided and manyfold, in short +contradictory. + +Before and after Socrates, philosophy and religion have searched for the +genuine, right, good, true, and beautiful, but have reached no +harmonious results. But it cannot be denied that in the course of the +centuries the problem has become clearer and clearer. The great names of +Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Cartesius, Spinoza, +Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, are milestones on the highway of this progress. +The evolution is apparent, but the interrelation between the +intellectual and physical, and especially between intellectual and +economic evolution, is much ignored. The bridge between mind and body +was not found, and philosophical evolution has been regarded up to our +day as a purely mental process accomplished by one or two dozen of +famous brains. I wish to point out to you now, that proletarian logic is +the continuation of the preceding research after the genuine, true, +good, and beautiful. It teaches how to conceive of these ideals +logically, and it has not so much proceeded from any one talented +brain, but is rather the product of the entire cosmic process. + +Philosophical brains have developed the science of logical thought only +to the extent that the material development of the world has stimulated +them to do so. You must regard the human brains only as secondary levers +of the universal lever which is not only genuine, true, good, and +beautiful, but truth, goodness, and beauty itself, or the world and the +absolute. + +The understanding of the absolute which is called "good Lord," and then +again "the bad world," in other words the selfsufficient cosmos, is very +inconvenient to the wisdom of the professors, and they are attempting to +assign it to a special study which they call "metaphysics." This +division of labor is not introduced for the purpose of making research +more productive, but of surrounding this study by mysterious darkness. +The professors who lecture to the young people on formal logic set aside +the ancient research after the true, the good, the beautiful, and try to +place these ideals outside of the light of science in order to be able +to preserve them unchanged in the tabernacle of faith. + +This charge may seem unjust, because the learned gentlemen reserved a +corner for the true, the good, and the beautiful in their metaphysical +department. But there is something peculiar about this. The great Kant +has asked the plain question: "Is metaphysics practicable as a science?" +Answer: No! The transcendental truth, etc., sought by metaphysics, and +named God, freedom, immortality in Christian language, cannot be found +by any reason. But being a child of his time, the great philosopher +makes a small concession to the transcendental. + +He teaches: Although transcendental truth cannot be located +scientifically, still the religious faith in its existence is wholesome. +We, in our time, think more soberly about this theory of salvation and +accept the elimination of all transcendentalism from science. While the +spokesmen of the "true people" would like to hide their exalted truth, +freedom, and immortality behind the curtains of temples, we throw the +full daylight of logic on the absolute truth, goodness, and beauty of +the material world. + +Logic as the science of correct thought cannot be restricted to any one +object, it cannot exclude any object, whether terrestrial or heavenly, +from its sphere. The great lights of present day learning do not wish to +subordinate the intellect as the object of the logical department, and +absolute truth as the object of the metaphysical department, to one +another, but to co-ordinate them side by side. + +But two co-ordinated things which are not subordinated to a third higher +thing lack logic, and the brain which is satisfied by such a condition +suffers from disorder. Logical truth must inevitably be a part of +absolute truth, and it is our duty to remove absolute truth from the +field of metaphysics, of transcendentalism, and to transfer it to the +sober world which forms an inseparable unit with the human mind. + +So much for the proletarian duty to continue the research after the +true, the good, and the beautiful which was the object of the +philosophers before and after Socrates. But remember that I am referring +only to the truly good, beautiful, etc., which is contained in the +universal truth of all true specifications. The question of the +ethically good, the esthetically beautiful and the absolutely perfect is +as necessarily contained in the question of the universal truth as red, +blue, and green in the rainbow, of course only in an abstract sense. + +Our logic which has for its object the truth of the universe, is the +science of the understanding of the universe, a science of universal +understanding or conception of the world. It teaches that the +interrelation of all things is truth and life, is the genuine, right, +good, and beautiful. All the sublime moving the heart of man, all the +sweet stirring his breast, is the universal nature or the universe. But +the vexing question still remains: What about the negative, the ugly, +the evil, what about error, pretense, standstill, disease, death, and +the devil? + +True, the world is vain, evil, ugly. But these are merely accidental +phenomena, only forms and appendages of the world. Its eternity, truth, +goodness, beauty, is substantial, existing, positive. Its negative is +like the darkness which serves to make the light more brilliant, so that +it may overcome the dark and shine so much more brightly. + +The spokesmen of the ruling classes are not open for such a sublime +optimism, because they have the pessimistic duty of perpetuating misery +and servitude. + + + + +TWELFTH LETTER + + +Logic, the science of correct thought, demands in the first place true, +or in other words, reasonable thought. Logic deals with reason and +truth. + +These two things have been endowed with a mysterious nature, while they +obviously belong to the entire universe and its tangible nature. Reason +and truth are not separated from the other things, are not things in +themselves. There is no such thing. Philosophers who have looked for +them in the depths of the human brain with their hands over their eyes +and engaged in brown study, were on the wrong road. Proletarian logic +differs from conventional logic in that it does not look for reason and +truth behind the curtains of temples, nor in the brains of the learned, +but it discovers them in the actual interconnection of all things and +processes of nature. + +Preachers, professors, judges, and politicians are the leaders of "the +wise men of Gotham," and since we have all passed our youth among them, +we find it difficult to get rid of their confused logic. + +We owe much of our better insight to the famous philosophers. These men +had many an eccentric notion, but on the whole they were reasonable +fellows who followed the doctrine of the unreliability of the senses and +the faith in the hidden truth and reason more in a theoretical than in a +practical way. In practice they operated with open eyes and ears. Thus +correct logic, although confused by queer notions, has been handed down +to us from generation to generation. Preachers, professors, judges, and +politicians cling to the confused notions, while we take the liberty to +discard them. + +Now we recognize not only that reason and truth are connected with the +world, but also that the universe is the supreme reason and truth, is +that being which religion and philosophy have long been looking for, the +most perfect being, which Plato called the true, good and beautiful, +Kant God, freedom, and immortality, and Hegel the absolute. + +If he is an atheist who denies that perfection can be found in any +individual, then I am an atheist. And if he is a believer in God who has +the faith in the "most perfect being" with which not alone the +theologists, but also Cartesius and Spinoza have occupied themselves so +much, then I am one of the true children of God. + +The abuse of sublime feelings and exalted ideas has filled many hearts +with disgust, so that they care no longer for any unctuous sermons. The +mere flavor of religion is odious to them. Nevertheless I assure you +that we shall never get rid of idol worship, unless we understand the +supreme being, reason or truth, in its true nature. + +"Understand" is a mysterious word. To bring light into the mystery of +understanding by a clear theory of understanding, is an integral part of +the science of thought, of logic. + +Permit me to compare the faculty of understanding with a photographic +apparatus, by the help of which you strive to obtain a picture of the +cosmic truth. Then you will see at a glance that in this way we can +obtain but a dim picture of the whole. The object appears boundless, too +infinitely great and sublime to permit of copying. And yet we can +approach it. Although we cannot get a true picture of universal truth, +yet we can obtain clear pictures of individual truths, in other words, +we can picture the infinite in its parts. By the help of your +intellect, you can grasp the infinite by means of limitation. + +Absolute truth appears to us in relative phenomena. The perfect being is +composed of imperfect parts. A "wise man of Gotham" may regard this as a +senseless contradiction. But we can separate the arms, legs, head, and +trunk from one another, and so separated they will be mere parts of a +corpse, while connected they certainly possess the chance of vitality. +Life is composed of the dead, the most perfect being is composed of +imperfect parts. In the universal truth everything is contained. It is +the perfect being, it includes the whole existence, even the imperfect. +The false, the ugly, the evil, the nasty are involved in the true, the +good, the beautiful. The universal existence is the absolute truth, the +whole is composed of relativities, of parts, of phenomena. Our +understanding, our instrument of thought, is likewise an imperfect part +of the perfect being. Our intellect produces only a dim, imperfect +picture of the absolute, but it reproduces true pictures of its parts, +although pictures only. + +There are good and bad, adequate and inadequate, true and false thoughts +and understanding. But there are no absolutely true thoughts. All our +conceptions and ideas are imperfect pictures of the most perfect being +which is inexhaustible in great things as in small things, as a whole +and in parts. Every part of nature is a natural part of the infinite. + +I repeat: All parts or things of this world have, apart from their +imperfect nature as parts, also the world nature of the absolute being. +They are imperfect perfections. Our intellect is no exception. The human +mind is the only mind having the name of reason, and is the most +perfect reason which can possibly exist. In the same way, the water of +this earth is the non plus ultra of all water. The belief in another and +different mind, in a monster mind, belongs to the same transcendental +category as the belief in a celestial river without the nature of water +flowing around the castle of Zion. Even the most perfect mind is nothing +else, and cannot be anything else, but an imperfect part of the absolute +world being. + +The first thing a student of correct thought has to learn is to +distinguish true thought from false thought, and for this purpose he +must know above all that distinction must not be exaggerated. All +differences can only be relative. The bad and the good pictures belong +to the same family, and all families finally belong to the absolute, are +individuals of the universe. + +For the purpose of distinguishing true thoughts from false, it should be +remembered that the true thought is only a part of the truth, a part +which does not exaggerate its own importance, but subordinates itself to +the absolute. + +The following illustration may explain this. Although astronomy teaches +that the earth revolves daily around its axis and that the sun is +standing still, it nevertheless knows that the fixed state of the sun is +only a relative truth, so that from a higher point of view both the +earth and the sun are revolving. The consciousness of its relative truth +alone makes the statement of the sun's standstill true. Again, when the +farmer sees that the earth is fixed and that the sun is moving every day +from East to West, he is mistaken only so far as he regards his +standpoint as the whole truth, his farmers' knowledge for absolute +knowledge. The knowledge of the absolute alone enables you to +distinguish correctly between truth and error. Whoever sees the sun +turning around the earth with the consciousness that this revolution is +but a partial truth is not in error, but sees truly. The knowledge of +the absolute truth clears up error and instructs us as to the method of +correct thought. This thought makes us apt, humble, and tolerant in +judging. + +The "wisest of men" was very proud of his modesty in knowing that he +knew nothing. His example may well be recommended to-day. Although we +have learned a great deal, we know very little compared to the +inexhaustible fountain of all wisdom, good mother nature. We learn every +day, but we never learn all there is to learn. What was to the credit of +Socrates, was his firm faith in the truth, his conviction of its +existence, and his faith in the mission of the human intellect to search +for truth. + +On the contrary, the sophists confused and disputed everything. They +frivolously flouted all truth and research. This same frivolousness now +relies upon Kant who, misled by the prejudice of his time, removed truth +to a transcendental world and therefore deprecatingly called our actual +world the "world of phenomena." In distinction from him, our logic +teaches that the phenomena of this world without exception are parts of +the one truth, and that the true art of understanding consists in +studying the parts. + +The doctrine of the sophists to the effect that everything may be denied +and disputed has a certain similarity with ours in that we declare that +the universe is the truth and all parts of it true parts, that smoke and +fog, reason and imagination, dreams and realities, subject and object, +are true parts of the world. They are not the whole truth, but still +true. For this reason it is well to call your attention to the +difference between the sophistical and the logical method of thought. +The contemporaries of Socrates are still alive to-day. They are teaching +in the name of God and believe in nothing, while to us truth, every day +naked and sober truth, is sacred. + + + + +THIRTEENTH LETTER + + +In his "Three Books On The Soul," Aristotle discussed at length the +question whether the human soul has five senses or one. The commentator, +J. H. von Kirchmann, the publisher of the "Philosophical Library," +remarks in his footnote 172 that man has six senses. He divides feeling +into pure and active feeling. According to this, the phrase of the five +senses belongs to the old iron the same as that of the four elements. +Now neither you, nor I, nor any reader should worry about the question +whether all sensation may be summed up in the one sense of feeling, +whether there are five senses according to Aristotle, or six according +to Kirchmann, or whether there is even a seventh sense for the +transcendental, the organ of which, as some optimists hope, will +gradually be developed with the growing perfection of man. We are +concerned in this matter only so far as it is connected with the +cardinal question, whether the world is only one thing or a mere +collection of an infinite number of disconnected things; whether the +so-called things are independent subjects and objects, or whether they +are only predicates of the one world subject. + +Looking through the window I see the river, the street, the bridge, +houses, and trees. Everything is a thing in itself and yet is connected +inseparably with all others. The qualities of the world are regarded by +the intellect as subjects; but the intelligent subject should also know +that its actions, its distinguishing and understanding, are formalities, +a formal dismemberment of the absolute, which in spite of all division +always remains the undivided whole. + +In order to master this method of thought, you must understand above all +that the things are only so-called things, but are in reality qualities +of the universe, in other words, relative things or predicates of the +absolute. You will then understand, that our thought has a right to make +one thing as well as six of a chair, its back, its seat, and its four +legs. You will recognize that the five senses of Aristotle are not an +eternal truth, but a classification, which is eternally variable. +Distinguishing means classifying. + +I know very well that I am making a bold statement here, and that it is +not easy to justify it. For this reason you must not expect that I can +make my meaning clear in a few sentences. It is not only the general +prejudice which prevents this by making a most mysterious and miraculous +thing of the intellectual function, but also the fact that this thing is +still very obscure, although it has become clearer and clearer in the +course of time. + +The freethinking pastor Hironymi writes on this point: "The most +prominent naturalists of the present, such as Dubois-Reymond, who are at +the same time thinkers, admit that they do not know what feeling, life, +consciousness, are, and how they arise. And this ignorance is far more +valuable for truth and religion than the alleged knowledge. Let us, +therefore, continue in the devotion with which we have hitherto admired +the universe without understanding it. The higher existence, the +consciousness, has not been explained, it has remained a miracle, the +only lasting, absolute, miracle." + +Thus speaks the preacher who is a know-nothing by nature and makes a +business of admiring and wondering, while we are interested in +understanding and knowing. We wish to fathom the mystery, and hence I +may write still more letters on logic and you may study some more. + +I shall try to demonstrate by a trivial example, how it is that +understanding or distinguishing is based on classification. + +Take it that you awake at early dawn and notice in a corner of your bed +room something uncouth and moving which you cannot clearly distinguish. +To know that a phenomenon appears is not enough because the term +phenomenon applies to everything, natural and unnatural things, good and +evil spirits. Even if you are sufficiently enlightened to know that the +thing in question must be something natural, still this explains very +little, for the term "nature" again means everything. But you understand +or recognize more when you ascertain that the uncouth thing is dead or +alive, wall paper or garment, man or animal. You will notice that in +this intellectual enlightenment it is simply a matter of classification, +of the head under which the mystery should be classed. To classify the +phenomena of truth and life, means to understand, to use the intellect, +to enlighten the brain. + +But we must well consider how far we shall have to go in our +classification in order to find the place in the system which will fully +clarify and determine understanding. Suppose that in the above mentioned +case you have ascertained that the motion is due to a cat, then the +inquiring faculty of understanding has not yet reached the end of its +tether. The next question is then, whether it is your cat or that of +your neighbor, whether it is black, white, or grey, young or old. And +when you finally recognize that it is your tomcat Peter, you must +remember that the subject which understands as well as the object to be +recognized, being parts of the absolute, are absolutely and infinitely +divisible parts, which are never fully understood and never fully +exhausted. + +Please remember that in speaking of something uncouth, we are not so +much concerned in Peter or Tabby, but in the intellect which we desire +to understand so that we may make a correct use of it. And I refer to it +as uncouth merely because its understanding is beset with so many +difficulties. When I compared it in the preceding letter with a +photographic apparatus which should furnish us with pictures, and in +likening it now to an instrument designed to distinguish things by +classification, I warn you not to be confused thereby. Classification is +most essential as a means of producing intellectual pictures. In this +connection I emphasize once more that the faculty of understanding, the +same as other things, is not independent by itself, but can accomplish +something only in the universal interconnection. The understanding that +the phenomenon quoted above belongs to the category of tomcats, and more +especially into the column labeled Peter, would not be any +understanding at all, if you had not become previously acquainted with +the mouse-devouring race and individual in question. Only in connection +with your previous experience is the understanding that this tomcat and +the uncouth motion are one and the same thing, or belong to the same +category, a true understanding. + +Ludwig Feuerbach says: A talented writer is recognized by the fact that +he assumes talent on the part of the reader also and does not chew up +his subject into minute parts like a petty schoolmaster. On the other +hand, it seems to me that it is possible to assume too much, and I +pursued a schoolmasterly course in this case, because the subject is new +to you and still leaves plenty of room for reflection. + +I wanted to show by a commonplace example what I mean by insight and +understanding and how by means of it the unknown and uncouth becomes +known and familiar. True, the understanding in this case was illumined +by previous experience, while you are after new knowledge. You want to +know how enlightenment arises in order to acquire new insight. Now, all +novelty has the dialectic quality of being at the same time something +antiquated. New understanding can be acquired only by the help of old +understanding. In other words, old and new understanding, which I define +here as the faculty of classification, have their existence only in the +total interdependence of the universal existence. + +You must discard the old prejudice that knowledge can be collected like +cents. Although this is well enough, it does not suffice for the purpose +of logical thinking. One science belongs to another, and all of them +together belong to one class with the entire universe. It will be +apparent to you, then, that at the beginning of your young days your +knowledge has not sprouted all at once, but has come out of the unknown. +And what is true of you, is true of the whole human race. In its cradle +it was without intellect. It had, indeed, the germ. But do not beasts, +worms, and sensitive plants have that also? In short, the light of +perception and understanding is nothing new in the radical sense of the +word, but connected with the old and with the world in general, and of +the same kind. All our knowledge must be connected and combined into one +understanding, one system, one realm, and this is the realm of reality, +of truth, of life. + +Systematic classification is the task of logic. The first requirement +for this purpose is the awakened consciousness of the indivisibility of +the universe, of its universal unity. This consciousness is, in other +words, at the same time the recognition of the merely formal +significance of all scientific classification. + +The unity of the universe is true, and is the sole and innate truth. +That this sole world truth is full of differences, is just as absolutely +different as absolutely the same, does no more contradict a reasonable +unity and equality than there is any contradiction in the fact that the +various owls have different faces and still the same owl face. + +Aristotle divided the sense into five parts, anthropologists the race of +man into five races, natural philosophers the space into three +dimensions. It is now a question of showing to you that such a division, +however true and just, is nevertheless far from being truth and justice, +but is merely classification. The fundamental requirement of logic is to +designate scientific classifications as that which they are, viz., +mental operations. It is the business of the intellect to make +classifications. That is its characteristic quality and does not +contradict the indivisible truth in the least. + +Old wiseacres teach that a reasonable man must not contradict himself, +and this is a wise, though very narrow, lesson. Hegel maintains that +everything in the world is reasonable, hence the contradictions are +also. Under this conservative exterior there is hidden a very +revolutionary perception of which the "destructive" minds take advantage +in order to flatly contradict the wiseacres and their stable, dead, +disordered order which cannot stand any contradiction. + +Reason dissolves all contradictions and opposition into harmony by +logical classification. "Everything in its own time and place." If it +does not wish to be called unreason, reason must rise to the +understanding that its opposite is only a formal antagonism. It must +know that God and the world, body and soul, life and death, motion and +rest, and whatever else the dualists may distinguish, are two and yet +one. Then it becomes clear that the conservatives are the real +revolutionaries, because by their senseless adherence to the "good old +order" they drive the proletariat to desperation, until it upsets that +order. On the other hand, the maligned revolutionaries are conservative, +because they subordinate themselves to the world's evolutionary process +which was, is, and will be eternal. + +The red thread winding through all these letters deals with the +following points: The instrument of thought is a thing like all other +common things, a part or attribute of the universe. It belongs +particularly to the general category of being and is an apparatus which +produces a detailed picture of human experience by categorical +classification or distinction. In order to use this apparatus +correctly, one must fully grasp the fact that the world unit is +multiform and that all multiformity is a unit. + +It is the solution of the riddle of the ancient Eleatic philosophy: How +can the one be contained in the many, and the many in one? + + + + +FOURTEENTH LETTER + + +Shoemaking and beet culture are as much sciences as physics, chemistry, +and astronomy. Reading, writing, and reckoning are called elementary +knowledge, and though I do not deny that they have an elementary value +for the culture of the mind, yet I can truly say that I have met +well-informed people who could neither read nor write. I wish to +indicate by this that there are indeed high and low degrees of knowledge +and science, but that such graduations have only a temporary, local, +relative, subjective significance, while in the absolute all things are +the same. + +The scorn with which you may hear some people speak of the night of the +absolute in which all cats are grey and all women beautiful Helenas +shall not prevent us from repeatedly studying the absolute which I have +again and again praised as the main topic of logic. Only remember, +please, that you must not have any mystic idea of it. The absolute is +the sum total of all that was, is, and will be. + +The subjects as well as the objects of all science belong to the +absolute, which is commonly called "world." + +All other sciences have for their object limited parts, relative +matters, while the science of the mind treats of all things, of the +infinite. This is a point to which I refer frequently because it tends +to make my lessons obscure. I am lecturing on the science of the +intellect, but I speak of all things, of the universe, because I am +obliged to demonstrate, not the relation of the mind to shoemaking or +astronomy, but its general interrelations. I have to make plain its +general conduct, and this leads necessarily to the all-embracing +generality, to the absolute. We wish to learn the art of thinking, not +on this or that subject, but the art of general world thought. + +The intellect is a special part, the same as every other scientific or +practical object. But it is that part which is not satisfied with piece +work, which knows that it itself and all special things are attributes +or predicates of the absolute subject, that it itself and all things are +universally interrelated. + +The human mind is sometimes called self-consciousness. But this name is +too limited for such an unlimited thing, for the pathfinder of the +infinite, for your, my, and every other consciousness of the world and +of existence in general. + +For centuries the question has been discussed whether there are innate +ideas hidden in the intellect or whether it may be likened to a blank +paper which experience impregnates with knowledge. This is the question +after the origin and source of understanding. Whence comes reason, where +do we get our ideas, judgments, conclusions? By the help of brown-study +from the interior of our brain, from revelation, or from experience? It +seems to me that you will quickly decide this matter when I ask you to +consider that everything we experience, together with the intellect +going through experiences, is a revelation of the absolute. Everything +we know is experience. We may consider the mind as a sheet of blank +paper, but in order that it may receive writing on its surface this +internal paper is as necessary as the external world which produces the +hand, the pen and the ink for this process of writing. In other words, +all experience originates from the world organism. Not knowledge, but +consciousness, world consciousness, is innate in the intellect. It has +not the consciousness of this or that in itself, but it knows of itself +the general, the existence as such, the absolute. + +The science of the intellect has ever wrestled with one peculiar fact. +It found knowledge which the mind had received from the outside, +so-called empirical knowledge. But it also found knowledge which was +innate, so-called _a priori_ knowledge. That there is always a valley +between two mountains, that gold is not sheet iron, that the part is +smaller than the whole, that the angles of a triangle are together equal +to two right angles, that circles are round, that water is wet, that +fire is hot, etc., these are things of which we know that they are true +in heaven and in hell, and in all time to come, although we have never +been there with our experience. This plainly shows that we harbor a +secret in our brains which the lovers of the mystical seek to exploit by +making believe that their self-interested wisdom of God and high +authority likewise belongs to the eternally innate truths. For this +reason it is especially important for the proletariat to bring the +controversy of the origin and source of understanding to a close. + +Our logic asks: Does wisdom descend mysteriously from the interior of +the human brain, or does it come from the outer world like all +experience? We shall leave its descent from heaven out of the question. + +The answer is: Science, perception, understanding, thought, require +internal and external things, subject and object, brain and world. +Truth is here and truth is there. Truth is so divine that it is +everywhere and absolute. + +But how to explain that wonderful _a priori_ knowledge which exceeds all +experience? For it is a fact that the intellect has not alone the +faculty of knowing things in general, but also that of separating them +into their parts and from one another and to name them. It cuts off +slices, so to say. But not like the butcher who sees everything merely +from the standpoint of his trade. You will remember from your own +experience as well as from my repeated statements that the world is not +a monotonous, but a multiform unit. This confused knot is dissolved and +explained by intellectual separation, by classification. In the absolute +everything is alike and unlike. But the intellect makes abstractions +from the unlike. For instance, in conceiving of the term minerals, we +pass over the distinction between gold and sheet iron. Then, when we +continue the classification by subordinating gold and sheet iron as +separate species to the general term of minerals, we know very well that +gold and sheet iron are different kinds of the same general mineral +nature. We know what the names indicate, and so long as they retain +their meaning, we know that neither in heaven nor in hell can gold be +sheet iron or sheet iron be gold. Water and fire are specialties taken +from the universe and named. Is it a wonder, then, that these names have +a special meaning and that we have the settled conviction that wherever +sense instead of nonsense is master, fire burns, water wets, circles are +round, and the sum of the angles of every triangle is equal to two right +angles? + +These illustrations are commonplace enough, indeed, but it seems to me +that they clearly show the mere formality of the distinction between +innate and experienced knowledge. You will recognize that both of these +kinds of knowledge are different and yet of the same kind, that both are +mixtures of the internal and external. Knowledge _a priori_ ceases to be +a miracle when we understand that it comes out of the same fountain of +experience as _a posteriori_ knowledge, and in either case knowledge is +acquired only by means of the intellect. Hence intellect connected with +the world is the sole source of all wisdom, and external nature as well +as our internal faculty of understanding are parts of the one general +nature, which is the truth and the absolute. + +"Only a gradual, slow, gapless development," says Noire, "can free the +thinking mind from the philosophical disease of wondering." + +The art of dialectics or logic which teaches that the universe, or the +whole world, is one being, is the science of absolute evolution. "In the +whole constitution of all natural things," writes Lazare Geiger, "there +is hardly anything more miraculous than the way in which the miracle +avoids our glance and continuously withdraws into the distance to escape +observation. In the place of the abrupt and strange things produced by +imagination, reason puts uniformity and transition." + +And we add that the science of reason, or logic, teaches simultaneously +with the unity of the whole world, also that all things are alike +miraculous, or that there is only one miracle, which is existence in +general, the absolute. In other words, everything and nothing is +miraculous. + +In demonstrating that the most different things, such as heat and cold, +and all radical distinctions, are only relative forms of universal +nature, I prove the uninterrupted and matter of fact transition and the +absolute graduality, the fusion, of all things. + +I have tried to establish this proof in regard to the two kinds of +knowledge and illustrated it with commonplace examples, because these +have a popularizing effect. In order to meet the demands of more +exacting minds, I shall presently take up the miracle of causality. The +indubitable statement that everything must have its cause is regarded as +the most miraculous innate knowledge, and is much misused for the +purpose of bringing confusion into logic. + + + + +FIFTEENTH LETTER + + +My Son: + +If on my return from some voyage I were to tell you of all the things I +have _not_ seen, you would justly doubt the order of my senses. Sane +reason demands that the description of unfamiliar things be given in a +positive, not in a negative manner. If that is so, is it not wrong to +proceed negatively by trying to prove in explaining the nature of the +intellect that it is not a miracle and no mysterious charm of wisdom? I +answer: No. For the present, the intellect is still a sort of _ignis +fatuus_ which is magnified into a fiery man. In order to understand the +_ignis fatuus_, it is necessary to remove the fiery man. Logic must show +that human reason is not a miracle, not a mystical receptacle of wisdom. +The negative process is in such a case positively in order. Wherever a +thing is obscured by prejudices, these must first be removed, in order +that room may be made for the bare fact. + +It was the famous Kant who posed the question: "How is _a priori_ +knowledge possible?" How do we arrive at the knowledge of things which +are not accessible to experience? The answer is that the intellect +cannot accomplish such a miracle, and Kant substantiates this in a +long-winded way and with admirable penetration. But he left a nasty hair +in the soup. + +He found that by the help of our reason we can explain only phenomena. +The confusion between truth and phenomena had been handed down to him as +an infirmity of ancient times. He worked diligently on its solution, but +left some work for those coming after him. Originally the study of +supernatural and the profane study of natural things were closely +intermingled. Not until the obvious results of natural science became +known, did thinkers accommodate themselves to the habit of leaving +supernatural things to faith and limiting science to the study of +natural phenomena. Science had so to say passed on to the practical +order of business, not paying any further attention to the contrast +between phenomena and truth. But the logic, which is innate in the human +mind, cannot content itself with the dualistic split between faith and +science. It demands a monistic system and does not desist until the +primeval forests of faith are completely put under cultivation. + +The logical impulse of culture caused Kant to continue what was begun by +Socrates. Philosophy before Socrates searched for truth externally. +While our logic teaches that everything is true, and truth is the +universe, the Ionic philosophers made a sort of fetish out of the +matter. Thales idolized the water as the thing of things, another the +fire, a third numbers. This worship of the fetish was the worship of +truth. The search for understanding starts out with misunderstanding. +From religious to scientific culture, it is a step, not a leap. When +Socrates turned to introspection and started out, with his "Know +thyself," in submitting the prodigy of the human soul to critique, he +made another important step. + +You know that the "wisest of men" was not interested in air and water, +in natural science of the strict order, but rather in the good, the +true, and the beautiful, in the human in the narrower sense, in the +realm of the spirit, in the soul. It was indeed unwise that he was +interested to the verge of idolization, since in consequence of this +interest in a special part, the other, the material part was being +neglected. According to Goethe's statement that one thing is not fit for +all, Socrates did right. He and all philosophical lights after him +studied the intellect. What they missed was the now dawning +understanding that the faculty of thought is not a prodigy but a +special, and at the same time common, part of universal nature. While +these philosophers looked for truth in any one special form of +excellence, you are now invited to look for it in the total +interrelation of things. + +Science has ever endeavored to do away with miracles and prodigies. This +could be accomplished only gradually, and the logicians have, therefore, +remained more or less biased and confused. The great Kant was no +exception. He looked for supreme truth, and for its sake he investigated +the intellect. He is celebrated because he explained so well that this +intellect feels no mission for anything transcendental, and cannot +understand anything but phenomena. Still he permitted something +transcendental to remain. + +Kant is of the opinion that we perceive things as they appear, but not +as they are "in themselves." Nevertheless we should believe that a +mysterious truth is at the bottom of those phenomena, because we should +otherwise arrive at the irreconcilable contradiction that there are +phenomena without anything which could appear. The intellect, he holds, +can operate only on the field of phenomena, and for this reason we +should give up the endless grubbing after the transcendental. But we +should leave one little room in the house of reason, one little chamber +of faith, which points beyond experience up to the point where a +mysterious truth guards God and His commands. + +The subsequent philosophers, especially the Hegelian philosophy, opposed +this separation which assigned to the intellect only the study of +phenomena and to faith the absolute and infinite for veneration. But +they did not yet succeed in completely mastering the matter, they did +not fully arrive at an indubitably clear exposition of the fountain of +understanding and of the unity of truth, so that reaction nowadays can +again sound the retreat after the melody: "Back to Kant." You know that +Lessing complained about the treatment of "a dead dog" accorded to +Spinoza, and Marx added pointedly: "Hegel is more of a dead dog to-day +than Spinoza was at Lessing's time." The enemies of the working class +are the enemies of evolution. They wish to preserve the existing order +of things and the good old time in which they feel at home. For this +reason it is the mission of the proletariat to continue the work of +logic. It is our duty to show clearly that the metaphysical truth which +Kant opposed to the phenomena of nature and could not eliminate from the +intellect, is nothing but just a metaphysical, a fantastically +exaggerated, thing. + +According to our logic, the universe is the truth and everything +partakes of it. That such a truth is logical and such a logic true, is +shown by the interconnection of things, so that this science is +applicable to everything which the sciences respect as reasonable and +true. + +In order to help you in the understanding of the absolute and liberate +your thought from all special miracles, I refer to Kant's critique of +reason. It teaches that our intellect becomes a source of understanding +only in connection with other phenomena of nature. Only his critique +stuck fast in the mysterious fountain of causality. Thus he showed that +he was only a seeker after logic, not its master. The conclusion that +there must be _something_ that does appear where there are phenomena is +certainly correct. But that which Kant was thinking of, something of a +transcendental or metaphysical nature, led him to the radically wrong +conclusion that there must be something different, peculiar, miraculous, +mysterious, wherever there are phenomena. + +The Kantian conclusion that there must be an absolute truth by itself +behind a phenomenon, an absolute truth that exists independent of and +disconnected with such phenomenon, was due to his fetish-like conception +of truth. It is the first requirement for a correct use of the faculty +of logical reasoning to know that truth is the common nature of the +universe. + +That a phenomenon must be based on nature, or an effect on a cause, is a +fact identical with "causality" which I already promised to discuss in +the preceding letter. This same problem may also be expressed in the +words: Where there are predicates, there must be a subject that carries +them. In order to make quite sure that I will not be misunderstood, I +emphasize once more the fact that I am not raising any doubt as to the +correctness of this conclusion, but only to the metaphysical application +of this conclusion after the Kantian manner which consists in making +the same use of it as a clergyman who tries to prove that his theology +is innate in reason. + +Our conception of logic wishes to show that all causes and effects are +matter of the same kind, and that our faculty of reasoning is a matter +of fact thing which brooks no mysteries or metaphysical dreams. + + + + +SIXTEENTH LETTER + + +Now let me illustrate the interconnection of all things, or the +world-unit, by discussing the question of causality. We know that +everything has its cause. We know that this is also true on the Moon or +on Uranus, although we have not acquired this knowledge by experience on +those world bodies. Thus it seemed that the intellect was a mysterious +receptacle containing innate wisdom. The same receptacle also contains, +for instance, the truth that all white horses are white and all black +horses black. We do not know anything about the color of other horses in +other countries, but the color of black and white horses we know even if +we have never seen them in other countries. It is thus apparent that our +intellect is an instrument which reaches beyond experience. For this +reason there would seem to be no telling where the supply of such +miraculous revelations would stop and into what mysterious worlds the +intellect passing beyond the limits of experience would lead us. + +In order that the human intellect may not appear transcendental, in +order to give it its place in the general classification of natural +forces, we must investigate the nature of causality and so-called _a +priori_ knowledge. + +Kindly observe in the first place that a thing is just as wonderful +_after_ it is explained as it was before its explanation. A scientific +explanation of a thing ought not to do away with our admiration, but +only to reduce it to reasonable bounds. The intellect may very well be +regarded as something wonderful, but its wondrous quality should be +reduced to the measure of all things which are none of them any less +wonderful. After you have explained what water is, after you have +learned that it is composed of two chemical elements, after you have +realized all its qualities thoroughly, it still remains a wonderful, +divine, fluid. + +"All things have their causes." What are all things? They are +attributes, qualities of the universe. It is innate in the intellect to +know that the world is _one_ thing, that all things belong, not to any +different thing, but to one and the same subject. The intellect is by +nature the absolute feeling of unity. It knows of itself that everything +is interrelated and that the consciousness of causality is nothing else +but the consciousness of cosmic interrelation. And I maintain that the +innateness of the consciousness of cosmic interrelation in our brain is +explained when we realize that it is an actual thing like all others, a +phenomenon which has the same general nature as every other +phenomenon.[7] + +The fact is undeniable that a certain knowledge is innate in our +consciousness. The only difficulty has been to explain this fact. At +this point I call your attention to the exaggerated notion entertained +in regard to explaining, and understanding, things. By explanations, a +thing is not dissolved, but only classified. + +The hatching of an egg is explained when you perceive that this process +is part and parcel of a whole class of similar processes. If you modify +the exalted idea of the effect of explanations in this sense, you must +realize that the innate consciousness of the general interrelation of +things is natural and intelligible and requires no other explanation +than the humidity of the water, the gravity of bodies, or the color of +black horses. + +Even after it has been explained and understood, the intellect with its +logic remains a wonderful thing. Just as clay is by its nature +untransparent and pliable, or glass transparent and brittle, so +consciousness has its peculiar innate qualities. In this way knowledge +comes to the intellect not only by experience, but it is also a sort of +receptacle full of wisdom. Still this receptacle would no more contain +wisdom without experience than the eye would have impressions without +light. + +In order to straighten out the intricate windings of our subject, I +recapitulate them. We wish to learn the proper use of our intellect, the +conscious application of consciousness. To this end we analyze its +hitherto hidden mystical nature. So long as we exalt this nature +transcendentally to the clouds, we do not acquire its proper use. +Therefore the first paragraph of our lesson reads: The intellect belongs +in the same category with all things of the universe. And the second +paragraph says: If we distinguish two classes of thought radiated by the +human intellect, viz., innate thoughts, such as causality, and on the +other hand thoughts which come through experience, we must remember that +such a distinction is correct only when we realize that in spite of this +classification in two kinds they really belong to the same kind. Innate +and acquired wisdom, though served on two different plates, still are +taken from the same general world dish. + +From this it follows that the science of causality, though applicable +to all the phenomena of the world, does not apply to the universe. If it +is a fact that all wisdom is worldly, then one must not fly outside of +the world with the concept of causality. + +This is the salient point at issue. + +All things are one thing, are interdependent, stand in the relation of +cause and effect toward one another, or of genus and species. To say +that all things have a cause means that they have a mother. The fact +that every mother has a mother finds its final ending in the world +mother or mother world, which is absolute and motherless and contains +all mothers in its womb. + +Causes are mothers, effects are daughters. Every daughter has not only a +mother, grand-mother, and great-grand-mother, but also a father, +grand-father, and great-grand-father. The origin, or the family +relationship, of a daughter is not one-sided, but all-sided. In the same +way all things have not one, but many causes which flow together in the +general cause. + +The intellect which has the innate knowledge that everything has its +cause will accept the teaching that all causes in the world are founded +in the absolute world cause and must return to it. It is the +quintessence of logic not only to ascertain the true nature of the +intellect, but also to elucidate the nature of the universe by the help +of the intellect. + +All things have a mother, but to expect that the world mother should +logically have a mother is to carry logic to extremities and to +misunderstand the intellect and its art of reasoning. + +If you have recognized the faculty of understanding as a part of +existence, you will not wonder at its miraculousness. Existence is +wonderful. Its parts arise one out of the other, out of the universal +interrelations of the one world. They all have their predecessors and +causes. But what is true of the relative parts, is not true of the +absolute whole. + +I am the son of my father and the father of my son. I am at the same +time father and son. In the same way all things are simultaneously cause +and effect. Although father and son are two different persons, still the +capacity of being father and son rest in the same person, and although +cause and effect are to be distinguished as two things, still they are +two relations of the same thing. Persons and things, causes and effects, +are not independent entities, but relative entities, are +interconnections or relations of the absolute. + +The intellect is innate in us, and with it and through it also the +consciousness of being, although it is innate in us only as the teeth of +the child which grow after birth. Everything that we become aware of is +known only as a part of the universe. In so far as this is wonderful, +the consciousness of causality is miraculous. But, in fact, the +knowledge of the causality of all things is innate wisdom the same as +that of the color of all white and black horses. At the same time it +must be observed that every innate knowledge is in part acquired, and +every acquired knowledge in part innate, so that both kinds intermingle +and form one category. + +My whole argument aims to convince you that all things are worldly +things, and their causality is only another name for the same thing, +just as the German _brot_ is called _pain_ in French and _bread_ in +English. Thus we derive the firm conviction that if there is _pain_ in +heaven there will be bread, and if there are things, there will be +causes and effects, or interrelation with the unit of existence. + +The mystery of causality is sometimes expressed by the statement that we +possess the indubitable knowledge which extends beyond all experience +that wherever a change takes place there must have preceded another +change. Indeed, we have the faculty of recognizing the unity in the +infinite multiplicity, and infinite multiplicity in the unity. +Multiplicity, change, motion--who is to split hairs about them, who will +make fine distinctions? The intellect is the photographic organ of the +infinite motion and transformations called the "world." It is and +possesses the consciousness of cosmic changes. Is it a wonder that it +knows that there is interrelation in its things, that no part of the +world, not a particle of its motion and transformations, stands alone by +itself, that everything is connected and mutually dependent in and with +the universe? Because this understanding is in a way innate in the +intellect, therefore it understands that there is nothing but change, +infinitely proceeding transformations. And if it detaches any single +thing from this process, it knows that changes preceded it and changes +will follow. + +In short, we must not marvel at any single part of nature, not even at +the intellect, but admire the whole universe. Then fetishism will at +last end and a true cult, the cult of world truth, can begin. + +The art of thinking, my dear Eugene, is not so easy. For this reason I +keep on warning you against misunderstanding. I do not mean to advise +you with the foregoing against admiring any single part of nature, or of +art, a landscape or a statue. My teaching merely tends to moderate +admiration by the reflection that the whole world is wonderful, that +everything is beautiful, so that nothing ugly remains. The distinction +between beautiful and ugly is only relative. Even when I say that the +true worship of God, the cult of truth, cannot begin until idol worship +ceases, you will appreciate the phrase and will not insinuate that I do +not value the cultivation of science in the past, or that I hate idol +worship to the extent of forgetting what I have emphasized repeatedly, +viz., that idol worship is also worship of God, and error a paving stone +on the way toward truth. The most minute thing is a magnitude. +Everything is true, good, and beautiful, for the universe is absolute +truth, beauty and goodness. I conclude with the words of Fr. von Sallet: + + + A sunny view of world and life + Is balm for brain and heart, + It is with health and beauty rife, + With noblest works of art. + But do not for a moment think + That it is captured in a wink. + The golden harvest does not grow, + Unless the early tempests blow. + And only bitter woe and strain + Will bright and lofty wisdom gain. + + +FOOTNOTE: + +[7] E. g. That of natural existence.--EDITOR. + + + + +SEVENTEENTH LETTER. + + +My subject, dear Eugene, is the simplest in the world, but it requires +thorough treatment for all its full understanding. So every letter is in +a way but a repetition of the same argument. "It is remarkable," says +Schopenhauer, "that we find the few main theses of pre-socratic +philosophy repeated innumerable times. Also in the works of modern +thinkers, such as Cartesius, Spinoza, Leibniz, and even Kant, we find +that their few main theses are repeated over and over." + +Now I ask you to consider what I said in my first letters, viz., that +the titles of the principal philosophical works reveal that philosophy +is engaged in the study of logic, in the analysis of the intellect and +the art of its use. You will then recognize that in the very nature of +the subject my presentation of the matter lacks systematization. It has +no real beginning and end, because its object, the intellect, is +interconnected with the whole universe, which is without beginning and +end, which has neither before nor after, neither above nor below. + +You may venture that the relation of the intellect to the universe does +not concern the intellect especially, but is a universal matter. That +would be true. + +But it is easy to show that the art of thinking and wisdom of the world +are identical. And although the universal interrelation of things is +germain to all things and subjects, yet its consideration is a special +task of logic which treats all objects of thought summarily. + +My subject therefore begins everywhere, even though it is a specialty. +Hence I take the liberty to take my departure from any literature which +I happen to study. In the present letter, I deal with "logical +investigations" of the prominent Professor Trendelenburg. His is a bulky +volume, but you need not fear that I shall weary you with its +subtleties. As a rule I read only the preface of philosophical works of +the second and third order, their introduction and perhaps the first few +chapters. Then I am approximately informed as to what I may expect from +them further on. One frequently finds statements which, if they do not +throw new light on the subject, still bring out in bolder relief some of +the accomplishments of historical research in our field. And in order +that the son may not trust to the father alone, which might lead to +distrust, I connect my argument with some statements of Trendelenburg. + +In the preface to the second edition the author complains of the "dull +headache" which the Hegelian intoxication has left in Germany and says: +"Philosophy will not resume its old power until it becomes consistent, +and it will not become consistent until it grows in the same way that +all other sciences do. In other words, it must not take a new departure +in every brain and then quit, but it must approach its problems +historically and develop them. The German prejudice must be abandoned, +according to which the philosophy of the future is supposed to look for +a new principle. This principle has already been found. It consists in +the organic world conception, the fundaments of which are resting in +Plato and Aristotle." + +The Professor is right, but he overlooks that the philosophers, even of +modern times, do not begin "each on his own account," do not have "each +his own principle," or if they have, such a "false originality" is but +the indifferent attribute of historical development which has handed the +object of logic, the true art of thought, from generation to generation +in an ever brighter condition. + +I repeat this emphatically for pedagogic reasons, because I consider it +essential to convince you and the reader that the apparent paradoxes +which I state are the objects of discussion since time immemorial. I +also wish to stimulate you to a study of the master works of philosophy +which show the cheering spectacle, in the persons of the most brilliant +specimens of the human mind, of the onward march of this mind from +darkness to light. + +In order that the wheat contained in this human treasure box may not be +concealed by the tares, I am endeavoring to throw light on the outcome +of the historical development of philosophy, and for this purpose I +continue to discuss the question by taking my departure in this instance +from some further statements of Trendelenburg. + +"It is a peculiarity of philosophical methods of reasoning to recognize +a part in the whole, and it is tacitly assumed that the whole is +descended from a thought which determines the parts. On the other hand, +it is peculiar to empirical methods of analysis to study the parts +without regard to their interrelation, or at best to collect them and +put them together, and it is tacitly assumed that every point is +something peculiar in itself which must be studied apart from all the +rest." + +"The aim of all human understanding is always to solve the miracle of +divine creation by further creative thought. When this task is +undertaken in detail, the detail study forces one on to other things: +for things must go backwards toward their dissolution by the same force +through which they arose out of the depths." + +These sentences state the problem before us. Shall we use the intellect +philosophically, or shall we use it empirically? We are striving to +understand the parts and the whole, and this is identical with the +research after a systematical world philosophy, or with the art of +dialectics. Now we must state in the first place that thinking of any +kind, whether it be philosophical or empirical, is of the same species, +that the same kernel is contained in both forms. Roses are different +flowers from carnations, but the flower nature is in both of them. Thus +the nature of thought is contained in both philosophical and empirical +thinking. The distinction is well enough, but their unity must not be +lost sight of. + +The philosophers, he says, seek to understand the detail by the whole; +the empirical thinkers analyze the details without regard to +interrelations. But both methods of research are different specimens of +the same genus, and both of them are one-sided when their +interconnection is overlooked. The empirical thinker who seeks to +understand the details in their isolation, thinks philosophically, when +he regards his special research as a contribution to the whole, and the +philosopher, who seeks to understand the detail by the whole, thinks +empirically when he rightly regards all details as attributes of the +whole. + +Trendelenburg, then, has expressed his case very obscurely. Both methods +of study, if employed one-sidedly, entirely misconceive the art of +thinking. The philosophers err when they regard the intellect as the +only source of understanding and truth; it is only a part of truth and +must be supplemented by all the rest of the world. On the other hand, +the empirical thinkers err when they look for understanding and truth +exclusively in the outer world, without taking into account the +intellectual instrument by the help of which they lift their treasures. +In fact, such one-sided philosophers exist only in theory; I mean there +are some who imagine that truth could be one-sided. But in practice they +all testify, much against their will, to the inevitable interconnection +of matter and mind, of inside and outside. In the practical use of the +intellect everybody shows that the part operates in the whole, and that +the whole is active in its parts. + +We know _a priori_ that the universe is a whole. The universal existence +can be conceived only as of one kind or nature. The mere thought that +there might be something which does not partake of the nature of the +universe is no thought, because it is a thought without sense or reason. +The whole world is the supreme being, though I grant that we have but a +vague conception of it. We have as yet no detailed, true, conception of +the universe, but it is gradually acquired in the course of science. +Still, our conception will never be perfect because details are +infinitesimal and the absolute being is infinite growth. + +As to details, we know them more or less accurately and yet not +accurately, because even the most minute part of the infinite is +infinite. All science has searched in vain for atoms. What our +understanding knows, has always been nothing but predicates or +attributes of truth, although they are true attributes and are truly +understood by us. + +I emphasize the inadequacy of all modes of thought and of all +understanding in opposition to those who make an idol of science. I +emphasize the truth of all perceptions in opposition to those +knownothings who claim that truth cannot be understood, but can only be +admired and worshipped. Hence it follows for our theory of understanding +that intellect and reason and the art of thought are no independent +treasure boxes which make any revelations to us. They are theoretical +classifications which in practice are operative only in the universal +interconnection of things. Understanding, perceiving, judging, +distinguishing and concluding, etc., are unable to produce any truths. +They can only enlighten and clarify experience by logical classification +and distinction. Because man produces works which are preceded by +planning, therefore the philosophical mode of research has "assumed that +the whole is descended from a thought." But this is an assumption of +human origin, which is shown to be without foundation on closer +analysis. The plans of our works are copies of natural originals and are +"free creations of the mind" only in a limited sense. The artists are +well aware of the natural descent of their thoughts and fictions. To +regard the world as the outcome of thought is a perverse logic. It is +the first condition of rational, proletarian, thought to recognize the +intellect and its products as attributes of the world subject. + + + + +EIGHTEENTH LETTER + + +Just as in political history action and reaction follow one another, +just as periods of economic prosperity are alternated by periods of +depression, so we find in literature a periodical fluctuation between +philosophical and anti-philosophical tendencies. + +After Hegel had for a time thoroughly aroused the spirits, a time of +apathy followed, so that this hero of thought who shortly before had +been almost idolized could be attacked and reviled. For about a decade, +a philosophical breeze has now once more been blowing. The subject of +logic, the theory of understanding, is again the object of universal +attention. This movement is stimulated by important discoveries in +science, such as the heat equivalent of Robert Mayer, the origin of +species by Darwin, etc., and natural science and philosophy may be +compared to two miners who are digging a tunnel, so that sharp ears on +both sides can hear the blows of the hammers and the clanging of the +tools. + +There is much truth in this picture, but it may also lead to +misunderstandings. By the vivisection of frogs and rabbits, by boring +into the brain, physiology will not discover the mind. No microscope, no +telescope, will reveal the nature of reason and truth or the art of +logical discernment. + +Neither will Lazarre Geiger, Max Mueller, Steinthal, and Noire succeed in +philology in solving the "last questions of all knowledge" by the help +of any primitive arch-language. + +At the same time, the value of the co-operation of these gentlemen is +not denied, only I desire to point out that the comparison with the +tunnel is not quite accurate. What Marx said of economic formulas, is +true of logical formulas: "In their analysis neither the microscope nor +chemical reagents are of any service. The power of abstraction must +replace them both." + +The two sciences will finally meet, not because each one of them digs +away in its own one-sided fashion, but because the miners meet after +working hours and exchange their experiences. And the philosophers may +be the dominant party, because they are specialists in logic and +therefore prepared to utilize anything which may serve their purpose, no +matter from what side it comes. The other party, on the other hand, has +its own specialties and promotes the cause of logic in a secondary and +involuntary fashion. + +Natural science has its own monism which is distinguished from +philosophical proletarian monism in that it does not appreciate the +historical outcome of philosophical research. One of the most prominent +representatives of the former is Noire. He entitles one of his little +works "Monistic Thought," but shows himself on its pages as a very +unclear dualist. He speaks of the "dual nature of causality" and relates +that the mind operates with a different causality than the mere +mechanical one. He calls this other "sensory causality." + +According to him the world has only two attributes: "Motion and +sensation are the only true and objective qualities of the world.... +Motion is the truly objective ... though it is admitted that it gives us +only the phenomenon.... Sensation makes up the internal nature of +things. Every subject, whether man or atom, is endowed with the two +qualities of all beings, viz., motion and sensation." + +Thereupon I have carefully looked for an explanation in Noire's works, +why he regards the nature of things as composed of an external and an +internal quality, and why sensation should not be regarded as a sort of +motion, but the only reason I could find was the dualistic nature of his +"monistic" reasoning. + +As Schopenhauer provided the whole world with a "will," so Noire +provides it with "sensation." + +Kant and his "Critical Philosophy" held in their time that our intellect +perceives only the phenomena of nature, while the mystic law of +causality, according to him, points to a hidden being, which cannot be +perceived but must be believed, which we may venerate but must leave +undisturbed by science. Schopenhauer, his brilliant successor, who in +spite of his brilliancy did not materially advance the cause of +philosophy, mystified the problem of causality by his discovery that the +nature of the world is will power. These teachings of Kant and +Schopenhauer are dressed up anew and mixed with the recent discoveries +of science by Noire. But he entirely ignores the work of Schelling and +Hegel, who by their criticisms have made evident the lack of logic in +the Kantian separation of phenomenon (apparition) from noumenon +(essence), of cause from effect. + +You are familiar with the silly question whether Goethe or Schiller, +Shakespeare or Byron, is the greater poet, and you will not think that I +am trying to elevate Hegel above Kant or Kant above Hegel. They are just +two cogs on the spinning wheel of history. If the second crushes what +the first has cracked, such is the result of their succession. + +Natural science is also a valuable co-operator in the solution of the +world problem, not so much by digging in the logical tunnel itself, or +making amateur excursions into the fields of philosophy or metaphysics, +but because it elucidates and renders tangible the special object of +logic in such far-embracing objects as the unity of natural forces or of +animal species. The scientific presentation of this special object, +however, requires a brain armed with the full equipment of the +historical outcome of philosophy. + +Now you must not believe that I am conceited enough to place my own +little personality on the pedestal as the only true philosopher. I am +too well aware of my shortcomings as a self-educated man. But seeing +that I have striven earnestly and without prejudice since my young days +to understand the high object of my studies, I feel in my heart a +certain confidence in my qualification to deal with it. On the other +hand, I know my lack of that sort of learning which is required in order +to be able to present the scientifically much-courted nature of the +human mind in such a form and with such emphasis as its sublime +character deserves. And if I, nevertheless, come before the public on +various occasions with my tentative works, I offer as an excuse that +hitherto the Messiah has not appeared who will come after me and whose +John the Baptist I should like to be. + +You, my dear Eugene, will take me soberly and reduce my resounding words +to their proper measure, when I, in the intoxication of enthusiasm, flow +over like that now and then. You know that I am no hero worshipper. +Though all research is but the product of individual minds, the mind of +each man is a part of the universal mind which produces science. Now +follows the point which forms the conclusion of all my letters: The +intellect which produces science is indeed a part of man, but still more +a part of the world, it is the universal world intellect, the reason of +the absolute, the absolute reason. + +The study of this intellect at work, not merely in shoemaking, in +anatomy, or in astronomy, but in all fields, in the infinite, of its +life in the absolute, is the means by which the art of logic is +acquired. It is true that the infinite exists only in finite parts, and +you cannot conceive of the infinite directly, you can perceive it only +in its parts. And in perceiving them you must always remember that every +part is an infinite piece of the infinite universe. + +In his "Introduction and Proofs of a Monistic Theory of Understanding," +Noire, after enumerating the new points contained in his work, adds +sneeringly that he is "not in a position to give any new clews as to the +nature of the absolute." For this very reason I want to denounce his +"Monism" as a shallow piece of work, which offers only the name instead +of the essence. + +The well-known Ernst Haeckel knows a great deal more about this subject. +In a lecture given at the twenty-fifth convention of natural scientists +in Eisenach, he calls the monistic view of nature "a grand pantheistic +one." The essence of all religion, according to him, consists in the +"conviction of a final and unmistakably common cause of all things." And +he continues: "In the admission that with the present day organization +of our brain, we are unable to penetrate to the final cause of all +things, the critical natural philosophy and dogmatic religion agree." +Whether the professor is one of those natural philosophers who regard +the human mind as too narrow for the understanding of the "unmistakably +(hence somewhat understood) common cause of all things," is not quite +clear to me, nor probably to the famous scientist himself. For he adds: +"The more we progress in the understanding of nature, the more we +approach that unattainable final cause." And further on: "The purest +form of monistic faith culminates in the conviction of the unity of God +and nature." + +Now I ask: If nature, God, and absolute truth are one and the same +thing, have we not learned something about the "final cause of all +things?" What necessity is there in that case for speaking in such an +abjectedly humble tone of human understanding, or to assign nothing but +straw and husks to it, in the language of Hegel? + +You see, then, that Haeckel has a higher estimate of absolute nature than +Noire who does not care to have anything to do with the nature of the +absolute. But my object at this moment is to convince you that neither +the one nor the other of these two, nor natural science, so-called, is +directly digging in the tunnel which will give us light on the question +of the limits of our understanding and the final cause of things. Our +logic, on the other hand, which treats the intellect as a part of +nature, cultivates a natural science that includes the mere empirical +natural science in the same way in which the day of twenty-four hours +includes the day of twelve hours and the night. + +Natural science proper deals mainly with tangible things. Light and +sound, the objects of eye and ear, are still included in its studies. +The objects of smell and taste stand on the dividing line. But the +socalled sciences of the mind, such as grammar and politics, political +economy and history, morals and law, and most decidedly logic, are +entirely excluded. + +Such a limitation is well enough, if we remember that it is purely +formal. However, it must not overlook the bridge which leads from +limited nature to universal, infinite, nature. + +The monism of natural science has a far too narrow view of the universe. +When it says that "all is motion," it says just as little or as much as +Solomon with his "all is vain." Everything is crooked and straight, +everything great and small, everything temporal and eternal, everything +truth and life. But nothing is thus said to show the meaning of +distinction in this world, to explain how rest exists in motion, and +sense in nonsense. + +In order to differentiate logically we must know that everything is +everything, that the universe or absolute is its own cause and the final +cause of all things, which embraces all distinctions, even that of +causality and that between matter and mind. + + + + +NINETEENTH LETTER + + +"Philosophy should not try to be edifying," said Hegel. This means that +religious feeling is far below scientific thought. But there is a +reverse side to this sentence, viz., that thoughts which do not rise to +the edifying interconnection of all things, no matter whether they +remain stuck in some specialty on account of frivolousness or of +narrowmindedness, are far below a wise world philosophy. + +In a former letter I have already emphasized, and I hope to prove it +more convincingly, that the conception of "God," or of the absolute, is +indispensable for a logical world philosophy. + +You know that in my dictionary the gods and divinities of all religions +and denominations are "idols," and justly so, since they are all +manufactured images. Instead of the entire universe, they worship a more +or less unessential part of it. + +The religions show by their idolatry, the sciences frequently by their +little creditable indifference, that they have no conception of the +intellect and its art of reasoning. + +The universe is a familiar conception. Everybody uses it, and there is +apparently little to say about it. But in fact it is the conception of +all conceptions, the being of all beings, the cause of itself which has +no other cause and no other being beside itself. That the whole world is +contained in the universe is so obvious that you may wonder at my waste +of words over such a matter-of-fact thing. But when you consider that +the people have always searched for a world cause outside of the world, +together with a beginning of the world and a transcendental truth, then +you will see that they have not grasped the conception of the world as a +whole, as a universe. And if that is admitted, then the proof that it is +the cause of all causes, the beginning of all beginnings, and the truth +of all truths, is not such a superfluous undertaking. + +Now you may say that it is presumptuous to try to understand the whole +universe at once. This objection is justified in a way, according to the +interpretation of the words. Still I hope that it will be my +justification to declare that it is not a question of understanding the +universe in detail, but only in general, not each and everything in its +differentiation, but only in a summary way. And it is only the edifying +conception of the universe as a whole which will open for you the door +to the understanding of the human mind, of thought, and the art of using +it. We wish to understand _the_ conception; not this or that conception, +but the whole conception, the conception of the whole. You will no +longer indulge in the superstition that the faculty of thought or +understanding is a thing apart from the world's interconnection. I +presume that you have now learned enough about the art of thought to be +sure not to think of anything without its worldwide interrelation. For +so long as one imagines that a piece of wood or a stone is a thing in +itself, without connection with light and air, with Earth, Moon, and +Sun, he has a very barbarian conception of the things of this world. + +I maintain that the understanding of the human faculty of reason and the +art of its use are inseparable from the world concept. And I want this +understood in the sense, that it is not a mistake to distinguish between +the internal mind and the outside world, but that these are merely +formal distinctions of the essentially indivisible and absolute +universe. + +The concept of this true God or divine, because universal, Truth shows +on close analysis that it includes the special truth of the art of +thought as well as all other sciences, and pre-eminently the science of +thought, because this science must not limit itself to any special +thing, but must be world wisdom by its very will and nature. + +To understand the universe, then, means to become aware that this being +of all beings has no beginning, no cause, no truth nor reason outside +and beside itself, but has everything in and by itself. To understand +the universe means to recognize that one is rushing beyond the worldly +infinity into the realm of fantastic transcendentalism and abusing the +intellect, when illogically applying such terms as beginning and end, +cause and effect, being and not being, to the absolute universe. Such an +illogical use of the faculty of thought is well illustrated and rebuked +by the poet who questions and answers: + + + "And when my life has passed away, + What will become of me? + The world has one eternal day, + 'Thereafter' cannot be." + + +In order to acquire the universal sense, you will strive to understand +that the universe includes all relative things, while as a whole it +embodies the absolute or the edifying deity. + +If you would become world-wise, you must learn that the things called +opposites and contradictions have a different meaning than is ordinarily +applied to them by the logic of the idolators. They say that God and the +world, body and soul, truth and error, life and death, etc., are +irreconcilable antipodes; that they exclude one another; that they +cannot be brought under the same roof, but must be kept wide apart by +the laws of eternal reason. But this doctrine of contradiction is merely +narrow dogmatism, which confuses the minds instead of enlightening them. +Certainly, death differs from life, the perishable from the +imperishable, black from white, crooked from straight, large from small. +Who would be silly enough to deny that? But even the apparently most +contradictory and opposite things may be classified under the same +genus, family, or species, as twins in a mother's womb. The same thing +that does not prevent male and female from sitting in the same nest, +does not prevent the most widely different things, in spite of their +separate characters, from being one and the same, from being two pieces +of the same caliber. You are certainly still the same Eugene that you +were as a little baby, and yet you are at the same time another. The +experts in physiology even claim that they can compute how often a man +of sixty has changed his flesh, bones, skin, and hair. Although the old +man is the same individual that he was when first born, yet he never +remained the same. + +You will see by this illustration that all difference is of the same +nature, a general, supreme, universal being, absolute and divine, and +this absolute world being is highly edifying, because it comprises all +other beings and is the Alpha and Omega of all things. + +Is this world-god a mere idea? No, it is the truth and life itself. And +it is very interesting to note that the so-called "ontological proof of +the existence of God" agrees very well with the world truth which I +proclaim in the tabernacle of logic. This proof is originally attributed +to the learned Anselmo of Canterbury. However that may be, it is certain +that Descartes and Spinoza support him with their famous names. They +hold that the "most perfect being" must necessarily have existence, +because otherwise it would not be the most perfect. + +"I understood very well," writes Descartes in the fourth section of his +"Method of Correct Thought," "that in accepting the hypothesis of a +triangle I would have to accept the fact that the sum of its three +angles is equal to two right angles. But nothing convinced me of the +presence of such a triangle, while I found that my conception of the +most perfect being was as inseparably linked to existence as my +conception of a triangle is to the identity of the sum of its angles +with two right angles.... Hence it is certainly as undeniable as any +geometrical proof can be that God exists as this most perfect being." + +This argument appears to me as clear as daylight and ought to convince +you, not of the existence of a transcendental idol, but of the truth of +the absolute and most perfect world being. If you were to remark that +this perfectness is not so very great, considering its many obvious +imperfections, I should ask you not to split hairs and to recognize with +sane senses that these imperfections of the world belong as logically to +the perfect world as the evil desires belong to virtue which becomes +virtue only by the test of overcoming them. The conception of a +perfection which has no imperfections to overcome would be a silly idea. + +Now in conclusion let me say a few words of apology for continually +interchanging the universe and the concept of the universe. I frequently +speak of the idea of a thing as if it were the thing itself. But see +here! Do you not ask on seeing the portrait of some person unknown to +you: Who is this? And do you not interchange the portrait for the person +itself, without difficulty and misunderstanding? The idea stands in the +same relation to the thing, as the portrait to the person it represents. +This remark is directed against that unsound logic which knows only the +separation of the idea from the thing, of reason from its objects, but +does not grasp the mere formality of such a distinction, does not +appreciate the unity of the world, the edifying and supreme truth, the +truth of the supreme being. + +This letter, my dear Eugene, pleads for edification, but only for that +kind of edification which includes the unedifying, whereby edification +is sobered down. If you would give the name of pantheism to this world +philosophy, you should remember that it is not a sentimental and +exalted, but a common sense pantheism, a deification which has the taste +of the godless. + + + + +TWENTIETH LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Today I am going to present my case with the precision of a +schoolmaster. + +The concept of white cabbage embraces all white cabbage heads that ever +were and ever will be. + +The concept of cabbage embraces red, white, and many other kinds of +cabbage. The concept of vegetable embraces a still wider range. The +organic field is still more comprehensive. And finally the world concept +embraces everything which we know and don't know, the end of which we +cannot conceive, and which therefore is called infinite. + +When we trace our steps backward over the same reasoning, we find at +once that the universal concept is divided into two parts, viz., the +universe and the conception of it. We thus find the world in the concept +and the concept in the world, so that both of these parts are +interconnected, each is the predicate of the other, and whether we turn +the thing to the right or to the left, the concept is in the world and +the world in the concept. + +Now it is true that the concept, or the faculty of understanding, is the +object of our study rather than the world outside of it. The faculty of +understanding, by the way, is nothing but a collective noun for all +concepts, hence simply another name for concept in general. But what I +eternally repeat is this: We cannot make a concept separated from all +the rest of the world the object of our study, because that would be an +empty abstraction which does not take on any meaning until we connect it +with the world, for instance the special concept of cabbage with +sense-perceived cabbage and so forth. + +The concepts of white cabbage, cabbage in general, vegetables, or +plants, etc., are all of them special concepts and at the same time +general concepts. The one and the other is relative. Compared to the +various species it includes, the general concept of cabbage is abstract, +while compared to the general concept of vegetables it is concrete. And +so it is with all concepts. They are abstract and concrete at the same +time. Only the final concept, the world concept, is neither concrete nor +abstract, but absolute. It is the concept of the absolute, which is +indispensable for an understanding of logic. + +We found a while ago that the absolute world concept consisted of two +parts, viz., the concept and the world. In the same way, the chemists +teach us that water consists of two elements, each of which by itself +does not make any water, while their compound makes pure water. But we +do not need such distant illustrations. My table in its present +composition is something different from what it would be if the same +pieces were put together in some other way and without a plan. + +Therefore the world concept is a far more sublime concept than all the +parts of which it consists. And in order to make this quite clear, I may +honor this compound of the world and its concept by a special name, say +"universe," so as to distinguish it from its component parts. + +Now I declare, without fear of having the word turned in my mouth by any +sophist, that the world embracing the thought, or the universe, is the +absolute which includes everything, while the world and the thought of +it, each by itself, are but classifications or relative things. + +We wish to understand thought, not empty abstract thought, but the +universal world-embracing thought, the thought in a philosophical sense. +This is not mere thought, but living truth, the universe, the absolute, +the supreme being. + +It is with the universe and its parts as it is with a telescope and its +concentric rings. Our intellect is a special ring which gives us a +picture of the whole concentric thing. This photographer, as I have +called it in a former letter, is not the object of our study for its own +sake, nor for the sake of its pictures, but rather for the sake of the +original, of the universe. It is as if somebody were to buy a portrait +of some historically renowned person. No matter how much concerned the +buyer would be with the picture, in the last analysis he is concerned +with that person itself. So it is with the art of understanding the +absolute, with world wisdom, which we study not for the sake of the +wisdom, but of the world itself. + +This lengthy discussion might have been cut short by simply speaking of +the world instead of going to so much trouble on account of the world +concept. But I should then miss my point, which is that the human +intellect is a part of the world, and that the ideological distinction +which separates this intellect from the rest of the world, requires for +the whole an embracing term. + +The absolute concept is the concept of the absolute, of the supreme +being. To it applies all the true, good, and beautiful ever attributed +to God, and it is also that being which lends logic, consistency, and +form to all thought. + +Plato is a philosopher who has thrown a wonderful light on the faculty +of understanding, though he has not fully explained it. In his dialogue +entitled "Gorgias," he makes Socrates say the following: "Does it seem +to you that men want that with which they occupy themselves at any time, +or that for the sake of which they undertake whatever they may be +engaged in? Do those, for instance, who take some medicine prescribed by +the physicians seem to want that which they do ... or to want that for +the sake of which they take medicine, viz., health?... In the same way +those who go on board of ships and trade do not want that which they are +doing; for who would care to go to sea and face danger or conquer +obstacles? That for which they go to sea is that which they want, viz., +to become rich; they are going to sea for the sake of acquiring wealth." + +Plato thus says that the immediate purposes of men are not their real +purposes, but means to an end, means to welfare or for "good." He +therefore continues: "It is in pursuit of good, then, that we go when we +go, because we are after something better, and we stand still for the +sake of the same good." + +Now let us go a step farther than Socrates and Plato. Just as men's +actions are truly done, not for the sake of some immediate purpose, but +of the ulterior, of welfare, and just as their socalled ethical actions +are justified only by the general wellbeing, so all things of the world +are not substantiated by their immediate environment, but by the +infinite universe. It is not the seed planted in the soil which is the +cause of the growing plant, as the farmer thinks, but the Earth, the +Sun, the winds, and the weather, in short, the whole of nature, and that +includes the seed germ. + +If we apply this reasoning to our special object, the faculty of +understanding, we find that it is not a narrowly human, nor a +transcendental, but a universal cosmic faculty. According to Homer, the +immortal gods call things by other names than mortal men. But once you +have grasped the concept of the absolute, you understand the language of +the gods, you understand that the intellect by itself is but a minute +particle, while in the interrelation with the universe it is an absolute +and integral part of the universal absolute. + +All things have a dual nature, all of them are limited parts of the +unlimited, the inexhaustible, the unknowable. Just as all things are +small and great, temporal and eternal, so all of them including the +human mind are knowable and unknowable at the same time. We must not +idolize the faculty of thought nor forget its divine nature. Man should +be humble, but without bowing in doglike submission to a transcendental +spirit, and he should be sustained by the sublime consciousness that his +spirit is the true one, the spirit of universal truth. + +Everything can be seen by eyes, including those of a hawk. Just as the +eye is the instrument of vision, so the intellect is the instrument of +thought. And just as spectacles and glasses are means of assisting the +eye in seeing, so senses, experience, and experiments are means of +assisting the intellect in understanding. With this equipment the +intellect can assimilate everything in its conceptions. It understands +"all," but "all" only in a relative sense. We understand all, just as we +buy everything for money. We can buy only what is for sale. Reason and +sunshine cannot be valued in money. We can see everything with eyes, and +yet not everything. Sounds and smells cannot be seen. Just as everything +is great and small, so everything is knowable and unknowable, according +to the meaning given to "everything" in the language of men or gods. +That word has the dual meaning of applying to any particle and to the +whole universe. So is the human mind universal, but only a universal +specialty. + +Look at that magnificently colored carnation. You see the whole flower, +and yet you do not see all of it. You do not see its scent nor its +weight. In the human language "whole" means a relative whole, which is +at the same time a part. Every particle of the universe is such a dual +thing. But in the language of the gods, which is spoken by philosophy, +only the absolute universe is whole. + +When the subject under discussion is not the intellect, but some other +part of the world, for instance the eyes, the universal concept of the +absolute is not so important, because the faculty of seeing, like the +faculty of wealth, is in little danger of being metaphysically abused. + +One knows that eyes which can see around a corner, or through a block of +iron, or which can perceive the scent of a carnation, are as meaningless +as a white sorrel. Even though our eyes cannot see the invisible, that +does not prevent them from being a universal instrument which can see +everything, that is everything visible. + +If you understand this, you will also see through the miserable wisdom +of the professors which wallows on its belly in the dust and cries with +the faithful: O Lord, O Lord! similarly to Du Bois-Reymond, who cries +out: _Ignorabimus_! It is true that the human mind is an ignoramus in +the sense that it is ever learning, because there is inexhaustible +material in nature. There is also something unknowable in every particle +of nature, just as there is something invisible in every carnation. But +the unknowable in the sense used by those ignorant people who cannot +understand the human mind because they have a transcendental monster in +their mind, such a monstrous unknowable exists only in the imagination +of the idolators to whom the true spirit reveals itself as little as the +spirit of truth. + +Just as surely as we know that there cannot be in heaven any knife +without a blade and a handle, nor any black horses that are white, just +so surely do we know that the faculty of understanding can never and +nowhere be the absolute, but must always be a special faculty. The +concept of understanding, like the concept of a knife, is limited to a +definite instrument. There may be all kinds of knives and intellects, +but nothing exists that has escaped from its own skin or from the +limitation of its own particular concept. + +By this standard you may measure the silly thought of those who speak +transcendentally of an unlimited faculty of understanding. They haven't +any right idea of the mind nor of the universe, of the conceivable nor +of the inconceivable, otherwise they would not speak in such a +nonsensical sense of the "Limits of Understanding." In short, you see +that the relative limitation or absoluteness of reason can only be +understood by means of the concept of the absolute. + + + + +TWENTY-FIRST LETTER + + +The proletarian logic of the working class searches after the supreme +being. The working class knows that it must serve but it wants to know +whom to serve. Shall it be an idol or a king? Where, who, what, is the +supreme being to which everything else is subordinate, which brings +system, consistency, logic, into our thought and actions? The next +question is then: By what road do we arrive at its understanding? Any +transcendental revelation being of no use to us, there are only two ways +open: Reason and experience. + +Now it is a mistake of common logic to regard these two roads as +separate, while, in fact, they are one and the same common road, which +by the help of empirical reason or reasonable experience leads us to the +point where we recognize that the supreme being to which everything is +subordinate, is nothing special, not a part or a particle, but the +universe itself with all its parts. + +We take medicine for the sake of health, we make efforts for the sake of +wealth. But neither health nor wealth are an end in themselves. What +good is health to us, when we have nothing to bite? What good are all +the treasures of Croesus, if health is lacking? Therefore health and +wealth must be combined. Nor is that enough. There is a spirit in us +that drives us farther ahead. There are still other treasures and +requirements, for instance contentment is surely one of them. But the +motive power of the world spirit is so infinite, that it is not +satisfied until it has everything. Everything, then, in other words the +whole world, that is the true end. + +Socrates and his school, to whom I alluded in the preceding letter, +wandered the way of separate reason for the purpose of finding the +supreme being, the true, the good, the beautiful. The platonic dialogues +paint a very magnificent picture of the truth that neither health nor +wealth, neither bravery nor devotion, are "the greatest good," but that +it is mainly a question of the understanding and use to which mankind +put these things. Accordingly they are good or bad, they are but +relative "goods." Love and faith, honesty and veracity, are good enough, +but not _the_ good; they only partake of the good. What is sought is +that which is under all circumstances absolutely good, true, and +beautiful. + +When Socrates asked his disciples to define the good or reasonable, they +enumerated as a rule a series of good and reasonable specialties, while +the master was continually compelled to instruct them, that his research +was not aimed at those objects. They name important virtues, and he +wants to know what absolute virtue is. They name good things, and he is +looking for _the_ good, for pure goodness, while the good things have +the bad quality of being good only under certain circumstances. + +The Socratic school then finds out that only the understanding or the +intellect can find the circumstances under which we may arrive at the +absolute. Understanding, the human mind, philosophy, is to them the +divine. Thus they arrive at their famous "Know thyself," which in their +language means: Hold introspection and rack your brain. But they did not +succeed in thus using the intellect as an oracle. Nor did the Christian +philosophers of later times fare any better with that method, when they +changed the title of the object of their studies and substituted God, +Liberty, and Immortality, for the good, the true, and the beautiful. + +In order to get out of the confusion resulting from the many names given +to the object of logic in the course of history, it must be remembered +that pagan as well as Christian research founded their quest for the +absolute on the innate need of understanding the supreme being which was +to be the pivot of all thought and action. Polytheism had to have a +supreme god, no matter whether his name was Zeus or Jupiter. In +consequence of this longing for unity it was very natural that the place +of the many immortals was finally taken by one eternal father of all. +The philosophers are distinguished from the theologians only in so far +as the former seek for the fulcrum of the world more on real than on +imaginary ground. + +After more than two thousand years of mediation by intermediary links, +ancient philosophy has at last been transformed into modern +democratic-proletarian logic which recognizes that the intellect is an +instrument which leads to the supreme being on condition that it does +not rack the brain but goes outside of itself and consciously connects +itself with the world outside. This connection constitutes the supreme +being, the imperishable, eternal, truth, goodness, beauty, and reason. +All other things only "partake of it," to use Platonic language. + +Although the Socratic school were handicapped by many fantastical +attributes, still they were on the road towards true logic, as neither +health nor wealth, nor any other treasure or virtue satisfied them. They +did not care for true phenomena, but for truth itself. But truth is the +universe, and man must understand that this is the only truth, in order +to be able to use his intellect logically, to be reasonable in the +highest and classical sense of this word. + +All the world speaks of logic and logical thought. But when you, my son, +as a thinking man feel the need of getting out of phraseology and +knowing exactly what words should mean, you will hardly find one book +that will give you sufficient light on the subject of logic. The best +book would be the Bible, perhaps. I mean that, when you inquire after +beginning and end, purpose and destination, in short, after that which +would give you and all things a definite support, when you search for +the vortex around which everything revolves, then the Bible does not +tell you about the beginning of this or that part of history, but speaks +of the absolute beginning and end of all history, of the general purpose +and general destination of all existence. That is what I call logic. + +The free thinkers were not satisfied with religious mythology, they +wanted to bring consistency and logic into their brains by their own +studies. Plato and Aristotle have done good work along this line. So +have the subsequent philosophers, Cartesius, Spinoza, Kant. The main +impediment for all of them was the obstinate prejudice that man could +have reason in his own brain. Of course, that is where he has it, but it +is not reasonable reason. The intellect shut up in the skull has not +wisdom in its keeping, as the ancients thought. Wisdom cannot be +acquired by racking your brain. Hegel is right: Reason is in the brain, +it is in all things, "everything is reasonable." I merely repeat, then, +that the universe is the true reason. + +You will not misunderstand the term "racking your brain." I am not an +opponent of introspective thought, but only desire to call your +attention to the fact that it has led to the wrong habit of separating +thought from sight, hearing, feeling, of divesting the mind of the body. +Just as the Christian looked for salvation outside of the flesh, so the +philosophers looked for reason or understanding outside of the +connection with the rest of the world, outside of experience. It was +especially the research after the nature of the intellect which imagined +it had to creep inside of itself. + +When studying the stars, we look at the heavens; when endeavoring to +enrich our knowledge of plants, we gather flowers. But if we attempt to +understand the mind, we must not rack our brain, nor dissect it with an +anatomical knife. We shall indeed find the brain, but not the mind, not +reason. + +And even the brain is not so easily cut out, as many an overzealous +materialist may think. The student of anatomy who pries into the nature +of the brain substance knows very well that this substance is not +contained in the head of this or that fellow, but must be sought in many +heads before the average brain is found, which differs materially from +that of Peter or Paul. This will show that your brain is not only your +own, but also "partakes" of the universal brain, and you will easily +conclude from this how much less your reason is yours alone. Hegel is +right: Not only men, but everything is reasonable. + +True, the most rotten conditions may be defended by such maxims. Hence +the great logician Hegel has the bad name of having been, not a +philosopher of the people, but a royal state philosopher of Prussia. I +will neither blacken nor whitewash him, nor will I overlook that he left +the great cause in a state of mystical obscurity. But I recognize that +even the worst prejudices, the most perverted morals, laws and +institutions, have their reasonable justification in the times and +conditions of their origin. Such an understanding is immediately +followed by the further insight, that the most reasonable things, +crushed by the wheel of time, will become rotten and unreasonable. In +short, the "good" is not any special institutions, but is found in the +interrelations of the universe. Only the absolute is absolutely good. +And for this reason not only some conservative editors of capitalist +papers, but also the revolutionary authors of the "Communist Manifesto," +are genuine Hegelians. + + + + +TWENTY-SECOND LETTER + + +Dear Eugene: + +Socrates teaches: When we walk, it is not walking, when we stand still, +it is not standing which is our purpose. We always have something +ulterior in view, until finally the general welfare is the true end of +our actions, in other words, the "good." And on closer analysis you will +find that your individual welfare, the socalled egoistic good, is not +enough in itself. + +You are not only related to your father, mother, brothers, sisters, +relatives and friends, but also to your community, state, and finally to +the entire population of the globe. Your welfare is dependent on their +welfare, on the welfare of the whole. + +I know very well that the horizon of the everyday capitalist minds does +not reach farther than they can see from the steeple of their church. +They think according to the bad maxim: The shirt is closer to the skin +than the coat. If I had to choose between the shirt and the coat, I +should prefer to wear the coat without a shirt rather than to run +around in shirt sleeves as the object of universal ridicule. The old man +who plants a tree the fruits of which he will perhaps never see is not +such a capitalist mind, otherwise he would sow seeds that would ripen +during this year's summer. + +At this juncture we must remember that the disciples of Socrates who +looked for the absolute under the name of the "good," were in so far +narrow as they conceived of it only from the moral, specifically human, +standpoint, instead of at the same time considering its cosmic side. +Just as health and wealth belong together, and even these are not +sufficient for human welfare which further requires all social and +political virtues, so the good is not comprised in the interrelations of +all mankind, but passes beyond them and connects itself with the entire +universe. Without the universe man is nothing. He has no eyes without +light, no ears without sound, no morals without physics. Man is not so +much the measure of all things; his more or less intimate connection +with all things is rather the measure of all humanity. Not narrow +morality, but the universe, the supreme being, is the good in the very +highest meaning of the word, is absolute good, right, truth, beauty, and +reason. + +In my preceding letter I spoke of universal reason and said that not +alone men, but also mountains, valleys, forests and fields, and even +fools and knaves were reasonable. Now you are familiar with that +student's song: "What's Coming from the Heights?" and you know that it +makes everything leathern. It speaks of a leathern hill, a leathern +coach-driver, a leathern letter, even father, mother, and sister are of +leather. And I mention this simply for the purpose of showing that I +understand that we cannot call leather reasonable and reasonable +leathern without brewing a mixture of language which is lacking the mark +by which all reasonable language is distinguished from chattering, +howling, and roaring. Language is only reasonable when it classifies the +world and distinguishes things by different names. + +This is easily understood. But it is more difficult to see that those +who use their intellect without logical training exaggerate distinctions +to such an extent that they ignore the connection between them. All +things are not only distinct, but also connected. But logic so far must +be blamed for not rising to the recognition of the interrelation of all +things. The science of understanding frequently treats reason and +experience as if they were two different things without a common nature. +Therefore, I make it a point to insist that there is no experience +without reason and no reason without experience. + +The linguists who dispute about the question whether reason has +developed after language or language after reason agree that both belong +together. One cannot speak without the use of reason, or talk without +sense, because chattering, or babbling, or whatever one may wish to call +it, are everything else but language. On the other hand, there can be no +reason without naming the things of this world, so as to distinguish +between leather and lady, between reason and experience. + +Of course, the idea of a leathern lady is only a youthful prank. Still +it is calculated to illustrate the dialectic transfusion of all names +and things, of all subjects and predicates. It shows indirectly that +according to common sense thought, reason has its home only in the brain +of man, and that this reason is nevertheless unsound when it does not +know and remember that the individual human brain is connected with all +brains, and reasons with the whole world, so that only all existence and +the entire universe is reasonable in the highest meaning of the word. + +In order to be able to use your reason in all research and on all +objects in a reasonable manner, you must know that the whole world has +one nature, even leather and your sister. Apparently there is a wide +gulf between these two, and yet in both of them the same forces are +active, just as a black horse has the same horse nature as a white +horse, so that from this point of view your sister is indeed leathern +and leather sisterly. Such statements sound paradoxical enough, yet I +insist on making them in this extreme manner in order to fully reveal +the absolute oneness of all existence, since it is the indispensable +basis of a reasonable understanding of logic. + +Take one of the questions of the day now agitating the public mind, for +a further illustration. Two tendencies are now observed in the most +radical political movement of the nations. One of them is called +propaganda of the deed. It works in Russia and Ireland with dynamite, +powder, and lead. The other recommends the propaganda of the word, of +the vote, and of lawful agitation. And the difference between these two +is not discussed reasonably with a view to ascertaining for whom, when, +where, and why, this or that propaganda is fitting, but every one tries +to present his relative truth with the fanatical sectarianism of those +who claim absolute truth. But if you have grasped the method of getting +at truth, the true method of using your reasoning faculty, you will take +sides for one thing today and for another thing tomorrow, because you +will understand that all roads are leading toward Rome. And if some of +the comrades outvote you occasionally, you will still value these +antagonists as friends, and if you combat them, even in a war to the +knife, this will still be a relative war, a use of the knife with +reason. + +Our proletarian logic is tolerant, not fanatical. This logic does not +want to be reasonable without passion, nor passionate without reason. It +does not abolish the difference between friend and foe, between truth +and falsehood, between reason and nonsense, but calms the fanaticism +which exaggerates those distinctions. Its fundamental maxim is: There is +only one absolute, the universe. + +Remember well that the conception of a universe which has anything +outside or beside itself is still more senseless, if possible, than the +idea of wooden iron. You thus see that all differences have one common +nature which does not permit a transcendentally wide difference between +things or opinions. Because the universe is the supreme being, therefore +all differences, even those of opinion, are unessential. + +For the purpose of studying logic, I entreat you to pay special +attention to the question of essential differences and to test it by +your own experience which will come to you from day to day. + +By means of our logic we learn the language of the gods. In the +dictionary of this language, there is only one essential being, the +universal or supreme being. On the other hand, the language of the +mortals calls every particle a "being," but such being can be relative +beings only. + +Every ear of a cornfield, every hair of an ox skin, and even every one +of their particles, is such a being. But these relative beings are at +the same time unessential attributes. Thus all differences between the +particles of the world are simultaneously essential and unessential; in +other words, they have a relative existence, they merely partake of the +supreme being, compared to whom they are absolutely unessential. Whether +you are a good or a bad man, whether your country is happy or unhappy, +free or oppressed, is very essential to you or me, but compared with the +great absolute whole it is very unessential. In the universal history +the fate of any single nation has no more significance than one hair on +my head, although none of my hairs is there by mere chance and all of +them have been counted. Hence everything is in its particular and +isolated self an unessential thing, but in the general interrelation +everything is a necessary, reasonable, essential and divine particle. + +And now we come to the moral of it all. The human reason, the special +object of logical research, partakes of the nature of the universe. It +is nothing in itself. As an isolated being, it is wholly void and +incapable of producing any understanding or knowledge. Only in +connection, not merely with the material brain, but with the entire +universe, is the intellect capable of existing and acting. It is not the +mere brain which thinks, but the whole man is required for that purpose; +and not man alone, but the total interrelation with the universe is +necessary for the purpose of thinking. Reason itself reveals no truths. +The truths which are revealed to us by means of reason, are revelations +of the general nature of the absolute universe. + +If you think of reason in this way, then, my son, you are thinking +reasonably, are world-wise, logical, and true. + + + + +TWENTY-THIRD LETTER + + + + +(A) + +Although we know that there is no actual beginning, because we are +living in the universe without beginning and end, still we mortals must +always begin at a certain point. So I have begun one of my retrospects +over the history of my subject with Plato, and at another time I have +ended with Hegel, although before and after them there has been much +philosophical thought. These two names are luminant points which throw +their light over everything which is situated between them. + +The errors of our predecessors are just as useful for the purpose of +illustration as their positive achievements. More even: the errors form +the steps of a ladder which leads toward a universal world philosophy. +We clamber up and down on it, perhaps a little irregularly, but nowadays +the crooked roads of an English park are preferred to the straight +French avenues. + +It was an achievement on the part of the Socratic and Platonic schools +to seek the good not in good specialties, but in general good, as a +"pure" or absolute thing, to search for virtue in general instead of +virtues. But it was a mistake which prevented their success, to +exaggerate the distinction between the special and the general. +According to Plato, the black and white horses canter over terrestrial +pavements, but the horse in general, which is neither brown, black, nor +white, neither as slender as a race horse nor as clumsy as a draft +horse, cantered along in the Platonic "idea," in the ideal mists. +Platonic logic lacked what is taught by our present, or if you prefer, +future proletarian logic, viz., the general understanding of the +interrelation of all things, the truth that in spite of their +individual differences all things belong together as individuals of the +same genus. The logical relation between individual and genus stuck +upside down in the brain of the noble Plato. + +He lived in a time which is similar to our own time in that the world of +the gods of the ancients was in the same state of dissolution in which +the Christian religions are today. Plato was as little satisfied with +Grecian mythology as a basis for a reasonable explanation of the world, +as we are with Christian mythology. He wanted to ascend to the universal +truth, not by way of little traditional stories, but by scientific +philosophy. His intention was good, but his weak flesh wrestled with a +task which required thousands of years for its solution. + +A while ago I said that it was that topsy-turvy view of religion as to +the relation between the special and the general which thwarted Plato. +Let me illustrate a little more in detail in what this religious +topsy-turvydom consisted. + +Here we have wind, the waters of the seas, the rays of the sun, chemical +and physical forces, forces of nature. These are specimens of the +universal force of nature. These specimens were regarded with sober +enough eyes by the Greeks, but the general nature sat high upon Olympus +in the form of Zeus. In the same way, the Greeks were familiar with +beautiful things, but beauty was an unapproachable goddess, Aphrodite. +True, the philosopher no longer believed in the gods, but he was +nevertheless still under the influence of transcendental concepts and +thus he mystified the general under the name of the "idea." The Platonic +ideas, like the gods of the heathen, are mystifications of the general. +Plato furthermore shows himself as a descendant of polytheism in this: +Although he clearly distinguished between virtue and virtuous things, +between beauty and beautiful things, between truth and true things, yet +he did not rise to the understanding that all generalities are +amalgamated and unified in the absolute generality, that, in so far, the +good, the true, and the beautiful are identical. The research for the +absolute did not become monistic until Christian monotheism lent a hand. +You will see from this that religion and philosophy form a common +chapter which has the genus of all genera for its object. Faith is +distinguished from science in that the latter no longer bows to the +dictates of imagination and of its organs, the priests, but seeks to +fathom the object of its studies by the exact use of the intellect. A +partial amalgamation of the two is, therefore, quite natural. + +"When a woman is strong, isn't she strong after the same conception and +the same strength? By the term _same_," says the Platonic Socrates, "I +mean that it makes no difference whether the strength is in the man or +in the woman." + +This quotation, taken from Plato's "Menon," shows that Platonic research +deals with the general, in this case the general concept of strength +which is the _same_ in man or woman, ox or mule, Tom and Jerry. It is +the genus by means of which black and white horses are known as horses, +dogs and monkeys as animals, animals and plants as organisms, and +finally the variations of the whole world as the universe, as the +_same_. Plato has grasped this _same-ness_ in a limited way, for +instance in regard to strength, reason, virtue, etc. But that in an +infinite sense everything is the _same_, that things as well as ideas, +bodies, and souls, are the same, remained for radical proletarian logic +to discover. + +Hand in hand with the narrow Platonic conception of the general went a +narrow theory of understanding or science, a wrong conception of the +intellect and its functions. The Socratic Plato and the Platonic +Socrates both call understanding by the name of "remembering." By +praising understanding, they teach us that we must not believe the +priests, but study by the help of our senses. But, nevertheless, they +still teach a wrong method, a narrow art of thought. + +In "Menon," the object of study is virtue. Socrates does not exactly +pose as a schoolmaster. He knows that he is called the wisest of men, +but explains that this is so, because others have a conceited opinion of +their wisdom, while his wisdom consists in humbly knowing that he knows +nothing. He does not so much try to teach what virtue is, as to +stimulate his disciples to search for it. But his idea of research is +distorted. + +Among the immortal things which he transcendentally separates from +mortal things, he also classifies the soul, "the immortal soul" which +dies and lives again, and has always lived, knows everything, but must +"remember." Thus his research becomes a cudgeling of the brain, an +introspective speculation. He is not looking for understanding by way of +natural science, through the interrelations of the world, but +speculatively through the inside of the human skull. + +In order to make his theory of memory plain, Socrates in "Menon" calls +an ignorant slave and instructs him in the fundamentals of geometry. He +quickly succeeds in getting from the ignorant fellow, who at first gives +wrong answers, the correct statements by recalling the connections of +thought by clever questioning. He thus demonstrates to his satisfaction +that man has wisdom _a priori_ in his head. But the Socratic-Platonic +art of logic has overlooked that such wisdom requires concepts which are +fixed in memory by internal _and_ external interrelations. The socalled +immortal soul with its innate wisdom has troubled the world a good while +thereafter. + +You must not think that I have a poor opinion of Plato, because I +criticize him in this way. On the contrary, I am highly delighted with +his divine and immortal writings. "Honor to Socrates, honor to Plato, +but still more honor to truth." I also assure you that I am a great +admirer of natural science, but nevertheless I should like to show you +that it indulges in narrow reasoning. + +Robert Mayer, the talented discoverer of the equivalent of heat, has +proven that the force of gravitation, of electricity, of steam, of heat, +etc., represents different modes of expression of the same force, of the +force of nature in general. But no, not quite so! He has ascertained the +numerical relation by which the transformations of one force into +another is accomplished. Thus a logical understanding sees that the +various forces and force in general are distinguished in detail but +identical in general. Darwin in his "Origin of Species" has accomplished +a similar demonstration. But neither Mayer nor Darwin have given that +general expression to world unity which is required by the art of logic. +In order to become an adept at this art, you must rise to the +understanding that all forces are various modes of expression of the one +force, all animals and species transformations of animaldom, that on the +moon a part is smaller than the whole, the same as on earth, that there +as well as here fire burns, and that as surely as you have no doubt of +your being, just as surely is there only one being, the infinite, +divine universe which has no other gods beside it, but contains all +forces, materials, and transformations. + +This is an innate science which is the cause of all other science, an +innate science which, indeed, must first be awakened in you by "memory." + +Hence our proletarian logic instructs you not to rack your brain by mere +introspection, as the ancient philosophers used to do, not to call the +senses impostors nor to search for truth without eyes, nose, and ears, +nor on the other hand to start out with the idea of certain natural +scientists who try to see, hear, and smell understanding without the +help of the intellect. + +The mistake committed in making a wrong use of the intellect is a "sin +against the holy ghost." The Socratic-Platonic doctrine of memory is one +extreme side of this sin; the other extreme side is represented by that +modern science which tries to find truth by mere external means and +rejects everything as untrue which is not ponderable or tangible. + +As this letter is more intimately connected with the following one than +is ordinarily the case, I take the liberty to unite them under the same +number and mark them with the letters A and B. + + + + +(B) + +We are still the guests of Plato today, my son, and I should like to +show you that this philosopher, in whose time natural science had barely +developed its first downy feathers, already suspected its stubborn +narrowness, although in a certain sense the Platonic logic was no less +narrow than that of the so-called exact sciences still is to-day, at +least in part. Still Platonic logic had at least the advantage of its +outlook toward the Supreme Being, the absolute, while modern naturalism +is still stuck in the narrow land of specialties. Therefore, I hope that +you will find it interesting to note with me the way in which universal +truth is peeping forth beneath the wings of Platonic speculation. + +"Listen, then, to what I am going to say," remarks Socrates in "Phaedo," +paragraph 45. "In my youth, O Cebes, I had a great interest in natural +science, for it seemed to me a magnificent thing to know the cause of +everything, to learn how everything begins, exists, and passes. A +hundred times I turned to one thing and then to another, reflecting +about these matters by myself. Do animals arise when the hot and the +cold begin to disintegrate, as some claim? Is it the blood, which +enables us to think, or the air or the fire? Or is it none of these, but +rather the brain which produces all perceptions, such as seeing, +hearing, smelling, and does memory and thought then arise by these, and +from thought and memory, when they become adjusted, understanding? And +again, when I considered that all this passes away, and the changes in +heaven and on earth, I finally felt myself poorly qualified for this +whole investigation. Let this be sufficient proof to you: In the things +which formerly were familiar and known to me, I became so doubtful by +this investigation, that I forgot even that which I thought I knew of +many other things, as for instance the question as to how man grows. I +thought that everybody knew that this was caused by eating and drinking. +For when through the food flesh comes to flesh and bone to bone, and in +the same way that which is akin to all the rest of the things which +constitute man, it seemed natural that a small mass would become larger, +and thus a small man grow tall. Does not this appear reasonable to +you?... Consider furthermore this. It seemed enough to me that a man +appeared large when standing by the side of something small, that he +looked taller by one head, and in the same way one horse by the side of +another; or what is still plainer, ten seemed to me more than eight, +because it is more by two, and a thing of two feet longer than that +which measures only one foot, because it exceeds it by one." + +Thereupon Cebes asks: "Well, and what do you think of this now?" + +"I think, by Zeus," says Socrates, "that I am far removed from knowing +the cause of any of these things. I do not even admit that by adding one +to one I obtain two, by such an addition. For I wonder how it is that +each was supposed to be one when by itself, while now, that they have +been added to one another, they have become two. Neither can I convince +myself that if one thing divides a thing in two, that this division is +the cause of it becoming two. For this would be the opposite way of +making two. But when I heard somebody reading something from a book, +written by Anaxagoras as he said, to the effect that it is reason which +had arranged everything and was the cause of everything, I rejoiced at +this cause.... Now if one were to search for the cause of all things, of +their origin, existence and passing, he should only find out what is the +best way to maintain their existence.... Hence it is not meet that man +should care for anything else in regard to himself as well as to all +other things, but for that which is best and most excellent, and then he +would also know the worst about things, for the understanding of both +is the same. Considering this, I was glad to have found a teacher who +knows about the cause of all things, who suited me, I mean Anaxagoras, +and who would now tell me, first whether the earth is round or flat, and +after telling me that, would also explain to me the necessity for it and +the cause, by pointing to the fact that it was better that it should be +so. And when he claimed that the earth was the center of things, I hoped +he would explain why it was better that it should be the center, and +when he had explained that, I was resolved that I would not ask for any +other cause. In the same way I was going to inquire after the cause of +the sun, the moon, and the other stars, etc.... For I did not believe +that after claiming all this to have been arranged by reason, he would +be dragging in any other cause than that of being best to have it just +so. And this wonderful hope I had to abandon, my friends, when I +continued to read and saw that the man accomplished nothing by reason +and adduces no other reasons relating to the arrangement of things, but +quotes air, and water, and ether, and many other astonishing things. + +"And it seemed that it was as if some one said Socrates accomplishes all +things by reason, and then, when he began to enumerate the cause of +everything I do, were to say first that I am sitting here because my +body consists of bones and sinews, and that the bones are hard and are +differentiated by joints, and the sinews so constructed that they can be +extended and shortened, etc. And further, if he tried to name the causes +of our discussion, he would refer to other similar things, such as +sound, and air and hearing, and a thousand and one other things, quite +neglecting the true cause, viz., that it suited the Athenians better to +condemn me, and that it suited me for this reason to stay here and +seemed more just to me to bear patiently the punishment which they have +ordered. For I believe that my bones and sinews would have gone long ago +to the dogs or been carried to the Boeotians, had I not considered it +more just and beautiful to atone to the state than to flee. + +"It is very illogical, then, to name such causes. But if any one were to +say that I should not be able to do what I please without these things +(sinews and bones, and whatever else I may have), he would be right. But +it would be a very thoughtless contention to say that these things are +the cause of my actions, instead of my free choice to do the best. That +would show an inability to distinguish the fact that in all things the +cause is one thing, and another thing that without which the cause could +not be cause. And it seems to me that it is precisely this which some +call by a wrong name in considering it as the cause. For this reason +some put a whirlwind from heaven round the earth and others rest it on +air as they would a wide trough on a footstool." + +So far Socrates, whose words I ask you to read repeatedly and carefully, +though they may look a little old-fashioned. This quotation is somewhat +lengthy, but I thought best not to cut it too short and to present it in +its main outlines. + +This quotation says on the whole the same thing which I have said in my +proceeding letters. According to Socrates, all our thoughts and actions +have a wider and more general purpose, which he calls the "good," so +that we even do evil for the sake of good. A crime always aims at some +particular good. Evil is misunderstood good. Applied to natural science, +this means that it misunderstands the interrelation of all its fine +discoveries. And this charge is true even to-day. Although the natural +interrelations are more and more recognized from day to day, still the +understanding of the absolute inter-connection continues to be +overlooked, especially that of the intellect with material things, or of +the ideal with the real. Natural science teaches after the manner of the +gospel of John: Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob. But it forgets +to teach that all these genitors were not genitors in the last analysis, +but begotten by old Jehovah himself. The uncultivated condition of +Grecian natural sciences may have been ground enough for Socrates to +think little of it. We, on the other hand, have to-day good reasons for +thinking highly of natural science, and for this very reason I take +pains to illustrate by its prominent example in what respect the neglect +of the universal world thought results in a narrow conception of the +world. + +We may well rejoice more lastingly than Socrates when natural science +teaches us how it happens that everything has its origin, life, and end, +because the knowledge of natural science has been far more enriched by +modern experiences than it was at the time of Anaxagoras. Nevertheless +you must not stop learning furthermore from logic that all growing, +coming into existence, living, and passing away is but a change of form. +The causes of natural science are indeed not causes, but effects of the +universe. They are reasonable effects of reason in so far as the latter +is not an isolated part, but interconnected with the universe. To +repeat: Our intellect is not ours, it does not belong to man, but it +together with man belongs to the universe. Reason and the world, the +true, the good, and the beautiful, together with Godhood which you +shall not idolize but understand in the spirit and in the world, in +truth and in reality, are all one thing, one being, and everywhere +eternal and the _same_. + +Socrates shows that he has as yet only a narrow anthropomorphic, not a +cosmic conception of the "best and good" and of reason. He was dominated +by the prejudice which still holds sway over the uncultured believers in +God, that reason is older than all the rest of the world, that it is the +ruling and antecedent creator. Our conception of logic, on the other +hand, teaches that the spirit which we have in our brain is but the +emanation of the world spirit. And this latter must not be conceived as +a nebulous world monster, not as an enormous spirit, but as the actual +universe, which in spite of all change and all variation is eternally +one, true, good, reasonable, real, and supreme. + + + + +TWENTY-FOURTH LETTER + + +The art of thought, my son, for which we are striving, is not pure and +abstract, but connected with practice, a practical theory, a theoretical +practice. It is not a separate and isolated thing, not a "thing in +itself," but is connected with all things; it has a universal +interrelation. Hence our logic, as we have repeatedly stated, is a +philosophy, world wisdom, and metaphysics. I include the latter, because +our logic excludes nothing, not even the transcendental. It teaches that +everything, even transcendentalism, if practiced with consciousness and +the necessary moderation, and at the right time and place, for instance +at the carnival, is a reasonable and sublime pleasure. + +All prominent philosophers were explorers and users of the same art of +thought, of living, of viewing the world, although many of them retired +to the solitude and were ascetics. Can the world be understood in a +hermitage? Yes and no. After you have been traveling and seeing many +lands, it is well to retire and classify the impressions received, and +thus to reflect about a true philosophy of life. In this way, secluded +thought, in the relative meaning of the word, that is, in connection +with observation and experience, with enjoyment and life, is a veritable +savior. Body and soul belong together, and if they are separated, it +must be remembered that such a separation is a mere matter of form, that +they are in fact one thing, attributes of the same being which is +infinitely great, so great that all other beings are but its fringes. + +The art of distinction distinguishes the infinite infinitely with the +consciousness that in reality everything is interrelated without +distinction and is one. + +This truth, and thus absolute truth, is ignored by laymen and +professional authorities alike. The thousand year dualism between body +and soul has been especially instrumental in preventing the +understanding of the universal interrelation. The whole history of +philosophy is but a wrestling with the dualism between matter and mind. +It was only by degrees that it moved towards its monistic goal. + +After the brilliant triple star Socrates-Plato-Aristotle was +extinguished, the philosophical sky was covered with dark clouds. The +heathens stepped from the stage, and Christianity and the dogmas of its +church predominated the logic of men, until at last a new scientific +light arose in the beginning of modern times. It was especially +Cartesius and Spinoza who were most brilliant among the early thinkers +that emancipated their minds slowly and under great difficulties. +Spinoza, of Jewish descent, is especially interesting in his fight +against narrowmindedness and for a universal philosophy. He wrote an +"Essay on the Improvement of the Intellect and on the Way by which it is +best led to a true Understanding of Things." He, as well as we, was +looking for the best way, the true way, the way of truth. He, as well as +we, seeks to study and practice the fundamentals of the art of thought. + +He begins: "After experience has taught me that everything which the +ordinary life offers is vain, and I have seen that everything which I +feared is only good or bad in so far as the mind is moved by it, I +finally resolved to investigate whether there is any true good--whether +there is anything the discovery of which will forever secure continuous +and supreme joy. What is most generally found in life, and what mankind +regards as the highest good, may be reduced to three things, viz., +wealth, honor, and sensual pleasure." + +After Spinoza has then uncovered the shadowy side and the vanity of +these popular ideals, he calls them "unsafe by their very nature," while +he is looking for "permanent good," which is "insecure only as regards +its possession, but not in its nature." + +But how is that to be found? + +"Here I shall say shortly what I mean by true good, and what is at the +same time the highest good. In order to grasp this fully, we must +remember that good or bad are only relative terms, and thus the same +thing may be called good or bad according to its relations, or on the +other hand perfect or imperfect." + +Spinoza, forestalling the object of his research, discovers that the +true, supreme and permanent good is the "understanding of the unity" of +the soul with the entire nature. "This then," he says, "is the goal +which I am coveting." + +"To this end, we must study morals, philosophy, and the education of +boys, and combine with this study the entire science of medicine, +because health materially assists us in reaching our ideal. Neither must +mechanics be neglected, because many difficult things are made easy by +art. Above all we must strive to find a way for the improvement of the +intellect." + +Here we have once more arrived at the pivotal point of our subject, my +dear disciple. Who or what is the intellect, whence does it come from, +whither does it lead? Answer: It is a light which does not shine within +itself, but throws rays outside of itself for the illumination of the +world. For this reason the science which has the faculty of +understanding for its object, though a limited, is at the same time a +universal science, a universal world wisdom. + +But isn't it a contradiction that a special science wants to be general +world wisdom? Is not general wisdom that which comprises all knowledge, +all special science? Must I not know everything in order to be world +wise? And how can any single brain assume to acquire all knowledge, to +know everything? Answer: It is impossible for you to know everything; +but you can rise to the understanding that your special wisdom and that +of all others is a part of universal wisdom and form together a relative +whole which in connection with all the rest of the world constitute the +absolute being. This understanding represents pure logic and is +universal understanding, understanding of the universal being. + +Do not be troubled by the fact that Socrates was looking for virtue and +the "best," or Spinoza for permanent and supreme joy, and that their +wisdom aimed only at the narrow circle of human life, without rising to +the cosmic interrelation. The means and the instrument by the help of +which they strive for their ideal is the intellect. It is quite natural +that intellectual research led to the study of the intellect, to the +"improvement of the intellect," to the "critique of reason," to "logic," +and finally to the understanding that the faculty of thought is an +inseparable part of the monistic whole, of the absolute which lends +support, consistency, reason and sense to all thought. + +On his exploring tour for the improvement of the intellect, Spinoza +picks up a remark which seems to me worthy of closer attention. He says +in so many words: If we are looking for a way to improve the intellect, +is it not necessary for the purpose of finding such a way to first +improve the intellect, in order to be at all able to discern the way +which leads to an improvement of the intellect, and so on without end? +"We must have a hammer to forge the iron, and in order to have a hammer, +it must be made; but for this purpose we need another hammer and other +instruments, and so forth without end. In this way it must not be proven +that men have no power to forge iron. Men have rather accomplished only +the easiest tasks with difficulty and imperfectly by the help of the +natural tools of their bodies. Gradually they accomplished more +difficult things with less labor and better. And thus they slowly +proceeded from the simplest tasks to the instruments." + +I admire in this process of reasoning the brilliant understanding that +the hammer is not such a limited instrument as the untrained human brain +thinks. It thinks that a hammer is not a pair of tongs. But Spinoza says +that the bare fist is a hammer when used for striking, much more a stone +or a club. A pair of tongs used to drive a nail becomes a hammer; a +hammer which I use to draw a nail becomes a pair of tongs. Fist or club, +sense or nonsense, all is one. In other words, things are separated, but +never so far as the fantastical dreamers think. Just as hammer and +tongs, saw and file, are parts of the class of tools, so all things are +parts of the one and absolute universe. Recognize, then, dear Eugene, +that the relative and the absolute are not separated by such a +bridgeless chasm, that the one should be praised to the skies and the +other damned to the lowest pit. Understand that everything is +dialectically interrelated, that the infinite, eternal, divine, can live +only in the finite, special things, and that on the other hand the parts +of the world can exist only in the absolute. In short, raise your +conception to the universal conception, and at the same time, understand +the supreme being in all its parts instead of idolizing it. + + + + +The Positive Outcome of Philosophy + +BY JOSEPH DIETZGEN + +Translated by Ernest Untermann + + + + +THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY + + + + +PREFACE + + +As a father cares for his child, so an author cares for his product. I +may be able to give a little additional zest to the contents of this +work by adding an explanation how I came to write it. + +Although born by my mother in 1828, I did not enter my own world until +"the mad year," 1848. I was learning the trade of my father in my +paternal shop, when I saw in the "Koelnische Zeitung," how the people of +Berlin had overcome the King of Prussia and conquered "liberty." This +"liberty" now became the first object of my musings. The parties of that +period, the disturbers and howlers, made a great deal of fuss about it. +But the more I heard about it, and hence became enthusiastic over it, +the duller, hazier and more indistinct became the meaning of it, so that +it turned things upside down in my head. The psychologists have long +known that enthusiasm for a cause and understanding of that cause are +two different things. Mark, for instance, the zeal displayed by Catholic +peasants in singing their mass, although they do not understand a word +of Latin. + +What is meant by political freedom? What is its beginning, what its end? +Where and how are we to find a positive and definite knowledge of it? In +the parties of the middle, the so-called "constitutionals," as well as +among the bourgeois democrats, there was no end of dissension. Nothing +could be learned there. Among them, as among the Protestants, every one +was a chosen interpreter of the gospel. + +However, the papers of the extremes, that is, the "Neue Preussische" +with its "For God, King and Fatherland," and the "Neue Rheinische," the +organ of "Democracy," gave me a hint that liberty had some sort of a +material basis. During the following years, my life in rural +surroundings gave me leisure to follow this scent. On one side, it was +the work of men like Gerlach, Stahl, and Leo, on the other of Marx and +Engels, that gave me a foothold. + +Though the communists and the ultra-conservatives came to widely +different conclusions, still I felt and read between the lines that both +of these extreme parties based their demands on one fundamental premise. +They knew what they wanted; they both had a definite beginning and end. +And that permitted the assumption that both had a common philosophy. The +Prussian landholding aristocracy based the cross, which they wore as an +emblem on their hats, on the historically acquired royal military power +and on the positive divine revelation of the Bible printed in black and +supported by the ecclesiastical police force dressed in black. And the +Communist point of departure was quite as positive, unquestionable and +material, viz., the growing supremacy of the mass of the people with +their proletarian interests based on the historically acquired +productive power of the working class. The spirit of both of these +hostile camps was descending from the results of philosophy, primarily +from the Hegelian school. Both of them were armed with the +philosophical achievements of the century, which they had not only +mechanically assimilated, but rather continually provided with fresh +food like a living being. + +In the beginning of the fifties, a pamphlet was published by one of the +cross bearers, Stahl, entitled "Against Bunsen." This Bunsen was at the +time the Prussian Embassador at London, a crony of the ruling Prussian +King Frederic William IV., and, apart from this, nothing but a liberal +muddle head who was interested in political and religious tolerance. + +The pamphlet of the cross bearer Stahl attacked this tolerance and +demonstrated valiantly that tolerance could be preached only by a +muddled free lance to whom religion and fatherland were indifferent +conceptions. Religious faith, so far as it is truth, so he said, has a +true power and can transpose mountains. Such a faith could not be +tolerant and indifferent, but must push its propaganda with fire and +sword. + +In the same way in which Stahl defended the interests of the landed +aristocracy, the philosopher Feuerbach spoke in the interest of the +infidel revolutionaries. Both of them were to that extent in accord with +the "Communist Manifesto" that they no longer regarded Liberty as a +phantasmagoria, but as a being of flesh and blood. + +When I had realized this, it dawned upon me that any conception +elucidated by philosophy, in this case the idea of liberty, had this +peculiarity: Liberty is as yet an abstract idea. In order to become +real, it must assume a concrete, special form. + +Political freedom as a glittering generality is a thing of no reality. +Under such fantastic ideal the constitutionalists or the liberals +conceal the liberty of the money bag. Under these circumstances, they +are quite right in demanding German unity with Prussia as a head, or a +republic with a grand duke at the top. The landed aristocracy also are +right in demanding the liberty of that aristocracy. And the Communists +are still more right, for they demand the liberty that will guarantee +bread and butter for the mass of the people and will fully set free all +the forces of production. + +From this experience and conclusion it follows that true liberty and the +highest right are composed of individual liberties and rights, that are +opposed to one another without being inconceivable. It is easy to +proceed from this premise to the rule of thought laid down in this work, +that the brain need not make any excursions into the transcendental in +order to find his way through the contradictions of the real world. + +In this way I passed from politics to philosophy, and from philosophy to +the theory of positive knowledge which I presented to the public in 1869 +in my little work "The Nature of Human Brain Work." Further studies on +the general powers of understanding have added to my special knowledge +of this subject, so that I am now enabled to fill the old wine into a +new bottle instead of publishing a new edition of my old work. + +The science which I present in the following pages is very limited in +its circumference, but all the better founded and important in its +consequences. This, I trust, will be accepted as a sufficient excuse for +the recurring repetition of the same statements in a different form. My +remaining confined to a single point requires no apology. What is left +undone by one, is bequeathed as a problem to others. + +There might be some dispute over the question, how much of this positive +achievement of philosophy is due to the author and to his predecessors. +But that is an interminable task of small concern. No matter who hoisted +the calf out of the well, so long as it is out. Anyway, this whole work +treats of the concatenation and interdependence of things, and this also +throws a bright light on the question of mine and thine. + +J. DIETZGEN. + +CHICAGO, March 30, 1887. + + + + +THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY + + + + +I + +POSITIVE KNOWLEDGE AS A SPECIAL OBJECT + + +That which we call science nowadays was known to our ancestors by a name +which then sounded very respectable and distinguished, but which has in +the meantime acquired a somewhat ludicrous taste, the name of wisdom. +This gradual transition of wisdom into science is a positive achievement +of philosophy which well deserves our attention. + +The term "ancestors" is very indefinite. It comprises people who lived +more than three thousand years ago as well as those who died less than a +hundred years ago. And a wise man was still respected a hundred years +ago, while to-day that title always implies a little ridicule and +disrespect. + +The wisdom of our ancestors is so old that it has not even a date. It +reaches back, the same as the origin of language, to the period when man +developed from the animal world. But if we call a wise man, in the +language of our day, a philosopher, then it is at once plain that wisdom +is descended from the ancient Greeks. This wonderful nation produced the +first philosophers. + +Whether this term indicates a man who loves wisdom or one who loves +science, is of little moment to-day, and there was no such distinction +in ancient times. We remember that it was entirely undecided among the +Greeks whether a mathematician, an astronomer, a physician, an orator, +or a student of the art of living deserved the title of a philosopher. +These professions were not clearly distinguished. They were wrapped up +one in another like the embryo in a mother's womb. While humanity had +still little knowledge, a man might well be wise. But to-day it is +necessary to specialize, to devote one's self to a special science, +because the field of exploration has grown so extended. The philosopher +of to-day is no longer a wise man, but a specialist. + +The stars are the objects of astronomy, the animals of zoology, the +plants of botany. Who and what are now the objects of philosophy? This +may be explained in one word to an expert. But if we try to give +information to the general public, the matter becomes difficult. + +What do I know about the shoe industry, if I know that it produces +shoes? I know something general about it, but I have no knowledge of its +details. It is impossible to give sufficient information on the details +of shoemaking to any one in a few words, not even to an educated person. +Neither is it possible to explain the object of philosophy in such a +way. The object may be stated, but not explained, for it cannot be made +plain and brought home to the understanding in a few words. + +That is the word, understanding. The understanding is the object of +philosophy. + +We must at once call the reader's attention to the ambiguity of this +term. Understanding, knowledge, is the object of all science. That is +nothing special. Every study seeks to enlighten the brain. But +philosophy wishes to be a science and does not desire to relapse into +antiquity by becoming universal wisdom. To say that understanding is the +object of philosophy is to give merely the same reply which Thales, +Pythagoras, or Plato would have given. Has proud philosophy gained +nothing since? What is its positive achievement? That is the question. + +Philosophy to-day still has understanding for its object. But it is no +longer indefinite understanding which tries to embrace everything, but +rather the understanding of the method by which knowledge may be gained. +Philosophy now wishes to learn _how it comes to pass_ that other objects +may be illumined by the mind. To speak plainly, it is no longer the +understanding which seeks to know everything as it did at the time of +Socrates that is now the special study of philosophy, but rather the +mind itself, its method and the perceptive powers of thought and +understanding. + +If this were all, if the world's wise men had done nothing but to at +last find the object of philosophy, it would be a very scanty +achievement. No, the harvest is much richer. The present day theory of +human understanding is a real science, which well deserves to be +popularized. Our ancestors sought understanding after the manner of +Socrates and Plato in the entrails of the human brain, while at the same +time despising the experience outside of it. They hoped to find truth by +cudgeling their brain. "Honor to Socrates, honor to Plato; but still +more honor to Truth!" + +Aristotle showed a little more interest in the outer world. With the +downfall of the old social stage the old philosophy naturally succumbed +also. It did not revive until a few hundred years ago, at the beginning +of modern times. + +A short while ago, Shakespeare attracted much attention, when some one +claimed to have discovered that it was not he who wrote those famous +dramas and tragedies, but his contemporary Bacon of Verulam, Lord +Chancellor of England. Whether Shakespeare keeps his laurels or not, +Bacon's name is still great enough, for it is generally accepted as the +mile stone of modern philosophy. + +One might say that philosophy was asleep from the time of Aristotle to +that of Bacon. At least it produced no remarkable results during that +period, and it cannot be denied that philosophy from ancient Greek days +to the present times moved in a mystic fog which detracted much from its +study in the eyes of educated and honest men. But the philosophers +themselves are less to blame for this than the concealment of the +object. Only after the entire social development has furthered the human +understanding to the point where it can benefit from the light spread by +the various branches of science, does philosophy become conscious of its +special object and able to separate its positive achievements from the +rubbish of the past. + +If we compare the old Grecian wisdom with modern science, the outcome of +philosophy looks insignificant by the side of the achievements of +science. Nevertheless, great as the value of the aggregate product of +science may be, it is composed of individual values, and every one of +its parts is worthy of consideration. The method, the way, the form, in +which the mind arrives at its practical creations is one of these parts. +The mind, on its march from ignorance to its present wealth has not only +gathered a treasury of knowledge, but also improved its methods, so that +the further constructive work of science proceeds faster now. Who will +fail to recognize that material production has accumulated a treasure in +the methods by which it produces to-day, which is by no means of less +value than the accumulated national wealth itself? The positive outcome +of philosophy bears the same relation to the wealth of science. + + + + +II + +THE POWER OF COGNITION IS KIN TO THE UNIVERSE + + +The way of Truth, or the true way, is not musing, but the conscious +connection of our thoughts with the actual life--that is the +quintessence of the teachings of philosophy produced by evolution. But +this is not everything. If I know that a tanner makes leather, I do not +by any means know everything he does, because there still remains the +manner and method of his manipulations. In the same way, the doctrine of +the interrelation of mind and matter, which is the product of the entire +social development, requires a better and more specific substantiation, +so that its true quality as a positive achievement of philosophy, or of +the theory of knowledge may be better understood. If the matter is +represented in this bare manner--it does, indeed, resemble the egg of +Columbus--one does not see why so much should be made of it. But if we +enter into the details that have produced the result, we do not only +learn to better respect the prominent philosophers, but their works also +reveal a rich mine of special and comprehensive knowledge. + +All sciences are closely related, for advances in one branch are +preparations for advances in others. Astronomy is unthinkable without +mathematics and optics. Every science has begun unscientifically, and in +the course of the accumulation of individual knowledge a more or less +exact systematic organization of this knowledge has resulted. No science +has as yet arrived at completeness and perfectness. We have as yet more +the results of experimental effort than accomplished perfection. +Philosophy is no better off in this respect. We rather believe we are +doing something to overcome a deeply rooted prejudice when we state that +philosophy is no worse off than other sciences, so long as we succeed in +ascertaining that it has accomplished positive results and in pointing +them out. + +It is a positive accomplishment of philosophy that mankind to-day has a +clear and unequivocal conception of the necessity of the division of +labor as a means of being successful. Our present day philosophers no +longer make excursions into dreamland in the quest of the True, the +Beautiful, and the Good, as did the ancients. The True, the Beautiful, +and the Good, are nevertheless the objects of all modern science, only, +thanks to evolution, these objects are now sought by special means. And +the clear consciousness of this condition of things is a philosophical +consciousness. + +It is a part of the theory of understanding to know that in order to +accomplish something one must limit oneself to a specialty. That is a +fundamental demand for the use of common sense, which the primitive +musing brain did not realize. Thinking must be done with wide open and +active eyes, with alert senses, not with closed eyes or fixed gaze. This +is a part of logic. We do not deny that men have always done their +thinking by means of the senses. We only claim that they did not do so +from principle, otherwise the old complaint about the unreliability of +the senses as a means of knowledge would not have lived so long. Neither +would the inner man have been so excessively overestimated, nor abstract +thought so much celebrated, just as if it alone were the child of nobler +birth. I do not wish to detract from the merits of the power of +abstraction, but I simply claim that the clay of which Adam was made was +no less divine than the spiritual breath that gave him his life. Nor do +I mean that it is due to philosophy alone that mankind learned not to +strain "understanding" in abstract vaporings, but instead to introduce +the division of labor and to take up the various specialties with open +senses. The technique of understanding is the product of the entire +movement of civilization, and as such a positive accomplishment of +philosophy. The total process of evolution has placed the philosophers +on their feet. + +There is no doubt that up to the present time, philosophy partook more +of the character of a desire and love of science than of world wisdom. +This wisdom does not amount to much, even to-day. This is plainly +demonstrated by the dissensions of the educated and uneducated on all +questions pertaining to wisdom of life. Socrates in the market of +Athens, and Plato in his dialogues, have probably said better things +about the questions: "What is virtue? What is justice? What is moral and +reasonable?" than the professors of philosophy would know how to say +to-day. Kant has well said that the unanimity of the experts is the test +by which one may decide what is a scientific fact and what is mere +dispute. From this it is easy to judge that wisdom of life is still in +a bad way and will have to wait for its scientific transformation. + +We declared understanding itself to be the special object of philosophy +and shall now attempt to outline the results so far obtained by it. + +One of the first requirements for the education of the object of +philosophy is to recall its various names. The understanding, or the +power of knowledge, is also called intelligence, intellect, mind, +spirit, reason, power of cognition, of conception, of distinction, of +imagination, of judgment, and of drawing conclusions. The attempt has +frequently been made to analyze understanding or to dissect it into its +various parts and to specialize them by the help of those names. +Especially logic knows how to give particular explanations of what is +imagination, a conception, a judgment, and a conclusion. It has even +divided these sections into subsections, so that a trained logician +might reproach me with being ignorant for applying various names to +intelligence, because only the common people confound those names and +use them as synonyms, while science has long used them in their proper +order for designating special parts of intelligence. + +To such a reproach, I answer that Aristotle and the subsequent formal +logicians have made some pretty pointed observations and excellent +arrangements in this field. But these proved to be premature or +inadequate, because the observations on which the ancient intellectual +explorers relied were too scanty. This scantiness of the observations +made in regard to intelligence, and by intelligence, has kept the human +race in the mazes of intellectual bondage and by this mysticism has even +prevented the most advanced minds from penetrating deeper into this +obscure question. The history of philosophy is not the history of a +useless struggle, but yet a history of a hard struggle with the +question: What is, what does, of what parts consists, and of what nature +is understanding, intelligence, reason, intellect, etc.? So long as this +question is unsettled, the questioner is entitled to dispense with any +and all sections and subsections of the intellectual object and to +regard the various names as synonymous. + +The main accomplishment in the solution of this question is the ever +clearer and preciser knowledge of our days that the nature of the human +intellect is of the same kind, genus or quality as the whole of nature. +In order that the theory of understanding may be able to elucidate this +point, it must divest itself, more or less, of the character of a +speciality and occupy itself with all of nature, assume the character of +cosmogony. + +It is principally an achievement of philosophy that we now know +definitely and down to the minutest detail that the human mind is a +definite and limited part of the unlimited universe. + +Just as a piece of oak wood has the twofold quality of partaking not +alone, with its oaken nature, of the general nature of wood, but also of +the unlimited generality of all nature, so is the intellect a limited +specialty, which has the quality of being universal as a part of the +universe and of being conscious of its own and of all universality. The +boundless universal cosmic nature is embodied in the intellect, in the +animal as well as in man, the same as it is embodied in the oak wood, in +all other wood, in all matter and force. The worldly monistic nature +which is mortal and immortal, limited and unlimited, special and +general, all in one, is found in everything, and everything is found in +nature--understanding or the power of knowledge is no exception. + +It is this twofold nature of the universe, this being at the same time +limited and unlimited, this reflection of its eternal essence and +eternal truth in changing phenomena, which has rendered its +understanding very difficult for the human mind. This intricate quality +has been represented by religion in the fantastic picture of two worlds, +separating the temporal from the eternal, the limited from the +unlimited, too unreasonably far. But nowadays the indestructibility of +matter and the eternity of material forces is a matter of fact accepted +by natural science. + +The positive outcome of philosophy, then, is the knowledge of the +monistic way in which the seeming duality of the universe is active in +the human understanding. + + + + +III + +AS TO HOW THE INTELLECT IS LIMITED AND UNLIMITED + + +Understanding taught by experience no longer muses about universal +nature, but acquires a knowledge of it by special studies. By degrees +philosophy, first unconsciously and lately clearly and plainly, has +taken up the problem of ascertaining the limits of understanding. + +This philosophical problem first assumed the form of polemics. It became +opposed to the religious dogma which represented the human mind as a +small, subservient, limited and restricted emanation of the unlimited +divine spirit. This terrestrial emanation was regarded as too limited +to understand and find its divine source. The study of the limits of the +understanding has now emancipated itself from this dogma, but not to +such an extent that there is no longer any mysterious obscurity floating +around the understanding and intelligence, and especially around the +question whether the human mind can penetrate only into some things +while others will remain in the unscrutable darkness of faith and +intuition, or whether it may penetrate boldly and without hindrance into +the infinity of the physical and chemical universe. + +We here desire to claim as a positive outcome of philosophy that it has +at last acquired the clear and exact knowledge that a socalled infinite +spirit, in the religious sense, is a fantastic, unscientific conception. +In the natural sense of the word, the human powers of understanding are +universal and yet in spite of their universality they are, quite +naturally, limited. The human understanding has its limits, why should +it not? Only drop the illusion that a dark mystery is concealed beyond +these limits. + +The understanding is a force among others, and everything that is +located alongside of other things is limited and restricted by them. We +can understand everything, but we can also touch, see, hear, feel, and +taste everything. We also have the power of moving about, and other +qualities. One art limits another, and yet each is unlimited in its own +field. The various human powers belong together and constitute together +the human wealth. Be careful not to separate the power of understanding +from other natural powers. In a certain sense it must be separated, +because it is the special object of our study, but it must always be +remembered that such a separation has only a theoretical value. + +Just as our power of vision can see everything, so our understanding can +grasp everything. + +Let us look a little closer at this statement. + +How can we see everything? Not from any single standpoint. In that sense +our powers of vision are limited. But what is not visible in the +distance, becomes so on approaching nearer to it. What one eye cannot +see, that of others can, and what is invisible to the naked eye, is +revealed by the telescope and microscope. Nevertheless the vision +remains limited, even though it may be the sharpest, and armed with the +best artificial means. Even if we regard all the eyes of the past and +future generations of humanity as organs of the universal human vision, +this vision still remains limited. Nevertheless, no one will complain +about the limits of human power, because we cannot see sounds with our +eyes or hear the light with our ears. + +The understanding of man is limited, just as his vision is. The eye can +look through a glass pane, but not through a plate of iron. Yet no one +will call any eye limited, because it cannot see through a block of +metal. These drastic examples are very opportune, because there are +certain wise men who reflectively lay their finger on their nose and +call attention to the limits of our intellect in that sense, just as if +the knowledge gained on earth by scientific means were only a nominal, +not a real, understanding and knowing. The human intellect is thus +degraded to the position of a substitute of some "higher" intellect +which is not discovered, but must be "believed" to exist in the small +head of a fairy or in the large head of an almighty being above the +clouds. Would any one try to make us believe that there is a great and +almighty eye that can look through blocks of metal the same as through +glass? The idea of a spiritual organ with an infinite understanding is +just as senseless. An unlimited single thing, an unlimited single being, +is impossible, unless we regard the whole world, the world without +beginning and without end, the infinite world, as a unit. Within this +world everything is subject to change, but nothing can go beyond its +genus without losing its name and character. There are various kinds of +fire, but none that does not burn, none which has not the general nature +of fire. Neither is there any water without the general nature of water, +nor a spirit that is elevated above the general nature of spirits. In +our days of clear conceptions the tendency toward the transcendental is +mere fantastic vaporing. + +It is not alone unscientific, it is fantastic, to think even afar of a +higher power of thought or understanding than the human one. One might +as well think of a higher horse which runs with eight, sixteen, or +sixteen hundred legs and carries away his rider in a higher air at a +higher speed than that of the wind or the light. + +It is a part of the achievements of philosophy, of correct methods of +thought, of the art of thought or dialectics, to know that we must use +all conceptions, without exception, in a limited, rational, commonplace +way, unless we wish to stray into that region where there are mountains +without valleys and where every theory of understanding loses its mind. + +It is true that all things, including our understanding, may be +improved. Everything develops, why should not our intellects do so? At +the same time we may know _a priori_ that our intellect must remain +limited, of course not limited in the sense of the dunce, just as our +eyes will never become so sharp that they can see through metal blocks. +Every individual has its limited brain, but humanity, so the positive +achievements of philosophy have shown, has an intellect of as universal +a power as any that can be imagined, required, or found, in heaven or on +earth. + +We maintain that philosophy so far has acquired something positive, has +left us a legacy, and that this consists in a clear revelation of the +method of using our intellect in order to produce excellent pictures of +nature and its phenomena. + +For the purpose of making the reader familiar with this method, with +this legacy of philosophy, we must enter more closely into the essence +of the instrument which lifts all the treasures of science. We are +especially interested in the question, whether it is a finite or +infinite and universal instrument with which we go fishing for truth. It +is the custom to belittle the faculties of the human understanding, in +order to keep it under the supremacy of the divine metaphysical augurs. +It is quite easy to see, therefore, that the question of the essence of +our powers of understanding is intimately related to, or even identical +with, the question of how we may be permitted to use them, whether they +should be used only for the investigation of the limited, finite, or +also for the study of the eternal, infinite, and immeasurable. + +We object here to the tendency of belittling the human mind. About a +hundred years ago, the philosopher Kant found it appropriate to draw the +sword against those who played fast and loose with the human mind, +against the socalled metaphysicians. They had made a miraculous thing of +the instrument of thought, a matter for effusions. In order to be able +clearly to state the outcome of philosophy, we must acquaint the reader +with the fact that this instrument of thought, in its way, is one of the +best and most magnificent things in existence, but that, at the same +time, it is bound to its general kind or genus. The human understanding +perceives quite perfectly, but we must not have an exaggerated idea of +its perfection, any more than we would of a perfect eye or ear, that, be +they ever so perfect, cannot see the grass grow or hear the fleas cough. + +God is a spirit, says the bible, and God is infinite. If he is a spirit, +an intellect, such as man, then it would be fair to assume that man's +intellect is also infinite, or even is the divine spirit itself which +has taken up its abode in the human brains. People cudgeled their brains +with such confused conceptions, so long as the object of modern +philosophy, the intellect, was a mystery. Now it is recognized as a +finite, natural phenomenon, an energy or a force which is not the +infinite, though it is, like all other matter and force, a part of the +infinite, eternal, immeasurable. + +Leaving all religious notions aside, the infinite, immeasurable, +eternal, is not personal, but objective; it is no longer referred to as +a masculine, but as a neuter. It may be called by many names, such as +the universe, the cosmos, or the world. In order to understand clearly +that the spirit which we have in our minds, is a finite part of the +world, we must get a little better acquainted with this infinite, +eternal world. Our physical world cannot have any other world beside it, +because it is the universe. Within the universe there are many worlds, +which all of them make out the cosmos, which has neither a beginning nor +an end in time and space. The cosmos reaches across all time and space, +"in heaven and on earth, and everywhere." + +But how do I know what I state in such an offhand manner? Well, the +knowledge of the universe, of the infinite, is given to us partly by +birth and partly by experience. This knowledge is inherent in man just +as language is, viz., in the germ, and experience gives us a proof of +the infinite in a negative way, for we never learn the beginning or the +end of anything. On the contrary, experience has shown us positively +that all socalled beginnings and ends are only interconnections of the +infinite, immeasurable, inexhaustible, and unfathomable universe. +Compared to the wealth of the cosmos the intellect is only a poor +fellow. However, this does not prevent it from being the most perfect +instrument for clearly and plainly reflecting the finite phenomena of +the infinite universe. + + + + +IV + +THE UNIVERSALITY OF NATURE + + +The positive outcome of philosophy concerns itself with specifying the +nature of the human mind. It shows that this special nature of mind does +not occupy an exceptional position, but belongs with the whole of nature +in the same organization. In order to show this, philosophy must not +discuss the human mind as if it were something separate from nature, but +must rather deal with its general nature. And since this general nature +of our intellect is the same of which every other thing partakes, it +follows that nature in general, or the universe, or the cosmos, all of +which is the same thing, are an indispensable object in the special +study of the nature of the human mind. + +We have already said that the experienced understanding of the present +day no longer muses over nature in general in the fantastic and mere +introspective manner as of old, but rather seeks to obtain a knowledge +of it by special study. In so doing we do not forget that the study of +specialties at the same time throws a light on the general relation of +things, of which every species is but a part. + +Since the human mind is a part of the whole of nature, viz., that part +which has the desire and longing to obtain a conception of all the other +parts, and more than that, to understand the interconnection between the +parts and the undivided and infinite whole, it is easy to comprehend the +fact that the philosophers have occupied themselves so much with the +most real and most perfect being. Whether this being was called God, or +substance, or idea, or the absolute, or nature, or matter, all of these +terms cannot prevent us today from approaching infinite nature with +sober senses, in order to gain, by its help, a lifelike picture of the +human intellect, which is not a mystical being, but a reasonable part of +the same nature that lives reasonably and intelligibly in all other +parts of nature. + +The inexperienced powers of distinction which did not understand their +function, magnified the difference between the infinite and its finite +phenomena out of all proportion. Now that we have made the philosophical +experience that the general as well as the special nature of the human +intellect admits only of moderate and bounded distinctions, we arrive at +the conclusion that the immeasurable, all-perfect, and eternal being is +composed of finite, commensurable, imperfect, and transient things in +such a way that the universal being combines in itself all perfections +as well as all imperfections. This contradictory universal being, this +nature to which all contradictory attributes may be simultaneously +assigned, in a certain sense puts the old rule to shame that you cannot +at the same time affirm and deny the predicate of any subject. + +Nature comprises all and is all. Reason and unreason, being and not +being, all these contradictions are contained in it. Outside of it there +are no affirmations and no contradictions. Since the human mind +eternally moves in affirmations and negations, in order to obtain a +clear picture of things, it has an interminable task in understanding +the interminable object. + +Our brain is supposed to solve the contradictions of nature. If it knows +enough about itself to realize that it is not an exception from general +nature, but a natural part of the same whole--although it calls itself +"spirit"--then it also knows and must know that its clearness can differ +but moderately from the general confusion, that the solution of the +problem cannot differ materially from the problem itself. The +contradictions are solved only by reasonable differentiation, only by +the science of understanding which shows that extravagant differences +are nothing but extravagant speculations. The human understanding +inclines to exaggerations in its untrained state, and it is a relic of +untrained habits to differentiate in an absolute manner the spiritual +from the rest of nature, to make a too extravagant distinction between +it and the physical body. It is the merit of philosophy to have given us +a clear doctrine of the use of the intellect, and this doctrine +culminates in the rule not to make exaggerated, but only graduated +distinctions. For this purpose it is necessary to realize that there is +only one being and that all other socalled beings are but minor +expressions of the same general being, which we designate by the name of +nature or universe. + +In consequence of the human bent to exaggeration, the human +understanding has been regarded as a being of a different nature from +that of natural beings which exist outside of the intellect. But it must +be remembered that every part of nature is "another" individual piece of +it, and, furthermore, that every other and different part is really +nothing different but a uniform piece of the same general nature. The +thing is mutual: The general nature exists only in its many individual +parts, and these in their turn exist only in, with and by the general +cosmic being. + +Nature which is divided by the human understanding into East and West, +South and North, and into a hundred thousand other named parts, is yet +an undivided whole of which we may say with certainty that it has as +many innumerable beginnings and ends as it is without beginning and end, +as it is the infinite itself. It is well known that there is nothing new +under the sun. Nothing is created, nothing disappears, and yet there is +a continuous change. + +The brain of man has a right and a left side, a top and a bottom, a +front and a back part, an interior and an exterior. And the innermost of +the brain again has two sides or qualities, a physical and a spiritual. +They are so little divided that the term brain has two meanings, +designating now the physical brain, now its mental functions. In +speaking here exclusively of the mind, we tacitly assume its inseparable +connection with the physical body. + +The material brain and the mental brain are two brains that together +make one. Thus two, three, four, or innumerable things are yet one +thing. The human understanding was endowed by nature with the faculty of +embracing the infinite variety of the universe as a unit, as a single +conception. The unity of nature is as true and real as its multiplicity. +To say that many are one and one many is not nonsense, but simply a +truism which becomes clear when understanding the positive outcome of +philosophy. + +A reader unfamiliar with this our product of philosophy still follows +the habit of regarding the physical body as something different from the +mind. A distinction between these two is quite justified, but this +manner of classification must not be overdone. The reader should +remember that he also is in the habit of regarding such heterogeneous +things as axes, scissors, and knives as children of the same family by +referring to them collectively as cutting tools. The outcome of +philosophy now demands that we apply the same method to the object of +our special study, the human brain. We must henceforth eschew all +effervescent flights of imagination and regard the powers of the human +mind as children of the same family as all other physical powers, whose +immortal mother is the universe. + +The universe is infinite not alone in the matter of time and space, but +also in that of the variety of its products. The human brains which it +produces are likewise internally and externally of an infinite +differentiation, although this does not prevent them from forming a +common group uniform in its way. + +To group the phenomena of nature, the children of the universe, in such +a way by classes, families, and species that they may be easily grasped, +that is the task of the science of understanding, the work and +constitution of the perceiving human brain. To understand simply means +to obtain a general and at the same time a detailed view of the +processes and products of the universe by grouping them in a fashion +similar to that used for the vegetable kingdom by botany and for the +animal kingdom by zoology. It goes without argument that we, the limited +children of the unlimited universe, are able to solve this problem only +in a limited way. + +However, this natural physical limitation of the human understanding +must not be confounded with the abject misery which slavish and +sentimental metaphysics attribute to it. The infinite universe is by no +means niggardly in its gifts to the human understanding. It opens its +whole depths to our intellectual understanding and perception. Our +intellect is a part of the inexhaustible universe and therefore partakes +of its inexhaustible nature. That part of nature which is known by the +name of intellect is limited only to the extent that the part is smaller +than the whole. + + + + +V + +THE UNDERSTANDING AS A PART OF THE HUMAN SOUL + + +The human intellect or understanding, the special object of all +philosophy, is a part, and in our case the most prominent part, of the +human soul. Gustav Theodore Fechner, a forgotten star on the literary +firmament, posed the question of the soul in his time and attempted to +answer it. In so doing he clothed the result of past philosophies in a +peculiar garb which looked fantastic enough at first sight. He regards +the outcome of philosophy merely as an individual product and he is so +full of veneration for the ancient terms, such as _immortal souls_, +_God_, _Christianity_, that he does not care to dismiss them, no matter +how roughly he handles their essence. + +Fechner extends the possession of a soul to human beings, animals, +plants, stones, planets; in short, to the whole world. + +This is simply saying that the human soul is of the same nature as all +the rest of the world, or vice versa, that all natural things have the +same nature as the human soul. Not only animals, but also stones and +planets have something analogous to our human soul. + +Fechner is not fantastic at bottom, and yet how fantastical it sounds to +hear him say: "I went out walking on a spring morning. The fields were +green, the birds were singing, the dew sparkled, the smoke rose toward +the clouds. Here and there a human being stirred. A glory of light was +diffused over it all. It was only a small piece of the Earth. It was +only a short moment of its existence. And yet, as I took all this in +with an ever-widening understanding, I felt not alone the beauty, but +also the truth that it is an angel who is thus passing through the sky +with his rich, fresh and blooming nature, his living face upturned to +the heavens. And I asked myself how it is that man can ever become so +stunted that he sees nothing but a dry clod in the Earth and looks for +angels above and beyond it, never finding them anywhere. But people call +this sentimental dreaming." + +"The Earth is a globe, and what it is besides may be found in the +museums of natural history." Thus writes Fechner. + +Now there can be no objection to comparing the beautiful Earth and the +stars around it with angels, any more than there can be to the lover +calling his sweetheart an angel of God. The Earth, the Moon, and the +stars are according to Fechner's terminology angelic beings with souls; +mediators between man and God. He knows very well that this is nothing +but a matter of analogy and terminology, he is as atheistic as the most +atheistic, but his fondness and reverence for the traditional terms lead +him to attribute a soul to the material world and to give to this great +and infinite soul a divine name. + +If we waive this religious hobby of Fechner's, there still remains his +peculiarity of using words and names in a symbolical sense. It is +nothing but the old poetic way of calling a sweetheart's eyes heavenly +stars and the stars of the blue heavens lovely eyes, which makes a snowy +hill of a woman's breast, a zephyr of the wind, a nymph of a spring of +water, and an erlking of an old willow tree. This poetic license has +filled the whole world with good and evil spirits, mermaids, fairies, +elfs, and goblins. + +This is not a bad way of speaking, so long as we keep in mind, like a +poet, what we are doing and that we are consciously using symbolical +terms. Fechner does this only to a certain extent. A little spleen +remains in his brain. It is this spleen which I intend to deal with in +the proper light, in order to thus demonstrate the outcome of +philosophy. + +Fechner is not aware that his universal soul reflects only one half of +our present outcome of philosophical study. The other half, which +renders an understanding of the whole possible, consists in the +perception that not only are all material things endowed with a soul, +but that all souls, including the human ones, are ordinary things. + +Philosophy has not only deified the world and inspired it with a soul, +but has also secularized God and the souls. This is the whole truth, and +each by itself is only a part. + +Apart from psychology, which treats of the individual human soul, there +has lately arisen a "psychology of nations" which regards the individual +souls as parts of the universal human soul, as individual pieces +constituting an aggregate soul which, decidedly, is more than a simple +aggregation of numbers. The soul of the psychology of nations has the +same relation to the individual souls that modern political economy has +to private economy. Prosperity in general is a different question and +deals with different matters than the amassing of wealth for your +individual pocket. Granted that the national soul is essentially +different from the individual soul, what would be the nature of the +universal animal soul, including the souls of lions, tigers, flies, +elephants, mice, etc.? If we now extend the generalization farther and +include in our psychology the vegetable and the mineral kingdom, the +various world bodies, our solar system, and finally the whole universe, +what else could that signify than a mere rhetorical climax? + +Mere generalization is one-sided and leads to fantastical dreams. By +this method one can transform anything into everything. It is necessary +to supplement generalization by specialization. We wish to have the +elephants separated from the fleas, the mice from the lice, at the same +time never forgetting the unity of the special and the general. This sin +of omission has often been committed by the zoologists in the museums +and the botanists in their plant collections, and philosophical +investigators of the soul like Fechner have drifted into the other +extreme of generalization without specialization. + +The positive outcome of philosophy, then, in its abstract outline, is at +present the doctrine that the general must be conceived in its relation +to its special forms, and these forms in their universal +interconnection, in their qualities as parts of nature in general. True, +such an abstract outline reveals very little. In order to grasp its +concrete significance, we must penetrate into its details, into the +special aspects of this doctrine. + +The title of "Critique of Reason," which Kant gave to his special study, +is at the same time a fitting term for all philosophical research. +Reason, the essential part of the human soul, raises the critique of +reason, the science of philosophy, to the position of the most +essential part of psychology. + +But why do we call this the most essential part? Is not the material +world and its understanding as essential as reason, as intellect, which +bends to the task of exploring this world? Surely, it is, and I do not +use the word essential in this sense. I call the intellect the most +essential part of the soul, and the soul the most essential part of the +world, only in so far as these parts are the special condition of all +scientific study and because the investigation of the general nature of +scientific study is my special object and purpose. Whether I endeavor to +explain the general nature of scientific study, whether I investigate +the intellect or the theory of understanding, it all amounts to the same +thing. + +Let us approach our task once more from the side of Fechner's universal +soul. With his extravagant animation of all things, with his plant, +stone, and star souls, he can help us to prove that the general nature +of that particle of soul which is called reason, intellect, spirit, or +understanding, is not so extraordinarily different from the general +nature of stones or trees as the old time idealists and materialists +were wont to think. + +As I said before, Fechner is a poet, and a poet sees similarities which +a matter-of-fact brain cannot perceive. But at the same time we must +admit that the matter of fact brain which cannot see anything but mere +distinctions is a very poor brain. The philosophers before me have +taught me that a good brain sees the similarities and the differences at +the same time and knows how to discriminate between them. A sober poetry +and the combination of poetic qualities with a comprehensive and +universal levelheadedness and discrimination, these are the marks of a +good head. Still the poorest as well as the most talented brains partake +of the general brain nature, which consists in the understanding that +like and unlike, general and special, are interrelated. The one is never +without the other, but both are always together. + +If the distinction between men and stones is so trifling that a talented +brain like Fechner's can justly speak of them both as being animated, +surely the difference between the body and soul cannot be so great that +there is not the least similarity and community between them. However, +this escaped Fechner's notice. Is not the air or the scent of flowers an +ethereal body? + +Reason is also called understanding, and it is a positive achievement of +philosophy to have arrived at the knowledge that this understanding does +not admit of any exaggerated distinctions. In other words, all things +are so closely related that a good poet may transform anything into +everything. Can natural science do as much? Ah, the gentlemen of that +science are also progressing well. They transform dry substance into +liquid, and liquid into gas; they change gravity into heat and heat into +mechanical power. And they are doing this without forgetting to +discriminate, as happened to our Fechner. + +It is not enough to know that the body has a soul and the soul a body, +not enough to know that everything has a soul. It is also necessary to +discriminate between the peculiarities and details of the human, animal, +plant, and other souls, taking care not to exaggerate their differences +to the extreme of making them senseless. + +We do not intend to follow this theory of a universal soul any further. +Fechner declares himself that "it must be admitted at the outset that +the whole question of a soul is a question of faith."... "Analogy is +not a convincing proof."... "We can no more prove the existence of a +soul than we can disprove it." + +However, from the time of Cartesius it has been an accepted fact in the +world of philosophers that the consciousness of the human soul is the +best proof of its existence. The most positive science in the world is +the empirical self-observation of the thinking soul. This subject is the +most conspicuous object imaginable, and it is the positive outcome of +philosophy to have given an excellent description of the life and +actions of this soul particle called consciousness or understanding. + +If the understanding is a part of the human soul and this soul an +evident and positive part of the universal life, then, clearly, +everything partaking of this life, such as pieces of wood and stones +scattered around, is related to this soul. Individual human souls, +national souls, animal souls, pieces of wood, lumps of stone, world +bodies, are all children of the same common universal nature. But there +are so many children that they must be classified into orders, classes, +families, etc., in order to know them apart. On account of their +likeness, the souls belong together in one class and the bodies in +another, and each requires more detailed classification. Thus we finally +arrive at the class of human souls forming a department by themselves, +because they all have a common general character. + +The manufacturers know that the work of ten laborers produces more and +is of a different quality than the work of a single laborer multiplied +by ten. Likewise the general human soul, or any national soul, expresses +itself differently from the sum of the various individual souls +composing it. More even, the very individual soul differs at various +times and places, so that the individual soul is as manifold as any +national soul. + +"Has the plant a soul? Has the earth a soul? Have they a soul analogous +to that of man? That is the question." Thus asks Fechner. + +Just as my soul of today has something analogous to my soul of +yesterday, so it has also with the soul of my brother, and finally with +the souls of animals, plants, stones, etc., proving that everything is +more or less analogous. A herd of sheep is analogous to yonder flock of +small, white clouds in the sky, and a poet has the license to call those +small clouds little sheep. In the same way Fechner is justified in +propounding his theory of a universal soul. + +Is it not necessary, however, to make a distinction between poetry and +truth? My brother's soul and my own are souls in the true sense of the +word, but the souls of stones--they are only so figuratively speaking. + +At this point I want to call the reader's attention to the fact that we +must not pass lightly over the valuation of the difference between the +true and the figurative sense of a word. + +Words are names which do not, and cannot, have any other function than +that of symbolic illustration. My soul, yours, or any other, are only +in conception the same souls. + +When I say that John Flathead has the same soul as you and I, my +intention is simply to indicate that he has something which is common to +you and me and to all men. His soul is made in the image of our souls. +But where shall we draw the line in this comparison of images? What is +not an image in the abstract, and what is more than an image in the +concrete? + +Truth and fiction are not totally different. The poet speaks the truth +and true understanding partakes largely of the nature of poetry. + +Philosophy has truly perceived the nature of the soul, and especially +that part of it with which we are dealing, that is, reason or +understanding. This instrument has the function of furnishing to our +head a picture of the processes of the world outside of it, to describe +everything that is around us and to analyze the universe, itself a +phenomenon, with all its phenomena as a process of infinite variety in +time and space. + +If this could be accomplished with the theory of a universal soul, then +Fechner would be the greatest philosopher that ever was. But he lacks +the understanding that the intellect which has to combine all things +within a general wrapper, must also consider the other side of the +question, that of specification. That, of course, cannot be achieved by +any philosopher. It must be the work of all science, and philosophy as a +doctrine of science must acknowledge that. + + + + +VI + +CONSCIOUSNESS IS ENDOWED WITH THE FACULTY OF KNOWING AS WELL AS WITH THE +FEELING OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF ALL NATURE + + +In the historical course of philosophy, there has been much discussion +as to where our knowledge comes from, whether any of it, or how much of +it, is innate, and how much acquired by experience. Without any innate +faculties no knowledge could have been gathered with any amount of +experience, and without any experience even the best faculties would +remain barren. The results of science in all departments are due to the +interaction of subject and object. + +There could be no subjective faculty of vision unless there were +something objective to be seen. The possession of a faculty of vision +carries with it the practical performance of seeing. One cannot have the +faculty of vision without seeing things. Of course, the two may be +separated, but only in theory, not in practice, and this theoretical +separation must be accompanied by the recollection that the separated +faculty is only a conception derived from the practical function. +Faculty and function are combined and belong together. + +Man does not acquire consciousness, the faculty of understanding, until +he knows something, and his power grows with the performance of this +function. + +The reader will remember that we have mentioned as an achievement of +philosophy the understanding of the fact that we must not make any +exaggerated distinctions. Hence we must not make any such distinction +between the innate faculty of understanding and the acquired knowledge. + +It is an established universal rule that the human intellect knows of no +absolute separation of any two things, although it is free to separate +the universe into its parts for the purpose of understanding. + +Now, if I claim that the conception of the universe is innate in us, the +reader must not conclude that I believe in the old prejudice of the +human intellect being like a receptacle filled with ideas of the true, +the beautiful, the good, and so forth. No, the intellect can create its +ideas and concepts only by self-production and the world around it must +furnish the materials for this purpose. But such a production +presupposes an innate faculty. Consciousness, the knowledge of being, +must be present, before any special knowledge can be acquired. +Consciousness signifies the knowledge of being. It means having at least +a faint inkling of the fact that being is _The_ universal idea. Being is +everything; it is the essence of everything. Without it there cannot be +anything, because it is the universe, the infinite. + +Consciousness is in itself the consciousness of the infinite. The innate +consciousness of man is the knowledge of infinite existence. When I know +that I exist, then I know myself as a part of existence. That this +existence, this world, of which I am but a particle with all others, +must be an infinite world, does indeed not dawn on me until I begin to +analyze the conception of being with an experienced instrument of +thought. The reader, in undertaking this work with such an instrument, +will at once discover that the conception of the infinite is innate to +his consciousness,[8] and that no faculty of conception is possible +without this conception. The faculty of conception, understanding, +thought, means above all the faculty of grasping the universal concept. +The intellect cannot have any conception which is not more or less +clearly or faintly based on the concept of the universe. _Cogito, ergo +sum._ I think, therefore, I am. Whatever I imagine is there, at least in +imagination. Of course, the imagined and the real thing are different, +yet this difference does not exceed the limits of the universal +existence. Creatures of fiction and real creatures are not so radically +different that they would not all of them fit into the general gender of +being. The manner, the form of being, are different. Goblins exist in +fiction and Polish Jews exist in a tangible form, but they both exist. +The general existence comprises the body and the soul, fiction and +truth, goblins and Polish Jews. + +It is no more inconceivable that the faculty of universal understanding +should be innate in us than that circles come into this world round, two +mountains have a valley between them, water is liquid and fire burns. +All things have a certain composition in themselves, they are born with +it. Does that require any explanation? The flowers which gradually grow +on plants, the powers and wisdom that grow in men in the course of +years, are no more easily explained than such innate faculties, and the +latter are no more wonderful than those acquired later. The best +explanation cannot deprive the wonders of nature of their natural +marvelousness. It is a mistake to assume that the faculty of +explanation which is located in the human brain, is a destroyer of the +belief in natural marvels. Philosophy which makes this faculty of +explanation and the nature of its explanations the object of its special +study gives us a new and much better understanding of this old miracle +maker. It destroys the belief in metaphysical miracles by showing that +physical nature is so universal that it absolutely excludes every other +form of existence than the natural one from this world of wonders. + +I and many of my readers find in our brains the actual consciousness +that this general nature of which the intellect is a part is an infinite +nature. I call this consciousness innate, although it is acquired. The +point that I wish to impress on the reader is that the difference +generally made between innate and acquired qualities is not so +extraordinary that the innate need not to be acquired and the acquired +does not presuppose something innate. The one contradicts the other only +in those brains who do not understand the positive outcome of +philosophy. Such thinkers do not know how to make reasonable +distinctions and exaggerate in consequence. They have not grasped the +conciliation of all differences and contradictions in universal nature +by which all contradictions are solved. + +Philosophy has endeavored to understand the intellect. In demonstrating +the positive outcome of philosophy, we must explain that philosophical +understanding as well as any other does not rise out of the isolated +faculty of understanding, but out of the universal nature. The womb of +our knowledge and understanding must not be sought in the human brain, +but in all nature which is not only called the universe, but is +actually universal. In order to prove this latter assertion, I refer to +the fact that this conception, this consciousness of the infinite in the +developed intellect, is in a manner innate. If the reader wishes to +object to my indiscriminately mixing the innate faculty with the +acquired understanding, I beg him to consider that I am endeavoring to +prove that any and all distinction made by the intellect refers in +reality to the inseparable parts of the one undivided universe. From +this it follows that the admired and mysterious intellect is not a +miracle, or at least no greater marvel than any other part of the +general marvel which is identical with the infinitely wonderful general +nature. + +Some people love to represent consciousness as something supernatural, +to draw an unduly sharp line of separation between thinking and being, +thought and reality. But philosophy, which occupies itself particularly +with consciousness, has ascertained that such a sharp contrast is +unwarranted, not in harmony with the reality, and not a faithful +likeness of reality and truth. + +In order to understand what philosophy has accomplished in the way of +insight into the function of the discriminating intellect, we must never +lose sight of the fact that there is only a moderate distinction of +degree between purely imaginary things and socalled real things. + +Neither the natural condition of our faculty of thought, nor the +universality of general nature, permit of an exaggerated distinction +between the reality of creations of imagination and of really tangible +things. At the same time the exigencies of science demand clear +illustrations and so we must distinguish between these two kinds of +reality. It is true that in common usage the mere thought and the purely +imaginary things are set apart from nature and reality as something +different and antagonistic. Yet the rules of language heretofore in +vogue cannot prevent the spread of the additional knowledge that the +universe, or general nature, is so unlimited that it can establish a +conciliation between these limited antagonisms. The cat and the dog, for +instance, are pronounced enemies, but nevertheless zoology recognizes +them as being legitimate domestic companions. + +Human consciousness is, in the first place, individual. Every human +individual has its own. But the peculiarity of my consciousness, of +yours, and that of others, is that of being not alone the consciousness +of the individual in question, but also the general consciousness of the +universe, at least that is its possibility and mission. Not every +individual is conscious of the universality of general nature, otherwise +there would be none of that distracting dualism. Nor would there be any +necessity for volumes and volumes of philosophy to teach us that a +limit, a thing, or a world outside of the universal, is a nonsensical +idea, an idea which is contrary to sense and reason. We may well say, +for this reason, that our consciousness, our intellect, is only in a +manner of speaking our own, while it is in fact a consciousness, an +intellect belonging to universal nature. + +It can no more be denied that our consciousness is an attribute of the +infinite universe than it can be denied that the sun, the moon and the +stars are. Since this intellectual faculty belongs to the infinite and +is its child, we must not wonder that this universal faculty of thought +is born with the capability of grasping the conception of a universe. +And whoever does no longer wonder at this, must find it explicable, must +realize that the fact of universal consciousness is thus explained. + +To explain the mysterious may be regarded as the whole function of +understanding, of intellect. If we succeed in divesting of its mysteries +the fact that the concept of an infinite universe is found in the +limited human mind, we have then explained this fact itself and +substantiated our contention that the things around us are explained by +their accurate reflection in our brain. + +We summarize the nature of consciousness, its actions, life, and aims in +these words: It is the science of infinite being; it seeks to obtain an +accurate conception of this being and to explain its marvelousness. But +we have by no means exhausted its life and aims in these words. With all +the power of language, we can convey but a vague idea of the immensity +of the object under discussion. Whoever desires to know more about it, +must work for his own progress by observation and study. This much may +be safely said: This question is no more mysterious than any other part +of the general mystery. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] E. g., given with his consciousness.--EDITOR. + + + + +VII + +THE RELATIONSHIP OR IDENTITY OF SPIRIT AND NATURE + + +"There is a natural law of analogy which explains that all things +belonging to the universe are members of the same family, that they are +related to one another by bonds which permit of the greatest variety in +individual differences and are not nullified even by the distance +between extremes." If we grasp the meaning of these words in their full +bearing, we recognize the outcome of philosophy up to date. They teach +us how to use our intellect in order to obtain an accurate picture of +the universe. + +The intellect is also called by the name of faculty of discrimination. +If in the science of the powers of this faculty we place ourselves on +the standpoint of present-day natural knowledge, we possess the clear +and plain insight that there are no exaggerated distinctions, no +unrelated extremes, in the universe. The infinite is related to the +finite. For all developed and perishable things are the direct offspring +of the imperishable, of the eternal universe. General nature and its +special parts are inseparably interlaced. There is nothing among all +that has a name which is fundamentally different from other things known +by name. + +There will hardly be any objection against these sentences, until we +proceed to draw their last consequences. If all things are related and +without exception children of the universe, it follows that mind and +matter must also be two yards of cloth from the same piece. Hence the +difference between human understanding and other natural human faculties +must not be magnified into that of irreconcilable extremes. + +In order to become accustomed to scientific distinctions, the reader +should consider that a man can remain under the sway of a belief in +ghosts only so long as he ignores the relationship of all existing +things. He believes in real ghosts whose reality is supposed to be +radically different from his own. Such a distinction is exaggerated and +illogical, and whoever believes in it does not know how to discriminate +scientifically and has not the full use of his critical faculties. + +Just as common parlance opposes art to nature and then forgets that art +is a part of nature, similarly as night is a part of day, so the +language of the believer in ghosts does not know that reason and wood, +mind and matter, in spite of all their differences, are two parts of the +same whole, two expressions of the same universal reality. Everything is +real and true, because in the last instance the universe is all, is the +only truth and reality. So I call it a slip of the tongue to speak of +natural nature as opposed to natural art or artificial nature, of +imaginary reality as distinct from real reality. There ought to be a +different name for the day of twelve hours than for the day of +twenty-four hours, so that it might be better understood that day and +night are not fundamentally different, but two prongs of the same fork. + +Just as the faculty of thinking is innate in the child, and grows with +its development, so mankind's faculty of thought grows and has hitherto +expressed itself in a language which gave only instinctive conceptions +of the composition of the human brain and of its functions. The +construction of languages explains in a way the condition of the human +mind which had only inadequate knowledge of itself so far. Those +shortcomings of speech which I called slips of the tongue were not +understood until sufficient progress had been made in the explanation of +the process of thinking, and now these same shortcomings offer an +excellent means of representing and demonstrating the results of +enlightenment. + +The mind is to give to man a picture of the world, the language is the +brush of the mind. It paints by its construction the universal +relationship of all things referred to in the beginning of this chapter, +and it does so in the following manner: It gives to each thing not only +its own name, but also adds to it another indicating its family, and +another indicating its race, another for the species, the genus, and +finally a general name which proclaims that all things are parts of the +one indivisible unit which is called world, existence, universe, cosmos. + +This diagrammatic construction of language furnishes us with an +illustration of the graduated relationship of things and of the way in +which the human race arrives at its knowledge, its perceptions or +pictures. + +We said that philosophy is that endeavor which seeks to throw light on +the process of human thought. This work has been rendered very difficult +by the unavoidable misunderstanding of the universal relationship just +mentioned. The transcendentalists insist above all that the process of +thinking and its product, thought, should not be classed among ordinary +physics, not as a part of physical nature, but as the creature of +another nature which carries the mysterious name of metaphysics. That +such a nature and such a science is neither possible nor real is proven +by the construction of language which normally describes everything as +being closely related and corroborates this by its abnormal shortcomings +which we called slips of the tongue. + +The shortcomings of language which demonstrate the positive outcome of +philosophy consist in occasionally giving insufficiently significant +names to things belonging to a group in which the distinction between +individuals, species, genera, and families is not clearly defined. It is +not discernible, for instance, whether the term "cat" applies to a +domestic cat or to a tiger, because that term is used for a large class +of animals of which the domestic cat is the arch-type. + +But it may be that this illustration is not well chosen for the purpose +of demonstrating that slip of the tongue which is supposed to give us an +exact appreciation of the positive outcome of philosophy. Let us find +another and better illustration which will be a transition from the +inadequate to the adequate and thus throw so much more light on the +obscurities of language. + +Another and better example of the inadequacies of language is the +distinction between fish and meat. In this case, we entirely lack a +general term for meat, one kind of which is furnished by aquatic animals +and the other by terrestrial animals. + +Now let the reader apply this shortcoming of language to the distinction +between physics and metaphysics, or between thought and reality. We lack +a term which will fully indicate the relation between these two. +Thoughts are indeed real things. True, there is a difference whether I +have one hundred dollars in imagination or in reality in my pocket. +Still we must not exaggerate this difference into something +transcendental. Painted money or imagined money are in a way also real, +that is in imagination. In other words, language lacks a term which will +clearly express the different realities within the compass of the unit. + +The understanding of these peculiarities of language is calculated to +promote the insight and enlightenment in regard to that secret lamp +which man is carrying in his brain and with which he lights up the +things of this world. The cultivation of the theory of understanding, +the critique of reason, has an elementary significance for the +elucidation of all things. This is not saying that philosophy, that +special science with which we are here dealing, is a universal science +in the sense in which antiquity conceived of it. But it is universal +nevertheless in the sense in which the alphabet and other primary topics +are universal. Every one must use his brains and should therefore take +pains to understand its processes. Though the knowledge of these does +not make other efforts unnecessary, still it explains many ideas, it +elucidates the nature of thinking which every one is doing and which is +frequently used in a more ruthless manner than a dog would treat a rag. + +The inertia which has prevented the one-sided idealists on the one hand +and the one-sided materialists on the other from coming to a peaceful +understanding may be traced to one of those slips of the tongue. We lack +the right terms for designating the relationship between spiritual +phenomena, such as our ideas, conceptions, judgments and conclusions and +many other things on one side and the tangible, ponderable, +commensurable things on the other. True, the reason for this lack of +terms is the absence of understanding, and for this reason the dispute +is not one of mere words, although it can be allayed only by an +improvement of our terminology. + +Buechner, in his well-known work on "_Force and Matter_," likewise +overlooks this point, the same as all prior materialists, because they +are as onesidedly insistent on their _matter_ as the idealists are on +their _idea_. Quarrel and strife mean confusion, only peace will bring +light. The contrast between matter and mind finds its conciliation in +the positive outcome of philosophy which teaches that all distinctions +must be reasonable, because neither our instrument of thought nor the +rest of nature justify any exaggerated distinctions. In order to +elucidate the moot question, nothing is required but the insight that +ideas which nature develops in the human brain are materials for the +work of our understanding, though not materials for the work of our +hands. Philosophy has made material efforts to grasp the understanding +and its conceptions and is still making them in the same way in which +chemistry is working for the understanding of substances and physics for +the understanding of forces. + +Substances, forces, ideas, conceptions, judgments, conclusions, +knowledge and perceptions, according to the positive outcome of +philosophy, must be regarded as differences or varieties of the same +monistic genus. The differentiation of things no more contradicts their +unity than their unity contradicts their differentiation. Darwin +expanded the conception of "species" and thus contributed to a better +understanding of zoology. Philosophy expands the conception of species +still far beyond the Darwinian definition in teaching us to consider the +species as little generalities and the largest genus, the absolute or +the cosmos as the all in one, the all-embracing species. + +In order to closely connect the worm and the elephant, the lowest and +the highest animal, the vegetable and the animal kingdom, the inorganic +and the organic, as members of the same species or genus in a reasonable +way, we must keep account of the gradations in nature, the transitions, +the connecting links and connecting ideas. Embryology, which shows that +the life of the highest animal develops through the stages of the animal +genus, has greatly promoted the understanding of the common nature of +all animals. + +"The continuity in the natural gradation of things is perfect, because +there are no gradations which are not represented, because there are no +differences between the various grades which nature does not fill by an +intermediary form.... There is no abrupt difference in nature, no +metaphysical jump, no vacuum, no gap in the order of the world," says a +well-known author of our times whose name I shall not mention, because I +wish to base my argument on the acknowledged facts rather than on names +of authorities. + +What Darwin taught us in relation to animal life, viz., that there are +no fundamental differences between species, that is taught by philosophy +in regard to the universe. The understanding of the latter is rendered +difficult by the habit of making a transcendental distinction between +matter and mind. + + + + +VIII + +UNDERSTANDING IS MATERIAL + + +Whether we say that philosophy has the understanding for the object of +its study, or whether we say that philosophy investigates the method of +utilizing subjective understanding in order to arrive at genuine, +correct, excellent, objective knowledge, that is only a matter of using +different terms for the same process. It makes no difference whether we +designate the object of our special science as a thing or as a process. +It is much more essential to understand that the distinction between the +thing and its action is in this instance of little consequence. + +According to modern natural science all existence is resolved into +motion. It is well known now that even rocks do not stand still, but are +continuously active, growing and decaying. + +The understanding, the intellect, is an active object, or an objective +action, the same as sunshine, the flow of waters, growing of trees, +disintegration of rocks, or any other natural phenomenon. Also the +understanding, the thinking which takes place consciously or +unconsciously in the human brain, is a phenomenon of as indubitable +actuality as the most material of them. It cannot in the least shake our +contention of the materially perceptible nature of intellectual activity +that we become aware of this activity by an internal, not by an +external, sense. Whether a stone is externally perceptible or thought +internally, what difference does this slight distinction make in the +incontestable fact that both perceptions are of equal material, natural +and sense-perceptible kind? Why should not the action of the brain +belong in the same category as the action of the heart? And though the +movement of the heart be internal and that of the tongue of the +nightingale external, what is to prevent us from considering these two +movements from the higher viewpoint of natural or material processes? +If the function of the heart may be referred to as material, why not the +function of the brain? True, the present usages of language are in +conflict with this mode of thought. But it must be remembered that every +science comes into conflict with usages of language by progressive +development. The discovery of every new thing in plant and animal life +compels the discoverer to invent a new term or change the meaning of an +old one. The term material has not had a well defined, but rather an +indefinite meaning so far. Now, since it is necessary, in order to +understand the function of the brain to remove it from the class of +transcendental or metaphysical conceptions and assign to it a place +among the material things, the question arises: What will be the most +appropriate term for it? The material and the spiritual are both two +species of the same genus. How are we to designate the species, how the +genus? For the sake of complete clearness, we require three different +names, one for each species and a common general name. But since we are +much less concerned about the name than about the understanding of these +facts which cannot be well explained without terms, we do not insist +dogmatically on calling the understanding material. It is sufficient to +point out that the function of the heart and of the brain both belong to +the same class, no matter whether this class be called material, real, +physical, or what not. So long as language has not established a +definite meaning for these terms, all of them serve equally well and are +equally deceptive. + +The positive outcome of philosophy which culminates in placing the +theory of understanding in the same class with all other theories, +cannot be easily demonstrated on account of a natural confusion of +thought which arises from an equally natural confusion of language. In +the special department of handicraft as well as in that of scientific +brain work the terminology is well systematized, while in the general +affairs of life and science there is a confusion which is as great in +the matter of conceptions as in that of applying the terms by which +those awkward conceptions are expressed. + +Wherever understanding is clear, there the language is also clear. The +man who does not understand shoemaking does not understand its +terminology. This is not saying that the understanding of a trade and +the understanding of its terminology are identical, but only indicating +their actual connection. + +If the reader has had a glimpse of the enormity of the work of more than +two thousand years of philosophy in order to state what little we know +today of its achievement in the science of understanding, he will not be +very much surprised at the difficulties we here meet with in finding +terms for its demonstration. + +The function of the brain is as material as that of the heart. The heart +and its function are two things, but they are dependent one upon the +other so that one cannot exist without the other. The function may +partly be felt. We feel the heart beating, the brain working. The +working of the heart may even be felt by touch, which is not the case +with the working of the brain. But it would be a mistake to imagine that +our knowledge of the function of the heart is exhausted by our +perception of it through the touch. Once we have overcome the habit of +making exaggerated distinctions between things, and have learned to +consider the differences of things as well as their interconnection, we +can easily understand that the science of the function of the heart is +an infinite science which is connected with all others. The heart cannot +work without the blood, the blood cannot exist without food, and this is +connected with the air, the plants, the animals, the sun, and the moon. + +The function of the brain and its product, the understanding, is +likewise inseparable from the universal interdependence of things. The +health of the blood which is produced by the action of the heart is no +more and no less a material phenomenon than the total knowledge of +science which appears as a product of brain life. + +Although we represent the doctrine of the material nature of +understanding as the positive outcome of philosophy, this is not +proclaiming the victory of that narrow materialism which has been +spreading itself particularly since the eighteenth century. On the +contrary, this mechanical materialism wholly misunderstands the nature +of the problem. It teaches that the faculty of thought is a function of +the brain, the brain is the object of study and its function, the +faculty of thought, is fully explained as a brain quality or function. +This materialism is enamored of mechanics, idolizes it, does not regard +it as a part of the world, but as the sole substance which comprises the +whole universe. Because it misunderstands the relation of thing and +function, of subject and predicate, it has no inkling of the fact that +this relation which it handles in such a matter-of-fact way, but not at +all scientifically, may be an object worthy of study. The materialist +of the old school is too horny-handed to consider the function or +quality of understanding as an object worthy of a separate scientific +department. We, on the other hand, follow the suggestion of Spinoza, who +required of the philosophers that they should consider everything in the +light of eternity. In so doing we find that the tangible things, such as +the brain, are qualities of nature, and that in the same way the +socalled functions are natural things, substantial parts of the +universe. + +Not only tangible objects are "things," but also the rays of the sun and +the scent of flowers belong to this category, and perceptions are no +exception to the rule. But all these "things" are only relative things, +since they are qualities of the one and absolute which is the only +thing, the "thing itself," well known to every one by the name of the +universe, or cosmos. + + + + +IX + +THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC + + +Since this work wishes to demonstrate the positive outcome of +philosophy, the reader may ask the author what are his proofs that +instead of the quintessence of thousands of years of philosophical work +he is not offered the elaboration of any individual philosopher, or even +that of the author himself. + +In reply I wish to say that my work would be rendered uselessly +voluminous by quotations from the works of the most prominent +philosophical writers, without proving anything, since the words of one +often contradict those of another. + +What is said by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel, in one place of any +of their works, is at least considerably modified, if not contradicted, +in another place of the same work. It is of little consequence, how and +by whose help I have arrived at the positive outcome of philosophy as +here rendered. Whether it is the actual outcome or not can be judged +only by the expert, and every opinion is necessarily very subjective. + +Under the circumstances I, as author, claim that my opinion is worth as +much as any other, and the reader may therefore accept my assurance. As +to the further value of that which I offer, it is a peculiarity of the +subject under discussion that every reader carries it and its +experiences within himself and may, without consulting any other author, +at once draw his own conclusions about my views, provided he has +acquired the necessary training in thought. What a traveler tells us +about the interior of Africa must either be believed to the letter or +verified by the accounts of other travelers. But what I say about logic +will, I hope, find its corroboration in the logic of every reading +brain. + +The theory of understanding which has become the special object of +philosophy, is nothing else, and cannot be anything else, but expanded +logic. Many practical rules and laws of this department are known and +recognized since the time of Aristotle. But the question whether there +is one world or two, a natural and unnatural, or supernatural as it is +called with preference, that is the point which has given much trouble +to philosophy and which will influence the health of logic so long as +it is undecided. + +Dr. Friedrich Dittes, director of the institute of pedagogy in Vienna, +has published a _School of Pedagogy_, several editions of which have +appeared, in which he gives much attention to logic. Dittes is a +prominent pedagogue, well known through his writings. He confines +himself in his _School_ to teaching only that which is well established +and accepted without a doubt. As a practical man who addresses himself +mainly to teachers of primary grades, he would not place himself on the +pinnacle of the outcome of philosophy, even if he could. He must confine +himself to that which is well established, which is far removed from the +disputes of the day. But it may here serve as a whetstone by the help of +which we may give to the positive product of philosophy its latest and +greatest sharpness. + +He writes right in the beginning of the first part: "Our ideas are as +manifold as the objects to which they refer. Several things may have +many or few, or at least one quality, in common. Still they may also be +totally different." + +This last point, viz., that there may be things which are "totally" +different from one another, is the one which is decidedly rejected by +that science which has risen to the eminence of the positive acquisition +of philosophy. There can be no natural things which are "totally" +different from one another, because they must all of them have in common +the quality of being natural. + +It sounds very commonplace to say that there are no unnatural things in +nature. Since the last witch was burnt, everybody is sufficiently +enlightened to know that. But the logical conclusions of natural monism +have not yet been drawn. True, natural science, properly socalled, is +busily engaged in arriving at them. But so much more strife is there in +the "science of mind" and there is no other remedy but a well founded +theory of understanding which teaches that nature is not alone absolute +nature, but also the nature of the absolute. From this doctrine it +necessarily follows that all things are not individually independent, +but related by sex, dependent children, "predicates" of the monistic +unity of the world. + +"The arch fountain of the human spirit," says Dittes, "is perception.... +Whether perception as such discloses to us the true nature of things, or +whether it makes us familiar only with their phenomena, this is not to +be discussed by logic." The practical pedagogue who confines himself to +the education of children's brains or who wishes at most to influence +such teachers as educate children's brains, is quite right in being +satisfied with the old traditional Aristotlean logic. But in the school +of the human race, this logic has not been sufficient. For this reason +the philosophers have broached the question whether perception, "the +arch fountain of the human spirit," is a true or a deceptive fountain. +The product of the philosophical investigation which we here offer +amounts to the declaration that the logicians are greatly mistaken about +the "arch fountain." It is a cardinal error of ancient logic to regard +perception as the ultimate source from which the human mind dips its +knowledge. It is nature which is the ultimate source, and our perception +is but the mediator of understanding. And its product, recognized +truth, is not truth itself, but merely a formal picture of it. Universal +nature is the arch fountain, is the eternal and imperishable truth +itself, and our perception, like every other part of universal +existence, is only an attribute, a particle of absolute nature. The +human mind, with whose nature logic is dealing, is no more an +independent thing than any other, but simply a phenomenon, a reflex or +predicate of nature. + +To confound true perceptions or perceived truths with general truth, +with the _non plus ultra_ of all truths, is equivalent to regarding a +sparrow as _the_ bird in general, or a period of civilization as +civilization itself, which would mean the closing of the door to all +further development. + +Modern philosophy, beginning with Bacon of Verulam and closing with +Hegel, carries on a constant struggle with the Aristotlean logic. The +product of this struggle, the outcome of philosophy, does not deny the +old rules of traditional logic, but adds a new and decidedly higher +circle of logical perception to the former ones. For the sake of better +understanding it may be well to give to this circle a special title, the +special name of "theory of understanding," which is sometimes called +"dialectics." + +In order to demonstrate the essential contents of this philosophical +product by an investigation of the fundamental laws of traditional logic +and to explain it thereby, I refer once more to the teacher of +elementary logic, Dittes. + +Under the caption of "Principles of Judgment" he teaches: "Since +judging, like all thinking, aims at the perception of truth, the rules +have been sought after by which this purpose might be accomplished. As +universally applicable rules, as principles or laws of thought, the +following four have been named: + + + (1) The law of uniformity (identity). + + (2) The law of contradiction. + + (3) The law of the excluded third. + + (4) The law of adequate cause." + + +So much scholastic talk has been indulged in over these four +"principles," that I can hardly bring myself to discuss them further. +But since my purpose, the demonstration of the positive outcome of +philosophy, consists in throwing a new light on the logic contained in +these four so-called principles or laws, I am compelled to lay bare +their inmost kernel. + +The first principle, then, declares that A is A, or to speak +mathematically, every quantity is equal to itself. In plain English: a +thing is what it is; no thing is what it is not. "Characters which are +excluded by any conception must not be attributed to it." The square is +excluded from the conception of a circle, therefore the predicate +"square" must not be given to a circle. For the same reason a straight +line must not be crooked, and a lie must not be true. + +Now this so-called law of thought may be well enough for household use, +where nothing but known quantities are under consideration. A thing is +what it is. Right is not left and one hundred is not one thousand. +Whoever is named Peter or Paul remains Peter or Paul all his life. This, +I say, is all right for household use. + +But when we consider matters from the wider point of view of cosmic +universal life, then this famous law of thought proves to be nothing but +an expedient in logic which is not adequate to the nature of things, but +merely a means of mutual understanding for us human beings. Hence the +left bank of the Rhine is not the right, because we have agreed that in +naming the banks of a river we will turn our backs to the source and our +faces to the mouth of the river and then designate the banks as right +and left. Such a way of distinguishing, thinking, and judging is good +and practical, so long as this narrow standpoint is accompanied by the +consciousness of its narrowness. Hitherto this has not been the case. +This determined logic has overlooked that the perception which is +produced by its rules is not truth, not the real world, but only gives +an ideal, more or less accurate, reflection of it. Peter and Paul, who +according to the law of identity are the same all their lives, are in +fact different fellows every minute and every day of their lives, and +all things of this world are, like those two, not constant, but very +variable quantities. The mathematical points, the straight lines, the +round circles, are ideals. In reality every point has a certain +dimension, every straight line, when seen through a magnifying glass, is +full of many crooked turns, and even the roundest circle, according to +the mathematicians, consists of an infinite number of straight lines. + +The traditional logic, then, declares with its law of identity, or in +the words of Dittes "law of uniformity," that Peter and Paul are the +same fellows from beginning to end, or that the western mountains remain +the same western mountains so long as they exist. The product of modern +philosophy, on the other hand, declares that the identity of people, +woods, and rocks is inseparably linked to their opposite, their +incessant transformation. The old school logic treats things, the +objects of perception, like stereotyped moulds, while the +philosophically expanded logic considers such treatment adequate for +household use only. The logical household use of stereotyped +conceptions extends, and should extend, to all of science. The +consideration of things as remaining "the same" is indispensable, and +yet it is very salubrious to know and remember that the things are not +only the same permanent and stereotyped, but at the same time variable +and in flow. That is a contradiction, but not a senseless one. This +contradiction has confused the minds and given much trouble to the +philosophers. The solution of this problem, the elucidation of this +simple fact, is the positive product of philosophy. + +I have just declared that logic so far did not know that the perception +produced by its principles does not offer us truth itself, but only a +more or less accurate picture of it. I have furthermore contended that +the positive outcome of philosophy has materially added to the clearness +of the portrait of the human mind. Logic claims to be "the doctrine of +the forms and laws of thought." Dialectics, the product of philosophy, +aims to be the same, and its first paragraph declares: Not thought +produces truth, but being, of which thought is only that part which is +engaged in securing a picture of truth. The fact resulting from this +statement may easily confuse the reader, viz., that the philosophy which +has been bequeathed to us by logical dialectics, or dialectic logic, +must explain not alone thought, but also the original of which thought +is a reflex. + +While, therefore, traditional logic teaches in its first law that all +things are equal to themselves, the new dialectics teaches not only that +things are equal to themselves and identical from start to finish, but +also that these same things have the contradictory quality of being the +same and yet widely variable. If it is a law of thought that we gain as +accurate as possible a conception of things by the help of thought, it +is at the same time a law of thought that all things, processes, and +proceedings are not things but resemble the color of that silk which, +although equal to itself and identical throughout, still plays from one +color into another. The things of which the thinking thing or human +intellect is one are so far from being one and the same from beginning +to end that they are in truth and fact without beginning and end. And as +phenomena of nature, as parts of infinite nature, they only seem to have +a beginning and end, while they are in reality but natural +transformations arising temporarily from the infinite and returning into +it after a while. + +Natural truth or true nature, without beginning and end, is so +contradictory that it only expresses itself by shifting phenomena which +are nevertheless quite true. To old line logic this contradiction +appears senseless. It insists on its first, second, and third law, on +its identity, its law of contradiction and excluded third, which must be +either straight or crooked, cold or warm, and excludes all intermediary +conceptions. And in a way it is right. For every-day use it is all right +to deal in this summary fashion with thoughts and words. But it is at +the same time judicious to learn from the positive outcome of philosophy +that in reality and truth things do not come to pass so ideally. The +logical laws think quite correctly of thoughts and their forms and +applications. But they do not exhaust thinking and its thoughts. They +overlook the consciousness of the inexhaustibleness of all natural +creations, of which the object of logic, human understanding, is a part. +This object did not fall from heaven, but is a finite part of the +infinite which actually has the contradictory quality of possessing in +and with its logical nature that universal nature which is superior to +all logic. + +From this critique of the three first "fundamental laws of logic" it is +apparent that the human understanding is not only everywhere identical, +but also different in each individual and has a historical development. +We are, of course, logically entitled to consider this faculty like all +others by itself and give it a birthday. Wherever man begins, there +understanding, the faculty of thought, begins. But we are +philosophically and dialectically no less entitled, and it is even our +duty, to know that the faculty of understanding, the same as its human +bearer, has no beginning, in spite of the fact that we ascribe a +beginning to them. When we trace the historical development of these +two, of man and understanding, backward to their origin, we arrive at a +transition to the animal and see their special nature merging into +general nature. The same is found in tracing the development of the +individual mind. Where does consciousness begin in the child? Before, +at, or after birth? Consciousness arises from its opposite, +unconsciousness, and returns to it. In consequence we regard the +unconscious as the substance and the conscious as its predicate or +attribute. And the fixed conceptions which we make for ourselves of the +units or phenomena of the natural substance are recognized by us as +necessary means in explaining nature, but at the same time it is +necessary to learn from dialectics that all fixed conceptions are +floating in a liquid element. The infinite substance of nature is a very +mobile element, in which all fixed things appear and sink, thus being +temporarily fixed and yet not fixed. + +Now let us briefly review the fourth fundamental law of logic, according +to which everything must have an adequate cause. This law is likewise +very well worthy of attention, yet it is very inadequate, because the +question what should be our conception of the world and what is the +constitution of the most highly developed thinking faculty of the world +requires the answer: the world, in which everything has its adequate +cause, is nevertheless, including consciousness and the faculty of +thought, without beginning, end, and cause, that is, a thing justified +in itself and by itself. The law of the adequate cause applies only to +pictures made by the human mind. In our logical pictures of the world +everything must have its adequate cause. But the original, the universal +cosmos, has no cause, it is its own cause and effect. To understand that +all causes rest on the causeless is an important dialectic knowledge +which first throws the requisite light on the law of the necessity of an +adequate cause. + +Formally everything must have its cause. But really everything has not +only one cause, but innumerable causes. Not alone father and mother are +the cause of my existence, but also the grand parents and great grand +parents, together with the air they breathed, the food they ate, the +earth on which they walked, the sun which warmed the earth, etc. Not a +thing, not a process, not a change is the adequate cause of another, but +everything is rather caused by the universe which is absolute. + +When philosophy began its career with the intention of understanding the +world, it soon discovered that this purpose could be accomplished only +by special study. When it chose understanding, or the faculty of +thought, as the special object of its study, it separated its specific +object too far from the general existence. Its logic, in opposing +thought to the rest of existence, forgot the interconnection of the +opposites, forgot that thought is a form, a species, an individuality +which belongs to the genus of existence, the same as fish to the genus +of meat, night to the genus of day, art to nature, word to action, and +death to life. It does not attempt to explore the essence of thought for +its own sake, but for the purpose of discovering the rules of exploring +and thinking correctly. It could not very well arrive at those coveted +rules, so long as it idealized truth transcendentally and elevated it +far above the phenomena. All phenomena of nature are true parts of +truth. Even error and lies are not opposed to truth in that exaggerated +sense in which the old style logic represents them, which teaches that +two contradictory predicates must not be simultaneously applied to the +same subject, that any one subject is either true or false, and that any +third alternative is out of the question. Such statements are due to an +entire misconception of truth. Truth is the absolute, universal sum of +all existing things, of all phenomena of the past, present, and future. +Truth is the real universe from which errors and lies are not excluded. +In so far as stray thoughts, giants and brownies, lies and errors are +really existing, though only in the imagination of men, to that extent +they are true. They belong to the sum of all phenomena, but they are not +the whole truth, not the infinite sum. And even the most positive +knowledge is nothing but an excellent picture of a certain part. The +pictures in our minds have this in common with their originals that they +are true. All errors and lies are true errors and true lies, hence are +not so far removed from truth that one should belong to heaven and the +other to eternal damnation. Let us remain human. + +Since old line logic with its four principles was too narrowminded, its +development had to produce that dialectics which is the positive +outcome of philosophy. This science of thought so expanded regards the +universe as the truly universal or infinite, in which all contradictions +slumber as in the womb of conciliation. Whether the new logic shall have +the same name as the old, or assume the separate title of theory of +understanding or dialectics, is simply a question of terms which must be +decided by considerations of expediency. + + + + +X + +THE FUNCTION OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE RELIGIOUS FIELD + + +We took our departure from the fact that philosophy is searching for +"understanding." The first and principal acquisition of philosophy was +the perception that its object is not to be found in a transcendental +generality. Whoever wishes to obtain understanding, must confine himself +to something special, without, however, through this limitation losing +sight of all measure and aim to such an extent that he forgets the +infinite generality. + +A modern psychologist who occupies himself with "Thoughts on +Enlightenment," which topic is evidently related to ours, says: "Real +and genuine enlightenment can proceed only from religious motives." +Expressed in our language, this would mean: Every genuine understanding, +every true conception or knowledge, must be based on the clear +consciousness that the infinite universe is the arch fundament of all +things. + +Understanding and true enlightenment are identical. "It is true," say +the "Thoughts on Enlightenment," "that all enlightenment takes the form +of struggles on account of the nature of him who is to be enlightened +and of the object about which he is to be informed. But it is a struggle +for religion, not against it." The author, Professor Lazarus, says in +his preface that he does not wish the reader to base his opinion on any +single detached sentence. "Every single sentence," he says, "may be +tested as to its value, but the whole of my views on religion and +enlightenment cannot be recognized from any single one of them." + +As this wish is entirely justified and as our position is somewhat +supported by his psychological treatment of enlightenment, we shall +comply with his wish and seek to grasp the meaning of his statements on +the religious nature of enlightenment in their entirety, not as isolated +sentences. + +We even go a step farther than Professor Lazarus, by extending to +understanding what he says about enlightenment, viz., that genuine +knowledge and enlightenment must, so to say, take their departure from +religious motives. But we differ a little as to what motives are +religious. Lazarus refers, so far as I can see, to ideas and the ideal, +while we, thanks to the positive outcome of philosophy, understand the +terms _religion_ and _religious_ to refer to the universal +interdependence of things. + +Obviously the dividing line between heat and cold is drawn by the human +mind. The point selected for this purpose is the freezing point of +water. One might just as well have selected any other point. Evidently +the dividing line between that which is religious and that which is +irreligious is as indeterminate as that between hot and cold. Neither +any university nor any usage of language can decide that, nor is the +pope a scientific authority in the matter. + +It is mainly due to the socalled historical school that a thing is +considered not alone by its present condition, but by its origin and +decline. What, then, is religion and religious? The fetish cult, the +animal cult, the cult of the ideal and spiritual creator, or the cult of +the real human mind? Where are we to begin and where to end? If the +ancient Germans regarded the great oak as sacred and religious, why +should not art and science become religious among the modern Germans? In +this sense, Lazarus is correct. The "enlightenment" which was headed in +France by Voltaire and the encyclopedists, in Germany by Lessing and +Kant, the "enlightenment" which came as a struggle for reason and +against religion, was then in fact a struggle for religion, not against +it. By this means one may make everything out of anything. But this has +to be learned first in order to recognize how our mind ought to be +adjusted, so that it may perceive that not only everything is +everything, but that each thing also has its own place. + +We wish to become clear in our minds how it is possible, and +reconcilable with sound conception, that such an anti-religious struggle +as that carried on during that period of "enlightenment" can +nevertheless be a struggle for and in the interest of religion. We wish +to find out how one may abolish religion and at the same time maintain +it. + +This is easily understood, if we remember the repeatedly quoted +dialectic rule according to which our understanding must never +exaggerate the distinctions between two things. We must not too widely +separate the religious from the secular field. Of course, the religious +field is in heaven, while the secular is naturally in the profane +universe. Having become aware that even religious imagination, together +with its heaven and spirit creator, are profane conceptions in spite of +their alleged transcendentalism, we find religion in the secular field, +and thus this field has in a way become religious. The religious and the +profane infinite have something in common, at least this that the +indefinite religious name may also be applied to the secular or profane +infinity. + +"All culture, every condition of humanity or of a nation, has its roots +as well as its bounds in history," says our Professor of psychology. +Should not religion, which according to the words of a German emperor +"must be preserved for the people," also have its bounds in history? Or +does it belong to the infinite and must it exist forever? In order to +free history of its bounds, it is necessary to avail ourselves of the +positive outcome of philosophy and to demonstrate that nothing is +infinite but the infinite itself, which has the double nature of being +infinite and inseparable from the finite phenomena of nature. The whole +of nature is eternal, but none of its individual phenomena is, although +even the imperishable whole is composed of perishable parts. + +The relation of the constant whole of nature to its variable parts, the +relation of the general to the specialties composing it, includes, if we +fully grasp it, a perfect conception of the human mind as well as of the +understanding and enlightenment which it acquires. This mind cannot +enlighten itself as to its special nature without observing how it came +to enlighten itself as to the nature of other specialties. We then find +that it has likewise enlightened itself on religious phenomena by +recognizing them as a part, as a variation, of the general phenomenon of +the constant, eternal, natural universe. Hence secular nature, which is +at the same time eternal and temporal, is the mother of religious +nature. Of course, the child partakes of the nature of the mother. +Religion, historically considered, arises from nature, but the +determination of the date of the beginning of this specialty is left as +much to the choice of man as that of the point where the cold and the +warm meet. The general movement of nature, from which arise its +specialties, proceeds in infinite time. Its transformations are so +gradual that every determined point constitutes an arbitrary act which +is at the same time arbitrary and necessary; necessary for the human +being who wishes to gain a conception of it. A perfect conception of +religion, therefore, goes right to the center of the question, to the +point where the religious specialty reaches a characteristic stage, to +its freezing point, so to say. From this standpoint, heat and cold may +be sharply defined; likewise religion. If we say, for instance, that +religion is the conception of a supernatural spirit who rules nature, +and the reader thinks this definition somewhat appropriate, the simple +demonstration of the achievements of philosophy in the field of +understanding or dialectics proves that this religious conception is +untenable in this world of the human mind which knows how to obtain a +logical picture of its experiences. + +To desire to preserve religion for the people as a sharply defined and +finite thing is contrary to all logic and equivalent to swimming against +the tide. On the other hand, it is equally illogical to identify +religion after the manner of Lazarus with the conception of natural +infinity or infinite nature, because that promotes mental haziness. + +The laws of thought obtained by philosophical research give us +considerable enlightenment about the infinite material process, the +nature of which is sublime enough to be worthy of religious devotion, +and yet special and matter-of-fact enough to wash the dim eyes with +natural clearness. + +We have already seen in preceding chapters that we must first define our +standpoint before we can decide which is the right or left bank of a +river. So it is also in the matter of abolishing and maintaining +religion for the people. It can be done the moment we extend the +discussion to the realm of infinity. The conception of infinity, called +substance by Spinoza, monad by Leibniz, thing itself by Kant, the +absolute by Hegel, is indeed necessary in order to explain anything, not +only by the fourth root, but by the infinite root of the adequate +reason. To that extent we are agreed that enlightenment, or +understanding as we say, is not alone a struggle against religion, but +also for it. In the theory of understanding acquired by philosophy, +there is contained a decisive repeal of religion. Nevertheless we say +with Lazarus: "The power of enlightenment and its aim are not expressed +in negation, not in that which is not believed, but in that which is +believed, venerated, and preserved." And yet every enlightening +perception, every understanding resulting from enlightenment, is a +negation. In seeking enlightenment, for instance, on understanding, it +is necessary, in order to prove that it is a natural phenomenon, to deny +the religious element in so far as it assumes the existence of a divine +chief spirit whose secondary copy the human spirit is supposed to be. +Or, in order to gain enlightenment on the nature of the universe, in +order to realize that it is a truly universal universe, we are compelled +to deny the existence of every "higher" world, including the religious. +But if we desire to become enlightened as to how it is that religion +may not alone be denied, but also preserved, we must transfer its origin +from an illogical other world into the natural and logical universe. +Thus religion becomes natural and nature religious. + +If worship is confined to the idolization of the sun or the cat, every +one realizes the temporality of the matter. And if we restrict worship +to the adoration of the great omnipotent spirit, every one realizes the +temporality of this adoration who has acquired an accurate conception of +the small human spirit. If, on the other hand, we extend religious +worship to everything which has ever been venerated, or will ever be +venerated, by human beings, in other words, if we extend the conception +of religion to the entire universe, then it assumes a very far-reaching +significance. + +This is the essence of enlightenment on religion: That we may at will +expand or contract our conceptions, that all things are alike to the +extent of representing only one nature, that all fantastical ideas, all +good and evil spirits and ghosts, no matter how "supernaturally" +conceived, are all natural. + +The essential thing in the enlightenment acquired by philosophical study +is the appreciation of the fact that understanding, enlightenment, +science, etc., are not cultivated for their own sake, but must serve the +purpose of human development, the material interests of which demand a +correct mental picture of the natural processes. + +We have chosen the religious idea for discussion in this chapter so that +it may serve as a means of illustrating the nature of thought in +general. We regard it as the merit of philosophy to have unveiled this +nature. + +Professor Lazarus is quite a pleasing companion. He is a fine thinker, +saturated with the teachings of the philosophers, not overfond of any +particular school, and only about two hands' breadth removed from our +position. But this is just enough to demonstrate by his shortcomings the +advantages of our position which proves that the part of the human soul +performing the work of thinking is understood by us at least two hands' +breadth better than by this prominent psychologist. + +"The function of enlightenment is to recognize that no phenomenon can be +an effect which has not another phenomenon as its cause, and to search +for the sole cause of every effect, noting all its parts and their +consecutive divisions." + +These words describe the mental work performed by the human brain fairly +well, but still they require a little addition, to the effect that the +mental work is no exception from any other phenomena, all of which have +not alone their special, but also one general cause. The cause of all +causes, of which religion is making an idol, must be profaned, so to +speak, by the cult of science, so that the above definition of Lazarus +regarding enlightenment would read as follows: The sole and true cause +of all effects is the universe, or the general interdependence of all +things. But this is not by far the full scope of enlightenment. It is +further necessary, as Lazarus well says, to note "all its parts and +their consecutive divisions." We further add: The universal cause must +be understood not alone in its consecutive parts, but also in its +co-ordinate parts. It is only then that understanding, enlightenment, +become perfect. We then find that after all the relation between cause +and effect, or the relation between the universal truth and its natural +phenomena, is not a very trenchant one, but a relative one. + +"Enlightenment advances in various, in all, fields of mental life. +Religious enlightenment has long been recognized as the most essential, +justly so, and for many reasons, the chief of them being that religious +enlightenment is the most important and hence the most bitterly +contested." + +Thus religious enlightenment is a part of universal, cosmic, +enlightenment. It is a confusing expression to say that it is confined +to "all fields of mental life." We believe to be shedding more light on +the question by saying that there is enlightenment in all fields, not +alone in the mental, but also in the cosmic, which unites both the +material and mental. To classify this field, that is the exhaustive task +of our understanding, that its exhaustive definition. + + + + +XI + +THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT IS ONE OF THE MEANS OF +UNDERSTANDING + + +The processes of the human mind and their subjective composition cannot +be analyzed in a _pure_ state and without regard to their objective +effects any more than handiwork can be explained without the raw +material to be handled and the products derived therefrom, any more than +any work can be described in a _pure_ state without regard to the +product. + +That is the sad defect of old time logic which is an obstacle to its +further advance: it literally tears things out of their connections and +forgets the necessity of interdependence over the need of special study. + +The instrument which produces thought and knowledge in the human brain +is not an isolated thing, nor an isolated quality. It is connected not +only with the brain and the nervous system, but also with all qualities +of the soul. True, thinking is different from feeling, but it is +nevertheless a feeling the same as gladness and sorrow. Thought is +called incomprehensible and the heart unfathomable. It is the function +of science, of thinking and thought, to fathom and comprehend what as +yet is not fathomed and not comprehended. + +Just as thinking and understanding are parts of the human soul, so the +latter is a part of physical and intellectual man. Together with the +physical development of man, of the species as well as of the +individual, the soul also develops and with it that part which is the +special object of the theory of understanding, viz., thought and +thinking. Not alone does physical development produce intellectual +development, but, vice versa, the understanding reacts on the physical +world. The one is not merely a cause, nor the other merely an effect. +This obsolete distinction does not suffice for the full understanding of +their interrelations. We pay a tribute to the "thoughts on +enlightenment" of Professor Lazarus quoted in the previous chapter by +acknowledging that they throw so much light on a certain point that +little more than the dot over the "i" is required in order to clear up a +bad misunderstanding about the relation of cause and effect. + +Since the time of Aristotle this relation has been called a category. We +have already noted the statement which characterizes the age of +enlightenment as one in which the causal category, or let us say the +distinction between cause and effect, became the dominant issue. Other +periods live with their understanding, with their thoughts, in other +categories. Though the ancient Greeks knew the distinction between +cause and effect, yet it was far from being the dominant point of view +in their search after scientific understanding. Instead of regarding, as +we do today, everything as effects which were produced by preceding +causes, they saw in every process, in every phenomenon, a means which +had a purpose. The category of means and purpose dominated the Greeks. +Socrates admired the knowledge of nature displayed by Anaxagoras, the +stories he could tell of sun, moon, and stars. But as Anaxagoras had +omitted to disclose the _reasonable purpose_ of the processes of nature, +Socrates did not think much of such a natural science. At that period +the means and the purpose were the measure of reason, the handle of the +mind, the category of understanding; today causes and effects have taken +their places. + +Between the golden age of Greece and the era of modern science, the +socalled night of the Middle Ages, the epoch of superstition, extends. +If then you started out on a voyage and first met an old woman, it meant +misfortune for you. Wallenstein cast the horoscope before he directed +his troops. "Understanding" was gathered from the flight of a bird, the +cry of an animal, the constellations of stars, the meeting with an old +woman. The category of that period was the _sign_ and its +_consequences_. + +And according to Lazarus, these things were believed by brains which +were by no means dull. "I refer to a name which fills us all with +veneration: Kepler believed in astrology, in the _category of the sign +and its consequence_, together with the thinkers of the thousand years +before him and of his own century. Astrology was a science for many +centuries, promoted together with astronomy ... and by the same people." + +The peculiar thing in this statement is the reference to the category +of sign and consequence as a _science_. This category has no longer a +place in modern science. + +May not our modern viewpoint, the category in which our present day +science thinks, the category of cause and effect, be equally transitory? + +The ancients have accomplished lasting scientific results in spite of +their "purposes." Mediaeval superstition with its "signs," its astrology +and alchemy, has likewise bequeathed to us a few valuable scientific +products. And, on the other hand, even the greatest partisans of modern +science do not deny that it is marred by various adventurous vagaries. + +The categories of means and purposes, of signs and consequences, are +still in vogue today and will be preserved together with that of causes +and effects. The knowledge that this latter category is likewise but a +historical one and exerts but temporarily a dominating influence on +science belongs to the positive outcome of philosophy, and Professor +Lazarus, with all his advanced standpoint, has remained behind this +result by about a yard. + +Kindly note that it is not the extinction of the relation between cause +and effect which we predict, but merely that of its dominance. + +Whoever skips lightly over the current of life, will be greatly shocked +when reading that we place the fundamental pillar of all perception, the +category of cause and effect, in the same passing boat in which the +prophets and astrologers rode. One is very prone to belittle the faith +of others by the name of "superstition" and honor one's own superstition +by the title of "science." + +Once we have grasped the fact that our intellect has no other purpose +than that of tracing a human picture of cosmic processes, and that its +penetration of the interior of nature, its understanding, explaining, +perceiving, knowing, etc., is nothing else, and cannot be anything else, +that moment it loses its mysterious, transcendental metaphysical +character. We also understand then, that the great spirit above the +clouds who is supposed to create the world out of nothing, could very +well serve the mind as a means of explaining things. And it is the same +with the category of cause and effect, which is a splendid means of +assisting explanation, but still will not suffice for the requirements +of all time to come. + +The perception that the great spirit above the clouds is a free +invention of the small human mind has become so widely spread that we +may well pass on over it to other things. + +Among the questions now on the order of business is the one whether the +"causes" with which modern science operates so widely are not in a way +creators in miniature which produce their effects in a sleight-of-hand +way. And this erroneous notion is, indeed, the current conception. + +If a stone falls into the water, it is the cause of the undulations, but +not their creator. It is only a co-operator, for the liquid and elastic +qualities of the water also act as a cause. If the stone falls into +butter, it creates at best but one undulation, and if this stony creator +falls on the hard ground, it is all up with the creation of undulations. +This shows that causes are not creators, but rather effects which are +not effected, but effect themselves. + +The category of cause and effect is a good help in explanation, so long +as it is accompanied by the philosophical consciousness that the whole +of nature is an infinite sea of transformations, which are not created +by one great or many small creators, but which create themselves. + +A well-known philosophical author expresses himself in the following +manner: "During the first weeks of its existence, the child has no +perception either of the world without, or of its own body, or of its +soul. Hence its feeling is not accompanied by the consciousness of an +interaction between these three factors. It does not suspect its +causes." We see that soul, body, and outer world are called the three +factors of feeling. Now note how each one of these three causes or +factors is, so to say, the store house of innumerable factors or causes, +all of which cause the feeling of the child. The soul consists of many +soul parts, the body of many bodily parts, and the outer world consists +of so many parts that it would consist of ten times more parts, if there +were any more than innumerable. + +There is no doubt that the child's feeling, or any other, does not exist +independently, but is dependent on the soul, the body, and the outer +world. This constitutes the indubitable interrelation of all things. In +the winding processes of the self-agitated universe, the category of +cause and effect serves as a means of enlightenment, by giving our mind +its help in the systematization of processes. If the drop of a stone +precedes, the undulations of the water follow; if soul, body, and outer +world are present, feeling follows. + +The positive outcome of philosophy does not reject the services of the +category of cause and effect. It only rejects the mystical element in +that category in which many people, even among those with a "scientific +education," still believe. There is no witchcraft in this matter, but +simply a mechanical systematization and classification of natural +phenomena in the order of their appearance. So long as water remains +water and retains its liquid and elastic properties, and so long as a +stone is a stone, a ponderous fellow striking the water heavily, just +so long will the splash of the stone be surely and inevitably followed +by undulations of the water. So long as soul, body, and outer world +retain their known properties, they will with unfailing precision +produce feeling. It is no more surprising that we can affirm this on the +strength of our experience than that we have a category of cause and +effect. There exists nothing extraordinary but the condition of things, +and in this respect all things are alike, so that human understanding, +cause and effect, or any other category, are no more extraordinary than +any other condition. The only wonder is the universe, but this, being a +universal wonder, is at the same time trivial, for nothing is so +familiar as that which is common to all. + +By the help of the viewpoint of cause and effect, man throws light on +the phenomena of nature. Cause and effect serve to enlighten us about +the world. + +The way, the method, by which this enlightenment is produced, is the +special object of our study. We do not deny that cause and effect serve +us as a means, but only as one of many. We honor the category of cause +and effect far too much when we regard it as _the_ panacea. We have seen +that formerly other viewpoints served the same purpose and still others +exist today, some of which have a prospect of being valued more highly +in the future than cause and effect. This category serves very well for +the explanation of processes which follow one another. But there are +other phenomena which occur side by side, and these must also be +elucidated. For such a purpose, the category of genus and species is +quite as serviceable. Haeckel speaks somewhat slightingly of "museum +zoologists and herbarium botanists," because they merely classify +animals and plants according to genera and species. The modern +zoologists and botanists do not simply consider the multiplicity of +animals and plants which exist simultaneously, but also the +chronological order of the changes and transformations, and in this way +they have gained much more of a life-picture of the zoological and +botanical world, a picture not alone of its being, but also of its +growing, of arising and declining. Undoubtedly the knowledge of the +museum zoologists and herbarium botanists was meager, narrow, +mechanical, and modern science offers a far better portrait of truth and +life. Still this is no reason for overestimating the value of analysis +by cause and effect. This method supplements the category of genus and +species. It assists in enlightening, it helps in the process of thought, +but it does not render other forms of thought superfluous. + +It is essential for the theory of understanding, to recognize the +special forms of thought of old and new times as peculiarities which +have a common nature. This common nature of the process of thought, +understanding, enlightenment, is a part of the universal world process, +and not greatly different from it. + +The conception of a cause partly explains the phenomena of the universe; +but so does the conception of a purpose and of a species, in fact, so do +all conceptions. + +In the universe all parts are causes, all of them caused, produced, +created, and yet there is no creator, no producer, no cause. The general +produces the special, and the latter in turn produces by reaction the +general. + +The category of the general and the special, of the universe and its +parts, contains all other categories in the germ. In order to explain +the process of thought, we must explain it as a part of the universal +process. It has not caused the creation of the world, neither in a +theological nor in an idealist sense, nor is it a mere effect of the +brain substance, as the materialists of the eighteenth century +represented it. The process of thought and its understanding is a +peculiarity of the universal cosmos. The relation of the general to the +special is the clear and typical category underlying all other +categories. + +One might also apply other names to this category, for instance, the one +and the many; the essence and the form; the substance and its +attributes; truth and its phenomena, etc. However, a name is but a +breath and a sound; understanding and comprehension are what we want in +the first place. + + + + +XII + +MIND AND MATTER: WHICH IS PRIMARY, WHICH SECONDARY? + + +It is the merit of the philosophical outcome to have delivered the +process of understanding from its mystic elements. So long as cause and +effect are not recognized as a form of thought belonging to the same +species with many other forms of thought, all of which serve the common +purpose of illuminating the cosmic processes for the human mind by a +symbolized picture composed of various conceptions, just so long will +something mysterious adhere to the category of cause and effect. + +Philosophy is particularly engaged in illuminating the understanding. It +has learned enough of its specialty to know that it is a part of the +universe performing the special function of arranging the world of +phenomena and its smaller circles according to relations of +consanguinity and chronology. Such an arrangement presents a scientific +picture of the world. The well-known diagram of conceptions used by +logicians, consisting of a large circle symbolizing the general, inside +of which smaller circles crossing and encircling one another represent +the specialties, is a fitting aid in explaining the method by which the +faculty of understanding arrives at its scientific results. Science in +general is the sum of all special kinds of knowledge, differing from +them in no greater degree than the human body from the various organs of +which it is composed. A bodily organ can no more exist outside of the +body than any particular knowledge can exist outside of the generality +of all sciences. No metaphysics is possible under this condition. + +As surely as we know that two mountains cannot be without a valley +between them, just so surely do we know that nothing in heaven, on +earth, or in any other place can lie outside of the general circle of +things. Outside of the worldly world there can be no other little world. +A logically constituted human mind cannot think differently. And it is +likewise impossible to discover such an outside world by the help of and +within the limits of experience, because thought is inseparable from +experience and there can be no experience without thought. A man who has +a head upon his shoulders--and there can be no man without a +head--cannot experience any unworldly metaphysical world. The faculty of +experience, which includes the faculty of understanding or perception, +is merely empirical. Our settled conviction of the unity of the universe +is an inborn logic. The unity of the world is the supreme and most +universal category. A closer look at it at once reveals the fact that it +carries its opposite, the infinite multiplicity, under its heart or in +its womb. The general is pregnant with specialties. + +This is a comparison, and comparisons limp. A mother has other qualities +beside that of motherhood, while the universe, or the absolute +generality, is nothing but the bearer, the cause, of all special and +separate things. It is "pure" motherhood which can no more be without +children than the children without a mother. In this way, no cause can +be without effects. A cause without an effect--let us dismiss it. The +child is as much a cause in motherhood as it is its effect and product. +In the same way the universe has never been, and could not be conceived, +without the many special children which it carries in its womb. + +If thought wishes to make for itself a picture, a conception of the +cause of all causes, it must necessarily take cognizance of the effects. +Thought may very well separate one from the other, but cannot think +correctly without the consciousness that its separating and +distinguishing is only a formality. Imagining, conceiving, knowing, +perceiving, are so many formalities.[9] + +But philosophy took its departure from the opposite, the wrong, view. It +regarded perceiving, understanding, as the main thing. It did not use +science as a formality, as something secondary, as something serving a +nature, a cause, a purpose, a higher reason, but it started with the +illogical and irrelevant assumption that the specialty of mind, +understanding, conceiving, judging, distinguishing, is the primary, +supreme, self-constituted cause and purpose, instead of being an element +in logic. Even in Hegel's logic, which, by the way, has given us much +light on the process of thought, this confounding of the original with +the copy is the cause of an almost impenetrable mysticism. + +Not nature, but science is to those idealist philosophers the source of +truth. The "true idea" surpassed everything with them. This "idea" is +forced by Hegel to roll about, and wind, and twist as if it were not a +natural child, but a metaphysical dragon. But we cannot deny that in +these twistings and windings of the Hegelian dragon the condition of the +mind is exposed in all its peculiarities and nakedness. + +According to Hegel's theosophical opinion I do not become aware of my +friend in material intercourse and bodily touch. Hegel's mark of a true +friend is not that he proves true in life, but that he corresponds "to +his idea." The "idea" of true friendship is for the idealist the measure +of friendly truth, just as Plato measures the ideal or true condition of +states and cooking pots of this valley of sorrows by the standard of an +"idea" of the state, or an "idea" of the cooking pot, supposed to be +derived from some other world. + +It is surely a valuable gift of nature that the human mind can form its +ideals. But it is a gift that has also caused much trouble and which +requires for its higher development the clear understanding that ideals +are constructed out of real materials. Without this understanding the +human race will never succeed in making a reasonable use of its ideal +faculty. The beautiful ideal of true friendship may stimulate us to +emulation. But the knowledge that it is nothing but an ideal which in +reality is always mixed with a little falseness serves as no mean +antidote against sentimental transcendentalism. And the same holds true +of truth, liberty, justice, equality, brotherhood, etc. + +The striving after an ideal is very good, but it does no harm to be +conscious of the fact and clearly see that any ideal can never be +realized without some admixture of its opposite. What is it that Lessing +says? "If God were to offer me the search for truth in his left hand, +and truth in his right, I should grasp his left hand and say: Father, +keep truth, it is for you alone." + +It has not been the task of philosophy to give us a true mind picture of +the world. This it cannot do, this cannot be done by any scientific +specialty. It may be done by the totality of sciences, and even by them +only approximately. Even with them striving is a higher truth and of +higher value than knowing. I repeat, then: It is not the particular task +of philosophy to furnish a true picture of the world, but rather to +investigate the method by which the human mind arrives at its world +pictures. That is its work, and it is the object of this book to sketch +its outline. + +A sketch is in itself an inexact piece of work. I may be blamed for +jumbling together such terms as world, cosmos, universe, nature, or such +others as ideas, judgment, conclusion, thought, mind, intellect, etc., +and for using them as synonyms when many of them have already been +assigned their fixed meaning in the classification of science. But this +is the point which I emphasize, that the method of science, of thought, +has the twofold nature of making fixed terms and still remaining +pliable. + +Science not only defines what this or that is, but also how it moves, +how it originates, passes away, and still remains; how it is fixed and +yet at the same time moving. The real being of which science treats, +viz., the universe, is not alone present, but also past and future, and +it is not alone this or that, but it is everything. Even nothing is +something belonging to the aggregate life. + +This dialectic statement is rather incomprehensible to the +unphilosophical brain. Nothing and something are conceptions so widely +diverging from one another in the unphilosophical mind that they seem +far more apart than heavenly bliss is supposed to be separated from +earthly misery, according to the declarations of clergymen. Clergymen +are transcendental logicians, and it is likewise transcendental to +regard nothing as an absolute nothing. It cannot be denied that it is at +least a conception or a term. Therefore, whether little or much, it is +something. We cannot get out of existence, out of the universe, any more +than Muenchhausen can pull himself out of a swamp by his pigtail. + +There can be no absolute nothing, because the absolute is synonymous +with the universe, and everything else is relative. So it is also with +nothing. It simply has the significance of not being the main thing. To +say: This is nothing means it is not that which is essential at this +time and place. This man is nothing simply means that he is not a man +out of the ordinary, and it does not at all signify that he is nothing +at all. + +The category of being and not being, like all categories,[10] which +appear as something fixed to the sound but ill-informed mind, is really +something shifting. Its poles fuse and flow into one another, its +differences are not perfectly radical. These categories give us an +illustration of the mobile universe, which is a unit composed of its +opposite, multiplicity. + +The positive outcome of philosophy has for its climax the understanding +that the world is multifarious, and that this multiplicity is uniform in +possessing the universal nature in common. The sciences must represent +these objects in such a contradictory way, because all things live in +reality in this contradiction. What the museum zoologists and the +herbarium botanists have accomplished on the field of zoology and botany +in the category of space, has been accepted by the Darwinians with the +addition of the variety of those subjects in the category of time. +Either class of scientists categorizes, classifies, systematizes. The +chemists do the same with substances and forces, and so does Hegel with +his categories of being and not being, quantity and quality, substance +and attribute, thing and quality, cause and effect, etc. He makes all +things flow into one another, rise, pass, move, and he is right in doing +so. Everything moves and belongs together. + +But that which Hegel missed and which is added by us consists in the +further perception that the flow and the variability of the categories +just quoted is only an illustration of the necessary variability and +interaction of all thoughts and conceptions, which are, and must be, +nothing but illustrations and reflexes of the universal life. + +However, the idealist philosophers who have all of them contributed +materially toward this ultimate special knowledge, are still more or +less under the mistaken impression that the process of thinking is the +true process and the true original, and that the true original, nature +or the material universe, is only a secondary phenomenon. We now insist +on having it understood that the cosmic interaction of phenomena, the +universal living world, is the truth and life. + +Is the world a concept? Is it an idea? It may be conceived and grasped +by the mind, but it does and is more than that. It surpasses our +understanding in the past, the present, and the future. It is infinite +in quantity and quality. How do we know that? We say in the same breath +that we do not know everything which is passing, has passed, and will +pass in the world; we do not understand the whole, and yet we claim to +have fully understood that this whole universe is not a mere idea, but +something absolute, something more than a conception or an intuitive +knowledge, something real and true, something infinite. How do we solve +this contradiction? + +The science of the limitation of the individual and of the collective +human intellect is identical with the universal concept; in other words, +it is innate in the human intellect to know that it is a limited part of +the absolute universe. This intellectual faculty of ours is no less +natural and aboriginal than the faculty of trees to become green in +summer and that of the spiders to spread their nets. Although the +intellect is a limited part of the unlimited and aware of this fact, yet +its faculty of knowing, understanding, judging, is a universal one. No +intellect is possible or conceivable which can do more than the +instrument of thought given by nature to the human race. We may indeed +conceive of a mental giant. But when we take a closer look, every one +will perceive that this mental giant cannot get outside of the +traditional race of thinkers, unless he is supposed to be the creature +of imagination. + +Thinking, knowing, understanding, are universal. I can perceive all +things in about the same way that I can see all cobble stones. I can see +them all, but I cannot see everything that they are composed of, I +cannot see, for instance, that they are heavy and ponderable. In the +same way all things may be perceived, but not everything that belongs +to them. They do not dissolve in understanding, in other words, +understanding is only a part of the universe, all of which may be +perceived, but the understanding of which is not the whole, since our +intellect is but a part of the universe. + +Everything may be understood, but understanding is not everything. Every +pug-dog is a dog, but every dog is not a pug-dog. The conflict of +idealism and materialism rests on this same conflict between genus and +subordinate species. The idealist incarnate contends that all things are +ideas, while we strive to make him see that ideal things and material +things are two species of the same genus, and that they should be given +a common family or general name beside their special name, on account of +their common nature and for the purpose of a sound logic. Wherever this +understanding has been acquired, the quarrel between idealists and +materialists appears in the light of a mere bandying of words. + +Everything is large, everything is small, everything extended through +space and time, everything cause and everything effect, everything a +whole and a part, because everything is the essence of everything, +because everything is contained in the all, everything related, +everything connected, everything interdependent. The conception of all +as the absolute, the content of which consists of innumerable +relativities, the concept of the all as the universal truth which +reflects many phenomena, that is the basis of the science of +understanding. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[9] A By means of which we picture and explain the monistic +interrelation of all things, called universe, nature and +cosmos.--EDITOR. + +[10] That is, like all categories that are subdivisions of the absolute +being, of general existence, pertaining only to the phenomena or +specialties which, however, in their entirety constitute the absolute +being or monistic nature.--EDITOR. + + + + +XIII + +THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE DOUBTS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CLEAR AND ACCURATE +UNDERSTANDING HAVE BEEN OVERCOME + + +A contemporaneous professor of philosophy, Kuno Fischer, of Jena, says: +"The problem of modern philosophy is the understanding of things." But +this problem does not occupy modern philosophy alone; it was also +considered by ancient philosophy. Even more, it belongs to the whole +world. All the world, I mean the whole human world, and especially the +sciences, search after understanding. I do not say this for the purpose +of setting the Professor right, for I acknowledge that he is a fairly +deserving philosopher. If I cared to go through his works, I should +surely find other passages which state the problem of philosophy more +accurately and concretely, to the effect that philosophy does not strive +merely for the indefinite "understanding of things," but rather for the +special understanding of that particular thing which bears the name of +"understanding." Philosophy at the climax of its development seeks to +understand "understanding." It has seriously attempted the solution of +this problem so long as men think, so far as our historical records go. + +After that which we have already said about the beginning and the end of +things and about their immortality, it will be easily understood that +the thing called understanding has no more historical beginning than all +the rest. The known grows out of the unknown, the conscious out of the +unconscious. Our modern consciousness, though agreeably cultivated, is +still an undeveloped, unconscious consciousness. Nevertheless, +development has gone far enough to make it plain that understanding is +anti-religious. Especially the understanding of understanding, the +outcome of positive philosophy, has a pronounced anti-religious, and to +that extent "destructive," tendency. But one should not have an +exaggerated idea of this destruction. Here, under this sun, nothing is +destroyed without leaving the basis for the growth of new life from the +ruins. It belongs to the conception of the universe to understand that +it is the main conception required for the conception of conception, for +the understanding of understanding. + +The history of philosophy begins with the decay of heathen religion, and +the history of modern philosophy with the decay of Christian religion. +Since religion must be preserved for the people according to the +official declarations of the rulers, the official professors are not +clear and accurate expounders of the positive outcome of philosophy. No +matter how great the work of Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel may be, +yet the followers of Kant and Hegel have no freedom of research, and +Kuno Fischer, although very close to the root of the subject, is +nevertheless doomed to remain in the mystification of the function of +conceiving and of understanding. His profession clouds his judgment. + +"Nature," says this professor, "is regarded as the first object of +understanding, as the principle from which everything else follows. In +this respect modern philosophy is naturalistic. It is taken for granted +that nature can be understood, or that the possibility of understanding +things is given. Modern philosophy makes this assumption +dogmatically.... The Kantian philosophy, on the other hand, assumes a +critical, not a dogmatic, attitude toward the possibility of +understanding." (System of Logic and Metaphysics, by Kuno Fischer, +second edition, pages 104 and 109.) In this latter, critical, stage, +the subject is kept rather hot by the professors of philosophy. The +critics are still engaged in exclaiming: Be amazed, oh world! How is +understanding possible? + +In the first place, there is nothing to be amazed at. Why is not the +"naturalistic" philosopher consistent by recognizing his special object, +understanding, as a natural object? + +The "supposition" that an understanding of things is possible, is +neither a supposition nor anything "dogmatic." + +The philosophers should abandon their old hobby of trying to prove +anything by syllogisms. Nowadays, a case is not substantiated by words, +but by facts, by deeds. The sciences are sufficiently equipped, and thus +the "possibility of understanding" is demonstrated beyond a doubt. + +"But," say the critics who are so wise that they hear the grass growing, +"are those perceptions which are produced by the exact sciences really +perceptions? Are they not simply substitutes? Those sciences recognize +only the phenomena of things; but where is the understanding which +perceives the truth?" + +We shall offer it to them. You are naturalists. Well, then, nature is +the truth. Or are you spiritualists who make a metaphysical distinction +between the truth and the phenomenon? To understand means to distinguish +and judge. The semblance must be distinguished from the truth, but not +in an excessive manner. It must be remembered that even the most evil +semblance is a natural phenomenon, and the sublimest truth is only +revealed by phenomena, just because it is natural. + +But the old logic cannot stand any contradictions. Semblance and truth +are contradictions for it and they cannot be reconciled by it. But the +irreconcilable simply consists in entertaining, in this monistic world, +thoughts which are supposed to be totally different. Hence old style +logic lacks entirely the mediating manner of thought which does not +elevate understanding and its faculty of thought to the skies, but is +satisfied to regard it as a very valuable, but still natural, quality. + +The old logic could not construct any valid rules of thought, because it +thought too transcendentally of thinking itself. It was not satisfied +that thought is only a faculty, a mode of doing, a part of true nature, +but the nature of truth was spiritualized by it into a transcendental +being. Instead of grasping the conception of spirit with blood and +flesh, it tries to dissolve blood and flesh into ideas. That would be +well enough, if such a solution of the riddles were meant to have no +other significance than that of symbols. + +The old logic contains long chapters about the proofs of truth. It is +supposed to be "identical" with the idea and to be proven by ideas. This +would be all right, if we remained conscious of the secondary relation +in which the idea and understanding stand to truth. But old line logic +is not conscious of this relation. On the contrary. Its consciousness +distorts that relation. It elevates the mind to the first place and +relegates blood and flesh to the last. + +"The necessity of a conception is proven by the impossibility of its +opposite. An idea is contradicted by proving its impossibility. This +impossibility is demonstrated when it can be proven that a thing is at +the same time A and not-A, or when it can be shown that a thing is +neither A nor not-A. The first mode of proof is called _antinomy_, the +second, _dilemma_." + +In this representation of the logical proof much is said of the "thing," +for instance this: A thing cannot be at the same time straight and +crooked, true and untrue, light and dark. The excellence of this +doctrine is easily apparent, because it is overlooked that the concept +"thing" is not a fixed, but a variable one. If a straight line is a +thing, and a crooked line another thing, and if these two things are +held to be opposed to one another, then the above logic is the most +justified in the world. But who claims that there are not many straight +lines which are crooked at one end, which run straight on for a certain +distance and then turn? Who will define to us what a line is? A line may +be composed of 10, 20, 30, etc., parts, and each part is a line. + +Before anything to the point can be said about the logical laws, it is +necessary to say above all how it stands with the relation of the whole +to its parts, of the universe to its subdivisions. The old theological +question of God and his creatures, the old metaphysical question of the +unity and the multiplicity, of truth and its phenomena, reason and +consequence, etc., in one word, the question of metaphysical categories +must be solved and settled before the definition of the minor factors of +understanding, the questions of formal logic, can be attempted. + +What is a "thing?" A clergyman would answer: Only God is something, +everything else is nothing! And we say: Only the universe is something, +and everything in it consists of vacillating, changing, precarious, +varicolored, fluid, variable phenomena or relativities. + +In our times, up to which the theologians have speculated so much and +contributed so little to understanding, one can hardly touch on the God +concept without annoying the reader. Yet it is very essential for a +thorough understanding of the human mind to point out that the God +concept and the universe concept are analogous concepts. Not in vain +have the first minds of modern philosophy, such as Cartesius, Spinoza, +Leibniz, occupied themselves so closely with the God concept. They +invented the socalled ontological proof of the existence of God. This +proof if applied to the universe, testifies to its divinity. A +metaphysical cloud pusher as well as the physical cosmos are +fundamentally concepts of the most perfect being. It makes little +difference whether we say that the concept of the universe, or of the +cosmos, or of the most perfect being is innate in man. If this concept +were not existing, it would lack the main thing required for its +perfection. Hence the most perfect being must exist. And it does. It is +the universe, and everything belongs to its existence. Nothing is +excluded from it, least of all understanding. The latter is, therefore, +not only possible, but a fact, which is proven by the very concept of +the most perfect being. + +This ought to be sufficient to help us over the doubts of the critics, +especially over Kantian criticism, or rather dualism. Kant did not care +to accept the dogma of the possibility of understanding without +examination; he wished to investigate first. He then discovered that we +may understand correctly, provided we remain with our understanding on +the field of common experience; in other words, in the physical +universe, and refrain from digressing into the metaphysical heaven. But +he did not understand that the metaphysical heaven against which he +warns us would be an obsolete standpoint in our days. + +He still permits that transcendental possibility to remain and while he +warns us not to stray into it with our understanding he omits to tell us +to also keep away from it with our intuition. Kant struggles about +between the "thing as phenomenon" and the "thing itself." The former is +material and may be understood, the latter is supernatural and may be +believed or divined. With this doctrine, he again made understanding, +the object of modern philosophy, problematical, thus inviting us to +investigate further. + +This we have done, and it is now the positive outcome of philosophy to +know clearly and definitely and understand that understanding is not +only a part of this world of phenomena, but a true part of the general +truth, beside which there is no other truth, and which is the most +perfect being. + +Philosophy took its departure from confused wrangling about that which +is and that which is not, especially from the religious disappointments +met by the Greek nation when its world of deities dissolved into +phantasms. Humanity demands a positive, strong, unequivocal, reliable +understanding. Now, in this world of ours, the solid is so mixed with +the fluid, the imperishable with the perishable, that a total separation +is impossible. Nevertheless our intellect catches itself continually +making separations and distinctions. Should not that appear mysterious +to it? The necessary and natural result was the problem of the theory of +understanding, the special question of philosophy: Which is the way to +an indubitably clear and positive understanding? + +The summit of Grecian philosophy bears the name of Aristotle. He was a +practical man who did not like to stray into the distance when he could +find good things near by, and he did not concern himself about the +descent of understanding. Its platonic origin from an ideal world went +instinctively against his grain. He, therefore, took hold of the +question at the nearest end and analyzed the positive knowledge +available at that time. But since Grecian science and the knowledge of +Aristotlean times were rather slim, his attempt to demonstrate logic +did not produce any decisive results. But it had been discovered that it +was possible to make positive deductions from fixed premises. + +Aristotle clung to this. He showed clearly and definitely, excellently +and substantially, how logical deductions should be made in order to +arrive at positive understanding. All dogs are watchful. My pug-dog is a +dog, therefore it is watchful. What can be more evident? Why, then, +speculate about God, freedom, and immortality, when indubitable +knowledge may be obtained by the formal method of exact deductions? + +But Aristotle had overlooked something, or, being a practical man, +perhaps overlooked it intentionally. The premise from which he deducted +the watchfulness of dogs in general, was handed down by tradition and +had been accepted on faith. But was it founded on fact? Could there not +be some dogs who lacked the quality of watchfulness, and might not our +pug-dog be very unreliable, in spite of all exact deductions? In the +case of the pug-dog this would not be of very great moment. But what +about the question of the beginning and end of the world, or the +question of the existence of God? The Grecian gods had been outgrown by +Aristotle. + +The history of logic, and of philosophy in general, is interrupted by +Christianity and by the decline of the antique world, until the +reformation opens a new era. The Catholic church had, in its own way, +thoroughly settled the great questions of the true nature of things, of +beginning and end, reason and consequence. But when it, and with it +Christianity, began to disintegrate, disbelief once more posed in the +brains of the philosophers the old question: How do we obtain reliable +and true understanding? Reliability and truth were at that time still +identical. + +Bacon and Descartes are the men who started the investigation. Both of +them were disgusted with Aristotle and with his formal logic, +particularly with the subtleties of scholasticism. It did not satisfy +this new epoch to found positive understanding on traditional +contentions and exact deductions therefrom. It is a radical epoch and, +therefore, epoch-making. The new philosophers have the aim of +unequivocal understanding in common with the ancient philosophers. Bacon +still connects himself with the stock in trade of the past. His +historian says of him that one should not reiterate that Bacon took his +departure from experience, for this means nothing or nothing more than +that Columbus was a mariner while the main thing is that he discovered +America.... He wanted to find a new logic corresponding to the new +life.... The inventive human mind has created the new time, the compass, +the powder, the art of typography.... He wanted a new logic which +corresponded to the spirit of invention. He, the philosopher of +invention, was Lord Chancellor of England, was a man of the world. Not +only himself, but also his science, was too ambitious, too full of +energy, too world-embracing, for him to bury himself in solitude. That +is a glory for a philosopher, but at the same time an obstacle for his +special task, for the new logic. He recognized the import of his task +only in its general outlines. But his contemporary and successor +Descartes approached the matter more radically and pointedly. + +Although in recent times the human mind had demonstrated its positive +faculty of understanding in natural sciences, especially by inventions, +still it was prejudiced by religious improbabilities in its great +premises dealing with the essence of things and men, with the "good, +true, and beautiful," as the ancients called it. In order to end his +doubts, Descartes elevates radical doubt to the position of a principle +and of a starting point for all understanding. Then he cannot doubt that +he is at least searching for truth. He who does not believe in any +understanding, any science, any inventions, cannot doubt at all events +that the impulse for understanding is there. It, at least, is +undeniable. _Cogito, ergo sum_--I think, therefore I am--that is a +premise which cannot be shaken. The rest, thinks Descartes, may be +deducted by Aristotlean methods. + +With this thought, the philosopher of modern times relapsed into the old +error that anything positively true could be ascertained with logical +formulas. His consciousness of the thoughts stirring in his brain, I +might say his flesh and blood, convinced him by matter-of-fact evidence +of the reality of their existence. + +This fact had hitherto been misunderstood. It is claimed that Descartes +could convince himself only of the existence of his soul, of his +thought, by evidence. No, my feeling, my sight, my hearing, etc., are +just as evident to me as my thinking, and simultaneously with sight and +hearing that which is heard and seen. The separation of subject and +object can and must be merely a formality. + +The Descartian thesis has been distorted into the statement that nothing +is evident to man but his own subjective conception. And the ideology +has been carried to the extreme of calling the whole world an idea, a +phantasmagoria. True, Descartes needed God in order to be sure that his +conceptions did not cheat him. + +In order to prove that we no longer need such extravagant means in our +times, I shall devote another chapter to this subject. + + + + +XIV + +CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DOUBTFUL AND +EVIDENT UNDERSTANDING + + +Let us divide the history of civilization into two periods. In the +first, the less civilized period, the doubtful perceptions predominate, +in the second period the evident ones. Our special investigation of the +correct way of evident understanding began in the first period in which +the doubtful perceptions, commonly called errors, predominated. In this +period, the gods rule in heaven and imagination on earth. + +To get rid of errors meant originally to lose gods and heaven. The ideal +world was the cause of metaphysics. Metaphysics which drew the +investigation of the supernatural into the circle of its activity, did +so for the purpose of enlightening the human mind. Thus its problem was +from the outset of a twofold nature. It desires to throw light on the +natural process of thought, which was temporarily unbalanced by a bent +for the supernatural, and for this reason it first loses itself in the +clouds. + +While human reason has now become soberer, the meaning of the term +"metaphysics" has also been sobered down. Our contemporaneous +metaphysicians speak no longer of such transcendental things as the +ancients did. Present day metaphysics occupies itself with such abstract +ideas as the thing and nothing, being and coming into being, matter and +force, truth and error. + +Particularly the investigation of doubtful, erroneous, and evident or +true understanding, which we here discuss, is a part of metaphysics. + +The term metaphysics, then, has a double meaning, one of them +transcendental and extravagant, the other natural and within sober +limits. Our sober task of demonstrating the positive outcome of +philosophy that acquired sober methods in dealing with understanding +also compels us to face transcendental metaphysics, which sobers down in +the course of time and develops into its opposite, into pure, bare, +naked physics. + +The divine has become human, the transcendental sober, and so +understanding grows ever more unequivocal and evident in the progress of +history. + +In order to become clear on the problem of understanding, we must cease +to turn our eyes to any one individual opinion, thought, knowledge, or +perception. We must rather consider the process of understanding in its +entirety. We then notice the development from doubt to evidence, from +errors to true understanding. At the same time we become aware how +unwise it was to entertain such an exaggerated idea of the contrast +between truth and error. + +Whoever searches for true and evident understanding will not find it in +Jerusalem, nor in Jericho, nor in the spirit; not in any single thing, +but in the universe. There the known emerges from the unknown so +gradually that no beginning can be traced. Understanding comes into +being and grows, is partly erroneous and partly accurate, becomes more +and more evident. But there is never an absolutely true understanding +any more than there can be an absolutely faulty one. Only the universe, +but not any single thing, is absolute, imperishable, and impregnable. + +In order to accurately define understanding, we must separate it from +misunderstanding, but not too far, not excessively, otherwise the thing +becomes extravagant. The limited formal logic teaches, indeed, that the +same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, affirmation +and denial being contradictions. But such a logic is very narrow. Herbs +are not weeds. Weeds are the negation of herbs, and still weeds are +herbs. An erroneous understanding is a negation of a true understanding, +error is not truth, and still it exists in truth. There is no absolute +error any more than perceptions are the truth itself. All perceptions +are and remain nothing but symbols or reflections of truth. + +We do not wish to confound error with truth and make a stew of them, but +rather understand them both. The mixing is done by the man who opposes +them as irreconcilable contradictions. Let us first note the mistake +committed in so doing. By so opposing error and truth something is done +which is not intended, not known. The intention is to confront the +erroneous understanding with truth. For this purpose, error is assumed +to be the same as erroneous understanding, which may be admitted; but +true understanding and truth are two different things and must be kept +separate, if we wish to arrive at clear and unmistakable results. If we +formulate the question in this way: How do erroneous and true +understanding differ, we are nearer to the desired clarity by two solar +distances. We then find that error and understanding do not exclude one +another, but are two species of the same genus, two individuals of the +same family. + +Two times two is not alone four; this is only a part of the truth; it is +also four times one, or eight times one-half, or one plus three, or +sixteen times one-quarter, etc. The man who first observed that the sun +circled around the earth once a day, committed a mistake, yet he made a +true perception. The apparent circulation of the sun in twenty-four +hours around the earth is a substantial part of the understanding which +illumines the relation of the motion of the sun and of the earth. No +truth is merely simple, but it is at the same time composed of an +infinite number of partial truths. The semblance must not be +contradictorily separated from truth, in an extravagant sense, but is +part of truth, just as all errors contribute toward true understanding. +In so far as all perceptions are limited, they are errors, partial +truths. True understanding requires above all the backing of the +conscious recognition that it is a limited part of the unlimited +universe. + +The cosmic relation of the whole to its parts, of the general to the +special, must be considered in order to get a clear conception of the +nature of the human understanding. + +Understanding or knowledge, thinking, perceiving, reasoning, must, for +the purpose of investigation, not be excessively separated from other +phenomena. In a way, every object which is chosen for special study is +isolated. In saying, "in a way," I mean that the separation of the +objects of study from other world objects must be consciously moderate, +not exaggerated. The separation of the intellect from other objects or +subjects when investigating them, must be accompanied by the recognition +that such a separation is not excessive, but only formal. In separating +a board, for the purpose of studying its condition, from other boards or +things and finding that it is black, I must still remember that this +board is black only on account of its interdependence with the whole +world process; that the blackness which it possesses is not of its own +making, but that light, and eyes, and the whole cosmic connection belong +to it. In this way every special perception becomes a proportionate part +in the chain of universal perceptions, and this again a proportionate +part of the universal life. + +That this evident universal life is not a mere semblance, not a ghost, +not a baseless imagination, but the truth, is made evident to the +thinking man by his consciousness, reason, common sense. True, he has +been deceived by them, sometimes. But it requires no logic, no +syllogistic proof, to know that they are telling the truth in this +respect. + +It is nevertheless important to give this proof, because by it the +peculiar nature of our intellect is revealed, of the object the study of +which is the special concern of philosophy. + +This proof, that the universe is the universal truth, was first +attempted by philosophy in an indirect way, by casting about in vain for +a metaphysical truth. + +The philosopher Kant was no doubt the thinker who confined the use of +understanding most strictly to the domain of experience. Now, if we +recognize that this field is universal, we become aware that the assumed +Kantian limitation is not a limitation at all. The human mind is a +universal instrument, the special productions of which all belong to +general truth. Though we make a distinction between the doubtful and the +positive, the outcome of philosophy teaches us that it must be no +excessive distinction, but must be backed up by the consciousness that +all evidence is composed of probabilities, of phenomena of truth, of +parts of truth. + +The thinking understanding--this is the result of philosophy--is no more +evident than anything else and derives its existence not from itself, +but from the universal life. This universal life from which thought +derives its perceptions, from which understanding derives its +enlightenment, does not only exist as a general thing, but also in the +form of infinitely varied individualities. And generalization, the +relation of things, their number and extension, are no more, and no +less, infinite than individualization and specialization. Every tree in +the forest, every grain of a pile of sand, are individual, separate, +distinct. Every particle of every grain of sand is distinctly +individual. And the infinite individualization of nature goes so far +that, just as the human individual is different every day, every hour, +every moment, so is the individual grain of sand, even though its +transformations were not to become noticeable until after thousands of +years, by accumulated changes. By classifying this contradictory, +infinitely general and infinitely individual nature in groups according +to time and space, in classes, genera, families, species, orders, and +other subdivisions, we are discerning and understanding. + +In the universe, every group is an individual and every individual is a +group. The uniformity of nature is not greater than its variety. Both of +them are infinite. We distinguish between time and space. Every moment +is composed of little moments. The smallest division of time cannot be +denominated any more than the largest, just because there is no smallest +and no largest in the universe, neither in time nor in space. Atoms are +groups. As smallest parts they exist only in our thoughts and thus give +excellent service in chemistry. The consciousness that they are not +tangible, but only mental things, does not detract from their +usefulness, but heightens it still more. + +It is the nature of human intelligence to divide, classify, group. We +divide the world into four cardinal points; we also divide it into two +kingdoms, the kingdom of the mind and the kingdom of nature; the latter +we again subdivide into the organic and the inorganic, or perhaps into +the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. In short, science seeks to +illumine the universe by division. The question then arises: Which is +the genuine and true division? Where does the variety of science, its +undecided vacillation end, and when does understanding become stable? + +The reader should remember that the things, the objects of +understanding, are not fixed, but also variable objects, and that the +whole universe is moving, progressing; that especially the human mind +becomes more and more affluent from century to century, from year to +year, and that for this reason science is not alone compelled to fix +things, but also to remain in flow. The fixed and the fluid are not so +widely separated in science any more, that the evidence could not be +evident and yet at the same time a little doubtful. + +Man and his understanding are progressive, and for this reason he must +progress by experience in his classifications, conceptions, and +sciences. + +The fixed, impregnable, socalled apodictical facts are nothing but +tautologies, if seen at close range. After it has become common usage to +call only heavy and tangible things bodies, it is an apodictical fact +that all bodies are heavy and tangible. If the conceptions of vapor, +water and ice are restricted by common usage and by science to the three +stages of aggregation of the same substance, then we need not wonder at +our firm assurance that the water will always remain fluid in all time +to come, also above the stars. This signifies nothing more than that we +conceive of the things as solid which we call solid, and of those as +fluid which we call fluid, but it does not change the fact that our +faculty of understanding or perceiving gives us only an approximate +picture of natural processes, in which the solid and the fluid are +neither wholly opposed nor different, but where the positive and the +negative gradually flow into one another. + +The philosophers produced a very good conception of understanding by +developing the concept of truth step by step and finally coming to quite +exact results. But this "quite exact" must only be accepted in a +reasonable sense, not in an extravagant one. Truth as the infinite, as +the sum total of all things and qualities, is "in itself" quite right, +but it cannot be accurately reproduced, not even by means of the mind, +of reason, or understanding. The means is smaller than the purpose, is +subordinate to purpose. So is our faculty of understanding only a +subordinate servant of truth, of the universe. The latter is absolutely +evident, true, indubitable, and positive. It does not vitiate the +sublimity of this world in the least that it is veiled by appearances, +by error, by untruth. On the contrary. Without sin there is no virtue, +and without error there is no understanding, no truth. The negative, the +weakness, the sin and error, are overcome, and thereby truth shines in +full splendor. The universe, the general truth, is a progressive thing. +It is absolute, but not at any fixed time or place, but only in the +combined unity of all time and space. + +It is sometimes said that this is too much for our intellect, that we +cannot understand this. It is true that we cannot squeeze this into any +of our categories, of our fundamental conceptions, unless we place the +category of illimited and indeterminable and infinite truth at the +beginning of them. If that is not quite clear and plain, it should +serve to teach us that the category of clear and plain human +understanding is destined to recognize its function as a subordinate +factor of nature. + +Such an understanding of understanding, such a higher consciousness +standing ever behind us, promotes a meek pride or a proud meekness which +is well distinguished from the mental poverty of theologians, from the +transcendental distinction between God and the world, between creator +and creature. To us the perishable soul is not a narrow-minded servant +for whom the plans of the imperishable monster soul are +incomprehensible. A philosophically educated and self-understanding mind +is a part of absolute nature. This mind is not only a limited human +mind, but the mind of the infinite eternal, omnipotent universe from +which it derived the faculty of knowing everything knowable. But when +this mind demands the ability to absolutely know everything, it demands +that knowledge should be everything, it becomes transcendental and +insolent, it misconceives the relation of science to infinity. The +latter is more than science, it is the object of science. + + + + +XV + +CONCLUSION + + +The philosopher Herbart declares: "If the meaning of a word were +determined by the use to which it is put by this or that person, then +the term _metaphysics_ would be ambiguous and scarcely comprehensible. +If one wishes to know what meaning of this term has been handed down to +us by tradition, he should read the ancient metaphysicians and their +followers, from Aristotle to Wolff and his school. It will then be found +that the concepts of being, of its quality, of cause and effect, of +space and time, have been the objects of this science everywhere ... +that it has been attempted to analyze them logically and that this has +led to all sorts of disputes. These disputes ... determined the concept +of metaphysics." + +Such a declaration is right enough to furnish, by the help of a little +criticism on our part, a sketch of the positive outcome of philosophy. + +Metaphysics has always been the principal part of philosophy. In the +first sentence of his "Handbook for the Elements of Philosophy," Herbart +defines philosophy as the "analysis of ideas." According to this, +metaphysics would have to analyze the special ideas of being, etc. Now +it must be remembered that the idea of being is not so much a special +concept as the general idea which comprises all ideas and all things. +Everything belongs to being, and to understand that is too much for +metaphysics. Hence it came into difficulties. Now our authority has just +explained to us that the concept of metaphysics was not so much +determined by the work it accomplished as by disputes. It did not work, +but only made the logical attempt to analyze the concept of being. In so +doing it led to disputes and did not distinguish itself very much as a +science. The latter, Kant has told us in his preface to his "Critique of +Pure Reason," is recognized by its agreements, not by its disputes. + +The metaphysical disputes were overcome by philosophic science, which is +the study of ideas or understanding, by arriving at a clear and plain +theory of understanding, the demonstration of which I have here +attempted. + +The faculty of understanding had been transmitted to us by our +superstitious ancestors as a thing of another world. But the illusion of +another world is a metaphysical one and led to disputes about the idea +of being. + +The positive outcome of philosophy assures us and demonstrates that +there is only one world, that this world is the essence of all being, +that there are many modes of being, but that they all belong to the same +common nature. Thus philosophy has unified the concept of being and +overcome metaphysics and its disputes. + +Universal being has only one quality, the natural one of general +existence. At the same time this quality is the essence of all special +qualities. Just as the concept of herbs includes all herbs, even weeds, +so the concept of being comprises not only that which is, but also that +which is not, which was once upon a time and which will be in the +future. + +To free the concept of being from its metaphysical disputes, is a very +difficult thing for those who attribute an extravagant meaning to the +first principle of logic which says: "Any subject can have only one of +two radically different predicates, because it cannot be at the same +time A and not-A." + +All previous science of understanding has really revolved around this +statement. It is based on something plausible, but still more on +misunderstanding. Only when we have become aware of what has finally +been the outcome of the science of understanding, only when this +statement is backed up by the positive product of philosophy, does this +stubbornly maintained and much contested statement receive a lasting +value by its just modification. + +In the first place, a "subject" is not a fixed, but a variable concept. +In the last analysis, as we have sufficiently explained in this work, +there is only one sole universal subject which is nowhere radically +different. + +The first principle of the old and tried Aristotlean logic tells us that +a man, a subject, who is lame cannot move about with alacrity. But I +have a friend who was totally lame and who today jumps about briskly; +there is no contradiction in this. But if I tell another man about my +lame friend and in the course of my story have this lame subject all of +a sudden jumping over chairs and tables, then such a thing is +_inconceivable_ and I contradict myself. Such a contradiction is a +violation of all logic, but not because agility and lameness are totally +different predicates which cannot be attributed to the same subject, nor +because the contradiction cannot exist. Being is full of contradictions, +but they are not simultaneous or without mediation. A logical speech or +story must not forget to mediate. By mediation, all contradictions are +solved. And this is the outcome of philosophy. + +In discordant metaphysics, being and not being are irreconcilable and +mutually exclusive contradictions. Metaphysics is in doubt whether this +common existence is real or only apparent, or whether there is not +somewhere in a heaven above the clouds an entirely different life. But +philosophy is now fully aware that even the most fictitious being is so +positively real that any negation which appearances may attribute to it +is outclassed by affirmation to the utter discomfiture of the former. +Being and its affirmation is absolute, negation and not being are only +relative. Being is everywhere and always dominant, so that there is no +non-existence. Though we may say that this or that is nothing, yet we +must remain conscious that anything we may call nothing is still +something very positive. There cannot be any ignorance which does not at +least know a little. There is no evil which cannot be transformed into +good. The things that have been, will be, and are, all of them are. +There is no non-existence. It is at least a word, though it does not +convey any meaning. The world and our language are of so positive a +character that even a meaningless word still means something. Nothing +cannot be expressed. + +The superstition of another "true" world which floats above this world +of phenomena or is secretly hidden behind it has so vitiated logic that +it is now difficult to remove the discordant metaphysical "concept of +being" from the human mind. The belief in something absolutely different +will not easily disappear. It is especially difficult to demonstrate +that conceived things are of the same nature as real things, that both +of them really belong to true nature. + +Conceived things are pictures, real pictures, pictures of reality. All +the limbs of an imaginary dragon are copied from nature. Such creations +of imagination are distinguished from truths only by their fanciful +composition. To connect nature and human life according to the given +order, that is the whole function of understanding. Knowing, thinking, +understanding, explaining, has not, and cannot have, any other function +but that of describing the processes of experience by division or +classification. The famous scientist Haeckel may call this +contemptuously "museum zoology" and "herbarium botany," but he simply +shows that he has not grasped the secret of the intellect, but still +wonders at it in a metaphysical way, the same as his predecessors. + +What Darwin ascertained about the "origin of species" and about the +transitions and evolutions in organic life is a very valuable expansion +of museum zoology. Whoever expects anything else from the nature of +intellectual faculties, shows that he is not familiar with the outcome +of philosophy, that he has not emancipated himself from the vain +wondering and its accompanying edification, which the wonder of human +intelligence caused to primitive ignorance. + +Understanding has hitherto been in error about itself and was, +therefore, inadequately equipped for the task of giving a true account +of its relatives, of the phenomena of nature and life. Nevertheless it +has acquired training in the course of culture and has progressively +accomplished better things. Its errors have never been valueless, and +its truths will never be sufficient. That this is so, is not due to the +defective condition of our intelligence, but to the inexhaustibleness of +being, the indescribable wealth of nature. + +The self-conscious, philosophically trained understanding and +intelligence has now the means of knowing that the accuracy of all +investigation is limited, that for this reason all its future results +will be affected by error. But a science which is backed up by such an +enlightened understanding, is reconciled to its limitations and +transforms them into a hall of glory. Self-conscious limitation is aware +of its partnership in the absolute perfection of the universe. + +The self-conscious intellect improved by the positive product of +philosophy knows that it can understand, describe, the whole world in a +natural, sensible way. There is nothing that can resist it. But in the +sense of a transcendental metaphysics, our understanding is not worthy +of that name. In return, this metaphysics is pure vagary in the eyes of +critical reason. + +Taking its departure from fantastical ideals, from contradictions, +especially between being and not being, metaphysics has gradually +transformed itself in the course of civilization and become philosophy, +which in its turn has progressed step by step the same as all other +science. + +Philosophy was at first impelled by the nebulous desire for universal +world wisdom and has finally assumed the form of a lucid special +investigation of the theory of understanding. + +This theory is part, and the most essential part at that, of psychology +or the science of the soul. Modern psychologists have at least divined, +if not recognized, that the human soul is not a metaphysical thing, but +a phenomenon. Like Professor Haeckel, they also complain about the dead +classification in their specialty. The human soul is presented to them +as a multitude of _faculties_. There is the faculty of understanding, of +feeling, of perceiving, etc., without number and end. But how is life +infused into them? Where is the consistent connection? + +There is, for instance, the conception and feeling of beauty in the +human soul. The beautiful again is divided into the artistically +beautiful and the ethically beautiful, and each of these into other +subdivisions. There is beside the beautiful also the pretty, the +charming, the graceful, the dignified, the noble, the solemn, the +splendid, the pathetic, the touching. Psychology also treats of the +ridiculous, of the joke, the wit, the satire, the irony, the humor, of a +thousand subtleties and distinctions, the ideological separation of +which it attempts just as do botany, zoology, and every other science in +their field. + +To all of them, being is the object of study. What is the use of +metaphysics under these circumstances? Only because it had in mind a +different being, a transcendental one, could it induce Kant to sum up +all his studies in the question: How is metaphysics possible as a +science? + +It is the merit of philosophy to have demonstrated that metaphysics is +possible only as fantastical speculation. + +It is the business of metaphysics to treat being transcendentally. It is +the business of special sciences to classify being after the manner of +herbarium botany. Classical order is already present in the vegetable +kingdom, otherwise no specialist in botany could classify it. + +But the objective arrangement of the vegetable kingdom in infinitely +more multiform than the subjective arrangement of botany. The latter is +always excellent, if it corresponds to the scientific progress of its +period. Whoever is looking for absolute botany or psychology, or for any +other absolute science, misunderstands the universally natural character +of the absolute as well as the relative special character of the human +faculty of understanding. + +Philosophy familiar with its historical achievement understands being as +the infinite material of life and science which is taken up by the +special sciences and classified by them. It teaches the specialists to +remember throughout all their classifications according to departments +and concepts that all specialties are connected by life and not so +separated in life as they are in science, but that they are flowing and +passing into one another. + +Thus our science of understanding finally culminates in the rule: Thou +shalt sharply divide and subdivide and farther subdivide to the utmost +the universal concept, the concept of the universe, but thou shalt be +backed up by the consciousness that this mental classification is a +formality by which man seeks for the sake of his information to register +and to place his experience; thou shalt furthermore remain aware of thy +liberty to progressively improve the experience acquired by thyself in +the course of time, by modifying thy classification. + +Things are ideas, ideas are names, and things, ideas, and names are +subject to continuous perfection. + +Stable motion and mobile stability constitute the reconciling +contradiction which enables us to reconcile all contradictions. + + +THE END + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Positive Outcome of Philosophy, by +Joseph Dietzgen + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY *** + +***** This file should be named 39964.txt or 39964.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/9/9/6/39964/ + +Produced by Odessa Paige Turner, Martin Pettit and the +Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net +(This file was produced from images generously made +available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at + www.gutenberg.org/license. + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at 809 +North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email +contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the +Foundation's web site and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/39964.zip b/39964.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..c26ee14 --- /dev/null +++ b/39964.zip |